### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 00 64 -C R

______________________________ GENNA RI O FE RRAL EZ , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appea l from the 114th J udicial District Court

Smit h County , Texas Trial Court No. 114-2145- 07

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice MoseleyOrig inally appea led t o the Twelfth Court of Appeals, this case was transfer red to thi s Court 1 by the Tex as S upreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization eff orts. See T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 73.001 (Ve rnon 2005). We a re unawa re of any conflict be tween pr ece dent of the Tw elfth Court of Appe als and that of this Court on any rele vant issue. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 41.3. 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON A ju r y f o u n d G e n n ar io F e r

r a le z ( th e a

p p e ll an t) g u il ty

o f dr iv in g w h il e in to xic a te d (DWI ). See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 49.04 (Ve rnon 2003). The ap p el l an t admi tted he had be en twice previously , finally , and sequentially convicted of DWI

. This ma de the appe llant's c urre nt conviction a fe lony offe nse. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 49 .0 9 ( Ve rn on Sup p. 20 08 ). Th e appel lant a lso

a dmi tte d h e ha d b e e n tw ic e pr e vio us ly , fin a lly , an d seq ue nti a lly c on vic te d of a fe lony of fe ns e . Thi s fac t thus made the appe llant eligible f or punishment applicable to first-deg re e fe l o n i es ; the jury assessed the appellant's punishment at seve nty -five y ear s' imprisonment. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp. 2008). The appellant now c ontends that the evide nce a dmitted at trial ag ainst him was leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to support his convictio n and that the tria l court e rre d by

admitting unsolicited evide nce of a prior f

elony DWI convi ct i o n during the g uil t/i nn oc e nc e ph a se of

the tr ia l. We ov e rr

ule the se iss ue s a

nd a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ' s ju dg me nt. 1 I. Evid entiary Suf

fi ciency I n his first two issues, the appellant contends the e vidence is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to establish that he oper ated a motor vehicle w hile intox icated. A leg al s u fficiency

revie w re quires an a

ppellate c ourt to ask " whether , afte r viewingthe evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the prosec ution, anyrational trier of fa ct could have found3

th e ess ent ial ele men ts of th e cri me bey on d a re aso nab le d oubt ." J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 31 9 (1 97 9)

. Th is sta

nd ard mand a te s the re vie wi ng c ourt to a c c or d d e fe re nc e to t he fa c t- fi nd e r' s d

uty to r esolve conflicts in te stimony and other evidenc e. Cla y ton v . S tat e , 2 3 5 S. W. 3 d 7 7 2 , 7 7 8 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2007). This review standard require s an ex amination of all the e vidence , both that which was prope rly

admitted and t

h a t w h ic h was improper ly

admitted, to determine w hether the cumulative fo rc e of a ll the e vid e nc e (d ir e c t, ci rc ums tanti a l, or bo th) su pp or ts the ve rd ic t whe n suc h ev ide nc e is viewed in the light most fa vorable to that verdict. Id. ; se e als o W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 235 S.W .3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). I n leg al suffic iency claims, it is often helpful to measure the evidenc e ag ainst the eleme nts of the offe nse with the same kind of analy sis as that applied in the test for a hy pothetically -cor

rec t jury char g e for

the case. Ma lik

v . S tat e , 9 53 S.W. 2d

23 4, 24 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). Th e hy

po the tic a lly

- c or

re c t jury c ha rg e " se ts o ut t

he la w, is a uth or ize d b y

the ind ic tme nt, d o es n o t u n n ec es s ar i l y

i n cr ea s e t h e S t at e's b u rd en o f p ro o f o r u n n ec es s ar i l y re s t ri ct t h e S t at e's theories of

liability , an d adequately descr ibes the par

ticular off

ense f or which the defe ndant was tr ied ." Id. A fa ctual suff

iciency revie w has subtle differ ence s. "E vidence may be fa ctually insufficient if : ' 1) it is so wea

k as to be c le arl y wr on g and manif e stl y un jus t or 2) the a dv e rs e fi nd ingis a g a ins t th e great wei ght and prep on dera nce of th e avai lab le e vi den ce.'" Be rry v . S tat e , 233 S.W .3d 847, 854 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 23 S.W .3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). " Such

a f a c t u a l su ffi cie ncy

revi ew req ui res th e rev iew in g court to con si der a ll of t he ev id ence. " I d.4

(q u o t i n g Ma rsh all

v . S tat e , 210 S.W .3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). " A clea rly wrongand

un jus t ve rd ic t oc c ur s wh e re the jur y ' s fi nd ing is manif

e stl y un jus t, s ho c ks the c on sc ie nc e , o r c le a rl y dem on st rat es b ias ." Id. (q u o t i n g S e l l s v . Stat e , 1 2 1 S .W.3d 748, 754 (Tex. C rim. App. 2003); Sa nte lla n v . S

tat e , 939 S.W .2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). L ike the leg al suffic iency revie w proce ss, the hy

pothetically -cor

rec t jury char g e construc t can be employ ed in ana ly zing the fa ctual sufficie ncy

of the e vidence

. Ve

ga v . S tat e , 267 S.W .3d 912, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Our lawstates that a pe rson " commits an offe nse i f t he per son is intox icated w hile operating

a mo to r veh icl e in a pu bl ic p lac e." T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 49 .0 4. Th e te rm " int oxic a te d" me a ns , among other thing s, "not having the normal use of mental or phy sical fa culties b y re as o n o f t he introduction of alcohol, a controlled substanc e, a dr ug , a dang erous dr

ug , a combination of two or

mor e of tho se su

bs tanc e s, or any oth e r su bs tanc e int o the bo dy

. . . ." T EX . P EN A L C O DE ANN . § 49.01(2)( A) (V ernon 2003) . Th e re l ev an t part of the indictment a lleg ed the a ppellant had "ope rate [d] a motor vehic le in a public plac e while . . . intoxi cate d by not having the normal use of

m en t al o r p h y s i ca l fa cu l t i es b y re as o n o f t h e i n t ro d u ct i o n o f al co h o l , a co n t ro l l eds u b s t an ce , a d ru g,

a da ng e ro us dr

ug , a c omb inatio n o f t

wo or mor e of tho se su bs tanc e s, or

any oth e r s ub sta

nc e int o h is bo dy

. . . . " Th e a

pp lic a ble hy po the tic a lly -c or

re c t jur y c ha rg e wo uld

the re fo re re qu ir e the Sta te to bring forth proof

of t he following elements: that (1) the a ppellant, (2) ope rate d, (3) a motor vehicle, (4) in a public pla ce, ( 5) while intox icated. With this framewor k in mind, we turn now to a revie w of the e vid e nc e a dmi tte d at tr ia l.Ha rtman a lso tol d th e jur

y that he pr e vio us ly wor ked as a de pu ty wi th t he Smith Co un ty 2 Sheriff' s Depa

rtment for thre e and a

half y ear s. H artm anr e p o rte d

th a t F e r r a le z d id n o t s h o w an y

v e rti c a l ny s ta g mus . V e rti c a l g a ze 3 ny stag mus (VGN) testing r esults can sug g est the pre sence of ce rtain ty pes or c lasses of illeg al narc otics, and/or the presenc e of an ex tremely high le vel of a lcohol. Se e ge ne ra lly State v. Nee sley , 5 Robert Har

tman, a troope r for

the Texas Depa

rtment of Public Safety

(DPS) since 2004, te sti fi e d f ir st. Ha rtman told the jur

y that he ha d b e e n o n p a tr ol t he e ve nin g of

Au g us t 8, 20 07 , in 2 Smit h County , Texas, when he stoppe d the appe llant's motor ve hicle b ec au s e t h e vehicle had a defe ctive stoplamp. See T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 547.323 (Ve rnon 1999). Ha rtman also said he witnessed F err alez make a turn without first signa ling the tur n. See T EX . T RAN SP . C ODE ANN . § 5 4 5

. 1 0 4 (V ern o n1 9 9 9 ). Ha rt m an t o l d t h e j u ry t h at t h e ap p el l an t s a i d h e h adb ee np ai n t i n g a residenc e ea

rlier in the da

y . During his roadside discussion with the appe llant, Hartman r eporte d smelling the " strong odor" of alc ohol coming f rom the appe llant's br ea t h . The a ppellant later admitted to having had one be er a fter he had stopped wor king e arlier

in the day . He a lso admitted to having been spr ay i n g lacque r paint all day , which the a ppellant believe d had made him feel "hi gh." Hart m an asked Fer rale z to perform seve ral standa rdized field-sobrie ty

tests. During the ho ri zon ta l g a ze ny sta g mus (H GN ) t e st, Ha rtman r e po rt e dly

ob se rv e d the a

pp e lla nt sh ow six of

six clues, whic h Har

tman testified was a st rong indicator that the a ppellant was intoxi cate d. Acc ording to H artman, a

pe rs on fa ils the HG

N te st if he sh ow s a s fe w a s f our o ut o f t

he six c lue s. Ha

rtman s a id he believe d Fe rra lez had more than one beer to drink on the nig ht in question. 3239 S.W .3d 780, 788 & n.3 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Ke ller, J ., concur ring ) (obse rvation of ve rtical ny stag mus later conf

irmed by laboratory

testing showingdefe ndant had ing ested c ocaine and mari hu ana ); Bu rk

e tt v . S tat e , 17 9 S

. W.3d 18, 23 (Tex. App.—S an Antonio 2005, no pet.) ( police office r used VG

N testing to look for sig ns of excessive alc ohol consumption). The a ppellant was una

ble to perf

orm the t hird test, descr ibed by the officer as the walk- and- 4 turn test. When asked why

he had not be en using a re s p i rator w hile spray ing la cquer

paint, the 5 appellant r eporte dly

st at ed t hat he ha d run out of re spirator filter s and there fore had to spray the lac qu er wi th ou t th e us e of pr ote c tiv e e qu ipm e nt. An inv e nto ry

se arc h o f t

he a pp e lla nt' s v e hic le reve aled a

new pa ckag e of r espirator filters on the fr ont seat of the a ppellant' s vehicle. 6 Har tman next asked the appe llant to perfor m the walk-a

nd-turn test. T h e ap p el l ant made

sever al er rors (incl u d i n g an inability to maintain his balance during the instruction phase) and ult imate ly

a dmi tte d th a t he c ou ld n ot c omplet e th e tes t be c a us e he wa s h ig h o n la c qu e r f ume s,

su g g e sti ngto H artman th a t th e a pp e lla nt h a d f a ile d th a t f

ie ld- so br ie ty

te st. 4 Har tman then aske d the appe llant w h et her he believed it wa s safe for him to have be en dri v i n g; t h e ap p el l an tre s p o n d ed , "N o , n o tre al l y . " Ba s edo nt h e i n t e r v i e w s an d t h e ap p el l an t 's 5 perf ormanc e duringthe three standardized fie ld-sobriety tests, Hartman c oncluded that the a ppellant had lost the normal use of his mental and/or phy sical faculties, was impaire d, and that he c ould not safe ly operate a motor vehicle. The a ppellant was the n arr ested for DWI . At the jail, the appe llant ref used to provide a

blood specimen for

purposes of te sting the a lcohol conce ntration. On cr oss-examination, Hartman admitted that the a ppellant had not bee n slurring his words on the nig ht in question, that he had not stumbled or stag g ere d as he w alked, that his ey es we re not g lassy or bloodshot, and that he ha d not be en weaving his car a ll over the roa d. Our re view of the7

videotape of

the traf fic stop conf

irms most of these conce ssions by the trooper. H artman a lso stated, in response to de fense counsel' s questioning, that the of fice r obser

ved the appellant " shaking , which is an impairment of phy sical ability , d u e t o h i m s p ray ing pa int lacquer ." We, howe ver, c ould not independe nt ly

observe the appe llant shaking , but the quality of the videota

pe submitted with the appellate rec ord wa s not of the hig hest g rade

. On re -direc t, Hartman told the jury that it is possible f or someone who is hig h on something such as lac quer pa int to lose the normal use of his phy sical and/or mental fac ulties. He also told the jury that not ever

y one he arre sts for DWI has glassy or bloodshot ey es, slurre d speec h, or swer ved all over the roadw ay s. Steven Hodg e, anothe r state troope r with the DPS, testified ab o u t the re levant eve nts he witnessed on August 8, 2007. Hodg e identified the appellant as being the person who was dr iving the ve hic le sto pp e d b y

Ha rtman. Ho dg e ' s p os t- arr e st i nv e nto ry se arc h o f t

he a pp e lla nt' s v e hic le

uncover ed no evide nce of alcoholic be vera g es. Ba rbar a F err alez (B arba

ra) testified on her husband' s behalf. B arba ra ma rried the appellant the month following his a rre st on the curr ent char g e. She told the jury that she had spoke n on the telephone w ith the appellant seve ral times on the day in qu es t i on; he neve r sounded a s if he wa s drunk or intoxi cate d. On cross-e x amination, she admitted that he occa sionally comes home " high" from lac quer a

nd paint fumes.Meca skey and the a ppellant wer e not romantica lly involved. 6 8 Ray sh e ll M e c a sk e y

sh are d a n a pa rtme nt w iththe a

pp e lla nt at th e tim e he was arreste d in

c on ne c tio n w iththi s c a se . She tol d th e jur y that t he app ell ant l e ft

the a pa rtme nt o n th e date in 6 question around 8:45 p.m. to take " some soda and some cr ac k er s" to B arba ra, w ho was sick. Meca skey repor ted that the appe llant did not appea r t o have been dr inking or "hig h" on a

ny thing at the time he lef

t. His demeanor

"w as just like normal ever y day " and she did not believe the appellant

was "h i gh " at the time. She did admit, however , that the appe llant smelled strong ly of paint or lacque r; she eve n had to open se vera l windows to help alleviate the pung ent odor that he had br oug ht with him int o their shar ed apa rtment. After revie wing all the evidenc e using the appr opriate a ppellate standa

rds, we c onclude the jur y ha d b e fo re it b oth

fa c tua lly and le g all y su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to f

ind that ( 1) the a

pp e lla nt, (2) ope rate d, (3) a

motor vehicle , (4 ) in a public plac e, (5) while intox icated. While it is true that there was no e vidence that t h e appe llant was we aving all over the road, ha d bloodshot ey es, wa s slurring his spe ech, or was stumbli ng over himself as he e x ited his vehicle on the nig ht in question, the jury nonetheless ha d befor e it o t her e vidence upon which it could re asonably conclude the appellant wa s gu i l t y o f t he cha rg ed off ense. This e vidence included Ha rtman' s testimony

and the vid e ota pe that c or

ro bo rate d ma

ny fa c ts to wh ic h the of

fi c e r te sti fi e d. We c ann ot sa y thi s a pp e llate

rec ord lea ds us to conclude the jur y ' s verdict wa s manifestly unjust, shocks the conscienc e, or de mon str a te s b ia s. Ac c or din g ly , w e ov e rr ule the a pp e lla nt' s f ir st a nd se c on d is su e s.9

II. Adm itting Evid ence of the Appellant's Pr evious Fe lony DWI Convi ction I n his last point of er

ror, the a ppellant contends the trial court e rre d by admitting, duringthe g uil t/i nn oc e nc e ph a se of tr ia l, uns oli c ite d ev ide nc e of his pr ior fe lony c on vic tio n for DWI . T he State responds by

arguing that the appellant ope ned the door to such questioning. We reviewa trial c ourt' s decision to a dmit or ex clude e x trane ous-offe nse evide nce unde r an abuse of discretion standa

rd. P o w e ll v . Stat e , 63 S.W .3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). "A n ap p el l at e c o u rt wo u l d

m i s ap p l y t h e ap p el l at e ab u s e of d i s cr et i o n s t an d ar d o f r ev i ew b y re v er s i n g a tr ial cou rt 's adm is si bi li ty

deci si on so lel y

bec aus e th e app ell ate cou rt di sagreedwi th it ." Id. An ap p el l at e c o u rt m ay

n o tco n cl u d e t h at t h e t ri al co u rt ab u s edi t s d i s cr et i o nu n l es s t h e l o w e r c o u rt 's ruling fell outside the z one of rea sonable disag ree ment. Id. ; se e als o Lop e z v . S tat e , 261 S.W .3d 103, 1 1 0 (T ex . Ap p . — S an An t o n i o 2 0 0 8 , p et

. re f'd ) ( ci t i n g Mo ntg om e ry v . S tat e , 8 1 0 S .W.2d 372, 390–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 9 1) (op. on r eh' g )). Our Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of

e xtra ne ou s- of fe ns e e vid e nc e e xce pt u

nd e r c e rt a in c on dit ion s: Evidence of other c rimes, wrong s or ac ts is not admis sible to prove the c hara cter of a p e r s o nin

o r d e r to s h o w a c ti o nin

c o n f o r mi ty th e r e w it h

. I t m ay , h o w e v e r , be a dmi ssi ble fo r o the r p ur po ses, su c h a s p ro of

of mot ive , o pp or

tun ity , in te nt, prepa ration, plan, knowle dg e, identity , or abse nce of mistake or acc ident, provided that upon timely

reque st by

the ac cused in a

criminal ca se, re asonable notice is g iven in advanc e of tria l of intent to introduce in the State' s case -in-chie f su ch evide nce other than that arising in the same tra nsaction. T EX . R. E V ID . 404(b).10

The ba sis upon which the State wishes to solicit ex trane ous-offe nse e v idence may not be el i ci t edt h ro u gh "p ro mp t i n g o r m an eu v er i n g" b y t h e S t at e du ri n g its c ro ss- e xami natio n of a wi tne ss; ins te a d, the pr of

fe re d re a so n fo r the State ' s a sse rt e d ne e d f or the e xtra ne ou s- of fe ns e e vid e nc e mus t fin d i t s gen esis in the direc t examination t estimony solicited by

the def ense. W he e le r v . S

tat e , 67 S

. W

. 3 d 8 7 9 , 8 8 5 & n

. 1 4 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 2 ) ( re fe re n ci n g Sh ipm an v . S tat e , 60 4 S.W .2d 182, 18 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 80 ); Ma re s v . S tat e , 75 8 S.W. 2d

93 2, 93 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 88 , p e t. ref ' d)). Duri ngg uil t/i nn oc e nc e , a nd ov e r t he a pp e lla nt' s o bje c tio n, the tr ia l c ourt pe rm itt e d the Sta te to ask Ba rbar a about he r husband' s prior fe lony DWI conviction. The tria l cour t ruled that the appellant ha d opened the door based on the def ense c ounsel' s ear lier direc t examination questi ons of B arb ara . T he sp e c if

ic te sti mony

up on wh ic h th e tr ia l c ourt

ba se d it s r

uli ngwa s a s f

oll ow s: Q [By Defense Cou ns e l] Can y ou

te ll the jur

y a bo ut [the a

pp e lla nt' s] dr ink ingha

bit s? A [Barba

ra F err alez] I t's ve ry rar e on occa sion. Som etimes he' ll have, y ou know, a c ouple of be ers or whateve r, but, no, he doe s not drink. Q So do y ou keep a

ny kind of liquor or bee r ar ound the house? A No, sir. Q To the best of y o u r k n owledg e, whe n he wa s living with this other person, r ight be fore he g ot married, did he keep be er or liquor around the house ? A No, sir.L at er , t h e t ri al co u rt d en i edt h e S t at e's re qu es t t o as k a d i ff er en twi t n es s ab o u tt h e ap p el l an t 's 7 prior robbe ry

conviction. The trial court conclude d that the witness' s testimony had opene d the door to s uc h e vid e nc e , bu t that c ourt fu rt he r h e ld t he pr ob a tiv e va lue of

su c h e vid e nc e wa s su

bs tanti a lly outweig hed by

its dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. See T EX . R. E V ID . 40 3. Th e ro bb e ry c on vic tio n w a s, there fore , proper ly

excluded by

the trial cour

t from admission during g uilt/i nnocenc e. 11 On cross-examination, afte r first obtaining pe rmission from the trial cour t to go into the now- at-issue extraneous-fe lony

conviction evidenc e, the f ollowing e x chang e occ urre d: Q [By State] . . . Accordingto y ou and y our opinion and fr om personal knowledg e of the defe ndant, y ou said that he doe sn' t drink and g et intox icated? A [Barba

ra] No, sir. Q N o ? Ar e y ou awa re of the fa c t tha t on May

6th , 2 00 3, he wa s se nte nc e d to f i v e y e ar s i nth e T e x a s D e p art m e n to f C o r r e c t i o n s f o r f e l o n y D W I? A Yes, sir. Q And it's still y our opinion that he doesn' t ge t intox icated a nd drink? A No, sir. Q L et me ask you this: You said that he doesn't drink, y et y ou have he ard him int oxic a te d. Ho w d o y ou e xpla in t hat? A Ididn't say t h at h e does not drink. I said he drinks on oc casion. A couple -- he might have a couple of beer s on occa sion afte r work but not to t he point of intox ication, no. 7 The State solicited similar testimony about the appe llant's f

ive-y ear felony DWI prison term during

cross-e x amination of Mec askey afte r Mec askey

had ea rlier testified that she neve r saw the appe llant intox icated a

nd did not allow alcohol to be broug ht into their apartment.The a ppellant also make s the argument that the probative va lue of a dmitti ng the prior f elony 8 DWI c on vic tio n w a s su

bs tanti a lly

ou tw e ig he d b y

its da ng e r of un fa ir pr e

jud ic e , in viol a tio n o f R

ule 40 3( b) of the Te xas Rul e s of Ev ide nc e . T he re c or d b e fo re us do e s n ot s ho w the a pp e lla nt r a ise d th is issue in the trial court a

nd thus the appellant ha s failed to pre serve it for our re view. Cf. Mendez v

. Sta te , 138 S.W .3d 334, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 12 T h e a p p e l l a n t ' s d i r e c te x a m i n a t i o n o f h i s w i f e ( an d l a t e r h i s d i r e c te x a m i n a t i o no f M e c a s k e y) le ft the ju ry wi th th e imp re ssi on that th e a pp e lla nt r are ly dr ink s o r g e ts i nto xicate d a nd that he is

ra re ly e ve n a ro un d a lc oh oli c be ve ra g e s. Th e State ' s c ro ss- e xami natio n w a s a rgua bly re lev a nt t o impeach a nd discredit the witnesses' char acte rizations of the appe llant as someone who r are ly drinks and neve r g ets intox icated. " When a witness pre sents a picture that the def endant is not the ty

pe of person to commit the cha rg ed off ense, th e prosecution may impeach that witness' te stimony by

cros s-e x ami ni ng th e wi tn ess con cern in g sim il ar ex tr aneo us off ens es. " W

heele r , 67 S.W .3d at 885 & n

. 1 (r ef

er e n c i n g Mc

Il v e e n v . S tat e , 559 S.W .2d 815, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). While one might re asonably

char acte rize the State' s cross-e x amination questions as " prompting a nd

ma n e u v e r in g " d e s ig n e d to o p e n th e d o o r to th is e xtr an e o u s f e lo n y , o n e mi g h t a ls o f

a ir ly c h ar a c te r iz e the a pp e lla nt' s d ir e c t e xami natio n o f B arb ara and Me c a sk e y

a s o pe nin g the do or (ev e n if e ve r s o slightly ) to this line of questioning. Thus, unde r the a pplicable standard of revie w, we must conclude no abuse of

discretion has be en shown. We over rule the a ppellant' s third and final issue. 8 III. Conclusion For the re asons stated, we conclude leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence supports the trial court' s judgme nt. We sim ilarly hold the rec ord bef

ore us doe s not de monstrate the trial court a bused13

its discretion by

admitting evide nce of

the appe llant's pr ior conviction fo r fe l o n y DWI beca

use, arguably , the appe llant's direc t e x amination of both Ba rbar a and Me caske y

opened the door to such

e vid e nc e . T he re be ingno oth e r i ssu e s r a ise d, we a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ' s ju dg me nt.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice

Date Submitted: Fe bruar y 13, 2009 Date D ecide d: Fe bruar y 25, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh