J-S33011-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHARRONE A. GRAY 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 971 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 6, 2021, 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0105661-2003

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2021

Sharrone A. Gray appeals from the April 6, 2018 order that dismissed 

her petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) as 

untimely. We affirm.

This Court previously summarized the factual history of this case in 

adjudicating Appellant’s direct appeal, as follows:

On the evening of November 28, 2002, which happened to 

be Thanksgiving Day, Appellant went to a local Philadelphia bar 

with a friend, Starleen Pringle, and Pringle’s mother. Other 

patrons in the bar included the victims, Daisy Alvarez and Anna 

Romano. During the course of the evening, Appellant argued with 

some of the other bar patrons, including Alvarez[’s] boyfriend, 

over use of the pool table. The disagreement escalated when it 

moved outside as the bar was closing for the night. Appellant and 

Pringle both became engaged in separate fistfights outside the bar 

while other patrons gathered around. Appellant managed to 

retrieve a crowbar from the trunk of her car which she started 

swinging at the people around her before she lost possession of 

it, and she escaped into the interior of the vehicle. Pringle and 

her mother also got in the car, and someone threw the crowbar 
J-S33011-21

- 2 -

into the rear car window as Appellant attempted to exit the 

parking space. Appellant quickly put the vehicle in reverse and 

backed up, hitting Alvarez as she did so. Alvarez fell to the 

ground. Appellant then drove a short distance before making a 

U-turn and returning to the scene at a high rate of speed, where 

the crowd still remained. Romero was kneeling down next to 

Alvarez when Appellant struck the two women with the car, first 

running over Alvarez completely then striking Romero and 

throwing her onto the windshield of a nearby vehicle.

Appellant then drove off and dropped off Pringle’s mother at 

her home near the bar, then she and Pringle traveled some 

distance to the rooming house where Appellant was staying. Once 

there, Appellant took a rifle from her landlord along with some 

ammunition, and she told Pringle she was returning to the bar. 

Pringle then called the police. Appellant was soon stopped by an 

officer who observed her broken rear window and other damage 

to the vehicle, and the rifle was retrieved from the trunk. Several 

bullets were also recovered from Appellant’s person.

Alvarez was pronounced dead that same night having 

sustained severe head and neck injuries consistent with having 

been run over by a car, as well as fractures to her pelvis and to 

both the left and right sides of each one of her ribs. Romero was 

seriously injured, spending approximately one month in the 

hospital for treatment to both legs and an arm, and at the time of 

trial she was expecting to undergo further surgical procedures.

Appellant was tried before a jury in a five-day trial. Upon 

her convictions [for third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and 

possessing an instrument of crime], she was sentenced to an 

aggregate term of incarceration of [twenty-five to fifty] years.

Commonwealth v. Gray, 869 A.2d 7 (Pa.Super. 2004) (unpublished 

memorandum at 1-3). On December 21, 2004, this Court affirmed Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence. Id. at 11. She did not seek allowance of appeal in our 

Supreme Court. 

On December 1, 2005, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. 

After counsel was appointed, an amended petition was filed on her behalf 
J-S33011-21

- 3 -

raising, inter alia, allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ultimately, 

Appellant’s first PCRA petition was denied, and the denial was affirmed on 

appeal by this Court. See Commonwealth v. Gray, 951 A.2d 1210 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (unpublished memorandum at 8). On July 1, 2010, 

Appellant filed a second pro se PCRA petition, which was dismissed as 

untimely. This Court affirmed the dismissal. See Commonwealth v. Gray, 

87 A.3d 390 (Pa.Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum at 3). Thereafter, 

our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. On 

February 3, 2015, Appellant submitted a filing styled as a motion for 

modification of sentence nunc pro tunc, which was treated as a serial PCRA 

petition and dismissed as untimely. On appeal, this Court affirmed. See 

Commonwealth v. Gray, 178 A.3d 198 (Pa.Super. 2017) (unpublished 

memorandum at 3).

On July 18, 2018, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition. No action 

was taken by the PCRA court until February 5, 2021, when it filed notice of 

intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

Appellant did not respond. On April 6, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed her

petition. On May 11, 2021, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

1

____________________________________________

1

 A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order 

from which it is taken. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). “In a criminal case, the date of 

entry of an order is the date the clerk of courts enters the order on the docket, 

furnishes a copy of the order to the parties, and records the time and manner 

of notice on the docket.” Commonwealth v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S33011-21

- 4 -

Appellant has raised four issues for our consideration:

1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s petition as 

untimely as relating to newly discovered evidence?

2. Did Appellant receive layered ineffective assistance of counsel 

throughout her trial and appeal process?

3. Did the Court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA [petition] 

based on [the] trial judge’s error in not granting a mistrial for 

incorrect deliberation sheets?

4. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s appeal citing 

prosecutorial misconduct?[2]

____________________________________________

(Pa.Super. 2000); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(A)-(C). Instantly, our review 

of the docket entries reveals no indication that the clerk furnished a copy of 

the order to Appellant. Furthermore, there is no notation on the docket 

recording the time and manner of notice. “Thus, we assume the period for 

taking an appeal was never triggered and the appeal is considered timely.” 

Jerman, supra at 368. Therefore, we will construe Appellant’s notice of 

appeal as having been timely filed. Id. 

Despite the clerk’s failure to note service on the docket, Appellant obviously 

received notice of the order given her filing of an appeal. Accordingly, we will 

also “regard as done that which ought to have been done” and treat this 

appeal as if the clerk had properly inscribed the date of service on the docket 

such that the instant appeal is timely. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 122 

A.3d 388, 391 (Pa.Super. 2015).

2

 On December 18, 2019, Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition without 

seeking leave from the PCRA court. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 905(A), the PCRA court may “grant leave to amend” a PCRA petition 

“at any time.” The Rule also directs that such amendment “shall be freely 

allowed to achieve substantial justice.” Pa.R.Crim.P.905(A). “Nevertheless, 

it is clear from the rule’s text that leave to amend must be sought and 

obtained, hence, amendments are not self-authorizing.” Commonwealth v. 

Baumhammers, 92 A.3d 708, 731 (Pa. 2014) (cleaned up). “It follows that 

petitioners may not automatically ‘amend’ their PCRA petitions via responsive 

pleadings.” Id. To the extent that Appellant seeks to raise claims for relief 

not asserted in her initial PCRA petition, such issues are waived. Id. at 732.
J-S33011-21

- 5 -

Appellant’s brief at 4. “Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to 

examining whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the 

record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015).

Before considering the merits of Appellant’s claims for relief, we must 

assess the timeliness of her PCRA petition which presents a question of 

jurisdictional gravity. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1140 

(Pa. 2020) (“If a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the trial 

court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not 

have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.” (cleaned up)). 

Pursuant to the PCRA, all “second or subsequent” petitions must be filed 

“within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1). For our purposes, a judgment becomes final “at the conclusion 

of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the 

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration fo 

time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on January 20, 2005, 

when her time in which to seek allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court as 

to her judgment of sentence expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). Thus, her 

instant petition is facially untimely by more than twelve years. 

However, PCRA petitioners may be excused from this strict chronological

limitation if they successfully allege and prove that:
J-S33011-21

- 6 -

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). At the time Appellant filed the instant PCRA 

petition, any petition invoking one of these exceptions was required to be filed 

within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.3 See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) (effective on or before December 23, 2018). 

Appellant has raised a number of different arguments regarding 

timeliness in her lengthy and disorganized PCRA petition. In this Court, she 

relies exclusively upon § 9545(b)(1)(ii) and asserts that the following 

constitute new facts: (1) the removal of assistant district attorneys who

Appellant claims participated in her prosecution for alleged misfeasance; and 

(2) letters from two eyewitnesses to Appellant’s crimes: Josette Blassingale 

____________________________________________

3

 On October 24, 2018, our General Assembly amended the statute. It 

currently provides that “[a]ny petition invoking an exception provided in 

paragraph (1) shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have 

been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) (emphasis added). This 

amendment took effect on December 24, 2018, and applies to claims that 

arose one year before the effective date of this section, i.e., on or after 

December 24, 2017. See 2018 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2018-146 (S.B. 915) at 

§§ 2-3. This amendment does not impact our holding.
J-S33011-21

- 7 -

and Starleen Pringle. See PCRA Petition, 7/18/18, at 3-7. We will address 

Appellant’s timeliness arguments seriatim.

Appellant’s first argument concerning timeliness baldly asserts that 

various assistant district attorneys involved in her case have since been 

terminated due to unspecified illegal or criminal behavior. There is no 

supporting documentation, averments of specific facts, or cogent discussion 

of these spurious allegations in Appellant’s PCRA petition.4 Indeed, our review 

of the certified record has been unable to confirm that the individuals named 

in Appellant’s petition were even involved in her prosecution.

“To invoke an exception, the petitioner must plead it and satisfy the 

burden of proof.” Commonwealth v. Geer, 936 A.2d 1075, 1077 (Pa.Super. 

2007). Appellant has offered no corroboration or elaboration with respect to 

these claims. Accordingly, she has failed to meet the necessary burden of 

proof to demonstrate the applicability of § 9545(b)(1)(ii). See 

Commonwealth v. Allison, 235 A.3d 359, 364 (Pa.Super. 2020) (“Aside 

from his unsubstantiated bald assertions, Appellant has failed to offer any 

evidence in support of his claims.”).

____________________________________________

4

 Appellant has attached documentation to her brief that was not provided to 

the PCRA court and does not appear in the certified record. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1921. “Under our Rules of Appellate Procedure, those documents which are 

not part of the official record forwarded to this Court are considered to be nonexistent[.]” Lundy v. Manchel, 865 A.2d 850, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004). Such 

a deficiency may not be remedied by merely appending the at-issue materials

to an appellant’s brief. Id. Therefore, we have not considered this evidence 

in rendering our holding in this case.
J-S33011-21

- 8 -

We turn to the exculpatory letters written by Blassingale and Pringle. 

The timeliness exception at § 9545(b)(1)(ii) “requires the petitioner to allege 

and prove that there were facts that were unknown to him and that he could 

not have ascertained those facts by the exercise of due diligence.” 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (emphasis

added). Although Appellant presents these materials as containing allegedly 

new facts, our review of the certified record reveals that she previously 

attached these same letters to a PCRA petition filed more than ten years ago. 

See PCRA Petition, 7/1/10, at 27-30, 32-34 (unpaginated). Appellant, 

therefore, cannot establish that these facts were unknown to her. Indeed, the 

letters had been in her possession and knowledge for more than eight years 

at the time she filed the instant PCRA petition. The letters and, more 

importantly, the facts contained therein are neither new nor newly discovered. 

Therefore, § 9545(b)(1)(ii) does not apply.

The remainder of Appellant’s claims for relief are either not framed as 

exceptions to the PCRA’s strict time bar, or merely incorporate the arguments 

addressed above. See Appellant’s brief at 13-30. To the extent that Appellant 

raises additional issues that do not invoke a timeliness exception at 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), those claims are untimely. See Commonwealth v. 

Thompson, 199 A.3d 889, 892 (Pa.Super. 2018) (holding that Superior Court 

lacked jurisdiction over PCRA claims filed “well-outside of the one-year time 
J-S33011-21

- 9 -

frame” where the petitioner failed to plead and prove the applicability of “one 

or more of the three statutory exceptions to the time bar”).

Based on the foregoing discussion, we discern no error of law or abuse 

of discretion in the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition. The record 

unambiguously demonstrates that Appellant’s petition is patently untimely 

and not subject to any exception.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/19/2021