### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J une 29 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1530 4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 3- 20 87 0 C V-UUB FRANCIS CARCAM O, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us MIAM I-DADE COUNTY, DOW NTOW N TOW ING COMPANY, D ef en da nts -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J un e 29, 200 4) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , H U L L a nd P RY O R, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Fr an ci s C ar cam o ( “ Appe llant” ) br ough t su it pur suant t o 42 U . S. C. § 19 83 ag ai nst , int er

a lia , Mi am i- D ad e Co unty ( “ Co unty ”) c la im ing tha t the Co untyParratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 101 S. Ct . 1908, 1916 (1981); Hudson v. 1 Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3203-04 (1984). 2 v i o l at ed h erp ro ce du ra l du e p ro ce s s ri g h t s . Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt g ra n t ed t h e C o u n t y’ s m ot io n t o d is m is s i n a th or ou gh op in io n app lying th e an al y si s s etou t i n M at he ws v . El d ri d g e, 4 2 4 U.S . 3 1 9 , 9 6 S. Ct . 8 9 3 (1 9 7 6 ); we ag re e w i t h t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s an al y sis , a nd a dopt

it s op ini on w hic h ha s be enpub lis he d in284 F . S upp. 2d 1 362 (S. D. Fla. 2003 ). A lth oughw e ad opt

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s op ini on, w e ad dr es s on e ar gum en t as se rte d b y

App el la nt whi ch was n ot sq ua rel y ad dr es se d b y

th e d is tri ctco ur t. Appe llant arg ue s th at

the Co unty

sho uld ha ve pr ovi de d apos t- de pr iva tio n adm ini str at ive he ar ing r athe r than apos t- de pr iva tio n to rt a ct ion , be ca

use the Countyacted pursuant to a policy or practice in im

poun ding her car. T he purported basis for her ar gum ent is an exception to the Par ratt-H udso n doctrine. 1 U nde r the P ar

ratt- H udso n do ctri ne , ar an dom a nd u nauth or iz ed

de pr iva tio n doe s no t vi ola te pr oc ed

ur al due pr oc es s if

the state pr ovi de s an a de qua te pos tde pr iva tio n r em edy . S ee Z ine rm on v . Burc h, 494 U . S. 113 , 132 , 110 S . Ct . 975 , 987 (1 990) . Appe llant arg ue s th at P ar ratt- H udso n do es not

appl y he re be ca

use the Co unty a ct ed pur suant t o a“ pol ic y

or pr ac tic e, ” an d th er ef

or e its a ct ion s w er e notAppellant see ks to take adva ntag e of what she a

rgues is an exception to the 2 doctrine, i.e . when the de privation results from a n “esta blished state policy .” In th e ins tant c a se , th e dis tr ic t c ourt no te d th a t App e lla

nt h a s n ot a lle g e d th a t a 3 he ari ngc ou ld o r s ho uld

have be e n h e ld b e fo re he r c ar w a s to we d o r b e fo re sh e pa id t he fe e s to ob ta in t he re tur n o f h e r v e hic le . 2 84 F . Su pp . 2 d at 13 65 n2 . N or

ha s a pp e lla nt a rgue d o the rw ise in this appeal. Rather , she has r epeatedly conce ded that pre -depr ivation proce ss was not require d. We also note that Appellant is mistaken to assume that the e x istence of a 4 g ov e rnme nt “ po lic y

or pr a c tic e ” ne c e ssa

ri ly ba rs the a pp lic a tio n o f P arr att- Hu ds on . Rathe r, po stdeprivation remedies may be ac cepta

ble eve n in contexts involving a state policy or proc edure . In Ritt enhouse v. D eKa lb County , 764 F.2d 1451 ( 11th Cir. 1985), we c oncluded that “ the rationale underlying the ‘established state proce dure’ exception is that where a deprivation occurs pursuant to an e stablished state proc edure , pre- deprivation process is ordinar ily fea sible.” I d. at 1455. Thus, the ac cepta

bility of post-depr ivation proce ss turns on the fea sibili ty of pre deprivation process, not the e x istence of a policy or pra ctice. Rittenhouse de monstrates how the case law as of

1985 establishes this proposition. S ubsequent c ase la w is consistent. See Z inermon, 494 U.S. at 132, 110 S. Ct. at 987 (“[T] he re asoningof Parr att and Hudson e mph a size s th e state ’s ina bil ity to p ro vid e pr e de pr ivatio n p ro c e ss[. ]”) ; se e a lso id. a t 12 8, 11 0 S. C t . at9 8 5 (“ P arra t tan d

Hu d s o nre p re s en ta s p ec i al ca s e o f t h e ge n er al M at h ew s v . E l dri d ge ana ly sis , in

wh ic h p os tde pr ivatio n to rt re me die s a

re a ll the pr oc e ss t

hat is du e , s imp ly

be c a us e they are the only

reme dies the state c ould be expected to provide .”). 3 random a nd u nauth or iz ed . S he c onc ed es tha t pr e- de pr iva tio n pr oc es s w as not 2 re qui re d he re , but

a rg ue s th at

the Co unty ’ s “pol ic y

or pr ac tic e” r equir es it

to 3 pr ovi de he r ana dm ini str at ive pos t- de pr iva tio n he ar ing r athe r than ator t a ct ion . Appe llant’ s arg um en t f

ai ls b ec au se P ar

ratt- H udso n c onc er

ns w he the r post de pr iva tio n r em ed ie s are a cc ep ta ble , not w he the r a pa rt ic ular ty

pe of pos tde pr iva tio n pr oc es s is a de qua te . S he of fe rs no r ea son w hy

astate ’ s po st- 4 de pr iva tio n j udi ci al pr oc ee din g sa tis fi es due pr oc es s innum er ous ca se s c om pr isi ngIn th os e c a se s, a s in thi s c a se , a

po st- de pr ivatio n a dmi nis tr a tiv e he ari ngpr ob a bly 5 was possible. 4 the P ar ratt- H udso n pr oge ny , but doe s no t i n th e ins tant c as e. N or c anw e fatho m 5 any such reason, e specially

in ligh t of the fac t that the private interest at stake here is so lacking in weight, i. e. , the purely m onetary

interest in the use of $208 .20 for a brief per iod of tim e. W e note that, as par t of the Par

ratt-H udso n progeny , this court has held that a judicial post-deprivation cause of action satisfies due process when the pr iva te int er es t i nvol ve d w as m uc h w ei ght ie r. S ee Mc K inn ey v. P at e, 20 F . 3d 1550 , 156 5 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) ( enbanc ) (i nvol vin g pl ai nti ff ’ s in te re st i n em plo ym en t) ; L ind se y

v. S tor ey , 936 F . 2d 5 54, 561 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) ( inv olv ing retention of plaintiff’ s autom obile itself, not just re tention of roughly $200 for a brief tim e). Wha t Appe llant s ee m s to w an t i s af re e tic ke t t o f

ed er al c ourt, r idi ng o n th e back of her “ established st ate policy ” theory , w ithou t apply ing th e w ell-established Ma the w s v. E ldr idg e thr ee -f ac tor a na ly sis . H ow ev er , the S upr em e Co urt ha s m ad e it clear that procedural due process cases, includin g thos e in which the plaintiff se ek s to a voi d th e Parr at t- H udso n do ctri ne on the ba sis of a n e sta bli she d st at e pol ic y or pr ac tic e, a re gov er

ne d by the thr ee -f

ac tor a na ly sis se t ou t i n M athe w s v. E ldr idg e. S ee Z ine rm on, 494 U . S. a t 12 7- 39, 110 S . Ct . a t 98 4- 90. T hus, the5

dis tr ic t c ourt c or

re ct ly a na ly ze d th is c as e by

e m plo y ing the Ma the w s v. E ldr idg e an al y sis . A s in dic at ed

above , w e ag re e w itha nd a dopt the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s ana ly sis . A cc or din gly , the j udgm en t of the dis tr ic t c ourt i s AFFIR MED.