alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AT MARCH 31, 1998 (UNAUDITED) AND THE CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 (UNAUDITED) 
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           1,587
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   19,385
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (840)
<INVENTORY>                                     20,097
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                43,592
<PP&E>                                          21,587
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (7,981)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  61,598
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           19,856
<BONDS>                                          5,637
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            59
<OTHER-SE>                                      32,506
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    61,598
<SALES>                                         35,914
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                38,497
<CGS>                                           25,909
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   28,959
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0<F1>
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 319
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    267
<INCOME-TAX>                                        99
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                168
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       168
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .03
<FN>
<F1>PROVISION FOR DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS AND INVENTORY PROVISION INCLUDED IN TOTAL
COSTS.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
583 A.2d 324

#### WILLIAM MURPHY AND MARY MURPHY, ETC. v. INA/AETNA, ETC.

February 20, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
EXHIBIT
32.1



CERTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO

SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In
connection with the Annual Report of Exeo Entertainment, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended November
30, 2019, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert S. Amaral,
as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The
    Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The
    information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
    of the Company.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|By:    | /s/
    Robert S. Amaral                                                                                                                       | Dated: | March
    16, 2020
|------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------------------
|       | Robert
    S. Amaral                                                                                                                           |        |                   
|Title: | Chief
                                         Executive Officer
        (Principal
        Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer)



This
certification is being furnished to the SEC as an exhibit to the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company
for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.



A
signed copy of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided by the
Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Gus Lewy & Co. v. Julius Karger.

(No. 1941.)

Appeal from Colorado County.

Kennon & Townsend, counsel for appellants.

Foard & Thompson, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Will-son, J.

§ 109. *Venue of suit; contract with reference to, construed; case stated.*Lewy & Co. instituted this suit against Karger, appellee, in the county court of Colorado county, to recover an alleged indebtedness of $851.68. Karger, being a resident of Austin county, pleaded in due form his privilege to be sued in the said county of his residence. His plea was sustained, and appellants’ suit was dismissed. It is shown by plaintiffs’ pleadings that at the time Karger contracted the indebtedness sued for, he executed to plaintiffs a written contract, wherein, among other stipulations, are the following: 1. That said indebtedness should be paid at plaintiffs’ office in Galveston, Texas. 2. That the attorney of said Karger should be authorized to *“*appear in open court, at any time, and *in any court having jurisdiction of the*amount,” and waive process and confess judgment upon said indebtedness or any portion thereof. 3. That an attachment might be sued out by plaintiffs upon said indebtedness, *139or any part thereof, in *“any court or courts having jurisdiction of the amount or amounts sued for.”*4. That all claims which the said Karger might prefer by reason of any attachment sued out should be asserted by him “in the court or courts *whence such attachment issued,*or in the courts of Galveston county, Texas, and not elsewhere.” *Held:*The question presented for decision involves the construction of the above stated stipulations iu the written contract. In' the absence of any written contract as to the venue of the suit, the defendant was entitled to be sued in the county of his residence. But he might waive such right, and he has expressly and unequivocally done so in the contract referred to. It is clear and beyond dispute that by the terms of the contract the suit could have been maintained in Galveston county. But it is not in express terms stipulated in the contract that suit might be maintained for said indebtedness in any other county than Galveston. When, however, the several stipulations above referred to are considered hnd construed together, we are of the opinion that the intention of the parties to the contract was, that plaintiffs should have the right to sue for said indebtedness not only in Galveston county, and in the county of defendant’s residence, but in any county in the state. We can place no other reasonable construction upon the contract. We hold that the court erred in sustaining the defendant’s plea of privilege. '

February 17, 1886.

Reversed and remanded.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         188,800
<SECURITIES>                                     9,150
<RECEIVABLES>                                   28,806
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     23,290
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               277,485
<PP&E>                                          59,895
<DEPRECIATION>                                  35,263
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 331,860
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           55,287
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       207,420
<OTHER-SE>                                    (18,079)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   331,860
<SALES>                                         87,317
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                87,317
<CGS>                                           41,014
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   41,014
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                32,257
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 14,320
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,296
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,164
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,164
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .27
        

</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00406-CV

R. WAYNE JOHNSON APPELLANT

V.

STEPHEN MARSH APPELLEE 

----------

FROM THE 158TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant, who has been determined to be a vexatious litigant subject to a 

pre-filing order under section 11.101(a) of the civil practice and remedies code,2

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2

We take judicial notice of the list maintained by the Office of Court 

Administration at http://www.txcourts.gov/oca/vexatiouslitigants.asp. See Merritt 

v. Davis, No. 05-13-00819-CV, 2013 WL 4459024, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

Aug. 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Douglas v. Am. Title Co., 196 S.W.3d 876, 

878 n.2 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
2

is attempting to appeal from a trial court order dismissing his suit for failure to 

obtain a pre-filing order from the local administrative judge. Tex. Civ. Prac. & 

Rem. Code Ann. § 11.101(a) (West Supp. 2013). Likewise, appellant has failed 

to obtain a pre-filing order before filing this appeal, despite our January 13, 2014 

notice giving him ten days to obtain such an order or face dismissal. See id.

§ 11.103(a) (West Supp. 2013).

Section 11.103(a) of the civil practice and remedies code provides that “a 

clerk of a court may not file a litigation, original proceeding, appeal, or other claim 

presented, pro se, by a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order under 

Section 11.101 unless the litigant obtains an order from the appropriate local 

administrative judge . . . permitting the filing.” Id. Appellant failed to obtain a prefiling order from the local administrative judge before filing this appeal; he also 

failed to obtain such an order after notice from this court. Accordingly, we 

dismiss the appeal. See id.; Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c); In re Johnson, No. 03-14-

00006-CV, 2014 WL 411763, at *1 (Tex. App.––Austin Jan. 31, 2014, orig. 

proceeding) (mem. op.); Kastner v. Fulco, No. 01-13-00100-CV, 2013 WL 

6157392, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 2013, no pet.) (mem. 

op.); Merritt v. Davis, No. 05-13-00819-CV, 2013 WL 4459024, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Aug. 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Minnfee v. Currietu, No. 13-13-00246-

CV, 2013 WL 2949348, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 13, 2013, no pet.)

(mem. op.); Scott v. Morgan, Nos. 14-12-00268-CV, 14-12-00269-CV, 2013 WL 

2149805, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 16, 2013, no pet.) (mem. 
3

op.); Minnfee v. Williams, No. 09-12-00328-CV, 2012 WL 4713721, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont Oct. 4, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.

DELIVERED: March 13, 2014
<PAGE>
EXHIBIT 11.1
 
                         VARI-LITE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
 
                     COMPUTATION OF INCOME PER COMMON SHARE
 
                FOR THE YEARS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 AND 1998
                        (IN THOUSANDS EXCEPT SHARE DATA)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                             1997        1998
                                                                                          ----------  ----------
<S>                                                                                       <C>         <C>
Income (loss) before extraordinary loss and cumulative effect of accounting change......  $    4,329  $   (2,690)
Net income (loss).......................................................................  $    4,329  $   (3,622)
Weighted average shares outstanding.....................................................   5,799,328   7,712,332
Dilutive effect of stock warrants after application of treasury stock method............      19,473      --
Shares used in calculating diluted income per share.....................................   5,818,801   7,712,332
Basic income (loss) per share before extraordinary loss and cumulative effect of change
  in accounting principle...............................................................  $     0.75  $    (0.35)
Diluted income (loss) per share before extraordinary loss and cumulative effect of
  change in accounting principle........................................................  $     0.74  $    (0.35)
Basic net income (loss) per share.......................................................  $     0.75  $    (0.47)
Diluted net income (loss) per share.....................................................  $     0.74  $    (0.47)
</TABLE>
583 A.2d 298

#### ROSS GIGLIOTTI v. JOEL MARMAR, M.D.

January 10, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
763 A.2d 358

#### OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, v. Robert McANDREW, Jr., Respondent.

No. 635 Disciplinary Docket No. 3.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 17, 2000.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2000, there having been filed with this Court by Robert McAndrew, Jr., his verified Statement of Resignation dated October 11, 2000, stating that he desires to resign from the Bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in accordance with the provisions of Rule 215, Pa.R.D.E., it is

ORDERED that the resignation of Robert McAndrew, Jr., be and it is hereby accepted and he is DISBARRED ON CONSENT from the Bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and it is further ORDERED that he shall comply with the provisions of Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E. Respondent shall pay costs, if any, to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 208(g), Pa.R.D.E.
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection with the quarterly report of Rockport Healthcare Group, Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended December 31, 2003 as filed with
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Harry  M.  Neer,  Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company, certify,
pursuant  to  18  U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  that  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

(2)  The  information  contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Harry M. Neer
--------------------------------
Harry M. Neer,
Chief Executive Officer and President
February 17, 2004


     A  signed  original  of  this written statement required by Section 906 has
been  provided  to  Rockport  Healthcare  Group,  Inc.  and  will be retained by
Rockport  Healthcare  Group,  Inc.  and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission  or  its  staff  upon  request.


<PAGE>
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 93 (Thursday, June 8, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5742]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                       VACATION OF SPECIAL ORDER

  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to vacate my special 
order of today for 5 minutes.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  

                          ____________________
```
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 93 (Thursday, June 8, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5736]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

     DISPENSING WITH CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS ON WEDNESDAY NEXT

  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in 
order under the Calendar Wednesday rule be dispensed with on Wednesday 
next.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.

                          ____________________
```
No. 11,941.

#### Dunkle et al. v. Nichols.

Pleading.— *Written Instrument.*— Reference *to Copy of Instrument.*— A pleading containing tlie statement, “ The said note is in the words and figures-following, to wit (here insert ‘Exhibit A,’ which is filed herewith and made a part hereof,) ” refers with reasonable certainty to the copy of the note filed with the pleading.

Promissory *Note.*— Demand.—It is not necessary to aver or prove a de*474mand for payment of a promissory note, designating the time of payment thus: “ On or before December 25th, 1881, after date, I promise to pay to the order of Mary Nichols five hundred and twenty-five dollars.”

Filed April 25, 1885.

From the Montgomery Circuit Court.

*J. M. Thompson, W. B. Herod*and *W. H. Thompson,*for appellants.

*E. C. Snyder,*for appellee.

Elliott, J.

The reference to the promissory note upon which the complaint is founded is not made in the most appropriate method, but it is nevertheless so made as to identify the instrument and incorporate it into the complaint. The reference is thus made: “ That said note is in the words and figures following, to wit (here insert ‘ Exhibit A/ which is filed herewith and made a part hereof).” It appears with reasonable certainty that the note is filed as an exhibit and is the one upon which the complaint is based.' This is sufficient. *Friddle*v. *Crane,*68 Ind. 583; *Carper*v. *Kitt,*71 Ind. *24; Wall*v. *Galvin,*80 Ind. 447.

It is not necessary to aver and prove a demand for payment of a note, designating the time of payment in these words: “On or before December 25th, 1881, after date, I promise to pay to the order of Mary Nichols five hundred and twenty-five dollars.”

Judgment affirmed.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 88 (Thursday, May 25, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5588]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

 DISPENSING WITH CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1995

  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in 
order under the Calendar Wednesday rule be dispensed with on Wednesday, 
June 7, 1995.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  

                          ____________________
```
<PAGE>




                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Land O'Lakes, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-K/A for the year ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2004 (the "Report"), I, John E. Gherty,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date:  August 16, 2004
                                                     By  /s/ John E. Gherty
                                                         -----------------------
                                                         John E. Gherty
                                                         President
                                                         and Chief Executive
                                                         Officer
Exhibit 10.81  AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO SEVERANCE AGREEMENT  This
Amendment No. 2 (this Amendment), dated as of January 12,
2009, amends that certain Severance Agreement (the Agreement) entered
into on June 25, 2008, by and between Force Protection, Inc., a Nevada
corporation (the Company), and Charles Mathis (the Executive).  WHEREAS, in
order to correct a scriveners error in the language in Section 5 of the
Agreement, the Company and the Executive desire to enter into this Amendment to
amend certain provisions of the Agreement.  NOW, THEREFORE,
for and in consideration of the promises and the mutual covenants and
agreements in the Agreement and herein, the Company and the Executive hereby
agree as follows:  1.Capitalized Terms. 
Capitalized terms that are not defined in this Amendment shall have the
meanings ascribed thereto in the Agreement.  2.Section 5 of the Agreement is amended in
its entirety to read as follows:  5.Payments Upon Non-Qualifying
Termination of Employment.If the Executives employment with the
Company shall terminate by reason of a Nonqualifying Termination, then the
Company shall pay to the Executive (or the Executives beneficiary or estate)
within thirty (30) days following the Date of Termination, a lump-sum cash
amount equal to the Accrued Amounts (other than the amount described in Section 3(a)(ii) if
the Executive is terminated by the Company for Cause) and provide the Other
Benefits.  3.Counterparts.  This
Amendment may be executed (including by facsimile transmission confirmed
promptly thereafter by actual delivery of executed counterparts) in
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original and all of which
together shall constitute one and the same instrument.  4.Governing Law.  This
Amendment shall be governed by, and construed and enforced in accordance with,
the internal laws of the State of South Carolina without regard to the
principle of conflicts of laws.  5.Headings.  Section headings
are for convenience only and shall not be considered a part of this Amendment.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and the Executive have caused this Amendment No. 2 to
be executed, effective as of the date first
written above.   FORCE PROTECTION, INC.By:
  /s/ Lenna Ruth MacdonaldName: Lenna Ruth MacdonaldTitle: Chief Strategy
  Officer, General Counsel & Corporate SecretaryEXECUTIVEBy:
  /s/ Charles MathisName: Charles MathisTitle: Chief Financial Officer