alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### J. M. & M. Ussery v. S. & M. A. Pearce.

(No. 58, Op. Book No. 1, p. 420.)

Error from Live Oak County.

May 24, 1877.

Opinion by

White, J.

§ 54. *Damages for hilling hogs;*defendants’ *plea of justification.*Defendants in their answer admitted that they had killed the plaintiff’s hogs, but pleaded in justification that “ the hogs were an intolerable nuisance both to defendants and the public.” This plea having been stricken out upon motion of plaintiff, is assigned as reversible error. In a similar case, where the judge charged that “if the jury believed that the hog was of a predatory character and had the reputation of a chicken-eating hog, then they would find for defendant, as any man had a right to abate a public nuisance,” the supreme court of North Carolina held that the doctrine was not supported on principle or authority, and if recognized would lead to monstrous consequences. [Morse v. Nixon, 6 Jones’ N. C. Law, p. 293.] Such acts (wantonly killing the hogs of another) necessarily tend to violence and breaches of the peace and neighborhood animosities, which destroy the peace, harmony and good order of society, and are eminently cases for damages by way of punishment and prevention. In trespass, when the party wantonly violates the law, the jury should not be sparing in damages. [Champion v. Vincent, 20 Tex. 811.]

Affirmed.
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE EXIDE
ELECTRONICS GROUP, INC. UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 1995 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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#### Marx & Kempner v. John Carlisle.

(No. 1081, Op. Book No. 3, p. 451.)

Appeal from — County.

Opinion by

Winkler, J.

§ 92. *Jurisdiction; appeal.*An appeal cannot confer upon the appellate court a jurisdiction which the court *a quo*did not possess. [Baker v. Chisholm, 3 Tex. 157.]

§ 93. *Jurisdiction of justice of the peace in trial of right of property.*In case of trial of the right of property, when the property in controversy exceeds in value $200, a justice of the peace has no jurisdiction of the case. [Chrisman v. Graham, 51 Tex. 454.]

§ 94. *Judgment of appellate court when court below had no jurisdiction.*When an appellate court’ reverses a judgment in a case in which the court below had no jurisdiction, or in a case where the cause of action is not such as the law will permit a recovery upon, and it appears that no amendment can be made which would maintain the action, the cause will not be remanded for further proceedings in the court below, but will be dismissed by the appellate court. [Roeser v. Bellmer, 7 Tex. 1; Arrington v. Sneed, 18 Tex. 135; Crawford v. Wingfield, 25 Tex. 414; Harris v. Ellis, 30 Tex. 4.]

§95. *Notice of appeal necessary to jurisdiction.*Where a judgment was rendered in the county court against the principal and sureties upon an appeal bond from justice’s court, and the principal gave notice in open court of appeal to the court of appeals, but it did not appear that the sureties had given notice of appeal, it was held that as to the sureties the jurisdiction of the court of appeals did not attach, and errors assigned as to them would not *40be revised or considered. [Lacy v. Williams, 8 Tex. 182; Chappell v. Brooks, 33 Tex. 275.]

January 26, 1881.

Affirmed.
#### John A. W. Burris v. Alfred Endy et al.

(No. 1011, Op. Book No. 3, p. 148.)

Error from Lamar County.

Opinion by

Watts, J.

§ 1307. *Evidence; admissibility of things incapable of record, such as manner, expression, clothing, instruments of crime, scraps of leather, etc.; rests in the discretion of the court, etc.*Defendants in error recovered a judgment against plaintiff in error, canceling and setting aside a contract of sale of Zulie’s patent process for tanning leather, which process plaintiff in error had sold to defendants in error, taking their notes for the purchase price. The ground upon which the contract was canceled was that of fraud practiced by plaintiff in error upon defendants in error, in falsely representing to them that the process was a valuable one, etc., when it was worthless, etc. Upon the trial the court admitted in evidence, over the objections of plaintiff in error, certain pieces of leather tanned by the Zulie process. The objections made to this evidence were, 1, that it made witnesses of the jurors; and 2, that the leather could not be made a matter of record, so that the appellate court might examine and act upon it. *Held,*such testimony, or rather means of evidence, is often properly resorted to. The most important cases often turn upon the manner, expression of countenance, or appearance of a witness upon the stand; yet we know that none of these can be so entered of record as' to be the subject of review by the appellate court. So in cases involving the identity of handwriting, the court and jury are allowed to examine and compare other instruments shown to be in the handwriting of the party. [Abbott’s Tr. Ev. 396.] In trials for murder, the clothes worn by the deceased are often admitted in evidence, as tending to show the position occupied by him at the time the homicide was committed. Also the instruments used in the commission of crime are admissible in evidence, and often have decisive weight upon the *759question of the guilt or innocence of the accused; yet those nor any of them can be made parts of the record, but may all be sent up, by order of the court, to be inspected by the appellate court. It is impossible to prescribe any definite rule upon this subject. The whole thing must, as a matter of necessity, be left to the sound discretion of the court below, and unless the record should disclose a palpable abuse of such discretion by th'e court below, this court would not be authorized to review the same.

November 23, 1881.

Affirmed.
**EXHIBIT
      32**


**Certification
      Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**


**(Subsections
      (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States
      Code)**





Pursuant
      to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
      section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the
      undersigned officers of Kings Road Entertainment, Inc., a Delaware corporation
      (the "Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge,
      that:





The
      Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the fiscal quarter ended January 31, 2008
      (the "Form 10-QSB") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of
      section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information
      contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the
      financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      Kings Road Entertainment, Inc. and will be retained by Kings Road Entertainment,
      Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.




Dated:
      August 28, 2008





/s/
                Philip HolmesPhilip
                HolmesPresident
                and Principal Executive Officer





/s/
                Robert KainzRobert
                KainzChief
                Financial
                Officer
#### THE STATE ex rel. HOGAN v. POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF KANSAS CITY, Appellants; THE STATE ex rel. KNIGHT v. POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF KANSAS CITY, Appellants; THE STATE ex rel. WACHS v. POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF KANSAS CITY, Appellants; THE STATE ex rel. SMITH v. POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF KANSAS CITY, Appellants.

In Banc,

December 24, 1902.

For the reasons set forth in State ex rel. Goodnow v. Police Commissioners of Kansas City, reported at page 109 of this volume, the judgments of the circuit court in the above causes are reversed, and the causes dismissed at relators’ costs.

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Ho». *E. P. Gates,*Judge.

Reversed.

MARSHALL, J.

These cases are in all essential respects similar to the case of State ex rel. Goodnow v. Police Commissioners of Kansas City (just decided), 184 Mo. 109; and the reasons given and the conclusion reached in that case apply equally to these cases. The judgment of the circuit court in these cases is therefore reversed, and the causes dismissed at relators’ costs.

All concur, except *Valliant, J.,*who dissents.
#### John Highland v. The City of Galveston.

(No. 84, Tex. L. J., vol. 1, p. 73.)

Appeal from Galveston County.

March 15, 1877.

Opinion by

White, J.

§ 623. *Garnishment; a municipal corporation cannot be garnished for wages due an employee.*The question is whether or not a municipal corporation can be garnished for wages due an employee. “When the question is left entirely open by statute, on principle a municipal corporation should be exempt from liability of this character with respect to its revenues and the salaries of its officers; but where it owes an ordinary debt to a third person, the mere inconvenience of having to answer as garnishee furnishes no sufficient reason for withdrawing it from the reach of the remedies which the law gives to creditors of natural persons and private corporations.” [1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, p. 85, sec. 65.] There has been much contrariety of decision in the courts of the various states on the question. [See Drake on Attachments (4th ed.), § 516.] But the rule above quoted seems to us founded in sound reason and justice, in the absence of any constitutional or legislative prohibition, as was the case when these proceedings were instituted. Our present constitution (since adopted) expressly provides that “no current wages for personal service shall ever be subject to garnishment” [Const. Gen. Provisions, art. XVI, sec. 28], and, of course, in cases arising since its adoption, this provision would control.

Reversed and remanded.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Steven P.
Wyandt, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of
Nitches, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the period ended
February 28, 2007, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in
such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of Nitches, Inc.

|Date:
      October 26, 2007     
|---------------------------------
|                                 
|/s/ Steven P. Wyandt             
|                                 
|Steven P. Wyandt                 
|Chief
      Executive Officer and
|Chief
      Financial Officer    

This certification is furnished pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the
extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by Nitches, Inc. for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange
Act"). Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference in
to any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act,
except to the extent that Nitches, Inc. specifically incorporates it by
reference.

---
News United States Air Force
 Around the Air Force: USAFE 80th Anniversary, Legion Pod Infrared Tech, Airmen Deploy to Fight COVID-19Published Feb. 18, 2022
                        
                        By Tech. Sgt. Britt Crolley
                        
                        
                        Air Force TV
                **FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, Md. (AFNS)   --**
                This week’s look Around the Air Force features the 80th anniversary of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, a new capability for the F-15C Eagle and Airmen deploying stateside in support of COVID-19 patients. (Hosted by Senior Airman Kahdija Slaughter)



For previous episodes, click **here** for the Air Force TV page.
Related links:**- USAFE's 80th Anniversary message from Gen. Harrigian****- Legion Pod reaches IOC****- Military hospital support to FEMA to begin in four states, expands in two states**Featured Video 



AFTV 



ATAF 



Around the Air Force 



Air Force 



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```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 79 (Friday, May 12, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H4901]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                  ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY, MAY 15, 1995

  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House 
adjourns today it adjourn to meet at 10:30 a.m. on Monday next for 
morning hour debates.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.

                          ____________________
```
EX-31 Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certification.

  Re: Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
  Certificates, Series 2011-C3 (the "Transaction"), issued pursuant to the
  Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of October 1, 2011 (the "Pooling
  and Servicing Agreement"), executed in connection with the Transaction
  (capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings set forth
  in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement).

  I, Steven Stern, certify that:

  1.I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
    required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on
    Form 10-K of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2011-C3 (the "Exchange Act
    periodic reports");

  2.Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
    whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
    state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
    the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
    with respect to the period covered by this report;

  3.Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
    information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
    covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

  4.Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement(s) required
    in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed
    in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their
    obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and

  5.All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria
    for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on
    assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed
    securities required to be included in this report in accordance with
    Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18
    have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise
    disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance
    described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form
    10-K.

    In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
    information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:  Bank
    of America, National Association as Primary Servicer, Midland Loan
    Services, a Division of PNC Bank, National Association as Special
    Servicer, Trimont Real Estate Advisors, Inc. as Trust Advisor, Wells
    Fargo Bank, National Association as Certificate Administrator, Wells
    Fargo Bank, National Association as Custodian, Wells Fargo Bank,
    National Association as Master Servicer, and CoreLogic Commercial Real
    Estate Services, Inc. and National Tax Search, LLC as Servicing
    Function Participants.

    Date:   March 28, 2014
    By: /s/ Steven Stern
    Name: Steven Stern
    Title: President
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 178 (Wednesday, September 15, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 56080]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-23158]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD


Sunshine Act Notice

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notification of Change in Meeting Location.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the provisions of the ``Government in the Sunshine 
Act'' (5 U.S.C. 552b), notice is hereby given of the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board's public hearing and meeting.

FEDERAL REGISTER CITATION OF PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT: 75 FR 43495 (July 
26, 2010).

PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED MEETING LOCATION:  Room 133, Richland Federal 
Building, 825 Jadwin Avenue, Richland, Washington 99352.

CHANGES IN THE MEETING:  The public meeting will now be held at Three 
Rivers Convention Center, 7016 W. Grandridge Boulevard, Kennewick, 
Washington 99336, (509) 737-3700.

TIME AND DATE OF MEETING:  Session I: 9 a.m.-1 p.m., October 7, 2010; 
Session II: 5 p.m.-9 p.m., October 7, 2010; Session III: 8 a.m.-12 
p.m., October 8, 2010.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:  Brian Grosner, General Manager, 
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 
700, Washington, DC 20004-2901, (800) 788-4016. This is a toll-free 
number.

    Dated: September 13, 2010.
Peter S. Winokur,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. 2010-23158 Filed 9-13-10; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 3670-01-P
#### H. Horton v. McKeehan Bros.

(No. 2728, Op. Book No. 4, p. —.)

Appeal from Jack County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 465. *Amount in controversy, and not amount of judgment, determines jurisdiction on appeal from justice to county court.*Horton sued MoKeehan Bros, on a sworn account for $200 in justice’s court. Judgment was rendered against him, and he appealed to the county court, where, upon motion, his appeal was dismissed. One ground of the motion was that neither the judgment of the justice nor the amount in controversy exceeded $20. The judgment of the justice was for the costs, amounting to $4.80, but the amount in controversy was $200, and it is “the amount in controversy” which determines jurisdiction on appeal.

§ 466. *One day’s notice of motion for new trial in justice’s court; failure to give, when no ground for complaint.*Another ground of the motion to dismiss in the county court was that “the plaintiff filed no motion for new trial in the lower court of which defendant had one day’s notice, as required by law.” While the statute requires the one day’s notice of a motion for new trial before hearing thereof in the justice’s court [Rev. Stats: art. 1621], still it cannot be seen how a party could possibly be injured by or has any ground to complain that he did not have the notice, where the motion was, as in this case,’ overruled. Had he been notified, and had he appeared, he could not have accomplished more than the defeat of the motion.

*217May 23, 1883.

§ 467. *Final judgment.*Another ground of the motion to dismiss was that there was no final judgment in the justice’s court. The judgment was as follows: “It appearing to the court, after hearing the evidence in the case, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything of said defendants, it is therefore ordered and adjudged hy the court that the plaintiff in the above cause pay all costs of suit, which is $4.80 to date.” *Held,*that it is a final judgment against plaintiff’s right to recover and for costs against him, there can be no doubt.

§ 468. *Appeal bond.*Where the appeal bond is in conformity with the statute in all respects save that the obligors bound themselves to prosecute the appeal *“with”*effect instead of *“to”*effect, *held,*the bond was sufficient.

§ 469. *Appeal bond not necessary to be signed by principal.*The appeal bond was signed hy West, as agent and attorney in fact of Horton. It was also signed by the sureties. *Held,*that it was not necessary to the sufficiency of the bond that it should be signed by the party appealing, and if it were, this could be done by his agent.

Reversed and remanded.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JOSEPH DERHAMMER,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 417 MAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of December, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

Whether the Superior Court erred when it upheld Petitioner’s conviction 

pursuant to a statute declared unconstitutional by this Honorable Court in 

Commonwealth v. Neiman?
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-7727

DOUGLAS L. JONES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MARK TIMOTHY WILLIAMS; HALIFAX COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT; BLUE RIDGE REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY; PROBATION AND PAROLE DISTRICT O8,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior District Judge. (7:08-cv-00436-JCT-MFU)

Submitted: November 20, 2008 Decided: December 2, 2008

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Douglas L. Jones, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Douglas L. Jones appeals the district court’s order

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b) (2000). We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated

by the district court. Jones v. Williams , No. 7:08-cv-00436-

jct-mfu (W.D. Va. July 30, 2008). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED