United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-1900

___________________________

American Railcar Industries, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

Specialty Risk Services, LLC; Randy P. Murphy

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: January 12, 2017

 Filed: February 7, 2017

____________

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

____________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

George Tedder worked at American Railcar Industries (ARI). He was injured

while he was on a break from work. After his workers compensation claim was
denied, he filed a civil action in federal court against ARI and was awarded over $1.5

million in damages. ARI then filed this insurance coverage action against Hartford

Insurance Company (Hartford). The district court granted Hartford summary 1

judgment after concluding that the policy did not cover Tedder's injuries and that

ARI's breach of the notification provision in the policy also barred coverage. ARI

appeals, and we affirm.

I.

George Tedder worked for ARI in Arkansas. While Tedder was on a break

from work on April 24, 2008, he was struck by a golf cart driven by a coworker. The

accident injured Tedder's lower back. At the time of the accident, ARI carried

workers compensation and employers' liability insurance that had been issued by

Hartford. Part one of the policy insured ARI against workers compensation claims. 

Under part one Hartford agreed to pay "the benefits required of [ARI] by the workers

compensation law." Part two of the policy insured ARI against bodily injury that

arose "out of and in the course of the injured employee's employment." Part two also

stated that "[t]here will be no right of action against [Hartford] under this insurance

unless: 1. [ARI has] complied with all the terms of this policy." Part four required

ARI to "[p]romptly give [Hartford] all notices, demands, and legal papers related to

the injury, claim, proceeding or suit." 

Tedder filed a workers compensation claim on June 6, 2008. ARI promptly

notified Hartford of Tedder's injury and his workers compensation claim. The claim

wasreferred to Georgia Diemer at Specialty Risk Services(SRS). SRS was a division

of Hartford at the time of Tedder's injury. Diemer hired an attorney to defend

Tedder's claim against ARI. Throughout the workers compensation proceedings,

The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Missouri.

-2-
Tedder's attorney told Diemer that he believed that Tedder's workers compensation

claimwould not prevail because Tedder had been on break at the time of the accident. 

Tedder's attorney indicated that he was neverthless required to pursue the workers

compensation claimin order to exhaust Tedder's administrative remedies before filing

a civil tort action. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Tedder's claim

was not compensable under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act because he had

not been performing employment services at the time of the accident. The full

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision.

On September 2, 2009, Tedder filed a tort action in federal district court against

ARI. ARI did not promptly forward this complaint to Hartford. On September 21,

ARI's counsel in the tort action sent a letter to Hartford's lawyer in the workers

compensation action asking himfor copies of any relevant discovery. Attached to the

letter was the answer ARI had filed in the tort action. An ARI employee testified at

his deposition that he thought he had notified Diemer in approximately October 2009

that, "hey, this has gone civil." That employee could however not "recall with

certainty" if this happened and stated that it was "just a conversation. It wasn't to

report it . . . ." A jury awarded Tedder $2,284,88.20 in 2012, but the district court

later reduced the award to $1,547,388.20. We affirmed. See Tedder v. Am. Railcar

Indus., Inc., 739 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2014). 

ARI filed the present insurance coverage action against Hartford in 2013. ARI

claimed that Hartford had breached part two of the insurance policy by refusing to

cover its losses resulting from the Tedder civil action. The district court granted

Hartford summary judgment after concluding that part two of the policy did not cover

Tedder's injuries because he had been on a break when the injury occurred. It

additionally concluded that ARI had failed to notify Hartford of the civil action and

that this breach of the policy obviated Hartford's coverage obligations. ARI appeals. 

-3-
II.

ARI argues that the district court erred by concluding that it breached the

insurance policy by not promptly notifying Hartford of Tedder's civil action. We

review a district court's "grant of summary judgment de novo and consider the facts

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Nichols v. Tri-Nat'l Logistics,

Inc., 809 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2016). A district court's grant of "[s]ummary

judgment is only appropriate when 'there is no genuine dispute asto any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Pinson

v. 45 Dev., LLC, 758 F.3d 948, 951–52 (8th Cir. 2014)). We review de novo

questions of contract interpretation. Anderson v. Hess Corp., 649 F.3d 891, 896 (8th

Cir. 2011). 

It is undisputed that Arkansas law governs this action. If an insurance policy

treats the giving of notice of a lawsuit as a condition precedent to recovery, "the

insured must strictly comply with the notice requirement, or risk forfeiting the right

to recover from the insurance company." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Care Mgmt.,

Inc., 361 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Ark. 2010). If the notice requirement is a condition

precedent, the "insurance company need not show that it was prejudiced by any

delays in or lack of notification." Id. The notice requirement in the policy here is a

condition precedent to recovery because part two provides that ARI does not have a

cause of action against Hartford unless ARI complies with all of the policy's terms. 

ARI would therefore forfeit any right to recover from Hartford if it did not strictly

comply with the policy's notice requirement. 

Under part four of the insurance policy, ARI was required to "[p]romptly give

[Hartford] all notices, demands, and legal papers related to the injury, claim,

proceeding or suit." ARI argues that Tedder's claims throughout the workers

compensation proceedings that he would file a civil action, ARI's counsel's

September 21 letter to Hartford's workers compensation counsel, and an ARI

-4-
employee's conversation with Diemer all put Hartford on notice that Tedder had filed

a civil action against ARI. It is undisputed, however, that ARI did not forward to

Hartford all of the notices, demands, or legal papers related to Tedder's tort action. 

It therefore did not strictly comply with the policy and forfeited any right to recover

from Hartford.

ARI alternatively argues that it was not required to comply strictly with the

notice provision because Hartford had repudiated coverage. In Arkansas, an insurer

is estopped fromenforcing its notice provision if the insured can show that the insurer

had unambiguously denied coverage and that the denial induced the insured's failure

to comply with the notice provision. See Kimbrell v. Union Standard Ins. Co., 207

F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2000); Am. Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Ne. Ark. Bus Lines, 146

S.W.2d 165, 165–67 (Ark. 1941). ARI argues that Diemer's notes and Hartford's

workers compensation attorney's statements to the ALJ denied coverage. Diemer's

notes indicate thatshe had told Tedder's workers compensation attorney that Hartford

did not belief the claim was compensable. Her notes do not however indicate that

Hartford had informed ARI that it would deny coverage under part two of the policy

if Tedder filed a tort action. At the workers compensation hearing the ALJ asked

Hartford's attorneywhether it had insured ARI "for both comp and premisesliability." 

Hartford's attorney responded, "No, Your Honor." Since the policy here only insured

ARI for workers compensation and employers liability, the Hartford attorney's

response was accurate and was not an unambiguous denial of coverage. 

III.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

-5-