COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Humphreys 

Argued by teleconference 

JAMIE MAURICE STOKES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2738-01-2 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS 

 JULY 2, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

George F. Tidey, Judge 

 Christopher J. Collins for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Jamie Maurice Stokes appeals his convictions, after a bench 

trial, for robbery and using a firearm in the commission of a 

robbery. Stokes contends the trial court erred in finding the 

evidence sufficient as a matter of law to sustain the robbery 

conviction. Instead, Stokes argues the evidence was sufficient 

to establish nothing more than that he was an 

accessory-after-the-fact. We disagree. 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. Further, because this memorandum 

opinion has no precedential value, we recite only those facts 

necessary to our holding. 
"'The distinctive elements of robbery are (1) the use of violence, 

or the threat thereof, against the victim, and (2) the theft of 

property from his person or in his presence.'"1

In order for a person to be a principal in 

the second degree to a felony, [such as 

robbery,] the individual must "know or have 

reason to know of the principal's criminal 

intention and must intend to encourage, 

incite, or aid the principal's commission of 

the crime." McGhee v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 

422, 427, 270 S.E.2d 729, 732 (1980) []. 

The person must be "present, aiding and 

abetting the act done, or keeping watch or 

guard at some convenient distance."2 Brown 

v. Commonwealth, 130 Va. 733, 736, 107 S.E. 

809, 810 (1921). "[M]ere presence and 

consent will not suffice." Underwood v. 

Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1045, 1048, 243 S.E.2d 

231, 233 (1978).3

Further, any element of an offense may be proved by circumstantial 

evidence.4 "Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is 

entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is 

 1 Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 373, 402 S.E.2d 

218, 224 (1991) (quoting Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532, 

543, 273 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 

(1981)). 

2

 This is opposed to an accessory, which is defined as "one 

not present at the commission of the offense, but who is in some 

way concerned therein, either before or after, as contriver, 

instigator or advisor, or as a receiver or protector of the 

perpetrator . . . ." Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 99, 18 

S.E.2d 314, 315 (1942); Hitt v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 752, 759, 

109 S.E. 597, 600 (1921) (emphasis added). 

3 Jones v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 384, 387, 424 S.E.2d 

563, 565 (1992) (emphases added). 

4 See Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 

864, 876 (1983). 

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sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis 

except that of guilt."5 In fact, intent may, and usually must, be 

proven by circumstantial evidence.6 "[T]he fact finder may infer 

that a person intends the immediate, direct, and necessary 

consequences of his voluntary acts. [Additionally], when the fact 

finder draws such inferences reasonably, not arbitrarily, they 

will be upheld."7 

 Here, Stokes' own statement to police proved that: 1) he had 

spent most of the day with Antoine Smith; 2) he knew Joseph 

Phillips, the robber; 3) he drove Smith and Phillips to the scene; 

4) he was present when the robbery occurred; 5) he drove himself, 

Smith and Phillips away after the robbery;8 6) he voluntarily 

shared in the robbery proceeds; and 7) he drove both Smith and 

Phillips to their intended destinations after the incident. Thus, 

the direct evidence, as well as the corroborating circumstantial 

 5 Id.

6 See Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 

S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988); see also Long v. Commonwealth, 8 

Va. App. 194, 198, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). 

7 Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 706-07, 508 S.E.2d 

354, 356 (1998) (citations omitted). 

8

 We note that the fact finder rejected Stokes' contention 

that he drove away under duress, because Phillips had a gun and 

he "told us to pull off." See Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 

379, 387, 464 S.E.2d 131, 136 (1995) ("[W]hen conducting 

appellate review on . . . question[s] of fact, considering the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we 

must grant the Commonwealth all reasonable inferences from the 

facts proven, and the trial court's judgment must be affirmed 

unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.") 

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evidence, permits the reasonable inference that Stokes shared 

Phillips' and Smith's criminal intent, proving beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Stokes was a principal in the second degree to the 

robbery. 

 Moreover, as the legal standard defining a principal in the 

second degree makes clear, it was not necessary for the 

Commonwealth to prove Stokes shared in the criminal intent to 

commit the robbery. The standard is defined in the disjunctive. 

Thus, if the evidence established that Stokes aided in, or in some 

way countenanced, the principal's commission of the crime, he 

could be convicted as a principal in the second degree.9 Here, 

Smith himself conceded that he aided in the commission of the 

robbery, by driving the men from the scene and sharing in the 

robbery proceeds. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is 

 Affirmed.

 

9 See Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 124, 306 

S.E.2d 886, 888-89 (1983) ("Mere presence, however, is 

insufficient to establish that [an accused] is a principal in 

the second degree. To prove [an accused] was an aider and 

abettor, the evidence must show that [he] was not only present 

but that [he] procured, encouraged, countenanced, or approved 

commission of the crime. In other words, [he] must share the 

criminal intent of the party who actually committed the [crime] 

or be guilty of some overt act in furtherance thereof.") 

(emphasis added); see also Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 

535, 540, 399 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1991) ("Specific intent is not 

required to convict the defendant as a principal in the second 

degree."). 

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