NEY GENERAL 

OFTE~AS 

October 20. 1969 

Honorable J. W. Edgar 

Commissioner of Education 

Texas Education Agency 

201 East 11th Street 

Austin, Texas 78711 

Dear Dr. Edgar: 

Opinion No. (M-493) 

Re: Whether the board of trustee~s 

of an independent school 

district may schedule and 

pay, from local school 

funds, a higher salary to 

teachers having dependents 

than it pays to those not 

having dependents. 

Your recent letter requesting the opinion of this department 

concerning the referenced matter, states, in part, as follows: 

"In its deliberations relative to a schedule 

for a higher salary to its employees, the board of 

trustees of a school district (Austin I.S.D.) is 

pursuing the possibility of higher pay from local 

school funds for such employees, men or women, who 

are determined to be head-of-a-household, the board 

citing as a reference the practice of the Federal 

Government for income tax purposes granting certain 

allowances for head of a household. 

"It points out in support of such a higher 

salary determination predicate that a head-of-ahousehold normally has more expenses than does one 

without family responsibilities; further that such 

could be either husband or wife, a married person 

without a spouse having dependents, or a single 

-2352- 
Honorable J. W. Edgar, page 2 (M-49,3) 

person having aged parents or other dependents 

that incurs greater living expenses to him or 

her than a single person without such responsibilities. 

"The Board of Trustees of the Austin Independent School District has requested this Agency to 

obtain an opinion from the Office of Attorney General 

on the following question: 

'Legally may a public school district 

from local school funds schedule and pay employees locally determined as head-of-ahousehold a supplemental salary which is more 

than it would pay employees who are not 

head-of-a-household?'" 

Section 1 of Article 2922-14, Vernon's Civil Statutes, as 

amended by Section 1 of House Bill Number 240 (Acts 61st Leg., 

R.S. 1969, ch. 872, p. 2634) provides that: 

"The board of trustees of each and every school 

district in the State of Texas shall pay their 

teachers upon a salary schedule providing a minimum 

beginning base salary, plus increments above the 

minimum for additional experience in teaching as 

hereinafter prescribed. The salaries fixed herein 

shall be reqarded as minimum salaries only and each 

district may supplement such salaries." (Emphasis 

added.) 

It is well settled that the school trustees are creatures 

of the law possessing only the jurisdiction and powers expressly 

or impliedly given them by statute. 51 Tex.Jur.2d 443, Schools, 

Sec. 83. In this situation, the statute, Article 2922-14, 

Vernon's Civil Statutes, requires the board of trustees of 

every school district to pay their teachers upon a salary 

schedule, and permits the district to supplement such salaries. 

Consequently, the school district may supplement such salaries 

upon any fair, non-discriminatory, and constitutional basis 

- 2353 - 
Honorable J. W. Edgar, page 3 (M-493) 

which it deems best to promote the purposes and objectives of 

the school system. 

It is recognized that for the purpose of fixing compensation for various officers and employees, classifications may be 

made so long as the classification is based on a real distinction 

and it is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Bexar 

County v. Tynan, 128 Tex. 223,97 S.W.2d 467 (1936). The test is 

whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification. 

Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W. 807 (1959): Smith v. Davis, 

426 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Sup. 1968). Therefore, we believe the 

Supreme Court of Indiana stated the general rule which is 

applicable to the facts herein presented when in Hutton v. Gill, 

8 N.W.2d 818 (Ind.Sup. 1937), it stated at page 820: 

"School boards as a matter of common knowledge, 

have, in adopting their several schedules, classified 

teachers under various heads and fixed the compensation 

for the several classifications. The record shows that 

the appellants in this case followed this method. So, 

if the legislative intent . . . was to authorize the 

school board to classify its teachers, it necessarily 

follows that such classification must be reasonable, 

natural and based upon substantial differences qermane 

to the subject, or upon some basis having a reasonable 

relation to the work assigned. If the classification 

is arbitrary or capricious, and upon a basis havinq no 

relation to the kind or character of the work to be 

done, it would be void and unlawful, and in conflict 

with the statute." (Emphasis added.) 

In the above case, the school trustees attempted to classify 

female teachers, for compensation purposes, according to their 

marital status, and place those who were married in a lower 

salary classification than unmarried women having like qualifications and doing like work. The court proceeded to hold 

such a policy unreasonable and invalid, stating at page 820: 

-2354- 
Honorable J. W. Edgar, page 4 (M-493) 

"This, in our judgment, was unlawful and 

arbitrary, and formed no rational basis for a 

classification. It had no reasonable relation to 

the work assigned to her, as the fact that appellant 

was a married woman did not affect her ability to 

impart knowledge or perform her duties in the schoolroom. It is conceded that her marriage status had no 

such effect, and, if not, there could be no just or 

reasonable basis for the school board classifying her 

as far as compensation is concerned, in a different and 

lower class than an unmarried female teacher having 

like work." 

This and other pertinent cases are annotated in 133 A.L.R. 

1437, at page 1439, and in 47 Am. Jur. 381, Schools, Section 120. 

Therefore, where the determination of the method of classification is left to the Local school board and where the method 

adopted is reasonable, natural and based upon substantial 

difference germane to the subject or upon some basis having 

a reasonable relation to the work assigned, the duties to be 

performed or the services to be rendered the determination of 

the board will be upheld. However, a differential in salary 

based not upon a material difference in training, qualifications, 

experience, abilities, duties, or services to be rendered, such 

action amounts to a determination which is arbitrary and 

discriminatory and which forms no rational basis for the classification. Likewise, a salary not based on any relation to the 

work assigned or upon material difference in training, qualifications, experience, abilities or duties, such action may be 

held to be a violation of Sections 51, 52 and 53 of Article III 

of the Constitution of Texas, which prohibits any grant of 

public moneys in aid of individuals. See also Article XVI, 

Section 6, Constitution of Texas, outlawing apporpriations for 

private or individual purposes. 

If the board's order fixing the supplemental salary is 

based solely on matters not having any relation to the work 

assigned or any relation to the training, qualification, 

- 2355 - 
. . 

Honorable J. W. Edgar, page 5 (M-492 1 

experience, ability or duties of the teacher, such order of 

supplementation would not be compensation for services 

rendered but rather a grant in aid of individuals for private 

purposes in violation of Section 51 of Article III of the 

Constitution of Texas. 

In view of the foregoing, you are advised the board of 

trustees of an independent school district may not legally 

schedule and pay, from local school funds, teachers a supplemental salary on the sole basis of their personal status as 

head-of-a-household, which salary would be more than it would 

pay other teachers not having such personal status but who have 

the same qualifications and perform the same quality and quantum 

of work, with like responsibilities. 

SUMMARY 

The board of trustees of an independent 

school district has the discretionary power 

to supplement salaries pursuant to the provisions of Article 2922-14, Vernon's Civil 

Statutes. However, the personal status of 

a teacher as head-of-a-household cannot be 

the sole basis for fixing the amount of 

supplemental salary to be paid a teacher. 

l2(2%zz 

MARTIN 

neral of Texas 

Prepared by John Reeves 

Assistant Attorney General 

- 2356 - 
. . 

Honorable J. W. Edgar, page 6 (M-493) 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Kerns Taylor, Chairman 

George Kelton, Vice-Chairman 

Jim Swearingen 

Roger Tyler 

Alfred Walker 

Jack Goodman 

MEADE F. GRIFFIN 

Staff Legal Assistant 

HAWTHORNE PHILLIPS 

Executive Assistant 

NOLA WHITE 

First Assistant 

- 2357 -