[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 181 (Monday, September 20, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57321-57326]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-23386]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-62908; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2010-111]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; 
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To 
Establish an Optional Depth Data Enterprise License Fee

September 14, 2010.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the ``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given 
that on September 7, 2010, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ'' or 
the ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, 
II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The 
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the 
proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    NASDAQ proposes to establish an optional Depth Data Enterprise 
License Fee for external distribution of depth-of-book data to non-
professional users. The text of the proposed rule change is below. 
Proposed new language is in italics; proposed deletions are in 
brackets.\3\
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    \3\ Changes are marked to the rule text that appears in the 
electronic manual of Nasdaq found at http://nasdaqomx.cchwallstreet.com.
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* * * * *

7023. NASDAQ TotalView

(a) TotalView Entitlement
    The TotalView entitlement allows a subscriber to see all individual 
NASDAQ Market Center participant orders and quotes displayed in the 
system as well as the aggregate size of such orders and quotes at each 
price level in the execution functionality of the NASDAQ Market Center, 
including the NQDS feed.
    (1)
    (A) Except as provided in (a)(1)(B) and (C), for the TotalView 
entitlement there shall be a $70 monthly charge for each controlled 
device.
    (B) Except as provided in (a)(1)(C), a non-professional subscriber, 
as defined in Rule 7011(b), shall pay $14 per month for each controlled 
device.
    (C) As an alternative to (a)(1)(A) and (B), a broker-dealer 
distributor may purchase an enterprise license at a rate of $25,000 for 
non-professional subscribers or $100,000 per month for both 
professional and non-professional subscribers. The enterprise license 
entitles a distributor to provide TotalView and OpenView to an 
unlimited number of internal users, whether such users receive the data 
directly or through third-party vendors, and external users with whom 
the firm has a brokerage relationship. The enterprise license shall not 
apply to relevant Level 1 and NQDS fees.
    (D) As an alternative to (a)(1)(A), (B) and (C), a market 
participant may purchase an enterprise license at a rate

[[Page 57322]]

of $30,000 per month for internal use of non-display data. The 
enterprise license entitles a distributor to provide TotalView and 
OpenView to an unlimited number of non-display devices within its firm. 
The enterprise license shall not apply to relevant Level 1 fees.
    (E) As an alternative to (a)(1)(A), (B), and (C), a broker-dealer 
distributor may purchase an enterprise license at a rate of $300,000 
for non-professional subscribers. The enterprise license entitles a 
distributor to provide NQDS (as set forth in Rule 7017), TotalView and 
OpenView to an unlimited number of internal users, whether such users 
receive the data directly or through third-party vendors, and external 
users with whom the firm has a brokerage relationship. The enterprise 
license shall not apply to relevant Level 1 fees.
    (2) 30-Day Free-Trial Offer. NASDAQ shall offer all new individual 
subscribers and potential new individual subscribers a 30-day waiver of 
the user fees for TotalView. This waiver shall not include the 
incremental fees assessed for the NQDS-only service, which are $30 for 
professional users and $9 for non-professional users per month. This 
fee waiver period shall be applied on a rolling basis, determined by 
the date on which a new individual subscriber or potential individual 
subscriber is first entitled by a distributor to receive access to 
TotalView. A distributor may only provide this waiver to a specific 
individual subscriber once.
    For the period of the offer, the TotalView fee of $40 per 
professional user and $5 per non-professional user per month shall be 
waived.
    (b) No change.
    (c) No change.
    (d) No change.
* * * * *
    (b) Not applicable.
    (c) Not applicable.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, NASDAQ included statements 
concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item III below, and is set forth in Sections A, B, and C below.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    NASDAQ disseminates market data feeds in two capacities. First, 
NASDAQ disseminates consolidated or ``core'' data in its capacity as 
Securities Information Processor (``SIP'') for the national market 
system plan governing securities listed on NASDAQ as a national 
securities exchange (``NASDAQ UTP Plan'').\4\ Second, NASDAQ separately 
disseminates proprietary or ``non-core'' data in its capacity as a 
registered national securities exchange. Non-core data is any data 
generated by the NASDAQ Market Center Execution System that is 
voluntarily disseminated by NASDAQ separate and apart from the 
consolidated data.\5\ NASDAQ has numerous proprietary data products, 
such as NASDAQ TotalView, NASDAQ Last Sale, and NASDAQ Basic.
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    \4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039 (Dec. 2, 2008) 
at p. 41.
    \5\ Id.
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    NASDAQ continues to seek broader distribution of non-core data and 
to reduce the cost of providing non-core data to larger numbers of 
investors. In the past, NASDAQ has accomplished this goal in part by 
offering similar enterprise licenses for professional and non-
professional usage of TotalView which contains the full depth of book 
data for the NASDAQ Market Center Execution System. NASDAQ believes 
that the adoption of enterprise licenses has led to greater 
distribution of market data, particularly among non-professional users.
    Based on input from market participants, NASDAQ believes that this 
increase in distribution is attributable in part to the relief it 
provides distributors from the NASDAQ requirement that distributors 
count and report each non-professional user of NASDAQ proprietary data. 
In addition to increased administrative flexibility, enterprise 
licenses also encourage broader distribution by firms that are 
currently over the fee cap as well as those that are approaching the 
cap and wish to take advantage of the benefits of the program. Further, 
NASDAQ believes that capping fees in this manner creates goodwill with 
broker-dealers and increases transparency for retail investors.
    Accordingly, NASDAQ is seeking to establish the Depth Data 
Enterprise License Fee, an optional $300,000 per month non-professional 
enterprise license for external distributors of any NASDQ depth-of-book 
data product including the National Quotation Dissemination Service or 
NQDS (Rule 7017) and TotalView and OpenView, (Rule 7023) (collectively, 
``NASDAQ Depth Data''). This Depth Data Enterprise License Fee will 
include non-professional usage, but will not include distributor 
fees.\6\ This program will be available only to broker-dealers 
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and would cover 
all usage fees with respect to both internal usage and re-distribution 
to customers with whom the firm has a brokerage relationship. Non-
broker-dealer vendors and application service providers would not be 
eligible for the enterprise license; such firms typically pass through 
the cost of market data user fees to their customers.
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    \6\ Distributors who utilize the enterprise license would still 
be liable for the applicable distributor fees.
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    The Depth Data Enterprise License Fee will cover usage fees for 
NASDAQ Depth Data received directly from NASDAQ as well as data 
received from third-party vendors (e.g., Bloomberg, Reuters, etc.). 
Upon joining the program, firms may inform third-party market data 
vendors they utilize (through a NASDAQ-provided form) that, going 
forward, non-professional depth data usage by the broker-dealer may be 
reported to NASDAQ on a non-billable basis. Such a structure attempts 
to address a long-standing concern that broker-dealers are over-billed 
for market data consumed by one person through multiple market-data 
display devices. At the same time, the proposed billing structure will 
continue to provide NASDAQ with accurate reporting information for 
purposes of usage monitoring and auditing.
    The proposed Depth Data Enterprise License Fee is completely 
optional and does not replace existing enterprise license fee 
alternatives set forth in Rule 7023. Additionally, the proposal does 
not impact individual usage fees for any product or in any way raise 
the costs of any user of any NASDAQ data product. To the contrary, it 
provides broker-dealers with an additional approach to providing more 
NASDAQ data at a lower cost.
2. Statutory Basis
    NASDAQ believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with 
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\7\ in general, and with Section 
6(b)(4) of the Act,\8\ in particular, in that it provides an equitable 
allocation of reasonable fees

[[Page 57323]]

among users and recipients of NASDAQ data. In adopting Regulation NMS, 
the Commission granted self-regulatory organizations and broker-dealers 
increased authority and flexibility to offer new and unique market data 
to the public. It was believed that this authority would expand the 
amount of data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and 
competition for the provision of market data.
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    \7\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
    \8\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
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    The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by deregulating the 
market in proprietary data--would itself further the Act's goals of 
facilitating efficiency and competition:

    [E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the 
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the 
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to 
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that 
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive 
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal 
analysis of the need for such data.\9\
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    \9\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70 
FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).

By removing ``unnecessary regulatory restrictions'' on the ability of 
exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of 
the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the 
free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to 
broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is 
sold should be set by the market as well. NQDS, TotalView and OpenView 
are precisely the sort of market data product that the Commission 
envisioned when it adopted Regulation NMS.
    On July 21, 2010, President Barak Obama signed into law H.R. 4173, 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(``Dodd-Frank Act''), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among other 
things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) of 
Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase ``on any person, 
whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory 
organization'' after ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-
regulatory organization.'' As a result, all SRO rule proposals 
establishing or changing dues, fees, or other charges are immediately 
effective upon filing regardless of whether such dues, fees, or other 
charges are imposed on members of the SRO, non-members, or both. 
Section 916 further amended paragraph (C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the 
Exchange Act to read, in pertinent part, ``At any time within the 60-
day period beginning on the date of filing of such a proposed rule 
change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section 
19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the change in 
the rules of the self-regulatory organization made thereby, if it 
appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise 
in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the Commission takes 
such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph 
(2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine whether the proposed rule should 
be approved or disapproved.''
    NASDAQ believes that these amendments to Section 19 of the Act 
reflect Congress's intent to allow the Commission to rely upon the 
forces of competition to ensure that fees for market data are 
reasonable and equitably allocated. Although Section 19(b) had formerly 
authorized immediate effectiveness for a ``due, fee or other charge 
imposed by the self-regulatory organization,'' the Commission adopted a 
policy and subsequently a rule stipulating that fees for data and other 
products available to persons that are not members of the self-
regulatory organization must be approved by the Commission after first 
being published for comment. At the time, the Commission supported the 
adoption of the policy and the rule by pointing out that unlike 
members, whose representation in self-regulatory organization 
governance was mandated by the Act, non-members should be given the 
opportunity to comment on fees before being required to pay them, and 
that the Commission should specifically approve all such fees. NASDAQ 
believes that the amendment to Section 19 reflects Congress's 
conclusion that the evolution of self-regulatory organization 
governance and competitive market structure have rendered the 
Commission's prior policy on non-member fees obsolete. Specifically, 
many exchanges have evolved from member-owned not-for-profit 
corporations into for-profit investor-owned corporations (or 
subsidiaries of investor-owned corporations). Accordingly, exchanges no 
longer have narrow incentives to manage their affairs for the exclusive 
benefit of their members, but rather have incentives to maximize the 
appeal of their products to all customers, whether members or non-
members, so as to broaden distribution and grow revenues. Moreover, we 
believe that the change also reflects an endorsement of the 
Commission's determinations that reliance on competitive markets is an 
appropriate means to ensure equitable and reasonable prices. Simply 
put, the change reflects a presumption that all fee changes should be 
permitted to take effect immediately, since the level of all fees are 
constrained by competitive forces.
    The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton v. SEC, No. 09-1042 (DC 
Cir. 2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior to the 
effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's reliance 
upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees 
for market data. ``In fact, the legislative history indicates that the 
Congress intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay 
of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are 
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those 
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the 
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.' '' 
NetCoaltion, at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 92 (1975), as 
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323). The court's conclusions about 
Congressional intent are therefore reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act 
amendments, which create a presumption that exchange fees, including 
market data fees, may take effect immediately, without prior Commission 
approval, and that the Commission should take action to suspend a fee 
change and institute a proceeding to determine whether the fee change 
should be approved or disapproved only where the Commission has 
concerns that the change may not be consistent with the Act.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    NASDAQ does not believe that the proposed rule change will result 
in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its 
determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to 
establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the 
NetCoaltion court found that the Commission had not, in that case, 
compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that the 
market for the data at issue in the case was competitive. For the 
reasons discussed above, NASDAQ believes that the Dodd-Frank Act 
amendments to Section 19 materially alter the scope of the Commission's 
review of future market data filings, by creating a presumption

[[Page 57324]]

that all fees may take effect immediately, without prior analysis by 
the Commission of the competitive environment. Even in the absence of 
this important statutory change, however, NASDAQ believes that a record 
may readily be established to demonstrate the competitive nature of the 
market in question.
    There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide 
transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data 
products. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are 
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of 
the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a 
paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision 
whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the 
attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the 
execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data 
products. Without the prospect of a taking order seeing and reacting to 
a posted order on a particular platform, the posting of the order would 
accomplish little. Without trade executions, exchange data products 
cannot exist. Data products are valuable to many end users only insofar 
as they provide information that end users expect will assist them or 
their customers in making trading decisions.
    The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of 
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, 
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution 
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair 
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a 
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both 
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's 
customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a 
unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will 
direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues 
from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution 
costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to 
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice 
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in 
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds 
its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it. 
Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a 
particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer 
decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less 
information, because executions of the broker-dealer's orders will not 
be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product 
will be less valuable to that broker-dealer because it does not provide 
information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data 
from the competing venue to which the broker-dealer is directing orders 
will become correspondingly more valuable.
    Thus, a super-competitive increase in the fees charged for either 
transactions or data has the potential to impair revenues from both 
products. ``No one disputes that competition for order flow is 
`fierce'.'' NetCoalition at 24. However, the existence of fierce 
competition for order flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity 
on the part of broker-dealers with order flow, since they may readily 
reduce costs by directing orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues. 
A broker-dealer that shifted its order flow from one platform to 
another in response to order execution price differentials would both 
reduce the value of that platform's market data and reduce its own need 
to consume data from the disfavored platform. Similarly, if a platform 
increases its market data fees, the change will affect the overall cost 
of doing business with the platform, and affected broker-dealers will 
assess whether they can lower their trading costs by directing orders 
elsewhere and thereby lessening the need for the more expensive data.
    Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from 
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data 
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is 
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and 
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs 
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading, 
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data 
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's 
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow, 
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about 
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the 
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the 
joint products.
    Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain 
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint 
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible, 
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering 
total costs. For example, some platform may choose to pay rebates to 
attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or 
provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices 
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy 
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting 
relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively 
low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there 
is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint 
products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints 
with regard to the joint offering. This would be akin to strictly 
regulating the price that an automobile manufacturer can charge for car 
sound systems despite the existence of a highly competitive market for 
cars and the availability of after-market alternatives to the 
manufacturer-supplied system.
    The market for market data products is competitive and inherently 
contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs 
necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing 
discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges 
compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself, 
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish 
to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data 
is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in 
a vigorously competitive market.
    Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their 
order flow, including ten self-regulatory organization (``SRO'') 
markets, as well as internalizing broker-dealers (``BDs'') and various 
forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools 
and electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market 
competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two 
FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities (``TRFs'') compete to 
attract internalized transaction reports. Competitive markets for order 
flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline 
for the inputs of proprietary data products.
    The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently 
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it 
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each 
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary 
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so, 
including NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS.

[[Page 57325]]

    Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs 
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order 
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple 
broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products. The potential 
sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.
    The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-
pass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete 
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data 
products, as BATS and Arca did before registering as exchanges by 
publishing proprietary book data on the Internet. Second, because a 
single order or transaction report can appear in an SRO proprietary 
product, a non-SRO proprietary product, or both, the data available in 
proprietary products is exponentially greater than the actual number of 
orders and transaction reports that exist in the marketplace.
    Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for 
proprietary data products because they control the primary means of 
access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their 
business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Reuters 
that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer 
proprietary products that end users will not purchase in sufficient 
numbers. Internet portals, such as Yahoo, impose a discipline by 
providing only data that will enable them to attract ``eyeballs'' that 
contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as 
Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it 
promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although 
the business models may differ, these vendors' pricing discipline is 
the same: they can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data 
product that fails to provide sufficient value. NASDAQ and other 
producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to 
these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to 
market proprietary data products successfully.
    In addition to the competition and price discipline described 
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly 
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable. 
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants 
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms 
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, 
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A 
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with 
fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.
    Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data, 
has increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers 
have previously published their proprietary data individually, 
Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to 
produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before 
possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to 
aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including 
Bloomberg, and Thomson-Reuters.
    The court in NetCoalition concluded that the Commission had failed 
to demonstrate that the market for market data was competitive based on 
the reasoning of the Commission's NetCoalition order because, in the 
court's view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the 
depth-of-book data at issue in the case is used to attract order flow. 
NASDAQ believes, however, that evidence not before the court clearly 
demonstrates that availability of depth data attracts order flow. For 
example, NASDAQ submits that in and of itself, NASDAQ's decision 
voluntarily to cap fees on existing products, as is the effect of an 
enterprise license, is evidence of market forces at work. In fact, the 
instant proposal creates a second enterprise license for non-
professional usage of depth data to complement the existing enterprise 
license set forth at NASDAQ Rule 7023(a)(1)(C).
    Competition among platforms has driven NASDAQ continually to 
improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data 
needs. For example, NASDAQ has developed and maintained multiple 
delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable 
customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the 
lowest cost to them. NASDAQ offers front end applications such as its 
``Bookviewer'' to help customers utilize data. NASDAQ has created new 
products like TotalView Aggregate to complement TotalView ITCH and 
Level 2, because offering data in multiple formatting allows NASDAQ to 
better fit customer needs. NASDAQ offers data via multiple extranet 
providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its 
data products. NASDAQ has developed an online administrative system to 
provide customers transparency into their data feed requests and 
streamline data usage reporting. NASDAQ has also expanded its 
Enterprise License options that reduce the administrative burden and 
costs to firms that purchase market data.
    Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message 
traffic, NASDAQ's fees for depth-of-book data have remained flat. In 
fact, as a percent of total customer costs, NASDAQ data fees have 
fallen relative to other data usage costs--including bandwidth, 
programming, and infrastructure--that have risen. The same holds true 
for execution services; despite numerous enhancements to NASDAQ's 
trading platform, absolute and relative trading costs have declined. 
Platform competition has intensified as new entrants have emerged, 
constraining prices for both executions and for data.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    Written comments were neither solicited nor received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section 
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.\10\ At any time within 60 days of the 
filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may 
temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission 
that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, 
for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the 
purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the 
Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the 
proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.
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    \10\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

    <bullet> Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
    <bullet> Send an e-mail to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5725223b327a34383a3a323923241724323479303821"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3644435a531b55595b5b535842457645535518515940">[email protected]</span></a>. Please include 
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-111 on the subject line.

[[Page 57326]]

Paper Comments

    <bullet> Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-111. This 
file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. 
To help the Commission process and review your comments more 
efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all 
comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, 
all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that 
are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating 
to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, 
other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance 
with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site 
viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, on 
official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies 
of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the 
principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted 
without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying 
information from submissions. You should submit only information that 
you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to 
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-111 and should be submitted on or before 
October 12, 2010.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\11\
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    \11\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-23386 Filed 9-17-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010-01-P


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