## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O
. A P- 76, 073

LA R R Y R A Y SW EA R I N G EN , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS

O N D IR E C T A P P E A L IN CA USE N UM BER 99

- 1 1

- 0 6 4 3 5
- CR FRO M THE 9 DI STRI CT CO UR T th O F M O N TG O M ER Y CO U N TY , TEX A S

H ERV EY , J., delivered the opinion for a un animous Court.
O P I N I O N
L arr y Ray Swe ari ng e n ( “ Ap pe lla nt” ), se nte nc e d to de a th f or the c a pit a l murd e r o f M e lis sa Trotter, a ppea ls an order

denying his motion for post-c onviction forensic DNA testing . For the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
. The e vidence from appellant’ s 2000 trial shows that, in Dec ember 1998, appellant murde red Melissa Trotter by

ligature stra

ng ulation with a piece o f p an t y h o s e during a

n ag g ravated sexualS w ea ri n g en --2

assault or kidnappingor attempted kid n ap p i n g an d left her body in a national for est wher e it was found about thre e we eks later
. Se e als o Swe ar inge n v . S tat e , 101 S.W .3d 89, 92-95 (Te x . Crim. App. 20 03 ) ( mor e fu lly

se tti ngou t th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at a pp e lla nt’ s 200 0 tri a l) . In th is thir d A rt ic le 64 proce eding that appellant has filed, the trial court made finding s, supported by evidenc e pre sented at appe llant’s 2000 trial and other evidenc e deve loped during p o st-conviction proc eeding s, that
ov e rw he lmi ng ly

su pp or t a pp e lla nt’ s g uil t. Since h is 2 0 0 0 tr ia l, a

p p e ll an t h a s f

il e d anin it ia l h a

b e a s c o r p u s a p p li c a ti o nan d

n u me rous
succe ssive habea s corpus a pplications, two of which we fo u n d contained c laims that could be considere d on their merits under Arti cle 11.071, Sec tion 5, T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . This Court denied ha beas c orpus re lief on the merits of these applications (the initial habe as cor pus application and two succe ssive habea s corpus applications) and dismiss ed appe llant’s other succ essive habe as corpus a pplications as an abuse of the writ. I n addition, appellant filed his first Chapter 64 motion fo r D NAte sti ngin O c tob e r 2 00 4, wh ic h th e tr ia l c ourt den ied in Apr il 2 00 5. Ap pe lla nt f ile d h is second Chapte r 64 motion f or DNA testing in Ma

y 2008, which the trial court denied on J anuar y 19, 2009. Appellant filed this third Chapter 64 motion for DNA testing on J anuar y 6, 2009, just three
wee k s b ef

o re his 2009 ex ecution date . The trial c ourt denied that motion on J anuar y 19, 2009. Appellant’s third Chapter 64 motion for DNA testing r equeste d DNA testing of mater ials for whic h appellant c ould have, but did not, seek DNA t esting in either of his two previous Chapter 64 motions f o r D N A te s ti n g . A p p e ll an t’ s th ir d Ch a p te r 6 4 mo ti o n f

o r D N A te s ti n g r e qu e s te d an orde r
au t h o ri z i n g: 1. rete sting of the blood under the vic tim’s finge rn ail s, using STR or mini-STR te s ti n g , to g e t a mo r e c o mp le te ST R p r o f il e th a t c an b e u

p lo a d e d in to CO DI S andS w ea ri n g en --3

The De partment of Public Safe ty (DPS) lab, in prior DNAtesting of the blood f lakes, wa s 1 able to obtain a f

ull DNA male pr ofile that did not match that of the a ppellant. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 64.01(a ). 2 compar ed to STR profiles from other piece s of evidenc e; 2. the compar ison of the exist i ng STR profile from the blood under the victim’s fi ng e rn a il s c ra

pin g s to the State and

F e de ra l D NAdata

ba nk s– CO DI S; 3
. t es t i n g of any

other mate rial fr om the fing erna il scraping s of the lef t and r igh t hands using Y-STR testing that f ocuses only

on male DNA ; 4. testing of

scra pings f rom the ripped je ans for

contac t or touch DNA using STR or m i n i -S T R

t es t i n g; 5
. t es t i n g o f t h e l i gat u re fo r t o u ch DN A u s i n g S T R t es t i n g; 6. testing of

the victim’s clothing, espec ially the ar eas w here her c lothes were moved, fo r t o u ch DN A u s i n g S T R t es t i n g; 7. testing of

the fore ign pubic hair that wa s rec overe d during the coll ec t i on of the rape kit using STR or mitochondrial DNA te sting; and 8. c omp ari so n o f a

ny pr of ile s obta ine d fr om the te sti ng re qu e ste d in 3-6 to t he pr of ile in 1 and 2. (F ootnote omitted and emphasis in orig inal). I n h is o rd e r d e nyingDN A t e sti ng , th e tr ia l jud g e c on c lud e d th a t D NAte sti ngwa s ava ila ble at the time of trial a

nd that testing of

blood flakes f

ound under the victim’s fing erna ils would be imp ro pe r a s it had alr e a dy be e n te ste d a

nd the te sti ngpr ov ide d a c c ur a te and pr ob a tiv e re su lts
. 1 Additionally , the trial cour t concluded that testing of the fing erna il scraping s of the lef t and rig ht hands and that testing of the scra pings f rom the ripped je ans wa s improper be cause there had bee n no showing that these e videntiary items contained biolog ical mater ial. The court also found testing 2 of the lig a tur e and

the vic tim ’s c lot

hin g wa s impr op e r be c a

us e the re ha d be e n no s ho wi ngthat th e se evidentiar y items contained biolog ica l material. Additionally , the cour t found appe llant’s motion to te s t th e p u

b ic h a ir im

p r o p e r b e c a

u s e th e p u

b ic h a ir c o u ld n o t b e f

o u n d an d a c h a in

of custody could not be esta

blished. Finally , t h e co u rt found that appe llant’s reque st for DNAtesting w as improper be cause the re quest was made to unrea sonably delay the execution of

appellant’ s sentence
.S w ea ri n g en --4

Se e Ro uti e r v . S

tat e , 273 S.W .3d 241, 245-46 (Te x . Crim. App. 2008). 3 Appellant timely

filed a direct appeal on J anuar y 23, 2009. I n his appea l, he asserts the trial cour t imp ro pe rl y

de nie d h is r e qu e st f

or DN A t e sti ngand

pr e se nts the fo llo wi ngiss ue s to thi s Co ur t. 1. Whether Appellant is entitled to conduct post-conviction DNA testing on the victim’s rig ht and left ha

nd fing erna il scraping s, the ligature used to stra ng le the victim , s e v e r a l d is c r e te ar e a s o f th e v ic ti m’ s c lo th in g th a t w e r e to u c h e d by the perpe trator, a

nd any hairs still in ex istence that were rec overe d from the sc ene, wher e such te sting (a) satisfies the require ments of Chapter 64 of the Te x as Code of Criminal Procedur e, i.e., that exculpatory results would cre ate at least a “ 51% c ha nc e ” tha t he wo uld

no t ha ve be e n c on vic te d, and

(b) ha s th e c a

pa c ity to conclusively

establish Appellant’s actual innoce nce by identifying a

nother convicted of

fende r as the tr

ue per petrator through use of the COD I S DNA databa se? 2. Whether the District Court er red in f ai l i n g to consider the sig nificant non-D NA evidenc e re futing the State’s evidenc e at tria l and supporting Appellant’s innoce nce i nd en y i n g h i s re qu es tfo r D NA t es t i n g? Appellant conte nds that the ex culpatory results of the testing would cre ate at least a 51% chanc e that he w ould not have been convicted. He further contends that the testing results have the capa city to conclusively

establish appellant’ s actua l innocence by identifying another person as the true pe rpetra

tor. The State a

rg ues that re quests for testing should have be en made at trial or in any of appe llant’s previous two motions for DNAtesting a nd the re sults of DN A t es ting a lrea dy conducte d on evidentiar

y materia ls have proven to be probative and a ccur ate. The State also argues that appellant ha s failed to pr ove that the e vidence that he wa nts submit ted for post-c onviction DNA testing c ontains biologica l material. This cour t is guided by prec edent and Chapter 64 of the Te x as Code o f C ri m i nal Proce dure. As Art. 64.01(b) indicates, diff ere nt burdens exist, depending on 3 whether evidentiar

y materia ls have pre viously b een te sted for D NA. When re viewing an appe al from a m o t i on seekingDNA testing , we de fer to the “trial c ourt’s dete rmination of issues of historical fa ct and a

pplication-of- law-to-f

act issues that turn on cre dibilit y and demea nor, while weS w ea ri n g en --5

Rivera v . State, 89 S.W .3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 4 Se e Sk inn e r v . S tat e , 293 S.W .3d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 5 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art
. 6 4
. 0 1 (b)(1 )(A )(I ). 6 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art
. 6 4
. 0 1 (b)(1 )(A )(i i)
. 7 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art
. 6 4
. 0 1 (b)(1 )(B ). 8 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 64.01 (a ). 9 re vie w d e no vo oth e r a

pp licati on -o f- law- to- fa c t is su e s. ” We b e g in o ur ana ly sis wi th t

ho se ite ms 4 that have ne ver be fore been te sted. I. AP P ELLA NT ’S P OST- CO NV IC TIO N REQU EST F OR DN A T ESTI NG

OF EVIDENTIARY MATERIALS THAT P REVIOUSLY HAVE NOT BEE N TEST ED Rip pe d je ans , li ga ture , a nd a rtic le

s o f v ic tim’s c lot

hing Chapter 64 r equire s multipl e threshold criter ia t o be met befor e a convicted person is entitled to DNA testing . One of

the primary

require ments is a showing of “una vai l ability ” which c an be
e sta bli sh e d in on ly thr e e wa y s. An Ap pli c ant may sh ow DN A te sti ng wa s no t ava ila ble a t th e tim e 5 of trial. I f DNA testing was available , an Applicant may show that the DNA -testing technolog y was 6

no t c a pa ble of pr ov idi ng a c c ur a te and pr ob a tiv e re su lts
. I n th e a lte rn a tiv e , a n App lic ant m a y

a lso 7
s ee k t es t i n g i f t h e i n t er es t s o f j u s t i ce re qu i re i tan d t h e f ai l u re t o t es tev i d en ce ea rl i er wa s t h ro u gh no fault of his own. I n any of the these scena

rios, it must first be esta

blished that evidenc e soug ht 8 to b e te ste d c on ta ins bio log ic a l mate ri a l. 9 Ar tic le 64 .0 1( a ) r e a ds in p art , “ A c on vic te d p e rson may su bmi t to the c on vic tin g c ourt a motion for fore nsic DNA te sting of e vidence containing biologica l material” (empha sis added). A literal re ading of the statute une quivocal l y m an d ates that a ll evidence to be tested must first be pr ov e n to con ta in bio log ic a l mate ri a l. Whe n inte rp re tin g a statut e , th is c ourt

is l imi te d to its pla inS w ea ri n g en --6

Bo y k in v . S tat e , 818 S.W .2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 10 Routier , 2 73 S.W. 3d

a t 25 6 (“ At

pr e se nt, ho we ve r, the a

pp e lla nt ha s pro vid e d no c on c re te 11 evidenc e that such an ex amination was actually done, or if it wa s, that any biologica l material that may have be en re cover ed wa s retaine d...the appe llant fails t o meet her threshold burde n of showing that there is even a

ny evidenc e conta ining biolog ical mater ial to be tested.” ). Di nk ins v . S tat e , 84 S.W .3d 639, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 12 See Ap pe lla

nt’ s Jan ua ry 6, 20 09 Mo ti on , at 4- 5. I n a pp e lla nt’ s th ir d mo tio n f

or po st- 13 c on vic tio n D NAte sti ng , a pp e lla nt a sse rt s, “ Tr ott e r’ s upp e r g arm e nts we re ob vio us ly g ra bb e d w ith considera ble forc e, more than enoug h to dislodge skin cells and other biol og ical evide nce f rom the (c o n tin u e d ...) meaningunless the lang uag e is ambig uous or its plain meaning leads to ab s u rd results that the L eg islature could not possibly have intende d. Be cause Chapter 64 does not de scribe a method for 10 de te rm ini ng the e xiste nc e of bio log ic a l mate ri a l, a pla in re a din g of the statut e , as ap pe lla nt p oin ts
ou t, c ou ld l e a d to the de pr ivatio n of D NAte sti ngin t he ra re c a se sim

ply be c a us e of the ina bil ity to
asce rtain whe ther or not biolog ical materia l e x ists. As an appellate court, we must give e ffe ct to the plain meaningof the s t at u t e. I t is incumbent upon the L eg islature, not this Court, to provide statutory means, if appropr iate, for deter mining whether the defe ndant m eets the burden of showing that evidenc e contains biologica l material. Howeve r, this c ourt has held that a mere asser

tion or a g ener al claim that existence of biolog ical mater ial is probable will fa il to satisfy the appel l an t ’s burden. Where an appellant has failed to pr ovide fac ts in support of his motion, “we ca nnot say 11 that the convictingcourt e rrone ously deter mined that appellant failed to showexis tence of evide nce containing biologica l material.” 12 Her e, the tria l court found that a ppellant fa iled to prove that biologica l material e x isted on the ripped je ans, the lig ature , or any of the article s of clothing . Whil e testimony prese nted at trial
su pp or ts t he fa c t th a t th e pe rp e tr a tor tou c he d sev e ra l item s soug ht to b e te ste d, a pp e lla nt m a ke s o nly a g ener al claim that biolog ical material could be f ound from that touching
. I n this thi rd motion for 13S w ea ri n g en --7

(
. . . cont i nued) 13 pe rs on wh o c arr ie d h e r i nto the wo od s. ” Sho rt ly la te r, a pp e lla nt cl a ims , “ Th e fo rc e ne e de d to str a ng le someone by

ligature a lso would have a brade d testable biolog ical mater ials from the ha nds of the attacke r.” S ee A p p e ll an t’ s Ja n u ar

y 6 , 2 0 0 9 M o ti o n , E xh ib it H
. I nth e le tt e r , th e D is tr ic t A tt o r n ey 14 c omm e nts on

the a bil ity to o bta in D NAus ingthe sc ra pin g me tho d, “ a

pr oc e ss in wh ic h f

or e ns ic scientists scrape place s wher e ther e ar e no stains or other signs of the possible prese nce of

DNA....” See Orde r on Third DN A Mtn., findings 29- 32, conclusions of law3-4. 15 post-conviction DNA te sting, a ppellant included a letter

from the District Attorne y ’s offic e handling the disappea

ranc e of Jon Bene t Ramsey , which hints at the succe ss of touch DNA
. I n his moti on, 14 he also re fer s t o sever al re ports in his mot ion that highlig ht the succe ss of Short Tandem Repe at (“STR”) D NA testing . The mer e fa ct that t hese DNA t echnolog ies exis t and that the tec hnology can potentially

be succ essful is not enoug h to cre ate the r ight to testing. Appellant fails to show whethe r STR testi ng would b e p ro b ative or if it wa s even possible. Rather , appellant r elies on conc lusory state me nts : The c oncept that individuals deposit their DNA o n o b j ects that they

touch, particula rly objects like a ligature that must be g raspe d with suc h a strongforc e is not a novel c oncept. No c redible D NA ana ly st could question that conclusion. We fail to understand w hy this testing was not pre viously reque sted if, in fac t, depos iting DNA on objec ts “touched” is not novel. Further , n o ex p er t testimony or scientific data wa s pr e se nte d to su

pp or t th e c on c lus ion

tha t D NAwo uld

ne c e ssa ri ly be de po sit e d thro ug h g ra sp ingwi th strong forc e. The trial court c oncluded there had bee n no showing that evidentiar y items submit ted fo r t e sti ng c on ta ine d biol og ic a l mate ri a l. Spe c if ic a lly , the tr ia l court fo un d tha t app e lla nt fa ile d to 15 show the fing erna il scraping s, the ligature, the sc raping s fro m t h e ri p ped jea ns or the re maining article s of clothing contained biolog ical mater ial. Almost tot al def ere nce is g iven to a

trial court’ sS w ea ri n g en --8

Ri v e ra , 89 S.W .3d at 59. 16 Orde r on Third DN A Mtn., finding 30, c onclusion of law 3. 17 Id., finding s 17, 19, 25, 28. 18 Reply to State’s Motion Opposing Petitioner’s January 6 Motion for

DNA testing , pg . 5 t h 19 (M ov ant a

rgue s th a t th e fa ilure to d e tec t any human D NAon

the vic tim ’s ri g ht h and

“ sh ou ld n ot, by definition prec lu d e ad d i t ional testing....[I ]t is unlikely that no human DNA is pre sent on the victim’s fing erna il scraping s. At a minimum we would expect to see the victim’s DNA .”). finding s conce rning whether the claimed DNA evidenc e exis ts and is in a condition to be tested. 16 As the trial judge makes clea r in its J anuar

y 19 order , the rec ord is void of any concr ete e vidence th that biologica l material e x isted on the evidenc e soug ht to be tested. We ag ree and ac cording ly aff irm the trial cour

t’s ruling in reg ards to items 4, 5, and 6. Left and right-han d scrapings Swear inge n also seeks “ testing of any other mate rial from the finger nail scra pings of the left
and ri g ht h and s. ” Ag a in, we are c on fr on te d wi th a sc e rt a ini ng wh e the r e vid e nti ary ma te ri a ls c on ta in biologica l mat eria l. The trial cour t expressly

conclude d “Movant’s motion...is improper under Chapter 64 be cause ther e has bee n no showing these e videntiary items do contain biologic al materia ls.” We ag ree .

17 Bot h ri gh t and lef

t-hand scr aping s have a lrea dy been e x amined by

Texas Depar

tment of Public Safety

(“D PS”). The only

materia l within the right-hand scraping s was “black flaky matter” that did not test posit ive for huma n DNA. The left-han d s cr apings wer e examined and
c ri min olo g ist s f

ound “ so me re a lly

sma ll, min

ute tr a c e of

wh a t a pp e are d to be lik e , san d o r g ra ve l” and “ve ry tiny , brig ht red flakes.” Ag ain, appe llant’s “p ro o f” of biologica l material re sts on 18

c on c lus or y state me nts and

g e ne ra l c la ims
. We reiterate today t hat in order to show evidenc e 19S w ea ri n g en --9

Routier , 273 S.W .3d at 250 (rejecting defe ndant’s speculative cla im that a tube sock mig ht 20 have be en used to g agher a nd there fore could contain a dditional biologica l materia l in the form of saliva and de ciding that defe ndant f ai l ed t o meet her

threshold burde n of showing any “evide nce containing biologica l material” in the form of sa liva to be tested). T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 64.01 (a )-( b). 21 Routier , 273 S.W .3d at 249, 251. 22 See Third DNA Mtn. Exhibit A, pag es 35-38. 23 c on ta ini ngbio log ic a l mate ri a l, a mov ant m

us t art ic ulate mor e tha

n me re a sse rt ion s. 20 As s u m i n g a r g u e ndo th at t he fi ngerna il scr api ngs d o co nt ain bi ol ogica l m ate ri als , mova nt s til l fails to meet the c riteria in Ar ticle 64.01(b). Evidentiary materia ls not previously

subjected to DN A testing c an be r equested o nly in three situations. Movant argues that, bec ause te chnolog y has 21 i mp ro v ed dra m at i ca l l y s i n ce h i s t ri al i n 2 0 0 0 , h e i s en t i t l edt o n ew DN A t es t i n g. W h i l e t ec h n o l o gy for DN A t esting has certainly improved si nce 2000, that does not equate to a lack of tec hnologic al capa bility at the time of trial. The standard is not wh et h er new tec hnology would y ield more pr ob a tiv e re su lts , b ut w he the r t he n- e xistin g te c hn olo g y wa s c a pa ble of y ie ldi ngany

pr ob a tiv e re su lts at all. Be cause appella n t h as n o t met his threshold burden of proving the evidenc e conta ins 22 bio log ic a l mate ri a l and the re c or d s ho ws DN A t e c hn olo g y wa s c a pa ble of y ie ldi ngpr ob a tiv e re su lts in 2 00 0, we up ho ld t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

to d e ny te sti ngof the fi ng e rn a il s c ra

pin g s. Pub ichai

r Ap pe lla nt r e qu e sts te sti ngof

a fo re ig n p ub ic ha ir

re c ov e re d d

u r i n g t h e a ut op sy . Ind e e d, pu

bic ha ir s w e re re c ov e re d fr om a va g ina l sw a b on Janu ary 4, 19 99
. Th e sp e c ime n w a s se nt t o a c ri me 23 lab at the F eder al B urea

u of I nvestig ation (“F BI ”), where it was subsequently repor ted “no ha irs wer e found” on the swab used f or the va g inal inspecti o n . Since the pubic ha irs wer e lost, the evidenc e
was ne ver submitted for te sting.Sw ear i ngen- - 10

Arizona v. Y

oungblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. C t. 333 (1988). 24 Id. 25 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 64.03(a )(1) (A)( I ). 26 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt . 6 4. 03 (a )( 1) (A )( ii) (t

he e vid e nc e ha s b e e n s ub

je c te d to a

c ha in 27 of custody

sufficie nt to establish that it has not been substitut ed, tamper ed with, re place d, or alter ed in any materia l respec t). I t has bee n said that when “ potentially exculpatory evidenc e is perma

nently lost, courts fac e the trea cher ous task of divining the import of mater ials whose conte nts are unknow n and, ver y often, disputed.” I n the abse nce of bad fa i t h , a fa i lure to pre serve potentially useful evide nce doe s not 24

v io late d u e p r o c e s s . A p p e ll an t h a s n o t a ll e g e d , n o r h a s th e r e b e e n an y f in d in g b y th e tr ia l court 25 sug g esting bad fa ith on t h e p ar t of the State. Thr oug h no fault of a ppellant, the pubic ha ir was inexpl icably

lost. However , while Chapter 64 allows for testing of evidenc e for rea sons that are of a natur e that the inter ests of justice re quire it, one c an n o t t est what ca nnot be found. B efor e a convicting court may order fore nsic DNA testing, i t must be shown that the evidenc e “still exi sts and is in a condition making DNA testing possible.” A cha in of custody must also be established. 26 27 Neither of these c onditions can prese ntly be met her e. Whil e ap p el l ant does address Ar ticle 64.03 with reg ard to the f inge rnail scr aping s and the victim’s clothing, no attempt is m ade to e x plain how the lost pubic hair mee ts the above c riteria. The F BI repor t clear ly states that “no ha irs wer e found” in the sample they rec eived f

rom DPS. And as the State c orre ctly

points out i n its brief, eve n if a sear ch wer e conducte d and the pubic hair found, a cha in of custody could not be esta blished. After

revie wing the re cord, our finding is in harmony with the trial court’ s conclusion: Appellant’s motion to “test the for eig n pubi c h ai r t h at was
rec overe d during the collection of the rape kit is improper under Chapter 64 beca use no hairs we re found in that specimen, a nd appellant do es n o t show that authorities would have any way ofSw ear i ngen- - 11

Orde r on Third DN A Mtn., conclusion of law6. 28 Acc ording to an Octobe r 8, 1999, DPS report, lef t-nail scra pings w ere sub m itted to the 29 DPS lab on J anuar

y 4, 1999. An additional fing erna il f rag ment was also submitted on October 27, 1999. I n a supplementa l report, DPS rep o rt ed that “sma ll red flake s were detec ted

30 microscopica lly

on the scra

ping stick use d on the victim’s left fing erna ils. The red substanc e wa s collecte d and fr ozen pending DNA a naly sis.” A s up ple me nta l D PS re po rt date d De c e mbe r 10 , 19 99 , state d, “ An atte mpt wa s ma de to 31 extract DNA f

rom the swab of

the nail scra

pings, two swa

bs from the suspec t’s truck, the r oots of the six head a

nd pubic hairs, the sw ab of the nail fra g ment, and the blood standard f rom Robbie L y

nn Grove .” Poly

mera se Chain Reac tion (“PCR”) is a method used to ana ly ze a short sample of D NA 32 by amplifying se lected se ctions allowing for r eproduc tion of the orig inal strand. a sc e rt a ini ng that any loo se pu bic ha ir fo un d amo ng sto re d ev ide nc e wa s fr om that pa rt ic ula r f or e ns ic specimen.” 28 II. AP P ELLA NT ’S P OST- CO NV IC TIO N REQU EST F OR DNA TESTI NG

OF EVIDENTIARY MATERIALS PREVIOUSL Y TEST ED Blo od fo und un de r the

v ic tim’s fi

nge rna ils Fing erna il scraping s and a f inge rnail fr ag ment wer e submitted t o the Texas DPS for analy sis. Upon a microscopic review , blood flake s wer e found in the finge rnail scr aping s collecte d

29 during the autopsy
. An attem p t wa s m ad e to ex trac t DNA fr om both the blood flakes and the 30 fing erna il frag ment. Eac h item was subjecte d to PC R testing. I t wa s deter mined that human 31 32 DNA c ould not be detec ted from the nail fra g ment. Criminologists howeve r, were able to cre ate a ful l DN A p ro file base d on DNA f rom blood flakes f

ound in the fing erna il scraping s. Both the
a pp e lla nt a nd the c omp la ina

nt w e re e xclu de d a s b e ingc on tr ibutor s o f t he se fl a ke s. Appellant see ks to retest blood under the victim’s fing erna ils, using STR or mini-STRSw ear i ngen- - 12

T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 64.01 (b) (2). 33 testing. A

ppellant alleg es these new DNA testing techniques would lead to a more c omplete STR profile that c an ult i m at el y l ead to the e x oneration of Swearing en. Where new DN A testing te c hn iqu e s w ill lik e ly

pr ov ide a

re a so na ble lik e lih oo d o f m or e a c c ur a te a nd pr ob a tiv e re su lts , convicted pe rsons may

reque st additional forensic D NA testing
. Howeve r, on the fa cts of this case , 33 appellant has not show n a re asonable likelihood that results would be more a ccur ate or probative. DPS criminalist C assie Carr adine testified that she wa s able to obtain a f ull DNA profile f

rom the blood found under t h e fi n ger n ail scra pings. B eca

use prior D NA testing has alre ady resulted in a
succe ssful male DNA profile being entere d into the Combined DNA Index S y stem (“CODI S”), we find additional testing of the l eft-ha nd fing erna il clippings have no value a dded and the ref ore a ffirm the trial cour

t’s ruling on this matter. Appellant also c laims that the t rial court erre d in failing to determine w hether the male DN A profile f rom the blood flake s has re cently been c ompare d to the CODI S DNA databa se to deter mine if it m a tc he s a

c onvic te d o ff

e nd e r. We d e c ide th at any a tte mpt by a pp e lla nt i n th is p ro c e e din g to require the trial court to de termine whether the unidentified male D NA prof ile has bee n resubmitted to CODI S is bey ond the s cope of Chapter 64. Chapter 64 provides for DNA testing or re testing of evidenc e conta ining biolog ical mater ial and not for database entry of alre ady

tested evide nce containing biologica l material that is not subject to rete sting. Notwithst a

n d in g th e f o r e g o in g , the re cord a lso supports the trial court’s f inding that a

ppellant fi le d h is thir d Ch a

pte r 64 mot ion fo r DN A te sti ng jus t 21 da y s b e fo re his sc he du le d e xec uti on “ to
unrea sonably

delay the execution of sentenc e.” I n response , he asse rts that he has trie d to seek DN A te sti ngsin c e 20 04 . App e lla nt’ s e sta bli sh e d p a tte rn of fi lin g mot ion s shor tly be fo re an exec uti on

dateSw ear i ngen- - 13

See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC art. 64.03 (a )(2) (B ) (c onvicting c ourt may order DNA testing 34 only if it finds, among other thing s, that the convicted person establishes by a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e that th e re q u est for D NA testing is not made to unrea sonably delay the execution of sentenc e or a dminist ration of justice)
.

See Skinner v . State, 293 S.W .3d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Anothe r re quirement 35 i s t h e “ d i f f e r e n t o u t c o m e ” s h o w i n g , w h i c h i s s a t i s f i e d w h e n t h e “ c o n v i c t e d p e r s o n e s t a b l i s h e s b y a preponde ranc e of the evide n ce t h at ... the per son would not have be en convic ted if exculpatory re s u l t s h adb ee no b t ai n edt h ro u gh DN A t es t i n g. ”) (c i t i n g T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt
. 64.03(a) (2)( A)). See Pr ibl e v . S

tat e , 245 S.W .3d 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ; W ils on v . S tat e , 185 S.W .3d 36 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Ho od v . S tat e , 15 8 S.W. 3d 48 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); W hitaker v. Sta te , 16 0 S.W. 3d 5, 9 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Car te r v. S tat e , 134 S.W .3d 484 (Tex. App.–Waco 20 04 ); Br e we r v . S

tat e , 143 S.W .3d 389 (Tex. App.–Be aumont 2004). h o we v er , l ea ves littl e doubt that sta lling continues to be an eff ective strateg y . He first filed a
su bs e qu e nt w ri t on

Janu ary 22 , 2 00 7 –

tw o d ay s b e fo re his sc he du le d e xec uti on . App e ll ant’ s la st two subsequent writs wer e filed on J anuar y 23, 2009 – four day s befor e his resc heduled e x ecution. Ap pe lla nt c ou ld h a ve re qu e ste d D NAte sti ngand re te sti ng of all of the m a te ri a ls i nv olv e d in thi s
ca s e w h en h e f

i l edh i s fi rs tan d

s ec o n d C h ap t er 6 4 m o t i o n s fo r D NA t es t i n g. 34 Mo re ov e r, in l ig ht o f t

he ov e rw he lmi nge vid e nc e of a pp ella nt’ s g uil t, e ve n if

we we re to g r an ta p p e l l an t ’ s r e qu e s tt o t e s ta l l o f t h e i t e m s p r o f

f e r e d a n d t h o s e r e s u l t s w e r e e x c u l p a t o r y, appellan t ca n n o t s h o w by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e, or that there is a 51% chanc e, that he would not have been convicted. Texas c ourts have consistently held that a movant does not satisfy 35 his burden under

Article 64.03 if the rec ord conta ins other substantial evidenc e of guilt independent
o f t h at fo r w h i ch t h e m o v an ts ee k s DN A t es t i n g. 36 One judg e on this Court has commented r eg arding the “mountain of inculpatory evidenc e”Sw ear i ngen- - 14

Ex parte Swearingen , 2009 WL 24 9 7 7 8 , at *9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Cochra n, J ., 37 concur ring ). Swearingen v. Thaler , Slip Op. 2009 WL 4433221, at *23 (S.D. Tex. Nove mber 18, 2009). 38 O r d e r o n T h i r d D N A M t n . , fi ndi ng 39. 39 ag ainst appell an t
. A fe dera l district court has also c ommented on this “mountain of inculpatory 37 evidenc e.” To reiter ate, Swea

ring en wa s the last person that Ms. Trotter was see n with alive. Ms. Tr ott e r ha d be e n in Swe ari ng e n’ s tr uc k, wh e re he fo rc ibl y

re mov e d h a ir

fo lli c le s. Swear inge n’s histologica l evidenc e does not explain why she was in his house that day , why it was later f

ound to be in disarra

y , and why

he fa lsely

claimed that ther e had bee n a burg lary

there . The e vidence itself does not explain why paper s belong ing to Ms. Trotter we re f

ound near the house of Swe aring en’s pa rents and he r cig are ttes wer e in Swear inge n’s house. The new infor mation doe s not e x plain why Ms. Trotter wa s f ound we ari ngthe same c lot

he s a s w he n s he dis a

pp e are d a nd wh y sh e ha d a no te g iven to her by

a fr iend on Dec ember

8 in her ba ck pocket. The ne w evidenc e does no t sh owwh y

c e ll p ho ne re c or ds tr a c e d Sw e ari ng e n to a loc a tio n near whe re Ms. Tr ott e r w a s f

ound . H ist ol ogy

do e s n ot e xpla in w hy

ha lf of a pa ir of pa nty ho se be lon g ingto S we ari ng e n’ s w if e wa s fo un d in S we ari ng e n’ s h ou se and the oth e r h a lf around Ms. Trotter’s nec k. The ne w evidenc e does not e x plain why the same me al Ms. Trotter wa s last seen e ating was found in her stomach. Swe aring en lied about his w h e r e a

b o u ts , tr ie d

to f a b r ic a te ana li b i, ma d e f

a ls e p o li c e r e p o rts , f

le d from police, aske d fr i en d s t o lie on his behalf, told others that the police would be af ter him, and cra fted a

n ultimately i n cu l p at o ry letter to throw attention away from himself. Swear inge n told other inmates, “F uck, y eah, I did it.” F inally , Swear inge n’s e x p e rt s d o n o te x p l a i nw h e r e M s . T r o t t e r w a s f r o m D e c e mb e r

8 u n t i l a f e w d ays b e f o r e h u n t e r s f

o u n d h e r b o dy. 38 More importantly , the trial court has made supported-by -the-r ecor d finding s o f f ac t that
a g a in, un de rs c or e the su

bs tanti a l e vid e nc e of

g uil t. 39

• On the eve ning of Dec ember 7, 1998, two of Movant’s a cquaintanc es, the F osters, witnessed a phone c onversation in which Movant arr ang ed for a lunch meeting with a girl at a librar y the following day , and Movant then told the F osters that the g irl was M el i s s a T ro t t er, a c oll e g e stu de nt f

ro m Will is.

• Three witnesses saw Mova nt sitt ing w ith Melissa in the Montgome ry College library betwee n 11:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. the following day , Dec ember 8, 1998.

• Me lis sa ’s B iol og y te a c he r saw Me lis sa le a ve the Mo ntg ome ry Col le g e lib ra

ry wi th a ma leSw ear i ngen- - 15

s h o rt l y a f t e r 1 : 3 0 p . m . t h a td ay.

• Melissa’s ca

r re mained in the Montgome ry College parkinglot following he r disappea ranc e on Dec ember

8, 1998.

• At 2:05 p.m. on Dec ember 8, 1998, Movant called Sarah Searle and said that he wa s at lunch with a frie nd.

• Sometime around 3:00 p.m. on Dec ember 8, 1998, Movant’s l andlord saw Applicant’s truc k leavingfrom behind his home.

• At 3:03 p.m. on Dece mber 8, 1998, Movant plac ed a c ell phone ca ll that utilized a cell tower ne ar F M 1 09 7 in

Willi s, Te xas, wh ic h w ou ld b e c on sis te nt w ithMo va nt d ri ving fro m hi s ho me to t he Sa m H ou sto n N a tio na l F or e st.

• Movant’s wife testified that she found the ir h o m e i n disarra y on the eve ning of

Dec ember 8 , 1 9 9 8 , b u tn o n e o f t h e S we ar i n gen ’s p ro p er t y wa s m i s s i n g.

• Movant’s wife observe d Melissa’s cig are ttes and lighter in Mova nt’s house that eve ning, a

nd those items were subsequently rec overe d from Movant’s home during the investig ation.

• Hair a

nd fiber e vidence , as we ll as other phy sical evidenc e, showe d that Melissa had be en in Movant’s ca

r and his home on the da

y of her disappea ranc e.

• Mo va

nt f ile d a burg lary re po rt fa lse ly c la imi ng that he ha d be e n out of tow n a nd his ho me was broke n into on the day of Melissa’s disappe ara

nce.

• Be tween the time of Melissa’s disappe ara nce an d Movant’s ar

rest, Movant told two a c qu a int anc e s o n tw o d if

fe re nt o c c a sio ns that he be lie ve d p oli c e wo uld be a ft e r h im.

• When the Foster s hear d that M eli ssa Trotter was missing on D ece mber 9, 1998, they contac ted Movant, who c laimed he did not re member the last name of the g i rl with whom he had me t the day

befor e.

• When Mrs. Foster told Movant that she rec alled him saying the last name was “ Trotter,” and that a g irl named Melissa Tr otter wa s now missing, the phone went dea d.

• Movant led a Sher iff’s de puty on a hig h speed c hase.

• Following Movant’s ar rest, law e nforcem ent authorities obser ved and photog raphe d red marks on Movant’s ne ck, che ek, and ba ck.

• On Dec ember

17, 1998, two neig hbors of Movant’ s mother an d stepfathe r collec ted nu me r o u s p i e c e s o f t o r

n p a p e r f r o m a l o n g t h e i r s t r e e t , w h i c h tu r n e d o u t t o b e Me lis sa Trotter’ s c la s s s c h e d

u le an d s o me h e a lt

h in s u r an c e p a

p e r w o r k M e li s s a ’ s f

a th e r h a d g ive n to her.

• Melissa’s body was discovered in an area of t he S am Houst on National F orest with which Movant would have been f amiliar fr om previous time spent there
.
• Melissa’s body

showed sig ns of sig nificant d ec o m p o sition when it was discovere d in the woods 25 day s after

her disappe ara

nce.

• Th e lig a tur e fo un d a ro un d M e lis sa ’s ne c k ma tc he d th e re ma ind e r o f a pa ir of pa nty ho se found within Movant’s home.Sw ear i ngen- - 16

• The Ha

rris Country

Chief Medica l Ex aminer te stified that during t h e digestive proc ess, a person’ s stomach will usually not empty

in less than two hours, an d any food within the stomach at de ath will remain ther e.

• The c ontents of M el i s sa’s stomach at the autopsy , which included w hat appe are d to be chicke n and a f

renc h fry -like for

m of potato, wer e consistent with the tater tots she ha d eate n at Montgome ry College shortly befor e leaving with Mova nt a nd the Chicken McNug g ets she and Movant ha d app ar en t l y purcha sed at the ne arby McDona ld’s on the day of her disappea ranc e.

• Whil e in jail, Movant attempted to cr eate an exculpatory letter wr itten in Spanish i n which he cla imed to be someone e lse who had know ledg e of Me lissa’s murder.

• Wit hin that le tter, Movant detailed specific s of the offe nse that acc urate ly corr oborate d the phy sical and me dical evide nce in the c ase.

• Whil e in jail awa iting trial, Movant told a cell mate that he had committed the capital murde r an d h i s o n l y o b

j e c t i v e w a s t o e s c a

p e t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y. Be cause of the overw helming evidenc e of g uilt indepe ndent of any potentially exculpatory DNA testing and appe llant’s inability to show a 51% pr obability that he would not have been convicted, a

ppellant’s first issue is over ruled. I n his second is sue, appe llant claims that the trial cour t “er red in fa iling to consider the signific ant non-DN A evidenc e re futing the State’s evide nce at tria l an d s upporting Appellant’s innocenc e in deny ing his reque st for DN A testing .” This claim per tains to evidence that appellant prese nted at a he aringin support of one of his succ essive habe as cor pus applications-that the vic tim’s bo d y wa s l eft in the national forest sometime af ter a ppellant’s ar

rest. The convicting court made finding s contrar

y to appellant on this claim, and this Court adopted these findings in de ny ing
a pp e lla nt r e lie f o n th is cla im
. W e c ann ot c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt wo uld have a bu se d it s discret i o n if it had not rec onsidered this evide nce in c onnection with appe llant’s third reque st for more DN A testing . Moreove r, any err or in doing so was har mles s i n l i gh t of the over whelming evidenc e of a

ppellant’s g uilt. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.Sw ear i ngen- - 17

H e r v e y , J.

Deliver ed: Fe bruar

y 10, 2010 Publis h