NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. JASON C. YOUKER,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 16

- 30135
D.C. No. 2:14

- cr - 00152

- SMJ

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Salvador Mendoza, Jr., District Judge, Presiding Submitted December 5, 2017 ** Seattle, Washington Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TALLMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. Jason Youker was convicted of numerous counts related to conspiracy to distribute methamphet amine and heroin, and unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of those crimes . Youker appeals his conviction on the grounds that he was denie d his Sixth Amendment right to self

- representation while

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

DEC 7 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

incarcerated pre

- trial and Fifth Amendment right to due process , and received ineffective assistance of standby counsel. Youker also argues the district court abused its discretion by restricting hi s access to discovery and denying his motion to continue the trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. Youker was not denied his constitutional right s to self

- representation and due process simply because standby counsel served a s a facilitator between the investigator and Youker. Given Youker’s stated need for an investigator and the
court

- funded private investigator’s refusal to work directly with Youker, the district court made a permissible adjustment “to assist the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant’s achievement of his own clearly indicated goals.” See Savage v. Estelle , 924 F.2d 1459, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) ( “ T he trial judge may be required to make numerous rulings reconciling the participation of standby counsel with a pro se defendant’ s objection to that participation [.]”). Neither did s tandby counsel’s refusal to relay investigative requests that were “outside the ethical bounds of things that could be requested” violate Youker’s right s to self

- representation and due process , as it was not “a matter that would normally be left to the defense’s discretion.” McKaskle , 465 U.S. at 181 ; see also Milton v. Morris , 767 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A] voidance of3

abuse by o pportunistic . . . defendants may require special adjustments. ” (citations omitted) ). “ T he right of self

- representation is not a license to abus e the d ignity of the courtroom” or “ not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law

. ” McKaskle , 465 U.S. at 184 (quoting Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)) . Moreover, complying with ethical rules is not ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); cf. United States v. Thoreen , 653 F.2d 1332, 1340 (9th Cir. 1981) (“ Ethical standards establish the outermost limits of appropriate a nd sanctioned attorney conduct .”)

. 1
2. T he district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Youker’ s numerous requests for “complete access” to discovery

. See United States v. Mitchell , 502 F.3d 931, 964 (9th Cir. 2007). A criminal defendant’s right to access discovery “must be balanced against the legitimate security needs or resource constraints of the prison.” United States v. Sarno , 73 F.3d 1470, 1491 (9th Cir. 1995)

. Here, the d istrict court did not give Youker unrestricted access in his cell to discovery

— which included sensitive statements by cooperating co

- defendants

— given safety concerns that Youker would disseminate the information to harass or

1 Appointing standby counsel despite Youker’s claim that “we don’t get along” did not violate the Sixth Amendment. See M cKaskle , 465 U.S. at 180

– 81 (no Sixth Amendment violation despite “acrimonious exchange[s]” between defendant and standby counsel, during which counsel “used profanity and curtly dire cted [defendant] to ‘[s]it down ’”).4

harm th ose co - defendants , and a reluctance to “micromanage jail officials,” whose prevailing policy did not permit detainees to keep discovery in their cells

. Youker’s argument that the discovery “could have been redacted , or placed on a computer” is unavailing. Youker had personal a ccess to over 2,6 00 pages of material, which the government organized into seven indexed binders and delivered to the jail for his perusal six months before trial. He could choose between daily access to one binder at a time in a visiting booth

— or, altern atively

— access to all seven at once in the law library, but only during allotted daily hours. “ When [constitutionally permissible legal assistance ] is provided [at government expense] , as was here, [Defendant] may not reject the method provided and insist on an avenue of his

. . . choosing. ” United States v. Wilson , 690 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted)

. These reasonable limits on Youker’s access to discovery w ere not an abuse of discretion

. See Sarno , 73 F.3d at 1492 (no abuse of discretion where defendant had twenty hours to review 250,0 00 pages of discovery )

. Here, Youker had access to the material for months, though testimony of the jail officials established he rarely looked at them.
3. Neither did the district court abuse its “ broad discretion ” by denying Youker’s request for a continuance on the first day of trial on a case that had been pending for a year

. See United States v. Flynt , 756 F.2d 1353, 1358

– 59 (9th Cir. 1985) (establishing four

- part test for reviewing a denial of a continuance).5

Notwithstanding prior continuances sought by both sides and granted by the district court , Youker argues he should have been allowed additional time because his consti tutional rights were violated. On this record , Youker’s constitutional claims are without merit. Youker “ has failed to adduce any evidence that would support a conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to postpone the tria l ” ag ain. See Sarno , 73 F.3d at 1493.
AFFIRMED.