NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CANYON PLAZA RESORT, Petitioner Employer,

COPPERPOINT WESTERN INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner Carrier, 

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

CORI ACOSTA, Respondent Employee. 

No. 1 CA-IC 15-0050 

Special Action - Industrial Commission 

ICA Claim No. 20143-440069 

Carrier Claim No. 14W02045 

Hon. Robert F. Retzer, Jr., Administrative Law Judge 

AWARD AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

CopperPoint Mutual Insurance Company, Phoenix 

By John W. Main 

Counsel for Petitioners Employer and Carrier 
2

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix 

By Andrew F. Wade 

Counsel for Respondent ICA

Cori Acosta, Flagstaff 

Respondent Employee 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined. 

K E S S L E R, Judge: 

¶1 This is a special action review of an Industrial Commission of 

Arizona (“ICA”) award and decision upon review for a compensable claim. 

The petitioner employer, Canyon Plaza Resort (“Canyon”), presents one 

issue on appeal: whether the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by 

applying the unexplained fall presumption to find the respondent 

employee’s (“Claimant’s”) injury compensable.1 Because we find that the 

ALJ appropriately relied on the unexplained fall presumption, we affirm 

the award. 

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶2 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(2) (2016), 23-951(A) (2012), and 

Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions 10.2 In reviewing findings 

and awards of the ICA, we defer to the ALJ’s factual findings, but review 

questions of law de novo. Young v. Indus. Comm’n, 204 Ariz. 267, 270, ¶ 

14 (App. 2003). We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to 

upholding the ALJ’s award. Lovitch v. Indus. Comm’n, 202 Ariz. 102, 105, 

¶ 16 (App. 2002).

 

1 Claimant did not file an answering brief, so this matter was submitted for 

decision on the record and the opening brief. ARCAP 15(a)(2). 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. 
CANYON v. ACOSTA 

Decision of the Court 

3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶3 At the time of injury, Claimant worked as a houseman for 

Canyon. He fell over a balcony railing on either the second or third floor 

and landed face down on the ground below. Claimant sustained a broken 

nose, broken ribs, an eye laceration, and a compression fracture of his T-6 

vertebra. He filed a workers’ compensation claim, which was denied for 

benefits. Claimant timely requested a hearing, and the ALJ held one 

hearing for testimony from Claimant and two coworkers. 

¶4 The ALJ entered an award for a compensable claim. Canyon 

timely requested administrative review, but the ALJ summarily affirmed 

the award. Canyon brought this appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

¶5 The statutory elements of compensability are an injury by 

accident arising out of and in the course of employment. See A.R.S. § 23-

1021(A). “Arising out of” refers to the origin or cause of the injury, while 

“in the course of” refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury 

in relation to the employment. See, e.g., Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 88 Ariz. 164, 168 (1960); Scheller v. Indus. Comm’n, 134 Ariz. 418, 

420 (App. 1982). It is the claimant’s burden to prove all elements of a 

compensable claim. E.g., Toto v. Indus. Comm’n, 144 Ariz. 508, 512 (App. 

1985). 

¶6 In this case, the ALJ relied on the unexplained fall 

presumption to find Claimant’s injuries compensable. An unexplained fall 

arises from an unknown cause or from a cause that can be attributed neither 

to the claimant personally nor to the employment. See 1 Arthur Larson et 

al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law (“Larson”) § 7.04[1], at 7-28 to -

36 (2015). An unexplained fall is rebuttably presumed to “arise out of” 

employment, if the fall occurred “in the course of” employment. See Circle 

K Store No. 1131 v. Indus. Comm’n, 165 Ariz. 91, 96 (1990); Arizona 

Workers’ Compensation Handbook (“Handbook”) § 3.3.4, at 3-14 to -15 

(Ray J. Davis, et al., eds., 1992 and Supp. 2015).

¶7 Canyon argues that the unexplained fall presumption does 

not apply in this case because Claimant’s employment did not place him in 

the “particular place at the particular time” that he fell and was injured.

Claimant testified that his date of injury was his first day of work, and he 

was training with a coworker. He stated that his job included removing 

used towels and linens from guest rooms, vacuuming, and cleaning 

windows and the hallways. 
CANYON v. ACOSTA 

Decision of the Court 

4

¶8 In the worker’s report of injury, Claimant stated he “fell 3 

stories using a ladder. Don’t remember anything else. Not even sure how 

it happened.” Claimant testified that the last thing he remembers before 

being in the hospital is that he was vacuuming an interior hallway, but “I 

think maybe I got sidetracked and went to go clean something with a ladder 

in the stairwell or something like that.” 

¶9 Claimant testified that his injury occurred in the afternoon, 

after lunch. He was working alone at the time of his injury, and he does not 

know his exact location immediately before the fall. Claimant agreed that 

he was 5’7” tall, and the balcony railings were above his waist level. He 

testified that he has a condition (ADHD) that makes it difficult for him to 

remain calm and focus. Although he had taken medication for this 

condition in the past, he was not taking anything at the time of his injury. 

¶10 Daniel Bahe testified that he worked in housekeeping at the 

time of Claimant’s injury. On the date of injury, he was cleaning a guest 

room when he heard Claimant call out. He went to investigate and found 

Claimant sitting under a tree outside the hotel. Mr. Bahe stated that it 

appeared Claimant had fallen through a tree, because it had broken 

branches that had not been broken before.3 He testified that he is 5’9”, and 

the balcony railings were high enough to prevent someone from falling 

over them. 

¶11 Donavin Freeman testified that he worked as a houseman at 

Canyon, and he was training Claimant on November 18, 2014. He stated 

that he was not with Claimant at the time he was injured. They had split 

up to check each hotel floor for linens, and he had sent Claimant to another 

building. Mr. Freeman stated that as he got to the third floor, he heard 

Claimant groaning and went to investigate. He found Claimant lying face 

down on the ground dazed and bleeding, and he went to get help. Mr. 

Freeman testified that the houseman job did not require Claimant to be in 

close proximity to the balcony railing or at risk of falling over. He noted 

that all of the laundry bins and maid carts had been put away and there 

were no ladders present. 

¶12 Canyon argues that Claimant has not satisfied the “in the 

course of” employment requirement. It bases this argument on Mr. 

Freeman’s testimony that the houseman work did not require Claimant to 

be in close proximity to the balcony railings, and Mr. Bahe’s testimony that 

 

3 Canyon filed photos of the hotel balconies, railings, and the tree. 
CANYON v. ACOSTA 

Decision of the Court 

5

the railings were high enough to prevent falls. By implication, it appears to 

argue that any fall must have been intentional. 

¶13 In that regard, we find Canyon’s view of the time, place and 

circumstances test to be too narrow. Claimant’s injury occurred at work, 

during work hours, and while Claimant was still on duty. There was no 

evidence that Claimant had any intention of injuring himself. Further, 

Claimant testified that he had no recollection of what he was doing at the 

time he fell or how it happened.4 The unexplained fall doctrine applied 

precisely because there was no explanation for the events leading up to 

Claimant’s injury.

¶14 We find guidance in Larson: 

If the employee, in the course of employment, engages in an 

utterly perplexing act for which no personal or employment 

motive can be deciphered, the neutral-risk principle should 

control and the employment connection supplied by the 

presence of the act within the course of employment should 

tip the scale in favor of compensability. 

¶15 Larson, supra, § 7.04[2][c] at 7-46, quoted in, Bennett v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 163 Ariz. 534, 538 (App. 1990). 

¶16 We are mindful that the Arizona Workers’ Compensation Act 

must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of placing the burden 

for industrial injuries on industry. Circle K Store No. 1131, 165 Ariz. at 96. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, the award is affirmed. 

 

4 The ALJ did not make an express credibility finding. See Holding v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 139 Ariz. 548, 551 (App. 1984) (stating the ALJ is the sole judge of 

witness credibility); but see Pearce Dev. v. Indus. Comm’n, 147 Ariz. 582, 583 

(1985) (concluding the ALJ’s credibility findings were implicit in the ALJ’s 

award).