Ta~A7a-rORNEY GENERAL 0~T~s-w AUSTIN XI.TEXAR September 5, 1957

Honorable Henry Wade CriminalDistrict Attorney 'DallasCounty Dallas, Texas Opinion No. WW-254
Re: Location of Juvenile Court in and for Dallas County, Texas, createdby House Bill No. 940, Acts 55th Legislature,Regular Session, Chapter 511, at Dear Mr. Wade: page 1490.

Your request for an opinion, dated August 13, 1957, submits the following question for our consideration:

"Whetherthe CommissionersCourtmust provide a court room and quarters for the newly created Juvenile Court in the Dallas County Court House, or whether itmay provide the only court room for that court in the Juvenile Home on Harry Hines Boulevard".
Your letter states that the proposed location on Harry Hines Boulevard iswithin the present corporate limits of the City of Dallas, but outside the limits of the "townof Dallas" at the time the latterwas designatedas the county seat of Dallas County. You further advise that the Juvenile Court of Dallas County,heretofore createdpursuant to Article 2338-1 of Vernon's Civil Statutes, sits at the proposed site on Harry Hines Boulevard. The right of this court to be so locatedwas upheld by the Supreme Court of Texas in the case of cox V. wood, 152 Tex. 283, 256 S.W.2d 841.

Section 18 of Article 2338-1provides for the location of Juvenile Courts created thereunder in the following language: "Sessionsof the court shallbe held as the Judge shall from time to time determine. Suitable quarters shallbe provided by the Commissioners Court of each county for the hearing of cases andHonorable Henry Wade, Page 2 (WW-254)

for the use of the judge, the probation officer and other employees of the court."
In Cox v. Wood, supra, the Supreme Courtupheld the right of the Dallas County Juvenile Court to be located and hold court sessionsat the site on Harry Hines Boulevard here in question. It was urged before the Court that under Section 7 of ArticleV of the Constitutionof Texas, the district courtswere confined, In the holding of court to the places now provided in the courthouse in the City of Dallas as the county seat of Dallas County,as said city existed at the time It was designated as the county seat of Dallas County. That provision of the Constitution specifiesthat the District Court "shall conduct itsproceedings at the county seat of the county inwhich the case is pending, except as otherwise provided by law."

Itwas furtherurged that the Legislaturehad made no exceptionwith reference to the place that sessions of the court could be held, In reply to this argument groundedupon the foregoing constitutionalprovision, the Supreme Court held that the Juvenile Courtwas not a "DistrictCourt"within the meaning of this constitutionalprovision "but is a special court created Q statute". The Court then said:

0

. . .What difference can it make that the site of the Juvenile Home and its courtroom is not within the bounds of the 'townof Dallas' of a century ago when it admittedly is within the present limits of the City of Dallas?" The Court further said: ,I

. . . It is undoubtedly the public policy of this state to protect the dependent or delinquent child, at the most critical time of his life, from the impressionshe would inevitably get 'fromthe oldmethod of handlingminors'. Most certainly that policy would not be served by the application of an inflexiblerule that the Juvenile Court of Dallas County,because it is presided over by a district judge, can function only in the courthouseor within the limits of the Town of Dallas as set in 1846. o a .We seeno need to write further."
Our primary concern is the applicability of the Court'sholding in the Cox case to the new Juvenile Court of - Dallas County createdby House Bill 940. With reference toHonorable Henry Wade, Page 3 (~~-254)

where the new court shall House Bill 940 provides: hold its session, Section 11 of

"The said Juvenile Court and Court of Domestic Relations shallbe courts of record, shall sit and hold court at the county seat of Dallas County,

. *

. (Emphasisadded) The answer to the question submittedhingesupon the constructionof the underscoredportion of the above section, Since the court is of statutoryorigin, the right of the Legislature to prescribe the sitewhere the court shall hold its sessions is unquestioned.

The term 'county seat"was defined by the Supreme Court of Texas in the case of Turner, et al v. Tucker, et al, 

### 113Tex. 

### 434, 258 S.W. 149, as follows:

"Inthe light of our Constitutionsand statutes, it seems to us not to admit of any reasonable doubt that the words 'countyseat',as used in section 2 of article 9, of the Constitution,mean the place where the courthouse is situated,where the county offices are kept, and where the district and county courts for the county are held.

. . . "Wegive the words 'countyseat'their ordinary signification. The Century Dictionarydefines the 'countyseat' to be: "'The seat of government of a county, the town inwhich the county and other courts are held, and where the county officersperform their functions'."
At the time House Bill No. 940 was enacted, the site were on Harry Hines Boulevardwas a place where county offices kept and also a place where the existing Juvenile Court of Dallas Countyheld its sessions. Itmust be presumed that the Legislaturewas aware of these factswhen House Bill 940 was enacted, since itmay be presumed that the Legislature "knew", "had inmind", or "was familiarwith" the "lawof the land", also prior decisions of the courts - at least those of last resort -pertaining to the subjectmatter. Itmay also be presumed that the Legislatureknew facts of common notoriety in the State, as well as any circumstancesor conditions affecting or relating to the particular enactment. 39 Tex. Jur. 

### 248and the cases there cited.._*

. .

Honorable Henry Wade, Page 4 (WW-254)

The designation of the town of Dallas as the county seat of Dallas Countywas firstmade by a specialAct of the Legislature,passed April 18, 1846. This Act is set forth in Volume II of Sayles'Early Laws of Texas at page 36, and is shownas Article 1633, reading as follows:

II

. .until otherwiseprovided by law, the town of-Dallas shallbe the seat of justice for Dallas county,and all the courts for said county shallbe held thereat."
As statedby your letter, the town of Dallas at the time of its designa.bion as the county seat of Dallas County was unincorporated and had no fixed boundaries, or if It can be said that there were fixedboundaries, suchboundaries cannot now be determinedwith any degree-of accuracy. In Rails v. Parrish, 105 Tex. 253, 147 S.W. 564, the Supreme Court held that:

!f

. . . Where a town is duly incorporated, it is embracedwithin definitemetes and bounds and without respect to an aggregation of inhabited houses,but, where it is an unincorporated town, its area is defined to be and to embrace the aggregation of inhabitantsand the collectionof occupied dwellings and other buildings constituting such town.
. . . II it is proper to say that the situs of an unincorporated town will not be controlledby the platted area of such town without reference to the collectionof inhabitedhouses,which together with the area appurtenant to same in the ordinary significationof f;he meaning of the word constitute the town.
. . . If the term "county seat"as used in House Bill 940 is to be construedas embracing only that area includedwithin the limits of the town of Dallas at the time the latterwas designated as the county seat,the metes and bounds of the included area, in view of the foregoing rule, would doubtless be a matter of considerable conjecture.

In seeking to resolve the question submittedwe have carefully considereda number of cases from other jurisdictions which hold in substancethat when a city or town is selected as the county seat, the boundaries of such Citg OP town, as they then exist, become the boundaries of the county seat, and subsequent inclusion of more territory,does not remove theHonorable Henry Wade, Page 

### 5 (WW-254),

county seat. Notable among such cases are: Marengo Countyv. Matkin, 

### 32 So. 669 (Ala. Supp., 1902);Way v. Fox, 80 N.W. mowa Supp., 1899); State ex rel Kellog, Attorney General, v. Board of County Commissionersof Atchison County, 24 Pac. 8

### 7 Kan.
A relaxation of the rigid rule announced in the foregoing cases is evident in the more recent cases of Jordan

, 221 P.2d 977 (Calir. (Ore. 1912x amath County Court, 

### 126 Pac. 

### 6 Supp., Each of the foregoing cases sustainedthe right of the county to'erect a courthouse on a site outside the original limits of t&e town or city designated as the county seat. located,was "at" In holding that the courthouse,as so the county seat of Visalia, the Court in the Jordan case said:

"Theprimary idea in the word 'at'is 'nearness' or 'proximity',and it is commonlyused as the equivalent of 'near'or 'about'.

. . .' The questionwith which we are here concerneddoes not involve the removal of the county seat of Dallas County. The only question involved is the right of a special court createdby statute to sit at a place outside the limits of the town of Dallas as that city existed 107 years ago. Our opinion is necessarily confined to the meaning of the phrase "at the county seat of Dallas County"as used in House Bill 940. The question,as we view it, is one of legislative intent. The meaning ascribed to the phrase by the courtswhen used in other contexts or other statutory or constitutionalprovisions is an aid to be considered,but same cannotbe given conclusiveeffect.

A cardinalrule of statutory construction is that an act shouldbe given a fair, rational, reasonable, and sensible construction,considering its languageand subjectmatter and with a view to accomplishing the legislative intent and purpose. 39 Tex. Jur. 172 and the cases there cited.

On the question of reasonable construction,the Supreme Court in the Cox case, su ra, saw no "goodreason to apply to it (theJuveze Court P-the ancient rule that in general-run-of-the-milllitigation the district courts of Dallas Countymust function in the courthouse of Dallas County or within that limitedportion of the citywhich was in existencewhen the 'townof Dallas'was designated as the county seat 107years ago." In view of all the circumstances, we think that if the Legislaturehad intended to preclude the new Juvenile Court from sittingat the locationwhere theHonorableHenry Wade, Page 

### 6 (~~-254)

existing courtwas then sitting,the languageused in expressing such intentwould have left no room for doubt or question. This seemsparticularly true in view of the fact that the location of the existing court had been the subject of both controversy and litigation.

You are accordingly advised that it is our opinion that the Juvenile Court created forDallas Countyby House Bill 940, may legally sit and hold court at the Juvenile Home on Harry Hines Boulevard, the latterbeing locatedwithin the present corporate limits of the City of Dallas. This conclusion apparently coincideswith your own sinceyour letter states that a contrary result would be based upon "aharsh and technical construction" House Bill 940. of the languageused in Section 11 of

In accordancewith your usual practice, you have submittedan exhaustivebrief in connectionwith your request, which was prepared by Mr. Broyles. Your outstanding cooperation in this respect is of immenseassistance to this office and we thank you most sincerely.
SUMMARY The Juvenile Court created for Dallas County by House Bill 940, Acts of the 55th Legislature, Regular Session, Chapter 511,page 1490,may legally sit and hold court at the Juvenile Home on Harry Hines Boulevard, said sitebeing within the present corporate limits of the City of Dallas. Yours very truly, WILL WILSON Attorney General of Texas

LP:jl APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE: George P. Blackburn, Chairman James H. Rogers Arthur Sandlin Wallace Finfrock JAY r Leonard Passmore Assistant

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: James N. Ludlum