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Filed 3/24/22; Certified for Publication 4/13/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JUAN PANTOJA,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A162591

 (Solano County

 Super. Ct. No. FCR349721)

Defendant Juan Pantoja filed a motion to suppress evidence of a 

firearm found on his person when he was patted down during a traffic stop. 

The trial court granted defendant’s motion and then dismissed the case. The 

District Attorney appeals. 

We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 2020, the Solano County District Attorney filed a one-count 

felony complaint charging defendant with possession of a firearm by a felon 

(Pen. Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The next month, defendant filed a motion 

to suppress evidence gathered on January 3, 2020 (§ 1538.5), arguing the 

evidence was obtained as the result of an unreasonably prolonged detention 

and illegal search. 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2

Hearing on Defendant’s Suppression Motion and Preliminary Examination

On April 12, 2021, the magistrate heard defendant’s suppression 

motion at the preliminary hearing. The only witness was Vacaville police 

officer Chris Hill. 

Officer Hill testified he was on duty around 1:30 a.m. on January 3, 

2020, when he saw a silver Dodge turn right onto Brown Street. The car

“caught [his] attention because it was going rather quickly” although it was 

traveling within the speed limit of 25 miles per hour. Hill turned around to 

follow the Dodge and noticed the license plate light and third brake light 

located at the back window of the vehicle appeared not to be working. 

As the Dodge pulled into an apartment complex parking lot, Hill turned 

on his overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop. Defendant was the driver 

and sole occupant of the car. Hill vaguely recognized him, and when 

defendant gave his name, Hill testified he remembered defendant “had a 

history of violence and firearm possession, and he was at the time an 

investigative lead in a homicide.”2 Hill had prior contact with defendant a 

handful of times and had “also seen his name in briefing logs.” He thought 

he transported defendant once when defendant was arrested for possession of 

firearms. Hill did not recall having any contact with defendant when a crime 

of violence was involved. 

When Hill approached the driver’s side door, the window was rolled 

down and defendant asked if the officer wanted his license, registration, and 

proof of insurance. There was no smell of marijuana and no contraband in 

plain view. Hill saw no signs that defendant was intoxicated. Hill ran a 

2 Initially, the trial court sustained a defense objection to this

testimony based on lack of foundation and hearsay. The prosecutor stated 

the evidence was only for “the effect on the listener” (and so not for the truth), 

and the court allowed the testimony for that purpose. 
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record check and learned defendant had a valid license and was not on 

probation or parole. Hill asked where defendant was coming from (he said he 

went to get a burrito) and when he got off probation (he answered, 2018). 

Hill asked if there was weed in the car, and defendant said he did not smoke 

weed. Hill asked defendant if he could take a look in the vehicle for 

contraband, and defendant declined. 

After defendant declined to consent to a search, Hill asked defendant to 

get out of his car and put his hands behind his head because Hill was going to 

issue him a citation for the vehicle lighting infractions. Around this time, 

another officer arrived on the scene. 

The prosecutor asked whether Hill believed “defendant was armed or 

dangerous at that moment.” Hill responded, “He was wearing baggy clothing. 

He had [a] hoodie on and jeans. The hoodie naturally has bulges in it, so 

based upon defendant’s history of weapons, I elected to remove him from the 

vehicle and pat him down so I can complete the citation.” Asked again if he 

believed defendant was presently armed and dangerous, Hill answered, 

“There’s a good possibility or chance, yes.” 

Defendant did not make any furtive gestures and did not make any 

sudden movements during the traffic stop, but “he appeared to be getting 

nervous” when Hill told him he was going to pat him down. As Hill patted 

defendant’s front waistband area, he felt what he recognized as a handle to a 

handgun. He lifted the front of defendant’s hoodie and saw a revolver.

Defendant was arrested. Hill inspected the revolver, which was loaded with 

five rounds. The traffic stop occurred in a high-crime area. 

On cross-examination, Hill agreed it had been years since he had seen 

defendant arrested. Defense counsel also established that in his police report 

of the incident Hill did not mention any bulges in defendant’s clothes and 
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apparently did not describe defendant’s sweatshirt as baggy. Hill

acknowledged that it was cold outside at the time of the traffic stop, Hill 

usually takes only about five minutes to write a traffic citation, and in fact

there was no arrest warrant for defendant in the homicide case in which he 

was “an investigative lead.” 

In support of the motion to suppress, defense counsel argued the 

prosecution failed to establish “reasonable articulable facts that Mr. Pantoja 

was armed and presently dangerous at the time,” noting there was no 

evidence of contraband, no furtive or evasive movements, and defendant 

complied with the traffic stop. He pointed out there was no proof defendant 

had “any arrests by the Vacaville Police within years of this occurring” and 

the prosecution cited no authority that “specifically says knowledge of a . . . 

defendant’s history from years prior allows them to pat search at will.” 

Defense counsel further observed that Hill initially left defendant alone 

inside his car while Hill returned to his patrol car to run the record check, 

which suggested the officer did not actually believe defendant was armed or

presently dangerous at the time of the traffic stop. 

The prosecutor argued the totality of the circumstances supported 

Hill’s reasonable belief that defendant was armed or dangerous, citing 

defendant’s baggy clothing, that it was dark outside and in the car, that the 

stop was in a high-crime area, and that Hill knew of “defendant’s history of 

violence and weapons possession.” 

Trial Court Rulings

The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress, explaining: 

“[T]he officer is well within his rights to remove a detainee from a vehicle 

while the investigation is proceeding, and that includes traffic stops and 

minor citations; however, in order . . . to conduct a pat search, there must be 
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specific and articulable facts known to that officer that would lead that officer 

to believe that he was presently armed and dangerous. When you asked this 

officer that exact question, his answer was, ‘There was a good chance,’ which 

to me means that that’s all speculative, and he didn’t have any specific or 

articulable facts to believe that this individual was presently armed or 

dangerous. [¶] Therefore, I’m going to grant the motion to suppress. The

motion to suppress being granted, there’s insufficient evidence for a holding 

order and this matter is discharged and his bond is exonerated. And that 

concludes Mr. Pantoja’s matters and that concludes our calendar for today.” 

DISCUSSION

Constitutional Principles

“In Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry), the United States Supreme 

Court held that there exists ‘a narrowly drawn authority to permit a 

reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where 

he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous 

individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the 

individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the 

individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 

circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of 

others was in danger.’ ” (King v. State of California (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 

265, 283.) 

“ ‘The sole justification of the search . . . is the protection of the police 

officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an 

intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden 

instruments for the assault of the police officer.’ ([Terry, supra, 392 U.S.] at 

p. 29.) The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts 

together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a 
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suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” (People v. Dickey (1994) 

21 Cal.App.4th 952, 955–956 (Dickey).) “[A]n ‘inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or “hunch” ’ is insufficient.” (In re Jeremiah S. (2019) 41 

Cal.App.5th 299, 305 (Jeremiah S.).)

In Dickey, for example, the Court of Appeal held a pat-down search was 

not justified based on circumstances that the defendant “(1) had no 

identification, (2) exercised his Fourth Amendment right and refused to allow 

the deputy to search the vehicle, (3) was nervous and sweating, (4) or because 

baking powder was found in a film canister” because “[n]one of these 

considerations, considered singly or in combination, would lead an officer to 

‘ “. . . reasonably believe in the possibility that a weapon may be used against 

him. . . .” ’ ” (Dickey, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) In Jeremiah S., the 

pat search of a minor who was detained with a companion just before 

midnight on suspicion of robbery was not justified where the two minors were

smaller than the officers, the officers had no information that the robbery 

being investigated involved weapons, the minors followed officer instructions, 

and they made no furtive, unusual or sudden movements. (Jeremiah S., 

supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 306.) In In re H.H. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 653, 

660 the pat search could not be justified based on the totality of the 

circumstances where a “minor was stopped for a traffic infraction, not a crime 

of violence,” at 11:30 p.m., because “the time and location of the encounter, 

though relevant, ‘are insufficient by themselves to cast reasonable suspicion 

on an individual.’ ” (Accord People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 

177–178 (Medina) [rejecting the Attorney General’s argument that the time 

of day and location may in combination be sufficient by themselves to justify 

a Terry stop and frisk].) 
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Standard of Review

“In reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to suppress 

evidence, we rely on the trial court’s express and implied factual findings, 

provided they are supported by substantial evidence, to independently 

determine whether the search was constitutional. [Citation.] ‘Thus, while we 

ultimately exercise our independent judgment to determine the constitutional 

propriety of a search or seizure, we do so within the context of historical facts 

determined by the trial court.’ [Citation.] It is the trial court’s role to 

evaluate witness credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the 

evidence, and draw factual inferences. [Citation.] We review those factual 

findings under the deferential substantial evidence standard, considering the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order.” (People v. Lee

(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 860–861, 870 [affirming the grant of a motion to 

suppress evidence obtained from an unconstitutional car search].) 

Analysis

Defendant was stopped for a vehicle code infraction in this case. He

was cooperative at all times during the traffic stop, he did not appear to be 

intoxicated, his driver’s license was valid, he answered Officer Hill’s 

questions, he made no furtive or sudden movements, and Hill did not 

describe any other behavior by defendant that suggested he was armed and 

dangerous. 

When asked whether he believed defendant was armed or dangerous, 

Hill cited (1) the fact defendant was wearing baggy clothing that “naturally 

has bulges in it” and (2) “defendant’s history of weapons” as reasons to pat 

him down. Asked again, “did you believe he was presently armed and 

dangerous?” Hill responded, “There’s a good possibility or chance, yes.” The 

trial court found Hill’s second response indicated his belief was “all 
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speculative, and he didn’t have any specific or articulable facts to believe that 

this individual was presently armed or dangerous.” 

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling and deferring to the court’s implied factual and credibility findings, we 

conclude the court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress. 

First, the trial court reasonably could have discounted Hill’s testimony 

that defendant’s clothing contributed to reasonable suspicion given the facts 

that Hill did not write in his police report that defendant’s clothes were 

suspiciously bulging or baggy and, at the suppression hearing, he 

acknowledged the bulges were “natural” and that it was cold outside that 

night. The District Attorney relies on People v. Rios (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 

584, for the proposition that “baggy or bulging clothing” may be relevant to

the reasonable suspicion analysis, but the facts of Rios are readily

distinguishable. In Rios, a probation officer “was dealing with a probable 

gang member who was overly dressed for the weather, belligerently refused 

to answer his questions or cooperate with him, and continued to make 

evasive movements even after [the officer] asked him to stop” and the court 

hearing the suppression motion credited the officer’s testimony that, based on 

all these factors, he believed Rios “was trying to hide a weapon.” (Id. at p. 

599.) Here, in contrast, defendant was dressed appropriately for the weather, 

he cooperated with Officer Hill during the traffic stop, he made no furtive or 

sudden movements, and Hill never testified that any of defendant’s conduct 

suggested he was trying to hide a weapon. 

Second, we agree with defendant that Hill’s description of “defendant’s 

history of weapons” was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion. Hill 

testified he was aware of defendant having been arrested for possession of 
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weapons on one occasion,

3 but it had been years since defendant was 

arrested. Defendant cites federal authority holding that a person’s criminal 

record is not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion to support a detention 

or search.4 (See United States v. Foster (4th Cir. 2011) 634 F.3d 243, 246–247

(Foster) [“ ‘A prior criminal record “is not, standing alone, sufficient to create 

reasonable suspicion” ’ ”]; United States v. Mathurin (3d Cir. 2009) 561 F.3d 

170, 177 [“a past criminal conviction, never mind an arrest record, is not 

sufficient alone for reasonable suspicion; law enforcement agents must 

support this fact with sufficient corroborating evidence”].) For example, in 

United States v. Davis (10th Cir. 1996) 94 F.3d 1465, 1469, the court 

observed, “Knowledge of a person’s prior criminal involvement is not, 

standing alone, sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.” In Davis, the court 

held the circumstances that the defendant was in a high crime area, that he 

walked away from the police, dropped eye contact, and kept his hands in his 

pockets and that the officer knew the defendant had a criminal record did not 

support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was unlawfully carrying a 

firearm. (Id. at pp. 1469–1470.)5

3 Although he initially referred to defendant having “a history of 

violence and firearm possession,” Hill did not provide any information about 

alleged violence and could not recall any contact with defendant that involved 

a crime of violence. Hill did not mention violence when explaining why he 

elected to pat defendant down. 

4 “Questions regarding the suppression of evidence are controlled by 

federal constitutional law.” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 

923, fn. 4 [discussing federal case law in review of the denial of a motion to

suppress].) 

5 These federal cases consider what circumstances are sufficient to 

support reasonable suspicion for an officer to detain an individual, but the

same reasoning applies to the question of reasonable suspicion to pat down 
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For the proposition that an officer’s history of weapons possession is 

sufficient by itself to justify a pat search, the District Attorney cites People v. 

Bush (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048. In that case, an officer stopped a vehicle

for missing registration stickers on the rear license plate. The officer learned 

the driver’s license was suspended and the car’s registration was not current, 

and the dispatcher further informed the officer the driver “ ‘had a history of 

violence, possession of weapons and was reported to be a kick-boxer.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 1050.) Because the officer was concerned for his safety, after another 

officer arrived, he had the driver get out of the car and searched the car. 

(Ibid.) On appeal, the driver argued the officer was not entitled to rely on the 

information from the dispatcher because it was six years old. 

The Court of Appeal concluded the search was justified, reasoning: “In 

our job as appellate court judges, we have been called upon to review 

hundreds upon hundreds of criminal convictions. Our experience has led us 

to the conclusion that, unfortunately, felons convicted of illegal weapons 

offenses often later carry concealed weapons, and they do so more than six 

years after an initial conviction. Moreover, while some persons who are ‘very 

violent’ reform such tendencies, many, many others do not. The information 

possessed by the dispatcher was not unreasonably stale. That information 

provided ‘specific and articulable facts’ which reasonably warranted the 

officer in believing that defendant was dangerous and could gain immediate 

control of weapons.” (Bush, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1053.) 

Bush is distinguishable because Officer Hill in this case did not know 

from personal knowledge or a dispatch report that defendant was “very 

an individual. (See Medina, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 [“Although the 

Supreme Court’s discussion on this subject addresses the propriety of Terry

stops, the court’s conclusions apply with equal force in determining the 

reasonableness of Terry frisks”].) 
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violent” (Hill mentioned seeing defendant’s name in briefing logs, but he did

not testify defendant was reported to be violent), and he knew only that 

defendant had been arrested for possession of a weapon many years ago. 

“[K]nowledge of a person’s prior criminal involvement (to say nothing of a 

mere arrest) is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable 

suspicion.” (United States v. Sandoval (10th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d 537, 542.)6

The District Attorney also argues the circumstances that the stop 

occurred in a high crime area and that defendant was “an investigative lead 

in a homicide” contributed to a reasonable suspicion defendant was armed 

and dangerous. But mere presence in a high crime area, by itself, does not 

justify a pat down search. (Medina, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 

[weapon search not justified merely because the suspect was in a high gang 

area late at night].) This principle certainly applies in this case, where it 

appears defendant was stopped as he pulled into his own apartment complex. 

And “a person’s Fourth Amendment rights cannot be lessened simply because 

he or she is ‘under investigation’ by the police. Just as an officer’s knowledge 

of a suspect’s past arrests or convictions is inadequate to furnish reasonable 

suspicion; so too is knowledge that a suspect is merely under investigation, 

which is an even more tentative, potentially innocuous step towards 

determining criminal activity.” (Foster, supra, 634 F.3d at p. 247.) 

6 As Sandoval explains, if prior criminal history alone sufficed to create 

reasonable suspicion, “any person with any sort of criminal record—or even 

worse, a person with arrests but no convictions—could be subjected to a 

Terry-type investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at any time 

without the need for any other justification at all. Any such rule would 

clearly run counter to the requirement of a reasonable suspicion . . . .” 

(Sandoval, supra, 29 F.3d at p. 543.) 
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In short, we conclude, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the trial court’s ruling, Officer Hill’s pat search of defendant was not

supported by reasonable suspicion. 

DISPOSITION

The orders granting defendant’s motion to suppress and dismissing the 

complaint are affirmed. 
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_________________________

Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Stewart, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Mayfield, J.*

A162591, People v. Pantoja

* Judge of the Mendocino County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
1

Filed 4/13/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JUAN PANTOJA,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A162591

 (Solano County

 Super. Ct. No. FCR349721)

BY THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on March 24, 2022, was not 

certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause and pursuant to 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105, it now appears that the opinion should be 

published in the Official Reports, and it is so ordered.

Dated: _______________________ ________________________________

Stewart, Acting P.J.
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Court: Solano County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Stephanie Grogan Jones

Krishna A. Abrams, Solano County District Attorney; Karen Jensen, Deputy 

District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant 

Jonathan Soglin, Deborah Rodriguez under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent

A162591, People v. Pantoja