IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

D.D.

†

Appellant.

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No. 35585-3-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — D.D. appeals from a juvenile court adjudicating her 

guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. She argues the evidence was insufficient 

to sustain her conviction. We affirm. 

FACTS

After shopping at the Union Gap Ross store, Teresa Arroyo Valdez went to the 

parking lot and could not find her black Honda Accord. She called the police and 

reported her car stolen. 

 

† To protect the privacy interests of D.D., a minor, we use her and her sister’s

initials throughout this opinion. General Order for the Court of Appeals, In re Changes to 

Case Title (Aug. 22, 2018), effective Sept. 1, 2018.

FILED

MARCH 5, 2019

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 35585-3-III

State v. D.D.

2

Shortly after 5:00 a.m. the next morning, Yakima Police Officer Thomas Tovar 

was driving on North 20th Avenue and saw a black Honda Accord driving toward him. 

He checked the license plate and discovered that the car had been reported stolen. 

Officer Tovar then turned to pursue the car. He saw the Honda turn down Willow 

Street. Officer Tovar activated his emergency lights, turned down Willow Street, but did 

not immediately see the Honda. As he drove along Willow Street, he spotted the Honda 

pulled over behind him on the side of North 19th Avenue, near Swan Road. Officer 

Tovar braked and drove his car in reverse onto North 19th Avenue behind the Honda. 

Officer Tovar noticed that the driver was still in the car and was its sole occupant. 

He radioed for assistance to perform a high-risk felony stop. Officer Lucas Hinton was 

nearby and arrived to assist. The driver complied with commands to exit the Honda, and 

the officers placed her in handcuffs and secured her in a patrol car. 

The driver identified herself as C.C., date of birth September 16, 1994. The 

officers attempted to verify her identity and soon suspected that she was C.C.’s juvenile

sister, D.D. They asked if she was D.D., and she falsely denied it. 

D.D. tried to explain why she was driving someone else’s car. She told the 

officers that she was visiting a friend named Thomas Hardy who had a cousin Chris. She 

did not know Chris’s last name. D.D. said that while Thomas was sleeping, she told 
No. 35585-3-III

State v. D.D.

3

Chris that she needed a ride to North 24th Avenue and Castlevale Road. She said that 

Chris, whom she did not know well, asked if he could trust her, and then told her she 

could borrow his car if she dropped it off near North 19th Avenue and Swan Road. D.D. 

said that Chris had described the key as being an aftermarket key with no keyring that was 

jammed in the ignition and could not be removed. She did not know the address where 

she had received the car. 

Law enforcement soon informed Ms. Valdez that her car had been recovered

around 19th Avenue and Swan. She obtained a ride to recover her car. Once there, Ms. 

Valdez saw papers that had been in the glove box strewn throughout her car. Some of the 

papers had her name on them. She also noticed her stereo was gone, a key was stuck in 

the ignition, wires were exposed, and the hood would not close normally. The key 

required pliers for it to be removed from the ignition.

The State charged D.D. in juvenile court with possession of a stolen motor vehicle

and making a false or misleading statement to a public servant. After a bench trial, the 

court found that D.D. had falsely identified herself, and had “possessed a stolen motor 

vehicle with knowledge that it was stolen when she drove Ms. Valdez’s car with a key 

stuck in the ignition, a missing stereo, papers addressed to the true owner tossed about in 

it, and [drove and parked the car] in a manner suggesting she was attempting to avoid 
No. 35585-3-III

State v. D.D.

4

Officer Tovar’s detection.” Clerk’s Papers at 22. The trial court adjudicated D.D. guilty 

of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant and possession of a stolen 

motor vehicle.

She timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

D.D. argues the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain her adjudication 

for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Specifically, she argues that the circumstantial 

evidence that she had notice was insufficient. We disagree.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In a criminal case, the State must provide sufficient evidence to prove each 

element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 316, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). When a defendant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence, the proper inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 

(1992). “[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the 

State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant.” Id. Furthermore, “[a] claim of

insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably 
No. 35585-3-III

State v. D.D.

5

can be drawn therefrom.” Id. In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 

circumstantial evidence and direct evidence carry equal weight. State v. Goodman, 150 

Wn.2d 774, 781, 83 P.3d 410 (2004).

Under RCW 9A.56.068(1), “[a] person is guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle if 

he or she . . . [possesses] a stolen motor vehicle.” “‘Possessing stolen property’ means 

knowingly to receive, retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that 

it has been stolen and to withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person other 

than the true owner or person entitled thereto.” RCW 9A.56.140(1). “A person knows or 

acts knowingly or with knowledge when . . . he or she has information which would lead 

a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are 

described by a statute defining an offense.” RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b).

Here, the State presented ample circumstantial evidence that a reasonable person in 

D.D.’s same situation would believe that the Honda was stolen. First and foremost, the 

Honda had an aftermarket key jammed into the ignition that could not be manually 

removed. The stereo was missing and documents with Ms. Valdez’s name on them were 

strewn about the car. Second, D.D.’s unsubstantiated story was not believable: Someone 

she barely knew loaned her the Honda at 5:00 a.m. and instructed her to leave it with a

key stuck in the ignition, effectively permitting anyone to drive it away. Third, viewing 
No. 35585-3-III 

State v. D.D. 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable trier of fact could have 

found that D.D. saw the officer tum his patrol car around to follow her, and that she 

attempted to hide because she knew the Honda was stolen. 

We conclude that the State presented substantial circumstantial evidence that D .D. 

reasonably should have known that the Honda was stolen. In fact, the evidence 

established that she did know the Honda was stolen. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Pennell, J. 

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