May 8, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S6263

been crying out for solution for all of

these years. I hope the process will untangle itself. I am now confident it

will—there was a moment there when

we were not sure, but I think it will

and I think it has—and we will then be

able to give Senators on both sides a

chance to vote for good product liability reform.

This is not a product of the Contract

With America. It is not a product of

the Democratic Party. It is a product

of people who want reform on both

sides of the aisle, working within the

Senate, within our ways, within our beliefs to achieve compromise. That is

the way the Senate works.

After all, the President of the United

States will have to sign the bill and

put it into law. This is what has always

struck me when people say that the

conference process will ruin everything. I have never felt that. I know

the Senator from Washington agrees

with me on that, and I suspect the majority leader does. I know I do. Because

the President, if he does not want to

sign the bill, if it does not meet his criteria, which he has laid out to us, will

simply veto it and that will be that. So

there is a discipline that works there

in conference process, which is good.

I remind my colleagues and the leadership in the other body of what I have

just said. We have tended to push aside

expansionism here and focus on product liability reform. We do that in the

agreement between the Senator from

Washington and the Senator from West

Virginia. So, let the leadership on the

other side understand that we are firm

in our resolution, and that the President is, too. He will not sign anything

other than what stands within his parameters of acceptability.

So I conclude simply by saying that

the sidebar of the day was that there

was a certain amount of confusion during the process at the end. But the

story is that the two sides have

reached agreement—Democrats who

favor reform and Republicans who

favor reform. I have been through this

reform with most of my colleagues on

my side and have met with a very good

reaction, and I assume the same is true

on the Republican side.

So, Mr. President, I simply wanted to

say that, because there was a certain

amount of confusion, but that pales in

comparison to the good news of the

agreement.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

f

NOMINATION OF JOHN M. DEUTCH,

OF MASSACHUSETTS, TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under

the previous order, the Senate will now

go into executive session to consider

Calendar Order No. 114, which the clerk

will report.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of John M. Deutch, of Massachusetts, to be Director of Central Intelligence.

The Senate proceeded to consider the

nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The debate on the nomination is limited to 2

hours, equally divided and controlled

by the Senator from Pennsylvania and

the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, there

have been requests only from Senator

MOYNIHAN, who was on the floor, for 15

minutes and from Senator HUTCHISON

for 10 minutes, in addition to statements which will be made by the distinguished Senator from Nebraska, the

vice chairman, Senator KERREY, and a

brief opening statement which I will

make. So, in the event that there are

any other Senators who wish to be

heard on the subject, they ought to

come to the floor now or at least let

the managers know of their interest in

speaking.

Mr. President, the nomination of

John M. Deutch to be Director of

Central Intelligence was reported to

the Senate last week, pursuant to a

unanimous vote in the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence with a recommendation that he be confirmed. It

was a unanimous vote, 17 to 0.

The committee held hearings on

April 26 and then proceeded to that

vote last week on May 3. There is a

need to move expeditiously, as I see it,

to have a strong Director of the

Central Intelligence Agency.

In consideration of Mr. John Deutch

to be Director, we took up a wide variety of issues. We examined Mr.

Deutch’s background and qualifications. He has an extraordinary academic record. He has an extraordinary

professional record. He has been a distinguished professor at MIT. He has

been the head of the department there.

He has been the provost there. He has

worked in the Energy Department. He

has worked in the Department of Defense. He currently serves as the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defense.

It is my thought, and I believe with

the concurrence of the committee

members, that he has the kind of

strength to take over the management

as Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency.

He comes to this position at a time of

substantial difficulty. He comes to this

position at a time when the agency is

with substantial problems of morale, in

the wake of the Aldrich Ames case,

where the agency had a spy within the

Central Intelligence Agency which

they could not ferret out and eliminate

themselves; hardly a recommendation

for an agency which is charged with

worldwide responsibility to gather intelligence.

There is, in my opinion, Mr. President, the need for intelligence gathering worldwide for the security of the

United States.

During the course of the hearings, we

explored with Mr. Deutch whether

there ought to be a reorganization. His

confirmation hearings came in the

wake of extraordinary success by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation on the

Oklahoma City bombing case. We explored with Mr. Deutch whether perhaps the Federal Bureau of Investigation ought to take over on worldwide

intelligence gathering. That has been

suggested by some.

It would be an extraordinary change

for the United States to do that. It

would vest enormous authority in the

FBI, perhaps more than is wise, in a

country where we prize limitations on

authority, where we prize separation of

power.

The FBI, though, is right now engaged in very extensive operations

overseas in work on terrorism as it relates at least to prosecution, work on

drug trafficking, work on organized

crime, many of those activities being

undertaken by the CIA as well. But

those were some of the subjects discussed.

I expressed at the hearings considerable concern about the Director of CIA

being a member of the President’s Cabinet. We have had the experience with

Cabinet officers before of the CIA, specifically William Casey, where we had

problems on Iran-Contra, and there has

been a concern that the policymakers

ought to be separated from the intelligence gatherers to the extent there

not be the motivation to shade intelligence gathering to support policy, to

sort of cook the evidence.

The Iran-Contra Joint Committee

made a strong recommendation against

that kind of a concern and that kind of

activity. But in the final analysis,

there is a need to move ahead with the

confirmation of the CIA Director, so

that it is my judgment, and I think the

judgment of others on the committee

who were concerned about having the

Director in the Cabinet, that we should

not hold up his confirmation in that respect.

Mr. Deutch has addressed that question very forcefully and directly, saying that he will be very mindful of

those policy considerations and will

comport himself so that intelligence

gathering is separate from any matters

of policy.

Mr. Deutch has made a very forceful

statement on taking strong action. If

there are those in the CIA, as there

were in the Aldrich Ames case, who

failed to act when there were lots of indications that Aldrich Ames was in

fact not doing his job—when he was intoxicated on the job, when there were

unexplained visits to foreign embassies, where he lost his files—Mr.

Deutch was emphatic that if anybody

was in a position of supervision over

another Aldrich Ames and did not take

forceful action, that person would be

fired peremptorily.
S6264 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE May 8, 1995

Then the question was raised with

Mr. Deutch about somebody who was in

a supervisory capacity who did not

know but should have known, and Mr.

Deutch answered very forcefully that

that person would be fired.

Mr. President, there are many people

in the CIA who have long, distinguished careers, and there are many

able men and women in the Agency

who can carry on. It is my hope, I

think the hope of the committee, that

the morale can be restored by a very

firm and forceful Director of the

Central Intelligence Agency.

We have recently had hearings on

Guatemala which, again, were disturbing, with the Deputy Director of the

CIA conceding flatly that the CIA

failed in its duty to notify both the

House Intelligence Committee and the

Senate Intelligence Committee of what

was going on in Guatemala.

In sum and substance, Mr. President,

it is my view, and I think the view of

the committee, that John Deutch is

well qualified to take on a very, very

tough job at this time.

Mr. President, the nomination of

John M. Deutch to be Director of

Central Intelligence was reported to

the Senate last week pursuant to a

unanimous vote of the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence, with a recommendation that he be confirmed. On

behalf of myself and Senator KERREY,

in our respective capacities as chairman and vice chairman of the committee, we urge the Senate to act favorably on this nomination.

The committee made a complete and

thorough inquiry of the nominee’s

qualifications as well as his views on

issues of mutual concern, and concluded that he is qualified by both experience and temperament to hold this

sensitive and critical position.

The Senate has moved expeditiously

in this important nomination. Nevertheless, the intelligence community

has been with out a confirmed director

since last December—a delay that is

particularly costly when the community so urgently needs a strong sense of

direction, of mission, and of management. It is a critical time for the intelligence community. If Mr. Deutch is

confirmed as DCI, he will come to the

job at a time of exceptional promise

and peril.

The peril is clear. It is now conventional wisdom that the euphoria which

erupted after the fall of the Berlin Wall

and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire was premature. While nostalgia for

the balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union is not

in order, it is apparent that the postcold-war world is not any less dangerous or unstale—as the bombing in

Oklahoma City, the World Trade Center bombing, and the gas attack in the

Tokyo subway have made shattering

clear. Global threats from international terrorism and narcotics smuggling, the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction, and expanding organized crime networks present the intelligence community with targets far

more dispersed and complicated than

the traditional focus on Soviet military power. The role and the priorities

of the intelligence community in the

Government’s efforts against these and

other threats—efforts which now have

significant diplomatic, economic, and

law enforcement implications—is very

much in need of redefinition and reordering.

Moreover, a series of revelations have

illuminated problems in the intelligence community that have severely

damaged morale among the rank and

file and have eroded the public confidence and trust that is essential for

an intelligence apparatus operating in

a democracy. From the abuses of power

evident in Iran-Contra to the incompetence and lack of accountability that

characterized the Aldrich Ames debacle, to charges of widespread sex discrimination, to the latest questions

about policies and practices that resulted in, at the very least, an impression of culpability in murders in

Central America, there is the sense of

an intelligence bureaucracy that is not

only incapable of meeting our national

security needs but, instead, presents a

recurring threat to our Nation’s credibility and legitimacy overseas through

its frequent missteps, miscalculation,

and mismanagement.

The American people are looking for

a Director of Central Intelligence who

will provide strong leadership, accountability, and a clearly defined mission.

And therein lies the promise. There is

growing support within the intelligence community, the Congress, and

the public for significant change in the

way we conduct intelligence. The end

of the bipolar superpower conflict that

dominated the cold war provides new

opportunities to build coalitions and

achieve consensus on international

threats. And thoughtful application of

continuing advances in technology can

greatly enhance our efficiency and effectiveness.

This committee, along with the

House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence and a congressionally

mandated commission chaired by Les

Aspin and Warren Rudman, will be taking a hard look at the intelligence

community—what it’s mission should

be in the post-cold-war world and how

it should be organized to accomplish

that mission—with an eye to legislation early next year. This is an opportunity to look forward; to begin a new

era and establish a new American

model for foreign intelligence.

A key issue for that future involves

the nature of the office that Mr.

Deutch seeks to assume. The DCI must

have the ear and the trust of the President. Yet he cannot allow his role as

confidante in any way to corrupt the

intelligence process or his role as intelligence advisor. This is the concern

that underlies questions about the wisdom of giving the DCI Cabinet status.

We have examined the nominee’s

views on a number of critical issues

facing the intelligence community,

sought and obtained assurances that

his position as a member of the Cabinet

would not politicize intelligence, and

examined the potential impact of his

earlier involvement with issues like

the Persian Gulf syndrome on his new

appointment. Our objective has been to

determine whether he can assert the

strong and independent leadership that

is so desperately needed. I have concluded that he can and I urge his

prompt confirmation by the Senate.

In the remainder of my remarks, I

will summarize for my colleagues the

nature of the committee’s inquiry, and

highlight the key features of Mr.

Deutch’s testimony to the committee.

SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE INQUIRY

As you know, the former DCI, James

Woolsey, resigned last December. In

February, the administration announced that it planned to nominate

retired Air Force General Michael C.P.

Carns to replace Woolsey as DCI. One

month later, General Carns withdrew

his name, citing immigration issues.

The administration then turned to

Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch.

In announcing on March 11, 1995, the

decision to nominate Mr. Deutch as

DCI, the White House also announced

that the post would be elevated to Cabinet-level status. Mr. Deutch’s name

was formally submitted to the committee on March 29, 1995.

The committee required Mr. Deutch

to submit sworn answers to its standard questionnaire for Presidential appointees, setting forth his background

and financial situations. These were

submitted to the committee on March

30, 1995.

On April 5, 1995, the committee received a letter from the Director of the

Office of Government Ethics transmitting a copy of the financial disclosure

statement submitted by Mr. Deutch.

The Director advised the committee

that is disclosed no real or potential

conflict-of-interest.

The chairman and vice chairman also

reviewed the FBI investigation done

for the White House on Mr. Deutch.

The committee held a confirmation

hearing on Mr. Deutch on April 26, 1995,

at which time the nominee was questioned on a variety of topics. Subsequently, written questions were submitted to the nominee for additional

responses.

Based upon this examination, the

committee reported the nomination to

the Senate on May 3, 1995, by a unanimous vote, with a recommendation

that Mr. Deutch be confirmed.

HIGHLIGHTS OF TESTIMONY

VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF THE DCI—CABINET

STATUS

In his opening remarks to the committee, Mr. Deutch described as the

primary duty of the DCI ‘‘to provide

objective, unvarnished assessments

about issues involving foreign events

to the President and other senior policymakers.’’ He emphasized that ‘‘with

the exception of policy that bears on
May 8, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S6265

the Intelligence Community, the Director of Central Intelligence should have

no foreign policy making role.’’ Speaking directly to the issue of making the

DCI a member of the Cabinet, the

nominee explained his belief that the

President intended this to signal the

importance he places on intelligence

and the confidence the President has in

Mr. Deutch. The nominee went on to

present his view that this status is important to ensure that the DCI will be

present when policy issues are deliberated so that he can present objective

assessments of alternative courses of

action and take away from those meetings a better understanding of policymaker needs.

I questioned Mr. Deutch on this issue

in meetings prior to the confirmation

hearing and again, for the record, in

open session. I noted my own view that

if you are in the Cabinet, you are much

more likely to get involved in making

policy than if you are not in the Cabinet. I referred to the congressional report on Iran-Contra and Secretary

Shultz’s assertion, as reported therein,

that the President was getting faulty

intelligence about terrorism because

there was a problem in keeping intelligence separated from policy. The

committee concluded in that report

that ‘‘the gathering, analysis, and recording of intelligence should be done

in a way that there can be no question

that the conclusions are driven by the

actual facts rather than by what a policy advocate hopes these facts will be.’’

This need to separate policymaking

from intelligence gathering and analysis is reflected in the statute defining

the National Security Council. The National Security Act of 1947 sets forth

the members of the NSC and then designates others, including the DCI and

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, as officials who are not members

but may attend and participate as the

President directs. It is my strong sense

that this is the appropriate status for

the DCI with respect to the Cabinet as

well.

Mr. Deutch has assured the committee that he will hold to the proper

standard of conduct and that he would

‘‘not allow policy to influence intelligence judgements and, not allow intelligence to interfere in the policy

process.’’

I believe that Mr. Deutch has the

best of intentions in this regard and

that he is certainly capable of recognizing the line between intelligence

and policy. The committee will be sensitive to any indication that this

standard is not being met. Ultimately,

however, the makeup of the Cabinet is

a Presidential prerogative and is not

statutorily defined.

Given the delay already experienced

in naming Mr. Deutch, and given his

strong qualifications in every other regard, I do not think this issue should

stand in the way of his confirmation by

the Senate.

With respect to DCI authorities, the

nominee noted in response to questions

at the hearing and those submitted

later for the record, that in his view,

the DCI could more effectively manage

the intelligence community if he or she

had budget execution authority over

key segments of the community.

In further response to questions, Mr.

Deutch agreed that this was a propitious time to consider establishing a

Director of National Intelligence—who

would serve at the pleasure of the

President and manage the entire intelligence community—and a separate

head of the CIA who would have a 10-

year tenure.

VIEWS ON THE MISSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

Mr. Deutch’s prepared statement outlined some of the significant dangers to

our national security today: Regional

conflicts; the spread of weapons of

mass destruction; international terrorism, international crime, international

drug trafficking, and their interconnection; instability in the former Soviet

Union; and China—as a threat to its

neighbors and supplier of missiles.

He then described four principal purposes to which the intelligence community [IC] should direct its efforts: First,

assuring that the President and other

policymakers have the best information available before making decision;

second, support to military operations;

third, addressing international terrorism, crime, and drugs, particularly improving interagency coordination and

support to law enforcement; and

fourth, counterintelligence [CI] that

rigorously adheres to high security

standards, accords priority to defensive

CI and counterespionage, and includes

full and early cooperation within the

CI community.

He emphasized that the national priorities for intelligence collection established by the recent Presidential

Decision Directive need to be implemented.

VIEWS ON MANAGEMENT

I applaud Mr. Deutch for his unusually candid and forthright opening

statement. In it, he outlined for the

committee the significant actions he

would take immediately upon confirmation to begin the process of

change that is so long overdue in the

intelligence community, or ‘‘IC.’’ First,

he indicated he would bring in several

new people to fill upper management

positions. In doing so, he will emphasize joint operations of the IC agencies

because ‘‘we can no longer afford redundant capabilities in several different agencies.’’ Second, he plans to

review and encourage changes in the

culture and operation of the Directorate of Operations. Third, he will

move to consolidate the management

of all imagery collection, analysis, and

distribution in a manner similar to the

NSA’s for signals intelligence. Fourth,

he wants to manage military and intelligence satellite acquisition in a more

integrated way. Fifth, he will put in

place a planning process for meeting

the priorities and goals established by

the Presidential Decision Directive.

Sixth, what he described as his most

important challenge is to ‘‘improve the

management—and thereby the morale—of the dedicated men and women

who make up the IC.’’

RESPONSE TO AMES

The issue of management is particularly critical in the wake of Ames. I

questioned Mr. Deutch on how he

would ensure that he knew what was

going on within the CIA so that he

could exert the proper management. I

cited former Director Gates’ admission

that by 1987, he had only been advised

of about 4 or 5 compromises of U.S.

agents, at a time when there were in

fact 40 or more compromised operations. Director Gates complained that

‘‘nobody bothered to share that information with Judge Webster, my predecessor, or with me,’’ when Gates was

his Deputy.

I wanted to know what action Mr.

Deutch would take if he identified a

person that had a pretty good idea that

Aldrich Ames was a mole but failed to

pass that information on up the chain

of command to the Director. Mr.

Deutch said he would terminate that

individual. Moreover, when asked

about reports that the supervisor of

Ames, who knew that Ames had an alcohol dependency and had observed the

negative consequences of this dependency, had not only failed to fire Ames,

but had, instead, written a highly complimentary review of his performance,

Mr. Deutch indicated that supervisor

should be fired. When questioned further, he conceded that if the supervisor’s supervisor should have known

about this improper conduct, that supervisor should also be fired.

The key in this exchange, as emphasized by the nominee, is the notion of

accountability. It is a sense of accountability that was absent under the last

DCI and that is an essential ingredient

of any plan to revitalize our foreign intelligence apparatus.

Mr. Deutch has told the committee

that if confirmed, he will review the

Ames case and will consider the committee’s report on Ames in connection

with any personnel action affecting the

individuals involved.

VIEWS ON CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

On the issue of congressional oversight, Mr. Deutch emphasized in his

opening statement that he could not

accomplish the significant change that

is needed in the intelligence community without the strong support of Congress. ‘‘I consider you my board of directors’’, he said. ‘‘I realize this means

I must keep you fully and currently informed about the activities for which I

would be responsible—both the good

news and the bad news. I understand

that I am accountable to you, and I expect you to hold me to a high standard

of performance.’’

Mr. Deutch conceded, when questioned, that, while he could not imagine it happening, if the President ever

told him not to inform the committee

he, Mr. Deutch, would ‘‘go happily

back to Massachusetts.’’
S6266 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE May 8, 1995

Moreover, the nominee assured the

committee that he interprets the requirement for timely notification of a

covert action finding, in the absence of

prior notification, to mean within 48

hours. Specifically, Mr. Deutch said, ‘‘I

think that in all situations there

should be prior notification. There may

be remote instances where that is not

possible, in a very, very tiny percentages of the cases. Then 48-hours is what

I see as the measure of timely notification.’’

COMMITMENTS FOR PROMPT ACTION

At the conclusion of the hearing, I

asked for, and received, a commitment

from Mr. Deutch to report back to the

committee as promptly as possible if

confirmed—preferably within 30 days of

confirmation—regarding several issues

of particular importance;

First, report on any needed changes

to DCI authorities;

Second, improving the intelligence

community’s fulfillment of its obligation to keep Congress fully and currently informed;

Third, the need for reorganization

within the intelligence community;

Fourth, changes in personnel;

Fifth, proposal for how to achieve

downsizing in a way which creates

headroom, weeds out poor performers,

and leaves the intelligence community

with the mix of skills required to accomplish its mission;

Sixth, intelligence reassessment of

the possibility that U.S. forces were exposed to chemical or biological agents

during Desert Storm;

Seventh, actions taken in response to

events in Guatemala; and

Eighth, improving coordination with

law enforcement.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing summarizes only the

highlights of the record before the

committee, which is, of course, available to all Members in its entirety at

the Intelligence Committee.

Based upon the nominee’s statements

to the committee, however, his record

of distinguished service and the absence of any disqualifying information

concerning him, the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence voted to report his nomination to the Senate with

a recommendation that he be confirmed by the full Senate as Director of

Central Intelligence.

Mr. President, before yielding the

floor, I want to commend my distinguished vice chairman, Senator

KERREY, for his outstanding work generally with the committee and on this

nomination.

The only other speaker who is to

come to the floor on our side is Senator

HUTCHISON, who has an allotment of 10

minutes, but I think there will be more

time within the unanimous-consent

agreement if Senator HUTCHISON wants

more time. Or if any other Republican

Senators wish to partake in the discussion, they can take time on our side.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise in

enthusiastic support of the nomination

of John M. Deutch to be Director of

Central Intelligence. While I cannot

predict a length in time that he will be

in service to his country in this capacity, I can predict with confidence,

should he be confirmed, he will turn

out to be one of the most effective and

influential DCI’s in the history of this

Agency.

The President of the United States,

with John Deutch, is making a statement that he intends to send a man to

take charge of Langley during what is

obviously one of the most tumultuous

periods ever experienced by Central Intelligence. The Aldrich Ames case and

recent Guatemala revelations portray

a troubled corporate culture at CIA.

In addition, many question whether

the intelligence community has come

to grips with the post-cold-war world

and whether new collection methods

and technologies are required to target

the new threats that have emerged.

The twin threats of international and

domestic terrorism lead many to question the intelligence community’s

proper role in supporting law enforcement. The very structure of the community is in question, as a joint Presidential-congressional commission and

several private study groups ask

whether intelligence is necessary at

all.

Mr. President, we have been watching, once again, another 50-year celebration in the last couple of days. This

time the celebration is the 50th anniversary of the day that victory in Europe was declared over Nazi forces.

That victory is being celebrated in part

because we are also celebrating the

fact that over the last 47 or so years,

we have avoided, with significant efforts, a third world war. For a 75-year

period, roughly from 1914, when the

guns of August started World War I,

until the fall of 1989 when the Berlin

Wall itself collapsed and Eastern Europe began to liberate itself, during

that 75-year period, it is, I believe, accurate to say we experienced the bloodiest 75 years in the history of mankind.

During that 75-year period, Mr. President, many things occurred, including

the institution of a policy that had the

United States of America leading an effort against a clearly identified enemy,

and the celebration that takes place

this year is not just a celebration of a

victory over that enemy, but a sense

that we have survived, as a human people, the forecast that we may annihilate ourselves through the use of nuclear weapons. It is a remarkable victory, and I dare not on this floor take

a great deal of time describing it, but

it is a profound change that the new

Director of Central Intelligence must

factor in as that individual, hopefully

John Deutch, begins to shape the agencies under his control to meet the new

challenges that this country faces.

You might expect that only somebody who was a glutton for punishment

would willingly volunteer and walk

into the set of problems that John

Deutch will face. But I can assure my

colleagues, as the distinguished chairman of the Committee has already

said, that John Deutch knows better

than this. He knows, as many of us on

the Intelligence Committee know, we

have a superb intelligence instrument

in this country staffed by brave and intelligent people who take risks every

single day and make sacrifices for their

country. They provide the President,

the military, the Cabinet, our diplomats and intelligence analysts a capability no other country can rival: the

capability to know most about threats

to our country’s freedom and independence, and threats to the lives and livelihoods of Americans.

Unlike the domestic agencies, our intelligence professionals cannot brag

about their competence. To brag would

lose the all-important source of information. So they are generally silent,

but they are of immense value. They

need guidance, they need leadership,

they need a visionary who can help

focus their talent on the Nation’s

pressing needs, and John Deutch is the

person to do it. Adm. Bill Studeman

has rendered a vital service as Acting

Director. He has kept a complex enterprise on track during a difficult period,

and the Nation owes him its thanks. He

would be the first to agree that the intelligence community needs a Presidentially appointed, senatorially confirmed director.

Even if John Deutch’s service in the

Defense Department were his own accomplishment, he would be a strong

candidate to be DCI. Most intelligence

funding is in defense, the military continues to be the leading customer for

intelligence, and his knowledge of defense intelligence is matched by few in

and out of our Government.

But another part of John Deutch’s

re ́sume ́ appeals to me. John Deutch is

a scientist of national renown and a

distinguished science professor. Technical intelligence collection is mainly

a science problem. The scientific decision of which system to buy or develop

to best collect against a certain threat

is typically made by lawyers advised

by scientists. In this administration,

however, the scientists have come to

the fore. I, for one, feel very comfortable knowing that the scientific

judgment of Bill Perry is making the

ultimate acquisition decisions in defense, and I will feel equal comfort

with John Deutch’s scientific judgment

on intelligence acquisitions. The fact

that he is a teacher and can explain

these complex systems to those of us

nonscientists, who are charged with intelligence oversight, is that much better for the American people.

We will get the benefit of Dr.

Deutch’s scientific expertise not a moment too soon. New threats, new collection priorities, and a rapidly changing collection environment mean that
May 8, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S6267

we cannot stand pat on our collection

technologies. Just to maintain the

edge we have now, we must fund research and development on new technologies and make hard decisions

about which road we will go down.

We also have to maintain the health

of our intelligence industrial base, the

private companies that produce these

remarkable systems. There are uniquely talented people working for these

companies, engineers and technicians

who turn the requirements statement

into reality. If we do not keep these

people at work in profitable undertakings, the Government will never be

able to afford new systems. That is

why Senator WARNER and I, last year,

urged the administration to permit

U.S. companies to sell 1-meter space

imagery and imaging equipment. We

did not want to see remote sensing, a

technology in which we lead the world,

go the way of the space launch. We also

wanted America to dominate this

growing industry. The administration

saw it the same way, and John Deutch

is a firm supporter of the administration policy. He knows that our industrial base is our true national treasure,

and he will continue to watch over its

health.

Intelligence technology routinely

saves American lives, but we should be

alert to opportunities to make it useful

to Americans in other ways. For example, the National Information Display

Laboratory in Princeton, NJ, noticed

that the technology that helped imagery analysts understand images better could also be helpful to radiologists

scanning a mammogram for early signs

of breast cancer. NIDL teamed with

Massachusetts General Hospital to

adapt the technology, and the outcome

could be as many as 15,000 American

lives saved each year.

Other opportunities abound for the

dual-use intelligence technology. We

have just begun to make public use of

space images and other intelligence

collected during the cold war. The declassification process has begun and we

must push the process until we can

fairly say that intelligence technology

serves not just a handful of

decisionmakers in Washington but the

250 million decisionmakers across our

country.

Mr. President, when I was a young

man operating in the U.S. Navy Seal

team, we had a piece of advice we tried

to follow all of the time, which was

that unless you had a need to know

something, you did not press the bet

and try to acquire it. We did not disseminate intelligence to people who did

not have a need to know. Mr. President, there are 250 million citizens of

the United States of America who need

to know increasingly a set of complex

facts in order to make decisions about

our foreign policy, in order to make decisions about our domestic policy, in

order to make decisions about all sorts

of things that are increasingly confusing our citizens.

Democracy cannot function unless

citizens make the effort to understand

those complexities and come to the

table at election time and come to the

table when it is time to influence their

Senator or Representative or President

with all of the facts and information.

The Director of Central Intelligence

is the President’s national intelligence

officer. John Deutch’s Government

background is in defense, and his testimony before the Committee made clear

that he understands the priority of intelligence support to the military. But

he also understands the role of national intelligence, and he understands

that not every problem facing the

country is a military problem. He is

aware, for example, of the intelligence

community’s contributions against

international terrorism, against drug

trafficking, against illegal trade practices. He knows how important intelligence is to this administration’s

international economic decisionmaking, and he knows that warning the

President about the economic crisis in

Mexico last year was at least as important as warning about a military crisis

in some less important region of the

world. It is ironic that, with the end of

the cold war, the Director of Central

Intelligence has a broader national

charter than ever. It is an irony which

John Deutch understands.

The intelligence community includes

much more than the CIA. The National

Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, FBI, and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and

Research all play their largely unique

roles. But no question, CIA, unfortunately, lately has been at the center of

controversy and likely will continue to

be. At least initially, the heart of John

Deutch’s task will be to make the CIA

more efficient and accountable to the

American people. I am greatly encouraged, as the chairman indicated earlier, by his testimony on the sense of

accountability and responsibility that

he intends to bring to CIA’s Directorate of Operations. I have visited CIA

officers in the field, and I know the

high quality of the people John Deutch

will lead. These are clear-headed, positive, enthusiastic Americans. The current senior managers should get credit

for recruiting and training and motivating a fine crop of younger officers.

Now it is time, as Mr. Deutch put it in

his own testimony, for the seniors to

let the younger officers take the reins.

As they take over, they must recruit

and retain more women and minorities,

and they must be alert to gender discrimination in assignments and promotions. The Directorate of Operations

has never been an easy place for women

to get a fair opportunity to make their

mark. Not only is gender discrimination illegal, it is also stupid because it

denies the American people the brain

power of more than 50 percent of our

people. It also creates resentments

which can dangerously weaken the

agency. I have heard all the excuses for

discrimination, and none of them wash.

I am confident that John Deutch will

not permit it.

CIA’s human intelligence activities,

which consist mainly in getting foreigners to secretly provide information, will always take place in the

shadows. Human sources will have to

be protected, so the activities will not

be able to be publicly discussed. But

CIA, no less than any other agency of

Government, must operate in accordance with American law and American

values. One purpose of congressional

oversight of intelligence is to ensure

that this is so. Oversight cannot work

if CIA does not inform Congress, or answer Congress’ questions. Failure to

promptly inform is one of the most

troubling aspects of both the Ames

case and the Guatemala case. Bad news

does not improve with age. The withholding of bad news—withholding information on an intelligence failure—

jeopardizes the oversight system without which the United States cannot

conduct foreign intelligence operations. John Deutch clearly understands his reporting responsibilities,

and I believe Directors Gates and Woolsey and Studeman also understood. The

challenge for John Deutch is to know

what is happening inside his organization, so the bad news gets to him first.

That is the mark of a tight, confident, organization. John Deutch has

some great material to work with, but

it is up to him to forge that kind of organization.

If anybody in this great country of

ours is up to that job, John Deutch is

the person to get the job done.

I yield the floor.

Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York [Mr. MOYNIHAN] is

recognized.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank my gallant

friend from Nebraska. I rise very much

in support of the position he has taken

and that of the distinguished chairman

of the committee, the Senator from

Pennsylvania.

I would say by way of introduction

that in the 103d Congress and then on

the first day of the 104th Congress, I offered legislation that would basically

break up the existing Central Intelligence Agency and return its component parts to the Department of Defense and the Department of State in

the manner that the OSS, the Office of

Strategic Services, was divided and

parceled out with the onset of peace in

1945 and 1946, to be followed, of course,

by a cold war which has persisted almost until this moment.

I had hoped to encourage a debate on

the role of intelligence and of secrecy

in the American society. That debate

has taken place. Some of the results, I

think, can be seen in the nomination of

this distinguished scientist and public

servant to this position.

It could not have been more clear

than in his testimony in which he

made a point, self-evident we would
S6268 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE May 8, 1995

suppose, but not frequently to be encountered in the pronouncements of

potential DCI’s. He said:

Espionage does not rest comfortably in a

democracy. Secrecy, which is essential to

protect sources and methods, is not welcome

in an open society. If our democracy is to

support intelligence activities, the people

must be confident that our law and rules will

be respected.

It may have come as a surprise—although it ought not to have—in recent

months and weeks, to find how many

persons there are in this country who

do not have confidence that our laws

and rules will be respected; who see the

government in conspiratorial modes,

directed against the people in ways

that could be of huge consequence to

Americans.

I am not talking about what Richard

Hofstadter referred to when he spoke of

‘‘the paranoid style in American politics.’’ I am talking about the widespread belief that the CIA was somehow involved in the assassination of

President Kennedy, if we can imagine.

But there it is.

It is important to understand how

deep this is in our society. In 1956, even

before Hofstadter spoke of it; Edward

A. Shils of the University of Chicago—

who just passed away—that great,

great, social scientist, published his

book, ‘‘The Torment of Secrecy,’’ in

which he wrote ‘‘The exfoliation and

intertwinement of the various patterns

of belief that the world is dominated by

unseen circles of conspirators, operating behind our backs, is one of the

characteristic features of modern society.’’

Such a belief was very much a feature of the Bolshevik society that took

shape in 1917 and 1918. The conspiratorial decision to help found and fund

in the United States, a Communist

party, half of which would be class destiny, the discovery from the archives

in Moscow that John Reed received a

payment of $1.5 million in 1920. Even as

soft money, that would be a very considerable sum today.

In the pattern that societies go

through, it is said that organizations

become like one other. To an extraordinary degree we emulate the Soviet

model in our own intelligence service.

Unintentionally, naturally, it happens that way, but a very powerful

analyses of this has just been written

by Jefferson Morley in the Washington

Post under the headline ‘‘Understanding Oklahoma’’ in an article entitled

‘‘Department of Secrecy: The Invisible

Bureaucracy That Unites Alienated

America in Suspicion.’’

Or by Douglas Turner, in an article

this weekend in the Buffalo News. I

spoke of these concerns in an earlier

statement on the Senate floor entitled

‘‘The Paranoid Style in American Politics,’’ which I ask unanimous consent

be printed in the RECORD along with

the articles by Douglas Turner and Jefferson Morley.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, what

we have is so much at variance with

what was thought we would get.

Allen Dulles was very much part of

the foundation of postwar intelligence,

having been in the OSS, served with

great distinction in Switzerland during

World War II.

Peter Grose, in his new biography,

‘‘Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen

Dulles,’’ recounts the testimony Dulles

gave before the Senate Armed Services

Committee on April 25, 1947, as we are

about to establish, passed the National

Security Act of 1947 and created this

small coordinating body, the Central

Intelligence Agency.

Personnel for a central intelligence

agency, he argued, ‘‘need not be very

numerous * * *. The operation of the

service must be neither flamboyant nor

overshrouded with the mystery and abracadabra which the amateur detective

likes to assume.’’ In a lecturing tone,

he tried to tell the Senators how intelligence is actually assembled.

Because of its glamour and mystery, overemphasis is generally placed on what is

called secret intelligence, namely the intelligence that is obtained by secret means and

by secret agents. . . . In time of peace the

bulk of intelligence can be obtained through

overt channels, through our diplomatic and

consular missions, and our military, naval

and air attahce ́s in the normal and proper

course of their work. It can also be obtained

through the world press, the radio, and

through the many thousands of Americans,

business and professional men and American

residents of foreign countries, who are naturally and normally brought in touch with

what is going on in those countries.

A proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by these overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80

percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy.

Mr. President, that could not happen,

did not happen. We entered upon a fivedecade mode of secret analysis, analysis withheld from the scrutiny, which

is the only way we can verify the truth

of a hypothesis in natural science or

the social sciences.

The result was massive miscalculation, Nicholas Eberstadt in his wonderful new book, ‘‘The Tyranny of Numbers,’’ writes ‘‘It is probably safe to say

that the U.S. Government’s attempt to

describe the Soviet economy has been

the largest single project in social

science research ever undertaken.’’ He

said that, sir, in 1990, in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations. ‘‘The largest single project in social science research ever undertaken,’’

and it was a calamity.

No one has been more forthright than

Adm. Stansfield Turner in an article in

Foreign Affairs about this time. He

said when it came to predicting the

collapse of the Soviet Union, the corporate view of the intelligence community was totally wrong.

I can remember the first years of the

Kennedy administration. I remember

having a meeting with Walt Rostow,

Chairman of the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State, in

which he said of the Soviet Union, I am

not one of those 6 percent forever people, but there it was, locked into the

analyses. That is what the President

knew.

Mr. President, in Richard Reeves remarkable biography of John F. Kennedy, he records that the agency told

the President that by the year 2000 the

GNP of the Soviet Union would be

three times that of the United States.

And that is what the President knew. A

person might come to him with the

most reasonable arguments, as did any

number of economists. The great theorists, Friedman, Hayek, Stigler, said it

could not happen, it would be theoretically impossible. Important work done

by Frank Holzman, at Tufts, and the

Russian Research Center at Harvard

said, ‘‘No, no. That is all very well

what you say professor. What I know is

different.’’

The consequences have been an extraordinary failure to foresee the

central event of our time. A vast overdependence on military and similar

outlays, that leave us perilously close

to economic difficulty ourselves.

I would like to close with a letter

written me in 1991 by Dale W.

Jorgenson, professor of economics at

the Kennedy School of Government, in

which he said:

I believe that the importance of economic

intelligence is increasing greatly with the

much-discussed globalization of the U.S.

economy. However the cloak-and-dagger

model is even more inappropriate to our new

economic situation than it was to the successful prosecution of the Cold War that has

just concluded. The lessons for the future

seem to me to be rather transparent. The

U.S. government needs to invest a lot more

in international economic assessments. * * *

(I)t should reject the CIA monopoly model

and try to create the kind of intellectual

competition that now prevails between CBO

and OMB on domestic policy, aided by

Brookings, AEI [American Enterprise Institute], the Urban Institute, the Kennedy

School, and many others.

I ask unanimous consent the entire

letter be printed in the RECORD at the

conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Those are the remarks I would like to make, sir. I have

the confidence that John Deutch, as a

scientist, will follow them. I have the

concern that the administration will

not.

We do know some things in social

science. Mancur Olson, in his great

book, ‘‘The Rise and Decline of Nations,’’ on this day, V–E Day—I was a

sailor on V–E Day, so I can remember

that—I can remember the Boston Common, actually— Mancur Olson asked:

Why has it come about that the two nations whose institutions were destroyed in

World War II, Germany and Japan, have had

the most economic success since? Whereas

Britain—not really much success at all; the

United States—yes, but.’’ And he came up

with a simple answer. The defeat wiped out

all those choke points, all those rents, all
May 8, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S6269

those sharing agreements, all those veto

structures that enable institutions to prevent things from happening. And we are seeing it in this Government today, 5 years

after the wall came down.

Remember, 2 years before the wall

came down the CIA stated that per capita GDP was higher in East Germany

than in West Germany. I hope I take no

liberty that I mentioned this once to

Dr. Deutch and added ‘‘Any taxi driver

in Berlin could have told you that was

not so.’’ And Dr. Deutch replied, ‘‘Any

taxi driver in Washington.’’ But if we

cannot summon the capacity to change

our institutions in our changed circumstances, there will be consequences

and let nobody say they were not predictable.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator

from Texas for her graciousness for allowing me to speak when in fact in alternation it would have been her turn.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Congressional Record, Apr. 25,

1995]

THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, As we think

and, indeed, pray our way through the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, asking

how such a horror might have come about,

and how others might be prevented, Senators

could do well to step outside the chamber

and look down the mall at the Washington

Monument. It honors the Revolutionary general who once victorious, turned his army

over to the Continental Congress and retired

to his estates. Later, recalled to the highest

office in the land, he served dutifully one

term, then a second but then on principle

not a day longer. Thus was founded the first

republic, the first democracy since the age of

Greece and Rome.

There is no a more serene, confident,

untroubled symbol of the nation in all the

capital. Yet a brief glance will show that the

color of the marble blocks of which the

monument is constructed changes about a

quarter of the way up. Thereby hangs a tale

of another troubled time; not our first, just

as, surely, this will not be our last.

As befitted a republic, the monument was

started by a private charitable group, as we

would now say, the Washington National

Monument Society. Contributions came in

cash, but also in blocks of marble, many

with interior inscriptions which visitors

willing to climb the steps can see to this

day. A quarter of the way up, that is. For in

1852, Pope Plus IX donated a block of marble

from the temple of Concord in Rome. Instantly, the American Party, or the KnowNothings (‘‘I know nothing,’’ was their

standard reply to queries about their platform) divined a Papist Plot. An installation

of the Pope’s block of marble would signal

the Catholic Uprising. A fevered agitation

began. As recorded by Ray Allen Billington

in The Protest Crusade, 1800–1860:

‘‘One pamphlet, The Pope’s Strategem:

‘‘Rome to America!’’ An Address to the

Protestants of the United States, against

placing the Pope’s block of Marble in the

Washington Monument (1852), urged Protestants to hold indignation meetings and contribute another block to be placed next to

the Pope’s ‘bearing an inscription by which

all men may see that we are awake to the

hypocrisy and schemes of that designing,

crafty, subtle, far seeing and far reaching

Power, which is ever grasping after the

whole World, to sway its iron scepter, with

bloodstained hands, over the millions of its

inhabitants.’’’

One night early in March, 1854, a group of

Know-Nothings broke into the storage sheds

on the monument grounds and dragged the

Pope’s marble off towards the Potomac. Save

for the occasional ‘‘sighting’’, as we have

come to call such phenomena, it has never to

be located since.

Work on the monument stopped. Years

later, in 1876, Congress appropriated funds to

complete the job, which the Corps of Engineers, under the leadership of Lieutenant

Colonel Thomas I. Casey did with great

flourish in time for the centennial observances of 1888.

Dread of Catholicism ran its course, if

slowly. (Edward M. Stanton, then Secretary

of War was convinced the assassination of

President Lincoln was the result of a Catholic plot.) Other manias followed, all brilliantly describe in Richard Hofstadter’s revelatory lecture ‘‘the Paranoid Style in

American Politics’’ which he delivered as the

Herbert Spencer Lecture at Oxford University within days of the assassination of John

F. Kennedy. Which to this day remains a fertile source of conspiracy mongering. George

Will cited Hofstadter’s essay this past weekend on the television program ‘‘This Week

with David Brinkley.’’ He deals with the

same subject matter in a superb column in

this morning’s Washington Post which has

this bracing conclusion.

‘‘It is reassuring to remember that

paranoiacs have always been with us, but

have never defined us.’’

I hope, Mr. President, as we proceed to

consider legislation, if that is necessary, in

response to the bombing, we would be mindful of a history in which we have often overreached, to our cost, and try to avoid such an

overreaction.

We have seen superb performance of the

FBI. What more any nation could ask of an

internal security group I cannot conceive.

We have seen the effectiveness of our State

troopers, of our local police forces, fire departments, instant nationwide cooperation

which should reassure us rather than frighten us.

I would note in closing, Mr. President, that

Pope John Paul II will be visiting the United

States this coming October. I ask unanimous

consent that Mr. Will’s column be printed in

the Record.

[From the Buffalo News, May 8, 1995]

GOVERNMENT SPOOKS, BEWARE—MOYNIHAN

AIMS TO REVEAL SECRETS

(By Douglas Turner)

WASHINGTON.—For generations, artists like

Jules Verne, Graham Greene, Steven

Spielberg, and Peter Benchley in his novel

‘‘White Shark,’’ have harnessed the public’s

flirtation with fear for innocent profit, fame

and fun.

There is something lurking out there, or

down there created by a force beyond our

knowing.

Far down the creative scale are conspiracy

freaks Oliver Stone, Ian Fleming and the

publishers of checkout-counter tabloids.

In dank corners of our society is a separate

category: Those who subsist utterly in paranoia: Oliver North, Gordon Liddy, David

Duke, Tim McVeigh and those who put on

war paint and military fatigues, play with

assault weapons, and preach war against a

popularly-elected constitutional government.

Like Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, they nurse

on paranoia and propagate it.

Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y.,

suggests this last category either exploits, or

is partly driven by the web of government secrets that has grown like spores since World

War II.

He speaks of official Washinton’s ‘‘enormous secrecy system . . . which just expands, if anything, which we’re in on and everyone out there is not, is out of, and easily

it’s a culture that breeds paranoia.’’

For years, Sen. Moynihan has been sounding a warning about what he calls our culture of paranoia. In an article he penned four

years ago, Moynihan said Stone’s film,

‘‘JFK,’’ could ‘‘spoil a generation of American politics just when sanity is returning.’’

Realizing he couldn’t do much about popular culture, Moynihan set about stripping

down government’s role in creating fear by

going after the mountain of official secrets

generated annually.

To that end, on Jan. 22, 1993, Moynihan introduced a bill creating a bipartisan commission on reducing and protecting government

secrecy. A Democratic Congress passed it

and President Clinton made it law.

The commission had its first meeting in

January and elected Moynihan chairman.

Other members include Sen. Jesse Helms, RN.C., who was appointed by Sen. Majority

Leader Bob Dole, R-Kansas; Ellen Hume of

Annenberg Washington Program, who was

named by the president; a Harvard professor,

and Clinton’s nominee to head the CIA, John

Deutch.

It has an office in an old Navy Building

with view of the Potomac, and a staff director, Eric Biel, formerly a senior Senate staffer. It has had a couple of organizational

meetings, all public. And its first real working session will be on May 17.

Moynihan in a television interview joked

‘‘we’ve managed to conceal our activities so

far by holding public hearings. Nobody goes

to public hearings.’’

On the 17th, the commission will hear

about official secrets from officials of the

National Security Council, who are cooperating as a result of an executive order issued

by President Clinton three weeks ago.

Government files harbor nearly a billion

official secrets.

It generates about 7 million of them a

year. But the secret, Moynihan wrote, is that

the government ‘‘only counts (secrets) up to

the level of Top Secret.

‘‘All the real secrets are higher than that

with code names I am not at liberty to reveal, having taken a kind of vow of secrecy

when I became vice chairman of the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence,’’ he said.

Three million government employees have

security clearances up to top secret. This is

fairly common stuff as most field grade military officers, beginning with lieutenants, are

entitled to top secret access.

The plethora of secrets, security levels and

‘‘cleared’’ employees has made a joke of the

security system itself—with ‘‘secret’’ material spilled into defense and intelligence

trade publications every day.

‘‘They’’ can see it, but you can’t.

Then there are the active classified files of

the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and

Firearms, the Secret Service, the Customs,

Immigration and Naturalization Service, the

Border Patrol, the Department of Energy,

and even the Department of Agriculture.

Official secrecy, endemic to big government, dies hard. As in corporate life, and in

the highest aeries of journalism, secrets are

not just the key to power. They are power.

Official infatuation with secrecy is reflected in the forbearance in President Clinton’s executive order. Existing secrets must

be declassified after 25 years, he said. Future

ones after 10 years.

This would matter in an age when breechload rifles were on the cutting edge of military science. The standard is ridiculous in

the light of today’s expanding technology.

Thanks to the reports the CIA issued—

based on ‘‘evidence’’ you and I could never
S6270 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE May 8, 1995

see or evaluate—on Soviet weaponry and the

economy, this country went on a military

spending binge beginning with the Vietnam

war and ending only three years ago.

But these CIA fabrications served to justify quantum leaps in spending on the American defense establishment, and of course

covert CIA. We will be paying for that buildup for the rest of our lives.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 30, 1995]

DEPARTMENT OF SECRECY

THE INVISIBLE BUREAUCRACY THAT UNITES

ALIENATED AMERICA IN SUSPICION

(By Jefferson Morley)

Scapegoating is a time-honored spring

sport in Washington. Professionals of the

pastime are already in fine mid-summer

form on Topic A: Who is responsible for the

Oklahoma City bombing? Skillful soundbites

indict various culprits: Right-wing talk

radio, the NRA, lone nuts and (the ever-reliable) ’60s counterculture.

But while the theories fly, the All-Stars of

the Washington blame game somehow overlook one of the leading suspects in the minds

of the American people: the Department of

Secrecy.

There is no official department of secrecy,

complete with Cabinet officer and official

seal. But there is the functional equivalent:

the federal bureaucracy that keeps the government’s secrets. It consists of the offices

and archives in the Pentagon, the intelligence agencies, the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms and other federal agencies that classify and guard all

sorts of information considered too sensitive

to be shared with the American public. The

connection between this empire of information and the Oklahoma City bombing is not

obvious but it is real.

First, the Department of Secrecy is a significant presence in American society and

politics. Viewed on an organizational chart,

the federal secrecy system is bigger than

many Cabinet agencies. According to a

Washington Post report last year, the secrecy system keeps an estimated 32,400 people employed full-time—more than the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Education combined. According

to the Office of Management and Budget, the

bureaucracy of secrets may cost as much as

$16 billion a year to run.

Second, mistrust of the government and its

many secrets is now raging out of control.

The assumption that the government is not

accountable for its actions is now the norm.

It is an article of faith among many on the

religious and paramilitary right (including,

apparently, one of the bombing suspects in

custody) that the federal government has

not been held accountable for the 1993 raid in

Waco which left 85 people dead.

Liberals and the left were angered but not

surprised by the recent revelations about the

CIA in Guatemala. In the name of protecting

its ‘‘sources and methods,’’ the agency

shielded from justice the Guatemalan colonel who is the leading suspect in the murder

of an American innkeeper and the husband of

an American lawyer.

Robert McNamara’s memoirs are an infuriating reminder to moderates that the veil of

secrecy allowed utterly respectable mainstream Washington officials to send thousands of American boys to slaughter in a disastrous and still-divisive war.

In the movie theaters of America, the most

treacherous, evil Hollywood villains often

work inside the Department of Secrecy. Popular movies like ‘‘Outbreak’’ and ‘‘Clear and

Present Danger’’ routinely depict senior officials in Washington as smooth-talking

criminals who think nothing of betraying

the public trust and sending innocent Americans to their death.

‘‘The pathology of public attitudes toward

government are due in large part to excessive and unnecessary secrecy,’’ says Steven

Aftergood of the American Federation of

Scientists, a leading advocate of government

openness in Washington.

The State Department, for example, retains the right to withhold information that

would ‘‘seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the

United States.’’ Under this standard the CIAin-Guatemala story would almost certainly

still be secret and two American women

would still be wondering who murdered their

husbands.

For now, the effect of Clinton’s order is expected to be modest.

‘‘I don’t think it’s going to make much difference,’’ said retired Lt. Gen. William

Odom, the former director of the National

Security Agency and a skeptic of openness

efforts. Odom recalled that a similar directive from President Carter in 1978 had little

effect on how he, Odom, actually classified

information for the government at the time.

Aftergood praised Clinton’s directive as a

distinct improvement over the old secrecy

rules but added ‘‘I just hope we are at the beginning of a reform process, not the end.’’

That will depend, in part, on what the public, the president and Congress learn from

Oklahoma City.

Is the bombing the work of isolated madmen with no connection to the larger political culture? Or is it a warning of the pathological possibilities opened up when the federal government loses the faith of its people?

These questions are especially pertinent

for people working within the secrecy system. Most of them do not hide wrongdoing

from the American people. The information

they guard is often legitimately secret: military codes, the names of law enforcement informants, the U.S. position in international

trade talks and the like.

But they shrug off the widespread mistrust

of their work at their own peril. With the

government generating so many secrets each

year—an estimated 6.3 million in 1993—and

continuing revelations about governmental

abuses of power, the line between the paranoia of a few and legitimate fears of the

many gets harder to draw.

A few years ago, the notion that the U.S.

government had, over the course of several

decades, routinely conducted dangerous radiation experiments on thousands of unwitting

Americans would have been regarded by

most reasonable people as unfounded, if not

ridiculous. Today, thanks to the aggressive

release of long-secret documents by Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary, the radiation experiments are cold, disturbing historical fact.

O’Leary’s leadership shows that full disclosure of embarrassing material is not political or institutional suicide. In fact, the Department of Energy, by all accounts, enjoys

more credibility on Capitol Hill and with the

public for coming clean.

We don’t know what other abuses of governmental power, if any, the secrecy system

is hiding. But we do know that a citizenry

without access to its own history has no

guarantee of democratic accountability. And

as long as democratic accountability is in

doubt, the citizenry, not just government office buildings, will remain vulnerable.

EXHIBIT 2

HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT,

Cambridge, MA, March 18, 1991.

Senator DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR PAT: This is just a personal note of

thanks for your eloquent and stimulating

contribution to the lunch discussion with

the new National Research Council Board on

Science, Technology, and Economic Policy

last Friday. Needless to say, I think you are

absolutely right about the significance of the

long-standing intelligence failure in assessing the Soviet economy and the Soviet military effort. While I do not concur with your

Galbraithian view of economics as a failed

profession, this has to be one of the great

failures of economics—right up there with

the inability of economists (along with everyone else) to find a remedy for the Great

Depression of the 1930’s.

On your specific arguments: In 1985 Paul

Samuelson was relying on the CIA estimates,

so that this is not an independent piece of

evidence. For every quotation you can give

from people like Lawrence Klein, you can

find a counter-argument in the writings of

Friedman, Hayek, Stigler and many others.

All three have been amply rewarded for their

efforts with the Nobel Prize, the National

Medal of Science, and the esteem of their

colleagues (with the conspicuous exception

of your former neighbor on Francis Avenue).

They deserve a lot of credit for the positions

they took in the 1930’s all the way up to the

1980’s and they are getting it.

It seems to me that it is better to address

the issue of international economic assessments within your framework of post-Cold

War recoversion that Galbaith’s entertaining

but wrong-headed view of economics as a

failed profession. Given the importance of

economic assessments of the Soviet Union, it

is almost incredible that the U.S. government established an in-house monopoly on

these assessments. The principal academic

centers for research in this area at Columbia

and Harvard were allowed to wither away.

Over the past decade, Frank Holzman of

Tufts and the Russian Research Center at

Harvard has been a lonely voice in opposition to the CIA view.

I believe that the importance of economic

intelligence is increasing greatly with the

much-discussed globalization of the U.S.

economy. However, the cloak-and-dagger

model is even more inappropriate to our new

economic situation than it was to the successful prosecution of the Cold War that has

just concluded. The lessons for the future

seem to me to be rather transparent. The

U.S. government needs to invest a lot more

in international economic assessments. Second, it should reject the CIA monopoly

model and try to create the kind of intellectual competition that now prevails between

CBO and OMB on domestic policy, aided by

Brookings, AEI, the Urban Institute, the

Kennedy School, and many others.

An important subsidiary lesson we can

learn from the failure of the CIA Soviet assessments is the importance of ‘‘sunshine’’.

Although economic intelligence is always

going to be sensitive to somebody, it should

be carried out in full sight of the public, including the professional peers of the intelligence analysts. I hope that the new National Research Council Board can contribute to the post-Cold War re-conversion of our

economic intelligence establishment in a

positive way. As I see it, this is a daunting

task. To use a medical analogy, this will require something more like a ‘‘life style’’

change than a simple remedy for a chronic

disease.

I hope that you can find the time to

present your perspective on this issue to the
May 8, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S6271

policy community, say in the form of an article for Public Interest. This would be an interesting opportunity to bring your ideas

about post-Cold War conversion to a specific

problem of great importance to the national

interest.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,

DALE W. JORGENSON.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the

Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I

am always happy to yield to the senior

Senator from New York, because I always enjoy hearing what he has to say.

Mr. President, the importance of intelligence gathering for our Nation is

at a critical juncture. Never has it been

as important as it is today that we

have foreign intelligence gathering capabilities, particularly because we are

now facing a time when weapons of

mass destruction, nuclear, chemical

and biological, are being made in different parts of the world. Even worse,

the weapons that transport those weapons are also being developed in different parts of the world. There is an

urgent need for us to know where those

weapons are and where the capabilities

are to transport those weapons, either

within their own theater or over to our

country.

So, there is no question in my mind

that we must have a strong foreign intelligence gathering capability. We

also have a problem. That is we need a

leader and we need a focus and we need

a mission for the people who are in our

intelligence gathering operations right

now. We have had several mishaps. The

Aldrich Ames case is one that has been

talked about on this floor and it is one

that is very troubling to us, even

today. Many people feel this traitor

was not dealt with in a way that will

show there is an accountability when a

drastic mistake happens.

The lack of management accountability did demonstrate, by recent

events in Guatemala, the lack of information that the oversight committees

had about the situation in Guatemala.

The escalation of terrorism all over the

world is causing an ongoing need for us

to have intelligence-gathering capabilities.

So, we do need a person who can take

control of our central intelligencegathering operation, lift the morale of

the wonderful people who work there,

and put an accountability into the system. We also need someone who can

make it more efficient. As we are

downsizing our budget we need to make

sure that we have a mission, that we

are using our assets in the most efficient way.

So we need someone to come in and

show that leadership. I believe John

Deutch is that person. I think the

President has made a good decision.

There are some issues that must be

dealt with. First, I must say I disagree

with the President giving Cabinet rank

to the Director of Central Intelligence.

The National Security Act of 1947 sets

forth the members of the National Security Council and then designates others, including the Director of Central

Intelligence and the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, as officials who

are not members but may attend and

participate as the President directs. I

believe that is also the appropriate role

for the DCI with respect to the Cabinet.

Mr. Deutch was asked these questions in our Intelligence Committee

hearing on his nomination regarding

the Cabinet status of the Director of

Central Intelligence. He assured the

committee that he would hold to the

proper standard of conduct and that he

would not allow policy to influence intelligence judgments and not allow intelligence to interfere in the policy

process.

That is a very important distinction

that the new Director has adopted and

which I think is very important for us

to keep—the separation between intelligence gathering and policymaking.

The committee is going to be sensitive

to any indication that this standard is

not being met, but I believe the makeup of the Cabinet is the responsibility

of the President. That is not within our

mission in confirmation. And, therefore, I hope the standards that we have

discussed will be adhered to, both by

the President and by the new Director

of Central Intelligence.

I brought up two major issues in

committee that I thought were important. First, a closer working relationship with the oversight committees in

Congress, the Intelligence Committee

in the Senate, and the one in the

House. I think it is most important

when you have a covert operation

which, of course, intelligence gathering

is, to have an even more strong relationship and communications network

with the oversight committees that

can assess the judgments that are

being made in these covert operations.

It is good for Congress and it is good

for the intelligence gathering, as well.

It is very important that we have an

oversight and we have the ability to

make judgments by the duly elected officials in the U.S. Congress when we

are dealing with such sensitive intelligence matters.

So I talked to the new Director-designate about that. And he agreed totally that we needed to have that line

of communication, and I think it has

been reiterated by every person who

has spoken on the floor today, and

most certainly every member of the

committee.

The second issue that was very important to me was complete financial

disclosure of every person who works

at the CIA and every contractor who is

working on CIA projects. I felt this was

important because one of the obvious

things that was missed in the Aldrich

Ames case was a high-living lifestyle

by Aldrich Ames and his family, clearly one that could not be shown to have

been supported by a person on the salary of Aldrich Ames.

If we had the vehicle in place to have

total financial disclosure, the CIA

could immediately have begun to

check on this lifestyle to see if there

was something that was not right.

Clearly, it was not right the way Aldrich Ames was living. And we found

out later it was because he was receiving millions of dollars from the Russian Government for secrets that he

was giving to them from our CIA. So

we need the basic information.

Mr. Deutch said, and promised, that

he would make sure that every person

who works for the CIA, who willingly

comes to work for the CIA, will give

basic financial disclosures. I think that

is going to be a very important tool for

us to show that there is an accountability in the CIA and that an Aldridge

Ames case will not as easily be repeated and, if it is repeated, that we

will have the ability to go in immediately and see what the assets are

that have been disclosed and if something seems to be amiss.

So these are two areas that I am satisfied that Mr. Deutch is going to address, and he has already given me his

word that there is going to be financial

disclosure among the CIA employees

and people who are working for the CIA

under contract.

So in conclusion, Mr. President, I

support Secretary Deutch for the role

of Director of Central Intelligence.

This is one of the most important

nominations that we will have before

us this year, because this agency needs

such direction. I believe Mr. Deutch

can provide that direction. I have

worked with him as a member of the

Armed Services Committee in his capacity as Deputy Secretary of Defense.

I find him to be a person of integrity.

I respect his judgment, and I think he

did a fine job as Deputy Secretary of

Defense. I think he is the person to fulfill this mission at this very important

time in our intelligence gathering reorganization.

I think we must take our responsibility in confirming him, to do this in a

swift and timely manner. We have had

five DCI’s in the last 10 years. This

agency needs leadership. We need some

reorganization. We need a mission, and

we need to make sure that we are using

our assets efficiently and well so that

everyone in our country is secure so

that we have the information that we

need to keep that freedom, independence, and liberty that we have.

So I am supporting Mr. Deutch for

this very purpose. I wish him well. It is

going to be a very tough job. I hope

that he will work with Members of

Congress who want him to succeed, and

we do. For all of our country, we must

succeed with this new Director.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the

floor.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am

pleased to join my colleagues today to

urge confirmation of John Deutch as

Director of Central Intelligence. As a

permanent resident of Belmont, MA,

and having a lifelong involvement in
S6272 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE May 8, 1995

the Massachusetts community, John

Deutch is a neighbor and a man who

has built a national and international

reputation as a leader and as a forceful

and effective professional. I described

him publicly, not long ago, as ‘‘superb

and first rate’’, and I reiterate that description today, without hesitation and

with renewed respect and continued

confidence in his extraordinary ability.

Let me add a few words about the

task he will face and the talent he will

bring to the position of Director of

Central Intelligence. The world is undoubtedly changing. It will continue to

change more quickly, perhaps, than at

any other time in our history. We are

seeing old threats and new threats

emerge in a shifting political and economic atmosphere that will test our resolve and challenge our leadership.

Mr. President, John Deutch is undoubtedly up to the challenge, and he

is a leader for his time. There is no

question about that. He understands

the critical task that he will face, and

the importance of facing it with resolve, strength, and a firm hand. He

has proven that he knows the need and

has the expertise to address what we

all acknowledge are operational and

administrative problems at the CIA. As

Director of Central Intelligence he will

face two daunting managerial tasks:

First, he must try to restructure the

U.S. intelligence community at a time

when many believe there is no longer a

need—nor the funds—for the level of intelligence activity to which we became

accustomed during the cold war. He

will have to balance proper and appropriate intelligence activity with increasing congressional and public scrutiny of scarcer and scarcer tax dollars.

Second, in the wake of recent events

at the CIA, he will have to look critically at internal operations and move

quickly to rebuild morale, public trust,

and confidence while maintaining the

integrity of America’s intelligence capability. As far as restructuring the intelligence community, I believe John

Deutch has one very important advantage over many who could have been

chosen to serve. He is not an architect

of either the current intelligence system or the processes that have been

put into place. He is a fresh face, a new

voice, a real leader with the talent and

the foresight to succeed.

Now, as far as what Secretary Deutch

will face at the CIA, operationally and

administratively, there is a need to act

expeditiously to turn things around

even if it means significant personnel

changes, and I am confident that John

Deutch has the necessary judgment

and will to quickly act in the best interest of the Agency and the Nation.

Mr. President, the American intelligence community will be well served

by the experience and leadership of

John Deutch who rightfully observed

in his statement to the Intelligence

Committee that ‘‘changing intelligence

priorities, as well as intelligence failures, dictate that we carefully re-examine the need for, and specific missions of, intelligence.’’ He added that

he sees ‘‘four significant dangers to our

national security and the social and

economic well-being of our citizens.’’

He cites major regional conflicts; the

spread of weapons of mass destruction;

international terrorism, crime, and

drug trafficking; and the present nuclear danger that still exists in Russia

and the Russian republics as they move

toward democracy.

I also see the new Director of Central

Intelligence moving, as he said he

would, to improve the support that the

intelligence community gives to law

enforcement agencies in areas of narcotics trafficking, international crime,

and terrorism. I agree with his assessments and I am confident he will move

expeditiously to address the continuing

threat of the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction, and particularly

the emerging threat of terrorist attacks with these weapons. I see the

new Director re-defining and establishing new standards for the proper role

for the intelligence community in the

areas of economic intelligence, and addressing the issue of making information, when appropriate, more readily

available by lowering classifications or

through declassification. And I see the

new Director, like every other director

of a Federal agency, looking for ways

to economize and streamline the operations at CIA to give us more for our

tax dollars.

From all we’ve heard about John

Deutch, I believe he has the experience,

the expertise, the professionalism, the

reputation, the perseverance, the qualifications and the integrity to do the

job, and I urge my colleagues to confirm his nomination.

Thank you, Mr. President, and I yield

the floor.

THE NOMINATION OF JOHN DEUTCH TO BE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I would

like to add my voice in support of the

nomination of Dr. John Deutch to be

Director of Central Intelligence. This

nomination is extremely important,

Mr. President, because the Central Intelligence Agency is at a crossroads

and I believe John Deutch has what its

going to take to redirect the Agency’s

course during its next few crucial

years.

There is no question that strong

leadership is critical for the CIA to be

able to transform the Agency’s mission

into one that provides policymakers

with timely, useful, and target-specific

intelligence. CNN can cover the world;

the CIA needs to bring greater attention and resources to bear on countries

and issues that represent a threat to

our national security interests.

Dr. Deutch was brutally frank in his

assessment of CIA successes and failures, and refreshingly candid about

what he would like to accomplish as

DCI. His candor was unusual, since

nominees normally go out of their way

to avoid categorical statements about

agendas and work plans. Dr. Deutch, in

contrast, went out of his way to explain exactly where he is headed and

what he would like to do.

During his confirmation hearing, I

heard Dr. Deutch speak of bringing in a

new generation of leaders at the CIA,

streamlining imagery operations, and

getting to the root of problems inside

the Operations Directorate.

Mr. President, John Deutch brings

with him a demonstrated track record

of achievement in both government

and academia. He is widely respected

within the defense community for his

performance as Secretary Perry’s deputy at the Pentagon and within the scientific community for his tenure at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

I believe he is more than equal to the

task of restoring luster to the CIA.

As a member of the Armed Services

Committee, I have worked with John

Deutch, and I have seen firsthand the

quality of his work and his conscientious commitment to our national defense and to the men and women who

serve our country.

Finally, Mr. President, as a Senator

from Virginia, I’m pleased that Dr.

Deutch understands the distress of talented Agency personnel and alumni

who have watched the CIA and other

intelligence branches endure a rough

patch. He is, in my judgment, the right

man at the right time to restore dignity and respect to deserving and hardworking public servants working in the

Intelligence Community.

Mr. President, I have high hopes for

Dr. Deutch’s tenure at the CIA, and I

urge my colleagues to support his nomination.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

NOMINATION OF JOHN M. DEUTCH TO BE THE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am

pleased to support the nomination of

John M. Deutch to be the Director of

Central Intelligence. The nomination

of Dr. Deutch, who presently serves as

the Deputy Secretary of Defense, has

received the unanimous, bipartisan

support of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This strong support

reflects Dr. Deutch’s outstanding

qualifications, including his first-rate

performance as Deputy Secretary of

Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

I have had the opportunity to work

closely with Secretary Deutch, both in

my prior capacity as chairman of the

Armed Services Committee and in my

current role as ranking minority member. He has made an outstanding contribution at the Department of Defense, and is well-qualified to serve as

the Director of Central Intelligence.

Secretary Deutch came to the Department of Defense following a long

and distinguished academic and government career. His positions in academia included service as provost and

institute professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His prior

Government experience included service on the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the early
May 8, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S6273

1960’s, and as Under Secretary of Energy during the late 1970’s. In addition,

he served on the Defense Science Board

and on many other advisory boards

over the years.

In 1993, he was nominated by President Clinton and confirmed by the Senate to serve as the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition. When Bill

Perry became the Secretary of Defense

in 1994, Dr. Deutch was nominated and

confirmed to his current position as

Deputy Secretary of Defense.

I have known Secretary Deutch personally for many years, including the

periods of his service in the Department of Energy and during his tenure

at MIT. His entire career—both in academia and in Government service—has

been devoted to developing creative

and thoughtful approaches to national

defense and intelligence policy issues.

Secretary Deutch has compiled as

solid record in the Department of Defense as a strong manager. He has

served the Nation well, not only in the

management of internal Department of

Defense functions, but also as the DOD

official with primary responsibility for

interface with the intelligence community. He knows how to solve problems,

make clear decisions, and address

pressing issues. On the Armed Services

Committee, we have appreciated his

breadth of knowledge, his candor, and

his willingness to engage in dialog. He

also has a good sense of humor, which

he uses to put difficult issues in perspective—a quality that will be most

useful in his new position.

The intelligence community faces

many difficult challenges in the postcold war era, particularly in the aftermath of the Ames espionage matter.

The Oklahoma City tragedy underscores the dangers of terrorism in the

modern world. The tensions in the Persian Gulf and North Asia, as well as the

problems faced by the States of the

former Soviet Union, are but a few of

the difficult challenges facing the intelligence community. John Deutch

has the experience and background to

take on these challenges. I strongly

urge the Senate to confirm his nomination to be Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.

DEWINE). The Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, there

are, to my knowledge, no other Senators who wish to speak on this nomination. I will offer a couple of closing

comments and then yield time, alerting colleagues who are watching of the

possibility that we may be yielding

back, and they have not told us they

wanted to speak. They could rush over

here and say a few words.

In my statement, I indicated, and it

is correct, that one of the problems we

have with our intelligence effort is

that as a consequence of needing to

protect security, we are unable—the intelligence people are unable—to brag

about successes, and thus not only is it

difficult for us to give credit, but increasingly citizens are needing and

asking for information that will enable

them to judge whether or not their tax

dollars are being well spent. I would

argue that this condition of being unable to disclose sometimes puts us in a

position of not being able to give citizens information or having them say,

‘‘Now I understand why we are doing

this, and I believe we are in fact getting our money’s worth.’’

I would like as a consequence to identify for citizens two recent events that

were publicly disclosed. And for the information of citizens, it is the President of the United States who has the

controlling authority both to make a

classification decision and to make a

declassification decision. That decision

is spelled out in statute. It is not a decision that can be made by either the

Congress, in the absence of changing

the law, or an individual Member of

Congress. But two recent disclosures,

probably, I suspect, disclosed by a decision made by the President to make

the disclosure, underscore the importance of this intelligence effort.

The first was that the United States

of America presented to the U.N. Security Council clear and present evidence

that North Koreans were engaged in a

policy, a strategy, an active effort to

acquire nuclear capacity. We could say

that they were, and people did or did

not believe it. They mostly said, ‘‘Well,

maybe that is just the United States

just sort of hung up again.’’ Because we

had the intelligence capacity, we presented information—in this case, images—to the Security Council, and the

Security Council sees clearly North

Korea is building nuclear capability

and the Security Council takes actions

supportive of the United States’ effort

to make certain that North Korea does

not become a nuclear nation.

Again, with the use of images disclosed to the public, our Ambassador to

the United Nations, Madeleine

Albright, at the direction of the President of the United States, at the time

when the French and the Russians were

weakening in their resolve in regard to

sanctions on Iraq, buying into the

Iraqis’ assertions that, ‘‘We are impoverished now; we don’t have very much

money; and, no, we are not building

any chemical or biological chemical

capability, and we are not really a

militaristic nation. You need not

worry about us any longer.’’

Our Ambassador presents, in a weeklong trip to I think 10 or 12 nations,

again, images that are our intelligence

images to these world leaders on the

Security Council, information clearly

indicating that the Iraqi leader had

built a $1.2 billion palace, hardly the

sort of action taken by a nation that

was impoverished; second, that chemical and biological capability continued

to be a problem; and that the acquisition of Kuwaiti military equipment

during their occupation of Kuwait was

being integrated into the Iraqi forces,

giving lie to all three of the statements

made by the Iraqi leader and giving the

United States the capacity, the President the capacity, through his United

Nations, our U.N. Ambassador, the

ability to make the argument to keep

the sanctions still tightening around

the nation of Iraq.

In both cases, the United States of

America received benefit. Who knows

what the cost to the world would have

been had North Korea been permitted

to continue building its nuclear capability or had the sanctions been

dropped from Iraq, a nation that continues to exhibit dangerous tendencies,

indeed dangerous actions.

I cite those two amongst the latest

that have been disclosed publicly because citizens deserve to get enough information upon which they can make a

decision about whether or not we are

either sort of captive to the intelligence community, as is very often

suspected by many who are not on this

Intelligence Committee, and perhaps

other citizens as well, that we in fact

are looking at these successes, insisting upon accountability, trying to assess the threats in the world and organize our intelligence efforts to meet

those threats, to maintain the capability to keep the United States of America as safe as is humanly possible.

Let me, in addition, Mr. President,

point out that there are two things Mr.

Deutch is going to be addressing which

in some ways are a consequence of both

our successes and at times our failures

of the past.

The first is, many of the threats that

we are now dealing with are threats

that are a consequence, sort of a residual, of the cold war. The proliferation

threat on the nuclear, biological, and

chemical is a threat that came as a

consequence of our building capacity

and the Soviets’ building capacity.

This proliferation threat is a very real

threat, and we are having to now take

the sort of residual problem of the cold

war and move it to the top of the list

knowing that the bombing in Oklahoma City would be magnified several

thousand times over were either chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to

be used in a terrorist effort.

This is a very real and present problem. It requires the United States of

America to lead. No other nation is

going to do it. We saw recently, when

the President put sanctions on Iran,

our friends in Europe said, ‘‘Well, we

think that’s a bad idea. We want to

continue to engage with a country

that’s involved with terrorism.’’

I do not know what they are going to

do; I suspect wait until something terrible were to happen. Only the United

States of America can lead on that

issue, lead trying to get Russia not to

sell nuclear technology to Iran. Only

the United States of America, I believe,

is willing to make the kind of diplomatic and financial effort necessary to

make this world safe in the area of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

and the terrorism that comes from

that.
S6274 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE May 8, 1995

There is a second problem, Mr. President, that our new, hopefully new Director of Central Intelligence is going

to have to be dealing with. The distinguished Senator from New York in his

comments referenced that, and that is

not just a cynicism toward Government but a precise suspicion that the

CIA is involved in all sorts of things

that are bad. That the CIA is possibly

responsible for the assassination of

John Kennedy is something that is actually honestly believed by some

Americans who see a conspiracy in

which the Central Intelligence Agency

perhaps played some central role.

We are going to have to face an awful

lot of that, Mr. President, and we are

going to have to face it very squarely

and very honestly. As I said earlier, I

am very excited watching the accounts

of the celebration of the victory in Europe 50 years ago, watching old men recall the stories of bravery and heroism

and sacrifice. I say, with no interest in

disparaging that success—I thrilled in

that success and am unable to measure

truly the sacrifice and heroic behavior

that was necessary, but it stands in

stark contrast to an event that occurred, oh, I guess about a month or so

ago when former Secretary of Defense

McNamara published a mea culpa book

saying that in 1966 the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America,

with all the intelligence effort at its

disposal, had actually concluded that

the war in Vietnam was unwinable.

Well, I was there in 1969. I do not remember McNamara saying anything

about it then. And that kind of a statement is the example of the sort of

thing, unfortunately, that feeds this

cynicism and this conspiracy theory

and causes people to say that the Government really is against rather than

trying to be on their side in making

their lives not only safe but their lives

secure as well. It means that we are

going to have to press the envelope a

bit on secrecy. By that I mean we are

going to have to take great care that a

secret is, indeed, necessary to protect

the American people rather than protecting those who are operating, either

the Director of Operations or other

sorts of entities. It cannot be that we

keep a secret from the American people because we are afraid of what they

will do to us if we tell them the truth.

It must be that a secret is being maintained because we are concerned about

our inability to carry out an important

security mission if full disclosure were

to occur.

As I indicated, there is a tremendous

capacity in the intelligence community to help citizens in a very difficult

time acquire the information needed to

become informed. When you are born in

the United States of America, you are

given enormous freedoms at birth and

should have been told at some point

during your public education or upbringing by your parents or upbringing

by others, you should have been told

that freedom is not free; that a contribution has to be made back of some

kind. And our citizens are increasingly

aware of the contribution of time and

effort that they have to make to become informed about what is going on

in Chechnya, what is going on in the

former Yugoslavia, what is going on in

Mexico, what is going on in places

where they have a difficult time pronouncing the name let alone making

decisions about what our foreign policy

ought to be. I believe the technologies

that we have at our disposal, if we

press the envelope judiciously and not

in a reckless fashion, can, indeed, help

our citizens make decisions and make

it more likely that government of, by,

and for the people works both in foreign as well as domestic policy.

Mr. President, no one has traipsed

over to the floor to provide additional

testimony, and I am prepared to yield

back what time is remaining and yield

the floor.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the

Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. We will also yield

back our time, and I will go forward

and close.

REMOVAL OF INJUNCTION OF

fSECRECY

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask unanimous

consent that the Injunction of Secrecy

be removed from the extradition treaty

with Hungary (Treaty Document No.

104–5), transmitted to the Senate by

the President today; and the treaty

considered as having been read the first

time; referred, with accompanying papers, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed; and

ordered that the President’s message

be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

The message of the President is as

follows:

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice

and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty

Between the Government of the United

States of America and the Government

of the Republic of Hungary on Extradition, signed at Budapest on December

1, 1994. Also transmitted for the information of the Senate is the report of

the Department of State with respect

to this Treaty.

The Treaty is designed to update and

standardize the conditions and procedures for extradition between the United States and Hungary. Most significantly, it substitutes a dual-criminality clause for the current list of extraditable offenses, thereby expanding the

number of crimes for which extradition

can be granted. The Treaty also provides a legal basis for temporarily surrendering prisoners to stand trial for

crimes against the laws of the Requesting State.

The Treaty further represents an important step in combating terrorism by

excluding from the scope of the political offense exception serious offenses

typically committed by terrorists, e.g.,

crimes against a Head of State or first

family member of either Party, aircraft hijacking, aircraft sabotage,

crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomats,

hostage-taking, narcotics-trafficking,

and other offenses for which the United

States and Hungary have an obligation

to extradite or submit to prosecution

by reason of a multilateral treaty, convention, or other international agreement. The United States and Hungary

also agree to exclude from the political

offense exception major common

crimes, such as murder, kidnapping,

and placing or using explosive devices.

The provisions in this Treaty follow

generally the form and content or extradition treaties recently concluded

by the United States. Upon entry into

force, it will supersede the Convention

for the Mutual Delivery of Criminals,

Fugitives from Justice, in Certain

Cases Between the Government of the

United States of America and the

Austro-Hungarian Empire, signed at

Washington, July 3, 1856, with certain

exceptions.

This Treaty will make a significant

contribution to international cooperation in law enforcement. I recommend

that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and

give its advice and consent to ratification.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE H

fOUSE, May 8, 1995.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mrs. HUTCHISON. As in executive

session, I ask unanimous consent that

the Senate immediately proceed to the

consideration of the following nominations on the Executive Calendar en

bloc: calendar Nos. 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,

and 112; further, that the nominations

be confirmed en bloc, the motions to

reconsider be laid upon the table en

bloc; that any statements relating to

the nominations appear at the appropriate place in the RECORD, the President be immediately notified of the

Senate’s action, and that the Senate

then return to legislative session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without

objection, it is so ordered.

The nominations considered and confirmed en bloc are as follows:

THE JUDICIARY

Maxine M. Chesney, of California, to be

United States District Judge for the Northern District of California.

Eldon E. Fallon, of Louisiana, to be United

States District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Curtis L. Collier, of Tennessee, to be United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee.

Joseph Robert Goodwin, of West Virginia,

to be United States District Judge for the

Southern District of West Virginia.