SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

Jeffrey J Clark Kent County Courthouse

Judge 38 The Green

Dover, DE 19901

Telephone (302)735-2111

November 10, 2016

Steven Schwartz, Esq. Annaliese Schlegel

Schwartz & Schwartz 39 Par Haven Drive

1140 South State Street Apartment E-22

Dover, DE 19901 Dover, DE 19904

RE: William F. Patterson v. Annaliese Schlegel

*AMENDED ORDER

K16J-01-269 JJC

Dear Mr. Schwartz & Ms.Schlegel:

Before the Court is Plaintiff WilliamPatterson’s (hereinafter “Mr. Patterson’s”)

motion to levy upon and sell 39 Par Haven Drive, Apartment E22, Kent County,

Delaware. Mr. Patterson is the legal owner of the property. Defendant Annaliese

Schlegel (hereinafter “Ms. Schlegel”) is the equitable owner of the property pursuant

to an installment purchase agreement with Mr. Patterson. Ms. Schlegel opposes the

motion because she contests the validity of the underlying judgment. The Court has

considered Mr. Patterson’s motion, the arguments of Mr. Patterson and Ms. Schlegel

presented at the motion hearing, and the letter and documents submitted by Ms.

Schlegel.

From the record, it appears that Mr. Patterson sought and obtained a judgment

in the Kent County Court of Common Pleas against Ms. Schlegel for unpaid amounts
due pursuant to the installment purchase agreement covering the subject matter

property. He seeks to execute on a judgment transferred to the Superior Court from

the Court of Common Pleas by levying upon and selling Ms. Schlegel’s equitable

interest in the property. 

In furtherance of execution, Mr. Patterson served interrogatories in aid of

execution to identify what personal property Ms. Schlegel possesses that is available

to satisfy the outstanding judgment. Mr. Patterson argues that since Ms. Schlegel did

not answer the discovery in aid of execution served on her on August 29, 2016, it

should be presumed that she has no personal property available to satisfy the judgment.

Accordingly , pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 4901, Mr. Patterson seeks to execute on Ms.

Schlegel’s equitable interest in the condominium. 

Mr. Patterson cites Lawyer’s Title Ins.Corp. V. Wohlhar &Gill, P.A.

1

in support

of the proposition that a lien of judgment can bind an executory interest in land subject

to an installment contract and that such interest may be sold as would a legal interest

in real property. In Lawyer’s Title Ins. Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court recognized

that “it is settled Delaware law that all possible titles to real estate, equitable,

contingent, or otherwise are subject to sale upon judgment and execution, except an

equitable interest under an active trust.”

2 The latter exception is not implicated here.

Ms. Schlegel argues that the underlying judgment was in error and claims she

was taken advantage of by Mr. Patterson during the underlying deal. The written

materials she submitted at oral argument advance the same argument. This Court,

however, cannot collaterally revisit a valid judgment entered by another court.

Namely, the Court of Common Pleas entered a valid judgment on behalf of Mr.

Patterson. That judgment was appropriately transferred to the Superior Court. Ms.

Schlegel has not provided any justification forsetting that judgment aside. This Court

1

575 A.2d. 1148 (Del. 1990).

2

Id. at 1153.

2
is not able to disturb the underlying judgment.

Here, absent the availability of sufficient personal property to satisfy the

outstanding judgment, Ms. Schlegel’s equitable interest in the property would be

subject to execution. At thisjuncture, however, the Court finds Mr. Patterson’s motion

to execute on the real property premature. Real property is subject to seizure and sale

upon judgment, only if an insufficient personal estate is available.3

Ms. Schlegel did not respond to Mr. Patterson’s interrogatories seeking to

determine what personal property she possesses that would be subject to execution.

The Court is mindful that Ms. Schlegel appears pro se and exhibited a great deal of

confusion regarding the legal process at hand. The Court does not find her delay in

responding to Mr. Patterson’s interrogatories in aid of execution to establish she has

no personal property available that would be subject to execution. 

On the other hand, Ms. Schlegel has the legal obligation to respond to the

reasonable efforts of Mr. Patterson to execute on his valid judgment. A judgmentcreditor, however, must avail himself or herself ofthe proper mechanismsfor execution

which include compelling responses regarding available assets.

4 Superior Court Civil

Rule 69(aa) and other Superior Court Civil Rule provisions provides the discovery

mechanisms necessary for Mr. Patterson to compel responses to his valid discovery.

Accordingly, Mr. Patterson’s motion to execute upon and sell real estate is premature.

Mr. Patterson’s motion is denied without prejudice, to be renewed should there be

insufficient personal property available to satisfy his judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED

/s/Jeffrey J Clark

 Judge 

JJC:jb

3

Id.; See also Smith v. Ford, 161 A. 214, 217 n. 1 (Del. 1932)(noting that seizing and

selling real estate only after the seizure and sale of the personal property levied upon is what was

contemplated by the precursor to 10 Del. C. § 4901).

4 Comegys v. Phillips, 69 A.2d 294, 295 (Del. Super. 1949).

3
Via file & Serve Xpress

4