NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIET M. EDWARDS, Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Defendant - Appellee. No. 13-56352 D.C. No. 2:12-cv-05875-SS
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Suzanne H. Segal, Magi strate Judge, Presiding Submitted November 3, 2014 ** Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. Juliet M. Edwards appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisd iction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

# FILED
DEC 08 2014 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).We review the district court’s order de novo. Molina v. Astrue , 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). We may set aside the denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or rests on legal error. Id. Edwards first contends that, because a vocational expert testified that she would be unable to perform her past releva nt work or any other work if she needed a cane to walk, the district court erre d by not considering her use of a cane in determining her residual f unctional capacity. Because Edwards failed to raise this argument before the district court, this issue is waived. See Greger v. Barnhart , 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006). Edwards next contends that the admi nistrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by finding that her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms and her need for a cane were not credible. The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing r easons for rejecting Edwards’s testimony concerning the debilitating effects of her pain and her need for a cane. First, Edwards’s subjective complaints of pain were not supported by the medical evidence. See Chaudhry v. Astrue , 688 F.3d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the ALJ properly relied on medical evidence undermining the claimant’s subjective assessment of limitations). Medical treatment records following Edwards’s injury indicate that she reported only mild tenderness in her mid-lumbar

13-56352 2spine and was prescribed a non-narcotic pa in reliever and physical therapy, which she later reported resolved her symptoms . She was found to have no permanent disability and was released back to work with no restrictions. In addition to considering medical ev idence to assess Edwards’s credibility, the ALJ properly took into account that Edwards stopped working due to a felony conviction, not because of debilitating back pain. See Bruton v. Massanari , 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (relying on the claimant’s layoff as a permissible ground for disbelieving complaints of severe pain). Finally, in assessing Edwards’s credibility regarding her pain and need for a cane, the ALJ properly considered th at Edwards received only conservative treatment. See Parra v. Astrue , 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of conservative treatment permits the ALJ to discount the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of an impairment). Accordingly, substantial evidence s upports the ALJ’s determination that Edwards had the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work and therefore was not disabled. AFFIRMED.

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