18-3227 

Stapleton v. Ponte

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 25th day of November, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT D. SACK,

PETER W. HALL, 

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

Kadar Stapleton, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 18-3227 

Joseph Ponte, Commissioner of Correction, Dora 

B. Schriro, former Commissioner of Correction, 

Department of Correction, Lisette Camilo, 

Commissioner of the New York City Department 

of Citywide Administrative Services, New York 

City Department of Citywide Administrative 

Services, The City of New York, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Kadar Stapleton, pro se, Rosedale, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Deborah A. Brenner, Claibourne Henry, of 

counsel, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation 

Counsel of the City of New York, New 

York, NY. 
2 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 

York (DeArcy Hall, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Kadar Stapleton, a former correction officer proceeding pro se, sued the City of New York 

(the “City”), the New York City Department of Correction (the “DOC”), DOC officials, the New 

York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services (the “DCAS”), and a DCAS official. 

He alleged that his termination from the DOC violated his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 and violated state law. The defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that Stapleton’s claims were barred by collateral estoppel because he 

had unsuccessfully litigated the same issues in a state court proceeding brought under Article 78 

of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, which was affirmed on appeal. See Matter of 

Stapleton v. Ponte, 138 A.D.3d 751 (2d Dep’t 2016). The district court granted the defendants’ 

motion on that ground. This appeal followed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo, “accepting 

the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s 

favor.” Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC, 750 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir. 

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also review de novo the application of the collateral 

estoppel doctrine. See Matusick v. Erie Cnty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31, 45 (2d Cir. 2014). 

 Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a federal court must apply New 

York collateral estoppel law to New York state court judgments. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. 
3 

Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 93 (2d Cir. 2005). “The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a 

party from relitigating an issue which has previously been decided against him in a proceeding in 

which he had a fair opportunity to fully litigate the point.” Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 

449, 455 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Parker v. Blauvelt 

Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d 343, 349 (1999) (Under New York law, “[c]ollateral estoppel . . . 

precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in 

a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party, whether or not the tribunals or causes 

of action are the same.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Collateral estoppel 

applies with respect to Article 78 proceedings. See LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 272 (2d 

Cir. 2002). 

The district court properly determined that the elements of collateral estoppel are met in 

this case. In the state court proceeding, Stapleton raised the same issues that he later raised in the 

district court: whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) had the requisite authority and 

jurisdiction to conduct the disciplinary hearing under New York Civil Service Law § 75(2)1 and 

whether the DOC Commissioner wrongfully terminated him. Stapleton, 138 A.D.3d at 752. 

Those issues were actually litigated and decided against Stapleton in state court, and Stapleton had 

a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate them in the state proceedings. Kaufman, 65 N.Y.2d at 455. 

Indeed, Stapleton does not argue to the contrary. 

1

 N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 75(2) provides, in relevant part, that the hearing addressing disciplinary charges 

“shall be held by the officer or body having the power to remove the person against whom such charges are 

preferred, or by a deputy or other person designated by such officer or body in writing for that purpose. In 

case a deputy or other person is so designated, he shall, for the purpose of such hearing, be vested with all 

the powers of such officer or body and shall make a record of such hearing which shall, with his 

recommendations, be referred to such officer or body for review and decision.” 
4 

Rather, Stapleton argues that collateral estoppel does not apply because there has been a 

change in controlling authority—the Second Department’s opinion in Matter of Lindo v. Ponte, 

150 A.D.3d 1244 (2d Dep’t 2017), issued after Stapleton and during the district court 

proceedings—that precludes the application of collateral estoppel. We have held that collateral 

estoppel does not apply where “[m]odifications in controlling legal principles could render a 

previous determination inconsistent with prevailing doctrine, and changed circumstances may 

sufficiently alter the factual predicate such that new as-applied claims would not be barred by the 

original judgment.” Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 290 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “even where the specified elements of collateral 

estoppel are present, reexamination of a legal issue is appropriate where there has been a change 

in the legal landscape after the decision claimed to have preclusive effect.” Faulkner v. Nat’l 

Geographic Enters. Inc., 409 F.3d 26, 37 (2d Cir. 2005). 

Stapleton’s argument that Lindo represents such a change is internally inconsistent. In his 

appellate brief, he quotes extensively from Matter of Wiggins v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 

N.Y.2d 385 (1983). Wiggins held that if there is no written designation authorizing an ALJ to 

conduct a N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 75 hearing, the ALJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the hearing or 

to discipline an employee, any report issued by the ALJ is a nullity, and any removing officer has 

no basis on which to act, such that its determination would be arbitrary. 60 N.Y.2d at 387–88. 

Lindo applied that principle in holding that the trial court erred in relying upon a letter as the 

requisite written designation because that letter was outside the record and not relied upon by the 

respondents. 150 A.D.3d at 1246–47. Stapleton argues, on the one hand, that New York courts 

have consistently ruled in accordance with Wiggins, but he also argues, on the other hand, that 
5 

Lindo represented “a change in the law applicable to his case.” Appellant Br. 7; see also id. at 

12. Wiggins, decided well before the Second Department’s decisions in both Stapleton and Lindo, 

represents the prevailing view of New York courts in interpreting N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 75(2). 

Even in Stapleton, the Second Department cited Wiggins—demonstrating that it was familiar with 

governing law on the issue—but nevertheless concluded that the ALJ had been properly designated 

to conduct Stapleton’s disciplinary hearing. Stapleton, 138 A.D.3d at 752. When the Second 

Department came to a different conclusion in Lindo a year later, that decision cited with approval 

both Wiggins and Stapleton. Lindo, 150 A.D.3d at 1246–47. It does not follow, then, given 

Lindo’s adherence to Wiggins and its approving reference to Stapleton, that Lindo either explicitly 

or implicitly changed “the legal landscape” so as to bar the application of the collateral estoppel 

doctrine. Faulkner, 409 F.3d at 37.2

At most, the Second Department in Stapleton misapplied Wiggins. But the preclusive 

effect of a final judgment is not “altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or 

rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.” Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. 

v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981). 

2

 The district court reasoned that Lindo did not constitute a change in the applicable law because 

it was not binding on the Appellate Division of the First Department, “the court before which 

Plaintiff’s case was decided.” App. 15. We agree with Stapleton that this reasoning was 

erroneous in that Stapleton’s state court appeal was decided by the Appellate Division of the 

Second Department, the court that authored Lindo. See Stapleton, 138 A.D.3d at 751. We 

nevertheless agree with the result reached by the district court. 
6 

We have considered all of Stapleton’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court