[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12894

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

NICOLE K. BLACKMON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cv-01283-RBD-DCI

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12894

Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:

Nicole Blackmon appeals the district court’s affirmance of 

the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of disability 

insurance benefits (“DIB”). On appeal, Blackmon argues (A) that 

the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in its Residual 

Functional Capacity assessment (“RFC”) by failing to include 

limitations (1) reflecting her numerous medically related absences 

and (2) regarding her mental capacity; and (B) that the Appeals 

Council (“AC”) erred in its determination that further evidence she 

submitted regarding her hip impairment was not chronologically 

relevant. After careful review, we affirm. 

I. Background

In March 2020, Blackmon filed a Title II application for a 

period of disability and DIB. She alleged the following ten

disabilities: “[s]ystemic [s]arcoidosis lungs/cardiac w/PFO”; 

“[o]bstructive [s]leep [a]pnea”; “[d]iabetes [i]nsipidus”; “[d]iabetes 

[m]ellitus w/insulin”; “[s]pinal stenosis with failed laminectomy”; 

“spinal bulging discs/lumbar radiculopathy”; “[a]djustment 

disorder w/mixed anxiety and depressed mood”; “[e]mpty [s]ella 

[s]yndrome”; “[a]drenal insufficiency”; and “[h]yperthyroidism.”

While she initially alleged an onset date of June 15, 2019, Blackmon 

amended her disability onset date to September 29, 2020, after the 

ALJ highlighted that she had engaged in substantial gainful activity 

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through the third quarter of 2020. She was 50 years’ old at the time 

of the amended alleged onset date. 

This background section will cover only the facts and 

procedural history relevant on appeal,1 including: (A) evidence

related to Blackmon’s absenteeism; (B) evidence related to 

Blackmon’s mental limitations; (C) the ALJ’s decision; (D) 

additional evidence submitted to the AC regarding Blackmon’s hip 

replacement; and (E) the district court’s ruling on appeal. Each will 

be discussed in turn. 

A. Medically-related absences 

Blackmon submitted records showing numerous inpatient 

hospitalizations, emergency room visits, and doctor’s 

appointments (collectively, “medical events”), the quantity of 

which are relevant to Blackmon’s argument on appeal that her 

absenteeism should have factored into her RFC. Specifically, 

Blackmon had medical events on at least 71 of the days between

June 15, 2019 (Blackmon’s original onset date), and April 22, 

2021(Blackmon’s last recorded medical event before filing), for an 

average of 3.14 times per 30-day period. However, looking to the 

time period between September 29, 2020, (Blackmon’s amended 

onset date) and April 22, 2021, Blackmon had medical events on 

only eight days, for an average of just over 1 event per 30 days. And 

Blackmon only had multiple medical events in one of the relevant

1 For instance, we need not cover the extensive medical records dealing with 

Blackmon’s physical impairments, because she does not challenge the ALJ’s 

findings on these impairments on appeal. 

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months. Notably, at a hearing on Blackmon’s claim, the ALJ asked 

the Vocational Expert (“VE”) “[i]f I have an individual who is going 

to be tardy, absent, leave early, or any combination of those and if 

that’s greater than one day a month on a regular and ongoing basis 

would there be any jobs for that individual?” The VE responded 

no.

B. Mental Limitations

Blackmon submitted evidence of various medical 

appointments and evaluations related to her mental limitations.

1. Tess Wilson’s evaluations

On September 28, 2020, Blackmon attended a telehealth 

appointment with Tess Wilson, a licensed independent social 

worker (“LISW”). Blackmon reported that she was doing okay, but 

that she was struggling with ongoing pain that negatively impacted 

her mood. She indicated that she had been trying to engage in 

exercises that were recommended by a physical therapist. On 

mental status examination, Wilson noted that Blackmon had a 

“euthymic” mood and “congruent” affect, that her thought content 

and speech were normal, and that her thoughts were linear, goal 

directed, and coherent. Blackmon reported difficulty falling asleep, 

but had “no specific plan[] to harm [her]self.” Wilson assessed 

Blackmon as having “[a]djustment disorder with mixed anxiety and 

depressed mood.” 

Following the amended alleged onset date, on October 2, 

2020, Blackmon attended a telehealth psychotherapy session with 

Wilson for her depression. She reported that she was okay, but 

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“not great.” She reported that she recently had her grandchildren 

over and that it was beneficial for her mood. She continued to have 

“negative/cyclic[al]” thoughts surrounding her pain. On mental 

status examination, Wilson noted that Blackmon’s mood was 

irritable, and that her affect was “mood congruent.” She exhibited 

normal speech; fair insight and judgment; and had linear, goal 

directed and coherent thought processes. However, she was 

having difficulty falling asleep. She had “no specific plan[] to harm 

[her]self.”

On October 15, 2020, Wilson saw Blackmon again and 

Blackmon reported that she was doing okay, but that she had been 

dealing with a number of stressors recently. Specifically, she 

reported that she had lost her job and that her mother was moving 

out, so she was having to make a lot of changes. She indicated that 

she had been able to engage in “thought-changing strategies” and 

reported that she had been able to reduce her pain from “90% to 

70%,” which allowed her to sleep. She also reported getting a dog, 

which had been beneficial in getting her up and moving and also 

had helped with her mood. Wilson conducted a mental status 

examination and noted that (1) Blackmon had a “euthymic” mood 

and “congruent” affect; (2) her thought content and speech were 

normal; and (3) her thoughts were linear, goal directed, and 

coherent. Blackmon again indicated that she did not have any 

plans to harm herself. 

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2. Dr. Bard’s evaluation

On September 22, 2020, Dr. E.M. Bard, Ph.D., a consultative 

psychological examiner, evaluated Blackmon, who was referred 

for a psychological consultative assessment related to her disability 

proceedings. Blackmon reported that since November 2018, she 

was employed by Alpha Phi Alpha Co. as a full-time property 

manager. When asked whether she had experienced any mental 

conditions that interfered with her work duties generally, 

Blackmon reported that since approximately 2012 she “had bouts 

of depression and anxiety” where she did not want to go to work.

Blackmon told Dr. Bard that she met with Wilson on a regular basis 

since June 2019, and that her treatment plan involved “coping skills 

to help [her] recognize ways [she] can change a situation.” When 

describing her depression, Blackmon became tearful, stating that 

both her depression and anxiety have caused her to have 

limitations in her work schedule. Her symptoms included not 

being able to get out of bed, not being able to answer the phone, 

and becoming socially withdrawn. Blackmon reported that she 

was not taking any psychotropic medications, but, in the past, she 

had been prescribed Xanax, which she did not like. She reported 

that on one occasion in 2013 or 2014, she had attempted to 

overdose in the hospital while she was being treated for meningitis, 

but she denied any current suicidal ideation.

As to her activities of daily living, Blackmon reported that 

her mother handled the routine household chores, but she was able 

to pay bills, manage her checking account, count money, make 

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change, and fold laundry. She was able to handle her own personal 

grooming activities and was able to read the local newspaper with 

comprehension, tell time, make appointments, manage her mail, 

and operate a computer. She provided childcare for her two-yearold granddaughter around two times a week. For hobbies, she was 

working on a family tree and enjoyed watching television. 

In conducting a mental status examination, Dr. Bard noted 

that Blackmon’s speech was relevant and coherent, and her eye 

contact was satisfactory. She was cooperative during the 

interview, although tearful at times. Her mood was somewhat 

unhappy, her affect was congruent, and she expressed concern 

regarding her deteriorating physical health. Dr. Bard noted that 

Blackmon “did not exhibit any overt characteristics of anxiety.” 

Dr. Bard also administered the Mini-Mental State Examination 

(“MMSE”) to assess Blackmon’s mental status and cognitive state. 

Blackmon’s overall performance was within the “Average” range 

and her intellectual ability was estimated to be within the “Above 

Average range.” Dr. Bard opined that Blackmon was able to make 

decisions and demonstrate problem solving skills. Dr. Bard 

diagnosed Blackmon with (1) unspecified depressive disorder, and 

(2) adjustment disorder with chronic anxiety.

Dr. Bard also completed a functional assessment and found 

that the only limitation that Blackmon had was that she was 

slightly below average in the area of dealing with normal pressures 

in a competitive work setting. Specifically, Dr. Bard found that 

Blackmon was “self-focused, concerned regarding her 

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-12894

deteriorating health and uncertain regarding her future” and that 

her mental health issues could impact her ability to deal with 

employment expectations to a mild degree. Dr. Bard opined that, 

if Blackmon was required to return to her original work-site, her 

mental health symptoms would be exacerbated. 

3. Dr. Mikalov’s evaluation

On June 24, 2020, Dr. Abraham Mikalov, M.D., performed 

an initial disability determination and RFC assessment. Notably, 

Dr. Mikolav determined that Blackmon had depressive, bipolar, 

and related disorders, but that they were non-severe. As to 

Blackmon’s ability to perform past relevant work, Mikalov 

indicated that she could perform her previous role in customer 

service. 

4. Dr. Haskins’s evaluation

Dr. Kristen Haskins, Psy. D., reviewed the “paragraph B” 

criteria2 and found that, while Blackmon had a mild limitation in 

the domain of adapting or managing oneself, no mental residual 

functional capacity (“MRFC”) was associated with this claim. 

2 Per the social security regulations, a claimant’s degree of functional 

limitations is rated in four areas, otherwise known as the “paragraph B” 

criteria. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(3). These domains are the claimant’s ability 

to: understand, remember, or apply information; interact with others; 

concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage oneself. Id., Pt. 

404 Subpt. P., App. 1, § 12.00(E)(1)-(4). 

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5. Dr. Waggoner’s evaluation

On January 20, 2021, at the reconsideration level of review, 

Dr. Cynthia Waggoner, Psy. D., found that Blackmon had mild 

limitations in the domain of adapting or managing oneself, but had 

no severe impairment.

D. ALJ decision

On August 16, 2021, after going through the SSA’s five-step 

sequential evaluation process,3 the ALJ issued a final decision, 

finding that Blackmon was not disabled. At step one, the ALJ found 

that Blackmon had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

September 29, 2020, the amended alleged onset date. 

At step two, while the ALJ found that Blackmon did have 

some severe physical impairments, the ALJ found that her 

unspecified depressive disorder, adjustment disorder with anxiety, 

and chronic anxiety, were all non-severe because, considering 

them individually and in combination, they did not cause more 

than a minimal limitation in her ability to perform basic mental 

work activities. In making this finding, the ALJ considered the 

3 The five-step process includes evaluating: (1) whether Blackmon is “engaged 

in substantial gainful activity;” (2) if not, “whether [she] has a severe 

impairment or combination of impairments;” (3) if so, whether that 

impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals the medical 

listings; (4) if not, whether she can perform her past relevant work in light of 

her RFC; and (5) if not, whether, based on her age, education, RFC, and work 

experience, she can perform other work found in the national economy. 

Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4).

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“paragraph B” criteria and found that Blackmon had a mild 

limitation in the domain of adapting or managing oneself, but had 

no limitations in any of the three other domains. The ALJ found 

that Blackmon was able to maintain an independent household, 

and was able to attend to self-care, as well as engage in light 

household chores. The ALJ noted that Blackmon was able to drive 

a car, shop in stores, use a computer, manage her own finances and 

e-mail account, take care of her granddaughter twice a week, watch

television, and assemble her family tree.4 

At step three, the ALJ found that Blackmon did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 

equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. 

At step four, the ALJ found that Blackmon had the RFC to 

perform sedentary work with the following limitations: she could 

frequently balance; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, climb 

ramps and stairs; she could never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; 

she had to avoid concentrated exposure to extremes of heat and 

cold, humidity, and pulmonary irritants, such as dust, odors, 

fumes, gases, and poor ventilation; and she had to avoid all 

exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous moving 

machinery. In support of the RFC finding, the ALJ extensively 

4 The ALJ then explained that the limitations identified in the above four 

“paragraph B” criteria were not an RFC assessment, but rather were used to 

rate the severity of mental impairments at steps two and three of the 

sequential evaluation process. The ALJ then stated that “[t]he following [RFC] 

assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the 

‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis.”

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reviewed the medical evidence regarding Blackmon’s physical 

impairments and found that Blackmon’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms, but that Blackmon’s statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms were 

not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other 

evidence in the record. While the ALJ did not mention Blackmon’s 

mental impairments specifically in its RFC analysis, the ALJ again 

highlighted that Blackmon was able to maintain an independent 

household, attend to her self-care, engage in light household 

chores, drive, shop, use a computer, manage her own finances and 

an e-mail account, care for her granddaughter twice per week, 

watch television, and assemble her family tree. 

In further support of its RFC finding, the ALJ discussed the 

medical opinions of Drs. Haskin, Waggoner, and Bard. The ALJ 

found that Drs. Waggoner and Haskin’s opinions were consistent 

with, and supported by, the overall evidence of record and were 

persuasive. The ALJ found that the record showed that Blackmon 

was briefly treated to re-train her psychological response to pain, 

was following no course of psychotropic medications, was above 

average in intellectual function with an intact memory, and had a 

linear and goal-oriented thought process. The ALJ found that 

Blackmon was in regular contact with her family, had denied 

difficulties with others in past workplaces, was able to function in 

public places, and was described in pro-social terms. The ALJ 

further found that Blackmon was said to possess and exhibit typical 

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-12894

levels of insight and judgment sufficient to allow for decision 

making and problem solving. 

The ALJ then noted that Dr. Bard indicated that Blackmon 

would have mild limitations in her ability to adapt to the stressors 

of day-to-day work, but no limitations in her ability to relate to 

others, to understand, remember and carry out instructions, and to 

concentrate, persist, and maintain pace. The ALJ found that, 

because “this opinion indicate[d] significant limitations in one of 

the four, psychologically based, work-related areas of function, it 

[wa]s only marginally consistent with, and supported by, the 

overall evidence of record.” Therefore, the ALJ found that Dr. 

Bard’s opinion was not persuasive. 

Based on the above findings, the ALJ found at step four that 

Blackmon was capable of performing past relevant work as a data 

entry clerk, as it did not require the performance of work-related 

activities precluded by her RFC. Accordingly, the ALJ found that 

Blackmon was not disabled. 

E. Appeal to the AC

Blackmon then sought review from the AC, providing 

additional evidence, including, in relevant part, an MRI from 

March 25, 2022.

This MRI was performed by Dr. Krikor Malajikian, M.D., 

and was prompted by Blackmon’s long term steroid use. The MRI 

showed a “suspected tiny focus of avascular necrosis” along 

Blackmon’s right hip, and a “small focus of mature appearing 

avascular necrosis” along her left hip. 

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The AC denied review on May 18, 2022, finding that there 

was no reason to review the ALJ’s decision. As to the MRI, the AC 

found that, because the ALJ decided her case through August 19, 

2021, “th[e] additional evidence d[id] not relate to the period at 

issue,” and, “[t]herefore, d[id] not affect the decision of whether 

[she] was disabled beginning on or before August 19, 2021.”

F. District Court 

Blackmon challenged this denial in the district court, 

asserting that: (1) the ALJ’s RFC finding was deficient because it did 

not include limitations relating to her medically-related absences, 

despite the “extraordinary number” of visits and hospitalizations in 

the record; (2) did not include any corresponding limitations that 

would account for the ALJ’s finding that she had mild mental 

limitations in the domain of “adapting or managing oneself”; and 

(3) the AC abused its discretion in declining to admit new and 

material evidence, specifically, the MRI that showed that she had 

“mature” avascular necrosis in her hip. 

A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation 

(“R&R”) recommending that the AC’s decision be affirmed. As to 

Blackmon’s argument regarding absenteeism, the magistrate judge 

concluded that Blackmon’s assertions were unsupported and 

waived because they were made in a perfunctory manner without 

legal authority. But, to the extent that they were not, the 

magistrate judge determined that the ALJ properly considered the 

nature of Blackmon’s treatment, in accordance with the 

regulations, and noted that, “[w]hile the ALJ did not apparently 

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14 Opinion of the Court 23-12894

credit [Blackmon]’s testimony regarding missing work or being 

tardy, the ALJ did consider it and decided not to include any 

absenteeism or time off task in the RFC.” 

As to Blackmon’s argument regarding her mental 

functioning, the magistrate judge found that, while the RFC was 

limited to Blackmon’s physical abilities, at step four of the analysis 

the ALJ also considered and “discussed [Blackmon]’s ability to 

attend to self-care, maintain an independent household, drive, 

shop, manage finances, [and] care for her granddaughter,” which 

are the same facts that the ALJ had considered when she found that 

Blackmon had a mild limitation in adapting and managing oneself 

at step two. The magistrate judge also found that the ALJ 

considered Dr. Bard’s consultative report, and specified that it had 

considered all of Blackmon’s symptoms in determining the RFC. 

Thus, the magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ adequately 

considered Blackmon’s mental functioning, including adapting and 

managing oneself. 

As to Blackmon’s argument regarding the AC declining to 

admit new and material evidence, the magistrate judge found that 

the AC properly found that the MRI was not chronologically 

relevant. The magistrate judge determined that the MRI was 

conducted months after the period of disability, and there was no 

discussion in the record that explained how the results related back 

to a prior date. Further, the magistrate judge found that the MRI 

report did not reflect that Dr. Malajikian reviewed any of 

Blackmon’s previous medical records nor was it based on findings 

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23-12894 Opinion of the Court 15

on Blackmon’s condition before the relevant date, but rather only 

noted that the reason for the exam was a history of long-term 

steroid use. The magistrate judge also found that there was not a 

reasonable probability that the MRI would change the outcome of 

the proceedings, because Dr. Malajikian’s impression that “mature 

appearing” avascular necrosis exists was insufficient to show that 

Blackmon’s right hip caused a disabling limitation not accounted 

for in the RFC. 

Blackmon objected to the R&R, reiterating the arguments 

from her memorandum in support of her complaint. The district 

court overruled Blackmon’s objections, adopted the R&R, and 

affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Blackmon appealed. 

II. Standard of Review

Where, as here, an ALJ denies benefits and the AC denies 

review, we review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final 

decision. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The 

Commissioner’s decision is reviewed “to determine whether [it] is 

supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal 

standards were applied.” Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 

1257 (11th Cir. 2019). “Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278). We 

may not reweigh the evidence and decide the facts anew and must 

defer to the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, 

even though the evidence may preponderate against it. Dyer v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). 

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We review an AC’s “refus[al] to consider new evidence 

submitted to it” de novo. Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 806 F.3d 

1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). 

III. Discussion 

On appeal, Blackmon argues (A) that the ALJ erred in its 

RFC by failing to include limitations (1) related to her medicallyrelated absences and (2) mental abilities; and (B) that the AC erred 

in its determination that further evidence submitted by Blackmon 

regarding her hip impairment was not chronologically relevant 

and, therefore, did not affect the outcome of the ALJ’s decision. 

We address each argument in turn. 

A. Whether the ALJ erred in its RFC analysis

Blackmon argues that the ALJ’s determination that she was 

not disabled was erroneous because the ALJ improperly 

determined her RFC by failing to include evidence regarding her 

(1) medically-related absences and (2) mental limitations in its RFC. 

The Social Security regulations outline a five-step process 

the ALJ must use to determine whether a claimant is disabled: 

(1) whether she is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, 

whether she has a severe impairment or combination of 

impairments; (3) if so, whether that impairment, or combination 

of impairments, meets or equals the medical listings; (4) if not, 

whether she can perform her past relevant work in light of her 

RFC; and (5) if not, whether, based on her age, education, RFC, 

and work experience, she can perform other work found in the 

national economy. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 

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1178 (11th Cir. 2011); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). A person cannot 

be found disabled if they are engaged in substantial gainful activity, 

regardless of the person’s medical condition, age, education, and 

work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). 

An RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do 

sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work 

setting on a regular and continuing basis. Social Security Ruling 

(“SSR”) 96-8p (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). The assessment considers only 

functional limitations and restrictions that result from an 

individual’s medically determinable impairment or combination of 

impairments, including the impact of any related symptoms. Id. 

1. Absenteeism

Blackmon argues that the ALJ’s RFC is materially deficient 

because it does not include any limitations relating to her medical 

absences despite the extraordinary number of visits and 

hospitalizations documented in the record. She provides that, 

between her original alleged onset date, June 15, 2019, and the date 

of the last available evidence in the record, April 22, 2021, she was 

variously admitted into the hospital, visiting the ER or else visiting 

one of her numerous primary and specialist treatment providers 

on at least 71 on those 677 days, which equates to 3.14 times every 

30 days. She highlights that the ALJ asked the VE whether any jobs 

would exist for “an individual who is going to be tardy, absent, leave 

early, or any combination of those and if that’s greater than one 

day a month on a regular and ongoing basis,” to which the VE 

responded no. 

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The ALJ’s decision not to include absenteeism limitations in 

Blackmon’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. Blackmon’s 

calculation of medical events includes events that occurred before 

the amended onset date. Looking to the time period between 

September 29, 2020, (Blackmon’s amended onset date) and April 

22, 2021 (Blackmon’s last documented medical event before filing), 

Blackmon had medical events on only eight days, for an average of 

just over 1 time per 30 days. And Blackmon had multiple medical 

events in just one of the months between her amended onset date 

and her filing, which is hardly having multiple medical events in a 

month on “a regular and ongoing basis.” Moreover, nothing in the 

record shows that Blackmon could not schedule future 

appointments outside of work hours, schedule more than one 

appointment per day, or schedule appointments on her off days, 

which would minimize the need to miss work.5 Accordingly, the 

ALJ did not err by failing to include Blackmon’s absenteeism as a 

limitation. 

2. Mental impairment

Blackmon next argues that the RFC finding is materially 

deficient because it does not include any corresponding limitations 

that would account for the ALJ’s finding that she had “mild” 

5 Additionally, six of the eight appointments were 30 minutes or less, and 

several were virtual. Notably, the VE testified as to the employability of 

someone who was absent, tardy, or left work early; but the VE did not say 

anything about someone who missed a brief portion of the middle of the day 

for a scheduled or virtual appointment. 

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limitations in the mental-functioning domain of “adapting or 

managing oneself.” 

Paragraph (c) of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 addresses mental 

abilities, and provides that:

When we assess your mental abilities, we first assess 

the nature and extent of your mental limitations and 

restrictions and then determine your residual 

functional capacity for work activity on a regular and 

continuing basis. A limited ability to carry out certain 

mental activities, such as limitations in 

understanding, remembering, and carrying out 

instructions, and in responding appropriately to 

supervision, co-workers, and work pressures in a 

work setting, may reduce your ability to do past work 

and other work. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(c).

“Consideration of all impairments, severe and non-severe, is 

required when assessing a claimant’s RFC.” Schink, 935 F.3d at 

1268. In Schink, we described the level of consideration an ALJ 

must give to a claimant’s impairments. There, the ALJ stated that 

it had “considered all symptoms” when assessing the claimant’s 

RFC, but the content of the decision demonstrated that it did not, 

as almost all of the opinion relating to RFC discussed the claimant’s 

physical impairments, not his mental condition of bipolar disorder 

nor how that disorder affected the RFC. Id. at 1269. We explained 

that, even if the ALJ had considered the mental conditions 

implicitly in determining the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ had failed to 

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provide sufficient reasoning to show that the proper legal analysis 

had been done, which mandated reversal. Id. at 1269. As a result, 

the ALJ’s assessment was “inadequate.” Id. at 1270. 

Here, the ALJ did not err in failing to include any mental 

limitations in Blackmon’s RFC because it appropriately considered 

the record evidence regarding her non-severe mental impairments 

at step four of the sequential evaluation, and its decision is 

supported by substantial evidence. Recall that the ALJ reviewed 

the paragraph B criteria at step two, finding that Blackmon had a 

mild limitation in the category of “adapting or managing oneself.” 

But what distinguishes this case from Schink is that, at step four in 

in relation to the RFC, the ALJ again reviewed Blackmon’s activities 

related to adapting or managing herself and the persuasiveness of 

the psychological examiners. First, the ALJ explained that 

Blackmon managed her self-care, engaged in light household 

chores, drove a car, shopped in stores, used a computer, managed 

her finances, and took care of her granddaughter twice per week.

And second, the ALJ explained that Drs. Haskins’s and Waggoner’s 

opinions, both of which ultimately concluded that there were no 

severe impairments associated with this claim, were consistent 

with, and supported by, the overall evidence of record and were 

persuasive. Thus, the ALJ here considered whether Blackmon’s 

mental limitations affected her RFC and concluded that they did 

not. 

Further, as briefly touched on above, substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s determination that Blackmon had no mental 

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limitations in her RFC. Schink, 935 F.3d at 1257. The record 

evidence also shows that Blackmon was not on any psychotropic 

medication and that she was working on managing her 

psychological response to pain. Further, the record evidence 

showed that she is above average in intelligence and exhibited 

typical levels of insight and judgment to allow for decision-making

and problem solving. And while Blackmon reported that, since 

approximately 2012 she “had bouts of depression and anxiety” in 

which she did not want to go to work, she had been able to 

maintain employment through at least June 2019. Therefore, 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to not include any 

mental limitations in Blackmon’s RFC. 

B. Chronological relevance

Blackmon argues that the AC abused its discretion in 

declining to admit “new and material” evidence showing that she 

had mature avascular necrosis in the right hip. She argues that, 

while the AC determined that the MRI “d[id] not relate to the 

period at issue” because the ALJ issued its decision months earlier 

in August 2021, the MRI in fact is new, material, and 

chronologically relevant evidence. 

A claimant is generally permitted to present new evidence 

at each stage of the administrative process. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007). The AC must consider 

evidence that was not presented to the ALJ when that evidence is 

new, material, and chronologically relevant. Id.

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22 Opinion of the Court 23-12894

We have explored whether evidence submitted to an AC is 

chronologically relevant in two published cases. In Washington v. 

Soc. Sec. Admin, Comm’r, the claimant challenged the AC’s failure to 

consider the opinions of a psychologist who evaluated the claimant 

in July 2012, after the ALJ’s decision, in December 2011. 806 F.3d

at 1318–19. We held that a psychologist’s evaluation and opinion 

were chronologically relevant because: (1) the claimant had 

described his mental symptoms during the relevant period to the 

psychologist; (2) the psychologist had reviewed the claimant’s 

mental health treatment records from that period; and (3) there 

was no evidence of the claimant’s mental decline since the ALJ’s 

decision. Id. at 1322. We further noted that the holding was based 

on “the specific circumstances of this case.” Id. at 1323. 

In Hargress v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 883 F.3d 1302, 1305 

(11th Cir. 2018), the claimant submitted medical records between 

March 2015 and October 2015 that post-dated the ALJ’s February 

2015 decision. On appeal, we held that nothing in the new medical 

records indicated that the doctors had considered the claimant’s 

past medical records or that the information in them related to the 

period at issue, which “materially distinguished” this case from 

Washington. 883 F.3d at 1309–10. We thus held that the AC did not 

err in concluding that the new medical records were not 

chronologically relevant. Id. at 1310. 

Here, the AC did not abuse its discretion in declining to 

consider additional evidence submitted by Blackmon regarding her 

hip impairment because this evidence is not chronologically 

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relevant. As with Hargress, there is no indication that Dr. Malajikian 

considered Blackmon’s past medical records or indicated whether 

this MRI, taken seven months after the ALJ’s decision, reflects 

Harmon’s condition during the relevant time period. Id. at 1309–

10. Further, Dr. Malajikian did not indicate whether Blackmon had 

any functional limitations. While Blackmon relies on the fact that 

the avascular necrosis appears to be “mature,” she offered no 

evidence, in the form of medical records, to the AC regarding how 

long it takes for avascular necrosis to mature, or how this condition

might impact her functional limitations. 

For all the reasons discussed above, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.

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