No. 86-06 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1986 

UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA FOUNDATION, 

a Montana nonprofit corporation, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, and its 

Administrator, ANNE MacINTYRE, 

Defendants and Appe1.lants. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, 

The Honorable Thomas Honzel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Janice Frankino Dogqett, Human Rights Commission, 

Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman; Thomas E. 

Hattersley, Helena, Montana 

Frederick F. Sherwood, Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: July 31, 1986 

Decided: October 9, 1986 

: ;986 is t; : 

Filed: 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The Montana Human Rights Commission appeals the order of 

the First Judicial District which restrained the Commission 

from any further proceedings regarding a discrimination 

complaint filed by Gayle Walton against the University of 

Montana Foundation. The order also required the Commission 

Administrator to immediately issue a right to sue letter to 

Gayle Walton. We affirm. 

The issues are: 

1. Did the District Court err in its interpretation of 

5 49-2-509, MCA, when it restrained the Commission from 

further proceedings and required the Commission to issue a 

right to sue letter? 

2. Did the District Court err when it refused to admit 

evidence regarding the cause of the delay in the Commission's 

investigation? 

On January 20, 1984 Gayle Walton filed three discrimination complaints with the Montana Human Rights Commission 

(Commission) against the University of Montana Foundation 

(Foundation). About sixteen months later, the Foundation 

requested that the Commission issue a right to sue letter 

regarding FJalton's complaints pursuant to 5 49-2-509, MCA. 

Anne MacIntyre, administrator for the Commission, refused the 

request and stated she was unable to determine whether Commission efforts to settle the case had been unsuccessful, and 

that a right to sue letter would not be issued until such a 

determination had been made. 

On September 27, 1985 the Foundation applied to the 

District Court for writ of review and writ of prohibition. 

The Foundation claimed the Commission lost jurisdiction of 
Walton's complaints by failing to meet the time limits set 

forth in S 49-2-509, MCA, and should be barred from further 

proceedings in the matter. The Commission responded with a 

motion to quash the Foundation's writ of prohibition. Additionally, Walton was permitted to intervene. Following 

briefing and oral argument, the District Court issued an 

order restraining the Commission from any further proceedings 

in the matter and requiring Anne MacIntyre, as Division 

Adiminstrator, to issue a right to sue letter. Commission 

appealed. 

Did the District Court err in its interpretation of 

S 49-2-509, MCA when it restrained the Commission from further proceedings and required the Commission to issue a right 

to sue letter? 

Section 49-2-509(1), MCA, provides: 

(1) The commission staff shall, at the request of 

either party, issue a letter entitling the 

complainant to file a discrimination action in 

district court if: 

(a) the commission has not yet held a contested case hearing pursuant to 49-2-505 and has 

determined that it will be unable to hold a contested case hearing within 12 months of the date 

the complaint was filed under 49-2-501; and 

(b) 180 days have elapsed since the complaint 

was filed and the efforts of the commission staff 

to settle the complaint after informal investigation pursuant to 49-2-504 have been unsuccessful. 

In determining legislative intent, the Court must first 

look to the plain meaning of the language used in the statute. State ex rel. Palmer v. Hart (~ont. 1982), 655 ~.2d 

965, 39 St.Rep. 2277; Dorn v. Board of Trustees of Billings 

School District No. 2 (Mont. 1983), 661 P.2d 426, 40 St.Rep. 
The Commission believes the statute does not permit 

removal of a case to district court until an attempt to 

settle the case has been made, even though the time requirements of the statute have been exceeded. In a letter from 

Anne MacIntyre to the Foundation's attorney, this position 

was clearly enunciated. In part, the letter stated: 

I am unable to determine that the "efforts of the 

commission staff to settle the case after informal 

investigation pursuant to 49-2-504 have been unsuccessful. " S 49-2-509(1) (b) , MCA and A.R.M. 

24.9.262 (2) (c) (emphasis added) . I am unable to 

make such a determination because the informal 

investigation has not been concluded, and will not 

be concluded until the commission staff issues its 

findings. The reasonable cause or lack of reasonable cause finding in a case under investigation is 

the staff's determination whether the allegations 

of the complaint are supported by substantial 

evidence. Section 49-2-504, MCA, requires the 

staff to make such a determination and then attempt 

to settle the case and eliminate the discriminatory 

practice through conference, conciliation, and 

persuasion. Section 49-2-509 (1) (b) , MCA, does not 

permit removal to district court until these steps 

have been completed, even though the time requirements have been met. (Second emphasis added for 

this opinion.) 

The position of the Commission as stated above is not a 

correct interpretation of the statute. 

We conclude that 5 49-2-509 (I), MCA, provides that on 

the request of either party, a right to sue letter should 

issue where 180 days have elapsed since the filing of the 

complaint without the completion of an informal settlement, 

and in addition, where 12 months have elapsed from the filing 

date so that a contested case hearing cannot be held within 

such 12 month period. Gayle Walton filed her complaints on 

January 20, 1984. As a result, an informal settlement must 

have been completed by the Commission by July 19, 1984 - 180 

days from filing. As an alternative, the Commission must 

have held a contested case hearing by January 19, 1985 - 12 
months from January 20, 1984. Neither of these statutory 

deadlines were met. This statute then provides that upon the 

request of either party, a right to sue letter should issue. 

As the District Court's well-phrased order stated: 

The language of the statute is clear on its face. 

The Commission staff must issue a right to sue 

letter at the request of either party if two conditions are met: (1) a contested case has not and 

cannot be held within 12 months of the filing of 

the complaint; and (2) efforts to informally settle 

the matter pursuant to S 49-2-504, MCA, have been 

unsuccessful and 180 days have elapsed. Here, no 

contested case has been held and more than 12 

months have passed since the filing of the complaint. In addition, more than 180 days have 

elapsed since the filing of the complaint, and 

there has not been a successful settlement. Since 

the Foundation has requested the Commission staff 

to issue a right to sue letter, it must do so. . . 

Section 49-2-509, MCA, does not say that the Administrator has the authority or the discretion to 

determine whether efforts at informal settlement 

have been unsuccessful. To hold that the Administrator has such discretion would be to insert 

something which was omitted by the Legislature. 

This the Court cannot do. Furthermore, to hold 

that the 180 days begins to run only after the 

Administrator has made a determination that efforts 

to settle have been unsuccessful, would permit the 

Commission staff to informally do what it could not 

formally do, that is, the staff could continue with 

the matter well beyond the 12 month time limit for 

holding a contested case. The plain language of 

the statute clearly shows that such was not the 

intent of the Legislature. 

Rule 1 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure in part 

provides that the rules shall be construed to secure "the 

just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 

The same guidelines properly may be applied to the administrative proceeding requirements of 5 49-2-509, MCA. The aim 

of the administrative process is to secure a just and inexpensive determination which is just as speedy as the court 

process. The legislature has placed a reasonable time limit 

on the administrative process by granting a total of 12 

months within which to complete that process. Nothing has 
been presented which demonstrates that the 12 month period is 

an unreasonable period. We hold that the District Court did 

not err when it restrained the Commission from further proceedings and required the Commission to issue the right to 

sue letter. 

I1 

Did the District Court err when it refused to admit 

evidence regarding the cause of the delay in the Commission's 

investigation? 

In the present case, the District Court refused to 

consider evidence that settlement had not been reached due to 

delay caused by the Foundation. If the time periods set 

forth in the statute have passed, then upon request a right 

to sue letter must be issued. The statute does not address 

delays, nor provide for additional time if one side or the 

other caused a delay. We hold the District Court did not err 

when it refused to admit evidence regarding the cause of the 

delay in the Commission's investigation. 

We affirm the District Court. 

We Concur: 

-4' 

Chief Justice 

Mr. Justice Frank E. Morrison, Jr. dissents as follows: 

I dissent. 

The wording in $ 49-2-509(1) (b), MCA, is ambiguous. 

Subsection (b) may be read as having one or two conditions. 

To determine legislative intent we should look to the 

legislative history of § 49-2-509, MCA. 

Section 49-2-509, MCA, was introduced as House Bill 660 

in the 1983 legislative session. Comments submitted by 

Commission Administrator MacIntyre indicate the bill was 

intended to provide an alternative forum for a complainant 

whose case was not being expeditiously investigated and 

settled by the Commission. 

There are several reasons the Commission has 

requested the introduction of this legislation. 

First, many complainants who are represented by 

counsel from the outset would prefer to pursue 

their complaints in court rather than at an 

administrative hearing. Secondly, because of the 

inadequate funding of the Commission, the number of 

cases awaiting hearing is large and growing. While 

the number is not large compared to the number of 

cases which are resolved by the Commission staff 

through investigation and conciliation prior to 

hearing, it does contribute to the Commission 

backlog. Furthermore, in many cases, damages 

continue to accrue while cases are awaiting hearing 

and this seems particularly inequitable to 

Respondents. 

Because of the fact that the Commission staff is 

able to resolve more than 90% of the cases filed 

with it through conciliation and investigation, the 

Commission believes that all complaints should be 

filed with the Commission initially. If the 

Commission staff cannot resolve the complaint 

within 180 days through conciliation and 

investigation, the complainant can then exercise 

the election provided for in this bill. 

Senate Judiciary Committee minutes, March 9, 1983. 

The bill was amended to provide both complainant and 

respondent with the right to request a right to sue letter. 
Sections 49-2-509, MCA, establish the administrative 

remedy for resolving discrimination complaints. The federal 

district court for the District of Montana found that the 

legislature intended to create a procedure whereby the 

Commission would informally eliminate discriminatory 

practices by conference, conciliation, and persuasion, and 

that the statutory remedy is exclusive. Walker v. The 

Anaconda Co. (D.C.Mont. 1981) 520 F.Supp. 1143, 38 St.Rep. 

1557. I agree with this analysis. 

In the present case, the District Court refused to 

consider evidence that settlement had not been reached due to 

delay caused by the Foundation. This was error. If a party 

is permitted to stall its way into district court, the 

statutory remedy can be rendered meaningless. Pursuant to 

549-2-504, MCA, the Commission staff shall informally 

investigate a filed complaint promptly and impartially. This 

task becomes exceedingly difficult where the respondent 

refuses to comply with discovery requests. 

I would interpret S 49-2-509 (1) (b) , MCA, to require a 

look into the progress of settlement efforts after 180 days 

have elapsed. The legislative history reveals S 49-2-509, 

MCA, was implemented to provide an alternative remedy where 

administrative delay is preventing resolution of a complaint. 

In the present case, the district judge should have 

determined whether the Foundation or the Commission was 

responsible for the delay. 

The Commission's interpretation of S 49-2-509 (1) , MCA, 

is found at ARM 24.9.262; 

(2) The division administrator shall issue 

the right to sue letter on behalf of the Commission 

upon receipt of a written request from either party 

if the administrator determines: 
(a) No contested case hearing has been held 

in the case; 

(b) 180 days have elapsed since the complaint 

was filed; 

(c) the efforts of the division to settle the 

case after informal investigation have been 

unsuccessful; and 

(d) the Commission will be unable to hold a 

contested case hearing in the matter within 12 

months of the date the complaint was filed. 

The District Court found this rule to be an incorrect 

interpretation of the statute as it contains four enumerated 

conditions rather than two, and it allows the division 

administrator to determine whether settlement efforts have 

been unsuccessful. 

The rule is, in my opinion, proper under the statute. 

Subsection (c) of the rule does not give the administrator 

unbridled discretion to extend a case beyond the 12 month 

time limit for holding a contested case hearing. The 

Commission has a duty to promptly investigate complaints and 

immediately try to eliminate discriminatory practices. 

Neither party should be permitted to circumvent the 

administrative remedy by using dilatory tactics. The 

legislative history and time limits contained within the 

statute support this result. 

The District Court should be reversed and the case