*

After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 28, 2007*

Decided July 3, 2007

Before

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 06-2899

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HARRY E. MILES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Central

District of Illinois.

No. 05 CR 40051

Joe Billy McDade, 

Judge.

O R D E R

A jury found Harry Miles guilty of conspiracy to distribute and possess with

the intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1),

and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine, id.

§ 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to a total of 360 months’ imprisonment and five

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-2899 Page 2

years’ supervised release. He appeals, proceeding pro se after representing himself

at trial with the help of standby counsel. 

 Miles first argues that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction

over his prosecution because, he asserts, the statute authorizing federal district

courts to hear criminal cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3231, was not passed by both the House of

Representatives and the Senate in the same session of Congress. Miles’s assertion

is incorrect; in fact, the House passed the bill in the first session of the 80th

Congress and the Senate in the second, with the House then voting to pass the

Senate version. In any event, if the Speaker of the House and the President pro

tempore of the Senate attest that a bill has been duly passed, the enrolled-bill rule

prevents us from going behind the bill in the manner Miles proposes to evaluate

whether the bill satisfied the constitutional requirement that it pass both houses of

Congress. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1892); see Public

Citizen v. U.S. District Ct., 2007 WL 1529482, at *8 (D.C. Cir. May 29, 2007). Once

the presiding officer of each chamber certifies the bill, “its authentication as a bill

that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.” 

Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 672. 

Miles raises another purported jurisdictional defect: he argues that the

penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 are “not law” because they were “repealed and

not properly re-enacted into law.” He contends that his convictions must be vacated

because a statute that criminalizes conduct without assigning penalties is invalid. 

Notably, Miles provides no support for his assertion that Public Law 99-570

repealed rather than amended the penalty provisions, and indeed, the amendments

to § 841 that he cites, contained in Title I, Subtitle A, of that legislation, do no such

thing. See Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,

§§ 1002, 1005, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 

Finally, Miles contends that the district court violated the Speedy Trial Act,

18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74, by improperly excluding certain days from counting toward

the 70 days allotted between indictment and trial. See id. § 3161(c)(1). The

government argues that Miles waived this contention by failing to develop it in his

opening appellate brief, where the totality of his argument consists of one sentence

incorporating by reference a separate memorandum of law located in a 114-page

separate appendix. We have counseled litigants that it is unacceptable to present

arguments by way of referring us to a brief or memorandum filed in the district

court. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 668 (7th Cir. 1998);

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sipula, 776 F.2d 157, 161 n.1 (7th Cir. 1985). The practice

“unnecessarily confuses and diffuses the issues presented” and often violates the

rules limiting the size of appellate briefs. Sipula, 776 F.2d at 161 n.1. Here, Miles’s

memorandum is not even a document he filed in the district court (though the

argument is identical); it is simply a continuation of his brief camouflaged as an
No. 06-2899 Page 3

“appendix.” Taken together, the documents exceed the word limit for appellate

briefs by 1,669 words. This is in spite of the fact that we denied the request that

Miles filed in February for permission to file an oversized brief. United States v.

Miles, No. 06-2899 (7th Cir. Feb. 5, 2007). Miles flouts our denial of that motion by

attempting to incorporate a separate memorandum into his brief, and as a result,

he has waived his speedy-trial argument. His attempt to resuscitate the argument

by discussing it in his reply brief is unavailing; arguments not developed in the

opening brief are waived. E.g., United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d 605, 611 (7th

Cir. 2006). 

AFFIRMED.