United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-3422

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ceneca Romale Johnson, also known as Ceneca Ronele Johnson

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport

____________

 Submitted: June 17, 2014

Filed: June 20, 2014

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Ceneca Johnson appeals the sentence that the district court imposed on him

1

after he pleaded guilty to bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). 

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern 1

District of Iowa.
Johnson’s counsel has moved to withdraw, and in a brief filed under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), counsel argues that the court abused its discretion

by denying Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, by imposing an

unreasonable sentence, and by imposing a condition of supervised release requiring

Johnson to submit to warrantlesssearches. Johnson joinsin some of these arguments

in his pro se brief, and adds arguments that he suffered prosecutorial misconduct and

violations of double jeopardy, and the court miscalculated his Guidelines range. He

moves for new counsel.

The foregoing arguments fail. First, the court did not abuse its discretion by

denying Johnson’s motion, filed before sentencing, to withdraw his guilty plea. We

agree with the court that Johnson failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he

had a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B);

United States v. Yell, 18 F.3d 581, 582 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review); United

States v. Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 806-07 (8th Cir. 2000). Johnson’s valid guilty plea

forecloses any challenge in this appeal to pre-plea, non-jurisdictional issues, and we

conclude that any surviving claims regarding prosecutorial misconduct and double

jeopardy are meritless and do not require discussion. See United States v. Broce, 488

U.S. 563, 569, 575 (1989); United States v. White, 724 F.2d 714, 716-17 (8th Cir.

1984) (per curiam).

As to Johnson’s sentence, see United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461

(8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (appellate review of sentences), the district court properly

determined that Johnson was a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a); United

States v. Clarke, 564 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2009) (de novo review), and did not

impose an unreasonable sentence by varying upward after providing multiple reasons

for doing so based on specified sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), see United

States v. White Twin, 682 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mangum,

625 F.3d 466, 470 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gatewood, 438 F.3d 894, 896 (8th

Cir. 2006). The court also did not abuse its discretion by imposing the special

-2-
supervised-release condition, in light of Johnson’s criminal history. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(1)-(3); United States v. Simons, 614 F.3d 475, 478-79 (8th Cir. 2010)

(standard of review).

Having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75

(1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we deny Johnson’s

pro se motion for new counsel, and we affirm. We also grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw, subject to counsel informing Johnson about procedures for seeking

rehearing or filing a petition for certiorari.

______________________________

-3-