### COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED August 18, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS . S TAT . § 808.10 and R ULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2018AP1672 Cir. Ct. No. 2015PR33 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT III

I N RE THE ESTATE OF E LIZABETH H. L AUER :

R ICHARD A. L AUER , A PPELLANT ,

V .
D ENNIS L AUER , P ERSONAL R EPRESENTATIVE FOR TH E E STATE OF E LIZABETH H. L AUER ,
R ESPONDENT .

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Outagamie County: GREGORY B. GILL, JR. , Judge. Affirmed

.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.No. 2018AP1672

2 Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in W IS . S TAT . R ULE 809.23(3).
¶ 1 PER CURIAM. Richard Lauer, pro se, challenges those parts of an
orde r that denied a petition to remove his brother, Dennis Lauer, as personal representative of their mother’s estate, and denied a motion for recusal of the judge. 1 As best as we can decipher , Richard 2 argues that: (1) the circuit court erred by denying his petition without a hearing, contrary to W IS

. S TAT

. § 857.15 (2017

- 18) 3 ; (2) the failure to “follow the mandates” of § 857.15 “resulted in a summary judgment” ; and (3) denial of the petition is proof of the judge’s partiality, thus requiring recusal. We reject Richard’s arguments and affirm the
order.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In July 2015, Richard’s mother, Elizabeth Lauer, died intestate with
ten adult children . Dennis petitioned for formal administration of the estate and consented to serve as personal repr esentative. Eight of the siblings, including

1 Although Richard purports to challenge the denial of his petition to remove Doug Hahn as attorney for the estate, Richard fails to develop any argument specific to Hahn. We will not develop it for him. See Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng ’ g Testing , Inc. , 2009 WI App 62, ¶ 25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82. The underlying order also denied Richard’s petition for d iscovery proceedings and motion for relief from a July 26, 2017 order. Because he raises no cognizable argument regarding these matters on appeal, any challenge to these parts of the order is deemed abandoned. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co s. , 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an issue raised in the circuit court, but not raised on appeal, is deemed abandoned).

2 Because this case involves parties sharing the same last name, we will refer to the parties by t heir first names.

3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017

- 18 version unless otherwise noted.No. 2018AP1672

3 Dennis, approved of his appointment as person al representative. Both Richard and another sibling, Mary Beth L ipp, filed their own petitions to serve as personal representative. After a hearing, the circuit court appointed Dennis as personal representative for the estate

. Richard appealed, arguing in relevant part that the court should not have rejected Richard’ s request for appointment as personal representative without first finding him unsuitable , and that the circuit court judg e should have recused himself because he prejud g ed the matter. This court rejected Richard’s arguments and affirmed the order. See L auer v. Lipp , No. 2016AP465, unpublished slip op. (WI App July 18, 2017).

¶ 3 Richard then filed a motion to remove both Dennis as the personal representative for the estate and Douglas Hahn as the attorney for the estate.
Richard also sou ght recusal of the circuit court judge. The court denied the
motions in an order e ntered July 26, 2017. That same day, the court entered the final judgment for formal administration of the estate. The court ordered that after all fees and expenses were paid, the balance of the estate was to be divided equally amongst the ten siblings after adjust ment to reflect any distribution of tangible personal property th at had been received. Richard appealed the July 26 order and judgment, as well as a subsequent order denying his motio n for reconsideration. In an opinion and order dated September 6, 2018, that appeal , No. 2017AP1790, was dismissed pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. R ULE 809.83(2), based on Richard’s failure to either file a brief or establish good cause for an extension.

¶ 4 During the pendency of appeal No. 2017AP1790, Richard filed the underlying petition for a hearing to remove Dennis and Hahn as personal representative and attorney, respe ct ively, of the estate. Richard also moved again
for the judge’s recusa l. The circuit court denied the petition and motion without a hearing, an d this appeal follows.No. 2018AP1672

4 DISCUSSION

¶ 5 As an initial matter , Dennis suggests that Richard’s appeal is procedurally barred. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, “a final judgment is conclusive in all subsequent actions between the same parties as to all matters which were litigated or which might have been litigated in the former proceedings.” Lindas v. Cady , 183 Wis. 2d 547, 558, 515 N.W.2d 458 (1994) (emphasis added). The elements of claim preclusion appear to apply , as the issues in this appeal could have been raised in Richard’s earlier appeal, had he filed a brief. Furthermore, we view Richard ’s prior appeal as essentially moving to

reo pen the prior judgment, and to the extent he is again making such a claim in the present appeal, it is not properly before us. Although Richard’s present appeal may be procedurally barred, we nevertheless address the merits of his arguments.

¶ 6 Richard contends that he was entitled to a hearing under W IS

. S TAT

. § 857.15, which governs a personal representative’s resignation or removal. The statute provides:

The judge may accept the written resignation of any personal representativ e. When a personal representative is adjudicated incompetent, disqualified, unsuitable, incapable of discharging the personal representative ’ s duties, or is a nonresident of this state who has not appointed a resident agent to accept service of process in all actions or proceedings with respect to the estate and caused such appointment to be filed with the court, the court shall remove the personal representative. When any personal representative has failed to perform any duty imposed by law or by any law ful order of the court or has ceased to be a resident of the state, the court may remove the personal representative. When grounds for removal appear to exist, the court on its own motion or on the petition of any person interested shall order the persona l representative to appear and show cause why the personal representative should not be removed.No. 2018AP1672

5 W IS

. S TAT

. § 857.15 ( e mphasis added)

. Whether to remove a personal representative is a matter within the circuit court’s discretion. Bell v. Neugart , 2002 WI App 180, ¶28, 256 Wis. 2d 969, 650 N.W.2d 52. When reviewing a discretionary decision, we search the record for reaso ns to sustain the circuit
court’ s exercise of discretion

. Lofthus v. Lofthus , 2004 WI App 65, ¶ 21, 270
Wis. 2d 515, 678 N.W.2d 3 93

. W e affirm if there is a reasonable basis for the

court ’ s decision

. Littmann v. Littmann , 57 Wis. 2d 238, 250, 203 N.W.2d 901 (1973).

¶ 7 Richard asserts, in conclusory fashion, that because his petition cited “good cause for removal , ” the statute required the circuit court to order Dennis to appear and show cause why he should not be removed as personal representative of the estate. We are not persuaded. Under the statute ’s plain language , a court is not required to order a show

- ca use hearing unless the petition establishes that “grounds for removal appear to exist

. ” By denying the motion, the court, sub
silen t io, determined no grounds for removal existed. In any event , the record supports the court’s discretionary decision. As t his court acknowledged in Richard’s earlier appeal: “ [T]he record supports the court’s finding that Dennis
was best suited to fill that role [of personal representative] . Eight of the ten heirs requested Dennis’ appointment. The court reasonably found t he other heirs would more likely cooperate with Dennis, including giving him access to places the alleged will might be found. ” Lauer , No. 2016AP465, ¶6. T he circuit court properly denied the petition without ordering a show

- cause hearing.

¶ 8 Richard also argues the circuit court judge should have recused
himself. W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 757.19 governs judicial disqualification . None of the objective factors that mandate recusal apply in this case. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 757.19(2)(a)

- (f). The only possible relevant consideration is whetherNo. 2018AP1672

6 § 757.19(2)(g) applies. That paragraph mandates a judge’s disqualification “only when that judge makes a determination that, in fact or in appearance, he or she cannot act in an impartial manner.” State v. American TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc. , 151 Wi s. 2d 175, 183, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989). Whether the subjective situation exists and requires disqualification is based on the judge’s
own determination of whether he or she will remain impartial. State v. Harrell , 199 Wis. 2d 654, 658, 546 N.W.2d 115 (199 6). Appellate review of that determination is limited to establishing whether the judge made a determination requiring disqualification. Id. at 663

- 64.

¶ 9 The statut ory paragraph at issu e does not require disqualific ation in
situations where: (1) some one other than the judge objectively believes there is an appearance that the judge is unable to act in an impartial manner; or (2) the judge’s impartiality can reasonably be questioned by someone other than the judge. American TV , 151 Wi s. 2d at 183. In Richard’s earlier appeal, we noted that because the circuit court judge repeatedly found he could be impartial, there
was no basis for this court to decide that he should have recused himself. In the present appeal, Richard offers no new facts other than the court’s decision on appeal to support his recusal argument. Specifically, he asserts that the circuit court’s denial of the petition without a show

- cause hearing is proof of the judge’s partiality. However, “judicial rulings alone a lmost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).

¶ 10 Finally, Richard suggests the circuit court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Dennis. Richard offers no authority for his claim, and the record provides no basis upon which Richard can establish that the denial s of his motions w ere , in effect, a summary judgment.No. 2018AP1672

7 By the Court

. — Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See W IS

. S T AT

. R ULE 809.23(1)(b)5.