NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CECILIA ORNELAS; VINCENT ORNELAS,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v.
DP INVESTMENTS; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 19

- 56071

D.C. No. 2:19

- cv

- 03035

- R

- AGR

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 10, 2020 * * Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and M. WATSON, ** * District Judge.

Plaintiffs Cecilia and Vincent Ornelas appeal from the district court’s

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Michael H. Watson, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, si tting by designation. 

# FILED

AUG 12 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

dismissal of their claims against the City of Goleta (“Goleta”) under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the court’s order dismissing their state

- law claims

against DP Investments, Dario Pini, and DLP Management Co. (“DP Defendants”)

after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. We review an order granting

a motion to dismiss under Rul e 12(b)(6) de novo

. Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc. , 913

F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019)

. We review a district court’s decision about whether

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state

- law claims for abuse of discretion.

Bryant v. Adventist Health Sy s./W ., 289 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm

both of the district court’s orders.

1. Plaintiffs’ sole federal claim is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Goleta

for an alleged violation of their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. As the

basis of the federal claim, Plaintiffs allege that Goleta fail ed to evaluate whether

Plaintiffs were entitled to relocation benefits under California law

. See Cal. Healt h

& Safety Code §§ 17975
, 17980. 6

. Plaintiffs also assert state law claims premised

on the same allegation. W e need not wade deep into Plaintiffs’ Due Process claim

since i t is based entirely on an alleged deprivation of state statutory benefits that are

not available to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs contend that they were entitled to, but improperly denied, statutory

relocation benefits after the c ity sent a letter to their landlord alleging a zoning

- law

violation and ordering that Plaintiffs’ residence be immediately vacated as an3

u npermitted , second residential unit

. But the plain language of the California statute
is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims. It explicitly provides that tenants are eligible for

relocation benefits only when t he violation at issue is “ of such a nature that the
immediate health and safety of the residents is endangered.” Cal. Health & Safety

Code § 17975. Here, the violation had nothing to do with the health and safety of

the residents. Goleta ordered that th e unit be vacated because it was zoned for use

as a single

- dwelling home but had been divided into two separate residential units

without the requisite permits. Plaintiffs offer no California case interpreting § 17975

to allow relocation benefits for an order to vacate of the type at issue here

. And we

will not adopt a novel reading of state law that conflicts with the plain language of

the statute. 1 Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed all of Plaintiffs’

claim s against Goleta for fail ure to state a claim.

2. Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ sole federal

- law claim at an early stage of

the litigation, the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state

- law claims against DP Defendants. See Carnegie

Mellon Univ

. v. Cohill , 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (when “all federal

- law claims

1 Plaintiffs argue that because state law authorizes the city to issue a vacation order only in cases where the health and safety of the residents is endangered
, the city’s order must necessarily mean that the violation giving rise to the order implicated their health and safety. We disagree. There are no factual allegation s that Plaintiffs’ health and safety was actually endangered, and the city’s letter references only a technical zoning violation.4

are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent

jurisdiction doctrine

—

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity

— will

[usual ly] point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state

- law
claims”)

.
AFFIRMED.