May 17, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S6797

But we must not hold Medicare Select

beneficiaries hostage until a date uncertain.

During debate today, concerns have

been raised about premium rating

based on age and one-time open enrollment periods under medigap policies. I

agree that these concerns should be addressed. However, these issues relate to

all MediGap policies, not just Medicare

Select. We should not single out those

who benefit from Medicare Select in

order to iron out differences in overall

MediGap policy. We can and should review these issues under Medicare reform and broader health care reform

legislation.

Medicare Select works for older people in Wisconsin. It saves beneficiaries

from 20 to 30 percent in premium costs

than under traditional medigap policies.

Medicare Select plans are subject to

the same regulations as other medigap

policies which are regulated by the

States. Select plans must offer sufficient access, have an ongoing quality

assurance program, and provide full

disclosure of network requirements.

The program saves money for Medicare recipients, does not cost the Federal Government, and perhaps most importantly, provides many beneficiaries

and providers their first exposure to

managed care.

Mr. President, time is running out. I

urge my colleagues to support and extend Medicare Select.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I thank

Senator ROCKEFELLER, the Senator

from West Virginia, for all of his help.

I am glad we were able to work this

out. It looked a little sticky at first,

but we have done it. I look forward to

working with him on the Finance Committee as we have the hearings next

fall or whenever the report comes in

from HHS.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I yielded the remainder of my time, so if the Senator

will yield.

Mr. CHAFEE. I yield. The Senator

may take as much of my time as he

wants.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. There are two

points I want to make that I think are

very important to those who might be

listening and who might be confused at

this point. One is that we went from a

5-year extension to a year-and-a-half

extension. Then, as the Senator from

Rhode Island pointed out, the yearand-a-half extension would then become automatic unless the Secretary

of HHS had objections or found problems or whatever. That means that basically—I do not want this to be taken

the wrong way—Donna Shalala who is

watching this closely—I do not think

destructively but constructively—18

months would pass and she would still

be there. So that for some of the colleagues who might be worried that this

is an automatic extension, it is not, except as the merit allows that. I think

that is a matter of great comfort to

me, and it is another reason why I appreciate the Senator from Rhode Island. I thank him.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I yield

back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there

be no further amendment to be proposed, the question is on agreeing to

the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The committee amendment was

agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The

question is on the engrossment of the

committee amendment and third reading of the bill.

The amendment was ordered to be

engrossed, and the bill to be read a

third time.

The bill was read a third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill

having been read the third time, the

question is, Shall the bill pass?

So the bill (H.R. 483), as amended,

was passed.

H.R. 483

Resolved, That the bill from the House of

Representatives (H.R. 483) entitled ‘‘An Act

to amend title XVIII of the Social Security

Act to permit medicare select policies to be

offered in all States, and for other purposes’’,

do pass with the following amendment:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and

insert:

SECTION 1. PERMITTING MEDICARE SELECT

POLICIES TO BE OFFERED IN ALL

STATES FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD.

Section 4358(c) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, as amended by section

172(a) of the Social Security Act Amendments of

1994, is amended to read as follows:

‘‘(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—(1) The amendments

made by this section shall only apply—

‘‘(A) in 15 States (as determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services) and such

other States as elect such amendments to apply

to them, and

‘‘(B) subject to paragraph (2), during the 5

year period beginning with 1992.

‘‘(2)(A) The Secretary of Health and Human

Services shall conduct a study that compares

the health care costs, quality of care, and access

to services under medicare select policies with

that under other medicare supplemental policies.

The study shall be based on surveys of appropriate age adjusted sample populations. The

study shall be completed by June 30, 1996.

‘‘(B) The Secretary shall determine during

1996 whether the amendments made by this section shall remain in effect beyond the 5 year period described in paragraph (1)(B). Such amendments shall remain in effect beyond such period

unless the Secretary determines (based on the

results of the study under subparagraph (A))

that—

‘‘(i) such amendments have not resulted in

savings of premiums costs to those enrolled in

medicare select policies (in comparison to their

enrollment in medicare supplemental policies

that are not medicare select policies and that

provide comparable coverage),

‘‘(ii) there have been significant additional expenditures under the medicare program as a result of such amendments, or

‘‘(iii) access to and quality of care has been

significantly diminished as a result of such

amendments.

‘‘(3) The GAO shall study and report to Congress, no later than June 10, 1996, on options for

modifying the Medigap market to make sure

that continuously insured beneficiaries are able

to switch plans without medical underwriting or

new pre-existing conditions exclusions. In preparing such options, the GAO shall determine if

there are problems under the current system and

the impact of each option on the cost and availability of insurance, with particular reference to

the special problems that may arise for enrollees

in Medicare Select plans.’’.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I move

to reconsider the vote.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I move to lay

that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was

agreed to.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask

MORNING BUSINESS

fthat we now have a period for morning

business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DEWINE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. DEWINE] is recognized.

Mr. DEWINE. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. DEWine pertaining to the introduction of S. 816 are located in today’s RECORD under ‘‘Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint

Resolutions.’’)

Mr. DEWINE. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.

FRIST). The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first let

me thank our colleague from Ohio for

his usual courtesy for giving me that

little heads up so I can get ready to address the Senate.

AUTOMOTIVE TRADE

NEGOTIATIONS

fMr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the purpose of the recently collapsed automotive trade negotiations between the

United States and Japan and the administration’s subsequent announcement to impose reciprocal restrictions

on Japanese products and file an unfair

trade complaint with the World Trade

Organization is simple That purpose is

to open Japan’s closed and protected

auto and auto parts markets.

Yesterday, the administration took

an important step toward opening Japan’s automotive market to American

products by announcing the specific

list of Japanese products to be sanctioned in retaliation for the unfair exclusion of American products from

Japan. We have listened to 25 years of

trade rhetoric from one administration

after another promising to open Japan’s automotive markets to United

States products. Endless talks and endless negotiations have not produced results. Japan’s markets remain almost

totally closed, and we have lost huge

numbers of jobs during this period.

I have a little chart here which shows

the statements of American Presidents

since 1971. Every President of both parties has had promises made to him and,

in turn, has assured the American people that we are going to act to open up

Japanese markets to American products.

President Nixon in 1971 said:

Japan has accelerated its program of liberalizing its restrictions on imports.

When President Nixon said that, the

deficit with Japan was $1.3 billion.
S6798 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE May 17, 1995

In 1974, President Ford said:

The United States and Japan will negotiate to reduce tariff and other trade distortions.

By that time the trade deficit with

Japan had grown to $2.8 billion.

In 1975, President Carter said:

[W]e’re trying to get the Japanese to buy

spare parts and parts for assembly of their

own automobiles in the U.S.

By that time the deficit had grown to

$2.9 billion.

President Reagan in 1983 said:

[W]e’re encouraged by recent commitments to further open Japan’s markets.

By that time the trade deficit had

grown to $21.6 billion.

In 1991, President Bush issued a

statement through the Vice President

as follows. Vice President Quayle said:

The President will take a direct message

to the Prime Minister of Japan after the

first of the year, saying that we don’t anticipate continuing business as usual.

Well, by then the trade deficit was

$43.4 billion. By now the trade deficit is

over $60 billion.

So actions clearly are long overdue.

The administration’s decision to tell

Japan to either open its markets or it

will face concrete reciprocal restrictions is the right thing to do and can

best be understood by showing that decision in a historical context of these

three decades. When Japan has had

total access to America’s auto and

auto parts markets while we have had

no real access to Japan’s automotive

markets, decades of painful history and

lost American jobs have proven that

Japan will open its markets only when

forced to do so.

The Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, JAMA, of course, complains about the announced sanctions.

In fact, the day after United States

Trade Representative Mickey Kantor

announced last week that we would

take trade actions to open Japan’s

automotive markets to competition,

JAMA put an ad in the Washington

Post saying that managed trade does

not work. I find it incredible that

Japan can even mouth the words

‘‘managed trade’’ given the fact that

they have the world’s most managed

economy and have had the world’s

most managed economy for decades.

They are the undisputed world champions of managed trade. Their wall of

protectionism against our auto parts

and our automobiles has been built

over 30 years.

JAMA’s own general director, William Chandler Duncan, before becoming general director of JAMA, wrote a

book. That book demonstrated just

how Japan was able to stop the opening

of its automobile market to the United

States and to our automobiles, and

that shutting us out of that market

has been a three-decade-old conscious

policy of the Japanese Government.

In 1973, Mr. Duncan published a book

entitled ‘‘U.S.-Japan Automobile Diplomacy, A Study in Economic Confrontation.’’ What a painful part of our

history is set forth in that book. The

book provides strong historical support

for the administration’s decision to pry

open markets which have been

discriminatorally closed to American

products for three decades. William

Duncan’s book documents how Japan’s

automotive industry was protected

from outside competition by the Government of Japan in order to protect

their domestic auto industry.

As you are going to hear from some

of the quotes that I have excerpted

from this book, it is a demonstration of

unfair trade policy at its worst. American negotiators suffering from Japan

fatique have three decades of fruitless

negotiation as a cause of that fatique.

An American President has finally

acted based on the certain belief that,

unless we do as other countries and act

to force open Japan’s market with reciprocal treatment, that market will

remain closed.

Mr. Duncan’s book gives us a historical view of the years 1967 to 1971. It has

only gotten worse.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that selected quotations from the

book entitled ‘‘U.S.-Japan Automobile

Diplomacy, A Study in Economic Confrontation’’ by William Chandler Duncan be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the materials was ordered to be printed in the

RECORD, as follows:

SELECTED QUOTES FROM UNITED STATESJAPAN AUTOMOBILE DIPLOMACY, A STUDY IN

ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION

The period under discussion ranges from

the opening of the U.S. diplomatic offensive

in the fall of 1967 until the Japanese approval

of the Mitsubishi-Chrysler joint venture in

June 1971 where Chrysler was limited to 35

percent ownership of Mitsubishi over 3 years.

‘‘The course of trade and capital liberalization was not a smooth one. It involved timeconsuming consultations between government and industry, long-term schedules of

decontrol, and complicated qualifications attached to concessions granted. This naturally lead to frustrations, if not bitterness,

on the part of many American’s anxious to

share in rapidly expanding Japanese markets.’’ [Introduction, page 16]

‘‘Though this dispute was later attributed

to a misunderstanding, it nevertheless clearly indicates the reluctance of the Japanese

to negotiate as well as the type of frustration that was to plague the U.S. team continually.’’ [page 4]

[January 1968] ‘‘It was natural, therefore,

that the Americans would continue to emphasize the abolition of Japan’s quantitative

trade restrictions. Again the Japanese delegation would make no commitment beyond a

vague statement to make a forward looking

investigation.’’ [page 6]

‘‘While all the (Japanese) automobile companies indicated a concern over the possible

consequences of capital liberalization the

Toyota Motor Company was most adamant

on the issue. In January (1968) they went as

far as amending their articles of incorporation to the effect that no foreigner could sit

on the board of directors of the company.’’

[page 7]

[June–August 1968] ‘‘The Japanese concessions were so painfully slow in coming, and

even then frustratingly offset with other

types of market restrictions, that the American government never once gave the Japanese side an affirmative response.’’ [page 15]

[March 1968, LDP mission to Washington]

‘‘Congressmen of both parties emphasized in

particular the problems of iron and steel imports and the liberalization of automobile

parts . . . . especially, Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, pointing to the increase of Japanese

made automobiles into America, countered

by saying that if it is Japanese policy to promote free trade, it should liberalize the import of American automobiles.’’ [page 17]

[June, 1968, USTR’s response to Japan’s

trade opening proposal] ‘‘One example that is

giving us great concern relates to one of our

biggest export industries, and that is the

automobile industry. Here the Japanese have

clearly illegal restrictions . . . . This has

been under bilateral discussion since the beginning of the year. We have finally told

them (Japan) that unless they come up with

a satisfactory solution in a very short period

of time, we will invoke article 23 of the

GATT to take them to court, which in turn

will most likely give us the ability to retaliate against them.’’ (Special Representative

for Trade Negotiations, William M. Roth).

[page 19]

‘‘These proposals clearly indicate the continued Japanese determination to exclude

foreign automobiles from their markets.’’

[page 21]

[May 1968] ‘‘However, it is clear that MITI

officials were unwilling to face the possibility of a fully owned Ford assembly plant in

Japan.’’ [page 22]

[August, 1968] ‘‘Though none of these initial efforts were realized, the considerable

discussion generated by them point out the

intensity with which many Japanese feared

the entrance of the U.S. companies into

Japan. Numerous articles and statements in

the Japanese press maintained that a ‘big

three’ advance would result in a wave of

take-overs of Japanese firms.’’ [page 24]

[Quote from Daiyamondo—Japanese newspaper] ‘‘If we liberalize within two years, it

is certain that the second class makers will

be bought out by foreign capital . . . Since

their mission, if they invest, will be to maintain and increase that investment, Americans will surely come to manage it. In that

case the Japanese will become slaves driven

unmercifully by American capital.’’ [Duncan’s comment] ‘‘This gives an indication of

the strength of feeling among those who advocated the so-called ‘Jidosha Joi Ron.’

‘Jidosha’ means ‘automobile’ while ‘joi Ron’

refers to the ‘expel-the-barbarian’ movement

of the mid-nineteenth century.’’ [page 24]

[June 21, 1968, Prime Minister Sato] ‘‘Capital liberalization must be advanced according to present day international trends.

There is no problem with Japanese shipbuilding, but capital liberalization for automobiles is still impossible even though their

exports have been flourishing. Domestic production is a matter of great concern and allowing the improvement of national prosperity is essential. But we would like to promote foreign capital induction in a way that

will advance Japan’s technology.’’ [page 24]

[July 20, 1968 debate between leaders of the

major Japanese automobile firms over

whether or not the industry was over protected]. ‘‘Keeping in mind the fact that the

government has heretofore fostered the automobile industry as an essential industry, the

industry will in the future endeavor to develop on a national basis.’’ [Duncan’s comment] ‘‘This latter point, known as the

‘Hakone Declaration’ is quite significant in

that it was interpreted as a unanimous

agreement by Japan’s major auto manufacturers not to tie up with foreign capital.’’

[page 28]

‘‘Henry Ford II continued to be the most

outspoken representative of the American

industry: ‘The U.S. Government never gets

tough enough . . . if they (the Japanese) go

far enough and start importing still more
May 17, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S6799

into this country, you’ll see a lot of action in

Congress.’’’ [page 32]

[Chairman of the Keidanren’s Foreign Capital Problems Committee, Teizo Okamura]

‘‘If we continue to hold on like this (to an

isolationist attitude) there is the possibility

of escalating the ‘yellow peril thesis.’ Presently there has appeared a movement for

voluntary restrictions on steel and synthetic

textiles, but it is conceivable that against

automobiles as well as voluntary restriction

policy will appear requesting a limit of

200,000 cars a year.’’ [page 32]

[February 21, letter from Automobile Manufacturers Association chairman Thomas

Mann to acting assistant Secretary of State

Joseph A. Greenwald]. ‘‘. . . The critical area

of discrimination is the severely restrictive

policies of Japan with reference to capital

investment by the United States auto interests. This is a clear violation of the United

States-Japan Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation. The Department of

State may wish to consider the advisability

of again appraising the government of Japan

with these views. At the same time its attention might be called to the consequences of

a continuing denial to U.S. manufacturers of

opportunities for trade and investment in

Japan . . .’’ [page 35]

[Duncan’s comment] ‘‘Though the contents

of this letter revealed nothing new as far as

the U.S. automobile industry’s position was

concerned, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo took

the unusual step of submitting the Mann letter directly to Kiyohiko Tsurumi, the Economic Affairs bureau Director of the Foreign

ministry, a move which created considerable

comment in Japan and underscored the dissatisfaction of the U.S. government as well

as the auto industry with continued Japanese recalcitrance.’’ [page 36]

[1971] ‘‘The automobile concessions, however, while designed to mitigate these growing pressures were, nevertheless, also a reflection of MITI’s continuing efforts to insure that the Japanese automobile industry

would be managed by Japanese citizens according to Japanese business practices.’’

[page 43]

[October 1969] ‘‘The Japanese, however, resisted this (American) pressure (for further

concessions), maintaining as before that

they needed time to strengthen their industry so that it could remain competitive with

the ‘big three.’ Their reasoning is reflected

in a document attached to the cabinet announcement: . . . the actual situation of our

country’s automobile industry is weak when

compared with the mammoth enterprises of

the United States and Europe; thee are still

considerable differential, in capital power,

technical development ability, etc . . .. For

this reason, it capital liberalization were to

be carried out with the situation as it is

now—there is strong danger that big disturbances would be created in the automobile industry, through the advance of foreign capital which has huge capital and enterprise

power.’’ [page 44]

[March 1970, letter from Thomas Mann of

the American Automobile Manufacturers Association, to the State Department outlining

the industry’s objections to Japan’s October

(trade concessions) announcement] ‘‘In sum,

the Japanese ‘‘concession’’ in the automotive sector, including the most recent decisions announced last October, have been

keenly disappointing and, in our judgment,

are incompatible with Japan’s responsibilities as one of the world’s great trading nations.’’ [page 44]

[1971] ‘‘Additional pressure on the Japanese

automobile industry came as a result of the

dramatic increase in exports to the United

States during this period.’’ [page 46]

‘‘In July (1971) Toyota Motor Sales vice

president Kato revealed that Ambassador to

the United States Shimoda had warned the

automobile industry that if the rate of exports continued, the Japanese industry

might expect either protectionist measures

in Congress or antidumping measures such

as had recently occurred with color television sets.’’ [page 46]

‘‘Throughout the negotiations the major

Japanese automobile companies were recording substantial profits; their exports were

expanding at a dramatic rate, and their sales

in the United States were increasing during

a time when total U.S. automobile sales were

generally declining. Furthermore, they were

setting up assembly plants and selling equipment abroad.’’ [page 53]

‘‘In short, when the Japanese spoke of reorganizing an industry they were referring

to a government, or more specifically, a

MITI policy of encouraging the amalgamation of designated industries into larger

units so as to keep them competitive with

foreign firms on the one hand, and secure

from foreign acquisition on the other.’’ [page

53]

‘‘One of the most striking aspects of these

negotiations, for example, was the strength

of Japanese resistance to the intense pressure applied by the United States. By 1969

Japan’s automobile industry was the world’s

second largest with rapidly expanding exports and foreign assembly operations; yet

despite threats of a U.S. import surcharge,

appeals to GATT, pressure from international institutions, and the implied consequences embodied in peripheral issues such

as textiles, Okinawa, etc. the Japanese refused to allow the American automobile industry any more than a token position in

their automobile market.’’ [page 111]

‘‘Since the prewar financial combines dissolved by the occupation have, in different

forms, gradually reconstructed themselves,

the Anti-Monopoly Law has become the center of one of the more significant controversies in Japan. . . . it did not discourage MITI

from pushing for reorganization in the automobile industry, or, for that matter, in other

industries as well.’’ [page 113]

‘‘. . . given present day conditions, it is unlikely that an American firm will in the near

future acquire significant management control of a Japanese automobile assembly operation.’’ [page 114]

‘‘The attempt of the American automobile

industry to enter the Japanese market covered three and a half years (fall 1967–June

1971) of frustrating negotiation and contributed significantly to a growing uneasiness in

Japanese-American relations.’’ [page 115]

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, two-anda-half decades later, the story is the

same. William Duncan was hired to run

JAMA, but his own book, written before he was hired by JAMA, is a dramatic reminder of Japan’s determination to prevent us from having access

to its markets.

Mr. President, I will just read three

or four of those excerpts. Again, this is

the man who wrote about what happened in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s,

wrote about how Japan acted as a government and an industry to keep

American products out of Japan in his

book. He is now the director of the

Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, JAMA. But this is what he

wrote prior to being hired as the director of JAMA.

In January 1968, this is what Mr.

Duncan wrote:

It was natural, therefore, that the Americans would continue to emphasize the abolition of Japan’s quantitative trade restrictions. Again, the Japanese delegation would

make no commitment beyond a vague statement to make a forward looking investigation.

That was 1968, January.

In June 1968, again quoting Mr. Duncan’s book:

These proposals clearly indicate the continued Japanese determination to exclude

foreign automobiles from their markets.

Then in 1969, this is what Mr. Duncan

said was going on:

By 1969 Japan’s automobile industry was

the world’s second largest with rapidly expanding exports in foreign assembly operations; yet despite threats of a U.S. import

surcharge, appeals to GATT, pressure from

international institutions, and the implied

consequences embodied in peripheral issues

such as textiles, Okinawa, etc., the Japanese

refused to allow the American automobile

industry any more than a token position in

their automobile market.

Finally, from Mr. Duncan, the final

quote that I will read here, although

there are many more that will be in

the RECORD, is the following:

The attempt of the American automobile

industry to enter the Japanese market covered three and a half years (the fall of 1967

through June of 1971) of frustrating negotiation and contributed significantly to a growing uneasiness in Japanese-American relations.

Mr. President, there is a long history

here. It is written very clearly by the

man who took a personal interest in

that history at that time. Two and a

half decades later, the story is the

same, albeit worse. The trade deficit

has grown by a about 40 times what it

was in 1970.

Mr. Duncan was hired to run JAMA,

but his own book written before he was

hired by JAMA is a dramatic reminder

of how Japan’s determination to prevent us from having access to its markets worked. It worked to Japan’s advantage. It worked to our disadvantage. It worked to the disadvantage of

American workers who have lost jobs

by the thousands because Japan has

been allowed to maintain a protected

market. We have tolerated it. It is long

overdue that we stop tolerating it, and

I am glad that the President finally

took action to knock down that protectionist wall which has surrounded the

Japanese automobile and auto parts

market for now three decades.

Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I

will yield the floor and note the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The

clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the

roll.

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that the order for

the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, an inquiry: Are we in morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. GORTON. Is there a time limitation on speeches?
S6800 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE May 17, 1995

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No, there

is not.

Mr. GORTON. Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT’S INTENTION TO

VETO THE RESCISSIONS BILL

fMr. GORTON. This morning, Mr.

President, the President of the United

States, Bill Clinton, announced that he

intended to veto the rescissions bill, a

proposal to save some $16 billion of already appropriated money as a modest

down payment on the tremendous fiscal crisis facing the United States

today.

This announcement was both a surprise and, I believe, almost unprecedented because, Mr. President, I am informed by the chairman of the Senate

Appropriations Committee, and can

speak from my own personal knowledge as the chairman of one of the subcommittees of the Appropriations

Committee, that there was no communication emanating from the White

House and directed at the conference

committee which has been in almost

continuous session for some 2 weeks on

this rescissions bill about the President’s desires or about his bottom line.

Mr. President, this is in dramatic

contrast with conference committees

on appropriations bills in the past, in

either the Reagan administration or

the Bush administration, in which that

contact between the White House and

the Congress was constant and in

which the bottom line of the President

was always well and clearly known to

members of the conference.

Here, by contrast, we had a situation

in which the White House was almost

totally silent with respect to its request about rescissions. The President

still pays lip service to a $16 billion

goal which must be seven or eight

times larger than the goal of his original rescissions bill itself. But only

after the deed is done, only when all

that remains for the Congress is the

formality of the approval of this conference committee report, do we hear,

first, that it does not cut enough dollars from what the President describes

as pork, and takes too much out of proposals which are of greater interest to

him.

Mr. President, a few general remarks.

The President attacks spending on

Federal courthouses, on the building of

U.S. courthouses in various parts of

the country.

Mr. President, I have no dog in this

fight. Earlier, there was a courthouse

in Seattle in one of these appropriations bills, but it is rescinded in this

bill. So none of the so-called pork exists in my State.

And there is also criticism of a number of highway projects that were not

rescinded. But note, Mr. President, I

said ‘‘not rescinded.’’ Every one of

these projects which the President of

the United States now describes as

pork, he signed into law less than a

year ago. Last year’s appropriations

bill for transportation, for the Treasury Department, for GSA, for the Post

Office, was signed and hailed by the

President. Those bills had every one of

these projects contained in them and

more besides, a significant number

that are rescinded in this bill. So today

we have described as pork proposals

which the President hailed last year

and proposals which spent more last

year when he signed them than this

year when some but not all have been

rescinded.

What in the world could have happened to have changed the President’s

mind about specific projects in the

course of 6 months, he does not tell us.

Mr. President, as recently as about 2

months ago, when the original rescissions debate had been completed in

both the House of Representatives and

here in the U.S. Senate, the President

said of the Senate proposal,

The bill passed 99 to 0 in the Senate, and I

will sign the Senate bill if the House and

Senate will send it to me. That’s how we

should be doing the business of America.

Mr. President, I think it is more than

safe to say that the bill the President

attacked today is considerably closer

to the proposal passed by the Senate

just a few weeks ago than those passed

by the House of Representatives. In

many of the very education and job

training areas which the President now

uses as an excuse to veto this bill, the

Senate provision prevailed, lock, stock,

and barrel, was accepted by the conferees. In several others, the compromise is considerably closer to the

Senate provision than it is to the

House provision, in some, it is 50–50,

and maybe, in one or two, it is closer

to the House provision.

But, Mr. President, a tiny handful—2,

3, 4 percent—of the dollar amount of

rescissions fall into the categories

which the President now criticizes.

And, Mr. President, one more repetition of my first point. Not a word

about this 1, 2, 3, 4 percent of these rescissions being deal busters, being entirely unacceptable to the President,

was communicated to the conference

committee while it was in being.

Mr. President, is it not safe to say,

overwhelmingly safe to say, that the

President of the United States wanted

to have something in this bill that

could give him a political excuse for a

veto? I regret to say that I believe that

to be the case.

And one more not incidental point,

Mr. President: there is a part of this

bill that the President of the United

States mentioned today which comes

very close to home. I know the Presiding Officer will remember the debate

on the floor of the Senate here on socalled timber language. That vote was

very close in language, of which I was

the author, and was substituted for

much more stringent House language

in the course of the debate here in the

Senate. But even our milder language

passed only by a narrow margin.

Briefly, the House of Representatives

mandated a certain harvest level of

salvage timber in all of the national

forests of the United States. The Senate, in language which I wrote, did not

mandate any harvest at all but simply

freed this administration to carry out

its own plans for salvage timber and its

own plans for harvest in the forests of

the Pacific Northwest under option 9.

In no way did the House language require President Clinton and his administration to do anything that it had not

planned to do. It simply freed what the

administration wants to do, consistent

with its views of all the environmental

laws from the constant blizzard of litigation to which it has been subjected

over the last several years.

And in fact, as recently as a week

ago, the new Secretary of Agriculture,

who, of course, has the Forest Service

under his jurisdiction, wrote a letter to

the chairman of this conference committee, one of the few interventions by

anyone in the administration with the

work of the conference committee, and

said, and I am quoting him:

We believe that the Senate provision which

directs the Secretary, acting through the

Chief of the Forest Service, to ‘‘prepare,

offer and award salvage timber sale contracts to the maximum extent feasible to reduce the backlog volume of salvage timber

in the interior’’ offers a more responsible approach than was adopted by the House.

So a week ago this Senate timber

provision was evidently acceptable to

the administration. Now, Mr. President, the timber provision which is denominated by the President of the

United States today as being a giveaway to big timber companies is the

original Senate language amended only

in minor details in a way that the administration itself asked us to amend

it.

I repeat, Mr. President, what Mr.

Clinton now criticizes is a set of provisions his own Secretary of Agriculture

approved of by this language a week

ago with minor changes that they suggested themselves. It is not the original House language.

Now, our Chief Executive is either ignorant of the rules which govern timber sales in the Forest Service or deliberately disingenuous when he begins,

once again, the class warfare of big

timber companies. Most of the big timber companies in the Pacific Northwest

at least are not eligible to harvest Forest Service timber because they export

some of the logs that they own from

their own lands—the Plum Creeks, the

Weyerhaeusers of this world are not a

part of this process at all.

Who are these so-called big timber

companies that will benefit from this?

Let me read you a couple of letters

that I have received in the course of

the last month.

The first one is from Tom Mayr, of

the Mayr Bros. Co. in Hoquiam, WA, a

local mill in that community. I am

quoting:

Slade, you must realize that this amendment is the single most important piece of

legislation in over 5 years to Mayr Brothers

and many independent sawmills like ours.

Congress and President Clinton have said