alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 80 (Monday, May 15, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H4956]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                             SPECIAL ORDERS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hayworth). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 4, 1995, and under a previous order of the House, the 
following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

                          ____________________
```
#### V. B. Smith v. M. J. McGehee & Co.

(No. 685, Op. Book No. 2, p. 125.)

Appeal from Cooke County.

Opinion by

Walker, R. S., P. J.

§ 940. *Pleading; counterclaim; partnership debt.*Me. & Co. sued S. upon an account alleged to be due the firm. *528S. pleaded, in defense a counterclaim, and also in reconvention for damages. Me., without pleading it, was permitted on the trial to introduce evidence of an indebtedness which he individually claimed of S. *Held,*that it was error to admit such evidence. “A complainant in a court of equity as well as law must recover, if at all, upon the identical case on which he has based his right to recover in stating his cause of action.” [Parker v. Beavers, 19 Tex. 410.] “The allegations must be broad enough to let in the proof, and no evidence not supported by the allegations can sustain a verdict.” [Denison v. League, 16 Tex. 408.] And proof without allegation to authorize it should be disregarded. [Paul v. Perez, *7*Tex. 345.] And facts not alleged, though proved, cannot form the basis of a judgment. [Hall v. Jackson, 3 Tex. 309; McKey v. Welch, 22 Tex. 390; Chrisman v. Miller, 15 Tex. 159.] In this case there was no legal basis for the introduction of evidence in support of the individual account of Me. The original suit was upon a partnership account, and no foundation was laid by the plaintiff’s pleading for evidence to support any other account. The individual account cannot be regarded as a set-off. The defendant is properly said to plead in set-off, but when the plaintiff introduces a new cause of action in addition to that on which his suit is brought, it must be done by amendment of his original pleading. In this case the plaintiff Me. could not have set up his individual account in any way, because it would have been a joinder of different causes of action in different rights.

June 23, 1880.

§941. *Account; pleadings upon.*The plaintiff is required to set forth his cause of action, and if founded on account, he must state or file the items thereof, under the rules of pleading which apply to the court in which the suit is instituted. The defendant in pleading a counterclaim is required by the statute to file an account stating distinctly the nature and the several items thereof.

Reversed and remanded.
<PAGE>   1

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

                  RAMSAY YOUTH SERVICES, INC. CLOSES $5 MILLION
                             SUBORDINATED FINANCING

CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA, JUNE 21, 2000 . . . RAMSAY YOUTH SERVICES, INC.
(NASDAQ:RYOU) announced today that it has closed a $5 million subordinated debt
financing with ING (U.S.) Capital LLC. The proceeds of the additional financing
will be used for general corporate purposes, including the expansion of the
Company's business.

Ramsay Youth Services, Inc. is a leading quality provider and manager of
treatment, education and community-based programs for at-risk, troubled and
special needs youth. The Company has operations in nine states and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Except for historical information contained herein, the matters set forth in
this news release are forward-looking statements as defined under the safe
harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties.
Actual operations and results may differ materially from those expected in the
forward looking statements made by the Company. Please refer to Ramsay's filings
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for additional information.


Contact:    Isa Diaz
            Vice President Corporate Relations
            (305) 569-4626
**
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION OF CEO PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2019 (the“Report”) of FS KKR Capital Corp. II (the “Registrant”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Michael C. Forman, the Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best ofmy knowledge, that: 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934, as amended; and 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Registrant. 

 
Dated: March 13th, 2020
/S/ MICHAEL C. FORMAN
**Michael C. Forman****Chief Executive Officer****
#### The People, ex rel. The Flint & Pere Marquette Railroad Company, v. The Board of Railroad Crossings.

*Railroad companies*— Condemnation *proceedings.*

This case is ruled by *Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., ante,*206.

*Certiorari*to the State Board of Bailroad Crossings..

Argued June 7, 1888. ’

Proceedings affirmed November 1, 1888.

The facts are stated in the opinion in the former-case.

*William L. Weller*and *Wisner & Draper,*for petitioner in *certiorari.*

*Edget, Brooks & Conway (Benton Hanchett,*of counsel), for respondent in *certiorari.*

*235Sherwood, C. J.

This case is *certiorari*to the Board of Railroad Crossings, relating to proceedings had by said board in the matter of the approval of the map of the Toledo, Saginaw & Mackinaw Railroad Company’s road through the county of Saginaw.

The ease of *Railroad Co. v. Railroad, Co., ante,*covers substantially the same questions involved in the present case, and renders a rediscussion of them unnecessary here- and we need only to say, further, that we have looked through the proceedings as they come before us upon this record, and have failed to discover any errors committed by the board, and its action in the premises will therefore be affirmed, with costs.

Champlin and Long, JJ., concurred with Sherwood, C. J.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-50837 

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

$69,530.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY,

Defendant,

DANIEL IFY IWEGBU,

Claimant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. P-97-CV-4

--------------------

December 13, 2000

Before DAVIS, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Daniel Ify Iwegbu, federal prisoner #22600-077, appeals from

the forfeiture of $69,530 to the Government in a civil forfeiture

action. Iwegbu lists as issues whether the Government’s

forfeiture complaint was time-barred; whether the complaint was

barred by laches; whether the violation of the Vienna Convention

resulted in violations of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments; and whether the district court abused its discretion
No. 98-50837 

-2-

by failing to suppress his alleged confession. Iwegbu provides

no legal arguments to support the contentions he lists for

appeal; he effectively has abandoned his issues for appeal. 

Justiss Oil Co. v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp., 75 F.3d 1057, 1067 (5th

Cir. 1996). Because Iwegbu has abandoned his issues by failing

to brief them, his appeal is dismissed as frivolous.

APPEAL DISMISSED. 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
Exhibit 32.1
 
  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Veritec, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Van Tran, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Chairman of the Board, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
  ·
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  ·
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  
  /s/Van Tran
  Van Tran, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Chairman of the Board
  Date: May14, 2010
#### Robinson Bros. & Co. v. W. G. Veal.

(No. 2327, R. Book No. 4, p. 284.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

April 14, 1883.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§311. *Mortgagee has no right of action against an attaching creditor who sells the mortgaged properly.*Article 2296, Rev. Stats., provides that “goods and chattels assigned or mortgaged as security for any debt or contract may be levied upon and sold on execution against the person making the pledge, assignment or mortgage subject thereto, and the purchaser shall be entitled to the possession when it is held by the pledgee, assignee or mortgagee, on complying with the conditions of the pledge, assignment or mortgage.” By levying his attachment upon and selling the mortgaged property, by due course of law, to satisfy his debt, the attaching creditor has committed no wrong or trespass against the rights of the mortgagee for which he could maintain an action. The mortgagee’s rights are fully protected by the law. Purchasers of the property at the attachment sale acquire the property subject to the mortgage lien of the mortgagee, and his remedy would be to follow the property with his prior lien into the hands of such purchasers. [Wright v. Henderson, 12 Tex. 43; Gilliam v. Henderson, 12 Tex. 47; Joost v. Seats, 19 Tex. 473; Belt v. Raguet, 27 Tex. 471.]

Reversed and remanded.
News United States Air Force
 DAF selects next locations for newest fightersPublished April 18, 2023
                        
                        
                        Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs
                **WASHINGTON (AFNS)  --**
                The Department of the Air Force selected the next bases to receive two of its newest fighters.Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, was selected as the preferred location to host the next F-35A Lightning II squadron and Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans and Fresno Air National Guard Base, California, will replace their F-15C/D Eagles with F-15EX Strike Eagles.The new squadrons will consist of 18 F-35As at Barnes ANGB and 18 F-15EXs each at both Fresno ANGB and NAS JRB New Orleans.The decision to host the next F-35As and the F-15EXs at their respective bases came after conducting site surveys at each location, assessing the location’s ability to facilitate the mission and infrastructure capacity, while accounting for community support, environmental factors and cost.The Department of the Air Force will conduct environmental impact analyses at each base, which are expected to be completed in spring 2024 before a final decision is made.LR 



USAF 



AF 



Air Force 



Fighters 



Barnes ANGB 



NAS JRB New Orleans 



Fresno ANGB 



F-35A 



Lightning II 



modernization 



Aircraft 



F-15 



eagle 



Strike Eagle
[No. 18255-0-III.

Division Three.

May 18, 2000.]

#### *In the Matter of the Marriage of*Rufus Dean Rains, *Appellant,*and Sonia Berman Rains, *Respondent.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 96-3-01836-6, Kathleen M. O’Connor, J., entered January 20, 1999. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Kurtz, C.J., concurred in by Brown and Kato, JJ.
Order entered August 1 , 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05
- 13
- 00004
- CR JAQUALYN JACKSON, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11
- 41279
- J 

### O RDER
The Court REINSTATE S the appeal. On June 19, 2013, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding why appellant’s brief has not been filed. We ADOPT the findings that: (1) appellant desires to pursue the appeal; (2) appellant is indigent and represented by the Dallas County Public Defender’s Office; (3) Kathleen Walsh explained that the delay in filing appellant’s brief is her workload and also stated she would be attending the Advanced Criminal Law Seminar July 22 th rough 25, 2013; and (4) Ms. Walsh requested thirty days from July 10, 2013 to file appellant’s brief.
We ORDER appellant to file her brief by MONDAY, AUGUST 12, 2013 . We note the brief is already more than two months overdue and appellant has previously be en granted a thirty

- day extension of time to file the brief. Therefore, if appellant’s brief is not filed by the datespecified, the Court will order Kathleen Walsh and the Dallas County Public Defender’s Office removed as counsel and will order the trial court to appoint new counsel to represent appellant in this appeal.
We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to the Honorable Gracie Lewis, Presiding Judge, Criminal District Court No. 3; Katherine Drew, Appellate

- Chief , Dallas County Public Defender’s Office; Kathleen Walsh, Dallas County Public Defender’s Office; and Michael Casillas, Dallas County District Attorney’s Office.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 81 (Tuesday, May 16, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1045]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

    CONGRATULATORY REMARKS FOR MISS CHELSI SMITH, MISS UNIVERSE 1995

                                 ______

                            HON. KEN BENTSEN

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                          Tuesday, May 16, 1995

  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize Miss Chelsi Smith 
who was crowned Miss Universe on May 12, 1995, in Namibia, South 
Africa. Miss Smith has become an inspirational figure to young people 
across the world.
  Chelsi Smith represented the State of Texas at the Miss USA 
competition in 1995. Upon her award, she continued her duties in South 
Africa where she represented the United States of America in the Miss 
Universe competition. Of the 82 contestants Chelsi Smith, of Deer Park, 
TX, has become the sixth Miss USA to be honored with the title of Miss 
Universe.
  Miss Smith, a 21-year-old woman, was raised in Deer Park, TX, were 
she graduated from Deer Park High School in 1991. She is a sophomore at 
San Jacinto Community College, were she intends to complete her studies 
in early childhood education after fulfilling her reign as Miss 
Universe.
  Chelsi has worked to raise the awareness of racial issues and has 
served as a motivational spokesperson to the youth of America.
  I congratulate Miss Chelsi Smith on her award of Miss Universe. I 
wish her well as she continues to represent the United States of 
America and the State of Texas. I am very proud that a fellow Texan has 
so well represented our Nation. It is with great pride that I extend my 
congratulations to Miss Smith for her important victory.

                          ____________________
```
[No. 24439-0-II.

Division Two.

May 26, 2000.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. John Robert Fencl, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Cowlitz County, No. 98-1-00883-8, Stephen M. Warning, J., entered February 19, 1999. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Morgan, J., concurred in by Armstrong, C.J., and Hunt, J.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 97-20083

Summary Calendar

____________________

JO ANN BOWEN RUSSU,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE CITY OF HOUSTON,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-95-CV-4040)

_________________________________________________________________

November 17, 1997

Before SMITH, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jo Ann Bowen Russu appeals a summary judgment dismissing her

gender and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, and her age and retaliation claims under

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.

Pursuant to our de novo review of the record, we AFFIRM for

essentially the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion
granting summary judgment. See City of Houston v. Russu, No. H-95-

CV-4040 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 1996) (unpublished).

AFFIRMED
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 402 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 402

To provide for the addition of certain real property to the reservation 
              of the Siletz Tribe in the State of Oregon.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 28, 2013

Mr. Wyden (for himself and Mr. Merkley) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide for the addition of certain real property to the reservation 
              of the Siletz Tribe in the State of Oregon.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PROPERTY OF THE SILETZ TRIBE OF THE 
              STATE OF OREGON.

    Section 7 of the Siletz Tribe Indian Restoration Act (25 U.S.C. 
711e) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(f) Treatment of Certain Property.--
            ``(1) In general.--
                    ``(A) Title.--The Secretary may accept title to any 
                additional number of acres of real property located 
                within the boundaries of the original 1855 Siletz Coast 
                Reservation established by Executive Order dated 
                November 9, 1855, comprised of land within the 
                political boundaries of Benton, Douglas, Lane, Lincoln, 
                Tillamook, and Yamhill Counties in the State of Oregon, 
                if that real property is conveyed or otherwise 
                transferred to the United States by or on behalf of the 
                tribe.
                    ``(B) Trust.--Land to which title is accepted by 
                the Secretary under this paragraph shall be held in 
                trust by the United States for the benefit of the 
                tribe.
            ``(2) Treatment as part of reservation.--All real property 
        that is taken into trust under paragraph (1) shall--
                    ``(A) be considered and evaluated as an on-
                reservation acquisition under part 151.10 of title 25, 
                Code of Federal Regulations (or successor regulations); 
                and
                    ``(B) become part of the reservation of the tribe.
            ``(3) Prohibition on gaming.--Any real property taken into 
        trust under paragraph (1) shall not be eligible, or used, for 
        any gaming activity carried out under the Indian Gaming 
        Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.).''.
                                 <all>
```
#### The Singer Manufacturing Co. v. The Herman Herschlerode Manufacturing Co.

(No. —, Tex. L. J., vol. 3, p. 646.)

Appeal from Harris County.

March 20, 1880.

Opinion by

Winkler, J.

§ 741. *A judgment once satisfied in full will not support another execution.*The judgment was paid off and discharged by a satisfactory arrangement between counsel representing the judgment creditors and the original defendants, Lubbock & Son. It was also shown that plaintiffs’ counsel was satisfied with and accepted the arrangement of settlement, and refused to proceed with an execution to enforce the collection of the judgment by the levy of the execution enjoined in the present suit, for the reason that the judgment had been paid. It seems, further, that the judgment creditor instructed the sheriff not to proceed with an attempt to enforce its collection by levy and sale of the property of appellants. To our minds, the insurmountable obstacle in the way of the appellees is the fact that the judgment upon which the execution rests is paid, and, for aught that is made to appear, the judgment is *functus officio,*and will not support the execution. The case seems to have proceeded at the trial on the idea that Lubbock & Son bore some such relation to the original judgment as would entitle them over to relief against the sureties of the intervenor, Smith, by subrogation, they having paid the judgment. We fail to find that they stood in such relation.

Eeversed and remanded.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-6532

TERRY WILLIAM GREEN, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RANDALL LEE, Respondent - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (CA-00-59) Submitted: June 15, 2000 Decided: June 26, 2000Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Terry William Green, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Terry William Green seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Green v. Lee , No. CA-00-59 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2000). We dispense with oral argument becausethe facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
November 18, 2014

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

AZUBUINE ESIABA, Appellant

NO. 14-13-00357-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. 

Having considered the record, this Court holds that there was no error in the 

judgment. The Court orders the judgment AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.