2019 UT App 185

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DARIO ARTHUR VELASQUEZ,

Appellant,

v.

STACY L. CHAVEZ,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20180451-CA

Filed November 15, 2019

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Matthew Bates

The Honorable Patrick Corum

No. 154901302

Marsha M. Lang, Attorney for Appellant

Michael P. Studebaker, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

HAGEN, Judge:

¶1 Dario Arthur Velasquez appeals the district court’s 

decision to hyphenate the surname of his biological son (the 

child). Velasquez argues that the court did not address the 

six-factor test articulated in Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273 (Utah 

Ct. App. 1989), for determining whether changing the child’s 

surname from Chavez to Velasquez-Chavez was in the child’s 

best interest. Because we conclude the district court properly 

considered all the relevant factors and provided sufficient 

findings to support its decision, we affirm.
Velasquez v. Chavez

20180451-CA 2 2019 UT App 185

BACKGROUND

¶2 Velasquez and Stacy L. Chavez were in a relationship and 

living together when Chavez became pregnant with their child. 

A few months into the pregnancy, Chavez ended the 

relationship and moved in with a former boyfriend who was the 

father of her daughter.

¶3 When Chavez gave birth to the child, she left the birth 

certificate blank as to the child’s father and gave the child the 

surname “Chavez.” A few weeks after the birth, Velasquez filed 

a Verified Petition for Decree of Paternity (the petition). Relevant 

to this appeal, Velasquez petitioned the court to change the 

child’s surname to “Velasquez.”

¶4 At the trial on the petition, the parties were present and 

stipulated to proffers of testimony before the court. Velasquez’s 

attorney argued that the child’s surname should be “Velasquez” 

because Velasquez believes that the child is confused as to who 

his “real father” is because he calls both Velasquez and Chavez’s 

significant other “daddy.” Velasquez’s attorney argued that the 

child will be stigmatized and embarrassed to have his mother’s 

surname because children at school “are very cruel” and will 

conclude he is “illegitimate.” His attorney anticipated that a 

hyphenated surname might be an option and expressed 

concerns that the name “Velasquez will be dropped off” if the 

child’s surname was changed to “Chavez-Velasquez.” There was 

also concern that the child would just go by “Chavez” if the last 

name was changed to “Velasquez-Chavez.” But Velasquez did 

not “have any objection to Chavez being a middle name.” 

Velasquez’s attorney argued that “for inheritance purposes, for 

the idea of carrying on the last name of Velasquez, for the 

heritage of his family, [the child] should have [Velasquez’s] last 

name.” At this point, the district court asked Velasquez directly, 

“[S]hare with me your heritage, where does your family come 

from?” Velasquez responded that he and his mother are from 
Velasquez v. Chavez

20180451-CA 3 2019 UT App 185

Texas and that his father was born in Mexico but has spent most 

of his life in Texas.

¶5 In response, Chavez’s attorney argued that Velasquez’s 

arguments with respect to the child’s confusion, embarrassment, 

and “stigmas in schools” were based on “a lot of speculation” 

without any support. Chavez disagreed that the child would 

suffer embarrassment or lack of identity without his father’s 

surname. Chavez’s attorney proffered that the child shared 

Velasquez’s middle name and that Chavez was “not opposed to 

the offer of the child’s last name being Velasquez-dash-Chavez.” 

Chavez’s attorney further explained that he had “spent a lot of 

time researching and trying to find any sociological or 

psychological literature” to make sure the child was not harmed 

by a hyphenated surname. The court asked Chavez where her 

family came from, and she responded that her family was from 

Colorado and that she lived in Utah. The court commented that 

“it is common in certain Latin cultures for a person’s last name 

to be the father’s last name hyphenated with the mother’s last 

name” and then asked if either family followed that tradition. 

Velasquez and Chavez each responded, “No.”

¶6 Following the proffered testimony, the district court gave 

its oral ruling, following the six-factor test articulated in Hamby 

v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), for determining 

whether changing the child’s surname is in the child’s best 

interest. The court concluded that it was in the child’s best 

interest to have the surname Velasquez-Chavez to “make sure 

that the child understands that he has two parents that don’t live 

together but they’re both his parents.” The court also explained 

that “although this isn’t common in the heritage of the two 

families here, it is . . . very common in the heritage of many Latin 

and Hispanic families, in Utah and outside of Utah . . . [and] it’s 

very common in . . . other cultures in this community.”

¶7 Velasquez objected to the hyphenated last name. He 

personally addressed the court, arguing that it had erroneously 
Velasquez v. Chavez

20180451-CA 4 2019 UT App 185

based its decision on “Latin countries and stuff,” despite the fact 

that he and Chavez were both born in the United States and “the 

ways here in America is [to use] one last name.” The court 

clarified that it “mentioned that particular cultural tradition only 

to demonstrate that [it] found little basis to find that a 

hyphenated name is going to cause the child any embarrassment 

simply because that is so prevalent in our community today, 

regardless of where it comes from.”

¶8 Following the trial, the court entered findings of fact and 

conclusions of law and ordered that the child’s surname be 

changed to Velasquez-Chavez. Velasquez now appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 Velasquez contends the district court erred in 

determining that it was in the child’s best interest to hyphenate 

the child’s name to Velasquez-Chavez. “We review the trial 

court’s findings under a clearly erroneous standard and will not 

disturb those findings unless they are against the clear weight of 

the evidence . . . .” Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 279 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1989). But “when the evidence consists only of proffers to 

the trial court, the appellate court is in as good a position to 

review the proffer as was the trial court, as no assessment of 

witness credibility occurred below.” Id. at 278 (cleaned up).

“Therefore, we review the facts and draw our own legal 

conclusions therefrom,” id. (cleaned up), and will reverse only if 

we “reach[] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made,” id. at 279.

ANALYSIS

¶10 This court has previously held that “the best interests of 

the child is the paramount consideration in determining whether 

a child’s name should be changed.” Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 

273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). There are six factors that are 
Velasquez v. Chavez

20180451-CA 5 2019 UT App 185

relevant for determining the best interests of the child in this 

regard:

1) the child’s preference in light of the child’s age 

and experience, 2) the effect of a name change on 

the development and preservation of the child’s 

relationship with each parent, 3) the length of time 

a child has used a name, 4) the difficulties, 

harassment or embarrassment a child may 

experience from bearing the present or proposed 

name, 5) the possibility that a different name may 

cause insecurity and lack of identity, and 6) the 

motive or interests of the custodial parent.

Christensen v. Christensen, 941 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 

(cleaned up).

¶11 Velasquez argues that the district court “did not correctly 

apply the [Hamby] factors in this matter in determining that the 

[c]hild’s name should be hyphenated and not just Velasquez 

after his father.” Velasquez asserts that the court improperly 

“used its belief that the parties have a culture and heritage from 

Latin or Central America because of the root of their surnames to 

support its decision.” Essentially, Velasquez argues that there 

are no facts apparent in the record to support the court’s 

decision to hyphenate the child’s surname and appears to 

challenge four of the Hamby factors: “the effect of a name change 

on the development and preservation of the child’s relationship 

with each parent”; “the difficulties, harassment or 

embarrassment a child may experience from bearing the present 

or proposed name”; “the possibility that a different name may 

cause insecurity and lack of identity”; and “the motive or 

interests of the custodial parent.” See id. (cleaned up). We

address each factor in turn.

¶12 We first address the district court’s findings related to 

“the effect of a name change on the development and 
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20180451-CA 6 2019 UT App 185

preservation of the child’s relationship with each parent.” Id.

(cleaned up). The district court found that this was the most 

“important factor” in this case. The court noted that the child 

lives in “a blended family where the child has a mother and a 

stepfather that the child lives with,” that “the child has a half 

sibling” with the last name of the stepfather, and that the child 

has visitation with Velasquez “outside of the home.” The court 

explained that, under such circumstances, “the child’s last name 

becomes somewhat important in helping the child to identify 

[with] his heritage, who his parents are[,] and to understand the 

difference between stepfather and natural father.” Thus, the 

court determined that this factor weighed in favor of “making 

sure . . . the child does have a last name that helps the child 

identify with [Velasquez].” Based on these findings, we see no 

error in the court’s determination that a blended family supports 

a hyphenated surname, and Velasquez has not persuaded us 

otherwise.1

¶13 Next, we address whether the hyphenated surname will 

result in “difficulties, harassment or embarrassment” to the

child. Id. (cleaned up). Velasquez argues that the child could 

suffer “possible harassment by not being considered an 

 

1. On appeal, Velasquez makes much of the fact that he is “the 

only male heir in his family” and that the child, as his only issue, 

“will be the only one who can carry on the surname Velasquez.” 

Thirty years ago, this court firmly rejected relying on the 

outdated notion “that a father has a protectible or primary 

interest in having his children bear his surname.” Hamby v. 

Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). As this court 

recognized, “a paternal preference for a child’s surname is 

improper, just as would be a preference for the maternal 

surname.” Id. at 277. We fail to see how Velasquez’s own interest 

in having the child carry on his family name bears on the child’s 

best interest, which is the “paramount consideration in 

determining whether a child’s name should be changed.” Id.
Velasquez v. Chavez

20180451-CA 7 2019 UT App 185

American by bearing a hyphenated name in the manner of a 

heritage and ethnicity that neither side of his family affiliates or 

associates themselves with.”2 In response to the court’s 

questions, Chavez and Velasquez made clear that they do not

identify with Latin culture, and the court recognized that there 

are many “blended families” and children “from various 

backgrounds,” including those “who are of European ancestry,”

with hyphenated names, “regardless of where [the practice of 

hyphenated names] comes from.” Velasquez does not challenge 

this finding, only arguing that the court improperly based its 

decision on its “belief that the parties have a culture and heritage 

from Latin or Central America.” But the court took care to clarify

that it “mentioned [the Latin or Hispanic] cultural tradition only 

to demonstrate that [it] found little basis to find that a 

hyphenated name is going to cause the child any embarrassment 

simply because [such a practice] is so prevalent in our 

community today, regardless of where it comes from.” We 

cannot say that the court’s determination was against the clear 

weight of the evidence, nor can we say that we are left with a 

firm and definite conviction that the court erred in weighing this 

factor.

¶14 With respect to “insecurity or lack of identity,” 

Christensen, 941 P.2d at 624, 626, the court again expressed the 

“need to make sure that the child properly identifies with both 

 

2. Velasquez insinuates that the prospect of a hyphenated 

surname was generated by the court’s own misguided 

assumptions about the parties’ ethnicities and cultural 

backgrounds. But it was the parties themselves who identified a 

hyphenated surname as an option. Velasquez’s attorney was the 

first to broach the possibility of a hyphenated name in proffering 

that Velasquez worried that the child might drop Velasquez and 

use only Chavez if his surname was hyphenated. And Chavez’s 

attorney proffered that Chavez was “not opposed to the offer of 

the child’s last name being Velasquez-dash-Chavez.”
Velasquez v. Chavez

20180451-CA 8 2019 UT App 185

parents and particularly, that he understands that [Velasquez] is 

. . . his father.” Velasquez does not directly challenge this 

finding, and instead argues that with a hyphenated name the 

child “will likewise face many throughout his life who think he 

is not a third-generation American but rather a Latin American, 

which raises the possibility that it may cause insecurity and lack 

of identity.” Velasquez did not provide any support for this 

assertion below or on appeal and relies on mere speculation. We 

therefore find no error in the court’s findings with respect to this 

factor.

¶15 Finally, Velasquez argues that the court “overlooked” the 

“exhibits and evidence indicating [Chavez’s] ulterior motives.” 

In support of his argument, Velasquez points to Chavez’s 

answer to his petition. But like the district court, we discern 

nothing in Chavez’s answer that suggests an ulterior motive.

Velasquez also complains that, in proceeding by proffer, the 

court deprived him of the opportunity to present evidence 

relating to Chavez’s motive. But both parties agreed at the outset 

to proceed by proffer. Nevertheless, after the court made its 

ruling, Velasquez claimed that the record was insufficient for 

purposes of appeal and asked for an evidentiary hearing. The 

court denied the request, noting that it had “accepted the facts 

[he] offered almost verbatim” and took issue only with “[his] 

suggestion that there was maybe some ill motive on Ms. 

Chavez’s part.” In fact, Velasquez never proffered any facts 

relating to Chavez’s motives. Instead, his attorney merely 

speculated that “[t]here seems to be some motive here that I 

don’t know” and hoped to find one by asking Chavez “on the 

stand . . . why in the world she wouldn’t want [the child] to have 

the last name Velasquez.” The district court acted well within its 

discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing to conduct such a 

fishing expedition. Because Velasquez proffered no facts to 

support his claim of an ulterior motive, the court properly 

concluded that this factor did not bear on the best interest of the 

child.
Velasquez v. Chavez

20180451-CA 9 2019 UT App 185

¶16 In light of the district court’s findings with respect to the 

four factors Velasquez challenges on appeal, we conclude the 

district court did not err in determining that it was in the child’s 

best interest to change his surname from Chavez to 

Velasquez-Chavez.

CONCLUSION

¶17 The district court’s determination that it was in the child’s 

best interest to change his surname to Velasquez-Chavez was 

not against the clear weight of the evidence and does not leave 

us with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made. 

Accordingly, we affirm.