J-S28016-19

2019 PA Super 242

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KATRICE K. ST. ROSE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1270 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 24, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-21-CR-0003747-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2019

Katrice K. St. Rose appeals from the judgment of sentence following her 

jury trial conviction for obtaining public welfare funds by misrepresentation

(“welfare fraud”), 62 P.S. § 481(a). St. Rose argues the trial court erred in 

instructing the jury as to the elements of the crime. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual history:

On December 17, 2012, [St. Rose] had a face-to-face 

appointment with a county benefits eligibility specialist in 

order to apply for childcare assistance. At that time, she 

received information on her rights and responsibilities. The 

information included notification concerning her duty to 

report changes in her circumstances. The specialist 

emphasized that this duty obligated [St. Rose] to report, 

among other things, any changes in her hours of 

employment or employment status. On January 2, 2013, 

[St. Rose’s] childcare assistance was terminated because 

her status changed to unemployed.

In September of 2013, [St. Rose] began working at 

MedStaffers as a Home Health Aide [“HHA”]. Her new 

employment allowed her to reapply for childcare assistance, 

which she did via a phone interview with the benefits 
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eligibility specialist. Again, [St. Rose] was notified of her 

duty to report any changes in her employment. As part of 

the yearly benefits renewal process, the eligibility specialist 

contacted [St. Rose] to update her benefits application on 

January 2, 2014. During that recertification call, the 

specialist reviewed the questions on the application. She 

specifically asked [St. Rose] if the employment information 

was correct. [St. Rose] confirmed that she was still working 

at MedStaffers as an HHA. She also confirmed the daycare 

provider that she was using for her childcare. As a result of 

the information, the specialist found that [St. Rose] still 

qualified for childcare assistance.

[St. Rose] continued to receive the childcare assistance for 

her MedStaffers job until she filed to reopen her cash 

benefits through the County Assistance Office around June 

of 2014. At that time, the eligibility specialist realized that 

[St. Rose] was no longer working for her reported employer. 

When the specialist looked into [St. Rose’s] employment 

records at MedStaffers, she learned that [St. Rose] had 

been terminated from her position with the company on 

October 25, 2013, months prior to the 2014 recertification.

At trial, the eligibility specialist testified about the benefits 

application process and her experiences with [St. Rose’s]

case. The human resources director from MedStaffers also

testified and confirmed that [St. Rose] had been terminated 

from her employment on October 25, 2013. Additionally, the 

operator of the daycare that cared for [St. Rose’s] children 

testified that [St. Rose] continued to use the daycare after 

October 25, 2013. He provided the daycare’s invoices for 

[St. Rose’s] three children from October 2013 through June 

2014. He also testified that he had an independent 

recollection of [St. Rose’s] children being at the daycare 

during that time.

Trial Court Opinion, filed Nov. 13, 2018, at 1-3 (footnotes and citations to 

record omitted).

St. Rose requested the following instruction as to the elements of 

welfare fraud:
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The defendant has been charged with welfare fraud. To find 

the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find that the 

following elements have been proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt: 

First, that the defendant made a false statement or 

misrepresentation [or withheld information][1],

Second, that the information provided [or withheld] was

material to that agency’s determination in approving or 

disapproving a person for public assistance;

and

Third, that the defendant did so willfully — that is, knowingly 

and with the intent to defraud the public assistance agency.

Defendant’s Proposed Jury Instructions, filed Mar. 22, 2018, at Exh. A.

The trial court denied the request and issued the following instruction:

In order to find the Defendant guilty of this offense, the 

Commonwealth must prove the following three elements 

beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that she made a false 

statement or withheld information. Second, the false 

statement provided or information withheld was material to 

the agency’s determination in approving or disapproving a 

person for public assistance. Three, the Defendant provided 

the false information or withheld the information willfully; 

i.e., she knew it was false at the time she made it or she 

knew the information withheld was material to the agency’s 

determination of her eligibility for public assistance.

N.T., 3/22/18, at 118-119.

The jury found St. Rose guilty of welfare fraud. In July 2018, the trial 

court sentenced St. Rose to five years’ probation. St. Rose filed a timely Notice 

of Appeal.

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1 The bracketed words were handwritten on the proposed instruction. 
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St. Rose raises the following issue: “Did the instruction given by the trial 

court to the jury regarding the charge of welfare fraud, 62 P.S. § 481, 

inaccurately state the law such that it was prejudicial to the outcome of trial?” 

St. Rose’s Br. at 5.

We review a challenge to a trial court’s decision as to jury instructions 

for an abuse of discretion or error of law. Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 

A.2d 783, 798-99 (Pa. 2009). “[Our] key inquiry is whether the instruction on 

a particular issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents the law to the 

jury, and is sufficient to guide the jury in its deliberations.” Commonwealth 

v. Cannavo, 199 A.3d 1282, 1286 (Pa.Super. 2018) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 766 A.2d 874, 878 (Pa.Super. 2001))

(alteration in original).

Welfare fraud is defined as:

(a) Any person who, either prior to, or at the time of, or 

subsequent to the application for assistance, by means of a 

wilfully false statement or misrepresentation, or by 

impersonation or by wilfully failing to disclose a material fact 

regarding eligibility or other fraudulent means, secures, or 

attempts to secure, or aids or abets or attempts to aid or 

abet any person in securing assistance, or Federal food 

stamps, commits a crime which shall be graded as provided 

in subsection (b).

62 P.S. § 481(a). Under this statute, a person is guilty of welfare fraud if, (1) 

before, during, or after applying for assistance, (2) the person makes a 

willfully false statement or misrepresentation, uses impersonation, willfully 

fails to disclose a material fact regarding eligibility, or uses other fraudulent 
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means, and (3) the person secures or attempts to secure assistance, or aids, 

abets, or attempts to aid or abet any person in securing assistance. 

The Human Services Code does not define “willfully.” The Crimes Code 

defines “willfulness” as: “A requirement that an offense be committed willfully 

is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of 

the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 302(g). “Knowingly” is defined as:

(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material 

element of an offense when:

(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the 

attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of 

that nature or that such circumstances exist; and

(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is 

aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause 

such a result.

Id. at § 302(b)(2).

St. Rose contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury by 

defining “willfully in a way that obscured the mens rea requirement that a 

defendant act with the object of committing a fraud.” St. Rose’s Br. at 14. She 

maintains the trial court failed to require that the jury find St. Rose willfully 

used fraudulent means to secure or attempt to secure assistance. St. Rose 

analogizes the welfare fraud statute to other statutes, such as insurance fraud

and worker’s compensation fraud, claiming that, similar to the other fraud 

statutes, the welfare fraud statute requires an intent to defraud. She 

concludes that the “jury should have been instructed that the Commonwealth 
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must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [St. Rose] act[ed] willfully with 

the intent to defraud the government.” Id. at 18. 

St. Rose relies on two separate statutes—the insurance fraud statute 

and the worker’s compensation fraud statute—arguing that because the 

standard instructions for crimes committed under those statutes state that the 

jury must find the defendant had an intent to defraud, a jury must also find 

the defendant had an intent to defraud to find a defendant guilty of welfare 

fraud. 

The statute defining insurance fraud provides, in part: 

A person commits an offense if the person does any of the 

following:

(1) Knowingly and with the intent to defraud a State or 

local government agency files, presents or causes to be filed 

with or presented to the government agency a document 

that contains false, incomplete or misleading information 

concerning any fact or thing material to the agency’s 

determination in approving or disapproving a motor vehicle 

insurance rate filing, a motor vehicle insurance transaction 

or other motor vehicle insurance action which is required or 

filed in response to an agency’s request.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4117(a)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Worker’s 

Compensation Statute provides that a person commits insurance fraud, in 

part, as follows:

A person, including, but not limited to, the employer, the 

employe, the health care provider, the attorney, the insurer, 

the State Workmen's Insurance Fund and self-insureds, 

commits an offense if the person does any of the following:

(1) Knowingly and with the intent to defraud a State or 

local government agency files, presents or causes to be filed 

with or presented to the government agency a document 
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that contains false, incomplete or misleading information 

concerning any fact or thing material to the agency’s 

determination in approving or disapproving a workers’ 

compensation insurance rate filing, a workers’ 

compensation transaction or other workers' compensation 

insurance action which is required or filed in response to an 

agency’s request.

77 P.S. § 1039.2(1) (emphasis added). The Standard Jury Instruction for both 

insurance fraud and worker’s compensation fraud include that the 

Commonwealth must prove that “the defendant did so knowingly and with 

intent to defraud.” Pa. SSJI (Crim) §§ 15.4117A, 15.4117B. For example, the 

standard instruction for insurance fraud includes:

First, that the defendant presented or caused to be 

presented to a state or local government agency any 

document that contained false, incomplete, or misleading 

information;

Second, that the information provided was material to that 

agency’s determination in approving or disapproving a 

motor vehicle insurance rate filing, a motor vehicle 

insurance transaction, or other motor vehicle insurance 

action that is required or filed in response to an agency’s 

request. Material information means information the agency 

would regularly rely on in making its official determinations 

or findings;

Third, that the defendant did so knowingly and with the 

intent to defraud.

Pa. SSJI (Crim) § 15.4117(a)(1).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury as 

to the elements for welfare fraud. As required under the statute, the trial court 

instructed the jury that, to convict St. Rose, the jury had to conclude that the 

Commonwealth had established beyond a reasonable doubt that St. Rose 

made a false statement or withheld information; that the false statement 
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provided or information withheld was material to the agency’s decision to 

approve or disapprove a request for public assistance; and that St. Rose 

“provided the false statement or withheld information willfully,” that is, “she 

knew it was false at the time that she made it or she knew the information 

withheld was material to the agency’s determination of her eligibility for public 

assistance.” N.T., 3/22/18, at 118-19.; 62 P.S. § 481(a). 

Unlike the statutes cited by St. Rose as statutes analogous to the welfare 

fraud statute, the welfare fraud statute does not include in the text of the 

statute that, to be convicted, a defendant had to act with an “intent to 

defraud.” Rather, to sustain a conviction, the statute requires that (1) before, 

during, or after applying for assistance, (2) the person make a false statement 

or misrepresentation, use impersonation, willfully fail to disclose a material 

fact regarding eligibility, or use other fraudulent means, and (3) the person 

secure or attempt to secure assistance or aid, abet, or attempt to aid or abet 

any person in securing assistance. See 62 P.S. § 481(a). Here, the trial court 

accurately conveyed these requirements. It required that the jury find that 

the defendant made a false statement or failed to disclose information, that 

the false statement or withheld information was material, and that the 

defendant acted willfully, that is, knew the information was false or knew that 

the information withheld was material to the agency’s determination as to 

eligibility for benefits. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/14/2019