NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC,

Appellant

v.

GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL,

Appellee

______________________ 

2023-1675

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

91274194.

______________________ 

Decided: December 5, 2023

______________________ 

J. SCOTT GERIEN, Dickenson Peatman & Fogarty, 

Napa, CA, for appellant. Also represented by JOY L.

DURAND. 

 JEFFREY H. GREGER, Hauptman Ham, LLP, Alexandria, VA, for appellee. 

 ______________________ 

Before DYK, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Case: 23-1675 Document: 31 Page: 1 Filed: 12/05/2023
JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC v.

GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL

2

Jackson Family Farms, LLC (“opposer”) appeals from 

a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) decision 

dismissing its opposition to a trademark application filed 

by Grands Domaines Du Littoral (“applicant”). The Board

determined that as a matter of law there is no likelihood of 

confusion between applicant’s mark and opposer’s mark. 

We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Grands Domaines Du Littoral filed a trademark application (No. 90184859) pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) to 

register the following mark: 

The mark was sought to be registered for “wines made from 

grapes from Côtes de Provence in accordance with adapted 

standards” in International Class 33. J.A. 1. 

Jackson Family Farm filed a notice of opposition. It 

pleaded that it owned the registration for the “standard 

character mark VÉRITÉ in connection with ‘alcoholic beverages except beers’ in International Class 33 and prior 

common law rights in the same mark for wine.” J.A. 2 (citation omitted). It opposed the registration on “the sole 

Case: 23-1675 Document: 31 Page: 2 Filed: 12/05/2023
JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC v.

GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL

3

ground of likelihood of confusion” between applicant’s 

mark and opposer’s mark. J.A. 2. 

Applicant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing there is no likelihood of confusion because the marks 

are not confusingly similar. The Board considered that applicant had conceded that the other DuPont factors of relatedness (articulated in In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & 

Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)) favored opposer 

and analyzed whether “based on the single factor of dissimilarity of the marks, [o]pposer cannot prevail as a matter of 

law, even if all of the other [DuPont] factors weigh in favor 

of [o]pposer.” J.A. 4. 

The Board considered that “the marks share the identical term VÉRITÉ.” J.A. 6. However, the Board determined that in opposer’s mark this term stood alone. In 

applicant’s mark it was part of a three-word phrase— 

VÉRITÉ DU TERROIR—and was just one of twenty-two 

words in the applicant’s mark. The Board concluded that

CHATEAU LA GORDONNE is the dominant part of applicant’s mark because those words are displayed in a larger 

font and in a different color. The Board also noted that the 

additional “design elements of [a]pplicant’s mark, in combination with the larger wording CHATEAU LA 

GORDONNE, result[] in a mark which is ‘visually readily 

distinguishable from’ [o]pposer’s mark.” J.A. 7 (citation 

omitted). Based on these determinations, the Board concluded there was “no genuine dispute of material fact that 

the marks at issue are distinct in appearance,” J.A. 6, and 

this alone demonstrated that “a likelihood of confusion cannot exist as a matter of law,” even when considering all 

other DuPont factors to weigh in the opposer’s favor, J.A. 

8. 

Opposer appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(4)(B). 

Case: 23-1675 Document: 31 Page: 3 Filed: 12/05/2023
JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC v.

GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL

4

DISCUSSION

“Likelihood of confusion is a question of law based on 

underlying factual findings regarding the DuPont factors.” 

Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 

2023). We review the Board’s decision to dismiss the opposition as a matter of law de novo. Id.

I 

Opposer first argues that the marks standing alone are 

not sufficiently dissimilar to show that there can be no likelihood of confusion as a matter of law. “The first DuPont

factor requires consideration of ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, 

sound, connotation and commercial impression.’” In re 

I.AM.Symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 

(quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “The proper test is not 

a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead 

‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of 

their commercial impression’ such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection 

between the parties.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Leading Jewelers Guild, Inc. v. LJOW Holdings, LLC, 82 

U.S.P.Q.2d 1901, 1905 (T.T.A.B. 2007)). 

Opposer argues that the Board erred in determining 

that the marks are dissimilar, or that there are at least 

material issues of fact as to the degree of their dissimilarity. Opposer contends that the marks are in fact similar 

because the “VÉRITÉ mark appears as the first term of 

[a]pplicant’s three-word mark VÉRITÉ DU TERROIR” and 

VÉRITÉ is therefore the dominant portion of applicant’s 

mark. Appellant Br. 13. Opposer further argues that sixteen of the twenty-two words on the label have been disclaimed and are entitled to less weight in the likelihood of 

confusion analysis. We agree with the Board. 

Opposer’s focus on the word “VÉRITÉ” ignores other, 

more prominent portions of applicant’s mark and does not 

Case: 23-1675 Document: 31 Page: 4 Filed: 12/05/2023
JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC v.

GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL

5

consider applicant’s mark as a whole. The Board did not 

err in determining that CHATEAU LA GORDONNE, not 

VÉRITÉ, is the dominant part of applicant’s mark. As the 

Board explained, CHATEAU LA GORDONNE is displayed 

in a larger font and different coloring relative to other elements of the label. Therefore, the Board did not err in attributing greater weight to the dominant CHATEAU LA 

GORDONNE portion of applicant’s mark when analyzing 

the similarities of the two marks. 

Opposer argues that CHATEAU LA GORDONNE is a 

house mark and VÉRITÉ DU TERROIR is “its own unitary 

composite product name,” and that the presence of the 

CHATEAU LA GORDONNE portion does not avoid confusion as a matter of law because both marks contain the 

term VÉRITÉ. Appellant Br. 15–16. In other words, consumers would perceive CHATEAU LA GORDONNE as a 

house mark and would ignore it in comparing the use of the 

term VÉRITÉ in the two marks. Even if this were the correct approach to the treatment of house marks, which we 

do not decide, there is no support for the notion that 

CHATEAU LA GORDONNE is a house mark that can be 

stripped out for likelihood of confusion purposes. The 

Board was correct to consider the presence of CHATEAU 

LA GORDONNE and the fact that it is the dominant portion of the mark. 

Opposer also cites cases finding similarity between 

marks when one mark entirely encompasses the other. But 

those cases involved situations in which the only differences between the marks was the addition of a few words

to the dominant portion of the mark, see, e.g., Stone Lion 

Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1319 

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (comparing “STONE LION CAPITAL” to 

“LION CAPITAL”); In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 

1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding likelihood of confusion between “JOSE GASPAR GOLD” and “GASPAR’S ALE” because “GASPAR” and “GASPAR’S” were the dominant 

features of the two marks and the commercial impression 

of the additional words were discounted), whereas here the 

Case: 23-1675 Document: 31 Page: 5 Filed: 12/05/2023
JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC v.

GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL

6

difference in marks includes the addition of over twenty 

words, some of which are more prominently displayed than 

VÉRITÉ. The Board’s conclusion that the marks are dissimilar was not erroneous. 

Opposer finally argues that disclaimed words in the 

mark should not be given consideration. While opposer is 

correct that those elements may receive less weight in considering the similarity of the marks, they cannot be ignored, see In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305

(Fed. Cir. 2018), and opposer concedes that GORDONNE 

was not disclaimed. 

II

Opposer argues that the Board erred in not properly 

weighing all of the other DuPont factors against the dissimilarity of the marks, particularly the fame of opposer’s 

mark. We disagree.

There is nothing inherently improper about making a 

likelihood of confusion determination solely based on dissimilarity of the marks at the pleading stage. See Ava Enters. Inc. v. P.A.C. Trading Grp., Inc., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1659 

(T.T.A.B. 2008). “[O]ne DuPont factor may be dispositive 

in a likelihood of confusion analysis, especially when that 

single factor is the dissimilarity of the marks.” Champagne 

Louis Roederer, S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373, 

1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on 

Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:79 (5th ed. 2023) 

(“It is possible that the first [DuPont] factor, the similarity 

or dissimilarity of the marks themselves, may be dispositive of the issue.”). We agree with the Board’s conclusion 

that a likelihood of confusion between the marks could not 

exist as a matter of law, even when taking all of the other 

DuPont factors to weigh in favor of opposer. 

AFFIRMED 

 

Case: 23-1675 Document: 31 Page: 6 Filed: 12/05/2023