14-2145 

Jara v. Lynch 

 BIA 

Straus, IJ 

A200 689 312

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 26th day of April, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: 

 DENNIS JACOBS, 

PETER W. HALL, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

 

ELIZABETH SAENZ JARA, AKA 

ELIZABETH CRISTINA SAENZ JARA, 

AKA ELIZABETH SAENZ, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 14-2145 

 NAC 

 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Robert C. Ross, West Haven, CT. 

 
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FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Assistant Attorney 

General; Francis W. Fraser, Senior 

Litigation Counsel; W. Daniel Shieh, 

Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington D.C. 

 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Elizabeth Saenz Jara, a native and citizen of Peru, 

seeks review of a May 20, 2014 decision of the BIA 

affirming the January 19, 2012, decision of an Immigration 

Judge (“IJ”), denying her application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief pursuant to the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Elizabeth Saenz 

Jara, No. A200 689 312 (B.I.A. May. 20, 2014), aff’g No. 

A200 689 312 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 19, 2012). We 

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 

and procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

both the decisions of the IJ and the BIA “for the sake of 

completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 

F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of 
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review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 

Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 

Absent past persecution, to establish an independent 

fear of persecution, an applicant must show that it is more 

likely than not that his or her “life or freedom would be 

threatened in [that] country because of [his or her] race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1); 

Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 

2004). An applicant is “‘not require[d] ... to provide 

evidence that he or she would be singled out individually 

for such persecution’” provided the applicant proves the 

existence of “‘a pattern or practice of persecution of a 

group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on 

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion,” and the 

applicant establishes her “inclusion in and identification 

with such group.’” Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 565 

(2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2)). 

The agency did not err in finding that Jara failed to 

meet her burden to show that she would more likely than not 

be persecuted in Peru on account of being homosexual. The 
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2010 U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices for Peru (“Human Rights Report”) stated 

that homosexuals were “sometimes harassed and abused” by 

government authorities, including police, and were subject 

to discrimination. However, the report also described 

various efforts being made to alleviate the problem. The 

agency did not err in giving more weight to the Human 

Rights Report—which did not show widespread mistreatment—

than various articles that gave inconsistent accounts of 

the level of discrimination and incidents involving 

homosexuals in Peru. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that a 

country report from the U.S. Department of State is 

“usually the best available source of information on 

country conditions” and that the weight of evidence “lies 

largely” within the agency’s discretion (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 

F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]here there are two 

permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice 

between them cannot be clearly erroneous”). 

 While the agency did not make an explicit credibility 

determination, we may deem this requirement satisfied if a 
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credibility finding can be gleaned from the record. Zaman 

v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding 

that “the IJ’s analysis in the present case was sufficient 

to qualify as an ‘explicit credibility finding’” even 

without a clear adverse credibility finding). Because 

there was no indication that Jara’s testimony had been 

called into question, and the agency considered her 

testimony about the treatment of homosexuals in Peru, we 

find the agency’s analysis sufficient to qualify as a 

finding that Jara was credible. See id. There is no 

indication here that the agency failed to consider Jara’s 

testimony or her documentary evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen, 

471 F.3d at 337 n.17 (presuming that the agency “has taken 

into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the 

record compellingly suggests otherwise”). 

Accordingly, because Jara failed to establish her 

eligibility for withholding of removal, she necessarily 

could not show, to qualify for CAT relief, that she would 

more likely than not be tortured, as that claim was based 
6

on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 

F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). 1 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending 

motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 

 1

 Jara has not challenged the agency’s denial of her 

asylum claim on timeliness and discretionary grounds.