J-S73045-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.K., A 

MINOR CHILD

APPEAL OF: K.K., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 850 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 17, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-63-DP-0000174-2015

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and JENKINS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2016

K.K. (“Mother”) appeals the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Washington County, Orphans’ Court, entered May 17, 2016, that granted the 

petition filed by Washington County Children and Youth Social Services 

Agency (“CYS”) to terminate her parental rights to her child, K.K. (“Child”) 

(born in September of 2015), and to change Child’s permanency goal to 

adoption.1 We affirm.

The trial court related the factual and procedural history as follows:

[Child] was born opiate dependent [in September of 

2015]. [M]other received no prenatal care. [Child] at birth 

experienced severe withdrawal symptoms and remained in the 

hospital until October 8, 2015 and she was then transferred to 

another facility until November 24, 2015, when she was 

 

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, A.H 

(“Father”). Father did not appeal that termination.
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discharged and placed in a pre-adoptive foster home, where she 

has remained.

Shortly after [Child]’s birth, CYS filed a dependency 

petition. On October 6, 2015, the [j]uvenile [c]ourt found that 

[Child] was dependent; the dependency [c]ourt also found that 

an aggravated circumstance was present and relieved CYS of 

any efforts to reunify [C]hild and her parents. At the 

dependency hearing, because no reunification efforts or services 

were required, no visitation between the parents and [C]hild was 

ordered. The dependency order and findings were not appealed. 

The aggravated circumstance found by the dependency [c]ourt 

was based on the fact that both Mother and Father had their 

parental rights involuntarily terminated as to other children on 

June 24, 2015 by [the trial court]. [M]other and Father 

appealed that termination order and the Superior Court affirmed 

the termination in a non-precedential decision dated February 

12, 2016.

At the termination hearing on March 29, 2016,[2][M]other 

testified that she was in a methadone treatment program and 

compliant, worked full-time and recently moved in with her 

parents. The [trial court] found that [M]other’s testimony that 

she was living with her parents was not credible; Mother had 

testified at a previous hearing regarding her older children 

before [the trial court] in May 2015 that she had moved to her 

parents’ home, but at [Child]’s birth, a few months later, in 

September of 2015, she was residing with Father and not with 

her parents. [M]other was drug tested regularly since [Child]’s 

birth; the last positive drug test was in December 2015.

The CYS caseworker, Andrew Albright, testified that the 

home the parents occupied and where [M]other was present in 

October 2015 had broken windows, garbage strewn throughout 

and was not appropriate. After [C]hild’s birth, [M]other was 

released from the hospital on September 21, 2015 and did not 

contact [C]hild or [the] hospital for several days. She came for 

a visit with [C]hild a few days later and visited thereafter every 

few days. After the dependency hearing on October 6, 2015, 

[M]other’s visitation was required to be supervised by an 

approved family member. Initially, paternal grandfather and his 

 

2 On January 8, 2016, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Child.
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wife accompanied Mother to the visits, but they then moved to 

Florida and were unavailable. Visitation with Mother then ceased 

in November 2015.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/16, at 1-3.

On May 17, 2016, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to 

Child pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the Adoption Act. Mother 

filed a notice of appeal on June 13, 2016, along with a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 

Mother raises three issues on appeal:

1. Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in analyzing and applying 

aggravated circumstances in considering the request to 

terminate [Mother]’s parental rights?

2. Whether the evidence supported a finding that [Mother] 

could not and would not remedy the causes for placement 

of [C]hild?

3. Whether the evidence supported a termination of 

[Mother]’s parental rights pursuant to 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 4.

We review an appeal from the termination of parental rights in 

accordance with the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., [] 9 A.3d 1179, 

1190 ([Pa.]2010). If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an 

error of law or abused its discretion. Id. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because 

the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 
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Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, [] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 ([Pa.]1994). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa.2012) (some internal 

citations omitted).

As the petitioner, DHS carries the burden to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of 

parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273 (Pa.Super.2009). 

Moreover: 

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

Id. at 276 (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super.2003)). 

This Court may affirm a trial court’s decision regarding the termination of 
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parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc). 

Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under 

Subsection (a)(2), which provides as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

We have stated:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super.2003) (citations 

omitted).

Mother’s first and second arguments challenge the trial court’s 

determination that CYS sustained its burden of proving that her parental 
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rights to Child should be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). In her 

brief, Mother argues that the trial court erred in applying aggravated 

circumstances in considering the request to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. Mother’s Brief at 9. Mother also contends that the trial court erred in 

finding by clear and convincing evidence that the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect, refusal cannot or will not be remedied by Mother.3Id. at 

16. Mother additionally claims that termination requires “a significant time 

period to be considered.” Id. at 14. 

This Court has determined that, “unlike Sections (a)(1), (5), and (8), 

Section 2511(a)(2) does not provide a statutory time constraint on 

termination. Rather, Section 2511(a)(2) addresses situations where 

remedial aid by an agency is not required, i.e. when there is a finding of 

aggravated circumstances[.]” In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 481–82 

(Pa.Super.2010). 

Here, Mother’s inability to parent Child predates Child’s birth. Courts 

have previously terminated Mother’s parental rights to her other three 

children. Further, the scope of CYS’s involvement with the family indicates 

that Mother has been and remains unable or unwilling to remedy the 

conditions that led to Child’s placement. Moreover, the trial court found that 

the circumstances have not changed significantly:

 

3 Mother does not contest the first and second prong of the test set forth in 

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. 
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[M]other’s last positive drug test was in December of 2015 and 

both parents are only in the beginnings of long-term drug 

treatment. Simply, with the involuntary termination of parental 

rights, the parents have already been declared as unfit and they 

are not afforded another opportunity with a new baby absent 

extraordinary circumstances.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/16, at 3. In light of the aggravating circumstances

of the case – the prior termination of Mother’s rights to her three other 

children, coupled with Mother’s long history of drug use and lack of 

consistency in drug treatment – we find the trial court properly terminated

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

Finally, we address Mother’s last issue. Therein, Mother argues that 

the trial court erred in finding that Mother’s parental rights should be 

terminated under Section 2511(b). Mother’s Brief at 10. 

Following a determination that the requirements of Section 2511(a) 

have been satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of 

Section 2511(b) have been satisfied. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 

999, 1009 (Pa.Super.2008) (en banc). The focus in terminating parental 

rights under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under Section 2511(b), 

the focus is on the child. Id. at 1008.

Section (b) provides as follows:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 
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filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6), or (8), the court shall 

not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). In reviewing evidence offered in support of 

termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child 

have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 

791 (Pa.Super.2012). In In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 485, this 

Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between 

the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa.2013). Moreover, we have observed 

that no bond worth preserving is formed between a child and a natural 

parent where the child has been in foster care for most of the child’s life, 

and the resulting bond with the natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa.Super.2008). 

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super.2010). 

Further, while Mother may love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love and 

affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. 

Id. at 1121. As we stated in In re Z.P., a child’s life “simply cannot be put 

on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the 
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responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic 

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon 

the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have 

proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 

(Pa.Super.2004).

The trial court found that CYS proved, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that termination best served the needs and welfare of [C]hild. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/16, at 7. Specifically, the trial court found “no bond 

existed between [C]hild and [M]other as she has never lived with her Mother 

and has only been in physical contact with her Mother a handful of times.” 

Id. Moreover, the trial court found “no detrimental effects would occur as to 

[C]hild if the parental rights were terminated.” Id. The guardian ad litem 

strongly supported termination of Mother’s parental rights. N.T., 3/29/16, 

143-44. Furthermore, the guardian ad litem found that there was no bond 

between Mother and Child, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

would not have any negative effect on Child. N.T., 3/29/16, at 20.

As part of its bonding analysis, the trial court appropriately examined 

Child’s relationship with Mother and her caregivers. See In re T.S.M., 71 

A.3d at 267–268 (stating that existence of a bond attachment of a child to a 

parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition, and 

the court must consider whether the child has a bond with the foster 
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parents). Specifically, the trial court found “[C]hild is in a pre-adoptive 

home where she has been since being released from the hospital and is 

bonded and thriving with them.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/16, at 7.

The record reveals that Mother’s inability to care for Child was due to 

her inability and unwillingness to manage her own drug addiction. Mother 

failed to “exhibit [the] bilateral relationship which emanates from the 

parent[’s] willingness to learn appropriate parenting . . . .” In re K.K.R.S., 

958 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa.Super.2008). Because competent evidence exists in 

the record to support the trial court’s credibility and weight assessments 

regarding Child’s needs and welfare and the absence of any bond with 

Mother, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

that Mother’s appeal as to Section 2511(b) lacks merit. See In re

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826–827. Accordingly, we affirm the decree 

terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/15/2016