IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-725

Filed 5 March 2024

Wake County, No. 19CVS8664

MIKE CAUSEY, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE OF NORTH CAROLINA, 

Petitioner,

v.

SOUTHLAND NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, SOUTHLAND 

NATIONAL REINSURANCE CORPORATION, BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, COLORADO BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, North 

Carolina Domiciled Insurance Companies, Respondents.

Appeal by intervenor-appellant from orders entered 30 December 2022 by 

Judge A. Graham Shirley II in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of 

Appeals 23 January 2024. 

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Deputy Solicitor General James W. 

Doggett, Special Deputy Attorney General Daniel S. Johnson, and Special 

Deputy Attorney General M. Denise Stanford, for petitioner-appellee. 

Williams Mullen, by Wes J. Camden, Caitlin M. Poe, and Lauren E. Fussell, 

for respondents-appellees.

Fox Rothschild LLP, by Matthew Nis Leerberg and Condon Tobin Sladek 

Thornton Nerenberg PLLC, by Aaron Z. Tobin, for intervenor-appellant.

FLOOD, Judge.

Intervenor-Appellant GBIG Holdings, LLC (“GBIG”) appeals from two orders 

entered 30 December 2022—an order denying GBIG’s motion for a continuance to 

allow discovery and an order of liquidation against Bankers Life Insurance Company 
CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

Opinion of the Court

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(“BLIC”) and Colorado Bankers Life Insurance Company (“CBLIC”). Our review of 

the Record reveals that GBIG should not have been allowed to intervene; 

nevertheless, the trial court did not err in denying GBIG’s motion to continue and 

ordering BLIC and CBLIC into liquidation. Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s 

orders to clarify GBIG is not a proper party and affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural Background

The case before us is one of many cases stemming from the insolvency of 

several insurance companies owned by Greg Lindberg (“Lindberg”). Here, we provide 

only the facts pertinent to this appeal and those relevant facts that have not 

previously been addressed by this Court in Southland National Insurance 

Corporation v. Lindberg, 289 N.C. App. 378, 889 S.E.2d 512 (2023). 

Respondents-Appellees Southland National Insurance Corporation 

(“Southland”), BLIC, and CBLIC are licensed domestic insurers, owned by GBIG. 

GBIG is wholly owned by Lindberg. On 18 October 2018, Southland, BLIC, and 

CBLIC consented to be placed under administrative supervision, following concerns 

from Petitioner-Appellee Commissioner of Insurance Mike Causey (“Causey”), that 

the companies would be financially unable to meet outstanding obligations to their 

policyholders. During the period of administrative supervision, Causey determined 

that under the current investment structure, Southland, BLIC, and CBLIC lacked 

the liquidity to pay their policyholders and ultimately placed the companies into 

rehabilitation. 
CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

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The Southland Liquidation Hearing

After over two years of supervising Southland, on 21 March 2021, Causey filed 

a petition for liquidation due to Southland’s insolvency. On 14 April 2021, GBIG filed 

an objection to the petition for liquidation as well as a motion for continuance to allow

for discovery, prompting Causey to file a response in which he asserted GBIG lacked 

standing under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 (2021) to bring an objection to the petition. 

On 16 April 2021, the petition for liquidation of Southland was heard and the trial 

court, in granting GBIG’s motion to intervene, stated, “I do believe [GBIG] ha[s] the 

right to contest [the petition].” Following the hearing, an order (the “Southland 

Order”) was entered, in which the trial court found:

10. [Causey] contends that GBIG lacks standing to 

defend against this petition because [he] seeks a 

liquidation order based solely on 58-30-11—which does not 

mention any right to defend. However, the immediately 

preceding statute, Section 58-30-95, explicitly requires the 

[c]ourt to “permit the directors of the insurer to take such 

action as are reasonably necessary to defend against the 

petition [for liquidation],” at least for petitions arising 

under that section. The [c]ourt finds it unnecessary to 

decide whether there is a statutory right to defend against 

a petition arising solely under 58-30-100, because the 

[c]ourt will exercise its “broad supervisory power” to allow 

GBIG to contest whether [Southland] is insolvent under 

the statutory definition of insolvency[.]

11. [Causey] contends that only “the directors of the 

insurer,” may defend against the petition under Section 58-

30-95(a) and therefore, GBIG does not have standing to 

defend against this petition. GBIG, in contrast, contends 

that under these circumstances, where [Southland] no 

longer has active directors, the statutory right of defense 
CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

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vests in GBIG as [Southland’s] sole shareholder and owner. 

[Causey] notes that as Rehabilitator he possesses the 

statutory power to exercise and enforce all rights, 

remedies, and powers of the sole shareholder, under 

Section 58-30-85 (a)(19). Again, the [c]ourt finds it 

unnecessary to decide whether GBIG may defend against 

the petition as a matter of statutory right, because the 

[c]ourt will instead invoke its broad supervisory power to 

allow GBIG to contest whether [Southland] is insolvent 

under the statutory definition of insolvency.

Ultimately, as to the Southland liquidation petition, the trial court concluded 

that GBIG would be allowed to “contest whether [Southland] [was] insolvent under 

the statutory definition of insolvency” and may conduct limited prehearing discovery, 

but neglected to rule specifically on whether GBIG had standing to intervene. 

On 10 June 2021, Southland, Causey, and GBIG jointly motioned to stay the 

liquidation proceedings, which the trial court granted, allowing the parties to 

reschedule for a later date. 

A few months later, on 3 November 2021, GBIG filed a motion seeking 

authority from the trial court to propose a plan of rehabilitation for Southland, BLIC, 

and CBLIC. In its order denying GBIG’s motion, the trial court found:

Without specifically ruling on the standing issue, this 

[c]ourt noted that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 permits 

directors of the insurer to take action to defend against a 

liquidation petition, and therefore found it unnecessary to 

determine whether GBIG [ ] had standing to file an 

objection. Instead this [c]ourt exercised “broad supervisory 

power” to allow GBIG [ ] to contest whether [Southland] is 

insolvent as defined by statute for the purpose of hearing 

on that specific determination.
CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

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The BLIC and CBLIC Liquidation Hearing

Nearly one year later, on 1 November 2022, Causey filed a verified petition for 

an order of liquidation against BLIC and CBLIC, asserting that the companies were 

insolvent within the meaning of Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 

At the time of filing, BLIC’s assets of $253,163,012 did not exceed its liabilities of 

$345,062,743, and CBLIC’s assets of $1,369,052,180 did not exceed its liabilities of 

$2,508,953,520. Two weeks later, GBIG filed an objection to the petition for 

liquidation as well as a motion for continuance to allow discovery, asserting that, as 

the “parent company” of both BLIC and CBLIC, it should be allowed to present 

evidence showing neither company was insolvent. 

On 21 November 2022, a hearing on GBIG’s motion for a continuance to allow 

for discovery came on, during which the trial court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with 

counsel for GBIG regarding GBIG’s participation in the matter. When asked where 

the directors of BLIC and CBLIC were, counsel for GBIG stated, “[w]ell, Your Honor, 

the directors were in effect disbanded when they filed liquidation.” Unconvinced, the 

trial court then asked counsel for GBIG to point to a statute that disbands directors 

of an insurer upon filing of liquidation, which counsel for GBIG could not do. 

Eventually, counsel for GBIG conceded that, at the time the liquidation petition was 

filed, both BLIC and CBLIC had directors; therefore, those directors could be in court 

to defend against the petition. 
CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

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The trial court continued questioning counsel for GBIG about whether the 

Rules of Civil Procedure governed this action, asking specifically if “every petition 

filed in Superior Court [was] governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure,” to which 

counsel for GBIG responded, “I don’t know the answer to that question.” Answering 

its own question, the trial court clarified by stating that not all petitions in superior 

court are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court went on to explain 

that “the Legislature has recognized that in a liquidation proceeding, [] the directors 

who owe a fiduciary duty can come in and argue against [the petition],” and again 

asked, “so why aren’t the directors here?” The following exchange then occurred:

[COUNSEL]: My understanding is that the board, there 

were some directors that were in place at the time. Then 

the corporations were placed into rehabilitation. Those 

directors, I believe some of them, they’ve done nothing 

essentially since that time and would be surprised to know 

that they have any obligations at this time. 

THE COURT: Well, who are those directors? 

[COUNSEL]: I don’t know their names right off the top of 

my head. 

THE COURT: You have done absolutely no investigation[.] 

After the lengthy back-and-forth, the trial court ultimately concluded from the 

bench that “when it comes to defending against an order of liquidation, the statute 

only authorizes directors to do that.” The Court further stated that it presumes the 

Legislature used the word “directors” to mean “directors, not anyone else.” 

Apparently dissatisfied with GBIG’s lack of knowledge regarding the whereabouts of 
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BLIC’s and CBLIC’s directors, the trial court stated “GBIG has made no – apparently 

no investigation into” where the directors were or who they were. Ultimately, with 

respect to the BLIC and CLBIC liquidation petitions, the trial court found that “GBIG 

does not have standing.” 

Upon holding from the bench that GBIG lacked standing, counsel for GBIG 

motioned to intervene “both as a matter of right under 24(a) and under permissive 

intervention under 24(b).” After allowing GBIG’s motion, the trial court added, “[y]ou 

should have made your motion to intervene some time ago.” 

On 30 December 2022, following the hearing, the trial court entered two 

orders—one denying GBIG’s motion for continuance to allow for discovery (the 

“Continuance Order”) and another, ordering BLIC and CBLIC into liquidation (the 

“Liquidation Order”). In the Continuance Order, the trial court stated its findings:

110. The Court finds the General Assembly’s distinction 

between shareholders and directors is intentional and that 

the General Assembly conferred no right upon the 

shareholders of an insurer to defend against a petition for 

an order of liquidation. The absolute right to defend 

against a petition to liquidate rest solely with the insurer’s 

board of directors. Unless otherwise ordered by the [c]ourt, 

the shareholders have no such right to defend against a 

petition for an order of liquidation and may only defend 

against such action as the [c]ourt in its discretion allows. 

. . . . 

122. To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the 

[c]ourt’s prior rulings on this issue, for the absence of all 

doubt, the [c]ourt hereby amends such interlocutory orders 

pursuant to its inherent authority to conform to this Order 
CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

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holding that GBIG does not have a statutory right to 

oppose the liquidation of [BLIC and CBLIC]. 

. . . . 

158. At the hearing, GBIG orally moved to intervene in 

this matter. In its discretion, the [c]ourt grants GBIG’s oral 

[m]otion to [i]ntervene in this matter. The [c]ourt does not 

base its ruling on any finding or conclusion that GBIG has 

carried its burden under Rule 24(a) or (b) of the North 

Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure assuming that the Rules 

of Civil Procedure [a]pply. Rather, the [c]ourt allows the 

intervention in its discretion under Article 30 of Chapter 

58 of the North Carolina General Statutes to administer 

the rehabilitation and liquidation proceedings. 

Ultimately, the trial court concluded the Continuance Order by stating that, 

in its discretion, it would grant GBIG’s motion to intervene “as a non-party in this 

matter for the purposes of informing the [c]ourt through argument and evidence at 

the hearing on the petition for liquidation.” The trial court echoed that statement 

again in the Liquidation Order, finding: “At the hearing on [the Liquidation Petition] 

this [c]ourt ruled that GBIG [ ], the sole shareholder of BLIC and CBL[IC] did not 

have a statutory right to object to or contest the Verified Petition. Nevertheless, the 

[c]ourt granted GBIG’s oral motion to intervene in the action.” 

GBIG filed timely notice of appeal from both the Continuance Order and 

Liquidation Order. 

II. Jurisdiction

The Continuance Order, while interlocutory, is immediately appealable under 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-278, which provides this Court may “review any intermediate 
CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

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order involving the merits and necessarily affecting the judgment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 1-278 (2023). The Liquidation Order constitutes a final judgment in the liquidation 

proceedings against BLIC and CBLIC and is therefore appealable under N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2023). 

III. Analysis

On appeal, GBIG argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for a 

continuance to allow for discovery and ordering BLIC and CBLIC into liquidation. 

As a threshold issue, however, we must first consider whether the trial court properly 

exercised “broad discretionary power” when it allowed GBIG to intervene as a nonparty. 

A. GBIG’s Participation in the BLIC and CBLIC Liquidation Hearing

Causey argues GBIG lacks standing to intervene against the liquidation 

petition because Chapter 58, Article 30 expressly states that the trial court shall 

grant “the directors of the insurer to take such action as are reasonably necessary to 

defend against the petition[.]” On the other hand, GBIG argues it should be allowed 

to intervene because the trial court had allowed it to intervene in the past, and it has 

a valuable property interest in both BLIC and CBLIC. 

When a trial court’s discretionary ruling rests on the interpretation of a 

statute, constructions of those statutes are reviewed de novo. Myers v. Myers, 269 

N.C. App. 237, 241, 837 S.E.2d 443, 448 (2020). Rule 1 of the North Carolina Rules 

of Civil Procedure applies “in all actions and proceedings of a civil nature except when 
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a differing procedure is prescribed by statute.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 1 (2023). 

Our Supreme Court in In re Ernst & Young, LLP held, however, that when “the 

legislature has prescribed specialized procedures to govern a particular proceeding,” 

the Rules of Civil Procedure “do not apply.” 363 N.C. 612, 616, 684 S.E.2d 151, 154 

(2009). Finally, “[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there 

is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe [it] using its plain 

meaning.” Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 

136 (1990).

In In re Ernst & Young, our Supreme Court considered facts very similar to 

the case at bar. Ernst & Young sold several tax shelters to Wal-Mart and then helped 

Wal-Mart restructure to implement the tax shelters. 363 N.C. at 613, 684 S.E.2d at 

152. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-258(a)(2), the Secretary of Revenue elected to 

request Ernst & Young provide testimony and documents relating to Wal-Mart’s tax 

shelters. Id. at 613, 684 S.E.2d at 152. Ernst & Young only partially complied, 

prompting the Secretary to pursue a court order compelling it to comply with the 

summons. Id. at 613, 684 S.E.2d at 152. Wal-Mart then filed both a motion to 

intervene and a motion to dismiss. Id. at 614, 684 S.E.2d at 153. In its motion to 

intervene, Wal-Mart claimed intervention was “the only way to assert its due process 

rights under the North Carolina and United States Constitutions.” Id. at 614–15, 

684 S.E.2d at 153. In its motion to dismiss, Wal-Mart claimed the case should be 

dismissed for failure to comply with the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure’s 
CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

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service requirements. Id. at 614, 684 S.E.2d at 153. The trial court allowed the 

motion to intervene but denied the motion to dismiss. 

Upon review, our Supreme Court considered, inter alia, whether the precise 

language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-258(a) required the Secretary of Revenue to initiate 

“a civil action as defined in the General Statutes governing civil procedure.” Id. at 

617, 684 S.E.2d at 154. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that, because the 

Secretary of Revenue’s initial inquiry under the statute did not explicitly involve 

filing a civil complaint or initiating a civil action, the statute was a “self-contained, 

specialized procedure, supplant[ing] the Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 617, 684 

S.E.2d at 155. The Supreme Court further concluded that “although the Court of 

Appeals erred in holding to the contrary, it correctly affirmed the order of the trial 

court in denying Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss.” Id. at 620, 684 S.E.2d at 156. 

Ultimately, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of this Court. Id.

at 620, 684 S.E.2d at 156. 

Subsequently, this Court in In re Simmons cited to In re Ernst & Young to 

support the conclusion that “[a]lthough our North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 

typically ‘apply in all actions and proceedings of a civil nature[,]’ the Rules do not 

apply ‘when a differing procedure is prescribed by statute.’” __ N.C. App. __, __, 893 

S.E.2d 271, 273 (2023) (alternation in original) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 Rule 

1). In In re Simmons, this Court considered whether the trial court erred in denying 

a motion to set aside an order allowing a foreclosure sale. Id. at __, 893 S.E.2d at 
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272. The grantors argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion pursuant 

to Rule 60(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at __, 893 S.E.2d at 

272. Ultimately, this Court held that the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure do 

not apply to foreclosure proceedings because the rules were not “specifically engrafted 

into the [foreclosure] statute.” Id. at __, 893 S.E.2d at 274.

Following the precedent set in In re Ernst & Young and In re Simmons, we 

note that when a statute describes a “proceeding of a civil nature with its own 

specialized procedure[,]” that statute then “supplants the Rules of Civil Procedure.” 

In re Ernst & Young, 363 N.C. at 620, 684 S.E.2d at 156. Further, following this 

Court’s holding in In re Simmons, the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure apply 

only when specifically “engrafted” into a statute that describes a proceeding with its 

own specialized procedure. See In re Simmons, N.C. App. at ___, 893 S.E.2d at 274.

Here, applying the same tenets of statutory construction, the clear and 

unambiguous language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 states that “[t]he [c]ourt shall 

permit the directors of the insurer to take such actions as are reasonably necessary 

to defend against the petition[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95. Similar to the optional 

authority given to the Secretary of Revenue to request documents and testimony in 

In re Ernst & Young, here, the statute does not explicitly require the directors to 

initiate a civil action or file a complaint. Rather, the statute only confers upon the 

directors of an insurer the option to take necessary actions to defend against a 
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liquidation petition. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95. Notably absent from the statute 

is any directive that directors shall file a civil complaint. 

For those reasons, we conclude N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 is a proceeding of a 

civil nature with its own specialized procedure, and therefore, it supplants the North 

Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re Ernst & Young, 363 N.C. at 620, 684 

S.E.2d at 156. Having concluded that Section 58-30-95 supplants the Rules of Civil 

Procedure, it follows that the procedure for defending against a liquidation petition 

is contained in the express, unambiguous language of the statute, which grants 

directors, and directors alone, the power to take necessary actions to defend against 

liquidation petitions. To hold otherwise would eviscerate the thrust of our 

Legislature’s intent in enacting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 by allowing any interested 

parties to participate in liquidation proceedings by asserting standing under N.C. R. 

Civ. P. 24(a) (allowing a non-party to intervene of right when they have an interest 

in the property or transaction) or N.C. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (allowing for permissive nonparty intervention when the non-party’s “claim or defense and the main action have 

a question of law or fact in common”). 

Where GBIG is not a director of either BLIC or CBLIC, non-party GBIG did 

not have standing to intervene, nor should it have been allowed to intervene in the 

liquidation proceeding simply because the trial court previously exercised its broad 

discretionary power to allow it to intervene in the Southland liquidation. See N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95. 
CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

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B. Trial Court’s Rulings on the Continuance and Liquidation Orders

Having concluded the trial court erred when it allowed GBIG’s motion to 

intervene, we next consider whether the trial court nevertheless acted properly when 

entering both the Continuance Order and the Liquidation Order. GBIG argues the 

denial of its motion for a continuance “prevented it from having a meaningful 

opportunity to defend against the liquidation petition” and therefore, the trial court 

erred in denying its motion to continue and entering the liquidation order. We 

disagree. 

1. The Trial Court’s Denial of GBIG’s Motion to Continue

An order denying a motion for continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

Shankle v. Shankle, 289 N.C. 473, 483, 223 S.E.2d 380, 386 (1976). Under an abuse 

of discretion standard, reversal is appropriate only to correct “gross abuse,” such as 

where a decision “was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned 

decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988). 

A trial court may grant a continuance if the movants have “acted with diligence 

and in good faith[.]” May v. City of Durham, 136 N.C. App. 578, 581, 525 S.E.2d 223, 

227 (2000). Accordingly, a movant cannot “use [its own] self-imposed delay to support 

a request for a continuance.” Marcoin, Inc. v. McDaniel, 70 N.C. App. 498, 508, 320 

S.E.2d 892, 899 (1984).

Here, the trial court correctly determined that GBIG “should have made [its] 

motion to intervene some time ago,” given GBIG waited two weeks after the superior 
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court noticed a hearing to seek a continuance. Further, GBIG’s argument that the 

denial of its motion to continue prevented it from having a meaningful opportunity to 

defend against liquidation is disingenuous, given both BLIC and CBLIC had been 

making detailed quarterly disclosures since being placed in rehabilitation. 

Considering GBIG waited two weeks after being noticed of the upcoming 

hearing to file a motion for continuance, it would appear to this Court that GBIG’s 

delay was self-imposed. For that reason, the trial court’s decision to deny GBIG’s 

motion can hardly be considered “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result 

of a reasoned decision.” Hennis, 323 N.C. at 285, 372 S.E.2d at 527.

2. The Trial Court’s Liquidation Order

Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal. See State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 

162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011). “‘Under a de novo review, the court considers 

the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the lower 

tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) 

(quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 

319 (2003)). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-10(13), an insurer is considered insolvent 

when it is unable to pay its obligations when they are due or if “its admitted assets 

do not exceed its liabilities[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-10(13) (2023). 

The Record is replete with evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that 

both BLIC and CBLIC were insolvent and “in such condition as to render the 

continuance of its business hazardous, financially, or otherwise, to its 
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policyholders[.]” At the time of filing the liquidation petition, BLIC’s assets of 

$253,163,012 did not exceed its liabilities of $345,062,743, and CBLIC’s assets of 

$1,369,052,180 did not exceed its liabilities of $2,508,953,520, rendering them both

insolvent under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-10(13). In ordering both BLIC and CBLIC 

into liquidation, the trial court focused on Article 30’s purpose—to protect the 

interests of thousands of policyholders in the State of North Carolina. See N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 50-30-1(c) (2023). 

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm both the Continuance Order and 

the Liquidation Order and modify each order to clarify that GBIG should not have 

been allowed to intervene pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 or through the 

exercise of the trial court’s broad discretionary power. See In re Ernst & Young, LLP, 

363 N.C. at 620, 684 S.E.2d at 156 (concluding that, despite this Court’s incorrect 

conclusion that the Rules of Civil Procedure superseded a statutory requirement, 

nevertheless the order should be modified, yet affirmed). 

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, we hold that as a shareholder, GBIG should not have been 

allowed to intervene and defend against the liquidation petition, as only a company’s 

directors are permitted to intervene to defend under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95. 

Where the trial court allowed GBIG to participate, we modify both the Continuance 

Order and the Liquidation Order to clarify that GBIG is not a proper party to the 

action and affirm.
CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

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MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED. 

Judges ARROWOOD and HAMPSON concur.