Ta~A7a-rORNEY GENERAL 

0~T~s-w 

AUSTIN XI.TEXAR 

September 5, 1957 

Honorable Henry Wade 

Criminal District Attorney 

'Dallas County 

Dallas, Texas 

Opinion No. WW-254 

Re: Location of Juvenile Court 

in and for Dallas County, 

Texas, created by House 

Bill No. 940, Acts 55th 

Legislature, Regular Session, Chapter 511, at 

Dear Mr. Wade: page 1490. 

Your request for an opinion, dated August 13, 1957, 

submits the following question for our consideration: 

"Whether the Commissioners Court must provide 

a court room and quarters for the newly created 

Juvenile Court in the Dallas County Court House, 

or whether it may provide the only court room for 

that court in the Juvenile Home on Harry Hines 

Boulevard". 

Your letter states that the proposed location on 

Harry Hines Boulevard is within the present corporate limits 

of the City of Dallas, but outside the limits of the "town of 

Dallas" at the time the latter was designated as the county 

seat of Dallas County. You further advise that the Juvenile 

Court of Dallas County, heretofore created pursuant to Article 

2338-1 of Vernon's Civil Statutes, sits at the proposed site 

on Harry Hines Boulevard. The right of this court to be so 

located was upheld by the Supreme Court of Texas in the case 

of cox V. wood, 152 Tex. 283, 256 S.W.2d 841. 

Section 18 of Article 2338-1 provides for the location of Juvenile Courts created thereunder in the following 

language: 

"Sessions of the court shall be held as the 

Judge shall from time to time determine. Suitable 

quarters shall be provided by the Commissioners 

Court of each county for the hearing of cases and 
Honorable Henry Wade, Page 2 (WW-254) 

for the use of the judge, the probation officer 

and other employees of the court." 

In Cox v. Wood, supra, the Supreme Court upheld the 

right of the Dallas County Juvenile Court to be located and 

hold court sessions at the site on Harry Hines Boulevard here 

in question. It was urged before the Court that under Section 7 of Article V of the Constitution of Texas, the district 

courts were confined, In the holding of court to the places 

now provided in the court house in the City of Dallas as the 

county seat of Dallas County, as said city existed at the 

time It was designated as the county seat of Dallas County. 

That provision of the Constitution specifies that the District 

Court "shall conduct its proceedings at the county seat of 

the county in which the case is pending, except as otherwise 

provided by law." 

It was further urged that the Legislature had made 

no exception with reference to the place that sessions of the 

court could be held, In reply to this argument grounded upon 

the foregoing constitutional provision, the Supreme Court 

held that the Juvenile Court was not a "District Court" within 

the meaning of this constitutional provision "but is a special 

court created Q statute". The Court then said: 

0 

. . . What difference can it make that the 

site of the Juvenile Home and its courtroom is not 

within the bounds of the 'town of Dallas' of a 

century ago when it admittedly is within the 

present limits of the City of Dallas?" 

The Court further said: 

,I 

. . . It is undoubtedly the public policy 

of this state to protect the dependent or delinquent child, at the most critical time of his 

life, from the impressions he would inevitably 

get 'from the old method of handling minors'. 

Most certainly that policy would not be served 

by the application of an inflexible rule that 

the Juvenile Court of Dallas County, because it 

is presided over by a district judge, can function 

only in the courthouse or within the limits of the 

Town of Dallas as set in 1846. o a . We see no 

need to write further." 

Our primary concern is the applicability of the 

Court's holding in the - Cox case to the new Juvenile Court of 

Dallas County created by House Bill 940. With reference to 
Honorable Henry Wade, Page 3 (~~-254) 

where the new court shall 

House Bill 940 provides: 

hold its session, Section 11 of 

"The said Juvenile Court and Court of Domestic 

Relations shall be courts of record, shall sit and 

hold court at the county seat of Dallas County, 

. * . (Emphasis added) 

The answer to the question submitted hinges upon 

the construction of the underscored portion of the above 

section, 

Since the court is of statutory origin, the right 

of the Legislature to prescribe the site where the court shall 

hold its sessions is unquestioned. 

The term 'county seat" was defined by the Supreme 

Court of Texas in the case of Turner, et al v. Tucker, et al, 

113 Tex. 434, 258 S.W. 149, as follows: 

"In the light of our Constitutions and statutes, it seems to us not to admit of any reasonable 

doubt that the words 'county seat', as used in 

section 2 of article 9, of the Constitution, mean 

the place where the courthouse is situated, where 

the county offices are kept, and where the district 

and county courts for the county are held. . . . 

"We give the words 'county seat' their ordinary 

signification. The Century Dictionary defines the 

'county seat' to be: 

"'The seat of government of a county, the town 

in which the county and other courts are held, and 

where the county officers perform their functions'." 

At the time House Bill No. 940 was enacted, the site 

on Harry Hines Boulevard was a place where county offices were 

kept and also a place where the existing Juvenile Court of 

Dallas County held its sessions. It must be presumed that the 

Legislature was aware of these facts when House Bill 940 was 

enacted, since it may be presumed that the Legislature "knew", 

"had in mind", or "was familiar with" the "law of the land", 

also prior decisions of the courts - at least those of last 

resort - pertaining to the subject matter. It may also be 

presumed that the Legislature knew facts of common notoriety 

in the State, as well as any circumstances or conditions 

affecting or relating to the particular enactment. 39 Tex. 

Jur. 248 and the cases there cited. 
._* . 

. 

Honorable Henry Wade, Page 4 (WW-254) 

The designation of the town of Dallas as the county 

seat of Dallas County was first made by a special Act of the 

Legislature, passed April 18, 1846. This Act is set forth in 

Volume II of Sayles' Early Laws of Texas at page 36, and is 

shown as Article 1633, reading as follows: 

II 

. . until otherwise provided by law, the 

town of-Dallas shall be the seat of justice for 

Dallas county, and all the courts for said county 

shall be held thereat." 

As stated by your letter, the town of Dallas at the 

time of its designa.bion as the county seat of Dallas County 

was unincorporated and had no fixed boundaries, or if It can 

be said that there were fixed boundaries, such boundaries 

cannot now be determined with any degree-of accuracy. In 

Rails v. Parrish, 105 Tex. 253, 147 S.W. 564, the Supreme 

Court held that: 

!f 

. . . Where a town is duly incorporated, it 

is embraced within definite metes and bounds and 

without respect to an aggregation of inhabited 

houses, but, where it is an unincorporated town, 

its area is defined to be and to embrace the 

aggregation of inhabitants and the collection of 

occupied dwellings and other buildings constituting 

such town. . . . 

II it is proper to say that the situs of 

an unincorporated town will not be controlled by 

the platted area of such town without reference to 

the collection of inhabited houses, which together 

with the area appurtenant to same in the ordinary 

signification of f;he meaning of the word constitute 

the town. . . . 

If the term "county seat" as used in House Bill 940 

is to be construed as embracing only that area included within 

the limits of the town of Dallas at the time the latter was 

designated as the county seat, the metes and bounds of the 

included area, in view of the foregoing rule, would doubtless 

be a matter of considerable conjecture. 

In seeking to resolve the question submitted we have 

carefully considered a number of cases from other jurisdictions 

which hold in substance that when a city or town is selected 

as the county seat, the boundaries of such Citg OP town, as 

they then exist, become the boundaries of the county seat, and 

subsequent inclusion of more territory, does not remove the 
Honorable Henry Wade, Page 5 (WW-254), 

county seat. Notable among such cases are: Marengo County v. 

Matkin, 32 So. 669 (Ala. Supp., 1902); Way v. Fox, 80 N.W. 

mowa Supp., 1899); State ex rel Kellog, Attorney General, 

v. Board of County Commissioners of Atchison County, 24 Pac. 

8 7 Kan. 

A relaxation of the rigid rule announced in the 

foregoing cases is evident in the more recent cases of Jordan 

, 221 P.2d 977 (Calir. 

(Ore. 1912x 

amath County Court, 

126 Pac. 6 Supp., Each of the foregoing cases 

sustained the right of the county to'erect a courthouse on a 

site outside the original limits of t&e town or city designated 

as the county seat. 

located, was "at" 

In holding that the courthouse, as so 

the county seat of Visalia, the Court in the 

Jordan case said: 

"The primary idea in the word 'at' is 'nearness' or 'proximity', and it is commonly used as 

the equivalent of 'near' or 'about'. . . .' 

The question with which we are here concerned does 

not involve the removal of the county seat of Dallas County. 

The only question involved is the right of a special court 

created by statute to sit at a place outside the limits of the 

town of Dallas as that city existed 107 years ago. Our opinion 

is necessarily confined to the meaning of the phrase "at the 

county seat of Dallas County" as used in House Bill 940. The 

question, as we view it, is one of legislative intent. The 

meaning ascribed to the phrase by the courts when used in other 

contexts or other statutory or constitutional provisions is an 

aid to be considered, but same cannot be given conclusive effect. 

A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that an 

act should be given a fair, rational, reasonable, and sensible 

construction, considering its language and subject matter and 

with a view to accomplishing the legislative intent and purpose. 39 Tex. Jur. 172 and the cases there cited. 

On the question of reasonable construction, the 

Supreme Court in the Cox case, su ra, saw no "good reason to 

apply to it (the Juveze Court P- the ancient rule that in 

general-run-of-the-mill litigation the district courts of 

Dallas County must function in the courthouse of Dallas County 

or within that limited portion of the city which was in 

existence when the 'town of Dallas' was designated as the 

county seat 107 years ago." In view of all the circumstances, 

we think that if the Legislature had intended to preclude the 

new Juvenile Court from sitting at the location where the 
Honorable Henry Wade, Page 6 (~~-254) 

existing court was then sitting, the language used in 

expressing such intent would have left no room for doubt or 

question. This seems particularly true in view of the fact 

that the location of the existing court had been the subject 

of both controversy and litigation. 

You are accordingly advised that it is our opinion 

that the Juvenile Court created forDallas County by House 

Bill 940, may legally sit and hold court at the Juvenile Home 

on Harry Hines Boulevard, the latter being located within the 

present corporate limits of the City of Dallas. This conclusion apparently coincides with your own since your letter 

states that a contrary result would be based upon "a harsh and 

technical construction" 

House Bill 940. 

of the language used in Section 11 of 

In accordance with your usual practice, you have 

submitted an exhaustive brief in connection with your request, 

which was prepared by Mr. Broyles. Your outstanding cooperation in this respect is of immense assistance to this office 

and we thank you most sincerely. 

SUMMARY 

The Juvenile Court created for Dallas County 

by House Bill 940, Acts of the 55th Legislature, Regular Session, Chapter 511, page 

1490, may legally sit and hold court at the 

Juvenile Home on Harry Hines Boulevard, said 

site being within the present corporate 

limits of the City of Dallas. 

Yours very truly, 

WILL WILSON 

Attorney General of Texas 

LP:jl 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE: 

George P. Blackburn, Chairman 

James H. Rogers 

Arthur Sandlin 

Wallace Finfrock 

JAY r Leonard Passmore 

Assistant 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY: 

James N. Ludlum