UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-2289

LAWRENCE GOLINI,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District 

Judge. (2:10-cv-00525-RBS-TEM)

Submitted: June 4, 2012 Decided: June 14, 2012 

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert W. Gillikin, II, RUTTER MILLS, LLP, Norfolk, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, 

Lawrence Leonard, Managing Assistant United States Attorney, 

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Lawrence Golini appeals the district court’s order 

accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and upholding 

the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny Golini a 

period of disability insurance benefits. We affirm.

Our review of the Commissioner’s disability 

determination is limited to evaluating whether the findings are 

supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law 

was applied. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th

Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006)). 

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). We do not reweigh evidence 

or make credibility determinations in evaluating whether a 

decision is supported by substantial evidence; “[w]here 

conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ,” this 

court defers to the Commissioner’s decision. Id.

On appeal, Golini contends that the administrative law 

judge (“ALJ”) erroneously classified his limitations as 

constituting an ability to perform light, rather than sedentary, 

work. The case turns on the role of the sit-stand limitation, 

as Golini argues that the total time he would stand and walk, 

given his sit-stand limitation, does not meet the minimum 

requirements of light work. Golini asserts that the ALJ should 
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have classified his work abilities as consistent with sedentary 

work, entitling him to disability benefits pursuant to MedicalVocational Guidelines Rule 201.14. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 201.14 (directing that high school 

graduate or more who is closely approaching advanced age without 

transferable skills be deemed disabled).

Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-12 notes that an 

individual with a sit-stand requirement may not meet the 

definition of either the sedentary or light work 

classifications. SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, at *4. This is 

because “[s]uch an individual is not functionally capable of 

doing either the prolonged sitting contemplated in the 

definition of sedentary work (and for the relatively few light 

jobs which are performed primarily in a seated position) or the 

prolonged standing or walking contemplated for most light work.” 

Id. The Commissioner “may rely on the [Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines] only in ‘appropriate cases.’” Gibson v. Heckler, 

762 F.2d 1516, 1520 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Heckler v. 

Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983)). Such reliance is 

inappropriate when, as here, a claimant’s residual functional 

capacity falls between the exertional categories upon which the 

Medical-Vocational Guidelines rely. See Jesurum v. Sec’y of 

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 120 (3d Cir.

1995) (collecting cases); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 
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App. 2, Rule 200.00(a), (d) (stating rules are to be used 

“[w]here the findings of fact made with respect to a particular 

individual’s vocational factors and residual functional capacity 

coincide with all of the criteria of a particular rule”).

Because Golini’s sit-stand requirement placed him 

outside the category of individuals contemplated by the MedicalVocational Guidelines, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision to 

rely on the vocational expert’s testimony was appropriate. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED