IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Karan and Pushpa Singh, and :

Mandeep Rana, deceased, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 240 C.D. 2019

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board :

(Asha Corporation), :

Respondent :

:

Asha Corporation, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 347 C.D. 2019

: Submitted: March 26, 2020

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board :

(Singh, Singh, and Rana, deceased), :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: May 1, 2020

In these consolidated matters, Karan and Pushpa Singh (Claimants) and Asha 

Corporation (Employer) petition for review of an order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Board), dated February 28, 2019. The Board reversed 

the decision of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), which granted Claimants’ 
2

fatal claim petition requesting benefits as a result of the death of Mandeep Rana 

(Decedent), Claimants’ son. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the Board’s 

order in part, affirm the Board’s order in part, and remand the matter to the Board 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Employer is a franchisee of Dunkin’ Donuts with three locations in

Pennsylvania. Decedent worked for Employer as a restaurant manager “in training.” 

Decedent worked primarily out of Employer’s Wyncote location but was required 

to work at Employer’s other locations as needed. On November 12, 2010, while 

traveling to another one of Employer’s locations, Decedent was involved in a motor 

vehicle accident. On November 14, 2010, Decedent died as a result of the injuries

he sustained in the motor vehicle accident.

On August 9, 2012, Claimants, who resided in India at the time of Decedent’s 

death, filed a fatal claim petition, alleging that Decedent was involved in a

work-related motor vehicle accident on November 12, 2010, which ultimately led to 

Decedent’s death on November 14, 2010. Claimants further alleged that they were 

totally dependent on Decedent for support at the time of Decedent’s death. In 

support of this contention, Mr. Singh testified regarding, inter alia, Claimants’ 

sources of income, Claimants’ monthly expenses, money that Decedent sent to 

Claimants on a monthly basis in 2008 and 2009, and money that Decedent sent to 

Claimants in January and March 2010.

On October 15, 2015, the WCJ issued a decision and order, granting

Claimants’ fatal claim petition. In so doing, the WCJ found, inter alia: (1) Decedent 

was acting in the course and scope of his employment with Employer at the time of 

the November 12, 2010 motor vehicle accident because Decedent was furthering 
3

Employer’s business affairs and/or was on a special assignment for Employer; 

(2) reciprocity for workers’ compensation claims exists between India and the 

United States as required by Section 310 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act);1

(3) Claimants were dependent on Decedent for support; (4) Decedent’s average 

weekly wage (AWW) was $1,500 per month or $375 per week, with a corresponding 

compensation rate of $337.50 or 90% of Decedent’s AWW; and (5) Employer was 

responsible for the payment of all of Decedent’s reasonable and necessary medical 

expenses and for the reimbursement of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW)2

lien in the amount of $71,330.84. Employer appealed the WCJ’s decision to the 

Board, and the Board reversed. In so doing, the Board concluded that Decedent was 

not acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the 

November 12, 2010 motor vehicle accident.

Claimants petitioned this Court for review. By opinion and order dated 

September 29, 2017, this Court concluded that Decedent was acting in the course 

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 563. Section 310 of the Act provides, 

in relevant part: 

Alien widows, children and parents, not residents of the 

United States, shall be entitled to compensation, but only to the 

amount of fifty per centum of the compensation which would have 

been payable if they were residents of the United States[;] 

[p]rovided, [t]hat compensation benefits are granted residents of the 

United States under the laws of the foreign country in which the 

widow, children or parents reside. . . . In no event shall any 

nonresident alien widow or parent be entitled to compensation in the 

absence of proof that the alien widow or parent has actually been 

receiving a substantial portion of his or her support from the 

decedent. 

2 At some point after DPW asserted its lien in this matter, the General Assembly 

redesignated DPW as the Department of Human Services. See Section 103 of the Human Services 

Code, Act of June 13, 1967, P.L. 31, as amended, added by the Act of September 24, 2014, 

P.L. 2458, 62 P.S. § 103.
4

and scope of his employment at the time of the November 12, 2010 motor vehicle 

accident. As a result, this Court reversed the Board’s order and remanded the matter 

to the Board for the consideration of the following issues previously raised by 

Employer on appeal from the WCJ’s decision and order, but which the Board 

previously declined to reach:

1. Whether the WCJ erred in the calculation of 

Decedent’s [AWW] and compensation rate;

2. Whether the WCJ erred in finding reciprocity exists 

for a United States citizen dependent pursuant to the 

workers’ compensation laws of India; 

3. Whether Decedent’s parents[, Claimants in this 

matter,] failed to establish they received a substantial 

portion of their support from Decedent at the time of 

his death and were substantially dependent upon him; 

4. Whether the WCJ erred by failing to account for 

Employer’s subrogation interest against a third-party 

recovery made by Decedent’s parents; and 

5. Whether the WCJ erred in ordering payment of a DPW 

lien which was already paid out of the third-party 

recovery. 

Rana v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Asha Corp.), 170 A.3d 1279, 1286 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). 

On remand, the Board again reversed the WCJ’s decision. In so doing, the 

Board concluded that there was absolutely no evidence in the record to support the 

WCJ’s finding that reciprocity exists for a United States citizen under India’s 

workers’ compensation law. The Board reasoned that the document attached to 

Claimants’ brief to the WCJ, which Claimants purported to be the relevant sections 

of India’s workers’ compensation law, could not support Claimants’ burden of proof 

under the fatal claim petition because such document was submitted to the WCJ after 

the close of the evidentiary record. Although the Board believed that the WCJ 
5

should have denied Claimants’ fatal claim petition on this basis, the Board went on 

to address the remainder of the issues identified by this Court in its 

September 29, 2017 remand opinion and order. First, the Board concluded that the 

WCJ’s calculation of Decedent’s AWW and corresponding compensation rate was 

erroneous. The Board reasoned that Decedent’s wages were fixed by the month, 

and, therefore, the WCJ should have calculated Decedent’s AWW pursuant to 

Section 309(b) of the Act3—i.e., ($1,500 x 12)/52 or $346.15. The Board further 

reasoned that the WCJ should have determined Claimants’ corresponding 

compensation rate pursuant to Section 307(5) of the Act4—i.e., either 32% of the 

AWW for partial dependency or 52% of the AWW for total dependency. Second, 

the Board concluded that, while the WCJ’s finding that Claimants were totally 

dependent on Decedent for support was not supported by substantial evidence, 

Mr. Singh’s credited testimony, when taken as a whole, supported a finding that 

Claimants were at least partially dependent on Decedent because Claimants did not 

meet their regular monthly expenses with their regular monthly income. Lastly, the 

Board concluded that the evidentiary record is devoid of information upon which the 

Board could resolve the issues of whether the WCJ erred by failing to account for 

 

3 77 P.S. § 582(b). Section 309(b) of the Act provides: “If at the time of the injury the 

wages are fixed by the month, the average weekly wage shall be the monthly wage so fixed 

multiplied by twelve and divided by fifty-two[.]”

4 77 P.S. § 561(5). Section 307(5) of the Act provides: 

If there be neither widow, widower, nor children entitled to 

compensation, then to the father or mother, if dependent to any 

extent upon the employe at the time of the injury, thirty-two per

centum of wages but not in excess of the Statewide average weekly 

wage[;] . . . [i]f the father or mother was totally dependent upon the 

deceased employe at the time of the injury, the compensation 

payable to such father or mother shall be fifty-two per centum of 

wages, but not in excess of the Statewide average weekly wage.
6

Employer’s subrogation interest against a third-party recovery made by Claimants

or by ordering payment of the DPW lien. The Board explained that there was no 

documentation relative to a third-party settlement that had been submitted into the 

record or any discussion about a third-party settlement on the record at any hearing, 

and, therefore, it did not have sufficient information to resolve these issues. 

Claimants and Employer then petitioned this Court for review. 

II. ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

On appeal,5 Claimants argue that the Board erred by: (1) reversing the WCJ’s 

finding of reciprocity for a United States citizen to collect benefits under the 

workers’ compensation laws of India; (2) calculating Decedent’s AWW without 

consideration of the mandate set forth in Section 307 of the Act that a deceased 

employee’s wages should not be less than 50% of the statewide AWW; and 

(3) failing to affirm the WCJ’s directive that Employer reimburse DPW for its lien 

in the amount of $71,330.84. In its cross-petition for review, Employer argues: 

(1) the Board committed an error of law by failing to consider whether Claimants 

were dependent on Decedent for support “at the time of the injury”—i.e., at the time 

of Decedent’s death; (2) the Board’s finding that Claimants were partially dependent 

on Decedent for support is not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) in the event 

that this Court concludes that Claimants are entitled to compensation under their 

fatal claim petition, the matter should be remanded to the WCJ for consideration of 

Claimants’ third-party recovery and its effect on the reimbursement of the DPW lien. 

We will discuss the parties’ arguments in the most logical order below.

 

5

“Our review is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, whether 

necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence[,] and whether constitutional 

rights were violated.” Combine v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp.), 

954 A.2d 776, 778 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), appeal denied, 967 A.2d 961 (Pa. 2009).
7

III. DISCUSSION

A. Reciprocity

Claimants argue that the Board erred by reversing the WCJ’s finding of 

reciprocity for a United States citizen to collect benefits under the workers’ 

compensation laws of India, because the relevant sections of India’s workers’ 

compensation law “provide for the payment of death benefits to dependents residing 

in the [United States] of relatives killed in work accidents in India.” (Claimants’ Br. 

at 14.) Claimants further argue that it was Employer’s burden to establish a lack of 

reciprocity with India’s workers’ compensation law, because Employer asserted 

reciprocity as an affirmative defense for the first time in its brief to the WCJ. 

Claimants also contend that, even if it was their burden to establish reciprocity, they 

were not required to enter the relevant sections of India’s workers’ compensation 

law into the evidentiary record to meet their burden of proof, because the WCJ had 

the power to and did take judicial notice of such relevant sections of India’s workers’ 

compensation law. In response, Employer argues that the Board properly concluded 

that Claimants failed to meet their burden of proof under their fatal claim petition 

because they failed to establish that reciprocity exists for a United States citizen 

under India’s workers’ compensation law. More specifically, Employer contends 

that the WCJ could not have considered the unauthenticated text that Claimants 

submitted after the close of the record, which Claimants purport are the relevant 

sections of India’s workers’ compensation law, because such unauthenticated text 

was not part of the evidentiary record.

It is important to recognize that Employer’s entire challenge to the WCJ’s 

finding of reciprocity before the Board related to the timing of Claimants’ 

submission of the content of India’s workers’ compensation law, not the substance 
8

of such submission. Employer alleged that Claimants did not meet their burden of 

proof because they submitted unauthenticated text, which Claimants purported to be 

the relevant sections of India’s workers’ compensation law, to the WCJ after the 

close of the evidentiary record. Employer did not argue that Claimants’ submission

was not in fact India’s workers’ compensation law, or a proper translation thereof, 

or that India’s workers’ compensation law does not provide workers’ compensation 

benefits to United States residents as required by Section 310 of the Act. Thus, we 

will limit our analysis to the question of whether Claimants were required to submit 

the content of India’s workers’ compensation law into the record, and we will not 

consider the question of whether the WCJ properly concluded that reciprocity for 

workers’ compensation claims exists between India and the United States.

While it is true that, “[i]n a fatal claim petition, the surviving family 

member[s] bear[] the burden of proving all of the elements necessary to support an 

award under the [Act],” Werner v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board

(Greenleaf Service Corporation), 28 A.3d 245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), appeal denied, 

47 A.3d 849 (Pa. 2012), this does not mean that Claimants were required to “prove” 

that India’s workers’ compensation law grants workers’ compensation benefits to 

United States residents. Werner, 28 A.3d at 250. This case involves a legal burden, 

not an evidentiary one. Claimants, or more accurately, Claimants’ attorney, was 

required to set forth what she believed to be the relevant sections of India’s workers’ 

compensation law and provide a legal argument regarding whether India’s workers’ 

compensation law grants workers’ compensation benefits to United States residents, 

which she did. The WCJ was then required to review India’s workers’ compensation 

law and decide whether India’s workers’ compensation law grants workers’ 

compensation benefits to United States residents—i.e., whether there is reciprocity 
9

for workers’ compensation claims between India and the United States. Although 

the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-9913, is not applicable in workers’ 

compensation proceedings, as it only applies to the “unified judicial system,”6

common sense dictates that a WCJ should be able to consider any relevant material 

or source on foreign law regardless of whether such material or source was submitted 

into evidence by a party or was admissible. See Section 5327(b) of the Judicial 

Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 5327(b).

7

 For these reasons, Claimants were not required to 

submit the content of India’s workers’ compensation law into the evidentiary record

for the WCJ to make a determination regarding reciprocity, and, given the argument 

raised by Employer on appeal to the Board, we must conclude that the Board erred 

by reversing the WCJ’s finding of reciprocity for a United States citizen to collect 

benefits under the workers’ compensation laws of India.

B. Dependency

Employer argues that the Board committed an error of law by failing to 

consider whether Claimants were dependent on Decedent for support “at the time of 

the injury”—i.e., at the time of Decedent’s death—because, based on Mr. Singh’s 

testimony, Decedent made no contributions to Claimants’ support in the 7 months 

prior to his death. Employer further argues that the Board’s finding that Claimants 

were partially dependent on Decedent for support at the time of his death is not 

supported by substantial evidence. Employer contends that, to be dependent, there 

 

6 See 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 102-103; see also Indep. Blue Cross v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Frankford Hosp.), 820 A.2d 868, 874 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (noting that Section 2503 of Judicial 

Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 2503, which addresses rights of participants to receive attorneys’ fees, only 

applies to unified judicial system).

7 Section 5327(b) of the Judicial Code provides: “In determining the law of any jurisdiction 

or governmental unit thereof outside this Commonwealth, the tribunal may consider any relevant 

material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under 

the rules of evidence.”
10

must be a deficit between Claimants’ reasonable monthly expenses and normal 

monthly income and that, because Mr. Singh did not specifically identify Claimants’ 

monthly expenses, the WCJ could not have determined whether such expenses were 

reasonable. In response, Claimants argue that the Board’s finding that Claimants 

were partially dependent on Decedent for support at the time of his death was 

supported by substantial evidence.

In workers’ compensation proceedings, “the test of dependency is whether or 

not the child’s earnings were needed to provide the parents with some of the ordinary 

necessities of life suitable for persons in their class and position, and that the parents 

were, consequently, dependent to some extent upon the child at the time of the 

accident causing his or her death.” Wyoming Valley Health Care Sys. v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kalwaytis), 921 A.2d 91, 93 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citing Lineal 

Indus., Inc. v. Worker’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Essel), 669 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Pa. 

1995)). In Lineal Industries, our Supreme Court stated the following about proving 

dependency:

In order to be eligible for compensation, the father 

or mother must “to any extent” be dependent upon the 

financial contributions of the deceased child. This means, 

simply, that when normal monthly bills extant at the time 

of the child’s death are set off against normal monthly 

income of the parent, there is a deficit, absent the child’s 

contribution. Further, in order to qualify as “dependent,” 

these regular monthly expenditures must be reasonable in 

light of the life circumstances of the parent at the time of 

the child’s death.

Lineal Indus., 669 A.2d at 332. In the context of dependency involving fatal claims, 

“at the time of the injury” has been interpreted to mean dependency not just during 

the period of time immediately preceding death but also a reasonable period of time 
11

prior to death. Dindino v. Weekly Review Publ’g Co., Inc., 149 A.2d 475, 478 

(Pa. Super. 1959).8

Here, Employer is essentially asking this Court to reweigh the evidence 

considered by the Board and find that Claimants were not partially dependent on 

Decedent for support at the time of his death, which we will not do. See Brown v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Knight Ridder, Inc./Phila. Newspapers, Inc.), 

856 A.2d 302, 307 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). In determining whether Claimants were 

partially dependent on Decedent for support at the time of his death, the Board 

considered Mr. Singh’s testimony:

Mr. Singh testified that he and his wife were married on 

May 11, 1969[,] and have two sons, one of whom was 

Decedent. They live in Faridabad. Mr. Singh testified that 

he retired from Goodyear Tire Company in 2005, and that 

his wife had not worked outside the home. They lived in 

a house with no mortgage. He did not have a credit card. 

Mr. Singh stated that he received a private pension 

of 765 rupees per month and a government pension of 

about 500 rupees. He received about $50.00 per month in

rental income. He also received money for performing 

charitable work, which he had started after Decedent’s 

death. He estimated his monthly expenses as 

about 20,000 rupees, which is about $500.00, at the time 

of Decedent’s death. Mr. Singh also testified that the rate 

of exchange was approximately 50 to 52 rupees to $1.00. 

Mr. Singh testified that Decedent traveled to the 

United States on May 20, 2008[,] and began working for 

[Employer] as a trainee on May 22, 2008. He stated that 

Decedent asked for 150,000 rupees to go to the United 

States, and that [he] sold a car which was being used as a 

taxi for hire to provide the funds. During the first year[,]

Decedent sent home about 50,000 [rupees] per month

 

8 While we recognize that Pennsylvania Superior Court cases are not binding on this Court, 

such cases “offer persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues.” Lerch v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
12

regularly. Mr. Singh stated that 50,000 rupees was 

approximately $1,000.00.

Mr. Singh testified that Decedent had a J1 visa for 

[1] year, beginning May 22, 2008, and returned to India on 

June 10, 2009. Decedent stayed in India for [1] month and 

16 or 17 days and returned to the United States on 

July 28, 2009. During the second year[,] Decedent had 

expenses for his studies so he did not send as much money. 

Mr. Singh stated that Claimants used proceeds from the 

sale of land owned by Decedent and money that Decedent 

sent to support themselves. On cross-examination, 

Mr. Singh testified that he had received 

approximately 250,000 rupees from the sale of Decedent’s 

land and gave 150,000 to Decedent. He stated that the 

proceeds were not used for anything in particular, just to 

support their life, and that his older son gave him money 

for emergencies. He elaborated that the older son did not 

give him money regularly and that he had to ask.

Mr. Singh further testified that his older son was 

living with him at the time of Decedent’s death and was 

earning very little money, so part of the household 

expenses at that time were attributable to the older son. 

The mortgage was paid off during the first year Decedent 

worked in the United States and there was no mortgage on 

the house at the time of Mr. Singh’s deposition. He agreed 

that his bank statements showed a deposit 

of 44,620.5 rupees on January 12, 2010 and a deposit 

of 22,453 rupees on March 8, 2010, sent by Decedent. He 

had not received any further money from Decedent.

(Board’s Decision, Feb. 28, 2019, at 8-10 (record citations omitted).) Based on such 

testimony, the Board found that Claimants were partially dependent on Decedent at 

the time of his death. The Board reasoned: 

We agree that Mr. Singh’s testimony is vague. Claimants 

were apparently not without resources at the time of 

Decedent’s death; Mr. Singh testified that assets were sold 

to finance Decedent’s education and that Claimants owned 

a residence unencumbered by a mortgage. While his 

testimony as to income was reasonably specific, Mr. Singh 

provided no information as to the cost of living in 

Faridabad and no information to substantiate his 
13

representation that Claimants’ general household 

expenses were 20,000 rupees per month. Further, 

Mr. Singh’s testimony as to the rate of exchange was 

inconsistent. Taken as a whole, however, Mr. Singh’s 

credited testimony supports a finding that Claimants’ 

regular monthly income did not meet their regular monthly 

expenses.

(Id. at 10-11.) Although not specifically stated, it can be inferred by the Board’s 

discussion that the Board considered whether Claimants’ dependency existed at the 

time of Decedent’s death. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the Board

failed to consider whether Claimants were dependent on Decedent for support “at 

the time of the injury” or that the Board’s finding that Claimants were partially 

dependent on Decedent for support at the time of his death is not supported by 

substantial evidence. 

C. Calculation of Decedent’s AWW

Claimants argue that the Board erred by calculating Decedent’s AWW 

without consideration of the mandate set forth in Section 307 of the Act that a 

deceased employee’s wages should not be less than 50% of the statewide AWW.9 

Section 307 identifies those family members who are entitled to receive 

compensation upon an employee’s death and how to compute the corresponding 

compensation rate. Before the compensation rate can be computed, however, 

 

9 Employer has not presented any substantive response in opposition to Claimants’ 

argument that the Board erred by calculating Decedent’s AWW without consideration of the 

mandate set forth in Section 307 of the Act that a deceased employee’s wages should not be less 

than 50% of the statewide AWW. Rather, Employer argues that Claimants waived this issue by 

failing to raise it in their petition for review. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1513(d)(5) 

provides that a petition for review in our appellate jurisdiction must contain: “a general statement 

of the objections to the order or other determination, but the omission of an issue from the 

statement shall not be the basis for a finding of waiver if the [C]ourt is able to address the issue 

based on the certified record.” We see no reason why we cannot address Claimants’ argument 

based on the contents of the certified record, and, therefore, we cannot conclude that Claimants 

waived the issue on appeal. 
14

Section 307 of the Act mandates that “in no case shall the wages of the deceased be 

taken to be less than [50%] of the [s]tatewide [AWW].” Because Decedent’s wages 

were fixed by the month, the Board calculated Decedent’s AWW pursuant to 

Section 309(b) of the Act—i.e., ($1,500 x 12)/52 or $346.15. Claimants do not 

dispute this calculation but, rather, appear to contend that the Board’s starting point 

for determining Claimants’ corresponding compensation rate was erroneous because 

Decedent’s AWW was less than 50% of the statewide AWW. We agree. The 

statewide AWW for 2010 was $845.00. 40 Pa. B. 479 (Jan. 16, 2010). In 2010, 

50% of the statewide AWW was $422.50. Given that Decedent’s AWW calculated 

pursuant to Section 309(b) of the Act is less than 50% of the statewide AWW 

for 2010, Decedent’s wages, for the purposes of calculating Claimants’ 

corresponding compensation rate pursuant to Section 307 of the Act, should have 

been $422.50, not $346.15. For these reasons, we must conclude that the Board 

erred by calculating Decedent’s AWW without consideration of the mandate set 

forth in Section 307 of the Act that a deceased employee’s wages should not be less

than 50% of the statewide AWW.

Due to the Board’s error, we must remand the matter to the Board with 

instructions to remand the matter to the WCJ for a determination of Claimants’ 

corresponding compensation rate based on weekly wages in the amount of $422.50. 

On remand, the WCJ should take into consideration the following statutory 

provisions: (1) Section 307(5) of the Act provides that parents of a deceased 

employee who are partially dependent on the deceased employee for support at the 

time of injury are entitled to receive 32% of the deceased employee’s wages; and 

(2) Section 310 of the Act provides that parents of a deceased employee who are not 
15

residents of the United States are only entitled to receive 50% of the compensation 

that would have been payable if they were residents of the United States. 

D. Third-Party Recovery and DPW Lien

Claimants argue that the Board erred by failing to affirm the WCJ’s directive 

that Employer reimburse DPW for its lien in the amount of $71,330.84. More 

specifically, Claimants contend that, irrespective of the third-party settlement and 

any compromise made by DPW in connection with such settlement, DPW should be 

entitled to the full amount of its lien if there is an avenue of recovery—i.e., this 

workers’ compensation matter. Employer, on the other hand, contends that this 

matter should be remanded to the WCJ for consideration of Claimants’ third-party 

recovery and its effect on the reimbursement of the DPW lien. More specifically, 

Employer contends that the WCJ did not address Claimants’ third-party recovery in 

her decision because the settlement of the third-party claim went undisclosed, and, 

therefore, the matter should be remanded to the WCJ for consideration of 

Employer’s potential subrogation interest and the potential effect of the third-party 

settlement on DPW’s lien.

The Board concluded that the evidentiary record is devoid of information 

upon which it could resolve the issues of whether the WCJ erred by failing to account 

for Employer’s subrogation interest against a third-party recovery made by 

Decedent’s parents or by ordering payment of the DPW lien. The Board explained 

that there was no documentation relative to a third-party settlement that had been 

submitted into the record or any discussion about a third-party settlement on the 

record at any hearing, and, therefore, it did not have sufficient information to resolve 

these issues. We agree with the Board that, given the lack of information in the 

record regarding the third-party settlement, the issues relative to the third-party 
16

settlement cannot be addressed on appeal. In light of the fact that Employer was not 

aware of the third-party settlement at the time of the proceedings before the WCJ, a 

fact that Claimants do not appear to dispute, we must remand the matter to the Board 

with instructions to remand the matter to the WCJ to address Claimants’ third-party 

settlement and its effect on these proceedings.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the Board’s order and 

remand the matter to the Board with instructions to remand the matter to the WCJ 

to: (1) determine Claimants’ corresponding compensation rate based on an average 

weekly wage of $422.50; and (2) issue findings of fact and conclusions of law 

relative to Claimants’ third-party settlement and to thereafter determine: (a) what 

effect, if any, the third-party settlement has on the payment of DPW’s lien by 

Employer as part of these proceedings; and (b) whether Employer has a subrogation 

interest in this matter as a result of the third-party settlement.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Karan and Pushpa Singh, and :

Mandeep Rana, deceased, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 240 C.D. 2019

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board :

(Asha Corporation), :

Respondent :

:

Asha Corporation, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 347 C.D. 2019

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board :

(Singh, Singh, and Rana, deceased), :

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 1

st day of May, 2020, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Board) is hereby AFFIRMED, in part, and 

REVERSED, in part, and the matter is REMANDED to the Board for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge