alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1034 

To amend the National Guard Youth Challenge Program under title 32, 

United States Code, to exclude nondefense funds made available by 

other Federal agencies for the Program from the matching requirements 

of the Program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 13, 2007 

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina (for himself, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. 

ETHERIDGE, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. HOLT, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. 

PASTOR, Mr. MELANCON, Mr. LAHOOD, and Mr. SPRATT) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To amend the National Guard Youth Challenge Program 

under title 32, United States Code, to exclude nondefense 

funds made available by other Federal agencies for the 

Program from the matching requirements of the Program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
2 

•HR 1034 IH

1 SECTION 1. FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR STATE PROGRAMS 

2 UNDER THE NATIONAL GUARD YOUTH CHAL3 LENGE PROGRAM. 

4 (a) FEDERAL SHARE OF COSTS OF STATE PRO5 GRAMS.—Subsection (d) of section 509 of title 32, United 

6 States Code, is amended to read as follows: 

7 ‘‘(d) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SHARE OF STATE

8 PROGRAM COSTS.—The amount of assistance provided 

9 under this section to a State program of the Program for 

10 a fiscal year using funds appropriated directly to the Sec11 retary of Defense may not exceed 60 percent of the costs 

12 of operating the State program during that year. However, 

13 nondefense funds made available or transferred to the Sec14 retary of Defense by other Federal agencies to support 

15 the Program or provided directly by other Federal agen16 cies in support of the Program shall not be subject to the 

17 matching-funds requirement imposed by the preceding 

18 sentence.’’. 

19 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—For fis20 cal year 2008, there is authorized to be appropriated to 

21 the Secretary of Defense $97,527,200 to carry out the Na22 tional Guard Youth Challenge Program under section 509 

23 of title 32, United States Code. 

Æ 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-30057

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Demetrius Pearson, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:22-CR-18-4

______________________________

Before Smith, Higginson, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

The attorney appointed to represent Demetrius Pearson has moved to 

withdraw and has filed a brief per Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Pearson has not filed 

a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and relevant portions of the 

record. 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 21, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-30057 Document: 00516904538 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/21/2023
No. 23-30057

2

We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no 

nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the motion to withdraw 

is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and 

the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

Case: 23-30057 Document: 00516904538 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/21/2023
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 79 (Friday, May 12, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6597-S6598]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

         INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE ACT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

                      UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, we are ending the long, long trail toward 
passage of S. 534.
  In order to accomplish crossing that goal line, I ask unanimous 
consent that, except for the following amendments, no other first-
degree amendments be in order after the close of 
 [[Page S6598]] business, and that these first-degree amendments be 
subject to relevant second-degree amendments and limited to one-half of 
the time allocated for each first-degree amendment. The excepted 
amendments are: Murray-Gorton, Feinstein, Levin, Domenici, and 
Kempthorne.
  I further ask unanimous consent that when the Senate resumes the bill 
on Tuesday at 9:30 a.m., Senator Murray be recognized to offer an 
amendment on which there will be a time limit of 1 hour to be equally 
divided in the usual form.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          Feinstein Amendment

  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that 
following the disposition of the Murray amendment, Senator Feinstein be 
recognized to offer her amendment on which there be 30 minutes to be 
equally divided in the usual form.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                            Levin Amendment

  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that 
following the disposition of the Feinstein amendment, Senator Levin be 
recognized to offer an amendment, relative to expansion, on which there 
be 30 minutes for debate to be equally divided in the usual form.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                           Domenici Amendment

  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that 
following the disposition of the Levin amendment, Senator Domenici be 
recognized to offer an amendment relative to title III, on which there 
be 30 minutes for debate to be equally divided in the usual form.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          Kempthorne Amendment

  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that 
following the disposition of the Domenici amendment, Senator Kempthorne 
be recognized to offer an amendment, which is clarifying in nature, on 
which there be 30 minutes for debate to be equally divided in the usual 
form.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________
```
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. VICTOR A. PERELLA.

March 27, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
Order entered September 3, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00270-CR

MACK MCKINLEY WARD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F12-63580-Y

ORDER

The Court REINSTATES the appeal.

On August 12, 2014, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding why the 

reporter’s record has not been filed. We ADOPT the findings that: (1) appellant desires to 

pursue the appeal; (2) appellant is indigent and represented by court-appointed counsel; (3) 

counsel timely requested preparation of the reporter’s record; (4) court reporter Sharon 

Hazlewood explained the delay in filing the record was due to her workload; and (5) Ms. 

Hazlewood stated the record could be prepared within ten days of the August 25, 2014 findings.

We ORDER Sharon Hazlewood, official court reporter of the Criminal District Court 

No. 7, to file the complete reporter’s record, including exhibits, within TEN DAYS of the date of 

this order. No further extensions will be granted. If the record is not filed within the time 
specified, the Court will order that Sharon Hazlewood not sit as a court reporter until the 

complete record is filed in this appeal.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to the 

Honorable Michael Snipes, Presiding Judge, Criminal District Court No. 7; Sharon Hazlewood, 

official court reporter, Criminal District Court No. 7; and to counsel for all parties.

/s/ DAVID EVANS 

JUSTICE
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 72 (Wednesday, May 3, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Page S6128]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                           ORDER OF PROCEDURE

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I will use my leader time as in morning 
business. There are a couple of issues I would like to address. As I 
understand it, once my remarks have been made, the Senate will then go 
into recess. So I will summarize my remarks at this point.

                          ____________________
```
#### G. W. Waters v. Conrad Pape.

(No. 467, Tex. L. J., vol. 2, p. 444.)

Appeal from Comal County.

Opinion by

Winkler, J.

§ 714. *Charge of court which indicates the judge’s opinion on the facts.*Where the court charged the jury: “Gentlemen of the jury, this case is for obtaining the J 43 *391ownership of a horse. The defendant has, by many witnesses, proved that he raised the horse; that in 1870 or 1871 he lost him, and in 1875 he found him in possession of the plaintiff, who proved that he bought -the horse from one Mathews in 1873, and therefore had possession of the horse up to 1875, about two years, and therefore claims the statute of limitations. The defendant further proved that he branded the horse with his brand. Now, should you find for the defendant, you may assess such damages as you may consider reasonable, according to the evidence in the *case,”*— held, this charge indicated very clearly the opinion of the judge as to whom the verdict should favor; and that the court assumed that certain facts had been proved, instead of leaving it to the jmy to determine what had and what had not been proved, and it leaves the jury the determination only of the single question of damages.

January 18, 1879.

§ 715. *Statute of limitations as to personal property.*The statute of limitations bars a recovery upon all actions for retaining personal property and its conversion, unless suit therefor is instituted within two years next after the cause of action accrues [Pas. Dig. art. 4604]; and genererally, upon proper averment and proof, the statute may he as effectually invoked as a weapon of offense in the hands of a plaintiff, as a shield of defense to a defendant, even in matters of greater moment than a horse. [Sayles’ Treatise (2d ed.), § 441.]

Eeversed and remanded.
Exhibit 35.1

SERVICING COMPLIANCE STATEMENT

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2011-4 for the fiscal year ending
December 31, 2014 (the Report), the undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Santander Consumer USA Inc. (the Servicer), does hereby certify and represent that:



| | 1. | A review of the activities and performance of the Servicer under the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of October 13, 2011, among Santander Drive Auto Receivables LLC, Santander Consumer USA Inc., Santander
Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2011-4 and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (the Agreement) during the period that is the subject of the Report has been made under my supervision.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the period that is the subject of the Report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC./s/ Jason KulasName:

Jason KulasTitle:

President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:

March 23, 2015/s/ Jennifer M. PoppName:

Jennifer M. PoppTitle:

Chief Accounting OfficerDate:

March 23, 2015
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. CLYDE BRIGGS.

February 16, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
#### L. Schwartz v. I. Burton.

(No. 1677, Op. Book No. 2, p. 531.)

Appeal from Uvalde County.

Opinion by

Watts, J.

§ 1216. *Attachment; nature of remedy by; damages for wrongfully suing out; for maliciously suing out; rules as to.*The remedy by attachment is summary, and may be rendered exceedingly harsh and oppressive by resorting to it wrongfully. However, it is a remedy provided for by law, and when called into requisition, in the cases provided by statute, and under the circumstances therein named, it is as legitimate as any other legal remedy, and there is no penalty following from its proper use. The law provides as a check upon the improper resort to the writ, that, if it is wrongfully sued out, the party injured by the wrong may recover the actual damages resulting to him from such use of the remedy; and if, in addition to its being wrongful, it is maliciously resorted to, without probable cause, he may recover exemplary damages. Actual damages that may be recovered for wrongfully suing out the writ are such only as are the natural, proximate and legal result or consequence of the wrongful act. [Wallace v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 35; Drake on Attach. § 175.] The burden in such case is upon the party who asserts that the writ has been wrongfully sued out, to establish that the grounds upon which it issued were untrue, and also to establish that the damages as claimed resulted from the wrongful act; and if, in addition, exemplary damages are claimed for the malicious use of the writ, the burden is upon the party asserting the malice to show that there was no probable cause to resort to the writ, and that it was done maliciously. However, where *699it is clearly shown that there was a want of probable cause, malice may be inferred. Loss or injury to credit is not the natural, proximate, legal consequence of wrongfully suing out the writ, and cannot be recovered as actual damages. But where it is shown that the resort to the remedy was without probable cause and malicious, loss or injury to the credit maybe recovered as exemplary damages. [Culbertson v. Cabeen, 29 Tex. 247; Drake on Attach. §§ 175, 745.]

October 10, 1881.

[Reversed and remanded.
Dismissed and Opinion Filed October 25, 2016 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-16-00977-CV LORI SCHMIDT AND JOSEPH HUEY, Appellants V. PARK ROYAL HOMEOWNER'S A SSOCIATION AND PARK ROYAL CONDOMINIUMS, INC. DBA PARK RO YAL HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, Appellees On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-07881 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Wright, Justi ce Lang-Miers, and Justice Stoddart Opinion by Chief Justice Wright By letter dated September 27, 2016, we notified appellants the Court received notice from the Dallas County District Cl erk that appellants did not pa y for or make arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record. We directed appellan ts to file written verification of payment or arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record or wr itten verification that ap pellants have been found to be entitled to proceed without payment of costs. We cautioned appellants that failure to do so would result in the dismissal of this appeal withou t further notice. To date, we have not received the requested verification or comm unication from appellants, and th e clerk’s record has not been
filed.–2– Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 37.3(b).

160977F.P05 /CarolynWright/ CAROLYN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE–3– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

LORI SCHMIDT AND JOSEPH HUEY, Appellants
No. 05-16-00977-CV V.
PARK ROYAL HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION AND PARK ROYAL CONDOMINIUMS, INC. DBA PARK ROYAL HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, Appellees On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-07881. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wright. Justices Lang-Miers and Stoddart participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED

. It is ORDERED that appellees Park Royal Homeow ner’s Association and Park Royal Condominiums, Inc. dba Park Royal Homeowner’s A ssociation recover their costs, if any, of this appeal from appellants Lori Schmidt and Joseph Huey.
Judgment entered this 25th day of October, 2016.
#### IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT W. HILL v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

January 17, 1984.

Petition for certification denied. (See 190 *N.J.Super.*418)
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 2084

KING GRANT

- DAVIS , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CHARLESTON COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY; CHARLESTON, COUNTY OF , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Charleston

. Patrick Michael Duffy , Senior District Judge. ( 2:15

- cv - 02676

- PMD )

Submitted : January 30 , 2018 Decided: February 1, 2018

Before MOTZ and KEENAN , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. King Grant

- Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Drew Hamilton Butler, Charleston, South Carolina , Carmen Vaughn Ganjehsani, RICHARDSON PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, PA, Colum bia, South Carolina , for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: King Grant

- Davis appeals the district court’s order adopting in part the magistrate judge’s recommendation and granting summary judgment in Grant

- Davis’ civil action in favor of the Board of Trustees of Charleston County Public Library and Charleston County

. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Grant

- D avis v. Bd. of Trs. of Charleston Cty. Pub. Library , No. 2:15

- cv - 02676

- PMD (D.S.C. Aug. 24, 2017) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not ai d the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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</TABLE>
#### Emile Richers v. Charles Helmcamp.

(No. 327, Tex. L. *J., vol. 1, p. 241.)*

Appeal from Fayette County.

Opinion by

Ector, P. J.

§ 682. *Alteration of a note; qualified plea of non est factum; burden of proof.*It was not necessary for the plaintiff to allege in his petition for *certiorari*that the notes sued on were not altered by him, because the qualified plea of *non est factum*admits that defendant executed the notes; and hence the burden of proving their alteration, if they were altered, rests on the defendant. If the petition had shown that the defendant had filed an *374ordinary plea of *non est factum,*in which he denied under oath the execution of the two notes, then it would not have been necessary for him to have stated that they were not altered by him. When a defendant in a suit on a note, bond, or other instrument of writing alleged to have been executed by him, denies its execution under oath, in this, that he avers a material alteration after the execution of the same without his consent, such qualified plea does not put in issue the signing of the instrument, nor throw the burden of disproving the alteration on the plaintiff, but it lies with the defendant to prove the alteration.

March 2, 1878.

When a regular plea of *non est factum*is filed by a defendant, denying the execution of the bond or note, then the instrument sued on cannot be read in evidence until the signature of the defendant to it has been proved; but where the signature of the defendant has been admitted in the plea, it may be read in evidence without proof of its execution, and then the defendant may offer evidence to prove that it has been materially altered, to his prejudice, since its execution, if he desires to do so. [Wells v. Moore, 15 Tex. 521; Dryer v. Rhode, decided by this court at the present term.]

§ 683. *Certiorari; sufficiency of petition for, not to be tested by justice''s transcript.*In determining the sufficiency of the petition, it is not proper to regard the facts as stated by the justice in hiS' transcript in opposition to those set forth and sworn to in the petition for *certiorari.*In this case there is some discrepancy between the transcript of the justice and the petition. The justice’s transcript simply states that “defendant’s counsel filed a plea of *non est factum,”*and we find no such plea copied into the record. On a motion to quash the petition for *certiorari*and dismiss the cause, the allegations in the petition must be taken as true for the purposes of the motion. [Hearne v. Foster, 21 Tex. 401.] The court erred in dismissing the petition.

Reversed and remanded.