[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-12074

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BLAINE JOYNER COGLIANESE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00263-VMC-TGW-1

____________________

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JORDAN, Circuit Judge, and 

BROWN,

∗ 1District Judge.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

Blaine Coglianese appeals his sentence of 168 months’ 

imprisonment followed by 30 years of supervised release, imposed 

pursuant to his guilty plea for numerous child sex crimes. He

challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his 

bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence, arguing that the district court 

did not properly consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. He also 

contests the imposition of a special condition of supervised release 

prohibiting him—absent probation office approval—from using or 

possessing a computer or a device capable of connecting to the 

internet and from possessing an “electronic data storage medium.”

I 

Mr. Coglianese was 22 years old when he met 14-year-old 

J.G. on a dating site. They exchanged photos for weeks before 

going to his residence. The first time they engaged in sexual 

activity, Mr. Coglianese believed J.G. was 18. By the second time 

they saw each other, Mr. Coglianese knew her true age. 

Undeterred, he continued eliciting nude photos of J.G. and sending 

her photos of himself via Facebook messenger. Around the same 

time, Mr. Coglianese began chatting with various Tumblr users 

∗ Honorable Michael L. Brown, United States District Judge for the Northern 

District of Georgia, sitting by designation.

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about his relationship with a 14-year-old. He sent some of those 

users photos of J.G. in exchange for other child pornography. 

The government charged Mr. Coglianese with coercion and 

enticement of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); receipt 

of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and 

(b)(1); and transportation of child pornography, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1) and (b)(1). Mr. Coglianese ultimately pled 

guilty to all charges without a plea agreement.

Given the offenses to which Mr. Coglianese pled guilty, and 

his criminal history category of I, the advisory guidelines range was 

168 to 210 months of imprisonment followed by five years to life 

of supervised release. The presentence investigation report did not 

reveal any factors that would warrant a departure or variance from 

the applicable sentencing range. 

At the sentencing hearing, the government recommended a 

sentence of 210 months at the high end of the guidelines range. Mr. 

Coglianese requested a term of 144 months. He argued that 

various factors warranted a downward variance from the 

sentencing guidelines, including the low number of pornographic 

images involved, the lack of predatory behavior, his untreated 

mental illness (major depressive disorder and attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder), his cooperation with law enforcement, and 

his low likelihood of recidivism. During the hearing, the district 

court discussed two principal concerns: (1) the government’s 

request for a high-end sentence; and (2) the fact that Mr. Coglianese 

knew J.G. when he shared photos of her with others.

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The district court asked defense counsel to address the 

government’s request for a sentence at the high end of the 

guideline range, which was unusual given that Mr. Coglianese had 

pled guilty to all of the charges. The court noted that the 

prosecutor assigned to the case was highly respected and did not 

typically request high-end sentences as a matter of course. The 

court explained that it usually gave less weight to 

recommendations from prosecutors who requested the high end 

of the guidelines in “every case.” See D.E. 85 at 46. When, as here, 

the request came from a prosecutor who was known to consider

the circumstances of each defendant before making a sentencing 

recommendation, the court considered the recommendation 

differently. See id. 

With respect to the parties’ sentencing recommendations, 

the district court said that it was considering a sentence at the low 

end of the guidelines as opposed to a high-end sentence or a 

downward variance. Although the downward variance Mr. 

Coglianese requested was modest, the court was hesitant to grant 

it because of the nature of his relationship with J.G. See id. at 44–

45. Unlike other child pornography cases, Mr. Coglianese knew his 

victim. And Mr. Coglianese had further victimized J.G. by sharing 

nude photos of her with others after having cultivated a 

relationship with her. See id. at 45. 

The district court ultimately sentenced Mr. Coglianese to 

168 months in prison—the low end of the sentencing guidelines 

range—followed by 30 years of supervised release. The terms of 

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supervised release included a special condition barring Mr. 

Coglianese from using or possessing a computer or a device 

capable of connecting to the internet without prior approval from 

the probation office. The special condition also prohibited him 

from possessing an “electronic data storage medium, including a 

flash drive, [a] compact disk, a floppy disk, or any other data 

encryption technique or program.” D.E. 85 at 63. See also D.E. 74 

at 5 (judgment containing nearly identical language).1

In explaining the sentence, the district court said it had 

considered all of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

The court emphasized the importance of punishment, deterrence, 

and protecting the public, and explained it had weighed the 

statutory factors against the “compelling circumstances” Mr. 

Coglianese presented before arriving at the sentence.

At the end of the hearing, Mr. Coglianese objected “to the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence, both as 

applied to the imprisonment and, in particular, to the computer 

term and the length of the term of the supervised release.” D.E. 85 

at 67. This appeal followed.

 

1 The presentence investigation report recommended a special condition 

imposing “computer/internet restrictions” but did not provide any specific 

proposed language. See PSR at 19, ¶ 151. The recommendation did not 

include any reference to “electronic data storage medium/media” or propose 

any restriction on the use or possession of such materials.

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II 

Generally, we review the reasonableness of a sentence for 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1186

(11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

46 (2007)). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to 

afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant 

weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant 

factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the 

proper factors.” Id. at 1189 (citation omitted).

We typically also review the validity of special conditions of 

supervised release for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2009). But if the defendant 

fails to properly state his objection in the district court, we conduct

plain error review. See United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 

(11th Cir. 2003).

III 

Mr. Coglianese argues that his 168-month sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable because the district court relied on 

factors outside those delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), failed to 

consider his expert witness’ testimony, and did not fully explain the 

reasons for the sentence. He also contends that his sentence was 

substantively unreasonable because it was greater than necessary 

under § 3553(a).

 

 

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A 

We first consider whether the district court committed any

procedural errors. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. As relevant here, a

court errs by “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a 

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 

explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51.2

Although a district court must consider all of the applicable 

§ 3553(a) factors in arriving at an appropriate sentence, it need not 

give all of the factors equal weight. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 

560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009). The court “is permitted to 

attach ‘great weight’ to one factor over others.” Id. (quoting Gall, 

552 U.S. at 57).

Here, the district court stated that it had considered the 

advisory guidelines and “all of the factors” set out in § 3553(a)(1)–

(7). See D.E. 85 at 65–66. It is true, as Mr. Coglianese points out, 

that the court specified that it looked at punishment, deterrence, 

and protecting the public. See id. at 57. But reliance on some 

§ 3553(a) factors over others does not necessarily render a sentence 

unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1192 

(11th Cir. 2008). Nor does the failure to discuss every factor. See 

United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2013). 

For example, we have upheld a sentence as procedurally 

2 A court also commits procedural error by failing to calculate or 

miscalculating the guidelines range or by treating the guidelines as mandatory, 

see Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, but Mr. Coglianese does not assert any such errors.

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reasonable despite a statement from the district court that some of 

the § 3553(a) factors “predominated” because the court had also 

stated that it had considered the parties’ arguments and all of the 

factors. See United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224–25 (11th 

Cir. 2018).

Reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the 

district court considered the parties’ arguments and all of the 

§ 3553(a) factors. The court listened to the evidence and 

arguments on the issue of Mr. Coglianese’s mental health—a fact 

that is apparent from the requirement that he participate in a 

mental health program, as requested by his counsel. See D.E. 85 at 

61. The record demonstrates that the court was familiar with the 

facts of the case, took into account the evidence presented, and 

imposed a sentence that was tailored to Mr. Coglianese’s 

circumstances and conduct.

The district court explained that, although it heard and 

considered Mr. Coglianese’s “compelling circumstances” in 

mitigation—including his expert witness’ testimony as to mental 

health issues—it nonetheless determined that a downward 

variance was not justified. See D.E. 85 at 66–67. In support of its 

determination, the court reiterated its concern that Mr. Coglianese 

knew J.G. when he sent nude photos of her to others. See id. at 66.

In this case, the court’s explanation was legally sufficient.

Finally, the district court’s statement that the prosecutor

was highly respected did not constitute error or affect the sentence 

imposed. The court rejected the prosecutor’s recommendation for 

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a high-end guidelines sentence and imposed a low-end sentence. 

Thus, the court’s comments did not render Mr. Coglianese’s 

sentence procedurally unreasonable. See Shabazz, 887 F.3d at 

1224–25.

B 

We next address whether Mr. Coglianese’s sentence is 

substantively reasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In conducting 

our review, we consider the totality of the circumstances. See id. 

Mr. Coglianese, as the party opposing the sentence, bears the 

burden of showing that it is “unreasonable in light of the record 

and the [§] 3553(a) factors.” Shabazz, 887 F.3d at 1224 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

A sentence is unreasonable “only if we are left with the 

definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a 

clear error of judgment . . . arriving at a sentence that lies outside 

the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” 

Id. (citation omitted). Though we do not apply a presumption of 

reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range, we 

ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. See, e.g., 

United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014). A 

sentence below the statutory maximum can also be indicative of 

reasonableness. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 

1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014).

Mr. Coglianese enticed a minor, had sex with her despite 

knowing her age, and then traded nude photos of her. The 

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advisory guidelines placed him at a range of 168 to 210 months of

imprisonment followed by five years to life of supervised release.

The district court imposed the lowest possible prison 

sentence within the range, 168 months, and it was within the 

court’s discretion to weigh the § 3553(a) factors as it did and arrive 

at this sentence. See Shabazz, 887 F.3d at 1224. First, the low-end 

nature of the sentence, which is below the statutory maximum, is

indicative of the reasonableness. See Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1364. 

Second, we have upheld similar sentences for defendants convicted 

of enticement and child pornography offenses. See United States 

v. Nagel, 835 F.3d 1371, 1372, 1376–77 (11th Cir. 2016) (upholding 

a 292-month sentence, at the bottom of the guidelines range, for a 

defendant convicted of enticement of a minor); United States v. 

Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892, 901 (11th Cir. 2014) (upholding a 151-

month sentence following the defendant’s guilty plea to one count 

of possession of child pornography and two counts of possession of 

child pornography); United States v. Brown, 772 F.3d 1262, 1267–

68 (11th Cir. 2014) (upholding a 240-month sentence, which was 

“well above the applicable [g]uidelines range of 78 to 97 months,” 

for a defendant who pled guilty to possession and receipt of child 

pornography).

IV 

 We now turn to the district court’s imposition of the 

special condition of supervised release barring Mr. Coglianese from 

accessing computers and the internet, and from possessing any 

“electronic data storage medium,” without prior approval from the

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probation office. Mr. Coglianese argues that this special condition

is unreasonable and overly broad. He contends that it amounts a

“blanket ban[ ]” that deprives him of his liberty more than is 

reasonably necessary and is tantamount to banishment from 

modern society. See Appellant’s Br. at 13–14.

A 

The government asserts that Mr. Coglianese’s objection to 

“the computer term” was too broad to apprise the district court of 

his challenge. Therefore, the government contends, plain error 

governs our review of the conditions of supervised release. We 

disagree.

An objection to a condition of supervised release is properly 

preserved when it “articulate[s] the specific nature of [the 

defendant’s] objection . . . so that the district court may reasonably 

have an opportunity to consider it.” Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1090 n.7. 

The defendant must raise the objection “in such clear and simple 

language that the [district] court may not misunderstand it.” 

United States v. Riggs, 967 F.2d 561, 565 (11th Cir. 1992). A 

sweeping, general objection is therefore insufficient. See United 

States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1238 (11th Cir. 2015).

Mr. Coglianese objected “in particular” to “the computer 

term.” See D.E. 85 at 67. Given the offenses Mr. Coglianese pled 

guilty to, and the recommendation contained in the presentence 

investigation report, that objection was sufficient to put the district 

court on notice that he was contesting the special condition 

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regarding computers and internet access. That condition 

encompassed various restrictions, including the ban on computer 

and internet use as well as the ban on possessing an “electronic data 

storage medium.” Mr. Coglianese’s objection went beyond a 

generalized statement about the sentence, and pointed out the 

particular special condition with which he took issue. Because Mr. 

Coglianese properly preserved his objection, we review the special 

condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion. See Zinn, 

321 F.3d at 1089 (defense counsel’s statement that polygraph 

testimony “is not a proper condition” of supervised release, 

“though perhaps imprecise, adequately conveyed the nature of 

[the] objection so as to preserve it for appeal”). Cf. HolguinHernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020) (When a 

defendant requests a shorter sentence, a sentencing court 

understands that the defendant is asserting that the requested 

sentence is sufficient and that a longer sentence is greater than 

necessary: “Nothing more is needed to preserve a claim that a

longer sentence is unreasonable.”).

Although some conditions of supervised release are 

statutorily prescribed, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583, a district court has 

discretion to impose “any condition of supervised release it deems 

appropriate so long as it comports with the factors enumerated in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1375 

(11th Cir. 2010). To be valid, a condition must (1) be “reasonably 

related” to a § 3553(a) factor; (2) “involve no greater deprivation of 

liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth” in 

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§ 3553(a); and (3) be “consistent with any pertinent policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Zinn, 321 F.3d 

at 1089 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)).

A condition of supervised release should not unduly restrict 

a defendant’s liberty, but “a condition is not invalid simply because 

it affects a [defendant’s] ability to exercise constitutionally 

protected rights.” Id. See also United States v. Bobal, 981 F.3d 971, 

977 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A] district court may impose reasonable 

conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by 

law-abiding citizens during supervised release.”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court “must 

consider the history and characteristics of the defendant, provide 

both adequate punishment and rehabilitation of the defendant, and 

protect society at large.” Moran, 573 F.3d at 1139.

Mr. Coglianese challenges the restrictions on his use of 

computers and the internet. His crimes, however, involved the use 

of a computer, and for such offenses the guidelines expressly 

recommend a condition limiting computer access. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 5D1.3(d)(7)(B).

We have uniformly upheld similar restrictions, so long as 

the defendant—like Mr. Coglianese here—has the ability to seek 

permission from the probation office to use a computer and/or 

access the internet for specified purposes. See, e.g., Zinn, 321 F.3d 

at 1093; Carpenter, 803 F.3d at 1239. In Zinn, we recognized the 

value and prevalence of the internet in society but held that 

because of the “strong link between child pornography and the 

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[i]nternet, and the need to protect the public, particularly children, 

from sex offenders,” a restriction on internet use was reasonable. 

See 321 F.3d at 1092–93. See also Moran, 573 F.3d at 1140 

(“Although the internet provides valuable resources for 

information and communication, it also serves as a dangerous 

forum in which an offender can freely access child pornography 

and communicate with potential victims.”).

Mr. Coglianese attempts to distinguish our prior decisions

by arguing that when those cases were decided smart phones, 

tablets, and other technology we depend on today had not yet been 

invented. This argument falls short in the face of more recent 

decisions upholding restrictions on the use of computers and 

internet. Indeed, in 2015, well after the advent of the iPhone, we

upheld a lifetime ban on internet use without prior approval from 

the probation office. See Carpenter, 803 F.3d at 1239 (defendant 

convicted of possessing child pornography). See also Bobal, 981 

F.3d at 973, 976–78 (holding that a lifetime ban on a sex offender’s 

computer usage was not unconstitutional because the “computer 

restriction [did] not extend beyond his term of supervised release, 

it [was] tailored to his offense, and [the defendant could] obtain the 

district court’s approval to use a computer for permissible 

reasons”).

To recap, Mr. Coglianese used at least three different 

internet sites to entice a minor and to disseminate and receive 

pornographic images of minors. The internet, therefore, was the 

means by which he committed his crimes. It was within the district 

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court’s discretion to impose restrictions on Mr. Coglianese’s use of 

computers and internet during his term of supervised release. 

Significantly, the court did not impose an absolute ban; it expressly 

permitted Mr. Coglianese to obtain approval from the probation 

office to use computers and the internet for legitimate purposes. 

On this record, there was no abuse of discretion.

B 

That leaves the district court’s restriction on the possession 

of “electronic data storage medi[a].” The court prohibited Mr. 

Coglianese from “possessing an electronic data storage medium, 

including a flash drive, [a] compact disk, a floppy disk, or any other 

data encryption technique or program.” D.E. 85 at 65, D.E. 74 at 

5. Like the restriction on using computers and the internet, this 

was not a flat-out ban, as Mr. Coglianese was allowed to seek the 

permission of the probation office to possess these materials. The 

court explained that “if approved to possess or use a device [Mr. 

Coglianese] must permit routine inspection of the device.” D.E. 74 

at 5. 

Mr. Coglianese argues that this restriction goes “far beyond 

a reasonably necessary deprivation of liberty.” Appellant’s Br. at 

14. More particularly, he asserts that it is overly inclusive and 

prohibits him from owning or possessing a mobile phone, a 

modern microwave oven, a modern television, a home alarm 

system, and many thermostats and digital alarm clocks because all 

of these items could conceivably be “electronic data storage media”

under a very broad construction of that term. See id. at 18–19.

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The relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), provides that a

district court may order a sex offender to submit his property, 

including his “computer, other electronic communications or data 

storage devices or media” to search at any time. The guidelines

also recommend certain special conditions for cases involving sex 

offenses. Among those listed is a condition requiring the defendant 

to submit to a search at any time of his computer or “other 

electronic communication or data storage devices or media.” 

U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C). But the term “electronic data storage 

medium”—the term used by the district court—does not appear in 

either Title 18 or the guidelines.

A district court has discretion to impose “any condition it 

deems necessary so long as it comports with the statutory 

requirements.” Tome, 611 F.3d at 1375. Yet the condition must 

be sufficiently specific to provide the defendant with “adequate 

notice of prohibited conduct when there is a commonsense 

understanding of what activities the categories encompass.”

United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167 (5th Cir. 2001)). 

Absent a statutory or guidelines definition of the term 

“electronic data storage medium,” we try to discern its ordinary 

meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez, 997 F.3d 1121, 

1124 (11th Cir. 2021) (using various dictionaries to define the term 

“sexual activity” because the relevant statute failed to provide a 

definition). Because there do not appear to be any dictionary 

definitions for the term “electronic data storage medium,” we turn 

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to the meanings of each word comprising the term. See Villarreal 

v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 964–65 (11th Cir. 2016) 

(defining the various words comprising a term/phrase to discern 

its meaning).

The word “electronic,” as an adjective, means “[u]sing the 

electronic transmission or storage of information, as by television 

or computer.” 1 Shorter Oxford Eng. Dictionary 804 (5th ed. 2002). 

See also Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, Unabridged 84a 

(2002 & Addenda) (“Implemented on or by means of a computer: 

involving a computer.”). “Data” is defined as “[n]umerical or other 

information represented in a form suitable for processing by 

computer.” Am. Heritage Dictionary of the Eng. Language 463 

(4th ed. 2009). See also McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Sci. & Tech.

Terms 548 (6th ed. 2003) (“General term for numbers, letters, 

symbols, and analog quantities that serve as input for computer 

processing.”). “Storage,” in a computing context, means “[t]he 

retention of data and instructions in a device from which they can 

be retrieved as needed; the part of a memory or other device in 

which data are stored.” 2 Shorter Oxford Eng. Dictionary at 3045. 

See also McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Sci. & Tech. Terms at 2038 

(“Any device that can accept, retain, and read back one or more 

times; the means of storing data may be chemical, electrical, 

magnetic, mechanical, or sonic.”). “Medium” is defined as 

“[s]omething (as a magnetic disk) on which information may be 

stored.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary at 106a. See also

McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Sci. & Tech. Terms at 1303 (“The 

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material, or configuration thereof, on which data are recorded; 

usually not applied to disk, drum, or core, but to storable, 

removable media, such as paper tape, cards, and magnetic tape.”).

Some of these words have been defined in combination with 

one another. For example, “storage medium” means “[a]ny device 

or recording medium into which data can be copied and held until 

some later time, and from which the entire original date can be 

obtained.” McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Sci. & Tech. Terms at 2039. 

See also Microsoft, Comput. Dictionary 499 (5th ed. 2002) (defining 

“storage media” as “[t]he various types of physical material on 

which data bits are written and stored, such as floppy disks, hard 

disks, tape, and optical disks”).3

Taking all of these definitions together, we understand an 

“electronic data storage medium” to be a device—such as a flash 

drive, magnetic disk, floppy disk, hard disk, tape, or optical disk—

that can store and transmit information in a form suitable for 

processing by a computer. Reading the term in context—as we 

must—the special condition imposed by the district court is 

sufficiently clear to put Mr. Coglianese on notice of the types of 

media or devices that he is prohibited from possessing without 

probation office approval. See In re Failla, 838 F.3d 1170, 1176 

(11th Cir. 2016) (“Context is a primary determinant of meaning.”) 

3 Media is the plural of medium. See Am. Heritage Dictionary of the Eng. 

Language at 1090.

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(quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012)).

The district court used the term “electronic data storage 

medium” when discussing the specific items that Mr. Coglianese 

was prohibited from possessing or using during his term of 

supervised release. The term was mentioned following the 

restriction on the use of computers or the internet and as part of 

the same special condition, which demonstrates that the term is 

related to the use of computers and/or technology. Indeed, Mr. 

Coglianese’s own objection to the special condition reflects an 

understanding that the restrictions all pertain to the use (or nonuse) of computers and related items (e.g., the internet and devices 

capable of storing computer-based information). See D.E. 85 at 67 

(objecting to the special condition as “the computer term”). To the 

extent that there was any doubt, the court provided a list of 

examples, stating that the prohibited items included “a flash drive, 

[a] compact disk, [and] a floppy disk.” D.E. 85 at 65. That list is 

consistent with our understanding of the restriction.

The term “electronic data storage medium” is not overly 

inclusive and does not impose a greater deprivation of liberty than 

necessary. Mr. Coglianese committed sexual crimes, largely 

through his use of computers and related technology. For 

example, he stored child pornography images of J.G. and 

distributed them to others via the internet. In sum, he used devices 

capable of storing and transmitting computer-based or digital 

information in the commission of the offenses to which he pled 

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guilty. As such, the district court’s restriction on his possession of

“electronic data storage medi[a]” during the term of his supervised 

release was tailored to his offenses and did not constitute an abuse 

of discretion.

We also note that there was no blanket ban; the district 

court gave Mr. Coglianese the opportunity to seek permission 

from the probation office to use an “electronic data storage 

medium” for legitimate purposes. The special condition begins 

with the words “[w]ithout prior written approval of the probation 

officer” and later says “[i]f approved to possess or use a device.” 

D.E. 74 at 5.4

V 

We affirm Mr. Coglianese’s sentence.

AFFIRMED. 

4 If the state of technology changes while Mr. Coglianese is incarcerated such 

that the special conditions of supervised release need modification, he can ask 

the district court for such relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32.1(a).

USCA11 Case: 20-12074 Date Filed: 05/17/2022 Page: 20 of 20