FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-4459

_____________________________

KWAME FERNANDERS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Stanley H. Griffis, III, Judge.

April 22, 2019

PER CURIAM.

After a joint trial with his co-defendant Quintae Edwards, 

Kwame Fernanders was convicted of home invasion robbery with 

a firearm, two counts of kidnapping to commit or facilitate a 

felony with a firearm, two counts of false imprisonment, and 

grand theft of a motor vehicle. Fernanders appeals, claiming 

prejudicial error in the trial court’s denial of a motion to sever 

their trials. We reject this argument and affirm. 

On the morning of trial, Edwards argued that his case 

should be tried separately from Fernanders’ because their 

defenses were antagonistic. Specifically, Edwards argued that 

Fernanders planned to testify that Edwards coerced him to 

commit the offenses, which would prejudice Edwards, while 
2

Edwards would make a general denial of the allegations. 

Fernanders adopted Edwards’ motion and asserted that if they 

were tried separately (and Edwards first), it was possible that 

Edwards might testify on behalf of Fernanders to confirm the 

alleged coercion. The trial court denied the motion, referring to it

as an “adoptive” motion on Fernanders’ part. 

At trial, overwhelming evidence was presented that 

Fernanders, Edwards, and another co-defendant, Kayla Black, 

invaded an apartment, held four victims at gunpoint, assaulted 

them, and bound them with tape while ransacking the apartment 

for goods to steal. Edwards stayed at the apartment with three 

victims while Fernanders and Black drove one, at gunpoint, to a 

bank to withdraw money; Fernanders told this victim that she 

was lucky he decided not to kill her. Law enforcement tracked the 

three to Tallahassee and found Edwards at a restaurant with a 

car stolen from one of the victims. Fernanders and Black were 

tracked to a hotel room, where officers found them asleep in bed 

alongside a gun, which Fernanders reached for but could not grab 

before being restrained by officers. DNA evidence, fingerprints, 

and the recovery of scores of stolen goods connected the 

defendants to the crimes. Fernanders later wrote letters to 

friends and family from jail, asking them to tell the victims to 

decide whether they would rather get the charges dropped and 

live or to proceed and die. Black testified for the state, stating 

that Fernanders was her boyfriend at the time and she went 

along with the crimes. She testified that Fernanders and 

Edwards were like brothers and rejected any idea that one 

coerced the other. Fernanders then testified that he committed 

all of the acts but only due to the coercion of Edwards. The jury 

rejected this argument. 

Fernanders argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

in denying severance because Edwards’ defense was antagonistic 

to his own and it deprived him of the possibility that Edwards 

would testify on his behalf and admit that he coerced Fernanders. 

We find that the trial court committed no error in denying 

Fernanders’ “adoptive” motion to sever. 

First, Fernanders cites Crum v. State, 398 So. 2d 810, 811 

(Fla. 1981), where the defendant argued at trial that his and his 
3

co-defendant’s “defenses were so antagonistic that he would be 

prejudiced if the trials were not severed” because the codefendant planned to reverse from his prior statements—that 

neither of the two were present when the victims died—and 

testify that the defendant was the murderer. Here, however, the 

co-defendant’s defense was not prejudicial to Fernanders in any 

way. Edwards did not testify and simply denied the charges, 

which did not affect Fernanders’ defense of coercion. See Biscardi 

v. State, 511 So. 2d 575, 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (finding that the 

appellant’s defense of coercion was not antagonistic to his codefendants even where the co-defendant testified that he did not 

engage in coercion).1

Second, Fernanders believed that, if Edwards had been tried 

first, he might later testify on behalf of Fernanders. Even if that 

may have happened,2 Fernanders has provided no authority 

stating that a trial court must work together with co-defendants 

to give one or more of them tactical advantages. Cf. McCray v. 

State, 416 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1982) (“Specifically, the fact that 

the defendant might have a better chance of acquittal or a 

strategic advantage if tried separately does not establish the 

right to a severance.”). This is not the purpose of the rule

regulating severance. “Rather, the rule is designed to assure a 

fair determination of each defendant's guilt or innocence.” Id.

 1 Regardless, “hostility among defendants, or an attempt by 

one defendant to escape punishment by throwing the blame on a 

codefendant,” is not “a sufficient reason, by itself, to require 

severance.” McCray v. State, 416 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1982); see 

also Biscardi v. State, 511 So. 2d 575, 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)

(“the object of the severance rule is not to provide defendants 

with an absolute right of severance when requested, [or] when 

they blame each other for the crime”). 

2 The record casts doubt that Edwards might have ever 

testified on Fernanders’ behalf. Edwards’ counsel told 

Fernanders’ counsel that Edwards “would not be testifying in 

that manner to help [Fernanders] at any trial – whether this one 

or some one in the future.”
4

Fernanders’ argument that the joint trial denied him a fair 

determination of his guilt is meritless, and we AFFIRM his 

conviction.3

WOLF, WINOKUR, and JAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Maria Ines Suber, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Amanda D. Stokes,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

 3 While we rule that the denial of the severance motion did 

not deny Fernanders of a fair trial, we take no position on 

whether the denial prejudiced Edwards.