CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. STERLING. 

[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Sterling (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 

Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Forging client’s 

signature on an affidavit and notarizing it — Handling a legal matter that 

attorney knows or should have known he is not competent to handle — 

Neglect of an entrusted legal matter — Failing to carry out contract of 

employment — Prejudicing or damaging client during course of 

professional relationship — Handling a legal matter without adequate 

preparation — Practicing law in a jurisdiction where to do so would violate 

the regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction — Practicing law while 

under suspension. 

(No. 98-1709 — Submitted September 29, 1998 — Decided December 30, 1998.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 97-59. 

 In November 1975, respondent, Howard Thomas Sterling of University 

Heights, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0034274, was admitted to the practice of 

law in Ohio. In March 1994, we suspended respondent from the practice of law 

for two years because he had violated several provisions of the Code of 

Professional Responsibility. Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Sterling (1994), 68 Ohio 

St.3d 528, 629 N.E.2d 400. We stayed the final eighteen months of the 

suspension, with respondent to be placed on monitored probation under certain 

conditions. We also suspended respondent from the practice of law and imposed 

sanctions upon him in May 1994 for his noncompliance with the continuing legal 

education requirements of Gov.Bar R. X. 69 Ohio St.3d 1457, 634 N.E.2d 219. 

 In June 1997, relator, Cleveland Bar Association, filed a three-count 

complaint charging respondent with violating various Disciplinary Rules and one 
 2

of the Rules for the Government of the Bar. After respondent filed an answer 

admitting most of the complaint’s factual allegations, a panel of the Board of 

Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”) 

heard the matter. 

 The panel found that respondent represented Olga Bryant, the plaintiff in an 

employment discrimination case in a federal district court in Pennsylvania. In 

opposing a dismissal motion, respondent filed a brief and an affidavit, which 

purported to be signed by Bryant. At the hearing on the dismissal motion, 

respondent admitted that, although certain of the statements in the affidavit were 

not true, he forged his client’s signature on the affidavit and then notarized it. 

According to respondent, because he had to file the brief and affidavit in a short 

period of time, he drafted the affidavit based on his notes from conversations with 

Bryant, and he did not intend to defraud either the court or his client by filing the 

affidavit. 

 The panel concluded that respondent’s conduct in the employment 

discrimination case violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct 

prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in any 

other conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law). 

 The panel further found that in December 1987, Charlotte Whiting hired 

respondent under a contingent-fee agreement to prosecute a wrongful death action 

on behalf of the estate of her mother and paid him $450 to cover deposition costs. 

After several months passed without being advised of the status of her case, 

Whiting repeatedly telephoned respondent’s office, but she received no reply. 

Whiting eventually was able to speak with respondent only when she posed as a 

new client. During that conversation, respondent assured her that he had filed a 
 3

complaint in her case in both Erie and Crawford Counties in Pennsylvania. 

Whiting then contacted the clerk’s offices in those counties and was advised that 

no such complaint had been filed. After several more unsuccessful attempts by 

Whiting to contact respondent, respondent then advised her that he would file the 

complaint. 

 In June 1989, respondent filed the complaint for Whiting in Erie and 

Crawford Counties in Pennsylvania, but never perfected service of the complaint, 

as required under Pennsylvania procedural rules. Respondent claimed that he had 

forgotten the Pennsylvania requirements concerning perfection of service. A 

Pennsylvania attorney subsequently informed Whiting that the complaint had not 

been served and that she had no genuine likelihood of prevailing in the suit. 

 The panel concluded that respondent’s conduct in the Pennsylvania case 

violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 6-101(A)(1) (handling a legal matter that 

he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating 

with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting a legal 

matter entrusted to him), 7-101(A)(2) (failing to carry out a contract of 

employment entered into with a client for professional services), and 7-101(A)(3) 

(prejudicing or damaging his client during the course of the professional 

relationship). 

 The panel additionally found that in September 1991, Linda Williams 

retained respondent to represent her in the purchase of property located in 

Cleveland. Lester Collins, the owner of the property, resided in a nursing home, 

and respondent was to prepare a deed and check with the probate court to 

determine whether Collins was under a guardianship. After respondent assured 

Williams that Collins was not under a guardianship, Williams paid off the existing 
 4

mortgage and obtained possession of the property. She then made substantial 

improvements to the premises and used it as a rental property. 

 After Collins died, his estate brought a legal action against Williams for 

concealment of assets. Collins had actually been under a guardianship at the time 

of the sale and did not have the capacity to sell the property. Respondent claimed 

that he had relied on erroneous information from the probate court clerk’s office to 

conclude that Collins was not under a guardianship when he advised Williams. 

Although he realized that he was under suspension, respondent represented 

Williams in the ensuing probate court litigation. Williams discharged him in 

September 1995. 

 The panel concluded that respondent’s conduct in the probate matter 

violated DR 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter without adequate preparation), 

3-101(B) (practicing law in a jurisdiction where to do so would violate the 

regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction), and Gov.Bar R. V(8) (practicing 

law while under suspension). 

 In mitigation, relator’s counsel noted that respondent is a Vietnam War 

veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome, that he had battled 

alcoholism, and that he had gone through a divorce. As part of the court’s 

previous suspension, respondent entered into the Ohio Lawyers Assistance 

Program, Inc. (“OLAP”) in May 1994 to treat his alcohol dependence and 

emotional problems. Relator found that Sterling had fully complied with the 

court’s previous conditions of the 1994 Gov.Bar R. V suspension. He also 

obtained over ninety hours of CLE credit in the year before the panel hearing. 

Relator’s counsel advised the panel that respondent had been a respected 

adversary for over twenty years and that respondent had fully cooperated with 

relator in the disciplinary proceeding. Relator informed the panel that an 
 5

indefinite suspension would be an appropriate sanction. The panel agreed with 

relator, noted that respondent “could be a credit to the profession,” and 

recommended an indefinite suspension from the practice of law. 

 The board adopted the panel’s findings, and recommended that respondent 

be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law and that he comply with OLAP 

requirements as a condition for his reinstatement. 

__________________ 

Hennenberg & Brown and Michael C. Hennenberg; and James Flaherty, for 

relator. 

Howard T. Sterling, pro se. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam. Upon review of the record, we adopt the findings, 

conclusions, and recommendation of the board. We hereby indefinitely suspend 

respondent from the practice of law in Ohio and order that he comply with OLAP 

requirements as a condition of his reinstatement. Costs taxed to respondent. 

Judgment accordingly. 

 MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 

LUNDBERG STRATTON,JJ., concur.