alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# News

## U.S. Air Force LogoUnited States Air Force

# Eielson AFB Airmen build first bombs for PACAF F-35s

              - Published  June 29, 2020
              -                             By Airman 1st Class Aaron Larue Guerrisky                                                    
              - 354th Fighter Wing Public Affairs

**EIELSON AIR FORCE BASE, Alaska (AFNS) --  **
Airmen from **Eielson Air Force Base**’s 354th Maintenance Squadron munitions flight built the first bombs intended for the 354th Fighter Wing’s **F-35A Lighting IIs**, June 15-19.The last time a 354th FW unit dropped combat-specific bombs was about 10 years ago when the **A-10 Thunderbolt II** and **F-16 Fighting Falcons** flew in the Alaskan skies.A bomb build is the intricate process munitions personnel go through to ensure a bomb body is usable for the operators.“During this process, and depending on the bomb they are building, (munitions personnel) will add a guidance and control unit, tail kit and fuse to a basic bomb body,” said Capt. Christina Merritt, a 354th MXS operations officer. “Each of these components work together to make up the type and purpose of the bomb.”Before a single bomb can be built, the munitions flight must coordinate and plan accordingly. The munitions are initially ‘barged’ which is a process of receiving, transporting and storing the explosives. Eielson AFB conducted its largest barge in years back in April.Once the barge is complete, the munitions Airmen then move onto bomb assembly.“We’re going to be building a total of 70 bombs over the course of the week,” said Master Sgt. Jason P. Brackins, the 354th MXS conventional maintenance noncommissioned officer in charge.The munitions flight typically builds bombs in mass fashion, especially when they are dealing with the largest shipment Eielson AFB has received in quite some time.“We typically work to build bombs in a mass fashion,” Merritt said. “Mass builds are done using an assembly line process, where each Airman has a particular job and we can produce multiple bombs at once.”Munitions are a key component to ensuring Eielson AFB’s F-35s meet all goals for initial combat capabilities and exercise Red Flag-Alaska participants have ammunition to train. The Airmen who build them are the ones ensuring Eielson AFB’s warfighters are prepared for the future fight.“We’re the ones that bring the fight to the aircraft and give them that offensive posture,” Brackins said. “Without (munitions personnel) it’s just another aircraft flying in the sky.”The junior Airmen in the munitions flight know how impactful the first bomb build is for the F-35s at the at the Eielson AFB-based fighter wing and for **Pacific Air Forces**.“It is very rewarding to be a part of making history,” said Airman 1st Class Daelyn Mayer, a 354th MXS conventional maintenance inspector. “I think it’s awesome to get to say we built the first bombs for the F-35s that are here at Eielson (AFB).”

LRUSAFAFAir ForceEielson Air Force Base354th Maintenance SquadronF-35A Lighting IIA-10 Thunderbolt IImunitionsbombsred flagPacific Air Forces
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WINIFRED JIAU,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.
KAIRE POOLE ; RANDY L. TEWS, Warden,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 16

- 15147

D.C. No. 3:13

- cv
- 00248

- WHA

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2017 **

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Winifred Jiau , a former federal prisoner, appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in her
action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971) . We ha ve jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 16 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 15147

We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo , 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015).

We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Jiau failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whe ther she properly exhausted her
administrative remedies, or whether there was “something in [her] particular case
that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively
unavailable to [her].” Albino v. Baca , 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) ; see

also Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (requiring proper exhaustion, which
means “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the
agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (emphasis, citation, and internal
quotation marks omitted) )

. Because we affirm the district court’s summary
judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we treat the
judgment as a dismissal without prejudice. See Lira v. Herrera , 427 F.3d 1164,
1170 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A] district court must dismiss a case without prejudice
when there is no presuit exhaustion [.] ” ( emphasis, citation , and internal quotation
marks omitted) )

. In light of our disposition , we do not reach the merits of Jiau’s claims

.
We do not consider Jiau’s contentions concerning appointment of counsel,3 16

- 15147

leave to amend, leave to conduct discovery, or deliberate indifference to medical
needs because they were not properly raised before the district court

. See L.A.

Ne ws Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd. , 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998).
We reject as unsupported by the record Jiau’s contentions that defendants
committed perjury.

AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Steven C. Bierman, certify that:

 

1.                     I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of CNH Equipment Trust 2011-B (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

 

2.                     Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.                     Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4.                     I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicer and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and

 

5.                     All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas.

 

----

 
| March 28,   2013 |   |
|-----------------------|--------|
|                  |   |
|                  |   |
|                  | By:    | /s/   Steven C. Bierman |
|                  | Name:  | Steven   C. Bierman |
|                  | Title: | President   (senior officer in charge of the servicing function) |

 

----
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-20804 Conference Calendar

DONALD RAY MIKE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus BRADLE BACHMAN; FRANCIS CHERIAN; GLENDA ADAMS; MS. KENT, Health Administrator, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-01-CV-163

-------------------- April 10, 2002 Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Donald Ray Mike, a Texas prisoner (# 423926), has filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s denial of his “Motion to Alter Judgment,” which was filed following the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because it was filed more than 10 days after the entry of the judgment, the “Motion to Alter Judgment” was essentially a F ED . R. C IV . P. 60(b) motion forNo. 01-20804 -2- relief from judgment. See Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc. , 784 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc). An appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is not an appeal from the merits of the underlying judgment, In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp. S.A. , 728 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1984), and review of such a denial is for abuse of discretion only. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enter., Inc. , 38 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1994). Under this standard, “[i]t is not enough that the granting of relief might have been permissible, or even warranted–-denial must have been so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi , 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981). Mike has not remotely made such a showing in his appellate brief. His appeal is wholly without merit and is thus frivolous.
See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. Accordingly, his appeal is DISMISSED. The dismissal of the instant appeal as frivolous and the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim each count as a “strike” under the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons , 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996). Mike is thus cautioned that, once he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

RE: Docket Number 2021 -CA -1156

Rusten May, Bryan Boudreaux, John D. Lewis, III, Eric

Jackson and Albert J. Walker

Versus - - 

Lane Carson, in His Capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana

Department of Veterans Affairs, and the State of Louisiana

through the Department of Veterans Affairs through its

State Director of Veterans Affairs, Bill Dixon

19th Judicial District Court

Case #: 624049

East Baton Rouge Parish

On Application for Rehearing filed on 08/ 14/ 2022 by John Lewis, III and Bryan Boudreaux

Rehearing b V') '; F— - Z) 

nnro AUG 16 2022

11
#### JAMES C. KOTZIAN v. DONALD E. BARR, JR.

April 18, 1978.

Petition for certification granted. (See 152 *N.*J. *Super.*561)
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 83 (Thursday, May 18, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5356]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                HOUR OF MEETING ON TUESDAY, MAY 23, 1995

  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House 
adjourns on Monday, May 22, 1995, it adjourn to meet at 10:30 a.m. on 
Tuesday, May 23, for morning hour debates.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.

                          ____________________
```
No. 12,255.

#### Williams *v.*The Thames Loan and Trust Company.

New Tbiae as of *Eight.*— Not *Proper in Action to Enforce Lien.*— Where it affirmatively appears that an action is to enforce a lien, a new trial as of right can not be granted.

*Same.*— Appeal.—Practice.—Where a new trial as of right is erroneously granted, it is proper to remand the cause for judgment upon the first finding or verdict.

*Same.*— Supreme *Court.*— Marion *Superior Court.-*— Where the effect of a judgment of the Marion Superior Court, in general term, is to remand the cause for such error, it will be affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal.

From the Marion Superior Court.

*R. D. Logan,*for appellant.

*D. M. Bradbury,*for appellee.

Elliott, J. —

On the 6th day of February, 1867, the party through whom the appellant claims title, bought the real estate in controversy at a tax sale made by the treasurer of the *421city of Indianapolis. A certificate of sale was issued by the treasurer, and, on- the 16th day of April, 1869, a deed was executed to the purchaser. This deed was never recorded. On the 13th day of August, 1875, the appellee loaned to the owner of the real estate a large sum of money and took a mortgage to secure its payment. This mortgage was foreclosed in March, 1879, the real estate was sold to the appellee upon the decree of foreclosure, on the 26th day of April, of that year, and a deed executed to him by the sheriff on the 28th day of April, 1880. The tax sale conveyed no title because the taxpayer had personal property out of which the taxes could have been made.

Filed Feb. 18, 1886.

This action was instituted in November, 1881, and is in form, as indicated by the frame of the complaint, an action of a dual nature, for the complaint seeks to quiet title, orj if this relief can not be obtained, to enforce a lien for taxes. There is, however, an admission of record which affirmatively shows that there was no question of title or possession involved in the cause. There were two trials, both resulting in a finding against the appellant; the finding on the first trial was vacated by the granting of a new trial as a matter of right.

The court erred in granting the new trial as of right. "Where it affirmatively and decisively appears that an action is to enforce a lien, a new trial as of right can not be granted. *Jenkins*v. *Corwin,*55 Ind. 21; *Butler University*v. *Conard,*94 Ind. 353.

Where a new trial as of right is erroneously granted, it is proper to remand the cause for judgment upon the first finding or verdict. *Sharpe*v. *O’Brien,*39 Ind. 501; *Gann*v. *Worman,*69 Ind. 548. This was the legal effect of the judgment of the general term of the superior court in the present instance, and there is, therefore, no cause for a reversal.

Judgment affirmed.
News United States Air Force
 Around the Air Force: B-1B Lancers to Guam, Nellis Aggressors Reactivate, Andrews Gets Grey WolvesPublished June 17, 2022
                        
                        By Senior Airman Kahdija Slaughter
                        
                        
                        Air Force TV
                **FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, Md. (AFNS)   --**
                In this week’s look around the Air Force, Global Strike Command sends B-1B Lancers from South Dakota to the Indo-Pacific to take part in a Bomber Task Force mission, the 65th Aggressor Squadron reactivates at Nellis AFB to provide 5th Generation adversary tactics for training, and the National Capital Region may be seeing Grey Wolves in the skies above. (Hosted by Senior Airman Garrett Hess)



For previous episodes, click **here** for the Air Force TV page.

Related links:**- B-1B Lancers deploy to Andersen AFB for Bomber Task Force Mission****- 65th Aggressor Squadron reactivates at Nellis AFB with aggressor force of F-35s****- New MH-139 Grey Wolves will go to Joint Base Andrews**Featured Video 



AFTV 



ATAF 



Around the Air Force 



Air Force 



AF
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 82 (Wednesday, May 17, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H5174]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. Kaptur] is recognized for 5 minutes.

  [Ms. KAPTUR addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in 
the Extensions of Remarks.]

                          ____________________
```
#### Richardson & Co. v. Thacker & Co.

(No. 1176, Op. Book No. 3, p. 490.)

Appeal from Washington County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 138. *Partnership; potver of member of, to bind the firm.*Where the subject matter of the contract is consistent with the partnership business, or incident thereto, the act of one partner is binding upon all. A purchase by one member of a law firm of a quantity of *brass,*or a purchase by a member of a dry goods firm of a lot of liquors, such purchases being beyond the scope of the legitimate business of the firm, would not bind the firms unless specially, authorized or ratified by them. But in this case the defendants were druggists, and dealt in drugs and poisons, and it was held that the firm was liable for a quantity of paris green purchased by one of the firm in the name of the firm, although such purchase was made contrary to the wishes of the other members of the firm, and without their being interested in the same. There was no proof to show that the plaintiff of the pub-*56lie had notice that the purchase of the paris green was otherwise than upon partnership account in the ordinary way of the legitimate business of the firm.

February 9, 1881.

Reversed and remanded.
No. 12,265.

#### The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company *v.*Doane.

Motion fob New *Trial.*— Judgment.—Practice.—A motion for a new trial is not a collateral motion, but one directly connected with the judgment, and so long as it remains undisposed of, there can be no final judgment within the meaning of the statute regulating appeals.

*Same.*— Appeal *to Supreme Court.*— Where a motion for a new trial was filed on the same day the judgment was rendered, and was not disposed of for six months or more, there was no final judgment from which to appeal until the ruling on the motion.

' From the Kosciusko Circuit Court.

*J. S. Frazer, W. D. Frazer*and *J. B. Cohrs,*for appellant.

*J. W. Cook*and *J. D. Widaman,*for appellee.

Elliott, J. —

The verdict in this case was returned on the 4th day of July, 1884, and on the following day judgment was entered upon it. On the same day that the judgment was entered the appellant filed a motion for a new trial; the cause was then continued until the 23d day of December, 1884, without any action being taken; on that day the appellee unsuccessfully moved to strike out some of the reasons assigned in the appellant’s motion for a new trial, and on the 23d day of January, 1885, the appellant’s motion was overruled and an appeal prayed.

There was no final judgment within the meaning of the statute governing appeals until the ruling denying the motion for a new trial. The appellant had a right to a ruling on that motion; for it was properly and seasonably filed. Until that *93motion was disposed of, there was no final disposition of the case. It is quite clear that if the appellant had brought up the case before a ruling on the motion, the appeal would have been dismissed, on the ground that it was prematurely taken.

Filed Jan. 22, 1886.

A motion for a new trial is not a collateral one, but is one directly connected with the judgment, and is essential to present for review errors occurring on the trial, and so long as it remains undisposed of there can be no final judgment within the meaning of the statute regulating appeals. A pending motion for a new trial keeps the cause in the trial court, provided, of course, that the motion was seasonably filed.

Motion to dismiss appeal overruled.
#### H. Vincent v. N. & S. Mayblum.

(No. 573, Op. Book No. 2, p. 270.)

Appeal from Port Bend County.

March 20, 1880.

Opinion by

White, J.

§ 763. *Trespass; damages in action of; verdict against the evidence.*The verdict and judgment in this case are clearly against the law and the evidence. The evidence shows that the defendants tore down the corn-crib of plaintiff and took one hundred and fifty bushels of his corn, for which they have never paid or accounted; that they broke the lock of his cotton house and took $50 worth of his cotton without his knowledge or consent, for which, also, they have never accounted. Appellees, by this conduct, were guilty of a trespass, and “the law supposes that every trespass committed upon property is necessarily attended with some damage, however inconsiderable the injury; and hence the right to recover damages for a trespass cannot be denied.” But this was not a bare technical trespass; it was committed deliberately and in wilful violation of plaintiff’s rights, in a manner and under circumstances showing aggravation, and in such cases the law allows damages beyond the strict measure of compensation, by way of punishment and for example’s sake. In trespass, where the party wantonly violates the law, “the jury should not be sparing in damages.” [1 Meeson & Welsby, 342; Champion v. Vincent, 20 Tex. 811.]

Reversed and remanded.
Order filed April 9, 2019 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-19-00198-CV

____________

LAUREN ERICKSON, Appellant

V.

KENNETH A. LEPOW, D.D.S., INC. D/B/A LEPOW DENTAL 

ASSOCIATES, LEPOW FAMILY DENTAL, PLLC, WEST ROAD 

DENTAL, PLLC, GREATER HOUSTON DENTAL SOCIETY, 

KENNETH A. LEPOW, D.D.S., CALVIN JUNG, D.D.S., AND EVAN 

MELAMED, D.D.S., Appellees

On Appeal from the 152nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2018-07441

O R D E R

The notice of appeal in this case was filed March 8, 2019. To date, the filing 

fee of $205.00 has not been paid. No evidence that appellants are excused by 

statute or the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure from paying costs has been filed. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 5. Therefore, the court issues the following order. 
Appellant is ordered to pay the filing fee in the amount of $205.00 to the 

clerk of this court on or before April 24, 2019. See Tex. R. App. P. 5. If appellant 

fails to timely pay the filing fee in accordance with this order, the appeal will be 

dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel Consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Spain.