1

Filed 3/7/14 Certified for publication 4/2/14 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUSTIN STEELE,

Defendant and Appellant.

C071857

(Super. Ct. No. 11F00219)

A jury found defendant Justin Steele guilty of pandering E. L. to become a 

prostitute; procuring E. L. to leave California for prostitution; pimping of E. L. and D. R.;

human trafficking of E. L. and D. R.; making criminal threats against E. L.; forcible oral 

copulation of E. L.; kidnapping of D. R.; abducting D. R. for prostitution; assault of D. R.

by force likely to produce great bodily injury; and pandering D. R., age 17, to become a 

prostitute. The jury found that defendant personally used a deadly weapon -- hot cooking 

grease or oil -- in the commission of the criminal threats count. The trial court found true 

two strike allegations. Defendant was sentenced to prison for 176 years to life.
2

On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the evidence of abducting D. R. for 

prostitution was insufficient; (2) instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1190, a rule of 

substantive law, immediately following CALCRIM No. 301, an instruction on witness 

credibility, erroneously suggested “that the law requires a special deference to the 

complaining witness’s credibility”; (3) Penal Code1section 654 bars separate punishment 

for kidnapping D. R. and human trafficking of D. R.; (4) the trial court’s refusal to 

permit discovery of D. R.’s medical records violated his confrontation and due process 

rights; and (5) due process requires limited disclosure of the medical records to the 

parties for the purpose of briefing under seal of the discovery issue. We affirm.

DISCUSSION

I

Sufficiency Of Evidence Of Kidnapping For Prostitution

Defendant contends the record contains insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction of kidnapping D. R. for prostitution. Specifically, he claims there was no 

evidence that D. R. was in the legal custody of a parent or guardian during the time of her 

abduction. We disagree.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment (People v. Boyer (2006) 

38 Cal.4th 412, 479-480), the evidence shows the following. On several occasions 

during the summer and fall of 2010, 17-year-old D. R. left home without stating where 

she was going. She testified: “Technically I didn’t run away. [¶] . . . [¶] I don’t run 

away. There is no point. I go back home.” 

In September 2010, 18-year-old E. L. was kicked out of her home and went to live 

with D. R. and her family. E. L. remained for only a short time because D. R.

experienced difficulties with her own mother and was asked to leave the residence. But 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

D. R. remained in contact with her mother and visited her in the days that preceded the 

charges of kidnapping, human trafficking, and abducting. 

E. L. and D. R. were regular visitors to the apartment of April Hart. Around this 

time, both girls were introduced to defendant, the boyfriend of Hart. Hart worked as a 

prostitute and gave her prostitution earnings to defendant. 

Around November 2010, Hart lent her electronic benefits transfer government 

assistance card to D. R. who used the card to make purchases without Hart’s permission. 

Defendant learned of D. R.’s purchases and informed Hart. Defendant, Hart, E. L. and 

15-year-old I. C. got into a car and went to confront D. R. The group found D. R. at her 

boyfriend’s residence. E. L. was ordered to call D. R. over to the car. Immediately upon 

entering the middle backseat, D. R. was questioned about the card. When D. R. screamed 

for help, defendant told her to “shut up” and threatened to kill her. Defendant gave 

D. R.’s backpack to E. L. and told her to search it for evidence of theft. E. L. found 

receipts from card purchases. 

The group eventually ended up back at Hart’s apartment. When they arrived 

several people were waiting outside. At Hart’s request a female neighbor beat up D. R.

while the others cheered. During the fight, defendant studied the receipts recovered from 

D. R.’s backpack. Defendant told E. L. that the beating was punishment for D. R.’s theft. 

At some point, defendant joined the fight. He choked and kicked D. R., lifted her into the 

air, threw her to the ground, and dragged her by the hair into the apartment. 

The group forced D. R. to don a dress and high heels and to pose for photographs 

that were then posted to a prostitution Web site. A few minutes later, a client responded 

to the post. The group returned to the car where Hart and I. C. told D. R. that she had to 

earn back the money she had stolen. Hart drove to a motel in the vicinity of Watt Avenue 

where D. R. was taken to a room and left with a man she did not know. The man 

attempted to put his penis in D. R.’s mouth but she bit it. When Hart learned this she beat 

up D. R. and then drove the group to a nearby residence. I. C. and D. R. were left at the 
4

residence while defendant, Hart, and E. L. continued to a downtown motel. At the 

residence, D. R. sent a text message to her boyfriend who contacted D. R.’s mother. The 

next morning, when I. C. and D. R. returned to Hart’s apartment, D. R.’s mother was 

waiting for her and took her home. 

“On appeal, the test of legal sufficiency is whether there is substantial evidence, 

i.e., evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution 

sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] Evidence meeting 

this standard satisfies constitutional due process and reliability concerns. [Citations.] [¶]

While the appellate court must determine that the supporting evidence is reasonable, 

inherently credible, and of solid value, the court must review the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the [judgment], and must presume every fact the jury could reasonably 

have deduced from the evidence. [Citations.] Issues of witness credibility are for the 

jury. [Citations.]” (People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 479-480.)

Section 267 provides: “Every person who takes away any other person under the 

age of 18 years from the father, mother, guardian, or other person having the legal charge 

of the other person, without their consent, for the purpose of prostitution, is punishable by 

imprisonment in the state prison, and a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars 

($2,000).”

Defendant contends the “taking of a minor, who comes and goes as she pleases, 

from the company of her boyfriend,” does not qualify as a crime under section 267. We 

disagree.

“ ‘The gist of the offense is the taking away of the child against the will of the 

person having lawful charge of her, for the purpose of prostitution . . . .’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Dolan (1892) 96 Cal. 315, 318.) “[W]hether [the minor] . . . wandered abroad 

at night [does] not affect . . . the question as to whether or not she was taken off while 

under the age of eighteen years, for purposes of prostitution, without the consent of her 

parents.” (Ibid.) Thus, the facts that D. R. “wandered abroad” to the company of her 
5

boyfriend and “comes and goes as she pleases” do not affect the question of whether she 

was taken while under age 18, for purposes of prostitution, without her parent’s consent. 

(Ibid.) Defendant’s argument, which confuses parental consent to the child wandering 

abroad with consent to her being taken for prostitution, has no merit.

Defendant relies on People v. Flores (1911) 160 Cal. 766, which reversed a 

defendant’s section 267 conviction because there was insufficient evidence that the minor 

was under the lawful charge of her mother. The court explained: “ ‘[W]here a female 

who has lost her virtue, under the age of eighteen, and who has been abandoned, or who 

is not in the legal charge of any one, but a wanderer upon the town, is aided in being 

placed in a house of prostitution, no crime has been committed. No one would say from 

the evidence in this record that the defendant took the girl from her mother. The words 

mean the removal or separation of the girl from the parent or legal guardian. If the girl 

was not with her mother or under the immediate control and custody of the mother, but 

living separate and apart from her, going from place to place of her own volition, not 

making her home with her mother, she was not “taken from the mother.” ’ ” (Id. at 

p. 770; italics added.)

In the present case, the jury had no duty to conclude that D. R.’s mother 

abandoned D. R. or relinquished her legal charge of D. R. Although the mother asked 

D. R. to leave the house in mid-October 2010, she filed a missing persons report with law 

enforcement on November 2, 2010, shortly before the present offenses. Moreover, the 

mother responded to D. R.’s text message by waiting for D. R. outside of Hart’s 

apartment and by taking D. R. home. For her part, D. R. testified that she “technically” 

does not run away and always returns home. She remained in contact with her mother 

and had visited the mother in the days prior to the taking. These facts show that D. R.

remained in her mother’s legal custody and that, contrary to defendant’s argument, they 

enjoyed a substantive parent-child relationship in which the mother endeavored to protect 

D. R.’s safety and character. Nothing in section 267 suggests that its protection is 
6

unavailable whenever family dynamics end up with a temporary separation of parent and 

child. Substantial evidence supports this charge. (People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 

pp. 479-480.)

II

Instructional Error

Defendant next contends the trial court’s placement of CALCRIM No. 1190 on 

noncorroboration of sexual assault crimes among the credibility instructions and 

immediately following CALCRIM No. 301 on the testimony of a single witness created a 

substantial likelihood that the jury misinterpreted the former as a credibility instruction,

thus erroneously suggesting that the law requires special deference to D. R.’s credibility.

The People respond that defendant forfeited the claim by failing to object to the 

jury instructions, which were “correct in law and responsive to the evidence.” (Citing 

People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1260.) Defendant replies that no objection was 

necessary because, as placed and given by the trial court, the instructions were 

misleading and thus not correct in law. (§ 1259.) 

CALCRIM No. 301 told the jurors: “Except for the testimony of April Hart, 

which requires supporting evidence, the testimony of only one witness can prove any 

fact. Before you conclude that the testimony of one witness proves a fact, you should 

carefully review all the evidence.” 

Immediately after the foregoing instruction, CALCRIM No. 1190 told the jurors: 

“Conviction of a sexual assault crime may be based on the testimony of a complaining 

witness alone.”

Defense counsel objected to CALCRIM No. 1190 on the grounds it was 

duplicative of CALCRIM No. 301 and “single[d] out a category of offense which I don’t 

think is appropriate.” The trial court overruled the objection, noting that the instructions 

have been upheld when given in conjunction. (E.g., People v. Gammage (1992) 2 Cal.4th 

693, 700.) 
7

In Gammage, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 10.60, the predecessor of 

CALCRIM No. 1190; and with CALJIC No. 2.27, the predecessor of CALCRIM No. 

301. The defendant argued that, “in combination, the instructions create a preferential 

credibility standard for the complaining witness, or somehow suggest that that witness is 

entitled to a special deference.” (People v. Gammage, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 701.) The 

court rejected the claim, stating: “Although the two instructions overlap to some extent, 

each has a different focus. CALJIC No. 2.27 focuses on how the jury should evaluate a 

fact (or at least a fact required to be established by the prosecution) proved solely by the 

testimony of a single witness. It is given with other instructions advising the jury how to 

engage in the fact-finding process. CALJIC No. 10.60, on the other hand, declares a 

substantive rule of law, that the testimony of the complaining witness need not be 

corroborated. It is given with other instructions on the legal elements of the charged 

crimes.” (Gammage, at pp. 700-701, italics added.) The court concluded “[t]he one 

instruction merely suggests careful review when a fact depends on the testimony of one 

witness. The other tells the jury there is no legal corroboration requirement. Neither 

eviscerates or modifies the other. As we observed early in this century, ‘There was no 

singling out of the testimony of the prosecuting witness with a view of giving it undue 

prominence before the jury.’ [Citation.] Nor do the instructions ‘dilute[] the “beyond a 

reasonable doubt” standard.’ [Citation.] The instructions in combination are no less 

correct, and no less fair to both sides, than either is individually.” (Id. at p. 701.)

In this case, as in Gammage, CALCRIM No. 301 was given with other 

instructions advising the jury how to engage in the fact-finding process. But unlike 

Gammage, several procedural instructions separated CALCRIM No. 1190 from the other 

substantive instructions. 

Defendant claims CALCRIM No. 1190’s proximity to CALCRIM No. 301 and 

consequent separation from substantive instructions obscured the fact that CALCRIM 

Nos. 301 and 1190 “have a different scope.” But the jury was instructed to “[p]ay careful 
8

attention to all of these instructions and consider them together.” (Italics added.) We 

assume that jurors are intelligent persons who are capable of understanding and 

correlating all jury instructions that are given. (People v. Mills (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 898, 

918; People v. Kegler (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 72, 80.) There is no indication that the 

slight separation of CALCRIM No. 1190 from “other instructions on the legal elements 

of the charged crimes” caused the instruction to be misleading or prejudicial. (People v. 

Gammage, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 701.)

Defendant claims the “immediate juxtaposition” of CALCRIM Nos. 301 and 1190 

made it reasonably likely that jurors believed the instruction to “carefully review all the 

evidence” did not apply to D. R.’s testimony. He reasons that, because CALCRIM No.

1190 does not repeat CALCRIM No. 301’s cautionary language, jurors were reasonably 

likely to conclude the law “does not require a cautionary review” of D. R.’s testimony. 

We disagree.

“When reviewing an instructional ambiguity claim, we ask whether the jury was 

reasonably likely to have construed the instruction in a manner that violated the 

defendant’s rights. [Citation.]” (People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1110.) We 

find no reasonable likelihood that the jury would understand the instructions as defendant 

suggests.

III

Multiple Punishment

Defendant contends section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for kidnapping 

D. R. and human trafficking of D. R. , because the intent and objective of the kidnapping 

was to facilitate the human trafficking. We disagree.

Section 654 provides in relevant part: “An act or omission that is punishable in 

different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that 

provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or 

omission be punished under more than one provision.”
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“ ‘The proscription against double punishment in section 654 is applicable where 

there is a course of conduct which . . . comprises an indivisible transaction punishable 

under more than one statute . . . . The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon 

the intent and objective of the actor, and if all the offenses are incident to one objective, 

the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than one.’ 

[Citation.] ‘The defendant’s intent and objective are factual questions for the trial court; 

[to permit multiple punishments,] there must be evidence to support a finding the 

defendant formed a separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was 

sentenced. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162; see People v.

Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208.)

Defendant does not address the evidence supporting the trial court’s implied 

finding of separate intents and objectives. Instead, he states without analysis or record 

reference that the jury found in effect that the kidnapping was for prostitution and, thus, 

the human trafficking for prostitution was “part of an indivisible course of conduct with 

the same intent and objective.” The claim that the jury determined the purpose of the 

kidnapping, raised in such perfunctory fashion, is forfeited. (People v. Harper (2000) 

82 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1419, fn. 4.)

The record supports the trial court’s implied finding of separate, and consecutive, 

intents and objectives, first to inflict a do-it-yourself analog of punishment and then to 

exact do-it-yourself restitution.

The kidnapping count alleged that defendant “did take, hold, or detain [D. R.] by 

using force or by instilling reasonable fear to move her a substantial distance without her 

consent.” The evidence showed that defendant and the others located D. R. at her 

boyfriend’s residence. D. R. was transported a substantial distance to Hart’s apartment

where several people were waiting. At Hart’s request, a female beat up D. R. Defendant 

admitted to E. L. that the beating was punishment for D. R.’s theft. This evidence amply 
10

supports an implied finding that the intent and objective of the kidnapping was to 

physically punish D. R. for the card theft, not to force her into prostitution.

The human trafficking count alleged that defendant deprived or violated D. R.’s 

personal liberty while intending to commit pimping, pandering, or abduction of a minor 

for prostitution. The evidence showed that defendant forced D. R. to don a dress and 

high heels and to pose for photographs that were posted to a prostitution Web site. A few 

minutes later, a client responded to the post. Hart and I. C. told D. R. that she had to earn 

back the money she had stolen. Hart drove D. R. to a motel where she was taken to a 

room and left with a man who attempted to put his penis in D. R.’s mouth. 

Thus, the evidence supports an implied finding that the intent and objective of the 

kidnapping was to inflict physical punishment upon D. R., while the intent and objective 

of the human trafficking was to exact restitution in the form of prostitution earnings. The 

separate punishments on these counts are supported by substantial evidence. (People v.

Coleman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 162-163.)

IV

Failure to Provide Medical Records

Defendant contends the trial court’s failure to provide exculpatory, relevant, or 

impeaching information contained in D. R.’s confidential medical records violated his 

confrontation and due process rights. In a separate argument, defendant contends due 

process requires a limited disclosure of the confidential material to the parties to allow 

briefing under seal of the foregoing contention. We disagree.

The defense subpoenaed the mental health records of D. R.’s stay, immediately 

following the kidnapping, at Heritage Oaks Hospital and asked the trial court to review 

the records in camera pursuant to People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, which 

holds that such review must occur at trial rather than prior to trial. (Id. at p. 1128.) 

Counsel believed the records could indicate a health condition involving psychosis or 

hallucinations or a mental disorder with regard to sexual conduct, either of which would 
11

be relevant to D. R.’s competency to testify as a witness and to her credibility at the time 

of the offense and at trial. Counsel argued the information was necessary to ensure 

defendant’s rights to confrontation and due process. 

The prosecutor objected that evidence of D. R. being a runaway, being 

incorrigible, harming herself, and similar matters constituted “improper character 

evidence” rather than anything that justified releasing confidential records. He 

acknowledged that the material was subject to Hammon review and expressed confidence 

that the court would identify any material that pertains to the relevance or credibility of 

D. R.’s testimony. 

When asked by the trial court to explain how D. R.’s medical treatment could 

affect issues in the case, defense counsel stated: “It is hard. I can’t give a particularized 

or more specific statement as to how it would be. But I think the things I indicated, if 

they -- if there is -- if any of those items, the history of psychotic or hallucinatory 

behavior, her life style [sic], her choice of how . . . who she’s choosing to be with as far 

as her boyfriend is concerned who is a run-away [sic] and a suspect in a number of 

offenses that she -- her behavior in general whether it is self-mutilation, whether it is her 

conduct and have to [sic] be taken to basically a hospital as opposed to an outpatient 

facility in terms of was she placed on any type of medication, if so why. [¶] Those 

would all tend to show or could show that she was suffering from a possible condition 

that would affect her that would be relevant to her credibility or competency.” 

The trial court ruled that it would review the records in camera. It ordered the 

hospital to deliver the records to the court for review. The next day, the trial court stated 

that it had reviewed the record. 

Small portions of three pages of records were released to the parties. The records 

indicated that D. R. had denied any physical abuse by her family and that she had 

reported a recent kidnapping by her friend’s aunt. During the incident D. R. had been
12

beaten, drugged, and possibly abused. The records also indicated a separate incident in 

which police brought D. R. home after she stole merchandise from WinCo Foods.

The defense requested an Evidence Code section 402 hearing regarding the 

WinCo Foods incident and a matter unrelated to the Heritage Oaks records. Before D. R.

testified, the prosecutor stated: “I think we covered this inlimine [sic], but I want to make 

sure there is [sic] no questions of her being put at [a mental health facility] or being a 

cutter or any type of mental issues, that there be [no] questioning in that area.” At the

hearing, D. R. explained that she and her cousin had tried to leave the store without 

paying for some cosmetics they had placed in a bag. 

At defendant’s request, we have reviewed the sealed materials in light of defense 

counsel’s lengthy explanation of how the materials might be relevant to the defense and 

in light of the prosecutor’s objection to matters such as D. R. being a runaway, being 

incorrigible, harming herself, and being placed at a treatment facility. Our review 

discloses that the disputed materials were within the scope of the objection, which the 

trial court impliedly sustained in that the materials were not released.

Defendant argues he “must contest this as error, and, in the nature of the situation, 

must do so blindly.” But “blind[ness]” does not excuse defendant’s failure to address the 

specific objection voiced by the prosecutor who had been equally “blind” to the records’ 

contents. Although defendant cites authorities on confrontation (e.g., Davis v. Alaska

(1974) 415 U.S. 308 [39 L.Ed.2d 347]), discovery (e.g., Brady v. Maryland (1963) 

373 U.S. 83 [10 L.Ed.2d 215]), and due process (e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 

401 U.S. 371 [28 L.Ed.2d 113]), he does not claim the objection lacked merit or explain 

how excluding improper character evidence would have transgressed any of these

constitutional rights. Any such claim is forfeited. (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 

150; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 563.)

Defendant argues the trial court “made a post facto determination that there was 

nothing more in [D. R.]’s records pertinent or relevant or touching on the impeachment of 
13

[D. R.]’s credibility,” which implicates his “right to obtain information substantially 

pertinent to the cross-examination and impeachment of important witnesses for the 

prosecution.” The point fails because the in camera examination of the hospital records 

and the Evidence Code section 402 hearing preceded, rather than followed, D. R.’s 

testimony. The in camera examination may have been “post facto” the discovery process 

but there is no right to pretrial disclosure of the records. (People v. Hammon, supra, 

15 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)

Noting his “limited . . . ability” to present his claim, defendant argues that due 

process and fundamental fairness require that the confidential records be released to 

counsel for both parties to enable the preparation and submission of briefing under seal. 

Defendant claims “[t]his is the only fair way to have review of the issue in question.” But 

he does not demonstrate that disclosure is the only means of obtaining a fair review. At 

another point in his briefing, defendant “ask[s] this Court to review pages 127 through 

161 of the first volume of the Clerk’s Transcript on appeal, which are currently sealed 

against the parties and the public.” He offers no reason to believe this requested review 

will be unfair to him. Thus, he has not shown that the limited disclosure is mandated by 

due process or fundamental fairness.
14

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 ROBIE , J.

We concur:

 HULL , Acting P. J.

 HOCH , J.
1

Filed 4/2/14

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUSTIN STEELE,

Defendant and Appellant.

C071857

(Super. Ct. No. 11F00219)

ORDER CERTIFYING 

OPINION FOR PARTIAL 

PUBLICATION

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed March 7, 2014, was not certified for 

publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it appears now that the opinion 

should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

BY THE COURT:

 HULL , Acting P. J.

 ROBIE , J.

 HOCH , J.

 

 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is 

certified for publication with the exception of parts II, III, and IV of the Discussion.
2

EDITORIAL LISTING

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Eugene 

Balanon, Judge. Affirmed.

Mark David Greenberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein and Kevin 

L. Quade, Deputies Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.