S6554 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD— SENATE May 11, 1995 

like to request unanimous consent to 

hold a hearing on the reorganization of 

the Veterans Health Administration, 

and the requirement of 38 U.S.C. 510(b) 

for the Department of Veterans Affairs 

to provide 90 days’ notice to the Congress before an administrative reorganization may take effect. The hearing 

will be held on May 11, 1995, at 10 a.m., 

in room 418 of the Russell Senate Office 

Building. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask 

unanimous consent that the Special 

Committee on Aging be authorized to 

meet during the session of the Senate 

on Thursday, May 11, at 9:30 a.m. to 

hold a hearing on the topic of longterm care financing. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISABILITY POLICY

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask 

unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Disability Policy of the 

Committee on Labor and Human Resources be authorized to meet for a 

hearing on the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, during the session of the Senate on Thursday, May 

11, 1995, at 10 a.m. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask 

unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized 

to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, May 11, 1995, at 2:30 

p.m. to hold a hearing on Immigration 

and Naturalization Service oversight. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask 

unanimous consent that the International Operations Subcommittee of 

the Committee on Foreign Relations be 

authorized to meet during the session 

of the Senate on Thursday, May 11, 

1995, at 3 p.m. to hear testimony on the 

reorganization and revitalization of 

America’s foreign affairs institutions. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH

ASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask 

unanimous consent that the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet 

during the session of the Senate on 

Thursday, May 11, 1995, at 10 a.m. to 

hear testimony on U.S. assistance programs in the Middle East. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask 

unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Readiness of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet at 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, 

May 11, 1995, in open session, to receive 

testimony on Environmental, Military 

Construction and BRAC Programs in 

review of S. 727, the National Defense 

Authorization Act for 1996. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SUPERFUND, WASTE

CONTROL, AND RISK ASSESSMENT

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask 

unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Superfund, Waste Control, and Risk Assessment be granted 

permission to conduct an oversight 

hearing Thursday, May 11, at 1:30 p.m., 

regarding the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY, 

AND GOVERNMENT

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask 

unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, 

and Government Information for the 

Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the 

Senate on Thursday, May 11, 1995, at 

9:30 a.m. to hold a hearing on mayhem 

manuals and the internet. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

f 

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS 

TRIBUTE TO LEE TODD 

∑ Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I 

rise today to recognize the career of 

Mr. Lee Todd, who is working hard to 

make Lexington, KY, a major stop on 

the information highway. Lee is president and CEO of DataBeam, one of the 

State’s few high-technology companies. 

Lee grew up in Earlington, KY, where 

at age 14 he became the best pool 

shooter in town. Lee credits his early 

years in the western Kentucky town 

with helping make him who he is 

today. In a recent article in Blugrass 

magazine, Lee says ‘‘I think every kid 

needs something to feel good about, to 

develop self esteem. For some kids it 

was athletics. For me, it was pool.’’

After graduating from high school, 

Lee attended Murray State University, 

but after 2 years he transferred to the 

University of Kentucky. After receiving his diploma, Lee moved to Boston 

and attended M.I.T., where he earned 

his M.S. and Ph.D in electrical engineering. It was also in Boston that he 

met his wife, Patsy. 

The Todds returned home to the 

Bluegrass State after graduation. They 

settled in Lexington, and Lee got a job 

in the Electrical Engineering Department at the University of Kentucky. 

He taught at U.K. for 9 years, and during that time he was honored with several teaching awards, including the 

coveted U.K. Alumni Association Great 

Teacher Award. 

Lee caught ‘‘entrepreneur fever’’ at 

M.I.T, where he was awarded with six 

patents for advancements in picture 

tube technology. These patents helped 

lead to the development of DataBeam. 

In 1993, DataBeam introduced FarSite, 

the first software-driven computer conference room system. This high-technology allows a document to be viewed 

at the same time on different computer 

screens at different locations throughout the country. 

DataBeam, which was given the Outstanding Small Business Award in 1988, 

is currently focusing on partnerships. 

The company recently added software 

giant Microsoft to its list of partners, 

which already includes AT&T, MCI, 

and Motorola. 

Lee believes that by improving education and by helping to create a hightechnology industry, Kentucky will 

have a brighter future. He founded and 

chairs the Kentucky Science, and 

Technology Counsel, which developed a 

hands-on learning package for elementary schoolchildren. This program is 

now used in about 60 percent of the elementary schools across the State. 

Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to 

join me in recognizing this outstanding 

Kentuckian for his many accomplishments. I am confident that Mr. Todd 

will continue to invest in the future of 

Kentucky, as he has done so graciously 

in the past.∑ 

f 

POLITICAL TRANSITION IN CHINA 

∑ Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, on 

March 23, the Congressional Economic 

Leadership Institute, in conjunction 

with the Congressional Competitiveness Caucus, held a discussion of China 

as that nation begins a political transition. 

The meeting was led by three China 

experts: former United States Ambassador to China, Jim Lilley; Nigel Holloway, Washington correspondent of the 

Far Eastern Economic Review; and 

Drew Liu, executive director of the 

China Institute. 

Called ‘‘China After Deng,’’ this vigorous discussion highlighted some of 

the outstanding issues in Chinese internal affairs and the United StatesChina relationship. I commend it to my 

colleagues who wish to gain a deeper 

understanding of these issues. 

The panelists agreed, in the words of 

Drew Liu, that ‘‘China is perhaps entering the most crucial period of transition.’’

Mr. Holloway expressed another 

theme by urging ‘‘constructive engagement,’’ since the United States and the 

West generally ‘‘need to keep drawing 

China out, into the wider world, and 

help to prevent its becoming a 

merchantilist military state.’’

Ambassador Lilley put these points 

in context by noting that basic longterm economic and political trends 

within China are positive and leading 

toward a more economically and militarily powerful nation, and that the 

range of United States interests in the 

relationship with China is very broad. 

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May 11, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD— SENATE S6555 

I want to compliment the institute 

for organizing this useful discussion, 

and I ask that the transcript be printed 

in the RECORD. 

The transcript follows: 

CHINA AFTER DENG

PANELISTS

Ambassador James R. Lilley, Director of 

Asian Studies, American Enterprise Institute. 

Nigel Holloway, Washington Correspondent, Far Eastern Economic Review. 

Drew Liu, Executive Director, China Institute. 

MODERATORS

U.S. Senator Max Baucus. 

Congressman Jim Kolbe. 

Rep. JIM KOLBE. We’re here to look at a 

very timely topic and one in which there is 

a great deal of interest in the United 

States—the subject of China in the era after 

Deng Xiaoping. 

It’s my pleasure this morning to introduce 

my Senate colleague and good friend, Max 

Baucus. Senator Baucus has been involved 

with the Competitiveness Forum for a long 

time—in fact, since it was begun in 1987. He 

is a member of the Trade Subcommittee of 

the Senate Finance Committee; he’s also 

ranking member of the Senate Environment 

Committee. As I think many of you know, he 

has taken a very strong and personal interest in the subject of China over the years. 

Please join me in welcoming, to introduce 

our panel this morning, the senior Senator 

from Montana, Max Baucus. Max: 

Sen. MAX BAUCUS. Thank you, Jim. Thank 

you all for coming out this morning. We 

have three very distinguished guests this 

morning to help us discuss the future of 

China as that nation enters an era of political transition. In politics and security, 

China is critical to every major Asian security issue—from the conflict between India 

and Pakistan, to the Spratly Islands, to the 

Korean peninsula and on up north to the 

Russian Far East. It holds a permanent seat 

with a veto in the United Nations Security 

Council and, of course, China is a nation of 

1.2 billion people with one of the world’s 

largest armies. 

In commerce, China is already one of the 

world’s largest economies and international 

traders. Its trading power will increase even 

more after 1997. While China is our fastest 

growing export market, its issues—copyrights and patents; market-access for Montana wheat-producers; World Trade Organization membership; and trade deficits—show 

that China is also one of our most difficult 

trade policy challenges. 

In environmental policy, China will very 

soon become the largest contributor to global warming. Its rapid coastal development, 

growing fishing fleet, and reliance on coal 

for power generation, all pose immensely difficult questions. And, of course, since 

Tiananmen Square in 1989, almost no foreign-policy issue has been as controversial or 

as divisive here in the United States as has 

human rights in China. 

Internally, China faces high inflation, 

widespread corruption, and a declining 

standard-of-living in rural and inland regions 

relative to urban and coastal areas. At the 

National People’s Congress last week, people 

as diverse as Prime Minister Li Peng and dissident petitioners identified these as problems threatening the stability of the country. 

And what should we, the United States, expect in the next few years? What policies are 

likely to get results? Conversely, what actions will create a backlash? Difficult questions—and we have had heated debates over 

them since 1989. But I think everyone will 

agree the U.S. would benefit from a deeper 

understanding of trends and possible future 

developments in China. The CELI has 

brought together a panel of three long-time 

observers who can help us arrive at that understanding. They are: 

The Honorable Jim Lilley. Jim is one of 

our country’s most accomplished diplomats 

and Chinese scholars. He, of course, was the 

Ambassador of China during the Bush Administration and previously served as Ambassador to Korea. An internationally respected commentator on Chinese Affairs and 

U.S. China policy, he is now a Scholar-in-residence at the American Enterprise Institute. 

Nigel Holloway, a long time observer of 

Chinese and Asian affairs. Mr. Holloway is 

the Washington correspondent for the Far 

Eastern Economic Review, which for decades 

has been the most respected Journal of East 

Asian business and politics. 

And Drew Liu, Executive Director of the 

China Institute. The China Institute, established here in Washington by Wong Jung Tao 

on his release from prison last year, links 

China’s most respectable intellectual dissidents on research on political and economic trends in China. 

Each panelist will speak for a few minutes 

on what he sees as a major trend in China’s 

economic and political development as we 

enter this transition era. Then we’ll take 

questions. Thank you all for coming. Let’s 

give a big warm welcome to our guest. [Applause.] Jim, I think you’re first. 

Ambassador JIM LILLEY. Well, that’s quite 

a challenge. Let me just anecdote the first. I 

asked three people about the future of 

China—not romantics or visionaries, but 

people that basically do business there. One 

was a Korean fat cat who has invested probably three-quarters of a billion dollars in 

China and is investing more. And I said 

Chairman, how do you see China? He looked 

at me and he went like this [gesturing]—he 

said headaches, terrible headaches. But also, 

he said, long-term good. 

Secondly, I talked to a Hong Kong businessman, just last night. And I said, where 

do you see it? He said, ‘‘I have just bought 

one-quarter of a billion dollars of property in 

Hong Kong and I see a long-term rise because 

I am in the business of making money. The 

one thing I avoid is having anything to do 

with princely, high-cadre kids, economically. 

Socially they’re fine—but don’t touch them 

any other way.’’ But he said, ‘‘I’m putting 

my money where my mouth is—investing in 

the future of Hong Kong.’’

The third person was a Department of 

Commerce representative who speaks beautiful Chinese. He said Commerce is quadrupling its staff in Shanghai, hiring 22 new 

locals; it’s going to become the base of operations, almost paralleling our operation in 

Beijing. In other words, the United States 

Government is putting its people where it’s 

mouth is, and they are going to build a center in Shanghai. This on a bet on the future 

of China’s economy. I’m not saying the U.S. 

Government is always right. But I’m saying 

this is where they are going to make their 

action. 

Let’s move into the situation of China. 

Just briefly, I’ll touch on three zones which 

are the obvious ones—political, military, 

economic. 

First, militarily: Senator Baucus has 

touched on the places in Asia where China is 

an indispensable player. On the Korean peninsula, the stakes are very high; we are in 

a game of chicken and brinkmanship this 

very weekend. Strategically, the Chinese are 

basically with us. But they play a different 

game, one with Chinese characteristics. 

They don’t want to see Kim Joy Il with nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Nor 

do they want to see instability on the peninsula. Probably better than anybody, the Chinese know what a really weird, strange regime Kim Joy Il runs. They’re done good 

work in the past; they’ve also been ambiguous in certain areas. But, to get a solution, 

the Chinese have to be a player, and we have 

to play with them. Because when we work 

with China, North Korea tends to give; when 

we split with China, they take advantage of 

it. 

Second, the South China Sea. Perhaps you 

saw the piece in the Outlook section of the 

Washington Post this weekend? China is 

playing a long-term game of taking over the 

South China Sea—no question about that. 

It’s going to happen, not in this century perhaps, but in the next century. It is not going 

to be necessarily large or violent, but more 

of a creeping takeover. This is spelled out in 

their internal documents. They are modernizing their military with this objective in 

mind. Jiang Zemin mentioned this in effect 

at the National People’s Congress. So you 

shouldn’t be confused. 

What you have a genuine argument over is: 

Can they do it? Are they able to do it? With 

economic growth, will China spend its money 

on unproductive military activity that puts 

them in confrontation with the rest of Asia 

and possibly with the world’s most powerful 

instrument, the United States Seventh 

Fleet? They’ve got to calculate very carefully and intelligently—which is precisely 

what they are doing. But they have ambitions, there’s little question. 

The third area, of course, is the Taiwan 

Straits. There’s a great deal of gong-banging, 

stage-acting and posturing: Both sides trying 

to use the Americans against the other 

side—a very old game. Please don’t get 

sucked in. The Chinese and Taiwanese are 

working very, very closely to straighten 

things out—when they really put their mind 

to it. But it’s much more fun for each one to 

use the Americans to bash the other side. So 

be careful here. We hope it isn’t next year’s 

issue. This year, the issue is intellectualproperty rights; last year, it was MFN and 

human rights. Next year, is it going to be 

Taiwan? Let’s not make it Taiwan. Let’s 

work ourselves out of this one—and we can if 

we don’t let the Chinese use us. 

Finally, the economic situation—obviously 

a mixed bag. China has an excellent growth 

record. Reserves are up a hundred percent. 

The trade balance has gone from 12 billion 

negative last year to five billion plus this 

year. But China also has 150 million surplus 

laborers, along with real problems in getting 

some sort of a financial code—a taxation 

code that functions. You see progress, but 

it’s shaky. So apply the same business judgment you would in any such country: Know 

your partner, know the local market situation, get a good contract, deal with the people in power to get things done. This all applies to China. There is no quick fix. 

The good news I see coming out of the National People’s Congress that just finished 

is—don’t get me wrong on this one, don’t 

caricature my position, but—a slow movement towards the rule of law. There are differences in the Chinese system about how 

this should be done, and how fast. But the arguments they are having are arguments we, 

as Americans, can comprehend: Subsidies to 

state-owned enterprises. Subsidies to agriculture. How you manage the distribution of 

money internally—how much you put into 

the state sector and how much you keep out 

in the free-market sector. Arguments about 

the rules governing property, bankruptcy, 

and central banking. And I see progress on 

most of these fronts. 

But the most encouraging sign is a degree 

of autonomy coming out of the Chinese 

themselves. You find one-third of the people 

voting against a candidate for Vice-Premier. 

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S6556 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD— SENATE May 11, 1995 

You certainly have people showing their displeasure at Li Peng’s work report—very few, 

but they show it. You, see across-the-board, 

the Chinese representative bodies, usually 

overstaffed, beginning to move in the direction of some kind of an independent posture—where they can exercise a function 

over the party people. What I think it boils 

down to, over the long haul, is the rule of 

law versus the rule of man. A very deep issue 

in Chinese history, it is not easily solved—

but the issue emerged in this National People’s Congress. And I think that probably is 

the most promising sign in China today. 

Thank you. [Applause.] 

NIGEL HOLLOWAY. Thank you very much. 

I’d like to thank the Institute very much for 

inviting me to this pulpit. First of all, I want 

to say that this is the first time that I’ve actually spoken about China’s future in this 

way. I’m a journalist, probably as many of 

you are—so, we have something in common. 

But I maybe can see things in a slightly different way from the specialist. I have obviously traveled in China several times. I lived 

in Hong Kong for three-and-a-half years. And 

I’ve written about Asia as a whole since 1982. 

I want to start by emphasizing the magnitude of what’s happening in China today. 

Living standards have been doubling every 

five years or so—something that has never 

happened in a country larger than 100 million people. What an extraordinary change 

taking place with one-fifth of the world’s 

population. (Of course, India is starting to go 

through the same transition—but it’s different in India.) 

Second point: In China, we have a Marxist 

superstructure, superimposed on a capitalist 

substructure. This is a recipe for tension, 

dislocation and conflict in the long term. 

You tend to compare it with Russia, where 

political opening preceded economic reform—and we can see where Russia is today. 

The Chinese transition, running the opposite 

way, is almost as difficult. China’s leadership is ‘‘riding the capitalist tiger’’ like the 

capitalist governments in eastern Europe 

after the second world war were riding the 

communist tiger—and they were swallowed 

up. (The only country that succeeded in pulling it off was Singapore, in the late 1950s, 

where Lee Kuan Yew managed to stifle the 

communist tiger.) 

In China’s case today the tiger, of course, 

is the capitalist system. Deng and his cohorts know they have to delivery the goods. 

But the goods contain the seeds of their own 

destruction, namely the destruction of the 

communist system. The stock market, its 

shareholders, these are people with stakes in 

an economic system antagonistic to the political superstructure. This could be resolved 

gradually without major conflicts. It could 

also, of course, lead to another revolution. 

The third factor is the leadership transition itself. We are going through another unprecedented situation for China, with nobody 

of a similar stature or credentials to replace 

Deng—so we are heading into an open country with no real road map. The first stages of 

the transition has already taken place: Deng 

has fully retired. I don’t think he has been a 

factor for about a year now since the military appointments, made about a year ago. 

He is not playing a role like Lee Kuan Yew, 

still a major factor in Singapore politics. 

What precedents do we have for the situation in China under a collective leadership? 

We have the inauspicious one, of course, of 

Yugoslavia after Tito—obviously there are 

major differences between the situation of 

Yugoslavia and that in China. Perhaps a better precedent is Vietnam: Since the death of 

Ho Chi Minh, there has been a fairly stable 

collective leadership. But Vietnam, of 

course, faces the same structural problems 

that China does long-term. 

Nobody knows of course, what will happen 

in China, just as nobody knows who’s going 

to win next year’s presidential election here. 

But it’s even harder to predict where China 

will be next year because it’s so opaque. 

Talking to specialists, which is basically 

what I do, I get most of this second-hand. 

But the consensus is that China will move to 

a sort of authoritarian-capitalist model. 

That I think is what it’s aiming for—rather 

like Singapore, a prospect the United States 

and the west can perhaps deal with. Singapore is a free-trading nation firmly in the 

Western camp but also with significant political differences. But Singapore is a very 

small island nation and China is a completely different kettle of fish. Could we live 

with a Singapore-style China? 

Another question: Will China break up 

after the demise of Deng Xiaoping. Again, 

the consensus among specialists is that this 

is very unlikely. But one of the points they 

make is how the interest groups—the interest-group politics really running China 

now—is like the woven weft of a textile. Pull 

out one strand, and the textile will not fragment—because there are so many overlapping interests. For example, the military regions China is divided into do not exactly 

match the economic territory—they overlap. 

Another example is how the regional military command is rotated on a regular basis 

so they can’t build local systems. At any 

rate, the consensus is China is unlikely to 

break up in the next 10 years. 

What should American policy be towards 

China? Constructive engagement is certainly 

the right objective. The United States and 

the west need to keep drawing China out, 

into the wider world, and help to prevent its 

becoming a mercantilist military state. This 

is absolutely the right objective. Also, because the United States has such a wide 

array of interests in dealing with China, it 

should lay those out, and take a very hard 

look at where its priorities lie, rather than 

veering in one direction or another. 

So I think the changes that are obviously 

taking place in U.S.-China policy over the 

last year have been in the right direction. 

This is absolutely the right way to go. The 

U.S. cannot bottle up China, nor should it. If 

it can help integrate China fully into world 

affairs, this will be one of the greatest 

achievements of the 21st Century. This requires an extremely deft handling to avoid 

the confusion we had a month ago when, in 

short order, we had conflict over intellectual-property rights, a dramatic reduction in 

MFN tariffs to China, and questions over the 

U.S. stance on China’s application to the 

WTO. In the midst of all of this, we also had 

Hazel O’Leary in Beijing touting the contracts. It was confusing for China—and confusing for Americans too. I mean, what is 

American policy towards China? So it requires a very careful explanation: ‘‘We have 

this array of differing interests—but these 

are the ones that are important.’’

The shift in the U.S. stance towards China’s WTO membership application is right—

the U.S. is right to call for the toughest possible terms on China’s application. China 

will probably become a member of the WTO 

by the end of the year, and that’s the very 

best development. But I think it will be 

largely on the west terms rather than on 

China’s. 

If you look at all different aspects of China’s relationships with the world and what 

Jim Lilley was saying about the rule of law, 

I sense a subtheme: China has to play by 

western rules if it wants to be a global player—whether it’s arm sales, trade, and so on. 

And I think that the U.S. is right to stress 

that in all international forums. 

I’d also like to make a plea that the U.S. 

should at every appropriate opportunity 

stress its strongest possible commitment to 

Hong Kong’s long-term autonomy. As we’ve 

seen over the last few years, there’s been a 

significant erosion in both the Chinese and, 

I must confess, the British attitude towards 

what was agreed on paper in the joint declaration. This is a source of serious concern. 

And the United States should stress during 

said meetings with Lu Ping, the senior representative of Beijing on Hong Kong affairs, 

that the U.S. has a strong interest in Hong 

Kong’s economic and political autonomy. 

I’d also like to agree with Jim Lilley that 

the U.S. must avoid pushing the Taiwan card 

too far. This has obviously been the major 

danger, I think, since the Republican victories in the election last year, and needs to 

be watched very carefully. That’s my final 

point. Thank you. 

DREW LIU. Thank you, Senator Baucus. 

Thank you, Congressman Kolbe. And I would 

like to thank also the Institute for this opportunity. 

China is perhaps entering the most crucial 

period of transition, and many of the 

changes have taken place over last dozen 

years or so. Those changes are fundamental 

and from bottom-up. And so China has entered the threshold of fundamental change. 

What is the background, the nature of the 

forces, behind this change? 

First, I would like to emphasize the crisis 

China is facing. In the political area, as everybody is aware, China is facing a crisis of 

transition, with a crack on the top echelon. 

And it’s reflected especially in this People’s 

Congress Session: Complaints and grievances 

from the lower echelon, and from local officials, are aimed against the center. And, in 

both political and economic areas—a linking 

point—you have this corruption issue. It is 

economical as well as political. The Chinese 

system is unable to contain corruption, 

which is very much hated by the Chinese 

populace. 

In economics, the problem of the system is 

more fundamental than at first glance. The 

whole structure of communist state ownership has been very much undermined. But 

the new system has not been established during this transition. The transition is from 

the one kind of a planning system to the 

market system—and you have this plundering of the public funds, and public property, by officials. There is no law—it’s a jungle. You [in America] talk about Ivan 

Boesky; in China today, everybody is Ivan 

Boesky. The Chinese people perceive this as 

very unfair, [a profound] injustice. Certainly 

in the social arena, you have hundreds of 

millions of people migrating from the rural 

area, from the inner provinces, to the southeast provinces. And these are the sign posts, 

in the Chinese history of big trouble, confirming a dynasty’s end. The Ching dynasty 

was very much ended in that way—migration 

was part of the reason. 

So there are three major scenarios. First is 

the continuation of dictatorship, the singleparty model, maybe. Second is the opening 

of a political system and gradual transformation into democracy. The third one we 

could see is social unrest. The [inaudible 

word] of the Chinese society and maybe the 

breaking-up of China. 

I would think the first scenario is growing 

less likely because of the lack of a strong 

man to hold China together—a Deng 

Xiaoping, a figure like that. With the power 

base in both military and party, and the 

state’s bureaucratic system and in the Chinese political culture, the demand is for 

some kind of strong man to hold it together. 

It’s like a reverse pyramid: One man at the 

bottom, everything is on top. The bottom 

goes away, and then you have the collapse. 

The current leadership of Jiang Zemin is less 

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May 11, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD— SENATE S6557 

capable of playing the same kind of integrating role as Deng Xiaoping. And [Chinese 

society lacks] the tradition of politics. Once 

in transition, divisions multiply. So continuation of the dictatorship is also unlikely. In 

all systems, the social forces formed during 

the reform process have been unable to be 

controlled. 

The second scenario is the deep social unrest. But we think the biggest opportunity 

[occurring with this scenario would be] the 

gradual transition to a constitutional democracy. And let me say how I envision this 

could happen. At the China Institute, we do 

studies, mainly in the integrated area of theory in the practice. And we try to combine 

the vision blueprinting with actual process 

of change. What we find is that China’s 

change in progress, towards political openness and the signs towards democratization, 

is always the result of a muddling through. 

It’s not designed. it’s not planned. It’s not in 

anybody’s mind. 

As a result, many consequences are unintended. The different interest groups need to 

reposition themselves—but they don’t have 

commonly accepted rules of the game. The 

process of democracy could be introduced 

into this situation—even though people may 

not be aware of the consequences. For instance, the mechanism of free elections, the 

mechanism of checks and balances, and the 

mechanism of [an impartial] monitoring device—all could be gradually introduced into 

the process. 

Now secondly, it’s not a moral process, 

like [in America]. Here, it’s the ideal—you 

know the Founding Fathers, you know about 

universal rights. In China, it’s not like that; 

it’s really a process of people. ‘‘See, this is 

we have to do. This [set of democratic mechanisms] is a way we can compromise without 

going total chaos [and risking] civil war.’’

So, in this [potential] process, what is the 

position and role of the western world? How 

is this important process linked to the western world in general and the U.S. in particular? Shift the angle a little bit to say the 

importance of the U.S./China relation in the 

immediate future. It’s very paradoxical and, 

I mean—there’s no China policy. Perhaps it 

shouldn’t be a ‘‘China policy’’—because of 

the two fundamental paradoxes in dealing 

with China. One is to deal with China on an 

international level—where you treat China 

as a society, as a state, as a collective. The 

other is the China of individuals. 

Let me offer an example: On intellectualproperty rights, we have monitored events, 

the process, very closely. Then we receive responses from different sectors among the 

Chinese—and I was surprised. Because, from 

our point of view, it is fair for China to abide 

by international standards. But I draw your 

attention to the internal Chinese response to 

this whole issue—to demonstrate why U.S. 

policy has to deal not only with China as a 

state and a collective, but also reach beyond 

that level, to the more individual level. 

The Chinese look at intellectual-property 

rights, as the government crack down, and 

many Chinese businessmen think it’s unfair—even though, from outside, we look at 

it as fair. Why is it unfair? Because in China 

there are more pressing issues—like fake 

medicine. Hundreds of people die as a result 

of fake medicine. One report in the Chinese 

media about hundreds dying—from fake wine 

made from industrial alcohol. People drink 

it and go blind. Things like that are more 

pressing issues than intellectual property. 

[America wants the Chinese] government to, 

you know, select intellectual-property rights 

and push them very hard. What the Chinese 

populace see is the government caving in to 

the interest of the foreigners—without taking care of the serious domestic issues. 

One more thing about pressing China. 

When we look at an event, the nationalism is 

always in the back of mind. Some of the 

same complaints of national because of this 

disparity between the two systems. So what 

do you perceive the fair—‘‘justice’’ in the 

global and international perspective, we perceive as injustice and defeat into some other 

forces that may not be productive. I’m trying to add perspective; I’m not saying specifically do this or do that. I offer an angle 

on China’s present position in the system—

incompatible with the democratic and market system on one hand; and, on the other 

hand, wanting to enter into the world community. 

So the political transformation, the liberalization, democratization are really the key 

to the future of the U.S./China relations in 

the long-term may not, you know like a very 

pressing issue, tomorrow in the media. But 

it’s like the under current that we will carry 

the problems or your [inaudible word] into a 

specific problem into U.S./China relations. If 

China is not going democratic, and that is 

very unlikely I would say. THe Chinese will 

observe the law of the, observe the general 

international accepted standards only by the 

doing system to be compatible, and then you 

can have a more better and more productive 

relationship. Thank you very much. 

Sen. BAUCUS. I’ll take the liberty of asking 

the first questions. A lot of discussion so far 

has been about the United States relationship to China. I would just like to turn the 

tables and ask our panelists: How the Chinese see us? I mean, do they see us as being 

fair or unfair? You mentioned that we’re 

pushing intellectual property protection, for 

example, to the local people. Say, gee that’s 

not according to our priorities in China. But 

do the businessmen in China or the Chinese 

leadership recognize or don’t know the 

United States has a legitimate beef after all. 

And perhaps they should follow the United 

States in trying to protect intellectual property. Or, on the other hand, are they just 

using local conditions as a cover to not do 

what they know they should do? My basic 

point is: What’s the Chinese leadership perception of the United States? For example, is 

this nation seen as relevant around the 

world these days? And, if we’re relevant, 

where are we relevant to how they see their 

future? Jim, I’ll give you that one. 

JIM LILLEY. I think the main fear in China 

with regard to U.S. attitude is that the U.S. 

looking for a boogie man or looking for an 

enemy, after Russia, to settle on China and 

will adopt the sort of containment policy 

which ever way you would like to put it that 

was adopted towards the Soviet Union. And 

so that’s, I think, one of the major reason 

why the constructive-engagement policy is 

the right one to draw China out to avoid the 

impression that United States is trying to 

encircle China and contain it. 

JIM KOLBE. Well I listened last night at a 

dinner to the Minister for, Director of, Administrator for Hong Kong affairs in China 

described the commitment that China has to 

maintaining the rules of law as he puts it 

and the agreement that was reached with 

Britain over the transition of Hong Kong to 

China. And I’m wondering if any of our 

speakers, this morning’s panelist would comment on the issue of how important is the 

transition to Chinese rule in Hong Kong. 

What will the rest of the world be watching 

in this transition and what do you think we 

can expect as this transition takes place? 

DREW LIU. Hong Kong issue is a very 

touchy issue in the sentiment of the Chinese 

mentality because it would cause the Chinese a humiliating defeat. But Hong Kong is 

also a very hot—like what we say in Chinese, 

a hot potato: You hold it, you want to eat it, 

but it’s hot. And there is paradox, of course: 

Hong Kong is resources for the foreign currency and, on the other hand, Hong Kong is 

the stronghold of liberal ideas, and may help 

to spread political instability. In reacting to 

that, how will the Chinese government deal 

with Hong Kong? 

I see several possibilities. I think the most 

likely response is to contain Hong Kong. 

Right now, there’s easier traffic form Hong 

Kong to China and then, if Chinese government step in, it most probably would maintain Hong Kong’s current system: Let Hong 

Kong still play the role it has been playing. 

On the other hand, in order to prevent Hong 

Kong’s penetration, especially in the media, 

China would make it more difficult for people to travel from Hong Kong to China and 

from China to Hong Kong. And I think that 

seeing this as one possible solution shows 

the mentality of the Chinese leadership. 

So what we are suggesting is, Hong Kong is 

really constructing, of course, opening wider 

China’s market, marketization and giving 

China the stimulus to go further in marketing reform, abolishing the kind of statecontrolled ownership structure. And on the 

other hand, it can gradually bring, you know 

alternatives, some models, examples of how 

to live and operate in a more democratic, 

more efficient society. 

So we propose that the following institutions, especially cultural institutions, may 

go into Hong Kong right now and then enlarge their activities—especially with regard 

to the linkages inside China. For instance, 

educational projects. You know, many cultural things may not be political—nonpolitical, I would say. You know, purely educational, but by doing this, by joint venture, 

joint project, then Hong Kong and China can 

be linked. If they try to cut off Hong Kong 

from China after 1997 in administrative 

ways, then China’s internal education would 

also suffer loss and damage. This is a very 

crucial time in Hong Kong, definitely, it is 

very, very important for the future of China. 

Thank you. 

JIM LILLEY [inaudible words] is basically 

allow free market forces to go and strangle 

the political process in the cradle. And they 

have a lot of sympathy from Chinese in Hong 

Kong who think this western bourgeois democracy is really not applicable. So I think 

you’ve got somewhat of an economy there in 

terms. Bob, you know the formula very well: 

Let the free-market process work in Hong 

Kong. Keep it the goose laying the golden 

eggs. Have commercial rule of law in Hong 

Kong. Persist it for 50 years—but do not 

allow the political process to work and to 

contaminate China. That is the formula they 

have—yes, their formula. I’m talking about 

how the Chinese view Hong Kong. 

The question came up last night, as the 

Congressman knows. Somebody asked our 

distinguished visitor why he didn’t deal with 

the democratic party in Hong Kong, the dissenters. And what he said in his very cogent 

and very frank way is this: The basic law of 

Hong Kong calls for freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of da-da, da-da, 

da-da—he sounded like Jefferson. Of course, 

everybody knows that isn’t what happens. 

And if, the basic law says very clearly, we’re 

going to have a fully elected, [inaudible 

word] in Hong Kong. So what are you worried about? 

The fact is, course, that most people say 

the Hong Kong process works just fine, but 

scattered angry people keep pushing a ‘‘bourgeois democracy’’ that doesn’t really make 

much sense. ‘‘They are all trained in England. They talk English better than we do. 

They don’t really represent the grassroots.’’

Fact is, these people keep getting most of 

the votes. There is a feeling out in Hong 

Kong that they really do deserve democracy. 

And there are people voting for Martin Lee 

mmaher on MIKETEMP with SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS

S6558 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD— SENATE May 11, 1995 

and Company. [Inaudible words.] They’re 

voting for them. It’s a rather positive sign. 

MODERATOR: Okay. 

Sen. BINGAMAN. I wanted to ask about our 

trade, growing trade imbalance with China. 

As I see it, the first year of the Bush administration, we had about a $3 million trade 

deficit with China. This year, this last year, 

we had about a $28 billion trade deficit with 

China. And China has only began to export: 

As a share of their gross national product, 

China is not near, doesn’t devote near as 

much of their economy to export manufacture as do other industrial countries. So the 

potential for increased manufacture for export is great. I see this growing geometrically over the next five to 10 years and, in 

the next century, a greater U.S. trade deficit 

with China than we have with Japan today—

with no way to turn that around. This will 

hamper our ability to produce or maintain 

manufacturing jobs in this country. I would 

be interested as to whether I am right or 

wrong in that prediction, and if there is 

some solution other than continued handwringing and teeth-gnashing. 

JIM LILLEY. I’ll take a crack at it. That is 

what Mickey Kantor’s trips were all about. I 

don’t think Mickey is sitting in a corner 

gnashing his teeth—he’s going to the Chinese 

and saying: Open your market. I think this is 

all about China getting into GATT and WTO. 

This is why they want to come in as a developing nation. Fifteen percent, 22 percent tariffs, developed nation, fifteen percent. Three 

thousand items are put on the block. 

They’ve got to protect inefficient dinosaurs 

in the state-owned enterprise sector. They 

are frightened of what GATT and WTO will 

do to them. So we can face up to this problem the way we faced it in other areas where 

it has worked—Taiwan and Korea. It hasn’t 

worked in Japan, unfortunately, because of 

their closed system. But we have been able 

to close some of these trade gaps by persistently demanding they pay royalties on intellectual properties—our strong suit, where we 

can export a great deal. 

As Jack Valenti said, our exports in the 

entertainment industry are one of our largest exports. In some sectors of China we are 

comparatively effective. So you go after 

those. I’m talking about power. I’m talking 

about aircraft. I’m talking about automobiles. I’m talking about electronics. The 

Americans have to get in there and compete 

as strong as any nation in the world. We 

aren’t going to win the China market by getting quotas or trying to force them into 

some sort of managed-trade arrangement. 

You get the Chinese to come across and 

change their trade surplus with us by opening their market. I think this is what Kantor 

is trying to do, and we should support it 100 

percent. We are beginning to make some 

progress on this. But it’s going to be a long 

hard road. 

MALE VOICE. The question that has come 

to my mind is the degree to which the other 

countries—let’s say Europe, Japan and others—are using our MFN position really [inaudible words], and are saying to China: No 

WTO membership until you open up and so 

forth. I agree that Japan and the others are 

taking advantage of us by working with the 

Chinese leadership. 

JIM LILLEY. I think, Senator, you make a 

very good point. The Europeans and Japanese love to hold our coats while we go in 

and slug it out with the Chinese. We finally 

get the agreement, then they all follow to 

take advantage of it. Let me make a contrast. On human rights, it was totally bilateral. Nobody else had anything to do with 

our position. And this is what undercut us, 

or it’s one big reason. The business community did not support us. No nation in the 

world supported us. They said, ‘‘What a 

bunch of goofballs. We’re going to pick up 

the pieces of the American effort.’’ But, on 

GATT and WTO, we got a lot of support; on 

IPR, we got a lot of support. They aren’t as 

aggressive as we are, the don’t have their 

Mickey Kantors—but they did come in. And 

they are going to support us to a degree on 

this. Of course, most of them are intellectual-property right violators too! So, there’s 

all sort of hypocrisy mixed into this arrangement. 

But it seems to me that in WTO and IPR, 

we are on solid ground with our friends, but 

as usual, Senator, the Americans have to 

take the lead. 

MALE VOICE. [Inaudible words.] 

MALE VOICE. Pardon. 

MALE VOICE. [Inaudible word.] 

JIM LILLEY. Well, I supposed what we try 

to do, at least we tried to do this when I was 

in GATT, is arrange tougher conditions on 

the Chinese. We would working with EC. And 

one of the, rather, I suppose I’m talking too 

much again. Through the EC and directly, 

we used to say to the Chinese: ‘‘You know, 

Taiwan’s an applicant too. And they are 

meeting all of the standards of GATT, WTO. 

If you drag your feet, it could be possible 

that Taiwan would get it first.’’ This was a 

very sobering influence, I think. It works 

about once or twice—that’s all. And then 

you’ve got to get better tactics to work on 

it. 

But the more usual argument, and you get 

European support on this, is if you don’t 

shape up, you aren’t going to get the technology you want. An the do lust for technology, they want the best—that’s all you 

hear from the Chinese. So this is where you 

put the brakes on. We don’t have COCOM 

anymore, but some sort of an arrangement 

with our allies. The Chinese are very dependent upon Europe and Japan to get some sort 

of common policy for when they violate too 

much by ‘‘going their own way,’’ as people 

say, you can bring to bear collective pressure. 

This approach worked very well in 1990 

when I was in China. We worked very closely 

with Japan, the Europeans, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders—to exert leverage. 

Because in the international bank, let me 

just make one point, China is very dependent 

on higher [inaudible word] loans. They are 

the biggest recipients in the world. It’s two 

to three billion dollars a year. It may not 

sound like much. But it is crucial when 

matched with a third yen loan package from 

Japan, and most every nation from the 

United States. Don’t use it as a club publicly, but quietly and effectively, through 

diplomatic channels. 

NIGEL HOLLOWAY. I just want to say that 

the trade imbalance within the U.S. and 

China is really quite extraordinary. U.S. exports to China are less than $10 billion and 

China’s exports here approach $40 billion. A 

lot of it has to do with the restructuring 

that is going on. The question then is, is 

Chin going to become another Japan, the 

capitalist but closed market. My hunch is it 

will not—because the corporate structure in 

China is evolving very different from that in 

Japan. Japan has these [inaudible word] networks of companies that basically collude 

through long-term equity arrangements. But 

the Chinese don’t do business that way. I 

think that’s something to bear in mind. 

What we really have, as Jim says, is a market-access question. China is starting to 

open its market. If you look at the market 

within China, there are enormous barriers 

for one province trying to trade with another. They basically compete with each 

other, and stumble over each other, and try 

and prevent goods from one province going 

into another. And this is the area where the 

World Bank is especially keen to see major 

changes. And I think it’s also one the U.S. 

should focus increasingly on: If it can pry 

open China’s market, this will be the biggest 

factor in increasing democratization in 

China. 

Sen. BAUCUS. Stand up please. Thank you. 

QUESTION. [Inaudible.] 

JIM LILLEY. I’m glad you asked for clarification, because there may be some misunderstanding. I’m not saying the United 

States will stay out of this thing. We are involved up to here. We have something called 

the Taiwan Relations Act, which is the law 

of the land. We also have an increasingly 

strong relationship with China. What I resent very much is lobbying groups and foreign ministry tantrums towards the United 

States to try to get us to become their point 

man on beating up on the other side. That’s 

what I don’t like. We’ve got a lot of leverage 

in this deal and I think we should use it—because both of them really need us in this 

one. 

But don’t get trapped into a Chinese ‘‘tong 

war’’ on it. Keep you powder dry. Keep managing it carefully. Don’t make a great big 

announcement of a Taiwan policy review and 

beat the gong saying this some sort of a big 

deal, when it turns out to be a big fat zero 

and everybody knows it—the Chinese become 

furious at the policy review and the Taiwanese are disappointed. Much better to 

keep your mouth shut and work a little bit 

quietly on this thing as it is run by all of the 

other administrations. 

By the same token, you have to be careful 

in terms of Chinese sensitivities on this. You 

also have to be careful in the Taiwan process, but as I was saying to Bob Kupp earlier, 

we have been pushing democracy in China 

for about 35 years. I used to beat upon the 

Taiwan government regularly about getting 

the dissidents out and letting the Taiwanese 

back in, letting the political process work. 

We succeeded. And now you’ve got a flourishing democracy, a chaotic democracy, and 

even fist-fighting in the legislative halls. 

JIM LILLEY. On the other hand, for the 

United States to begin stumbling around in 

the thicket of Taiwan domestic policies, 

watch your step. The responsible businessmen and politicians in Taiwan know the limits of what they can do. And they know that 

breaking with China is not in their interest. 

But this doesn’t stop demagogues and others 

from raising hell on the basis of political 

strategy. On the other side, on China’s side, 

if I hear ‘‘sacred sovereignty’’ one more 

time, I think I’ll vomit. I’ve gotten into a lot 

of trouble by noting how it sounds like Gunboat Diplomacy from the 19th century. ‘‘It’s 

what you Chinese hate the worst. Don’t talk 

about [engaging in] it yourself; don’t start 

practicing it. Don’t start flexing your muscles and saying if we don’t get what we want, 

we’re going to use force. This doesn’t make 

any sense.’’

The irony is that China and Taiwan are 

getting along extremely well—solving problem after problem. Taiwan just hosted the 

highest-ranking Chinese delegation in history and many, many leading figures in the 

political, economic and cultural realms deal 

with their Chinese friends. You have Taiwan 

businessmen going over there to spend four 

hours with Jiang Zemin giving him advice on 

how to make a new central bank. You’ve got 

people from Taiwan going over there and reorganizing all of their deep ports—a major 

priority in China. You got them keeping the 

whole economy bustling. Of course, there’s 

speculation, a few nasty little elements of it, 

but it increases the growth rate. 

So all I can say to America is: Be careful 

you don’t, somehow or another in the next 

year or so, get trapped into this ugly little 

war or this ugly little fracas they are trying 

to create. It’s not in our interest to do so. 

mmaher on MIKETEMP with SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS

May 11, 1995 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD— SENATE S6559 

Sen. BAUCUS. Any questions? 

VOICE. [Inaudible words.] 

NIGEL HOLLOWAY. Yeah. Let me just give 

you three principles of what’s happening in 

China right now. You have three things. You 

have what we call persistent feudalism, 

which is Confucianism—no, chaos collectively. This feudalism is part of the Chinese 

structure. This mixes in with decaying socialism. And this is socialism’s ingrown 

privilege, a party privilege. Third, you have 

rapid capitalism. You have corruption, nepotism and growth. They all jam together in 

today’s China. 

If you have this growth and if you have 

feudalism, and if you have this decaying socialism, what results is great disparties of 

wealth between provinces, et cetera. And the 

millions of people begin to move towards the 

productive areas. It’s very hard to control 

because these people live in camps. They 

have three and four children. They pay no 

attention to birth control or the national 

policy. It drives the Chinese wild—who, of 

course, have some rather draconian methods 

to keep things down. Basically, I think they 

have been very successful in keeping control 

of the population—but it’s not very pretty to 

look at. They think it’s crucial to the control of the situation. 

What they are trying to do now in a very, 

very concerted effort is beginning to move 

investment capitalism into the hinterlands, 

but they’ve got to make it competitively attractive, and that’s hard to do. They recognize the problem; they recognize it’s very serious. It’s right at the heart of how you reform state-owned enterprises. Because the 

conservatives are saying, keep the money 

flowing. Others say let them go bankrupt 

and take care of this thing through other 

means. And it ends up as gridlock in many 

cases. But, at least, I think they are acutely 

aware of the problem and are trying to deal 

with it. 

Sen. BAUCUS. You have time for one more 

question. 

QUESTION. [Inaudible words.] 

DREW LIU. We touch on the topic of the 

trade imbalance as China opens up its market. And I would like to say something more 

about the fundamental problem, the system 

problem, the structural problem. One of the 

things is transparency of the legal system. 

And if you don’t have transparency—when 

the local government, you know, the sector 

cannot break their own laws—this instantly 

creates barriers. For instance, on the WTO: 

The center wants to enter the WTO. The 

local, some of the local wants to enter the 

center also, but not without some incentive. 

But there’s some problem in it. That is how 

to guarantee the Chinese abide by these laws 

and the standards. And, there are loopholes, 

you know, that are unpredictable. Our future 

in China comes without a well established 

legal system, without transparency and due 

process. 

And the second thing is the political system. For instance, entering the WTO, whether China can do it or not politically, is a 

question. If, in entering the WTO, the center 

enforces the regulations—you know, opening 

its market—then maybe thirty percent of 

the state-owned workers will be unemployed. 

A great political problem and a great risk to 

the Chinese leadership. But are you going to 

take the risk or not take the risk? And what 

if the risk becomes threatening and then it 

[the new policy] reverses in some way. Much 

uncertainty links to the internal process of 

the Chinese system. 

JIM LILLEY. Okay. I just want to make one 

comment on agriculture. A terrible problem 

for China is that agricultural land is shrinking; the harvest is not good. They are going 

to import more and more grain. It’s going to 

be a big problem and so I would say your agriculture-export possibilities are considerable. Some estimates have China importing 

as much as 100 million tons of grain by the 

next century; they have made some bad converting mistakes in terms of agricultural 

land, industrial land. The solution, people 

say, is what they call village- and townshipenterprises: Basically capitalistic, they are 

put into the countryside, are use surplus agriculture labor to create small consumer 

items. But they’ve gone about increasing agriculture production by importing chemical 

fertilizers, by developing their own plants. 

It’s really very, very difficult for them. And 

I see a big market for agricultural products. 

Sen. BAUCUS. Okay. We have no more time! 

Let’s give a great round of applause to our 

panelists: Drew Liu, Nigel Holloway and Jim 

Lilley. Bob mentioned a packet of information which I think will be very interesting 

for everyone. I encourage you to go pick up 

a copy as you leave. I want to thank CELI 

very much for hosting this event—I want another soon. Thank you.

f 

∑ 

DECISION TO EXTEND NPT 

INDEFINITELY 

∑ Mr. PELL. Mr. President, international efforts to curb the spread of 

nuclear weapons were given a tremendous boost today with the decision by 

more than 170 nations to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty. The U.S. Arms Control Agency 

and Ambassadors Ralph Earle II and 

Thomas Graham, Jr., deserve our deep 

appreciation. 

The decision by the participants in 

the NPT extension conference demonstrates their willingness to trust us 

and the other nuclear powers to continue with the effort in SALT and 

START to reduce our strategic nuclear 

arsenals, to strive eagerly and effectively to bring about an end to nuclear 

testing, and to be unflagging in efforts 

to spare the world from nuclear war 

and the threat of nuclear war. We have 

today incurred a renewed obligation to 

prove to those who trust us that their 

trust is not misplaced.

f 

∑ 

TRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL HERITAGE HALL OF FAME INDUCTEES 

∑ Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I would 

like to recognize the accomplishments 

of four distinguished community leaders from the Detroit area. These four 

individuals will be inducted tonight, 

Thursday, May 11, 1995, into the International Heritage Hall of Fame housed 

at Cobo Center. The inductees have 

been selected for outstanding service to 

their respective ethnic groups and the 

community at large. 

The International Institute of Metropolitan Detroit has been working since 

1919 to assist immigrants who have arrived in the Detroit metropolitan area. 

The inductions of the four 1995 honorees will bring the membership in the 

Hall of Fame, which began in 1984, to 

56. The inductees are U.S. Circuit 

Court Judge Damon J. Keith, the late 

Daniel F. Stella, Dr. Helen T. Suchara, 

and Mrs. Barbara C. VanDusen. 

U.S. Circuit Judge Damon Keith is a 

former president of the Detroit Housing Commission and former chairman 

of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. An African-American, Keith has 

served as a Federal judge since 1967 and 

was chief judge of the U.S. District 

Court for Eastern Michigan from 1975 

to 1977. He is a graduate of West Virginia State College, the Howard University Law School, and Wayne State 

University School of Law. He also 

holds honorary doctorates from those 3 

institutions and 24 other colleges and 

universities. He has held numerous 

civic positions including national 

chairman of the Judicial Conference 

Committee on the Bicentennial of the 

U.S. Constitution, chairman of the 

Citizens Council for Michigan Public 

Universities, and general cochair of the 

United Negro College Fund. 

Daniel Stella was president for 10 

years of Friends of the International 

Institute. An Italian-American who 

died last July, Stella was instrumental 

in the establishment of the Hall of 

Fame and an active promoter of relations between Detroit and its sister 

city, Toyota, Japan. Mr. Stella was 

also a partner in the Detroit law firm 

of Dykema Gossett. He was a graduate 

of the Harvard Law School, the College 

of Holy Cross, and the London School 

of Economics and Political Science, 

and a member of the Michigan and 

California bars, among others. He was 

a director of the Detroit and Windsor 

Japan-American Society and a member 

of the Association for Asian Studies, 

American Citizens for Justice, the 

Michigan Oriental Arts Society, and 

the Founders Society and Friends of 

Asian Art of the Detroit Institute of 

Arts. Mr. Stella also served in Vietnam 

with the U.S. Navy Judge Advocate 

General’s Corps. 

Helen Suchara, a retired educator, 

last served as director of the Office of 

Student Teaching at Wayne State University. A Polish-American, she was a 

Peace Corps volunteer in Poland from 

1990 to 1992 and has begun a new career 

in public service since her retirement. 

She holds positions on the Madonna 

College Social Work Advisory Board 

and the board of regents of Saginaw 

Valley State University. She received 

bachelor’s and master’s degrees from 

Wayne State University and a doctorate from Columbia University. She 

taught at WSU, Columbia, the University of Delaware, the University of Virginia, and Wheelock College in Boston, 

and earlier in public schools in Detroit 

and Howell, MI. She has worked on the 

boards of the International Institute 

and Friends of the International Institute. She has also worked in affiliation 

with the Polish-American Congress of 

Michigan Scholarship Committee, the 

Catholic Social Services of Wayne 

County, the Michigan Elementary 

School Curriculum Committee, and the 

Dominican Sisters of Oxford Formation 

Committee. 

Barbara VanDusen is a member of 

the executive committee of Detroit 

mmaher on MIKETEMP with SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS