14

- 540

Yousuf v. Holder BIA A096 014 174 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT


# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11 th day of March , two thousand fifteen.

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

GERARD E. LYNCH, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges

.

_____________________________________ NAVEED YOUSUF, AKA SHAFQAT KHAN,

Petitioner ,

v. 14

- 540 NAC ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

.

_____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, New York.

FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda , Acting Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel; Nicole N. Murley, Trial Attorney, Kamille Go, Law Clerk, Office of Immigration Litigation,2 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C.

UPON DUE CONSID ERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.
Petitioner Naveed Yousuf, a native and citizen of Pakistan,

seeks review of the BIA’s February 10, 2014, decision denying
his motion to reopen. In re Naveed Yousuf , No. A096 014 174
(B.I.A. Feb. 10, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity
with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
The applicable standards of review are well established.
See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey , 546 F.3d 138, 168

- 69 (2d Cir.
2008). An applicant may file a motion to reopen within 90 days

of the date on which a final administrative decision was
rendered in the proceeding sought to be reope ned. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c )(2). It is
undisputed that Yousuf’s motion to reopen was untimely because
it was filed in December 2013, more than one year after his June
2012 final removal order. However, the time limitation does
not apply when a motion “is based on changed country conditions3

arising in the country of nationality or the country to which
removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was
not available and would not have been discovered or presented

at t he previous proceeding.” 8 U. S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);

accord , 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
As observed by the BIA, the record evidence was replete with
examples of increased violence in Pakistan . However, as the
BIA ruled, such evidence did not constitute a material change
in country conditions because general violence and civil strife
are, standing alone, insufficient to demonstrate a well

- founded
fear of future persecution or a likelihood of t orture

. See
Melgar de Torres v. Reno , 191 F.3d 307, 314 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“General violence in [a country] does not constitute
persecution, nor can it form a basis for petitioner’s

well

- founded fear of persecution.”) ; Mu

- Xing Wang v. Ashcroft ,
320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that country
conditions evidence demonstrating some incidents of torture is
insufficient to establish an applicant’s eligibility for CAT
relief absent evidence that someone in the applicant’s
“particular alleged circumst ances is more likely than not to
be tortured”) . And, Yousuf’s conclusory assertion that there4

is evidence of violence against similarly situated individuals
with perceived connections to the United St ates is not supported
by the record.
Accordingly, sub stantial evidence supports the BIA’s
conclusion that Yousuf failed to show a material change in
country conditions, and therefore it did not abuse its
discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); see also Jian Hui Shao , 546 F.3d at

168

- 69.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, Yousuf’s pending
motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as

moot.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk