No. 88-219 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE? OF MONTANA 

1988 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

VICKIE LYNN LARSON, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

LONNIE EINAR LARSON, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, 

The Honorable Thomas Honzel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appell-ant: 

Lonnie E. Larson, pro se, Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Dowling Law Firm; Thomas F. Dowl-ing, Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Aug. 26, 1988 

Decided: October 31, 1988 

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Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Lonnie Einar Larson, acting without counsel, appeals 

from the judgment of marital dissolution, property 

settlement, and child support entered by the District Court, 

First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, in the 

dissolution of his marriage from Vickie Lynn Larson. We 

affirm the District Court judgment on all counts and remand 

the case to the District Court for determination of proper 

attorney fees to be awarded respondent on appeal. 

Lonnie and Vickie Larson were married on November 10, 

1983. No children were born of the marriage but Vickie is 

the mother of a girl who will be 16 years old on December 26, 

1988. During the course of the marriage, Lonnie adopted the 

girl on March 15, 1984. 

The decree of marital dissolution was entered on January 

26, 1988. The District Court divided the marital property 

and ordered Lonnie to pay Vickie $185 per month as child 

support for the minor girl, to terminate when she reaches the 

age of 18, marries, or is otherwise emancipated. Husband was 

awarded reasonable rights of visitation, and wife was awarded 

sole custody. 

In this case, husband has discharged two attorneys 

during the course of the civil action, and on appeal, 

represents himself. His objections on appeal against the 

judgment are not well articulated. His brief does not 

include a statement of the issues for review, as required by 

Rule 23(a)(2), M.R.App.Civ.P. Because he is without counsel, 

we are not insisting on the formal clarity ordinarily 

reserved for briefs filed by lawyers. In our examination of 

his contentions, we find him objecting principally to the 
division of the marital estate, and to the award of child 

support. 

We look first at the marital property division. The 

District Court awarded the wife the following: 

(a) A 1986 Honda Accord 

(b) Her public employment retirement system benefits, 

her deferred compensation ($918) and an IRA account 

($2,000) 

(c) All personal property presently in her possession 

with the exception of the Ashley wall unit, 2 brass endtables and two lamps 

The District Court award of marital property to the 

husband included: 

(a) " A 1985 Honda Prelude 

(b) His public employment retirement system benefits, 

his deferred compensation (not spelled out in the 

findings, but from the transcript, in excess of $5,000) 

and his IRA'S ($4,000) 

(c) Personal property presently in his possession plus 

the Ashley wall unit, 2 brass end-tables and two lamps 

The court provided each of the parties would be 

responsible for debts incurred by him or her after the date 

of separation. Husband was charged with paying the balance 

owing on the Mastercard bill (not specified) and the loan at 

the State Capital Employees Credit Union. 

In his brief, husband argues that he brought into the 

marriage assets of $52,118.75 or 97% as compared with the 

wife's $1,025.00 or 3% of the marital assets. During the 

course of their marriage, they bought a home and sold it and 

applied the profits to pay outstanding bills and to pay for 

the two automobiles. Husband also had other property which 

was sold during the marriage. Some of the personal property 

apparently had been used by him for business purposes. 
Husband's brief does not suggest in what way the 

division of the property by the District Court should be 

revised or modified by us. From the modest amount of 

personal property divided and the apparent effort of the 

District Court to make certain that each of the parties had 

an automobile, the retirement benefits owned by each through 

their employments, and their own personal property, one can 

find little or no basis to state that the District Court 

abused its discretion in dividing the personal property, 

regardless of which party brought the greater amount of 

property into the marriage. In Brown v. Brown (1978), 179 

Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361, we stated that the standard for 

reviewing a property division in a marital dissolution decree 

is that the apportionment made will stand unless there has 

been a clear abuse of discretion as manifested by a 

substantially inequitable division of the marital assets 

resulting in substantial injustice. We have followed that 

standard fairly consistently. Applying that standard of 

review to this case, we find a complete lack of any reason to 

reverse or modify the District Court's division of the 

marital property. 

With regard to child support, the District Court 

determined that the husband should pay the wife $185 per 

month as child support for the minor girl. Husband ' s 

principal objection to the payment of the child support seems 

to be that the wife induced him to adopt the minor child, 

knowing that she would eventually seek a divorce from him. 

In this way, husband implies he was "fraudulently" led into a 

support duty for the minor child. Nothing in the transcript 

supports this innuendo. Under § 40-8-125, MCA, after a final 

decree of adoption is entered, the relation of parent and 

child, and all the rights, duties and other legal 

consequences of the natural relation of child and parent 
exists between the adopted child and the adoptive parent. A 

marital dissolution action is no place for a collateral 

attack upon an adoption. 

When a final child support award is attacked on appeal, 

the standard of review is whether an abuse of discretion has 

occurred which results in substantial injustice. Brown v. 

Brown, supra; In Re Marriage of Benner (1985) , 711 P. 2d 802, 

42 St.Rep. 1943. 

The task of the District Court in this case to determine 

the amount of the husband's net income available for child 

support was made difficult by the deductions that the husband 

took for deferred compensation and a credit union. The court 

noted, for example, that his pay slip for the two-week pay 

period, ending November 20, 1987, showed a net income for 

that period of only $135.76, and a year-to-date income of 

$2,382.14. Yet his year-to-date gross income for that period 

was $14,559.00 and his gross income for the two-week period 

was $614.00. It appears that husband had deducted a 

considerable amount for deferred compensation and the credit 

union. He also had extra money withheld for his taxes. The 

court found that the amount of his paycheck was misleading in 

helping in any determination of net income available for 

child support. The court did take into consideration various 

factors and determined that husband had available for 

purposes of child support an income of $865.00 per month from 

his employment from the State of Montana. He had in addition 

a monthly income of $395.00 from a corporate liquidation, 

which will run far beyond the period of his child support 

payments. 

Wife, on the other hand, is an employee of the State of 

Montana, who has a net annual income for child support 

purposes of $10,459.00. Her take-home pay is $402.30 for 

each two-week pay period. In addition, she has done 
part-time work as a hostess at a local restaurant, and had. 

some minor income for modeling. 

The evidence shows the child's support needs amounted to 

$300.00 per month, of which husband was ordered to pay 

$185.00 or 61.7 percent. In view of their available incomes 

for child support purposes, the amount awarded by the court 

is well within the child support guidelines promulgated by 

this Court for such cases, effective January 13, 1986 (cause 

no. 86-223). We find no abuse of discretion in the amount of 

child support awarded. 

Husband further claims that in this case he is entitled 

to attorney fees of $2,000.00. Our determination is that 

attorney fees should be awarded the other way, in favor of 

wife. Husband's appeal is obviously trifling, without 

substantial basis, and perhaps mean-spirited. We are 

satisfied from the record and the presentation of the appeal 

in this civil case that the same was taken without 

substantial or reasonable grounds, and merits an award of 

damages under Rule 32, to the other party, in the form of her 

counsel fees incurred in this appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and decree of the 

District Court, and remand this cause to the District Court 

for the further purpose of determining proper attorney fees 

on appeal to be awarded to Vickie Lynn I,arson, in addition to 

her ordinary costs of appeal.