alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1028 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1028

    To create a Rural Policing Institute as part of the Federal Law 
                      Enforcement Training Center.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 13, 2007

  Mr. Salazar (for himself and Mr. Udall of Colorado) introduced the 
  following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To create a Rural Policing Institute as part of the Federal Law 
                      Enforcement Training Center.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RURAL POLICING INSTITUTE.

    (a) In General.--There is established a Rural Policing Institute, 
which shall be administered by the Office of State and Local Training 
of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center of the Department of 
Homeland Security, to--
            (1) evaluate the needs of law enforcement agencies of units 
        of local government and tribal governments located in rural 
        areas;
            (2) develop expert training programs designed to address 
        the needs of rural law enforcement agencies regarding combating 
        methamphetamine addiction and distribution, domestic violence, 
        law enforcement response related to school shootings, and other 
        topics identified in the evaluation conducted under paragraph 
        (1);
            (3) provide the training programs described in paragraph 
        (2) to law enforcement agencies of units of local government 
        and tribal governments located in rural areas; and
            (4) conduct outreach efforts to ensure that training 
        programs under the Rural Policing Institute reach law 
        enforcement officers of units of local government and tribal 
        governments located in rural areas.
    (b) Curricula.--The training at the Rural Policing Institute 
established under subsection (a) shall be configured in a manner so as 
to not duplicate or displace any law enforcement program of the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center in existence on the date of enactment 
of this Act.
    (c) Rural Defined.--In this section, the term ``rural'' means area 
that is not located in a metropolitan statistical area, as defined by 
the Office of Management and Budget.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section (including for contracts, staff, 
and equipment)--
            (1) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2008; and
            (2) $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4251

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

VICTOR HUGO MARTINEZ-LUCIO, a/k/a Victor LNU, a/k/a Victor 

Martinez,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (6:09-cr-00787-HMH-1)

Submitted: October 21, 2010 Decided: November 16, 2010

Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Wallace H. Jordan, Jr., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. 

Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Victor Hugo Martinez-Lucio appeals from his conviction 

and fifty-seven month sentence following his guilty plea to 

three counts of sale of a firearm to a convicted felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). 

Martinez-Lucio’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), stating that there were no 

meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the 

district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting 

Martinez-Lucio’s guilty plea. Martinez-Lucio, advised of his 

right to file a pro se supplemental brief, did not do so. We 

affirm. 

Because Martinez-Lucio did not move in the district 

court to withdraw his guilty plea, the Rule 11 hearing is 

reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 

517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). We conclude the district court fully 

complied with the Rule 11 requirements in accepting 

Martinez-Lucio’s guilty plea. During the plea hearing, in 

compliance with Rule 11, the district court properly informed 

Martinez-Lucio of the rights he was forfeiting as a result of 

his plea and the nature of the charges and penalties he faced, 

found that Martinez-Lucio was competent and entering his plea 

voluntarily, and determined there was a sufficient factual basis 

for the plea. Therefore, the record establishes Martinez-Lucio
3

knowingly and voluntarily entered into his guilty plea with a 

full understanding of the consequences and there was no error in 

the district court’s acceptance of the plea. 

As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Martinez-Lucio, in writing, of his 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Martinez-Lucio requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Martinez-Lucio. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. STEPHEN KALDROVICS.

February 28, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
April 24, 2012

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

GEORGE FLEMING AND FLEMING & ASSOCIATES, L.L.P., Appellants

NO. 14-12-00299-CV V.

CAROLYN B. ALVAREZ, ET. AL., Appellees

____________________

Today the Court heard appellant=s motion to dismiss the appeal from the judgment 

signed by the court below on February 17, 2012. Having considered the motion and 

found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order that each party shall pay its costs incurred by reason of this 

appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

We further order the mandate be issued immediately.
#### O. *Conrad*& Co. v. R. Walsh.

(No. 1267, R. Book No. 4, p. 194.)

Appeal from Grayson County.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 229. *Agency; proof insufficient to establish.*Where O. & Co. had as agent one S., who carried on a branch house for them at D., in a suit by W. against C. & Co. for damages growing out of a breach of contract made by them with one G., who claimed to be their agent by virtue of an appointment as sub-agent from S., *held,*that G.’s agency could not be established by his own statement that he was agent for O. & Co.’s branch house at D., appointed such by S. Such evidence was incompetent to establish the agency, and should not have been admitted. The declarations of an agent are not admissible to prove his agency. [Latham v. Pledger, 11 Tex. 439.]

§ 230. *Sub-agency; how proved.*Where G. claimed'to be a sub-agent of O. & Co. by appointment of their agent S., then the authority of S. to appoint a sub-agent should have been proven. When authority in the nature of a personal trust is conferred, it does not impliedly invest the agent with the power of substitution, but is to be considered exclusively personal, unless from the express language used, or from the fair presumption growing out of the particular transactions, or of the usage of trade, a broader power was to be conferred upon the agent. [Smith v. Sublett, 28 Tex. 163.]

§ 231. *Bills of exceptions; alteration of.*After the defendants’ bills of exception had been allowed and signed *92by the judge, and filed by the clerk, the judge, at the request of plaintiff’s attorney, and without the knowledge or consent of defendants or their attorney, took three of the bills from the file, and materially altered the same. *Held,*this action on the part of the judge was certainly unwarranted by any law or practice known to us, and we would not in any case, whether the party had been injured thereby or not, permit a judgment to stand when accompanied by so dangerous an irregularity.

November 11, 1882.

Reversed and remanded.
Exhibit 31.02

                                   Certification

I, Tom Hofer, certify that:

1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Vendalux
Corporation

2.  Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this quarterly report;

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4.  The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being
prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this
quarterly report(the "Evaluation Date"); and

c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the
Evaluation Date;

5.  The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors ( or persons performing the
equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

<PAGE>
<PAGE> 2

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls'
and

Date: August 15, 2005

By: /s/
   --------------------------------
   Tom Hofer
   (Chief Financial Officer)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 302 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the registrant and will be
retained by the registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 179 (Thursday, September 16, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 56555]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-23173]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

National Park Service


National Register of Historic Places; Notification of Pending 
Nominations and Related Actions

    Nominations for the following properties being considered for 
listing or related actions in the National Register were received by 
the National Park Service before August 21, 2010. Pursuant to Sec.  
60.13 of 36 CFR Part 60, written comments are being accepted concerning 
the significance of the nominated properties under the National 
Register criteria for evaluation. Comments may be forwarded by United 
States Postal Service, to the National Register of Historic Places, 
National Park Service, 1849 C St., NW., 2280, Washington, DC 20240; by 
all other carriers, National Register of Historic Places, National Park 
Service, 1201 Eye St., NW., 8th floor, Washington, DC 20005; or by fax, 
202-371-6447. Written or faxed comments should be submitted by October 
1, 2010.
    Before including your address, phone number, e-mail address, or 
other personal identifying information in your comment, you should be 
aware that your entire comment--including your personal identifying 
information--may be made publicly available at any time. While you can 
ask us in your comment to withhold your personal identifying 
information from public review, we cannot guarantee that we will be 
able to do so.

J. Paul Loether,
Chief, National Register of Historic Places/National, Historic 
Landmarks Program.

CALIFORNIA

Alameda County

Olsen, Donald and Helen, House, 771 San Diego Rd, Berkeley, 10000812

MAINE

Androscoggin County

Webster Grammar School, 95 Hampshire St, Auburn, 10000806

Kennebec County

Waterville High School, 21 Gilman St, Waterville, 10000807

NEW JERSEY

Hunterdon County

Van Syckle, John, House, 195 Rummel Rd, Holland Township, 10000814

Middlesex County

Goldman House, 143 School St, Piscataway Township, 10000813

NEW YORK

Cattaraugus County

Olean School <greek-i>10, 411 W Henley St, Olean, 10000810

Columbia County

North Hillsdale Methodist Church, 1012 County Rte 2, North 
Hillsdale, 10000811

Niagara County

Park Place Historic District, Park Place, portions of Prince Ave, 
4th St, and Main St, Niagara Falls, 10000809

Rockland County

Houser--Conklin House, 246 Rte 306, Monsey, 10000808

[FR Doc. 2010-23173 Filed 9-15-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4312-51-P
1 In The 

### Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________ NO . 09 - 24 - 00102 - CR

__________________ E X PARTE DANIEL TROY LEBLANC

__________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 24DCCR 0361

__________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION Dani e l Troy LeBlanc filed a n application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking a bond reduction in Trial Cause Number 24DCCR0361. The trial court issued the writ but denied relief. LeBlanc filed a notice of appeal

. The State filed a motion to dismiss LeBlanc’s appeal on the ground that the trial court had granted the State’s motion to dismiss the indictment in Trial Cause Number 24D C CR0361. The State argues the appeal was moot because LeB lanc had been reindicted in Trial Cause Number 24DCCR052 0 and LeBlanc filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in Trial Cause Number 24DCCR052 0.2 On August 14, 2024, LeBlanc filed a notice of appeal fr o m an order denying relief on an app lication for a writ of habeas corpus for bond reduction in Trial Cause Number 24DCCR0520
. 1 The Clerk of the Court docketed the appeal from the order signed in Trial Cause Number 24DCCR0520 as Appeal Number 09

- 24

- 00283

- CR
. The clerk’s record filed in Appeal Number 09

- 24

- 00283

- CR includes a surety bond that establishes that LeBlanc was released from custody on August 15, 20 24. “Where the premise of a habeas corpus application is destroyed by subsequent developments, the legal issues raised thereunder are rendered moot.” Hubbard v. State , 841 S.W.2d 33, 33 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.). LeBlanc’s complaints about the trial court’s order in Trial Cause Number 24DCCR 0361 would not secure his release from confinement because LeBlanc ha s posted bail in Trial Cause Number 24DC C R0520
. “ When a defendant has once given bail for his appearance in answer to a criminal charg e, he shall not be required to give another bond in the course of the same criminal action except as herein provided. ” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. a rt. 17.09 ; s ee Garcia v. State , 292 S.W.3d 146, 151 ( Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2009, no pet.) ( E vidence of bond forfeiture was sufficient where the State reindicted the defendant under a new case number and dismissed the original cause in which the bond had been filed

. ).

1 We take judicial notice of the appellate record in Appeal Number 09

- 24

- 00283

- CR.3 Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal. APPEAL DISMISSED. PER CURIAM
Submitted on August 27, 2024 Opinion Delivered August 28, 2024 Do Not Publish Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.
News United States Air Force
 First Marine graduates Air Force’s F-35 intelligence coursePublished July 1, 2015
                        
                        By Staff Sgt. Marleah Robertson
                        
                        
                        33rd Fighter Wing Public Affairs
                **EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, Fla. (AFNS) --**
                The first Marine Corps officer graduated the Air Force’s F-35 Lightning II Intelligence Formal Training Unit course here June 24.
The formal course combines fifth-generation, fighter-specific and general intelligence academics applicable to the F-35 and the low-observable global strike mission. Completion of the course curriculum fulfills all initial qualification training requirements, and students are assigned basic qualification status.
Marine Corps 1st Lt. Samuel Winsted, an F-35B Lightning II intelligence officer, began his training May 18, 2015, at Eglin Air Force Base, learning the unique aspects of F-35 employment and intelligence support to the F-35 mission.
“It’s our job to help students understand what the F-35 can do and what it brings to the fight,” said Staff Sgt. Jeffrey Miskin, a 33rd Operations Group F-35 IFTU instructor. “We have to change and modify our lessons so we can incorporate those changes program-wide as the F-35 program approaches initial operational capability.”
The Marine Corps will declare IOC with the F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing variant this summer.
“Having Lieutenant Winsted here is significant because the Marine Corps doesn’t have a course equivalent to our F-35 IFTU course,” said Lt. Col. Bradley Turner, the 33rd Operations Support Squadron commander. “It will absolutely increase their capability.”
Winsted will serve in a critical role assisting the Marine Corps’ F-35 program at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, as it becomes the first operational F-35B base.
“Now that I have my basic qualification status, I can provide the right information, scenario development and mission integration to the F-35B to the Marine aircrews at MCAS Yuma,” Winsted said.
The F-35 IFTU at Eglin AFB provides reach-back support regarding intelligence support to other services’ F-35 squadrons.
“Hopefully, we will be able to teach more Navy and Marine intelligence analysts,” Miskin said. “That way, as a whole, we can all be on the same page as to what intelligence to provide and how they will support F-35 aircrew to complete the mission.”intelligence 



Marine 



F-35 Lightning II Intelligence Formal Training Unit course 



Eglin AFB 



AETC 



F-35 Lightning II 



F-35 



: Marine Corps
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6466

QUENTIN L. SMITH, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. ELAINE PINSON, Warden, Walden Correctional Institution, Respondent - Appellee, and JON OZMINT, SCDC Director, Respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. (6:07-cv-00777-TLW) Submitted: August 4, 2008 Decided: August 27, 2008 Before MICHAEL, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Quentin L. Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Quentin L. Smith seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Smith has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
758 A.2d 655

#### In the Matter of Mark David MAZZA.

No. 588 Disciplinary Docket No. 3.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Aug. 3, 2000.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

AND NOW, this 3rd day of August, 2000, a Rule having been entered by this Court on May 15, 2000, pursuant to Rule *129214(d)(1), Pa.R.D.E., directing Mark David Mazza to show cause why he should not be placed on temporary suspension and no response thereto having been filed, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Rule is made absolute; Mark David Mazza is placed on temporary suspension and he shall comply with all the provisions of Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E.; and the matter is referred to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 214(f)(1), Pa.R.D.E.
583 A.2d 348

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MICHAEL STAITI.

March 26, 1990.

Petition for certification denied.
EXHIBIT 23.1









CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ENGINEERS








Milagro Oil & Gas, Inc.


1301 McKinney, Suite 500


Houston, Texas 77010





We hereby consent to (i) the inclusion of our reserve report relating to certain estimated quantities of the proved reserves of oil and gas, future net income and discounted future net income, effective December 31, 2012 of Milagro Oil & Gas, Inc. (the “Company”) in this Annual Report on Form 10-K prepared by the Company for the year ending December 31, 2012, as amended, filed as Exhibit 99.1 of the Form 10-K, and (ii) the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report on Form 10-K prepared by the Company for the year ending December 31, 2012, as amended, of information contained in our report relating to certain estimated quantities of the Company’s proved reserves of oil and gas, future net income and discounted future net income, effective December 31, 2012. We further consent to references to our firm under the headings “Description of Business and Properties - Oil and Natural Gas Reserves” and “Risk Factors,” and included in or made a part of the Annual Report on Form 10-K prepared by the Company for the year ended December 31, 2012, as amended.








Yours truly,





W.D. Von Gonten & Co.







Phillip R. Hunter


Vice President


TX #96590





April 2, 2013