COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

August 18, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP1672 Cir. Ct. No. 2015PR33

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN RE THE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH H. LAUER:

RICHARD A. LAUER,

 APPELLANT,

 V.

DENNIS LAUER, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ESTATE OF 

ELIZABETH H. LAUER,

 RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Outagamie County: 

GREGORY B. GILL, JR., Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.
No. 2018AP1672

2

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Richard Lauer, pro se, challenges those parts of an 

order that denied a petition to remove his brother, Dennis Lauer, as personal 

representative of their mother’s estate, and denied a motion for recusal of the 

judge.1 As best as we can decipher, Richard2argues that: (1) the circuit court 

erred by denying his petition without a hearing, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 857.15

(2017-18)3; (2) the failure to “follow the mandates” of § 857.15 “resulted in a 

summary judgment”; and (3) denial of the petition is proof of the judge’s 

partiality, thus requiring recusal. We reject Richard’s arguments and affirm the 

order. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 In July 2015, Richard’s mother, Elizabeth Lauer, died intestate with 

ten adult children. Dennis petitioned for formal administration of the estate and 

consented to serve as personal representative. Eight of the siblings, including 

 

1

 Although Richard purports to challenge the denial of his petition to remove Doug Hahn 

as attorney for the estate, Richard fails to develop any argument specific to Hahn. We will not 

develop it for him. See Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng’g Testing, Inc., 2009 WI App 

62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82. The underlying order also denied Richard’s petition 

for discovery proceedings and motion for relief from a July 26, 2017 order. Because he raises no 

cognizable argument regarding these matters on appeal, any challenge to these parts of the order 

is deemed abandoned. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 

N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an issue raised in the circuit court, but not raised on 

appeal, is deemed abandoned). 

2

 Because this case involves parties sharing the same last name, we will refer to the 

parties by their first names. 

3

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted. 
No. 2018AP1672

3

Dennis, approved of his appointment as personal representative. Both Richard and 

another sibling, Mary Beth Lipp, filed their own petitions to serve as personal 

representative. After a hearing, the circuit court appointed Dennis as personal 

representative for the estate. Richard appealed, arguing in relevant part that the 

court should not have rejected Richard’s request for appointment as personal 

representative without first finding him unsuitable, and that the circuit court judge

should have recused himself because he prejudged the matter. This court rejected 

Richard’s arguments and affirmed the order. See Lauer v. Lipp, No. 2016AP465, 

unpublished slip op. (WI App July 18, 2017).

¶3 Richard then filed a motion to remove both Dennis as the personal 

representative for the estate and Douglas Hahn as the attorney for the estate. 

Richard also sought recusal of the circuit court judge. The court denied the 

motions in an order entered July 26, 2017. That same day, the court entered the 

final judgment for formal administration of the estate. The court ordered that after 

all fees and expenses were paid, the balance of the estate was to be divided equally 

amongst the ten siblings after adjustment to reflect any distribution of tangible 

personal property that had been received. Richard appealed the July 26 order and 

judgment, as well as a subsequent order denying his motion for reconsideration. 

In an opinion and order dated September 6, 2018, that appeal, No. 2017AP1790, 

was dismissed pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2), based on Richard’s failure 

to either file a brief or establish good cause for an extension. 

¶4 During the pendency of appeal No. 2017AP1790, Richard filed the 

underlying petition for a hearing to remove Dennis and Hahn as personal 

representative and attorney, respectively, of the estate. Richard also moved again 

for the judge’s recusal. The circuit court denied the petition and motion without a 

hearing, and this appeal follows. 
No. 2018AP1672

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DISCUSSION

¶5 As an initial matter, Dennis suggests that Richard’s appeal is 

procedurally barred. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, “a final judgment is 

conclusive in all subsequent actions between the same parties as to all matters 

which were litigated or which might have been litigated in the former 

proceedings.” Lindas v. Cady, 183 Wis. 2d 547, 558, 515 N.W.2d 458 (1994)

(emphasis added). The elements of claim preclusion appear to apply, as the issues 

in this appeal could have been raised in Richard’s earlier appeal, had he filed a 

brief. Furthermore, we view Richard’s prior appeal as essentially moving to 

reopen the prior judgment, and to the extent he is again making such a claim in the 

present appeal, it is not properly before us. Although Richard’s present appeal 

may be procedurally barred, we nevertheless address the merits of his arguments. 

¶6 Richard contends that he was entitled to a hearing under WIS. STAT.

§ 857.15, which governs a personal representative’s resignation or removal. The 

statute provides: 

 The judge may accept the written resignation of any 

personal representative. When a personal representative is 

adjudicated incompetent, disqualified, unsuitable, incapable 

of discharging the personal representative’s duties, or is a 

nonresident of this state who has not appointed a resident 

agent to accept service of process in all actions or 

proceedings with respect to the estate and caused such 

appointment to be filed with the court, the court shall 

remove the personal representative. When any personal 

representative has failed to perform any duty imposed by 

law or by any lawful order of the court or has ceased to be a 

resident of the state, the court may remove the personal 

representative. When grounds for removal appear to exist, 

the court on its own motion or on the petition of any person 

interested shall order the personal representative to appear 

and show cause why the personal representative should not 

be removed.
No. 2018AP1672

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WIS. STAT. § 857.15 (emphasis added). Whether to remove a personal 

representative is a matter within the circuit court’s discretion. Bell v. Neugart,

2002 WI App 180, ¶28, 256 Wis. 2d 969, 650 N.W.2d 52. When reviewing a 

discretionary decision, we search the record for reasons to sustain the circuit 

court’s exercise of discretion. Lofthus v. Lofthus, 2004 WI App 65, ¶21, 270 

Wis. 2d 515, 678 N.W.2d 393. We affirm if there is a reasonable basis for the 

court’s decision. Littmann v. Littmann, 57 Wis. 2d 238, 250, 203 N.W.2d 901 

(1973). 

¶7 Richard asserts, in conclusory fashion, that because his petition cited 

“good cause for removal,” the statute required the circuit court to order Dennis to 

appear and show cause why he should not be removed as personal representative 

of the estate. We are not persuaded. Under the statute’s plain language, a court is 

not required to order a show-cause hearing unless the petition establishes that 

“grounds for removal appear to exist.” By denying the motion, the court, sub 

silentio, determined no grounds for removal existed. In any event, the record 

supports the court’s discretionary decision. As this court acknowledged in 

Richard’s earlier appeal: “[T]he record supports the court’s finding that Dennis 

was best suited to fill that role [of personal representative]. Eight of the ten heirs 

requested Dennis’ appointment. The court reasonably found the other heirs would 

more likely cooperate with Dennis, including giving him access to places the 

alleged will might be found.” Lauer, No. 2016AP465, ¶6. The circuit court 

properly denied the petition without ordering a show-cause hearing. 

¶8 Richard also argues the circuit court judge should have recused 

himself. WISCONSIN STAT. § 757.19 governs judicial disqualification. None of 

the objective factors that mandate recusal apply in this case. See WIS. STAT.

§ 757.19(2)(a)-(f). The only possible relevant consideration is whether 
No. 2018AP1672

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§ 757.19(2)(g) applies. That paragraph mandates a judge’s disqualification “only 

when that judge makes a determination that, in fact or in appearance, he or she 

cannot act in an impartial manner.” State v. American TV & Appliance of 

Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 183, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989). Whether the 

subjective situation exists and requires disqualification is based on the judge’s 

own determination of whether he or she will remain impartial. State v. Harrell, 

199 Wis. 2d 654, 658, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996). Appellate review of that 

determination is limited to establishing whether the judge made a determination 

requiring disqualification. Id. at 663-64. 

¶9 The statutory paragraph at issue does not require disqualification in 

situations where: (1) someone other than the judge objectively believes there is an 

appearance that the judge is unable to act in an impartial manner; or (2) the 

judge’s impartiality can reasonably be questioned by someone other than the 

judge. American TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 183. In Richard’s earlier appeal, we noted 

that because the circuit court judge repeatedly found he could be impartial, there 

was no basis for this court to decide that he should have recused himself. In the 

present appeal, Richard offers no new facts other than the court’s decision on 

appeal to support his recusal argument. Specifically, he asserts that the circuit 

court’s denial of the petition without a show-cause hearing is proof of the judge’s 

partiality. However, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis 

for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 

¶10 Finally, Richard suggests the circuit court erroneously granted 

summary judgment in favor of Dennis. Richard offers no authority for his claim, 

and the record provides no basis upon which Richard can establish that the denials

of his motions were, in effect, a summary judgment. 
No. 2018AP1672

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By the Court.—Order affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.