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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46533

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRIAN RAY McGRAW,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: March 2, 2020

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Michael J. Reardon, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ted S. Tollefson, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge 

Brian Ray McGraw appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance. McGraw argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

when it accepted his plea and at sentencing. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal, we reversed the district court’s 

order suppressing evidence discovered during a vehicle search and remanded the case for further 

proceedings. State v. McGraw, 163 Idaho 736, 741, 418 P.3d 1245, 1250 (Ct. App. 2018). The 

opinion stated, in relevant part, that “the district court erred in granting Killeen’s and McGraw’s 

motions to suppress and in dismissing their cases on that basis.” Id. 
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After remand, McGraw pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, 

I.C. § 37-2732(c). During sentencing, in discussing what would be the appropriate amount of 

credit for time served, counsel for McGraw noted the procedural posture of the case was “weird”

because the district court granted an oral motion to dismiss the case after the State indicated that 

it could not proceed without the evidence that was the subject of McGraw’s motion to suppress.1

 

In response, the district court noted it set aside its order of dismissal.2 Counsel for McGraw then 

noted that the remittitur did not set aside the dismissal, although he said it “would make sense 

that the order to dismiss be set aside.” After the parties presented their sentencing arguments, the 

district court inquired whether there was any legal cause why judgment should not be entered. 

Although both parties responded, “No,” the district court noted its concern over whether the 

State was required to refile because this Court “did not address the dismissal.” Before imposing 

sentence, the district court requested briefing on the procedural posture of the case following 

remand. 

Pursuant to the district court’s request, the State submitted a brief arguing that it was not 

necessary to refile the charging document in this case following remand because, once the case 

was remanded, the case was reinstated to the procedural posture prior to the order granting 

suppression. Counsel for McGraw did not file a brief, but indicated counsel agreed with the 

State’s legal analysis. Ultimately, the district court agreed with the State as well. The district 

court thereafter imposed sentence and entered a judgment of conviction. McGraw appeals. 

 

1 There was no written order dismissing McGraw’s case. Rather, both the motion to 

dismiss and the court’s decision to grant the motion were oral. While an order granting a motion 

to dismiss is appealable, a written order is required in order to appeal such a determination. 

I.A.R. 11 (identifying appellate judgments and orders and requiring that a copy of the order or 

judgment be attached to the notice of appeal); I.A.R. 14(a) (an appeal may be made by filing a 

notice of appeal within forty-two days from the date of the filing stamp of the clerk of the court 

on any judgment or order of the district court). The written order appealed by the State was the 

district court’s order granting McGraw’s motion to suppress, which reads: “[T]he motion to 

suppress evidence is granted.” The order was silent as to dismissal. 

2 There is nothing in the record that indicates when the order of dismissal was set aside,

perhaps because of the oral nature of the order in the first instance. 
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A question of jurisdiction is fundamental, cannot be ignored, and should be addressed 

before considering the appeal’s merits. State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 

1084 (2003). The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law over which this 

Court exercises free review. State v. Svelmoe, 160 Idaho 327, 330, 372 P.3d 382, 385 (2016).

III.

ANALYSIS

McGraw argues that the district court erred in concluding that it had subject matter 

jurisdiction over this case upon remand after McGraw. Specifically, McGraw argues that the 

State had to file a new charging document before proceeding against him because our opinion in 

McGraw did not expressly set aside the district court’s prior order dismissing the case.3

 The 

State argues that the district court correctly determined it had subject matter jurisdiction because 

our opinion in McGraw returned the case to the posture it was in prior to the order granting 

McGraw’s motion to suppress. We hold that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to 

enter judgment against McGraw on remand without the State refiling a new charging document.

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s abstract power to hear cases of a certain 

class or character. State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003). A court 

cannot enter a judgment against a defendant in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. See 

State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 411, 313 P.3d 732, 739 (Ct. App. 2013). One way Idaho courts 

obtain subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases is through the filing of an information or 

complaint alleging an offense was committed within the state of Idaho. State v. Rogers, 140 

Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004). Absent a statute or rule extending jurisdiction, a 

district court’s jurisdiction over a criminal case terminates when a dismissal order becomes final. 

State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 47, 266 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2011). Generally, upon issuance of a 

remittitur from an appellate court, the jurisdiction of a district court reattaches. State v. Billups, 

 

3 It is unclear how McGraw can reconcile his insistence that his case was dismissed with 

prejudice with his assertion that the State could and was required to refile the charge against him

following remand. Because we conclude that the State was not required to refile, we need not 

resolve this apparent inconsistency. 
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163 Idaho 889, 891, 421 P.3d 220, 222 (Ct. App. 2018). Under I.A.R. 38(c), district courts then 

have the authority to take those actions that are consistent with and necessary to comply with the 

appellate court’s opinion. Billups, 163 Idaho at 891, 421 P.3d at 222; State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 

664, 667, 239 P.3d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 2010).

This Court’s opinion in McGraw concluded the district court erred in granting McGraw’s 

motion to suppress and dismissing his case on this basis. The actions consistent with and 

necessary to comply with our opinion required reinstating McGraw’s case to its presuppression 

and predismissal status. See Billups, 163 Idaho at 892, 421 P.3d at 223 (noting that, although the 

appellate opinion did not include a specific directive to remand, reversal of defendant’s 

conviction based on the conclusion that the defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress should have 

been granted returned the case to its status prior to denial of the suppression motion). That is 

what occurred in this case. Nothing in our opinion in McGraw stripped the district court of its 

jurisdiction over this case. See Billups, 163 Idaho at 893, 421 P.3d at 224. Thus, the district 

court had jurisdiction to accept McGraw’s guilty plea, impose sentence, and enter judgment 

against McGraw following our remand. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over this case 

upon remand after McGraw. Thus, McGraw has failed to show that the district court erred in 

entering judgment absent the State filing a new information. Accordingly, McGraw’s judgment 

of conviction for possession of a controlled substance is affirmed.

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.