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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Nos. 123,229

123,230

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

PETRINA LOURINE SNIDER,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Montgomery District Court; F. WILLIAM CULLINS, judge. Opinion filed June 18, 

2021. Affirmed.

Submitted by the parties for summary disposition pursuant to K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6820(g) and 

(h).

Before MALONE, P.J., POWELL and WARNER,JJ.

PER CURIAM: Petrina Lourine Snider appeals the district court's revocation of her

probation and the imposition of her underlying prison sentences in two cases which have 

been consolidated on appeal. We granted Snider's motion for summary disposition 

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 48). The State has not 

responded. After a review of the record, we affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, in 17 CR 514-I, Snider pled no 

contest to possession of methamphetamines, a severity level 5 drug felony, and 

possession of marijuana, a class A nonperson misdemeanor. In 18 CR 1-I, Snider pled no 
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contest to seven counts of forgery, seven counts of identity theft, and one count of theft, 

all nonperson felonies. At the sentencing hearing on September 18, 2018, the district 

court sentenced Snider to an aggregate sentence of 10 months in prison in each case but 

ordered the sentences to run consecutive to each other, for a total term of incarceration in 

both cases of 20 months. However, the district court granted Snider probation from both 

her prison sentences for a period of 18 months.

On January 2, 2019, Snider stipulated to violating her probation for failing to enter 

into drug treatment, waived her right to counsel and a hearing, and agreed to a three-day 

intermediate jail sanction.

On March 10, 2020, the State sought to revoke Snider's probation alleging, among 

other things, that Snider had committed new crimes while on probation as evidenced by 

her convictions in two Wilson County cases for theft, criminal damage to property, and 

criminal trespass. At her probation violation hearing held on July 21, 2020, Snider 

admitted to all the State's allegations, including her commission of new crimes. As a 

result, the district court, citing Snider's refusal to enter into drug treatment and her 

commission of new crimes, revoked her probation and imposed her underlying prison 

sentences.

Snider now appeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion by revoking her 

probation and ordering her to serve her prison sentences. Once a probation violation has 

been established, the decision to revoke probation is within the sound discretion of the 

district court. See State v. Coleman, 311 Kan. 332, 334, 460 P.3d 828 (2020); State v. 

Skolaut, 286 Kan. 219, 227-28, 182 P.3d 1231 (2008). A district court abuses its 

discretion if it bases its decision on legal or factual errors or if no reasonable person 

would agree with its decision. State v. Ballou, 310 Kan. 591, 615, 448 P.3d 479 (2019). 

Snider bears the burden to show an abuse of discretion by the district court. See State v. 

Thomas, 307 Kan. 733, 739, 415 P.3d 430 (2018).
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In this case, the district court's discretion on whether to revoke probation was

limited by the intermediate sanctions outlined in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716. According 

to the law in effect at the time Snider committed her crimes, a district court was required 

to impose graduated intermediate sanctions before revoking an offender's probation. 

K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c); State v. Huckey, 51 Kan. App. 2d 451, 454, 348 P.3d 997

(2015). However, there are exceptions which permit a district court to revoke a 

defendant's probation without having previously imposed the statutorily required 

intermediate sanctions. One exception allows the district court to revoke probation 

without imposing sanctions if "the offender commits a new felony or misdemeanor while 

the offender is on probation." K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(8)(A).

Here, it is undisputed that Snider committed new crimes while on probation, 

meaning the district court had the legal authority to revoke Snider's probation. Moreover, 

Snider fails to persuade us why she should have been placed back on probation given her 

refusal to enter into drug treatment and her commission of new crimes while on 

probation. Under these facts, we have no trouble concluding that a reasonable person 

could agree with the district court's decision to revoke Snider's probation and order that 

she serve her underlying prison sentence.

Affirmed.