J

- S28016

- 19
2019 PA Super 242

____________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KATRICE K. ST. ROSE

Appellant :
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1270 MDA 2018 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 24, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 21

- CR

- 0003747

- 2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2019

Katrice K. St. Rose appeals from the judgment of sentence following her
jury trial conviction for obtaining public welfare funds by misrepresentation
(“welfare fraud”) , 62 P.S. § 481(a)

. St. Rose argues the trial court erred in

instruct ing the jury as to the elements of the crime . We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following factual history:

On December 17, 2012, [St. Rose] had a face

- to

- face appointment with a county benefits eligibility specialist in order to apply for childcare assistance. At that time, she received information on her rights and responsibilities. The information i ncluded notification concerning her duty to report changes in her circumstances. The specialist emphasized that this duty obligated [St. Rose] to report, among other things, any chan ges in her hours of employment or employment status. On January 2, 2013, [St. Rose’s] childcare assistance was terminated because her status changed to unemployed.

In September of 2013, [St. Rose] began working at MedStaffers as a Home Health Aide [“HHA”]

. Her new employment allowed her to reapply for childcare assistance, which she did via a phone interview with the benefitsJ

- S28016

- 19

- 2

- eligibility specialist. Again, [St. Rose] was notified of her duty to report any changes in her employment. As part of the yearly ben efits renewal process, the eligibility specialist contacted [St. Rose] to update her benefits application on January 2, 2014. During that recertification call, the specialist reviewed the questions on the application. She specifically asked [St. Rose] if the employment information was correct. [St. Rose] confirme d that she was still working at MedStaffers as an HHA. She also confirmed the daycare provider that she was using for her childcare. As a result of the information, the specialist found that [S t. Rose] still qualified for childcare assistance. [St. Rose] continued to receive the childcare assistance for her MedStaffers job until she filed to reopen her cash benefits through the County Assistance Office around June of 2014. At that time, the elig ibility specialist realized that [St. Rose] was no longer working for her reported employer. When the specialist looked into [St. Rose’s] employment records at MedStaffers, she learned that [St. Rose] had been terminated from her position with the company on October 25, 2013, months prior to the 2014 recertification. At trial, the eligibility specialist testified about the benefits application process and her experiences with [St. Rose’s] case. The human resources director from MedStaffers also testified an d confirmed that [St. Rose] had been terminated from her employment on October 25, 2013. Additionally, the operator of the daycare that cared for [St. Rose’s] children testified that [St. Rose] continued to use the daycare after October 25, 2013. He provid ed the daycare’ s invoices for [St. Rose’s] three children from October 2013 through June 2014. He also testified that he had an independent recollection of [St. Rose’s ] children being at the daycare during that time. Trial Court Opinion, filed Nov. 13, 201 8, at 1

- 3 (footnotes and citations to
record omitted).
St. Rose requested the following instruction as to the elements of

welfare fraud:J

- S28016

- 19

- 3

- The defendant has been charged with welfare fraud. To find the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find that th e following ele ments have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that the defendant made a false statement or misrepresentation [or withheld information] [ 1 ]
, Second, that the information provided [or withheld] was material to that agency’ s determination in approving or disapproving a person for public assistance;

and
Third, that the defendant did so willfully

— that is, knowingly and with the intent to defraud the public assistance agency. Defendant’s Proposed Jury Instructions, filed Mar. 2 2, 2018, at Exh. A.

The trial court denied the request and issued the following instruction:

In order to find the D efendant guilty of this offense, the Commonwealth must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that she made a false statement or withheld information. Second, the false statement provided or information withheld was material to the agency’s determination in approving or disapproving a person for public assistance. Three, the D efendant provided the false informatio n or withheld the information willfully; i.e., she knew it was false at the time she made it or she knew the information withheld was material to the agency’s determ ination of her eligibility for public assistance.
N.T., 3/22/18, at 118

- 119.
The jury foun d St. Rose guilty of welfare fraud. In July 2018, the trial
court sentenced St. Rose to five years’ probation. St. Rose filed a timely Notice
of Appeal.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 The b racketed words were handwritten o n the proposed instruction.J

- S28016

- 19

- 4

-

St. Rose raises the following issue: “Did the instruction given by the trial
court to the jury regardi ng the charge of welfare fraud, 62 P.S. § 481,
inaccurately state the law such that it was prejudicial to the outcome of trial?”

St. Rose’s Br. at 5.
We review a challenge to a trial court’s decision as to jury instructions

for an abuse of discretion or e rror of law

. Commonwealth v. Galvin , 985
A.2d 783, 798

- 99 (Pa. 2009). “[Our] key inquiry is whether the instruction on
a particular issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents the law to the
jury, and is sufficient to guide the jury in its deliberations.” Commonwealth

v. Cannavo , 199 A.3d 1282, 1286 (Pa.Super. 201 8 ) (q uoting

Commonwealth v. Hamilton , 766 A.2d 874, 878 (Pa.Super. 2001) )
(alteration in original)

.
Welfare fraud is defined as:

(a) Any person who, either prior to, or at the time of, or subsequent to the application for assistance, by means of a wilfully false statement or misrepresentation, or by impersonation or by wilfully failing to disclose a material fact regarding eligibility or other fraudulent means, secures, or attempts to secure, or aids or abets or attempts to aid or abet any person in securing assistance, or Federal food stamps, commits a crime which shall be graded as provided in subsection (b).
62 P.S. § 481 (a)

. Under this statute, a person is guilty of welfare fraud if, (1)
before, during, or after applying for assistance, (2) the person mak es a
willfully false statement or misrepresentation, uses impersonation, willfully
fails to disclose a material fact regarding eligibility, or uses other fraudulentJ

- S28016

- 19

- 5

-

means, and (3) the person secures or attempts to secure assistance , or aids,
abets, or atte mpts to aid or abet any person in securing assistance.

The Human Services Code does not define “willfully.” The Crimes Code

defines “willfulness” as: “ A requirement that an offense be committed willfully
is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respe ct to the material elements of
the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears. ” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 302(g). “Knowingly” is defined as:

(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element in volves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.

Id. at § 302(b)(2).
St. Rose contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury by
defining “willfully in a way that obscured the mens rea requirement that a
defendant act with the object of committing a fraud.” St. Rose’s Br. at 14. She
maintains the trial court failed to require that the jury find St. Rose willfully
used fraudulent means to secure or attempt to secure assistance. St. Rose
analogizes the welfare fraud statute to other statutes, such as insurance fraud
and worker’s compensation fraud , claiming that, similar to the other fraud
statutes, the welfare fraud statute requires an intent to defraud. She
concludes that the “jury should have been instructed that the CommonwealthJ

- S28016

- 19

- 6

-

must prove beyond a reasonab le doubt that [St. Rose] act[ed] willfully with
the intent to defraud the government.” Id. at 18.

St. Rose relies on two separate statutes

— the insurance fraud statute
and the worker’s compensation fraud statute

— arguing that because the

standard instructions for crimes committed under those statute s state that the
jury must find the defendant had an intent to defraud, a jury must also find

the defendant had an intent to defraud to find a defendant guilty of welfare

fraud

. The statute defining in surance fraud provides, in part:

A person commits an offense if the person does any of the following: (1) Knowingly and with the intent to defraud a State or local government agency files, presents or causes to be filed with or presented to the government age ncy a document that contains false, incomplete or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to the agency’s determination in approving or disapproving a motor vehicle insurance rate filing, a motor vehicle insurance transaction or other motor vehicle insurance action which is required or filed in response to an agency’s request.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4117(a)(1) (emphasis added)

. Similarly, the Worker’s
Compensation Statute provide s that a person commits insurance fraud, in
part, as follows:

A pe rson, including, but not limited to, the employer, the employe, the health care provider, the attorney, the insurer, the State Workmen's Insurance Fund and self

- insureds, commits an offense if the person does any of the following: (1) Knowingly and with the in tent to defraud a State or local government agency files, presents or causes to be filed with or presented to the government agency a documentJ

- S28016

- 19

- 7

- that contains false, incomplete or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to the agency’s d etermination in approving or disapproving a workers’ compensation insurance rate filing, a workers’ compensation transaction or other workers' compensation insurance action which is required or filed in response to an agency’s request.
77 P.S. § 1039.2(1) (emphasis added)

. T he Standard Jury Instruction for both

insurance fraud and worker’s compensation fraud include that the
Commonwealth must prove that “the defendant did so knowingly and with

intent to defraud.” Pa. SS J I (Crim) §§ 15.4117A , 15.4117B

. For e xample, the

standard instruction for insurance fraud includes:

First , that the defendant presented or caused to be presented to a state or local government agency any document that contained false, incomplete, or misleading information;

Second , that the information provided was material to that agency’s determination in approving or disapproving a motor vehicle insurance rate filing, a motor vehicle insurance transaction, or other motor vehicle insurance action that is required or filed in response to an agency’s request. Material information means information the agency would regularly rely on in making its official determinations or findings;

Third , that the defendant did so knowingly and with the intent to defraud.

P a. SSJ I (Crim) § 15. 4117(a)(1).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when i t instructed the jury as
to the elements for welfare fraud. As required under the statute, the trial court
instructed the jury that, to convict St. Rose, the jury had to conclude that the

Commonwealth had establish ed beyond a reasonable doubt that St. Rose

made a false statement or withheld information ; that the false statementJ

- S28016

- 19

- 8

-

provided or information withheld was material to the agency’s decision to
approve or disapprove a request for public assistance; an d that St. Rose
“provided the false statement or withheld inf ormation willfully,” that is, “ she

knew it was false at the time that she made i t or she knew the information
withheld was material to the agency’s determination of her eligibility for public

ass istance.” N.T., 3/22/18, at 118

- 19. ; 62 P.S. § 481(a)

. Unlike the statutes cited by St. Rose as statutes analogous to the welfare

fraud statute , the welfare fraud statute does not include in the text of the
statute that, to be convicted, a defendant had to act with an “intent to

defraud.” Rather, to sustain a conviction, the statute requires that (1) before,
during, or after applying for assistan ce, (2) the person make a false stat ement
or misrepresentation, use impersonation, willfully fail to disclose a material

fac t regarding eligibility, or use other fraudulent m eans, and (3) the person
secure or attempt to secure assistance or aid , abe t, or attempt to aid or abet
any person in securing assistance. See 62 P.S. § 481 (a)

. Here , the trial court
accurately conveyed these requirements. It required that the jury find that
the defendant made a false statement or failed to disclose information, that
the false statement or withheld information was material, and that the

defendant acted willfully, that is, knew t he information was false or knew that
the information withheld was material to the agency’s determination as to
eligibility for benefits.

J udgment of sentence affirmed.J

- S28016

- 19

- 9

-

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 08/14/2019