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CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS REALTY

CORPORATION v. JAMES E.

CHRISTIANSEN ET AL.

(AC 38637)

DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord, Prescott and Mullins, Js.

Considered January 13—officially released March 8, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Mintz, J.)

Jeffrey M. Knickerbocker, in support of the motion.
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. The substituted plaintiff, Mid Pac Portfolio, LLC,1

filed a motion to dismiss the appeal of the

defendant James E. Christiansen2

from the judgment of

the trial court denying his third motion to open the

judgment of strict foreclosure and from the foreclosure

judgment. The plaintiff argues that this appeal is moot

because the denial of the defendant’s third motion to

open did not stay the running of the law days and, thus,

title to the subject property has vested in the plaintiff.

We agree with the plaintiff that this court can provide

no practical relief on appeal, and, therefore, we grant

the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal

as moot.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of

this issue. The defendant and Cielo Christiansen owned

real property in Greenwich encumbered by a mortgage

that had been assigned to the original plaintiff, Citigroup

Global Markets Realty Corporation (Citigroup), as of

the commencement of the action. Citigroup brought

this action to foreclose its mortgage on the basis of the

failure of the defendant and Cielo Christiansen to meet

their payment obligations on the underlying note. A

default for failure to file a responsive pleading was

entered against the defendant.3

On January 20, 2009, the court rendered a judgment

of strict foreclosure with a law day of April 7, 2009.

The judgment was opened and the law day extended

five times over the six years that followed the initial

judgment of strict foreclosure as a consequence of five

bankruptcy petitions filed by the defendant and Cielo

Christiansen. After the bankruptcy court granted the

plaintiff’s motion for relief from the stay arising from

the defendant’s most recent bankruptcy petition, the

plaintiff moved to open and reenter the judgment of

strict foreclosure. The court granted that motion to

open on May 26, 2015, rendered a judgment of strict

foreclosure, and set a law day of August 25, 2015.

The defendant filed three consecutive motions to

open the judgment and to extend the law day after the

May 26, 2015 judgment of strict foreclosure. The court

denied all three of those motions to open. The court

denied the defendant’s first motion to open on August

24, 2015, but the court, sua sponte, opened the judgment

and extended the law day to September 29, 2015.4 The

court denied the defendant’s second motion to open

on September 28, 2015, but the court again, sua sponte,

opened the judgment and extended the law day to

December 1, 2015. The defendant filed his third motion

to open on November 16, 2015, and the court denied

that motion to open on November 30, 2015. The court

in its November 30, 2015 order did not reschedule the

law day set to run on December 1, 2015.5

The defendantfiled this appeal on November 30, 2015.
He did not exercise his right of redemption on the

December 1, 2015 law day.6 On December 9, 2015, the

plaintiff moved to dismiss this appeal as moot.7 The

defendant did not file a response to the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff argues that the court’s denial of the

defendant’s third motion to open did not stay the running of the law day, that title to the property accordingly

has vested in the plaintiff, and that there is no relief

that this court can afford the defendant. We agree with

the plaintiff.

The question of mootness implicates our subject matter jurisdiction. ‘‘When, during the pendency of an

appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate

court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot. . . .

Mootness implicates this court’s subject matterjurisdiction, raising a question of law over which we exercise

plenary review.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View

Associates, 278 Conn. 672, 679–80, 899 A.2d 586 (2006).

This appeal was filed one day before the defendant’s

law day was scheduled to run. The question we must

first address, then, is whether the law day ran as scheduled and title vested in the plaintiff.

We conclude that no automatic appellate stay arose

upon the court’s denial of the defendant’s third motion

to open and the filing of the appeal therefrom. Prior to

October, 2013, a defendant in a foreclosure action could

employ consecutive motions to open the judgment in

tandem with Practice Book §§ 61-11 and 61-14 ‘‘to create

almost the perfect perpetual motion machine.’’(Internal

quotation marks omitted.) First Connecticut Capital,

LLC v. Homes of Westport, LLC, 112 Conn. App. 750,

762, 966 A.2d 239 (2009). Prior to October, 2013, a

court’s denial of a motion to open a judgment of strict

foreclosure automatically stayed the running of the law

days until the twenty-day period in which to file an

appeal from that ruling had expired, and, if an appeal

was filed, that initial appellate stay continued until there

was a final determination of the appeal.

Practice Book § 61-11 was amended effective October 1, 2013, however, to address this problem by the

addition of subsections (g) and (h). Practice Book § 61-

11 (g) applies in this appeal and provides in relevant

part: ‘‘In any action for foreclosure in which the owner

of the equity has filed, and the court has denied, at least

two prior motions to open or other similar motion, no

automatic stay shall arise upon the court’s denial of

any subsequent contested motion by that party, unless

the party certifies under oath, in an affidavit accompanying the motion, that the motion was filed for good

cause arising after the court’s ruling on the party’s most

recent motion. . . .’’

The defendant’s third motion to open, filed on

November 16, 2015, did not have an accompanying affi-
davit, and, thus, the motion did not meet the requirement contained in § 61-11 (g) to set forth a good cause

that arose after the court’s ruling on the defendant’s

most recent motion. As was the case with the prior two

motions, the defendant’s third motion to open sought

an extension of the law day as he and Cielo Christiansen

pursued alternatives to foreclosure.8 Under § 61-11 (g),

the denial of that motion to open on November 30, 2015,

did not create an automatic appellate stay. Because the

defendant failed to exercise his right of redemption on

his law day, title to the property vested in the plaintiff

after the close of business on December 1, 2015.

This appeal is moot, because, upon the vesting of

title to the property, there is no longer any relief that

this court can afford the defendant from the denial of

his third motion to open the judgment. In this regard,

we are guided by our decisions in Barclays Bank of

New York v. Ivler, 20 Conn. App. 163, 565 A.2d 252,

cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 792 (1989), and

Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB v. Charles, 95 Conn. App.

315, 898 A.2d 197, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 909, 902 A.2d

1069 (2006).

‘‘In Barclays Bank of New York v. Ivler, supra, 20

Conn. App. 163, the defendant mortgagor appealed from

the denial of his motion to open a stipulated judgment

of strict foreclosure. . . . In that case, this court stated:

The question this court must address . . . is whether

the law days have run so as to extinguish the defendant’s

equity of redemption and vest title absolutely in the

plaintiff. If this has occurred, no practical relief [could]

follow from a determination of the merits of this case

. . . . [This court] concluded that because the law days

had run and title had vested absolutely in the plaintiff,

the defendant’s appeal was moot. . . . [This court]

explained that it is not within the power of appellate

courts to resuscitate the mortgagor’s right of redemption or otherwise to disturb the absolute title of the

redeeming encumbrancer. . . . Simply put, once title

has vested absolutely in the mortgagee, the mortgagor’s

interest in the property is extinguished and cannot be

revived by a reviewing court.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ocwen Federal Bank,

FSB v. Charles, supra, 95 Conn. App. 324; see also

General Statutes § 49-15 (a).9

In Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB v. Charles, supra, 95

Conn. App. 317, the defendant mortgagors filed two

appeals to raise issues concerning the judgment of strict

foreclosure. Before the second appeal was filed, the

trial court terminated the appellate stay, and, while the

matter was pending before this court, the judgment was

opened and the law days rescheduled. Id., 321–22. Both

parties indicated in their appellate briefs that title to

the property vested in the plaintiff following the running

of the law days. Id., 322. This court dismissed the defendants’ claims to the extent that the remedy sought, the
restoration of their interest in the property, could not

be afforded to them. Id., 324–27.

In this appeal, the defendant’s preliminary statement

of issues indicates that he is challenging the denial of

his third motion to open the judgment and to extend

the law day, as well as the underlying judgment of

strict foreclosure. Because the defendant’s law day has

passed and title has vested absolutely in the plaintiff,

we cannot grant the defendant any practical relief.

Accordingly, the appeal is moot.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 After the action was filed, the court granted two motions to substitute

the party plaintiff when the note and mortgage were assigned to different

entities, resulting in the current plaintiff’s being Mid Pac Portfolio, LLC. The

court granted the motion filed by the original plaintiff, Citigroup Global

Markets Realty Corporation, to substitute Citi Property Holdings, Inc., as

the plaintiff on April 12, 2011. The court granted Citi Property Holdings,

Inc.’s motion to substitute Mid Pac Portfolio, LLC, as the plaintiff on October

24, 2012. We therefore refer in this opinion to Mid Pac Portfolio, LLC, as

the plaintiff.

2 The original plaintiff had commenced this action against James E. Christiansen and Cielo Christiansen. Only James E. Christiansen has appealed.

We therefore refer in this opinion to him as the defendant and to Cielo

Christiansen by name.

3 A default for failure to file an appearance also was entered against

Cielo Christiansen.

4 All three of the defendant’s motions to open were filed more than twenty

days after the most recent rendering of the judgment of strict foreclosure,

and, therefore, no automatic stay of the judgment arose upon the filing of

those motions. See Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1). The trial court’s denials of

the first two motions to open, however, each gave rise to a twenty-day

automatic stay that would have prevented the existing law days from running.

See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. Frimberger, 29 Conn. App. 628, 630–32, 617

A.2d 462 (1992).

5 The court’s November 30, 2015 order denying the third motion to open

included a further order that no writ of ejectment should be filed with the

court until February 5, 2016.

6 Cielo Christiansen also did not exercise her right of redemption on the

law day.

7 The plaintiff also argues in its motion that the appeal is frivolous and

should be dismissed. See Practice Book § 85-2. Because we conclude that

the appeal is moot, we do not reach that claim.

8 The defendant did not contest the trial court’s jurisdiction to render the

judgment of strict foreclosure.

9 General Statutes § 49-15 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) Any judgment

foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion

of the court rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person

having an interest in the judgment and for cause shown, be opened and

modified . . . provided no such judgment shall be opened after the title

has become absolute in any encumbrancer except as provided in subdivision

(2) of this subsection.

‘‘(2) Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure

may be opened after title has become absolute in any encumbrancer upon

agreement of each party to the foreclosure action who filed an appearance

in the action and any person who acquired an interest in the real estate

aftertitle became absolute in any encumbrancer, provided (A) such judgment

may not be opened more than four months after the date such judgment

was entered or more than thirty days after title became absolute in any

encumbrancer, whichever is later, and (B) the rights and interests of each

party, regardless of whether the party filed an appearance in the action,

and any person who acquired an interest in the real estate after title became

absolute in any encumbrancer, are restored to the status that existed on

the date the judgment was entered. . . .’’

The plaintiff has not agreed that the judgment of strict foreclosure may be
opened, and, thus, the exception provided by subdivision (2) does not apply.