[Cite as Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681.] 

CECCARELLI, APPELLANT, v. LEVIN, TAX COMMR., APPELLEE. 

[Cite as Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681.] 

Taxation — Motor-fuel tax — R.C. 5735.12 — Four-year limit on assessments 

applicable to assessments on individuals liable as responsible parties 

under R.C. 5735.35. 

(No. 2009-2217 — Submitted October 13, 2010 — Decided November 24, 2010.) 

APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2007-V-391. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 

(“BTA”) that affirmed an assessment against the appellant, Jack Ceccarelli, of 

motor-fuel-tax liabilities reported but not fully paid for April, May, June, and 

August 2000. Ceccarelli was assessed not as a motor-fuel dealer himself, but 

rather as a “responsible party” by virtue of his status as owner and president of 

Restructure Petroleum Marketing Services, Inc. (“RPMS”). RPMS itself had 

previously been assessed for the unpaid taxes, which amounted to $396,565.16. 

The tax commissioner found that Ceccarelli was a responsible party who was 

liable to pay the amount assessed against the corporation because he was the 

indirect owner and the president of RPMS. 

{¶ 2} Before the BTA, Ceccarelli did not contest his status as a 

responsible party under the statute, but instead asserted that the assessment was 

barred because it had been issued after the statutory four-year limitation period 

expired. The tax commissioner argued that the limitation statute in question, R.C. 

5735.12, applies to assessments issued against motor-fuel dealers, but not to 

assessments issued against “responsible parties” who were their officers or 
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employees. The BTA agreed with the commissioner’s position and affirmed the 

assessment against Ceccarelli. 

{¶ 3} On appeal, Ceccarelli again contends that the four-year limitation 

also applies to assessments against employees or officers of motor-fuel dealers 

who qualify as responsible parties. We agree, and we therefore reverse the 

decision of the BTA. 

Facts 

{¶ 4} Underlying the assessment against Ceccarelli in this case are four 

assessments previously issued against RPMS pertaining to motor-fuel taxes 

reported but not fully paid for April, May, June, and August 2000. Jack 

Ceccarelli was identified as corporate president of RPMS on filings with the 

office of the Ohio secretary of state and in correspondence with the Ohio 

Department of Taxation. The four months of unpaid taxes amounted to 

$396,565.16, finally totaling $665,797 after assessment of interest and penalties. 

{¶ 5} RPMS had belatedly filed motor-fuel-tax returns for April, May, 

June, and August 2000 on July 7, December 19, September 18, and December 11, 

2000, respectively. The commissioner issued his assessment against Ceccarelli as 

a responsible party on February 24, 2005 — more than four years after the tax 

reports had been filed. 

{¶ 6} The record is sparse, but Ceccarelli has not disputed the 

commissioner’s findings of fact. The commissioner found that Ceccarelli was not 

only president of RPMS, but also “100% owner of Restructure, Inc., who owned 

100% of RPMS.” The final determination also relied on filings and 

correspondence signed by Ceccarelli to establish that he “had the authority to 

exercise control of the corporation’s fiscal responsibilities,” a criterion for 

responsible-party liability under R.C. 5735.35(A). 

Analysis 
January Term, 2010 

3 

{¶ 7} The third paragraph of R.C. 5735.12(A) states: “No assessment 

shall be made against any motor fuel dealer for taxes imposed by this chapter 

more than four years after the date on which the report on which the assessment 

was based was due or was filed, whichever is later. This section does not bar an 

assessment against any motor fuel dealer who fails to file a report required by 

section 5735.06 of the Revised Code, or who files a fraudulent motor fuel tax 

report.” Thus, when motor-fuel-tax reports have been filed late, the four-year 

limitation period runs from the time of filing. It is undisputed in the present case 

that the commissioner issued the assessment against Ceccarelli more than four 

years after the filing of the underlying corporate motor-fuel-tax reports. 

{¶ 8} The question is whether the four-year time limitation set forth in 

R.C. 5735.12(A) applies to assessments against employees or officers of motorfuel dealers who qualify as responsible parties pursuant to R.C. 5735.35. R.C. 

5735.35(A)(2) provides that the “sum due for the liability [of responsible parties] 

may be collected by assessment in the manner provided in sections 5735.12 and 

5735.121 of the Revised Code.” The BTA affirmed the commissioner’s 

assessment, holding that the four-year limitation does not apply to responsibleparty assessments. Ceccarelli asserts that the “manner” of assessment against him 

as a responsible party incorporates the four-year limitation on assessment against 

motor-fuel dealers. This question of statutory construction presents an issue of 

law that we determine de novo on appeal. State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 

2007-Ohio-4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 8. 

R.C. 5735.35(A)(2) provides that motor-fuel-tax liabilities of 

responsible parties be assessed “in the manner” of assessments 

issued against motor-fuel dealers, and the manner of assessment 

includes the four-year limitation in R.C. 5735.12(A) 

{¶ 9} In Bowshier v. Limbach (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 140, 556 N.E.2d 

463, we considered whether an assessment of sales tax against a responsible 
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corporate officer was barred by the four-year limitation on sales-tax assessments 

set forth at R.C. 5739.16(A). That section explicitly imposed the time limit on 

assessments “issued against a vendor or consumer,” and because of that restrictive 

language, we held that the limitation did not apply to assessments against 

responsible parties, who were neither vendors nor consumers under the sales-tax 

law. The commissioner regards Bowshier as dispositive here. 

{¶ 10} As an initial matter, the commissioner points to the fact that the 

third paragraph of R.C. 5735.12(A) limits the prohibition against assessments to 

assessments issued against “any motor fuel dealer.” Similarly, in Bowshier, R.C. 

5739.16(A)’s limitation restricted assessments against vendors and consumers — 

not against responsible parties who were assessed when the primary obligors 

failed to discharge their legal duties. 

{¶ 11} But this argument overlooks a crucial distinction between the 

motor-fuel-tax statutes and the sales-tax law. R.C. 5735.12(A) both authorizes 

motor-fuel-tax assessments and imposes the four-year limitation on assessments 

against motor-fuel dealers. By contrast, the statute of limitation for sales-tax

assessments is set forth in R.C. 5739.16, which is an entirely different section 

from the section that authorizes the tax commissioner to make assessments (R.C. 

5739.13). 

{¶ 12} The distinction is significant because the respective code sections 

that address responsible-party liability provide that assessments against 

responsible parties should be made “in the manner provided” in the section that 

authorizes the making of assessments. R.C. 5739.33 (sales tax); R.C. 5735.35 

(motor-fuel tax). As a result, the language of R.C. 5739.33 incorporates the salestax-assessment provisions at R.C. 5739.13, but does not incorporate the four-year 

limitation at R.C. 5739.16. By contrast, R.C. 5739.35 does incorporate the time 

limitation because the limitation is set forth in R.C. 5735.12. 
January Term, 2010 

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{¶ 13} To be sure, the commissioner can argue that the “manner” of 

making assessments does not encompass the timing of those assessments, but that 

argument is unavailing. “Manner” means “a mode of procedure or way of 

acting.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed.2006) 756. While 

time limitations may in some contexts be distinguished from other aspects of a 

“mode of procedure,” we see no justification for regarding the time for making an 

assessment as any less a part of the statutorily prescribed procedure in this 

context. Quite simply, R.C. 5735.12 sets forth a mode of procedure for 

assessment that includes the four-year limitation, and R.C. 5735.35 incorporates 

that mode of procedure (including the time limitation) by reference. 

The commissioner’s exclusive focus on R.C. 5735.12(A) is not justified, because it 

would accord no significance to the language of R.C. 5735.35(A)(2) 

{¶ 14} The commissioner also argues that because R.C. 5735.12(A) itself 

authorizes assessments against responsible parties, there is no need or justification 

for an incorporation by reference of the time limitation by virtue of R.C. 

5735.35(A)(2). Under the tax commissioner’s reading of the statutes, the proper 

method of determining the scope of the four-year limitation on assessments is to 

construe the assessment and time-limitation provisions within the four corners of 

R.C. 5735.12(A). 

{¶ 15} The second paragraph of R.C. 5735.12(A) states as follows: 

{¶ 16} “If any person required by this chapter to file reports and pay the 

taxes, interest, or additional charge levied by this chapter fails to file the report, 

files an incomplete or incorrect report, or fails to remit the full amount of the tax, 

interest, or additional charge due for the period covered by the report, the 

commissioner may make an assessment against the person based upon any 

information in the commissioner’s possession.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 17} The third paragraph then sets forth the time limitation: 
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{¶ 18} “No assessment shall be made against any motor fuel dealer for 

taxes imposed by this chapter more than four years after the date on which the 

report on which the assessment was based was due or was filed, whichever is 

later.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 19} The commissioner relies on the contrast between the broad 

language authorizing assessments against “any person” with liabilities under the 

motor-fuel-tax law and the third paragraph’s reference to “motor fuel dealer”: 

under this reading, the contrasting language means that the four-year limitation 

should not be viewed as incorporated into the manner for making assessments 

against responsible parties. 

{¶ 20} We disagree. To adopt the commissioner’s proposed reading 

would violate the precept that we “should construe statutes to give effect to all the 

enacted language.” Church of God in N. Ohio v. Levin, 124 Ohio St.3d 36, 2009-

Ohio-5939, 918 N.E.2d 981, ¶ 30, citing State ex rel. Bohan v. Indus. Comm.

(1946), 147 Ohio St. 249, 251, 34 O.O. 151, 70 N.E.2d 888 (courts should “ 

‘accord meaning to each word of a leglislative [sic] enactment if it is reasonably 

possible to do so’”). Namely, the commissioner’s construction of the statutes 

would make a nullity out of R.C. 5735.35(A)(2)’s mandate that assessments 

against responsible parties be made “in the manner provided in sections 5735.12 

and 5735.121 of the Revised Code.” 

{¶ 21} Although we acknowledge that the contrasting language of the 

second and third paragraphs of R.C. 5735.12(A) may imply that some persons 

who are subject to being assessed do not enjoy the benefit of the four-year time 

limitation,1

 we reject the contention that the employees, officers, or trustees of a 

 

1. The motor-fuel-tax statutes authorize assessments against some persons who may not 

themselves qualify either as motor-fuel dealers or as responsible-party employees, officers, or 

trustees of a motor-fuel dealer. See, e.g., R.C. 5735.064(C), 5735.101, 5735.123, and 5735.124. 

Because the present case involves an assessment against a corporate officer of a motor-fuel dealer, 

we need not and do not address the applicability of the four-year limitation to assessments against 
January Term, 2010 

7 

motor-fuel dealer fall within that category. Because assessments against 

employees, officers, or trustees of a motor-fuel dealer must be made “in the 

manner provided in” R.C. 5735.12, and because that section imposes the fouryear time limit on assessments against the motor-fuel dealer itself, we hold that 

assessments against a motor-fuel dealer’s employees, officers, or trustees as 

responsible parties are also subject to the four-year limitation period. As a result, 

the assessment against Ceccarelli in this case was time-barred. 

{¶ 22} Finally, we address the commissioner’s contention that any “doubt 

concerning the reasonableness and lawfulness of the Commissioner’s and the 

BTA’s interpretation of R.C. 5735.12(A)” should be “resolved against Mr. 

Ceccarelli’s statute of limitation claim.” This argument is premised on the 

doctrine that a statute of limitations does not restrain the state unless the restraint 

is expressly provided for in the statute. See State ex rel. Springfield City School 

Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Gibson (1935), 130 Ohio St. 318, 320-321, 4 O.O. 352, 199 

N.E. 185 (holding that although the state is immune from statutes of limitation 

and such immunity “can only be waived by express provision to that effect within 

the statute,” the state’s immunity does not extend to a political subdivision); 

Seeley v. Thomas (1877), 31 Ohio St. 301, 308 (laches does not run against the 

state); State ex rel. Parrott v. State Bd. of Public Works (1881), 36 Ohio St. 409, 

414 (statute providing for payment of interest with late payment did not apply to 

state); Heddleston v. Hendricks (1895), 52 Ohio St. 460, 465, 40 N.E. 408 (no 

adverse possession against the state). Unlike the cases cited, however, the present 

case involves an explicit limitation on state authority, i.e., the power to issue tax 

assessments. By contrast, the cited cases hold only that a general statute that 

binds private litigants does not bind the state absent express language to that 

 any person who is assessed on some basis other than his or her status as an employee, officer, or 

trustee of a motor-fuel dealer. 
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effect. The cases are inapposite, and the doctrine they articulate does not apply to 

the four-year limitation at issue. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 23} Because the BTA acted unlawfully when it upheld the assessment 

of unpaid motor-fuel taxes against Ceccarelli, we reverse the decision of the BTA. 

Decision reversed. 

 BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

 Carlile, Patchen & Murphy, L.L.P., Leon Friedberg, and Robert T. Castor, 

for appellant. 

 Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Barton A. Hubbard and Sophia 

Hussain, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 

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