16-1836 Barretta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JA NUARY 1, 2007, IS PE RMITTED AND IS GOVERNE D BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATA BASE (WITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2 nd day of June, two thousand seventeen.

PRESENT: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, DENNIS JACOBS, PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ Frances Ann Barretta, Appellant , v. 16-1836 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Appellee.

_____________________________________ FOR APPELLANT: Frances Ann Barretta, pro se, Meriden, Connecticut.

FOR APPELLEE: Henry F. Reichner, Reed Smith LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Appeal from an order of the United States Di strict Court for the Di strict of Connecticut (Thompson, J .).2 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED

. Frances Ann Barretta, appearing pro se, appeals from the dist rict court’s denial of her motion for a stay pending appe al. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“ Wells Fargo”) had obtained a judgment in strict foreclosure in state court on Barre tta’s home. Barretta then petitioned for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code, which triggered an automatic stay on foreclosure proceedings pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. The bankruptcy court granted Wells Fargo relief from the automatic stay, and plaintiff appeal ed to the district court, where she filed a motion to stay the bankruptcy court’s order pending appeal. The district court denied her motion, which Barretta now appeals to this Court. We assume th e parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. As an initial matter, it could be argued that we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order, which is essentially a denial of an injunction as encompassed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See In re Chateaugay Corp. , 880 F.2d 1509, 1512 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he preliminary hearing on a motion for relief from the [automatic ] stay is similar to a hearing on a preliminary injunction, and the decision as a resu lt of the final hearing on the mo tion for relief is equivalent to a permanent injunction.”); see also Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain , 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“So long as a party to a proceeding or case in bankruptcy meets the conditions imposed by § 1292, a court of appeals may rely on that st atute as a basis for jurisdiction.”); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp. , 485 U.S. 271, 287–88 (1988) (“Section 1291( a)(1) . . . provide[s] appellate jurisdiction over orders that grant or deny injunctions and orders that have the practical effect of granting or denying injunctions and have serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.” (internal3 quotation marks omitted)). But, in any event, to th e degree our jurisdiction is in doubt, we would reach the same outcome by exer cising hypothetical jurisdiction. See Marquez-Almanzar v. I.N.S. , 418 F.3d 210, 216 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).

Because here the district court’s denial of Barretta’s motion for a stay pending appeal is

akin to the denial of a preliminary injunction, we review th e denial for abuse of discretion. See Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd. , 762 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2014). Upon review, we conclude

that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s motion. When deciding a motion for a stay pending appeal, a court must consider four factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showi ng that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured abse nt a stay; (3) whether issu ance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest

lies.” In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig. , 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill , 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). The district court properly c oncluded that Barretta did not establish a likelihood of success on the merits because her challenge to the bankruptcy court’s order was likely barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which provides that the lowe r federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought by st ate court losers that invite revi ew and rejection of state court judgments. Green v. Mattingly , 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009). Th is Court has set forth four requirements that must be met in order for a claim to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: (1) the plaintiff must have lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment, (3) the plain tiff must invite district court re view and rejection of the state court judgment, and (4) the state judgment must have been rende red before the district court4 proceedings commenced. Id. Each of the four requirements is satisfied in this case. First, Barretta lost in state court by virtue of the judgment in strict foreclosure. See Benvenuto v. Mahajan , 715 A.2d 743, 745–47 (Conn. 1998) (judgment in strict foreclosure a fina l judgment despite remain ing issues regarding attorney’s fees); see also Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. , 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014) ( Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars review of Connectic ut state court judgment in strict foreclosure). Second, Barretta claims that she will be injured by the foreclosure of her property, which was authorized by the stat e court. Third, the objections she asserts to the bankruptcy court’s order collaterally attack the state court judgment a nd would effectively requir e the district court to declare the state court judgme nt void for her to prevail on the merits of her appeal. See Kropelnicki v. Siegel , 290 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2002). Lastly, the state court judgment was issued before she petitioned for bankruptcy.

The district court also did not abuse its discretion in holding th at the remaining stay factors

did not warrant that relief . While Barretta likely faces irreparable harm without a stay, this factor is outweighed by the others. See Thapa v. Gonzales , 460 F.3d 323, 334–35 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing weighing of stay factor s). As for the third factor, the re cord indicates that Wells Fargo has not been able to foreclose on the property desp ite being authorized to do so by the bankruptcy court’s 2015 order, and has expended resources litig ating this dispute. The fourth factor also weighs against Barretta because ther e is a public interest in finality. In re Turner , 207 B.R. 373, 379 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997). In light of the balancing of these four fact ors, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ba rretta’s motion for a stay pending appeal.5 We have considered all of Barretta’s argum ents and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk