IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

April 2, 2002 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER M. FLAKE

Appeal by permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 97-09256 Bernie Weinman, Judge

No. W2000-01131-SC-R11-CD Filed - August 29, 2002

E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., with whom ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., joins, concurring in part and

dissenting in part.

I concur in the majority’s holding that a jury verdict rejecting the insanity defense should be

reversed only if the appellate court, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

concludes that no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defendant’s insanity at the

time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence. 

I disagree, however, with the majority’s application of the standard to the facts and

circumstances of this case in which virtually all of the lay and expert testimony established the

defendant’s insanity at the time of the offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501(a) (1997). In my view,

the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that no reasonable trier of fact could have failed

to find that the defendant’s insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and

convincing evidence. I therefore dissent.

As the majority recognizes, the evidence indicated that the only two witnesses to the offense

– Turner Carpenter, the pastoral counselor, and Patricia Ann Hoffman – described the shooting as

bizarre and unexplained. According to Carpenter and Hoffman, they were in Carpenter’s office in

a counseling session when the defendant “stuck his head in” and asked to meet with Carpenter.

When Carpenter said he would meet with the defendant in fifteen minutes, the defendant left briefly

and then suddenly returned wielding a pistol and yelling Carpenter’s name. After shooting

Carpenter, the defendant held the pistol to Hoffman’s head for a few moments and then fled from

the scene. Carpenter testified that the defendant was yelling in an “abnormal” voice and had changed

from a normal appearance to “horrible looking,” “crazed,” and "the devil himself.” Carpenter
1

After the offense, the defendant showed no emotion when he was arrested and looked “distraught” or

“tired” when questioned about the whereabouts of the gun. The defendant told officers that the gun was in a vehicle

glove box and he executed a consent to search form.

2

Dr. Johnson was deceased at the time of trial.

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described the shooting as “totally off the wall, weird, and crazy,” and said that there had been no ill

will between he and the defendant.1 

The evidence also established that the defendant had a ten-year history of mental illness,

including depression, mixed chemical dependency, oppositional disorder, and major affective

disorder, for which he had been hospitalized. The evidence showed that his mental state had

substantially deteriorated during the week immediately preceding this shooting. In fact, the

defendant’s bizarre behavior was so apparent that his worried father scheduled an additional

appointment with the defendant’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Janet Johnson, on April 3, 1997, only two

days after his previous session. Dr. Johnson’s notes from the April 3, 1997 visit, which was only

three days before the shooting, described a recent incident where the defendant saw a man working

on his farm and left his Prozac medication in the man’s mailbox because he “looked like he needed

help.” 

Finally, the trial evidence revealed that a total of five mental health professionals, both

psychiatrists and psychologists, performed numerous, comprehensive evaluations of the defendant

and all determined that he suffered from a severe mental illness, schizophrenia, and was unable to

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct in shooting the victim. Indeed, after the offense and prior

to trial, the defendant was examined by a number of psychiatrists and, as a result of the proof, the

trial court found him to be incompetent to stand trial for a period of over two years after the offense.

The trial court declared him competent to stand trial only after the State had furnished extensive

treatment and anti-psychotic medication over the more than two years following the offense.

The first mental health professional to evaluate the defendant was Dr. Lynne Zager, a clinical

psychologist and Director of the Forensic Services Program at Midtown Mental Health Center. She

examined him over a four-month period from October 1997 to January 1998 to determine his

competency to stand trial and his mental state at the time of the offense. Dr. Zager testified that the

defendant suffered from the severe mental illness of paranoid schizophrenia and that due to the

mental illness, he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct during the shooting on April

6, 1997. Dr. Zager relied in part on the notes of the defendant’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Janet

Johnson, regarding the defendant’s bizarre behavior.2

Next to testify was Dr. Hilary Linder, a practicing psychiatrist for 33 years employed by the

State at Western Mental Health Institute. He evaluated the defendant in November of 1998. Dr.

Linder, likeDr. Zager, determined that the defendant had suffered from paranoid schizophrenia since

his early teen years and could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts due to his severe mental

illness. 
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Also testifying for the defense was Dr. Rokeya Farooque, a psychiatrist at Middle Tennessee

Mental Health Institute, who evaluated the defendant from November 17, 1997, to December 16,

1997. Dr. Farooque reviewed the defendant’s medical records which indicated the defendant had

experienced prior hallucinations associated with drug abuse, blackouts, major depression, an anxiety

disorder, and an obsessive-compulsive disorder. Dr. Farooque noted that the defendant had received

psychiatric treatment, including hospitalization, for his prior conditions. Dr. Farooque testified that

the defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and was incapable of appreciating the

wrongfulness of his conduct in committing the offense. 

The last State-employed mental health professional testifying for the defense was Dr. Sam

Craddock, a clinical psychologist at Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute, who stated that he

evaluated the defendant from November 17, 1997 to December 16, 1997. He agreed that the

defendant had paranoid schizophrenia, which is a serious mental illness, and that the defendant could

not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions in committing the offense. Dr. Craddock added that

the defendant “morally felt justified” to shoot the victim because he apparently believed the victim

was a terrorist. 

The final mental health professional to testify for the defense was Dr. John Hutson, a clinical

psychologist employed by the defense, who stated that he had evaluated the defendant, reviewed his

lengthy history of mental illness and treatment, and administered several tests, including the MMPIII, which revealed he was psychotic. According to Dr. Hutson, the defendant believed he was

working for the government as an agent or enforcer when he shot the victim. Dr. Hutson determined

that the defendant suffered from schizophrenia, undifferentiated-disorganized type, which he called

a serious, incapacitating mental illness. He testified that the defendant was one of the three “most

disturbed individuals” he had ever seen among the over 10,000 persons he had evaluated in his

career, and one of only 25 patients whom Dr. Hutson concluded could not appreciate the

wrongfulness of his or her conduct.

Finally, Rebecca Smith, a psychiatric social worker at Western Mental Health Institute,

testified that she interviewed and obtained a history from the defendant. According to Smith, the

defendant believed that Carpenter, the pastoral counselor, was a terrorist with access to chemical

weapons, and that voices told the defendant to shoot the victim as a signal to the F.B.I. to come to

the church to take care of the terrorists and mafia associated with the church.

To summarize, all of the mental health professionals who completed numerous and

comprehensive evaluations of the defendant consistently determined that he suffered from a severe

mental illness, paranoid schizophrenia, and that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his

conduct in shooting the victim. All of these professionals had years of experience in conducting

competency and mental state evaluations. Three of these experts were employed by the State of

Tennessee and had no motive to provide testimony favorable to the defense; indeed, three of these

same expert witnesses had testified on behalf of the State with regard to whether the defendant was

competent to stand trial in this proceeding. In contrast, the State presented no expert testimony
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showing that the defendant did not have a mental illness or that he could appreciate the wrongfulness

of his conduct. 

Although the majority has accurately summarized the evidence from the record, it

nonetheless upholds the jury verdict on the basis that the jury is to weigh all of the facts and

circumstances and that the jury is not required to accept expert testimony. I agree that the jury has

those responsibilities, yet I disagree with the majority’s conclusions in this case for several reasons.

First, the majority argues that the defendant fabricated an answer on a gun application made

before the offense and acted “normally” on the day of the offense prior to the shooting. These

normal actions, however, are as characteristic of schizophrenia as abnormal actions. Second, the

majority speculates that the jury may have believed that the defendant’s motive for shooting the

victim was not because he thought the victim was a terrorist but was in someway related to the

defendant’s fantasy that the victim was a homosexual. The evidence noted by the majority did not

directly relate to the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense, in contrast to the testimony

of the two eye-witnesses to the offense and the testimony of five mental health experts regarding the

defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense. Moreover, the inferences relied upon by the

majority did not refute the evidence of the defendant’s serious mental illness and his incapacity to

appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the offense. In fact, the expert witnesses

testified without contradiction that persons suffering from schizophrenia do not act bizarre or appear

“crazy” all the time and often behave normally for periods of time. 

Finally, the majority argues that the State’s cross-examination of the defense experts

attempted to establish that the defendant was malingering and had never complained of auditory

hallucinations until after this offense was committed. All of the mental health experts uniformly and

without contradiction responded, however, that the defendant was not malingering or feigning the

symptoms of his mental illness. Moreover, two of the State’s own rebuttal witnesses – Dr. John

McIntosh and Dr. Mark Luttrell – refuted the malingering theory by agreeing that the defendant

suffered from a serious mental disease. Significantly, the State’s rebuttal witnesses were not asked

by the State the core question relevant to the defense of insanity, i.e., whether the defendant could

appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct in shooting the victim. 

This is not a case in which experts offered different opinions regarding the defendant’s

mental state. All were unanimous and testified without contradiction that the defendant suffered

from a severe mental illness, schizophrenia, and that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his

conduct. Nor is this a case in which there was lay testimony regarding the facts and circumstances

of the offense that differed from the expert testimony. In short, I can find no basis in this record for

the jury to have reasonably rejected the expert or lay evidence regarding the defendant’s mental state

at the time of the offense. Although I am fully aware that reversal of a jury’s verdict under the

standard we have adopted will be rare, I am concerned that by upholding the jury’s verdict under the

facts and circumstances of this case, the majority has made appellate review of a jury’s verdict

meaningless and useless. 
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Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s holding that a jury verdict rejecting the insanity

defense should be reversed only if the appellate court, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable

to the prosecution, concludes that no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the

defendant’s insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence.

I disagree, however, with the majority’s application of the standard to the facts and circumstances

of this case. In my view, the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that no reasonable trier

of fact could have failed to find that the defendant’s insanity at the time of the offense was

established by clear and convincing evidence. I therefore dissent.

I am authorized to state that Justice Birch joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

_______________________________________

E. RILEY ANDERSON, JUSTICE