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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

SANDRA FOSTER and WILLIAM FOSTER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, UNPUBLISHED February 16, 2017

v No. 328283
Monroe Circuit Court M & H PARTY STORE, INC., LC No. 14-036470-NI

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: S TEPHENS , P.J., and S AAD and M ETER , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

In this premises liability ac tion, plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s order that granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(1 0). We affirm.

On October 13, 2012, plaintiff Sandra Foster patronized defend ant’s convenience store to purchase a bottle of wine. In images from defendant’s surveill ance camera, plaintiff can be seen walking through the parking lot to ward defendant’s store at 7:5 4:54 p.m. The sidewalk appeared to be damp and there were a number of puddles in the far side o f the parking lot. As Ms. Foster entered the store, there was a y ellow wet-floor sign a few feet from the door, which she passed on her left side. At the same time, defendant’s employee was m opping by the front door. At 7:55:05 p.m., plaintiff walked through the aisle in the back ofthe store and passed a second wetfloor sign on her left side. Ms. Foster entered the wine aisle at 7:55:11 p.m. and fell within 30 seconds, though her actual fall wa s not visible from any of the surveillance footage.

Plaintiff testified that she did not see any warning signs in defendant’s store before she
fell. She also recalled that bef ore she slipped, she was looki ng straight ahead and was not taking any special precautions out of con cern that the floors may be w et or slippery. H owever, after she fell, she discovered that the floor was wet and observed a smal l puddle of water near the side of the aisle. Ms. Foster acknowledged that the surveillance video showed her walking past two wet-floor signs but testified tha t “[t]hey weren’t there” and t hat “I did not see it.”

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant and alleged tha t Ms. Foster slipped on a liquid on the floor of defendant’s store, which plaintiffs asse rted was present because defendant’s employee had recently mopped the floor. Ms. Foster sought dama ges for the injuries she sustained in the fall based on theories of premises liability, “storekeeper’s liability,” and general negligence. Plaintiffs also a lleged that her husband, plaintif f William Foster, was entitled to damages for loss of consortium.-2- Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition and argued th at it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was no genuine issue of material fact that (1) defendant met its duty of care to warn when it placed wet-floor signs in the store and, alternatively, (2) the condition was open and obvious. The tri al court ruled that defendant satisfied its duty to warn invitees of the risk posed by the we t floor by the placement of the caution signs in strategic locations. The court also cited the open and obvious doctrine when it granted defendant’s moti on for summary disposition. 1

On appeal, plaintiffs raise thr ee issues that purportedly show that the court erred when it relied on the open and obvious doctrine. However, plaintiffs d o not specifically address the trial court’s primary ground for grantin g summary disposition: that defendant fulfilled its duty to protect invitees from unknown dangers when its signs warned cus tomers that the floors were wet. Because plaintiffs do not challenge this necessary ground , they are precluded from any relief on appeal. See City of Riverview v Sibley Limestone , 270 Mich App 627, 638; 716 NW2d 615 (2006) (“[A] party’s failure to brief an issue that necessa rily must be reached precludes appellate relief.”); Roberts & Son Contracting, Inc v N Oakland Development Corp , 163 Mich App 109, 113; 413 NW2d 744 (1987). Although not necessary for us to address, we nonetheless
find that the trial court did not err when it ruled that there is no question of fact that defendant fulfilled its duty to warn.

This Court reviews rulings on summary disposition motions de n ovo. Wilson v Alpena
Co Rd Comm , 474 Mich 161, 166; 713 NW2d 717 (2006). “Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding a ny material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” West v Gen Motors Corp , 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). “When deciding a motion for summary dispo sition under this rule, a court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, adm issions, and other documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties i n the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Bialick v Megan Mary, Inc , 286 Mich App 359, 362; 780 NW2d 599 (2009).

It is undisputed that Ms. Foster was an invitee of defendant’s business when she fell on October 13, 2012. As an invitee, defendant owed her a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect her against unreasonabl e risks of harm from potentially hazardous conditions on its
property. Hoffner v Lanctoe , 492 Mich 450, 460; 821 NW2d 88 (2012). A premises owner is liable for a breach of this duty when the owner “knows or shoul d know of a dangerous condition on the premises of which the invitee is unaware and fails to fi x the defect, guard against the defect, or warn the invitee of the defect .” Id . (emphasis added).

1 While the court acknowledged that the open and obvious doctrin e can bar a plaintiff from recovery in a premises liabi lity action, it noted how the wet floor signs were open and obvious—
not the hazard itself. Because the open and obvious doctrine relates to the obviousness of the
hazard , see Riddle v McLouth Steel Prod Corp , 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992); Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc , 429 Mich 495, 500; 418 NW2d 381 (1988); Slaughter v Blarney Castle Oil Co , 281 Mich App 474, 478; 760 NW2d 287 (2008), it is not clear t o what extent the court actually relie d on this doctrine when it grant ed summary disposition.-3- Here, as the trial court correctly noted, there were multiple wet-floor signs present and
Ms. Foster “almost had to walk a round” two of them while she wa s inside the store. Thus, we agree with the trial court that there is no question of fact th at defendant complied with its duty to warn invitees, such as plaintiff, of the wet-floor dangers pres ent in the store. Accordingly, the court properly grante d defendant’s motion for summary dispositi on.

Although plaintiffs do not address the adequacy of the signs r elated to whether defendant successfully discharged its duty to warn, we will address the a dequacy of the signs in this context. As an initial matter, plaintiffs cite no authority fo r the proposition that a warning must be directly visible from every location that presents a risk of injury. “An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to disc over and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” Kubicki v Mortgage Elec Registration Sys , 292 Mich App 287, 291; 807 NW2d 433 (2011). In any event, it was undisputed that the establishment was a small convenience store. Ms. Foster walked by two signs—one at the entrance to the store and one at the rear of the store—on her way to the wine aisle. Because it was wet outside from rain, which clearly could be brought into the store by patr ons, a reasonabl e person would not take such notice as a warning to only those two specific locati ons. Instead, one would view the warnings as applying to the entire store. Indeed, in addition to the two signs that Ms. Fo ster passed, there was at least one other wet-floor sign located elsewhere in the store, and the em ployee who was mopping was using a yellow mop bucket that a lso had a “wet floor” warning. Accordingly, we hold that it would be unreasonable to require a shop owner under these circu mstances to place wet-floor signs in every aisle. The several signs located throughout the small store complied with the weather conditions, and were mor e than adequate notice that wet conditions could exist anywhere in the store.

Because there was no issue of material fact with respect to wh ether defendant had fulfilled its duty to warn customers of any potential wet hazar ds (and because plaintiffs do not challenge this aspect of the trial court’s ruling), we need not address plaintiffs’ arguments related to whether the particular hazard here was open and obvious. 2

2 Of course, a premises owner owes no duty to protect or warn an invitee of dangers that are open
and obvious. Hoffner , 492 Mich at 460-461. The reason for this rule is that open a nd obvious dangers “by their nature, appris e an invitee of the potential h azard, which the invitee may then
take reasonable measures to avoid.” Id.

Plaintiffs also argue that there “should” be an independent du ty for storekeepers to provide reasonably safe aisles th at obviates the open and obvio us doctrine. But this suggestion has been rejected in binding precedent in Kennedy v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co , 274 Mich App 710; 737 NW2d 179 (2007). The case that plaintiffs rely on

, Quinto v Woodward Detroit

CVS , 305 Mich App 73; 850 NW2d 642 (2014), merely suggested a diff erent outcome than Kennedy , but it nonetheless acknowledged that Kennedy was controlling. Id. at 74-75. Notably,
this Court declined the Quinto panel’s request to convene a conflict panel. Accordingly, wer e-4- Affirmed. Defendant, as the pr evailing party, may tax costs p ursuant to MCR 7.219.

/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Patrick M. Meter

we inclined to agree with plaintiffs, which we do not, we would likewise be bound by Kennedy

. See MCR 7.215(J)(1).