J-S06013-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEFAN ANTHONY BOURNE

Appellant No. 558 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 23, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0006184-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MARCH 30, 2016

Appellant, Stefan Anthony Bourne, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered by the Honorable Richard K. Renn, Court of Common Pleas 

of York County. Additionally, Bourne’s court-appointed counsel, Christopher 

D. Moore, Esquire, filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We affirm the 

judgment of sentence and grant Attorney Moore’s petition to withdraw.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. Bourne’s case 

was scheduled to proceed to trial; however, after the jury was selected, but 

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*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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before the trial began, Bourne elected to enter “open” guilty pleas1to 

charges of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance2and 

firearms not to be carried without a license.3 The trial court, the Honorable 

Richard K. Renn, subsequently imposed an aggregate term of 31⁄2 to 7 years’ 

imprisonment. 

On the day of the sentencing, Bourne’s former counsel, Bruce Blocher, 

Esquire, filed a motion to reconsider the sentence. Bourne later filed a pro se 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied both motions after 

holding a hearing. Thereafter, Bourne filed a direct appeal to this Court and 

Attorney Moore was appointed to represent him. Attorney Moore 

subsequently filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and an Anders brief. 

We begin by addressing Attorney Moore’s petition to withdraw. If 

counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and wishes to withdraw 

representation on appeal, he must follow certain steps.

First, counsel must petition the court for leave to withdraw 

and state that after making a conscientious examination of 

the record, he has determined that the appeal is frivolous; 

second, he must file a brief referring to any issues in the 

record of arguable merit; and third, he must furnish a copy 

of the brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to 

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1 An “open” plea agreement does not include a negotiated sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Vega, 850 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2004).

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). 
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retain new counsel or to himself raise any additional points 

he deems worthy of the Superior Court's attention.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 351 (citation omitted). Substantial compliance with 

these requirements is sufficient. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 

1287, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2007). Once counsel has met his obligations, “it 

then becomes the responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full 

examination of the proceedings and make an independent judgment to 

decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 

355 n.5 (citation omitted). 

Attorney Moore has substantially complied with the technical 

requirements of Anders as articulated in Santiago. Additionally, Attorney 

Moore sent a copy of the Anders brief to Bourne, as well as a letter 

explaining to Bourne that he has the right to proceed pro se or retain new 

counsel. Bourne has not filed a response. 

We will now conduct an independent evaluation of the record to 

determine the accuracy of Attorney Moore’s averment that this appeal is 

wholly frivolous. Attorney Moore set forth a single issue in the Anders brief, 

namely, “Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea?” Anders Brief, at 4 (unnecessary 

capitalization omitted). 

“Our law is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently entered.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 

A.2d 517, 522 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). “There is no absolute 
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right to withdraw a guilty plea, and the decision as to whether to allow a 

defendant to do so is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.” 

Id. (citation omitted). A trial court can only grant a post-sentence motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea upon a showing of prejudice that amounts to 

“manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 383 

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “A plea rises to the level of manifest 

injustice when it was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or 

unintelligently.” Id. (citation omitted). 

In order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty 

plea colloquy must affirmatively show that the defendant 

understood what the plea connoted and its consequences. This 

determination is to be made by examining the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea. A plea of guilty 

will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances surrounding the 

entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had a full 

understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea and 

that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea. 

Commonwealth v. Rush, 909 A.2d 805, 808 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation 

omitted). “Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was 

aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Id. 

(citation omitted). 

This Court cannot overturn a trial court’s order denying a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea absent an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth 

v. Mobley, 581 A.2d 949, 952 (Pa. Super. 1990). In the present case, we 

do not discern any abuse of discretion on behalf of the trial court. At the 

hearing regarding his pro se motion, Bourne argued that he should be 

allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to the firearms not to be carried without 
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a license charge because trial counsel did not adequately represent his 

interests. See N.T., Hearing, 4/14/15, at 4, 7. This claim, however, does not 

merit any relief because claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are generally 

not ripe until collateral review, and none of the exceptions to this rule are 

applicable in the instant case. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 

562, 576 (Pa. 2013). We therefore decline to address Bourne’s allegations of 

ineffectiveness of counsel at this time.4

While under oath at the hearing, Bourne also argued that he should be 

allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to the firearms not to be carried without 

a license charge because the admissions he made during his plea colloquy 

were not true. See N.T., Hearing, 4/14/15, at 4, 7, 11. This argument is also 

meritless because “[t]he longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a 

defendant may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while 

under oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies.” Pollard, 832 

A.2d at 523 (citation omitted). If a person elects to plead guilty, “he is 

bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and he 

may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the 

statements he made at his plea colloquy.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, 

Bourne explicitly stated during his plea colloquy that he had the firearm in 

question on his person. See N.T., Hearing, 4/14/15, at 9. Bourne may not 

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4 Bourne may still raise this claim in a petition timely filed pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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now contradict his sworn testimony in order to obtain relief. See Pollard, 

832 A.2d at 523. 

Our review of the record indicates that Bourne was fully apprised of 

the consequences of his pleas during his oral colloquy and entered into both 

pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. After examining the issue 

contained in the Anders brief and undertaking our own independent review 

of the record, we agree with Attorney Moore’s assessment that the appeal is 

wholly frivolous. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Permission to withdraw as counsel 

granted. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/30/2016