1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

No. 09-17-00202-CR

____________________

CHRISTOPHER RYAN HATTON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the 9th District Court 

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 16-01-00068-CR

________________________________________________________ _____________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

Christopher Ryan Hatton appeals from a jury’s verdict that resulted in his 

conviction for committing an aggravated assault against a public servant.

1 Hatton 

presents three issues for our consideration in his appeal. In his first two issues, 

 

1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011) (defining the elements 

for the crime of aggravated assault), § 22.02(b)(2) (West 2011) (elevating

aggravated assault a first-degree felony when the person assaulted is known by the 

defendant to be a public servant discharging his or her official duties).
2

Hatton argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for continuance and by 

denying the request he made to the trial court asking that it instruct the jury on the 

lesser-included offense of misdemeanor deadly conduct.

2 In a third issue, Hatton 

argues the evidence cannot support the jury’s decision convicting him of committing 

the aggravated assault. We overrule Hatton’s issues and affirm the judgment. 

Background

One night in January 2016, Tyson Sutton, a patrol officer with the Conroe 

Police Department, saw someone driving an SUV without a front license plate.

Officer Sutton used the equipment on his patrol car to signal the SUV’s driver to 

stop. The officer followed the SUV into a parking lot, where the individual stopped.

The man driving the SUV got out and fled into the woods nearby. While Officer 

Sutton and another officer chased the man on foot, they lost track of him in the 

woods. 

Officer Gregory Vradenburg heard over his police radio that Officer Sutton 

was chasing a man on foot. Officer Vradenburg drove to the area being searched.

Shortly after he arrived, he saw a man that matched the description of the man the 

police chased into the woods. 

 

2 See id. § 22.05(a) (West 2011).
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According to Officer Vradenburg, upon spotting Hatton, he identified himself 

as a police officer and ordered Hatton to stop. Hatton responded by fleeing, and 

Officer Vradenburg followed on foot. A short time later, Hatton tripped and fell.

Officer Vradenburg came upon Hatton, while he was lying on the ground, and he 

put his foot on Hatton’s back to keep him down. Next, the officer ordered Hatton to 

show his hands, but Hatton refused. In response, Officer Vradenburg threatened to 

shoot Hatton with his taser. At that point, Hatton rolled over onto his right side, and 

Officer Vradenburg noticed that Hatton had a handgun in his right hand. Hatton fired

the gun over his left shoulder in Officer Vradenburg’s general direction. Vradenburg 

discharged his taser but was not sure if he hit Hatton; the officer then turned and ran 

toward a nearby tree. Standing near the tree, Vradenburg noticed that Hatton was 

running away. A short time later, other officers at the scene caught and arrested 

Hatton. 

Denial of Motion to Continue

In his first issue, Hatton complains that the trial court erred by denying his 

motion to continue. According to the motion, filed two weeks before Hatton’s trial,

Hatton’s attorney needed more time to review documents produced during discovery

because she had not had time to do so, claiming she had been tied up with personal 

family issues. Also, the motion alleges that Hatton’s attorney had not yet reviewed
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documents produced in discovery or had an expert evaluate them because the 

attorney was ill. On the date Hatton’s trial began, which was two weeks after the 

trial court denied Hatton’s motion to continue, Hatton’s attorney never complained 

that she still had not reviewed the discovery the State produced. In the brief Hatton

filed to support his appeal, he claims the trial court’s ruling on the motion to continue 

his case deprived his trial attorney of the ability to call any witnesses on his behalf 

during the guilt-innocence phase of his trial.

On appeal, we review rulings on motions for continuance using an abuse-ofdiscretion standard.

3 To establish that an abuse of discretion occurred, the defendant

must establish that the ruling on the defendant’s motion prejudiced the defendant’s 

ability to present his defense.

4 According to the Court of Criminal Appeals, an abuse 

of discretion does not occur unless the record shows specifically how the denial of 

the motion harmed the defendant’s ability to present his case at trial.5

Usually, the evidence that is necessary to establish that the trial court’s denial 

of a motion to continue resulted in harm is presented in a hearing on a motion for 

 

3 See Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

4 See Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

5 Id. at 842. 
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new trial.6 Yet, the record in Hatton’s case reveals that Hatton never filed a motion 

for new trial. Thus, we cannot determine what witnesses Hatton might have called 

had the trial court granted his motion or what these witnesses might have said. On 

this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s ruling on the motion is the 

reason that no witnesses were called on Hatton’s behalf in the guilt-innocence phase 

of the trial.

7 We overrule Hatton’s first issue. 

Sufficiency of Evidence

We address issue three next, since reviewing the arguments Hatton advances 

in this issue serve to shorten the discussion needed to dispose of issue two. In issue 

three, Hatton argues the evidence before the jury is insufficient to support his 

conviction for committing an aggravated assault against a public servant. Under the 

language that is used in Hatton’s indictment, the State needed to prove during 

Hatton’s trial that (1) Hatton (2) intentionally or knowingly threatened Officer 

Vradenburg with imminent bodily injury (3) while using or exhibiting a deadly 

 

6 Id. at 842-43.

7 Id. 
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weapon, a firearm, when committing the assault, and (4) that he knew Officer 

Vradenburg was a public servant acting to discharge his official duties.

8

 

On appeal, Hatton argues the evidence before the jury failed to establish that 

he acted knowingly or intentionally when he discharged the gun. According to 

Hatton, the evidence the jury considered, at most, established that he acted 

recklessly. Given that Hatton’s argument focuses on the mens rea required to prove 

he committed the aggravated assault, we focus our review on whether a reasonable 

jury could have concluded from the evidence that Hatton intentionally or knowingly

threatened Officer Vradenburg with imminent bodily injury. 

In reviewing the evidence the jury was asked to consider in Hatton’s trial, we 

must decide “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”9 In a case tried to a jury, the jury decides which 

witnesses are credible and determines the weight to afford any testimony.10 In 

 8 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(2) (West Supp. 2018), § 22.02(a)(2), 

(b)(2)(B) (West 2011), § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (West Supp. 2018).

9 Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

10 Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
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deciding a defendant’s guilt, the jury can consider both direct and circumstantial 

evidence as probative about whether the defendant committed the crime, as 

“‘circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.’”11 When a 

defendant’s conviction rests on circumstantial evidence, the facts need not point 

directly to the defendant’s guilt if the jury’s conclusion is warranted by the combined 

and cumulative force of the incriminating circumstances.12 Our task in reviewing 

whether the evidence supports the jury’s verdict is to decide whether the inferences 

the jury made from the evidence were reasonable after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict.

13 The jury’s verdict will be affirmed unless a 

rational factfinder must have had reasonable doubt about an element the State needs 

to prove to establish that the defendant committed the crime.

14

Hatton concedes that the evidence supports the inference that he recklessly 

discharged the gun, but he argues it is insufficient to show that he did so knowingly 

 

11 Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

12 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1993)); see also Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

13 See Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing 

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16-17).

14 See Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
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or intentionally. Under Texas law, whether the defendant acted with the required 

mental state necessary to show that he acted knowingly or intentionally is a matter 

that is generally treated as a question of fact.

15 Whether the defendant acted with the 

requisite intent is a question that juries are generally required to infer from the 

evidence describing the circumstances of the crime, which includes evidence 

relevant to the defendant’s actions, words, and conduct.

16 Hatton did not testify in 

his trial, so proving whether he acted intentionally or knowingly, as those terms are 

defined in the Penal Code,17 was a matter the jury was required to infer from the 

circumstances showing why Hatton fired his gun.

18

In our opinion, the circumstances that led up to Hatton’s firing his gun allowed 

the jury to infer that he intentionally or knowingly pulled the gun’s trigger. The 

testimony and exhibits in Hatton’s trial show that just before Hatton fired, Officer 

Vradenburg threatened him with his taser. Hatton had also refused Officer 

 

15 See Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

16 Id. 

17 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a), (b) (West 2011).

18 In contrast, when the State is required to show the defendant acted 

recklessly, the evidence must show the defendant knew of a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk created by his conduct, which he then consciously disregarded. Id.

§ 6.03(c) (West 2011).
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Vradenburg’s command asking Hatton to show his hands. The transcript from the 

trial shows that Officer Vradenburg testified, without objection, that Hatton “pointed 

[the gun] right at me...pulled the trigger and got up and ran.” Hatton’s flight from 

police after firing his gun is additional circumstantial evidence that supports the 

conclusion that Hatton was not merely reckless in firing the gun.

19 Finally, the jury 

viewed a video recording, captured by a camera in Officer Vradenburg’s patrol car

and his body camera, and this evidence supports Officer Vradenburg’s account of 

the circumstances surrounding Hatton’s discharge of his weapon. From the 

cumulative weight of the direct and circumstantial evidence admitted in Hatton’s 

trial, we hold the record contains enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion 

that Hatton acted intentionally or knowingly in firing his gun. We overrule Hatton’s 

third issue. 

Lesser-Included Offense—Misdemeanor Deadly Conduct

In his second issue, Hatton argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying his request for an instruction on misdemeanor deadly conduct, which he 

 

19 See Hemphill v. State, 505 S.W.2d 560, 562-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) 

(concluding that the evidence the defendant fled the scene after the shooting and 

sought to conceal himself from police were “circumstances to be considered along 

with the other evidence in determining [the defendant’s] intent”).
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argues is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault.

20 In its brief, the State 

concedes that deadly conduct is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault by 

threat, as alleged in the indictment used in Hatton’s case. Nevertheless, the State 

argues that the evidence before the jury about the circumstances in which Hatton 

fired his gun would not have allowed the jury to infer that he was guilty only of the 

crime of misdemeanor deadly conduct. According to the State, because the evidence 

did not support submitting an instruction on misdemeanor deadly conduct, the trial 

court did not err by refusing Hatton’s instruction on the lesser-included offense. 

On appeal, we must affirm the trial court’s ruling if the ruling is correct under 

any theory of law.21 Determining whether a defendant is entitled to have the jury 

instructed on a lesser-included offense required the trial court to engage in a twostep process.

22 Step one required the trial court to determine if proof of the requested

lesser-included offense “‘is included within the proof necessary to establish the 

 20 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.05(a).

21 Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“An 

appellate court should affirm a trial court’s ruling so long as it is correct under any 

theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court did not rely on that 

theory.”).

22 See Safian v. State, 543 S.W.3d 216, 219-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
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offense charged.’”23 Step two required the trial court to determine whether there is 

some evidence in the record that would allow the jury “to rationally find that, if the 

defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser-included offense.”24

To establish the trial court erred, Hatton must show the jury could have 

rationally returned a verdict finding him guilty only of misdemeanor deadly conduct. 

A finding of misdemeanor deadly conduct would have required the jury to find that 

Hatton acted recklessly.

25 Hatton did not testify in his trial, so nothing in the record 

describes his thought process that led him to fire his gun. On the other hand, the 

circumstantial evidence in the record tends to show that Hatton made several 

conscious movements so that he could place himself into a position to fire his gun. 

The circumstantial evidence also showsthat Hatton knew before Officer Vradenburg 

caught up with him that he was being chased by the police, and that Officer 

Vradenburg was a police officer. Hatton fired the gun after refusing Officer 

Vradenburg’s command to show his hands, and he then positioned himself in a way 

 23 Id. (quoting Rice v. State, 333 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011));

see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09 (West 2006) (listing four elements 

to consider in determining whether an offense is a lesser-included offense of another 

crime).

24 See Safian, 543 S.W.3d at 220 (emphasis added).

25 See Rice, 333 S.W.3d at 145.
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that allowed him to use his right hand to fire his gun. Under the circumstances, we 

conclude that no rational jury could have returned a verdict finding that Hatton fired 

the gun recklessly.

We conclude the trial court did not err by denying Hatton’s requested

instruction on misdemeanor deadly conduct.

26 We overrule Hatton’s second issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Hatton’s issues, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED. 

_________________________

 HOLLIS HORTON

 Justice

Submitted on August 13, 2018

Opinion Delivered February 6, 2019

Do Not Publish

Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.

 26 Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (explaining 

that under the second step of the analysis the evidence relevant to the lesser-included 

offense “must rise to a level that a rational jury could find that if [the defendant] is 

guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser-included offense” and that “[m]eeting this 

threshold requires more than mere speculation—it requires affirmative evidence that 

both raises the lesser-included offense and rebuts or negates an element of the greater 

offense”).