UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-6106

STEPHON BERNARD PEAKE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. 

Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (1:20-cv-01450-CMC)

Submitted: June 29, 2021 Decided: July 2, 2021

Before HARRIS, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stephon Bernard Peake, Appellant Pro Se. Beth Drake, Acting United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Stephon Bernard Peake appeals the denial of his motions to appoint counsel, the 

district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing 

Peake’s claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act,∗ (“FTCA”) for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and the district court’s order denying Peake’s Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and 

advised Peake that failure to file timely, specific objections to this recommendation could 

waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is 

necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the 

parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Martin v. Duffy, 858 

F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2017); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985); see 

also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1985). Although Peake received proper notice 

and filed timely objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, he has waived 

appellate review of the denial of his claims regarding outgoing mail, access to institutional 

forms, and medical care because the objections were not specific to the particularized legal 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge on those claims. See Martin, 858 F.3d at 

245 (holding that, “to preserve for appeal an issue in a magistrate judge’s report, a party 

must object to the finding or recommendation on that issue with sufficient specificity so as 

∗ 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680.
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reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

Although Peake filed specific objections to his FTCA claim regarding the failure to 

protect, on appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the informal brief. See 4th 

Cir. R. 34(b). Because Peake’s informal brief does not challenge the basis for the district 

court’s disposition of his failure to protect claim, he has forfeited appellate review of the 

court’s order. See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal 

brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues 

preserved in that brief.”). 

Finally, regarding the denial of Peake’s motions for the appointment of counsel, we 

have reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion. See Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 

962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating standard of review). 

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED