alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
This decision was not selected for publication inthe New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of non-precedential dispositions. Please also note that this electronic decision may contain computer-g enerated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Supreme Court. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. A-1-CA-37008 4 CLIFTON WHITE, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Angela J. Jewell, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 12 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 HANISEE, Judge. 17
{1} Defendant Clifton Wh ite appeals from the district court’s revocation of his 18 probation. On appeal, Defe ndant contends that there was insufficient evidence 19 presented to establish that his violation was willful. This Court issued a calendar 202 notice proposing to affirm the revocation of Defendant’s probation. Defendant has 1 filed a memorandum in opposition to our no tice of proposed disposition, which we 2 have duly considered. U npersuaded, we affirm. 3
{2} In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant asserts that the district court erred 4 in concluding that his probation violati on was willful where he came forward with 5 evidence that he had taken other drug test s during that same time period that were 6 negative and that he had made arrangements with his probation officer to reschedule 7 his drug test. [MIO 4-5] However, th e only testimony that Defendant asserts 8 established these facts is his own. To th e extent that Defendant’s probation officer 9 testified that he had missed a required drug test and did not also testify to agreeing to 10 reschedule the drug test with Defendant, this presents an issue of credibility for the 11 district court to decide. 12
{3} As this Court noted in our notice of pr oposed disposition, we must “view[] the 13 evidence in a light most favorable to the State and indulg[e] all reasonable inferences 14 in favor of the [district] court’s judgment.” State v. Erickson K. , 2002-NMCA-058, 15 ¶ 21, 132 N.M. 258, 46 P.3d 1258. We further noted that contrary evidence does not 16 support a basis for reversal. State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 17 P.2d 829. As the arguments that Defendant continues to assert on appeal ask this 18 Court to reweigh evidence, we mu st decline to do so and affirm. See State v. Salas , 193 1999-NMCA-099, ¶ 13, 127 N.M. 686, 986 P.2d 482 (recognizing that it is for the 1 fact-finder to resolve any conflict in the te stimony of the witnesse s and to determine 2 where the weight and credibility lie). 3
{4} Accordingly, for the reasons stated aboveand in this Court’s notice of proposed 4 disposition, we affirm the district c ourt’s revocation of Defendant’s probation. 5
{5} IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

7 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 8 WE CONCUR: 9

10 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Chief Judge 11

12 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 13
EXHIBIT 31.2





EUROSITE POWER INC.


CERTIFICATION





I, Bonnie Brown, certify that:





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|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|1. | I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of EuroSite Power Inc.; and




|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.




Date: April 29, 2016





/s/ Bonnie Brown


Bonnie Brown


Chief Financial Officer, Secretary, and Treasurer
EXHIBIT 31.1






CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d)






I, Theodore H. Bunting, Jr., Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer of Entergy Louisiana, LLC, as servicer (the “Servicer”), certify that:




1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Entergy Louisiana Investment Recovery Funding I, L.L.C. (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);




2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;




3.  Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;




4.  I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the Servicer, and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the Servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the Investment Recovery Property Servicing Agreement dated as of September 1, 2011 between Entergy Louisiana Investment Recovery Funding I, L.L.C., as the Issuing Entity, and the Servicer, in all material respects; and




5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rule 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.













Date:  March 29, 2012




By:   /s/ Theodore H. Bunting, Jr.


Name:    Theodore H. Bunting, Jr.


Title:      Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Ahmed Jabbori v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-14-00672-CR

Trial court case number: 1401652

Trial court: 183rd District Court of Harris County

Appellant, Ahmed Jabbori, pleaded guilty, without a plea-bargain agreement, to 

the felony offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court accepted 

appellant’s plea and found sufficient evidence to find appellant guilty, but deferred 

making any finding regarding appellant’s guilt and placed appellant on community 

supervision for a period of five years. Appellant, through his retained counsel, Neal 

Davis, III, timely filed a notice of appeal. Counsel, who continued to represent appellant 

on appeal, has filed a motion to withdraw from his representation of appellant because, 

after reviewing the record, he concluded that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. In 

support of his motion to withdraw, Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967).

“Only appointed counsel are required to file an Anders brief. Retained counsel are 

not required to do so.” Knotts v. State, 31 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Nguyen v. State, 11 S.W.3d 376, 379 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.)). “A retained attorney, upon determining that an appeal is 

frivolous, must so inform this Court and seek leave to withdraw by filing a motion 

complying with rule 6.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Id. Accordingly, we 

strike the Anders brief filed by appellant’s retained counsel. 

Further, counsel’s motion to withdraw does not meet the requirements of rule 6.5

because it fails to (1) provide appellant’s last known address and telephone number, 

(2) contain a statement that a copy of the motion was delivered to appellant, and (3) state 

that appellant was notified in writing of the right to object to the motion. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 6.5(a)(2)–(4), (b). We therefore deny counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
Because appellant’s retained counsel has represented to the Court that the appeal is 

frivolous, and counsel is under an ethical duty to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal, 

we order appellant’s counsel to file a motion to withdraw that complies with Rule 6.5

within 14 days of the date of this order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5. Counsel states in both 

his brief and his motion to withdraw that he “has attempted communication with the 

Appellant to no avail” and that he “understands that the Appellant is currently detained 

by the Department of Homeland Security and is awaiting deportation.” If counsel is 

unable to obtain current contact information for appellant, counsel should detail his 

efforts to obtain appellant’s contact information in his motion to withdraw and should 

provide appellant’s last known address. 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Michael Massengale

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: May 28, 2015
EX-10.38



 Exhibit 10.38 

Amendment to the Distribution Agreement 

This Amendment (this “Amendment”), effective as of August 8, 2014, 2014, is made to the Distribution Agreement dated January 6,
2009 (as Amended June 15, 2012 the “Distribution Agreement”) by and between Tyson Foods, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Tyson”), and Freshpet, Inc. f/k/a Professor Connor’s, a Delaware Corporation (the
“Company”). 
 WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend the Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth below. 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as
follows: 
  

	 	1.	The parties agree that regardless of anything in the agreement to the contrary the Company will be allowed to utilize any method or person to manage shipments from its production facilities or customer pickups from any
Company contracted facility (i.e. it may be from time to time that either direct shipment to a customer from our new location or a pickup of our products from new or existing locations may be handled exclusively by the Company). 


 

	 	2.	Section 8(a)(iv) shall be amended to read as follows: By Tyson upon six (6) months’ notice to Company. 

  

	 	3.	Pursuant to Section 8(b) of the Distribution Agreement, the parties agree to extend the term to run from the date hereof until December 31, 2015. 


 

	 	4.	General Terms: Unless otherwise expressly stated herein, all capitalized items used in this Amendment shall be defined as set forth in the Agreement, and the terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain in
full force and effect. Upon execution of this Amendment, the parties will be bound by all terms of the Agreement, including this Amendment and all references in the Agreement to the “Agreement” shall include this Amendment.


 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be executed by their duly authorized representatives on the dates written
below. 
  

			
	FRESHPET, INC.
		
	By:	 	




		 	  

		
	Name:	 	Richard Kassar
		 	  

		
	Title:	 	CFO
		 	  










 
					
		 	TYSON FOODS, INC.
			
	  
 




	 	By:	 	




	 		 	  

	 	  
 Name:
	 	  
 Andrew Rojeski

	 		 	  

	 	  
 Title:
	 	  
 Vice President, Pet Products
#### J. Kerr v. E. P. Clegg *& Co.*

(No. 1063, Op. Book No. 2, p. 386.)

Appeal from Galveston County.

Opinion by

White, P. J.

§ 791. *Appeal bond from justice’s to county court; conditions of.*Appellant appealed to the county court from a judgment rendered against him in justice’s court. His appeal was dismissed upon the ground that his ap*436peal bond was not conditioned as the law required it should be. The conditions of the bond were as follows: “That the said J. Kerr, appellant, shall prosecute his said appeal with effect, and, shall pay and satisfy the judgment or decree that may be rendered against the obligors in this bond on the trial of this case in the county court aforesaid, if the decision shall be against the said Kerr.” *Held,*the statute requires that the appeal bond shall be conditioned that “the party appealing shall prosecute his appeal to effect, or shall pay and satisfy the judgment or decree that may be rendered against the obligors in such bond.” [Gen. Laws 1876, p. 163, § 21; R. S. 1639.] Compared with the statute, it will be seen that the bond differs from the statute in two respects, viz.: the bond stipulates that the appeal shall be prosecuted “with” instead of “to” effect, and uses the word “and” instead of “'or” before the words “shall pay and satisfy,” etc. It is not perceived that the meaning of the statutory condition of the bond is changed by the use of the words “with” and “and” instead of the words “to” and “or,” as used in the statute, and this objection to the bond is not well taken. [Robinson v. O’Brien, 20 Tex. 438.] Undoubtedly the rule is correct, that “when the conditions of a statutory bond are clearly and definitely stated in the law, if the bond does not literally follow the statute, it must fully and clearly embrace all the conditions prescribed by it.” [Reid v. Fernandez, 52 Tex. 379.] The addition of the words in the bond, ‘ ‘ on the trial of this case in the county court aforesaid, if the decision of said court shall be against said Kerr,” did not in anywise affect the validity of the bond. These words -were unnecessary and superfluous, and do not affect the obligation of the bond one way or the other, either in limiting the force of the obligation, or by imposing a more onerous condition upon the obligors. As a general rule, it is believed to be well settled that when the conditions or covenants of a statutory bond are more onerous than are required by law, such a depart*437ure from the statute invalidates the bond. Such is not the case where that which is prescribed is distinctly stated in the bond, but more not necessary is superadded, because the unnecessary addition may be rejected as surplusage, retaining that which is properly set out, and which makes the bond a good one. [Janes v. Langham, 29 Tex. 413.]

February 26, 1881.

Reversed and remanded.
No. 87-892.

#### Arrant *v.*Alabama et al.

Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.
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| 1 | I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2011-4 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”); |

|   |
|---|
|   |  |
| 2 | Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; |

|   |
|---|
|   |  |
| 3 | Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports; |

|   |
|---|
|   |  |
| 4 | Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and |

|   |
|---|
|   |  |
| 5 | All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K. |

|                                                               |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                               |  |
| /s/ Ryan C. Farris                                            |   |
|                                                          |
| Ryan C. Farris                                                |
| President, Ally Auto Assets LLC, as Depositor                 |
| (Senior Officer in charge of securitization of the depositor) |
News United States Air Force
 Hawaiian raptors strengthen regional readiness at the Keystone of the PacificPublished June 15, 2022
                        
                        By Senior Airman Jesse Monte
                        
                        
                        18th Wing Public Affairs
                **KADENA AIR BASE, Japan (AFNS) --**
                The skies over the Keystone of the Pacific recently featured unique guests, as several visiting **F-22 Raptors** and Airmen from Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, conducted a series of missions at **Kadena Air Base**, Japan.

While at Kadena AB, the fifth-generation air dominance fighters, as well as the U.S. Airmen who fly, maintain and support these machines, conducted various missions to enhance operational readiness to defend Japan and ensure a free-and-open Indo-Pacific.

“Our visit is part of our normal readiness training to practice interoperability in support of bilateral and joint operations,” said Lt. Col. Kevin Horton, Hawaii Air National Guard 199th Fighter Squadron commander. “In short, we go somewhere new, then seamlessly integrate into the complex and dynamic multi-domain joint force.”

Due to its vital strategic location, Kadena AB regularly hosts visiting joint, allied and partner forces.

Operating out of Kadena allowed the Hawaiian Raptors to build invaluable experience in the physically vast and strategically complex environment of the Indo-Pacific, which enabled greater readiness and interoperability with Kadena Airmen and aircraft, as well as regional allies and partners.

Of note, integration among fourth-generation aircraft, such as the 18th Wing’s **F-15C/D Eagles**, and the visiting fifth-generation F-22s enabled U.S. pilots to familiarize themselves with each fighter’s unique strengths and limitations, building a stronger total-force team.

Flying together in a training environment allowed units to refine tactics, techniques and procedures, and built confidence in the ability to fight together and increase each other’s lethality, explained Horton.

Furthermore, by operating from Kadena AB during this visit, Hawaii’s Raptors reinforced the U.S.-Japan alliance in accordance with mutual defense agreements.

“It is very encouraging to see this great total-force integration and a team of like-minded individuals focused on the mission,” Horton said. “Japan is a great ally of the United States and a crucial partner in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific, and we are very honored to be here.”LR 



USAF 



AF 



Air Force 



Pacific Air Forces 



PACAF 



Kadena Air Base 



Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam 



F-22 Raptors 



Keystone of the Pacific 



Joint Interoperability
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 76 (Tuesday, May 9, 1995)]
[House]
[Page H4554]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                REPUBLICAN DOUBLESPEAK ON MEDICARE CUTS

  (Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to address the House 
for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to warn my colleagues to 
beware of Republican doublespeak on Medicare cuts.
  The greatest doublespeak is that Republicans will reform Medicare to 
give seniors more choices by giving them vouchers to buy private 
insurance.
  What they do not say is that the vouchers will not be worth enough to 
enable them to buy an insurance policy that gives them the choices they 
have today.
  They do not say that the value of the vouchers will force seniors 
into the lowest cost and most restrictive HMO's.
  They do not say that the value of the voucher is going to be 
ratcheted down every year to become worth less and less until seniors 
are saddled with virtually all the costs of their health care.
  They do not say that the vouchers will toss seniors to swim alone in 
the perilous and confusing currents of the private insurance market--
the same market that has reduced their children's choices.
  Vouchers are not more choice. They spell the end of Medicare coverage 
that seniors--and their families--rely on.

                          ____________________
```
#### St. Louis, I. M. & S. R’y Co. *v.*A. C. L. Hindsman.

(No. 1273, R. Book No. 4, p. 161.)

Appeal from Tarrant County.

Opinion by

Willson, J.

§ 204. *Railroad’s liability for damages in failing to deliver goods within reasonable time.*The suit was for damages for the unreasonable and grossly negligent delay of the railroad in delivering to plaintiff a trunk and its contents, shipped from Little Rock, Ark., to Gordon, Tex., by the plaintiff, who procured at Little Rock a ticket for herself and a check for the trunk. On the trial plaintiff recovered a judgment for actual damages, $180.50, and for exemplary damages, $100.

§ 205. *Joint and several liability of railroads whose lines are connecting ones.*Where the lines of two railroads are connecting lines, are operated in conjunction with each other, recognize each other’s passenger tickets and baggage checks, such roads are jointly liable for the proper transportation and delivery of baggage checked over the lines of their road. [T. & P. R. R. Co. v. Ferguson, Commissioners of Appeals, Austin Term, 1882.]

§ 208. *Measure of damage for •delay in delivery.*Where goods, as in this case, are not intended for sale at the point of their destination, but are intended for the owner’s own personal use, the carrier is not responsible or liable for depreciation in market value by reason of delay, but in the absence of special circumstances is liable only for the value of the use of such property during the delay. [Hutchinson on Carriers, § 776; Benton v. Fay, 64 Ill. 417; Priestly v. The R. R. 26 Ill. 205; Green v. Williams, 45 Ill. 206.]

§ 207. *Damages for lost baggage.*A party is not entitled, as part of his damages, to the necessary expenses incurred in searching for his baggage; right to such damages is expressly denied in T. & P. R’y Co. v. Ferguson. [Commissioners of Appeals, Austin Term, 1882.]

*83October 28, 1882.

§ 208. *Exemplary as distinguished from actual dam*ages, *with reference to joint and several liability.*The rule with regard to damages on account of negligence must be restricted to the company actually guilty of the negligence for which the damages are sought. In other words, while there is a joint liability of the companies for *actual*damages, the liability for *exemplary*damages must be confined to the defendant guilty of the tort for which the damages are awarded. [Field on Damages, sec. 84.]

Reversed and remanded.