The H onorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for th e 1 Eastern District of Missouri, adopting the recommendation of the Honorable Thomas C. Mum mert III, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-2556

___________ Neil Edgar Beachem, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. Dora B. Schriro, Cranston J. Mitchell, * Gary Bass, * * Appellees *

___________ Submitted: February 10, 1998

Filed: April 23, 1998

___________ Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge. Neil E. Beachem appe als the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ 1 of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.-2- I.
Beachem be gan serving a ten-year sentence in Maryland in August of 1982

. That same month, the State of Missouri, seeking prosecution for felony charges, placed a detainer against him pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). In late 1982, the State of Virginia, also pursuing a felony prosecution, lodged a simila r detain er. Beachem was temporarily transferred to Missouri in 1984, where h e eventually pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. The Missouri circuit court sentenced Beac hem to an aggregate eighteen-year term to run concurrently with his Maryland sentence and granted him credit for time served in the Marylan d correction al system. Beachem was then returned to the custody of the State o f Maryland.

In November of 1987, Beachem was extradited to Virginia to answer to th e felo ny charges pending there. He was found guilty and sentenced to an aggregat e twenty-two-year term to be served consecutively to “any other sentences that [Beachem was] serving,” and was subsequently returned to Maryland’s custody. Marylan d
re leased Beachem to Virginia in 1989 to serve that state’s sentence. Missouri the n filed a detainer against Beachem for the balance of his Missouri sentence, a detainer that Beachem alleges adversely affected his Virginia prisoner classification.
Meanwhile, the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole (the Board) informed Beachem that he had been granted a delayed parole release date of September 17 , 1991. Beachem, contending that the documents failed to include the 837 days credit given to him by the Missouri sentencing judge, did not sign the documents. The Board in terpreted Beachem’s failure to sign as a refusal and therefore canceled the releas e date. The Boa

rd later informed Beachem that Missouri law prohibited credit for time served in another state. On October 25, 1991, Beachem received a new parole dat e fro m the Board. He again refused to sign the release documents, and his release was-3-

canceled onc e more. In November, 1991, Beachem filed a motion to vacate hi s sentence in Missouri circuit court. After the motion was dismissed as untimely , Beachem fil ed a state writ of habeas corpus petition pursuant to Missouri Suprem e Court Rule 91, which was subsequently denied on the ground that he was not in th e custody of Missouri.
Beachem then filed this federal habeas action. Mea nwhile, Beachem’s Missouri detainer was removed and he was released on parole from Miss ouri, to be served while he fin ished his Virginia sentence. We now consider Beachem’s arguments that: (1 ) Missouri waived jurisdiction over him when it failed to exercise its detainer after his
re lease from custody in Maryland; and (2) Missouri violated the terms of his ple a agreement by failing to grant him credit for time served in Maryland.
II.
The state challenges Beachem’s jurisdictional claim as nonjusticiable, arguing that the removal of its de tainer renders his allegations moot. The inability of a federal court to “review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of th e Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.” Liner v. Jafco, Inc. , 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). “[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigant s in the case b efore them.” North Carolina v. Rice , 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (pe r curiam). In habeas corpus cases, the Supreme Court has been willing to presume , no twithstanding the intervening satisfaction of a sentence, that a wrongful crimina l conviction carries with it collateral consequences suf ficient to create an Article III case
or controv ersy. See Sibron v. New York , 392 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1968); Carafas v

. LaVallee , 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968). As the Court recently observed, that presumption encompasses “collateral consequences that are remote and u nlikely to occur.” Spencer v. Kemna , 118 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1998).-4-

The limits of this presumption were tested in Lane v. Williams , 455 U.S. 62 4 (19 82). There, two convicted felons challenged their sentences, which included a manda tory parole term at the conclusion of the defendants’ fixed terms o f im prisonment. Both defendants, having violated their parole, unsuccessfully argue d that thei r parole revocations created collateral consequences sufficient to create a justiciable claim. See id. at 625-30. The Court, emphasizing that the men wer e chall enging their sentences rather than their convictions, held that the doctrin e enuncia ted in Carafas and Sibron did not apply to parole revocations. See id. at 632.

In Spencer , the Court suggested a narrow application of the presumption o f collateral consequences and note d that the presumption’s evolution had proceeded “in summary fashion, . . . to accept the most generaliz ed and hypothetical of consequences
as suff icient to avoid mootness in challenges to conviction.” Id. at 984. The Cour t obser vedthat the practice of presuming collateral consequences runs contrary to th e “long-s ettledprinciple that standing cannot be ‘inferred argumentatively fro m averments in the pleadings,’ but rather ‘must affirmatively appear in the record.’” Id. at984-85 (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas , 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). The Cour t concluded that although the presumption is likely to comport with reality in the context of challenged criminal convictions, the same cannot be said for parole revocations. See id. at 985. Thus, Spencer

counsels a cautious approach to the presumption of collateral consequences.
Beachem is scheduled

for release from Missouri’s parole term on November 1, 2002. Although the record contains no specific reference to Beachem’s Virgini a release date, it suggests that he wi ll remain in the legal custody of Virginia authorities, in one form or another, until late 2010. Beachem originally sug gested that the Missouri detainer was detrimentally affecting his Virginia prisoner classification an d consequently sought r

emoval of the detainer. Missouri has removed the detainer, and Beachem, challenging that state’s jurisdiction over him, now maintains that hi s Missouri parole term is void. After considering: (1) that Beachem is challenging the-5-

administrationof his sentence, rather than his conviction, see Lane, 455 U.S. at 631; (2) that the limiting principles of Spencer , 118 S. Ct. at 983-86, militate agains t applying the presumption of collateral consequences; and (3) that it is improbable that the Missour i parole will adversely affect Beachem, see id. at 985; we decline t o presu meany collateral consequences from Beachem’s Missouri parole term. “Th e question remains, then, whether [Beachem] demonstrated such consequences.” Id. at 986. Citing Un ited States v. Burton , 629 F.2d 975, 977 (4th Cir. 1980), Beache m argues that if he is granted an early release from his Virginia sentence and his Missouri parole is later revoked, he would be required to served the remainder of his sentence in a Missouri prison. We reject this argument for two reasons . First, this case contains unique facts not presented in Burton . Whereas the parolee in Burtonfaced th e p o ssibility of having his parole revoked and thus being required to serve his disputed sentence, see 629 F.2d at 977, it is unlikely that Beachem will serve any of his sentence in a Missouri prison. Beachem’s early release from Virginia would result in a Virginia parole term, the revocation of which would land him back in a Virginia pr ison. Second, Beac hem is personally responsible for avoiding parole revocation. “Respondent s themselves are able -- and indeed required by law -- to prevent [parole violations] from occurri ng.” Lane , 455 U.S. at 633 n.13. Indeed, Beachem has enjoyed the adde d benefit of serving his Missouri sentence concurrently to his Virginia sentence, a sentence that was or

iginally intended to be served consecutively to his Missouri term.
As the Court in Lan e observed: “Collateral review of a final judgment is not an
en deavor to be undertaken lightly. It is not warranted absent a showing that th e complainant suffers actual harm from the judgment that he seeks to avoid.” Id. Absent a reasonable expectation

that Missouri’s sentence will again affect Beachem, the case is moot. See Murphy v. Hunt , 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam). “[E]ither a low probability or doubt a

bout the context of future disputation requires a court to dismiss-6-

the case.” D. S.A. v. Circuit Court Branch 1 , 942 F.2d 1143, 1154 (7th Cir. 1991 ) (Easterb rook, J., dissenting) (citing Renne v. Geary , 501 U.S. 312, 320-24 (1991))

. We conclude that Beachem has not met this burden. Finally, Beachem ar

gues that Missouri violated the terms of his plea agreement by failing to grant him credit for time served in Maryland. Because Beachem urges us to v oid the balance of his Missouri sentence, the same relief he sought in the above

mentioned analysis, his sentencing argument is likewise moot. The judgment is affirmed. A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.