Note: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-7267 SHERWOOD BROWN, Claimant-Appellant,

v. JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secret ary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

Sherwood Brown , of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, pro se. Matthew H. Solomson , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Depar tment of Justice, of Wash ington, DC, for respondentappellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey S. Bucholtz , Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson , Director, and Deborah A. Bynum , Assistant Director. Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims Chief Judge William P. Greene, Jr.NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-7267 SHERWOOD BROWN, Claimant- Appellant,

v. JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secret ary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

______ ____________________ DECIDED: May 8, 2008

______ ____________________ Before MICHEL, Chief Judge , PROST, Circuit Judge , and HOCHBERG, * District Judge

. PER CURIAM. Sherwood Brown appeals an Ap ril 30, 2007 decision of t he Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirmi ng a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) denying his claim of clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”) in prior Board adjudications, such that he would be entitled to earlie r service date for his knee disability. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
I

* Honorable Faith Hochberg, District J udge, United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. Brown served on active duty from August 19 60 to February 1961. At the time of his enlistment, Brown had pre-exis ting injuries to both knees. He experienced difficulty with his knees in service in or around No vember 1960 and was ultimately recommendedfor separation because of medical disqualificat ion in February 1961. Shortly after his separation, Brown filed a claim for disability compensation. Both in August 1961 and April 1977, the Board denied Brown’s claim for service connection for his injuries to both knees, finding that his condition existed prior to service and that he had not show n that his condition was aggravated by service. In September 1994, Brown sought to re-open his claim, and in 1998, he submitted to the Regional Office (“RO”) a medical opinion stating that there was “at least a significant aggravation of his pre-existing condition duri ng the course of his enlisted days.” In January 2000, the RO again d enied his claim. But on app eal, the Board reversed finding service connection for his knee di sability based on the 1998 medical opinion, and the RO ultimately assigned September 1, 1994 as the effect ive date for service connection. In December 2001, Brown submitted a moti on for revision, cont ending that the Board committed CUE in the 1961 and 1977 dec isions. On December 10, 2004, the Board held that no CUE h ad been committed based on t he law and medical evidence before the Board at the time of the 1961 and 1977 decisions. Brown then appealed to the Veterans C ourt, and in April 2007 in a single-judge disposition, the Veterans Court affirmed. In particular, the court rejected Brown’s argument that he was prohibited from submitting evidence from his treating physician at the time of the 1961 and 1977 Board decisions. The Vete rans Court also held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Brown’s c ontention that he should receive an earlier effective date for his claim for total disa bility based on individual unemployability (“TDIU”) because there was not yet a final Board decision on that claim.

2007-3320 22007-3320 3 II Our jurisdiction to review decisions of t he Veterans Court is limited. We have jurisdiction to “review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof” by the Veterans Court “and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (c). Unless the appeal presents a constitutional issue, however, this court “may not review (A) a c hallenge to a factual det ermination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particula r case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). On appeal, Brown argues that he s hould be awarded benefits for his knee disability from the date of hi s discharge, i.e., 1961, rather than the date of re-opening of his claim. Specifically, he contends that the Board co mmitted CUE in its 1961 and 1977 decisions rejecting his claim because his m edical records in service showed that his knee disability was aggravated during service. Because these issues are factual ones, however, we lack jurisdiction to review them. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). Brown raises other issues related to hi s TDIU claim, his claim for a spinal condition, and his claim for flat feet. It appear s that there has been no final decision on these claims, and thus they are not properly raised in this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.