*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 17, 2005*

Decided November 17, 2005

Before

 Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 04-4200

FREDERICK HENDRICKS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin

No. 03-C-817

J.P. Stadtmueller,

Judge.

O R D E R

Frederick Hendricks was denied social security benefits after an

Administrative Law Judge determined that his alleged short-term memory

problems following surgical complications did not qualify him as disabled. The

Appeals Council declined review, but the district court reversed the ALJ’s decision

and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings because the ALJ did

not obtain a valid waiver of counsel or fully develop the vocational expert’s

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-4200 Page 2

testimony. After again hearing testimony from both Hendricks and a vocational

expert, the ALJ concluded that Hendricks retained the capacity to perform a

significant number of jobs and was therefore not disabled. The Appeals Council

again declined review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security. Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir.

2005). Hendricks again sought review in the district court, but it upheld the

Commissioner’s decision. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

Hendricks applied for social security benefits, claiming total disability due to

complications from emergency kidney surgery in 1995 that caused difficulties

concentrating, clumsiness, some dizziness, and occasional anxiety attacks. But at

his second benefits hearing, he testified that he continued to drive, performed

chores around the house including cooking, washing dishes, and mowing, and was

able to play volleyball once a week. At this same hearing, a vocational expert

testified that, given Hendricks’ age, education, work experience, and his residual

functional capacity to perform simple, routine, low-stress work at a medium

exertional level, there were 178,000 jobs in the state of Wisconsin that he could

perform including cleaning, food preparation, message delivery, and unskilled

assembly work. The ALJ concluded that Hendricks was not disabled as defined in

the Social Security Act “at any time through the date of this decision”—February

2003.

The district court affirmed the denial of benefits, concluding that the ALJ

sufficiently developed the record during his colloquy with the vocational expert, and

that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s residual functional capacity

assessment. Finally the district court concluded that Hendricks failed to produce

sufficient evidence to show that the ALJ erred in calculating the date last insured

as September 1998, and in any event Hendricks failed to show good cause for not

introducing any such evidence during the administrative proceedings.

Hendricks’ only argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred in not updating a

finding that his insured status for benefits expired on September 30, 1998. He

asserts without elaboration that the ALJ should have updated his last-insured date

to reflect unspecified work that he apparently had done after 1998.

Hendricks has failed to develop or substantiate his contention that the ALJ

erred in identifying September 30, 1998 as the date he was last insured. Anderson

v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001) (dismissed under Fed. R. App. P.

28(a)(9)). But even if there was an error, it was harmless. See Keys v. Barnhart,

347 F.3d 990, 994-95 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying harmless error doctrine to Social

Security disability decision). Even if the ALJ had updated Hendricks’ insured
No. 04-4200 Page 3

status to extend through February 2003, the ALJ’s decision reflects that he

considered relevant medical reports from June and September 2002, showing that

Hendricks suffered only mild cognitive deficit and no cognitive decline since 1996. 

The ALJ thus properly found Hendricks not disabled under the Social Security Act

as of February 2003 and the doctrine of harmless error spares us from remanding

this case for what would at most be an inconsequential error. See Keys, 347 F.3d at

994-95.

In his self-styled “Statement in Lieu of a Reply Brief,” Hendricks appears to

raise novel arguments such as the potentially stress-inducing effects of the jobs

identified by the vocational expert and the need for a psychiatric examination. But

he waived these issues by not raising them first in the district court. See

Schoenfeld v. Apfel, 237 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2001).

AFFIRMED.