57314 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 181 / Monday, September 20, 2010 / Notices 

7 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A). 

8 17 C.F.R. 240.19b–4(f)(2) [sic]. 

9 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

3Changes are marked to the rule text that appears 

in the electronic manual of NASDAQ found at 

http://nasdaqomx.cchwallstreet.com. 

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed 

Rule Change and Timing for 

Commission Action 

The foregoing rule change has become 

effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A) 

of the Act 7 and subparagraph (f)(2) of 

Rule 19b–4 8 thereunder. At any time 

within 60 days of the filing of the 

proposed rule change, the Commission 

summarily may temporarily suspend 

such rule change if it appears to the 

Commission that such action is 

necessary or appropriate in the public 

interest, for the protection of investors, 

or otherwise in furtherance of the 

purposes of the Act. 

IV. Solicitation of Comments 

Interested persons are invited to 

submit written data, views, and 

arguments concerning the foregoing, 

including whether the proposed rule 

change is consistent with the Act. 

Comments may be submitted by any of 

the following methods: 

Electronic Comments 

• Use the Commission’s Internet 

comment form (http://www.sec.gov/ 

rules/sro.shtml); or 

• Send an e-mail to rulecomments@sec.gov. Please include File 

Number SR–CBOE–2010–081 on the 

subject line. 

Paper Comments 

• Send paper comments in triplicate 

to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, 

Securities and Exchange Commission, 

100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 

20549–1090. 

All submissions should refer to File 

Number SR–CBOE–2010–081. This file 

number should be included on the 

subject line if e-mail is used. To help the 

Commission process and review your 

comments more efficiently, please use 

only one method. The Commission will 

post all comments on the Commission’s 

Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/ 

rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the 

submission, all subsequent 

amendments, all written statements 

with respect to the proposed rule 

change that are filed with the 

Commission, and all written 

communications relating to the 

proposed rule change between the 

Commission and any person, other than 

those that may be withheld from the 

public in accordance with the 

provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be 

available for Web site viewing and 

printing in the Commission’s Public 

Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE., 

Washington, DC 20549, on official 

business days between the hours of 10 

a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of the filing also 

will be available for inspection and 

copying at the principal office of the 

Exchange. All comments received will 

be posted without change; the 

Commission does not edit personal 

identifying information from 

submissions. You should submit only 

information that you wish to make 

available publicly. All submissions 

should refer to File Number SR–CBOE– 

2010–081 and should be submitted on 

or before October 12, 2010. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.9

Florence E. Harmon, 

Deputy Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2010–23384 Filed 9–17–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8010–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–62907; File No. SR– 

NASDAQ–2010–110] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The 

NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of 

Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of 

Proposed Rule Change To Modify Rule 

7019 

September 14, 2010. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 

‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2

notice is hereby given that on 

September 7, 2010, The NASDAQ Stock 

Market LLC (‘‘NASDAQ’’ or the 

‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the Securities 

and Exchange Commission (the 

‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule 

change as described in Items I, II, and 

III below, which Items have been 

prepared by the Exchange. The 

Commission is publishing this notice to 

solicit comments on the proposed rule 

change from interested persons. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Terms of Substance of 

the Proposed Rule Change 

NASDAQ proposes to modify Rule 

7019 to harmonize distributor and direct 

access fees for depth-of-book proprietary 

data products. The text of the proposed 

rule change is below. Proposed new 

language is in italics; proposed 

deletions are in brackets.3

* * * * * 

7019. Market Data Distributor Fees 

(a) No change. 

(b) The charge to be paid by 

Distributors of the following NASDAQ 

Market Center real time data feeds shall 

be: 

Monthly direct 

access fee 

Monthly internal distributor 

fee 

Monthly external distributor 

fee 

Issue Specific Data ...................................................................................................................... ........................ ........................ ........................

Dynamic Intraday ......................................................................................................................... ........................ ........................ ........................

NASDAQ-listed security depth entitlements [TotalView] ............................................................. $2,000 $1,000 $2,500 

Non NASDAQ-listed security depth entitlements [OpenView] .................................................... 1,000 500 1,250 

(c)–(d) No change. 

* * * * * 

(b) Not applicable. 

(c) Not applicable. 

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

In its filing with the Commission, 

NASDAQ included statements 

concerning the purpose of, and basis for, 

the proposed rule change. The text of 

these statements may be examined at 

the places specified in Item III below, 

and is set forth in Sections A, B, and C 

below. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 181 / Monday, September 20, 2010 / Notices 57315 

4 15 U.S.C. 78f. 

5 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4). 

6Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 

(June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005). 

A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and the 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

1. Purpose 

NASDAQ is proposing to modify Rule 

7019, which governs market data 

distribution fees, to harmonize the 

distributor fees for depth products by 

including Level 2, also known as NQDS, 

under the current TotalView fee for 

NASDAQ-listed securities. Currently, 

distributors receiving the data feed that 

contains the NASDAQ Level 2 

entitlement and OpenView entitlement 

pay distributor fees for non-NASDAQ 

listed securities (under the OpenView 

entitlement) but do not pay distributor 

fees for NASDAQ-listed securities. By 

contrast, distributors receiving 

NASDAQ-listed data through TotalView 

do pay the fee. Harmonization of the 

depth distributor fee entitlement for 

NASDAQ-listed securities on the Level 

2 data product, consistent with other 

NASDAQ depth products such as 

TotalView, ensures product and policy 

consistency. As mentioned above, the 

NASDAQ Level 2 data feed contains two 

different entitlements (the OpenView 

entitlement and Level 2 entitlement). 

The data feed is the physical stream of 

data, whereas the entitlement is the 

subscription for which customers signup. 

The NASDAQ Level 2 entitlement 

was created in 1983 at a time when all 

real-time products fell under the 

auspices of the UTP Plan. Subsequently, 

NASDAQ created a separate security 

information processor for UTP data in 

2002 and petitioned the SEC to remove 

the Level 2 entitlement from the UTP 

Plan. When NASDAQ received 

exchange status in 2006, Level 2 data 

was removed from the UTP plan. 

Currently, the Level 2 data feed carries 

top-of-file exchange participant 

quotations for both NASDAQ and 

Consolidated Quotation System issues. 

This information is also carried in 

TotalView along with the full 

participant quotes. As such, Level 2 is 

a subset of TotalView data. Like 

TotalView and NASDAQ’s other data 

products, the Level 2 data feed is offered 

in a full range of network protocols. 

In addition to the new distributor 

fees, NASDAQ is expanding the direct 

access fee to customers who subscribe to 

the Level 2 entitlement. As with the 

disparity in the TotalView distributor 

fee, customers who access only the 

Level 2 information through the Level 2 

entitlement directly from the Exchange 

are not charged a direct access fee (as 

‘‘Direct Access’’ is defined in NASDAQ 

Rule 7019). NASDAQ is seeking to 

remedy this so that these customers are 

charged the same direct access fee as are 

customers of TotalView and OpenView. 

It is important to note that customers 

will only be charged one direct access 

fee for NASDAQ-listed securities and 

one direct access fee for non-NASDAQ 

listed securities, paralleling the 

TotalView and OpenView direct access 

entitlements. 

The Exchange believes that the 

harmonization of the distributor fee and 

direct access fee makes NASDAQ’s 

depth distributor fees and direct access 

fees consistent across products and 

allows NASDAQ to assess a fair price 

for the value delivered through all of 

NASDAQ’s depth products. Firms 

would pay only one distributor fee and 

one direct access fee for a non-NASDAQ 

listed securities entitlement, regardless 

of the number of feeds consumed. 

Additionally, firms would only pay one 

distributor fee and one direct access fee 

for a NASDAQ-listed securities 

entitlement, regardless of the number of 

feeds consumed. This proposed rule 

change also has no affect on 

professional and non-professional user 

fees, as this change is aimed solely at 

the harmonization of distributor and 

direct access fees. 

NASDAQ will implement the changes 

made by this proposed rule change on 

September 1, 2010. 

2. Statutory Basis 

NASDAQ believes that the proposed 

rule change is consistent with the 

provisions of Section 6 of the Act,4 in 

general, and with Section 6(b)(4) of the 

Act,5 in particular, in that it provides an 

equitable allocation of reasonable fees 

among users and recipients of NASDAQ 

data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the 

Commission granted self-regulatory 

organizations and broker-dealers 

increased authority and flexibility to 

offer new and unique market data to the 

public. It was believed that this 

authority would expand the amount of 

data available to consumers, and also 

spur innovation and competition for the 

provision of market data. 

The Commission concluded that 

Regulation NMS—by deregulating the 

market in proprietary data—would itself 

further the Act’s goals of facilitating 

efficiency and competition: 

[E]fficiency is promoted when brokerdealers who do not need the data beyond the 

prices, sizes, market center identifications of 

the NBBO and consolidated last sale 

information are not required to receive (and 

pay for) such data. The Commission also 

believes that efficiency is promoted when 

broker-dealers may choose to receive (and 

pay for) additional market data based on their 

own internal analysis of the need for such 

data.6

By removing ‘‘unnecessary regulatory 

restrictions’’ on the ability of exchanges 

to sell their own data, Regulation NMS 

advanced the goals of the Act and the 

principles reflected in its legislative 

history. If the free market should 

determine whether proprietary data is 

sold to broker-dealers at all, it follows 

that the price at which such data is sold 

should be set by the market as well. 

On July 21, 2010, President Barack 

Obama signed into law H.R. 4173, the 

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 

Consumer Protection Act of 2010 

(‘‘Dodd-Frank Act’’), which amended 

Section 19 of the Act. Among other 

things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank 

Act amended paragraph (A) of Section 

19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the 

phrase ‘‘on any person, whether or not 

the person is a member of the selfregulatory organization’’ after ‘‘due, fee 

or other charge imposed by the selfregulatory organization.’’ As a result, all 

SRO rule proposals establishing or 

changing dues, fees, or other charges are 

immediately effective upon filing 

regardless of whether such dues, fees, or 

other charges are imposed on members 

of the SRO, non-members, or both. 

Section 916 further amended paragraph 

(C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Exchange 

Act to read, in pertinent part, ‘‘At any 

time within the 60-day period beginning 

on the date of filing of such a proposed 

rule change in accordance with the 

provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section 

19(b)], the Commission summarily may 

temporarily suspend the change in the 

rules of the self-regulatory organization 

made thereby, if it appears to the 

Commission that such action is 

necessary or appropriate in the public 

interest, for the protection of investors, 

or otherwise in furtherance of the 

purposes of this title. If the Commission 

takes such action, the Commission shall 

institute proceedings under paragraph 

(2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine 

whether the proposed rule should be 

approved or disapproved.’’ 

NASDAQ believes that these 

amendments to Section 19 of the Act 

reflect Congress’s intent to allow the 

Commission to rely upon the forces of 

competition to ensure that fees for 

market data are reasonable and 

equitably allocated. Although Section 

19(b) had formerly authorized 

immediate effectiveness for a ‘‘due, fee 

or other charge imposed by the selfregulatory organization,’’ the 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with NOTICES
57316 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 181 / Monday, September 20, 2010 / Notices 

Commission adopted a policy and 

subsequently a rule stipulating that fees 

for data and other products available to 

persons that are not members of the selfregulatory organization must be 

approved by the Commission after first 

being published for comment. At the 

time, the Commission supported the 

adoption of the policy and the rule by 

pointing out that unlike members, 

whose representation in self-regulatory 

organization governance was mandated 

by the Act, non-members should be 

given the opportunity to comment on 

fees before being required to pay them, 

and that the Commission should 

specifically approve all such fees. 

NASDAQ believes that the amendment 

to Section 19 reflects Congress’s 

conclusion that the evolution of selfregulatory organization governance and 

competitive market structure have 

rendered the Commission’s prior policy 

on non-member fees obsolete. 

Specifically, many exchanges have 

evolved from member-owned not-forprofit corporations into for-profit 

investor-owned corporations (or 

subsidiaries of investor-owned 

corporations). Accordingly, exchanges 

no longer have narrow incentives to 

manage their affairs for the exclusive 

benefit of their members, but rather 

have incentives to maximize the appeal 

of their products to all customers, 

whether members or non-members, so 

as to broaden distribution and grow 

revenues. Moreover, we believe that the 

change also reflects an endorsement of 

the Commission’s determinations that 

reliance on competitive markets is an 

appropriate means to ensure equitable 

and reasonable prices. Simply put, the 

change reflects a presumption that all 

fee changes should be permitted to take 

effect immediately, since the level of all 

fees are constrained by competitive 

forces. 

The recent decision of the United 

States Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton v. 

SEC, No. 09–1042 (DC Cir. 2010), 

although reviewing a Commission 

decision made prior to the effective date 

of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the 

Commission’s reliance upon 

competitive markets to set reasonable 

and equitably allocated fees for market 

data. ‘‘In fact, the legislative history 

indicates that the Congress intended 

that the market system ‘evolve through 

the interplay of competitive forces as 

unnecessary regulatory restrictions are 

removed’ and that the SEC wield its 

regulatory power ‘in those situations 

where competition may not be 

sufficient,’ such as in the creation of a 

‘consolidated transactional reporting 

system.’ NetCoaltion, at 15 (quoting H.R. 

Rep. No. 94–229, at 92 (1975), as 

reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 

323). The court’s conclusions about 

Congressional intent are therefore 

reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act 

amendments, which create a 

presumption that exchange fees, 

including market data fees, may take 

effect immediately, without prior 

Commission approval, and that the 

Commission should take action to 

suspend a fee change and institute a 

proceeding to determine whether the fee 

change should be approved or 

disapproved only where the 

Commission has concerns that the 

change may not be consistent with the 

Act. 

B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement on Burden on Competition 

NASDAQ does not believe that the 

proposed rule change will result in any 

burden on competition that is not 

necessary or appropriate in furtherance 

of the purposes of the Act, as amended. 

Notwithstanding its determination that 

the Commission may rely upon 

competition to establish fair and 

equitably allocated fees for market data, 

the NetCoaltion court found that the 

Commission had not, in that case, 

compiled a record that adequately 

supported its conclusion that the market 

for the data at issue in the case was 

competitive. For the reasons discussed 

above, NASDAQ believes that the DoddFrank Act amendments to Section 19 

materially alter the scope of the 

Commission’s review of future market 

data filings, by creating a presumption 

that all fees may take effect 

immediately, without prior analysis by 

the Commission of the competitive 

environment. Even in the absence of 

this important statutory change, 

however, NASDAQ believes that a 

record may readily be established to 

demonstrate the competitive nature of 

the market in question. 

There is intense competition between 

trading platforms that provide 

transaction execution and routing 

services and proprietary data products. 

Transaction execution and proprietary 

data products are complementary in that 

market data is both an input and a 

byproduct of the execution service. In 

fact, market data and trade execution are 

a paradigmatic example of joint 

products with joint costs. The decision 

whether and on which platform to post 

an order will depend on the attributes 

of the platform where the order can be 

posted, including the execution fees, 

data quality and price and distribution 

of its data products. Without the 

prospect of a taking order seeing and 

reacting to a posted order on a particular 

platform, the posting of the order would 

accomplish little. Without trade 

executions, exchange data products 

cannot exist. Data products are valuable 

to many end users only insofar as they 

provide information that end users 

expect will assist them or their 

customers in making trading decisions. 

The costs of producing market data 

include not only the costs of the data 

distribution infrastructure, but also the 

costs of designing, maintaining, and 

operating the exchange’s transaction 

execution platform and the cost of 

regulating the exchange to ensure its fair 

operation and maintain investor 

confidence. The total return that a 

trading platform earns reflects the 

revenues it receives from both products 

and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, 

an exchange’s customers view the costs 

of transaction executions and of data as 

a unified cost of doing business with the 

exchange. A broker-dealer will direct 

orders to a particular exchange only if 

the expected revenues from executing 

trades on the exchange exceed net 

transaction execution costs and the cost 

of data that the broker-dealer chooses to 

buy to support its trading decisions (or 

those of its customers). The choice of 

data products is, in turn, a product of 

the value of the products in making 

profitable trading decisions. If the cost 

of the product exceeds its expected 

value, the broker-dealer will choose not 

to buy it. Moreover, as a broker-dealer 

chooses to direct fewer orders to a 

particular exchange, the value of the 

product to that broker-dealer decreases, 

for two reasons. First, the product will 

contain less information, because 

executions of the broker-dealer’s orders 

will not be reflected in it. Second, and 

perhaps more important, the product 

will be less valuable to that brokerdealer because it does not provide 

information about the venue to which it 

is directing its orders. Data from the 

competing venue to which the brokerdealer is directing orders will become 

correspondingly more valuable. 

Thus, a super-competitive increase in 

the fees charged for either transactions 

or data has the potential to impair 

revenues from both products. ‘‘No one 

disputes that competition for order flow 

is ‘fierce’.’’ NetCoalition at 24. However, 

the existence of fierce competition for 

order flow implies a high degree of price 

sensitivity on the part of broker-dealers 

with order flow, since they may readily 

reduce costs by directing orders toward 

the lowest-cost trading venues. A 

broker-dealer that shifted its order flow 

from one platform to another in 

response to order execution price 

differentials would both reduce the 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 181 / Monday, September 20, 2010 / Notices 57317 

value of that platform’s market data and 

reduce its own need to consume data 

from the disfavored platform. Similarly, 

if a platform increases its market data 

fees, the change will affect the overall 

cost of doing business with the 

platform, and affected broker-dealers 

will assess whether they can lower their 

trading costs by directing orders 

elsewhere and thereby lessening the 

need for the more expensive data. 

Analyzing the cost of market data 

distribution in isolation from the cost of 

all of the inputs supporting the creation 

of market data will inevitably 

underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, 

because it is impossible to create data 

without a fast, technologically robust, 

and well-regulated execution system, 

system costs and regulatory costs affect 

the price of market data. It would be 

equally misleading, however, to 

attribute all of the exchange’s costs to 

the market data portion of an exchange’s 

joint product. Rather, all of the 

exchange’s costs are incurred for the 

unified purposes of attracting order 

flow, executing and/or routing orders, 

and generating and selling data about 

market activity. The total return that an 

exchange earns reflects the revenues it 

receives from the joint products and the 

total costs of the joint products. 

Competition among trading platforms 

can be expected to constrain the 

aggregate return each platform earns 

from the sale of its joint products, but 

different platforms may choose from a 

range of possible, and equally 

reasonable, pricing strategies as the 

means of recovering total costs. For 

example, some platform may choose to 

pay rebates to attract orders, charge 

relatively low prices for market 

information (or provide information free 

of charge) and charge relatively high 

prices for accessing posted liquidity. 

Other platforms may choose a strategy 

of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) 

to attract orders, setting relatively high 

prices for market information, and 

setting relatively low prices for 

accessing posted liquidity. In this 

environment, there is no economic basis 

for regulating maximum prices for one 

of the joint products in an industry in 

which suppliers face competitive 

constraints with regard to the joint 

offering. This would be akin to strictly 

regulating the price that an automobile 

manufacturer can charge for car sound 

systems despite the existence of a highly 

competitive market for cars and the 

availability of after-market alternatives 

to the manufacturer-supplied system. 

The market for market data products 

is competitive and inherently 

contestable because there is fierce 

competition for the inputs necessary to 

the creation of proprietary data and 

strict pricing discipline for the 

proprietary products themselves. 

Numerous exchanges compete with 

each other for listings, trades, and 

market data itself, providing virtually 

limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs 

who wish to produce and distribute 

their own market data. This proprietary 

data is produced by each individual 

exchange, as well as other entities, in a 

vigorously competitive market. 

Broker-dealers currently have 

numerous alternative venues for their 

order flow, including ten self-regulatory 

organization (‘‘SRO’’) markets, as well as 

internalizing broker-dealers (‘‘BDs’’) and 

various forms of alternative trading 

systems (‘‘ATSs’’), including dark pools 

and electronic communication networks 

(‘‘ECNs’’). Each SRO market competes to 

produce transaction reports via trade 

executions, and two FINRA-regulated 

Trade Reporting Facilities (‘‘TRFs’’) 

compete to attract internalized 

transaction reports. Competitive markets 

for order flow, executions, and 

transaction reports provide pricing 

discipline for the inputs of proprietary 

data products. 

The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, 

and ATSs that currently produce 

proprietary data or are currently capable 

of producing it provides further pricing 

discipline for proprietary data products. 

Each SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is 

currently permitted to produce 

proprietary data products, and many 

currently do or have announced plans to 

do so, including NASDAQ, NYSE, 

NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS. 

Any ATS or BD can combine with any 

other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs or BDs 

to produce joint proprietary data 

products. Additionally, order routers 

and market data vendors can facilitate 

single or multiple broker-dealers’ 

production of proprietary data products. 

The potential sources of proprietary 

products are virtually limitless. 

The fact that proprietary data from 

ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-pass 

SROs is significant in two respects. 

First, non-SROs can compete directly 

with SROs for the production and sale 

of proprietary data products, as BATS 

and Arca did before registering as 

exchanges by publishing proprietary 

book data on the Internet. Second, 

because a single order or transaction 

report can appear in an SRO proprietary 

product, a non-SRO proprietary 

product, or both, the data available in 

proprietary products is exponentially 

greater than the actual number of orders 

and transaction reports that exist in the 

marketplace. 

Market data vendors provide another 

form of price discipline for proprietary 

data products because they control the 

primary means of access to end users. 

Vendors impose price restraints based 

upon their business models. For 

example, vendors such as Bloomberg 

and Reuters that assess a surcharge on 

data they sell may refuse to offer 

proprietary products that end users will 

not purchase in sufficient numbers. 

Internet portals, such as Google, impose 

a discipline by providing only data that 

will enable them to attract ‘‘eyeballs’’ 

that contribute to their advertising 

revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as 

Schwab and Fidelity, offer their 

customers proprietary data only if it 

promotes trading and generates 

sufficient commission revenue. 

Although the business models may 

differ, these vendors’ pricing discipline 

is the same: they can simply refuse to 

purchase any proprietary data product 

that fails to provide sufficient value. 

NASDAQ and other producers of 

proprietary data products must 

understand and respond to these 

varying business models and pricing 

disciplines in order to market 

proprietary data products successfully. 

In addition to the competition and 

price discipline described above, the 

market for proprietary data products is 

also highly contestable because market 

entry is rapid, inexpensive, and 

profitable. The history of electronic 

trading is replete with examples of 

entrants that swiftly grew into some of 

the largest electronic trading platforms 

and proprietary data producers: 

Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, 

Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, 

BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A 

proliferation of dark pools and other 

ATSs operate profitably with 

fragmentary shares of consolidated 

market volume. 

Regulation NMS, by deregulating the 

market for proprietary data, has 

increased the contestability of that 

market. While broker-dealers have 

previously published their proprietary 

data individually, Regulation NMS 

encourages market data vendors and 

broker-dealers to produce proprietary 

products cooperatively in a manner 

never before possible. Multiple market 

data vendors already have the capability 

to aggregate data and disseminate it on 

a profitable scale, including Bloomberg, 

and Thomson-Reuters. 

The court in NetCoalition concluded 

that the Commission had failed to 

demonstrate that the market for market 

data was competitive based on the 

reasoning of the Commission’s 

NetCoalition order because, in the 

court’s view, the Commission had not 

adequately demonstrated that the depthof-book data at issue in the case is used 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with NOTICES
57318 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 181 / Monday, September 20, 2010 / Notices 

7 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii). 

8 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

to attract order flow. NASDAQ believes, 

however, that evidence not before the 

court clearly demonstrates that 

availability of data attracts order flow. 

For example, as of July 2010, 92 of the 

top 100 broker-dealers by shares 

executed on NASDAQ consumed NQDS 

and 80 of the top 100 broker-dealers 

consumed TotalView. During that 

month, the NQDS-users were 

responsible for 94.44% of the orders 

entered into NASDAQ and TotalView 

users were responsible for 92.98%. 

Competition among platforms has 

driven NASDAQ continually to improve 

its platform data offerings and to cater 

to customers’ data needs. For example, 

NASDAQ has developed and 

maintained multiple delivery 

mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and 

compression) that enable customers to 

receive data in the form and manner 

they prefer and at the lowest cost to 

them. NASDAQ offers front end 

applications such as its ‘‘Bookviewer’’ to 

help customers utilize data. NASDAQ 

has created new products like 

TotalView Aggregate to complement 

TotalView ITCH and Level 2, because 

offering data in multiple formatting 

allows NASDAQ to better fit customer 

needs. NASDAQ offers data via multiple 

extranet providers, thereby helping to 

reduce network and total cost for its 

data products. NASDAQ has developed 

an online administrative system to 

provide customers transparency into 

their data feed requests and streamline 

data usage reporting. NASDAQ has also 

expanded its Enterprise License options 

that reduce the administrative burden 

and costs to firms that purchase market 

data. 

Despite these enhancements and a 

dramatic increase in message traffic, 

NASDAQ’s fees for market data have 

remained flat. In fact, as a percent of 

total customer costs, NASDAQ data fees 

have fallen relative to other data usage 

costs—including bandwidth, 

programming, and infrastructure—that 

have risen. The same holds true for 

execution services; despite numerous 

enhancements to NASDAQ’s trading 

platform, absolute and relative trading 

costs have declined. Platform 

competition has intensified as new 

entrants have emerged, constraining 

prices for both executions and for data. 

C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement on Comments on the 

Proposed Rule Change Received From 

Members, Participants, or Others 

Written comments were neither 

solicited nor received. 

III. Date of Effectiveness of the 

Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 

Commission Action 

The foregoing rule change has become 

effective pursuant to Section 

19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.7 At any time 

within 60 days of the filing of the 

proposed rule change, the Commission 

summarily may temporarily suspend 

such rule change if it appears to the 

Commission that such action is 

necessary or appropriate in the public 

interest, for the protection of investors, 

or otherwise in furtherance of the 

purposes of the Act. If the Commission 

takes such action, the Commission shall 

institute proceedings to determine 

whether the proposed rule should be 

approved or disapproved. 

IV. Solicitation of Comments 

Interested persons are invited to 

submit written data, views, and 

arguments concerning the foregoing, 

including whether the proposed rule 

change is consistent with the Act. 

Comments may be submitted by any of 

the following methods: 

Electronic Comments 

• Use the Commission’s Internet 

comment form (http://www.sec.gov/ 

rules/sro.shtml); or 

• Send an e-mail to rulecomments@sec.gov. Please include File 

Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–110 on the 

subject line. 

Paper Comments 

• Send paper comments in triplicate 

to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, 

Securities and Exchange Commission, 

100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 

20549–1090. 

All submissions should refer to File 

Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–110. This 

file number should be included on the 

subject line if e-mail is used. To help the 

Commission process and review your 

comments more efficiently, please use 

only one method. The Commission will 

post all comments on the Commission’s 

Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/ 

rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the 

submission, all subsequent 

amendments, all written statements 

with respect to the proposed rule 

change that are filed with the 

Commission, and all written 

communications relating to the 

proposed rule change between the 

Commission and any person, other than 

those that may be withheld from the 

public in accordance with the 

provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be 

available for Web site viewing and 

printing in the Commission’s Public 

Reference Room, on official business 

days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 

3 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be 

available for inspection and copying at 

the principal office of the Exchange. All 

comments received will be posted 

without change; the Commission does 

not edit personal identifying 

information from submissions. You 

should submit only information that 

you wish to make available publicly. All 

submissions should refer to File 

Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–110 and 

should be submitted on or before 

October 12, 2010. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.8

Florence E. Harmon, 

Deputy Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2010–23385 Filed 9–17–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8010–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–62882; File No. SR–NSCC– 

2010–09] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; 

National Securities Clearing 

Corporation; Notice of Filing of 

Proposed Rule Change Regarding the 

Creation of a Universal Trade Capture 

Application and Automated Special 

Representative Facility 

September 10, 2010. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

(‘‘Act’’),1 notice is hereby given that on 

August 30, 2010, the National Securities 

Clearing Corporation (‘‘NSCC’’) filed 

with the Securities and Exchange 

Commission (‘‘Commission’’) and on 

September 9, 2010, amended the 

proposed rule change described in Items 

I and II below, which Items have been 

prepared primarily by NSCC. The 

Commission is publishing this notice to 

solicit comments on the rule change 

from interested parties. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Terms of Substance of 

the Proposed Rule Change 

The proposed rule change would 

modify NSCC’s rules and procedures 

regarding the creation of a Universal 

Trade Capture application and an 

automated Special Representative 

facility. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with NOTICES