In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 12-3303

RIVERA PETTY, as Administratrix of the Estate of Timothy 

Petty, Deceased,1

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 07 CV 7013 — Wayne R. Andersen and Virginia M. Kendall, Judges.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2013 — DECIDED DATE JUNE 9, 2014

____________________

Before WILLIAMS, SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Timothy Petty was arrested on 

the suspicion that he, along with another person, shot and 

killed Albert Counsel and wounded two others. Petty was 

 1 After oral argument, but before this case was decided, Timothy Petty 

passed away. His mother, as administratrix of his estate, continues this 

case in his place and is substituted as party plaintiff.
2 No. 12-3303

identified as the shooter and was indicted for murder, but 

was found not guilty after a bench trial. After his acquittal, 

Petty filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of 

Chicago and individual Chicago Police Department officers 

arguing that the officers violated his due process rights by 

intentionally mishandling the shooting investigation and 

prosecuting him for murder based on falsified evidence. 

Specifically, Petty alleged that CPD officers held a witness, 

Fredrick Tarver, in a room for over 13 hours without food, 

water, or access to a bathroom until he implicated him. But 

Petty’s argument fails because his “coerced evidence” claim 

is not cognizable under the Due Process Clause. 

In addition, Petty alleged that Defendants concealed evidence and failed to disclose their misconduct in violation of 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We disagree. Summary 

judgment was proper here because Petty was aware of the 

Defendant’s alleged misconduct before trial and had ample 

opportunity to make use of the information at trial. Finally, 

he claimed that the City was liable for the police officers’ 

conduct because it had a policy of detaining people believed 

to be crime witnesses for extended periods of time against 

their will. But his Monell claim also fails because he did not 

suffer a constitutional injury sufficient to support it.2 Therefore, we affirm the district courts’ decision.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Shooting and the Identifications

 2 After Judge Andersen dismissed Petty’s Monell claim, the case was 

transferred to Judge Kendall, who ruled on the summary judgment motion.
No. 12-3303 3

In the early morning of October 18, 2003, two individuals 

shot and killed Albert Council, wounding Sebastian Moore 

and Lowell Hubbard. Minutes after the shooting, Chicago 

Police Department (“CPD”) officers arrived at the scene and 

were told by witnesses that the shooters were AfricanAmericans who wore dark clothing, masks, and skull caps. 

Officers brought witnesses Frederick Tarver and Mario Parker to CPD Area 3 Headquarters for further questioning. Between 13 to 17 hours later, Tarver selected Timothy Petty’s 

photo from a photo array and identified him as a shooter. 

On November 29, Petty, also known as “Spank,” was arrested on an outstanding warrant and after Moore also positively identified Petty as one of the shooters murder charges 

were filed against him. On December 19, Petty was indicted 

for murder and held in custody for 33 months pending trial.

B. Petty’s Motions Before His Bench Trial

In state court, Petty moved to quash his arrest and suppress any evidence that arose from it, arguing that he was 

arrested without a valid warrant or probable cause. After 

hearing testimony from CPD officers regarding their conduct surrounding Tarver’s positive identification of Petty, 

his motion was denied. 

Petty filed a second motion to suppress Tarver’s identification testimony, alleging that Tarver recanted his identification and only made the initial false identification because police officers told him who to pick out of the line-up. At the 

hearing, Tarver said the police tried to make him pick Petty 

from the line-up, and that he had told the officers he was not 

sure whether Petty was the shooter. He also testified that he 

was not allowed to leave the police station after the line-up 
4 No. 12-3303

and was left in a locked room until the next morning. Tarver 

said Defendant Detective Michael Conway threatened to 

have his parole revoked if he did not help convict Petty. 

When Tarver was shown the picture of Petty with his signature on it, Tarver said that the signature looked like his but 

he did not remember seeing or signing the picture. Tarver 

also stated that he had filed a civil lawsuit against the police 

for their conduct and that the suit was pending. After a hearing, the state court judge denied Petty’s motion, finding that 

Tarver identified “Spank” to the police and that the police 

acted in good faith and committed no misconduct. At a 

bench trial, Petty was tried for murder and found not guilty. 

Petty then filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City 

and Defendants, which they removed to federal court.

C. Petty’s Civil Suit

In his complaint, Petty alleged that the City was liable for 

the police officers’ conduct under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Specifically, he asserted that the City had a policy of detaining 

people believed to be witnesses to crimes for extended periods of time against their will. The City moved to dismiss Petty’s Monell claim, arguing that Petty could not have suffered 

a constitutional violation because he was not the one detained, and without a direct link, he could not establish a direct connection between the City’s alleged policy and his alleged injury. Judge Andersen granted the City’s motion to 

dismiss. 

In the same complaint, Petty alleged that the individual 

officers: (1) violated his due process right to a fair trial by 

inducing prosecutors to wrongfully prosecute him; and (2) 

deprived him of exculpatory information in violation of 
No. 12-3303 5

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). He claimed that the individual defendants coerced Tarver into falsely identifying 

Petty as the shooter by holding him against his will at the 

police station, harassing him at his home, and arresting and 

refusing to release him until he identified Petty from a lineup. He believes that CPD officers violated Brady because 

they failed to tell prosecutors how Tarver’s identification 

was secured.

When the case was transferred to Judge Kendall, Defendants moved for summary judgment on Petty’s due process 

and Brady claims and they filed a statement of undisputed 

facts under United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1. In Petty’s response in opposition, he admitted everything in the Defendants’ statement of facts and submitted a 56.1 statement with 169-

paragraphs of additional facts. Petty also provided 42 exhibits spanning 480 pages.

Defendants moved to strike all but the first 40 paragraphs of Petty’s 56.1 statement citing Local Rule 56.1, which 

prohibits a party from submitting more than 40 paragraphs 

without permission from the court. The district court struck 

all those additional facts because Petty never sought, nor received, permission to file additional paragraphs and granted 

summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Petty filed a motion to reconsider the court’s ruling, citing Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2012), 

which had been decided a day before the district court ruled 

against him. He argued that Whitlock held that the deliberate 

manufacture of false evidence violates the Due Process 

Clause and that the district court’s decision contradicted 

Whitlock. He also moved for leave to file a statement that 
6 No. 12-3303

contained more than 40 paragraphs. The court denied his 

request to file the additional paragraphs and his motion for 

reconsideration. He now appeals that decision as well as the 

grant of summary judgment as to all of his federal claims, 

and the dismissal of his Monell claim against the City.

II. ANALYSIS

First, Petty contends that the district court should have 

allowed him to submit a fact statement in excess of 40 paragraphs. Second, he argues that the district court erred when 

it granted summary judgment for the City on his due process and Brady claims. Finally, he asserts that it was error for 

the district court to dismiss his Monell claim. We address 

these issues below. 

A. No Error in Striking Petty’s Additional Facts 

Petty contends the district court abused its discretion by 

striking his additional fact statements in excess of that allowed by local rules. A party filing a motion for summary 

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must file “a statement of material facts as to which the 

moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that 

entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law.” 

N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(a)(3). The non-moving party must file 

a response to the moving party’s statement, and, in the case 

of any disagreement, cite “specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” Koszola v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 385 

F.3d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting N.D. Ill. Local R. 

56.1(b)(3)(A)). According to Local R. 56.1(b)(3)(C) “[a]bsent 

prior leave of Court, a respondent to a summary judgment 

motion shall not file more than 40 separately-numbered 
No. 12-3303 7

statements of additional facts.” We review district court decisions concerning compliance with local rules for abuse of 

discretion. Id.

Petty argues that the district court should have given him 

greater leeway to submit more than 40 paragraphs given the 

complexity of the case, but we do not agree. Petty violated 

Local Rule 56.1 by submitting additional facts in excess of 

the 40 permitted without permission from the court, and 

tries to justify his error by arguing that malicious prosecutions and due process cases are so fact intensive that the paragraph limitation is simply not practical. While this kind of 

case may be more complex, Local Rule 56.1 contemplates 

this very problem and outlines how movants may address 

their concerns within the confines of the rule. See Local R. 

56.1 Committee Comment (“A party may seek leave to file 

more asserted statements of ... additional fact, upon a showing that the complexity of the case requires a relaxation of 

the ... 40 statement limit.”). If Petty felt that his case required 

the district court to relax the limit, he should have asked the 

court to excuse compliance with its rule before he submitted 

his additional statement of facts that violated the court’s rule. 

But, he did not do that. We have said that district courts may 

require parties to strictly adhere to their rules. See Elustra v. 

Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 710 (7th Cir. 2010). Because Petty had the 

opportunity to comply with Local Rule 56.1 but chose not to, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking 

those additional facts. 

Petty also argues that the district court was “overly 

harsh” in striking his additional paragraphs. We disagree. 

We have stated that “it is not the parties[’] prerogative to determine when a rule can be satisfied by other than what the 
8 No. 12-3303

rule requires.” Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 

1317 (7th Cir. 1995). If parties fail to comply with local rules, 

they “must suffer the consequences, harsh or not.” Id. We 

have “consistently and repeatedly upheld a district court’s 

discretion to require strict compliance with its local rules 

governing summary judgment.” Koszola, 385 F.3d at 1109 

(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 562 (7th 

Cir. 2002)). 

Finally, Petty argues that the district court’s striking of his 

excess paragraphs harmed him. Once again, we do not 

agree. The court’s ruling did not negatively impact his case. 

In addition to Petty’s admitted 40 paragraphs, he agreed to 

all of the City’s statements of material fact, which referenced: 

(1) Petty’s allegations regarding CPD officers’ treatment of 

Tarver; (2) whether the attorney tasked with prosecuting the 

case would have brought charges if she had known how 

CPD officers treated Tarver; and (3) that Tarver’s subsequent 

lawsuit was disclosed to Petty during the course of his murder trial. Although Petty’s excess paragraphs were struck, 

enough facts remained for the court to rule on his due process, Brady, and Monell claims.

B. Summary Judgment Was Proper on Due Process 

and Brady Claims

Petty contends that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for the City on his due process and 

Brady claims. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the facts in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. Mercatus Group, 

L.L.C. v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2011). 
No. 12-3303 9

Petty alleges that CPD officers systemically wore down 

Tarver by placing him in a locked room that had no windows or toilets, and then deprived him of food, water, and 

sleeping arrangements for over 13 hours until Tarver falsely 

identified Petty as the shooter. Additionally, Petty claims 

they did not disclose to the prosecutor that Tarver was coerced into implicating Petty.

While Petty makes allegations that would concern any 

court and would require close scrutiny of police tactics, an 

examination of the record reveals that Petty’s allegations do 

not reveal that the police committed a Brady violation or violated his due process rights.

1. No Due Process Claim

Petty argues that CPD officers violated his right to due 

process by manufacturing evidence against him and coerced 

Tarver into giving false witness statements inculpating him. 

In the past, we have labeled a claim like Petty’s as a malicious prosecution claim. See McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 

782, 786 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that an allegation of manufacturing evidence is an “in essence, one for malicious prosecution, rather than a due process violation”). And we did not 

allow the claims to be brought in federal court because there 

was an adequate state law remedy. See Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 

819, 841 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that “a plaintiff cannot invoke the substantive due process clause where state laws 

provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the complained-of conduct”). Following that precedent, Petty’s claim 

would have been barred from being brought in federal court 

because Illinois provides an adequate remedy for his malicious prosecution claim. See Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 

660, 664 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that the plaintiff cannot bring 
10 No. 12-3303

a Section 1983 malicious prosecution suit because Illinois 

law recognizes tort claims for malicious prosecution). Petty 

argues that we recently changed how we examine these cases in Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2012), 

and should be willing to allow his claim to stand. We need 

not address his argument because, as discussed below, this 

is a coercion case, not a fabrication case like Whitlock.

In Whitlock, two police officers, an Illinois State Police investigator, and a State’s Attorney formed an “investigative 

team” that conspired to frame two men for murder, and 

covered up their alleged misdeeds for two decades. The two 

defendants were convicted of murder, but were later exonerated. The police officers and prosecutor allegedly fabricated the testimony of two witnesses who were essential to the 

State’s case. We have “consistently held that a police officer 

who manufactures false evidence against a criminal defendant violate[d] due process if that evidence is later used to 

deprive the defendant of her liberty in some way.” 682 F.3d 

at 580. And we stated that there was no reason that the same 

logic should not apply to prosecutors acting in an investigatory capacity who fabricate evidence that is used to obtain a 

wrongful criminal conviction. Id.

More recently, we had the opportunity, in Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Fields II”), to comment on 

Whitlock and its effect on due process jurisprudence. In Fields 

II, we stated that a prosecutor who falsely creates evidence 

against a defendant violates the defendant’s due process 

right. 740 F.3d at 1114. We also explained that there is a difference between coercing witnesses to testify and fabricating 

witness testimony. Id. at 1110 (“Coerced testimony is testimony that a witness is forced by improper means to give; 
No. 12-3303 11

the testimony may be true or false. Fabricated testimony is 

testimony that is made up; it is invariably false. False testimony is the equivalent; it is testimony known to be untrue 

by the witness and by whoever cajoled or coerced the witness to give it.”).

In fabrication cases, the police or prosecutor manufactures evidence that he knows to be false. See, e.g., id. (the 

prosecutor fabricated evidence that he knew to be false from 

a prospective witness); Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 571-72 (the prosecutor was a part of an investigative team that told witnesses 

what to say knowing that the information they gave the witnesses was false). As we said in Fields II and reiterate here, a 

prosecutor fabricating evidence that she knows to be false is 

different than getting “a reluctant witness to say what may 

be true.” See 740 F.3d at 1112. 

In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, we explained that “[c]oercing 

witnesses to speak ... is a genuine constitutional wrong, but 

the persons aggrieved [are the witnesses] rather than [the 

arrestee].” 20 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994). Therefore, obtaining a statement with coercive tactics that inculpated the arrestee may have violated the witness’s rights, but it did not 

violate the arrestee’s due process rights. Id. In Whitlock, we 

emphasized the point when we observed that “[c]oercively 

interrogating witnesses, paying witnesses for testimony, and 

witness-shopping may be deplorable, and these tactics may 

contribute to wrongful convictions, but they do not necessarily add up to a constitutional violation even when their 

fruits are introduced at trial,” because “[e]vidence collected 

with these kinds of suspect techniques, unlike falsified evi-
12 No. 12-3303

dence and perjured testimony, may turn out to be true.” 682 

F.3d at 584.3

After carefully reviewing the record, applying Fields II

and Whitlock, we conclude that Petty’s claim fails because his 

claim is a “coercion” case for which there is no cognizable 

due process claim, as opposed to an “evidence fabrication” 

case where there is a cognizable claim. Although Petty’s case 

appears to be a fabrication case because he alleges that the 

police “manufactured false evidence” and used “false identification” to prosecute him, a deeper look reveals that the 

case is more accurately described as a coercion case. 

Petty alleges that CPD officers coerced Tarver into giving 

false evidence by threatening him with jail time if he did not 

cooperate, holding him against his will in a locked room 

without food or water for over 13 hours, badgering him, and 

pressuring him to identify Petty as one of the assailants. As a 

result of their alleged tactics, Petty argues that the Defendants knew or should have known that Tarver’s statements 

 

3 Although Buckley and Whitlock examined the use of coerced and fabricated evidence as it relates to prosecutorial immunity, the same due process constitutional analysis that applies to prosecutors applies to police 

officers during the early stages of an investigation because the police and 

prosecutors are essentially performing the same investigatory function. 

Fields II, 740 F.3d at 1115; Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580 (stating that a prosecutor acting in an investigatory capacity is subject to the same rules as a 

police officer because a “prosecutor who manufactures evidence when 

acting in an investigatory role can cause a due process violation just as 

easily as a police officer”). In Whitlock, we observed that it would be “incongruous to hold a police officer liable for fabricating evidence but hold 

that the prosecutor has not committed any violation for taking the same 

action in the same capacity.” 682 F.3d at 580-81 (internal citation omitted).
No. 12-3303 13

were flawed. Although we do not decide here whether such 

actions amount to coercion, the tactics alleged in this case are 

similar in nature to other coercion cases. See, e.g., Buckley, 20 

F.3d at 794 (prosecutor threatened witnesses and repeatedly 

interrogated them). This is different than alleging that CPD 

officers created evidence that they knew to be false, which is 

the hallmark of a fabrication case. Petty’s claim fails because 

he did not allege in his complaint, his statement of material 

facts in opposition to the Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment, or his appellate brief that CPD officers manufactured evidence that they knew to be false.

As we held in Fields II, the true nature of the claim matters and parties should be precise in their terminology. Although Petty may have used terms and phrases such as 

“manufactured false evidence” and “false identification,” 

when one closely examines the evidence, it is clear that his 

case is a coercion case. There is not one shred of evidence to 

suggest that CPD officers fabricated evidence, which would 

have been a due process violation. “Manufactured false evidence” and “false identification” are not magic talismans 

that will transform a coercion case into an evidence fabrication case and give rise to a cognizable claim where one does 

not exist. Instead, we will look at the underlying facts of the 

claim. While Petty did not have the benefit of such a brightline distinction when he initially brought his case, after Fields 

II and Whitlock plaintiffs should be cognizant of the terminology they use so as to not to confuse these two types of 

cases. 

2. No Brady Claim 

Next, Petty argues that CPD officers committed a Brady 

violation by not disclosing to the prosecutor how it obtained 
14 No. 12-3303

Tarver’s eyewitness statement. To succeed on a Brady claim, a 

plaintiff must show that: (1) the suppressed evidence is either exculpatory or impeaching and is favorable to the accused; (2) the government, either willfully or inadvertently, 

suppressed the evidence; and (3) the suppressed evidence 

resulted in prejudice. Harris v. Kuba, 486 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th 

Cir. 2007). To establish that evidence was suppressed, a 

plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) the state failed to disclose known evidence before it was too late for [a defendant] 

to make use of the evidence; and (2) the evidence was not 

otherwise available to [a defendant] through the exercise of 

reasonable diligence.” Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 850 (7th 

Cir. 2002). The relevant inquiry is not whether the City disclosed the potentially exculpatory information at all, but 

whether Petty had sufficient time to use any exculpatory information revealed to him during trial. 

Petty knew of the City’s alleged misconduct before his 

trial started. He was so aware, in fact, that he tried to suppress all evidence that emanated from it. At the motion to 

suppress hearing, Petty called Tarver to testify about CPD 

officers’ alleged violation. Tarver testified that he felt threatened and coerced by the police into identifying Petty as the 

shooter. Tarver also stated that he had a civil suit pending 

against the police for their treatment of him. After hearing all 

the evidence, the court found no police misconduct and Petty was acquitted at the bench trial. 

Petty not only knew of Tarver’s treatment before his trial 

began, he had the opportunity to explore this topic at trial 

and could have subpoenaed the CPD officers to compel their 

testimony to cast doubt on Tarver’s identification. Because 

Petty knew of Tarver’s alleged coerced identification before 
No. 12-3303 15

his trial started and had sufficient time to use that information at his trial, summary judgment was appropriate on 

the Brady claim.

C. Petty’s Monell Claim Was Properly Dismissed

Finally, Petty alleges that at the time of the shooting, 

CPD officers acted pursuant to the City’s “widespread, permanent and well-settled” policy of detaining witnesses to 

crimes for extended periods of time against their will, which 

resulted in his arrest, charge, and detention for 21⁄2 years. He 

argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his 

Monell claim for failing to provide sufficient evidence to 

support his claim. We review a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Village of DePue, Ill. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 537 

F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Under Monell v. Department of Social Service. of City of New 

York, municipalities and other local governments can be held 

liable for a tortfeasor’s actions that it employs. 436 U.S. 658, 

690 (1978). For municipality liability to arise, however, there 

needs to be more than an employment relationship between 

the alleged tortfeasor and the municipality. See Collins v. City 

of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992). Liability only 

accrues if the tortfeasor inflicts a constitutional injury on the 

plaintiff in the execution of the government’s policy or custom. Id.; see also Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 

1006, 1029 (7th Cir. 2006). For a municipality to be held liable 

for a tortfeasor’s actions, the municipality’s custom or policy 

must deprive a claimant of his constitutional rights. City of 

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 (1985) (plurality 

opinion) (stating that Monell teaches that the city may only 
16 No. 12-3303

be held accountable if the [constitutional] deprivation was 

the result of municipal custom or policy). To establish municipal liability and prevail on his Monell claim, it is not 

enough for Petty to allege that CPD’s alleged policy injured 

him. Rather, he must establish: (1) that he suffered a constitutional injury, and (2) that the City authorized or maintained 

a custom of approving the unconstitutional conduct. Thompson v. Boggs, 33 F.3d 847, 859 (7th Cir. 1994). But if no constitutional violation occurred in the first place, a Monell claim 

cannot be supported. See Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 

630 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] municipality cannot be 

liable under Monell when there is no underlying constitutional violation by a municipal employee.”).

Petty’s Monell claim fails because he did not suffer a constitutional injury and so has no basis to support a Monell 

claim. In the past, we have said that “[i]t is well established 

that there can be no municipal liability based on an official 

policy under Monell if the policy did not result in a violation 

of [a plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.” Houskins v. Sheahan, 

549 F.3d 480, 493 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting King v. East St. Louis School Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 2007)). Coercing 

witnesses to secure information that may ultimately be false 

does not per se violate Petty’s constitutional rights. See Fields 

II, 740 F.3d at 1112 (stating that “coercion per se does not 

make a prosecutor acting as an investigator liable should the 

coerced evidence be used to obtain a conviction of an innocent criminal defendant”). Even if the City had a policy of 

detaining witnesses until they gave up information, Petty’s 

Monell claim could not succeed because it is not his rights

that would be violated by such a policy. Since Petty’s due 

process constitutional rights were not violated by CPD officers’ allegedly coercive tactics, he cannot prevail on his Mo-
No. 12-3303 17

nell claim and the district court properly dismissed his claim. 

See, e.g., Houskins, 549 F.3d at 493. (stating that the plaintiff’s 

Monell claim failed because she failed to establish that she 

was deprived of a constitutional right); Alexander v. City of 

South Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that a 

municipality defendant cannot be liable under Monell for a 

policy or custom of inadequately training and supervising 

its police officers, unless the defendant violated a constitutional guarantee). 

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.