alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
News United States Air Force
 The 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th monthPublished Nov. 11, 2022
                        
                        
                        Air Force Life Cycle Management Center Public Affairs
                **WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Ohio (AFNS) --**
                Nov. 11, 1919, “Armistice Day” marked the first anniversary of the end of World War I. In 1926, Congress passed a resolution calling for an annual observance which then became a national holiday in 1938.
An armistice is a formal agreement to end hostilities. On the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month, 1918, fighting in WWI officially stopped after Germany signed an armistice agreement with Allies earlier in the day.
In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed legislation that changed the federal holiday’s name from Armistice Day to Veterans Day. The name change aimed to pay tribute to all Americans who served their country honorably during war or peacetime.
It’s not the powerful weapons or sophisticated technology that makes the Air Force and **Space Force** the greatest in the world. The true strength is the spirit and skill of its Airmen and Guardians, past and present.
 
While formally recognizing and honoring those who have worn — and now wear the nation’s colors on this one day — veterans are remembered by appreciating their experiences and building on their legacy of service. President Ronald Reagan once remarked, “Veterans know better than anyone else the price of freedom, for they have suffered the scars of war. We can offer them no better tribute than to protect what they have won for us."Veterans Day 



armistice 



AFLCMC 



space force 



Nov. 11 



honor 



sacrifice 



history 



people 



One Team One Fight 



Service 



Freedom 



USAF 



AF 



Air Force 



Airmen 



guardians 



11th hour 



11th day 



11th month 



USA
Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

November 17, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

131439-40 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, COMPANY, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 131439 

 COA: 258240 

Saginaw CC: 03-049653-CZ 

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL BUERKEL, 

KAREN BOSHA-WEAVER and AMIE 

R. SMITH,
 Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

STATE LANES, INC.,

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

AMIE R. SMITH,

Plaintiff, 

v SC: 131440 

 COA: 260775 

Saginaw CC: 03-047815-NI 

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL BUERKEL, 

 Defendant/Cross-Defendant, 

and 

KAREN LYNN BOSHAW-WEAVER, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

STATE LANES, INC.,

Defendant/Cross-PlaintiffAppellant. 

_________________________________________/ 
 _________________________________________ 

 

2 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 21, 2006 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral 

argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action. MCR 

7.302(G)(1). The parties shall submit supplemental briefs within 35 days of the date of 

this order addressing whether the Court of Appeals analysis of MCL 257.401(1) paid 

adequate attention to the statute’s provision that “[t]he owner is not liable unless the 

motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge” 

(emphasis added), and whether the motor vehicle at issue in this case was being driven 

with the owner’s “express or implied consent or knowledge.” The parties should avoid 

submitting a mere restatement of the arguments made in their application papers. 

p1114 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

November 17, 2006 

 Clerk
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Brett D. Davis, certify that:

 

1.                                      I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of CNH Equipment Trust 2011-B (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

 

2.                                      Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.                                      Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4.                                      I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicer and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and

 

5.                                      All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas.

 

----

 
| March 30,   2015 |   |                                                             |
|-----------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                  |   |                                                             |
|                  |   |                                                             |
|                  | By:    | /s/   Brett D. Davis                                             |
|                  | Name:  | Brett   D. Davis                                                 |
|                  | Title: | President   (senior officer in charge of the servicing function) |

 

----
#### Dominick Rutta et al. v. Jacob Laffera.

(No. 1399, Op. Book No. 2, p. 685.)

Error from Fayette-County.

February 3, 1883.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 822. *Citation; must state the court in which the suit is pending.*This suit was instituted in the county court of Fayette county. The citations served upon the defendants notified them to appear before the *district coicrt*of that county. Judgment by default was rendered against defendants. *Held,*the citations were unquestionably defective. They summoned the defendants to appear before a different court from the one in which the suit was pending. One of the most material requisites of a citation is that it shall name the court before which the defendant is summoned to appear, and the time and place of holding such court, and the court so named must be the one in which the suit is pending. [R. S. 1215; Covington v. Burleson, 28 Tex. 368.]

§ 823. *Judgment; there can he hut one final, in a case.*There -were three defendants in the suit, each of whom was served with citation. Each failed to answer. Judgment by default was rendered against two of tbóm, but the record did not show that any disposition had been made of the case as to the other defendant. *Held,*it is well settled that but one final judgment shall be given in a case. [R. S. 1283; Burton v. Varnell, 5 Tex. 139; Ledyard v. Brown, 39 Tex. 402; Long v. Garnett, 45 Tex. 400; Boles v. Linthicum, 48 Tex. 220.] Some disposition of the suit as to the other defendant should have been made simultaneously with the judgment against the plaintiffs in error.

Reversed and remanded.
<PAGE>

                                                                  Exhibit 11


<TABLE>
                                               ENGINEERED SUPPORT SYSTEMS, INC.
                                       STATEMENT RE:  COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE

<CAPTION>
                                                                      Three Months Ended                   Six Months Ended
                                                                           April 30                            April 30
                                                                 ----------------------------        ----------------------------
                                                                    1999              1998              1999              1998
                                                                 ----------        ----------        ----------        ----------
<S>                                                              <C>               <C>               <C>               <C>
NET INCOME                                                       $1,792,234        $1,324,079        $3,180,636        $2,243,240
                                                                 ==========        ==========        ==========        ==========

BASIC EARNINGS PER SHARE

    Average basic shares outstanding                              5,052,423         4,747,826         4,950,724         4,755,098
                                                                 ==========        ==========        ==========        ==========

                                                                       $.35              $.28              $.64              $.47
                                                                 ==========        ==========        ==========        ==========

DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE

    Average basic shares outstanding                              5,052,423         4,747,826         4,950,724         4,755,098

    Net effect of dilutive stock options<F1>                        178,179           222,682           179,103           213,813
                                                                 ----------        ----------        ----------        ----------
                                                                  5,230,602         4,970,508         5,129,827         4,968,911
                                                                 ==========        ==========        ==========        ==========

                                                                       $.34              $.27              $.62              $.45
                                                                 ==========        ==========        ==========        ==========

<FN>
<F1> Based on the treasury stock method.



Note:  On June 26, 1998, the Company effected a 3-for-2 stock split in the
form on a 50% stock dividend.  All share and per share amounts included on
this schedule reflect this stock split.
</TABLE>


                                 16
January 31 , 2013.



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

YOLANDA MARIE WILLIA MS , Appellant

NO. 14

- 12

- 00508

- CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

________________________________ This cause was heard on the transcript o f the record of the court below. Having considered the record, this Court holds that there was no error in the judgment. The Court orders the judgment AFFIRMED

. We further order appellant pay all costs expended in the appeal. We further order this decis ion certified below for observance.
#### PLASTIC REEL CORPORATION OF AMERICA v. GOTHAM INDUSTRIAL PARK, INC.

Jan. 3, 1980.

Petition for certification is dismissed as having been improvidently granted.
#### HENRY SZUSTER v. TERESA SZUSTER.

June 13, 1985.

Petition for certification granted, the judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter is summarily remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of changed circumstances.

Jurisdiction is not retained.
News United States Air Force
 Air Force Materiel Command reaches IOC as servicing major command for Space ForcePublished Oct. 21, 2021
                        
                        
                        Air Force Materiel Command Public Affairs
                **WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Ohio (AFNS) --**
                The **Air Force Materiel Command** declared Initial Operational Capability for its support to the **U.S. Space Force** Oct. 1. The IOC milestone means AFMC is well on its way to fully supporting the Space Force as its servicing major command for Space Force-assigned Airmen.
The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Space Force took a series of steps over the past year in the designation of AFMC as servicing MAJCOM for the Space Force. Those actions included a programming plan, approved this summer, outlining the functional support AFMC will provide to Airmen assigned to the Space Force.
At IOC, a memorandum of agreement has been established between the Department of the Air Force and U.S. Space Force, and the functions and personnel who will be serviced by AFMC have been identified.
As the servicing MAJCOM, AFMC will accomplish the roles and responsibilities traditionally performed by a major command for the Airmen supporting the Space Force. These major command functions typically include, but are not limited to, providing policy guidance; professional development opportunities/guidance; developmental team representation; and functional-specific roles. Approximately 8,000 Airmen assigned to Space Force installations and units will eventually be serviced by AFMC.
Full operational capability is expected by fall 2022 when all assigned functional areas will be fully supported by AFMC, and AFMC has hired all of the positions required to provide servicing major command support to Space Force Airmen.
Airmen at U.S. Space Force installations will continue to be serviced by their local military personnel flight and civilian personnel office, and the **Air Force Personnel Center** will continue to provide service to all Airmen at Space Force installations.
The Department of the Air Force created this unique and first-time servicing MAJCOM structure to ensure Airmen assigned to the Space Force receive the same force development opportunities, and functional and administrative support as those at U.S. Air Force installations.LR 



USAF 



AF 



Air Force 



AFMC 



Air Force Materiel Command 



space force 



MAJCOM 



initial operational capability 



Wright-Patterson AFB
#### SEBASTIAN T. CERNIGILIARO v. U. S. TRUCKING CORP.

Dec. 10, 1979.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Fort Worth City Mills Co. v. Milam & Patterson.

(No. 2221, R. Book No. 4, p. 251.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 247. *Amendment; new cause of action; costs.*Where a suit was prematurely brought, and plaintiff by amendment set up an entirely new cause of action, this could be done. [Tarkinton v. Broussard, 51 Tex. 550; Kirkland v. Little, 41 Tex. 456; Littlefield v. Fry, 39 Tex. 299; Woods v. Durrett, 28 Tex. 429; Cox v. Reinhardt, 41 *98Tex. 591.] But the costs up to such amendment should be adjudged against the plaintiff. [Kirkland v. Little, 4 Tex. 456.]

November 22, 1882.

Reversed and reformed.
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Prospect Sustainable Income Fund, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended June 30, 2022, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Kristin Van Dask, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:





1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and


2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.





/s/ Kristin Van Dask


Kristin Van Dask


Chief Financial Officer


(Principal Accounting and Financial Officer)


Date: September 6, 2022
#### Grant & Eastern v. Simon K. Anderson.

(No. —, Op. Book No. 3, p. 777.)

Appeal from — County.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 190. *Minor; may sue on note payable to guardian after arriving at majority.*A minor after arriving at the age of maturity may maintain a suit upon a note taken for his benefit, and made payable to his guardian, although the guardian has not been discharged from his trust, the guardian making no objection to the suit. [Robson v. Osborn, 13 Tex. 298; 11 Verm. R. 273.]

§ 191. *Limitation; note given to guardian of minors.*A note given to the guardian of minors, for the minors, was held not barred by limitation although more than four years had elapsed since its maturity before the filing of the suit, but four years had not elapsed since the removal of the minors’ disabilities and before the filing of the suit. [R. S. art. 3222; Lacy v. Williams, 8 Tex. 182; House v. Mullen, 22 Wall. 42; Marquis Cholmondelay v. Lord Clifton, 2 Jacob & Walker R. 157.]

Affirmed.
#### A. Freidman v. John Wagner.

(No. 551, Tex. L. J., vol. 3, p. 571.)

Appeal from Galveston County.

Opinion by

Winkler, J.

§ 734. *Indorsement upon a note of the words, “this note is not transferable,” destroys its negotiability.*We are of opinion that the indorsement on the back of the instrument that “this note is not transferable,” made at the time and under the circumstances disclosed by the *403evidence, destroyed its negotiability, and that it was subject to the provisions of art. 222, Pas. Dig., and in the hands of appellee subject to every discount and defense against it to which it would have been subject in the hands of the original payee, before notice of the assignment.

March 19, 1879.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Riggins & Anderson v. H. C. Ford.

(No. 2356, Op. Book No. 2, p. 652.)

Appeal from Hill County.

Opinion by

Watts, J.

§ 1286. *Distress warrant; bound for;*“illegally” *is not synonymous with*“unjustly.” The statute requires the conditions of a bond for a distress warrant to be, “to pay the defendant such damages as he may sustain in case such warrant has been illegally and unjustly sued out” [R. S. 3113], whereas the conditions of the bond in this case omitted the words “and unjustly.” Statutory bonds must contain fully and clearly all the conditions prescribed by the statute. “ Illegally ” and “unjustly” are not convertible terms. They are not synonymous in a legal sense. Mr. Bouvier defines ‘ ‘ illegally ” to mean “contrary to law,” and “unjustly” as “that which is against the established law; that which is opposed to a' law which is the test of right and wrong.” Under our statute, when an amount due is for rent, the creditor has the legal right to sue out a distress warrant. But suppose that the debtor had an abundance of property out of *746which the debt could be made, and the creditor should resort to the remedy by distress, not for the honest purpose of securing his debt, but with the intent and for the purpose of vexing and harassing his debtor. In such case all forms of law are complied with; the facts existed that authorized the issuance of the writ, and it cannot be said that the writ was “illegally ” issued. But the intent of the creditor being to harass and vex his debtor, and not to secure his debt, the writ would issue “unjustly;” and doubtless this was the sense in which the legislature used the term in the statute under consideration. It will not be presumed that the legislature would use simple words meaning the same thing, if a different meaning can reasonably be assigned to the words used in an enactment. The motion to quash the bond should have been sustained, and the judgment which should have been rendered in the county court is rendered here.

June 21, 1882.

Reversed and rendered.
#### Long & Reese v. A. Dennis.

(No. 1084, Op. Book No. 2, p. 385.)

Appeal from Bell County.

June 8, 1881.

Opinion by

Watts, J.

§ 1121. *Landlord’s lien; purchaser without notice-of lien.*The landlord’s lien for rents holds for one month after the property has been removed from the rented premises, and no longer. Where cotton was purchased from sub-tenants of rented premises, without the knowledge on the part of the purchaser of where it was raised, and without notice of the landlord’s hen thereon, it was *held*that the purchaser was not liable to the landlord for the cotton. The purchaser was not chargeable with the landlord’s lien when he did not know as a matter of fact where the cotton was grown, at the time he purchased and paid a valuable consideration therefor.

Reversed and remanded.