IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-30715

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

DEMITORIS C. ALEXANDER, also known as Big Tachi, also known as Big 

Dog; COLIN Y. KNOX, also known as Niles, also known as Bearwolf,

 Defendants - Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:15-CR-83

Before CLEMENT, HAYNES, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendants Demitoris Alexander and Colin Knox were convicted of 

felony drug offenses. Alexander appeals two of his convictions and his 

sentence, arguing a lack of sufficiency of the evidence. Knox appeals his 

conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in excess of five kilograms 

(specifically challenging the amount of cocaine) and his sentence. But the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 5, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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record contains overwhelming evidence to support the challenged convictions. 

Several of Defendants’ sentencing arguments have either been waived or 

forfeited; applying appropriate standards of review, none prevail. We therefore 

AFFIRM.

I. Background

Alexander was a large-scale cocaine dealer in Louisiana with suppliers 

in Houston, Texas. For the drug syndicate’s trips to Houston, Alexander placed 

vacuum-sealed cash in the load car’s secret compartment. He paid women to 

drive back and forth from Houston. The drug suppliers removed cash from the 

secret compartment at an agreed upon location and replaced it with cocaine. 

Alexander would later rendezvous with the load car to pay the driver. Once 

one of Alexander’s associates removed the cocaine, the keys to the load car were 

returned to Alexander. After a close encounter with law enforcement, 

Alexander traveled to Houston to get a new load car, rented a storage unit for 

the car, and recruited a new driver, Andrea Rumore. 

Rumore was stopped by law enforcement on her second trip to Houston, 

and the load car was seized. Law enforcement discovered eighteen kilograms 

of cocaine in the secret compartment. Alexander stayed at Rumore’s house 

that night to watch her. He then changed his modus operandi. Houston 

suppliers began delivering cocaine to Louisiana, with Alexander paying for the 

drugs upon delivery. The first delivery to Alexander had over fifteen kilograms 

of cocaine. In the first nine months of 2013, Alexander’s associates sold over 

350 kilograms of cocaine that they received from him.

Kelly Williams was a large-scale cocaine dealer in Baton Rouge, 

Louisiana. Defendant Colin Knox was a member of Williams’s drug 

organization—Williams allowed Knox to party with him, and provided Knox 

money and drugs. In exchange, Knox served as Williams’s enforcer, using 

violence and threats when deemed necessary. For example, Knox went looking 

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to kill one of Williams’s customers over a pricing dispute. Knox knew Williams 

was a cocaine dealer, knew the quantities of cocaine Williams distributed, and 

was occasionally present for drug transactions. 

Count one of the second superseding indictment charged Alexander and 

Knox with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute five 

kilograms or more of cocaine. Count two charged Alexander with aiding and 

abetting the possession of five or more kilograms of cocaine with the intent to 

distribute. Counts three and four separately charged Alexander and Knox 

with unlawful use of a communications facility, i.e. using a phone to discuss 

the sale of cocaine. Alexander and Knox both proceeded to a jury trial. 

Williams, Rumore, Alexander’s cousin, and several of Alexander’s associates 

and load-car drivers testified at trial. At the conclusion of the government’s 

evidence, both Defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court denied both motions. The 

jury found both Defendants guilty on all counts, and specifically found that the 

conspiracy involved at least five kilograms of cocaine. 

The presentence report (PSR) determined that Alexander was 

responsible for 240 kilograms of cocaine, making his base offense level 36. The 

PSR also imposed enhancements for possession of a dangerous weapon, 

making credible threats to use violence and directing the use of violence, 

committing a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood, and being 

an organizer and leader of criminal activity that involved five or more 

participants. The enhancements made Alexander’s total offense level 46. The 

highest guideline level is 43, and the district court imposed a guidelines 

sentence of life imprisonment. 

Knox’s PSR determined that he was responsible for 25 kilograms of 

cocaine and calculated his total offense level as 38, which included a two-level 

enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The 

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obstruction enhancement stemmed from Knox threatening to kill Williams or 

anyone else who testified against him. The PSR also determined Knox was a 

career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because of prior Louisiana state 

convictions for manslaughter and possession with intent to distribute 

marijuana. The district court decreased the drug quantity attributable to 

Knox, making his total offense level 37. The district court imposed a low-end 

guideline sentence of 360 months of imprisonment.

Alexander and Knox filed timely appeals. We have jurisdiction over the 

appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Defendants make 

several arguments for why their convictions should be overturned and why 

their sentences were improper. Each argument is addressed below. 

II. Discussion

A. Alexander

1. The Government Presented Sufficient Evidence for the Drug Count

Alexander first argues the government did not present sufficient 

evidence for the jury to convict him of the substantive drug count. We assess

“whether the record evidence could reasonably support” the jury’s verdict. 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). Although we review the 

sufficiency of the evidence de novo, it is “highly deferential to the verdict.” 

United States v. Bowen, 818 F.3d 179, 186 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting

United States v. Beacham, 774 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2014)). “We view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give the 

government the benefit of all reasonable inferences and credibility choices.” 

United States v. Barnes, 803 F.3d 209, 216 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United 

States v. Williams, 507 F.3d 905, 908 (5th Cir. 2007)). 

To convict a defendant of possession with intent to distribute a controlled 

substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, the government must prove “(1) 

knowledge, (2) possession, and (3) intent to distribute the controlled 

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substance.” United States v. Mata, 491 F.3d 237, 242 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Alexander argues the government did not prove that he ever possessed the 

cocaine. But “[p]ossession may be actual or constructive, may be joint among 

several defendants, and may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.” 

United States v. Ramos-Cardenas, 524 F.3d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 2008) (per 

curiam). Constructive possession is “the knowing exercise of, or the knowing 

power or right to exercise dominion and control over the proscribed substance.” 

United States v. Molinar-Apodaca, 889 F.2d 1417, 1423 (5th Cir. 1989)

(quotation omitted). Alexander admits that his associates testified that he 

purchased the cocaine. There was also testimony that Alexander called 

suppliers in Houston to arrange cocaine purchases, put vacuum sealed cash in 

the secret compartment of load cars that the supplier would replace with 

cocaine, paid women to drive the load cars, would meet the driver upon arrival 

to pay her, and that his associates sold cocaine they received from Alexander. 

Thus, the government presented ample evidence for a jury to convict Alexander 

on the possession count. 

2. The Government Presented Sufficient Evidence for the Phone Count

Alexander next argues the government did not present sufficient 

evidence for the jury to convict him of the phone count. We review the 

sufficiency of the evidence under the same standard articulated above with 

respect to the drug count. To convict a defendant of unlawful use of a 

communications facility in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), the government must 

prove the defendant “(1) knowingly or intentionally (2) used a communications 

facility (3) to facilitate the commission of a drug offense.” United States v. 

Mankins, 135 F.3d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis removed). The 

government admitted three recordings of phone calls made by Alexander to an 

associate on July 14, 2013, to discuss the sale of cocaine. The associate 

identified Alexander’s voice on the recordings. In the first call, Alexander 

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instructed the associate to sell two kilograms of cocaine to the customer. In 

the second call, Alexander confirmed the identity of the customer. In the third 

call, Alexander asked whether the customer had been told where to go to 

complete the sale. Special agent Mark Lusco, who testified as an expert in 

drug trafficker terminology, corroborated the subject of the phone calls. The 

government therefore presented ample evidence for a jury to convict Alexander 

on the phone count.

3. Alexander Failed to Adequately Brief Sentencing Issues

Finally, Alexander attempts to challenge the district court’s 

determination of drug quantity and all four sentence enhancements. But his 

arguments are nothing more than conclusory assertions that the district court 

erred. An issue that is not adequately briefed is waived and will not be 

considered. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Because Alexander has failed to 

abide by the briefing requirements of Rule 28, his sentencing arguments are 

waived. See United States v. Reagan, 596 F.3d 251, 254–55 (5th Cir. 2010) 

(stating that a failure to explain arguments constitutes waiver for failure to 

brief). 

B. Knox

1. The Government Presented Sufficient Evidence for Drug Quantity

Knox first argues the government did not provide sufficient evidence for 

the jury to find he knew or should have known that the conspiracy involved at 

least five kilograms of cocaine. We review a jury’s finding regarding drug 

quantity de novo and assess whether the record evidence could reasonably 

support the jury’s verdict. See United States v. Daniels, 723 F.3d 562, 570 (5th 

Cir. 2013) (employing the Jackson standard of review for a challenge to a jury’s 

drug quantity finding). Knox was an enforcer in Williams’s cocaine 

distribution enterprise. At trial, Williams testified that he spoke with Knox 

almost daily, that Knox was occasionally present for drug transactions, and 

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that Knox was aware of the quantities Williams distributed. This constitutes 

sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Knox either knew or should have 

known that the conspiracy involved five or more kilograms of cocaine. We 

affirm his conviction.

2. There was No Clear Error for the Obstruction of Justice Enhancement

Knox next argues the district court erred when it imposed a sentencing 

enhancement for obstruction of justice. A district court’s determination that a 

defendant obstructed justice is a finding of fact that we review for clear error. 

United States v. Zamora-Salazar, 860 F.3d 826, 836 (5th Cir. 2017). The PSR 

provided detailed information regarding Knox’s threats to anyone who testified 

against him. Further, as the district court noted, Williams was attacked 

shortly after testifying at a pre-trial hearing. There was ample evidence to 

justify an obstruction enhancement. 

Because PSRs are presumed reliable, a sentencing court may adopt a 

PSR’s findings regarding obstruction of justice absent rebuttal evidence by the 

defendant. United States v. Rodriguez, 602 F.3d 346, 363 (5th Cir. 2010). 

Because Knox did not provide rebuttal evidence before the district court, it was 

“free to adopt the PSR’s findings without further inquiry or explanation.” Id. 

3. Knox Fails to Demonstrate Plain Error as to the Career Offender 

Status Determination

Finally, Knox argues that the district court erred in determining he is a

career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because the Louisiana crime of 

manslaughter is not categorically a crime of violence. We review de novo 

whether a prior conviction is a crime of violence. United States v. HernandezMontes, 831 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2016). At sentencing, Knox withdrew his 

objection to his career offender designation. Arguably, then, he waived his 

challenge. See, e.g., United States v. Musquiz, 45 F.3d 927, 932 (5th Cir. 1995)

(withdrawing an objection waives the challenge).

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The specific objection he now raises was never made so, assuming 

arguendo it is not waived, it must be reviewed for plain error. United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733–734 (1993). To demonstrate plain error, Knox must 

show there was an error, that the error was plain, and that the error affected 

his substantial rights. Id. at 732–34. Plain error is one that is so “clear or 

obvious” that it is not “subject to reasonable dispute.” Puckett v. United States, 

556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 

A felony offense is a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another” or is one of certain enumerated offenses, including voluntary 

manslaughter. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Whether a conviction is a crime of 

violence is determined using the “categorical approach”—we look only to the 

statutory elements and not to the facts underlying the defendant’s conviction. 

See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). The Government concedes 

that there is no basis to apply the modified categorical approach here because 

the underlying appropriate documents from this manslaughter conviction were 

never presented to the district court. The government also states that the 

Louisiana manslaughter statute is broader than generic manslaughter. 

Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31(A)(2) (defining “[a] homicide committed 

without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm” as manslaughter) with

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (requiring at least recklessness to qualify as 

manslaughter).

We need not decide whether Knox’s Louisiana manslaughter conviction 

qualifies as generic manslaughter because we conclude he fails to show plain 

error as to whether it qualifies as a “use of force” crime of violence. The full 

parameters of “use of force” in the context of a manslaughter statute such as 

this one are unclear. In United States v. Castleman, the Supreme Court stated, 

“[i]t is impossible to cause bodily injury without applying force in the common-

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law sense.” 572 U.S. 157, 170 (2014). In United States v. Reyes-Contreras, we 

overruled the distinction between direct and indirect force, but we left open the 

question of whether the negligent use of force or homicide by omission 

qualifies. 910 F.3d 169, 181–83 & n.25, 32 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc). Given the 

unresolved state of the law, it is not “clear” or “obvious” that Louisiana 

manslaughter is not a crime of violence. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Therefore, 

the district court did not commit plain error in characterizing Knox’s 

manslaughter conviction under Louisiana law as a crime of violence. See 

Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 273 (2013) (noting there is no plain 

error when the law is unsettled at the time of appellate review).

AFFIRMED. 

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