UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4730

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

EDGARDO BARRON-ESPINOSA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior 

District Judge. (5:13-cr-00259-F-2)

Submitted: June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015

Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stacey A. Phipps, STACEY A. PHIPPS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C., Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Edgardo Barron-Espinosa pled guilty to conspiracy to 

distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more 

of cocaine. The district court sentenced him to 120-months’

imprisonment. Barron-Espinosa’s counsel filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating 

that, in counsel’s view, there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal, but raising a policy argument as to the disparity in 

Barron-Espinosa’s sentence compared to that of his co-conspirator 

who, counsel argued, had a higher position in the conspiracy than 

Barron-Espinosa. Barron-Espinosa filed a pro se supplemental 

brief challenging the drug quantity attributed to him and the 

sentencing enhancements imposed for a supervisory role and for 

maintaining a premises for drug trafficking. Concluding that the 

district court did not err, we affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuseof-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). In so doing, the court examines the sentence for 

“significant procedural error,” including “failing to calculate 

(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] 

§ 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 

sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A district court must conduct 
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an “individualized assessment” of the particular facts of every 

sentence, whether the court imposes a sentence above, below, or 

within the Guidelines range. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 

325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).

The district court appropriately determined that BarronEspinosa was responsible for the distribution of 24 kilograms of 

cocaine based on his admissions and his stipulation in the plea 

agreement that he was attributable with at least 15 but not more 

than 150 kilograms of cocaine. The court properly increased 

Barron-Espinosa’s offense level based on his possession of a 

firearm, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2D1.1(b)(1) 

(2013); his supervisory role based on his recruiting two persons 

and directing their activities, USSG § 3B1.1(c); and maintaining 

a premises for the purpose of drug trafficking, USSG

§ 2D1.1(b)(12). Applying the new drug table per the Government’s 

stipulation and reducing Barron-Espinosa’s offense level for 

acceptance of responsibility, the district court correctly 

computed Barron-Espinosa’s advisory Guidelines range as 168 to 210 

months. After considering the Government’s motion and the relevant 

sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), the court imposed 

a 120-month sentence. 

Counsel suggests that the sentence imposed is procedurally 

unreasonable because it resulted in sentence disparity between 

Barron-Espinosa and his co-conspirator. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
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(2012) (requiring court to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who 

have been found guilty of similar conduct”). Although the court 

did not explicitly address this sentencing disparity argument, the 

court thoroughly explained its reasons for the sentence imposed 

and did not commit procedural error. See United States v. Johnson, 

445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006) (court need not “robotically 

tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection”).

We conclude that the court adequately explained its reasons 

for the sentence imposed and that 120-month sentence is not 

unreasonable and not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying an appellate 

presumption of reasonableness to a sentence imposed within a 

properly calculated advisory Guidelines range); see also Rita v. 

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-56 (2007) (upholding presumption 

of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm Barron-Espinosa’s conviction and sentence. This 

court requires that counsel inform Barron-Espinosa, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Barron-Espinosa requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 
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withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a 

copy thereof was served on Barron-Espinosa. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED