COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

DANIEL JOSEPH BULLIS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2265-94-4 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 MARCH 12, 1996 

REGINA BULLIS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Richard J. Jamborsky, Judge 

 Edward A. Shackelford for appellant. 

 Gwendolyn Jo M. Carlberg for appellee. 

 This appeal arises from a circuit court judgment entered in 

an action brought pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 

Judgments Act. Code §§ 8.01-465.1 to 8.01-465.5. The appellant, 

Daniel Joseph Bullis, contends that the trial judge erred in 

converting to a Virginia judgment an Arizona judgment that 

awarded his former wife, Regina Bullis, a portion of his military 

retirement pay. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

circuit court's judgment. 

 I. 

 The appellee, a resident of Arizona, commenced this action 

in 1994 in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, against 

appellant, a resident of Virginia, to obtain a Virginia judgment 

based upon a judgment she obtained in the Superior Court for the 

County of Maricopa in the State of Arizona. See Aetna Casualty & 

Surety Co. v. Whaley, 173 Va. 11, 3 S.E.2d 395 (1939). In her 

"Petition for Judgment," appellee alleged jurisdiction "pursuant 

to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 
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§ 8.01-465.1, et seq., of the . . . Code of Virginia," pursuant 

to "§ 8.01-466, et seq., of the . . . Code of Virginia," and 

pursuant to "the Uniform Services Former Spouse's Protection Act 

(USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. [§] 1401 et seq." 

 Appellee also alleged that the parties were divorced July 6, 

1982, in Arizona and that the divorce decree equitably divided 

all their community, joint, and common property. She further 

alleged that on September 24, 1992, a court of record in Arizona 

entered an order that modified the 1982 divorce decree pursuant 

to the USFSPA and awarded her "one half of the community interest 

in the disposable military retirement pay of the [appellant]." 

Appellee alleged that appellant resided in Fairfax County, was 

retired from active duty with the United States Army, and was 

receiving military retirement benefits. 

 Appellant filed a demurrer in which he alleged that relief 

was not available under 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) because he retired 

from the military under Chapter 61 disability and that appellee 

had been denied payment when she forwarded her claim to the 

Defense Finance and Accounting Service. When a judge overruled 

the demurrer, appellant filed an answer generally denying the 

allegations in the petition. 

 II. 

 The parties agree upon the essential facts. The appellant 

joined the United States Army in December 1961 and married 

appellee in November 1964. They were divorced in Arizona by a 
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final decree entered July 6, 1982. The decree equitably divided 

between them all community, joint, and common property without 

any reference to retirement pay. 

 On September 24, 1992, an Arizona superior court granted 

appellee's petition to modify the final divorce decree and 

awarded appellee "one-half of the community interest in the 

disposable military retirement pay of . . . Daniel Joseph Bullis, 

upon his retirement." The order also stated the following: 

 The community interest is to be determined by 

the fraction whereby the numerator is the 

number of months that [Daniel Joseph Bullis] 

was in the service during the marriage of the 

parties, or 212 months, over the denominator, 

which will be the total number of months that 

[he] has been and will remain in the Armed 

Services until retirement. 

The order further stated that "[appellant was] neither . . . 

present [nor] represented by counsel, although counsel for . . . 

 [appellant had] been previously notified of this hearing;" that 

federal legislation enacted after McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 

210 (1981), entitled appellee to file a claim for a portion of 

appellant's disposable military retirement payments; that the 

court observed and complied with the Soldiers and Sailors Civil 

Relief Act of 1940; and that the court had jurisdiction under 

Arizona law to modify the final decree and order a division of 

the retirement payments. Appellant did not appeal from the 

Arizona order modifying the final divorce decree. 

 The trial judge found the Arizona judgment to be valid and 

entered a Virginia judgment awarding appellee "a sum equal to 
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one-half . . . of the disposable interest of [appellant's] 

nondisability, nonexempt military retired pay on a monthly basis 

pursuant to the percentage formula under the amended law of 1986 

of 10 U.S.C. [§] 1408, Uniformed Services Former Spouses 

Protection Act." Based upon a finding that appellant retired 

from the military in March 1993 with a permanent disability 

rating of 60% and received $596.85 per month "nondisability, 

nonexempt, disposable portion of retired pay," the trial judge 

entered judgment awarding appellee $294.43 monthly and $4,774.80 

in arrearages, computed from the date of appellant's retirement. 

 The trial judge retained jurisdiction "pending [appellee's] 

first receipt of payment for her portion in monthly retired pay, 

the sum certain amount to be determined by the Defense Finance 

and Accounting Service in Indianapolis, Indiana according to the 

formula established by the Arizona court." In addition, the 

trial judge retained jurisdiction "to reflect any increase in the 

cost of living adjustment (COLA) which [appellant] may have 

received pending first payment to [appellee]" and ordered other 

relief. This judgment order is the subject of this appeal. 

 III. 

 Appellant has not addressed in his brief the statute that 

confers jurisdiction in this Court to entertain his appeal. 

Appellee does not contest jurisdiction. We are required, 

however, to ascertain our jurisdiction before proceeding. West 

v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 456, 445 S.E.2d 159 (1994), appeal 
- 5 - 

dismissed, 249 Va. 241, 455 S.E.2d 1 (1995); In re O'Neil, 18 Va. 

App. 674, 446 S.E.2d 475 (1994). In Virginia, "[t]he general 

appellate jurisdiction . . . is in the Supreme Court and not in 

the Court of Appeals." West, 18 Va. App. at 458, 445 S.E.2d at 

160. This Court's appellate jurisdiction in civil cases "is 

limited to the subject matter set forth in Code §§ 17-116.05 and 

17-116.05:1." West, 18 Va. App. at 457, 445 S.E.2d at 159. In 

pertinent part, Code § 17-116.05 provides as follows: 

 Any aggrieved party may appeal to the Court 

of Appeals from: 

* * * * * * * 

 3. Any final judgment, order, or decree of 

 a circuit court involving: 

 a. Affirmance or annulment of a 

 marriage; 

 b. Divorce; 

 c. Custody; 

 d. Spousal or child support; 

 e. The control or disposition of a 

 child; 

 f. Any other domestic relations matter 

 arising under Title 16.1 or Title 20; 

 or 

 g. Adoption under Chapter 11 (§ 63.1-220 

 et seq.) of Title 63.1; 

 4. Any interlocutory decree or order 

entered in any of the cases listed in 

 this section (i) granting, dissolving, 

 or denying an injunction or (ii) 

 adjudicating the principles of a cause. 

 In Carlton v. Paxton, 14 Va. App. 105, 415 S.E.2d 600, 

aff'd, 15 Va. App. 265, 422 S.E.2d 423 (1992) (en banc), the 

appellant appealed to this Court from a chancery court proceeding 

that was instituted as an independent action pursuant to Code 
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§ 8.01-428 to set aside an order of adoption. The trial judge 

had refused to set aside a final decree of adoption after the 

evidence proved the child's father had not received notice. 

Relying upon the literal language in Code § 17-116.05(3)(g), this 

Court ruled by order that jurisdiction did not lie because "the 

appeal is not from a final decree involving adoption." 

(Unpublished order, May 1, 1991). When the appeal was 

transferred to the Supreme Court, that Court ruled by order that 

a decree refusing to vacate or set aside an order of adoption is 

a final decree involving adoption. See Carlton v. Paxton, Record 

No. 910689 (May 15, 1991). Applying that ruling, this Court held 

in a later case that an appeal from a final order entered in an 

independent action brought pursuant to Code § 8.01-428 to set 

aside a decree for fraud was appealable to this Court. Khanna v. 

Khanna, 18 Va. App. 356, 357 n.1, 443 S.E.2d 924, 925 n.1 (1994). 

 The Court reasoned that the underlying cause was an annulment 

and, therefore, jurisdiction was proper under Code 

§ 17-116.05(3)(a). Id. 

 The rulings in Carlton and Khanna suggest that jurisdiction 

over this appeal lies in this Court. Although this action was 

instituted in the circuit court for the purpose of domesticating 

and enforcing a judgment of another state, the subject matter of 

the underlying issue involved a domestic relations matter. As in 

Khanna, we conclude that jurisdiction over an appeal from a final 

judgment must be based upon an assessment of the underlying 
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cause. See 18 Va. App. at 357 n.1, 443 S.E.2d at 925 n.1. 

Because the underlying cause in this case is a decree involving a 

divorce, we hold that this Court has jurisdiction to review the 

final judgment. 
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 IV. 

 Appellant raises the following issues on this appeal: 

 1. Whether the Court erred in determining 

that there was any military retired pay which 

fell within the definition of "disposable" 

under 10 U.S.C. [§] 1408 when the parties 

were divorced on July 6, 1982 and Appellant 

was later retired under Chapter 61, 10 U.S.C. 

for disability. 

 2. Whether the Court erred in determining 

that the November 16, 1986 amendment to 10 

U.S.C. [§] 1408 was controlling, rather than 

the original September 8, 1992 Act 

(retroactive to June 25, 1981) which was the 

controlling statute fixing the definition of 

"disposable retired pay" at the time of the 

divorce order. 

 3. Whether the Court erred in awarding the 

appellee a sum equal to one-half (1/2) of the 

disposable amount of the husband's military 

retired pay in disregard of Code of Virginia, 

1950, as amended, § 20-107.3(G)(1). 

 4. Whether the Court erred in awarding an 

amount certain in monthly entitlement and 

arrearages, without hearing evidence and 

applying all applicable law. 

 5. Whether the Court erred in awarding 

counsel fees to the Wife. 

 6. Whether the Court erred in issuing an 

order with internal inconsistencies as to the 

determination of entitlements and arrearages. 

 Although none of these issues expressly challenge the 

validity of the Arizona judgment, the Arizona judgment is the 

basis upon which the trial judge entered the judgment. "The 

United States Constitution, as well as federal and state 

statutes, requires the courts of this state to give full faith 

and credit to a judgment rendered in another state, provided the 
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foreign court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 

matter." Hupp v. Hupp, 239 Va. 494, 499, 391 S.E.2d 329, 332 

(1990). 

 Citing Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908), the 

Supreme Court has further held as follows: 

 The effect of the Full Faith and Credit 

Clause was to render the foreign judgment 

immune from reexamination for error in the 

domestic court. Therefore, even if the 

[state] court [whose judgment is being 

enforced] had erred with respect to the 

enforceability of the underlying transaction 

(by misperceiving the law of [another 

jurisdiction]) the remedy for that error was 

direct appeal, not collateral attack in the 

courts of a sister state. 

Coghill v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 240 Va. 230, 233, 396 S.E.2d 

838, 839 (1990). Neither the trial court nor this Court has the 

power to correct any alleged mistakes in the Arizona court's 

application of the law when rendering its judgment. Thus, to the 

extent appellant collaterally attacks the Arizona court's alleged 

misapplication of the law, this Court cannot reexamine the 

Arizona ruling. 

 V. 

 To clarify the parties' disagreement, we briefly address the 

history concerning a state's ability in divorce decrees to divide 

military retirement benefits as property. In 1981, the United 

States Supreme Court held in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 

223 (1981), that federal law precludes state courts from dividing 

military retirement benefits pursuant to state community property 
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laws. Congress responded to McCarty by enacting the USFSPA, 

which enabled state courts to treat "disposable retired or 

retainer pay . . . either as property solely of the member or as 

property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law 

of the jurisdiction of such court." Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 

730, 731 (1982) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) 

(1994)). The USFSPA was effective on February 1, 1983, and 

applied to disposable retired pay payable after June 25, 1981, 

the day of the McCarty decision, and to court orders entered 

after that date. Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730, 737, § 1006 

(1982); see also Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 588 n.7 

(1989). 

 When first enacted, the USFSPA excluded all Chapter 61 

disability benefits, see 10 U.S.C. § 1201, from the definition of 

"disposable" retired pay, effectively sheltering all Chapter 61 

disability benefits from distribution to military spouses in 

divorce actions. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4). Thus, if a service 

member retired under Chapter 61 with a disability rating, all of 

that member's pay was excluded from the definition of disposable 

retired pay. However, on November 14, 1986, Congress amended the 

USFSPA to exempt only the portion of a member's retired pay 

attributable to the member's disability. Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 

Stat. 3887, § 644(a)(1) (1986) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1408 (a)(4)(C) (1994)). The 1986 amendment further stated that 

the amendment "shall apply with respect to court orders issued 
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after the date of the enactment of this Act." Id. at § 644(b). 

 With that backdrop, the Superior Court for the County of 

Maricopa, Arizona, entered an order on September 24, 1992, 

modifying the parties' final decree of divorce as follows: 

 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED: 

 The Decree of Dissolution of Marriage 

entered in this cause on July 6, 1982 is 

hereby modified to award to Petitioner, 

Regina Bullis, her one-half of the community 

interest in the disposable military 

retirement pay of the Respondent, Daniel 

Joseph Bullis, upon his retirement. The 

community interest is to be determined by the 

fraction whereby the numerator is the number 

of months that Respondent was in the service 

during the marriage of the parties, or 212 

months, over the denominator, which will be 

the total number of months that Respondent 

has been and will remain in the Armed 

Services until retirement. 

 Appellant does not contend that the Arizona court lacked 

personal or subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order. 

Furthermore, we note that the Arizona Supreme Court has held that 

Arizona Revised Statutes § 25-327(A) and Rule 60 of the Arizona 

Rules of Civil Procedure grant Arizona trial courts the power to 

reopen final divorce decrees entered after McCarty, and before 

enactment of USFSPA. Under this ruling, former spouses may claim 

a community interest in the disposable military retirement pay of 

the military member. See Edsall v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 895, 

897-901 (Ariz. 1984). Thus, to the extent that appellant's first 

two issues challenge the validity of the Arizona judgment, we 

conclude the trial judge did not err in ruling that the Arizona 
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judgment modifying the parties' final divorce decree was valid 

under Arizona law. The record also supports the trial judge's 

finding that neither party appealed the Arizona judgment. Thus, 

the trial judge did not err in beginning his analysis by giving 

full faith and credit to the Arizona judgment. 

 VI. 

 Appellant first contends that the trial judge erred in 

determining that his Chapter 61 disability retired pay is 

"disposable" retired pay within the meaning of 10 U.S.C. § 1408. 

 He argues the applicable law is the original USFSPA, not the 

USFSPA as amended in 1986. This issue arises because the 1992 

Arizona decree did not address whether the original or amended 

USFSPA controlled the definition of "disposable retired pay." 

 The parties' final divorce decree was entered on July 6, 

1982, after the McCarty decision but before the enactment of the 

USFSPA. Obviously, appellant cannot claim the McCarty ban 

protects him from having his retired pay considered as property 

subject to division in a state court divorce proceeding. When 

Congress enacted the USFSPA, "Congress sought to change the legal 

landscape created by the McCarty decision." Mansell, 490 U.S. at 

587-88. Moreover, Congress chose June 25, 1981, the day before 

the McCarty decision, as the applicable date for restoring 

partial state authority over military retirement benefits. Id.

at 588 n.7. By express provision, Congress included within the 

coverage of USFSPA divorce decrees such as the parties' decree, 
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entered after McCarty and modified under the law of the state 

granting the divorce. Thus, the only issue before the trial 

judge was whether the term "disposable retired pay" was governed 

by the original USFSPA or the 1986 amended USFSPA, now in effect. 

 The original text of the USFSPA defined "disposable retired 

or retainer pay" as follows: 

 "Disposable retired or retainer pay" means 

the total monthly retired or retainer pay to 

which a member is entitled (other than the 

retired pay of a member retired for 

disability under Chapter 61 of this title) 

less amounts which . . . . 

10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (emphases added). According to the plain 

language of the statute, Chapter 61 military pensions are 

sheltered in their entirety from division at divorce. See also

Mansell, 490 U.S. at 589. If, for example, a service member 

retired under Chapter 61 with a disability rating of 60%, all of 

that member's pay fell outside the definition of "disposable" pay 

and could not be apportioned by a state court order. 

 Congress removed the total exclusion on Chapter 61 retired 

pay when it amended the USFSPA's definition of "disposable 

retired pay" effective November 14, 1986, by Public Law 99-661. 

Section 644(a) of the revised USFSPA changed subsection (a)(4) of 

the original Act and inserted in lieu thereof the following 

language: 

 (4) The term "disposable retired pay" means 

the total monthly retired pay to which a 

member is entitled less amounts which . . . . 

 (C) in the case of a member entitled 

 to retired pay under Chapter 61 of 
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 this title, are equal to the amount

 of retired pay of the member under 

 that chapter computed using the 

 percentage of the member's disability
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 on the date when the member was 

 retired. . . . 

10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(C) (emphases added). 

 The amended version of the USFSPA therefore exempts only 

that portion of Chapter 61 benefits which corresponds to the 

retiree's disability percentage rating at the time of retirement. 

 If, for example, a service member retires with 60% disability 

under Chapter 61, then 60% of the member's retirement benefits 

are excluded from the definition of "disposable retired pay." 

The remaining 40% of the member's benefits may be judicially 

apportioned under state community property laws. 

 In addition to the revised definition of "disposable retired 

pay," § 644(b) of the 1986 amended USFSPA contains the following 

clause: 

 EFFECTIVE DATE. -- The amendments made by 

subsection (a) shall apply with respect to 

court orders issued after the date of the 

enactment of this Act [November 14, 1986]. 

Currently, 32 C.F.R. 63.6(e)(2) states that "[f]or court orders 

issued on or before November 14, 1986 (or amendments thereto) 

disposable retired [pay] does not include retired pay of a member 

retired for disability under 10 U.S.C. Chapter 61." 

 To support his argument that none of his retired pay is 

"disposable" within the meaning of the USFSPA, appellant relies 

on Wallace v. Fuller, 832 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). In 

Wallace, the service member and his wife were divorced in 1966. 

The divorce decree contained no reference to retirement benefits. 
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Id. at 715. The service member retired in 1973 with a Chapter 

61 disability rating of 60%. Id. at 718. The trial judge 

modified the divorce decree on October 9, 1986, and awarded the 

service member's former wife a portion of his Chapter 61 

benefits. Id. at 715-16. The Texas Court of Appeals reversed 

the judgment, holding that the original USFSPA, then in effect, 

did not treat Chapter 61 disability pay as disposable income. 

Id. at 718. 

Wallace provides little guidance in deciding this case 

because all the significant events in Wallace -- i.e., the 

divorce, retirement from the military, and the modified order -- 

occurred before November 14, 1986, the effective date of the 

amended Act. In the case before us, the initial Arizona divorce 

decree was entered in 1982. However, the Arizona court modified 

the final order on September 24, 1992, after the effective date 

of the amended USFSPA. Likewise, appellant retired in 1993, 

after the effective date of the amended Act. 

 When Congress amended the USFSPA in 1986 to revise the 

definition of "disposable retired pay," the amended Act stated in 

plain terms that the amendment made to the USFSPA "shall apply 

with respect to court orders issued after the date of the 

enactment of this Act." Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3887, 

§ 644(b) (1986) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the amended Act 

provides that "[t]he term 'court order' means a final decree of 

divorce . . . (including a final decree modifying the terms of a 
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previously issued decree of divorce . . . .)." 10 U.S.C. § 1408 

(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the 1992 Arizona order, which is 

an order modifying the 1982 final decree, is a court order within 

the USFSPA's definition of "court order." Furthermore, that 

order was issued after November 14, 1986, the effective date of 

the amended Act. 

 Appellant contends, however, that Carmody v. Secretary of 

the Navy, 886 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1989), contains a definition of 

"court order" under the USFSPA that supports his position. In 

Carmody, the original California divorce decree, entered on 

October 1, 1965, was also silent as to the division of the 

military pension. Id. at 679. The decree was modified on 

September 9, 1986, to award the member's former wife 29% of his 

military retirement benefits. Id. On the wife's appeal from the 

trial judge's ruling that she was not entitled to avail herself 

of the direct payment provision of USFSPA, the Fourth Circuit 

affirmed the judgment and ruled that the California order 

modified a divorce decree which predated the McCarty decision of 

June 26, 1981. Id. at 680. Nothing in the Court's recitation of 

the definition of "court order" supports appellant's contention 

in this case. See id. at 681. 

 Alternatively, appellant argues that the 1992 Arizona 

modification order retroactively applies the amended USFSPA and 

impairs his substantive or vested rights. We disagree. The 

amended USFSPA plainly states that the Act will not be given 
- 18 - 

retroactive effect, but shall apply to "court orders" issued 

after the effective date of enactment. We agree with appellee 

that the 1992 modification order is a "court order" as defined by 

the Act because it is "a final decree modifying the terms of a 

previously issued decree of divorce." 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(2). 

The modification order does not retroactively apply the Act. 

 Moreover, even if appellant's vested rights argument had 

merit, appellant cannot now challenge in a Virginia court the 

effect of the 1992 Arizona order. That ruling, directing a 

division of his military retirement benefits, was made by an 

Arizona court applying Arizona and federal laws. Appellant could 

have raised his vested rights arguments on appeal in the Arizona 

courts and is precluded from collaterally attacking this nonjurisdictional issue. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eades, 248 

Va. 285, 288, 448 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1994); Coghill, 240 Va. at 

233, 396 S.E.2d at 839. Because the 1992 Arizona judgment is a 

"court order" under the USFSPA, the trial judge did not err in 

applying the amended Act and ruling that appellee is entitled to 

receive "one-half of the community interest in appellant's 

disposable military retirement pay" under the USFSPA in effect in 

1992. 

 VII. 

 Appellant also contends the trial judge erred in awarding 

appellee one-half of the entire disposable amount of his military 

retired pay. He contends that appellee was only entitled to 
- 19 - 

one-half of the "marital share," the designation provided in 

Virginia law. See Code § 20-107.3(G)(1). Appellant's reliance 

on Virginia law is misplaced. Under the Uniform Enforcement of 

Foreign Judgments Act, Code § 8.01-465.1 et seq., the trial judge 

correctly ruled that the "community interest" is determined by 

Arizona law. "We have only the foreign judgment before us, not 

the underlying transaction on which it was based." Coghill, 240 

Va. at 235, 396 S.E.2d at 840. 

 We note, however, that the judgment order of the Circuit 

Court of Fairfax County is internally inconsistent. The initial 

two paragraphs of the order and paragraphs numbered 2, 3, 7, and 

12 correctly recite that the Arizona court awarded the appellee 

"one-half (1/2) of the community property interest in the 

disposable military retired pay." Other paragraphs of the order 

are inconsistent with these recitations and the Arizona judgment. 

 For example, numbered paragraph 5 refers to "one-half (1/2) of 

the disposable interest of . . . military retired pay," and 

numbered paragraph 11 refers to "marital share." 

 Appellee agrees that "[t]he duty of the Virginia trial court 

. . . was to give the Arizona order full faith and credit." 

Because the circuit court is only enforcing the Arizona judgment, 

the judgment order must apply the community property interest 

formula specified in the Arizona order. The provisions in the 

circuit court's order that are inconsistent with the Arizona 

order are obvious drafting errors that must be corrected on 
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remand. In particular, we note that the calculations contained 

in numbered paragraph 6 are also based on the drafting error and 

must be corrected. 

 VIII. 

 Appellant also contends the trial judge erred in (1) 

ordering monthly and arrearage amounts without regard to income 

tax law changes and without hearing any evidence or applying 

applicable law, (2) awarding a definite monthly amount, in 

addition to stating that the Defense Finance and Accounting 

Service would set "the sum certain," and (3) awarding appellee 

her attorney's fees. Appellant failed to object to these issues 

in the trial court below and is barred from raising them on 

appeal. Rule 5A:18. 

 For these reasons, the judgment is affirmed and remanded for 

correction of the drafting errors referred to in Part VII of this 

opinion. 

 Affirmed and remanded.