IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

K.J., a Minor, etc., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

LUIS A. CARRILLO,

Objector and Appellant.

S241057

Second Appellate District, Division Three

B269864

Los Angeles County Superior Court

BC505356

January 30, 2020

Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 

Cuéllar, and Kruger concurred.
1

K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

S241057

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

This case presents a narrow question of procedural law: 

Does a Court of Appeal have jurisdiction to review an order 

directing an attorney to pay sanctions when the notice of appeal

identifies the attorney’s client as the appealing party, but other 

indicia make clear that the attorney was the party seeking 

review? The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding 

that the attorney’s client lacked standing to challenge the 

sanctions order and that the notice of appeal could not be 

liberally construed to include the omitted attorney. 

We reverse the Court of Appeal’s dismissal and hold that,

when it is clear from the record that the omitted attorney 

intended to participate in the appeal and the respondent was 

not misled or prejudiced by the omission, the rule of liberal 

construction compels that the notice be construed to include the 

omitted attorney. We further conclude that test is satisfied here 

based on the following: (1) the notice of appeal expressly 

designated the sanctions order as the sole order or judgment at 

issue in the appeal; (2) the challenged order only imposed 

sanctions against the attorney and had no effect on the rights of 

the client; (3) during the trial court proceedings, the attorney 

engaged in substantial litigation regarding the sanctions 

motions that focused exclusively on whether the court had 

authority to discipline him; and (4) the adverse party, Los 

Angeles Unified School District, did not assert that it was misled 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

2

or prejudiced from the notice’s failure to reference the attorney

as an appealing party. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court Proceedings 

Attorney Luis Carrillo represented K.J., a minor, in a 

negligence action against the Los Angeles Unified School 

District and district personnel (collectively LAUSD) arising 

from a sexual assault that occurred on LAUSD property. During 

the litigation, LAUSD filed an application for sanctions 

asserting that Carrillo had willfully obstructed a court-ordered

psychiatric examination of K.J. by directing the examiner not to 

ask questions about the details of the assault. LAUSD

contended that Carrillo’s conduct directly violated a prior 

discovery order in which the trial court had declined to place any

such limitations on the examiner.

After issuing an order to show cause and holding an 

evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order of contempt 

finding Carrillo guilty of willfully disobeying the prior discovery 

order. The court ordered Carrillo to serve 24 hours in county

jail and to pay a $750 fine. The court’s order also invited LAUSD 

to file a supplemental application to recover the fees and costs it 

had expended in litigating the sanctions motion and the 

contempt proceedings. Carrillo filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal challenging the contempt 

order. On October 26, 2015, the Court of Appeal issued an order 

staying the order of contempt.

While the stay was in effect, LAUSD filed its supplemental 

application, which sought $100,000 in sanctions from Carrillo 

and his law firm. The requested sanctions included $52,247 in 

fees and costs that LAUSD had incurred in litigating the
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

3

original application for sanctions and an additional $47,752 

penalty to “deter future misconduct.”

At the hearing on the supplemental application, the court 

informed the parties that it intended to order Carrillo to pay

discovery sanctions totaling $16,111. K.J.’s cocounsel, John 

Henrichs, argued that the Court of Appeal’s stay of the contempt 

order barred the trial court from entering any further sanctions 

against Carrillo. In response, the trial court explained that it 

was not “looking at this as contempt sanctions. I mean, it’s 

arising out [of] that incident and it came up in connection with 

a contempt hearing, but it’s really a motion for interference with 

[the] discovery process. [¶] . . . [¶] So, this particular decision 

will stand, in my view, regardless of what the appellate decision 

is. [¶] . . . [¶] There is no penal component on this award.” On 

December 1, 2015, the trial court entered an order directing 

“Luis A. Carrillo, individually, and/or the Law Offices of Luis A. 

Carrillo, jointly and severally” to pay $16,111 to LAUSD. The

order pertained only to Carrillo; it had no effect on K.J. 

Several weeks after the order was filed, the Court of 

Appeal issued a “suggestive Palma notice” (see Brown, Winfield 

& Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 

1238; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 

171), informing the trial court that there was insufficient 

evidence to find Carrillo had willfully disobeyed the discovery 

order, and that it intended to issue a peremptory writ of 

mandate compelling the trial court to enter a new order finding 

Carrillo not guilty of contempt.

In response to the Palma notice, the trial court vacated its 

contempt order and issued a new order finding Carrillo not 

guilty of willfully disobeying the prior discovery order. The 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

4

court’s order clarified, however, that the “new order [did not] . . . 

reverse or change the Court’s previous order, dated December 1, 

2015, awarding sanctions totaling $16,111.00 to LAUSD, based 

upon its finding that [Carrillo] had violated discovery 

statutes . . . .” 

On January 26, 2016, attorney Mark Allen filed a notice of

appeal using Judicial Council form APP-002. In the caption 

area of the standard form, Allen identified himself as K.J.’s 

attorney, and incorporated the same case title that was used in 

the trial court, “K.J., a minor through her guardian ad litem, . . . 

v. Los Angeles Unified School District.” Section one of the notice 

stated: “1. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT . . . K.J., a 

minor through her guardian ad litem, . . . appeals from the . . .

order in this case, which was entered on . . . December 1, 2015[.]” 

In a preprinted list that allows the appellant to designate the 

type of judgment or order being appealed from, a box was 

checked indicating an appeal of an order pursuant to “Code of 

Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(3)–(13).”

1 Allen signed the 

notice, which contained no reference to Carrillo. 

B. The Court of Appeal’s Dismissal of the Appeal

1. The parties’ contentions on appeal

The appellant’s opening brief argued that the trial court’s 

sanctions order should be reversed for two reasons. First, 

appellant contended the Court of Appeal’s stay of the contempt 

 

1 Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(11), 

authorizes an appeal “from an interlocutory judgment directing 

payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney for a 

party if the amount exceeds [$5,000].” Both parties 

acknowledge that the sanctions order at issue in this case is 

appealable under subdivision (a)(11).
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

5

order had divested the trial court of authority to issue the 

subsequent sanctions order. In support, appellant noted that 

the contempt order included language inviting LAUSD to seek 

the very fees and costs the court had awarded in its subsequent 

sanctions order. Second, appellant argued that once the trial 

court had vacated its contempt order, it had no basis to direct 

the payment of further sanctions based on the same conduct 

that was at issue in the contempt proceedings.

In its respondent’s brief, LAUSD argued for the first time 

that the appeal should be dismissed based on K.J.’s “obvious 

lack of standing” to challenge an order that only imposed 

sanctions against Carrillo. LAUSD did not address whether the 

notice of appeal could or should be construed to include Carrillo. 

LAUSD’s brief also responded to the merits arguments raised in 

the opening brief, contending that the Court of Appeal’s stay of 

the contempt order did not preclude the trial court from entering 

a separate sanctions order for discovery violations. 

Appellant’s reply brief did not dispute that K.J. lacked 

standing to challenge the sanctions order. The brief asserted, 

however, that in furtherance of the “strong policy in favor of 

hearing appeals on their merits,” the notice of appeal should be 

liberally construed to include Carrillo as an intended party to 

the appeal. The brief contended that because the notice sought 

review of an order that directed only Carrillo to pay sanctions, 

it was clear that Carrillo was the intended “underlying litigant.”

2. The Court of Appeal’s ruling

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. Citing Calhoun v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist.

(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 39 (Calhoun) and People v. Indiana 

Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1 (Indiana 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

6

Lumbermens), the court held that when a sanctions order is 

entered against an attorney, the right of appeal is vested “ ‘in 

[the attorney], not [the attorney’s client]. . . . Absent any 

attempted appeal by the sanctioned party, the sanction ruling is 

not . . . reviewable.’ ” (Quoting Calhoun, at p. 42.) The court 

also rejected K.J.’s assertion that the notice of appeal should be 

construed to include Carrillo, explaining that the liberal 

construction requirement could not be “stretch[ed] . . . so far as 

to deem a notice of appeal to include an unnamed party.”

Carrillo filed a petition for review seeking resolution of the 

following question: Does the Court of Appeal lack jurisdiction 

to review an order imposing sanctions on an attorney when the 

notice of appeal is brought in the name of the client rather than 

the attorney, or does the liberal construction requirement set 

forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) permit the 

court to construe the notice to include the omitted attorney? 

II. DISCUSSION

“[T]he timely filing of an appropriate notice of appeal or 

its legal equivalent is an absolute prerequisite to the exercise of 

appellate jurisdiction.” (Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. 

Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 670 (Hollister).) The parties dispute 

whether Carrillo satisfied that jurisdictional requirement here 

given that the notice of appeal listed only K.J. as the appealing 

party. Carrillo argues that, contrary to the Court of Appeal’s 

holding, the rule of liberal construction permits a reviewing 

court to construe a notice of appeal from a sanctions order to 

include a sanctioned attorney who is not referenced in the 

notice. LAUSD disagrees, contending the Court of Appeal 

correctly concluded it had no authority to read an unnamed 

party into the notice. 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

7

A. Summary of the Rules Governing the Notice of 

Appeal 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(1)2requires that, 

“[t]o appeal from a superior court judgment or an appealable 

order of a superior court, . . . an appellant must serve and file a 

notice of appeal in that superior court.” Rule 8.100(a)(2) further

provides that “[t]he notice of appeal must be liberally construed. 

The notice is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or 

order being appealed.” In an article describing the purpose and 

scope of the original Rules on Appeal, which became effective on 

July 1, 1943 and contained a provision that is essentially 

identical to current rule 8.100(a)(2) (see former rule 1(a)), the 

rules’ drafter, B.E. Witkin, explained that the Judicial Council 

had chosen not to impose any further “requirements . . . as to 

the contents of the notice . . . on the ground that . . . this basic, 

jurisdictional notice should be simple, to make it relatively 

immune from attack on technical grounds.” (Witkin, New 

California Rules on Appeal (1944) 17 So.Cal. L.Rev. 79, 83

(hereafter New California Rules on Appeal).)

Rule 8.100(a)(2)’s liberal construction requirement 

reflects the long-standing “ ‘law of this state that notices of 

appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the right of 

appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying 

to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly 

have been misled or prejudiced.’ ” (In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 

Cal.4th 261, 272; see Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 59.) The 

rule is intended to “implement the strong public policy favoring 

the hearing of appeals on the merits.” (Norco Delivery Service, 

 

2 All further references to rules are to the California Rules 

of Court. 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

8

Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 955, 

960; see Glassco v. El Sereno Country Club, Inc. (1932) 217 Cal. 

90, 92 [“notices of appeal are to be liberally construed with a 

view to hearing causes on their merits”]; Kellett v. Marvel (1936) 

6 Cal.2d 464, 471 [“notices of appeal are liberally construed to 

preserve the right of review unless it appears that the 

respondent has been misled”].) 

Considered together, rules 8.100(a)(1) and 8.100(a)(2) 

reflect the different standards that govern the filing of the notice 

of appeal versus the content of the notice with respect to 

appellate jurisdiction: While the timely filing of a notice of 

appeal is an absolute jurisdictional prerequisite (see Hollister, 

supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 669; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(b) [“[i]f 

a notice of appeal is filed late, the reviewing court must dismiss 

the appeal”]3), technical accuracy in the contents of the notice is 

not. (See Beltram v. Appellate Department (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 

711, 714 (Beltram) [“[t]he general rule is that although failure 

to file a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be 

remedied, once a notice is filed it is to be construed liberally in 

favor of its sufficiency”].) Once a notice of appeal is timely filed, 

the liberal construction requirement compels a reviewing court 

to evaluate whether the notice, despite any technical defect,

nonetheless served its basic function — to provide notice of who 

is seeking review of what order or judgment — so as to properly 

invoke appellate jurisdiction. 

 

3 California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a) sets forth the 

requirements governing when a notice of appeal must be filed, 

typically the earliest of 60 days after service of the notice of 

entry of the appealable order or judgment, or 180 days after 

entry of the order or judgment. There is no dispute that the 

notice in this case was filed in a timely manner.
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

9

In Chung Sing v. Southern Pacific Co. (1918) 178 Cal. 261

(Chung Sing), we applied the liberal construction requirement

to a notice of appeal that had misnamed one of the appealing 

parties. The plaintiff in Chung Sing obtained a judgment 

against three defendants, Southern Pacific Company, H. W. 

Crumrine and George Blackburn. Defendants’ counsel filed a 

notice of appeal that correctly listed two of the appellants —

Southern Pacific Company and H. W. Crumrine — but 

erroneously listed the third appellant as C. A. Burton, rather 

than George Blackburn. The plaintiff argued that defendant 

Blackburn should be dismissed from the appeal because he was 

not referenced in the notice. 

We rejected that argument, concluding that “[i]t [was] 

perfectly apparent from the notice, when read in connection 

with the record, that such notice was filed on behalf of 

[defendant Blackburn] . . . .” (Chung Sing, supra, 178 Cal. at 

p. 263.) We noted that Blackburn was one of the parties who 

had been named in the challenged judgment, and that “no one 

named Burton was involved therein.” (Ibid.) We explained that 

the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the record was 

that “the use of the name ‘C. A. Burton’ . . . to designate one of 

the appellants was solely due to inadvertence” (id. at pp. 263–

264), and that “the adverse party could not have been misled

thereby” (id. at p. 264).

In Vibert v. Berger (1966) 64 Cal.2d 65 (Vibert), we held 

that a notice of appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer

could be construed to incorporate the judgment of dismissal 

entered thereon. In our analysis, we explained that, under 

“ ‘hornbook law . . . [an] order sustaining a demurrer is 

interlocutory [and] not appealable, and that the appeal must be 

taken from the subsequently entered judgment.’ ” (Id. at p. 67.) 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

10

However, quoting at length the reasoning in Evola v. Wendt 

Construction Co. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 658 (Evola), we further 

observed that several courts addressing the same issue had 

nonetheless concluded that the notice should be construed to 

include the underlying judgment if the appellant’s intent was 

clear, and no prejudice would accrue to the respondent: “ ‘There 

may be many situations where a notice of appeal from a 

nonappealable order cannot and should not be treated to be a 

notice of appeal from a judgment subsequently entered. In 

many situations there might be doubts as to just what the 

appellant was seeking to have reviewed. But there is no doubt 

in the instant case. Clearly, the appellant was seeking to have 

reviewed the propriety of the order sustaining the demurrer . . . . 

[B]y incorrectly stating that he was appealing from the order 

instead of from the judgment, he should not be precluded from 

securing a review of what all concerned knew he was seeking to 

have reviewed. No one was misled. No prejudice to the 

respondent appears. Respondent is simply trying to take 

advantage of a mistake made by appellant . . . .’ ” (Vibert, at pp. 

68–69, italics omitted, quoting Evola, at p. 661.) 

Finding persuasive the analysis in Evola, supra, 158 

Cal.App.2d 658, we held that “[w]hether the error in the notice 

of appeal was merely one in describing the order or judgment or

whether it was caused by appellant’s ignorance, the notice may 

without prejudice to respondent reasonably be interpreted to 

apply to [the] appealable order or judgment rendered before the 

appeal was noticed. The appeal must therefore be heard on the 

merits.” (Vibert, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 70.) 

More recently, in Walker v. Los Angeles County 

Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15 

(Walker), we applied the rationale of Vibert to a notice of appeal 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

11

that sought review of an order denying a motion for new trial. 

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal based on Rodriguez v. 

Barnett (1959) 52 Cal.2d 154 (Rodriguez), a prior decision in 

which we dismissed an appeal from an order denying a new 

trial, and specifically “admoni[shed] . . . members of the bar . . . 

to cease appealing from such an obviously nonappealable order.” 

(Id. at p. 156.) 

In Walker, we agreed with the Court of Appeal’s finding 

that “an order denying a motion for new trial is not 

independently appealable,” and that the plaintiff had “thus 

plainly erred in seeking to appeal from the . . . order . . . rather 

than from the . . . judgment . . . .” (Walker, at p. 19, italics 

omitted.) We disagreed, however, that Rodriguez precluded the 

Court of Appeal from “construing the notice to encompass the 

underlying judgment” (ibid.), explaining that the dismissal in 

Rodriguez did not have “the effect of closing the doors to the 

party’s appeal since . . . the appealing party [in that case] had 

filed both a notice of appeal from the order denying a new trial 

and a timely notice of appeal from the underlying judgment. . . . 

[¶] In this case, only one notice of appeal was filed, and 

dismissal would have the effect of completely denying [plaintiff] 

an appeal.” (Id. at p. 20, italics omitted.) Finally we held that 

“[b]ecause ‘[t]he law aspires to respect substance over formalism 

and nomenclature’ [citation], a reviewing court should construe 

a notice of appeal from an order denying a new trial to be an 

appeal from the underlying judgment when it is reasonably 

clear the appellant intended to appeal from the judgment and 

the respondent would not be misled or prejudiced.” (Id. at p. 22.) 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

12

B. The Court of Appeal Erred in Concluding That a 

Notice of Appeal Cannot Be Liberally 

Construed To Include an Unnamed Party

Based on the reasoning of our decisions above, we agree 

with Carrillo that a reviewing court is not categorically 

precluded from construing a notice of appeal from a sanctions 

order to include a sanctioned attorney who is not referenced in 

the notice. Applying the standard set forth in Walker, supra, 35 

Cal.4th 15, we conclude that a reviewing court must construe a 

notice of appeal from a sanctions order to include an omitted 

attorney when it is reasonably clear that the attorney intended 

to join in the appeal, and the respondent was not misled or 

prejudiced by the omission. 

Although LAUSD is correct that the rule of liberal 

construction is most commonly employed to remedy defects in a

notice’s designation of the order or judgment that is being 

appealed from, our holding in Chung Sing, supra, 178 Cal. 261,

makes clear that the rule also applies to defects in the notice’s 

designation of the parties to the appeal.4 (See Chung Sing, at 

 

4 B. E. Witkin, who drafted the original Rules on Appeal 

(see ante, at p. 7), appears to have anticipated that, in 

appropriate cases, the rule of liberal construction would be 

utilized to remedy defects in the notice’s description of the 

appealing parties. Witkin noted that former rule 1(a)’s 

requirement that “ ‘[a] notice of appeal shall be liberally 

construed in favor of its sufficiency’ ” was intended to reflect 

“the rule of liberal construction declared in a number of cases.” 

(New California Rules on Appeal, supra, 17 So.Cal. L.Rev. at 

p. 82.) In support, Witkin cited to several cases that had 

previously applied the rule, including Poggetto v. Bowen (1936) 

18 Cal.App.2d 173 (Poggetto), in which the reviewing court 

construed a notice of appeal that mistakenly identified the 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

13

pp. 263–264; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) § 

562, p. 641 [under the rule of liberal construction, “[m]istakes in 

the designation of parties will not be fatal”, citing In re Estate of 

Strong (1937) 10 Cal.2d 389, 390 [notice that erroneously 

designated plaintiff as the executor of the estate construed to 

have been brought in plaintiff’s individual capacity], Boynton v. 

McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 787–788 [notice that 

identified only one defendant as the respondent construed to 

include all of the codefendants], Poggetto, supra, 18 Cal.App.2d 

at pp. 175–176].)

While Chung Sing, supra, 178 Cal. 261, involved a notice 

of appeal that had merely misnamed one of the appealing

parties, other decisions have applied the liberal construction 

requirement to construe a notice to include a party who was

omitted from the notice entirely. In Beltram, supra, 66 

Cal.App.3d 711, for example, a judgment was entered jointly 

against the City of Los Angeles and an employee of the city. The 

city filed a notice of appeal that did not refer to the employee. 

The court, however, concluded the notice was sufficient to 

preserve the employee’s right of appeal: “Any liability of the 

City of Los Angeles to plaintiffs is wholly derivative from the 

liability of its employee . . . . The issues as to the city and its 

employee [we]re identical. Therefore, the inadvertent omission 

of the employee’s name from the notice of appeal [could not] have 

 

defendant as the appellant to have been brought on behalf of 

the plaintiff. Poggetto included citations to Chung Sing, supra, 

178 Cal. 261, and other cases that had applied the rule to 

remedy errors in the notice’s designation of the parties. 

(Poggetto, at p. 176.) 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

14

prejudiced or misled plaintiffs or in any way affected their 

preparation for the appeal.” (Id. at p. 715.)

Similarly, in Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1208, 

an attorney filed a notice of appeal from a judgment that was 

entered jointly and severally against a husband and wife. 

Although the husband had signed the notice, the area of the 

form designating the names of the appellants was left blank. 

The plaintiffs argued that because only the husband’s name 

appeared on the notice, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction 

to consider any appeal by the wife, and thus the judgment 

against her must stand. The court rejected the argument,

concluding that because the challenged judgment subjected both 

husband and wife “to the same award,” the rule of “[l]iberal 

construction . . . compel[led]” the court to conclude she was an 

intended appellant despite her omission from the notice. (Id. at 

p. 1216.) 

Our reasoning in Walker, supra, 35 Cal.4th 15, and Vibert, 

supra, 64 Cal.2d 65, is also instructive. In each case, we 

explained that while the appellant had “plainly erred” by

designating only a nonappealable order in the notice (Walker, at 

p. 19; see Vibert, at p. 69), the strong public policy favoring the 

hearing of appeals on their merits compelled that the notice be 

construed to incorporate the underlying judgment if the party’s 

intent was “apparent” from the record (Vibert, at p. 68), and the 

respondent was not misled or prejudiced by the omission. As 

stated in Vibert, even if the notice’s defect was the result of 

“appellant’s ignorance” (id. at p. 70) of the technical 

requirements of appellate procedure, he “ ‘should not be 

precluded from securing a review of what all concerned knew he 

was seeking to have reviewed’ ” (id. at pp. 68–69, italics omitted, 

quoting Evola, supra, 158 Cal.App.2d at p. 661). That reasoning 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

15

applies equally where it is clear from the record that an attorney 

intended to join in an appeal from an order directing him or her 

to pay sanctions, but, either through clerical error or ignorance

of the law, was omitted from the notice of appeal.

5

 

The Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion, 

holding that the notice of appeal filed in K.J.’s name could not 

be construed to include Carrillo regardless of whether his intent 

to join in the appeal was otherwise clear from the record. In

support, the court relied on Calhoun, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 39,

one of several cases holding that a client’s notice of appeal from 

a sanctions order cannot be construed to include an omitted 

attorney. (Id. at p. 43; see Indiana Lumbermens, supra, 226 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 10–11 [following Calhoun’s analysis]; In re 

Marriage of Knowles (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 35, 38, fn. 11 

[dismissing attorney’s appeal of sanctions order and citing 

Calhoun]; but see Kane v. Hurley (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 859, 

861, fn. 4 [liberally construing client’s notice of appeal from 

order sanctioning attorney to “include [the omitted attorney]”]; 

Eichenbaum v. Alon (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 967, 974 

[construing party’s notice of appeal from joint sanctions order to 

“include [party’s] attorney”].)

 

5 Although LAUSD contends that construing a notice of 

appeal that identifies a nonappealable order to include the 

underlying judgment is “far different” than construing a notice 

of appeal to include an omitted party, it fails to explain why 

those circumstances should be treated differently. Where an 

omitted party’s intent to join in the appeal is clear from the 

record, the respondent suffers no more prejudice than when the 

notice erroneously designates a nonappealable order, but it is 

clear from the record that the appellant sought review of the 

judgment entered thereon. 

 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

16

Calhoun, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 39, and its progeny 

effectively adopt a bright-line rule mandating that an attorney’s 

name appear in the notice of appeal to preserve his or her right 

to challenge a sanctions order. We acknowledge this bright-line 

approach would provide the benefit of clarity, and relieve the 

Court of Appeal from having to make case-by-case

determinations whether an omitted attorney’s intent to join in 

the appeal was sufficiently clear. However, the same could be 

said of the various types of technical defects that we addressed 

in Chung Sing, supra, 178 Cal. 261, Vibert, supra, 64 Cal.2d 65,

and Walker, supra, 35 Cal.4th 15. In all those cases, we 

concluded that the defect in the notice did not warrant 

automatic dismissal. Instead, we held that the public policy

interests underlying the liberal construction requirement 

justified an examination of the record to determine whether, 

despite the notice’s defect, the appellants’ intent was

nonetheless clear to the parties. The same is true here. 

Whatever benefits might accrue from the formalistic approach

set forth in Calhoun do not justify forfeiture of a party’s right to 

appeal in cases where his or her intent to participate in the 

appeal is reasonably clear from the record, and the omission has 

caused no confusion or prejudice to the opposing party. (See 

Walker, at p. 22.)6

 

6 To the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion, we 

disapprove Calhoun v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist., supra, 

20 Cal.App.4th 39, and other prior cases that suggest an 

attorney’s name must appear in the notice of appeal to preserve 

his or her right to challenge a sanctions order, including People 

v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 

at page 10, In re Marriage of Knowles, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 

at page 38, footnote 1, and Taylor v. Varga (1995) 37 

Cal.App.4th 750, 761–762, footnote 12.
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

17

LAUSD presents two additional arguments in support of 

its contention that a reviewing court cannot construe a notice of 

appeal from a sanctions order to include an omitted attorney. 

First, LAUSD argues that the language of rule 8.100(a)(1), 

which states that an “appellant must serve and file a notice of 

appeal,” impliedly requires that a party’s name must be 

included on the notice to preserve his or her right to appeal. 

According to LAUSD, had the Judicial Council intended to allow 

reviewing courts to construe a notice of appeal to include 

appellants who are not expressly referenced in the notice, “they 

could have made that clear, but they have chosen not to do so.” 

We are not persuaded. While it is true that rule 

8.100(a)(1) compels the “appellant” to file a notice of appeal, rule 

8.100(a)(2) specifically provides that the contents of the notice 

are to be liberally construed. As explained above, prior case law 

makes clear that this rule of liberal construction applies to 

defects in the designations of the parties, including errors 

involving the omission of an intended appellant. (See ante, pp. 

12–14.) We find nothing in the text of rule 8.100 that prohibits 

construing a notice of appeal to include an omitted party whose 

intent to join in the appeal is otherwise clear from the record.

LAUSD next asserts that construing a client’s notice of 

appeal to include the sanctioned attorney would contravene the 

well-established rule that a party lacks standing to “ ‘assert 

error that injuriously affected only nonappealing coparties.’ ” 

(Conservatorship of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67–

68, quoting Estrada v. RPS, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 976, 

985.) Our holding, however, does not provide a client with 

standing to appeal a sanctions order on behalf of a sanctioned 

attorney. Instead, our holding compels a reviewing court to 

construe a notice filed in the name of the client to include an 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

18

omitted attorney when it is reasonably clear that the attorney 

intended to join in the appeal, and the respondent was not 

misled or prejudiced by the omission.

7

That does not mean, however, that a client’s notice of 

appeal from a sanctions order must always be construed to 

include an omitted attorney. There may be situations where an 

omitted attorney’s intent to join in the notice of appeal is not 

sufficiently clear from the record, or where the omission has 

otherwise caused prejudice to the respondent, rendering the 

attorney’s inclusion in the appeal improper. To avoid any 

questions as to an attorney’s right to appeal, and to avoid 

unnecessary litigation regarding that issue, the better practice 

is for the attorney to file a notice of appeal that expressly 

identifies himself or herself as an appealing party. 

 

7 Although the parties’ briefs include multiple references to 

“standing,” which is a jurisdictional requirement set forth in 

Code of Civil Procedure section 902 (see § 902 [“[a]ny party 

aggrieved may appeal”]; In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236 

[“only a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal”]; Marsh v. 

Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 295 

[“[s]tanding to appeal is ‘jurisdictional’ ”]), neither party 

disputes that Carrillo, as the sanctioned party, has standing to 

challenge the sanctions order. (See Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 

Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3 [sanctioned attorney entitled to appeal 

sanctions order].) Similarly, neither party has argued that K.J., 

whose rights were not affected by the order, does have standing 

to appeal. Thus, this case does not actually present any issue of 

standing. Rather, the issue in dispute is whether a notice of 

appeal from a sanctions order that is brought only in the name 

of a client can be construed to include the client’s sanctioned 

attorney.
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

19

C. The Court of Appeal Should Have Construed 

K.J.’s Notice of Appeal To Include Carrillo as an 

Appellant 

Having articulated the conditions under which a client’s 

notice of appeal from a sanctions order should be construed to 

include an omitted attorney, we must next determine whether 

those conditions are present here. Several factors weigh in favor 

of construing the notice of appeal filed in the name of K.J. to 

include attorney Carrillo. 

First, the notice expressly designates the sanctions order

as the subject of the appeal; no other orders or judgments are 

referenced in the notice. Thus, all parties were aware that the 

sole basis of the appeal was a challenge to the trial court’s 

sanctions order.

Second, the trial court’s order only assessed sanctions 

against Carrillo; the order had no effect on K.J.’s rights. The 

fact that Carrillo served as K.J.’s attorney in the underlying 

proceedings, and that he was the only party who was affected by 

the order (and thus the only party who had reason to challenge 

it), strongly suggests that he was in fact the intended appellant. 

(See Laurino v. Tate (10th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3d 1213, 1218 

[omitted attorney’s intent to appeal sanctions award was 

sufficiently clear because the challenged order only imposed 

sanctions against him]; see also Retail Flooring Dealers of 

America, Inc. v. Beaulieu of America, LLC (9th Cir. 2003) 339 

F.3d 1146, 1149 [the fact that the order only imposed sanctions 

against the omitted attorney was a factor establishing his 

“desire to appeal”].)

Third, the record shows that, during the trial court 

proceedings, Carrillo vigorously challenged the court’s authority 

to issue sanctions against him. After initially being found in 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

20

contempt for having willfully disobeyed a discovery order, 

Carrillo filed a petition for habeas corpus that resulted in a stay 

of the contempt order. While the stay was in effect, the trial 

court held additional proceedings to address whether the stay 

precluded it from entering discovery sanctions against Carrillo

based on the same misconduct that gave rise to the contempt 

order. Over Carrillo’s objections, the trial court concluded it 

retained sanctioning authority, and entered the order that is the 

subject of the current appeal. The fact that the parties engaged 

in substantial litigation regarding the issue of sanctions that 

focused exclusively on Carrillo provides additional indicia that

he was an intended appellant. 

Finally, LAUSD’s briefing does not assert that it was 

misled or prejudiced by Carrillo’s omission from the notice of 

appeal. Nor is any prejudice suggested by the record. The only

claim raised in the appellant’s opening brief was that the trial 

court had erred in sanctioning Carrillo. LAUSD raised the

jurisdictional argument for the first time in its respondent’s 

brief, which also addressed the merits of appellant’s claim. 

Thus, the fact that Carrillo was omitted from the notice had no

apparent effect on the appellate proceedings, other than to cause 

LAUSD to raise the jurisdictional argument.8 (See Walker, 

 

8

In response to questioning at oral argument, LAUSD 

contended for the first time that it had been prejudiced because, 

if the notice of appeal is now construed to include Carrillo, he 

would then be able to present the merits of his claims, which 

could result in a reversal of the sanctions order. LAUSD has 

presented no authority suggesting that, in this context, allowing 

an opposing party to present the merits of his or her appeal 

qualifies as a cognizable form of “prejudice.” Under LAUSD’s 

rationale, prejudice would always be present in cases where a 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

21

supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 21 [appellant made “colorable argument” 

of nonprejudice where the record showed that respondent raised 

appealability issue for the first time in a respondent’s brief that 

also addressed the merits]; Beltram, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 

715 [notice’s omission of codefendant found nonprejudicial 

because the “issues as to [all defendants were] identical,” and 

the omission thus did not “affect[] [plaintiffs’] preparation for 

the appeal”].)

Considered together, the factors described above 

demonstrate with reasonable clarity that although Carrillo’s

name did not appear in the notice of appeal, he nonetheless 

intended to participate in the appeal, and that LAUSD suffered 

no prejudice from his omission. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal 

should have construed the notice to include Carrillo as an 

appealing party. 

III. DISPOSITION

The Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the appeal is reversed. 

The matter is remanded with directions to the Court of Appeal 

to set aside its order of dismissal and decide the merits of 

appellant Carrillo’s challenge to the sanctions order.

 

party seeks excusal of a technical error in the notice of appeal. 

We think it clear that the mere fact an opposing party would be 

able to present his or her claims on appeal is, standing alone, 

insufficient to establish prejudice.

 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

22

GROBAN, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School District 

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 2/23/17 – 2d Dist., Div. 3

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding 

Review Granted 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S241057

Date Filed: January 30, 2020

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Los Angeles

Judge: William P. Barry

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Werksman Jackson Hathaway & Quinn, Kelly C. Quinn and Mark W. Allen for Objector and Appellant.

Coleman and Associates, John M. Coleman; Law Offices of Bruce T. McIntosh and Bruce T. McIntosh for 

Defendants and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Kelly C. Quinn

Werksman Jackson Hathaway & Quinn, LLP

888 West Sixth Street, Fourth Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90017

(213) 688-0460

Bruce T. McIntosh

Law Offices of Bruce T. McIntosh

1055 E. Colorado Blvd., #500

Pasadena, CA 91106 

(626) 201-6717