(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09–1498. Argued February 22, 2011—Decided May 26, 2011 

The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Act) provides, inter alia, that in “any case

in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial . . . shall commence

within seventy days” after the arraignment, 18 U. S. C. §3161(c)(1),

but lists a number of exclusions from the 70-day period, including

“delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion,” §3161(h)(1)(D). 

Respondent Tinklenberg’s trial on federal drug and gun charges

began 287 days after his arraignment. The District Court denied his 

motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the trial violated

the Act’s 70-day requirement, finding that 218 of the days fell within

various of the Act’s exclusions, leaving 69 nonexcludable days, thus 

making the trial timely. On Tinklenberg’s appeal from his conviction, the Sixth Circuit agreed that many of the 287 days were excludable, but concluded that 9 days during which three pretrial motions

were pending were not, because the motions did not actually cause a 

delay, or the expectation of delay, of trial. Since these 9 days were

sufficient to bring the number of nonexcludable days above 70, the

court found a violation of the Act. And given that Tinklenberg had 

already served his prison sentence, it ordered the indictment dismissed with prejudice. 

Held: 

1. The Act contains no requirement that the filing of a pretrial motion actually caused, or was expected to cause, delay of a trial. 

Rather, §3161(h)(1)(D) stops the Speedy Trial clock from running

automatically upon the filing of a pretrial motion irrespective of 

whether the motion has any impact on when the trial begins. Pp. 3–

12. 
2 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Syllabus 

(a) The Sixth Circuit reasoned that subparagraph (D)’s “delay resulting from” phrase, read most naturally, requires a court to apply

the exclusion provision only to motions that actually cause a trial delay, or the expectation of such a delay. While such a reading is linguistically reasonable, it is not the only reasonable interpretation.

The subparagraph falls within a general set of provisions introduced 

by the phrase: “The following periods of delay shall be excluded.” 

§3161(h). That phrase is followed by a list that includes “[a]ny period

of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, 

including. . . .” §3161(h)(1). This latter list is followed by a sublist,

each member (but one) of which is introduced by the phrase “delay

resulting from . . . .” Ibid. Those words are followed by a more specific description, such as “any pretrial motion” from its “filing”

“through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition

of, such motion.” §3161(h)(1)(D). The whole paragraph can be read 

as requiring the automatic exclusion of the members of that specific

sublist, while referring to those members in general as “periods of delay” and as causing that delay, not because Congress intended the 

judge to determine causation, but because, in a close to definitional

way, the words embody Congress’ own view of the matter. Thus, language alone cannot resolve the basic question presented. Pp. 4–7.

(c) Several considerations, taken together, compel the conclusion 

that Congress intended subparagraph (D) to apply automatically.

First, subparagraph (D) and neighboring subparagraphs (F) and (H)

contain language that instructs courts to measure the time actually

consumed by the specified pretrial occurrence, but those subparagraphs do not mention the date on which the trial begins or was expected to begin. Second, during the 37 years since Congress enacted 

the statute, every other Court of Appeals has rejected the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation. Third, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would

make the subparagraph (D) exclusion significantly more difficult to

administer, thereby hindering the Act’s efforts to secure fair and efficient trials. Fourth, the Court’s conclusion is reinforced by the difficulty of squaring the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation with the “automatic application” rule expressed in, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 

476 U. S. 321, 327. Fifth, the legislative history also supports the 

Court’s conclusion. Sixth, because all the subparagraphs but one under paragraph (1) begin with the phrase “delay resulting from,” the 

Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would potentially extend well beyond 

pretrial motions and encompass such matters as mental and physical 

competency examinations, interlocutory appeals, consideration of

plea agreements, and the absence of essential witnesses. Pp. 7–12.

2. The Sixth Circuit also misinterpreted §3161(h)(1)(F), which excludes from the 70-day calculation “delay resulting from transporta-
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 

Syllabus 

tion of any defendant . . . to and from places of examination . . . , except that any time consumed in excess of ten days . . . shall be presumed to be unreasonable.” The lower courts agreed that a total of

20 transportation days had elapsed when Tinklenberg was evaluated

for competency, and that because the Government provided no justification, all days in excess of the 10 days specified in the statute were

unreasonable. However, the Sixth Circuit exempted 8 weekend days 

and holidays from the count on the theory that subparagraph (F) incorporated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(a), which, at the 

time, excluded such days when computing any period specified in

“rules” and “court order[s]” that was less than 11 days. Thus, the 

Circuit considered only two transportation days excessive, and the 

parties concede that the eight extra days were enough to make the

difference between compliance with, and violation of, the Act. 

This Court exercises its discretion to consider the subsidiary subparagraph (F) question because doing so is fairer to Tinklenberg, who 

has already served his sentence. In the Court’s view, subparagraph 

(F) does not incorporate Rule 45. The Act does not say that it does so, 

the Government gives no good reason for such a reading, and the 

Rule itself, as it existed at the relevant time, stated it applied to rules

and court orders, but said nothing about statutes. The fact that Rule 

45 is revised from time to time also argues against its direct application to subparagraph (F) because such changes, likely reflecting considerations other than those related to the Act, may well leave courts 

treating similar defendants differently. The better reading includes

weekend days and holidays in subparagraph (F)’s 10-day period under the common-law rule that such days are included when counting 

a statutory time period of 10 days unless a statute specifically excludes them. Many courts have treated statutory time periods this

way, and Congress has tended specifically to exclude weekend days 

and holidays from statutory time periods of 10 days when it intended

that result. Indeed, Rule 45 has been recently modified to require a 

similar result. Pp. 12–14. 

3. Although the Sixth Circuit’s interpretations of subparagraphs 

(D) and (F) are both mistaken, the conclusions the court drew from 

its interpretations in relevant part cancel each other out, such that

the court’s ultimate conclusion that Tinklenberg’s trial failed to comply with the Act’s deadline is correct. Pp. 14–15. 

579 F. 3d 589, affirmed. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, 

GINSBURG, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined as to Parts I and III. SCALIA, 

J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 
4 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Syllabus 

in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined. KAGAN, J., took no part 

in the consideration or decision of the case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 09–1498 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JASON LOUIS 

TINKLENBERG 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[May 26, 2011] 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq., 

provides that in “any case in which a plea of not guilty is

entered, the trial . . . shall commence within seventy days”

from the later of (1) the “filing date” of the information or 

indictment or (2) the defendant’s initial appearance before 

a judicial officer (i.e., the arraignment). §3161(c)(1). The 

Act goes on to list a set of exclusions from the 70-day 

period, including “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion 

of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such

motion.” §3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III) (emphasis 

added).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

held in this case that a pretrial motion falls within this 

exclusion only if it “actually cause[s] a delay, or the expectation of a delay, of trial.” 579 F. 3d 589, 598 (2009). In 

our view, however, the statutory exclusion does not contain this kind of causation requirement. Rather, the filing

of a pretrial motion falls within this provision irrespective

of whether it actually causes, or is expected to cause, delay 
2 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Opinion of the Court 

in starting a trial. 

I 

Jason Louis Tinklenberg, the respondent, was convicted 

of violating federal drug and gun laws. 18 U. S. C. 

§922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm); 21 U. S. C.

§843(a)(6) (possession of items used to manufacture a 

controlled substance). He made his initial appearance

before a judicial officer on October 31, 2005, and the

Speedy Trial clock then began to run. His trial began on 

August 14, 2006, 287 days later. Just before trial, 

Tinklenberg asked the District Court to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the trial came too late, violating the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day requirement. The 

District Court denied the motion after finding that 218 

of the 287 days fell within various Speedy Trial Act exclusions, leaving 69 nonexcludable days, thereby making the 

trial timely.

On appeal the Sixth Circuit agreed with the District

Court that many of the 287 days were excludable. But it 

disagreed with the District Court about the excludability 

of time related to three pretrial motions. The Government 

filed the first motion, an unopposed motion to conduct a

video deposition of a witness, on August 1, 2006; the District Court disposed of the motion on August 3, 2006. The 

Government filed the second motion, an unopposed motion 

to bring seized firearms into the courtroom as evidence at 

trial, on August 8, 2006; the District Court disposed of the 

motion on August 10, 2006. Tinklenberg filed the third 

motion, a motion to dismiss the indictment under the 

Speedy Trial Act, on August 11, 2006; the District Court 

denied that motion on August 14, 2006. In the Sixth 

Circuit’s view, the nine days during which the three motions were pending were not excludable because the motions did not “actually cause a delay, or the expectation of 

delay, of trial.” 579 F. 3d, at 598. Because these 9 days 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

were sufficient to bring the number of nonexcludable days

above 70, the Court of Appeals found a violation of the Act.

And given the fact that Tinklenberg had already served 

his prison sentence, it ordered the District Court to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.

We granted certiorari at the Government’s request in

order to review the Sixth Circuit’s motion-by-motion causation test. We now reverse its determination. But because we agree with the defendant about a subsidiary 

matter, namely, the exclusion of certain holidays and 

weekend days during the period in which he was transported for a competency examination, id., at 597, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ ultimate conclusion. 

II 

A 

In relevant part the Speedy Trial Act sets forth a basic

rule: 

“In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, 

the trial of a defendant . . . shall commence within 

seventy days from [the later of (1)] the filing date . . . 

of the information or indictment, or . . . [(2)] the date

the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of 

the court in which such charge is pending . . . .”

§3161(c)(1) (2006 ed.). 

The Act then says that the “following periods of delay shall 

be excluded in computing . . . the time within which the 

trial . . . must commence.” §3161(h) (2006 ed., Supp. III).

It lists seven such “periods of delay.” 

It describes the first of these seven excludable periods as 

“(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant including but not limited to— 

“(A) delay resulting from any proceeding . . . to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of 
4 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Opinion of the Court 

the defendant; 

“(B) delay resulting from trial with respect to other

charges . . . ;

“(C) delay resulting from any interlocutory appeal;

“(D) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from 

the filing of the motion through the conclusion of

the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such 

motion; 

“(E) delay resulting from any proceeding relating to

the transfer of a case [or defendant] . . . from another 

district . . . ; 

“(F) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another district, or to and from places of

examination or hospitalization, except that any time 

consumed in excess of ten days . . . shall be presumed 

to be unreasonable; 

“(G) delay resulting from consideration by the court 

of a proposed plea agreement . . .; 

“(H) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not 

to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding

concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court.” Ibid. (2006 ed. and Supp. III) 

(emphasis added). 

B 

The particular provision before us, subparagraph (D),

excludes from the Speedy Trial period “delay resulting

from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion 

through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt 

disposition of, such motion.” §3161(h)(1)(D). The question

is whether this provision stops the Speedy Trial clock from 

running automatically upon the filing of a pretrial motion 

irrespective of whether the motion has any impact on 

when the trial begins. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, we believe 

the answer to this question is yes.

We begin with the Act’s language. The Sixth Circuit 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

based its answer primarily upon that language. It argued 

that the phrase “delay resulting from,” read most naturally, requires a court to apply the exclusion provision only

to those “motion[s]” that “actually cause a delay, or the 

expectation of a delay, of trial.” 579 F. 3d, at 598. We 

agree that such a reading is linguistically reasonable, but 

the Court of Appeals wrote that there “is no conceivable

way to read this language other than to require a delay to 

result from any pretrial motion before excludable time

occurs.” Ibid. See also ibid. (“[T]he statute is clear”). And 

here we disagree.

When the Court of Appeals says that its reading is the 

only way any reasonable person could read this language,

it overstates its claim. For one thing, even though the 

word “delay” ordinarily indicates a postponement, it need

not inevitably do so. Compare The American Heritage 

Dictionary 480 (4th ed. 2000) (“[t]o postpone until a later 

time” or “[t]o cause to be later or slower than expected or 

desired”) with ibid. (“[t]he interval of time between two 

events”). In any event, terms must be read in their statutory context in order to determine how the provision in

question should be applied in an individual case. 

Statutory language that describes a particular circumstance, for example, might require a judge to examine

each individual case to see if that circumstance is present.

But, alternatively, it might ask a judge instead to look at 

more general matters, such as when a statute requires a

judge to increase the sentence of one convicted of a “crime

of violence” without requiring the judge to determine 

whether the particular crime at issue in a particular case

was committed in a violent manner. See Taylor v. United 

States, 495 U. S. 575, 602 (1990) (“crime of violence” characterizes the generic crime, not the particular act committed). Similarly a statute that forbids the importation of

“wild birds” need not require a court to decide whether a

particular parrot is, in fact, wild or domesticated. It may 
6 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Opinion of the Court 

intend to place the entire species within that definition 

without investigation of the characteristics of an individual specimen. See United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685 F. 2d 1131, 1137 (CA9 1982). 

More than that, statutory language can sometimes 

specify that a set of circumstances exhibits a certain characteristic virtually as a matter of definition and irrespective of how a court may view it in a particular case. A 

statute that describes “extortion” as a “crime of violence” 

makes that fact so by definition, without asking a court 

to second-guess Congress about the matter. 18 U. S. C. 

§924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006 ed.) (defining “violent felony” to 

include extortion for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act).

The statute before us, though more complex, can be read 

similarly. The pretrial motion subparagraph falls within a

general set of provisions introduced by the phrase: “The

following periods of delay shall be excluded.” §3161(h) 

(2006 ed., Supp. III). That phrase is then followed by a list 

that includes “[a]ny period of delay resulting from other 

proceedings concerning the defendant, including . . . .”

§3161(h)(1). This latter list is followed by a sublist, each

member (but one) of which is introduced by the phrase

“delay resulting from . . . ,” ibid. (2006 ed. and Supp. III), 

which words are followed by a more specific description,

such as “any pretrial motion” from its “filing” “through the

conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition 

of, such motion.” §3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III). The 

whole paragraph can be read as requiring the automatic 

exclusion of the members of that specific sublist, while 

referring to those members in general as “periods of delay” 

and as causing that delay, not because Congress intended

the judge to determine causation, but because, in a close to 

definitional way, the words embody Congress’ own view of 

the matter. 

It is not farfetched to describe the members of the spe-
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

cific sublist in the statute before us in this definitional 

sense—as “periods of delay” or as bringing about delay.

After all, the exclusion of any of the specific periods described always delays the expiration of the 70-day Speedy

Trial deadline. Or Congress might have described the

specific periods listed in paragraph (1) as “periods of delay” and “delay[s] resulting from” simply because periods 

of the type described often do cause a delay in the start of

trial. Both explanations show that, linguistically speaking, one can read the statutory exclusion as automatically 

applying to the specific periods described without leaving

to the district court the task of determining whether the 

period described would or did actually cause a postponement of the trial in the particular case. Thus, language

alone cannot resolve the basic question presented in this 

case. But when read in context and in light of the statute’s structure and purpose, we think it clear that Congress intended subparagraph (D) to apply automatically. 

C 

We now turn to several considerations, which, taken 

together, convince us that the subparagraphs that specifically list common pretrial occurrences apply automatically

in the way we have just described. First, subparagraph

(D) clarifies that the trial court should measure the period

of excludable delay for a pretrial motion “from the filing of 

the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or 

other prompt disposition of such motion,” but nowhere

does it mention the date on which the trial begins or was

expected to begin. §3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III).

Thus, it is best read to instruct measurement of the time 

actually consumed by consideration of the pretrial motion. Two other related subparagraphs contain clarifying

language that contemplates measurement of the time

actually consumed by the specified pretrial occurrence

without regard to the commencement of the trial. See 
8 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Opinion of the Court 

§3161(h)(1)(F) (“Any time consumed in excess of ten days

from the date an order of removal or an order directing

such transportation, and the defendant’s arrival at the 

destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable”); 

§3161(h)(1)(H) (“delay reasonably attributable to any

period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court”). If “delay” truly referred to the

postponement of trial, then presumably those subparagraphs would instruct that excludable periods should be 

measured from the date that trial was otherwise scheduled to begin.

Second, we are impressed that during the 37 years since

Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act, every Court of 

Appeals has considered the question before us now, and 

every Court of Appeals, implicitly or explicitly, has rejected the interpretation that the Sixth Circuit adopted in

this case. See United States v. Wilson, 835 F. 2d 1440, 

1443 (CADC 1987) (explicit), abrogated on other grounds

by Bloate v. United States, 559 U. S. ___ (2010); United 

States v. Hood, 469 F. 3d 7, 10 (CA1 2006) (explicit); 

United States v. Cobb, 697 F. 2d 38, 42 (CA2 1982) (explicit), abrogated on other grounds by Henderson v. United 

States, 476 U. S. 321 (1986); United States v. Novak, 715 

F. 2d 810, 813 (CA3 1983) (explicit) abrogated on other 

grounds by Henderson v. United States, 476 U. S. 321 

(1986); United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F. 3d 248, 253–254 

(CA4 1997) (explicit); United States v. Green, 508 F. 3d 

195, 200 (CA5 2007) (explicit); United States v. Montoya, 

827 F. 2d 143, 151 (CA7 1987) (explicit); United States v. 

Titlbach, 339 F. 3d 692, 698 (CA8 2003) (implicit); United 

States v. Van Brandy, 726 F. 2d 548, 551 (CA9 1984) 

(explicit); United States v. Vogl, 374 F. 3d 976, 985–986 

(CA10 2004) (explicit); United States v. Stafford, 697 F. 2d 

1368, 1371–1372 (CA11 1983) (explicit). This unanimity

among the lower courts about the meaning of a statute of 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

great practical administrative importance in the daily

working lives of busy trial judges is itself entitled to strong 

consideration, particularly when those courts have maintained that interpretation consistently over a long a period

of time. See General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. 

Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 593–594 (2004). 

Third, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would make the

subparagraph (D) exclusion significantly more difficult to 

administer. And in doing so, it would significantly hinder 

the Speedy Trial Act’s efforts to secure fair and efficient 

criminal trial proceedings. See Zedner v. United States, 

547 U. S. 489, 497 (2006) (noting that the Act’s exceptions 

provide “necessary flexibility”); H. R. Rep. No. 93–1508, p.

15 (1974) (the Act seeks to achieve “efficiency in the processing of cases which is commensurate with due process”); 

S. Rep. No. 93–1021, p. 21 (1974). Trial judges may, for

example, set trial dates beyond 70 days in light of other 

commitments. And in doing so, a trial judge may well be 

aware, based on his or her experience, that pretrial motions will likely consume the extra time—even though the 

judge may know little about which specific motions will be 

filed, when, and how many. How is that judge to apply the 

Sixth Circuit’s approach, particularly when several, including unanticipated, pretrial proceedings did consume 

the time in question? 

Moreover, what is to happen if several excludable and 

several nonexcludable potential causes of delay (e.g., pretrial motions to take depositions, potential scheduling 

conflicts, various health examinations, etc.) coincide, 

particularly in multidefendant cases? Can the judge, 

motion by motion, decide which motions were responsible 

and which were not responsible for postponing what otherwise might have been an earlier trial date? And how is 

a defendant or his attorney to predict whether or when a 

judge will later find a particular motion to have caused a 

postponement of trial? And if the matter is difficult to 
10 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Opinion of the Court 

predict, how is the attorney to know when or whether he

or she should seek further postponement of the 70-day 

deadline? 

With considerable time and judicial effort, perhaps

through the use of various presumptions, courts could find

methods for overcoming these and other administrative

difficulties. In some instances, the judge may know at the

time of filing that a given motion is easily resolved or that 

its complexity will almost certainly postpone the trial. 

Judges could note on the record their predictions about

whether the motion will postpone trial at the time that the

motion is filed. Parties could also stipulate as to whether 

a given motion would be excluded from the Speedy Trial 

clock. But those theoretical strategies would not prevent 

all or even most mistakes, needless dismissals of indictments, and potential retrials after appeal—all of which

exact a toll in terms of the fairness of and confidence in 

the criminal justice system. And any such future strategies for administering the Sixth Circuit’s rule cannot 

provide a present justification for turning the federal 

judicial system away from the far less obstacle-strewn

path that the system has long traveled.

Fourth, we are reinforced in our conclusion by the difficulty of squaring the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation with

this Court’s precedent. In Henderson v. United States, 476 

U. S. 321 (1986), the Court rejected the contention that

the exclusion provision for pretrial motions governs only

reasonable delays. The Court there concluded (as the

Court of Appeals had held) that the exclusion “was intended to be automatic.” Id., at 327 (quoting United States 

v. Henderson, 746 F. 2d 619, 622 (CA9 1984); internal 

quotation marks omitted). See also Bloate v. United 

States, 559 U. S. ___ (2010) (holding based in part on 

the view that the exclusion applies “automatically” to the 

specified period of delay). Henderson did not consider 

whether a trial court must determine whether the pretrial 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

motion actually caused postponement of the trial in each

individual case. But the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation 

would nonetheless significantly limit the premise of “automatic application” upon which the case rests. 

Fifth, for those who find legislative history useful, it is 

worthwhile noting, (as this Court noted in Henderson)

that the Senate Report concerning the reenactment of the

provision in 1979 described it, along with the other provisions in §3161(h)(1), as referring to “specific and recurring

periods of time often found in criminal cases,” and characterized them as “automatically excludable delay,” S. Rep.

No. 96–212, p. 9 (1979). See H. R. Rep. No. 93–1508, at 21 

(“The time limits would be tolled by hearings, proceedings 

and necessary delay which normally occur prior to the

trial of criminal cases” (emphasis added)); S. Rep. No. 93–

1021, at 21 (“[The Act] has carefully constructed exclusions and exceptions which permit normal pre-trial preparation in the ordinary noncomplex cases which represent 

the bulk of business in the Federal courts”). But cf. id., at 

35 (paragraph (h)(1) excludes “[d]elays caused by proceedings relating to the defendant” (emphasis added)).

Sixth, because all the subparagraphs but one under

paragraph (1) begin with the phrase “delay resulting

from,” the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would potentially 

extend well beyond pretrial motions and encompass such

matters as mental and physical competency examinations,

interlocutory appeals, consideration of plea agreements, 

and the absence of essential witnesses. See §3161(h)(1) 

(2006 ed., Supp. III); §3161(h)(3)(A) (2006 ed.). Given the 

administrative complexity the causation requirement

would bring about in all these areas, those Circuits that 

have considered a causation requirement in respect to 

these other matters have rejected it. See, e.g., United 

States v. Pete, 525 F. 3d 844, 852 (CA9 2008) (interlocutory 

appeal); United States v. Miles, 290 F. 3d 1341, 1350 

(CA11 2002) (unavailability of essential witnesses); United 
12 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Opinion of the Court 

States v. Robinson, 887 F. 2d 651, 656–657 (CA6 1989) 

(trial on other charges). That further complexity, along

with these lower court holdings, reinforce our conclusion. 

We consequently disagree with the Sixth Circuit that

the Act’s exclusion requires a court to find that the event

the exclusion specifically describes, here the filing of the

pretrial motion, actually caused or was expected to cause

delay of a trial. We hold that the Act contains no such 

requirement. 

III 

Tinklenberg also argues that the Sixth Circuit wrongly

interpreted a different exclusion provision, this time the 

provision excluding 

“delay resulting from transportation of any defendant

from another district, or to and from places of examination or hospitalization, except that any time consumed in excess of ten days from the date an order of 

removal or an order directing such transportation, 

and the defendant’s arrival at the destination shall be 

presumed to be unreasonable.” §3161(h)(1)(F) (2006 

ed., Supp. III) (emphasis added). 

The District Court granted Tinklenberg’s request for a

competency evaluation and he was transported to a medical facility for examination. The lower courts agreed that 

a total of 20 transportation days elapsed and that since 

the Government provided no justification, all days in 

excess of the 10 days specified in the statute were unreasonable. But in counting those excess days, the court 

exempted weekend days and holidays. Since Veterans 

Day, Thanksgiving Day, and three weekends all fell 

within the 20-day period, only 2 days, not 10 days, were 

considered excessive, during which the 70-day Speedy 

Trial Act clock continued to tick. 

Tinklenberg argues that subparagraph (F) does not 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

exempt weekend days and holidays; hence the court 

should have considered 10, not 2, days to be excessive. 

And the parties concede that those 8 extra ticking days are

enough to make the difference between compliance with, 

and violation of, the Act. 

As the Solicitor General notes, we may consider, or 

“decline to entertain,” alternative grounds for affirmance. 

See United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 242, n. 16 

(1975). In this case, we believe it treats Tinklenberg, who

has already served his sentence, more fairly to consider

the alternative ground and thereby more fully to dispose of

the case. 

The Sixth Circuit exempted weekend days and holidays 

because it believed that subparagraph (F) incorporated

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(a). At the relevant 

time, that Rule excluded weekend days and holidays when 

computing any period of time specified in the “rules,” in 

“any local rule,” or in “any court order” that was less than

11 days. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 45(a) (2005). But in our 

view subparagraph (F) does not incorporate Rule 45. The 

Act does not say that it incorporates Rule 45. The Government has given us no good reason for reading it as

incorporating the Rule. And the Rule itself, as it existed 

at the relevant time, said that it applied to “rules” and to

“orders,” but it said nothing about statutes. Other things

being equal, the fact that Rule 45 is revised from time to

time also argues against its direct application to subparagraph (F). That is because those changes, likely reflecting 

considerations other than those related to the Speedy 

Trial Act, may well leave courts treating similar defendants differently.

Without relying upon a cross-reference to Rule 45, we

believe the better reading of subparagraph (F) would 

include weekend days and holidays in its 10-day time

period. Under the common-law rule, weekend days and

holidays are included when counting a statutory time 
14 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Opinion of the Court 

period of 10 days unless the statute specifically excludes 

them. See 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Time §22, p. 589 (2001) 

(in calculating time periods expressed in statutes, “when

the time stipulated must necessarily include one or more

Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, those days will not be

excluded, in the absence of an express proviso for their 

exclusion”). Many courts have treated statutory time

periods this way. See, e.g., Howeisen v. Chapman, 195 

Ind. 381, 383–384, 145 N. E. 487, 488 (1924); American 

Tobacco Co. v. Strickling, 88 Md. 500, 508–511, 41 A. 

1083, 1086 (1898). And Congress has tended specifically 

to exclude weekend days and holidays from statutory time 

periods of 10 days when it intended that result. Compare

18 U. S. C. §3142(d)(2) (permitting the temporary detention of certain defendants “for a period of not more than

ten days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays”) 

and 5 U. S. C. §552a(d)(2)(A) (requiring an agency to

acknowledge receipt of a request to amend agency records

within “10 days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal 

public holidays)”) with 18 U. S. C. §2518(9) (establishing a 

10-day period for disclosing applications for and court 

orders authorizing wiretaps without specifically excluding

weekends and holidays) and §4244(a) (providing a 10-day

period after conviction for filing a motion to request mental health treatment without specifically excluding weekends and holidays). Indeed, Rule 45 has been recently 

modified so that now (though not at the time of Tinklenberg’s proceedings) it requires a similar result. Fed. Rule 

Crim. Proc. 45(a)(1) (2010) (instructing that weekend days 

and holidays are to be counted when calculating all time 

periods, including statutory time periods for which no

alternative method of computing time is specified). 

* * * 

We disagree with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of 

both subparagraph (D) and subparagraph (F), and now 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

hold that its interpretations of those two provisions are

mistaken. Nonetheless the conclusions the court drew 

from those two interpretations in relevant part cancel 

each other out such that the court’s ultimate conclusion 

that Tinklenberg’s trial failed to comply with the Speedy

Trial Act’s deadline is correct. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit’s judgment ordering dismissal of the indictment on

remand is 

Affirmed. 

JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 09–1498 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JASON LOUIS 

TINKLENBERG 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[May 26, 2011] 

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 

JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in part and concurring 

in the judgment. 

I join Parts I and III of the Court’s opinion. I agree with

the judgment of the Court in Part II that a pretrial motion

need not actually postpone a trial, or create an expectation of postponement, in order for its pendency to be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C.

§3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III). But I think that 

conclusion is entirely clear from the text of the Speedy 

Trial Act, and see no need to look beyond the text. The 

clarity of the text is doubtless why, as the Court’s opinion

points out, ante, at 8, every Circuit disagrees with the

Sixth Circuit’s conclusion. That is the direction in which 

the causality proceeds: Clarity of text produces unanimity

of Circuits—not, as the Court’s opinion would have it,

unanimity of Circuits clarifies text.

As the Court discusses, ante, at 5, the word “delay” can

mean postponement, but it can also mean an “interval of 

time between two events.” American Heritage Dictionary 

480 (4th ed. 2000). One might refer to the “delay” between

two ticks of a clock, or between seeing lightning and hearing thunder, but that does not imply that the first postponed or slowed the second. Here there are substantial 

textual indications that the word “delay” similarly refers 
2 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

to the period between ticks of the speedy trial clock—in 

other words, the period during which the Speedy Trial

Act’s 70-day requirement is tolled.

Interpreting the “delay” referred to in §3161(h)(1)(D) (or 

referred to anywhere else in §3161(h)) as the delay of a 

trial date* would make little sense in light of the context 

of the provision and the structure of the statute. Section 

3161(h)(1)(D) specifies starting and stopping points for the 

excludable “delay” that bear no relation whatsoever to the 

actual amount of time that a trial might be postponed by a 

pretrial motion. It equates the “delay resulting from any

pretrial motion” to the period of time between “the filing 

of the motion” and “the conclusion of the hearing on, or 

other prompt disposition of, such motion.” This equation is

possible if “delay” refers to an interval of time excludable 

for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, but it makes no sense 

if “delay” refers to the time a trial is postponed. Consider, 

for example, a pretrial motion that is pending for 10 days

but causes the district court to push back a trial’s beginning by only one day. In such a situation, §3161(h)(1)(D) 

would require that the entire 10-day period be excluded 

for Speedy Trial Act purposes. 

Neighboring statutory provisions, moreover, link the

excludable “delay” to the time consumed by the specified

event, not the number of days a trial is postponed. Section 

3161(h)(1)(H), for example, excludes “delay reasonably

attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days,

during which any proceeding concerning the defendant 

is actually under advisement by the court.” And 

§3161(h)(1)(F) excludes “delay resulting from transporta-

—————— 

* I consider only this possibility, and not the extended meaning invented by the Sixth Circuit (“expectation of a dela[y] of trial”)—

presumably to explain how delay can be computed ex ante, before any 

trial delay has actually occurred. See 579 F. 3d 589, 598 (2009).

“[E]xpectation of a delay” is simply not one of the possible meanings of

“delay.” 
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

tion . . . except that any time consumed in excess of ten

days from . . . an order directing such transportation, and 

the defendant’s arrival at the destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable.” If “delay” means trial delay, it

makes little sense for Congress to have placed a limit upon

the “time consumed” in transporting a defendant rather

than upon the permissible postponement of trial date. 

The Speedy Trial Act’s structure also suggests that 

§3161(h)(1)(D) is meant to apply automatically and is not 

dependent on predicate findings of postponement. Section 

3161(h) lists various types of delay that may be excluded,

the first six of which (including §3161(h)(1)(D)) make no

reference to any required findings. But the seventh, which 

excludes “delay resulting from a continuance granted by 

any judge,” conditions that exclusion upon certain findings, §3161(h)(7)(A). In light of this difference in formulation, we have held that the first six exclusions are “‘automatic,’” apply “regardless of the specifics of the case,” and 

require no district-court findings. Bloate v. United States, 

559 U. S. ___, ___, n. 1, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 1, n. 1, 6); 

see also Henderson v. United States, 476 U. S. 321, 327 

(1986). Tinklenberg’s incorporation of a threshold inquiry 

into §3161(h)(1)(D) would make it none of these things. 

Delay of trial is also ruled out by the fact that the text

is forward looking. It says that the “following periods of 

delay shall be excluded in computing . . . the time within 

which the trial . . . must commence.” §3161(h) (emphasis

added). This is designed to enable the determination in 

advance of the date by which the trial “must commence.”

Quite obviously, if the specified delays did not count 

unless and until they delayed the trial, one could not know

whether they counted until after the fact. And on that 

interpretation the provision should have read, not “the

time within which the trial . . . must commence,” but 

rather “the time within which the trial . . . should have 

commenced.” 
4 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

And finally, there are the administrative difficulties

that arise when “delay” is taken to mean “delay in trial,” 

discussed in the Court’s opinion at pages 9–10. These are 

not relevant on their own, but only because they bear upon 

the meaning of the text. When one of two possible meanings yields impracticable results, the other meaning is

more likely correct.

Tinklenberg would invent a threshold inquiry applicable

only to §3161(h)(1)(D): If, he says, at least some delay of 

the trial date has occurred, then the entire period specified

in §3161(h)(1)(D) may be excluded. This makes no sense. 

First, nothing in the statute supports treating the word 

“delay” as a trigger for an exclusion of an unrelated period 

of time; quite the opposite, §3161(h)(1)(D) treats the period 

of “delay” and the pendency of the pretrial motion equivalently. Second, that interpretation would ascribe different

meanings to the word “delay” as it is used throughout the 

Speedy Trial Act. “[D]elay resulting from any interlocutory appeal,” §3161(h)(1)(C), for example, would refer to 

the number of days a trial was postponed; but “delay

resulting from any pretrial motion,” §3161(h)(1)(D), would 

refer to the different period specified in that paragraph. 

Identical words used in different parts of a statute are presumed to have the same meaning absent indication to 

the contrary, and here no such indication exists. See IBP, 

Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34 (2005). 

Tinklenberg also argues that his interpretation draws

support from the phrase “resulting from,” which appears

after the word “delay” in §3161(h)(1)(D). He asserts that 

this phrase “underscores that Subsection (D) excludes 

periods of delay that occur as a consequence of pretrial

motions, not merely the time during which such motions 

are pending.” Brief for Respondent 17. That is true 

enough, but it sheds no light on the meaning of the word 

“delay.” Cf. Bloate, supra, at ___, n. 9 (slip op., at 8, n. 9). 

There is nothing odd in saying that an interval of exclud-
Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 5 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

able time under §3161(h)(1)(D) arises “as a consequence” 

of a party’s having filed a pretrial motion; if no pretrial

motion is filed, no delay results.