Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1026 | December 19, 2019 Page 1 of 21

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

MOTHER

Don R. Hostetler

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT FATHER

Talisha Griffin

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of: A.G., Minor 

Child, 

A.S., Mother, and T.G., Father, 

Appellants-Respondents,

v. 

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner, and

Child Advocates, Inc.,

Guardian ad Litem.

December 19, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JC-1026 

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn A. 

Moores, Judge

The Honorable Jennifer Hubartt, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1812-JC-3086 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1026 | December 19, 2019 Page 2 of 21

Brown, Judge.

[1] A.S. (“Mother”) and T.G. (“Father,” and together with Mother, “Parents”) 

appeal the trial court’s order determining that A.G. is a child in need of services 

(“CHINS”). We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August 2018, Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a 

report concerning allegations of substance use and assigned family case 

manager Regan Woodruff (“FCM Woodruff”) to A.G., who had just been 

born. Conducting an assessment, FCM Woodruff spoke with Mother, who 

“disclosed that she was not currently using any illegal drugs at the time [and]

that she had previously used marijuana and cocaine recreationally and had 

been addicted to pills, specifically opiates.” Transcript at 8. Per an informal 

adjustment, Mother agreed to random drug screens, home-based case 

management, and a substance use assessment.

[3] On December 20, 2018, DCS filed a verified petition alleging that A.G. was a

CHINS, that she was born drug-exposed to cocaine and that Parents failed to 

provide her with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment free from 

substance abuse. It also alleged that Mother tested positive for cocaine and 

marijuana on numerous occasions during the period of the informal adjustment

since October 2018 and that Father knew of Mother’s drug use and did not take 

necessary action to protect A.G.
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[4] At an initial hearing held on the same day, at which Mother and Father did not 

appear, the court ordered A.G. removed. When family case manager Shelicia 

Jones (“FCM Jones”) later visited Mother’s home to remove A.G., neither 

Mother nor the child was present. FCM Jones contacted her, and Mother 

indicated that she was not willing to turn A.G. over and would take the child to 

Atlanta before she allowed DCS to obtain custody. When contacted, Father 

stated he lived in Atlanta and that “before DCS would take custody of his child, 

he would move [Mother] and [A.G.] to Atlanta and DCS would not see the 

child until she was 18.”1

 Id. at 21. DCS filed a missing persons report for A.G. 

due to Parent’s unwillingness to provide an address, and when it ultimately 

obtained custody on December 28, 2018, A.G. was placed in foster care. 

[5] On January 4, 2019, the court issued an order indicating that it held a continued 

hearing at which Parents appeared, it appointed counsel for Father, and Mother 

indicated that she planned to engage private counsel. The order indicates the 

court appointed a guardian ad litem, retained A.G. in foster care, and ordered 

that Parents have supervised parenting time. On January 18, 2019, the court 

held a pretrial hearing at which Parents appeared, each with counsel, Father 

requested “mediation and fact finding dates” and indicated that he would not be 

willing to “waive the 60,” and the court set the fact-finding hearing for February 

1 When asked during cross-examination at the fact-finding hearing about serving process on Father for the 

December 20, 2018 initial hearing, FCM Jones indicated that Father “wasn’t in Atlanta” and that he 

disclosed to her “he was never in Atlanta.” Transcript at 37.
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15th, pursuant to counsels’ schedules.

2

 Supplemental Transcript at 4. After 

indicating that it had “drug screen results and some positive screens for 

substances,” DCS’s counsel stated “Judge[,] we don’t have thirty days to file a 

motion requesting authorization for the toxicologist to appear telephonically so 

I’ll just do that orally today,” both parents objected, and the court took the 

request under advisement. Id. at 6-7. The court issued an order on the same day 

which stated DCS “orally requests authorization for telephonic testimony . . . 

from John Martin, Wayne Ross, Kimberly Peterson, Bridget Lorenz, Donna 

Coy.” Father’s Appendix Volume II at 94.

[6] On January 25, 2019, the court issued an order on submission of report stating it 

had set the hearing date of February 15, 2019, that “[a]t that time,” DCS moved 

the court to permit the telephonic testimony of “Bridget Limberg, Kimberly 

Peterson, and John Martin, noting that they were not 30 days between the setting 

of the trial date and the trial,” and that Parents, “by counsel, were provided with 

approximately 27 days of notice of the DCS Motion.” Id. at 100-101. It 

indicated that, “[a]fter consideration of the Motion, and of any written objection, 

and, after consideration [sic] Ind. Admin. R. 14, the court finds these relevant 

factors,” and further stated: “John Martin and Kimberly Peterson live in 

California. Ms. Lemberg lives in Michigan respectively, and requiring each to 

travel for testimony would cause great burden and inconvenience,” that the 

2 The court’s order from the same day indicated the parties agreed to mediation and to set a fact-finding 

hearing, but were “unwilling to waive the sixty (60) day trial rule.” Father’s Appendix Volume II at 93. 
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telephonic testimony of Martin, Peterson and “Bridget Limberg” will not 

preclude effective cross-examination by Parents, and that Parents were not 

prejudiced by the telephonic testimony. Id. at 101.

[7] On February 15, 2019, Parents appeared at the fact-finding hearing. FCM 

Woodruff testified that Mother disclosed she had been addicted to pills, 

specifically opiates. She testified about Mother’s assessment in August 2018 and 

stated that she had indicated she was “using illegal substances up until the point 

where she found out she was pregnant and had already been pregnant prior to 

stopping her substance use.” Transcript at 10. When asked whether she 

conversed with Mother about Father “at this time,” FCM Woodruff answered 

affirmatively and stated that she had indicated that she was no longer with Father 

“because he was still using substances and did not want to stop.” Id. 

[8] FCM Jones testified about attempting to remove A.G. in December 2018 and 

her communication with Parents and stated that, during the removal incident, 

A.G.’s whereabouts were unknown to DCS for eight days before it finally took 

custody of her. Id. at 21. She indicated that she referred Mother to random 

drug screens, substance abuse assessments, home-based case management, 

individual therapy, and intensive outpatient treatment. When asked whether

she had conversations with Mother about drug use “[w]hile the case was open 

as an Informal Adjustment,” she answered affirmatively and, in explaining the 

conversations, stated that, in October 2018, a child and family team meeting 

occurred for the purpose of discussing a positive cocaine drug screen. Id. at 17. 

Mother objected, the court allowed FCM Jones to testify about the discussion, 
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and she indicated that Mother had stated she used cocaine and marijuana 

recreationally and that she had administered to Mother an oral drug screen.

3

 

When asked whether, in the “conversation that you were having with Mother,” 

she “was talking about current drug use or things that had happened in the 

past,” FCM Jones stated, “[c]urrent drug use.” Id. at 19. She testified that she 

had safety concerns for A.G. in Mother’s care “because of the current drug use” 

and “there was safety concerns regarding [Mother] transporting the child under 

the influence.” Id. She explained that “[a]t this time Mother was employed on 

the West side and had stated to [her] that she was transporting the child on the 

West side for daycare.” Id. She also explained that Mother had stated she was 

transporting A.G. to doctor’s appointments without a license.4 When asked 

what actions DCS took when these safety concerns arose, she indicated that the 

informal adjustment was unsuccessfully closed and the CHINS petition was 

filed. She indicated that she had not been able to verify Mother’s employment

and, with regard to housing, that Mother had provided an “address that she 

resides with” Father. Id. at 22. 

[9] FCM Jones answered affirmatively when asked whether she had any additional 

conversations with Mother about drug use since the CHINS case was filed, 

3 In sustaining an objection about FCM Jones discussing the results of the test, the court precluded her 

testimony from mentioning the “results of tests that are not in evidence.” Transcript at 18. 

4 She later explained further that there was concern with supervision “with [Mother] admitting to 

transporting the child with no license to doctor’s appointments as well as to daycare, placing the child in 

danger.” Transcript at 32. During cross-examination, FCM Jones stated that Mother had told her that she 

had never had a driver’s license. 
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indicated that Mother requested her drug screen results be emailed to her, and 

stated that she sent a message informing Mother “which screens have been 

positive for Cocaine.” Id. After the court sustained Mother’s objection “to the 

extent it involve[d] screen results,” she testified that Mother shared that “she had 

a prescription for an opiate that was prescribed to her during her pregnancy that 

she did not test positive for throughout the life of the IA but has subsequently 

throughout the CHINS proceeding” and that Mother sent a picture of the 

prescription. Id. at 23. DCS’s counsel asked if Mother “made any other 

disclosures about new usage,” and she answered that “[t]hrough Mother’s 

concern for [A.G.’s placement],” she “has stated that the usage is due to stress, 

that she can’t concentrate with knowing that her child – she can’t concentrate on 

sobriety with knowing that her child still remains in foster care.” Id.

[10] Regarding Father, FCM Jones testified that he had been offered the opportunity 

to participate in other services, that his response was “he does not need services 

provided by DCS,” and that DCS wanted Father to participate in random drug 

screens and a substance abuse assessment. Id. at 24. She also indicated she had 

not been able to verify that Father had stable employment. She indicated that 

she underwent training to be able to administer drug screens and described: her 

duties in administering them; the procedures used to collect drug screen 

samples, seal them for sending, ensure they are not contaminated, and send 

them by UPS; and the manner in which she collected a sample from Father and 

followed the collection procedure she had just described. Over objection, the 

court admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 the consent form that Father and FCM 
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Jones signed to administer the screen, which includes their signatures and the 

date as “1/11/2019” and states “Specimen ID: S2955283.” Exhibits Volume at 

4. Below the box containing FCM Jones’s signature as the

“Collector/Observer Certification,” Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 states “Megumi R.” 

Id. FCM Jones indicated that Father’s sample was under her sight and control 

during the collection and sealing process, that she placed the sample in a UPS 

envelope, and that at the time she left the sample for mailing, she did not 

believe the sample had been compromised.

[11] After FCM Jones testified, DCS called, and the court contacted telephonically, 

toxicologist Bridget Lemberg. Mother’s counsel objected under Administrative 

Rule 14 to “the inability to . . . confront the witness face to face,” which the court 

overruled.5

 Transcript at 50. Lemberg testified that she was the lab director and 

toxicologist for Forensic Fluids Laboratories in Kalamazoo, Michigan; that, as 

the lab director, she ensured “all employees follow our standard operating 

procedures which consists of an internal chain of custody, quality control that we 

run daily”; and that she was also responsible for “going through each one of the 

positive[s] by itself” and “[g]oing back and looking up the screening test results to 

make sure that . . . we followed our standard operating procedures.” Id. at 53. 

She described the screening process used by Forensic Fluids to analyze samples 

received from DCS and the additional confirmation testing that a positive screen 

5 In later overruling an objection that Lemberg testified about chain of custody while she looked at a packet

of documents, the court stated it had already dealt with the telephonic testimony issue and that “[a]s to your 

questions about the chain of custody that will go to waive [sic] and not admissibility.” Transcript at 61. 
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undergoes. DCS’s counsel showed Lemberg what it had marked as Petitioner’s 

Exhibit 3 and she identified it as the two-page affidavit “that we send when we 

send test results . . . for Court,” stated it “says that the test results that accompany 

this affidavit are true and accurate,” and affirmed that her signature was at the 

bottom.

6

 Id. at 57. DCS moved to admit the document, Father’s counsel 

objected and stated that there were no pages attached and “this form has been 

altered,” and DCS’s counsel stated that “the document that was attached is going 

to be [Petitioner’s E]xhibit 4” and that she could wait and introduce everything at 

one time, and the court took the motion under advisement. Id. at 58.

[12] Lemberg indicated that the person who received the UPS bag with Father’s 

January 11, 2019 sample was Megumi Roberts, that the UPS bags are checked 

by a specimen processor who follows certain procedures, and that there was no 

indication that the sample had been tampered with or any concerns about its 

integrity. She testified that this “specimen sample ID, S as in Sam, 2955283, 

initially screened” for marijuana, cocaine and oxycodone, indicated that the 

sample received further testing in the confirmation lab, which confirmed the 

results, stated the results, and affirmed that the results were documented in 

what had been marked as Petitioner’s Exhibit 4, that her name was on the 

report as the lab director or toxicologist, and that she had determined that the 

6 Petitioner’s Exhibit 3 states “As a result of the procedures employed by Forensic Fluids Laboratory Inc., I 

can state that both the Chain of Custody and that the test results are scientifically reliable” and that the 

“attached document(s) are the original or exact duplicates of the original business records” maintained in 

regards to Father and includes the signature of Bridget Lorenz Lemberg. Exhibits Volume at 9-10. 
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results were trustworthy. Id. at 66. The court admitted Petitioner Exhibits 3 

and 4 over Parent’s objections. Petitioner’s Exhibit 4 indicates that Father 

tested positive for THC, cocaine, and oxycodone on January 11, 2019. 

[13] On March 14, 2019, the court entered an order which found A.G. a CHINS 

and stated: 

Findings of Fact:

* * * * *

7. In August, 2018, mother admitted to FCM Woodruff that she 

used marijuana, cocaine, and pain pills during her pregnancy 

with the child. Mother admitted that she had a previous 

addiction to opiate pain pills and recreationally used marijuana 

and cocaine.

8. In August, 2018, mother identified [Father] as the father, but 

told FCM Woodruff she was no longer involved with [Father] 

due to his ongoing drug use.

* * * * *

30. Toxicologist Bridget Lemberg reviewed [F]ather[’]s 1/11/19 

drug screen. Father[’]s use of marijuana, cocaine, and 

oxycodone occurred approximately 24 hours prior to the drug 

screen[’]s administration.

31. Following the CHINS filing and the removal of the child, 

[F]ather stated to FCM Jones that he is unwilling to participate 

in any services offered by DCS.

32. Based upon [F]ather[’]s statement that he would not 

participate in any services offered by DCS, FCM Jones has not 

offered [F]ather additional drug screens.
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33. Parents currently reside together. Each parent is aware of

the other[’]s past and current drug use.

34. Mother has been offered services to address her drug use and 

admitted addiction since August of 2018. Mother failed to

benefit from the services when provided on a voluntary basis 

under the IA case and is still admittedly using illegal drugs.

35. Father has been deceptive regarding his residence, has 

disregarded the Court[’]s order for removal of the child, and has 

been adamant that he will not participate in services with DCS.

36. Father has not provided a drug screen since 1/11/19, when 

he was positive for marijuana, cocaine, and oxycodone. His 

failure to provide a screen and/or lack of drug screens since 

1/11/19 is not evidence of [F]ather[’]s sobriety.

37. The child is an infant and is completely dependent upon her 

caregiver(s) to meet all of her needs.

Father’s Appendix Volume II at 129-131. On April 5, 2019, the court entered a 

dispositional decree. 

Discussion

[14] Father first argues that the court abused its discretion in allowing Lemberg’s 

telephonic testimony and contends that DCS did not comply with the 

requirements of Ind. Admin. Rule 14 (B). In asserting that DCS did not meet 

the “only exception to the Rule’s thirty-day notice and service requirement” by

failing to move for telephonic testimony on or before January 16, 2019, Father 

directs us to Ind. Admin. Rule 14(B)(3)(e) and contends that the exception does 

not apply because the court is permitted “to alter the time deadlines only upon a 

motion made prior to the thirty-day deadline.” Father’s Appellant Brief at 18. 
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He additionally argues that no evidence or argument by DCS supports the 

court’s finding of good cause and asserts that the court did not consider all the 

factors under Ind. Admin. Rule 14 (B)(2). 

[15] To the extent that we must interpret our administrative rules, we do so de novo. 

C.S. v. State, 131 N.E.3d 592, 595 (Ind. 2019) (interpreting Ind. Admin. Rule 14 

de novo). Ind. Admin. Rule 14(B) provides that a “trial court may use telephone 

or audiovisual communications subject to”:

(1) the written consent of all the parties, entered on the 

Chronological Case Summary; or

(2) upon a trial court’s finding of good cause, upon its own motion 

or upon the motion of a party. The following factors shall be 

considered in determining “good cause”:

(a) Whether, after due diligence, the party has been unable to 

procure the physical presence of the witness;

(b) Whether effective cross-examination of the witness is 

possible, considering the availability of documents and exhibits 

to counsel and the witness;

(c) The complexity of the proceedings and the importance of 

the offered testimony in relation to the convenience to the 

party and the proposed witness;

(d) The importance of presenting the testimony of the witness 

in open court, where the fact finder may observe the demeanor 

of the witness and impress upon the witness the duty to testify 

truthfully;

(e) Whether undue surprise or unfair prejudice would result; 

and
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(f) Any other factors a trial court may determine to be relevant 

in an individual case.

(3) A party or a trial court if it is acting on its own motion must 

give notice of the motion to use telephone or audiovisual 

telecommunication as follows:

(a) Any motion for testimony to be presented by telephone or 

audiovisual telecommunication shall be served not less than 

thirty (30) days before the time specified for hearing of such 

testimony;

(b) Opposition to a motion for testimony to be presented by 

telephone or audiovisual telecommunication shall be made 

by written objection within seven (7) days after service;

(c) A trial court may hold an expedited hearing no later than 

ten (10) days before the scheduled hearing of such testimony 

to determine if good cause has been shown to present 

testimony by telephone or audiovisual telecommunication;

(d) A trial court shall make written findings of fact and 

conclusions of law within its order on the motion for 

testimony to be presented by telephone or audiovisual 

telecommunication; and

(e) For cause found, a trial court may alter the time deadlines 

set forth in paragraphs (a) through (c) upon motion made 

prior to the expiration of the time for the required action.

[16] Our review of the record reveals that, at the January 18, 2019 pretrial hearing, 

the court set the fact-finding hearing for February 15th upon Father’s request

and unwillingness to waive the sixty-day trial rule requirement, and pursuant to 

counsels’ schedules. Supplemental Transcript at 4. In light of the newly-set 

date, DCS’s counsel alerted the court that it had drug screen results and of the 
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thirty-day requirement needed to file a motion requesting authorization for the 

toxicologist to appear telephonically before making the motion verbally. The 

court’s January 25, 2019 order indicated that Parents, present at the meeting 

and represented by counsel, were provided with approximately twenty-seven 

days of notice. The order continued: “[a]fter consideration of the Motion, and 

of any written objection, and, after consideration [sic] Ind. Admin. R. 14, the 

court finds these relevant factors”; “John Martin and Kimberly Peterson live in 

California. Ms. Lemberg lives in Michigan respectively, and requiring each to 

travel for testimony would cause great burden and inconvenience”; the 

telephonic testimony will not preclude effective cross-examination by Parents;

and Parents were not prejudiced by the telephonic testimony. Id. at 101. 

[17] Regarding the finding of good cause, we additionally note that in this CHINS 

action two witnesses provided testimony about Father’s positive drug screen 

result. The court admitted a total of four exhibits: a signed consent form for the 

drug screen, the CV of the testifying lab director for Forensic Fluids who lived 

out-of-state, the affidavit from the same witness certifying the reliability of the 

procedures and accuracy of the test results relating to Father, and the test 

results. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the court incorrectly 

determined or failed to consider the Ind. Admin. Rule 14 (B)(2) factors in 

determining “good cause.”

[18] Father next argues that the court erred when it admitted Petitioner’s Exhibits 3 

and 4 and Lemberg’s testimony regarding the exhibits “because the State failed 

to meet its burden in proving proper chain of custody,” that Lemberg’s 
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testimony was based on hearsay and not any personal knowledge sufficient to 

establish a proper chain of custody, and that, “[w]ithout the testimony or an 

affidavit from the individual or individuals who were responsible for the 

custody of the sample at all critical times, the court could not be confident in 

the integrity of the sample or the test results.” Father’s Appellant Brief at 21, 

23-24. He contends that an oral swab sample is fungible evidence with a high 

potential for a mistake or mishandling, that the specimen processor, or the 

individual who collected the sample from its delivery at the laboratory and 

deposited it to the specimen processing room, was a significant witness for 

providing a chain of custody for the sample and did not testify, and that the 

professional who conducted the lab testing on the sample did not testify and 

was not identified by name or title. 

[19] The admission of evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the juvenile 

court. Matter of A.F., 69 N.E.3d 932, 941-942 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing In re 

A.J., 877 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied. We 

will find an abuse of discretion only where the juvenile court’s decision is 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.

at 942. If a juvenile court abuses its discretion by admitting challenged 

evidence, we will reverse for that error only if it is inconsistent with substantial 

justice or if a substantial right of the party is affected. Id. (citing In re S.W., 920 

N.E.2d 783, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).

[20] In describing the burden of establishing the chain of custody, Father points to 

caselaw occurring in the criminal context that predates the Indiana Supreme 
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Court’s decision of Troxell v. State, in which the Court found no error in the 

admission of evidence challenged by a criminal defendant claiming error in the 

chain of custody of a DNA sample and provided:

To establish a proper chain of custody, the State must give 

reasonable assurances that the evidence remained in an 

undisturbed condition. Cliver v. State, 666 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Ind. 

1996). However, the State need not establish a perfect chain of 

custody, and once the State “strongly suggests” the exact 

whereabouts of the evidence, any gaps go to the weight of the 

evidence and not to admissibility. Wrinkles v. State, 690 N.E.2d 

1156, 1160 (Ind. 1997); Jenkins v. State, 627 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind. 

1993) (noting that failure of FBI technician to testify did not 

create error). Moreover, there is a presumption of regularity in 

the handling of evidence by officers, and there is a presumption 

that officers exercise due care in handling their duties. Wrinkles, 

690 N.E.2d at 1160; Culver [v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ind. 

2000)]. To mount a successful challenge to the chain of custody, 

one must present evidence that does more than raise a mere 

possibility that the evidence may have been tampered with. 

Cliver, 666 N.E.2d at 63.

778 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ind. 2002). The Troxell Court also found that the absence 

of such information “goes to the weight of the evidence and not its 

admissibility.” Id. at 815 (citing Jenkins, 627 N.E.2d at 793).

[21] Here, the record reveals that FCM Jones testified about the procedures for 

collecting drug screen samples, ensuring that no contamination occurs, and 

sending samples, and that she collected a sample from Father following the 

procedure she described. She indicated that Father’s sample was under her 

sight and control during the collection and sealing process, that she placed the 
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sample in a UPS envelope, and that at the time she left the sample for mailing, 

she did not believe the sample had been compromised. Lab director and 

toxicologist Lemberg testified that she ensured all employees follow an 

“internal chain of custody, quality control that we run daily” and described the 

process of receiving samples and analyzing them. Transcript at 53. We further 

observe Megumi Roberts received Father’s sample, that both the consent form 

Father signed in Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 and the test results in Petitioner’s Exhibit

4 are for Specimen ID “S2955283,” and that Lemberg indicated the sample, 

which had been initially screened for marijuana, cocaine and oxycodone, 

received further testing in the confirmation lab and that she determined the 

results were trustworthy. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the 

court abused its discretion when it admitted the challenged drug test results.

[22] Parents next argue that the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s 

determination that A.G. was a CHINS. Father argues that the evidence did not 

support Findings 8 and 33. He argues DCS did not present evidence that: he was 

currently using drugs at the time of the August assessment or fact-finding 

hearing, he was impaired at any time when caring for A.G., or he contributed to 

A.G. being born with substances in her blood cord or that it endangered her. He 

contends: the drug test results, even if properly admitted, “at most” indicate he 

“used drugs on one occasion when he was nowhere near his daughter,” the 

evidence does not establish when he purportedly used drugs in the past, and that 

DCS did not observe him supervising A.G. Father’s Appellant Brief at 29. 

Mother contests the finding that she used illegal drugs during the informal 
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adjustment period and argues: “at best,” DCS has one admission from Mother 

that she took illegal drugs before she learned she was pregnant, no drug testing 

evidence contradicts her statement that she stopped using illegal drugs when she 

was pregnant; the only evidence DCS presented of drug usage after A.G.’s birth 

was the “FCM’s ambiguous testimony of ‘current’ drug use”; and that “[w]ords

(or the lack thereof) must mean something” such that the FCM’s testimony 

“about ‘usage’ does not support the . . . finding that Mother admitted to taking 

illegal drugs” after the CHINS petition was filed. Mother’s Appellant Brief at 12-

13. She also contends that DCS failed to show that driving A.G. without a valid 

driver’s license seriously endangered her or that she did not meet A.G.’s needs. 

[23] DCS maintains that the findings which Father disputes are supported by the

testimony and the reasonable inferences arising therein and contends that 

reversal is not warranted even if Finding No. 33 was erroneous because “[b]oth 

parents were abusing illicit substances, meaning neither parent was an 

appropriate care-giver.” Appellee Brief at 27. It argues that the evidence shows 

that drug use was a current and ongoing problem for Parents, that illicit drug 

use endangers children and, in the case of A.G., leaves her without a competent 

caregiver, and that Parents will not provide A.G. with a safe and stable home 

free from substance abuse without the coercive intervention of the court. 

[24] In reviewing a trial court’s determination that a child is in need of services, we 

neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. In re S.D., 2 

N.E.3d 1283, 1286-1287 (Ind. 2014), reh’g denied. Instead, we consider only the 

evidence that supports the trial court’s decision and reasonable inferences 
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drawn therefrom. Id. at 1287. As to issues covered by findings, we apply the 

two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings and whether 

the findings support the judgment. Id. We review remaining issues under the 

general judgment standard, under which a judgment will be affirmed if it can be 

sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id. “We will reverse a 

CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous.” In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep’t of 

Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). A decision is clearly erroneous if 

the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal 

standard to properly found facts. Id.

[25] “A CHINS proceeding is a civil action; thus, ‘the State must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the 

juvenile code.’” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012) (quoting In re 

N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)). At the relevant time period Ind. Code § 

31-34-1-1 provided:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes 

eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously 

impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the 

inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, 

or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, 

clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; 

and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1026 | December 19, 2019 Page 20 of 21

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without 

the coercive intervention of the court.

(Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 198-2019, § 8 (eff. July 1, 2019)).

[26] The CHINS statute does not require that a court wait until a tragedy occurs to 

intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a 

child is a CHINS when he or she is endangered by parental action or inaction. 

Id. Because a CHINS determination regards the status of the child, a separate 

analysis as to each parent is not required in the CHINS determination stage. In 

re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. The conduct of one parent can be enough for a 

child to be adjudicated a CHINS. Id. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is 

to protect children, not punish parents. Id. The resolution of a juvenile 

proceeding focuses on the best interests of the child, rather than guilt or 

innocence as in a criminal proceeding. Id.

[27] To the extent Mother and Father cite Perrine v. Marion Cty. Office of Child Services, 

in which this Court held that a single admitted use of methamphetamine, 

outside the presence of a child and without more, was insufficient to support a 

CHINS determination, we find this case to be distinguishable. 866 N.E.2d 269, 

277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In Perrine, at a hearing on the CHINS petition the 

mother answered affirmatively when asked “[i]s that the only time you ever 

used methamphetamine,” indicated that she was at a friend’s house when she 

used it, and testified that she “never used drugs around [the child]. Never ever. 

Even prescription medicine . . . .” Id. at 275-276. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-1026 | December 19, 2019 Page 21 of 21

[28] Having found that Petitioner’s Exhibit 4 was properly admitted, we observe that 

Father tested positive for THC, cocaine, and oxycodone on January 11, 2019. 

Father indicated to DCS that he did not need to participate in services. 

Regarding Mother, the record reveals that she indicated to FCM Jones that she 

resided with Father. FCM Jones testified that Mother indicated in October 

2018 that she used cocaine and marijuana recreationally, that Mother spoke of 

current drug use, and that she had safety concerns for A.G. as a result. FCM 

Jones testified about her conversations with Mother about drug use after the 

CHINS case was filed, that Mother shared she had a prescription for an opiate 

for which she tested positive subsequently, and that Mother, through concern 

for A.G.’s placement, had made a disclosure about usage due to stress.

[29] To the extent Parents’ arguments invite us to reweigh the evidence and reassess 

witness credibility, we are unable to do so. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1286. 

The evidence most favorable to the judgment supports the court’s findings that 

Parents’ actions or inactions have seriously endangered A.G., that A.G.’s needs 

are unmet, and that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. 

See id. at 1287. In light of the unchallenged findings and the evidence and 

testimony presented at the fact-finding hearing, we cannot say that the trial 

court’s judgment is clearly erroneous. 

[30] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.