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******************************************************JAY M. TYLER v. THOMAS J. TYLER ET AL. (AC 36164)
DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Sheldon, Js. Argued March 5—officially released June 17, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Sommer, J.) Jay M. Tyler, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Bruce D. Tyler, self-represented, the appellant (defendant and cross complaint plaintiff).
Kathleen Eldergill, with whom, on the brief, was Bruce S. Beck, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).Opinion DiPENTIMA, C. J. The self-represented plaintiff, Jay Tyler, and cross claim plaintiff, Bruce Tyler, appeal from thejudgment ofthe trial court granting in part the motion for summaryjudgment filed by the defendants Thomas Tyler, Russell Tyler, John Tyler, and Richard Tatoian.1 There are two claims on appeal. First, the plaintiffs claimthatthe courtimproperlyrenderedsummary judgment on several counts asserted against Tatoian. Second, JayTylerclaimsthatthe courtimproperlyrendered summaryjudgment on his counts seeking to modify the trust on the ground of undue influence. As to the first claim, the decision on the counts relating to Tatoian was not a final judgment, and we therefore dismiss that portion of the appeal. As to the second claim, we agreewithJayTylerandreversethejudgment of the court. This appeal pertains to an irrevocable trust executed by Ruth Tyler on October 8, 2004, for the benefit ofher sons, John Tyler, Bruce Tyler, Thomas Tyler, Russell Tyler andJay Tyler. The trust named Tatoian as trustee andprovided forthe termination ofthe trust upon Ruth Tyler’s death, with the assets of the trust remaining after payment ofvarious expenses to be distributed to her five sons in substantially equal shares. The trust specified, by reference to Ruth Tyler’s will, that the shares allotted to the plaintiffs be reduced in accordance with the debt owed by each to Ruth Tyler. On April 1, 2010, Ruth Tyler died. Due to the value of the trust’s assets and the amount of debt owed, Jay Tyler
was not entitled to receive any money from the trust.2
The lengthy and convoluted procedural history of this appeal began on January 28, 2011, when Jay Tyler commenced an action contesting the trust and alleging, among other things, that Thomas Tyler had exerted undue influence overtheir mother.3 Bruce Tyler, ostensibly a defendant in Jay Tyler’s action, responded by admitting the allegations of undue influence and filing
a cross complaint. The defendants denied Jay Tyler’s allegations and pleaded several special defenses. After
numerous motions, interlocutory rulings, and amendments to the pleadings, the action ultimately consisted of(1) two counts asserted byJay Tyler seeking to modifythe trust onthe grounds ofundue influence, conspiracy, and what the court characterized as ‘‘tortious interference with the expectancy of inheritance,’’ and (2) several counts assertedbybothJayTyler and Bruce Tyler against Tatoian for negligence and breach ofvarious duties. On April 15, 2013, the defendants filed a motion for summaryjudgment. Theplaintiffsfiledajointobjection. Both sides submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of their positions. The defendants also moved to strike certain portions of the plaintiffs’affidavits and documentary evidence. In a memorandum of decision dated August 22, 2013, the court granted the defendants’ motion to strike some of the evidence. On the basis of the remaining evidence and memoranda, the court rendered summaryjudgment on those countsassertedbyJayTylerseekingtomodifythetrust, concluding that there was no genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to the claim of undue influence and that the claimsofconspiracyandtortiousinterferencenecessarilyfailedwithoutapredicatefinding ofundueinfluence. The court also rendered summaryjudgment on all but
one of the counts asserted by the plaintiffs against Tatoian, concludingthat General Statutes § 45a-204 and the terms ofthe trust barred the claims based on Tatoian’s failure to provide accountings and his alleged mismanagement ofthe trust.4 The plaintiffs have appealed. Additional facts andprocedural historywillbe setforth
as necessary. I
Asathresholdmatter, we considerwhethertheruling fromwhichtheplaintiffs appeal constitutes afinaljudgmentforthepurposes ofdeterminingthe subjectmatter jurisdiction of this court.5 After oral argument, we invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing on this issue.6 We conclude that the ruling constitutes a final judgment with respect to Thomas Tyler, John Tyler, andRussellTyler, butnotwithrespecttoTatoian. ‘‘Thejurisdiction ofthe appellate courts is restricted to appeals fromjudgments that are final. General Statutes §§ 51-197a and 52-263; Practice Book § [61-1]

. . . . The policy concerns underlying the final judgment rule are to discourage piecemeal appeals and to facilitate the speedy and orderly disposition of cases at the trial court level.

. . . The appellate courts have
a duty to dismiss, even on [their] own initiative, any appeal that [they lack] jurisdiction to hear.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 793–94, 967 A.2d 1 (2009). ‘‘A judgment that disposes of only a part of a complaint is not a final judgment

. . . unless the partial judgment disposes of all causes of action against a particular party or parties; see Practice Book § 61-3; or ifthe trial court makes a written determination regarding the significance of the issues resolved by the judgment and the chiefjustice or chiefjudge of the court having appellate jurisdiction concurs. See Practice Book § 61-4 (a).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Harnage v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 141 Conn. App. 9, 13–14, 60 A.3d 308 (2013). Here, the ruling from which the plaintiffs appeal was a partial judgment, as it did not dispose of the entire complaint or cross complaint. Nevertheless, the rulingconstitutes a final judgment with respect to Thomas Tyler, John Tyler and Russell Tyler, as it disposed of all the counts asserted against them. See Practice Book § 61-3. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Jay Tyler’s claim on appeal relating to those defendants. On the other hand, the court’s ruling disposed of only a portion ofthe plaintiffs’ counts asserted against Tatoian.7Asthetrial court didnotmake awritten determination regarding the significance of the issues resolved by the judgment, neither of our rules ofpractice conferring final judgment status on a partial judgment applies with respect to Tatoian. Practice Book § 61-4. Furthermore, we are notpersuaded bythe plaintiffs’ argument that the court’s ruling is an appealable interlocutory order under State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). Accordingly, we dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal with respect to Tatoian for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II
We now consider the merits ofJay Tyler’s claim that the court improperly rendered summary judgment on his counts seeking to have the trust modified. Jay Tyler argues that the court incorrectly concluded that there
was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Thomas Tyler exerted undue influence over Ruth Tyler. We agree. We begin by setting forth the well established standard of review. ‘‘Pursuant to Practice Book § 17-49, summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Such questions of law are subject to plenary appellate review.

. . . In deciding whether the trial court properly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

. . . ‘‘Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue

. . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence ofsuch a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact

. . . are insufficient to establish the existence ofa material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court

. . . . It is frequently stated in Connecticut’s case law that, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 17-45 and 17-46, a party opposing a summaryjudgment motion must provide an evidentiaryfoundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.

. . . [T]ypically [d]emonstrating a genuine issue requires a showing of evidentiary facts or substantial evidenceoutside the pleadings from which material facts alleged in the pleadings can be warrantably inferred.

. . . A material fact is one that will make a difference in the result of the case.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marutv. IndyMacBank, FSB, 132 Conn. App. 763, 767–68, 34 A.3d 439 (2012). Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with respect to any one element that the plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail at trial. See Sherman v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 79 Conn. App. 78, 90–91, 828 A.2d 1260 (2003) (summaryjudgmentappropriateinmedicalmalpractice action where no genuine issue of material fact existed
as to essential element of causation); see also Chase ManhattanMortgage Corp. v. Machado, 83 Conn. App. 183, 189–90, 850 A.2d 260 (2004) (summary judgment appropriate in fraud action where no genuine issue of material fact existed as to third essential element). Guiding our analysis is the relevant law of undue influence. ‘‘Undue influence isthe exercise ofsufficient control over a person, whose acts are brought into question, in an attempt to destroy his [or her] free agencyandconstrainhim [orher] to dosomethingother than he [or she] would do under normal control.

. . . It is stated generally that there are four elements of undue influence: (1) a person who is subject to influence; (2) an opportunity to exert undue influence; (3)
a disposition to exert undue influence; and (4) a result indicating undue influence.

. . . Relevant factors include age and physical and mental condition of the
one alleged to have been influenced, whether he [or she] had independent or disinterested advice in the transaction

. . . consideration or lack or inadequacy thereoffor any contract made, necessities and distress of the person alleged to have been influenced, his [or her] predisposition to make the transfer in question, the extent of the transfer in relation to his [or her] whole worth

. . . failure to provide for all of his [or her] children in case ofatransferto one ofthem, active solicitations andpersuasionsbythe otherparty, andthe relationship ofthe parties.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pickman v. Pickman, 6 Conn. App. 271, 275–76, 505 A.2d 4 (1986).
Onappeal,theissuebeforeusiswhethertheevidence submittedbytheparties,8viewedinthelightmostfavorable toJayTyler, demonstrates agenuine issue ofmaterial fact as to undue influence. In conducting a plenary review ofthe record, we are mindful that the elements of undue influence are typically questions for the jury. See Salvatore v. Hayden, 144 Conn. 437, 440, 133 A.2d 622 (1957) (‘‘[u]nderproperinstructionsfromthe court, the questions of the mental capacity of a testator and undueinfluencepresentissuesoffact’’); see alsoHospitalofCentral Connecticutv.NeurosurgicalAssociates, P.C., 139 Conn. App. 778, 793, 57A.3d 794 (2012) (‘‘sum-mary judgment is ordinarily inappropriate where an individual’s intent and state of mind are implicated’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). We also note that Connecticut courts have consistently held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of undue influence. SeeStantonv. Grigley, 177 Conn. 558, 565, 418 A.2d 923 (1979) (‘‘[w]here there is no direct evidence of influence, a factual foundation supportive ofareasonable inference that, but forthe [defendant’s] actions, the testatorwouldhave made adifferent disposition, is sufficient to sustain a finding of undue influence’’); see also Lancaster v. Bank ofNew York, 147 Conn. 566, 573, 164 A.2d 392 (1960) (‘‘[d]irect evidence ofundue influence is often unavailable and is not indispensable’’).
The court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to three of the four elements of undue influence. Because Jay Tyler had the burden to prove allfourofthe elements, this conclusionprompted the court to render summary judgment. As they form the basis for the court’s decision to grant summary judgment, we limit our plenary review to consideration ofthose three elements.9 Reviewing the evidence in the lightmostfavorable toJayTyler, we are persuadedthat there is a genuine issue of material fact as to each. First, we consider the evidence concerning the first element, a person subject to undue influence. Bruce Tyler’s affidavit recounts specific examples regarding Ruth Tyler’s state of mind during the relevant time period, such as her inability to remember selling a car to one of her sons and her submissiveness in being forcedto sellthe familyfarm. This isthetype ofcircumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Ruth Tyler was susceptible to undue influence. Next, we consider the evidence concerning the second element, the opportunity to exert undue influence. The affidavits of both Bruce Tyler and Thomas Tyler discuss Thomas Tyler’s frequent contact with his mother throughout the relevant time period. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that he had the opportunity to exert undue influence over his mother. Finally, we consider the evidence concerning the fourth element, a result indicating undue influence. Here, the evidence of Ruth Tyler’s previous will, contrasted with her current will and trust, demonstrates a stark differencebetweenhowherestatewaspreviously to be distributed and the distribution scheme at the time of her death. These documents constitute sufficient evidence ofa result indicating undue influence to warrant submission of the issue to the jury.
None of this is to say that a jury ultimately will be persuaded by the evidence submitted by Jay Tyler. But giventhat ‘‘[i]tisthe [trier] [offact’s] exclusiveprovinceto weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses and determine whether to accept some, all or none of a witness’ testimony’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Traggis v. Shawmut Bank Connecticut, N.A., 72 Conn. App. 251, 260, 805 A.2d 105, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 903, 810 A.2d 270 (2002);
we conclude that summary judgment was not appropriate in this case. The appeal is dismissed with respect to Richard Tatoian. The judgment is reversed as to Jay Tyler’s counts seeking to modify the trust and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 As discussed in this opinion, Bruce Tyler is ostensibly a defendant in the action commenced by Jay Tyler. Bruce Tyler’s cross complaint asserts claims only as to Tatoian. For the purpose of clarity in this opinion, we will refer to Bruce Tyler and Jay Tyler collectively as the plaintiffs, and will refer to Jay Tyler by name when discussing the allegations in the counts of his complaint that do not pertain to Tatoian. We also note that James R. Mapplethorpe and Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., were named as defendants before the trial court, but are not parties to this appeal. We refer in this opinion to Thomas Tyler, Russell Tyler, John Tyler, and Tatoian collectively as the defendants.

2 Under Ruth Tyler’s previous will, each brother’s share was to be calculated on the basis of his net worth, where the brother with the lowest net worth would receive payment until his net worth was equal to the net worth ofthe brother with the next lowest net worth, and so on. Ifthis distribution scheme had been in effect at the time of Ruth Tyler’s death, Jay Tyler allegedly would have received the lion’s share of the estate.
3 As originallypleaded, JayTyleralso contestedthevalidityofRuthTyler’s will. On June 15, 2011, the court dismissed that portion ofthe action, along with several other counts, for being within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction ofthe Probate Court. That decision is not a part ofthis appeal.

4 Following the court’s ruling, the plaintiffs filed motions to reargue. In

a memorandum of decision dated September 19, 2013, the court granted in part the motions, vacating its order of summary judgment ‘‘as to the sole issue of the trustee’s obligation to provide trust accounting to the remainder beneficiaries.’’

5 This issue initially was raised by Tatoian in a motion to dismiss filed in this courtpursuantto Practice Book § 61-4 (a). Helaterwithdrewthe motion ‘‘in the interests of bringing this matter to conclusion.’’ As ‘‘[n]either the parties nor the trial court

. . . can conferjurisdiction upon [an appellate] court’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co

. v. Lone StarIndustries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 794, 967 A.2d 1 (2009); we nonetheless must make a preliminary jurisdictional determination. See id. (‘‘[t]he right of appeal is accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the rules of court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are met’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

6 The defendants declined the opportunityto submit asupplemental brief.

7 Certain counts against Tatoian have since been resolved at trial.
8 The defendants’ evidence in support of their motion for summaryjudgment consisted of a copy of the trust agreement, a copy of Ruth Tyler’s will, affidavits of the defendants, deposition testimony of the parties and ofthe manager ofthe assisted living facility where Ruth Tyler lived at time of the creation of the trust, and a mental status evaluation of Ruth Tyler conducted at that facility. Jay Tyler’s evidence in opposition to the motion consisted of a copy of Ruth Tyler’s previous will, affidavits ofthe plaintiffs and deposition testimony of Bruce Tyler. The court refused to consider certain portions ofthe plaintiffs’ affidavits because theywere notbased onpersonal knowledge. The court also refused to consider a letter and various newspaper clippings submitted byJay Tyler because theywere unauthenticated, containedhearsaystatements andwere irrelevant. Finally, the court chose to disregard a document that appeared to be Jay Tyler’s answers to the defendants’ interrogatories because the disregardedstatementswerenotsupportedbyspecificfacts. Astheplaintiffshave not challenged these determinations on appeal, we will take into account only that evidence considered by the court.
9 The court determinedthat agenuine issue existed as to whetherThomas Tyler had a disposition to exert undue influence.