DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JEFFREY M. HASTINGS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-0379

[May 29, 2024]

Appeal from the County Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; April Bristow, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2022-MM-008583-

AXXX-SB.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T. Acuña, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

FORST, J.

Jeffrey M. Hastings (“Defendant”) timely appeals his conviction and 

sentence after a jury found him guilty of resisting an officer without 

violence. Defendant raises three issues on appeal, one of which pertains

to the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and a 

challenge, raised for the first time on appeal, to the size of the jury. We 

affirm on these two issues without discussion.

We reverse and remand on Defendant’s third issue, related to jury 

selection, because the trial court conducted a deficient Melbourne1 inquiry

and reversibly erred when it overruled Defendant’s peremptory strike to 

prospective juror “K.L.” Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial 

court to hold a new trial, subject to our ruling that the trial court properly 

denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.

Background

1 Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996).
2

Defendant was charged with driving with a suspended license (a charge 

for which the trial court ultimately entered a judgment of acquittal) and 

resisting an officer without violence. Defendant requested a jury trial. 

During voir dire, the State’s counsel inquired if any venirepersons watched 

“crime shows,” such as CSI: Crime Scene Investigation or Law & Order. 

Prospective Juror K.L. confirmed that he watched CSI, which at times 

portrayed courtroom scenes and evidence admissions.

Later, defense counsel asked all venirepersons about their perspectives 

on police including if police are generally trustworthy. K.L. responded, “I 

think yes” and “[the police] are doing whatever they have to do and 

[inaudible; juror not using microphone], so yes.” Many other

venirepersons offered similar responses including, but not limited to, “I 

think the vast majority are doing a good service,” “I feel they are 

trustworthy,” and “[p]retty much the same view as everybody. 

Trustworthy, yes. And of course there are a few bad people in every area.” 

Defense counsel successfully exercised cause challenges on several 

venirepersons who expressed generally favorable views of the police.

Defense counsel sought to exercise Defendant’s first peremptory strike 

against K.L. The State’s counsel asked for a race-neutral reason. The trial 

court then requested the State to identify the protected class to which K.L.

belongs. The State’s counsel responded that K.L. is Indian American.

At this point, the trial court announced it would conduct a Melbourne

inquiry and asked defense counsel for a race-neutral reason for 

peremptorily striking K.L. Defense counsel responded, “[K.L.] stated that 

he believes police are generally trustworthy and he also likes to watch CSI. 

We believe [K.L.] might, without having raised to the level of a cause 

challenge, might preference police testimony over others.” The trial court 

responded:

Okay. That’s not a race neutral reason, and even if it was I 

don’t think that’s genuine at this juncture. It’s very 

speculative. [K.L.] didn’t give any indication that he wouldn’t 

be fair and impartial. The fact that he watched CSI doesn’t 

make you -- I am going to overrule then -- overrule the use of 

that peremptory challenge based on the reason proffered.

As voir dire continued, defense counsel accepted jurors, but reminded

the trial court that acceptance was “subject to our peremptory that was 

denied, retaining that challenge.” After the trial court announced the main 

panel, which included K.L., defense counsel stated they were maintaining 

the challenge to the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s peremptory strike 
3

against K.L. When defense counsel reaffirmed they were preserving the 

issue for the record, the trial court responded:

No, that’s fine. And for the record, the proper[2] reason was 

that [K.L.] said he generally trusts police but there are some 

bad apples, and he watches CSI. And the Court found that 

that was not a race neutral, or if it was, even it wasn’t a 

genuine reason for exercising a strike, given the facts and 

circumstances and the make-up of the panel, for the record.

Following Defendant’s conviction, defense counsel moved for a new trial 

based on the trial court’s denial of the peremptory challenge to K.L. The 

trial court then expanded on its rationale for denying the peremptory

strike, stating:

The race-neutral reason I was proffered is that [K.L.] stated 

generally speaking he trusted the police, but he recognized 

that there were a few, you know, bad apples. And also that 

he watched CSI. To the extent I wasn’t clear, the trusting the 

police, sure, that’s a race-neutral reason. That [K.L.] watched 

CSI in and of itself is not a reason at all. Had [defense counsel]

elaborated and were -- this isn’t a forensic case. There is 

nothing forensic here. It could have been, but it was not 

elaborated. Just the fact that someone watches CSI in and of 

itself is not a reason. But then I shifted to the genuineness, 

and that’s for the Court to determine based on the totality of 

the circumstances, the whole panel, everything I saw. And 

that particular answer that [K.L.] gave that you described as 

the race-neutral reason, almost every single person on that 

panel gave. That yes, generally, we trust the police but -- but 

there may be a few bad apples. I can count at least fifteen 

people who gave that same exact answer. So unless you were 

striking each and every single person who gave that answer, 

based on the totality of the circumstances and what the Court 

saw, I don’t find that that was a genuine exercise of that. So 

that is why the challenge was overruled, the exercise of the 

peremptory challenge, and so I am going to deny the new trial.

This appeal follows.

Analysis

Three-Step Framework

2 The court reporter likely should have transcribed the word “proffered” rather 

than “proper.”
4

When a party challenges the opponent’s exercise of a 

peremptory strike, the trial court must follow the three-step 

procedure set forth by the Florida Supreme Court in 

Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996):

Step 1 A party objecting to the other side’s use of a 

peremptory challenge on racial grounds must: a) make 

a timely objection on that basis, b) show that the venire 

person is a member of a distinct racial group, and c) 

request that the court ask the striking party its reason 

for the strike. If these initial requirements are met, the 

court must ask the proponent of the strike to explain 

the reason for the strike.

Step 2 At this point, the burden of production shifts to 

the proponent of the strike to come forward with a raceneutral explanation.

Step 3 If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the 

court believes that, given all the circumstances 

surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext, 

the strike will be sustained.

Spencer v. State, 162 So. 3d 224, 226–27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting 

Frazier v. State, 899 So. 2d 1169, 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).

“When an objection is made, an on-the-record analysis must be applied 

to every challenge, without exception.” Jones v. State, 229 So. 3d 834, 837 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (Klingensmith, J., concurring specially). 

Here, we find no error in the manner that the trial court conducted step 

1 of the Melbourne framework. Therefore, our analysis focuses on steps 2 

and 3. In so doing, we stress that even when the burden of production 

shifts to the strike proponent during step 2, the burden of persuasion 

“never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful racial 

discrimination.” See Landis v. State, 143 So. 3d 974, 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2014) (quoting Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764). The strike opponent has a 

“heavy burden” because “[t]he exercise of a peremptory challenge is 

presumed to be nondiscriminatory.” See Hamdeh v. State, 762 So. 2d 

1030, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). 
5

Step 2 

We review the facial validity of the proponent’s race-neutral explanation 

de novo. See Frazier, 899 So. 2d at 1173. An explanation that is “based 

on something other than the race or ethnicity of the juror” and has no 

apparent predominant discriminatory intent on its face will satisfy step 2. 

See id. 

Here, defense counsel expressed as its reasons, “[K.L.] stated that he 

believes police are generally trustworthy and he also likes to watch CSI. 

We believe [K.L.] might, without having raised to the level of a cause

challenge, might preference police testimony over others.” Neither K.L.’s 

views on police nor his interest in CSI bears any relation to K.L.’s protected 

status as an Indian/South Asian American. See id. 

In fact, courts have found that a potential juror’s views on police and 

interest in CSI are both race-neutral reasons for excusing that potential 

juror. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 920 So. 2d 698, 700 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) 

(“The defense stated a race-neutral reason for excusing the juror. That is, 

the juror’s voir dire responses indicate that the juror may tend to assume 

that police officers testify truthfully.”); Heggan v. State, 745 So. 2d 1066, 

1069 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (discussing that juror’s answer that he would 

believe a police officer less than others is a valid race-neutral reason); see 

also U.S. v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 157 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The prosecution 

offered two race-neutral reasons for excusing [a] prospective juror . . . [one 

of which being that] his frequent television viewing of the three ‘CSI’ 

television shows might make him reluctant to convict in the absence of 

scientific evidence.”). 

Thus, the trial court erred at step 2 when it initially found defense 

counsel’s explanations about K.L.’s views on police and viewership of CSI

were not race-neutral. See Scott, 920 So. 2d at 700; Farhane, 634 F.3d at 

157. 

Step 3 

Once the strike proponent proffers a race-neutral reason, the trial court 

must proceed to a genuineness determination under step 3. See Landis, 

143 So. 3d at 978. “[W]e should review the step 3 genuineness assessment 

for clear error.” Frazier, 899 So. 2d at 1173. “[T]he proper procedure 

requires the trial court to make an inquiry of the opponent of the strike. 

At that point, the opponent bears the burden of persuasion, to demonstrate 

why the reason was not genuine.” Landis, 143 So. 3d at 978 (emphasis 

added). “The trial court should also request that the opponent advise how, 
6

given all the circumstances, the explanation is a pretext for 

discrimination.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Here, the trial court made no inquiry of the State as the strike opponent 

and the party with the heavy burden of persuasion. See id.; Hamdeh, 762 

So. 2d at 1032. Instead, the trial court expressed, “[e]ven if it was [raceneutral] I don’t think that’s genuine at this juncture. It’s very speculative.” 

This statement essentially relieved the State of its burden to prove 

purposeful racial/ethnicity discrimination related to Defendant’s 

peremptory strike of K.L. See State v. Johnson, 295 So. 3d 710, 715 (Fla. 

2020). 

We also note that the trial court’s rationale in denying Defendant’s 

strike of K.L. was in part due to its belief that “[K.L.] didn’t give any 

indication that he wouldn’t be fair and impartial.” But the trial court’s 

reasoning that a juror can be impartial should not serve as its basis for 

justifying the denial of a peremptory strike. See Julmice v. State, 14 So. 

3d 1199, 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“Based on the incorrect premise that 

there was no race-neutral reason, the trial court also found pretext. 

However, the reason was race-neutral and the denial of the peremptory 

strike cannot be justified simply because the trial judge felt the juror could 

be fair.”). 

“[A] trial court’s determination that a strike is pretextual will be 

reversed by the appellate court if there is no record support for the trial 

court’s finding.” Brannon v. State, 320 So. 3d 898, 902 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). 

When determining if a proffered race-neutral reason is genuine, the trial 

court “may consider all relevant circumstances surrounding the strike.” 

See Landis, 143 So. 3d at 978 (quoting Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 

1120 (Fla. 2009)). “Relevant circumstances may include—but are not 

limited to—the following: the racial make-up of the venire; prior strikes 

exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally 

applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the juror out for special 

treatment.” Id. at 978–79 (quoting Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1120). However, 

the trial court is not required to deliver a “perfect script” or “incant magic 

words” to comply with the required step 3 analysis. See Wimberly v. State, 

118 So. 3d 816, 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). 

Here, we have no information as to the racial or ethnic identity of other 

members of the jury venire, including individuals who voiced views of the 

police similar to K.L.’s. Thus, as in Henfield El v. State, 308 So. 3d 202, 

204 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), “[o]ur appellate review is hampered by a collective 

failure at the trial level to make a sufficient record. We are unable to 

conclusively identify the racial make-up of the venire, prior strikes 

exercised against the racial group of the challenged juror, or whether the 
7

reason proffered for the strike . . . was equally applicable to unchallenged 

jurors.” See also Brannon, 320 So. 3d at 903 (“[T]here is no record 

evidence that [the defense counsel] tried to exercise strikes against any 

other Hispanic venirepersons. This, coupled with the absence of any 

evidence regarding the racial make-up of the venire, makes it impossible 

for us to find the necessary support in the record to uphold the trial court’s 

genuineness finding.”). 

Here, the State neither suggested, let alone established, that defense 

counsel was habitually or even disproportionately striking other Indian 

Americans/South Asian Americans. In fact, defense counsel used 

Defendant’s first peremptory strike on K.L. Much of the trial court’s 

explanation surrounding the denial was not articulated until it was faced 

with Defendant’s post-verdict motion for new trial. 

Thus, we cannot find the record supports the trial court’s holding that 

the State established Defendant’s use of a peremptory strike against K.L. 

was not genuine and was a pretext for purposeful discrimination. See 

Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 (“The court’s focus in step 3 is not on the 

reasonableness of the explanation but rather its genuineness. Throughout 

this process, the burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the 

strike to prove purposeful racial discrimination.” (footnotes omitted)); 

Jones v. State, 787 So. 2d 154, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (reversing and 

remanding because trial court expressed, “[I] don’t think it’s a genuine 

strike” after defendant offered two facially neutral reasons, but there was 

nothing in the transcript to show that the trial court considered factors to 

determine genuineness (alteration in original)). 

Conclusion 

Because the trial court reversibly erred under step 2 when it found 

defense counsel’s explanations were not race-neutral, and under step 3 

when it implicitly concluded the State had met its burden of “prov[ing] 

purposeful racial discrimination,” we reverse and remand for new trial, 

subject to our affirmed ruling on Defendant’s motion to suppress. 

Affirmed in part; Reversed and Remanded for New Trial. 

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., and CIKLIN, J., concur. 

* * * 

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.