F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
J ONATHAN M I CH A EL T HOMAS ,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 11-10451

D.C. No. 4:10-cr- 00628- CKJ -GEE- 1
OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Arizona Cindy K. J org enson, District Judge, Pre siding Argued and Submitted Ap ri l 18 , 2 01 3— San F ra

nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed August 8, 2013
Be fore : Alfred T . Goodwin, Diar muid F. O’Sca

nnlain,
and N. Rand y Smith, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Op ini on by Judg e O’ Sc ann la inU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Crim inal L aw Reversingthe denial of

a suppre s s ion motion and va cating a convic tion, the panel considere d the demands of the Speedy Trial Ac t in the case of a supers ed ing indictment, a nd
e xplor e d th e e me rg ing p ara me te rs fo r t

he c on sti tut ion a l us e of dr ug -d e te c tio n d og s. The pa nel held t h at cha

rg es in a super sedingindictment
no t r e qu ir e d to be joi ne d w iththe or ig ina l c ha rg e s c ome wi th
a new seventy -day

clock unde r the Spee dy

Trial Act, and that the conspira cy

count introdu c e d

in th e superse ding indictment in this case wa s not require d to be joined with the count in the
or ig ina l in dic tme nt c ha rg ingpo sse ssi on wi th i nte nt t o distribute marijuana.
Be cause in acc ord with then-bindingprec edent mar ijuana seized from a tool box attache d to the bed of the defe ndant’s truck wa s not subject to exclusi on o n t h e basis of an
un c on sti tut ion a l tr e sp a ss or phy sic a l intr us ion , the pa

ne l di d
no t de c ide wh e the r a g e nts vio late d or implic ate d th e F ourt h Amendment by

direc ting the dr

ug -dete ction dogto jump up
an d p u t h is p aw s an d

n o s e o nth e to o lb o x. The pa nel re verse d the denial of the sup p re s s ion motion and vac ated the c onviction beca use t he g overnme nt’s failure to turn over a

full complement of dog- history discovery

was e rr or , a nd that e rr or wa s n ot h arm le ss.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 3 Rejecting an alternative basis for invalidating the se arc h, the pa ne l e xpla ine d th at e vid e nc e fr om a tra ine d an d r e lia ble handler about alert behavior r ecognized in his dogcan, depending on the fac ts a nd circ umstances, be the basis for probable cause
.

CO UN SEL
Br ian I . Rademac her, A ssistant Fede ral Public Def ender , Distr ic t o f A r iz o n a , T u c s o n , A r iz o n a , ar gu e d th e c a u s e and filed the brie fs for the appellant. With him on t he brie fs wer e Jo nM

. Sa

n d s , F e d e r a l P u

b li c D e f e n d e r , an d

Ri c h ar d W. Ray nor, Assistant Federa l Publi c De fende r, District of Arizona.

Br uce M. F erg , Assistant United States Attorney , District of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, argued the c ause a nd filed a br ief fo r t he app e lle e . With h im o n th e br ie f w e re JohnS. L e on ard o, Un ite d St ate s A tto rn e y , a nd Chr ist ina

M. Cabanillas, Appellate Chief, District of Ar izona.

OP IN ION
O’SCANNLAI

N, Circuit J udg e:
This c riminal appea l r aises two issues of first impression. We are called upon to c onsid erthe demands of the Speedy Tr ia l A c t in the c a se of a

su pe rs e din gind ic tme nt a s w e ll a s to explore the emer g ing pa

rame ters for

the constitutional use of dr ug -d e te c tio n d og s.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 4

T he p art i es di sput e whet her T ho m as l ef t h is v e h ic le volunt ari l y and 1 wh et h er h e con s en t ed t o a n e n s u i n g s ea r ch

. At t h e s u ppr es s i on heari ng, T h o m a s te stif

ie d to telling the a g e n t “n o ” w h e n a sk e d “fo r p e rm issio n to
se a rc h the to o lb o x .” I
A
In the ea rly afte rnoon on F ebrua

ry 2 8, 2010, J onathan Thomas approa ched a highw ay chec kpoint in so uthern Arizona manned by

the United States Border

Patrol. He wa s drivinga silver pick- up tru ck wi th a larg e blac k toolbox attache d to the b ed

. Bor der Patrol Ag ent Christopher L eB lanc ha d a par

tner that da

y : “B eny -A,” his drug -dete ction dog , who was tra ined in the det ection of conce aled humans and cont ro lled substances. L eB lanc wa s stationed about fiftee n fee t in front of a “ prim ar y i n s p ection” a rea . As Thomas’s truc k passed, Be ny -A started to demonstrate what L eB lanc de scribed a s “ale rt behavior.” The d o g’s tail and
ear s went up, his posture and breathing pattern cha ng ed, and he starte d “air -sce nting.”

B a se d o n th os e re sp on se s, a g e nts dir e c te d T ho ma s to seconda ry inspection wher e he a

nd his t hree youngchildren exit ed the truc k. Starting at the tailgat e, L eB lanc wa lked 1 Be ny -A c ounterc lockwise a round t h e t ruck. A s they
en co un t er edar ea s o f i n t er es t , L eB l an c s i gn al edBe ny -A t o go the r e
. T h e d o gw a s “ in

o d o r ” thr o u g h o ut, me an in gh e was very animated a

nd excited . Nea

r the g as tank on the p a s s e n g e r s i d e th e d o ge x h i b i t e d

m o r e a l e rtb e h av i o r
. B e nyA is tr ai n ed t o perf

orm what is known in the tra de as a n “indication” when he discovers contra band: he “r ock[s] back into a sit.”U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 5
Whe n th e te am c ame up on the too lbo x, L e B lanc c a st h is hand low-to-high. In response , Be n y -A jumped up and pla c e d h is p aws on

the ve hic le and pr e sse d h is n os e a g a ins t Th o m as ’s toolbox . L eB lanc testified that the dogthen tried to sit, but t hat he did not allow him to complete that tra ined ind ic atio n. Ne xt, L e B lanc re tur ne d B e ny -Ato h is k e nn e l,
o b ta in e d T h o ma s ’ s k e y s , an d

s e ar c h e d th e lo c k e d

to o lb o x. Inside was a

blanket and, unde rneath, bundles of m ar ijuana weighing ab o u t150 pounds. Thomas was a rre sted, advised of his Mir anda rig hts, and transporte d to the Tucson B order Patr ol s tatio n. Duri ngint e rv ie ws wi th t he B order Patr ol, Thomas said he had knowing ly transporte d the marijuana but
un de r d ur e ss.
B
Th oma s w a s in dic te d o n a sin g le c ount o f P os se ssi on wi th Intent to Distribute Marijuana, 21 U .S.C . § 841(a) (1), (b)(1 )( C), on Marc h 24, 2010. On May 18, 2011, a superse ding indictment issued. In addit ion to renew ing the possess i o n offe nse, the super sedingindictment added a
c ha rg e : Co ns pir a c y

to P os se ss w ithInte nt t o D istri bute Marijuana , 21 U.S.C. § 846.
1
Invoking the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161, et seq. , Thomas s o u gh t to have both counts in the super seding i n d i c tm e n td i s m i s s e d

. T h e c o urtn o t e d th at4 5 4 c a l e n d ar

d ays had ela ps ed s ince the or igina l single- count indictment. Of that tim e , se ve nty-s ix d ay s we re no n- e xclu da ble

. Beca

us e that period e x cee ded the se vent y -day “cloc k” under

the Speedy Trial Ac t, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) , the district court enter ed a dismissal o f the possession char g e withoutU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 6

T h at of

f en s e wa s n ot r ec h ar g ed. 2 prejudice

. Howeve r, the c ourt kept the c onspiracy count 2
a liv e , r e a so nin gtha

t un de r t he Ac t th e g ov ernment c ou ld avail it self of a

second se venty -day

clock, trig g ere d by

the
su pe rs e din gind ic tme nt.
2
B e fo re tr ia l T ho ma s a lso fi le d a mo tio n to su pp re ss e vid e nc e of

the mari

jua na ob ta ine d at th e c he c kp oint. Th oma s, Ag e nt L e B lanc , a nd K9 Co or din ator

Pa ul D ub ois testified about the circ umstances surrounding t h e F ebrua ry 2010 sear ch. Thomas pur sued two ar guments. He c laimed that t he sea

rc h o f t he too lbo x ha d v iol ate d th e F ourt h Amendment bec ause the drugdog ’s fa ilure to indicate me ant probable cause had not bee n es t ablished. And duringthe suppression hea

ring , Thomas also objec ted to rec eiving heavily reda cted tra ining- and per formance- evaluation
re c or ds on B e ny -A and his ha nd le r. Af te r de c idi ng that th e se limit ed disclosure s satisfied the g overn m ent’s dis cover y obligation under Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the district judge ruled that the g overnme nt had met its burden of
e sta bli sh ingpr ob a

ble c a us e . T ho ma s’ s moti on to s up pr e ss was de nied.
3
Th e c a se pr oc e e de d to tria l. T ho ma s to ok the sta nd in h is defe nse. Having be en unsucc essful in ex cludingthe
mari jua na , T ho ma s argue d th e le g a l e xcu se of dure ss. He did
n o t d e ny h av in g kn o w in g ly p o s s e s s e d th e dr u g s , n or did he contest ente ringinto a conspirac y to distribute them. I nstead, he ar gued that he ha d b ee n an unwilling c ourier. T homasU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 7

te sti fi e d th at a

Hi sp anic man w itha gun had lur e d h im i nto the de se rt un de r f a lse pr e te ns e s and thr e ate ne d to ha rm him and his fa m i l y

unless he tra

nsported the mar ijuana. Af ter a tw o- da y tr ia l, t he jury ret urned

a guil ty ve rd ic t a s to cons pirac y

—the only

count re maining in the supe rseding i n d i ct m ent. The c ourt sentenc ed him to thirty months of incar cer ation, followed by thirty -six months of sup er v i sed rele ase. Thoma s timely

appea led.

II
A First, we consider T h o m as’s c laim that the Speedy Trial Act re quired the distr i ct court to dismiss both counts of the
su pe rs e din gind ic tme nt—

no t si mpl y

the po sse ssi on

of fe ns e that trac ed to the orig inal one-c o u nt indictment. W hat dis tin guis he s a su

pe rs e din g ind ic tme nt fr om a re ind ic tme nt i s that th e fo rm e r i s is su e d w ith out th e or iginal char g e fi rs t being dismiss ed. Se eUn ite d S tates v . H os le tt , 998 F.2d 648, 657 n.11 (9th Cir. 1993)

. Although the issue Thomas ra ises is o ne of fi rs t im pr e ssi on , o the r c ir c uit s h ave c on fr onte d it , and ther e is some prior guidanc e i n o u r case law as to whe n a subseque nt indictment trigg ers a new spe edy -trial per iod.

B
The S peedy

Trial Ac t has three “cloc ks” that ar e re levant to this st atutory

interpre tation issue. For the most part, the Ac t i s d e s i g n e d t o e xp e d i t e th e tr i a l i n th at : (i ) i t “esta blish[ es] a thirty -day limit for filing a n indictment after
an ar rest,” United States v. W

ilson , 6 90 F .2 d 1 26 7, 12 76 (9 th Cir

. 19 82 ) (c iti ng 18 U. S.C. § 3 16 1( b) ), and —c e ntr a l to thi s c a se —( ii) it d e mand s th at a de fe nd ant h ave the op po rt un ityU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 8
to b e tr ie d w ith in se ve nty da y s o f i nd ic tme nt. 18 U. S.C. § 3161(c) (1). Conver sely , to safegu ar dag ainst the risk of undue haste , secti o n 3161(c) (2) pr events the g overnme nt from insisti ngthat the trial beg in “less than thirty day s from the date on

wh ic h th e de fe nd ant f

ir st a pp e ars
. 1
We b e g in b y c o n s id e r in g th e s u b s e c ti o n c r e ati ng the seventy -day

clock: [i ]n any c a s e i n w h i c h a p l e a o f n o t gu i l ty is enter ed, the trial of a defe ndant cha rg ed in an inf o r m a t i o n o r i n d i c tm e nt with the commission of an offe nse shall commenc e wi t h i n seventy

day s from the filingdate ( and makingpublic) of the information or indictment , or fr om the date the de fenda nt has
a pp e are d .

. . wh ic he ve r d ate la st o c c ur s.
18 U. S.C. § 3 16 1(c)(1) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he mos t straig htforwa

rd re adingis that s u ch provision applies to t he superse ding indictment he re. U n d erthat view, the issuanc e of the ne w i nd ic tme nt t

ri g g e re d a ne w s e ve nty-d ay

pe ri od in which to bringThomas to trial. Since the jury was e mpaneled just over one month af ter the f iling of the superse ding indictment, there w o u l dbe no violation of the Spee dy Trial Ac t.
Matte rs are no t qu ite so sim ple , h ow e ve r. We p re vio us ly have acknow ledg ed that the Act does not e x pressly p ro v i de for supe rsedingindictments. See United States v. Karsseboom , 881 F.2d 604, 606 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the Act spea ks d i re ctly

as to reindictments only . On that score ,U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 9

See , e

. g. , Uni t ed S t a t es v

. Ki ng , 483 F. 3d 969, 972 ( 9t h Ci r
. 2007) 3 (charact eri zi ng Kar s s eboom as ho l d i ng th a t “t he f i l i ng of a superseding i nd i ct m ent w i l l no t a ut o m at i cal l y reset t he [Sp eed y T ri al A ct ] cl o ck where t he new i ndi ct ment does not ch ar ge a n ew cr i me, but onl y cor r ect s a def ect in th e o rig ina l i n d ic tm e n t” ); Uni t ed S t at es v. A l var ez
- P er ez , 629 F. 3d 1 0 5 3 , 1 0 5 8 (9t h C i r. 20 1 0 ) ( ci t i ng Kar s s eboom fo r th e p ro p o sitio n tha t a “s up ers ed i ng i nd i ct m ent chargi ng [t he] same o f f enses d o es not res t art [t he Sp eed y T ri al A ct ] cl o ck”). section 3161(d) (1) pr ovides that when the defe ndant sec ures a dismissal “both the 30-day trial prepa ration period and the 70-day speedy trial ti m e period start over.” Karsseboom , 881 F.2d at 606. We ha

ve also held that whe n the def endant i s reindicted a fter a su a s po nte d is mi s s a l b y th e c o urt, the seventy -day clock is reset. United States v. Fe ldman , 788 F.2d 544, 549 ( 9th Cir. 1986).
Th oma s argue s th is n e w- c loc k ru le , whic h a

pp lie s to the se reindictment sce narios, has no application to indictments that
are superse ding. In Karsseboom , w e he ld t hat so me s u p e r s e d i n gi n d i c tm e n t s d o n o tr e s t artth e o r i g i n a l s p e e dytrial clock. 881 F .2d at 607 (“When a superse ding indictment
me re l y c o r r e c t s t e c h n i c a l e r

r o r s b utc h ar g e s a g a i nth e s a me offe nses the 70-day

clock c ontinues and does not beg in anew unless the orig inal indictm en t i n its entirety has bee n previously

dismiss ed.”) . Howeve r, t hat ca se left ope n whether in a situation such a s this, where the new indictment int ro du c e s d if

fe re nt c ha

rg e s, the se ve nty-d ay

c loc k s tart s runninganew
. 3
To resolve this problem (to which section 3161(c) (1) doe s not provide a pla in answer), we t h ink it useful to consider other aspec ts of

the Speedy

Trial Ac t. See D ada v. Muk asey , 554 U.S. 1, 16 (2008) ( “In rea ding a statute we must not lookU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 10

W e re c o g n iz e tha t ap p lying this le sso n to su p e rs e d in g ind ic tm e n ts 4 req uires an i nfere nti al st ep si nc e se cti o n 3 1 6 1 (h)(5 ), b y i t s l i te r al t erm s, conce r ns onl y r ei ndi ct ment s
. Y et , we ar e n ot al one i n u nder s t andi ng t hat
se c tio n t o s h e d s o m e li g h t o n ho w the A c t o p e ra te s w ith re sp e c t t o su p e rs e d ing ind ic tm e n ts. See , e

. g. , Uni t ed St at es v

. Rom an , 822 F. 2d 261, 2 6 4

– 6 5 (2d C i r. 19 8 7 ). me re ly to a pa rt ic ula r c la us e but c on sid e r i n c onne c tio n w ith it the whole statute.” ( internal quotation marks omitted))

. S o m ew h atan al o go u s t o th e g o v ern m en to b t ai n i n g a superse ding indictment is the gover nment’s choiceto have a

n indictment dismi ssed and r echarg ed. See U nited States v. Ke lly , 45 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1995)

. In that ci rcumstanc e, althoug h t he initial seventy -day clock still applies, section 31 61 (h )( 5) slo ws its marc h by pr ov idi ngthat, a s “

for the
sa meoff e ns e , or any

offe nse requ i r ed to be joined wi th that off e ns e , any period of de lay

fr o m t h e date the cha

rg e wa s dis mis se d to the date the tim e lim itatio n w ou ld c omm e nc e to run as to the subsequent charg e” should be excluded from the applicable speedy-trial clock. See United States v. MaganaOl v e ra , 9 1 7 F. 2 d

4 0 1 , 4 0 5 (9 thC i r
. 1 9 9 0 ). T h i s l an gu age sug g ests one of two possibilities f or the c ase at hand. Either separ ate and distinct c harg es broug ht by s up erseding i n d ictment—which ar e no t “re quired to be joined”—are meant to be g overne d by the most demandingtiming require ments (both ineligible for exclusion and subjec t to the initial clock) or, a lternatively , they stand on their own and a

re subject to a ne w timing per iod under sec tion 3161(c)( 1). 4

T h e latt e r c o n c e p ti o n is th e b e tt e r inte r p r e tati o n
. We believe the Fifth Circuit’s discus s ion in United States v. Al for d , 142 F. 3 d 8 25 (5th Cir. 1998), to be instructive. As that c ou rt recog nize d, “ a s to c ha rg e s th at th e g ov e rnme nt i sU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 11 not require d to join with t he off enses c harg ed in the orig inal indi c tm e n t, th e g o v e r

nme n t m ay

o b ta in a f r e s hs p e e dy

tr ial clock by simply waitinguntil c o m p l etion of the prose cution for the char g es contained in the orig inal indictme n t and beg inning a

new prosec ution on the additional char g es.” Id.
at 82 9. To int e rp re t th e Spe e dy Tr ia l A c t a s T ho ma s urg e s, would often re leg ate the g overnme nt to that protracted and ineffic ient proce dure at no clea r benefit to the defe ndant who
wo uld have to e nd

ur e tr ia ls seri atim. L ike the F if th C ir c uit , we pe rce ive “no logic al basis for c oncludingthat” is what the Act re quires. Id. We thus hold that c harg es in a superse ding indictment not require d to be joi ned with t he orig inal char g es come with a ne w seve nty -day clock unde r the Spee dy

Trial Act. See U

nited States v. Rocha-

Leon , 187 F.3d 1157, 1159
n. 3 (9 th Cir . 1 99 9) (e xpla ini ngthat th e “ int e rp re tatio n th at ‘ is consistent with the l anguag e of the s tatute and avoids absurd
re s u l t s ’ i s [ t o b e] p re fe rr ed ” ( qu o t i n g United States v. Alfec he , 942 F.2d 697, 698- 99 (9th Cir.1991)).
Th is co nc lus ion

is i n li ne wi th v ari ou s o ut- of -c ir c uit authorities. See, e .g. , U

n i t e d S ta t es v . H ale , 685 F.3d 522, 537 (5th Cir. 2012) (“ [T] he orig i n al i n dictment started one spe e dy tr ia l c lo c k f

o r th e o r ig in a l tw o c h ar g e s , and the superse ding indictment star ted a se cond spee dy trial clock f or the fo ur ne w c ha rg e s. ” ); Al for d , 142 F.3d at 829–30 (same ); United States v. Lattany , 982 F.2d 866, 872 n.7 (3d C ir. 1992) (c on c lud ingthat whe n a

su pe rs e din gind ic tme nt “ c ha rg e s a new o ff ense that did not have to be joined with the orig inal char g es, then the s ub s equent f iling commenc es a ne w, ind e pe nd e nt spe e dy

tr ia l pe ri od ” ); Un ite d S

tates v . M ar sh all , 935 F.2d 1298, 1302 n.7 ( D.C. Cir. 1991) (“I f, conve rsely , the char g e in the sec ond count was not one re quired to be joined with the char g es in the first indictment, then the spee dy trial clock f or t h at co unt did not begin to run until [the date theU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 12

supe rs e din gind ic tme nt w a s f ile d].” ); c f. U n ite d S ta te s v. Roman , 82 2 F .2 d 2 61 , 2 65 (2 d Ci r. 19 87 ) ( imp lic itl y acc epting“that a ne w 7 0 -d ay clock be g ins to run when the superse ding indictment contains a completely new c harg e”)

. 2 We now apply

today ’s holding to Th o m as’s c ase. The g o v e r n m e n t h a d a n e w s e v e n ty - d ay c l o c k un d e r the Ac t so long a s the conspira cy

count introduce d in the superse ding indictment was not “re quired to be joined.”
Other courts of appea ls ha ve taken that conce pt as ref err ing to the “

joinder re quired by

the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution” and neither party urg es a diff

ere nt understandinghere

. U

n ite d S ta te s v

. No v ak , 715 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1983), overruling on other grounds recognized in United States v. Fe lton , 811 F.2d 190, 195 ( 3d Cir. 1987);
se eals o A lfo rd, 1 42 F .3 d at 82 9; Ma rsh all , 935 F.2d at 1302. As the dis tr ic t c ourt

re c ognize d, it i s cle ar that do ub le je op ard y do e s n ot require the g ov e rnme nt t o p ro se c ute Thomas for the conspirac y offe nse in t he same trial as for possession with intent to di st ri b u t e. See U nited States v. Fe lix , 5 0 3 U

. S

. 3 7 8 , 3 9 1

– 9 2 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ( c o n s p i r a c y t o c o m mit drugoffe nse distinct from substantive offe nse).
We c o n c lu d e th at T h o ma s ’ s p r o s e c uti o nf o r Co n s pirac y to Poss e ss w ithInte nt t o D istri bute Mari jua na c omp lie d w ith the Spe e dy

Tr ia l A c t be c a

us e tr ia l c omm e nc e d wi thi n s e ve nty da y s o f t he su pe rs e din gind ic tme nt.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 13

T h e g ov er n men t a rgues that T h omas ’ s f ai l u r e t o r ai s e t h i s t h eor y of 5

v i ol at i on i n h i s mot i on t o s u ppr es s me an s t h at t h e ar g u men t i s n ow wa i v ed. Al t h ou g h h e di d n ot a r g u e i t i n t h e di s t r i ct c ou r t , h e cou l d n ot hav e been expect ed t o s i nce t he Supre me C our t had not y et ha nded do wn Jones

. O ur cour t wi l l r evi ew an i s s ue r ai s ed f or t he f i r s t t i m e o n a pp eal

“ whe n a cha ng e i n l aw r ai s es a new [ pur el y l ega l ] i s s ue whi l e an appeal is p e n d ing ,” a n d it is no t i n e q u itab le to tak e it up
. N a tive E c o sy s. C o u n c il
v. Wel don , 69 7 F.3d 10 4 3 , 10 5 1 (9t h C i r. 20 1 2 ). III
Be cause the district co urt was c orre ct not to dismi ss the
con s p i racy

count, we tur

n to Thomas’s other pr etrial
c ha lle ng e : hi s ar gume nt that the e vid e nc e of mari jua na sh ou ld have be en suppre ssed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary

rule. Contained within that ar gum en t are thr e e se pa

rate a sse rt ion s. To beg in wi t h , for the f irst time on appeal, Thoma s contends that ag ents invaded a constitutionally

protec ted ar ea by dir e c tin gthe dr

ug de te c tio n dog to “

jum p[] up and

put hi s paws and nose on the toobox i n the truckbe d, and stay [] like that, ref using to move.” This argument is based on the water shed S upreme Court opinion in United States v. J ones , 132 S. Ct . 945, 950–51 & n.3 ( 2012), as we l l as on a ve ry rec ent application of the principle a nnounced in Jones to the
use of a drug dog within the curtilag e of a home. See F

lorida v. Jardine s , 133 S. Ct . 1409, 1414 (2013). 5 Second, Thomas a

rgu es that even if

the dog ’s touching did not violate the Four

th Amendment in a wa

y com p ell ing
su pp re ssi on , th e g ov e rnme nt f a ile d to dis c los e a de qu ate evidenc e of B eny -A’s a nd his handler ’s profic iency and
e xp e r ie n c e to ju s ti f

y th e s e ar c ho f

h is to o lb o x.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 14 Third, Thomas cla ims that even if the c omplete re cords about the drugdog establish Be ny -A’s reliability , his failure to in d i c at e b y

s i tt i n gm e an s th atth e b o r d e r p atr o l a g e nts lacke d probable cause to searc h.
A
1
Th e g ov e rnme nt c la ims tha t it is f ri vo lou s f or Th oma s to c onte nd that the do g ’s c onta c t wi th his tr uc k was a Fourt

h Amendment sea

rch. A fter J

on es and Jardines , his argument cannot be so easily

dismiss ed.
Be fore those ca ses, rel y i n g on a conc urre nce by J ustice Ha rl an f ro m Ka tz v

. U

n ite d States , 389 U.S. 347 (1967), courts ty pically “said that a

violation occurs whe n g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic e rs viol ate a

pe rs on ’s ‘r e a so na

ble expectation of privac y .’” Jones , 132 S. Ct . at 9 5 0 (citation omitted). Jones chang ed the jurispruden t ial landsca pe by holding that this wa s not the exclusive rubric. Id. at 950, 953. Rather, we we re to understand “ the Kat z rea sonableexpectation-of- privac y

test [as hav i n g] been added to, not substitut ed for, the c ommon-law trespa ssory test.” Id . at 952; see also id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring ).
Case law now

direc ts t h at if “‘ the Gover nment obtains inf or matio n b y

phy sic a lly

int ru din g ’ o n p e rs on s, ho us e s, paper s, or ef

fec ts, ‘a “se arc h” within the original m eaningof th e Fourth Amendment’ ha s ‘undoubtedly occur red.’ ” Jardines , 1 3 3 S

. C t

. at 1 4 1 4 (qu o t i n g Jones , 132 S. Ct. at 950 n.3). Applying this principle, the J on es Court held that a de minimi s phy sical intrusion with respec t t o t he exterior of a
c ar ( ins ta lli nga

GPS -t ra c kin gde vic e ) w a s a

se arc h s ub

je c t toU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 15

T h e g o v e rn m e n t d o e s n o t co n te n d tha t an y se a rc h no n e the le ss w o u ld 6 hav e been r eas onabl e, and t hu s not a Fourt h A mendm ent vi ol at i on. I t ha s claim ed , t ho ug h, t ha t t he co ntac t d o es no t t rigge r t he A m en d m en t b ec au se it falls sh o rt o f co n stituting a tre sp a ss to c h a ttel. T h is is no t t h e c a se to dec i de wh et h er t h e el eme n t s of a pa r t i cu l ar t or t of

t r es pas s or t h e con ce pt
o f a “ p hy si cal ent ry or i nt rus i o n” shoul d gui d e the in q ui ry
. A l t ho ugh Jones charact eri zed t he C o urt ’ s juri sprud ence “ unt i l t he l at t er hal f of t he 20 t h Cent ur y ” a s “ t i ed t o c o m m o n- l aw t r es pas s , ” 132 S. Ct

. at 949 , we n o te tha t Jar di nes s peaks onl y i n t er ms of an i nt r us i on. Fur t her mo r e, pre K a tz d e c isio n s so m e tim e s tur n e d o n “the re a lit y o f an a c tua l i n tru sio n into
a c o n stitutio n a lly p ro te c te d a re a ” r a the r th a n “the tec h n ic a lit y o f a t r es pas s
. ” Si l ver m an v. Uni t ed St at es , 3 6 5 U .S . 5 0 5 , 5 1 2 (1 9 6 1 ); see a lso O rin S . K e rr , The C uri ou s H i s t ory of F ou r t h A m endm ent Searc hes , 2 0 1 2 S. C t

. R ev. (f

o rt hco m i ng 20 1 3 ). th e F o urthA m e n dm e n t ’ s r e qu i r e m e n to f r e a s o n a b l e n e ss. 132 S. Ct . at 949, 954. And this past term, the Supreme Court held that the use of “a t raine d police dogto expl ore the are a around the home in hopes o f discoveringincriminating evidenc e” impl icated the Jones principle. Jardines , 133 S. Ct

. at 1 4 1 6

. I t d id s o b e c a u s e u s in g th e d o g in that fa sh ion e xce e de d th e te rm s of th e pr op e rt y -l aw l ic e ns e to

“ a pp ro a c h th e ho me by the fr ont pa th, kn oc k p ro mpt ly , w a it bri ef l y t o be re ceive d, and then ( absent invitation to linger longe r) lea

ve.” Id. at 1415.
“It i s beyond dispute that a vehic le is an ‘e ffe ct’ a s that term is used in the [Fourth] Amendment.” Jones , 1 32 S. Ct

. at9 4 9 (c i t i n g United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)) . Thus, it is conceivable that by direc ting the dr

ugdog to touch the truck a

nd toolbox in o rd er to gather sensor y information about what was inside, the bor d er p atrol ag ent committed an unconstitutional trespass or phy sical intrusion. 6U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 16

T h e s cenari o i n D a v is was t hat at t he t i m e o f f i cers p erf

o rme d t heir 7
se a rc h in A la b a m a , g o v e rn ing E le v e n th C irc u it p re c e d e n t d e e m e d th e ir act i o ns co nst i t ut i o nal

. D avi s’ s m o t i o n t o sup p res s had b een d eni ed in t he di s t r i ct cour t on t he bas i s of t hat ci r cui t pre ceden t , but wh i l e on di r ect appeal , t he Supre me C our t s hi f t ed do ct r i nal cour s e by an noun ci ng a n ew, m o re defendant- f

ri end l y vers i o n o f

t he search- i nci d ent

- t o - arres t do ct ri ne i n Ar iz o n a v. G ant , 5 5 6 U .S . 3 3 2 (2 0 0 9 ). S e e D a v is , 131 S. Ct

. at 2 4 2 5

– 2 6

. U nd er G ant , t h e E le v e n th C ir c u it r e c o g n iz e d tha t D a v is’s F o u rth A m e n d m e n t righ ts ha d , i n fac t, b e e n vio la te d

. I d. a t 2426. 2

a
Yet we need not de cide whe t h er it vi olated or e ven implicated the F ourth Amendment whe n ag ents direc ted the dogto touch Thomas’s vehic le bec ause, a s the g overnme nt c or re c tly ob se rv e s, no t eve ry c on sti tut ion a l viol atio n le a ds to application of the exclusionary rule—a “judicially created
re me dy” the on ly purp os e of wh ic h “ is t o d e te r f

utu re F ourt h Amendment violations.” Davis v. U nited States , 131 S. Ct

. 2419, 2426–27 (2011) ( “Exclusion is not a per sonal
co n s ti tuti o n a l r igh t, n o r is it d e s ign e d to r e dr e s s th e injury
occa sioned by

an unconstitutional sear ch.” ( int e r n a l q uotation marks omitted)). As a

result of the ex clusionary rule’s lim ite d a ims , th e Sup re me Court has ins tr uc te d u s n ot t o apply it to “suppress the truth and se t the criminal loose in the community

without punishm ent” if the evidenc e wa s “obtained dur ing a s ear ch conducted in rea sonable re liance on binding pr ece dent.” Id. at 2427, 2429. This max im aptly has 7 been dubbe d “the ‘ faith-in-c aselaw ’ ex ception to the exclusionary

rule.” Caleb Mason, New Pol i ce Surveillance Te c hn ologie

s a nd the Goo d-Fa ith Ex c e

pti on : W arra ntless GP S Trac k e r E v ide nc eAf

te r United States v. J ones, 13 Ne v. L .J . 60, 66 (2012).U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 17

T he agent s i n Jones l ab o re d u n d e r the mis co ncep t i o n t hat t he 8 “r easona b l e exp ect a tio n of p ri vacy” t est excl usi vel y m arked t he A m e n d m e n t’s b o u n d a rie s. See 13 2 S. C t

. at 95 0. C as es f o st ering t hat im p re ssio n w e re ub iq u ito u s. See , e

. g. , New Y o rk v

. C l a ss , 475 U

. S. 106, 11 2 (1986 ) ( “ [ T ] he St at e’ s i nt r us i on i nt o a par t i cul ar ar ea, whe t her i n a n au t omobi l e or e l s ew h er e, c an n ot r es u l t i n a Fou r t h Amen dmen t v i ol at i on un l es s t he ar ea i s one i n w hi ch t her e i s a c ons t i t ut i onal l y prot ect ed
re a so n a b le e x p e c ta tio n o f p riv a c y.” (in te rn a l m a rk s o m itt e d )) ; Uni t ed S ta te s v . K n o tts , 4 6 0 U

. S. 2 7 6 , 2 8 0 (19 8 3 ) ( exp l ai ni ng t hat wi t h K a tz “ t he Cour t ov er r u l ed O l m s t eads ay i ng t hat t he Fourth A mendm ent ’ s r eac h

‘ canno t t urn up o n t he p res ence or ab sence o f a p hy si cal i nt rus i o n i nt o any g ive n e n c lo su re .’” (c itatio n o m itt e d )) ; Uni t ed St at es v. M cI ver , 186 F. 3d 11 19 , 112 6 ( 9t h C i r
. 19 99 ) ( expl ai ni ng t hat “ [ t ] he l aw of t r es pas s ” out l aws i ntrusi o ns “t ha t t he F o urth A m en d m en t w o uld n o t p ro scrib e. Fo r t resp ass l aw e x t en ds to i nst anc es w h er e t h e ex er ci s e of t h e r i g h t t o e x cl u de
v ind ic a te s n o leg iti m a te p riv a c y inte re st” (a lter a tio n in o rig ina l)); Uni t ed St at es v

. H ead , 783 F. 2d 142 2, 142 7 (9t h Ci r
. 198 6) ( concl udi ng t hat depu t i es ’ ph y s i ca l t ou ch i n g of a ca r ’ s ext eri o r h ad n o t con s t i t u t ed a se a rc h ); P e op le v . S til lw e ll , 129 Cal

. Rpt r
. 3d 233, 240 ( Cal

. Ct

. App. 2 0 1 1 ) (r eje c ting d e fen d a n ts’ cla im tha t d ru g d o g e x c e e d e d F o u rth A m e n d m e n t l im its “b y p la c ing his fro n t p a w s o n the ” b o d y o f th e c a r in
s eve r al pl ace s becau s e “ no r eas onabl e e xpect at i on of pri vac y was vi o l at ed ”); s ee Jones , 13 2 S. C t

. at 9 5 8 ( A lit o , J. , co ncurri ng i n t he ju d g m e n t) (c la im ing the m a jo rity’s ho ld ing ha d “lit tle if an y su p p o r t i n c u rr e n t F o u rth A m e n d m e n t ca se law ” ); butc f

. Lava n v

. Ci t

y of Los A ng el es , 693 F. 3d 1022, 1028 ( 9t h Ci r
. 2012) ( s u g g est i ng t h at a 1992 Applying this exception in United States v. Pi n edaMoreno , 688 F.3d 1087 (9 t h C ir. 2012), we deter mined that th e d e f e n d an t c o u ld

n o t r e ly o n Jo nes to obtain suppression of e vid e nc e de ri ve d f

rom a GPS tr a c ke r o n h is c ar b e c a us e that prec edent ha d not b ee n o n the books when the trac ker
wa s in sta lle d, and

be cause a g e nts ha d a c te d “ in o bje c tiv e ly
rea sonable reliance on then-bindingprec edent.” Id. at 1090. So too here. In rea ching such conclusion, we do not answ er the broa d question of whether office rs wer e on notice be fore Jones that phy sical i ntrusions or trespassor y behavior counted
a s se arche s un de r t

he F ou rt h A me ndme nt. Th at is be c a us e 8U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 18

S u p re m e C o u rt p re c e d e n t “c la rified tha t t h e F o u rth A m e n d m e n t p ro te c ts pos s es s or y a n d l i ber t y i n t er es t s e v en w h en pr i v ac y ri g h t s a r e n ot i m p l i cat ed ”).

See al s o M uehl er v

. M ena , 54 4 U

. S. 93 , 10 1 ( 20 05 ) ( e x pl a i n i ng t hat 9 C ab al l es “ h el d t h at a dog s n i f f pe r f or med du r i n g a t r af

f i c s t op doe s n ot vi o l at e t he Fo urt h A m end m ent ”). authoritative guidanc e from the Supreme Court allowe d the particula r ac tions of Be n y -A a

nd L eB lanc. In Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405 (2005), the Court he ld that “the use of
a we ll- tr a ine d na

rc oti c s- de te c tio n do g ” on a mot or ve hic le did

“ no t r ise to t

he le ve l of

a con st itutio na lly

c ogniza ble infring ement.” Id. at40 9; s ee also id. at 410 (“ A dogsniff conducte d duringa . . . lawf ul traff ic stop th at re v eals no information other tha

n the location of a

substance that no ind ivi du a l ha s any

ri g ht to pos se ss doe s n ot v iol ate the F ourt h Amendment.”)

. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 5 31 U. S. 9 32 (2000), it was e x plained that “a n exterior sniff of a

n automobile” is permissible, in part, be cause it “does not
re q u i re entry

into the car .” Id. at 40. Holdingthat “the
c anin e sn if

f i s su i ge ne ris ,” the Court ea rlier ha d held that utiliz ing a

drug -dete ction dogto examine lugg ag e is not “a
sear ch re quiringprobable cause .” Un i t ed State v. P lace , 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983).
b
Th oma s a sse rt s that it w ou ld h ave be e n o bje c tiv e ly
unrea sonable for

Ag ent L eB lanc to per ceive these drug -dog
case s from the Supreme Court as bl essinghis use of B eny -A to find the marijuana

stowed i n the toolbox of the pick- up. Cab alles and Edmond

are ins uf fi c ie nt i n h is vi ew, be c a

us e they approve d of off

icer s walkin g “the drugdogaround theU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 19

A l t ho ugh t he p reci se preced ent i al rel i ance i n D a v is w a s o n E le v e n th 10 C irc u it c a se law , t h e m a jo rity also e x p la ine d tha t “[f]o r ye a rs , Bel t on was w i d ely un d ersto o d t o h av e se t d o w n [the] sim p l e, b right- l i ne rule” ju st d e sc rib e d . 1 3 1 S . C t. a t 2 4 2 4 ; s ee also Th o rn t o n v. Uni t ed St at es , 5 4 1 U .S . 6 1 5 , 6 2 8 ( 2 0 0 4 ) (S c a lia, J ., co n c u rr ing in the ju d g m e n t) ( col l ect i ng ca s es au t hor i zi ng i nci dent

- t o- ar r es t s ear che s af t er t he s us pect
was s ecured , i ncl ud i ng one f rom t hi s ci rcui t ). car in public space , not to intrude in trespa ss on the vehicle.” At oral a rgument, though, counsel for Thomas admitted that those ca ses “didn’ t s ay

that”—in the sense that neither
a uth or ity so muc h a s hint e d th at of fi c e rs we re to a

vo id contac t betwee n the dog ’s nose a nd paws a

nd the vehicle ’s exterior.
Th is i s si g nif

ic ant f or tw o r e a so ns . F ir st, it c los e ly para llels what the Supreme Court confronted in Da v is when it w ithhe ld e xclu sio n o n th e ba sis of fa ithin p re c e de nt. There , the Court addre ssed its prior holding that an offic er who had law fully

arr ested “ the occupant of an automobile . . . may , as a c ontemporane ous incident of that ar rest, sea rch the passeng er c ompartm en t of that automobile.” New Y ork v. Belton , 453 U.S. 454, 4 6 0 (1981). As the Supreme Court would later a cknowledg e, Belton ’s re c itatio n o f t he fa c ts d id mention that the car ’s occ upant had no t b ee n handcuf fed or
o therwise se cure d at the time of the se arc h. S e e A rizona v. Gant , 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (2009). None theless, the Court strong ly sug g ested that it was r easona ble to understand Belton as authorizing a

sear ch eve n afte r the oc cupant “had bee n subdued by police.” Da v is , 131 S. Ct. at 2424. Even fa rther 10 afie ld, the key

prec edent on u sing a

drug -dete ction dogon a vehicle did not eve n rec ount whether the dogh ad made phy sical conta ct duringthe sea rch it validate d. See Caballes , 543 U.S. at 406–10.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 20 Second, the abse nce of a pre viously

expressed limit along the lines of Jones/J

ardines matters b ec ause the re c an be no
e xclu sio n “ wh e n b ind inga pp e llate pr e c e de nt s pecif ic a lly authorizes a particula

r police pra ctice.” Da v is , 131 S. Ct . at 2429. I t is beyond dispute that as of Fe bruar y 2010, wh en Ag e nt L e B lanc a c te d, Sup rem e Court pr e c e de nt s pe c if

ic a lly
a uth or ize d la

w e nf or c e me nt to u se a

dr ug -d e te c tio n d ogto seek out illeg al nar cotics on a va lidl y d et ai ned vehic le. See Caballes , 5 43 U. S. at 40 9. W hen a ff a ir s are su c h, “ we lltr a ine d o ff

ic e rs wi ll a

nd sh ou ld u se tha

t to ol t o fu lf

ill the ir crime- detec tion and public-s af ety responsibilities.” Da v is , 13 1 S. Ct. at 24 29. “Po lic e pr a c tic e s tr ig g e r t he ha rs h
s an ct i o no f e x cl u s i o no n l y wh enth ey

ar e d el i b er at e e n o u gh to yield meaning ful deter renc e, an d culpable enoug h to be worth the pric e paid by

the justic e s y s t em.” Id. at 2428 (alter ations and interna l quotation marks omitted).
Be cause L eB lanc a cted in ac cord w ith then-binding prec edent, the marijuana seized is not subject to ex clusion on the basis of an unconstitutional tre spass or phy sical intrusion.

B Separate from the dog ’s touching , Thomas’s sec ond and thi rd argume nts fo r r e ve rs ingthe de nia l of th e mo tion t o suppress identify the age nts’ openingand investig atingof the toolbox as the unc onstitut ional sear ch.
At fix ed B order

Patrol chec kpoints withi n the nation’s interior, the g o v er nment can se nd a motorist for a br ief second a r y in s pection upon “a

minimal showing of suspicion,” but then (as is the case with an ordina ry traff ic stop) it needs probable cause or consent in or der to sea rch the vehicle. See United S t a tes v. Taylor , 934 F.2d 218, 220–21 ( 9th Cir.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 21

Al t houg h T homas chal l eng ed t he s econdar y r ef er r al bel ow, he does 11

n o t re n e w tha t ch a llen g e o n a p p e a l. T h e go v e rn m e n t ag re e s tha t p ro b a b le
ca u s e i s t h e st and ard, w h i l e al s o pr es er v i n g t h e ar g u men t i t ma de bel ow t hat T ho m as consent ed t o t he search yi el d i ng the m ari juana. N ei t her t he
m ag i s t r at e n or t h e di s t r i ct c ou r t r ea ch ed t h e con s en t i s s u e. I t i s “ t he go vernm ent ’ s b urden t o pro ve t hat [any ] consent was fr eel y and vol un t ar i l y gi ven
. ” Uni t ed St at es v

. Pat ayan Sor i ano , 361 F. 3d 494, 501 (9th C i r. 2 0 0 4 ). O n remand , t he d i st ri ct co urt i s f ree t o t ake up t he i ss ue o f co n se n t i n the f

ir st insta n c e
. See , e

. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. B r ewer , 9 4 7 F.2d 40 4 , 41 1 (9t h C i r. 19 9 1 ). 1991). W h i l e h e a c kn o w l e d g e s th atana l e rtb y a r e l i able 11 drug -dete ction dogestablishes proba ble ca use, Thomas challeng es B eny -A’s r el i ab ility and questions whethe r the behavior the dog ex hibited was a

probable -ca

use-g ener ating “ale rt.”
1
Wit h respe ct to reliability , Thomas claims it was impr oper for the g overnme nt to have supplied hea vily reda cted r ecor ds
c on c e rn ing B e ny -A a

nd L e B lanc ’s tr a ini ngand

e xpe ri e nc e in
narc otics detec tion.

a
Such rec ords show t hat L eB lanc and Be ny -A ha d attended y ear ly cer tification prog rams from the Bor der Patrol a nd wer e up-to-date at the time of the sear ch. Biwe ekly logs, ca l led g ree n sheets, we re a lso produced. T he t ea m’s perf ormanc e duringeig ht-hour-c ontrolled eva luations w as score d on a
s cale of one to six—t he hig he r the score , the wor

sethe perf ormanc e. At least one re cord a naly zed at the suppression hear ing r evea led marg inal perf ormanc e in “s ea rch skill s.” The tea m rec eived a

3.50. Had it been one-te nth of a pointU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 22 highe r it would h ave been “ a fa iling scor e.” T he re dactions ob sc ur e c omm e nts on ne arl y e ve ry pa g e of the re c or ds . A s to wh ati s b e n e athth e b l a c k e d

- o utp ar a g r a p h s , th e d e f

e n d a nt, district judge , this court, and eve n the B order Pa t ro l’s custodian of r ecor ds are entirely in the dark.

In United States v. Cedano-Are llano , 3 32 F .3 d 5 68 (9 th C i r. 2 0 0 3 ), we h el d

th atwh ena d ef

en d an t r equ es t s d o ghistory discovery

to pursue a motion to s uppress, F eder al R u l e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d

ur e 1 6 c o mp e l s th e g o v e r n m e n t to disclose the “ha

ndler’s log ,” as w ell as “tra ining r ecor ds and
score sheets, ce rtification re cords, and tra ining standa rds and manual s” per

taining to the dog

. Id. at 57 0– 71 . T he se mate ri a ls w e re he ld to be “ c ru c ia l to [the de fe nd ant’ s] a bil ity to a sse ss t

he do g ’s re lia

bil ity , a very imp or tant i ssu e in h is defe nse, and to c onduct an effe ctive cr oss-examination of the dog ’s handler ” at the suppr ession hear ing. Id. at 571. Th e se dis c los ur e s a

re “ mand ator

y” wh e n th e gover

nme nt s e e ks to rely on a dogaler

t as the evide ntiary

basis for its sear ch. See United States v. Cortez-Roc ha , 3 94 F .3 d 1 11 5, 11 18 n. 1 ( 9th Cir. 2005).
A un animous Supreme Court ec hoed this in another
rec ent dog -sniff c ase. Se e Flor ida v . H arris , 133 S. Ct . 1050, 1057 (2013). H

a rris ex p lained that a de fenda nt must be aff orded the opportunity

to challeng e “e vidence of a dog ’s reliability , whether

by cross-e x amining the testifying of fice r or by introducinghis own fac t or expert witnesses.” Id. “The defe ndant, for e x ample, may contest th e adequacy

of a
c e rt if ic atio n o r t

ra ini ngpr ogra

m, p e rhaps a sse rt ingthat it s standards a

re too lax or its methods faulty . So t o o , theU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 23

T he C o urt w ent o n to co nf i rm t hat “ a p rob ab l e- cause heari ng f o cusi ng 12 on a dog’ s al er t ” s houl d proceed ac cordi ng t o “ t he us ual r ul es of cr i mi nal procedur e. ” I

d. a t 1058.

C la rifica tio n s a b o u t the su b sta n tive c o n to u rs o f the F o u rth 13 A m en d m en t

— he re the w ay p ro b a b le ca use ap p l i es to d rug - d o gs’
s ear che s

— appl y “ t o al l ca s es t hat ar e n ot y et f i nal

. ” Uni t ed S t a t es v. G on z al ez , 5 9 8 F .3 d 1 0 9 5 , 1 0 9 7 (9 th C ir. 2 0 1 0 ). T h a t inc lud e s T h o m a s’s ap p eal s i nce i t was pend i ng on d i rect re vi ew whe n H a rris cam e d o wn. T he l at es t g u i dan ce on t h e ex cl u s i on ar y r u l e di d n ot di s pl ac e t h i s l o ngst and i ng p ri nci p l e. S e e D a v is , 1 3 1 S . C t. a t 2 4 2 9

– 3 2 ; i d. a t 2436–37 (B rey er, J. , dis sent i ng). defe ndant may examine how the dog (or handler) per formed in the assessments made in those settings.” Id. 12

In flat contravention of the principle at the hea rt of Ha rri

s an d Cedano-Are llano , Thomas’s counse l was hamstrungby the fa ct that the ce rtification re cord s h ad bee n so reda cted. 13 The K9 C oordinator f

or the B order

Patrol conce ded during the su pp re ssi on he ari ng that the re da c tio ns c onta ine d, in p art , information about “the trainingmethodology and the techniques u s ed to t rain the K 9s and eva luate the K9s.” He a lso sa id that if the re da c tio ns we re lif te d, he wo uld

e xpe c t to see c ritiques of the tea

m’s competenc e as well as discussions
a bo ut a re a s f or imp ro ve me nt.
b

T h e g o v e r

n m e n t m ak e s s e v e r a l ar gum e n t s w h y CedanoArellano do e s n ot a

pp ly he re . N on e is a

va iling . F ir st, it argues that bec ause Thoma s did not co n t est that he transporte d the marijuana —but rather

rai s ed the af

firmative de fe ns e of

dure ss at tr ia l—t

he dis c ov ery

wa s n ot “ mate ri a l” to his particular “ defe nse.” F ed. R

. C rim. P. 16(a)(1) (E)( i).U NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 24
In Cedano-Arellano , ho we ve r, the de fe nd ant did no t c onte st his guilt at all; he e ntere d a cond i tional guilty plea that
rese rved only

his suppression challeng e. 332 F .3d at 570. What is m ore, Cedano-Arellano ex p l i citly considere d
s u b s ec t i o n(a )( 1 )( E ) w h ena n n o u n ci n g i t s ru l e t h atd o ghistory discovery

oug ht to be allowed whe n reque sted. Id. at 57 1. As a thr e e -j ud g e pa

ne l, we are no t fr e e to i nte rp re t th is rule of cri m i n al proc edure afr esh. See U nited States v. Lee , 704 F.3d 785, 790 n.2 ( 9th Cir. 2012). Second, the gove rnment cites law -enf orce ment privileg e. But , n either the mag istrate, nor the district court, re lied on that do c tr ine a s a

jus tif ic atio n f or wi th ho ldi ngthe re c or ds

. Fur thermore , our caselaw c alls for a n in c am e ra evaluation by the trial cour

t of th e gover

nment’s claim to privileg e if the defe ndant g oes beyond “mer e suspicion” that the undisc losed evidence wi l l be helpf

ul in his criminal case. United States v. He nderson , 241 F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2001). As we have nothing but a bare asser

tion of sensitivity and beca us e t here h as b ee n no in c am e ra revie w, we c annot appr ove of the limit ed disclosure on this ground.
As a fi na l r e fu g e , th e g ov e rnme nt a pp e a ls t o th e ha

rm le ss err or doctrin e. W e ar e per suaded that admission of the marijuana evidenc e af

fec ted Thomas ’s substantial rig hts at trial so as not to be harmless be yond a re asonable doubt. See, e.g. , United States v. Alvare z , 35 8 F .3 d 1 19 4, 12 04 n. 3. (9 th Cir . 2 00 4) ; U

n i t e d S ta t es v

. Sto dd

ard , 111 F.3d 1450, 1458 n.11 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, the onl y question is whether the reda cted pa ssag es would have u n d ermined the reliability of Be ny -A so as to de feat probable c ause. Unlike in Ced a n oArellano , beca

use we have not be en af

forde d acc ess t o the
c omp le te re c or ds , w e c ann ot s ay that th e re is “ no thingin tho se do c ume nts that wo uld have c ha

ng e d th e ult imateU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 25
deter mination that the a g ents had [probable c ause] to support their sea rch.” 332 F.3d at 574. The er ror w as t hus not harmless unde r F eder al Rule of Criminal Procedur e 52(a ).
2
B e c a us e it i s sq

ua re ly pr e se nte d for our r e vie w a nd it w ill
ari se a g a in u

po n r e mand , w e a lso take up Th om as’ s cla im that whether

or not the disclos ure w as ade quate, B eny -A’s be havio r c ou ld not give r ise to p ro ba ble c a us e . H is contention is t h at even a ssuming B eny -A a nd L eB lanc we re a rel i able duo, because the dognever completed his traine d indication—the si tt in g

d is c u s s e d ear lier—his behavior was a n insufficient ba sis for sea

rchingthe toolbox . Thomas say s that the “ a le rt ” be havio r d e sc ri be d b y Ag e nt L e B lanc (b oth

at hi s pre- primary

post and during t h e secondary inspection) consists of “untra ined” responses that a dogmight exhibit at any time, which fa ll short of probable c ause a s a m at ter of law.
Fa ced w ith a simil ar a

rgument, our sister cir cuit declined to adopt a rule “which w ould requ i re t h e dogto give a fina l indication befor e proba

ble ca use is establi shed.” United States v. Parada , 577 F.3d 1275, 12 8 1–82 (10th Cir. 2009); see also id. at 1275 (u

ph old ing a s su ff

ic ie nt, the do g ’s “ ra

pid deep b re athing , body

stiffening , and upbre akingfrom the
sear ch patter

n . . . around a

vehicle” ). Its rationale wa s on the
mark : pr ob a

ble c a us e is m e a sure d in

re a so na ble e xpe c tatio ns , not cer taint ies. Id. ; see also United States v . Cervantes , 703 F.3d 1135, 1139 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (“An of fice r will have probable cause to searc h if there is a fair prob abil ity

that
c o n tr a b an d o r e v id e n c e o f

a c r im e w il l b e f

o un d in a partic u la r p la c e , b a s e d

o nth e to ta li ty

o f th e c ir c ums ta

n c e s .” (interna l quotation marks omitted)). Evidence from a tr ainedU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 26

It wi l l be f

o r t he d i st ri ct co urt i n t he f i rs t i nst ance t o de t erm i ne 14 whether “ o n reman d , a pro t ect i ve o rder o r an i n ca m era he a rin g is
n e c e ssa ry to a c c o m m o d at e any l aw e n fo rc e m e n t co n fid e n tiality co n c e rn s.” Uni t ed St at es v

. Budz i ak , 69 7 F.3d 11 0 5 , 11 1 3 (9t h C i r. 20 1 2 ). and re lia ble ha nd le r a bo ut a le rt be havio r he re c ognize d in his dog can be the basis for pr obable c ause. Whether a par ticular dogdisplay s enoug h si gn al ing be havior will depe nd on the fac ts and circ umstances of eac h case

. Th e Sup re me Court ’s Ha rri s decision conf

irms the
corr ectne ss of this view. 133 S. Ct

. at 1055 (“We have re je c ted r ig id r

ule s, br ig ht- lin e te sts , a nd me c ha nis tic inquiries in f

avor of a more flexibl e, al l-things- considere d approa ch.”) . In reje ct i n gFlorida ’s evidentiar y chec klist for a drugdog ’s reliabilit y , the Court explained that “[a] gap a s to a ny one matter

. . . should not sink the St at e’ s case ,” b ecause that is “the a ntithesis of a totality -of- thecirc umstances a

naly sis.” Id. at 1056.
Thomas’s alter

native basis for invalidatingthe sea rch the re fo re fa ils

. IV
B e c a us e the g ov e rnme nt’ s f

a ilure to tu rn

ov e r a fu ll complement of dog -history discovery

was an err or that wa s not harmless, we reve rse the di s trict court’ s denial of the motion to s uppress a

nd vacat e T h omas’s convic tion. On
rema nd, the district court m u s t decide whether the g overn m en t can establish the dog ’s re liability in light of a

n adequate re cord, or

a lte rn ativ e ly , whe the r i t c an e sta bli sh 14 th atT h o m a s f

r e e l y c o n s e n t e d t o A g e n tLe B l an c ’ s s e ar c h

. If either pr obable c ause or consent is shown, then the c ourt mayU NI TED S T A T ES V

. T HOMAS 27

W e reject T ho m as’ s t ri al and s ent enci ng chal l enges. I t was wi t hi n t he 15 di s t r i ct cour t ’ s di s cr et i on t o permi t t he gover nm en t to i mp eac h T homas
a b o u t his p rio r m isd e m e a n o r c o n v ic tio n
. See , e

. g. , Uni t e d St at es v. Ant onake as , 2 5 5 F .3 d 7 1 4 , 7 2 4

– 2 5 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 1 ); Uni t ed St at es v. C a still o , 1 8 1 F .3 d 1 1 2 9 , 1 1 3 2

– 3 4 (9 th C ir. 1 9 9 9 ). A n d , the d istric t co u rt’s d ec i si o n no t t o d e p art d o w nw ard b ase d o n his p o st

- t rau m ati c stress d iso rd e r o r m ili ta ry se rv ic e d id no t r e n d e r h is se n te n c e su b sta n tive ly
u n re a so n a b le

. See Uni t ed St at es v

. Res s am , 6 7 9 F .3 d 1 0 6 9 , 1 0 8 7

– 8 8 (9 th C i r. 20 1 2 ) ( en b a n c ); Uni t ed St at es v. Tan kers l ey , 537 F. 3d 1100, 1114 (9th C i r. 20 0 8 ). reinstate the conviction. See, e .g. , Un ite d S tates v . B e rn al- 15 Ob eso , 989 F.2d 331, 337 ( 9th Cir. 1993). I f not, a new tria l without evidence of the mar ijuana will be appr opriate. VACATED, REVERSED and REMAND ED.