Spec ifically , th e plain tiffs alleg e that the d efendants v iolated the Q ualifications C lause and the 1 First an d F ourteen th A m endm ents. A m . C om pl. ¶ ¶ 25 2- 257. UN ITED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA RA L PH N AD ER e t al

. , : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 08-0428 (RMU)

: v. : Document Nos.: 47, 48

: TERRY MCAUL I FF E e t al

. , : : Def endants. : M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION G R A N TI N G TH E D EF END A N TS ’ M OT I ONS T O D I SM I SS THE P LA INT IF FS ’ A M E NDE D C OM PL A I N T I. IN TR OD UC TIO N This matter is befor e the c ourt on the motions to dis miss filed by defe ndants Ter

ry McAuliffe , former

Chairman of the Democr atic National Comm ittee (“ DNC”), a nd Steven Raikin, Director , Trea surer and Secr etar

y of a political org anization called the B allot Project. The plaintiffs – Ralph Na der, his for mer runningmate Peter

Camejo and six of their supporters – broug ht the instant suit and many others followingNade r’s unsucc essful pre sidential bid in 2004. They claim that the def

endants c ommitt ed conspira cy , abuse of proce ss, malicious prosecution and violations of the United States Constituti on and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The def endants have 1 moved to dismiss . Be cause the cour t’s dismiss al of the pla intiffs’ claims in Civil Action No. 07- 2136 bar the state law c laims raised in this action under the doctrine of re s judicata, the c ourt g rants the de fenda

nts’ motions t o dismiss those claims. And bec ause the court re jects the plaintiffs’ alleg ation that the def endants a cted “ under c olor of state la w” a s require d for a

§ 1983 claim, the cour

t gr ants the def

endants’ motions to dismis s the plaintiffs’ fe dera l claims.2 II. F ACTUAL & P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND Th e fa c ts g ivi ngri se to t

he pla int if

fs ’ c la ims have be e n s e t f or th i n g re ate r d e ta il i n
sever al prior opinions. See Nader v. De mocratic Nat’l Comm. , 2008 WL5273109, at *1-*2 (D .D .C. De c . 2 2, 20 08 ); Nader v. De mocratic Nat’l Comm ., 555 F. Supp. 2d 137, 144-46 (D .D .C. 20 08 ); Nad

e r v . M c Au lif fe , 549 F. Supp. 2d 760, 761-62 (E .D. Va. 2008) . In short, the plaintiffs alleg e that supporter s of the Ke rry -Edwa rds 2004 campaig n “pre sided over a nationwide conspira cy

to suppress voter c hoice dur ing the 2004 Gene ral Elec tion” by filing ba llot
e lig ibi lity c omp la int s to un de rm ine Na de r’ s c and ida c y . Pl s. ’ O pp ’n to D e fs .’ Mo ts. to D ism iss (“Pls.’ Opp’n” ) at 3-4. T o rec tify the alleg ed violations of state a nd fede ral law , the plaintiffs broug ht suit i n this court, in the Superior Court of the D istrict of Columbia and in the United States District Court for the Ea stern District of V irg inia ag ainst various individuals associated with the Democr atic ticket. More spe cifica lly , the plaintiffs filed suit in the D.C. Superior Court ag ainst the DNC and three DNC offic ials, Kerr y -Edwa rds 2004, J ohn Ker

ry individually , Reed Smith L L P (“Reed Smit h”), the Ba llot P rojec t and two B allot Project offic ials, America Coming Tog ether

(“A CT”)
and the Se rv ic e Em

plo y e e s Inte rn atio na l U nio n ( “ SEI U” ), a lle g ingc on sp ir a c y , a bu se of pr oc e ss,
ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on

and vio latio ns of

42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 a

nd the Con sti tut ion . T he de fe nd ants
remove d the ac tion to thi s court, whe re it wa s dockete d as Civil Action No. 07-2136. The plaintiffs then ame nded their c omplaint and remove d the fe dera l claims, leavingonly the alleg ations of civil conspirac y , abuse of proce ss and malicious prosec ution. SeeAm. Compl., Nader v. De mocratic Nat’l Comm ., 555 F. Supp. 2d 137 (No. 07- 2136). On May 23, 2008, the court dismissed Civil Action No. 07-2136, de termining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider theBeca use the co m

plaint filed

in the E astern District of Virg inia b ore th e cap tion “ I n the Su perior 2 Court of the D istrict of Colum bia,” see C om

pl., the plaintiffs am ended the com plaint to correc t the ca ption, see A m . C om

pl
. Eachdefe ndan t’s m otion to dis m iss inco rporates the o ther b y referen ce. See D ef

. Mc A ul if fe ’s 3 Mot. to D ism iss (“McAuliffe Mot. ”) at 1; D ef. Raik in’s Mot. to Dism iss (“R aik in Mot. ”) at 2. 3 plaintiffs’ malicious prose cution claims that direc tly attacke d prior state c ourt judg ments, and that the Fir st Amendment barr ed the plaintiffs’ rema ining c laims. Nader v. De mocratic Nat’l Comm ., 555 F. Supp. 2d at 145. The da y afte r the plaintiffs f

iled suit in t he D.C. Superior Court, they filed the instant complaint ag ainst defe ndants McAuliffe and Raikin in the Easter n District of Virg inia. The 2
ame nd e d c omp la int

in t his a c tio n, wh ic h is ne arl y ide nti c a l to the or ig ina l c omp la int in C ivi l Action No. 07-2136 sa

ve for the identities of the def

endants, c om

pa reCompl. with Compl., Nader v. De mocratic Nat’l Comm. , 555 F. Supp. 2d 137 (No. 07- 2136), wa s later tra nsfer red from the Ea stern District of V irg inia to this court, seeMem. Op. (Ma r. 7, 2008) ( g rantingthe defe ndants’ motion to transfer venue to this court) . Finally , afte r this court dismissed the plaintiffs’ ame nded complaint in Civil Action No. 07-2136, the plaintiffs filed Civil Action No. 08 -0 96 3 a g a ins t th e DN C, K e rr y -E dw ard s 2 00 4, JohnKe rr y and Re e d Sm ithin t

his c ourt , alleg ing c onspiracy

and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Constitut ion. After de termining that it s d ism iss a l of

Civ il A c tio n N o. 07 -2 13 6 w a s r e s ju dic ata a s to the c la ims ra ise d in Civ il Action No. 08-0963, the court dismissed the latter a ction on Dec ember 22, 2008. Se e ge ne ra lly Nader v. De mocratic Nat’l Comm. , 2008 WL5273109 (D.D.C. De c. 22, 2008). Def endants McAuliffe a

nd Raikin have moved to dismiss the instant amended
c omp la int
. Withre sp e c t to the state law c la ims , th e y inc or po rate by re fe re nc e the de fe nd ants ’ 34

motions t o dismiss in Civi l Action No. 07-2136. See De f. Mc Au lif fe ’s Mo t. t o D ism iss Am
. Compl. (“McAuliffe Mot.”) at 1; De f. Raikin’s Mot. to Dismis s Am. Compl. (“Raikin Mot.”) at 1. An d in su pp or t of the ir mot ion s to dis mis s th e pla int if fs ’ f e de ra l c la ims , th e de fe nd ants contend that the c laims fail to alleg e state a ction, see McAuliffe Mot. at 4-11; Raikin Mot. at 6-8; fail to alleg e a c onstitut ional violation, see McAuliffe Mot. at 11; are time- barr ed, see Ra iki n Mot. at 8-10; and ar e conc lusory , see id. at 10 . T he c ourt no w t ur ns to t he se argume nts .

III . A NA LY SIS A. Le ga l St anda r d forRul e 12 (b )( 6) M ot ion to Di sm iss A Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss tests the lega l sufficienc y of a c omplaint. Browning v. Clint on , 2 92 F .3 d 2 35 , 2 42 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 2) . T he c omp la int ne e d o nly

se t f or th a sh or t and pla in statement of the c laim, givingthe def endant f air notice of the c laim and the g rounds upon which it rests. Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. W illiams , 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (c iting F ED . R. C IV . P. 8(a) (2) a

nd Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “ Such simpli fied notice pleadingis made possible by the libera l opportunity

for discove ry

and the other

pre- trial proce dures e stablished by the Rules to disclose more pre cisely the basis of both cla im and defe nse to define more na rrowly the disputed fac ts and issues.” Conley , 355 U.S. at 47-48 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . It is no t ne c e ssa ry fo r t he pla int if

f t o p le a d a ll e le me nts of

his prima fa cie c ase in the c omplaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sonoma N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002), or “plea d law or match fa cts to ever y element of

a leg al theory ,” Kri e

ge r v . F ad e ly , 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (inter nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted).5

Yet, the plaintiff must alleg e “a ny set of fa cts consistent with the alleg ations.” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 127 S. Ct . 1955, 1969 (2007) ( abrog atingthe oft-quoted la ng uag e fr om Conley , 355 U.S. at 45-56, ins tr uc tin gc ourt s n ot t o d ism iss fo r f a ilure to s tate a

c la im unle ss i t appea rs beyond doubt that “no set of f acts in support of his cla im [ ] would entit le him to relief” ); Aktieselsk

abet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v . Fame J eans, Inc
. , 525 F.3d 8, 16 n.4 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (a ff ir min gthat “ a

c omp la int

ne e ds some information about the c ircumstance s g iving r ise to the
c la ims ” ). Whil e the se fa c ts m us t “ po sse ss e no ug h h e ft

to ‘ sh o[w ] that th e ple a de r i s e nti tle d to relief ,’” a complaint “does not ne ed deta iled fac tual alleg ations.” Twom bly , 127 S. Ct . at 1964, 1966. In resolvinga Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the cour t must t reat the complaint’s fa ctual
a lle g atio ns – in c lud ingmixe d q ue sti on s o f l aw a

nd fa c t – a s tr

ue and dr aw a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces the ref

rom in the plaintiff’s fa

vor. Macharia v. U

nited States , 334 F.3d 61, 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Ho ly

Lan d F ou nd . fo r R e lie f &De v . v . A sh c ro

ft , 333 F.3d 156, 165 ( D.C. Cir. 20 03 ); Browning , 292 F.3d at 242. Whi le many well-plea ded complaints ar e conc lusory , the court ne ed not ac cept a s true infe renc es unsupported by fac ts set out in the complaint or leg al conclusions ca st as fac tual alleg ations. W arre n v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 3 53 F .3 d 3 6, 40 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 4) ; Browning , 292 F.3d at 242. The cour t’s resolution of a Rule 12( b)(6) motion repr esents a r

uling on the me rits with res judicata e ffe ct. Haase v . Sessions , 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987).6 B. T he Co ur t G r ant s t he De fend ant s’ M ot ion s t o D ism iss Co unt s I a nd II of t he Am e nde d Co m pla int 1. Legal Stand ard for Res Judicata “The doctrine of

res judicata pre vents repe titious litigation involving the sa me ca uses of action or the same issues.” I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund v . Indus. Gear M fg. Co. , 723 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Res judicata has two distinct aspec ts – claim prec lusion and issue prec lusion (commonly

known as c ollatera l estoppel) – that apply in differ ent circ umstances a nd with differ ent conse quence s to the liti g ants. NextW ave P ers. Commc’ns, Inc. v . Fed. Commc ’ns Comm’n , 2 54 F .3 d 1 30 , 1 42 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 1) ; Novak v . W orld Bank , 7 03 F .2 d 1 30 5, 13 09 (D .C. Cir. 1983). Under

claim pre clusion, “a f

inal judgme nt on the merits of an a ction prec ludes the parties or their privies fr om relitigating issues that we re or could have been r aised in that ac tion.” Drakev. Fe d. Aviation Admin. , 2 9 1 F. 3 d 5 9 , 6 6 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Al le n v . M c Cur ry , 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). Under issue pr eclusion or c ollatera l estoppel, “onc e a c ourt has dec ided an issue of fa ct or lawnece ssary to its j udg ment, that decision may prec lude re litigation of the issue in a suit on a diffe rent c ause of action involving a

party to the first ca se.” Y

amaha Corp. of Am. v. United States , 9 6 1 F. 2 d 2 4 5 , 2 5 4 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Allen , 4 49 U. S. at 94 ). In s ho rt , “cla im preclusion fore closes all that which mig ht have be en litigated pre viously ,” while issue prec lusion “preve nts the relitigation of any issue that was ra ised and de cided in a pr ior ac tion.” I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund, 7 23 F .2 d at 94 9; Novak, 7 03 F .2 d at 13 09 . In th is w ay , r e s ju dic ata helps “c onserve judicial resour ces, a void inconsistent results, eng ender respe ct for judg ments of predic table and c erta in effe ct, and [] prevent seria l forum-shoppingand piec emea l liti g ation.” Hardison v. Alex ander , 6 55 F .2 d 1 28 1, 12 88 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 1) ; se e als o Allen , 449 U.S. at 94.7

Be cause “re s judicata be longs to c ourts as we ll as to lit iga nts,” a c ourt may

invoke re s judicata su a s

po nte . Sta nto n v . D .C. Ct. of A pp e als , 1 27 F .3 d 7 2, 77 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 7) ; se e als o Tinsl ey v . Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc

. , 1 99 9 WL 50 67 20 , at *1 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 9) (p e r c ur iam) (n oti ngthat a

dis tr ic t c ourt

may a pp ly re s ju dic ata

up on takin gjud ic ia l no tic e of

the pa rt ie s’ previous ca se). 2. The Re s J udic at a D oc tr ine Bar s C ount s I a nd II of t he Am e nde d Co m pla int Pr e suma bly be c a us e the pa rt ie s b ri e fe d th e mot ion s to dis mis s in Ap ri l 20 08 – th at is , befor e the c ourt dismissed Ci vil Action No. 07-2136 on May 27, 2008 – the def

endants did not raise r es judicata

as a ba r to the plaintiffs’ c laims of conspirac y , abuse of proce ss and malicious prosec ution. Se e ge ne ra lly McAuliffe Mot.; Raikin M ot. All parties, howeve r, agree that the
c la ims ra ise d in

Civ il A c tio n N o. 07 -2 13 6 a re ide nti c a l to the state law c la ims br ou g ht i n Co un ts Iand I Iof the instant ac tion. SeeMcAuliffe Mot. at 1; Raikin Mot . at 1; Pls.’ Opp’n at 1-2. The court’s dismissal of Civil Action No. 07-2136 was ba sed on its determination that it lacke d jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ ma licious prosecution cla ims that directly attacke d prior state cour t judgments a

nd that the Fir st Amendment barr ed the plaintiffs’ rema ining c laims. Nader v. De mocratic Nat’l Comm ., 555 F. Supp. 2d at 145. B eca use Counts Iand I Iof the instant complaint are ide ntical to the state lawclaims dismissed in C ivil Action No. 07-2136, the court will not permit the par ties to relitigate those cla ims here. See I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund , 723 F.2d at 949. Accor dingly , the cour t gr ants the def

endants’ motions to dismis s Counts Iand I Iof the amended c omplaint.8 C. The Co ur t G r ant s t he De fend ant s’ M ot ion s t o D ism iss Co unt s II I a nd IVof t he Am e nde d Co m pla int 1 . L eg a l S ta n d a rd f

o r § 1 9 8 3 Cl a i ms Se c tio n 1 98 3 c re ate s a

c a us e of a c tio n a g a ins t [e] very person who, unde r color of any statute, ordinanc e, re g ulation, custom, or usag e, of a

ny State or Ter

ritory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or c auses to be subjected, a

ny citizen of the United States or other pe rson within the jurisdiction there of to the depr ivation of an y rig hts, privilege s, or immuniti es sec ured by the Con sti tut ion

and laws . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff bring ing a § 1983 claim “must alleg e both (1) that he was de prived of a r ight se cure d by

the Constitut ion or laws of the United States, and (2) that the def endant acte d ‘under

color of’ the law of

a state, te rritory

or the District of Columbia.” Hoai v. Vo , 935 F. 2 d 3 0 8 , 3 1 2 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 1 ) ( ci t i n g Adicke s v. S.H. Kress &Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)). Al tho ug h § 19 83 or din ari ly do e s n ot c re ate a

c a us e of a c tio n r e late d to the c on du c t of pr ivate pa rt ie s, pr ivate c on du c t ma

y be de e me d to be “ un de r c olo r o f s tate law” wh e n it is “ fa ir ly attributable” to the state. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc. , 4 57 U. S. 9 22 , 9 37 (1 98 2) . T his
occur s in two circumstanc es: when pr ivate par ties “conspire with state offic ials, and whe n they willfully eng ag e in joint activity

with a state or its ag ents.” Hoai , 935 F.2d at 313. A showing of state a c tio n r e qu ir e d to de mon str ate a vio latio n o f t

he F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt e nc omp a sse s a showing of ac tion “under c olor of state la w” f or the purpose s of § 1983. LaRouche v . Fowler , 152 F.3d 974, 988 n.18 ( D.C. Cir. 1998). Courts must adhere c are fully to the dichotomy

betwee n state ac tion and private a ction, as it “pre serve s an ar ea of individual free dom by

limit ing the
rea ch of f eder al law a

nd fede ral judicial powe r.” Lugar , 4 57 U. S. at 93 6. Thus , a § 1 98 3 c la im b ro u gh taga i n s ta p ri v at e p arty ca n n o ts urv i v e am o t i o nt o d i s m i s s i f t h e p l ai n t i ff fa i l s t o al l egeThe defen dants adv ance three o ther argum ents in sup port o f their m otions to dis m iss: first, they 4 conten d that the plaintiffs h av e failed to alleg e a constitutio nal v iolation becau se the re is no constitutio nal rig ht to be free of challeng es to ballot a ccess petitions, McAuliffe Mot. at 1 1; secon d, they

assert that the plain tiffs’ claim s are tim e- barred, R aik in Mot. at 8
- 10; and third, they subm it that the p laintiffs failed to plead with sufficient particularity their alleg ations of consp iracy , id. at 1 0. A s a result o f its d eterm ination that the defe ndan ts’ con duct is no t actionab le un der § 19 83 becau se it did n ot tak e plac e un der c olor o f state law, the court has no occasio n to reach these conten tions. 9 that the def

endant wa s eng ag ed in state a ction or ac ted under color of state law. Hoai , 935 F.2d at 312. 2. The Defendan ts Are Not State Act ors and Did Not Ac t Under Colorof S tate Law The de fenda

nts move to dismi ss Counts I I Iand IV of the a mended c omplaint – which alleg e conspira cy

and violations of § 1983 and the Constitution – contending that they are not state ac tors and did not act unde r color of state law. Mc Auliffe Mot. at 4-11; Raikin Mot. at 6-8. 4 The plaintiffs disagree , seePls. ’ O pp ’n at 8- 14 , a rguin gthat th e ir

“ a lle g atio ns are su ff

ic ie nt t o establish state ac tion under a ‘ public function’ test or a ‘joint action’ test,” id. at 13. The c ourt
no w a dd re sse s e a c h o f t

he se tw o th e or ie s. First, the plaintiffs a lleg e that the de fenda nts “wer e eng ag ed in a public f unction when the y c on sp ir e d, by

and thr ou g h th e DN C and

its state De moc ratic Part y a ff ili ate s, to s up pr e ss voter c hoice in the 2004 pr esidential ele ction by preve nting a

competingcandida cy

from g aining ballot acc ess.” Id. at 4. Notingthat the “ope rative te st” for whether a private par

ty has eng ag ed in a public func tion in thi s context i s whether the par ty “exerc ise[d] power

over the elec toral p r o c e s s , ” th e p la inti f

f s ma inta in

th at t h e d e f e n d an ts s ati s f

ie d th is s ta n d ar d b y “ e xe r c is [i n g ] a unilatera l power de leg ated by the State to challeng e compe ting c andidates,” as we ll as by “eng ag [i ng ] i n the public func tion of testing the c andidates’ qualifications for public offic e.” Id. at 11.10

Th e de fe nd ants re fute the pla int if fs ’ c ha ra c te ri zat ion , n oti ngthat “ [f]il ingc ha lle ng e s to ba llo t pe tit ion s . . . is n ot a fu nc tio n tr a dit ion a lly

pe rf or me d b y the state or

tr a dit ion a lly employing state power s;” to the contra ry , state ballot ac cess statutes g ive private citizens the right to file cha lleng es of the sor t that the defe ndants filed her e. De f. McAuliff e’s Reply in Support of M o t . t o Di s m i s s (“ M cA u l i ff e R ep l y ”) at6
. Fu rt h er , ci t i n g Fu lan i v . M c Au lif fe , a ca se brought
a g a ins t de fe nd ant M c Au lif fe by su pp or te rs of the Na de r- Came

jo t ic ke t in

20 04 , th e de fe nd ants argue that “to the e x tent that Plaintiffs acc use De fenda nts of using State e lection law to impede the Nade r/Camejo ca

ndidacy and violate Plaintiffs’ e qual protec tion rights or r ight to vote, that claim fa ils as a matter of

law” be cause “‘me rely

resor ting to the c ourts and beingon the winning side of a la

wsuit does not make a pa rty ’ re sponsible for depr iving a plaintiff of his rig hts.” M cA u l i ff e M o t . at6 (qu o t i n g Fu lan i v . M c Au lif fe , 2005 WL2276881 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2005)). In the def

endants’ vie w, the plaintiffs’ tr ue grieva nce is with the “ fairne ss and constitutionalit y

of the ba llot acce ss statutes,” but that “is an issue for a diffe rent c ase.” Id. As a pr e lim ina

ry matte r, the c ourt

a g re e s w iththe de fe nd ants ’ o bs e rv atio n th at me re ly filing, a nd winning, a

lawsuit does not g ive rise to a c onstitut ional claim unless the plaintiff alleg es that the judg e pre siding ove r the law suit was a co- conspirator or a joint ac tor with a private pa rty . Dennis v. Spark

s , 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980). The plaintiffs make no suc h alleg ation; there fore , to the extent that the plaintiffs’ relianc e on the “ public function” te st stems from the defe ndants’ appe al to the cour ts, see, e .g. , Pl s. ’ O pp ’n

at 7 ( de c lari ngthat th e de fe nd ants “conspire d to preve nt Mr. Nade r and Mr . Camejo from runningfor public of fice . . . and to deny Pla int if f- vo te rs the c ho ic e of

vo tin gfo r t

he m, b y . . . w a g [ing ] a n atio nw ide a ssa ult of g ro un dle ss and abusive litigation”) , their § 1983 cla im fails. Furthe r, it is well-settled that a public f unctionThe plaintiffs m ak e m uch of the fact that the act of co nduc ting and regulatingan election has 5 be en

h el d to b e an

e xc lu si v el y

p ub li c func ti on , P ls
. ’ O pp ’na t 1 0; see a lso F lagg Bros . v . B rooks , 436 U. S. 149, 15 8 (1 978), but beca use the alleg edly

un constitutio nal co nduc t here consisted of filing cha lleng es to elig ibility for office ra ther th an a ctually con ductingor reg ulatingan election, that authority

is n ot on po int. Altho ug h the plead ing s do no t prov ide th e text of all of the state ballot a ccess statutes unde r 6 whic h the defe ndan ts cha lleng ed th e N ader candid acy , th ey cite two such statutes as ex am ples, one of which prov ides th at “[a]ny leg al v oter . . . h av ingob j ections to any

certificate of nom ination or n om ination papers or p etitions filed, shall file an o bjector’s petition [with] the State Board o f Elec tions, ” 10 I LL . C O MP . S TAT . 5 /10- 8, and the o ther o f w hich places no lim it on who m ay ob j ect to a no m ination paper or p etition, see 25 P A . S TAT . ANN . § 29 37. 11 “ is n ot s imp ly

on e ‘t ra dit ion a lly

e mpl oye d b y

g ov e rnme nts ,’ but r athe r o ne ‘t ra dit ion a lly exclusively

rese rved to the State.’ ” LaRouche , 1 5 2 F. 3 d at9 9 0 (qu o t i n g Flagg Bros. v. Brooks , 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978)). The plaintiffs offe r no fa cts that plausibly sug g ests that filing ba llot
acc ess cha lleng es is a func tion “traditionally exclusively

rese rved to the States.” See Twom bly , 1 2 7 S
. C t . at1 9 6 5 (qu o t i n g Pa pa sa n v . A lla in , 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (statingthat “on a motion to di smiss, courts ‘are not bound to acce pt as true a leg al conc lusion couched a s a fa ctual alleg ation’”) ). Moreove r, the fa ct that private citizens may file cha lleng es under

the ballot 5
a c c e ss s tatut e s is a

nti the tic a l to the a sse rt ion that do ingso is a

fu nc tio n tr a dit ion a lly

e xclu siv e ly 6
re se rv e d to the State s. As a re su lt, the c ourt

re je c ts t he pla int if

fs ’ a sse rt ion

that th e de fe nd ants
e ng a g e d in

an e xclu siv e ly

pu bli c fu nc tio n b y fi lin gc ha lle ng e s und e r t

he state ba llo t a c c e ss statutes. In a dd iti on

to a rguin gtha

t th e de fe nd ants are lia

ble un de r § 19 83 ba se d o n a “ pu bli c function” the ory , the plaintiffs also conte nd that “[a] finding of state action . . . is furthe r justified by the joint participation [in t he def endants’ a lleg ed conspira cy by ] st ate of

ficials in seve ral states.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 13. They cite eight specific a cts of state of ficials in I llinois , New Me x ico, Ore g on, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbi a and West Virg inia that, in their view,12

demonstrate that the defe ndants wer e eng ag ed in joint action with state offic ials and ca n there fore be held liable unde r § 1983. Id. at 4-6, 13. Th e de fe nd ants c ounte r t

hat a lth ou g h th e pla int if

fs argue that th e de fe nd ants e ng a g e d in joint activity

with state offic ials, they

fail to name a

ny state ac tors as def

endants or a s nondefe ndant co- conspirator s. Def. Ra ikin’s Reply in Support of Mot. to Dism iss at 4. Furthe r, the defe ndants note that the state of ficials the plaintiffs ide ntify “fa ll into t wo categ ories: (1)
e mpl oye e s o f s tate le g isl atur e s w ho a ssi ste d th e a lle g e d c o- c on sp ir ator s to dr a ft ba llo t a c c e ss
c ha lle ng e s, and

(2 ) s tate c ourt

jud g e s, se c re tari e s o f s tate and state atto rn e y s w ithre sp on sib ili ty t o s e e th atth e s t at e ’ s s t atu t e s w e r e e n f o r c e d
. ” M c A u l i f

f e R e p l y at8
. A s t o th e f

o r m e r c at e g o r y, the de fe nd ants ave r t

hat th e e mpl oye e s o f s tate le g isl atur e s w ho he lpe d d ra ft ba llo t a c c e ss challeng es did not lend the imprimatur of the state to the ballot acc ess cha lleng es. Id. at 8-9. An d a s to the latte r, wh ile the de fe nd ants c on c e de that th e state of fi c ia ls p e rf

or me d a state function by

enfor cingthe states’ ba llot acce ss laws, they submit t hat these of

ficials’ a ctions are protec ted by

qualified immunity
. Id. at 9. A p ri vate pa

rt y c an b e he ld l ia

ble un de r § 19 83 wh e n h e or sh e c on sp ir e s o r a c ts i n
conce rt with state ac tors. Rende ll-Baker v . Kohn , 457 U.S. 830, 838 & n.6 ( 1982) (c ontrasting
c a se s in wh ic h th e Sup re me Court up he ld § 19 83 su its ba se d o n th e joi nt a c tiv ity pr inc ipl e wi th
case s in which it declined to apply the principle be cause the state off icials’ role in the conduct
wa s n ot s uf

fi c ie ntl y pr omi ne nt) ; se e als o Adicke s , 3 9 8 U. S
. at1 5 2 (qu o t i n g United States v. Price , 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)) ( explaining that “[t] o act ‘ under c olor’ of la w does not re quire that the ac cused be an off icer of the State[, beca

use] [ i] t is enoug h that he is a willful par ticipant in joint activity

with the State or its ag ents”). H ere , despite adva ncingvague asse rtions that the13

defe ndants eng ag ed in a “ conspirac y that involved the State . . . and whic h implicates the State,” Pls. ’ O pp ’n

at 4, and a c c us ingstate a c tor s o f “ e ng a g [ing ] in a c ts t hat f ur the re d D e fe nd ants ’ conspirac y ,” id. at 13, the plaintiffs do not conte nd that state off icials enter ed into a conspira cy with the defe ndants to violate the plaintiffs’ c onstitut ional rig hts, seeAm. Compl. ¶¶ 25-46 (f a ili ngto l ist

any state of fi c ia ls a s a lle g e d “ no n- de fe nd ant c o- c on sp ir ator s” ); c f. Adicke s , 398 U.S. at 152 (holding that private de fenda nts could be held liable a s state ac tors if they “re ache d
an und e rs tand ing ” wi th s tate of fi c ia ls t o d e ny

the pla int if

fs ’ c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts ); Hoai , 935 F.2d at 313 (re jectingthe plaintiff’s c laim that the defe ndant ac ted under color of state law be cause the plaintiff fa iled to alleg e that the de fenda nt conspired with state of ficials). N or do they

“identify any fac ts that are sug g estive enough to rende r a . . . c onspiracy plausible.” Twom bly , 1 27 S. Ct
. at 1965. As a r esult, the court r ejec ts the plaintiffs’ asse rtion that the defe ndants ac ted in conce rt wi th s tate a c tor s. Fur thermore , althoug h the plaintiffs ac knowledg e that a ke y fac tor in the joint action analy sis is whether the pr ivate conduc t rec eived the imprimatur of the state, see Blum v. Y

aretsky , 45 7 U .S. 99 1, 10 03 (1 98 2) ; Franz v. United States , 707 F.2d 582, 594 n.45 ( D.C. Cir. 1983), they fail to articulate how the de fenda nts’ conduct he re r ece ived the public imprimatur of the state. As the de fe nd ants c or

re c tly po int out, t he pu bli c of fi c ia ls who we re inv olv e d in the ba llo t a c c e ss challeng es – state c ourt judg es, sec reta ries of state and state’ s attorney s – are shielded fr om liability
. See W

ill v. Mich. De

pt. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holdingthat “neither a State no r i ts o ff

ic ia ls a c tin gin t

he ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s a re ‘p e rs on s’ un de r § 19 83 ” ). An d th e so le
re ma ini nga lle g atio n o n whic h th e pla int if fs ’ j oint a c tiv ity

the or y re sts – th at so me ind ivi du a ls employ ed by

state leg islatures assisted in dra fting ballot acc ess cha lleng es – fa ils to establish “a14

sufficie ntly

close ne x us betwee n the State and [the defe ndant] . . . so that the action of the latter may be fa irly treated as that of the State itself.” Blum , 4 5 7 U. S
. at1 0 0 4 (qu o t i n g Jack son v. Metro. Edison Co. , 4 19 U. S. 3 45 , 3 51 (1 97 4) (a ff ir min gthe dis mis sa l of

the c omp la int

be c a us e the de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t di d n ot c on sti tut e state a c tio n) ); se e als o Griffin v. Maryland , 3 78 U. S. 1 3 0 , 1 3 5 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ( n o t i n gth at“ [ i ] f ani n d i v i d

u a l i s p o s s e s s e d

o f s t at e a u th o r i ty and purports to act
un de r th at a uth or ity , h is a c tio n is state a c tio n” ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . A c c or din g ly , th e c ourt re je c ts the plaintiffs’ c laim that the defe ndants’ conduc t is actionable unde r § 1983 and grants the de fe nd ants ’ m oti on s to dis mis s Co un ts I I Iand I V o f t he ame nd e d c omp la int
.
IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the c ourt g rants the de fenda nts’ motions t o dismiss the pla int if fs ’ a me nd e d c omp la int . A n O rd e r c on sis te nt w ith thi s Me mor and

um O pin ion

is separ ately and conte mporane ously

issued this 7th day

of January , 2009.

RI CARDO M. URBI

NA United States District J udg e