SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3075-17T4

DERRICK ROUNDTREE,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

Submitted January 16, 2019 – Decided 

Before Judges Koblitz, Currier, and Mayer. 

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of 

Corrections. 

Derrick Roundtree, appellant pro se. 

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Stephanie R. Dugger, 

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 14, 2019
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Appellant Derrick Roundtree, a State inmate, appeals from the 

Department of Corrections (DOC) finding that he was guilty of prohibited act 

*.306, conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running 

of the correctional facility, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). Because we 

conclude the hearing officer failed to articulate appropriate reasons for the 

imposed sanctions required under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.17(a), and Mejia v. New 

Jersey Department of Corrections, 446 N.J. Super. 369, 378-79 (App. Div. 

2016), we remand to the DOC for reconsideration of the sanctions.

After a correction officer noticed Roundtree had covered the observation 

camera in his cell, he approached the cell and found Roundtree had also covered 

the door with a sheet. The officer removed the sheet and observed Roundtree 

standing on his toilet. When asked to step down from the toilet, Roundtree 

refused. As multiple officers arrived to the scene, Roundtree came down from 

the toilet and uncovered the camera.

Roundtree requested, and was granted, a counsel substitute for the 

disciplinary hearing. He declined the opportunity to present witnesses or crossexamine any adverse witnesses.

The hearing officer found Roundtree guilty of *.306 and imposed 

sanctions of 180 days of administrative segregation, 365 days of loss of 
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commutation time, thirty days loss of recreational privileges, thirty days loss of 

canteen privileges, and thirty days loss of television and radio. The hearing

officer stated as reasons for the imposed sanctions that Roundtree "refused to 

calmly participate in the hearing. [Inmate] continues to violate policy and accrue 

charges. [Inmate] needs to follow rules for safety and security of others." 

The DOC reviewed and affirmed the findings and sanctions. The assistant 

superintendent stated: "The decision of the Hearing Officer was based on 

substantial evidence and the sanction is proportionate in view of the offense.

The facts were not misinterpreted. The plea for leniency is denied." 

Our role in reviewing a prison disciplinary decision is limited. Figueroa 

v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. 2010). In general, 

the decision must not be disturbed on appeal unless it was arbitrary, capricious, 

or unreasonable, or lacked the support of "substantial credible evidence in the 

record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)

(citation omitted). 

We will not, however, "perfunctorily review and rubber stamp the 

agency's decision." Balagun v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 361 N.J. Super. 199, 203 

(App. Div. 2003) (citations omitted). "Instead, we insist that the agency disclose 
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its reasons for any decision, even those based upon expertise, so that a proper, 

searching, and careful review by this court may be undertaken." Ibid. 

On appeal, Roundtree asserts there was no credible evidence to find him 

guilty of *.306, and he was deprived of his due process rights.

1 We discern no 

merit to these contentions.

A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing must be "based upon substantial 

evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-

9.15(a). We are satisfied Roundtree was afforded all of his due process rights 

regarding the hearing as articulated in Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525-33 

(1975). The substantial evidence presented at the hearing sustained the finding 

of guilt on *.306.

Roundtree was deprived, however, of an articulation of the reasons for the 

imposed sanctions. Id. at 533. Although under "reasons for sanction," the 

hearing officer informed that Roundtree did not participate calmly in the hearing 

and continued to violate rules and policy, these statements do not provide 

reasons for the particular sanctions imposed. 

A conviction under prohibited act *.306 results in a sanction of no less 

than ninety-one days and no more than 180 days of administrative segregation,

 

1 Roundtree does not specify which of his due process rights were violated. 
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as well as one or more of the additional sanctions required under N.J.A.C. 

10A:4-5.1(g). Roundtree was sanctioned to the maximum amount of 180 days 

of administrative segregation. The additional sanctions imposed of 365 days 

loss of commutation time and thirty days loss of several facility privileges were

the maximum amount of time that could be imposed for each sanction.

A hearing officer must provide an inmate with individualized reasons for 

the specific actions imposed. Malacow v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 

87, 97-98 (App. Div. 2018); Mejia, 446 N.J. Super. at 378-79. It is not sufficient 

to merely impose a sanction within the maximum authorized limits. Instead, the 

hearing officer must articulate the factors considered in the imposition of 

sanctions, so we may perform our review of "whether a sanction is imposed for 

permissible reasons." Mejia, 446 N.J. Super. at 379; see also N.J.A.C. 10A:4-

9.17(a) (providing factors to individualize particular sanctions).

We, therefore, remand for a reconsideration of the imposed sanctions. 

Appropriate reasons for the sanctions must be articulated using the factors listed 

in the administrative code. 

Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.