J-S40015-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL DRENNON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2040 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 30, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004547-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL DRENNON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2041 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 30, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004548-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL DRENNON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2042 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 30, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000850-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.
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MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 7, 2023

Michael Drennon appeals1from the judgment of sentence imposed 

following his convictions in three cases of two counts of first-degree murder, 

three counts of possession of an instrument of crime, and one count each of

attempted murder, aggravated assault, carrying a firearm without a license, 

carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a); 907; 

901; 2702(a); 6106; 6108. Drennon argues that the verdicts were against the 

weight of the evidence; the evidence was insufficient to support the 

convictions; the trial court erred in consolidating the cases; the trial court 

erred in admitting evidence; the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

admit evidence of prior crimes by one of the victims; and the trial court erred 

in denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm.

The trial court set forth an extensive recitation of the underlying facts 

involving the attempted murder of James Crawford and the murders of Renee 

____________________________________________

1 We note that Drennon filed three separate notices of appeal, which each 

listed all three docket numbers but included a check mark next to the trial 

docket number at issue. Despite citing to all three docket numbers in each 

notice of appeal, we conclude that Drennon complied with Commonwealth 

v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 976 (Pa. 2018) (holding that appellants are 

required to file separate notices of appeal when a single order resolves issues 

arising on more than one lower court docket), by filing separate notices of 

appeal, and the appeals need not be quashed. See Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (even if appellant 

lists multiple trial court docket numbers on notices of appeal, appeals need 

not be quashed because the appellant files an appropriate number of notices 

of appeal). Moreover, this Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals on 

February 18, 2022.
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Cosom and Adeline Hill, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 2-12.

Briefly, Drennon was living with his paramour, Cosom. Cosom obtained 

a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order against Crawford, her ex-boyfriend. 

Notably, following the PFA hearing, Drennon threatened to kill Crawford. As a 

result, Crawford obtained a restraining order against Cosom and Drennon; 

however, police offers were unable to serve the order. 

On December 23, 2016, Crawford drove to Cosom’s house and alerted 

the police to Cosom’s and Drennon’s location. After Drennon observed 

Crawford sitting in a SUV, he approached Crawford and fired multiple shots 

into the driver’s side window. Crawford suffered gunshot wounds to his face 

and his shoulder. The police arrested Drennon, and the Commonwealth 

charged him with, inter alia, attempted murder, aggravated assault, violations 

of the Uniform Firearms Act, and possession of an instrument of crime. The 

trial court placed Drennon on house arrest at Cosom’s home pending trial.

On January 29, 2018, police officers arrived at Cosom’s home to find 

the dead bodies of Cosom and her mother, Hill, who had both been shot in 

the head. Drennon was at the home at the time of the shooting and insisted 

that two males, including Crawford, had entered the home and killed the two 

women. The police found a .38 special revolver containing three live rounds 

and two fired cartridges in a bedroom in the home. Subsequently, police 

officers took Drennon to the homicide unit around midnight on January 30, 
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2018. The detectives began interviewing Drennon at 6:10 a.m. and first read 

Drennon his Miranda2rights. Drennon indicated that he was willing to give 

information and that he did not want the presence of an attorney. Drennon 

was given several opportunities to use the bathroom, eat, and smoke 

cigarettes, and Drennon slept for about 9 hours. The detectives were also 

aware that Drennon was on house arrest for the attempted murder of 

Crawford but did not ask questions regarding that case. In total, Drennon 

spent 32 hours in the interrogation room. 

The police eventually arrested Drennon for both murders, and the 

Commonwealth charged him with two counts of first-degree murder and 

possession of an instrument of crime. The Commonwealth filed a motion to 

consolidate the trials, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, Drennon filed 

a motion to suppress his statements to the police. Following a hearing, the 

trial court denied the motion.

Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine, seeking the 

introduction of a self-recorded video taken from Drennon’s phone

approximately two weeks before he shot Crawford. The video shows Drennon 

rapping a song he had written about wanting to shoot someone in the face. 

The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion. The Commonwealth also 

filed a motion in limine to admit Cosom’s personal daily planner, wherein she 

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2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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noted several days on which Drennon assaulted her. The trial court denied 

this motion.

The cases proceeded to a jury trial. Notably, during trial, Drennon 

moved to admit portions of Cosom’s statements to detectives after Crawford’s 

shooting, in which she stated Crawford had been violent toward her and had 

threatened to kill her. Because Drennon introduced this evidence, the trial 

court allowed the Commonwealth rebuttal evidence in the form of Cosom’s 

daily planner to suggest Cosom also feared Drennon. Ultimately, the jury 

found Drennon guilty of the above crimes. Prior to sentencing, Drennon orally 

raised a weight of the evidence challenge, which the trial court denied. 

Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Drennon to life imprisonment without 

parole. Drennon filed a timely appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement.3

On appeal, Drennon raises the following questions for our review:

1. Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence?

2. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the [Drennon’s] guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt for each offense?

3. Did the trial court err when it granted the Commonwealth’s 

Motion to Consolidate?

4. Did the trial court err when it denied the [Drennon’s] Motion to 

Suppress his videotaped statement to police?

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3 We note that after filing the appellate brief, Drennon’s counsel sought leave 

to withdraw as counsel. This Court denied the application.
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5. Did the trial court err when it admitted the [Drennon’s] selfrecorded video into evidence?

6. Did the trial court err when it allowed decedent Renee Cosom’s 

unauthenticated diary into evidence?

7. Did the trial court err when it denied the [Drennon’s] motion in 

limine to admit James Crawford’s multiple crimen falsi and 

harassment/stalking convictions into evidence[?]

8. Did the trial court err when it denied the [Drennon’s] motion 

for a mistrial after the Commonwealth introduced forensic 

testimony contrary to previously elicited testimony[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

In his first claim, Drennon contends that the verdicts of attempted 

murder and aggravated assault relating to the shooting of Crawford and firstdegree murder relating to the murders of Cosom and Hill were against the 

weight of the evidence. See id. at 15-16. Drennon argues that he shot 

Crawford in self-defense and that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden 

to disprove self-defense. See id. Drennon asserts that the trial court 

erroneously relied on his statement to the police that he “lost it” as evidence 

of specific intent to kill, noting that had Crawford been killed, that statement 

would have supported a voluntary manslaughter charge. See id. at 16. 

Additionally, Drennon claims that Crawford killed Cosom and Hill, highlighting 

that Crawford had previously threatened Cosom. See id.

Here, the trial court set forth the relevant standard of review and 

concluded that the verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence. See 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 12-15. The trial court found that Drennon’s 
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statement that he “lost it” with Crawford, in conjunction with other evidence, 

established that he did not act in self-defense. See id. at 13; see also 

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1136 (Pa. 2011) (concluding that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s weight 

challenge where the jury did not find appellant’s self-serving testimony 

credible, and the evidence established that appellant was the aggressor when 

he fired his gun multiple times). Further, the trial court concluded that the 

credible evidence established that Drennon, not Crawford, killed Cosom and 

Hill. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 13-15. We agree with the trial court’s 

sound analysis and affirm on this basis. See id. at 12-15.

In his second claim, Drennon contends that the evidence was insufficient 

to support his convictions. See Appellant’s Brief at 16-17. The entirety of 

Drennon’s argument is as follows:

a. As to the attempted murder and aggravated assault of []

Crawford, the Commonwealth presented no evidence to 

disprove the Defendant’s self-defense claim beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

b. As to [] Cosom and [] Hill, the evidence was insufficient to find 

the Defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. As 

the evidence was insufficient to find [Drennon] guilty of firstdegree murder, the evidence could not have been sufficient to 

sustain convictions on firearm offenses used during the 

commission of the murders.

Id. at 17.

As preliminary matter, in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement, 

Drennon merely states that “[t]he verdict was not sufficient to establish the 
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Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for each offense.” Concise 

Statement, 10/28/21, at 1 (unnumbered). The statement fails to specify the 

convictions or element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient; 

thus, the claim is waived. See Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 260 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that to preserve a sufficiency claim, “the 1925(b)

statement needs to specify the element or elements upon which the evidence 

was insufficient.” (citation omitted)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) 

(requiring a Rule 1925(b) statement to “concisely identify each error that the 

appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be 

raised for the judge”). Likewise, Drennon’s appellate brief is woefully 

inadequate, as he fails to cite any relevant authority and merely provides 

conclusory statements that he is entitled to relief. See Commonwealth v. 

Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“The failure to develop 

an adequate argument in an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim 

under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.”). 

However, even if we found that Drennon preserved his sufficiency claim, 

we would conclude that his claim is without merit based upon the trial court’s 

sound reasoning in its opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 15-20. 

Therefore, Drennon is not entitled to relief on his second claim. See id.

In his third claim, Drennon argues that the trial court erred in granting 

the Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate the cases. See Appellant’s Brief at 

17-18. In support, Drennon merely claims that he “suffered clear prejudice, 
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as the attempted murder of [] Crawford by firearm illustrated a propensity for 

violence that effectively assured convictions for gun-related homicide. That 

the incidents took place in 2016 and 2018, respectively, suggest no temporal

connection that could have supported joinder.” Id. (citation omitted).

Additionally, Drennon baldly contends that if the cases were properly joined, 

he should have been entitled to counsel during questioning regarding the 

murders of Hill and Cosom. See id. at 18.

Again, Drennon’s argument is poorly developed, and he fails to establish 

through any citation to record or relevant case law that the trial court abused 

its discretion in consolidating the cases. See Freeman, 128 A.3d at 1249.

Nevertheless, upon reviewing Drennon’s argument, we conclude that it is 

without merit based upon the sound reasoning of the trial court. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 20-22. In sum, the attempted murder and double 

homicide cases included evidence concerning Cosom’s relationships with 

Crawford and Drennon and allowed the jury to observe the development of 

the facts of the case, including that Drennon blamed Crawford for the double 

homicide. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1150 (Pa. 

Super. 2020) (en banc) (noting the Commonwealth’s policy to encourage 

joinder, especially where “the result will be to avoid the expensive and time

consuming duplication of evidence.” (citation omitted)). Drennon fails to

demonstrate that the jury could not distinguish between the cases or that he 

was prejudiced by the consolidation. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 20-
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22. Finally, as noted above, Drennon has not demonstrated through any 

citation to authority that the detectives’ questioning of him relating to the 

murders of Cosom and Hill prevented the consolidation of cases. Regardless, 

we note that the detectives did not question Drennon regarding the attempted 

murder of Crawford, and the trial court specifically rejected Drennon’s claim 

regarding counsel during questioning following the double homicide. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 26-27 (finding the evidence established that 

Drennon knowingly and unequivocally waived his right to have counsel present 

during the questioning). Therefore, Drennon’s third claim is without merit.

In his fourth claim, Drennon contends that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress his videotaped statements to the detectives. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 18-20. Drennon argues that his statements to the 

police were not voluntary, because although he could eat and use the 

restroom, the interrogation lasted over 30 hours and took a physical and 

mental toll on him. See id. at 19. Additionally, Drennon claims that his 

statements were not voluntary because he was represented by counsel on his 

attempted murder of Crawford case and any questioning conducted on the 

intersecting attempted murder and the double homicide cases was done in 

violation of Miranda and the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 18-19.

Here, in his concise statement, Drennon argues that “[t]he trial court 

erred in denying [Drennon’s] Motion to Suppress his video-taped statement.” 

Concise Statement, 10/28/21, at 1 (unnumbered). The trial court found that 
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Drennon raised three distinct claims in his motion to suppress; however, 

Drennon’s vague claim in his concise statement does not specify which of the 

trial court’s suppression rulings he is challenging. See Trial Court Opinion, 

1/12/22, at 22-23. Thus, Drennon waived his claim. See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(ii). 

Nevertheless, even if Drennon properly preserved his claim on appeal, 

we would conclude that it is without merit based upon the sound reasoning of 

the trial court. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 23-27; see also 

Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1252 (Pa. 2013) (noting that the 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until a prosecution has 

commenced “whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 

indictment, information, or arraignment.”). We adopt the sound reasoning of 

the trial court for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, 

at 23-27.

In his fifth claim, Drennon baldly contends that the trial court erred in 

admitting his “arguably relevant” rap video recorded on his phone at trial.

Appellant’s Brief at 20. Drennon argues that even if the video was relevant, it 

was manifestly unreasonable and prejudicial. See id. According to Drennon, 

a reasonable jury could not have set aside the contents of the video when 

considering the charges against him. See id.

Here, the trial court addressed Drennon’s claim and concluded that it is 

without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 27-30. Drennon has not 
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established through any reasoned analysis or citation to case law that the trial 

court abused its discretion in determining that the video’s probative value 

outweighs the risk of undue prejudice. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (noting that an 

argument must include a pertinent discussion and citation to authorities). 

Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s sound analysis. See 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 27-30.

In his sixth claim, Drennon baldly argues that the trial court should not 

have admitted into evidence Cosom’s unauthenticated planner, which 

suggested that their relationship was violent. See Appellant’s Brief at 20. 

Drennon asserts that seeking admission of Cosom’s statement to the police, 

which illustrated fear of Crawford, did not require rebuttal evidence by way of

Cosom’s diary. See id.

“With regard to the admission of evidence, we give the trial court broad 

discretion, and we will only reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or deny 

evidence on a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Lang, 275 A.3d 1072, 1077-78 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citation omitted).

The trial court addressed this claim and concluded that because Drennon 

successfully admitting portions of Cosom’s statements to police after the 

shooting of Crawford, wherein she indicated Crawford had threatened to kill 

her, the Commonwealth could introduce rebuttal evidence in the form of her 

statements in her planner that she feared Drennon as well. See Trial Court 
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Opinion, 1/12/22, at 30-32. Based upon our review of the record, and 

Drennon’s failure to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting the evidence, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. See 

id. Furthermore, although Drennon states that Cosom’s planner was 

unauthenticated, he has not set forth any argument to establish that the 

Commonwealth failed to authenticate the planner. Accordingly, Drennon’s 

sixth claim is without merit. 

In his seventh claim, Drennon claims that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion in limine to admit Crawford’s multiple prior 

convictions, including those “going back thirty years.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. 

The trial court addressed Drennon’s argument, finding that he was 

permitted to impeach Crawford with prior convictions. See Trial Court Opinion, 

1/12/22, at 32-33. The trial court further noted that it excluded some of 

Crawford’s prior convictions because they were more than ten years old. See 

id. at 33 (citing Pa.R.E. 609(b)(1) (stating that “if more than 10 years have 

passed since the witness’s conviction or release from confinement for it, 

whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible only if ... its 

probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect[.]”)). Drennon 

does not demonstrate that the probative value of the older convictions 

outweighed the prejudicial effect. Therefore, we agree with the reasoning of 

the trial court and affirm on this basis. See id.
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In his final claim, Drennon contends that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for a mistrial. See Appellant’s Brief at 21. Drennon merely claims 

that testimony from Hung Le, a scientific expert, was then contradicted by a 

detective’s testimony. See id.

Preliminarily, Drennon’s argument is poorly constructed, as he does not 

identify the testimony that was contradicted or cite to the trial transcript to 

support his claim; thus, it is waived on appeal. See Freeman, 128 A.3d at 

1249. Nevertheless, the trial court addressed Drennon’s claim and concluded 

that it is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 33-34. We agree 

and affirm on this basis.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/7/2023