IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2016-KA-00932-COA WILLIE CARL PICKETT A/K/A WILLIE PICKETT A/K/A WILLIE C. PICKETT AND JACARRUS ANTYONE PICKETT A/K/A JACARRUS PICKETT A/K/A ANTYONE PICKETT A/K/A JACARRUS A. PICKETT APPELLANTS

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/07/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LESTER F. W I LLIAMSON JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK ROBERT GREER W HITACRE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALICIA MARIE AINSW ORTH DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BILBO MITCHELL NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/06/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: EN BANC. GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Jacarrus Pickett and W i llie Pickett were tried jointly and convicted of attem pted f i rstdegree m u rder. On appeal, they argue: (1) the indictm e nt was im properly am e nded; (2) the indictm ent, as am e nded, is void; ( 3) the j ur y w a s im properly instructed on the elem ents of
attem pted m urder; (4) Mississippi’s attem pted-m urder statute is unconstitutional; and (5) the verdict was against the w eight and suf f iciency of the evidence. W e f ind no error and af

f irm

.FACTS

¶2. Wa l t e r Culpepper, Jam es Tay lor, and Decarlos C lark worked a s g a r b a g e me n i n Meridian, Mississippi. On October 31, 2013, t he m en were assigned a route Clark had never worked. Clark told his supervisor that he could not go on the route because of a dispute with

som e m en in that area. The supervisor told him to go on the assigned route or go hom e. So Clark worked the route with Culpepper and T ay lor. Culpepper drove the truck, while Tay lor and C lark rode on the b a c k, loading garbage into the truck. Tay lor testif i ed that Clark appeared nervous and jittery

. As they approached an a rea near O akland Heights Elem entary School, Clark told T a y l o r h e h a d been i n a n altercation with som e o ne in that area. Tay lor then saw a tall, m

uscular m an running toward the truck with a pistol. C lark r ecognized the

m an as W illie. Clark testif ied that W illie y elled at him , “I g otcha[ .] I ’m f ixing to kill y ou, B * * * *

. ” C l a r k j um

ped into the cab of the truck and hid under the dash. W illie told Culpepper and Tay lor t o get out of the way if they did not want to be involved. Culpepper and Tay lor f

led. According to Clark, W illie f ired m ultiple shots at the garbage truck. Clark testif i ed that W illie only r etreated either when his gun jam m ed or w h en he r an out of bullets. No one was struck. ¶3. Clark testif

ied that he exited the truck w hen he thought W i llie was gone. C ulpepper had returned at t hat point and asked Clark if he was okay

. J ust as Clark responded that he

was okay , he heard J a carrus y e ll, “ Turn around, W illie, he ain’t dead. B ut I’m f ixing to kill him .” Clark testif

ied t hat Jacarrus then f

ired approxim ately f

if teen r ounds at him

. Clark ran up a hill and escaped u n injured. Culpepper corroborated Clark’s testim ony t hat all the shots

2were directed at Clark. Investigators recovered thirteen shell casings n ear the garbage truck,

and f ound eight bullet holes in the hood, side m irror, windshield, and side window. ¶4. J a c a r r u s a n d Wi l l i e w ere convicted in t he Lauderdale County C ircuit C o u r t o f
attem pted f i rst-degree m

urder. Jacarrus w as s entenced t o t wenty -f ive y ears in the custody of the Mississippi D epartm ent of Corrections (MDOC), with ten y ears suspended, and f ive
y ears of postrelease supervision. W illie was sentenced to thirty y ears in the custody

of the MDOC, with ten y ears suspended, a n d f i ve y e ars of p ostrelease supervision. Posttrial

m otions w ere denied, and this appeal f ollowed. Jacarrus and W illie have subm itted separate brief s raising the sam e issues f or appeal. W illie joins all argum ents presented by Jacarrus, whose brief

was f iled f irst. DISCUSSION I. Am ended Indictm ent ¶5. Jacarrus and W illie f irst argue that the circuit court erroneously allowed the State to

am end the indictm ent o n the second day of trial. “The circuit court’s decisi o n t o a l low an indictm ent to be am ended is a question of l aw,” which we review de n ovo. W illiams v. State , 131 So. 3d 1174, 1176-77 (¶6) (Miss. 2 014) (quoting Powell v
. State , 80 So. 3d 849, 852 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)). ¶6. An indictm ent m ay b e am ended “ t o c o r r e c t d e f e c t s o f f orm ; however, def

ects of substance m

ust be corrected by t he grand jury

. ” Patton v. State , 1 09 So. 3 d 66, 80-81 (¶44) (Miss. 2012). An a m e ndm ent to f orm does n ot “alter f

a cts [ that] are the e s s e n c e o f the of f ense on the f

ace o f the indictm ent as it originally stood o r m aterially a l ter a def ense to the

3indictm ent as it originally stood so as to prejudice the def endant’s case.” Id. “The test f or whether an am endm ent to the indictm ent will prejudice the def ense is whether the def

ense

as it originally stood will be e qually available af ter the am endm ent is ma d e . ” I d.
“Am endm ent s hall be allowed only if the def endant is af

f orded a f air opportunity to present a def ense and is not unf

airly surprised.” URCCC 7.09. 1 ¶7. The original indictm ent charged that on Oc t o b e r 3 1 , 2 0 1 3 , J a c a rrus and W illie “wil[ l ]f u lly , unlaw f

u l ly , and f

eloniously , with deliberate design to ef f ect the death of

. . . Clark, d id attem

pt to kill and m

urder

. . . C lark

. . . by shooting him .” O n the s econd day of trial, af ter Culpepper had t estif

ied , the State m ade an o re tenus m otion to am end the i n d i c tm ent by inserting the word “at” between the w ords “ s hooting” and “him ,” s o t h e indictm ent would read that Jacarrus a n d W illie attem pted “to k ill a n d m

urder” Clark “by shooting at him ,” rather than “by shooting him .” (Em phasis a dded). The prosecutor stated that the om ission of the w ord “at” was a clerical e r r o r . J a c arrus and W illie objected. The tri a l c o u r t g ave def

ense counsel additional t im e to research the issue, and af ter hearing
argum ents, granted the m otion to am end. ¶8. Jacarrus and W illie a rg u e t h a t t h e i r d e f e n s e s w ere p rejudiced because, af ter the indi c t ment was am ended, they had to def end against shooting “at” Clark, r ather than “shooting Clark.” W e cannot f ind the am endm ent altered the substance of the indictm ent or unf airly p r ejudiced the def

ense. W hether Clark was actually s hot was n ot a q uestion—it is

1 T h e U n if

o r m R u les o f C i rcu it an d C o u n ty C o u rt relativ e to crim in al p ractice w ere p reem p ted b y th e M ississip p i R u les o f C rim in al P ro ced u re, ef f ectiv e Ju l y 1 , 2 0 1 7

. We ap p ly th e f o rm er ru les, as th ey

w ere in ef

f ect at th e tim e o f

trial. 4undisputed that h e was not. Nonetheless, Jacarrus and W illie assert that p art of their def ense strategy was to def

end against the indictm ent’s a s sertion that they attem pted to kill Clark “by shooting him .” During v oir dire, W illie’s counsel told the venire t h a t i t w a s “very hard to believe” that Clark was “shot at dozens of tim e s, b ut was not shot.” Arguably , this statem ent standing a lone could indicate that W illie’s def ense w a s t h a t he did not succeed in striking Clark with a bullet. However, f urther statem ents of

counsel indicate otherwise. ¶9. W i llie’s counsel went on to state during voir dire that “the State h a s t o p r o v e t h at W i llie . . . shot at

. . . Clark in an ef

f ort to kill him [ .]” (Em

phasis added). During opening
statem ents, W illie’s counsel told the j u r y t h a t the State had to prove that “Clark was shot” to f i nd W i llie guilty . The State objected, arguing that it never alleged that Clark was shot; rather, the indictm ent stated that C l a r k was “shot a t.” The judge s aid, “it does say ‘by shooting him .’” W illie’s counsel continued, “The only person that is going t o say h e got shot

at or s hot or whatever he is going to sa y , i s a c o n v i cted f elon[ .]” (Em

p hasis added). Jacarrus’s counsel, durin g v o i r d i re, stated that an alibi witness would testif y that Jacarrus

was at hom e when “ Clark was being shot at, or claim s t o have been shot a t[ .]” Then, during opening statem ents, J acarrus’s counsel stated, “the State is going to say that [ J acarrus] was shooting at

. . . Clark or shot h i m with the intent to kill h i m. ” C ounsel continued that
Jacarrus w as “f

a lsely accused of s hooting at [ Clark].” These are just som e o f the instances where def ense counsel told the jury that Clark was “shot a t ,” c o nsistent with the am endm ent to the indictm ent, prior to the indictm ent being am ended. ¶10. The am endm ent to the in d i c t me n t r ef lected the language used a t trial a nd did not

5prejudice the def ense. The am endm e nt did not change the nature of the charges and, thus, did not deprive Jacarrus o r W illie of a f air o p p o r t u n i t y t o p resent their d ef ense. Also,
Jacarrus and W illie cannot claim unf air surprise, as they knew at all tim es that Clark was not actually shot, only shot a t, and that this was the basis f or the c harges. This i ssue is without

m erit.
II. Sufficiency of the Am ended Indictm ent ¶11. Jacarrus and W illie argue that the am ended indictm ent f ailed to charge the essential elem ents o f attem

pted m urder. “ An indictm ent m

u st contain (1) the e ssential elem e nts of the crim e charged, (2) suf

f icient f acts to f airly inf orm the def

endant of t he charge which he m ust def end, and (3) s uf

f icient f acts to enable him to plead double jeopardy in the event of a f uture prosecution f

o r the sam e of

f e nse.” Y oung v. State , 119 So. 3d 309, 319 (¶11) (Miss. 2013). The suf f iciency of an indictm ent is reviewed de novo. Id. ¶12. M i s s i s s i p p i ’s attem pted-m urder statute states: “Every person who shall design and endeavor to commit a n a ct which, if accomplished, would constitute an of f ense of m urder under [ s]ection 97-3-19, b u t shall f ail therein, or shall b e prevented f rom com m itting the

sam e, shall be guilty of attem pted m u rder[ .]” Miss. Code Ann. § 97- 1

- 7 ( 2 ) ( R e v. 2014) (em phasis added). Mississipp i C o d e A nnotated s ection 97-3-19(1)(a) (Supp. 2017) states the killing of a hum an b eing shall be f irst-degree m

urder “[ w]hen d one with deliberate design to ef f ect the death of

the person killed, or of

any hum an being.” ¶13. The am ende d i n d i c t m e n t c h a r ged that on October 31, 2 013, W illie a nd Jacarrus “wil[ l ]f u lly , unlawf

ully , and f

e l oniously , with deliberate design to ef f ect the death of

. . .

6Clark, did attem pt to k i ll and m

u rder

. . . Clark, a h um a n being, w ithout authority of law and not in necessary

self

- def ense, by shooting at him .” Jacarrus and W illie argue the am ended indictm ent is d e f

i c i e n t because it does not charge a specif i c “act which, if accom

plished, would constitute an o f

f ense of m u rder.” Rather, J acarrus a nd W i llie argue that the specif ic
act charged—“shooting at” Clark— i f a ccom plished, would constitute aggravated assault. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a) (Supp. 2017). ¶14. W e discussed the required proof f o r a t t e mp t v e rsus the required e l em ents of an

a t t e mp t i n d i ctm ent in Spearman v. State , 58 So. 3d 3 0, 36 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) , stating:
An attem pt has this required proof

: (1) an attem

pt to com m it a particular crim e, (2) a direct inef

f ectual act d one toward its com m ission[ ,] and (3) the f ailure to consum m ate its c om m ission. Though tho s e three elem ents m ust be proved, the [ s]uprem e [ c]ourt

. . . h a[ s] held that [ o nly ] two e lem ents n eed t o be charged: (1) t h e intent to c om m it the of f ense, and ( 2) an overt a c t toward its com m ission. (Quoting Neal v. State , 936 So. 2d 463, 467 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). ¶15. Und e r t h e two f

actors in Spearman , the indictm e nt was required to charge that: (1)
J a c a r rus and W illie intended to m urder Clark, and (2) they com m itted an o vert act towar d

m urdering him

. Id. The i ndictm ent c harged that (1 ) they acted “ with deliberate design to ef f ect the death” o f C lark b y attem pt i n g t o mu r d e r or kill him , and (2) they com m itted the
overt act of “shooting at him .” W hile Jacarrus a nd W illie a r gue that the indictm ent f ails to specif y whether they “f

ailed” or w ere “prevented f rom ” com m itting the act, the indictm ent

uses the word “attem

p t,” which h as been held to put “a def endant on notice that the State will prove that the crim e was not com pleted.” Id. As the indictm ent charged that J a carrus and

7W i llie “ a ttem p t [ e d ] t o k i l l and m

urder” Clark, there w as no need f o r it to also specif

y that they f ailed or were prevented f

rom com pleting the act. This issue is without m erit.
III. Attem pted-Murder Jury Instruction ¶16. Jacarr u s a n d W i llie argue that the elem e nts jury i nstruction f ailed to include all the statutory elem e nts of attem pted m urder. “Failure to instruct the jury on the e ssential elem ents of the crim e is plain error.” Rogers v. State , 95 So. 3d 623, 632 (¶30) (Miss. 2012). ¶17. T h e a t t e mp t e d

- mu r d er elem ents instructions required the jury to f i n d b e y o n d a reasonable doubt that: 1. On or about October 31, 2013, in Lauderdale County , Mississippi, 2. The [ d]ef

endant,

. . . individually or while aiding and a b e t t ing and/or acting in concert w ith another, did willf ully and unlawf

ully attem pt to m u rder . . . Clark 3. By shooting at him with a f

irearm , 4. W ith deliberate design to ef f ect death,
5. W ithout authority

of law and not in necessary self -def e n se[ .] ¶18. Jacarrus and W i llie argue, a s they did in i ssue two, that “shooting at” som eone is not “an a ct whic h , if accom

plished, would constitute

. . . [ f irst-degree] m

urder.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-7(2). Again, attem pted m urder i s com m itted when the def endant “design[ s] and endeavor[ s] to c om m it an act which, if accom plished, would constitute

. . . [ f i r s t

- d e gree]

mu r d e r . . . , but shall f

ail therein, or shall be prevented f rom com m i tting the s a m e [

. ] ” I d

. And f i rst-degree m

urder is the “killing of a hum an being without the authority o f l aw by any

m eans or in any m anner . . . [ w ] h e n d o n e w i t h d eliberate design to ef f ect the death of the

8person killed, or of any hum an being[ .]” ¶19. In P eyton v. State , 2 8 6 So. 2d 817, 818 ( M i s s . 1 9 73), Roosevelt Pey ton w as f ound guilty of attem

pted m urder. Pey

ton went to the intended victim ’s hom e arm ed with a pistol,
y e l l e d t h a t he was going t o kill every one at the hom e, and kicked the f ront door partially
open. Id. at 820. The intended victim shot and inj u r e d Pey ton; Pey ton never f

ired a shot. Id. The s u p r e me c o urt upheld Pey ton’s a t tem

pted-m urder conviction, f

inding that he “com m itted overt acts t oward the consum m ation of the crim e by a ttem p ting to f orcibly enter his victim ’s hom e af

t er arm i ng him s e l f w i th a d eadly weapon,” and “was prevented f rom

car r y i ng out his intent t o m urder only because his intended victim shot him f irst.” Id. ; see also D uke v. State , 340 So. 2d 727, 73 2 ( M i s s . 1977) (af f irm ing an a ttem

p ted-m urder conviction in a m

urder-f o r -hire case). ¶20. Jacarrus and W illie went one step f urther than Pey

ton. Not only

did they approach Clark with guns drawn, verbally threaten to kill him , and s ay t hat they wanted him d ead, they f ired m ultiple shots a t him as he tried to hide and esc ape. W e f ind that Jacarrus’s and
W i llie’s acts of “shooting at” C lark “with a f irearm ” with the deliberate design to ef f ect Clark’s death are acts, which, i f accom plished, would constitute f irst-degree m

urder. The jury was correctly

instructed. This issue is without m erit.
IV. Constitutionality of the Attem pted-Murder Statute ¶21. Jacarrus a nd W illie argue that the attem p ted-m urder statute is v ague and overly broad, and violates the Eighth Am endm ent’s prohibition against c ruel and unusual punishm ent. No challenge was m a de t o the statu t e a t t r i a l. However, we review t his i ssue on a ppeal, as a

9conviction under an unconstitutional s tatute violates t he Due Process Clause and is excepted

f rom any procedural bar. Fulgham v. State , 47 So. 3d 698, 700 (¶6) (Miss. 2010); W illiams v. State , 154 So. 3d 64, 66 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). ¶22. “ [ T ] h e p o w e r to create and def ine crim inal of

f enses rests exclusively w i t h i n t h e authority of the Legislature.” W i lcher v
. S t a t e , 2 2 7 S o. 3d 890, 895 (¶28) ( Miss. 2017) (citing State v. Russell , 358 So. 2 d 409, 411 (Miss. 1978)). “ The Legislature h as the power
to def ine and puni sh any act as crim inal unless lim i ted by constitutional provisions.” Id. (citing Brawner v. State , 947 S o. 2d 254, 268 (¶42) (Miss. 2006)). T h e challenging party

m ust prove a statute’s u nconstitutionality bey o nd all reas o n able doubt. Id. Even if the challenging party so proves, this Court m u st “uphold t he s t a t u t e , i f p ossible, b y placing a reasonable construction on it which would render it constitutional.” Id. ¶23. A statute is unconstitutionally vague and violates due p rocess if “persons of com m on intelli g e n c e m

ust g uess at its m eaning and dif f er as to its a

p plication.” Id. at 896 (¶29) (citation and internal quotation m a rks om itted). Likewise, a statute is void f or vagueness if it “encourages arbitrary and e rratic arrests and convictions.” Id. “It is well established that
vagueness challenges [ that] do n ot involve First Am endm ent f reedom s m

ust be exam ined in the light of the f

acts of the case at hand.” Hill v. State , 853 So. 2d 1 00, 103 ( ¶11) (Miss. 2003) (quoting United States v. Mazurie , 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)). ¶24. A statute is “unconstitutionall y o v e r b r o a d i f i t ‘ d o es not aim specif i cally at evils within t he allowable a rea of [ s]tate control but, on t he contrary sweeps w ithin its am bit other activities’ pro t e c t e d b y the First Am endm ent.” W ilcher , 2 27 So. 3d a t 895 (¶26) (quoting

1 0Thornhill v. Alabama , 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940 ) )

. “ [ A] s tatute’s overbreadth [ m ust] be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitim ate sweep.” Id. (quoting United States v. W illiams , 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)). ¶25. Section 97-1-7(2) does not im plicate any First Am endm ent f reedom s, so we analy

ze it under the f

acts of the present case. Am ple testim ony was p resented t hat Jacarrus and
W i l l i e c l early intended to do what the statute f orbids—they unlawf

ully shot a t C lark with deliberate design t o ef

f e ct Clark’s death. W itnesses h eard W illie say , “I gotcha[ .] I’m f ixing
to kill y ou, B****,” a s he r an toward Clark with a gun. Clark hid, a nd W i llie t old the other

m en present to get out of the way if th e y did not w ant t o b e involved. W illie then f ired at Clark m ultiple tim es, only s t opping when either his gun jam m ed or ran out of bullets. Once Clark cam e out f

rom hiding, he saw Jacarrus, w ho, seeing t hat W illie had not successf ully killed Clark, s a id, “Turn around, W illie, he ain’t dead. But I ’m f ixing to kill him .” Jacarrus then f ired m ultiple s hots at C lark. It i s clear that the attem pted-m u rder statute was intended
to punish t he crim es com m itted. No person of com m on i ntelligence would have t o guess at its m eaning or would dif

f er as to its application, nor does the statute e ncourage arbitrary and erratic arres t s . T h u s, t he s tatute is not unconstitutionally vague. Nor is the statute overly broad, as it does not “sweep[ ] within its am bit” other protected rights. ¶26. The statute a lso does not violate the Eighth Am endm ent. Jacarrus and W i llie argue that the attem

pted-m urder statute im

poses a greater sentence f or essentially the sam e crim e
as attem pted aggravated assault. 2 However, our suprem e court has held that:

2 T h e statu to ry sen ten c e f o r attem p ted m u rd er is tw en ty y ears to lif e. M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 7 -1 -7 (2 ). T h e sen ten ce f o r a t t e mp t ed a g g rav a ted assau lt is u p to tw en ty y ears. 1 1[ e]ven where there are two s tatutes covering the sam e crim e, and there is a

dif f er e n c e i n the penalty between the two statutes, the [ S ]tate is under no obligation to prosecute under the statute with the lesser penalty

. It m ay choose to prosecute under e ither, and so long as the choice is clear a n d unequivocal the def endant has no right to com plain. Hye v. State , 162 So. 3d 750, 758 (¶25) (Miss. 2015) (citation o m itted). “[ T]he responsibility
to determ ine the charges” is lef t to the S tate alone. Id. at (¶26). The dif f erence in s e ntencing bet w e e n t h e t w o statutes does not violate the Eighth Am endm ent. This issue is without

m erit.
V. Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶27. W h en r eviewing the legal suf f iciency of the evidence, we consider all evidence in the light m ost f

avorable t o t he State. Bush v. S t a t e , 8 9 5 S o . 2d 836, 843 ( ¶16) (Miss. 2005) (abrogated on other grounds by L ittle v. State , 2014-CT-01505-SCT, 2 017 W L 4546740, at *3 (¶19) (Miss. Oct. 12, 2017)). Credible evidence consistent with g uilt m ust be accepted

as true. Id. The State receives the benef it of all f a v orable inf

erences r easonably drawn f rom the e vidence, and a ll m a tters of w eight and credibility are r esolved by the jury

. Id. Reversal is proper when r easonable and f a ir-m inded jurors could only f i nd the accused n ot guilty

. Id. ¶28. W h en reviewing the weight of the evidence, “we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the o verwhelm ing weight of the evidence t h a t t o a l low it to stand would sanction an unconscionable i njustice.” Id. a t 844 (¶18). The e vidence is v iewed in the light

m ost f avorable to the verdict. Id. All evidence consistent with the def endant’s guilt, along

M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 7 -3 -7 (2 )(a). O n th eir attemp ted -m u rd er co n v ictio n s, Jacarru s w as sen ten ced to tw en ty -f

iv e y ears, w ith ten y e a r s su sp en d ed , a n d f iv e y ears o f p o strelease su p erv i sio n ; an d W illi e w a s sen ten ced to th irty y ears, w ith ten y ears su sp en d e d , an d f iv e y ears o f p o strelease su p e rv isio n . 1 2with a ny r easonable inf erences that m ight be drawn f rom the e v idence, is accepted as true. Id. ¶29. Clark, Culpepper, and T ay lor testif ied to the events surrounding the s h ooting. Clark testif i ed t hat he did not want to g o on t he assigned garbage route because he had gotten into

an altercation with som e m en in that area. Tay l or conf irm ed that C l a r k was nervous and jittery as they approached an a rea near Oakland Heights Elem entary School, a nd Clark told Tay lor he had been in an altercation with som eone near t h e r e. Tay lor saw a m an running toward the truck with a pistol. Clark, who recognized the m an as W illie, heard W illie say , “I gotcha[ .] I’m f

ixing to k ill y o u, B****.” Clark jum ped into the cab of the truck and hid under the dash. W illie told Culpepper and Tay lor to get out of the way if t hey did not want
to be involved. W illie t hen f ired m ultiple s hots at t he garbage truck. Clark testif ied that he exited the truck when he thought W illie was gone. Jacarrus then appeared a nd y elled, “Turn around, W illie, h e ain’t dead. B ut I’m f ixing to kill him .” J acarrus then f i red m ultiple rounds at him . Clark testif

ied that all shots were directed at him , a nd Culpepper corroborated this testim o ny . Investigators recovered thirteen s h ell casings near the g arbage truck, and discovered eight bullet holes in the hood, side m irror, windshield, and side window. ¶30. Giving the State the benef it of all f avorable inf

erences and viewing the e v idence in the light m ost f

avorable to the verdicts, the v e r d i c t s were not against the weight or suf f i ciency of the evidence. This issue is without m erit. The attem pted-m u rder convictions are af f irm ed. ¶31. AFFIRMED.

1 3LEE , C .J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, FAIR, WESTBROOKS

AN D T I N D E L L, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, J., CONCURS I N P ART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. CARLTON, J ., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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