14-337-cr(L) 

United States v. Chestnut 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 25th day of August, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

 DENNY CHIN, 

 Circuit Judges. 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. Nos. 14-337-cr(L), 

 14-2685-cr(CON) 

HERMIE GLYNN CHESTNUT, AKA Christopher 

Williams, AKA Sean Harris, AKA Henry Thomas, 

AKA Glen Fambro, AKA Alex Hoyt, AKA Barry 

Cummings, AKA Tim Thomas, 

Defendant-Appellant, 

ASHLEY HYMSON, SECOND CHANCE, AKA Danny 

Concepcion, AKA Danny Second, AKA Danny 

Chance, ANITA BEHARRY, 

 Defendants.

*

 

 * The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption in this case to conform with the above. 
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FOR HERMIE GLYNN CHESTNUT: ROBERT J. BOYLE, Law Office of Robert J. 

Boyle, New York, NY. 

FOR UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: EDWARD B. DISKANT (Karl N. Metzner, on the 

brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for

Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the 

Southern District of New York, New York, 

NY. 

 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (George B. Daniels, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

Defendant Hermie Glynn Chestnut appeals from the District Court’s January 23, 2014 

judgment convicting him, after a guilty plea, of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and 

aggravated identity theft and sentencing him principally to 116 months’ imprisonment and three 

years’ supervised release.1

 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 

history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

Section 4241(a) of Title 18, United States Code, requires a district court, on its own motion, 

to conduct a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may 

presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the 

extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him 

or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). We review for abuse of discretion a district 

court’s determination that there is no “reasonable cause” to hold a competency hearing. United States 

v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1232–33 (2d Cir. 2002).2

Upon review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court acted well 

within its discretion in not holding a competency hearing sua sponte. At the plea allocution, the 

District Court explicitly inquired into Chestnut’s health and mental competency. After Chestnut 

stated that he was taking “[m]edicine related to complex PTSD,” the District Court specifically 

asked him whether the medicine affected his ability to think clearly, to which he responded, “No. I 

can understand you today.” App. 25–26. The District Court then asked him, “Is your mind clear 

today?” and, “Are you feeling well today?” Id. at 26. Chestnut responded yes to both questions. The 

District Court further inquired, “Do either counsel have any doubt as to the defendant’s 

 1 Chestnut also filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s April 10, 2014 order of restitution in the 

amount of $999,988.53, but he does not raise any arguments on appeal with regard to restitution. 

2 Although the Government argues that plain-error review should apply because defense counsel did not 

challenge Chestnut’s competency below, that standard of review makes little sense in this context, where Chestnut’s 

principal argument on appeal is that the District Court should have held a competency hearing sua sponte under the terms 

of the relevant statute. See United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 2010). 
3 

competence to plead at this time?” Id. Both counsel responded no. The District Court then 

concluded: “On the basis of Mr. Chestnut’s responses to my questions and my observations of his 

demeanor, I find that he is fully competent to enter an informed plea at this time.” Id. at 27. 

On this record, it is abundantly clear that the District Court acted well within its discretion in 

determining that there was no “reasonable cause” to hold a competency hearing sua sponte. See 

Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1233; United States v. Kirsh, 54 F.3d 1062, 1071 (2d Cir. 1995). 

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Chestnut on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s January 23, 2014 

judgment. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk