### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 6, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RIC KY GRO VER AA RON

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 99-D- 2360 WalterKurt z, Judge

No. M2002- 02288-CCA -R3-C D -F iled Jul y 8, 2004

On Oc tob e r 2 8, 19 99 , th e de fe nd a nt, Ric ky Gr ov e r A aro n, was in di cte d b y the Da vid so n Co un ty Gra nd J ury

for e specia lly

ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor and espe cially ag g ravated kid nappi ng. F oll ow ing a jury tr ia l in June of

20 01 , th e de fe nd a nt w a s c on vic te d o f e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor and fa lse i m p ri s o n m ent. The tria l court sentenc ed the d e f e n d a n t t o e le v e n y e ar s f

o r e s p e c ia ll y

a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l e xp lo it a ti o n o f a mi n o r a n d e le ven months, twenty -nine da y s for fa lse imprisonment. The sentences w ere to run conc urre ntly to eac h other a nd consec utively

to a fe dera l sentenc e t h e d ef endant was serving at the time of trial. The defe ndant ar g ues eig ht issues on appea l:(1) whether the trial c ourt err ed in denying the defe ndant’s motion to di smiss due to unnecessa ry delay ; (2) wh et h er t h e trial court err ed in denying the defe ndant’s pretrial m otion to suppress his alleg ed admissi ons to police because the defendant wa s subjected to c ustodial inter rog ation without ha ving been g iven Miranda warnings; (3) whether the
tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inde nying the de fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss a ha nd g un se ize d b y

po lic e fr om h is vehicle; ( 4) whe ther the evidenc e in the record is sufficie nt to support a finding by a rational trier of fac t that the defe ndant is g uiltybey ond a r ea s o nable doubt of e specia lly ag g ravated sexual exploi tation of a minor and false imprisonment; (5) whether the trial court erre d in admitting alleg ed hear say testimonyrelated to the al le g e d v ic ti m’ s mo th e r ’ s r e s ponse to her da ug hter’s c hara cterization of the de fendant as a “ perve rt”; (6) whether the trial court erre d in admitting evidenc e that anothe r person ha d been c onvicted of a sexual offense involving the alleg ed victim in an unr elated c ase; (7) whether the trial court erre d in failing to declar e a mist rial when the prosecutor, i n direc t violation of the trial c ourt’s pre trial ruling , elicited testimo n y fr o m a police de tective that the de fenda nt admitted having child pornog raphy on his computer; and ( 8) whe ther the tria l court er red in imposing an excessive se ntence for the defe ndant’s convic tion for espe cially ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor, a nd did the court further e rr in orde ri n g t h at the sentenc es in this case be serve d

c on se c uti ve ly

to the de fe nd a nt’ s f

e de ra l se nte nc e . Wea ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court is Aff irm ed

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES , and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.It i s t he p o l i cy o f t his C o urt t o refer t o all eg ed victi m s o f sexu al ab use b y t he i r i nit i als. 1

-2- J eff rey DeVa sher, Assistant Public Defe nder, Nashville, Tenne ssee, for the appe llant, Ricky Grove r Aar on.

Paul G. S ummers, Att orney Gene ral & R eporte r; Kim R. Helper
, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. J ohnson , District Attorney Gene ral; B rian Holmg ren and L isa Nay lo r , A s s is ta

n t D is tr ic ts Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND

The de fendant caug ht the fourtee n-y ear -old, H.F.
, shoplifting in the pharmacy wher e he w as 1 the assistant manag er. The defe ndant met with the victim and her mother an d agr ee d t o drop any crim i n al ch ar ges i f the victim would ag ree to do some work ar ound the pharmacy for him. The victim visi ted the pharmacy sever al times pursuant to this ag re em en t

. On one oc casion, the defe ndant ca lled H.F. ove r to his car and showe d her pornog raphic pictures of y oung children. O n
a no the r o c c a sio n h e br ou g ht H. F

. int o th e ma na g e r’ s o ff ic e a ndloc ke d th e do or . H e a sk e d th e vic tim whether she had ever had sex with an older man and brag g ed that he had had sex with a fiftee n-y ear

old gir l. H e made sever al sexual c omments and beg an to rub the vic tim’s legs. H e then br oug ht out

a g un and told H.F

. she could not le ave until he took some photogr aphs. He remove d her c lothing and took a pictur e of he r in h er u n d er wear. The de fendant offer ed the victim some blue a nd pink pills which she ref

used. He then told he r to r emove he r under wea r and took a nother picture with her brea sts and g enitals exposed. He then thre atene d to kill her or prosec ute her f or shoplifting if she told any one. H.F

. did not return to the pha rmac y and did not tell any one about the pic tures at that tim e . L a te r, sh e tol d h e r m oth e r a bo ut the pic tur e s whi le ho sp ita lize d at the Vand e rb ilt Psy c hiatr ic Ho sp ita l. S he the n s po ke wi th the po lic e a t V a nd e rb ilt

.

Detec tive J eff

rey Goodwin of the D avids o n C o u n t y Metropolitan Police went to the de fe nd a nt’ s h ome wh e re the de fe nd a nt l ive d w ith his g ir lf ri e nd , B rand y

Ma y e s. Ms. Ma y e s a c tua lly

ow ne d th e h o m e i n q u e s t i o n

. D e t e c t i v e G o o d w i n f o l l o w e d M s

. M a y e s t o H i c k o r y H o l l o w M a ll wher e he told h er t h at he suspec ted the def endant of possessing c hild pornog raphy and aske d for permission to searc h their home whe n the def endant wa s not present. Ms. May es ca me up with a plan to g et the def

endant out of the house and co n s en t ed in writi ng to the sear ch. The defe ndant

came h o m e d u ri ng the sea rch and Detec tive Goodwin spoke with him. This discussion led to the defe ndant a d m itting that he showe d pornog raphic photogr aphs to the victim and that he a lso took some photog raphs of

the victim. The def

endant a lso me ntioned he might have some photogr aphs in his truck. This statement led to a sear ch of his truc k wher e Detec tive Goodwin found a g un. At some point while sear ching the house, the police also found pornog raphic imag es of c hildren on the defe ndant’s computer

.-3-

Th e de fe nd a nt w a s a

rr e ste d o n f

e de ra l c ha

rg e s in June of

19 99 ba se d o n th e po rn og ra ph ic ima ges found on his computer. H e wa s relea sed on bail pending trial. On Oc tober 28, 1999, the defe ndant was indicte d by the Davidson County

Gra nd J ury

for one count of e specia lly ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor and one count of espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping . On Novembe r 5, 19 99 , h e wa s ta

ke n b a c k in to fe de ra l c us tod y

. Th e de fe nd a nt re ma ine d at th e Da vid so n Co un ty C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e C o m p l e x u n t i l S e p t e m b e r o f 2 0 0 0
, e v e n t h o u g h h e w a s i n f e d e r a l c u s t o d y

. In J anuary of 2001, while in fe dera l prison in a nother state, the defe ndant bec ame pe rsonally awa re that there was a

state deta iner on him place d in Davidson County . At that time, he dec lined the opportunity

to force Davidson County authorities to bring him to trial in Tennessee. In J anuary of 2002, the def

endant f inally filed the a

ppropriate paper s to beg in prosecution of his ca se.
Following a jury trial, in June of 2002, the defe ndant was convicted for espec ially ag g ravated exploi tation of a mi nor and false imprisonment. The trial court sente nced the defe ndant on J uly 8, 20 02 to e le ve n y e ars fo r the e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d e xploi ta tio n o f a mino r, to r un c on se c uti ve to h is fe de ra l se nte nc e a nda

c on c ur re nt se nte nc e of

e le ve n mo nth s, tw e nty -n ine day s f or his fa lse imp ri so nme nt co nv ic tio n. Th e tr ia l c ou rt de nie d th e de fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n f or a ne w t ri a l onAu g us t 9, 2002. Def

endant f iled his notice of appe al on September 5, 2002.

ISSU ES

The de fendant arg ues eig ht issues on appea l: (1) whether the trial court e rre d in deny ing the defe ndant’s motion to dism iss due to unnece ssary delay ; (2) whe ther the tria l court er red in de ny ing the def endant’ s pretria l motion to suppress his a lleg ed admissions to police bec ause the defe ndant was subjec ted to custodial interrog ation without having be en advise d of i s M i ra n d a wa rning s; (3) whether the trial court erre d in deny ing th e d ef en d an t ’s m otion to suppress a handg un seized by police fr om his vehicle; (4) w hether the evidenc e in t he record is sufficient to support a finding by

a rational trier of f

act that the de fendant is guilty bey ond a re asonable doubt of espec ially ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a mi nor and false imprisonment; (5) whether the trial court e rre d in admitting hear say te s ti mo n y r e la te d to th eall e g ed victim’s mother’s r esponse to her daug hter’s c hara cterization of the de fendant as a “ perve rt”; (6) whether the trial court erre d in admitting evidenc e that anothe r person ha d been convicted of a sexual offense involving the alleg ed victim in an unre lated ca se; (7) whether the trial court err ed in failing to decla re a mistrial when the prose cutor, in direc t violation of the trial c ourt’s pr et ri al ruling , elicited testimony from a police detec tive that the def endant admitted having child pornog raphy on his computer; and ( 8) whe ther the trial court erre d in imposi ng an excessive se ntence on the def endant’ s conviction for e specia lly aggravated se x ual exploit ation of a minor, an d d i d the court further err in ordering that the sentenc es in this case be serve d

consec utively

to the defe ndant’s fe dera l sentence

.-4- AN AL YSI S

Speedy Trial

Th e de fe nd a nt’ s f

ir st a rg ume nt i s th a t he wa s de prive d of du e pr oc e ss o f l a w u nd e r the F if th and F ourtee nth Amendments to the United States Constit ution a nd Article I , § 8 of the Te nnessee Constit ution due to the delay in bring ing him to trial. The defe ndant arg ues that his right to a spe edy trial was de nied bec ause the off en s es were a lleg ed to have occur red be tween January

1, 1998 and J une 24, 1998, and c ommenceme nt of the prose cution of the c ase did not beg in until M arc h 21, 20 02

. He arg ue s that the re wa s a c tua l pr e jud ic e a s a

re su lt o f the de la y

be c a us e : ( 1) he wa s u na

ble to ge t the names a nd addre sses of the e mploy ees at the ph ar m ac y where he w as the mana g er; (2) fede ral a g ents had de stroy ed his computer and its contents during the delay ; (3) the building wher e the of fe ns e s w e re c omm itt e d h a d b e e n d e str oy e d a nd re pla c e d; ( 4) a ndhe los t th e op po rtun ity to

se rv e his se nte nc e c on c ur re ntl y wi th his fe de ra l sen te nc e . The de fe nd a nt a lso arg ue s th a t th e State

cause d the delay

to gain tactical a dvantag e.

The United State s an d T ennessee Constituti ons g uarantee the c riminal defe ndant the rig ht to a spee dy

trial. U.S. Const. amend VI ; T enn. Const. ar t. I
, § 9; State v. Utley , 956 S.W .2d 489, 492 (Tenn.1997) . The rig ht to a speedy trial is also statutory in Tenne ssee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 14-101. I n addition, t h e T ennessee Rules of Criminal Procedur e provide for the dismissal of an ind ic tme nt, pr e se ntm e nt, inf orma tio n o r c ri min a l c omp la int “ [i]f the re is u nn e c e ssaryde la y in prese nting the c harg e to a g rand jury ag ainst a de fendant who has bee n held to answe r to the trial court, or if

there is unnece ssary

delay in bring ing a

defe ndant to trial....” Te nn. R. Crim. P . 48(b). The Te nnessee Supreme Court has state d that “formal g rand jury action or the actua l restra ints of an

arr e st a re re qu ir e d” to t

ri g g e r sp e e dy tr ia l a na ly sis

. Ut le y , 9 56 S.W. 2da t 49 3. Th is i s b e c a us e “ it i s at t h i s s t age of ar

rest and g rand jury

action that the sig nificant intere sts served by the rig ht to a

s p ee d y tri al ar e m o s td i re ct l y

i m p l i ca t ed : t h e p ro t ec t i o n aga i n s to p p re s s i v e p re -t ri al i n ca rc er at i on and the re duction of anxiety

and conc ern c aused by

unresolved c harg es.” I d.

When an ac cused se eks the dismissal of cha rg es base d upon the denial of the c onstitut ional ri g ht t o a

sp e e dy tr ia l, the a c c us e d mu st e sta bli sh a pe ri odof

de la y that is “ pr e su mpt ive ly prejudicia l.” State v. J eff

erson, 938 S.W .2d 1, 12 (Tenn. Crim. App.1996) (citing Dog g ett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.C t. 2686, 120 L . Ed.2d 520 (1992); Ba rker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct

. 2182, 33 L

. Ed.2d 101 (1972))

. The leng th of the delay is de pendent upon the pec uliar

c ir c ums ta nc e s o f e a c h c a se , a ndthe de la y that c a n b e tol e rate d f

or “an ord in ary

str e e t c ri me ” is g ener ally much l ess t han for a serious, complex felony char g e. B arke r, 407 U.S. at 530-31. A de lay of one y ear or longe r marks the point at w hich courts deem the delay unrea sonable enoug h to trigg er further inquiry

. Dog g ett, 505 U.S. at 652 n. 1; Utley , 956 S.W .2d at 494. I f this threshold is crossed,

a balanc ing test determines the merits of the speedy trial issue. I n State v. Bishop, 493 S.W .2d 81, 83- 85 (Te nn.1973), the Te nnessee Supr em e C o u rt rec og nized and adopted the ba lancing test the United States Supreme Court set forth in Ba rker in which four fac tors must be bala nced. T he fa ctors

are : (1) the leng th of the delay ; (2) the rea sons for the delay ; (3) the acc used' s assertion of the rig ht-5-

to speedy trial; and (4) the pr ejudice r esulting f rom the delay . Ba

rker , 407 U.S. at 530-32; Bishop, 493 S.W .2d at 83-84.

This court also re cog nizes that findings of f act by the trial judg e ar e pre sumed correc t and may only be over come by

a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e contr ary

to that finding

. Tenn. R. App. P. 1 3( d) . T he Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s h e ld that “[q]ue sti on s o f c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the weig ht and value of the e vidence , and re solution of conflicts in the evidenc e ar e matter s entrusted
to the tr ia l ju dg e a s th e tr ie r o f f a c t.” State v. Od om, 92 8 S. W.2 d 1 8, 23 (T e nn .1 99 6) . T he pa rt y pr e va ili ng a t th e tr ia l c ou rt le ve l is e nti tle d to the “ str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w of the e vid e nc e ” a s w e ll as “a ll reasona

ble and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that e vidence .” I d.

The trial c ourt stated the f ollowing f

indings fr om the bench:

F i r s to f a l l
, t h e f i r s t B ark e r v e r s u s W i n g o f a c t o r i s l e n g t h e n e d d u e t o d e l a y, and ce rtainly

the delay here of forty -four months is s ufficie nt to support a speedy trial analy sis. The rea son for the delay is the nex t fac tor I ’m supposed t o look at, and that
t h en i s d i v i d ed i n t o fo u r s u b ca t ego ri es

. I n t en t i o n al d el ay t o gai n a t ac t i ca l ad v an t age or to h ar ass the def

endant, that is not prese nt here . There ’s no indication of int e nti on a l de la y

to g a in a ta c tic a l a dv a nta g e or

to h ara ss the de fe nd a nt. Two, bure aucr atic indiffe renc e or ne g lige nce, I think t h at i s prese nt here

. Ce rt a inl y , w he n h e wa s in c us tod y in l a te ‘9 9 a nd in m os t of 20 00 , h e wa s a va ila

ble to b e se rv e d b y th is cap ia s. I t w a sn ’t do ne . A s n e ar a s I

c a n f ig ur e ou t, i t w a s ju st neg lige nce that it wasn’t done. And that c erta inly is a fac tor in favor

of the de fe nd a nt. Th e oth e r r e a so n f

or de la y the n w a s th a t the State simply did n’ t e xer c ise its rig ht under the inter state compa ct af ter January

of 2001 but allowed the defe nse - - d ef endant to be put on notice and for him to act. I suppose that does we i gh somewhat in fa vor of the de fense

. The a ssertion of the right - - we ll, it’ s a littl e conf using. A ccor ding to the defe ndant’s testi mony he hired Mr. R ay , but Mr. R ay couldn’t find the charg e so he sort of let that go

. W h en h e was formally notified of the c harg e in 2001, he specific ally declined to a ssert it and finally asserted it in J anuary

of 2002. The othe r thing is under

the assertion of the rig ht, but I presume this also lea

k s o v er i n t o the prejudice side, he wa s in custody of the fe dera l g overnme nt. So thi s isn’t like an

occa sion of a pre trial detaine e or a person on bond waiting trial. Since the fa ll of ‘99, h e ’ s b e e n i n f

e d e r a l c u s t o d y. But the most important fac tor by far is prejudice. I n evaluating this fac tor the Cour t m ust be awa

re of the spee dy

trial rig ht and its design to pr event undue and impressive inca

rce ration prior to trial, t h at ’s n o t been the case here . The inc arc e ratio n h a s b e e n pu rs ua nt to the fe de ra l f ir st p re tr ia l in c arc e ratio n a ndthe n h is incar cer ation pursuant to fe dera l conviction.-6- To minimi ze anx iety and conc ern a ccompa nied [sic] public acc usation, and there ’s no proof that that exi sts here e specia lly in the light of the fede ral c harg es that

wer e pending and then f

or which he became convicte d of. And then to limit the possibili ties of long delay will impair the defe nse. Now, he m a d e t h i s ar g u m e n t t h a t t h e r e ’ s m i s s i n g w i t n e s s e s o u t t h e r e

. B u t t h i s is p re tty nebulous, and I

can’ t rea lly

put my fing er on any thing that would - - any witness that mig ht b e he lpf

ul n or ha s h e sp e c if

ic a lly su g g e ste d wh a t a ny wi tne ss wo uld do to h e lp him other than he told us about a c onversation he had with a f ellow employ ee. B ut it s ou nd e d to me li kethat e nti re c on ve rs a tio n w ou ld b e ina dmi ssi ble a t le a st c e rt a inl y by the def ense. A s to what admissions he made to a f ellow employ ee w ould n’t ordinarily be admissible under 803(1.2), I g uess what some pe ople ca ll a self-se rving decla rations, but they ’re not rea lly self-se rving decla

rations but are sometimes thought to fa ll under that rule of evidenc e. And t he other thing is a los s of concurre nt time which rea lly wasn’t ve ry

- - it did not impress the Tenne ssee Supreme Court in State versus Simm ons. And he still hasn’t entire ly

lost his opportuni ty

for c oncurr ent time. This is not an insubstantial claim of denial of a speedy trial. But Ithink taking a ll the Ba rker versus Wingo fac tors into consideration espe cially considering the lack of

proven pr ejudice, the fa c t th a t he ’s be e n infe de ra l cus tod y sin c e the fa ll of ‘9 9, that w hil e a c los e c a ll balanc e c o me o u t in f

a v o r o f th e St a te h e r e , th e mo ti o n to d is mi s s f o r la c k of a speedy trial is respec tfully

overr uled.

Now we turn to our ana ly sis using the B arke r fa ctors, k ee p i n g i n mind that the fac tual fi nd ing s o f the tr ia l c ou rt

are pr e su me d c or

re c t.

(1) The L eng th of the De lay As noted above , a delay

of one y ear

or long er “m ar k s the point at which courts deem the de la y un re a so na

ble e no ug h to tr ig g e r the B ark e r i nq uiry .” Do g g e tt, 50 5 U .S. at 65 2 n . 1 ; see a lso Utley , 956 S.W .2d at 494. T h e d el ay i n this case wa s over one y ear and, ther efor e, mee ts the thr e sh oldfo r c on sid e ratio n o f the oth e r f a c tor s.
(2) The Reason for

the Delay Re a so ns fo r the de la y

of pr os e c uti on fa ll w ith in f

ou r c a te g orie s: (1 ) int e nti on a l de la y to g a in

a ta c tic a l a dv a nta g e ov e r the de fe ns e or de la y de sig ne d to ha

ra ss the de fe nd a nt; (2 ) b ur e a uc ratic indiffer ence or neg lige nce; ( 3) delay nece ssary to the fair and ef fec tive prosec ution of the ca se; and (4) de lay cause d, or ac quiesce d in by th e d e f e n s e

. St a te v. Wood, 924 S .W.2d 342, 346-47 (Tenn.1996). “The third type of de lay is, by definition, justifiable and is not weig hed against either party .” W ood, 924 S.W .2d at 347. As stated above, the trial court found that there was no intentional dela y on the part of the S tate. The evidence prese nted at the he aring bear s out the trial court’s f inding. The trial court did conc lude that the delay was c aused more by

neg lige nce on the part of both the detec tives who investig ated the c ase and the State. The te stimonyat t he hearing also supports this finding by the trial court. Detec tive Goodwin stated at the hearing that he re fer red the indictment to the fug itive-7-

section of the police department for further a ction but did not follow up on bring ing the defe ndant to trial. Ms. O meka Warfield, of the Davidson County District Attorney ’s Off

icer also testified at the hea ring . Ms. Warfield proc esses re quests for de tainers a nd extraditions
, an d s h e h andled the defe ndant’s case

. She stated that her r ecor ds state that the def endant wa s indicted in October 1999 and she se nt a letter to the de fendant at the fe dera l fac ilityin West Virg inia. She rec eived a certified mail rec eipt back, but no c orre spondence . She then s tated that the di strict attorney assig ned to the defe ndant’s ca se dec ided to wait and se e if the de fendant would ask to b e b ro u gh t back. T he evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the t rial court’s finding s with reg ard to the c ause of the delay of the pr o s ec u t i on of the de fendant. There fore , we a g ree with the trial court that the de lay was
cause d by neg lige nce and this weig hs somewhat ag ainst the State in the balanc e.
(3) The Acc used’s Asse rtion of the Rig ht to a Speedy Trial The Te nn es s ee an d Un i t ed S t at es S u p re m e C o u rt s h av e b o t h re co gn i z ed t h at “a n acc used who is unawar e that char g es are pending ag ainst him or her, as is of ten the case wher e an indictment has been se aled a nd not served, c annot be pe nalized for his or her failure to assert the spe edy trial rig ht.” Woo d, 92 4 S.W.2 d at 351 n. 13 (T e nn .1 99 6) (c iti ng Do g g e tt , 505 U.S. at 652-54). The defe ndant
te sti fi e d at th e he ari ng that he hir e d a Mr . Ray a s h is atto rn e y

to p ur su e a ny

Sta te char ge s a g a ins t him

. Th e de fe nd a nt te sti fi e d tha t Mr. Ra y fo un d no ch arg e s. Mr . Ray wa s n ot p re se nte d a s a

wi tne ss at t h e h e ar in g

. T h e d e f

e n d a n t w a s f

o r ma ll y n o ti f

ie d o f th e c h ar g e s in Ja n u ar y o f 2 0 0 1 , while in a fede ral prison out-of

-state, but dec ided not to assert his rig ht to be broug ht to trial. The trial court’s finding of fa ct ar e indee d su p p o rt ed b y t h e record. The fac t that the defe ndant had notice of the char g es ag ainst him, but di d not assert his spee dy trial rig hts, acc ounts for 12 months o u t of 44 months of delay . There fore , we f ind that this weighs a g ainst the State to a small deg ree

. (4) Pre judice The final fac tor to be reviewe d in determining whether a defe ndant' s rig ht to a speedy trial has bee n violated is whether the def endant ha s been prejudice d due to the delay . Wood, 924 S .W.2d at 348; Bishop, 493 S.W.2d at 84. This final factor is also the m ost important of the four balanc ing fac tors. Wood, 924 S .W.2d at 348. I n determining this re maining fac tor, we focus on (1) a ny undue and oppre ssive incar cer ation, (2) the anx iety acc ompany ing a

public acc usati o n , an d (3) a ny impairment of the de fendant's a bilityto prepa

re his def ense. Bishop

, 493 S.W .2d at 8 5 ; S t at e v. Ko lb

, 75 5 S. W.2 d 4 72 , 4 75 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 88 ). I n a pp ly ing the thi rdof

the se c on sid e ratio ns , the impairment of defe nse, the Te nnessee Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have

a c kn ow le dg e d:

[I ]mpa ir me nt o f o ne ' s def e ns e is the mos t di ff

ic ult fo rm of sp e e dy tr ia l pr e jud ic e to prove be cause time's erosion of ex culpatory evidenc e and testimony “can rar ely be sh o w n

. ”

. . . [E ]xc e s s iv e d e lay p r e s u mp ti v e ly

c o mp r o mi s e s th e r e li ab il it y o f a tr ial in way s that neither pa

rty can pr ove or, f

or that matter, ide ntify . Whil e such presumptive pre

judice cannot alone ca

rry a Six th Amendment claim without reg ard to the other B arke r criteria, it is part of the m ix of re levant fa cts, and its importance incre ases with the leng th of the dela y

.-8-

Woo d, 92 4 S. W.2 d at 34 8 ( c iti ng Do g g e tt , 505 U.S. at 655) (c itations omi tted).

I n its finding s, the trial court noted that the prejudice fac tor is the most im portant fa ctor. The trial court stated t hat there was no undue or oppre ssive incar cer ation beca use the de fendant was alre ady incar cer ated f

or his fede ral c onvictions throug hout the delay

. The trial court also stated that there was no proble m conce rning minimi zing anxiety and conc ern a ccompa ny ing public a ccusation beca use he ha d been c harg ed an d co n v icted for fede ral c rimes re lated to the off enses unde r the indictment. The trial court also stated that the de fendant’s claim re g arding his miss ing w itnesses was “pre tty nebulous” be cause he did n o t p re s ent conclusive evidenc e at tria l that any of his former

e mpl oy e e s w ou ld a c tua lly su pp ort hi s c a se . T he de fe nd a nt a lso arg ue d a bo ut the los s o f h is a

bil ity to serve his fe dera l and state sente nces c oncurr ently . Howeve r, as the trial court pointed out, the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt “ do [ es] no t a g re e that th e los t po ssi bil ity of c on c ur re nt s e nte nc ing is enoug h in and of itself to require dismiss al on spee dy trial g rounds.” State v. Simmons, 54 S .W.3d 75 5, 76 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) . A ft e r r e vie wi ng the re c or d o f the he ari ng , w e fi nd no evi den c e to preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s finding s with reg ard to the pr ejudice fa ct o r. T he def endant failed to prove that he wa s prejudice d by the delay in the prosec ution of his case.

At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial court held that afte r a c lose ca ll, the balance tipped in favo r o f th e St ate a n d n o t d is mi s s a l o f th e in d ic tm e n t. We f

in d n o th in g in th e r e c o r d w h ic h preponde rate s ag ainst the findi ng s of t he trial court. After apply ing the Ba rker fac tors, we a g ree with the trial court that the ba lance narr owl y t i p s i n favor of the State in not dismissi ng the indictment. There fore , we a ffirm the tria l court’s de nial of the de fendant’s motion to di smiss based

u p o n u n n e c e s s ar y d e l a y.

M ot ion s t o Supp r e ss

Our standa

rd of r eview f

or a tria l court’s finding s of fact and c onclusions of law on a motion
to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e is set for th in S ta te v. Od om, 92 8 S. W.2 d 1 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) . U nd e r this standard, “ a trial c ourt’s finding s of fa ct in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidenc e pr e po nd e rate s o the rw ise .” I d. a t 23 . A s is c us tom ary , “ the pr evai li ng part y in the tr ia l c ou rt is aff orded the ‘strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re asonable and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that e vidence .’” State v. Carter
, 16 S.W .3d 762, 765 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998)). Neve rtheless, this Court revie ws de novo the
tr ia l c ou rt ’s app lic a tio n o f the la w to the fa c ts, wi tho ut ac c or din g a ny pr e su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss t o those conc lusions. S ee State v. Walton, 41 S

. W

. 3 d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001) ; State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W .2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999)

.

Admissions t o Police

The de fendant filed a motion to s uppress stateme nts he made to De tective Goodw in the day the police se arc hed his residen ce , J uly 29, 1998. At trial, the State pre sented testimony from Detec tive Goodwin that the defe ndant acknow ledg ed, during the sear ch of his residenc e, that he ha d taken nude photogr aphs of H.F . and had show n her photog raphs of nude children . The trial c ourt-9-

de nie d th is m oti on . T he de fe nd a nt s ub mit s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in den y in g h is moti on to

su pp res s h is a dmi ssi on s to the de te c tiv e s. He c on te nd s th a t th e se state me nts we re ob ta ine d in violation of his rig ht ag ainst self-inc rimination under the Fifth and Fourte enth Amendments to the United States Constit ution and Article 1, § 9 of the Tenne ssee Constit ution be cause they wer e the p ro d u ct o f custodial interrog ation without the benef it of the warnings r equire d by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

The trial c ourt’s finding s of fa ct with reg ard to the suppr ession of the st atement to the de te c tiv e s is a s f

oll ow s:

As t o the sec ond issue about the stateme nt I , ag ain, cr edit the detec tive. I think it was clear from his testimonythat the def endant wa s attempting to c ooperate, was fr ee to leav e, ev en wa s told he was fr ee to lea ve. I might eve n describe the defe ndant’s at t i t ude as kind of naively cooper ating . Perhaps the de fendant didn’t

un de rs tand ho w mu ch p ote nti a l tr ou ble hewa s in wi th b oththe fe de ra l a ndstate

au t h o r i t i e s a n d t a l k i n g ab o u th o w h e w a n t e d t o c o o p e r a t e a n d g e tb a c k t o w o rk

. If

ever there w a s s o rt o f

a n a iv e s tate me n t, th a t w a s it

. B u t I th in k a ll th e f a c ts and

c ir c ums ta nc e s he re ind ic a te to me that he wa s n ot i n c us tod y , th a t he fr e e ly sp ok e to the office r and it’s not custodial interrog ation and, there fore
, it’s a dmissibl e. So the
mot ionto su pp re ss b a se d u po n th e ill e g a lit y of the se arc h a ndse izur e is r e sp e c tf ull y
ov e rr ule d. Th e mot ionto s up pr e ss t he o ra l st a te me nt m a de to O ff ic e r G oo dw in i n the fi rs t se ve ra l ho ur s o f this se arc h o n th a t mo rn ing is - - his pr e se nc e in the ho me is respec tfully

overr uled.

As this Court st ated in State v. Cooper, 912 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995):

Whether one is in custod y t u rn s not on whether the interrog ation occur

red in a “coe rcive environment” but on whether the acc used was “deprived of his fre edom of
act io n in a n y s ig n if

ic a n t w a y

. ” O r e g o n v

. M a th ia s o n , 4 2 9 U

. S. 4 9 2
, 9 7 S. Ct . 711, 714, 50 L .Ed.2d 714 (1977). U nder California v. B ehele r, 463 U.S

. 1 1 2 1 , 1125, 11 26
, 10 3 S .Ct . 3 51 7, 35 20 , 7 7 L .E d. 2d12 75 (1 98 3) , th e ult imate inq uiry to determine whether

a per son is “in custody ” for purpo s es of re ceiving Miranda protec tion is “simpl y

whether there is a ‘formal arr est or re straint of fr eedom of movement’ of the deg ree associate d with a forma l arre st.”

Her e, the tria l court spec ifically acc redited the testimony of De tective Goodw in who testified that he told the defe ndant he was not unde r arr est and was fr ee to lea ve. The court re cog nized that by the def endant’ s own testimony , he wa s try ing to cooperate with authorities. The c ourt noted that alth o u g h th e d e f

e n d a n t m a y

n o t h a v e r e a li ze d th e p o te n ti a l f o r tr o u b le
, h e c o o p e r a te d w ith the detec tives and said that he w anted to g o back to wor k.-10-

The de fendant relies on State v. Ander son, 937 S.W .2d 851 (Tenn. 1996) . I n Ander son, our
su pr e me c ou rt

se t ou t the te st to de te rm ine wh e the r Mir a nd a wa rn ing s a re re qu ir e d. Th e Sup re me Court stated:

[T] h e appr opriate inquiry . . . is whether, unde r the totality of the c ircumstance s, a
re a so na ble pe rs on in the su spect ’s po sit ion wo uldc on sid e r h ims e lf or he rs e lf deprive d of fr eedom of

movement to a deg ree associate d with a formal a rre st. The test is objective from the vi ewpoint of the s uspect, a nd the unarticulated, subjec tive vie w o f l a w e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic ia ls that the ind ivi du a l be ing qu e sti on e d is or is n ot a suspect does not be ar upon the question.

Ander son, 937 S.W .2d at 855. Ander son also includes a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to the a ssessment of whe ther Mira nda

warnings a

re r equire d. These f

actor s are : 1. the time and location of the interrog ation; 2

. t h e d u ra t i o n an d ch ar ac t ero f t h e q u es t i o n i n g; 3. the offic er’ s tone of voice and g ener al demeanor; 4

. t h e s u s p ec t ’s m et h o d o f t ra n s p o rt at i o n t o t h e p l ac e o f q u es t i o n i n g; 5. the nu mbe r o f p oli c e of fi c e rs pr e se nt; 6. any

limit ation on movement or other form of r estraint imp o s ed o n t h e suspect during the interrog ation; 7. any

interac tions between the offi cer and the suspec t, including the w ords spoken by the of fi c e r t o th e su sp e c t, andthe su sp e c t’ s v e rb a l or no nv e rb a l r e sp on se s; 8. the extent to which the suspect is conf ronted with the law enfor ceme nt office r’s suspicions of g uilt; and 9. the extent to which the suspect is made a war e that he or she i s fre e to re fra in from answe ring qu e sti on s o r t o e ndthe int e rv ie w at w ill

.

I d. at 855.

B e c aus e thi s was a

mot ionto s up pr e ss, we mus t a c c re dit the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t. The trial c ourt acc redited the testimony of Detec tive Goodwin, and the evidenc e in the re cord doe s not preponde rate otherwise. When we a p ply the Ander son fac tors to the fac ts as testified to by Detec tive Goodwin, we de termine that the de fendant was not i n custody under the totalityof the

c ir c ums ta nc e s.

The de fendant was questioned at his res i d en ce in the middle of the day . He sig ned the
consent to sea

rch f orm within minutes of returning home, s o the t ime prior to his consent to search

was ne g ligible. From the testimony of the de fendant, the office rs tone of v o i ce and g ener al demea nor see med to be businesslike, but not abusive. The defe ndant drovehimself to the residenc e in his girlfriend’s ca

r. It appea

rs that althoug h there wer e seve ral law enfor ceme nt office rs from

sever al diffe rent a g encie s, the defe ndant was not re strained. The interac tions between the office rs
a ndthe de fe nd a nt a

pp e are d to be c oo pe rativ e a ndc or dia l. Ac c or din g to D e te c tiv e Go od wi n, he tol d-11-

the de fe nd a nt h e wante d to sp e ak w ith him a ndthe de fe nd a nt s a t do wn . D e te c tiv e Go od wi n a lso
state d th a t he tol d th e de fe nd a nt h e wa s f re e to l e a ve if

he wa nte d a ndhe wa s n ot u nd e r a rr e st.

Under these fa ctors and the test in Ander son, we do not find the defendant to be in custody

as re quired by

Miranda. T he def

endant wa s at his own residenc e and had access to both his car and his girlf riend’s c ar. H e was told he was fre e to le ave. Detec tive Goodwin also told the defe ndant he wa s not under ar

rest. Unde r the totality

of the c ircumstance s, we c onclude a rea sonable pe rson would not consider himself to be under formal arr est. Ther efor e, we aff irm the trial court’s denial of the de fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss.
Handg un

Th e de fe nd a nt a lso arg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in de nying his mot io n to su pp re ss w ith reg ard to the introduc tion of the defe ndant’s handg un. The trial c ourt’s findings of fa ct with reg ard
to the su pp re ssi on of

the ha nd g un is a s f

oll ow s:

As t o t h e weapon, I

acc redit Mr. Goodw in’s testimonythat the def endant

c on se nte d to that se arc h. I t ma y be a lit tle od d that on c e ha vin g it h e the n h a s so me doubts about its identit y

and, ther efor e, lef

t it at the house. Be cause I believe at that tim e he c ou ld h a ve se ize d it a s e vid e nc e . It sp e aks we ll f or him ho w he w a nte d to be assur ed that it was the weapon unde r consider ation. I think he also could have seized it just beca

use as pr obable c ause of

a misdemea nor of c arry ing a wea pon for purposes of g oing a

rmed. B ut he didn’t so, he left it there. Ms. May es testified a bout th e phone ca ll, his permission t o come ba ck and g et it, which I think was constitutionallyvalid. And the orig inal seizure was c onstitut ionally valid. There ’s an inter esting case decide d by the Court of Criminal Appeals in the

se ve nti e s o r m ay be e arl y

e ig hti e s. I

ha pp e n to kn ow it, be c a us e it c ome s f ro m th is court, a lthough on a

prior judg e. It’s called Stat e ver sus Duer ( phonetic) or Duer versus the State. And what it talks about is the office r’s opinion about whe ther or not he had probable cause or the leg ality of his action is rea lly

not relevant. A judge has to d e te rm ine wheth e r the fa c ts w e re su ff ic ie nt f or pr ob able c a us e or

no np ro ba

ble

cause , not what the officer thinks of his own actions. So that just buttresses the idea that w hil e the of

fi c e r m a y ha ve ha d s e c on d th ou g hts abo ut s e izin g thi s, I be lie ve his ini tia l se izur e wa s c on sti tut ion a l.

The trial c ourt clea

rly acc redits t he testi mony of Detective Goodwin. W e ar e bound by the
tr i a l c o u r t ’ s f

i n d i n g s o f f a c t w h e n t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s n o tp r e p o n d e r a t e a g a i n s tt h e m

. In h i s t e s t i m o n y, Detec tive Goodwin s tated that the def endant c onsented to the sea rch of his truck, wher e De tective Goodwin found t h e gu n

. The de fendant himself admitted at the hea ring that he ac companied the detec tives to the truck and told them about t he gun. The evidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’ s findings of

fac t. There fore , we c onclude the de fendant consented to the se arc h and the
tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y de nie d th e de fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss.-12- Suf fi ciency of the Evidence

When a defenda nt challeng es t he suff iciency of the e vidence , this Court i s oblige d to review that claim ac cording to certain well-settled prin ci p les. A ver dict of g uilty , rende red by a jury and

“ app ro ve d b y

the tr ia l ju dg e , a c c re dit s th e tes ti mony of the ” State ’s wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s a ll conflicts in the testimony in f avor of the State. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992) . Thus, althoug h the ac cused is orig inally cloake d with a presumption of i nnocenc e, the jury verdic t of g uiltyremove s this presumption “and re place s it with o n e o f gu ilt.” State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). He nce, on a ppeal, the burden of proof r ests with the defe ndant to demonstrate the insufficienc y of the c onvicting e vidence

. I d. Th e re le va nt q ue sti on the re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t a ns we r i s w he the r any ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have f ound the ac cused g uiltyof every element of the offe nse bey ond a re asonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Ha

rris, 839 S.W.2d at 75. I n making this decision, we are to acc ord the State “ the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence as we ll as all rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn there from.” Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d at 914. As such, this Court is precluded f rom re- weig hing

or re considering the evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morg an, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) ; S t at e v

. M atthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). More over, w e may not substitute our own “infe renc es for those dr awn by the trier of

fac t from circ umstantial evidence .” Matthew s, 805 S.W .2d at 779.

Especia lly

ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor is f ound at Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 39-17- 1005. This statute states that “[i ] t is unlawful for a person to knowing ly

promote, employ , use, assist, transport or permit a minor to pa rticipate in the perf

ormanc e or in the pr oduction of material which includes the minor eng ag ing in: (1) sexual activity. . . .” The definition of “se x ual activity ” under

this part of the c ode includes, “ (G) [l]ascivious ex hibition of the female brea st or the g enitals or the pubic a

rea of any person.” Fa lse imprisonme n t i s addre ssed at Te nnessee Code An no ta te d se c tio n 39 -1 3- 30 2. Th is se c tio n state s, “ [a] pe rs on c omm its the of fe ns e of fa lse imprisonment who k n o wi n gl y remove s or conf

ines another

unlawfully

so as to interfe re w ith the other’s liberty .”

The following fac ts were prese nted at trial. At the time of trial, H.F . was e ighte en y ear s old. H.F. te stified that the def endant c aug ht her shoplifting at a Revc o pharma cy wh er e h e was an
ass is tan t man ager on Decem ber 5 , 1 99 7. I n ex chan ge for t he d efen dan t n otpres si ng char ges, H .F. ag ree d to come by

the s tore once or twice a

wee k to speak with the de fendant to assure him that she

was stay ing out of trouble. Ba rbar a Bone of the Metro Police Youth Service s Divis i o n ex plained that the defendant called about dismiss ing the citation. She described that dec ision as uncommon. H. F .’ s moth e r

e xp l a i n e d t h a tt h e d e f

e n d a n tt h o u g h th e a n d t h e v i c t i mc o u l d w o rk o u ts o me ag ree ment to drop the cha rg es. Althoug h unable to g ive a n ex ac t number, H.F . visited the store

sever al times to chec k in with the defe ndant. H.F .’s mother made sure that H. F. h onored he r
a g re e me nt w iththe de fe nd a nt.
Sometime after January

1, 1998, H.F. ma de a stop at the store to c h ec k -i n wi t h The defe ndant. He c alled her over to his car and showed her pornog raphic pictures of y oung children that-13-

the def en d ant said he g ot off of the internet. He also said that he wa s in one of the photos. The defe ndant told H.F. that the g irls made a lot of money for appea ring in the photos. When H.F. g ot ho me , s he tol d h e r m om that th e de fe nd a nt w a s a pe rv e rt

. H.F. stoppe d by

the store, a fter the “p i ct u re incident,” on a Sunday evening shortly

befor e closing . The de fendant told H.F. to follow him to the back of t h e st ore. When they enter ed the manag er’ s office , the def

endant locke d the door behind H.F . The de fendant asked H.F . whether she had ever had sex with an older man. The defe ndant told H.F. that he had had se x with a fiftee n-y ear

old gir l. The def

endant c ontinued to make sex ual comments and st arte d rubbing H.F.’ s leg s. When H.F. tried to leave
, he told he r to sit down. At that time, a g un appea red on the desk. The defe ndant told H.F. she w ould not be able to lea ve until some photos were taken.

Aft er H. F. rem ov ed h er j acket , s hi rtand pan ts , t he d efen dan t t oo k a po lar oi d p ho to of H .F. in her bra and panties. H e then told her to remove he r under g arme nts. He off ere d her blue and pink pills, which H.F. re fused. F ear ful for he r life, H.F . remove d the re st of her c lothing. The defe ndant then took a photo of he r sitting in the chair with her f eet on the c hair ba se, exposing her g enitals and brea sts to the ca m er a. The de fendant put the photos in hi s pocket. He also took a photo of the victim’s fac e.

After the def endant a llowed H.F . to ge t dressed, H .F. be g g e d for the photos, but the de fenda nt ref used. He later pul led a g un from under the seat of his truck, plac ed thre e bullets in the cha mber, and told her he would kill her and nobody would know who did it. The def endant a lso threatene d to p ro se c ute H. F . f

or sh op lif tin g if sh e tol d a ny on e abo ut the ph oto s.
When H.F. g ot home, she did not tell her mother wh at happened bec ause she was sca red. H.F. ne ver w ent b ac k t o t h e p harma cy . She later told her mother about the inc ident during her hospitaliz ation at Vande rbilt Psy chiatric Hospital. Whi le at Vande rbilt, H .F. spoke with the police. H.F. later identified the g un at the district attorne y ’s offic e.

De te c tiv e Jeffrey Goo dw in o f the Me tr o Po lic e De pa rt me nt u se d to wo rk

wi th the Yo uth Se rv ic e s d ivi sio n in ve sti g a ting c hil d s e x crime s. B y the tim e he be c a me inv olv e d inthi s inv e sti g a tio n, the de fe nd a nt w a s n o lo ng e r w or kin g a t th e ph arm a c y . When De te c tiv e Go od wi n f ir st spoke with t h e victim , she wa s crying and nervous. How ever , when she g ave the detec tive the

c lothin g sh e wa s w e ari ng on the day of the c ri me , s he wa s c oo pe rativ e a ndhe lpf ul.

As part of his investigation, De tective Goodw in went to the def endant’ s home in L aVe rg ne. He initially

followed Bra ndy May es from the home to the Hickory Hollow Mall. May es owne d the home in question, but s hare d it with the defendant, who was he r live-in boy friend. May es g ave written conse nt to se arc h the home. When the defe ndant ar rived home, he spoke with the dete ctive.

At first, the def

endant did not re cog nize H.F.’s na me. Howe ver, w hen asked if he re called

a fe ma le juv e nil e inv olved wi th a sh op lif tin g c itatio n at th e ph arm a c y wh e re he ha d p re vio us ly

wo rk e d, he re me mbe re d H.F

.. At that ti me , th e de fe nd a nt a dmi tte d s ho wi ng c hil d p orno g ra ph y to-14-

her. H e said the g irls in the photos, ta ken off of the internet, wer e “not in ac tion.” The de fendant also ac knowledg ed that during one of H.F .’s visits to t he store, he took her to his office and then made five or six nude photogr aphs of her. The defe ndant said he g ave the photos to a maintenanc e man at the pha

rmac y and to a f

riend of his in Arkan sas. At the time of the tria l, the detec tive had

no t r e c ov e re d a ny

of the pic tur e s.

The de fendant claimed he m i gh t h av e o n e or two of the photos in his truck. During the

se arc h o f th e truc k, De te c tiv e Go od wi n f ou ndpo laro id p ho tos of

va ri ou s st or e dis play s. He a lso found a handg un tucked in the se at of the truc k.

At the tim e of

tr ia l, P a tr ic k K e nn e dy

wo rk a s a sto re ma na g e r a t a

CV S dr ug sto re , f orme rl y Revco. Ac cording to Kennedy , store policy is to call the pare nts if a y oung person i s caug ht sho p li f ti n g

. H o w e v e r , h e te s ti f

ie d th a t it w a s n o t Re v c o ’ s p o li c y to h a v e mi n o r s r e p o r t to store

ma na g e rs to m ake su re the y re ma ine d o ut o f t

ro ub le . In 1 99 8, he wo rk e d at th e Re vc o lo c a tio n in Donelson whe re the defe ndant worke d. To the best of Kenne dy ’s rec ollection, a locked door in the office could be ope ned by turning the handle f

rom the inside.

The jury obviouslycre dit ed t h e t es timonyof H.F . as to whethe r the de fendant made a photogr aph of he r, and there fore
, was g uilty of espec ially ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor. H.F. testified that when the defe ndant l ocked her in the m anag er’ s office he for ced he r to take he r clothes off

and made a photog raph of her displ ay i n g h er b re asts and her g enitals. Althoug h the photogr aphs we re ne ver f

ound, it is t he jury ’s province to judge the credibility of wit nesses. W e ar e not to second-g uess the jury on cre dibilit y

issues. There fore , we c onclude ther e is sufficient evidenc e to find the de fendant guilty of espe cially

ag g ravated exploit ation of a minor.

Th e ju ry als o fo un d H. F.’s tes ti mo nyto be cr edi bl e so as t o p rov e fal se i mp ri so nm ent . H. F. testified that the defenda nt locked her in the manag er’ s office . This falls within the definition of fa lse imp ri so nme nt. As state d a bo ve , it is the jury ’s pr ov inc e to j ud g e the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s. The indictment was orig inally for espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping
, which re quires the a dditional

us e of a de a dly we apo n. Th e jury ’s de c isi on to c on vic t th e de fe nd a nt of the le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e shows that the jury

was we ighing the evidenc e very car efully

.

Whe n v ie we d ina

lig ht mos t fa vo ra

ble to the Sta te , w e fi ndthat th e re is ampl e e vid e nc e to

su pp ort th e jury ’s fi nd ing of g uil t f or e sp e c ia lly

a g g ravated ex pl oi ta tio n o f a min or a ndfa lse imp ri so nme nt.

He ar sa y Te st im ony

The de fendant next arg ues that the trial court err ed in a dmitti ng hear say testimony . At trial the following exchang e occ urre d:

[ S t a t e ] : W h e n yo u s a w t h o s e p i c t u r e s , w h a td i d yo u d o t h a td a y? [H. F .]: I

we nt h ome a ndtol d my mom that I thi nk thi s g uy is a pe rv e rt

.-15- [Sta te ]: Di d y ou te ll h e r w hy y ou tho ug ht h e wa s a

pe rv e rt ? [H.F.]: No. I

was sca red. [S tate]: Did y our mom respond to what y ou said? [H.F.] She asked me why and I wouldn’t tell her. [ D e f e n d a n t ] : O b

j e c t i o n , Y o u r

H o n o r

. H e ar s a y. [S tate]: I t’s not offer ed for the truth. [C ourt]: Well approac h the benc h, please

. B EN CH CO NF ERE NC E [Sta te ]: [H. F .], I ’m g oin g to r e ph ra se the qu e sti on a nd app ro a c h it in a diffe rent way

. You said y ou didn’t tell y our mom why y ou thought that [the defe ndant] was

a pe rv e rt in y ou r m ind , is that c or

re c t? [H. F .]: Ye s. [S tate]: So, did y ou tell y our mother that he had shown y ou these ty pes of pic tur e s? [H.F.]: No, sir. [Sta te ]: Whe n y ou tol d y ou r mothe r that y ou tho ug ht h e wa s a pe rv e rt , w h a t w a s y o u r

mo th e r ’ s r e s p o n s e to y o u r [s ic ]? [H.F.]: She said oh [H.F.]. S he didn’t believe that he wa s a per vert [S tate]: So, did y ou mother tell y ou not to g o back to the store at that point in ti me? [H.F.]: No. [S tate]: Did she tell y ou stay away from ther e? [H.F.]: No.

The de fendant’s objection ca me af ter H.F. t estified, “She [H.F .’s mother] asked me w hy and I wouldn’t tell her.” The de fendant objected to this statement. A benc h confe renc e wa s then had, that is not transcribed in the r ecor d. Following the benc h confe renc e, the State e licits the statement in question as testified to by H.F., “ She said oh [H.F.]. S he didn’t believe that he wa s a per vert.”

As noted above, the bench confe renc e conduc ted in the trial court has not been transcribed in the rec ord. The be nch conf ere nce is imperative to review of this issue. Wi thout the transcription of the be nch conf

ere nce, this Court does not have the ar g uments by both sides as to what the a ctual objectionable he arsay

statement wa s and what the trial court co n sidered in making its decision. Be cause it appear s to the Court that the rec ord on appe al is n o t ad equate to fac ilitate review , the defe ndant has waived this iss ue. See T enn. R. App. P. 24(b) (“ [T] he appe llant shall have pre pare d
a tra nscript of such part of the evidence or proce eding s as i s nece ssary to convey a fair, ac curate and

c o m p l e t e a c c o u n to f

w h a ttr a n s p i r e d w i t h r e s p e c tt o t h o s e i s s u e s t h a t ar e t h e b a s i s o f ap p e a l

. ” )

. In

a dd iti on , w he n a

re c or d is no t c omp le te a nd do e s no t c on ta in re le va nt i nf orma tio n, thi s Co urt mu st presume that the trial court wa s corr ect in its ruling

. See State v. Richar dson, 875 S .W .2d 671, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App.1993) ; State v. Cooper, 736 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tenn. Crim. App.1987) . Moreove r, it is difficult t o understand how the statement that H.F .’s mother did not believe that the def endant-16-

was a perve rt could have prejudice d the def endant since it calls i nto question H.F.’ s opinion of the de fe nd a nt.

There fore , we a ffirm the tria l court’s decision that the s tatement was not hearsay prese nted for the tr uth of the matter a sserted.

Evi de nc e of Ot he rSe xua l Offe nse s In vo lvi ng t he Vi c ti m

The de fendant next arg ues that the trial court err ed in admitting e vidence that another person ha d b e e n c on vic te d o f a

se xua l of fe ns e inv olv ing the a lle g e d vic tim in an un re la te d ca se . At tria l,
t h e d efendant aske d the victim whether she had stolen he r g randmother ’s ca r. The State obje cted to this question. A jury -out hea ring followed, and the defe ndant claimed that the issue of whe ther H.F. stole her gr andmother’ s car was relevant because it impacted the victim’s cr edibility . The trial
court a lso ruled at the sa me jury -out hea ring that the def

endant c ould ask H.F . about other stre sses g oing on in he r life that led to he r psy chiatric hospitaliz ation at Vande rbilt. The def ense que stioned H.F. a bout the theft of he r g randmother ’s ca r and othe r stresse s to prove that her hospitaliz ation was not solely related to the crime in question.

On re direc t examination, H.F. testified about a sex ual assault ag ainst her on the night of the
torna do , w hic h o c c ur

re d a ft e r the inc ide nts wi th the de fe nd a nt. She state d th a t D e te c tiv e Go od wi n also investigated the sexual assault that occ urre d on the nig ht of the tornado. The defenda nt did not object to this testimony . On re -cr oss, H.F. testified that the perpe trator wa s not the defe ndant.

During direc t examination of Detec t i v e Goodwin, the trial court allowe d an off er of proof

ou t of the he ari ng of

the jury . T he State pr op os e d asking De te c tiv e Go od wi n a bo ut the se xua l a ssa

ult

assertions made by

the victim ag ainst the third party . After much discussion, the defe ndant objecte d on both relevance and hear say g rounds. The tria l court over ruled the obje ction on the re levanc e g rounds and state d:

I –I r e j e c tt h e d e f

e n s e ’ s v i e w t h a ti t ’ s n o tr e l e v a n t , a n d h e r e ’ s w h y I think it’s relevant: I

t h i n kwhen y ou throw out, in a ca se like this, the fac t that somebody else – that – that she’s been a subject of another – sexual a ssault, there’ s
a lw a y s so me poss ibl e imp lic a tio n th a t sh e c ou ld b e a pe rs on wh o ma

ke s f a lse

a lle g a tio ns

. There fore , I think it’s fair g ame f or the State to show that ther e wa s substance to this, so the jury is not left with the impli cations that it was fa lse.

The trial court did sustain the hear say objection conce rning admissions by the third party that he perpe trated the sexual assault. On re- direc t examination, the State attempted to introduce Detec tive Goodwin’s testimony

conce rning his investigation of the sexual assault as we ll as a ce rtified copy of the third party ’s conviction for the sexual assault. The defenda nt objected ba sed upon improper

re dir e c t e xami natio n. Du ri ng a be nc h c on fe re nc e , th e tr ia l c ou rt tol d th e defend ant that he wo uld-17-

sustain his objection, but that the State could call a deputy cler k to testify and enter t he ce rtified copy into evidence . At this point , the def endant withdre w his obje ction and told the State to g o ahea d and

a s k D e t e c t i v e G o o d w i n ab o u tt h e c e r t i f i e d c o p y.

The de fendant now arg ues that this evidence should not have been admissible because the evidenc e wa s irrele vant under Rules 401 and 402 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidenc e, that it allowed the State to improperly bolster the cr edibilityof its own witness, and that it cre ated undue sy mpathy forH.F.

Ev ide nc e mus t be re le va nt and pr ob a tiv e to a n iss ue a t tria l in or de r t o b e a dmi ssi ble . St a te v. McCary , 922 S.W .2d 511, 515 (Tenn. 1996) ; see a lso Te nn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is releva nt if it ha s “any tendenc y to ma ke the exis tence of any fac t that is of c onsequenc e to the dete rmination of the a ction more proba

ble or less proba

ble than it would be without the evidenc e.” T enn. R. Evid. 40 1. Ho we ve r, re le va nt ev ide nc e ma y be e xclu de d at tria l if the pr ob a tiv e va lue of

that e vid e nc e “ is substan t i all y

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, c onfusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” Te nn. R. Evid. 403. The determination of rele vancy is le ft to the discretion of the trial court, a nd this Court will not overturn a t rial court's determination i n this reg ard in the absence of

a n a bu se of dis c re tio n. State v. Willi a mso n, 91 9 S.W. 2d69 , 7 8- 79 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ); State v. For bes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 449 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

The d efe ndant aske d H.F. a bout her psy chiatric hospitaliz ation and the thef t of her g randmother ’s ca

r which le d to her de tention at the J uvenile De tenti o n C en t er . I n the jury -out he ari ng , th e de fe nd a nt’ s a tto rn e y state d that the y wa nte d to bring ou t th e re a so ns H. F . e nd e d u p in
t h e h o s p i t a l a n d t h a t s h e w a s u n d e r m a n y s tr e s s e s

. T h e f a c t t h a t H

. F

. w a s s e x u a l l y a s s a u l t e d b y a third party shortly afte r her encounte r wit h the defendant, but befor e her hospitaliz ation, is without question an additional stressor that did most l ikely contribute to her

hospitaliz ation. The de fenda nt made this information re levant whe n he questioned H .F. about her hospitaliz ation. This evidence is not prejudicial to the def endant. It give s y et another rea son other than any

dealing s with the defe ndant for H .F.’ s hospitaliz ation.

We do not find any abuse of discretion in the decision of the trial court. The ref ore, w e af firm the trial court’s decision.

F ailure to De clare a Mistrial

The de fendant also claims that the trial court err ed by failing to de clar e a mistrial whe n the prosec utor, in direct violation of the tria l court’s p re t ri al ruling , elicited testimony from a police de te c tiv e that th e de fe nd a nt a dmi tte d to ha vin g c hil d po rn og ra ph y on his ho me c omp ute r. Pr ior to tr i a l t h e d e f

e n d a n tf i l e d a m o t i o n i n l i m i n e t o e xc l u d e a n y a n d a l l e v i d e n c e r e l a t e d t o t h e c o n t e nts of the de fendant’s home computer . The trial c ourt g rante d this mot ion.-18-

During the direc t examination of Detective G oodwin, the State asked him about the sear ch of the de fendant’s residenc e. Detec tive Goodwin t estified about his di scussion with the defe ndant when the de fendant arrived hom e. The following ex chang e occurre d during the direc t examination:

[S tate ]: Wh a t d idy o u a s k [t h e d e f e n d a n t] ? [W itness] : I

started out asking him about child pornogra phy pictures, a nd he ac knowledg ed that he did ha ve child pornog raphy pictures a nd t h at he did have some on his computer. An d I a sk e d him abo ut a – a wo rk c omp uter or hom e computer. He said he didn’t have any at work, his private collection wa s all at home. [C ourt]: Hold on. Ex cuse me

.

Approa ch the be nch plea se.

A benc h confe renc e wa s held out of the hearing of the jury

. The de fendant immediately objected and there was a

discussion conce rning t h e ac t u al p ar ameter s of the trial c ourt’s prior r uling. The trial court then he ld a jury -out hearing. During this hearing, the trial court made clea r its ruling that there

wa s to be no me nti on of

the c hil d p orno g ra

ph y c on ta ine d in the de fe nd a nt ’s com pu te r. Th e State continued with i t s d i re ct examination of Detec tive Goodwin. The de fendant did not ask for a mis tr ia l or a c ur a tiv e ins truc tio n. I n Sta te v. Jone s, 73 3 S.W. 2d 51 7 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ), thi s court stated:

The de cision whether to gr ant a mistrial is within the di s cretion of the trial court whose decis i o n wi l l not be disturbed on appe al unless there was a n abuse of th at discretion. State v. Ha ll, 667 S.W .2d 507, 510 (Tenn. Cr. A pp. 1983). Ge ne ra lly , a

mis tr ia l w ill be de c lare d a ndthe jury dis c ha rg e d in a c ri min a l c a se on ly if there is “manifest ne cessity ” re quiring such ac tion by the trial judg e. Ar n o l d v. State, 563 S.W .2d 792, 794 (Tenn. Cr. A pp. 1977).

. . . . Th e app e lla nt h a s th e re sp on si bil ity to p re se nt t o th e app e llate c ou rt s a tr a n s c r i p to f

“ s u c h p art o f

t h e e v i d e n c e o r

p r o c e e d i n g s a s i s n e c e s s ar y t o c o n v e y a fair, a ccur ate a nd complete a ccount of what tra nspired with re s p ec t to those issues that are the ba se s of app e a l.” Rul e 24 (b ), T. R.A .P. I n that re g ard
, c ou ns e l m ust insure that objec tions are not made at side-ba r conf ere nces or

insist t hat the court

re po rt e r r e c or d s uc h c on fe re nc e s v e rb a tim . F urthe rm or e, c ou ns e l mu st n ot f a il t o take “whateve r ac tion was rea sonably available to preve nt or nullify the harmful

e ff e c t of a n e rr or .” Rul e 36 (a ), T. R.A .P.

733 S.W .2d at 522.

T h e d e f e n d a n tal s o p o i n t s t o an o t h erp i ec e o f t es t i m o n y wh er e t h e f

o l l o wi n g ex ch an ge
occur red:-19- [S tate]: And he admitted showing her photogr aphs, or on this colored

c op y of no te bo ok pa pe r a s y ou de sc ri be d, of

c hil dr e n th a t are nu de ; is that c or re c t? [Witne ss]: Th a t’ s c or

re c t. [Sta te ]: An d th is a ll t oo k p la c e at hi s r e sid e nc e , c or re c t? [ W i t n es s ] : The intervi ew t o o k p l ac e a tt h i s re s i d en ce

. T h e a ctual showing of this in the photogr aph, it took place in the Re vco Dr ug store in Donelson. [Sta te ]: An d h e a c kn ow le dg e d to y ou that he kn e w that ha vin g c hil d po rn og ra ph y wa s – wa s w ro ng , rig ht? [Witne ss]: Th a t’ s c or

re c t.

The de fendant specifica lly points to t he portions that ar e hig hlighted a bove. The defe ndant did not ob je c t to thi s te sti mon y

a t tria l, andon c e a g a in, didno t ask fo r a cu rativ e ins truc tio n o r a mis tr ia l. Howeve r, this testimonydoes not ref er to defenda nt’s computer at all, but rather to photogr aphs that he showe d H.F. It is our understandin g t h at t h e order limit ing r efe renc e to photog raphs f rom the defe nd ant ’s c om pu terdo es not p ro hib it t e sti mon y c on c e rn ing th e ph ot ograph s act ual lysh own to H.F. At the hea

ring on the motion in limine, the defense attorney specific ally stated t hat t he def ense w as only try ing to e x clude e vidence conce rning the contents of the defe ndant’s computer

.

F a ilu re to c on te mpo rane ou sly ob je c t, r e qu e st c ur a tiv e ins truc tio n o r mo ve fo r m ist ri a l is typically g rounds for w aiver

of an issue on a

ppeal, a bsent plain er ro r. S ee S t ate v. W alker , 910 S.W .2d 381, 386 (Tenn. 1995) ; State v. Rob i n son, 971 S.W .2d 30, 42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ; State v. Griff

is, 964 S.W .2d 577, 599 (Tenn. Crim. App.1977) ; State v. Seay
, 945 S.W .2d 755, 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) ; Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a); Te nn. R. Crim. P . 52(b).

I n order to review an issue under

the plain er

ror doc trine, five fac tors must be prese nt: (1) the

rec ord must clearly

establish what occurre d in the t rial court; (2) a clea r and une quivocal rule of law must have bee n brea ched; ( 3) a substantial rig ht of the def endant must have been a dverse ly aff ecte d; (4 ) the a c c us e d d id n ot w a ive the iss ue fo r tacti cal rea so ns ; a nd(5 ) c on sid e ratio n o f the e rr or is

ne c e ssa ry to d o s ub sta nti a l ju sti c e . St a te v. Smith, 24 S.W. 3d27 4, 28 2- 83 (T e nn

. 20 00 ) (c iti ng Sta te v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1994)); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

For a “substantial right” of the a ccuse d to have been affe cted, the err or m ust have pre judiced the de fe nd a nt. I n o the r w or ds , it mus t ha ve a ff

e c te d th e ou tc ome of th e tr ia l c ou rt pr oc e e din g s. Un ite d St a te s v . O la no , 5 07 U. S. 7 25 , 7 32 -3 7 ( 19 93 ) ( a na ly zing the su bs ta nti a lly sim ila r F e d. R. Crim. P. 52(b)); Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642. Thi s is the s ame type of inquiry as the ha rmless err or analy sis under Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b) , but the appellant be ars the bur den of persua sion with respec t to plain error

claims. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-37.

I n his brief, the defe ndant l ay s the burden on the t rial court to g ive a c urative instruc tion or decla re a mistrial without t he def

endant ha ving r equeste d such re medies. Ther efor e, h e d o es not-20-

arg ue, as such, this issue as plain err or. Howeve r, he does make an arg ument conce rni n g t he prejudicia l nature of

the testimony

in question.

The de fendant arg ues that the e vidence of his g uilt is “close ” and, the ref ore, the prejudicia l imp a c t of the state me nt is e ve n g re a te r. He a lso state s that the state me nt is pr e jud ic ia l be c a us e it i s evidenc e of another conviction. Howeve r, we view the statement diffe rently . I nitiallywe point out that De te c tiv e Go od wi n state d that the de fe nd a nt a dmi tte d he ha d c hil d p orno g ra ph y pic tur e s o n h is computer. The re w as no re fer ence as to the number of pictures. In actua lity , as st at ed i n other portions of the re cord not pre s ented to the jury , the number of pictures wa s very , very

high and

wo uldde fi nit e ly be pr e

jud ic ia l. Ho we ve r, the jur y didno t kn ow ho w m a ny

pic tur e s th e re a c tua lly

wer e on the de fendant’s computer. In addition, the fede ral c onviction for t h e p o s s es s i on of the pictures on the de fendant’s computer w as not mentioned in front of the jury

. And finally , the jury alr eadykn ew t hatth e def

end ant was in po ss ess io n of p orn ograph ic i mages of ch il dren becau se H .F. testified that the def

endant ha d shown h er p ornog raphic imag es of c hildren bef ore he took the photogr aphs of her. The ref ore, the defe ndant has not ca rried his burde n of proving prejudice so that it w ou ld a ff

e c t th e ou tc ome of

the tr ia l.

T h e r e f o r e , w e a f f i r m t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s a c t i o n s w i t h r e g ar d t o D e t e c t i v e G o o d w i n ’ s t e s t i m o n y.

Se nt e nc ing

The de fendant also appeals his sentence imposed by the trial court. At the conc lusion of the
sentenc ing h ea ri n g , the trial court sentence d the def endant to ele ven y ear s on his conviction for

e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vated sex ual expl oit a tio n o f a min or a nde le ve n mo nth s, tw e nty -n ine da y s o n h is conviction for f

alse imprisonment. He w as s en t en ce d as a Rang e I Standard Of

fende r. The trial

c ou rt fu rthe r o rd e re d th a t hi s se nte nc e s b e se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y to e a c h o the r, bu t c on secu ti vel yto t h e f ed er al s en t en ce t h ath e i s cu rr en t l y s er v i n g.

The de fendant arg ues that his sentenc e for espec ially

ag g rava ted sexual ex ploitation of a minor is ex cessive an d t h at his state sentenc es should not be run c onsecutively to his feder al

se nte nc e s.

“When re viewing sentenc ing issues . . . , the appellate court shall conduc t a de novo review on the re cord of

such issues. Such re view shall be c onducted with a pr esumption that the determinations made by

the court from which the a ppeal is take n are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). “Howe ver, the presumption of corr ectne ss w hich acc ompanies the trial court’s a ction is conditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord t h at t h e trial c ourt consider ed the
sentenc ing principles and a ll relevant facts a nd circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I n conducting our re view, we must consider the de fendant’s potential for reha bilitation, t h e trial a nd sentenc ing he aring evidenc e, the pr e-se ntence report, the sentenc ing principles, sente ncing alternative arg uments, the nature and cha rac ter of the offe nse, the e nhancing and mitigating fac tors, and the de fendant’s statements. Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 40-35-103( 5), -210( b);-21-

Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. We are to al s o recog nize that the defe ndant bea rs “the bur den of demonstrating that the sentenc e is improper.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

I n balanc ing the se conc erns, a trial court should start at the pre sumptive sentence , enhanc e the se nte nc e wi thi n th e rang e fo r e xistin g e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s, a ndthe n r e du c e the se nte nc e wi thi n the ra ng e for exis ting mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e). N o particula r we ight fo r e a c h f a c tor is p re sc ri be d b y

the statut e . Se e Sta te v. Sa nti a g o, 91 4 S. W.2 d 11 6, 12 5 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ). Th e we ig ht g ive n to e a c h f a c tor is l e ft to t he dis c re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt a s lon g a s it comports with the sentenc ing pri n ci p l es and purposes of our c ode and a s long a s its findings ar e supported by

the re cord. I d.

T h e t ri al co u r t p r o p e r l y

fo l l o we d t h e p ro ce d u re fo r i m p o s i n g a s en t en ce

. T h e t ri al j u d ge
ap p l i e d t h e e n h a n c i n g f

a c t o r s t h e n t h e m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s a n d c o n c l u d e d t h a tt h e d e f e n d a n tsh ou ld be se nte nc e d to e le ve n y e ars . E sp e c ia lly a g gravat e d s e xua l e xploi ta tio n o f a min or is a Cla ss B Fe lony which has a

sentenc ing r ang e of n o t l es s t h an eig ht nor more than twe lve y ear s. The trial court’s se ntence of ele ven y ear s is one y ear short of the maximum sentenc e. The trial court r elied upon three enhanc ement factors: (1) “The defe ndant has a previous history of criminal convictions

or criminal behavior in addition to those nece ssary to establish the appropriate rang e.” T enn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2); (2) “ The off ense involved a

victim and was c ommitt ed to g ratify the defe ndant’s desire for plea sure or excitement.” Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35

- 1 1 4 ( 8 ) ; (3) “T he def endant abused a position of public or private trust . . . .” T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(16)

.

L eng th of Sentence

B e c aus e the tr ia l c ou rt

fo llo we d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s, we mus t no w d e c ide w h e th e r the se enhanc ement fa ctors ar e supported by the re cord. F or the fir st e nhance ment fac tor, a pre vious history

o f c ri m i n al co n d u cto r c ri m i n al b eh av i o r , t h e r e i s am p l e s u p p o rt

. T h e d ef en d an twa s s er v i n g a fe de ra l se nte nc e at the tim e of his tr ia l a nd se nte nc ing

. Th e se c on d e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor , th e of

fe ns e
was c ommitt ed to g ratify

the def endant’ s desire f

or plea sure or excitement is also supported. The trial court state d:

I think this offe nse t he main offe nse here, could be commit ted i n a totally , kind of,
ste ri le c omm e rc ia l se tti ng in wh ic h that wo uld n’ t be the c a se

. B ut that’ s no t th e c a se here

. There was testimony
, which I cre dit, that the defe ndant mentioned to her about having sexual relations and the like, so it was obvious that the taking of the photogr aphs we re f

or his pleasure and excitem ent, as we ll as a potential, either g ratuitous or commer cial exploitation wit h the photog raph.

I n State v. Arne tt, 49 S.W .3d 250, 262 (Tenn. 2001), the Tenne ssee Supre me Court stated that the State must “provide additional objec tive evidenc e of the def endant’ s motivation t o seek ple asure or excitement” when apply ing this e nhance ment fac tor which can include “se x ually expli cit rema

rks

a ndov e rt se xua l di sp la y s ma de by the de fe nd a nt, su c h a s fo nd lin g or kis sin g a vic tim or oth e rw ise behaving in a sexual manner . . . .” H.F. te stified to an incident whe re the d ef en d an t s h o we d her-22-

po rn og ra ph ic ph oto g ra

ph s o f y ou ng c hil dr e n a nde ve n to ld h e r that he wa s in one of the ph oto g ra

ph s. Acc ording to H .F., the de fendant also asked H.F . if she had e ver ha d sexual relations with an older

ma n a ndbr a g g e d th a t he ha d h a d s e xua l r e la tio ns wi th a fi ft een -y e ar- oldg ir l. T he de fe nd a nt a lso

ma de se ve ra l se xua l c omm e nts to H .F . w hil e ru bb ing he r le g s and e ve n off e re d he r som e pil ls to h e lp her rela x

. This te stimony clea rly meets the require ments set out in Arne tt. There fo re , t h e r ecord supports the trial court’s application of this fa ctor.

The third factor, the defe ndant was in a posi tion of public or private trust is also supported by the re cord. The trial court stated, “that the defe ndant abused a position of private trust when he manipulated this situation to beco m e, s o rt o f, a defa cto probation officer . . . ‘Well, I

won’t bring formal c harg es but y ou report to me,’ then he took that position and e x ploited it as the proof in the

case shows.” The defe ndant relies upon State v. Kissinge r, 922 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1996), to support his positi on that this enhance ment fac tor does not apply . I n Kis s i n ger , o ur supre me court stated,

“ Th e de te rm inatio n o f the e xiste nc e of a po sit ion of trus t do e s n ot d e pe ndon the le ng th o r f orma lit y of the re lationship, but upon t he natur e of the relationship. Thus, t he court should look t o see whether the offe nder f

orm ally or informa lly

stood in a relationship to the victim that promoted confide nce, r eliability , or fa ith.” Kissinge r, 922 S.W .2d at 488. The trial c ourt’s cha rac terization

o f t h e relationship i s appropriate. The defe ndant put himself in the position of private trust when he spoke w ith H.F. and he r mother a nd promised not to press cha rg es if H.F . would come a nd do

wo rk fo r h im at th e ph arm a c y . H e ha d H. F

. pe ri od ic a lly c he c k in w ith him os te ns ibl y

fo r the pu rp os e of making sure she was staying out of trouble. He put himself in the position of a per son who takes an intere st in the mentoring or reha bilitation of a child. We find that the rec ord supports the trial court’s a pplication of this enhanc ement fa ctor.

As stated above , it is i n the trial court’ s discretion as to the we ight of eac h fac tor. Having found support for

the applicati o n o f ea ch enhanceme nt fac tor, we a ffirm the tria l court’s sente nce of ele ven y ear s for e specia lly ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor.

Consecutive Sentenc ing

At the se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt ma de the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s w ith regard to

co n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g:

I believe that consec utive sent encing is warr anted he re. I think this defe ndant has been c onvicted, if I

look at the prior Fe dera l c onvictions and this conviction here of two more off

enses involving sexual abuse of a minor. A n d
, I

think there is proof he re that th e vic tim re c e ive d men ta l dam a g e fr om this of fe ns e . A ndI

ho ld that th is

c hil d p orno g ra

ph y of fe ns e s, wh e the r the y

be F e deral o r S ta te inv olv e se xua l a bu se of a m in o r , a n d th e in te n t o f b o thth e Co n g r e s s o f

th e U n it e d St a te s a n d the Tenne ssee L eg islature in passing thes e l aw s wa s to stop sex ual abuse of a minor. And I
, t here fore , find that 40-35-115( 5) [sic] is present a nd that this eleven y ear
se nte nc e sh ou ld r

un c on se c uti ve to the F e de ra l c on vic tio ns

.-23-

T h e r e c o r d r e f

le c ts th a t th e d e f

e n d a n t w a s c o n v ic te d in f e d e r a l c o u r t f

o r p o ssession of material involvin g s ex u al ex p l o i t at i o n o f m i n o rs an d re ce i p to f m at er i al i n v o l v i n g s ex ual exploit ation of min or s. Ea c h of the se se nte nc e s we re fo r 51 mon ths wi th thr e e y e ars su pe rv isi on . Cl e arl y thi s fac t supports the trial court’s application of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-115(b)( 5) that the def endant ha s been c onvicted of two or more off enses i n v o l v i n g t he sexual abuse of a minor. I n addition, Rule 32(c) of t he Tennessee Rules of C riminal Procedur e states, “ [i ]f the defe ndant has additional sentenc es or portions thereof to serve, as the result of a conviction . . . in fede ral c ourt, the

se nte nc e imp os e d s ha ll b e c on se c uti ve the re to u nle ss the c ou rt sh a ll d e te rm ine in the e xer c ise of its discretio n t h at good cause exis ts to run the sentenc es conc urre ntly . . . .” We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s imposit ion of consec utive sentenc es. The evidenc e d o es n ot preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s finding s. There fore , we a ffirm the de fendant’s sentenc e.

CO NC LU SION

F or the abo ve re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.



### ___________________________________ JERR Y L. SMITH, JUDGE