alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Wade & Charlton v. Buford & Zeigler.

(No. 690, Op. Book No. 2, p. 567.)

Appeal from Rockwall County.

Opinion by

Quinan, J.

§ 1334. *Statement of facts not filed in term time.*We find in the record what purports to be a statement of facts, signed by the county judge, and filed 19th February, 1879, which was twenty days after the end of the term of the county court at which the cause was tried and judgment rendered. The statute in force at the time required that the statement of facts should be made up during the term at which the trial was had, and filed in the records of the cause as part thereof. [Pas. Dig. art. 1490.] This statement not being so made up and filed during the term, forms properly no part of the record, and cannot be considered on appeal. [Frost v. Frost, 45 Tex. 324; Johnson v. Blount, 48 Tex. 40.]

§ 1335. *Absence of statement of facts; practice on appeal.*In the absence of a statement of facts, the general rule is that it will be presumed that the judgment is correct, and that the evidence adduced upon the trial was sufficient to warrant it. Duffield v. Bodine, 2 Tex. 292; Linn v. Montross, 5 Tex. 510; Johnson v. Blount, 48 Tex. 41.] Without the statement of facts the appellate court will not revise the action of the court below in the admission or rejection of testimony. [Cottrell v. Teagarden, 25 Tex. 317; Hutchins v. Wade, 20 Tex. 7; Fulgham v. Bendy, 23 Tex. 65.] The exception to the rule is where it can be clearly shown that an error has been ‘ *780committed without reference to the statement of facts; as where, when a note which may be the foundation of the suit, or a deed, which may be a link in the chain of one’s title, or other testimony to which it is apparent there could be no equivalent, or which is manifestly material to the maintenance of the action or defense, has been rejected. [Galbreath v. Templeton, 20 Tex. 45.]

November 15, 1880.

§ 1886. *Incompetent testimony when case is tried by the judge.*It has often been decided that the admission of incompetent testimony where a case is tried before a judge, when there is other testimony sufficient to warrant his judgment, is not ground for reversal of it, for he will be presumed to have regarded it no moro than it deserved to be regarded. [Beaty v. Whitaker, 23 Tex. 526; Gilliard v. Chessney, 13 Tex. 337; Mullican v. Millican, 24 Tex. 453.] And the conclusions of the judge as to the relevancy and materiality of the testimony should be received with the same liberal construction as in the case of the reception of incompetent testimony.

§ 1337. *Newly discovered evidence not available in the absence of a statement of facts.*The refusal of the court to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered testimony will not be revised in the absence of a statement of facts. [Angell v. Street, 21 Tex. 485; Madden v. Shapard, 3 Tex. 49.]

Affirmed.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00302-CR

Rodney Nathaniel Boone

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From Criminal District Court No. 2

of Tarrant County (1289758D)

March 13, 2014

Opinion by Chief Justice Livingston

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Terrie Livingston

 Chief Justice Terrie Livingston
Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Trans Energy, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2002, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
William F. Woodburn , Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certifies to
the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects,  the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.


/s/   WILLIAM F. WOODBURN
----------------------------------
      William F. Woodburn
      Principal Accounting Officer
      November 15, 2002
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1175 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1175

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
     To amend the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Study and 
  Facilities Act to increase the ceiling on the Federal share of the 
   costs of phase I of the Orange County, California, Regional Water 
                          Reclamation Project.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CEILING INCREASE ON FEDERAL SHARE OF WATER RECLAMATION 
              PROJECT.

    Section 1631(d) of the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Study 
and Facilities Act (43 U.S.C. 390h-13(d)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1) by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and 
        inserting ``paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(3) The Federal share of the costs of the project 
        authorized by section 1624 shall not exceed the following:
                    ``(A) $22,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.
                    ``(B) $24,200,000 for fiscal year 2008.
                    ``(C) $26,620,000 for fiscal year 2009.
                    ``(D) $29,282,000 for fiscal year 2010.
                    ``(E) $32,210,200 for fiscal year 2011.
                    ``(F) $35,431,220 for fiscal year 2012.
                    ``(G) $38,974,342 for fiscal year 2013.
                    ``(H) $42,871,776 for fiscal year 2014.
                    ``(I) $47,158,953 for fiscal year 2015.
                    ``(J) $51,874,849 for fiscal year 2016.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives June 5, 2007.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
110th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 1175

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

     To amend the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Study and 
  Facilities Act to increase the ceiling on the Federal share of the 
   costs of phase I of the Orange County, California, Regional Water 
                          Reclamation Project.
```
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 MARCH 23, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 10-14546

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 3:09-cv-01175-MEF,

 BKCY No. 3:08-80083-bk-DHW

DAVID A. HINES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ANTHONY J. MARCHETTI, 

WEST GEORGIA EMERGENCY MEDICINE, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

________________________

(March 23, 2011)

Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court’s order of August 30, 2010 affirming the
partial summary judgment the bankruptcy court granted appellees denying 

appellant a discharge because he violated 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) by transferring

property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor within one year

before he filed for bankruptcy. Appellant contends that the existence of material

issues of fact foreclosed summary judgment; hence, we should reverse the district

court’s judgment and instruct the district court to vacate the summary judgment

and remand the case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings.

After examining the relevant portions of the record, we are convinced that,

for the reasons stated by the district court in its August 30 order, the bankruptcy

court did not err in granting the summary judgment complained of.

AFFIRMED.

2
#### In the Matter of Elizabeth James, Appellant, v Dan Hickey, Respondent. Armean Mayo et al., Nonparty Respondents.

[774 NYS2d 407]

*537In a child custody proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the maternal grandmother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Hinrichs J.), entered November 14, 2002, which denied her petition for custody of the subject child.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

“The determination of custody is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, which is in the most advantageous position to evaluate the testimony, character, and sincerity of the parties” *(Vinciguerra v Vinciguerra,*294 AD2d 565, 566 [2002]; *see Santoro v Santoro,*224 AD2d 510 [1996]). A determination of custody should not be set aside unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record (see *Vinciguerra v Vinciguerra, supra; Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982]). It is well settled that a court, in considering questions of child custody, must determine “what is for the best interest of the child” (Domestic Relations Law § 70; *see Eschbach v Eschbach, supra).*

The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that it was in the child’s best interests to remain in the custody of the Department of Social Services and to be available for adoption by the foster parents *(see Matter of Violetta K. v Mary K.,*306 AD2d 480, 481 [2003]). Since the foster parents are the only parents the child has ever known, it is in her best interests to continue that stable relationship *(see Matter of David B.,*2 AD3d 725 [2003]; Domestic Relations Law § 70 [a]), rather than be removed to the custody of her maternal grandmother. We note in this regard that “[a] nonparent relative takes no precedence for custody over the adoptive parents selected by an authorized agency” *(Matter of Ella J. v Iva J., 4*AD3d 527 [2004]). Santucci, J.P., S. Miller, Schmidt and Townes, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 91 (Tuesday, June 6, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1163-E1164]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                     SALUTE TO DR. RAYMOND M. OLSON

                                 ______

                          HON. ELTON GALLEGLY

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                          Tuesday, June 6, 1995
  Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to salute a selfless 
community leader and educator who has spent his life helping those 
around him find strength and guidance through two principal sources--
education and religion.
  Dr. Raymond M. Olson was born nearly 85 years ago on a farm near 
Eagle Grove, IA. But those of us who make our homes in Ventura County 
are grateful for the fact that he found his way out West and has 
selflessly dedicated himself to improving the lives of the people 
around him.
  In his long, distinguished and varied career, Dr. Olson has served as 
a teacher, a pastor [[Page E1164]] in the Lutheran Church, president of 
the National Lutheran council and president of the California Lutheran 
College in Thousand Oaks. He now holds the title of president emeritus 
of California Lutheran university and continues to maintain his ties to 
the school.
  Dr. Olson's impressive career accomplishments are rivaled only by a 
tireless dedication to his community and extensive record of public 
service.
  He has served on the Ventura County grand jury, the board of 
directors of the Conejo Valley Historical Society, the United Fund of 
Ventura County, various boards of education, the Cultural Center 
Planning Committee and has been a member of the Thousand Oaks Rotary 
Club since 1963.
  In addition to these numerous professional and philanthropic 
commitments, Dr. Olson and his wife of nearly 60 years, Helen, have 
raised two daughter and a son.
  In short, Mr. Speaker, I believe that Dr. Raymond M. Olson has truly 
served his family and his community through a lifetime of service and 
selflessness.
  He was recently selected as the 1995 Patriotic Citizen of the Year by 
the Conejo Valley chapter of the Military Order of the World Wars and 
was presented with the Chapter's Silver Patrick Henry Medallion. This 
recognition was truly appropriate, because one of the basic tenets of 
the organization is that it is better to serve than to be served.
  Dr. Olson has lived his life in strict adherence to this belief and 
has backed up this opinion with an unparalleled record of action and 
dedication to others. I commend him to all in this body and 
congratulate him on his award.

                          ____________________
```
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

Januar y 25, 2018

No. 04

- 17

- 00594

- CV

Josh Michael CRUZ,

Appellant

v.

Alicia CRUZ,

Appellee

From the 2nd 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15

- 0953

- CV

Jessica Crawford, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Appellees ’ motion for extension of time to file their brief is GRANTED. We order the

brief due on February 20, 2018.

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 25th day of January, 2018

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
Amendment to Stock Pledge Agreement



 EXHIBIT 10.93 
  
 AMENDMENT TO STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT 
  
 THIS AMENDMENT TO STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of the 12th day of April, 2002, by and between JEFFREY A. ALLRED (the “Pledgor”) and PTEK HOLDINGS, INC., a Georgia corporation (the
“Secured Party”). 
  
 W I T N E S S E T H

  
 WHEREAS, the Pledgor and the Secured Party entered
into that certain Stock Pledge Agreement as of January 3, 2002 (the “Original Agreement”); and 
  
 WHEREAS, the Pledgor and the Secured Party desire to amend the Original Agreement as set forth herein; and 
  
 WHEREAS, capitalized terms that are not defined herein shall have the
meanings ascribed to them in the Original Agreement; 
  
 NOW,
THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and the agreements and covenants contained herein, the parties hereby amend the Original Agreement as follows: 
  
 1. The third “WHEREAS” clause is deleted in its entirety and replaced by the following:

  
 “WHEREAS, the Pledgor may deliver
additional Promissory Notes to the Secured Party pursuant to the terms of the RSA Agreement (such Promissory Notes and the Note are referred to collectively herein as the “Secured Notes); and 
  
 WHEREAS, to secure the payment of all obligations of
the Pledgor under the Secured Notes, the Pledgor has agreed to pledge to the Secured Party, and to grant the Secured Party a security interest in, all of the Shares;”. 
  
 2. The second sentence of Section 1 is deleted in its entirety and replaced by the following: 
  
 “The Pledgor has delivered to and deposited with the Secured Party one
or more certificates representing the Shares and stock powers endorsed in blank, as security for payment of (i) all obligations of the Pledgor to the Secured Party under the Note, and any extension, renewal, amendment or modification thereof, (ii)
all obligations of the Pledgor to the Secured Party under subsequent Secured Notes, and any extension, renewal, amendment or modification thereof, and (iii) all obligations of the Pledgor to the Secured Party hereunder.” 
  
 3. The first sentence of Section 3 is amended by deleting
“the Note” in the first line and replacing it with “a Secured Note.” 
  
 4. Section 6 of the Original Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 
  
 “6. Return of Shares to Pledgor. Upon payment in
full of all principal and interest on all of the Secured Notes, this Agreement shall terminate and the Secured Party shall return to the Pledgor all of the then remaining Shares.” 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be entered into as of the day
and year first above written. 
  

	PLEDGOR:
	
	 /s/ Jeffrey A. Allred

 Jeffrey A. Allred

	 	 	 


  
  

	 SECURED PARTY:
  
 PTEK Holdings, Inc.

		
	By:	 	/s/ Patrick G. Jones
	 	

	 	 	 Patrick G. Jones
 Executive Vice
President
2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-18-2012

Dhany Rinastuti v. Attorney General United States

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1978

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Dhany Rinastuti v. Attorney General United States" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 261.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/261
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1978

___________

DHANY DINAR RINASTUTI,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

 Respondent

____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A088-649-516)

Immigration Judge: Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 17, 2012

Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 18, 2012)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Dhany Rinastuti, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the 

agency’s denial of relief. This is the companion case to C.A. No. 12-1977; Rinastuti is 

the partner of Ufuq Abror, the petitioner in that matter, and the relevant facts and issues 
2

in both matters are identical. Rinastuti fears potential persecution in Indonesia on 

account of a possible familial veto of her desired marriage to Abror, and also worries 

about societal disapproval of her children being born out of wedlock. For substantially 

the same reasons that we recited in 12-1977, however, Rinastuti has failed to show any 

basis to disturb the agency’s final order of removal. We must therefore deny this petition 

for review.1 

 

1 We exercise jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, as limited by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3)

and 1252(d)(1).
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly  Report of GlobeTel  Communications  Corp. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended March 31, 2006 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Lawrence E. Lynch, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant
to  18  U.S.C.  Section  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  Section  906  of  the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

1. The Report fully  complies with the  requirement of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: and

2. the  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Lawrence E. Lynch
Chief Financial Officer
May 12, 2006
#### Howard Bros. v. L. Caperon.

(No. 5459.)

June 22, 1887.

Appeal from Runnels County.

W. J. Wingate and Hill & Crosson, counsel for appellants.

Opinion by

"Will-son, J.

§ 313. *Attachment; affidavit for held sufficient.*In this suit, brought by appellee against appellants to recover an indebtedness, appellee sued out an attachment, the ground therefor stated in the affidavit being “that the defendants are about to transfer their property for the purpose of defrauding their creditors,” etc. Appellants moved to quash the attachment because the ground therefor stated in the affidavit was not a statutory one. This motion was overruled. *Held*correct. The ground stated in the affidavit is embraced within the tenth stattory ground. [R. S. art. 152.] The word “dispose” has a broader signification than the word “transfer.” A fraudulent *transfer*of property is a fraudulent *disposition*of it. [Pearre & Co. v. Hawkins, 62 Tex. 434.]

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-QSB FOR THE
QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING OCTOBER 31, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1996
<CASH>                                         213,340
<SECURITIES>                                 5,191,073
<RECEIVABLES>                                  581,031
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (10,000)
<INVENTORY>                                    920,125
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,895,569
<PP&E>                                         219,998
<DEPRECIATION>                               (208,683)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,927,123
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          329,415
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    24,947,893
<OTHER-SE>                                (18,450,879)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,927,123
<SALES>                                        711,304
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               782,546
<CGS>                                          369,468
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  607,369
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                175,177
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,480
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            173,697
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   173,697
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .03
        

</TABLE>