alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
News United States Air Force
 Around the Air Force: New Medical Profiles, Mourning CMSAF McCoy, Hexa Test FlightPublished July 29, 2022
                        
                        By Staff Sgt. Benjamin Cooper
                        
                        
                        Air Force TV
                **FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, Md. (AFNS) --**
                In this week’s look around the Air Force, a new system for generating medical profiles prepares to launch, former Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force James M. McCoy passes away, and the Lift Hexa reaches a new milestone. (Hosted by Senior Airman Kahdija Slaughter)





For previous episodes, click **here** for the Air Force TV page.
Related links:**- New medical profile system to enhance communication, readiness****- Air Force mourns the loss of 6th Chief Master Sgt. of the Air Force****- New flight milestone in Hexa testing**USAF 



AF 



Air Force 



ATAF 



Around the Air Force 



AFTV
#### RIVERLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. LOMBARDO CONTRACTING COMPANY, INC., A CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND TOWNSHIP OF BRIDGEWATER, A MUNICIPAL BODY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Argued May 22, 1978

Decided June 15, 1978.

*Mr. Richard M. Salsburg*argued the cause for appellant.

*Mr. Richard K. Rosenberg*argued the cause for respondent Lombardo Contracting Co., Inc. *{Messrs. Rosenberg and Wdldmam,*attorneys).

*523
      *Mr. Andrew R. Jacobs*argued the cause for respondent Bridgewater Township *(Messrs. Lanigan, O’Connell and Hirsh,*attorneys).

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the opinion of the Appellate Division.

*For affirmance*— Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman, Clifford, Schreiber and Handler — -7.

*For reversal*— None.
#### L. & H. Blum v. Martindale & Shultz.

(No. 1638, Op. Book No. 2, p. 395.)

Appeal from Williamson County.

Opinion by

Quinan, J.

§ 1127. *Damages; measure of, in conversion of property; erroneous charge.*Appellees sued appellants for damages occasioned by the seizure, under appellants’ attachment against one Stenbick, of a lot of flour. The flour belonged to appellees, but was in Stenbick’s possession when seized, and while in possession of the officer under the levy was destroyed by fire. The judge charged the jury as follows: “ Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the value of the flour . . . and eight per cent, interest from the date of the attachment, and such actual damage as they had sustained by reason of said attachment, and they are also entitled to the benefit of any appreciation or advance in the price of the flour since said attachment.” *Held,*there were no circum*638stances of fraud, malice or aggravation in the case. In such case the measure of damages was the value of the flour at the time of the levy of the attachment, to be determined by the market price, and interest thereon at legal rate to the time of trial. [Weaver v. Ashcroft, 50 Tex. 427; 2 Sedgwick on Dam. 389.] The cases of Calvit v. McFaddin, 13 Tex. 324, and Heilbroner v. Douglass, 45 Tex. 402, were unlike this cáse. They were suits to recover damages for the non-delivery of specific articles at an agreed time, which were exceptional in their character and justified the application of a different rule. The charge of the court was erroneous, and it must be assumed that the jury obeyed the instructions of the court, and it cannot be said from the evidence in this case that the verdict was not the result of this erroneous charge. Where the charge is wrong it must appear manifestly that the verdict was not influenced by it, or the verdict will be set aside [Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2; 1 Cal. 352.]

June 8, 1881.

Reversed and remanded.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0679

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

REX WILLIAM ALLEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including April 26, 2023, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

March 20 2023

03/20/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0679
#### W. J. Montgomery v. N. Q. Henderson and John Ireland.

(No. 1642, Op. Book No. 3, p. 719

Appeal from Travis County.

Opinion by

Winkler, J.

§ 166. *Guarantor; surety; notice.*Suit was brought by M. against H. and. I., upon the following instrument in writing, and indorsement thereon: “Seguin, November 3d, 1877. J. H. R. &Co., Austin. Gentlemen: Mr. N. Q. H. desires an accommodation from you of one hundred and fifty dollars at three or four months. Should you be able to accommodate him, consider this as an indorsement by me for him to that amount. Very respectfully, J. I.” This was a telegram from I. to J. H. R. & Co., and was accompanied by a telegram to N. Q. H., as follows: “If you can get the one hundred and fifty dollars from any source at three or four months, this shall be surety therefor. J. I.” H. failing to get the money from J. H. R. & Co., obtained it from the plaintiff, M. *Held,*1. That I. was not merely an indorser for H., but was liable as an original surety for the money obtained upon the telegram, and such liability was coextensive with that of H., the principal. [Brandt on Suretyship and Guar. §’ 1.] 2. That I. was not entitled to notice that H. had obtained the money from M. upon the telegram, because the contract was absolute and complete in its terms, without conditions as to terms or amount. [Wade on Notice, § 394; Allen v. Rightmere, 20 Johnson, 365; Bleeker v. Hyde, 3 McLean, 279; Brud v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 523; Foster v. Barney, 3 Vermont, 60; Train v. Jones, 11 Vermont, 444; Russell v. Buck, id. 166; Penny v. Crane Bros. 80 Ill. 244.]

§167. *Letter of credit; notice of acceptance of'.*Where the collateral liability arises on a letter of credit, generally or specially addressed, which is indefinite as to the amount and the time within which the credit or future advances are to be extended or given, although the lan*67guage of the instrument may be technically consistent with the idea of a present absolute undertaking, as distinguished from a mere proposal to guaranty, except where it is a continuing guaranty, the party executing such instrument should not be held liable thereon, without notice, express or implied, of the acceptance of the guaranty, unless there had been a previous understanding that the credit would be given in case it was authorized by the guarantor. [Wade on Notice, § 405.]

Reversed and remanded.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



         In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of EDAC
Technologies Corporation (the "Company") for the period ended March 29, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned Glenn L. Purple, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



                                              /s/ Glenn L. Purple
                                              -----------------------
May 9, 2003                                   Glenn L. Purple
                                              Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to EDAC Technologies Corporation and will be retained by EDAC
Technologies Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
#### Nathaniel Toby v. Sampson Heidenheimer.

(No. 1071, Op. Book No. 2, p. 456.)

March 23, 1881.

Opinion by

Winkler, J.

§ 795. *Charge of the court; need not be in writing.*The provisions of the statute with reference to the charge of the court [R. S. 1316 et seq.] are directory merely, and a verbal charge given by the judge to the jury is not of itself such error as will necessarily cause a reversal of the judgment. It must be shown that the charge was in itself erroneous. [Reid v. Reid, 11 Tex. 585; Chapman v. Sneed, 17 Tex. 428.] The cases cited, although arising under a former statute, are equally applicable to the provisions of the Revised Statutes above cited.

Affirmed.
#### J. W. Green v. Ned Larkins.

(No. 820, Op. Book No. 2, p. 356.)

Appeal from Waller County.

February 26, 1881.

Opinion by

Hurt, J.

§ 785. *Bailment for hire; extent of bailee’s liability.*Green hired a mule of Larkins for two months, at the rate of $10 per month. While Green had the mule under this contract it Avas lost, Avithout any fault or negligence on his part. Larkins brought this suit to recover the alleged value of the mule, and the hire thereof, and in the court beloAv recovered judgment for both. Held, the contract between the parties constituted a bailment of the mule for hire. It is well settled that a bailee for hire is bound only for ordinary diligence, and is responsible only for ordinary negligence. He is held responsible only for that degree of care and diligence which a prudent man would take cr use, that is, which the generality of mankind use in keeping their own goods of the same kind. [Story on Bailments, 352, 353.] The judgment in this case is not supported by the evidence.

Reversed and remanded.
**Exhibit 13.1**

 

**906 Certification**

 

Securities and Exchange Commission

100 F Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20549

 

Ladies and Gentlemen:

 

In connection with the annual report of Wowo Limited (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2014 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Jianhui Lai, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:

 

1. the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.

 

This Certificate has not been, and shall not be deemed, “filed” with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

 
| Date:  | May 15, 2015       |   |
|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   |                    |   |
| By:    | /s/ Maodong Xu          |   |
| Name:  | Maodong Xu              |   |
| Title: | Chief Executive Officer |   |

 

----
News United States Air Force
 Air Force Surgeon General authorizes 5-year shaving waiversPublished June 23, 2020
                        
                        By Air Force Surgeon General Public Affairs
                **FALLS CHURCH, Va. (AFNS) --**
                In a memorandum dated June 18, 2020, **Lt. Gen. Dorothy Hogg**, Air Force Surgeon General authorized five-year shaving waivers for Air and Space professionals diagnosed with Pseudofolliculitis Barbae, effective immediately.
Driven by feedback from the field, the change is intended to provide more time for skin to heal and prevent a recurrence.
The previous policy required PFB waivers to be updated annually. The change allows shaving waivers to be valid for five years from the date of initiation. The waiver remains valid regardless of the member’s deployment or new permanent change of station location.
Once diagnosed with PFB, members are instructed on proper shaving methods to prevent a recurrence. Red bumps associated with this condition can cause a secondary infection and excessive scarring. PFB is most common in men with hair that curls when cut.
The policy on the length of facial hair remains the same and cannot exceed one-quarter of an inch.
Facial hair must be grown out naturally. Any shaping or styling of facial hair is not allowed, and facial hair cannot interfere with the wear of personal protective equipment, such as a gas mask. Members must be able to perform required duties.
This new authority will be updated in Air Force Instruction 44-102, *Medical Care Management*; and AFI 36-2903, *Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel*, and will be standardized across the force.AFWN 



USAF 



AF 



Air Force 



AFMS 



Air Force Medical Service 



Shaving Waiver 



Air Force Surgeon General 



Pseudofolliculitis Barbae 



PFB 



Air Force Instruction 44-102 



Medical Care Management 



AFI 36-2903
## IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

NO. WR
- 84,487
- 03

EX PARTE CLINTON MANNING DAVIS , Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 22,163
- A IN THE 258 TH DISTRICT COURT FROM POLK COUNTY
Y EARY , J., filed a concurring opinion in which S LAUGHTER , J., joined . CONCURRING OPI NION In 2013, Applicant , Clinton Manning Davis , pled guilty and was convicted of indecency with a child and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. In 2020, Applicant filed this application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, alleging his p lea was involuntary because counsel told him he would receive a sixty

- year sentence if he did not take the State’s plea offer of fifteen years

. T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. art. 11.07. Today, the Court remands this application to the trial court to further develop the record . I agree this application should be remanded , and so I join the Court’s order doing so. But I write separately, as I have previously, to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this c ase. See Ex parte Smith , 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a trial court has the authority to sua sponte considerDAVIS

— 2 the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Sepeda , No. WR

- 92,711

- 01, 2021 WL 2450089 (Tex. Crim. App. June 16, 2021) (per curiam) (not des ignated for publication) (Yeary, J., concurring) (reviewing Ex parte Smith ’s holding and the principles that justify a trial
court’s sua sponte authority to consider laches). The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant ’ s trial occurred in 2013 , but this application was not filed until almost six and a half years later. 1 In addition, the record is silent with regard to circumstances that may excuse Applicant ’ s delay. Consistent with this Court ’ s precedent, the trial co urt may, sua sponte , give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay. It may also give the State and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant ’ s delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant ’ s claims. And ultimately, the trial court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court ’ s remand order. With these additional thoughts, I join the Court ’ s order

.

FILED : September 29, 2021 DO NOT PUBLISH

1 “Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes f inal.” Ex parte Perez , 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe , 132 S.W.3d 434, 437

– 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

ROSHANKUMAR B. PATEL

, Appellant,

v.

SEBRING HEALTH SERVICES, LLC,

Appellee

.

No. 4D 20

- 2753

[ August 26, 2021 ]

Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth

Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; William W. Haury Jr. , Judge; L.T. Case

No. CACE19024320

.

Matthew D. Landau, Eric Fischer and Paul Kunz of The Landau Law

Group, Boca Raton, for appellant.

Benjamin R. Shiekman, Martin B. Goldberg and Jason A. Coe of Lash

& Goldberg LLP, Miami, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

M AY

, C IKLIN and L EVINE

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DAVID JOSEPH VERVAET.

April 18, 1978.

Petition for certification denied.
EX-10.13.1



 Exhibit 10.13.1 

AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 

THIS AMENDMENT entered into at the City of Laval, Province of Quebec, as of the 18th day of December, 2012 

 

			
	BETWEEN:	  	Ludwig Melik, of the city of Laval in the Province of Québec
		
		  	(hereinafter referred to as the “Executive”)
		
	AND:	  	TENROX INC., a corporation incorporated under the laws of Canada
		
		  	(hereinafter referred to as the “Company”).
		
	AND:	  	SILVERBACK ENTERPRISE GROUP, INC., a corporation incorporated under the laws of Delaware.
		
		  	(hereinafter referred to as “Silverback”).

 WHEREAS the Executive and the Company entered into an Employment Agreement dated February 10, 2012
(“Employment Agreement”); 
 AND WHEREAS the parties hereby wish to amend the Employment Agreement by way of the present amendment;

 NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
  

	1.	This amendment forms part of the Employment Agreement. 

  

	2.	The parties hereby agree that paragraph 9.3.5 will now read as follow: 

 9.3.5 If this Agreement
is terminated by the Company without serious reason, the Executive shall be entitled to receive an indemnity in lieu of notice equal to six (6) months of his remuneration (base salary and incentive compensation), less applicable deductions and
withholdings required by law. Such indemnity in lieu of notice shall be paid on a pay continuance basis during the six (6) month period following the termination of his employment (the “Indemnity Period”). During the Indemnity Period,
the Executive shall be entitled to continue his participation in the Company’s group medical and dental plans. Payment of the indemnity provided in this section 9.3.5 is conditional upon i) the 








 
Executive providing a full and final release of any and all claims against the Company and Silverback relative to his employment or the termination thereof, and 2) the Executive agreeing not to
make any negative or disparaging comments regarding the Company or Silverback. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have executed this Agreement. 

 

									
		 		 	TENROX INC.
				
		 		 	Per:	 	/s/ Michael Hill
		 		 		 	  

		 		 		 	Name:	 	Michael Hill
		 		 		 	Title:	 	Corp. Secretary
			
		 		 	SILVERBACK ENTERPRISE GROUP, INC.
				
		 		 	Per:	 	/s/ Michael Hill
		 		 		 	  

		 		 		 	Name:	 	Michael Hill
		 		 		 	Title:	 	CFO
				
	SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED	 		 	)	 	
	in the presence of:	 		 	)	 	
		 		 	)	 	
	/s/ Ara Israilian	 		 		 	/s/ LUDWIG MELIK
	  
	 		 		 	  

	Witness	 		 	)	 	LUDWIG MELIK
				
	Ara Israilian
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Unity National Bank v. John Scroggins

Appellate case number: 01-20-00593-CV

Trial court case number: 2017-31933

Trial court: 164th District Court of Harris County

The Court’s records indicate that appellant’s notice of appeal, filed on August 18, 2020, 

may not have been timely filed to appeal the trial court’s judgment signed on May 21, 2020. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a). Any party “seek[ing] to alter the trial court’s judgment” must timely file 

a notice of appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c). Generally, if a party fails to timely file a notice of 

appeal, we have no jurisdiction to address the merits of the party’s appeal. TEX. R. APP. P.

25.1(b).

On July 29, 2021, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that the Court may dismiss 

this appeal for lack of jurisdiction unless appellant filed a written response that demonstrated, 

with citation to the record, statutes, rules, and case law, that this Court has jurisdiction over the 

appeal. On August 12, 2021, appellant responded to the notice by letter. See generally TEX. R.

CIV. P. 306a(4), (5); TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2.

The Court requests from appellee, John Scroggins, a letter response to appellant’s August 

12, 2021 letter regarding jurisdiction. Appellee should include in his response whether he is 

opposed or unopposed to appellant’s request for abatement of the appeal to allow the trial court 

to sign a written order specifying the date when appellant or appellant’s attorney first received 

notice or acquired actual knowledge of the trial court’s judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2(c). 

The letter response must be filed no later than 14 days from the date of this order.

Judge’s signature: ____/s/ Julie Countiss_________

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: ___August 19, 2021_____
#### J. B. Dibrell v. Ireland *&*Burges.

(No. 2363, R. Book No. 4, p. 265.)

Appeal from Guadalupe County.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 300. *Suit upon a note; descriptive allegation of.*Where the petition alleged that the note was made and delivered to petitioners *“for the use and benefit*of E. W.,” and the note offered in evidence was, “I promise to pay to E. W. five hundred dollars,” etc., *held,*that the portion of the petition which stated that the note was made and delivered for the use and benefit of E. W. was not intended as part of the description of the note, but was an averment of a fact *clehors*the note, and cannot therefore be properly regarded as a descriptive allegation with which the note must correspond.

§ 301. *Suggestion of delay; effect of.*A suggestion of delay on appeal opens up for revision the whole cause and all errors, if there be any, whether they have been assigned or not. [Riggs v. Horde, 25 Tex. Sup. 460; Brown v. Hancock, 13 Tex. 22; Moody v. Benge, 28 Tex. 545; Batey v. Dibrell, 28 Tex. 173.]

§ 302. *Petition on a note substantially defective.*Where, on a suit on a note, there is no allegation in the *123petition showing any right in plaintiffs to sue upon the note, and no allegation that they, or the party for whose use and benefit they profess to sue, are the owners, holders or bearers of it, the petition is fatally defective. A petition must state the plaintiff’s cause of action by distinct averments, and leave no material fact to be inferred. The petition in this case fails to state a cause of action in plaintiffs. [Moss v. Jennings, 4 Tex. 452; Malone v. Craig, 22 Tex. 609; Gray v. Osborne, 24 Tex. 157; Thigpen v. Mundine, 24 Tex. 282; Colbertson v. Beeson, 30 Tex. 76; Seeligson v. Hobby, 51 Tex. 147; Wood v. Evans, 43 Tex. 175.]

October 2, 1882.

Reversed and remanded.