alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

RENTECH NITROGEN PARTNERS, L.P.

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report of Rentech Nitrogen Partners, L.P. (the Partnership) on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Keith B. Forman, Chief Executive Officer of the general partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Partnership as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                         |  |  |  |  |  |                        
|------------------------ |  |  |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Dated: December 29, 2014 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ Keith B. Forman    
|                         |  |  |  |  |  | Keith B. Forman        
|                         |  |  |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer

This certification accompanies the report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be
deemed filed by the Partnership for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
OFFICE OF THEATTORNEY GENERAL OFTEXAS **AUSTIN**

Honorable 

### Jca Z. 2isbrr, 

### District &tcIn*y hl hl@6tin4, %X46

.be4il6UbEittPd 

### $0U6. 

# ttw **that the**  **pcpula t**  it *OUl& 666¶5 to, fX&S6iOn4r6' COUXt 010 oulary In ad&ition to In addition to the raer ot hs Com~l66~onar6* court 8 salary ths tea per omt of $ 88 this amaunt does **not**

anaea under Artiole r **oent** frou.the

you that the Co~rdsoionera’ Court night pay the 4ount t446 O? OfflO 6y OD CS-OitiCiO 6&ihl'y illM48itiOn t0 th4 4~ sot exaee6 

### the%axtm.u&.a&i aalarp ia aaaltion~to tha f6tr a006 The county **attorney oould**  **?&em**hlra **hi8 OWE** 6tUnoqIlrpher,and pay,b4r kiim6eif, **but** -6 **ik** not b41iW4 **that** tbors atatutac ref6b4d to iuthorizo **the** Cozmlcsionar8* Court to 86t Mid6 ton per oeat of tbe adinpu4nt t&ix46 or say otbar amount to ?aaothe odary of a 6tsrOtrapber for tba county attornsy.

### Eon. Jos. 2. r'isber,?a,-t 8



### -e are *able to asa howa 

### oounty 00~16enter into r contract cr agroemsnt to aet **46lda** ten per sent of the delinquent tax66 to pay the sclary of a etrnographer rcr the oounty attorney w:thout oaid

### agreement being incorporated in,and becoming 4part Of, a au&tract entered intobetweea the oouty and scmoone 

### to otrlleot dslinquent taxas. is stated in an ophiion, 

### bytbe EGX. 

### Giem **R**i:tWiS,** sddrsoso4 to you CC =une 12, 1939, wblob **~4 quote.**  13 part as ~ollow6:

"Articla 7XXia, Revlscd Civil Xstutu6, places at)rtaln llnAtatl.:nsupon such **po*:car** ic 

### contract,. A6 said Sy the **Coztrds6ion** of 

### kppsais in the 

### caac cf asterwo:rd vs. f",cnderson

County, 62 -. i.. 

### (2d) 66, 

### *Thepower to provic;efor tba coll4otlor ofdelinquent tare6 and preecrlba the ocxpancatloc tobe pald for servlasa rend4r6d In tLat respect resides erolusivcly in 

### the Legislature exoept as given by statute a 'acmdssioner61 oourt ia'&eriens to contract in tho respsats 

### mxitionsd.~w
It 13, tb.eretore,cur oplnlon thet the 

### Coxz5sslonorsq Court ;rfjasper County **doe6** not have tts autborlty to set saida **354~** per cent of the d4linCuont tax46 belonging to the oountp topay the salary oi a etenographer for the oounty attorney to6s6i6t In thetiling of dellngtent tax 8tit6.

~;etrust that thisanrmora your inquiry, **vi6** ac4 Very truly your6 grTDIzL:::.Y

GF.rfRAL03 TSXAE i,

By 3&Ccib@ * 4issiatent FCC: s
COMMOTEE
| (logo) WELLS  FARGO | **Commercial  Mortgage Servicing**D1050-084,  8th Floor  401 South Tryon St.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE**

** **

Reference is herebymade to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of August 1,2011, by and among Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation, asDepositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, MidlandLoan Services, A Division of PNC Bank, NA, as a Pooled Special Servicer, WellsFargo Bank, National Association, as Providence Place Mall Loan SpecialServicer, U.S. Bank, National Association, as Trustee, Wells Fargo Bank,National Association, as Certificate Administrator, Paying Agent and Custodian,and Trimont Real Estate Advisors, Inc., as Operating Advisor, with respect toCommercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series DBUBS 2011-LC3 (the"Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise definedshall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section10.11 of this Agreement, Daniel Marthinsen, Managing Director of SpecialServicing and Timothy S. Ryan, Managing Director of Customer RelationshipManagement, do hereby certify that:

 

1. A review of theactivities of the Providence Place Mall Loan Special Servicer during the periodfrom January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017 (the “Reporting Period”), and ofits performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision, and

 

2. To the best ofmy knowledge, based on such review, the Providence Place Mall Loan SpecialServicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in allmaterial respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28th day of February2018.

 

 

/s/ DanielMarthinsen

Daniel Marthinsen

Managing Director

Wells Fargo Bank

 

/s/Timothy S. Ryan

TimothyS. Ryan

ManagingDirector

WellsFargo Bank

 

 

| Wells  Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo)  Together we’ll go far |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-2492

STERLING L. JENNINGS; DEIRDRE D. JENNINGS,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

ROUNDPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING CORPORATION; EQUITY 

TRUSTEES, LLC,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District Judge. (2:17-cv-00427-RBS-RJK)

Submitted: April 4, 2019 Decided: April 8, 2019

Before NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sterling L. Jennings, Deirdre D. Jennings, Appellants Pro Se. David M. Gettings, 

TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Robert Ryan Michael, BWW 

LAW GROUP, LLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Sterling L. Jennings and Deirdre D. Jennings seek to appeal the district court’s 

order granting summary judgment to one of the two defendants in their action seeking 

compensatory damages and rescission of the foreclosure of their home. This court may 

exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain 

interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); 

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). The order that the 

Jenningses seek to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or 

collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED
[No. 43442-0-I.

Division One.

May 8, 2000.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Earl Ray Harleaux, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 98-8-00614-7, Patricia Hall Clark, J., entered September 16, 1998. *Dismissed*by unpublished per curiam opinion.
[No. 24280-0-II.

Division Two.

March 31, 2000.]

#### *In the Matter of the Detention of*John H. Mathers, *Appellant,*and The State of Washington, *Respondent.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 96-2-07023-3, Grant L. Anderson, J, entered November 24, 1998. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Armstrong, J., concurred in by Bridgewater, C.J., and Morgan, J. Now published at 100 Wn. App. 336.
News United States Air Force
 Moody Airmen host riot training for local state troopersPublished Nov. 22, 2016
                        
                        By Airman 1st Class Daniel Snider
                        
                        
                        23rd Wing Public Affairs
                **MOODY AIR FORCE BASE, Ga. (AFNS)  --**
                Airmen from Moody Air Force Base hosted Georgia State Patrol’s Mobile Field Force semiannual riot control training here Nov. 16-17.The GSP used Moody’s facilities to ensure their readiness for riots while Airmen supported by participating as rioters. The training consisted of both classroom and outdoor portions.“In this day and age, we’re going to have peaceful protests, and we’re all about that,” said GSP Capt. Kevin Rexroat, the Troop H commander. “Unfortunately, we’re also going to have some agitators in every peaceful protest. This training gives the troopers a scenario to know what they’re looking for, how to engage and let the rest of the peaceful protesters get their word out.”Moody facilitated this training by providing the Military Operations in Urban Terrain village, a training area consisting of buildings, obstacles and gravel roads.“Sometimes, we don’t have the luxury of a facility like this,” Rexroat said. “Most of the places we’ve (trained) have been generally flat areas, such as airport hangars and taxiways. This facility gives us a more realistic scenario of what we’re facing in real-word situations, and it is a great benefit to our troopers.”Not only did Moody AFB provide the MOUT village, but also added to the realistic environment by role-playing as rioters who yelled, protested and threw debris at the police officers.Rexroat explained how knowing steps and techniques of crowd control can only take you so far. When an actual person is yelling in the face of a police officer, he or she has to apply those skills in a high-stress atmosphere to keep the peace.“Most of the time, our goal is to have a command presence,” Rexroat said. “We show the command presence and dictate, just by being there. Our ultimate goal is to keep everything peaceful and not let anything get out of control.”Not only did having the Mobile Field Force train at Moody AFB aid the GSP, but it also allowed Airmen to see how their civilian counterparts conduct business.“We got to see what they can do and learn from them,” said Senior Airman Chester Montague, an 823rd Base Defense Squadron fire team member who acted as a riot role-player. “If they have proper training to handle situations like this, it better suits everyone else.”The GSP reciprocated Montague’s enthusiasm.“I hope this shows the public the collaborative effort of the military and civilian law enforcement -- that we work together as a team,” Rexroat said.joint 



Moody AFB 



Georgia State Patrol 



ACC 



training 



Riot
Order entered January 23 , 2023

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 22

- 00438

- CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellant

V.

BRADLEY SHAVERS , Appellee

On Appeal from the County C riminal Court No. 5

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. MC19

- A6636

O RDER

Appellee’s fourth motion for extension of time to file appellee’s brief is

GRANTED and we ORDER the brief received with the motion on January 20,

2023

, filed as of the date o f this order.

/s/ DENNISE GARCIA JUSTICE
No. 87-999.

#### McQuillen *v.*Wisconsin Education Association Council et al.

C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

This case presents the question whether a plaintiff may prevail on a disparate treatment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e *et seq.,*only by establishing that the employer’s discriminatory intent was the “but for” cause of the adverse employment action.

*915The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in this case that a Title VII plaintiff must prove that “the discriminatory motivation was a determining factor in the challenged employment decision in that the employee would have received the job absent the discriminatory motivation.” 830 F. 2d 659, 664 (1987). The court found support for this “but for” standard of causation in the language of Title VII, which prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee or potential employee *“because of*such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” § 2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added).

The Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the standard of causation adopted by the Eighth Circuit in *Bibbs*v. *Block,*778 F. 2d 1318 (1985) (en banc). A plaintiff can establish Title VII liability under *Bibbs*merely by proving that “an unlawful motive played some part in the employment decision.” *Id.,*at 1323. If the employer establishes that discriminatory intent was not the determinative factor in the employment decision, however, the plaintiff’s recovery is limited to declaratory relief, an injunction against future or continued discrimination, and partial attorney’s fees.

The Seventh Circuit’s view that Title VII liability is established only when an unlawful motive was the “but for” cause of the challenged employment action is shared by three other Circuits. See *Haskins*v. *United States Dept. of Army,*808 F. 2d 1192, 1198 (CA6), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 815 (1987); *Lewis*v. *University of Pittsburgh,*725 F. 2d 910, 915-916 (CA3 1983), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 892 (1984); *Mack*v. *Cape Elizabeth School Bd.,*553 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA1 1977). Two Circuits have indicated that the discriminatory motive must be a “significant” or “substantial” factor, but not necessarily the determinative factor, before liability may be imposed on an employer under Title VII. See *Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco,*741 F. 2d 1163, 1166 (CA9 1984); *Whiting*v. *Jackson State University,*616 F. 2d 116, 121 (CA5 1980).

Accordingly, in view of the divergent positions taken by the Federal Courts of Appeals with regard to the standard of causation to be applied in determining Title VII liability, I would grant certiorari.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

LAKESHA MCGRUDER,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 9 EM 2024

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 4

th day of June, 2024, the “Petition for King’s Bench Jurisdiction,” 

advanced by Mark Marvin, is DISMISSED.
Electronically Filed 

Supreme Court 

SCPW-14-0000786 

03-JUN-2014 

10:15 AM 

SCPW-14-0000786
 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
 

DIANA R. MACHADO, Petitioner-Defendant,
 

vs.
 

HONORABLE LLOYD VAN DE CAR, JUDGE OF THE FAMILY COURT OF THE


THIRD CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAII, Respondent Judge, 


and
 

JOHN A. MACHADO, Respondent-Plaintiff.
 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
 

(FC-D NO. 08-01-0037)
 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
 

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Pollack, and Wilson, JJ.)
 

Upon consideration of petitioner Diana R. Machado’s
 

petition for a writ of mandamus, filed on April 29, 2014, the
 

documents attached thereto and submitted in support thereof, and
 

the record, it appears that petitioner fails to demonstrate that
 

the respondent judge committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of
 

discretion by denying the motion to disqualify counsel inasmuch
 

as (1) petitioner was not a client of the law firm at the time of
 

the divorce proceeding as contemplated under HRPC Rule 1.7, 


(2) petitioner does not establish that the prior matter in which
 
the law firm represented petitioner and respondent is
 

substantially related to the current divorce matter, and 


(3) petitioner appears to have waived any conflict of interest 

objection. Petitioner, therefore, is not entitled to a writ of 

mandamus. See Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204-05, 982 P.2d 

334, 338-39 (1999) (a writ of mandamus is meant to restrain a 

judge of an inferior court who has exceeded his or her 

jurisdiction, has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of 

discretion, or has refused to act on a subject properly before 

the court under circumstances in which he or she has a legal duty 

to act); Otaka v. Klein, 71 Haw. 376, 386, 791 P.2d 713, 719 

(1980) (applying the “substantial relationship” test to review 

issues related to the disqualification of an attorney who is 

allegedly representing a party whose interests are adverse to 

those of the attorney’s former client); Straub Clinic & Hosp. v. 

Kochi, 81 Hawai'i 410, 415, 917 P.2d 1284, 1289 (1996) (the grant 

or denial of a motion for disqualification is within the 

discretion of the trial court). Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of 

mandamus is denied. 

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, June 3, 2014. 

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald 

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
 

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
 

/s/ Richard W. Pollack
 

/s/ Michael D. Wilson
 

2
ORIGINAL 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

DA 23-0668 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

CLAYTON DOUGLAS KIRN, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

ORDER 

Appellant Clayton Douglas Kirn, acting on his own behalf, moves this court for 

"new counsel" in this appeal. Kirn presently has appointed counsel, Chad M. Wright, from 

the Appellate Defender Division (ADD). Kirn appeals an October 2, 2023 Butte-Silver 

Bow County District Court Judgment and Order of Commitment after this Court remanded 

the matter "for a resentencing [] based on correct sentencing information." State v. Kirn, 

2023 MT 98, ¶ 59, 412 Mont. 309, 530 P.3d 1. 

Citing to various constitutional authority, rules, and case law, Kirn puts forth that 

he should have new counsel because of the communication difficulties and the difference 

in his and counsel's perspective of the appeal's success. Kirn contends that "a breakdown 

in the effective performance and communication" has occurred with present counsel. In 

requesting new counsel, Kirn "further [m]oves the Montana Supreme Court to assign [him] 

new counsel from outside of the Office of the Appellate Public Defender." 

This Court has no authority either to appoint "outside" counsel at state expense or 

to retain private counsel for an incarcerated litigant. Sections 47-1-102, 47-1-104, and 47-

1-111, MCA. 

"[N]o one has a constitutional right to counsel of his choice." Section 46-8-

104(1)(d), MCA; State v. Skurdal, 235 Mont. 291, 298, 767 P.2d 304, 309 (1988) (internal 

citation omitted). Kirn is not entitled to substitution of counsel in this appeal. While Kirn 

06/07/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0668
is entitled to the appointment of counsel for his direct appeal, pursuant to § 46-8-104(1)(d), 

MCA, that right does not extend to counsel of his choice. State v. Dethman, 2010 MT 268, 

¶ 15, 358 Mont. 384, 245 P.3d 30 (citations omitted). Kirn's arguments, therefore, do not 

establish good cause to substitute counsel. 

This Court cautions Kirn to refrain from filing pleadings on his own behalf while 

represented by counsel in an appeal. M. R. App. P. 10(1)(c). Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Kirn's Motion for Appointment of New Counsel or 

Representation is DENIED. 

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to counsel of record and to 

Clayton Douglas Kirn pers nally. 

DATED this day of June, 2024. 

For the Court, 

FILED 

JUN 7 2024 

Bowen Greenwood 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

State of Montana 

2 

Chief Justice
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ARMANDO RESTAINO.

Dec. 20, 1979.

Petition for certification denied.
No. 12,307.

#### Lockwood *v.*Chambers et al.

Filed Feb. 13, 1886.

From the DeKalb Circuit Court.

*W. L. Penfield*and *H. J. Shafer,*for appellant..

*J. E. Rose,*for appellees.

Howk, J. —

In this case, the same questions are presented for our decision, in substantially the same way, as those which were considered and decided by this court in *Lockwood*v. *Ferguson, ante,*p. 380. Upon the authority of the case cited, this ease must be decided as that was decided. See, also, *Storms*v. *Stevens,*104 Ind. 46, where the questions referred to are more fully considered.

The judgment is reversed with costs, and the cause remanded with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the complaint.
[No. 23745-8-II.

Division Two.

April 14, 2000.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Kenneth Dewey Fleet, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Cowlitz County, No. 98-1-00263-5, James E. Warme, J., entered September 11, 1998. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Morgan, J., concurred in by Houghton and Bridgewater, JJ.
Exhibit
32.2




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Veritec, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form
10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John Quentin, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:




·
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




·
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.









/s/John
Quentin




John
Quentin, Chief Financial Officer




Date:
February 19, 2010
**Exhibit 32.1****CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO**

   **SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

   **(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**

   

   In connection with the annual report of mCig Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending April 30, 2017, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Paul Rosenberg, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

   

   (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

   

   (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

   

   Dated: August 28, 2017

   

   /s/ Paul Rosenberg

   Paul Rosenberg,

   Chief Executive Officer


---
[No. 24238-9-II.

Division Two.

May 26, 2000.]

#### Matthew Fassel, *Appellant,*v. The City of Tacoma, *Respondent.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 97-2-06245-0, Thomas Felnagle, J., entered January 21, 1999. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Houghton, J., concurred in by Morgan, J., and Draper, J. Pro Tern.