May 25, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD— SENATE S7491 

I congratulate Mr. Kopecky on his 

distinguished career and wish him well 

in his retirement. 

f 

COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL 

STORAGE 

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, 

dangerous nuclear leftovers from the 

cold war and the commercial spent fuel 

storage problem present the U.S. with 

two major environmental challenges. 

An explosion at the liquid high-level 

waste storage tanks at Hanford could 

result in a catastrophic nuclear accident, and electric utilities are running 

out of space for storage at commercial 

nuclear reactors. Although these are 

separate problems, the solutions are related. Unfortunately, President Clinton 

is AWOL (absent without leadership), 

and the DOE is playing legal games instead of taking responsibility for taking the commercial spent fuel by 1998. 

It’s time for a comprehensive solution. 

First, let’s review the facts: 

Thirty thousand tons of spent nuclear fuel is being temporarily stored 

at powerplants at 75 sites. 

In less than 3 years, 23 reactors will 

run out of space in their spent fuel 

storage pools. 

By 2010, a total of 78 reactors will 

have run out of space. 

We’ve already spent 12 years and $4.2 

billion to find permanent high-level repository and conduct site characterization at Yucca Mountain. 

DOE will decide if Yucca Mountain is 

a suitable site for a permanent repository in 1998. If it is, DOE will file for license in 2001. DOE has told us that the 

odds of the site being suitable are 

about 80 percent. However, DOE has 

also indicated that the odds of getting 

a license for a permanent repository 

under our existing laws are about 50-50, 

and probably much worse. These odds 

are not good enough to bet the taxpayer’s money on. 

Still, the fact remains that, if after 3 

to 6 years more work at Yucca Mountain, and a total expenditure of at least 

$9 billion on our nuclear waste disposal 

program, Yucca is either found not to 

be suitable or licensable, we have nowhere to turn. We currently have no 

contingency plan for waste storage. We 

will simply have to start over. 

Meanwhile, the President and DOE 

are dragging their feet. DOE has recently issued a ‘‘Final Interpretation 

of Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues,’’

reaffirming its earlier position that its 

contracts with the utilities to take 

waste by 1998 are not enforceable in 

court. DOE has also asserted that it 

has no authority under existing law to 

site an interim repository. DOE has 

missed the point. While DOE is focusing on legal technicalities to avoid its 

obligations to the American people, we 

have had no suggestions from DOE regarding solutions to this problem. 

Although we have been told that 

DOE is studying the issue, all we have 

heard from the administration is a refusal to support any pending legislation at this time. I have received no response to my letter to the President requesting that the administration engage on this issue in a meaningful way. 

Finally, the State of Nevada and the 

Nevada congressional delegation remain opposed to the location of any 

nuclear waste facilities in their State. 

It is time to take a comprehensive 

look at the problem based on two basic 

principles: First, the Government must 

meet its obligation to take spent fuel 

by 1998 or as soon thereafter as practical. The ratepayers have paid for it. 

They deserve performance, not excuses. 

Even if it is found to be suitable, Yucca 

Mountain will not be ready before 2010. 

Therefore, interim storage of spent fuel 

is needed. Although there is nothing 

unsafe about the storage of spent fuel 

at reactor sites, for reasons of both economics and safety, we must consolidate our 74 spent fuel storage sites into 

1 or 2. 

Second, the U.S. must continue efforts toward a permanent geological repository. While we can keep alternatives such as deep seabed disposal 

and transmutation alive (if Yucca is 

found unsuitable), our long-term goal 

remains geologic disposal. 

This raises a more difficult question: 

Where do we locate central interim 

storage? I would suggest the best location for an interim storage facility 

would meet the following criteria: 

Spent fuel should already be there. 

There should be adequate land area. 

The Federal Government should already own the land. 

There should be transportation infrastructure. 

There should be a security infrastructure. 

A skilled work force familiar with 

handling nuclear materials should be 

available. 

A nuclear safety/worker protection 

infrastructure should be in place. 

The location(s) should be in general 

proximity to the Nation’s reactors, i.e., 

one for the East and one for the West. 

The new economic activity associated with spent fuel management may 

address concurrent job losses. 

After all of these considerations are 

evaluated, the relative costs of the alternatives should be taken into account. 

Locations that meet the above criteria include some of our existing DOE 

weapons facilities. Geographically, the 

most likely candidates are Hanford and 

Savannah River. There are other important factors about Hanford, and Savannah River—each contain nuclear 

materials dramatically more dangerous than spent commercial fuel 

safety contained in dry casks. For example, Hanford has 61 million gallons 

of liquid high level wastes in 177 underground tanks—some of which have 

leaked or are leaking. Under certain 

conditions, one or more of these tanks 

could explode, resulting in a catastrophic nuclear accident. Also at Hanford are 4,300 metric tons of plutonium 

in various forms and locations, contaminated reprocessing facilities, corroding and possibly dangerous DOE nuclear fuels, and a contaminated plutonium finishing plant just to name a 

few. Savannah River has five closed reactors, two contaminated reprocessing 

facilities, and a variety of liquid and 

solid radioactive wastes. 

Despite the very real environmental 

health and safety risks that exist at 

Hanford and Savannah River, fiscal 

pressures are forcing us to cut the 

overall cleanup budget even as we 

squander millions of dollars cleaning 

up low risk sites to comply with environmental regulations designed for a 

perfect world. As Ivan Selin, Chairman 

of the NRC, said last week, 

Prioritization of the cleanup at DOE 

sites, based on an assessment of risk to 

the public and the cleanup workers, 

isn’t happening to the extent it should. 

Finally, Hanford and Savannah River 

already have spent nuclear fuel. Not 

the safe, stable nuclear fuel found in 

commercial power reactors—but military fuel designed to be quickly reprocessed to make plutonium. When we 

abruptly shut down plutonium production, this military fuel was left in 

limbo. Today it sits, corroding, in pools 

at Hanford and Savannah 

River... 206 metric tons at Savannah 

River, and 2132 metric tons at Hanford. 

To review the situation, we need one 

or two centralized, dry cask storage 

sites for spent commercial nuclear 

fuel, until Yucca Mountain or another 

permanent geologic repository is 

ready. We have spent military fuel at 

Hanford and Savannah River—along 

with a host of other environmental 

problems—that demand attention despite declining dollars and misplaced 

priorities dictated by current environmental statutes. Employment at Hanford and Savannah River is dropping. 

The local communities are feeling the 

economic pinch. the activity at Hanford and Savannah River is shifting 

from defense production to environmental restoration. 

Hanford and Savannah River meet all 

the criteria listed earlier: 

Spent fuel is already there. 

There is adequate land area. 

The Federal Government already 

owns the land. 

There is transportation infrastructure. 

There is security infrastructure. 

There is an available, skilled work 

force that knows how to handle nuclear 

materials. 

There is a nuclear safety/worker protection infrastructure in place. 

Savannah River is conveniently located with respect to civilian power reactors in the east, and Hanford is convenient to reactors in the west. 

The new economic activity associated with spent fuel management will 

help address economic declines in the 

area. 

The new dry cask storage facilities 

may even help safely contain the more 

dangerous spent military fuel that exists at both sites. 

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S7492 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD— SENATE May 25, 1995 

Overall costs of transportation and 

storage would appear to be lower at 

these sites. 

Therefore, I believe Hanford and Savannah River offer excellent sites for 

the temporary, dry cask storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel until a permanent geologic repository is available. 

At this point, I would like to make 

clear my support for continued 

progress toward a permanent geologic 

repository. Hanford and Savannah 

River already have defense nuclear 

waste and spent nuclear fuel from defense and research activities that is 

destined for the permanent geologic repository. This proposal is intended to 

hasten the day that those wastes, as 

well as the civilian spent fuel, are sent 

away from the sites for permanent disposal. I realize that at this time, nobody wants to store nuclear waste. Incentives must be offered. The communities near Hanford and Savannah 

River will understandably ask, what’s 

in it for us? 

I would be prepared to pursue benefits for these communities if they are 

inclined to take spent commercial fuel 

on an interim basis only. First, I am 

working with several of my colleagues 

to develop legislation that will 

prioritize DOE cleanups in accordance 

with actual risks. That approach will 

result in Hanford and Savannah River 

being cleaned up faster, since many of 

the high-risk problems are located 

there. Second, I am encouraging the 

privatization of efforts to vitrify—or 

turn into glass—high-level liquid 

wastes at Hanford. This is the best way 

to stabilize the liquid tanks and make 

them safe. 

Third, we are offering new construction and economic activity associated 

with the construction and operation of 

an interim, above ground, dry cask 

storage site. This will help address the 

job losses and economic declines associated with the end of defense-related 

activities at Hanford and Savannah 

River. Fourth, there are other arrangements, including financial incentives, 

that can be considered. Whether or not 

DOE continues to exist as a Cabinetlevel agency, its functions and operations will be significantly scaled 

back. As the various DOE sites compete for the remaining missions, special consideration could be given to a 

site that hosts the interim storage facility. Other benefits to communities 

agreeing to host an interim storage 

site can also be discussed. 

Finally, to provide assurances to the 

local communities of Richland/Pasco/ 

Kennewick, WA; Aiken, SC; and Augusta, GA, that the interim dry cask 

storage sites are not intended to be 

permanent, work on Yucca Mountain 

will be continued. Remember, there is 

already spent nuclear fuel at these 

sites that is destined for a permanent 

geologic repository, when one is available. It is in the long-term interest of 

these facilities to participate in a program that will take care of the immediate problem so that the work on the 

permanent repository can go forward. 

In addition to selecting a site, there 

are four elements that we should include in a legislative bill dealing with 

spent nuclear fuel. First, in order to 

construct a central interim storage facility in a timely manner, changes 

must be made in the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act. These amendments should 

provide: that licensing of an interim 

storage facility can begin immediately; 

that the interim dry cask storage site 

can be constructed incrementally and 

that waste acceptance can begin as sections are completed; that the NRC will 

be the sole licensing authority; shortterm renewable licenses to ease NRC 

rulemaking; and that DOE will be 

treated like a private licensee. 

Second, to help ensure that the spent 

fuel can be moved from reactor sites to 

interim storage as soon as possible, a 

transportation system must be developed. Legislative changes would provide: that utilities are responsible for 

obtaining casks; that DOE will take 

title to fuel at reactor site; that DOE 

will be responsible for delivery; and a 

clear regulatory regime related to the 

transportation of spent fuel. 

Third, to ensure that Yucca can be licensed, we should streamline licensing 

provisions, specifying repository performance standards. 

Finally, fourth, a budgetary framework must be established that ensures 

that the money put into the Nuclear 

Waste Fund by the ratepayers is available to the program in amounts sufficient to achieve the first three goals in 

a timely and efficient way. 

These draft proposals outline a workable and efficient interim storage program that would allow us to pursue the 

investigation of our permanent disposal options, including a full study of 

the Yucca Mountain site. However, one 

lesson we have learned is that we cannot put all of our eggs in one basket. 

We cannot solve every nuclear waste 

and spent fuel issue before this country 

in this Congress. However, we can set 

up the beginnings of a workable, integrated nuclear waste management system that will allow succeeding generations to apply new technologies to 

these problems. 

In conclusion, I have given a basic 

outline of principles Congress must address if we are to solve these two major 

environmental problems. As chairman 

of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, I pledge to continue 

our goal of reaching a common sense 

and comprehensive solution. We’d like 

to do that with the help of President 

Clinton and his Department of Energy. 

So far, I have not seen sufficient indication they really want to be a part of 

any solution. Unfortunately, this issue 

is not one where America can be without leadership. I will look forward to 

working with all of those who have an 

interest and concerns to resolve what 

is undoubtedly one of America’s most 

frightening problems, the management 

of waste left at DOE defense weapons 

facilities, while providing a legislative 

framework for DOE to meet its obligation to take possession of the Nation’s 

civilian spent nuclear fuel. 

f 

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS 

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the distinguished Majority Leader has indicated 

that, when the Senate returns from the 

upcoming recess, it will take up S. 652, 

the ‘‘Telecommunications Competition 

and Deregulation Act of 1995.’’ As my 

colleagues are aware, this is a very important piece of legislation dealing 

with many aspects of the complicated, 

fast-changing marketplace in telecommunications and the many competing commercial interests in that 

marketplace. 

Of great interest is the international 

marketplace in telecommunications 

equipment and services, which is extremely lucrative, and is subject to 

many of the same kind of barriers to 

entry for American companies that we 

see in other business sectors. Currently, the US Trade Representative, 

Ambassador Mickey Kantor, has initiated a 301 case against the Japanese in 

the area of automobile parts, after 

years of frustration in trying to gain 

fair entry into the Japanese market—

just as the Japanese have access into 

the American market, and the Senate 

has strongly endorsed this action. 

Similar problems exist in the telecommunications field, and the bill as 

reported from the Commerce Committee includes a provision to protect 

our telecommunications companies 

from unfair competition. The provision 

requires that reciprocity is needed in 

the international marketplace, and in 

adjusting the rules for foreign ownership of telecommunications services in 

the U.S., the host countries of those 

businesses seeking market access in 

the U.S. allow fair and reciprocal access to our telecommunications providers in those nations. 

This is a case of fairness, and the 

Committee has wisely included needed 

leverage for the Administration to prod 

our trading partners into opening their 

markets. 

Given the highly lucrative nature of 

the telecommunications marketplace, 

the stakes of gaining market access to 

foreign markets are high. It should be 

no surprise that securing effective market access to many foreign markets, 

including those of our allies, including 

France, Germany and Japan has been 

very difficult. Those markets remain 

essentially closed to our companies, 

dominated as they are by large monopolies favored by those governments. In 

fact, most European markets highly restrict competition in basic voice services and infrastructure. A study by the 

Economic Strategy Institute in December of 1994 found that ‘‘while the U.S. 

has encouraged competition in all telecommunication sectors except the 

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