### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 637 -CR

Br e nt Chr ist ophe r Or m and , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

FR OM T HE C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W N O. 1 OF C A L D WE L L C OU N T Y NO. 3262 2 , HO NORAB LE EDWARD L. JARRETT , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
As ca lled for in a ple a ag ree ment, appellant B rent Christopher O rmand plea ded no contest to an infor

mation acc using him of dr iving while intoxicated, puni s h m en t wa s assessed at incar cer ation for 180 da

y s and a $700 fine, im position of sentence was suspended, and appellant wa s place d on community

supervision. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.04 (West 2003). The only issue on appea l is whether the tr ial court e rre d by overr ulin g ap p el l ant’s pre trial motion to di smiss on speedy trial g rounds. We will affirm the judg ment of convic tion. The unde rlying f

acts a re not disputed. Appellant was arr ested for this off ense on May 24, 2003, and re lease d on bond the s ame day
. He pr omptly reta ined an attorney , Stuart Kinard, who on J une 13, 2003, g ave notice of his repr esentat i o n of appe llant. The complaint and infor mation
we re fi le d o n M arc h 1 7, 20 05 , a pp ro xima te ly

tw e nty -two mo nth s f

oll ow inga

pp e lla nt’ s arr e st. Ap pe lla nt l e arn e d th a t th e inf

or matio n h ad been fi le d w he n h e pe rs on a lly re c e ive d n oti c e in l a te2

A p r i l t h a tt h e c a

u s e h a d b e e ns e tf

o r ar r a i g n m e n to nM ay 1 6
. A p p e l l an tr e t a i n e d a n e w a t t o r

n e y, David Wahlberg , who filed various pretria l motions, including a waiver of ar raig nment. Wahlberg filed appellant’s motion to dismiss for failure to aff ord a spe edy

trial on J uly

12, 2005. The motion was he ard a

nd overr uled on September

6, 2005, afte r which appellant immediately enter ed his plea. T h e r ig h t t o a

s p e e dy tr ia l is c o n s ti tuti o n a ll y g u ar an te e d
. U
. S. Co n s t. a me n d
. V I ; T e x. Con st. a rt . I , § 10 ; see Bark er v. W ingo , 4 07 U. S. 5 14 (1 97 2) ; Hu ll v . S tate , 699 S.W .2d 220, 221 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ). I n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a de fe nd ant h a s b e e n d e nie d th is r ig ht, a c ourt mus t balanc e four fac tors: ( 1) leng th of the delay , (2) rea son for the delay , (3) a ssertion of the r ight, a nd (4) pr ejudice to the acc used. Barker , 4 07 U. S. at 53 0; J oh ns on v . S

tate , 9 5 4 S. W. 2 d

7 7 0 , 7 7 1 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1997). The a pplication of thes e factors is a leg al question subject to de novo r eview. Johnson , 954 S.W .2d at 771.

Length of delay. Appellant wa s tried over twenty -seve n months after be ing a rre sted. The State c oncede s t h at this delay exceeds that ne eded to trig g er a full speedy -trial inquiry
. See Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992). I t is a fa ctor that we ighs he avily ag ainst the State. Zam oran o v . S

tate , 84 S.W .3d 643, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Reason for delay. The State be ars the bur den of justifying the delay
. Tur ne r v . S tate , 545 S.W .2d 133, 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Appe llant was the only witness at the hea

ring below, and the State of

fer ed no e vidence to expl ain the dela y betwee n appellant’ s arr est in 2003 and the filing of the i nformation in 2005. During argument, the prosecutor t old the court that “we have a n extreme bac klog of

case s” and that the rea son for the delay was “ simply case load.” Althoug h officia l neg lige nce in br inginga cas e t o t ri al i s weig hed more lightly than a de liberate intent to harm the defe nse, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide betwee n acc eptable a nd unacc eptable r easons3

for de laying a

criminal prose cution. Dogge tt , 5 05 U. S. at 65 7. Th is f a c tor we ig hs a g a ins t the State beca use the ultimate re sp o n s ibilit y for suc h circ umstances must rest with the State, not the defe ndant. Zamorano , 8 4 S
. W
. 3 d at 6 4 9 (c i t i n g Barker , 407 U.S. at 531). As ser ti on of

rig ht. The re sponsibili ty

to assert the spe edy

trial rig ht lies with the
acc used. Barker , 4 07 U. S. at 53 1. I n th is c a se , th e State argue s th a t a pp e lla nt, by wa iti ngtw e nty -s ix months before filing his motion to dism iss, did not t imely asser t the rig ht. The State fur

ther a rg ues that by fi lin g a mot ion to d ism iss , a

pp e lla nt sho we d that he wa s not tru ly int e re ste d in a sp e e dy tr ia l. Appellant ar g ues that he c ould n o t b e ex p ected to demand a tr ial befor e he w as formally char g ed. See State v . Flores , 951 S.W .2d 134, 139 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.). B ut appellant knew that he had been arre sted for driving while intox icated, and t his Court has noted t h at an acc used ca

n seek the prompt disposit ion of an a ccusation before a for mal char g ing instrument is filed. Se e Sin c lai r v . S tate , 894 S.W .2d 437, 440 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no pet.). Appellant testified that dur ing the four months immediately following his a

rre st, he called K inard

“ pr obabl y fi ve ti mes” to inq uir e int o th e status of

his c a se . H e a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he did no t a sk counsel to ex pedite the case . There afte r, he w as unable to contact the attorney , and he later lea rned “throug h the g rape vine” that Kina rd wa s no longe r pra cticing
. Appellan t d id

n o t h ir e n e w c o u n s e l u

n ti l a f te r h e r e c e iv e d

th e ar r a ig n me n t n o ti c e. This attorney promptly filed motions for discovery and to suppr ess evidenc e but did not file a motion for spe edy t ri al . I nstead, two months afte r beinghired a nd four months afte r the infor mation was fi le d, c ouns e l f

ile d th e mot ion

to d ism iss . T his f

act ten ds to we a ke n a

pp e lla nt’ s c a se be c a

us e it manifests a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy trial. Zamarano , 84 S.W .3d at 651 n.40 (c iting Pa rk e rso n v . S tate , 9 42 S.W. 2d

78 9, 79 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Worth 19 97 , n o p e t.) ). I n h is b ri e f t o th is4

Court, however , counsel a rg ues that the harm to appe llant cause d by the delay was done befor e the information was f

iled, and ther efor e it was a ppropriate to seek a

dismiss al. Se e Ph ill ips v . S tate , 650 S.W
. 2 d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (stating that in some case s, defe nse counse l may le g iti mate ly

be lie ve that de lay

ha s c a us e d c lie nt s uc h p re

jud ic e that di smi ssa l is wa rr ante d, e ve n if State is belatedly

rea dy to move promptly). I t a pp e ars fr om the re c or d a s a wh ole that, a s tim e pa sse d, a pp e lla nt wa s c on te nt t o allow t h i s p rosecution to languish without seekingeither a trial or a dismissal. His interest in the
c a se wa s r e ne we d o nly

a ft e r r e c e ivi ngno tic e of the arr a ig nment. This f a c tor we ig hs a g a ins t
a pp e lla nt. P r e ju d ic eto a c c us ed. T h e speedy trial rig ht serves to pre vent oppre ssive pretria l incar c e r a ti o n , mi n im iz e an xie ty an d c o n c e r n r e s u lt in g f

r o m th e p e n d in g c h ar g e s , an d limit the possible impairment of t h e d ef en se. Barker , 407 U.S. at 532. The fir st of these intere sts is not imp lic a te d h e re , a s a

pp e lla nt w a s r e le a se d o n b on d w ith in h ours a ft e r h is a rr e st The most important of the thre e intere sts protected by the spee dy

trial ri g ht is the defe ndant’s ability

to prepa re a defe nse. Id . Appe ll ant s ug g e sts in h is b ri e f t hat th e los s o f h is
or ig ina l c ouns e l po te nti a lly ha rm e d h is de fe ns e , bu t he of fe re d no e vid e nc e a t the he ari ng that th is potential was rea liz ed. Althoug h excessive delay in itself presumptively

compromises the de fense , this pre sumption is attenuate d when the acc used acquie sces in a ll or part of the delay
. Dogge tt , 505 U.S. at 655-58. Appe llant ne ver soug ht to expedite the handling of his c ase, did not re quest a spee dy tr ia l e ve n a ft e r t

he inf or matio n w a s f

ile d, and wa ite d f our m on ths a ft e r t

hat to fi le his mo ti on to dis mis s.5 I ti s t h e s ec o n d

i n t er es tt h at wa s m o s tcl ea rl y as s er t edb y

ap p el l an tat t h e h ea ri n g. Appellant testified that he suffe rs from Crohn’ s Disease , a condition that is ag g ravated by stress. He added, “ Ihave ha d a lot of trouble with anxiety , stress a n d d ep ression. I have be en tre ated continuously

over the se last 20—I

g uess 26 months with medicines an d d i ffe rent ty pes of sug g estions on how to be able to g et s ome s leep at night.” Appellant testified that since May 2003, he had soug ht me dical attention at least fiftee n times “ for the stress or depre ssion or anxiety related to this arrest.” Although there is no evidenc e direc tly ref uting a ppellant’s testimony

reg ardingthe eff ect the pe nding char g e had on his me dical condition, there is circumstantial evide nce that it was
no t a s se ve re a s h e su g g e ste d. Ap pe lla nt a dmi tte d that he did

no t a sk his fi rs t atto rn e y

to e xpe dit e the ca se. When he lost contac t with Kinard, and e ven af ter he l ea rn ed t h at Kinar d was no long er prac ticing law, appellant did not hire new counsel in a n eff ort to move his c ase fo rw ar d
. I nstead, appellant q u i et l y

acquie sced a s the months passed with no action by the State. Appellant did not obtain new counsel until af ter the State belatedly

filed the infor

mation and beg an to take a n active interest in the prose cution, and eve n then he did not ask for a prompt trial. Appellant’s inac tion after Kinard dr opped out of the c ase is some evidence that the stre ss of the pendingchar g es wa s not as de le te ri ou s to a

pp e lla nt’ s h e a ltha s he te sti fi e d. I t is a lso re a so na ble to a ssume that a

pp e lla nt w ou ld have e xpe ri e nc e d ma

ny of the sy mpt oms of

hi s chronic dis e a se e ve n if the c a se ha d b e e n a c tiv e ly pursued by

the State following his arre st. On this record, w e concl u d e that the prejudice f actor
w e i g h s a g a i n s ta

p p e l l an t , a l t h o u g h o n l y m o d e r a t e l y. Balan ce. The e x cessive a nd unjustified de lay in the prosec ution of this case we ighs heavily ag ainst the State. On the other hand, there is no e vidence that appellant suff ere d any actua l6

pr e jud ic e ins of

ar a s h is a bil ity to pr e pa

re a de fe ns e is c on c e rn e d. An d e ve n if the str e ss a

nd anxie ty of the pending char g e ag g ravated appellant’ s medical c ondition, there is no evidenc e that he took a ny aff irmative ac tio n t o s eek a

prompt resolution of the matter . To the contra ry , afte r losing c ontact with his first attorney , appellant simply waited f or the State to re activate the prosec ution before obtaining ne w counse l. Appellant’s acc eptanc e of the delay of his tria l should be compar ed to the defe ndant’s timely

and per sistent assertion of his s p ee d y t ri al rig ht in Sto c k v . S tate , No. 03-05- 00139-CR (Tex. App.—Austin J an. 22, 2007, no pet. hist.). I t is difficult for a def endant to prove that he was deni e d

a s p e e dy tr ia l i f h e f a il s to a s s e rt t

h e r ig h t i na

ti me ly an d p e r s is te n t m an ner. Barker , 407 U.S. at 532. Although the question is a close one, we hold that appellant’s spe edy trial ri g ht w a s n ot v iol a te d a

nd the tr ia l c ourt

did no t e rr by ov e rr uli ngthe mot ion

to d ism iss
. The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 1, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh