[Cite as Song v. Rom, 2024-Ohio-1787.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

XUDONG SONG, ET AL., :

Plaintiffs-Appellants, :

No. 112770

v. :

DAVOR ROM, ET AL., :

Defendants-Appellees. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 9, 2024

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CV-20-931640

Appearances:

DJKovach Law LLC and David J. Kovach, for appellants. 

Sammon Law, LLC, and Colin P. Sammon, for appellees

TitleCo Title Agency, Ltd., and Kim Greco.

James D. Gilbert, for appellees WC Management, Close 

To Home Realty LLC, Steve Close, and Alex Close. 

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

Now come plaintiffs-appellants, Xudong Song (“Song”) and Sunshine 

International LLC (“Sunshine”) (collectively, “Appellants”), and appeal the trial 
court’s decision to dismiss Appellants’ claims, with prejudice, against 11 of 14

defendants. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Factual Background

This case involves the sale of approximately 60 properties in the state 

of Ohio to Song. Defendant-appellee Davor Rom (“Rom”), a Florida resident, 

utilized several companies in both Florida and Ohio to facilitate these sales. Rom 

principally did business through his company defendant-appellee Assets Unlimited 

LLC (“Assets Unlimited”), a Florida limited liability company. Rom utilized Ohio 

limited liability companies created on his behalf to market and sell the properties. 

Three of those companies were defendants-appellees Property Hotline LLC 

(“Property Hotline”); IIP1 Cleveland Regeneration (“ICR”); and a former party, IIP 

Ohio LLC2 (“IIP Ohio”). Rom utilized defendant-appellee TitleCo Title Agency, Ltd. 

(“TitleCo”) for title and escrow services for its sales in Ohio. Rom also appointed 

TitleCo’s owner, defendant-appellee Kim B. Greco (“Greco”), as the statutory agent 

for IIP Ohio; IIP Management LLC (“IIP Management”); ICR; and IIP Akron LLC

(“IIP Akron”) in 2014. TitleCo handled all of the title and escrow services for sales 

of property to Song. 

In September 2013, Song, a Chinese national, responded to an 

advertisement from SouFun International Ltd (“SouFun”) by sending an email to 

1 IIP stands for Investment Income Properties and is used in the name of several 

of Rom’s companies.

2 The complaint included claims against IIP Ohio; however, plaintiffs-appellants 

dismissed their claims against it on December 22, 2020.
Xianyao Wu (“Wu”). Wu had purchased properties from IIP Ohio and subsequently 

became Rom’s companies’ representative in China. Wu helped Rom to secure an 

agreement with SouFun to advertise properties on its website. 

Wu sent Song a brochure titled “Welcome to IIP” that proclaimed 

properties purchased would provide an annual net return on investment of 

approximately 17 percent and also promised that a professional property 

management company would manage the properties on behalf of buyers. 

Ultimately, Song signed nine purchase and sale agreements (“PSAs”) for the 

purchase of 60 properties in Franklin, Cuyahoga, and Summit County, Ohio. Song 

believed all of his purchases were from IIP Ohio; however, IIP Ohio was responsible 

for 48 of the sales. He later learned that some of the properties were held by 

different companies. Song also contracted with IIP Management and defendantappellee Close to Home Realty LLC (“Close to Home”) to provide property 

management services for his holdings. Sunshine was formed in December 2014, 

with Song as the sole member. The properties Song acquired were subsequently 

transferred to Sunshine. 

In August 2014, Rom notified Song that there were issues with IIP 

Management necessitating the “release” of all employees and the replacement with 

“better, more sophisticated employees.” Appellant’s Complaint (“Complaint”) ¶ 111. 

Other investors complained about the property management as well. Song claimed 

that incompetent management caused his return on investment to be significantly 

less than advertised. 
Part of Song’s purchases included 33 units in the Woodcliff 

Condominiums in Franklin County. Sometime after the purchase, Song learned that 

his units had been the subject of a court order from the Franklin County Municipal 

Court’s Environmental Court (the “Environmental Court”). The properties Song 

purchased were previously owned by defendant-appellee WC Management LLC 

(“WC Management”). WC Management participated in the Environmental Court 

case and was at one point the receiver for the properties. The company was also 

tasked with abating nuisance conditions and existing code violations for its 

properties. Song was not informed of the Environmental Court’s involvement or its 

rulings that affected his properties either before his purchase or during his 

ownership. Song hired Close to Home as the property manager for these holdings. 

Song did not receive the expected return on investment for these properties. 

Other defendants-appellees were tied to the case as follows: 

defendant-appellee Alex Close was the owner and/or manager of Close to Home. 

Close to Home paid some of its profits from Song to WC Management, which was 

owned by defendant-appellee Steve Close. Alex Close signed “transactional 

documents” on behalf of WC Management. Complaint ¶ 18. Steve Close was 

involved in transactions between Assets Unlimited and Close to Home, and on at 

least one occasion, both Alex and Steve Close were included on electronic 

communication between an employee of Close to Home and defendant-appellee 

Zdravko Rom (“Z.Rom”) regarding properties IIP Ohio sold to Song that Close to 

Home managed. Z.Rom also handled some of the property management issues and 
settled water bill disputes that arose at some of Song’s properties. Z.Rom’s 

company, Z & L Advisors LLC, received $11,000 from Assets Unlimited in 2015. His 

company also shared a business address with Assets Unlimited. Z.Rom received 

payments from Assets Unlimited that were termed “partner’s shares,” and Assets 

Unlimited paid certain expenses for him, including health insurance premiums. 

Procedural Background 

Song I

In July 2015, Appellants filed suit in the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Ohio against Rom, IIP Ohio, and IIP Management. The 

third amended complaint filed on March 4, 2016, included IIP Akron as a defendant 

and removed IIP Management from the case. Appellants alleged fraudulent 

inducement by Rom and IIP Ohio, alleged fraudulent inducement and fraudulent 

concealment by Rom and IIP Akron, requested to pierce the corporate veil to obtain 

relief against Rom personally, and alleged breach of contract against all defendants.

On May 23, 2016, Appellants moved for leave to amend their 

complaint. The proposed fourth amended complaint (“PAC”) attached to the 

motion added 12 new defendants, including defendants-appellees ICR, Assets 

Unlimited, TitleCo, WC Management, Property Hotline, Close to Home, and Z.Rom. 

Neither Steve Close, Alex Close, nor Kim Greco were included in the PAC. The PAC 

also added additional counts, some of which had been dismissed previously by the 

court. The new counts included state law claims under R.C. 1707, the Ohio Corrupt 

Activities Act R.C. 2923.31 et seq., and additional federal claims under RICO 18 
U.S.C. 1962(c). After the trial court reviewed the appellants’ new claims and the 

factual basis offered in support, the court noted: 

Plaintiffs seek to add twelve (12) defendants. For most, there is little or 

no linkage to any of the actual properties plaintiffs claim to have been 

fraudulently induced to purchase. In the allegations relating to the 

parties, plaintiffs set forth corporate ownership and links to Rom, 

(currently a defendant) but does not follow up with how that corporate 

structure translates into a “Scheme” to defraud plaintiffs. The mere 

linkage of the companies to Rom (who is alleged to be “the mastermind 

of the scheme” who “us[ed] his companies interchangeably” (PAC 

¶¶ 100, 102)), and possibly to one another (allegedly “transferr[ing] 

funds between themselves and to other entities that were owned 

and/or controlled by Rom” (PAC ¶ 103)), does not, without more, 

establish any linkage to the properties plaintiffs purchased or any part 

in any alleged fraudulent inducement to purchase those properties or 

to use the management services offered to plaintiffs.

(Footnote omitted.)

The court was also concerned about the failure to raise these claims 

earlier: 

Even where there is a linkage alleged between a company and plaintiffs’ 

purchased properties, the Court is hard-pressed to see why that could 

not have been determined earlier, so as to have been included in the 

original complaint (or, at the very least, in one of the several 

subsequent amended complaints). For example, the PAC claims that 

some of the newly-named defendant companies were “the seller[s] on 

the deeds” of one or two properties purchased by plaintiffs. (PAC ¶ 62-

63). The PAC alleges that newly-named defendant TitleCo Title 

Agency, LTD “was designated by Rom and exclusively used as the title 

agency and escrow agent for the closing of all sixty real estate 

properties[.]” (PAC ¶ 65.) These are all facts known from the outset 

and, with even minimal due diligence, were all facts ascertainable prior 

to filing the initial complaint. Further, the mere fact that a person or 

entity might have knowledge of facts that would make that person or 

entity a viable witness does not require that the person or entity be 

made a party defendant.
Finally, the court denied the request for leave to file the PAC, noting 

that the new complaint was more than twice as long as the previous one, introduced 

12 defendants and six additional causes of action: 

This case has been assigned to the Standard Track, which requires that 

it be resolved within fifteen (15) months of its commencement. The 

original complaint was filed on July 21, 2015, currently leaving only 

four (4) months for completion. Another amended complaint 

(especially the one now proposed), if permitted, would only further 

delay resolution. Therefore, under the circumstances described herein, 

justice does not require granting leave to file yet another amended 

complaint.

After the ruling, Appellants moved to dismiss Song I without 

prejudice under Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which was 

denied. Appellants subsequently settled with IIP Akron and proceeded to a jury trial 

against Rom and IIP Ohio. The jury found in favor of the Appellants on the claim of 

fraudulent inducement against Rom and awarded them actual damages in the 

amount of $50,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $0. The jury also found 

in favor of the Appellants on their claim of fraudulent inducement against IIP Ohio 

and awarded Appellants actual and punitive damages in the amount of $0. Rom 

appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit;

however, the appeal was dismissed. Appellants did not appeal the judgment or the 

denial of the motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. 

Song II 

On November 6, 2017, appellants filed a complaint in the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas against current defendants-appellees Rom, Assets 
Unlimited, ICR, Property Hotline, Close to Home Realty, and TitleCo, as well as IIP 

Ohio, IIP Management, and CC Contracting LLC (“CC Contracting”). Appellants’ 

first amended complaint added additional defendants including current 

defendants-appellees WC Management, Steve Close, Alex Close, and Z.Rom, as well 

as Mathew Moffie, the owner of CC Contracting. Appellees alleged violations of the 

Ohio Corrupt Activities Act, civil conspiracy, fraudulent inducement, negligent 

misrepresentation, and tortious interference with contract. Motions for summary 

judgment were filed on behalf of multiple defendants in the case. 

On August 28, 2019, the Franklin County judge granted the motions 

for summary judgment. The appellees argued that the amended complaint alleged 

the same facts and claims raised in the PAC in Song I and they were therefore barred 

due to res judicata as found in Cusack v. ICS Holdings, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

05AP-914, 2006-Ohio-2536. The trial court agreed and found that Song II was 

barred under Cusack. The trial court found that the appellants were able to appeal 

the denial of their motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint after the 

federal case came to final judgment. They did not appeal, which gave preclusive 

affect to the Song I court’s decision. Further, the court found that the federal judge’s 

denial of leave to file an amended complaint reached the merits of the claims.

On September 2, 2019, appellants voluntarily dismissed Song II, 

without prejudice. 
Song III: The Current Case

On April 20, 2020, Appellants filed the current case in the Cuyahoga 

County Court of Common Pleas against Rom, Assets Unlimited, IIP Ohio, ICR, 

Property Hotline, CC Contracting, Matthew Moffie, WC Management, Steve Close, 

Close to Home Realty, Alex Close, TitleCo, Kim Greco, and Z.Rom. In their 

complaint, Appellants noted that this was a refiling of Song II, which they 

voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on September 2, 2019. The Appellants 

alleged the following: violation of the Ohio Corrupt Practices Act (all defendants) 

(Count 1); civil conspiracy (all defendants) (Count 2); fraudulent inducement (Rom, 

Assets Unlimited) (Count 3); fraudulent inducement (Rom, Assets Unlimited, Close 

to Home) (Count 4); negligent misrepresentation (Rom, Assets Unlimited) (Count 

5); negligent misrepresentation (Rom, Assets Unlimited, Close to Home) (Count 6); 

and tortious interference with contract (Rom, Assets Unlimited) (Count 7). 

On July 31, 2020, Rom filed a counterclaim against Appellants 

alleging (1) malicious prosecution (Count 1); abuse of process (Count 2); bad faith 

and meritless/frivolous litigation under R.C. 2323.51 (Count 3); wrongful use of civil 

proceedings (Count 4); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 5). 

Rom also filed a third-party complaint, which added Appellants’ counsel David 

Kovach and his firm as third-party defendants raising the same claims as the 

counterclaim. 

On August 1, 2020, TitleCo and Greco filed a motion for judgment on 

the pleadings (“TitleCo MJP”) and, separately, a counterclaim and third-party 
complaint, which added Appellants’ lawyer as a third-party defendant raising claims 

similar to those raised by Rom. On December 30, 2020, Rom and ICR moved for 

joinder to the motion as to Counts 1 and 2 of Appellants’ complaint.3 Property 

Hotline also moved for joinder to the motion. 

In the TitleCo MJP, TitleCo and Greco alleged that (1) Appellants’ 

claims were barred by res judicata; (2) if the claims were not barred by res judicata,

then they were barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the appellants’ claims for 

violation of the anti-racketeering and corrupt activities act did not meet the 

heightened pleading standards under Ohio law; (4) Appellants’ claims against 

TitleCo did not allege the necessary elements of a valid negligence claim under Ohio 

law; (5) the civil conspiracy claims fail because Appellants’ did not allege against 

TitleCo an independent tort that is actionable without the conspiracy; and 

(6) Appellants’ failed to state a claim on behalf of Sunshine, which was never in 

privity with TitleCo.

Subsequently on September 11, 2020, TitleCo and Greco filed a first 

amended counterclaim and third-party complaint. The complaint raised claims 

against Appellants and their attorney for (1) vexatious litigation and frivolous 

conduct (Count 1); (2) violation of Rule 11 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure 

(Count 2); (3) wrongful use of civil proceedings (Count 3); (4) invasion of 

3 IIP Ohio was included in this motion, although Appellants dismissed it from the 

case a few days earlier.
privacy/public disclosure of private facts (Count 4); and (5) malicious prosecutionSong II (Count 5).

On December 17, 2020, Z.Rom filed a motion for summary judgment. 

(“Z.Rom’s MSJ”). On May 28, 2021, TitleCo and Greco filed a notice to “join in the 

arguments, authorities and exhibits” in Z.Rom’s MSJ. Close to Home and Alex 

Close, jointly, and WC Management and Steve Close, jointly, filed to join in the 

arguments, authorities, and exhibits raised in the motion on June 22, 2021.

In Z.Rom’s MSJ, he alleged that he was entitled to summary 

judgment based on res judicata. He noted that the Appellants added him as a 

defendant in the PAC in federal court. Additionally, he alleged that the same facts 

were used to support the claims against him in Song II and Song III. Accordingly, 

per Z.Rom, it followed that the claims in Song III should be barred based on the 

doctrine of res judicata and the holding in Cusack, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP914, 2006-Ohio-2536.

On December 30, 2020, Rom filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings as to Counts 3 through 7 of the Complaint (“Rom’s MJP”). Rom alleged 

that the claims against him were barred by res judicata and the four-year statute of 

limitations on each claim. He argued that the Appellants’ claims had already been 

litigated to completion in federal court; accordingly, all claims that could have or 

should have been raised in the federal lawsuit are now barred by res judicata.
The trial court ruled on all three motions in a single journal entry and 

decision that addressed the motions and the corresponding response and reply 

briefs. The trial court found as follows: 

The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio’s order denying 

leave to file a fourth amended complaint became final and appealable 

upon the entry of judgment following the jury trial. Plaintiffs did not 

appeal the order at that time, and the denial of leave to amend 

constitutes res judicata on the merits of the proposed claims. As a 

consequence, those claims as restated in Plaintiffs’ complaint in the 

case currently before this Court are barred as to defendants Davor 

Rom, IIP Cleveland Regeneration, Assets Unlimited LLC, TitleCo Title 

Agency, LTD., WC Management LLC, Property Hotline LLC, Close to 

Home Realty LLC, and Zdravko Rom.

The trial court further found that privity barred claims against Kim 

Greco, Alex Close, and Steve Close. The trial court accordingly granted all three 

motions and dismissed the claims against the defendants-appellees with prejudice. 

Appellants appeal and raise the following assignment of errors for our review. 

Assignment of Error No. 1 

The trial court committed reversible error when it dismissed the claims 

of the plaintiffs against the non-Song I defendants on the grounds of 

claim preclusion.

Assignment of Error No. 2 

The trial court committed reversible error when it dismissed the claims 

of the plaintiffs against Davor Rom on the grounds of claim preclusion.

Law and Analysis

Appellate Jurisdiction

Preliminarily, we must examine whether we have jurisdiction to hear 

this case. We requested the parties brief the issue of jurisdiction as appellate courts 
must address the issue when jurisdiction seems uncertain. Kohout v. Church of St. 

Rocco Corp., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88969, 2008-Ohio-1819, ¶ 4.

The instant case’s uncertainty arises from the existence of multiple 

claims that were not addressed by the trial court’s order. First, both TitleCo and 

Greco, jointly, and Rom filed counterclaims against Appellants alleging malicious 

prosecution and other allegations addressing the repeated lawsuits. They also both 

filed third-party complaints against Appellants’ counsel and his law firm addressing 

the same issues. These claims were not addressed in the trial court’s May 23, 2023

journal entry that dismissed the claims against the appellees. Second, claims against 

CC Contracting and Matthew Moffie, neither of whom are parties to this appeal, as 

well as their counterclaims, remained pending after the trial court’s ruling on the 

motions addressed here.

A final appealable order exists only when it meets ‘“the requirements 

of both R.C. 2505.02 and, if applicable, Civ.R. 54(B) * * *.”’ Gehm v. Timberline 

Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514, 2007-Ohio-607, 861 N.E.2d 519, ¶ 15, quoting, 

State ex rel. Scruggs v. Sadler, 97 Ohio St.3d 78, 2002-Ohio-5315, 776 N.E.2d 101, 

¶ 5. R.C. 2505.02(B) provides, in relevant part:

(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, 

or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect 

determines the action and prevents a judgment;

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special 

proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after 

judgment;
Since the trial court entered final judgment as to one or more but 

fewer than all of the claims, Civ.R. 54(B) becomes applicable. Civ.R. 54(B) provides:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether 

as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, and whether 

arising out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple

parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or

more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 

determination that there is no just reason for delay.

A trial court’s application of Civ.R. 54(B) by including the language 

“no just reason for delay” in its order, is tantamount to a factual finding that an 

interlocutory order should be immediately appealable, “in order to further the 

efficient administration of justice and to avoid piecemeal litigation or injustice 

attributable to delayed appeals.” Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., 122 Ohio St.3d 83, 

2009-Ohio-1971, 909 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 11, citing Wisintainer v. Elcen Power Strut Co., 

67 Ohio St.3d 352, 617 N.E.2d 1136 (1993). 

“[W]here the record indicates that the interests of sound judicial 

administration could be served by a finding of ‘no just reason for delay,’

the trial court’s certification determination must stand.” [Wisintainer

at 355]. Where, however, the interests of judicial economy are not 

served by immediate appeal, a trial court’s Civ.R. 54(B) finding is 

“subject to reversal.” [Third Fed. S. & L. v. Krych, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 99762, 2013-Ohio-4483, ¶ 7], citing Hill v. Hughes, 4th Dist. Ross 

No. 06CA2917, 2007-Ohio-3885, ¶ 8.

Rae-Ann Suburban, Inc. v. Wolfe, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107536, 2019-Ohio-1451, 

¶ 15.

Accordingly, the trial court’s order must be final in order for Civ.R. 

54(B) to render it appealable. Altenheim v. Januszewski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
105860, 2018-Ohio-1395, ¶ 10, citing Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio 

St.3d 17, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989), citing Douthitt v. Garrison, 3 Ohio App.3d 254, 

255, 444 N.E.2d 1068 (9th Dist.1981). 

We have found that where a trial court’s order disposes of all claims 

against one or more parties, but does not resolve all claims against all parties, the 

order is final and may be rendered immediately appealable under Civ.R. 54(B). 

Continuum Transp. Servs. v. Elite Internatl. Corp. L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

111261, 2022-Ohio-3738, ¶ 13.

In the instant case, the trial court’s order disposed of all of Appellants’

claims against WC Management, Close to Home, Assets Unlimited, ICR, Property 

Hotline and Z.Rom. Accordingly, by including Civ.R. 54(B) language that there was 

“no just cause for delay” the order is appealable as to those appellees. However, 

although the trial court’s order disposed of all of Appellants’ claims against Rom, 

TitleCo and Greco it did not dispose of their counterclaims and third-party

complaints.

Civ.R. 54(B) does not make a final order appealable if there are 

unresolved counterclaims that touch on the same facts, legal issues, and 

circumstances of the original claim. Altenheim, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105860, 

2018-Ohio-1395, at ¶ 3-7, 10-13. 

“An order that disposes of fewer than all of the claims in an action and

contains a Civ.R. 54(B) determination that there is no just reason for 

delay, is appealable if the claim or claims disposed of are entirely 

disposed of and either of the following applies. First, are the disposed 

of claims factually separate and independent from the remaining 
claims? An example would be claims that are based on different 

transactions or occurrences such as one claim for slander and another 

for negligence because of an automobile accident. Second, if the claims 

are not factually separate and independent, do the legal theories 

presented in the disposed of claims require proof of substantially 

different facts and/or provide for different relief from the remaining 

claims.”

Krych, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99762, 2013-Ohio-4483, at ¶ 8, quoting Walker v. 

Firelands Community Hosp., 6th Dist. Erie No. E-06-023, 2006-Ohio-2930, ¶ 23.

The counterclaims and third-party complaints TitleCo, Greco, and 

Rom filed all deal with the multiple lawsuits filed after the transactions that are the 

subject of Song I. Specifically, they raise claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of 

process, vexatious litigation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In 

contrast, the trial court’s order disposes of a distinct branch of the case, i.e., 

Appellants’ claims that arose out of the purchase of property by and through these 

appellees. The ruling also prevents Appellants from proceeding on its claims against 

Rom, TitleCo, and Greco. Accordingly, the order is a final order that effected a 

substantial right and is therefore appealable.

Res Judicata

Both of Appellants’ assignments of error challenge the trial court’s 

ruling that Song I prevents further litigation of these issues under the doctrine of res 

judicata. Rom is the only litigant who was a party to Song I. Although Appellants 

sought leave to amend their complaint, that ruling was denied. Accordingly, we 

must determine whether Appellants’ current claims against Rom are barred by res 
judicata. We must then determine whether the judgment bars Appellants’ claims 

against those appellees who were never named as parties of Song I. 

Standard of Review

Judgment on the Pleadings

A judgment on the pleadings deals solely with issues of law, which is 

why our review is de novo. New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer 

Group Architecture & Eng., Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 164, 2019-Ohio-2851, 133 N.E.3d 

482, ¶ 8, citing Rayess v. Edn. Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates, 134 Ohio St.3d 

509, 2012-Ohio-5676, 983 N.E.2d 1267, ¶ 18. De novo review entails an 

independent examination of the record and law without deference to the trial court’s 

decision. Torres v. Concrete Designs, Inc., 2019-Ohio-1342, 134 N.E.3d 903 (8th 

Dist.) ¶ 48, citing Gateway Consultants Group, Inc. v. Premier Physicians Ctrs. 

Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104014, 2017-Ohio-1443, ¶ 22, citing Demeraski v. 

Bailey, 2015-Ohio-2162, 35 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).

Judgment on the pleadings limits our review “solely to the allegations 

in the complaint and answer, as well as any material attached as exhibits to those 

pleadings.” Schmitt v. Edn. Serv. Ctr., 2012-Ohio-2208, 970 N.E.2d 1187 (8th 

Dist.), ¶ 10, citing State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 

569, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). Additionally, we must consider the factual allegations 

in the complaint as true, although unsupported conclusions are insufficient to 

defend against the motion. Pincus v. Dubyak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110135, 2021-

Ohio-3034, ¶ 17.
When a defendant requests judgment on the pleadings, it is 

appropriate to grant the motion when the plaintiff’s complaint has failed to allege 

facts that, if true, would establish the defendant’s liability. Id. at ¶ 17, citing Walters 

v. First Natl. Bank, 69 Ohio St.2d 677, 433 N.E.2d 608 (1982). In short, to grant a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must determine that no material 

factual issues exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Id., quoting Pontious at 570.

Ordinarily res judicata is not the proper basis for dismissal under 

Civ.R. 12; however, “the trial court may appropriately consider whether res judicata 

applies when the res judicata defense ‘does not depend on documents outside the 

pleadings.’” Berryhill v. Khouri, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109411, 2021-Ohio-504, ¶ 

20 quoting Jones v. Wainwright, 162 Ohio St.3d 491, 2020-Ohio-4870, 165 N.E.3d 

1253, ¶ 5. On appellate review, ‘“the court takes into consideration the complaint, 

answer, and any materials attached as exhibits to those pleadings.”’ Id., quoting 

Kalski v. Bartimole, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108995, 2020-Ohio-4137, 157 N.E.3d 

436 ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Schmitt at ¶ 9. See Civ.R. 10(C) (“A copy of any written 

instrument attached to a pleading is part of the pleading for all purposes.”). 

However, “written instruments” under Civ.R. 10(C) typically do not include orders 

and opinions from prior cases between the parties. State ex rel. Leneghan v. Husted, 

154 Ohio St.3d 60, 2018-Ohio-3361, ¶ 17, citing State ex rel. Vandenbos v. Xenia, 2d 

Dist. Greene No. 14-CA-14, 2015-Ohio-35, ¶ 14. 
Summary Judgment

A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment is also 

reviewed under a de novo standard. Khalia Ra v. Swagelok Mfg. Co., L.L.C., 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109789, 2021-Ohio-1657, ¶ 16, citing Montgomery v. Greater 

Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109559, 2021-Ohio-1198, 

¶ 18, citing Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 

(1996). 

Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is warranted when 

(1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence 

that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence 

most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to 

summary judgment. Id. at ¶ 17. ‘“Once the moving party demonstrates entitlement 

to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce 

evidence related to any issue on which the party bears the burden of production at 

trial. Civ.R. 56(E).”’ Id., quoting Mattress Matters, Inc. v. Trunzo, 2016-Ohio-7723, 

74 N.E.3d 739, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). 

Res Judicata for Claims Against Davor Rom

“The doctrine of res judicata is a rule of law[; it] promotes judicial 

economy, finality of judgments, and preserves resources of litigants and the court.” 

Persaud v. St. John Med. Ctr., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105402, 2017-Ohio-7178, 

¶ 20. It includes both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Grava v. Parkman 
Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995). Claim preclusion “‘prevents 

subsequent actions, by the same parties or their privies, based upon any claim 

arising out of a transaction that was the subject matter of a previous action.’” State 

ex rel. Peterson v. Miday, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112792, 2023-Ohio-2963, ¶ 4 

quoting O’Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 

N.E.2d 803, citing Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations 

Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395, 692 N.E.2d 140 (1998). Issue preclusion prevents 

“‘relitigation of any fact or point that was determined by a court of competent 

jurisdiction in a previous action between the same parties or their privies.’” Id., 

quoting id.

This case raises the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata. The 

doctrine requires that a plaintiff present “‘every ground for relief in the first action 

or be forever barred from asserting it.’” Persaud at ¶ 20, quoting Natl. Amusements 

v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62, 558 N.E.2d 1178 (1990). Accordingly, the final 

judgment in the first action is “‘conclusive as to all claims, which were or might have 

been litigated in a first lawsuit.’” Id., quoting id.

Res judicata applies to bar further claims when there is “(1) a final 

decision on the merits of the first action, (2) a second action involving the same 

parties or persons in privity with those parties, (3) the second action raises claims 

that were or could have been litigated in the first action, and (4) the claims in the 

second action arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the first action.” Id.
at ¶ 21, citing Daniel v. Shorebank Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92832, 2010-

Ohio-1054, ¶ 13. 

A review of the record with respect to Rom establishes that three out 

of the four requirements were met to bar further litigation: (1) there was a final 

judgment in the original action. Song I went to jury trial and was resolved in 

appellants favor against Rom; (2) after the resolution of Song I, Appellants filed 

Song II and Song III against Rom and others; (3) the claims in the current case arise 

out of the same transactions that were the subject of Song I, i.e., the sale of 60

properties by Rom through his companies to Song. 

The final requirement is that the claims that were raised in the 

subsequent action could have or should have been raised in the first action. Here 

because Appellants did raise these claims in the PAC, we must address the effect of 

the trial court’s denial of leave and the Appellants’ failure to appeal that denial after 

final judgment. Courts that have looked at this issue have found that the denial of a 

motion for leave to amend a complaint does not necessarily preclude further 

litigation. Bayview Loan Servicing, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Humphreys, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 20AP-396, 2021-Ohio-4324, ¶ 26; see also Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 

226 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir.2000) (“[D]enial of a motion to amend will not inevitably 

preclude subsequent litigation of those claims set out in a proposed new 

complaint.”); Neff v. Std. Fed. Bank, S.D.Ohio No. 2:06-cv-856, 2008 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 37729 (May 8, 2008); N. Assur. Co. of Am. v. Square D Co., 201 F.3d 84, 88 

(2d Cir.2000). Whether res judicata applies depends on why leave to amend was 
denied. If the denial of leave to amend the complaint was based on the merits of the 

claims, then res judicata would apply to bar further litigation. Id., citing Curtis, 226 

F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir.2000). If the denial of leave to amend is not based on the 

merits, res judicata may still apply if claims in the subsequent case should have been 

or could have been raised in the original action. N. Assur. Co. of Am. at 88.

With respect to Appellants’ claims in the PAC the Song I Court made 

two specific findings, (1) that the alleged facts failed to establish appellants’ claims 

for fraudulent inducement to purchase properties or that they were fraudulently 

induced to utilize Appellees’ management companies; and (2) these claims and facts 

could have been ascertained much earlier in the case,4 included in the original 

complaint, and certainly should have been included by the third amended 

complaint, which was filed eight months after the case was initiated. 

The Song I Court accordingly considered both the merits of the new 

claims and whether the claims should have been raised earlier in the proceedings. 

Appellants elected not to appeal this decision. They now argue they could not appeal 

4 The court noted that the original complaint was filed on July 21, 2015. Appellants 

filed a first amended complaint on July 30, 2015. On September 21, 2015, Appellants 

moved to file a second amended complaint, which removed IIP Akron as defendant. 

Before the trial court could rule, IIP Akron filed an answer and counterclaim. On 

September 29, 2015, the court allowed the second amended complaint, which was filed 

on September 30, 2015. Despite having dismissed IIP Akron from the complaint, on 

October 12, 2015, Appellants filed an answer to IIP Akron’s counterclaim and added a new 

counterclaim bringing IIP Akron back into the case as a counter-claim defendant. 

Because of these conflicting pleadings, the trial court directed Appellants to file a third 

amended complaint that was consistent with the trial court’s ruling to date. Appellants 

filed their third amended complaint on March 4, 2016. A month later, Appellants filed a 

motion for extension of time to amend the complaint again. A month after that Appellants 

filed the motion for leave to file the PAC.
that decision because it was interlocutory and could not be appealed unless certified. 

Furthermore, they could not appeal after final judgment because the ruling merged 

with the final judgment. Finally, they were not able to appeal the decision because 

they won the case and were not the aggrieved party. 

The denial of leave to amend a complaint does not merge with the 

final judgment and is appealable. See Romanov v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

6th Cir. No. 23-5868, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 32141, 1 (Dec. 5, 2023), citing 

McLaurin v. Fischer, 768 F.2d 98, 101-102 (6th Cir. 1985). Additionally, appellants 

argue they were not the aggrieved party in Song I; however, their subsequent 

lawsuits indicate dissatisfaction with that court’s order. Further, they cite to no 

authority that establishes they could not appeal. Accordingly, the Song I Court’s 

decision denying leave to amend the complaint is a decision on the merits. Under 

res judicata, such a decision bars any subsequent lawsuit on the same issues.

Based on this record, the Song I Court’s ruling was a decision on the 

merits of the claims against Rom and established that the claims against him should 

have been brought in that proceeding. Accordingly, Appellants are barred from 

pursuing Rom further due to res judicata.

Appellants’ second assignment of error is therefore overruled. 

Res Judicata for Claims Against the Non-Song I Defendants

With respect to the remaining appellees, we must consider whether 

res judicata applies, i.e., whether (1) in Song I, there was a final decision on the 

merits, (2) there was a second action involving the same parties or persons in privity 
with those parties, (3) the second action raises claims that were or could have been 

litigated in the first action, and (4) the claims in the second action arise out of the 

same transaction or occurrence as the first action. Persaud, 2017-Ohio-7178, at ¶ 21,

citing Daniel, 2010-Ohio-1054, at ¶ 13. 

Here, the issue is whether the non-Song I appellees are in privity to 

the parties in Song I. If they are, then they would be entitled to the benefit of res 

judicata and Appellants would be barred from a subsequent lawsuit against them. 

Within the context of res judicata, privity is “somewhat amorphous.” Brown v. 

Dayton, 89 Ohio St.3d 245, 248, 730 N.E.2d 958 (2000). The Ohio Supreme Court 

has taken a more relaxed view concerning what constitutes privity when applying 

the principles of res judicata. Ferrara v. Vicchiarelli Funeral Servs., 2016-Ohio5144, 69 N.E.3d 171, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.) (“Ferrara I”). A broader definition of privity 

may be warranted for instance where there is a mutuality of interest, “including an 

identity of desired result.” Brown at 248. Privity is a word used to convey ‘‘‘“that 

the relationship between the one who is a party on the record and another is close 

enough to include that other within the res judicata.”’” Id., quoting Thompson v. 

Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 184, 637 N.E.2d 917, 923 (1994), quoting Bruszewski v. 

United States (C.A.3, 1950), 181 F.2d 419, 423 (Goodrich, J., concurring). 

A review of the record establishes that the non-Song I appellees’ 

relationship with Rom and IIP Ohio was close enough to allow them the benefit of 

res judicata. Their connection to the lawsuit is only through the properties sold to 
Song. Additionally, the record establishes that Appellants knew of the existence of 

these parties and could have included them in the litigation in Song I. 

With respect to the non-Song I appellees, Appellants identified Assets 

Unlimited and ICR as companies operated by Rom to sell properties within the state 

of Ohio in its third amended complaint to Song I. Exhibit 1, attached to Z.Rom’s

MSJ; Song I Third Amended Complaint ¶ 11. Appellants were similarly aware that 

the Song I defendants utilized Close to Home for property management services. Id.

at ¶ 13. TitleCo was the escrow agency for all of Song’s purchases. Complaint ¶ 10. 

WC Management previously owned some of the Woodcliff Condominiums 

properties that Song later purchased from IIP Ohio, and the company and its owner 

had ties to Close to Home. The two companies shared office space, and both Alex

Close and Steve Close were in communication with Z.Rom. Complaint ¶ 15-18. 

Property Hotline marketed and sold Rom’s Ohio properties. Complaint ¶ 7. Z.Rom’s 

involvement is limited to receiving some funds from Rom’s companies and 

addressing property management issues at some of Song’s properties. Greco, Alex

Close, and Steve Close were the owners of TitleCo, Close to Home, and WC 

Management respectively.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the remaining appellees were in 

privity with the Song I defendants. Their sole involvement in this case has to do 

with their involvement with property sales to Song through Rom and his companies. 

Accordingly, appellees’ interests were adequately represented by the Song I

defendants as well. Furthermore, Appellants could have and should have included 
these appellees in that matter. Although the Song I Court denied Appellants’ motion 

for leave to amend the complaint, that ruling was a ruling on the merits, which 

became final for res judicata purposes when Appellants failed to appeal. 

Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellants costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR