Rel: May 17, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 

Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 

300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 

errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

SC-2023-0657

_________________________

City of Orange Beach 

v. 

The Lamar Companies

Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court

(CV-07-900924 and CV-09-901011)

MENDHEIM, Justice.

The City of Orange Beach ("Orange Beach") appeals from the 

Baldwin Circuit Court's order denying Orange Beach's motion to enforce 
SC-2023-0657

2

consent decrees that declared the settlement terms of a dispute between 

Orange Beach and The Lamar Companies ("Lamar"). We reverse the 

circuit court's order.

I. Facts

In 1991, Orange Beach adopted a zoning ordinance pertaining to 

"off-premises" signs within its jurisdiction ("the zoning ordinance"). 

Before the adoption of the zoning ordinance, Lamar had constructed and 

erected four billboard signs along the beach highway in Orange Beach. 

Section 15.0403 of the zoning ordinance provides that signs erected 

before the adoption of the zoning ordinance are deemed to be 

"nonconforming signs" and that

"[a] non-conforming sign may be maintained only by painting 

or refinishing the surface of the sign face or sign structure so 

as to keep the appearance of the sign as it was when the prior 

permit was issued or the City permit tag affixed. Upon a 

determination by the administrator and notice to the 

permittee that a nonconforming sign has become dilapidated 

or structurally unsound, such sign shall be moved within 20 

days unless an appeal of such determination has been 

previously filed with the Board of Adjustment. Any structural 

or other substantive maintenance of the nonconforming sign 

shall be deemed an abandonment of the nonconforming sign 

and shall render the prior permit void and shall result in the 

reclassification of such sign as an illegal sign pursuant to 

Section 15.0401." 
SC-2023-0657

3

On September 24, 2007, Orange Beach Inspector Chuck Smith 

determined that the four Lamar billboards were in a dilapidated 

condition and recommended that Orange Beach order Lamar to remove 

the billboards because they did not comply with the zoning ordinance. 

Orange Beach subsequently sent letters to Lamar informing it that the 

four billboards did not comply with the zoning ordinance and that Lamar 

was required to remove them. 

On October 12, 2007, Lamar appealed to the Board of Adjustment 

of the City of Orange Beach the determination that the four billboards 

did not comply with the zoning ordinance. In its appeal, Lamar both 

challenged Orange Beach's determination that Lamar had not followed 

the zoning ordinance's requirements for nonconforming signs and 

requested a variance from the zoning ordinance, pursuant to § 11-52-

80(d)(3), Ala. Code 1975, because, it said, application of the zoning 

ordinance would result in "unnecessary hardship."1 On November 19, 

2007, the Board of Adjustment considered and denied Lamar's appeal.

1Section 11-52-80(d)(3), Ala. Code 1975, authorizes a board of 

adjustment

"[t]o authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance 

from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the 
SC-2023-0657

4

On November 27, 2007, Lamar appealed the Board of Adjustment's 

decision to the Baldwin Circuit Court, and the appeal was assigned to 

Circuit Judge J. Langford Floyd. In its amended complaint filed on 

August 18, 2008, Lamar asserted claims contending, among other things, 

that Section 15.0403 of the zoning ordinance: (1) violates the Alabama 

Constitution in that it is "void for vagueness and grant[s] unfettered 

discretion to [Orange Beach] officials to license speech"; (2) "violates the 

Alabama Constitution's due process guarantees" because it uses 

ambiguous terms; and (3) "deprives Lamar of equal protection" because 

it "favors the speech of certain groups and organizations while 

prohibiting speech by other entities that would be no more detrimental 

to any legitimate governmental interest" and because Orange Beach was 

"clearly selectively enforcing the [Zoning] Ordinance against Lamar."

On August 28, 2009, Lamar commenced a separate action against 

Orange Beach in the Baldwin Circuit Court, which was assigned to 

Circuit Judge Robert E. Wilters, that alleged nearly identical claims to 

public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a literal 

enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in 

unnecessary hardship and so that the spirit of the ordinance 

shall be observed and substantial justice done."
SC-2023-0657

5

those asserted in their appeal of the Board of Adjustment's decision, 

including allegations of free-speech, equal-protection, and due-process 

violations related to Orange Beach's alleged selective enforcement of the 

zoning ordinance.2 On September 1, 2009, Lamar moved to consolidate 

the two actions, and on September 16, 2009, Judge Floyd entered an 

order consolidating the two actions. On September 29, 2009, Orange 

Beach filed a "Motion to Vacate and Rescind Order of Consolidation." On 

October 20, 2009, Judge Floyd granted Orange Beach's motion and 

returned the separate action to Judge Wilters.

On June 3, 2010, Judge Wilters ordered the parties to mediate their 

dispute. On June 16, 2010, Judge Floyd ordered the parties to mediate 

their dispute in the appeal from the Board of Adjustment's decision 

together with the already initiated mediation of the dispute in Lamar's 

separate action. The mediation was successful, and the parties reached a 

2In a subsequent filing, Lamar asserted that its reason for 

commencing the separate action was that in June 2009 it had submitted 

to Orange Beach permit applications for constructing and erecting new 

billboards, but that in July 2009 Orange Beach had denied those 

applications despite having permitted similar signs constructed and

erected by a different company.
SC-2023-0657

6

settlement agreement that encompassed both Lamar's appeal from the 

Board of Adjustment's decision and Lamar's separate action. 

On March 24, 2011, Judge Floyd entered an order explaining the 

settlement agreement. That order stated:

"The parties, The Lamar Companies, the City of Orange 

Beach, Alabama and the City of Orange Beach Board of 

Adjustment, were previously ordered by this Court to attend 

a joint mediation to see if the issues raised in [the separate 

action] and [the appeal of the Board of Adjustment's decision] 

could be resolved. The parties have favorably reported to the 

Court that they have reached an agreement. Pursuant to that 

representation, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and 

DECREES:

"1. This Court will assert jurisdiction over both the 2009 

and 2007 cases for purpose of entering this Consent Decree.

"2. In 1991, the City of Orange Beach adopted a zoning 

ordinance prohibiting off-premise signs within [Orange 

Beach]. [Lamar] currently [has] four off-premise signs within 

[Orange Beach] as depicted in the attached aerial map as A, 

B, C, and D. The signs are deemed non-conforming under the 

zoning ordinance because they pre-existed the 1991 ban on 

such signs.

"3. The parties' dispute centers on whether the four nonconforming signs are dilapidated or structurally unsound, and 

as such, subject to removal under the terms of the zoning 

ordinance. To resolve these cases, the parties agree and the 

court orders as follows:

"(a) The three signs identified as A, B, and D 

on the attached aerial map will be removed not 

later than 60 days from the date of this order, and 
SC-2023-0657

7

shall not be replaced. Lamar will remove all debris 

and trash associated with the removal.

"(b) The sign identified as 'C' on the attached 

aerial map and located on tax parcel # 66-06-13-3-

001-043.000, owned by Annette B. Little and 

currently leased to Lamar, may remain on such 

site as a non-conforming sign so long as it complies 

with the terms of this order, but must be removed 

not later than twelve years from the date of the 

sign permit issued pursuant to subparagraph (c) 

below.

"(c) Upon submittal of properly completed 

application(s), [Orange Beach] agrees to issue such 

permits to Lamar within 60 days as may be 

necessary to modify sign C as follows:

"(1) the monopole, header and 

sign face may be replaced with a new 

support and header and one 10' 6" x 36' 

trivision mechanical sign board, one on 

each side, for a total of two, 

replacement sign faces;

"(2) the replacement sign will be 

externally illuminated. Under no 

circumstances will any digital or 

internal illumination be allowed.

"(d) During the twelve year period as defined 

in subpart (b) above, Lamar will maintain the 

property immediately surrounding the 

circumference of the sign, keeping it free of debris, 

trash and overgrown grass, and otherwise comply 

with [Orange Beach's] ordinances concerning the 

regulation of signs, including inspections and 

permitting. Lamar shall perform no work on the 
SC-2023-0657

8

sign other than routine maintenance to the 

trivision mechanisms and interchange of copy 

without first obtaining a permit. 

"4. In the event Lamar fails to comply with any of the 

terms of this decree, upon application of [Orange Beach], this 

Court will order the immediate removal of the nonconforming 

sign with no further hearings.

"5. The remaining claims contained in the above-styled 

cases are due to be dismissed with prejudice, each party to 

bear its own costs."

(Emphasis added.) On April 12, 2011, Judge Wilters entered an identical 

order in the separate action.3 The orders entered by Judge Floyd and 

Judge Wilters are referred to collectively as "the consent decrees."

On April 8, 2011, in accordance with the consent decrees, Orange 

Beach granted Lamar's permit application for Billboard C. The permit 

referenced the consent decrees and quoted the portion of them that stated 

that Billboard C was to "remain on ... site as a non-conforming sign so 

long as it complies with the terms of this order, but must be removed not 

later than twelve years from the date of the sign permit issued."

3The only difference between the two orders was that Judge Floyd's 

order was titled "Order" while Judge Wilters's order was titled "Consent 

Decree." 
SC-2023-0657

9

On March 14, 2023, Orange Beach sent Lamar a letter reminding 

Lamar of the consent decrees' terms concerning Billboard C and stating 

that the billboard "must be removed on or before April 8, 2023. Failure to 

do so will result in further legal action." Lamar did not respond to Orange 

Beach's March 14, 2023, letter. The 12-year period for Billboard C's 

display under the consent decrees expired on April 8, 2023. It is 

undisputed that Lamar continued to operate and maintain Billboard C 

after that date. On April 14, 2023, Orange Beach sent Lamar another 

letter that reiterated the consent decrees' terms concerning Billboard C,

which stated in part that "[t]his letter serves as final notice to remove the 

sign and all debris therefrom immediately. If proper removal is not 

completed within 14 days, [Orange Beach] will move forward with legal 

action and/or remove the sign." Lamar did not respond to Orange Beach's 

April 14, 2023, letter.

On May 3, 2023, Lamar filed in the Baldwin Circuit Court under 

the case number assigned to its appeal from the Board of Adjustment's 

decision a "Motion to Enjoin" Orange Beach "from requiring the removal 
SC-2023-0657

10

of [Billboard C] and/or enjoining [Orange Beach] from removing 

[Billboard C]."4 In that motion, Lamar contended:

"3. Since the date[s] of the [consent decrees] there has 

been a material change in the circumstances surrounding 

[Orange Beach's] enforcement, or selective enforcement, of its 

[zoning] ordinance, Article 15, ... as to off-premises and onpremises advertising signs. [Orange Beach] has selectively 

enforced its [zoning] ordinance as to Lamar's sign at issue but 

has failed to enforce its [zoning] ordinance as to several other 

advertising signs throughout [Orange Beach], which are nonconforming and remain in place.

"4. [Orange Beach's] selective enforcement of its [zoning]

ordinance as to Lamar and to the exclusion of others similarly 

situated has been intentional and unequal and is a deviation 

from the ordinance.

"5. Lamar has a constitutional right to conduct offpremises advertising and [Orange Beach's] selective 

enforcement of its [zoning] ordinance is intended to prevent 

that right while numerous similarly situated persons or 

entities that operate off-premises advertising signs in 

[Orange Beach] have not been prosecuted."

4Lamar's "Motion to Enjoin" asserted that the consent decrees

"would allow Lamar's non-conforming digital off-premises advertising 

sign to remain in place until April 30, 2023." It is not clear from the record 

or the parties' briefs why Lamar believed that the deadline for removing 

Billboard C was April 30, 2023, rather than April 8, 2023. However, the 

difference is immaterial because Lamar has acknowledged that it did not 

remove Billboard C before either date and, indeed, that it still has not 

done so.
SC-2023-0657

11

Based on the foregoing contentions, Lamar sought a judgment declaring 

that Article 15 of the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional under 

Alabama's Constitution, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief 

enjoining Orange Beach from enforcing its zoning ordinance with respect 

to Billboard C, and "any further and additional relief that the Court 

should deem appropriate."

On June 12, 2023, Orange Beach filed a "Motion to Enforce 

Judgment and for Finding of Contempt" under both the case number 

assigned to the separate action and the case number assigned to Lamar's 

appeal from the Board of Adjustment's decision. In that motion, Orange 

Beach requested that the circuit court order the removal of Billboard C 

pursuant to the consent decrees and sought a finding of civil contempt 

against Lamar and an award of attorney fees to Orange Beach as a 

sanction for Lamar's alleged violation of the consent decrees. Orange 

Beach contended in its motion to enforce the consent decrees that,

because the parties' settlement agreement had been incorporated into a 

court order, it was "res judicata as to any claims that Lamar otherwise 

may have had" and that "Lamar affirmatively waived any irregularities 

associated" with the consent decrees. In support of its motion to enforce 
SC-2023-0657

12

the consent decrees, Orange Beach filed several evidentiary submissions, 

including an affidavit from Orange Beach Director of Community 

Development Kit Alexander, who testified to having attended the 

settlement discussions between the parties, described Orange Beach's 

interpretation of the consent decrees, and related that Billboard C 

"remains standing to this very day in blatant violation of this Court's 

direct orders."5 On the same date, Orange Beach filed in both case 

numbers a response in opposition to Lamar's "Motion to Enjoin" the 

removal of Billboard C that reiterated and expanded upon the arguments 

contained in Orange Beach's motion to enforce the consent decrees, 

including its contention that the claims asserted by Lamar in its "Motion 

to Enjoin" were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Orange Beach also 

argued:

"Lamar's 'Motion to Enforce' reads as though it is a new 

lawsuit, but [it was] filed in the same case, without payment 

of a new filing fee. The Motion even includes a purported 

claim for a 'declaratory judgment' under which it requests 

new relief from this Court despite the entry of a final 

judgment twelve years ago. This is improper. These cases 

were dismissed with prejudice on March 24, 2011, and April 

12, 2011, when the Consent Decrees were entered. The matter 

cannot be 're-opened' through the filing of a motion 'to enjoin' 

5Pictures supporting Alexander's testimony that Billboard C 

remained in place were attached to Alexander's affidavit.
SC-2023-0657

13

or prayer for declaratory relief -- because it was finally settled

twelve years ago. That is doubly true given that the Motion to 

Enjoin purports to allege new acts or omissions by [Orange 

Beach], which[,] again, allegedly post-date the settlement in 

this case and have no bearing upon it."

On August 25, 2023, the circuit court -- Judge J. Clark Stankoski 

presiding -- held a hearing concerning Orange Beach's motion to enforce 

the consent decrees. On the same date, the circuit court entered an order 

denying Orange Beach's motion to enforce the consent decrees. The order 

did not explain Judge Stankoski's reasons for denying the motion. On 

September 8, 2023, Orange Beach appealed the circuit court's order.

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing the circuit court's denial of Orange Beach's motion to 

enforce the consent decrees, we apply a de novo standard of review. See, 

e.g., Ingenuity Int'l, LLC v. Smith, [Ms. SC-2022-0501, June 16, 2023] __ 

So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2023) (stating that "we [will] apply the standard of 

review that applies to a permanent injunction enforcing a settlement 

agreement, which is de novo"); McIver v. Bondy's Ford, Inc., 916 So. 2d 

616, 619 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) ("Because the trial court did not receive 

ore tenus evidence as to the alleged settlement agreement, we review the 

judgment without a presumption of correctness.").
SC-2023-0657

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III. Analysis

A. Lamar's Motion to Dismiss the Appeal

Before we address the substance of Orange Beach's appeal, we note 

that Lamar has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. Lamar contends that 

Orange Beach has not appealed from a final judgment because its own 

"Motion to Enjoin" Orange Beach "from requiring the removal of 

[Billboard C] and/or enjoining [Orange Beach] from removing [Billboard 

C]" remains pending before the circuit court and, Lamar asserts, that 

motion is intertwined with Orange Beach's motion to enforce the consent 

decrees. Lamar observes that "[a] final judgment that will support an 

appeal is one that puts an end to the proceedings between the parties to 

a case and leaves nothing for further adjudication" and that, "[w]ithout a 

final judgment, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal." Ex 

parte Wharfhouse Rest. & Oyster Bar, Inc., 796 So. 2d 316, 320 (Ala. 

2001).

Orange Beach counters that its motion to enforce the consent 

decrees sought injunctive relief, citing Kappa Sigma Fraternity v. PriceWilliams, 40 So. 3d 683 (Ala. 2009), and Lem Harris Rainwater Family

Trust v. Rainwater, 344 So. 3d 331 (Ala. 2021), in support of that 
SC-2023-0657

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proposition, and so, Orange Beach argues, under Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. 

App. P., the circuit court's order was appealable within 14 days of the 

date of the circuit court's order. In Kappa Sigma Fraternity, this Court 

concluded that a trial court's order commanding a party to pay settlement 

proceeds to another party was "injunctive in nature." 40 So. 3d at 690. In 

Rainwater, this Court, relying on Kappa Sigma Fraternity, concluded 

that a trial court's order "directing the parties to comply with the 

settlement agreement" "was injunctive in nature -- because it 

commanded the parties to take specific action." 344 So. 3d at 334, 335.

Lamar does not deny the holdings in Rainwater and Kappa Sigma 

Fraternity. Instead, Lamar seeks to distinguish those decisions, arguing 

that in those cases this Court 

"held that appeals can be taken from interlocutory orders 

granting injunction. ... In this case, the [circuit court's] order 

denying [Orange Beach's] Motion to Enforce Judgment and 

for Finding Contempt ... is not the denial of an injunction and 

not an injunctive order as it does not command either party to 

take a specific action nor does it prevent either party from 

taking a specific action. See Dawkins v. Walker, 794 So. 2d 

333, 335 (Ala. 2001) ('An injunction is defined as "[a] court 

order commanding or preventing an action." Black's Law 

Dictionary 788 (7th ed. 1999).')."

Lamar's Motion to Dismiss, p. 5; see also Lamar's brief, pp. 10-11

(repeating verbatim the same argument). 
SC-2023-0657

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As Orange Beach notes, however, Lamar's manner of 

distinguishing Rainwater and Kappa Sigma Fraternity makes no sense 

given that Rule 4(a)(1)(A) expressly provides for the appeal of "any 

interlocutory order granting, continuing modifying, refusing, or 

dissolving an injunction, or refusing to dissolve or to modify an 

injunction." (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is immaterial that in Rainwater

and Kappa Sigma Fraternity the trial courts were granting injunctive 

relief rather than refusing such relief as in this case. The circuit court's 

August 25, 2023, order denying Orange Beach's motion to enforce the 

consent decrees constituted a refusal to require Lamar to remove 

Billboard C from the beach highway, i.e., refusing to require Lamar to 

take a specific action. It was clearly an order "refusing ... an injunction." 

Rule 4(a)(1)(A). Orange Beach appealed from the August 25, 2023, order 

within 14 days of the entry of the order; therefore, we have jurisdiction 

to consider Orange Beach's appeal under Rule 4(a)(1)(A).

B. The Circuit Court's Denial of Orange Beach's Motion to Enforce the 

Consent Decrees

Orange Beach contends that the circuit court erred by not granting 

its motion to enforce the consent decrees because the consent decrees' 

terms were unequivocal that Billboard C had to be removed 12 years after 
SC-2023-0657

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the date the permit for it was issued and it is undisputed that Lamar has 

not removed Billboard C even though the 12-year term has expired. The 

consent decrees expressly stated, in relevant part: 

"(b) The sign identified as 'C' ... may remain 

on such site as a non-conforming sign so long as it 

complies with the terms of this order, but must be 

removed not later than twelve years from the date 

of the sign permit issued pursuant to 

subparagraph (c) below.

"....

"4. In the event Lamar fails to comply with any of the 

terms of this decree, upon application of [Orange Beach], this 

Court will order the immediate removal of the nonconforming 

sign with no further hearings."

(Emphasis added.) Orange Beach issued the permit for Billboard C on 

April 8, 2011. It is undisputed that Lamar did not remove Billboard C by 

April 8, 2023, and that it still has not removed Billboard C during the 

pendency of this litigation.

Orange Beach notes that this Court has stated that a consent 

decree " '"must be 'regarded as in the nature of a contract or binding 

obligation between the parties thereto.'"'" Phoenix East Ass'n v. Perdido 

Dunes Tower, LLC, 295 So. 3d 1016, 1026 (Ala. 2019) (quoting Mudd v. 

Lanier, 247 Ala. 363, 372, 24 So. 2d 550, 558 (1945), quoting in turn 
SC-2023-0657

18

Garrett v. Davis, 216 Ala. 74, 76, 112 So. 342, 343 (1927), quoting in turn 

Cowley v. Farrow, 193 Ala. 381, 384, 69 So. 114, 115 (1915)). Further, a 

consent decree "'is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will 

be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to 

the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.'" Austin

v. Alabama Check Cashers Ass'n, 936 So. 2d 1014, 1038 (Ala. 2005)

(quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992)).

See also Mays v. Julian LeCraw & Co., 807 So. 2d 551, 554 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2001) (stating that "[a] settlement agreement entered into between the 

parties is binding and will be summarily enforced"). Moreover, the 

consent decrees were orders of the circuit court, and "a trial court has 

residual jurisdiction to enforce its judgments." Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. 

Gulf State Park Auth., 58 So. 3d 727, 730 (Ala. 2010). See also Ingenuity 

Int'l, LLC, __ So. 3d at __ (observing that a "circuit court [has] general 

authority to enforce settlement agreements. See Kappa Sigma, 40 So. 3d 

at 696 (Murdock, J., concurring in rationale in part and concurring in 

result) ('[A] trial court exercises inherent power to [enforce a settlement 

agreement] based on the fact that the agreement has been made before 

the court.')."); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 
SC-2023-0657

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375, 381 (1994) (concluding that a federal district court lacked ancillary 

jurisdiction to address the claims at issue, but noting that "[t]he situation 

would be quite different if the parties' obligation to comply with the terms 

of the settlement agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal 

... by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order. 

In that event, a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, 

and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore 

exist.").

Lamar does not deny any of the foregoing points of law. Rather, it 

asserts:

"During the mediation, it was represented to Lamar that the 

City of Orange Beach does not, and would not, allow off 

premises advertising within [Orange Beach]. The City of 

Orange Beach [Zoning Ordinance] specifically prohibit[s] off 

premises advertising signs, except off premise signs for nonprofit organization special events. (Ordinance at 15.06). 

Lamar agreed to the Consent [Decrees] and agreed to the 

removal of billboards A, B, and D based on [Orange Beach's]

assurance that it would not allow digital signage or off 

premises advertising signs in the future and so that billboard 

C was the last remaining off premises advertising sign within 

[Orange Beach]. Despite that assurance, subsequently 

[Orange Beach] allowed multiple off premises signs and 

digital signs. While [Orange Beach] was demanding that 

Lamar remove its off premises sign pursuant to the Consent 

[Decrees], [Orange Beach] was and is allowing numerous off 

premises advertising signs to operate throughout [Orange 

Beach]."
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Lamar's brief, pp. 2-3. In other words, Lamar argues that Orange Beach's 

alleged "selective enforcement" of its zoning ordinance entitles Lamar not 

to comply with the consent decrees. 

There are numerous problems with Lamar's argument. First, the 

consent decrees do not say anything about a possibility that future socalled "selective enforcement" of Orange Beach's zoning ordinance could 

warrant Billboard C remaining on display past the 12-year period stated 

in the consent decrees and declared by the permit for Billboard C. "A 

settlement agreement is a contract." Lem Harris Rainwater Fam. Tr. v. 

Rainwater, 373 So. 3d 1089, 1093 (Ala. 2022). "Rules applicable to the 

construction and interpretation of contracts are applicable to the 

construction and interpretation of judgments. Thus, in construing a 

consent judgment, the intention of the parties derived from the judgment 

itself controls if its language is plain and unambiguous." Hanson v. 

Hearn, 521 So. 2d 953, 954-55 (Ala. 1988). The language of the consent 

decrees is plain and unambiguous: it states that Billboard C could remain 

on site for 12 years but that it "must be removed not later than twelve 

years from the date of the sign permit issued ...." Lamar's argument that 

it agreed to the terms of the consent decrees only because of Orange 
SC-2023-0657

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Beach's representations about future enforcement of the zoning 

ordinance with respect to off-premises advertising is not reflected in the 

provisions of the consent decrees, which dictate the stated intentions of 

the parties. Because Lamar's argument is not grounded in the language 

of the consent decrees, it does not constitute a basis for refusing to enforce 

the terms of the consent decrees with respect to Billboard C.

Second, as we related in Part I of this opinion, Lamar asserted 

allegations of selective enforcement of the zoning ordinance against 

Orange Beach in both its 2007 appeal from the Board of Adjustment's 

decision and in its 2009 separate action against Orange Beach. In the 

consent decrees, Lamar settled its disputes with Orange Beach. In doing 

so, Lamar waived its right to assert its then-pending selectiveenforcement claims against Orange Beach. Indeed, the consent decrees

expressly stated that "[t]he remaining claims contained in the abovestyled cases are due to be dismissed with prejudice ...." "A consent 

judgment acts as a final settlement of the claims raised, and under such 

a judgment the parties waive errors and irregularities, absent fraud or 

mistake." Winston Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Haleyville City Sch. Bd., 738 So. 2d 

886, 890 (Ala. 1999). Lamar was aware of Orange Beach's alleged 
SC-2023-0657

22

selective enforcement of the zoning ordinance at the time it entered into 

the settlement agreement and stipulated to the terms of the consent 

decrees. Therefore, Lamar's previous allegations of selective enforcement

are not a basis for refusing to enforce the terms of the consent decrees.

Third, Lamar's "Motion to Enjoin" clearly raises new allegations of 

selective enforcement of the zoning ordinance that it says have occurred 

"[s]ince the date[s] of the [consent decrees]." Lamar's motion couched 

those new allegations as "a material change in circumstances 

surrounding [Orange Beach's] enforcement, or selective enforcement, of 

its [zoning] ordinance, Article 15, ... as to off-premises and on-premises 

advertising signs." Lamar's new claims do not seek to enforce the consent 

decrees but, rather, seek to challenge Orange Beach's current manner of 

enforcing the zoning ordinance. The assertion of such new claims 

requires the commencement of a new action. See, e.g., Ex parte Caremark 

Rx, LLC, 229 So. 3d 751, 760 (Ala. 2017) (finding that "[t]he jurisdiction 

retained by the trial court after it entered its final judgment ... is limited 

to interpreting or enforcing that final judgment"); Gulf Beach Hotel, 58 

So. 3d at 731 (concluding that "[b]ecause [the plaintiff] did not seek 

enforcement of the June 26, 2008, judgment, the trial court did not have 
SC-2023-0657

23

retained or residual jurisdiction to consider the amended complaint" and 

that the claims "should, therefore, have been asserted in a new action 

...."); Rowland v. Tucker, 286 So. 3d 713, 724-25 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019)

(holding that: (1) "the present case does not concern whether the May 

2008 judgment can or should be enforced"; (2) a motion filed subsequent 

to the judgment "should have been treated as a new action"; and (3) the 

failure of the party who filed the motion "to pay the required filing fee in 

conjunction with the commencement of the action resulted in a failure to 

invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court").6 Lamar has neither 

commenced a new action nor paid a filing fee for such an action. 

Therefore, the new claims asserted in Lamar's "Motion to Enjoin" do not 

constitute a basis for refusing to enforce the terms of the consent decrees.

6Lamar argues that because its "claim that [Orange Beach] is 

selectively enforcing its [zoning ordinance] was raised in both its 2007 

Complaint and 2009 Complaint, ... the trial court retained jurisdiction" 

to consider Lamar's new selective-enforcement claims. Lamar's brief, p. 

3. But, as we already have observed, the consent decrees expressly 

dismissed with prejudice all claims asserted in Lamar's 2007 appeal from 

the Board of Adjustment's decision and Lamar's 2009 separate action. 

Thus, the circuit court did not retain jurisdiction to consider any 

selective-enforcement claims, let alone claims based on actions that 

occurred after the entry of the consent decrees.
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court erred 

by refusing to enforce the consent decrees. It is undisputed that Lamar 

has not removed Billboard C from its location even though more than 12 

years have transpired since the permit for Billboard C was issued by 

Orange Beach. The consent decrees clearly state that, "[i]n the event 

Lamar fails to comply with any of the terms of this decree, upon 

application of [Orange Beach], this Court will order the immediate 

removal of the nonconforming sign with no further hearings." Thus, upon 

Orange Beach's filing of its motion to enforce the consent decrees, the 

circuit court should have ordered Lamar to remove Billboard C. 

Accordingly, the circuit court's order is due to be reversed.

IV. Conclusion

Orange Beach's appeal was appropriate and timely under Rule 

4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P., and so, by separate order, we deny Lamar's 

motion to dismiss the appeal. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Lamar 

violated the terms of the consent decrees by failing to remove Billboard 

C within the period specified in the consent decrees, and none of the 

reasons offered by Lamar for that failure constitute a legitimate legal 

basis for not enforcing the terms of the consent decrees. Therefore, we 
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reverse the circuit court's order denying Orange Beach's motion to 

enforce the consent decrees, and we remand the action for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.