# I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S

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L A W R E N C E D O N O V A N , A p p e l l a n t

v . T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N A P P E L L A N T ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E S E C O N D C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

T A R R A N T C O U N T Y

J O H N S O N 

## , J . , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e u n a n i m o u s c o u r t .

O P I N I O N Appellant L awr ence Donovan plead nolo contende re to a char g e of injury to a child and was 1 

## place d on defe rre d-adjudica tion community s u p er v i s i o n in 2006. I n 2008, a modification of 2 

## appellant’ s conditions of community supervision require d him to attend a sex-offende r-tre atment
prog ram and meet a number of trea tment g oals over a period of time. I n a subsequent proce eding ,

T e x
. P e n a l C o d e § 2 2

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T e x
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. 2

## 2

the trial cour

t found that appe llant had violated the terms of his de fer red adjudication by failing to attend the sex-offende r-tre atment prog ram and to meet its g oals, adjudicate d him g uilty of injury to

a child, and sentenc ed him to four y ear s’ imprisonment. The court of appea ls aff irmed, and appellant petitioned this Court for discretionar y revie w. We aff

irm. Background
I n 2004, appellant was char g ed with ag g rava ted sexual assault and indece ncy with a child.
On Aug ust 23, 2006, the i ndictment was amended to add a char g e of injury to a c h i l d

. Ap p el l an t
enter ed a plea of nolo contende re to the added char g e, and the trial court place d him on five y ear s’
d e f e r r e d

- a d ju d ic a ti o n c o mm

unity supervision (“pr obation” in appellan t’ s p e ti ti o n a

n d o ld e r s o u

r c e s )

. The trial co u rt found appellant not g uilty of the orig inally alleg ed offe nses of ag g rava ted sexual
assault and indece ncy with a child and, with the ag ree ment of the state, g rante d an expunction of the

two offe nses on which appellant had been acquitted. The state did not appea l the order g ranting the expunctions. Appellant’s community supervision was modified a number of times afte r it was orig inally imposed on Aug ust 23, 2006. The first modification came two day s later, on Aug ust 25. The trial

court modified a condition that appellant “not use, possess, or consume” any alcoholic bever ag e to

o n e of “no excessive consumption.” Following the elec tion of a new judge to the t ri al co u rt , appellant’ s community supervision was modified on Marc h 24, 2008. T he “no excessive consumption” condition was chang ed back to “do not use, possess, or consume,” and the trial court extended appellant’ s community supervision for an ad d i t i onal y ear
. The trial court also imposed
sex-offende r conditions on appellant, including the following condition:
3. Submit to sex offe nder trea tment evalua tion as direc ted by the supervision office r.

## 3

Attend and participa te fully in and succe ssfully complete psy cholog ical counseling , trea tment, and afte rca

re sessions for sex offe nders with an individual or org anization as spec ified by

or appr oved by

the Court or the supervision offic er. Pay all costs of evalua tion, counseling , trea tment and afte rca re. Treatment must be completed within three y ear s of its initiation, with at least one-third of trea tment completed eac h y ear
. [3 ]


## I nitially , appellant beg an sex-offende r trea tment with provider PSY. Howeve r, due to conflicting schedule s, appellant switched to Strain and Associates, which offe red wee kend sessions
that could acc ommodate appellant’ s schedule

. Appellant diligently attended and participa ted in the
prog ram until November of 2008. An issue arose during g roup sessions when appellant was require d

to discuss the expunged sex offe nses. Ba sed upon the acquittals and expunction, appellant ref used,
and the tre atment provider dismiss ed appe llant until he either admitted to the offenses or passed a poly g raph examination. Appe l l an t wa s able to return to the prog ram a few wee ks later afte r his community -super

vision office r was able to work out an ag ree ment with Strain. I n Fe bruar y of 2009, appellant’ s attorney s filed a motion for modification of the conditions of com m u n i ty supervision
based upon the offe nse-discussion issue. I n Marc h, his attorney s and the trial court had an ex parte confe renc e in chambe rs to discuss the problem. I n Aug ust, a second confe renc e was held in
chambe rs among ap p ell ant’s attorney s, the s tate’s attorney , the t rial court, appellant’ s community supervision office r May

ra Pinedo, a

nd Strain. The trial c ourt deter mined that appellant would not be require d to admit 100% o f t h e o ff en s e, which was one of the g oals require d by the trea tment
prog ram. Howeve r, the court deter mined that appellant would still be require d to disc uss the fac ts of the off ense. Appellant’s trea tment then continu ed u ntil the issue rea red its head ag ain on Fe bruar y 1,

O n N o v e m b e r 1 7 , 2 0 0 8 , t h e t r i a l c o u r t a d d e d s i x t e e n d a y s o f w e e k e n d j a i l c o n f i n e m e n t

. T w o w e e k s l a t e r 3

o n D e c e m b e r 1 , a p p e l l a n t ’ s w o r k

- r e l e a s e d a y s w e r e m o d i f i e d t o a c c o m m o d a t e t h e h o l i d a y s e a s o n
.

## 4

2010, during a session bet we en ap p ellant and a victim thera pist. The victim thera

pist wanted
appe l l an t t o discuss the expunged offe nses, but appellant believed that he could discuss only the
offe nse for which he was on community supervision for: injury to a child. On Fe bruar y 3, appellant

met with Strain with documents prepa re d by his attorney s reg arding the expunction. Strain,

conce rned about leg al liability for discussing the expunged offe nses, stopped appellant’ s trea tment until they could g et clar ification. Appellant talked to his attorney s about asking for clar ification from
the court, and appellant called Pinedo the next day

. L ess than a wee k later, o n Fe bruar y 8, appellant’ s attorney s met with t h e trial court, which wanted to hear from community supervision
befor e ruling

. On Fe bruar y 24, Strain sent a letter to Pinedo asking for c larification. I n this letter , Strain conclude d that, if appellant could not discuss the expunged offe nses, then there might not be
any useful work that could be done in Strain’s sex-offende r-tre atment prog ram. Pinedo took Strain’s
letter to a co u rt o ff

icer , and that office r returne d with a response : appellant would still be held 4



## acc ountable for

attending sex-offende r treatment and meeting the trea tment goa ls. During appellant’ s wee kly meeting s with Pinedo over the course of the next sever al months,
Pinedo reiter ated to appellant that he would be held acc ountable. Pinedo also told appellant that he could g o to a differ ent provider. Howeve r, appellant de clined to do so, say ing tha t the problem of
what offe nses could be discussed–injury to a child versus the expunged offe nses–would nece ssarily rise ag ain.
On Oc t o b er 20, 2010, the state moved to proce ed to adjudication based upon appellant’s
failure to attend s ex -o ff

en d er trea tment and his failure to meet two-thirds of the g oals of a sexI t i s u n c l e a r w h a t t y p e o f o f f i c e r ( b a i l i f

f , c l e r k , r e p o r t e r , e t c
. ) P i n e d o t o o k S t r a i n ’ s l e t t e r t o
. I n h e r 4 t e s t i m o n y , P i n e d o s i m p l y r e f e r r e d t o “ t h e c o u r t o f

f i c e r ” a n d i d e n t i f

i e d h i m a s M r
. T h o m p s o n
. P r e s u m a b l y , M r
. T h o m p s o n i s k n o w n t o t h e p a r t i e s b e c a u s e h i s r o l e w a s n o t e x p l o r e d f u r t h e r
.

## 5

offe nder- trea tment prog ram. A hear ing was held on J anuar y 7, 2011, and the trial court found that appellant had violated the terms of his community supervision, found him g uilty of injury to a child,
and sente nced him to four y ear s’ imprisonment.
The court of appea ls aff

irmed the trial court’s judgme nt, finding that appellant had forf eited
any claim to err or about the se x -off ender -treatment condition. 5 

## Appellant petitioned this Court for re view, and w e g rante d revie w on two g rounds: (1) Did the Court of Appea ls err oneously aff irm the trial court’s order revoking P et i t ioner’s probation when the trial court ignore d a final expunction order enter ed by the former judge of the court? Can an expunction order t h at is final be ig nored by

a cour t, C.S .C.D. office r, or treatment provider? [6 ] 

## (2) Did the Court of Appea ls err oneously aff irm the trial court’s order revoking Petitioner’s probation when the probation was revoke d beca use P et i t ioner failed to attend and meet the requisite number o f go al s of a sex offe nder trea tment p rog ram for an offense that had been ex pung ed and for which he had bee n found “not g uilty ? ”

P rese rvation of E rror Be fore addre ssing a

ppellant’s g rounds for revie w, we addre ss w hether appellant pr eser

ved

err or. B ased upon Speth v. State , the cour t of appe als found that appe llant did not preserve err or, 7


## and it declined to a ddress the me rits of his claim. I n Speth , we e x plained the need to object to the imposit ion of conditio ns of community supervision befor e the trial court to prese rve err or for appea l.

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. I n a c o n c u r r i n g a n d d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n , J u s t i c e W a l k e r w o u l d h a v e h e l d t h a t a p p e l l a n t p r e s e r v e d e r r o r , n o t t o t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n a d d i n g t h e s e x - o f f e n d e r - t r e a t m e n t c o n d i t i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a d f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o , b u t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t b y S t r a i n ’ s s e x - o f f e n d e r - t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m t h a t a p p e l l a n t a d m i t a n d d i s c u s s t h e o f

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. J u s t i c e D a u p h i n o t , i n h e r d i s s e n t , a d d r e s s e d t h e m e r i t s o f a p p e l l a n t ’ s r e v o c a t i o n a n d w o u l d h a v e f o u n d a n a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t n o t o n l y i n t h e r e v o c a t i o n , b u t i n t h e c o m m u n i t y s u p e r v i s i o n m o d i f i c a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s
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o r C o m m u n i t y S u p e r v i s i o n a n d C o r r e c t i o n s D e p a r t m e n t

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## 6

[C ]ondi tions not objected to are aff irmatively acc epted as terms of the contra ct. Thus, by enter ing into the contra ctual relationship without objection, a defe ndant aff irmatively waives any rig hts encr oache d upon by the terms of the contra ct. A defe ndant who benef

its from the c ontrac tual privileg e of pr obation, the g ranting of which does not in v o l v e a sy stemic rig ht or prohibition, must complain at trial to conditions he finds objectionable. A trial objection allows the trial court the opportunity to either risk abusing his di s cr et i on by imposing the condition over objection or rec o n s i d er the desirability of the contra ct without the objectionable condition. Speth , 6 S.W .3d at 534-35.
Ba sed upon the rec ord, appellant did not object to the ori gi n al i m p o s ition of community supervision or to any of the trial court’s modifications. I nstead, appellant acc epted and participa ted
in sex-offende r trea tment. Thus, the court of appea ls corr ectly deter mined that, there fore , appellant was estopped from objecting to the i mpositi on of t he sex -off ender -treatment condition on appea l,
thus it di d not rea ch the mer its of appellant’s a ppeal.
Howeve r, appellant’ s g rounds for appea l to the court of appea ls wer e not based on the orig inal imposit ion of the sex-offende r-tre atment condition. Appellant’s initial brief to the court of
appea ls challeng ed the revoc ation of his community supervision. His three g roun d s of err or claimed 8

I n t h r e e p o i n t s o f e r r o r , a p p e l l a n t a s s e r t e d , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h a t 8

T h e t r i a l j u d g e a b u s e d h e r d i s c r e t i o n w h e n s h e r e v o k e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s p r o b a t i o n f o r f a i l u r e t o c o m p l e t e s e x o f

f e n d e r t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m a s a c o n d i t i o n o f h i s p r o b a t i o n f o r t h e n o n - s e x o f

f e n s e o f i n j u r y t o a c h i l d

. . . . T h e t r i a l j u d g e a b u s e d h e r d i s c r e t i o n w h e n s h e r e v o k e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s p r o b a t i o n f o r f a i l u r e t o a t t e n d a s e x o f f e n d e r t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m f r o m F e b r u a r y 3 , 2 0 1 0 , t h r o u g h t h e d a t e o f t h e r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g
.

. . . T h e t r i a l j u d g e a b u s e d h e r d i s c r e t i o n w h e n [ s h e ] f o u n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t v i o l a t e d h i s p r o b a t i o n b y f a i l i n g t o c o m p l e t e t w o - t h i r d s o f a s e x o f f e n d e r t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m o n o r b e f o r e A u g u s t 1 8 , 2 0 1 0

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s m i s i n t e r p r e t e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n t o r e v o k e h i s c o m m u n i t y s u p e r v i s i o n a s a n a t t a c k o n t h e o r i g i n a l i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e s e x - o f f e n d e r - t r e a t m e n t c o n d i t i o n , w h i c h , b y t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f h i s p o i n t s o f e r r o r , w a s n o t h i s c o m p l a i n t

.

## 7

that the trial judg e abuse d her discr etion in revoking his community supervision based on: ( 1) his
failure to attend and complete sex-offende r trea tment; (2) his failure to attend sex-offende r trea tment from Februa

ry 3, 2010, th ro ug h the date of t he revoca tion hear ing; and (3) his failure to complete two-thirds of the g oals of the se x -off ender -treatment prog ram by Aug ust 18, 2010.
When a defe ndant’s community supervision has been revoke d for violation of the conditions
of community supervision and he is sentenc ed, he may appea l the revoc ation. Although appellant 9


## failed to prese rve error reg arding the original i mpositi on of the sex-offe nder c onditions, appellant timely appea led the trial c ourt’s orde r revoking his community supervision and preserve d err or as to the propriety

of the re vocation. 1 0


## Stand ard of Review
“F o r p ro b ation-re vocation case s, we have descr ibed the appellate standard of revie w as whether the trial court abused its discretion.” A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision 1 1


## lies outside the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment, is arbitra ry or unrea sonab l e, o r is without 1 2 1 3

T e x
. C o d e C r i m
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. 9

“ A n a p p e a l f

r o m a n o r d e r r e v o k i n g p r o b a t i o n i s l i m i t e d t o t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e r e v o c a t i o n
. ” C o r l e y v
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.

## 8

ref ere nce to any g uiding rules or principles. The mere fac t that a trial court decide d a matter within 1 4


## its discretionar

y authority differ ently than an appellate court wo u l d h ave resolved the matter does
not demonstrate suc h an abuse

. 1 5


## Gr ound s for Revocat ion
The trial court revoke d appellant’ s community supervision based upon two g rounds: (1) that
he failed to attend a sex-offende r-tre atment prog ram; and (2) that he failed to meet two-thirds of the completion g oals of that sex-offe nder- trea tment prog ram. Turning to the first g round to revoke , community -super vision office r Pinedo testified at the

revoc ation hear ing tha t she believe d appellant ha d a session wit h Strain on Fe bruar y 3. After that
session she rec eived a letter from Strain indicating that an issue had come up and that clar ification by the trial court was neede d befor e appellant could return to Strain’s prog ram. Pinedo testified that
she offe red appellant an opportunity to g o to trea tment with another provider, but appellant ref used
the ref err al. Her understanding was that appellant did not attend any other trea tment afte r Fe bruar y , even thoug h she re peate dly made him awa

re tha t he would be he ld acc ountable.
Strain testified that, bec ause of the expunction issue, there was a brea kdown in a

ppellant’s

trea tment pr og ram on Fe bruar y 3. Strain halted further trea tment a nd place d appellant on inactive

status until clar ification came from the court about what appellant could be require d to discuss in the

trea tment prog ram. Strain testified t hat he sent a letter to Pinedo reg arding the s ituation. He also
testified that, unlike other situations in which a person on community supervision would eventua lly

S t a t e v
. T

h o m a s , 4 2 8 S

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. H e r n d o n , 2 1 5 S

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. 3 d 9 0 1 , 9 0 7

- 1 4 0 8 ( T e x
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. 2 0 0 7 ) ; H o w e l l v
. S t a t e , 1 7 5 S

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.

## 9

return a fter a

brea kdown in trea tment, appellant neve r re turned. Appellant testified that he met with Strain on Fe bruar y 3 to discuss the expunged- offe nse issue. Acc ording to appellant, Strain terminated their rela tionship and told appellant to work out the
issue with th e co u rt befor e coming back. Appellant confirme d Pinedo’s testimony that he was offe red the option to g o to a di ff er en t p rovider. Howeve r, appellant declined beca use, until the expunction issue was resolved, it would not matter which provider he went to; the trea tment prog ram would still brea

k down. Appellant testified that, since Fe bruar y 3, he had not attended trea tment beca use he w as wa iting for

clar ification. Only

afte r cla rifica tion would he return to tre atment.
A t re at m ent provider from Denton County testified as an expert for appellant at t h e

revoc ation hear ing. This provider testified that, on top of finding more g oals completed than Strain did, he would have been able to fashion a treat ment prog ram to fit appellant’ s particula r circ umstance. Rather than a sex-offende r-tre atment prog ram, he would have place d appellant into
a sex-education prog ram. Pinedo told appellant about other available t rea tment providers, while also reminding him
that he was still require d to attend a sex-offende r-tre atment progr am
. I n spite of this, appellant
declined to switch providers, believing that the prob le m in v o lv in g the expunged offe nses would arise
ag ain, req u i re t h e s ame clar ification that Strain was looking for, and lead to future impasses. Ap p ellant chose not to attend a differ ent prog ram, but there was no evidenc e that other trea t m en t providers w ould ha

ve halted appellant’ s participa tion like Strain did. On the c ontrary , appellant’ s

own expert testified that it would be possible to tailor a prog ram to fit appellant’ s unusual situation.
Even if the ex punction issue would make it im p ossible for appellant t o participa te full y in
and succe ssfully complete a trea tment prog ram, that issue does not preve nt him from comply ing with

## 10

the condition tha t he attend trea tment. Leonard v. State , 385 S.W .3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012),
offe rs a useful compa ri son. L eonar d was subject to the s ame sex -off ender -treatment condition as appellant. Although suc cessf ul completion was entirely within Strain’s discre tion and outside of 1 6


## L eonar d’s control, L eonar d attended and participa ted fully in Strain’s prog ram. I n the case befor e 1 7



## us, appellant violated the condition of his community supervision that require d him to attend a sexoffe nder- trea tment prog ram
. Attendanc e at such a prog ram was within appellant’ s control. 1 8 

## Although Strain’s decisions preve nted appellant from attending Strain’s prog ram afte r Fe bruar y of 2010, Strain’s dec ision did not preve nt appellant fr om attending another prog ram. Acc ording ly , we find that appellant was require d, as a condition of community supervision,

to attend a sex-offende r-tre atment prog ram. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant’ s community supervision for failing to do so. Be cause proof of the violation of a sing le
condition of community supervision is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to r evoke, we 1 9


## need not discuss the ot her gr ound upon which the trial court based t he revocat i o n
. W e overr ule 2 0 

## appellant’ s second g round for revie w.

I d

. a t 5 7 2

. 1 6

I d

. a t 5 7 6

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. S t r a i n d i s c h a r g e d L e o n a r d f r o m t h e p r o g r a m a f

t e r L e o n a r d w a s u n a b l e t o p a s s p o l y g r a p h 1 7 t e s t i n g
. I

d

. a t 5 7 3

. T h e d i s c h a r g e w a s t h e g r o u n d f o r r e v o k i n g L e o n a r d ’ s p r o b a t i o n
. I d

. a t 5 7 4

. B e c a u s e t h e t r i a l
c o u r t ’ s d i s c r e t i o n w a s b a s e d u p o n S t r a i n ’ s d i s c r e t i o n , e x a m i n a t i o n o f S t r a i n ’ s t h i r d

- p a r t y d i s c r e t i o n w a s n e c e s s a r y
. I d

. a t 5 7 7

. W e f

o u n d t h a t r e v o c a t i o n b a s e d u p o n t h e f a i l u r e t o p a s s p o l y g r a p h e x a m i n a t i o n s r e q u i r e d b a s i n g t h e c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n o n i n a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e a n d w a s t h e r e f o r e a n a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n
. I d

. a t 5 8 3

. T h e t r i a l c o u r t a l s o f

o u n d a p p e l l a n t i n v i o l a t i o n f o r f a i l i n g t o m e e t t w o - t h i r d s o f t h e g o a l s o f t h e 1 8 t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m
. T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f w h e t h e r a p p e l l a n t h a d m e t t h e g o a l s o f t h e p r o g r a m w a s a t S t r a i n ’ s d i s c r e t i o n
. H o w e v e r , f a i l u r e t o a t t e n d i s a s e p a r a t e g r o u n d s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t a p p e l l a n t ’ s r e v o c a t i o n , a n d w e n e e d
n o t f u r t h e r d i s c u s s a p p e l l a n t ’ s f a i l u r e t o m e e t t w o - t h i r d s o f t h e g o a l s o f t h e t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m i n t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d b y t h e s e x - o f

f e n d e r c o n d i t i o n
. S e e M o o r e v
. S t a t e , 6 0 5 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 4 , 9 2 6 ( T e x
. C r i m
. A p p
. 1 9 8 0 )

. G a r c i a v
. S t a t e , 3 8 7 S

. W

. 3 d 2 0 , 2 6 ( T e x
. C r i m
. A p p
. 2 0 1 2 ) ; O ’ N e a l v
. S t a t e , 6 2 3 S

. W

. 2 d 6 6 0 , 6 6 1 ( T e x
. 1 9 C r i m
. A p p
. 1 9 8 1 )

.

M o o r e , 6 0 5 S

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. 2 d a t 9 2 6

. 2 0

## 11 The Exp unction Is sue Appellant’s first g round for revie w asks whether the trial co u rt ab u sed its discretion in revoking community superv is io n w h e n it ig n o r e d appellant’ s expunction. Be cause of our dispositi on of his second g round for revie w, we need not addre ss the eff ec t s o f the expunction order

. Acc ording ly , we dismiss appellant’s fir st gr ound for r eview.
Conclusion
Unlike L eonar d, appellant violated a condition of his community supervisi o n that was entirely within his own control

. W h i l e it is true that Strain had suspended his trea tment of 2 1 

## appellant, appellant was informed of other t reatment prog rams that he could attend. He chose to decline to enter any alterna tive prog rams, say ing that the expunction issue would ag ain become an issue. Be cause he wa s re q uired to attend a sex-offende r-tre atment prog ram, beca use he did not object to that condition when it was imposed, and beca use he chose not to attend any prog ram afte r Fe bruar y of 2010, the tri al court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant’ s community supervision. We aff

irm the judg ment of the c ourt of appe als.

Deliver ed: J uly

1, 2015 Do not publish

C f

. L e o n a r d , 3 8 5 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 7 6

- 7 7

. 2 1