alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
      32.1





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the quarterly report of U.S. Microbics, Inc. (the "Company")
      on
      Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert Brehm, Chief
      Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 906
      of
      the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, In all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by U.S. Microbics, Inc. and furnished to the
      Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





August
      20, 2007








/S/
      Robert
      Brehm


Robert
      Brehm


Chief
      Executive
      Officer
**RB** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 1 8 - 0335 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DAVID MICHAEL YOUMANS,

Defendant and Appellant.

**GRANT OF EXTENSION** Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30 - day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, Appellee is gran ted an extension of time to and including Septe mber 27 , 2020 , within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief.

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court August 24 2020

08/24/2020
Case Number: DA 18-0335
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THIS FORM
10-KSB AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998             JAN-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-30-1997             JAN-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1998             JAN-31-1997
<CASH>                                          89,702                   3,283
<SECURITIES>                                     8,708                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   48,805                  25,873
<ALLOWANCES>                                    (1,895)                 (1,095)
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               148,290                  31,144
<PP&E>                                          11,738                   8,177
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (3,923)                 (1,529)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 171,317                  57,973
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           91,789                  63,942
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                  20,780
<PREFERRED>                                          0                      17
<COMMON>                                            65                      11
<OTHER-SE>                                      78,772                 (76,317)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0                       0
<SALES>                                        118,906                  46,839
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               157,189                  61,598
<CGS>                                            2,429                   1,591
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  172,024                 142,740
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,201                   1,321
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,054                   6,727
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (19,152)                (87,865)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,843                     800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (21,995)                (88,665)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (21,995)                (88,665)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0                       0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.43)                  (9.48)
        

</TABLE>
EX-10(iii)(A)(9.2) AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREMNT



 




Exhibit (10)(iii)(A)(9.2)






Amendment No. 2 to Employment Agreement

Between

Cincinnati Bell Inc. and Michael W. Callaghan




     The Employment Agreement between Cincinnati Bell Inc., an Ohio corporation
(the “Employer”) and Michael W. Callaghan (the “Employee”) with an Effective
Date of December 4, 2001, as amended on February 3, 2003, (the “Employment
Agreement”), is hereby further amended as of October 22, 2003.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	1.	 	 	The second sentence of Section 13.D of the Employment
Agreement, as amended on February 3, 2003, is further amended to
read as follows:
	 
	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	Employee may terminate this Agreement by written notice to
Employer at any time within the period between December 15,
2004 and December 31, 2004.







     All other terms and conditions of the Employment Agreement not
specifically amended herein shall remain in full force and effect as previously
agreed upon by the parties.



	 	 	 
	CINCINNATI BELL INC
	 	MICHAEL W. CALLAGHAN
	 
	 
	/s/ John F. Cassidy
	 	/s/ Michael W. Callaghan
#### The State of Ohio, Appellant, *v.*Schwartz, Appellee.

(Decided May 5, 1941.)

*Mr. Hal G. DeRan,*for appellant.

*Mr. Glenn P. Braey,*for appellee.

Carpenter, J.

Under Section 13008, General Code, Melvin Schwartz was convicted of failing to support his illegitimate child and, not having tendered a bond as provided in Section 13010, General Code, was sentenced to the workhouse for six months.

Prom this judgment he appealed, and this court affirmed the judgment and the Supreme Court refused review and remanded the case to the trial court for execution of sentence.

*70Thereupon the defendant tendered the bond contemplated in Section 13010, General Code, and the trial court, although the term had passed, suspended the prison term, ordered payment of $7 per week for the support of the child and a bond for $500, which was given.

The mother of the child, in her own behalf and as next friend of the child, demanded of the prosecuting attorney that he appeal from this order of the court, claiming it had no power to thus modify the sentence which had been affirmed by the reviewing courts. The prosecutor refused the demand and the mother, in her own behalf and as next friend of the child, filed notice of appeal on questions of law and fact.

The defendant filed a motion to. dismiss the appeal for the reason that “the so-called appeal is not sought or filed, either by the accused or the state of Ohio, the only parties to the case.”

This was a criminal action in which the state of Ohio was the prosecuting party. Section 2916, General Code, imposes upon the prosecuting attorney the duty to represent the state in'such actions. Nowhere is a person interested in the results of such action, as was this child or its mother, given authority to intervene and take over any part of such prosecution. If this can be done in this case, where will the end be ?

This appellant lacking authority to take the appeal, this court has no jurisdiction in the matter, and the attempted appeal is dismissed. Even if the appellant were one with authority to take an appeal, this being a criminal judgment, the appeal could only be on questions of law.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Lloyd, J., concurs.

Overmyer, J., not participating.
This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
STATE OF NEW MEXICO , 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3
v. NO. 34,847 4 KEITH RUSSELL JUDD, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Stan Whitaker, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Keith Russell Judd 12 Midland, TX 13 Pro Se Appellant 14 MEMORANDUM OPINION 15 KENNEDY, Judge. 162 {1} Appellant, who is self-represented, appeals from a di strict court order denying 1 his motion to vacate a 1999 order. We issu ed a calendar notice proposing to dismiss. 2 Appellant has responded with a me morandum in opposition. We dismiss. 3 {2} Appellant’s appeal is from a July 2015 district court order [RP 1815] that 4 denied a motion to vacate a 1999 district court order that dismissed criminal charges 5 against him and released him from probation. [RP 1570, 74-75; 1815-16] In June 6 1998, the district court entered a judgment and sentence after finding Appellant guilty 7 of two misdemeanors. [RP 1528] Appellant appealed that judgment [RP 1544], and 8 this Court affirmed the convictions. [RP 1580] Appellant served his sentence by the 9 time mandate was issued by this Court, as indicated by the 1999 order now being 10 challenged. [RP 1570]. Appellant is arguing that the district court should not have 11 issued the 1999 dismissal order while his appeal from the underlying judgment was 12 pending. We are aware of no authority for the proposition that a court may not address 13 a situation where a defendant has served his full sentence prior to the disposition of 14 his appeal. In any event, we conclude thatthe current appeal is moot, because there 15 is no remedy that this Court could gr ant that would afford actual relief. See State v. 16 Sergio B. , 2002-NMCA-070, ¶ 9, 132 N.M. 375, 48 P.3d 764 (“An appeal is moot 17 when no actual controversy exists, and an appellate ruling will not grant the appellant 18 any actual relief.”). There also are no collateral consequences that would otherwise 193 allow us to address the appeal. See id . ¶ 10. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See 1 id
. 2 {3} IT IS SO ORDERED. 3

_______________________________ 4 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 5
WE CONCUR: 6

___________________________________ 7 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge 8

_________________________________ 9 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 10
#### STATE ex rel. Nolan JAMES v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2010-KH-1716.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 25, 2011.

In re James, Nolan; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 402; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0463.

Denied.
#### Ft. Worth & R. G. R’y Co. v. J. F. Culver.

(No. 3192.)

October 23, 1889.

Appeal from Tarrant County.

N. A. Stedman, counsel for appellant.

Ball, Wynne & McCaet, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 5. *Argument; right to open and conclude in condemnation proceedings.*This is a proceeding by appellant under the statute to condemn right of way for a railroad over appellee’s land. Appellee filed objections to the award of the commissioners, and the cause was tried in the county court. On the trial in the county court appellee claimed and was awarded the right to open and conclude the argument. Appellant excepted and assigns this matter as error. This court has held that, in a proceeding to condemn land, the party seeking the condemnation, and not the owner of the land, is the party upon whom the burden of proof rests, and is the party entitled to open and conclude the argument, unless such right be defeated by an admission made and entered of record in accordance with rule 31 for district courts. [3 Civil Cas. Ct. App., §§ 409, 415; 8 Crim. Law Mag., p. 620, § 4.] No such admission was entered of record by appellee in this case.

Beversed and remanded.
#### Smith, a Taxpayer, Appellant, *v.*Reed, Appellee.

(Decided December 2, 1940.)

*Mr. George W. Weber, Jr.,*for appellant.

*Mr. Charles K. Pulse,*for appellee.

Matthews, J.

This is an action by the plaintiff as a taxpayer on behalf of the city of Lockland, to recover a judgment for money, based on fines collected from various persons found guilty by the defendant of violating ordinances of the city of Lockland, of which defendant was mayor, and in which capacity he acted in rendering judgments against such persons. These fines were collected and have been retained since then by the defendant. This action was begun in 1939.

The defendant demurred to the petition on two grounds: (1) That the cause of action is barred by the *512statute of limitations; and (2) that the plaintiff, as a taxpayer, has no capacity to sue.

The court sustained the first ground of the demurrer, and the plaintiff, not desiring to plead further, judgment was entered in favor of the defendant.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from that judgment.

We believe the issue is foreclosed for this court by the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *State, ex rel. Board of Education,*v. *Gibson, Aud.,*130 Ohio St., 318, 199 N. E., 185, in which it was held in the second and third paragraphs of the syllabus, that:

*“2.*A board of education or school district, clothed with the capacity to sue and be sued, is thereby rendered amenable to the laws governing litigants, including the plea of the statute of limitations.

“3. Where a statute does not expressly exempt a subordinate political subdivision from its operation, the exemption therefrom does not exist.”

While the judicial function is undoubtedly sovereign in its nature, and the agencies through which it may be exercised are created by the Constitution or the power reserved thereby to the G-eneral Assembly (Section 1, Article IV), the public school system is as clearly made a sovereign function under the direct control of the state by the Constitution (Section 4, Article VI).

If the statute of limitations runs against a board of education, by parity of reasoning it should run against a municipal corporation, both being subordinate political subdivisions of the state. We so hold.

For these reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Hamilton, P. J., and Ross, J., concur.
#### Carolina Rodriquez ARBELAEZ, et al., Appellants v. R. Richard NEWCOMB, In his official capacity as Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, et al., Appellees.

No. 00-5217.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Jan. 18, 2001.

Before SENTELLE, HENDERSON, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties. The court has determined that the issues presented occasion no need for a published opinion. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 36; D.C.Cir. Rule 36(b). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed May 16, 2000 be affirmed. Appellants are foreign nationals without a substantial connection to the United States; they therefore lack standing to bring a challenge under Article I, Section 9, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States. *See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,*494 U.S. 259, 271, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) (“[A]liens receive constitutional protections [only] when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.”); *People’s Mojahedin Organization v. Dept. of State,*182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C.Cir.1999) (“A foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional rights, under the due process clause or otherwise.”).

The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED APRIL 30, 1997 AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1997
<CASH>                                              96
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,593
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     65,904
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                          50,146
<DEPRECIATION>                                   8,396
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 154,554
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           58,161<F1>
<BONDS>                                            517
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           201
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   154,554
<SALES>                                          6,630
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                63,937
<CGS>                                            3,852
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   64,087
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (180)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,176
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (1,146)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (249)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (897)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (897)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.05)
<FN>
<F1>THE COMPANY UTILIZES AN UNCLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET PRESENTATION. THIS FORMAT
WAS FOLLOWED BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE VIDEOCASSETTE RENTAL INVENTORY
REPRESENTS ASSETS USED BY THE COMPANY TO GENERATE CURRENT OPERATING INCOME, AND
MANAGEMENT BELIEVES THAT TO CLASSIFY ALL OF THESE COSTS AS NONCURRENT WOULD BE
MISLEADING TO THE READERS OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT
INDICATE THE LEVEL OF ASSETS EXPECTED TO BE CONVERTED INTO CASH IN THE NEXT
YEAR AS A RESULT OF THE RENTALS OF THE VIDEOCASSETTES.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.2****Rule 13a-14 Certification**I, Frank P. Vaughan, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of The Cronos Group (the “Registrant”);2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The Registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:(a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; and(b) evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(c) disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the Registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the Registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the Registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.5. The Registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrant’s auditors and the AuditCommittee of Registrant’s Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):(a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrols over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report information; and(b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the Registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: November 14, 2005/s/ FRANK P. VAUGHAN
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 92 (Wednesday, June 7, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5625]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                 DESIGNATION OF THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

  The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following 
communication from the Speaker:

                                               Washington, DC,

                                                     June 7, 1995.
       I hereby designate the Honorable Frank Riggs to act as 
     Speaker pro tempore on this day.
                                                    Newt Gingrich,
     Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                          ____________________
```
#### Clifford & Lincoln v. Clark & Loftus.

(No. 2266.)

February 19, 1887.

Appeal from Harris County.

Jones <& Garnett, for appellant.

B. O’Malley and Henry F. Fisher, for appellees.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 238. *Appeal bond from justice’s court; conditions in, held sufficient.*Appellees having recovered a judgment for money against appellants, the latter appealed to the county court, executing an appeal bond conditioned that they would prosecute their appeal with effect, and would “pay off” the judgment, etc. The appeal was dismissed upon motion of appellees, upon the ground that the bond should have been conditioned that appellants would “pay off and satisfy the judgment,” etc., in the exact language of the statute. [Gen. Laws 18 th Leg. p. 91.] *Held*error to dismiss the appeal. The objection made to the bond is not a valid one. The judgment appealed from is for money only, and to “pay off” said judgment would be also to “satisfy” it. If the judgment had been of a character requiring something more of the defendant than the payment of money, the word “satisfy” would have been essential to the validity of the bond. [2 W. Con. Rep. §§ 26, 112, 793.]

Eeversed and remanded.