United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

 

__________________________ 

IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA DEVICES CORP., 

Petitioner. 

__________________________ 

Miscellaneous Docket No. 990 

__________________________ 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United 

States District Court for the District of Delaware in case 

no. 10-CV-00869, Judge Sue L. Robinson. 

__________________________ 

ON PETITION 

__________________________ 

DEANNE E. MAYNARD, Morrison & Foerster LLP, of 

Washington, DC, for petitioner. With her on the petition 

were BRIAN R. MATSUI and ADAM A. ELTOUKHY.; and 

HAROLD J. MCELHINNY and MARK W. DANIS, of San Francisco, California. 

INDRANIL MUKERJI, Fish & Richardson PC, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him on the response 

were RUFFIN B. CORDELL and WILLIAM SEKYI; THOMAS L.

HALKOWSKI, of Wilmington, Delaware; DAVID BARKAN, of 

Redwood City, California; and JOHN DRAGSETH, of Minneapolis, Minnesota. 

__________________________ 
IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA 2

Before RADER, Chief Judge, DYK and O’MALLEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM.

O R D E R 

Link_A_Media Devices Corp. (LAMD) seeks a writ of 

mandamus directing the United States District Court for 

the District of Delaware to vacate its order denying 

LAMD’s motion to transfer venue, and to direct the Delaware district court to transfer the case to the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of California. Marvell International Ltd. (Marvell) opposes. LAMD 

replies. Because the district court abused its discretion in 

denying LAMD’s motion to transfer venue under 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a), this court grants LAMD’s petition for a 

writ of mandamus. 

I. 

The petition for writ of mandamus arises out of a suit 

brought by Bermuda-based Marvell charging LAMD with 

patent infringement. LAMD is incorporated under the 

laws of the state of Delaware where this suit was brought 

in federal district court. 

LAMD moved to transfer the case to the Northern 

District of California, where it maintains its principal 

place of business, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). That 

section authorizes a district court of proper jurisdiction to 

nonetheless transfer a case “[f]or the convenience of the 

parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 

In its motion, LAMD stated that “Delaware had no 

discernable connection to this case beyond it being 

LAMD’s state of incorporation.” Petitioner’s Appendix 

Materials at 15-16. LAMD further stated that Marvell is 
3 IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA

a holding company, and that a related entity, which is 

headquartered in the Northern District of California, 

employs the inventors of the patents-in-suits and presumably houses all of Marvell’s relevant documents to 

this matter. Id. 

Nearly all of LAMD’s 130 employees work in its headquarters in the Northern District of California, and none 

work in Delaware. LAMD therefore argued that it would 

be more convenient for the witnesses and the parties to 

try this case in the Northern District of California. In 

addition, LAMD asserted that the district court failed to 

apply some of the factors relevant to a venue consideration. 

Marvell responded that its choice of forum should be 

entitled to substantial deference because it selected 

Delaware for the legitimate reason that “LAMD is incorporated in Delaware and, thus, cannot claim surprise at 

being brought into the Delaware courts for litigation.” Id. 

at 121. Marvell added that “LAMD is a global company” 

as opposed to a regional enterprise, and should be expected to defend itself where those products are sold and 

has the resources to do so. Id. at 127. 

Agreeing with Marvell, the Delaware district court 

denied LAMD’s motion to transfer. LAMD then filed this 

petition for a writ of mandamus. 

II. 

The remedy of mandamus is available only in extraordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power. In re Calmar, Inc.,

854 F.2d 461, 464 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In reviewing a district 

court’s ruling on a motion to transfer pursuant to 

§ 1404(a), we apply the law of the regional circuit, in this 
IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA 4

case the Third Circuit. See Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco 

Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 836 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

The Third Circuit has held that mandamus may be 

used to correct an improper transfer order if the petitioner can establish a “clear and indisputable” right to the 

writ. See Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., Inc., 5 

F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1993). That standard is an exacting 

one, requiring the petitioner to establish that the district 

court’s decision amounted to a failure to meaningfully 

consider the merits of the transfer motion. See SwindellDressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 

1962). We find that this standard is satisfied here. 

The Third Circuit has identified various private and 

public interest factors to be considered in a § 1404 transfer analysis. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 

879 (3d Cir. 1995). In this case, the district court failed to 

balance those factors fairly and instead elevated two 

considerations to overriding importance. With respect to 

private interests, the district court’s fundamental error 

was making Marvell’s choice of forum and the fact of 

LAMD’s incorporation in Delaware effectively dispositive 

of the transfer inquiry. See Minstar, Inc. v. Laborde, 626 

F. Supp. 142, 146 (D. Del. 1985) (“[T]he mere fact that 

Delaware is the plaintiffs’ choice of forum and . . . the 

defendants’ state of incorporation will not, standing alone, 

prevent this Court from transferring this suit to another 

forum.” (quoting Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. WheelingPittsburgh Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 365, 369 (D. Del. 

1971)). 

First, the district court placed far too much weight on 

the plaintiff’s choice of forum. To be sure, the Third 

Circuit places significance on a plaintiff’s choice of forum. 

When a plaintiff brings its charges in a venue that is not 

its home forum, however, that choice of forum is entitled 

to less deference. See generally Sinochem Int’l Co. v. 
5 IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA

Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) 

(stating that when a plaintiff files a suit outside of its 

home forum, the presumption that its choice of forum is 

convenient and appropriate applies with “less force”); see 

also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981) 

(stating that when a plaintiff is foreign, the presumption 

of favor for its choice of forum is “much less reasonable”). 

Many district courts in the Third Circuit have recognized this distinction. See, e.g., High River Ltd. P’ship v. 

Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 487, 498-99 (M.D. Pa. 

2005) (“[T]he plaintiff’s choice is ‘entitled to less weight 

where the plaintiff chooses a forum which is neither his 

home nor the situs of the occurrence upon which the suit 

is based.’” (quoting Reed v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 166 F. 

Supp. 2d 1052, 1057 (E.D. Pa. 2001)); Tischio v. Bontex, 

Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 521 (D.N.J. 1998) (explaining 

that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to less weight 

“where the plaintiff has not chosen his or her home forum” and “where the choice of forum by a plaintiff has 

little connection with the operative facts of the lawsuit”); 

Pennwalt Corp. v. Purex Indus., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 287, 

289 (D. Del. 1986) (“A defendant's burden with respect to 

plaintiff's choice of forum is easier to meet where the 

plaintiff has not brought suit on its ‘home turf.’”). 

The court’s heavy reliance on the fact that LAMD was 

incorporated in Delaware was similarly inappropriate. 

See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 

527-28 (1947) (explaining that the “[p]lace of corporate 

domicile in such circumstances might be entitled to little 

consideration under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 

which resists formalization and looks to the realities that 

make for doing justice.”). Neither § 1404 nor Jumara list 

a party’s state of incorporation as a factor for a venue 

inquiry. It is certainly not a dispositive fact in the venue 

transfer analysis, as the district court in this case seemed 

to believe. 
IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA 6

The district court also refused to consider two of the 

private interest factors in a Third Circuit venue inquiry: 

the convenience of the witnesses and the location of the 

books and records. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Rather than 

analyze the merits of the parties’ arguments relating to 

these factors, the district court stated that these issues 

are “outdated, irrelevant, and should be given little 

weight, if any, except for those rare exceptions where 

truly regional defendants are litigating.” Marvell Int’l 

Ltd. v. Link_A_Media Devices Corp., Case No. 10-cv-869, 

2011 WL 2293999, *2 (D. Del. June 8, 2011). While 

advances in technology may alter the weight given to 

these factors, it is improper to ignore them entirely. 

The district court also erred when it found that consideration of the public interest factors did not favor 

either forum. Jumara lists six public interest factors: (i) 

the enforceability of the judgment, (ii) practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or 

inexpensive, (iii) court congestion, (iv) the local interest in 

deciding local controversies at home, (v) the public policies of the fora, and (vi) the familiarity of the trial judge 

with the applicable state law in diversity cases. 55 F.3d 

at 879-80. 

When reviewing the public interest factors, the district court, again, noted LAMD’s incorporation in Delaware. The defendant’s state of incorporation, however, 

should not be dispositive of the public interest analysis. 

Aside from LAMD’s incorporation in Delaware, that 

forum has no ties to the dispute or to either party. LAMD 

is headquartered in the Northern District of California, 

where its relevant witnesses and evidence are located. 

Marvell is a holding company that is incorporated in 

Bermuda and has its principal place of business there. 

The named inventors of the patents-in-suit, moreover, are 

employed by a Marvell affiliate, Marvell Semiconductor, 
7 IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA

Inc., which is headquartered in Santa Clara, California, 

only three miles from LAMD. 

Finally, Marvell argues to this court that the case 

should remain in Delaware because “the District of Delaware’s judges are highly experienced in patent infringement litigation.” Answer to Petition for Writ of 

Mandamus 19. It appears that Marvell is confusing the 

public interest factor relating to a trial court’s familiarity 

with “applicable state law,” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80, 

which is not relevant here. Marvell’s claims arise under 

the federal patent laws, for which there is uniformity 

nationwide, and which the Northern District of California 

is equally equipped to address. 

We have, by comparison, considered a district court’s 

concurrent litigation involving the same patent to be a 

relevant consideration, if the court’s experience was not 

tenuous and the cases were co-pending. In re Verizon 

Bus. Network Servs. Inc., 635 F.3d 559, 562 (Fed. Cir. 

2011); In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010). Here, the asserted experience is with patent 

cases generally and not with the patents at issue. There 

is no evidence, moreover, that the District of Delaware’s 

acknowledged experience in this area translates to speedier resolution of patent cases than occurs in the Northern 

District of California. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

The petition for a writ of mandamus is granted. The 

United States District Court for the District of Delaware 

is directed to vacate its order denying petitioner’s motion 

to transfer venue, and to direct transfer to the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of California. 
IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA 8

FOR THE COURT

December 2, 2011 /s/ Jan Horbaly 

 Date Jan Horbaly 

 Clerk