Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1509-PC-1506 | August 16, 2016 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT, PRO SE

Jeremiah Beverly

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Hale Barrow

Kyle Martin Hunter

Deputy Attorney Generals

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeremiah Beverly,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

August 16, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1509-PC-1506

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Grant W. 

Hawkins, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G05-1501-PC-1403

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Jeremiah Beverly (“Beverly”) appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his 

petition for post-conviction relief in which he requested educational credit for 

his completion of a bachelor’s degree. The post-conviction court denied the 

petition on the basis that Beverly had not exhausted his administrative remedies 

for challenging the denial of his educational credit with the Indiana Department 

of Correction (“the DOC”). Because we also find that Beverly did not exhaust 

his administrative remedies, we conclude that we do not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over Beverly’s case and must dismiss his appeal.

[2] We dismiss.

Issue

Whether we have subject matter jurisdiction to review the postconviction court’s denial of Beverly’s petition for post-conviction 

relief.

Facts

[3] On March 6, 2003, Beverly was sentenced to forty (40) years with five (5) years

suspended for Class A felony voluntary manslaughter and five (5) years for 

Class C felony carrying a handgun without a license, with the sentences to be 

served concurrently. 

[4] In May 2008, while incarcerated, Beverly completed the coursework 

requirements to earn a bachelor of general studies degree (“Bachelor’s Degree”) 

from Ball State University (“Ball State”). On July 14, 2008, he submitted an 
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application to graduate from the university at the end of the Fall 2008 semester. 

However, on August 29, 2008, he received a Class A conduct report from the 

DOC for refusing a work assignment on five occasions between July 17, 2008 

and July 28, 2008. As a result of this report, Beverly was placed in segregation 

at the Indiana State Prison (“ISP”) and withdrew his application for 

graduation. 

[5] On May 27, 2009, Beverly again applied to Ball State for graduation. He then 

graduated on June 19, 2009 and received his Bachelor’s Degree. On August 11, 

2009, the Dean of Ball State’s School of Extended Education mailed a letter to 

the DOC certifying that Beverly had “completed all of the requirements” for his 

Bachelor’s Degree on June 19, 2009. (Appellant’s App. 20). Two days later, 

the DOC Supervisor of Education at Beverly’s prison completed a form

verifying that Beverly had completed his degree and then sent it to the Offender 

Placement section of the Classification Division of the DOC. However, on 

August 26, 2009, the DOC Supervisor of Offender Placement and 

Classification, Randall Short (“Classification Supervisor”), issued a finding that 

Beverly was not eligible for any educational credit for completing the degree

because he had received a Class A conduct report during the year prior to 

completing his degree.1

 

1

“Educational credit” means a reduction in a person’s term of imprisonment or confinement awarded for 

participation in an educational, vocational, rehabilitative, or other program. IND. CODE § 35-50-6-0.5. 

Pursuant to the DOC’s policies, which Beverly has partially included in his Appellant’s Appendix, an 
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[6] Sometime between the end of August 2009 and October 2009, Beverly 

transferred to the ISP.

2

 The Supervisor of Education there submitted a second 

form verifying that Beverly had completed his Bachelor’s Degree. However,

the Classification Supervisor again found that Beverly was ineligible to receive 

any educational credit as a result of his conduct in the year prior to earning his 

degree.

[7] On November 1, 2010, the DOC’s Director of Education, John Nally 

(“Director of Education”), sent a letter to Beverly stating that Beverly’s “recent 

letter to the Commissioner ha[d] been forwarded to [his] office.”3 (Appellant’s 

App. 10). The Director of Education then informed Beverly that: “I have 

confirmed with Ball State University that you officially completed your degree 

on June 19, 2009. I had them check it twice, and that is the official date.” 

(Appellant’s App. 10).4 In addition, the Director of Education noted that he 

had reviewed Beverly’s 2008 and 2009 violations, as well as a later violation in 

 

offender must have “one (1) year clear of any Class A conduct reports at the time of program completion” in 

order to qualify for educational credit. (Appellee’s App. 20). 

2

It is apparent that Beverly had transferred from the ISP after his 2008 placement in segregation there. 

3 Beverly did not include a copy of the letter he sent to the Commissioner, or any of his other letters, in his 

Appendix. Accordingly, we do not know when he sent this letter or what its contents were.

4 Beverly failed to number the pages in his Appellant’s Appendix in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 

51(C). All reference to the Appellant’s Appendix will begin pagination with page one being the Notice of 

Completion of the Clerk’s Record and proceeding consecutively from there. Further, we will distinguish 

between the Appellant’s Appendix and the Appellee’s Appendix by referring to them as “Appellant’s App.” 

and “Appellee’s App.,” respectively.
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2010. Based on these violations, the Director reaffirmed that he could not 

approve Beverly’s degree for purposes of educational credit. 

[8] Four months later, on March 10, 2011, Beverly submitted a “Request for 

Interview” form to the Site Manager of the Indiana State Prison, Deborah J. 

Cutler (“ISP Site Manager”). In this request form, Beverly asked the ISP Site 

Manager if the date he had completed his Bachelor’s Degree, for the purposes 

of receiving educational credit, was the date that he had completed his 

coursework requirements for the degree. She replied that the relevant date was 

the date Beverly had “actually graduated” from the program, not the date of his 

last class. (Appellant’s App. 9).

[9] On April 19, 2011, the Director of the Indiana Department of Administration 

Ombudsman Bureau (“Ombudsman Bureau”) wrote Beverly a letter confirming 

that the Ombudsman Bureau was “in receipt of [his] recent complaint regarding 

credit time for [his] Bachelor’s Degree.”5 (Appellant’s App. 11). The Director 

told Beverly that she had contacted the appropriate personnel concerning his 

complaint and had determined that Beverly was not eligible for educational 

credit due to the conduct report he had received prior to graduating. She 

further wrote that the Bureau had closed the complaint and that Beverly should 

“[f]eel free to file additional complaints with the Bureau should [he] suspect a 

 

5

In the letter, the Director noted that the Ombudsman Bureau was established to “investigate and resolve 

complaints that [the DOC] violated a law, rule, or its own policy, or that it endangered the health or safety of 

any person.” (Appellant’s App. 11). Beverly’s complaint is not a part of the record, so we do not know the 

date that Beverly filed the complaint or its contents.
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break in DOC policy or procedure.” (Appellant’s App. 11). However, she 

requested that he “please use the facility level process available to [him] before 

submitting complaints with the Bureau.” (Appellant’s App. 11). 

[10] On November 13, 2014, Beverly filed a classification appeal arguing that he 

should have been allowed to have copies of all of his completed program 

certificates or the verification forms for his completed programs. He wrote that 

the reason for his appeal was that he had not received all of his educational 

credit and needed a “stamped list of completed programs that [he had not] 

received time cuts for.” (Appellant’s App. 12). His appeal was denied based on 

the reasoning that he was not allowed to possess copies of any certificates that 

he had earned.

[11] On January 15, 2015, Beverly filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief 

arguing that he should have received educational credit for his Bachelor’s 

Degree because he had “completed” the degree when he finished the credit 

hours required for the degree rather than when he graduated. (Appellee’s App. 

5). Because he had completed those credit hours in May 2008, prior to 

receiving his Class A conduct report, he argued that he had not received a Class 

A conduct report within the year prior to earning his degree. As a result, he 

claimed that he should have been awarded educational credit. 

[12] On February 18, 2015, while his petition for post-conviction relief was pending, 

Beverly filed a formal grievance with the DOC Offender Grievance Program. 

As in his petition, he argued that he had completed his degree in May 2008,
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before his Class A conduct report and, therefore, should have received credit for 

the degree.

[13] On March 5, 2015, the State filed a motion to dismiss Beverly’s petition for 

post-conviction relief or, in the alternative, for summary disposition of the 

petition. The post-conviction court held a hearing on the State’s motion on 

April 15, 2015, and denied the motion at the end of the hearing. On June 24, 

2015, the post-conviction court then held an evidentiary hearing on Beverly’s 

petition, which it denied on September 2, 2015. As a basis for its denial of the 

petition, the post-conviction court reasoned that Beverly had not exhausted his 

administrative remedies prior to filing his petition because Beverly had not 

followed the procedures specified in the DOC’s “Offender Grievance Process.” 

(Appellant’s App. 6). Alternatively, the post-conviction court reviewed the 

merits of Beverly’s claim and determined that Beverly had not “completed his 

degree” until he had officially graduated—which occurred after he received his 

Class A conduct report. Beverly now appeals.

Decision

[14] On appeal, Beverly argues that the post-conviction court erred in determining 

that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his petition 

for post-conviction relief.6 Specifically, he asserts that he was required to 

 

6 Beverly also argues that the DOC and the post-conviction court erred in determining that he had not 

completed his degree until he officially graduated from his program. However, because we find the issue of 

jurisdiction dispositive, we need not address Beverly’s remaining argument.
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exhaust his administrative remedies under the “Classification Decision Appeals 

Process,” not the “Offender Grievance Process” that the post-conviction court 

considered. (Appellant’s App. 6, 7). He also asserts that his attempts to contact 

the Commissioner, the ISP Site Manager, and the Ombudsman Bureau were 

sufficient to exhaust his administrative remedies. Because he argues that he did 

exhaust his administrative remedies, he further claims that he was entitled to 

educational credit for his degree. 

[15] Preliminarily, we note that “[t]he petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding 

bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Hollowel v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 268-69 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Fisher 

v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004)). When appealing from the denial of 

post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing 

from a negative judgment. Id. at 269. To prevail on appeal from the denial of 

post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads 

unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the postconviction court. Id. 

[16] Beverly disputes the post-conviction court’s conclusion that he did not exhaust 

his administrative remedies to challenge the DOC’s denial of his educational 

credit. Pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-50-6-3.3, a person earns education 

credit if the person:

(1) is in credit Class I, Class A, or Class B; 

(2) has demonstrated a pattern consistent with

rehabilitation; and 
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(3) successfully completes requirements to obtain one (1) 

 of the following: . . . 

(D) A bachelor degree from an approved 

 postsecondary educational institution (as 

 defined under [I.C. §] 21-7-13-6(a)) earned 

 during the person’s incarceration.

The legislative intent behind the educational credit statute is to enhance 

rehabilitation by providing offenders with the incentive to further their 

education while incarcerated. Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006). While the trial court determines the initial credit time when an 

offender is sentenced, modification to that credit time—which includes 

modification because of educational credit—is the responsibility of the DOC. 

Id. Stated differently, “the trial court imposes the sentence, and the DOC

administers the sentence.” Id. at 983. As a consequence, the DOC maintains 

the responsibility to deny or restore credit time, and an offender with a 

grievance regarding credit time must exhaust all of his administrative remedies 

with the DOC before resorting to judicial remedies. Id. We have previously 

held that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address an issue of credit 

time when a defendant has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. In 

such a case, we must dismiss the appeal. Id. Further, the burden is on the 

defendant to show what the relevant procedures are and that he has exhausted 

them at all levels. Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (Ind. 2008); Burks-Bey 

v. State, 903 N.E.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
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[17] Here, we find that Beverly has waived his exhaustion argument by failing to 

present evidence that he fulfilled his burden of showing the post-conviction 

court what the relevant DOC procedures were and that he had exhausted them 

at all levels. See id. Beverly’s Appendix consists of freestanding documents and 

documents that are labeled as “Exhibits” but lack any context. It is not clear if 

or when the documents were admitted as evidence. Two such freestanding 

documents are excerpts of the DOC’s “Offender Grievance Process” and

“Classification Decisions Appeal Process.” (Appellant’s App. 6, 7). Neither of 

these excerpts is labeled as an exhibit, and Beverly has not given any context for 

either of them to establish which procedural remedy he was required to 

exhaust. Further, there is no evidence that he submitted either excerpt at his 

post-conviction hearing to inform the post-conviction court of the relevant 

procedures. Beverly withdrew his request for a transcript of the post-conviction 

hearing, so our ability to review the evidence he presented to the postconviction court is limited. 

[18] Our supreme court has held that an appellant bears the burden of presenting 

this Court with a record that is complete with respect to the issues raised on 

appeal. Clark v. State, 562 N.E.2d 11, 13 (Ind. 1990), cert. denied. This burden 

includes the duty to ensure that the appellate court has before it a transcript of 

the trial proceedings or, where no transcript is available, an affidavit setting 

forward the content of the proceedings. Id. Failure to do so can result in 

waiver. Id. Accordingly, because Beverly’s exhaustion of administrative 

remedies is an issue on appeal and he did not meet his burden of ensuring that 
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the record was complete with respect to his handling of that issue at his hearing, 

we conclude that he has waived his claim. 

[19] Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that we do not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over Beverly’s claim because he has not shown that he exhausted

his remedies, regardless of whether the applicable DOC procedure was the 

“Offender Grievance Process” or the “Classification Decisions Appeal 

Process.” According to a document “Procedure for Earning Additional Credit 

under 135-50-6-33,” which Beverly included in his Appendix, it is the role of 

the Offender Placement/Release Sections within the Classification Division of 

the DOC to determine, once they have received verification that an offender 

has completed an educational degree, whether the offender meets all of the 

eligibility requirements for earning educational credit.7 (Appellant’s App. 15). 

The Supervisor of the Classification Division must then notify the offender of 

the change in his or her earliest possible release date and the amount of credit 

time that he or she has been awarded or denied. (Appellant’s App. 15). The 

DOC’s “Manual of Policies and Procedures” (“the Manual”) then delineates 

the “Offender Grievance Process” and the “Classification Decisions Appeals 

Process. 

[20] If, as the post-conviction court determined, the “Offender Grievance Process” 

applies to Beverly’s challenge, Beverly was required to attempt to “resolve the 

 

7 Beverly did not provide a context for this document. 
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grievance in an informal manner by discussing it with [his] counselor or another 

staff member in the housing unit who may be able to assist in the resolution of 

the problem,” according to the excerpt of the Manual that he included in his 

Appendix. (Appellee’s App. 39). Beverly had to contact the staff member “as 

soon as possible after the incident, but in no case . . . [after] more than five (5) 

working days from the date of the incident” without “a reasonable explanation 

for delay.” (Appellee’s App. 39). If he was unable to resolve his grievance 

informally, he was then required to file a formal written grievance within 

twenty working days from the date of the incident triggering the grievance. 

[21] Beverly has not shown that he completed any of these processes within the time 

limits specified in the Manual. Even if his letter to the Commissioner or request

for an interview with the ISP Site Manager qualified as attempts at resolving his 

grievance informally, he did not undertake either action until over a year after 

he was initially denied educational credit. In addition, he did not file his formal 

written grievance until February 18, 2015—five-and-a-half years after he was 

initially denied educational credit. 

[22] Alternatively, Beverly also failed to show that he exhausted his administrative 

remedies under the “Classification Decisions Appeals Process.” Pursuant to 

the excerpt of the Manual that Beverly included in his Appendix, if an offender 

decides to appeal a classification decision, 

the offender shall: 
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(1) Submit a written appeal within ten (10) working days 

from the date that the offender received the 

classification decision;

(2) Submit the appeal on the State Form 9260, 

CLASSIFICATION APPEAL;

(3) Attach relevant documents to the appeal form as 

deemed necessary; and,

(4) Submit the appeal form and all other documents to the 

Superintendent. 

(Appellant’s App. 7). The Superintendent is the final administrative review for 

intra-facility classification decisions. (Appellant’s App. 8).

[23] Rather than filing an appeal within ten days, as required, Beverly did not file a 

classification appeal until November 13, 2014, five years after the Classification 

Division had initially denied his educational credit in August 2009. Further, 

Beverly’s classification appeal did not even directly challenge the Classification 

Division’s denial of his educational credit. Instead, Beverly argued in his 

appeal that he should have been allowed to have copies of all of his completed 

program certificates. He mentioned that he had not received all of his 

educational credit, but he did so only in order to justify his request for the

certificates rather than to challenge the denial of the credit. 

[24] In spite of his failure to follow either the “Offender Grievance Process” or the 

“Classification Decision Appeals Process,” Beverly argues that he exhausted his 

remedies through the various attempts he made to raise his grievances with 

DOC officials. In support of this argument, Beverly cites to Delp v. State, No. 
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49A02-1405-PC-358 (Ind. Ct. App. March 27, 2015). However, Delp is an 

unpublished memorandum decision that does not have any precedential value. 

See Ind. Appellate Rule 65 (stating that a memorandum decision that is not 

published in the official reporter and is not citable). Beverly has not provided us 

with any other authority indicating that we may deviate from the DOC’s 

established procedures when determining whether a defendant has exhausted 

his remedies. Accordingly, we conclude that, because Beverly did not follow

either of the DOC processes he potentially presented at his post-conviction 

hearing, he has not met his burden of showing that he exhausted his 

administrative remedies prior to filing his petition for post-conviction relief. As 

such, we do not have jurisdiction to review his claim and must dismiss his 

appeal. See, e.g., Members, 851 N.E.2d at 983 (holding that this Court was 

required to dismiss the appeal where the defendant had not exhausted his 

administrative remedies to challenge the denial of his educational credit).

[25] Dismissed. 

Baker, J., and Bradford, J., concur.