alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1
**CERTIFICATIONS**
     I, Steven G. Murdock, certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Meade Instruments Corp.;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;
     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report isbeing prepared;  b)  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  c)  disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and
     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a)  all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting     Date: May 31, 2005   By: /s/ Steven G. Murdock      President, CEO and Secretary
583 A.2d 329

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MARION JACOBS.

February 26, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1335 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

508 East Main Street in Seneca, South Carolina, as the ‘‘S/Sgt Lewis 

G. Watkins Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 6, 2007 

Mr. BARRETT of South Carolina introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 508 East Main Street in Seneca, South Carolina, as the ‘‘S/Sgt Lewis G. Watkins Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. S/SGT LEWIS G. WATKINS POST OFFICE BUILD4 ING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 508 East Main Street in Seneca, 

7 South Carolina, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘S/ 

8 Sgt Lewis G. Watkins Post Office Building’’. 


bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1335 IH

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘S/Sgt Lewis G. Wat5 kins Post Office Building’’. 

Æ 


bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with BILLS
News United States Air Force
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```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 87 (Wednesday, May 24, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5570]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                         ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

  Mr. THOMAS, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that 
that committee had examined and found truly enrolled a bill of the 
House of the following title, which was thereupon signed by the 
Speaker:

       H.R. 1421. An Act to provide that references in the 
     statutes of the United States to any committee or officer of 
     the House of Representatives the name or jurisdiction of 
     which was changed as part of the reorganization of the House 
     of Representatives at the beginning of the One Hundred Fourth 
     Congress shall be treated as referring to the currently 
     applicable committee or officer of the House of 
     Representatives.

                          ____________________
```
**Exhibit 31.1**I, Donald L. Grill, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Fentura Financial, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presentedin this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  (c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter(the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.       Dated: August 10, 2007   /s/Donald L. Grill           Donald L. Grill      Chief Executive Officer
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

**OF CHIEF FINANCIALOFFICER**

 

I, Kevin F. McLaughlin, certifythat:

 

1.             I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A(“this report”) to the annual report on Form 10-K of PRAECIS PHARMACEUTICALSINCORPORATED;

 

2.             Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;

 

3.             Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, andother financial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flowsof the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.             The registrant’s other certifying officer and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand have:

 

(a) Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b) [Paragraphomitted in accordance with SEC transition instructions];

 

(c) Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

(d) Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.             The registrant’s other certifying officer and I havedisclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofthe registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

 

(a) Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

(b) Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 
| Date: May 7,  2004       |
|--------------------------|
|                     |
|                     |
| /s/ Kevin F.  McLaughlin |   |
| Kevin F. McLaughlin      |
| Chief Financial Officer  |

 

----
#### St. Louis, A. & T. R’y Co. v. Ed. Felton.

(No. 3252.)

Appeal from Hopkins County.

Perkins, Gilbert & Perkins, counsel for appellant.

Peteet & Crosby, counsel for appellee.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 39. *Damages recoverable under article Devised Statutes, must be caused by actual contact with locomotive orear; negligence; evidence held insufficient to prove.*This suit was brought for damages under article 4245, Revised Statutes, for injury done to a mare by the “running of said defendant company’s locomotive and cars over and against said mare.” The evidence shows that the locomotive or cars did not come in contact or collision with, nor touch, the mare, but that she and another horse became frightened at the train, and ran down the track to a small bridge, where she became injured in trying to escape across said bridge. It is shown that the train was running at the rate of twenty-five miles an hour, while the schedule time was only eighteen miles an hour. But it was proven by defendant, without conflict or contradiction; that when a train was behind time it was allowable for it to run at the rate of twenty-five miles an hour. It was further proven, and *61not contradicted, that, when the employees running the train saw the danger likely to ensue to the animals, they used all the means at their command to avoid and avert the same, and stopped the train as soon as it was possible for them to do so. In his conclusions of law and fact the court found defendant company liable on account of the gross negligence of its agents and employees, and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff against said company for $129.50.

December 12, 1889.

In the suit as brought there was no allegation or claim made that the damage was occasioned by the negligence of the parties, the agents and employees. It was simply a suit as above stated, under article 1215, Revised Statutes, for injury done to the animal. It has been held by our supreme court and by this court that said article 1215 does not apply to a case where animals are injured, not by actual collision with a locomotive or car, but through fright caused by a train. [Railway Co. v. Hughes, 68 Tex. 290; 3 Civil Cas. Ct. App., § 221.] If it be contended that in a suit where it is instituted before a justice court, and where the pleadings are ordinarily oral, that a judgment can be had for damages occasioned by negligence when no negligence is alleged, still, in this case, under the facts proven, we are clearly of opinion that negligence has not been proven, and that the conclusion of the judge finding it as the basis of his judgment is not sustained by the evidence, and that his conclusion and the judgment are against the evidence.

Reversed and remanded.
#### JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. A. Kathleen McNEILLY, Esquire, Respondent.

No. 5D11-83.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

April 15, 2011.

Christian D. Lake, Assistant- General Counsel, The Justice Administrative Commission, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

A. Kathleen McNeilly of A. Kathleen McNeilly <& Associates, P.A., DeLand, for Respondent.

EVANDER, J.

The Justice Administrative Commission (JAC) seeks certiorari review of an order requiring it to pay the attorney fees of a mother’s court-appointed private counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The record reflects that counsel was appointed after the mother had executed a voluntary written surrender of her parental rights.1 Pursuant to section 39.807(1), Florida Statutes (2010),2 the mother was not entitled to publicly-funded counsel. *Justice Admin. Conim’n v. Harp,*24 So.3d 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); *303*see also Justice Admin. Comm’n v. Goettel,*32 So.3d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Because the mother was not entitled to appointed counsel, JAC was not obligated to pay counsel’s fees. § 29.007(2), Florida Statutes (2010); *see also Goettel; Harp.*We conclude that the trial court’s order departed from the essential requirements of law. *See Goettel; Harp.*We grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order under review.

GRANT PETITION, ORDER QUASHED.

TORPY and LAWSON, JJ„ concur.

1

. The mother never challenged the voluntariness of her surrender of parental rights.

2

. Section 39.807 Right to counsel; guardian ad litem.

(l)(a) At each stage of the proceeding under this part, the court shall advise the parent of the right to have counsel present. The court shall appoint counsel for indigent parents ....

(l)(d) This subsection does not apply to any parent who has voluntarily executed a written surrender of the child and consent to the entry of a court order therefor.
#### John McKay v. G. S. Barlow.

(No. 3171.)

Appeal from Aransas County.

M. J. Hathaway and C. P. Bailey, counsel for appellant.

No counsel appeared for appellee.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 299. *Judgment by default; cannot be taken on appearance day.*This suit was instituted in the county court upon a verified itemized account for $393.13. Judgment by default was taken on the second day of the appearance term of the court. An answer was regularly filed on the same day the judgment by default wTas taken, but subsequent thereto. On the succeeding day a motion for a new trial was filed, setting up various defenses which were claimed to be meritorious, and also showing cause why the court erred in rendering judgment by default, it being contended that the time in which to answer had not expired on the second day. Can a judgment by default be rendered on the second day of the county court? Evidently the action of the court was based upon its construction of the act of the twenty-second legislature as found in the general law of 1891, page 94, as follows: “Art. 1280. The second day of each term of the district or county court is appearance day.” The article quoted is an amendment to article 1280 of the Revised Statutes, which reads as follows: “The fifth day of each term of the district court and the third day of each term of the county court are termed appearance days.” It is further provided by the Revised Statutes, article 1281: “It shall be the duty of the court on appearance day of each term, or as soon thereáfter as may be practicable, to call in their order all the cases on the docket which are returnable to such term. [Art, *5191282.] Upon the call of the appearance docket, or at any time after appearance day, the plaintiff may take judgment by default against any defendant who has been duly served with process, and who has not previously filed an answer.” Article 1263 provides: “In all cases in which the citation has been personally served at least five [now ten days under the last amendment, — • 1891] days before the first day of the term to which it is returnable, exclusive of the day of service and return, the answer of defendant shall be filed in the district court on or before the fifth day of the return term, and in the county court on or before the third day of the return term.” These are the provisions of our statute with reference to appearance days and judgments by default as they existed prior to the adoption of the amendment as above set out. In construing these statutes together, and because repeals by implication are not favored in law, we are of opinion that under the amendment the party would have the whole of the second day in which to file his answer; and, while the appearance docket is called on that day, still judgment by default cannot be taken until the third day, as is provided by article 1263. Because the court erred in rendering judgment by default on the second day, and in failing to grant a new trial, defendant having filed his answer on the second day, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

March 5, 1892.

Reversed and remanded.
**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**EXCHANGE
      ACT RULE 15D-14(B) AND**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of U.S. Dry Cleaning Corporation
      (the ”Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2007, as
      filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Robert Y. Lee, Principal Accounting Officer of the
      Company, certify, to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to Exchange Act Rule
      15d-14(b) and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
      the
      Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that:





i.  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





ii.  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to U.S. Dry Cleaning Corporation and will
      be
      retained by U.S. Dry Cleaning Corporation and furnished to the Securities and
      Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




By:
            /S/ ROBERT Y.
              LEEName:
            Robert Y. LeeTitle:
            Principal Accounting
              OfficerDate:
            August 14,
              2007
#### H. S. Golightly et al. v. J. T. Irvine.

(No. 3602.)

Appeal from Ellis County.

W. H. Pears, counsel for appellants.

No counsel appeared for appellee.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 181. *Appeal; affidavit in forma pauperis in lieu of bond, held insufficient.*This case originated in a justice’s court, and was thence appealed to the county court, and was filed in said last court in December, 1888. Several continuances were had until the October term, 1889, at which term appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal *269for informality and defects in the affidavit made *in forma pauperis*in lieu of an appeal bond. The motion was sustained and the appeal dismissed, and from that judgment appellants prosecute an appeal to this court. After-giving the style, etc., of the case, the affidavit *in forma pauperis*is as follows, viz.: “ Ancl now comes H. S. Go-lightly and H. S. Golightly, Jr., and in open court make application to the county court of Ellis county, and each, upon oath, says that they are unable to pay the costs,” and then come the signatures. This affidavit is clearly insufficient, under the statute which requires that appellant shall make oath that he “is unable to pay the costs of appeal, or give security therefor.” [R. S., art.' 1401; 1 Civil Cas. Ct. App., §§ 632, 743, 1073.] But it is insisted that the motion to dismiss came too late, and that the defects in the affidavit will be considered as having been waived. An affidavit not in conformity with the statute will not perfect the appeal. [Authorities *supra.]*It cannot give the county court jurisdiction of the appeal, and want of jurisdiction is fatal at any time, and cannot be cured by waiver or consent of parties. [2 Civil Cas. Ct. App., § 37.] There was no error in dismissing the appeal.

December 6, 1890.

Affirmed.