alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Cite as State v. Moody , 2021-Ohio-1923.] 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee,

- v - RICKY LEE MOODY, JR., Defendant-Appellant. CASE NO. 2021-L-052

Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas

Trial Court No. 2018 CR 000866

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Decided: June 7, 2021 Jud g ment: Appeal Dismissed

Charles Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 10 5 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 ( For Plaintiff-Appellee )

. Ricky Lee Moody, Jr., pro se, PID#: A770-961, Grafton Correctional Institution, 2500 South Avon-Belden Road, Grafton, OH 44044 ( Defendant-Appellant )

.

MATT LYNCH, J. {¶1} On April 28, 2021, appellant, pro se, filed a notice of appeal and motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. Appellant appeals from the tri al court’s March 20, 2020 entry sentencing him to serve five years in prison, concurrentl y with the Summit County sentences he is presently serving, after he entered a plea of g uilty to aggravated possession of drugs. {¶2} A timely notice of appeal was due no later than April 20, 2020, which was not a weekend or a holiday, so the appeal is untimely.2

Case No. 2021-L-052 {¶3} No brief or response in opposition to the motion has been filed

. {¶4} App.R. 5(A) provides, in relevant part: {¶5} “(1) After the expiration of the thirty day period provided by App.R. 4(A) for the filing of a notice of appeal as of right, an appeal may be taken by a defendant with leave of the court to which the appeal is taken in the followin g classes of cases: {¶6} “(a) Criminal proceedings; {¶7} “(b) Delinquency proceedings; and {¶8} “(c) Serious youthful offender proceedings. {¶9} “(2) A motion for leave to appeal shall be filed with the court of appeals and shall set forth the reasons for the failure of the appellant to perfect an appeal as of right.

* * *.” {¶10} As reasons for the delay in f iling his appeal, appellant indica tes: 1) he was “never in receipt of [his] sentencing journal entry from [his] lower court case,” and he was not notified of his right to appeal and for appointment of coun sel; 2) since arriving at the prison, he has not had access to the law library to file a time ly appeal; and 3) the law librarian could not retrieve a digital copy of the sentencing e ntry online from the [Lake] County website, and he had to wait for family and friends to go to the clerk’s office to get a copy of the entry to mail to him. {¶11} A review of the trial court record shows that in the past year, between the time of appellant’s sentence and his present notice of appeal, appellant filed three pro se motions for jail time credit and a motion for reconsideration w ith the trial court. {¶12} Not only is appellant’s reason of not having his sentencing ent ry available not convincing, but his other reasons fail to justify the delay in filing his appeal.3

Case No. 2021-L-052 {¶13} Thus, it is ordered that appellant’s motion for leave to file a delayed appeal is overruled, and the appeal is dismissed.

MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J., CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,

concur.
EXHIBIT
32.1
 
 Certification
Pursuant to Exchange
Act Rule 15d-14(b) and 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350
 
 In
connection with the quarterly Report of Legacy Holdings, Inc. (the ”Company”) on
Form 10QSB for the period ending March 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert Matthews,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, to the best of my knowledge,
pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 15d-14(b) and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (i)
              The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and
 
 (ii)
              The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.
 
 
 
 Dated:  August
6, 2008
 
 
 /s/ Robert Matthews
 Name:
Robert Matthews
 Title:   Chief
Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                              JAN-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                              31
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,739
<ALLOWANCES>                                        44
<INVENTORY>                                      3,625
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                11,654
<PP&E>                                          38,387
<DEPRECIATION>                                  22,886
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  27,170
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,005
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            3,536
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,000
<OTHER-SE>                                    (39,799)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    27,170
<SALES>                                         15,626
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                15,626
<CGS>                                           18,310
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   18,693
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   168
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 168
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (3,235)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (3,235)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (3,235)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                              78
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,511
<ALLOWANCES>                                       440
<INVENTORY>                                      3,515
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                10,084
<PP&E>                                          37,401
<DEPRECIATION>                                  21,532
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  25,957
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,923
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            3,477
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,000
<OTHER-SE>                                    (31,376)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    25,957
<SALES>                                         40,453
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                40,453
<CGS>                                           44,856
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   45,730
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   556
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 556
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (5,833)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,833)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                          290
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,543)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2936 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2936

 To provide that in the case of leases to local education agencies and 
elementary and secondary schools, consideration may be at or below fair 
                 market value or for no consideration.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 18, 2014

   Mr. Scott introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide that in the case of leases to local education agencies and 
elementary and secondary schools, consideration may be at or below fair 
                 market value or for no consideration.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LEASING OF NON-EXCESS PROPERTY OF MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND 
              DEFENSE AGENCIES; TREATMENT OF VALUE PROVIDED BY LOCAL 
              EDUCATION AGENCIES AND ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS.

    Section 2667 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(k) Leases for Education.--In the case of a lease under this 
section to a local education agency or an elementary or secondary 
school (as those terms are defined in section 9101 of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801)), consideration 
may be at or below fair market value or for no consideration.''.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AND STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1997
<CASH>                                       1,491,627
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                6,812,310<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0<F1>
<INVENTORY>                                  5,246,391
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            15,611,497
<PP&E>                                         253,289<F1>
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0<F1>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              15,964,231
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,898,763
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     2,657,818
<OTHER-SE>                                   9,386,552
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                15,964,231
<SALES>                                     37,960,675
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            37,960,675
<CGS>                                       28,440,522
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               28,440,522
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              95,811
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                452,360
<INCOME-TAX>                                   131,185
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            321,175
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   321,175
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .26
<FN>
<F1>THE ASSET VALUES FOR RECEIVABLES AND PP&E REPRESENT AMOUNTS NET OF
ALLOWANCES AND DEPRECIATION RESPECTIVELY.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
1 John T. Boyd, Chi ef Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Ap peals, sitting by

assignment . NO. 07-02-0260 -CV IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L E NOVEM BER 19, 2002

______________________________ MARK C. DREW , M.D., APPELLAN T

V. NORTHW EST TEXAS HEALTHCARE SYST EM, INC., APPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE181 ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUN TY; NO. 85,908-B; H ONORAB LE JOHN B OARD, JU DGE

_______________________________ Before REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ. and BOYD, S.J. 1 AppellantMark C. D rew, M .D., and ap pe l l ee , N or th we st Te xa s H ea l th ca re Sy st em, Inc., filed an Agreed Motion to Dism iss on Novem ber 12, 2002, averring that they no longer w ishe d topur

suethis app eal.2

W ithoutpassing on the m erits of the case, the parties’ agreed m otion for dismissal is granted and the appeal is hereby dism issed. Tex. R . App. P . 42.2 . All costs having been paid, no order pertaining to the costs is m ade. Having dism issed the appeal atthe parties’ request , no m otion for r e hea ring w il l be entertained and our m andate will issue forthwith.
Phil Johnson Justice

Do not publish.
```

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 76 (Tuesday, May 9, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E977]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      EXPLANATION OF AMENDMENT TO BE OFFERED TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT

                                 ______

                            HON. RANDY TATE

                             of washington

                    in the house of representatives

                          Tuesday, May 9, 1995
  Mr. TATE. Mr. Speaker, earlier today I had preprinted in the 
Congressional Record an amendment offered by myself, and my 
distinguished colleague, Representative Mike Parker, to H.R. 961, the 
Clean Water Amendments of 1995.
  The explanation follows:
  amendment to h.r. 961 to resolve the tacoma case by including state 
     water quality recommendations in the ferc licensing process--
                              explanation

       The purpose of this amendment is to address the serious 
     concerns that the Supreme Court's 1994 Tacoma decision are 
     creating for the nation's hydropower projects. These projects 
     are the leading source of clean, renewable electric energy in 
     this country. But they are operating under a cloud because 
     the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clean Water Act, in 
     particular section 401 of the Act, so broadly as to 
     effectively supersede the Federal Energy Regulatory 
     Commission (FERC)'s licensing authority over the projects 
     under the Federal Power Act.
       This amendment would rectify that situation. It directs 
     state water quality agencies to provide their Clean Water Act 
     recommendations--for hydropower projects under the 
     Commission's jurisdiction--to the Commission to consider 
     under the Federal Power Act. Section 10(a) of the Federal 
     Power Act requires FERC to conduct a lengthy, comprehensive 
     review of both proposed hydropower projects and existing 
     projects upon relicensing. That review focuses heavily on the 
     potential environmental impacts of each project and best ways 
     to mitigate or avoid those impact. Furthermore, section 10(a) 
     specifically requires the Commission to take into account the 
     recommendations of state and federal agencies, Indian tribes, 
     and the public. Therefore, in the context of hydropower 
     projects under FERC's jurisdiction, it makes sense to fold 
     state water quality agency recommendations into the 
     comprehensive licensing process that already exists under the 
     Federal Power Act. This amendment accomplishes that 
     objective.
     

                          ____________________
```
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906





Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, the undersigned officer of First Rate Staffing Corporation (the "Company"),
hereby certify to my knowledge that:



The Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2014
of the Company fully complies, in all material respects, with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.





|/s/ Cliff Blake                           | 
|----------------------------------------- | 
|President and Principal executive officer | 
|Principle Financial Officer               | 
|                                          | 
|Date: March 31, 2015                      |
# U ni te d S ta te s Co ur t of A pp ea ls For the Eig hth Circu it

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ No. 1 6- 37 26

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ Uni te d S ta te s o f Am eri ca
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Pla in ti

ff - App el le e

v.
Mar io Desh awn Ste ve ns on
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Defe nd

an t - Ap pe ll an t

__ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co ur t fo r th e North ern Dis tri ctof I owa , W at erl oo

__ __ __ __ __ __ Subm it te d: Apri l 2 6, 2 01 7 Fi le d: May 1, 20 17 [Un publ is he d]

__ __ __ __ __ __ Befo re RI LEY, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circ ui t J ud ge s.

__ __ __ __ __ __ PER CURI AM.

Mar io St ev en so n di rect ly ap pe al s th e b e lo w-Gui de li ne s- ran ge se nt en ce th e di st ric t co ur t im

po se d aft er he pl ead ed gu il ty to a dru g ch arg e. His co un se l ha s 1

The Hon or ab le Leo na rd T. St ran d, Chi ef Ju dg e, Uni te d St at es Dis tri ct Co ur t 1 fo r th e Nor th ern Dis tri ctof I owa
.mo ve d fo r le av e to wit hd raw, an d ha s fil ed a br ie f un de r And ers v. Cal ifo rn ia , 3 8 6

U.S. 73 8 (1 96 7) , arg ui ng th at th e se nt en ce is su bs ta nt iv el y un reas on ab le an d th at th e di st ric t cou rt sh ou ld ha ve va rie d d own wardev en fur th er. St ev en so n h as no t fi le d a pr o s e b rie f.

W e co nc lu de th at th e di st ric t co ur t di d no t im po se a subs ta nt iv el y un reas on ab le

se nt en ce. See Uni te d St at es v. Feem st er, 57 2 F.3 d 45 5, 46 1 (8 th Ci r. 20 09 ) (en ba nc ) (d es cri bi ng ap pe ll at e rev ie w o f se nt en ci ng de ci si on s) ; se e al so Uni te d St at es v. McC au le y , 71 5 F.3 d 11 19 , 11 27 (8 th Ci r. 20 13 ) (n ot in g th at whe n di st ric t co ur t ha s
va rie d be lo w G u i d e l in es ran ge , it is “ ne arl y in co nc ei va bl e” th at co ur t ab us ed it s di sc ret io n in no t va ry in g do wnwar d fu rth er). In ad di ti on , w e h a v e in de pe nd en tl y
rev ie wed th e reco rd un de r Pen so n v. Ohi o, 48 8 U.S. 75 (1 98 8) , an d ha ve fo un d no
no nf riv ol ou s is su es fo r ap pe al

. Acco rd in gl y , we gr an t co un se l’s m ot io n fo r le av e to wit hd raw, an d we a ffi rm
.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

-2

-
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ONE 1977 CHEROKEE JEEP, VIN J7A17MP116712, Bonnie Jones Lopez, David Lopez, Jr., Richard L. Lopez, Bonnie Lindan Lopez, and Daniel Dario Lopez, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 80-1121.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Unit A

March 9, 1981.

Knox Jones, Kyle B. Welch, McAllen, Tex., for defendants-appellants.

Jamie C. Boyd, U.S. Atty., Jeremiah Handy, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RUBIN and GARZA, Circuit Judges and SPEARS,* District Judge.

*

 District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881, of a Cherokee Jeep used for the transportation of illegal drugs. *213Appellants, the widow and children of the offender, contend that because their husband and father died intestate during the commission of the offense, his community property interest in the vehicle passed to them prior to the initiation of the contested forfeiture proceeding. It is undisputed that Bonnie Lopez, the widow, was not involved in the unlawful transactions culminating in her husband’s death. Therefore, appellants argue, this forfeiture violated the due process clause of the Constitution. We disagree.

The Supreme Court, in *Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,*416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974), upheld the application of forfeiture statutes to innocent owners, but commented:

> It ... has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim .... of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property ....

*Id.*at 689-90, 94 S.Ct. at 2094-95. However, the district court here found that the widow of the decedent had suspected her husband of having been involved for some time in illicit drug activity. This finding is not clearly erroneous. *See, e. g., United States v. Graves,*428 F.2d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1970). It is a reasonable inference that she was aware that the jeep was being used in furtherance of this activity. In view of this we need not consider the more difficult question what a wife might reasonably do to prevent her husband from using community property or whether, indeed, the situation is controlled by the *Calero-Toledo*dicta, if one spouse is using community property for the proscribed use.

Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to discuss the effect of the community property laws upon this forfeiture proceeding. Perhaps there could be cases where it would be appropriate to address that issue, but this is not one of them.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.