May 9, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks E 963

bodies. With the cooperation of city agencies, schools and volunteer groups (she calls

her own role ‘‘coalition-building’’), more

than a dozen playgrounds were made safer.

Metal swings—which too often smashed into

children, sometimes fracturing skulls—were

replaced by soft rubber ones. Broken climbing bars with jagged points also were replaced. Pocked asphalt, which so easily

tripped dashing feet, yielded to rubberized

surfaces. Graffiti-strewn walls were painted

over with cheerful murals by schoolchildren.

Five entirely new playgrounds with Harlem

motifs were created.

Dr. Barlow didn’t stop there. When a child

was raped in the darkness of unkempt Jackie

Robinson Park in northern Harlem, where

the lights had long been out, she demanded

that city officials get the lights back on.

Now, Little League teams once again play on

the park’s renovated fields, and two of the

teams are sponsored by Harlem Hospital.

While sports have their place, they can’t

give a child what gardening can, according

to Bernadette Cozart, a gardener for the city

parks department. Her ‘‘Greening of Harlem’’ project works in cooperation with the

Injury Prevention Program. Under Cozart’s

eye, children fill vacant lots and playground

plots with flowers and vegetables. Typical is

the garden at P.S. 197, an elementary school.

Roses, lilies, tomatoes, eggplants, even collard greens thrive there. ‘‘I have kids who

wouldn’t eat anything green until they started growing it,’’ said Cozart.

Like gardening, the hospital’s popular

dance program might seem far afield from

injury prevention. But time spent dancing is

time away from the mean streets of the

inner city. ‘‘Why shouldn’t these children be

loaded up with afterschool activities, just

like suburban children are?’’ asked Dr. Barlow.

No Harlem child, however, can avoid the

streets: 48 percent of pediatric trauma injuries at Harlem Hospital involve motor vehicles. So ‘‘Safety City,’’ a course for thirdgraders on how to be a safe pedestrian, is

part of the Injury Prevention Program (aided

by the city’s department of transportation).

Another part of the program is the Urban

Youth Bike Corps, which provides helmets

and bicycle-repair instruction, while the

KISS (Kids, Injuries and Street Smarts)

project educates teens about gun violence.

So varied has the Injury Prevention Program become that it’s easy to assume Dr.

Barlow has little time left for old-fashioned

doctoring. That would be a mistake. She still

takes a turn of duty every fourth night,

though, as a department chief, she doesn’t

have to.

Dr. Barlow’s pioneering program is now

going national, thanks to a new $1.1 million

grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Pittsburgh, Chicago and Kansas City,

Mo., are the first cities to replicate it. At

Harlem Hospital, meanwhile, the surest sign

of the continuing downward trend in trauma

injuries is a dark corner of the pediatric

ward. ‘‘We used to have patients hanging off

the rafters when I first came here.’’ said Dr.

Barlow. ‘‘Now I‘ve closed off six beds. We

don’t need them anymore.’’

SOCIAL SECURITY COURT OF

APPEALS ACT OF 1995

f

HON. ANDREW JACOBS, JR. OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 9, 1995

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing the Social Security Court of Appeals

Act of 1995 which creates a court to adjudicate appeals from Federal district court related to Social Security. A summary prepared by

the minority staff of the Subcommittee on Social Security follows:

The past decade has witnessed increasing

regional variation in the standards of eligibility

used by the Social Security Administration

[SSA] to evaluate applications for disability

benefits. A significant cause of this variation is

the Federal courts’ increased role in reviewing

SSA decisions and interpreting agency regulations. Court intervention has been, and continues to be, vitally important in protecting the

right of claimants. However, the regional nature of court jurisdiction can also serve to fragment Social Security disability standards along

geographic lines and result in disparities in

treatment of similarly situated claimants.

To address this problem, this legislation

would establish a single, national Social Security Court of Appeals. This court would be

modeled after the court of appeals for the

Federal circuit, which has jurisdiction over patent and trademark law, international trade, and

the Court of Claims. The new court would replace the 12 Federal circuit courts of appeal in

adjudicating Social Security and Supplemental

Security Income [SSI] benefit appeals from

Federal district courts. The court would consist

of five judges with lifetime appointments. It

would render appeal decisions in panels of

three judges, as is the case at present with

Federal circuit courts of appeal. The new court

would be located in Washington, DC, but

would have authority to travel as it deemed

necessary. As the single body to adjudicate

Social Security and SSI appeals from Federal

district courts, this court would be positioned

to articulate a consistent body of case law and

to eliminate regional discrepancies in SSA policy.

Claimants’ rights to appeal SSA decisions to

Federal district courts would be unaffected by

this legislation. Moreover, decisions of the Social Security Court of Appeals would be appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court, just as

Social Security decisions by the circuit courts

of appeal are under current law.

DOD INCREMENTAL COSse member.TS IN SUPPORT OF U.N.

fPEACEKEEPING

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 9, 1995

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, many members have expressed interest in the scope and

nature of incremental costs incurred by the

Department of Defense in support of peacekeeping operations conducted or authorized

by the United Nations. This issue was the subject of some confusion during the debate in

the House on H.R. 7, the National Security

Revitalization Act.

On January 13, I wrote to Secretary of Defense William Perry requesting detailed information on these costs. On February 15, I received an interim response from Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe, followed

by further clarification in a letter from Under

Secretary Slocombe on April 18.

The Department of Defense now estimates

its voluntary incremental costs in support of

nonassessed U.N. peacekeeping operations at

$1.41 billion in fiscal year 1994. As Under

Secretary Slocombe points out in his latest letter:

Were the United States to credit amounts

of this size against our annual U.N. peacekeeping assessment, it would cancel out our

entire yearly contribution, thereby seriously

impairing the U.N.’s capability to conduct

peacekeeping operations.

Because these are now the latest official

Department of Defense estimates of these

costs, I ask that this correspondence be included in the RECORD.

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS,

Washington, DC, January 13, 1995.

Hon. WILLIAM J. PERRY,

Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,

The Pentagon, Washington, DC.

DEAR SECRETARY PERRY: I write concerning the Committee on International Relations impending markup of H.R. 7, the foreign affairs portion of the ‘‘Contract with

America’’, and information we need prior to

that markup in order to defend the Administration’s position.

Two provisions in H.R. 7, if enacted as currently drafted, would cripple the ability of

the United States to support U.N. peacekeeping operations, and might well shut down

such operations altogether. Sections 501 and

508 of that legislation, taken together, would

prohibit effectively the ability of the Defense Department to support U.N. peacekeeping operations, and off-set any DOD support

for U.N. authorized actions against the U.S.

peacekeeping assessment to the U.N.

I believe that these provisions stem from a

political perception that DOD participation

in or support for U.N. peacekeeping operations and related activities has had a negative impact on U.S. military readiness.

While I anticipate a lengthy debate this year

in Congress on the subject of U.S. military

readiness generally, my problem is that we

in Congress do not have the necessary information to have an informed debate on

whether and how DOD support for U.N.

peackeeping operations might contribute to

the readiness issue.

I therefore would urge you to provide at

your earliest possible convenience the following information:

How does DOD differentiate between direct

and indirect support for ‘‘Contingency Operations’’, and for direct and indirect support

for U.N. peackeeping operations?

What costs has DOD incurred in Fiscal

Year 1994 for contingency operations for U.N.

authorized operations, such as the no-fly

zone in Iraq? For ‘‘Blue Helmet’’ operations

such as UNSOM II?

How much was DOD reimbursed by the

U.N. in Fiscal Year 94 for support of U.N.

peacekeeping operations? In each case, at

what time were DOD costs incurred, on what

date did DOD request each such reimbursement, and when did each such U.N. reimbursement occur?

How much of these costs in Fiscal Year

1994 have been covered by U.S. supplemental

appropriations? In cases where supplemental

appropriations have been provided and the

U.N. has subsequently reimbursed those

costs, how much has DOD returned to the

U.S. Treasury?

Who within DOD compiles information on

incremental costs associated with U.N.

peackeeping operations? Is it done by each

service, then collated by the Office of the

Secretary of Defense? Or some other way?

I look forward to your prompt response.
E 964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks May 9, 1995

With best regards,

Sincerely,

LEE H. HAMILTON,

Ranking Democratic Member.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

Washington, DC, February 15, 1995.

Hon. LEE H. HAMILTON,

Ranking Democrat, Committee on International

Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: Secretary Perry asked

me to respond to your letter of January 13

about the effect of HR–7 on the ability of the

United States to support UN peacekeeping

activities. The provisions of the ‘‘Contract

with America’’ embodied in HR–7 that address this issue could certainly significantly

reduce the funding available to the United

Nations for these efforts, especially if the

U.S. position becomes the model for all nations to use. Let me discuss my concerns

with three particular sections of the bill.

Section 501 would require that we deduct

from our UN peacekeeping assessment the

‘‘costs of United States support for, or participation in, United Nations Peacekeeping

activities for that preceding fiscal year.’’ We

oppose this. If this provision is broadly interpreted and recent experience is a guide, requiring the United States to deduct these

costs from our peacekeeping assessment

would end all U.S. assessment payments to

UN peace operations—in violation of our

commitment under the UN charter—or force

us to cease those military activities which

we voluntarily undertake to support UN operations when they serve our national security interests.

Further, this section would invite chaos in

the United Nations financial system by

prompting member states to adopt our unilateral policy. For example, other NATO

states may seek credit for costs incurred in

enforcing the Bosnia and Iraq no-fly zones;

Japan might seek reimbursement for the

fund it established to underwrite the logistics costs in Somalia or for its large voluntary contributions to the United Nations

peace operation in Cambodia.

The Department also takes strong exception to Section 507, which would prohibit the

United States from paying UN peacekeeping

assessments until we are reimbursed for all

prior-year assistance to the United Nations.

The fact is, the United States already receives preferential treatment in being reimbursed promptly. Nevertheless, the process is

sufficiently complex and time consuming

that reimbursement takes some months to

complete. In addition, any delays are due in

part to the fact that many member states,

including the United States, are perennially

behind in paying their peacekeeping assessments to the United Nations.

Section 508 would prohibit the Department

from paying incremental costs associated

with participation in United Nations peace

operations unless Congress has specifically

appropriated funds for this purpose. This

Section is an unacceptable infringement on

the President’s constitutional authority and

could spell the end of many important U.S.

operations. This provision would bar the

President from deploying forces or otherwise

supporting peace operations unless Congress

first authorizes such operations. For example, this prohibition would have delayed the

time sensitive Desert Shield/Desert Storm

actions ordered by President Bush, thereby

jeopardizing the success of this model of coordinated international efforts undertaken

to sustain world order.

The effect of participation in United Nations peace operations on the readiness of

our armed forces has been a much discussed

topic. This should not be an issue. As you are

aware, the Secretary of Defense has made

readiness a top priority. The readiness of our

military forces has clearly been demonstrated through superb performance in a

wide range of contingency operations. Overall, the readiness ratings of our units remain

at very high levels and the Secretary is committed to devoting the necessary resources

to see our forces remain ready. Next year, in

fact, our readiness funding per capita remains high, and in November 1994, the Secretary announced a $2.7 billion quality of life

initiative tailored to ensure we sustain our

well-trained military personnel.

We all know that peace operations are not

a substitute for vigorous alliances or strong

unilateral U.S. action when it is necessary to

protect our vital interests. However, wellplanned and well-managed United Nations

peace operations have a demonstrated capacity to effectively protect and advance U.S.

security and humanitarian interests. We do

ourselves a disservice as a nation if in the

process of identifying and taking steps to redress the shortcomings of United Nations

peace operations, we disregard or disparage

the concrete U.S. interests advanced by the

more than 60,000 United Nations troops—98

percent of them non-American—serving in

seventeen peace operations around the globe.

For example, in the Persian Gulf, a 1,200 person observer mission—which includes 15

Americans—monitors Iraqi troop movements

along the Iraq-Kuwait border, demonstrating

the international community’s continued resolve to contain Saddam Hussein’s expansionist ambitions. Another longer term effort has been the UN presence in Cyprus,

where 1,200 UN troops—all non-American—

have successfully prevented a flareup of violence between two key NATO allies.

The enclosed fact sheet responds to each of

your questions on FY 1994 funding and reimbursement for contingency operations, as

well as providing information on how the Department compiles relevant cost data. I trust

that the information provided advances informed congressional debate on this issue.

WALTER B. SLOCOMBE.

RESPONSES TO REPRESENTATIVE HAMILTON’S

QUESTIONS

(1. How does DoD differentiate between direct and indirect support for ‘‘Contingency

Operations,’’ and for direct and indirect

support for UN peacekeeping operations?)

The Department incurs costs associated

with a wide range of unplanned ‘‘contingency

operations.’’ Many, but not all of these operations, are authorized by the United Nations.

UN peace operations are among these UN-authorized activities.

U.S. involvement in UN related operations

falls into three different categories.

(1) U.S. Participation in UN Peace Operations. A small number of U.S. troops participate in UN mandated and assessed ‘‘bluehelmeted’’ operations. These include some

800 U.S. military personnel serving with

UNPROFOR contingents in Croatia and Macedonia and the more than 2,000 U.S. troops

that served in UNOSOM II in 1993 and 1994.

(2) Support to UN Peace Operations. DoD

provides various forms of support on a reimbursable basis to UN blue-helmeted peace operations under the authorities of Section 607

of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms

Export Control Act. This support takes the

form, for example, of military services to

move troops or equipment to and from UN

peace operations and the lease or sale of various types of equipment for such operations.

(3) U.S. Participation in Operations Authorized by the UN. Other U.S. troops participate in several operations that are authorized by the UN, often at the request of

the United States as a means to gain wider

international participation and support.

Some of these operations are carried out in

close coordination with and in the vicinity of

ongoing UN peace operations. Examples include U.S. forces involved in conducting the

Deny Flight operation over Croatia and

Bosnia, sanctions enforcement directed

against Iraq and several states of the former

Yugoslavia, and the Multinational Force operation in Haiti. Also included in this category is support to UN peace operations for

which the U.S. is not reimbursed (e.g., transportation support in Angola).

The Department does not differentiate between U.S. direct and indirect support for

contingency operations in general, nor for

UN peace operations in particular. Incremental costs are calculated for all contingency

operations, including those operations identified as UN related.

Pending clarification of the definitions

contained in H.R. 7, the Department has not

determined which of the above types of operations and the costs associated with them

should be considered ‘‘direct’’ and ‘‘indirect’’

support of UN peace operations.

(2. What costs has DoD incurred in Fiscal

Year 1994 for contingency operations for

UN authorized operations, such as the nofly zone in Iraq? for ‘‘Blue Helmet’’ operations such as UNOSOM II?)

The table below provides FY 1994 incremental costs for each of the UN authorized

operations. (Note that total incremental

costs incurred by DoD for all contingency

operations in FY 1994 were in excess of $1.9

billion, including responses to increased tensions in Korea, and support to pick up and

process the Cuban migrants in Guantanamo

and Panama as well as many UN authorized

operations.)

Fiscal year 1994 U.N.-related operations DOD

incremental costs 1

[In millions of dollars]

U.S. Participation in Peace Operations:

Former Yugoslavia (Macedonia) .. 3.0

Somalia 2 ...................................... 528.0

Support to UN Peace Operations:

Cambodia ..................................... 5.0

Rwanda (UN requested airlift) ..... 10.8

U.S. Participation in Operations Authorized by the UN:

Angola ......................................... 2.6

Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia/Croatia) .......................................... 289.0

Haiti (Interdiction/Sanctions) ..... 65.8

Haiti (Uphold Democracy) ........... 200.8

Iraq (Provide Comfort) ................ 91.8

Iraq (Southern Watch) ................. 333.0

Rwanda ........................................ 95.9

Western Sahara ........................... .1

Total ......................................... 1,625.8

1Excludes costs of longstanding UN Operations

such as Korea and the Multinational Observer Force

in the Sinai. 2 Includes both the U.S. troops participating in the

UN operation and the Quick Reaction Force operating in support of this effort as these costs cannot be

differentiated.

(3. How much was DoD reimbursed by the UN

in Fiscal Year 1994 for support of UN peacekeeping operations? In each case, at what

time were DoD costs incurred, on what

date did DoD request each such reimbursement, and when did each such UN reimbursement occur?)

During FY 1994, the Department received

$95.9 million in reimbursements from the UN

for goods and services provided to and personnel participation in UN peace operations.

Most of the reimbursements ($92.8 million)

were for Somalia. Of these, $11.5 million was

for costs incurred in FY 1994, with the balance related to FY 1993 costs. At the minimum, it takes 90 days for the DoD to forward

a bill to the United Nations, and 60 days for

the United Nations to complete reimbursement.
May 9, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks E 965

4. How much of these costs in Fiscal Year

1994 have been covered by U.S. supplemental appropriations? In cases where supplemental appropriations have been provided and the UN has subsequently reimbursed those costs, how much has the DoD

returned to the U.S. Treasury?)

The information follows:

FISCAL YEAR 1994 UN-RELATED OPERATIONS

[In millions of dollars]

Incremental

costs

Covered

by supplemental

U.S. Participation in Peace Operations: Former Yugoslavia (Macedonia) ........................... 3.0 3.0 Somalia ................................................................. 528.0 424.1 Support to U.N. Peace Operations: Cambodia .............................................................. 5.0 ............. Rwanda (U.N. requested Airlift) ........................... 10.8 ............. U.S. Participation in Operations Authorized by the

U.N.: Angola ................................................................... 2.6 ............. Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia) ................................. 289.0 273.7 Haiti (Interdiction/Sanctions) ............................... 65.8 50.0 Haiti (Uphold Democracy) ..................................... 200.8 (1)

Iraq (Provide Comfort) .......................................... 91.8 92.0 Iraq (Southern Watch) .......................................... 333.0 332.5 Rwanda (Unilateral Support) ................................ 95.9 122.2 Western Sahara .................................................... .1 .............

Total ................................................................. 1,625.8 1,297.5

1 The Secretary of Defense used the Feed and Forage authority to cover

$126.3 million of the costs incurred in this effort. The appropriations to

cover these costs are requested in the FY 1995 Emergency Supplemental.

Note: The Department returned to the Treasury all reimbursements for

costs already funded through supplemental appropriations. For FY 1994, the

total amount was $25 million, of which $22 million was associated with

UNOSOM II (Somalia) and the balance related to UNPROFOR (Former Yugoslavia).

5. Who within DoD compiles information on

incremental costs associated with UN

peacekeeping operations? Is it done by

each Service, then collated by the Office of

the Secretary of Defense? Or some other

way?)

The DoD Components determine the incremental costs for contingency operations in

which each is involved. They report these

costs to the Department of the Army, which

as Executive Agent for these efforts prepares

a consolidated report for all operations. The

DoD is in the process of transferring the reporting responsibility to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, an organization that has the basic mission of providing

this type of service to the Department.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

Washington, DC, April 18, 1995.

Hon. LEE HAMILTON,

Ranking Democrat, Committee on International

Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN; As I indicated in our

15 February response to your January 13 letter regarding the impact of H.R. 7 on the

ability of the United States to support UN

peacekeeping activities, we initiated another

examination of the fiscal year 1994 costs associated with contingency operations. In

particular, we wanted to provide you a more

specific breakout of the costs associated

with contingency operations related to United Nations Security Council resolutions,

where possible. The attached information

provides the best data available.

At the time that some of these UN-related

operations commenced, we did not foresee

the requirement to account for costs according to the authority under which U.S. forces

participated, and therefore, did not require

the Services or Defense Agencies to collect

data at the level of detail requested in your

letter. We have since remedied this through

new financial procedures directed by the

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). In

the interim, working with the Services and

the Office of Management and Budget, we

have been able to use existing information to

develop a better estimate of the costs for

certain operations. I stress, however, that

the attached figures are our ‘‘best estimate’’

of the incremental costs since we did not require the Services and Defense Agencies to

capture these precise data.

The most important point about this information is that it indicates that crediting the

incremental expenditures associated with

our voluntary participation in these UN-related operations would, at a minimum, reduce significantly the USG’s payment of

United Nations peacekeeping assessments if

DoD’s incremental costs were credited

against the USG’s assessment. The United

States spent $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1994 on

operations voluntarily undertaken in connection with UN Security Council resolutions. Were the United States to credit

amounts of this size against our annual UN

peacekeeping assessment, it would cancel

out our entire yearly contribution, thereby

seriously impairing the UN’s capability to

conduct peacekeeping operations.

I hope the following provides you with useful information and is of value during any

further debate of this issue in the Congress.

Sincerely yours,

Walter B. Slocombe.

INCREMENTAL COSTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994 ‘‘NON-BLUE

HELMET’’ BUT UN-RELATED OPERATIONS 1

Operation Cost

(million) UNSCR

Former Yugoslavia2 .................................................. $289

Sanctions Enforcement (Sharp Guard) ............... (75) 787 Humanitarian Airdrop (Provide Promise) ............ (77) 770 No-Fly Zone (Deny Flight) ................................... (85) 781, 816,

836 Other Costs ......................................................... (52) Haiti: Multinational Force (Uphold Democracy) ............ 197 940 Sanctions Enforcement (Support Democracy) ..... 65 841 Southwest Asia: Sanctions Enforcement/No-Fly Zone-S. Iraq

(Southern Watch) ............................................ 333 687 No-Fly Zone/Kurdish Relief-N. Iraq (Provide

Comfort) .......................................................... 92 688 Somalia (non-UNOSOM II)3 ...................................... 434 794

Total ................................................................ 1,410

1 For the purposes of this analysis, the operations were limited to those

carried out in relation to a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) but not

including UN mandated and assessed ‘‘blue helmet’’ peace operations. 2 Estimates based on reports from the Services. The category titled ‘‘Other Costs’’ includes costs that are not attributable to the ‘‘blue-helmet’’

UNPROFOR operation, but are related to the other three operations in the

former Yugoslavia. Further, these costs could not be allocated accurately to

a specific DoD component. All other costs were related directly to a Military

Department. 3

IN RECOGNITION OF THE FROMM

INSTITUTE FOR LIFELONG

Estimate based on reports from the Services.

fLEARNING

HON. NANCY PELOSI OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 9, 1995

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in

recognition of the University of San Francisco’s Fromm Institute for Lifelong Learning,

which celebrates its 20th anniversary on May

6, 1995.

Alfred and Hanna Fromm are a living example of the American dream. As a married couple fleeing Hitler’s Germany in the 1930’s,

they came to this country as refugees, and

reaped the rewards of their hard work. Alfred

was instrumental in reviving a dormant wine

industry in California following Prohibition,

using his talents to transform Christian Brothers, and then Paul Masson, into world-renowned labels of wine. His distributorship,

Fromm & Sichel, became the largest distributor of California wines in the world.

Alfred and Hanna have never forgotten the

needs of their community. They have involved

themselves deeply and generously in the civic

and cultural life of San Francisco. They are

cofounders of the Jewish Community Museum, and have served on the boards and

supported organizations as diverse as the

opera and Amnesty International. Their dedicated service to the San Francisco community

and the Nation is a model and inspiration for

all.

In 1976, Hanna and Alfred recognized the

need to expand and enhance the then severely limited educational opportunities and

options available to senior San Franciscans

living in retirement. Together, they set to work

to provide a suitable setting where retired

members of the community could pursue serious academic study among their peers and

under the tutelage of their peers, but with the

resources of a modern great urban university

at their disposal.

Thus was born the Fromm Institute for Lifelong Learning. Thousands of seniors have enrolled in this ‘‘university within a university,’’

presenting 8-week, noncredit, academic

courses three times a year. Courses span the

disciplines of psychology, literature, philosophy, science, theology, history, art, music, politics, and creative writing.

Mr. Speaker, Hanna and Alfred have received recognition and commendations from

Presidents, Governors, and mayors. Yet, their

deepest satisfaction comes from seeing their

peers who enter the halls of the Fromm Institute for Lifelong Learning and continue the

journey of learning through their retirement

years. That may be the best and greatest legacy of these two extraordinary people, and on

behalf of the Congress, let us join the entire

San Francisco community in thanking Alfred

and Hanna Fromm on the occasion of the

20th anniversary of the Fromm Institute for

Lifelong Learning.

CAPT. RANDOLPH L. GUZMAN

fHON. BILL BAKER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 9, 1995

Mr. BAKER of California. Mr. Speaker, the

entire Nation continues to mourn the tragedy

in Oklahoma City. This cowardly and vicious

act was an assault on our country, a wanton

act of political terrorism and social destruction.

It was also an act in which dozens of individual lives were brutally ended. From small

children to senior Federal employees, we have

witnessed the heartbreaking spectacle of battered bodies carried out of the Murrah Federal

Building, one by one.

One of these bodies was covered with an

American flag. It was that of Marine Capt.

Randolph L. Guzman, a native of Castro Valley, CA, a city in the East Bay area I am privileged to represent in Congress.

Captain Guzman was the recruiting station

executive officer in the Murrah Building. A marine since 1983, he was a graduate of California State University at Hayward and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1988.

A participant in Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm, his service included tours in Virginia, Hawaii, Japan, and finally in Oklahoma.

Among his many decorations are the Navy