In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 12‐2217

FOZYIA HURI,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE

CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11 C 3675 — Samuel Der‐Yeghiayan, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 23, 2015 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and REAGAN,

Chief District Court Judge.

*

REAGAN, Chief District Judge. Fozyia Huri sued her em‐

ployers at the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, alleging

Defendants subjected her to a hostile work environment on

                                                  * Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 12‐2217

the basis of her religion (Islam) and national origin (she hails

from Saudi Arabia), and further that they retaliated against

her for complaining about that discrimination. Huri brought

claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e‐16 (“Title VII”), and—claiming her First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated—42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

The district court disposed of the case at the motion to

dismiss stage, concluding Huri failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted and, in any event, that her su‐

pervisors were entitled to qualified immunity on the consti‐

tutional claims. Huri appeals, and for the following reasons

we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, con‐

struing all well‐pleaded facts (and all reasonable inferences

from them) in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Hts., 782 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir.

2015); Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2014).

Facts are taken from Huri’s Second Amended Complaint.

In 2000, Huri began working at the Circuit Court of Cook

County. Her manner of dress marked her as a follower of Is‐

lam: she always wore a hijab, an “Islamic head scarf” cover‐

ing her hair, but not her face. From 2002 through November

2010, she worked as a child care attendant—the only one

who was an Arab, and the only one who was a Muslim—

under Defendant Sylvia McCullum. McCullum is neither an

Arab nor a Muslim; she is a devout (and allegedly vocal)

Christian.
No. 12‐2217 3

According to the Second Amended Complaint, McCul‐

lum was unfriendly from the moment the two were intro‐

duced. (McCullum, the executive director for all Cook Coun‐

ty court system child care attendants, did not even bother to

introduce herself to Huri—the only attendant stationed in

the same building—for two weeks.) Over the eight years

Huri worked for her, McCullum repeatedly told Huri one of

her colleagues was a “good Christian” and a “good church‐

going Christian,” that the chief judge was a “good Chris‐

tian,” and that McCullum herself was a “good Christian.”

In 2009, McCullum ratcheted up the rhetoric, telling a co‐

worker to work with a “good Christian” rather than with

Huri, who was “evil.” The same year, McCullum asked sev‐

eral child care attendants to hold hands and, when they did

so, McCullum said a prayer “in the name of Jesus Christ.”

Further, McCullum falsely criticized Huri, made false mis‐

conduct allegations against her, subjected her to different

rules than her co‐workers, screamed at her, and generally

subjected her to greater scrutiny than her co‐workers.

Huri filed internal complaints regarding McCullum’s be‐

havior. McCullum became aware of those complaints and

told Huri that the Chief Judge’s Office was uninterested in —

and tired of—Huri’s complaints. Then, in retaliation for

Huri’s complaints, McCullum made more false criticisms

and allegations of misconduct.

In November 2010, Huri was transferred to the Court Re‐

porters’ Office at the Cook County circuit court. Defendants

Marilyn Filishio (the Court Reporters’ Office Administrator)

and James Lawless (Filishio’s assistant) generally behaved as

badly as McCullum, retaliating against Huri for filing Equal

Employment Opportunity complaints (or “charges”) and
4 No. 12‐2217

subjecting her to the same sorts of false allegations, different

rules, and greater scrutiny because Huri is a Muslim Arab.

Additionally, Filishio and Lawless prohibited Huri from ac‐

cessing her office early (other employees have 24‐hour ac‐

cess), prohibited Huri’s daughter from waiting for Huri in

the lobby (children of non‐Muslim, non‐Arab employees are

admitted to the lobby and offices), and prohibited Huri (and

Huri alone) from having non‐work items in the office. They

also excluded Huri from a departmental social gathering at

the office, and Filishio denied Plaintiff time off for an Islamic

religious holiday. Huri repeatedly complained to the Chief

Judge’s Office, to no effect.

During her travails, Huri filed three complaints (or

“charges”) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com‐

mission (“EEOC”). She submitted the first charge pro se in

May 2010, and relayed the following regarding her time un‐

der McCullum:

I was hired by Respondent on June 5, 2000. My cur‐

rent position is Childcare Attendant. During my em‐

ployment, I have been subjected to harassment be‐

cause of my religion and national origin. I filed inter‐

nal complaints, however, the harassment continued.

I believe I have been discriminated against because of

my religion, Muslim, and national origin, Saudi Ara‐

bian, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended.

I also believe I have been retaliated against for engag‐

ing in protected activity, in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
No. 12‐2217 5

Huri’s filed her second charge in April 2011 to correct a tech‐

nical deficiency in the first.

Huri’s third charge, filed in November 2011, relates to her

time in the Court Reporters’ Office. The detailed third charge

lists all the allegations against Filishio and Lawless recount‐

ed above. The EEOC issued right‐to‐sue letters for each

charge, and Huri filed suit.

Huri’s Second Amended Complaint invoked two statuto‐

ry provisions: Title VII, which makes it unlawful to discrim‐

inate against an employee, retaliate against her, or subject

her to a hostile work environment based on race, color, reli‐

gion, sex or national origin; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under

which individuals can be held liable for constitutional viola‐

tions.1 Huri alleged Defendants subjected her to retaliation

for her complaints, and to a hostile work environment be‐

cause she is Muslim and an Arab.

On Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the district court dis‐

posed of the entire case. As discussed below, the analysis be‐

low is replete with error, so we must remand.

II. Discussion

Huri assigns several errors to the district court. We turn

first to whether her Title VII hostile work environment

claims—dismissed because the district court determined

they were not within the scope of her EEOC charges—

should have survived that analysis. Because we answer that

question affirmatively, we proceed to examine those claims

                                                  1 Title VII only authorizes suits against the employer as an entity.

Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 896 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2012).
6 No. 12‐2217

alongside the Title VII and § 1983 claims, which (with one

exception, briefly addressed in Part III, infra.) fell to the dis‐

trict court’s misguided application of the federal pleading

standards.

A. Huri’s EEOC Charges Support her Title VII Claims

Preliminarily, we agree with Huri that the district court

erred in dismissing her Title VII hostile work environment

claims for failing to exhaust administrative remedies.

As a precondition to filing claims under Title VII, Huri

had to file a charge with the EEOC. See Lavalais v. Vill. of Mel‐

rose Park, 734 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2013). The primary pur‐

pose of the EEOC charge requirement is twofold: it gives the

EEOC and the employer a chance to settle the dispute, and it

gives the employer notice of the employee’s grievances.

Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994).

Huri attached three EEOC charges to the Second Amend‐

ed Complaint. Her first charge (filed pro se) was submitted in

May 2010 and broadly describes “harassment” and discrimi‐

nation on the basis of her race and national origin, plus retal‐

iation for making internal complaints. Her third charge, filed

in November 2011 with the help of counsel, covers her post‐

transfer period in the Court Reporters’ Office and includes

very detailed allegations that mirror the Second Amended

Complaint.

Courts review the scope of an EEOC charge liberally. Far‐

rell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2005). Most

EEOC charges are (like Huri’s first one) drafted by layper‐

sons rather than lawyers, so a Title VII plaintiff need not in‐

clude in her charge every fact that, individually or in combi‐
No. 12‐2217 7

nation, forms the basis of a subsequent lawsuit’s claims.

Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. See also Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773

F.2d 857, 865–66 (7th Cir. 1985) (district court “erred by re‐

quiring an exact correspondence between the words of the

EEOC charge and the judicial complaint”). To be cognizable

in federal court, a Title VII claim must simply be “like or rea‐

sonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing

out of such allegations.” Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. The relevant

claim and the EEOC charge must, at a minimum, describe

the same conduct and implicate the same individuals. Moore

v. Vital Prods., 641 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir. 2011).

Defendants concede that Huri’s November 2011 charge

suffices to support her post‐transfer allegations, but contend

that the May 2010 charge did not describe a hostile work en‐

vironment (and thus fails to support any Title VII hostile

work environment claims pertaining to Huri’s time as a child

care attendant). The first charge, Defendants claim, mentions

discrimination and retaliation, but does not “allege a hostile

work environment.”

By highlighting the absence of the phrase “hostile work

environment,” Defendants read the first EEOC charge too

narrowly. They conveniently overlook simple but important

language (emphasis added): “During my employment, I

have been subjected to harassment because of my religion

and national origin. I filed internal complaints [and] the har‐

assment continued.” In the context of Title VII cases, the

word “harassment” frequently describes the conduct that

defines the phrase “hostile work environment.” See Hilde‐

brandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1032–33 (7th Cir.

2003) (“Harassment ... is a broad term which encompasses

all forms of conduct that unreasonably interfere with an in‐
8 No. 12‐2217

dividual’s work performance or create an intimidating, hos‐

tile, or offensive working environment.”); see also Dandy v.

Utd. Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 271 (7th Cir. 2004) (“har‐

assment” informs the hostile work environment analysis).2

We decline to punish Plaintiff, whose first charge was draft‐

ed pro se, for describing her plight with the same inter‐

changeable phraseology frequently used by this Court.

Given Huri’s inclusion of nationality‐ and religion‐based

harassment in the her first EEOC charge, her employers had

no reason to be surprised by her Title VII hostile work envi‐

ronment allegations covering her time as a child care at‐

tendant. We conclude those allegations are reasonably relat‐

ed to the contents of Huri’s first EEOC charge, which impli‐

cates the same individuals and behavior pertinent to this

suit. Defendants cede (and the detail of the document clearly

shows) that Huri’s third EEOC charge supports the later al‐

legations pertaining to her time in the Court Reporters’ Of‐

fice. Dismissal of Huri’s hostile work environment claims

was erroneous.

B. The Complaint Passes Muster under Twombly / Iqbal

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the

complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Specific facts are unnecessary, but the com‐

plaint must give the defendant fair notice of what the claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests. Olson v. Champaign

                                                  2 Dandy was a § 1981 action, but the substantive standards under that

statute also apply in Title VII cases. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 896 (7th

Cir. 2012).
No. 12‐2217 9

Cnty., 784 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam), and Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Neither conclusory le‐

gal statements nor abstract recitations of the elements of a

cause of action add to the notice that Rule 8 demands, so

they do not help a complaint survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2010).

A pleader’s responsibility is to state a claim for relief that

is plausible on its face. Id. at 404 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Plausibil‐

ity does not mean probability: a court reviewing a 12(b)(6)

motion must “ask itself could these things have happened,

not did they happen.” Id. (emphasis there). The standard

simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expecta‐

tion that discovery will reveal evidence supporting the alle‐

gations. Olson, 784 F.3d at 1099.

In Swanson, this Court had occasion to apply current

pleading standards to a discrimination claim (under the Fair

Housing Act rather than Title VII, but that difference is im‐

material here—both statutes forbid discrimination on ac‐

count of race). A complaint that identified “the type of dis‐

crimination” the plaintiff thought occurred, “by whom, ...

and when” was “all [the plaintiff] needed to put in her com‐

plaint.” Swanson, 614 F.3d at 405. See also EEOC v. Concentra

Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2007) (reli‐

gious discrimination plaintiff need only say that the employ‐

er held the worker’s religion against him).

Huri’s Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleges Ti‐

tle VII hostile work environment and retaliation claims, and

sufficiently pleads hostile work environment claims under

§ 1983.
10 No. 12‐2217

1. The Title VII Claims

Huri’s Second Amended Complaint advances claims of

both hostile work environment and retaliation. Title VII for‐

bids both, though the substantive standards differ. A com‐

parison of the Second Amended Complaint to the guiding

legal principles reveals that Huri easily clears the plausibility

threshold.

To plead a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must

(though she need not use the specific terms) allege that she

engaged in statutorily protected activity and was subjected

to adverse employment action as a result of that activity.

Luevano v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1029 (7th Cir.

2013). In the retaliation context, “adverse employment ac‐

tion” simply means an employer’s action that would dis‐

suade a reasonable worker from participating in protected

activity. Chaib v. Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 986–87 (7th Cir. 2014).

Here, it is beyond dispute that Huri engaged in protected

activity by filing EEOC charges and making internal com‐

plaints. Whether she was subjected to an adverse employ‐

ment action is also apparent: the litany of malfeasance she

alleges—screaming, false disciplinary reports, mistreatment

of her daughter, exclusion from social functions, denial of

time off, etc.—would certainly cause a reasonable worker to

think twice about complaining about discrimination—that’s

all it takes in the retaliation context.3 See Chaib, 744 F.3d at

                                                  3 It bears mention: employees who bring a Title VII claim of discrim‐

ination (rather than retaliation) have a heavier burden: an “adverse em‐

ployment action” in those cases must visit upon a plaintiff a significant

change in employment status, and often involves the employee’s current

wealth, her career prospects, working conditions, etc. Andrews v. CBOCS
No. 12‐2217 11

986–87; Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1085 (7th Cir.

2008) (complaint stated retaliation claim when plaintiff

simply alleged she complained about discrimination then

was subject to adverse employment actions, then listed a

number of those specific actions).

To state a Title VII hostile work environment claim, a

plaintiff must allege (1) she was subject to unwelcome har‐

assment; (2) the harassment was based on her national origin

or religion (or another reason forbidden by Title VII); (3) the

harassment was severe or pervasive so as to alter the condi‐

tions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working

environment; and (4) there is basis for employer liability.

Cooper‐Schut v. Visteon Auto. Sys., 361 F.3d 421, 426 (7th Cir.

2004). To rise to the level of a hostile work environment,

conduct must be sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the

conditions of employment such that it creates an abusive rela‐

tionship. Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 982

(7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis there).  

Here again, Huri’s pleadings describe events that could

have happened and which discovery can be reasonably ex‐

pected to reveal. Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404; Olson, 784 F.3d at

1099. And if discovery goes Huri’s way, she could prove her

case. The basic questions demanded by Swanson are an‐

swered here: the type of discrimination (national origin and /

or religion); the whom (Huri’s supervisors); and the when

(from 2002 through the date suit was filed). Huri has alleged

that she was harassed, and it is certainly within reason to

conclude that Defendants, due to Huri’s garb and appear‐

                                                                                                             

West, Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 2014); Lewis v. City of Chi., 496 F.3d

645, 653 (7th Cir. 2007).  
12 No. 12‐2217

ance, knew she was a Muslim and an Arab. If Huri’s allega‐

tions prove true, employer liability will be proper since her

direct supervisors harassed her. See Vance v. Ball State Univ.,   

‐‐‐ U.S. ‐‐‐‐, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). And it is premature

at the pleadings stage to conclude just how abusive Huri’s

work environment was. It is enough to say that it is plausible

that the screaming, prayer circles, social shunning, implicit

criticism of non‐Christians, and uniquely bad treatment of

Huri and her daughter could plausibly be abusive.

The pleading standards in Title VII cases are, of course,

different from the evidentiary burden a plaintiff must subse‐

quently meet. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511

(2002). It may be that Huri, once discovery has run its

course, cannot produce evidence to survive summary judg‐

ment. But that question can safely be postponed to another

day. Defendants have fair notice of Huri’s claims and the

grounds upon which those claims rest, and the details in her

Second Amended Complaint present a story that “holds to‐

gether.” Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404. Dismissal of the Second

Amended Complaint was therefore error.

2. The Constitutional Claims

We turn to Huri’s § 1983 claims, which parallel her Title

VII hostile work environment claims of religion‐ and nation‐

ality‐based harassment.

Constitutional claims must be addressed under the most

applicable provision, Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th

Cir. 2005) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)),

and this Court has recognized the distinction between claims

that target a plaintiff’s religious practices and those in which
No. 12‐2217 13

a defendant arbitrarily discriminates against a plaintiff be‐

cause of her religion, Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 962 (7th

Cir. 1988). The First Amendment’s religion clauses4 guide the

former, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection

Clause guides the latter. Id.  

Here, Huri’s § 1983 hostile work environment claims are

straightforward theories of arbitrary treatment based on her

religion and nationality. In other words, we analyze both

§ 1983 claims under the Equal Protection Clause. It is a short

step from there to concluding Huri’s § 1983 claims should be

resurrected on remand. When a plaintiff uses § 1983 as a

parallel remedy to a Title VII harassment claim, the prima

facie elements to establish liability are the same under both

statutes. Rivera v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewers Auth., 331 F.3d 183,

192 (1st Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). Stating a hostile work

environment claim under Title VII therefore establishes a vi‐

able claim to § 1983 relief. Id. As discussed above, Huri stat‐

ed viable Title VII hostile work environment claims. Her

§ 1983 claims against McCallum, Filishio, and Lawless sur‐

vive for the same reasons.

                                                  4 The First Amendment proscribes, in pertinent part: “Congress shall

make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” (the Establishment

Clause), “or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” (the Free Exercise

Clause). U.S. Const. amend. I. Both clauses are operative against the

States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See

Everson v. Board of Ed. Of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause

incorporated); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise

Clause incorporated).  
14 No. 12‐2217

C. Qualified Immunity and County’s Party Status

Two tangential issues remain. Neither requires abundant

discussion.

First, the district court’s cursory dismissal of Defendants

Filishio and Lawless on qualified immunity grounds was er‐

ror.5 The validity of a qualified immunity defense is re‐

viewed de novo. Estate of Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388, 404

(7th Cir. 2012). Qualified immunity is improper where, as

here, the asserted right is clearly established at the time the

conduct occurred (or constitutes an obvious violation of a

constitutional right). Doe, 782 F.3d at 915. Huri’s Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free from a hostile work environ‐

ment was well‐established by 2010, when Filishio and Law‐

less began supervising her. See Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d

774, 787 (7th Cir. 2003) (reviewing elements of an Equal Pro‐

tection hostile work environment claim). Likewise, freedom

from arbitrary religion‐ and nationality‐based discrimination

had long been illegal. Reed, 842 F.2d at 962. See also Tamayo,

526 F.3d at 1090 (because immunity defense usually depends

on the facts, dismissal at pleading stage is inappropriate).

Finally, Defendants ask this Court to determine whether

Cook County is a proper party to the lawsuit. That issue was

not presented below, so we decline to address it here. See

Russian Media Grp., LLC v. Cable Am., Inc., 598 F.3d 302, 308

                                                  5 It is unclear precisely how Defendant McCullum prevailed below

as to Huri’s constitutional claims. Huri posits that Defendant McCullum

must also have been granted qualified immunity. But because that de‐

fense is unavailable to McCullum and the record is murky, we invite the

district court to clarify the matter on remand.
No. 12‐2217 15

(7th Cir. 2010) (“In civil litigation, issues not presented to the

district court are normally forfeited on appeal.”).

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and this

case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.