16-2333 

Wu v. Sessions 

BIA 

Van Wyke, IJ 

A087 516 173

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

23rd 4 day of February, two thousand eighteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 REENA RAGGI,

8 DENNY CHIN, 

9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 QUI MEI WU, AKA WUI MEI WU, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 16-2333 

17 NAC 

18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Gerald Karikari, New York, NY. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

26 Attorney General; Briena L. 

27 Stippoli, Senior Litigation 

28 Counsel; Timothy Bo Stanton, Trial 

29 Attorney, Office of Immigration 

30 Litigation, United States 

31 Department of Justice, Washington, 

32 DC. 
2

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Qui Mei Wu, a native and citizen of the People’s 

6 Republic of China, seeks review of a June 7, 2016, decision of 

7 the BIA affirming a December 8, 2014, decision of an Immigration 

8 Judge (“IJ”) denying Wu’s application for asylum, withholding 

9 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

10 (“CAT”). In re Qui Mei Wu, No. A087 516 173 (B.I.A. June 7, 

11 2016), aff’g No. A087 516 173 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 8, 

12 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

13 facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 Because the BIA agreed with the IJ’s credibility 

15 determination and emphasized particular aspects of it, we have 

16 reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions, including the 

17 portions of the IJ decision not explicitly discussed by the BIA. 

18 Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The 

19 applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 

20 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 

21 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 
3

1 Under the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, in light of 

2 “the totality of the circumstances,” base an adverse 

3 credibility determination on an asylum applicant’s 

4 responsiveness, inconsistencies in her statements, “without 

5 regard to whether” those inconsistencies go “to the heart of 

6 the applicant’s claim,” and the “inherent plausibility” of her 

7 account, among other factors. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); 

8 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2008). In 

9 conducting “substantial evidence” review, we “defer . . . to 

10 an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of 

11 the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder 

12 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 

13 534 F.3d at 167. 

14 The adverse credibility determination satisfies our 

15 review. The agency identified two areas of Wu’s testimony that 

16 were vague, lacked detail, and were of questionable 

17 plausibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Wensheng Yan 

18 v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n assessing the 

19 credibility of an asylum applicant’s testimony, an IJ is 

20 entitled to consider whether the applicant’s story is 

21 inherently implausible.”). The IJ fulfilled his obligation 

22 “to solicit more detail” by asking numerous follow-up 
4

1 questions. Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 

2 2008) (“[A] finding of testimonial vagueness cannot, without 

3 more, support an adverse credibility determination unless 

4 government counsel or the IJ first attempts to solicit more 

5 detail from the alien.”). 

6 First, aside from identifying her aunt, Wu was vague about 

7 her fellow churchgoers. Wu testified that she told some of her 

8 friends about the church, and later saw them there, but denied 

9 having brought them. She could not explain which of the 50 or 

10 60 other church members recruited her friends, and further 

11 suggested that she never thought to ask her friends how they 

12 came to attend. In addition to deeming this testimony vague, 

13 the IJ was justifiably incredulous. If Wu had told her friends 

14 about the church and later ran into them there, they would have 

15 discussed the topic. Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168-69 

16 (2d Cir. 2007). 

17 Wu’s testimony about her family members was similarly 

18 vague. She identified four relatives who initially attended 

19 the church, but could not remember the names of three or four 

20 other family members who joined later and were arrested during 

21 the raid. When asked, Wu could not say which--or even how 

22 many--of her relatives were arrested. Cf. Jin Chen v. U.S. 
5

1 Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (in pre-REAL 

2 ID case, remanding where the IJ and Government “failed to create 

3 a record that could support” the IJ’s vagueness-based 

4 credibility finding). The IJ reasonably found it implausible 

5 that Wu did not ask her mother for this information. Siewe, 

6 480 F.3d at 168-69. Moreover, the letter submitted by Wu’s 

7 mother said nothing about their relatives being arrested, 

8 casting further doubt on Wu’s account. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d 

9 166 n.3 (an omission in a document can ground an adverse 

10 credibility determination). 

11 Wu argues that the IJ should not have focused on whether 

12 she knew that the underground church was illegal. Although the 

13 IJ observed that Wu seemed to be differing with the definition 

14 of “illegal,” the IJ’s main point was that Wu’s testimony made 

15 little sense: how could she not know the church was illegal after 

16 her aunt explained that it moved each week to avoid police 

17 detection? The IJ asked a further question: if church leaders 

18 worried about detection, why would they not warn new members 

19 that the church was illegal? Otherwise, new members might talk 

20 about it openly. Wu submitted a church attendance certificate, 

21 which featured her name, address, and photograph. That 

22 document caused the IJ to ask another reasonable question: why 
6

1 would an underground church maintain the photographs and 

2 personal identifying information of its members? Wu 

3 characterizes the IJ’s questions as speculative, but all are 

4 grounded in Wu’s incompatible statements. Siewe, 480 F.3d at 

5 168-69. 

6 The totality of the circumstances outlined above supports 

7 the adverse credibility determination. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d 

8 at 164. Wu’s asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims 

9 were all based on the same factual predicate, and so the 

10 credibility determination was dispositive as to all three. See 

11 Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

13 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion 

14 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 

15 FOR THE COURT: 

16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk