John Junek v. St. Mary’s County Department of Social Services, No. 74, September Term 

2018. Opinion by Hotten, J. 

FAMILY LAW ARTICLE – INDICATED CHILD NEGLECT – ELEMENT OF 

INTENT – The Court of Appeals held that intent or scienter is not an element of “neglect”

under Maryland Code, § 5-701(s) of the Family Law Article. The language defining 

“abuse” under Fam. Law Art. § 5-701(b) and the corresponding COMAR provision that 

supported an implicit element of intent for child abuse in Taylor v. Harford Cty. Dep’t of 

Soc. Servs., 384 Md. 213, 862 A.2d 1026 (2004), and McClanahan v. Washington Cty. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 445 Md. 691, 129 A.3d 293 (2015), does not exist under the child 

neglect provisions. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals declined to require an implicit 

element of intent in order to sustain a finding of child neglect. 
Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County

Case No. 18-C-16-001199

Argued: May 6, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 74

September Term, 2018

__________________________________

JOHN JUNEK

v.

ST. MARY’S COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF SOCIAL SERVICES

__________________________________

Barbera, C.J.,

McDonald,

Watts,

Hotten,

Getty,

Booth,

Harrell, Glenn T., Jr.,

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)

JJ.

__________________________________

Opinion by Hotten, J.

__________________________________

Filed: June 25, 2019
Petitioner, John Junek,

1

seeks reversal of an Administrative Law Judge’s finding 

that Mr. Junek was responsible for indicated child neglect under Maryland Code, Family 

Law Article § 5-701(s). Mr. Junek poses the following question for our review: “Is intent 

or scienter an element of child neglect under Md. Code. Ann., Family Law (“Fam. Law”) 

§ 5-701(s)?” For the reasons outlined below, we answer Mr. Junek’s question in the 

negative, and affirm the Administrative Law Judge’s finding of indicated child neglect.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Factual Background

The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. On September 3, 2014, Mr. 

Junek was responsible for taking his older son to preschool and younger son to daycare 

before going to work.2 Mr. Junek first dropped his older son off at preschool. However, 

instead of dropping off his younger son at daycare, Mr. Junek drove directly to his 

workplace at the Naval Air Station Patuxent River. Mr. Junek arrived at work just before 

9:00 a.m., parked his car, overlooked his 17-month-old son in the backseat of the car, and

went into work. At about 3:20 p.m. that afternoon, Mr. Junek received a phone call from 

his wife who had arrived at the daycare center to pick up their younger son. Ms. Junek was 

unable to find her younger son’s car seat that Mr. Junek was supposed to leave at the 

daycare that morning, and called Mr. Junek to inquire as to its whereabouts. It was then, 

 

1

In accordance with the privacy policy of the Court of Special Appeals in cases 

involving children, the lower court referred to Mr. Junek using his initials, J.J. 

2 At the time, Mr. Junek’s older son was two years old, and his younger son was 17 

months old. 
2

for the first time that day, that Mr. Junek realized he had forgotten to drop his younger son 

off at daycare, and left the toddler in the backseat of the vehicle. 

Mr. Junek went immediately to his car, where he found his younger son strapped 

into his car seat, “unconscious, unresponsive, and not breathing.” Mr. Junek, with the help 

of a nurse who was passing by the car at the time, performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation 

(CPR) on the child and called emergency services. Attempts to revive the child failed, and 

he was pronounced dead at the scene. The outside temperature that day had reached a high 

of 85 degrees. 

The Investigation and Administrative Hearing

Respondent, the St. Mary’s County Department of Social Services (“the 

Department”) initiated an investigation into the above events. At the conclusion of its 

investigation, the Department notified Mr. Junek that it had rendered a finding of “indicated 

child neglect[]” against him. Mr. Junek challenged the Department’s finding and requested 

a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings. An Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) held a hearing on June 23, 2016 regarding Mr. Junek’s appeal of the neglect 

finding.

3

 After the hearing, the ALJ concluded that the Department “ha[d] established by 

 

3 An ALJ had originally stayed Mr. Junek’s appeal pending the outcome of criminal 

charges of involuntary manslaughter and violations of Maryland’s Unattended Child 

Statute, Md. Code, Family Law Article § 5-801, issued against Mr. Junek in the United 

States District Court for the District of Maryland. See Fam. Law Art. § 5-706.1(b)(3)(i) 

(“If a criminal proceeding is pending on charges arising out of the alleged abuse or neglect, 

the Office of Administrative Hearings shall stay the hearing until a final disposition is 

made.”). Criminal charges were brought in federal court because the main operative events 

of September 3, 2014 took place on Naval Air Station Patuxent River, a United States 

military installation and federal enclave subject to the “special maritime and territorial 
3

a preponderance of the evidence that the finding of indicated child neglect [was] supported 

by credible evidence and [was] consistent with the law.” In reaching this conclusion, the 

ALJ commented that “there is no intent requirement under section 5-701(s)[,]” and that no 

such requirement appears in the Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 07.02.07.12 

(Child Neglect Disposition). Mr. Junek filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit 

Court for St. Mary’s County. A hearing was conducted by Judge David Densford, who 

subsequently affirmed the ALJ’s decision and accompanying legal conclusions. 

The Court of Special Appeals

Mr. Junek filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, presenting 

the single issue of whether “‘neglect’ under § 5-701(s) of the Family Law Article of the 

Annotated Code of Maryland require[s] proof of an element of scienter?” J.J. v. St. Mary’s 

Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 2038, 2018 WL 6839467, slip op. at *1 (Dec. 31, 2018) 

(emphasis in original). Applying its recent holding in I.B. v. Frederick Cty. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 239 Md. App. 556, 197 A.3d 598 (2018), the Court of Special Appeals concluded 

“that a finding of indicated neglect under the statutory provisions of Section 5-701 et seq., 

of the Family Law Article, does not require intent[.]” Id. at *4. The Court compared the 

definition of “abuse” and the definition of “neglect” in the Family Law Article, explaining 

that “[t]he General Assembly, in 2017, amended the definition of abuse to include intent 

as an element by excluding ‘the physical injury of a child by accidental means[]’” from the 

 

jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2018). The criminal charges against Mr. 

Junek were eventually dismissed, after which the hearing before the ALJ proceeded.
4

definition of abuse, while not making any such amendment to the definition of neglect. 

Id. (citing 2017 Maryland Laws, Chapter 652). 

Mr. Junek filed a timely petition for certiorari before this Court, requesting that we 

consider whether the definition of child neglect under § 5-701(s) of the Family Law Article

requires proof of the element of intent. We granted certiorari accordingly to address this 

issue. Junek v. St. Mary’s Cty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 463 Md. 146, 204 A.3d 189 (2019). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review an administrative agency’s decision under the same statutory standards 

as the [c]ircuit [c]ourt. Therefore, we reevaluate the decision of the agency, not the 

decision of the lower court.” Gigeous v. E. Corr. Inst., 363 Md. 481, 495-96, 769 A.2d 

912, 921 (2001). “[O]rdinarily the Court reviewing a final decision of an administrative 

agency shall determine (1) the legality of the decision and (2) whether there was substantial 

evidence from the record as a whole to support the decision.” Baltimore Lutheran High 

Sch., v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662, 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985). Purely 

legal questions are reviewed de novo with considerable “weight [afforded] to an agency’s 

experience in interpretation of a statute that it administers[.]” Schwartz v. Md. Dep’t of 

Nat. Res., 385 Md. 534, 554, 870 A.2d 168, 180 (2003). Matters of statutory interpretation 

and application are questions of law, reviewed de novo. Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 

535, 907 A.2d 175, 184 (2006). 

DISCUSSION

Maryland Code, Family Law Article § 5-701(s) defines “[n]eglect” as:
5

the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and 

attention to a child by any parent or other person who has permanent or 

temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the child under 

circumstances that indicate:

(1) that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial 

risk of harm; or

(2) mental injury to the child or a substantial risk of mental injury.

COMAR 07.02.07.12A(1) permits “a finding of indicated child neglect when there is 

credible evidence, which has not been satisfactorily refuted,” of:

(a) A failure to provide proper care and attention;

(b) A child victim;

(c) A parent or caregiver of the alleged victim responsible for the alleged 

neglect; and

(d) Circumstances including the nature, extent, or cause of the alleged neglect 

indicating that the alleged victim’s health or welfare was harmed or was 

at substantial risk of harm.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of 

the legislature. Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 56, 673 A.2d 221, 229 (1996). In reading 

the language of the statute, a court should use “common sense to avoid illogical or 

unreasonable constructions[.]” Id. We will interpret a statute so as “to give every word 

effect, avoiding constructions that render any portion of the language superfluous or 

redundant.” Blondell v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 341 Md. 680, 691, 672 A.2d 639, 644 

(1996). To that end, we first examine the plain meaning of the statutory language. MVA 

v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 254, 923 A.2d 100, 107-08 (2007). “If the words of the statute, 

construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous 
6

and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Jones v. 

State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994). If the meaning of the language 

is unclear or ambiguous, however, we will “consider ‘not only the literal or usual meaning 

of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose 

of the enactment,’ in our attempt to discern the construction that will best further the 

legislative objectives or goals.” Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672, 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 

(1995) (quoting Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994)).

It is clear that the plain language of § 5-701(s) and the COMAR provision does not 

identify an element of scienter or intent as a requirement for a finding of child neglect. 

However, Mr. Junek urges this Court to consider other portions of the COMAR, the Family 

Law Article, the Criminal Law Article, and prior Maryland case law to support his position 

that an implicit intent requirement should be read into the definition of “neglect” in § 5-

701(s). 

Maryland Code, Family Law Article § 5-701(b)(1) defines “[a]buse” as:

(i) the physical or mental injury of a child under circumstances that indicate 

that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being 

harmed by:

1. a parent;

2. a household member or family member;

3. a person who has permanent or temporary care or custody of the child;

4. a person who has responsibility for supervision of the child; or

5. a person who, because of the person’s position or occupation, exercises 

authority over the child; or

(ii) sexual abuse of a child, whether physical injuries are sustained or not.
7

Importantly, sub-section (b)(2) continues on to exclude “physical injury of a child by 

accidental means[]” from the definition. Additionally, COMAR 07.02.07.11A permits a 

finding of indicated child physical abuse based on credible evidence of:

(a) A physical injury;

(b) A child victim;

(c) A parent, caregiver, or household or family member of the alleged victim 

responsible for the alleged abuse; and

(d) Circumstances including the nature, extent, and location of the injury 

indicating that the alleged victim’s health or welfare was harmed or was 

at substantial risk of harm.

Similar to sub-section (b)(2) of Family Law Article § 5-701, COMAR 

07.02.07.11C(2)(c)(i) rules out a finding of child abuse where “[t]he injury resulted from 

accidental or unintended contact with the child and was not caused by a reckless disregard 

for the child’s health or welfare[.]” Family Law Article § 5-701(s) and COMAR 

07.02.07.12, supra, which define and provide guidance on child neglect dispositions, do

not have a similar or equivalent exclusion for accidental or unintentional conduct such as 

the one present in child abuse dispositions. 

In Taylor v. Harford County Department of Social Services, we considered an 

appeal by Father of a finding of indicated child abuse by the Harford County Department 

of Social Services after he angrily kicked a stool, which accidentally bounced and struck 

his daughter, resulting in injuries requiring medical attention. 384 Md. 213, 215, 862 A.2d 

1026, 1027 (2004). Father challenged the child abuse finding, arguing that intent was a 

required element of child abuse, and that his actions did not constitute an intent to harm his 

daughter. Id. at 223, 862 A.2d at 1032. Upon considering the definition of “abuse” under 
8

§ 5-701(b)(1) of the Family Law Article, we explained that a finding of child abuse is ruled 

out where “[t]he act causing the injury was accidental or unintentional and not reckless or 

deliberate[.]” Id. at 226, 862 A.2d at 1033 (citing COMAR 07.02.07.11C(2)(c)(i)4). 

Because of this provision, we concluded that the “act must be shown to have been either 

reckless in its nature or deliberately intended to harm the child in order for a finding of 

‘indicated child abuse’ to be made.” Id. at 232, 862 A.2d at 1037. 

We had the opportunity to revisit these provisions again in McClanahan v. 

Washington County Department of Social Services, in which we considered “whether a 

parent can be liable for child abuse mental injury within the meaning of [Fam. Law § 5-

701] if the parent acted without intent to harm the child.” 445 Md. 691, 700, 129 A.3d 

293, 298 (2015) (footnote omitted). In McClanahan, the Washington County Department 

of Social Services became aware that Mother was manipulating her child into believing 

that Father was assaulting her, causing the child to develop behavioral and emotional 

problems. Id. at 696-97, 129 A.3d at 296. We determined that there was no distinction 

between the physical and mental varieties of child abuse, and due to this lack of distinction, 

 

4 Prior to 2017, child abuse dispositions were regulated under 07.02.07.12 and child 

neglect dispositions were regulated under 07.02.07.13. In 2017, COMAR 07.02.07 was 

amended and renumbered to incorporate changes in federal and State regulations, 

department policies, and court clarifications. The 2017 amendments renumbered the 

section addressing child abuse dispositions to 07.02.07.11, and the section addressing child 

neglect dispositions to 07.02.07.12. In addition to its renumbering, the amendment altered 

the language of the child abuse regulation in form, but not in substance. Prior to 2017, 

child abuse was “ruled out” under then section 07.02.07.12C, where “[t]he act causing the 

injury was accidental or unintentional and not reckless or deliberate[.]” Similarly, child 

abuse is “ruled out” under current section 07.02.07.11C where “[t]he injury resulted from 

accidental and unintended contact with the child and was not caused by reckless disregard 

for the child’s health or welfare[.]” 
9

there needed to be a finding of intent to harm for mental, as well as physical, child abuse 

findings. Id. at 706, 129 A.3d at 301; see also Taylor, 384 Md. at 232, 862 A.2d at 1037. 

Mr. Junek contends that these two cases, which stand for the proposition that 

indicated mental and physical child abuse require a showing of intent to harm, support his 

position that intent is similarly an implicit requirement for a finding of child neglect. In 

applying this precedent, Mr. Junek posited in his brief that “[c]hild neglect has been 

described as a form of child abuse[,]” and that “it is illogical to impose a scienter

requirement for child abuse but not for child neglect.” In support of this contention, Mr. 

Junek further points to Owens v. Prince George’s County Department of Social Services, 

in which the Court of Special Appeals upheld a finding of indicated child neglect based on 

a guardian’s intentional act of ordering the child from the home and refusing to allow the 

child to return. 182 Md. App. 31, 54, 957 A.2d 191, 204 (2008). However, Mr. Junek’s 

application of Owens to the present case is unpersuasive. While Owens deals with 

intentional conduct, it does not stand for the general rule that conduct must be intentional 

for a finding of indicated child neglect. Nowhere in the Owens opinion did the Court of 

Special Appeals rely on the guardian’s actions being intentional. Rather, the Court merely 

concluded that there was substantial evidence for the ALJ to conclude that the guardian

kicked the child out of her home, constituting neglect. Id. A similar conclusion could have 

been reached had the conduct been unintentional, as are the facts in the present case. 

Taylor and McClanahan are similarly inapplicable to the present case. It is 

undisputed that Taylor and McClanahan address an intent requirement for child abuse, not 
10

child neglect. Mr. Junek attempts to extend the application of these two cases to child 

neglect situations. The Court of Special Appeals has recently addressed this precise issue, 

observing the distinctions between the child neglect and abuse statutes and regulations, 

under strikingly similar facts to those in the present case, in I.B. v. Frederick County 

Department of Social Services, 239 Md. App. 556, 197 A.3d 598 (2018). In I.B., Father 

took his children to church and unintentionally left his infant daughter strapped into her car 

seat on a hot day. Id. at 559, 197 A.3d at 600. The authorities were called and the child 

was removed, alive, from the vehicle. Id. The Frederick County Department of Social 

Services investigated the incident and issued a finding of indicated child neglect against 

Father. Id. Criminal charges were also issued against Father, who ultimately pled guilty 

to confinement of a minor under Family Law § 5-801, while the State nol prossed a charge 

of neglect of a minor under Criminal Law § 3-602.1. Id. at 560, 197 A.3d at 600. 

Following disposition of the criminal charges, Father requested a hearing before an ALJ, 

who ultimately affirmed the Department of Social Services’ findings. Id. at 561, 197 A.3d 

at 601. Father sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision, which was affirmed by the 

Circuit Court for Frederick County. Id. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals

considered, inter alia, “whether an implied element of intent or scienter, found by case law 

in the related child abuse statute of the Family Law Article, exists in the neglect statute of 

that same article.” Id. at 562, 197 A.3d at 601. The Court answered this question in the 

negative, concluding that the element of intent is not required for a finding of child neglect. 

Id. at 571, 197 A.3d at 607. 
11

We agree with the rationale of the Court of Special Appeals in I.B. There exists “a 

significant distinction between COMAR provisions for neglect and abuse in terms of 

intent.” Id. at 568, 197 A.3d at 605. In reviewing COMAR 07.02.07.11 and .12, supra, it 

is clear that the Department of Social Services need not prove intent to establish neglect,

but that a successful prosecution of child abuse on the other hand must establish proof of 

intent. Compare COMAR 07.02.07.11C, with COMAR 07.02.07.12C. Mr. Junek cites to 

the principle that “a statute is to be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical 

or incompatible with common sense[,]” for the proposition that it would be at odds with 

the intent of the General Assembly to require intent for a finding of child abuse, while not 

requiring the same element of intent for a finding of child neglect under the same statute. 

See Western Correctional Institution v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125, 142, 807 A.2d 32, 42 (2002). 

We disagree. The General Assembly amended the definition of abuse in 2017 to exclude 

injury of a child by accidental means. See 2017 Maryland Laws, Chapter 652. No such 

amendment was offered or adopted for the definition of neglect. Compare Fam. Law. § 5-

701(b), with Fam. Law § 5-701(s). “As such, an intent requirement cannot be imputed to 

the definition of neglect within the same subtitle, especially because abuse and neglect are 

two distinct concepts.” J.J. v. St. Mary’s County Department of Social Services, No. 2038, 

2018 WL 6839467, slip op. at *4 (Dec. 31, 2018). 

Mr. Junek further argues that because the Criminal Law Article (“Crim. Law”) 

defines neglect as “the intentional failure to provide necessary assistance and resources 

for the physical needs and mental health of a minor[,]” the definition of neglect in the 
12

Family Law Article requires a similar element of intent. See Md. Code, Crim. Law § 3-

602.1(5)(i) (emphasis added). However, we find such an action by the General Assembly 

contrary to Mr. Junek’s position. By including the phrase “intentional failure” in the 

definition of criminal child neglect, but not amending § 5-701(s) of the Family Law Article 

to include this same language, the General Assembly has made clear that the elements of 

criminal and civil child neglect differ with regard to scienter. “[T]he [General Assembly]

is [presumed] to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to

prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the policy of the prior 

law.” Donlon v. Montgomery County Public Schools, 460 Md. 62, 77, 188 A.3d 949, 957-

58 (2018) (quoting Board of Education of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 

A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982)). It is clear that the General Assembly has the power to amend 

the definition of child neglect under § 5-701(s) of the Family Law Article, but has made 

the informed decision not to propose or implement such an amendment. 

CONCLUSION

We conclude that intent or scienter is not an element of child neglect under § 5-

701(s) of the Family Law Article. We have made clear that intent is a requirement to 

sustain a finding of child abuse. See Taylor v. Harford Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 384 Md. 

213, 862 A.2d 1026 (2004); McClanahan v. Washington Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 445 Md. 

691, 129 A.3d 293 (2015). However, any “attempt to expand the definition of neglect to 

mirror the intent requirements established by the Court of Appeals for the definition of 

abuse, is to no avail.” I.B. v. Frederick County Department of Social Services, 239 Md.
13

App. 556, 570-71, 197 A.3d 598, 607 (2018). The General Assembly has taken the 

affirmative action of amending the definition and elements of “abuse” under Fam. Law § 

5-701(b), as well as “neglect” under Crim. Law § 3-602.1, with no similar action taken 

regarding the neglect under Fam. Law § 5-701(s), clearly evidencing their intent to 

differentiate between abuse and neglect. Because the plain language of the statute excludes 

intent as an element of child neglect, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 

Appeals. 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 

SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED. 

COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

PETITIONER.