[ J
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- 2017 ] [MO: Saylor, C.J. ] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

IN RE: ANGELES ROCA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT PHILADELPHIA COUNTY

APPEAL OF: ANGELES ROCA : : : : : : : No. 42 EAP 2016 Appeal from the Order dated December 16, 2016 of the Court of Judicial Discipline at No. 14 JD 2015. ARGUED: May 9, 2017

CONCURRING O PINION

JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: November 22, 2017 I join the majority opinion in full . I agree with the majority that Article V, Section 18(c )( 2 ) of the Pennsylvania Constitution directs this Court to review a judicial sanction imposed by the C ourt of J udicial D iscipline (“CJD”) to determine whether th e sanction is “lawful

. ” P A

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. art. V., § 18(c)(2)

. 1 I further agree that o ur lawfulness inquiry is guided by Article V, Section 18(b)(5), which provides that the CJD “may order removal from office, suspension, censure or other discipline as authorized by this section and as
warranted by the record. ” P A

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. art. V. , § 18(b)(5). A ccordingly, a s the majority
holds , this Court’s lawfulness review encompasses a n examination of whether the sanction is authorized by Section 18 and warranted by the record , i.e. , the sanction is

no t “an unreasonably harsh penalty completely out of proportion to the misconduct
involved

. ” Slip Op. at 21. For the reasons set forth by the majority, I agree that the
CJD’s sanction of removing Appellant Angeles Roca from office is, indeed, lawful.

1 Article V, Section 18(c)(2) provides that, on the law, this Court’s review is plenary; on the facts, our review is clearly erroneous; and as to sanctions, our review is whether the sanction imposed was lawful. P A

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. art. V, §18(c)(2).[ J

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- 2017 ] [MO: Saylor, C.J. ]

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I writ e separately to comment upon the majority’s observation that the imposition of discipline “not only punishes the wrongdoer, but also repairs the damaged public trust and provides guidance to other members of the judiciary regarding their conduct.” Slip Op . at 19 (quoting In re Berkheimer , 930 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). I agree that the imposition of judicial discipline , by collateral consequ e nce, acts to restore the public trust in the judiciary . T he CJD may
not , however, under the guise of restoring the public trust, exercise its discretion in a manner untethered to the misconduct of the accused jurist. It is not the role of the CJD
to impose a more severe penalty upon a judicial officer in or der to “mak e an example” out of the jurist or to allay the public’s alleged fears of judicial dysfunction as portrayed by the media. The CJD’s focus should always be on the individual judicial misconduct
committed. 2 While the CJD is indisputably an independent cour t established by this Commonwealth’s Constitution, P A

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. art. V. § 18 (b)(1), it does not possess unbridled discretion to sanction a judicial officer in accordance with the purported whims of the CJD, the peculiar judge or judicial panel hearing the ma tter, or the “court of public opinion.”

2 This is evid ent in the CJD’s consideration of the following nonexclusive factors the CJD adopted in In re Toczydlowski , 853 A.2d 24 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2004) , and applied in this case: (1) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of conduc t; (2) the nature, extent and frequency of the acts of misconduct; (3) whether the conduct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (4) whether the m isconduct occurred in the judge’ s official capacity or in his or her private life; (5) whether the judge has ac knowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (6) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his or her conduct; (7) the judge’s length of service on the bench; (8) whether there have been prior complaints about the judge; (9) the eff ect the misconduct has upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and (10) the extent to which the judge exploited his position to satisfy his personal desires.