IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE 

AT JACKSON 

Assigned on Briefs April 2, 2024 

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WILLIAM DANGELO PENNY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County 

No. 21-15 Donald H. Allen, Judge 

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No. W2023-00912-CCA-R3-CD 

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The Defendant, William Dangelo Penny, was convicted of driving under the influence of 

an intoxicant. The trial court placed him on probation for eleven months and twenty-nine 

days after service of forty-eight hours. The court also suspended his driver’s license. 

Thereafter, the Defendant was arrested for evading arrest, reckless driving, leaving the 

scene of an accident, and driving on a suspended license. After a hearing, the trial court 

fully revoked the Defendant’s probationary sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that 

a complete revocation of his sentence was an abuse of discretion. Upon our review, we 

respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; 

Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed 

TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined. 

Harold E. Dorsey, Trenton, Tennessee, for the appellant, William Dangelo Penny. 

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Allison Martin, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

OPINION 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In May 2021, the Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence and other 

traffic offenses. The trial court placed the Defendant on probation for eleven months and 

04/25/2024
2 

twenty-nine days after service of forty-eight hours in custody, which was to be served 

consecutively to a two-year sentence in a previous case. The trial court also suspended the 

Defendant’s driving privileges. 

On April 12, 2023, Investigator Jeff Herndon with the Jackson Police Department 

witnessed a truck crash into an SUV. Investigator Herndon yelled out of his window and 

instructed the truck’s driver, the Defendant, to pull over, but the Defendant fled. The 

investigator followed, activating his emergency equipment. 

During the chase, the Defendant drove into oncoming traffic and traveled at nearly 

seventy miles per hour. The chase ended when the Defendant abandoned the truck and 

attempted to escape on foot. The officers apprehended the Defendant after pursuing him 

on foot and with a helicopter. The Defendant did not have a valid driver’s license, and the 

officers discovered that the truck was stolen with an altered vehicle identification number. 

The Defendant claimed that he had borrowed the truck from a friend, though the friend told 

officers that the Defendant did not have permission to use the truck. 

At a later probation revocation hearing, the Defendant admitted that he violated the 

terms and conditions of his probationary sentence, but wished to be heard “on the 

resolution.” The Defendant called his probation officer, Marcus Jones, to testify. Mr. 

Jones stated that the Defendant had complied with the terms of his probation and was a 

“model” probationer before this incident. 

In his own testimony, the Defendant admitted to making an “irrational, impulsive 

decision” to flee from law enforcement. However, the Defendant also claimed that he did 

not know that the investigator was a law enforcement officer and denied that the 

investigator pursued him with lights or sirens. The Defendant testified that he fled because 

he had previous experience with the court and feared coming back after having an accident 

with no driver’s license. 

After the conclusion of proof, the trial court found that the Defendant violated the 

conditions of his probation by committing new criminal offenses, including felony evading 

arrest, reckless driving, leaving the scene of an accident, and driving with a suspended 

license. The court also found that the Defendant failed to report the arrest to his probation 

officer. The court then ordered that the Defendant serve the balance of his original sentence 

of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court entered the revocation order on 

June 14, 2023, and the Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal six days later. 
3 

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 

Our supreme court has recognized that “the first question for a reviewing court on 

any issue is ‘what is the appropriate standard of review?’” State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692, 

698 (Tenn. 2022). The principal issue in this case is whether the trial court acted within its 

discretion in fully revoking the Defendant’s suspended sentence. We review this issue for 

an “abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness so long as the trial court 

places sufficient findings and the reasons for its decisions as to the revocation and the 

consequence on the record.” State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2022). 

However, if the trial court does not make such findings, then this Court “may conduct a de 

novo review if the record is sufficiently developed for the court to do so, or [we] may 

remand the case to the trial court to make such findings.” Id. In this case, because the trial 

court placed sufficient findings on the record to support its decisions regarding the violation 

and consequence determinations, we review those decisions for an abuse of discretion. 

ANALYSIS 

When a trial court imposes a sentence for criminal conduct, the court may suspend 

the sentence for an eligible defendant and place that defendant on probation. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103; 40-35-303(b). The trial court may also require that the defendant 

comply with various conditions of probation where those conditions are suitable to 

facilitate rehabilitation or to protect the safety of the community and individuals in it. State 

v. Holmes, No. M2020-01539-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 2254422, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

June 23, 2022) (“The primary purpose of probation sentence, however, ‘is [the] 

rehabilitation of the defendant,’ and the conditions of probation must be suited to this 

purpose.” (quoting State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tenn. 1996))), no perm. app. filed; 

see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-302(1). 

As long as a defendant complies with the conditions of the suspended sentence, the 

defendant will remain on probation until the sentence expires. See State v. Taylor, 992 

S.W.2d 941, 944-45 (Tenn. 1999). However, if a defendant violates a condition of 

probation, then the trial court may address the violation as it “may deem right and proper 

under the evidence,” subject to various statutory restrictions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

311(d)(1) (Supp. 2021). As such, the nature of a probation revocation proceeding involves 

a two-step process with “two distinct discretionary decisions.” Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 

757. As our supreme court confirmed in Dagnan, the “first [step] is to determine whether 

to revoke probation, and the second is to determine the appropriate consequence upon 

revocation.” Id.
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A. THE VIOLATION DETERMINATION 

As to the first step, a trial court cannot find a violation of the conditions of probation 

unless the record supports that finding by a preponderance of the evidence. See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-311(d)(1); State v. Beard, 189 S.W.3d 730, 734-35 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005). 

Where a defendant admits that he or she violated a condition of probation, the trial court 

may properly find that a violation exists. See State v. Johnson, 15 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1999); see also, e.g., State v. Brewster, No. E2021-00793-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 

WL 2665951, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11, 2022), no perm. app. filed. 

“[C]ompliance with our state laws is an automatic condition of a suspended 

sentence, and when a trial court learns that a defendant has violated the law, it has the 

power to initiate revocation proceedings.” State v. Stubblefield, 953 S.W.2d 223, 225 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). As this Court has recognized in the context of felony probation, 

“The probation statute provides for two categories of probation violations, technical and 

non-technical, with differing penalties for both.” State v. Walden, No. M2022-00255-

CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 17730431, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2022) (citing Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-35-311(e)(2) (Supp. 2021)). In felony probation cases, a trial court’s 

authority to revoke probation fully for criminal conduct is generally limited to nontechnical violations, or those consisting of new felonies or Class A misdemeanor offenses. 

Id.; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(g) (Supp. 2022).1

 This statutory limitation does not 

exist, though, when the defendant is on probation for a misdemeanor offense. 

In this case, the Defendant was on probation for a misdemeanor, and the trial court 

found that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation by committing new 

criminal offenses. On appeal, the Defendant does not dispute that he violated his probation 

through this criminal conduct, and, as such, we conclude that the record supports a finding 

that the Defendant committed a violation of probation. 

B. THE CONSEQUENCE DETERMINATION

As to the second step, “the consequence determination essentially examines whether 

the beneficial aspects of probation are being served and whether the defendant is amenable 

to continued probation.” State v. Robinson, No. M2022-00248-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 

17335656, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 8, 2023); 

see also State v. Fleming, No. E2017-02352-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 6787580, at *3 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2018) (“[T]he trial court may review a defendant’s past criminal 

1

 If the new criminal conduct consists of a Class B or C misdemeanor, the trial court may fully revoke 

the defendant’s felony probation when the conduct results in a fourth or subsequent revocation. See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-311(e)(1). 
5 

history in order to determine, based on a totality of the circumstances, ‘whether the 

beneficial aspects of probation [are] being served’ and whether the defendant is amenable 

to continued probation.”), no perm. app. filed; State v. Davis, No. E2007-02882-CCA-R3-

CD, 2008 WL 4682238, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2008) (observing that the trial 

court “took a totality of the circumstances approach in order to decide whether the 

defendant’s probation violations merited incarceration or another opportunity for 

rehabilitation. After doing so, the court determined that the defendant was not amenable 

to continued probation.”), no perm. app. filed. 

As the supreme court observed in Dagnan, a trial court may consider factors 

relevant to the nature and seriousness of the present violation, the defendant’s previous 

history on probation, and the defendant’s amenability to future rehabilitation. See Dagnan, 

641 S.W.3d at 759 n.5. Factors important to a defendant’s amenability to correction may 

include the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and genuine remorse, as well as 

whether the defendant will comply with orders from the court meant to ensure his or her 

effective rehabilitation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(C); State v. Owens, No. E2021-

00814-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 2387763, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2022), no perm. 

app. filed. A trial court may also consider whether the violation shows that the defendant 

is a danger to the community or individuals in it. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-302(1) 

(“Supervised individuals shall be subject to: (1) Violation revocation proceedings and 

possible incarceration for failure to comply with the conditions of supervision when such 

failure constitutes a significant risk to prior victims of the supervised individual or the 

community at large and cannot be appropriately managed in the community[.]”). 

In this case, the Defendant argues that the trial court did not separately identify 

reasons why full revocation of the suspended sentence was appropriate. We respectfully 

disagree. Importantly, “[i]t is not necessary for the trial court’s findings to be particularly 

lengthy or detailed but only sufficient for the appellate court to conduct a meaningful 

review of the revocation decision.” Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759. In our review of the trial 

court’s announcement, it is clear that the trial court’s consequence determination relied 

upon two reasons in particular. 

First, the trial court was concerned about the nature and seriousness of the 

violations, finding that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation in “a substantial 

way.” This was a proper consideration for the trial court and one expressly authorized by 

Dagnan. See Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 n.5. Importantly, the Public Safety Act of 2016 

permits trial courts to consider whether a violating probationer can “remain compliant and 

crime-free in the community” as part of the consequence determination. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-28-302(2). From this premise, this Court has also observed that “[t]he 

rehabilitative goals of probation are directed precisely toward the goal of lawful conduct 

and public safety. Thus, this Court has long recognized that where the probationer 

continues to commit new crimes, the beneficial aspects of probation are not being served.” 
6 

State v. Everett, No. E2022-00189-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 16643628, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Nov. 3, 2022) (citation omitted), no perm. app. filed. 

The record confirms that the Defendant’s conduct was particularly serious. 

Investigator Herndon testified that, as the Defendant evaded police, he traveled at excessive 

speeds and drove in the opposing lane of traffic. The Defendant’s decision to endanger 

others to avoid accountability shows that he presents an unacceptable risk to the safety of 

the community and the people in it. Further, his new criminal conduct was similar to his 

original offense in that both involved the dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. See State 

v. Tobin, No. E2022-00604-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 176108, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 

9, 2023) (recognizing that repeated criminal conduct of a similar nature “shows that the 

Defendant cannot or will not abide by the first rule of probation: maintaining lawful 

conduct.” (citations omitted)), no perm. app. filed. As such, the trial court properly 

considered the nature and seriousness of the Defendant’s new criminal conduct as part of 

the consequence determination. 

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the trial court was concerned about the 

Defendant’s ability to follow court orders meant for the safety of the community. As the 

trial court explained, 

I mean, [the Defendant] was convicted of a DUI first offense. His license 

was revoked. He was told he couldn’t drive a motor vehicle. I mean, that’s 

what the Court ordered him, not to drive a motor vehicle until he gets his 

privileges reinstated, which apparently he has never done that. . . . He wasn’t 

supposed to be driving, period. 

In considering whether to place a defendant on probation in the first instance, a trial 

court must consider measures that encourage “effective rehabilitation of those defendants, 

where reasonably feasible, by promoting the use of alternative sentencing and correctional 

programs that elicit voluntary cooperation of defendants[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

102(3)(C) (emphasis added). This principle of sentencing recognizes that rehabilitative 

efforts cannot be “reasonably feasible” when the defendant does not voluntarily comply 

with those efforts. Thus, when a trial court weighs whether to continue rehabilitative 

efforts, it may certainly consider whether the defendant will voluntarily comply with the 

court’s orders. See State v. Banning, No. E2022-00188-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 10225186, 

at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2022) (affirming full revocation, in part, when “the trial 

court concluded that other factors outweighed the Defendant’s request for additional 

community-based treatment, including that the Defendant could not be expected to comply 

with the court’s rehabilitative orders”), no perm. app. filed. The trial court’s consideration 

of this fact was appropriate as part of the consequence determination. 
7 

Admittedly, the proof at the hearing showed that the Defendant had complied with 

other technical aspects of his probation. However, the proof also showed that the 

Defendant engaged in new criminal conduct, placed the safety of the community in danger, 

sought to escape accountability for those actions by evading police, and knowingly violated 

orders meant for his effective rehabilitation. We conclude that the trial court acted within 

its discretion in fully revoking the Defendant’s suspended sentence. 

CONCLUSION 

In summary, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that 

the Defendant violated the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence. We also hold 

that the trial court acted within its discretion when it revoked the Defendant’s suspended 

sentence and ordered that he serve the balance of his sentence in the Department of 

Correction. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

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TOM GREENHOLTZ, JUDGE