* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JILL GARCIA, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee. No. 08-16920 D.C. No. 4:07-CV-00167-DCB

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 5, 2009 San Francisco, California Before: B. FLETCHER, CANBY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges. Jill Garcia appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Allstate Insurance Company on her empl oyment discrimination claim. Reviewing de novo, see, e.g., Metoyer v. Chassman , 504 F.3d 919, 930 (9th Cir. 2007), we

reverse. 

# FILED

NOV 18 2009 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 The parties agree that Allstate’s motion for summary judgment should be evaluated using the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, [t]he employee must firs t establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If [s]he does, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the cha llenged action. Finally, if the employer satisfies this burden, the employee must show that the “reason is pretextual either directly by pers uading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the empl oyer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co. , 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The only serious dispute in this case is whether Garcia provided sufficient evidence to suppor t a finding that Allstate’s reasons for firing her were a pretext for discrimination. We conclude that Garcia’s evidence of pretext was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. First, we conclude that Garcia provi ded sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether regional manager Tom Smith was involved in Garcia’s termination. See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc. , 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that disputes about whether specific individuals were involved in the adverse employment action are “for the trier of fact to resolve”). It was Smith who firs t asked Garcia about potential conflicts of interest. Additionally, Allstate asserts thatit fired Garcia in part due to her failure3 to provide Smith updated information, suggesting Smith’s ongoing role in the investigation. Further, Garcia’s directsupervisor made remarks suggesting that Smith would decide whether Garcia would keep her job. Second, we conclude that the record provides sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning both Allstate’s and Smith’s discriminatory animus toward female employees. Allstate sponsored several performance incentives from wh ich the women at Allstate felt excluded, many of which were organized in substantial part by Smith. Garcia also provided several examples of Allstate’s male mana gers making gender-oriented derogatory comments at company functions, including comments Smith made about Garcia specifically. Additionally, at the time of Garcia’s firing, she was being considered for a promotion that would have made her one of the few women under Smith’s direct supervision, and Garcia’s then-bo ss told her that she would have to show Smith that she could be “one of his boys.” Finally, the record presents a triabl e issue whether Allstate’s proffered rationale for firing Garcia is “unworthy of credence.” See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000). Following an investigation for an alleged conflict of interest violation, Allstate’s Corporate Security department recommended no disciplinary action against Ga rcia. Allstate neither contradicted4 Smith’s testimony that Allstate follows these recommendations ninety-nine percent of the time nor explained why Garcia’s case was treated differently from ninetynine percent of investigated cases. Th e fact that Allstate also fired a male employee for a conflict of interest violation is irrelevant because Allstate’s internal investigation recommended that the male employee be subject to disciplinary action. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Allstate. REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings.