J-S83041-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDREW NORMAN WHITE,

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1098 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered July 10, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-CR-0000791-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 15, 2019

Andrew Norman White (“White”), pro se, appeals from the Order

denying his pro se “Petition for Modification of Sentence,” which the common 

pleas court treated as a second Petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”).1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

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1 The PCRA court properly treated White’s Petition as a PCRA Petition, and we 

will therefore refer to it as such. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 

516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that this Court has “repeatedly held that 

any petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated 

as a PCRA petition.”) (citation and ellipses omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating 

that “[u]nder the plain words of the [PCRA], if the underlying substantive 

claim is one that could potentially be remedied under the PCRA, that claim is 

exclusive to the PCRA.” (emphasis in original)).
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Following White’s negotiated plea of guilty to sexual assault and attempt 

to commit indecent assault,2the trial court sentenced him, on June 7, 2016,

to an aggregate term of 42 to 84 months in prison.

3

 Notably to the instant 

appeal, the trial court informed White at the time of sentencing that he was 

not eligible for the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive (“RRRI”) program.4 

White thereafter filed several pro se post-sentence filings. On October 

11, 2016, White filed a pro se “Motion to Vacate,” which the PCRA court 

treated as a first PCRA Petition. In response, the PCRA court appointed White 

PCRA counsel, who filed an Amended PCRA Petition. White later filed a Motion 

to withdraw his PCRA Petition, which the PCRA court granted.

On June 13, 2018, White filed the instant pro se PCRA Petition, 

requesting a “modification” to his sentence based upon a perceived change in 

the rules applicable to RRRI. Specifically, White asserted that he was entitled 

to this relief pursuant to the then-recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme 

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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3124.1, 901(a).

3 The sentences were at the low end of the applicable standard sentencing 

guidelines ranges. Moreover, as a result of his convictions, White was required 

to register as a sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offenders Registration and 

Notification Act (“SORNA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41 (amended 

Feb. 21, 2018).

4 See 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4501-4512. The RRRI Act “is intended to encourage 

eligible offenders to complete Department of Corrections programs that are 

designed to reduce recidivism. See 61 Pa.C.S. §§ 4502, 4504(b). Eligible 

offenders may also be able to take advantage of a reduced sentence. See

id. § 4505(c).” Commonwealth v. Cullen-Doyle, 164 A.3d 1239, 1240 (Pa.

2017).
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Court in Cullen-Doyle (decided July 20, 2017) (holding that a single firstdegree burglary conviction was insufficient to evidence a history of present or 

past violent behavior such that the defendant was ineligible for RRRI).

By an Order entered on July 10, 2018, the PCRA court denied the 

Petition without a hearing. In its Order, the PCRA court determined that even 

if it possessed jurisdiction to reach the merits of White’s claim, Cullen-Doyle

is inapposite, and White was not RRRI-eligible at the time of sentencing on 

the basis that he was convicted of an offense that made him statutorilyineligible. White timely filed a Notice of appeal, followed by a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal. The 

PCRA court then issued a Rule 1925(a) Opinion.

White now presents the following questions for our review:

1.) Is [White] eligible for relief from the Crawford County Court[]

for R.R.R.I. based on “Newly Discovered” information on prior 

“criminal history[,]” under the Supreme Court ruling under []

Cullen-Doyle...?

2.) Is [White] eligible for consideration for R.R.R.I. relief under

Cullen-Doyle based on the “Newly Discovered” information 

clause under Com[monwealth] v[.] Brandon[,] 51 A[.]3d 

231 [(Pa. Super. 2012),] and Com[monwealth] v[.]

Smith[,] 35 A[.]3d 766 [(Pa. Super. 2011)]?

3.) Did the Crawford County Court[] err[] and abuse [its] 

discretion for not granting [White] relief based on the 

Supreme Court ruling in Cullen-Doyle?

Brief for Appellant at 2. As White’s issues are closely related, we will address 

them simultaneously.
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Initially, we note that the Argument section of White’s brief consists of 

only two sentences, cites to only one case (Cullen-Doyle), and does not 

correspond with the three issues set forth in his above-listed Statement of 

Questions Presented. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also Commonwealth v. 

Long, 753 A.2d 272, 279 (Pa. Super. 2000). However, we will overlook these

defects, and briefly address White’s claims, to the extent that we can discern 

them. See Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014) 

(acknowledging that this Court may liberally construe materials filed by a pro 

se litigant). White contends that the PCRA court erred in determining that 

Cullen-Doyle was of no avail to him, and that he was per se ineligible for 

RRRI consideration. Brief for Appellant at 6; see also id. (asserting that 

White had no prior criminal history and was not found to be a sexually violent 

predator).

Any PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Here, White’s instant

Petition is facially untimely, as he filed it approximately two years after his 

judgment of sentence became final. Furthermore, because White did not 

acknowledge the untimeliness of his Petition or invoke any of the three 

exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), the 

PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of his claim. See

Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1215 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) 
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(stating that “Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear 

an untimely PCRA petition.” (citation omitted)).

Nevertheless, even if the PCRA court had jurisdiction to address the 

merits of White’s claim,5 we would determine that the court properly rejected 

it,

6 and in so holding, adopt the following sound rationale in the PCRA court’s

Opinion:

[White] was convicted of, inter alia, Sexual Assault, located at 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3124.1. Sexual Assault is enumerated under [the] RRRI

[Act] as an offense rendering a [d]efendant per se ineligible for 

the RRRI program. [See 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503(4) (setting forth the 

definition of an “eligible offender” under the RRRI Act).] Not only 

is Sexual Assault an offense for which SORNA registration is

required, Sexual Assault is arguably a personal injury crime as 

described in the “Crime Victim’s Act[,]” [see 18 P.S. § 11.101 et

seq.; see also 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503(3) (providing that an RRRIeligible offender “[h]as not been found guilty of or previously 

convicted of ... a personal injury crime as defined under ... the 

Crime Victims Act....”).] Accordingly, the fact that [White] does 

not have a “history of past or present violent behavior[,]” see 

Cullen-Doyle, 164 A.3d at 1240, is irrelevant. [White] is per se 

ineligible for RRRI because he was convicted of Sexual Assault, 

which automatically disqualified him from participation in the 

program.

In fact, in Cullen-Doyle, the [Supreme C]ourt

“acknowledge[d] that Section 4503 prescribes that individuals 

who have been convicted of certain enumerated offenses are 

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5

It could be argued that White, in citing the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Cullen-Doyle, was inexpertly attempting to invoke the newly-recognized 

constitutional right timeliness exception, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(iii). 

6 “In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). 
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ineligible for participation in the [RRRI] program. See 61 Pa.C.S. 

§ 4503 ....” [Cullen-Doyle, 164 A.3d at 1243]. Here, CullenDoyle supports the fact that [White] is per se ineligible because 

of his Sexual Assault conviction.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/27/18, at 2 (unnumbered, emphasis added).

Accordingly, as none of White’s issues entitle him to relief, and we 

discern no error by the PCRA court, we affirm the Order denying White’s 

second PCRA Petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/15/2019