[Cite as State v. Rucker, 2011-Ohio-5007.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

DEWITT RUCKER 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 25657 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR 2009-01-0047C 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 30, 2011 

 

 DICKINSON, Judge. 

INTRODUCTION 

{¶1} A jury convicted DeWitt Rucker of possession of crack cocaine, possession of 

cocaine, trafficking in cocaine, having weapons under disability, and possessing criminal tools. 

In addition, the judge who presided over his trial found him guilty of a minor misdemeanor 

charge of possession of marijuana. Mr. Rucker appealed, and this Court affirmed his 

convictions. He filed a petition for postconviction relief in the trial court 306 days after the 

transcript of proceedings was filed in his direct appeal. The trial court dismissed his petition as 

untimely. 

{¶2} Mr. Rucker has appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to review the transcript 

of proceedings before it dismissed his petition for postconviction relief and that the trial court 

incorrectly determined that he was not unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts 

underlying his petition. We affirm because the trial court was not required to review the trial 
2 

 

transcript and Mr. Rucker did not demonstrate that his petition was based on facts that could not 

have been discovered within the time period allowed for filing his petition. 

UNTIMELY PETITION 

{¶3} Mr. Rucker’s first assignment of error is that the trial court incorrectly failed to 

review the trial transcript before denying his petition as untimely. Specifically, Mr. Rucker has 

argued that Section 2953.21(C) of the Ohio Revised Code required the trial court to consider “all 

the files and records pertaining to the proceedings against the petitioner, including, but not 

limited to, the indictment, the court’s journal entries, the journalized records of the clerk of the 

court, and the court reporter’s transcript.” 

{¶4} The problem with Mr. Rucker’s argument is that he has taken Section 2953.21(C) 

of the Ohio Revised Code out of context. The language upon which Mr. Rucker relies describes 

what a trial court is required to consider when it decides whether there are substantive grounds 

for relief stated in a timely petition. Id. If a trial court decides that a petition is untimely and that 

there were no grounds for filing it late, the trial court does not have to make the determination 

described in Section 2953.21(C). In this case, the trial court decided that Mr. Rucker’s petition 

was untimely, so Section 2953.21(C) of the Ohio Revised Code did not apply. Mr. Rucker’s first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶5} His second assignment of error is that the trial court incorrectly determined that 

the evidence upon which his petition was based was either known at the time of trial or could 

have been discovered then. Under Section 2953.23(A)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code, a trial court 

cannot consider an untimely petition for postconviction relief unless the petitioner demonstrates 

“that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the 

petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or . . . the United States Supreme Court 
3 

 

recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s 

situation[.]” Mr. Rucker supported his petition with the affidavit of Marvin Shepard, a fellow 

inmate, and two affidavits from Everitt Whitfield, a witness who testified during his trial but who 

now claims that he lied. According to Mr. Rucker’s petition, he “was certainly unavoidably 

prevented from discovering” this fact, but he did not explain how he was unavoidably prevented 

from doing so until now. See generally State v. Cool, 9th Dist. No. 24518, 2009-Ohio-4333, at 

¶13. In fact, one of Mr. Whitfield’s affidavits is dated well within the time limit for filing a 

petition for postconviction relief. Mr. Rucker’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶6} Section 2953.21(C) of the Ohio Revised Code did not require the trial court to 

consider the trial transcripts before it decided whether Mr. Rucker had cause for filing an 

untimely petition for postconviction relief, and Mr. Rucker did not demonstrate how he was 

unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts supporting his petition. The judgment of the 

Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 
4 

 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 CLAIR E. DICKINSON 

 FOR THE COURT 

WHITMORE, P.J. 

MOORE, J. 

CONCUR

APPEARANCES:

NEIL P. AGARWAL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.