Filed 6/28/18; pub. order 7/27/18 (see end of opn.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

CALIFORNIA WATER IMPACT 

NETWORK,

 Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN LUIS 

OBISPO et al,

 Respondents,

JUSTIN VINEYARDS AND 

WINERY, LLC et al.

 Real Parties in Interest and 

Respondents.

2d Civil No. B283846

(Super. Ct. No. 16CVP-0195)

(San Luis Obispo County)

The County of San Luis Obispo (County) issues well 

permits without conducting a California Environmental Quality 

Act (CEQA) review. Appellant California Water Impact Network 

petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel County to comply with 

CEQA. County asserted that well permits are ministerial actions 
2

exempt from CEQA. The trial court agreed with County and 

dismissed appellant’s petition on demurrer. 

Appellant relies on Chapter 8.40 of the San Luis Obispo 

County Code, which is intended to prevent groundwater pollution 

or contamination during well construction. We conclude that 

issuance of a well permit is a ministerial action under the 

ordinance. If an applicant meets fixed standards, County must 

issue a well permit. The ordinance does not require use of 

personal or subjective judgment by County officials. There is no 

discretion to be exercised. CEQA does not apply. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2016, County issued permits to construct wells on land 

belonging to four agricultural enterprises, who are the real 

parties in interest (RPIs).1 RPIs’ operations, mostly vineyards, 

are 160 acres to over 400 acres in size. The well depths range 

from 500 to 1000 feet. County authorized the wells without 

conducting a CEQA review. 

Appellant petitioned for a writ of mandate, challenging 

RPIs’ well permits. As amended, the petition alleges that County 

made a discretionary decision to issue permits allowing RPIs to 

extract groundwater; this requires environmental review under 

CEQA. The petition states, “As a result of its de facto policy of 

processing all well permit applications as ministerial, the County 

has conducted no analysis whatsoever of the cumulative impacts 

associated with its ongoing approval of several dozen, if not 

hundreds, of well construction permits over the past several 

years.” 

 

1 RPIs are Lapis Land Company, LLC; Justin Vineyards 

and Winery, LLC; Paso Robles Vineyards, Inc.; and Moondance 

Partners, LP.
3

Appellant alleges that County “prejudicially abused its 

discretion by approving the well permits without first evaluating 

whether it may have significant individual or cumulative impacts 

on the environment, in violation of CEQA.” The petition requests 

an order directing County to set aside its actions in issuing well 

permits and comply with CEQA before approving or denying the 

well applications. 

County and RPIs demurred. They argued that CEQA does 

not apply to the issuance of well construction permits, a purely 

ministerial function under County ordinance. County asserted 

that the only issue with respect to well construction relates to 

water quality, to prevent contamination of groundwater; 

depletion of groundwater supply quantity is not an issue. In 

County’s view, a permit must be approved once it determines that 

the applicant is a licensed drilling contractor who will comply 

with the technical requirements specified by ordinance. 

Appellant countered that County bypassed public 

disclosure of potentially significant impacts to groundwater 

resources by characterizing its review of well applications as 

purely ministerial, failing to evaluate the severity of the impacts 

and identify mitigation measures with the benefit of public 

review and comment. Appellant asserted that County has broad 

discretion to impose environmental conditions on well permits, 

beyond the objective requirements specified in state Department 

of Water Resources (DWR) Bulletins. 

The trial court concluded that the standards for issuing a 

well drilling permit are ministerial, with no discretion to shape a 

project to address environmental concerns. Accordingly, CEQA 

did not apply. The court sustained the demurrers and entered 

judgment for respondents. 
4

DISCUSSION

1. Review

Review is de novo. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa 

Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) We 

examine the petition and the governing ordinance to determine 

whether County had a duty to conduct a CEQA review, or 

whether issuing a permit is a ministerial act exempt from CEQA. 

(San Bernardino Associated Governments v. Superior Court 

(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1113-1114 [demurrer was properly 

sustained as a matter of law because an agency’s action was 

ministerial].) 

2. Overview: State Water Policy Principles

State policy requires that water resources be put to 

beneficial use. Our Constitution declares that “the general 

welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to 

beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and 

that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of 

use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such 

waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and 

beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the 

public welfare.” (Cal. Const., art. X, § 2.) Use of water for 

domestic purposes and irrigation is considered beneficial. (Wat. 

Code, § 106.) 

Groundwater belongs to the state, “but may be extracted by 

those with the right to do so, including those whose land overlies 

the groundwater source.” (Delaware Tetra Technologies, Inc. v. 

County of San Bernardino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 352, 358.) 

Local agencies manage the appropriation of groundwater through 

a permitting system. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 

211 Cal.App.4th 266, 278.) 
5

3. Discretionary vs. Ministerial Acts

CEQA applies to projects subject to discretionary approval 

by the government; it does not apply to ministerial acts. (Pub. 

Res. Code, § 21080, subds. (a), (b)(1).) A project is an activity that 

may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or 

a reasonably foreseeable indirect change (Id., § 21065) with 

“tangible physical manifestations that are perceptible by the 

senses.” (Martin v. City and County of San Francisco (2005) 

135 Cal.App.4th 392, 403.)

A discretionary project “requires the exercise of judgment 

or deliberation”; it does not encompass situations where the 

agency “merely has to determine whether there has been 

conformity with applicable statutes, ordinances, or regulations.” 

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15357.) 

A ministerial action is one “involving little or no personal 

judgment by the public official as to the wisdom or manner of 

carrying out the project. The public official merely applies the 

law to the facts as presented but uses no special discretion or 

judgment in reaching a decision. A ministerial decision involves 

only the use of fixed standards or objective measurements, and 

the public official cannot use personal, subjective judgment in 

deciding whether or how the project should be carried out.” 

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15369.)

The legislative rationale for excluding purely ministerial 

projects from CEQA “implicitly recognizes that unless a public 

agency can shape the project in a way that would respond to 

concerns raised in an EIR [Environmental Impact Report] . . . 

environmental review would be a meaningless exercise.” 

(Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 

Cal.4th 105, 117.) Absent discretion to deny a permit, an agency 

has no duty to conduct a CEQA review, no matter what “terrible 
6

environmental consequences” an EIR might reveal. (Leach v. 

City of San Diego (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 389, 394.)

The law administered by an agency is “the litmus for 

differentiating between its discretionary and ministerial 

functions.” (People v. Department of Housing & Community Dev. 

(1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 185, 192.) The agency may determine what 

acts are ministerial by analyzing its own laws (Cal. Code Regs., 

tit. 14, § 15268(a)), and its view of the scope and meaning of its 

own ordinance is entitled to great weight unless that view is 

clearly erroneous or unauthorized. (Friends of Davis v. City of 

Davis (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1015.) Here, the law being 

administered by County is Chapter 8.40 of the County Code.

4. The County Well Construction Ordinance

Chapter 8.40 of the County Code addresses wells. This 

includes wells to extract water for irrigation. (Id., § 8.40.020.)2 

The purpose of the chapter is to ensure that wells are 

constructed, repaired, modified or destroyed “in such a manner 

that the ground water of this county will not be contaminated or 

polluted and that water obtained from wells will be suitable for 

beneficial use and will not jeopardize the health, safety or welfare 

of the people of this county.” (§ 8.40.010.) 

Well permit applications submitted to the County must list 

the proposed well location, depth and use, and describe nearby 

property lines, sewage disposal systems, water courses or bodies, 

drainage patterns, existing wells, and access roads. Only 

licensed well drilling contractors may obtain permits. 

(§ 8.40.040(a), (c).) 

 

2 Unlabeled section references are to the San Luis Obispo 

County Code.
7

Well permits “shall be issued” if they comply with County 

and state standards. (§ 8.40.040(e).) County standards require 

specified well seal depths, which appellant concedes are 

ministerial. (§ 8.040.060(b).) Though groundwater extraction is 

limited in “the coastal zone” to satisfy the state Coastal Act 

(§ 8.040.065), appellant concedes that RPIs’ wells are not within 

“the coastal zone.” This leaves open only the question of whether 

state standards, set forth in DWR bulletins, require County to 

exercise discretion before issuing a well permit. (§ 8.040.060(a).) 

5. State DWR Standards Incorporated Into County Code 

Chapter 8.40

County Code Chapter 8.40 incorporates DWR well 

standards. (§ 8.40.060(a).) DWR sets “minimum standards of 

well construction” (Wat. Code, § 231) to “protect the quality of 

water used or that may be used for any beneficial use.” (Id., 

§ 13800.) Local agencies are required to adopt a well 

construction ordinance “that meets or exceeds the standards 

contained in [DWR] Bulletin 74.81.” (Id., § 13801, subd. (c).)

DWR Bulletin No. 74-81, entitled “Water Well Standards: 

State of California,” reads: “To ensure the continued utility of 

our underground resources, they must be protected. Standards 

for both the construction of water wells and the destruction of 

abandoned wells can help protect ground water quality.” It gives 

specifications for well construction, including the required 

distance between wells and sources of contamination (sewers, 

sewage leech fields, cesspools, animal enclosures); well seals; 

surface features; casing material, etc. 

Bulletin No. 74-81 notes that careless well construction can 

create a physical connection between pollution (unsanitary and 

inferior-quality water) and usable water, citing “water-borne 

disease outbreaks,” “undesirable chemicals, both toxic and 

nontoxic,” and “seawater intrusion” as adverse effects on 
8

groundwater. The bulletin’s construction standards aim to 

prevent “contamination and pollution” and ensure sanitary water 

quality.3

DWR Bulletin No. 74-7, from 1971, specifically addresses 

County. It lists “high nitrate concentrations” in County 

groundwater—from waste disposal and use of fertilizers—as a 

source of public and private concern, and refers to a 1964 typhoid 

epidemic in Nipomo caused by the pollution of well water with 

septic tank wastes. The Bulletin adopts standards for the Arroyo 

Grande Basin “to prevent impairment of water quality” from 

improperly constructed, abandoned or defective wells. 

6. County Code Chapter 8.40 Is Ministerial and Does Not 

Purport to Give County Any Discretion

Section 8.40.040 (e) states that well permits “shall be 

issued” if state and County standards are met. Appellant cites no 

case in which a landowner who wished to construct a well was 

subject to a full CEQA review requiring an environmental impact 

report. Issuance of building permits “shall be presumed to be 

ministerial” under CEQA absent any discretionary provision in 

the ordinance. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15268(b); Friends of 

Juana Briones House v. City of Palo Alto (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 

286, 302-303.) A well building permit is a type of building 

 

3 Section 8.40.060(a) does not list DWR Bulletin No. 74-90, 

a supplement to Bulletin No. 74-81. However, County admittedly 

uses Bulletin No. 74-90. The supplement pursues the theme that 

“Improperly constructed . . . wells are a potential pathway for 

introducing poor quality water, pollutants, and contaminants to 

good-quality ground water” by allowing them to enter the well 

bore or pass into an aquifer. While recommending “minimum

statewide standards for the protection of ground water quality,” 

Bulletin No. 74-90 notes that local agencies “may need to adopt 

more stringent standards for local conditions to ensure ground 

water quality protection.” 
9

permit. So long as technical standards and objective 

measurements are met, County must issue a well permit to 

licensed contractors. “To the extent that grant or denial of the 

construction permit is governed by fixed design and construction 

specifications in statute or regulation, the official decision of 

conformity or nonconformity leaves scant room for the play of 

personal judgment.” (People v. Department of Housing & 

Community Dev., supra, 45 Cal.App.3d at p. 193.) 

Appellant concedes that County standards (relating to well 

seal depths) are ministerial, but argued below that state 

standards give County discretion to deny permits based on the 

cumulative depletion of groundwater.4 However, state DWR 

standards incorporated into the County Code relate to ground 

water quality. The effect of RPIs’ wells on ground water quality 

is not at issue here, and nothing in the DWR Bulletins gives 

County discretion to impose limitations on water usage. Indeed, 

DWR Bulletin No. 74-81 states that it is designed to protect 

groundwater utility; it is not designed to ensure “the effective use 

of these resources” through conservation. DWR Bulletin passages 

cited in appellant’s brief expressly allude to “protection of 

groundwater quality,” not depletion from overuse. (Italics 

added.) 

The DWR Bulletins contain technical specifications. 

Appellant does not contend that the applicants here failed to 

satisfy the specifications. County did not impose extra conditions 

 

4 In its reply brief, appellant disclaims a goal of preserving 

water supplies. This contradicts appellant’s argument to the trial 

court that the purpose of the ordinance “is to protect groundwater 

resources . . . not just quality, but . . . also supply.” Counsel 

stated, “I think the intent of the standards is to protect the 

resources, to protect the groundwater supply both in terms of 

quality and sustainable use in the future.” 
10

beyond the standards imposed by the DWR Bulletins. (See Day 

v. City of Glendale (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 817, 822-824 [city 

imposed discretionary safety conditions on a grading permit it 

issued to put landfill in 70 acres of canyon]; Friends of Westwood 

v. City of Los Angeles (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 259, 274 [city 

imposed discretionary conditions on a high-rise building permit 

because the project affected public streets outside the building].)

DWR Bulletin No. 74-81 allows localities to deviate from 

state standards and enact different standards for “unusual 

conditions.” County did not deviate from DWR standards in 

adopting section 8.40.060(a): it reads, “Standards for the 

construction, repair, modification or destruction of wells shall be 

as set forth” in DWR Bulletins. The standards set forth in the 

Bulletins are technical requirements that do not call for the 

exercise of subjective judgment. 

Appellant suggested in the trial court that County could 

impose additional conditions, for example, pump limits and 

subsidence monitoring. These are not authorized by Chapter 

8.40, nor can we imply the possibility of imposing such 

conditions. Rules of statutory interpretation prevent us from 

rewriting laws. Our job “is simply to ascertain and declare what 

the statute contains, not to change its scope by reading into it 

language it does not contain . . . . [Courts] may not rewrite the 

statute to conform to an assumed intention that does not appear 

in its language.” (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 

243, 253.) 

The purpose of Chapter 8.40 is to prevent contamination or 

pollution of groundwater during well construction, repair, 

modification or destruction. Only an impermissible rewriting of 

the ordinance would allow us to infer a legislative intent to 

condition well permits on pump limits or subsidence monitoring, 

which have nothing to do with groundwater pollution. The 
11

County has no discretion to impose water usage conditions on 

permits issued under Chapter 8.40. 

Appellant’s claim that County has some discretion in 

issuing well permits does not affect our analysis. “‘CEQA does 

not apply to an agency decision simply because the agency may 

exercise some discretion in approving the project or undertaking. 

Instead to trigger CEQA compliance, the discretion must be of a 

certain kind; it must provide the agency with the ability and 

authority to “mitigate . . . environmental damage” to some 

degree.’” (San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition v. City of 

San Diego (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 924, 934.) 

The well permitting ordinance does not become 

discretionary merely because it states that an applicant must 

include any “information as may be necessary to determine if 

underground waters will be protected.” (§ 8.40.040(a)(6).) The 

subcontext of this provision is whether underground waters will 

be protected from contamination or pollution. (§ 8.40.010.) The 

ordinance does not give County discretion to shape a well permit 

to mitigate potential environmental damage arising from 

groundwater overuse. The instruction to applicants to include all 

necessary information does not transform the inquiry into a 

discretionary review. 

A new state law addresses groundwater depletion. The 

Legislature enacted the Sustainable Groundwater Management 

Act (SGMA) in 2014, empowering local agencies to adopt 

groundwater management plans tailored to community resources 

and needs. (Wat. Code, § 10720 et seq.) In 2015, County began 

implementing groundwater preservation measures. (E.g., County 

Ord. No. 3307 [requiring groundwater conservation in specified 

areas] and County Resolution No. 2015-288 [regarding a 

countywide water conservation program].) SGMA is not 

addressed in County Code Chapter 8.40, the law at issue here. 
12

Appellant’s concerns about groundwater sustainability do not 

empower the courts to rewrite County Code Chapter 8.40 to 

hasten appellant’s legislative goals. Those goals must be 

addressed to County’s elected officials as they implement SGMA. 

Appellant did not and cannot plead a cause of action 

requiring County to comply with CEQA before issuing well 

permits under County Code Chapter 8.40. No aspect of that 

ordinance, or the DWR standards it incorporates, supports an 

interpretation that well permits are discretionary. Instead, the 

statutory scheme imposes fixed technical requirements. When 

those requirements are met—and appellant does not allege 

otherwise—issuance of a well permit is a ministerial act. CEQA 

does not apply to the ministerial act of issuing a well permit.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to

respondents, as the prevailing parties on appeal. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

TANGEMAN, J.
13

Barry L. LaBarbera, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

M.R. Wolfe & Associates and Mark R. Wolfe; Law Offices of 

Babak Naficy and Babak Naficy, for Petitioner and Appellant.

Rita L. Neal, Timothy McNulty and Erica A. Stuckey, 

County Counsel, for Respondents County of San Luis Obispo, et 

al.

Roll Law Group, Courtney Vaudreuil, Johnny Traboulsi, 

Sophie-Nic Froelich and Robert Donnelly Thornton, for Real 

Party in Interest and Respondent Justin Vineyards and Winery, 

LLC.

Stoel Rives, Timothy M. Taylor, Carissa M. Beecham, 

Wesley A. Miliband and Eric R. Skanchy, for Real Party in 

Interest and Respondent Lapis Land Company, LLC.

Adamski Moroski Madden Cumberland & Green, Thomas 

D. Green and Michelle L. Gearhart, for Real Parties in Interest 

and Respondents Paso Robles Vineyards, Inc. and Moondance 

Partners, LP.
14

Filed 7/27/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

CALIFORNIA WATER IMPACT 

NETWORK,

 Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO et al,

 Respondents,

JUSTIN VINEYARDS AND WINERY, 

LLC et al.

 Real Parties in Interest and 

Respondents.

2d Civil No. B283846

(Super. Ct. No. 16CVP-0195)

(San Luis Obispo County)

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION 

FOR PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 28, 2018, was 

not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now 

appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is 

so ordered.