J-A19033-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

1720 SANSOM STREET, LP, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

MATTHEW CORRELL : No. 1209 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment June 3, 2016 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Civil Division, No(s): 140500361

1720 SANSOM STREET, LP : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

MATTHEW CORRELL, :

:

Appellant : No. 1210 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment June 3, 2016 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Civil Division, No(s): 00361

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 12, 2017

1720 Sansom Street, LP (“Plaintiff”), appeals, and Matthew Correll 

(“Correll”) cross-appeals, from the judgment that ultimately determined the 

ownership of, and boundary line between, their respective properties. We 

affirm.

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, by a deed recorded on December 

29, 2011, Susannah H. Hall conveyed to Correll property located at 1715 
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Moravian Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (“the Correll Property”), for the 

sum of $252,000.00. 

By a deed recorded on February 22, 2013, Yuko Omori (“Omori”) 

conveyed, to Plaintiff,1 adjoining properties located at 1717 Moravian Street 

and 1720 Sansom Street in Philadelphia (“Plaintiff’s Property”), for the sum 

of $1.00. 

In April 2012, Plaintiff’s Property2 was substantially damaged in a fire. 

After the resolution of unrelated insurance issues, Plaintiff contracted with 

Matthew DiPasquale, Inc. (“DiPasquale”), to commence reconstruction of 

Plaintiff’s Property. During this reconstruction, Plaintiff discovered that a 

third-floor powder room on the Correll Property, with its plumbing and 

fixtures located on the second floor (collectively, “the Improvements”), was 

partially located on Plaintiff’s Property.3 A survey conducted by Plaintiff’s 

architect confirmed that the Improvements encroached on Plaintiff’s Property 

by approximately 18 inches. A deck on the Correll Property (“the Deck”) 

also was found to encroach on Plaintiff’s Property. 

 

1 Omori is a limited partner of Plaintiff. 

2 Although Omori owned the property at the time, we will refer to her 

property as “Plaintiff’s Property” for clarity.

3 A subsequent inspection by Philadelphia’s Department of Licenses and 

Inspections determined that the Improvements were built without the 

issuance of a building permit. 
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On May 6, 2014, Plaintiff initiated the instant action by filing a Petition 

for a preliminary injunction and a Complaint for equitable relief based upon 

Correll’s alleged trespass upon Plaintiff’s Property. Correll counterclaimed, 

seeking to quiet title to the Improvements by application of the consentable 

line doctrine, as the Improvements had been in existence for over 21 years. 

Correll additionally sought to quiet title to the Deck.

On February 12, 2016, after a bench trial, the trial court determined 

that Correll is the owner of the Deck and the Improvements. The trial court 

directed that Correll pay the costs of installing a permanent firewall between 

the Correll Property and Plaintiff’s Property. 

Plaintiff filed a post-trial Motion for judgment n.o.v., challenging the 

trial court’s application of the consentable line doctrine and its denial of relief 

for Correll’s trespass onto Plaintiff’s Property. Correll filed a post-trial Motion 

to clarify and amend the trial court’s February 12, 2016 Order. Specifically, 

Correll sought an amendment of the Order to reflect that the plumbing for 

the Improvements, located on the second floor of Plaintiff’s Property, should 

be awarded to him, and a clarification regarding the location of the proposed 

firewall. Correll further challenged the requirement that he pay the costs 

associated with installation of a firewall between Plaintiff’s Property and the 

Correll Property. Finally, Correll asserted that Plaintiff already had 

constructed a temporary firewall, and it was unclear as to what Correll was 

to do with that firewall.
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On March 16, 2016, the trial court entered an Order amending its 

February 12, 2016 Order, and declaring Correll to be the legal owner of “the 

[D]eck and the third floor [Improvements], including the plumbing servicing 

it on the second floor of [the Correll Property] and extending into [Plaintiff’s 

Property.]” Trial Court Order, 3/16/16, at ¶ 6. The trial court’s Order 

further clarified that Correll was to construct the firewall between Plaintiff’s 

Property and the Correll Property, “on the property line which reflects the 

ownership as mandated by this Order.” Id. at ¶ 8. The trial court directed 

the parties to submit proposed reformed deeds for all of the affected 

properties, but stayed that portion of the Order pending appeal. Thereafter, 

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, after which Correll filed a cross-appeal of 

the trial court’s March 16, 2016 Order. The trial court subsequently entered 

Judgment.4

In its appeal, Plaintiff presents the following claims for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and exceed its equitable 

power when it applied the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex to 

determine that [Correll] is the owner of the [I]mprovements?

[2]. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to 

consider the post[-]trial findings of Code enforcement violations 

found by the municipal court?

[3]. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and exceed its 

equitable power when it barred Plaintiff’s claims for trespass of 

 

4 “A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but 

before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such 

entry and on the date thereof.” Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 A.3d 994, 

1008 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). 
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the [Improvements] pursuant to the application of the doctrine 

of laches?

[4]. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error 

of law when it denied Plaintiff’s request for a permanent 

injunction?

[5]. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error 

of law when it denied Plaintiff’s request for a directed verdict?

Brief for Appellant at 6-7 (some capitalization omitted, numbering changed). 

Before addressing Plaintiff’s claims, we observe that, in its Statement 

of Questions Involved, Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s application of the 

de minimis doctrine. Id. at 6. In the Argument section of its brief, 

however, Plaintiff generally argues that the trial court improperly declared 

Correll to be the owner of the property encompassing the Improvements. 

Id. at 14. Under this heading, Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly 

(a) determined that Correll established a consentable boundary line; (b) 

determined that Correll failed to establish the requisite 21 years of adverse 

use; and (c) supplanted rules of law with equitable principles. See id. at 14, 

25, 28. In subsection (c), Plaintiff addresses the claim set forth in his 

Statement of Questions Involved. Although we could deemed waived any 

issues not set forth in Plaintiff’s Statement of Questions Involved, we will 

address the claims set forth in the Argument section of Plaintiff’s brief. 

Counsel, however, is reminded of Rule of Appellate Procedure 2116(a). See 

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (directing that “[n]o question will be considered unless it 
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is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested 

thereby.”)

In its first claim, Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s determination that 

Correll had established ownership of the Improvements and the Deck by 

application of the consentable line doctrine. Brief for Appellant at 14. 

Plaintiff contends that neither Plaintiff nor Correll recognized a new boundary 

line, 18 inches away from the deeded property line. Id. at 16. Plaintiff 

argues that the positioning of interior walls, within one’s own property, is not 

equivalent to recognizing a boundary line. Id. at 17. Plaintiff directs our 

attention to evidence that Plaintiff and Correll were not aware that the 

Improvements were placed over the boundary line of Plaintiff’s Property. Id.

at 16. Plaintiff also directs our attention to testimony of owners in the 

parties’ respective chains of title that they were unaware of any 

encroachment by the Improvements onto Plaintiff’s Property. See id. at 18, 

20 (wherein Plaintiff points out (1) Correll’s testimony that he was unaware 

of whether the Improvements matched the description set forth in the 

Movarian Street Deed, (2) Hall’s testimony that she had no knowledge that 

the Improvements had been constructed and installed beyond the Correll 

Property’s boundary line, and (3) Dr. Peter Hunt’s (“Dr. Hunt”) testimony 

that he had no knowledge of any alterations by Correll after the time of his 

transfer of the property to Hall). 

We keep in mind the applicable standard of review: 
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In equity matters, appellate review is based on a determination 

by the appellate court of such questions as whether (1) sufficient 

evidence supports the findings of the judge; (2) the factual 

inferences and legal conclusions based on those findings are 

correct; and (3) there has been an abuse of discretion or an 

error of law. Generally, in an appeal from a trial court sitting in 

equity, the standard of review is rigorous. The function of this 

Court on an appeal from an adjudication in equity is not to 

substitute its view for that of the lower tribunal; our task is 

rather to determine whether a judicial mind, on due 

consideration of all of the evidence, as a whole, could reasonably 

have reached the conclusion of that tribunal.

Omicron Sys., Inc. v. Weiner, 860 A.2d 554, 557-58 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we are “bound 

by the trial court’s determination concerning the credibility of witnesses and 

weight to be accorded the evidence.” Marchetti v. Karpowick, 667 A.2d 

724, 726 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted).

“Based upon a rule of repose sometimes known as the doctrine of 

consentable line, the existence of such a boundary may be proved either by 

dispute and compromise between the parties or recognition and 

acquiescence by one party of the right and title of the other.” Moore v. 

Moore, 921 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2007).

“Acquiescence,” in the context of a dispute over real property, 

denotes passive conduct on the part of the lawful owner 

consisting of failure on his part to assert his paramount rights or 

interests against the hostile claims of the adverse user. A 

determination of consentable line by acquiescence requires a 

finding 1) that each party has claimed the land on his side of the 

line as his own[;] and 2) that he or she has occupied the land on 

his side of the line for a continuous period of 21 years.... [W]hen 

a consentable line is established, the land behind such a line 

becomes the property of each neighbor regardless of what the 

deed specifies. In essence, each neighbor gains marketable title 
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to that land behind the line, some of which may not have been 

theirs under their deeds.

Id. at 5 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The parties need 

not have specifically consented to the location of the line. Sorg v. 

Cunningham, 687 A.2d 846, 849 (Pa. Super. 1997). “It must nevertheless 

appear that for the requisite twenty-one years[,] a line was recognized and 

acquiesced in as a boundary by adjoining landowners.” Plauchak v. 

Boling, 653 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Proof of passage of the statutory period may be 

shown by tacking the current claimant’s tenancy to that of his predecessor. 

Moore, 921 A.2d at 5. 

We have reviewed the parties’ briefs and the certified record. We 

agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, 

regarding this claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 4-5. We 

therefore affirm on the basis of the trial court’s Opinion with regard to 

Plaintiff’s first claim of error, see id., with the following addendum.

Plaintiff contends that a consentable line has not been recognized 

above a properties’ surface. Brief for Appellant at 21. However, a property 

owner’s “interest in exclusive possession is not limited to the surfaces; it 

extends above and below.” Jones v. Wagner, 624 A.2d 166, 169 (Pa. 

Super. 1993) (citations omitted). As stated above, the consentable line 

doctrine is a rule of repose that may be used to determine a property’s 

boundary line(s). Moore, 921 A.2d at 4. We can find no case law limiting 
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application of the doctrine to surface rights only. Consequently, we cannot 

conclude that the trial court erred in finding a consentable line above the 

surface of the property.

Plaintiff also claims that Correll failed to satisfy the 21-year statutory 

requirement for application of the consentable line doctrine. Brief for 

Appellant at 25. At trial, Omori testified that she and her husband acquired 

Plaintiff’s Property on October 27, 1994.5 N.T., 10/1/15, at 117. Omori 

explained that she subsequently deeded Plaintiff’s Property to Plaintiff, of 

which she is a limited partner. Id. at 118. Omori stated that she never 

gave anyone permission to use a portion of Plaintiff’s Property, while she 

owned it. Id. at 135. Omori explained that she used the third floor of her 

property, up to the wall dividing Plaintiff’s Property from the Correll 

Property, from 1997 to 2006. Id. at 148. During her ownership, Omori 

believed that she owned up to the wall on the east and west side of 

Plaintiff’s Property. Id. at 165. 

James Campbell (“Campbell”), Plaintiff’s expert architect, testified that 

in February or March 2013, he was asked by Omori to “come over to take a 

look at a fire-damaged building” on Plaintiff’s Property. N.T., 10/2/15, at 

27. Campbell stated that as part of that work, he engaged surveyor David 

Landrecht (“Landrecht”) to survey the property. Id. at 35. Landrecht 

testified that he surveyed Plaintiff’s Property on February 6, 2014. N.T., 

 

5 Omori’s husband died on December 14, 1995. 
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8/30/15, at 65. Landrecht acknowledged a “common wall” between the 

Correll Property and Plaintiff’s Property. Id. at 73. 

Dr. Hunt, an oral surgeon, testified that he owned the Correll Property 

from September 4, 1987 to 2004. N.T., 6/17/14, at 20. According to Dr. 

Hunt, the third-floor bathroom existed at the time he purchased the Correll 

Property. Id. at 12-13. Dr. Hunt further testified that he made no changes 

to the bathroom during his period of ownership. Id. at 14, 17. In addition, 

Dr. Hunt testified that the third-floor bathroom existed at the time he sold 

the Correll Property to Susannah Hall (“Hall”), Correll’s predecessor in title. 

Id. at 15. Dr. Hunt confirmed that the Correll Property included the Deck, at 

the time of his purchase, and on the date that he conveyed the Correll 

Property to Hall. Id. at 15-16. Dr. Hunt testified that he used the bathroom 

and the Deck during his period of ownership. Id. at 17. 

Hall confirmed that the Improvements and the Deck existed at the 

time she purchased the Correll Property. N.T., 10/6/15, at 58. Although 

Hall renovated the Improvements by installing bathroom tile, she did not 

move the walls or plumbing, and retained the same sink and toilet. Id. at 

62. Hall performed some work on the Deck, but did not expand the Deck’s 

size. Id. at 63. Hall used the Improvements and Deck during her 

ownership of the Correll Property. Id. at 63-64. Hall sold the Correll 

Property to Correll on December 9, 2011. Id. at 63. During her period of 
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ownership, Hall considered the Improvements and the Deck to be owned by 

her. Id. at 64, 66. 

Suzin Kline (“Kline”), a real estate agent, testified that she 

represented the seller of the Correll Property during the sale to Hall, and 

from Hall to Correll. Id. at 72. According to Kline, the listing for the Correll 

Property included a reference to the Improvements as a “one-half bath.” Id.

at 74. When Hall purchased the Correll Property, Kline personally observed 

the Improvements. Id. at 76. The listing for the Correll Property also 

included a reference to the Deck. Id. at 77. 

Finally, Correll testified as to his belief that, at the time he purchased 

the Correll Property, “when I walked through with my realtor, I believed 

[that] all [of] the property within the house, as well as the [D]eck, was 

considered to be my property.” N.T., 10/5/15, at 120. Correll testified to 

his belief that the other side of the wall of the Improvements was Plaintiff’s 

Property. Id. at 148-149. Correll also acknowledged his use of the 

Improvements and the Deck throughout his ownership of the Correll 

Property. Id. at 151-52. 

Thus, the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that each party 

has (1) claimed the land on their respective sides of the Improvements and 

the Deck as their own; and (2) occupied their respective side of the line for a 

continuous period of 21 years. See Moore, 921 A.2d at 5. 
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Plaintiff, in his first claim, also argues that Correll failed to satisfy the 

21-year statutory period because there was no obvious presence of a 

boundary line, so as to allow Correll’s possession to tack onto that of his 

predecessors in title. See Brief for Appellant at 25, 26-27. Plaintiff 

contends that there was only a “hidden” boundary line in the air space above 

an alley. Id. at 27. 

As our Supreme Court has explained, 

“where a boundary line, or corner, is actually located is a 

question for the trier of fact.” Corbin v. Cowan, 716 A.2d 614, 

617 (Pa. Super. 1998) (resolving dispute regarding location of 

common boundary line and ownership rights of dirt road) 

(emphasis added), quoting Plott v. Cole, 377 Pa. Super. 585, 

547 A.2d 1216, 1219 (Pa. Super. 1988); see also Plauchak[,]

... 653 A.2d [at] 675 (noting “location of ... [a] boundary line is a 

matter for the trier of fact” in action in ejectment and/or to quiet 

title regarding location of boundary line and ownership of 

property surrounding boundary line) (emphasis in original)....

Starling v. Lake Meade Prop. Owners Ass’n, 162 A.3d 327, 352-53, (Pa. 

2017) (emphasis omitted). 

The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Correll established 

the existence of a consentable line for the requisite 21-year period. As set 

forth above, Omori testified that she believed that Plaintiff owned up to the 

wall on the east side of Plaintiff’s Property. N.T., 10/1/15, at 148, 165. 

Hall, Dr. Hunt, and Correll each testified that they believed that they owned, 

and continually used, the Improvements and the Deck throughout their 

periods of ownership. N.T. (Correll), 10/5/16, at 120; N.T. (Hall), 10/6/15, 

at 63-64, 66; N.T. (Dr. Hunt), 6/17/14, at 12-13, 15-17. Thus, Correll 
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established the existence of a consentable line, the location of which was left 

to the trial court, as finder of fact, to decide. See Starling, 162 A.3d at 

352-53. Because the evidence supports the findings of the trial court, as 

fact-finder, and its legal conclusions are sound, we cannot grant Plaintiff 

relief on this contention. See Omicron Sys, Inc., 860 A.2d at 557-58.

Under his first claim of error, Plaintiff additionally argues that the trial 

court improperly replaced “rules of law with equitable principles[.]” Brief for 

Appellant at 28 (capitalization omitted). Plaintiff contends that the trial 

court’s “sua sponte application of the de minimis doctrine exceeded the trial 

court’s equitable power.” Id. According to Plaintiff, the doctrine had no 

place in this litigation, and the trial court improperly used this doctrine “in 

place of finding that [Correll] had legally established ownership by 

consentable line.” Id. at 32. Plaintiff directs our attention to testimony 

regarding water damage to Plaintiff’s Property, purportedly caused by the 

flashing on the pole attaching the Deck to Plaintiff’s Property. Id. at 33-34. 

Plaintiff argues that this damage is not trifling or immaterial. Id. at 37. 

Our review discloses that, although the trial court found that the 

encroachment was de minimis, the trial court additionally determined that 

Correll had established a consentable line by recognition and acquiescence. 

See Trial Court Order, 3/16/16, at ¶¶ 3 (finding in favor of Correll as to 

Count III of Correll’s Counterclaim for quiet title based upon the consentable 

line doctrine), 6 (finding that Correll owns the Improvements and Deck); 
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see also Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 5-7 (determining that Correll met 

the required 21-year period of possession for application of the consentable 

line doctrine). Because we discern no error or abuse of discretion as to this 

determination, we need not address Plaintiff’s challenge to the 

characterization of the encroachment as de minimis. However, even if we 

were to address this claim, we would affirm on the basis of the trial court’s 

Opinion with regard to this issue. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 4-5. 

As to Plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court improperly “replaced rules 

of law with equitable principles,” see Brief for Appellant at 28, we point out 

that Plaintiff sought equitable relief from the trial court. We cannot conclude 

that the trial court erred by applying equitable principles to Plaintiff’s claim 

for equitable relief. 

In its second claim of error, Plaintiff argues that the trial court 

improperly applied the doctrine of laches to bar Plaintiff’s claim for trespass 

as to a support post of the Deck. Brief for Appellant at 38. According to 

Plaintiff, Correll suffered no prejudice caused by Plaintiff’s alleged delay. Id. 

at 40. 

“The doctrine of laches is an equitable bar to the prosecution of stale 

claims and is the practical application of the maxim that those who sleep on 

their rights must awaken to the consequence that they have disappeared.” 

Fulton v. Fulton, 106 A.3d 127, 131 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Laches arises when a party’s position or rights 
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are so prejudiced by length of time and inexcusable delay, plus attendant 

facts and circumstances, that it would be an injustice to permit presently the 

assertion of a claim against him.” In re Estate of Moskowitz, 115 A.3d 

372, 380 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“The question of whether laches applies is a question of law; thus, we are 

not bound by the trial court’s decision on the issue.” Fulton, 106 A.3d at 

131. 

Laches bars relief when the complaining party is guilty of 

want of due diligence in failing to promptly institute the action to 

the prejudice of another. Thus, in order to prevail on an 

assertion of laches, respondents must establish: a) a delay 

arising from petitioner’s failure to exercise due diligence; and, b) 

prejudice to the respondents resulting from the delay.

Id. (citation omitted). 

The party asserting laches as a defense must present 

evidence demonstrating prejudice from the lapse of time. Such 

evidence may include establishing that a witness has died or 

become unavailable, that substantiating records were lost or 

destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in 

anticipation that the opposing party has waived his claims.

Estate of Moskowitz, 115 A.2d at 380 (quoting Fulton, 106 A.3d at 131 

(internal citations omitted)). 

Here, Correll testified that a critical reason for his purchase of the 

Correll Property was the Deck. N.T., 10/5/15, 147. According to Correll, “it 

was a big asset to me to have an outdoor space and eating area since my 

kitchen is ... very small and not suitable for entertainment.” Id. Correll also 

testified that he would not have purchased the Correll Property had the Deck 
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not been included as part of the property. Id. Contrary to Plaintiff’s claim, 

Correll presented evidence of prejudice due to the lapse of time. 

In its second claim, Plaintiff also argues that the trial court improperly 

barred Plaintiff’s claim for trespass by a water diverter from the Correll 

Property. Brief for Appellant at 41. Plaintiff asserts that the water diverter 

violated the Philadelphia Property Maintenance Code, as it resulted in the 

concentration of water drainage to Plaintiff’s Property. Id. 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Plaintiff’s claim of trespass 

based upon the water diverted from the Correll Property. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 3/21/17, at 8-9. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial 

court, as expressed in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis as to Plaintiff’s 

contention in this regard. See id.

In its third claim of error, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by 

denying its request for a permanent injunction. Brief for Appellant at 44. 

According to Plaintiff, the trial court’s failure to enjoin Correll from 

maintaining the Deck’s post on Plaintiff’s Property violates the Philadelphia 

Property Maintenance Code. Id. at 45. 

Our review of the record discloses no abuse of discretion or error in 

the trial court’s determination of the parties’ respective property rights. The 

extent to which the Deck complies with or violates the Philadelphia Property 

Maintenance Code was/is the subject of a municipal court proceeding. Any 

violations, and potential remedies to correct violations, are properly before 
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the municipal court for determination. Finally, we agree with the trial court’s 

determination that “[i]t would be improper to import, after the close of 

evidence and completely out of context, the findings of another court as to 

another matter.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 5 n.4. Consequently, 

Plaintiff is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

In its fourth claim of error, Plaintiff argues that the trial court 

improperly denied its Motion for a directed verdict. Brief for Appellant at 47. 

According to Plaintiff, Correll failed to sufficiently describe the land in 

controversy, such that the trial court could afford Correll the relief sought. 

Id. at 47-48. 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim and concluded that 

it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 9. We agree with the 

reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on this basis as to Plaintiff’s fourth 

claim. See id.

In its fifth claim, Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly refused 

to consider the post-trial findings of the municipal court as to code violations 

by Correll. Brief for Appellant at 52. Plaintiff contends that this newly 

discovered evidence was relevant to Correll’s “unclean hands.” Id. 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim and concluded that 

it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 5 n.4. We agree with 

the trial court’s determination, and affirm on this basis as to Plaintiff’s fifth 

claim. See id.
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We next address the following claims raised by Correll:

1) Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in ordering [Correll] to 

construct and pay the costs of installing a permanent firewall 

between [Plaintiff’s Property and the Correll Property,] when the 

[trial c]ourt’s ruling was against the weight of the evidence 

insofar as there was no evidence presented at trial that [the 

Correll Property] was cited for violation of any City of 

Philadelphia codes regarding the fire separation [between the 

properties]?

2) Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in ordering [Correll] to 

construct and pay the costs of installing a permanent firewall 

between [Plaintiff’s Property and the Correll Property] by failing 

to consider [that the] existing condition of the properties were 

such that the City of Philadelphia would even require a firewall to 

be constructed by [Correll]?

3) Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in ordering [Correll] to 

construct and pay the costs of installing a permanent firewall 

between [Plaintiff’s Property and the Correll Property,] since it 

was beyond the scope of relief requested by [Plaintiff] in its 

Complaint?

4. Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in its order by failing to 

specify that [Correll] did not construct the [Improvements] and 

the plumbing servicing [them] had been in existence for more 

than forty years?

5. Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in ordering [Correll] to 

construct and pay the costs of installing a permanent firewall 

between [Plaintiff’s Property and the Correll Property] when facts 

at trial established that [Plaintiff], through its agents, removed 

material from the wall between [Plaintiff’s Property and the 

Correll Property] which could have sufficed as a firewall, and 

therefore[,] Correll should not be forced to bear the costs of 

erecting a firewall when any damage to [Plaintiff’s Property] was 

caused by [Plaintiff]?

6. Whether the Court erred by failing to specify in its [O]rder 

that [Correll] is only required to install and pay the costs of 

installing a firewall on [Correll’s] side of the property line[,] as 

determined by the [trial court] in its [O]rder of March 16, 2016, 
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not on [Plaintiff’s] side of the property line, if the City of 

Philadelphia deems it necessary?

Brief for Cross-Appellant at 6-7.

In its Opinion, the trial court succinctly addressed each of these issues, 

and concluded that they lack merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 

10-12. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as expressed 

in its Opinion, and affirm on the basis of the trial court’s Opinion with regard 

to each of Correll’s claims. See id.

Accordingly, we affirm the Judgment entered by the trial court.

Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/12/2017
1 Sansom Street and Moravian Street ar both smaller streets in Philadelphia, and Sansom is just north of Moravian. 

They run parallel to one another, and a e separated by approximately six to seven car-lengths. 

conditions predated their owners ip of the property, and have been in place for decades. 

the alleged property line, at its d epest. Prior owners of both properties testified that these 

plaintiffs property as well. The ncroachment was approximately eighteen inches in depth over 

defendant's roof deck and certai plumbing serving the powder room trespassed upon the 

the plaintiff enjoyed prior to the owder room's installation. The plaintiff alleged that the 

not penetrate the plaintiffs prop rty walls or otherwise intrude into the interior living space that 

Street.1 The plaintiff acknowled es that it was initially unaware of the encroachment, which does 

on that property encroaches on t e interior wall space of the plaintiffs property, 1717 Moravian 

owns a rowhome at 1715 Moravian Street in Philadelphia, and some portion of a powder room 

This is a case about a "p wder room encroachment" - the defendant, Matthew Correll, 

I. Facts and Procedur I History 

POWELL, JR. KENNETH J., March 21, 2017 . 

OPINION 

<::.) 

··.:·t.., (J_) 

i,.) II II 111111111111111 

14050036100134 

MATTHEW CORRELL 

. .. · 1720 Sansom Street, LP. Vs Correll-OPFLD 

......, -- .. 

/ ·, v. 

1720 SANSOM STREET, L.P. DOCKET NO.: 140500361 

44 .......... 

; ··- ....... 

i 

1209 & 1210 EDA 2016 

Circulated 09/13/2017 04:18 PM 

INT E COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

FIRST JUD CIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL TRIAL DIVISION 
2 

2 For clarity's sake, the opinion wilt refe to the plaintiff and counterclaim defendant as the plaintiff, and the 

defendant and counterclaim plaintiff as e defendant. 

1. Whether the trial co erred in finding that Appellee is the legal owner of the third 

floor powder room an the plumbing servicing it on the second floor, and the roof 

deck, to the extent tha they extend over the deeded property line between 1715 

Moravian Street and 1 1 7 Moravian Street? 

a. Whether the tr al court considered that Appellee was found liable for code 

enforcement v olations pertaining to the roof deck and powder room 

encroachment ost trial in Philadelphia Municipal Court on February 18, 

2016, as raise in Appellant's Post Trial Motion? 

claims of error:2 

greater detail infra. The plaintiff nd counterclaim defendant brings a broader range of alleged 

this Court's order that he constru t and pay for a firewall between the properties, as described in 

The defendant and count claim plaintiff brings six alleged points of error, all relating to 

2016, both sides filed timely noti es of appeal. 

construct and pay the costs of a p rmanent firewall between the two properties. On April 13, 

and the deck, the claim for injun tive relief is dismissed as moot, and the defendant is ordered to 

counterclaim plaintiff as to tresp ss, permanent injunction, and quiet title as to the powder room 

On March 16, 2016, the der was amended as follows: judgment for the defendant/ 

is dismissed as moot. 

title, judgment is entered for the efendant; and count III of the counterclaim for injunctive relief 

action to quiet title, judgment is ntered for the defendant; on count II of counterclaim for quiet 

preliminary injunction, judgmen is entered for the defendant; on count I of counterclaim for 

complaint for ejectment for tresp ss, judgment is entered for the defendant; on count II for 

fact. On February 12, 2016, this ourt entered an order specifying that on count I of the 

The parties agreed to for go a jury trial and to proceed with this Court as the finder of ... 
3 

Zeglin v. Gahagen, 812 A.2d 55 (Pa. 2002). In a boundary dispute case, as in a general action in 

of fact. Plott v. Cole, 547 A.2d 1 16, 1219 (Pa. Super. 1988) (abrogated on other grounds by 

boundary line is a matter oflaw hile the location of that boundary line is a matter for the trier 

Doman v. Brogan, 592 A.2d 104 110 (Pa. Super. 1991). The question of what constitutes a 

reverse on appeal unless the trial [udge's findings are unsupported by competent evidence. 

Where, as here, the trial c urt sits as the sole finder of fact, an appellate court will not 

equitable powers. 

to the maximal extent, given that the encroachment was de minimis and given the Court's 

This Court ruled as it did n order to preserve the value of each of the affected properties 

II. Discussion 

2. Whether the trial co erred in permitting the Appellee to tack his predecessors' 

periods of possession to comply with the Doctrine of Consentable Lines' required 21 

year period of posses ion? 

3. Whether the trial cou erred in failing to determine that Appellee's deck post that is 

situated on Appellant s roof is a trespass onto Appellant's property and is required to 

be repositioned onto ppellee's roof? 

a. Even if the tri 1 court finds Appellee to be the owner of the roof deck to the 

extent it exten s over the deeded property line, why it failed to enjoin the 

water penetrat on into appellant's property caused by the deck post? 

4. Whether the trial cou erred in failing to determine that Appellee's water drainage 

diversion gutter is at spass onto Appellant's property requiring removal from 

Appellant's property d redirection into Appellee's own downspout? 

5. Whether the trial cou erred in denying Appellant's request for a permanent 

injunction? 

6. Whether the trial cou 's February 12, 2016 Order was a final order per Pa.R.A.P. 

341? 

7. Whether the trial cou erred in denying Appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict 

and by finding in fav r of Appellee as to Counts I and II of his Counterclaim to quiet 

title where Appellee iled to sufficiently describe[] the land in controversy? 

8. Whether the trial cou erred in failing to identify the precise location of the property 

line between 1 715 M ravian Street and 1 71 7 Moravian Street on which Appellee 

must construct a fire all as required by Item Number 8 of the Court's March 16, 

2016 Order? 

.. 
4 

3 "The doctrine is set forth in the maxim 'de minimus non curat lex,' which means that the law will not concern 

itself with trifles. More specifically it m ans that a court will not grant equitable relief to a plaintiff who seeks a 

decree which will do him no good but w ich will work a hardship on another." Yeakel v. Driscoll, 467 A.2d 1342, 

1344 (Pa. Super. 1983) (citing Bristol- ers Co. v, Lit Brothers, Inc., 6 A.2d 843 (Pa. 1939). 

there for years prior to its discov y by the plaintiff. On the other hand, to require that the 

significant harm or loss either be re or upon belated discovery of the encroachment, which was 

would have been an equitable dis ster.3 The plaintiff did not establish that it had suffered any 

the encroachment was de mini mi , and to require demolition of the powder room and roof deck 

property line between 1715 Mora ian Street and 1717 Moravian Street? This Court found that 

servicing it on the second floor, a d the roof deck, to the extent that they extend over the deeded 

finding that the defendant was th legal owner of his third floor powder room and the plumbing 

The plaintiffs first point f error goes to the heart of the litigation: did this Court err in 

judgment for that of the trial cou . Frowen v. Blank, 425 A.2d 412 (Pa. 1981). 

conclusions reached by a trial co rt sitting in equity, an appellate court will not substitute its 

(Pa. Super. 1977). Where a readi g of the record can reasonably be said to reflect the 

evidence. In re Estate a/Tippins, 408 A.2d 1377 (Pa. 1979); Hoffman v. Gekoski, 378 A.2d 447 

evidence presented, but whether he trial judge's conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the 

1982). The test is not whether th reviewing court would have reached the same result on the 

Daley v. Hornbaker, 472 A.2d 7 3 (Pa. Super. 1984); Lynch v. Hook, 444 A.2d 157 (Pa. Super. 

ruling will not be disturbed unles it is unsupported by the evidence or demonstrably capricious. 

1995). 

supported in the certified record. d.; see also Plauchak v. Boling, 653 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 

ejectment, an appellate court wil not reverse the trial court's findings of fact if they are 

The scope of appellate re iew of a ruling in equity is particularly limited, and such a 
5 

4 The plaintiff brings, as a sub-claim, an inquiry as to whether this Court considered certain code violations found in 

the Municipal Court, an inferior court, o February 18, 2016, after the close of evidence in this matter. The answer? 

Certainly not. It would be improper to · port, after the close of evidence and completely out of context, the findings 

of another court as to another matter. In act, such consideration would raise important due process concerns. It is of 

no event, because the zoning issues are ot relevant to the equitable determination this Court has made, despite the 

plaintiffs aggressive marketing of its "u clean hands" allegations. 

time prescribed by the statute of l mitations, they are precluded from claiming that the boundary 

premises up to a certain line whic they mutually recognize and acquiesce in for the period of 

Under the doctrine of consentabl line, "[ijf adjoining landowners occupy their respective 

although both involve a twenty-o e year statute of limitation. Id. at 267-68, 545 A.2d at 930. 

consentable line is a separate and distinct theory from that of traditional adverse possession, 

930 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en bane). s the en bane court explained in Niles, the doctrine of 

or (2) by recognition and acquies ence. Niles v. Fall Creek Hunting Club, Inc., 545 A.2d 926, 

which a boundary may be establi hed through consentable line: (1) by dispute and compromise, 

discouraging confusing and vexa ious litigation." Plott, 547 A.2d at 1220. There are two ways in 

"The doctrine of consent le line is a rule of repose for the purpose of quieting title and 

671, 677 (Pa. Super. 1995). 

consentable line was established y recognition and acquiescence. Plauchak v. Boling, 653 A.2d 

(citing Newton v. Smith, 40 Pa. S per. 615, 616 (1909)). This rule also applies where the 

twenty-one years. Niles v. Fall C eek Hunting Club, Inc., 545 A.2d 926, 930 (1988) (en bane) 

and compromise, the line becom s binding under application of the doctrine of estoppel after 

21 year period of possession. W re a consentable line has been clearly established by dispute 

predecessors' periods of possessi n to comply with the Doctrine of Consentable Lines' required 

The plaintiff next claims hat this Court erred in permitting the defendant to tack his 

property value. The equities coul not be clearer, in favor of the defendant.4 

powder room be demolished wo ld cause a serious diminution to the defendant's property and 
6 

21 years, the chips will be allowe to fall where they may, for reasons of equity and peace." Id.) 

( citation omitted), and confirmed that privity of possession was sufficient] to enable landowners 

which was previously claimed an occupied by the grantor and is taken by the grantee as 

successor in such interest." Id. at 66. Zeglin applied the 21-year statute th such claims ("After 

possession of land not within (bu contiguous to) property described by deed of conveyance, 

theory of acquiescence in a boun ary] upon sufficient and credible proofof delivery of 

period. "We hold, therefore, that acking is permitted in such context [claims brought under a 

of possession by different person, to treat the periods for legal purposes as one continuous 

. 

years." Id. at 561 (citingJedlic v. Clemmer, 677 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. \super. 1996); Plott, 547 

A.2d at 1221). Zeglin also clarifi d the application of tacking, the joining of consecutive periods 

his own; and 2) such occupation ust have continued for the statutory period of twenty-one 

Pennsylvania law. "Two elemen 'are prerequisites [to establishment of 4 boundary by 

acquiescence]: 1) each party mu have claimed and occupied the land ori his side of the line as 

In Zeglin v. Gahagen, 81 A.2d 558, 561 (Pa. 2002), our Supreme Court reexamined the 

law of establishment of a bound y line by acquiescence, which has long! been a feature of 

i 

The establishment of a consenta le line is not a conveyance of land withf n the meaning of the 

; 

line thus recognized and acquies ed in is not the true one." Plott, 54 7 A}d at 1221 ( citing Adams 

v. Tamaqua Underwear Co., 161 A. 416 (Pa. Super. 1932); 12 Am.Jur.Zd, Boundaries§§ 85-90). 

Statute of Frauds because no est te is thereby created. Hagey v. Detweiler, 35 Pa. 409, 412 

i 

(1860). Therefore such a line m be initiated by oral agreement and pro~ed by parol evidence. 

Beals v. Allison, 54 A.2d 84, 85 
7 

5 See 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession 79 ("Privity of possession is a succession of relationship to the same thing, 

whether created by deed or by other ac, or by operation of law."). 

6 In its post-trial brief: the plaintiff attet pts to cite Zeglin as some sort of wholesale endorsement of the position 

articulated in Baylor v. Soska, 658 A.2 743, 746 (Pa. 1995), that "the only method by which an adverse possessor 

may convey the title asserted by advers possession is to describe in the instrument of conveyance by means 

minimally acceptable for conveyancin ofrealty that which is intended to be conveyed." See Plaintiff's Post Trial 

Brief, filed 10.28.2015, p. 25. At a min mum, the plaintiff should be reminded of the necessity of reading the 

entirety of a case before citing that cas . The cited quotation, which the plaintiff offers as if it were the holding of 

Zeglin, is actually quoted in Zeglin to istinguish Baylor from cases in acquiescence: "Although Baylor was a 

boundary case, it proceeded on the the ry of adverse possession, as opposed to acquiescence. While we recognize 

that this is a fine basis for distinction g ven the relatedness of these doctrines, strict application of Baylor's holding 

in the acquiescence paradigm would el minate tacking in cases involving successive owners and mistaken 

boundaries, which would appear to be he prevailing set of circumstances in this line of decisions ... Accordingly, 

we find the majority view (requiring o ly privity of possession) better suited to claims brought under a theory of 

acquiescence in a boundary." Id. at 56 -66. 

Laches bars relie when the complaining party is guilty of want of 

due diligence in failing to promptly institute the action to the 

prejudice of anot er. Thus, in order to prevail on an assertion of 

laches, responde ts must establish: a) a delay arising from 

petitioner's failur to exercise due diligence; and, b) prejudice to the 

Super. 2005) 

Fulton v. Fulton, 106 A.3d 127, 31 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing Kern v. Kern, 892 A.2d 1, 9 (Pa. 

'those who sleep on their rights ust awaken to the consequence that they have disappeared."' 

equitable bar to the prosecution f stale claims and is 'the practical application of the maxim that 

for the plaintiff not to have notic d, the doctrine of laches applies. "The doctrine of laches is an 

Further, as to the roof deck, whee the defendant's alleged encroachment would be impossible 

relief." Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass v. Warren, 950 A.2d 1137, 1147 (Pa. Commw. 2008). 

encroachment, and "the mere exi tence of an encroachment is not adequate to justify equitable 

property line. This is another ins ance where, at best, the plaintiff has established de minimis 

that is part of the defendant's roo deck must be repositioned, as it is five to six inches past the 

The plaintiff also claims at this Court erred in failing to determine that a certain post 

to tack their predecessor's period of ownership.5 Because the defendant established privity of 

possession, tacking was appropri te in this case, and this claim of error is meritless.6 
8 

7 The fact that Ms. Omori has transferr d ownership of the property to a corporation of which she is a partner cannot 

vitiate the laches issue, because to hol otherwise would enable any claim that would otherwise fail to laches to be 

revived by creation of a holding comp ny for the sole usage and benefit over the party whose claim has thereby 

lapsed. 

serious rip in the plaintiff's roof this would have been readily apparent long ago. The plaintiff 

best - again, this post has been resent for many decades, so if it was causing some sort of 

"water penetration" caused by t e deck post. The evidence as to water penetration was weak at 

The plaintiff also claims hat this Court erred in failing to enjoin what it describes as 

of diligence, a delay arising ther from, and prejudice, this claim is meritless. 

if the defendant is starting from scratch in that regard. Because the defendant established a lack 

easier to get the original builder o return and correct any minor flaws, but at this late date it is as 

claim had been raised closer tot e time of the roof deck's building, it would have been much 

ignoring the roof deck for these ast few decades, given its open and notorious nature. If the 

acquiescence, this claim falls to aches. The plaintiff cannot claim to have been duly diligent in 

late date of repositioning any as ect of the deck, to the extent that the deck is not governed by 

longstanding and obvious existe ce of the deck in its current state, and the inconvenience at this 

1994, over twenty years ago. 

7 G' en the de minimis nature of the alleged intrusion, the 

of the house and a partner in the laintiff organization, came to own 171 7 Moravian Street in 

intrusion of this post came into ing after the deck's installation. Yuko Omori, the prior owner 

one's home. The deck was instal ed prior to 1987, and there is no evidence that the alleged 

very hard to miss, unlike an intr sion into a shared wall that does not protrude into the interior of 

A.2d 184, 187-88 (Pa. 1988)). P iladelphia rowhome roof decks are a common feature, and are 

Estate ofScharlach, 809 A.2d 3 6, 382-383 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quoting Sprague v. Casey, 550 

respondents resul ing from the delay. Moreover, the question of 

laches is factual d is determined by examining the circumstances 

of each case. 
9 

error, and therefore it has no pla e in a concise statement of errors. 

In its seventh claim of er or, the plaintiff argues that this Court erred in failing to enter a 

directed verdict as to counts one· d two of the defendant's counterclaim as to quiet title, 

because of the defendant's alleg d failure to describe the land in controversy. This is silly. Each 

side in this litigation paid a surv yor. The land in controversy was mapped, plotted, and 

described out of all proportion t its size and impact. If the land in controversy has not been 

adequately described, then how oes the plaintiff suppose that it has made out any kind of case? 

This claim is meritless. 

appeal at 1398 EDA 2016 as ecessarily duplicative. In any case, this is not a statement of 

has not established that it is har ed, that it acted with due diligence, or that it cannot, given 

present conditions, control its o roof. This claim fails. 

The plaintiff further clai s that the water drainage situation is a trespass, Again, this is a 

state of affairs that has been con tant and ongoing for decades. For the reasons stated above, the 

plaintiff cannot establish due dil gence and the claim fails. 

The plaintiff claims that his Court erred in denying a permanent injunction. In order to 

establish a claim for a permanen injunction, the party must establish hislor her clear right to 

relief. See Boyle v. Pennsylvani Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n., Inc., 676 A.2d 695, 699 (Pa. 

Commw. 1996); Buffalo Twp. v. ones, 813 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa. 2002). For all the reasons 

explained above, the plaintiff ha failed to do that, and the injunction was rightfully denied. This 

is just a rehashing of the other is .ues raised by the plaintiff under another heading. 

The plaintiff asks in its si th claim of error whether the Court's order of February 12, 

2016 is a final order under Pa.R. .P. 341. This is an unusual point of error, as it is not clear what 

the plaintiff is arguing. Perhaps is question is directed at the Superior Court, which quashed the 
10 

Weight of the evidence c aims acknowledge the sufficiency of the evidence, but argue 

only that the greater weight of e idence is against the verdict. A new trial should be awarded 

when the verdict is so contrary t the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of 

a new trial is imperative so that ight may be given another opportunity to prevail. Mammoccio v. 

1818 Market Partnership, 734 .2d 23, 28 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations omitted). 

The defendant's argume t as to weight of the evidence depends entirely on whether or 

not there was evidence as to co violations, given that this Court excluded such evidence. That 

is plainly a non sequitur. The ne d for a firewall is not solely in order to satisfy building codes; 

there are also, of course, the rea ons that the codes were established in the first place, like basic 

safety norms. The defendant's gument is fatally flawed, in that it depends entirely on 

In its eighth claim of erro , the plaintiff argues that this Court erred in failing to identify 

the precise location of the prope y line for construction of the firewall. This argument is waived 

for failure to raise it at any point earlier in the litigation, and is meritless for the reasons 

discussed in the preceding parag aph. 

Finally, the defendant bri gs six claims of error as well, all involving the firewall. The 

defendant claims that this Court rred in ruling that the defendant must construct a firewall by a) 

ruling against the greater weight of the evidence; b) failing to consider whether the City of 

Philadelphia would require cons ruction of a firewall, given the condition of the two properties; 

c) awarding relief beyond the sc pe requested by the plaintiff; d) failing to specify by order that 

the defendant himself did not bu ld the powder room; e) failing to consider that the plaintiff 

removed materials that "could h ve sufficed" as a firewall; and f) failing to specify that the 

defendant is required only to bui d a firewall on the 1715 Moravian Street side of the property 

line. 
11 

substituting code violation findi gs for the Court's equitable powers. Further, this is actually a 

sufficiency argument and not a eight argument. There was ample support for the Court's 

exercise of its equitable powers; his argument is meritless. 

Next, the defendant fault the Court for failing to consider whether the City of 

Philadelphia would require cons ruction of a firewall, given the condition of the two properties. 

However, the Court is not a mer instrument of the City's power. In fact, the Court derives its 

power from the Commonwealth, which is a higher level of government than the City. Whether 

the City would require a firewal is neither here nor there. This scope shift is inapposite and 

renders this point of error meritl ss. 

The defendant claims ths t this Court erred in awarding relief that was beyond the scope 

of what the Plaintiff requested i its complaint. "Courts sitting in equity hold broad powers to 

grant relief that will result in an qui table resolution of a dispute." Williams Twp. Bd. of 

Supervisors v, Williams Twp. E ergency Co., 986 A.2d 914, 921 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009). The 

Court did not give the plaintiff a 1 of the relief it requested in its complaint, because destruction 

of the powder room would dimi ish the defendant's property value to an extent completely out 

of proportion to the encroachme t. However, the Court also wanted to recognize that the plaintiff 

should have the protection that firewall will afford. This was within the Court's broad equitable 

powers, and therefore this claim is meritless. 

The defendant claims th t this Court erred in failing to specify by order that the defendant 

himself did not build the powde room. The defendant did not build the powder room, but what 

that has to do with the Court's o der is unclear. In any event, hopefully this declaration will 

satisfy the defendant; however, e has not explained how he was prejudiced by the complainedof omission in the Court's order This claim is meritless. 
12 

KENNET 

For the foregoing reasons, the C urt's verdict should be affirmed. 

BY THE COURT, 

I 

r 

I 

III. Conclusion 

line, the firewall should be cons cted. This argument is also meritless. 

to argue that the Court was not ' lose enough" in specifying where, in relation to the property 

arguing that your powder room i "close enough" to the property line, do not use the next breath 

deafness about compliance with he Court's order. In other words, if with one breath you are 

you should not then put yoursel in the position of being ultra-specific to the point of tone 

property line. If you are the part that is arguing that an encroachment is not that big of an issue, 

the defendant is being willfully btuse. The defendant is required to build a firewall on the 

is required only to build a firew 11 on the 1715 Moravian Street side of the property line. Here, 

Finally, the defendant cl ims that this Court erred in failing to specify that the defendant 

baseless. 

remove them. The Court did not fail to consider this evidence; this allegation is completely 

evidence did not establish the n ure of the removed materials or that there was no necessity to 

finding that the plaintiff remove materials that "could have" acted as a firewall, but the 

circumstances. This utterly spec lative claim of error implicitly asks that the Court make a 

neighbors. Construction of the fi ewall is the right thing for the defendant to do, under the 

that it is nothing or that it has no effect. The firewall will help to set things right between the 

all relevant evidence. Just becau e the defendant's encroachment is de minimis does not mean 

materials that "could have suffic d" as a firewall. This is simply wrong. This Court considered 

The defendant claims th' this Court erred in failing to consider that the plaintiff removed