Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20A0031. MARTHA JACKSON v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION.

Martha Jackson filed a complaint against the Georgia Department of

Transportation (“GDOT”), Reeves Construction Company, Inc. (“Reeves

Construction”), and three unidentified individuals (“John Doe I, John Doe II, and

John Doe III”), for injuries she sustained when she fell into a storm drain. She

asserted a claim for negligence, and claims for negligent hiring, training, and

supervision, against each defendant.

1 The trial court granted Reeves Construction’s

motion for summary judgment and dismissed Jackson’s case against it with prejudice.

The court later granted GDOT’s motion to dismissfinding that GDOT had not waived

its sovereign immunity. Jackson filed a timely notice of appeal seeking review of the

trial court’s grant of GDOT’s motion to dismiss.

“In a case involvingmultiple parties or multiple claims, a decision adjudicating

fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties is not

a final judgment.” (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. Hosp.Corp. ofAmerica, 192 Ga.

App. 628, 629 (385 SE2d 731) (1989). Although Reeves Construction and GDOT

were dismissed from the action, the trial court’s orders are silent as to the remaining

unidentified individuals. Jackson’s claims against those individuals have therefore

1

Jackson’s amended complaint filed on February 12, 2018, does not assert any

claims against John Doe I.

August 08, 2019
not been adjudicated.

2

“In such circumstances,there must be an express determination

under OCGA § 9-11-54 (b) or there must be compliance with the interlocutory appeal

requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). Where neither of these code sections [is]

followed, the appeal is premature and must be dismissed.” (Citations and punctuation

omitted.) Id.

The trial court’s order in this case did not direct the entry of judgment pursuant

to OCGA § 9-11-54 (b). Therefore, the challenged order is not a final order, and it is

appealable only through the interlocutory appeal proceduressetforth in OCGA § 5-6-

34 (b). Shoenthal v. Shoenthal, 333 Ga. App. 729, 730 (776 SE2d 663) (2015);

Johnson, supra, 192 Ga. App. at 629. Jackson’s failure to follow the proper appellate

procedure deprives us of jurisdiction to consider this direct appeal, which is hereby

DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

2 The “John Doe” defendantsremain, at thistime, unidentified. But if and when

the plaintiffs discover their identities, under OCGA § 9-11-15 (c), they may “amend

the original pleadings so as to change the party against whom a claim is asserted.”

(Punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. Estate of Jester, 333 Ga. App. 41, 43 (775 SE2d

569) (2015). Moreover, for purposes of renewing a suit under OCGA § 9-2-61, an

“original suit is void if service was never perfected, since the filing of a complaint

without perfecting service does not constitute a pending suit. . . . However, unless and

until the trial court enters an order dismissing a valid action, it is merely voidable and

not void.” Hobbs v. Arthur, 264 Ga. 359, 360 (444 SE2d 322) (1994). Here, although

the unidentified defendants have not been served, service was perfected on GDOT

and Reeves Construction. Accordingly, the suit is not void. And the trial court

dismissed the complaint against GDOT and Reeves Construction; it did not dismiss

the entire action.

08/08/2019