NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0318n.06 Case No. 07- 5548 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. RONALD DEATON STATO N, Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DI S TR IC T O F K

EN TU CKY

BEF OR E: BA TC HELD ER , C hie f Cir c uitJudge; S UT TON and KETHL ED G E, C ir c uit Judg e s. ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, Chief Ju dge. Ron a ld D e a ton Staton (“ Staton ” ) a

pp e a ls h is

se nte nc e fo r p os se ssi on wi th int e nt to dist ri bu te me tha do ne and oxy c od on e in v iol a tio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. § 841(a) (1) ( “Count One” ), and for carr ying a firearm during a drug traff icking offe nse in violation of 18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (c ) ( “ Count Th re e ” ). Spe c if ic a lly , Stat on argue s th a t th e se nte nc e of 93 mon ths ’ imp ri so nme nt i s unr e a so na ble . We dis a g re e and

AF F I RM. I. On September

7, 2006, a Gr and Jury

for the E astern D istrict of Kentuc ky returne d a thre ecount indictment ag ainst Staton. S taton pled g uilty to counts one and three, a nd the g overnme nt dismiss ed the se cond count, a ll pursuant to a plea a g ree ment. The Prese ntence I nvestig ation Report (“PSR”) ca lculated Staton’s guidelines rang e for Count One at 37–46 months, while Count Three

car ried a 60-month mandatory

minimum . Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (D)( ii) the sentenc es07- 5548 , U S A v . S t at on

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w e r e r e qu i r e d

t o b e s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y. At his sentencinghear ing Staton specific ally said that he did not object to the finding s in the PSR . The district cour

t then stated that it wa s adopting both the fac ts and the g uidelines ca lculations contained in the PSR. St aton did bring to the district court’ s attention fac tors he thoug ht releva nt to h is s e nte nc ing un de r 18 U. S.C. § 35 53 (a ), inc lud inghis a g e (6 1) , p oo r h e a lth , p re vio us ho no ra ble milit ary service , employ

ment history , family

situation, and the fac t that the drug amounts fell at the low end of the applicable rang e. He conclude d by asking the di strict court to consider these fa ctors and impose a se ntence at t h e l o w end of the g uidelines. I mportantly , he did not reque st either a

va ri anc e or a de pa rt ur e do wnwa

rd . T he dis tr ic t c ourt

ini tia lly se nte nc ed S tat on to 3 6 mo nth s’ imprisonment for Count One, one month below the bottom of the app l icable guideline ra ng e, and 60 months of consec utive imprisonment for Count Three , to be followed by five y ear s of supervise d rele ase. The court noted the Booke r decision, and found the sentenc e “to be suff icient but not gr eate r than nec essar

y to comply

with the sentenc ing pur

poses” of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court also rec ommended that Staton participate in an intensive drugeducation and tr eatment prog ram while incar cer ated. At the c onclusion of announc ing its propose d sentenc e t h e district cour t ga ve the par ties the o p p o rt u n i t y to make any leg al objections by

asking : “I s there a

ny rea son sentence sh ou ld n ot b e imp os e d a s st a te d .

. . ? ” Staton ans we re d: “No , your H on or .” Up on Staton ’s re qu e st the district court re duced the sentenc e by three months to give c redit for time serve d in state court

on the same c ha

rg e s, br ing inghis tot a l se nte nc e do wn to 9 3 mo nth s. Staton no w b ri ng s th is t ime ly

a pp e a l. II.07- 5548 , U S A v . S t at on

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Staton challeng es both the pro ce d u ra l and substantive re asonable ness of his sentenc e, claiming that the district court did not ade quately consider the § 3553(a) fac tors and that the se ntence is too long. We will a

naly ze e ach claim in turn. United States v. Simmons , 5 87 F .3 d 3 48 , 3 55 (6 th Cir. 2009) (“I

n asce rtaining the standar d of re view, we must dist inguish be tween Simmon’s substantive and proc edura l objections.”). A. P r oc e dur al R e as ona ble ne ss We ge nera lly

revie w under

an abuse of discre tion standard the rea sonablene ss of sentenc es imposed by

the district court. Un ite d S tates v . V owe ll , 516 F.3d 503, 509 ( 6th Cir. 200 8 ). He re, howeve r, we revie w only for plain e rror

beca use Staton did not object to his sentence when the district court provided the opportunity under Bo sti c . United States v. Vonne r , 516 F.3d 382, 385–86 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) (e n b anc ); Un ite d S tates v . B os tic , 371 F.3d 865, 872–73 ( 6th Cir. 2004). Plain error exis ts where a d ef

en dant demonstrate s: “(1) e rror (2) that wa s obvious or clea r, (3) that aff

ecte d defe nd an t ’s s u b s tantial rig hts and (4) a ffe cted the f airne ss, integr ity , or public re putation of the judicial proce eding s.” Vonner , 516 F.3d at 386 (internal quotation marks omi tted). We should find

e r r o r o n l y i n e xc e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t an c e s w h e r e “ ‘ t h e e r r o r i s s o p l a i n t h a t t h e t r i a l jud g e . . . [w a s] dere lict in countenanc ing it.’” Id. (a l t er at i o n s i no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Gardiner , 463 F.3d 445, 459 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). A s e nte nc e may

be pr oc e dura lly

unre a so na

ble if the dis tr ic t c ourt

fa ils , amon g oth e r t

hin g s, to consider the a

pplicable § 3553( a) factor s. Un ite d S tates v . S mi th , 474 F.3d 888, 894 ( 6th Cir. 2007); see G all v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The amount of re asoning a dis trict court judge needs to provide when e x plaining a sentenc e var ies ac cordingto the context. Rita v . United07- 5548 , U S A v . S t at on

W e reco gni ze t he sy st em i c val ue o f m o re com p l et e exp l anat i o ns f rom dis t ri ct co urt judges at s ent enci ng, 1 se e R ita , 5 5 1 U .S . at 3 5 7

– 5 8 ; V on ner , 516 F. 3d a t 386–87, bu t a l s o n ot e t h at s y s t emi c i n ef f i ci en cy i s di s t i n ct f

r om p ro c e d u ra l er ro r. S e e R ita , 5 5 1 U .S . at 3 5 8 (“[ T ]h e se n te n c ing ju d g e ’s state m e n t o f re a so n s w a s b rie f b u t l e g a lly su ff ic ie n t.”) ; V

on ner , 5 1 6 F .3d at 3 8 7

– 8 8 (rec o gn i zing t ha t , w hil e “[n]o o ne wo uld ca l l [t he d i st rict co urt’ s] exp l anat i o n i d eal , ” “ any p o t ent i al err o r was not ‘ p l ai n’ ”). 4 S t a tes , 5 5 1 U
. S
. 3 3 8 , 3 5 7 ( 2 0 0 7 )

. W e d o n o t r e qu i r e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt t o “ e n g a g e i n a ri tua lis tic incantation of the § 3553(a) fac tors it considers,” United States v. Chandler , 4 19 F .3 d 48 4, 48 8 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 5) , b ut t

he e xplanatio n s ho uld

be “ su ff ic ie ntl y de ta ile d to re fl e c t the c on sid e ra tio ns lis te d in § 3553(a) .” United States v. Mc Bride , 434 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2006). The ex planation “ne ed

n o t b e lengthy” whe n the district court indepe ndently ag ree s with the SentencingCommi ssion’s conclusions. United St ates v. W ilms , 4 95 F .3 d 2 77 , 2 80 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) . Wh ile the jud g e wi ll

“ no rm a lly” e xpla in at g re a te r l e ng th why he ha s rejec ted defe ndant’s nonfr ivolous arg uments, Ri ta , 551 U.S. at 357, when, a s here , the judg e ac c e pts those arguments and fur thermore g ives the defe ndant a mo re le nie nt se nte nc e tha n the de fe nd ant re qu e ste d, the re is e ve n le ss c a us e to e xpla in the imposed sentenc e at leng th. 1 He re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a do pte d, wi tho ut ob

je c tio n, the PSR’ s fa c tua l fi nd ing s and pr op e rl y de te rm ine d th e Gu ide lin e ra ng e . T he jud g e lis te ne d to the e xplanatio n o f S taton ’s he a lthpr ob le ms, family situation, lack of sig nificant c riminal history , employ ment history , the char acte ristics of the instant offense , and Staton’s re quest for a s en t en ce at the low end of the g uidelines. The district court we nt over the c harg es, and f ound that the sentenc e would be “ sufficie nt but not gre ater than

nece ssary to comply

with the sentenc ing purposes” of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court then se ntence d Staton below the applica

ble ra ng e, g iving him a lesse r sentenc e than he asked f or, and also noted that Staton should par

ticipate in the intensive drug education and treatment prog ram while inc arc erated.07- 5548 , U S A v . S t at on

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We f ind no e rr or , mu c h le ss a

“ pla in” e rr or , in

the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a

bb re viate d e xplanatio n w he n it listened to the defe ndant’s § 3553(a ) ar g uments and then g ave him a lesser term than he aske d for. See V onner , 5 1 6 F
. 3 d a t 3 8 8 ( f in d in g n o p la in

e r r o r w h e r e “ [n ]o th in g in

th e r e c o r d , o r

th e c o n te xt of the he aring , sug g ests t h at t h e court did not li sten to, consider, a nd understand e very

argument [ De fe n d an t ] m ad e” (c i t i n g Ri ta , 551 U.S. at 358) (a lterations and quotation mar ks omitt ed))

. B. Subst ant ive Re as ona ble ne ss We r eview under an abuse of discretion standard the rea sonablene ss of sentenc es imposed by the district court. Vo we ll , 516 F.3d at 509. Sentences imposed within or below the guidelines rang e are pre sumptively

rea sonable upon a

ppeal by the def endant. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . Cu rry , 536 F.3d 571, 573 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (noting that “simple logic compels t he conclusion that, if a sente nce of 32 4 to 40 5 mo nth s w ou ld h a ve be e n p re sumpt ive ly re a so na ble in leng th, de fe nd ant’ s ta sk in persua ding us that the m o re l en i ent sentenc e of 240 months is unrea sonably long is e ven more d em an d i n g” ( ci t i n g United States v. Bailey , 264 F. App’ x 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2008))). A s e n t e n c e i s s u

b s t an t i v e l y u n r e a s o n a

b l e i f “ t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rts e l e c t s t h e s e n t e n c e ar b i t r ar i l y, bases the se ntence on impermissible factor s, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) fac tors or g ives an

unrea sonable amount of weight to any pertinent fa ctor.” Sm ith , 474 F.3d at 894 (internal quotation

mark s, omi ssi on s, and

c itatio ns omi tte d) ; Simmons , 587 F.3d at 365. The sentenc e “must be proportionate to the se riousness of the c ircumstance s of t he offense and offe nder, a nd sufficie nt but not gr eate r than ne cessa

ry to comply

with the purposes” of § 3553(a ). Vo we ll , 516 F.3d at 512 (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted). Contrary to Staton’s contention, we find no e vidence t h at t h e d istrict court selec ted the07- 5548 , U S A v . S t at on

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sen t en ce a

rbitrar ily , used impermissible fac tors, disreg arde d any rele vant conc erns, or

g ave
unrea sonable we ight to any p ar t i cular § 3553(a) fac tors. As detailed a bove, the district cour

t was
awa r e o f th e f

a c ts an d c ir c u ms ta

n c e s , d e te r

mi n e d th e p r o p e r G u id e li n e s r an g e , li s te n e d to the defe ndant’s explanation and re quest and g ave him a se ntence below what he aske d for, a sentenc e which—at lea st from the defendant’ s perspe ctive—is presumptively rea sonable. S taton has g iven

us no rea son to re

j ec t t h at pre sumption. See V onner , 516 F.3d at 390. We find no abuse of discretion, and the ref

ore f ind the sentenc e re asonable

.

III . Acc ording ly , we AF F IRM the district court’s se ntence
.