No. 88-219
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE?OF MONTANA 1988

IN RE THEMARRIAGE OF VICKIE LYNN LARSON, Petitionerand Respondent, and
LONNIE EINAR LARSON, Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable ThomasHonzel,Judgepresiding.
COUNSELOF RECORD:
ForAppell-ant: Lonnie E. Larson,pro se,Helena,Montana
For Respondent: Dowling Law Firm;ThomasF. Dowl-ing,Helena,Montana

Submitted onBriefs: Aug. 26, 1988 Decided: October 31, 1988

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# -- 2Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Lonnie Einar Larson, acting without counsel, appeals from the judgment of marital dissolution, property settlement,and child support entered by the District Court, First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, in the dissolution of his marriage from Vickie Lynn Larson. We affirm the District Court judgment on all counts and remand the case to the District Court for determination of proper attorney fees to be awarded respondenton appeal. Lonnie and Vickie Larson were married on November 10, 1983. No children were born of the marriage but Vickie is the mother of a girl whowillbe 16years old on December 26, 1988. During the course of the marriage, Lonnie adopted the girl onMarch 15, 1984. The decree ofmarital dissolutionwas entered on January 26, 1988. The District Court divided the marital property and ordered Lonnie to pay Vickie $185 per month as child support for the minor girl, to terminatewhen she reaches the age of 18,marries, or is otherwise emancipated. Husband was awarded reasonable rights ofvisitation,andwifewas awarded sole custody. In this case, husband has discharged two attorneys during the course of the civil action, and on appeal, represents himself. His objections on appeal against the judgment are not well articulated. His brief does not include a statement of the issues for review, as required by Rule 23(a)(2), M.R.App.Civ.P. Because he iswithout counsel,
we are not insisting on the formal clarity ordinarily reserved for briefs filed by lawyers. In our examination of his contentions, we find him objecting principally to the

### division of the marital estate, and to the award of child support. We look first at the marital property division. The DistrictCourt awarded the wife the following: (a) A 1986 HondaAccord (b) Her public employment retirement system benefits, her deferred compensation ($918) and an IRA account

($2,000) (c) All personal property presently in her possession with theexceptionof theAshleywall unit, 2

### brass endtables and two lamps The District Court award of marital property to the husband included: (a)" 

### A 1985Honda Prelude (b) His public employment retirement system benefits, his deferred compensation (not spelled out in the findings,but from the transcript, in excess of $5,000) and his IRA'S ($4,000)

(c) Personalproperty presently in his possession plus the Ashley wall unit, 2 brass end-tables and two lamps The court provided each of the parties would be responsible for debts incurred by him or her after the date of separation. Husband was charged with paying the balance owing on the Mastercard bill (notspecified)and the loan at the State Capital EmployeesCredit Union. In his brief, husband argues that he brought into the marriage assets of $52,118.75 or 97% as compared with the wife's $1,025.00 or 3% 

### of the marital assets. During the
course of theirmarriage, they bought a home and sold it and applied the profits to pay outstanding bills and to pay for the two automobiles. Husband also had other property which
was sold during themarriage. Some of the personal property apparently had 

### been used by him forbusinesspurposes.

### Husband's brief does not suggest in what way the division of the property by the District Court should be revised or modified by us. From the modest amount of personal property divided and the apparent effort of the District Court to make certain that each of the parties had
an automobile, the retirement benefits owned by each through their employments, and their own personal property, one can find little or no basis 

### to state that the District Court abused its discretion in dividing the personal property, regardless of which party brought the greater amount of property into the marriage. In Brown v. Brown (1978), 179 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361, we stated that the standard for reviewinga property division inamarital dissolution decree is that the apportionmentmade will stand unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion as manifested by a substantially inequitable division of the marital assets resulting in substantial injustice. We have followed that standard fairly consistently. Applying that standard of review to this case,we find a complete lack ofany reason to
reverse or modify the District Court's division of the maritalproperty. With regard to child support, the District Court determined that the husband should pay the wife $185 per month as child support for the minor girl. Husband

### 's 

### principal objection to thepayment of the child support seems to be that the wife induced him to adopt the minor child, knowing that she would eventually seek a divorce from him. In thisway,husband implieshe was "fraudulently" led intoa support duty for the minor child. Nothing in the transcript supports this innuendo. Under § 

### 40-8-125,MCA, after a final decree of adoption is entered, the relation of parent and child, and all the rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parentexists between the adopted child and the adoptive parent. A marital dissolution action is no place for a collateral attack upon an adoption. When a final child support award is attacked on appeal, the standard of review iswhether an abuse of discretion has occurred which results in substantial injustice. Brown v. Brown, supra; In Re Marriage of Benner (1985)

## , 711 P.2d 802, 42 St.Rep. 1943. The task of the District Court in this case to determine the amount of the husband's net income available for child supportwasmade difficultby the deductions that thehusband took fordeferred compensationand a creditunion. The court noted, for example, that his pay slip for the two-week pay period, ending November 20, 1987, showed a net income for that period of only $135.76, and a year-to-date income of $2,382.14. Yet hisyear-to-date gross income for thatperiod
was $14,559.00 and his gross income for the two-week period
was $614.00. It appears that husband had deducted a considerable amount for deferred compensation and the credit union. He also had extramoney withheld for his taxes. The court found that the amount ofhispaycheck wasmisleading in helping in any determination of net income available for child support. The courtdid take into considerationvarious factors and determined that husband had available for purposes of child supportan income of $865.00 per month from his employment from the StateofMontana. He had in addition
a monthly income of $395.00 from a corporate liquidation, which will run far beyond the period of his child support payments. Wife, on the other hand, is an employee of the State of Montana, who has a net annual income for child support purposes of $10,459.00. Her take-home pay is $402.30 for each two-week pay period. In addition, she has donepart-time work as a hostess at a local restaurant, and had. some minor income formodeling. The evidence shows the child's support needs amounted to $300.00 per month, of which husband was ordered to pay $185.00 or 61.7 percent. Inview of their available incomes for child support purposes, the amount awarded by the court is well within the child support guidelines promulgated by this Court for such cases, effective January 13, 1986 (cause
no. 86-223). We find no abuse of discretion in the amount of child supportawarded. Husband further claims that in this case he is entitled to attorney fees of $2,000.00. Our determination is that attorney fees should be awarded the other way, in favor of wife. Husband's appeal is obviously trifling, without substantial basis, and perhaps mean-spirited. We are satisfied from the record and the presentationof the appeal in this civil case that the same was taken without substantial or reasonable grounds, and merits an award of damages under Rule 32,to the other party, in the form ofher counsel fees incurred in this appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and decree of the District Court, and remand this cause to the District Court for the further purpose of determining proper attorney fees
on appeal tobe awarded toVickie Lynn I,arson,in addition to her ordinary costs of appeal.