- 75 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

Alexandra Courtney, appella

v. Rene Jimenez, appell

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 26, 2017. No. A-16-868.

1. Judgments: Injunction: Appeal and Error. A protection order is analogous to an injunction. Accordingly, the grant or denial of a protection 

order is reviewed de novo on the record.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the 

trial court.

3. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Because mootness is 

a justiciability doctrine that operates to prevent courts from exercising 

jurisdiction, an appellate court reviews mootness determinations under 

the same standard of review as other jurisdictional questions.

4. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a jurisdictional 

question does not involve a factual dispute, its determination is a matter 

of law, which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the decisions made by the lower courts.

5. Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A case becomes moot when the 

issues initially presented in litigation cease to exist or the litigants lack 

a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of litigation.

6. Moot Question. As a general rule, a moot case is subject to summary dismissal.

7. Moot Question: Appeal and Error. Under certain circumstances, an 

appellate court may entertain the issues presented by a moot case when 

the claims presented involve a matter of great public interest or when 

other rights or liabilities may be affected by the case’s determination.

8. ____: ____. When determining whether a case involves a matter of public interest, an appellate court considers (1) the public or private nature 

of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication for future guidance of public officials, and (3) the likelihood of 

future recurrence of the same or a similar problem.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

10/02/2017 02:11 AM CDT
- 76 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

9. Motions to Vacate: Time. A court has inherent power to vacate or 

modify its own judgments at any time during the term at which those 

judgments are pronounced, and such power exists entirely independent 

of any statute.

10. Judgments: Statutes: Time. The 5-day period set forth in Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 42-925(1) (Reissue 2016) is not central to the purpose of the 

domestic abuse protection order statutes; once the ex parte protection 

order has been granted, the fundamental purpose of the statute has 

been satisfied.

11. Pleadings: Time. The 5-day period to file a show cause hearing request 

as set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-925(1) (Reissue 2016) is directory 

and not mandatory. Accordingly, failing to file a request for a show 

cause hearing within that 5-day period does not preclude the later filing 

of a motion to bring the matter back before the court, including the filing of a motion to vacate an ex parte order.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Leig

Ann Retelsdorf, Judge. Affir

Jeff T. Courtney, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.

Hugh I. Abrahamson, of Abrahamson Law Office, for 

appellee.

Moore, Chief Judge, and Pirtle and Bishop, Judg

Bishop, Judge

INTRODUCTION

An ex parte domestic abuse protection order was entered 

by the Douglas County District Court in favor of Alexandra 

Courtney and against Rene Jimenez. Jimenez did not request 

a hearing to challenge the ex parte order within 5 days as set 

forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-925(1) (Reissue 2016); however, Jimenez subsequently filed a motion to vacate the order. 

Courtney appeals from the district court’s order vacating the ex 

parte order. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Courtney filed a petition and affidavit for an ex parte 

domestic abuse protection order on May 6, 2016. The petition 
- 77 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

indicates that Courtney and Jimenez have a 3-year-old child 

together, that a “Paternity/Custody” case was pending between 

them, and that another protection order against Jimenez (in 

favor of Courtney) was set to expire on May 8. Where the form 

requested the facts of the most recent incidents of domestic 

abuse, Courtney described the following incidents: First, she 

alleged that on April 29, 2016, Jimenez sent her a text message 

“about our daughter and death,” which she took as a death 

threat to her (Courtney). In a second incident, on October 16, 

2015, Jimenez told a mediator that “the protection order would 

be over soon [and] ‘he’ll be able to handle this himself.’” 

Courtney said that “[t]his made me very afraid because of the 

way I know that he handles things.” Courtney next listed as an 

incident of domestic abuse, “See previous affidavit submitted 

on 5/7/2015.” Finally, Courtney alleged that on May 6, 2016, 

after she spoke to the county attorney about Jimenez’ April 

29 text message, she was informed that the text message had 

become part of a “‘warrant case’”; she thought this would “further provoke” Jimenez.

The district court entered an ex parte domestic abuse protection order against Jimenez on May 6, 2016. The order stated:

If the respondent wishes to appear and show cause 

why this order should not remain in effect for a period of 

one year, he or she shall affix his or her current address, 

telephone number, and signature on the Request for 

Hearing form provided and return it to the clerk of the 

district court within five (5) days after service upon him 

or her.

(Emphasis in original.)

Jimenez was served on May 17, 2016, but did not return 

the “Request for Hearing” form within 5 days thereafter. 

Instead, Jimenez filed a “Motion to Dismiss Protection Order” 

on August 1. He requested that the district court vacate the 

protection order because “reading [Courtney’s] Petition and 

Affidavit to Obtain Domestic Abuse Protection Order in the 

most favorable light to [her], it is readily apparent that [she] 
- 78 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

has failed to allege the facts necessary” for the court to issue 

a protection order. While the document was titled “Motion to 

Dismiss Protection Order,” we will refer to it as a motion to 

vacate because it asked the court to vacate the protection order 

and because the district court’s later order referred to it as a 

motion to vacate.

The district court held a hearing on Jimenez’ motion to 

vacate on August 9, 2016. At the hearing, Jimenez’ counsel 

argued that the allegations in Courtney’s petition and affidavit 

did not meet the statutory criteria for a domestic abuse protection order because the text message was not threatening and 

Jimenez was only seeking suggestions on how to explain a 

family death to their daughter. Jimenez’ counsel stated:

The only reason I can think that there would be a protection order here is to try and provoke my client, and that’s 

not the use of a protection order. My client has done nothing that would warrant the issuance of a protection order, 

and I’d ask that you set it aside.

Courtney’s counsel responded:

The problem, Judge, is that there is probably more of 

a record that would have been created in support of the 

protection order, at least through the testimony of my 

client and any of her witnesses, but there was no hearing and nothing was placed on the record because . . . 

Jimenez did not ask for a hearing.

Courtney’s counsel further argued that Courtney’s fears were 

justified because of her past experiences with Jimenez, and her 

counsel asked that a hearing be held on the merits of the petition and affidavit, wherein Courtney could “fill in the gaps” 

with her testimony.

The district court said that it understood both parties’ positions, but determined that Courtney’s petition and affidavit 

failed to allege enough facts to support the protection order. 

The court acknowledged the possibility of other evidence 

but told the parties that “in a hearing on a protection order, 

the Court is confined to what’s alleged in the Petition.” 
- 79 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

Although the court decided the protection order should be 

vacated, it informed Courtney she could refile for an order, 

and the court further directed that an order would be entered 

in the pending paternity case that Jimenez was to have “absolutely no contact” with Courtney whatsoever. Courtney filed a 

timely appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Courtney assigns, restated, that the district court erred when 

it vacated the domestic abuse protection order against Jimenez 

because (1) Jimenez’ motion to vacate was untimely and was 

not a proper pleading under the domestic abuse protection 

order statutes and (2) Courtney alleged facts sufficient to support the issuance of the protection order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A protection order is analogous to an injunction. 

Mahmood v. Mahmud, 279 Neb. 390, 778 N.W.2d 426 (2010). 

Accordingly, the grant or denial of a protection order is 

reviewed de novo on the record. Id.

[2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which 

an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. 

Glantz v. Daniel, 21 Neb. App. 89, 837 N.W.2d 563 (2013).

[3,4] Mootness does not prevent appellate jurisdiction. But, 

because mootness is a justiciability doctrine that operates to 

prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction, an appellate court 

reviews mootness determinations under the same standard of 

review as other jurisdictional questions. Id. When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, its determination is a matter of law, which requires an appellate court to 

reach a conclusion independent of the decisions made by the 

lower courts. Id.

ANALYSIS

Mootness.

Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, an 

appellate court must determine whether it has jurisdiction. 
- 80 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

In re Interest of Jamyia M., 281 Neb. 964, 800 N.W.2d 259 

(2011). While it is not a constitutional prerequisite for jurisdiction, the existence of an actual case or controversy is necessary 

for the exercise of judicial power. Hron v. Donlan, 259 Neb. 

259, 609 N.W.2d 379 (2000). In the absence of an actual case 

or controversy requiring judicial resolution, it is not the function of the courts to render a judgment that is merely advisory. 

Glantz v. Daniel, supra. Therefore, we first consider whether 

this appeal is moot, since the protection order in this case 

would have already expired had it not been vacated.

[5,6] A case becomes moot when the issues initially presented in litigation cease to exist or the litigants lack a legally 

cognizable interest in the outcome of litigation. See id. As a 

general rule, a moot case is subject to summary dismissal. Id.

The district court entered a temporary ex parte protection 

order on May 6, 2016. Jimenez was served with the order 

on May 17. Jimenez did not request a show cause hearing 

within 5 days of service, so the temporary order became a 

final ex parte protection order, valid until May 6, 2017. See 

§ 42-925(1). The district court vacated the protection order on 

August 9, 2016, after a hearing on Jimenez’ motion to vacate. 

Courtney filed a notice of appeal on September 8; however, 

she did not send a copy of the praecipe for bill of exceptions 

to the court reporter as required by appellate court rules. This 

resulted in a delay in the preparation of the appellate record, 

which was followed by multiple extensions of brief dates filed 

by Courtney. These delays have contributed to this appeal 

coming before this court after what would have been the expiration date of the protection order, had it not been vacated. 

Since this court cannot reinstate an expired protection order, 

this appeal is moot.

[7,8] However, under certain circumstances, an appellate 

court may entertain the issues presented by a moot case when 

the claims presented involve a matter of great public interest 

or when other rights or liabilities may be affected by the case’s 

determination. Glantz v. Daniel, supra. When determining 
- 81 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

whether a case involves a matter of public interest, an appellate court considers (1) the public or private nature of the 

question presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative 

adjudication for future guidance of public officials, and (3) 

the likelihood of future recurrence of the same or a similar 

problem. Id.

This case is similar to Glantz v. Daniel, 21 Neb. App. 89, 

837 N.W.2d 563 (2013), where we applied the public interest 

exception to a moot case concerning an ex parte harassment 

protection order. Individuals subject to an ex parte harassment protection order have 5 days from the date of service 

to request a hearing to show cause why the order should not 

remain in effect for 1 year. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.09(7) 

(Reissue 2016). In Glantz, a hearing was requested more than 

5 days after service of the ex parte order, but the district court 

nevertheless allowed the hearing and dismissed the ex parte 

harassment protection order. On appeal, it was argued that the 

district court erred by allowing the show cause hearing when it 

had not been requested within the 5 days specified by statute. 

Courtney makes a similar argument in the present appeal, but 

in the context of the domestic abuse protection order statutes 

rather than the harassment protection order statutes at issue 

in Glantz.

However, as in this case, the harassment protection order in 

Glantz had expired when the case came before this court on 

appeal, rendering the appeal moot. In Glantz, we noted that 

the case involved the interpretation of a statute and that there 

was no previous interpretation of the time limitation contained 

in § 28-311.09(7); thus, the case raised a public question and 

our decision on the issue would provide valuable guidance to 

lower courts. Further, because of the multitude of harassment 

protection order cases filed in Nebraska, this court concluded 

that the same question would likely arise in the future. Id. 

Therefore, we found that the public interest exception to the 

mootness doctrine applied and we addressed the merits of 

the case.
- 82 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

While we are mindful that the public interest exception 

should not be used so often that it circumvents the mootness 

doctrine, this case presents a sufficiently important issue to 

merit consideration. See Yancer v. Kaufman, 22 Neb. App. 

320, 854 N.W.2d 640 (2014). Like Glantz v. Daniel, supra, 

this case raises a statutory question more public in nature 

than private, an authoritative adjudication for future guidance 

is desirable, and there is a likelihood of future recurrence of 

the same or a similar problem. Similar to Glantz, there is no 

previous interpretation of how the 5-day time requirement 

specified in § 42-925(1) for requesting a show cause hearing 

to challenge an ex parte domestic abuse protection order may 

impact a later request for hearing. Additionally, in this case, 

we are asked to consider whether a party’s failure to request a 

hearing in accordance with § 42-925(1) should prevent a district court from exercising its inherent power to vacate a prior 

order. Accordingly, we conclude the public interest exception 

to the mootness doctrine applies, at least in part, to the present appeal.

District Court’s Inherent 

Power to Vacate.

Courtney argues that the district court should not have considered Jimenez’ motion to vacate because he did not timely 

file his request to contest the protection order. She argues that 

the 5-day deadline in § 42-925(1) is “a ‘hard and fast’ deadline” and that “[t]he five day period is similar to a statute of 

limitations, or the 30 day period in which a notice of appeal 

must be filed following entry of a final order of a trial court.” 

Brief for appellant at 7. Courtney categorizes the motion to 

vacate as “a time barred, inappropriate collateral attack on 

a valid order issued by the court. Not only was the five day 

period not adhered to, the 30 days in which Jimenez could 

have appealed the entry of the order expired 38 days before the 

motion to dismiss was filed.” Id.
- 83 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

[9] We initially draw a distinction between Jimenez missing the statutory 5-day period for requesting a show cause 

hearing as described in § 42-925(1) and his filing a motion to 

vacate the protection order. With regard to a motion to vacate, 

a court has inherent power to vacate or modify its own judgments at any time during the term at which those judgments 

are pronounced, and such power exists entirely independent 

of any statute. Kibler v. Kibler, 287 Neb. 1027, 845 N.W.2d 

585 (2014). The local rules of the district court for the Fourth 

Judicial District, applicable here, provide that the term of the 

court runs from January 1 to December 31 of the calendar 

year. See Rules of Dist. Ct. of Fourth Jud. Dist. 4-1 (rev. 

1995). The ex parte order was filed on May 6, 2016, and 

Jimenez filed his motion to vacate on August 1. Accordingly, 

Jimenez filed his motion to vacate within the court’s term, 

and the court had the inherent power to vacate or modify its 

prior order.

In considering the motion to vacate, the district court determined that Courtney’s petition and affidavit failed to allege 

enough facts to support the protection order, stating, “The 

problem that this court has is I don’t believe there’s enough 

— when I read the Petition and the affidavit, I don’t think 

there’s enough in the Petition itself for a protection order.” 

The court acknowledged the possibility of other evidence but 

told the parties that “in a hearing on a protection order, the 

Court is confined to what’s alleged in the Petition.” The court 

said the protection order should be vacated, but “[s]hould 

you [Courtney] want an order . . . and you feel the need for 

an order, you would have to put those things in the Petition 

itself so that we could have a hearing and address them.” 

The discussion between the court and counsel indicates that 

the paternity matter was scheduled for trial “this coming 

Monday,” “[t]he 15th.” The court noted that a different district court judge entered the protection order and that it “is 

always problematic when more than one judge is involved in 

the proceedings.” The court vacated “this protection order at 
- 84 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

this point in time,” but stated that an order was to be entered 

in the paternity case that Jimenez was “to have absolutely no 

contact” with Courtney whatsoever.

Courtney argues, however, that “[a]ny argument from 

Jimenez that the trial court’s equity powers allow it to vacate 

the ex-parte order and dismiss the petition and affidavit” is 

without merit. Brief for appellant at 8 (emphasis in original). 

The totality of Courtney’s argument in support of this assertion is limited to her reference to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924(5) 

(Reissue 2016), which states, “If there is any conflict between 

sections 42-924 to 42-926 and any other provision of law, 

sections 42-924 to 42-926 shall govern.” Courtney does not 

explain how the district court’s inherent power to vacate orders 

within its court term conflicts with these statutory sections. 

Our review of the listed statutes reveals no apparent conflicts, 

and in light of Courtney’s failure to provide any discussion 

of the same, we decline to consider this assertion further. See 

State v. Cook, 290 Neb. 381, 860 N.W.2d 408 (2015) (court 

declined to address appellant’s conclusory arguments which 

had no supporting explanation).

Finding no conflict between § 42-924(5) and the district 

court’s inherent power to vacate a prior order entered within 

its court term, we find no error in the district court’s order 

dismissing Courtney’s petition and vacating the ex parte protection order.

Failure to Follow Deadline 

in § 42-925(1).

Courtney argues that § 42-925(1) sets forth “a ‘hard and 

fast’ deadline” for “action on the part of Jimenez.” Brief for 

appellant at 7. Courtney claims the 5-day period is similar to 

a statute of limitations, and she suggests that failing to request 

a hearing within those 5 days should preclude any subsequent action on a final protection order, including the filing 

of the motion to vacate. We do not read the statute to create 

such limitations.
- 85 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

As noted previously, this court has addressed a similar 

5-day statutory requirement with regard to harassment protection orders. In Glantz v. Daniel, 21 Neb. App. 89, 837 N.W.2d 

563 (2013), a request for hearing on an ex parte harassment 

protection order was challenged as being untimely, since it 

was filed outside the 5-day deadline in § 28-311.09(7). This 

court concluded that the 5-day period to request a hearing was 

directory rather than mandatory. We determined that the deadline for requesting a hearing regarding a harassment protection 

order did not affect the underlying goal of the harassment 

statutes, e.g., protecting victims of stalking or harassment. 

The immediate protections afforded to stalking or harassment 

victims was accomplished by allowing the courts to enter an 

ex parte order upon the filing of a petition. We found no error 

in the district court’s decision to proceed to hearing, nor in its 

decision to then dismiss the protection order petition and ex 

parte order.

In considering principles of statutory construction, our 

Supreme Court has stated:

The general rule is that the word “shall” in a statute 

is mandatory and inconsistent with the idea of discretion. But we construe the word “shall” as permissive if 

the spirit and purpose of the legislation requires such 

a construction. No universal test distinguishes mandatory from directory provisions. Broadly, provisions that 

relate to the essence of the thing to be done are mandatory while provisions for which compliance is a matter 

of convenience rather than substance are directory. Put 

another way, we have been reluctant to deem provisions mandatory if something less than strict compliance would not interfere with the statute’s fundamental purpose.

We have frequently applied these principles to statutory 

time limits. In most cases, we have decided that provisions specifying the time by which something “shall” be 

done are merely directory. But we have given “shall” a 
- 86 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

mandatory construction if completion of the action within 

the specified period was essential to accomplishing a 

principal purpose of the law.

D.I. v. Gibson, 291 Neb. 554, 557-58, 867 N.W.2d 284, 287 

(2015) (emphasis supplied). The footnote to the italicized language above identifies a number of supporting cases where 

statutory time limits were determined to be directory rather 

than mandatory, including Glantz v. Daniel, supra.

In the present matter, the Protection from Domestic Abuse 

Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-901 et seq. (Reissue 2016), provides that a victim of domestic abuse may file a petition and 

affidavit for a protection order with the clerk of the district 

court. § 42-924. Section 42-925 provides that domestic abuse 

protection orders, as defined under § 42-924, may be issued 

ex parte. If a court issues a domestic abuse protection order 

ex parte:

[S]uch order is a temporary order and the court shall 

forthwith cause notice of the petition and order to be 

given to the respondent. The court shall also cause a 

form to request a show-cause hearing to be served upon 

the respondent. If the respondent wishes to appear and 

show cause why the order should not remain in effect, he 

or she shall affix his or her current address, telephone 

number, and signature to the form and return it to the 

clerk of the district court within five days after service 

upon him or her. Upon receipt of the request for a showcause hearing, the request of the petitioner, or upon the 

court’s own motion, the court shall immediately schedule 

a show-cause hearing . . . . If the respondent does not so 

appear [at the hearing] and show cause, the temporary 

order shall be affirmed and shall be deemed the final protection order. If the respondent has been properly served 

with the ex parte order and fails to appear at the hearing, 

the temporary order shall be affirmed and the service of 

the ex parte order shall be notice of the final protection 
- 87 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

order for purposes of prosecution under subsection (4) of 

section 42-924.

§ 42-925(1) (emphasis supplied).

The fundamental purpose of the Protection from Domestic 

Abuse Act is “to provide abused family and household members necessary services including shelter, counseling, social 

services, and limited medical care and legal assistance.” See 

§ 42-902. As with harassment protection orders, immediate 

protection is afforded under the domestic abuse protection 

order statutes by allowing courts to enter an ex parte order 

upon the filing of a petition and affidavit. Upon entry of such 

an ex parte order, the respondent is immediately enjoined from 

engaging in any of the actions set forth in § 42-924, as may be 

ordered by the court.

[10,11] We see no reason why the 5-day period for domestic abuse protection orders set forth in § 42-925(1) should 

be treated any differently than the 5-day rule for harassment 

protection orders set forth in § 28-311.09(7), see Glantz v. 

Daniel, 21 Neb. App. 89, 837 N.W.2d 563 (2013), or the 7-day 

rule for emergency protective custody hearings as addressed 

in D.I. v. Gibson, 291 Neb. 554, 867 N.W.2d 284 (2015). As 

stated by our Supreme Court, “We have noted our reluctance 

to find statutory time limits mandatory if they are not central 

to the purpose of the statute.” Id. at 561, 867 N.W.2d at 289. 

The 5-day period set forth in § 42-925(1) is not central to 

the purpose of the domestic abuse protection order statutes. 

Although prompt responses to ex parte domestic abuse protection orders no doubt encourage orderly and rapid resolution of 

challenges to such orders, once the ex parte protection order 

has been granted, the fundamental purpose of the statute has 

been satisfied. We conclude the 5-day period to file a show 

cause hearing request as set forth in § 42-925(1) is directory 

and not mandatory. Accordingly, failing to file a request for a 

show cause hearing within that 5-day period does not preclude 

the later filing of a motion to bring the matter back before the 
- 88 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance S

25 Nebraska Appellate Repor

COURTNEY v. JIMENEZ

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 75

court, including the filing of a motion to vacate an ex parte 

order as was filed in this case.

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Courtney argues that she alleged facts sufficient to support the issuance of the protection order and that therefore, 

it should not have been vacated. We need not address this 

argument because even if we were to determine that Courtney 

alleged sufficient facts to support the issuance of an ex parte 

protection order, we cannot provide her with a remedy because 

the underlying protection order would have expired on May 

6, 2017. Unlike interpreting § 42-925(1), whether Courtney 

alleged sufficient facts for an ex parte protection order is of a 

private nature, it does not demand an authoritative adjudication for future guidance of public officials, and because of 

the unique facts of her case, the same or a similar problem 

is not likely to recur. See Hron v. Donlan, 259 Neb. 259, 

609 N.W.2d 379 (2000). We find no exception to the mootness doctrine under which we can address sufficiency of the 

evidence. See Doty v. West Gate Bank, 292 Neb. 787, 874 

N.W.2d 839 (2016) (appellate court is not obligated to engage 

in analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate case and controversy before it).

CONCLUSION

The district court’s order dismissing Courtney’s petition 

and vacating the ex parte domestic abuse protection order 

is affirmed.

Affirmed