IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

o to CD 

### STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) 

## ) No. 71466-0-1 S ^ rn. Te Respondent, ) -< &~n„. 

## ) DIVISION ONE £ 3£^p v- ) x» oimV-l 

## ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION §>'" K.L.G., ) V? 2^ ) Appellant. ) FILED: May 26,2015 

### ) oAppelwick, J. — Twelve year old K.L.G. was convicted of child molestation inthe first degree of fiveyearold C.S. K.L.G. asserts thatthejuvenile courtapplied an incorrect legal standard and abused its discretion when itconcluded C.S. was competentto testify. He argues thatthejuvenile court erred inadmitting C.S.'s child hearsay statements. He 

### alleges that the court erred when itallowed the child interview specialistto remain in the courtroom during the proceedings. For the first time on appeal, he contends that C.S.'s oath was not adequately administered. We affirm. FACTS 

### Throughout his childhood, 12 year old K.L.G. has been repeatedly removed from households because of his behavioral problems. Eventually, K.L.G.was placed with his 

### biological father, Newton Gibson. Gibson lived with his girlfriend, Jennifer Pursley, and her three children, including her youngest child, C.S. On September 28, 2013, after six weeks in the home, K.L.G. ran away. 

### The day K.L.G. ran away from home, C.S. told Pursleythat "the otherday" K.L.G. had pulled down C.S.'s pants, put soap in C.S.'s bottom, and put his penis inside C.S.'s bottom. But, when Pursley tried to get more details from C.S. about the incident at thatNo. 71466-0-1/2 time, C.S. was emotional and did not say anything else about it. Laterthat day, Pursley called the police to reportthat K.L.G. had run away from home. The police found K.L.G. and asked Pursley to come pick him up. When Pursley arrived to pick up K.L.G., she spokewith Officer Molly Ingram. Pursleytold Officer Ingram that there had been some issues with K.L.G.'s disruptive behavior in the home and she told Officer Ingram aboutwhat C.S. had told her. Laterthatnight, PursleytookC.S. to the hospitalto beexamined by SexualAssault 

### Nurse PractitionerSherryAllen. C.S. told NurseAllenthat K.L.G.does "gross stuff' when 

### they are alonetogetherand that K.L.G. hurts him. Nurse Allenthen performed a physical
exam. Nurse Allen did not observe anything inthe rectal area and noted no trauma. 

### The next day, police officers interviewed K.L.G. K.L.G. denied the allegations and remarked that he thought itwas possible that C.S. was offered money to falsely accuse 

### K.L.G. inorderto get K.L.G. into trouble. Duringthe interview, K.L.G. also informedthe officers that he was physically abused and thatthere was drug abuse inthe home. On October 2, 2013, C.S. was interviewed by Child Interview Specialist Gina 

### Coslett. C.S. has developmental delay issues, and he was very distracted during the interview. Nonetheless, during the interview, C.S. told Coslett that K.L.G. had humped him and touched C.S.'s buttwith his hands. C.S. said that humping means "doing gross stuff." 

### That same day, the State charged K.L.G. withrape of a child in the firstdegree. It subsequently added one count of childmolestation in the firstdegree. 

### The juvenile court conducted a combined competency and child hearsay determination during the course oftrial. C.S. testified that K.L.G.'s"wiener" touched hisNo. 71466-0-1/3 

### bottom and that itwent inside his butt. At times, C.S. seemed reluctant to testify and said that he did not know the answerto several questions. C.S. asked about lunch threetimes 

### during the course of his testimony and mentioned the service dog in the courtroom. C.S. also asked to go to recess. Coslett and Pursley also testified. Cosletttestified about her prior interview with C.S. and Pursley testified about C.S.'s disclosure ofthe incident and the events thattook place that day. Thejuvenile court concluded that C.S. was competent. And, itconcluded thatthe 

### statements C.S. made to Pursley and Coslett were admissible as child hearsay. The juvenile court entered written findings and conclusions about C.S.'s competence and aboutthe reliability and admissibility ofC.S.'s statements to Pursley and Coslett. Thejuvenile courtfound K.L.G. guilty of child molestation. K.L.G. appeals. DISCUSSION K.L.G. argues that the juvenile court erred when it concluded that C.S. was competent to testify. He further maintains that the court erred when it admitted C.S.'s child hearsay statements. He further contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to exclude Coslett from the courtroom. And, he contends that his motion to exclude Coslett from the courtroom below enables him to challenge the propriety of C.S.'s oath for the first time on appeal, because Coslett interjected herself into the oath administration. I. Competency K.L.G. first contends that the juvenile court performed an incorrect, incomplete legal analysis when itdetermined that C.S. was competentto testify.No. 71466-0-1/4
This court reviews competency determinations for abuse of discretion. State v. Stanqe. 53 Wn. App. 638, 642, 769 P.2d 873 (1989). Ifthetrial court's ruling is based on
an erroneous view of the law or involves application of an incorrect legal analysis, it necessarily abuses its discretion. Dixv. ICT Grp., Inc.. 160 Wn.2d 826, 833, 161 P.3d 1016(2007). 

### The testofthe competency of a young child as a witness consists ofthe following: (1) an understanding ofthe obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity atthe time ofthe occurrence to receive an accurate impression ofit; (3)
a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the 

### capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it. State v.Allen. 70 Wn.2d 690, 692, 424 P.2d 1021 

### (1967). Satisfaction ofeach of the Allenfactors isessentialto a determination that achild may properly testify. Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. No.1, 105 Wn.2d 99, 102-03, 713 P.2d 79 (1986). 

### K.L.G. first contends that the juvenile court did not satisfactorily employ the first Allen factor, because itevaluated only if C.S. "understood his obligation to speak the 

### truth." According to K.L.G., the court failed to determine whether C.S. understood his 

### obligation tospeaktruthfullyon the witness stand, in a legal proceeding. Allen, 70 Wn.2d at 692. K.L.G. appears to be drawing this conclusion, becausethe findings of fact do not specifically mention that C.S. understood he needed to speak truthfully on the witness 

### stand. But,just because the court did notentera finding of factmimicking the language of the first Allen factor does not necessarily mean that the court did not engage in that 

### analysis. In fact, C.S. was on the witness stand when he promised totell thetruth. And,No. 71466-0-1/5
the record indicates that the court considered this fact in making its determination. The juvenile courtengaged inthe correct inquiry underthe first Allen factor. K.L.G. then argues thatthejuvenile court did not accurately apply the second and third Allen factors, because itconsidered only whetherC.S. had "an accurate recollection at the time ofthe occurrence and the ability to retain the recollection." K.L.G. contends that the court did not make the required determination that C.S. had the ability to receive
an accurate and independentimpression ofthe incidentthat allegedly occurred. But, the record indicates the court did consider the proper standard in making its determination. Specifically, thejuvenile court opined that C.S. clearly had the mental capacityto receive
an accurate impression of the occurrence, noting that itwas only three months before trial. Itcontinued that C.S. had a sufficient memory to retain an independent recollection ofthe occurrence. K.L.G. contends that even ifthe juvenile court applied the correct competency 

### analysis standard, the juvenile court abused its discretion by ultimately concluding that C.S. was competentto testify underAllen. In reviewing ajuvenile court adjudication, this court must decide whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and, in turn, whetherthefindings supportthe conclusions of law. State v. B.J.S., 140Wn. App. 91, 97, 169 P.3d 34 (2007). Unchallenged findings offact are verities on appeal.

The determination of the witness's competence and ability to meet the 

### requirements ofthe Allen test rests primarily with the trialjudge who sees the witness, notices his manner, and considers his capacity and intelligence. Allen, 70 Wn.2d at 692. These are matters that are not reflected in the written record for appellate review, jd.No. 71466-0-1/6


### Their determination lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal inthe absence of proof ofmanifest abuse ofdiscretion. ]d. There is probably no area of law where it is more necessary to place great reliance on the trial court'sjudgment than in assessing the competency of a child witness. State v. Woods. 154 Wn.2d 613, 617, 114 P.3d 1174 (2005). On appeal, this court may examine the entire record in reviewing a competency determination. Id. A. Obligation to Tell the Truth (Allen Factor (D) K.L.G. alleges thatthejuvenile court abused its discretion, becausethere was not 

### substantial evidence to support the court's finding that C.S. understood his obligation to tell the truth in a legal proceeding. Priorto testifying atthe competency hearing, thejudge began to administer C.S.'s oath: THE COURT: Okay. Good morning. We are going to ask you to raise your right hand. Can you do thatfor me? The other right hand. That's right. Put itback up. Do you swearthatthetestimonyyou will give inthis proceedingtoday will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? MS. GINA COSLETT: Do you promise to tell the truth? THE WITNESS: Yes. Consequently, K.L.G. first contends that C.S. failed to understand his obligation to tell the truth in a legal proceeding, because C.S. was improperly sworn in. He contends thatthe oath did not solicit a promiseto the judge to tell the truth inthe courtroom setting. He claims that C.S.'s silence afterthejudge asked him if he swore to tell the truth plainly illustrates that C.S. did not understand the importance of telling the truth. But, K.L.G.No. 71466-0-1/7 agreed to tell the truth after Coslett clarified the question and distilled it into language a five year old could better understand. Moreover, a formal oath is not a prerequisite to a satisfaction ofthis Allen factor. See State v. Johnson, 28 Wn. App. 459, 461, 624 P.2d 

### 213 (1981) (findingthe witness competenteven though the courtdid not require the child to subscribe to a formal oath), affd, 96 Wn.2d 926, 639 P.2d 1332 (1982). There is substantial evidence in the record indicating that C.S. understood the 

### importance of telling the truth in a legal proceeding. First, C.S. promised to tellthe truth 

### during the oath in court. Additionally, he acknowledged that his parents told him it is important to tell the truth. His mother testified that she taught C.S. the importance of 

### telling the truth and that lying is a bad thing. And, C.S. promised to tell the truth during his prior interview with Coslett. 

### Nonetheless, K.L.G. cites to portions of the record and raises a number of additional concerns about C.S.'s testimony, thatC.S. testified that he sometimestells the truth and he sometimes does not tell the truth; that C.S. testified inconsistently about 

### whether he told his mother about the event in question; that he could not remember if 

### Coslett told him during their interviewthat itwas important to tell the truth; and that he "tricked" Coslett and latertestified that he "didn't trick anything"—implying that C.S. was 

### lying aboutpriorevents. However, to the extentK.L.G. highlightsinconsistenciesinC.S.'s testimony, inconsistencies in a child's testimony go to weight and credibility, not competency. State v. Carlson, 61 Wn. App. 865, 874, 812 P.2d 536 (1991). Moreover, appellate courts do not weighevidence. Quinn v. Cherry Lane Auto Plaza, Inc., 153 Wn. App. 710, 717, 225 P.3d 266 (2009). 

### Substantial evidence supports the findingthat C.S. satisfied this Allen factor.No. 71466-0-1/8

B. Independent Recollection and Ability to Retain and Describe the Events (Allen Factors (3), (4), & (5)) K.L.G. further claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it determined thatC.S. had an independentrecollection ofthe claimed eventwhen he made only occasional, vague, and fragmentary statements that were elicited by adult professionals. He further challenges thejuvenile court's finding offact that C.S. had the ability to describe the events and understand simple questions about the events. He first asserts that C.S. did not answer simple questions with clear descriptions that showed he had perceived or independently remembered the alleged event. Rather, he contends, C.S. had to be prompted by adults questioning him via leading questions and that C.S. failed to respond adequately to those questions. K.L.G. cites to several 

### examplesfrom C.S.'s interview withCoslett. Coslettasked C.S. why C.S. cameto speak 

### with her. C.S. responded that he did not know both times. Coslett asked why C.S.'s mother was worried something happened to him, and C.S. responded that he did not know. But, Coslettthen told C.S. that she heard he wentto see the doctor. Atthat point, C.S. responded: C.S.: Oh yeah then urn (unintelligible) was humping me and doing that stuff. CIS Coslett: [Something what[?] 

### C.S.: Kylewas humping me and doing that stuff[.] CIS Coslett: Kylewas humping you and doing that stuff[?] C.S. [Y]eah[.]No. 71466-0-1/9
Neither Coslett nor C.S. mentioned K.L.G. or the specific incident until C.S. 

### mentioned it inresponse to why he wentto the doctor. Then, during C.S.'s testimony in court, he independently reiterated that K.L.G. did "gross stuff" to him. He then described 

### the "gross stuff' to be touching his butt with K.L.G.'s "wiener." And, he said that K.L.G.
was touching his butt. When asked whether K.L.G.'s wiener was on the outside of his butt, C.S. independently responded that "itwas in my butt." Even though C.S. was 

### distracted during both his interview withCoslettand while testifying, he still responded to questions that showed he independently remembered the alleged event. There was substantial evidence inthe record that C.S. had the ability to independently describe the events and understand simple questions aboutthem. K.L.G. also refers to instances which he claims show that C.S. did not have an 

### accurate recollection of the events. During his interview with Coslett, C.S. could not remember what room he was inwhen there was "humping," but during his testimony in 

### court, C.S. said that the humping took place in his bedroom. And, C.S. could not 

### remember that he had previously defined "humping" as K.L.G. touching him with his 

### hands. But, again, inconsistencies in a child's testimony do not go to the question of competency. Carlson, 61 Wn. App. at 874. And, the existence of inconsistencies or contradictions in a witness's testimony do not render the witness incompetent. Stange, 53 Wn. App. at 642. 

### Substantial evidence supported thefinding that C.S. satisfiedAllenfactors (3), (4), and (5).No. 71466-0-1/10

C. Mental Capacity at the Time ofOccurrence (Allen Factor (2)) 

### Whetherthejuvenile court abused its discretion in finding that C.S. satisfied Allen factor (2) is dependent upon C.S.'s mental capacity at the time ofthe occurrence. In re Dependency ofA.E.P.. 135 Wn.2d 208, 225-26, 956 P.2d 297 (1998). K.L.G. alleges the court erred when itfound C.S. competentto testify, because C.S. did not have the ability to perceive the events atthe time. He challenges the court's finding offact that C.S. had
an accurate recollection at the time of the occurrence and the ability to retain the recollection. The trial court should determine whether the child has the capacity at the time of the eventto receive an accurate impression ofthe event, id. Ifthe trial court has no idea when the alleged event occurred, itcannot begin to determine whetherthe child had the mental ability at the time ofthe alleged event to receive an accurate impression of it. jd.
at 225.InA.E.P., an allegedly abused child testified that she was inappropriatelytouched
a very long time ago. jd. at224. The child could not specify how long ago the eventtook place. Id. Thetrial courtconsideredwhetherthe child could connecttheeventto another point of reference inthe child's life such as who her babysitterwas at the time or where her motherwas living. Id. The child listed offfour different babysitters who all babysat at differentpoints in time. jd. TheA.E.P. courtdetermined thatbecause thetrialcourtcould not determine when inthe pastthe alleged events occurred, itcould notpossibly begin to determine whetherthe child had the mental ability at the time ofthe incident. Id. at 225. 

### Consequently, the court held that the second Allen factor was not satisfied. Id. at 225- 26.

10No. 71466-0-1/11
C.S.'s mother, Pursley, testified that C.S. does not know the difference between a month, a couple of days, or a week. K.L.G. contends that, as a result, this Allen factor cannotbe satisfied. Coslettcorroborated Pursley's statementand testified thatC.S. does not have an accurate sense oftime. But, she also testified that this is not unusual for a five yearold and thattime sequencing is difficult for children. 

### C.S. testified that he did not report the incident to his parents right after it happened. He furthertestified thathetold his motheraboutthe incidenton the same day that K.L.G. ran awayfrom home. When C.S. told Pursley aboutthe incident, he said that ithappened "'the otherday.'" Pursleyfurthertestified that aboutthree weeks before C.S. reported the alleged event, she noticed thatC.S. became moreclingy and emotional. She identified one momentthree weeks before the allegation surfaced in which she saw C.S. with K.L.G. and C.S.'s face was red and teary. She further testified that C.S. was acting scared and seemed too scared to report what was making him upset. Here, although C.S.'s testimonywas not specific as to the date the eventoccurred, other evidence in the record allowed the juvenile court to determine an adequate approximation of when the alleged event occurred. The courtfound that the eventtook 

### place sometime between September 1, 2013 and September 30, 2013.1 This is unlike A.E.P. in which the court reasoned that it could not determine when the past alleged
events occurred. Moreover, given that finding, there was substantial evidence in the record to determine that C.S. had the mental capacity at the time ofthe occurrence to receive an accurate impression. C.S. was clear about the date he reported it to his mother. C.S. 

### 1 K.L.G. did not explicitlychallenge this finding of fact.

11No. 71466-0-1/12
testified that K.L.G.'s wienerwent inside his butt, that he did not like itand said that it felt bad, and that K.L.G. humped C.S. by touching his buttwith his hands. And, thejuvenile court noted that when C.S. testified that he did not like K.L.G. touching him, C.S. was assertive and looked at K.L.G. during that point inthe testimony. Substantial evidence supported the finding that C.S. satisfied Allen factor (2). 

### We concludethatthejuvenile courtdid not abuse itsdiscretion when itdetermined that C.S. satisfied the Allen factors and was competentto testify.

II. Child Hearsay 

### The juvenile court ruled that C.S.'s statements to his mother, interviewspecialist Coslett, and Nurse SherryAllen2were admissible as childhearsay. K.L.G. contends that under State v. Ryan, 103Wn.2d 165,691 P.2d 197 (1984), thejuvenile courterred when it allowed Pursley and Coslettto testify as to C.S.'s statements. 

### "Hearsay" is a statement made by a declarant nottestifying at trial that is offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. ER 801(c). Hearsay is not 

### admissible except as provided for by the rules of evidence, by other court rules, or by statute. ER 802. The child hearsay statute provides that a statement made by a child 

### under the age of 10describing an act of sexual conductwith the child or on the child is admissible ifthe court finds that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement 

### provide sufficientindiciaofreliability and thechild either testifies at the proceedings or is unavailable as a witness. RCW 9A.44.120. In determining whether the statements are


### 2 K.L.G. challenges only C.S.'s statements to Pursley and Coslett on appeal. 

### Defense counsel stipulated to the admission of NurseAllen's statements attrial based on the medical diagnosis hearsay exception. Therefore, the juvenile court did not analyze those statements under the Ryan factors.
12No. 71466-0-1/13 reliable, this court applies nine factors known as the Ryan factors. State v. Swan, 114 

### Wn.2d 613, 647-648, 790 P.2d 610 (1990). Atrial court need not determine that every Rvan factor is satisfied before admitting childhearsay, but the trial court must show that the factors are substantially met. Id. at 652. The Rvan factors are: 

### "(1)whetherthere is an apparent motive to lie; (2)the general characterof 

### the declarant; (3)whether more than one person heard the statements; (4) 

### whetherthe statements were made spontaneously;... (5) the timing of the declaration and the relationship between the declarant and the witness"[; (6)]the statementcontains noexpress assertion aboutpastfact; [(7)] crossexamination could not show the declarant's lack of knowledge; [(8)] the possibility of the declarant's faulty recollection is remote; and [(9)] the circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no reason to suppose the declarant misrepresented defendant's involvement. 

### id. at 647-48 (citation omitted) (quoting Rvan, 103 Wn2d at 176). The trial court is inthe best position to make the determination of reliabilityas it is the only courtto see the child and the otherwitnesses. State v. Pham. 75 Wn. App. 626, 631, 879 P.2d 321 (1994). Whether statements are admissible pursuant to the child hearsay exception is within the sound discretion ofthe trial court and will not be reversed 

### absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion, id. Reliability does not depend on whether the child is competent to take the witness stand, but on whetherthe comments and circumstances surrounding the statement indicate it to be reliable. Swan, 114Wn.2d at 648. Ifthe declarant was not competent at the time of making the statements, the statements may not be introduced through hearsay repetition. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 173. K.L.G. contends that an analysis ofthe Rvan factors show thatthe statements are
not reliable.

13No. 71466-0-1/14

A. Apparent Motive to Lie 

### The juvenile court found that there was no evidence that C.S. had an apparent motive to lie. K.L.G. contends that C.S. did have an apparent motive to lieand thatthere 

### is not substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile court's finding. K.L.G. references Pursley's testimony that C.S. and K.L.G. had a sibling rivalry and did not get along with each other, just like normal brothers. But, there is no evidence in the record 

### that C.S. wanted K.L.G. out ofthe home. Nor is there evidence that five year old C.S. knewthatby fabricating a very specific sexual assaultallegation K.L.Gwould be removed from the home. No evidence suggests that, sibling rivalry or not, C.S. wanted to harm K.L.G. K.L.G. further claimsthatthe record indicates thatC.S. had a motiveto lie, because C.S.'s family wanted K.L.G. outofthe house. When K.L.G. spoke withthe police officers he said that he thought C.S. was offered moneyto fabricate the allegations. But, there is
no additional evidence in the record that supports this possibility. And, this theory presupposes that C.S. had the wherewithal to repeatedly lie on purpose. This is belied by K.L.G.'s arguments attacking C.S.'s competence and mental abilities. The record supports the finding thatthis factor is satisfied. B. The Child's General Character The basis ofthis factor is whether C.S. had a reputation for telling the truth. State
v. Lopez, 95 Wn. App. 842, 853, 980 P.2d 224 (1999). Thejuvenile courtfound thatthere
was no evidence that C.S. had a reputation for dishonesty and that he has the same reputation for truthfulness of a normal five year old boy. K.L.G. contends that C.S.'s characterfor honestywas "bad" and thatthejuvenilecourtneitherexpressly analyzed his

14No. 71466-0-1/15 

### character for honesty nor had the substantial evidence necessary to enter itsfinding. K.L.G. claims that C.S.'s character and reputation for honesty was bad, because he tricked Coslettaboutwhat he had forbreakfastduring their interview and then liedabout it in court. And, because he was silent when the court administered the oath. 

### But,these two instances do not establish a reputation fordishonesty. Moreover, 

### Pursley testified that C.S. knew the importance oftelling the truth and generally tells the truth. This is reputation evidence, however limited, of the fiveyear old's honesty. The record supports a finding thatthis factor is satisfied. C. Whether More than One Person Heard the Statements Thejuvenile court found that C.S. told his mother, Coslett, and Nurse Allen about 

### the incident. This factoris satisfied where thechild repeats similarstatements to different people on different occasions. Lopez, 95 Wn. App. at 853. K.L.G. contends that the 

### inconsistency of C.S.'s statements to these individuals cuts against satisfaction of this factor. 

### Despite minor inconsistencies in C.S.'s definition of "humping" or "doing gross 

### stuff," C.S. told allthreewomen similarversions ofK.L.G. touching himsexuallyor "doing gross stuff." It is true that aside from his testimony in court, C.S. only explicitly revealed the sexual penetration to his mother. But, C.S. did reveal to different people similar statements about sexual activity with K.L.G. See Lopez, 95 Wn. App. at 853 (finding this Rvan factor satisfied even after children told different and inconsistent versions of their stories because they revealed similarstatements to different people about sexual activity with theirfather). This factor is satisfied.

15No. 71466-0-1/16

D. The Spontaneity ofthe Statements Thejuvenile courtfound that all ofC.S.'s statements were spontaneous. For purposes ofdetermining the reliability of a statementmade by a child victim ofsexual abuse, any statements made that are not the result of leading or suggestive questions
are spontaneous. kL K.L.G. argues that the statements were not spontaneous, but were a result of coaxing and urging. He contends that thejuvenile court lacked substantial evidence to find that all the statements were spontaneous under the law. First, he contends that C.S.'s statement to his mother was not spontaneous, because Pursley questioned C.S. for several hours afterhe made a statement inthe car about K.L.G. But, this questioning
was after C.S. told Pursley that K.L.G. had pulled C.S.'s pants down, put soap in his bottom, and stuck his penis in. C.S. made that statement after he spontaneously told Pursley that he had something to tell her and after Pursley gave him a little tickle and asked him whatwas going on. K.L.G. further contends that all of C.S.'s statements to Coslett were as a result of 

### drawn-outcoaxing and urging. But, Coslettdid not mention K.L.G. orthe specific incident untilC.S. mentioned it inresponse to why he wentto the doctor. Simply because Coslett
was speaking with C.S. and asking him vague questions does not mean that she led him into making a specific statement about K.L.G. This factor is satisfied. E. Timing ofStatements and Relationship Between Declarant and Witness Thejuvenile courtfound that C.S. waited to disclose the incident until K.L.G. was out of the home, (as opposed to doing so when K.L.G. was still in the home with the 

### capability of hurting himagain), implying that C.S.'s disclosure showed reliability. K.L.G.

16No. 71466-0-1/17
contends that the timing of the statements was not reliable, because Pursley told the police about C.S.'s statements only afterfirst telling the officers about K.L.G.'s behavioral problems. In so doing, K.L.G. is evaluating the timing of Purslev's statements and not C.S.'s statements to Pursley thatthe State soughtto admit as hearsay. Pursley is C.S.'s mother. A relationship oftrust between the child declarant and the witness can establish reliability. See Swan, 114 Wn.2d at 650 (concluding reliability, because children's parents were undoubtedly trusted by the children). Moreover, C.S. made additional statements about the incident to Coslett, a professional trained in properly interviewing sexually abused children. The presence of professionals investigating child abuse enhances the reliability of the statements. State v. Young, 62 Wn. App. 895, 901, 802 P.2d 829, 817 P.2d 412 (1991). K.L.G. further contends thatthejuvenile courtabused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard when assessing this prong. He claims this is so, because it inquired about the relationship between the declarant, C.S., and the accused, K.L.G., instead of the relationship between C.S. and the witness, Pursley. While the juvenile court did unnecessarily examine the relationship between K.L.G. and C.S., the Rvan factors are nonexclusive. A.E.P., 135 Wn.2d at 230. The timing ofC.S.'s statements and the relationship between C.S. and Coslettand Pursley suggest reliability. This factor is satisfied. F. Remoteness ofthe Possibility ofthe Child's Recollection Being Faulty Thejuvenile courtfound no indication that C.S.'s recollection was faulty or that he misrepresented K.L.G.'s involvement. The juvenile court opined that C.S. was on the witness stand and told the court about specificfacts that had happened. Itcontinued that

17No. 71466-0-1/18 although there were questions interms ofwhattime the event may have occurred, there
was no reason to suppose that C.S.'s recollection was faulty. K.L.G. argues that this factor is not satisfied, because the record indicates that C.S. is a person of poor trustworthiness generally. He again refers to C.S.'s "admitted dishonesty" and the trick C.S. played on Coslett during the interview. 

### C.S. recalled the incidents with specific facts and was ableto be cross-examined.3 A child need not remember every detail of the event. See Lopez, 95 Wn. App. at 854. This factor was satisfied. G. Circumstances Surrounding the Statements and Accused's Involvement The juvenile court found that there was no indication that C.S. misrepresented K.L.G.'s involvement in the event, because C.S.'s statements were spontaneous and in 

### response to nonleading questions. K.L.G. contends thatthe circumstances do not show the hearsay testimony to be reliable. But, he does not provide any additional supportfor 

### this argument. No evidence inthe record indicates that C.S. misrepresented the facts. This factor is satisfied. 

### We concludethatthejuvenile courtdid not abuse its discretion indetermining that 

### the Rvan factors were satisfied and in admittingPursley's and Coslett's statements.4

3K.L.G.contendsthatthejuvenilecourtlackedthe substantialevidence necessary 

### to enterthis finding of fact. But, C.S. was subject to cross-examination. And, while he 

### may have had difficulty recalling what he had previously discussed with Coslett and defense counsel in earlier interviews, while on the stand, C.S. was able to recall K.L.G. touching him. 

### 4Because we conclude thatthejuvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that C.S. was both competent to testify and competent at the time he made 

### the statementsto Coslettand Pursley, we need notaddress K.L.G.'s confrontation clause argument.
18No. 71466-0-1/19

III. Coslett's Presence in the Courtroom K.L.G. also argues that the juvenile court erred when it denied his motion to exclude Coslett from the courtroom. Below, K.L.G. moved to exclude Coslett from court while other witnesses were testifying. The State claimed that because itwas difficult to keep C.S. focused, Coslett's expertise and presence would be beneficial. The juvenile court denied K.L.G.'s motion reasoning that it did not know of any basis for it to exclude Coslett. Itopined thatgenerallya testifying detective is allowed to remain inthe courtroom and it did not see a reason why Coslett should be treated any differently. ER 615 states that at the request of a party, the court may order witnesses excluded so they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. But, ER 615 does not authorize exclusion of a person whose presence is shown to be reasonably necessary to the presentation ofthe party's cause. When ER 615's exclusionary rule is invoked, it is 

### customary to exempt one witness to confer with the prosecutor during trial. State v. Weaver, 60 Wn.2d 87, 90, 371 P.2d 1006 (1962). Questions concerning the exclusion of witnesses and the violation ofER 615 are within the broad discretion ofthe trial court and willnot be disturbed, absent manifest abuse ofdiscretion. State v. Schapiro, 28 Wn. App. 860, 867-68, 626 P.2d 546 (1981). 

### On appeal, K.L.G. contends that allowing a State's witness to be present inthe courtroom during the entire case risks many dangers, including, but not limited to, the 

### danger that the witness will be able to tailor his or her testimony to the testimony of witnesses appearing beforehand. He claimsthatthe State's desireto have a trialwitness inthe courtroom who itbelieved could assist in keeping the complainantfocused is not a proper basis to allow the witness to stay.

19No. 71466-0-1/20
K.L.G. provides no authority for any of his assertions that a child interview specialistcannotremain inthe courtroom during the proceedings. As a result, K.L.G. has not established thatthejuvenile court abused its discretion by denying K.L.G.'s motion to exclude Coslett.

IV. Adeguacv of C.S.'s Oath K.L.G. argues that C.S.'s oath was inadequate, because its contentwas improper and because an interested State's witness procured it. Prior to C.S.'s testimony, the juvenile courtjudge began to administer the oath to C.S. When C.S. did not respond, Coslett interjected and asked C.S. ifhe "promise[d] to tell the truth." K.L.G. challenges the adequacy ofthe oath for the first time on appeal. The State contends K.L.G.'sfailure to objectto the oath attrialconstitutes a waiver ofany error. Failure to object to the adequacy of a child witness's oath attrial results in


### a waiver ofany error. See State v. Dixon. 37 Wn. App. 867, 876, 684 P.2d 725 (1984). But, K.L.G. contends that his general objection to Coslett's presence in the courtroom functioned as a standing objection as to anything Coslett did while in the courtroom— including her involvement in administering C.S.'s oath. 

### The purpose underlying issue preservation is to encourage the efficient use of judicial resources. State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304, 253 P.3d 84 (2011). Issue preservation serves this purpose by ensuring that the trial court has the opportunity to correct any errors. Jd. at 304-05. Here, K.L.G.'s counsel objected to Coslett's presence 

### in the courtroom, because "it's something [he had] never seen done before." Counsel provided no rationale or argumentto alertthe court as to why Coslett's presence was an

error that needed to be corrected.

20No. 71466-0-1/21


### On appeal, K.L.G. contends that the oath was improperly administered, because
an interested State's witness helped procure it. But, there is no indication in the record 

### that K.L.G. objected to Coslett's presence because of a fear that she would improperly interject herself into the proceedings. Therefore, K.L.G.'s general objection was insufficient to serve as an objection to the content and manner of administration ofthe oath. Alternatively, K.L.G. argues that the absence of an adequate oath is manifest 

### constitutionalerrorunderRAP2.5(a)(3) thatcan bechallengedforthefirst time on appeal. 

### In State v. Avila, 78 Wn. App. 731, 737-38, 899 P.2d 11 (1995), the court rejected the defendant appellant's RAP 2.5(a)(3) argumentthat itwas manifestconstitutional errorfor a child witness to testify without first being administered a formal oath to tell the truth. 

### The Avila court rejected the argument, because Avila failed to engage in the four step approach established by the court in State v. Lynn, 67 Wn. App. 339, 345, 835 P.2d 251 (1992), for determining whether an alleged constitutional error may be raised forthe first time on appeal. Avila, 78 Wn. App. at 738. While K.L.G. cites to Lynn, he does not engage in a meaningful analysis ofthe four factors. Therefore, like the court in Avila, we reject K.L.G.'s RAP 2.5(a)(3) argument. Even ifwe found the issue was properly before us, the oath was adequate. ER 603 requires that every witness be sworn before testifying. Avila, 78 Wn. App. at 738. But, where the witness is a child, a trial court does not abuse its discretion indeclining to administer a formal oath. id. at 737-38. It is sufficient that a child promised to tell the truth. id. at738. The trial court administered the formal oath, but C.S. hesitated. Coslett

21No. 71466-0-1/22 

### interrupted to clarify to C.S. that he was being asked if he would tell the truth. He answered, "Yes" to the court. Therefore, there was no error here. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that C.S. was competentto testify, when itadmitted C.S.'s child hearsay statements, and when itdenied K.L.G.'s requestto exclude Coslettfrom the courtroom. We affirm.

WE CONCUR: 

# WL/fc-e^

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