IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2021 WY 41

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2020

March 9, 2021

BRADLEY MICHAEL ELMORE,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-20-0172

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County

The Honorable Tori R.A. Kricken, Judge 

Representing Appellant:

R. Michael Vang of R. Michael Vang P.C., Laramie, Wyoming

Representing Appellee:

Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney 

General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristen R. Jones, 

Assistant Attorney General

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume.
1

DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Bradley Elmore appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence below. He 

claims on appeal that his failure to maintain a single lane of travel on two separate 

occasions did not create the reasonable suspicion required to justify stopping his vehicle. 

Marijuana was found in a free-air K-9 sniff during the stop. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Elmore’s motion to suppress?

FACTS

[¶3] On July 28, 2019, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Aaron Kirlin was parked on 

the median near mile post 308 on Interstate 80 monitoring traffic with his drug-detection 

dog, Frosty. At approximately 8:44 p.m., Trooper Kirlin observed a silver rental vehicle 

bearing California plates traveling east on Interstate 80 cross roughly two feet over the 

dotted center white line separating the two lanes of traffic for about an eighth of a mile 

before correcting itself. 

[¶4] Trooper Kirlin followed the vehicle, and approximately two minutes later he 

observed it cross the center line a second time. After observing the second traffic violation, 

he activated his flashing lights and initiated a traffic stop. He made contact with the driver 

of the vehicle, who was later identified as Bradley Elmore. Mr. Elmore informed Trooper 

Kirlin that the vehicle was a rental and provided him with the rental agreement. The rental 

agreement listed “John Griffin Delles” as the person who had rented the vehicle. Trooper

Kirlin requested a cover unit to assist him, and an officer identified in the record as Deputy 

Carroll arrived at the scene. While Deputy Carroll called the rental company to inquire 

about the agreement, Trooper Kirlin deployed his K-9 Frosty, who alerted to the presence 

of controlled substances in the vehicle. Trooper Kirlin then searched the vehicle and found 

a small amount of marijuana in the passenger compartment and nine duffel bags containing 

approximately 127 pounds of marijuana in the trunk. 

[¶5] Mr. Elmore was charged with possession of a controlled substance, a felony, in 

violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A), and unlawful possession with intent to 

deliver a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), a felony. 

On September 10, 2019, defense counsel moved to suppress the evidence found in the 

vehicle. He argued that the two minor deviations from Mr. Elmore’s lane of travel did not 

create the reasonable suspicion required to justify the initial traffic stop. 

[¶6] Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress, 

holding that absent any adverse conditions, the two deviations from a single lane of travel, 

taken together with the surrounding circumstances, gave rise to reasonable suspicion that 
2

a traffic violation had occurred. Accordingly, it found that Trooper Kirlin had reasonable 

suspicion to stop the vehicle. 

[¶7] Mr. Elmore subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a 

controlled substance. The district court sentenced him to three to five years in prison, 

suspended in favor of two years of probation, and he timely appealed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8] Mr. Elmore challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress under the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 4 of the Wyoming 

Constitution.1 

In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we 

adopt the district court’s factual findings unless those findings 

are clearly erroneous. Rodriguez v. State, 2018 WY 134, ¶ 15, 

430 P.3d 766, 770 (Wyo. 2018) (citing Jennings v. State, 2016 

WY 69, ¶ 8, 375 P.3d 788, 790 (Wyo. 2016)). We view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s 

decision because the court conducted the hearing and had the 

opportunity to “assess the witnesses’ credibility, weigh the 

evidence and make the necessary inferences, deductions and 

conclusions.” Kunselman v. State, 2008 WY 85, ¶ 9, 188 P.3d 

567, 569 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Hembree v. State, 2006 WY 

127 ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 905, 907 (Wyo. 2006)). “On those issues 

where the district court has not made specific findings of fact, 

this Court will uphold the general ruling of the court below if 

supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.” Feeney v. 

State, 2009 WY 67, ¶ 9, 208 P.3d 50, 53 (Wyo. 2009) (citing

Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Wyo. 1979)). “The 

ultimate question of whether the search or seizure was legally 

justified, however, is a question of law we review de novo.”

Rodriguez, ¶ 15, 430 P.3d at 770.

Pryce v. State, 2020 WY 151, ¶ 16, 477 P.3d 90, 94-95 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Brown v. 

State, 2019 WY 42, ¶ 10, 439 P.3d 726, 730 (Wyo. 2019)).

1 Mr. Elmore referred to the Wyoming Constitution in his motion to suppress, but he provided no cogent 

argument as to how the initial stop violated Article I, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. “General citation 

to the Wyoming Constitution does not suffice to preserve a state constitutional argument for appeal, nor 

does citation to cases decided under the Wyoming Constitution without argument concerning how they 

apply to the case under consideration.” Gibson v. State, 2019 WY 40, ¶ 13, 438 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 

2019) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, we confine our review to his Fourth Amendment claim.
3

DISCUSSION

[¶9] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against 

“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth 

Amendment, there are “three tiers of interaction between law enforcement and citizens: 

consensual encounters, investigatory detentions and arrests.” Simmons v. State, 2020 WY 

132, ¶ 11, 473 P.3d 1259, 1262 (Wyo. 2020) (citation omitted). Mr. Elmore’s interaction 

with law enforcement began as a traffic stop, which is an investigatory detention.

[¶10] Mr. Elmore’s sole claim is that Trooper Kirlin did not have reasonable suspicion to 

justify the initial traffic stop. Because it is an investigatory detention, a traffic stop must 

comply with the Fourth Amendment. Kennison v. State, 2018 WY 46, ¶ 13, 417 P.3d 146, 

149 (Wyo. 2018) (“A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a ‘seizure’ of the 

occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth 

Amendment.”) (quoting Allgier v. State, 2015 WY 137, ¶ 14, 358 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Wyo. 

2015)).

To justify a traffic stop, the trooper must have “reasonable 

suspicion—that is, a particularized and objective basis” to 

suspect the motorist is violating the law. The trooper’s conduct 

is judged by “‘an objective standard which takes into account 

the totality of the circumstances.’” “[W]hile the test is 

objective, the [trooper]’s training, experience, and expertise 

are to be considered as part of the totality of the 

circumstances.”

Simmons, ¶ 12, 473 P.3d at 1262 (quoting Robinson v. State, 2019 WY 125, ¶ 22, 454 P.3d 

149, 156 (Wyo. 2019)).

[¶11] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-209(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2019) specifies that when a roadway 

is divided into two or more clearly marked lanes “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as 

practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the 

driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.” As previously 

noted, Trooper Kirlin observed Mr. Elmore’s vehicle cross roughly two feet over the center 

line for about an eighth of a mile twice. 

[¶12] Mr. Elmore first challenges the veracity of Trooper Kirlin’s observations and claims 

that the dash camera video contradicts his version of events. Alternatively, he claims that 

his lane deviations do not give rise to reasonable suspicion that he violated § 31-5-209(a)(i). 

He contends his action in the first deviation could not support a reasonable suspicion 

because it could be explained—he was preparing to pass a semi-truck and crossed the 

center line to avoid Trooper Kirlin’s parked patrol vehicle by a wider margin. He further 

contends that neither deviation could arouse reasonable suspicion because he was not 
4

required to maintain a “perfect vector,” and that his deviations were minor and did not 

endanger others. 

[¶13] The district court found as follows (footnotes omitted):

1. While on patrol at approximately 8:44 p.m. on July 28, 

2018, Trooper Aaron Kirlin, of the . . . Wyoming Highway 

Patrol, was parked on [the] median of the highway, 

approximately six-to-eight feet onto the median from the 

passing lane, when he observed a silver rental vehicle bearing 

California plates traveling eastbound on Interstate-80. The 

weather was clear and the roads dry, though the sun was 

setting.

2. Near mile marker 308, Trooper Kirlin observed the 

silver rental vehicle cross roughly two feet over the dotted 

center white line for about an eighth of a mile before correcting 

itself. After Trooper Kirlin began to follow the vehicle, he 

observed the vehicle cross the center white-dotted line for a 

second time, for about the same distance and to about the same 

degree. Trooper Kirlin’s testimony at the hearing is 

corroborated by the dash camera DVD footage from Trooper 

Kirlin’s patrol vehicle which, while somewhat difficult to 

discern on the DVD, does depict the vehicle crossing the dotted 

lane line twice, consistent with the trooper’s testimony. 

Additionally, Trooper Kirlin can be overheard in the video 

noting aloud each time he observed the vehicle depart from its 

lane of travel. 

* * *

21. Mr. Elmore asserts that his driving actions were not 

particularly egregious and were justified in that he “only drove 

over the dotted white passing line for a short distance, which 

was justified under the facts and circumstances of his case to 

make room for Trooper Kirlin’s parked vehicle, as Mr. Elmore 

was getting ready to pass a semi-truck.” . . . .

22. Having reviewed the dash camera video from Trooper 

Kirlin’s patrol vehicle and based on the testimony provided at 

the suppression hearing, this Court disagrees. Mr. Elmore 

points to no adverse conditions (such as high winds, sharp 

curves, or damaged pavement) to justify the departure from his 
5

lane of travel, nor can this Court locate any such conditions on 

the DVD. See Dods [v. State, 2010 WY 133], ¶ 15, 240 P.3d 

[1208,] 1211 [(Wyo. 2010)]. While Mr. Elmore’s contention 

that he properly and safely moved partially from the passing 

lane into the right lane in order to give Trooper Kirlin’s parked 

patrol vehicle more room the first time Mr. Elmore crossed the 

center line, Mr. Elmore offers no explanation for why he 

crossed the center line a second time shortly thereafter. Also, 

Trooper Kirlin testified that there was no requirement to “move 

over” or make room for law enforcement vehicles unless the 

emergency lights were activated. Here, Trooper Kirlin’s were 

not.

23. Absent adverse conditions or the like, these two 

deviations from a single lane of travel, taken together with the 

surrounding circumstances, give rise to reasonable suspicion 

that a traffic violation has occurred. Consequently, Trooper 

Kirlin’s decision to stop Mr. Elmore’s vehicle was justified at 

its inception.

[¶14] We have reviewed Trooper Kirlin’s dash camera footage. His vehicle was parked 

approximately six to eight feet into the median with his right tire just off the asphalt surface 

of the road. At approximately 8:43:55 p.m., a semi-truck passed his parked vehicle,

followed by a silver vehicle that straddled the center line some distance behind the semitruck. Trooper Kirlin testified that the vehicle “crossed over the center dotted line for about 

an eighth of a mile before correcting and coming back into the correct lane” and on the 

dash camera footage at approximately 8:44:13, Trooper Kirlin stated that he observed Mr. 

Elmore’s vehicle cross over the center line. 

[¶15] Approximately sixteen seconds before Trooper Kirlin announced the lane violation, 

the video from camera 2, which captured the view from Trooper Kirlin’s passenger side, 

shows that the silver vehicle was driving over the center line with no turn signal to indicate 

that it was in the process of changing lanes. It continued to straddle the white dotted line, 

with no vehicle next to it, for approximately seven more white dotted lines before the

vehicle moved into the center of the passing lane. The vehicle straddled the center line 

with its tires in both lanes of traffic for approximately four seconds, until the vehicle is no

longer clearly visible. After observing Mr. Elmore’s vehicle driving over the center line, 

Trooper Kirlin began to follow it. 

[¶16] Before Trooper Kirlin began to follow Mr. Elmore’s vehicle, a dark van driving in 

the right lane passed his patrol vehicle at approximately 8:44:00. At some point, though it 

is not all that clear in the video, the van moved from the right lane into the left passing lane 

of traffic, directly in front of Trooper Kirlin’s patrol vehicle. At approximately 8:45:19, 
6

the van signaled and began to move from the left lane to the right lane. At 8:45:21, Trooper 

Kirlin reported on the patrol car audio that Mr. Elmore’s vehicle was “over the center line 

again.” At that point, the road was straight, flat, and clear. Additionally, as the district 

court found, the weather was clear, the sun was setting, and the roads were dry. 

[¶17] The van in front of Trooper Kirlin obstructed the camera’s view of Mr. Elmore’s 

vehicle, and we are unable to discern for how long Mr. Elmore deviated from his lane of 

travel the second time Trooper Kirlin testified that he did so. However, at 8:45:21, when 

the van moved into the right lane, the video shows that Mr. Elmore’s vehicle was over the 

center line. There was a semi-truck in the right lane that Mr. Elmore’s vehicle appears to 

have been attempting to pass, but the video does show that his vehicle was rather close to 

the rear of the semi-truck and that he had straddled the center line. We are unable to discern 

the precise distance between the semi-truck and Mr. Elmore’s vehicle from the video. 

[¶18] At approximately 8:45:23 p.m., Mr. Elmore started to move back into his lane of 

travel, away from the dotted center line toward the yellow solid line on the left side of the 

road, and by approximately 8:45:25, he was again driving in the center of the left lane. At 

8:45:36, Mr. Elmore stepped on his brakes, signaled a lane change, and moved from the 

left lane into the right lane of traffic behind the semi-truck. Trooper Kirlin then initiated 

the traffic stop. 

[¶19] Mr. Elmore’s assertion that Trooper Kirlin’s observation and testimony is 

contradicted by the audio and video recording is contrary to the district court’s factual 

findings. “A trial court’s specific findings of fact are presumed to be correct . . . unless 

they are clearly erroneous.” Maestas v. State, 2018 WY 47, ¶ 7, 416 P.3d 777, 780 (Wyo. 

2018). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support 

it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” Simmons, ¶ 17, 473 P.3d at 1263. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s determination, we conclude that 

its findings were not clearly erroneous. We also reject Mr. Elmore’s claim that his first 

lane deviation was reasonable because he was passing a semi-truck and moved to the right 

to make room for Trooper Kirlin’s vehicle. 

[¶20] First, his explanation is undermined by the distance between his vehicle and the 

semi-truck, and by the fact that he did not signal a lane change to indicate that he was 

moving into the right lane due to the patrol vehicle parked in the median. Additionally, we 

judge the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion based on information that was available 

to him at the time of the stop, not with reference to later-obtained information. Jennings 

v. State, 2016 WY 69, ¶ 10, 375 P.3d 788, 791 (Wyo. 2016). According to Trooper Kirlin’s 

testimony, Wyoming drivers are not required to move over unless a patrol vehicle’s lights 

are activated, and we cannot expect the trooper to have known Mr. Elmore’s claimed

reasoning and to have factored it into his observations. In any event, as the district court 
7

noted, even if Mr. Elmore crossed the center line the first time to make room for Trooper 

Kirlin’s parked vehicle, that does not explain the second lane deviation. 

[¶21] Next, we turn to Mr. Elmore’s claim that neither deviation could provide reasonable 

suspicion to stop him because each deviation was minor and did not endanger others. He 

contends that the “as nearly as practicable” language in § 31-5-209(a)(i) does not require a 

“perfect vector,” and that since he only had two minor deviations outside his lane of travel, 

and they did not pose a danger to other traffic, there could not have been reasonable 

suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory detention for failing to maintain a single lane 

of travel. 

[¶22] In Dods v. State, we first interpreted the “as nearly as practicable language” and 

held that it precludes “absolute standards,” and also that it requires a fact-specific inquiry 

to assess whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation has 

occurred. 2010 WY 133, ¶ 18, 240 P.3d 1208, 1212 (Wyo. 2010). We concluded that a 

trooper’s stop of a vehicle was justified after he observed its “passenger side tires cross the 

white fog line by approximately eight inches for about five seconds/several hundred yards.” 

Id. ¶¶ 3, 17-19, 240 P.3d at 1209, 1212. We explained that a single lane deviation could 

be a violation of § 31-5-209(a)(i), and that the record in that case supported a finding of 

the required reasonable suspicion under those circumstances because the defendant had not 

pointed to any objective factor that might have made it impractical for him to remain in his 

lane. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 240 P.3d at 1211-12. 

[¶23] We adhered to that interpretation in Tiernan v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 2011 WY 

143, ¶ 16, 262 P.3d 561, 566 (Wyo. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Allgier, ¶ 9, 358 

P.3d at 1276. Then a year later, in 2012, we again reaffirmed our holding in Dods, and we 

rejected an argument that the “as nearly as practicable language” should be interpreted to 

require that the failure to maintain a lane endanger others. 

As an initial matter, we note that Mr. Espinoza expends 

a great deal of space in his brief analyzing the meaning of § 31-

5-209 and arguing that, given the statutory imperative that a 

driver maintain his lane to the extent “practicable,” we should 

interpret the statute as only prohibiting failing to maintain a 

lane if another vehicle/driver is placed in danger. This Court 

discussed § 31-5-209 at length in Dods v. State, 2010 WY 133, 

240 P.3d 1208 (Wyo.2010). We considered case law from 

other jurisdictions interpreting statutes with language similar 

to our “as nearly as practicable” requirement and concluded:

We . . . agree with the [Tenth Circuit’s] assessment that 

a court must examine all of the surrounding 

circumstances to determine whether there is a 
8

justification for the stop. . . . Under adverse weather 

and/or road conditions, any vehicle could be subject to 

an isolated incident of moving into the right shoulder of 

the roadway, without giving rise to a suspicion of 

criminal activity. [United States v.] Gregory, 79 F.3d

[973,] 978 [(10th Cir. 1996)]. We keep in mind that 

Gregory, however, does not create a “bright-line rule” 

of what conduct constitutes a violation of this type of 

statute, but rather “highlight[s] the need to analyze 

objectively all the surrounding facts and 

circumstances” to determine whether the officer had a 

reasonable suspicion to make the stop. [United States v.] 

Ozbirn, 189 F.3d [1194,] 1198 [(10th Cir. 1999)]

(emphasis added). Based upon such a fact-sensitive 

analysis, one or two deviations from a lane may or may 

not constitute a violation, depending on the 

circumstances. While it might not be reasonable to 

expect a driver to avoid even the slightest deviation 

from a lane over an extended distance, it may be 

reasonable to expect drivers to avoid a sudden, 

significant deviation from the lane or a sudden, overcompensating return back, absent physical obstacles, 

mechanical difficulty, or other uncontrollable 

circumstances. State v. Woodruff, 403 N.J.Super. 620, 

629, 959 A.2d 1233, 1239 (Law Div.2008).

Id., ¶ 16, 240 P.3d at 1211-12. Mr. Espinoza has not convinced 

us that we should waver from our decision in Dods, and we 

will continue to follow that approach without superimposing a 

requirement that any lane deviation put another driver into 

danger before the statute is violated.

Espinoza v. State ex rel. Wyoming Dep’t of Transp., 2012 WY 101, ¶ 9, 280 P.3d 1226, 

1230 (Wyo. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Allgier, ¶ 9, 358 P.3d at 1276 (footnotes 

omitted).

[¶24] Mr. Elmore has not shown us that our rulings in Dods, Tiernan, and Espinoza are 

not controlling, nor has he distinguished them. We thus adhere to our precedent and look 

to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether Trooper Kirlin’s decision to stop 

Mr. Elmore’s vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion. Our de novo review of the 

ultimate determination regarding the constitutionality of the initial stop in this case leads 

us to conclude that Trooper Kirlin’s actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

Trooper Kirlin’s testimony, together with the dash camera footage, supports the district 
9

court’s legal conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the initial stop based on its 

findings of fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly denied the 

motion to suppress.

[¶25] Affirmed.