NUMBER 13-20-00012-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

IGLESIA PENTECOSTAL 

FILADELFIA, INC., Appellant,

v.

JOSE I. RODRIGUEZ JR., Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 357th District Court 

of Cameron County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant Iglesia Pentecostal Filadelfia, Inc. (the Church) appeals the trial court’s 

order dismissing its case for lack of jurisdiction based on the ecclesiastical abstention 

doctrine. By what we construe as two issues, the Church contends that (1) appellee Jose 
2

I. Rodriguez, Jr. (Jose Jr.)1 is precluded from presenting claims that substantively and 

effectively challenge his removal, and (2) because the trial court was precluded from 

adjudicating Jose Jr.’s claims, the trial court erred in dismissing the Church’s claims 

involving disputes to property.

By three issues, cross-appellant Jose Jr. contends that the trial court (1) improperly 

denied his plea to the jurisdiction because it refused to allow him to submit evidence of 

the Church’s fraudulent pleadings by limiting the subject matter of the final hearing to the 

issue of whether the Church followed corporate formalities in its operations, (2) erred in 

denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds of quo 

warranto, and (3) erroneously dismissed his third party petition against third party 

defendants.2 We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The Church, a domestic non-profit corporation, was organized in 1987 for 

educational and religious purposes. Its articles of incorporation list, Jose I. Rodriguez

(Jose Sr.), Catalina Rodriguez, and Hermelinda Rodriguez as the initial board of directors. 

They were the only signatories on the Church’s Constitution, By-Laws, and Statement of 

Faith (the Bylaws). Over the years, the Church filed periodic reports with the secretary of 

state, and also filed franchise tax public information reports (the reports).

3 After 2006,

Hermelinda and Jose Sr. did not appear on the reports, but Jose Jr. did. Additionally, in 

1 We refer to appellee/cross-appellant Jose I Rodriguez, Jr. and members of his family with the 

same last name by their first names to avoid confusion.

2 Third-party defendants are Jose I. Rodriguez, Sr., Janie Nieves Garza, Hermelinda Rodriguez, 

Maria Ortiz, and Laura Croasdale. However, they are not parties to this appeal.

3 We note that not all of the reports are in the record.
3

2014, Catalina filed a certificate of correction form, which notably requested the deletion 

of “Jose I. Rodriguez, . . . [a]s [p]resident.”4 There are also two sets of minutes in the 

record which are disputed.

Subsequently, on or about September 5, 2018, Jose Jr. was allegedly delivered a

cease-and-desist and demand for return of funds letter, stating among other things that 

he has no right or interest in any church property, nor does he have any authority to act 

on the Church’s behalf. Further, the letter advised him that he was “henceforth banned 

from all [c]hurch facilities and activities,” and it demanded that he return all church 

property presently in his possession.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Approximately one week after the alleged delivery of the cease-and-desist letter, 

the Church sued Jose Jr. for trespass to try title, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and 

sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief among other things, to which Jose Jr. 

timely answered. The Church included with its pleading a warranty deed listing the Church 

as grantee in support of its allegations that the Church owned property located in

Brownsville, Texas. Jose Jr. filed a third-party petition against Jose Sr., Janie Garza, 

Hermelinda, Maria Ortiz, and Laura Croasdale (the third-party defendants) asserting

trespass to try title, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion among other claims. In

February of 2019, both parties filed pleas to the jurisdiction.

On October 2, 2019, the trial court set a hearing to hear witness testimony and 

allow the parties to present evidence. Hermelinda, Janie, and Jose Jr. testified at the 

4 The certificate of correction does not note whether this deletion referred to Jose Sr. or Jose Jr., 

but we note that the partial address designated therein matches the address of Jose Sr. listed in the articles 

of incorporation.
4

hearing, and Jose Jr. also presented two witnesses, Lorenzo Hernandez (Hernandez) 

and Orfalinda Hernandez, by affidavit as a proffer one day after the evidentiary hearing.

Hermelinda testified that (1) there were no corporate meetings, (2) discussions 

among Catalina, Jose Sr., and herself were not reduced to writing since they resided 

together, (3) they did not vote on things rather they just agreed on things, (4) there was 

no agenda, and (5) there was no notice of meetings. Further, Hermelinda explained she 

was the secretary/treasurer but she stopped handling the Church’s deposits of offerings 

and tithes into the Church account in late 2006 because she got married; however, she 

did not stop being the secretary/treasurer. Janie testified that she does not recall any 

meeting where Catalina, Jose Sr., and Hermelinda voted her in as secretary or treasurer; 

although she later did not deny being in either role. Additionally, Janie testified that she, 

Hermelinda, and Jose Sr. were not happy about Jose Jr. becoming the pastor but they 

accepted it.

At the same hearing, Jose Jr. testified that he began acting as a pastor when his 

mother, Catalina, passed away, and that he found out about the Bylaws when the Church 

filed suit. Jose Jr. also testified that he was on the board of elders,

5 and conceded that

he was not currently abiding by the Bylaws despite holding services twice a week out of 

his collision shop. Lastly, Hernandez stated in his affidavit that “Jose Rodriguez, Sr., and 

Hermelinda Rodriguez, claimed to be the only remaining directors after the death of 

Catalina Rodriguez. During the July 20, 2018 meeting, they did not elect any of the new 

5 The Church asserted in its briefing that that a Board of Elders does not exist. Specifically, in the 

statement of facts, the Church says: “The Church’s pastor serves as President of the Board of Directors 

and ecclesiastical matters are governed by a ‘Board of Elders’. However, it is undisputed that no one has 

ever acted in the capacity of Church Elder; nor has any such board been established.” (internal citation 

omitted).
5

officers by a majority vote to the total Board of Elders because there was no Board of 

Elders.”

After filing competing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court entered 

findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 3, 2020, which provide in part as follows:6

Findings of Fact

FF5. [The Church] failed to comply with the organizational and governing 

documents that existed to create, organize and govern the church; 

including Bylaws, the corporate structure with respect to compliance, 

the functioning of the Board of Elders, and the items set forth in the 

corporate documents[; and]

FF6. [The Church] and [Jose Jr.] were equally guilty of not complying with 

the organizational and governing documents that existed to create, 

organize and govern the church.7

This appeal and cross appeal ensued.

6 We note that while the Church refers to the findings of fact and conclusions of law in its briefing 

as those submitted by the trial court on February 14, 2020, it has not raised an untimely or harm objection 

to the later filed findings of fact and conclusions of law signed on March 3, 2020. Thus, we refer to the 

March 3, 2020, findings of fact and conclusions of law in this memorandum opinion. See Jefferson Cnty. 

Drainage Dist. No. 6 v. Lower Neches Valley Auth., 876 S.W.2d 940, 960 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994, writ 

denied) (“If a judge files belated findings and conclusions, then the objecting litigant must show harm and 

injury.”); see also Cancino v. Cancino, No. 13-13-00124-CV, 2015 WL 2160049, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi–Edinburg May 7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Moreover, under Jefferson County Drainage District, 

the later findings control. Id. (“Under well-established decisional precedent, any conflict between the original 

findings and the amended findings are resolved definitely in favor of the later findings.”).

7 Since a trial court is not required to make fact findings on undisputed issues, we did not include 

all of the findings the trial court made on March 3, 2020, in this memorandum opinion. See Barker v. 

Eckman, 213 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2006) (stating that fact findings are not necessary when the matters 

in question are not disputed). However, a trial court can make findings of fact and conclusions of law on 

ultimate or controlling issues. See ASAI v. Vanco Insulation Abatement, Inc., 932 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 1996, no writ) (explaining that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 198 only requires additional 

findings of fact and conclusions of law if they relate to ultimate or controlling issues). “A ‘controlling issue’ 

is one which, if answered favorable to the theory in which it is presented, will support a basis for judgment 

for the proponent of the issue.” Gomez v. Franco, 677 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 1984, no writ) (holding in part that the trial court properly refused to submit appellants’ requested 

issues to the jury because they were not controlling issues within Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 277 and 

279). Moreover, we do not recite the conclusions of law as they are reviewed de novo, and conclude that 

finding of fact number seven, “FF7”, is a conclusion of law, although it is listed as a finding of fact. See 

ASAI, 932 S.W.2d at 121 (“Conclusions of law are reviewable de novo.”).
6

III. THE CHURCH’S APPEAL

A. Jose Jr.’s Claims

In what we construe as the Church’s first issue, the Church asserts that, as a 

pastor, Jose Jr. is precluded from presenting claims that substantively and effectively 

challenge his removal. In furtherance of the Church’s contention, it argues that (1) matters 

involving the removal of a pastor or clergy are inherently ecclesiastical, (2) any failure by 

the Church to comply with its Bylaws in removing Jose Jr. as pastor is an ecclesiastical 

matter, and (3) no matter how Jose Jr.’s claims are pled, they substantively and effectively

request that the trial court involve itself with the firing or disciplining of a pastor.

After arguing that the trial court should not have considered Jose Jr.’s claims 

because they are precluded on ecclesiastical grounds, the Church ultimately concludes 

that the trial court did not err, and requests that we sustain the trial court’s dismissal of 

Jose Jr.’s claims. However, since the Church is not seeking to alter the trial court’s 

decision, any opinion we would render on this issue would be advisory because the trial 

court has already entered a binding order that the Church does not desire to disturb on 

appeal. See Tex. Workforce Comm’n v. Gill on Behalf of $2,583.45, 964 S.W.2d 308, 310 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1998, no pet.) (“The distinctive feature of an 

advisory opinion is that it decides an abstract question of law without binding the parties.”); 

see also Archie v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., Institutional Div., No. 13-04-562-CV, 2005 

WL 2551739, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. 

op.) (explaining that a decision that does not bind the parties is, by definition, an advisory 

opinion); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.4. Stated differently, if we issued an opinion 

on this issue, such opinion would merely act as guidance on the trial court’s decision 
7

without changing its impact. See generally, Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 964 S.W.2d at 310 

(holding that appellee’s claim seeks an advisory opinion because the purpose of 

appellee’s suit is to obtain from the trial court guidance on how to satisfy rival claims). 

Accordingly, we overrule the Church’s first issue.8

B. Alleged Property Disputes

In what we construe as the Church’s second issue, the Church asserts that

because the trial court was precluded from adjudicating Jose Jr.’s claims, which 

challenged his removal, the trial court erred in dismissing the Church’s claims involving 

disputes to its property. In furtherance of the Church’s contention, it argues that (a) nonecclesiastical claims are settled using neutral principles of law and the trial court cannot 

avoid exercising jurisdiction where it exists, and (b) the substance and effect of the 

Church’s claims do not implicate ecclesiastical matters and can be settled by applying 

neutral principles of law. In the body of its argument, the Church only frames its claims 

for trespass to try title, conversion, and its declaratory judgment action as property 

disputes.

Jose Jr.’s response focuses on the alleged fraudulent nature of the Church’s 

pleadings and its contention that the trial court should have dismissed the Church’s claims 

under Chapter 66 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code pertaining to quo 

warranto actions. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 66.001–003.

8 We note that the Church complains that the trial court should have granted its plea to the 

jurisdiction, but additionally asserts that the trial court did not err in dismissing Jose Jr.’s claims. Therefore, 

the Church is complaining about the timing or the means by which the trial court dismissed Jose Jr.’s claims; 

however, the Church ultimately obtained the relief it sought—dismissal of Jose Jr.’s claims. Notwithstanding 

the foregoing, we do not determine whether the Church has standing to challenge Jose Jr.’s claims.
8

1. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. C.L. 

Westbrook, Jr. v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007); see also Ceglar v. Christ’s 

Harbor Church, No. 13-19-00034-CV, 2020 WL 948380, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi–Edinburg, Feb. 27, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op). We focus on the plaintiff’s 

petition first to determine whether the facts pled affirmatively demonstrate that subject

matter jurisdiction exists. Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 394–95; Torralva v. Peloquin, 399

S.W.3d 690, 695 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2013, pet. denied). When “[t]he 

pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the 

cause[,]” a court should deny a plea to the jurisdiction. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 

S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. 2009). If the pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction, then a plea 

may be granted without allowing a plaintiff the opportunity to amend. Tex. Dep’t of Parks 

& Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004). “We construe the pleadings 

liberally in favor of the plaintiff.” Peloquin, 399 S.W.3d at 695. If a plea to the jurisdiction 

challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial court may consider evidence and 

must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Id.

2. Applicable Law

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits Congress from 

making any “law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 

thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend I; In re Diocese of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506, 512–13 (Tex. 

2021) (orig. proceeding) (“The First Amendment prohibits government—and courts—from 

interfering with a believer’s ability to observe his faith and from interfering with a church’s 

management of its internal affairs.”). The Fourteenth Amendment imposes this restriction 
9

on the states. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. The provision prohibiting the 

establishment of religion means that the government may not interfere with a religious 

organization’s “ecclesiastical decisions.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 

Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S.171, 188–89 (2012).

“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits civil courts from delving into 

matters of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the 

conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.’” In 

re Diocese of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 508–09 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. 

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 (1976)). However, the First Amendment does not bar all 

claims against religious bodies. Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 677, 680–81 (Tex. 

1996). A court may exercise jurisdiction over a controversary if it can apply neutral 

principles of law that will not require inquiry into matters such as religious doctrine. See

Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 398–400; Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Ceglar, 2020 WL 948380, at *2 (“Under [a neutral principles 

of law] approach, a court may interpret church documents in purely secular terms without 

relying on religious precepts in resolving the conflict.”).

“Under the neutral-principles methodology, courts decide non-ecclesiastical issues 

such as property ownership based on the same neutral principles of law applicable to 

other entities, while deferring to religious entities’ decisions on ecclesiastical and church 

polity questions.” Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2013) 

(internal citation omitted). Nevertheless, “[a]ny exception to ecclesiastical abstention by 

application of neutral principles must be narrowly drawn to avoid inhibiting the free 

exercise of religion or imposing secular interests on religious controversies.” In re Diocese 
10

of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 513.

3. Analysis

The Church’s trespass to try title claim, its conversion claim, and its declaratory 

judgment claim which the Church contends are substantively and effectively property 

disputes allege that:

Trespass to Try Title. [Jose Jr.] is liable to [the Church] for Trespass to Try 

Title. [The Church] is the record owner of the Property and has had 

possession of the same for over twenty years. [Jose Jr.] has changed the 

locks to the Church and excluded [the Church] from access to the same. 

[Jose Jr.] is not a renter, nor does he have any ownership rights to the 

property at issue. Accordingly, [Jose Jr.’s] conduct is without right or 

entitlement and a violation of [the Church’s] ownership rights to the property.

Conversion. [Jose Jr.] is in charge of the Church’s administrative 

recordkeeping, invoicing, expensing and collections. Moreover, as the 

alleged Pastor, [Jose Jr.] has full access to the Church’s donations and the 

ability to bind the Church to agreements with third parties. [Jose Jr.] has 

used his position to unlawfully convert funds from the Church in the form of 

purchases for personal use and unverifiable payments to vendors or other 

third-parties.

Declaratory Judgment. [The Church] incorporates all of the preceding facts 

into these paragraphs and, relying upon those facts, brings this declaratory 

judgment action pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 

§ 37.001 et seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, for the purpose of settling 

any uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the Parties rights, status, and 

other legal relations to the IPF, the Church and its property. 

[The Church] seeks declaratory judgment that it is entitled to sole 

possession and access to the Church and its property. Pursuant to a valid 

deed filed of record in the Official Records of Cameron County, Texas, [the 

Church] is sole owner of the Church. Accordingly, [Jose Jr.] and his 

representatives have no right to expel or deny [the Church] and its 

representatives’ access to the property. Furthermore, [the Church] further

seeks a declaratory judgment that [Jose Jr.] has no right or authority to act 

on the behalf of [the Church] and its congregation. [Jose Jr.] has not been 

vested with any authority by [the Church’s] board of directors.
11

Here, the trial court found that neither side complied with the Church’s 

organizational and governing documents, including the Bylaws, a decision we find support 

for in the record, as discussed below. Therefore, we find that a determination of the 

Church’s claims at issue would impermissibly embroil the trial court in a religious 

controversary to include choosing its church leaders. See Retta v. Mekonen, 338 S.W.3d 

72, 77 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (explaining that “[t]he church’s failure to follow 

its bylaws on a matter of internal governance is also a matter of internal church 

governance and ecclesiastical concerns, and the courts may not interfere with that 

decision”); Dean, 994 S.W.2d at 395 (concluding that the issue of a pastor’s ouster is 

ecclesiastical in nature); see also Peloquin, 399 S.W.3d at 695 (“The ecclesiastical 

abstention doctrine prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that 

would require an analysis of [a] ‘theological controversary . . . .”) (internal quotations 

omitted). Specifically, we find support in the record from the October 2, 2019 hearing, that 

neither side complied with the Bylaws because (1) Janie without proper authority 

conducted business on the Church’s behalf by handling the Church’s deposits;9 (2) Janie 

conceded that she, Hermelinda, and Jose Sr. had knowledge that Jose Jr. became pastor 

of the Church;10 and (3) Jose Jr. conceded that he was not even aware of the Bylaws 

existence until he was sued in 2018. Moreover, we find support in the record that neither 

9 Article III of the Bylaws state in relevant part that: “The officers in their collective capacity shall be 

known as the Board of Directors and under that name shall constitute the governing body, and shall conduct 

and transact all business of the corporation.” Additionally, Article V of the Bylaws state in relevant part that: 

“[The Secretary and Treasurer] shall require all monies and other valuables and effects to be deposited in 

the name and to the credit of the Corporation in such bank or other depositories as may be designated by 

the officers and Directors.”

10 Article III of the Bylaws state in relevant part that: “[T]he President of the corporation shall be the 

[p]astor and he shall also be an active member of the Board of Elders.”
12

side complied with the Bylaws because (1) Catalina unilaterally sought to remove Jose 

Sr. from the articles of incorporation through the filing of the certificate of correction in 

2014;11 (2) Jose Jr. allegedly installed an entirely new board in 2015 that did not consist 

of Hermelinda nor Jose Sr.;12 and (3) Hermelinda and Jose Sr. purportedly elected a 

replacement director for Catalina in 2018 but the Church conceded in its briefing that a 

board of elders did not exist, and Hernandez, a witness proffered by Jose Jr., averred 

that a board of elders did not exist.13

Additionally, with regards to the Church’s trespass to try title claim and the first

declaration it seeks, a review of the warranty deed attached to the Church’s live pleading 

plainly shows that the Church, as grantee, is the record owner, and we do not see any 

other conveyance instrument or lease in the record that shows otherwise, thereby clearly

entitling the Church to possession and access. However, even with that determination, a 

trial court could still not resolve either claim without determining who governs the Church’s 

affairs, as such persons would ultimately decide who is entitled to possession and access. 

See generally, In re Diocese of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 516 (Decisions regarding 

“[w]hether a party’s claims against a church are barred by the ecclesiastical abstention 

doctrine . . . [are based on] whether the substance and nature of the plaintiff’s claims 

11 Article III of the Bylaws state in relevant part that: “[T]he present officers now duly constituted 

and elected shall consistute the Board of Directors, and they shall hold their officers permanently.”

12 Article III of the Bylaws state in relevant part that: “[T]he present officers now duly constituted 

and elected shall consistute the Board of Directors, and they shall hold their officers permanently.”

13 Article I of the Bylaws state in relevant part that: “The purpose of [the Church] shall be to establish 

a body of believers in the Lord Jesus Christ who will: [1] Be governed with the Lord Himself in the council 

of the elders with the senior pastor.” Additionally, Article III of the Bylaws state in relevant part that: “[I]n the 

event of the death of any officer, the remaining [o]fficers, shall elect another officer to fill the vacancy from 

the Board of Elders.” We note that despite the Church’s assertion a board of elders does not exist, Jose Jr. 

testified that he was on the board of elders.
13

implicate ecclesiastical matters, including a church’s internal affairs . . . [or] 

governance . . . .”) (emphasis added). Further, the Church’s second declaration is clearly

a matter of church authority or governance as opposed to substantively and effectively a 

property dispute as it asks the trial court to declare that “[Jose Jr.] has no right or authority 

to act on the behalf of [the Church] and its congregation.”

Moreover, to develop the Church’s conversion claim would impermissibly force the 

trial court to decide the Church’s corporate governance because to do so would require 

it to determine which board to inquire of for the reason behind the alleged unlawful use of 

funds. See generally, El Pescador Church, Inc. v. Ferrero, 594 S.W.3d 645, 657–59 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over conversion claim brought by church based on the ecclesiastical 

abstention doctrine); see also In re Godwin, 293 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2009, pet. denied) (orig. proceeding) (concluding the trial court abused its 

discretion by asserting jurisdiction over former church member’s fraud claim regarding 

misuse of church funds where they may have been approved by the church’s finance 

committee and a biblical basis may exist to support some of the other disputed financial 

expenditures); see also Walter v. Delgatto, No. 14-05-00055-CV, 2006 WL 664214 at *2 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that vexatious 

litigant’s claims are beyond the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction because they relate 

to how and when the church may spend its resources and are thus ecclesiastic in nature).

Lastly, while the Church directs us to Masterson, we find such case inapposite 

because, as discussed above, a plain reading of the warranty deed shows that decisions 

regarding possession and access lie with the Church, but the trial court cannot determine 
14

who governs the Church without entanglement in a religious controversy. See Masterson, 

422 S.W.3d at 610. Therefore, we hold that the trial court was without subject matter 

jurisdiction over the Church’s trespass to try title claim, its conversion claim, and its 

declaratory judgment action, and we overrule the Church’s second issue. See In re 

Godwin, 293 S.W.3d at 749 (“Although wrongs may exist in the ecclesiastical setting, and 

although the administration of the church may be inadequate to provide a remedy, the 

preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle it 

overshadows the inequities that may result from its liberal application.”).

IV. JOSE JR.’S CROSS APPEAL

A. Alleged Fraudulent Pleadings and Quo Warranto Action

In his first two issues, which we address together, Jose Jr. argues that the trial 

court (1) improperly denied his plea to the jurisdiction because it refused to allow him to 

submit evidence of the Church’s fraudulent pleadings by limiting the subject matter of the 

final hearing to the issue of whether the Church followed corporate formalities in its 

operations,14 and (2) erred in denying Jose Jr.’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction on the grounds of quo warranto. 

Because we have already determined that the trial court lacks jurisdiction, we need 

not consider these issues as they are not dispositive. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court 

of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that 

addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”); 47.4; see 

14 Additionally, we observe that in the body of his argument, Jose Jr. also asserts that “[b]ecause 

no valid resolutions were passed on July 20, 2018 during the secret meeting, the church as an entity is not 

entitled to file this suit or seek injunctive relief because it lacks standing.” However, we do not reach this 

argument since the trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction on other grounds as discussed in this 

memorandam opinion.
15

also Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Dallas, No. 05-19-00997-CV, 2021 WL 3556830, at 

*11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (declining to reach the 

remaining arguments by the parties after concluding that the trial court did not err in 

granting Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas’ plea to the jurisdiction). Accordingly, we 

overrule Jose Jr.’s first and second issue.

B. Claims Against Third-Party Defendants

In his third issue, Jose Jr. asserts that the trial court erroneously dismissed his 

third party petition against third party defendants, whose wrongful acts and fraudulent 

pleadings resulted in a wrongful injunction against him, and the allegations against the 

third party defendants cannot be categorized as ecclesiastical in nature.

Other than citing to a case with regards to the standard of review, Jose Jr. does 

not direct us to any other authorties to show how the trial court erred in dismissing his 

third-party petition against the third-party defendants. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The 

brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with 

appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). Instead, Jose Jr. focuses his 

argument on what the Church allegedly did to him or should have done, and that the 

remedy of quo warranto is applicable. Therefore, we conclude that Jose Jr. has waived 

his complaint for inadequate briefing, and overrule Jose Jr.’s third issue. Id.

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

NORA L. LONGORIA

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

29th day of December, 2021.