alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

 The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-2560

___________

Rose Mary Delgado, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * 

*

Rodney Hajicek, Badge No. 556, a * Appeal from the United States

detective and police officer employed * District Court for the 

by the East Grand Forks Police * District of Minnesota. 

Department in both his individual and *

official capacities; Chris Olson, a * [UNPUBLISHED]

police officer, employed by the East *

Grand Forks Police Department in both *

his individual and official capacities, * 

* 

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2009

Filed: March 25, 2009

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges

___________

PER CURIAM.

Rose Mary Delgado sued detective Rodney William Hajicek, and others,

alleging deprivation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court1

 granted
-2-

summary judgment to defendants. Delgado v. Hajicek, No. 07-2186, 2008 WL

2042606 (D. Minn. May 12, 2008). Delgado appeals with respect to Hajicek. Having

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.

Davenport v. University of Arkansas Board of Trustees, 553 F.3d 1110, 1112 (8th Cir.

2009). A moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the evidence, viewed

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establishes that no genuine issue

of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

King v. Hardesty, 517 F.3d 1049, 1056 (8th Cir. 2008). 

Delgado raises two issues on appeal: (1) Hajicek violated her Fourth

Amendment rights by issuing a theft citation without probable cause; and (2) Hajicek

violated her Fourth Amendment rights because he “materially misled” the Polk

County Court, leading to the issuance of a warrant for her arrest. 

Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, this court finds no

error in the district court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. Therefore, this court

affirms for the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned

opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

______________________________
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

CERTIFICATION

 

I, James Whang, certify that:

 

1.          I have reviewed this reporton Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report onForm 10-K of Fixed Income Trust For Goldman Sachs Subordinated Notes, Series 2011-1 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

 

2.          Based on my knowledge, theExchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleadingwith respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.          Based on my knowledge, allof the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this reportis included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4.          Based on my knowledge and theservicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the ExchangeAct periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and

 

5.          All of the reports on assessmentof compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliancewith servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 ofRegulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosedin this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably reliedon information provided to me by the following unaffiliated party: The Bank Of New York Mellon, as Trustee.

 

Date: March 13, 2015

 

/s/ James Whang
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Paul DePond, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the
Annual Report of Notify Technology Corporation on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained
in such Annual Report on Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Notify Technology Corporation.



|                  |  |  |  |     |  |                       |  |                        
|----------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | --------------------- |  | -----------------------
|December 19, 2006 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/    PAUL F.
DEPOND
|                  |  |  |  |     |  | Name:                 |  | Paul F. DePond         
|                  |  |  |  |     |  | Title:                |  | Chief Executive Officer



I, Gerald W. Rice,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Notify Technology Corporation on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2006
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of Notify Technology Corporation.



|                  |  |  |  |     |  |                       |  |                        
|----------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | --------------------- |  | -----------------------
|December 19, 2006 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/    GERALD W. RICE
|                  |  |  |  |     |  | Name:                 |  | Gerald W. Rice         
|                  |  |  |  |     |  | Title:                |  | Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of
this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Notify Technology Corporation and will be retained by Notify Technology Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-6567

GEORGE W. DAVIS, III, Petitioner - Appellant, versus GENE M. JOHNSON, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District Judge. (3:06-cv-00108-HEH) Submitted: October 24, 2007 Decided: November 14, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. George W. Davis, III, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Thomas Judge, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: George W. Davis, III, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Davis has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### MARSH *v.*KENYON.

Judicial Sales.

While a purchaser of land at a judicial sale under ordinary conditions will not be compelled to accept a title that is not good (citing *McCaffrey*v. *Little,*20 App. D. C. 116), he will be required to accept the title if it is good by adverse possession, although such a title is not what, is called a good record title (citing *Block*v. *Ryan, 4*App. D. C. 283).

No. 2296.

Submitted November 7, 1911.

Decided December 4, 1911.

Hearing on an appeal by a purchaser at a judicial sale from’ a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia directing compliance with an accepted offer of sale.

*Affirmed.*

The facts are stated in the opinion.

*Mr. D. C. O’Callaghan, Mr. W. W. Bride,*and *Mr. Sidney F. Smith*for the appellant.

*Mr. D.*W. *O’Donoghue*and *Mr. J. M. Kenyon*for the appellees.

Mr. Chief Justice Shepard

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This is an appeal from a decree directing compliance with an accepted offer of purchase at a judicial sale.

The undivided interest of William W. Breneman in certain lots of land in the city of Washington was offered for sale by J. Miller Kenyon and Daniel W. O’Donoghue, trustees, on July 26, 1910, and declared sold to George W. Marsh, who made a deposit of $200 to secure his said bid. The decree directing *575the sale was regularly made in a cause pending in the equity court, the proceedings in which are shown in the report of the same on appeal to this court. *Breneman*v. Herdman, 35 App. D. C. 27. Marsh petitioned the equity court to annul the sale and direct the return of his deposit, alleging that notice was given that the title was good; that he purchased in reliance thereon; that he has since discovered that the title is not good, being based upon a pretended title by adverse possession under a notoriously defective tax deed.

The sworn answer of the trustees avers that the title was announced good by them at the sale, but there was no statement that the title was good of record. They say that the title is good in the Breneman heirs—the interest of one of whom was the subject-matter of the sale—by adverse possession under tax deeds to their grandfather in 1839. This adverse possession has been continuous and undisturbed for more than seventy years, and constitutes a good marketable title. That the title was good by adverse possession was not denied by the purchaser.

His contention respecting the character and form of the decree requires no discussion. The principle is well established that a purchaser, under ordinary conditions, will not be compelled to accept a title that is not good. *McCaffrey*v. Little, 20 App. D. C. 116-121.

But it is not necessary that a title to be good shall be what is called a good record title. A title is good if it has been acquired by adverse possession under such circumstances, and for such length of time, as to render it indefeasible at law or in equity. *Block*v. *Ryan, 4*App. D. C. 283-287. There can be no doubt that the adverse possession in this case constituted such a title.

The decree is right, and is affirmed, with costs.

*Affirmed.*
H. J. Res. 43 

One Hundred Tenth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE FIRST SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday, 

the fourth day of January, two thousand and seven 

Joint Resolution 

Increasing the statutory limit on the public debt. 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That subsection 

(b) of section 3101 of title 31, United States Code, is amended 

by striking out the dollar limitation contained in such subsection 

and inserting in lieu thereof $9,815,000,000,000. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
#### COPELAND *v.*COPELAND.

Where what purports to be a brief of the evidence, attached to the bill of exceptions, does not appear to have been approved by the trial judge and ordered filed as part of the record, and is not identified by the judge’s signature, it can not be considered; and if the questions raised by the assignments of error require a consideration of the evidence before the judge, his judgment must be affirmed.

No. 6419.

April 16, 1928.

Attachment for contempt. Before Judge Maddox. Floyd superior court. November 3, 1927.

*Henry Walker,*for plaintiff. *Porter & Mebane,*for ¿(efendant.

Hines, J.

Oscar Copeland was cited for contempt of court for not paying to his former wife, Ethel Copeland, temporary and permanent alimony which had been awarded to her in a divorce case between them. He made no written answer to the rule nisi, and the case was heard without such response. Evidence was introduced by both parties. The court discharged the rule, upon the ground that the defendant was not in contempt, as he had “no money, property, or earning capacity whatever.” The evidence introduced on the hearing is not set out in the bill of exceptions, which recites that “Movant annexes hereto and a part of this bill of exceptions a brief of'the oral evidence submitted on the hearing of said rule. No documentary evidence was offered.” Following the certificate to the bill of exceptions is what purports to be a brief of the oral evidence. This brief was not approved and ordered filed as a part of the record in the case, nor was it identified by the signature of the judge. Where the bill of exceptions shows on its face that the evidence material to a consideration of the errors assigned is not before this court in such a manner that it can be considered, and the questions raised by the assignments of error necessarily involve a consideration of the evidence, this court can not adjudicate that any error was committed, or that there should be a judgment of reversal. *Waldrip v. Slagle,*161 *Ga.*464 (131 S. E. 53).

*Judgment affw-med.*

*All the Justices concur.*
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Defense

###### Department of the Army; Corps of Engineers

# AGENCY:

Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, DoD.

# ACTION:

Notice; extension of comment period.

# SUMMARY:

                        The comment period for the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed construction of the Western Wake Regional Wastewater Management Facilities, in Wake and Chatham Counties, NC published in the                         **Federal Register**                         on Friday, December 18, 2009 (74 FR 67180), required comments be submitted 33 days (January 19, 2010) following publication in the                         **Federal Register**                        . The comment period has been extended to 54 days (February 9, 2010). This is because the initial Web version of the Final Environmental Impact Statement had problems with the Web links. The web version was corrected on December 28, 2009.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Henry Wicker, Telephone (910) 251-4930.

Brenda S. Bowen,

Army Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 2010-237 Filed 1-8-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3720-58-P
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Renal Care Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David
M. Dill, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

/s/ David M. Dill
------------------------------
David M. Dill
Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
August 4, 2005
News United States Air Force
 All global strike bombers deploy to Andersen, maintain stability in PACOM theaterPublished Aug. 11, 2016
                        
                        By Headquarters Pacific Air Force Public Affairs
                **ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, Guam (AFNS) --**
                Air Force Global Strike Command's three strategic bombers, the B-52 Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit, are all in the U.S. Pacific Command regionconducting the area's first integrated operational mission for all three bombers. 
The B-1, which arrived at Andersen Air Force Base Aug. 6, will replace the B-52 in support of the PACOM’s continuous bomber presence mission. The CBP bomber swap between the B-1 and B-52 is occurring throughout the month of August as the B-1s return to support this mission for the first time since April 2006.
In addition to the CBP bomber swap, three B-2s arrived in theater to conduct a bomber assurance and deterrence deployment. The CBP mission and BAAD deployments are part of a long-standing history of maintaining a consistent bomber presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region in order to maintain stability and provide assurance to U.S. allies and partners in the region.B-2 



B-1 



B-52 



Andersen AFB 



Guam 



PACOM 



PACAF 



CBP 



bomber 



AFGSC Related Links
        B-2s conduct deployment to Indo-Asia-Pacific
            
            B-1s to replace B-52s during routine bomber presence rotation
<PAGE>
Exhibit 23.1

                             CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
                          CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS







SPACEDEV, INC.
San Diego, CA

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (333-47338) of SPACEDEV, INC. of our report dated
February 20, 2002, relating to the consolidated financial statements of the
Company appearing in its Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2001. Our
report contains an explanatory paragraph regarding the Company's ability to
continue as a going concern.

We also consent to the reference to us under the caption "Experts" in the
Prospectus.



/s/ Nation Smith Hermes Diamond

Nation Smith Hermes Diamond,
Accountants and Consultants, APC
San Diego, California
March 6, 2002
#### Sam Seaton v. Brooking et al.

(No. 728, Op. Book No. 2, p. 276.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

Opinion by

Quinan, J.

§ 1041. *Orders of court are under its control, etc.*The orders of a court are under its control until the end of the term at which they have been made. [Doss v. Tyack, 14 Howard, 312.]

*586§ 1042. *Garnishment; married woman may make affidavit and sign bond for.*Where plaintiffs in the suit were husband and wife, and the suit was for the recovery of the wife’s money, she was held to be authorized to make the affidavit and sign the bond required to obtain a writ of garnishment. It was not necessary that the principals should have signed the bond.

§ 1043. *Garnishee cannot object to irregularity of proceedings against debtor.*The debtors against whom the suit was brought appeared to have been duly served with or accepted service of process. The judgment against them recited that they appeared in the suit, and they being personally before the court, the garnishee was nob interested in the proceedings by which their appearance was secured, and could not be heard to complain that such proceedings were irregular.

§ 1044. *Partnership debts; garnishment of, for individual debt of partner.*Undoubtedly the general rule is that partnership debts cannot be reached for the satisfaction of the debt of an individual partner, or any number of them less than the whole, by the process of garnishment. [Drake on Attach. 569; Taylor v. Keylor, 28 Lead. Am. Cas. 530; Johnson v. King, 6 Humph. 233; Myers v. Smith, 29 Ohio St. 120; Barry v. Fisher, 8 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 369; Wyman v. Stewart, 42 Ala. 163; Knerr v. Hoffman, 65 Pa. St. 126.] By some courts, however, it has been intimated that under the garnishee or trustee process the interest of the individual partner in the partnership credits may be reached. [Wallace v. Hull, 28 Ga. 68; Winston v. Ewing, 1 Ala. 132; Fisk v. Herrick, 6 Mass. 271; Parker v. Wright, 66 Maine, 392.] The court in this case did not find it necessary to adopt any rule upon the subject, but expressed itself as strongly inclined to indorse the general rule as above stated, that partnership credits cannot be reached by garnishment process for the individual debt of a member of such partnership.

*587March 3, 1881.

§ 1045. *Garnishment; proceedings by, not liberally construed.*The process of garnishment is purely a legal remedy given by statute, and these laws giving these summary proceedings have not been liberally construed, and courts may well refuse to extend aid to such proceedings beyond the plain import of the law. [Price v. Brady, 21 Tex. 614.]

§ 104 6. *Garnishment; cannot change nature of contract, etc.*.It'is well settled that a garnishment cannot have the effect of changing the nature of a contract between the garnishee and the defendant, or of preventing the garnishee from performing a contract with a third person. [Drake on Attach. 517.]

Reversed and remanded.
#### Suzanne L. CATHEY v. Melissa Lynn OGEA, et al.

No. 2012-CJ-2099.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 12, 2012.

In re Cathey, Suzanne L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2011-1277; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 12-563 C/W CW 12-324.

Denied.