Filed 7/19/21 In re Chloe M. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re CHLOE M., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B308615

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

18CCJP01849A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JILL M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates, Vincent W. 

Davis, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

_________________________

Jill M., the mother of now-four-year-old Chloe M., appeals 

the juvenile court’s November 2, 2020 order terminating her 

parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 366.26.1 Jill contends the court erred in ruling she had 

failed to establish the parent-child-relationship exception to 

termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). We 

affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Sustained Petition

On March 21, 2018 the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (Department) filed a dependency 

petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious 

physical harm, one count) and (b) (failure to protect, four counts), 

based on the history of violent altercations between Jill and 

Chloe’s father, Charlie M.; both parents’ histories of mental and 

emotional problems; and Charlie’s history of substance abuse. At 

the detention hearing the court found a prima facie case for 

detaining Chloe and ordered her placed in the temporary custody 

of the Department.

A continued jurisdiction/disposition hearing was held on 

July 27, 2018. The court dismissed the allegation of serious 

1 Statutory references are to this code.
3

physical harm pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a),2 as well 

as the subdivision (b) count regarding Jill’s history of mental and 

emotional problems. The remaining three counts were sustained. 

The court declared Chloe a dependent child of the court, ordered 

her removed from the care and custody of her parents, and placed 

her with the Department for suitable placement. The court 

ordered the Department to provide the parents with family 

reunification services. Monitored visits were ordered for Charlie, 

and a combination of monitored and unmonitored visits were 

ordered for Jill. Jill’s case plan consisted of conjoint counseling, 

parenting education, mental health counseling, including taking 

all prescribed medication, and compliance with any protective 

orders in place against Charlie. 

2. The Status Review Hearings and Termination of Jill’s 

Parental Rights

At the continued six-month review hearing held on April 4, 

2019, the juvenile court found Jill had been partially compliant 

with her case plan and ordered continuation of her reunification 

services. 

At the 12-month review hearing on September 19, 2019, the 

parents requested the matter be set for contest. Given the time 

2 In her opening brief on appeal Jill states the court 

dismissed the allegation of serious physical harm brought 

pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a). The Department does 

not specifically address the court’s ruling on the subdivision (a) 

allegation. The minute order for the jurisdiction hearing is silent 

on that count of the petition, and the record does not contain a 

reporter’s transcript for the hearing. Regardless, the lack of 

clarity on the court’s jurisdiction findings does not affect the 

outcome of the appeal.
4

that had elapsed since Chloe’s detention, the court set the matter 

for a contested permanency review hearing pursuant to 

section 366.22. The permanency review hearing was held on 

November 13, 2019. The court found Jill’s progress on her case 

plan had not been substantial and terminated reunification 

services for Jill and Charlie.

A continued selection and implementation hearing 

pursuant to section 366.26 was held on November 2, 2020.3 

Neither Jill nor Charlie appeared at the hearing. Parents’ 

counsel requested a continuance, stating their clients wished to 

participate. The court found notice was proper and denied the 

request. The Department and Chloe’s counsel requested parental 

rights be terminated. Charlie’s counsel objected to termination of 

parental rights based on the parental bond exception to 

termination under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), arguing 

Charlie’s visitation had been consistent and he assumed a 

parental role during visits. When the court inquired as to Jill’s 

position, her counsel stated, “I have no direction, but please note 

[Jill’s] objection to termination of her parental rights.” 

The court found continued jurisdiction was necessary and 

found by clear and convincing evidence that Chloe was adoptable. 

In response to Charlie’s argument, the court found the parental 

bond exception did not apply because Charlie’s visits had been 

inconsistent and he had not shown he had taken on a parental 

role in Chloe’s life. The court terminated Jill’s and Charlie’s 

parental rights and transferred the care, custody and control of 

3 The selection and implementation hearing, originally 

scheduled for March 11, 2020, was first continued so the matter 

could be set for contest and was again continued due to

COVID-19 restrictions.
5

Chloe to the Department to complete adoption by her current 

caregiver. Jill filed a timely notice of appeal.4

DISCUSSION

1. Governing law 

The express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is “to 

provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent children. 

(§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Once the court has decided to end parentchild reunification services, the legislative preference is for 

adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1); In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 

532 [“[i]f adoption is likely, the court is required to terminate 

parental rights, unless specified circumstances compel a finding 

that termination would be detrimental to the child”].)

Section 366.26 requires the juvenile court to conduct a twopart inquiry at the selection and implementation hearing. First, 

it determines whether there is clear and convincing evidence the 

child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. 

(Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249-250; In re 

D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 290.) Then, if the court finds 

by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted, 

the statute mandates judicial termination of parental rights 

unless the parent opposing termination can demonstrate one of 

the enumerated statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B); see Cynthia D., at pp. 250, 259.)

4 Charlie also filed a notice of appeal. After his appointed 

counsel was unable to identify any arguable issues, Charlie failed 

to present any issues for consideration. Charlie’s appeal was 

dismissed on March 3, 2021. (See In re Phoenix H. (2009) 

47 Cal.4th 835, 838.)
6

One of the statutory exceptions to termination is contained 

in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which permits the court 

to order some other permanent plan if “[t]he parents have 

maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the 

child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” The 

exception requires the parent to prove he or she has maintained 

regular visitation and his or her relationship with the child 

“‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to 

outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent 

home with new, adoptive parents.’” (In re Collin E. (2018) 

25 Cal.App.5th 647, 663; accord, In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 

614, 629-630 [what the parent-child-relationship exception 

“requires a parent to establish, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, is that the parent has regularly visited with the child, 

that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, and 

that terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the 

child. [Citations.] The language of this exception, along with its 

history and place in the larger dependency scheme, show that the 

exception applies in situations where a child cannot be in a 

parent’s custody but where severing the child’s relationship with 

the parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a new 

adoptive home, would be harmful for the child”].) The parent has 

the burden of proving the statutory exception applies. (In re 

Caden C., at p. 629; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 

826.) 

2. Jill Forfeited Her Argument by Failing To Object in the 

Juvenile Court

“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge 

to a ruling if an objection could have been made, but was not 

made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to 
7

encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial 

court, so they may be corrected. [Citation.] [¶] Dependency 

matters are not exempt from this rule.” (In re S.B. (2004) 

32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. omitted; accord, In re Aaron S. (2015) 

235 Cal.App.4th 507, 521; see In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th

1148, 1158 [“‘[a]s a general rule, a party is precluded from urging 

on appeal any point not raised in the trial court’”]; In re Elijah V. 

(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 582 [“[a] parent’s failure to raise an 

issue in the juvenile court prevents him or her from presenting 

the issue to the appellate court”]; see also In re Marriage of 

Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1138 [“it would be unfair to 

allow counsel to lull the trial court and opposing counsel into 

believing the statement of decision was acceptable, and 

thereafter to take advantage of an error on appeal although it 

could have been corrected at trial”]; Caminetti v. Pacific Mutual 

Life Ins. Co. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 386, 392 [forfeiture rule keeps a 

party from playing “‘fast and loose with the administration of 

justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection 

of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to 

go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and 

which he may avoid, if not’”].)

As discussed, at the selection and implementation hearing 

Jill’s counsel registered a one-sentence general objection to 

termination of parental rights, but he did not at any time suggest 

Jill contended the parent-child exception to termination was 

applicable, let alone present any evidence or argument on that 

point. (See In re E.A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 787, 790 [“General 

objections are insufficient to preserve issues for review. 

[Citation.] The objection must state the ground or grounds upon 

which the objection is based”].) The failure to raise a statutory 
8

exception to termination of parental rights at the section 366.26 

hearing forfeits the issue for purpose of appeal. (In re Daisy D.

(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.