Filed 5/11/21 P. v. Goodson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WALTER GOODSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

F079847

(Super. Ct. No. BF152669B)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael G. Bush, 

Judge.

Ross Thomas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Louis M. 

Vasquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P.J., Detjen, J. and Peña, J.
2.

Appellant Walter Goodson appeals after his petition for resentencing under Penal 

Code section 1170.95 was denied.1 Appellant argues the statute is ambiguous and should 

be construed to permit his resentencing and, additionally, raises equal protection concerns 

should he not be eligible. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2014, appellant was charged with one count of first degree murder, one count of 

attempted murder, one count of participating in a street gang, and one count of 

discharging a weapon from a vehicle, along with several enhancements. In 2015, 

appellant pleaded no contest to the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter and 

participating in a street gang, along with certain enhancements.

In 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95.

The trial court rejected this petition on the ground appellant was not eligible for relief. 

This appeal timely followed.

DISCUSSION 

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review issues of statutory construction de novo. (People v. Gonzales (2018) 6 

Cal.5th 44, 49.) Our goal is to determine the legislative intent of the statute. “Because 

the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first 

at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Alford v. 

Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1040.) When the statutory language is 

unambiguous, its plain meaning controls. Where the language supports more than 

one reasonable construction, we may look to extrinsic aids, including the legislative 

history, for additional guidance. (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105–1106.) 

Finally, in exceedingly rare situations, the literal meaning of the statutory language may 

be disregarded to avoid absurd results. (People v. Bell (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 315, 351.)

1 All further code references are to the Penal Code.
3.

Relevant to this case, section 1170.95, subdivision (a) provides: 

“(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable 

consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to 

have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining 

counts when all of the following conditions apply:

“(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that 

allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine.

“(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder 

following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be 

convicted for first degree or second degree murder.

“(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder 

because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”

Section 1170.95 Does Not Apply to Manslaughter Convictions 

Appellant raises two arguments for why one who was charged with murder, but 

was convicted of manslaughter, should remain eligible for resentencing under 

section 1170.95. First, appellant claims that the specific language of section 1170.95, 

subdivision (a), requiring one be convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural 

and probable consequences theory conflicts with the broader language of 

section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2) which requires one be sentenced for first or 

second degree murder or have accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the 

defendant could not be charged with murder under the new law, is ambiguous and results 

in absurdity if appellant is not eligible for resentencing. Second, appellant asserts he is 

entitled to the benefit of the law under the equal protection clause. We do not agree.

Section 1170.95 has been construed by several courts, including this one. (See 

People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 557; People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985

(Flores); People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428; People v. Paige (2020) 51 
4.

Cal.App.5th 194; People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914 (Sanchez); People v. 

Larios (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 956 (Larios).) These cases have considered and rejected 

arguments identical or substantially similar to those raised by appellant here.

For example, in Larios, this court considered whether section 1170.95 could apply 

to someone convicted of attempted murder. Concluding it could not, the court wrote:

“We agree with the reasoning of [People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087] 

and [People v. Munoz (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 738] that the relief provided in 

section 1170.95 is limited to certain murder convictions and excludes all other 

convictions, including a conviction for attempted murder. The language and the 

legislative history of section 1170.95 support this conclusion. And there is a rational 

basis for the Legislature’s decision to grant relief pursuant to section 1170.95 only to 

murder convictions and exclude attempted murder convictions based on judicial economy 

and the financial costs associated with reopening both final murder and final attempted 

murder convictions. In light of this unambiguous language, Larios is categorically 

excluded from seeking relief through the section 1170.95 petitioning procedure for his 

attempted murder convictions, which have long been final.” (Larios, supra, 42 

Cal.App.5th at p. 970.)

Similarly, in Flores, the court sought to “determine whether section 1170.95 

permits persons who were convicted of voluntary manslaughter to have their convictions 

vacated and to be resentenced.” (Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.) There, a 

similar argument based on section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2) was raised and rejected, 

with the court explaining the argument “places outsized importance on a single clause to 

the exclusion of the provision’s other language” which expressly limits eligibility to those 

convicted of murder. (Flores, at pp. 995–996.)

In Sanchez, another case involving one convicted of voluntary manslaughter, the 

court rejected an equal protection clause argument like that raised here. (Sanchez, supra, 

48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 920–921.) The court found both that those convicted of 
5.

manslaughter were not similarly situated to those convicted of murder, but that even if 

they were, a rational basis existed for treating the two groups differently for purposes of 

resentencing. (Ibid.) We agree with the court’s conclusion that “the Legislature could 

have reasonably concluded ‘that the punishment for voluntary manslaughter was 

appropriate, but the punishment for murder based on the [natural and probable 

consequences theory] could be excessive and reform was needed only there.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 921.)

Finally, in our independent review we have found no case reaching the opposite 

conclusion, that one not convicted of murder is eligible for resentencing under the 

statutory language. Upon consideration of the arguments raised and the language of the 

statute, we see no reason to depart from our conclusion in Larios that the statutory 

language limits eligibility to those convicted of murder. And we see no reason to break 

from those courts, like Sanchez, that concluded such line drawing does not violate equal 

protection principles. Based on these conclusions, appellant cannot make a prima facie 

showing of eligibility, as he is statutorily ineligible for relief. We thus affirm the trial 

court’s order denying appellant’s petition.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.