[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-10554

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D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cr-00084-TKW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

DEAN MATTHEWS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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(July 6, 2021)

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Dean Matthews appeals his 57-month sentence for 

making false statements to a firearms dealer. On appeal, Matthews reasserts 

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objections that he raised at sentencing to the base offense level adopted by the 

district court. Matthews specifically takes issue with the application of sentencing 

enhancements for (1) an offense involving a semiautomatic firearm that is capable 

of accepting a large capacity magazine, and (2) having a prior conviction for a 

crime of violence. Because we find no reversible error by the district court, we 

affirm.

I.

A. Background

On September 23, 2019, Dean Matthews pled guilty to a single count of 

making a false statement to a firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2). According to the plea agreement’s factual proffer, on 

April 1, 2019, Matthews attempted to purchase a DPMS Oracle 5.56 rifle from 

Mike’s Outdoor Sports/Mike’s Gun Shop (Mike’s Gun Shop), a federally licensed 

firearms dealer in Pensacola, Florida. As part of the purchase process, Matthews 

completed and signed Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

(ATF) Form 4473—the Firearms Transaction Record. However, Matthews was 

denied the purchase of the rifle due to his inability to pass a background check. A 

subsequent review of Matthews’s ATF Form 4473 revealed that he falsely 

answered “no” when asked if he was subject to a court order restraining him from 

harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner. At the time of the attempted 

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purchase, Matthews was under an injunction restraining him from having any 

contact with the listed victim in a pending 2019 felony sexual assault case. 

B. PSI and Sentencing

Matthews’s presentence investigation report (PSI) began with a base offense 

level of 22, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3), because (1) the offense involved a 

semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and (2) he 

had a prior felony conviction for a crime of violence. The probation officer found 

that the firearm “held 31 rounds” and that Matthews’s prior conviction for Florida 

felony battery constituted a crime of violence. The offense level was decreased by 

three points for timely acceptance of responsibility, for a total offense level of 19. 

Matthews’s criminal history was in category III, resulting in an advisory 

Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months.

Matthews filed written objections to the PSI’s calculation of his base offense 

level, arguing, as relevant here: (1) that his prior felony battery conviction under 

Fla. Stat. § 784.041 does not qualify as a crime of violence; and (2) that it was 

error to conclude his offense involved a firearm capable of accepting a large 

capacity magazine because, at the time of the offense, the rifle was not loaded with 

a magazine and Matthews never came into possession of either the rifle or a

magazine. In support of his second objection, Matthews noted that the rifle can 

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accommodate different sizes of magazines and that there was no evidence 

establishing what magazine, if any, he would have purchased with the rifle.

The district court quickly dispensed with Matthews’s first objection at 

sentencing, noting that it was bound by precedent to conclude that Matthews’s 

felony battery conviction constituted a crime of violence. See United States v. 

Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that Florida 

felony battery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence).

To rebut Matthews’s second objection, the Government pointed to portions 

of Matthews’s PSI which stated that Matthews was “a former infantryman in the 

U.S. Army Reserve, trained in combat and marksmanship,” making it “highly 

improbable” that he “purchased the firearm in question without knowing it came 

with a 30-round magazine and that he would receive both had his application been 

approved.” The Government also presented testimony from Mary Evans, the ATF 

agent responsible for investigating Matthews’s case. Agent Evans confirmed that 

the “standard magazine” for the rifle in question is a 30-round magazine, but noted 

that firearms “generally do not have the magazines in” them when people are 

looking at them at the store. On cross-examination, Agent Evans admitted that she 

did not ask the salesperson whether they discussed with Matthews what type of 

magazine would come with the firearm. In response to Agent Evans’s testimony, 

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Matthews argued that at the time of the false statement the firearm did not have a 

magazine and the facts must be judged at the time of the offense.

The court overruled Matthews’s objections, adopted the recommendations in 

the PSI, and ruled:

I think the evidence I heard is that there was no magazine 

attached to [the rifle], but I think what I heard was that 

[Matthews] was purchasing or attempting to purchase a 

specific firearm which comes standard with a magazine of 

30 rounds. And so I think I can find, based upon what I’ve 

heard, that it had a magazine that could accept more than 

15 rounds in close proximity to it.

Finding that Matthews’s criminal history was “underreported”—and the 

Guidelines range insufficient—the court sentenced Matthews to a term of 57 

months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. Matthews timely

appealed.

II.

On appeal, Matthews raises the same objections to his base offense level that 

he did at sentencing, arguing that he does not meet either of the requirements for 

enhancing his sentence pursuant to § 2K2.1(a)(3). We address each argument in 

turn.

A. Large Capacity Magazine

We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its 

application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Tejas, 868 F.3d 

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1242, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Clear-error review is deferential, and we

will not disturb a district court’s factual findings unless we are left with “a definite 

and firm conviction that the court made a mistake.” Id. Importantly, the clearerror standard “plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of 

the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case 

differently.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Thus, we 

may not reverse “[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in 

light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Id. at 573–74.

When a defendant challenges one of the factual bases of a sentence 

enhancement, the Government has the burden of establishing the disputed fact by a 

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Little, 864 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th 

Cir. 2017). “This burden requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a 

fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Almedina, 686 F.3d 

1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The sentencing 

court’s factual findings may be based upon facts admitted by the defendant’s guilty 

plea, undisputed statements in the PSI, or evidence presented at the sentencing 

hearing. United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2009). The 

court may also make reasonable inferences from the evidence. United States v. 

Green, 981 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Philidor, 717 

F.3d 883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (stating that at sentencing, a district 

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court could make inferences “based on common sense and ordinary human 

experience”).

“When interpreting the Guidelines, a guideline’s meaning is derived first 

from its plain language and, absent ambiguity, no additional inquiry is necessary.” 

United States v. Gordillo, 920 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation 

mark omitted). “Commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains 

a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or 

is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Id.

(alteration adopted).

The district court applies a base offense level of 22 for making a false 

statement to a firearms dealer “if (A) the offense involved a . . . semiautomatic 

firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine . . . and (B) the 

defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one 

felony conviction of . . . a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). The 

commentary defines a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large 

capacity magazine” as

a semiautomatic firearm that has the ability to fire many 

rounds without reloading because at the time of the offense 

(A) the firearm had attached to it a magazine or similar 

device that could accept more than 15 rounds of 

ammunition; or (B) a magazine or similar device that 

could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition was in 

close proximity to the firearm.

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Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.2 (emphasis added). The district court concluded that 

Matthews’s offense involved the latter—that is, that a magazine capable of 

accepting more than 15 rounds of ammunition “was in close proximity” to the rifle.

Neither we nor our sister circuits have published an opinion addressing how 

the sentencing enhancement under § 2K2.1(a)(3) applies when the underlying 

offense is making a false statement to a firearms dealer. But we have interpreted 

the definition of a semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large 

capacity magazine in cases involving the offense of being a felon in possession of 

a firearm.

In those cases, we interpreted the phrase “capable of accepting a large 

capacity magazine” to be “words of possibility, not actuality,” and the phrase “at 

the time of offense” to modify the following subparts. United States v. Evans, 958 

F.3d 1102, 1108 (11th Cir. 2020). We have also discussed the meaning of “close 

proximity”—based on its plain meaning and in light of our caselaw interpreting 

application note 14 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1—in the context of close proximity 

between firearms and drugs in drug trafficking offenses, and concluded that close 

proximity “encompasses both physical distance and accessibility.” Gordillo, 920

F.3d at 1298–1300 (emphases omitted). We adopted Gordillo’s approach to 

determine that a semiautomatic weapon in a case located outside a residence was in 

close proximity to a large capacity magazine in a bedroom drawer within the 

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residence. United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1109–10 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. 

denied, 140 S. Ct. 2553 (2020) (mem.).

We have also discussed the history of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, which was 

amended in response to the expiration of the federal assault weapons ban. See 

Gordillo, 920 F.3d at 1298. In Gordillo, we stated that, while the amendment 

history did not address the “close proximity” requirement, “the Commission 

believed the enhanced base offense levels should continue to apply to ‘these types 

of firearms’ . . . . [which] suggests the Commission was concerned with identifying 

the type of gun—making sure the component parts were all present and could be 

identified as part of a corresponding firearm and magazine.” Id. We further noted 

that the sentencing enhancements in the Guidelines “are intended to punish 

firearms crimes involving particularly dangerous types of weapons.” Id. at 1300.

We can find no basis in the record on which to overturn the district court’s 

factual findings regarding the close proximity of a large capacity magazine to the 

rifle Matthews attempted to purchase, nor in its legal conclusion that the offense 

conduct met the standard for the Guidelines enhancement. Matthews attempted to 

purchase a semiautomatic rifle that comes standard with a 30-round magazine and 

committed the offense of making false statements to a firearm dealer while inside 

Mike’s Gun Shop, which sells both firearms and magazines. Based on these facts, 

it was reasonable for the district court to infer that a magazine capable of accepting 

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more than 15 rounds of ammunition—that comes “standard” with the rifle—was in 

close proximity to the rifle Matthews sought to purchase. See Gordillo, 920 F.3d 

at 1300 (rejecting the argument that a firearm and magazine could not be in “close 

proximity” if they were stored separately); see also United States v. Chavez, 584 

F.3d 1354, 1367 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding a sentencing court was “free to make” a 

reasonable inference that is not “speculative to the point of being clearly 

erroneous”).

We also find that the application of the large-capacity magazine 

enhancement in this context—the attempted purchase of a semiautomatic rifle by 

an individual subject to a restraining order—furthers the policy rationale behind § 

2K2.1 of punishing firearm crimes involving “dangerous types of weapons.” See 

Gordillo, 920 F.3d at 1300.

Because the district court’s account of the evidence “is plausible in light of 

the record viewed in its entirety,” we affirm Matthews’s sentence as to this issue. 

See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.

B. Crime of Violence

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“We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a 

crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Estrada, 777 

F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

Sitting en banc, we held that a conviction for felony battery under Fla. Stat. 

§ 784.041 is categorically a crime of violence. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d at 1308. 

Under the prior-precedent rule, we are bound to follow binding precedent “unless 

and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme 

Court or by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 

1332 (11th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination 

that Matthews’s prior conviction for Florida felony battery constitutes a crime of 

violence.

For the foregoing reasons, the rulings of the district court are AFFIRMED.

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