1 The pa pers submitted in connec tion with thi s matter include: Plaintiffs’ Complaint (“ Com pl. ” ); De fe nd ants ’ M oti on to D ism iss (“ Mo t.” ); Pla int if fs ’ R e sp on se to D e fe nd ants ’ Motion to Dism iss (“Opp.” ); Def endants’ Re ply

in Support of Motion t o Dismiss (“Reply ”); Pla int if fs ’ M oti on

fo r L e ave to F ile a

Sur re ply ; D e fe nd ants ’ M e mor and um i n O pp os iti on

to Motion for L eave to File a Surr eply ; Defe ndants’ Answe r and Counter claim (“ Countercl.”) ; Pla int if fs ’ M oti on

to D ism iss De fe nd ants ’ Ans we r a nd Counte rc la im ( “ Mo t. t o D ism iss Counte rc l.” ); De fe nd ants ’ O pp os iti on to P la int if

fs ’ M oti on

to D ism iss ; and

Pla int if fs ’ R e ply Me mor and

um i n Su pp or t of Mo tio n to Di smi ss D e fe nd ants ’ C ounte rc la im. UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

____________________________________ ) HAROL D D. L ONG a

nd ) SHERRI E K. L ONG, ) ) Pla int if fs , )

) v. ) Ci vi l A cti on No. 08 -84 9 (P L F) ) UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, et al., ) ) De fe nd ants
. ) ____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Plaintiffs broug ht this sui t for dama g es re sulting fr om alleg edly illega l tax liens pla c e d o n th e ir

ho us e . D e fe nd ants c ounte rc la ime d to re du c e the lie ns to j ud g me nt. Th e a c tio n is pr e se ntl y be fo re the Court

on de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to d ism iss the c omp la int purs ua nt t o Ru le 12(b)( 6) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure a nd plaintiffs’ motion to dism iss the counter claim. Upon ca

ref ul consideration of the parties’ paper s and the e ntire re cord in the c ase, the Court g ra nts de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to d ism iss , a

nd de nie s p la int if

fs ’ m oti on

to d ism iss

. 12 I . BA CKGROUND Plaintiffs Harold D. L ongand Sherr ie K. L ongalleg e that the Interna l Revenue Service (“I RS”) unlawfully place d five tax liens totaling $52,617.29 on their house be tween 1997 and 2003. See Compl. ¶¶ 14, 19. Plaintiffs fur ther a lleg e that they

first lear ned of the se liens on November

20, 2004, when they

wer e sche duled to close on the sa le of their house . See id. ¶¶ 13- 14. At the closing , an attorne y informed plaintiffs that any proce eds fr om the sale we re due to the I RS. S ee id. ¶

13. Plaintiffs alleg e that the illeg al liens ca used the c ance llation of the closing and sig nificant fina ncial har dship. See id. ¶¶ 16-18. Plaintiffs a lso alleg e that they have exhausted their administrative re medies. See id. ¶ 37. T hey now see k damag es for

unauthorized tax collections under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 and failure to relea se a lien unde r 26 U.S.C. § 7432 ag ainst defe ndants, the United States of A merica and the Interna l Revenue Ser vice. In response , defe ndants asser

t a counter claim to reduc e to judg ment plaintiffs’ alleg edly unpaid taxes which
we re the ba sis fo r t

he lie ns . I I . STANDARD OF REVI EW Rule 12(b)(6) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure a llows dismi ssal of a complaint if plaintiffs fa il “to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 12(b)( 6). In Be ll Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supre me Court clar ified the standar d of plea ding that plaintiffs must meet in order to survive a motion to di smiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . The Court noted that “ Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 8(a )(2) require s only ‘a sh or t and pla in s tate me nt o f t

he c la im s ho wi ngthat th e ple a de r i s e nti tle d to re lie f, ’ i n o rd e r t o ‘g ive the def

endant f air notice of what the . . . claim is and the g rounds upon which it re sts[ .]’”3

I d. at 555 (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Aktieselskabe t AF 21 v. Fame J eans Inc., 525 F .3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Althoug h “deta iled fac tual alleg ations” ar e not
nece ssary to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, to provide the “g rounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief,” plaintiffs must furnish “more tha n labels and c onclusions” or “ a formulaic r ecitation of the elements of a cause of ac tion.” Be ll Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555; see a lso Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). T he Court stated that ther e was no “ probability

require ment at the plea ding sta g e,” B ell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, but “something beyond . . . mere possibili ty . . . must be alleg ed[.] ” I d. at 557-58. The fa cts alleg ed in the complaint “must be e noug h to raise a rig ht to relief a

bove the spe culative level,” id. at 555, or must be sufficie nt “to state a c laim for re lief that is plausible on its face .” I d. at 570. The Court re fer

red to this newly

clar ified standar d as “the plausibilit y standard.” I d. at 56 0 ( a ba nd on ingthe “ no se t of

fa c ts” langua g e fr om C on le y v. Gi bs on ). Ac c or din gto t he D. C. Circuit, Twombly

“lea ves the long -standingfundame ntals of notice plea ding intac t.” Aktieselskabe t AF 21 v. F ame Jeans Inc., 525 F .3d at 15.

On a motion to dismi ss under Rule 12(b) (6), the Court “ must acce pt as true a ll of the fa ctual alleg ations contained in the c omplaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007); see also Be ll Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555. The c omplaint “is construed lib e ra lly in t he pla int if

fs ’ f avo r, and [the Court

sh ou ld] gra

nt p la int if fs the be ne fi t of

a ll infere nces that can be derive d from the f acts a lleg ed.” K owal v. MCICommuni cations Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). Neve rtheless, the Court ne ed not ac cept infe renc es dra wn by plaintiffs if those infer ence s are unsupported by fac ts alleg ed in the complaint; nor must the4

Court acc ept plaintiffs’ leg al conc lusions. S ee K owal v. MCICommuni cations Corp., 16 F .3d at 1276; Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D .C. Cir. 2002).
I I I . DI SCUS SI ON As an initial matter, the Court finds that def endants’ a

rgument that the United States is the only

proper defe ndant under

Sections 7432 and 7433 has be en conc eded by p l a i n t i f f s . S e e L. C IV . R. 7(b). The I RS wil l be dismissed as a def endant. A. The Statute of Li mitations Bars Pl aintiff s’ Claims Th e statut e s u

po n whic h p la int if

fs re ly fo r t he ir c la ims pr ov ide a

tw o ye ar s tatut e of lim itatio ns . Se e 26 U. S.C. § 7 43 2( d) (3 ) ( “ an a c tio n to e nf or c e lia bil ity c re ate d und e r t

his section . . . may

be brought only

within 2 y ear s after

the date of

the rig ht of ac tion accr

ues.”) ; 26 U. S.C. § 7 43 3( d) (3 ) ( same ). Pla int if fs ’ c a us e of a c tio n “ a c c ru e [d] wh e n [th e y ] ha d a re a so na ble op po rt un ity to d isc ov e r a ll e sse nti a l e le me nts of a po ssi ble c a

us e of a c tio n. ” 26 C.F .R. § 301.7432-1(h) (i)(2) ; see a lso 26 C.F.R. § 301.7433-1(g )(2) (same) . The Court finds that plaintiffs had a

rea sonable opportunity

to discover a ll of the essential e lements of their c ause of action whe n they

first lear ned of the tax l iens on Novembe r 20, 2004. See, e .g ., Delvec chio v Smit h, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1250 (S.D. F la. 2008) (c ause of action under

26 U.S.C. § 7433
acc rued when plaintiffs lea rned of fede ral tax lien); Bright v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (ca

use of a ction under 26 U .S.C. § 7433 accrue d when plaintiff le arne d of I RS l evy on his salary

). Ac cording ly , plaintiffs had until November 20, 2006 to commence suit.2 Pla int if fs a lle g e that th e y

e xha us te d th e ir

a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s. Se e Com pl. ¶ 37. In opposition t o defe ndants’ motion, plaintiffs state that they filed their f

irst administrative claim on J une 21, 2007. See O pp. ¶ 12. Reg ardle ss of whethe r the filingof an a dminist rative a c tio n to lls the statut e of

lim itatio ns un de r S e c tio ns 74 32 and 74 33 , it c ou ld n ot d o s o in

thi s case , beca use plaintiffs made their first filingafte r the statute of limit ations alrea dy

had run. 5 They did not file this lawsuit unt il May 16, 2008, well af

ter the two- y ear

statute of limitations expired. 2 Plaintiffs argue that they suffe red a

continuing violation and that the statute of limit ations theref

ore should ac crue on a later date. The continuing violation doctr ine applies when the c omplained of a ct “‘ is one that could not rea sonably have be en expected to be made the
su bje c t of a laws uit wh e n it fi rs t oc c ur

re d b e c a us e its c ha

ra c te r a s a

vio latio n d id n ot b e c ome
c le ar u nti l it wa s r e pe ate d d

ur ingthe lim itatio ns pe ri od ,’ ty pic a lly be c a us e it i s o nly

its cumulative impact . . . that r evea ls its i lleg ality .” Ta ylor v. FD I C, 132 F. 3d 753, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quotingDasgupta v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. Of Re g ents, 121 F. 3d 1138, 1139 ( 7th Cir. 1997)) (i nte rn a l c itatio n o mitte d) . T he c on tin uin gvio latio n d oc tr ine c ann ot b e inv ok e d “ if a sin g le inc ide nt m e re ly

pr od uc e s a lin g e ri nginj ur

y .” Ma c kli n v . U nit e d St ate s, 30 0 F . 3 d 8 14 , 8 24 (7 th Cir. 2002). See a lso Felter v. Kempthorne , 473 F.3d 1255, 1260 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (“a

linge ringeff

ect of an unlawf

ul act is not itself an unlawf ul act”)

. Pla int if fs have a lle g e d th at f

ive ind ivi du a l li e ns we re un lawf ull y pla c e d o n th e ir house. Eac h of these liens, e ven if it has continuingeff ects, c onstitut es a sing le ac t. The liens
are not subject to the continuing violation doctrine. See Ma cklin v. United States, 300 F.3d at 824 (the c ontinuing violation doctrine ha s no applicability to a ca se alleg ing the “ling eringinjury of a sing le alleg ed wr ong , the filing of a tax lien.”); Dziura v. United States, 168 F . 3d 581, 583 (1st Cir. 1999) (tolling the a ccr ual of the statute of

limit ations for a

Section 7433(a) claim base d3 The Court in its discretion denies plaintiffs’ Motion for L eave to File a Surr eply

.

See B aloch v. Nor

ton, 517 F. Supp. 2d 345, 348-49 n.2 (D.D .C. 2007); Groober t v. President and Direc tors of Ge org etown Colleg e, 219 F . Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2002). Plaintiffs seek to ra ise a ne w a rgume nt i n th e ir

surr e ply — n ame ly , th at th e statut e of lim itatio ns sh ou ld b e e qu ita bly tolled. The Court will not consider this argument. See Presby terian Me d. Ctr. of the Univ. of Pa. Hea lth Sy s. v. Shalala, 170 F .3d 1146, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (a court ne ed not consider

an argument first raise d in a re ply brief) ; Demer

y v. Montgome ry

County , Civil Action No. 08-1304, 2009 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 21825 at *14-15 n. 4 (D.D.C. Mar . 18, 2009) (same); B aloch v. Norton, 517 F . Supp. 2d at 348-49 n. 2 (same ); D.L . v. District of Columbia, 450 F. Supp. 2d 11, 20 n.6 (D.D.C. 2006) ( same). 6 on the continuingviolation doctrine is a “long -odds exception”); see also Nesovic v. United States, 71 F. 3d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1995) ( “the wr ongcomplained of was a single act, i.e., the assessment which in turn c reated the lien and c aused the harm” ).

Pla int if fs re ly on Wal la c e v. Un ite d St ate s, 55 7 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 00 (D .D .C. 20 08 ), in wh i ch J u d ge U rb i n a ap p l i edth e c o n t i nu i n g v i o l at i o nd o ct ri n e t o a S ec t i o n7 4 3 3 ca s e r ega rd i n g a levy whose ope ration re sulted in monthl y deductions fr om the plaintiff’s paychec k. In view of the dec isions in M acklin, Dziura a nd Nesovic — a ll of which we re tax case s — the Court is not
c onvin c e d th at Judg e Ur

bin a ’s ana ly sis is c or

re c t. B ut e ve n if

it i s a rgua ble that mo nth ly de du c tio ns c an c a

us e a c on tin uin gha rm , p la int if

fs have ma de no a lle g atio ns that make pla us ibl e the conc lusion that the five sepa rate tax l iens on their house c onstitut e an ong oing wrong . Rather, e ach time a

lien attache s “constitute[s] [a] discrete act[], which fall[s ] out side the scope of th[e] [continui ngviolation] doctrine.” Sny der v. United States, 260 F. App’ x 488, 493 (3d. Cir . 2 00 8) . T he Court

c on c lud e s th at pl a int if

fs ’ c la ims are ba

rr e d b y the statut e of

lim itatio ns . 3 B. Defe ndants’ Counterclaim W ill N ot Be Dismissed Def endants have asse rted a

counter claim to reduc e to judg ment the outstanding tax obl igations that resulted in the liens plaintiffs now dispute. The c ounterc laim alleg es that7

Har old D. L ongwas indebte d to the United States for f ailure to pa

y income taxes and for penalties fr om filing fr ivolous tax returns, a nd that Sherrie K . L ongwas indebte d to the United States beca

use of pe nalties for f

iling fr ivolous tax returns. See Countercl. ¶¶ 60, 66, 72. The counter claim also alleg es that notice a nd demand wa s g iven in acc ordanc e with 26 U.S.C. § 6303 and that Ha

rold D. L ongand Sherr ie K. L onghave f ailed to pay

the full amounts due. See Countercl. ¶¶

61-63, 67-68, 74- 76. The c ounterc laim appea rs appr opriate unde r Rule 13(a ) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e bec ause it “a rises out of the tra

nsaction or oc curr ence that is the subject matter of

the opposing party ’s claim” — na mely , the alleg ed tax liabili ty — and it “does not require addinganother party over whom the court c annot ac quire jurisdiction.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 13(a)

. Pla int if

fs , who are no t pr o s e , do not cite any of the provisions of Rule 12 of the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure a s th e ba sis fo r t he ir mot ion to d ism iss de fe nd ants ’ counter claim. Instead they argue that the liens a

re illeg al bec ause de fenda nts violated due proce ss by

failingto give notice to plaintiffs of their attachme nt. Reg ardle ss of whethe r plaintiffs’ ar g ument that defe ndants violated due pr ocess r equire ments has merit, it does not pr ov ide a ba sis fo r d ism iss a l of

the c ounte rc la im. Pla int if fs a lso a sse rt

that th e c ounte rc la im “conta ins miss tatements of f act” and “f

alsely procla ims” that the I RS gave proper notice. See Mot. to Dismi ss Countercl. ¶¶ 1, 6. Such a fac tual dispute is inappropriate f or re solution on a motion to di smiss.

In plaintiffs’ re ply

memorandum they

raise, f or the fir st tim e, a va

riety of other leg al base s for dismissal. Plainti ffs have disreg arde d the structure of motions practice provided for in the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure a nd in the L ocal Rules for

this dist rict, and ha

ve8

de nie d d e fe nd ants the op po rt un ity to r e sp on d to a

ho st o f p re vio us ly

unra ise d le g a l th e or ie s. Just as it declined to c onsider the ne w ar g uments raised in plaintiffs’ surre ply to defe ndants’ motion to dismi ss, the Court will not consider these a rguments. See Presby

terian Me d. Ctr. of the Univ. of Pa. He alth Sy s. v. Shalala, 170 F .3d at1152 (a court ne ed not consider

an ar g ument first raise d in a re ply brief) ; Demer

y v. Montgome ry

County , 2009 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 21825 at *14-15 n. 4 (“B eca use [the] argument was ra ised for the first time in [ defe ndants’] reply brief, it will not be
c on sid e re d. ” ); B a loc h v . N or ton , 5 17 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 34 8- 49 n. 2 ( “ I f t he mov ant r a ise s a

rgume nts fo r t he fi rs t ti me in h is r e ply

to t he no n- mov ant’ s o pp os iti on , th e c ourt [may ] ig no re tho se
argume nts
. . .” ); D. L . v . D istri c t of Col umb ia , 4 50 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 20 n. 6 ( “ De fe nd ants sh ou ld have inc lud e d th is a

rgume nt i n th e ir

mot ion to d ism iss , r athe r t

ha n w a iti ngto r a ise it i n th e ir Reply .”). De fe nd ants ’ m oti on to d ism iss wi ll b e g ra

nte d in its e nti re ty . Pl a int if

fs ’ m oti on

to dismiss defe ndants’ counte rcla im will be denied. An Or der c onsistent with thi s Memorandum Opinion will is sue this same day

. /s/______________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DA TE : Marc h 31, 2009