S6598 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE May 12, 1995

business, and that these first-degree

amendments be subject to relevant second-degree amendments and limited to

one-half of the time allocated for each

first-degree amendment. The excepted

amendments are: Murray-Gorton, Feinstein, Levin, Domenici, and

Kempthorne.

I further ask unanimous consent that

when the Senate resumes the bill on

Tuesday at 9:30 a.m., Senator MURRAY

be recognized to offer an amendment

on which there will be a time limit of

1 hour to be equally divided in the

usual form.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

FEINSTEIN AMENDMENT

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of the Murray

amendment, Senator FEINSTEIN be recognized to offer her amendment on

which there be 30 minutes to be equally

divided in the usual form.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

LEVIN AMENDMENT

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of the Feinstein

amendment, Senator LEVIN be recognized to offer an amendment, relative

to expansion, on which there be 30 minutes for debate to be equally divided in

the usual form.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

DOMENICI AMENDMENT

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of the Levin

amendment, Senator DOMENICI be recognized to offer an amendment relative

to title III, on which there be 30 minutes for debate to be equally divided in

the usual form.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

KEMPTHORNE AMENDMENT

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of the Domenici

amendment, Senator KEMPTHORNE be

recognized to offer an amendment,

which is clarifying in nature, on which

there be 30 minutes for debate to be

equally divided in the usual form.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, after

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

fchecking with the leadership, I am free

to announce there will be no further

rollcall votes today.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask

MORNING BUSINESS

funanimous consent that there be a period for morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I want to

congratulate the President for his successful summit in Kiev. Under President Kuchma, Ukraine has become a

model for the States of the former Soviet Union. Agreement to disband nuclear weapons; free market economic

reforms; free and fair elections; open

investment climate. President Clinton’s visit was a timely show of support to the deserving people of

Ukraine. I expect the Congress to show

our support for Ukraine’s political success.

There has been a lot said in the

media about reaction to the Moscow

summit. I have expressed my disappointment at the results of the Moscow summit. As I said yesterday, this

is not partisan politics—it is a judgment based on the facts. I note that today’s New York Times carries a headline, ‘‘Iran relieved on Yeltsin deal.’’ If

Iran is relieved at the results of the

summit, all of us have cause for concern. Secretary Christopher, in particular, has led the administration’s efforts to prevent nuclear technology

from reaching Iran. I hope to work

with him over the coming months in

support of that important goal.

The reality is, however, that there

was great controversy over President

Clinton’s decision to attend V–E Day

ceremonies in Moscow and not in other

capitals. The President made his decision, and the President decided to add

to the V–E Day ceremonies with a substantive summit. Now, in the aftermath of the summit, Judgments are

being made about what was achieved. I

happen to share the view of Henry Kissinger, that a tremendous opportunity

was missed on this overseas trip. I also

agree with Dr. Kissinger that ‘‘NATO

expansion requires a decision, not a

study.’’ As he points out, the current

drift in United States policy could

leave us with the worst of all worlds—

the disintegration of Western unity

with a still-anxious Russia.

In the past few days, other distinguished writers have expressed their

views on what was achieved at the

Moscow summit, particularly by Bill

Safire and Charles Krauthammer.

These articles deserve careful reading

by my colleagues as we continue our

assessment of the Moscow summit.

I ask unanimous consent the articles

by Safire, Krauthammer, and the article by former Secretary Kissinger be

printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

There being no objection, the articles

were ordered to be printed in the

RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, May 11, 1995]

NADIR OF SUMMITS

(By William Safire)

WASHINGTON.—Bill Clinton represented

American interests poorly in Moscow.

On the sale of Russian nuclear plants to

Iran, he was taken in by—or participated

in—a trick.

One month ago, to create a ‘‘concession’’

to the naı ̈ve American President, Boris

Yeltsin’s atomic energy chief upped the ante,

letting C.I.A. ears hear him consider adding

centrifuges to the deal with Teheran. That

outrageous act would be like selling mullahs

the means to make a bomb right away, instead of in a few years with nuclear plants

alone.

It was a ploy. While brushing aside a Clinton plea to withhold nuclear facilities from

Iran, Mr. Yeltsin grandly agreed not to add

the centrifuges. Clinton said he was ‘‘deeply

impressed’’ by this marvelous restraint, then

failed to make a strong case against the

plants on TV; Warren Christopher spun the

centrifuge ploy as ‘‘great progress.’’

Score a second victory for Yeltsin’s generals on the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. This was the agreement to limit

Russian troops, tanks and artillery near the

West from Norway to Turkey.

But the heroes of Chechnya want to put a

new 58th Russian Army in the Caucasus to

dominate its freed republics, much as Russia

now runs Georgia, Moldova and Belarus. This

would menace Turkey as well, but apparently nobody told Tansu Ciller during her recent visit to the White House that Mr. Clinton would say ‘‘We are supporting the Russian position’’ in blithely changing a treaty

ratified by the U.S. Senate.

The third defeat suffered by our absorbent

President in this nadir of summits was about

Chechnya. With the American next to him,

Yeltsin brazenly told the world press ‘‘there

is no armed activity’’ in that bloodied republic. ‘‘The armed forces are not involved

there. Today the Ministry of the Interior

simply seizes the weapons still in the hands

of some small armed criminal gangs.’’

As he was mouthing this baldfaced lie, the

Russian Army was intensifying its shelling

of rebel positions southeast of Grozny, following its Mylai-style massacre of unarmed

civilians in Samashki one month ago. The

Clinton response was to shut up. In his long,

prepared speech later, he devoted two quick

sentences to ‘‘this terrible tragedy’’ that

could ‘‘erode support for Russia.’’

Americans could well feel humiliated by

their President’s acquiescence in the lying in

his presence, and by his failure to respond to

that personal insult by broadcasting the

truth. Many Russians were hoping he would

express the dismay felt by the rest of the

world at the brutality of the generals supporting the unpopular Yeltsin. But he hardly

went through the motions.

Watching on TV in his Duma office, reformer Grigory Yavlinsky said ‘‘not enough’’

when Clinton touched ever-so-lightly on the

continuing Chechnyan slaughter. And when

Clinton praised Yeltsin for promising elections on time, as if that were proof of his

democratic spirit. Yavlinsky said: ‘‘But we

always had elections on time. The question

is what kind of elections—how open, how

fair, how financed, how counted, how supervised.’’

We do not yet know if Mr. Clinton gave

away our right to deploy regional defenses

against ballistic missiles; if so, that would

score this summit Yelsin 4, Clinton 0. And

the individual meetings we hoped he would

have with opposition leaders degenerated

into a breakfast group photo-op.

The White House spinmeisters will say: but

we got Yeltsin to join the Partnership for

Peace, didn’t we?

C’mon: the PfP will go pfft at noon on Jan.

20, 1997. If the paper ‘‘partnership’’ is a fig

leaf to cover the necessary eastward expansion of NATO, it fools nobody; but if

Yeltsin’s plucking of the fig leaf means Russia expects to be invited to join NATO, there

goes the neighborhood—NATO would lose all

meaning as a deterrent to future Russian

empire-rebuilding.