IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 05–1365

Filed September 2, 2016

Amended November 8, 2016

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

MICHAEL GERARD REILLY,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

A former attorney whose license to practice law we previously

revoked submitted an application for reinstatement of his license to 

practice law in Iowa. APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT 

PROVISIONALLY GRANTED SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS SET 

FORTH IN THIS OPINION.

Tara van Brederode and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

Michael G. Reilly, Council Bluffs, pro se.
2

PER CURIAM.

Ten years ago, we revoked the respondent’s license to practice law. 

This matter comes before us on the respondent’s application for 

reinstatement of his license to practice law under Iowa Court Rule 

34.25(9). We provisionally grant the respondent’s application for 

reinstatement of his law license subject to the conditions set forth in this 

opinion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

We admitted respondent Michael G. Reilly to practice law in Iowa 

in June 1981, and the Nebraska Supreme Court admitted him to 

practice law in Nebraska in September 1982. In 2006, we revoked his 

license to practice law in Iowa. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Reilly, 708 N.W.2d 82, 82 (Iowa 2006). Thereafter, the Nebraska 

Supreme Court disbarred him in a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding. 

State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of Neb. Supreme Ct. v. Reilly, 712 

N.W.2d 278, 278–79 (Neb. 2006) (per curiam). Prior to the revocation of 

his law licenses, Reilly engaged in the private practice of law at a law firm 

in Council Bluffs, Iowa. He had an excellent reputation as a diligent and 

skilled trial attorney.

We revoked Reilly’s license to practice law in Iowa because he 

misappropriated client funds. In November 2000, Reilly obtained a 

settlement of $137,500 on behalf of the parents of a child who sustained 

a serious eye injury and caused a conservatorship to be opened for the 

child. Reilly, 708 N.W.2d at 83. Upon receiving the settlement funds, 

Reilly deposited them in his firm’s trust account. Id. In addition to the 

checks issued from the trust account to cover the contingent fee and 

expenses associated with the case, Reilly deposited additional checks

totaling the remaining balance of the settlement funds in his personal 
3

bank account rather than the conservatorship account in December 

2000 and January 2001. Id. At the time, Reilly had an active gambling 

addiction that caused him to be constantly in need of funds. Id. at 85.

In August and September 2001, after he unsuccessfully attempted 

to secure a loan from a friend to repay the misappropriated funds, Reilly 

wrote a series of kited checks between his personal accounts attempting 

to float a check to the conservatorship account to replace the

misappropriated funds. Id. at 83. Eventually, a bank associated with 

one of Reilly’s personal accounts honored a check he wrote to the 

conservatorship account after a bank associated with another one of his 

personal accounts honored a kited check he had written. Id. The

account with the second bank ended up $96,000 overdrawn because the 

bank was unable to cash another check Reilly had written from yet 

another account with insufficient funds. Id. By the time Reilly repaid 

the bank the following year, it had already notified federal authorities. 

Id.

After our client security and disciplinary commissions received a

letter from the United States Attorney recounting these events and the 

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board conducted an 

investigation confirming them, the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa recommended we suspend Reilly from the 

practice of law for three years. Id. at 82, 83–84. Instead, we concluded 

consistency with our past decisions addressing misappropriation of client 

funds and the protection of the public warranted a harsher sanction. In 

January 2006, we revoked Reilly’s license to practice law in Iowa. Id. at 

85.

In January 2009, Reilly filed an application for reinstatement of his 

license to practice law in Iowa based on the progress he had made in 
4

addressing his gambling addiction. The Board opposed reinstatement, 

noting the Iowa Court Rules contained no provision addressing 

reinstatement following a license revocation as opposed to a license 

suspension. Though the Board acknowledged we had reinstated a 

revoked license in the past, it insisted the standard for assessing 

whether reinstatement was appropriate was set forth in Committee on 

Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Brodsky, 487 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1992),

in which we stated, 

License revocations are ordinarily permanent in Iowa. 

Indeed our rules spell out no special procedure for applying 

for readmission by a lawyer whose license has been revoked.

On occasion we nevertheless consider such 

applications under our inherent power and, in extremely rare 

cases, have granted them. These rare cases have arisen 

where, in long retrospect, it appears the need for permanent 

revocation was debatable, and where there has been a 

demonstrated reformation on the part of the lawyer so that 

the public interest would not be compromised by 

readmission.

Id. at 675. Following a hearing, we issued an order in which we rejected 

the application for reinstatement. In the order, we concluded Reilly had 

not “carried his heavy burden of showing that the need for permanent 

revocation was debatable and that he has undergone such a reformation 

that the public interest would not be threatened by readmitting him to 

the practice of law.” 

In May 2015, following a period of public comment, we amended

Iowa Court Rule 35.14 to renumber existing provisions within the rule 

and incorporate new provisions setting forth a procedure by which an 

individual whose license to practice law has been revoked may apply for 

its reinstatement. The amendments became effective September 1, 2015. 

By subsequent amendment shortly thereafter, we moved the provisions 
5

addressing reinstatement to Iowa Court Rule 34.25.1 The purpose of the 

amendment was to allow an attorney who has rehabilitated him or 

herself the opportunity to petition the court for reinstatement and prove 

to the court he or she has good moral character, is fit to practice law, 

and is in all respects worthy of readmission to the Iowa bar. 

Reinstatement under the rule is not meant to be automatic.

In November 2015, Reilly filed his second application for 

reinstatement of his license to practice law in the State of Iowa with this 

court. Prior to submitting the application, Reilly submitted a request for 

preparation of a character and fitness report by the National Conference 

of Bar Examiners (NCBE) and paid an administrative fee to the Iowa 

Board of Law Examiners as required by Iowa Court Rule 34.25(8). In his

application for reinstatement, Reilly first reported that we admitted him

to the Iowa bar in June 1981 and revoked his license to practice law in 

Iowa in January 2006. See Iowa Ct. R. 34.25(9)(b). Reilly next affirmed

that he had complied in all respects with all orders of this court 

pertaining to his license revocation and the Iowa Court Rule governing 

the notification of clients, opposing counsel, and courts upon revocation 

of an attorney’s license to practice law. See id. Finally, he affirmed that 

the Client Security Trust Fund expended no funds due to his conduct. 

See id. r. 34.25(9)(e). Reilly attached a letter from the Office of 

Professional Regulation confirming he had paid all fees set forth in the 

rules governing the Client Security Commission, his annual continuing 

legal education fees, and all costs associated with the disciplinary matter 

that culminated in the revocation of his license to practice law. See id. r.

34.25(9)(d)–(e). 

1The subsequent amendment became effective April 1, 2016, after Reilly filed his 

second application for reinstatement. 

 
6

With his application for reinstatement, Reilly submitted an affidavit 

detailing his personal history, work history, and educational history

following his license revocation along with letters from six attorneys 

currently practicing in the Fourth Judicial District of Iowa recommending 

his license to practice law be reinstated. See id. r. 34.25(9)(c). In the 

affidavit, Reilly indicated he received treatment for his compulsive 

gambling addiction from April 2002 through November 2008. He also 

indicated he has abstained from casino gambling since February 2002. 

Reilly also described his work immediately following his license 

revocation as a litigation consultant offering mediation services to law 

firms and individual attorneys, as well as his current work providing 

consulting services on insurance litigation and claims handling involving 

insurance policies of various types issued to clients throughout the 

country. Finally, Reilly indicated that although he has not received any 

formal educational training since we revoked his license, he has 

maintained his familiarity with current Iowa law by regularly reviewing 

state and federal appellate court decisions as well as through his 

employment, which requires him to deal with statutes, rules, and 

regulations in most states. 

The recommendation letters Reilly submitted from members of the 

bar recommending his reinstatement described him as a particularly

diligent and skilled trial attorney who consistently accepted responsibility 

for the actions that led to the revocation of his license and expressed

remorse for the harm they caused. The individuals who penned the 

letters were practicing attorneys who knew Reilly when he was still in 

practice and remained in close contact with him after we revoked his 

license. Each expressed the opinion that Reilly is of good moral 

character and fit to practice law. The letters also described how Reilly
7

aggressively pursued treatment for and overcame the gambling addiction 

that motivated him to engage in the conduct for which we revoked his 

law license.2

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a 

resistance to the application for reinstatement urging us to deny it. 

Relying on Brodsky, the Board argued reinstatement is inappropriate in 

this case because revocation is indisputably the appropriate sanction for 

conduct involving the conversion of client funds to which an attorney has

no colorable future claim. Moreover, the Board argued the fact that 

Reilly misappropriated client funds confirms that he lacks the

fundamental honesty and integrity necessary to be an attorney. 

Although the Board acknowledged Reilly had an active gambling 

addiction when he misappropriated client funds, it argued his addiction

is irrelevant to the question of whether reinstatement of his law license is 

appropriate because no illness, regardless of its severity, can excuse an 

attorney’s dishonest conduct. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Hansel, 558 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Iowa 1997). Finally, the Board 

claimed we should not reinstate Reilly’s law license because the passage 

of time, his payment of restitution, and his completion of a treatment 

program did nothing to erase the harm to the public and the legal 

profession that resulted from his conduct.

The board of law examiners also filed a report and 

recommendation concerning the application for reinstatement. See Iowa 

Ct. R. 34.25(13). The board noted that, with the exception of two 

2After Reilly filed his application for reinstatement, we subsequently received two 

additional letters from district court judges in the Fourth Judicial District of Iowa 

recommending his application to practice law in Iowa be reinstated. The letters were 

substantially similar to the letters from attorneys that Reilly submitted with his 

application for reinstatement.

 
8

foreclosure proceedings closely connected to the events leading up to the 

revocation of his license, Reilly has had no significant involvement in any 

criminal or civil proceedings since we revoked his license and has 

maintained consistent employment since that time. Although the board 

noted that Reilly appears to have made great strides in overcoming his 

gambling addiction, a four-member majority of the board declined to 

recommend reinstatement of his law license, concluding Reilly submitted 

insufficient evidence concerning his rehabilitation to demonstrate he 

presently has the requisite moral character to be worthy of readmission 

to the bar. In particular, the majority noted the status of Reilly’s 

gambling addiction had not been professionally evaluated since 2008. 

The majority also noted Reilly did not submit an expert opinion 

addressing the likelihood that his addiction would relapse or a copy of 

his current credit report. Finally, the majority expressed concern that

Reilly indicated he has abstained from “casino gambling” in his 

application for reinstatement but did not address whether he has 

engaged in other forms of gambling. Two members of the board 

dissented, concluding Reilly had met his burden of demonstrating he is 

“of good moral character and in all respects worthy of readmission to the 

bar” despite the seriousness of the conduct that led to the revocation of 

his license. The dissenters noted Reilly’s character and fitness 

examination revealed no information to suggest he would present a 

danger to the public if we reinstated his license.3 See id. r. 34.25(9)(c).

Following a hearing on the application for reinstatement in 

January 2016, we ordered Reilly to provide copies of his complete credit 

3The Iowa Board of Law Examiners consists of five persons admitted to practice 

law in the state and two persons not admitted to practice law in the state. See Iowa Ct. 

R. 31.1(1). One board member took no part in the board decision concerning the report 

and recommendation.

 
9

report and a report evaluating the status of his gambling addiction 

prepared by a qualified professional to this court and the board of law 

examiners. See id. r. 34.25(11), (15). We further ordered the board of 

law examiners to interview Reilly and file a supplemental report and 

recommendation concerning his application for reinstatement upon 

receipt of the credit report and evaluation. See id. r. 34.25(11). Finally,

we ordered the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board to file a 

supplemental statement indicating whether reinstatement is warranted 

under the facts of this case. See id. We held this matter in abeyance 

pending our receipt of the requested documents from Reilly, the board of 

law examiners, and the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary 

Board. 

Thereafter, Reilly filed a copy of his current credit report and a 

written report evaluating the status of his gambling addiction prepared 

by the licensed mental health provider and certified compulsive gambling 

counselor who treated him from 2002 to 2008. The report concluded 

Reilly has continually kept his casino gambling addiction in full 

remission and requires no further treatment. Though it acknowledged 

Reilly admitted to occasionally participating in an office pool, purchasing 

a lottery ticket, or betting on a golf game, it indicated that none of these 

forms of gambling were problematic in nature for Reilly. The credit 

report Reilly submitted supports this conclusion, as it showed that Reilly

makes his payments on time, has little revolving debt, and has a credit 

score in the very-good-to-exceptional range. 

Upon receiving the evaluation and credit report, the board of law 

examiners interviewed Reilly and prepared a supplemental report and 

recommendation concerning his application for reinstatement. The 

supplemental report and recommendation indicated a majority of the 
10

board agreed Reilly had met his burden of demonstrating he is “of good 

moral character and in all respects worthy of readmission to the bar.” 

Thus, the board recommended we reinstate his license to practice law. 

Id. r. 34.25(13). Two board members dissented without providing an

explanation.4

In its supplemental statement, the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board once again urged us to deny Reilly’s application for 

reinstatement of his license to practice law. More precisely, the Board 

argued any former attorney whose law license has been revoked due to 

misappropriation of client funds with respect to which he or she had no 

colorable future claim is ineligible for reinstatement because such 

conduct is fundamentally dishonest and worthy of a permanent sanction, 

not a temporary one. In his response to the supplemental statement, 

Reilly pointed out the grievance commission did not find his character 

beyond redemption or fundamentally unfit for the practice of law in 2006 

when it concluded a three-year suspension, rather than revocation of his 

license, was the appropriate sanction for his misconduct.

Upon receipt of the additional documents we requested from Reilly, 

the board of law examiners, and the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board, we took up the matter for resolution without further 

oral argument. 

II. Standards for Determining the Eligibility of an Applicant 

Seeking Reinstatement of His or Her License to Practice Law in 

Iowa. 

Iowa Court Rule 34.25(15) states that a former attorney who 

applies for reinstatement of his or her license to practice law in Iowa 

4Once again, one board member took no part in the board decision concerning 

the report and recommendation.

 
11

“bears the burden of demonstrating that the applicant is of good moral 

character, is fit to practice law, and has complied in all respects with the 

terms of the order or judgment of revocation.” It further indicates that 

an applicant for reinstatement must submit “satisfactory proof that the 

applicant is of good moral character and is in all respects worthy of 

readmission to the bar.” Iowa Ct. R. 34.25(9)(c). Accordingly, an 

applicant seeking reinstatement of his or her license to practice law must 

demonstrate his or her moral character and fitness for the practice of law 

by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. See In re Peterson, 439 

N.W.2d 165, 166 (Iowa 1989) (concluding an applicant for admission to 

the Iowa bar must demonstrate his or her moral fitness to practice law 

by a convincing preponderance of the evidence before we will reverse a 

decision of the board of law examiners denying him or her an 

opportunity to sit for the bar because by rule the applicant bears the 

burden of submitting “satisfactory proof” of his or her fitness to practice 

law). “A convincing preponderance of the evidence is more than a 

preponderance of the evidence, but less than proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d 

596, 601 (Iowa 2012). Numerous subsections of the rule set forth 

various prerequisites and procedural requirements associated with 

submitting an application for reinstatement. See Iowa Ct. R. 34.25(7), 

(8), (9), (15). 

Our review of an application for reinstatement is de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowe, 830 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Iowa 

2013). In reviewing an application for reinstatement, we remain mindful 

that the primary goal of attorney discipline is protection of the public, not 

punishment of the attorney. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d 466, 487 (Iowa 2014). Therefore, our primary 
12

task in considering an application for reinstatement is to assess whether

the applicant seeking reinstatement of his or her law license has proved

he or she has good moral character, is fit to practice law, and is in all 

respects worthy of readmission to the Iowa bar. See Iowa Ct. R. 34.25(9), 

(15).

We now contemplate the factors we will consider in making that 

assessment. The American Bar Association has promulgated a model 

reinstatement rule listing eight criteria for consideration in assessing an 

application for reinstatement. See Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 

Enf’t r. 25(E) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2002).5 Similarly, some states in which 

5The model rule states,

A lawyer may be reinstated or readmitted only if the lawyer meets 

each of the following criteria, or, if not, presents good and sufficient 

reason why the lawyer should nevertheless be reinstated or readmitted:

(1) The lawyer has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all 

prior disciplinary orders except to the extent that they are abated under 

Rule 26.

(2) The lawyer has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the 

unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension or 

disbarment.

(3) If the lawyer was suffering under a physical or mental disability or 

infirmity at the time of suspension or disbarment, including alcohol or 

other drug abuse, the disability or infirmity has been removed. Where 

alcohol or other drug abuse was a causative factor in the lawyer’s 

misconduct, the lawyer shall not be reinstated unless:

(a) the lawyer has pursued appropriate rehabilitative 

treatment;

(b) the lawyer has abstained from the use of alcohol or 

other drugs for at least [one year]; and

(c) the lawyer is likely to continue to abstain from alcohol 

or other drugs.

(4) The lawyer recognizes the wrongfulnesss and seriousness of the 

misconduct for which the lawyer was suspended or disbarred.

(5) The lawyer has not engaged in any other professional misconduct 

since suspension or disbarment.

(6) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the lawyer was disciplined, the 

lawyer has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law.

 
13

disbarred attorneys may be reinstated have adopted court or disciplinary 

rules specifying the criteria to be considered in assessing applications for 

reinstatement. See, e.g., Ill. Supreme Ct. R. 767(f); N.D. R. Lawyer 

Discipline 4.5(F); Md. R. 19-752(h)(2). In states with less specific 

reinstatement rules, courts “have adopted diverse ethical inventories to 

assess an applicant for reinstatement.” In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d 297, 300 

& n.3 (S.D. 1997) (surveying cases). 

The myriad of factors relied upon in assessing applications for 

reinstatement vary from state to state. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, 

Reinstatement of Attorney After Disbarment, Suspension, or Resignation, 

70 A.L.R.2d 268, §§ 11–18, at 283–93 (1960 & 2007 Later Case Service & 

Supp. 2015). Furthermore, there is no clear consensus among state 

supreme courts or disciplinary agencies as to how to weigh the relevant 

factors. G.M. Filisko, The Rough Road to Redemption, 99 A.B.A. J. 46, 49 

(2013). Nonetheless, the diverse ethical inventories and rules relied upon 

in assessing the reinstatement applications of previously disbarred 

attorneys generally serve a common purpose—to aid in determining the 

likelihood that “the public can rely on the competence and integrity of 

the previously disbarred attorney.” In re Cooke, 42 A.3d 610, 615–16 

(Md. 2012) (quoting In re Murray, 558 A.2d 710, 711 (Md. 1989)). 

(7) The lawyer has kept informed about recent developments in the law 

and is competent to practice.

(8) In addition, a lawyer who has been disbarred must pass the bar 

examination and the character and fitness examination.

Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enf’t r. 25(E). The accompanying commentary 

instructs that the “presumption . . . should be against readmission.” Id. r. 25 cmt. 

This presumption reflects the primary purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings—

protection of the public. In re Reinstatement of Wiederholt, 295 P.3d 396, 399 (Alaska 

2013). It is also consistent with our conclusion that a lawyer seeking readmission 

establish his or her entitlement to reinstatement by a convincing preponderance of the 

evidence. 

_______________
14

Undoubtedly, the protection of the public is of paramount 

importance in evaluating an application for reinstatement. See Barnhill, 

847 N.W.2d at 487; see also In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d at 299. As we have 

often observed,

[a]ttorney disciplinary proceedings are not designed to 

punish, but rather to determine the fitness of an officer of 

[the] court to continue in that capacity, to insulate the 

courts and the public from those persons unfit to practice 

the law, to protect the integrity of and the public confidence 

in our system of justice, and to deter other lawyers from 

engaging in similar acts or practices.

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Santiago, 869 N.W.2d 172, 181 

(Iowa 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 378 (Iowa 2005)). 

Though we acknowledge the important purposes served by attorney 

disciplinary proceedings, we share the view of other state supreme courts 

that “a fallen lawyer may rise again.” In re Cooke, 42 A.3d at 614 

(quoting In re Murray, 558 A.2d at 711). In determining whether an 

attorney previously disbarred for misconduct has demonstrated his or 

her eligibility for reinstatement, one “major consideration . . . is whether 

the disbarred attorney has overcome those weaknesses which produced 

the earlier misconduct.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Rosellini,

739 P.2d 658, 660 (Wash. 1987); see In re Reinstatement of Robbins, 836 

P.2d 965, 966 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc). 

Mindful of the purposes attorney discipline serves, we conclude the 

following factors are most relevant to assessing whether an applicant 

seeking reinstatement of his or her license to practice law in Iowa has 

proved his or her good moral character, fitness for the practice of law, 

and worthiness of readmission to the bar:
15

1. The nature and character of the conduct that led us to revoke 

the applicant’s license to practice law as well as the context in which the 

applicant engaged in that conduct;

2. Whether the applicant recognizes the wrongfulness and 

seriousness of the conduct that led us to revoke the applicant’s license to 

practice law;

3. Whether the applicant has demonstrated candor and sincerity 

in communications with this court and other entities assessing his or her 

current moral character, fitness for the practice of law, and worthiness 

for readmission to the Iowa bar;

4. Whether the applicant has demonstrated with respect to any 

physical or mental condition such as addiction or substance abuse that 

was a causative factor in the conduct that led to revocation of his or her 

license:

a. That the applicant has completed appropriate rehabilitative 

treatment from a qualified treatment provider;

b. That the applicant is presently abstaining from any behavior or 

substance use believed by his or her qualified treatment provider to be 

problematic for the applicant and has been abstaining from such 

behavior or substance use for a significant period of time; and

c. That the applicant is likely to continue to abstain from any such

behavior or substance;

5. How much time has passed since the applicant’s license to 

practice law was revoked and the nature of any activities the applicant 

has engaged in during that time, including whether the applicant has 

engaged in or attempted to engage in the unauthorized practice of law or 

any other professional misconduct since the revocation of his or her 

license;
16

6. The opinions of the attorneys recommending reinstatement of 

the applicant’s license to practice law with respect to the question of his 

or her moral character, fitness for the practice of law, and worthiness of 

readmission to the Iowa bar; and

7. Any other matters shown by the evidence to bear on the 

question of whether the applicant has good moral character, is fit to 

practice law, and is in all respects worthy of readmission to the Iowa 

bar.6 

6In determining which factors we find most relevant to evaluating applications 

for reinstatement, we rely primarily on the criteria appearing in model reinstatement 

rules promulgated by the American Bar Association and our prior caselaw in a similar 

context. Specifically, in In re Peterson, we considered whether an applicant to the Iowa 

bar with a prior criminal record had been wrongly denied the opportunity to sit for the 

Iowa bar examination. 439 N.W.2d at 166. In determining whether the applicant had 

demonstrated he had the requisite moral fitness for bar membership, we considered the 

following factors: 

1. The nature and character of the offenses committed.

2. The number and duration of offenses.

3. The age and maturity of the applicant when the offenses were 

committed.

4. The social and historical context in which the offenses were 

committed.

5. The sufficiency of the punishment undergone and restitution made in 

connection with the offenses.

6. The grant or denial of a pardon for offenses committed.

7. The number of years that have elapsed since the last offense was 

committed, and the presence or absence of misconduct during that 

period.

8. The applicant’s current attitude about the prior offenses.

9. The applicant’s candor, sincerity and full disclosure in the filings and 

proceedings on character and fitness.

10. The applicant’s constructive activities and accomplishments 

subsequent to the criminal convictions.

11. The opinions of character witnesses about the applicant’s moral 

fitness.

Id. at 169 (quoting In re Manville, 538 A.2d 1128, 1133 n.4 (D.C. 1988)). 

In articulating the factors most relevant to assessing an application for 

reinstatement, we also rely upon the decisions of other state supreme courts setting 

 
17

It is within our discretion to place conditions on the reinstatement 

of a license to practice law following its revocation. Iowa Ct. R. 

34.25(16)(b). Preconditions on reinstatement may include, but are not 

limited to, requiring the individual seeking reinstatement to pass the 

Iowa bar examination. Id. Generally, if we determine an individual who 

otherwise qualifies for reinstatement need not retake the bar 

examination, we will require the individual to attend and report up to 

100 hours of continuing legal education as a condition of reinstatement. 

Id. Additionally, every individual seeking reinstatement of his or her 

license to practice law in Iowa following its revocation must post a scaled 

score of at least 80 on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam 

(MPRE) as a precondition of reinstatement. Id. 

Furthermore, we may subject the continued maintenance of a 

reinstated law license to ongoing requirements not generally applicable to 

members of the Iowa bar. See id. For example, we may find it 

appropriate to reinstate a revoked license to practice law subject to the 

attorney’s continued maintenance of malpractice insurance. If the 

attorney fails to meet a condition we impose on the continued 

maintenance of his or her reinstated license, we may summarily revoke it 

without a hearing. Id.

forth factors found to be relevant in this context. See, e.g., In re Reinstatement of 

Wiederholt, 295 P.3d at 399–400; In re Reinstatement of Robbins, 836 P.2d at 966; In re 

Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C. 1985); In re Application of Griffith, 913 P.2d 695, 

700 (Or. 1996) (en banc); In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d at 300; In re Hart, 822 P.2d 264, 267 

(Wash. 1992) (en banc). Likewise, we consider the reinstatement rules adopted in other 

states setting forth specific criteria to be considered in assessing applications for 

reinstatement as well as court decisions applying those rules. See, e.g., Ill. Supreme Ct. 

R. 767(f); N.D. R. Lawyer Discipline 4.5(F); Md. R. 19-752(h)(2); In re Reinstatement of 

Golden, 315 P.3d 377, 380 (Okla. 2013).

_______________
18

III. Analysis. 

The evidence Reilly submitted indicates he complied with the terms 

of the order revoking his license to practice law and all other procedural 

requirements set forth in the rule governing reinstatement of a former 

attorney’s law license following its revocation. See id. 34.25(7), (8), (9), 

(15). Therefore, the question of whether Reilly is eligible for the 

reinstatement of his law license turns on whether he has submitted 

adequate evidence demonstrating his good moral character, fitness to 

practice law, and worthiness of readmission to the Iowa bar. Id. r. 

34.25(15).

In light of the evidence Reilly submitted in support of his 

application for reinstatement, we conclude he has proved by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence that he has good moral character, is fit to 

practice law, and is in all respects worthy of readmission to the Iowa bar. 

Though the conduct that led us to revoke Reilly’s license to practice law 

was egregious, it occurred during a relatively brief period following years 

of bar membership during which Reilly earned a reputation as a 

particularly diligent and skilled attorney. We find this notable given that 

Reilly struggled with his casino gambling addiction for years. Although 

his addiction does not obviate the seriousness of his improper conduct, 

the evidence he submitted demonstrating his efforts to overcome it 

supports his eligibility for reinstatement to the bar. For years before and 

for years after we revoked his license, Reilly voluntarily underwent

treatment for his addiction with a licensed mental health provider and 

certified compulsive gambling counselor. Furthermore, he has managed 

to abstain from engaging in the behaviors his treatment provider has 

advised him to avoid for more than fourteen years. Thus, his treatment 

provider has concluded he requires no further treatment for his 

addiction. 
19

As his dedication to his recovery might suggest, Reilly has 

consistently accepted responsibility for the impropriety of his conduct 

and acknowledged the harm it caused his clients, the bank that reported 

him to the federal government, and the bar. The members of the bar who 

have recommended we reinstate Reilly uniformly attest to his good moral 

character and fitness for the practice of law and express confidence that 

he is presently equipped to exercise the responsibility and judgment bar 

membership requires. Their letters commend Reilly for his outstanding 

legal ability, his commitment to treating his casino gambling addiction, 

and his acceptance of responsibility and remorse for the harm he caused. 

Moreover, they confirm Reilly has held a position of executive 

responsibility with his current employer for years without incident and 

maintains a personal and professional support system that includes, 

among others, many of his former colleagues in the bar. Based on our 

careful examination of the evidence submitted, we believe Reilly has 

established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that 

reinstatement of his license to practice law poses no threat to the public 

because he has good moral character, is fit for the practice of law, and is 

in all respects worthy of readmission to the bar.

We note Reilly has maintained his familiarity with current law by 

means of his subsequent employment and regular reviews of state and 

federal appellate court decisions. Therefore, we decline to require him to 

pass the Iowa bar examination as a precondition of the reinstatement of 

his license to practice law. Nevertheless, given that Reilly has been 

without a law license for more than ten years, we think it appropriate to 

require him to report at least thirty hours of continuing legal education, 

including at least three hours of continuing legal education dedicated to 

legal ethics, as a precondition of its reinstatement. This is equivalent to 

the minimum continuing legal education members of the Iowa bar must 
20

report every two calendar years. See id. r. 41.3. Accordingly, all 

continuing legal education courses Reilly has taken since January 1, 

2015, shall be counted in satisfaction of this requirement. By rule, Reilly 

must also post a scaled score of at least 80 on the MPRE as a 

precondition of the reinstatement of his license to practice law. Id. r. 

34.25(16)(b). 

Upon Reilly’s demonstration that he has satisfied the preconditions

of reinstatement set forth in this opinion, we will order the reinstatement 

of his license to practice law subject to his continued maintenance of a 

malpractice insurance policy whenever he is engaged in the private 

practice of law. Within thirty days of the reinstatement of his license to 

practice law, Reilly shall provide the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board with proof that he has obtained a malpractice 

insurance policy or a report indicating he is not currently engaged in 

private practice. Upon his subsequent entry into the private practice of 

law, if applicable, he shall provide the Board with proof that he has 

obtained malpractice insurance within thirty days.

IV. Disposition. 

We provisionally grant Reilly’s application for reinstatement of his 

license to practice law in Iowa subject to the conditions set forth in this 

opinion. If Reilly has not met the preconditions of reinstatement set 

forth in this opinion by July 30, 2017, we will deny his application for 

reinstatement without further hearing unless he requests an extension of 

time. See id.

APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT PROVISIONALLY 

GRANTED SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THIS 

OPINION.

This opinion shall be published.