[Cite as State v. Harris, 2012-Ohio-10.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 96566 

STATE OF OHIO 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

MICHAEL HARRIS

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-534091 

BEFORE: Jones, P.J., S. Gallagher, J., and Keough, J. 

 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 5, 2012 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Britta M. Barthol 

P.O. Box 218 

Northfield, Ohio 44067

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Margaret A. Troia 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

LARRY A. JONES, P.J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael Harris, appeals his conviction for burglary. 

We affirm. 

{¶ 2} In 2010, Harris was charged with two counts of burglary and one count of 

theft. One count of burglary was accompanied by a notice of prior conviction. Harris 

was charged along with Quentin Willis, who pled guilty to one count of burglary and was 

sentenced to one year in prison. 

{¶ 3} Harris’s matter proceeded to a jury trial, at which the following pertinent 
evidence was presented. 

{¶ 4} Mary Thomas, an analyst at the Cleveland Clinic, was at work on 

September 23, 2009, when she received a phone call from her sister. Her sister, who 

lived next door to Thomas, informed Thomas that her condominium had been broken 

into. Thomas went home and saw that her living room window was smashed. She 

went inside, called police, and found that her two televisions, a computer, printer, and 

DVR player had been taken. She also found that a media player, camera, jewelry, and 

coins were missing. She testified that the value of the stolen items was over $5000. 

{¶ 5} The responding police officer, Herman Dotson, observed a broken living 

room window and a screen lying on the ground. Detective John Riedthaler of the 

Cleveland Police Crime Scene Unit noted the same. The detective processed the scene 

and recovered a total of ten latent prints. The detective located the prints on the 

interior pane of the broken window, on the ground outside of the condominium, inside the 

home, and on the exterior of the window. He did not photograph the scene. 

{¶ 6} Felicia Simington of the Crime Scene Unit testified as a fingerprint expert. 

Simington analyzed the prints and determined that three of the ten prints belonged to 

Harris. The prints that belonged to Harris were located on the interior and the exterior 

of the window. The other prints belonged to Quentin Willis. 

{¶ 7} Willis testified that he pled guilty to burglary and agreed to testify truthfully 

against Harris. He detailed his past criminal history. He testified that on September 

23, 2009, he was at home when he received a phone call from Harris. Harris told him 
that someone named “D” lived by Thomas and knew there was money in her home. 

Harris asked Willis if he wanted to break into the house and Willis agreed. 

{¶ 8} Harris picked Willis up, D was sitting in the back seat. D directed Willis 

and Harris to the Thomas home. Willis testified that Harris pulled past Thomas’s house 

and let D and Willis out of the car. Harris then parked the car. The three males went 

up to Thomas’s living room window. D gave Willis a screwdriver. Willis broke the 

window and started pulling out pieces of glass. Harris helped Willis pull out the glass 

while D served as a lookout. 

{¶ 9} Willis testified that Harris’s hand went through the window to pull out 

glass. Harris then left to get the car, but did not return. Willis crawled through the 

window and unlocked the front door for D. Willis and D carried the items out of the 

home. Willis later sold the items. 

{¶ 10} Later that day, Willis saw Harris and asked him why he did not return to 

help them take the items out of the house. Willis testified that Harris “wanted some of 

the things,” but he did not give Harris anything “[be]cause he wasn’t there when we — 

when I took the things — when I got D and * * * took the things from the house.” 

Willis reiterated that Harris was present when he broke the window and helped him 

remove pieces of glass. 

{¶ 11} The jury convicted Harris of the two burglary charges, but acquitted him of 

theft. The trial court merged the two counts of burglary and sentenced him to eight 

years in prison. 
{¶ 12} Harris appeals, raising the following assignment of error for our review: 

{¶ 13} “I. The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of burglary.” 

{¶ 14} In his sole assignment of error, Harris contends that his convictions are not 

supported by sufficient evidence. The test for sufficiency requires a determination of 

whether the prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, Cuyahoga 

App. No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶12. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing 

the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State 

v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 942, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 15} Harris was found guilty of burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A), which 

provides that “[n]o person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the following: 

“(1) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately 

occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person other than an 

accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the structure or in 

the separately secured or separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal 

offense; 

“(2) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately 

occupied portion of an occupied structure that is a permanent or temporary 

habitation of any person when any person other than an accomplice of the offender 

is present or likely to be present, with purpose to commit in the habitation any 

criminal offense; 

“ * * *.” 

{¶ 16} The state proceeded under a theory of complicity, pursuant to R.C. 2923.02, 

which provides that “[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the 
commission of an offense, shall * * * (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the 

offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to 

commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an 

innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense.” 

{¶ 17} Harris argues that there is insufficient evidence that he committed burglary. 

 We disagree. 

{¶ 18} Willis testified Harris initially contacted him to tell him about Thomas’s 

condo and ask Willis if he wanted to participate in the burglary. Harris picked him up 

and drove Willis and D to Thomas’s house. Harris dropped the two men off near the 

condo, then parked his car and returned to the condo. After Willis broke a window in 

Thomas’s living room, Harris assisted him by helping taking pieces of glass out of the 

window. Willis testified that Harris put his hand through the window when taking out 

pieces of the glass and Harris’s fingerprint was found on the interior of the window. 

Harris then went to get the car, but did not return. 

{¶ 19} This court has held that “[i]n proving the element of unlawful entry in the 

criminal prosecution of [a] defendant upon a charge of burglary, proof of the insertion of 

any part of defendant’s body is sufficient to constitute an entrance.” (Emphasis added.) 

State v. Rudolph, Cuyahoga App. No. 92085, 2009-Ohio-5818, ¶18, citing State v. 

Cuthbertson (June 1, 1976), Hamilton App. No. C-75362. Thus, Harris’s act of putting 

his hand through Thomas’s window constituted the trespass necessary for the burglary. 

{¶ 20} Harris claims that the state failed to present evidence that Harris took a 
“substantial step” toward the commission of the burglary because he voluntarily 

abandoned his efforts to participate in the crime. Harris cites the attempt statute, R.C. 

2923.02, to support his argument that he did not attempt to commit the burglary. But 

Harris was not charged with attempt; thus, Harris’s argument that he abandoned the crime 

under the meaning of R.C. 2923.02(D) has no merit.1

 

{¶ 21} During trial Harris set forth the affirmative defense of termination pursuant 

to R.C. 2923.03(E), which provides that it “is an affirmative defense to a charge under 

this section that, prior to the commission of or attempt to commit the offense, the actor 

terminated his complicity, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary 

renunciation of his criminal purpose.” To prove termination, Harris would have to show 

that he manifested a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. 

{¶ 22} When questioned by the state if Harris ever told Willis that he was no 

longer going to participate in the burglary, Willis responded, “No.” Again, Willis 

testified that Harris helped him remove some of the glass from the window and told 

Willis he was going to get the car and would be right back. Willis testified that Harris’s 

car was parked “about 10 minutes” from the condominium, but he only remained at 

Thomas’s condo for five to seven minutes after Harris left. When Willis saw Harris 

later that day, Harris told him that he wanted some of the stolen property, but Willis 

refused. In light of the above, there is insufficient evidence that Harris terminated his 

 

1

R.C. 2923.02(D) provides for an affirmative defense for an attempt if “the actor abandoned the actor’s effort to 

commit the offense or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and 

voluntary renunciation of the actor’s criminal purpose.” Id. 
participation in the burglary. 

{¶ 23} The state set forth evidence that Harris planned the burglary, drove the 

parties to the scene, and actively participated in the burglary. Therefore, the state 

presented sufficient evidence as to each of the elements of the burglary offenses. 

{¶ 24} The sole assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR