SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).

IMO Proposed Quest Academy Charter School of Montclair Founders Group (A-12-12) (070972)

Argued September 9, 2013 -- Decided December 16, 2013

LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers the standard of review applicable to the Commissioner of Education’s

decision to deny a charter school application and the propriety of that decision.

The Charter School Program Act of 1995 (the Act), N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-1 to -18, authorizes the 

establishment of charter schools in New Jersey. The Act charges the Commissioner of Education (Commissioner) 

with the responsibility to establish a program to “provide for the approval and granting of charters to charter schools 

pursuant to [the Act].” N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-3. The application process is governed by the Act, see N.J.S.A.

18A:36A-4, -4.1, -5, and implementing regulations, see N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1. Each charter school application must 

be submitted not only to the Commissioner, but also to the local board of education for a recommendation to the 

Commissioner. The Commissioner has the “final authority to grant or reject a charter application.” N.J.S.A.

18A:36A-4(c). Although the statutory and regulatory programmatic requirements provide no guidance to the 

Commissioner on how to assess an application, case law requires the Commissioner to (1) avoid segregation 

resulting from the grant of a charter school application and (2) evaluate the impact that loss of funds would have on 

the local school district’s ability to deliver a thorough and efficient education. In re Grant of Charter Sch. 

Application of Englewood on the Palisades Charter Sch. (Englewood on the Palisades II), 164 N.J. 316 (2000).

On October 15, 2010, Tracey Williams, on behalf of a group of founders, submitted an application to the 

Commissioner to open Quest Academy, a proposed charter high school in Montclair. On December 6, 2010, 

Williams received an email response from the State Department of Education (Department) stating that certain 

sections of the application were incomplete, insufficient, or unclear, pointing out specific deficiencies in the

application, and providing an opportunity to address the deficiencies through the submission of further information. 

Also on December 6, 2010, Dr. Frank Alvarez, Superintendent of the Montclair Public Schools, provided the 

Commissioner comments on the Quest Academy application on behalf of the local board of education. Dr. Alvarez 

addressed the negative financial impact that the proposed charter school would have on the Montclair School 

District and criticized the application for containing inadequate and unclear information on course requirements, 

graduation requirements, and curriculum development. Quest Academy submitted additional materials on 

December 14, 2010. On January 18, 2011, the Commissioner sent a brief, form-like letter to Williams stating that, 

“based on recommendations and my review, I am denying your request because of the deficiencies in your 

application.” Although there was no further detail regarding the deficiencies, the letter informed Williams that the 

Department had additional information regarding her application and invited her to arrange an appointment with 

staff to review the additional information and to register for a Department training program on preparing charter 

school applications.

Williams filed a notice of appeal with the Appellate Division on February 24, 2011. On June 6, 2011, the 

Commissioner submitted an amplification of reasons for the denial to the Appellate Division. The Commissioner 

characterized Quest Academy’s education plan as weak and discussed content and programmatic deficiencies, 

including that Quest Academy failed to present a comprehensive and fully integrated educational program and that 

its strategies were neither connected to, nor supportive of, the proposed educational program. The Commissioner 

added that, from her own experience, stand-alone charter high schools were particularly difficult to open and operate 

successfully. She also expressed concern that a charter school might interfere with the existing desegregation order 

that applies to the Montclair public schools. Finally, the letter cited criticisms voiced by Dr. Alvarez and 

community members who had written unsolicited letters of opposition to the proposed charter school. The 

Appellate Division affirmed the Commissioner’s denial. The appellate panel stated that, because the Commissioner 

did not act in a quasi-judicial capacity, it did not review the Commissioner’s decision under the substantial-credible-
2

evidence standard, but rather under the standard of whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 

The panel found that the Commissioner’s denial of Quest Academy’s application was not arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable. The Court granted Williams’s petition for certification. 212 N.J. 288 (2012).

HELD: The arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard of review is applicable to the Commissioner’s decision to 

grant or deny a charter school application. The Commissioner’s decision to deny Quest Academy’s charter school 

application was amply supported by the record and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

1. Because the Act does not confer a right to an administrative hearing for charter school applications, applicants 

cannot claim the right to a quasi-judicial administrative hearing as a “contested case” under the Administrative 

Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15. However, that does not end all inquiry into the nature of the 

proceedings before the Commissioner. The labels of “quasi-judicial” and “quasi-legislative” typically are used to 

determine whether an agency is obligated to provide an administrative adjudicative hearing, regardless of whether 

the matter would merit the designation of a “contested case” under the APA. If the matter centers on the resolution 

of disputed adjudicative facts, if the parties are adverse, or if credibility determinations must be made, more formal 

adjudicatory-type proceedings must be provided (hence the quasi-judicial designation). The quasi-judicial and 

quasi-legislative labels have limits to their usefulness, however, because agencies must retain the ability to provide 

various informal, flexible procedures for determining certain issues that may not fit easily into either 

characterization. Importantly, the labels do not result in a meaningful difference in the role played by judicial 

review of administrative determinations. (pp. 17-20)

2. Reflecting the need to respect agency action taken pursuant to authority delegated by the Legislature, an appellate 

court may only reverse an agency decision if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. In other words, a court may 

intervene when it is clear that the agency action is inconsistent with its mandate. That standard is applicable to 

administrative agency actions regardless of whether they are quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. In addition, it is 

inarguable that the arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard requires that the administrative decision be 

supported by the evidence in the record. (pp. 20-23)

3. The Commissioner’s decision to deny Quest Academy’s application was amply supported by the record. The 

Court does not second guess the educational judgments expressed in the Commissioner’s amplification. Moreover, 

the analysis provided by Dr. Alvarez, which is required by the Act, was properly included in the record and was 

appropriately part of the Commissioner’s determination. It was also appropriate for the Commissioner to consider 

the existing desegregation order pursuant to Englewood on the Palisades II. Finally, the Court finds no error in the 

Commissioner’s consideration of unsolicited letters from local citizens or her reliance on her own expertise in 

assessing the overall viability of the proposed charter school. Case law has recognized the value that administrative 

expertise can play in making predictive or judgmental determinations. The Commissioner’s decision demonstrates a 

thoughtful and thorough weighing and judgment of the merits of Quest Academy’s application and does not warrant 

judicial intervention. (pp. 23-27)

4. Rule 2:5-1(b) permits the filing of an amplification of reasons after an appeal has been filed and no objection was 

raised on the basis of the Rule’s time frames for such submissions. In addition, the Court accepts the 

Commissioner’s explanation for the manner of her initial response to the application. Although the letter of denial 

did not detail the application’s deficiencies, it offered instead a face-to-face meeting to review the application in 

detail. In reviewing a complex proposal for a charter school, there is a benefit to offering a discussion, instead of a 

written cataloguing, of mistakes or deficiencies in the application that has been rejected. The Court does not fault 

the Commissioner for choosing a dialogue involving constructive criticism as her preferred approach for producing 

approvable applications when resubmitted. (pp. 27-28)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, JUSTICES ALBIN and PATTERSON, and JUDGES RODRÍGUEZ

and CUFF (both temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-12 September Term 2012

070972

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

PROPOSED QUEST ACADEMY

CHARTER SCHOOL OF MONTCLAIR 

FOUNDERS GROUP.

Argued September 9, 2013 – Decided December 16, 2013

On certification to the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division.

Michael J. Confusione argued the cause for 

appellant Tracey Williams a member of Quest 

Academy Charter School of Montclair Founders 

Group (Hegge & Confusione, attorneys).

Michelle Lyn Miller, Assistant Attorney 

General, argued the cause for respondent The 

Commissioner of Education (John J. Hoffman, 

Acting Attorney General; Lewis A. 

Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Diana C. Sierotowicz and Geoffrey 

N. Stark, Deputies Attorney General, on the 

briefs).

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion for the Court.

The Charter School Program Act of 1995 (the Act), L. 1995, 

c. 426, §§ 1 to 18 (codified as amended at N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-1 to 

-18), authorizes the establishment of charter schools in New 

Jersey. See N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-2 (finding that charter schools 

“can assist in promoting comprehensive educational reform” and 
2

that their establishment “is in the best interests of the 

students of this State”). The Act charges the Commissioner of 

Education (Commissioner) with the responsibility to establish a 

program to “provide for the approval and granting of charters to 

charter schools pursuant to [the Act].” N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-3. 

The application process is governed by the Act, see N.J.S.A.

18A:36A-4, -4.1, -5, and implementing regulations, see N.J.A.C.

6A:11-2.1. Review of applications is conducted in accordance 

with prescribed timing requirements that promote batched reviews 

tied to school cycles. See N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(b)(5), -2.1(f). 

Ultimately, the Commissioner has the “final authority to grant 

or reject a charter application.” N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-4(c); see 

also N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(a).

In this matter, petitioner is one of the founders of the 

proposed Quest Academy Charter School of Montclair (Quest 

Academy), which sought licensure pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-4 

to operate as a charter school for high school students. The 

Commissioner denied the application in a writing that was short 

on detail with respect to the application’s deficiencies. 

Instead, an offer to meet and discuss the application’s 

shortcomings was extended, as well as the opportunity to 

participate in a training program for preparing an application 

for the upcoming application deadline. Following petitioner’s 

filing of a notice of appeal to the Appellate Division, the 
3

Commissioner issued a written amplification of reasons for 

denial of the application. The Appellate Division upheld the 

Commissioner’s action on the grounds that the decision was not 

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 

We granted certification to consider petitioner’s claim 

that the Appellate Division misconstrued the standard of review 

applicable to the Commissioner’s decision. We now affirm the 

judgment of the Appellate Division. For clarity’s sake, we 

restate the standard applicable in appellate review of agency 

actions and what is encompassed in that review; however, we 

discern no error in the appellate panel’s performance of its 

review function here. Further, like the Appellate Division, we 

see no basis for interfering with the Commissioner’s use of a

written amplification of reasons for her denial after 

petitioner’s appeal had been filed. 

I.

On October 15, 2010, petitioner Tracey Williams, on behalf 

of a group of founders, submitted an application to the 

Commissioner to open Quest Academy, a proposed charter high 

school to serve pupils in grades nine through twelve with 

approximately eighty pupils per grade. We digress briefly to 

explain the regulatory process required for charter schools 

before addressing the Commissioner’s response to the Quest 

Academy application.
4

A.

Pursuant to the Act, a charter school application minimally 

must include the following information:

a. The identification of the charter 

applicant;

b. The name of the proposed charter school;

c. The proposed governance structure of the 

charter school including a list of the 

proposed members of the board of trustees of 

the charter school or a description of the 

qualifications and method for the

appointment or election of members of the 

board of trustees;

d. The educational goals of the charter 

school, the curriculum to be offered, and 

the methods of assessing whether students 

are meeting educational goals. Charter 

school students shall be required to meet 

the same testing and academic performance 

standards as established by law and 

regulation for public school students.

Charter school students shall also meet any 

additional assessment indicators which are 

included within the charter approved by the 

commissioner;

e. The admission policy and criteria for 

evaluating the admission of students which 

shall comply with the requirements of 

[N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8];

f. The age or grade range of students to be 

enrolled;

g. The school calendar and school day 

schedule;

h. A description of the charter school staff 

responsibilities and the proposed 

qualifications of teaching staff;
5

i. A description of the procedures to be 

implemented to ensure significant parental 

involvement in the operation of the school;

j. A description of, and address for, the 

physical facility in which the charter 

school will be located;

k. Information on the manner in which 

community groups will be involved in the 

charter school planning process;

l. The financial plan for the charter school 

and the provisions which will be made for 

auditing the school pursuant to the 

provisions of [N.J.S.A. 18A:23-1];

m. A description of and justification for 

any waivers of regulations which the charter 

school will request; and

n. Such other information as the 

commissioner may require.

[N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-5.]

Regulations impose additional requirements, including completion 

of the Department’s “New Jersey Charter School Application.” 

N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(b)(1); see N.J. Dep’t of Educ. Office of 

Charter Sch., Phase One Request for Applications (2013), 

available at

http://www.nj.gov/education/chartsch/app/2013PhaseOneCharter 

SchoolApplication.pdf. The initial application form is made 

available no later than August 31 of each year. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-

2.1(b)(1).
6

Significantly, the application process proceeds in two 

phases.1 In phase one, the application must include

i. The name of the proposed charter 

school;

ii. Mission;

iii. Educational program overview;

iv. Applicant and founder information;

v. Enrollment and admission information;

vi. Demonstration of need; and

vii. Community and parent involvement.

[N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(b)(2).]

The Commissioner determines whether the applicant is a 

“qualified applicant” that advances to phase two of the 

evaluation process. See N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(b)(3), (c). In 

order to advance to phase two, the applicant must have

submitted an application that[: 1] has a 

clear, focused, and results-oriented mission 

statement that aligns with all parts of the 

application; [2] demonstrates understanding 

of the population that the school is likely 

to serve; [3] has an educational program 

that is likely to be effective for the 

student population; [4] has strong and 

 

1 The process is further separated into standard applications and 

expedited applications. Standard applicants may submit the 

phase one application no later than March 31 of the year before 

the school seeks to open. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(b)(5). Applicants 

with “demonstrable experience operating an educational 

institution” may submit applications by October 15 for expedited 

review. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(g). Quest’s application seeking

expedited review was filed in accordance with the October 15 

deadline.
7

diverse leadership; and [5] has strong 

financial planning and management.

[N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(b)(3)(ii).]

In phase two, the applicant must submit additional detailed

information addressing the following:

(1) Educational program;

(2) Goals and objectives;

(3) At-risk populations;

(4) Staffing information;

(5) Financial plan;

(6) Governance and organizational plan;

(7) Facilities;

(8) Daily and annual schedule;

(9) Requested waivers; and

(10) All required documentation as set forth 

in the phase two application. Such 

documentation shall include, but not be 

limited to: course and curriculum outlines, 

graduation requirements, school scheduling 

information, professional backgrounds of 

administrators and staff, professional 

development and evaluation plans, an 

organizational chart, and documentation of 

fiscal and legal compliance.

[N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(b)(3)(iii).]

Following receipt of the required phase two information, the 

Commissioner schedules the applicant for “an in-depth interview” 

with the Commissioner or a designated representative. N.J.A.C.

6A:11-2.1(b)(3)(iv), (e).
8

Each charter school application must be submitted not only 

to the Commissioner, but also to the local board of education 

or, if the district is being operated under State intervention,2

the State district superintendent. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-4(c). The 

board or district superintendent must review the application and 

recommend to the Commissioner whether she should grant or deny 

the application. See ibid. (requiring board of education in 

which proposed charter school is to be located to review 

application and to forward to Commissioner recommendation on 

application’s merit); N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(d)(1)-(2) (requiring 

same and setting forth specified time frames dependent on phase 

of review). The information clearly is intended to assist the 

Commissioner in her consideration of the application. 

Despite all their detail, the statutory and regulatory 

programmatic requirements provide no guidance to the 

Commissioner on how to assess an application. Case law imposes 

two requirements, however. First, “the Commissioner must assess 

the racial impact that a charter school applicant will have on 

the district of residence in which the charter school will 

operate” and “must use the full panoply of [her] powers to 

avoid” segregation resulting from the grant of a charter school 

 

2 N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-34 permits the State Board to place a failing 

school district under State control. The State Board appoints a 

State district superintendent to run such a district. See

N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-35.
9

application. In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application of 

Englewood on the Palisades Charter Sch. (Englewood on the 

Palisades II), 164 N.J. 316, 329 (2000). Second, if the local 

school district “demonstrates with some specificity that the 

constitutional requirements of a thorough and efficient 

education would be jeopardized by [the district’s] loss” of the 

funds to be allocated to a charter school, “the Commissioner is 

obligated to evaluate carefully the impact that loss of funds 

would have on the ability of the district of residence to 

deliver a thorough and efficient education.” Id. at 334-35; see

N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1 (“The Legislature shall provide 

for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient 

system of free public schools for the instruction of all the 

children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen 

years.”).

B.

On December 6, 2010, approximately six weeks after Quest 

Academy submitted its October 15 application, Ms. Williams 

received an email response from a representative of the State 

Department of Education, stating that certain sections of the 

application were incomplete, insufficient, or unclear. The 

response informed Quest Academy of specific deficiencies in its 

application and afforded it the opportunity to address the 

concerns raised through the submission of further information.
10

Also on December 6, 2010, in accordance with the Act, Dr. 

Frank Alvarez, Superintendent of the Montclair Public Schools, 

provided comments on the Quest Academy application to the 

Commissioner on behalf of his local board of education. Dr. 

Alvarez addressed the negative financial impact that the 

proposed charter school would have on the Montclair School 

District in light of recent reductions in state aid and the 

District’s reliance on local property taxes. Substantively, Dr. 

Alvarez criticized the application for lacking clear information 

on course requirements, inadequately addressing state high 

school graduation requirements, and failing to specify a process 

of curriculum development in the nine areas of the state’s core 

curriculum content standards.

Quest Academy submitted additional materials on December 

14, 2010, in response to the December 6 departmental request. 

Thereafter, on January 3, 2011, Department representatives met 

with Quest founders to discuss the application as augmented by 

the addenda.

On January 18, 2011, the Commissioner sent a brief and

rather form-like letter to Williams denying Quest Academy’s 

application. In it, the Commissioner referred to the forty-five 

applications that had been reviewed in the application cycle as 

“present[ing] varying degrees of readiness to successfully 

implement exciting and educationally innovative models to 
11

enhance student achievement,” but tersely informed Williams 

that, “based on recommendations and my review, I am denying your 

request because of the deficiencies in your application.” There 

was no further detail on those deficiencies in the denial 

letter.

The letter provided other important information, however. 

It advised Williams of her right to appeal the Commissioner’s 

denial. It informed Williams that the Department had additional 

information regarding Quest’s application and invited her to 

call to arrange an appointment with staff to review the 

additional information. The letter further informed Williams 

that training was available to assist individuals with 

preparation of charter school applications for the next charter 

school application deadline, which was March 31, 2011. The 

letter invited Williams and the founders to register for the 

training program offered by the Department for the upcoming 

application deadline.

Williams, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal with the 

Appellate Division on February 24, 2011.

On June 6, 2011, the Commissioner submitted to the Clerk of 

the Appellate Division an Amplification of Reasons for the 

denial in the form of a letter from Carly Bolger, Director of 

the Department’s Office of Charter Schools. According to the 

Amplification, the Commissioner denied the application based on 
12

its overall lack of quality, as expressed in the initial letter. 

In the Amplification, the Commissioner expanded upon her 

concerns. 

The Commissioner characterized Quest Academy’s education 

plan as weak, discerning content and programmatic deficiencies 

in several aspects of the proposed program. Specifically, the 

Commissioner noted that

Quest’s educational plan . . . incorporated 

many different strategies, programs, and 

philosophies, but failed to present these 

varied ideas as a comprehensive and fully 

integrated educational school program. In 

particular, the goals and objectives 

presented in the plan were weak. . . . 

Moreover, the Commissioner found that the 

strategies presented by Quest were neither 

connected to, nor supportive of, the 

proposed educational program.

The Commissioner added that, from her own experience, she 

believed that stand-alone charter high schools were particularly 

difficult to open and operate successfully. She questioned the 

ability of the school to attract sufficient students in the 

small community of Montclair, and expressed concern that a 

charter school might interfere with Montclair’s desegregation 

efforts. The letter cited criticisms voiced by Dr. Alvarez and 

community members who had written unsolicited letters of 

opposition to the proposed charter school. Those criticisms 

questioned the capacity and qualifications of Quest’s founders; 

the potential negative impact on the quality of programs and 
13

educational offerings at Montclair public schools; a lack of 

community support for, or interest in, a charter school and, 

conversely, strong community support for the public high school; 

and the lack of an adequate facility to house the proposed 

charter school. 

According to the Amplification, based on the entirety of

those considerations, the Commissioner had determined that 

Quest’s application did not have a high probability of success. 

She therefore had denied the application.

C.

On appeal before the Appellate Division, petitioner’s 

criticisms focused on the Commissioner’s review procedures and 

the specific information used by the Commissioner in her 

evaluation of the application, including the information 

provided through Dr. Alvarez’s evaluation, the citizen letters, 

and the existing desegregation order that applied to the 

Montclair public schools. In addition, petitioner contended 

that the federal No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316, 

required the Commissioner to approve charter school applications 

in districts, like Montclair, that had been identified as in 

need of improvement. 

In response, the Commissioner addressed the propriety of 

the information that she had considered in connection with the 

application, countered the argument that the No Child Left 
14

Behind Act had applicability in this setting, and urged the 

Appellate Division to affirm her determination because the 

administrative decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable. 

The Appellate Division affirmed the Commissioner’s denial 

in an unpublished decision. The court noted that a deferential 

standard of review applied to its review of the Commissioner’s 

action in this matter. Quoting In re Grant of Charter Sch. 

Application of Englewood on the Palisades Charter Sch., 320 N.J. 

Super. 174, 217 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d as modified, 164 N.J.

316 (2000), the court stated that, because the Commissioner 

“[did] not act in a quasi-judicial capacity,” the appellate 

panel “‘[did] not review the Commissioner’s decision under the 

substantial-credible-evidence standard, but rather under the 

standard of whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious or 

unreasonable.’”

Turning to the record that the Commissioner considered in 

making her determination, the appellate panel found that the 

Commissioner did not act improperly in considering Dr. Alvarez’s 

views, the opposition letters from Montclair citizens, or the 

desegregation order. The panel held that, based on the record, 

the Commissioner’s denial of Quest Academy’s application was not 

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The court specifically 

rejected petitioner’s argument that the federal No Child Left 
15

Behind Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316, requires the Commissioner to 

approve charter school applications in districts identified as 

in need of improvement. Petitioner’s other arguments were

summarily rejected.

With the assistance of counsel, Williams filed a petition 

for certification, which was granted. 212 N.J. 288 (2012).

II.

Before this Court, petitioner’s arguments are refined. 

Focusing primarily on the standard of review, she zeros in on 

two sentences in the Appellate Division’s decision and claims 

that the panel reviewed the Commissioner’s determination under a 

misapprehension of the correct standard for appellate review. 

She contends that an appellate court reviewing a denial of a 

charter school application must consider whether the decision 

was supported by “substantial credible evidence,” not simply

whether it was “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable” as the 

Appellate Division said in its decision. She further argues 

that the Commissioner should be required to provide written 

reasons for a denial at the time the decision is made, and that 

an Amplification of Reasons given after a decision is appealed 

should not be allowed. Consistent with those criticisms,

petitioner claims that due process was violated because the 

decision, when issued, was not supported by substantial credible 

evidence.
16

The Commissioner argues that the Appellate Division 

correctly applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of 

review. She further argues that the panel appropriately 

determined that the Commissioner’s denial procedurally was

compliant with law and substantively was not arbitrary, 

capricious, or unreasonable.

More specifically, the Commissioner characterizes her 

decision to deny a charter school application as quasilegislative, distinguishing it from quasi-judicial actions. The 

Commissioner points out that the Act does not require the 

Commissioner to conduct a hearing and none is required by due 

process. The Commissioner and the applicant do not have an 

adversarial relationship and the Commissioner is not required, 

in deciding whether to grant a charter school application, to 

weigh opposing parties’ evidence or make credibility 

determinations. Therefore, the Commissioner maintains that this 

appeal does not involve review of quasi-judicial action. 

Instead, she relies on case law that states that quasilegislative decisions are reviewed under the arbitrary, 

capricious, or unreasonable standard. Further, the Commissioner 

contends that, subsumed in that standard, are the requirements

that the Commissioner’s decision demonstrate a thorough review 

of the record and that the decision reached have sufficient 

support in the record to sustain it. Both requirements, she 
17

contends, are met here. Further, in response to petitioner’s 

objection to the Commissioner’s amplification of reasons for her 

decision, the Commissioner cites Rule 2:5-1(b), which permits a 

judge, officer, or agency to file an amplification of a prior 

decision if it is appealed, as authority for her action.

III.

A.

Judicial review of administrative agency action is a matter 

of constitutional right in New Jersey. See N.J. Const. art. VI, 

§ 5, ¶ 4 (allocating relief from agency actions to “the Superior 

Court, on terms and in the manner provided by rules of the 

Supreme Court, as of right”). Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) provides for 

review of “final decisions or actions of any state 

administrative agency or officer” in the Appellate Division of 

the Superior Court. 

Through N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-4(c), the Legislature has decreed 

that the Commissioner is the final administrative decision-maker 

on the grant or rejection of a charter school application. 

Thus, an applicant has the right to appeal the Commissioner’s 

rejection of a charter school application pursuant to Rule 2:2-

3(a)(2). The Act also confers on an unsuccessful applicant a 

statutory right to appeal. See N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-4(d)

(conferring statutory right to appeal to Appellate Division of

Superior Court on charter school applicant and local board of 
18

education).

While the Act grants to a denied applicant a statutory 

right to appeal, it does not confer a right to an administrative 

hearing. That has the consequence of denying a rejected 

applicant the ability to claim the right, under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, to 

a quasi-judicial administrative hearing governed by APA 

standards for a “contested case.” See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2

(defining “contested case” as “a proceeding . . . in which the 

legal rights, duties, obligations, privileges, benefits or other 

legal relations of specific parties are required by 

constitutional right or by statute to be determined by an agency 

by decisions, determinations, or orders, addressed to them or 

disposing of their interests, after opportunity for an agency 

hearing”).3 However, that does not end all inquiry into the 

nature of the proceedings before the Commissioner when reviewing 

an application to operate a charter school. 

The labels of “quasi-judicial” and “quasi-legislative”

typically are used to determine whether the agency is obligated

to provide an administrative adjudicative hearing, regardless of 

whether the matter would merit the designation of a “contested 

case” under the APA. See Cunningham v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 69 

 

3 The applicant has not asserted a substantive constitutional 

right. 
19

N.J. 13, 20 (1975) (using such labels in explaining when, 

outside of APA requirements, right to trial-like hearing exists

as matter of fundamental fairness and administrative due 

process). If the matter centers on the resolution of disputed 

adjudicative facts, if the parties are adverse, or if

credibility determinations must be made, more formal 

adjudicatory-type proceedings must be provided (hence the quasijudicial designation). See, e.g., High Horizons Dev. Co. v. 

N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 120 N.J. 40, 49-51 (1990) (discussing 

when need arises for trial-like, adjudicatory process). The 

most important procedural rights in such proceedings are 

adequate notice, a chance to know opposing evidence, and the 

opportunity to present evidence and argument in response. Id.

at 52-53.

Such labels as quasi-adjudicative and quasi-legislative

have limits to their usefulness. Indeed, this Court has 

recognized that agencies must retain the ability to provide 

various informal, flexible procedures for determining certain 

issues or taking certain actions. Ibid. In all instances,

fundamental due process requirements of notice and opportunity 

to be heard must be satisfied, even though the contours of their 

satisfaction may vary. See id. at 51-54 (reviewing property 

owner’s criticism of procedural fairness in Commissioner of 

Transportation’s handling of application for highway access 
20

permit). As in the matter presently before this Court, High 

Horizons involved a due process challenge in a matter that did 

not fit easily into classifications of whether an agency was 

acting in a judicial or “quasi-judicial” capacity, or in a 

legislative or “quasi-legislative” capacity. Id. at 50-51. 

Importantly, the labels do not result in a meaningful difference 

in the role played by judicial review of administrative 

determinations. The “core value[] of judicial review of 

administrative action is the furtherance of accountability.” 

Id. at 53.

B.

Reflecting the need to respect agency action taken pursuant 

to authority delegated by the Legislature, the standard for 

judicial review of administrative agency action is limited: An 

appellate court may reverse an agency decision if it is 

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See In re Petition for 

Rulemaking, 117 N.J. 311, 325 (1989). In other words, a court 

may intervene when “it is clear that the agency action is 

inconsistent with its mandate.” Ibid. Indeed, the test often 

is expressed in the negative. See, e.g., Brady v. Bd. of 

Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (“Unless a Court finds that the 

agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the 

agency’s ruling should not be disturbed.”). The test, although 

deferential, does not lack content. As this Court has stated on 
21

many occasions,

[a]lthough sometimes phrased in terms of a 

search for arbitrary or unreasonable agency 

action, the judicial role [in reviewing an 

agency action] is generally restricted to 

three inquiries: (1) whether the agency’s 

action violates express or implied 

legislative policies, that is, did the 

agency follow the law; (2) whether the 

record contains substantial evidence to 

support the findings on which the agency 

based its action; and (3) whether in 

applying the legislative policies to the 

facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching 

a conclusion that could not reasonably have 

been made on a showing of the relevant 

factors.

 

[Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 

(1995).] 

See, e.g., In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011); N.J. 

Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep’t of 

Agric., 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008); In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 

482-83 (2007); Dennery v. Bd. of Educ., 131 N.J. 626, 641 

(1993); In re Petition for Rulemaking, supra, 117 N.J. at 325;

Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). 

The standard is applicable to administrative agency actions 

regardless of whether they are quasi-legislative or quasijudicial.4 Examples demonstrate the test’s applicability to a

quasi-legislative rulemaking context, see, e.g., N.J. Soc’y for 

 

4 Some cases have made this standard for judicial review of 

agency action a four-part inquiry. See, e.g., Brady, supra, 152 

N.J. at 210-11 (separating duty to follow law into two 

inquiries, one legislative and one constitutional). We adhere 

to the test as formulated in Mazza.
22

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, supra, 196 N.J. at 384-85; In 

re Petition for Rulemaking, supra, 117 N.J. at 325; Public Serv. 

Elec. & Gas Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 101 N.J. 95, 103 

(1985), as well as to a quasi-judicial context, see, e.g.,

Mazza, supra 143 N.J. at 25; Dennery, supra, 131 N.J. at 641; 

Exec. Comm’n on Ethical Standards v. Salmon, 295 N.J. Super. 86, 

96-97 (App. Div. 1996).

In this matter, both parties concede that the arbitrary, 

capricious, or unreasonable standard applicable in the review of 

administrative agency decisions subsumes the need to find 

sufficient support in the record to sustain the decision reached

by the Commissioner. The point is beyond argument, for a

failure to consider all the evidence in a record would perforce

lead to arbitrary decision making. See, e.g., Close v. Kordulak 

Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965) (noting that “the proofs as a 

whole” must be considered); Green v. State Health Benefits 

Comm’n, 373 N.J. Super. 408, 415 (App. Div. 2004) (finding 

agency decision that failed to address issues raised in key 

documents in record arbitrary and capricious). Moreover, a 

decision based on a complete misperception of the facts 

submitted in a record would render the agency’s conclusion

unreasonable. See, e.g., Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 109 

N.J. 575, 588-89 (1988) (stating that appellate court should 

intervene where agency’s “finding is clearly a mistaken one”); 
23

Constantino v. N.J. Merit Sys. Bd., 313 N.J. Super. 212, 218 

(App. Div.) (reversing board’s decision where findings were 

unsupported by record, based on “total disregard” of facts, 

against “overwhelming weight” of testimony, and based on record 

“skew[ed]” by administrative law judge), certif. denied, 157 

N.J. 544 (1998). Plainly, the standard requires that the 

administrative decision be supported by the underlying record, 

regardless of the manner in which due process requires that the 

record be created. The obligation that there be substantial 

evidence in the record requires a sifting of the record, and the 

ability to find support for the conclusions reached by the 

Commissioner under the statutory framework within which she must 

act.

IV.

A.

The statutory and regulatory scheme for the approval of 

applications to operate a charter school functions under tight 

time frames as cycle after cycle of charter school applications 

are submitted seeking approval to open in the ensuing school 

year. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(b)(1). The regulatory scheme operates 

under the expectation that an application either will be 

approved through phases one and two of the review process and 

move on for implementation in the upcoming school year, or will

require retooling and resubmission. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1. The 
24

Department, as noted in Quest’s denial letter, assists 

applicants with the application process by offering training 

programs in how to prepare applications for review. 

That said, the applications arrive in batches and must be 

reviewed and resolved in a timely fashion in order to proceed to 

implementation in the next school year. See ibid. At oral 

argument, the Attorney General, arguing for the Commissioner, 

represented to the Court that the Commissioner is exceedingly 

careful in the approval of charter schools because of the impact 

that a wrong decision will have on students who attend a charter 

school that falters, or worse, fails to provide an educational 

program that satisfies the constitutional standard of a thorough 

and efficient education. See Englewood on the Palisades II, 

supra, 164 N.J. at 323, 336 (stating obligation to provide 

“thorough and efficient system of education” and holding that 

Commissioner must assess economic impact of proposed charter 

school on district of residence). We are appreciative of the 

importance that must be ascribed to the Commissioner’s approval 

of a charter school and that, nevertheless, such reviews must 

proceed expeditiously.

Turning to the merits of the Commissioner’s determination 

in respect of Quest Academy’s application, we find that the 

Commissioner’s decision was amply supported by the record before 

her. We do not second guess the educational judgments expressed 
25

in the Amplification letter issued on behalf of the 

Commissioner, such as her findings that Quest Academy “failed to 

present . . . a comprehensive and fully integrated educational 

program” and that “the strategies presented by Quest were 

neither connected to, nor supportive of, the proposed 

educational program.” Moreover, as envisioned by the 

Legislature, that record properly included relevant submissions 

necessary for proper consideration and allowance of a charter 

school to operate. Specifically, we refer to the analysis 

provided by the local superintendent of schools, which is 

required to be submitted by N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-4(c) and N.J.A.C.

6A:11-2.1(d). In addition, in Englewood on the Palisades II, 

supra, we stated that the Commissioner was obliged to consider 

whether an impacted local school district had demonstrated “with 

some specificity that the constitutional requirements of a 

thorough and efficient education would be jeopardized by [the 

district’s] loss” of the funds to be allocated to a charter 

school, and that the Commissioner was “obligated to evaluate 

carefully the impact that loss of funds would have on the 

ability of the district of residence to deliver a thorough and 

efficient education” when considering whether or not to approve 

the charter school. 164 N.J. at 334-35. The information in Dr. 

Alvarez’s submission was appropriately part of the 

Commissioner’s determination. We add that Quest Academy was 
26

entitled to respond to it by way of argument, at the least, 

within the tight time frames permitted in the review process, 

and through any subsequent resubmission of the application. 

In addition, petitioner’s objection to the Commissioner’s 

reliance on the existing desegregation order as a factor to 

consider in rejecting the application lacks merit. Again, in

Englewood on the Palisades II, supra, we stated that “the 

Commissioner must assess the racial impact that a charter school 

applicant will have on the district of residence in which the 

charter school will operate” and “must use the full panoply of 

[her] powers to avoid” segregation resulting from the grant of a 

charter school application. 164 N.J. at 329. 

Finally, we see no error in the Commissioner’s 

consideration of unsolicited letters from local citizens or her 

reliance on her own expertise in assessing overall viability of 

this proposed charter school. In making predictive or 

judgmental determinations, case law has recognized the value 

that administrative expertise can play in the rendering of a 

sound administrative determination. Judicial deference is at a 

high when reviewing such findings. See, e.g., Golden Nugget 

Atl. City Corp. v. Atl. City Elec. Co., 229 N.J. Super. 118, 

122-23 (App. Div. 1988). 

The Commissioner’s decision -- but only as it was amplified

-- demonstrates a thoughtful and thorough weighing and judgment 
27

of the merits of the Quest Academy application. There is no 

right to operate a charter school. There is only the 

opportunity to apply for approval to operate one if the 

application demonstrates proper merit. The burden is on the 

applicant to show that it can meet the requirements for 

obtaining permission to educate public school children in a 

charter school setting. The Commissioner’s review and rejection 

of this application is sustainable on the record she had before 

her. There is no basis for judicial intervention.

B.

We add only a brief comment about the Commissioner’s 

amplification. Rule 2:5-1(b) expressly permits its filing after 

a notice of appeal has been filed. Indeed, the Rule anticipates

that amplification may occur after an appeal has been filed. To 

the extent that there are time frames for its submission set 

forth in the Court Rule, we note that no objection was raised on 

the basis of the Rule’s time frames for such submissions, which 

are designed to prevent delay in the processing of appeals.

We add that we accept the Commissioner’s explanation for 

her manner of responding to applicants. Although the letter of 

denial did not detail the deficiencies found in the application, 

it offered instead a face-to-face meeting to review in detail 

the shortcomings in the application that Quest Academy 

submitted. According to the Commissioner, the large number of 
28

applicants (forty-five) who were reviewed in the batch with 

Quest Academy rendered lengthy written responses difficult and 

taxing of precious departmental resources. While it would be 

naturally preferable from the applicant’s perspective to receive

initially more than a generic form letter denying an 

application, here Quest Academy received a bit more than that. 

Some information about the application’s shortcomings was 

provided in the denial letter, and the subsequent amplification 

fully detailed those issues. In reviewing as complex a proposal 

as that required for a newly proposed charter school, there is a 

benefit to offering a discussion, instead of a written

cataloguing, of mistakes or deficiencies in the application that 

has been rejected. We do not fault the Commissioner for 

choosing a dialogue involving constructive criticism as her

preferred approach for producing approvable applications when 

resubmitted.

V.

The judgment of the Appellate Division, affirming the 

Commissioner of Education’s denial of the charter school 

application of Quest Academy, is affirmed. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, and JUSTICES ALBIN and PATTERSON, and 

JUDGES RODRÍGUEZ and CUFF (both temporarily assigned) join in 

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

NO. A-12 SEPTEMBER TERM 2012

ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

IN THE MATTER OF THE

PROPOSED QUEST ACADEMY

CHARTER SCHOOL OF MONTCLAIR

FOUNDERS GROUP

DECIDED December 16, 2013

Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING

OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY

DISSENTING OPINION BY 

CHECKLIST AFFIRM 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X

JUSTICE ALBIN X

JUSTICE PATTERSON X

JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (t/a) X

JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X

TOTALS 6