alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A19D0333. LAURIE SEVILLE v. PAUL GERARD MANNELLINO.

The parties were divorced in 2015. In 2018, Laurie Seville filed a petition to

modify custody over her minor daughter. Following a hearing, the court declined to

change the custody of the minor child or modify the child support provisionsfromthe

parties’ divorce. Seville filed an application for discretionary review with the

Supreme Court, which transferred the application to this Court. See Case No.

S19D0606 (transferred Jan. 25, 2019).

Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11), direct appeals are permitted from “[a]ll

judgments or orders in child custody cases awarding, refusing to change, or

modifying child custody.” Thus, when the issue on appeal pertains to child custody,

the order is directly appealable. See Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 46-47 (799 SE2d

160) (2017). Because Seville seeks to challenge the trial court’s child custody ruling,

the order here may be appealed directly. See id.

We will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is

subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is

hereby GRANTED. Seville shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a 

March 05, 2019
notice of appeal with the trial court. The clerk of the trial court is DIRECTED to

include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

03/05/2019
**Exhibit31.2**

 

**Certification Pursuant to**

**Section302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I, G. Kenneth Burckhardt,certify that:

 

1.   Ihave reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of McLeodUSA Incorporated;

 

2.   Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.   Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.   Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

a)                    Designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b)                   Evaluated theeffectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

c)                    Disclosed inthis report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.   Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

a)                    Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

b)                   Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

 
| November 9, 2004 |                    | /s/ G. Kenneth  Burckhardt |   |
|------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|--------|
|             | G. Kenneth Burckhardt   |
|             | Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-20420

Summary Calendar

 

JOANNE ROSE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER

OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-96-CV-2108

 

December 26, 1997

Before GARWOOD, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:

Joanne Rose appeals from a judgment affirming the decision of

the Commissioner of Social Security partially denying her claim for

disability insurance benefits. She contends that the Commissioner

failed to apply the correct legal standards and that his decision

concerning the onset of her disability was not supported by
2

substantial evidence. We have reviewed the record and the briefs

of the parties, and we AFFIRM for essentially the reasons set forth

by the magistrate judge and adopted by the district court. See

Rose v. Chater, No. H-96-2108 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 1997).
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                          9
                    
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000  
       
<S>                                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                6-MOS  
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                 MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                         1,957
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         6,058
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                   0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                   0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                        0
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                       135,341  
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         132,444
<LOANS>                                      201,990
<ALLOWANCE>                                      378
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               371,169
<DEPOSITS>                                   233,393
<SHORT-TERM>                                  32,500
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            5,497
<LONG-TERM>                                   62,500 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<COMMON>                                         225
<OTHER-SE>                                    37,054 
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               371,169  
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                7,333
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              4,825
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 128
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                              12,286
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             5,471
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             2,512
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          4,303
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                     25
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                4,495
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                3,342
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     2,066
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                   2,066
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   1.06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   1.06
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                  2.59
<LOANS-NON>                                      456
<LOANS-PAST>                                       0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 421
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                     71
<RECOVERIES>                                       3
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                378
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             378
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                            0
        


</TABLE>
#### JEAN ZAJAC v. TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE TOWNSHIP OF WYCKOFF.

February 6, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
[No. 1587.]

#### Drew Hall *v.*The State.

1. Theft—Practice—Evidence.—Information charging the theft of a hog alleged the value óf the animal to be five dollars. The State failed to prove any value whatever. *Held*fatal to the conviction.

2. Same—Venue.—Proof of the venue of the offense is absolutely essential ' to the validity of a conviction.

Appeal from the County Court of Hopkins. Tried below before the Hon. J. IL Milam, County Judge.

The information was filed September 29, 1882, and charged the appellant with the theft of a hog, of the value of five dollars, the property of Alf. Hall. The venue was laid in Hopkins county, and the offense was alleged to have been committed on *41the thirteenth day of September, 1882. The appellant was convicted, and the jury affixed his punishment at a fine of fifty dollars, and confinement in the county jail for five days.

Opinion delivered November 7, 1883.

The opinion discloses the grounds of the reversal of the judgment.

*King & Foster,*for the appellant.

*J. TI. Burts,*Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Hurt, Judge.

hog of the value of five dollars. Upon the trial the State failed to prove that the hog was of any value.

In this character of cases the value must be alleged and *jgroved.*(Art. 725, Penal Code; 44 Texas, 85; *Radford*v. *The State,*35 Texas, 15; *Cady*v. *The State,*4 Texas Ct. App.; 238.)

. There is no proof of venue in this case. This is fatal. For these errors the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

*Reversed and remanded.*
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS OF

PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, John Didsbury, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report
of DARA BioSciences, Inc. on Form 10-Q of DARA BioSciences, Inc. for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and that information contained in such Quarterly
Report of DARA BioSciences, Inc. on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of DARA BioSciences, Inc.



By:

/s/ John DidsburyName:

John DidsburyTitle:

President and Chief Operating OfficerDate:

May 15, 2008


I, John C. Thomas, Jr., pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of DARA BioSciences, Inc. on Form 10-Q of DARA BioSciences, Inc. for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Exchange Act and that information contained in such Quarterly Report of DARA BioSciences, Inc. on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of DARA BioSciences, Inc.



By:

/s/ John C. Thomas, Jr.Name:

John C. Thomas, Jr.Title:

Chief Financial OfficerDate:

May 15, 2008
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-105466, 333-90662, 333-64024, 333-80333,333-32218, 333-38798 on Form S-8 of Copper Mountain Networks, Inc. of our report dated February 13, 2004 appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Copper Mountain Networks, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2003. 

 

DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP 

San Diego, California 

February 23, 2004
#### P. J. Lawless v. Sam Evans, Sr.

(No. —.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

J. A. HollanI) and Byron G. Johnson, counsel for appellant.

No counsel appeared for appellee.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 26. *Warranty of title to land; proof of breach of entitles plaintiff to nominal damages, though there is no*
      *46
      *evidence as to the value of the land.*Appellant sued Evans for $429.75 damages for breach of covenant of title to land. He claimed that the title had wholly failed to 136x461 feet of the tract, and that $429.75 was the proportional purchase price of that part of the land. On the trial by the judge without a jury, there was a judgment for 'defendant Evans, the appellee on this appeal. The judge below filed his conclusions of law and fact, and appellant’s assignments of error call in question the correctness of said findings. As to the facts, the court found that plaintiff had purchased the land described in his petition, two lots, from defendant, and had paid $1,000 for the same, and that defendant had warranted the title to the same; that the title had wholly failed to one lot, or 136x461 feet of the land, as alleged in plaintiff’s petition. The court further found “that plaintiff is entitled to recover of defendant the amount of the purchase price of the lot, the title to which has failed.” But ‘ *‘*there being no evidence as to the value of said lot, the title to which has failed, or as to what portion of the purchase price of the lots was paid for same (that is, the 136x461 feet), the plaintiff cannot recover, and it is so adjudged.” Without discussing other questions raised in the record, we are of the opinion the judgment in favor of defendant was erroneous. Having found that there was a covenant of warranty of title, and that the same had wholly failed, plaintiff was unquestionably entitled to nominal damages, if no more, and he should have had a judgment at least for his nominal damages and costs of suit. “The failure to perform a duty or contract is a legal wrong, independent of actual damage to the party for whose benefit the performance of such duty or contract is due. The omission to show actual damages, and the inference therefrom that none have been sustained, do not necessarily render the case trivial. The law has regard for the substantial rights of the parties, though it may overlook trivial things. When such *47right is violated the maxim *de minimis non curat lex*has no application. The court will add nominal damages to the finding of a jury when necessary to such rights, as in the instance to carry costs. So a judgment which should have been given for a plaintiff for nominal damages, but which was rendered for the defendant, will be reversed if such damages will entitle the plaintiff to costs. [1 Suth. Dam., pp. 13, 14.]

November 27, 1889.

Keversed and remanded.
#### UNITED PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Alfred TUFF, Appellee.

No. 3D10-2598.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 18, 2011.

Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey, Morrow, & Schefer and Shannon P. McKenna, Hollywood, for appellant.

Alvarez, Carbonell, Feltman, Jimenez & Gomez and Jorge L. Carbonell and Paul B. Feltman, for appellee.

Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and WELLS and CORTINAS, JJ.

*ON CONFESSION OF ERROR*

PER CURIAM.

Based on Appellee’s proper confession of error and our own independent review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s non-final order compelling appraisal and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether post-loss requirements were sufficiently complied with under the policy. *See Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Gutierrez,*59 So.3d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); *Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Mango Hill Condo. Ass’n 12,*54 So.3d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); *Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Maytin,*51 So.3d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); *Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Galeria Villas*
      *593
      *Condo. Ass’n,*48 So.3d 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

Reversed and remanded.
#### Chas. Scheuber v. Bruce Wheeler.

(No. 2950.)

Appeal from Denton County.

*' {Transferred from Austin.)*

Capps & Cantey and Jagoe & Ponder, counsel for appellants.

No* counsel appeared for appellee.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 211. *Fraudulent conveyance; constructive notice of fraudulent intent of vendor; case stated.*Wheeler sued Scheuber and the constable, Snead, for conversion of a stock of drugs, fixtures, etc. The defendants, who are appellants here, answered that said goods were seized and sold as the property of T. J. Wheeler,'who is plaintiff’s brother, by virtue of a writ of attachment in a suit *316in which Scheuber was plaintiff and T. J. Wheeler was defendant; and charged fraud upon appellee in purchasing. the goods from his brother, T. J. Wheeler. Upon the trial a verdict and judgment was for the plaintiff, and both defendants appeal. Appellants requested the court to give to the jury this instruction: “If you find from the testimony that T. J. Wheeler sold to Bruce Wheeler with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors of the said T. J. Wheeler, and that the said Bruce Wheeler had notice of said intent, and that defendant was one of the creditors of said T. J. Wheeler at the time of said sale, then you will find for defendants. .1 further instruct you that ‘notice,’ as used in the preceding section, may be either actual or constructive notice; and by ‘ constructive notice ’ is meant knowledge of such fact or facts as would excite the suspicions óf a man of ordinary prudence, and put him on inquiry as to the fraudulent intent of the vendor.” These instructions were refused, and this is assigned for error. Under the facts and peculiar circumstances of this case, we are of opinion that these instructions should have been given. Appellee has filed no brief in the case. We suppose, however, that he would contend that the substance of these charges had already been submitted to the jury. We have carefully examined the charge given, and we find that the instructions given are not as full and pertinent as those requested. The statute bearing upon this subject reads: “Art. 2165. This article shall not affect the title of a purchaser for valuable consideration unless it appears that he had notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor.” Upon these provisions bur courts of last resort have placed the construction that, if the purchaser for valuable consideration had knowledge of such facts as would excite the suspicion of a man of ordinary prudence, and put him upon inquiry as to the fraudulent intent, knowledge of such facts is constructive *317notice, and is equivalent to actual notice. [W. & W. Con. Rep. 1005; Blum v. Simpson, 66 Tex. 81; Traylor v. Townsend, 61 Tex. 111.]

January 31, 1891.

Reversed and remanded.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1109 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1109

                For the relief of Alejandro E. Gonzales.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 15, 2007

  Mr. Pastor introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
                For the relief of Alejandro E. Gonzales.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. WAIVER OF GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL OF, DENIAL OF ADMISSION TO, 
              ALEJANDRO E. GONZALES.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding sections 212(a) and 237(a) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, Alejandro E. Gonzales may not be 
removed from the United States, or denied admission to the United 
States, by reason of any act of his that is a ground for removal or 
denial of admission and is reflected in the records of the Department 
of Homeland Security, or the Visa Office of the Department of State, on 
the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (b) Rescission of Outstanding Order of Removal.--The Secretary of 
Homeland Security shall rescind any outstanding order of removal, or 
any finding of inadmissibility or deportability, that has been entered 
against Alejandro E. Gonzales by reason of any act described in 
subsection (a).
    (c) Establishment of Good Moral Character.--Notwithstanding section 
101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, any act described in 
subsection (a) may not be considered in determining whether Alejandro 
E. Gonzales is, or during any period has been, a person of good moral 
character for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 21.1

Subsidiaries of Franklin Street Properties Corp.

                                                                 Jurisdiction of
Name                                                              Organization
----                                                              ------------

FSP Investments LLC                                               Massachusetts

FSP Property Management LLC                                       Massachusetts

FSP Holdings LLC                                                  Delaware

Essex Lane Associates Limited Partnership                         Massachusetts

FSP Austin N.W. Limited Partnership                               Massachusetts

FSP Blue Ravine Limited Partnership                               Massachusetts

FSP Bollman Place Limited Partnership                             Massachusetts

FSP Gateway Crossing Limited Partnership                          Massachusetts

FSP Hillview Center Limited Partnership                           Massachusetts

FSP Lyberty Way Limited Partnership                               Massachusetts

FSP North Andover Office Park Limited Partnership                 Massachusetts

FSP Park Seneca Limited Partnership                               Massachusetts

FSP Piedmont Center Limited Partnership                           Massachusetts

FSP Santa Clara Limited Partnership                               Massachusetts

FSP Silverside Plantation Limited Partnership                     Massachusetts

FSP Southfield Centre Limited Partnership                         Massachusetts

FSP Telecom Business Center Limited Partnership                   Massachusetts

One Technology Drive Limited Partnership                          Massachusetts

FSP Gael Apartments Limited Partnership                           Texas

FSP Goldentop Technology Center Limited Partnership               California

FSP Merrywood Apartments Limited Partnership                      Texas

FSP Park Ten Limited Partnership                                  Texas

FSP Timberlake Corp.                                              Delaware

FSP Timberlake East Corp.                                         Delaware

FSP Forest Park IV NC Limited Partnership                         North Carolina