J-S51021-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GREGORY MAURICE WYATT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 870 MDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 9, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0003361-2013

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MARCH 02, 2021

Gregory Maurice Wyatt appeals pro se from the order denying his third 

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition as untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

9541-9546. We affirm.

On June 2, 2014, Wyatt pleaded guilty to Third-Degree Murder, 

Robbery, Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person, and Carrying a 

Firearm without a License.1 The court sentenced him that same day to an 

aggregate term of 25 to 30 years’ incarceration. Wyatt filed a post-sentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but withdrew his motion following a hearing 

on July 11, 2014. Wyatt did not file a direct appeal. Wyatt thereafter filed two 

PCRA petitions, neither of which resulted in relief.

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 3701(a)(1)(i), 6105(a)(1), and 6106(a), 

respectively.
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Wyatt filed the instant PCRA petition, pro se, on April 3, 2020. The PCRA 

court determined that Wyatt’s judgment of sentence became final on August 

11, 2014, 30 days after he withdrew his post-sentence motion and the period 

in which to file a direct appeal had expired. PCRA Court Rule 907 Notice, 

5/20/20, at 2 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3)). As he did not file his petition 

within a year of that date, the court found it was untimely. Id. (citing 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)). The court noted that Wyatt’s petition did not plead 

any of the statutory exceptions to the one-year time limit, but rather he 

“focuse[d] his arguments on plea counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.” Id.

at 2 n.2 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii)). The court issued a Rule 907 

notice of its intent to dismiss Wyatt’s petition, and thereafter dismissed the 

petition as untimely. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

Wyatt appealed, raising the following:

1. Whether [Wyatt] should be given relief under a newly after 

discovered evidence claim under 42 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 9543(a)(2)(v) 

of the Post-Conviction Relief Act based upon a fraudulent arrest 

warrant [Wyatt] just received on November 5, 2019[, f]rom 

Barbara W. Pianka, 12-1-02, when she wasn’t the issuing 

author[ity] of the arrest warrant Joseph P[.] Lindsey was 12-0-00 

[sic]?

2. Is [Wyatt] eligible for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act 

due to his conviction and sentence resulting from ineffective 

assistance of counsel?

3. Was defense counsel ineffective according to 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 

9543(a)(2)(ii)?

4. Was defense counsel ineffective according to 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 

9543(a)(2)(iii)?
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5. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in ignoring 

the sentencing guidelines?

6. Whether trial counsel’s defense was [in]adequately funded and 

thus [Wyatt’s] sixth Amendment rights were violated under 

standards articulated in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S[.] 648 

(1984) and under additional Pennsylvania Constitutional grounds 

as articulated in Karen v. Luzerne [C]ounty, 146 A.3d 715 (Pa. 

2016).

7. Challenge 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 6501[(a)(1)] 5 to 10 year sentence, 

and 18 Pa. C.S.A [§] 3701 10 to 20 year sentence. In addition to 

9712 statu[t]e that was used on the guideline sentence form to 

give petitioner his sentence. In accordance with the United States 

Supreme [C]ourt precedents in Alleyne v. United States, 133 

S.Ct. 2151 (2013), [Wyatt’s] factors which placed him in a 

mandatory sentence statu[t]e. These factors were not raised in 

front of a jury, to be deliberated on guilt or innocence, violating 

[Wyatt’s] sixth Amendment right to due process of law.

8. Challenge [Wyatt’s] sentence, which exceeds the upper limit of 

the standard range sentence in the basic sentence matrix, and fell 

within the aggravated Pennsylvania sentencing guideline range. 

Common[wealth] v. Brian T. Mro[z]ik, 213 A.[3]d 273 

([Pa.Super.] 2019). The sentence was improper, as the court did 

not state [its] reasons for imposing an aggravated range sentence 

on the record or on the Pennsylvania Guideline form, because the 

District Attorney never filed a guideline sentence form in [Wyatt’s] 

case [p]ursuant to 204 Pa. Code 303.1 (d) and (c). The 

Pennsylvania guideline range refers to an offender’s minimum 

sentence, the sentencing guidelines provide for minimum and not 

maximum sentences.

9. Challenge [Wyatt’s] out-of-state record score [p]ursuant to 204 

Pa[.] Code 308.

10. Ineffective assistance of counsel, failing to advise [Wyatt] of 

a one-day time deal that the District Attorney’s offered, but 

counsel Deanna A. Muller, never advised her client about plea deal 

and it lapsed. Where [Wyatt] has evidence that counsel said 

[Wyatt] turned down Plea.

11. The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 

criminal complaint did not contain the District Attorney’s 

signature, as required under Pa. R.C.P. 507(B) and Pa. R.C.P. 225.
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12. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the 

criminal complaint for lacking District Attorney’s signature, under 

Discovery Rule 573 and in violation of 42. Pa. C.S.A. [§] 8931 (d) 

(c). As well as the hand writing of the same District Attorney’s, 

hand writing on two separate complaints being different 

handwriting.

[13.] The court erred when it sentenced [Wyatt] to pay fines in 

the amount [of] $9,513.79 without a determination of his ability 

to pay. By statute, the court shall not sentence a defendant to pay 

a fine unless it appears of record that [the] defendant is or will be 

able to pay such fines. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § (b)(c)(2)[sic].

Wyatt’s Br. at 4-8 (suggested answers omitted).

“Our standard of review is well settled.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 

234 A.3d 735, 737 (Pa.Super. 2020). “When reviewing the denial of a PCRA 

petition, we must determine whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by 

the record and free of legal error.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 

181 A.3d 1168, 1174 (Pa.Super. 2018)).

The time limitations imposed by the PCRA are jurisdictional, and we may 

not address claims made in an untimely petition. Id. This rule applies with 

equal force to PCRA claims based on counsel ineffectiveness. See 

Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 915-16 (Pa. 2000).

We agree with the PCRA court that as Wyatt did not file his PCRA petition 

within one year of when his judgment of sentence became final, it is patently 

untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1), 9545(b)(3). Furthermore, Wyatt 

has made no cogent argument in either his PCRA petition or his brief regarding 

any of the statutory exceptions to the time bar. The only argument he raises 

on appeal that could be construed as implicating timeliness is his allegation 
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that he did not obtain a copy of the arrest warrant in his case until November 

5, 2019. Wyatt alleges that the copy is fraudulent, proves that there was no

probable cause for his arrest, and establishes his trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. See Wyatt’s Br. at 13-14; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(ii) 

(providing petition timely if predicated on newly-discovered facts).

2 However, 

even if he had pleaded the new facts exception in his PCRA petition, which he 

did not, Wyatt’s allegedly recent receipt of such evidence does not render his 

petition timely, as Wyatt has never explained why he could not, with the 

exercise of due diligence, have obtained it earlier. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(ii) (providing under newly-discovered facts exception, petitioner 

must plead and prove facts upon which petition is based “could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”).

As Wyatt failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s time 

limitations, the PCRA court was without jurisdiction to entertain his 

substantive claims. We affirm the order dismissing his petition.

Order affirmed.

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2 Wyatt raised this argument in his PCRA Petition and preserved it in his Rule 

1925(b) statement. See PCRA Pet., 4/3/20, at 4 (unpaginated); Rule 1925(b) 

Statement, 7/10/20, at 1.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/02/2021