An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-437

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 2 December 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Rutherford County

Nos. 12 CRS 52994 & 13 CRS 927

WILLIAM TODD SCRUGGS

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 9 October 2013 by 

Judge J. Thomas Davis in Rutherford County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 September 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 

Teresa M. Postell, for the State.

Anne Bleyman, for defendant-appellant.

STEELMAN, Judge.

The trial court properly charged the jury on the statutory 

requirement that defendant’s violation of a domestic violence 

protective order must be knowing. Defendant was not entitled to 

the requested jury instruction on intent. Where defendant has 

no right to appeal issues regarding his guilty plea, those 

arguments are dismissed.
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I. Factual & Procedural History

William Todd Scruggs (“defendant”) and Sandra Scruggs 

Mulray (“Sandra”) were married, but separated on 16 June 2010. 

On the day before the separation, 15 June 2010, defendant 

assaulted Sandra and threatened to kill her. Following this 

incident, defendant moved out of their marital residence and

Sandra obtained a one-year domestic violence protective order

against defendant, which was valid from 28 June 2010 until 28 

June 2011. The domestic violence protective order required that 

defendant “not assault, threaten, abuse, follow, harass (by 

telephone, visiting the home or workplace or other means), or 

interfere with [Sandra]” and that defendant “stay away” from 

Sandra’s residence.

On 18 August 2010, defendant was convicted of three 

separate counts of violating the domestic violence protective 

order. The protective order was later renewed for another two 

years, making the expiration date 28 June 2013.

On 14 September 2012, at approximately 8:40 p.m., Sandra 

and Tracer Malray (“Tracer”), Sandra’s then boyfriend, arrived 

at Sandra’s residence. As Sandra and Tracer walked to the front 

door of the residence, they observed a truck suddenly turn its 

headlights off and come to a stop on the road in front of the 
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residence. Sandra recognized the truck as belonging to 

defendant. A male voice from the truck started shouting 

obscenities at Sandra including: “[y]ou effed up. I am going to 

kick your ass”; “[y]ou F-ing whore”; and “[t]his ain’t over, 

Sandra.” Sandra identified the voice as being that of

defendant. The truck remained stopped on the road for two or 

three minutes, revving its engine and spinning its tires before 

it drove away.

After the truck left, Sandra called 911 and spoke with 

Deputy Thomas Keever of the Rutherford County Sheriff’s 

Department. Several days later, Deputy Keever spoke with 

defendant over the telephone. Defendant told Deputy Keever that 

he had been drinking on the night in question when “he saw the 

mother fucker standing out in the yard” and then proceeded to 

ask “where was his bitch, slut, whore was at.”

On 22 April 2013, defendant was indicted by the Rutherford 

County grand jury for feloniously violating a domestic violence 

protective order,

1 and for attaining the status of an habitual 

felon. On 7 October 2013, defendant’s case was tried before 

Judge Davis and a jury. Defendant stipulated to the three prior 

 

1 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1(f) provides that a knowing violation 

of a valid protective order becomes a felony when the defendant 

has previously been convicted of two offenses under chapter 50B.
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violations of the domestic violence protective order.2 Defendant 

also pled guilty to attaining the status of an habitual felon. 

On 9 October 2013, defendant was found guilty of violating a 

domestic violence protective order. Defendant was sentenced as 

an habitual felon to an active prison term of 84 to 113 months.

Defendant appeals.

II. Jury Instructions

In his first argument, defendant argues the trial court 

should have instructed the jury in accordance with defendant’s

requested instruction on intent because intent is a substantive 

or material feature of the crime of violating a domestic 

violence protective order. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

“Assignments of error challenging the trial court’s 

decisions regarding jury instructions are reviewed de novo[.]” 

State v. Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 458, 466, 675 S.E.2d 144, 149 

(2009).

This Court reviews jury instructions contextually and 

in its entirety. The charge will be held to be 

sufficient if it presents the law of the case in such 

manner as to leave no reasonable cause to believe the 

jury was misled or misinformed. The party asserting 

 

2 By admitting the prior violations of the domestic violence 

protective order, defendant avoided having the State introduce 

evidence of the prior offenses before the jury. See N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 15A-928.
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error bears the burden of showing that the jury was 

misled or that the verdict was affected by the 

instruction. Under such a standard of review, it is 

not enough for the appealing party to show that error 

occurred in the jury instructions; rather, it must be 

demonstrated that such error was likely, in light of 

the entire charge, to mislead the jury.

State v. Blizzard, 169 N.C. App. 285, 296–97, 610 S.E.2d 245, 

253 (2005) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses 

omitted) (quoting Bass v. Johnson, 149 N.C. App. 152, 160, 560 

S.E.2d 841, 847 (2002)).

B. Analysis

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1 provides that it is a criminal 

offense for a person to “knowingly violate[] a valid protective 

order” entered pursuant to chapter 50B. With respect to this 

offense, the trial court instructed the jury:

For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, 

the State must prove three things beyond a reasonable 

doubt: First, that a valid domestic violence 

protective order had been issued pursuant to North 

Carolina law; second, that the defendant violated the 

valid domestic violence protective domestic order by 

stopping in front of the residence of Sandra Lynn 

Scruggs and yelling at her; [and] third, that the

defendant did so knowingly.

The instruction given by the trial court substantively and 

accurately conveyed to the jury what constitutes the offense of 

violating a valid protective order under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B4.1. Defendant argues that intent is a substantive or material 
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feature of violating a protective order, and contends that the 

trial court should have given the instruction on intent 

requested by defendant. However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1 only 

requires that a defendant must have knowingly violated a valid 

protective order. The trial court correctly charged the jury 

that they must find that defendant knowingly violated the 

domestic violence protective order.

Further, even if the trial court had given the requested 

instruction on intent, it would not have changed the outcome of 

the trial. Defendant’s requested instruction would have 

informed the jury that intent “must ordinarily be proved by 

circumstances from which it may be inferred.” N.C.P.I. Crim. 

120.10. The circumstances present in this case show that

defendant parked his truck on the road in front of Sandra’s 

residence while shouting obscenities at her. It strains 

credibility that a jury could examine defendant’s actions and 

conclude that defendant did not have the intent to violate the

terms of the valid protective order. Defendant did not simply 

drive by Sandra’s residence. Instead, he parked his car on the 

road in front of Sandra’s residence, and repeatedly yelled

threats and obscenities at her. Given defendant’s conduct and 

the clear provisions of the protective order, there is no 
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reasonable likelihood that a jury would have found that the 

State failed to prove an intent to violate the order. Defendant 

cannot demonstrate that the jury’s verdict was affected by the 

trial court’s refusal to give defendant’s requested instruction 

on intent. 

Defendant’s argument is without merit.

III. Habitual Felon Guilty Plea

In his second, third, and fourth arguments, defendant 

contends that the trial court erred in accepting his plea of 

guilty to habitual felon status; and sentencing him as an

habitual felon because: (1) there was not a sufficient factual 

basis for the plea; (2) the trial court failed to inform

defendant of the maximum possible or the mandatory minimum 

sentence that he could receive, and therefore the plea was not 

an informed choice; and (3) that the status of habitual felon

violates defendant’s constitutional right to be free from cruel 

and unusual punishment. We disagree.

“[U]nder N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(e), a defendant who has 

entered a plea of guilty is not entitled to appellate review as 

a matter of right, unless the defendant is appealing sentencing 

issues or the denial of a motion to suppress, or the defendant 

has made an unsuccessful motion to withdraw the guilty plea.” 
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State v. Pimental, 153 N.C. App. 69, 73, 568 S.E.2d 867, 870

(2002). None of defendant’s claims regarding his guilty plea 

involve an issue that is entitled to appellate review and all of 

defendant’s arguments regarding his guilty plea are dismissed.

Defendant has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. In our 

discretion we deny defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari.

Even assuming arguendo that these issues were properly 

before this court, defendant’s arguments are without merit. 

Defendant asserts that there was not a sufficient factual basis 

for his guilty plea. This assertion is based solely upon the 

argument that the allegations contained in the indictment were

the sole factual basis for the plea. However, this claim is 

belied by the record. At the close of the State’s evidence, 

defendant elected to admit his prior convictions of violating a 

domestic violence protective order. At this time, defendant 

also pled guilty to having obtained the status of an habitual 

felon. The trial court went over the three prior felonies that 

were the basis for the habitual felon charge as follows:

THE COURT: At this time, too, I need to know whether 

your client is going to admit, deny, or remain silent 

as to the habitual felon status and admit the guilt as 

to that status set out in that indictment . . .

consisting of a conviction on March 20, 1991 for 

felony to sell marijuana, and file No. 91 CRS 1017, 

and the date of that occurrence of that offense was 

November 6 of 1990. 
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The second felony that is alleged in the indictment 

was a felony attempted possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon. It’s in file No. 10 CRS 52176, 

conviction date of that was August 18, 2010, and the 

occurrence date of that offense was June 15 of 2010. 

The third felony conviction that is alleged in the 

indictment, it is a felony offense of domestic 

violence protective order violation. The file No. 11 

CRS 52549, conviction date of September 29, 2011, the 

occurrence date of July 31, 2011.

Is your client going to admit the guilt as to those 

matters, also?

([Defendant’s counsel] nods head up and down.)

THE COURT: We will need a separate transcript for 

those, also, that needs to be prepared. I will go 

over the transcript with him in that regard.

A plea transcript was subsequently prepared, and defendant 

pled guilty before the trial court. The only elements of the 

offense of habitual felon status were the three prior felony 

convictions. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1 (2013). Since the 

trial court had just gone over the three prior felonies with 

defendant, the trial court stopped the prosecutor from 

enumerating the three prior felonies as a factual basis for the 

plea, and referred to the three felonies set forth in the 

indictment. We hold that the State presented a sufficient 

factual basis for defendant’s plea to being an habitual felon.

Defendant’s assertion that his plea was not valid because 
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he was not informed of the sentence he was facing is undermined

by the prior decisions of this Court. “When reviewing the 

validity of a defendant’s plea, our courts have declined to 

adopt a technical, ritualistic approach to determining whether 

or not the plea was voluntary and intelligent. Instead, we 

review the totality of the circumstances and determine whether 

non-compliance with the statute either affected defendant’s 

decision to plead or undermined the plea’s validity.” State v. 

Szucs, 207 N.C. App. 694, 701-702, 701 S.E.2d 362, 367-368 

(2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also

State v. Williams, 133 N.C. App. 326, 515 S.E.2d 80 (1999). 

While discussing the State’s pre-trial plea offer with 

defendant, the trial court informed defendant that “[i]f you are 

found guilty you could have to – assuming a Class D felony, 

assuming a level 4 – you could have to serve as much as a 97 

month minimum, 129 month maximum term”, which defendant stated 

he understood. When defendant later decided to plead guilty to 

having obtained an habitual felon status, the trial court asked 

defendant if he understood that an habitual felon status would 

increase his potential punishment for feloniously violating a 

protective order from a Class H to a Class D felony. Defendant 

stated he understood the consequences of his plea. Although
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defendant’s plea transcript form is blank where the maximum and 

minimum sentences should be set forth, this does not invalidate 

his plea. Under the totality of the circumstances, we hold that 

defendant was aware of the direct consequences of his guilty 

plea and he entered into the plea voluntarily and 

understandingly.

3

Finally, defendant asserts that habitual felon status

violates his constitutional rights to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment. However, this assertion contradicts wellestablished precedent. Defendant acknowledges that our Supreme 

Court has repeatedly rejected arguments contesting the 

constitutionality of habitual felon status. See e.g., State v. 

Todd, 313 N.C. 110, 326 S.E.2d 249 (1985). This Court does not 

have the authority to overrule decisions of our Supreme Court of 

North Carolina.

Defendant’s arguments are without merit.

NO ERROR.

Judges CALABRIA and McCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

 

3 In the written transcript of defendant’s plea, he swore under 

oath that he was aware of the maximum punishment, that his 

lawyer had explained the charges to him, that the plea was

freely and voluntarily entered, and that he acknowledged that 

the recited terms of his plea arrangement were correct.