Mr . D e lane y and Ms. Shu le r a lso br ou g ht s uit a s n e xt fr ie nd

of the ir min or so n, M. 1 D e l an e y. P l ai n t i ff s ar e p ro ce ed i n g pro s e . Ms. Shuler has not appea red a s counsel in this matter, 2 b u ts h e a s s e rt s th ats h e i s anat t o r n e y. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

_______________________________________ ) MELVIN DELANEY, JR., et al., ) ) P lai nt iffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 08-1651 (RMC) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) ) De fend ant s. ) _______________________________________)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION On September

26, 2009, Melvin Delane y , J r. and Me lodie Vene e Shuler filed a 1 tw e nty-o ne c ount c omp la int a g a ins t se ve nte e n d e fe nd ants and va ri ou s unid e nti fi e d D .C. employ ees a

nd corr ectional of

fice rs. The c omplaint alleg es violations of fede ral a nd state law 2
ari sin gfr om a

Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

c ri min a l a c tio n a g a ins t Mr . D e lane y du e to u np a id c hil d
su pp or t, f ro m a Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

c ri min a l a c tio n a g a ins t Ms . Shule r b a se d o n a n a ssa ult char g e, and f

rom other c ircumstance s. Amongthe claims, Plaintiffs alleg e bre ach of contra ct ag ainst Mr. Dela

ney ’s forme r employer, Shopper s Food Ware house Corporation (“Shoppers” ), and bre ach of

the duty of fa ir repr esentation ag ainst the union that repr esente d him when he worke d at Shoppers, the United F ood and Commercia l Workers Union L ocal 400 ( the “Union” ). The Union moves to dismiss for failure to state a c laim beca use the Complaint is barre d by the-2-

statut e of lim itatio ns . Sh op pe rs mov e s to dis mis s f or la c k o f s ub

je c t ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n. Th e ir motions wil l be g rante d, as explained below. I. F AC TS Th e e ig hty-t

wo pa g e , tw e nty-o ne c ount C omp la int is s ome wh at g arb le d. Am id the morass of c laims, the Complaint asserts two counts ag ainst Shoppers and one ag ainst the Union. Mr. Dela

ney worke d at Shoppers and w as a me mber of the Union duringthe fa ll of 2006. Compl. ¶ 117; Union’s Mem. in S upp. of Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 4] at 2. He la st worked at Sho pp e rs in N ov e mbe r o f 2 00 6, pr ior to h is a rr e st o n N ov e mbe r 1 1, 20 06 . Pl s. ’ O pp ’n to Union’s Mot. to Dismis s [Dkt. # 11] at 6; Pls.’ Mem. in S upp. of Mot. for Summ. J . [Dkt. # 21] at 1. He w as inca

rce rate d due to fa ilure to pay child support from May

29, 2007 to September 25, 2007. Compl. ¶ 20. He soug ht to return to work at Shoppers when he was re lease d from prison, but Shoppers did not place him on the wor k schedule . The Complaint alleg es, “Mr
. De lane y re pe ate dly

c a lle d th e c omp any

and wa s r e pe ate dly

tol d h e wa s n ot o n th e sc he du le beca use human re source s had to revie w the information he provided a bout his incarce ration.” Compl. ¶ 128. CountSeven alleg es that Shoppers ne g lige ntly g arnished mor e of Mr . Delane y ’s wag es than pe rmitted by

law re g ardingthe collec tion of child support. Id . ¶¶ 117- 120. Count Eig ht alleg es that Shoppers bre ache d Mr. Dela ney ’s employ

ment contra ct by

terminatinghim and brea ched a

n oral c ontrac t to rehire him. Id . ¶¶ 121- 135. Count Nine alleg es that the Union brea ched its duty

of fa ir repr esentation by

failingto assist him when he soug ht to return to work at Shoppers. Id . ¶¶ 136- 139.

Shoppers and the Union both move to dism iss. Ms. S huler opposes a nd moves forMr . D e lane y did no t f ile any re sp on se to t

he se mot ion s to dis mis s. As he fa ile d to 3 contest the fa cts and the la w, they are deeme d conce ded. SeeL CvR 7( h) (f a c ts s e t f or th i n motion for summary

judgme nt are admitted if not controver ted in response to summary jud g me nt) ; Hopkins v. W omen’ s Div., Ge neral Bd. of Global Ministri es , 238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2002) ( “It is well understood in this C ircuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a motion to dis miss addressingonly cer tain arguments raised by

the def endant, a court may tre atth o s e a rgu m en t s th atth e p l ai n t i ff fa i l edt o ad dre s s as co n ce d ed
. ”) (c i t i n g FDIC v. Be nder , 12 7 F .3 d 5 8, 67 -6 8 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 7) ). Ms. Shu le r a nd Mr . D e lane y

fi le d th e ir

Com pla int pro s e . Although Ms. Shuler c ontends to be an attorney , she has not filed a n appea ranc e on beha lf of Mr. Delane y in this case, and in he r ca pacity as a la y person, Ms. Shuler c annot re prese nt Mr. Delane y . See G eorgiades v. M artin-Tri gona , 729 F.2d 831, 834 ( D.C. Cir. 1984) (a la y person can a ppear pro s ebut is no t qu a lif ie d to a pp e ar a s c ouns e l f

or oth e rs ); se ege ne ra lly

Or de r t o Show Cause [Dkt. # 28] . Thus, her opposition to Shoppers and the Union’ s motions and her cross motions for summary judgme nt were not filed on beha lf of Mr. De laney . The motions filed by Sho pp e rs and

the Un ion

c an b e g ra

nte d a s c on c e de d a s a g a ins t Mr . D e lane y . E ve n if Ms. Shuler’s filing s were deeme d to speak for Mr. Dela ney , the motions filed by

Shoppers and the Union would be g rante d on their merits as e x plained below. Re cognizi ngthat Ms. Shuler in her pro s ecapa city

can only file on her

own beha lf, for e ase of

ref ere nce, the response s to the motions t o dismiss are ref err ed to as “ Plaintiffs’ Oppositions” and Ms. Shuler’s cr oss motions for summary judgme nt are ref

err ed to as “ Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgme nt.” -3- summary judgme nt. The motions to dism iss will be gr anted on their merits as set for

th below. 3 II. STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW A. F ailure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6) A motion to di smiss pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) challeng es the a dequac y

of a c omplaint on its fac e, testingwhether a plaintiff ha s proper ly

stated
a c la im. A c omp la int

mus t be su ff

ic ie nt “ to g ive a

de fe nd ant f

a ir no tic e of the c la ims a g a ins t him.” Be ll A tl. Cor

p. v . Two mb ly , 127 S. Ct . 1955, 1964 (2007). Although a complaint does not need de tailed fa ctual alleg ations, a plaintiff’s oblig ation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “ require s more than labe ls and conc lusions, and a formulaic rec itation of the eleme nts of
a ca use of a ction will not do.” Id. at 19 64 -6 5 ( int e rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) . Ru le 8( a ) r e qu ir e s a “showing ” and not just a blanke t assertion of a rig ht to relief. Id. at 1965 n.3.-4- On a mot ion to d ism iss , a

c ourt mus t tr e at th e c omp la int ’s fa c tua l a lle g atio ns — including mixed questions of law and f act — a s true, dra

wingall rea sonable infe renc es in the plaintiff’s fa

vor. Macharia v. U

nited States , 334 F.3d 61, 64, 67 ( D.C. Cir. 2003). C o u rt s are he s i t a nt t o g r a nt a mot i on t o d i s mi s s ba s e d o n t he s t a t ut e of l i mi t a t i ons un l e s s t he f a c t s t ha t g i ve ris e to th e d e f

e n s e are cle a r o n th e f

a c e o f th e co m p la in t. S m it h -H a yn ie v. D istrict o

f C o lum b ia , 15 5 F
. 3d 57 5, 57 7-78 ( D
. C
. C i r . 19 98 )
. I n d eci ding a R ule 12(b)( 6) mo t i on , t he C ou r t m ay
con si der only “t he f

act s al l eg ed in t he co m plai nt, do cum ents a t t ached as exh i bit s or i nco r po r at ed by r ef er ence i n the com plai nt, and m at t er s abo ut w hich t he C ou r t m ay t ake judici al no t i ce. ” Gus t av e - Sc hmi dtv . Chao , 2 2 6 F. Su p p . 2 d 1 9 1 , 1 9 6 ( D
. D
. C
. 2 0 0 2 ) (cit ation o m it ted ). Once a claim has be en stated a dequate ly , “it may be supported by

showingany

set of fa cts consistent with the alleg ations in the complaint.” Twom bly , 127 S. Ct . at 1968-69.

B. Lac k o f

Su bj e c t M at t e r Ju r i s di c t i on Unde r Rul e 12 ( b) ( 1) Fe dera l courts ar e cour

ts of limit ed jurisdiction and the law presumes that “a
cause lies outside this l imited jurisdiction.” Kokkone n v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 5 11 U. S. 37 5, 37 7 ( 19 94 ); St. Paul Mercury Indem . Co. v. Red Cab Co. , 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938). Be cause “subjec t matter jurisdiction is an ‘Art. I I Ias we ll as a statutory require ment[,] no action of the pa rties ca n confe r subject- matter jurisdiction upon a fe dera l court.’” Akinsey e v. D istrict of Colum bia , 3 3 9 F. 3 d

9 7 0 , 9 7 1 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxite deGuinea , 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). O n a motion to dism iss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) , the plaintiff bea rs the burde n of establishingthat the cour t has subject matter

jurisdiction. Evans v. B .F. Perk ins Co. , 166 F.3d 642, 647 ( 4th Cir. 1999); McNutt v. Ge n. Motors Acce ptance Corp. , 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936).-5- B e c a us e su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n f oc us e s o n th e c ourt ’s po we r t o h e ar t he c la im, h o we v er , th e c o urtmu s tgi v e t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s fa ctu al al l ega t i o n s cl o s er s cr u t i ny wh enre s o l v i n g a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be require d for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Ma c ha ria , 334 F.3d at 64; Gran d Lo dgeof F ra te rn al O rd

e r o f P oli c ev . A sh c ro

ft , 1 85 F. Sup p. 2d 9, 13 (D .D .C. 20 01 ). Mo re ov e r, the c ourt is n ot l imi te d to the a lle g atio ns c onta ine d in the complaint. Hohri v. United States , 782 F.2d 227, 241 ( D.C. Cir. 1986), vacate d on other grounds , 482 U.S. 64 (1987). Instead, to dete rmine whe ther it has jurisdiction over the claim, the court may consider materials outside the plea dings. He rb e rt v . Na t’ l A c ad . o f Sc is. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992). III . A NA LY SIS

A. Claim Against the Union A six -month statute of limitations applies to a breac h of duty of fa ir repr esentation claim like that Plaintiffs filed ag ainst the Union. Se eDe lCo ste llo v . I nt’ l B hd . o f Te am ste rs , 462 U.S. 151, 169-72 (1983) ( six -month limi tations period found in the National L abor Relations Act (“N L RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), a pplies to hy

brid suit ag ainst the employ er a nd the union for brea ch of c ontrac t/duty

of fa ir repr esentation); Georgev. Local 639 , 1 00 F .3 d 1 00 8, 10 14 (D .C. Cir. 1996) (six -month statute of limitations applies to sui ts where only the union is sued). The statute of limitations begins runningwhen a plaintiff knew or

should have known that the union had stopped pursuinghis gr ievanc e. Cephas v. MVM , Inc. , 520 F.3d 480, 488 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (c i t i n g Sanders v. Hughe

s, Aircraft Co. , 26 F.3d 132 ( Table) , 1994 WL227971 (9th Cir. 1994));
se e als o W

atk ins v . Co mm c ’n W

or k e rs , 7 36 F . Su

pp . 1 15 6, 11 60 (D .D .C. 19 90 ) ( tim e lin e ss i s
measure d from whe n the employ ee kne w or should have known of the la st action taken by theAlthough the Complaint reads “f rom Dec ember

of 2007 to J anuar

y of 2007,” Plaintiffs 4 intended to state fr om “from De cembe r 2007 to J anuar y 2008 .” SeePls. ’ M e m. i n Su pp . o f M ot. for Summ. J . [Dkt. # 21] at 2. -6- union which constituted the bre ach of duty of fa ir repr esentation). The duty of fa ir repr esentation claim in this case is based on the Union’ s alleg ed fa ilure to p ur su e Mr . D e lane y ’s g ri e va nc e a g a ins t Sh op pe rs . T he statut e of lim itatio ns on

thi s claim beg an at the time Mr. D elane y knew or should have known that the Union stopped pursuinghis gr ievanc e. The Complaint allege s that “[f]rom Decembe r of 2007 to January of 20 0[8] M r. De lane y

c ontin uo us ly c a lle d th e Un ion

that he pa id d

ue s f or but w a s r e pe ate dly

tol d that he would be c alled bac k.” Compl. ¶ 138. Mr. Dela ney should have known that the Union 4 was not pursuinghis gr ievanc e by the end of

J anuar y 2008. He ha d been inc arc erated from Ma y 29, 2007 to September 25, 2007; by the end of

J anuar y 2008 he had be en unemployed for eig ht months and fre ed fr om incarc eration for four months. He should have known that he was not employ ed and the Union was not g oing to pr ocess his g rieva nce f or whatever

rea son. Thus, the statute of limitations bega n to run at the e nd of January 2008, and expired six months later at the end of July

2008. Be cause Plaintiffs did not file the Compl aint in this case until September 26, 2008, the bre ach of

duty of fa ir repr esentation claim is ti me-ba rre d. Pla int if fs argue that e qu ita

ble tol lin gsh ou ld a

pp ly be c a us e the Un ion

fa ile d to return his phone calls. Pls.’ Opp’n at 6- 7. Equitable tolling a pplies to hy

brid claims only

when a plaintiff, despite due diligenc e, is unable to obtain vital information bearingon the exist ence of his claim. Do v ev . W

MA TA , 402 F. Supp. 2d 91, 97-98 (D .D.C. 2005). Plaintiffs do not argue that despite due dilig ence Mr. Dela ney was una ble to file suit within the six month statute of limit ations period. F ailure to re turn phone c alls does not constitute aff irmative misconduct that-7-

wo u l d gi v e r i s e t o equ i t ab l e t o l l i n g. B. Claims A gainst Sh oppers Plaintiffs alleg e that Shoppers br eac hed Mr. De laney ’s employ ment contra ct by terminatinghim, neg lige ntly g arnished mor e of his wa g es than pe rmitted by law, and br eac hed an
or a l c ontr a c t to re hir e Mr . D e lane y . T he re is n o d isp ute that Mr . D e lane y ’s e mpl oy me nt w ith Shoppers was subjec t to a collective ba rg ainingagree ment (“CB A”) betwee n Shoppers and the Union. The CB A provides f or a grieva

nce pr ocedur e and a

rbitration. Shoppers’ O pp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J . [Dkt. # 36] at 3 (quotingCBA Ar t. 20). Mr. De laney

failed to file a

g rieva nce or submit his claim to arbitration. SeeCompl. ¶ 39 (alleg ing that Mr. Delane y called the Union and the Union f

ailed to ca ll him back). Employ ees must ava il themselves of g rieva nce a nd arbitration procedur es provided by

a CBAbefor e filingsuit. Am. Postal W orkers Union v . U.S. Postal Service , 7 55 F. S u p p . 1 0 7 6 , 1 0 7 8 (D
. D. C
. 1 9 8 9 ) ( ci t i n g Republic Stee l Corp. v Maddox , 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965)) . “B y

ag ree ing to a

rbitrate, a party ‘trade s the proce dures a

nd opportunity

for r eview of the cour t[ ] for the simplicity , informality , and expedition of arbitration.” Gilmer v. In te rst ate /J oh ns on Lan eCor

p ., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (c itiation omi tted). An individual who
a g re e s to arb itr ate do e s n ot f or e g o a ny su bs tanti ve ri g hts a ff

or de d b y statut e ; he me re ly

su bmi ts to resolution in an arbitra l rather than a judicial f

orum. Id. at 26. B eca

use the Mr. D elane y

failed to gr ieve a

nd arbitrate his claim reg ardinghis termination, he has fa iled to exhaust contractual
reme dies. Acc ording ly , the bre ach of employ ment contra ct claim ag ainst Shoppers is dismi ssed without prejudice.

Wit h reg ard to the r emainingstate law c laims ag ainst Shoppers, the cla ims forBe cause 28 U.S.C. 1367(b) relates to diversity jurisdiction, it i s not releva nt here
. 5 -8- ne g lig e nt g arn ishme nt a

nd br e a c h o f a

n a lle g e d o ra l c ontr a c t to re hir e , th e Court de c lin e s to
e xer c ise su

pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n. To de te rm ine wh e n ju ri sd ic tio n o ve r a

state law c la im i s
a pp ro pr iate , a

c ourt mus t de te rm ine wh e the r t he state law c la ims are pa rt of the same c ontr ov e rs y as the fe dera l law claims, i.e. , whether they “der ive from a

common nucleus of ope rative f act.” United Mine W

orkers v . Gibbs , 3 83 U. S. 7 15 , 7 25 (1 96 6) ; accord D ecatur Liquors, Inc. v. Di str ic t of Colum bia , 478 F.3d 360, 362 ( D.C. Cir. 2007). I f the state la w claims ar e par

t of the
same c ontroversy , the cour t then decide s whether

it will ex erc ise its discretion to assert jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

he state law c la ims , c on sid e ri ngjud ic ia l e c on omy , c onve nie nc e , a nd fa ir ne ss t o the litigants, Gibbs , 383 U.S. at 725-26, as we ll as comity betwee n fede ral a

nd state cour

ts. Car ne gie -M e llo n U niv . v . Co hil l , 4 84 U. S. 3 43 , 3 50 n. 7 ( 19 88 ); se eals o S te v e ns on v . S

e v e rs , 158 F.3d 1332, 1334 ( D.C. Cir. 1998). “The re ma y be re asons independe nt of jurisdictional considerations, such as the likelihood of jury confusion in treating diver g ent leg al theorie s of
re lie f, that w ou ld j us tif

y se pa ra tin gstate and

fe de ra l c la ims fo r t

ri a l, F e d. R. C iv. P. 4 2( b) . I f s o jurisdiction should ordinarily be re fused.” Gibbs , 383 U.S. at 726. Congr ess essentially

codified Gibbs in 28 U.S.C. § 1367. E d m o n d s o n & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n , 48 F.3d 1260, 1266 ( D.C. Cir. 1995). Section 1367 pr ov ide s: (a ) E xce pt a s p ro vid e d in su bs e c tio ns (b ) and

(c ) o r a s e xpre ssl y 5 provided other

wise by Fe dera l statute, in any

civil action of whic h the dis tr ic t c ourt s h ave or ig ina l juri sd ic tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt s sh a ll have su pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n o ve r a ll o the r c la ims that are so related to claims in the ac tion within s uch orig inal jurisdiction that they form par t of the same c ase or

controve rsy

under Article I I Iof the United States Constitut ion.-9- . . . . (c) The district cour

ts may decline to e x erc ise supplemental jurisdiction over a c laim under subsec tion (a) if — (1) the c laim raises a

novel or c omplex issue of State law, (2) the c laim substantially predominate s over the c laim or claims over which the district cour t has orig inal jurisdiction, (3 ) t he dis tr ic t c ourt

ha s d ism iss e d a ll c la ims ov e r whic h it has orig inal jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional cir cumstance s, there a re othe r compellingrea sons for dec lining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. On one hand, § 1367 doe s not restrict the district cour t’s discretion to dec line supplemental jurisdiction. Diven v . Amalgamated Transit Union Int’l , 3 8 F .3 d 5 98 , 6 01 (D .C. Cir. 1994). On the other , a district cour t’s ability to decline to exerc ise supplemental jurisdiction is circumscr ibed by

the provisions of the statute. Lindsay v. Gov’ t Employee s Ins. Co. , 448 F.3d 41 6, 42 4 ( D. C. C ir . 2 00 6) . In d e c lin ingjur isd ic tio n th e dis tr ic t c ourt mus t ana ly

ze i ts r e a so ns in light of the provisions of § 1367(c) and must balanc e the inter ests of ec onomy , convenie nce, fairne ss, and comity
. Id . at 424-25.

Pla int if fs a sse rt that th e c la ims fo r n e g lig e nt g arn ishme nt a nd br e a c h o f c ontr a c t to rehire are part of the same c ontroversy raised by Plaintiffs’ claims of bre ach of employ ment contra ct and br eac h of duty of re prese ntation. Howeve r, havingdismiss ed such f eder al law claims ag ainst Shoppers and the Union, it is appropr iate to dec line supplemental jurisdiction over the alleg edly

related state lawclaims. See28 U. S.C. § 1 36 7( c )( 3) . T he Com pla int do e s r a ise-10-

oth e r f e de ra l la w c la ims , b ut t

ho se are unre late d to the e mpl oy me nt a nd g arn ishme nt c la ims ag ainst Shoppers and the Union. See, e .g. , Co mpl . ¶ ¶ 4 2- 58 (C ount 1 , d

ue pr oc e ss c la im reg ardinghandlingof child support orde rs ag ainst the District of Columbia); ¶¶ 140- 148 (Count 10 , F ir st A me ndme nt f

re e sp e e c h a

nd a c c e ss t o th e c ourt s c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t and its employ ees) ; ¶¶ 154-160 ( Count 12, Fifth Amendment cla im reg ardingMs. Shuler’s ac cess to her clients ag ainst the District and its employ ees) . Thus, the Court will decline supplementa l jurisdiction over the c laims of neg lige nt ga rnishment and bre ach of

contra ct to rehire
. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons stated a

bove, the motion to dismi ss filed by the Union [Dkt. # 4] wi ll b e g ra

nte d, and the Un ion

wi ll b e dis mis se d a s a

pa rt y to t his su it. Th e mot ion

to d ism iss filed by Shoppers [Dkt. #7] will be g rante d, and Shoppers will be dismissed without prejudice du e to f a ilure to e xha

us t c ontr a c tua l r e me die s. Pla int if fs ’ m oti on s f

or summa ry jud g me nt a g a ins t the Union [Dkt. # 21] and ag ainst Shoppers [Dkt. # 20] as we ll as Shopper’s motion to stay consideration of Plainti ffs’ motion for summar y judgme nt [ Dkt. # 35] wil l be denied a s moot. A memorializing orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion.

Date: Ma y 4, 2009 _____________/s/______________________ ROSEMARY M. COL LYER Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge