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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

SANDRA FOSTER and WILLIAM FOSTER, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

UNPUBLISHED 

February 16, 2017 

v No. 328283 

Monroe Circuit Court 

M & H PARTY STORE, INC., LC No. 14-036470-NI 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and SAAD and METER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In this premises liability action, plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s order that granted 

defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm. 

 On October 13, 2012, plaintiff Sandra Foster patronized defendant’s convenience store to 

purchase a bottle of wine. In images from defendant’s surveillance camera, plaintiff can be seen 

walking through the parking lot toward defendant’s store at 7:54:54 p.m. The sidewalk appeared 

to be damp and there were a number of puddles in the far side of the parking lot. As Ms. Foster 

entered the store, there was a yellow wet-floor sign a few feet from the door, which she passed 

on her left side. At the same time, defendant’s employee was mopping by the front door. At 

7:55:05 p.m., plaintiff walked through the aisle in the back of the store and passed a second wetfloor sign on her left side. Ms. Foster entered the wine aisle at 7:55:11 p.m. and fell within 30 

seconds, though her actual fall was not visible from any of the surveillance footage. 

 Plaintiff testified that she did not see any warning signs in defendant’s store before she 

fell. She also recalled that before she slipped, she was looking straight ahead and was not taking 

any special precautions out of concern that the floors may be wet or slippery. However, after she 

fell, she discovered that the floor was wet and observed a small puddle of water near the side of 

the aisle. Ms. Foster acknowledged that the surveillance video showed her walking past two 

wet-floor signs but testified that “[t]hey weren’t there” and that “I did not see it.” 

 Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant and alleged that Ms. Foster slipped on a 

liquid on the floor of defendant’s store, which plaintiffs asserted was present because defendant’s 

employee had recently mopped the floor. Ms. Foster sought damages for the injuries she 

sustained in the fall based on theories of premises liability, “storekeeper’s liability,” and general 

negligence. Plaintiffs also alleged that her husband, plaintiff William Foster, was entitled to 

damages for loss of consortium. 
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 Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition and argued that it was entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law because there was no genuine issue of material fact that (1) 

defendant met its duty of care to warn when it placed wet-floor signs in the store and, 

alternatively, (2) the condition was open and obvious. The trial court ruled that defendant 

satisfied its duty to warn invitees of the risk posed by the wet floor by the placement of the 

caution signs in strategic locations. The court also cited the open and obvious doctrine when it 

granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.1

 On appeal, plaintiffs raise three issues that purportedly show that the court erred when it 

relied on the open and obvious doctrine. However, plaintiffs do not specifically address the trial 

court’s primary ground for granting summary disposition: that defendant fulfilled its duty to 

protect invitees from unknown dangers when its signs warned customers that the floors were 

wet. Because plaintiffs do not challenge this necessary ground, they are precluded from any 

relief on appeal. See City of Riverview v Sibley Limestone, 270 Mich App 627, 638; 716 NW2d 

615 (2006) (“[A] party’s failure to brief an issue that necessarily must be reached precludes 

appellate relief.”); Roberts & Son Contracting, Inc v N Oakland Development Corp, 163 Mich 

App 109, 113; 413 NW2d 744 (1987). Although not necessary for us to address, we nonetheless 

find that the trial court did not err when it ruled that there is no question of fact that defendant 

fulfilled its duty to warn. 

 This Court reviews rulings on summary disposition motions de novo. Wilson v Alpena 

Co Rd Comm, 474 Mich 161, 166; 713 NW2d 717 (2006). “Summary disposition is appropriate 

under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 

665 NW2d 468 (2003). “When deciding a motion for summary disposition under this rule, a 

court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary 

evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Bialick v Megan Mary, Inc, 286 Mich App 359, 362; 780 NW2d 599 (2009). 

 It is undisputed that Ms. Foster was an invitee of defendant’s business when she fell on 

October 13, 2012. As an invitee, defendant owed her a duty to exercise reasonable care to 

protect her against unreasonable risks of harm from potentially hazardous conditions on its 

property. Hoffner v Lanctoe, 492 Mich 450, 460; 821 NW2d 88 (2012). A premises owner is 

liable for a breach of this duty when the owner “knows or should know of a dangerous condition 

on the premises of which the invitee is unaware and fails to fix the defect, guard against the 

defect, or warn the invitee of the defect.” Id. (emphasis added). 

 

1

 While the court acknowledged that the open and obvious doctrine can bar a plaintiff from 

recovery in a premises liability action, it noted how the wet floor signs were open and obvious—

not the hazard itself. Because the open and obvious doctrine relates to the obviousness of the 

hazard, see Riddle v McLouth Steel Prod Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992); 

Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495, 500; 418 NW2d 381 (1988); Slaughter 

v Blarney Castle Oil Co, 281 Mich App 474, 478; 760 NW2d 287 (2008), it is not clear to what 

extent the court actually relied on this doctrine when it granted summary disposition. 
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 Here, as the trial court correctly noted, there were multiple wet-floor signs present and 

Ms. Foster “almost had to walk around” two of them while she was inside the store. Thus, we 

agree with the trial court that there is no question of fact that defendant complied with its duty to 

warn invitees, such as plaintiff, of the wet-floor dangers present in the store. Accordingly, the 

court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. 

 Although plaintiffs do not address the adequacy of the signs related to whether defendant 

successfully discharged its duty to warn, we will address the adequacy of the signs in this 

context. As an initial matter, plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that a warning must 

be directly visible from every location that presents a risk of injury. “An appellant may not 

merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for 

his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting 

authority.” Kubicki v Mortgage Elec Registration Sys, 292 Mich App 287, 291; 807 NW2d 433 

(2011). In any event, it was undisputed that the establishment was a small convenience store. 

Ms. Foster walked by two signs—one at the entrance to the store and one at the rear of the 

store—on her way to the wine aisle. Because it was wet outside from rain, which clearly could 

be brought into the store by patrons, a reasonable person would not take such notice as a warning 

to only those two specific locations. Instead, one would view the warnings as applying to the 

entire store. Indeed, in addition to the two signs that Ms. Foster passed, there was at least one 

other wet-floor sign located elsewhere in the store, and the employee who was mopping was 

using a yellow mop bucket that also had a “wet floor” warning. Accordingly, we hold that it 

would be unreasonable to require a shop owner under these circumstances to place wet-floor 

signs in every aisle. The several signs located throughout the small store complied with the 

weather conditions, and were more than adequate notice that wet conditions could exist 

anywhere in the store. 

 Because there was no issue of material fact with respect to whether defendant had 

fulfilled its duty to warn customers of any potential wet hazards (and because plaintiffs do not 

challenge this aspect of the trial court’s ruling), we need not address plaintiffs’ arguments related 

to whether the particular hazard here was open and obvious.2

 

2

 Of course, a premises owner owes no duty to protect or warn an invitee of dangers that are open 

and obvious. Hoffner, 492 Mich at 460-461. The reason for this rule is that open and obvious 

dangers “by their nature, apprise an invitee of the potential hazard, which the invitee may then 

take reasonable measures to avoid.” Id. 

 Plaintiffs also argue that there “should” be an independent duty for storekeepers to 

provide reasonably safe aisles that obviates the open and obvious doctrine. But this suggestion 

has been rejected in binding precedent in Kennedy v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 274 Mich 

App 710; 737 NW2d 179 (2007). The case that plaintiffs rely on, Quinto v Woodward Detroit 

CVS, 305 Mich App 73; 850 NW2d 642 (2014), merely suggested a different outcome than 

Kennedy, but it nonetheless acknowledged that Kennedy was controlling. Id. at 74-75. Notably, 

this Court declined the Quinto panel’s request to convene a conflict panel. Accordingly, were 
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 Affirmed. Defendant, as the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219. 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

we inclined to agree with plaintiffs, which we do not, we would likewise be bound by Kennedy. 

See MCR 7.215(J)(1).