* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should n ot be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances

set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 96-10038

Summary Calendar

_______________

In the Matter of:

ERIC L. SHERMAN,

Debtor.

JOHN WHEAT GIBSON,

Appellant,

VERSUS

COLONIAL SAVINGS,

Appellee.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:95-CV-2690-H)

_________________________

September 3, 1996

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: *

John Gibson appeals sanctions imposed upon him by the2

bankruptcy court. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

I.

Gibson represents Eric Sherman, the debtor, in the underlying

bankruptcy proceeding. Dorothy Scherr is the attorney for Colonial

Mortgage (“Colonial”), one of Sherman’s creditors. In August 1995,

Colonial and Sherman began disputing whether a court order properly

calculated the po st-petition arrears Sherman owed to Colonial.

Sherman informed Gibson that the order failed to account for a $465

payment he had made to Colonial. Without obtaining a copy of the

canceled check or any other proof that Sherman had made the

payment, Gibson filed a motion to reconsider the order.

A hearing on Gibson’s motion was set for September 26, 1995.

Prior to the hearing, Gibson spoke by telephone with Scherr, who

agreed to modify the arrearage calculation if Sherman would produce

a copy of the canceled check. Gibson failed to produce a copy of

the check prior to the hearing.

On the morning of the hearing, Sherman finally informed Gibson

that he did not have a copy of the check. At about the same time,

Gibson received a copy of Scherr’s response to his motion to

reconsider, which included a moti on to sanction Gibson for

vexatious litigation. Gibson proceeded to the hearing without a

copy of the canceled check, whereupon the court denied his motion

to reconsider. The court also found that Gibson could have

resolved the controversy by commu nicating more effectively with1 Given Scherr’s willingness to have the order modified upon receipt of the

canceled check, the court presumably meant that Gibson should have resolved this

matter without a hearing.

3 Scherr 1 and sanctioned him $250.

Gibson then filed a motion to reconsider the sanctions. The

district court denied the motion in a four-page order. Gibson

appealed to the district court, which affirmed.

II.

Gibson first contends that the bankruptcy court erred by

“rel[ying] exclusively on the bald assertions” of Scherr. His

truncated argument, however, is insufficient to permit us to rule

in his favor; indeed, we cannot even determine what is the basis of

his complaint. To be sure, he does cite U nited States v. Treadway

,

445 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Tex. 1978), which held that an attorney may

not appear before a grand jury as both prosecutor and witness. But

Treadway does not apply to the instant cas e, as Scherr did not

appear before the court as a witness. Nor does Gibson appear to be

complaining that Scherr communicated ex parte with the court on the

motion for sanctions; the record re veals that both Scherr and

Gibson were present at the hearing, and the court heard from both

before imposing sanctions. Finally, we note that Gibson does not

claim that any specific statement by Scherr was a misrepresentation.

Gibson also argues that he did not receive reasonable notice2 Initially, Gibson appears to argue that he did not receive an opportunity

to present evidence in his defense. It is evident from the context of his

argument, however, that he is actually asserting that he was unable to prepare

an adequate defense because he lacked notice of the sanctions.

If Gibson is attempting to argue that the bankruptcy court did not hear

from him, he is in error. The record reveals that the court heard from Gibson

at the hearing on the sanctions motion before imposin g sanctions. Finally,

Gibson’s failure to cite any legal authority in support of his position waives

his argument. S ee F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 28(a)(6) (requiring that appellant's brief

"con t ain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, and the

reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the

record relied on"); C avallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.

, 44 F.3d 256, 260

n.9 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that "failure to provide any legal or f actual

analysis of an issue results in waiver"); United States v. Maldonado

, 42 F.3 d

906, 91 0 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that failure to do more than vaguely

refer to issue constitutes waiver); Zuccarello v. Exxon Corp.

, 756 F.2d 402, 407

(5th Cir. 1985) (noting that court will not consider issue that was not briefed

under standards of rule 28).

4 that the bankruptcy court was considering sanctions. 2 He does not,

however, make a due process claim SS he fails even to invoke the term

“due process.” Rather, he contends that the district court did not

give him the notice mandated by the bankruptcy and civil rules.

Gibson’s claim that the bankruptcy court failed to provide him

with the notice mandated by the rules of civil procedure is utterly

meritless. He complains that he did not receive the notice

required by rules 5 and 6. Even a cursory examination of the rules

of civil procedure, however, should have informed him that they do

not apply to bankruptcy proceedings. S ee F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 81(a)(1)

(“[t]he[se rules] do not apply to proceedings in bankruptcy”).

Gibson also c laims that he did not receive adequate notice

pursuant to B ANKR

. R. 9014. That rule, however, applies only “[i]n

a contested matter under the Code not otherwise governed by these3 Colonial originally moved for sanctions pursuant to bankruptcy rule 9011

and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994). At the hearing on Colonial’s motion, the court

simply imposed the sanction “for failure to communicate effectively with respect

to [Colonial’s] counsel,” but it twice invoked both rule 9011 and § 1927 in its

written order denying Gibson’s motion to reconsider the sanction. In light of

this, we conclude that the district court relied o n rule 9011 and § 1927 as

alternative bases for the sanction. Because we determine that the sanctions were

permissible under rule 9011, we need not consider whether the court’s alternative

basis requires a remand.

5 rules.” The bankruptcy court imposed sanctions under rule 9011. 3

The sanctions were therefore “otherwise governed by these

rules” SS specifically rule 9011 SS and rule 9014 is inapplicable.

Finally, Gibson asserts that Colonial’s motion did not comply

with B ANRK

. R. N.D. T EX

. 9014(c), which requires that “ [i]n any

evidentiary hearing conducted on a ‘contested matter,’ all counsel

shall certify before the presentation of evidence: (1) that good

faith settlement have been held or why they were not held.” Gibson

appears to argue that because Scherr failed to conduct settlement

negotiations regarding the sanctions motion, he received inadequate

notice of the motion.

Rule 9014(c) applies only where there has been an “evidentiary

hearing on a contested matter,” however, and Gibson has not pointed

to any such hearing. The only relevant hearing of which we are

aware was the hearing o n the motion to reconsider. But that

hearing was not an evidentiary hearing, as neither side presented

evidence or testimony under oath. We therefore find local rule

9014(c) inapplicable.

AFFIRMED.