The pa rties and the district c ourt ref er to the or der dated Novembe r 3 0 , 2005 as the 1 “Oc tober 2005 order ” and the order dated April 4, 2006 as the “ Fe bruar y 2006 order ,” re fer encing the date on w hich the hea ring s on these orde rs wer e held. We will do the same. As the par

ties share the same sur

name, we will refe renc e their f irst names. 2 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 308 -CV

M ar ga r e t A nne Er le wine , A ppe lla nt

v. Mark Erlewine , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 98- 1266 4 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Citi ng e v id e n c e o f

v ar io u s b e h a v io r s o f

h is e x- w if

e , M ar g ar e t E r le w in e , M a rk Erlewine obtained a suc cession of f ive protec tive order s over a 16-month period—a

final protec tive order dated Ma

rch 22, 2005, w hich expired in J uly 2 0 0 5 ; temporary protec tive order s dated Septem b er 1 5 , 2005, November 30, 2005 (the “ October 2005 order ” ), and A

pril 4, 2006 1 (t he “ F e br ua ry 20 06 or de r” ); and

a fi na l pro te c tiv e or de r da te d J un e 7, 20 06 , w hic h r e ma ins in e ff e c t. These or ders we re g rante d following evidentiar y hear ings b e f

o r e s e v e r a l d if

fer ent Travis County

trial judge s. The cur

rent prote ctive orde r prohibits Marg are t from com m i t t i n g family violence, see 2 Te x. F a m. C od e An

n. § 7 1. 00 4 ( Wes t 20 02 ), and fr om c omm

un ic a tin g wi th M ark ; th e 12 -y e a r- oldI n addition to pursuing this appe al, Marg are t fi l ed a p et i t ion for wr it of mandamus 3 challeng ing the J une 2006 protec tive order . This Court denied the petition on October 19, 2006. See In re M argaret A. Erlewine , No. 03-06-00533- CV (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 19, 2006). 2 son of t heir former marriag e, J.J .; and Mark’ s wife, Dia nne, except throug h an attorne y . Marg are t appea ls. Whil e it is difficult to disc ern her prec ise complaints from her pro se br ie fi ng , w e lib e ra lly construe he r ar g uments to conce rn (1) the Marc h 2005 final protec tive order ; (2) the Nove mber 30, 2005 temporar

y protec tive order ; and (3) the curr ent J une 7, 2006, final protec tive order
. We 3

a ff ir m. As an in iti a l matte r, we no te that sev e ra l of Marg are t’ s com pla int s ar e no t pr op e rl y befor e us. I n her se cond issue, Mar g are t asserts that the Ma rch 2005 pr o t ec tive order was not—contrar

y to its title and the repr esentations of he r attorne y —an “A g ree d Protective Or der” and that she did not consent to i t. I n her f ifth issue, Marg are t contends that Mar k’s application for the Marc h 2005 order

did not comply

with cer tain require ments of the fa mily code. T he Mar ch 2005 order was a family -vi o l en ce protec tive order
. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 85.001, 85.022 (West 2002). Fa

mily -violence protec tive order s that dispose of all par ties and issues ar e fina l and appealable despite the trial c ourt’s continuing jurisdiction to modi fy the orde r. B.C. v . Rhodes , 116 S.W .3d 87 8 , 8 81-82 (Te x . App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). The Marc h 2005 order disposed of all issues and par

ties—Mark a lleg ed ac tions by Marg are t that he claimed e ntitled him t o the protec tive order , the district court re solved this issue in Mark’s favor, and pr ohibited Marg are t from communicating w i t h o r contacting Ma rk, Dianne , and J.J . The duration of the protec tive order did no t de pe nd

on fu rt he r a c tio n b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt , b ut s pe c if ie d a n e xpir a tio n date of

July 21, 2005. Thus, the Marc h 2005 order disposed of all par

ties and issues and wa s, theref ore, f inalI n h e r r e ply br ie f, Marg are t c on te nd s that the pr ote c tiv e or de r wa s no t fi na l be c a us e it d id 4 not comply

with all of the requirements in the family code. Such a

complaint conce rns whethe r the or de r w a s e rr on e ou s, no t w he the r i t w a s f ina l an d a pp e a la ble . M arg are t a lso a sse rt s a rgume nts in her r eply brief to the e ffe ct that there was no “trial” prec eding the M arc h 2005 order and that she ha d “no ability

to mention complaints to the trial court reg arding the application [for the protec tive order ] befor e [the order ] was render ed.” Even if this complaint is not fore closed by her f ailure to a ppeal the Marc h order , the re cord r eflect s t h at M arg are t appea red be fore the district court throug h her attorney of re cord a

nd that Marg are t’s attorney signe d the orde r. 3 and appe alable. See R hodes , 1 16 S.W. 3d a t 88 2; se e als o Ke lt v. Ke lt , 67 S.W .3d 364, 366 4 (T e x 200 1 n o p e t.) ; Cooke v . Cooke , 65 S.W
. 3 d 7 8 5, 787-88 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2001, no pe t.); Striedel v. Striedel , 15 S.W .3d 163, 164-65 (Tex
. Ap p . — C o rpus Christi 2000, no pet.); W insett v. Edgar , 2 2 S. W.3 d 5 09 , 510 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 1 99 9, no pe t.) ; J

am es v . H ub ba rd , 985 S.W .2d 516, 518 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Marg are t did not ti mely perf ect a n appea l from this final order
. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 26 .1 . Sh e ha s, a c c or din g ly , w a ive d a ny e rr or in the Marc h 2005 order
. See Tex. R. App. P . 33.1(a)
.

Simi larly , we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over Mar g are t’s complaints reg arding the Octobe r 2005 tempora ry protec tive order

beca use they are moot. I n h er fi rs t issue, Marg are t
asser ts that there wa s no evidenc e to support t he is suance of t he October 2005 temporary protec tive order . I n her f

ourth issue, Marg are t argues that the district cour t’s decision to issue the temporar y order was influenc ed by

perjure d testimony . I n her sixth i ssue, Marg are t asserts that the modification of child support orde red in t h e t emporary order was improper . The Oc tober 2005 orde r
was ex p re s s l y denoted “ temporar y ” and is no long er in e ffe ct. The same is true of the other temporar y o r d e r s in th is c a s e ; t

h e y a ll h a v e b e e ns u

p e r s e d e d b y th e Ju n e 7 , 2 0 0 6 f

in a l p r o te ctive
o r d e r . Co mp la in ts r e lati n g to te mp o r ar y o r d e r s th a t h a v e s in c e b e e n s u p e r s e d e d b y a f

in al orde rSub se qu e nt t o th e su bmi ssi on of thi s c a

us e , Ma rk fi le d a “ Mo tio n to Str ike Ap pe nd ix I Ito 5 Appellant’s Ame nded and Corr ecte d Br ief,” arguing that he was no t serve d with a copy of the appendix. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.5( a). Additionally , Mark contends that the appendi x co n t ains d o c u me n ts th a t a

r e o u ts id e o f

th e r e c o r d

an d , th e r e f

o r e , s h o u ld

n o t b e c o n sidered. Se e Car lis le v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 805 S.W .2d 498, 501 (Tex. App
. — Aus tin 1991, writ denied). We g rant Mark’ s motion t o strike as to docume nts not in t he re cord. 4 are moot. See In re K.L.R. , 16 2 S.W. 3d 29 1, 30 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —T y le r 2 00 5, no pe t.) ; In re M .C.M. , 57 S.W. 3d 27 , 37 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Di st. ] 2 00 1, pe t. d e nie d) ; In re P.R. , 994 S.W .2d 411, 417 (Tex. A

pp.—For t Worth 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.), disapproved on other grounds , In re J .F .C. , 9 6 S .W.3d 256, 267 & n.39 (Te x . 2002); W right v. W

entzel , 7 4 9 S. W. 2 d 2 2 8 , 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1988, no writ).

I n her third issue, Ma

rg are t challeng es the suff

iciency of t he evidence suppor ting the
curr ent J une 2006 prote ctive orde r. We, a ccor dingly , survey the evidenc e pre sented to the district
c ou rt
. T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt h e ar d e v id e n c e th a t M ar k an d M ar g ar e t d iv o r c e d in 1 9 9 9 an d that the 5 divorce decr ee a llowed Marg are t on ly limit ed visitation with J .J . throug h “Kids Exchang e,” a service that pr ov ide s su

pe rv ise d v isi ta tio n f

or c hil dr e n a

nd the ir pa re nts
. Mark testified that he and Ma rg are t rea ched an “o ra l agreement” in 2001 allowing Marg are t mo re c on ta c t with J.J. Mark e xpla ine d, ho we ve r, that J.J.’ s b e havio r s oo n b e c a me “ e rr a tic
an d d i s r u p t i v e , ” a n d

t h a tJ. J. ’ s c o u n s e l o r

a t t r i b u t e d t h i s b e h a v i o r t o M ar g ar e t ’ s “ v e r b a l a b u s e ” o f J. J. I n 2003, Mark de cided to ter minate the informa l arra

ng ement with Marg are t and the par ties resumed vis itatio n a c c or din g to t

he div or c e de c re e ’s te rm s. Mark f urther te stified that

o nM ar ch 2 , 2 0 0 5 , M ar gar et ap p ea re d u n ex p ec t ed l y

at J
. J .’s school. The sc hool notified Mark of he r appe ara nce a nd Mark, concer

ned about Marg are t’s behavior5

and it s eff

ect on J.J ., instructed a sc hool official to kee p J .J . awa y from Mar g are t. The nig ht following this incident, J .J
. was “very upset, shaking , very nervous.” The ne x t day , Mark a pplied for a protec tive order

ag ainst Marg are t. The district court sig ned the or der on Ma rch 22. The March 22, 2005 order prohibited Marg are t from (1) committing family violence, (2) c ommunicating directly with Mark, J .J ., or Dianne except throug h an attorne y or other a ppointed repr esentative, (3 ) go i n g to or nea r Mar k’s home, J.J .’s school, or a ny place wher e J.J .’s extracurr icular activities took pla ce, (4) removing J .J
. from Mark’ s custody , (5) c ontacting the police or Child Protective Service s reg ardingJ .J ., and (6) rec eivi n g an y i n formation about J.J .’s school activities. Additionally , Marg are t was orde red to be g in co u n s el ing w ithin 30 day s from the date of the orde r. The prote ctive orde r expired on J uly 21, 2005. On J uly

22, Mark f

iled an application fo r a no the r p ro te c tiv e or de r a lle g ingthat Ma rg are t ha d v iol a te d th e Marc h o rd e r b y fa ili ngto b e g in
cou n s el i n g an d by

sending a ca

rd direc tly

to J .J . with a stamp on the enve lope that re ad, “Stop Family Violence .” The district court signed a temporar y protec tive order

on September 15, 2005. Th e Se pte mbe r o rd e r c on ta ine d th e same re qu ir e me nts a s th e pr e vio us ord er bu t a dd iti on a lly p ro h i b i t edM ar gar et fr o m co m m u n i ca t i n g a t h re at t o M ar k , J
. J
. , o r D i an n e, en gagi n g i nh ar as s i n g,
ann oying , a larm ing , a

bu siv e , to rm e nti ng , o r e mba rr a ssi ngc on du c t to wa

rd the m, a nd g oin g ne a r t

he ir residenc e or pla ces of

employ ment. The orde r also set a hear ing f or Oc tober 24. At the October 24 hear ing, the district court hea rd evide nce of

Marg are t’s violation of the Mar ch and Septe mber orde rs. The district c ourt enter ed another temporar y protec tive order (the Oc tober 2005 orde r) pr ohibiting the same c onduct as the pr ior order s but additionally order ing6

Marg are t to obtain a psy cholog ical evaluation by J anuar y 15, 2006. The district cour t set a hea ring for Apr il 28, 2006 to determine whe ther a final protec tive order

should be enter ed. On Fe bruar

y 2, 20 0 6 , the district court e x tended the de adline for Marg are t’s psy cholog ical eva luation and orde red that the psy cholog ical re port be prepa red befor e the April 28 hear ing. T he district cour t entere d another

temporar y protec tive order

(the F ebrua

ry 2006 order ), simil ar to the othe rs preceding it. This order contained an additi onal requirement that Marg are t not communicate a

threat or eng ag e in har assing , an n o y i ng , alar ming, a busive, tormenting , or embar rassing conduct towa

rd Mar k’s attorne y

of re cord. At the final hear ing on A pril 28, Marg are t testified that she had c ompleted the ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio n b ut w a s una ble to p ro du c e it f

or the dis tr ic t court be c a

us e the ps y c ho log ist would not relea se the re port “until it’s paid in full.” Marg are t claimed that she w as unable to pay for the evalu a ti o n . H o w e v e r , M ar g ar e t a d mi tt e d to b e in g e mp lo y e d

w h e nth e c o u rt f

ir s t o r d e r ed
c ouns e lin g and to be ing a ble to af fo rd a ne w ca

r that sh e purc ha se d in

Janu ary 20 06 . T he mon thl y pay ments on t h e ca r wer e $324.00. When aske d if she wa s curr ently in counseling , Marg are t
c la ime d th a t sh e wa s b ut wa s una ble to re c a ll the la st name of he r co un se lor . M arg are t a dmi tte d to usi n g t h e “Stop Family

Violence ” stamp in a letter to J .J . but claimed that the postca rd “w ent throug h” her attorney
. Marg are t also admitted to sending J.J . an ema il in viol ation of the prote ctive order but only beca use “the re w as no off

icer of the c ourt to g o thr o u gh
. ” At o n e p oint during the hear ing, the district court aske d Marg are t, “Do y ou ag ree that these letter s and ca rds that y o u sent violate J udg e Meur er’ s protective order from Fe bruar y ? ” Marg are t a dmitted, “ They do. But I had no other wa

y to send a letter

to my child.”7 The district cour

t also hear d testimony

from Dr . Gai l J o h n son, a g uardia n ad litem appointed by the district c ourt in October “to direc t Ms. Erlewine to a psycholog ist for an e valuation, and to monitor cou n s eli ng that would proce ed fr om there.” Dr. Johnson t estified that she spoke with Marg are t severa l times following her appointment “to try

an d deter mine a psy cholog ist” but that Ma rg are t in dic a te d to he r that sh e did no t in te nd

to o bta in a

ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio n b e c a us e “she w as in the proc ess of a ppealingthe pre vious court dec i s i o n s . ” J o h nson testified that she had diffic ulty

fulfi l l i n g her duties a s g uardia n beca use “Ma rg are t wasn’t par

ticipating.” J ohnson
e xpla ine d th a t Ma

rg are t’ s th ou g hts on cou nsel ing wo uld of te n “ fl uc tuate ” in t

hat sh e wo uld sometimes w ant to r ece ive counseling but othe r times w ould not. Acc ording to J ohnson, Marg are t eventua lly

ag ree d to be eva luated by a cour t-order ed psy cholog ist, Dr. Stephen Thorne . J ohnson testified that Dr. Thor

ne had “ completed his mee tings” with Marg aret b u t h ad not finished his e va luatio n be c a

us e he wa s “ wa iti ng fo r fu rt he r pa y me nt” fr om Ma

rg are t. John so n als o
s u m m a r i z e d D r . T h o r n e ’ s f i n d i n g s : M ar g ar e t h a d a “ h i g h l e v e l o f c o n f u s i o n ” an d “ w a s n o ta l w a ys in tou c h w ithre a lity .” Dr . T ho rn e a lso re c omm e nd e d th a t “ so me sa fe g ua rd s n e e de d to be pu t in place for the c hild.”

During Mark’ s testimony , the district court a sked him questions about J .J .’s welf are : Q: Has [J .J .] ex presse d conce rns about see ing his mother? A: He ha s. I ’ve a sked him numerous times if he would like to see his mother. He fe e ls that sh e ne e ds tr e a tme nt be fo re he wo uld de c ide wh e the r h e wa

nts to see he r. He ’s conc erne d about her mental state. Q: Do y ou be lie ve he wo uld be in fe ar if he sa w he r [sho w] up a t [J.J .’ s] sc ho ol? A: Yes, I

do.8

Q: And what would he be in fe ar of ? A: Fe ar of not knowing wh at h er i n t entions [were] or how she would behave the re a t sc ho ol w ithhim
. M ar k ’ s an s w e r s t o M ar g ar e t ’ s i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s w e r e a l s o a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e . In the ans we rs , M ark

de sc ri be d in

de ta il n ume ro us inc ide nts of

wh a t Mar k char a c te ri zed a s f a mil y violence c ommitt ed by

Marg are t betwee n 2003 and 2005, including sta lking J.J ., endang eringJ .J .’s
sa fe ty , thre a te nin g a nd

ha ra ssi ngMark

and Di ann e , a

nd e ng a g ingin v e rb a lly

and e mot ion a lly
a b u s i v e b e h a v i o r

t o w ar d J. J. Whe n a sk e d if

Marg are t ha d v iol a te d th e F e br ua ry 20 06 or de r, Mark

re pli e d, “ Ye s, sh e ha s, by

se nd ingle tte rs and

e ma ils , a nd no t c omp le tin g the ps y c ho log ic a l eva luatio n. ” Mark a lso d e s c r i b e d an i n c i d e n t i n w h i c h M ar g ar e t s h o w e d u p a t t h e h o m e o f o n e o f J. J. ’ s f r i e n ds . T his
surp ri se d M ark , “ be c a

us e Marg are t is fu lly

awa re tha t [J.J.] spe nd s a lot

of tim e ov e r t

he re and c ou ld well have been the re, a

nd that’s a dire ct violation of the protec tive order .” At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the district court found that Ma rg are t “has intentionally

violated numerous pr ovisions of the M ar ch 2005 protec tive order and the F ebrua

ry 20 06 te mpo ra

ry pr ote c tiv e or de r. ” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt fu rt he r f ound that Ma rg are t “ ha d th e a

bil ity to pay for he r psy cholog ical eva luation pr ior to the hear ing toda y , and that she intentionally did not pay the re maining ba lance so that the eva luation would not be available to the Court today .”

“B ased on the numerous violations of the prior protec tive order s,” the district court enter ed a two- y ea r protective orde r ag ainst Marg are t. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85.002Se c tio n 8 5. 00 2 p ro vid e s: 6 I f the c ourt finds that a re spondent violated a protec tive order by committing an a ct prohibited by

the orde r as provided by

Section 85.022, that the orde r wa s in effe ct at the time of the violation, and that the or der ha s ex p i re d after the date that the violation occurr ed, the court, without the necessity of m aking the finding s descr ibed by Section 85.001(a) , shall rende r a pr otective order as provided by

Section 85.022 applying only

to the responde nt and may rende r a pr otective or d er as provided by Section 85.021. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85.002 ( West 2002). Marg are t devotes much of he r brief ing unde r t his issue to the question of whe ther sec tion 7 85.002 applied to the Marc h 2005 and F ebrua ry 2006 order s. Marg are t asserts that the Ma rch 2005 order was not a f

inal order but an ex parte temporar y order and that the F ebrua

ry 2006 order

was a n inv a lid e xten sio n o f t

he Marc h 200 5 ord e r. Ho we ve r, Ma rg are t ne ve r p re se nte d th e se argume nts to the district court. The ref

ore, the y are waived. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 33 .1 (a ); se e als o M

an sfi e ld S tat e Bank v . Cohn , 5 73 S.W. 2d 18 1, 18 5 (T e x. 19 78 ) (“ L iti g ants wh o re pr e se nt the mse lve s mu st c omp ly wi th the a pp lic a ble pr oc e dura l ru le s, or e lse the y wo uld be g ive n a

n unf a ir a dv anta g e ov e r l iti g a nts repr esente d by

counsel.” ). 9 ( We s t 2002). The prote ctive orde r conta ined the same prohibitions as the previous orde rs but

6 included the following additional prohibitions: “[Marg are t] will not have the rig ht to be informed of or c onsulted conce rning the child. She will not have the r ight to ac cess the c hild’s r ecor ds. She wi ll not have the ri g ht to co ns ult wi th t he pr of e ssi on a ls i nv olv e d w iththe c hil d unle ss s pe c if ic a lly reque sted by

that profe ssional.” The district c ourt further order ed that Mar g are t would not have any visits wi t h J .J . until she completed her psy cholog ical eva luation with Dr. Thorne . The orde r wa s signe d on J une 7, 2006.

I n h er third issue, Marg are t attacks the le g al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the district
c ourt ’s fi nd ing s th a t Marg are t vio la te d the Ma rc h 20 05 and F e br

ua ry 20 06 or de rs . A district court’s 7 finding s of fac t a

re revie wed for leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e under the same leg al standards a s jury

verdic ts. Ortiz v. Jones , 9 1 7 S
. W
. 2 d 7 7 0 , 7 7 2 (T ex . 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g An de rso n v . Ci tyMarg are t seems to argue in her brief that the di strict court’s findings should be reviewe d 8 fo r b oth le g a l and fa c tua l suf fi c ie nc y and

a bu se of dis c re tio n. I t is tr

ue that in so me fa mil y law c a se s, we a pply a hy brid standar d of re view to t he dis trict court’s f indings. See, e .g. , Ze ifm an v . M ic he ls , 212 S.W .3d 582, 587-88 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) ( suit to m odify conser vatorship). Howeve r, the supre me cour t has explained that in case s wher e the rele vant s tatute provides that the tr ia l c ourt “ sh all enter an orde r,” the trial court has no discretion and acts primarily as a f actf inder. See I n re Doe , 19 S.W .3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000). I n such ca ses, we a pply the normal leg al and f

actua l sufficie ncy

standard of

revie w. Se e id . This is such a case . Section 85.002 provides, “I f the c ourt finds that a responde nt violate d a protec tive order by committing an act prohibited by the orde r as provided by

Section 85.022, that the orde r wa s in effe ct at the time of the violation, and that the orde r has expired a ft er the date that the violation occ urre d, the cour t . . . sh all

rende r a pr otective order . . . .” Te x . Fa

m. Code Ann. § 85.002 (empha sis added). Thus, w e do not re view the or der f or abuse of discretion. 10 of S e v e n P oin ts , 806 S.W .2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991)). When review i n g the evidenc e for leg al 8 sufficie ncy , we consider the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the challeng ed finding , cre diting fa vo r a b l e e v i d e n c e i f a r e a s o n a b l e f a c t
- f i n d e r c o u l d an d d i s r e g ar d i n g c o n t r ar y e v i d e n c e u n l e ss a
rea sonable fa ct -f

i n d er could not
. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is leg ally

insufficient if the r ecor d reve als: (a) the complete a bsence of a vital fa ct; (b) the
c ourt is b arr e d b y

ru le s o f l aw o r o f e vid e nc e fr om g ivi ngwe ig ht t o th e on ly e vid e nc e of

fe re d to prove a vital fac t; (c) the evidence offer ed to prove a vital fac t is no more than a mer e scintilla; or (d) the e vidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fa ct. Id . at 81 0. Ev ide nc e is leg ally sufficie nt if it would enable fair- minded people to r eac h the finding or ver dict under r eview. Id . at 827. I n revie wing a factual sufficiency point, we weig h all of the e vidence in the rec ord. See So uth weste rn Be ll Te l. Co. v . G ar za , 1 64 S.W. 3d

60 7, 63 1 ( Te x. 20 04 ); Jones , 917 S.W .2d at 772. Finding s may

be over turned only

if they are so ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e as to be clea

rly wrongand unjust. J

o nes , 9 1 7 S
. W
. 2 d

at 7 7 2 (c i t i n g Cai n v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986)).11 Marg are t c on te nd s th a t be c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

di d n ot m a ke a

fi nd ingof

fa mil y violence, the re is insuffic ient evidenc e to support the orde r. B efo re i s s u ing a family -violence pr ote c tiv e or de r, the dis tr ic t c ourt us ua lly mus t f ir st f ind that f a mil y vio le nc e ha s o c c ur

re d a nd is likely to occur in the future. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85.001( a) ( West 2002). Howeve r, such a finding is not n ec es s ar y “[ i] f the c ourt finds that a re spondent violated a pr otective or der by committing an a ct prohibited by the orde r as provided by Section 85.022, that the order was in effe ct at the time of the violation, and that th e order has expired af

ter the date that the violation
occur red.” Id . 85.002. There was legal l y and fa ctually sufficie nt evidence to support the district court’s finding s that Marg are t violated t he March 2005 and Februa ry 2006 order s. The March 2005 orde r prohibited Marg are t f

rom communicating with J .J . except throug h an attorne y . Marg are t admitted that she s en t a ca rd t o J .J . in J une 2005 using an enve lope with a “Stop Fa mily Violence ” stamp. Although Ma

rg are t claimed that this communicat ion “went throug h” her attorney , a copy

of the
env elo pe wa s a dmi tte d in to e vid e nc e , a nd it h a d M arg are t’ s h and

wr itt e n n a me and

re tur n a dd re ss on it. A rea sonable fa ct-finde r could conclude fr om this evidence that Marg are t sent the l e t t e r d i r e c t l y t o J. J. Th e F e br ua ry 20 06 or de r a lso pr oh ibi t e d M arg are t f ro m c omm

un ic a tin g dir e c tly

wi th J .J . Marg are t a dmitted that in Ma rch 2006 she sent an email direc tly to J.J
. beca use “ther e was no office r of the court t o g o throug h.” A reasonable fac t-finder could credit this admissi on as evide nce that Marg aret vi ol a te d th e F e br ua ry 20 06 or de r. A r e a so na ble fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld a lso dis c re dit12

Marg are t’s testimony

that “ther e was no office r of the c ourt to g o throug h” bec ause a g uardia n
a d li te m ha d b e e n a

pp oin te d in

the c a se and

Ma rk wa s r e pr e se nte d b y

c ouns e l. Additionally , the Marc h 2005 order require d Marg are t to beg in counseling within 30 day s from the date of the or der w ith a “phy sician, psy cholog ist, or licensed ther apist or profe ssional
c ouns e lor ” re c omm e nd e d b y Dr . Su sa n M c Mil lan. Mark

te sti fi e d th a t Ma

rg are t di d no t do so beca use she ha d difficulty

working with Dr. McMillan. Dr. J o h n s o n al s o testified to Marg are t’s difficulty working with Dr. McMillan. A r ea s o n ab l e fact-f inder c ould cre dit this testimony as evidenc e that Mar g are t did not begin c ounseling as orde red.

Fur thermore , the Fe bruar

y 2006 order require d Marg are t to complete a psy cholog ical evaluation pr ior to the April 28 hear ing. Marg are t a dmitted that she did not complete the e valuation. Al tho ug h M arg are t c la ime d th a t sh e c ou ld n ot a ff or d to c omp le te the e va luatio n, a re a so na ble fa c tfi nd e r c ou ld c on c lud e tha t th is w a s n ot t

ru e in l ig ht o f M arg are t’ s te sti mony that sh e wa s a

ble to aff ord monthly

pay ments of $324.00 for a

new c ar that she purcha sed in J anuar y 2006. Th e F e br ua ry 20 06 or de r a lso e xpre ssl y pr oh ibi ted Mar gar e t f

ro m c omi ngwi thi n 200 y ards of

any place she re asonably

believed t h at J .J . might be. Ma rk testified that Mar g are t visited the home of one of J .J .’s friends in Ma rch 2006. Marg are t a dmitted to this, but cl aim ed that she wa s only

seekingto speak with the fr iend’s mother. Area sonable fa ct-f i n d er co uld view M ar k ’s testimony

and Mar g are t’s admission as further evidenc e that Mar g are t violated the Fe bruar y 2006 order
. Con sid e ri ng

the abo ve ev id ence i n t he l ight mo st favo rabl e to th e chal len ged fi nding s,
we c onclude that the e vidence is leg ally sufficie nt to s u p p o rt the district court’s f indings that13

M ar gar et v i o l at edt h e M ar ch 2 0 0 5 an d F e b ru a ry 2 0 0 6 o rd er s . W e a l s o co n cl u d e t h at t h e f i n d i n gs
are not so ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera n ce of the evidenc e as to be clea rly wrongand unjust. See J

ones , 9 17 S.W. 2d

a t 77 2. Th e re fo re , th e e vid e nc e is a lso fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o
su pp or t th e fi nd ing s. We overrule Marg are t’s third issue.
CO NC LU SION We a ff ir m th e or de r o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 29, 2007