IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1078

Filed January 27, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

NOELLE COURTNEY YOUNGBEAR,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Nancy A. 

Baumgartner (guilty plea) and Fae E. Hoover-Grinde (sentencing), Judges.

Defendant appeals her convictions for second-degree burglary and two 

counts of willful injury causing bodily injury. AFFIRMED.

Melissa A. Nine of Nine Law Office, Marshalltown, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., Tabor, J., and Mahan, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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MAHAN, Senior Judge.

Defendant Noelle Youngbear appeals her convictions for second-degree 

burglary and two counts of willful injury causing bodily injury. There is a sufficient 

factual basis in the record for Youngbear’s guilty pleas to all three charges. The 

evidence shows Youngbear’s guilty pleas were made voluntarily and intelligently. 

The sentence imposed in this case did not constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

According to the minutes of evidence, on November 3, 2013, at about 

4:00 a.m., Merona Jefferson (Merona) and Yolanda Hernandez got into a 

physical altercation at a birthday party at the home of Barbara Lincoln in Tama 

County. Merona contacted her friends, Youngbear, Maggi Walker-Morgan, and 

Brandy Johnson. Gage Tyon stated the women asked him for the location of 

Hernandez. Tyon stated they “seemed really mad like they wanted revenge or 

something.” Youngbear’s boyfriend, Andrew Jefferson, stated he believed the 

intention of Youngbear, Walker-Morgan, and Johnson “was to confront them,”

referring to Hernandez and her friends.

The women went to Lincoln’s home, where Hernandez was staying. 

Lincoln’s daughter, DeShane Buffalo, stated she heard a knock on the door at 

about 6:00 a.m. When she and Hernandez went to answer the door, they saw 

Youngbear, Walker-Morgan, and Johnson already inside the home. A fight 

ensued involving Youngbear, Walker-Morgan, Johnson, Hernandez, Lincoln, and 

Buffalo. Buffalo stated Youngbear struck her in the head with a wrench. Buffalo

also stated she saw Youngbear hitting Lincoln in the head with a wrench. 
3

Another witness, Hailee Almanza, stated she saw Youngbear strike Lincoln with 

an object. Buffalo stated she then struck Youngbear in the head with a glass 

lampshade.1 Buffalo received a laceration about four inches long on her 

forehead. Lincoln received a deep laceration about three inches long in the 

middle of her forehead. Youngbear had a fractured vertebrae in her neck and 

needed to be life-flighted to Iowa City.

Youngbear, Walker-Morgan, and Johnson were charged with first-degree 

burglary, two counts of willful injury resulting in serious injury, carrying a 

concealed weapon, and assault while participating in a felony. Youngbear 

entered into a plea agreement in which she agreed to plead guilty to burglary in 

the second degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 713.5(1) (2013), and enter 

Alford pleas2to two counts of willful injury causing bodily injury, in violation of 

section 708.4(2). The State agreed to dismiss the other charges. Under the plea 

agreement both parties could make sentencing recommendations.

After the plea hearing on May 9, 2014, the district court accepted 

Youngbear’s guilty plea to second-degree burglary and Alford pleas to two 

counts of willful injury causing bodily injury. At the sentencing hearing the State 

recommended Youngbear serve time in prison but requested concurrent 

sentences. Defense counsel requested a deferred judgment and probation. 

Youngbear was sentenced to ten years in prison on the second-degree-burglary 

 

1 According to a police report, Buffalo’s statement that she hit Youngbear with a 

lampshade “did not correspond to the evidence that the lamp reveals,” because there 

was blood on the middle section of the lamp.

2

In an Alford plea, a defendant may “voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly 

consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit 

his participation in the acts constituting the crime.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 

37 (1970).
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charge and five years on each of the willful injury charges, all to be served 

concurrently. She now appeals her convictions and sentence.

II. Ineffective Assistance.

A. Youngbear contends she received ineffective assistance because 

defense counsel permitted her to plead guilty when there was not a factual basis 

for her pleas to second-degree burglary or the two counts of willful injury causing 

bodily injury.3 

We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Ennenga 

v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Iowa 2012). To establish a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) the attorney failed to perform 

an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied the defendant

a fair trial. State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 2009). A defendant has 

the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence counsel was ineffective. 

See State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa 1992).

“It is a responsibility of defense counsel to ensure that a client does not 

plead guilty to a charge for which there is no objective factual basis.” State v. 

Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 54 (Iowa 2013). The court should not accept a guilty 

plea unless there is a factual basis for the plea, including Alford pleas. State v. 

Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999). “Our cases do not require that 

the district court have before it evidence that the crime was committed beyond a 

 

3 Youngbear raises the claim that the court could not rely on the minutes of evidence in 

this case because the proposed testimony in the minutes was not in accordance with the 

deposition testimony of the witnesses. The depositions were never made a part of the 

record. We do not consider her claims based on evidence outside the record. See 

Hughes v. Waters, 204 N.W.2d 599, 600 (Iowa 1973) (“We must decide the case on the 

evidence in the trial court.”).
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reasonable doubt, but only that there be a factual basis to support the charge.” 

Finney, 834 N.W.2d at 62.

“On a claim that a plea bargain is invalid because of a lack of accuracy on 

the factual-basis issue, the entire record before the district court may be 

examined.” Id. We consider whether there is an objective factual basis in the 

entire record available to the court when it accepted the plea. State v. Sutton, 

853 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). We may consider (1) the 

prosecutor’s statements, (2) the defendant’s statements, (3) the minutes of 

evidence, and (4) the presentence report, if it was available at the time of the 

plea. Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 29 (Iowa 2014).

1. We find there is a sufficient factual basis in the record to support 

Youngbear’s guilty plea for second-degree burglary. During the plea colloquy 

this exchange occurred:

THE COURT: And did you enter onto—into an occupied 

structure—was it a house or was it an apartment? YOUNGBEAR: 

House.

THE COURT: House. And when you did so, did you do so 

without any right, license or privilege to be in the house? In other 

words, you didn’t have any authority to go in? YOUNGBEAR: No.

THE COURT: And when you entered the property, did you 

do so with the intent to commit an assault or did the other people 

with you have the intent to commit an assault? YOUNGBEAR: Is 

this a yes or no question?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes. YOUNGBEAR: Yes.

. . . . 

THE COURT: There were people home? 

YOUNGBEAR: Yes.

Youngbear’s answers established the elements necessary for burglary. 

See Iowa Code § 713.1 (defining burglary as “[a]ny person, having the intent to 

commit a felony, assault or theft therein, who, having no right, license, or 
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privilege to do so, enters an occupied structure”). There is additional factual 

support for the plea in the minutes of evidence. There were several people 

inside Lincoln’s home on the morning of November 3, 2013, making it an 

occupied structure. Hernandez and Buffalo stated that Youngbear, WalkerMorgan, and Johnson were already inside the home when they went to answer 

the door, and thus, they entered without the authority to do so. Tyon stated the 

three women “wanted revenge,” and Jefferson stated they had the intention to 

“confront” the other women, which could support a finding they had the intent to 

commit an assault. The evidence additionally established the elements of 

second-degree burglary. See Iowa Code § 713.5(1).

2. Youngbear entered an Alford plea to the charges of willful injury 

causing bodily injury. “In an Alford plea, because the accused is denying his 

guilt, a factual basis must be established independent of his statements.” Farley 

v. Glanton, 280 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Iowa 1979); see State v. Hansen, 344 N.W.2d 

725, 728 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). The factual basis may be determined from the 

minutes of evidence. State v. Ramirez, 400 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Iowa 1987) (citing 

State v. Townsend, 238 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Iowa 1976)).

Willful injury is defined as “[a]ny person who does an act which is not 

justified and which is intended to cause serious injury to another.” Iowa Code 

§ 708.4. In a police report attached to the minutes of evidence, Buffalo stated: “I 

saw my mom and Noelle on the floor and my mom was on top. Noelle had a 

wrench and was hitting my mom in the head.” Also, Almanza stated, “she saw 

Youngbear strike Barbara with an object.” When officers first approached Lincoln 

she appeared to be intoxicated, but told the officers “she was assaulted by Noelle 
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who had struck her in the head with a wrench.” We conclude there is a factual 

basis in the record to support Youngbear’s guilty plea to willful injury causing 

bodily injury of Lincoln.

The minutes also show Buffalo stated that as she went downstairs she 

observed Walker-Morgan punching Hernandez, when out of nowhere “she was 

struck in the head with a wrench by Noelle.” Lincoln told an officer, “Youngbear 

had struck her daughter [Buffalo] first in the head and then she got between 

them.” An officer reported that based on how deep Buffalo’s wound was, it was 

clear that an object had been used to strike her. We conclude there is a 

sufficient factual basis in the record to support Youngbear’s guilty plea to willful 

injury causing bodily injury to Buffalo.

B. Youngbear claims she received ineffective assistance because her 

defense counsel “pushed her into pleading guilty with assurances she would 

receive a deferred sentence and ultimately the charges would be expunged from 

her record.” She states her pleas were not made voluntarily and intelligently.

The record does not support Youngbear’s contentions. At the beginning 

of the plea colloquy, the prosecutor stated he would be recommending 

concurrent sentences and stated, “Defendant is free to ask for deferred 

judgments on any and all of the offenses as part of the agreement.” The court 

carefully explained the maximum and minimum penalties for the charges. 

Youngbear was informed the maximum penalty on the burglary charge was a 

term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years, while the maximum penalty on the 

charges of willful injury causing bodily injury was a term of imprisonment not to 

exceed five years. The court told Youngbear that while she could request a 
8

deferred judgment, “There’s no guarantee that that’s going to happen.” The court 

told her that if she received consecutive sentences she could be sentenced to 

twenty years in prison.

After the maximum and minimum penalties were explained, Youngbear 

continued to enter her pleas. The court then stated, “I find that the Defendant’s 

pleas are voluntarily and intelligently made, with a knowledge of the 

consequences, and that there is a factual basis for each.” Based on the record 

made during the plea colloquy, we determine Youngbear could not have 

reasonably believed she was assured of receiving a deferred sentence.

We conclude Youngbear has not shown she received ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

III. Sentencing.

Youngbear asserts her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. She states that balancing the 

gravity of the crime to the severity of the sentence, the sentence is 

disproportional. Youngbear claims the sentence in patently unfair because out of 

an altercation where numerous people were involved, she received the most 

severe sentence, although she was also the one who was most seriously injured.

Our review of this constitutional issue is de novo. State v. Oliver, 812

N.W.2d 636, 639 (Iowa 2012). “If the sentence does not create an inference of 

gross disproportionality, then ‘no further analysis is necessary.’” Id. at 650 

(citation omitted). “Our principal task at this stage is to ‘balanc[e] the gravity of 

the crime against the severity of the sentence.’” Id. (citing State v. Bruegger, 773 

N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009)). “[I]t is rare that a sentence will be so grossly 
9

disproportionate to the crime as to satisfy the threshold inquiry and warrant 

further review.” Id. Also, we give substantial deference to the legislature in 

establishing penalties for various crimes. Id.

Youngbear has not shown her sentence is grossly disproportionate to the 

severity of her crimes. Youngbear entered an occupied home without 

permission, then caused injuries to two of the residents of the home by striking 

them with a wrench. The fact that she was also injured is not a mitigating 

circumstance. We conclude she has not shown her sentence constitutes cruel 

and unusual punishment.

We affirm Youngbear’s convictions and sentence.

AFFIRMED.