NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1862-18T1 

F.K.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

INTEGRITY HOUSE, INC.,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

THOMAS LUSCH and MARVIN

DEUPREE,

Defendants.

____________________________

Submitted May 20, 2019 – Decided July 8, 2019

Before Judges Sumners, Mitterhoff and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-2239-16.

Marc L. Winograd, attorney for appellant.

Law Offices of Daniel J. Mc Carey, LLC, attorneys

for respondent (Daniel J. Mc Carey, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MITTERHOFF, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

July 8, 2019

APPELLATE DIVISION
A-1862-18T1 2

Plaintiff F.K. appeals the trial court's December 11, 2018 order granting 

summary judgment to defendant Integrity House and dismissing his complaint 

with prejudice. The trial court determined that defendant was entitled to 

immunity from plaintiff's negligence action under New Jersey's Charitable 

Immunity Act ("the Act"), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. On appeal, plaintiff 

contends that the amount of private contributions received by defendant, 

roughly $250,000 or 1.26% of annual revenue, is too insignificant to entitle 

defendant to charitable immunity. Having reviewed the record in light of the 

applicable legal principles, we conclude that defendant did not present 

sufficient evidence to support its entitlement to the affirmative defense of 

charitable immunity. Accordingly, we reverse.

I. 

We glean the following facts from the record.

Integrity House's stated purpose in its certificate of incorporation is "[t]o 

keep former drug addicts drug free." Integrity House is a tax-exempt 

organization under section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 

§ 501(c)(3). On its 2015 tax return, Integrity House described its mission as 

follows: "Integrity House is committed to helping individuals and families 

through an effective and measurable system of comprehensive therapeutic 
A-1862-18T1 3

community addiction treatment and recovery support in a way that brings 

about positive, long-term lifestyle change." 

As alleged in his complaint, plaintiff was a resident at the Integrity 

House residential drug-treatment facility in Newark. On November 3, 2015, 

he sustained personal injuries when he slipped and fell due to a wet condition 

on an interior staircase within the facility. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging 

Integrity House was negligent in the maintenance of the premises.

Integrity House answered the complaint, asserting, among other 

defenses, the affirmative defense of charitable immunity. Before the close of 

discovery, Integrity House moved for summary judgment on the ground of 

charitable immunity. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Integrity 

House submitted its 2015 tax return.1

Integrity House reported $20,094,046 in total revenue for the 2015 tax 

year. According to Part VII, "Statement of Revenue," Integrity House received 

$15,355,805 from government grants,2 $157,310 from fundraising events, and 

$296,409 from "[a]ll other contributions, gifts, grants, and similar amounts not 

 

1

 Specifically, Integrity House filed a Form 990 "Return of Organization 

Exempt from Income Tax." 

2

 Integrity House received $12,036,891 from the New Jersey Department of 

Human Services, $1,114,993 from Hudson County, and $1,502,370 from the 

New Jersey Department of Children and Families. 
A-1862-18T1 4

included above." Integrity House also reported $4,261,364 in "program 

service revenue."3 With regard to the fundraising revenue and private 

contributions, Schedule G, Part II, "Fundraising Events," specifies that 

Integrity House received $252,855 in "gross receipts" from two fundraising 

events4and $157,310 in "contributions" from those events. 

After hearing oral argument on May 12, 2017, the trial court issued an 

order and written opinion denying the motion for summary judgment. The 

trial court concluded that while Integrity House's 2015 tax return appeared to 

show that it received roughly $250,000 in contributions, the record did not 

conclusively "reveal the source of those funds and how they were utilized." 

The trial court noted that there was still one month before the discovery end 

 

3

 The tax return further delineates the "program services revenue" as follows: 

$1,553,390 from Work First NJ/SAI; $900,730 from welfare and food stamp 

revenue; $286,721 from federal probation program fees; $83,049 from the 

intensive supervision program; $1,307,168 from other program related 

revenue; and $130,306 from all other program service revenue. In support of 

its motion for summary judgment, Integrity House did not submit evidence 

detailing the fee structure for its programs, including whether any of its 

programs are offered at no or reduced cost or whether it bills medical 

insurance providers.

4

 These events are listed as "Gala" and "Golf." There is no evidence in the 

summary judgment record detailing Integrity House's specific fundraising 

efforts in the 2015 tax year. 
A-1862-18T1 5

date and determined that Integrity House's source of funds remained a disputed 

factual issue. 

After the close of discovery, Integrity House re-filed its motion for 

summary judgment. The renewed motion added only short certifications of 

Integrity House's CEO and CFO stating that all of the roughly $252,000 in 

"gross receipts" raised from fundraising for the 2015 tax year were used in 

furtherance of Integrity House's charitable purposes. 

In opposition to defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment, 

plaintiff submitted a report from a forensic accounting expert analyzing the 

2015 tax return. In pertinent part, the expert concluded:

I have looked at the financial documents and have 

highlighted certain pages and line items. Annexed 

hereto as Exhibit A is page one of Integrity House's 

2015 Form 990. This page reports total revenues 

received of $20,094,046 for 2015 but the [d]efendant 

in its brief makes no mention of this amount.

With regard to the "charitable contribution of almost 

$300,000 for the calendar year," attention is directed 

to Schedule G. Part II, Fundraising Events, annexed 

hereto as Appendix B. On that page, the sum of 

$252,855 is reported as gross receipts from 

fundraising events and the sum of $157,310 is 

reported as contributions. The [d]efendant in his brief 

provides absolutely no explanation as to the source of 

the funds for either of these amounts. As a forensic 

accountant, without supporting third-party 

documentation, I cannot determine whether these 

funds were obtained from a government or private 

source.
A-1862-18T1 6

With regard to the certification of [Integrity House's 

CFO], I note that she provides absolutely no 

information regarding the source of Integrity House's 

revenue in the year 2015. She provides no 

explanation regarding the source of the $20,094,046 

received by Integrity House during that year and she 

provides absolutely no analysis regarding the source 

of the $252,855 reported as gross receipts and no 

analysis of the $157,310 reported as contributions. It 

appears that all she attempts to do in her certification 

is justify Integrity House's expenditures. Her 

certification does not enable me, as a forensic 

accountant, to determine whether these funds were 

obtained from a government or private source. The 

certification of [Integrity House's CEO] provides 

absolutely no information in this regard as well.

Conclusion

In my professional opinion and to a reasonable degree 

of certainty in the field of forensic accounting, 

Integrity House has failed to provide an analysis of the 

source of its funds for the year in which the November 

3, 2015 accident took place. Based on the information 

provided by Integrity House, there is absolutely no 

documentation which would facilitate a determination 

of the funding sources.

Without hearing further oral argument, the trial court entered an order granting 

summary judgment on October 27, 2017. 

Plaintiff appealed, and we vacated the dismissal order and remanded for 

further proceedings because the trial court failed to issue an oral or written 

reasoning for its conclusion that Integrity House was entitled to charitable 

immunity. F.K. v. Integrity House, No. A-1376-17 (App. Div. October 26, 
A-1862-18T1 7

2018). On remand, the trial court issued an order and written opinion granting 

summary judgment on December 11, 2018.5 

In its written decision, the trial court determined that Integrity House 

established the three elements necessary for charitable immunity: that the 

organization "(1) was formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) is organized 

exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) was 

promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff 

who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works." Tonelli v. Bd. of Educ. 

of Wyckoff, 185 N.J. 438, 444-45 (2005) (quoting Hamel v. State, 321 N.J. 

Super. 67, 72 (App. Div. 1999)). 

The trial court found that Integrity House satisfied the first prong based 

upon its incorporating documents and status as a non-profit organization as 

defined in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 

501(c)(3). In so holding, the trial court rejected plaintiff's reliance on 

Abdallah v. Occupational Ctr. of Hudson Cty., Inc., 351 N.J. Super. 280 (App. 

Div. 2002) and contention that Integrity House received too small a portion of 

its funding from private contributions. The trial court reasoned: "The [c]ourt's 

opinion in [Morales v. N.J. Acad. of Aquatic Scis., 302 N.J. Super. 50 (App. 

 

5

 The trial court did not allow for new submissions or hold oral argument on 

remand. 
A-1862-18T1 8

Div. 1997)] is clear that a receipt of government funds, even if that 

encompasses the majority of an entity's funding, does not eliminate an entity's 

protection under the Charitable Immunity Act."6

The trial court found that Integrity House met the second prong, 

reasoning:

Defendant Integrity House has presented extensive 

evidence that it does not merely distribute government 

funds, but provides actual services to individuals, 

including housing and counseling. The [c]ourt finds 

that the [d]efendant Integrity House has satisfied the 

second prong of the analysis required under N.J.S.A. 

2A:53A-7, having demonstrated that is organized for 

religious, charitable or education purposes, as 

evidenced by their statement of purpose, as well as the 

services they provide. 

Finally, the trial court concluded that Integrity House satisfied the third 

prong because plaintiff was a resident at Integrity House's drug treatment 

facility at the time of the accident. 

Accordingly, the trial court issued an order granting summary judgment 

and dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

II. 

On appeal, plaintiff challenges only the trial court's determination as to 

the second prong of the charitable immunity analysis. He argues that the 

 

6

 As discussed below, this analysis actually falls under the second prong. 
A-1862-18T1 9

$252,855 in private contributions, comprising 1.26% of Integrity House's total 

revenue in the 2016 fiscal year, is too insignificant to establish that Integrity 

House is organized exclusively for charitable purposes and to entitle it to 

immunity under the Act. 

Integrity House counters that "no statute or court in this State has 

provided precise guidelines regarding the exact percentage of revenue derived 

from charitable sources required to confer charitable status." It maintains that 

the $252,855 in gross receipts and the $157,3107in contributions, comprising 

2.04% of its 2016 revenue, are "sufficient for Integrity House to establish that 

it is entitled to charitable immunity protection because, unlike the defendant in 

Abdallah, Integrity House actively pursued these funding sources and the 

funds directly supported its charitable endeavors." 

A. 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standard as the trial court. Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 

330 (2010). Summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with 

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 

challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a 

 

7

 It appears that Integrity House mistyped this sum as $157,855 in its brief. 
A-1862-18T1 10

matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). The court considers whether "the competent 

evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the 

alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).

"The trial court's conclusions of law and application of the law to the 

facts warrant no deference from a reviewing court." W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 

229, 238 (2012) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 

140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). Accordingly, "[a] trial court's determination of the 

applicability of charitable immunity is reviewed de novo because an 

organization's right to immunity raises questions of law." Green v. Monmouth 

University, 237 N.J. 516, 529 (2019). 

B. 

The Supreme Court recently recounted the history of charitable 

immunity in New Jersey: 

New Jersey's doctrine of charitable immunity was first 

declared "as a judicial expression of [New Jersey's] 

public policy" in D'Amato v. Orange Memorial 

Hospital, 101 N.J.L. 61 (E. & A. 1925), but was 

expressly repudiated by this Court in Collopy v. 

Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29 (1958), as 

lacking historical foundation and contrary to "modern 

concepts of justice." 
A-1862-18T1 11

The Legislature immediately responded by passing a 

precursor to the Charitable Immunity Act and, a year 

later, the Act itself. Through that legislation, "'the 

common law doctrine as it had been judicially defined 

by the courts of this State' was restored." 

The Charitable Immunity Act's "original purpose was 

to avoid the diversion of charitable trust funds 'to noncharitable purposes in order to live up to the 

reasonable expectations of the benefactors.'" "Over 

time, however, our case law has recognized that the 

purposes underlying charitable immunity are broader 

than simply preserving charitable trust funds and 

include the encouragement of altruistic activity" by 

limiting the economic impact of litigation on charities. 

[Green, 237 N.J. at 529-30 (alteration in original) 

(citations omitted).]

The Act provides that 

[n]o nonprofit corporation, society or association 

organized exclusively for religious, charitable or 

educational purposes or its trustees, directors, officers, 

employees, agents, servants or volunteers shall . . . be 

liable to respond in damages to any person who shall 

suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or 

servant of such corporation, society or association, 

where such person is a beneficiary, to whatever 

degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, 

society or association . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a).]

The Legislature directed that the Act

shall be deemed to be remedial and shall be liberally 

construed so as to afford immunity to the said 

corporations, societies and associations from liability 

as provided herein in furtherance of the public policy 
A-1862-18T1 12

for the protection of nonprofit corporations, societies 

and associations organized for religious, charitable, 

educational or hospital purposes. 

[N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10.]

Nonetheless, "[o]nly those classes of entities that were immunized under 

common law remain within the sweep of the Act. However, as to those 

entities, the several provisions of the Act should be liberally construed to 

afford immunity." Tonelli, 185 N.J. at 444; see also Hardwicke v. Am. 

Boychoir Sch., 188 N.J. 69, 98 (2006) ("[A]lthough N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10 states 

that [the Act] 'shall be liberally construed,' we must consider the scope of that 

common law when interpreting the scope of the immunities provided in the 

statute."). 

C. 

"Charitable immunity is an affirmative defense, as to which, like all 

affirmative defenses, defendants bear the burden of persuasion." Abdallah, 

351 N.J. Super. at 288. As stated above, an entity seeking charitable immunity 

must establish that it "(1) was formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) is organized 

exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) was 

promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff 

who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works." Tonelli, 185 N.J. at 444-

45 (quoting Hamel, 321 N.J. Super. at 72). 
A-1862-18T1 13

With regard to the second prong, "neither non-profit status nor the 

performance of socially useful services, either independently or together, are 

dispositive of charitable status." Abdallah, 351 N.J. Super. 283-84. "Whether 

a nonprofit entity, whose certificate of incorporation and by-laws provide that 

it is organized exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, or hospital 

purposes, actually conducts its affairs consistent with its stated purpose often 

requires a fact-sensitive inquiry." Kuchera v. Jersey Shore Family Health Ctr., 

221 N.J. 239, 252 (2015). "What is required is an examination of the entity 

seeking to clothe itself in the veil of charitable immunity to discover its aims, 

its origins, and its method of operation in order to determine whether its 

dominant motive is charity or some other form of enterprise." Parker v. St. 

Stephen's Urban Dev. Corp., Inc., 243 N.J. Super. 317, 325 (App. Div. 1990). 

Because "[b]oth 'educational' and 'religious' have a limited and 

commonly understood meaning . . . [but] 'charitable' is a more complex notion 

that defies precise definition[,]" the Court has prescribed distinct inquiries for 

organizations seeking immunity for educational or religious purposes and 

organizations seeking immunity for charitable purposes. Ryan v. Holy Trinity 

Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333, 343 (2003). "Entities that can 

prove they are organized exclusively for educational or religious purposes 

automatically satisfy the second prong of the charitable immunity standard" 
A-1862-18T1 14

and "no further financial analysis is required to satisfy the second prong of the 

Act." Id. at 346. 

In contrast, for an entity asserting that it is organized for charitable 

purposes, a reviewing court must conduct a "source of funds assessment" to 

discern whether a charitable purpose is being fulfilled. Ibid.; Abdallah, 351 

N.J. Super. at 284 (noting that the source of funds analysis "looks beyond the 

organization's non-profit structure and social service activities" and "must take 

into account the organization's source of funds as a critical element of 

charitable status."). In this regard, "an organization claiming immunity under 

the Act must demonstrate some level of support from charitable donations 

and/or trust funds as it is those sources of income the Act seeks to protect." 

Bieker v. Cmty. House of Moorestown, 169 N.J. 167, 178 (2001) (emphasis 

added); see also Morales, 302 N.J. Super. at 56 (noting that the defendant 

"receive[d] a substantial amount of charitable contributions, which is one of 

the essential characteristics of a non-profit corporation entitled to charitable 

immunity." (footnote omitted)). 

In the seminal case of Parker, Justice Long, then an Appellate Division 

judge, explained that an entity asserting a charitable purpose must show it

"undertak[es] acts by which the government is relieved pro tanto from a 

burden it would otherwise have to perform." 243 N.J. Super. at 326. In that 
A-1862-18T1 15

case, we reversed a grant of charitable immunity to a nonprofit corporation 

established by St. Stephen's A.M.E. Zion Church to serve "as a conduit for 

federal mortgage money and for federal rent subsidies" to fund a low and 

moderate income housing complex. Id. at 325. We reasoned that the entity 

"was not created to lessen the burden on government but to obtain as much 

funding from the government as possible and to operate the project exclusively 

with that funding. As such, it is no more entitled to charitable immunity than 

the government itself." Id. at 326. We also emphasized that "[e]qually 

important is the absence from defendant's operation of fund-raising activities 

and charitable contributions." Ibid. 

Similarly, in Abdallah, we reversed a grant of charitable immunity to an 

occupational center that provided training and job placement for vocationally 

disabled individuals because it received the vast majority of its funding 

through governmental grants and payments from employers for subcontracted 

labor. 351 N.J. Super. at 287-88. We found that annual private contributions 

amounts of $48,000, or less than one-and-one-half percent of the total revenue, 

and $3,000, or less than one-tenth of one percent of total revenue, were "too 

insignificant to have any effect on the charitable-status determination." Id. at 

288. We also were "concerned that what is disclosed by the record and our 

inferences and assumptions therefrom may not constitute a sufficiently 
A-1862-18T1 16

complete or fair picture of the entirety of the [defendant's] operation." Ibid. 

For these reasons, we found that the defendant had failed to carry its burden to 

establish charitable immunity. Ibid. 

The Supreme Court also has denied charitable immunity to purported 

charitable organizations. See Kuchera, 221 N.J. at 254-55 (rejecting a 

contention that an outpatient facility owned by a nonprofit hospital was 

organized for charitable purposes based on its provision of charity care and 

holding that the organization was entitled only to limited liability for hospitals 

under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-8); Tonelli, 185 N.J. at 450 (holding that a township 

school board was not entitled to charitable immunity because it was "not 

supported by charitable contributions, philanthropic activity or a spirit of 

altruism[,]" was funded solely by public funds, did not "relieve[] the 

government of the need to provide beneficent services[,]" and was "an 

instrumentality of the State itself[.]"); Bieker, 169 N.J. at 179-80 (remanding 

for consideration of whether a community center received too great a quantity 

of income from the rental of its facilities to for-profit entities so as to render 

the organization's primary purpose non-charitable). 

Nonetheless, "the acceptance of government funds and some measure of 

government control does not transform a private non-profit corporation into a 

governmental instrumentality." Morales, 302 N.J. Super. at 55; see also 
A-1862-18T1 17

Estate of Komninos v. Bancroft Neurohealth, Inc., 417 N.J. Super. 309, 325 

(App. Div. 2010) (noting that "the percentage figure [of private contributions] 

does not rigidly dictate the analysis of charitable status."). Accordingly, we

affirmed the grant of charitable immunity to New Jersey Academy of Aquatic 

Sciences, which operated the New Jersey State Aquarium, even though "the 

State provide[d] support to the Academy by leasing the Aquarium and its 

facilities for a nominal rent . . . [and] exercise[d] control over certain aspects 

of its operations[.]" Morales, 302 N.J. Super. at 55. We noted that the 

organization "received $4,012,383 in contributions and grants, which 

constituted more than 40% of its total revenues." Id. at 56 n.1. 

Notably, in 1993 the Law Division held that Integrity House was entitled 

to charitable immunity in a published opinion in Pelaez v. Rugby Labs., Inc., 

264 N.J. Super. 450 (Law Div. 1993). In that case, the court discussed the 

following evidence of Integrity House's funding:

Lorraine Brown, an employee of Integrity House 

familiar with its funding, was deposed. Ms. Brown 

testified that Integrity House raises private 

contributions through various fund-raising activities. 

Contributions are raised by submitting proposals to 

various private foundations, conducting car wash 

operations, soliciting advertisements for a graduation 

journal, and soliciting donations from churches in 

exchange for work performed at those churches by 

Integrity House patients.
A-1862-18T1 18

Integrity House tax returns for 1988 revealed that out 

of a total funding of $3,027,009 defendant Integrity 

House received $2,550,870 (84.3%) from 

governmental grants, and $476,139 (15.7%) from 

public support of various organizations, foundations 

and individuals. Public support income consisted of 

$308,452 (10.2%) worth of in-kind contributions and 

$167,687 (5.5%) from monetary contributions.

In 1989, Integrity House tax returns revealed that out 

of a total funding of $4,112,706 Integrity House 

received $3,398,425 (82.6%) from governmental 

grants and $714,281 (17.4%) from public support. 

Public support in 1989 consisted of $377,671 (9.2%) 

worth of in-kind contributions and $336,610 (8.2%) 

from monetary contributions.

[Id. at 453-54.]

Relying on this evidence, the Law Division distinguished Integrity 

House's funding from that of the housing organization in Parker. Id. at 457-58. 

The court reasoned, "[d]espite plaintiff's argument that private contributions 

made up only a small portion of defendant's revenues, tax records indicate that 

Integrity House relies on private charitable contributions to operate this drug 

rehabilitation center, and accordingly lessens the government burden of 

providing such funding." Id. at 457. Whereas the organization in Parker did 

not engage in fundraising activities, the Law Division found that the record 

supported that Integrity House "made substantial efforts to obtain funding from 

private sources." Id. at 458. 
A-1862-18T1 19

D.

Having carefully reviewed the summary judgment record in light of the 

above legal principles, we conclude that Integrity House failed to sustain its 

burden to prove entitlement to charitable immunity. Accordingly, the trial 

court improvidently granted summary judgment. 

Initially, we note that the parties dispute the percentage of total revenue 

that Integrity House receives from private charitable contributions. In his 

appellate brief, plaintiff relies on $252,855 designated as "gross receipts" as 

the figure for Integrity House's total private contributions for the 2015 year. In 

contrast, Integrity House relies on both the $252,855 designated as "gross 

receipts" and the $157,310 designated as "private contributions" for a total of 

$410,165 in total contributions. Using plaintiff's figure, the $252,855 in "gross 

receipts" represents 1.26% of Integrity House's total revenue. Using Integrity 

House's figure, the $410,165 in total private contributions represents 2.04% of 

Integrity House's total revenue. 

Based on the summary judgment record, particularly the unrebutted 

forensic accounting expert report, we are unable to conclusively determine 

which figures should be used in the charitable immunity analysis. More 

broadly, as the trial court found in its initial order and decision denying 
A-1862-18T1 20

summary judgment, the record does not allow for a conclusive determination 

as to the source and use of Integrity House's funding.8 

Because Integrity House did not submit sufficient evidence to 

substantiate the source and use of its funding, we find that Integrity House did 

not present sufficient evidence to support its burden of persuasion on the 

affirmative defense. See Abdallah, 351 N.J. Super. at 288. In addition to 

failing to provide evidence to assist in analyzing its tax return and determining 

the percentage of funds received from charitable contributions, Integrity House 

did not submit any evidence to: (1) specify the fee structure for its services; 

(2) detail its fundraising efforts beyond the indication on its tax return that it 

held a golf event and a gala event; (3) rebut plaintiff's forensic accounting 

expert's report; or (4) substantiate that its public service efforts relieved the 

government of a burden. 

The Law Division's decision in Pelaez is thus factually distinguishable 

from the instant matter. Most notably, both the gross sums of private 

 

8

 Integrity House failed to certify specifically as to the amount of private 

charitable contributions or present its own accounting expert. As plaintiff's 

expert found, the CEO's and CFO's certifications added nothing regarding the 

source of funding to the record after the trial court initially denied summary 

judgment on the grounds that Integrity House had failed to provide a sufficient 

analysis as to the source of its funds. Instead, the CEO's and CFO's 

certifications only state that the $252,855 in gross receipts from fundraising 

events was all spent in advancement of Integrity House's charitable proposes. 
A-1862-18T1 21

contributions and percentages of total revenue in 1988 ($476,139; 15.7%) and 

1989 ($714,281; 17.4%) are substantially greater than the figures presented in 

this case. See Pelaez, 264 N.J. Super. at 454. Moreover, the employee's 

deposition provided specific evidence of the fundraising activities undertaken 

by Integrity House. See id. at 454-55. By contrast, in this case, Integrity 

House has not submitted certifications or any evidence other than its 2015 tax 

return detailing its fundraising efforts or supporting that it relies on private 

charitable contributions for any of its programs. 

Unlike Pelaez, the current record does not establish that Integrity House 

"actively seeks private contributions and derives a substantial amount of 

income from private contributions." Id. at 457. Considering the fact-specific 

nature of the analysis of the second prong under the Act, see Kuchera, 221 N.J. 

at 252, Integrity House cannot rely on the Law Division's decision based on 

financial data from roughly twenty years ago.

In addition, although a determination of the specific percentage of 

funding Integrity House receives from private contributions is not necessary 

for our analysis, we note for completeness that no published case has granted 

charitable immunity to a non-religious, non-educational entity with such a 

small portion of funding from private contributions. The closest precedent 

with respect to the small percentage of private contributions is Komninos, but 
A-1862-18T1 22

that case is distinguishable because we determined that the defendant group 

home fulfilled an educational purpose, obviating the need to conduct a source 

of funds analysis. See Komninos, 417 N.J. Super. at 325 ("Moreover, for the 

reasons we have already expressed, [the organization's] immunized status is 

established by its core educational purposes."). 

Using either plaintiff's or defendant's figures, the percentage of private 

contributions received by Integrity House seems too nominal to advance the 

underlying purpose of the doctrine to protect and encourage private charitable 

contributions. See Abdallah, 351 N.J. Super. at 285 ("[T]here is agreement 

that [the doctrine's] underlying purpose and rationale have always been the 

protection and encouragement of private philanthropy both to assure the 

continued provision of beneficent services and to relieve government of the 

burden of providing them."). Viewing the summary judgment record in the 

light most favorable to plaintiff, the substantial sum of government funding 

received by Integrity House, $15,355,805 or over three-fourths of its 2015 

fiscal year total revenue, allows for the reasonable inference that it is 

attempting to maximize the amount of governmental funding it can receive in a 

fashion similar to the goals of the housing organization in Parker. 

Ultimately, Integrity House bears the burden of persuasion on its 

affirmative defense of charitable immunity, Abdallah, 351 N.J. Super. at 288, 
A-1862-18T1 23

and we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Brill, 

142 N.J. at 540. Judged against these standards, we conclude that the trial 

court erred in determining that Integrity House was entitled to charitable 

immunity. 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.