1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value.

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

** The Honorable Alan M. Ahart, Bankruptcy Judge for the

Central District of California, sitting by designation.

1

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. AZ-12-1544-TaAhJu

)

BRETT GORDON PEKRUL, ) Bk. No. 11-22774-GBN

)

Debtor. )

______________________________)

)

WEIMAR INVESTMENTS, INC., )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) MEMORANDUM*

)

FIRST FINANCIAL BANK, N.A., )

)

Appellee. ) )

Argued and Submitted on June 21, 2013 

at Phoenix, Arizona

Filed - July 22, 2013

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the District of Arizona

Honorable George B. Nielsen, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 

Appearances: Robert P. Bettinger argued for appellant Weimar

Investments, Inc.; Andrew V. Hardenbrook of Snell

& Wilmer LLP argued for appellee First Financial

Bank, N.A. 

Before: TAYLOR, AHART,** and JURY, Bankruptcy Judges.

FILED

JUL 22 2013

SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. 

“Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, and “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.

2

INTRODUCTION1

The bankruptcy court granted a motion brought by First

Financial Bank, N.A. (“First Financial”) and held Weimar

Investments, Inc. (“Weimar”) in civil contempt. The bankruptcy

court subsequently denied Weimar’s motion for reconsideration of

the contempt order and then awarded attorneys’ fees to First

Financial. Weimar appeals from the contempt order, the denial of

its motion for reconsideration, and the award of attorneys’ fees. 

We AFFIRM.

FACTS

Pre-Bankruptcy

In 2005, two borrowers obtained a loan from First

Financial's predecessor-in-interest. A deed of trust (the “Deed

of Trust”) with respect to real property located in Las Vegas,

Nevada (the “Property”) secured their obligations. The borrowers

eventually defaulted, and a trustee's sale was scheduled. 

The Hammer Bankruptcy

Weimar apparently was in the foreclosure avoidance business.

Just two weeks prior to the scheduled trustee's sale, Weimar

recorded a Grant Deed that transferred a 1% interest in the

Property from a borrower to John W. Hammer (“Hammer”), a

chapter 13 debtor. Hammer, thereafter, added his newly acquired

“1/100th” interest in the Property to his Schedule A, and Weimar

then contacted the trustee under the Deed of Trust, advised of
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Over the next five months, the Debtor amended his

Schedule A approximately 12 times. Each time, he added

additional real property based on an "undivided 1/100th" interest

therein.

3

the transfer and Hammer’s bankruptcy, and requested cancellation

of the foreclosure sale. First Financial immediately sought and

obtained relief from the automatic stay in Hammer's bankruptcy

case. A trustee’s sale was re-scheduled for the following month.

Debtor's Chapter 13 Bankruptcy

On August 9, 2011, Brett Gordon Pekrul (“Debtor”) filed a

skeletal chapter 13 petition. On October 18, 2011, Weimar

recorded a Grant Deed transferring a 1% interest in the Property

to Debtor,2 who thereafter added the “1/100th” interest in the

Property to his Schedule A. Once again, Weimar contacted the

trustee under the Deed of Trust and requested cancellation of the

trustee's sale. And, once again, First Financial sought and

obtained emergency stay relief.

Rule 2004 Orders and Subpoena

As a result of Weimar’s involvement in the Debtor's

bankruptcy case, First Financial sought and obtained an order

allowing a Rule 2004 examination of Weimar and requiring the

production of documents pursuant to Rule 2004 from Weimar

(“Rule 2004 Order”). The Rule 2004 Order established

December 23, 2011, as the deadline for Weimar to produce the

requested documents. First Financial's attorney subsequently

served Weimar with a subpoena based on the Rule 2004 Order

(“Subpoena”). 

At Weimar's request, First Financial informally extended the
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

deadline to produce the requested documents to January 6, 2012

and then to January 13, 2012. On January 23, 2012, ten days

after the second extension date, Weimar finally produced more

than 600 pages of documents to First Financial. After review,

however, First Financial deemed the production incomplete and so

advised Weimar. Weimar then requested a further extension of the

production deadline; First Financial agreed. 

In connection with this extension, the parties formally

stipulated to an extension of the deadline and obtained a

bankruptcy court order approving their agreements (“Stipulation

Order” and, jointly with the Rule 2004 Order, “Orders”). The

Stipulation Order extended the deadline for production to

February 2, 2012. It further approved Weimar’s agreed submission

to bankruptcy court jurisdiction and waiver of any objection to

the Rule 2004 Order or Subpoena. Once again, however, Weimar

failed to produce documents as required by the Stipulation Order. 

At the subsequent Rule 2004 examination, First Financial

agreed yet again to extend the document production deadline. But

again, Weimar did not produce any additional documents. 

 In the background of these production issues, Weimar and

its President, Michael Kaplan (“Kaplan”), were the subjects of a

search and seizure warrant for premises in Tempe, Arizona. While

this was a distraction, the issues arose only after Weimar’s

initial non-compliance.

Contempt Order

Eventually, First Financial moved for an order: (1) holding

Weimar in contempt of court; (2) compelling the production of

documents; (3) imposing a per diem fine for its noncompliance;
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

and (4) awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs (the

“Contempt Motion”).

At an initial hearing, Weimar's counsel insisted that

Kaplan, as Weimar's sole or principal shareholder, be allowed to

personally appear and defend and explained that Kaplan’s recent

brain tumor diagnosis prevented an appearance at the current

hearing. He also discussed the ongoing criminal investigation

and asserted that Weimar/Kaplan had the right to assert their

respective Fifth Amendment rights. As a result of problems with

telephone reception for parties appearing telephonically, the

bankruptcy court continued the hearing. 

At the continued hearing, Weimar raised a new argument,

alleging collusion between First Financial and law enforcement

agencies; it requested an evidentiary hearing. Weimar further

expanded on its Fifth Amendment privilege argument, asserting

that it applied because the information sought by First Financial

was personal in nature to Kaplan, rather than confined to

corporate documents. First Financial argued against these points

and, in particular, denied collusion with law enforcement

agencies.

At the conclusion of oral argument, the bankruptcy court

rejected Weimar's assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege based on

Weimar’s waiver of any objections to the Rule 2004 Order pursuant

to the Stipulation Order and a determination that a corporate

entity was not entitled to assert that privilege. The bankruptcy

court also emphasized that the pending criminal investigation did

not automatically stay discovery proceedings in a bankruptcy

case. Thus, the bankruptcy court determined that Weimar
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

expressly violated the Rule 2004 Order, the Stipulation Order,

and the Subpoena. It also required Weimar to produce the

remaining requested documents by May 18, 2012, and continued the

hearing on the Contempt Motion for status. On May 11, 2012, the

bankruptcy court entered an order granting the Contempt Motion

(“Contempt Order”). 

During this time, the bankruptcy court also dismissed with

prejudice and closed the Debtor’s bankruptcy case. But it

specifically retained jurisdiction over the Contempt Motion and

related matters.

Motion to Reconsider

On the eve of a continued status hearing, Weimar filed a

motion for reconsideration (“Motion to Reconsider”), which it

supported with Kaplan's declaration. In these documents, Weimar

asserted for the first time that it timely produced approximately

600 pages to First Financial and that neither Weimar, Kaplan, nor

any employees possessed other documents responsive to the Orders. 

It alleged that based on this compliance, contempt did not exist;

thus, it requested that the bankruptcy court reverse the Contempt

Order. Weimar also asserted that it was entitled to due process

rights, including a jury trial and a standard of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. At the status hearing, the bankruptcy court

scheduled the matter for argument.

At the subsequent hearing, Weimar reasserted and expanded on

its new arguments. It attempted to explain its lapse in failing

to immediately advise of its alleged full compliance as a result

of a change in counsel. It further asserted that any delay was

inadvertent. When the bankruptcy court pointed out that Weimar,
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

as the client, was still responsible for informing First

Financial and the bankruptcy court of its compliance, Weimar

responded that Kaplan had a brain tumor and then a stroke, which

rendered him unavailable to counsel.

At the conclusion of arguments, the bankruptcy court orally

ruled and denied the Motion to Reconsider. Applying Civil

Rule 59(e), it held that grounds for reconsideration did not

exist. The bankruptcy court concluded that First Financial was

entitled to compensation. The bankruptcy court entered a minute

entry/order denying the Motion to Reconsider on July 17, 2012.

Fees Award

First Financial next submitted an Application for Attorneys’

Fees and requested an award of $24,135 for reasonable attorneys’

fees and costs incurred in seeking Weimar’s compliance with the

Orders. Attached was an affidavit from First Financial’s counsel

and an itemized report of legal services provided with respect to

the Rule 2004 Order and related proceedings. First Financial’s

counsel stated that the itemized legal services were performed by

counsel and were actually, reasonably, and necessarily incurred

expenses.

At the final hearing on October 10, 2012, Weimar argued that

the fees requested were excessive. In response, the bankruptcy

court remarked that while the fees tilted toward the higher

range, the matters were not necessarily routine, and, therefore,

the fees were reasonable. It, thus, allowed the requested fees.

On October 23, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered an order

granting the application (“Fees Award”). Weimar timely appealed.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A). As discussed below, we have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

Did the bankruptcy court err in: (1) finding Weimar in civil

contempt; (2) denying the Motion to Reconsider; or (3) awarding

attorneys’ fees to First Financial?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the following decisions of the bankruptcy court

for abuse of discretion: imposition of civil contempt, denial of

a motion for reconsideration, and sanctions for civil contempt

under § 105(a). Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d

1178, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (imposing civil contempt); Fadel v.

DCB United LLC (In re Fadel), 492 B.R. 1, 9 (9th Cir. BAP 2013)

(denying motion for reconsideration); Rosales v. Wallace

(In re Wallace), 490 B.R. 898, 904-05 (9th Cir. BAP 2013)

(awarding sanctions for civil contempt). The underlying factual

findings are reviewed for clear error. In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at

1191. 

An evaluation of abuse of discretion is a two-prong test;

first, we determine de novo whether the bankruptcy court

identified the correct legal rule for application. See United

States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2009)

(en banc). If so, we review whether the bankruptcy court’s

application of the legal rule was clearly erroneous; we will

affirm unless its findings were illogical, implausible, or

without support in the record. See id. at 1262.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

We may affirm on any basis on the record. Caviata Attached

Homes, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (In re Caviata Attached Homes,

LLC), 481 B.R. 34, 44 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).

DISCUSSION

A. The scope of the appeal.

Following Weimar’s notice of appeal, First Financial moved

to dismiss the appeal as untimely to the extent Weimar sought

review of the Contempt Order or denial of the Motion to

Reconsider. A motions panel denied this motion, as it determined

that the Contempt Order was not final and appealable until entry

of an order awarding attorneys’ fees as a sanction. See

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union,

733 F.2d 645, 645 (9th Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Mazzola, 761 F.2d

1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1985). It further determined that the

Contempt Order and denial of the Motion to Reconsider merged into

the final Fees Award and, thus, are subject to this appeal. See

Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Const. Corp., 248 F.3d

892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). 

We agree with the motions panel and conclude that the scope

of this appeal includes the Contempt Order and the denial of the

Motion to Reconsider.

B. The bankruptcy court did not err in finding Weimar in civil

contempt.

The bankruptcy court found Weimar in contempt based on the

latter’s failure to comply with the Orders and Subpoena. First

Financial's Contempt Motion requested relief pursuant to § 105(a)

which provides bankruptcy courts with civil contempt authority. 

In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1192. We agree that the bankruptcy court
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

granted Financial First's requested relief pursuant to this

authority, rather than as a discovery sanction.

In determining whether a party is in civil contempt, the

movant bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing

evidence that the contemnor violated a specific and definite

order of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 1190-91. If the movant

meets this showing, the burden shifts to the contemnor to explain

its inability to comply. In re Wallace, 490 B.R. at 905. A

party who fails to take reasonable steps within its power to

insure compliance with a bankruptcy court's order in turn fails

to act as ordered by the court. Id.

The record adequately supports the bankruptcy court’s

findings. The bankruptcy court entered two orders: the Rule 2004

Order and the Stipulation Order. Both were specific and definite

orders of the bankruptcy court. First Financial’s counsel served

the Subpoena based on the bankruptcy court’s Rule 2004 Order. 

Weimar received extensions – four times – of the deadline to

produce the requested documents. Weimar never denied that it

violated the bankruptcy court’s specific orders by failing to

timely produce documents. Instead, it belatedly tried to defend

itself by asserting objections - objections explicitly waived in

the Stipulation Order.

Weimar’s argument that a criminal investigation involving

Kaplan armed it with a good faith basis to essentially disregard

the Orders and the Subpoena and that the Contempt Motion

implicated various constitutional rights (including its right to

due process and the privilege against self-incrimination, even if

not waived) lack merit. 
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

First, the criminal investigation came to light only after

Weimar’s initial act of contempt. 

Second, the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination does not extend to corporate entities in civil

proceedings. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105

(1988) (privilege against self incrimination protects only

natural persons, not corporations). By its own terms, the

Rule 2004 Order compelled the production of documents by Weimar,

not Kaplan in his personal capacity. 

Third, due process in a civil contempt proceeding solely

requires adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. See

Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Contrary to Weimar’s arguments, a party possibly subject to civil

contempt is “not entitled to the full panoply of procedural

protections that are normally reserved for defendants charged

with a criminal offense, such as an independent prosecutor, proof

beyond a reasonable doubt, and a jury trial.” Id. It is beyond

dispute here both that Weimar had notice of the contempt hearing

and that the bankruptcy court provided it with several

opportunities to appear and be heard. 

Fourth, a criminal investigation does not stay a civil

proceeding. See Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro,

889 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1989) (no constitutional right to a

stay of civil proceedings pending the disposition of a parallel

criminal proceeding). To the extent a party desires such a stay,

it must affirmatively seek and obtain such relief. See id. But

a party may never unilaterally decide that it simply will not

comply with a court order. 
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Weimar also alleges that the bankruptcy court’s

characterizations of the criminal investigation and its failure

to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the relationship between

First Financial and law enforcement agencies were in error. We

disagree. While Kaplan is Weimar’s president, Kaplan and Weimar

are not synonymous entities. Similarly, Weimar’s assertions as

to an alleged conspiracy between First Financial and law

enforcement agencies are irrelevant, as they do not justify

Weimar’s complete disregard of a direct court order. 

Finally, the record shows that Weimar’s failure to timely

produce documents pursuant to the Orders preceded Kaplan’s

illness by three or four months. Similarly, the criminal

investigation surfaced approximately three months after entry of

the Rule 2004 Order. Thus, these alleged excuses for delay are

not adequate to excuse Weimar’s contempt.

In sum, Weimar was subject to the Rule 2004 Order, the

Stipulation Order, and the Subpoena. It sought and obtained two

informal extensions of the Rule 2004 Order, then belatedly

produced documents to First Financial. When First Financial

challenged the completeness of this production, Weimar requested

yet another extension and agreed to the Stipulation Order. At a

hearing, the bankruptcy court again ordered Weimar to produce

additional documents on or before May 18, 2012. Weimar again

ignored the deadline established by the bankruptcy court.

On this record, the bankruptcy court’s findings were not

illogical, implausible, or without support from the record. 

Therefore, based on the evidence before it, the bankruptcy court

did not abuse its discretion in finding Weimar in civil contempt. 
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Although Civil Rule 59(e) provides for 28 days, Rule 9023

expressly limits the timing to 14 days in bankruptcy cases.

13

C. The bankruptcy court did not err in denying the Motion to

Reconsider.

Weimar also asserts that the bankruptcy court erred in

denying its Motion to Reconsider. A court treats a “motion for

reconsideration” as a motion to alter or amend a judgment or

order under Civil Rule 59(e) (incorporated into bankruptcy cases

by Rule 9023), if filed within 143 days of entry of the order. 

See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc., 248 F.3d at 898-99. 

Otherwise, the bankruptcy court treats the motion as one for

relief from a judgment or order under Civil Rule 60(b)

(incorporated into bankruptcy cases by Rule 9024). Id. 

Here, Weimar moved for reconsideration exactly one month

after the bankruptcy court entered the Contempt Order. Thus, the

Motion to Reconsider was subject to Civil Rule 60(b). The

bankruptcy court, however, referred to Civil Rule 59(e) as the

basis for denial. Consequently, the bankruptcy court did not

apply the correct legal standard. We conclude, however, that

this error was harmless; there was no basis for reconsideration

under either of Civil Rules 59(e) or 60(b). See, e.g., Fed. R.

Civ. P. 61 (incorporated into bankruptcy proceedings by

Rule 9005).

A court correctly denies a motion for reconsideration where

the movant merely rehashes arguments already presented or asserts

additional theories that could have been argued in connection

with the initial determination. See In re Fadel, 492 B.R. at 18. 
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

The grounds for reconsideration under Civil Rule 60(b) are

limited to six identified grounds for relief, including mistake. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). For the purposes of Civil

Rule 60(b)(1), mistake generally entails “circumstance[s] where

there is some reason for confusion or misunderstanding by the

parties.” In re Walker, 332 B.R. 820, 829 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005);

see also Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097,

1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (party is not “released from a poor

litigation decision made because of inaccurate information or

advice . . . .”).

Weimar predominantly based its request for reconsideration

on its alleged mistake in failing to understand and communicate

that the initial (untimely) production was complete. The

bankruptcy court found that Weimar bore responsibility for

informing its counsel that it provided all the documents

responsive to the Orders and Subpoena. The bankruptcy court 

could not comprehend, based on the evidence before it, how Weimar

only belatedly discovered that it had produced all of the

responsive documents. It expressly stated that Weimar’s own

actions (or inaction) resulted in the finding of contempt and,

thus, that Weimar failed to establish that reconsideration was

warranted.

The substance of the bankruptcy court’s ruling supports

denial of reconsideration based on “mistake” under Civil

Rule 60(b)(1). Implicit in its ruling is its disbelief that

Weimar’s belated assertion resulted from legitimate confusion or

misunderstanding prior to the initial hearing. The bankruptcy

court did not err in denying reconsideration where Weimar had the
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

ability to raise the issue in its initial opposition. See

In re Fadel, 492 B.R. at 18.

Further, Weimar’s alleged mistake is an inadequate basis for

reconsideration even if newly discovered. This mistake never

explains why the initial document production was late (and

consequently, in clear violation of the Orders). 

Finally, the bankruptcy court did not err in disregarding

this basis for reconsideration where the record is replete with

instances of Weimar’s delay and actions that are inconsistent

with its subsequent position. Weimar failed to respond to the

first scheduled deadline under the Rule 2004 Order and Subpoena;

it was ten days late in responding to the second informally

established deadline; it never responded to the third scheduled

deadline under the Stipulation Order or the fourth informally

established deadline; and it failed to respond by the May 18,

2012 deadline, notwithstanding the bankruptcy court’s express

instruction at the May 4, 2012 hearing. 

Weimar continuously violated the Orders. Its inaction

remains unexplained, and its “mistake” as to the scope of the

initial production, even if legitimate, was not objectively

reasonable and resulted in litigation decisions that wasted

judicial resources, harmed First Financial, and compounded the

existing contempt. The bankruptcy court’s reasoning, even if

erroneously based on Civil Rule 59, supports the conclusion that

Weimar's “mistake” does not justify relief from the Contempt

Order under Civil Rule 60(b)(1).

In argument in connection with reconsideration, Weimar also

raised for the first time the assertion that its retention of new
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Moreover, to the extent Weimar argues that its counsel’s

“mistakes” are to blame, its argument is similarly unavailing. 

In Latshaw, the Ninth Circuit stated that, “[f]or purposes of

[Civil Rule 60](b)(1), parties [are] bound by and accountable for

the deliberate actions of themselves and their chosen counsel. 

This includes not only an innocent, albeit careless or negligent,

attorney mistake, but also intentional attorney misconduct. Such

mistakes are more appropriately addressed through malpractice

claims.” 452 F.3d at 1101. Thus, Weimar cannot now contend that

its counsel’s acts somehow constituted “mistake.”

16

counsel caused or contributed to its failure to timely explain

that the initial production was complete. The bankruptcy court

did not err in rejecting this excuse. Weimar obtained new

counsel approximately two months after entry of the Rule 2004

Order.4 In other words, these events all followed the Rule 2004

Order production date by several months and, thus, fail to

adequately explain Weimar’s initial untimely production, its

subsequent failures to produce documents, or its initial

admissions that additional documents existed.

On appeal, it also now argues that a prior counsel’s inept

representation constituted excusable neglect under Civil

Rule 60(b)(1). This argument was not raised below, and, thus, we

will not consider it on appeal. See Samson v. W. Capital

Partners, LLC (In re Blixseth), 684 F.3d 865, 872 n.12 (9th Cir.

2012) (appellate court may decline to address argument not raised

before bankruptcy court) (citation omitted). Similarly, we

reject its other arguments raised only on appeal in connection

with reconsideration. Finally, we also reject its arguments to

the extent they merely regurgitate arguments already made in

connection with the Contempt Motion. See In re Fadel, 492 B.R.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

at 18. 

We conclude that the substance of the bankruptcy court’s

ruling supports denial of reconsideration under Civil

Rule 60(b)(1). Thus, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Weimar’s Motion to Reconsider.

D. The bankruptcy court did not err in awarding attorneys’ fees

based on Weimar’s contempt.

Finally, Weimar argues that the bankruptcy court erred in

awarding attorneys' fees pursuant to the Contempt Order. 

Sanctions for civil contempt may be imposed based on one or

both of the following: (1) to compel or coerce obedience with

respect to a court order; or (2) to compensate the opposing party

for damages resulting from the contemnor's noncompliance. 

Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 1983);

see also In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1195 (“[A]ttorneys' fees are an

appropriate component of a civil contempt award.”).

Here, the bankruptcy court awarded First Financial

attorneys’ fees in the amount of $24,135. Based on the evidence

before it, the bankruptcy court found that the fees requested

were reasonable. In doing so, it considered the amount of the

fees requested and the scope of work as reflected in counsel’s

timesheets. It also noted that Weimar filed an untimely

opposition and failed to present a specific, cognizable objection

to the fee application. On this record, the bankruptcy court’s

findings were not illogical, implausible, or without support from

the record. Thus, it did not abuse its discretion in awarding

the fees as compensatory damages.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM.