UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4901

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

EDWARD CLINTON JONES, III,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Richard M. Gergel, District 

Judge. (2:14-cr-00342-RMG-1)

Submitted: July 31, 2015 Decided: September 3, 2015

Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kimberly H. Albro, Research & Writing Specialist, FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. 

William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Nathan S. Williams, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Edward Clinton Jones, III, appeals the 151-month sentence 

imposed by the district court following his guilty plea to 

solicitation of murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

373, 1958 (2012), and use of interstate commerce facilities in 

the commission of murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1958. On appeal, Jones contends that his sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable, that the district court erred in 

failing to sua sponte order a mental competency hearing, and 

that the court improperly delegated judicial authority in 

imposing a special condition of supervised release. Finding no 

error, we affirm. 

Jones first contends that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court abused its discretion 

during sentencing by failing to explain its reasons for denying 

his motion for a downward variance. In reviewing a sentence, we 

must ensure that the district court did not commit any 

“significant procedural error,” such as failing to properly 

calculate the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, failing to 

consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, or failing to 

adequately explain the sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In explaining its sentence, the district 

court is not required to “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s 

every subsection.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 
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(4th Cir. 2006). However, the court “must place on the record 

an ‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular facts of 

the case before it. This individualized assessment need not be 

elaborate or lengthy, but it must provide a rationale tailored 

to the particular case at hand and adequate to permit 

‘meaningful appellate review.’” United States v. Carter, 564 

F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50) 

(internal citation and footnote omitted)). 

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing the 151-month sentence. The court 

thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors in finding that a 

within-Guidelines sentence was appropriate and provided an 

adequate explanation for the sentence imposed upon balancing 

those factors. Moreover, the record reflects that the court 

adequately considered Jones’ arguments for a downward variance 

but found those mitigating factors insufficient to warrant a 

below-Guidelines sentence. 

Jones next contends that the district court abused its 

discretion in failing to sua sponte order a mental competency 

hearing. The district court must sua sponte order a competency 

hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the 

defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or 

defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he 

is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the 
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proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 

18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012). “Reasonable cause may be 

established through evidence of irrational behavior, the 

defendant’s demeanor at trial, and medical opinions concerning 

the defendant’s competence.” United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 

583, 592-93 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The mere presence of mental illness is not, however, “equated 

with incompetence.” Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Competency turns on “whether the defendant has 

sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 

reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has 

a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 

against him.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court did not err in failing to sua 

sponte order a competency hearing. See United States v. Dreyer, 

705 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that “a district 

court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing on its own 

motion will always be subject to plain error review”); see also

Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27 (2013) 

(providing standard for plain error review). The record 

reflects no indication that Jones acted irrationally or 

inappropriately at any point during the proceedings. The 

district court was aware of Jones’ mental conditions and 

medications, and the court adequately inquired into Jones’ 
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understanding of the proceedings. “Whether reasonable cause

exists is a question left to the sound discretion of the 

district court.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 592 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion 

in this case.

Finally, Jones contends that the district court violated 

Article III of the Constitution by delegating its judicial 

authority to the probation officer to determine whether mental 

health treatment would be a condition of supervised release. A 

probation officer has the authority to “manage aspects of 

sentences and to supervise . . . persons on supervised release 

with respect to all conditions imposed by the court.” United 

States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th Cir. 1995). A court 

may not, however, delegate to a probation officer a judicial 

function, as such a delegation violates Article III of the 

Constitution. Id. at 808-09. “To determine if a court 

improperly delegated the judicial authority of sentencing, 

[courts] have drawn a distinction between the delegation to a 

probation officer of a ministerial act or support service and 

the ultimate responsibility of imposing the sentence.” United 

States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Where the court makes the 

determination of whether a defendant must abide by a condition,

it is permissible to delegate to the probation officer the 
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details of where and when the condition will be satisfied.” Id.

(internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted). 

We conclude that the district court did not err in imposing 

on Jones the special condition of supervised release requiring

mental health treatment. The court unequivocally ordered that 

Jones undergo mental health treatment as a condition of his 

supervised release and tasked the officer with the authority to 

determine the type of treatment necessary to fulfill the 

condition, a purely ministerial function. Thus, the court did 

not violate Article III.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED