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[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 78 (Thursday, May 11, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6505-S6506]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                             RUSSIA SUMMIT

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, President Clinton is now in Ukraine. I 
support his decision to visit Kiev. Economic and political reform in 
Ukraine are proceeding very well. There is strong bipartisan support 
for United States assistance to Ukraine. It is in the American national 
interest to strengthen our relations with Ukraine. I hope the President 
has a successful and productive summit with President Kuchman.
  The report cards are now being filed on the Moscow Summit. As I said 
yesterday, I was disappointed at the lack of progress on the two key 
summit issues: Nuclear sales to Iran and the conflict in Chechnya. It 
seems pretty clear the American agenda at this summit did not fare 
well. My staff spoke to State Department and National Security Council 
officials yesterday afternoon. The White House provided my office with 
copies of all the joint statements from the Moscow Summit. To conclude 
that the summit made little progress in advancing American interests is 
not politics, and it is not partisan. It is simply a review of the 
facts.
  On Iran, Russia did not agree to cancel its sale of nuclear reactors 
to Iran. If President Yeltsin cannot make the decision to stop the 
sale, I do not have great confidence that it will be made later at a 
lower level. With respect to the much-publicized concession on not 
selling advanced gas centrifuge technology, it seems clear this was 
floated as a bargaining chip. As recently as last Friday, I note the 
Washington Post headline: ``Russia denies plan to sell gas centrifuge 
to Iran.'' It seems this was a plan designed to be a concession from 
the start.
  Just last week, when asked if a halt in the gas centrifuge sale would 
be enough, Secretary of State Christopher said, ``not at all. We would 
not be satisfied with that''. I agree with the Secretary's assessment. 
We should not be satisfied. The bottom line is Russia still intends to 
proceed with a sale of nuclear technology to the outlaw regime in 
Tehran. This flies in the face of the summit's joint statement on 
proliferation which pledges ``To work together closely to promote broad 
non-proliferation goals.''
  On Chechnya, President Yeltsin rejected any effort to address the 
legitimate concerns of the international community over human rights 
violations. In President Yeltsin's statement about Chechnya, there is 
an unfortunate ring of former soviet leaders rejecting western concerns 
over human rights as meddling. And whatever the political leaders were 
saying in Moscow, the Russian army kept attacking. Literally within 
minutes of yesterday's press conference, Russian helicopters attacked 
Chechen civilian targets.
  The situation in Chechnya also raises the issue of the flank limits 
in the Conventional Forces in Europe
 [CFE] Treaty. In the fall, if Russian forces are still in Chechnya, 
the Russian Government will be in violation of these flank limits. The 
Moscow summit did not result in any assurances of Russian compliance 
with the CFE limits.

  On missile defenses, the administration continued down the same path 
of seeking Russian permission on the deployment of theater missile 
defenses--despite the fact that Russian insistence on providing nuclear 
technology to Iran increases the proliferation threat. The fact is that 
theater missile defenses are not prohibited by the cold-war era ABM 
Treaty. Moreover, the United States must not allow Russia to have a 
veto over matters of national security.
  The summit also failed in what was not on the agenda--namely, Bosnia. 
As the two Presidents were meeting, Sarajevo was being heavily shelled. 
There was no U.N. response, no NATO response, and no summit response.
  [[Page S6506]] It is true that Russia agreed to join the partnership 
for peace at this summit--as they previously agreed to do last year, 
before abruptly changing their minds at the OSCE summit in Budapest. At 
this summit, Russia continued to express strong opposition to the 
expansion of NATO.
  Mr. President, summit diplomacy has a long and distinguished history. 
Historically, summits have succeeded when the parties had clear 
agendas, pursued their interests consistently, and were ready, willing, 
and able to meet each others' concerns. And if agreement is not 
reached, history shows it is better to state the disagreements clearly 
rather than paper them over. In the case of the Moscow summit, it is 
clear that President Yeltsin was not in a position to address our 
concerns. We should admit that forthrightly and respond appropriately. 
Congress will respond by looking closely at all forms of aid to 
Russia--especially aid to the government. Certain types of aid such as 
democracy support, or Nunn-Lugar funding for nuclear clean up still 
promote important American interests. Other aid programs may not, and 
may be halted.
  The United States must remain engaged with Russia. It was and is our 
hope that democracy and free market reforms will prosper. We hope that 
the Russian elections planned for this year and next year proceed on 
time--and that they are free and fair. But Russia is not our only 
strategic relationship--we have other interests in other areas. That is 
why I support the President's decision to visit Ukraine. That is why 
NATO expansion should not be subject to a Russian veto. And that is why 
we cannot allow Iran to become a nuclear weapons state.

                          ____________________
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