J-A22018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RYAN MICHAEL BROWN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 369 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 15, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-16-CR-0000234-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: MARCH 5, 2024

Appellant, Ryan Michael Brown, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered March 15, 2023, as made final by the denial of his post-sentence 

motion on March 23, 2023. We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the relevant facts adduced during the 

September 29, 2022 suppression hearing as follows: 

On August 25, 2021, [Appellant] was scheduled to appear at a 

[m]agisterial [d]istrict [c]ourt in Clarion County[, 

Pennsylvania,] for a hearing at 10[:00] a.m. On that date, at 

10:15 a.m., [Appellant] called the district court office and 

indicated he would be late for his hearing because his car had 

a flat tire. This message was relayed to Trooper Tyler Lauer 

(hereinafter “Trooper Lauer”) who was present for the hearing 

with [Appellant. Appellant] arrived at the court office at 10:25 

a.m. Trooper Lauer [approached Appellant upon his arrival 

and] smell[ed] a strong odor of alcohol emitting from 

[Appellant] . . . and observed that [Appellant] could not remain 

still and had bloodshot eyes that were glassy. Upon 

questioning, [Appellant] stated he drank alcohol the night 

before [but stopped] around 2:00 a.m. Further, when asked 
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how he got to the court office, [Appellant] stated that his 

ex-wife was waiting with the car with the flat tire[, which 

Appellant claimed was along Route 66 near the court]. Trooper 

Lauer contacted [Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”)]-Clarion to 

request that a trooper check for the car and [Appellant’s]

ex-wife[.] PSP Clarion did not find either the car or 

[Appellant’s] ex-wife along Route 66 near the court. When 

presented with this information, [Appellant] said his ex-wife 

must have taken the car to a tire shop. Trooper Lauer asked 

[Appellant] to call his ex-wife. [Appellant complied. When 

talking with Appellant’s ex-wife,] Trooper Lauer asked [her] 

which tire shop she went to, and [Appellant’s] ex-wife stated 

she was in Meadville, Pennsylvania, which is approximately one 

hour away from the court office where [Appellant] and Trooper 

Lauer were located. [After the telephone call with Appellant’s 

ex-wife concluded, Appellant admitted that] he had a 

suspended license and did not want [to be seen] driving so he 

parked the car at Commodore Homes along Route 66 south of 

Amsler Avenue. [Appellant] further admitted he was getting his 

prescribed [m]ethadone dose in Erie[, Pennsylvania,] at 8:00 

a.m. as the reason for being late to court. 

Trooper Lauer said he suspected that [Appellant] was under the 

influence [of alcohol] so he asked [Appellant] if he was able to 

perform field sobriety tests. [Appellant agreed] and Trooper 

Lauer administered the [Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”)], 

One Leg Turn, and Walk and Stand [tests]. According to 

Trooper Lauer, [Appellant] displayed signs of impairment. [In 

addition, Trooper Lauer asserted that,] during the tests[, 

Appellant] appeared disheveled and hyper [leading Trooper 

Lauer to believe that Appellant consumed something other than 

alcohol. As such,] Trooper Lauer asked if [Appellant] would 

submit to [Advanced Roadside Impairment Driving Enforcement 

(“ARIDE”)] tests. [Appellant complied]. Trooper Lauer 

indicated that [Appellant] displayed signs of impairment on 

these tests as well. [Trooper Lauer then placed Appellant under 

arrest]. 

[Thereafter, Appellant] was transported to Clarion Hospital for 

a blood draw. On the way, [] Trooper [Lauer] took [Appellant] 

past Commodore Homes [and asked Appellant to identify his 

vehicle]. The vehicle was in the parking lot of Commodore 

Homes and identified by [Appellant]. It had a suspended 

registration for insurance cancellation. [When they arrived at 
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Clarion Hospital, Trooper Lauer administered the O’Connell1

warnings to Appellant and Appellant consented to blood 

testing]. At 11:24 a.m., [Appellant] submitted to a blood test 

and tested positive for amphetamine and methadone. The test 

was negative for alcohol. [At 11:27 a.m., Trooper Lauer read 

Appellant his Miranda2rights]. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/22, at *1-*3 (unpaginated) (footnotes added). 

On October 20, 2021, Appellant was charged with driving under the 

influence (“DUI”): controlled substance – schedule II or III, careless driving, 

driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked and vehicle 

registration suspended. On August 31, 2022, Appellant filed an omnibus 

pre-trial motion in which he argued that he was subjected to custodial 

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1 The O'Connell warnings were first pronounced in Commonwealth, 

Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O'Connell, 

555 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1989). In a later opinion, our Supreme Court explained 

both the O'Connell warnings and the reasoning behind the warnings:

in order to guarantee that a motorist makes a knowing and 

conscious decision on whether to submit to testing or refuse 

and accept the consequence of losing his driving privileges, the 

police must advise the motorist that in making this decision, he 

does not have the right to speak with counsel, or anyone else, 

before submitting to chemical testing, and further, if the 

motorist exercises his right to remain silent as a basis for 

refusing to submit to testing, it will be considered a refusal and 

he will suffer the loss of his driving privileges[. T]he duty of the 

officer to provide the O'Connell warnings as described herein 

is triggered by the officer's request that the motorist submit to 

chemical sobriety testing, whether or not the motorist has first 

been advised of his Miranda rights.

Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Scott, 

684 A.2d 539, 545 (Pa. 1996).

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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interrogation, necessitating the issuance of Miranda warnings from the 

inception of his encounter with Trooper Lauer. Hence, Appellant claimed that 

Trooper Lauer’s failure to issue Miranda warnings until 11:27 a.m. warranted 

suppression of any admissions made by Appellant prior to that time. In 

addition, Appellant challenged the Commonwealth’s prima facie case 

supporting the charge of DUI – controlled substance – schedule II or III. The 

trial court convened a hearing on Appellant’s motion on September 29, 2022, 

during which Trooper Lauer testified. On October 31, 2022, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s motion. 

The matter proceeded to a jury trial on January 30, 2023, after which 

the jury convicted Appellant of DUI – controlled substance – schedule II or 

III.

3

 After the jury was dismissed, the Commonwealth nolle prossed 

Appellant’s remaining offenses. On March 15, 2023, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate term of 12 to 24 months’ incarceration. Appellant 

filed a post-sentence motion on March 21, 2023, which the trial court denied 

on March 23, 2023. This timely appeal followed. 

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:4

1. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] pre-trial 

suppression motion based on an illegal “search and seizure” 

of [Appellant], there being no reasonable suspicion or 

probable cause for the same?

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3 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(d)(1)(ii).

4 We have re-ordered Appellant’s issues for ease of discussion and disposition. 
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2. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] pre-trial 

suppression motion where any alleged statements or 

admissions by [Appellant] were obtained illegally, while 

under coercion or duress, in violation of his constitutional 

rights?

3. [Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence 

to sustain Appellant’s conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3802?] 

4. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion for 

judgment of acquittal at the close of the Commonwealth’s 

case-in-chief where the Commonwealth failed to meet its 

burden of proof under 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802[(D)(1)(ii)], to[-]

wit, [Appellant] was driving with a [s]chedule II or III 

controlled substance in his system, not medically prescribed, 

when the Commonwealth offered no evidence to this effect?

See generally Appellant’s Brief at 4-6 (emphasis and superfluous 

capitalization omitted).5 

In Appellant’s first two issues, he challenges the trial court’s suppression

ruling. Initially, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress because Trooper Lauer lacked the requisite level of 

____________________________________________

5 Appellant presents seven separate questions in his appellate brief. See

Appellant’s Brief at 4-6. Of these seven questions, several challenge the trial 

court’s suppression rulings and three relate to Appellant’s claim that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove its charge of DUI – controlled substance –

schedule II or III. See id. The four-part argument section of Appellant’s 

brief to this Court includes one section that challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence introduced by the Commonwealth to prove the offense of

DUI – controlled substance – schedule II or III. In this section, Appellant 

claims that the Commonwealth “did not meet its burden that [he] was 

operating or otherwise in control of a motor vehicle at a time when he had a 

controlled substance in his system.” Id. at 15. Because Appellant’s claim 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we will limit our analysis 

accordingly and omit the inclusion of superfluous issues, except that we shall 

address Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s suppression rulings as an 

initial matter. 
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suspicion to detain him at the magistrate’s office and investigate whether he

committed DUI. Appellant’s Brief at 28. Next, Appellant argues that the trial 

court erred in concluding that Trooper Lauer’s detention did not amount to a 

custodial interrogation, warranting the issuance of Miranda warnings. Id. at 

35. Appellant therefore claims that the trial court erred in failing to suppress 

evidence, namely, Appellant’s admission that he drove to the magisterial

district judge’s office on the day in question. Id. at 40. We address 

Appellant’s interrelated claims together. 

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial 

of a suppression motion is

limited to determining whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct.

We may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so 

much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the 

record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in 

reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts.

Moreover, it is within the lower court's province to pass on the 

credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to be given to 

their testimony.

Furthermore, our Supreme Court [has] clarified that the scope 

of review of orders granting or denying motions to suppress is 

limited to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 315–316 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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Under Pennsylvania law, there are three categories of police-citizen 

interactions. As our Supreme Court has clearly articulated:

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for 

information) which need not be supported by any level of 

suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to 

respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be 

supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a 

stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such 

coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of 

an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be 

supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Gutierrez, 36 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(quotation omitted), appeal denied, 48 A.3d 1247 (Pa. 2012).

Further, this Court previously explained: 

[t]o determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of 

an investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as a 

matter of law, the police conducted a seizure of the person 

involved. To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court 

must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter 

to determine whether the demeanor and conduct of the police 

would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or 

she was not free to decline the officer's request or otherwise 

terminate the encounter. Thus, the focal point of our inquiry 

must be whether, considering the circumstances surrounding 

the incident, a reasonable person innocent of any crime, would 

have thought he was being restrained had he been in the 

defendant's shoes.

Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201-1202 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(internal citations omitted). 

“It is long-settled that Miranda warnings are only required for the 

third-level interaction, i.e., custodial interrogation.” Commonwealth v. 

Spence, 2023 WL 2002292 *1, *9 (Pa. Super. Feb. 15, 2023), citing 
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Commonwealth v. Smith, 836 A.2d 5 (Pa. 2003). This Court previously 

explained: 

Statements made during custodial interrogation are 

presumptively involuntary, unless the accused is first advised 

of her Miranda rights. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 

A.2d 574, 579 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 806 A.2d 858 

(Pa. 2002). Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by 

law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of [her] freedom of action in any 

significant way.” Miranda, supra at 444[. “T]he Miranda

safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is 

subjected to either express questioning or its functional 

equivalent.” Commonwealth v. Gaul, 912 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 

2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 939, (2007). Thus, 

“[i]nterrogation occurs where the police should know that their 

words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating

response from the suspect.” Commonwealth v. Ingram, 814 

A.2d 264, 271 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 821 A.2d 586 

(Pa. 2003). “[I]n evaluating whether Miranda warnings were 

necessary, a court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances. In conducting the inquiry, we must also keep in 

mind that not every statement made by an individual during a 

police encounter amounts to an interrogation. Volunteered or 

spontaneous utterances by an individual are admissible even 

without Miranda warnings.” Gaul, supra.

Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes 

depends on whether the person is physically denied of 

[her] freedom of action in any significant way or is placed 

in a situation in which [she] reasonably believes that [her] 

freedom of action or movement is restricted by the 

interrogation. Moreover, the test for custodial 

interrogation does not depend upon the subjective intent 

of the law enforcement officer interrogator. Rather, the 

test focuses on whether the individual being interrogated 

reasonably believes [her] freedom of action is being 

restricted.

Commonwealth v. Clayton Williams, 650 A.2d 420, 427 (Pa. 

1994) (internal citations omitted)[; s]ee also Commonwealth 

v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 202 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc) 

(stating whether person is in custody for Miranda purposes 
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must be evaluated on case-by-case basis with due regard for 

facts involved); Commonwealth v. Peters, 642 A.2d 1126, 

1130 (Pa. Super. 1994) (en banc), appeal denied, 649 A.2d 670 

(Pa. 1994) (stating: “Among the factors the court utilizes in 

determining, under the totality of the circumstances, whether 

the detention became so coercive as to constitute the functional 

equivalent of a formal arrest are: the basis for the detention; 

the duration; the location; whether the suspect was transferred 

against [her] will, how far, and why; whether restraints were 

used; the show, threat or use of force; and the methods of 

investigation used to confirm or dispel suspicions”; fact that 

[the] defendant was [the] focus of investigation is relevant for 

determination of whether defendant was in “custody” but does 

not require per se Miranda warnings).

Said another way, police detentions become custodial 

when, under the totality of the circumstances, the 

conditions and/or duration of the detention become so 

coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest.

Mannion, supra at 200. Thus, the ultimate inquiry for 

determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda

purposes is “whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint 

on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a 

formal arrest.” Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 

988 (Pa. 2006)[, quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 

318, 322 (1994)[]. Under the totality of the circumstances 

approach, the following factors are relevant to whether a 

detention has become so coercive as to constitute the functional 

equivalent of a formal arrest: “the basis for the detention; its 

length; its location; whether the suspect was transported 

against his or her will, how far, and why; whether restraints 

were used; whether the law enforcement officer showed, 

threatened or used force; and the investigative methods 

employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.” Commonwealth v. 

Levanduski, 907 A.2d 3, 24 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 919 A.2d 955 (Pa. 2007).

Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 30–31 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(parallel citations omitted).
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The testimony at Appellant’s suppression hearing revealed the following. 

On August 25, 2021, Appellant was scheduled to appear in magisterial district 

court in Clarion County, Pennsylvania, at 10:00 a.m. regarding a separate

matter. Trooper Lauer was also present at the magisterial district judge’s

office that day, in full uniform, as he was the arresting officer in the other 

matter. At 10:15 a.m., Appellant called the magisterial district judge’s office 

and stated that “he [would] be late for court because he got a flat tire on his 

way to the hearing.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/29/22, at 4. This 

information was relayed to Trooper Lauer. Appellant eventually arrived at 

10:25 a.m. Once Appellant arrived, Trooper Lauer approached Appellant in 

the lobby of the magisterial district court office in order “to talk to him about 

the [other] court matter.” Id. at 5. Upon approach, Trooper Lauer smelled

alcohol emanating from Appellant’s person and noticed that Appellant 

appeared “hyper,” “jittery,” and “could [not] stand still.” Id. at 7. Trooper 

Lauer then asked Appellant about his vehicle, specifically, “where the vehicle 

was [] that had broke[n] down and had the flat tire.” Id. at 5. Appellant 

stated that the vehicle was “along Route 66, Paint Boulevard.” Id. As such, 

Trooper Lauer contacted PSP Clarion to “check the area for the vehicle,” but 

they were unable to locate the vehicle in that location. Id. 

After learning that Appellant’s vehicle was not in the location provided, 

Trooper Lauer asked Appellant “how [] he got to [the magisterial district court 

office].” Id. at 6. In response, Appellant claimed that “his ex-wife was [with] 

the vehicle” and “she must have got it fixed and headed to a tire shop locally.” 
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Id. Trooper Lauer then directed Appellant to call his ex-wife and Appellant 

obliged. During the call, Appellant’s ex-wife revealed that she was in 

Meadville, Pennsylvania, which is approximately one hour away from Clarion 

County. Thereafter, Trooper Lauer confronted Appellant, stating that, because 

his ex-wife admitted to being in Meadville, “there [was] no possible way his 

ex-wife could be [with his] vehicle.” Id. at 10. At that time, Appellant 

admitted to driving to the magisterial district court office and informed Trooper 

Lauer that he parked the vehicle “at the trailer factory down the road” to avoid 

being seen driving due to his suspended license. Id. Upon further questioning 

by Trooper Lauer, Appellant also admitted that he drank alcohol that morning, 

estimating that “he quit drinking at [2:00 a.m.].” Id. at 11. Based upon all 

the foregoing, Trooper Lauer asked Appellant to submit to field testing, 

including the HGN, One Leg Turn, Walk and Stand, and ARIDE tests. Appellant 

exhibited signs of impairment on the aforementioned tests, prompting Trooper 

Lauer to place him under arrest and put him in handcuffs. 

Following Appellant’s arrest, Trooper Lauer transported him to Clarion 

Hospital for a blood draw. On the way, Trooper asked Appellant to show him 

where the vehicle was parked. Appellant complied. Once at the hospital, 

Trooper Lauer administered the O’Connell warnings to Appellant and 

Appellant consented to a blood draw, which occurred at 11:24 a.m. Then, at 

11:27 a.m., after Appellant’s blood draw, Trooper Lauer issued Miranda

warnings to Appellant. Trooper Lauer then subjected Appellant to additional 

questioning, after which Appellant informed Trooper Lauer that he received 
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his prescribe dose of methadone from New Directions Health Care at 8:00 

a.m. Appellant’s blood tests indicated positive for amphetamine and 

methadone, but negative for alcohol. Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/22, at *3. 

Upon review, we conclude that, when Trooper Lauer initially approached 

Appellant at the magisterial district judge’s office, the interaction amounted 

to nothing more than a mere encounter. Indeed, Trooper Lauer specifically 

stated at the suppression hearing that, once Appellant arrived at the office, 

he approached Appellant “to talk to him about the [other] court matter,” for 

which he was the arresting officer. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/29/22, at 5

and 24. No facts suggest that, upon doing so, Trooper Lauer acted coercively 

or spoke to Appellant in a forceful manner. To the contrary, the initial 

approach by Trooper Lauer typified a mere encounter, not an investigative 

detention. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1047 (Pa. Super. 

2008). 

“[D]uring the course of the encounter” between Trooper Lauer and 

Appellant, however, “the level of intrusion into [Appellant’s] liberty 

[changed].” Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Indeed, at the suppression hearing, Trooper Lauer testified that, after initially 

approaching Appellant, he detected alcohol emanating from Appellant’s 

person and observed that Appellant was “hyper,” “jittery,” and “could [not] 

stand still.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/29/22, at 5 and 7. In addition, 

Trooper Lauer admitted that the odor caused him “to see if [Appellant] drove 

to court that day.” Id. at 5. After Trooper Lauer detected the odor of alcohol, 
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and being aware that Appellant telephoned the magisterial district judge’s 

office to say that he would be late to the hearing because he had a flat tire, 

Trooper Lauer’s interaction with Appellant assumed a more probing posture 

and Appellant became the focus of an investigative detention. We must 

therefore determine whether, at this time, Trooper Lauer possessed the 

requisite justification, i.e., reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged 

in criminal conduct. 

This Court previously explained: 

A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an 

investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the 

individual is engaging in criminal conduct. “This standard, less 

stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as 

reasonable suspicion.” In order to determine whether the police 

officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the 

circumstances must be considered. In making this 

determination, we must give “due weight ... to the specific 

reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw 

from the facts in light of his experience.” Also, the totality of 

the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an 

examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal 

conduct. Rather, “[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when 

taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police 

officer.” 

Commonwealth v. Raglin, 178 A.3d 868, 872 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal 

citations omitted), quoting Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 

(Pa. 2004). 

We conclude that Trooper Lauer had reasonable suspicion to detain 

Appellant once he detected an odor of alcohol about Appellant’s person. In 

particular, Trooper Lauer testified that, prior to his initial interaction with 
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Appellant, he became aware that Appellant called the magisterial district 

judge’s office claiming he would be late for court because he got a flat tire on 

his way to the hearing. Based upon this statement, Trooper Lauer reasonably 

began to suspect that Appellant, himself, operated a vehicle on the morning 

in question. Moreover, after approaching Appellant upon his arrival at the 

magisterial district court office, Trooper Lauer detected alcohol emanating 

from Appellant’s person and also observed that Appellant was “hyper,” 

“jittery” and “could [not] stand still.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/29/22, at 

5 and 7. This behavior, coupled with all of the circumstances of which the 

trooper was aware, was sufficient to provide Trooper Lauer with reasonable 

suspicion that Appellant operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or a 

controlled substance. As such, Trooper Lauer was justified in detaining

Appellant as long “as [was] necessary to confirm or dispel [his reasonable]

suspicion[s].” Commonwealth v. LeMonte, 859 A.2d 495, 500 (Pa. Super. 

2004). Thus, we reject Appellant’s contention that Trooper Lauer detained 

him at the magisterial district court office in violation of his constitutional 

rights. 

Moreover, we reject Appellant’s contention that the initial phases of 

Trooper Lauer’s detention constituted a custodial interrogation, warranting the 

issuance of Miranda warnings. To support his position, Appellant points to 

the fact that he was legally required to appear at the magisterial district court 

office for a summary trial involving another matter. Appellant’s Brief at 37. 

This, per Appellant, restricted his “freedom of movement,” rendering him in 
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custody for Miranda purposes. Id. at 35. We note, however, that the mere 

fact that Appellant was legally required to be at the magisterial district court 

office did not, in and of itself, elevate the encounter between him and Trooper 

Lauer to a custodial interrogation. See Commonwealth v. Lidge, 582 A.2d 

383 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that the appellant was not seized because she 

was not restrained by physical force or a show of authority even though the 

encounter with police occurred at an airport). In addition, as noted by the 

trial court, there is no evidence that, from the initial phases of Appellant’s 

interaction with Trooper Lauer until the point of Appellant’s arrest, “the 

conditions and/or duration of the detention became so coercive as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of arrest.” Mannion, 725 A.2d at 201; 

see also Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/22, at *6-*7 (unpaginated) (finding that 

Trooper Lauer did not “restrain[ Appellant] in any way” and “did not show or 

threaten the use of force and the investigative methods were to confirm or 

dispel suspicions of [Appellant] driving while intoxicated”). Because Appellant 

was not in custody at the time he first admitted to driving to the magisterial 

district court’s office, Miranda warnings were not required. 

We do, however, hold that the nature of the interaction shifted to a 

custodial interrogation, warranting the issuance of Miranda warnings, when 

Trooper Lauer placed Appellant under arrest at the conclusion of field sobriety 

testing. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Lauer testified that, after 

inquiring into how Appellant arrived at the magisterial district judge’s office, 

Appellant eventually admitted to driving to the office and informed Trooper 
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Lauer that he parked the vehicle “at the trailer factory down the road” to avoid 

being seen driving because he had a suspended license. N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 9/29/22, at 10. Based upon Appellant’s statement, Trooper Lauer 

requested that Appellant submit to field sobriety tests, and Appellant 

complied. Appellant exhibited signs of impairment during the tests, and 

Trooper Lauer determined that probable cause existed to place Appellant 

under arrest for DUI. After the administration of field sobriety tests, but 

before Trooper Lauer issued Appellant Miranda warnings, Trooper Lauer 

transported Appellant to Clarion Hospital for a blood draw.6 While Appellant 

was in the police vehicle, Trooper Lauer drove near the area in which Appellant 

admitted to parking the vehicle and asked Appellant to point out his vehicle. 

Appellant complied. As the Commonwealth concedes on appeal, after Trooper 

Lauer arrested Appellant, but before Appellant’s arrival at the hospital and his 

receipt of Miranda warnings, Appellant was subjected to a custodial 

interrogation since Trooper Lauer could reasonably anticipate that his inquiries 

would elicit incriminating responses from Appellant. See Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 12. Because Trooper Lauer did not administer Appellant’s Miranda

warnings until 11:27 a.m., after Appellant’s arrest, interrogation, and 

____________________________________________

6 To be clear, we conclude, based upon the totality of circumstances, that 

Appellant was subject to a custodial arrest at the moment Trooper Lauer 

transported him from the magisterial district court office to the hospital to 

conduct a blood draw. We further conclude that Appellant’s arrest was 

supported by probable cause, as established by Appellant’s prior admissions, 

his observed appearance and odor, and his poor performance on field sobriety 

tests.
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transportation to Clarion Hospital, we conclude that Appellant’s identification 

of the vehicle’s location was obtained in violation of Miranda and subject to 

suppression. 

“A suppression court’s error in failing to suppress statements by the 

accused, however, will not require reversal if the Commonwealth can establish 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.” Commonwealth 

v. Frein, 206 A.3d 1049, 1070 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). “Miranda 

violations are subject to this harmless error rule.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Harmless error exists if the Commonwealth proves that (1) the 

error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de 

minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely 

cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially 

similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the 

properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so 

overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so 

insignificant by comparison that the error could not have 

contributed to the verdict.

Id. (citation omitted). 

Upon review of the record of this case, we conclude that Appellant’s 

statement in which he identified the location of his parked vehicle was 

harmless because it was “merely cumulative of other [substantially similar]

untainted evidence.” Id. In particular, the Commonwealth at trial established 

that, prior to Appellant’s arrest, he voluntarily admitted to driving the vehicle 

to the magisterial district judge’s office, even though his license was 

suspended. See N.T. Trial 1/30/23, at 50-51. Appellant’s specific 

identification of the location of his vehicle for Trooper Lauer was therefore
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substantially similar to his own admission which was testified to by Trooper 

Lauer during trial. We therefore conclude that the admission of Appellant’s 

statement of identification was harmless and Appellant is not entitled to relief.

7

 

Compare Commonwealth v. Rivera, 296 A.3d 1141, 1160-1161 (Pa. 2023) 

(holding that the erroneous admission of the appellant’s post-arrest silence 

was not harmless because it was not “’merely cumulative’ of other evidence 

introduced at trial” and because the “properly admitted and uncontradicted 

evidence of guilt” was not “so overwhelming,” rendering “the prejudicial effect 

of the error . . . insignificant”) (citation omitted). 

In Appellant’s third and fourth issues, he argues that the Commonwealth 

failed to present sufficient evidence supporting his conviction for DUI –

controlled substance – schedule II or III. In particular, Appellant claims that 

the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that he “was operating or otherwise 

in control of a motor vehicle at a time when he had a controlled substance in 

his system.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. Similarly, in his final issue, Appellant 

claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the amphetamines in his 

system were not medically prescribed and, as such, an illegal substance. Id. 

at 40. Upon review, we conclude that Appellant’s claims lack merit. 

____________________________________________

7 We note that the results of Appellant’s blood draw are not subject to 

suppression as a result of a Fifth Amendment violation, even though the blood 

draw was completed prior to Trooper Lauer’s administration of Miranda

warnings to Appellant. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 

(1966) (holding that “the blood test evidence, although an incriminating 

product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence 

relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not 

inadmissible on privilege grounds”).
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This Court previously explained: 

Our standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence challenge 

is to determine if the Commonwealth established beyond a 

reasonable doubt each of the elements of the offense, 

considering all the evidence admitted at trial, and drawing all 

reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the Commonwealth 

as the verdict-winner. The trier of fact bears the responsibility 

of assessing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the 

evidence presented. In doing so, the trier of fact is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Newton, 994 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(quotation omitted), appeal denied, 8 A.3d 898 (Pa. 2010).

Section 3802(d)(1) of the Vehicle Code, in relevant part, states:

(d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive, 

operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a 

vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

(1) There is in the individual's blood any amount of a:

(ii) Schedule II or Schedule III controlled substance, 

as defined in The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device 

and Cosmetic Act, which has not been medically 

prescribed for the individual[.]

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(ii).

Importantly, 

“[t]he term ‘operate’ requires evidence of actual physical 

control of either the machinery of the motor vehicle or the 

management of the vehicle's movement, but not evidence that 

the vehicle was in motion.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 833 

A.2d 260, 263 (Pa. Super. 2003). “Our precedent indicates that 

a combination of the following factors is required in determining 

whether a person had ‘actual physical control’ of an automobile: 

the motor running, the location of the vehicle, and additional 

evidence showing that the defendant had driven the vehicle.” 

Commonwealth v. Woodruff, 668 A.2d 1158, 1161 (1995). 
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A determination of actual physical control of a vehicle is based 

upon the totality of the circumstances. [Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 871 A.2d 254, 259 (Pa. Super. 2005)]. 

Commonwealth v. Brotherson, 888 A.2d 901, 904-905 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(parallel citations omitted).

Upon review, we conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient 

evidence to support Appellant’s conviction for DUI - controlled substance –

schedule II or III. Initially, we note that, in contrast to Appellant’s claim, the 

Commonwealth’s evidence demonstrated that he, himself, drove to the 

magistrate’s office on the day in question. Indeed, at trial, the Commonwealth 

presented evidence that Appellant arrived at the magisterial district court 

office by himself and that Appellant admitted to driving to the hearing. N.T. 

Trial, 1/30/23, at 44-47 and 50-51. Moreover, the Commonwealth presented 

evidence that Appellant was under the influence at the time he drove to the 

magistrate’s office. First, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of 

Appellant’s blood test results taken on August 25, 2021, which revealed the 

presence of amphetamines in his system. See N.T Trial, 1/30/23, at 57-60;

see also N.M.S. Labs Toxicology Report (Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1). 

Second, Trooper Lauer testified that, after receiving Miranda warnings, 

Appellant admitted that he did not ingest any other substance “in between 

when he parked [his] car and got to the [magistrate’s office].” N.T. Trial, 

1/30/23, at 61. We therefore conclude that the foregoing evidence

demonstrated that Appellant drove his vehicle to the magistrate’s office while 

under the influence of amphetamines and, as such, was sufficient to support
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Appellant’s conviction for DUI - controlled substance – schedule II or III. See 

Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099, 1106-1107 (Pa. Super. 2022) 

(holding that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that the 

appellant drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the vehicle while 

intoxicated when it presented evidence that, inter alia, he admitted to driving 

after consuming a six-pack of beer and that the residence was not accessible 

by public transportation). 

In this same vein, Appellant’s contention that his conviction was not 

supported by sufficient evidence because the Commonwealth failed to 

demonstrate that the amphetamines found in his system here not medically 

prescribed lacks merit. In Commonwealth v. Sojourner, 408 A.2d 1108 

(Pa. Super. 1979), this Court addressed a similar claim lodged under the 

Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. Importantly, we held 

that, before the Commonwealth was required to disprove that a defendant 

was authorized to possess narcotics, the defendant needed to come forward 

with credible evidence of authorization. Id. at 1114-1115. Importantly, this 

very concept was recently upheld by a panel of this Court. See 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 2018 WL 3358610, *1, *3 (Pa. Super. July 10, 

2018) (unpublished memorandum) (holding that, because the appellant did 

not “come forward with evidence that he possessed a prescription for 

oxycodone,” the Commonwealth was not required to “disprove his 

authorization for the drug”). Thus, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, he was 

required to come forward with some proof that he possessed a prescription 
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for amphetamines before the Commonwealth was required to disprove his 

authorization to possess the drug. Appellant, however, only claimed to have 

an authorized prescription for methadone, not amphetamines. N.T. Trial, 

1/30/23, at 61. Hence, the Commonwealth was not required to present 

evidence to disprove that element of the offense. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

FILED: 3/5/2024