In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3270

Estate of Shannon Novack, deceased,

by its personal representative, Susan Turbin,

and Susan Turbin,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

County of Wood, a municipal corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 98-C-0850-S--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge.

Argued March 27, 2000--Decided August 7, 2000

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, Posner and Williams,

Circuit Judges.

 Flaum, Chief Judge. The estate of Shannon Novack

and Susan Turbin brought suit against the County

of Wood (the "County") under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983,

alleging that the County deprived Novack of his

Eighth Amendment rights when it failed to prevent

his suicide during his incarceration in the Wood

County Jail ("WCJ"). The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendant. For

the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

 On December 22, 1997, Shannon Novack was

diagnosed by Dr. Edward Root as a paranoid

schizophrenic who tended to be impulsive and who

was a possible suicide risk. Dr. Root prescribed

medication to address Novack’s condition. On

December 29, 1997, while he was with his mother

Susan Turbin and grandmother Gladys Jaehn, Novack

became agitated and threatened to kill himself.

Turbin convinced Novack to voluntarily commit

himself at the Norwood Mental Health Center

("Norwood"). However, when Turbin and Novack

arrived at Norwood, Novack changed his mind about

being committed and left the facility. 
 A short time later, Novack was arrested by an

officer from the Marshfield Police Department on

outstanding warrants and taken to the Marshfield

police station. Shortly thereafter, Wood County

Deputy Sheriff Rick Kirst transported Novack from

the police station to the Wood County Jail.

Deputy Kirst talked with Turbin and Kenneth

Wahlstrand, an employee at Norwood, regarding

Novack’s condition. Deputy Kirst told Turbin and

Wahlstrand that he would notify WCJ staff of

Novack’s potential for suicide and that jail

personnel would watch him closely. When Deputy

Kirst met with Deputy Raymond Starks to transfer

Novack to WCJ, he informed Starks that Novack was

a suicide risk and should be watched closely.

Neither Kirst nor Starks thought that Novack

behaved in an unusual manner during their contact

with him.

 Novack was booked into WCJ by Officer Denise

Ellis, who conducted a medical screening of

Novack as part of standard WCJ procedure. The

medical screening is intended to identify

physical or mental problems that an inmate may

possess. In his responses to the medical

screening questions, Novack indicated that he had

seen mental health professionals in the past,

including a visit to Dr. Root earlier in the

week, but stated that he was not considering

suicide and had never attempted suicide. Deputy

Starks then informed Officer Ellis that Novack

was a suicide risk and that WCJ staff should

watch him accordingly. Deputy Starks also told

Officer Ellis that Novack had been at Norwood

earlier in the day but had not been admitted.

Officer Ellis concluded that Novack had a

possible mental illness based on the information

provided by Deputy Starks and the medical

screening.

 Officer Ellis decided to place Novack in an

observation cell which is normally used for

inmates on suicide watch. The WCJ officer on duty

the following day was not informed of the reasons

for Novack’s placement in the observation cell.

Novack remained in the observation cell until

about 2:00 p.m. the next day when he was taken to

court and it was determined that he would remain

in custody because of a probation violation. Upon

his return from court, Novack was placed in a

two-person cell in the general jail population.

Officer King, the supervisor on duty at the time,

does not know who made the decision to place

Novack in the general population instead of in

the observation cell or why that decision was

made.

 The following day, December 31, 1997, Dr. Root

telephoned WCJ to prescribe new medication for

Novack. WCJ personnel filled the prescription and
administered the medication to Novack during the

remainder of his stay at WCJ.

 During the following two weeks, Annalee Miller,

an inmate housed in the cell next to Novack’s,

heard Novack pounding on the cell walls on a

daily basis and periodically giggling

uncontrollably. Miller reported Novack’s behavior

to WCJ officers and expressed concern that Novack

might be in need of mental health care. Novack’s

cell-mate Lewis England also saw Novack regularly

pounding on the cell walls and thought he was in

need of mental health care. However, WCJ

personnel did not observe any unusual behavior by

Novack during his stay at WCJ.

 At 10:00 p.m. on January 17, 1998, WCJ officers

entered Novack’s cell to give him his prescribed

medication. At 12:05 a.m. on January 18, jail

personnel returned to Novack’s cell and

discovered that Novack had hung himself using a

bed sheet. Susan Turbin, Novack’s mother, brought

suit on behalf of Novack’s estate and on her own

behalf against Wood County alleging that the

County had deprived her son of his Eighth

Amendment rights by having inadequate policies

and practices for treating mentally ill inmates

and by failing to adequately train WCJ personnel

to provide necessary mental health care to her

son that would have prevented his suicide. The

district court granted summary judgment in favor

of the County, and the plaintiffs now appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

 We review the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the County de novo. See

Johnson v. University of Wisc. Eau-Claire, 70

F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 1995). We look at all

evidence in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs and draw all reasonable inferences in

their favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

 Prison inmates have an Eighth Amendment right

to be confined under conditions that provide

"adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical

care." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526-27 (1984)). In addition, prison officials are

responsible for taking reasonable steps to

guarantee the safety of the inmates in their

charge. Id. To make out a claim for a violation

of an inmate’s Eighth Amendment right to adequate

conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must make

two showings: "First, the danger to the inmate

must be objectively serious, posing a substantial

risk of serious harm. Second, the prison official

must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind--

one of ’deliberate indifference’ to inmate health

or safety." Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640-41
(7th Cir. 1996); see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

 "Deliberate indifference," as it is used in the

Eighth Amendment context, comprehends more than

mere negligence but less than the purposeful or

knowing infliction of harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 836; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976); Haley, 86 F.3d at 641. Deliberate

indifference requires that a prison official know

of and disregard a substantial risk of serious

harm to inmate health or safety. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837. The deliberate indifference standard

is a subjective one. It is not enough that there

was a danger of which a prison official

objectively should have been aware. "[T]he

official must both be aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference." Id.

 Shannon Novack committed suicide while

incarcerated in the Wood County Jail. The

plaintiffs argue that Novack’s suicide was the

result of WCJ policies and practices that

reflected the County’s deliberate indifference to

the medical needs of mentally ill inmates.

Suicide is a "serious harm" and prison officials

must take reasonable preventative steps when they

are aware that there is a substantial risk that

an inmate may attempt to take his own life. See

Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 259 (7th

Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant prison

officials "may be liable for [an inmate’s]

suicide if they were deliberately indifferent to

a substantial suicide risk"); see also Collignon

v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 990 (7th Cir.

1998); Payne v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1041

(7th Cir. 1998). Mere knowledge that an inmate is

behaving violently or "acting in a ’freaky’

manner" is not sufficient to impute awareness of

a substantial risk of suicide. State Bank of St.

Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir.

1983); see also Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88,

91 (7th Cir. 1997). In order to be liable under

the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must be

cognizant of the significant likelihood that an

inmate may imminently seek to take his own life

and must fail to take reasonable steps to prevent

the inmate from performing this act. See

Collignon, 163 F.3d at 990 (holding that even

placing an inmate on suicide watch may not

demonstrate a subjective awareness of a

substantial risk of imminent suicide); Camic, 712

F.3d at 1146 (holding that officers took

reasonable measures to prevent an inmate’s

suicide where they were unaware that the inmate

was a high suicide risk but removed the

prisoner’s belt and shoe laces in order to guard

against suicide attempts). 
 In this case, when Shannon Novack was first

brought to the WCJ, jail officials were informed

that he had been at a mental health facility

earlier in the day and that he was a potential

risk for suicide. Novack was then questioned

concerning his mental health, and he responded

that he was not contemplating suicide and had

never attempted suicide. In addition, neither the

sheriff’s deputies who transported Novack to WCJ

nor the jail personnel who initially admitted him

were aware of any suicidal behavior exhibited by

Novack. Nevertheless, Novack was placed in an

observation cell until he was taken to court the

next day. Novack did not exhibit any suicidal

behavior during this time. When Novack’s

psychiatrist Dr. Root contacted the jail the next

day, he prescribed medication for Novack but did

not inform WCJ that Novack was a suicide risk.

Other inmates apparently informed jail personnel

that Novack was behaving strangely by pounding on

the walls of his cell and giggling. However,

strange behavior alone, without indications that

that behavior has a substantial likelihood of

taking a suicidal turn, is not sufficient to

impute subjective knowledge of a high suicide

risk to jail personnel. See Mathis, 120 F.3d at

91; Camic, 712 F.2d at 1146. Novack did not take

his life until more than two weeks after he was

incarcerated at WCJ. While he may have exhibited

some bizarre behavior during that time, he

evidenced no behavior that put jail officials on

notice that there was a significant likelihood

that he would attempt to harm himself. We cannot

conclude on this record that WCJ personnel were

subjectively aware that Novack posed a high risk

of suicide and were deliberately indifferent to

that risk.

 The plaintiffs argue, however, that WCJ

personnel would have been aware that Novack posed

a substantial suicide risk had they been

adequately trained to handle mentally ill

inmates. Ordinarily, a prison official does not

violate the Eighth Amendment when he should have

been aware of a risk that harm would befall an

inmate but was not actually subjectively aware of

that risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 ("[A]n

official’s failure to alleviate a significant

risk that he should have perceived but did not,

while no cause for commendation, cannot under our

cases be condemned as the infliction of

punishment."). However, a municipality, rather

than an individual, may violate the Eighth

Amendment where a risk of serious harm was so

patently obvious that the municipality must have

been aware of risk of harm and, by failing to act

to rectify it, sanctioned the harmful conduct.

See Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 152

(7th Cir. 1995); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841 (noting

that allegations that individual officers
violated Eighth Amendment rights are examined

using a subjective awareness standard while

allegations of municipal misconduct receive an

objective analysis).

 A municipality may be liable for harm to

persons incarcerated under its authority "if it

maintains a policy that sanctions the maintenance

of prison conditions that infringe upon the

constitutional rights of the prisoners." Payne,

161 F.3d at 1043. This liability is not founded

on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat

superior that holds a municipality responsible

for the misdeeds of its employees. See City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989);

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479

(1986). Rather, a municipal policy or practice

must be the "direct cause" or "moving force"

behind the constitutional violation. See City of

Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 820 (1985);

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385; Monell v.

Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978). In other words, "it is when execution of

a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts

the injury that the government as an entity is

responsible under sec. 1983." Monell, 436 U.S. at

694. That a constitutional injury was caused by

a municipality may be shown directly by

demonstrating that the policy itself is

unconstitutional. See id. at 694-95 (holding that

a municipality may be liable under sec. 1983 for

a policy that requires pregnant women to take

unpaid leave before leave was required for

medical reasons because the policy itself is

unconstitutional). Municipal liability may also

be demonstrated indirectly "by showing a series

of bad acts and inviting the court to infer from

them that the policymaking level of government

was bound to have noticed what was going on and

by failing to do anything must have encouraged or

at least condoned, thus in either event adopting,

the misconduct of subordinate officers." Jackson,

66 F.3d at 152.

 The plaintiffs argue that the policies in place

to train WCJ personnel on the proper treatment of

mentally ill inmates were so inadequate that the

County was on notice at the time Shannon Novack

was incarcerated that there was a substantial

risk that he would be deprived of necessary

medical care in violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights. The plaintiffs allege that because of

inadequate WCJ policies and practices concerning

the treatment of mentally ill inmates, WCJ

officers were unaware that Novack posed a

significant suicide risk and failed to take

reasonable steps to prevent him from taking his

own life.

 As noted above, the plaintiffs may prove their
allegation that the County was deliberately

indifferent to the constitutional violations WCJ

personnel were inflicting on mentally ill inmates

by presenting either a series of unconstitutional

acts from which it may be inferred that the

County knew WCJ officers were violating the

constitutional rights of WCJ inmates and did

nothing or by direct evidence that the WCJ

policies, practices or training methods were

unconstitutional. Plaintiffs have not shown that

there was a pattern of suicide at WCJ from which

we can draw the inference that the County was

aware that WCJ policies for treating mentally ill

inmates at risk for suicide were inadequate and

chose to do nothing in the face of this

knowledge. Even if we were to find that Novack’s

suicide itself was a result of unconstitutional

conduct, a single instance of allegedly

unconstitutional conduct does not demonstrate a

municipality’s deliberate indifference to the

constitutional rights of its inhabitants./1 See

Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24 ("Proof of a single

incident of unconstitutional activity is not

sufficient to impose liability under Monell,

unless proof of the incident includes proof that

it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional

municipal policy."); Jackson, 66 F.3d at 152. In

the absence of a series of constitutional

violations from which deliberate indifference can

be inferred, the plaintiffs must show that the

policy itself is unconstitutional.

 As evidence that WCJ policies themselves were

constitutionally inadequate the plaintiffs first

point to several instances where the policies and

practice of WCJ differ from the requirements of

state statute./2 While state law violations

should be of concern to Wood County and the State

of Wisconsin, they do not form the basis for

imposing sec. 1983 liability. See White v. Olig,

56 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1995); Burgess v.

Ryan, 996 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir. 1993); Martin

v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1455 (7th Cir. 1988). It

is only when municipal policy fails to meet

federal constitutional or statutory standards

that sec. 1983 liability may be imposed. See

Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 816. Section 1983 provides no

remedy for failure to meet state law

requirements.

 Next, the plaintiffs present expert testimony

from a psychiatrist who points out numerous flaws

in the WCJ policies for treating mentally ill

inmates and states the opinion that these

deficiencies contributed to Novack’s death. While

the expert’s opinion may demonstrate that WCJ

personnel could have done more to become aware of

the danger that Novack posed to himself based on

the strange behavior that he was exhibiting, that

opinion does not indicate that WCJ policies
caused jail personnel to be deliberately

indifferent in the face of a patently obvious

suicide risk. In other words, the evidence

presented by the plaintiffs has not shown that

but for WCJ policies, WCJ personnel would have

been aware that Novack posed a high risk of

suicide and would have taken reasonable steps to

prevent him from taking his own life. We have

found that WCJ officers in this case were not

deliberately indifferent to the suicide risk

posed by Novack, and we cannot conclude that the

officers would have been aware of that risk had

it not been for the County policies that caused

their deliberate indifference./3 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the defendant is

Affirmed.

/1 While the plaintiffs make reference in their

Statement of Facts to another suicide that

occurred at WCJ one month prior to Novack’s

incarceration, they do not argue that this

incident put WCJ on notice that its policies and

practices posed a substantial risk to the safety

of WCJ inmates.

/2 The plaintiffs assert that WCJ policy and

practice did not comport with state statutes

requiring more frequent observation of mentally

ill inmates than inmates in the general

population, documentation of observation of

inmates, maintenance of procedures for addressing

non-emergency medical situations, and segregation

of mentally ill inmates from non-mentally ill

inmates.

/3 The dissent contends that WCJ personnel’s "bad

acts" of "routinely" ignoring several WCJ

policies could create an inference that the

County was deliberately indifferent to Novack’s

Eighth Amendment rights. However, the "bad acts"

from which municipal liability may be indirectly

inferred must be a "pattern of conduct or a

series of acts violative of constitutional

rights." Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639,

651 (7th Cir. 1981). The plaintiffs have not

presented any evidence that WCJ personnel

regularly ignored established WCJ policies,

rather than simply failing to follow certain

policies in the singular instance of their

treatment of Novack. Furthermore, the failure to

follow a policy calling for documenting an

inmate’s refusal to eat or for frequently

observing an inmate who is on suicide watch is
not itself an infliction of cruel or unusual

punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment.

See, e.g., Estate of Cole, 94 F.3d at 261

(holding that failure to observe an inmate who

was on suicide watch more frequently than once

each hour did not violate the Eighth Amendment);

Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1427 (7th

Cir. 1996) ("In order to violate the Eighth

Amendment, the condition of confinement must be

a denial of ’basic human needs’ or ’the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.’")

(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981)). Because the plaintiffs have not

presented evidence of a "series" of

constitutional violations, or of any

constitutional violations at all, there is no

"bad acts" evidence from which County liability

may be inferred under Monnel.

 In the absence of indirect evidence, the

plaintiffs are required to show that WCJ policies

themselves are unconstitutional. However, WCJ

policies call for jail personnel to evaluate

inmates for suicide risk and take reasonable

measures to protect inmates when they become

aware that a risk is present. The plaintiffs do

not claim at this stage that WCJ personnel were

inadequately trained to carry out these policies.

While we agree with the dissent that there are

additional policies that could improve WCJ’s

treatment of its mentally ill inmates, the

plaintiffs’ proffered evidence does not

demonstrate that WCJ’s existing policies fall

below the constitutional standards mandated by

the Eighth Amendment. See Anderson v. Romero, 72

F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The Eighth

Amendment forbids cruel and unusual punishments;

it does not require the most intelligent,

progressive, humane, or efficacious prison

administration.").

 Williams, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I generally

agree with my colleagues’ legal analysis but find

that genuine issues of material fact preclude

summary judgment. I agree with the majority’s

determination that the Eighth Amendment is

implicated only when prison officials are

cognizant of a significant likelihood that an

inmate may imminently seek to take his own life.

Thus, we have not found prison officials liable

for prison suicides without an allegation of

suicidal tendencies, evidence of past suicide

attempts, or warnings of suicidal conditions. See
Payne v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1042 (7th Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1004 (1999).

Moreover, behaving in a strange or bizarre manner

is not enough to put prison officials on notice

that an inmate is a substantial suicide risk. See

Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88 (7th Cir. 1997);

State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140

(7th Cir. 1983). 

 In Novack’s case, however, genuine issues of

material fact exist for a reasonable jury to find

that prison officials were aware of a substantial

risk that he may imminently commit suicide. For

example, when Novack was booked into the Wood

County Jail, Deputy Raymond Starks of the Wood

County Sheriff’s Department informed Officer

Denise Ellis that Novack was a suicide risk and

that the jail staff should watch him accordingly.

Officer Ellis also knew that Novack had been at

Norwood Mental Health Center earlier that day.

Furthermore, she wrote "watch" on Novack’s

medical screening inventory. She was aware that

Novack had been diagnosed in the past with a

mental illness, and she concluded that Novack had

a possible mental illness. 

 Novack was then placed in an observation cell

that is normally used for inmates on suicide

watch./1 However, there is no record that the

jail officials paid close attention to Novack

while he was in the observation cell.

Furthermore, without consulting any mental health

experts or insuring that he would be subject to

suicide watch scrutiny, the officials

inexplicably transferred him to the general jail

population. 

 While in jail, Novack took psychotropic medicine

prescribed by his psychiatrist. There is no

record of the jail officials insuring that he

took his medicine when they handed it to him.

Furthermore, his jailers did not make any record

of closely observing Novack to watch his reaction

to this prescription medicine. During his time in

general population, his mental health did not

improve. He pounded on his cell walls almost

every day and was subject to regular uncontrolled

fits of laughing and giggling. He did not eat all

of his meals, he lost weight, and his appearance

was unkept. However, jail staff never conducted

a full medical evaluation of Novack. 

 The facts at issue here are similar to those in

Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1992), where

we ruled that a jury, and not the court, must

determine whether jail officials were aware of a

substantial suicide risk. In Hall, we affirmed

the district court’s denial of defendants’

summary judgment motion. We agreed that the

detainee’s estate raised genuine issues of
material fact whether defendants were aware that

the detainee/2 was a substantial suicide risk.

See id. at 405. After his arrest, the detainee

became excited and belligerent. He urinated on

the floor and swore at the police officers. See

id. at 403. Moreover, he had threatened to commit

suicide when he was arrested by the same police

department nine months prior to the incident in

question. See id. at 403-04. The detainee’s prior

arrest report states that he has attempted

suicide several times. See id. at 404. Based on

the detainee’s behavior on the day of his arrest

and his prior encounters with this police

department, we found that the plaintiff had

raised genuine issues of material fact whether

defendants knew that the detainee was a serious

suicide risk. See id. at 405./3 

 As in Hall, we have more than Novack’s strange

and bizarre behavior. We also have evidence that

jail officials knew that Novack was a suicide

risk and had a possible mental illness. Finally,

the jail staff failed to conduct a full medical

evaluation and failed to subject Novack to any

suicide watch scrutiny. Consequently, from this

evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude

that there existed a substantial risk that Novack

would imminently commit suicide and that jail

officials knew of this risk, yet failed to act.

 The majority opinion seems to discount this

evidence and instead focuses on the fact that

Novack told the intake officer that he was not

contemplating suicide. Moreover, the majority

opinion focuses on the conversation between Dr.

Root, Novack’s psychiatrist, and jail officials,

where Root did not mention that Novack had any

suicidal tendencies. These facts do not, however,

allow us to draw a legal conclusion that Wood

County Jail officials were not deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk that Novack

would harm himself. 

 The County of Wood is the only remaining

defendant. Local government liability cannot be

based upon the theory of respondeat superior. As

the majority opinion indicates, however,

municipal liability can be demonstrated

indirectly if a court can infer from a series of

bad acts that policymakers were condoning

subordinates’ misconduct. See Jackson v. Marion

County, 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir. 1995). 

 A reasonable jury could find that Wood County’s

customs and lack of procedures caused the

deliberate indifference to Novack’s Eighth

Amendment rights. First, the jury could find that

there was a custom of not following certain

procedures as it relates to mentally ill inmates

and that this custom caused Novack’s suicide. For
example, evidence suggests that the following

jail policies were routinely ignored: (1)

referral of mentally ill inmates to medical

staff; (2) segregation of mentally ill from

non-mentally ill inmates; (3) suicide watch for

at-risk inmates where they are checked and a log

completed every 15 minutes; (4) medicine consumed

in front of officers; and (5) officers

determining and documenting the reason that

inmates decline food. By ignoring these policies,

a reasonable jury could find that the jail showed

deliberate indifference toward inmates who, like

Novack, already had a demonstrated risk of

suicide. Consequently, a jury could properly

infer from these "bad acts" that Wood County Jail

condoned this conduct./4

 Second, a reasonable jury could find that the

lack of certain jail procedures demonstrates

deliberate indifference toward suicide risk

inmates. Arden Geisler, the administrator of the

jail since 1978, is responsible for policies and

procedures at the Wood County Jail. Wisconsin

state law makes the sheriff or other jailkeeper

responsible for enacting a policy and procedure

manual for the operation of the jail. See Wis.

Stat. sec. 302.365(1)(a). The following

procedures were not in place at Wood County Jail:

(1) no health appraisal is conducted by a health

care professional, even when initial screening

warrants it; (2) a supervisor may remove an

inmate from a suicide watch without consulting

with a health professional; (3) no mental health

professional examines an inmate after he is put

on suicide watch; and (4) suicide risk

assessments are not performed, even when initial

screening warrants it. By failing to implement

procedures to involve health care professionals

in the care taking of mentally ill inmates who

are specific suicide risks, a reasonable jury

could find that the Wood County Jail showed

deliberate indifference toward inmates who are

known suicide risks. 

 While the district court should review the

whole record, it must draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmovant and can

neither weigh the evidence nor make any

credibility determinations. Cf. Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097,

2110 (2000)./5 "Credibility determinations, the

weighing of the evidence, and drawing of

legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

functions, not those of a judge." Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Consequently, we must give credence to the

numerous facts that support plaintiffs’

allegations that Wood County Jail officials were

aware of a substantial risk that Novack may

imminently commit suicide. The weighing of this
evidence is the sole province of the jury--not

the district court, or this court. The district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Wood County Jail should be reversed. Accordingly,

I respectfully dissent.

/1 The majority cites Collignon v. Milwaukee County,

163 F.3d 982, 990 (7th Cir. 1998), for the

proposition that placing an inmate on suicide

watch may not demonstrate a subjective awareness

of a substantial risk of imminent suicide.

Collignon, however, concerns an inmate who killed

himself after being released to the custody of

his parents. The issue in Collignon was whether

officials had a constitutional obligation to

devise a treatment plan for the inmate, not

whether they could have prevented his suicide

while he was in custody.

/2 Pretrial detainees, who are protected under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for

maltreatment while in custody, receive the same

protection as inmates. See Payne, 161 F.3d at

1041.

/3 Other courts have denied summary judgment motions

by defendants in similar situations. See Greason

v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 831-32, 835 (11th Cir.

1990) (finding that a factfinder could conclude

that defendants were deliberately indifferent to

decedent’s needs because defendants were aware

that decedent had contemplated suicide, continued

to have suicidal tendencies, and was taking

antidepressants); Cabrales v. County of Los

Angeles, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding

deliberate indifference because the same jailers

had rescued decedent from a previous suicide

attempt); Partridge v. Two Unknown Police

Officers, 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding

deliberate indifference because defendants knew

that decedent had attempted suicide in a previous

confinement); Viero v. Bufano, 925 F. Supp. 1374,

1377-78, 1388 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding genuine

issue of material fact because defendants knew

about decedent’s emotional health, his

depression, his thoughts of suicide, and his need

for medication); Guglielmoni v. Alexander, 583 F.

Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1984) (finding genuine issue

because inmate hanged himself after previous

faked suicide); Matje v. Leis, 571 F. Supp. 918

(S.D. Ohio 1983) (finding genuine issue because

inmate’s counsel had informed jailers of

decedent’s suicide threats).

/4 Moreover, the jail was arguably under

constructive notice that some of its policies

were not working. Less than a month before Novack

was incarcerated, another prisoner committed

suicide while supposedly under continuous
surveillance in the observation cell. 

/5 While Reeves involved a judgment as a matter of

law, the summary judgment analysis is identical.

See 120 S. Ct. at 2110 ("[T]he standard for

granting summary judgment ’mirrors’ the standard

for judgment as a matter of law, such that ’the

inquiry under each is the same.’" (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250-51 (1986))).