UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-6376

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ROBERT CY MANN, a/k/a B,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District 

Judge. (2:98-cr-00047-RAJ-TEM-12)

Argued: January 26, 2010 Decided: April 9, 2010

Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Jenifer Wicks, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dana James Boente, 

United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia; Darryl J. 

Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Robert Mann of possession with intent to 

distribute crack cocaine and distribution of cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On January 15, 1999, the 

district court held a hearing to determine the drug quantities 

involved and sentenced Mann to 252 months’ imprisonment on each 

count, to run concurrently, plus five years of supervised 

release for each count, also to run concurrently.

On May 27, 2008, Mann moved for a reduction of sentence 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) and the crack cocaine 

amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” 

or “Guidelines”). U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 706, 711. On July 

14, 2008, the district court denied the motion, finding Mann 

“ineligible for an adjustment of sentence, as [his] drug weight 

exceeds 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base.”

On July 22, Mann moved pro se to alter or amend the July 14 

order, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The district court construed this motion as one for 

reconsideration and appointed counsel to represent Mann. On 

January 26, 2009, the district court granted the motion,

explaining that “after further review, . . . the record of the 

sentencing hearing does not sufficiently establish that 

Petitioner was explicitly held responsible for 4.5 kilograms of 

crack cocaine.” The Government noted this appeal.
3

We heard oral argument in this case on the same day as we 

heard argument in United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233 (4th 

Cir. 2010). In Goodwyn, the Government asserted that a district 

court does not have jurisdiction to reconsider a months-old 

order granting or denying a § 3582 motion for sentence 

reduction. We agreed, holding that the district court in that 

case lacked the authority to further reduce Goodwyn’s sentence 

after initially granting his § 3582(c)(2) motion.

Although represented by the same attorney, the Government

did not take the same approach in its brief in this case as it 

had in Goodwyn. On brief in the case at hand, the Government

made no jurisdictional argument. Failure to challenge 

jurisdiction, however, does not eliminate the need for this 

court “to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but 

also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.” United 

States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, after issuing our opinion in Goodwyn, we 

requested supplemental briefing in this case, affording Mann the 

opportunity to show a basis for jurisdiction here. Mann offers 

no legal authority for the sentence reduction other than 

§ 3582(c)(2). Rather, in addition to simply protesting the 

result in Goodwyn, Mann only argues that the district court in 

his case had the authority to reduce his sentence because
4

“[u]nlike in Goodwyn, here, the trial court did not grant a 

reduction in sentence twice.” Supp. Br. of Appellee at 2.*

When the Sentencing Commission reduces the Guidelines 

range applicable to a prisoner’s sentence, the 

prisoner has an opportunity pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) 

to persuade the district court to modify his sentence. 

If the result does not satisfy him, he may timely 

appeal it. But he may not, almost eight months later, 

ask the district court to reconsider its decision.

Our 

holding in Goodwyn forecloses this argument, for we there 

explained:

Goodwyn, 596 F.3d at 236.

Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant

Mann’s second request for a sentence reduction pursuant to 

§ 3582(c)(2). We therefore vacate the January 26, 2009 order 

granting Mann’s motion for reconsideration and reducing his 

sentence to 188 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run 

concurrently. We remand the case for reinstatement of the 252-

month concurrent sentences pronounced on January 15, 1999 and 

affirmed in the July 14, 2008 order.

VACATED AND REMANDED

 * Mann also contends that the Government waived any 

arguments challenging the district court’s jurisdiction, but, of 

course, “subject-matter jurisdiction can never be forfeited or 

waived” because “it involves a court’s power to hear a case.” 

United States v. Hartwell, 448 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2006) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).