Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court are available to the 1 public and can be accessed through the Judicial Branch’s homepage at 2 http://www.courts.state.co.us

. Opinions are also posted on the 3 Colorado Bar Association ’s homepage at http://www.cobar.org

. 4 5 ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE 6 May 21, 2018 7 8 20 18 CO 41 9 10 No. 17SC406, Parocha v. Parocha
— Personal J urisdiction 11 12 In this case, the supreme court considers whether and when a civil protection 13 order is available to a victim of alleged domestic abuse who comes to Colorado seeking 14 refuge from a non

- resident. The court concludes that a n out

- of

- state party’s harassment 15 of, threatening of, or attempt to coerce an individual known by the non

- resident to be 16 located in Colorado is a tortious act sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under 17 the state’s long

- arm statute , section 13

- 1

- 124, C.R.S. ( 2017 ) . The court also concludes 18
that such conduct creates a sufficient nexus between the out

- of

- state party and 19
Colorado to satisfy the requisite minimum contacts such that the exercise of jurisdiction 20 by a Colorado court to enter a protection order comports w ith traditional notions of fair 21 play and substantial justice. 221 2 The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 3 2 East 14 th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 8020 3 4
20 18 CO 41 5 Supreme Court Case No. 17SC406 6 Certiorari to the District Court 7 Boulder County, District Court Case No. 17CV30006 8 Petitioner : 9 Megan Maya Parocha , 10

v. 11 Respondent : 12 Richard Francis Saga Parocha

. 13 Judgment Reversed 14 en banc 15 May 21, 2018 16 17 Attorney for Petitioner: 18 Bruce Wiener 19 Boulder, Colorado 20 21 No appearance on behalf of Respondent. 22 23 Attorneys for Amici Curiae Safe Shelter of St. Vrain Valley, Rocky Mountain Victim 24 Law Center, Rocky Mountain Children’s Law Center, Colorado Coalition Against 25 Domestic Violence, 26 Project Safeguard, and Sa fehouse Progressive Alliance for Nonviolence: 27 Lyons Gaddis Kahn Hall Jeffers Dworak & Grant, P.C. 28 Eve I. Canfield 29 Longmont, Colorado 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 JUSTICE H ART delivered the Opinion of the Court. 372

¶1 Megan Maya Parocha fled from New Jersey to Colorado to escape her abusive
spouse
. Her husband , who knew that she had come to join her family in Colorado , contacted her almost daily

. When she expressed reservations about returning to New Jersey , the frequency and tone of such contact intensified. He called her, emailed her, and texted her repeatedly , and she felt threatened

. When Megan Parocha sought a civil protection order, her husband claimed that Colorado courts had no jurisdiction to offer her this protection be cause he was an absent non

- resident. We disagree

. ¶2 This case presents us the first opportunity to address whether and when a civil protection order is available to a victim of alleged domestic abuse who comes to Colorado seeking refuge from a non

- resident. 1 W e begin by examining Colorado’s long

- arm statute , section 13

- 1

- 124, C.R.S. ( 2017 ) , before turning to constitutional due process considerations. We hold that an out

- of

- state party ’s harassment of , threatening of, or attempt to coerce a n individual know n by the non

- resident to be located in
Colorado is a tortious act sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under our long

arm statute

. We also hold that such conduct creates a sufficient nexus between the out

of

- state party and this state to satisfy the requisite minimum contacts such that the exercise of jurisdiction to enter a protection order comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

1 We granted certiorari to review the following issue: 1. Whether the county court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction to enter a civil protection order under section 13

- 14

- 106, C.R.S. (2016), was proper
.3

¶3 Because we conclude that the county court had both statuto ry and constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction over Megan Parocha’s out

- of

- state h usband for the
limited purpose of entering a permanent civil protection order , we reverse the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings as necessary
. 

### I. Facts and Procedural History ¶4 Three months after moving from New Jersey to Colorado with the parties’ minor
child , Petitioner Megan Maya Parocha (“Wife”) sought a civil protection order against Respondent Richard Francis Saga Parocha (“ Husband ”)

. Fo llowing an ex parte hearing held on December 6, 2016, the county court issued a temporary civil protection order. On December 20, 2016, the court held a second hearing to determine whether issuance of a permanent protection order was appropriate

. Husband appeared at the second hearing with counsel and raised the argument that the Colorado court could not legally
exercise jurisdiction over him because he lacked minimum contacts with the state

. Because there was a factual dispute about the sufficien cy of Husband’s contacts with Colorado, the court proceeded with a hearing on that question

. ¶5 At the hearing, Wife testified to a “cycle” of domestic abuse in the marriage

. Specifically, Wife alleged that in the months before she came to Colorado, Husband had raped her ; threatened to punch her ; threatened to take their child ; locked her out of
their home ; broke n the door of their bathroom when she was in the shower with the
door locked ; and grabbed her out of bed by the hair , ripp ing a chunk of her hair fro m her scalp. She further testified that he exercised extreme control over their finances

. Husband disputed Wife’s allegations of violence, but testified that their relationship4

involved bouts of fighting

. Husband also acknowledged Wife’s report s of alleged
domestic abuse in New Jersey to Husband’s employer, the local Coast Guard

. ¶6 Both Husband and Wife testified that because of their fighting, in the fall of 2016, Wife declared her intent to travel to Colorado with their child to seek refuge with
he r family. Husband drew up a document stating that Wife could take the child to
Colorado for three months. The parties also both testified that, during the months she was in Colorado, Husband contacted Wife daily

— often several times a day

— purportedly to s peak to the ir one

- year - old child. As the three

- month period that Husband had agreed to let Wife stay in Colorado was coming to a close, Wife told Husband that she wanted to stay with her family and did not want to return to New Jersey. His response to th at revelation was to tell her in a series of FaceT ime phone calls, emails, and texts on December 5, 2016 , that he would “make” her come back to New Jersey. It was those statements, perceived by Wife as threats, which prompted her to apply for the civil protection order.
¶7 At the conclusion of the permanent protection order proceedings, the county
court determined that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over Husband pursuant to Colorado’s long

- arm statute

. The county court deemed Wife’s testimony cred ible with respect to “each of the alleged incidents of abuse.” The county court referred to the parties’ courtroom demeanor and the consistency between Wife’s testimony at the temporary protection order hearing and permanent protection order hearing. On those bases, the county court found that Wife had suffered domestic abuse at Husband’s hands, as defined by section 13

- 14

- 101 (2) , C.R.S. (2017). T he county court found that5

Wife was the victim , for example, of various “acts of coercion, including financia l control, property control, psychological abuse, sexual abuse, and threatened physical
abuse.” The county court then made the following additional findings relevant to jurisdiction: As to whether [Husband] engaged in any tortious acts here in Colorado, t he Court finds that he did. He specifically agreed that [Wife] and [the parties’ daughter] would live here in Colorado for at least three months; and then he had frequent contact with [Wife], some of which, in the context of the abuse she suffered while th ey lived together, she experienced as harassing and threatening, including [the December 5, 2016 communications].
¶8 Based on these fact ual determinations , the county court concluded that
Husb and’s December 5, 2016 contact s with Wife constitute d tortious acts as contemplated by Colorado’ s long

- arm statute. Accordingly, the county court issued a permanent protection order prohibiting Husband from having certain contact with
Wife

. That order was narrowly tailored to permit limited communications between th e parties in relation to (i) the minor child and (ii) New Jersey divorce proceedings that
had been initiated by Husband. 2

2 The permanent protection order specified that Husband “shall not contact, harass, stalk, injure, intimidate, threaten, touch, sexually assault, abuse, or molest [Wife] . . . [or] use, attempt to use, or threaten to use physical force against [Wife] that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.” An exception for email contact between the parties was made for communications necessitated by litigation or mediation, and child

- related issues. Phone contact was confined to emer gency situations only with respect to Husband and Wife. However, email and phone contact was permitted between Husband and the parties’ minor child.6

¶9 Husband appealed to t he district court , which vacated the permanent protection
order , declaring that the county court’s exercise of p ersonal jurisdiction over Husband
was clear error. Wife petitioned for certiorari , and we granted the petition

. 

### II. Analysis ¶10 To exercise personal jurisdiction over a non

- resident, a Colorado court must comply with both Colorado’s long

- arm statute and constitutional due process. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil , 123 P. 3d 1187, 1193 (Colo. 2005) (citing Keefe

v. Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C. , 4 0 P.3d 1267, 1270 (Colo. 2002 )); s ee also
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 25; § 13

- 1

- 124, C.R.S. ( 2017 ). Because

c ompliance with the long

- arm statute is a threshold matter that is not necessarily subsumed in a due process analysis , we consider each in turn.


### A. Standard of Review
¶11 Whether a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non - resident is a question of law, which we review de novo. Align Corp

. v. Boustred , 2017 CO 103, ¶ 8,

___ P.3d

___ , 2017 WL 7208133, at *3 (quoting Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating
Co. , 2016 CO 60M, ¶ 9, 381 P.3d 30 8 , 312, as modified on denial o f reh’g (Oct. 17, 2016)). However, t he underlying findings of the trier of fact

— here the county court

— as they relate to the jurisdictional question must be accepted on review, unless they are so clearly erroneous as not to find support in the record. See Briano v. Rubio , 347 P.2d 497 ( Colo. 1959); s ee also C.R.C.P. 52 (“Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”)

.7 

### B. Colorado’s Long

- Arm Statute ¶12 In enacting this state’s long

- arm s tatute, the G eneral A ssembly intended for
Colorado courts to have the maximum scope of jurisdiction constitutionally permissible. Keefe , 40 P.3d at 1270 ( citing Scheuer v. Dist. Ct

. , 684 P.2d 249, 250 (Colo. 1984) )

. ¶13 As is relevant here, the long

- arm statute allows Colorado’s courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non

- resident who commits “ a tortious act ” within the state
when the cause of action relates to that tortious act

. § 13

- 1

- 124 (1)(b), C.R.S. ( 2017 ). We have previously held that the tortious act(s) that give (s) rise to jurisdiction must cause injury within Colorado , but that the conduct itself need not occur in Colorado to satisfy the long

- arm statute. See Scheuer , 684 P.2d at 251 ( holding that the alleged negligent disbursement of a Colorado client’s funds from trust account by an out

- of

- state attorney satisfie d the requirement of the commission of a tortious act within Colorado for the purposes of the long

- arm statute)

. T he statute is satisfied so long as the resultant harm
occurs within the state. Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket , 832 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo. 1992) ( holding that alleged misrepresentations directed into Colorado from Nebraska in the course of telephon e conversations contributed to the “totality of conduct” making up the tortious acts at issue). When identifying a tortious act for purpo ses of determining whether harm occurred in Colorado, we do not look at i ncidents in
isolation , but instead at the “totality of conduct” by the actor

. Id. at 236.
¶14 As defined in Colorado’s civil protection order statute , domestic abuse can constitute tortious activity. Domestic abuse is statutorily defined , in pertinent part, as :8

[A]ny act, attempted act, or thre atened act of violence, stalking, harassment, or coercion that is committed by any person against another person . . . with whom the actor is living or has lived in the same domicile, or with whom the actor is involved or has been involved in an intimate r elationship. § 13

- 14

- 101(2), C.R.S. (2017). “Coercion,” specifically, “includes compelling a person by force, threat of force, or intimidation to engage in conduct from which the person has the right or privilege to abstain, or to abstain from conduct in which the person has the right or privilege to engage.” Id

. The General Assembly also made plain that “domestic abuse is not limited to physical threats of violence and harm,” but also includes other forms of psychological manipulation “that make a victim more likely to
return to an abuser due to fear of retaliation o r inability to meet basic needs.” § 13

- 14

- 100.2(2), C.R.S. (2017).
¶15 Our state is not the only jurisdiction to recognize telephone calls as tortious acts conferring long

- arm jurisdiction over nonresidents of the forum state. See, e.g. , McNair
v. McNair , 856 A.2d 5 , 12, 14 ( N. H. 2004) ( holding that harassing phone calls qualify as
tortious conduct where the allegations appear to assert the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress)

. Other states have also permitted the exercise of personal jurisdiction over out

- of

- state actors for the purpose of issuing a civil protection order
when the subject contact is only, or at least predominantly , made by telephone or
written communications. See Brown v. Bumb , 871 So. 2d 1201 (La. Ct. App. 2 004) ; Dobos v. Dobos , 901 N.E.2d 248, 253

– 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008 ); Haas v. Semrad , 2007 O H Ct. App. 2828, ¶ 1 4 , 2007 WL 1653032, at * 3

. We agree with the Ohio appellate court’s reasoning in Dobos that “[a] defendant’s physical presence in the forum state is9

unnecessary when, in modern life, a substantial amount of interactions occur via telephone and electronic communications.” Dobos , 901 N.E.2d at 254 (internal quotation and citations omitted)

. ¶16 The question here, then, is whether one or more of Husband ’s communications knowingly directed into Colorado is a tortious act that caused injury to Wife in this

state , thus bringing him within the jurisdiction of Colorado courts in connection with that injury. T he county court found, after hearing extensive tes timony, that Wife “has been subjected to domestic abuse” and “that there have been acts of coercion, including financial control, property control, psychological abuse, sexual abuse, and threatened physical abuse.” Although Husband denied abusing Wife, it was the county court’s prerogative to weigh and evaluate the parties’ credibility. See, e.g. , People v. Harlan , 109 P.3d 616, 627

– 28 (Colo. 2005). H aving taken testimony from both parties and
observ ed the demeanor of each during the proceedings , the cou nty court found the whole of Wife’s testimony to be credible. Importantly, the county court found that Wife perceived Husband’s December 5, 2016 communication as harassing and threatening in light of the cycle of coercion and abuse that had preceded that communication. We see
no error in the county court’s conclusion that, in the context of that pattern of domestic
abuse , Husband’s statements through FaceTime and texts that he would “make” Wife return to New Jersey constituted tortious conduct that gave the court jurisdiction to enter a civil protection order consistent with Colorado’s long

- arm statute. Instead, the

erro r was in t he district court ’s examination of the December 5, 2016 communications in10

isolation, rather than as part of the pattern of domestic abuse that had prompted Wife to seek refug e with her family in Colorado.
¶17 The General Assembly has recognized the “ paramount importance” of civil protection orders to “ promote safety, reduce violence and other types of abuse, and prevent serious harm and death. ” § 13

- 14

- 100 .2(1 ), C.R.S. (2017). For a protection order to fulfill those goals, it must be available to protect a victim in Colorado not only from an abuser who is currently in the state but also from an out

- of

- state abuser who knows
his victim is in Colorado. Thus, w e hold that an out

- of

- state party’s harassment of, threatening of, or attempt to coerce an individual known by the non

- resident to be located in Colorado is a tortious act sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under our long

- arm statute. 

### C. Constitutional Due Process
¶18 The personal jurisdiction inquiry does not end with a determination th at the requirements of the long

- arm statute have been met. Rather, we must separately
determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Husband by a Colorado court can withstand constitutional scrutiny. In re Marriage of Malwitz , 99 P.3d 56, 61 (Colo. 2004). The question we ask in making that determination is whether Husband purposefully established “minimum contacts” in our state such that a Colorado court’s issuance of a permanent protection order restraining him “does not off end ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” In t’ l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer , 311 U .S. 457 (1940)); see also Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); Keefe , 40 P.3d at 1270

– 71.11

¶19 When we assess whether a defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state, we
consider whether “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum S tate are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World

- Wide
Vo lkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)

. 3 A single act can be sufficient

contact “where that act creates a substantial connection between the defend ant and the
forum state.” Malwitz , 99 P

. 3d at 61. We have previously held that we determine whether the connection created by a single act is substantial by asking, as relevant here: ( 1) whether the defendant purposefully caused important consequences in Colorado; ( 2) whether the cause of action arises f rom those consequences; and ( 3) whether the consequences of the defendant’s actions are substantial enough to make jurisdiction
reasonable. Id. (citing Van Schaack & Co. v. Dist. Ct. , 538 P.2d 425, 426 ( Colo. 1975)).
¶20 Here, Husband , repeatedly contacted W ife by FaceTime and text when he knew
she was in Colorado , pressuring her to return to New Jersey , and , in so doing, caus ed
her to reasonably fear for her safety because of the cycle of domestic abuse in their relationship. The cause of action

— a request f or a civil protection order

— flowed directly from those consequences. And, in light of Colorado’s strong interest in protecting victims of domestic abuse in the state, the consequences of Husband’s

3 I n D & D Fuller CATV Const r uction , Inc. v. Pace , 780 P.2d 520, 525 (Colo. 1989) , we held that “ the commi ssion of a tort, in and of itself, creates a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the state so as to satisfy the due process inquiry, ” and that when jurisdiction is premised on the commission of an intentional tort that causes injury in Colorado , no further minimum contacts analysis is necessary. Because of the important public policy concerns implicated here, we believe it is important to explain that a minimum contacts analysis would lead us to the same constitutional conclusion.12

actions are certainly substantial enough such that exercising jurisdiction to enter the protection order was reasonable.
¶21 Once a showing of minimum contacts is established, we must evaluate whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice

. ” Keefe , 40 P.3d at 1271 ( quoting Burger King , 471 U.S. at 476 ( quoting Int ’l Shoe , 326 U.S. at 316 ) ). Here, we consider: ( 1 ) the burden on Husband of litigating the matter in Colorado; ( 2 ) Wife’s interests in obtaining convenient and effective relief; ( 3 ) the state’s interest in adjudicating disputes of this type and vindicating the rights of its citizens; ( 4 ) the interstate judicial system’s interest in the efficient resolution of controversies; and ( 5 ) the shared interest of the several states in furthering f undamental social policies. See World

- Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 293 ; see also Burger King , 471 U.S. at 476

– 77

. ¶22 Weighing these factors here, we conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction to enter a civil protection order comports with fair play and su bstantial justice. Any burden on
Husband in this context is minimal. We note that the court did not seek to order any affirmative relief against Husband, but only to confer protected status to Wife. 4 The
other interests at stake weigh heavily in favor of jurisdiction in Colorado. Wife sought refuge from Husband’s alleged domestic abuse with her family in this state

. She should

4 In fact, in several other states, courts have found that personal jurisdiction over the defendant is unnecessary to issue a protection order, likening the issuance of protec tion orders to cases adjudicating marital status, in which personal jurisdiction is not require d. See, e.g. , Bartsch v. Bartsch , 636 N.W.2d 3, 6

– 10 (Iowa 2001); Spencer v. Spencer , 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); Caplan v. Donovan , 8 79 N.E.2d 117, 123 ( Mass. 2008).13

not have had to wait until he arrived at her door to seek the court’s protection from his
threats in l ight of the history of violence and coercion in their marriage. Her interest in convenient and effective relief from potential further domestic abuse through a civil protection order entered by a court in the state i n which she resides is weighty.
Moreov er, as the state’s civil protection law makes plain, Colorado has a very strong interest in protecting victims of domestic abuse within its borders

. The civil protection
order sta tute recognizes that “the issuance and enforcement of protection orders are of paramount importance in the state of Colorado because protection orders promote safety, reduce violence and other types of abuse, and prevent serious harm and death.” § 13

- 14

- 100.2(1), C.R.S. ( 2017 ). Finally, t his court has recognized that “all states share a common interest in protecting victims of domestic abuse and providing effective means
of redress for such victims.” Malwitz , 99 P.3d at 63

. Considering all of these factors,
p ermitting a court to enter a c ivil protection order against an out

- of

- s tate defendant
who is harassing, threatening, or attempting to coerce a person residing in Colorado as part of a cycle of domestic abuse plainly comports with fair play and substantial justice

. 

### I V
. Conclusion ¶23 W e hold that the county court properly exerc ised personal jurisdiction over
Husband pursuant to both Colorado’s long

- arm statute and the requirements of due
process
. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court vacating the permanent civil protection order , and we remand the case to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion

.