Page 1 of 18

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE Lois E. DeAngelis, Petitioner, v. Joseph A. DeAngelis, Jr., and Cynthia L. DeAngelis, Respondents. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) C.A. No. 11646

- MA

MASTER’S REPORT
Date Submitted: February 3, 2017 Draft Report: Final Report: May 16, 2017

Seth L. Thompson, E squire, of SERGOVIC CARMEAN WEIDMAN MCCARTNEY & OWENS, P.A., Georgetown, Delaware; Attorney for Petitioner Albert M. Greto, Esquire, R. Jos eph Hrubiec, Esquire, of the LAW OFFICES OF ALBERT M. GRETO, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Respondent

AYVAZIAN, MasterPage 2 of 18

Introduction
A widow is seeking to partition a small parcel of real property located in
Millville , Delaware, which she and her husband had purchased with her husband’s son and daughter

- in

- law in March 2006

. T he recorded deed reflect s that each married couple originally held title to an undivided fifty percent interest in the property as tenants by the entireties. Following her husband’s death in January 2012, the widow
filed in the Register of Wills Office in Sussex County an affidavit of joint ly held property , showing title of an undivided fifty percent interest in the real property was now in her sole name

. In May 2015, the widow moved to an assisted living facility in New Jersey

. After the widow and her stepson were unable to agree on a price for the widow’s interest in the property, s he filed this action , which is opposed by her s tepso n and step daughter

- in

- law . They deny that the widow has an y ownership interest,

a lleg ing instead that she ha d only a life estate in the real property which terminate d
when s he moved out of state in May 2015 . According to the stepson and his wife, title
to the real property then pass ed to the deceased husband’s two sons. The stepson and
his wife have fi led a counterclaim, seeking the imposition of a resulting trust over the real property for the benefit of the deceased husband’s sons

. Pending before me are the parties’ motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the Court approve the partition of t he real property and dismiss the counterclaim seeking imposition of a resulting trust.Page 3 of 18

Factual Background
In 1994, Pe titioner Lois DeAngelis ( formerly known as Lois McKenna , hereinafter “Lois” ) married Joseph DeAngelis, Sr. (“Joseph, Sr.”) in New Jersey, w here they both resided. 1 A few days before they were married, the couple executed an Ante

Nuptial Agreement

. 2 Paragraph 2.1 of the Agreement defines separate property acquired during the marriage as:

Any property acquired during the marriage in the name of one party or under circumstances in which it is clear that such property was intended to be acquired separately by one party or where the source of the funds or assets by which such separate property was acquired is premarital assets, shall remain t he separate property of the party acquiring such assets, including but not limited to any property into which same is converted , any income or other usufruct thereon, increments, accretions, or increases in value of such assets, whether due to market condit ions or the services, skills, or efforts of either party, at any time thereto. 3 Paragraph 2.3 of the Agreement define s interspousal gifts as:

Any gift or other gratuitous transfers made by one party to the other during the contemplated marriage shall be treated and deemed the separate property of the done e to the extent that the source of funds or assets used in the acquisitio n of such property was the separate property of the donor, and shall include but not be limited to any property into which same is converted, any income or other usufruct thereon, increments, accretions, or increases in value of such assets, whether due to market conditions or the services, skills, or efforts of either party, to the extent thereof and governed by paragraph 2.1. 4

1 I use first names here for the sake of clarity and intend no disrespect by this practice. 2 Opening Brief i n Support of Lois E. DeAngelis’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A. 3 Id. , Ex. A at 3. 4 Id. , Ex. A at 4.Page 4 of 18

Par agraph 2.4 define s marital property as “[ a] ny property acquired during the marriage not deemed to be separate property under Paragraphs 2.1 or 2.2 hereof, 5 shall be treated and deemed to be joint assets acquired during the marriage, except, however, subjec t to the provisions of Paragraph 2.3.” 6
Paragraph 6.1 of t he Agreement provide d that upon the death of Joseph, Sr., his
widow would receive:
a life estate in the property located at 5612 Central Avenue, located in the City of Sea Isle, County of Cape May and State of New Jersey, subject to [the widow] being responsible for all expenses of the property, including but not limited to, taxes, sewer, water, insurance, utilities and maintenance and upkeep, and she hereby waives and relinquishes all rights that s he may now have or hereafter acquire under present or future laws of any jurisdiction to share in the property of the estate of [Joseph, Sr.] as a result of the marital relationship, including, but not limited t o, dower, courtesy, statutory allowances, wid ow allowances, homestead rights, or rights under N.J.S.A. 3A:35

- 5 or any other right to take against his last will and testament even if named as a beneficiary therein (unless such last will and testament is executed subsequent to the execution of this agr eement), and the right to act as administrator or executor of his estate (unless such right is contained in a last will and testament executed subsequent to the execution hereof). 7

5 Paragraph 2.2 defines i nheritances or gifts from third parties which are not involved in this case. Id. , Ex. A at 3

- 4. 6 Id. , Ex. A at 3. 7 Id. , Ex. A at 7. In Paragraph 6.2 of the Agreement, Joseph Sr. waived his rights to a share in Petitioner’s estate as a result of their marital relationship in the event he survived her. Id. , Ex. A at 8.Page 5 of 18

On December 20, 2001, Joseph, Sr. and Lois executed an Ante

- Nuptial Agreeme nt Modification, in which they agreed to delete Paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 and to insert a new Paragraph 6.1 that stated:
Each party hereto agrees to and accepts the terms and provisions of the Last Wills and Testament each has executed the 20 th day of Decembe r, 2001. Each party agrees that such Last Wills and Testaments are to be in full force and effect and that such Last Wills and Testaments are not to be changed or modified in any way without the written consent of both parties hereto. In consideration of the above, each party hereto waives and relinquishes his or her right to an elective share or any right or claim he or she may have against the other party’s estate other than claims or rights arising out of the Last Wills and Testaments dated December 20 , 2001. 8 On the same date, the couple executed their wills. In his Last Will and Testament, Joseph, Sr., gave his spouse:
The right to reside in my real property known as 5612 Central Avenue, Sea Isle City, New Jersey, for her lifetime subject to the fo llowing provisions. i. My spouse shall have the right to reside at the property for her life time, provided she pays all bills in a timely manner and resides at such property at least six (6 ) months per year. ii. In the event she fails to pay the bills of the residence in a timely manner, or fails to reside at the property for six (6) months a year, then at such time, the life estate shall end and the property shall pass as set forth hereafter. iii. Upon the death of my spouse, or earlier, in the event she shall fail to satisfy the conditions above, the aforesaid real estate shall pass equally to my children then surviving. 9

8 Id. , Ex. A at JCD 15

- 16. 9 Joseph, Sr. was survived by two son s, Respondent Joseph A. DeAngelis , Jr. and Todd C. DeAngelis. Id. , Ex. B at 3

- 4.Page 6 of 18

The balance of Joseph, Sr.’s residuary estate was to pass equally to his surviving
children

. 10 Joseph, Sr. also named his spouse as executrix of his estate

. 11 In October 2005, Joseph, Sr. executed an agreement to purchase real property
located at 12 9 Naomi Drive, Millville, Delaware 19967 (hereinafter “129 Naomi
Drive” ) for $480,000

. 12 Settlement occurred on March 6 , 2006. 13 According to the settlement sheet, 129 Naomi Drive was purchased with a cash deposit of $5,000.00, a loan from Flagstar Bank, FSB in the amount of $384,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage, a second mortgage in the amount of $96,016.16, and a credit from the realtors in the amount of $7,200.00. 14 The borrowers list ed on the settlement sheet

were Joseph, Sr., Lois, Joseph , Jr., and Cynthia. Each borrower signed the settlement sheet, although Joseph, J r. signed on behalf of his wife as her power of attorney. The second mortgage was also in the name of these four borrowers, who signed the HUD
settlement statement in the same manner. 15

The deed was prepared by a title company, and named “Joseph A. DeAn gelis, Sr., and Lois E. De A ngelis, as to an undivided 50% interest, as Tenants by the Entirety,

10 Id. , Ex. B at 4. 11 Id. , Ex. B at 9. 12 Opening Brief in Support of Respondents Joseph A. DeAngelis, Jr. and Cynthia L. DeAngelis’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. C. 13 Id. , Ex. D. 14 Id. 15 Id.Page 7 of 18

Joseph A. DeAngelis, Jr., and Cynthia L. DeAngelis, as to an undivided 50% interest, as Tenants by the Entirety, of 1 2 9 Naomi Drive, Millville, DE 19967 , partie s of the second part.” 16 The deed was recorded on March 10, 2006, in Deed Book 3280 on page 157. The two mortgages described the four borrowers as “JOSEPH A DE
ANGELIS A Married Man and LOIS E DE ANGELIS A Married Woman and
CYNTHIA L DEANGELIS A Married Woman and JOSEPH A DEANGELIS A Married Man, AS JOINT TENANTS.” 17 The borrowers initialed these documents with Joseph, Jr. initialing on behalf of Cynthia as her power of attorney. 18
After the above purchase agreement was executed but before settlement

oc curred, Joseph, Sr. allegedly wrote what is now described by Respondents as “ the
2006 Letter of Intent. ” Th e 2006 Letter of Intent is typewritten. It allegedly was signed by Joseph, Sr. on February 6, 2006, but the signature was not witnessed nor notarized.
The letter states:

To Whom It May Concern: It is my intention and desire that should I become deceased or unable to communicate effectively, that a portion of the monies from the sale of the property known as 5612 Central Ave, Sea Isle City, New Jersey be use d to satisfy the mortgage on the property known as 129 Naomi Drive, Ocean View, Delaware. The balance of the money less $200,000 is to go to my sons Joseph

16 Opening Brief in Support of Petitioner Lois E. DeAngelis’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. D. 17 Id. , Ex. E. 18 The two mortgages were recorded on March 10, 2006. Id.Page 8 of 18

A. De Angelis Jr and Todd C. De Angelis. The $200,000 is to be given to my wife Lois De Angelis. I t is also my desire that the property known as 129 Naomi Drive be treated as though it was 5612 Central Ave as depicted in my last will and testament. This agreement is to be in effect as long as there is a mortgage on the Naomi Drive property or another a greement is made and all parties agree to it. 19

A mortgage satisfaction piece, dated September 6, 2006, was recorded in the
Office of the Recorder of Deeds on October 4 th for each of the two mortgages encumbering 129 Naomi Drive. 20 On September 13, 2006, th e Delaware Department
of Natural Resources and Environmental Control’s Division of Water Resources issued a Subaqueous Lands Lease to Joseph, Sr. to repair the dock at 129 Naomi Drive along
Whites Creek , which was recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds on September 26, 2006. 21

On January 17, 2012 , Joseph, Sr. passed away

. Shortly after their father’s death, Joseph, Jr. and his brother Todd met with their stepmother at a restaurant to discuss their father’s estate. The discussion was secretly re corded , 22 presumably by one of the

19 Respondents’ Answering Brief in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. G. 20 Opening Brief in Support of Petitioner Lois E. DeAngelis’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. F. 21 Opening Brief in Support of Respondents Joseph A. DeAngelis, J r. and Cynthia L. DeAngelis’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. F. 22 Respondents’ Answering Brief in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. H.Page 9 of 18

brothers. The recording reveals the brothers express ing concern that their father might
not have left a will or might have changed his will, and if things were not spelled out, Lois would inherit their father’s boats, car trailer, and truck. They also told their stepmother that their father had always wanted them to get 129 Naomi Drive. Lois told
the brothers that she did not want the boat or car tra iler and did not want to get into a “pissing contest” with them because they would win. 23 Lois also told the brothers that her husband had wanted her to have a place to live and t hat they would get the house after she moved or passed away. Joseph, Jr. the n informed Lois that , according to the deed, she, Joseph, Sr., Joseph, Jr. and his wife were joint tenants with right of survivorship. In the recording, Joseph, Jr. explained to Lois that each of them originally owned 25 percent of the property, and after Joseph, Sr. died, his share was divided among the three surviving owners, so each now own ed “33” of the property, and when Lois died, her “33” would be divided between Jose ph, Jr. and his wife. 24 Joseph, Jr. also told Lois that he had promised his father that Todd would be taken care of and he intended to keep that promise. Lois was surprised that her husband had never told her how the property was owned

. The final portion of the ir conversation went as follows:
Joseph, Jr.: “ It’s your house, Lois.” Lois: “Yeah.” Joseph, Jr. “Until, you know, you pass away.”

23 Id. , Ex. H at 8. 24 Id. , Ex. H at 11.Page 10 of 18

Lois: “Yeah.” Joseph, Jr. “I would just like to be able to come there with my kids and family and continue to enjoy the

-- ” Lois: “Yeah

-- ” Joseph, Jr. “

— the shore and

-- ” Lois: “

— that’s all right, yeah. But I don’t cook.” 25 On February 27, 2012, Lois filed Joseph, Sr.’s death certificate, Last Will and Testament dated December 20, 2001, an A ffidavit of J ointly H eld R eal Property, 26 and
a Small Estate Affidavit in the Sussex County Register of Wills Office

. Lois continued

to reside at 129 Naomi Drive until May 2015, when she moved to an assisted living facility in Woodbridge, New Jersey. Through h er attorney in fact, Lois filed a petition for partition o n October 28, 2015. 27 According to a “Decisional Capacity Evaluation” performed on September 27, 2016, 28 Lois was then suffering from severe dementia and
lack ed sufficient decisional capacity to make relevant decisions.

25 Id ., Ex. H. at 12

- 13. 26 Opening Brief in Support of Petitioner Lois E. DeAngelis’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. H. Several documents list the address of the real property at issue as 127 Naomi Drive, Ocean View, Sussex County, Delaware 19970. However, t he tax parcel number p rovided on these documents is identical with the tax parcel number provided o n the deed and mortgage documents

. Id. , Exs. D

- F. 27 Docket Item (“DI”) 1. 28 Opening Brief in Support of Petitioner Lois E. DeAngelis’ Motion for Summary Judgment , Ex. I

.Page 11 of 18

Issues
Respondents seek summary judgment on their counter claim that Joseph, Sr.’s interest in 129 Naomi Drive should pass to his two children in equal shares , and that Lois’s interest in this real property should be converted into a resulting trust for the
benefit of Joseph, Jr. and Todd. Respondents argue that the 2006 L etter of I ntent signed by Joseph, S r. provides clear and convincing evidence that Joseph, Sr. only intended
Lois to have a life estate in 129 Naomi Drive , which ended after she moved to New Jersey in May 2015 . As further e vidence of their father’s intent, Respondents cite
Lois’s recorded statement s following her husband’s death. According to Respondents, Joseph, Sr. originally had planned to sell his solely

- owned Sea Isle property and use the proceeds from that sale to purchas e 129 N aomi Drive . Instead, he had to borrow

money in order to purchase the Delaware property, and was told by a Delaware attorney that he would have to put his wife’s name on the deed and mortgage. Shortly after he purchased 129 Naomi Drive, Joseph Sr. sold hi s property in New Jersey and used the proceeds from th at sale to satisfy the mortgage s on 129 Naomi Drive. Joseph, Sr.’s intent, according to Respondents, was to own 129 Naomi Drive in his sole name , and not to provide Lois with an ownership interest in this proper ty. Petitioner argues that sh e is entitled to partition as title owner of an undivided 50 percent interest in 129 Naomi Drive. According to Petitioner, the recorded deed clearly demonstrates that her husband intended to create a tenancy by the entiretiesPage 12 of 18

with his wife over an undivided 50 percent interest in 129 Naomi Drive. Respondents
have present ed no evidence regarding the source of the funds used f or the deposit and to satisfy the two mortgages on 129 Naomi Drive , but even if some of her husband’s separate funds were used to acquire their interest in the property, those funds were an interspousal gift to her. She is also outraged that her stepsons se cretly recorded her conversation while she was in the throes of grief over her husband’s recent death. Petitioner argues that the counterclaim should be dismissed on the basis of laches and equitable estoppel since Respondents were on record notice of her interest in the property as of February 13, 2012.
Respondents reply that since neither they nor Lois provided the funds to satisfy the mortgage s , logic dictates that Joseph, Sr. supplied those funds. Citing Hudak v.
Procek , 29 Respondents argue that they h ave presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that Joseph, Sr., intended to make a gift to Lois of an undivided 50 percent
interest in 129 Naomi Drive. Respondents argue that b y placing Lois’s and their names on the deed and mortgage s , Joseph, Sr. intended only to facilitate the initial purchase of 129 Naomi Drive. Once the proceeds from the sale of the Sea Isle p roperty were available, Joseph, Sr. satisfied the mortgages. Respondents point to two other documents relating to this prop erty, i.e., the residential contract for sale executed by

29 Hudak v. Procek , 806 A.2d 140, 147 (Del. 2002).Page 13 of 18

Joseph, Sr., and the subaqueous lands lease granted to Joseph, Sr., as evidence that Joseph, Sr. intended to own 129 Naomi Drive in his sole name. Finally, Respondents argue that the defenses of l aches and equitable estoppel should not apply because they did not have notice of the Affidavit of Jointly Held Property and , as non
- lawyers, they
had assumed that the 2006 Letter of Intent was controlling and 129 Naomi Drive would

pass to Joseph, Sr.’s tw o sons in the same manner as the Sea Isle p roperty would have passed to them under Joseph, Sr.’s Last Will and Testament. It was not until Respondents received the partition petition did they become aware that Lois no longer
resid ed in the property and wa s now claiming an ownership interest in 129 Naomi
Drive.

Standard of Review
Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment. However, since none of the parties has argued that a trial is necessary because there is any material issue of disputed fact, I will deem the motions as the equivalent of a stipulation for decision on the merits based on the record submitted with the motions, under Court of Chancery Rule 56(h).

An alysis

Petitioner is seeking the partition sale of 129 Naomi Drive with the net sale

p roceeds , presumably, to be divided equally between herself, as owner of an undividedPage 14 of 18

50 percent interest in this property , and Respondents as o wners of the other undivided 50 percent interest in this property. Respondents are seeking a resu lting trust to be imposed over 129 Naomi Drive in favor of Joseph, Jr. and Todd, the residuary beneficiaries of Joseph, Sr.’s estate and, in their view , the current owners of 129 Naomi
Drive now that Petitioner no longer lives there . A resulting trust is an equitable remedy designed to prevent unjust enrichment, and may be imposed in cases where a person supplies the purchase money for property, intending to retain a beneficial interest in the property but, for some reason, places title to the property in the name of another

person. 30 Here, Respondents contend that Joseph, Sr. provided the purchase money for 129 Naomi Drive, but title was placed in his name and the names of his wife, son , and daughter

- in

- law s imply because the purchase money was unavailable at the time of
settlement. Respondents claim that Joseph, Sr.’s purchase money subsequently became
available following the sale of his New Jersey property, when proceeds from that sale
were used to satisfy the two mortgages encumbering 129 Naomi Drive nin e months
after its closing.
Under Delaware law, if the person supplying the purchase money is a parent or a spouse who then places legal title to property in the name of his or her child or spouse, a presumption arises in this familial setting that the parent or spouse intended to make

30 Id. at 146.Page 15 of 18

a gift of the property, and did not intend to retain an ownership interest in the property. 31 This presumption operates against the donor, i.e., the donor parent or donor spouse, who must produce clear and convincing evide nce to rebut the presumption of a gift. 32
In this case, Joseph, Sr., the donor parent/spouse , is no t available to pr oduce such
evidence because he is deceased

. Moreover, in an unusual twist, the donee child(ren) , i.e., Respondents , are at ris k of losing their legal title to an undivided 50 percent interest in the property as tenants by the entireties , 33 i f they succeed i n their quest to deprive
the don ee spouse , i.e., Petitioner , of her legal title to an undivided 50 percent interest
i n the property. Nevertheless, Respondents have attached several documents with their
motion for summary judgment , a nd have provided an audio recording of a conversation
with Petitioner , which they c laim constitute clear and convincin g evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of a gift by Joseph, Sr.
The primary document on which Respondents rely is the 2006 Letter of Intent
that they claim was written by Joseph, Sr. Assuming for the sake of argument that this
l etter is authentic , it is not a testamentary document since it lacks the requisite signatures of two witnesses. 34 Moreover, b y its own terms, this “agreement” was to be

31 Id. 32 Id. at 147. 33 The only potential loser , however, would be Cynthia, since Joseph, Jr. would retain an interest in the property if a resulting trust were imposed in favor of Joseph, Jr. and his brother Todd. 34 12 Del. C. § 202 (a) provides:Page 16 of 18

in effect only as long as there was a mortgage on 129 Naomi Drive or until another agreement was made and all parties agreed to it. There is no evidence of any mortgage secured by 129 Naomi Drive after the original two mortgages were satisfied in October
2006 . There is also no evidence of any other agreement made by “all partie s,” i.e., Joseph, Sr., Lois, Joseph, Jr. and Todd. Therefore, the 2006 Letter of Intent does not provide any support for Responden t ’ s argument. The audio recording contains a

statement by Petitioner indicating that she understood she could live in 129 Naomi Drive until she died or she moved away. But it also appears from the recording that
Petitioner was unaware that s he had an ownership interest until her stepson informed her about the deed following Joseph, Sr. ’ s death.
Respondents also ignore other facts in this case which support the presumption of a gift. Over 95 percent of the purchase price was borrowed and , in or der to finance the purchase of 129 Naomi Drive, Joseph, Sr., Petitioner , and Respondents sign ed on two mortgages, making all four of them liable for the mortgage debt. Under Delaware law, the actions of Petitioner and Respondents in assuming responsibility for th is

(a) Every will, whether of personal or real estate, must be: (1) In writing and signed by the testator or by some person subscribing the testator’s name in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s express direction; and (2) Subject to §1306 of this title, attested and subscribed in testator’s presence by 2 or more cr edible witnesses

.Page 17 of 18

mortgage debt constitute consideration from them to Joseph, S r. 35 Furthermore, after
the mortgage s were satisfied nine months later , no change was ever made to the title of
129 Naomi Drive. Joseph, Sr. continued to reside in this property with hi s wife until his death approximately six years later. Had Joseph, Sr. used the proceeds from the sale of his solely

- owned New Jersey property to satisfy the mortgages, 36 and had he intended his wife to have only a life estate in 129 Naomi Drive , Joseph, S r. could have made changes to the deed or in his will , but there is no evidence that he made any such changes, 37 despite Joseph, Jr.’s repeated attempts to persuade his father to make a
will

. 38

35 See Hanby v. Hanby , 245 A.2d 428, 430 (Del. 1968); Real Estate of Shockley v. Foraker , 2004 WL 51260, at **3

- 4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2004). 36 There is also no evidence that the New Jersey property was sold, or if it was sold, on what date, at what price, and the disposition of the net sale proceeds. If the New Jersey property had been sold before Joseph, Sr.’s death, then the specific gift of a life estate in that property in Joseph, Sr.’s Last Will and Test ament dated December 20, 2001, would have been adeemed. 37 The A nte

- N uptial A greement M odification dated December 20, 2001 would have required Lois’ s written consent to any subsequent changes to Joseph, Sr.’ s will. Since Lois was never told by her husband that she had an ownership interest in 129 Naomi Drive and she did not understand the deed’s language when Joseph, Jr. attempted t o explain it to her , it seems unlikely that she would have opposed any proposed changes in her husband’s will or the deed as long as she could continue to reside in 129 Naomi Drive. 38 The recording of the parties’ conversation following Joseph, Sr.’s death includes admission s by Joseph, Jr. that he was aware of the four names on the deed, Respondents’ Answering Brief in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. H at 10, and that he frequently tried to persuade his father to make or change his will: “Well, I mean

– I mean that’s , you know, I kept

– every time I wasPage 18 of 18

Conclusion
For the above reasons, I find that Respondents failed to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of a gift to Petitioner and, by the same token, to Respondents . T herefore, I recommend that the Court grant judgment in favor of Petitioner, allowing the partition sale of the property to proceed, and that the Court
d ismiss Respondents’ counterclaim seeking the imposition of a resulting trust

. On May 11, 2017, Petitioner’s attorney filed a suggestion of death, in dicating
that P etitioner passed away on April 2 4, 2017. 39 As a result, I am waiving a draft report, issuing this decision as a final report, and staying the period for taking exception to a Master’s Final Report under Court of Chancery Rule 144 until such time as Petitioner’s estate is opened and the real party i n interest, i.e., the executor or administrator of Petitioner’s estate, is substituted as a party plaintiff

. 40
Respectfully, /s/ Kim E. Ayvazian Kim E. Ayvazian Master in Chancery
KEA/kekz

at Dad’s, “Would you go get a will? Would you please

– would you please go? Please go. Please go,” every time he had an illness. “Would you, Dad.” Id. , Ex. H at 6. 39 DI 38. 40 See Ch. Ct. R

. 17(a).