1 

Filed 11/20/14 P. v. Scott CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Tehama) 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

THOMAS CHARLES SCOTT, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

C071590 

(Super. Ct. No. NCR82011) 

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION AND DENYING 

REHEARING 

[CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] 

THE COURT: 

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 31, 2014, be modified as follows: 

1. On page 2, the second to the last sentence of the last paragraph is modified to 

include the text “awarding defendant one additional day of presentence custody 

credit to account for 2012 being a leap year.” The sentence now reads:

We shall modify the judgment by reducing the criminal conviction 

assessment fee to $150, awarding defendant one additional day of 

presentence custody credit to account for 2012 being a leap year, and 

awarding defendant 192 days of presentence conduct credit, and 

affirm the judgment as modified. 

2. On page 12, in the last paragraph, the sentence beginning with “The trial court 

erred,” is deleted and replaced with the following text: 
2 

Because 2012 was a leap year, defendant was entitled to one 

additional day of presentence confinement credit, for a total of 385 

days. He is also entitled to conduct credit. 

3. On page 12, in the last paragraph, the last two sentences are revised to reflect a 

total of 385 days of presentence confinement credit and 577 days total 

presentence custody credit. These sentences now read: 

Utilizing the formula set forth above, defendant is entitled to 192 

days of conduct credit (385 divided by 4 equals 96; 96 multiplied by 

2 equals 192). Thus, the total amount of presentence custody credit 

should be increased from 385 to 577 days. 

4. On page 13, the disposition is revised to reflect the defendant is awarded 577 

days of presentence custody credits, consisting of 385 actual days and 192 

conduct days. The disposition now reads: 

 The judgment is modified to (1) reduce the criminal assessment 

imposed pursuant to Government Code section 70373, subdivision 

(a)(1) from $175 to $150, and (2) award defendant, in lieu of the 384 

days originally received, 577 days of presentence custody credits, 

consisting of 385 actual days and 192 conduct days. As so modified, 

the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to (1) amend the 

abstract of judgment to reflect these modifications, and (2) correct 

section 1 of the abstract of judgment to reflect that defendant’s 

sentence on count V is to run concurrent to his sentence on count I. 

The trial court shall forward a certified copy of the amended abstract 

of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied. 

BY THE COURT: 

 BLEASE , Acting P. J. 

 DUARTE , J. 

 HOCH , J.
1 

Filed 10/31/14 (unmodified version) 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Tehama) 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

THOMAS CHARLES SCOTT, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

C071590 

(Super. Ct. No. NCR82011) 

 A jury found defendant Thomas Charles Scott guilty of cultivating marijuana 

(Health & Saf. Code, § 11358; count I), possession of marijuana for sale (id., § 11359; 

count II), possession of concentrated cannabis (id., § 11357, subd. (a); count III), 

maintaining a place for selling or using a controlled substance (id., § 11366; count IV), 

and possession of child pornography after having suffered a prior conviction for a sex 

offense (Pen. Code,1 § 311.11, subd. (b); count V). Defendant admitted 10 prior strike 

convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) for oral copulation while 

 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 

acting in concert (§ 288a, subd. (d); four convictions), sexual penetration by force (§ 289, 

subd. (a)(1); one conviction), and rape by force while acting in concert (§ 264.1; five 

convictions). 

 The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in state prison, consisting of: 

25 years to life on count I and a concurrent 25 years to life on count V. (§ 1170.12, subd. 

(c)(2)(A), (B).)2 The trial court stayed defendant’s sentence as to counts II through IV 

pursuant to section 654. As relevant here, the trial court also awarded defendant 384 

days of presentence custody credit and imposed a base sex offender fine in the amount of 

$500 (§ 290.3) and a conviction assessment fee in the amount of $175 (Gov. Code, 

§ 70373). 

 Defendant appeals, contending: (1) the trial court erred in failing to consider his 

motion for a new trial; (2) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 

maintaining a place for selling or using a controlled substance; (3) the base sex offender 

fine must be reduced from $500 to $300; (4) the conviction assessment fee must be 

reduced from $175 to $150; and (5) he is entitled to presentence conduct credit. We shall 

modify the judgment by reducing the criminal conviction assessment fee to $150 and 

awarding defendant 192 days of presentence conduct credit, and affirm the judgment as 

modified. We shall also remand the matter to the trial court to correct an error in the 

abstract of judgment. 

 

2 The trial court did not specify whether defendant’s sentence on count V was to run 

consecutive to his sentence on count I. Where, as here, the trial court had the discretion 

to impose a concurrent sentence (see People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508, 512-515; 

§ 667, subd. (c)(6)) but fails to direct how the term of imprisonment shall run, the term 

shall run concurrently (§ 669, subd. (b)). 
3 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. The Prosecution’s Case 

 On June 17, 2011, Eric Clay, an investigator with the Tehama County District 

Attorney’s Office and an expert in marijuana investigations, was looking at a Web site 

called “budtrader.com” when he came across a job listing for a kitchen worker for a 

marijuana edibles business in Red Bluff. The listing included the Web site address 

<www.buddbuzzard.com>. According to that Web site, Budd Buzzard produced and 

sold marijuana laced beef jerky, honey, and tinctures (a concentrated form of marijuana). 

The Web site listed defendant as the company’s founder and described the business’s 

recent expansion and purchase of a mobile kitchen. Clay performed an online records 

search for fictitious business filings and found defendant listed as the registered owner of 

Budd Buzzard Products based at 23410 Hillman Court in Red Bluff. 

 On June 22, 2011, Clay along with members of the Tehama Interagency Drug 

Enforcement Task Force (TIDE) executed a search warrant at 23410 Hillman Court in 

Red Bluff. The search included a residence and a 25-foot trailer located behind the 

residence. 

 The trailer contained a fully-enclosed industrial kitchen, complete with stainless 

steel appliances, a stove, a dehydrator, and a refrigerator. Officers also found two digital 

scales, several boxes of gallon-size Ziploc freezer bags, approximately 2,000 one-ounce 

baggies, and a sheet of Budd Buzzard’s Jerky sticker labels. 

 The residence contained three bedrooms, two of which had been converted: one to 

an office and the other to a “hangout” or “party” room. It appeared that only defendant 

lived in the main residence. Inside the office officers found: three five-gallon buckets 

containing a liquid form of marijuana labeled “tincture” and “20-ounces to four gallons,” 

two five-gallon buckets containing what appeared to be honey, a scale, a credit card 

scanner, invoices, business cards, sticker labels, and United Parcel Service (UPS) 

pouches. There were between 12 and 20 sales receipts and invoices found, some for 
4 

“cannabis jerky” and “honey.” The invoices were labeled Budd Buzzard Beef Jerky. 

One invoice, dated May 26, 2011, showed $100 cash was paid for one pound of jerky. A 

photocopy of a receipt dated June 2, 2011, showed $500 cash was paid for “24 tincture, 

six honey, and one pound jerky . . . .” 

 The business cards read, “Budd Buzzard Products Makers of the Original 

Cannabis Beef Jerky. It is yummy good,” and listed defendant’s name, a phone number, 

and the Web site <www.buddbuzzard.com>. The back of the cards read, “We’re now 

shipping throughout California and we pay for the shipping with orders totalling [sic] 

$200 or more. www.buddbuzzard.com. Beef jerky, $100 pound . . . [(]32 times .5 bags 

equal one pound[)] . . . Honey/Pot, $15 . . . [(]Three-ounce jar[)] . . . tincture, $15 each or 

four for $50 . . . [(]One ounce bottles[)].” 

 The sticker labels had a picture of a marijuana leaf and read, “A Nor . . . Cal 

product, $7 . . . [(]Two for $12[)]” and “www.buddbuzzard.com.” 

 Another document found in the office showed 100 shipping pouches had been 

ordered by “Budd Buzzard Products Tom” and received from a UPS shipping supply 

company. 

 Inside the kitchen of the main residence, officers found 38 gallon-size freezer 

bags, each of which contained 32 smaller bags of jerky. Each of the smaller bags was 

labeled, “Budd Buzzard Products, Jerky,” and “half ounce.” There were nine small bags 

of jerky that were not inside of a larger bag. Officers also discovered two amber-colored 

bottles of liquid with dropper tops and labels that said, “Budd Buzzard, Tincture Number 

6”; two one-gallon containers full of a liquid substance, labeled “tincture” and “8 to 1”; 

various containers holding a sludge-like, green material that smelled liked marijuana; a 

crock pot containing liquid and plant material that looked and smelled like marijuana; 

two vacuum heat sealers; and a container labeled “honey for jerky.” 

 Inside the “hangout” room officers found 17 mason jars containing about one and 

one-half pounds of marijuana, a recipe for 100 pounds of marijuana jerky, and a 
5 

breakdown of the cost to produce 100 pounds of marijuana jerky. Seven of the jars were 

labeled with the strain of marijuana inside. Officers also found various pipes and bongs. 

 There were two messages on the answering machine: one from a UPS 

representative concerning setting up an account to ship items; and another from a woman 

calling about marijuana jerky. 

 Outside officers discovered ten live marijuana plants, three of which were in the 

flowering stage. 

 Defendant returned home during the search and his car was searched. Officers 

found over 50 pounds of beef in the trunk. Defendant’s wallet contained a credit card 

with his name and “Budd Buzzard Products,” as well as shipping receipts indicating beef 

jerky had been shipped on June 15, 2011. 

 During the search, an employee who “work[ed] with the jerky” arrived at the 

residence. Completed timecards for “Gary” and “Marcos” were found in the office inside 

the residence. The first date that appears on the timecards is April 28, 2011, and the last 

date is May 3, 2011. 

 Law enforcement recovered a total of 38 pounds of beef jerky and over two 

pounds of usable marijuana from the residence, not including the tinctures and jerky. 

Forensic analysis of the jerky revealed the presence of Delta 9 tetrahydrocannabinol 

(THC), the psychoactive ingredient in marijuana. Tincture taken from the residence also 

tested positive for Delta 9 THC. Testing of the honey was inconclusive. A usable 

amount of concentrated cannabis was found in the two dropper-top bottles, two gallonsize containers, and other marijuana products in various stages of production. 

 Clay opined that while some of the marijuana may have been possessed for 

personal use, “overall, the marijuana, especially in the various forms of jerky, honey, 

tincture,” was possessed for sale and defendant was operating a commercial enterprise. 

Clay based his opinion on, among other things, the shipping receipts, Web site presence, 

and shipping materials. 
6 

 Two computers were seized from the residence. The hard drive of one of the 

computers contained 33 images of suspected child pornography. Many of the images 

depicted small children and undeveloped teens in sexual postures manipulating a male’s 

erect penis or engaged in sexual intercourse or oral copulation. 

B. The Defense 

 Dr. Marilyn Hulter, a board-certified anesthesiologist, who worked at the 

Cannabis Healing Clinic in Redding, testified for the defense. She examined defendant at 

the clinic in March 2011, when he was renewing his “Proposition 215 recommendation.”3 

Hulter determined defendant would benefit from the use of medical marijuana for pain 

relief and issued him a recommendation for the use of medical marijuana in the amount 

of two ounces per week. Two ounces per week equates to six and one-half pounds per 

year. Defendant told Hulter he gargled with a tincture made from marijuana and honey. 

He also told her he was making marijuana beef jerky for dispensaries. 

 Kirk Stockham, a computer forensics expert, testified that when a user deletes data 

on a computer it may go to unallocated space, which means it is no longer indexed by the 

computer but is left on the hard drive as raw data machine code. The pictures found on 

defendant’s hard drive were in the unallocated space. The report used by the 

prosecution’s expert indicated all 33 pictures relied on by the prosecution occupied the 

same byte space, which is not possible. Thus, the report relied on by the prosecution’s 

expert was in error. It is not possible to determine how the pornographic images got into 

the unallocated space on defendant’s hard drive. 

 

3 Proposition 215 refers to an initiative adopted by the votes that became the 

Compassionate Use Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5). (People v. Kelly (2010) 47 

Cal.4th 1008, 1012.) 
7 

DISCUSSION 

I 

The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Consider Defendant’s Motion for New Trial 

 Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to consider his motion for a new 

trial, and thus, the matter must be remanded for a hearing on the motion. We disagree. 

 At his sentencing hearing, defendant, against the advice of his counsel, informed 

the trial court that he had prepared a motion for new trial, his mother had submitted it to 

the clerk of the court, and the clerk refused to file it because defendant was represented 

by counsel.4 The trial court sentenced defendant without considering his motion. 

Defendant’s motion does not appear in the record. 

 As indicated above, defendant was represented by counsel when his mother sought 

to submit the motion for new trial. Consequently, “the court had the authority to refuse to 

file or consider pro se motions and other documents presented by [defendant] that related 

to the conduct of the case,” including any motion for a new trial. (People v. Harrison

(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 780, 789; see People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 554-555; 

see also People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 173; People v. Mattson (1959) 51 Cal.2d 

777, 797-798.) 

 

4 Specifically, defendant told the court, “It says it all in the motion. It is under the 

motion under California law. With the guidelines that was [sic] going by, I should have 

never been prosecuted. And, it is all in that motion. It is all in law. I do have a copy of 

the Senate Bill 420 with me which is the Medical Marijuana Program Act. I have the 

Department of Justice state guidelines for the security and non-diversion of marijuana 

drawn for medical use with me and everything it says in there along with also case law 

showing I am supposed to be exempt from these charges. It is all in the motion. I would 

like to submit it to the Court so it would be public record.” 
8 

II 

There Is Sufficient Evidence Defendant Maintained a Place for Selling Marijuana 

 Defendant next contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction 

for maintaining a place for selling a controlled substance “because the record lacks 

credible evidence that [defendant] made his home or the buildings on it available to 

others for drug use or drug transactions.” Again, we disagree. 

 “When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we apply the 

familiar substantial evidence rule. We review the whole record in a light most favorable 

to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that 

is credible and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offense.” (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 

Cal.App.4th 854, 859.) “An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury 

might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 

Cal.4th 342, 396.) “Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for the 

insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is 

there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury.” (People v. Hicks

(1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429.) 

 Health and Safety Code section 11366 provides in pertinent part: “Every person 

who opens or maintains any place for the purpose of unlawfully selling, giving away, or 

using any controlled substance which is . . . specified in paragraph (13) . . . of subdivision 

(d) of Section 11054 . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period 

of not more than one year or the state prison.” Paragraph (13) of subdivision (d) of 

section 11054 of the Health and Safety Code lists marijuana as a controlled substance. 

“[T]he acts of ‘selling’ and ‘giving away’—as used in the phrase ‘selling, giving away, or 

using’ in [Health and Safety Code] section 11366—both require the participation of a 

person other than defendant, i.e., a purchaser or recipient.” (People v. Franco (2009) 

180 Cal. App. 4th 713, 721 (Franco), italics added.) “[T]he offense defined by [Health 
9 

and Safety Code] section 11366 ‘is not a simple possession offense,’ but ‘is more like a 

commercial offense’ such as the sale, production or manufacture of controlled 

substances.” (Id. at p. 722, quoting People v. Ferrando (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 917, 

920.) 

 In this case, a large quantity of packaged marijuana jerky was discovered at 

defendant’s residence, labeled and ready for sale. In addition, officers discovered 

evidence of a manufacturing and sales operation, including a commercial kitchen, 

packaging materials, shipping materials, scales, business cards, and product labels. Of 

particular significance, officers found business cards that read, “Budd Buzzard Products 

Makers of the Original Cannabis Beef Jerky,” included defendant’s name, the Web site 

<www.buddbuzzard.com>, and pricing information, and stated, “We’re now shipping 

throughout California . . . .” They also found numerous receipts and invoices that 

reflected recent sales of marijuana products. There also was a message on his home 

telephone from a UPS representative about setting up a shipping account and another 

from a woman inquiring about marijuana jerky. The fictitious business filing lists 

defendant as the registered owner of Budd Buzzard Products and lists the business’s 

address as 23410 Hillman Court, defendant’s residence. A reasonable jury could infer 

from such evidence that defendant’s residence was maintained for the purpose of selling 

marijuana jerky and other marijuana laced products. 

 Defendant concedes that “the evidence supports the inference that [he] maintained 

a marijuana shipping business” but argues that is insufficient to constitute a violation of 

Health and Safety Code section 13366. According to defendant, the prosecution was 

required to produce evidence of persons physically going onto his property to purchase 

his products. Neither the statute nor the cases interpreting it support such a construction. 

While personal use or simple possession does not constitute a violation of the statute 

(Franco, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 721-722), maintaining a place for the purpose of 
10 

selling marijuana laced products to others, even if such sales are done exclusively 

through the mail, does constitute a violation. 

 In sum, ample evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant maintained his 

residence for the purpose of selling a controlled substance to others. 

III 

The Trial Court Properly Imposed a Sex Offender Fine in the Amount of $500 

 Defendant next contends the trial court erred in determining the base sex offender 

fine was $500. He is mistaken. 

 Section 290.3, subdivision (a) states: “Every person who is convicted of any 

offense specified in subdivision (c) of Section 290 shall, in addition to any imprisonment 

or fine, or both, imposed for commission of the underlying offense, be punished by a fine 

of three hundred dollars ($300) upon the first conviction or a fine of five hundred dollars 

($500) upon the second and each subsequent conviction, unless the court determines that 

the defendant does not have the ability to pay the fine.” Among the offenses specified in 

subdivision (c) of section 290 are violations of sections 264.1, 288a, 289, and 311.11. 

 Here, defendant was convicted of violating section 311.11 and admitted four prior 

convictions for violating section 288a, one prior conviction for violating section 289, and 

five prior convictions for violating section 264.1. Because defendant had 10 prior 

convictions for offenses specified in subdivision (c) of section 290, the trial court 

properly imposed a base fine of $500. 

 Defendant’s assertion that section 290.3 does not encompass convictions in other 

proceedings lacks merit. There is nothing in the statute that indicates that is the case. 

Moreover, People v. O’Neal (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 817 (O’Neal), cited by defendant, 

supports a contrary interpretation. There, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of 

committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14, and the trial court imposed two 

fines pursuant to section 290.3, subdivision (a). (O’Neal, at p. 819.) The defendant 

argued “nothing permits the imposition of multiple section 290.3 fines in the same 
11 

proceedings.” (Id. at p. 822.) In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the court observed that 

Penal Code section 290.3, subdivision (a) “refers to fines for convictions, not fines for 

proceedings.” (O’Neal, at p. 822, italics added.) While O’Neal involved two convictions 

in a single proceeding, its focus on the number of convictions is equally applicable here. 

Because defendant’s conviction for possession of child pornography constituted a 

“subsequent conviction” under section 290.3, subdivision (a), the trial court did not err in 

imposing a $500 base fine. 

IV 

The Criminal Conviction Assessment Must Be Reduced from $175 to $150 

 Defendant also contends, and the People concede, that the criminal conviction 

assessment imposed pursuant to Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1) 

must be reduced from $175 to $150 because the base amount per count is $30. We agree. 

 Subdivision (a)(1) of Government Code section 70373 states in pertinent part: 

“To ensure and maintain adequate funding for court facilities, an assessment shall be 

imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense . . . . The assessment shall be 

imposed in the amount of thirty dollars ($30) for each misdemeanor or felony and in the 

amount of thirty-five dollars ($35) for each infraction.” 

 Defendant was convicted of five felonies. Accordingly, the total assessment 

should be $150 (5 multiplied by $30), and not $175. 

V 

Defendant Is Entitled to Conduct Credit 

 Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life and awarded 384 days of presentence 

custody credit (§ 2900.5, subd. (a)). Defendant contends, and the People concede, that he 

should be awarded 192 days of presentence conduct credit, for a total of 576 days of 

presentence custody credit. We agree. 

 A defendant sentenced under the Three Strikes law is entitled to presentence 

conduct credits under section 4019 where, as here, the current felony is not a violent 
12 

felony. (People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1129-1130; People v. Williams 

(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1175-1176.) The Legislature amended section 4019 

effective September 28, 2010, (Stats. 2010, ch. 426, § 2) and again effective October 1, 

2011, (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482; Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53). The applicable version of 

section 4019 is that which was in effect between these two dates because defendant 

committed his crimes during that period (on June 22, 2011). (See People v. 

Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48-49 (Rajanayagam).) The September 2010 

amendment deleted the subdivision excluding sex registrants and defendants with a prior 

strike from enhanced credit earning eligibility. Instead, all prisoners accrued conduct 

credits at a rate of two days for every four days in custody. (Former § 4019, as amended 

by Stats. 2010, ch. 426, § 2; see Rajanayagam, at p. 49.) To calculate the conduct 

credits, we calculate the number of actual custody days, divide by four, drop the 

remainder, and then multiply by two. (See In re Marquez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 14, 26.) 

 Here, defendant was in continuous custody from June 22, 2011, the day of his 

arrest, to July 10, 2012, the day of his sentencing. At sentencing, the trial court correctly 

awarded defendant 384 days of presentence confinement credit.5 The trial court erred, 

however, failed to award defendant any conduct credit. Utilizing the formula set forth 

above, defendant is entitled to 192 days of conduct credit (384 divided by 4 equals 96; 96 

multiplied by 2 equals 192). Thus, the total amount of presentence custody credit should 

be increased from 384 to 576 days. 

 

5 In his opening brief, defendant erroneously asserts that the trial court miscalculated the 

amount of time he was in actual custody and that the time period between June 22, 2011, 

and July 10, 2012, amounted to 387 days. He appears to have properly abandoned that 

claim in his reply brief. 
13 

VI 

The Abstract of Judgment Must Be Corrected 

 As previously discussed (see ante, fn. 2.), the trial court failed to specify that that 

the sentence on count V was to be consecutive, rather than concurrent; hence, it must be 

construed as concurrent (§ 669, subd. (b).) The abstract of judgment incorrectly fails to 

indicate that defendant’s sentence on count V is to run concurrent. The trial court shall 

correct this clerical error by checking the box “CONCURRENT” next to count V in 

section 1 of the abstract of judgment. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is modified to (1) reduce the criminal assessment imposed pursuant 

to Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1) from $175 to $150, and (2) award 

defendant, in lieu of the 384 days originally received, 576 days of presentence custody 

credits, consisting of 384 actual days and 192 conduct days. As so modified, the 

judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to (1) amend the abstract of judgment to 

reflect these modifications, and (2) correct section 1 of the abstract of judgment to reflect 

that defendant’s sentence on count V is to run concurrent to his sentence on count I. The 

trial court shall forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

 BLEASE , Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

 DUARTE , J. 

 HOCH , J.