SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1296-15T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANDREW J. FEDE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

Submitted March 7, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Reisner and Sumners.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. 004-

04-15.

Martyrson Imbert, and Andrew Ucheomumu (The 

Ucheomumu Law Group) of the Maryland Bar, 

admitted pro hac vice, attorneys for appellant

(Mr. Imbert and Mr. Ucheomumu, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Elizabeth Rebein, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

July 10, 2017
2 A-1296-15T4

Defendant Andrew J. Fede appeals his conviction for 

obstruction of justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1, following a trial de 

novo in the Law Division. We affirm.

We summarize the facts pertinent to our review. On March 16, 

2015, Cliffside Park Police officers responded to a 911 call 

reporting a domestic dispute involving a male and a female at an 

apartment on Palisades Ave. After the police knocked on the 

apartment door, defendant partially opened the door, keeping a

chain lock engaged. The police repeatedly requested to enter to 

determine if there was an injured person needing assistance, but 

defendant refused in an angry, uncooperative, and hostile manner.

Defendant acknowledged that a woman lived with him in the apartment 

but stated she was not present, and that police needed a search 

warrant to enter. 

At one point, when defendant told the police that he would 

not allow them entry, one of the officers replied, "Sir if you let 

us in, if you let us look, then you can sign a complaint against 

all of us." Defendant repeated that the police needed a search 

warrant to enter. Eventually, one of the police officers used a 

baton to break the chain, and a subsequent search of the apartment 
3 A-1296-15T4

revealed that no female was present. Defendant was arrested and 

charged with obstruction of justice.1

The municipal court judge found there was sufficient evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of obstruction 

of justice. Specifically, he determined that police had a right 

to enter the apartment under the emergency-aid doctrine to 

investigate a 911 report of domestic violence. 

Upon a trial de novo on the record, Judge Frances A. McGrogan 

found defendant guilty anew. In her written decision, she rejected

defendant's argument that the municipal court judge erred in 

finding that defendant had a duty to unchain his door lock to 

allow police to conduct a warrantless search of his home. Similar 

to the municipal court, Judge McGrogan reasoned that the police 

 

1 N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), provides that:

 

A person commits an offense if he purposely 

obstructs, impairs or perverts the 

administration of law or other governmental 

function or prevents or attempts to prevent a 

public servant from lawfully performing an 

official function by means of flight, 

intimidation, force, violence, or physical 

interference or obstacle, or by means of any 

independently unlawful act. This section does 

not apply to failure to perform a legal duty 

other than an official duty, or any other 

means of avoiding compliance with law without 

affirmative interference with governmental 

functions.
4 A-1296-15T4

had a reasonable basis to believe there was a need to enter the 

apartment to aid a possible harmed person, but that "defendant 

prevented the officers from entering his apartment by purposefully

refusing to unchain his door, thereby creating an obstacle, which 

prevented the police from performing their official function [in 

violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a)]." The judge noted that 

"[w]ithout further investigation, the police had no way of knowing 

whether there was an injured person outside their line of sight. 

Once the officers explained their purpose, [defendant had] an 

obligation to allow [them] into his home without interference." 

Before us, defendant argues that:

I. UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED 

STATES CONSTITUTION, IT IS NOT A CRIME FOR 

ANYONE TO REFUSE TO UNCHAIN THEIR DOOR FOR THE 

POLICE TO CONDUCT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH.

II. THE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY HELD THAT THE 

APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO UNCHAIN THE DOOR LOCK 

TO HIS APARTMENT TO ALLOW THE POLICE TO 

CONDUCT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HIS HOME IS 

AN OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW 

AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED 

STATE[S]. 

"We begin our review with the well-settled proposition that 

appellate courts should give deference to the factual findings of 

the trial court." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (citing 

State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999)). When the Law 

Division conducts a trial de novo on the record developed in the 
5 A-1296-15T4

municipal court, our appellate review is limited. State v. 

Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005).

Because the Law Division judge is not in a position to gauge

the credibility of witnesses, he or she should "give due, although 

not necessarily controlling, regard" to the credibility findings 

of the municipal court judge. Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 

42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964)). Furthermore, when the Law Division 

agrees with the municipal court, the two-court rule must be 

considered. "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts 

ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of 

fact and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent 

a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." Reece, supra, 

222 N.J. at 166 (quoting Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 474). 

However, an appellate court does not afford any special deference 

to the legal determinations of the trial court. Templo Fuente De 

Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).

Having considered defendant's contentions and the applicable 

legal principles, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated 

in Judge McGrogan's written decision. We add only that further 

support is found in Reece, supra, 222 N.J. at 171-72, where our 

Supreme Court held that a defendant is guilty of obstruction of 

justice by attempting to close a door on police officers to prevent 

them from lawfully performing an official function under the 
6 A-1296-15T4

emergency-aid doctrine. Defendant's appellate arguments are 

without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2).

Affirm.