alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Stiver, Appellee, *v.*Stiver, Appellant.

(Decided November 14, 1939.)

*Messrs. Maple & Maple*and *Mr. G. Donald Dilatush,,*for appellee.

*Messrs. Hayes S Hayes*and *Mr. Benjamin P. Pink,*for appellant.

Hamilton, P. J.

This case is here on a motion of the appellee to dismiss the appeal on the ground that there is no final order or judgment from which the appeal could he taken.

The record discloses that in a divorce and alimony proceeding the court, on July 24,1939, entered an order appointing the county sheriff receiver to take charge of property held jointly by plaintiff and defendant. Prom that order no appeal was taken, and the time has long since passed for appeal from that order. The receiver did not execute a bond, the receiver and the parties thinking the sheriff’s bond as such officer was sufficient security under the law. On October Í2,1939, defendant filed a motion to require the receiver to give bond as receiver. The trial court thereupon put on record an entry in which it stated that in order to remove any doubt that might exist as to the sufficiency of the sheriff’s bond, the receiver was ordered to execute a bond in the sum of $1,000, which the receiver promptly gave.

On October 18,1939, the defendant filed a motion requesting the court to set aside and vacate the appointment of the receiver, on the ground that upon his ap*328pointment he did not properly qualify as such receiver in that he did not take the proper oath or give a bond as such receiver.

This motion the court overruled and it is from the overruling of the motion to vacate that this appeal is taken.

The statement of the proceeding as disclosed by the record is sufficient to show that no appealable order was made in the overruling of the motion to vacate. The order appointing a receiver may have been error, but was not void. The Common Pleas Court has general jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. An appeal from that order would have been proper. If a review of the motion to vacate could be had in this case, it would require a review of the original judgment. If this could be done, then in any casé where appeal was out of time, in order to get a review, it would only be necessary to file a motion to vacate the judgment and proceed *de novo*from that motion.

It is argued that the receiver, not having properly qualified, the order of appointment did not take effect until the receiver was properly qualified. This position is not tenable. The force of the order is that it finds it necessary and proper to appoint a receiver. If the party designated by the court fails to qualify, the court, under its order, may appoint another person by interlocutory order. The court always has control over its receiver. The receiver is the arm of the court. The court did order the receiver to execute a new and proper bond, which it clearly had a right to do.

The motion to vacate and the proceedings thereunder were but interlocutory in their nature, and lack the finality necessary to give the right of appeal to this court.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Matthews and Ross, JJ., concur.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. FREDERICK WILKS.

March 27, 1984.

Petition for certification denied.
EXHIBIT 34.1




Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm








The Management Committee


BMW Financial Services NA, LLC





We have examined BMW Financial Services NA, LLC’s (the “Company”) compliance with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange  Commission's Regulation AB for Asset-Backed Securities, BMW Vehicle Owner Trust 2011-A (except for the servicing criteria described in the following paragraph), which the Company has determined as being applicable to the activities it performs with respect to the asset-backed securities transactions being serviced as of December 31, 2014 and for the period from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014. Management is responsible for the Company’s compliance with those servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the Company’s compliance with those servicing criteria based on our examination.





The Company has determined that the servicing criteria in Items 1122(d)(1)(ii), 1122(d)(1)(iii), 1122(d)(1)(iv), 1122(d)(2)(vi), 1122(d)(4)(ix), 1122(d)(4)(x)(A)-(C), 1122(d)(4)(xi), 1122(d)(4)(xii), 1122(d)(4)(xiii), and 1122(d)(4)(xv) are not applicable to the activities it performs with respect to the asset-backed securities transactions being serviced as of December 31, 2014 and for the period from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014.





Our examination was conducted in accordance with the attestation standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria specified in the first paragraph of this report and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria specified in the first paragraph.





In our opinion, BMW Financial Services NA, LLC complied, in all material respects, with the aforementioned servicing criteria as of December 31, 2014 and for the period from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014.





/s/ CohnReznick LLP





Roseland, New Jersey


March 20, 2015
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 442 Received in Senate (RDS)]

  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 442

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 3, 2008

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
Directing the Secretary of the Senate to correct the enrollment of the 
                             bill S. 3001.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That in the enrollment of the bill S. 3001, the Secretary of the Senate 
shall make the following corrections:
            (1) In section 201(1), strike ``$11,045,052,000'' and 
        insert ``$10,943,840,000''.
            (2) In section 202(a), strike ``$11,799,660'' and insert 
        ``$11,799,660,000''.

            Passed the House of Representatives October 2, 2008.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 82 (Wednesday, May 17, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5087]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                              {time}  1015
               WE MUST ACT NOW ON MEDICARE AND THE BUDGET

  (Mr. JONES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 
minute.)
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, in the coming months we face two 
extraordinary battles--the battle to protect the future of our Nation's 
seniors and the battle to preserve the future of America's children.
  We cannot fail in either of these battles. Our opponents will do 
everything they can to distort what we are trying to do. They will use 
fear tactics to scare innocent Americans into a false sense of security 
about the status quo.
  The status quo is the enemy. If we do nothing Medicare will be 
bankrupt in 7 years. What would the Democrats have our seniors do then? 
By acting now we can save the Medicare system and offer security to our 
seniors.
  If we do nothing about the budget, our children will pay more than 
$187,000 over the course of their lives just to pay for interest on the 
national debt. We must balance the budget now if we want to protect the 
American dream for our children.
  Mr. Speaker, we must stand firm and deliver. The stakes are too high 
to do nothing.

                          ____________________
```
#### Nathan Bijur, appellant, *v.*Standard Distilling and Distributing Company, respondent.

[Argued March 9th, 1911.

Decided June 19th, 1911.]

On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Emery, whose opinion is reported in *74 N. J. Eq. (4 Buch.) 546.*

*Mr. Benjamin N. Cardoza*(of the New York bar), for the appellant.

*Mr. Levy Mayer*(of the Illinois bar), for the respondent.

Per Curiam.

The decree appealed from is affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion of Vice-Chancellor Emery.

*For affirmance*— The Chiee-Justice, Garrison, Swayze, Parker, Bergen, Voori-iees, Minturn, Bogert, Vredenburgh, Congdon, Sullivan — 11.

*For reversal*— None.
News United States Air Force
 21 selected for training, recruiting squadron commandPublished Oct. 22, 2013
                        
                        By Staff Sgt. Ian Hoachlander
                        
                        
                        Air Force Personnel Center Public Affairs
                **JOINT BASE SAN ANTONIO -- RANDOLPH, Texas (AFNS) --**
                Twenty-one officers from various Air Force career fields have been selected for Air Education and Training Command training and recruiting squadron command opportunities, Air Force Personnel Center officials announced. 
Using squadron commander candidate lists released in August, AETC hiring officials and Air Force Personnel assignment teams matched candidates to projected command positions, said Joseph Marchino, AFPC special duty assignments branch. Assignment teams will coordinate change of command and reporting dates with gaining and losing units to effect the announced command assignments.
"Being selected for squadron command is a significant milestone achievement, the culmination of years of preparation, training, and education. It is an opportunity to which every Air Force officer should aspire. Within AETC, these commanders have the unique opportunity to set the foundation for skills, standards, and core values expected of all Airmen," said Marchino. 
Selection lists have been posted on the myPers website. To see the list and learn more about command opportunities and other personnel issues, visit https://mypers.af.mil. Enter PSDM 13-99 in the search window to locate the command match list.squadron commander 



recruiting 



AFPC 



AETC 



training
#### John A. Green v. James E. Carlton.

(No. 1456, Op. Book No. 2, p. 721.)

Appeal from Coleman County.

February 14, 1883.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 833. *Reconvention; right to plea of, in attachment suit.*Appellee sued appellant upon a promissory note, and obtained an attachment, which was levied upon property, which property appellant replevied under article 170, Rev. Stat. Appellant pleaded in reconvention for damages for the wrongful, etc., suing out the attachment, and upon the trial offered to support his plea by evidence, but the court rejected all such evidence upon the ground that, as appellant had replevied the property attached, he could not plead damages in reconvention, but could only recover damages by suit upon appellee’s attachment bond. *Held,*the plea in reconvention was a good plea, warranted by law, and the court erred in rejecting evidence offered in support of it. There is no such rule of law as that a defendant cannot reconvene for damages in an attachment suit when he has replevied the property attached. [R. S. 650; Walcott v. Hendricks, 6 Tex. 406; Wiley v. Trawick, 14 Tex. 662; Punchard v. Taylor, Hadden & Co. 23 Tex. 424; Harris v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 79; Castro v. Whitlock, 15 Tex. 437.]

§ 83 4. *Argument; right to open and conclude.*Defendant admitted plaintiff’s cause of action, and the only issue was upon defendant’s plea in reconvention. *Held,*upon this issue the defendant held the affirmative, had the burden of proof, and was entitled to open and conclude the argument. [Rule 34 for Dist. Court.]

Reversed aiid remanded.
#### Michael Tally *versus*James A. Hamilton.

Oct. Term, 1828.

Where a plea in abatement has been interposed on the part of the defendant by mistake, and under a misapprehension of facts, the court will, upon a proper application, and upon prescribed terms, permit the plea to be withdrawn, notwithstanding it has been verified by affidavit.

The plaintiff brought his action upon a certain agreement in writing made with the defendant, and the defendant pleaded, in *abatement,*the non-joinder of C. H. Hall as a co-defendant, he being a joint contractor with the defendant, and equally responsible to the plaintiff upon the agreement. The plea was verified by affidavit; but the defendant subsequently discovered that Hall, although in fact equally interested with him in the subject matter of the contract, had never signed the agreement, nor did it run in his name, although the defendant had always supposed that it was executed by him also; and with this impression he had interposed the plea in abatement.

*J. P.*Hall, for the defendant,

upon an affidavit setting forth these facts, and showing that the plea was put in under a clear mistake and misapprehension as to the circumstances of the case, but in good faith, now moved for leave to withdraw the plea. [He cited *Arch. Prac.*124. 7 *Taunt. R.*278. *(Free. v. Hawkins) and*2 *Strange,*906-960.]

The motion was opposed by *Mr. O’Conner,*on the part of the plaintiff, who insisted, that as the plea was verified by affidavit, it could not be withdrawn.

*Per Curiam.*

The plea, it appears, was put in under a mistake as to the facts of the case, and under such circumstances as to make the mistake natural. The court will, therefore, permit the plea to be withdrawn, notwithstanding it is verified by affidavit, for that was necessary; but it must be upon terms. The defendant must pay the costs of the motion, and such as pertain to the plea, and must plead an issuable plea without delay.

[O’Conner, *Att'y for the plff.*P. Hamilton, *Att'y for the deft.]*
#### W. C. Everhart et al. v. G. W. O’Bannon et al.

(No. 2274, Op. Book No. 2, p. 655.)

Appeal from Grayson County.

Opinion by

Delaney, J.

§ 1288. *Sheriff; duties and liabilities in regard to levy of attachment, etc.; return on process prima facie evidence.*Appellees recovered this judgment against Ever-hart, sheriff, upon his official bond, for failing to make a sufficient levy under an attachment which appellees had against one Owens. The attachment was for $118.20, Property was levied upon, the value of which was estimated by the sheriff in his return on the writ to be $690. The property, when sold by the sheriff, brought only $210. The judgment for appellees was for $238.20, the amount of damages claimed by them. *Held:*Plaintiffs complain that the sheriff has failed to do his duty, whereby they have been damaged. Although this is a negative allegation, they should certainly have offered some proof to sustain it. [1 Greenl. Ev. § 78.] The proof that they offered was that they put into the sheriff’s hands a writ which directed him to attach goods enough to make something over $100, and that the goods attached, when sold some months afterwards, brought only $210. But it does not necessarily follow from this that the sheriff has failed to perform his duty. His return shows that he levied on goods of the value of $690. This return is at least *prima facie*evidence for him. [Drake on Attach. § 210 (5th ed.); Freeman on Ex. § 366.] This return was. sufficient until it was controverted by plaintiffs. It was not enough for them to show that the goods sold for much less than the sheriff’s estimate. That might have *748arisen from a variety of causes. Suppose the goods had greatly declined in price between the levy and the sale. Must the sheriff pay the difference? We think not. Some discretion must be allowed the sheriff in cases like this. lie must not neglect the interests of the plaintiff, yet he must not needlessly oppress the defendant. He must act with prudence and sound judgment. It is highly probable that the goods which he attaches will, when sold as he will sell them, bring less than their real value; therefore he should take more in value than the amount of the claim and the probable costs and expenses. How much more he should take has not been determined, and cannot be determined, by any invariable rule. The real question generally is, not how much did the sheriff take, but did he exercise that “cautious and reasonable discretion, such as should influence the conduct of prudent and discreet men generally in the management of their own affairs?” [Dewitt v. Oppenheimer, 51 Tex. 103.] The judgment in this case is not sustained by the evidence.

June 21, 1882.

Beversed and remanded.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6109

TOMICA LAVERNE WHITE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

DANVILLE CITY JAIL, (Medical),

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior District

Judge. (7:06-cv-00662-jct)

Submitted: March 29, 2007 Decided: April 6, 2007

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Tomica LaVerne White, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Tomica LaVerne White appeals the district court’s order

dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b) (2000). We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by

the district court. See White v. Danville City Jail, No. 7:06-cv00662-jct (W.D. Va. filed January 9, 2007; entered January 10,

2007). We also deny White’s motion for appointment of counsel. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports.

Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum

opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain

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Appeals and does not include the filing date. 

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

3 Plaintiff-Appellant,

4 v. No. 32,390

5 MELISSA ZUNIE,

6 Defendant-Appellee.

7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MCKINLEY COUNTY

8 Louis E. DePauli, Jr., District Judge

9 Gary K. King, Attorney General

10 Santa Fe, NM

11 M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General

12 Albuquerque, NM

13 for Appellant

14 Steven F. Seeger

15 Gallup, NM

16 for Appellee

17 MEMORANDUM OPINION

18 SUTIN, Judge.
2

1 The State appealed from an order suppressing evidence. On October 23, 2012,

2 we issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm. The State

3 has filed a response with this Court indicating that it will not be filing a memorandum

4 in opposition. 

5 Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the notice of proposed summary

6 disposition, we affirm.

7 IT IS SO ORDERED.

8 __________________________________

9 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge

10 WE CONCUR:

11 _________________________________

12 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge

13 _________________________________

14 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
#### RITA G. KELHOFFER v. WILLIAM S. KELHOFFER.

Jan. 14, 1980.

Petition for certification denied.
#### W. J. Williams v. Wm. Truitt and C. S. Hefner.

(No. —, Op. Book No. 1, p. 303.)

Error from Titus County.

November 7, 1877.

Opinion by

Ector, P. J.

§ 518. *Assignment of errors; rule as to.*The rule is well settled that in civil cases all errors not assigned will be regarded as waived, except the error be such as renders the judgment void, or goes to the foundation of the action. [11 Tex. 572; 16 Tex. 9; 17 Tex. 122; 24 Tex. 169; 29 Tex. 40; 34 Tex. 15.]

§ 519. *Jurisdiction of county court; warranty of title to land; suit for breach of., is not suit for the trial of title to land; amount in controversy determines jurisdiction, etc.*Appellees recovered judgment in the county court against appellant upon a breach of warranty of title to land. The amount in controversy was $300. Appellant objects that the county court had no jurisdiction of the suit. *Held,*this is neither a suit for the recovery of land nor for the trial of title to land, and the amount sued for being within the jurisdiction of the county court, the suit was properly brought in that court. The amount in controversy in such cases generally determines the question of jurisdiction. If the plaintiff, however, in stating his cause of action, improperly attempts to give jurisdiction of a demand not cognizable by the court, and the question is presented by a plea to the jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed. In all doubtful cases the plea to the jurisdiction will not be sustained, and when the plaintiff declares for a sum within the jurisdiction conferred, the court will adjudicate the subject matter, and may give a judgment less than the amount sued for, although such amount may be less than the minimum limit of the court’s jurisdiction.

Affirmed.
#### E. P. Lyle v. M. C. Harris.

(No. 676, Op. Book No. 3, p. 422.)

Appeal from Dallas County.

June 9, 1880.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§71. *General demurrer; legal effect of .*The legal effect of a general demurrer is to admit the facts pleaded to be true, but to deny that they constitute a cause of action or ground of defense. [Zacharie v. Bryan, 2 Tex. 274.] And the only question which will be considered under it is whether any cause of action or ground of defense is disclosed in the pleading demurred to. [Warner v. Bailey, 7 Tex. 517.] If sufficient be stated in the pleading demurred to, to enable the court to see that a good cause of action or ground of defense exists, however defectively stated, a general demurrer will not be sustained. [Williams v. Warnell, 28 Tex. 611; Edgar v. Galveston, 46 Tex. 421.]

Eeversed and remanded.