### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ma y 3, 200 5 S es sio n
ANGELA K AMIL LE DRAPER, AS 

### P ARENT 

### , S URVIV OR AND 

### N EX T 

### F RIEND OF 

### B RYANNA 

### F AITH 

### D RAP ER 

### , D ECEAS ED 

### v. LARRY H. WE STERFI ELD, ET AL 

### .

App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Appe als Circuit Court

for Su llivan County No. C34189(M ) John S . McLe llan, I II, Jud ge

No. E2003-02381-SC-R11- CV - F iled October 12, 2005

I n th is a pp e a l, w e mus t de te rm ine : ( 1) wh e the r the de fe nd a nt, a do c tor, is i mmu ne fr om l ia bil ity pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-410(a ) (1996) in conne ction with his review of

a c hil d a bu se vic tim ’s me dic a l re c or ds a s re qu e ste d b y auth oriti e s in ve sti g a tin g a lle g a tio ns of c hil d abuse; (2) whether

the def endant ha s a common law duty to report suspec ted chil d ab u s e; and (3) whether Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-4 0 1, et. seq. (1996) pr ovides a private rig ht of action for failure to report suspec ted child abuse

. We c onclude that immunit y under Te nnessee Code An notated sec tion 37-1-410(a ) is aff orded only

to those who ac tually

report harm. B eca

use the determination of whether the defe ndant reported harm involves a g enuine issue of material fac t, the Court of Appea ls corre ctly held that the trial c ourt err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt on this i ssue. We f urthe r c on c lud e that by re vie wi ng the vic tim ’s me dic a l re c or ds , the de fe nd a nt und e rt oo k a d uty to use rea sonable c are in review ing the rec ords and r eporting his finding s and conc lusions to t he investigators. Finally , we hold t h at b ec ause the plaintiff did not assert a private right of

action p u r s u a n t t o T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d s e c ti o n 3 7

- 1 -401, et

. seq. in her c omplaint, the Court of Ap pe a ls e rr e d ina dd re ssi ng theiss ue . A c c or din g ly , th e jud g me nt o f the Cou rt of Appeals is aff i rm ed in part and reve rsed in part, and the ca se is rema nded to the trial c ourt for f urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e nt of t he Co ur t o f Appe als Affir m e d in P art; Reve rsed in Par t; Re m anded to the Trial Court

J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , C.J ., and F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined.

Andre w T. Wampler and Richar d Mann Currie, Jr., King sport, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, L arry H. Westerfie ld.

Ke nn e th D . H a le a ndPaul R a y mon d Wo hl f o r d , B ri sto l, T e nn e sse e , f

or theAp pe lle e , A ng e la

Kamil le Dra per.D u rin g a c o m p u te riz e d to m o g ra p h y (C T ) s c a n , “[p ]ic tur e s o f struc tur e s w ithin the b o d y [a re ] c re a te d b y a 1

c om pu t e r t h a t t a k e s t h e da t a fr om mu l t i pl e X- r a y i ma g e s a n d t u r n s t h e m i n t o p i c t u r e s on a s c r e e n

. ” M e dTer ms D i ct i o nary , ht t p : / / www

. m ed t erm s. co m / scr i p t / m ai n/ art

. asp? art i cl ekey=2 8 7 8 (l ast vi si t ed O ct o b er 10 , 20 0 5 ).

A “h yg ro m a ” is a “ c y stic tu m o r o f l ym p h a tic o rig in.” M e d line P lus M e d ic a l D ic tio n a ry, 2
ht t p : / / www 2

. m erri am

- web st er. co m / cgi

- b i n/ m wm ed nl m ? b o o k= M ed i cal & va= hy grom a (l ast vi si t ed O ct o b er 10 , 20 0 5 ).
-2- OP IN ION

On J une 2, 2000, thre e-month-old B ry an n a Dr aper (“B ry anna” ) died a s a re sult of injuries inf lic te d u po n h e r b y

he r f a the r, Danie l L e e Dr ape r ( “ Mr . D ra pe r” ). Bry a nn a ’s mothe r, An g e la Dra per ( “Mrs. Dr aper ”), a s pare nt, survivor, and ne x t friend of Bry anna, br oug ht suit against severa l de fe nd a nts , in c lud ing Dr . L arry Wes te rf ie ld ( “ Dr . We ste rf

ie ld” ), a ra dio log ist . T he fo llo wi ng fa c ts relate to Mrs. Dra

per’ s claims ag ainst Dr. Westerf ield.

In M a y 2 0 0 0 , B r ya n n a

w a s a d m i t t e d t o H o l s t o n V a l l e y R e g i o n a l M e d i c a l C e n t e r f o r x

- r a ys and a CT sc an of her

brain. Mrs. Dr aper

alleg es in her c omplaint that various phy sicians opined that 1 Bry anna’ s x -ray s were“norma l” and that they discharg ed B ry anna to he r par ents on May 14, 2000.
During the same time pe riod, the De partment of Children’ s S er v i ces ( “DCS”) be g an an inv e sti g ati on regarding po ssi blec hil d a bu se of B ry a nn a . O n M a y

15 , 2 00 0, Di a ne Sta nle y

(“ Ms. Stanley ”), a

DCS casewor

ker, c ontacted the hospital’s radiolog y department and re quested a second opinion reg arding Bry anna’ s x -ray s. An em ploy ee in the r adiolog y department scheduled an
ap p o i n t m e n tf

o r M s

. S t a n l e y w i t h D r

. W e s t e r f i e l d f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y.

Ms. Sta nle y a nd De te c tiv e L ou is Eli a s of the Sul liv a n Coun ty She ri ff ’s De pa rt me nt me t w ith Dr. Westerf

ield at the hospital and re quested that he revie w the x -ray s and CT br ain sca n as part of the investigation. Dr. Westerfield claims he informed Ms. Stanley and Detec tive El i as t h at he ob se rv e d a

bn orma litie s in c lud ing a

sma ll b if ro nta l su bd ur a l fl uidc oll e c tio n o r a hy g ro ma in the CT

2
scan, an arm fra cture , and a clavicle fra cture

. Acc ording to D r. Westerfie ld, he furthe r informe d the inv e sti g a tor s th a t heob se rv e d s ig ns of po ssi blea

bu se a ndthat th e pa

re nts we rethelik e ly

abu se rs

. Dr. Westerf

ield also claimed he told the i nvestig ators that he did not believe that the injuries re sulted fr om m ish a nd lin g by

nu rs e s at th e ho sp ita l.
Ms. Stanley claimed that upon examining the CT sc an, Dr. Westerf ield stated that the re port sh ou ld r e pr e se nt that th e sc a n w a s a bn orma l rathe r than no rm a l bu t that the abn orma lit y wa s n ot a
c aus e fo r c on c e rn

. Ac c or din g to Ms. Sta nle y , Dr . West e rf ie ld opi ne d that Bry a nn a ’s inj urie s c ou ld ha ve oc c ur

re d a s a re su lt o f B ry a nn a ’s re a c tio n to theho sp ita l nu rs e s’ a tte mpt s to t reat he r. Ms. Stanley maintained that Dr . Westerfield ne ver told her that Bry anna’ s injuries likely resulted f rom abuse by her pa rents. Ms. Stanley testified that if Dr. Westerfield had state d that he observed sig ns of child abuse , she would have r emoved B ry anna f rom her pa

rents’ c ustody . Ms. Stanley stated that her me eting with Dr. Westerfie ld was only one compone nt o f h er inve stigation and that she continued with her

investigation after the ir meeting conclude d.-3-

Mr s. Dr ape r f

ile d s uit a g a ins t D r. Wes te rf

ie ld c la imi ng that he had a du ty to r e po rt his suspicions of Bry anna’ s abuse to the investig ators. I f Dr. Westerfield had reported this information, t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r s w o u l d h a v e r e m o v e d B r ya n n a f r o mM r

. D r ap e r ’ s c u s t o d y.

Dr . West e rf

ie ld fi le d a motio n for su mma ry jud g me nt co nte nd ing that Mrs . Dr ape r f a ile d to

e sta bli sh the re qu ir e d ele me nts of me dic a l ma lpr a c tic e be c aus e a ph y sic ia n- patie nt r e latio ns hip did not exi s t b et wee n Dr. Westerf ield and B ry anna and that Dr. Westerf ield did not deviate fr om the applicable standard of

car e. Dr . Westerfield further m aint ained that Te nnessee Code Annotated section 37-1- 410 (1996) provided him with immunit y

. The trial c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt to Dr. Westerfie ld. Wi th reg ard to the me dical malpra ct ice c laim, the trial court f ound that no ph y sic ia n- patie nt r e latio ns hip e xiste d b e tw e e n D r. Wes te rf ie ld andB ry a nn a . Re c og nizi ng that Mr s. Dra per a lso alleg ed neg lige nce, the trial court f urther f ound that a disputed issue of mate ri al fact exis ted as to whe ther Dr . Westerfield r ep o rt ed ch ild abuse to the investig ators. Reg ardle ss of the

c on te nt of th e in fo rm a tio n, ho we ve r, thetria l c ou rt he ld that D r. Wes te rf

ie ld w a s e nti tle d to immunit y pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37- 1-410 (1996) for cooper ating with the investigators and providing information to them..

The Court of Appea ls a ffirme d the trial court’s judgme nt, f inding that no phy sician-patient

re latio ns hip had been est abli sh e d b e tw e e n D r. Wes te rf ie ld andB ry a nn a . T he Cou rt of Ap pe a ls further conclude d that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-401, et. seq. (1996), entitled “Mandatory

Child Abuse Reports,” cr eate s a private rig ht of action ag ainst one who fails to report suspicions of child abuse. Theintermediate appellate court he ld th at immunityunder Te nnessee Code Annotated section 37-1-410 ( 1996) attac hes whe n a per son reports suspected c hild abuse and not when he or

she fails to do so. The Court of Ap p ea l s concluded that the content of the information that Dr. Wester field provided to the inve stigators was a disputed issue of material fac t and ther efor e re verse d the trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt on this issue. We g rante d revie w.

AN AL YSI S

Th e tria l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to g rant sum mary jud g me nt is ap pr op ri a te on ly if Dr . We ste rf

ie ld demonstrated that no ge nuine issues of material fac t exi sted and that he is entitle d t o judgme nt as a matter of law. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181, 183 (Tenn. 20 0 0 )

. We r e v ie w th e tria l c o u rt’ s d e c is io n to g r a n t s u mm ar y ju d g me n t d e n o v o w ith no presumption of cor

re ct n es s attache d to the trial court’ s conclusions. See Mooney v. Sneed, 30 S.W. 3d30 4, 30 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . We a lso vie w the e vid e nc e in the l igh t mo st f a vo ra bleto M rs

. Drap er, t he n on -m ov in g part y , d rawi ng all reas on abl e in feren ces i n her f avo r. S ee S tap les v. CBL & A ssocs., I nc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Te nn. 2000). The purpose of summary judgme nt “ is to re solve controlling issues of law r ather than to find fac ts or resolve disputed factua l issues.” XI Props., I nc. v. Race Trac Petroleum, I nc., 151 S.W.3d 443, 4 4 6 (Tenn. 2004) (citation omitted). The primary issues underlying a

motion for summary

judgme nt are “(1) whether a factual dispute exists; (2) whether the disputed fac t is material to the outcome of the case ; and (3) whe ther the disputed f act
cre ates a g enuine issue f

or trial.” B yrd v. Ha ll, 847 S.W .2d 208, 214 (Tenn. 1993)

.T he ver s i on of T enn es s ee C od e A nn ot at ed s ect i on 3 7- 1- 41 0 ( 19 96 ) i n ef fect at t he t i me of

t he eve nt s s ubj ect 3

t o t hi s l awsui t co nt ai ned only t wo s ub sect i o ns. Sub sect i o n (b) p rovided that “[a]ny p ers o n rep o rt i ng und er t he p rovis i o ns
o f t hi s p art shal l ha ve a ci vi l c ause o f a ct i o n for app rop ri at e co m p ensat o ry and punit i ve d am ages agai nst any pe rs o n who

causes a d et ri m ent al change i n t he em p l o y m ent st at us o f t he repo rt i ng p art y b y reason o f t he repo rt

. ” T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 7 -1 -4 1 0 (b ) (1 9 9 6 ).
-4- A. Im m uni ty

Dr. Westerf

ield maintains that irrespe ctive of the cause s of action alleg ed by Mrs. Dra per, he is immune from liabilitypursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-410 as a re sult of his cooper ation with investigators. The ve rsion of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-410(a ) (1996) in ef

fec t when the e vents subject to this lawsuit oc curr ed provides that “[a] person re porting h ar m s h a l l b e p r e s u m e d t o b e a c t i n g i n g o o d f a i t h a n d s h a l l t h e r e b y b e i m m u n e f r o ma n y l i ab i l i t y,
c ivi l or c ri min a l, that mi g ht o the rw ise be inc ur re d o r i mpo se d for

su c h a c tio n. ” Un de r the plain

3 la ng ua g e of the statut e , a pe rs on wh o r e po rt s h arm is i mmu ne fr om all

civil and criminal liabili ty that otherwise may

arise f rom such ac tion. Bec ause Mr s. Drape r’s c laims ag ainst D r. W est erf ield are based upon the doct o r’ s conduct with re g ard to the inve stigation of child abuse c laims, Dr. Westerfield is e ntitled to immunit y if he “re port[ed] harm” under the statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-410( a) ( 1996).
A “[r]eport of harm” is a “r eport filed und er [ section] 37-1-403.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 37-1-401( 3) (1996) . Tenn e s s e eCo d eA n n o ta te d section 37-1- 403(a) (1996) lists the circ umstances under w hich a pe rson is require d to report suspec ted child abuse . Acc ording to this subs ection,

A n y p e r s o n , i n c l u d i n g , b u tn o tl i m i t e d t o , a n y: (1) Phy sician, osteopathic phy sician, medica l examiner, chiropra ctor , n urse or hospital personnel en gag ed in the admission, examination, care or treatment of pe rs on s;
(2) He alth or mental he alth profe ssional other than one listed in subdivision (a)( 1); [or]

. . . . (8) Ne ighbor , relative, friend or any other pe rson; having knowledg e of or called upon to r ender aid to any child who is suffering f

rom or has sustained any

wound, injury , disability , or phy sical or menta l condition which is of su c h a

natur e a s to re a so na

bly ind ic a te that it

ha s b e e n c aus e d b y

br uta lit y , a bu se or neg lect or w hich on the basis of available information re asonably appea rs to have been c aused by

brutality , abuse or

neg lect, shall re port such harm i m mediately , by te le ph on e or

oth e rw ise, to th e jud g e ha vin g juv e nil e jurisd ic tio n o r t o th e c ou ntyD r. W est erf i el d c o nt end s t hat T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 37

- 1

- 4 1 0 (a)( 6 ) and (7) (20 0 1 ) al so affo rd 4
hi m i mm un i t y

. Subs ect i on ( a) ( 6) pr ovi des t hat

[a] p ers o n f

urni shi ng a repo rt , i nfo rma t i o n or reco rds as requi red o r aut ho ri zed unde r t he p rovis i o ns
o f t hi s p art s hal l have t he same imm uni t y and the sam e scop e o f imm uni t y w i t h respe ct t o t est i m o ny such p ers o n m ay b e requir ed t o gi ve o r m ay gi ve i n any judici al o r ad m i ni st rat i ve p roce ed i ng or i n any
co m m uni cat i o ns wi t h t he d ep art m ent or any l aw enf o rcem ent o f f i ci al a s i s o t herwi se co nferred b y t he pr ov i s i on s of

t h i s s u bs e c t i on u po n t h e pe r s on w h o m a de t h e or i g i n a l r e po r t of h a r m.

T enn

. Co de Ann. § 37

- 1- 41 0(a) ( 6) ( 20 01 )

. Subs ect i on ( 7) pr ovi des t hat

[i]f the p e rs o n furn ish ing a re p o rt, info rm a tio n o r re c o rd s d u rin g the no rm a l co u rs e o f suc h p e rs o n ’s d u ties a s re q u ire d o r a u tho riz e d u n d e r t h e p ro v isio n s o f t h is p a rt is d iff e re n t t h a n the p e rs o n o rig ina lly

r e po r t i n g t h e h a r m, t h e n t h e pe r s on f u r n i s h i n g s u c h r e po r t , i n for ma t i on or r e c or ds s h a l l ha v e t h e s a me im m u n ity a n d th e s a m e s c o p e o f im m u n ity w ith re sp e c t t o tes tim o n y su c h p e rs o n m a y b e re q u ire d to gi ve o r ma y g i v e i n an y j u di ci al or admi n i s t r at i v e pr oce edi n g or i n an y commu n i ca t i on s wi t h t he d e p a rtm e n t o r a n y law e n fo rc e m e n t o ff ic ia l as is o the rw ise c o n fe r r e d b y t h e p ro v isio n s o f t h is

su b se c tio n up o n the p e rs o n w h o m a d e the o rig ina l re p o rt.

Id . at (7 ). T h e se p ro v isio n s, ho w e v e r, w e re n o t in effe c t un til 2 0 0 1 , ap p ro x im a te ly o n e ye a r a fter the e v e n ts su b je c t t o th is l a w su it o c c u rr e d . T h u s, w e d o no t re a c h the issu e o f t h e e ff e c t o f t h e se su b d ivisio n s u p o n M rs . D ra p e r’s c la im ag ai n s t D r

. W es t er f

i el d.
-5- officeof the department or to the officeof the sheriff or thechief law enf orce ment of fi c ia l of themun ic ipa lity

wh e rethec hil d r e sid e s.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-403(a ) (1996)

.
When rea d toge ther, these statutes provide that immunityis aff orded only to a per son who actua lly reports harm. The langua g e of section 37-1- 410(a) does not aff ord immunityto a per son 4 wh o iss ues a

re po rt that do e s n ot i nc lud e a c on c lus ionof

c hil d a bu se . Cf . Co nn . G e n. Stat. § 17a-101e (b) ( 2004) (“ Any perso n , i n s tituti on or ag ency which, in g ood faith, make s, or in g ood faith does not ma

ke, the report . . . shall be immune from a ny liability , civil or criminal, which mig ht otherwise beincurre d or i mposed.

. . .”); Manifold v. Rag ag lia, 862 A.2d 292, 301 n.15 (Conn. 2004) (explaining that sec tion 17a -101e( b) was amende d to inc lude the lang uag e “in g ood faith does not make” to ext end immunityto those who, in exercising their prof essional judg ment, conclude that no

abu se oc c ur

re d) . Furthe rm or e , th e plain l a ng ua g e of se c tio n 37 -1 -4 10 (a ) do e s n ot e xten d im mun ity to those who coope rate in an investigation by DCS or law enfor ceme nt officials. Cf. L a. Child. Code An n. art . 6 11 A( 1) (2 00 4) (p ro vid ing immun ity to a ny pe rs on “ wh o ing oo d f a ith

. . . c oo pe rate s in any investigation arising as a result of [a] report”) ; Mich. Comp. L aws § 722.625 (2005) (extending immun ity to a pe rs on a c tin g in g oo d fait h wh o “ c oo pe rate s ina n in ve sti g a tio n” ); N. C. G e n. Stat. § 7B- 309 (1999) ( aff

ording immunit y

to any one who “ co o p er at es wi th the county department of social services in a pr otective se rvice s inquiry or investig ation”); Te x . Fam. Code Ann. § 261.106(a) (1995) ( providing immunit y to a person a cting in good f aith who “a ssists i n the investig ation of a report of alleg ed child abuse ”).-6-

Dr . We s t e rf

i e l d a d v an c e s s e v e r a l po lic y

arg ume nts in s up po rt

of his c on te nti on that im mun ity sh ou ld b e a ff

or de d to a ny on e wh o ing oo d f a ithc oo pe rate s intheinv e sti g a tio n o f a lle g e d c hil d abuse. Acc ording to Dr. Westerfie ld, a thoroug h investigation by DCS of most cases of suspec ted

c hil d ab us e re qu ir e s a med ic a l opin ion . D CS w ill be ableto o btain o bje c tiv e me dic a l a dv ic e on ly if medica l consultant s ar e g rante d immunit y based upon the ir coope ration with investigators. Dr. Wes te rf ie ld m a int a ins that a

do c tor wh os e me dic a l op ini on is s ou g ht b y DC S lik e ly

wi ll r e fu se to cooper ate if the doctor is subject to liabilityfor pr oviding an objective opinion in g ood faith. The plain lang uag e of Te nnessee Code Annotated section 37-1-410( a) (1996), howe ver, doe s not provide immunit y under the se circ umstances. See City of Cookeville v. Humphrey , 126 S.W .3d 897, 902 (T e nn . 2 00 4) (e xpla ini ng that w he rethela ng ua g e of a statut e is c le ar andunamb igu ou s, we mus t apply t h e s t at u t e in acc ordanc e with its plain lang uag e). We may not alter or amend a statute. Mooney , 30 S. W

. 3d at 306 (c itation omit ted). Furthermor e, we may neither que stion the

rea sonablene ss of a statute nor substitut e our policy

judgme nts for those of the leg i s l ature . I d. at 306-07.

Acc ording ly , we hold that Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 37-1-410( a) ( 1996) does not

a f f o r d i m m u n i t y t o D r

. W e s t e r f i e l d u n l e s s h e i n f

o r m e d S t a n l e y a n d D e t e c t i v e E l i a s t h a tt h e x

- r a ys and C T scan indicated child abuse. Dr. W esterf ield claims that he informed the investig ators that the x-ray s and CT scan indicated that B ry anna w as bei n g abused. Stanley maintains that Dr. Westerfield did not provide he r with this information. Thus, the determination of whether Dr. Westerfield reported suspected c hild abuse and thus is entitled to immuni ty involves a disputed issue of mate ri a l f

a c t pr e c lud ing su mma

ry jud g me nt.

B

. Mr s . Dr a p er ’s Cl a i ms

Irre spective of immunit y , the parties raise severa l issues reg arding Mrs. Dra per’ s cause s of action. B efor e we addre ss the issues raised by the parties, howeve r, we must first determine whe ther Mrs. Dra per’ s claim is one of medic al malpra ctice or of common law ne g lige nce. We have pr evio u s l y

observe d the “subtle” distinction between medic al malpra ctice and common law neg lige nce r ecog nizi ng that “me d i ca l m alpra ctice is but a spe cies of ne g lige nce and no rig id analytical line sepa rate s the two.” Gunte r v. L ab. Corp. o f Am

. , 1 2 1 S.W .3d 636, 639 (Tenn. 2003) (citations omitted). A neg lige nce claim require s proof of “(1) a duty of ca re ow ed by the def endant to the plaintiff; ( 2) conduc t by the def endant fa l l i n g below the standa rd of c are amounting to a brea ch of that duty ; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and ( 5) proximate or leg al cause.” B iscan v. B rown, 160 S.W.3d 462, 478 (Tenn. 2005).

Medica l ma lprac tice actions are controlled by Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 29-26- 115 (2000), whic h incorporates the common law e lements of neg lige nce. Gunter, 121 S.W.3d at 639. Pursuant to section 29-26-115( a), the plaintiff must prove : ( 1) the rec og nized standa rd of car e; (2) the de fe nd a nt’ s fa ilu re to ac t in a c c or da nc e wi th the app lic able stand ard of c are ; and (3 ) p ro xima te
cause in that as a proximate result of the defendant’s neg lige nce, the plaintiff suffe red injuries that otherwise w ould not have occ urre d.-7-

Cases involving he alth or medica l entities do not automatically fall within the medica l malprac tice statute. Gunte r, 121 S.W.3d at 640. Rathe r, i n d etermining whe ther a n action is for medical malpr acticeor for common law neg lige nce, the issue is whether the alleg ed neg lige nt
c o n d u c t “ b e ar s a s u b s tan ti a l r e lati o n s h ip to th e r e n d it io n o f me d ic a l tr e a tm e n t b y a medical profe ssional.” I d. at 641. I f so, the medical malprac tice st atute applies. I d. I f, however, the plaintiff seeks compensation for injuries re sulting fr om neg lige nt conduct not af fec ting a patient’s medica l treatment, the claim fa lls under common law ne g lige nce. I d. at 640.

I n the pre sent ca se, Mrs. Dr aper raised c laims in the trial court base d upon both medical malprac tice and c ommon law neg lige nce in he r complaint. I n this Court, Mrs. Dra per did not appe al the Court of Appe als’ dete rmination that no phy sician-patient relationship was established betwee n Dr . We ste rf

ie ld andB ry a nn a . Sh e a lso do e s n ot s e e k to f urthe r h e r m e dic a l ma lpr a c tic e c la im. Ra the r, Mr s. Dr ape r n ow re lie s u po n h e r c omm on la w n e g lig e nc e c la im.
Mrs. Draper se eks re lief base d upon Dr. Westerf ield’s conduc t in reviewing Bry anna’ s
rec ords a n d p r o v id in g in f o r mati o n to in v e s ti g a to r s

. D r

. We s te r f ie ld ’ s a c ti o n s d o n o t r e late to the

me dic a l tr e a tme nt o f B ry a nn a

. Ra the r, the pu rp os e of Dr . We ste rf

ie ld’ s c on du c t w a s to pr ov idea id to inve stigators seeking to pr otect Bry anna from child abuse. Thus, Mrs. Dra per’ s cause of ac tion is for that of c ommon law neg lige nce.

Our focu s i n this appeal is upon the first e lement of a common law neg lige nce a ction, the exis tence of a duty . The de termination of whether a duty exis ts is a question of law. B iscan, 160 S.W .3d at 478. I n g ener al, all persons have a broad duty to exercise re asonable car e to avoid ca using fore seea ble injury to others. Doe v. L

inder Constr. Co., 845 S.W .2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1992) . One does not have an affirmative duty to act for the prote ction of a third pa rty unless he or she “stands in some special r elationship to either the person who is the sour ce of the dang er, or

to the person who is forese eably

at risk from the dang er.” T u rn er v

. J ordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tenn. 1997) (citation omitted). Mrs. Dra per, howeve r, does not r ely upon a “spec ial relationship” in contending that a du ty e xiste d. Ra the r, sh e ma int a ins that by un de rt akin g to r e vie w B ry a nn a ’s me dic a l r e c or ds , Dr . We ste rf

ield a ssu me d a

du ty to u se re a so na

blec arein r e vie wi ng there c or ds a ndre po rt ing his fi nd ing s a ndc on c lus ion s to theinv e sti g a tor s.

We have p r e v io u s ly h e ld th a t “ ‘ [o ]n e w h o a s s u me s to a c t, e v e n th o u g h g r a tu it o u s ly , may thereb y b ec o m e s ubject to the duty of ac ting c are fully .’” B iscan, 160 S.W.3d at 482-83 (quoting Stewart v. State, 33 S.W.3d 785, 793 (Tenn. 2000))

. By revie wing Bry anna’ medical r ecor ds as part of a c hil d a bu se inv e sti g a tio n, Dr . West e rf ie ld vol un tari ly un de rt oo k a d uty on be ha lf of B ry a nn a to
us e re a so na

blec arein r e vie wi ng theme dic a l r e c or ds a ndre po rt ing his fi nd ing s a ndc on c lus ion s to the investig ators. I f Dr. Westerfield is found not to have r eporte d harm a nd is there fore not immune from liability , Mrs. Dra

per’ s common law neg lige nce action may proce ed. Mrs. Dra per, how ever , still bear s the burden of

establishing the rema ining e lem en t s o f neg lige nce: br eac h of duty , injury or loss, cause in fac t, and proxim ate c ause. See Biscan, 160 S.W .2d at 478.-8-

Finally , Dr. W esterf

ield contends that irrespe ctive of the issue of immunity , he is not subject to civil liabili ty

beca use Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-401, et. seq. (1996 ), entitled “Mandatory

Child Abuse Reports,” does not cr eate a “private ri gh t o f action” f or failure to report
su sp e c te d c hil d a

bu se . D r. W est erfi eld cite s to Pr e miu m F inanc e Cor p. of Am e ri c a v. Crump I nsuranc e Servic es of Me mphis, I nc., 978 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tenn. 1998), in which this C ourt discussed the principles f

or dete rm i n ing w hether

the leg islature intended that a statute provide f or an independe nt statutory rig ht of action. A caref ul rea ding of

Mrs. Dra per’ s complaint and ame nded complaints, howeve r, re veals that she did not alleg e an inde pendent statutory rig ht o f ac tion for violation of Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 37-1-403 (1996). Rather, in addition to the medica l

ma lpr a c tic e a c tio n, Mr s. Dr ape r brou g ht a c omm on la w n e g lig e nc e c la im a g a ins t D r. Wes te rf ie ld based upon his alleg ed fai l u re to re port suspecte d child abuse. Astatutory rig ht of ac tion and a

co m m o n l aw neg lige nce a ction are two distinct bases of civil liability . See Mar quay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 277 (N.H . 1995) (disting uishing be tween the two cause s of ac ti o n ). Moreover, Dr

. Westerfield did not raise the “private rig ht of ac tion” i s s u e i n his answer to either Mrs. Dr aper ’s complaint or her amende d complaints or in his moti on for summary judgme nt. The first time that Dr. Westerfield contende d that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tions 37-1-401, et. seq. didno t c re a te an indepe ndent statutory

rig ht of action was in his brief to the C ourt of Appeals. Since Mrs. Dra per did not assert an inde pendent statutory rig ht of action, the Court of Appea ls e rre d in addre ssing the issue.

CO NC LU SION

We conclude that the determination of whether Dr. Westerf

ield reported harm, thus entitl ing him to im mu ni typu rs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 3 7- 1- 41 0( a ) ( 19 96 ), inv olv e s a g enuine issue of material f act that prec ludes summary judgme nt. We further hold that in re viewing B ry a nn a ’s me dical re c or ds , D r. Wes te rf ie ld a ssu me d a

du ty to B ry a nn a

to u se re a so na

blec arein revie wing the re cords and reporting his finding s and conclusions to the investig ators. F inally , we conclude that the Court of Appe als err ed in addr essing the issue of whet h er T en n essee Code Annotated se ction 37-1-401, et. seq. (1996) pr ovided for private rig ht of ac tion because Mrs. Dra per did not assert a private rig ht of action in he r complaint. Acc ording ly , the judgme nt of the Court of Appea ls is affirmed in pa

rt and re verse d in part, and the c ase is re manded to the tria l court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

The c osts of appea l are taxed to the appellant, L arry H. Westerfie ld, and his surety , for whic h

e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

______________________________ JANI CE M . H OLDE R, JUS TI CE