2020 IL App (1st) 181263-U 

 FIRST DISTRICT,

SECOND DIVISION

 April 7, 2020 

No. 1-18-1263 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

_____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CARNELL JONES, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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) 

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) 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County, Illinois. 

No. 13 CR 3179 

Honorable 

Kevin M. Sheehan, 

Judge Presiding.

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: (1) Trial record was insufficiently developed to adjudicate defendant’s ineffective 

assistance claim. (2) State’s firearm identification expert was not required on direct 

examination to disclose the facts underlying his opinion. (3) Allowing jury access to 

unadmitted transcript during deliberations was harmless error because the transcript 

contained nothing inculpatory. (4) Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of firstdegree murder on a theory of accountability. 

¶ 2 Following a shooting incident in a parking lot, defendant Carnell Jones was convicted of 

the murder of Javonne Oliphant and the attempted murder of Andre Gladney. Jones argues that 

his conviction must be reversed because (1) his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 
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suppress evidence that Jones possessed one of the guns used in the incident; (2) the State lacked 

a foundation for the opinions of its firearm identification expert and bolstered his conclusion 

with inadmissible hearsay; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the jury access to a transcript of 

grand jury testimony introduced only as to Jones’ co-defendant Omar Williams; and (4) the 

evidence was insufficient to prove Jones guilty of Oliphant’s murder. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 At around 11:15 p.m. on July 1, 2011, Gladney and Oliphant were shooting dice at a 

playground near the Abla Homes housing project. Gladney had consumed a cup of tequila and a 

pill of ecstasy, and he had been smoking marijuana all day. Although he was high, he claimed it 

did not affect his ability to function. In an adjacent parking lot, he saw a van pull up which he 

recognized as belonging to Antoine Williams and his “cousin or uncle” Omar Williams. 

¶ 5 Gladney gave multiple accounts of what happened next. At trial, he testified that after 

the dice game ended, he saw Omar and Antoine in the parking lot, but he did not see Jones, 

whom he knew from the neighborhood since he was a child. Oliphant went to speak with Omar 

and Antoine, while Gladney remained at the playground doing things on his cell phone. He 

could hear Oliphant, Omar, and Antoine “going back and forth” as if they were explaining things 

to each other, but he did not hear any raised voices. Suddenly, while Gladney was still looking 

at his cell phone, he was shot in the back. He fled on foot. While fleeing, he was shot several 

more times. He did not see who shot him, nor did he see what happened to Oliphant. 

¶ 6 Gladney told a different version of events in a handwritten statement he gave to an 

assistant State’s attorney on September 28, 2011, as well as his grand jury testimony, both of 

which were introduced as substantive evidence (see 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2016)). In his 
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statement and in his grand jury testimony, he said that he saw Jones with Omar and Antoine in 

the parking lot. Gladney and Oliphant both went to speak with them, and a verbal argument 

broke out between Omar and Oliphant. During the argument, Omar walked behind Gladney and 

grabbed him by the shoulders. When Gladney tried to pull away, Omar shot him in the back. 

Gladney fell to the ground, and Omar shot him two more times. Oliphant grabbed Omar, and the 

two of them started tussling. Gladney got up and began running away in the direction of the 

playground. As he ran, he looked back and saw Omar shoot Oliphant three times. Oliphant fell 

to the ground, whereupon Omar turned back toward Gladney, pointed his gun at him, and fired 

“[l]ike three more times.” At the same time, Gladney also saw Jones firing a gun at him. 

¶ 7 A security guard at Abla Homes, Jason Jones (no apparent relation to defendant), was 

standing by his squad car when he heard a series of gunshots and saw people running away from 

the nearby playground area. He approached the scene of the shooting, where he saw one victim

lying on the ground “bleeding out” and a second victim running away. At trial, Jason was unable 

to recall whether he saw anyone firing a gun. But in his grand jury testimony on October 18, 

2011, Jason stated that he had a clear line of sight to the shooter, whom he described as a black 

man with short dreadlocks, around 5’7” and 175 pounds, wearing a white t-shirt and dark jeans. 

Although he only saw a single shooter, he testified that the earlier gunfire sounded as if it came 

from two different caliber handguns. 

¶ 8 Police and paramedics arrived on the scene, and Gladney was hospitalized with nine 

gunshot wounds. As for Oliphant, a medical examiner determined that he died of multiple 

gunshot wounds. Police collected evidence from the scene, including twelve 9-millimeter 

cartridge cases and seven .40-caliber cartridge cases.
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¶ 9 The day after the shooting, on August 2, 2011, detectives visited Gladney in the hospital. 

Gladney told them that he did not see who shot him. On August 9, detectives brought Gladney

to the police station, whereupon he told a different story: he said that Jones and Omar were the 

shooters and identified photographs of them. At trial, Gladney testified that he lied to the 

detectives on August 9 because they knew that he was “on the run from the Feds” and threatened 

to turn him over unless he said what they wanted to hear. (In fact, at the time of trial, Gladney 

was in federal custody for conspiracy to deliver heroin.) Detective Marco Garcia, one of the 

detectives who interviewed Gladney, denied threatening to turn him over to federal authorities. 

¶ 10 A few days later, on August 12, 2011, at around 3 a.m., Officer Brandon Smith and his 

partner were on patrol in an unmarked squad car. They observed a car parked outside a house 

with loud music playing from its stereo, and two or three people drinking beer outside. They

exited their squad car to “stop the noise disturbance”; as they did so, one of the beer drinkers 

dropped his beer and ran inside the house. 

¶ 11 Smith’s partner went to the front of the house while Smith went to the backyard. 

Through the back window of the house, Smith saw Jones standing inside, approximately five feet 

away. Jones was posing with two guns, one in each hand, while another man took photographs 

of him. Smith recognized the guns as Glock handguns because of their distinctive square-shaped 

barrels, and he also observed that both guns had extended magazines. 

¶ 12 Smith radioed for backup. A few minutes later, five to ten backup officers arrived, 

entered the house, and began detaining individuals. Smith followed them inside, found Jones 

standing near the basement door, and “place[d] him in custody” for aggravated unlawful use of a 

weapon (AUUW). He then searched the basement and, in a washing machine, found two 

handguns: a Glock 9-millimeter semi-automatic pistol and a Glock .40-caliber semi-automatic 
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pistol, both with extended magazines and both loaded. Smith recognized them as the handguns 

that Jones had been holding. He did not find any other guns in the house. 

¶ 13 State firearms identification expert Kellen Hunter tested the guns and determined that the 

9-millimeter Glock matched all twelve of the 9-millimeter cartridge cases found at the scene of 

the crime. The other gun did not match the remaining cartridge cases. 

¶ 14 On September 28, 2011, Gladney spoke with an assistant State’s attorney and gave a 

handwritten statement implicating Jones and Omar in the shootings. He told the ASA that he 

initially claimed not to have seen who shot him because he planned to retaliate on his own, but 

after Oliphant’s funeral, he decided that he “didn’t want any more trouble” since “it was already 

enough that [he] lost [his] best friend.” On October 13, 2011, Gladney appeared before a grand 

jury and gave testimony consistent with his handwritten statement.

¶ 15 Jones and Omar were tried simultaneously before separate juries. During trial, Hunter 

testified that Jones’ 9-millimeter Glock matched the 9-millimeter cartridge cases recovered from 

the crime scene. In reaching this conclusion, he considered both class characteristics (features 

designed by the manufacturer) and individual characteristics (irregularities and imperfections). 

The common class characteristics he observed were caliber and the elliptical shape of the firing 

pin; the individual characteristics were “the shear mark as well as the breech face marks.” 

Hunter also testified, without objection, that the Illinois State Police lab requires all his 

conclusions to be verified by another examiner. 

¶ 16 During cross-examination, counsel for Jones asked Hunter: 

“Q. And when you ultimately make that call [that a fired cartridge case matches a 

firearm], *** that decision is ultimately based on your subjective judgment, your training, 

and your experience? 
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A. Yes.

 Q. There is no objective standard and there is no computer program or anything 

like that out there that tells you for certain, this cartridge case was or was not fired from 

this particular gun? 

 A. Yes. It was based on my training and experience as well as being verified by 

another court-qualified examiner.”

Counsel for Jones did not object to this testimony.

¶ 17 During redirect examination, the State asked Hunter, “And, [in] this case, your work was 

validated as well, correct?” Over the defense’s hearsay objection, Hunter was allowed to 

reiterate that his results were verified by “another court-qualified examiner.” 

¶ 18 Omar called Kenneth McNeal as a witness in his defense; Jones’ jury was not present 

during McNeal’s testimony. McNeal testified that he was in the parking lot when the shooting 

occurred. He saw Antoine’s van but did not see Omar. When the shooting began, McNeal ran 

away and did not see who was firing. McNeal was impeached by his grand jury testimony, in 

which he stated that he glanced back while running and saw a man “let off two shots into the 

victim” (Oliphant). McNeal also told the grand jury that he heard more gunshots from the left 

side of the parking lot, which sounded like they came from a different gun. 

¶ 19 During deliberations, Jones’ jury sent a note requesting transcripts of Gladney’s and 

Jason’s grand jury testimony. (Jason’s transcript was admitted into evidence, but Gladney’s 

transcript was not.) After discussion with counsel and the deputy sheriff, the trial judge sent 

back a note saying, “You should have the Jason Jones grand jury document. *** Continue to 

deliberate. You have all the evidence and exhibits.” The jury sent a second note stating that it

had transcripts of both Jason’s and McNeal’s grand jury testimony, but not Gladney’s. 
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¶ 20 Jones’ counsel observed that McNeal was Omar’s defense witness and that “[t]hey are 

deliberating with the wrong evidence,” whereupon the court directed the deputy sheriff to 

remove the McNeal transcript from the jury. Jones’ counsel then moved for a mistrial. The trial 

court denied the motion, observing that “[t]here is nothing inculpatory there.” 

¶ 21 The jury found Jones guilty of both the murder of Oliphant and the attempted murder of 

Gladney. 

¶ 22 After his conviction but prior to sentencing, Jones obtained new counsel and moved for a 

new trial, arguing, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek 

suppression of the Glock recovered from the house party. In support, he argued: 

“The trial testimony revealed that on August 11, 2011, officer Smith illegally entered the 

backyard of 9125 S. Paulina and looked through a window into the home. He allegedly 

observed Jones holding a gun. Officer Smith along with other officers proceeded to enter 

the home without a valid consent or warrant. *** The officers’ actions violated Jones’ 

constitutional rights and should have been barred from evidence at trial.”

¶ 23 At the hearing on Jones’ motion, the trial court asked: “Did [Jones] have any standing to 

assert anything on that private property? *** If a gun is found in a dryer, does he have any 

standing to contest its recovery?” The State argued that Jones did not, since there was no 

evidence he lived at the house and, in fact, his arrest report listed a different residence for him. 

The State additionally argued there was no evidence that Jones was an invited guest at the house, 

and it was possible that the house was abandoned property or that Jones was trespassing. 

¶ 24 The trial court denied Jones’ motion for a new trial. Jones was sentenced to consecutive 

prison terms of 45 years for the murder of Oliphant and 25 years for the attempted murder of 

Gladney. 
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¶ 25 ANALYSIS

¶ 26 Jones argues that his conviction must be reversed because (1) his counsel was ineffective 

for failing to seek suppression of the handguns recovered from the house party; (2) the State 

lacked a foundation for Hunter’s firearm identification testimony and also bolstered his 

conclusion with inadmissible hearsay; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the jury access to 

McNeal’s grand jury testimony; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to prove Jones guilty of 

Oliphant’s murder, since he did not personally shoot Oliphant and there was no evidence he 

shared a criminal design with Omar. We consider these contentions in turn. 

¶ 27 Suppression of the Glocks 

¶ 28 Jones’ first argument is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 

suppress the handguns recovered from the house party. 

¶ 29 To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s 

performance was objectively unreasonable and (2) defendant was thereby prejudiced. People v. 

Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 81 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)). 

For the performance prong, we are mindful that counsel’s decision not to file a motion to 

suppress is typically “ ‘a matter of trial strategy, which is entitled to great deference.’ ” People 

v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122, 128 (2008) (quoting People v. White, 221 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2006)). For the 

prejudice prong, Jones bears the burden of demonstrating “that the unargued suppression motion 

is meritorious, and that a reasonable probability exists that the trial outcome would have been 

different had the evidence been suppressed.” People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 15. 

¶ 30 We begin by considering the merits of the unargued suppression motion. The fourth 

amendment to the United States Constitution protects people from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. But fourth amendment rights are personal and may not be 
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vicariously asserted. People v. Rosenberg, 213 Ill. 2d 69, 77 (2004); People v. McCauley, 2018 

IL App (1st) 160812, ¶ 29 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Thus, before a 

defendant can seek to suppress the fruit of an unlawful search, he must first show that he is 

entitled to contest its legality. McCauley, 2018 IL App (1st) 160812, ¶ 29. A defendant may

accomplish this by proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Id.; 

People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 170474, ¶ 23. Alternately, a defendant may prove that he 

was unlawfully arrested and the challenged search was the fruit of the unlawful arrest. People v. 

Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 92 (2010) (“evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest may be 

subject to the exclusionary rule and inadmissible” if there is a sufficient “causal nexus” between 

the illegal police activity and the disputed evidence) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 

471, 484-86 (1963)); see also People v. Horton, 2019 IL App (1st) 142019-B, ¶¶ 82-85 

(suppressing evidence discovered as a result of unlawful detention of defendant); Henderson, 

2013 IL 114040, ¶¶ 31, 50 (although defendant was unlawfully seized, incriminating evidence 

later found by police was not the fruit of the unlawful seizure and therefore did not warrant 

suppression). 

¶ 31 Here, Jones has not met his burden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the house where the party occurred. The record does not reflect that Jones resided at 

the house, or that he was an overnight guest, or that any other circumstances existed which 

would make an expectation of privacy reasonable. (In fact, during the hearing on his posttrial 

motion, Jones did not dispute the State’s assertion that he resided elsewhere.) All we know, on 

this record, is that Jones was present in the house when the search occurred, which is plainly 

insufficient to create a reasonable expectation of privacy. See City of Champaign v. Torres, 214 
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Ill. 2d 234, 245 (2005) (defendant could not contest legality of warrantless search of residence

where he was “just there to attend a party”). 

¶ 32 Jones next argues that his arrest was unlawful since Smith lacked a warrant or probable 

cause that he had committed a crime. As discussed, Smith testified at trial that he saw Jones 

posing for photos while holding two Glock handguns. He then radioed for backup. After the 

backup arrived, Smith entered the house, saw Jones standing near the basement door, and 

“plac[ed] him in custody” for AUUW. Smith then searched the basement and found the guns 

Jones had been holding. 

¶ 33 These facts do not reflect that Smith had probable cause to believe that Jones had 

committed or was committing a crime at the time of his arrest. The AUUW statute then in effect 

allowed a citizen to carry a gun when “on his or her land” or when “on the land or in the legal 

dwelling of another person as an invitee with that person’s permission.” 720 ILCS 5/24-

1.6(a)(1) (West 2010). Nothing in Smith’s testimony suggests that he had any reason to believe 

that Jones was not in his own house or in a friend’s house. On the contrary, Smith admitted that 

he never found out who owned the house. Additionally, Smith did not testify to any facts that 

would give rise to suspicion that Jones was committing another gun-related crime, such as 

burglary or assault. 

¶ 34 But because there was no suppression hearing, and because the legality of Jones’ 

possession of the handguns was not at issue at trial, the record is insufficiently developed for 

Jones to meet his burden of proof on this issue. We do not know, for instance, if Smith asked 

Jones to produce his Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card prior to the arrest, or if Smith 

had other reasons, not stated at trial, for believing that Jones’ possession of the handguns was 

unlawful. Therefore, we find that Jones has, on this record, failed to prove that his arrest was 
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illegal. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d at 135 (rejecting defendant’s ineffective assistance claim on direct 

appeal where the record was insufficient to address defendant’s arguments, but observing that 

defendant could still raise his claim in a postconviction petition); see also Henderson, 2013 IL 

114040, ¶ 22 (“[W]here, as here, the defendant’s claim of ineffectiveness is based on counsel’s 

failure to file a suppression motion, the record will frequently be incomplete or inadequate to 

evaluate that claim because the record was not created for that purpose.”).

¶ 35 Additionally, even assuming arguendo that Jones’ arrest was unlawful, Jones would still 

bear the burden of demonstrating that the guns recovered from the house were the fruit of his 

unlawful arrest. In determining this issue, we consider “ ‘whether the chain of causation 

proceeding from the unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been interrupted by some 

intervening circumstance so as to remove the “taint” imposed upon that evidence by the original 

illegality.’ ” Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 33 (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 

471 (1980)). Relevant factors include the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the 

discovery of the evidence, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and 

flagrancy of the illegal conduct. Id.

¶ 36 Here, Smith testified that when he entered the house, 5 to 10 backup officers had already 

entered and were “detaining individuals in the house.” (It is unclear on what basis these

individuals were detained.) Smith also testified that the entire house was searched. Under these 

circumstances, we cannot say whether the discovery of the guns was the fruit of Jones’ arrest as 

opposed to the detention of the other partygoers. Again, we observe that, because there was no 

suppression hearing, the record has not been fully developed in this regard. 

¶ 37 For these reasons, we find that Jones has not met his burden of showing that the unargued 

suppression motion is meritorious (Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 15), and we therefore reject 
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his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 87 (ineffective 

assistance claims may be decided on Strickland’s prejudice prong alone).

¶ 38 Hunter’s Testimony 

¶ 39 Hunter, the State’s firearm identification expert, opined at trial that Jones’ 9-millimeter 

Glock matched the 9-millimeter cartridge cases recovered from the crime scene. Jones argues 

that he lacked foundation for his opinion because he cited similarities in “the shear mark as well 

as the breech face marks” but did not describe those similarities.

¶ 40 Jones’ argument is without merit. Illinois Rule of Evidence 705 provides: “The expert 

may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to 

the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be 

required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.” Ill. R. Evid. 705 (eff. 

Jan. 1, 2011); see People v. Simpson, 2015 IL App (1st) 130303, ¶ 37 (explaining that “Rule 705 

permits an expert to give an opinion without divulging the basis for it”); People v. Williams, 238 

Ill. 2d 125, 140 (2010) (“[A]n expert testifying at trial may offer an opinion based on facts not in 

evidence, and the expert is not required on direct examination to disclose the facts underlying the 

expert’s opinion.”) Under Rule 705, “the burden is placed upon the adverse party during crossexamination to elicit facts underlying the expert opinion.” Williams, 238 Ill. 2d at 140. Thus, 

Hunter was not required to describe the individual characteristics on which he based his 

conclusion that Jones’ gun matched the cartridges at the crime scene. 

¶ 41 Jones does not cite Rule 705, much less offer any argument as to why it does not apply 

here. Rather, he relies solely upon People v. Jones, 2015 IL App (1st) 121016, and People v. 

Safford, 392 Ill. App. 3d 212 (2009). But Jones was vacated pursuant to a supervisory order 
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entered by the Illinois Supreme Court and is no longer good law. See People v. Simmons, 2016 

IL App (1st) 131300, ¶ 116 (“We cannot consider Jones, as that judgment has no effect”).

¶ 42 Jones’ reliance on Safford is equally unavailing. In Safford, a latent print examiner 

testified that defendant’s fingerprint matched one found near the scene of a shooting, but he did 

not explain how he arrived at that conclusion. Safford, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 217. The Safford

court held that the lack of evidentiary foundation for the expert’s testimony prevented the 

defense from conducting a meaningful cross-examination. Id. at 223-24. But this conclusion is 

irreconcilable with the plain language of Rule 705, which controls here. For this reason, 

“Safford has been heavily criticized, and characterized as an outlier.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) People v. Robinson, 2018 IL App (1st) 153319, ¶ 19 (observing that “we can find no 

published case following Safford’s reasoning”); see also Simmons, 2016 IL App (1st) 131300, 

¶ 124 (“[L]ooking to Safford itself, we conclude that its analysis was flawed. While the court in 

Safford cited the principle that the information on which an expert bases his opinion must be 

reliable [citation], it did not correctly analyze that principle.”); People v. Wilson, 2017 IL App 

(1st) 143183, ¶ 41 (declining to follow Safford); People v. Negron, 2012 IL App (1st) 101194, 

¶¶ 41-42) (same).

¶ 43 Accordingly, we also reject Safford. Illinois law is clear that the lack of detail in 

Hunter’s testimony went to its weight, not to its admissibility. Robinson, 2018 IL App (1st) 

153319, ¶ 19; Negron, 2012 IL App (1st) 101194, ¶ 42. 

¶ 44 Jones next contends that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing Hunter to 

testify that his conclusion was verified by another examiner. He argues that this testimony was 

inadmissible hearsay and violated his right to confront witnesses against him as set forth in 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004). 
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¶ 45 The State argues that Hunter’s testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered for 

the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to show the basis for Hunter’s opinion. See People v. 

Risper, 2015 IL App (1st) 130993, ¶ 35 (an out-of-court statement offered to prove something 

other than the truth of the matter asserted is, by definition, not hearsay); People v. Anderson, 133 

Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1986) (expert may reveal the contents of materials on which he reasonably relies to 

make his opinion, and doing so for that limited purpose does not constitute hearsay). We find 

the State’s argument questionable, since in this case the “matter asserted” by the verifying expert 

was exactly the same as Hunter’s opinion, such that asserting the truth of the latter is 

synonymous with asserting the truth of the former. See People v. Yancy, 368 Ill. App. 3d 381, 

385 (2005) (fingerprint examiner’s testimony that the quality assurance department agreed with 

her identification was offered to prove the truth of the matter it asserted, namely, that the 

department found the prints were defendant’s). Under these circumstances, the State’s assertion 

that it did not intend the jury to substantively believe the opinion of the verifying expert is, at 

best, dubious. 

¶ 46 However, Jones did not raise any objection on direct examination when Hunter testified 

that all his conclusions are verified by another examiner, nor did he object during crossexamination when Hunter said that the verification helped form the basis for his conclusion. 

Accordingly, he has forfeited any claim of error with regard to these statements. People v. 

Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611-12 (2010). Since he also does not argue plain error, we honor 

Jones’ forfeiture. See People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 550 (2010) (appellate court erred in 

reaching merits of issues where defendant forfeited issues and did not argue plain error). 

¶ 47 The only complained-of testimony to which Jones raised an objection was Hunter’s

statement on redirect examination that his conclusion was verified by another examiner. But this 
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testimony was cumulative of his prior testimony and, therefore, any error in its admission was 

harmless. People v. Littleton, 2014 IL App (1st) 121950, ¶ 65 (erroneous admission of hearsay 

evidence is harmless error when it is merely cumulative); Yancy, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 387 (hearsay 

fingerprint identification testimony was cumulative of testifying expert’s testimony and did not 

warrant reversal). Jones’ confrontation clause argument is unavailing for the same reason. 

People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 427-28 (2005) (Crawford violations are subject to harmlesserror analysis, which includes “determining whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely 

cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence”). Thus, Hunter’s testimony regarding the 

verification of his conclusion does not warrant reversal. 

¶ 48 McNeal’s Grand Jury Testimony

¶ 49 Jones next argues that his conviction must be reversed because McNeal’s grand jury 

testimony was given to the jury in error. Although it is improper during deliberations for the jury

to view items which have not been entered into evidence (People v. Long, 316 Ill. App. 3d 919, 

928 (2000)), such error is only cause for reversal if the defendant was thereby prejudiced. 

People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 438-39 (1995) (error in giving jury access to slip opinion was 

“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Long, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 928 (“Where an error of this 

type could not have reasonably affected the outcome of the trial, the verdict will be affirmed”). 

Here, Jones does not claim that he was prejudiced by the jury’s access to the McNeal transcript, 

nor do we find any evidence of prejudice in the record. On the contrary, the trial court found that 

the transcript contained “nothing inculpatory” as to Jones since “no one is named,” a finding 

which Jones does not dispute. 

¶ 50 Jones’ cited cases are inapposite, since they involve situations where the jury’s access to 

extraneous materials was prejudicial. See People v. Holcomb, 370 Ill. 299, 300 (1938) 
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(unadmitted exhibits were “damaging links” that “would tend to unduly influence the jury 

against defendant”); People v. Carr, 53 Ill. App. 3d 492, 497 (1977) (error was “clearly 

prejudicial”); Long, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 928 (same); People v. Fields, 258 Ill. App. 3d 912, 918 

(1994) (error was not harmless under the circumstances). Here, where it is undisputed that the 

McNeal transcript did not implicate Jones, the jury’s access to the transcript was harmless error. 

¶ 51 Sufficiency of the Evidence 

¶ 52 Finally, Jones argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of Oliphant’s 

murder. (He does not raise any argument as to the attempted murder of Gladney.) Although 

both Jones and Omar fired at Gladney, Omar was the only one witnessed firing at Oliphant; thus, 

Jones was convicted of Oliphant’s murder on a theory of accountability. Jones argues that the 

State failed to show that he shared a common criminal design with Omar. 

¶ 53 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not our function to retry the 

defendant. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2011). Rather, we must determine “ ‘whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in 

original.) People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979)). 

¶ 54 A person is legally accountable for the criminal conduct of another if “either before or 

during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that

commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other person in the 

planning or commission of the offense.” 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2014). To establish the 

requisite intent, the State must prove that the defendant shared the principal’s criminal intent or 

there was a common criminal design. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 266 (2000). Where a 
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common criminal design exists, any acts performed in furtherance of that design committed by 

one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design, and all such parties are 

responsible for the consequences of those acts. People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13. 

¶ 55 The State argues that a rational finder of fact could have found that Jones and Omar 

shared a common criminal design to kill Gladney, and Omar killed Oliphant in furtherance of 

that goal. We agree. According to Gladney’s handwritten statement and grand jury testimony, 

Jones and Omar were simultaneously shooting at him, thus demonstrating a common design to 

kill him. See People v. Bailey, 265 Ill. App. 3d 262, 273 (1994) (“To sustain a charge of attempt 

murder, it is sufficient to discharge a weapon in the direction of another individual, either with 

malice or total disregard for human life”). Thus, Jones and Omar were accomplices in the 

attempted murder of Gladney. 

¶ 56 It can also reasonably be inferred that Omar shot Oliphant in furtherance of the attempted 

murder of Gladney. Specifically, after Omar initially shot Gladney in the back, Oliphant 

intervened by grabbing Omar, thus giving Gladney time to flee. Omar struggled with Oliphant 

and shot him multiple times before Oliphant fell to the ground, leaving Omar free to resume 

firing at Gladney. 

¶ 57 Jones argues that he did not intend to harm Oliphant, nor did he have advance knowledge 

that Omar was going to harm Oliphant. But as our supreme court has stated, “there is no 

question that one can be held accountable for a crime other than the one that was planned or 

intended, provided it was committed in furtherance of the crime that was planned or intended.” 

Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 19. Because Jones and Omar both intended to kill Gladney, Jones 

can be held accountable for Omar’s actions in furtherance of that attempted murder even if he 

did not plan or intend Oliphant’s murder. Id.
No. 1-18-1263 

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¶ 58 People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254 (2000), and People v. Estrada, 243 Ill. App. 3d 177 

(1993), cited by Jones in his brief, are distinguishable because neither involved a principal and 

an accomplice shooting at the same victim. In Perez, the court held that the defendant’s gang 

affiliation and his presence at a murder scene, without more, were insufficient to prove that he 

aided or abetted the killer. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d at 268. Similarly, in Estrada, defendant’s 

conviction for murder was reversed where he smashed a window at the scene of the shooting but 

did not participate in the shooting. Estrada, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 185. By contrast, Jones’ actions 

in firing at Gladney showed that he did in fact share a common criminal design with Omar. 

¶ 59 Finally, Jones argues that Gladney was not a credible witness because (1) he changed his 

story multiple times; (2) on the night of the shooting, he consumed tequila and ecstasy and had 

been smoking marijuana “all day”; and (3) he admitted being high when the shooting occurred. 

Jones is, in effect, inviting us to substitute our judgment regarding Gladney’s credibility for that 

of the jury, which we will not do. See Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d at 280-81; In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 

IL 107750, ¶ 60 (it is well established that “[a] conviction will not be reversed simply because 

the defendant tells us that a witness was not credible”). Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, as we must, we find the evidence was sufficient to convict Jones of 

Oliphant’s murder. 

¶ 60 CONCLUSION

¶ 61 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

¶ 62 Affirmed.