[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 177 (Tuesday, September 14, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 55852-55889]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-22626]



[[Page 55851]]

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Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Parts 117 and 121



Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 55852]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 117 and 121

[Docket No. FAA-2009-1093; Notice No. 10-11]
RIN 2120-AJ58


Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA is proposing to amend its existing flight, duty and 
rest regulations applicable to certificate holders and their flightcrew 
members. The proposal recognizes the growing similarities between the 
types of operations and the universality of factors that lead to 
fatigue in most individuals. Fatigue threatens aviation safety because 
it increases the risk of pilot error that could lead to an accident. 
The new requirements, if adopted, would eliminate the current 
distinctions between domestic, flag and supplemental operations. The 
proposal provides different requirements based on the time of day, 
whether an individual is acclimated to a new time zone, and the 
likelihood of being able to sleep under different circumstances.

DATES: Comments are due November 15, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues: Dale E. Roberts, 
Air Transportation Division (AFS-200), Flight Standards Service, 
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-5749; e-mail: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#55313439307b307b273a3730272126153334347b323a23"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="583c39343d763d762a373a3d2a2c2b183e3939763f372e">[email protected]</span></a>. For legal issues: Rebecca MacPherson, Office of 
the Chief Counsel, Regulations Division (AGC-200), 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3073; e-mail: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#70021512151313115e1d111300181502031f1e301611115e171f06"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="03716661666060622d6e6260736b6671706c6d436562622d646c75">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Later in this preamble under the Additional 
Information section, we discuss how you can comment on this proposal 
and how we will handle your comments. Included in this discussion is 
related information about the docket, privacy, and the handling of 
proprietary or confidential business information. We also discuss how 
you can get a copy of this proposal and related rulemaking documents.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in 
Title 49 of the United States Code. This rulemaking is promulgated 
under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), which requires 
the Administrator to promulgate regulations and minimum safety 
standards for other practices, methods, and procedures necessary for 
safety in air commerce and national security.

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Background
    A. Statement of the Problem
    B. NTSB Recommendations
    C. International Standards
    1. Amendment No. 33 to the International Standards and 
Recommended Practices, Annex 6 to the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation, Part I, International Commercial Air Transport--
Aeroplanes (ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP))
    2. United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority Publication 371 (CAP-
371)
    3. Annex III, Subpart Q to the Commission of the European 
Communities Regulation No. 3922/91, as Amended (EU OPS Subpart Q)
III. General Discussion of the Proposal
    A. Applicability
    B. Joint Responsibility
    C. Fatigue Training
    D. Flight Duty Period
    E. Acclimating to a New Time Zone
    F. Daily Flight Time Restrictions
    G. Mitigation Strategies
    1. Augmentation
    2. Split Duty Rest
    H. Consecutive Nighttime Flight Duty Periods
    I. Reserve Duty
    J. Cumulative Duty Periods
    K. Rest Requirements
    1. Pre-Flight Duty Period Rest
    2. Cumulative Rest Requirements
    L. Fatigue Risk Management Systems
    M. Commuting
    N. Exception for Emergency and Government Sponsored Operations
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

I. Executive Summary

    As discussed in greater detail throughout this document, this 
rulemaking proposes to establish one set of flight time limitations, 
duty period limits, and rest requirements for pilots in part 121 
operations. The rulemaking aims to ensure that pilots have an 
opportunity to obtain sufficient rest to perform their duties, with an 
objective of improving aviation safety.
    Current part 121 pilot duty and rest times differ by type of 
operation (domestic, flag, and supplemental). A general summary of 
current versus proposed flight time limits, duty time limits, and rest 
time requirements are included in the table below.

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                                              Rest time                                  Duty time                              Flight time
                            ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Scenario                                                          Maximum flight      Maximum flight
                              Minimum rest prior   Minimum rest prior to      duty time--         duty time--       Maximum flight      Maximum flight
                              to duty-- domestic    duty--international       unaugmented          augmented      time-- unaugmented    time--augmented
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Current Part 121...........  Daily: 8-11          Minimum of 8 hours to   16................  16-20 depending on  8.................  8-16 depending on
                              depending on         twice the number of                         crew size.                              crew size.
                              flight time.         hours flown.
NPRM.......................  9..................  9.....................  9-13 depending on   12-18 depending on  8-10 depending on   None.
                                                                           start time and      start time, crew    FDP start time.
                                                                           number of flight    size, and
                                                                           segments.           aircraft rest
                                                                                               facility.
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[[Page 55853]]

    A summary of the FAA estimates of the costs and benefits associated 
with the provisions in this rule can be found in the table below.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Nominal costs         PV costs
                                      (millions)          (millions)
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Total Costs (over 10 years).....            $1,254.1              $803.5
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            Benefits               Nominal benefits       PV benefits
                                      (millions)          (millions)
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$6.0 million VSL................              659.40              463.80
$8.4 million VSL................                 837                 589
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    The FAA began considering changing its existing flight, duty and 
rest regulations in June 1992, when it announced the tasking of the 
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Flightcrew Member Flight/
Duty Rest Requirements working group.\1\ The tasking followed the FAA's 
receipt of hundreds of letters about the interpretation of existing 
rest requirements and several petitions to amend existing regulations. 
While the working group could not reach consensus, it submitted a final 
report in June 1994 with proposals from several working group members. 
Following receipt of the ARAC's report, the FAA published a notice of 
proposed rulemaking in 1995 (1995 NPRM).\2\ The FAA received over 2000 
comments to the 1995 NPRM. Although some commenters, including the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), NASA, Air Line Pilots 
Association, and Allied Pilots Association, said the proposal would 
enhance safety, many industry associations opposed the 1995 NPRM, 
stating the FAA lacked safety data to justify the rulemaking, and 
industry compliance would impose significant costs. The FAA never 
finalized the 1995 rulemaking, and on November 23, 2009, the agency 
withdrew it because it was outdated and raised many significant issues 
that the agency needed to consider before proceeding with a final 
rule.\3\
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    \1\ 57 FR 26685; June 15, 1992.
    \2\ Flightcrew Member Duty Period Limitations, Flight Time 
Limitations and Rest Requirements notice of proposed rulemaking (60 
FR 65951; December 20, 1995).
    \3\ 74 FR 61067.
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    On June 10, 2009, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
Administrator J. Randolph Babbitt testified before the Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation 
Operations, Safety, and Security on Aviation Safety regarding the FAA's 
role in the oversight of certificate holders. He addressed issues 
regarding flightcrew member \4\ training and qualifications, flightcrew 
fatigue, and consistency of safety standards and compliance between air 
transportation certificate holders.\5\ He also committed to assess the 
safety of the air transportation system and to take appropriate steps 
to improve it.
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    \4\ A ``flightcrew member'' is defined in 14 CFR 1.1 as a pilot, 
flight engineer, or flight navigator assigned to duty in an aircraft 
during flight time.
    \5\ In this document, the terms ``certificate holder'' and 
``carrier'' are used interchangeably. Technically, one could be a 
``certificate holder'' under part 121 without also being an air 
carrier. Accordingly, the draft regulatory text only uses the term 
``certificate holder''.
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    In June 2009, the FAA chartered the Flight and Duty Time 
Limitations and Rest Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) 
\6\ comprised of labor, industry, and FAA representatives to develop 
recommendations for an FAA rule based on current fatigue science and a 
thorough review of international approaches to the issue. The FAA 
chartered the ARC to provide a forum for the U.S. aviation community to 
discuss current approaches to mitigate fatigue found in international 
standards and make recommendations on how the United States should 
modify its regulations. The ARC consisted of 18 members representing 
airline and union associations. The members were selected based on 
their extensive certificate holder management, direct operational 
experience, or both.
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    \6\ See http://www.faa.gov/about/office%5Forg/headquarters%5Foffices/avs/offices/afs/afs200/ for the ARC Charter.
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    Specifically, the FAA asked the ARC to consider and address the 
following:
    <bullet> A single approach to addressing fatigue that consolidates 
and replaces existing regulatory requirements for parts 121 and 135.\7\
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    \7\ While tasked to consider part 135 operations, the ARC did 
not consider these operations, and this proposal does not address 
them either.
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    <bullet> Generally accepted principles of human physiology, 
performance, and alertness based on the body of fatigue science.
    <bullet> Information on sources of aviation fatigue.
    <bullet> Current approaches to address fatigue mitigation 
strategies in international standards.
    <bullet> The incorporation of fatigue risk management systems 
(FRMS) into a rulemaking.
    The ARC met over a 6-week period beginning July 7, 2009. Early on, 
the FAA told the ARC members it was very interested in the ARC's 
recommendations, but that the agency retained the authority and 
obligation to evaluate any proposals and independently determine how 
best to amend the existing regulations. The agency reiterated that 
participation on the ARC in no way precluded the ARC members from 
submitting comments critical of the NPRM when it was published. On 
September 9, 2009, the ARC delivered its final report to the FAA in the 
form of a draft NPRM.\8\
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    \8\ A copy of the ARC recommendations can be found in the docket 
for this rulemaking.
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    The ARC's goal was to reach as much agreement as possible on the 
prospective regulation. However, the members recognized early on that 
they would not be able to reach consensus on all issues. They were, 
however, generally successful in agreeing upon broad regulatory 
approaches and were able to reach consensus on two issues--how to 
address reserve \9\ and the role of commuting in any proposed 
regulations.
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    \9\ See proposed Sec.  117.3 (Definitions) were the term 
``Reserve Flightcrew Member'' is defined.
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    The Cargo Airline Association (CAA) presented a separate proposal 
for FAA consideration to address the unique operations of its 
members.\10\ According to the CAA, cargo operations are subject to 
different operational and competitive factors than scheduled passenger 
air carrier operations, including flight delays and schedule changes 
outside of the control of the certificate holder. The National Air 
Carrier Association (NACA) also submitted an alternate proposal to the 
ARC.\11\ NACA proposed

[[Page 55854]]

that the regulations contained in subpart S to part 121 continue to 
apply to certificate holders conducting unscheduled supplemental 
operations. In addition, it proposed to include a requirement that such 
operators develop and implement FRMS.
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    \10\ This proposal may be found in attachment 1 to the ARC 
report.
    \11\ This proposal may be found in attachment 2 to the ARC 
report.
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    To assist the ARC with its goal of developing proposed rules to 
enhance flightcrew member alertness and employ fatigue mitigation 
strategies, the following experts in sleep, fatigue, and human 
performance research presented a brief overview of the existing science 
and studies on sleep and fatigue to the ARC:
    <bullet> Dr. Gregory Belenky, M.D., Sleep and Performance Research 
Center, Washington State University and Dr. Steven R. Hursh, Ph.D., 
President, Institutes for Behavior Resources, Professor, Johns Hopkins 
University School of Medicine presented information on sleep, fatigue, 
and human performance.
    <bullet> Dr. Thomas Nesthus, Ph.D., FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute 
(CAMI) presented an overview of the current FAA fatigue studies.
    <bullet> Dr. Peter Demitry, M.D., 4d Enterprises, addressed 
questions from the ARC but did not make a presentation.
    The ARC members considered the information presented by the 
scientists as well as other available scientific information and used 
their substantial operational experience knowledge base to develop the 
ARC proposals.
    Following their presentations, the scientific experts encouraged 
the ARC to consider the entire body of scientific studies in developing 
any proposed limitations and requirements, rather than any one 
scientific study.\12\
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    \12\ A bibliography of available studies has been placed in the 
docket for this rulemaking.
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    On August 1, 2010, the President signed the Airline Safety and 
Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, Public Law 111-
216 (the Act). In section 212 of the Act, Congress directed the FAA to 
issue regulations no later than August 1, 2011 to ``specify limitations 
on the hours of flight and duty time allowed for pilots to address 
problems relating to pilot fatigue.''
    The Act directed the FAA to consider several factors that could 
impact pilot alertness including time of day, number of takeoffs and 
landings, crossing multiple time zones, and the effects of commuting. 
In addition, the agency was directed to review the available research 
on fatigue, sleep and rest requirements recommended by the NTSB and 
NASA, and applicable international standards. Finally, the agency was 
to explore alternate procedures to facilitate alertness in the cockpit, 
air carrier scheduling and attendance policies (including sick leave), 
and medical screening and treatment options.
    The FAA has developed a proposal for addressing the risk of fatigue 
on the safety of flight based on an evaluation of the available 
literature, existing regulatory requirements in both the United States 
and other countries, and the broad personal, professional experience of 
the ARC members and FAA staff, as well as the recommendations of the 
NTSB and NASA. Today's proposal is consistent with the statutory 
mandate set forth in the Act and takes a new approach whereby the 
distinctions between domestic, flag, and supplemental operations are 
eliminated. Rather, all types of operations would take into account the 
effects of circadian rhythms, inadequate rest opportunities and 
cumulative fatigue.
    The FAA believes its proposal sufficiently accommodates the vast 
majority of operations conducted today, while reducing the risk of 
pilot error from fatigue leading to accidents. In some areas, the FAA 
proposes to relax current requirements, while in others, it strengthens 
them to reflect the latest scientific information. The agency proposes 
to provide credit for fatigue-mitigating strategies, such as sleep 
facilities, that some certificate holders are currently providing with 
no regulatory incentive. The agency has also tentatively decided that 
certain operations conducted under the existing rules are exposing 
flightcrew members to undue risk.
    Today's proposal sets forth a matrix that addresses transient 
fatigue (i.e., the immediate, short-term fatigue that can be addressed 
by a recuperative rest opportunity) by establishing a 9-hour minimum 
rest opportunity prior to commencing duty directly associated with the 
operation of aircraft (flight duty period, or FDP), placing 
restrictions on that type of duty, and further placing restrictions on 
flight time (that period of time when the aircraft is actually in 
motion--flight time is encompassed by FDP).
    The proposal provides carriers with a level of flexibility not 
afforded today by permitting a limited extension of FDP and a limited 
reduction in the minimum rest opportunity in circumstances that are 
neither within the carrier's control nor reasonably foreseeable. In 
order to assure that carriers are adequately scheduling flightcrew 
member's work days, so as not to overuse the extension, carriers would 
be required to report on both their overall schedule integrity and 
specific crew-pairing schedule integrity on a bi-monthly basis. Should 
a carrier fail to meet the required levels of integrity, it would have 
to adjust its schedule to make it more reliable.
    The proposal addresses cumulative fatigue by placing weekly and 28-
day limits on the amount of time a flightcrew member may be assigned to 
any type of duty, including FDP. Further 28-day and annual limits are 
placed on flight time. Flightcrew members would be required to be given 
at least 30 consecutive hours free from duty on a weekly basis, a 25 
percent increase over the current requirements.
    In addition, today's proposal addresses the impact of changing time 
zones and flying through the night by reducing the amount of flight 
time and FDP available for these operations. More flight time and FDP 
would be available for certificate holders that add additional 
flightcrew members and provide adequate rest facilities to allow 
flightcrew members an opportunity to sleep aboard the aircraft. Credit 
would also be available to certificate holders that provide sufficient 
ground-based rest facilities.
    All carriers would have to develop training programs to educate all 
employees responsible for developing air carrier schedules and safety 
of flight on the symptoms of fatigue, as well as the factors leading to 
fatigue and how to mitigate fatigue-based risk.
    For those operations that cannot be conducted under the proposed 
prescriptive requirements, today's proposal also allows a carrier to 
develop a carrier-specific fatigue risk management system (FRMS). An 
FAA-approved FRMS would allow a certificate holder to customize its 
operations based on a scientifically-validated demonstration of 
fatigue-mitigating approaches and their impact on a flightcrew member's 
ability to safely fly an airplane beyond the confines of the proposed 
rule. Finally, today's proposal provides a limited exception for 
certain emergency operations or operations conducted under contract 
with the United States government that cannot otherwise be conducted 
under the prescriptive requirements proposed here. In order to assure 
there is no abuse, and that the exception is necessary, the proposal 
includes a reporting requirement.

II. Background

A. Statement of the Problem

    Fatigue is characterized by a general lack of alertness and 
degradation in mental and physical performance. Fatigue manifests in 
the aviation context

[[Page 55855]]

not only when pilots fall asleep in the cockpit while cruising, but 
perhaps more importantly, when they are insufficiently alert during 
take-off and landing. Reported fatigue-related events have included 
procedural errors, unstable approaches, lining up with the wrong 
runway, and landing without clearances.
    There are three types of fatigue: transient, cumulative, and 
circadian. Transient fatigue is acute fatigue brought on by extreme 
sleep restriction or extended hours awake within 1 or 2 days. 
Cumulative fatigue is fatigue brought on by repeated mild sleep 
restriction or extended hours awake across a series of days. Circadian 
fatigue refers to the reduced performance during nighttime hours, 
particularly during an individual's window of circadian low (WOCL) 
(typically between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.).
    Common symptoms of fatigue include:
    <bullet> Measurable reduction in speed and accuracy of performance,
    <bullet> Lapses of attention and vigilance,
    <bullet> Delayed reactions,
    <bullet> Impaired logical reasoning and decision-making, including 
a reduced ability to assess risk or appreciate consequences of actions,
    <bullet> Reduced situational awareness, and
    <bullet> Low motivation to perform optional activities.
    A variety of factors contribute to whether an individual 
experiences fatigue as well as the severity of that fatigue. The major 
factors affecting fatigue include:
    <bullet> Time of day. Fatigue is, in part, a function of circadian 
rhythms. All other factors being equal, fatigue is most likely, and, 
when present, most severe, between the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.
    <bullet> Amount of recent sleep. If a person has had significantly 
less than 8 hours of sleep in the past 24 hours, he or she is more 
likely to be fatigued.
    <bullet> Time awake. A person who has been continually awake more 
than 17 hours since his or her last major sleep period is more likely 
to be fatigued.
    <bullet> Cumulative sleep debt. For the average person, cumulative 
sleep debt is the difference between the amount of sleep a person has 
received over the past several days, and the amount of sleep they would 
have received if they got 8 hours of sleep a night. A person with a 
cumulative sleep debt of more than 8 hours since his or her last full 
night of sleep is more likely to be fatigued.
    <bullet> Time on task. The longer a person has continuously been 
doing a job without a break, the more likely he or she is to be 
fatigued.
    <bullet> Individual variation. Individuals respond to fatigue 
factors differently and may become fatigued at different times, and to 
different degrees of severity, under the same circumstances.
    There is often interplay between various factors that contribute to 
fatigue. For example, the performance of a person working night and 
early morning shifts is impacted by the time of day. Additionally, 
because of the difficulty in getting normal sleep during other than 
nighttime hours, such a person is more likely to have a cumulative 
sleep debt or to not have obtained a full night's sleep within the past 
24 hours.
    Scientific research and experimentation have consistently 
demonstrated that adequate sleep sustains performance. For most people, 
8 hours of sleep in each 24 hours sustains performance indefinitely. 
Sleep opportunities during the WOCL are preferable, although some 
research indicates that the total amount of sleep is more important 
than the timing of the sleep. Within limits, shortened periods of 
nighttime sleep may be nearly as beneficial as a consolidated sleep 
period when augmented by additional sleep periods, such as naps before 
evening departures, during flights with augmented flightcrews, and 
during layovers. Sleep should not be fragmented with interruptions. In 
addition, environmental conditions, such as temperature, noise, and 
turbulence, impact how beneficial sleep is and how performance is 
restored.
    When a person has accumulated a sleep debt, recovery sleep is 
necessary to fully restore the person's ``sleep reservoir.'' Recovery 
sleep should include at least one physiological night, that is, one 
sleep period during nighttime hours in the time zone in which the 
individual is acclimated. The average person requires in excess of 9 
hours of sleep a night to recover from a sleep debt.\13\
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    \13\ Recovery sleep does not require additional sleep equal to 
the cumulative sleep debt; that is, an 8-hour sleep debt does not 
require 8 additional hours of sleep.
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    Several aviation-specific work schedule factors \14\ can affect 
sleep and subsequent alertness. These include early start times, 
extended work periods, insufficient time off between work periods, 
insufficient recovery time off between consecutive work periods, amount 
of work time within a shift or duty period, number of consecutive work 
periods, night work through one's window of circadian low, daytime 
sleep periods, and day-to-night or night-to-day transitions.
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    \14\ Rosekind MR. Managing work schedules: an alertness and 
safety perspective. In: Kryger MH, Roth T, Dement WC, editors. 
Principles and Practice of Sleep Medicine; 2005:682.
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    The FAA believes its current regulations do not adequately address 
the risk of fatigue. Presently, flightcrew members are effectively 
allowed to work up to 16 hours a day, with all of that time spent on 
tasks directly related to aircraft operations. The regulatory 
requirement for 9 hours of rest is regularly reduced, with flightcrew 
members spending rest time traveling to or from hotels and being 
provided with little to no time to decompress. Additionally, 
certificate holders regularly exceed the allowable duty periods by 
conducting flights under part 91 instead of part 121, where the 
applicable flight, duty and rest requirements are housed. As the NTSB 
repeatedly notes, the FAA's regulations do not account for the impact 
of circadian rhythms on alertness, and the entire set of regulations is 
overly complicated, with a different set of regulations for domestic 
operations, flag operations, and supplemental operations.

B. NTSB Recommendations

    The NTSB has long been concerned about the effects of fatigue in 
the aviation industry. The first aviation safety recommendations, 
issued in 1972, involved human fatigue, and aviation safety 
investigations continue to identify serious concerns about the effects 
of fatigue, sleep, and circadian rhythm disruption. Currently, the 
NTSB's list of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements includes 
safety recommendations regarding pilot fatigue. These recommendations 
are based on two accident investigations and an NTSB safety study on 
commuter airline safety.\15\
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    \15\ On February 2, 2010, the NTSB released a press release 
summarizing the results of its investigation into the Colgan Air 
crash of February 12, 2009, which resulted in the death of 50 
people. The NTSB did not state that fatigue was causal factor to the 
crash; however, it did recommend that the FAA take steps to address 
pilot fatigue.
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    In February 2006 the NTSB issued safety recommendations after a 
BAE-J3201 operated under part 121 by Corporate Airline struck trees on 
final approach and crashed short of the runway at Kirksville Regional 
Airport, Kirksville, Missouri. The captain, first officer, and 11 of 
the 13 passengers died. The NTSB determined the probable cause of the 
October 19, 2004 accident was the pilots' failure to follow established 
procedures and properly conduct a non-precision instrument approach at 
night in instrument meteorological conditions. The NTSB

[[Page 55856]]

concluded that fatigue likely contributed to the pilots' performance 
and decision-making ability. This conclusion was based on the less than 
optimal overnight rest time available to the pilots, the early report 
time for duty, the number of flight legs, and the demanding conditions 
encountered during the long duty day.
    As a result of the accident, the NTSB issued the following safety 
recommendations related to flight and duty time limitations: (1) Modify 
and simplify the flightcrew hours-of-service regulations to consider 
factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload, and other 
factors shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current 
industry experience to affect crew alertness (recommendation No. A-06-
10); and (2) require all part 121 and part 135 certificate holders to 
incorporate fatigue-related information similar to the information 
being developed by the DOT Operator Fatigue Management Program into 
initial and recurrent pilot training programs. The recommendation notes 
that this training should address the detrimental effects of fatigue 
and include strategies for avoiding fatigue and countering its effects 
(recommendation No. A-06-10).
    The NTSB's list of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements 
also includes a safety recommendation on pilot fatigue and ferry 
flights conducted under 14 CFR part 91. Three flightcrew members died 
after a Douglas DC-8-63 operated by Air Transport International was 
destroyed by ground impact and fire during an attempted three-engine 
takeoff at Kansas City International Airport in Kansas City, Missouri. 
The NTSB noted that the flightcrew conducted the flight as a 
maintenance ferry flight under part 91 after a shortened rest break 
following a demanding round trip flight to Europe that crossed multiple 
time zones. The NTSB further noted that the international flight, 
conducted under part 121, involved multiple legs flown at night 
following daytime rest periods that caused the flightcrew to experience 
circadian rhythm disruption. In addition, the NTSB found the captain's 
last rest period before the accident was repeatedly interrupted by the 
certificate holder.
    In issuing its 1995 recommendations, the NTSB stated that the 
flight time limits and rest requirements under part 121 that applied to 
the flightcrew before the ferry flight did not apply to the ferry 
flight operated under part 91. As a result, the regulations permitted a 
substantially reduced flightcrew rest period for the nonrevenue ferry 
flight. As a result of the investigation, the NTSB reiterated earlier 
recommendations to (1) finalize the review of current flight and duty 
time limitations to ensure the limitations consider research findings 
in fatigue and sleep issues and (2) prohibit certificate holders from 
assigning a flightcrew to flights conducted under part 91 unless the 
flightcrew met the flight and duty time limits under part 121 or other 
applicable regulations (recommendation No. A-95-113).
    In addition to recommending a comprehensive approach to fatigue 
with flight duty limits based on fatigue research, circadian rhythms, 
and sleep and rest requirements, the NTSB has also stated that FRMS may 
hold promise as an approach to dealing with fatigue in the aviation 
environment. However, the NTSB noted that it considers fatigue 
management plans to be a complement to, not a substitute for, 
regulations to address fatigue.

C. International Standards

    There are a number of standards addressing flight and duty time 
limitations and rest requirements that have been adopted by other 
jurisdictions, as well as the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), and these standards were reviewed by the ARC to determine if 
any of their philosophy or structures could be adopted by the FAA. 
While the ARC found many of the requirements useful, it also determined 
that the U.S. requirements would need to address the U.S. aviation 
industry and that the existing standards could not fully achieve that 
objective. The FAA agrees that none of the existing standards fully 
address the U.S. aviation environment. Nevertheless, the existing 
standards do serve as the basis of many of the provisions proposed 
today. Accordingly, specific provisions of these standards are 
discussed throughout the rest of this document and a copy of each 
standard has been placed in the docket.
1. Amendment No. 33 to the International Standards and Recommended 
Practices, Annex 6 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
Part I, International Commercial Air Transport--Aeroplanes (ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP))
    The ICAO SARP for Contracting States (States) provide that a 
certificate holder should establish flight time and duty period 
limitations and rest provisions that enable the certificate holder to 
manage the fatigue of its flightcrew members. The ICAO SARP do not 
provide specific numerical values for these provisions but set forth a 
regulatory framework for member States to use as guidelines in 
establishing prescriptive limitations for fatigue management. Member 
States are required to base their regulations on scientific principles 
and knowledge with the goal of ensuring that flightcrew members perform 
at an adequate level of alertness for safe flight operations. The ICAO 
SARP do not address fatigue risk management programs currently; 
however, these programs are currently under development.
2. United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority Publication 371 (CAP-371)
    Air Navigation Order 2000, Part VI, as amended, requires a 
certificate holder to have a civil aviation authority-approved scheme 
for regulating the flight time of aircrews. CAP-371 provides guidance 
on this requirement and recognizes that the prime objective of a flight 
limitation scheme is to ensure flightcrew members are adequately rested 
at the beginning of each Flight Duty Period (FDP) and are flying 
sufficiently free from fatigue so they can operate efficiently and 
safely in normal and abnormal situations. When establishing maximum 
FDPs and minimum rest periods, certificate holders must consider the 
relationship between the frequency and patterns of scheduled FDPs and 
rest periods, and the effects of working long hours with minimum rest.
3. Annex III, Subpart Q to the Commission of the European Communities 
Regulation No. 3922/91, as Amended (EU OPS subpart Q)
    EU OPS subpart Q prescribes limitations on FDPs, duty periods, 
block (flight) time, and rest requirements. Like the previous standards 
discussed, EU OPS subpart Q recognizes the importance of enabling 
flightcrew members to be sufficiently free from fatigue so they can 
operate the aircraft satisfactorily in all circumstances. In 
establishing flight and duty limitation and rest schemes, EU OPS 
subpart Q requires certificate holders to consider the relationship 
between the frequencies and pattern of FDPs and rest periods, and the 
cumulative effects of long duty hours with interspersed rest. 
Certificate holders must take action to revise a schedule in cases 
where the actual operation exceeds the maximum scheduled FDP on more 
than 33 percent of the flights in that schedule during a specified 
period.

[[Page 55857]]

III. General Discussion of the Proposal

A. Applicability

    The FAA is proposing to limit this rulemaking to part 121 
certificate holders and the flightcrew members \16\ who work for them. 
While fatigue is a universal problem that applies to all types of 
operations and to all safety sensitive functions, the agency has 
decided to take incremental steps in addressing fatigue. Thus, future 
rulemaking initiatives may address fatigue concerns related to flight 
attendants, maintenance personnel, and dispatchers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ A flightcrew member is a certified pilot or flight engineer 
assigned to duty aboard an aircraft during a flight duty period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, part 135 certificate holders should pay close 
attention to both this NPRM and any final rule. This is because part 
135 operations are very similar to those conducted under part 121, 
particularly part 121 supplemental operations. The FAA does not 
intuitively see any difference in the safety implications between the 
two types of operations, although it acknowledges there may be less 
overall risk to the flying public in part 135 operations than part 121 
operations. Accordingly, the part 135 community should expect to see an 
NPRM addressing its operations that looks very similar to, if not 
exactly like, the final rule the agency anticipates issuing as part of 
this rulemaking initiative.
    Today's proposal applies to all flights conducted by part 121 
certificate holders, including flights like ferry flights that are 
historically conducted under part 91. While these types of flights can 
continue to operate under the general rules of part 91, the flight, 
duty, and rest requirements proposed here would also apply.
    In addition, the FAA has tentatively decided against adopting 
different requirements based on the nature of the operation. The FAA 
has designed the flight, duty and rest scheme proposed today to enhance 
flightcrew member alertness and mitigate fatigue. The agency's existing 
regulatory scheme provides different rules for domestic operations, 
flag operations, and supplemental operations. This hodgepodge of 
requirements developed over time to address changing business 
environments and advances in technology that allowed for longer periods 
of flight. Thus, in domestic operations, flight time is essentially 
calculated based on time at the controls, while in supplemental 
operations, the regulations contemplate restrictions based on ``time 
aloft'' since a flightcrew member may not be at the controls for the 
entire flight; crew augmentation is prohibited in domestic operations; 
and the regulations governing flag operations, where augmentation is 
largely assumed, allow certificate holders to liberally increase the 
amount of flight time based on the presence of additional flightcrew 
members, regardless of whether those individuals can actually fly the 
airplane.
    Fatigue factors, however, are universal. The sleep science, while 
still evolving and subject to individual inclinations, is clear in a 
few important respects: most people need eight hours of sleep to 
function effectively, most people find it more difficult to sleep 
during the day than during the night, resulting in greater fatigue if 
working at night; the longer one has been awake and the longer one 
spends on task, the greater the likelihood of fatigue; and fatigue 
leads to an increased risk of making a mistake.
    The FAA recognizes there are different business models and needs 
that are partly responsible for the differences in the current 
regulations. It is sympathetic to concerns raised within the ARC by 
cargo carriers and carriers engaged in supplemental operations that new 
regulations will disproportionately impact their business models. 
However, the FAA also notes that the historical distinction between the 
types of operators has become blurred. Cargo carriers conduct the vast 
majority of their operations at night, but passenger carriers also 
offer ``red eyes'' on a daily basis. Some carriers operate under 
domestic, flag or supplemental authority, depending on the nature of 
the specific operation. Additionally, in some instances, the FAA has 
authorized a carrier to conduct supplemental operations under the flag 
rules.
    Today's proposal is designed to recognize the growing similarities 
between the kinds of operations and the universality of factors that 
lead to fatigue in most individuals. Thus, the proposal provides 
different requirements based on the time of day, whether an individual 
is acclimated to a new time zone, and the likelihood of being able to 
sleep under different circumstances. If today's proposal is adopted, 
the FAA expects that most part 121 operators will be required to make 
changes to their existing operations, and some will need to make more 
changes than others. However, the FAA also believes that the proposal 
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the vast majority of operations 
conducted today without imposing unreasonable costs.

B. Joint Responsibility

    Fatigue mitigation is a joint responsibility of the certificate 
holder and the flightcrew member. Today's proposal recognizes the need 
to hold both certificate holders and pilots responsible for making sure 
flightcrew members are working a reasonable number of hours, getting 
sufficient sleep, and not reporting for flight duty in an unsafe 
condition. Many of the ways that carriers and flightcrew members will 
negotiate this joint responsibility will be handled in the context of 
labor management relations. Others will not. Today's proposal is 
drafted in a manner that directly imposes the regulatory obligations on 
both the certificate holders and the flightcrew members. It is unfair 
to place all the blame for fatigue on the carriers. Pilots who pick up 
extra hours, moonlight, report to work when sick, commute 
irresponsibly, or simply choose not to take advantage of the required 
rest periods are as culpable as carriers who push the envelop by 
scheduling right up to the maximum duty limits, assigning flightcrew 
members who have reached their flight time limits additional flight 
duties under part 91, and exceeding the maximum flight and duty limits 
by claiming reasonably foreseeable circumstances are beyond their 
control.
    One important element of this proposal is that flightcrew members 
may not accept an assignment that would consist of an FDP if they are 
too fatigued to fly safely. Likewise a flightcrew member may not 
continue subsequent flight segments if he or she has become too 
fatigued to fly safely. Certificate holders also must assess a 
flightcrew member's state when he or she reports to work. If the 
carrier determines a flightcrew member is showing signs of fatigue, it 
may not allow the flightcrew member to fly. Flightcrew members should 
be cognizant of the appearance and behavior of fellow flightcrew 
members, including such signs of fatigue as slurred speech, droopy 
eyes, requests to repeat things, and attention to the length of time 
left in the duty period. If a flightcrew member (or any other employee) 
believes another flightcrew member may be too tired to fly, he or she 
would have to report his or her concern to the appropriate management 
person, who would then be required to determine whether the individual 
is sufficiently alert to fly safely.
    In addition, under today's proposal, carriers would need to develop 
and implement an internal evaluation and audit program to monitor 
whether

[[Page 55858]]

flightcrew members are reporting to work fatigued. The FAA anticipates 
that the program would look at both the number of instances in which 
this happens as well as the reasons contributing to the problem. The 
FAA is aware of anecdotal reports of pilots flying when fatigued 
because they are short on sick leave, as well as instances when pilots 
have called in sick when the true problem was fatigue. As part of the 
internal audit, a carrier may need to delve into the reasons flightcrew 
members call in sick to make sure it is capturing accurately incidents 
of pilot fatigue. It could choose to create a separate fatigue category 
to mitigate the risk of pilots calling in sick when in fact they are 
fatigued.
    A carrier would be required to take steps to correct any fatigue 
problem that it identifies. For example, if the carrier became aware 
that flightcrew members were commuting during their WOCL, the carrier 
could require that all flightcrew members spend the night prior to 
starting a series of FDPs within the local commuting area. The carrier 
could also implement other measures to address problems associated not 
only with commuting, but any behavior that could lead to flightcrew 
members reporting for FDPs unfit for duty.
    Several ARC members urged that these requirements be encapsulated 
in a non-punitive fatigue policy. While the FAA certainly supports such 
policies, it also recognizes that requiring carriers to develop and 
implement non-punitive fatigue policies is challenging from a 
regulatory perspective. Carriers are entitled to investigate the causes 
for an employee's fatigue. If a carrier determines that the flightcrew 
member was responsible for becoming fatigued, it has every right to 
take steps to address that behavior. To the extent the fatigue may be a 
function of the carrier not following the regulatory requirements, the 
FAA certainly would investigate and possibly initiate enforcement 
action. In addition, self-reporting could be encapsulated in a 
carrier's voluntary disclosure program under the FAA's Aviation Safety 
Action Program (ASAP), which has certain non-punitive provisions built 
into the program.

C. Fatigue Training

    The FAA believes fatigue-based training requirements are critical 
to informing flightcrew members how their personal behavior can 
unwittingly lead to fatigue, and how to mitigate the risk of fatigue in 
an industry that does not follow a traditional 9-to-5 work day. Fatigue 
training is not currently required under any regulatory regime. In the 
presentation to the ARC by the sleep specialists, all specialists noted 
that people regularly underestimate their level of fatigue, often to 
dangerous levels. The ARC generally agreed that fatigue training was a 
good idea, and several members noted that such training should extend 
to all ``stakeholders'', e.g., employees of the certificate holder 
responsible both for scheduling and for safety of flight, rather than 
just flightcrew members.
    The FAA agrees that flightcrew members do not bear sole 
responsibility for making sure they are adequately rested and that they 
are not the only employees of the carrier who need to be trained on the 
impact of fatigue on the safety of flight. The agency is proposing to 
require fatigue training for each person involved with scheduling 
aircraft and crews, all crewmembers and management personnel. The FAA 
is proposing to require 5 hours of initial training for all newly-
hired, covered employees prior to starting work in that capacity and 2 
hours of annual, recurrent training. This training would be approved 
through the agency's Operations Specifications (OpSpec) process.
    The training curriculum would address general fatigue and fatigue 
countermeasures along with the following subject areas:
    <bullet> FAA regulatory requirements for flight, duty and rest, and 
NTSB recommendations on fatigue management;
    <bullet> The basics of fatigue, including sleep fundamentals and 
circadian rhythms;
    <bullet> The causes of fatigue, including medical conditions that 
may lead to fatigue;
    <bullet> The effect of fatigue on performance;
    <bullet> Fatigue countermeasures, prevention and mitigation;
    <bullet> The influence of lifestyle, including nutrition, exercise, 
and family life, on fatigue;
    <bullet> Familiarity with sleep disorders and their possible 
treatments;
    <bullet> The impact of commuting on fatigue;
    <bullet> Flightcrew member responsibility for ensuring adequate 
rest and fitness for duty; and
    <bullet> The effect of operating through and within multiple time 
zones.
    In addition, the FAA recognizes that the study of fatigue and 
fatigue mitigation is on-going. Changes may need to be made to training 
programs even after approval by the FAA. Accordingly, whenever the 
Administrator finds that revisions are necessary for the continued 
adequacy of an approved fatigue education and training program, the 
certificate holder must, after notification, make any changes in the 
program that are deemed necessary by the Administrator. The FAA 
anticipates that such changes would be implemented through the agency's 
OpSpecs as provided for in 14 CFR 119.51, providing carriers with an 
opportunity to provide input and appeal rights.

D. Flight Duty Period

    There are numerous studies that generally address fatigue, as well 
as models \17\ that have been developed. The models predict fatigue-
based performance degradation based on data input such as when a flight 
begins, how long it lasts, whether there is a rest opportunity, and the 
local time of day at departure and landing. Only one of these models 
has been validated in the aviation context,\18\ although there is 
general validation in the railroad and motor carrier industries. The 
available validations are not directly applicable to aviation because 
of the impact of relatively rapid movement within multiple time zones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Bio-mathematical modeling of fatigue and performance can 
assist in providing objective metrics, which are conspicuously 
lacking in fatigue science. The rationale for modeling is that 
conditions that lead to fatigue are well known. A model simulates 
specific conditions and determines if fatigue could be present. 
Models can estimate degradations in performance and provide an 
estimate of schedule-induced fatigue risk that considers many 
dynamically changing and interacting fatigue factors.
    \18\ The SAFE model, developed by Mick Spencer of the United 
Kingdom, has been validated in the aviation context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While there is ample science indicating that performance degrades 
during windows of circadian low and that regular sleep is necessary to 
sustain performance, there is no evidence that flying multiple segments 
is more fatiguing than flying one or two segments per duty period. 
However, multiple segments require more time on task because there are 
more take-offs and landings, which are both the most task-intensive and 
the most safety-critical stages of flight. Also, pilots appear to 
generally agree that flying several legs during a single duty period 
could be more fatiguing.
    One approach to addressing fatigue is to link the length of duty 
directly related to flight to the time of day and the number of legs 
that are scheduled to be flown. This approach recognizes the additional 
fatigue introduced by night-time flying and by flying several legs, 
with multiple take-offs and landings. As discussed earlier, the current 
regulatory system in the United States provides variability based on 
whether a given

[[Page 55859]]

operation is flown under domestic, flag or supplemental rules; but 
within each category of operation there is little to no variability in 
permissible flight time based on the particular operation.
    Other jurisdictions have largely eliminated the concept of a 
uniform flight time in favor of a variable FDP that encompasses flight 
time but also includes other duties directly related to flight. An FDP 
is duty consisting of training required by the certificate holder's 
approved flight training curriculum and qualification segment to be 
conducted in a simulator, flight training device and aircraft 
training,\19\ as well as pre-flight deadheads \20\ without an 
intervening rest, and all duties from the time the flightcrew member is 
required to report for duty to fly until the last movement of the 
aircraft. An FDP begins when a crewmember is required to report for 
duty that includes a flight, series of flights, or positioning flights 
(including part 91 ferry flights) and ends when the aircraft is parked 
after the last flight and there is no plan for further aircraft 
movement by the same crewmember.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Training conducted in accordance with the certificate 
holder's approved ground training program would be considered duty 
outside of an FDP.
    \20\ Deadhead transportation means transportation of a 
crewmember as a passenger, by air or surface transportation, as 
required by a certificate holder, excluding transportation to or 
from a suitable accommodation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the UK's CAP-371 an FDP is limited to no more than 13 hours 
under a minimum crew pairing, but may be increased through augmentation 
or split duty rest, and is reduced based on flying in the WOCL or 
flying multiple legs. The minimum FDP is 9 hours, unless flying 
multiple night-time operations, when FDP is reduced to 8 hours. A pilot 
in command may extend the FDP up to 3 hours due to unforeseen 
circumstances. Any duty immediately preceding flight check-in is also 
considered FDP, as is simulator training conducted during the same duty 
period if prior to flying, regardless of whether there is a break.
    Under EU-OPS subpart Q, the maximum FDP is 13 hours, reduced at 30-
minute increments per segment after the second segment down to a 2-hour 
reduction. One-hour extensions are permitted, except when an FDP has 
more than six segments, when no extension is permitted. There is a more 
complicated formula that applies when encroaching on the WOCL. There 
are no more than two extensions during any 7-day period. Schedule 
robustness is addressed by requiring that actual operations not exceed 
FDP more than 33 percent of the time (i.e., actual flights are within 
the FDP limits at least 67 percent of a scheduling season). A 2-hour 
extension is permitted at the discretion of the entire crew for 
unforeseen circumstances.
    The pending EASA proposal on flight duty and rest would adopt the 
same FDP concept as CAP-371 and EU-OPS subpart Q. Like those standards, 
the maximum FDP is 13 hours unless a mitigation strategy such as 
augmentation is adopted, and the FDP is reduced based on time of day 
and number of legs flown. Unlike the CAP-371, and similar to EU-OPS 
subpart Q, the EASA proposal contemplates that schedules that do not 
regularly meet the maximum-allowable FDP will be changed. The CAP-371 
merely requires a pilot in command to report when the FDP is exceeded.
    The ARC members generally agreed with the approach adopted in CAP-
371 and by EASA, although they could not agree on how conservative 
maximum FDPs should be. Tables A(1) and A(2) depict the two ranges of 
FDP discussed by the ARC, with Table A(1) generally representing the 
labor position, and A(2) generally representing the carriers' position. 
Both tables reduce the amount of FDP during the nighttime hours to 
address flying during one's WOCL, and both reduce the amount of FDP 
once a flightcrew member has flown more than four legs. Flightcrew 
members would enter the table based on the time at their home base 
(i.e., the city where they regularly fly from) unless they have 
acclimated to a different time zone, at which point they would enter 
the table based on local time. In addition, the FDP would be reduced by 
30 minutes for unacclimated flightcrew members. Extensions no greater 
than 2 hours (possibly as many as 3 hours internationally or for 
augmented flights) beyond a scheduled FDP would be allowed for 
circumstances beyond a carrier's control. The decision to extend would 
rest on both the carrier and the pilot in command, although specific 
coordination might not be required in every instance. In addition, 
there would be limits on the number of times a crew pairing could be 
extended in any 168-hour period, with discussion of whether that limit 
should be once or twice, but general agreement that it should not be 
allowed on consecutive days. A flightcrew member could not continue an 
FDP beyond the extension except under emergency circumstances.

                             Table A(1)--Flight Duty Period: Un-Augmented Operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Maximum flight duty period (hours)  for lineholders based on number of flight
Time of start  (Home base or                                       segments
         acclimated)         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   1           2           3           4           5           6          7+
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0359...................          9           9           9           9           9           9           9
0400-0459...................         10          10           9           9           9           9           9
0500-0559...................         11          11          11          11          10         9.5           9
0600-0659...................         12          12          12          12        11.5          11        10.5
0700-1259...................         13          13          13          13        12.5          12          11
1300-1659...................         12          12          12          12        11.5          11        10.5
1700-2159...................         11          11          10          10         9.5           9           9
2200-2259...................       10.5        10.5         9.5         9.5           9           9           9
2300-2359...................        9.5         9.5           9           9           9           9           9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 55860]]


                             Table A(2)--Flight Duty Period: Un-Augmented Operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Maximum flight duty period (hours)  for lineholders based on number of flight
                                                                   segments
 Time of start  (Home base)  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   1           2           3           4           5           6          7+
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0159...................          9           9           9           9           9           9           9
0200-0459...................         10          10          10          10           9           9           9
0500-0659...................         12          12          12          12        11.5          11        10.5
0700-1259...................         13          13          13          13        12.5          12        11.5
1300-1659...................         12          12          12          12        11.5          11        10.5
1700-2159...................         11          11          11          11           9           9           9
2200-2259...................       10.5        10.5        10.5        10.5           9           9           9
2300-2359...................        9.5         9.5         9.5         9.5           9           9           9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to assure that the extensions are not abused and that 
carriers are creating schedules contemplating circumstances that may be 
beyond their control, but that are reasonably foreseeable (e.g., 
seasonal weather trends, planned runway construction, chronically-
delayed airports or markets), a carrier would provide the FAA with 
scheduled FDPs for all its crew pairings and the actual FDPs, including 
any extensions, on a regular basis. Some argued this cycle should be as 
little as once a month, while others argued a quarterly reporting cycle 
was sufficient. Should the carriers' actual FDPs fail to meet the 
scheduled FDP too many times during the reporting cycle, they would be 
required to change the scheduled FDPs to more realistic levels. The ARC 
agreed that 95 percent of a carrier's schedules would need to fall 
within the maximum FDP depicted in Table A(1) or A(2). In order to 
identify specific crew pairings that were problematic, each crew 
pairing would need to fall within the limits in the tables for a lesser 
percentage of the time, somewhere between 70 percent and 85 percent.
    The FAA has decided to propose the more conservative FDPs depicted 
in Table A(1), with a 2-hour extension for unforeseeable circumstances 
beyond the carrier's control permitted once in a 168-hour period.\21\ 
Since the entire flightcrew is impacted by the extension, only one 
flightcrew member needs to have utilized the extension in the previous 
168 hours for it to no longer be available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ A 3-hour extension would be allowed for augmented 
operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the extension is less than 30 minutes, the FAA anticipates 
permitting multiple extensions during the 168-hour period. The FAA has 
tentatively determined that short incursions into the permissible 
extension are unlikely to be fatiguing given the other requirements of 
today's proposal and that limiting a flightcrew member to a single 
weekly extension that could be as small as five or ten minutes is 
unreasonable. However, the extensions are intended to address 
unforeseeable circumstances beyond the carrier's control. Such 
circumstances should be of sufficiently short duration that the carrier 
could not reasonably make schedule adjustments. Thus, while the FAA 
contemplates that adverse weather could fit within the criteria because 
it is beyond the control of the certificate holder, it would not always 
be considered unforeseeable. Carriers should anticipate thunderstorms 
in many parts of the United States during the summer months. Likewise, 
heavy snow in the northern parts of the country should be anticipated 
during the winter, and the jet stream follows basic seasonal patterns. 
By the same token, carriers are not responsible for air traffic delays; 
however, if they are operating out of chronically delayed airports, air 
traffic delays are clearly foreseeable. To the extent even small 
extensions are regularly occurring, the schedule reliability 
requirements discussed by the ARC should require schedule adjustments, 
even when encroachments beyond the times in the FDP table are very 
small.
    The FAA recognizes that adopting the numbers in Table A(1) is a 
conservative approach. The FAA has decided to propose the more 
conservative numbers because it has little experience with this type of 
regulatory regime. However, the numbers contemplated under both tables 
are very similar, and the FAA is open to arguments that a more 
expansive FDP is merited. The agency also recognizes that upon 
completion of an FDP, a flightcrew member could be assigned other 
duties as long as he or she is provided with a required rest 
opportunity prior to commencing his or her next FDP. The underlying 
premise of today's proposal is to ensure flightcrew members are 
adequately rested during the time they are responsible for the 
operation of aircraft. To the extent other duties are not directly 
related to the safe operation of flight, the FAA believes there is no 
need to reduce the current implied daily duty limit of 16 hours in un-
augmented operations, as long as those duties do not introduce the 
potential for fatigue during flight.
    The reduction in maximum FDP during nighttime hours is broadly 
supported by existing sleep science. Although not addressed by sleep 
studies, the FAA has also tentatively decided to reduce the amount of 
available FDP depending on the number of legs flown (flight segments) 
because of a general agreement among the ARC members and FAA staff 
previously employed as pilots by commercial air carriers that multiple 
take-offs and landings are more fatiguing. Much of the available 
science is based on laboratory studies, with exceptionally limited 
validation in the aviation context; accordingly, the FAA has 
tentatively decided to rely on the experience of these individuals 
rather than assuming no adverse impact on safety. The FAA is not 
proposing to make any adjustments for the first four flight segments 
based on this same experience. The linear reduction contemplated in the 
EASA regulations (which is used for multiple purposes) appears to have 
more to do with regulatory simplicity than with any actual experience 
or science.
    As recommended by the ARC, a flightcrew member would enter the FDP 
table based on home base time, unless acclimated to a different time 
zone. Thus, if a flightcrew member ordinarily flies out of Chicago, the 
flightcrew member would enter an FDP as though he or she were in 
Chicago, regardless of where he or she is physically located.\22\

[[Page 55861]]

A 10 a.m. crew pairing out of Heathrow would be treated as if it 
commenced at 4 a.m., because of the 6-hour time difference between 
Chicago and London. If the operation requires the flightcrew member to 
cross more than four time zones, he or she would be considered 
unacclimated, and there would be a 30-minute reduction in the maximum 
FDP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Some carriers have moved to virtual home bases, or have no 
home base. This is most common among supplemental operators. In 
those instances, the proposal contemplates that the carrier would 
name a home base somewhere within the continental United States, and 
that home base would be considered the flightcrew member's home 
base.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has also decided to propose the reporting requirements 
discussed by the ARC to assure realistic scheduling. The agency has 
tentatively decided that reports be filed with the FAA every two 
months. The ARC discussed a range of one to three months. The FAA 
believes a monthly reporting requirement could be excessively 
burdensome to both the certificate holders and the FAA. By the same 
token, if the reporting interval is too long, carriers may avoid 
addressing common delay scenarios, simply waiting them out.
    Under today's proposal, carriers must first demonstrate that 100 
percent of the scheduled crew pairings fall within the limits in the 
FDP table. Actual system-wide FDPs should not exceed the maximum levels 
in the FDP table more than five percent of the time. Each crew pairing 
would need to fall within the FDP table 80 percent of the time. The 
agency believes a 20 percent variation for a specific crew pairing 
provides carriers with sufficient flexibility to address multiple yet 
small excursions beyond the FDP table, while still forcing the carriers 
to recognize when a particular crew pairing is problematic. Because no 
flightcrew member may exceed the limits in the FDP table beyond 30 
minutes more than once in any 168-hour period, the FAA does not believe 
a 20 percent variation will result in any immediate adverse safety 
situation.
    Should any of the three proposed reporting requirements be 
exceeded, a carrier would be required to readjust the problematic crew 
pairings to more realistic schedules. These adjustments, which could be 
seasonal in nature, would be on-going and would apply to subsequent 
years. To the extent a carrier could immediately implement measures to 
improve schedule fidelity, it should do so. However, the ability of 
carriers to immediately address the scheduling issue is difficult to 
evaluate without understanding the impact of published schedules on 
resolving the problem. The FAA has notionally proposed that changes be 
made within 60 days, but it is interested in better understanding the 
impact of such a requirement on carriers' schedules.
    Below, and throughout this document, we invite commenters to 
address specific questions, along with any other matters they consider 
relevant. We are particularly interested in receiving recommendations 
that would provide the same or better protection against the problems 
of fatigue at lower cost. We may incorporate any such recommendation in 
a Final Rule in this proceeding.
    With that in mind, the FAA seeks comment on the following:
    (1) Please comment on adopting maximum FDPs. Should the maximum FDP 
vary based on time of day? Should it vary based on the number of 
scheduled flight segments? Should the proposed limits be modified up or 
down, and to what degree? Please provide supporting data.
    (2) Please comment on permitting flightcrew members and carriers to 
operate beyond a scheduled FDP. Is the proposed 2-hour extension 
appropriate? Is the restriction on a single occurrence beyond 30 
minutes in a 168-hour period appropriate? Should a flightcrew member be 
restricted to a single occurrence regardless of the length of the 
extension? Please provide supporting data.
    (3) Please comment on the proposed schedule reliability reporting 
requirements. Should carriers be required to report on crew pairings 
that exceed the scheduled FDP, but not the maximum FDP listed in the 
FDP table?
    (4) Should carriers be required to report on more parameters, such 
as cumulative duty hours or daily flight time? If so, why?
    (5) What should be the interval between reporting requirements?
    (6) How long after discovering a problematic crew pairing should 
the carrier be afforded to correct the scheduling problem?

E. Acclimating to a New Time Zone

    Unlike other forms of transportation, where an individual moves 
gradually through multiple time zones over the course of the day, the 
nature of aviation allows an individual to traverse several time zones 
over a relatively short period of time. This phenomenon exposes 
flightcrew members to a greater sense of disorientation or jet lag than 
employees in other forms of transportation. For trips with short turn 
around times, a flightcrew member likely would not acclimate, and would 
simply enter the FDP table based on his or her home base time. However, 
flightcrew members remaining in a new theater for longer periods of 
time may need to acclimate to the new theater.
    During the question and answer session with ARC members, the sleep 
specialists explained how an individual acclimates to time zones when 
flying long range operations. They stated that having sleep 
opportunities during a physiological night is the most important 
fatigue mitigation strategy for global travel. They also noted that an 
individual attempting to acclimate to a new time zone will adjust his 
or her clock approximately 1 hour per day for each hour of time zone 
difference. The ARC members noted that based on their collective 
personal experience, one could acclimate much more quickly if one 
managed his or her sleep opportunity appropriately. The sleep 
specialists also noted that even if an individual consciously decided 
not to acclimate to a new time zone, given enough time, the individual 
would begin to acclimate anyway because of the differences in exposure 
to daylight.
    The ARC discussed various approaches to determine whether a 
flightcrew member is acclimated before accepting an assignment for an 
FDP. The ARC originally defined the un-acclimated condition as flying 
across five or more time zones.\23\ Moving beyond these constraints 
would qualify as moving into a new theater of operations. The ARC 
members agreed that the continental United States should constitute a 
single theater so that a flightcrew member would always be acclimated 
when flying domestically. The ARC concluded that to reset from an un-
acclimated condition to an acclimated condition a flightcrew member 
would require either three consecutive physiological night's rest,\24\ 
during which period the flightcrew member could fly, or a 30 to 36 hour 
layover rest period. Some ARC members noted that a flightcrew member 
could be on duty during the period encompassing 3 local nights, but not 
during local nighttime hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ In some areas of the world, time zones change in one half 
hour increments rather than one hour increments. Accordingly, one 
would have to experience a time change of at least four hours as 
well as five time zones.
    \24\ Physiological night's rest means the rest occurs between 
the hours of 0100 and 0700 local time. This definition assures an 
opportunity to sleep during the WOCL.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted previously, sleep science has not been validated in the 
aviation context. The members of the ARC universally rejected the 
premise that it would take between six and 9 days to acclimate to a 
European time zone. The FAA is inclined to agree with the ARC members' 
experience, especially given the limited scientific information 
specific to aviation. The FAA also recognizes that assuring that length 
of time to acclimate to a new theater is impractical in the aviation 
context.

[[Page 55862]]

    The FAA proposes to permit a carrier to adjust where the flightcrew 
member enters the FDP as an acclimated crew member if the individual 
has been in a new theater of operations for 72 hours or has been given 
at least 36 consecutive hours free from duty. Remaining in the same 
theater for 72 hours allows for three physiological night's rest. A 36 
consecutive hour break in duty does not allow for the same amount of 
rest, but allows the individual to structure the available rest 
opportunity in a manner that best suits his or her personal sleep 
patterns. The FAA is not proposing to stipulate that an unacclimated 
flightcrew member will only become acclimated when continuing to fly 
within a new theater as long as that flightcrew member does not fly at 
night. This strikes the agency as an unnecessary constraint.
    While the continental United States is considered a single theater, 
operations from one part of the United States could trigger the need to 
acclimate sooner than operations from another part of the United 
States. Thus, a flight from New York to Hawaii could trigger a need to 
acclimate in Hawaii, while a flight from Los Angeles to Hawaii would 
not.
    The ARC discussed the amount of rest needed for flightcrew members 
returning to their home base after becoming acclimated in another 
theater. The ARC members noted that the flightcrew member is not truly 
acclimated to the new theater but also is no longer acclimated to his 
or her home base. Ultimately, the ARC members agreed that a flightcrew 
member must always find at least 30 to 36 continuous hours free of duty 
in any 168 consecutive hours and that once a flightcrew member is given 
this rest, the flightcrew member is considered acclimated to local 
time. Based on this discussion, the FAA has decided against imposing 
any unique restrictions on a flightcrew member simply because he or she 
has returned to his or her home base. Acclimation to a home base is 
treated the same as any other acclimation to a new theater.
    However, the FAA is proposing to require a greater rest opportunity 
when a flightcrew member has been away from his or her home base for 
more than 168 hours. In this instance, the FAA proposes to require a 
rest period that includes 3 physiological nights, rather than 36 hours 
free from duty or permitting the flightcrew member to fly during that 
approximately 72-hour period. This decision is based on the ARC 
members' consideration of the amount of rest being dependent on how 
long the flightcrew member was away from home base. The ARC reviewed 
the current regulation, which requires a flightcrew member who exceeds 
12 flight hours to receive twice the amount of rest upon return to home 
base.
    The ARC members also discussed the impact of multiple consecutive 
round-trip flights where flightcrew members would fly consecutive 
flights to an international destination, lay over for a day, and then 
return to the home base (e.g., Houston, Texas, to Paris, France, and 
return to Houston).\25\ These types of pairings are common, with a 
flightcrew member potentially flying three roundtrips in a week. The 
concern was that these types of flights will typically have layovers 
from 20 to 28 hours. The length of the layovers is primarily based on 
scheduling concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ These pairings do not always involve a return to a home 
base, but could be a return to another city within the time zone for 
or adjacent to the flightcrew member's home base. They can also 
occur when the flightcrew member has adjusted to a new theater and 
an airport within that theater effectively becomes the home base.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The length of the layover does not initially appear problematic, 
particularly in light of the current regulations which only require one 
24-hour break in duty in a 7-day period. However, when the flights are 
particularly long, a layover of approximately 24 hours becomes a 
problem because the flightcrew member is constantly flipping his or her 
internal clock. When one runs the scenario through the SAFTE/FAST model 
with a three-person augmented crew, the flightcrew member reaches high 
fatigue limits during the second round-trip flight and is dangerously 
fatigued during the third round-trip flight. However, when the flights 
are not particularly long flights, flightcrew members appear to have no 
problem flying three roundtrip flights, even with the 24-hour layovers.
    The ARC developed a draft regulatory proposal to address operations 
so long that they almost trigger a fourth flightcrew member. Under that 
proposal, if the flight assignment is for a three pilot flight crew and 
the layover is between 20 and 28 consecutive hours and the two FDPs, 
separated by the layover rest, are greater than 22 to 24 hours, then 
the flight crew requires two physiological night's rest or one 
physiological night's rest with an 8-hour restriction on the next FDP.
    Upon reflection, the FAA has decided that the ARC proposal is 
unduly complicated and only addresses a small number of potential 
operations. The agency has decided against proposing it. However, as 
part of the required training program proposed today, carriers should 
be educated on the risks associated with flipping a flightcrew member's 
internal clock, particularly when conducting operations that are on the 
cusp of requiring an additional flightcrew member.
    The FAA requests comments on the following:
    (7) Is a 3-day adjustment to a new theater of operations sufficient 
for an individual to acclimate to the new theater?
    (8) Is a 36-hour break from duty sufficient for an individual to 
acclimate to a new theater?
    (9) Should flightcrew members be given a longer rest period when 
returning to home base than would otherwise be provided based on moving 
to a new theater?
    (10) Should the FAA have different requirements for flightcrew 
members who have been away from their home base for more than 168 
hours? If so, why?
    (11) Should the FAA require additional rest opportunities for 
multiple pairings between two time zones that have approximately 24-
hour layovers at each destination? What if the scheduled FDPs are well 
within the maxima in the applicable FDP table or augmentation table?

F. Daily Flight Time Restrictions

    Initial ARC discussion of FDPs assumed that, as is the case in CAP-
371 and the EASA regulations, there would be no daily limit on flight 
time. Instead flight time would effectively be limited to approximately 
2 hours less than the FDP because FDP assumes a flightcrew member will 
report for duty an hour and a half before flying and will spend 
approximately 30 minutes after completing all flying for the day 
completing paperwork. In that context, the maximum amount of time 
flying during the middle of the day could increase from the current 8 
hours to as much as 11 hours, almost a 50 percent increase. The ARC 
noted that the FAA may decide that daily limits on flight time are 
still needed and proposed a variable flight time based on the hour of 
the day. Tables B(1) and B(2) represent potentially acceptable flight 
time limitations within FDPs. Table B(1) generally represents the 
position of the carriers, while Table B(2) generally represents the 
position of labor.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ Some carriers argued that no limit should be placed on 
flight time and some labor representatives argued that the maximum 
limit should be variable, but should never exceed eight hours.

[[Page 55863]]



                 Table B(1)--Maximum Flight Time Limits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Maximum flight
              Time of start (home base)                   time (hours)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0159............................................                7
0200-0459............................................                8
0500-0659............................................               10
0700-1259............................................               11
1300-1659............................................               10
1700-2159............................................                9
2200-2259............................................                8.5
2300-2359............................................                7.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                 Table B(2)--Maximum Flight Time Limits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Maximum flight
               Time of start (home base)                  time (hours)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0459.............................................                 7
0500-0659.............................................                 8
0700-1259.............................................                 9
1300-1959.............................................                 8
2000-2359.............................................                 7
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the CAA presented an alternate regulatory approach, 
whereby flight time limits for all-cargo operations would be more 
expansive and would differ dependent on whether the particular 
operation was a domestic operation or an international operation. The 
numbers proposed by the CAA are presented in Tables B(3) and B(4).

       Table B(3)--Maximum Flight Time Limits, Domestic All-Cargo
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Maximum flight  Maximum flight
        Time of start (home base)         time (hours) 1-  time (hours)
                                             4 sectors      5+ sectors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0459...............................               8               7
0500-1459...............................              11               9
1500-1659...............................              10               8
1700-2359...............................               8               7
------------------------------------------------------------------------


     Table B(4)--Maximum Flight Time Limits, International All-Cargo
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Maximum flight
                                          Maximum flight  time (2 pilot,
                                          time (2 pilot)    1 engineer)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight time includes WOCL...............               8              12
Flight time does not include WOCL.......              10              12
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has decided to propose a variation of the more conservative 
maximum daily flight time limits for unaugmented operations in Table 
B(2). The agency proposes to extend the number of hours reflected in 
Table B(2) by one hour. This approach melds the different approaches in 
Tables B(1) and B(2), allowing for slightly higher flight time limits 
during early morning and daytime hours than are currently allowed, but 
not permitting extensions that, at some hours, come close to a 50 
percent increase over the current limits. Because current unaugmented 
operations are limited to 8 hours, the FAA's ability to evaluate the 
impact of significantly longer flight time limits on aviation safety is 
limited. Accordingly, the FAA believes it is appropriate to propose 
overall limits that are more conservative than those depicted in Tables 
B(1), B(3) and B(4).
    The FAA recognizes that it has allowed up to 12 hours of flight 
time in circumstances that it has considered augmented operations, even 
though the third flightcrew member is not able to fly the plane. This 
has occurred in supplemental and flag operations when the flightcrew 
consists of two pilots and a flight engineer, and was more common when 
the fleet of aircraft requiring flight engineers was larger. 
Accordingly, this data set is much smaller than the set based on the 8-
hour domestic limitation. Nevertheless, based on the safety history of 
these operations, it may be possible to demonstrate that longer flight 
time limits will not adversely affect safety, particularly during 
daytime hours when the flightcrew had an opportunity to sleep through 
their WOCL the previous night.
    The FAA also recognizes that daily flight time limits will have the 
greatest impact on crew pairings that consist of a single leg. This is 
because when flying multiple segments, more of the FDP will be spent on 
layovers. Thus, for a single segment pairing, almost all of the FDP 
will consist of flight time, while for a pairing with three or four 
legs, much of the FDP will not consist of flight time. As a carrier 
adds legs, the FDP becomes more of a constraint than the flight time 
limit.
    The FAA has decided against proposing special rules for all-cargo 
operations because there are no physiological differences between 
pilots who fly cargo planes and pilots who fly passenger planes. As 
noted before, the FAA believes the distinctions between domestic and 
international operations are largely irrelevant. To the extent they are 
truly distinct (generally due to the length of the trip), those 
differences are better addressed through augmentation rather than 
simply by extending the allowable flight time. Augmentation is 
discussed in greater detail in the next section.
    The FAA seeks comment on the following:
    (12) If the FAA adopts variable FDP limits, is there a continued 
need for daily flight time limits?
    (13) If the FAA retains daily flight time limits, should they be 
higher or lower than proposed? Please provide data supporting the 
answer.
    (14) Should modifications be made to the proposed flight time 
limits to recognize the relationship between realistic flight time 
limits and the number of flight segments in an FDP?

G. Mitigation Strategies

1. Augmentation
    Even with the variable FDP and flight time, there will continue to 
be a need to augment crews for longer flights. Ideally, augmentation 
should follow the same approach as FDP, i.e., circadian rhythms, 
acclimation to time changes, and multiple flight segments should be 
considered in determining how much augmentation is required. Further 
consideration should be given to the quality of the available rest 
facility.
    Essentially, the current regulations require augmentation beyond 8 
hours of scheduled flight time. Under the FAA's flag and supplemental 
rules, augmentation permits the following increases in flight time 
above the 8-hour limitation contemplated under the agency's domestic 
rules: \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Because the domestic rules do not allow for any extension 
of flight time, augmentation is not used domestically.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    <bullet> If there are three flightcrew members (one of whom may be 
an engineer), maximum flight time is extended to 12 hours. There is no 
requirement for a rest facility.
    <bullet> If there are four pilots (or three pilots and two flight 
engineers), maximum flight time is extended to 16

[[Page 55864]]

hours. There must be an FAA-approved rest facility on board the 
aircraft (generally a bunk).
    <bullet> There are no hard constraints on flight time that exceeds 
16 hours. Instead, the FAA has addressed the carriers' fatigue 
mitigation practices on a case-by-case basis.
    The FAA believes that its current approach to augmentation fails to 
consider several pertinent factors. It fails to adequately consider the 
qualifications of all of the flightcrew members, giving credit for 
individuals who are not qualified to operate the controls; it fails to 
consider the varying quality of sleep facilities below a 12-hour flight 
time limit; it fails to recognize that, provided an opportunity for 
sleep is provided, some domestic operations could benefit from 
augmentation; and, as is the case generally with the agency's flight 
and duty regulations, it fails to consider the impact of circadian 
rhythms.
    The FAA proposes to amend the existing regulations by varying the 
levels of augmentation credit depending on the quality of the rest 
facility, except that no credit would be given for rest in coach seats. 
The level of extensions would also vary based on when the flight takes 
place to account for circadian rhythms and whether the flight crew is 
acclimated. Domestic augmentation would be permitted if a sufficient 
rest opportunity is provided. Finally, all flightcrew members would 
have to be type-rated as a second-in-command (SIC) or pilot-in-command 
(PIC) and throughout the flight at least one crewmember on the 
flightdeck would have to be type-rated as a PIC. The FAA would also 
continue to permit extensions in flight time based on the number of 
flightcrew members, with greater credit given for four-man flightcrews 
than for three-man crews.
    The FAA believes this approach will provide carriers with a 
significant amount of flexibility. Should the carrier decide not to 
invest in superior rest facilities, it could opt to provide a lesser 
quality rest facility and add additional, qualified flightcrew members 
to extend the augmentation period.
    The FAA's proposal is largely based on the general recommendation 
of the ARC. In reaching its conclusions, the ARC members reviewed the 
scientific material regarding augmentation that was presented during 
its meetings. Following are key points made by the sleep specialists 
during their presentations.
    <bullet> In-flight naps with augmented flightcrews are dramatically 
helpful in mitigating sleep debt.
    <bullet> When extending the FDP with an augmented flightcrew, 
augmented flightcrew members are presented with an opportunity for in-
flight sleep, however the flightcrew members must take advantage of 
this sleep opportunity because augmentation is of no value if the 
entire flightcrew is awake.
    <bullet> The value of augmented flightcrew operations depends on 
the available sleep facility, with a quiet, flat bunk being the most 
desirable.
    <bullet> In-flight sleep has restorative value, and the flatter one 
is able to lie, the more beneficial the sleep.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Sitting up increases blood flow to the brain and causes 
emission of norephrenephrine, which is stimulative instead of 
relaxing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    <bullet> To divide in-flight duty and rest among the flightcrew 
appropriately, route guides for positioning of sleep should be 
developed for augmented flightcrews (i.e., not all crewmembers need to 
be provided for equal sleep opportunities; rather pilots responsible 
for more complicated duties such as take-offs and landings may need 
more of a sleep opportunity, and may need that opportunity at a more 
ideal time in the flight).
    In establishing the maximum scheduled FDP limitations for an 
augmented flightcrew, the ARC discussed the relative merits and safety 
of operations conducted with augmented flightcrews receiving in-flight 
rest, as compared to conventionally scheduled operations. The ARC noted 
that the type of rest facility needs to be addressed in the proposed 
rule and in advisory material.
    The most comprehensive evaluation of available sleep facilities was 
conducted by the Dutch government in 2007 to provide science-based 
advice on the maximum permissible extension of the FDP related to the 
quality of the available onboard rest facility and the augmentation of 
the flightcrew with one or two pilots. Extension of Flying Duty Period 
by In-flight Relief (July 29, 2007) (TNO Report). The TNO report 
benchmarked existing research in arriving at its recommended values. 
The TNO report evaluated the quality of existing sleep facilities to 
determine how much sleep a flightcrew member could reasonably expect to 
get. The evaluation ranged from coach seats (a class IV rest facility) 
to bunks that were isolated from the rest of the crew and passengers (a 
class I rest facility). Based on the quality of the facility, the TNO 
Report assigned different values that would allow for an extension of 
the FDP. Based on its research, TNO decided against giving any credit 
for class IV rest facilities.
    The ARC noted that both the TNO Report and CAP-371, to varying 
degrees, assign value to in-flight rest opportunities that depend on 
the quality of the rest facility available on the aircraft. The ARC 
determined that there are approximately 20 different combinations of 
facilities among various certificate holders. The ARC members developed 
a rating system dependent on the ability to lie in a horizontal, flat 
position; control the amount of light and noise; and rest in a 
temperature-controlled environment; as well as the flightcrew member's 
time off task. Depending on the amount of points assigned to these 
areas, the amount of credit for receiving rest in a type of seat could 
be calculated. The ARC members suggested a Type I, II, and III scheme, 
resulting in the following classes of sleep facilities:
    <bullet> Class 1 rest facility: A bunk or other surface that allows 
for a flat sleeping position, is separated from both the flight deck 
and passenger cabin to provide isolation from noise and disturbance and 
provides controls for light and temperature.
    <bullet> Class 2 rest facility: A seat in an aircraft cabin that 
allows for a flat or near flat sleeping position (around 80 degrees 
from the seat's vertical centerline),\29\ is separated from passengers 
by a minimum of a curtain to provide darkness and some sound 
mitigation, and is reasonably free from disturbance by passengers and/
or flightcrew members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ This constraint would likely keep the rest facility out of 
the coach or economy section of the aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    <bullet> Class 3 rest facility: A seat in an aircraft cabin or 
flight deck that reclines at least 40 degrees, provides leg and foot 
support, and is not located in the coach or economy section of a 
passenger aircraft.
    Accordingly, the ARC revised the sleep credit for the class rest 
facility to more closely align the percentages with the TNO Report 
recommendations as follows:
    <bullet> Class 1: 75 percent.
    <bullet> Class 2: 56 percent.
    <bullet> Class 3: 25 percent.
    <bullet> No credit for coach seats.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ CAA would give partial credit for coach seats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ARC determined that augmentation should be required when either 
the maximum scheduled FDP or flight time hour limit depicted in Tables 
A and B of this document is insufficient for the planned operation. The 
ARC considered that longer flights crossing multiple time zones or 
overnight flights could be better indicators of the need to augment 
than flight times. For example,

[[Page 55865]]

an 8-hour, 45-minute flight during the day could be safely operated by 
an un-augmented flightcrew, but a 7-hour, 30-minute overnight flight 
should perhaps be augmented. One ARC member proposed that any planned 
pairing with greater than 6.5 block hours where the FDP infringes on 
the normal sleep cycle require augmentation.
    The ARC developed Table C, which combines the limits from the first 
(single flight segment) column of the proposed FDP table (Table A) with 
principles from the TNO Report.

                                              Table C--Flight Duty Period: Acclimated Augmented Flightcrew
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Maximum flight duty period (hours and minutes) based on rest facility and number of pilots
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Time of start  (home base)                      Class 1 rest facility           Class 2 rest facility           Class 3 rest facility
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             3 pilots        4 pilots        3 pilots        4 pilots        3 pilots        4 pilots
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0559...............................................           13:50           16:05           12:55           14:20           11:45           12:15
0600-0659...............................................           15:10           17:40           14:10           15:40           12:55           13:25
0700-1259...............................................           16:30           19:20           15:25           17:05              14           14:30
1300-1659...............................................           15:10           17:40           14:10           15:40           12:50           13:20
1700-2359...............................................           13:50           16:05           12:55           14:20           11:45           12:15
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ARC discussed placing an absolute cap of 16 or 18 hours (for a 
three- or four-man flightcrew, respectively) on the FDP, even though 
the TNO Report scheme results in a higher FDP. The ARC determined that 
higher FDPs could be achieved only by use of an FRMS. Under such a 
constraint, only augmented operations commencing between the hours of 7 
a.m. and 1 p.m. would be constrained beyond Table C, and then only when 
the highest quality rest facility is provided. The ARC stated that its 
prescriptive approach could apply to most operations, but certificate 
holders engaged in ultra-long range operations could use an FRMS to 
develop an alternate means of fatigue mitigation tailored to their 
specific operations. The ARC members noted that some types of 
operations, such as air cargo operations, which operate under different 
demands and circumstances, might approach augmentation and fatigue 
differently than other types of operations.
    The maximum scheduled FDP limitations for augmented flightcrew 
member operations with an unacclimated flightcrew are set forth in 
Table D.

                                             Table D--Flight Duty Period: Unacclimated Augmented Flightcrew
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Maximum flight duty period (hours and minutes) based on rest facility and number of pilots
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Time of start  (home base)                      Class 1 rest facility           Class 2 rest facility           Class 3 rest facility
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              3 pilot         4 pilot         3 pilot         4 pilot         3 pilot         4 pilot
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0559...............................................           13:15           15:20           12:20           13:35           11:15           11:45
0600-0659...............................................           14:30              17           13:35              15           12:15           12:50
0700-1259...............................................           15:50           18:30           14:50           16:25           13:30              14
1300-1659...............................................           14:30              17           13:35              15           12:20           12:45
1700-2359...............................................           13:15           15:20           12:20           13:35           11:15           11:40
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The ARC calculated the maximum scheduled FDPs in Table D for 
augmented flightcrew members who are not acclimated based on the same 
methodology provided for acclimated flightcrew members in Table C 
above. However, for unacclimated flightcrew members there is a roughly 
30-minute reduction in the planned maximum FDP for augmentation 
calculation. The absolute cap of 16 and 18 hours would correspondingly 
be reduced to 15.5 and 17.5 hours, respectively.
    The FAA has decided to propose the augmentation levels proposed by 
the ARC in Table C, except that the numbers have been rounded up or 
down to the closest half hour for regulatory efficiency. As suggested 
by the ARC, acclimated operations are capped at 16 hours if only a 
three-man crew is available and 18 hours if a four-man crew is 
available. In addition, the FAA is not proposing to implement Table D 
into the regulatory text because it is essentially a thirty minute 
reduction from Table C. Rather, the regulatory text specifies that the 
numbers in Table C are reduced by 30 minutes if a crew is not 
acclimated. This approach is consistent with the one proposed for un-
augmented operations.
    The ARC noted that augmentation should be used strictly for long 
flights and not to extend the FDP for multiple short flight segments. 
The ARC discussed whether more than two flight segments should be 
permitted in augmented flight operations and, if so, should an FRMS be 
required to do so. Some members of the ARC cautioned that augmentation 
should not be permitted to facilitate unnecessary additional flight 
segments or eliminate crew swaps. These individuals argued that 
augmentation was initially permitted to address those flights that 
could not reasonably be conducted within the existing rules at that 
time because the distances involved prevented long layovers or crew 
swaps. This issue was particularly relevant to the discussion of 
whether augmentation should be used for domestic operations. The 
primary concern related to multi-segment augmented flights was the 
available sleep opportunity for flightcrew members. Everyone 
acknowledged that flightcrew members are not going to sleep during 
take-off and landing. Accordingly, flight segments need to be 
sufficiently long to permit the flightcrew members to actually sleep. 
The ARC agreed that a flightcrew member assigned to a multi-segment 
trip needs a specific amount of available time to rest to fly the 
multiple segments.

[[Page 55866]]

    The FAA agrees that short flight segments will not permit a 
flightcrew member to sleep. Thus, too many flight segments, even within 
an extended FDP, would not allow a meaningful sleep opportunity for the 
flightcrew. The FAA is proposing that a certificate holder not schedule 
an augmented crew pairing with more than three segments (including FDPs 
that include required technical stops such as stopping for fuel or to 
clear customs). In addition, two consecutive hours must be available 
for in-flight rest for the flightcrew member manipulating the controls 
during landing; a 90-minute consecutive period must be available for 
in-flight rest for each flightcrew member; and the last flight segment 
must provide a two consecutive hour rest period. The proposed 
requirement for the 2-hour rest opportunity on the last flight segment 
is designed to address a common recognition among the ARC members that, 
even on a flight with only two segments, the last segment is often of 
such duration that there is no realistic rest opportunity, even though 
this is when the crew is likely to be the most fatigued.
    The ARC discussed the qualifications of the relief flightcrew 
member used in augmented operations. Some ARC members emphasized that 
there must be one type-rated flightcrew member on the flight deck at 
all times. One ARC member noted that current regulations require only 
one type-rated flightcrew member on the aircraft. Another ARC member 
stated that under no circumstances should a flight engineer serve as a 
relief flightcrew member. The ARC proposed that at least one flightcrew 
member type-rated in the aircraft be on the flight deck at all times. 
The ARC largely deferred to the FAA in deciding whether to allow 
augmentation based on the presence of a flight engineer.
    As mentioned earlier in this section, the FAA does not believe a 
flight engineer may serve as a relief flightcrew member unless he or 
she is qualified as a PIC or SIC and type rated. The purpose of a 
relief flightcrew member is to have someone available to help fly the 
airplane when another flightcrew member is at rest. In order for him or 
her to do this, the relief flightcrew member must know how to actually 
operate the aircraft.
    The FAA seeks comment on the following:
    (15) Should augmentation be allowed for FDPs that consist of more 
than three flight segments? Does it matter if each segment provides an 
opportunity for some rest?
    (16) Should flight time be limited to 16 hours maximum within an 
FDP, regardless of the number of flightcrew members aboard the 
aircraft, unless a carrier has an approved FRMS?
    (17) Should some level of credit be given for in-flight rest in a 
coach seat? If so, what level of credit should be allowed? Please 
provide supporting data.
    (18) Is there any reason to prohibit augmentation on domestic 
flights assuming the flight meets the required in-flight rest periods 
proposed today?
    (19) Are the proposed required rest periods appropriate?
    (20) Should credit be allowed if a flightcrew member is not type-
rated and qualified as a PIC or SIC?
2. Split Duty Rest
    The concept of allowing mitigation for split duty sleep is similar 
to that for augmentation, in that a crewmember can regenerate to some 
extent because of the ability to sleep for a period of time during his 
or her FDP. In fact, the quality of the sleep facility may be 
significantly better than the quality of a sleep facility aboard an 
aircraft. However, the initial theory behind augmentation was that it 
was impossible to simply place a fresh crew aboard the aircraft. While 
that may be true in some instances where split duty rest is 
contemplated, it is not universally true. In any case, current 
regulations provide no incentive for a carrier to provide its 
flightcrew members with a rest opportunity outside of the mandatory 
rest requirements. Nevertheless, some carriers have spent considerable 
amounts of money developing rest facilities for their employees, and 
others provide hotel rooms, even though not required by the FAA. 
Carriers have taken these steps recognizing that, even though not 
required, providing the rest facilities increases the level of safety.
    The ARC discussed the concept of split sleep with the sleep 
specialists to assess the value of the type of rest obtained on a split 
duty trip. The scientists noted that split sleep is an area of 
intensive work. All other factors being equal, if the total amount of 
actual sleep is the same, split sleep is theoretically as valuable as 
continuous sleep.\31\ However, the presenters noted that the value of 
sleep is impacted by where it falls in the circadian cycle. They stated 
that split sleep with 4 hours sleep during a circadian night is better 
than 8 hours of continuous sleep during the day. However, the larger 
portion of split sleep ideally would fall during the WOCL, and they 
reiterated that split sleep with a component at night is better than 
consolidated sleep during the day. This is because the ability to sleep 
effectively is diminished during daytime hours because it is very 
difficult to get continuous sleep during this time. They also stressed 
that actual sleep is important, and noted that a 4-hour sleep 
opportunity may only net 2 hours of actual sleep.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ However, they also noted that there is an overhead involved 
in getting to sleep, and that split sleep multiplies that overhead. 
Therefore, split sleep with 4 hours at night and 4 hours during the 
day would, over time, result in a cumulative sleep debt.
    \32\ The presenters stated that it is less clear if a split 
sleep involving a 2-hour sleep segment and a 6-hour sleep segment is 
equivalent to eight hours of continuous sleep.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ARC discussed extending the FDP based on the opportunity for 
sleep during the duty period and the mitigations needed to extend the 
FDP. These mitigations would apply to split duty trip pairings 
(including continuous duty overnights, also known as CDOs), in which a 
flightcrew member has a downtime of several hours between flights 
within the same FDP.
    Some members of the ARC rejected the concept of a regulatory credit 
for split duty sleep, while others noted that it is fully consistent 
with the concept of extending FDPs based on augmentation. The ARC 
considered allowing a certificate holder to extend the FDP up to 50 to 
75 percent of time that a flightcrew member spent resting in a suitable 
accommodation up to a maximum FDP of 12 to 13 hours as long as certain 
conditions were met. First, the sleep facility should be a single 
occupancy, temperature-controlled facility with sound mitigations that 
provide a flightcrew member with the undisturbed ability to sleep in a 
bed and to control light. Second, the flightcrew member must be given 
an actual, not simply scheduled, sleep opportunity in the suitable 
accommodation. Some ARC members also suggested that there should be a 
requirement that the sleep facility be approved by the FAA, there be an 
employee feedback process to assure the facilities were adequate, and 
that the opportunity for rest coincide with the flightcrew member's 
circadian rhythms.
    The FAA is proposing to permit credit for split duty sleep 
consistent with the proposal presented by those members of the ARC 
supporting credit. A reasonable sleep opportunity must actually be 
provided (as opposed to simply scheduled), and the sleep facility must 
be adequate to reasonably allow sleep. A carrier could extend an FDP by 
50 percent of the actual available sleep opportunity if it provides at 
least 4

[[Page 55867]]

hours sleep opportunity. However, the FDP could not be extended beyond 
12 hours.\33\ The sleep opportunity is calculated from the time the 
flightcrew member actually reaches the sleep facility, rather than when 
it is scheduled. This is because a scheduled sleep opportunity may be 
reduced considerably if there are delays or an unanticipated need for 
further aircraft movement. As with all other instances when 
transportation to or from a rest facility is involved, the period of 
time engaged in transportation does not count as duty, but it also does 
not count as rest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ As a practical matter, the 12-hour limitation on FDP makes 
split duty sleep desirable only for nighttime operations or 
operations that begin late at night and restart very early in the 
morning. The FAA believes it is unlikely a carrier would rely on 
split duty sleep opportunities in the middle of the day because 
there would be no additional credit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The rest facility must be adequate to reasonably permit the 
flightcrew member with an opportunity to rest. To that end, it must be 
quiet, temperature-controlled, and light-controlled. The FAA considered 
whether to require that it also be a single occupancy facility. The 
agency has tentatively decided against such a requirement because it 
understands that there are currently facilities where there may be more 
than one bed per room, and it believes this is fundamentally a labor-
management issue. Flightcrew members regularly spend the night near 
their home base in houses or apartments where there may be multiple 
beds in a single room. If this dormitory-type housing is sufficient for 
full rest periods, it should, from a regulatory perspective, be 
sufficient for a split rest facility.
    The FAA seeks input on the following:
    (21) Please comment on whether a single occupancy rest facility 
provides a better opportunity for sleep or a better quality of rest 
than a multiple occupancy facility such as a multi-bed crew sleeping 
facility or multi-bed living quarters. Please provide supporting data.

H. Consecutive Nighttime Flight Duty Periods

    There was a discussion among ARC members on whether there should be 
a limitation on the number of consecutive nights that a pilot could 
fly, based, in part, on a presentation to the ARC that performance 
falls off under the SAFTE/FAST model after the third night. Currently 
the FAA places no restrictions on the number of allowable consecutive 
nighttime operations, as long as the crewmember receives 24 consecutive 
hours free from duty in a 7-day period. CAP-371 provides a scheme 
whereby flight duty periods are reduced based on the number of previous 
consecutive nights flown. The FAA is unaware of the basis for this 
scheme, and it is not readily apparent from a reading of the 
requirement.
    Modeling indicates that consecutive nights of nighttime work will 
lead to a decrease in productivity over a relatively short period of 
time (approximately 3 days). The modeling notes a steady deterioration 
in performance because it is very difficult for most people to sleep 
effectively during the day.\34\ The members of the ARC who had flown 
nighttime operations generally agreed that the first night of multiple 
nighttime operations was the most difficult because they were 
unaccustomed to being awake all night.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ A copy of the technical report evaluating the model has 
been placed in the docket. See also, Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., 
Graeber, R.C., Connell, L.J., Gregory, K.B., Miller, D.L., & Barnes, 
R.M. (1998). Crew factors in flight operations: The initial ASA-Ames 
field studies on fatigue. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine, 69 (2), B1-B60. Thomas, M.J.W., Petrilli, R.M., Roach, 
G.D. (2007). The Impacts of Australian Transcontinental ``Back of 
Clock'' operations on sleep and performance in commercial aviation 
flight crew (B2005/0121). Adelaide/Whyalla, Australia: University of 
South Australia, Centre for Applied Behavioural Science. Gander, 
P.H., Gregory, K.B., Connell, L.J., Miller, D.L., Graeber, R.C., & 
Rosekind, M.R. (1996). Crew factors in flight operations: VII. 
Psychophysiological responses to overnight cargo operations (NASA/
TMm1996-110380). Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the ARC discussion, the cargo contingent of the part 121 
community asserted that if one changes the assumption in the SAFTE/FAST 
model and assumes that one can train oneself to sleep effectively 
during the day, it may be possible to work more consecutive nights 
without a significant degradation in performance. This may be 
particularly true if an individual is provided an opportunity to sleep 
during the night while packages are being sorted from one plane to the 
next. The cargo carriers asserted that higher levels of sleep pressure 
brought on by the longer period of wakefulness on day one of the 
pairing act to offset the general inability to sleep effectively during 
the day, particularly when people have been trained to understand the 
need to take advantage of the sleep pressure to improve their ability 
to sleep during the day. The FAA has asked Dr. Hursh, who developed the 
SAFTE/FAST model,\35\ to input these assertions into the model. Dr. 
Hursh determined that, given a sufficient sleep opportunity at night, a 
person can sustain his or her performance at acceptable levels for five 
consecutive nights. However, the smaller the nighttime sleep 
opportunity, the lower level of performance, particularly by night 
five. In addition, training on how to maximize sleep opportunities is 
critical because an individual needs to get enough sleep during the day 
to make up for the nighttime sleep deficit. A copy of Dr. Hursh's 
analysis has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ This model is widely used, with approximately 14 major 
carriers and sixteen governmental agencies world-wide having used 
the model to evaluate fatigue in aviation and other industrial 
settings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has decided to take a comprehensive approach towards 
consecutive nighttime operations that it believes addresses the 
concerns by both contingents within the ARC. The agency proposes to 
permit consecutive nighttime flying, constrained only by 30-hour 
consecutive rest required for any 168-hour period, as long as there is 
an opportunity to rest in a suitable facility during the flight duty 
period. As proposed, this sleep opportunity would have to comport with 
the proposed split duty requirements for extending a flight duty 
period. Should no such opportunity be provided, a carrier could not 
assign a flightcrew member to more than three consecutive nightime 
FDPs. While this approach is more restrictive than currently permitted, 
it permits cargo carriers who provide adequate rest facilities to 
continue their current operations. It also assures that flightcrew 
members are given an opportunity for limited nighttime rest.
    The FAA has concerns that simply limiting nighttime operations to 
three consecutive nights could result in a significant increase in the 
number of first night operations, since presumably carriers will not 
change the nature of their operations, but simply will schedule more 
multiple-night crew pairings to accommodate the existing operations. 
Thus, a flightcrew member who is currently assigned two 5-night 
pairings in a 2-week period could potentially be assigned three 3-night 
pairings in the same 2-week period, increasing the risk associated with 
the first night of operations by 50 percent during that timeframe. 
Certainly long-standing industry practice has been to fly more than 
three consecutive nights. The FAA is concerned that taking an approach 
that may appear safer in modeling could lead to adverse safety impacts 
in the real world.
    The ARC contingent advocating restrictions on consecutive night 
flight duty periods suggested a fourth night was acceptable as long as 
a 14-hour rest was provided between nights three and four. The FAA 
notes that a 14-hour rest opportunity would limit a flightcrew member 
to a maximum 10-hour duty

[[Page 55868]]

period, excluding the time required for local commuting.\36\ The FAA is 
not sure that this approach would provide a meaningful FDP for the 
fourth night.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Although today's proposal does not contemplate a 24-hour 
day, the FAA assumes that consecutive nighttime operations would 
generally be scheduled at approximately the same time each day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA requests input on the following:
    (22) Should there be any restriction on consecutive nighttime 
operations? If not, why?
    (23) If the nighttime sleep opportunity is less than that 
contemplated under the split duty provisions of this notice, should a 
carrier be allowed to assign crew pairing sets in excess of three 
consecutive nights? Why or why not?
    (24) If the nighttime sleep opportunity meets the split duty 
provisions of this notice, should the carrier be allowed to extend the 
flight duty period as well as the number of consecutive nighttime 
flight duty periods? Why or why not?
    (25) Should a fourth night of consecutive nighttime duty be 
permitted if the flightcrew member is provided a 14-hour rest period 
between nights three and four?

I. Reserve Duty

    While the term ``Reserve'' has been used for years in the air 
carrier industry, the term is not addressed at all in part 121. The 
agency has issued 11 legal interpretations on the subject of reserve, 
which range from examples of whether a crewmember is on duty and, if 
applicable, whether the required rest associated with that duty period 
is impeded by being in a reserve status.
    The ARC discussed various definitions of reserve and initially 
proposed that reserve means that a pilot that does not have a regular 
flying schedule and is available for flight when contacted by the 
company. That pilot has no telephone or reporting responsibility to the 
company. The ARC refined the definition of ``reserve'' to read ``a 
flightcrew member that is required by a certificate holder to be 
available to receive an assignment for duty.'' In addition, the ARC 
established the following types of reserve duty: Long-call, short-call, 
and airport/standby. The ARC noted that the policies that apply to 
reserve flightcrew members vary significantly between certificate 
holders, but also found that there are some relatively consistent 
conditions.
    CAP-371 places restrictions on ``Standby Duty'', which is generally 
the equivalent of short-call reserve discussed below. When standby duty 
is undertaken at home, or in a suitable accommodation provided by the 
operator, during the period 2200 to 0800 hours local time and a crew 
member is given 2 hours or less notice of a report time, the allowable 
FDP starts at the report time for the designated reporting place. EASA 
recognizes ``standby duty'', but does not place any regulatory 
restrictions on this type of duty.
    Reserve duty is inherently based on unpredictable events, such as 
covering trips for flightcrew members who become ill, have difficulty 
traveling to the airport for an assignment because of weather or other 
reasons, or are stranded due to severe weather creating flightcrew 
member shortages throughout a certificate holder's system. The very 
nature of reserve duty makes injecting predictability into a reserve 
flightcrew member's schedule a challenge.
    The ARC set a goal to make reserve duty as predictable as possible, 
and to manage fatigue as much as possible. The proposal on how to 
address reserve limits was one of two areas of consensus by the ARC. 
The ARC concept includes defining limits associated with flight duty 
period, duty period and rest limitations.
    One of the most fatiguing elements of reserve duty is the lack of 
predictability. Unlike a flightcrew member who has a set schedule (a 
line-holder), a flightcrew member on reserve may spend several hours 
on-call and then, once called, be expected to report to the airport 
ready to commence his or her duty day. The lack of predictability means 
the reserve crewmember cannot schedule naps or otherwise control his or 
her sleep opportunities to assure the reserve crewmember is adequately 
rested when he or she reports to work.
    The ARC asked the sleep specialists what impact this lack of 
predictability has on a reserve flightcrew member compared to a line-
holding flightcrew member. The presenters responded that depending on 
when a reserve flightcrew member is called and how much notice is 
given, he or she may not have the same opportunity to nap that a line-
holder would have, because the line-holder would know about the trip 
and could plan his or her rest accordingly. A reserve flightcrew member 
also might not nap, even if he or she thought a call was unlikely, 
because this uncertainty may disrupt his or her sleep schedule. The ARC 
asked the scientists how a reserve flightcrew member could best prepare 
for a potential assignment, without knowing when he or she may be 
called. They recommended a normal night's sleep through the WOCL and a 
late afternoon nap in the minor WOCL. The ARC also asked the presenters 
if there was a maximum duty time that should be set for reserve duty. 
The scientific presenters noted that the ability to successfully manage 
time-on-duty is dependent on rest. If 8 hours sleep in the WOCL is 
available, then 16 hours of duty is theoretically possible.
Short-Call and Airport/Hotel Standby Reserve
    Airport/standby reserve \37\ is known by several terms among 
various certificate holders, but ultimately involves a flightcrew 
member on call at an accommodation or other facility at or near an 
airport. The flightcrew member is not at home and is not resting. The 
purpose of such reserve duty is to have an available flightcrew member 
close to the operation in case of a schedule irregularity. Flightcrew 
members on these assignments can receive notice to report to work in as 
little as 1 hour before departure time, requiring them to be in a 
constant state of readiness. Because of the unique nature of these 
assignments, and the fact that the flightcrew member is not resting, an 
airport/standby reserve assignment is considered to be an FDP, 
regardless of whether a flying assignment is ultimately received by the 
flightcrew member.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ The word ``airport'' was added to standby to differentiate 
between the ICAO term ``standby,'' which is the equivalent of 
``reserve'' in U.S. terminology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Short-Call Reserve
    A short-call reserve flightcrew member typically receives an 
assignment on relatively short notice, meaning he or she would not be 
provided an adequate time for a legal rest period before reporting for 
duty. Report times are typically within two to 3 hours from 
notification. Short-call reserve differs from airport/standby reserve 
in that the flightcrew member is likely to be at home and available for 
contact by the certificate holder, rather than at the airport or a 
hotel actively awaiting an assignment. Although the flightcrew member 
may be at home, the opportunity for sleep before reporting for duty 
cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, the ARC deemed a limit on the amount 
of time spent on short-call reserve duty as necessary.
    The ARC noted that a number of variables may impact the maximum FDP 
for a short call reserve.\38\ These variables include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ These same variables apply to airport/standby reserve but 
are addressed there by the maximum FDPs in the FDP table.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    <bullet> Timing of on-call period within a circadian day. Where an 
on-call period starts in relation to standard circadian rhythms can 
affect alertness and state of

[[Page 55869]]

rest. Generally, short call availability periods may be classified as 
very early morning, daytime, or night. The ARC considered that daytime 
reserve flightcrew members can be presumed to be well-rested and alert 
at the start of their reserve period because they can get a regular 
night's sleep. For the other classifications, circadian factors may 
make flightcrew members less alert and rested than those on daytime 
reserve. One ARC member suggested that flightcrew members called to 
report during overnight hours should have a reduced maximum FDP.
    <bullet> Length of on-call period. Not all carriers have the same 
reserve policies. Some certificate holders have relatively short on-
call periods, lasting only a few hours, while other certificate holders 
may require flightcrew members to be on call for 12 hours or more.
    <bullet> Timing of call and report time in relation to on-call 
period and length of duty day. One ARC member noted that during an on-
call period, the time the flightcrew member is called and the time the 
flightcrew member is expected to report may affect the flightcrew 
member's alertness and rested state (e.g., called at 5 a.m. to report 
at 3 p.m. vs. called at 10 a.m. to report at noon).
    <bullet> Recent on-call history. The ARC noted that reserve 
flightcrew members with on-call schedules often change schedules from 
day to night, or vice-versa, within a short period of time. Such 
changes, especially if given with short notice, can result in reserve 
flightcrew members failing to obtain proper rest before their on-call 
periods.
Long-Call Reserve
    Long call reserve \39\ pilots are given relatively substantial 
advance notice of when they are to fly. This notice may be from 9 hours 
to over 24 hours. A long-call reserve flightcrew member typically 
receives an assignment for duty well in advance and will have a sleep 
opportunity before reporting for duty, and may have enough notice of 
the assignment to plan his or her rest accordingly. The ARC recognized, 
however, that depending on the timing of notice and the report time in 
relation to circadian rhythms, reserve flightcrew members may not be 
able to obtain a full 8 hours of sleep, despite the opportunity to do 
so. The lack of predictability of when the flightcrew member will be 
required to report for duty makes it difficult for the reserve 
flightcrew member to plan ahead in his or her sleep rest cycles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ The ARC defined a long-call reserve as ``a reserve 
flightcrew member whose obligation to report for an FDP following 
notification contains a legal rest period before report time.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ARC considered two reserve systems developed by working groups 
consisting of ARC members representing industry and labor groups.
    One working group proposed a WOCL Aware Reserve System to the ARC. 
Some key points of the system are as follows:
    <bullet> Any reserve flightcrew member called between 2200 and 0600 
will receive a minimum of 10 hours of rest before reporting for duty.
    <bullet> Any reserve flightcrew member called to fly into the WOCL 
would have to be contacted within the first 6 hours of his or her 
reserve duty.
    <bullet> If normal sleep time is not interrupted and a reserve 
flightcrew member is not being called to fly into the WOCL, he or she 
would have the same FDP limit as a line-holder because they received 
similar rest.
    <bullet> Airport/standby reserve is to be treated like a trip 
assignment and is considered as an FDP. No part of airport/standby 
reserve may be considered rest, even if the flightcrew member is at a 
hotel.
    The proposal for a Predictable Reserve System with Circadian 
Stability (Predictable System) is based on three prongs: Science, 
circadian stability, and adequate rest. The proposal incorporates 
provisions from CAP 371, and provides some recommendations from a 
reserve rest ARC that convened in 1999. The second proposal contained 
the following elements:
Reserve Limits
    <bullet> Created several definitions applicable to reserve 
including ``reserve availability period'' (RAP), ``reserve duty 
period'' (RDP), ``short call reserve'', and ``long call reserve.''
    <bullet> Maximum RDP is 16 hours.
    <bullet> Maximum reserve availability period (RAP) for short call 
reserve is 14 hours.
    <bullet> Carrier receives half credit for not calling a reserve 
crew member on phone availability between 0000 and 0600; maximum 3 
hours.
Shifting RAP
    <bullet> Later--12 hour maximum in any 168 consecutive hours.
    <bullet> Earlier--3 hour maximum into the WOCL; 5 hour maximum 
otherwise.
    <bullet> Not allowed on consecutive days.
    Concerns were expressed regarding individuals on phone availability 
being called during the window of circadian low. However, it was noted 
that based on scientific modeling, for a reserve called during the 
window of circadian low, a 4-hour lookback (the period in which the 
carrier must contact the reserve from the start of the RAP to use the 
entire available FDP) actually would be better than the 6-hour lookback 
originally proposed under the WOCL Aware proposal.
    A scenario was also posed of a pilot with a RAP starting during the 
window of circadian low, but not called until after the window of 
circadian low had passed. It was proposed that some credit be given for 
the sleep obtained before being called. After brief discussion, the ARC 
decided to move forward with a maximum FDP limit of 16 hours after the 
start of the RAP.
    After considering the above proposals and other discussions, the 
ARC proposed the following requirements for reserve duty:
    <bullet> ``Scheduled'' is defined as times assigned by a 
certificate holder when a flightcrew member is required to report for 
duty. ``Assigned'' is defined as scheduling by a certificate holder 
when a flightcrew member is required to report to duty.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ The ARC notes that ``assigned'' and ``scheduled'' are one 
in the same; therefore, when a certificate holder assigns a reserve 
flightcrew member a trip, that certificate holder has given that 
flightcrew member a schedule. This prevents a certificate holder 
from assigning a trip to a flightcrew member and stating that the 
term assigned does not fall under the definition of scheduled. It 
also prevents certificate holders from only assigning trips and not 
scheduling any trips.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    <bullet> Airport/standby reserve counts as part of the flightcrew 
member's FDP.
    <bullet> RAP and RDP only apply to short call reserve.
    <bullet> The maximum RDP for un-augmented operations is the 
flightcrew member's possible FDP under the FDP table plus 4 hours, or 
16 hours, whichever is less.
    <bullet> The maximum RDP for an augmented flight crew is the 
flightcrew member's possible FDP under the augmented FDP table plus 4 
hours.
    <bullet> A carrier receives half credit for not calling a reserve 
crew member on phone availability between midnight and 6 a.m. up to a 
maximum of 3 hours (e.g., if the crew member is on reserve starting at 
1 a.m., but isn't called until 3 a.m., the RAP is extended by 1.5 
hours).
    <bullet> A short-call reserve duty period in which the crewmember 
is not called to report to work may not exceed 14 hours.
    <bullet> Conversion from long-call to short-call reserve assignment 
must be preceded by a legal rest period.
    <bullet> A long-call reserve flightcrew member must receive a legal 
rest prior to reporting for duty and at least 12 hours notice of an 
assignment of a trip pairing that will extend into the window of 
circadian low.

[[Page 55870]]

    <bullet> A reserve flightcrew member's RAP may be shifted under the 
following conditions:

--A shift to a later RAP may not exceed 12 hours.
--A shift to an earlier RAP may not exceed 5 hours, or if the shift 
will move the availability into the flightcrew member's window of 
circadian low, it may not exceed 3 hours.
--A shift to an earlier RAP may not occur on consecutive days.
--The total amount of shift in RAPs for a flightcrew member may not 
exceed 12 hours (regardless of direction) in any 168 consecutive hour 
period.

    Tables E(1) and E(2) are visual depictions of the maximum RAP 
discussed above based on the two FDP tables contemplated by the ARC.

                                        Table E(1)--Flight Duty Period Reserve: Two Flightcrew Members, Option 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Maximum flight duty period reserve (hours) based on number of flight segments
              Time of start  (home base)               -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              1             2             3             4             5             6            7+
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0359.............................................          13            13            13            13            13            13            13
0400-0459.............................................          14            14            13            13            13            13            13
0500-0559.............................................          15            15            15            15            14            13.5          13
0600-0659.............................................          16            16            16            16            15            15            14.5
0700-1259.............................................          16            16            16            16            16            16            15
1300-1659.............................................          16            16            16            16            15.5          15            14.5
1700-2159.............................................          15            15            14            14            13.5          13            13
2200-2259.............................................          14.5          14.5          13.5          13.5          13            13            13
2300-2359.............................................          13.5          13.5          13            13            13            13            13
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                        Table E(2)--Flight Duty Period Reserve: Two Flightcrew Members, Option 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Maximum flight duty period reserve (hours) based on number of flight segments
              Time of start  (home base)               -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              1             2             3             4             5             6            7+
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0159.............................................          13            13            13            13            13            13            13
0200-0459.............................................          14            14            14            14            13            13            13
0500-0659.............................................          16            16            16            16            15.5          15            14.5
0700-1259.............................................          16            16            16            16            16            16            15.5
1300-1659.............................................          16            16            16            16            15.5          15            14.5
1700-2159.............................................          15            15            15            15            13            13            13
2200-2259.............................................          14.5          14.5          14.5          14.5          13            13            13
2300-2359.............................................          13.5          13.5          13.5          13.5          13            13            13
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because this was one of only two ARC consensus areas, the FAA has 
decided to propose the ARC recommendation with only a few changes.
    First, the agency has decided against adding Table E to the 
regulatory text. The agency believes the regulatory text is 
sufficiently clear. Also, the table does not include the credit that 
could be given for not calling during the reserve crew member's window 
of circadian low and could be misleading. Carriers (and the pilot 
associations) are of course free to draft whatever tables they think 
are helpful to understand the regulatory requirements.
    Second, the ARC did not consider time within the RAP to be duty. 
However, the FAA believes that it may be appropriate to designate time 
spent in a short-call reserve status as duty.\41\ While in a short-call 
reserve status, the crewmember can expect that he or she will not 
receive an opportunity to rest prior to commencing a flight duty 
period. The crewmember also is required to limit his or her actions 
sufficiently so that he or she can report to his or her duty station 
within a fairly short timeframe. Accordingly, the FAA believes this 
time needs to be accounted for within the cumulative duty limits 
discussed later in this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ This issue was not discussed by the ARC and there appears 
to be a general agreement in the aviation community that reserve is 
neither rest nor duty. The FAA agrees this approach is appropriate 
for long-call reserve and acknowledges that calling short-call 
reserve ``duty'' could have adverse implications if there were a 
daily duty limit. However, the FAA also believes that some portions 
of industry have developed reserve policies that increase the 
likelihood of fatigue because the reserve crewmember can spend long 
periods of time on reserve with no anticipation of a rest 
opportunity prior to reporting to work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the FAA is proposing the ARC recommendation on reserve, it 
also notes some concern with the level of its complexity. The agency is 
particularly concerned that the partial credit given for not calling 
during the window of circadian low will be difficult to implement. It 
may make more sense to simply assign a credit for not calling during 
the window of circadian low. The agency also has some concern that the 
RDP for augmented operations could extend to 22 hours. While there 
would be some opportunity to rest on board the aircraft, this proposal 
would permit some reduction in the overall rest opportunity.
    The FAA seeks comment on the following:
    (26) Please comment on whether a 16 maximum hour FDP for long call 
reserve is appropriate when the maximum FDP for a lineholding 
flightcrew member is 13 hours.
    (27) Please comment on whether the proposed maximum extended FDP of 
22 hours for an augmented flightcrew member is appropriate. If not, 
please provide an alternative maximum FDP.
    (28) Please comment on whether a certificate holder should receive 
credit for not calling a flightcrew member during the WOCL while on 
reserve.
    (29) Should minimum required rest while on reserve status be 
greater than the amount of rest required for a lineholding flightcrew 
member? If so, please provide supporting data, if not, please provide 
rationale.
    (30) Please comment on the level of complexity on the proposed 
reserve system.

[[Page 55871]]

J. Cumulative Duty Periods

    The FAA's current regulations do not impose a cumulative 
restriction on duty, although as a practical matter, a flightcrew 
member engaged in domestic operations is effectively limited to a 16-
hour duty day and all flightcrew members are entitled to 24 consecutive 
hours free from duty during a 7-day period. Rather, the FAA has 
historically placed limitations on the number of flight hours a 
flightcrew member may be assigned on a daily, weekly, monthly, and 
annual basis. Depending on whether one is operating under domestic, 
flag or supplemental rules, flight time is limited to 30-32 hours a 
week, 100-120 hours a month, 300-350 hours a quarter, and 1,000 hours a 
year.
    CAP-371 and EU-OPS subpart Q impose more restrictions on cumulative 
duty, with weekly limits ranging from 55 to 60 hours, biweekly limits 
of 95 hours (CAP-371 only), and slightly less than monthly limits of 
190 hours (calculated against 28 days rather than an actual month). The 
ICAO SARP recommend that member states restrict duty hours within any 
seven consecutive days or a week and 28 consecutive days or a calendar 
month.
    Scientific studies suggest that long periods of time on duty 
infringe upon an individual's opportunity to sleep, thus causing a 
``sleep debt'' which is also known as cumulative fatigue.\42\ Some 
conclusions are based on experiments in sleep labs, and there is 
limited data either supporting or refuting that the amount of 
cumulative duty has a direct effect on cumulative fatigue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Krueger, G.P. (1989). Sustained work, fatigue, sleep loss 
and performance: a review of the issues. Work & Stress. 3, (2), 129-
141. Galy, E., Melan, C., & Cariou, M. (2008). Investigation of task 
performance variations according to task requirements and alertness 
across the 24-h day in shift workers. Ergonomics, 51 (9), 1338-1351. 
Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Gregory, K.B., Smith, R.M., Miller, 
D.L., Oyung, R., Webbon, L.L., & Johnson, J.M. (1996). Managing 
fatigue in operational settings 1: Physiological considerations and 
countermeasures. Behavioral Medicine, 21, 157-165. Graeber, R.C. 
(1986). Crew factors in flight operations: IV. Sleep and wakefulness 
in international aircrews (NASA/TMm1986-88231). Moffett Field, CA: 
NASA Ames Research Center. Gander, P.H., Graeber, R.C., Connell, 
L.J., & Gregory, K.B. (1991). Crew factors in flight operations: 
VIII. Factors influencing sleep timing and subjective sleep quality 
in commercial long-haul flight crews (NASA/TMm1991-103852). Moffett 
Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Despite the lack of validated data, the FAA believes it is 
appropriate to take a conservative approach and is proposing to impose 
cumulative limitations on duty, flight duty periods, and flight time. 
Not only are cumulative limits consistent with current regulations here 
and abroad, but they offer protections against practices common in the 
aviation industry, where pilots commonly work more than an 8-hour day, 
often at varying times in a single week. The FAA proposes to set 
maximum duty limitations, flight duty periods, and flight time (block) 
periods based on specific time intervals. Fewer hours on duty can be 
equated to more opportunity for rest, which can mitigate the amount of 
cumulative fatigue experienced by a flightcrew member. The proposed 
limits decline over extended periods of time, i.e., the 28-day limits 
are less than four times the weekly limits. This approach would allow 
flightcrew members to work long hours over a relatively short period of 
time, but prevent long duty periods over extensive lengths of time.
    The ARC defined duty as ``any task that crewmembers are required by 
the certificate holder to perform including, but not limited to: Flight 
duty, administrative work, ground training, ancillary training, 
positioning, and airport standby.'' The FAA believes this definition 
appropriately details the type of work commonly required of crewmembers 
except that, as discussed earlier, it believes that time spent on 
short-call reserve should apply to the cumulative duty limits proposed 
today.
    Under today's proposal, duty time would be limited to 65 hours in 
any consecutive 168-hour period (7 days) and 200 hours in any 
consecutive 672-hour period (28 days). The FAA is proposing consecutive 
hourly limits that equate to 7 and 28 days because the current 
requirements assume that a day starts just after midnight, which is an 
arbitrary constraint that does not work well for carriers. As a result, 
carriers have been allowed to define when their ``day'' begins. This 
approach is unwieldy. As a practical matter, the FAA expects that 
carriers and flightcrew members will base their ``week'' on the time 
the flightcrew member reported for duty after completing his or her 
extended rest period.
    The weekly limit could be extended by up to 10 hours to 75 hours 
during a rolling 168 hours and the 28-day limit could be extended to 
215 hours if the duty period includes deadhead segments in a rest seat 
outside the flight deck meeting or exceeding the provisions of class 2 
rest facility.\43\
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    \43\ Except that no curtain need be provided if the crewmember 
is being deadheaded commercially, since this would be beyond the 
certificate holder's control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Allowing an additional 10 hours duty time for non-FDP deadhead 
flights when adequate sleeping accommodations are provided seems to be 
a reasonable accommodation to that sector of the industry that relies 
on deadheading to position pilots to areas outside of the U.S. Since 
the extension is limited to no more than 10 additional hours, there 
should be sufficient fatigue mitigation.
    Since short-call reserve periods are tentatively considered to be 
duty, the FAA also believes it is appropriate to allow carriers to 
increase the maximum cumulative duty periods to account for the time 
spent on short-call reserve, while still recognizing that time spent on 
reserve is less strenuous than time actively spent on duty.
    The FAA also notes that it may be appropriate to provide the same 
accommodation to management personnel. The rationale for allowing 
longer duty periods based on deadhead segments centered on the fact 
that deadheading in a ``rest seat'' provided mitigation in the form of 
an opportunity to rest; office work would not allow for such 
mitigation, but limiting the duty period to 65 hours a week for 
management could have an adverse safety impact (e.g., force flying 
shorter, unaugmented flights) since the management workload likely will 
not be reduced.
    The extension of the maximum duty limit would only be extended by 
the amount of time spent engaged in the type of duty allowing for an 
extension. Thus, if a flightcrew member spent 5 hours on short-call 
reserve, the maximum weekly duty period would only be extended by 5 
hours, to a total of 70.
    The proposed cumulative limitation on flight duty periods is 
largely consistent with the approach already adopted by the British and 
EASA. Specifically, the ARC recommended that flight duty period be 
limited to 60 hours in any consecutive 168 hours (7 days) and 190 hours 
in any 672 consecutive hours (28 days). The ARC decided there was no 
need to implement a biweekly requirement, as exists in CAP-371, instead 
endorsing the approach adopted by EASA. The FAA agrees that a weekly 
and monthly approach sufficiently mitigates the effects of cumulative 
fatigue and is proposing the limits suggested by the ARC. The FDP is a 
sub-set of duty, and the maximum FDP limits are subsumed within the 
maximum duty limits. To the extent any duty other than that encompassed 
in the definition of a FDP cannot be completed within the time 
dedicated to non-FDP duty (typically 5 hours a week or 10 hours in a 4-
week period), the amount of FDP is correspondingly reduced. Thus, 
during a 168-hour period, if a flightcrew member spent 30 hours in 
ground

[[Page 55872]]

training, the available amount of FDP for that period would only be 35 
hours.
    ``Flight time'' retains the meaning in 14 CFR 1.1. While the ARC 
largely agreed on a 100 hour limitation in any 672 consecutive hours 
(28 days), it was unable to agree on a maximum annual limit. Some 
argued that the constraints on cumulative duty and flight duty periods 
obviated the need for any limit. This argument was particularly strong 
with regard to annual limits on flight time. However simple 
calculations of the proposed weekly and 28-day limits revealed that 
absent an annual limit, a flightcrew member could potentially accrue as 
many as 2,000 flight hours in a 12-month period. Based on this 
assessment, those arguing against any limit conceded that some annual 
limit may be appropriate, but that in any case the current limit of 
1,000 hours per year could be relaxed to 1,200 hours. Others argued 
that the current annual limit is too high and urged the FAA to consider 
a 900 hour limit. The FAA has tentatively decided to retain the current 
annual flight time limitation of 1,000 hours in any 365 consecutive 
days because the ARC members were unable to agree and the current limit 
is within the limits presented by the ARC.
    (31) The FAA seeks input on the appropriate cumulative limits to 
place on duty, flight duty periods and flight time. Is there a need for 
all the proposed limits? Should there be more limits (e.g., biweekly, 
or quarterly limits)?
    (32) The FAA also asks for comments on measuring limits on an 
hourly rather than daily or monthly basis. Does this approach make 
sense for some time periods but not for others?

K. Rest Requirements

1. Pre-Flight Duty Period Rest
    Adequate rest is the most critical component of fatigue mitigation. 
As such, it is critical that the FAA implement unambiguous rest 
requirements that address both the potential for fatigue on a daily 
basis and the risk posed by cumulative fatigue. Currently, 14 CFR part 
121, subparts Q, R and S address rest limits within a 24-hour period. 
However, certificate holders conducting operations with airplanes 
having a passenger seat configuration of 30 seats or fewer and a 
payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or less, may comply with the less 
stringent requirements of 14 CFR sections 135.261 through 135.273. 
Perhaps the largest problem with the existing regulations is that there 
is no mechanism to assure that rest is provided prior to flight, and 
there is no guarantee that the 9-hour rest requirement results in 8 
hours of actual sleep opportunity.
    In addition, the existing requirements do not adequately apprise 
the regulated community on what constitutes being free from duty. The 
FAA has issued 55 legal interpretations regarding rest that apply to 
pilots, flight attendants and dispatchers, many of which relate to 
whether a crew member is at rest when required to answer phone calls or 
pagers or otherwise be in contact with the carrier.
    CAP-371 defines rest as a period of time before starting a flight 
duty period which is designed to give crew members adequate opportunity 
to rest before a flight. The minimum rest period must be as long as the 
preceding duty period, or 12 hours, whichever is greater. After being 
called out from reserve, the length of minimum rest is determined by 
the length of reserve duty, time spent on positioning, and any 
completed FDP.
    EASA defines a rest period as a continuous and defined period of 
time, subsequent to and/or prior to duty, during which a crew member is 
free of all duties. Certificate holders are required to ensure that 
rest periods provide sufficient time for flightcrew members to overcome 
the effects of the previous duties and be well rested for the next FDP. 
In addition, a certificate holder must ensure that the effects on a 
flight crew passing through different time zones are compensated for 
with additional rest. As is the case with CAP-371, the EU OPS subpart Q 
requires that minimum rest for an FDP beginning at home base must be at 
least as long as the preceding duty period or 12 hours, whichever is 
greater. If the FDP begins away from home base, the rest must be as 
long as the preceding duty period or 10 hours, whichever is greater. 
Within this rest period, a certificate holder must provide at least 8 
hours of opportunity for sleep. EU OPS subpart Q also requires 
certificate holders to increase the minimum rest periodically to a 
weekly rest period. The pilot-in-command also may reduce rest in the 
event of unforeseen circumstances.
    As discussed earlier, the study of sleep science is somewhat 
settled on the following points: The most effective fatigue mitigation 
is sleep; an average individual needs to have an 8-hour sleep 
opportunity to be restored; 8 hours of sleep requires more than 8 hours 
of sleep opportunity; and daytime sleep is less restorative than 
nighttime sleep.\44\ For most people, 8 hours of sleep in each 24 hours 
sustains performance indefinitely.\45\ There is a continuous decrease 
in performance as sleep is lost. Examples of this reduction in 
performance include complacency, a loss of concentration, cognitive and 
communicative skills, and a decreased ability to perform calculations. 
All of these skills are critical for aviation safety.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Akerstedt, T., & Gillberg, M. (1981). The circadian 
variation of experimentally displaced sleep. Sleep, 4 (2), 159-1659. 
Akerstedt, T., & Gillberg, M. (1990). Subjective and objective 
sleepiness in the active individual. International journal of 
neuroscience, 52 (1-2), 29-37. Gander, P.H., De Nguyen, B.E., 
Rosekind, M.R., & Connell, L.J. (1993). Age, circadian rhythms, and 
sleep loss in flight crews. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine, 64 (3), 189-195.
    \45\ Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Gregory, K.B., Smith, R.M., 
Miller, D.L., Oyung, R., Webbon, L.L., & Johnson, J.M. (1996). 
Managing fatigue in operational settings 1: Physiological 
considerations and countermeasures. Behavioral Medicine, 21, 157-
165.
    \46\ Caldwell, J.A., Mallis, M.M., Caldwell, J.L., Paul, M.A., 
Miller, J.C., & Neri, D.F. (2009). Fatigue countermeasures in 
aviation. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 69 (1), 29-
59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The scientific presenters stated that during long pairings with 
significant time zone shifts, a minimum of 24 hours off would be 
necessary for flightcrew members to find an adequate sleep opportunity, 
and sufficient time free from duty.\47\ A minimum of two nights of 
sleep might be necessary to acclimate to a different time zone.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Gander, P.H., Myhre, G., Graeber, R.C., Anderson, H.T., and 
Lauber, J.K. (1985). Crew factors in flight operations: I. Effects 
of 9-hour time-zone changes on fatigue and the circadian rhythms of 
sleep/wake and core temperature (NASA/TMm 1985-88197). Moffett 
Field, CA. NASA Ames Research Center.
    \48\ Lamond, N., Petrilli, R.M., Dawson, D., and Roach, G.D. 
(2006). Do short international layovers allow sufficient opportunity 
for pilots to recover? Chronobiology International, 23(6), 1285-
1294. Lamond, N., Petrilli, R.M., Dawson, D., and Roach, G.D. 
(2005). The impact of layover length on the fatigue and recovery of 
long-haul flight crew. Adelaide/Whyalla, Australia: University of 
South Australia, centre for Sleep Research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The scientific presenters noted that an individual's circadian 
clock is sensitive to rapid time zone changes. They added that long 
trips present significant issues requiring mitigation strategies.\49\ 
Twenty-four or 48 hours of rest may not be adequately restorative 
during a trip pairing where a flightcrew member is working 20 days 
separated by 24-hour layovers. In some cases, shorter rest periods, 
such as 18 hours or less, may

[[Page 55873]]

be more restorative because of circadian issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See also, Gander, P.H., Graeber, R.C., Connell, L.J., and 
Gregory, K.B. (1991). Crew factors in flight operations: VIII. 
Factors influencing sleep timing and subjective sleep quality in 
commercial long-haul flight crews (NASA/TMm 1991-103852). Moffett 
Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., 
Gregory, K.B., Smith, R.M., Miller, D.L., Oyung, R., Webbon, L.L. 
and Johnson, J.M. (1996). Managing fatigue in operational settings 
2: An Integrated Approach. Behavioral medicine, 21, 166-170.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In defining a rest period, the ARC included the condition that a 
flightcrew member be free from all contact during a rest period. The 
proposed definition means that the certificate holder cannot contact a 
flightcrew member nor can the flightcrew member be required to contact 
the certificate holder during a rest period.
    The ARC members agreed on a general approach towards rest without 
agreeing on the number of hours one needed to be free from duty to 
assure an 8-hour sleep opportunity. On the lower end, they developed a 
domestic rest requirement of 10 hours by working out in each direction 
from an 8-hour sleep opportunity, with 30 minutes on each end for 
transportation, and 30 minutes on each end for physiological needs such 
as eating, exercising and showering. Others on the ARC noted that a 
longer rest period was required to assure an 8-hour sleep opportunity.
    For international operations, some members of the ARC suggested 
this rest requirement should increase to 12 hours. They noted that 
flightcrew members may require a longer rest period at international 
layovers because of issues with time zone changes and possible 
difficulties obtaining sleep because the flightcrew member is non-
acclimated. There were also concerns raised with a potential for 
increased stress associated with communicating with air traffic control 
in countries where English is not the native language. Some ARC members 
acknowledged that the minimum period captures the same elements as the 
10-hour requirement discussed above but includes an additional 2 hours 
to transit customs and immigration or travel a long distance to hotel 
accommodations in foreign destinations.
    The ARC discussed permitting the minimum rest time to be reduced to 
a lower level due to unforeseen circumstances. On the one hand, this 
would allow the carrier to recover a schedule; on the other hand, the 
need for reduced rest may be based on factors, such as poor weather or 
mechanical problems with the aircraft, which are potentially more 
fatiguing than normal operations. Ultimately, the ARC members proposed 
to allow certificate holders to reduce a minimum rest period from 10 to 
9 or 12 to 11 hours for operational flexibility in unforeseen 
circumstances, but to limit the number of times rest could be reduced 
to once in a 168-hour period. In addition, the decision to reduce 
minimum rest would be a joint decision between the pilot in command and 
the certificate holder.
    The FAA is proposing flightcrew members be provided with a minimum 
of 9 hours rest prior to commencing a flight duty period. The agency 
has tentatively decided against proposing different requirements for 
domestic and international operations. Time associated with clearing 
customs and immigration or traveling longer distances to a hotel has 
been addressed by refining the time at which the rest requirement 
begins and ends, as discussed below. While the FAA agrees that changes 
in time zones and the need to acclimate require additional safeguards, 
the agency believes that it has already accommodated that additional 
risk in other provisions to the proposed rule. As to concerns raised 
with air traffic controllers who do not speak English as their primary 
language, the FAA is unconvinced that providing an additional 2 hour 
sleep opportunity after the flight has ended would have any impact on 
the stress associated with communicating with air traffic control after 
entering foreign air space. Based on the available sleep studies, it 
does not appear that a longer rest period immediately prior to 
commencing a flight in non-U.S. airspace would be necessary since 
presumably the flightcrew member has received the requisite amount of 
sleep to report to duty refreshed and well-rested.
    As suggested by the ARC, the rest opportunity could be reduced by 1 
hour once in any 168-hour period, but only if agreed to by the pilot in 
command. Under no circumstances may the opportunity to rest be reduced 
by more than 1 hour because such reductions would seriously encroach 
upon the 8-hour sleep opportunity. Should the time period between the 
beginning of the rest period and the time the flightcrew must report 
for transportation to the airport be less than 8 hours, the carrier 
would need to delay the next day's flight or make other crewing 
arrangements.
    This proposal does not exactly mirror the ARC recommendation, 
because the FAA is proposing that transportation time to or from a duty 
station not be included in the minimum rest periods; nor would it be 
considered duty. Rather, the rest period would begin once the 
flightcrew members reach the hotel. The FAA's proposal does not change 
the intent of the ARC to generally assure an 8-hour sleep opportunity. 
However, the FAA believes that time in transit is not rest. In 
addition, the agency is concerned that allowing this time to be 
included in the rest period could result in a reduction in actual rest 
opportunity below 8 hours. The ARC members recognized this possibility 
and considered an approach whereby any time exceeding 30 minutes would 
not be considered in the rest period. Ultimately, the impact is the 
same; it is simply clearer from a regulatory perspective to acknowledge 
that time in transit is not rest. The FAA has decided against treating 
this time as duty because it recognizes that the permissible amount of 
cumulative duty is only nominally higher than the permissible amount of 
FDP and that the location of a rest facility is a lifestyle issue that 
is typically negotiated between the carriers and their unions.
    The FAA seeks comment on the following:
    (33) If transportation is not considered part of the mandatory rest 
period, is there a need for a longer rest period for international 
flights?
2. Cumulative Rest Requirements
    Much as there should be cumulative limits on the amount of work a 
flightcrew member can be expected to perform in a week, there also 
needs to be an opportunity for rest that exceeds the amount of rest 
required on a daily basis. The scientific presenters to the ARC stated 
that cumulative fatigue is fatigue brought on by repeated mild sleep 
restriction or extended hours awake. They noted that the repeated 
infringement of duty time on the opportunity to sleep results in 
accumulated sleep debt and that the operative factor in recovery from 
cumulative fatigue is sleep. When a person has accumulated a sleep 
debt, recovery sleep is necessary. Recovery sleep requires an 
opportunity to obtain sufficient sleep to fully restore the person's 
``sleep reservoir.'' Recovery sleep should include at least one 
physiological night, that is, one sleep period during nighttime hours 
in the time zone in which the individual is acclimated.
    The ARC discussed what would constitute rest sufficient to act as a 
restorative rest reset for the 168 consecutive hour rolling window. The 
ARC noted that current regulations require 24 hours free of duty in any 
7 consecutive days dependent on the type of operation. The ARC 
considered whether reset rest should (1) incorporate a minimum of two 
physiological nights' rest, which would be variable based on when the 
FDPs began and ended, or (2) be a fixed number of hours ranging from 30 
to 48 hours. The ARC proposed that a 30 to 36 hour rest during any 168 
consecutive hours constitutes a restorative rest period. Those arguing 
for a 36 hour rest period noted that the 30 hour period would only 
rarely afford

[[Page 55874]]

one the opportunity for two physiological nights rest. Those supporting 
30 hours noted that this time frame would allow for one physiological 
night's rest and at least one additional sleep opportunity, albeit less 
than a full 8 hours.
    The FAA is proposing to impose a 30 hour continuous rest 
requirement for each rolling 168-hour period. This approach does not 
guarantee two consecutive physiological nights rest in a 7-day period. 
Rather, it provides for a single physiological night rest and a rest 
opportunity immediately preceding or following that night. Although 
this is less rest than suggested by some members of the ARC, it still 
represents a 25 percent increase over current requirements. In 
addition, the FAA believes the cumulative limits on duty and FDP during 
the same 7-day period should adequately mitigate the effects of 
cumulative fatigue.

L. Fatigue Risk Management Systems

    A Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) is a carrier-specific 
method of evaluating how to best mitigate fatigue based on active 
monitoring and evaluation by the carrier and flightcrew members. This 
cooperative approach has the potential to provide a cooperative and 
flexible means of monitoring and mitigating fatigue during operations 
when the prescriptive approach is not optimal. An FRMS requires a 
carrier to develop numerous processes and structures within an 
operation. These measures lead to an effective management and 
mitigation of fatigue on the part of both the carrier and its employees 
that might affect the operation.
    An FRMS requires that a baseline of fatigue effects be identified 
for the affected population, scientific modeling of respective work 
schedules, education and management of the process for all 
stakeholders, and effective evaluation and validation of the instituted 
policies. As a continuously improving system, the knowledge gained in 
developing and validating fatigue data should result in regular 
improvements in how the certificate holder and its employees manage and 
mitigate fatigue.
    No country has adopted FRMS as a regulatory alternative. However, 
ICAO is actively considering requiring member states to implement some 
alternative means of compliance with existing rules, and EASA has 
proposed requiring FRMS as an integral part of an operator's management 
system. Permitting FRMS as a regulatory alternative to today's proposal 
is widely supported by industry, with several organizations requesting 
that the FAA adopt FRMS as a means of addressing fatigue. 
Theoretically, a carrier could apply its FRMS to all of its operations. 
Realistically, it would likely only be used when the carrier cannot 
meet the more prescriptive rules because of the nature of the specific 
operations.
    The FAA has decided to include an FRMS option in today's proposal. 
A certificate holder may utilize this option when it has developed an 
FAA-approved equivalent level of safety for monitoring and mitigating 
fatigue specific to those operations.\50\ The proposed regulatory text 
provides broad performance requirements that a certificate holder would 
need to demonstrate it met prior to the FAA granting approval. These 
requirements include an additional FRMS-specific training element above 
and beyond the general requirement proposed today. The extent of the 
additional training would be determined as part of the overall approval 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ The FAA anticipates that all FRMS proposals would be 
evaluated and approved at headquarters by individuals within AFS-200 
dedicated to overseeing FRMS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While FRMS is not fully matured, the general concepts are well 
understood and have been developed in other contexts. For example, the 
approach used to obtain ultra-long range OpSpecs is essentially an 
FRMS, except that it does not contemplate flightcrew members providing 
feedback to the certificate holder or a system of accountability. The 
FAA's Advanced Qualification Program, which has been in place since 
1990, also incorporates many aspects of an FRMS. In addition, ICAO is 
currently working on developing FRMS standards. The FAA is actively 
engaged in the development of these standards, as are at least two 
members of the ARC. Accordingly, the FAA believes that FRMS will be 
sufficiently robust to be implemented for operations that cannot 
otherwise be accommodated under the rule by the time the rule takes 
effect.
    Generally, a certificate holder would need to demonstrate that its 
FRMS has an education and awareness training program; a fatigue 
reporting system; a system for monitoring flightcrew fatigue; a 
performance evaluation; and possibly an incident reporting process. The 
FAA issued advisory circular (AC) 120-103 entitled Fatigue Risk 
Management Systems for Aviation Safety \51\ on August 3, 2010 outlining 
the types of data and processes a certificate holder would need to 
develop to receive FRMS approval from the agency. I
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ You may view the AC at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/319218.
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    As is the case with the proposed training requirements, whenever 
the Administrator finds that revisions are necessary for the continued 
adequacy of an FRMS, the certificate holder would have to make any 
changes in the program deemed necessary by the Administrator after 
being notified that such changes are needed. This would likely be done 
through the OpSpec process.
    The FAA requests comment on:
    (34) Whether some elements of an FRMS, such as an incident 
reporting system, would be better addressed through a voluntary 
disclosure program than through a regulatory mandate?

M. Commuting

    The impact of commuting to a duty station has been linked to 
increased fatigue, most recently in the crash in Buffalo, New York. 
Commuting is common in the airline industry, in part because of 
lifestyle choices available to pilots by virtue of their being able to 
fly at no cost to their duty station, but also because of economic 
reasons associated with protecting seniority on particular aircraft, 
frequent changes in the flightcrew member's home base, and low pay and 
regular furloughs by some carriers that may require a pilot to live 
someplace with a relatively low cost of living. While commuting to a 
duty station can be handled responsibly (particularly assuming one has 
the means), it is also subject to abuse.
    The only current impediment to irresponsible commuting in the FAA's 
regulations is the general requirement in part 91 that pilots report to 
work fit for duty. CAP-371 provides that if journey time from home to 
normal home base is more than 1.5 hours, crew members should consider 
making arrangements for temporary accommodation nearer to base. This 
provision is not mandatory.
    The ARC unanimously recommended that pilots be reminded of their 
existing obligations under part 91 to report to work fit for duty, but 
that the FAA impose no new requirements. The FAA has tentatively 
rejected this approach.
    Commuting is fundamentally a fitness for duty issue. If a 
flightcrew member commutes irresponsibly, it is possible that he or she 
may become fatigued. A responsible commuter plans his or her commute to 
minimize its impact on his or her ability to get meaningful rest 
shortly before flying, thus fulfilling the proposed requirement that he 
or she reports for an FDP rested and prepared to perform his or her 
assigned duty.
    The FAA considered proposing a requirement similar to the one in 
CAP-

[[Page 55875]]

371 mandating that pilots arrive at the pilot's domicile airport in 
time to receive the pre-flight rest period in that area prior to 
commencing flight. At first blush, this approach has appeal, in that it 
would require a flightcrew member to have an opportunity for rest 
immediately prior to commencing an FDP. However, because commuting 
constitutes an activity conducted by a pilot on his or her own time, it 
is difficult to regulate. In addition, a strict commuting regulation, 
such as one that requires a pilot to report to a duty station area well 
in advance of the scheduled flight, would not necessarily result in 
more responsible commuting. A pilot could choose to commute during 
times that interfere with his or her WOCL (for example, taking a red 
eye for an afternoon flight), leaving him or her less rested for 
flight. This approach could also discourage responsible commuting. For 
example, today a flightcrew member can catch a mid-morning flight to 
his or her duty station and then commence his or her flying shortly 
after arrival a couple of hours later. The flightcrew member would have 
received a full night of sleep, and would be in a much better position 
to work than the individual who had taken an overnight or very early 
morning flight. While the irresponsible commuter would be available to 
fly by mid-afternoon, the mid-morning commuter would not be available 
to fly until late evening, just as he or she is beginning to tire.
    The FAA does believe that it is unreasonable to assume that an 
individual is resting while commuting. Accordingly, time spent 
commuting, either locally or long-distance, is not considered rest, and 
a certificate holder will need to consider the commuting times required 
by individual flightcrew members to ensure they can reach their home 
base while still receiving the required opportunity for rest. This 
approach is consistent with that taken for transportation to and from a 
sleep facility other than home discussed earlier in this document.
    The FAA also believes it is inappropriate to simply rely on the 
existing requirements in part 91 to report to work fit for duty. The 
FAA believes a primary reason that pilots may engage in irresponsible 
commuting practices is a lack of education on what activities are 
fatiguing and how to mitigate developing fatigue. The FAA has developed 
a draft fitness for duty AC that elaborates on the pilot's 
responsibility to be physically fit for flight prior to accepting any 
flight assignment, which includes the pilot being properly rested. 
Additionally, the AC outlines the certificate holder's responsibility 
to ensure each flightcrew member is properly rested before assigning 
that flightcrew member to any flight. That document has been placed in 
the docket for this rulemaking. Additionally, the proposed training 
program discussed earlier contains an element on the impact of 
commuting on fatigue.

N. Exception for Emergency and Government Sponsored Operations

    The ARC discussed various types of supplemental operations that may 
not be adequately addressed by the proposed requirements.\52\ These 
operations range from moving armed troops for the U.S. military and 
conducting humanitarian relief, repatriation, Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
(CRAF), Air Mobility Command (AMC), and State Department missions. Many 
of these types of supplemental operations fly into hostile areas, while 
others are conducted into politically sensitive, remote areas without 
rest facilities. The ARC recognized the uniqueness of these operations 
and noted that today some AMC and emergency operations are conducted 
under a deviation authority contained in 14 CFR 119.55 and 119. 57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ The FAA notes that cost is not the critical factor since a 
regulatory impact on crew costs would more than likely be passed on 
the Department of Defense via the uniform rate process, resulting in 
no increase in cost to the carrier. While crew costs are typically 
based on historical costs, the FAA has been informed that the 
uniform rate process is sufficiently flexible to allow projected 
costs when the cost increase is the result of a regulatory action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently, all flights operated by an air carrier under contract 
with a U.S. Government agency must comply with part 121 or part 135, 
including flight and duty time regulations. These operations include, 
but are not limited to:
    <bullet> AMC contracts and other Department of Defense (DOD) 
contracts;
    <bullet> State Department contracts;
    <bullet> Department of Homeland Security contracts, including FEMA, 
humanitarian flights and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
deportations; and
    <bullet> Department of Justice contract flights.
    Activation of the CRAF would allow military use of civil aircraft. 
CRAF is activated by presidential order in a time of war.\53\ Under 
CRAF, air carriers are required to operate their aircraft at the 
direction of DOD. However, the activation of CRAF does not obviate the 
air carrier's responsibility to operate under part 121, including the 
flight and duty time regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ CRAF is currently not activated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    14 CFR 119.55 allows the FAA Administrator to authorize an air 
carrier who has a contract with AMC a deviation to any part of part 
119, 121, or 135 for the operation under that contract. AMC reviews an 
air carrier's request for a deviation and either supports it or does 
not support it before AMC forwards the request to the FAA for a final 
decision.
    14 CFR 119.57 allows the FAA Administrator to authorize deviations 
during an emergency under certain conditions. The FAA has used this 
authority in the past. For instance, an OpSpec was used during 
Hurricane Katrina to allow humanitarian flights into and out of New 
Orleans. This authority is issued on a case by case basis during an 
emergency situation as determined by the Administrator.
    Neither of these current regulatory options fully address the needs 
of carriers who occasionally need to exceed the allowable FDP (with 
extensions) or who are operating under contract to a U.S. government 
agency other than AMC. These operations are distinguishable from 
tourism operations or operations where cargo shows up late to the 
aircraft for loading.
    The FAA recognizes that all carriers could encounter circumstances 
that would require a flightcrew member to exceed the limits in the FDP, 
including extensions. The most likely scenario probably would be a 
diversion into an area where, for whatever reason, it would not be safe 
for the crew or passengers to stay. In addition, the FAA recognizes 
that there is a public policy interest in permitting the United States 
government to contract out certain operations to air carriers. If these 
operations were conducted on military aircraft, the pilots would 
generally be subject to a 16-hour duty day, almost all of which could 
be flight time.
    Currently, if a military pilot flies a similar operation into a 
hostile area and must fly an aircraft out of theater due to a military 
exigency, and doing so would cause that pilot to exceed the military-
mandated flight and duty time limits, that pilot can call his or her or 
her central command for permission to do so. A similar system, with FAA 
involvement, seems to make sense. In the event that there is no time to 
call back to the air carrier, the captain's emergency authority would 
allow the captain to move the airplane to safety, with a report to the 
FAA. Likewise, the pilot in command is always authorized to address 
emergency situations.
    The concern of the FAA is not that circumstances may arise that 
require

[[Page 55876]]

pilots to take emergency action, but rather that air carriers should 
know that delays in certain operations for the U.S. government are 
possible and plan accordingly. Air carriers should mitigate the chances 
of such an event, for instance by staging crews at other airports or 
installing rest facilities on the aircraft to allow augmentation, in 
order to ensure that flight crews will not exceed FDP limits. 
Fundamentally, a carrier needs to have performed adequate planning for 
the mission, including having the appropriate onboard rest facilities 
or number of flightcrew members for the length of the duty day, and the 
emergency should not be self-induced. If a certificate holder chooses 
not to equip an aircraft with adequate rest facilities, then the 
certificate holder should not be able to claim an inability to comply 
with requirements because of the lack of those facilities.
    The FAA proposes to allow air carriers operating commercial flights 
and who are not under contract with a U.S. government agency to ask for 
a ``one time deviation'' to the FDP limits under part 121 for a one 
time event in exceptional circumstances. Each event of this type would 
be reported to the FAA. The number of ``one time deviations'' would be 
tracked by the FAA, as would the rationale for needing the deviation. 
If the Administrator determines that the carrier is relying excessively 
on this deviation authority, the air carrier would have to change its 
operations or develop an FRMS in order to mitigate the chances of such 
events happening in the future. There would be extra rest requirements 
after such an event.
    For operations under contract with a U.S. government agency that 
cannot be conducted consistent with the general rules because of unique 
circumstances (such as when operating into an SFAR area, or when there 
is a declared military exigency that necessitates operations outside 
the scope of what the regulation contemplates), a different approach is 
proposed. Such operations could be conducted under an exception to the 
FDP and flight time limits, but not to the cumulative restrictions on 
FDP, flight time and duty. In addition, additional rest would be 
required and the carrier would have to demonstrate why the operations 
could not have been adjusted to prevent exceeding the daily limits. 
This could be done with a bi-monthly reporting requirement.
    By tracking these events, the FAA can determine if the air carrier 
is properly planning its operations and mitigating the chances of its 
flight crews exceeding the FDP limits. The proposed regulation 
contemplates that the air carrier will develop an FRMS if it cannot 
restructure its operations so that only very few of those operations 
continue to need the exception. Sections 119.55 and 119.57 would remain 
unchanged and used as they are today.
    (35) Are there other types of operations that should be excepted 
from the general requirements of the proposal? If so, what are they, 
and why do they need to be accommodated absent an FRMS?

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

Regulatory Impact Analysis, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, and 
Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency 
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires 
agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small 
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits 
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to 
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. 
standards, the Trade Agreements Act requires agencies to consider 
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis 
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of 
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that 
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, 
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with 
base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's 
analysis of the economic impacts of this proposed rule. The FAA 
suggests readers seeking greater detail read the full regulatory impact 
analysis, a copy of which the agency has placed in the docket for this 
rulemaking.
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this 
proposed rule: (1) Has benefits that justify its costs, (2) is an 
economically ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 
3(f) of Executive Order 12866, (3) is ``significant'' as defined in 
DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) would have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (5) would 
not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States; and (6) would impose an unfunded mandate on State, local, or 
tribal governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold 
identified above. These analyses are summarized below.

Benefits of the Rule

    During the past 20 years, there have been over 18 aviation 
accidents caused by pilot error where pilot fatigue was a factor. NTSB 
has identified five accidents where the flight crew started the day in 
a state of fatigue. We statistically identified 4.6 accidents where the 
flight crew became fatigued during a long flight-duty period (NTSB 
cited pilot fatigue as a contributing factor in three of those 
accidents). We have also statistically estimated that some of the 6.2 
accidents that occurred between midnight and 6 a.m. involved some 
degree of pilot fatigue. Two of these have already been accounted for 
in the previously discussed analyses. There were also three accidents 
where the pilot became fatigued due to being awake for many hours. 
Lastly, there were two accidents where chronic fatigue was a 
contributing factor. In summary, we project there would be at least 
18.8 accidents (13 passenger airplane accidents and 5.8 cargo airplane 
accidents) during the next 20 years where pilot fatigue would be a 
contributing factor to the accident.
    Having projected the possible extent of fatigue based on the 
historical record, we estimate the likelihood of accidents happening in 
the future using simulation techniques. We also use simulation 
techniques to estimate future casualties, which we monetize. In this 
way, we estimate the potential benefits of the proposed rule. Finally, 
we model risk of fatigue for current pilot schedules, and compute the 
number of hours in higher risk categories with and without the rule. 
The projected reduction in fatigue exposure is corroborating evidence 
supporting this proposal. Pilot fatigue is a serious problem. If 
nothing is done about this problem, we can expect from one to possibly 
six aviation accidents a year where pilot fatigue will be a 
contributing factor. Pilot fatigue will be a contributing factor in 
many accidents that could potentially cost billions of dollars.
    Using simulation analysis, the mean is 28.9 airplane accidents in a 
ten-year period. These accidents would result in a mean of 174.7 
deaths. The estimated cost of these accidents would be a mean value of 
$1.581 billion ($1.121 billion, present value). These numbers represent 
an estimate of the likely number of

[[Page 55877]]

future accidents, deaths, and costs from future accidents with fatigue 
as a factor.
    The above analysis establishes an estimate of the number and range 
of fatigue related accidents if no action is taken to address the 
problem. It is seldom the case that a rule is 100 percent effective at 
addressing an identified problem. In particular, fatigue is rarely a 
primary or sole cause of an accident, and therefore this rule, if 
adopted, is not likely to prevent all future accidents that include 
fatigue as a factor.
    FAA reviewed all NTSB accident reports on part 121 accidents that 
occurred from 1990 through 2009 to assess the likely capacity of the 
NPRM to have averted those accidents. The FAA's Office of Accident 
Investigation & Prevention assessed the effectiveness of this rule to 
prevent accidents like those in the historical database. Most reports 
on major accidents (hull losses or non-hull losses that resulted in 
multiple fatalities) provided extensive data on flight crews' duty 
tours and recent rest periods, which facilitated relatively strong 
assessments.
    The FAA's Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention (AVP) 
rated each accident by conducting a scoring process similar to that 
conducted by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), a well 
documented and well understood procedure. All the accidents that have 
had final National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports published 
have been scored against the CAST safety enhancements. When these 
accidents were not well defined in the probable cause or contributing 
factors statements of the NTSB reports, AVP used a Joint Implementation 
Monitoring Data Analysis Team (JIMDAT)-like method.
    Following this scoring, the proposed rule would be 40 percent 
effective at preventing passenger airplane accidents where pilot 
fatigue was a contributing factor and would be 58 percent effective at 
preventing cargo airplane accidents where pilot fatigue was a 
contributing factor. Accordingly, the above estimate of the benefits of 
avoiding passenger airplane accidents where pilot fatigue was a causal 
factor have been reduced from their above stated values. The revised 
estimated benefits of avoiding passenger and cargo airplane accidents 
would be a mean value of $659.4 million ($463.8 million, present 
value).

Cost of the Rule

    The total estimated cost of the proposed rule is $1.25 billion 
($804 million present value using a seven percent discount rate) for 
the ten year period from 2013 to 2022. The FAA classified costs into 
four main components and estimated the costs for each component. We 
obtained data from various industry sources; the sources of the data 
used in cost estimation are explained in each section. We were very 
fortunate that several carriers ran two alternatives to the proposed 
rule through their crew scheduling programs. Their estimates provided 
some comparison data to calibrate and validate our costing approach. 
Without their help, we would have likely missed some cost elements. The 
table below provides a summary of the four main cost components. Flight 
operations cost makes up about 60 percent of the total cost of the 
rule. Each of the main cost components are explained in-depth in the 
following sections of this document.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14SE10.006

    In addition to the costs presented in this table, there may be 
costs of a fatigue risk management system (FRMS). The FAA is not 
imposing an FRMS programrequirement on Part 121 carriers, but is 
allowing them the option of developing and implementing such a program. 
Operators might do this for ultralong flights, which have flight time 
over 16 hours. Operators might develop an FRMS program as an 
alternative to the flight and duty period rules proposed by this 
rulemaking when the crew scheduling cost savings equal or exceed the 
costs of the FRMS program. The FAA estimates that an FRMS program would 
cost between $0.8 and $10.0 million for each operator over ten years. 
The FAA believes that about 35 operators have at least partially 
adopted an FRMS program at this time. The FAA estimates the total cost 
would be $205.7 million ($144.9 million present value), which would be 
more than offset by a reduction in crew scheduling costs. Accordingly, 
the cost is not added to the total costs imposed by this rule. The FAA 
calls for comment on this aspect of the proposal as it has not assigned 
a cost to the cumulative maximums.

Summary of Benefits and Costs

    Following NTSB recommendations regarding pilot fatigue, labor and 
industry worked together to provide the basis of this rulemaking. 
Furthermore, Congress has directed the FAA to issue a rule addressing 
pilot fatigue. We have validated the need for this rule in the benefit 
discussion. Based on the expected effectiveness of this proposed rule 
at preventing fatigue accidents with an averted fatality valued at $6 
million, the simulation methodology produced benefits of $659.4 million 
with $463.8 million in present value. The total estimated costs of the 
proposed rule over 10 years are $1.25 billion ($804 million at present 
value). There is over a 7 percent probability that undiscounted cost of 
avertable passenger airplane accidents would exceed $1.25 billion and 
over a 10 percent probability the present value of

[[Page 55878]]

the cost of avertable passenger airplane accidents would exceed $804 
million. The benefits from a near term catastrophic accident in a 150-
passenger airplane with average load factor exceeds the cost of this 
rule. If $8.4 million were used for VSL, the undiscounted benefits 
would be $837 million and the present value of those benefits would be 
$589 million. When the value of an averted fatality increases to $12.6 
million, the present value of the benefits equals the present value of 
compliance costs. In addition, the FAA has identified two additional 
areas of unquantified benefits: preventing minor aircraft damage on the 
ground, and the value of well rested pilots as accident preventors and 
mitigators. Due to data limitations, the FAA was unable to estimate the 
cumulative effect of preventing minor aircraft damage on the ground, 
but if the rule were to reduce damage by about $600 million over 10 
years ($340 million present value) it would break even in terms of net 
benefits using a $6 million VSL. These considerations lend weight 
towards moving ahead with this proposal. FAA invites comment on this 
issue.

Alternatives Considered

    FAA examined a number of alternatives to the proposed rule, 
scheduling alternatives and a training alternative. Since crew 
scheduling costs comprised the largest share of costs, most of the 
alternative analysis focused on these costs and these will be discussed 
first. Alternatives were selected using industry-proposed limits 
resulting from the ARC, as well as FAA-proposed limits. The table below 
summarizes each of the alternatives. For each of the scheduling 
alternatives, FAA developed a crew scheduling cost estimate using the 
same methodology as was used to determine the crew scheduling costs of 
the proposed rule.

Summary of Crew Scheduling Alternatives
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14SE10.007

Scenario A

    FAA provided a sample of carriers with a draft version of the 
proposed rule in fall 2009. The carriers estimated the cost of this 
version of the proposed rule using their own crew scheduling models and 
processes. FAA also estimated the costs of the same version of the 
proposed rule for the entire industry using the crew scheduling model 
and process outlined in the crew scheduling costs sub-section of the 
flight operations cost section described in the full regulatory 
evaluation. Scenario A table below presents the annual crew scheduling 
resource costs for the Scenario A alternative. As we were able to 
accomplish our safety objectives at a lower cost, we rejected this 
alternative.

[[Page 55879]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14SE10.000

Scenario B

    FAA examined another, more restrictive version of the proposed 
rule. The main difference was that the minimum required rest for 
international duty periods was eleven hours. Scenario B table presents 
the final, adjusted crew scheduling resource costs of the Scenario B 
alternative.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14SE10.001


[[Page 55880]]



Summary of Crew Scheduling Alternatives

    The summary table below provides the ten-year total crew scheduling 
resource costs for the proposed rule and each of the alternatives. The 
proposed rule represents the lowest-cost alternative and achieves the 
FAA safety objectives.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14SE10.002

Fatigue Training Cost Analysis of Alternatives to the Proposed Rule

    Fatigue training costs account for approximately 20 percent of the 
total cost of the proposed rule. The FAA examined two scenarios for 
fatigue training requirements, ultimately selecting the lower-cost 
scenario for the proposed rule. The table below shows the different 
fatigue training requirements for each of the two scenarios.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14SE10.003

Scenario C

    The fatigue training requirements of Scenario C differed 
significantly from the fatigue training requirements of the proposed 
rule. The required number of both initial and annual recurring fatigue 
training hours was substantially higher. Fatigue training was to take 
place in a classroom rather than through distance learning, which would 
result in higher costs due to the need to pay instructors, and the need 
to provide hotel and per diem compensation to flightcrew members 
receiving the fatigue training. As a result the costs are substantially 
higher. The FAA reviewed the recommended training requirements and 
decided to reduce the initial training requirements from 8 hours to 5 
hours and reduce the recurrent training hours from 4 to 2 hours.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14SE10.004


[[Page 55881]]


    The FAA seeks comments on the alternatives analysis conducted to 
develop this proposal. In addition, it is requesting comments on 
possible approaches designed to reduce the costs of this rule while 
maintaining or increasing the benefits.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination and Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a 
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to 
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the 
rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of small 
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and 
small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the determination is that it would, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
the RFA.
    However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is 
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the 
head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis 
is not required. The certification must include a statement providing 
the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    The FAA believes that this proposed rule would have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities and therefore 
has performed an initial regulatory flexibility analysis as required by 
the RFA. The Small Business Administration small entity criterion for 
small air carrier operators is 1,500 or fewer employees. The FAA 
invites comment from affected small entities and others to aid us to 
make an assessment of these impacts. In particular, the FAA invites 
more information on the financial stability and competitive positions 
of small entities.

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    Under Section 603(b) of the RFA, the initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis must address:
    <bullet> Description of reasons the agency is considering the 
action
    <bullet> Statement of the legal basis and objectives for the 
proposed rule
    <bullet> Description of the record keeping and other compliance 
requirements of the proposed rule
    <bullet> All federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict 
with the proposed rule
    <bullet> Description and an estimated number of small entities to 
which the proposed rule will apply
    <bullet> Analysis of small firms' ability to afford the proposed 
rule
    <bullet> Conduct a disproportionality analysis
    <bullet> Conduct a competitive analysis
    <bullet> Estimation of the potential for business closures
    <bullet> Description of alternatives considered

Reasons the Rule Is Proposed

    The objective of the proposed rule is to increase the margin of 
safety for passengers traveling on U.S. part 121 air carrier flights. 
Specifically, the FAA wants to decrease diminished flight crew 
performance associated with fatigue or lack of alertness brought on by 
the duty requirements for flightcrew members.

The Legal Basis and Objectives

    The legal basis for the proposed rule is found in 49 U.S.C. Section 
44701 et seq. Specifically 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 (a)(4) requires the 
Administrator to promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce 
by prescribing regulations in the interest of safety for the maximum 
hours or periods of service of airmen and other employees or air 
carriers. Among other matters the FAA must consider as a matter of 
policy the maintaining and enhancing of safety in air commerce as its 
highest priority (49 U.S.C. Section 40101(d)).

The Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements of this NPRM

    This proposed rule would increase reporting and recordkeeping. In 
addition to changes in crew schedules, there would be a minor increase 
in documenting crew rest.

All Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the 
Proposed Rule

    There are no Federal Rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict 
with the proposed rule.

Description and an Estimated Number of Small Entities

    The proposed rule would apply to all certificate holders operating 
under part 121. There are 96 such operators of which 45 operators have 
fewer than 1,500 employees. Among these 45 operators, 25 are small 
entities that provide all air-cargo scheduled service competing with 
larger operators, code-share passenger service for large operators, and 
charter service.

Affordability

    The FAA expects wide variability in cost impacts on small entity 
operators. The sample crew scheduling changes provide only a rough 
proxy for the impact on pilots' time and availability. Current crew 
schedules vary by operator, labor contract, and size of pilot pools. 
The agency understands that many smaller operators have maximized their 
pilot time in the cockpit and may have little flexibility with 
potential new flight and duty regulations. Operators needing to hire 
more pilots would incur the cost of hiring, wages, overhead, and 
training. Some captains from smaller operators could be lured away by 
other operators, especially the larger operators with better benefit 
packages. That outcome might be mitigated by the recent extension of 
pilots being able to work to age 65 and the inherent flexibility of the 
larger carriers.
    The FAA requests that small entity operators provide estimated 
impacts of the proposed changes on their existing crew schedules. The 
FAA requests that all comments be accompanied by clear supporting data. 
For now the agency expects some small operators would likely need to 
hire more pilots. This increase in the demand for pilots may eventually 
raise pilot wages. Based on small operators who would need to hire more 
pilots and the resulting pressure on overall wages, there could be a 
significant economic impact.

Disproportionality Analysis

    Part 121 operators would need to provide more rest for pilots which 
overall could result in the need to hire more pilots. The proposed 
changes to flight and duty time would be more difficult to accommodate 
for operators with small pilot staffs. While the changes to flight and 
duty may be measured in hours per week for operators with small, fully 
employed staffs, such changes can be difficult to accommodate. To be in 
compliance with the proposed changes small airlines may need a fraction 
of a new pilot's time to meet requirements. In this case, the airline 
would need to hire and train an additional pilot or reduce the number 
of operations. This added pilot would account for a larger percentage 
of the cost of pilots for the small airline than is likely to be the 
case for a major

[[Page 55882]]

airline. The FAA believes that this may be the case for many small 
operators. Moreover, the smaller the operator, the more likely this 
situation will occur. Thus, the proposed rule is likely to have a 
disproportionate economic impact on small entities.

Competitiveness Analysis

    The competitiveness analysis examines whether a small airline is 
under a competitive disadvantage from the implementation of the 
proposed rule. This proposed rule would impose significant costs on 
some small entities, and as a result it is likely to worsen such 
entities relative competitive position.
    A major criterion in a competitiveness analysis is the ability of 
an airline to pass on the costs imposed by the rule to their customers. 
The extent to which an airline can pass costs on to its customers is 
determined by the elasticity of demand of the service by the customer. 
The elasticity of demand for a product is a measure of the 
responsiveness to price that consumers have in their buying habits. The 
elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in quantity 
demanded resulting from a 1 percent change in price. If the demand for 
airline travel is relatively elastic, then the airlines would have less 
capacity to transfer the added cost of the rule to their passengers 
without losing significant revenue. For operators with a niche market, 
the demand for their services will be less elastic and more of the cost 
can be transferred. For instance, specialty cargo carriers have niche 
markets and some ability to pass on costs. Other operators would have 
little flexibility. In the most extreme case are operators who provide 
scheduled service for larger carriers generally under contract. Overall 
the disproportionate impact is likely to weaken small entity operators' 
competitive situation, but the FAA is unable to provide a measure of 
how much.
    While the preceding discussion points out potential impacts of the 
proposed rule on the competitiveness of small entities, the FAA is 
uncertain about this impact on the level of competition within the U.S. 
airline industry. The FAA has very little firm-specific flight crew 
schedule data and route structure market data to refine this analysis 
and asks commenters to provide information on the impact this proposed 
rule would have on the continued capacity of small airlines to compete 
in their current markets. The FAA invites comment from affected 
airlines and other parties that might better inform the agency on this 
competitiveness issue.

Business Closure Analysis

    Even if there is a disproportionate impact and a loss in 
competitive positioning does not mean a firm would have to close 
because of this proposed rule. While small entity operators are likely 
to experience a significant economic impact, changes to crew schedules 
are difficult to assess. Further complicating this business closure 
analysis are the external changes as upswings in traffic demand or 
declines in the price of fuel quickly improve the bottom-line.
    The FAA solicits comments from the aviation community regarding the 
likelihood of business closure. As noted previously, the FAA requests 
that all comments include supporting data.

Alternatives Considered

    In accordance with the RFA, the FAA considered alternatives to the 
proposed rule to mitigate or eliminate significant economic impacts on 
small entities.
    Alternative One--The FAA is promulgating this rule because the 
status quo alternative subjects the society to an unacceptably high 
aviation accident risk.
    Alternative Two--The FAA considered extending the compliance time, 
but again the purpose of this proposed rule is to reduce the accident 
risk and postponing the compliance period extends this risk.
    Alternative Three--The FAA did consider expanding the rule to 
include part 135 operators. All or nearly all of these operators are 
small entities. As the economic impact may be more severe, the agency 
wants to study the impact on these operators before proposing a 
rulemaking.
    The FAA has tentatively determined that there are no reasonable 
alternatives to this rulemaking that would lessen the potential impact 
on a substantial number of small entities. The agency seeks comment on 
this assessment.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $143.1 million in lieu of $100 
million. This proposed rule contains such a mandate; therefore, the 
requirements of Title II apply. The alternatives considered by the FAA 
are discussed above in the Summary of Benefits and Costs section.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This proposal contains the following new information collection 
requirements. As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 
U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted the information requirements 
associated with this proposal to the Office of Management and Budget 
for its review.
    Title: Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements.
    Summary: The FAA is proposing data collection from air carriers 
certificated under Title 14 Code of Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
CFR) part 121 as prescribed in 14 CFR part 117, Flight and Duty 
Limitations and Rest Requirements: Flightcrew Members. Two sections in 
the proposal drive this requirement, 14 CFR part 117, Sec.  117.7 
Schedule Reliability and Sec.  117.31 Operations in Unsafe Areas. In 
accordance with these two sections, each affected air carrier is 
required to submit a report to the FAA detailing:
    <bullet> Schedule reliability for each air carrier ongoing 
reportable of 2-month intervals,
    <bullet> For those air carriers conducting operations under 
contract for the United States Government and exceeding the proposed 
requirements, ongoing reportable periods of 2-month intervals, and
    <bullet> For those air carriers conducting operations not under 
contract for the United States Government and exceeding the proposed 
requirements, within 14 days of each occurrence, the air carrier relied 
on the relief granted under Sec.  117.31 to reposition the aircraft to 
a safe region.
    Use of: Maintaining schedule reliability is a critical element to 
fatigue mitigation. Air carriers build flight schedules projected to 
meet the constraints of individual FDP. If, however, actual flight time 
exceeds the projected (scheduled) flight time, the validity of the air 
carrier's scheduling process may come into question. This proposal 
places accountability upon each air carrier with regard to their 
scheduling practices and provides a means for the FAA to oversee the 
reliability of the air carrier's scheduling process relative to the 
flightcrew members actual FDP as opposed to the flightcrew member's 
scheduled FDP.
    The proposal defines a flight duty period as a period that begins 
when a flightcrew member is required to report for duty that includes a 
flight, a series of flights, or positioning flights, and

[[Page 55883]]

ends when the aircraft is parked after the last flight and there is no 
intention for further aircraft movement by the same flightcrew member. 
If the air carrier's system-wide actual FDPs exceed the scheduled 
flight by more than five (5) percent or any actual FDP that exceeds the 
pairing-specific schedule by more than twenty (20) percent, the air 
carrier will be required to make adjustments to its schedule factoring 
in the actual time exceeded in order to reflect a more realistic 
schedule based upon actual data. Under the proposal, each air carrier 
must make scheduling reliability adjustments to its schedule any time 
the aforementioned limitations have been exceeded. Additionally, each 
air carrier must submit an ongoing report on 2-month intervals 
detailing its overall schedule reliability and pairing-specific 
reliability.
    This proposal provides relief for air carriers conducting 
operations into unsafe areas and repositioning the aircraft to another 
region for safety or a safe location where another crew can relieve the 
current crew from duty. As a result, these circumstances may result in 
a flightcrew member's FDP being exceeded for the day. The proposed 
section grants the air carrier authority to operate beyond the limits 
of the flightcrew's FDP to the extent of reaching a safe location where 
the crew must be relieved and/or go into required rest. However, by 
exercising such relief, the air carrier must report the occurrence to 
the FAA. The reporting requirements are different for air carriers 
operating under a contract with the United States Government and those 
who are not.
    Air carriers under contract with the United States Government must 
submit a report every sixty (60) days detailing the number of times 
during the reporting period the air carrier relied on this relief, and 
for each occurrence, the reason for exceeding the FDP, the extent the 
FDP was exceeded and the reason the operation could not be completed 
consistent with part 117. If an air carrier does not rely on the 
proposed relief, there would be no obligation to report. If the air 
carrier is not under contract with the United States Government and 
relies on the proposed relief, it must submit a report within fourteen 
(14) days of each occurrence detailing the reason the FDP was exceeded, 
the extent the FDP was exceeded and the reason the operation could not 
be completed consistent with part 117.
    Respondents (including number of): The number of likely respondents 
is 92. The likely respondents to this proposed information requirement 
are part 121 certificate holders.
    Frequency: The FAA estimates each part 121 certificate holder will 
need to provide schedule reliability data every two months. Certificate 
holders regularly providing service to the United States government 
into unsafe areas may need to file reports as often as every two 
months. The FAA anticipates that certificate holders would only rarely 
need to fly into unsafe areas for reasons other than in support of U.S. 
government operations and estimates that fewer than five such reports 
would be filed each year.
    Annual Burden Estimate:
    This proposal would result in an annual recordkeeping and reporting 
burden as follows:
    a. Number of respondents: 92.
    Scheduling and Schedule Reliability Reporting: 92.
    b. Total annual responses: 552.
    (92 carriers reporting 6 times each year: 92 x 6 = 552)
    Scheduling and schedule reliability reporting: 552.
    1. Percentage of these responses collected electronically: 100%.
    Scheduling and Schedule Reliability Reporting: 100%.
    c. Total annual hours requested: 4,416 hours.
    (92 air carriers requiring 1 employee 8 hours to complete report:
    92 x 1 x 8 = 4,416 hours).
    Scheduling and schedule reliability reporting: 4,416.
    d. Current OMB inventory: 0 hours.
    Scheduling and schedule reliability reporting: 0.
    e. Difference: 4,416 hours.
    Scheduling and Schedule Reliability Reporting: 4,416.
    Annual reporting and recordkeeping cost burden (in thousands of 
dollars)
    a. Total annualized capital/startup costs: $20,645.
    Scheduling and Schedule Reliability Reporting: $15.
    Fatigue Training.
    Fatigue Risk Management Systems: $20,630.
    b. Total annual cost ((O&M): $23,902.
    Scheduling and Schedule Reliability Reporting: $482.
    Fatigue Training: $23,420.
    Fatigue Risk Management Systems: $0.
    c. Total annualized costs requested: $44,547.
    Scheduling and Schedule Reliability Reporting: $497.
    Fatigue Training: $23,420.
    Fatigue Risk Management Systems: $20,630.
    d. Current OMB inventory: $0.
    Scheduling and Schedule Reliability Reporting: $0.
    Fatigue Training: $0.
    Fatigue Risk Management Systems: $0.
    e Difference: $44,547.
    Scheduling and Schedule Reliability Reporting: $497.
    Fatigue Training: $23,420.
    Fatigue Risk Management Systems: $20,630.
    The agency is soliciting comments to--
    (1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
    (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to 
be collected; and
    (4) Minimize the burden of collecting information on those who are 
to respond, including by using appropriate automated, electronic, 
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms 
of information technology.
    Individuals and organizations may send comments on the information 
collection requirement by November 15, 2010, and should direct them to 
the address listed in the Addresses section at the end of this 
preamble. Comments also should be submitted to the Office of Management 
and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: 
Desk Officer for FAA, New Executive Building, Room 10202, 725 17th 
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20053.
    According to the 1995 amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 
CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not collect or sponsor the 
collection of information, nor may it impose an information collection 
requirement unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. 
The OMB control number for this information collection will be 
published in the Federal Register, after the Office of Management and 
Budget approves it.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency has 
determined that this action would not have a substantial direct effect 
on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and 
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among 
the various levels of government, and, therefore, would not have 
federalism implications.

[[Page 55884]]

Environmental Analysis

    Environmental Analysis FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions 
that are categorically excluded from preparation of an environmental 
assessment or environmental impact statement under the National 
Environmental Policy Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. 
The FAA has determined this proposed rulemaking action qualifies for 
the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no 
extraordinary circumstances.

Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or 
Use

    The FAA has analyzed this NPRM under Executive Order 13211, Actions 
Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it 
is not a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order 
because while a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866, it is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the 
supply, distribution, or use of energy.

Additional Information

    Comments Invited:
    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. It also 
invites comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy or 
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in 
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion 
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain 
duplicate comments, please send only one copy of written comments, or 
if filing comments electronically, please submit your comments only one 
time.
    The FAA will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as 
a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel 
concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this proposal, 
the agency will consider all comments we receive on or before the 
closing date for comments. It will consider comments filed after the 
comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without incurring 
expense or delay. The FAA may change this proposal in light of the 
comments we receive.
Proprietary or Confidential Business Information
    Do not file in the docket information that you consider to be 
proprietary or confidential business information. Send or deliver this 
information directly to the legal contact person identified in the FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. You must mark the 
information that you consider proprietary or confidential. If you send 
the information on a disk or CD ROM, mark the outside of the disk or CD 
ROM and also identify electronically within the disk or CD ROM the 
specific information that is proprietary or confidential.
    Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when the FAA is aware of proprietary 
information filed with a comment, the agency does not place it in the 
docket. It is held in a separate file to which the public does not have 
access, and a note is placed in the docket that the agency has received 
it. If the agency receives a request to examine or copy this 
information, it treats it as any other request under the Freedom of 
Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). The FAA processes such a request under 
the DOT procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.
Availability of Rulemaking Documents
    An electronic copy of rulemaking documents may be obtained using 
the Internet by--
    1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov);
    2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
    Alternatively, a copy may be requested directly from the FAA by 
sending a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of 
Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, 
or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make sure to identify the docket number 
or notice number of this rulemaking.
    All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule, 
including economic analyses and technical reports, are located in the 
docket for this rulemaking and may be viewed on the internet through 
the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in paragraph (1).

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 117

    Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Safety.

14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration proposes to amend Chapter I of Title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations, as follows:
    1. Part 117 is added to read as follows:

PART 117--FLIGHT AND DUTY LIMITATIONS AND REST REQUIREMENTS: 
FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS

Sec.
117.1 Applicability.
117.3 Definitions.
117.5 Fitness for duty.
117.7 Fatigue risk management system.
117.9 Schedule reliability.
117.11 Fatigue education and training program.
117.13 Flight time limitation.
117.15 Flight duty period: Un-Augmented operations.
117.17 Flight duty period: Split duty.
117.19 Flight duty period: Augmented flightcrew.
117.21 Reserve status.
117.23 Cumulative duty limitations.
117.25 Rest period.
117.27 Consecutive nighttime operations.
117.29 Deadhead transportation.
117.31 Operations into unsafe areas.
Table A to Part 117--Maximum Flight Time Limits for Un-Augmented 
Operations
Table B to Part 117--Flight Duty Period: Un-Augmented Operations
Table C to Part 117--Flight Duty Period: Augmented Operations

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 46901, 44903-44904, 
44912, 46105.


Sec.  117.1  Applicability.

    This part prescribes flight and duty limitations and rest 
requirements for all flightcrew members and certificate holders 
conducting operations under part 121 of this chapter. This part also 
applies to all flightcrew members and part 121 certificate holders when 
conducting flights under part 91 of this chapter.


Sec.  117.3  Definitions.

    In addition to the definitions in Sec. Sec.  1.1 and 119.3 of this 
chapter, the following definitions apply to this part. In the event 
there is a conflict in definitions, the definitions in this part 
control.
    Acclimated means a condition in which a crewmember has been in a 
theater for 72 hours or has been given at least 36 consecutive hours 
free from duty.
    Airport/standby reserve means a defined duty period during which a 
crewmember is required by a certificate holder to be at, or in close 
proximity to, an airport for a possible assignment.
    Augmented flightcrew means a flightcrew that has more than the

[[Page 55885]]

minimum number of flightcrew members required by the airplane type 
certificate to operate the aircraft to allow a flightcrew member to be 
replaced by another qualified flightcrew member for in-flight rest.
    Calendar day means a 24-hour period from 0000 through 2359.
    Certificate holder means a person who holds or is required to hold 
an air carrier certificate or operating certificate issued under part 
119 of this chapter.
    Crew pairing means a flight duty period or series of flight duty 
periods assigned to a flightcrew member which originate or terminate at 
the flightcrew member's home base.
    Deadhead transportation means transportation of a crewmember as a 
passenger, by air or surface transportation, as required by a 
certificate holder, excluding transportation to or from a suitable 
accommodation.
    Duty means any task, other than long-call reserve, that a 
crewmember performs on behalf of the certificate holder, including but 
not limited to airport/standby reserve, short-call reserve, flight 
duty, pre- and post-flight duties, administrative work, training, 
deadhead transportation, aircraft positioning on the ground, aircraft 
loading, and aircraft servicing.
    Duty period means a period that begins when a certificate holder 
requires a crewmember to report for duty and ends when that crew member 
is free from all duties.
    Fatigue means a physiological state of reduced mental or physical 
performance capability resulting from lack of sleep or increased 
physical activity that can reduce a crewmember's alertness and ability 
to safely operate an aircraft or perform safety-related duties.
    Fatigue risk management system (FRMS) means a management system for 
an operator to use to mitigate the effects of fatigue in its particular 
operations. It is a data-driven process and a systematic method used to 
continuously monitor and manage safety risks associated with fatigue-
related error.
    Fit for duty means physiologically and mentally prepared and 
capable of performing assigned duties in flight with the highest degree 
of safety.
    Flight duty period (FDP) means a period that begins when a 
flightcrew member is required to report for duty with the intention of 
conducting a flight, a series of flights, or positioning or ferrying 
flights, and ends when the aircraft is parked after the last flight and 
there is no intention for further aircraft movement by the same 
flightcrew member. A flight duty period includes deadhead 
transportation before a flight segment without an intervening required 
rest period, training conducted in an aircraft, flight simulator or 
flight training device, and airport/standby reserve.
    Home base means the location designated by a certificate holder 
where a crew member normally begins and ends his or her duty periods.
    Lineholder means a flightcrew member who has a flight schedule and 
is not acting as a reserve flightcrew member.
    Long-call reserve means a reserve period in which a crewmember 
receives a required rest period following notification by the 
certificate holder to report for duty.
    Physiological night's rest means the rest that encompasses the 
hours of 0100 and 0700 at the crewmember's home base, unless the 
individual has acclimated to a different theater. If the crewmember has 
acclimated, the rest must encompass the hours of 0100 and 0700 at the 
acclimated location.
    Report time means the time that the certificate holder requires a 
crewmember to report for a duty period.
    Reserve availability period means a duty period during which a 
certificate holder requires a reserve crewmember on short call reserve 
to be available to receive an assignment for a flight duty period.
    Reserve duty period means the time from the beginning of the 
reserve availability period to the end of an assigned flight duty 
period, and is applicable only to short call reserve.
    Reserve flightcrew member means a flightcrew member who a 
certificate holder requires to be available to receive an assignment 
for duty.
    Rest facility means a bunk, seat, room, or other accommodation that 
provides a crewmember with a sleep opportunity.
    (1) Class 1 rest facility means a bunk or other surface that allows 
for a flat sleeping position and is located separate from both the 
flight deck and passenger cabin in an area that is temperature-
controlled, allows the crewmember to control light, and provides 
isolation from noise and disturbance.
    (2) Class 2 rest facility means a seat in an aircraft cabin that 
allows for a flat or near flat sleeping position; is separated from 
passengers by a minimum of a curtain to provide darkness and some sound 
mitigation; and is reasonably free from disturbance by passengers or 
crewmembers.
    (3) Class 3 rest facility means a seat in an aircraft cabin or 
flight deck that reclines at least 40 degrees and provides leg and foot 
support.
    Rest period means a continuous period determined prospectively 
during which the crewmember is free from all restraint by the 
certificate holder, including freedom from present responsibility for 
work should the occasion arise.
    Scheduled means times assigned by a certificate holder when a 
crewmember is required to report for duty.
    Schedule reliability means the accuracy of the length of a 
scheduled flight duty period as compared to the actual flight duty 
period.
    Short-call reserve means a period of time in which a crewmember 
does not receive a required rest period following notification by the 
certificate holder to report for a flight duty period.
    Split duty means a flight duty period that has a scheduled break in 
duty that is less than a required rest period.
    Suitable accommodation means a temperature-controlled facility with 
sound mitigation that provides a crewmember with the ability to sleep 
in a bed and to control light.
    Theater means a geographical area where local time at the 
crewmember's flight duty period departure point and arrival point 
differ by no more than 4 hours.
    Unforeseen operational circumstance means an unplanned event beyond 
the control of a certificate holder of insufficient duration to allow 
for adjustments to schedules, including unforecast weather, equipment 
malfunction, or air traffic delay.
    Window of circadian low means a period of maximum sleepiness that 
occurs between 0200 and 0559 during a physiological night.


Sec.  117.5  Fitness for duty.

    (a) Each flightcrew member must report for any flight duty period 
rested and prepared to perform his or her assigned duties.
    (b) No certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may 
accept assignment to a flight duty period if the flightcrew member has 
reported for a flight duty period too fatigued to safely perform his or 
her assigned duties or if the certificate holder believes that the 
flightcrew member is too fatigued to safely perform his or her assigned 
duties.
    (c) No certificate holder may permit a flightcrew member to 
continue a flight duty period if the flightcrew member has reported 
himself too fatigued to continue the assigned flight duty period.
    (d) Any person who suspects a flightcrew member of being too 
fatigued to perform his or her duties during flight must immediately 
report that information to the certificate holder.
    (e) Once notified of possible flightcrew member fatigue, the

[[Page 55886]]

certificate holder must evaluate the flightcrew member for fitness for 
duty. The evaluation must be conducted by a person trained in 
accordance with Sec.  117.11 and must be completed before the 
flightcrew member begins or continues an FDP.
    (f) As part of the dispatch or flight release, as applicable, each 
flightcrew member must affirmatively state he or she is fit for duty 
prior to commencing flight.
    (g) Each certificate holder must develop and implement an internal 
evaluation and audit program approved by the Administrator that will 
monitor whether flightcrew members are reporting for FDPs fit for duty 
and correct any deficiencies.


Sec.  117.7  Fatigue risk management system.

    (a) No certificate holder may exceed any provision of this part 
unless approved by the FAA under a Fatigue Risk Management System that 
provides at least an equivalent level of protection against fatigue-
related accidents or incidents as the other provisions of this part.
    (b) The Fatigue Risk Management System must include:
    (1) A fatigue risk management policy.
    (2) An education and awareness training program.
    (3) A fatigue reporting system.
    (4) A system for monitoring flightcrew fatigue.
    (5) An incident reporting process.
    (6) A performance evaluation.
    (c) Whenever the Administrator finds that revisions are necessary 
for the continued adequacy of an FRMS that has been granted final 
approval, the certificate holder must, after notification, make any 
changes in the program deemed necessary by the Administrator.


Sec.  117.9  Schedule reliability.

    (a) Each certificate holder must adjust within 60 days --
    (1) Its system-wide flight duty periods if the total actual flight 
duty periods exceed the scheduled flight duty periods more than 5 
percent of the time, and
    (2) Any scheduled flight duty period that is shown to actually 
exceed the schedule 20 percent of the time.
    (b) Each certificate holder must submit a report detailing the 
scheduling reliability adjustments required in paragraph (a) of this 
section to the FAA every two months detailing both overall schedule 
reliability and pairing-specific reliability. Submissions must consist 
of:
    (1) The carrier's entire crew pairing schedule for the previous 2-
month period, including the total anticipated length of each set of 
crew pairings and the regulatory limit on such pairings;
    (2) The actual length of each set of crew pairings, and
    (3) The percentage of discrepancy between the two data sets on both 
a cumulative, and a pairing-specific basis.


Sec.  117.11  Fatigue education and training program.

    (a) Each certificate holder must develop and implement an education 
and training program, approved by the Administrator, applicable to all 
employees of the certificate holder responsible for administering the 
provisions of this rule including flightcrew members, dispatchers, 
individuals involved in the scheduling of flightcrew members, 
individuals involved in operational control, and any employee providing 
management oversight of those areas.
    (b)(1) Initial training for all individuals listed in paragraph (a) 
of this section must consist of at least 5 programmed hours of 
instruction in the subjects listed in paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
    (2) Recurrent training for all individuals listed in paragraph (a) 
of this section must be given on an annual basis and must consist of 2 
programmed hours of instruction in the subjects listed in paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section.
    (3) The fatigue education and training program must include 
information on--
    (i) FAA regulatory requirements for flight, duty and rest and NTSB 
recommendations on fatigue management.
    (ii) Basics of fatigue, including sleep fundamentals and circadian 
rhythms.
    (iii) Causes of fatigue, including possible medical conditions.
    (iv) Effect of fatigue on performance.
    (v) Fatigue countermeasures.
    (vi) Fatigue prevention and mitigation.
    (vii) Influence of lifestyle, including nutrition, exercise, and 
family life, on fatigue.
    (viii) Familiarity with sleep disorders and their possible 
treatments.
    (ix) Responsible commuting.
    (x) Flightcrew member responsibility for ensuring adequate rest and 
fitness for duty.
    (xi) Operating through and within multiple time zones.
    (c) Whenever the Administrator finds that revisions are necessary 
for the continued adequacy of a fatigue education and training program 
that has been granted final approval, the certificate holder must, 
after notification, make any changes in the program that are deemed 
necessary by the Administrator.


Sec.  117.13  Flight time limitation.

    No certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may 
accept an assignment or continue an assigned flight duty period if the 
total flight time:
    (a) Will exceed the limits specified in Table A of this part if the 
operation is conducted with the minimum required flightcrew.
    (b) Will exceed 16 hours if the operation is conducted with an 
augmented flightcrew.


Sec.  117.15  Flight duty period: Un-augmented operations.

    (a) Except as provided for in Sec.  117.17, no certificate holder 
may assign and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment for an 
unaugmented flight operation if the scheduled flight duty period will 
exceed the limits in Table B of this part.
    (b) If the flightcrew member is not acclimated:
    (1) The maximum flight duty period in Table B of this part is 
reduced by 30 minutes.
    (2) The applicable flight duty period is based on the local time at 
the flightcrew member's home base.
    (c) In the event unforeseen circumstances arise:
    (1) The pilot in command and certificate holder may extend a flight 
duty period up to 2 hours.
    (2) An extension in the flight duty period exceeding 30 minutes may 
occur only once in any 168 consecutive hour period, and never on 
consecutive days.


Sec.  117.17  Flight duty period: Split duty.

    For a split duty period, a certificate holder may extend and a 
flightcrew member may accept a flight duty period up to 50 percent of 
time that the flightcrew member spent in a suitable accommodation up to 
a maximum flight duty period of 12 hours provided the flightcrew member 
is given a minimum opportunity to rest in a suitable accommodation of 4 
hours, measured from the time the flightcrew member reaches the rest 
facility.


Sec.  117.19  Flight duty period: Augmented flightcrew.

    The flight duty period limits in Sec.  117.15 may be extended by 
augmenting the flightcrew.
    (a) For flight operations conducted with an acclimated augmented 
flightcrew, no certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member 
may accept an assignment if the scheduled flight duty period will 
exceed the limits specified in Table C of this part.
    (b) If the flightcrew member is not acclimated:

[[Page 55887]]

    (1) The maximum flight duty period in Table C of this part is 
reduced by 30 minutes.
    (2) The applicable flight duty period is based on the local time at 
the flightcrew member's home base.
    (c) No certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may 
accept an assignment under this section unless during the flight duty 
period:
    (1) Two consecutive hours are available for in-flight rest for the 
flightcrew member manipulating the controls during landing;
    (2) A ninety minute consecutive period is available for in-flight 
rest for each flightcrew member; and
    (3) The last flight segment provides an opportunity for in-flight 
rest in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
    (d) No certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may 
accept an assignment involving more than three flight segments under 
this section unless the certificate holder has an approved fatigue risk 
management system under Sec.  117.7.
    (e) At all times during flight, at least one flightcrew member with 
a PIC type-rating must be alert and on the flight deck.
    (f) In the event unforeseen circumstances arise:
    (1) The pilot in command and certificate holder may extend a flight 
duty period up to 3 hours.
    (2) An extension in the flight duty period exceeding 30 minutes may 
occur only once in any 168 consecutive hour period.


Sec.  117.21  Reserve status.

    (a) Unless specifically designated otherwise by the certificate 
holder, all reserve is considered long-call reserve.
    (b) For airport/standby reserve, all time spent in a reserve status 
is part of the flightcrew member's flight duty period.
    (c) For short call reserve,
    (1) All time within the reserve availability period is duty.
    (2) The reserve availability period may not exceed 14 hours.
    (3) No certificate holder may schedule and no reserve flightcrew 
member on short call reserve may accept an assignment of a flight duty 
period that begins before the flightcrew member's next reserve 
availability period unless the flightcrew member is given at least 14 
hours rest.
    (4) The maximum reserve duty period for un-augmented operations is 
the lesser of--
    (i) 16 hours, as measured from the beginning of the reserve 
availability period;
    (ii) The assigned flight duty period, as measured from the start of 
the flight duty period; or
    (iii) The flight duty period in Table B of this part plus 4 hours, 
as measured from the beginning of the reserve availability period.
    (iv) If all or a portion of a reserve flightcrew member's reserve 
availability period falls between 0000 and 0600, the certificate holder 
may increase the maximum reserve duty period in paragraph (c)(4)(iii) 
of this section by one-half of the length of the time during the 
reserve availability period in which the certificate holder did not 
contact the flightcrew member, not to exceed 3 hours.
    (5) The maximum reserve duty period for augmented operations is the 
lesser of--
    (i) The assigned flight duty period, as measured from the start of 
the flight duty period; or
    (ii) The flight duty period in Table C of this part plus 4 hours, 
as measured from the beginning of the reserve availability period.
    (iii) If all or a portion of a reserve flightcrew member's reserve 
availability period falls between 0000 and 0600, the certificate holder 
may increase the maximum reserve duty period in paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of 
this section by one-half of the length of the time during the reserve 
availability period in which the certificate holder did not contact the 
flightcrew member, not to exceed 3 hours.
    (d) For long call reserve,
    (1) The period of time that the flightcrew member is in a reserve 
status does not count as duty.
    (2) If a certificate holder contacts a flightcrew member to assign 
him or her to a flight duty period or a short call reserve, the 
flightcrew member must receive the required rest period specified in 
Sec.  117.25 prior to reporting for the flight duty period or 
commencing the short call reserve duty.
    (3) If a certificate holder contacts a flightcrew member to assign 
him or her to a flight duty period that will begin before and operate 
into the flightcrew member's window of circadian low, the flightcrew 
member must receive a 12 hour notice of report time from the air 
carrier.
    (e) An air carrier may shift a reserve flightcrew member's reserve 
availability period under the following conditions:
    (1) A shift to a later reserve availability period may not exceed 
12 hours.
    (2) A shift to an earlier reserve availability period may not 
exceed 5 hours, unless the shift is into the flightcrew member's window 
of circadian low, in which case the shift may not exceed 3 hours.
    (3) A shift to an earlier reserve period may not occur on any 
consecutive calendar days.
    (4) The total shifts in a reserve availability period in paragraphs 
(e)(1) through (e)(3) of this section may not exceed a total of 12 
hours in any 168 consecutive hours.


Sec.  117.23  Cumulative duty limitations.

    (a) The limitations of this section on flightcrew members apply to 
all commercial flying by the flightcrew member during the applicable 
periods.
    (b) No certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may 
accept an assignment if the flightcrew member's total flight time will 
exceed the following:
    (1) 100 hours in any 28 consecutive calendar day period and
    (2) 1,000 hours in any 365 consecutive calendar day period.
    (c) No certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may 
accept an assignment if the flightcrew member's total Flight Duty 
Period will exceed:
    (1) 60 flight duty period hours in any 168 consecutive hours and
    (2) 190 flight duty period hours in any 672 consecutive hours.
    (d) Except as provided for in paragraph (d)(3) of this section, no 
certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may accept an 
assignment if the flightcrew member's total duty period will exceed:
    (1) 65 duty hours in any 168 consecutive hours and
    (2) 200 duty hours in any 672 consecutive hours.
    (3) If a flightcrew member is assigned to short-call reserve or a 
certificate holder transports a flightcrew member in deadhead 
transportation in, at a minimum, a seat in aircraft cabin that allows 
for a flat or near flat sleeping position, the total duty period may 
not exceed:
    (i) 75 duty hours in any 168 consecutive hours and
    (ii) 215 duty hours in any 672 consecutive hours.
    (4) Extension of the duty period under paragraph (d)(3) of this 
section is limited to the amount of time spent on short-call reserve or 
in deadhead transportation.


Sec.  117.25  Rest period.

    (a) No certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may 
accept assignment to any reserve or duty with the certificate holder 
during any required rest period.
    (b) Before beginning any reserve or flight duty period, a 
flightcrew member

[[Page 55888]]

must be given at least 30 consecutive hours free from all duty in any 
168 consecutive hour period, except that:
    (1) If a flightcrew member crosses more than four time zones during 
a series of flight duty periods that exceed 168 consecutive hours, the 
flightcrew member must be given a minimum of three physiological nights 
rest upon return to home base.
    (2) A flightcrew member operating in a new theater must receive 36 
hours of consecutive rest in any 168 consecutive hour period.
    (c) No certificate holder may reduce a rest period more than once 
in any 168 consecutive hour period.
    (d) No certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may 
accept an assignment for reserve or a flight duty period unless the 
flightcrew member is given a rest period of at least 9 consecutive 
hours before beginning the reserve or flight duty period measured from 
the time the flightcrew member reaches the hotel or other suitable 
accommodation.
    (e) In the event of unforeseen circumstances, the pilot in command 
and certificate holder may reduce the 9 consecutive hour rest period in 
paragraph (d) of this section to 8 consecutive hours.


Sec.  117.27  Consecutive nighttime operations.

    No certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may 
accept more than three consecutive nighttime flight duty periods unless 
the certificate holder provides an opportunity to rest during the 
flight duty period in accordance with Sec.  117.17.


Sec.  117.29  Deadhead transportation.

    (a) All time spent in deadhead transportation is considered part of 
a duty period.
    (b) Time spent in deadhead transportation is considered part of a 
flight duty period if it occurs before a flight segment without an 
intervening required rest period.
    (c) Time spent entirely in deadhead transportation during a duty 
period may not exceed the flight duty period in Table B of this part 
for the applicable time of start plus 2 hours unless the flightcrew 
member is given a rest period equal to the length of the deadhead 
transportation but not less than the required rest in Sec.  117.25 upon 
completion of such transportation.


Sec.  117.31  Operations into unsafe areas.

    (a) This section applies to operations that cannot otherwise be 
conducted under this part because of unique circumstances that could 
prevent flightcrew members from being relieved by another crew or 
safely provided with the rest required under Sec.  117.25 at the end of 
the applicable flight duty period.
    (b) A certificate holder may exceed the maximum applicable flight 
duty periods to the extent necessary to allow the flightcrew to fly to 
a destination where they can safely be relieved from duty by another 
flightcrew or can receive the requisite amount of rest prior to 
commencing their next flight duty period.
    (c) The flightcrew shall be given a rest period immediately after 
reaching the destination described in paragraph (b) of this section 
equal to the length of the actual flight duty period or 24 hours, 
whichever is less.
    (d) No extension of the cumulative fatigue limitations in Sec.  
117.3 is permitted.
    (e) If the operation was conducted under contract with an agency or 
department of the United States Government, each affected air carrier 
must submit a report every 60 days detailing the--
    (1) Number of times in the reporting period it relied on this 
section to conduct its operations.
    (2) For each occurrence,
    (i) The reasons for exceeding the applicable flight duty period;
    (ii) The extent to which the applicable flight duty period was 
exceeded; and
    (iii) The reason the operation could not be completed consistent 
with the requirements of this part.
    (f) If the operation was not conducted under contract with an 
agency or Department of the United States Government, each affected air 
carrier must submit a report within 14 days of each occurrence 
detailing--
    (1) The reasons for exceeding the applicable flight duty period;
    (2) The extent to which the applicable flight duty period was 
exceeded; and
    (3) The reason the operation could not be completed consistent with 
the requirements of this part.
    (g) Should the Administrator determine that a certificate holder is 
relying on the provisions on this section, the Administrator may 
require the certificate holder to develop and implement a fatigue risk 
management system.

     Table A to Part 117--Maximum Flight Time Limits for Unaugmented
                               Operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Maximum flight time
           Time of start (Home base)                     (hours)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0459.....................................                        8
0500-0659.....................................                        9
0700-1259.....................................                       10
1300-1959.....................................                        9
2000-2359.....................................                        8
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                         Table B to Part 117--Flight Duty Period: Unaugmented Operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Maximum flight duty period (hours)  for lineholders based on number of flight
Time of start  (Home base or                                       segments
         acclimated)         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   1           2           3           4           5           6          7+
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0359...................          9           9           9          9.           9           9           9
0400-0459...................         10          10           9           9           9           9           9
0500-0559...................         11          11          11          11          10         9.5           9
0600-0659...................         12          12          12          12        11.5          11        10.5
0700-1259...................         13          13          13          13        12.5          12          11
1300-1659...................         12          12          12          12        11.5          11        10.5
1700-2159...................         11          11          10          10         9.5           9           9
2200-2259...................       10.5        10.5         9.5         9.5           9           9           9

[[Page 55889]]

 
2300-2359...................        9.5         9.5           9           9           9           9           9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                          Table C to Part 117--Flight Duty Period: Augmented Operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Maximum flight duty period (hours) based on  rest facility and number of pilots
                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Time of start  (local time)     Class 1 rest facility       Class 2 rest facility       Class 3 rest facility
                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                3 Pilots      4 Pilots      3 Pilots      4 Pilots      3 Pilots      4 Pilots
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0559...................           14            16            13          14.5            12          12.5
0600-0659...................           15          17.5            14          15.5            13          13.5
0700-1259...................           16            18          15.5            17            14          14.5
1300-1659...................           15          17.5            14          15.5            13          13.5
1700-2359...................           14            16            13          14.5            12          12.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

    2. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 46901, 44903-44904, 
44912, 46105.

Subpart Q [Removed and Reserved]

    3. Remove and reserve subpart Q, consisting of Sec. Sec.  121.470 
and 121.471.

Subpart R [Removed and Reserved]

    4. Remove and reserve subpart R, consisting of Sec. Sec.  121.480 
through 121.493.

Subpart S [Removed and Reserved]

    5. Remove and reserve subpart S, consisting of Sec. Sec.  121.500 
through 121.525.

    Issued in Washington, DC on September 3, 2010.
Raymond Towles,
Acting Director, Flight Standards Service, Aviation Safety.
[FR Doc. 2010-22626 Filed 9-10-10; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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