NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

LLOYD B., TINA M., Appellants,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, L.B., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0022

Appeal from the Juvenile court in Maricopa County

No. JD22289

The Honorable Bradley H. Astrowsky, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll, Esq., Scottsdale

By Denise L. Carroll

Counsel for Appellant Lloyd B.

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant Tina M.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By JoAnn Falgout

Counsel for Appellee Arizona Department of Economic Security
LLOYD B., TINA M. v. ADES, L.B.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 This is an appeal from a juvenile court’s order granting the 

State’s motion to terminate parental rights. For reasons that follow, we 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 L.B. was born in July 2010; his parents are Lloyd B. 

(“Father”) and Tina M. (“Mother”).1 In June 2012, the Arizona 

Department of Economic Security (“ADES”) received a report alleging 

that (1) Father was increasingly violent towards Mother in L.B.’s presence; 

(2) Father and Mother’s residence had dog feces on the floor and was so 

cluttered that only a small path permitted movement through the home;

(3) L.B. was left in his high chair or playpen for hours at a time because he 

could not be safely placed on the ground; (4) Father and Mother allowed 

L.B. to remain in his own feces for extended periods of time, resulting in a 

rash; (5) Father refused to give L.B. food or water for hours at a time; (6) 

both parents were unemployed; and (7) Father and Mother had not 

obtained services to address L.B.’s special needs due to his premature 

birth.

¶3 After an investigation, ADES offered the parents in-home 

family preservation services. ADES authorized childcare for L.B. and 

urged Father and Mother to remedy the home’s condition. Nevertheless, 

Father and Mother did not consistently take L.B. to daycare, made only 

minimal improvements to the home’s condition, and failed to participate 

in the offered family preservation program.

 1 Father testified that he learned from Mother in November 2013 that 

he may not be L.B.’s biological father, but he agrees that he is L.B.’s legal 

father.
LLOYD B., TINA M. v. ADES, L.B.

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 In mid-July 2012, Father and Mother both tested positive for 

methamphetamine, and ADES thereafter implemented a safety plan

requiring that Mother and L.B. live with Mother’s relatives. Mother

violated the plan, however, when she left her relatives’ home and could 

not be located when L.B. needed medical attention.

¶5 ADES took custody of L.B. in late July 2012, three days after 

L.B.’s second birthday. ADES placed L.B. with a maternal relative, who 

has provided care since then and has expressed an interest in adopting 

him.

¶6 On July 31, 2012, ADES filed a dependency petition alleging 

neglect due to Mother and Father’s substance abuse, domestic violence, 

failure to obtain needed medical services, and failure to provide a safe 

living environment. After Mother contested the dependency allegations, 

the court found L.B. dependent as to both parents and established a case 

plan of family reunification, with a concurrent case plan of severance and 

adoption.

¶7 Father, a military veteran, has a long history of abusing 

alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine. Father used 

methamphetamine sporadically starting in 1986, and began using daily 

with Mother starting in May or June 2012. Father acknowledged that 

when he uses drugs, he is unable to appropriately care for L.B., and Father 

admitted that he had consumed alcohol and methamphetamine while L.B. 

lived with him.

¶8 ADES offered Father the following reunification services: 

substance abuse assessment and treatment, drug testing, parent-aide

assistance, and supervised visitation. ADES also recommended that 

Father self-refer for mental health services through the Veterans’ 

Administration (“VA”) or Magellan Health Services.

¶9 Father was scheduled for 57 random drug screens from late 

July 2012 through October 2013, but he did not submit any valid urine 

samples to the Treatment Assessment Screening Center (“TASC”). 

Although Father testified that he has urinary tract and prostate problems 

that prevented him from urinating while being monitored, he did not 

provide medical support for this claim.

¶10 In late October 2012, Father completed an intake assessment 

at TERROS Treatment Center. Although Father denied drug use, he

tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of the intake assessment, 

as well as in January and February 2013. Father did not consistently 
LLOYD B., TINA M. v. ADES, L.B.

Decision of the Court

4

participate in TERROS’s substance abuse treatment program, which 

resulted in TERROS discontinuing services.

¶11 Father went to Magellan Health Services in June 2013, but he

did not qualify for services. Father completed an intake assessment with 

Maverick House, a substance abuse treatment center, which 

recommended him for outpatient treatment. In late August, Father

completed a 72-hour outpatient program, but he quit the recommended 

aftercare program after two weeks. Father claimed that he began 

attending Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings in April 2013.

¶12 In mid-January 2013, Father began participating in parentaide services, but he did not consistently spend time with L.B. During the 

dependency proceedings, Father changed residences multiple times, and 

at the time of the severance hearing, Father was living in temporary 

housing that he acknowledged would not be an appropriate residence for 

L.B. Father also testified that he suffered a stroke in 2011, and since then 

has not had stable employment. At the time of the severance hearing, he 

was attempting to secure employment at Luke Air Force Base.

¶13 Mother has a history of alcohol, marijuana, and 

methamphetamine use. She began using methamphetamine in 2011, with 

her use peaking in 2012.

¶14 ADES referred Mother for psychological consultation and 

offered her the following reunification services: substance abuse 

assessment and treatment, drug testing, parent-aide assistance, and 

supervised visitation.

¶15 Although Mother knew that ADES wanted her to submit to 

urinalysis testing at TASC, she did not consistently comply with required 

drug testing until approximately June 2013. From July 2012 through 

October 2013, Mother missed 80 of 187 random urinalysis tests. Mother 

tested positive for methamphetamine twice in January 2013.

¶16 In August 2012, Mother completed an intake assessment

with TERROS. But she participated in less than half of the required 

counseling sessions from August through December 2012, and she tested 

positive for methamphetamine in October 2012. In November 2012, 

Mother had “regressed to the early stages of change.” She admitted that 

she only went to outpatient meetings sporadically because she was using 

methamphetamine and chose not to participate in outpatient treatment.
LLOYD B., TINA M. v. ADES, L.B.

Decision of the Court

5

¶17 In February 2013, Mother went to an inpatient treatment 

facility at Maverick House and participated in a 12-step program. She 

lived at the Maverick House facility for 28 days and tested negative for 

drugs during that time. ADES referred her to an aftercare program at a 

recovery facility, Sunlight of the Spirit, but she left after two weeks to be 

with Father. Mother was asked to leave the aftercare program after she 

tested positive for methamphetamine in March 2013. In March 2013, 

TERROS closed out services to Mother due to her inadequate efforts.

¶18 In April 2013, Mother reengaged with TERROS, which 

referred her for standard outpatient treatment with the National Council 

on Alcoholism and Drug Dependency (“NCADD”).

¶19 In mid-May 2013, Mother completed an intake assessment

with NCADD, testing positive for methamphetamine. But Mother only 

attended one of four scheduled treatment classes.

¶20 In June 2013, Mother moved to Sojourner Center, a domestic 

violence shelter, after reporting that Father had assaulted her. Mother 

missed all four of her treatment classes that month at NCADD, and she 

missed two TASC urinalysis tests.

¶21 In June 2013, ADES filed a Motion for Termination of ParentChild Relationship on the grounds of substance abuse and six months’ 

time in care, and later amended the petition to also include nine and 15 

months’ time in care.2 In July, Mother missed one out of four NCADD 

 2 The six months’ time-in-care ground allows termination of parental 

rights if a “child who is under three years of age has been in an out-ofhome placement for a cumulative total period of six months or longer 

pursuant to court order and the parent has substantially neglected or 

wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances” leading to the out-of-home 

placement. Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(8)(b). The nine months’ 

time-in-care ground mirrors the six months’ standard for termination, but 

is applicable to children of any age. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a). The fifteen 

months’ time-in-care ground allows severance based on an out-of-home 

placement of 15 months or longer if “the parent has been unable to 

remedy the circumstances” that caused the out-of-home placement and 

“there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near 

future.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).
LLOYD B., TINA M. v. ADES, L.B.

Decision of the Court

6

classes. In August, she missed another class and another drug test. In late 

August 2013, Sojourner Center asked Mother to leave because she had 

missed required meetings. She was homeless for a couple of weeks before 

moving into Crossroads Halfway House in late September 2013.3 That 

month, she ended her relationship with Father.

¶22 After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the court found 

severance to be in the best interests of the child and terminated Father’s 

and Mother’s parental rights to L.B. based on substance abuse, nine 

months’ time in care, and 15 months’ time in care.

¶23 Father and Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 8-

235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶24 Father and Mother argue that there was insufficient 

evidence to support severing their parental rights based on substance 

abuse, nine months’ time in care, and 15 months’ time in care. Father also 

argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that ADES made 

reasonable efforts to provide him appropriate reunification services and 

that severance of Father’s parental rights was in L.B.’s best interests.

I. Applicable Legal Standards.

¶25 The juvenile court may terminate the parent–child 

relationship only if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one 

statutory ground for severance. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 

22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005); see also A.R.S. § 8-533(B). The court must 

also find that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that severance 

is in the child’s best interests. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d at 

1018; see also A.R.S. § 8-533(B). We review the juvenile court’s severance 

order for an abuse of discretion, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to sustaining the court’s findings and accepting the court’s 

factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d 43, 47 (App. 2004); Manuel M. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2, 181 P.3d 1126, 1128 (App. 

2008). We similarly defer to the juvenile court’s credibility assessments. 

 3 Mother signed a commitment contract on September 24, 2013 to 

stay at Crossroads for the next 126 days.
LLOYD B., TINA M. v. ADES, L.B.

Decision of the Court

7

Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 

(App. 2002).

¶26 The statutory ground for severance due to substance abuse 

requires proof “[t]hat the parent is unable to discharge parental 

responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous 

drugs, controlled substances or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds 

to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate 

period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). Severance under § 8-533(B)(3) also requires 

a showing that ADES provided the parent with adequate reunification 

services. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 19, 219 

P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009).Drug use does not need to be constant to be 

considered chronic drug abuse. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 

Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 16, 231 P.3d 377, 381 (App. 2010). Parental 

responsibilities under § 8-533(B)(3) include providing a child with “food, 

shelter, and medical attention,” as well as with good physical care, 

emotional security, guidance, and control. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 97, ¶ 19, 210 P.3d 1263, 1268 (App. 2009).

II. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Findings 

Regarding Statutory Grounds for Severance.

¶27 Father argues the juvenile court erred by finding that he 

would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and 

control in the near future due to substance abuse. But a parent’s failure to 

remedy his or her substance abuse, knowing that the loss of his or her 

child is imminent, is evidence that the parent has not overcome 

dependency on drugs and alcohol. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29, 231 

P.3d at 383. In considering whether a parent’s substance abuse will 

continue for a prolonged indeterminate period, courts consider the 

parent’s treatment history “to gauge the likelihood the parent will be in a 

position to parent the child in the foreseeable future.” Id. at 378, ¶ 25, 231 

P.3d at 382 (citation omitted). If the parent has been unable to sustain 

sobriety in a noncustodial setting, “there is little hope of success in 

parenting.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶28 Here, Father refused to participate in required urinalysis 

testing through TASC following L.B.’s removal. Father alleged that a 

medical condition affected his ability to comply with urinalysis testing, 

but he did not provide any evidence documenting his alleged medical 

condition. Moreover, he acknowledged that he was able to provide a 

urine sample for a new employer a week prior to the severance hearing.
LLOYD B., TINA M. v. ADES, L.B.

Decision of the Court

8

¶29 Father’s participation with substance abuse treatment was

inconsistent. TERROS services were eventually closed due to Father’s lack 

of attendance, and he tested positive for methamphetamine in October 

2012, January 2013, and twice in February 2013. Although Father 

completed a 72-hour treatment program in late August, his successful 

completion does not demonstrate sobriety because the program did not 

require drug testing. And Father stopped attending an aftercare program 

after only two weeks. Although Father testified that he had been 

attending an AA 12-step program, he could not recall the steps of the 

program, despite alleging that he was on Step 10.

¶30 Although Father testified that he last used 

methamphetamine in April 2013, he did not comply with a drug testing 

program that could have supported his assertion, and he did not 

otherwise show that he was drug free. Accordingly, the record supports 

the juvenile court’s finding that Father would be unable to discharge his 

parental responsibilities because of substance abuse, and that there were

reasonable grounds to believe that Father’s substance abuse would

continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period.

¶31 Father also contends that ADES did not make diligent efforts 

to provide appropriate reunification services under § 8-533(B)(3). 

Specifically, he argues that ADES failed to offer services to treat domestic 

violence and post-traumatic stress disorder. But the record reflects that 

Father waited until May 2013 to self-refer for VA mental health services, 

and he did not inform ADES about an alleged two-year waiting list to be 

seen by VA mental health specialists. Accordingly, the juvenile court did 

not abuse its discretion by concluding that ADES provided appropriate 

reunification services.

¶32 Mother argues that the State failed to present sufficient 

evidence to prove that she was unable to discharge her parental 

responsibilities due to substance abuse. She asserts that she stopped using 

drugs at the end of May 2013 and was successfully participating in 

substance abuse treatment through NCADD and Crossroads at the time of 

the severance hearing.

¶33 The record reflects, however, that Mother has not 

demonstrated an ability to remain sober when not in an inpatient setting. 

Mother did not consistently submit to urinalysis testing until 

approximately mid-June 2013, and she missed 80 out of 187 required 

random drug tests from July 2012 through October 2013. She tested 

positive for methamphetamine twice in January 2013.
LLOYD B., TINA M. v. ADES, L.B.

Decision of the Court

9

¶34 After L.B.’s removal, Mother moved from one treatment 

center to another without successfully completing a treatment program. 

She participated in less than half of the TERROS sessions from August 

2012 through December 2012. Although she tested negative for 

methamphetamine use while living at the Maverick House in February 

2013, she was asked to leave a subsequent aftercare program after a 

positive test in March 2013. TERROS discontinued services due to 

Mother’s inadequate participation.

¶35 Mother reengaged services at TERROS in April 2013, and 

began participating in NCADD programs in mid May. At intake with 

NCADD, however, she tested positive for methamphetamine use and

missed three out of four classes. In June 2013, she moved into a domestic 

violence shelter and continued to sporadically attend NCADD classes 

through September 2013. In late August 2013, the domestic violence 

shelter asked her to leave because she had missed required meetings.

¶36 Mother testified at the severance hearing that she had not 

been successful at prior treatment centers because she had not realized at 

that time that her life had become so unmanageable. She admitted not 

being willing to make a change until September 2013, and that she had 

just started to make changes 15 months after L.B. was removed from her 

care.

¶37 Notwithstanding Mother’s recent efforts to treat her drug 

problem, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother had

been unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of drug use 

and that there were reasonable grounds to believe Mother’s chronic 

substance abuse would continue for a prolonged and indeterminate 

period of time.

¶38 Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that severance of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to L.B. was 

warranted based on substance abuse under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), and 

because it is undisputed that L.B. had been in a court-ordered placement 

for 15 months or longer, the evidence also supports the juvenile court’s 

findings under § 8-533(B)(8)(c). Having upheld these grounds for 

severance, we need not address any additional grounds found by the 

juvenile court. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, 

¶ 27, 995 P.2d 682, 687 (2000).
LLOYD B., TINA M. v. ADES, L.B.

Decision of the Court

10

III. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding that 

Severance Is in L.B.’s Best Interests.

¶39 Father argues that the juvenile court’s best interests finding 

is not supported by the evidence. He alleges that L.B. is unhappy at his 

foster placement, the foster parents are spanking and abusing L.B., and 

L.B.’s needs are not being met. Father also argues that he has learned 

appropriate parenting skills and should be given more time to obtain 

necessary treatment, and that he has a close bond with L.B.

¶40 To determine whether severance is in the best interests of a 

child, the court balances the parent’s rights against the child’s rights. Kent 

K., 210 Ariz. at 287, ¶ 37, 110 P.3d at 1021. Termination of the parent–child 

relationship is in the child’s best interests if the child would be harmed if 

the relationship continues or would benefit from termination. Mary Lou 

C., 207 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d at 50. Factors to consider include (1) 

whether an adoptive placement is immediately available, Audra T. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998), 

(2) whether the current placement is meeting the child’s needs, id., and (3) 

whether the child is adoptable. See Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352, 884 P.2d 234, 238 (App. 1994).

¶41 The juvenile court found that L.B.’s placement with a 

relative was meeting L.B.’s special needs, and that L.B. is happy and has 

bonded with the relative, who is willing to adopt him. The juvenile court 

further found that L.B. “needs to be in a safe, stable, and loving 

environment” and that [n]either parent can provide same at this time, or 

in the foreseeable future.”

¶42 The evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that 

termination of Father’s parental rights is in L.B.’s best interests. The ADES 

case manager testified that L.B.’s placement with relatives provided a 

loving and caring environment, and that L.B. appeared to be happy and to 

have bonded with his foster parents. The current placement is also 

meeting L.B.’s special needs as he is receiving occupational/speech 

therapy and attending a developmental preschool. L.B. is adoptable, and

L.B.’s foster parents are willing to adopt him, which demonstrates an 

affirmative benefit to L.B. from severance of Father’s parental rights. See

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d 943, 945 

(App. 2004).

¶43 Although Father argues that termination of his parental 

rights is premature, we conclude otherwise. See Maricopa County Juv. 
LLOYD B., TINA M. v. ADES, L.B.

Decision of the Court

11

Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577, 869 P.2d 1224, 1230 (App. 1994) 

(“Leaving the window of opportunity for remediation open indefinitely is 

not necessary, nor do we think that it is in the child’s or the parent’s best 

interests.”). By the time of the severance hearing, Father had not 

demonstrated sobriety, and he acknowledged that he was not in a “stable 

place” where he could parent L.B.

¶44 Because severance of Father’s parental rights will allow L.B. 

to benefit from adoption in a stable and loving home where his special 

needs are met, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding 

that severance is in L.B.’s best interests. See James S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 193 Ariz. 351, 356, ¶ 18, 972 P.2d 684, 689 (App. 1998).

CONCLUSION

¶45 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to L.B.