Joshua Sabisch v. Stephen T. Moyer et al. Department of Public Safety and Correctional 

Services, No. 6, September Term, 2019

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS – MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. 

PROC. (1974, 2013 REPL. VOL., 2015 SUPP.) (“CJ”) § 3-702(a) – “COMMITTED, 

DETAINED, CONFINED, OR RESTRAINED FROM [] LAWFUL LIBERTY 

WITHIN [] STATE” – PROBATION – Court of Appeals held that, under plain language 

of CJ § 3-702(a), to be eligible to petition for writ of habeas corpus, person must be 

“committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his [or her] lawful liberty within [] 

State[,]” nothing more and nothing less. At time that petition for writ of habeas corpus was 

filed, petitioner, who was on unsupervised probation and living in Michigan, was not 

committed, detained, confined, or restrained in Maryland, as required by CJ § 3-702(a), 

and thus was not eligible to seek habeas corpus relief in Maryland. 

Court of Appeals concluded that, consistent with historic purpose of writ of habeas corpus,

plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) does not limit eligibility for habeas corpus relief to those 

in physical custody. Under plain language of CJ § 3-702(a), petition for writ of habeas 

corpus is not foreclosed where person is placed on probation with conditions that 

significantly restrict or restrain person’s lawful liberty within State. Court concluded that 

people who are committed, detained, or confined within State or persons on probation with 

conditions that significantly restrain person’s lawful liberty within State are entitled to seek 

habeas corpus relief. In short, under CJ § 3-702(a)’s plain language, to be eligible to seek 

habeas corpus relief, person must be committed, detained, confined, or restrained in 

Maryland, which may involve physical custody or significant restrictions of person’s 

lawful liberty within State. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 6

September Term, 2019

______________________________________

JOSHUA SABISCH

v.

STEPHEN T. MOYER ET AL.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND 

CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

______________________________________

Barbera, C.J.

McDonald

Watts

Hotten

Getty

Booth

Battaglia, Lynne A. (Senior 

Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Watts, J.

______________________________________

Filed: November 20, 2019

Circuit Court for Baltimore County

Case No. 03-C-17-006383

Argued: September 6, 2019 
A writ of habeas corpus—meaning “that you have the body” in Law Latin—is 

“employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the person’s 

imprisonment or detention is not illegal[.]” Habeas Corpus, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 

ed. 2019). This Court has observed that “the great object” of a writ of habeas corpus “is 

the liberation of parties who may be imprisoned or detained without sufficient cause.” 

Olewiler v. Brady, 185 Md. 341, 345, 44 A.2d 807, 809 (1945) (cleaned up). The common 

law writ of habeas corpus was codified in a Maryland statute in 1809, and later 

encompassed by the protections of the Maryland Constitution of 1867. See id. at 346, 44 

A.2d at 809. Specifically, the Maryland Constitution provides that “[t]he General 

Assembly shall pass no Law suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Md. 

Const., Art. III, § 55.

Today, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.) 

(“CJ”) § 3-702(a) generally governs who may petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 

providing:

A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his [or her] 

lawful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any color or 

pretense or any person in his [or her] behalf, may petition for the writ of 

habeas corpus to the end that the cause of the commitment, detainer, 

confinement, or restraint may be inquired into.

Upon receipt of a properly filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus, among other things, 

“the judge shall grant the writ unless[] the judge finds . . . that the individual confined or 

restrained is not entitled to any relief[.]” Md. R. 15-303(e)(3)(A). 

In this case, we must determine whether a person who was placed on unsupervised 

probation by a Maryland trial court and subsequently moved to another State was 
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committed, detained, confined, or restrained within Maryland. Following a bench trial in 

the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore County, Joshua Sabisch, Petitioner, 

was found guilty of fourth-degree sex offense. The District Court stayed the entry of 

judgment and offered Sabisch probation before judgment (“PBJ”) with conditions, which 

he accepted. Five months later, Sabisch appeared before the District Court for a violation 

of probation hearing, and the District Court found that Sabisch had violated his probation.

The District Court modified the conditions of probation to be “unsupervised” to 

accommodate Sabisch’s desire to move from Maryland to Michigan. Sabisch subsequently 

filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 

alleging that the terms of his probation constituted an unlawful restraint on his liberty and 

raising various grounds for relief related to the proceedings in the District Court.

1 At a 

hearing on the petition, the circuit court denied the petition. Sabisch appealed, and, in an 

unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss,

holding that, at the time that Sabisch filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he was 

neither physically restrained nor within the State. Thereafter, Sabisch filed in this Court a 

petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. 

Against this backdrop, we must decide whether the Court of Special Appeals erred 

in holding that, to be entitled to habeas corpus relief pursuant to CJ § 3-702(a), a person 

must be physically restrained within Maryland, and that Sabisch was not entitled to habeas

 

1Stephen T. Moyer, Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and 

Correctional Services, Joseph F. Clocker, Director of Parole and Probation, and Ashley 

Jung, Sabisch’s probation agent (collectively, “Respondents”), identified in the petition as 

the respondents, opposed the petition.
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corpus relief because he was not physically restrained within the State. We hold that, under 

the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a), to be eligible to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a 

person must be “committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his [or her] lawful 

liberty within the State[,]” nothing more and nothing less. The plain language of CJ § 3-

702(a) does not limit eligibility for habeas corpus relief to those in physical restraint. Under 

the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a), a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not foreclosed 

where a person is placed on probation with conditions that significantly restrict or restrain 

the person’s liberty within the State. We hold that people who are committed, detained, or 

confined within the State or persons on probation with conditions that significantly restrain 

the person’s lawful liberty within the State are entitled to seek habeas corpus relief. In 

short, under CJ § 3-702(a), to be eligible to seek habeas corpus relief, a person must be 

committed, detained, confined, or restrained in the State, which may involve physical 

custody or significant restrictions of a person’s liberty within the State. Here, when the 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed, Sabisch, who was on unsupervised probation

and living in Michigan, was not committed, detained, confined, or restrained in Maryland, 

as required by CJ § 3-702(a). Under the circumstances of this case, when Sabisch filed his 

habeas corpus petition, he was not significantly restrained in Maryland, and thus was not 

eligible to seek habeas corpus relief in Maryland pursuant to CJ § 3-702(a). 

BACKGROUND

Although the issues in this case do not involve resolution of the merits of the claims 

that Sabisch raised in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for context, we set forth the

circumstances that gave rise to the imposition of probation and conditions of probation.
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Pretrial Proceedings in the District Court

In 2016, the District Court tried Sabisch on the sole count of fourth-degree sex 

offense. It was alleged that Sabisch had sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year-old girl 

and that he was at least four years older than she was. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law 

(2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.) § 3-308(b)(3) (“A person may not engage in . . . 

vaginal intercourse with another if the victim is 14 or 15 years old, and the person 

performing the act is at least 4 years older than the victim.”). 

On October 26, 2016, Sabisch appeared, without counsel, in the District Court for 

the first time, seeking a postponement of the trial date. When Sabisch’s case was called,

the prosecutor explained that the State was not opposed to a postponement. The District 

Court asked Sabisch whether he had heard the court “explain the importance of having an 

attorney to the other” defendants who preceded him on the court’s docket, and Sabisch 

responded “[y]es.” The District Court asked Sabisch: “What are you going to do about 

getting an attorney?” Sabisch responded that he had not “thought about it[,]” and the 

following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: All right. Well, you need to think about it. You need to either 

hire private counsel, pay them and have them enter their appearance on your 

behalf. Or make application to the Office of the Public Defender if you 

cannot afford private counsel. That’s their information, sir. You need to see 

them at that location in person that’s listed there in Towson immediately. 

Don’t wait. This week or next week. You would not want to come back 

without an attorney and attempt to represent yourself. It would not be in your 

interest; do you understand that, sir?

[SABISCH]: Yes. 

(Paragraph breaks omitted). 
- 5 -

Trial Proceedings in the District Court and Probation Before Judgment

On December 8, 2016, Sabisch appeared, without counsel, in the District Court for 

trial. The prosecutor advised the District Court that it was his “understanding [that] 

Sab[]i[s]ch [was] entering a guilty plea to his sole charge[,]” and Sabisch agreed that that 

was correct. At that time, the District Court gave Sabisch the following advisements:

THE COURT: Sir, the maximum possible penalty of this charge is one year 

in jail. The State is deferring to me. That[] means they’re saying, Judge, it’s 

up to you. I want you to understand I could still impose that maximum 

sentence. Do you understand that?

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, I want you to understand that you certainly don’t have 

to plead guilty. You are entitled to either a judge or a jury trial. In either 

instance, what would happen is, the State would call in witnesses that they 

had. They would testify in the witness chair like this one to my left. You 

could question any witnesses that are called against you. You could call 

witnesses on your own behalf. You could call yourself as a witness. Or you 

could say, you choose a judge trial, which you didn’t want to testify. If you 

did that, I would not draw any inference from your silence. If this case was 

called for a jury trial and a jury was provided, you could tell the judge 

presiding at that jury trial that you did not want to testify. And the judge 

would tell those jurors they could draw no inference from your silence.

Now, for a trial like that, a judge or a jury, it would be up to the State 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt respectively to the fact finder, be that a 

judge or a jury, that you were guilty of the charge. Now, if it was a jury trial, 

the jury’s verdict would have to be unanimous. That means all 12 jurors 

would have to agree. By proceeding like this, pleading guilty, you’re 

waiving your right to have a judge and a jury trial. Do you understand that?

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: Yes.

THE COURT: Sir, if you were on parole or probation to anybody on August 

the 20th when this event allegedly occurred, the plea that you’re entering 

here in all likelihood would violate that parole or probation. Do you 

understand that?

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: Yes.
- 6 -

THE COURT: Sir, the offense you’re pleading guilty to is that you engaged 

in intercourse with a person 14-years-old, you being at least four years old[er]

than the victim. Are you admitting that in fact that your defenses to that 

offense, it is correct that you did that?

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: Yes. 

The District Court asked whether it was Sabisch’s “final decision to plead guilty[,]”

and Sabisch responded that he would “like to have the witness come forward.” The 

following exchange occurred: 

THE COURT: All right. So do you want to plead guilty or do you want to 

have a trial?

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: What happens if I -- I don’t quite understand if I have a 

trial.

THE COURT: So if you had a trial, what’s going to happen is, as I explained 

to you, witnesses will testify. And you question those witnesses, you could 

call witnesses on your own behalf. You could testify yourself if you want to 

or you can remain silent, as I explained to you. It will be up to the State to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you’re guilty of the charge. You have 

the right to have your case tried. You also certainly have the right to accept 

the plea. In either instance, you’re going to be able to address me in terms 

of the case. If you plead guilty, however, you’re not going to be able, 

effectively, to stand up and say[:] well, I want to tell you this didn’t happen. 

If you want to give me what’s called mitigation through yourself or through 

someone else in terms of an explanation as to why this happened, you can do 

that. But again, you have the right to have a trial. Nobody’s trying to talk 

you out of that. Most importantly, I’m not trying to talk you out of that.

So you are in a situation right now where you have the right to either 

have a trial before me and a trial before a jury or proceed by way of a guilty 

plea the State told me that you guys agreed to. Do you understand the three 

options you have?

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: I want a trial.

THE COURT: Do you want to have your case tried before me or do you want 

to have it tried before a jury?
- 7 -

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: Before you. 

Although Sabisch advised the District Court that he wanted to proceed by way of a 

bench trial, Sabisch also continued to tell the District Court that he wanted to plead guilty. 

At that time, the District Court indicated that Sabisch apparently did not understand the 

legal consequence of a guilty plea, and the following exchange ensued: 

THE COURT: Okay. Now, I’m not going to continue to go back and forth. 

Not because I don’t want to, but effectively unless someone is entering 

what’s called a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, I’m just going to enter a 

not guilty plea on your behalf and call the case for a trial. If you enter a guilty 

plea, all that’s going to happen is, the State’s Attorney is going to tell me 

what happened here. After I’ve heard that, you’re going to have the 

opportunity to address me and tell me why it happened and anything else you 

want to tell me. As I told you, if you plead guilty, the one thing you can’t do 

is, you can’t then stand up and say, Judge, it didn’t happen. Because you’re 

admitting if you plead guilty.

If you want to plead not guilty, there’s going to be live testimony. The 

State’s going to call witnesses.

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: I plead not guilty.

THE COURT: You want to plead guilty?

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: Not guilty.

THE COURT: Not guilty. 

The District Court took a brief recess, and asked Sabisch for his “final decision[.]” 

Sabisch advised that he was asking for a postponement “[t]o get a Public Defender.” The 

District Court asked Sabisch what he had done to obtain a lawyer since October—when he 

was advised of his right to a Public Defender—and Sabisch responded:

I’ve been trying to get, because I’m on [Supplemental Security 

Income], and I’ve been trying to get the money to save out, but I’ve also, 

because I’ve been homeless, trying to get an apartment and transportation, 

it’s very hard for me. But I’m aware of these charges and I will work even 
- 8 -

harder if you give me a postponement to get an attorney. I can even go down 

today to fill out and get a Public Defender. 

The District Court denied the request for a postponement, and the following exchange 

occurred: 

THE COURT: I’m going to have to deny your postponement request, Mr. 

Sab[]i[s]ch, under the circumstances. Now, you have the right to have your 

case tried before a jury or a judge. A few minutes ago you indicated to me 

you wanted to have your case tried before a judge and you’re waiving your 

right to a jury trial, is that correct?

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: I honestly don’t understand, but I’d like to plead guilty. I 

mean, I don’t understand any of this, because I’ve never really done this 

before.

THE COURT: All right. I’ve explained to you a couple of times about the 

difference between a guilty plea and a not guilty plea. And I’m candidly not 

convinced that you understand what a guilty plea is. And I can only accept 

the guilty plea if I’m convinced that it’s a knowing[] and a voluntary plea, 

and it’s an intelligent plea. And it’s that third element that I’m struggling 

with and I’m not convinced you understand what it is. Because you told me 

you have a witness here. 

Shortly thereafter, a short bench trial occurred. As the sole witness for the State,

the victim, who was fourteen years old at the time of trial, testified that she met Sabisch on 

the internet. The victim testified that, while she was fourteen years old, she had vaginal 

intercourse with Sabisch, who was twenty years old. Sabisch called the victim’s mother 

as a witness. On cross-examination, the victim’s mother acknowledged that, “[f]rom what 

[she had been] told,” the victim and Sabisch had vaginal intercourse. 

The District Court asked Sabisch whether he would like to testify or remain silent, 

and Sabisch responded: “I want a jury trial.” The District Court explained that a jury trial 

was no longer an option, and again asked Sabisch whether he wanted to testify or remain 
- 9 -

silent. After briefly conferring with an assistant public defender who happened to be in the 

courtroom, Sabisch advised that he would “like to remain silent.” 

The District Court found Sabisch guilty of fourth-degree sexual offense, but stayed 

the entry of judgment and offered him PBJ. The District Court explained that probation 

would be supervised for twelve months, and would require Sabisch to comply with 

probation conditions, including no contact with the victim, a substance abuse evaluation, 

“regist[ration] with law enforcement[,]” and waiver of the right to appeal. Sabisch told the 

District Court that he did not understand PBJ, and the following exchange occurred: 

THE COURT: So there’s a guilty finding that I made, but I struck it in favor 

of probation before judgment. Now, if you want to accept it, you are waiving 

your right to an appeal, because there’s no guilty finding to appeal to. If you 

violate my probation, there’s 12 months incarceration that is hanging over 

your head, if you will. And if you violate my probation, I will put you in jail. 

But hopefully that will not come to pass.

Having said all of this, do you now understand what probation before 

judgment is?

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Do you want to accept it and waive your right to an appeal?

[] SAB[]I[S]CH: I do. 

The bench trial concluded shortly thereafter. 

Post-Trial Proceedings in the District Court

A week later, on December 15, 2016, Sabisch—now represented by counsel—filed 

a motion for modification or reduction of his sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(e). 

Sabisch requested that the District Court strike the requirement that he register as a sex 

offender, arguing that registration was within a trial court’s discretion when imposing PBJ 
- 10 -

and, in his view, requiring him to register was contrary to the “ultimate sentence of 

probation before judgment.” Sabisch also offered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. The 

District Court held the motion sub curia. 

Approximately eight weeks later, on February 8, 2017, Sabisch pled not guilty to 

charges that he violated his probation by having contact with the victim. Sabisch also 

indicated that he was “not competent to stand trial[.]” The District Court ordered a 

competency evaluation, and a forensic psychologist found that Sabisch was competent 

because he demonstrated an understanding of “the nature and object of the proceedings and 

[an ability to] assist in his defense.” On his own initiative, on March 3, 2017, Sabisch 

submitted to another psychological evaluation. The results of that evaluation revealed that 

Sabisch presented symptoms of bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, and 

unspecified intellectual disability, and that Sabisch had a low-functioning cognitive ability 

and an IQ of 59. 

On May 3, 2017, the District Court conducted a violation of probation hearing; 

Sabisch was represented by counsel. The District Court found that Sabisch had violated 

probation by contacting the victim. Sabisch asked the District Court to modify his sentence 

to allow him to move back to Michigan, where he lived before he met the victim and where 

his family lived. The District Court left the PBJ finding intact and agreed to modify the 

conditions of probation to accommodate Sabisch’s desire to move out of Maryland. The 

District Court imposed a sentence of eighteen-months “unsupervised” probation that 

permitted Sabisch to leave Maryland, but, as conditions of probation, required him to

among other things, have no unsupervised contact with minors, report to his probation 
- 11 -

agent by telephone every thirty days or as otherwise determined appropriate by the 

probation agent, provide his current address, and register as a Tier I Sex Offender.2 

After returning to Michigan, Sabisch learned that, under Michigan law, he would be 

designated as a Tier III sex offender and required to register as a sex offender for life. 

Petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis

Meanwhile, on April 10, 2017, Sabisch filed in the District Court a petition for a 

writ of error coram nobis, asking the District Court to vacate the December 8, 2017 PBJ 

order for alleged trial errors. The District Court denied the petition on the ground that 

Sabisch was on probation, and thus ineligible for coram nobis relief. Sabisch appealed. In 

June 2017, the circuit court dismissed the appeal on the same ground.

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Circuit Court

The following month, on July 3, 2017, in the circuit court, Sabisch filed a petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus, requesting that the circuit court “remedy the unlawful restraint 

on his liberty by the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services through the 

Division of Parole and Probation.” Sabisch alleged that the unlawful restraint on his liberty 

consisted of being “subject to unsupervised probation with the special condition that he 

report to [] his probation agent in Baltimore County[] by phone each month.” (Citations 

omitted). Although in the petition Sabisch mentioned other conditions of probation, he did 

not allege that those conditions constituted unlawful restraints on his liberty. Sabisch 

 

2Pursuant to CP §§ 11-701(o)(1), 11-707(a)(4)(i), and 11-707(c), in Maryland, as a 

Tier I sex offender, Sabisch is required to register for ten to fifteen years, depending on 

whether certain conditions are satisfied for ten years.
- 12 -

alleged the following four grounds for relief: (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily 

waive his right to counsel; (2) he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a 

jury trial; (3) in accepting the PBJ, he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to 

appeal; and (4) the District Court erred by failing to conduct an inquiry to determine 

whether he “was mentally competent to represent himself.” (Citations omitted). Sabisch 

asked the circuit court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, vacate the finding of guilt, and order 

a new trial. 

On July 17, 2017, the State3filed an answer to the petition, opposing the petition on 

multiple grounds. The State argued that, procedurally, the petition was inadequate for two 

reasons: (1) Sabisch was not eligible for habeas relief in Maryland while he was in 

Michigan, i.e., an individual seeking habeas relief must “be restrained from lawful liberty 

within the State[,]” and Sabisch filed his petition while in Michigan; and (2) Sabisch had 

failed to pursue other avenues of relief, such as a motion for new trial under Maryland Rule 

4-331 or a notice of appeal under Maryland Rule 7-104. (Emphasis omitted). As to the 

merits, the State asserted that the petition was inadequate for several reasons, including 

that the “[a]dequacy of counsel is not reviewable under a writ of habeas corpus” (footnote 

omitted); Sabisch had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial and

requested a bench trial; and Sabisch had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 

appeal by accepting the PBJ. Finally, as to Sabisch’s competency, the State maintained

 

3Although the petition named Stephen T. Moyer, Secretary of the Department of 

Public Safety and Correctional Services, Joseph F. Clocker, Director of Parole and 

Probation, and Ashley Jung, Sabisch’s probation agent, as respondents, the answer was 

filed on behalf of the State. 
- 13 -

that the District Court was not required to have Sabisch evaluated and contended that 

Sabisch’s “confusion with court proceedings did not demonstrate a failure to understand 

the nature and object of the proceedings or [his] inability to assist in his defense.” 

(Emphasis omitted). 

On October 13, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, 

the prosecutor asserted that, although Sabisch was still on probation, he was not “being 

restricted by anything in Maryland[,]” arguing:

[T]he real reason we’re here today is because [the District Court] ordered 

[Sabisch] to register as a tier one sex offender, which carries, my 

understanding, in Maryland ten years, ten years of registration, [the District 

Court] gave him the benefit of [PBJ]. That is, those are the conditions of his 

probation here. Because [] Sabisch decided to leave, because he decided to 

go to Michigan, . . . he is being required to register for life. Now, I don’t 

believe that is a confinement. It was his decision to go to Michigan. I didn’t 

tell him to go to Michigan. 

Sabisch’s counsel responded that probation was a restraint on liberty and, therefore, 

Sabisch was eligible to pursue habeas relief. Sabisch’s counsel contended that Sabisch was 

not disqualified from seeking a writ of habeas corpus simply because he resided in 

Michigan. According to Sabisch’s counsel, Sabisch had restraints on his liberty in 

Maryland because he was still subject to the terms of the probation imposed by the District 

Court. Additionally, Sabisch’s counsel argued that the District Court failed to inform 

Sabisch of his right to counsel and of the importance of counsel. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the circuit court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, stating: “It’s my 

judgment, based on the colloquy between [the District Court] and [Sabisch], that [the 

District Court] complied with the rule, that [Sabisch] understood what he was doing and, 
- 14 -

therefore, [] your writ is denied.” 

On November 22, 2017, the circuit court issued an order denying the petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court also issued a memorandum opinion explaining the 

reasons for denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In the memorandum opinion, 

as to the procedural issues in the case, the circuit court rejected the State’s argument that 

Sabisch was not in Maryland for purposes of pursing habeas relief, explaining: 

[Sabisch], while living in Michigan, is subject to specific terms and 

conditions of probation imposed by [the District Court]. As such, [Sabisch] 

does not have unfettered liberty. The State’s implied request that the Petition 

be denied because [Sabisch] does not live in Maryland is denied. 

The circuit court nevertheless agreed with the State that the record demonstrated that 

Sabisch “knowingly waived his right to appeal[,]” as Sabisch “could have appealed the 

District Court’s ruling, but chose not to do so.” As such, the circuit court stated that, “[o]n 

that basis, the Petition [] would be denied.” 

The circuit court noted that, had Sabisch “elected to appeal, the matter would have 

been de novo and the other issues set forth in the Petition would not have been at issue. 

However, because the issues were briefed and argued,” the circuit court would “address 

them.” Accordingly, the circuit court addressed the merits of the various issues raised in 

the petition. As to the waiver of counsel, the circuit court concluded that “[i]t [was] clear 

from the record that [Sabisch] was aware of the charges and possible penalties, the right to 

counsel[,] and the importance of assistance of counsel[,]” and that “it was not an abuse of 

discretion for [the District Court] to find that [Sabisch] waived his right to counsel by 

inaction.” The circuit court explained:
- 15 -

[The District Court] told [Sabisch] that it would not be in his best interest to 

return to Court without an attorney and [Sabisch] confirmed that he 

understood that. Never[]the[]less, [Sabisch] appeared for trial in the District 

Court without counsel in December 2016. In viewing the record as a whole, 

including the discussions that [Sabisch] had with [the District Court], it is 

clear that when [Sabisch] indicated that he did not understand, the [District 

Court] took [its] time to explain the matter to him until he comprehended. 

As to waiver of the right to a jury trial, the circuit court determined that there was 

no evidence that Sabisch “did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a 

jury trial.” The circuit court explained that “[t]here was no evidence presented concerning 

[Sabisch]’s IQ, nor that he did not understand [the District Court]’s explanation concerning 

the difference between a court and jury trial. . . . [Sabisch] has failed to set forth any 

evidence that he did not understand the difference between a court and a jury trial.” The 

circuit court reiterated that the record showed that, when Sabisch “did not understand 

something[,] the [District Court] took [its] time to explain the matters to him until he 

understood.” 

The circuit court concluded that Sabisch had validly waived the right to appeal, 

explaining:

[Sabisch]’s counsel argues that [Sabisch]’s limited IQ would have prevented 

him from understanding and appreciating the significance of accepting 

[PBJ]. [Sabisch] bears the burden of proving his allegations. He has 

presented no evidence concerning his IQ, nor did he present any evidence 

that he did not understand that by accepting [PBJ], he would no longer have 

a right to appeal. 

The circuit court rejected the allegation that the District Court failed to determine whether 

Sabisch was competent to represent himself, stating that there was “no credible evidence 

that [Sabisch] was incompetent or lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the 
- 16 -

consequences of his decisions.” 

In the meantime, on October 18, 2017, Sabisch filed a notice of appeal. 

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals

On January 2, 2019, the Court of Special Appeals granted the State’s motion to 

dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Joshua Sabisch v. Stephen 

T. Moyer, et al., No. 1858, Sept. Term, 2017, 2019 WL 290291, at *1, 5-6 (Md. Ct. Spec. 

App. Jan. 2, 2019). The Court of Special Appeals held that, when Sabisch filed the petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus, Sabisch was neither physically restrained nor within the State, 

and, therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider or provide habeas corpus relief. 

See id. at *5-6. 

Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals determined that, although CJ § 3-702(a)

“does not use the word ‘physical,’ Maryland case law does[,]” and “Maryland courts have 

held consistently that the writ of habeas corpus is not available to bailees or parolees 

because they are not in ‘actual, involuntary, illegal restraint.’” Id. at *5 (cleaned up). The 

Court of Special Appeals explained:

Yes, there are more recent federal cases that define restraint more in terms of 

liberty restrictions than physical restrictions, and it[ is] also true that some 

Maryland cases interpreting the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act 

(“UPPA”) have as well. But the federal cases do[ not] work—the UPPA 

occupies most of the field that the federal habeas corpus statute covers in the 

federal system, and the General Assembly has left a much narrower range of 

potential relief for habeas to provide.

Id. As such, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that, given the 

limited context of habeas corpus in Maryland, [] Sabisch’s [PBJ] status 

places him in the same position as parolees and people out on bail—his 

liberty was fettered, to be sure, but he was not committed, detained, confined, 
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or restrained, and we do[ not] have jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus

relief for him.

Id. 

The Court of Special Appeals noted that “Sabisch was not in Maryland when he 

filed his petition[.]” Id. at *6. The Court of Special Appeals explained:

While he was on unsupervised probation, his ongoing requirement to check 

in with a probation officer fell short of creating a presence in Maryland that 

could justify common law habeas corpus relief here. [] Sabisch is[ not] 

wrong that federal cases interpreting the federal counterpart writ focus more 

on the physical location of the custodian than the petitioner. But again, the 

federal version of the writ has a different scope, and unlike federal courts, 

Maryland courts can[not] compel production of a body that[ is] outside of 

our borders.

Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals granted the motion to dismiss 

the appeal and did not consider the merits of the issues raised in the petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus. See id. The Court of Special Appeals observed, though, that Sabisch may 

not be “out of options” because, “[a]s both sides acknowledged at oral argument, he has 

now completed his probation, and thus no longer is barred by that obligation from seeking 

a writ of coram nobis. Whether he is entitled to relief remains to be seen.” Id.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

On February 27, 2019, Sabisch petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the 

following three issues:

1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that [Sabisch], while 

on [PBJ] and required as conditions of his probation to obey all laws, to have 

no contact with the victim, to have no unsupervised contact with children 

under age eighteen, to provide his current address to probation authorities, to 

register as a sex offender, and to report by telephone to his probation 

supervisor in Maryland every thirty days while residing in Michigan and to 

follow his supervisor’s lawful instructions, was not entitled to petition for the
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writ of habeas corpus pursuant to [CJ] § 3-702, because he was not subject 

to “physical” restraint?

2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that [Sabisch], while 

on [PBJ], was not entitled to petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant 

to [CJ] § 3-702, because he was not present in Maryland at the time of the 

filing of his petition and because the conditions of [Sabisch]’s probation did 

not create a sufficient “presence” in Maryland while [Sabisch] was residing 

in Michigan?

3. Did the circuit court err in denying [Sabisch]’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus on grounds that [Sabisch] accepted [PBJ] and waived his right 

to appeal pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. [(2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 

2015 Supp.) (“CP”)] § 6-220?

On April 10, 2019, this Court granted the petition. See Sabisch v. Moyer, 463 Md. 525, 

206 A.3d 315 (2019).

DISCUSSION4

The Parties’ Contentions

Sabisch contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that he was not 

entitled to habeas corpus relief pursuant to CJ § 3-702 because he was not subject to 

physical restraint. Sabisch argues that the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) does not require 

a person to be subject to physical restraint to be entitled to habeas corpus relief, and that 

case law does “not compel adherence to a jurisdictional requirement of physical restraint 

in a strict sense (e.g., placement behind bars)[.]” Sabisch asserts that probation, which may 

 

4Because the first two issues raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari involve 

interpretation and application of CJ § 3-702(a), we consolidate the issues. And, because 

we hold that Sabisch was not entitled to seek habeas corpus relief under CJ § 3-702(a), we 

need not—and do not—address the third issue raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari, 

concerning whether the circuit court properly denied habeas corpus relief on the ground 

that Sabisch accepted PBJ and waived his right to appeal pursuant to CP § 6-220.
- 19 -

require that a person comply with a condition “that limits his or her liberties, falls squarely 

within the requirement that a person petitioning for the writ of habeas corpus be restrained 

from his [or her] lawful liberty.” (Cleaned up). Sabisch maintains that, unlike the terms 

“committed,” “detained,” and “confined,” the word “restrained,” as used in CJ § 3-702(a), 

does not necessarily imply application of physical force. According to Sabisch, at the time 

that he filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he was subject to actual restraint by 

operation of the various conditions of his probation. 

Sabisch contends that the Court of Special Appeals also erred in holding that he was 

not entitled to petition for a writ of habeas corpus because he was not in Maryland at the 

time of the filing of the petition and because the conditions of his probation did not create 

a sufficient presence in Maryland while he was living in Michigan. Sabisch argues that

physical presence in Maryland at the time of filing a habeas corpus petition is not a 

jurisdictional requirement of CJ § 3-702(a). Sabisch maintains that, for purposes of CJ § 

3-702(a), “the critical presence is that of the custodian or respondent, because if Maryland 

does not have personal jurisdiction over the respondent, no inquiry may be made into the 

cause of the commitment, detainer, confinement, or restraint.” 

Respondents counter that “the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over”

the petition for a writ of habeas corpus because, when the petition was filed, “Sabisch was 

neither in physical custody nor inside Maryland’s borders.” (Some capitalization omitted). 

Respondents contend that, as a statute codifying the common law, CJ § 3-702(a) declares 

the State’s public policy with respect to habeas corpus relief, and, in keeping with the 

common law, the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) requires physical custody. Respondents 
- 20 -

assert that the common law required physical custody, and that Maryland case law has 

reinforced that requirement. Respondents maintain that CJ § 3-702(a) unambiguously 

incorporates the common law’s physical custody requirement by use of the terms 

“committed, detained, confined, or restrained,” as those “terms denote physical custody.” 

Respondents contend that, when the habeas corpus petition was filed, Sabisch was not in 

physical custody, but instead was “free on ‘unsupervised’ probation in Michigan with the 

duty to call his Maryland probation officer monthly.” According to Respondents, because 

Sabisch was not in physical custody, he was not entitled to petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus under CJ § 3-702(a). 

Respondents argue that, additionally, CJ § 3-702(a) limits who may file a habeas 

corpus petition to those in custody within the State of Maryland. Respondents assert that, 

because Sabisch was in Michigan when he filed the petition, he was not authorized to seek 

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under CJ § 3-702(a). Respondents contend that “[t]he 

requirement that a petitioner be in custody ‘within’ the State is essential to a habeas court’s 

power to compel production of ‘the body’ and test the lawfulness of custody.” (Italics 

omitted). Respondents argue that the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) “connects the 

requisite custody to the petitioner’s body” and thus recognizes that Maryland courts cannot 

compel production of a body that is outside of the State’s borders. 

Standard of Review

“An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s interpretation of a 

statute. [And, w]e review the Court of Special Appeals’s interpretation of [a] statute de 

novo.” Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 480-81, 157 A.3d 272, 280 (2017) (cleaned up). 
- 21 -

And, in Wilson v. Simms, 157 Md. App. 82, 91, 849 A.2d 88, 93, cert. denied sub nom. 

Wilson v. State, 382 Md. 687, 856 A.2d 723 (2004), as to denial of a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus, the Court of Special Appeals stated: “We review the denial of an application 

for habeas corpus relief under the standard set forth in Maryland Rule 8-131(c). We will 

review the case on both the law and the evidence, and we will not set aside the judgment 

on the evidence unless clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted). “Questions of law, however, 

require our non-deferential review. When the trial court’s decision involves an 

interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, this Court must 

determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are legally correct.” Estate of Zimmerman 

v. Blatter, 458 Md. 698, 717-18, 183 A.3d 223, 235 (2018) (cleaned up). See also State v.

Hart, 449 Md. 246, 264, 144 A.3d 609, 619 (2016) (“[W]here an order involves an 

interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, our Court 

must determine whether the trial court's conclusions are “legally correct” under a de novo

standard of review.” (Citation omitted)).

Statutory Construction

Because this case involves statutory interpretation, we set forth the following 

relevant rules of statutory construction:

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intent of the General Assembly.

As this Court has explained, to determine that purpose or policy, we look 

first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. 

We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have 

meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is 

clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the 

General Assembly’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed according 
- 22 -

to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and 

express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written. In 

addition, we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute 

to give it a meaning not reflected by the words that the General Assembly 

used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or 

limit the statute’s meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, either 

inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry 

as to legislative intent ends.

Bellard, 452 Md. at 481, 157 A.3d at 280 (citation omitted). 

Law

Habeas Corpus in Maryland

CJ § 3-702(a) generally governs who may apply for a writ of habeas corpus, 

providing in its entirety:

A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his [or her] 

lawful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any color or 

pretense or any person in his [or her] behalf, may petition for the writ of 

habeas corpus to the end that the cause of the commitment, detainer, 

confinement, or restraint may be inquired into.

This language has remained unchanged since 1973, when Md. Code, Art. 42 (1957, 1973 

Supp.), § 3 was recodified as CJ § 3-702(a) as part of the creation of the Courts and Judicial 

Proceedings Article of the Code of Maryland. See 1973 (July Extraordinary Sess.) Md. 

Laws 4, 129 (Ch. 2, S.B. 1). 

CJ § 3-702(b) sets forth additional provisions related to habeas corpus petitions, 

including that, upon receiving the petition, a judge shall grant the writ of habeas corpus 

immediately, if it appears that the petitioner is entitled to the relief. And, Maryland Rules 

15-301 to 15-312 implement procedures and requirements related to habeas corpus 

petitions and proceedings in the State. For example, Maryland Rule 15-302(a) sets forth 
- 23 -

the information that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus must include, such as “a statement 

that the individual by or on behalf of whom the writ is sought is unlawfully confined or 

restrained[,]” Md. R. 15-302(a)(1), and “the circumstances and the cause of the 

confinement[,]” Md. R. 15-302(a)(4). 

As to appeals in habeas corpus cases, in Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 652, 

574 A.2d 898, 906 (1990), this Court stated “that statutory provisions like [CJ] § 12-301 []

generally authorizing an ‘appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case,’

do not apply to habeas corpus cases.” Rather, “[a]n appeal may be taken from a final order 

in a habeas corpus case only where specifically authorized by statute.” Id. at 652, 574 A.2d 

at 906 (citations omitted). In Gluckstern, id. at 652, 574 A.2d at 906-07, this Court 

identified four statutes that permit appeals or applications for leave to appeal in habeas 

corpus cases: (1) what is now CP § 9-110, which “authorizes an appeal under certain 

conditions from the denial of a habeas corpus application in an extradition case”; (2) CJ § 

3-707, which “provides for applications for leave to appeal from the denial of relief in 

habeas corpus cases regarding the right to bail or allegedly excessive bail”; (3) CJ § 3-706, 

which applies where a writ of habeas corpus is issued “on the ground that the law under 

which the person was convicted is unconstitutional[,]” CJ § 3-706(a); and (4) what is now 

CP § 7-107, which is part of the UPPA.5 (Footnote omitted).

 

5CP 7-107(b) provides: 

(1) In a case in which a person challenges the validity of confinement under 

a sentence of imprisonment by seeking the writ of habeas corpus or the writ 

of coram nobis or by invoking a common law or statutory remedy other than 
- 24 -

In separate cases decided several decades ago, this Court held that habeas corpus 

relief is not available to persons free on bail or parolees. In Hendershott v. Young, 209 

Md. 257, 260, 120 A.2d 915, 916 (1956), this Court held that a trial court properly denied

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that was filed by a petitioner who had been released 

on her own recognizance, but the trial court’s decision was “predicated on the wrong 

grounds[.]” In that case, a Montgomery County lawyer contended that recent legislation 

from the General Assembly “had abolished the office of justices of the peace, and justices 

of the peace designated as committing magistrates . . . and transferred all of their former 

authority, power[,] and jurisdiction to the judges of the newly created People’s Court for 

Montgomery County.” Id. at 259, 120 A.2d at 915-16. The lawyer sought to create “a test 

case to establish that the justices of the peace, and . . . committing magistrates, were without 

legal power or authority,” so the lawyer parked her vehicle in a street intersection in 

violation of State law. Id. at 259, 120 A.2d at 916. The lawyer refused to sign a summons 

to appear at the People’s Court and instead was taken before “a justice of the peace who 

 

this title, a person may not appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Court of 

Special Appeals.

(2) This subtitle does not bar an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals:

(i) in a habeas corpus proceeding begun under § 9-110 of this article; 

or

(ii) in any other proceeding in which a writ of habeas corpus is sought 

for a purpose other than to challenge the legality of a conviction of a crime 

or sentence of imprisonment for the conviction of the crime, including 

confinement as a result of a proceeding under Title 4 of the Correctional 

Services Article.
- 25 -

acted regularly as a committing magistrate[.]” Id. at 259-60, 120 A.2d at 916. The lawyer 

then refused to post collateral of $6.45 and was committed to the custody of the 

Montgomery County sheriff, with bail set at $50. See id. at 260, 120 A.2d at 916. That 

same afternoon, the lawyer sought habeas corpus relief in the Circuit Court for 

Montgomery County on the ground that she was being illegally detained, and the court 

released the lawyer on her own recognizance, pending a hearing on the habeas corpus 

petition. See id. at 260, 120 A.2d at 916.

At the hearing on the petition, the lawyer argued that her commitment to jail by the 

justice of the peace was illegal and void because the new laws abolished the justice of the 

peace’s office and transferred that jurisdiction and power to the People’s Court. See id. at 

260, 120 A.2d at 916. The trial court issued an opinion denying the habeas corpus petition 

and ruling that the General Assembly did not take away authority from justices of the peace 

sitting only as committing magistrates, and, therefore, the justice of the peace acted within 

the scope of his authority and the lawyer was to be remanded to the sheriff’s custody “until 

released by due process of law.” Id. at 260, 120 A.2d at 916 (internal quotation mark 

omitted).

This Court concluded that the lawyer was not entitled to habeas corpus relief for 

two reasons other than the reason given by the trial court. See id. at 260-63, 120 A.2d at 

917. First, this Court held that habeas corpus relief is not available to a person who is free 

on bail because there is no “actual or physical restraint of” such a person, explaining:

Traditionally, and in practice, the writ of habeas corpus has been and 

is available only to liberate persons who are in actual, involuntary, illegal 

restraint. The courts have not lent themselves to the issuance of the writ 
- 26 -

when restraint was theoretical or technical only, or was actual but by choice, 

and the real purpose of the writ was to test the validity of a law and not, in 

fact, to bring about release from involuntary confinement. It is clear that 

habeas corpus will not be granted one who is free on bail. . . . Unless there 

be an actual or physical restraint of a person, the writ of habeas corpus may 

not issue, and a person released from imprisonment on bail is not so 

restrained of his [or her] liberty as to be entitled to the writ. This statement 

of the law is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority. . . . Indeed, 

we do not find a case in the books holding that a person out under bail is so 

restrained as to entitle him [or her] to the writ. Many courts agree with these 

holdings.

Id. at 261-62, 120 A.2d at 917 (cleaned up). This Court held that habeas corpus relief also 

is not available to an individual whose confinement is voluntary:

Made plain also by the cases is the rule that if the confinement is 

voluntary, there is no need for the issuance of the writ and it will be denied. 

In [a California case], the Court held that where the imprisonment involved 

is voluntary, as where an indicted person on bail procures his [or her] 

surrender solely to make a habeas corpus case, the writ will not issue. It said: 

the essential object and purpose of the writ is to inquire into all manner of 

involuntary restraint, as distinguished from voluntary, and relieve a person 

therefrom if such restraint is illegal. It was never contemplated, as anciently 

designed, or as at present guaranteed in the different jurisdictions of this 

country, that the writ should be invoked [o]n behalf of a person who was not 

actually in restraint and involuntarily and illegally so[.]

Id. at 262-63, 120 A.2d at 917 (cleaned up).

Applying that law to the circumstances of the case, this Court determined that the 

lawyer’s “detention and restraint, such as it was, was self-contrived and self-imposed[,]” 

and that, after being released on her own recognizance, the lawyer had “been at liberty ever 

since.” Id. at 264-65, 120 A.2d at 918-19. We concluded that the lawyer was not entitled 

to a writ of habeas corpus, and that the trial court “should have denied the writ for the 

reasons we ha[d] set forth and need not have and should not have gone into the question of 

the jurisdiction and powers of the justice of the peace.” Id. at 266, 120 A.2d at 919. As 
- 27 -

such, we remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing the habeas 

corpus petition on the grounds set forth in the opinion. See id. at 266, 120 A.2d at 919.

Two years later, in McGloin v. Warden of Md. House of Corr., 215 Md. 630, 630-

31, 137 A.2d 659, 660 (1958), where the petitioner was released on parole, this Court held 

that the case in which the trial court denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was moot. 

In that case, the petitioner was convicted of crimes and sentenced to concurrent terms of 

imprisonment. See id. at 630, 137 A.2d at 660. The petitioner sought a writ of habeas 

corpus, contending that one of the sentences was illegal; the trial court rejected that 

contention and denied the petition; and the petitioner applied for leave to appeal. See id.

at 630, 137 A.2d at 660. In the meantime, the petitioner was released on parole, and the 

State argued that the case was moot as a result. See id. at 631, 137 A.2d at 660. We agreed 

that the case was moot and denied the application for leave to appeal, explaining:

[W]e pointed out that it is generally held that a parolee is not entitled to the 

writ[.] . . . [W]e [have also] cited many cases holding that a person on bail is 

not entitled to the writ. With the exception of Florida, the [S]tate courts seem 

to have uniformly held that a parolee is not entitled to the writ. This has also 

been the rule in the federal courts. A more recent Supreme Court decision 

casts some doubt upon the proposition, for in [that case], the court intimated 

that the federal statute should receive a broader interpretation to embrace 

applications in the nature of the writ of coram nobis. But whatever the scope 

of the federal statute may be, we think the writ of habeas corpus is not 

available in Maryland under the circumstances of the instant case, and that 

the case is moot. As we [have] pointed out . . . , there are other means 

available to raise questions as to the legality of a sentence.

Id. at 631, 137 A.2d at 660 (citations omitted).

More recently, in In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. 66, 70-71, 102 

A.3d 837, 839 (2014), the Court of Special Appeals held that an appeal from the denial of 
- 28 -

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was not allowed. In that case, a mother sought habeas 

corpus relief, requesting that the trial court direct the temporary guardians of her children 

to produce the children, appear in court, and show cause why the children should not be 

returned to the mother. See id. at 87, 102 A.3d at 849. The trial court denied habeas corpus 

relief, and the mother appealed. See id. at 87, 102 A.3d at 849. The Court of Special 

Appeals held that the mother “had no right to file an appeal” from the denial of the writ of 

habeas corpus because none of the four statutory exceptions permitting appeals or 

applications for leave to appeal in habeas corpus cases were “even arguably applicable[.]” 

Id. at 87-88, 102 A.3d at 849. 

In a footnote, the Court of Special Appeals stated that, even if the mother had a right 

to appeal, the trial court did not clearly err in denying habeas corpus relief. See id. at 88 

n.6, 102 A.3d at 849 n.6. The Court of Special Appeals explained: “The writ could be 

issued pursuant to the statute upon which [the mother] relied[,] i.e., [CJ § 3-701,] if she 

could show that the minor children were being detained in the [S]tate of Maryland. It was 

undisputed that the children were located in North Carolina.” Id. at 88 n.6, 102 A.3d at 

849 n.6 (cleaned up). The Court of Special Appeals also observed that under CJ § 3-701,

in a separate case, the mother had applied to a judge of the Court of Special Appeals for a 

writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 88 n.6, 102 A.3d at 849 n.6. In that separate case, the 

judge of the Court of Special Appeals “denied the writ on the grounds that neither the 

children [nor the temporary guardians] were in Maryland at the time the writ was 

requested.” Id. at 88 n.6, 102 A.3d at 849 n.6.
- 29 -

The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act

The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, or UPPA, is currently codified at CP 

§§ 7-101 to 7-301. The General Assembly first enacted the UPPA in 1958 for the following 

purposes:

providing a remedy for challenging the legality of incarceration under 

judgment of conviction of a crime and sentence of death or imprisonment 

therefore, including confinement as a result of a proceeding under Article 

31B of the Code, but not affecting remedies incident to the proceedings in 

the trial court and remedies of direct review of the judgment of conviction; 

providing that hereafter no appeal shall be permitted or entertained in habeas 

corpus cases and repealing the right of appeal in coram nobis cases or from 

other common law or statutory remedies which have heretofore been 

available for challenging the validity of incarceration under sentence of death 

or imprisonment; and providing further, that any person may apply to the 

Court of Appeals of Maryland for leave to appeal from an order passed under 

this Act, relating generally thereto and repealing all laws or parts of laws 

inconsistent herewith to the extent of such inconsistency.

1958 (Reg. Sess.) Md. Laws 178-79 (Ch. 44, S.B. 14). Indeed, the UPPA, “for the first 

time, created a statutory remedy under which a prisoner could collaterally challenge the 

conviction and sentence, or defective delinquency determination, which led to his [or her] 

incarceration.” Gluckstern, 319 Md. at 658, 574 A.2d at 909. Moreover, “[t]he purpose 

of the [UPPA] was to create a simple statutory procedure, in place of the common law 

habeas corpus and coram nobis remedies, for collateral attacks upon criminal convictions 

and sentences.” Id. at 658, 574 A.2d at 909 (citations omitted). More recently, in Douglas 

v. State, 423 Md. 156, 175, 31 A.3d 250, 261-62 (2011), we discussed the purpose of the 

UPPA, stating: 

The purpose of the UPPA was to streamline into one simple statute all 

the remedies, beyond those that are incident to the usual procedures of trial 

and review, which are presently available for challenging the validity of a 
- 30 -

sentence. The UPPA does not eliminate alternative remedies, such as habeas 

corpus, coram nobis, or other common law or statutory remedies, though it 

restricts the right to appeal orders pursuant to those traditional remedies. But 

where the UPPA does not provide a remedy, the preclusive effects of C.P. § 

7-107(b)(1) do not apply. See Gluckstern [], 319 Md. [at] 662, 574 A.2d [at]

912 [] (explaining that, “[i]n situations where the Post[c]onviction Procedure 

Act did not provide a remedy, and thus was not a substitute for habeas corpus, 

the enactment of the new statute provided no reason for restricting appeals in 

habeas corpus cases”).

(Cleaned up). Moreover, although the UPPA “did not abrogate the remedies formerly 

available under the writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis and other common-law []

remedies, it clearly took away the right of appeal from an order denying them.” Brady v. 

State, 222 Md. 442, 447, 160 A.2d 912, 915-16 (1960). 

In 1965, in relevant part, the General Assembly amended Md. Code, Art. 27 (1957, 

1964 Supp.), § 645A(a) “to permit a person on parole or probation to institute a proceeding 

under the [UPPA.]” 1965 (Reg. Sess.) Md. Laws 634 (Ch. 442, H.B. 901). In other words, 

the UPPA expressly applies to persons on parole or probation. Currently, CP § 7-101 

provides that the UPPA “applies to a person convicted in any court in the State who is: (1) 

confined under sentence of imprisonment; or (2) on parole or probation.” (Paragraph 

breaks omitted). 

Federal Habeas Corpus Law

Currently, one of the federal habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), sets forth 

who may petition for a writ of habeas corpus, providing:

The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless--

(1) He [or she] is in custody under or by color of the authority of the 

United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
- 31 -

(2) He [or she] is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance 

of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or 

judge of the United States; or

(3) He [or she] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States; or

(4) He [or she], being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein 

is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, 

authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, 

order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and 

effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or

(5) It is necessary to bring him [or her] into court to testify or for trial.

Significantly, federal habeas corpus law has developed on a different trajectory from 

Maryland over the course of the past century. In Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245, 247-48

(1913)—a case that this Court cited in Hendershott, 209 Md. at 262, 120 A.2d at 917—the 

Supreme Court held that a petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus relief “because, 

since the appeal, he has given bond in the district court, and has been released from arrest 

under the warrant issued on the indictment.” The Supreme Court further explained:

[The petitioner] is no longer in the custody of the marshal to whom the writ 

is addressed, and from whose custody he seeks to be discharged. The 

[petitioner] is now at liberty, and having secured the very relief which the 

writ of habeas corpus was intended to afford to those held under warrants 

issued on indictments, the appeal must be dismissed.

Johnson, 227 U.S. at 248. A few years later, in Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339, 343

(1920), the Supreme Court reiterated that a petitioner free on bail “is not entitled to be 

discharged on habeas corpus. Being no longer under actual restraint within the District of 

Columbia[,] he was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.” (Citations omitted).

Since Johnson and Stallings, the Supreme Court has greatly broadened the scope of 
- 32 -

those who are eligible to pursue federal habeas corpus relief to encompass persons on 

parole or probation, as well as those released on bail or on their own recognizance. For 

example, in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 236, 243 (1963), the Supreme Court held

that a person who was placed on parole in Virginia was eligible to seek federal habeas 

corpus relief. In that case, the Supreme Court noted that the federal habeas corpus statute 

did “not attempt to mark the boundaries of ‘custody’ nor in any way other than by use of 

that word attempt to limit the situations in which the writ c[ould] be used.” Id. at 238. 

Thus, the Supreme Court looked generally at the common-law usages and history of habeas 

corpus in England and the United States. See id. at 238-40. The Supreme Court observed 

that “the chief use of habeas corpus has been to seek the release of persons held in actual, 

physical custody in prison or jail[,]” but that English courts had not limited habeas corpus 

relief “only to those in jail or like physical confinement.” Id. at 238-39. And, “[s]imilarly, 

in the United States the use of habeas corpus ha[d] not been restricted to situations in which 

the applicant [was] in actual, physical custody.” Id. at 239. The Supreme Court noted that, 

“besides physical imprisonment, there [we]re other restraints on a [person]’s liberty, 

restraints not shared by the public generally, which ha[d] been thought sufficient . . . to 

support the issuance of habeas corpus.” Id. at 240.

With respect to the petitioner’s case, the Supreme Court observed that the Virginia 

parole statute provided that a paroled prisoner was “released into the custody of the Parole 

Board[,]” and that the parole order placed the “petitioner under the custody and control of 

the Virginia Parole Board[,]” which “involved significant restrictions on [the] petitioner’s 

liberty[.]” Id. at 241-42 (cleaned up). In the Supreme Court’s view, those restraints were 
- 33 -

“enough to invoke the help of the” writ of habeas corpus because,

[w]hile [the] petitioner’s parole release[d] him from immediate physical 

imprisonment, it impose[d] conditions which significantly confine[d] and 

restrain[ed] his freedom; this [wa]s enough to keep him in the ‘custody’ of 

the members of the Virginia Parole Board within the meaning of the habeas 

corpus statute; if he can prove his allegations this custody is in violation of 

the Constitution, and it was therefore error for the Court of Appeals to 

dismiss his case as moot instead of permitting him to add the Parole Board 

members as respondents.

Id. at 243. And, the Supreme Court stated that the writ of habeas corpus “always could 

and still can reach behind prison walls and iron bars[,]” as the scope of the writ “has grown 

to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to 

be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.” Id.

Two decades later, in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 422, 430 (1984), the 

Supreme Court recognized the applicability of its holding in Jones, 371 U.S. 236, to 

persons on probation. In that case, the Supreme Court stated that the respondent, who was 

on probation, “was, to be sure, subject to a number of restrictive conditions governing 

various aspects of his life, and he would be regarded as ‘in custody’ for purposes of federal 

habeas corpus.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430 (citing Jones, 371 U.S. at 241-43).

In Hensley v. Mun. Ct., San Jose Milpitas Jud. Dist., Santa Clara Cty., Cal., 411 

U.S. 345, 349 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a person who is released on bail or on 

his or her own recognizance is in custody for purposes of the federal habeas corpus statute, 

i.e., that such a person may pursue federal habeas corpus relief. Referring to Jones, 371 

U.S. 236, the Supreme Court recognized that a “parolee is generally subject to greater 

restrictions on his [or her] liberty of movement than a person released on bail or his [or 
- 34 -

her] own recognizance[,]” but noted that other courts had “concluded that a person released 

on bail or his [or her] own recognizance may be ‘in custody’ within the meaning of the 

statute.” Hensley, 411 U.S. at 348-49 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court agreed with 

the reasoning of that line of cases, concluding that the bailee in Hensley was

subject to restraints not shared by the public generally, that is, the obligation 

to appear at all times and places as ordered by any court or magistrate of 

competent jurisdiction. He cannot come and go as he pleases. His freedom 

of movement rests in the hands of [S]tate judicial officers, who may demand 

his presence at any time and without a moment’s notice. Disobedience is 

itself a criminal offense.

Id. at 351 (cleaned up). And, in a footnote, the Supreme Court stated that, insofar as 

previous decisions, such as Stallings, 253 U.S. 339, and Johnson, 227 U.S. 245, “may 

indicate a narrower reading of the custody requirement, they may no longer be deemed 

controlling.” Hensley, 411 U.S. at 350 n.8. 

And, in Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 488 (1973), the Supreme 

Court addressed “a sharp conflict among the federal courts on the choice of forum where a 

prisoner attacks an interstate detainer on federal habeas corpus.” (Footnote omitted). In 

that case, an inmate of an Alabama prison filed a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus

in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. See id. at 485. At

issue in the case was whether the federal habeas corpus statute precluded the District Court 

from considering the petition where a petitioner was not within the territorial limits of the 

District Court. See id. The Supreme Court held that the District Court was not so 

precluded, stating that the language of the federal habeas corpus statute “requires nothing 

more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian.” Id. at 495. 
- 35 -

The Supreme Court explained:

So long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can 

issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’ requiring that the prisoner be brought 

before the court for a hearing on his [or her] claim, or requiring that he [or 

she] be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner him[- or her]self 

is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.

Id.

Analysis

Here, we hold that, under the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a), to be eligible to 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a person must be “committed, detained, confined, or 

restrained from his [or her] lawful liberty within the State[,]” nothing more and nothing 

less. Under the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a), a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 

not foreclosed where a person is placed on probation with conditions that significantly 

restrict or restrain the person’s lawful liberty within the State. Cf. Jones, 371 U.S. at 242, 

243 (“[T]he custody and control of the Parole Board involves significant restraints on 

petitioner’s liberty[,]” and the “conditions and restrictions . . . significantly restraint 

petitioner’s liberty[.]” (Emphasis added)). To be sure, in the past, Maryland case law held

that the scope of persons entitled to seek habeas corpus relief was narrow and limited to 

those who were in actual or physical restraint in the State. Indeed, in the past, this Court 

expressly declined to extend the availability of habeas corpus relief to parolees and persons 

released on bail. Nevertheless, the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) is not so limiting. Thus, 

to the extent that, in Hendershott, 209 Md. at 262, 120 A.2d at 917, and McGloin, 215 Md. 

at 631, 137 A.2d at 660, we have held that physical custody within the State is necessary 

for habeas corpus relief, in light of later case law from the United States Supreme Court, 
- 36 -

we overrule those cases and hold today that people who are committed, detained, or 

confined within the State or persons on probation with conditions that significantly restrain 

the person’s lawful liberty within the State are entitled to seek habeas corpus relief. Under 

CJ § 3-702(a)’s plain language, to be eligible to seek habeas corpus relief, a person must 

be committed, detained, confined, or restrained in the State, which may involve physical 

custody or other significant restrictions of a person’s lawful liberty within the State. In this 

case, however, when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed, Sabisch, who was 

on unsupervised probation and living in Michigan, was not committed, detained, confined, 

or restrained from his lawful liberty in Maryland. Stated otherwise, under the 

circumstances of this case, when Sabisch filed his habeas corpus petition, he was not 

significantly restrained from his lawful liberty in Maryland, and thus was not eligible to 

seek habeas corpus relief in Maryland pursuant to CJ § 3-702(a).

By its plain language, CJ § 3-702(a) governs who may petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, providing that a person who is “committed, detained, confined, or restrained from 

his [or her] lawful liberty within the State” may petition for a writ of habeas corpus so that 

“the cause of the commitment, detainer, confinement, or restraint may be inquired into.” 

In other words, to be eligible to pursue habeas corpus relief, a person must be “committed, 

detained, confined, or restrained . . . within the State[.]” Key to eligibility to seek a petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus is that the person is being committed, detained, confined, or 

restrained within Maryland. Indeed, it is clear from CJ § 3-702(a)’s plain language that 

“[a] person [must be] committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his [or her] lawful 

liberty within the State[,]” i.e., the person must be committed, detained, confined, or 
- 37 -

restrained in Maryland. (Emphasis added). 

Put simply, read to its logical conclusion, CJ § 3-702(a) means that, to be eligible 

to seek habeas corpus relief in Maryland, a person must be experiencing commitment, 

detention, confinement, or restraint within Maryland. It makes sense that, to be eligible to 

seek habeas corpus relief in Maryland, a person must be committed, detained, confined, or 

restrained within Maryland. A person’s presence in a particular jurisdiction is obviously 

not an issue in the federal habeas corpus arena because the federal government has 

jurisdiction across the country, and no issue as to extradition or jurisdiction would arise. 

The United States Supreme Court has stated as much, focusing on the physical location of 

the custodian rather than the person petitioning for habeas corpus relief. In Braden, 410 

U.S. at 485, 495, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal habeas corpus statute 

“requires nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the 

custodian[,]” notwithstanding whether the petitioner was physically present within the 

territorial limits of the District Court. This is so because, “even if the prisoner [] is confined 

outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction[,]” “[s]o long as the custodian can be reached by 

service of process, the court can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’ requiring that the 

prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his [or her] claim, or requiring that he 

[or she] be released outright from custody[.]” Id. at 495. 

By contrast, under CJ § 3-702(a)’s plain language, to be eligible to seek Maryland 

habeas corpus relief, the person committed, detained, confined, or restrained must be 

within Maryland, i.e., within Maryland’s jurisdiction. As the Court of Special Appeals 

noted in Zealand, 220 Md. App. at 88 n.6, 102 A.3d at 849 n.6, even if the mother in that 
- 38 -

case had the right to appeal the denial of the writ of habeas corpus, the trial court did not 

clearly err in denying habeas corpus relief because the minor children were in North 

Carolina and were not being detained within Maryland. In other words, physical presence 

in the State is necessary for purposes of habeas corpus relief, and CJ § 3-702(a) expressly 

connects the requisite physical custody to the body of the person petitioning for habeas 

corpus relief, recognizing that Maryland courts cannot automatically compel production of 

a body that is outside the State’s borders.6 Thus, Sabisch was not eligible for habeas corpus 

relief because he was not committed, detained, confined, or restrained within the State 

when he filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It simply cannot be said that, while 

Sabisch was living in Michigan, on unsupervised probation, the conditions of his probation

constituted commitment, detainment, confinement, or restraint in Maryland. 

Although our analysis could end here and we need not reach the issue of whether 

physical custody is required under CJ § 3-702(a), because the issue is an important one that 

has been fully briefed and argued by the parties and resolved by the Court of Special 

Appeals, we address the matter. We begin by looking to the plain language of the statute. 

CJ § 3-702(a) does not use the word “physically” before “committed, detained, 

confined, or restrained[,]” although the first three terms, given their natural and ordinary 

meaning, indicate physical custody or a physical component to the commitment, detainer, 

or confinement. The term “restrained,” however, is broader and does not necessarily 

 

6

In Maryland, there are formalized extradition procedures that must be followed to 

bring someone into the State from another State to appear in a Maryland court. See, e.g., 

CP §§ 9-101 to 9-128 (Uniform Criminal Extradition Act).
- 39 -

require physical custody, but instead may encompass situations in which a person is 

significantly restrained but not in actual physical custody, i.e., not confined, detained or 

committed. Under the circumstances, we think it helpful to briefly turn to the “natural and 

ordinary meaning” of the terms “committed,” “detained,” “confined,” and “restrained.” 

Bottini v. Dep’t of Fin., 450 Md. 177, 195, 147 A.3d 371, 382 (2016) (cleaned up). “To 

ascertain the natural and ordinary meaning of” these terms, “we look to dictionary 

definitions as a starting point[,]” as “it is proper to consult a dictionary or dictionaries for 

a term’s ordinary and popular meaning.” Id. at 195, 147 A.3d at 382 (cleaned up). 

Although the language “detained, restrained, or confined” existed in the CJ § 3-702(a)’s 

earliest predecessor statute that was enacted in 1809, for a plain language analysis, it is 

helpful to review the current definitions of those terms, as well as the term “committed,” 

as those terms are understood today. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “commit,” in relevant 

part, as “[t]o send (a person) to prison or to a mental health facility, esp[ecially] by court 

order.” Commit, Black’s Law Dictionary. And, in relevant part, “commitment” may be

defined as “[t]he act of confining a person in a prison, mental hospital, or other institution; 

esp[ecially], the sending of a person to jail, by warrant or order, for crime, contempt, or 

contumacy[.]” Commitment, Black’s Law Dictionary. Similarly, Merriam-Webster 

defines “committed,” in pertinent part, as being “placed in confinement (as in a mental 

institution)[.]” Committed, Merriam-Wester (2019), https://www.merriamwebster.com/

dictionary/committed [https://perma.cc/43FC-R4B9]. Thus, it is evident that the natural 

and ordinary meaning of the word “committed,” as used in CJ § 3-702(a), is actual or 

physical commitment to a prison, facility, or other institution.
- 40 -

Likewise, “detain” is defined as “to hold or keep in or as if in custody[.]” Detained, 

Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/detained [https://perma.

cc/6HDR-HNP6]. And, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “detainer” as “[t]he action of 

detaining, withholding, or keeping something in one’s custody.” Detainer, Black’s Law 

Dictionary. In other words, a person who is “detained” for purposes of CJ § 3-702(a) is 

physically within the custody of another. The term “confined” is defined, in relevant part,

as “kept within confines: such as[] limited to a particular location [or] held captive[.]” 

Confined, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/confined 

[https://perma.cc/KF2K-MJFU]. Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term 

“confinement” as “[t]he act of imprisoning or restraining someone; the quality, state, or 

condition of being imprisoned or restrained[.]” Confinement, Black’s Law Dictionary. 

Stated otherwise, someone who is confined is physically kept to a particular location, such 

as a prison. 

By contrast, “restrained” is defined as “marked by restraint[,]” Restrained, 

Merriam-Webster, https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restrained [https://perma.cc/

9JY8-QWT6], which, in turn, means “an act of restraining: the state of being restrained” 

and “a means of restraining[,]” Restraint, Merriam-Webster, https://merriamwebster.com/

dictionary/restraint [https://perma.cc/3BCA-6WM7]. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the 

term “restraint,” in relevant part, as “[c]onfinement, abridgment, or limitation[.]” 

Restraint, Black’s Law Dictionary. And, “restrain” has several definitions, including “to 

prevent from doing, exhibiting, or expressing something[,]” “to limit, restrict, or keep 

under control[,]” and “to deprive of liberty[,] especially: to place under arrest or 
- 41 -

restraint[.]” Restrain, Merriam-Webster, https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restrain 

[https://perma.cc/MG3X-M3BT]. Thus, unlike the terms “committed,” “detained,” and 

confined,” the term “restrained” does not necessarily imply the use of physical force or 

control, but instead is more comprehensive, and may encompass significant restraints on a 

person’s lawful liberty that fall short of physical custody.7

At bottom, these definitions demonstrate that the plain and ordinary meaning of the 

terms “committed,” “detained,” and “confined” involve physical custody, whereas the 

plain and ordinary meaning of the term “restrained” does not necessarily imply physical 

custody, but instead may involve significant limitations or restrictions of a person’s liberty 

other than physical custody. Nothing in CJ § 3-702(a) purports to limit the definition of 

the term “restrained” to physical restraint. In short, under CJ § 3-702(a)’s plain language, 

to be eligible to seek habeas corpus relief, a person must be committed, detained, confined, 

or restrained in the State, which may involve physical custody or other significant 

restrictions of a person’s lawful liberty within the State. 

Additionally, we observe that the Maryland Rules pertaining to habeas corpus 

proceedings refer to a person being “confined or restrained,” demonstrating that those two 

terms have different meanings. For example, Maryland Rule 15-302(a)(1) provides that a 

habeas corpus petition must include “a statement that the individual by or on behalf of 

whom the writ is sought is unlawfully confined or restrained[.]” (Emphasis added). As 

 

7We note that, in accord, on brief, Sabisch acknowledges that the terms 

“committed,” “confined,” and “detained” “connote the application of physical force.” He 

argues, however, that the word “restrained” “does not necessarily imply such.” (Citation 

omitted). We agree.
- 42 -

another example, Maryland Rule 15-303(c), concerning procedure on a habeas corpus 

petition, provides in relevant part: 

If the petition is made by or on behalf of an individual confined or 

restrained as the result of a prior judicial proceeding, a judge to whom the 

petition has been made may refer the petition, without taking other action, 

to the administrative judge of the court in which the prior proceeding was 

held.

(Emphasis added). Maryland Rules 15-302(a)(1)’s and 15-303(c)’s use of the terms 

“confined or restrained” leads to the conclusion that those terms mean different things—

that “confined” means one thing and “restrained” means another thing, i.e., that “confined” 

and “restrained” are not synonymous.8 This is consistent with CJ § 3-702(a)’s use of 

 

8The background of Maryland Rules 15-302 and 15-303 supports the conclusion 

that the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (“the Rules Committee”) 

deemed the terms “confined” and “restrained” to mean different things, and that this Court, 

in adopting the Rules, endorsed that position. Prior to 1996, the Maryland Rules pertaining 

to habeas corpus were in Chapter 1100 in Subtitle Z. The Rules Committee issued the One 

Hundred Thirty-Second Report proposing adding Maryland Rules 15-301 to 15-312 as a 

new separate subtitle concerning habeas corpus. The Reporter’s Note to Maryland Rule 

15-302 stated, in relevant part: “The pertinent Code provisions use the terms 

‘commitment,’ ‘detainer,’ ‘confinement,’ and ‘restraint.’ The Z Rules, as originally 

adopted, only use the terms ‘confinement’ and ‘restraint.’ This divergence from the 

language of the Code was probably based on the thought that the terms used in the Code 

are redundant.” The Reporter’s Note to Maryland 15-303 stated in relevant part:

The provision for referral is broadened to cover all petitions based on a 

confinement or restraint that is the result of a prior adjudication and not just 

petitions based on a confinement resulting from conviction. Further, the 

Committee recommends that the Rule permit only the individual confined or 

restrained, and not a plaintiff who is other than the person confined or 

restrained, to consent to referral to a judge who sat at the prior proceeding. 

On February 6, 1996, and March 5, 1996, the Court held a hearing on the One 

Hundred Thirty-Second Report. On March 15, 1996, the Rules Committee held a meeting 

to consider revisions to the proposed Rules of the One Hundred Thirty-Second Report; 
- 43 -

different terms—“committed, detained, confined, or restrained”—to mean different things 

for habeas corpus purposes. Similarly, Maryland Rule 15-301 provides that “[t]he rules in 

this Chapter apply to all habeas corpus proceedings challenging the legality of the 

confinement or restraint of an individual.” (Emphasis added).

Construing the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) to mean that physical restraint is not 

required is consistent with the historic purpose of the writ. The writ of habeas corpus is a 

common law remedy that was imported into Maryland law under Article 5 of the Maryland 

Declaration of Rights.9 As we note in the introduction, the General Assembly is limited 

by Art. III, § 55 of the Maryland Constitution in legislating with respect to the writ. As 

such, the right to habeas corpus relief is a judicially-created common law right that is 

governed by judicial development, much as we do in this case, and the General Assembly 

may regulate the right consistent with the Maryland Constitution, i.e., without suspending 

the writ. Thus, we look to the historic purpose of the writ as well as the plain language of 

CJ § 3-702(a). As the Supreme Court observed in Jones, 371 U.S. at 238, although “the 

chief use of habeas corpus has been to seek the release of persons held in actual, physical 

custody in prison or jail[,]” “English courts have long recognized the writ as a proper 

remedy even though the restraint is something less than close physical confinement.” The 

 

these revisions did not include changes to the Reporter’s Notes to proposed Maryland Rules 

15-302 and 15-303 or to the language of those Rules as to the use of the terms “confined” 

and “restrained.” On June 5, 1996, the Court adopted the Maryland Rules pertaining to 

habeas corpus, and on January 1, 1997, the Rules became effective.

9

In relevant part, Article 5 provides “[t]hat the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled 

to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, 

and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, 

seventeen hundred and seventy-six[.]”
- 44 -

Supreme Court noted that, “in the United States[,] the use of habeas corpus has not been 

restricted to situations in which the applicant is in actual, physical custody.” Id. at 239. As 

such, the Supreme Court stated: “History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, 

besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man’s liberty, restraints not 

shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking 

world to support the issuance of habeas corpus.” Id. at 240.

More recently, in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732, 739-52 (2008), a case in 

which the Supreme Court considered whether enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo 

Bay were eligible to seek habeas corpus relief, the Supreme Court discussed the historic 

purpose and development of the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court stated that 

“protection for the privilege of habeas corpus was one of the few safeguards of liberty 

specified in a Constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights.” Id. at 739. Addressing 

the history of the writ in England, the Supreme Court observed:

Magna Carta decreed that no man would be imprisoned contrary to the law 

of the land. Art. 39, in Sources of Our Liberties 17 (R. Perry & J. Cooper 

eds. 1959) (“No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or 

outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, 

nor send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law 

of the land”). 

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740. The Supreme Court explained that, over time, the writ of 

habeas corpus became the means by which the protection of Magna Carta was achieved. 

See id. (citing 9 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 112 (1926)). As to the early 

American development of the writ, the Supreme Court stated that the Framers of the United 

States Constitution “considered the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual 
- 45 -

liberty is evident from the care taken to specify the limited grounds for its suspension[.]” 

Id. at 743.10

Because the historic purpose of the writ is clear and the language of CJ § 3-702(a) 

is unambiguous, we need not resort to a review of its legislative history. We observe that

the General Assembly’s enactment of the UPPA did not alter the plain language of CJ § 3-

702(a) or its predecessor statute. As we have recognized, “[t]he purpose of the [UPPA] 

was to create a simple statutory procedure, in place of the common law habeas corpus and 

coram nobis remedies, for collateral attacks upon criminal convictions and sentences.” 

Gluckstern, 319 Md. at 658, 574 A.2d at 909 (citations omitted). Notably, however, “[t]he 

UPPA does not eliminate alternative remedies, such as habeas corpus, coram nobis, or 

other common law or statutory remedies, though it restricts the right to appeal orders 

pursuant to those traditional remedies.” Douglas, 423 Md. at 175, 31 A.3d at 261 (citation 

omitted). Stated otherwise, although the UPPA “took away the right of appeal from an 

order denying” a writ of habeas corpus, Brady, 222 Md. at 447, 160 A.2d at 916, the UPPA 

did not otherwise alter habeas corpus relief in Maryland. 

 

10In Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740, 747, 752, the Supreme Court cited a law review 

article that discusses the history of the writ of habeas corpus. See Halliday & White, The 

Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 Va. 

L. Rev. 575 (2008). Among matters, the law review article informs that “[t]he Supreme 

Court, for its part, has consistently maintained that the contemporary constitutional 

jurisprudence of habeas corpus needs to be informed by the legal and constitutional history 

of the ‘Great Writ,’ both in England and in the framing period of the Constitution.” 

Halliday & White, 94 Va. L. Rev. at 580. The law review article states that “the statutory 

writ was never understood, in the period before the American framing, as superseding the 

common law habeas jurisprudence.” Id. at 631 (footnote omitted).
- 46 -

To the extent that our case law has delineated the bounds of habeas corpus relief in 

Maryland as being available only to persons who are in actual or physical commitment, 

detainer, confinement, or restraint, we abrogate those holdings in light of the plain language 

of CJ § 3-702(a) and the persuasive authority of the Supreme Court’s case law.

11

 In 

Hendershott, 209 Md. at 262, 120 A.2d at 917, this Court stated that, “[u]nless there be an 

actual or physical restraint of a person, the writ of habeas corpus may not issue[.]” 

Moreover, we explained that, both “[t]raditionally[] and in practice, the writ of habeas 

corpus has been and is available only to liberate persons who are in actual, involuntary, 

illegal restraint[,]” and not where “restraint was theoretical or technical only, or was actual 

but by choice[.]” Id. at 261-62, 120 A.2d at 917. And, this Court has stated that the writ 

of habeas corpus is not available to persons free on bail or parolees because those persons 

are not in actual or physical restraint. See id. at 262, 120 A.2d at 917 (“[A] person released 

from imprisonment on bail is not so restrained of his [or her] liberty as to be entitled to the 

writ.” (Citation omitted)); McGloin, 215 Md. at 631, 137 A.2d at 660 (“[I]t is generally 

held that a parolee is not entitled to the writ[.]” (Citation omitted)). Insofar as Hendershott

 

11Under the doctrine of stare decisis, generally, “a court must follow earlier judicial 

decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” Stare Decisis, Black’s Law 

Dictionary. “[S]tare decisis[, however,] is not absolute.” Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 

669, 128 A.3d 147, 159 (2015) (cleaned up). Under the two exceptions to “stare decisis, 

an appellate court may overrule a case that either was clearly wrong and contrary to 

established principles[,] or has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” 

Scott v. State, 454 Md. 146, 183, 164 A.3d 177, 198 (2017) (cleaned up). From our 

perspective, given the significant changes in federal habeas corpus law implemented by the 

United States Supreme Court, it is appropriate to abrogate our holdings in Hendershott and 

McGloin.
- 47 -

and McGloin endorse a narrower reading of the requirement that a petitioner be committed, 

detained, confined, or restrained from his or her lawful liberty within the State, those

holdings are no longer controlling.12

From our perspective, the Supreme Court’s cases concerning the federal habeas 

corpus statute are instructive. To be sure, one of the federal habeas corpus statutes, 28 

U.S.C. § 2241(c), setting forth who may petition for a writ of habeas corpus, uses the phrase 

“in custody,” which is not used in CJ § 3-702(a). Rather, CJ § 3-702(a) uses the terms 

“committed, detained, confined, or restrained[,]” which are obviously different from the 

phrase “in custody” as used in the federal habeas corpus statute. Nevertheless, this Court 

has previously noted in a postconviction case that the Supreme Court’s “expansive 

interpretation of the ‘in custody’ requirements of federal [habeas corpus] statutes[,]” 

although “not binding upon us in our determination of the scope of the custody requirement 

of [the UPPA,] is persuasive authority[.]” McMannis v. State, 311 Md. 534, 542, 536 A.2d 

652, 656 (1988). Just as in McMannis, the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of 

the federal habeas corpus statute guides our determination today concerning the scope of 

habeas corpus relief. 

In Jones, 371 U.S. at 236, 238, in holding that a person who was placed on parole 

in Virginia was eligible to seek federal habeas corpus relief, the Supreme Court noted that 

 

12We note that Hendershott, 209 Md. at 262, 120 A.2d at 917, cited Johnson, 227 

U.S. 245, as one of multiple cases in which courts had held that persons free on bail are not 

entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Significantly, Johnson has since been overruled by the 

Supreme Court as being too narrow a reading of the federal habeas corpus statute’s in 

custody requirement. See Hensley, 411 U.S. at 350 n.8.
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the federal habeas corpus statute did “not attempt to mark the boundaries of ‘custody’ nor 

in any way other than by use of that word attempt to limit the situations in which the writ 

c[ould] be used.” And, with respect to the petitioner’s case, the Supreme Court observed 

that the Virginia parole statute provided that a paroled prisoner was released “into the 

custody of the Parole Board[,]” and that the parole order placed the petitioner “under the 

custody and control of the Virginia Parole Board[,]” which “involved significant 

restrictions on [the] petitioner’s liberty[.]” Id. at 241-42 (cleaned up). And, in the Supreme 

Court’s view, the conditions of the petitioner’s parole, “which significantly confine[d] and 

restrain[ed the petitioner’s] freedom” were “enough to keep him in the ‘custody’ of the 

members of the Virginia Parole Board within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute[.]” 

Id. at 243. Additionally, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that the scope of the 

writ of habeas corpus in the federal arena had “grown[,]” or expanded. Id.

Murphy, 465 U.S. at 422, 430, and Hensley, 411 U.S. at 349—in which the Supreme 

Court held, respectively, that persons on probation or released on bail or on his or her own 

recognizance are “in custody” for purposes of the federal habeas corpus statute—likewise 

involved interpretation of the federal habeas corpus statute and its use of the phrase “in 

custody.” In Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430, the Supreme Court determined that the probationer 

“was, to be sure, subject to a number of restrictive conditions governing various aspects of 

his life, and he would be regarded as ‘in custody’ for purposes of federal habeas corpus.” 

(Citing Jones, 371 U.S. at 241-43). Among other things, the conditions of probation in that 

case involved participation in a treatment program for sex offenders, reporting to a 

probation officer as directed, and being “truthful with the probation officer ‘in all matters.’” 
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Murphy, 465 U.S. at 422. And, in Hensley, 411 U.S. at 348-49, the Supreme Court agreed 

with the reasoning of other courts that had “concluded that a person released on bail or his 

[or her] own recognizance may be ‘in custody’ within the meaning of the statute.” 

(Footnote omitted).

To be certain, in neither Jones, Murphy, nor Hensley did the Supreme Court 

evaluate Maryland’s habeas corpus statute or whether parole and probation in Maryland 

would be the equivalent of being “in custody” for purposes of the federal habeas corpus 

statute. And, even had the Supreme Court determined that Maryland parole and probation 

constitute being “in custody” under the federal habeas corpus statute, that determination 

would not be dispositive of whether Maryland parole and probation constitute 

commitment, detainer, confinement, or restraint for purposes of CJ § 3-702(a). 

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Jones, Murphy, and Hensley, and its 

expansive view of who is eligible to pursue federal habeas corpus relief inform our analysis

of CJ § 3-702(a).

On another note, we observe that some jurisdictions follow the federal habeas 

corpus approach and have determined that persons on parole or probation, or those free on 

bail or released on their own recognizance, are permitted to seek habeas corpus relief under 

State law, and others do not. In one example, in In re Douglas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 236, 246-

47 (2011), a California Court of Appeal, citing various California cases, stated: 

Traditionally, a writ of habeas corpus applied to those under actual physical 

restraint; however, decisional law has expanded the scope of the writ to apply 

to those in constructive custody situations and today may apply to those on 

parole, probation, bail, or sentenced prisoners released on their own 

recognizance pending hearing on the merits of their petition. Without actual 
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or constructive custody, courts have no authority to grant relief.

(Citations omitted). As another example, in Noble v. Siwicki, 197 A.2d 298, 300 (R.I. 

1964), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that persons on probation are eligible to 

seek State habeas corpus relief, explaining:

We are of the opinion that the provisions of our statute . . . are of 

sufficient latitude to enable a person restrained by reason of commitment to 

the custody of a probation officer to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to 

terminate that restraint if unlawfully imposed. The pertinent portion thereof 

provides that every person imprisoned in a correctional institution ‘or 

otherwise restrained of his [or her] liberty by any officer or other person’ 

may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from such restraint if 

unlawfully imposed. The view which we take of this statute appears to be 

consistent with the basic concept set out in Jones[], 371 U.S. 236[.]

See also Escamilla v. Superintendent, 777 S.E.2d 864, 868 (Va. 2015) (The Supreme Court 

of Virginia held that a person is “detained” for purposes of that State’s habeas corpus 

statute “so long as the sentence under attack has not been ‘fully served.’ A petitioner who 

enjoys physical freedom but remains subject to a sentence not yet fully served, such as a 

suspended sentence, supervised parole, or probation, is under detention.” (Citation 

omitted)).

And, some State courts have specifically held, as the Supreme Court has, that 

parolees may seek habeas corpus relief. See, e.g., Caton v. State, 869 N.W.2d 911, 914-

15 (Neb. 2015) (The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that “a parolee may seek relief 

through [the Nebraska] habeas corpus statute.”); State ex rel. Atkinson v. Tahash, 142 

N.W.2d 294, 298-99 (Minn. 1966) (The Supreme Court of Minnesota held “that a [S]tate 

prisoner, released from a [S]tate institution and in custody of the Adult Corrections 

Commission under conditions imposed by that body and subject to revocation, [i.e., a 
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parolee,] is entitled to the remedy of habeas corpus as used under the practice in this [S]tate 

as a postconviction remedy.”); Sellers v. Bridges, 15 So.2d 293, 294 (Fla. 1943) (The 

Supreme Court of Florida held that a parolee could seek habeas corpus relief because “[t]he 

parolee, although at large while on parole, is a prisoner no less than a prisoner physically 

confined.”).

By contrast, some jurisdictions have concluded that, absent physical confinement or 

restraint, a person is not eligible to seek habeas corpus relief. For example, in People ex 

rel. Williams v. Morris, 357 N.E.2d 851, 852 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), the Appellate Court of 

Illinois held that parolees were not entitled to seek habeas corpus relief under the State 

statute because, “for purposes of [the State habeas corpus statute], actual custody or 

imprisonment is required, and, therefore, a parolee contending that he [or she] is entitled 

to absolute discharge due to the expiration of his [or her] sentence is not entitled to bring a 

habeas corpus action.” The Court further explained:

We recognize that a parolee remains at all times in the legal custody 

of the Department of Corrections and subject to the authority of the parole 

and pardon board until the expiration of his [or her] sentence. However, a 

parolee is not imprisoned and is subject to reimprisonment only if he [or she] 

violates a condition of his [or her] parole. No one has actual custody or 

physical control of the parolee, and where, as here, the parolee is at liberty to 

come into court on his [or her] own, there is little sense in directing a writ of 

habeas corpus to a parole officer or parole board whose only authority to take 

physical custody of the parolee is dependent upon that parolee’s breaching 

of a condition of his [or her] parole. We believe that section 22 of the [State] 

Habeas Corpus Act is intended to provide relief to a prisoner who has 

satisfied the judgment under which he is confined and seeks to obtain his [or 

her] release from imprisonment, and is not susceptible to a ‘constructive 

custody’ interpretation.

Id. at 852-53 (citations omitted). And, the Court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Jones, 
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371 U.S. 236, stating: “Jones is an interpretation of a specific federal habeas corpus statute 

[] on a nonconstitutional basis, and although persuasive authority, is not binding on this 

court.” Williams, 357 N.E.2d at 853. See also State ex rel. Ali v. Sperbeck, 411 N.Y.S.2d 

344, 344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court 

held that a parolee was not entitled to seek habeas corpus relief because his “liberty [was] 

no longer being restrained in view of his release on parole.”). 

In Williams v. State, 155 So.2d 322, 323 (Ala. Ct. App. 1963), the Court of Appeals 

of Alabama held that “[h]abeas corpus is not a [S]tate court remedy available to a parolee 

in Alabama, who is not otherwise under detention.” The Court explained:

Persons under bail are not restrained of their liberty, so as to be 

entitled to a discharge on habeas corpus. [I]t seems that, as a general rule, a 

person placed on parole is not considered as being restrained of his [or her] 

liberty to such a degree as to be entitled to the benefit of the writ of habeas 

corpus. Jones[], 371 U.S. 236, [] which deals only with 28 U.S.C.[ §] 2241, 

[one of the federal habeas corpus statutes,] does not apply here.

Williams, 155 So.2d at 323 (cleaned up). See also Sorrow v. Vickery, 184 S.E.2d 462, 462 

(Ga. 1971) (The Supreme Court of Georgia stated “that habeas corpus is available to test 

the legality of present confinement only, and if the applicant is no longer incarcerated there 

is nothing for the courts to adjudicate.” (Citations omitted)). In short, case law from other 

jurisdictions demonstrates that habeas corpus relief under a State’s statute depends on the 

language of the statute at issue as well as an analysis of relevant case law, much as we 

determine here.

Applying the plain language of CJ § 3-702(a) to the circumstances of this case, we 

conclude that, when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed, Sabisch, who was 
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on unsupervised probation and living in Michigan, was not committed, detained, confined, 

or restrained in Maryland, as required by CJ § 3-702(a). In sum, in this case, we conclude 

that the Court of Special Appeals properly dismissed the appeal, determining that Sabisch 

was not entitled to seek habeas corpus relief under CJ § 3-702(a). Under the plain language 

of CJ § 3-702(a), to be eligible to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a person must be

“committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his [or her] lawful liberty within the 

State[,]” which may involve physical custody or other significant restrictions of a person’s 

lawful liberty within the State. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not foreclosed 

where a person is placed on probation with conditions that significantly restrict or restrain 

the person’s lawful liberty within the State. Here, when the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus was filed, Sabisch—who was on unsupervised probation and living in Michigan—

was not committed, detained, confined, or restrained in Maryland. Thus, Sabisch was not 

restrained in Maryland and was not eligible to seek habeas corpus relief in Maryland 

pursuant to CJ § 3-702(a). Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals’s 

judgment, dismissing the appeal.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 

APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY 

COSTS.