### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Marc h 24 , 200 4 S es sio n
JOAN N M ALL INA K GLA SSEL L v. R ICHA RD LEE GLA SSEL L

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for K nox Coun ty No. 150397-3 Sharon Bell, Chan cellor F ILED JUNE 10, 2004

No. E2003-01602-COA- R3-CV

J oann Mallinak Gla ssell (“Plaintiff”) was re prese nted by atto rn ey J ames M. Crain ( “Crain” ) thr ou g ho ut d ivo rc e pr oc e e din g s sh e fi le d a g a ins t Ric ha rd L e e Gl a sse ll (“ De fe nd a nt” ). Af te r a tr ia l, the Tria l Co urt or de re d th e e qu ity fr om the sal e of th e mari ta l r e sid e nc e to b e div ide d e qu a lly betwee n the parties. The Tria l Court then applied various of f-se ts to the amount awar ded Plaintiff, there by reduc ing th e n et am o u n t of Plaintiff’s re covery to $0.00. The Tria l Court concluded that Crain’s attorne y ’s fe e lien wa s lower in priority to the various off- sets. Crain appea ls, c laiming the Trial Court imprope rly subordinated his attorney ’s fe e lien to the off -sets and that his li en should be g iven priority . We modify the judg ment of the Trial Court and af firm as modified.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed as Modif ied; Case Re m anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the op in io nof the c ourt, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., E.S., and B EN H. C A N T RE LL , S P

. J ., joined. Appellant James M. Crain, Attorney , Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee. Kimberly R. Tay lor, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llee Richar d L ee G lassell.

OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Th is a pp e a l in vo lv e s th e e nf

or c e me nt o f an atto rn e y ’s fe e lie n. Th e app e lla nt i s attorney J ames M. Crain, who repr esente d Plaintiff in the underlying divor ce litig ation which beg an on Marc h 20, 2001, when Plaintiff f iled a complaint seeking a divorc e fr om Defe ndant on various g rounds. Crain re prese nted Plaintiff when the c omplaint was filed and thr oug hout the trial.T hi s C o urt has no t b een p rovided a t rans cri p t f rom t he d i vo rce t ri al

. H o wever, none of t he f act ual f i nd i ngs 1 ari si ng f rom t he t ri al are di rect l y at i ss ue o n ap p eal

. W e wi l l dis cuss only t ho se fact ual fi nd i ngs i n the F i nal Jud gm ent t hat are r el evant t o s ho wi ng how and why the T ri al C o urt dis t ri b ut ed P l ai nt i f f ’ s eq ui t y i n t he m ari t al res i d ence i n t he
manne r i n w hi ch i t di d. B eca us e we do not ha ve a t r ans cr i pt , we concl us i vel y pre s ume t he T rial Co ur t ’ s f act ual d et erm i nat i o ns ari si ng f rom t est i m o ny p res ent ed at t ri al are co rr ect

. " T hi s co urt canno t revi ew t he f act s d e no vo wi t ho ut an ap p el l at e reco rd co nt ai ni ng t he f act s, a nd ther ef o re, w e m ust a ss um e t hat t he reco rd, had i t be en p res erved , wo ul d have
con t ai n ed s u f

f i ci en t e v i den ce t o s u ppor t t h e t r i al c ou r t ' s f ac t u al f i n di n g s
. " In r e A d o p t i o n o f D

. P

. M. , 90 S. W

. 3d 263, 2 6 7 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 20 0 2 ) ( q uo t i ng S h e rro d v . W ix , 8 4 9 S .W .2 d 7 8 0 , 7 8 3 (T e n n . C t. A p p .1 9 9 2 ))

. -2- Def endant a nswere d the complaint and f iled a countercla im seeking a divorc e fr om Pla int if f o n th e sa me g ro un ds a s th os e a lle g e d b y Pla int if f. B othPla intif

f andDe fe nd a nt s ou g ht t o be the primary

residential pa

rent of the ir two minor children, w ho are 10 and 11 y ear s old.

I n J une of 2001, upon a g ree ment of the pa rties, the Tria l Court entere d an orde r appointing attorney Way ne Wy koff (“Wykoff” ) as g uardia n ad litem on behalf of the two c hildren. The order i n s tructed Wykoff to “ma ke an a ppropriate investigation into t he cir cumstance s of the parties a nd the best intere st of his wards” and to su b mit a report to the Trial Court once the investigation was completed. Plaintiff a nd Def endant a lso ag ree d to underg o ps y ch ologic al evaluations byElsbeth Fr eema n, PhD, and an a g ree d Orde r wa s entere d by the Tr i al Court to that eff ect. The parties a g ree d to split the costs of t he psy cholog ical evaluations, “subjec t to rea llocation by the Court at the trial of this cause.”

I n Fe bruary

of 2002, De fendant obtained an Or der of Protection afte r proving alleg ations of domestic abuse . Def endant wa s awa

rded e x clusive possession of the marital residenc e and Plaintiff was or dere d to vacate the pre mises. The Ord er fu rt h er provided that counse l for Def endant wa s to submit an aff idavit of attorney ’s fee s incurre d in obta ining the Orde r of Protection and g rante d Def

endant “ rea sonable attorney fee s incurre d in this cause.” The pa rties e q u it y in th ema rit a l re sidence was $53,471.78. The marital re sidence was sold prior to trial with the equity proce eds being held in trust while resolution of t he various issues
we re pe nd ing wi th the Tria l Co urt. In O c tob e r o f 2 00 2, the Tria l Co urt pe rm itt e d Pl a int if f t o withdraw $2,000 f

rom her share of the equity proce eds in or der for he r to make pay ments on a ca r no te a nda

lin e of cred it , sai d pay me nts tot a lin g $5 28 .3 1. Th e re ma ini ng $1 ,4 71 .6 9 w a s p a id t o P l a i n t i f f d i r e c t l y.
Th e div or c e tr ia l an d vari ou s mo tio ns too k a pp ro xima te ly

six day s, be g inn ing in Aug ust of 2002 and concluding in November of that same y ear . An extensive Final Judgment wa s enter ed by

the Trial Court on De cembe r 9, 2002, an d am en d ed on May 22, 2003. I n the Fina l

1 J udg ment, as ame nded, the Trial Court concluded that the equity proce eds from the marital re sidence should be divided equa lly with Plaintiff and Def

endant eac h rec eiving an aw ard of $26,735.89. The Tria l Co urt late r s ta te d th a t:-3- The Court believe s that the monies held in Trust constitutes (sic) a common fund cr eate d by

and for the m arital estate and believes that it can cha rg e ce rtain expenses on the e state.

Be cause Plaintiff alrea dy

had re ceive d $2,000 from her share of the e quity

proce eds, her

total awar d
was re duced to $24,735.89. The Trial Court's order w ith reg ard to Plaintiff’s re maining $24,735.89 fo rm s th e ba sis of

thi s a pp e a l.

After the parties separ ated, De fendant was the primary residential pa

rent of the two minor children. One of the many issues at t rial was the amount of Plaintiff’s child support ar rea rag e. The Trial Court fo u n d P l ai n t i ff wa s g ainfully employ ed fr om April throug h November of 2001,
earning $40,248 in g ross wag es. Plaintiff also re ceived $ 5 4 8 in unemploy ment compensation for the month of Decembe r, t here by resulting in total gr oss wag es of $40,796 f or 2001. From J anuary throug h Aug ust of 2002, Plaintiff rec eived une mploy ment compensation a vera g ing $1,237.50 pe r month. Pl aintiff paid no c hild support from April 2001 throug h Aug ust 2002.

I n D e c e mbe r o f 20 01 , Pl a int if f b e g a n r e c e ivi ng $1 ,3 66 pe r m on th i n So c ia l Se c urity disabilitybenef

its. At that same time, eac h of the c hildren beg an re ceiving monthlybenef its of $321. Al l of the Soc ia l Se c urity

pay me nts we re se nt d ir e c tly to P la int if

f, inc lud ing the c omb ine d mo nth ly benef it o f $642 for the c hildren. B eca use De fendant was the primary residential pa

rent, the Trial Court concluded Plaintiff sho u l d h av e given the $642 in monthly payments to Defe ndant for the children’ s use and be nefit. From Dec ember of 2001 throug h Aug ust of 2 0 0 2 , P laintiff re ceive d a total of $5,778 in be nefits for the children, but g ave Def endant only $1,600. Acc ording ly , the Trial Court concluded that Plainti ff owe d Def endant $4,178 f

or the Social Sec urity

benef its earmar ked for the c hildren’s be nefit which Pl aintiff retained for her own use. The Trial Court also found that Plaintiff owed Defe ndant re imbursement for he alth and denta l insurance on the childre n and foroneha lf of the c hil dr e n’ s u np a id m e dic a l bi lls . A ll i n a ll, the Tri al Co urt con clud e d Pl a int if f w a s in
arr ear s a total of $19,584.69 for child support, social sec urit y p ay ments improperly reta ined, reimburse ment for he alth insurance , and one- half of the outstanding me dical bills.

As previously

noted, Def

endant was awa

rded attorney ’s fe es whe n he obtained the O r d e r o f P r o t e c t i o n
. T h e a m o u n to f a t t o r n e y ’ s f

e e s D e f e n d a n tw a s a w ar d e d w a s $ 1 , 5 3 3

. 4 4

. In addition, Plainti ff a

ppare ntly was late to court on seve ral oc casions an d fa i l ed to coope rate in the dis c ov e r y p r o c e s s t o s u c h a n e xt e n t t h a t s a n c t i o n s w e r e i m p o s e d

. F o r e xa m p l e , P l a i n t i f f f a i le d to appea r for depositions which resulted in De fendant’s incurring additional attorney ’s fees. The amount of sanc tions im posed by the Trial Court wa s $5,372

. 5 0

. T h u s , the combined a mount Plaintiff owed De fendant for attor n ey fee s resulting from the Or der of Protection and discove ry sanctions totaled $6,905.94. The Trial Court conc luded these e x penses should be paid to Defe ndant out of the re maining $24,735.89 f rom Plaintiff’s share in the equity proce eds fr om the sale of the marital re sidence , there by reduc ing Plaintiff’ s awa

rd to $17,829.95. Although Plaintiff a g ree d to the appointment of Wy koff as g uardia n ad litem a ndto underg o a psy cholog ical examination with Dr

. E ls b eth Fr eema n, Def endant pa id most of the up-frontT he K no x C o unt y Juveni l e C o urt exerci sed juri sdi ct i o n o ver cust o d y of t he chi l d ren. G uardian a d l i t e m fees 2

were i ncurred i n that p roce ed i ng as well

. T he $ 9 , 7 2 8

. 8 5 t o t al ref l ect s t he guardian ad l i t em f ee s ow ed by Pl ai n t i f

f f r om b o t h p ro ce ed i ng s. -4- c os ts a sso c ia te d w iththe se a g re e d u po n e ve nts

. I n ad dit ion to pa y ing his po rt ion of the se e xpe ns e s, Def endant paid, on Plainti ff’ s behalf, a total of $2,002.50 toward the fee of the g uardia n ad litem and $1,950 toward the fee of Dr. Fr eema n. The outstanding balanc e Plaintiff owed D efe ndant base d on his pay ment on her be half of the se ag ree d upon expenses was $3,952.50. The Trial Court deduc ted this amount from the $17,829.95 rema ining in Plainti ff’ s share of the e quity proce eds, lea ving he r a bala nce of

$13,877.45.
Next, the Trial Court determined that Pla i ntiff’s re maining $13,877.45 should be
app lie d to wa

rdthe $1 9, 58 4. 69 in c hil d s up po rt arr e ara g e , th e re by

low e ri ng that arr e ara g e to $5,707.24 and reduc ing Plaintiff’s rema ining share in the equity proce eds to $0.00. The Trial Court then stated:

Ea c h party ’s po rt ionof the c ou rt

c os ts a s p ro vid e d h e re ina ft e r i n Para g ra ph 34 sh a ll c ome ou t of tha t party ’s sh are of the mon ie s h e ld in Trust to the ex tent monies rema in, and the court costs shall include the Guar d i an ad L item fee s as alre ady provided he rein with the cler k’s costs having priority

over the Guar dian ad Litem’s fee s tax ed as costs inth e e v e n t o f

a s h o r tf a ll

. T o th e e xte n t i n s u f

f ic ie n t f unds
re ma in t o c ov e r that pa

rt y ’s sh are of

su c h c ou rt

c os ts, that pa

rt y sh a ll sti ll b e re sp on sib le fo r the re ma ind e r o wi ng
. Th e a mou nt o wi ng to the Guar dian ad Litem from ... [P laintiff is] $9 , 7 2 8

. 8 5 .... The 2 attorney ’s lien ea ch attorne y has ag ainst their re spe c ti v e clients c omes last in the Order

of priority

. After entry of the F inal J udg ment, Crain withdrew as Plainti ff ’s counse l, entere d a specia l appea

ranc e, and f

iled a motion to amend the F inal J udg ment. I n this mot ion, Crain asserted that he had a

lien on all money

or ot her assets awa

rded to his forme r client pursua nt to Tenn. Code An n. § 23- 2- 10 2. Cr a in cl a ime d tha t bec a us e of thi s lie n, he ha d a pro pe rt y ri g ht in Pl a int if f’ s a sse ts and the T r ia l Co u r t la c k e d au th o r ity to a d ju d ic a te th o s e r ig h ts in th e man n e r in w h ic h it did. Acc ording to Crain, Plaintiff’s financ ial obligations could be pa id from her share of the e quity

“if, and only to the extent that, said sums e x cee d her liability to A ttorney for his f ees an d ex penses.” Crain’s lien claim is based solely on Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-2-102. No written ag ree ment g ranting a lien on any

of Plaintiff’s property was enter ed into be tween Plaintiff and Crain. The Trial Court
e sse nti a lly

de nie d Cr a in’ s mo tio n, statin g a s f oll ow s: [The para g raphs in the F inal J udg ment reg arding at t o rney liens] ... pertain to att o rney liens and priority

of payments from the Trust Acc ount and how the attorney liens fall within the priority of payment, [and] this Court Alt ers or Amends t he J udg ment to clarifyT en n
. Code An n
. § 23- 2- 102 c r ea t es a s t at u t or y at t or n ey ’ s l i en for a t t or n ey s w h o be g i n a l aw s u i t

. T en n
. Code 3 A nn. § 2 3

- 2

- 1 0 3 creat es a s t at ut o ry l i en fo r an at t o rney who i s hi red aft er s ui t has al read y b een b rought. In S c h m ittt he Cour t obs er v ed t h at “ t h e an al y s i s u n der bot h of t h e s t at u t es i s t h e s ame
. ” 113 S. W

. 3d a t 351- 52.
-5- this Court’s ruling and f

inds th at ea ch at torney

has a lien a s to any money g oing into their r espec tive cli ent’s possession. This Court finds that with respec t to the funds which have been he ld in Tr ust, we are talking a

bout other monies of the ma rital estate. T his Court finds that J ames M. Crain was not a pa rty and the issue of

enfor ceme nt of his lien w as not be fore this Court. Rather, this Court finds that what was be fore this Court was the issue of prioritizi ng payments/pay ment of c la ims to be ma de fr om the mari ta l e state , s pe c if ic a lly fu nd s h e ld in Trust. This Court finds that as t o the priorityof cla ims ag ainst the
mari ta l e state , th e a tto rn e y ’s lie n th a t e a c h p art y ha s a g ain st the ir
r e s p e c t i v e c l i e n t s c o m e s l a s ti n t h e O r d e r o f p r i o r i t y. Crain appe als the denia l of his motion to alter or amend the F inal J udg ment. Crain’s iss ue on app e a l is wh e the r the Tria l Co urt e rr e d “ in d ir e c tin g that mo nie s a wa rd e d to Pla int if

f i n th is action be de voted to payment of Plaintiff’s oblig ations, fre e and c lear of the lien of he r attorne y .”
Discussion As explained in footnote one of this Opinion, the re levant fa cts are not in dispute on appea l. Wi th respec t to lega l issues, our revie w is conducte d “under a pure de novo standard of revie w, ac cording no defe renc e t o t h e conclusions of law made by the lower

courts.” So uth e rn Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

First, we will address the Trial Court’s conclusion that Crain “wa s not a party and the issue of enf

orce ment of his lien was not befor e thi s Court.” The Trial Court rende red this opinion
on May 22, 2003 , en t ere d nunc pro tunc to March 7, 2003. Seve ral months later, on O ctober 30, 2003, our Supreme Court issued its de cision in Sc hm itt v . S mi th , 1 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d 3 4 8 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 3 )

. In that case , Mrs. Schmitt obt ained c ounsel and ther eaf ter a complain t fo r divorce was filed on he r behalf . Mrs. Schmitt subs equently reta ined new counsel. Mrs. Schmitt and her ne w attorne y executed an e mploy ment ag ree ment that g rante d her attorney a “lien as t o all property , both rea l and persona l, including money , assets, alimon y or thing s of value, w hich wer e re cover ed, obtained, prese rved or

protec ted for Schmitt in this l awsuit or any lawsuit or claim.” 118 S.W .3d at 350. The final dec ree order ed the pa rties to sell the m arital residence and to pay their own attorney

fee s. After the marital residenc e was sold, Schmitt’s attorney filed a petition to enfor ce the lien. Id . One of 3 the issues to be dec ided was w hether the trial court had jurisdiction to enforc e the lien or whether the attorne y

was re quired to file a separ ate lawsuit in or der to ha ve the lien e nforc ed. In resolving this iss ue, the Court stated:-6- The lien in this case is a cha rg ing lien attache d to the proce eds g ener ated f

rom the sale of

the parties' marital home. " Whil e a char g ing lien se rves to sec ure an attorney ' s fee s, it does not function
as an ad j u d i cation of the rig hts betwee n the lawy er and his or her cli ent ." Starks , 2 0 S

. W

. 3 d at6 5 2 (c i t i n g Pierce v. Lawrence , 84 Tenn. 572, 1 S.W. 204, 205-06 (1886)). Thus , "[a] trial court may decla re the exis tence of an attorney ' s lien in the suit out of which the d i s p u t e r e g ar d i n g t h e a t t o r n e y' s f e e ar o s e , b u t o r d i n ar i l y a n a t t o r n e y, no t be ing a pa

rty to the pr oc e e din g , may no t ob ta in a

jud g me nt w ith
res pect to hi s or he r fee i n t hat act io n. " Id. (c i t i n g Sta te v . E dg e fie ld & KentuckyR.R. , 6 3 T e nn . 9 2, 97 (1 87 4) ; P e r k in s v . Perkins , 56 Tenn. (9 H eisk.) 95, 97-98 ( 1871)).

Al tho ug h a n atto rn e y

must g e ne ra lly

c omm e nc e a

se pa rate proce eding to enforce his or he r contra ctual rig ht to a fee , an exception has bee n carved out in which the tria l court may exert jurisdiction where the money or prope rty

that is the subject of the lien "c omes within the control of the court in the case in w hich the
ser vi ces w ere ren dere d. " Id. at 653....

We have he re a

divorce action in which t h e trial c ourt a dju dic a te d th e dis tr ibu tio n of the mari ta l pro pe rt y ow ne d b y Sc hmi tt and Smith. The residenc e that was the subjec t of McCrary ' s lien was inc lud e d inthe mari ta l pro pe rt y ult imate ly div ide d by the tr ia l c ou rt

. As such, the pr operty

upon which the lien wa s t o be enf orce d, the ho us e , w a s w ith in the c on tr ol o f the tr ia l cou rt

.... Th e re fo re , w e ho ld that the trial court prope rly adjudicate d the attorne y ' s lien in this case.

* * * *

F ina lly , w e no te that it

is i n th e int e re st o f j ud ici al e c on omy to a llo w the sa me c ou rt

to h e ar a ll ma tte rs re g ard ing the pr op e rt y in question. For ci n g t he parties to procee d in a sepa rate action with a jud g e un famil iar w iththe un de rl y ing fa c ts o f thed ivo rc e a c tio n w ou ld
cause both parties to incur a ddit i o n al attorne y ' s fee s, costs, and lit ig a tio n e xpe ns e s. Th e re fo re , we ho ld that th e tr ia l c ou rt in this c a se had jurisdiction to adjudicate Mc Crary ' s attorney ' s lien.

Sc hm itt , 118 S.W .3d at 353-55 (f ootnote omitted).

When Crain’s m otion to alter or ame nd the final judg ment was de cided, the T rial Court did not have the bene fit of the Sc hm itt opinion. Apply ing the holding of Sc hm itt , we c onclude-7-

that the Trial Court had jurisdict i o n t o ad judicate issues surr ounding the enfor ceme nt of Crain’s attorney ’s fe e lien and, in f act, did so. The primary

issue on appea l i s wh et h er the Trial Court er red w hen it subordinated Cr a in’ s li e n to Pla int if

f’ s f inanci al ob lig a tio ns in the ma nn e r s e t f orth a bo ve , th e re by

dir e c tin g a ll of Plaintiff’s shar e of the equity proce eds to be used in partial satisfaction of these oblig ations and, for a ll intents and purposes, leaving Plaintiff without any assets to satisfy

Crain’s lien.

Def enda n t a r g u e s th e T r ia l C o u r t c o rr e c tl y p r io r it iz e d Cr a in ’ s li e n in li g h t o f the decision of our Supreme Court in Ro be rts v . Mitc he ll , 94 Tenn. 277, 29 S.W. 5 (1895). I n that case , Mit c he ll w a s a wa

rd e d a mon e tary jud g me nt ag a ins t Robe rt s. I n a se pa rate a ndind e pe nd e nt l a ws uit , Roberts was a war ded a mone tary judgme nt ag ainst Mitchel l

. R oberts then f iled a motion to have the judg ments off-se t ag ainst eac h other. Mitchell’s attorney s opposed the motion unless it was g rante d s ub

je c t t o th e ir

lie n f or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Th e iss ue on app e a l w a s w he the r the jud g me nts should be off

-set ag ainst eac h other subjec t to the lien for attorne y ’s fe es. Id. at 277-78, 29 S.W. at 5.

The re levant statutory provision as it ex isted at that time was Te nn. Code Ann. § 25- 105 which provide d that “[j] udg ments of the same cour t m ay be set off ag ainst eac h other on mot ion .” Af

te r dis c us sin g ho w o the r j urisd ic tio ns ha ve re so lve d th is p art ic ula r i ssu e , o ur

Sup re me Cou rt a do pte d th e fo llo wi ng ru le :

We think the better and more equitable r u l e i s one that subordinates the rig ht of set-off of independe nt judgme nts render ed in differ ent suits, gr owing out of d i ff er en t cause s of ac tion, to the
a tto rn e y ’s lie n or cla im fo r s e rv ic e s r e nd e re d inthe pa rt ic ula r s uit ; and we do not hesitate to adopt it as the rule of pra ctice in this State. O n th is s u b

je c t, a n d in e la

b o r a ti o n o f o u r v ie w s , w e q u o te the lang uag e of Chanc ellor Walworth in Dunki ns v. Vandenburgh , 1 Paige Ch. 624:

" Th e qu e sti on in a ll the se c a se s is , Wh a t is equitable a nd just be tween the parties a nd the attorne y or solicitor? Where diff ere nt claims arise in the
c ou rs e of the sa me su it, or

in r e la ti on to the s a me ma tte r, it i s u nd ou bte dly

e qu ita ble a nd jus t th a t th e se equit ies should be ar

rang ed betwe en the pa

rties without refe renc e to the solicitor or attorney ' s lien. His lien is onlyon the c l ear balanc e due to his client afte r all these equities are settled. But where o t h er claims, arising out of diff

e r e n t tr ansac tions, and which could not have been leg al or e quitable set-of f in that
su it, e xist b e tw e e n th e pa

rtie s, the Cou rt ou g ht no t toT he rel evant st at ut e was am end ed i n 19 3 2 t o exp res sl y i ncl ud e t he p rovis i o n regardi ng at t o rney ’ s fee l i ens 4 whi ch t he R o b e rts Cou r t h e l d was i mp l i e d. W i t h t h i s a me n dm e n t , t h e s t a t u t e pr ov i de d t h a t “ [j ] u dg me n t s of t h e s a me
co urt m ay b e s e t o ff

agai nst each o t her on m o t i o n, but no t s o as t o de feat l i ens of at t o rney s o r t o ci rcum vent t he
ex empt i on l aw s
. ” T h e s t at u t e h as r ema i n ed u n ch an g ed s i n ce t h e 1932 a men dmen t a n d i s n ow codi f i ed at T en n
. Code A n n . § 2 5 -1 -1 0 3

. -8-

divest the lien of the attorney or s olicitor which has
a lr e a dy a tta c he d on the a mou nt r e c ov e re d f or the c os ts o f t h at particular litigation. W hen the solicitor has be e n at th e la

bo r ande xpe ns e of

pr os e c uti ng a su it, it is equitable and just that his costs should be paid out of t hatli ti gati on ."

No r is ... t h e C o d e t o b e c o n s tru e d s o a s t o m i l i t a t e a g a ins t thi s v ie w. B y

that se c tio n it is p ro vid e d th a t " jud g me nts of

the sa me Court may

be set off ag ainst eac h other on motion." B ut we hold that this section must be rea d as if it c ontained the implied condition that this set- off will not be allowed in derog ation of the attorney ' s lien for h is s e r v ic e s inp r o s e c u ti n g th e s u it a n d o b tain in g th e p ar ti cular jud g me nt. We thin k th is con str uc tio n g ive s f

ull fo rc e to this provision of the C ode, and, at t he same time, it preserve s the equities of the pa rties intere sted.... I n the ca se at bar an order will be e ntere d all owing the set-of

f, but subject to the lien of the solicitors, which will be decla

red by a prope r orde r.
Ro be rts , 94 Tenn. at 279-81, 29 S.W . at 5, 6. 4

This Court had occa sion to discuss the Ro be rts opinion in Babcoc k v. J ones , No. 73, 1987 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 3070 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1987)

. Babcoc k involved a landlord- tenant lawsuitwh er ei n t h e t ri al co u rt en t er ed o ff -s et t i n g j u d gm en t s
. T h e d ef en d an t ’s at t o rn eyfi l ed a motion for a new trial beca

use no provision was made for his attorne y ’s fe e lien. Babcoc k , 1987 Tenn. App. LEXI S 3070, at * 1. The trial court overrule d the motion and thi s Court affirmed that dec ision relying on the rule a dopted in Ro be rts . We noted t h at T en n. Code Ann. § 25-1- 103 had no application to judg ments rende red on claims which arose from the sa me transa ction and which w ere order ed off

-set. Id . at * 3. We noted that while Ro be rts was decide d befor e the statute wa s amende d to add the phra se “but not so as to defe at liens of attorne y s...”, its rationale a pplied with continuing forc e bec ause the Ro be rts Court “implicated a c ondition ... almost identical to the ame ndment which
was a dded thirty

seven y ear s later.” Id

. Ap plying the fo re g oin g to the pr e se nt c a se , we mus t de te rm ine wh e the r t he cl a ims wh ic h w e re of

f- se t by the Tria l Co urt aro se “ in the c ou rs e of the sa me su it, or

in r e la tio n to the sa me matter” such that it would be “undoubte dly equitable a nd just that these e quities should be arrang ed betwee n the parties, without ref ere nce to the solicitor or attorne y ' s lien.” Ro be rts , 94 Tenn. at 280, 29 S.W . at 5. I n so doing w e must k ee p i n m i n d t h at t he “matter” at issue before the Trial Court-9-

when it re ndere d its Final J udg ment was the diss o l u tion of the six teen y ear marria g e betwe en the parties.

The fir st off-se t by the Trial Court wa s for $1,533.44 in attorney ’s fe es incurr ed by Def endant in succ essfully

obtaining an Or d er o f P rotec tion which was issued ba sed on Plaintiff’s do mest ic abu se . T he Pe tit ionfo r an O rd e r o f P ro te c tio n w a s f ile d o ri g ina lly

in the F ou rth Ci rc uit Court for Knox County on Marc h 20, 2001, and an Ex Parte Orde r of Protec tion was issued by that Court the same day . Marc h 20, 2001, also is when Plaintiff fil ed t h e compl aint for divorc e in the Trial Court. The order of protection was transfer red to the Trial Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 3- 60 3 w hic h p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:
36-3-603. Duration of prot ection order – P etition for protec tion order in divorce ac tion. – (a) I f an order of protection is ordere d by
a court and either

the petitioner or r espondent fil es a complaint for divorce , the orde r of pr otection shall rema in in effe ct until the court in which the divorc e ac tion lies modi fies or dissolves the or der. (b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a petitioner from reque sting re lief under

this section in a divorce action.

I n Feb ruary

of 2002, the Trial Court appar ently rea ffirme d the pre vious order a fter concluding that Def

endant ha d proven domestic abuse by Plaintiff. I n this new Orde r of Protec tion, Def endant wa s awa

rded attorney ’s fe es. We believe the a war d of attorne y ’s fe es in the amount of $1,533.44 ar o s e o u t o f t h e same suit and is in relation to the samematter at issue before the Trial Court and, there fore , was properly off- set ag ainst Plaintiff’s share of the equity proce eds fr om the sale of the marital re sidence

. This rationale a lso holds true for the $5,372.50 in sanc tions im posed ag ainst Plainti ff during the divorce litigation. Clearly , these sanc tions arose out of and wer e part of the same suit wher ein Plaintiff was a war ded, at lea st init ially , a judg ment of $24,735.89.

Plaintiff affirmatively

ag ree d to the appointment of Wykoff a s g uardia n ad litem and to underg o a psy cholog ical exam i n at i o n by Dr. Elsbeth Free man. Plaintiff’s ag ree ment was memorialized in the divorce action via entry of ag ree d order s by the Trial Cour t

. Defendant
a dv a n c e d P l a i n t i f

f $ 3 , 9 5 2

. 5 0 t o w ar d s t h e s e a g r e e d u p o n e xp e n s e s
. I tw o u l d d e f y r e a s o n t o ho ld these e x penses did not arise out of t he same suit or we re not in re lation to the same matter at issue befor e the Trial Court. Acc ording ly , we conclude the Trial C ourt proper ly enter ed a judgment f or Def endant f or this amount and prope rly off- set that amount ag ainst Plainti ff’ s judgme nt for her share of the e quity

proce eds fr om the marital re sidence

. Th e final amo unt w hic h w a s o ff -s e t f ro m Plaint if

f’ s $ 24 ,7 35 .8 9 ju dg me nt w a s a portion of the child support ar rea rag e. As noted a

bove, the total ar

rea rag e wa s $19,584.69, which repr esente d unpaid child support, social sec urity funds improperly

reta ined, unpaid medica l expenses, etc. Unpaid child support is often at issue in divorce litigation when the parties have be en living in sepa

rate residenc es, and w as so at issue in this lawsuit. Again, w e would be har d-pre ssed-10-

to come up with a rationale for holding that these expenses did not arise out of the same la wsuit or
we re no t r e la te d to the sa me ma tte r at is su e be fo re the Tria l Co urt. W e ins te a d h oldthat th e se expenses did arise out of this same suit and wer e related to the matter then at issue bef

ore the Trial Cou rt a nd , th e re fo re , w e re pr op e rl y of f- se t a g a ins t Plaint if

f’ s sh are of

the e qu ity

pr oc e e ds

. After apply ing the rule announce d by our Supreme Court in Ro be rts and re aff irmed by this Court i n Babcoc k , w e c on c lud e the Tria l Co urt di d n ot c omm it r e ve rs ibl e e rr or wh e n it reduc ed Plaintiff’s entire $24,735.89 judgme nt by the various off-se ts awar ded De fendant by g iving those off- sets priority

over Crain’s attorney ’s fe e lien. Crain’ s “lien is only on the clea r bala nce due to his clie n t af

t er al l these e quities are se ttled.” Her e “the clea r bala nce due ” Plaintiff af ter the “equities a

re se ttled” is zero.

Ho w e v e r , w e n o te th a t a ll o f th e is s u e s s u rr o u n d in g c u s to d y o f th e c h ildr en we re resolved by

the Knox C ounty

J uvenile Court, w h ic hin v o lve d an indepe ndent proc eeding and matter s not directly

at issue bef

ore the Trial Court her ein. We, there fore , modify t h e T ri al Court’s Fina l Judg me nt t o g ive Cr a in’ s lie n f or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s p ri ority

ov e r any c os ts a sso c ia te d w ith the Juve nil e Court litigation i ncluding , but not lim ited to, the g uardia n ad litem fe es i n cu rr ed i n t h at p ro ce ed i n g. We a c kn ow le dg e that ou r m od if ic a tio n o f the Tria l Co urt’ s ju dg me nt w ill be of lit tle c omf

ort to Crain a s th e $ 2 4 , 7 3 5

. 8 9 w h ic h Cr a in c laim s is s u b je c t to h is a tt o r n e y li e n is r e d u c e d to zero even wi th this mod if

ic a tio n o f the Tria l Co urt’ s ju dg me nt.
The F inal J udg ment of the Trial Court is affirmed a s modifie d

. I n s o d oing, w e emphasize t h at P laintiff does not cha lleng e the a dequac y of the leg al re prese ntation she rec eived fr om C rain andou r Jud g me nt s ho ul d in no way bere a d to su g g e st that Plaint if f i s n ot i nd e bte d to Crain for the leg al fe es and e x penses r esulting f rom Crain’s re prese nting Plaintiff. I n l ight of our h o l d i n g , w e p r e t e r m i tD e f e n d a n t ’ s i s s u e o f

w h e t h e r th e $ 2 4 , 7 3 5

. 8 9 a c t u a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d a “ r e c o v e r y” of asse ts subject to an attorne y ’s fe e lien. We also pre termit t h e i s s u e o f whether the Trial Court pr op e rl y c on sid e red th e e qu ity

fr om the mari ta l r e sid e nc e to b e a “ c omm on fu nd ” fr om w hic h it could orde r payment of marital de bts prior to enfor cing an attorne y ’s fe e liens.
Conclusion The judg ment of the Trial Court is aff irmed as modified a nd this cause is re manded to the Tria l Co urt f

or fu rthe r pr oc e e din g s c on sis te nt wi th this Op ini on a ndfo r c oll e c tio n o f the c os ts b e l o w
. C o s t s o n ap p e a l ar e a s s e s s e d a g a i n s tt h e A p p e l l a n tJ a m e s M

. C r a i n a n d h i s s u r e t y.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE