## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

N O S. P D - 529- 09 t hrough P D - 545 - 09

E x p a rte J A M E S W . E L L IS a n d J O H N D . C O L Y A N D R O , A p p ell a n ts

O N A PPE LL A N T’ S A N D STA TE ’ S PET I TI ON S FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE THI RD CO URT O F AP PEALS

TRAVI S CO UNTY K ELL ER , P . J. , del i vere d t he opi ni on of t he unan i m ous C ourt . Th is c a se inv olv e s c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e s to the mon e y la un de ri ngstatut e and

to c e rt a in Election Code provisions relating to cor porate contributions. Wit h respe ct to the money launder ing statut e , w e de te rm ine tha

t the c ourt of a pp e a ls i na pp ro pr ia te ly

re so lve d is su e s th a t are no t c og niza ble in a pre trial habe as proc eeding . Wit h respe ct to the Election Code provisions, w e deter mine that the statutes are not f

acia lly unconstitutional. Consequently , we sustain the State’s firs t gro u n d for

re vie w a nd oth e rw ise a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls. I. BACKG ROUND The State filed a

number o f indictments ag ainst Coly andro f or ele ction code violations. These indictments c harg ed that, in 2002, on beha lf of the Te x ans for Republican Major ity

Polit icalELL IS & COLYANDRO — 2

Ex pa rteEl lis , 279 S.W .3d 1, 19 (Tex. App.–Austin 2008). 1 Action Commi ttee (TRMPAC), Coly andro know ingly acc epted f

rom sever al cor

porations political contributions in various dollar amounts that he kne w wer e contr ibuted in violation of Chapter 253 of the Elec tion Code. The S tate also filed one indictment ag ainst Coly andro f or money launder ing and one indictment a g ainst Ellis for money launder ing. The money launder ing indictments a lleg ed that the above co ntributions were tra nsfer red to the Republica

n National Committ ee ( RNC) via a $190,000 chec k made pa

y able to the Republican N ational State Elec tions Com mittee (RNSEC) that Coly andro sig ned and de livered to Ellis and that Ellis del i v er ed to the RNC. The State later f iled

re- indictments of the money lau n d er i n g char g es. The r e-indictments omitted any ref ere nces to a “che ck,” instea d alleg ing the “tra nsfer of funds of th e v al u e o f $190,000” fr om TRMP AC to the RN SEC

. Ellis and Coly andro f

iled pretria l habea s corpus a pplications, which the trial c ourt denied. On appe al, they

argued th at t h e Election Code provisions g overningpolitical contributions were unconstitutionally

vag ue and ove r

b r o a d w it h r e s p e c t t o p r o te c te d First Amendme nt expression. They further argued that the m oney launder ing statute was unc onstitut ionally vag ue if it wer e interpr eted to apply to chec ks or to a tra

nsaction involving somethingother than c ash. Dr awi nga

sh arp dis tin c tio n b e t

w e e n c o nt r i b ut i o n s a

n d e xp e n d i t u r e s, the c ourt

of a pp e a ls h e ld that la ws g ov e rn ingc on tr ibutio ns we re no t su bje c t to “ str ic t sc rutiny ” bu t w e re re vie we d und e r a le ss ri g or ou s te st o f b e ing “ c los e ly dr awn ” to me e t a “ su ff ic ie ntl y imp or tant i nte re st. ” Re sp on din g to

1 the a pp e lla nts ’ o ve rb re a dth

argume nt, the c ourt

of a pp e a ls r eje cte d th e c on te nti on that Su pr e me Court case s prohibiting re strictions on expenditures had any application to the Texas E lection CodeELL IS & COLYANDRO — 3

Id. at 20. 2 Id. at 20-21. 3 Id. at 21-23. 4 Id. at 22. 5 Id. 6 Id. at 23-30. 7 pr ov isi on s th a t r e str ic te d c on tr ibutio ns . Mo re ov e r, the c ourt of a pp e a ls h e ld t

hat th e a pp e lla nts 2 failed to de monstrate that the contribution restric tions re ache d a substantial a mou n t o f protected conduct. Wit h respe ct to the appellants’ vag ueness claims, the court of appea ls concluded that the

3 Election Code provisions, thoug h broad and complex, we re not so indefinite as to deprive a person of ordinar y intelligenc e of the ability to understand what was prohibited. The c o u rt h el d that “a 4 pe rs on of or din ary int e lli g e nc e is c a

pa ble of pr op e rl y de sig natin g wh e the r his or he r c on tr ibutio n is intended to suppor

t or oppose a measure (lawf ul), be used solely for administ ra t i v e ex penses (lawf ul), be used f

or unre g ulated expenditures (la wful), or be used [] ‘in connection with’ a candidate’s ca

mpaig n (unlawf

ul).” The court of appeals explained that “the statute pla ces bur dens 5 on those making and ac ceptingcorpor ate c ontributions to designate and to ascertain the pur pose of a contr ibution before g iving it or using it in a campaig n for e lective of fice .” 6 The c ourt o f appe als answe red the contention that the money launder ing statute was

un c on sti tut ion a lly

va g ue if it a pp lie d to c he c ks by ho ldi ngthat th e statut e did no t a pp ly to c he c ks

. 7 Whether the statute e nco m p as s ed che cks depe nded on whe ther c hecks w ere included in theELL IS & COLYANDRO — 4

Id. at 23-24. 8 Id. at 24. 9 Id. 10 Id. at 25. 11 Id. at 25-26. 12 Id. at 25. 13 Id. at 26. 14 de fi nit ion of “ fu nd s. ” Th e statut e pr ov ide d th a t th e te rm “ fu nd s” inc lud e s a lis t of

sp e c if ic ite ms. 8 9 Ac c or din g to the c ourt of a pp e a ls, the te rm “ inc lud e s” me ant that the lis t wa s not e xclu siv e . B ut, 10 relying upon t h e p ri n ci p le of e jus de m ge ne ris , th e c ourt he ld t hat th e te rm

“ fu nd s” c ou ld o nly encompa ss items that were of the “same kind, class, or nature” as the it ems in the l ist. The c ourt 11 of appe als then obser

ved that all the items in the list were f orms of ca sh or ca sh equivalents. The 12 court of a ppeals he ld that chec ks were unlike these items bec ause a chec k is not gua

rante ed, and the re fo re do e s n ot f

un c tio n a s c a shor

a c a she qu iva le nt: Coi n, c ur re nc y , c a sh , or ite ms that fu nc tio n a s c a sh e qu iva le nts a re, t hems e lve s, pay ment. By contra st, a chec k is a promise or c ommitm ent to make pa y ment when the che ck is later pr esente d for pay ment. Acc ording ly , pay

ment by chec k that is not g uara nteed in some wa

y , such as a

cashie r’s c heck or teller’s c heck, is not pay ment in t he same se ns e a s p ay

me nt b y c a shor c a she qu iva le nt. 13 * * * C as h o r c as h eq u i v al en t s s u ch as cu rr en cy , T re as u ry n o t es , s i l v er ce rt i fi ca t es , fo re i gn bank dra fts, cashie r’s chec ks, or other f orms of pay

ment simil ar to those e numerated in the pre- 2005 version of se ction 34.01 are not at al l s i m i l ar to c hecks or other no n- g ua ra nte e d n e g oti a

ble ins tr ume nts a s a

me dium of

e xch ang e . Ca sh or a

c a sh e qu iva le nt i s, wi tho ut m or e , a fo rm of pa y me nt, and on c e the c ur

re nc y or oth e r c a sh equivalent is deliver ed , pay ment is acc omplished and is no longe r conting ent on so me futur e e ve nt. 14ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 5

Id. at 26 n.21. 15 Id. at 24. 16 Id. at 27-29. In 2005, the money launder ing sta t u t e was amended to explicitly include 17 chec ks within the definition of “funds.” See id. at 28 (citing Acts 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1162, §1). See id. at 37 (supplemental opinion). The State also challeng ed the court of a p p eals’s

18 statutory construction ana ly sis, see id. at 39-41, but, give n our disposition of the State’s first g round for r eview, see this opini on, inf ra , we a re not c oncer

ned with that cha lleng e her e. Id. 19 Id. at 37-38. 20 During this discussion, the court of appeals not ed that a “fore ign ba nk draf t” was a “teller ’s che ck,” with pay ment g uara

nteed, a nd thus constituted a cash e quivalent. “ F o r e ign ba nk draf ts” was among 15 the ite ms i n th e statut or

y lis t. Th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls a lso c ite d le g isl a tiv e his tor y in s up po rt

of its 16 conclusion that the version of the money launder ing statute that was a pplicable to the a

ppellants was

no t in te nd e d to a

pp ly to c he c ks

. 17 I n a motion for re hear i ng , the State ar g ued that the c ourt of appe als err ed in discussing wh e the r o r n ot t

he mon e y la un de ri ngstatut e a

pp lies to ch e c ks be c a

us e the a pp e lla nts ’ c la im w ith respe ct to chec ks was an “ as a pplied” cha lleng e to the statute that wa s not cog nizable in pretrial habea s proce eding s. I n a suppl emental opinion, the court of appeals conc eded that it “may consider 18 only fac ial challeng es on pre trial habeas.” Neve rtheless, the c ourt of appe als conc luded that the 19 State’s contention was without mer it. First, the court conclude d that the appe llants had in fac t raised

a fa c ia l c ha lle ng e to the statut e be c a us e the y did no t con te nd that th e te rm ‘f un ds ’ w a s v a g ue “ on ly

as it a pplied in the se indictments.” Although the appellants argued that t h e m o n ey l aunder ing 20 statut e wa s unc on sti tut ion a l if mon e y la un de ri ng c ou ld b e c omm itt e d b y c he c k, the c ourt

of a pp e a lsELL IS & COLYANDRO — 6

Id. at 38 (some inter

nal quotation marks omitted). 21 Id. 22 455 U.S. 489 (1982). 23 El lis , 2 7 9 S

. W

. 3 d

at 3 8 (q u o t i n g Hoffman Estates , 4 55 U. S. at 49 5) ; se e als o E lli s , 279 24 S.W .3d at 38-39. J ustice He nson reque sted that the case s be hear d en banc , and that re quest was ove rruled. 25 Id. at 30. Id. at 31 (He nson, J ., dissenting)

.

26 Id. 27 found that the a

ppellants also ar g ued more g ener ally that “dictionar ies o ff

er many and diver g ent definitions of ‘fund,’ which ar e inconsistent with the ty pes of ‘funds’ enumer ated in the statute” a nd that “the statute is unconstitutionally vag ue bec ause it denie s fair notice that it criminaliz es conduc t not w ithin the enumer ated classes of ‘funds.’” Second, the cour t of appe als conc luded that, eve n 21 if some of the a

ppellants’ complaints could be char acte rized as ra ising a n “as a pplied” cha lleng e,

re so lut ion of tho se c omp la int s wa s n e c e ssa ry to r e so lvi ngthe fa c ia l c ha lle ng e a t is su e on a pp e a l. 22 I n support of this conclusion, the cour t relied up o n a st atement by the Supreme Court in Hoffman E s t a t es v. Fli

pside, Hoffman Estates Inc. , t h a ti nan a l y z i n g a f a c i a l o v e r b r e a d t h o r

v a g u e ne ss 23 challeng e, “[a] court should . . . ex am ine the complaina nt’s conduct be fore analy zing other hy pothetical applications of the law.” 24 I n a dissent to the re fu s al t o h ear the ca se en ba nc, J ustice He nson criticized the cour t of 25

a pp e a ls p ane l’ s o pin ion

a s “ ov e rb ro a d a

nd ri fe wi th d ic ta .” She bel iev ed th at the pa ne l, i n 26 concludingthat the money launder ing statute did not apply to c hecks, had rea ched the merits of an

“ a s a pp lie d” c ha lle ng e that wa s n ot p ro pe rl y be fo re the c ourt

. She c ha ra c te ri zed the a pp e lla nts ’ 27ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 7

Id. 28 Id. at 32. 29 Id. at 3 3 (c i t i n g Le e v . S tat e , 29 S.W .3d 570 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2000, no pe t.) and Da v is 30 v . S tat e , 68 S.W .3d 273 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2002, pe t. r ef’d)). Justi ce H enson ac knowledg ed that “the pr ecise issue of whe ther c hecks w ere c o n s id ere d ‘funds’ unde r the money launder ing statute was not before the cour

t” in those ca ses. El lis , 279 S.W .3d at 33. Id. 31 Id. at 35-37. 32 See id. at 41. 33 Id. 41-42 (Patter son, J ., dissenting)

. 34 challeng e as a

n “as a pplied” challeng e “in sheep’ s clothing” beca use “the State’s interpre tation of the s t at u t e must be corr ect in orde r for their vagueness c halleng e to succ eed.” J ustice He nson 28 fu rt he r c on c lud e d th a t, b e c a

us e the a pp e lla nts c on c e de d tha t the te rm “ fu nd s” pla inl y

inc lud e s c a sh

or cur renc y , a fa cial cha lleng e must nece ssarily fail on that basi s . S h e al s o observe d that two 29 D a l l a s C o u rto f

A p p e a l s c a s e s h a d

u p h e l d t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f

t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u

p p o rtm o n e ylaunder ing c harg es base d on transac tions invol ving c hecks and that the f eder al money

launder ing 30 statute “c lear ly

criminalizes the launder ing of chec ks.” J ustice He nson also criticized the pane l’s

31 application of the principle of e jus de m ge ne ris and the c onclusions drawn f rom the 2005 amendments to the money launder ing statute. 32 I n a dissent to the over

rulingof the State’s motion for r econside ration en ba nc, J ust i ce 33 Pa tte rs on als o a

rgue d th a t th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls p ane l ha d r

ule d o n a n “ a s a pp lie d” va g ue ne ss

c ha lle ng e that w a s not pr op e rl y be fo re it. I n he r vie w, the mon e y la un de ri ngind ic tme nts me re ly 34 alleg ed the $190,000 c heck a s the method of launde ring the funds, but t h e ac t u al funds wer e theELL IS & COLYANDRO — 8

Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. at 42-43. 37 Th e State ’s g ro un ds fo r r e vie w r e a d a s f oll ow s: 38 GROUND O NE: The c ourt of appe als err ed by addre ssing the a

ppellants’ “a s applied” challeng e to the 2002 money launder ing statute broug ht in a pretria l w rit of habea s corpus, whe re only a facial challeng e wa s cog nizable. I n holding that this “a s applied” challenge was a ctually a fa cial cha lleng e, the c ourt improperly looked behind the fa ce of the indictment a nd misint erpr eted a dec ision of the United States Sup re me Court

. GROUND TWO: The c ourt of app ea ls erre d in perfor ming unne cessa

ry statutory analy sis and in examini ng leg islative history and tre atises to interpre t the meaningof terms in the statute whe n the plain text was not a mbiguous and did not lead to absur d re su lts

. Due to our disposition of the State’s first g round for revie w, we do not rea ch its second g round for revie w. corpor ate c ontributions, which may or may not have consisted of che cks. Be cause a trial ha d not 35

oc c ur re d, in w hic h e vid e nc e c ou ld h a ve be e n e lic ite d a s to the e xac t f or m of the c or po rate contributions, J ustice P atterson concluded that a ruling on the appe llants’ vag ueness c halleng e wa s premature. J ustice Patterson a lso concluded that any fac ial challeng e made by

the appe llants failed 36 beca use, by conce ding that “funds” inc luded ca sh, they could not demonstrate that the statute was

va g ue in a ll i ts a

pp lic a tio ns . 37 The State filed a petition for discretionary revie w, arg uing in its first g round t hat t he cour t of a pp e a ls e rr e d in

dis c us sin g wh e the r o r not the mon e y la un de ri ng statut e a

pp lie s to che c ks be c a

us e the appellants’ claim with respec t to checks w as an “ as applied” challeng e to the statute that wa s not cog nizable in pretrial habe as proc eeding s. Coly andro a lso filed a petition for discr etionary revie w, 38ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 9

Col y and ro ’s g ro un ds fo r r e vie w r e a d a s f oll ow s: 39 GRO U N D O N E : T h e c o u rt o f a

p p e a ls e r r e d in f in d in g th a t Se c ti o n 2 5 3

. 0 94 of the Texas Election Code was not unc on s t itutionally vag ue, employing a

standard of re vie w a pp lic a ble to c ivi l, n ot c ri min a l c a se s. GROUND TWO: The c ourt of appe als err ed in finding that Section 253.094 of the Texas Election Code was not unconstitutionally overbr oad, employ ing a standa rd of re vie w a pp lic a ble to c ivi l, n ot c ri min a l c a se s. I n his brief, Coly andro br eaks the discussion into t hree topics: (1) the a ppropriate standard of

revie w, (2 ) v a g ue ne ss, and

(3 ) o ve rb re a dth . T he State c on te nd s th a t the sta nd ard of re vie w top ic is the on ly issue fairly

encompa ssed within Coly andro’ s petition and that we should not addre ss the merits of the va g ue ne ss a

nd ov e rb re a dth

iss ue s. We c on c lud e , h ow e ve r, that th e thr e e top ics o utl ine d in Coly andro’ s brief w ere all fairly raised in his petition, and we will follow the three- point structure of his br ie f i n o ur

ana ly sis of

his c la ims

. See Men e fe e v . S tat e , 287 S.W .3d 9, 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (cour t of appe als that 40 a ff ir me d th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g ment on on e ba sis wa s n ot “ c omp e lle d to a dd re ss” an a lte rn a te ar g u m e n tf

o r a f f i r m i n g t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s j u d g m e nt) ; State v. Plambe ck, 182 S.W .3d 365, 367 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (cour t of appea ls did not e rr in fa iling to dec ide an issue that be came moot be c a us e of its re so lut ion

of a dif fe re nt i ssu e ); State v. Me rcado , 972 S.W .2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (a n appellate court may

consider, f

or the fi rs t time on appea l, an alter nate theor

y of law arguin g that th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls e rr e d in

de c lin ingto a

pp ly a “ str ic t sc rutiny ” ana ly sis and e rr e d in

r e f u s in g to h o ld

th a t t h e E le c ti o nCo d e p r o v is io n s w e r e u n c o n s ti tuti o n a ll y v a g u e o r o v e r b r o a d

. We

39 g ra nte d b oth pe tit ion s. II. AN AL YSI S

A. M one y La unde r ing Reg ardingthe State’s pe t i t i o n , the first question that we c onfront wa s raised by Ellis’s attorney at oral ar gument: “Why are we he re? ” The court of a ppeals a ffirme d the trial cour t’s judgme nt in favor of the State, so the State “won” on appea l. Ordinarily , a first-le vel appe llate cour t

re ta ins wi de la tit ud e to u ph old a tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

in a mann e r t

he a pp e llate c ourt

de e ms appropr iate. But pre trial hab e a s , f o ll o w ed by

an interloc utory

appea l, is an “extraordinar y reme dy ,” 40ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 10

applicable to the fac ts of the ca se which suppor ts the trial court’ s decision). Bu t se e Ru sh ing v . S tat e , 85 S.W .3d 283, (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (althoug h the c o u rt of appe als aff irmed the trial c ourt’s decision in favor

of the State, we g rante d the State’s petition for discre tionary revie w and he ld that the cour t of appe als err ed in finding a statute unc onstitut ional). Ex parte Doste r , 303 S.W .3d 720, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (interna l quotation marks 41 omi tte d) (q

uo tin g , in pa rt , f ro m Ex pa rteSm ith , 178 S.W .3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Doster , 303 S.W .3d at 721, 721 n.2, 727. 42 Id. a t 72 4; W

e isev . S tat e , 55 S.W .3d 617, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 43 Se e Ex

pa rteSm ith , 185 S.W .3d 887, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 200 6) ( in p ar i m ate ria 44 c ha lle ng e no t c og niza

ble on pr e tr ia l ha

be a s) ; W e ise , 55 S.W .3d at 620-21 (w hether illega l dumping statute requir es a c ulpable mental state not ripe for revie w on pre trial habe as). W e ise , 55 S.W .3d at 620-21. 45 and “a ppellate c ourts have be en ca ref ul to ensure that a pretrial writ is not misused to secur e pre trial appellate revie w of matters that in actua l fac t should not be put befor e appellate courts at the pre trial stag e.” Consequently , whether a claim is even cog nizable on pretrial ha beas is a thr eshold issue 41 that sh ou ld b e a dd

re sse d b e fo re the me ri ts of the c la im may be re so lve d. I f a

no n- c og niza

ble c la im 42 is resolved on the me rits in a pretria l habea s appea l, the n the pretria l writ has bee n misused, and the State can a

ppropriate ly

petition this Court to corre ct such misuse. So, did the court of appea ls r esolve a non-cog nizable c laim? Gene rally , pretria l habea s is not avai l ab l e t o test the sufficie ncy of the c harg ing instrument or to construe the meaningand 43 application of the statute defining the offe nse char g ed. Pretrial habea s can be used to bringa fa cial 44

c ha lle ng e to t

he c on sti tut ion a lity

of the statute th at defi ne s th e of fe ns e bu t ma

y no t be us e d to advanc e an “ as applied” challeng e. 45 Th e a pp e lla nts c e rt a inl y

a sserted th a t th e mon e y la un de ri ngstatut e wa s f a c ia lly

un co n s t i t u t i o n al, but such an a ssertion is not, by itself, enoug h. I f a c laim desig nated a s a fa cialELL IS & COLYANDRO — 11

T EX . P EN A L C ODE § 34.02(a) (2). 46 Id. , § 34.01(4). 47 Id. , § 34.01(2). 48 Lon g v . S

tat e , 931 S.W .2d 285, 287-88 (Te x . Crim. App. 1996). 49 W as hin gto n S

tat e Gran ge v . W

as hin gto n S

tate Rep ub lic an Pa rty , 552 U.S. 442, 449 50 (2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Un i t ed S tates v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), which se t forth the standa rd); Sa nc he z v . S tat e 995 S.W .2d 677, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Appellants conte nd that the Salerno sta nd ard no lon g e r a

pp lie s and

ins te a d a

rgue that th e te st i s w he ther th e st atu te ha s “ pla inl y leg itimate sweep.” I n State v. Mark ovich , we r ecog nized that the appropriate standar d to apply for c ha lle ng e is i n f

a c t an a s- a

pp lie d c ha lle ng e , c ourt s shou ld r e fu se to c on sid e r t he me ri ts o f t

he c la im. The money

launder ing statute that the appe llants are a ccuse d of violating p r o v id e s : “ A person commi t s an o ff

ense if the person knowing ly . . . conducts, super

vises, or fa cilitates a tra

nsaction involving the pr ocee ds of cr iminal activity .” The ter m “p roceeds” is de fined to mea n “funds 46

a c qu i r e d o r d e r i v e d d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y f r o m , p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h , o r r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h ana c t

. ” In 47 tur n, the te rm

“ fu nd s” is d e fi ne d a s f

oll ow s: (A) c oin or pape r money of the United States or a ny other c ountry

that is designated as leg al tender and that circ ulates and is customar ily used and a cce pted as a

medium of exchang e in the countr y of issue; (B ) United States sil v er certific ates, United States Tr easur y notes, and F eder al Re se rv e Sy ste m no te s; (C) off icial fore ign ba

nk notes that are customarily used and acc epted as a medium of e xch ang e in a

fo re ig n c ountr

y and fo re ig n b ank

dr a ft s. 48 The c ourt of appe als’s supplemental opinion sug g ests that t h e ap p ellants’ cha lleng e to the de fi nit ion of “ fu nd s” wa s a

fa c ia l c ha lle ng e be c a

us e it w a s n ot l imi te d to the pa rt ic ula r i nd ic tme nts i nt h es e c as es . Bu t u n l es s Fi rs t Am en d m en t fr ee d o m s ar e im p l i ca t ed , a f ac i al v agu en es s ch al l en ge 49

c an s uc c e e d o nly

if it i s sh ow n th a t th e law i s unc on sti tut ion a lly va g ue in a ll o f i ts a

pp lic a tio ns . 50ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 12

fac ial vag ueness challeng es was “the subject of debate wit hin the U.S . Supreme Court.” 77 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Our readingof W ashington Stat e Grange ind ic a te s th a t th e de bate has been settled in f

avor of the Salerno standard, 552 U.S. at 449, but, as i n that case , id. , evaluation of the money launder ing statute under the “plainly leg itimate sw eep” standard would not alter our dis po sit ion

he re . As our d isc us sio n w ill sh ow , th e e xiste nc e of le g iti ma te a

pp lic a tio ns in t

his c a se also shows that the statute has a “plainly leg itimate sweep.” “ ‘ I n c lu d e s ’ an d

‘ in c lu d in g ’ ar e te r

ms o f e n la r g e me n t a n d n o t o f li mi tati o no r

e xc lu s ive 51 enumer ation, and use of the t erms does not create a pr esumption that components not expressed are Her e, no one has argued that the money launder ing statute implicates First Amendment activity , and

we have no rea son to think that it doe s so. I t is not enoug h, then, that the appe llants’ constitutional challeng e may

have be en somewhat broade r than the indictments. That fa ct, standing alone, doe s not suffice to establish that the claim is a fac ial challeng e beca use, despite this brea dth, it st ill is not

a c la im that th e law i s v a g ue in a ll o f i ts a pp lic a tio ns . A f a c ia l va g ue ne ss c ha ll e ng e to t he de fi nit ion

of “ fu nd s” in t he mon e y la un de ri ngstatut e would have to take one of two forms. First, one could challeng e the de finition of “funds” a s vag ue in its entirety . But the a

ppellants conc eded in their briefs to the court of appea ls that the items list ed in t he statut or

y de fi nit ion

of “ fu nd s” were r easona

bly sp e c if ic . T he y re fe rr e d to the lis t a s a “see mingly

narr ow def

inition,” that was disrupted b y t h e S tate’s br oad interpr etation of the te rm “includes.” The appellants took the position that the enumer ated items w ere forms of c ash, and the y objected to the money launder ing statute only insofar a s it “criminalized transac tions not i nvolving cash.” T h er e i s a s ec o n d fo rm t h at a fa ci al ch al l en ge c o u l d t ak e i nt h i s ca s e. On e c o u l d ch al l en ge the def inition of “funds” a s vag ue insofar as it ext ends outside t he statutory list. This second

scena rio for mounting a fa cial cha lleng e is possible beca use the ter

m “i n cl u d es , ” as a ter

m of

“ e nla rg e me nt a nd no t of limit a tio n, ” e sse nti a lly c re a te s an imp lie d “ c a tc h- a ll” pr ov isi on . Co ur ts 51ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 13

excluded.” T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 311.005(13).

Ci ty o f La k e wo o d v . P la in D e a le r P u b lishing C o. , 486 U.S. 750, 769-70, 772 (1988) 52 (catch-a ll provision found to be unconstitutionally vag ue, re mand to deter mine whether un c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on s c an b e se ve re d) ; State v. Mullen , 577 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Minn. 1998) (e rr or in i ns tr uc tin g jur y on fa c ia lly un c on sti tut ion a lly

va g ue cat c h- a ll p ro vis ion wa s h arm le ss i n light of othe r nonvague provisions under w hich the jury was a lso instructed). Sometimes the appellants and the c ourt of appe als ref er to “c as h eq u i v alents.” F or the 53 sake of dis c us sio n, futur e refere nces to “ a fo rm of c a sh ” in t

his op ini on

inc lud e the te rm

“ c a sh equivalents.” have r ecog nized that a catc h-all provision ca n be unconstitutionally vag ue on its fac e eve n if the other, e numerated items in a statutory list are re asonably

specific

. 52 But a challeng e to the implied c atch- all provision in this c ase is de feated by the inclusion of fo re ig n b ank

dr a ft s in the lis t. A s w e have ob se rv e d a bo ve , the a

pp e lla nts c la im that all o f t

he ite ms in t he statut or

y lis t of “ fu nd s” are fo rm s o f c a sh , and the y c la im that th e te rm

“ fu nd s” is v a g ue to 53 the extent that it encompa sses items other than c ash. “F oreig n bank dra fts” is one of the enumer ated items in the list . For

the appe llants’ char acte rization of the list t o b e co rr ec t , then, fore ign ba nk draf ts would have to be a

form of c ash, and in fac t, the appellants (a nd the cour

t of appe als) conte nd that a for eig n bank dra ft is a form of cash be cause pay

ment is gua

rante ed by

the bank. We nee d not decide whether

the cha rac terization of fore ign bank draf ts a s a form of cash is ac curate. Assuming its accur acy

for the sa ke of discussion, the char acte rization would apply equally to domestic bank draf ts, also known as “ca shier’s checks” —a fact t he court of appeals recog nized in its opi nion. But domestic bank dra fts are not enumerated in the list, so they would be cove red bythe implied catchall provision. And beca use the implied catch-a ll provision would cover at l ea s t o n e form of cash—dome stic bank dra fts, a.k.a. c ashier’ s chec ks—the appe llants “ c a s h o n ly ” p o s it io n , if

assumedELL IS & COLYANDRO — 14

Be cause domestic bank dra fts are in common use, a fac ial challeng e would fa il even under 54 the “ pla inl y

le g iti ma te sw e e p” sta

nd ard a dv oc a te d b y

the a pp e lla nts

. 455 U.S. at 493-94. 55 See id. at 495. 56 Id. 57 to b e tr ue , e sta bli sh e s th a t th e imp lie d c a tc h- a ll p ro vis ion is f a c ia lly c on sti tut ion a l. 54 What about the court of appea ls’s contention that it had to resolve whe ther the statute w as

c on sti tut ion a l “ a s a

pp lie d” in o rd e r to re so lve the a pp e lla nts ’ f a c ia l c ha lle ng e ? Th e sh or t ans we r t o this question is that the appe llants did no t re all y advanc e a f

acia l challeng e, but adva

nced a n “as applied” claim that was disg uised as a f acia l challeng e. Addr essing the “a s applied” substanc e of the claim re sulted in a circ umvention of the pre trial habe as cog nizabili ty limit ations. Wit h respe ct t o the cour

t of appe als’s re liance upon Hoffman Estates for the pr oposition t hat it should ex amine the a

ppellants’ conduc t before analy zing ot h er hy

pothetical applications of the law, we observe that the dec ision in Hoffman Estates was issued a fter a full t ri al

. When the

55 Supreme Court sug g ested addressing the complainant’s conduct first, it had a r ecor d detailing the 56 conduct in q u es t i o n . I n the pre trial habe as ac tion curre ntly befor e us, all we have a re the indictments. Moreover , the rationale for f irst examini ng the conduc t of t he complaining party is that

a pe rs on “ wh o en g a g e s in some c on du c t tha t is c le arl y pr os c ri be d c ann ot c omp la in o f t he va g ue ne ss of the lawas applied to the c onduct of others.” The sug g estion that a complaining party ’s conduc t 57 should be examined first is designe d to quickly dispose of unmeritorious fa cial cla ims. Given the cog nizabili ty

limit ations and the spar se re cord in pre t ri al h ab eas pr ocee dings, a n appellate court should not ad d ress a

novel statutory

construction ar g ument when, unde r established la w, theELL IS & COLYANDRO — 15

Id. at 500 (bra ckete d materia l inserted). 58 424 U.S. 1, 23-29 (1976). 59 defe ndant’s fa cial cha lleng e is clea rly without merit. Moreove r, the Hoffman Estates court upheld the facial validi ty of t he ordinance at issue by finding that “at lea st some of the items sold by [t he complainingparty ] are cove red” clea rly by the statutory lang uag e. The Supreme Court did not feel the nee d to comprehe nsively deter mine what 58

was a nd was not cove red to uphold the fa cial constitutionality of the statute. I t was enoug h to say that some things we re c lear ly cover ed. I n the present case , the cour t of appe als held that che cks ar e not cover ed by

the term “ funds” be cause the term “ funds” c overs only forms of cash. I

n arr iving at its ho ldi ng , th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls n e c e ssa

ri ly de te rm ine d th a t th e ite ms co nta ine d in the statut or y lis t, along with cashier ’s che cks, we re f orms o f cash that clea

rly constituted “funds” under the money la un de ri ngstatut e . D e c idi ngtha t th e te rm “ fu nd s” c le arl y c ov e rs a t le a st tho se ite ms that are fo rm s of ca sh would itself have be en suff icient to defe at a facia l vag ueness challeng e. There wa s no need for the c ourt of appe als to g o further and dec ide that “f

unds” cove red only

forms of c ash. Consequently , we sustain the State’ s first g round for revie w, and we hold that the court of

a pp e a ls i mpr op e rl y

re so lve d a

n “ a s a pp lie d” c ha lle ng e wh e n it

he ld t hat th e mon e y

la un de ri ngstatut e did no t a pp ly to c he c ks

. B. E le c ti on C ode 1. Ove rview We beg in with a brief ove rview of the evolution of t he S upreme Court’s First Amendme nt jurisprudenc e with respect to money in elections. In Buck

ley v . Valeo , the Court upheld limitations

on the amount of m oney a person may contribute to another person’ s campa ign but struck down 59ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 16

Id. at 39-56. 60 Id. at 20-21. 61 Id. at 47-48. 62 Id. at 26-28. 63 Id. at 45-48. 64 539 U.S. 146, 161-62 (2003). 65 Id. at 162. 66 l i m i t a t i o n s o ni n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i tu r e s m a d e o nb e h a l f o f a p o l i t i c a l c a

u s e o r c an d i d a t e . A l t h o u gh

60 a limitation upon the amount of money a per son or g roup m ay contribute to a ca ndidate or political committee “enta ils only a marg inal restric tion upon the contributor’s ability to e ng age i n fre e

c omm un ic a tio n, ” a

li mi tat ion

up on ind e pe nd e nt e xpe nd iture s “ he a vil y burd e ns c or e F ir st 61 Amendment expression.” The Court f ound that contribution limit ations wer e suff iciently justified 62 by the dang er of

corr uption or the appeara

nce of corr uption, while these da

ng ers we re not suff

icient 63 to j us tif y lim itatio ns on

ind e pe nd e nt e xpe nd iture s. 64 I n Fede ral Election C o mm ’n v. Beaumont , th e Cou rt wo uld la te r s ay that th is d isp a rate treatment betwee n contributions and independe nt expenditures was explained b y a d i ffe ring level of scr utiny applied to the t wo categ ories of a ctivity

. Contribution reg ulations were justified so long 65 as they wer e “c losely

dra wn t o m at ch a s u ff

i ci en t l y i mp o rt an ti n t er es t , ” w h i l e e x p en d i tu re re gu l at ions had to be “ narr owly

tailored to ser

ve a c ompelling g overnme nt interest.” 66 I n Austin v. Mic higan State Chamber of Commerce , the Supreme Court he ld that limi tations on independe nt corporate expenditures wer e justified by a new ly articulate d , c o mp e ll in g

g overnme nt interest in pre venting the “c orrosive a nd distorting eff

ects of immense ag g reg ations of wea lth thatELL IS & COLYANDRO — 17

494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 67 Beaumont , 539 U.S. at 153. 68 Id. at 154. 69 Id. at 155. 70 130 S. Ct . 876, 175 L . Ed. 2d 753 (2010). 71 Citi zens United , 130 S. Ct . at 912-13, 175 L . Ed. 2d at 798-99. 72 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 73 are acc umulated with the help o f t he . . . unique state -conf err ed cor porate structure .” Beaumont 67 was de cided a fter Austin and cited Au sti n for the proposition that the “spec ial char acte ristics of the

c o r p o r a te s tr u c tu r e ” c o u ld thr e a te nth e in te g r it

y o f th e p o li ti c a l p r o c e s s . B u t t he B ea u mont

c a se 68 involved a ban on corpor ate contributions, rathe r t han on ex penditures, a nd the statute wa s analy

zed

un de r t he mor e tr a dit ion a l r a tio na le of pr e ve nti ngc or

ru pti on . I n a dd iti on

to p re ve nt i n g

“ w a r- c he st” 69

corr uption, the Beaumont

court e x plained that a ba

n on corpor ate c o ntrib uti o n s also serve d to preve nt ind ivi du a ls f

ro m us ingthe c or

po rate fo rm

to c ir c umv e nt v a lid

c on tr ibutio n li mit s. Re centl y , in 70 Citi zens United v. F

ederal Elec tion Comm’n , th e Su p r e me Co u rt overrule d Au sti n and held that 71 the g ov e rnme nt c ou ld n ot p la c e lim itatio ns up on ind e pe nd e nt c or

po ra te e xpe nd iture s. 72 2. Stan dard of Revie w Coly andro c ontends that the cour t of appe als should have r eviewed the Elec tion Code provisions under strict scr utiny —the compelling g overnme nt interest test

— rather than under the more lenie nt “suffic iently important interest” te st applied to contributions in Buck ley and Beaumont

. First, Coly andro a

rg ues that st ri ct s cr u t i n y

should apply

to the extent that a law ca rries c riminal

sanc tio ns . In s up po rt

of thi s p ro po sit ion , h e c ite s Reno v . American Civil Liberties Union

. Reno 73ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 18

Id. 74 Buck ley , 424 U.S. at 8-9. 75 Id. at 8. 76 See id. at 40-41. 77 is not on point beca

use that opinion a ddresse d the constitutionality of the Communications Dec ency Act, not the regulation of political contributions. I f the Supreme Court’s case law we re de void of 74 political contribution decisions, then we mig ht look to Reno for guidance , but that is not t he situation here , as we have Buck

ley and Beaumont

to guide us. Col y and ro a sse rt s th a t B u ckleyand Beaumont are distinguishable be cause the laws a ddresse d in th o s e c a s e s “ inv o lv e d

c iv il r e g u lati o n s o n c o n tr ib u ti o n s , a s o p p o s e d to c r im in a l p e n a lt ie s . ” We find that Coly andr o i s mistaken in that reg ard. The Buck ley lawsuit sought de clar atory and inj un c tiv e re lie f. Th e Attor ne y Ge ne ra l of the Un ite d Stat e s wa s nam e d as o ne of the de fe nd a nts , 75 76 pr e s u ma b ly b e c a u s e th e plaintiffs fe are d potential criminal liability . I ndeed, Coly andro obse rves that the independe nt expenditure limi tations in B u c k ley d i d car

ry criminal pena lties, and he c ites the “expenditures” por

tion of the Buck

ley op ini on fo r t he pr op osit io n that “ c los e e xami natio n” is require d when “the leg islation imposes criminal penalties in an a rea perme ated by

First Amendme nt interests.” But Coly andro overlooks the fac t that the contribution limit ations also car ried c riminal 77 penalties, whic h was take n into account by the Court in Buck

ley , which h el d t hat the expenditure limit ations were not neede d to enforc e the va lid lim itations upon contribu t i o n s : “There is no ind ic a tio n th a t th e su

bs tanti a l c ri min a l pe na lti e s f or vio la t i n g t h e c o nt r i b ut i o n c e i l i n g s c o m

b i ne d w ith the political r eper cussion of such violations will be insufficient to police the co n t ri b u t i onELL IS & COLYANDRO — 19

Id. at 55-56. 78 Beaumont , 539 U.S. at 149-50. 79 Id. at 153 (bra ckete d materia l added)

. 80 See id. at 162. 81 Id. at 161-62. 82 provisions.” 78 Beaumont

involved a lawsuit by

a corporation aga inst the Fe dera l Election Commis sion that

c ha llen ged th e c on sti tut ion a lity of a fe de ra l st a tut e and

so me F EC r e g ulatio ns , and it a pp e a rs to 79 have be e n in

e sse nti a lly

the same pr oc e dura l po sture a s Buck ley . The Beaumont court re cog nized the c ri min a l sa

nc tio ns a tta c he d to ill e g a l c or po rate c on tr ibutio ns : “ [M]uc h o f t he pe ri od ic amendmen t [ o f

e le c ti o nla

w s ] w a s me an t t o s tr e n g th e nth e o r ig in a l, c o r e p r o h ib it io no nd irec t corpor ate c ontributions. The For eig n Corrupt Practice s Act of 1925, f or example, broade ned the ba n

on contributions to include ‘any thing of value,’ and criminalized the act of rec eiving a contr ibution to matc h the c ri min a lity of makin g on e .” Ap ply ingstr ic t sc rutiny

to a n e le c tio n s ta tut e on

the ba sis 80 that it carr ies a c riminal penalty would also conflict with B e a u mont ’s p ro n ounceme nt that “the deg ree of scr

utiny turns on the nature of the a ctivity regulated.” 81 Col y and ro ne xt argues tha

t Buck ley is disti ng uishable bec ause it limited only the size of

c o n t r i b u t i o n s , w h i l e t h e e l e c t i o n s t a tu t e s a t i s s u e h e r e b anc o r p o r a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s i nt h e i r e n t i r e t y. B ut Beaumont

de a lt w itha ba

n on c or po rate c on tr ibutio ns , and Col y and ro a c kn ow le dg e s th a t, i n 82 that c a se , the Sup re me Court “ he ld that a ba n o n d ir e c t c or

po rate c on tr ibutio ns do e s n ot c ha ng e its analy tical approa ch to the constitutional que stion.” The Supreme Court explained that “re strictions

on po lit ic a l c on tr ibutio ns have be e n tr e a te d a s me re ly ‘m arg ina l’ sp e e c h r e str ic tio ns su bje c t toELL IS & COLYANDRO — 20

Id. at 161. 83 Id. at 162. 84 Citi zens United

was ha nded down a fter the oral a rg uments in the prese nt case

. 85 relatively complaisant re view under the Fir st Amendment, bec ause c ontribu t i o ns lie closer to the edg es than to the c ore of

political expression.” Acc ording to the C ourt: “I t is not that the differ ence 83 betwee n a ban a

nd a limit is to be ig nored; it is just t hat the time to consider it is when a pply ing

sc rutiny a t th e le ve l se le c te d, no t in se le c tin g the sta

nd ard of re vie w i tse lf

.” Ne verth e le ss, 84 Coly andro c laims that “the Court has y et to rule on whe ther such a ban on contr ibutions demands strict scrutiny when the statute at issue also imposes c riminal penalties for violations,” bu t as we have e x plained above , Coly andro is simply mistaken in that reg ard. Finally , in a supplemental-a uthority letter, Coly andro sug g ests that ou r analy sis should be aff ecte d by the re cent Supre me Court decision in Citi zens United

. Coly andro a cknowledg es that

85 “the Supre me Court’s explicit hol ding w as limited to campa ign expenditures,” but he conte nds that “the r uling mar ks a philosophical shift in the Cour t ’s t re atm ent of re strictions on corporate fre e speec h.” Coly andro arg ues: “Given the fac t that contributions are a ty pe of political speec h, Citi zens United ’s br oa d la

ngua g e c on c e rn ing the un lawf uln e ss of re str ic tio ns on c or po rate sp e e c h lo g ic a lly extends to restrictions on corporate ca mpaig n contributions.” Al tho ug h w e a g re e that Citi zens United

h a s s ig n if ic a ntly aff ecte d the constitutional landscape wi th r esp e c t to c or

po rate fr e e sp e e c h b y

re mov ingre str ic tio ns on ind e pe nd e nt c or

po rate expenditures, we disag ree with Coly andro’ s contention that the decision has had any eff ect on the Court’s jur isp ru de nc e re latin g to c or po rate c on tr ibutio ns . T he Court e xpla ine d th a t Buck

leyELL IS & COLYANDRO — 21

Citi zens United , 130 S. Ct . at 901-02, 175 L . Ed. 2d at 785-86. 86 Id. , 1 3 0 S

. C t

. a t 9 0 9 , 1 7 5 L

. E d

. 2 d at 7 9 4 (d i s cu s s i n g Fede ral Election Comm’n v. 87 National Right to W

ork Comm. , 459 U.S. 197, 210, 103 S. C t. 552, 74 L . Ed. 2d 364 (1982))

. Citi zens United , 130 S. Ct . at 921, 175 L . Ed. 2d at 807-08 ( Roberts, C.J ., concur ring ). 88 Id. , 130 S. Ct . at 919-20, 175 L . Ed. 2d at 806. 89 Id. , 130 S. Ct . at 929, 175 L . Ed. 2d at 816 (Sca lia, J ., concur ring ). 90 See id. ( “ T h e [F ir s t] A me n d me n t i s w r itte nin te r ms o f ‘spee c h , ’ n o t s p e a k e r s . I ts te xt 91 offe rs no foothold for e x cluding any cate g ory of speaker, from single individuals to partner ships of indivi d u a ls , to u n in c o r

p o r a te d a s s o c iati o n s o f in d iv id u a ls , to in c o r

p o r a te d a s s o c iati o n s of individuals.”) “distinguishe d

d ir e c t c o ntrib uti o n s to c a

n d id a te s f rom independe nt expenditures.” The Court found 86 that a la te r ca se ha d “ lit tle re le va nc e ” to t he iss ue a t ha

nd be c a us e it “ inv olv e d c on tr ibutio n li mit s, wh ic h, un lik e lim its on ind e pe nd e nt expe nd iture s, have be e n an a c c e pte d mea ns to p re ve nt qu id p ro quo corr uption.” 87 Two conc urringopinions in Citi zens United sug g est continued support for the Court’s prior pronounce ments reg arding corpor ate contributions. Chief J ustice R oberts, joi ned by J ustice Alito,

re mark e d th a t Au sti n w a s an“ a b e r r a t i o n ” t h a t“ u n d e r

m i n e d t h e c ar e f u l l i n e t h a t Buck

ley dr e w t o distinguish limit s to contributions t o ca n d i d ates from limi ts on independent e x penditures on sp e e c h. ” Th e Chi e f Jus tic e a lso e xpla ine d th at Beaumont , and ce rtain other c ases de cided a fter

88 Au sti n , did not in any

way “re aff irm” Au sti n ’s holding. J ustice Scalia obse rved that corporations 89

are entitled to First Amendment protec tion beca use t hey are simply

“assoc iations of individuals.” 90 I f i t is un c on sti tut ion a l to lim it a n in div idu a l’ s in de pe nd e nt e xpe nd iture , th e n it is n e c essa

ri ly

un c on sti tut ion a l to lim it expe nd iture s mad e by a sso c ia tio ns of

ind ivi du a ls. B ut i f i t is le g iti ma te

91 to l imi t an in div idu a l’ s c on tr ibutio ns ( Buck ley ), then it f

ollows that la

ws can be enac ted to preve ntELL IS & COLYANDRO — 22

Long , 931 S.W .2d at 287. 92 Id. at 288 (if First Amendment is involved, “cr iminal law may be held f acia lly invalid even 93 though it may

not be unconstitutional as applied to the def endant’ s conduct” ). U n it e d S ta te s v . W il liams , 5 5 3 U. S

. 2 8 5 , 3 0 4 (2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g W ar d v . R oc k Ag ain st 94 Ra c ism , 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989)) ( internal quotation marks omitted). T EX . E L EC TI ON C ODE § 253.003(b). 95 Id. , § 253.094(a)

. 96 Id. , § 251.001(2). 97 a sso c ia tio ns of

ind ivi du a ls f

ro m be ingus e d to c ir c umv e nt t ho se c on tr ibutio n li mit s ( Beaumont

). 3. V ag ue ne ss Whe n F ir st Ame ndme nt f re e do ms a

re imp lic a te d, a

c ri min a l la

w m us t: ( 1) be su ff

ic ie ntl y clea r to a ffor d a person of ordinary intelligenc e a re asonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, (2 ) e sta bli shde te rm inate g uid e lin e s f or law e nf or c e me nt, and

(3 ) b e su ff

ic ie ntl y defi ni te to a

vo id chilling pr otected e x pression. When a vagueness c hallenge involves First Amendment 92

c on sid e ratio ns , a

c ri min a l la

w m ay be he ld f

a c ia ll y inv a lid

e ve n if the law h a s so me va lid application. “B ut pe rfe ct clar ity and prec ise g uidance have never been require d even of regulations 93 that restric t expressive activity .” 94 Coly andro’ s prosec ution arises fr om the interplay of seve ral provisions of the Ele ction Code. Texas Election Code § 253.003 provides in re levant par t that “[a] person may

not knowingly

acc ept a political contribution the per son knows to have be en made in violation of this chapter .” Under 95 § 253.094, “[a] corporation .

. . may not make a political c ontribution . . . that is not authorized by this subchapter.” A “c ontribution” is “ a direc t or indirect transfe r of money , g oods, service s, or any 96

o t h er t h i n g o f va l u e, ” an d a co n t ri b u t i o n co n s t i tu t es a “p o l i t i ca l co n t ri b u t i o n ” if i ti s “aca mp ai gn 97ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 23

Id. , § 251.001(5). 98 Id. , § 251.001(3). 99 Id. , § 253.096. 100 contribution or an of

fice holder c ontribution.” A “c ampaig n contribution” is “a c ontribution to a 98 candidate or political committee that is offe red or g iven wit h the i ntent that it be used in c onnection with a ca mpaig n for e lective of

fice or on a me asure .” 99 a. Issue Adv ocacy Coly andro a

rg ues that this statutory

sc h e me is u

n c o n s ti tu ti o n a ll y v a g ue bec ause a

corpor ation that makes a

contribution for the pur pose of a dvocating an i s s u e would not know whether the

co n t ri b u t i o nwa s l ega l

. He as k s : “[ I ] f a ce rt ai np o l i t i ca l ca n d i d at e i s t h e o n l y p er s o ns u

p p o rt i n g a particula r mea sure, a

nd the cor

poration knows that any money g iven to a poli tical committee supporting the mea s u re w ould assist thi s candidate’s ca mpaig n, then has the c orporation made a contribution ‘in connec tion wi th’ a c ampaig n for e lective of fice ? ” Coly andro obse rves that the Election Code allows c erta in corpora te contributions in support of measur es, but he ove rlooks the signific ance of the wor ding of the provision in question. As we e xpla ine d ab ov e , co rp or a te po lit ic a l con tr ibutio ns are pr oh ibi te d unle ss autho ri zed in the Elec tion Code. The Code authorizes corpor ate contributions on a measure under the following

c ir c ums tanc e s: “ A c or

po ratio n . . . may

make c a mpa ig n c on tr ibutio ns fr om i ts o wn pr op e rt y in

connec tion with an election on a me asure only to a political committee for supporting or opposing

measure s exclusively .” Under this statute, a corpor ation can co n tribute money to support or 100 oppose a me asure , but only if it g ives that money to an entity devoted ex clusively to measure s, i.e.

an e nti ty that do e s n ot c on tr ibute to c and idate s. A c or po rati on vio la te s th e law i f i t make s aELL IS & COLYANDRO — 24

See id. , §§ 253.104, 257.001, 257.002, 257.004. 101 contribution to a political committee for the purpose of s u p p orting or opposing a mea sure if that po lit ic a l c omm itt e e a lso c on tr ibute s to c and idate s. Th e e xclu siv ity a sp e c t of the prov isi on

se e ms d es i gn edt o p re v en td i v er s i o no f f u n d s fr o m an ac ce p t ab l e p u rp o s e ( s u p p o rt i n g o r o p p o s i n g a

measure ) to an una cce ptable purpose (s u p p orting or opposing a ca ndidate). Acorpor ation can be confide nt that it is following the law if the contribution is given to a political committee devoted exclusively

to me asure s beca

use that political c ommitt ee cannot make a contr ibution to a candidate. And a c orporation can be equally confide nt that a political c ontribution g iven to an entity that is not devoted e x clusively

to measure s is a violation of the l aw unless authorized by another provision of the El e c tio n Co de . Co rp or a tio ns are a lso a llo we d to c on tr ibute to p ol iti c a l pa rt ie s und e r c e rt a in

c ir c ums tanc e s. 101 b. Designation Coly andro a lso contends that the cour t of appe als’s holding t h at t h e ele ction statute is not vag ue hing es upon the c ou rt ’s deter mination that a person c an “de signate” the pur pose of a contribution. But, he a

rg ues, the whole point of Buck ley ’s ho ldi ngwi th r e sp e c t to c on tr ibutio ns is that the contributor doe s not have to desig nate an y t h i n g—it is t he per son who rec eives the contribution who dec ides how the money is spent. I f a c orporation must desig nate the purpose f or which a c ontribution is u s ed , t h en, C oly andro c ontends, the contribution bec omes “c loser to an expenditure” unde r the Supreme Court’s jurisprudenc e. An under standing of the c ourt of appe als’s “de signation” discussion r equire s an examination of some ar g uments made by Coly andro in the c ourt of appe als. Coly andro sug g ested two sce narios in w hic h th e El e c tio n Co de fa ile d to pr ov ide a de qu a te g uid anc e re g ard ing wha t condu c t isELL IS & COLYANDRO — 25

See id. , § 253.100. 102 See id. , § 253.100(a)

. 103 Id. , § 253.100(b). 104 Id. , § 253.100(a)

. 105 Id. , § 253.100(a) (1)- (12). 106 prohibited. First, he contende d that a cor poration mig ht wi s h t o make a donation to a g roup that advocates in favor

of a pa rticular issue. We have addre ssed t his argument above. A corpor ation may make a political contribution to a g roup that favors a mea sure but only if the g roup does not contribute to c andidates. I n a sense, the corpor ation “desig nates” the purpose of the contribution by g iving it to a g roup that ca n use it only

for a cer tain purpose. The sec ond scena

rio Coly andro prese nted to the cour t of appe als was ba sed on § 253.100, which gover

ns expenditures made by a corporation to financ e the establishment or administration of a g ener al-purpose committee. Coly andro contende d that this law allowed TRMPAC t o acc ept 102 corpor ate money

for e stablishment and administration, but he contende d that the l aw offer ed no cle ar de fi nit ion of the ph ra se “ e sta

bli sh me nt or a dmi nis tr a tio n, ” so that a cor po rate do no r w ou ld h a ve to g uess whethe r a donation would fit that categ ory . Under § 253.100, a corpor ation may cre ate its own political committee. The c orporation 103

may the n u se thi s p oli tic a l c omm itt e e to s oli c it c on tr ibutio n s f r o m s h a r e h o l de rs , e mpl oy e e s, and the ir families. The c orporation is permitted t o make ex penditures for the maintena nce a nd operation 104 of the c ommitt ee. The L eg islature set out a list of twelve items included as qualify ing 105

e xpe nd iture s ( e.g. , office equipment and utilities) and a list of eight i tems for whic h expenditures 106ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 26

Id. , § 253.100(d)( 1)-( 8). 107 See id. , § 251.001(8)( “‘D irec t c ampaig n expenditure’ means a campa ign e x penditure that 108 does not constitute a ca

mpaig n contribution by

the per son making the expenditure”)

. Buck ley , 424 U.S. at 39-44. 109 may no t be ma de

. I t a

pp e ars that c on tr ibutio ns ma de by a c or po ra tio n to su c h a com mit te e wo uld 107 not be consider ed to be e x penditures. But e ven assuming that they could be c onsidered the same, 108 it i s n e ve rt

he le ss c le ar t

hat § 2 53 .1 00 c on te mpl a te s e xpe nd iture s mad e by a c or po ra tio n f or c e rt a in purposes. A c ontribution with no st ring s attache d would not qualify as such a n expenditure. To the extent that the court of a ppeals may

have sug g ested that ther e is no such thing as an undesig n a te d c o r

p o r a te p o li ti c a l c o n tr ib u ti o n , th e e r r o r it ma d e w a s mi n o r . I t w o u ld b e more

ac curate to say

that there is no such thing a s a leg al undesig nated c orporate political contribution. I ndividuals can leg ally

make unde signated political contributio n s , but corporations cannot. A corpor ation must designate the purpo s e o f t h e political contribution by contributing to a political committee that is exclusively devoted to mea sures, by making expenditures for maintena nce or op e ratio n o f a corpor a te po lit ic a l c omm itt e e , o r b y c on tr ibutin g to a

po lit ic a l pa

rt y un de r c e rt a in

na rr ow ly de fi ne d c on dit ion s. c. “in connec tion wi th” Col y and ro a lso argue s that the ph ra se “ in c on ne c tio n w itha c a mpa ig n f

or e le c tiv e of

fi c e ” is unconstitutionally

vag ue for

the same r easons that the phr ase “ relat i v e t o a cle arly identified

c an d id a te ” w a s f

o u n d p r o b le matic in Buck ley . But the Supre me Court’s problem with the latter phrase arose in the contex t of i ndepende nt expenditures, not contributions. The Court addr essed 109

a sim ila rl y br oa d p hr a se , “ ‘f

or the purp os e of

inf luen c ing ’ a

n e le c tio n, ” and

fo un d th a t it s u seELL IS & COLYANDRO — 27

Id. at 24 n.24. 110 Id. 111 539 U.S. at 149. As with our st atute, the fede ral e lection statute allowe d a cor poration 112 to form a polit ical commit tee for t he purpose of sol iciting contributions from it s share holders and employ ees. Id.

Buck ley , 424 U.S. at 42. 113 Id. 114 prese nted “fe wer problems in c onnection with the definition of a c ontribution because of the limiting connotation cr eate d by

the g ener al under standing of what constitutes a political con t ri b u t i o n.” 110 Un d er t h i s l i m i t e d d e f

i n i t i o n , “[ f] u n d s p ro v i d edt o a c an d i d at e o r p o l i t i ca l p ar t y o r c am p ai gn committee either

direc tly or indirec tly

throug h an interme diary

constitute a contribution. I n addition, dollars g iven to another

person or

org an i z at i o n t h at ar e ea rmarke d for political purpose s are contributions under the A ct.” Moreove r, though the Court did not address a vag ueness a

rg ument 111 in Beaumont , it is neve rtheless worth pointing out that the Court uphe ld ag ainst a F irst Amendment challeng e th e c o n tr ib u ti o na s p e c t o f a s tatute th a t m a k e s it

“ u n la w f u l .

. . f o r an y c o r p o r a tion wh a te ve r . . . to ma ke a c on tr ibutio n or expe nd iture in c on ne c tio n w ith ” c e rt a in f e de ra l e le c tio ns . 112 Coly andro points to the Supreme Court’s statement that “the distinction between discussion of iss ue s and

c and idate s and

a dv oc a c y

of e le c tio n o r d e fe a t of

c and idate s may ofte n d iss olv e in prac tical application.” Ag ain, this statement was made with resp ect to indepe ndent 113

e xpe nd iture s. Th e Sup re me Court ha s n ot s ug g e ste d th a t a sim ila r pr ob le m ari se s w ithre sp e c t to 114 contributions. The problem a rises with r espec t to independe nt e x penditures beca use expenditures

on so me ty pe s o f s pe e c h a

re a llo we d w hil e oth e rs are no t, a nd the di vi di ng lin e be tw e e n th e m isELL IS & COLYANDRO — 28

Id. at 42-43. 115 See B eaumont , 539 U.S. at 161-63 (c orporate par ticipation limi ted t o es t ab l i shing a nd 116 paying the administrative expenses of political ac tion committ ees)

. Our discussions abov e h av e l ar g ely answe red the contention that a c ontributor cannot 117 kn o w w h et h er

t h e c o n t ri b u t i o nwi l l b e c o n s t ru edas i n t en d ed fo r u s e i n co n n ec t i o n wi t h a c am p ai gn fo r e le c tiv e of

fi c e . Co rp or a tio ns a re no t pe rm itt e d to make un de sig nate d p oli tic a l c on tr ibutio ns . What remains to be addr essed is the possi b i l i t y t hat a c ontribution does not qualify as a “ political c on tr ibutio n” be c a

us e it i s not

intended to be use d in connec tion with an e lection, e.g. , a contr ibution made f or the purpose of lobbying the leg islature. wholly subjective. But, a s Coly andro has p o i n t ed o u t , and as w ith the statute in Beaumont , the

115 Election Code provisio n s at i ssue her e ef fec t a complete ba

n on undesig nated c orporate political

c on tr ibutio ns . 116 d. Intent Finally , Coly andro c ontends that vagueness inher es in the re quirement that the c ontribution be made “with the intent that it be used” for pr ohibited purposes. He cla i m s t h at a contr ibutor cannot know w hether

the intended use of the contribution would be construed as beingin connec tion with a campaig n for political office and that the recipient cannot know the intent of the c ontributor, 117 espec ially if the contributor is a corporation. Coly andro further argues that enf orce ment of the law is virtually

impossibl e becau s e law enforc ement will not be able to a scer tain the intent of the

c or po rate c on tr ibutor

or the re c ipi e nt: Given that t h e E lection Code does not for ce the corpor ate c ontributor to report the purpose of

the contribution, law e nforc ement will be hard- presse d to de termine whe n an acc eptor of an unlawful contribution actua lly knew that the contribution was g iven with an unlawf

ul intent. L ikewise, pro s ec u ting a corpor ate c ontributor for intentionally

making an unlawful contribution would be close to impossible in the absenc e of a

leg isl at i v e re quirement that the c orporation report the pur pose of the contribution. But the Supre me Court has held that the pr actica l diffi cu l t y a factfinder ma y have in a scer

tainingELL IS & COLYANDRO — 29

W illiams , 553 U.S. at 306 (citation omitted). 118 New Y

ork Central & Hudson Riv. R.R. Co. v. U nited States , 2 1 2 U

. S. 4 8 1 , 483 (1909) 119 (quoting Chief J ustice F eld in Te le gram Ne wsp ap e r Co . v . Co mm on we alt h , 172 Mass. 294, 297, 52 N.E. 445, 446 (1899) ). intent does not rende r a la w unconstitutionally

vag ue: What r e nd e rs a statut e va g ue is n ot t he po ssi bil ity

that it wi ll s ome tim e s b e dif

fi c ult to determine w hether

the incriminating fac t it establishes has bee n proved; but rather the indeter

minacy of prec isely what that fac t is. Thus, we have struck down statutes that tied criminal culpabilit y to whether the def endant’ s conduct wa s “annoy ing” or “indec ent”—wholly

subjective judg ments without statutory definitions, narrowing c on te xt, or

se ttl e d le g a l me anin g s. Th e re is no su c h ind e te rm ina c y he re . Th e statut e require s that the defendant hold, and make a st atement that ref lects, t he belief that the ma te ri a l is c hil d po rn og ra ph y ; or that he c omm

un ic a te in a

mann e r i nte nd e d to c a

us e another so to believe. Those are clea r qu es t i o n s of fa ct. Whether someone held a belief or had an intent is a true-or -fa lse deter mination, not a subjective judg ment such as whe ther c onduct is “annoy ing” or “inde cent.” Simi larly true or f al s e is the deter mination whether a

par ticular for

mulation reflec ts a belief that material or purported material is child pornogra phy

. To be sure, it may be difficult in some ca ses to determine w hether

these c lear

require ments have be en met. “B ut courts and jurie s ever y day pass upon k

n o w le dg e, belief

and intent—the state of

men’s minds—having be fo re the m no mor e th an evi den c e of the ir wo rd s and

c on du c t, f

ro m w hic h, in ordinary human experienc e, mental c ondition may be infe rre d.” 118 Mo re ov e r, the Sup re me Court ha s lon g sin c e take n the po sit ion that int e nt c an b e a sc e rt a ine d w ith

r e s p e c tt o c o r

p o r a t i o n s f

o r t h e p u r p o s e o f i mp o s i n g c r i m i n a l l i a

b i l i t y: Mr . Chie f Justic e F e ld, sa id: “ We thi nk that a cor po ra tio n ma y be lia ble c ri min a lly fo r c e rt a in o ff

e ns e s o f w hic h a

sp e c if ic int e nt may be a ne c e ssa ry e le me nt. Th e re is no more diff

iculty in imputi ng to a cor

poration a spe cific intent in cr iminal proce eding s than in civil.” * * * I t is true that there are some crimes, w hich in their nature cannot be commi t t ed by corpor ations. Bu t t h er e is a lar g e cla ss of offe nses, of whic h rebating unde r the Fe d er al s t at u t es i s o n e, wh er ei nt h e c r i m e c o n s i s t s i np u rp o s el y d o i n g t h e t h i n gs prohibited by

statute. I n that class of crimes we see no g ood rea son why corpor ations may not be held re s p o n s i b l e for and cha rg ed with the knowledg e and pur poses of the ir a g e nts , a c tin g wi thi n th e a uth or ity c on fe rr e d u

po n th e m. 119ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 30

Broadrick v . Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 120 Id. at 613. 121 Id. at 615. 122 The Elec tion Code provisions at issue require that a contri b u t or have a ce rtain intent befor e the contribution is deemed illeg al, and it re quires that a rec ipient know that a contr ibution is in fac t illega l, which entails knowing the i ntent of t he contributor, befor e im posing c riminal liabilit y . The State has the burde n to prove the applicable culpable mental states, and if it ca nnot, then a def

endant

c ha rg e d und e r t

he se pr ov isi on s is e nti tle d to an a c qu itt a l. We conclude that the Elec tion Code provisions at issue here a re not fa cially

unconstitutional du e to v a g ue ne ss. 4. Overbre adth To vin dic a te F ir st A me ndme nt i nte re sts and pr e ve nt a c hil lin g e ff

e c t on the e xer c ise of

F ir st Amendment fr eedoms, the overbr eadth doctrine allows a statute to be invalidated on its fac e eve n if it ha s leg itimate a

pplication, and even if the parties befor e the cour t have suff

ere d no constitutional violation. The overbr eadth doctrine is “ strong medicine” that should be employ ed “spa ring ly ” and 120 “only as a la st resort.” “[T] he over brea dth of a statute m u s t n ot only be re al, but substantial as 121 well, judg ed in re lation to the statute’s plainly leg itimate sweep.” 122 Col y and ro con ten ds tha

t th e re str ic tio ns on

c or po rate c on tr ibutio ns are ov e rb ro a d b e c a us e they encompa ss issue advoca cy by prohibiting some c ontributions with respect to measur es. He argues: “[I ]f an elec tion on a measure coincides w ith a political c andidate’ s support for this measure , then a c ontribution to an ele ction on this measure is ‘in c onnection with’ that c andidate’ s campa ign, espec ially if the candidate is one of the sole supporters of the measure . How ev er . . . § 2 5 3 .094ELL IS & COLYANDRO — 31

T EX . E L EC TI ON C ODE , § 253.096. 123 Id. ; § 253.094. 124 As we ha

ve alre ady explained a

bove, the “suff

iciently important interest” te st, not strict 125 scrutiny , is the appropr iate standa rd. See B uckle

y , 424 U.S. at 25-29; Beaumont , 539 U.S. at 162. See B eaumont , 539 U.S. at 155 (important intere s t i n p re v enting the circ umvention of 126 valid contribution limi ts). would preve nt such issue advoc acy . . . .” Coly andro’ s contention about the ope ration of the statute i s n o t en t i rely corr ect. As w e expla i n ed ab o v e in connec tion with his vag ueness c laim, a cor poration may

make a political contribution with respec t to a measure , so long a s the contribution is to a political committee devoted exclusively

to measure s. That a particula r candidate may be associated with t he mea sure ha s no 123 eff ect on this authorization. As we a lso ex plained above , it is true that a corpor ation may not make

a po lit ic a l c on tr ibutio n w ithre sp e c t to a me a su re to a po lit ic a l c omm itt e e that a lso c on tr ibute s to candidates. That is so, reg ardle ss of whethe r or not a pa rticular c andidate is a ssociated with the 124

measure in question. We de cide that the prohibition a g ainst making corpor ate political c ontributions on a measure to a m i x ed-pur

pose political committee is “close ly draw n to match a suff iciently important int e re st. ” Th is p ro hi bi ti on ser ve s to pr e ve nt t

he div e rs ion

of c or po ra te “ me a sure ” mon e y

to 125

c and idate s, and thu s e ns ur e s th a t th e pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t c or po ra te c on tr ibutio ns to c and idate s w ill not be circ umvented. The law is na rrowly draw n beca

use it a ddresse s a narr ow aspec t of political 126

a sso c ia tio n w hil e a llo wi ngc or po ratio ns se ve ra l a lte rn a te a ve nu e s f or po lit ic a l e xpre ssi on

wi thELL IS & COLYANDRO — 32

See B uckle

y , 424 U.S

. at 28-29 (“The A ct’s $1,000 contr ibution li mitation focuses 127 prec isely on the problem of larg e campa ign c ontributions -- the nar row a spect of political a ssociation wher e the a ctuality

and potential fo r corruption have be en identified - - while lea ving pe rsons fre e to e ng a g e in i nd e pe nd e nt p oli tic a l e xpre ssi on , to as so c ia te a c tiv e ly thr ou g h v olu

nte e ri ngthe ir service s, and to assist t o a l i m ited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting ca ndidates and committees with financia l resourc es.”)

. T EX . E L EC TI ON C ODE § 253.096. 128 T EX . E L E C TI ON C ODE § 2 53 .1 00 ; see also id. , § 253.092 (“I f a political c ommitt ee the 129 only principal purpose of which is ac ceptingp o l itical contributions and making political expenditures incorporates for liability purposes only , the committee is not considere d a cor poration for pur poses of this subchapte r.”)

. See Beaumont , 539 U. S. at 162 -6 3 (“ [T]he se c tio n p e rm its so me pa rt ic ipatio n o f u

nio ns and c or po ratio ns in t

he fe de ra l e le c tor a l pr oc e ss b y a llo wi ngthe m to e sta

bli sh and pay the administrative expenses of (PACs). The PAC option allows corp o ra t e p olitical participation without t he temptation to use cor porate funds for political influence, quite possibly at od ds wi th t

he se nti me nts of

so me sh are ho lde rs or

me mbers , and

it l e ts t he g ov e rnme nt r e g ulate c a mpa ig n a c tiv ity

thr ou g h re g istratio n and

dis c los ur e , w ith ou t je op ard izin g the a sso c ia tio na l r ig hts of advoc acy

org anizations’ members.”) (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See Buck ley , 424 U.S. at 28-29. See also Citizens United , pa ssi m ( o v e rtu r n in g f e d e ral 130 limit ations on corpor ate indepe ndent expenditures). respe ct t o m ea s u re s . First and most obviously , a cor poration may

contribute to a political 1 27 committee devoted e x clusively to measure s. Second, a corpor ation may cre ate its own political

128 commit te e , wh ic h can the n solicit contributions from the corpor ation’s share holders, employ ees, a nd the ir fa mil ie s, and

any c on tr ibutio ns re c e ive d ma y the n b e c on tr ibute d w ith ou t be ingsu bje c t to

c or po rate li mitat ion s. F ina lly , a c or po ra tio n ma y make ind e pe nd e nt e xpe nd iture s ( e.g. , b uy its 129 own issue ads), ma

ke press relea ses, and other wise have its ag ents direc tly eng ag e in communication with r espec t to a measure (or a candidate, for that matter). To the extent t h at C oly andro’ s 130

argume nts a dd

re ss mor e br oa dly the c on c e pt of iss ue a dv oc a c y , r e g ard le ss o f w he the r a me a sure is slated for elec tion, the second a

nd third avenue s detailed a bove af ford suff icient ave nues for

fre eELL IS & COLYANDRO — 33

See B uckle

y , 4 24 U. S. a

t 28 -2 9; Beaumont , 539 U.S. at 162-63. 131 expression. We rejec t Coly andro’ s overbr eadth c ontention.

131 III . C ON CL USI ON We sustain the State’ s first g round for revie w and hold that the c ourt of appe als should not have a dd re sse d a n “ a s a pp lie d” c ha lle ng e to t

he mon e y la un de ri ngstatut e . H ow e ve r, we a g re e wi th the c ourt of a pp e a ls’ s c on c lus ion

that th e El e c tio n Co de pr ov isi on s ar e no t fa c ia lly un c on sti tut ion a l. Th e re fo re , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls.

Deliver ed: April 28, 2010 Pub lis h