16-90 

Chi v. Sessions

BIA 

Hom, IJ 

A087 392 900 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

11th day of December, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

 Chief Judge,

PETER W. HALL, 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

DONG JIANG CHI, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 16-90 

 NAC 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Cora J. Chang, New York, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General; Anthony 

W. Norwood, Senior Litigation 
2

Counsel; Colin J. Tucker, Trial 

Attorney; Sarah C. Martin, Law 

Clerk, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Dong Jiang Chi, a native and citizen of the 

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 11, 2015 

decision of the BIA affirming an April 11, 2014, decision of 

an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Chi’s application for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Dong Jiang Chi, No. A087 392 

900 (B.I.A. Dec. 11, 2015), aff’g No. A087 392 900 (Immig. Ct. 

N.Y.C. Apr. 11, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with 

the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s 

decision as modified by the BIA. See Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we 

address the adverse credibility determination and the agency’s 

conclusion that Chi failed independently to establish a 

well-founded fear of persecution. 
3

 Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility 

determination. The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of 

the circumstances,” base an adverse credibility determination 

on an applicant’s internally inconsistent testimony, 

discrepancies between an applicant’s oral and written 

statements and between an applicant’s statements and other 

record evidence, as well as an applicant’s “demeanor, candor, 

or responsiveness.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia 

Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). “We defer 

. . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless . . . it is 

plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse 

credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. 

The agency reasonably relied on Chi’s omission of any 

reference to attending church in China. Id. at 166 n.3 (an 

omission and inconsistency are equivalent for credibility 

purposes). Chi’s application emphasized that he “recently 

started to attend church activities,” and did not mention being 

a Christian in China, attending church in China, or encountering 

any difficulty on account of his religion. But on cross 

examination, Chi testified that he attended an underground 

church in 2004 and faced problems as a result. Chi argues 

against finding inconsistency because he never identified what 
4

problems he faced. He also argues that he was “confused by the 

question.” But these explanations are not compelling because 

they do not explain the omission, and Chi’s inability to 

elaborate on the problems he faced, after confirming he 

understood the question, further undermines his credibility. 

See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 

petitioner ‘must do more than offer a plausible explanation for 

his inconsistent statements to secure relief; ‘he must 

demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled 

to credit his testimony.’” (emphasis omitted)(quoting Zhou Yun 

Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2004))). Given the 

materiality of this omission to the basis for Chi’s asylum 

claim—his practice of Christianity—this omission alone is 

substantial evidence. Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

446 F.3d 289, 294–95 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 The adverse credibility determination is bolstered by both 

Chi’s inconsistent testimony regarding his criminal history and 

his demeanor. He testified that he was arrested three times; 

but on cross examination he admitted an additional arrest in 

2013 while denying several other arrests reflected in his 

criminal records, claiming that someone had stolen his wallet 

and identification around this time. The IJ was not required 
5

to credit the explanation given the lack of evidence of the theft 

and Chi’s omission of the other arrest. Majidi, 430 F.3d at 

80. 

 The agency reasonably relied on Chi’s problematic 

demeanor, noting multiple long pauses when Chi was asked for 

details of his claim, his difficulty answering questions on 

cross examination, and his vague or incomplete answers. We 

give particular deference to the IJ’s demeanor finding, see id. 

at 81 n.1, and the record supports this finding. For example, 

when Chi was asked to describe the problems he faced for 

attending an underground church in China, he was initially 

nonresponsive and when pressed by the IJ was unable to provide 

any detail, eventually answering that he did not know. 

Given the foregoing omission, inconsistencies in the 

evidence, and lack of responsiveness and detail, the totality 

of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility 

ruling. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because Chi’s claims 

for relief were all based on the same factual predicate, the 

adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, 

withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 

F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). 
6

Alternatively, we find no error in the agency’s 

determination that Chi did not state an objectively reasonable 

fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); 

Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). 

First, Chi did not show that he would be singled out for 

persecution, especially given his testimony that he had not 

attended church for the past year. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). And he did not provide evidence of a 

pattern of persecution of Christians in his home province. Cf. 

Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 159-62, 174 (2d Cir. 

2008). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk