UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

________________________________

 )

SON LY and VINH TRAN, )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

) Case No. 12-CV-1004 (EGS)

v. )

 )

SOLIN, INC., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the Court on defendants Kanlaya 

Intavong’s and Paul Surachai’s joint motion to dismiss, 

defendant Pichet Laosiri’s Motion to Dismiss, and defendant 

Piwat Laosiri’s Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons explained 

below, the motions will be GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND

On June 19, 2012, plaintiffs filed a complaint against 

seven defendants: Solin, Inc. (“Solin”), LPK, Inc. (“LPK”), 

Kanlaya Intavong, Paul Surachai, Piwat Laosiri, Pichet Laosiri, 

and Michael Strong. Plaintiffs brought various state law causes 

of action against defendants, including breach of fiduciary 

duty, breach of contract, embezzlement of corporate funds, 

conspiracy to defraud, false misrepresentation, negligence, and 

“piercing the corporate veil.” Plaintiffs also sought a 

declaratory judgment. 
2

All of the individual plaintiffs and defendants are listed

in the complaint as having addresses in the State of Virginia. 

The corporate defendants are incorporated in the District of 

Columbia. In the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, 

plaintiffs stated that “This Court has jurisdiction due to the 

parties [sic] are D.C. Corporations and all of the individual 

parties are from different jurisdictions; Both companies are 

registered to do business in D.C.; Mr. Tran has monetary 

contributions of $653,649.00 in shares of two companies.” 

Though the complaint contained no further allegations of 

diversity, plaintiffs’ counsel indicated on the accompanying 

Civil Cover Sheet that jurisdiction in this Court was based on 

diversity jurisdiction. See ECF No. 1-2.

On July 5, 2012, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to 

include two counts under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“RICO”). Plaintiffs 

allege that the defendant corporations Solin and LPK were 

“enterprises” within the meaning of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). 

Plaintiffs further allege that all individual defendants, who 

were employed by or associated with the corporate “enterprises,”

engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity” within the 

meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1962(c). Plaintiffs allege that the pattern of racketeering 

activity included the fraudulent execution of a promissory note 
3

for stock in the defendant corporations. Amend. Compl. ¶ 11. 

In particular, plaintiffs state that defendant Kanlaya Intavong 

“intentionally signed her name in the promissory note of selling 

the stock to Vinh Tran as ‘Kanlaya Surachai’ knowing that Vinh 

Tran did not know she was not married to Paul Surachai.” The 

complaint further alleges that Intavong wrongfully denied that 

the signature on the promissory note was not hers. Plaintiffs 

allege that defendants “conduct their business in such a manner 

constitutes [sic] a ‘pattern of racketeering activity’” within 

the meaning of the RICO statute. This claim only alleges that 

defendants caused harm to plaintiff Vinh Tran; no facts are 

alleged as to plaintiff Son Ly. 

In the second RICO count, plaintiffs allege that defendants 

engaged in a conspiracy to engage in racketeering activity, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Plaintiffs allege that 

defendants “engaged in numerous overt and predicate fraudulent 

racketeering acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, including 

material misrepresentations and omissions designed to defraud 

plaintiffs of money.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 25. Specifically, 

plaintiffs allege that Kanlaya Intavong and Paul Surachai “have 

sought to and have engaged in the commission of and continue to 

commit fraud in the sale of securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1961(1)(D).” Amend. Compl. ¶ 27. It appears that this 

reference is to the alleged stock transaction referred to in the 
4

first RICO count. At the conclusion of the conspiracy claim, 

plaintiffs add a seemingly unrelated allegation that Michael 

Strong, an attorney for Intavong and Surachai, knowingly drafted 

an unnamed agreement and induced Son Ly to sign that agreement 

in bad faith and in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy. Amend. 

Compl. ¶ 32. As a result of these alleged acts, plaintiffs 

state that Vinh Tran lost “all of the money . . . he paid for . 

. . 25% of the stocks in Solin, Inc. and LPK, Inc.” Amend. 

Compl. ¶ 29. 

Defendants filed several motions to dismiss, each alleging 

that neither of the RICO counts stated a claim, that diversity 

jurisdiction did not exist as to the remaining state law claims, 

and that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over those remaining claims. See Def. Michael 

Strong’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 20; Joint Mot. to Dismiss of 

Kanlaya Intavong and Paul Surachai, ECF No. 22; Def. LPK, Inc.’s 

Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 23; Def. Pichet Laosiri’s Mot. to 

Dismiss, ECF No. 27; and Def. Piwat Laosiri’s Mot. to Dismiss, 

ECF No. 28.

Pursuant to the request of the plaintiffs, the Court agreed 

to a stay of 60 days to permit the parties to discuss 

settlement. A settlement was not reached and plaintiffs were 

directed to respond to the motions to dismiss by November 13, 

2012. On that date, plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss 
5

without prejudice defendants LPK and Solin pursuant to Rule 

41(a). Also on that date, plaintiffs responded to the motions 

to dismiss filed by Surachai, Intavong, Piwat Laosiri, and 

Pichet Laosiri. On November 20, 2012, the parties filed a 

stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to defendant Michael 

Strong. 

As a result of the voluntary dismissal of several 

plaintiffs, only several motions remain before the Court: 

defendants Kanlaya Intavong’s and Paul Surachai’s joint motion 

to dismiss, defendant Pichet Laosiri’s Motion to Dismiss, and 

defendant Piwat Laosiri’s Motion to Dismiss. Also before the 

Court is former defendant LPK, Inc.’s opposition to plaintiffs’ 

voluntary dismissal of their claims against it, in which LPK, 

Inc. requests the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against 

plaintiffs. LPK argues that plaintiffs’ complaint was brought 

in bad faith and in violation of Rule 11 by alleging diversity 

jurisdiction where none existed and by raising frivolous RICO 

claims to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction 

and “possess only that power conferred by [the] Constitution and 

[by] statute.” Logan v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 357 F. Supp.

2d 149, 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “There is a 
6

presumption against federal court jurisdiction and the burden is 

on the party asserting the jurisdiction, the plaintiff in this 

case, to establish that the Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over the action.” Id. at 153 (citing McNutt v. 

Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83

(1936)). When it perceives that subject matter jurisdiction is 

in question, the Court should address the issue sua sponte. See 

Prunte v. Univ. Music Group, 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 

2007) (citing Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 

871 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that, because subject matter 

jurisdiction “goes to the foundation of the court’s power to 

resolve a case, [] the court is obliged to address it sua 

sponte”)). 

In a suit between private litigants, a plaintiff generally 

demonstrates the existence of subject matter jurisdiction by 

establishing federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331 or diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

“A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction when [he] 

pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or 

laws of the United States.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 

513 (2006) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-85 (1946)). 

Where the district court's jurisdiction is dependent solely on 

the diversity of citizenship between the parties, there must be 

“complete diversity,” meaning that no plaintiff may have the 
7

same citizenship as any defendant. E.g., Owen Equip. & Erection 

Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1978).

In assessing whether a complaint sufficiently alleges 

subject matter jurisdiction, the Court accepts as true the 

allegations of the complaint, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009), and liberally construes the pleadings such that 

the plaintiff benefits from all inferences derived from the 

facts alleged, Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir.

2004). However, “[a] pleading that offers labels and 

conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it 

tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations, quotation marks and 

brackets omitted). When the inquiry focuses on the Court's 

power to hear the claim, “the Court may give the plaintiff's 

factual allegations closer scrutiny and may consider materials 

outside the pleadings.” Logan, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (citing 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Herbert v. Nat'l Academy of Scis., 974 

F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order 

of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001)).

“A claim invoking federal-question jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331 . . . may be dismissed for want of subject matter

jurisdiction if it is not colorable, i.e., if it is immaterial 

and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or it 
8

is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 500, 

513 n. 10 (2006) (citations omitted); accord Tooley v. 

Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Best 

v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (a complaint is 

subject to dismissal on jurisdictional grounds when it is 

“patently insubstantial,” presenting no federal question 

suitable for decision); see Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. 

Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 701 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bell v. Hood,

327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)). 

III. DISCUSSION

The threshold issue before this Court is whether it has 

subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims. For 

the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that it does 

not, and will dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. 

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

As discussed above, plaintiffs initially indicated on the 

civil cover sheet filed with their complaint that the Court has 

diversity jurisdiction over this action, although plaintiffs did 

not invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In the complaint, plaintiffs 

stated only that “[t]his Court has jurisdiction due to the 

parties [sic] are D.C. Corporations and all of the individual 

parties are from different jurisdictions; Both companies are 

registered to do business in D.C.; Mr. Tran has monetary 

contributions of $653,649.00 in shares of two companies.” This 
9

jurisdictional allegation does not properly invoke diversity 

jurisdiction. 

Moreover, it appears from the face of the complaint that 

diversity jurisdiction did not exist at the time the complaint 

was filed, nor does it currently exist. Indeed, there is no 

diversity whatsoever between any of the individual plaintiffs 

and defendants, all of whom are described in the complaint as 

having addresses in the State of Virginia. The corporate 

defendants, who have since been voluntarily dismissed, are 

incorporated in the District of Columbia. Their presence or 

absence in the litigation has no effect on diversity 

jurisdiction, however, since 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires “complete 

diversity” between the plaintiffs and defendants. See Owen

Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). 

Because there are plaintiffs and defendants from the State of 

Virginia, diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this action. 

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Because diversity jurisdiction is not present in this case, 

plaintiffs must establish that federal question jurisdiction 

exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513 n. 

10 (2006). “A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction 

when [he] pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the 

Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id. (citing Bell,

327 U.S. at 681-85). In this case, plaintiffs’ supplemental 
10

RICO claims are the only claims brought under federal law and 

are therefore the only basis under which federal question 

jurisdiction could be properly invoked. 

1. Count IX: Violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)

In order to state a claim for a violation of the RICO

statute, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: “(1) 

conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of 

racketeering activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 

479, 496 (1985). To show such a pattern, RICO requires at least 

two predicate criminal racketeering acts over a ten-year period. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The predicate acts must be among the 

criminal acts listed in Section 1961(1). The Supreme Court has 

further ruled that these predicate acts must show elements of 

relatedness and continuity. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell 

Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). In other words, a 

plaintiff must show “that the racketeering predicates are 

related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued 

criminal activity.” Id. In determining whether this continuous 

pattern is established, there are a number of factors to be 

considered: “the number of unlawful acts, the length of time 

over which the acts were committed, the similarity of the acts, 

the number of victims, the number of perpetrators, and the 

character of the unlawful activity . . . as they bear on the 

separate questions of continuity and relatedness.” Edmondson & 
11

Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265 

(D.C. Cir. 1995). 

Count IX of plaintiffs’ complaint wholly fails to set forth 

a RICO claim under Section 1962(c). Plaintiffs have alleged 

only one predicate act, though the statute requires at least 

two.1

 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Having alleged only one act, it 

is impossible for plaintiffs to establish the other required 

elements of relatedness and continuity, nor did plaintiffs make 

any attempt to do so. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239; Edmondson

& Gallagher, 48 F.2d at 1265 (allegation of single scheme, 

single injury, and few victims makes it virtually impossible for 

plaintiffs to state a RICO claim). Plaintiffs have also failed 

to allege a threat of continued criminal activity, since the 

complaint refers only to one alleged past act. See H.J. Inc., 

492 U.S. at 239. 

 1 The Court notes without deciding that plaintiffs may have also 

failed to allege a predicate act that falls within the purview 

of RICO because plaintiffs allege that defendants committed 

securities fraud. As argued in the motion to dismiss of 

Surachai and Intavong, the Private Securities Litigation Reform 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) exempted securities fraud from the list 

of qualifying RICO predicate acts. Plaintiffs respond to this 

argument by stating that the shares in LPK, Inc. and Solin, Inc. 

are “not regulated by the 1933 Security [sic] Act and the 1934 

Security [sic] Exchange Act.” Pls.’ Combined Opp. to Mots. to 

Dismiss at 10. Because there is insufficient information in the 

record for the Court to decide this issue and because 

plaintiffs’ RICO claims fail for other reasons discussed herein, 

the Court does not reach the issue of whether plaintiffs have 

sufficiently alleged a predicate act under RICO. 
12

2. Count X: Conspiracy to Violate RICO, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1962(d)

Plaintiffs’ second RICO count fares no better than their 

first. Count X alleges a conspiracy to violate Section 1962(c), 

in violation of Section 1962(d). Section 1962(d) provides that 

it is “unlawful for any person to conspire” to violate a 

substantive RICO provision. To state a Section 1962(d) 

conspiracy, the complaint must allege that (1) two or more 

people agreed to commit a subsection (c) offense, and (2) a 

defendant agreed to further that endeavor. RSM Construction 

Corp. v. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer U.S. LLP, 682 F.3d 1043, 

1047-48 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

In Count X, plaintiffs merely incorporate by reference

their allegations of a single-event RICO violation based on 

alleged securities fraud committed by Intavong and Surachai.2

 

For the reasons explained above, plaintiffs have failed to set 

 2 In this claim, plaintiffs also add an allegation of wrongdoing 

as to Michael Strong, attorney for Intavong and Surachai. 

Plaintiffs allege that Strong “knowingly drafted an agreement 

and induced Mr. Ly to sign on [sic] the agreement. [Strong] 

should not and could not in good faith to ask [sic] Mr. Ly to 

sign the agreement of January 20, 2012. [Strong] also advised 

Mr. Tran on two other occasions. [Strong’s] acts for the sake 

of Solin and LPK, Intavong and Surachai constituted a RICO 

violation.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 32. These allegations do not state 

a claim for RICO for several reasons, including that they do not 

set forth a predicate act, nor do they establish the elements of 

relatedness and continuity. Accordingly, this allegation also 

cannot set forth the basis for a RICO conspiracy. In any event, 

all claims against Strong have been dismissed with prejudice and 

are not properly before this Court. See ECF No. 35. 
13

forth any claim for a RICO violation. Accordingly, they are 

unable to establish that “two or more people agreed to commit a 

[RICO violation],” which is necessary to state a claim for a 

RICO conspiracy. Furthermore, other than plaintiffs’ conclusory 

allegations, plaintiffs have not set forth any allegations that 

any defendants agreed to further any such RICO conspiracy. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for a RICO 

conspiracy against any of the defendants. See Edmondson & 

Gallagher, 48 F.3d at 1265 (“Further, as the allegations provide 

no basis for inferring any conspiracy broader than the alleged 

scheme itself, the § 1962(d) claim fails as well; there is no 

conspiracy to violate any of the provisions of subsection (c).”) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

3. Plaintiffs’ RICO Claims Fail to Invoke this Court’s Subject 

matter Jurisdiction

The Court finds that plaintiffs’ RICO claims are subject to 

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This is 

plainly not a RICO case; rather, plaintiffs’ claims appear to 

set forth, at most, a state-law business dispute falling 

squarely within the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia 

courts. Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations of “racketeering”

are simply not colorable and do not present a federal question 

for this Court’s decision. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513 n. 10 

(2006) (“A claim invoking federal-question jurisdiction under 28 
14

U.S.C. § 1331 . . . may be dismissed for want of subject matter

jurisdiction if it is not colorable, i.e., if it is immaterial 

and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction . . . 

.”); accord Tooley, 586 F.3d at 1009 (quoting Best, 39 F.3d at

330 (a complaint is subject to dismissal on jurisdictional 

grounds when it is “patently insubstantial,” presenting no 

federal question suitable for decision)); Williams v. Aztar 

Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 300 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding 

that plaintiff’s RICO theory was “so feeble, so transparent an 

attempt to move a state-law dispute to federal court . . . that 

it [did] not arise under federal law at all”). Accordingly, 

Counts IX and X of plaintiffs’ complaint are DISMISSED with 

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction

In view of the Court’s dismissal of the federal claims, and 

the lack of diversity jurisdiction in this matter, the Court 

must determine whether to dismiss the remaining state law 

claims. District courts are given supplemental jurisdiction 

over state claims that “form part of the same case or 

controversy” as federal claims over which they have original 

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). By the same token, they 

“may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [such] 

claim[s] . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all 

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” § 1367(c)(3).
15

The decision of whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

where a court has dismissed all federal claims is left to the 

court's discretion. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 

726 (1966). When deciding whether to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over state claims, federal courts should consider 

“judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.” Id.

Nonetheless, “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims 

are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be 

considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial 

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward 

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 

claims.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 

7 (1988); see Edmondson & Gallagher, 48 F.3d at 1267.

Here the factors clearly weigh against retention of this

case. This Court has handled little in the case beyond the 

current Motions to Dismiss and has not dealt at all with the 

supplemental state claims. Compare Schuler v. 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 595 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

(finding that district court appropriately retained supplemental 

jurisdiction over state claims where it had “invested time and 

resources” in the case). Finally, Plaintiff will not be 

prejudiced because 28 U.S.C. 1367(d) provides for a tolling of 

the statute of limitations during the period the case was here 

and for at least 30 days thereafter. See Shekoyan v. Sibley 
16

Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that because 

of this tolling, dismissal of the pendent state claims “will not 

adversely impact plaintiff's ability to pursue his District of 

Columbia claims in the local court system.”) (internal citation 

omitted).

Accordingly, the remaining claims in this case will be 

DISMISSED without prejudice. 

D. Leave to Amend

In the concluding paragraph of their consolidated 

opposition to defendants’ motions to dismiss, plaintiffs state 

that “[i]f there is [sic] any RICO pleading deficiencies, 

Plaintiffs should be given a chance to correct the deficiencies 

by amendment.” Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 18, ECF 

No. 34. Plaintiffs did not separately move for leave to amend, 

nor did plaintiffs include a proposed amended complaint. 

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may 

amend its pleadings once as a matter of course within a 

prescribed time period. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). When a 

party seeks to amend its pleadings outside that time period or 

for a second time, it may do so only with the opposing party's 

written consent or the district court's leave. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 15(a)(2). The decision whether to grant leave to amend a 

complaint is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district 

court, but leave “should be freely given unless there is a good 
17

reason, such as futility, to the contrary.” Willoughby v. 

Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

Because plaintiffs have already amended their pleadings once, 

they may only do so with the consent of the plaintiffs or by 

leave of the Court. 

Under the Local Rules of this Court, a “motion for leave to 

file an amended pleading shall be accompanied by an original of 

the proposed pleading as amended.” Local Civ. R. 15.1. 

Critically, a party seeking leave to amend must file a motion to 

amend before a court can consider the issue. Confederate Mem. 

Ass’n, Inc. v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[A] 

bare request in opposition to a motion to dismiss[,] without any 

indication of the particular grounds on which amendment is 

sought . . . does not constitute a motion within the 

contemplation of Rule 15(a).”). 

Plaintiffs’ request to amend their RICO claims, made in 

passing at the end of their opposition to defendants’ motions to 

dismiss, will be denied. Plaintiffs failed to properly file a 

motion for leave to amend and have made no indication to the 

Court of the grounds for any such amendment. Rather, plaintiffs 

are hedging their bets: they state that if the Court were to 

find that there are deficiencies in plaintiffs’ RICO claims, 

then plaintiffs will submit an amended complaint. This approach 

not only violates the Local Rules but deprives the Court of the 
18

ability to determine whether leave should be denied on grounds 

of futility or otherwise. See Confederate Mem. Ass’n, Inc., 995 

F.2d at 299. Accordingly, because plaintiffs have failed to 

properly move for leave to amend and have failed to provide the 

Court with their proposed amended claims, plaintiffs’ request 

for leave to amend is DENIED. 

E. Rule 11 

On November 13, 2012, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed 

defendant LPK from this action. ECF No. 32. LPK had moved to 

dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint and plaintiffs filed a notice of 

voluntarily dismissal on the day that their opposition to LPK’s

motion would have been due. On November 28, 2012, LPK filed an 

opposition to plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal, arguing that 

plaintiffs are subject to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11 because plaintiffs’ claims were brought in bad 

faith. 

“Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to certify that they 

have conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any 

papers filed with the court are well-grounded in fact, legally 

tenable, and not interposed for any improper purpose.” Cooter & 

Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The rule's text provides, in relevant 

part, that
19

[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written 

motion, or other paper ... an attorney or 

unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the 

person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed 

after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 

...

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 

are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 

argument for extending, modifying, or reversing 

existing law or for establishing new law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

Rule 11 permits courts to award sanctions for violations of 

Rule 11(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1) (“If, after notice and 

a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that 

Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an 

appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that 

violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.”). “‘The 

test [for sanctions] under Rule 11 is an objective one: that is, 

whether a reasonable inquiry would have revealed that there was 

no basis in law or fact for the asserted claim. The Court must 

also take into consideration that Rule 11 sanctions are a harsh 

punishment, and what effect, if any, the alleged violations may 

have had on judicial proceedings.’” Scruggs v. Getinge USA, 

Inc., 258 F.R.D. 177, 180–81 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Sharp v. 

Rosa Mexicano, D.C., LLC, 496 F. Supp. 2d 93, 100 (D.D.C.

2007)).

Rule 11 sets forth specific procedural requirements for a 

party moving for sanctions. The motion “must be made separately 
20

from any other motion and must describe the specific conduct 

that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). 

The motion must be served on the nonmovant “but it must not be 

filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, 

claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or 

appropriately corrected within 21 days. . . .” Id. Here, it 

appears that LPK did not fully satisfy this requirement. In its 

motion, LPK represents that “[l]etters were written and phone 

calls were made that the corporations were not proper party 

defendants. Indeed, more than 21 days after filing the Motion 

to Dismiss, Plaintiffs refused to remove the offending 

pleadings.” LPK’s Opp. to Pls.’ Voluntary Dismissal at 4, ECF 

No. 38. This representation does not establish that LPK made a 

separate motion, served it upon plaintiffs, and having received 

no resolution of the Rule 11 issue within 21 days, filed the 

motion with the Court. 

Even though LPK’s motion fails to meet the requirements of 

Rule 11, the Court itself has the authority to impose Rule 11

sanctions sua sponte. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B). This 

inherent power, as the D.C. Circuit recognized, “guard[s] 

against abuses of the judicial process.” Shepherd v. Am. Board. 

Co., 62 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In this regard, Rule 

11 serves the purpose of protecting the Court from “frivolous 

and baseless filings that are not well grounded, legally 
21

untenable, or brought with the purpose of vexatiously 

multiplying the proceedings.” Cobell v. Norton, 211 F.R.D. 7, 

10 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 157 F. Supp. 2d 82, 

86 n. 8 (D.D.C. 2001)). If the Court determines that the motive 

and intent of the offending party is to harass the other party, 

or that a party has otherwise violated Rule 11(b), it has the 

inherent power to consider a Rule 11 sanctions motion sua sponte

by issuing an order directing the offending party to show cause 

why it has not violated Rule 11(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 

11(c)(1)(B).3 Although the Court has found it lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims, the Court may 

retain jurisdiction over the issue of Rule 11 sanctions. See 

Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1992). Likewise, 

plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of certain claims against 

certain defendants does not prevent the Court from considering 

claims made against those defendants in connection with Rule 11 

sanctions. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384 

(1990) (district court may enforce Rule 11 even after a 

 3 When exercising its discretion and imposing sanctions sua 

sponte, the court is not required to provide a party with the 

safe harbor period, as is required in Rule 11(c)(1)(A). Compare

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B) (containing no explicit safe harbor 

provision) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A) (containing an 

explicit safe harbor provision); see, e .g., Elliot v. Tilton,

64 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1995) (distinguishing between the safe 

harbor required when sanctions are requested by motion and the 

absence of the safe harbor requirement when the court is acting 

sua sponte). 
22

plaintiff files a notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 

41(a)(1)).

At this stage of the litigation, it appears to the Court 

that plaintiffs failed to conduct the reasonable inquiry 

required by Rule 11(b) when they sought to invoke the Court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction. Although the common citizenship 

between all individual plaintiffs and defendants was plain from 

the face of the complaint, plaintiffs nonetheless sought to 

invoke diversity of citizenship as the initial basis for the 

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Counsel was obligated, 

however, to make reasonable inquiry into the basis for diversity 

jurisdiction. See Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724, 724

(D.D.C. 1984) (awarding sanctions and stating that counsel “had 

an obligation to make a reasonable inquiry into the basis for 

diversity. The Court finds that it was not reasonable to 

overlook the citizenship of counsel’s own client . . . .”); 

Rowland v. Fayed, 115 F.R.D. 605, 607 (D.D.C. 1987) (awarding 

sanctions for filing of complaint invoking diversity 

jurisdiction where no such jurisdiction existed and citizenship 

of all parties was known to counsel when complaint was filed). 

Complete diversity between the parties was so clearly lacking

that even the most cursory of legal inquiries would have 

uncovered this error. See, e.g., Diversity of Citizenship, The 

Free Legal Dictionary, http://legal-
23

dictionary.thefreelegaldictionary.com/Diversity+Jurisdiction

(last visited December 17, 2012). 

Although counsel’s meritless invocation of diversity 

jurisdiction would have been enough to risk Rule 11 sanctions, 

counsel compounded her initial error by subsequently amending 

the complaint to add two wholly insubstantial civil RICO claims

in an effort to invoke federal question jurisdiction. The RICO 

claims were not warranted by existing law or a “nonfrivolous 

argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or 

establishing new law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). It 

appears to the Court at this time that the RICO claims were 

frivolously filed solely to invoke the jurisdiction of this 

Court and sanctions under Rule 11 may be warranted. See 

Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 300 (7th 

Cir. 2003) (directing plaintiff to show cause why he should not 

be sanctioned for frivolous RICO claim filed solely to invoke 

federal court’s jurisdiction). 

Because the issue of Rule 11 is being raised sua sponte by 

this Court, sanctions will not be imposed at this time. Rather, 

an Order will be issued contemporaneously herewith affording an 

opportunity for counsel for plaintiffs to show cause why 

sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 should not be issued. 
24

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that it 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 

Accordingly, Counts IX and X of the complaint are hereby 

DISMISSED with prejudice; Counts I through IIX are DISMISSED

without prejudice; and leave to amend the complaint is hereby 

DENIED. The Court will retain jurisdiction over the case solely 

to resolve the issue of sanctions under Rule 11. An appropriate 

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

December 17, 2012