[Cite as State v. Meeks, 2020-Ohio-5050.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DEFIANCE COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 4-20-02 

 v. 

JOSHUA A. MEEKS, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 19 CR 13669 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: October 26, 2020 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Henry Schaefer for Appellant 

 Russell R. Herman for Appellee 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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SHAW, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Joshua A. Meeks (“Meeks”), brings this appeal 

from the January 24, 2020 judgment of the Defiance County Common Pleas Court 

sentencing him to an aggregate, indefinite prison term of 17 to 22 years after Meeks 

entered guilty pleas to, and was convicted of, Kidnapping in violation of R.C. 

2905.01(A)(3), a felony of the first degree, and Felonious Assault in violation of 

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree. On appeal, Meeks argues that 

his convictions for Kidnapping and Felonious Assault should have merged for the 

purposes of sentencing. 

Background

{¶2} On August 29, 2019, Meeks was indicted for (Count 1) Attempted 

Aggravated Murder in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and R.C. 2903.01(B), a felony of 

the first degree, (Count 2) Kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), a felony 

of the first degree, (Count 3) Rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of 

the first degree, (Count 4) Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a 

felony of the second degree, (Count 5) Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree, and (Count 6) Domestic Violence in 

violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the third degree due to Meeks having two 

prior convictions for Domestic Violence. Counts 1 through 5 of the indictment all 

contained Repeat Violent Offender specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A) 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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indicating that Meeks had previously been convicted of Felonious Assault in 

Defiance County in 2007. The alleged victim of all the crimes in this indictment 

was Meeks’ wife. At the time of the incidents Meeks and his wife still lived together 

but they were proceeding through a divorce. Meeks pled not guilty to the charges. 

{¶3} On November 7, 2019, a change-of-plea hearing was held wherein 

Meeks agreed to plead guilty to Count 2, Kidnapping in Violation of R.C. 

2905.01(A)(3), a felony of the first degree, Count 5, Felonious Assault in violation 

of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree, and (Count 6) Domestic 

Violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the third degree. In exchange 

for Meeks’ pleas, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges against him and 

to dismiss the Repeat Violent Offender specifications. Further, the State agreed that 

the Felonious Assault and Domestic Violence convictions would merge for 

purposes of sentencing. 

{¶4} The trial court conducted a Crim.R. 11 colloquy with Meeks and 

determined that his pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court 

also had the State recite a factual basis for the charges, which Meeks and his counsel 

acknowledged were essentially correct, though Meeks stated the crimes did not 

occur in precisely the way the State alleged. Afterward, Meeks’ pleas were accepted 

and he was found guilty. 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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{¶5} On January 16, 2020, the matter proceeded to sentencing. The State 

recommended a lengthy prison term due to Meeks’ violent criminal history. It was 

noted that Meeks had been charged with another Aggravated Assault while he was 

being held in custody as this case was pending. 

{¶6} Meeks’ attorney then argued that the Felonious Assault and Kidnapping 

counts should merge. The State objected, contending that if the State was aware 

Meeks would be seeking merger of those two charges it would not have dismissed 

certain other charges or specifications. Nevertheless, the trial court found that the 

Felonious Assault and Kidnapping charges did not merge, reasoning that there were 

multiple instances of serious violence against the victim in this matter. 

{¶7} After Meeks apologized to the victim in this matter, Meeks was ordered 

to serve an indefinite prison term of 10-15 years on the Kidnapping conviction, and 

7 to 10 and 1⁄2 years on the Felonious Assault conviction. The Felonious Assault 

and Domestic Violence charges were merged for the purposes of sentencing. The 

trial court ordered that Meeks’ sentences be served consecutively for an aggregate, 

indefinite prison term of 17 to 22 years. A judgment entry memorializing this 

sentence was filed January 24, 2020. It is from this judgment that Meeks appeals, 

asserting the following assignment of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred when it failed to merge appellant’s sentence 

for Kidnapping and Felonious Assault. 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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{¶8} In his assignment of error, Meeks contends that the trial court erred by 

failing to merge his sentences for Kidnapping and Felonious Assault. 

Standard of Review 

{¶9} “ ‘Whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import is a question 

of law that this Court reviews de novo.’ ” State v. Jessen, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-

18-16, 2019-Ohio-907, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Frye, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-30, 

2018-Ohio-894; see generally State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-955. 

Relevant Authority 

{¶10} Revised Code 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, states: 

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 

constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 

indictment or information may contain counts for all such 

offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one. 

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 

offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two 

or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately 

or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or 

information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the 

defendant may be convicted of all of them. 

{¶11} In State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio held the following with regard to determining allied offenses: 

1. In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar 

import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate

three separate factors—the conduct, the animus, and the import.

2. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the 

meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct 
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constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that 

results from each offense is separate and identifiable. 

3. Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports 

multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of 

the following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of 

dissimilar import, (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were

committed separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses 

were committed with separate animus. 

The Supreme Court in Ruff explained: 

At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts 

of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct. 

The evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will 

reveal whether the offenses have similar import. When a 

defendant’s conduct victimizes more than one person, the harm 

for each person is separate and distinct, and therefore, the 

defendant can be convicted of multiple counts. Also, a defendant’s 

conduct that constitutes two or more offenses against a single 

victim can support multiple convictions if the harm that results 

from each offense is separate and identifiable from the harm of

the other offense. We therefore hold that two or more offenses of 

dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) 

when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving 

separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is 

separate and identifiable. 

Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995 at ¶ 26. 

Analysis 

{¶12} In this case Meeks was convicted of Kidnapping in violation of R.C. 

2905.01(A)(3), which reads, 

(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception, * * * by any means, 

shall remove another from the place where the other person is 

found or restrain the liberty of the other person, for any of the 

following purposes: 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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* * * 

(3) To terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the 

victim or another[.] 

{¶13} Meeks was also convicted of Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(1), which reads, “No person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause serious 

physical harm to another[.]” 

{¶14} Meeks argues that his sentences for Kidnapping and Felonious Assault 

should have merged in this case, particularly since they “shared” the element of 

serious physical harm.1

 In addition, Meeks argues that Kidnapping and Felonious 

Assault could be committed by the same conduct if the restraint was only to engage 

in the assault, and that there was only one victim of the offenses. Thus Meeks 

contends that the only remaining question under Ruff is whether the offenses were 

committed with a separate animus. 

{¶15} With regard to his “animus” in this matter, Meeks alleges that he never 

intended to separately commit a Kidnapping; rather, he argues that “in his mind [the 

Kidnapping] was not a distinct and separate event [from the Felonious Assault], and 

he had no separate animus.” (Appt.’s Br. at 8). Meeks claims the lack of a separate 

animus for the Kidnapping was illustrated at the sentencing hearing when he only 

apologized for the Felonious Assault. 

 

1

 As will be discussed, infra, Felonious Assault clearly requires serious physical harm, but Kidnapping only 

requires restraint with purpose to terrorize or inflict serious physical harm. 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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{¶16} The State counters by citing to numerous cases wherein Kidnapping 

and Felonious Assault convictions were not merged. See, e.g., State v. Harmon, 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 26502, 2013-Ohio-1769. While we acknowledge the State’s point 

that cases exist finding that Kidnapping and Felonious Assault would not merge, 

under the current law, merger inherently involves an examination of the particular 

facts and circumstances of each case. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995 at ¶ 26. As to the facts 

in this case, the State contends that the circumstances establish a separate animus 

for each of the offenses. We agree. 

{¶17} In State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126 (1979), the Supreme Court of 

Ohio set forth guidelines for when Kidnapping should merge with another offense. 

(a) Where the restraint or movement of the victim is merely 

incidental to a separate underlying crime, there exists no separate 

animus sufficient to sustain separate convictions; however, where 

the restraint is prolonged, the confinement is secretive, or the 

movement is substantial so as to demonstrate a significance 

independent of the other offense, there exists a separate animus 

as to each offense sufficient to support separate convictions; 

(b) Where the asportation or restraint of the victim subjects the 

victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm separate and apart 

from that involved in the underlying crime, there exists a separate 

animus as to each offense sufficient to support separate 

convictions. 

“Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set 

forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were 

committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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the Ruff test.” State v. Sowers, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-58, 2019-Ohio-649, ¶ 

18, citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio-4452, 

¶ 125, citing State v. D.E.M., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-589, 2016-Ohio-5638, 

¶ 143; State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13MA125, 2015-Ohio-4100, ¶ 

18; State v. Stinnett, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 15-CA-24, 2016-Ohio-2711, ¶ 53. 

{¶18} Notably, this case was resolved by way of a plea agreement, providing 

fewer facts for the trial court to make a determination regarding merger. 

Nevertheless, the record in this case contained, inter alia, the indictment, the sworn 

affidavit of a police officer initially filed with a complaint, the factual statements at 

the plea hearing, and the statements contained in the pre-sentence investigation, all 

of which provided a sufficient account of the incidents in question for purposes of 

reviewing the issue of merger in this case. 

{¶19} First, the indictment alleged multiple instances of Felonious Assault 

and a sexual assault via a Rape. Second, and more specifically to the facts in 

question, an officer who initially met with the victim filed an affidavit that stated as 

follows. 

On 08/16/2019 at approx. 1249 hours, Ptl Herbert and I were 

dispatched to 1005 Sunday St. Defiance, OH for a Domestic 

Violence complaint that took place at 622 Riverside Ave. 

Defiance, OH on 08/16/2019 at approx. 0130 hours. We made 

contact with [the victim] who stated [that she and] her husband, 

Joshua Meeks, are going through a divorce, but still live together. 

She stated that he accused her of seeing another guy. She stated 

that they were in the bedroom and he grabbed her by the throat 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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(larynx area) and was strangling her. She stated he then leg swept 

her, knocking her on the bed and slapping her in the face. She

stated he then grabbed a wooden walking stick, and began hitting 

her in the head, shoulders, and legs. He then grabbed a serrated 

knife and held it against her throat and threatened to kill her and 

himself. She stated that she told him that she wanted to be with 

him and they would work things out s[o] he would calm down and 

he took the knife away from her throat. Ms. Meeks had scrapes 

on her elbows. A large bruise on her left bicep. A large bruise on 

her right shoulder and a mid sized bruise on her left shoulder. On 

the front of her thighs, were bruises that almost covered the entire 

area from her pelvic region to her knee. Ms. Meeks was taken to 

Defiance Mercy Hospital for treatment for her injuries. 

* * * 

Joshua Meeks was located at 622 Riverside Ave. * * * He stated

that his wife likes to be choked during sex and he denied hitting 

her. * * * 

(Doc. No. 1). 

{¶20} Third, in addition to the officer’s affidavit in the record, the State 

recited a factual narrative at the change of plea hearing, which indicated that Meeks 

assaulted the victim “repeatedly.” (Nov. 7, 2019, Tr. at 16). These incidents 

included one where he choked the victim nearly to the point of unconsciousness, 

another incident where Meeks struck the victim all over with a “wooden dowel,” 

and one incident where a knife was put to her throat. The victim was only able to 

leave the room the next morning. 

{¶21} Finally, the presentence investigation, which was discussed at 

sentencing, indicated that the victim was forced into a sexual encounter that she was 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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afraid to prevent because of the incident earlier in the evening wherein Meeks had 

choked her to the point of unconsciousness, and because of the incident wherein 

Meeks threatened to kill her with a knife at her throat. The strangling incident led 

to the victim having broken blood vessels (petechiae) in her eyes, and the knife left 

a straight line scraping on her throat. The sexual assault purportedly occurred as the 

victim was drifting off to sleep. Meeks pulled her legs apart and had sexual 

intercourse with her. After reviewing all of the information the trial court had before 

it, the trial court determined that the convictions for Felonious Assault and 

Kidnapping did not merge. 

{¶22} In our own review of the record, we emphasize that there appeared to 

be multiple instances of potential serious physical harm and an accusation of sexual 

assault. There were allegations of the victim being choked to unconsciousness (or 

near unconsciousness), allegations of a knife being held to her throat with threats of 

murder, allegations of the victim being beaten repeatedly with a wooden dowel, and 

allegations of sexual assault. 

{¶23} When the victim tried to get away from the situation in the house she 

shared with Meeks at one point, she was restrained against her will and she was only 

able to leave the following morning. It is not entirely clear from the record at what 

point she was restrained or at what point each of the physical acts were perpetrated 

against the victim; however, as there were multiple incidents here of serious 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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physical harm, or for potential serious physical harm, we could not find that the trial 

court’s failure to merge these offenses was improper under these circumstances. See 

Sowers, supra, 2019-Ohio-649, ¶ 19 (finding that separate identifiable acts in the 

midst of a Kidnapping resulted in separate animus). There is no indication that the 

restraint in this matter was only to perpetrate a single assault. 

{¶24} Moreover, the Kidnapping statute only requires that a defendant

restrain a victim with the purpose to terrorize or inflict serious physical harm. In 

other words, a defendant does not even have to complete his acts. See State v. Davis, 

116 Ohio St.3d 404 2008-Ohio-2, quoting State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 

255, 262 (analyzing another Kidnapping provision and holding, “R.C. 

2905.01(A)(4) requires only that the restraint or removal occur for the purpose of 

non-consensual sexual activity—not that sexual activity actually take place.”) 

(emphasis sic.) Thus the restraint for the Kidnapping here did not even have to lead 

to completed acts. Nevertheless, as stated previously, there were multiple acts 

reflected in the record of this case, which the trial court could have properly 

determined were separate and distinct. For all of these reasons, Meeks’ assignment 

of error is overruled. 
Case No. 4-20-02 

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Conclusion

{¶25} For the foregoing reasons the assignment of error is overruled and the 

judgment of the Defiance County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed 

PRESTON and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur. 

/jlr