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SJC-12980

R.H. MANDEVILLE vs. ERIN GAFFNEY.1

Suffolk. February 3, 2021. - April 29, 2021.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 

& Georges, JJ.

Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief.

Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 

Court by the United States District Court for the District of 

Massachusetts.

Dana Alan Curhan for the petitioner.

Randall E. Ravitz, Assistant Attorney General, for the 

respondent.

CYPHER, J. After this court affirmed the petitioner R.H. 

Mandeville's convictions of murder in the first degree and armed 

assault with intent to murder in 1982, he filed a series of 

State and Federal court challenges to his convictions. In 2017, 

he filed his most recent Federal habeas petition, which the 

1 Superintendent, Old Colony Correctional Center.
2

respondent, the superintendent at the correctional facility in 

which Mandeville is held (superintendent), moved to dismiss as 

untimely under the one-year deadline set forth in the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

for filing a habeas petition in Federal court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1). Because the one-year deadline in the AEDPA is 

tolled while an application for postconviction or other 

collateral review is pending in State court, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2), whether the petition is untimely under the AEDPA

turns on whether motions for a new trial that were denied before 

Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 36 n.10 (2000), were 

subject to the time limitation announced therein, in which this 

court held that "[h]ereinafter . . . a gatekeeper petition 

pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, [must] be filed within thirty 

days of the denial of a motion for a new trial." Before Mains, 

there was not a time limitation on filing a gatekeeper petition. 

See G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Confronted with the application of Mains, a judge of the 

Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts 

certified the following question to this court:

"Does the thirty-day time limitation established by the 

Court in Mains for filing a gatekeeper petition under 

[G. L. c.] 278, § 33E, apply to denials that had occurred 

prior to December 13, 2000, so as to permit only gatekeeper 

petitions regarding those prior denials that were filed 

within thirty days of the publication of the Mains opinion, 
3

or do those pre-Mains denials continue to be not subject to 

any time limitation as under the prior practice?"

We answer that the thirty-day time limitation established in 

Mains does not apply to denials that occurred before 

December 13, 2000. Therefore, pre-Mains denials continue not to 

be subject to any time limitation, as under pre-Mains practice.

Background. 1. Legal framework. We begin with an 

overview of the legal framework to provide context for the

following discussion.

a. The AEDPA. The AEDPA established a one-year time limit 

to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the

Federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As relevant to the 

matter before us, the one-year time limit runs from the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for 

seeking such review in the State court.2 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The time limit is tolled while an application 

for postconviction review or other collateral review is pending 

in State court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). "[A] petition 

continues to be 'pending' during the period between one court's 

2 The one-year time limit runs from the latest of the 

conclusion of direct review in the State court; the removal of 

an unconstitutional impediment to filing an application; the 

recognition of a new right by the United States Supreme Court, 

asserted by a petitioner and retroactively applicable to cases 

on collateral review; or the date on which the factual predicate 

for the habeas claim or claims could have been discovered 

through the exercise of reasonable due diligence. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1).
4

decision and a timely request for further review by a higher 

court." Currie v. Matesanz, 281 F.3d 261, 266 (1st Cir. 2002), 

quoting Fernandez v. Sternes, 227 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 2000).

b. Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 and G. L. c. 278, § 33E. In 

Massachusetts, a defendant seeking postconviction review in a 

capital case after issuance of the rescript on direct review may 

file a motion for a new trial in the Superior Court under Mass. 

R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). To appeal 

from the denial of such a motion, a defendant must seek leave to 

pursue the appeal from a single justice of this court under 

G. L. c. 278, § 33E (gatekeeper provision). See Currie, 281 

F.3d at 263. The single justice must determine that the 

petition presents "a new and substantial question" for the 

defendant to be entitled to review by the full court. G. L. 

c. 278, § 33E. For purposes of the AEDPA time limitation, the 

denial of a gatekeeper petition constitutes "final resolution 

through [Massachusetts's] postconviction procedures." Drew v. 

MacEachern, 620 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2010), quoting Carey v. 

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002).

c. The Mains decision. General Laws c. 278, § 33E, does 

not contain a deadline for filing a gatekeeper petition after 

the denial of a motion for a new trial; however, in Mains, which 

was decided on December 13, 2000, this court imposed a deadline: 

"Hereinafter, in the interests of consistency and finality, we 
5

shall require that a gatekeeper petition pursuant to G. L. 

c. 278, § 33E, be filed within thirty days of the denial of a 

motion for a new trial." Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 n.10. This 

thirty-day deadline was imposed prospectively. See Weaver v. 

Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1028, 1029 (2002).

2. The petitioner. After trial in 1977, Mandeville was 

convicted of murder in the first degree and armed assault with 

intent to murder. Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 386 Mass. 393,

394, 407 (1982). This court affirmed his convictions on direct 

appellate review. Id. at 413.

Since his conviction was affirmed, Mandeville has filed 

multiple motions for a new trial, gatekeeper petitions, and 

habeas petitions, none of which has been successful.

In 2017, Mandeville filed his most recent motion for a new 

trial and gatekeeper petition, both of which were denied. In 

his gatekeeper petition, he noted that the 1982 and 1991 denials 

of his motions for a new trial were pending before the single 

justice. After his gatekeeper petition was denied, he filed 

another habeas petition. The superintendent moved to dismiss 

the habeas petition on the ground that it was not filed within

the AEDPA's one-year deadline. Mandeville opposed the motion, 

asserting that the Mains deadline applied only to the filing of 

a gatekeeper petition for denials of new trial motions after 

Mains. The superintendent argued that all gatekeeper petitions 
6

that could have been filed as of the date of the decision in 

Mains had to be filed within thirty days from December 13, 2000. 

Therefore, the superintendent maintained, a defendant with a 

pre-Mains denial had to file a gatekeeper petition by January 

12, 2001; otherwise, he or she would be foreclosed from doing so 

by Mains. As the judge noted, if the superintendent's view is 

correct, the time to file a habeas petition would have begun to 

run from January 13, 2001, and would have expired before 

Mandeville filed his petition in August 2017. Presented with 

the two differing interpretations of Mains, the judge certified 

the above question to this court, asking us to determine the 

application of the Mains time limitation to denials of motions 

for a new trial that occurred before December 13, 2000.

Discussion. Mandeville argues that the thirty-day time 

limitation established in Mains does not apply to pre-Mains

denials of motions for a new trial. He further asserts that 

such denials are not subject to any time limitation, absent a 

further decision from this court. The superintendent disagrees 

with Mandeville's interpretation of Mains. We conclude that the 

thirty-day time limitation established in Mains does not apply 

to denials that occurred before December 13, 2000.

As discussed supra, G. L. c. 278, § 33E, does not contain a 

time limit for filing a gatekeeper petition, but the court in

Mains imposed a thirty-day time limit, to be applied 
7

prospectively. Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 n.10. Since Mains, we 

have not addressed directly the applicability of the Mains rule 

to pre-Mains denials of motions for a new trial, but we did 

touch on the issue in Commonwealth v. Nassar, 454 Mass. 1008

(2009). In Nassar, we denied a petitioner's appeal from the 

denial of a gatekeeper petition filed in 2008, seeking review of 

a 1982 denial of a motion for a new trial. Id. at 1008-1009. 

In denying Nassar's gatekeeper petition, the single justice 

wrote:

"[Nassar] claims that, at the time [of the denial of his 

motion for a new trial in 1982], there was no time limit 

for appealing the denial of his motion for a new trial. 

. . . First, he is wrong. The appeal period always has 

been thirty days. Second, even if there were some 

ambiguity about the appeal period, the defendant's reliance 

on [Mains] is fatal. The Mains case was decided on 

December 13, 2000. Therefore, if Mains settled the issue, 

the defendant's application should have been filed within 

thirty days after December 13, 2000."

Commonwealth vs. Nassar, Supreme Judicial Court, No. SJ-2008-

0352 (Dec. 4, 2008).

The subsequent full court opinion, however, did not adopt the 

single justice's view that the appeal period always had been 

thirty days, nor did it apply the same reasoning regarding the 

application of Mains. The full court concluded that Nassar's 

appeal was barred by the rule that "the decision of the single 

justice, acting as a gatekeeper pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 

is 'final and unreviewable.'" Nassar, supra at 1009, quoting 

Commonwealth v. Herbert, 445 Mass. 1018, 1018 (2005), and 
8

Commonwealth v. Perez, 442 Mass. 1019, 1019 (2004). The court 

observed in a footnote that Nassar "[m]anifestly . . . did not 

file the instant gatekeeper petition within a reasonable time,"

noting that his "gatekeeper petition was filed more than twentyfive years after the 1982 denial, [and] more than seven years 

after we announced, albeit prospectively, that a gatekeeper 

petition must be filed within thirty days of the denial of a 

motion for a new trial." Id. at 1009 n.2. It therefore appears 

that the court did not view Nassar as being subject to the Mains

deadline.

Federal cases reflect the ambiguity. In Currie, 281 F.3d 

at 271, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 

noted that Mains created a thirty-day time limit, but that 

"finality concerns [that underlie AEDPA's statute of 

limitations] are limited to a relatively small subset of 

petitioners: Massachusetts [S]tate prisoners who were convicted 

of first degree murder and whose new trial motions had been 

denied, but not appealed, when the [Supreme Judicial Court]

imposed the new [thirty]-day limit in December, 2000." The 

court went on to note that "Massachusetts appears to have been 

alone -- at least within this Circuit -- in its decision to 

impose no time limit on a certain class of appeals from the 

denial of post-conviction relief." Id. at 271 n.12. In the 

nonprecedential ruling on Mandeville's earlier habeas 
9

application, the Federal District Court judge relied on Currie, 

writing that "because Mains only applies prospectively, motions 

for a new trial that were denied before the decision, but never 

appealed, are still governed by the rules of procedure as they 

existed beforehand –- and there was apparently no time limit 

whatsoever for filing a gatekeeper petition." Mandeville vs. 

Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. CV 14-12220-FDS, slip op. at 11 (D. 

Mass. July 23, 2015), citing Currie, supra at 271.

Moreover, although the superintendent is correct that Mains

discussed the interests of consistency and finality, Mains, 433 

Mass. at 36 n.10, those interests do not compel us to adopt the 

position that the Mains deadline applies to pre-Mains denials of 

motions for a new trial. Where, as here, there is legitimate 

disagreement regarding the application of a rule that would 

foreclose a specific class of defendants from seeking certain 

postconviction relief, finality and consistency interests do not 

always override the defendants' interest in their ability to 

seek postconviction relief.3 See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 481 

3 In addition, the superintendent supports this position 

with an analogy to statutes or judicial decisions providing for 

new or shortened time limits for civil claims. See, e.g., 

Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Grassi, 356 Mass. 1, 2-4 (1969) 

(court rule shortening time during which no action could be 

taken in pending suit before dismissal applied to suits already 

filed, but only if adequate notice was provided to litigants). 

The civil cases, however, do not mandate retroactive application 

of a new deadline.
10

Mass. 582, 596 (2019) ("finality principle remains fundamental 

to our system of justice, yet other well-settled principles 

regarding the effect of a conviction and the scope of the right 

to an appeal remind us that it is not altogether inviolable").

We also decline to impose a requirement that a gatekeeper 

petition must be filed within a specific time after the denial 

of a pre-Mains motion for a new trial. Because we conclude that 

Mandeville is not subject to Mains, we need not reach his 

argument that "the absence of fair notice that the thirty-day 

time limit may apply to decisions that predated Mains, 

extinguishing [his] right to pursue gatekeeper petitions on 

decisions that predated Mains, would violate his right to due

process."

Conclusion. We answer the reported question that the 

thirty-day time limitation established in Mains does not apply 

to denials that occurred before December 13, 2000.

The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of 

this opinion to the clerk of this court. The clerk in turn will 

transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of 

the United States District Court for the District of 

Massachusetts, as the answer to the question certified, and also 

will transmit a copy to each party.