United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-30253

____________

Jason E. Walls, individually and on behalf of his deceased father, 

William E. Walls; William Walls, individually and on behalf of 

his deceased father, William E. Walls, 

Plaintiffs—Appellees, 

versus

Sheriff’s Office of Caddo Parish; Ryan Chapman; 

Stephen W. Prator, 

Defendants—Appellants. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:22-CV-579

______________________________

Before Jolly, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam*: 

William E. Walls died of a heart attack he suffered while detained in 

the back of a Caddo Parish, Louisiana, patrol car. His survivors filed a civil 

rights lawsuit against a Caddo Parish deputy, the Caddo Parish sheriff, and 

the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office. The defendants removed the lawsuit to 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 6, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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federal court and moved to dismiss several of the plaintiffs’ claims. As 

relevant to this appeal, the deputy invoked qualified immunity to dismiss the 

plaintiffs’ excessive force claim against him. The district court denied

qualified immunity. The deputy appealed. We AFFIRM.

I.

A.

On appeal from a denial of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss 

stage, “[w]e must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, draw all inferences in 

favor of the nonmoving party, and view all facts and inferences in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 

F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1) (federal 

pleading rules apply to actions removed from state court). Here, the petition 

alleges the following facts.

On March 9, 2021, Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office Deputy Ryan 

Chapman and other deputies attempted to execute an arrest warrant for Chad 

Deloach. The deputies believed that Deloach was living on William E. 

Walls’s Keithville property. When the deputies arrived at the property, 

Walls told them he did not know Deloach’s location and cooperated with 

their investigation. Walls invited the deputies into his home so they could 

search for Deloach. Walls also offered to call his son, who lived in a separate 

trailer on his property, and ask him where Deloach was. Deputy Chapman 

rejected Walls’s offer, cursed at him, threatened him, and ordered him back 

inside his home. Walls obeyed but revoked consent for the deputies to reenter his home. 

Upon returning inside his home, Walls observed the deputies

searching the exterior of anotherresidence on his property. As Walls watched 

the deputies through the windows of his home, he held his phone. Chapman 

saw Walls with his phone and thought that he was videotaping the deputies. 

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In response, Chapman forced his way into Walls’s home. Chapman 

“forcefully grabbed” Walls, ROA.16, threw him against his kitchen counter, 

ROA.19, handcuffed him, ROA.16, “aggressively and violently” pulled him 

from his home, ROA.19, “slammed” him against the hood of the patrol car, 

ROA.19, and “forced” him into the back of the car. ROA.19.

After a short period of time detained in the patrol car, Walls (a senior 

citizen) suffered a heart attack and stopped breathing. The deputies pulled 

him from the patrol car and administered CPR. Walls died at the scene. 

B.

Walls’s two surviving sons (hereinafter “plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit in 

Louisiana state court against Chapman, Caddo Parish Sheriff Stephen Prator, 

and the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office. They asserted claims pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law. The plaintiffs asked for money 

damages and costs.

The defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court and moved to 

dismiss several of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). As relevant to this appeal, 

Chapman invoked qualified immunity as a defense to the § 1983 excessive 

force claim. The district court denied Chapman’s qualified immunity

defense, and Chapman timely appealed. Our review is de novo. See Club Retro, 

L.L.C., 568 F.3d at 194. 

II.

Plaintiffs seek money damages from a law enforcement officer. To 

win, they must overcome qualified immunity. That means they must show

(1) that Chapman violated Walls’s constitutional rights and (2) that the right 

at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. See 

Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

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Deputy Chapman challenges only the second requirement—clearly 

established law. So that is all we address.

Qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those 

who knowingly violate the law.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 

63 (2018) (quotation omitted). It “shields officers from civil liability so long 

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” City 

of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).

“[T]o show a violation of clearly established law, [the plaintiff] must identify 

a case that put [the officer] on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.”

Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021) (per curiam).

Courts must be careful “not to define clearly established law at too 

high a level of generality.” City of Tahlequah, 595 U.S. at 12 (quotation 

omitted). “[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment 

context . . . .” Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 6 (quotation omitted). In particular, 

“excessive force is an area of the law in which the result depends very much 

on the facts of each case, and thus police officers are entitled to qualified 

immunity unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at 

issue.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam) (citation 

and quotation omitted).

The Supreme Court has never said that circuit precedent is sufficient 

to put officers on notice of their constitutional obligations. See Wesby, 583 

U.S. at 66 n.8 (“We have not yet decided what precedents—other than our 

own—qualify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.”); 

see also Boyd v. McNamara, 74 F.4th 662, 672 (5th Cir. 2023) (Oldham, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). But our court has repeatedly said 

that circuit precedent can clearly establish the law. See, e.g., Boyd, 74 F.4th at 

670–71 (majority op.). 

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Assuming our precedent can clearly establish the law, two of our cases 

are relevant here. See Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2008); Deville v. 

Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009). In Bush, we denied qualified 

immunity where the officer slammed a compliant arrestee’s face into the 

window of a nearby car, injuring her jaw and teeth. See 513 F.3d at 500–02. 

And in Deville, we denied qualified immunity where the officer pulled over a 

woman for speeding, ordered her out of the car, and then (when she did not 

comply) broke the vehicle’s window, pulled the woman out, and caused her 

multiple injuries (including “contusions to both wrists, neuropathy of her 

hands, right shoulder strain, left shoulder bruising (with hand prints), and 

multiple cuts caused by broken glass”). See 567 F.3d at 167–69.

Under Bush and Deville, the district court did not err. On the wellpleaded facts of this case, Walls was not suspected of any crime, posed no 

immediate threat to the safety of the deputies or others, and made no attempt 

to actively resist arrest or evade arrest by flight. Chapman violently seized 

Walls only because Chapman mistakenly thought Walls was videotaping the 

officers. There was no evidence that Chapman’s actions were compelled by 

necessity and exigency. Walls was injured in the arrest and then died. 

Assuming the truth of the facts as pleaded, Chapman violated clearly 

established law. 

AFFIRMED.

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