In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-2945 

JEFFREY BRUNO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

CHASITY WELLS-ARMSTRONG, JAMES ELLEXSON,

and CITY OF KANKAKEE, ILLINOIS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois.

No. 2:20-cv-02052 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 19, 2023 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 23, 2024 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey Bruno, a veteran firefighter 

with the Kankakee Fire Department (KFD), suffered a severe 

cardiac event in September 2017. After he recuperated and returned to work, Mayor Chasity Wells-Armstrong promoted 

him to Deputy Chief. But in the summer of 2019, after Bruno 

had worked in that position for over a year, Wells-Armstrong 

denied him a raise and then presented him with an 
2 No. 22-2945 

employment contract that conditioned additional compensation on his enrollment in college courses. Bruno asked James 

Ellexson, the Human Resources Director for the City of 

Kankakee, to remove this education condition as an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act because 

his heart condition prevented him from attending classes. But

Ellexson refused. Bruno signed the contract nonetheless and 

retired soon thereafter.

Bruno then sued Wells-Armstrong, Ellexson, and the City 

of Kankakee, alleging, among other claims irrelevant on appeal, discrimination and retaliation under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12101 et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), 775 

ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Bruno’s discrimination claim fails 

because his request to waive the education condition was not 

a request for a reasonable accommodation and he has failed 

to show that the defendants’ reason for denying him a raise 

was pretextual. His retaliation claim fails because he did not 

engage in protected activity under the ADA. Thus, we affirm. 

I 

A 

Jeffrey Bruno, a firefighter with the KFD for over two decades, was a line captain in the summer of 2017. After the KFD 

Chief advised him that returning to college could improve his 

chances of being promoted to Assistant Chief, Bruno enrolled 

in college courses in August 2017. But in September 2017 he

suffered an aortic dissection which prevented him from continuing classes. 

After recovering, he returned to work in December 2017 

and applied to be Assistant Chief later that month. Despite 
No. 22-2945 3 

knowing that Bruno lacked a bachelor’s degree, in early 2018, 

Mayor Chasity Wells-Armstrong selected Bruno to be the Assistant Chief (the title was later changed to Deputy Chief)

over candidates with bachelor’s and master’s degrees. After 

his promotion, Bruno reenrolled in college courses for the 

2018 spring semester but did not continue beyond that semester because his doctor advised him to stop attending. 

Bruno worked as Deputy Chief for the entirety of 2018 

without a contract. In January 2019, Wells-Armstrong and Ellexson presented him with a contract covering February 6, 

2018, to April 30, 2019, that required him to enroll in college 

courses to keep his position. Bruno asked that the provision 

be removed. Ellexson agreed, and Bruno was permitted to remain Deputy Chief without enrolling if he obtained a doctor’s 

note excusing him from taking classes, which he did. 

Months later, in the summer of 2019, Wells-Armstrong decided to deny Bruno a raise because of his perceived insubordination—a failure to “separate from the ranks.” This 

stemmed from concerns that Bruno had leaked information 

from a confidential management discussion and criticized Ellexson’s management decisions to rank-and-file firefighters. 

In July 2019, Ellexson directed Bruno to cease speaking with 

a KFD firefighter who had sued the City for sex discrimination. But Bruno defied that directive and continued to speak 

with her. Ellexson and Wells-Armstrong believed that Bruno 

had shared information with the firefighter because her lawsuit included information known only to Ellexson, Bruno, and 

the KFD Chief. Bruno claimed he was unaware of any issue 

of trust until August 2019. But before that date, he had participated in a counseling session with Ellexson to discuss
4 No. 22-2945 

leadership and the expectations for the position which covered the importance of confidentiality. 

Though she decided to not give Bruno a raise, Wells-Armstrong (and Ellexson) still offered Bruno a new contract on 

July 31, 2019, covering May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020, that 

would entitle him to additional compensation if he returned 

to college. Bruno again requested that the education condition 

be removed as an accommodation under the ADA. This time, 

Ellexson refused to waive the provision, asserting that its removal was not a reasonable accommodation. Bruno signed 

the contract anyway, but soon after submitted his retirement 

paperwork and ceased his employment with the KFD. 

B 

Bruno sued Wells-Armstrong, Ellexson, and the City of 

Kankakee, raising a number of state and federal claims, including: (1) disability discrimination under the ADA, 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(a), and IHRA, 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A); (2) retaliation under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), and IHRA, 775 ILCS 

5/6-101(A); and (3) indemnification under Illinois law, only 

against the City, 745 ILCS 10/9-102. 

Bruno pursued two theories of disability discrimination: 

(1) failure to accommodate premised on the rejection of his request to waive the education condition; and (2) disparate 

treatment based on the decision to deny him a raise. See 

Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting 

that the ADA defines disability discrimination “to include 

disparate treatment and failure to accommodate”). In granting summary judgment for the defendants on the failure to 

accommodate theory, the district court focused on whether 

the defendants’ refusal to waive the education condition was 
No. 22-2945 5 

an adverse employment action. It observed that our cases 

have held that denial of a raise is an adverse employment action, but a denial of a bonus is not. It then concluded that because the pay bump was a bonus, the denial of the pay bump 

via the refusal to waive the education condition was not an 

adverse action and thereby could not serve as the basis for a 

failure to accommodate. But an adverse employment action is 

not required to prevail on a failure to accommodate theory. 

E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Nonetheless, Bruno’s failure to accommodate theory still fails 

because, as explained below, his request was not for a reasonable accommodation.

The court also rejected Bruno’s disparate treatment theory. The defendants conceded that their decision to not raise 

Bruno’s salary in the second contract was an adverse employment action that could support a claim of discrimination under a disparate treatment theory. But they argued that Bruno 

could not prevail because they had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision which he could not show was 

pretextual. The district court agreed and found for the defendants on Bruno’s ADA discrimination claim. 

Finally, the district court rejected Bruno’s retaliation claim 

because he did not engage in any activity protected by the 

ADA. And because his state law claims under the IHRA and 

for indemnification rise or fall with his ADA claims, the district court also granted judgment for the defendants on those 

claims. 

II

Bruno appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his ADA discrimination and retaliation claims, 
6 No. 22-2945 

identical IHRA claims, and claim for indemnification. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, 

viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the non-moving party. E.E.O.C. v. Charter Commc'ns, 

LLC, 75 F.4th 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2023). 

A 

Bruno first challenges the district court’s conclusion that 

the refusal to waive the education condition could not support recovery for failure to accommodate under the ADA. The

ADA bars discrimination against a qualified person “on the 

basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The failure to accommodate theory of recovery arises out of the language of 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5), which defines discrimination to include

“not making reasonable accommodations.” Recovery under a 

failure to accommodate theory requires proof that (1) the 

plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the 

defendant was aware of the plaintiff’s disability; and (3) the 

defendant failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s

disability. Scheidler, 914 F.3d at 541. A reasonable accommodation is a measure that enables the employee to “perform the 

essential functions of the employment position.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12111(8); see also Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 

F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2017) (Reasonable accommodation “is 

expressly limited to those measures that will enable the employee to work.”); Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of Admin., 

44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The duty of reasonable accommodation is satisfied when the employer does what is 

necessary to enable the disabled worker to work in reasonable 

comfort.”). 

An adverse employment action is not needed to prevail on 

a failure to accommodate theory. AutoZone, 630 F.3d at 638 
No. 22-2945 7 

n.1. Thus, the district court did not need to determine whether

the defendants’ refusal to waive the education condition was 

a denial of a bonus or a raise. That determination was only 

relevant to whether there was an adverse employment action

and thus irrelevant to the failure to accommodate inquiry. 

Bruno’s request to waive the education condition was not 

a request for a measure that would enable him to do his essential job functions and thus not a request for reasonable accommodation. Rather, it was just a request for an increase in 

pay that was not earned. The pay bump provision in the contract was structured as an if/then: “If the Deputy Fire Chief 

maintains enrollment in an accredited college program leading to the achievement of a Bachelor’s Degree, then the Employer will add a total of 2% ($2024.63) of annual salary to 

Deputy Fire Chief’s base sum per annum.” Bruno claims his

aortic dissection rendered him unable to satisfy the “if” condition because attending college courses would have worsened his health, and thus the condition should have been

waived. But the pay bump was not something Bruno was entitled to as of right just because he performed his essential job 

tasks. Bruno would have needed to go beyond his duties to 

obtain the pay bump. The defendants did not need to provide 

accommodations to allow Bruno to go beyond his essential 

job functions and thus attain the pay bump, let alone allow 

him to obtain the pay bump without satisfying the education 

condition. 

Our decision in Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 

1109 (7th Cir. 2001), reflects this point. There, we held that an 

employer who accommodated a disabled employee with a 

modified job position did not violate the ADA by failing to 

also provide that employee with higher wages because the job 
8 No. 22-2945 

responsibilities of that modified position did not entitle the 

employee to that higher wage. Id. at 1113, 1116. Here, because 

the pay bump did not depend on Bruno performing his essential duties, the defendants did not have to provide an accommodation that enabled him to obtain it because doing so 

would have been awarding him compensation he did not 

earn—that was not a measure that enabled Bruno to work. 

Moreover, while the waiver would have entitled Bruno to 

more compensation without him having to jeopardize his 

health, it would not have impacted his ability to perform his 

job. Bruno conceded multiple times that—so long as he did 

not have to attend classes—he could perform the essential duties of his position without undermining his health and 

stressed that he had been performing satisfactorily without 

the pay bump. Attending college was not a requirement of his 

job. Bruno’s request that he be compensated more for performing his essential duties because his health prevented him 

from attending and obtaining the pay bump was not a request 

for reasonable accommodation. 

B 

Bruno next argues that the district court erred in rejecting 

his disparate treatment theory premised on the defendants’ 

decision to deny him a raise—which they concede suffices as 

the adverse employment action needed for recovery under 

this theory. Because the parties proceeded under the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792 (1973), for disability discrimination claims, we do too. 

Under this approach, a plaintiff must first establish a prima 

facie case of discrimination by showing that he is a qualified 

person with a disability and suffered an adverse employment 

action because of his disability. See Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 
No. 22-2945 9 

424, 434 (7th Cir. 2022). If the prima facie case is made, the 

burden shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. If the employer 

meets its burden, the plaintiff must show that reason is pretextual. Id. In doing so, the plaintiff must demonstrate by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s reason is 

a lie. Id. at 435. It is insufficient to merely prove that the reason 

was unfair, unethical, or mistaken; rather, the plaintiff must 

show that the employer’s reason was not an honestly held belief. Id. at 435–36. 

Because the parties contest only the district court’s evaluation of pretext, we assume without deciding that Bruno established his prima facie case. The defendants’ stated reason 

for not raising Bruno’s salary is, in effect, that Bruno had been 

insubordinate. They assert he had failed to “separate from the 

ranks” because he undermined the Mayor and City leadership by, among other things, leaking confidential discussions 

with City leadership and criticizing City management decisions to rank-and-file firefighters. Bruno argues that this reason is pretextual because there is no written evidence of this 

failure to separate from the ranks and that he first heard of 

this specific concern during depositions in this litigation (and 

he notes that he had not heard of any trust issues the Mayor 

had until an August 2019 phone call with Ellexson). 

Bruno’s pretext argument is belied by the record and inadequate to show that the defendants’ reason for not raising 

his salary was insincere. True, there was no written evidence 

of the insubordination concern. But Bruno admitted that Ellexson believed he had leaked information from a confidential 

discussion and that he had a counseling session with Ellexson 

covering the importance of keeping such discussions 
10 No. 22-2945 

confidential that predated the choice to not raise his salary. 

He also conceded that he contravened Ellexson’s order to not 

speak with a KFD firefighter who had sued the City before he 

was presented with the second contract. Bruno effectively admits not only that he engaged in insubordination but also that

the defendants genuinely believed that he had done so; this 

dooms his claim of pretext. See Everroad v. Scott Truck Sys., 

Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2010). 

C 

We next turn to Bruno’s retaliation claim. To defeat summary judgment on a claim of retaliation under the ADA, a 

plaintiff must show: (1) statutorily protected activity; (2) an 

adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Trahanas 

v. Northwestern Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 856 (7th Cir. 2023). Protected activity under the ADA includes opposition to “any act 

or practice made unlawful by this chapter” or participating in 

“an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). In other words, the ADA protects from 

retaliation those who have “engaged in activities protected by 

the ADA,” Rowlands v. United Parcel Serv. - Fort Wayne, 901 

F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2018), not activities protected only by 

other antidiscrimination laws. 

On appeal, Bruno identifies as protected activity only his 

continued contact with a KFD firefighter who had filed sex 

discrimination claims against the City. He expressly disclaims 

reliance on his January and August 2019 requests that the education condition be removed as his protected activity. The

former firefighter did not raise any claims under the ADA, so 

Bruno’s meetings with the former firefighter could not have 

been protected activity under the ADA. Accordingly, the 
No. 22-2945 11 

district court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants on Bruno’s retaliation claim. 

D 

The parties agree that Bruno’s IHRA and indemnification 

claims rise or fall with his ADA claims. Tate v. Dart, 51 F.4th 

789, 793 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Illinois courts analyze IHRA claims 

under a framework that is practically indistinguishable from 

the ADA framework.”). And as to indemnification, because 

the City need only indemnify its employees if those employees are found liable, the indemnification claim fails if the employees are not liable. See Ybarra v. City of Chicago, 946 F.3d 

975, 981 (7th Cir. 2020). Therefore, because we conclude that

the district court properly granted summary judgment to the 

defendants on Bruno’s ADA claims, it also did not err in 

granting summary judgment for the defendants on Bruno’s 

IHRA claims for the same conduct and his indemnification 

claim against the City. 

AFFIRMED