COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bent on, Clements and Beales Argued at Richmond, Virginia

JAMES DELESLIE KENNEDY MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0218-06-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS OCTOBER 24, 2006 MILDRED D. KENNEDY

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF HENRICO COUNTY Gary A. Hicks, Judge Diane Christensen (Woods & Christensen, on brief), for appellant. John H. Goots (Bynum, Coleman, Goots & Mu zi, L.L.P, on brief), for appellee.
James Deleslie Kennedy (husband) appeal s the December 20, 2005 final decree granting Mildred D. Kennedy (wife) a divorce on the gro und of cruelty and adjudi cating the issues of equitable distribution, spousal s upport, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, husband contends the trial court erred in awarding wife (1) a divorce on the ground of cruelty, (2) sixty-five percent of the marital value of the parties’ residence, (3) fi fty-five percent of the value of husband’s Edward Jones IRA, (4) $400 per month in spousal support, and (5) $2,500 in attorney’s fees. Husband further requests an award of his atto rney’s fees and costs incurred in pursuit of this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’ s judgment in part, reverse the trial court’s judgment in part, remand for reconsideration c onsistent with this opi nion, and deny husband’s request for appellate atto rney’s fees and costs.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - As the parties are fully co nversant with the record in this case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, th is opinion recites on ly those facts and incidents of the proceedings as ar e necessary to the parties’ unders tanding of the disposition of this appeal.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The parties married on May 31, 1984, and se parated on October 15, 2003. No children were born of the marriage. On October 21, 2003, wife filed a bill of complaint for divorce on the grounds of adultery and cruelty. Husband filed an answer denying wife’s allega tions of adultery and cruelty. On December 19, 2003, th e trial court entered a pendente lite order directing husband to pay wife $1,000 per month in spousal support. On November 15, 2 004, wife filed a mo tion for a rule to show cause against husband allegingarrearages of $2,000 in the c ourt-ordered spousal support. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on December 13, 2004, but no apparent action was taken at that time. Another h earing on wife’s previously filed show cause motion was held on February 28, 2005. The trial cour t found the evidence sufficient to grant the requested rule to show cause but withheld a finding and continued the matter on the docket. On Ma y 26, 2005, wife again filed a motion for a rule to show cause alleging husband was $2,000 in arrears in his spousal support payments. That motion was noticed for hearing on July 5, 2005. On July 5, 2005, the trial judge heard evidence concerning th e grounds of divorce, equitable distribution, spousal support, husb and’s spousal support arrearage, and attorney’s fees and received the parties’ joint stipulations and respective e xhibits. Per the judge’s directive, the parties subsequently submitted their cl osing argument s in writing. In a letter opinion date d November 30, 2005, the trial judge conc luded that wife was entitled to a divorce from husband on the ground of cruelty. Th e judge further concluded, inter alia , that- 3 - wife was entitled to sixty-five percent of the ma rital portion of the procee ds from the sale of the marital residence, fifty-five percent of the value of husband’s Edward Jones IRA, $400 per month in spousal support, and $2,500 in attorney’s fees and costs. Th e judge entered a final decree memorializing his rulings on December 20, 2005. This appeal followed.
II. GROUNDS OF DIVORCE Husband contends wife failed to prove he r allegation of cruelty . Specifically, husband argues that wife’s evidence was insufficient to prove his single act of misconduct constituted cruelty and that wife failed to present sufficien t evidence to corroborate her allegation of cruelty. Thus, husband concludes, the trial court erre d in granting wife a divorce on the ground of cruelty. We disagree. Code § 20-91(A)(6) authori zes a divorce from the bond of matrimony on the ground of cruelty. “[T]he misconduct [that] will form a good ground for [divorce] mu st be very serious and such as amounts to extreme cruelty, entirely subversive of the family relations rendering the association intolerabl e.” Zinkhan v. Zinkhan , 2 Va. App. 200, 209, 342 S.E.2d 658, 663 (1986). The long-established rule is that “the cruelty th at authorizes a divorce is anything that tends to bodily harm and thus renders cohabi tation unsafe.” Latham v. Latham , 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 307, 320-21 (1878). Moreover, “a single act of physical cruelty will c onstitute grounds for divorce if it is so severe and atrocious as to endanger life [or] it indicates an intention to do serious bodily harm.” Davis v. Davis , 8 Va. App. 12, 15, 377 S.E.2d 640, 642 (1989). “[B]efore a spouse may obtain a divorce, he or she must prove the grounds therefor and no complain t for divorce shall be defaulted, taken for confessed, or granted upon th e pleadings or upon unco rroborated testimony.” Clark v. Clark , 11 Va. App. 286, 296, 398 S.E.2d 82, 88 (1990) (citing Code § 20-99).- 4 - We view the evidence, and all reasonable infe rences flowing from the evidence, in a light most favorable to wife, the party who prevailed below. Congdon v. Congdon , 40 Va. App. 255, 258, 578 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2003). “That principle requir es us to ‘discard the evidence’ of the appellant which conflicts, either directly or inferentially, with the evidence presented by the appellee at trial.” Id. (quoting Wactor v. Commonwealth , 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002)). So viewed, the evidence presented at trial proved that, on October 15, 2003, husband returned home about 10:00 p.m. and told wife he was leaving her. After an argument, husband chased wife upstairs. When wi fe threw husband’s clothes, telli ng him to take his clothes and leave, husband picked wife up and threw her acro ss the bed. Wife landed on the floor “between the bed and the nightstand,” severely injuring he r neck. Because of her injuries, including the inability to chew, wife went to the hospital the next day. X-rays revealed that wife had suffered a fractured jaw. Wife was also found to have sustained a neck sprain and bruising and swelling in her neck, shoulder, and jaw as a result of the assault. After the hospital staff reported wife’s injuries to the police, husband was arrested a nd charged with assault and battery. Husband eventually pled nolo contendere to the charge, admitting there was sufficient evidence to find him guilty, and the juvenile and domestic relati ons district court ente red a protective order against him. In addition, wife’s friend Marsha Clements te stified at trial that she saw wife on October 16, 2003, “the day after the assau lt,” and observed bruising on her jaw, neck, and shoulder. Clements further testified that wife “was havi ng difficulty talking” and was in obvious pain. Clements encouraged wife to seek medical treatment. We conclude that husband’s picking wife up and throwing her across the bed and onto the floor causing her to sustain serious injuries was conduct “so severe and atrocious as to- 5 - endanger life” and “indicate[d] an intention to do serious bodily harm.” Davis , 8 Va. App. at 15, 377 S.E.2d at 642. Accordingly, we hold that husb and’s “single act of physical violence” against wife constituted cruelty. Id. We further conclude that wife presented su fficient evidence to co rroborate her allegation of cruelty. As our Supreme Court has stated: It is not necessary that the testim ony of the complaining spouse be corroborated on every element or essential charge stated as a ground for divorce. The corrobor ative testimony need not be sufficient, standing alone, to pr ove the alleged ground for divorce. Any other rule would deprive th e testimony of the complaining spouse of any practical effect. Th e general rule is that where a particular fact or circumstance is vital to complainant’s case, some evidence of the same, in addition to the complainant’s own testimony, is essential. The main object of the provision of the statute requiring corroboration is to prevent collusion. Where it is apparent that there is no collusi on, the corroboration needs to be only slight.
Graves v. Graves , 193 Va. 659, 662-63, 70 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1952). Here, there is no appearance in the record of collusi on between the parties. The tes timony of wife’s friend regarding the visible injuries sustained by wife corroborated wife’s testimony re garding the essent ial fact that husband committed an act of physical violence agains t wife that caused her serious bodily harm. Accordingly, the testimony of wife’s friend was sufficient to satisfy the corroboration requirement. We hold, therefore, that the trial judge did not err in granting wife a divorce on the ground of cruelty. III. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION “In reviewing an equitable distribution award on appeal, we have recognized that the trial court’s job is a difficult one, and we rely heavily on the discretion of the trial judge in weighing the many considerations and circum stances that are presented in each case.” Klein v. Klein , 11 Va. App. 155, 161, 396 S. E.2d 866, 870 (1990). Such an award “will not be reversed ‘unless it- 6 - appears from the record that the [t rial judge] has abused his discretio n, that he has not considered or misapplied one of the statutory mand ates, or that the evidence fails to support the findings of fact underlying his resolution of the conflict of the equities.’” Hart v. Hart , 27 Va. App. 46, 53, 497 S.E.2d 496, 499 (1998) ( quoting Robinette v. Robinette , 10 Va. App. 480, 4 86, 393 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1990)). “[A] trial court ‘by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.’” Shooltz v. Shooltz , 27 Va. App. 264, 271, 498 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1998) (quoting Koon v. United
States , 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)). Thus , a trial judge abuses his di scretion if he “use[s] an improper legal standard in exercising [his] discretionary function.” Thomas v. Commonwealth , 263 Va. 216, 233, 559 S.E.2d 652, 661 (2002). A. Distribution of Marital Residence As previously mentioned, the trial court heard evidence related to equitable distribution on July 5, 2005. The partie s presented no evidence at that hearin g of any repairs that were needed in order to sell the marital residence or of the partie s’ contributions toward any such repairs. The parties sold the marital residence in early November 2005. On No vember 22, 2005, wife’s counsel sent the trial court (with a copy to husband’s co unsel) a letter inquiring about the status of the court’s equitable distribution ruling and providing information to the court re garding the sale of the residence. Among other things, the le tter informed the court as follows: Mr. Kennedy has refused to contribute towards the repairs done by Embers Painting ($13 0.00) and Links Heating & Air ($70.00). Mrs. Kennedy advancedthe funds for payment to the service provider. In awarding wife sixty-five percent of the mari tal portion of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, the trial judge noted in his letter opinion of November 30, 20 05, as follows: The Court . . . finds it sign ificant that Mrs. Kennedy contributed to the repairs needed fo r the sale of the marital residence while Mr. Kennedy did not. . . . The Court awards Mrs. Kennedy 65% of the [marital] proceeds from the marital residence, approximately seventy-seven thousa nd one hundred five dollars and- 7 - fifty-four cents ($77,105.54). Mr. Kennedy is awarded the remaining 35% of the proceeds, a pproximately forty-one thousand five hundred eighteen dollars and thirty-seven cents ($41,518.37). The Court has carefully considered each of the statutory factors enumerated in [Code] § 20-107.3, including the grounds for divorce, as well as the evidence before the Court in making this award. In his objections to the final decree of divorce, husband objected to the trial court’s use of the ex parte evidence in distributing the proceeds fr om the sale of the marital residence and requested an evidentiary hearing with regard to that evidence. The trial judge entered the final decree without conducting an evidentiary hearing or amending his ruling. On appeal, husband contends the trial judge erred in relying on the ex parte information in wife’s counsel’s letter as a basis for awarding wife sixty-five percent of the marital value of the parties’ residence. That information, husband argues, was not properly in evidence before the court and was thus utilized by the judge in viol ation of the prohibition ag ainst the consideration of “facts” not in evidence. Wife concedes that the trial judge improperly relied on the ex parte information in her counsel’s letter without prov iding husband an opportunity to be heard on that information. She asserts, however, that the j udge’s reliance on that in formation was harmless and, thus, not reversible error. We disagree with wife’s assertion. It is axiomatic that a trial court may not base its findings and conclusi ons on facts that are not properly in evidence befo re the court. See, e.g. , Bernau v. Nealon , 219 Va. 1039, 1041-42, 254 S.E.2d 82, 84 (1979) (“The consideration of fact s outside of and not made a part of the record is improper.”); see also M. Morgan Cherry & Assocs. v. Cherry , 38 Va. App. 693, 710, 568 S.E.2d 391, 399 (2002) (en banc) (Benton, J., disse nting) (noting that a party who is not given the opportunity to challenge or rebut evidence considered significant by the trial judge is “denied the essence of due pro cess” (citing Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”))).- 8 - Here, it is clear that the information in the November 22, 2005 letter regarding husband’s failure to contribute to the repair s needed for the sale of the marital residenc e constituted “facts” that were not properly before the cour t. That information was not recei ved into evidence by the trial judge at an evidentiary hearing, and husband had no opportunity to properly ch allenge or rebut it. It is also clear that the trial judge considered that information as evidence and erroneously relied on it in determining the equitable distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. Indeed, the trial judge expressly st ated that he found it “significant” that husband did not help pay for the needed house repa irs. Moreover, the judge provided no other specific reason for his decision. Because the judge’s decision wa s expressly based on his errone ous consideration of “facts” not in evidence, we cannot say that the judge’s reliance on the information in the letter was harmless. Accordingly, we hold that the trial cour t committed reversible error in relying on that information. B. Distribution of Husband’s IRA Husband next challenges the tria l court’s award to wife of fift y-five percent of the value of his Edward Jones IRA. Specifi cally, husband argues the trial j udge erred in considering the parties’ future earning capacity in making that award. We agree. In addressing the factors to be considered in fashioning an equitable distribution award, we have held that Code § 20-107.3(E) “does not contemplate consideration of [a spouse’s] earning capacity.” Reid v. Reid , 7 Va. App. 553, 565, 375 S.E.2d 533, 540 (1989). Code § 20-107.3 provides for the equitable distribution of the accumulated marital wealth between the marital parties; it does not contemplate consideration of the future ability of one spouse to accumulate what will be separate property or the future needs of the other spouse. In short, the marital partnership notion terminates with the terminati on of the marriage and whatever marital wealth has been accumulated is to be equitably distributed at that time. It is axiomatic th at whatever the future may hold for- 9 - either of the parties has no beari ng on the issue of the appropriate division of what has been accu mulated by their contributions during the marriage. Id. Here, in concluding that wife was entitled to fifty-five percent of the value of husband’s Edward Jones IRA, the trial judge stated in his letter opinion as follows: The Court also considered as a factor in this equitable distribution, pursuant to [Code] § 20-107.3(E)(11), the earning capacities of the parties. Mr. Kenned y is able to work and has steady and dependable employment with Am eriGas. Mrs. Kennedy is also able to work and curre ntly has steady empl oyment; however, the testimony before the C ourt was that her empl oyment was classified and could be terminated at any time. In addition, the testimony revealed that Mrs. Kennedy is not granted any retirement benefits through the City of Richmond base d on her job classification. She testified that she has applied fo r other positions and was granted interviews but has faile d to obtain more secure employment. She has consistently worked and contribute d to the well-bein g of the family throughout the marriage. Applying the principl es set forth in Reid to the circumstances of th is case, it is clear that the trial judge erroneously considered the future “earning capacities of the parties” in arriving at his decision to award wife fifty-five percent of the value of husband’s Edward Jones IRA. The fact that wife’s employment could be terminated at any time and the factthat wife would not receive retirement pay in connect ion with her current job have no bearing on the marital wealth accumulated by the parties during the marriage. Thus , they were not proper factors to consider under Code § 20-107.3. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge erre d in considering the parties’ future earning capacities in determin ing the equitable distri bution of the value of husband’s IRA. Wife argues that this Court permitted the tria l court to address the future needs of a spouse in Torian v. Torian , 38 Va. App. 167, 181, 562 S.E.2d 355, 362-63 (2002), where we affirmed the trial court’s decision to award the husband one hundred percent of a pension he was- 10 - already receiving based on the fact that he was sixty-seven year s old and no longer eligible to work full time. Wife’s reliance on Torian is misplaced, however. In Torian , the parties had significant accumulated marital assets but little actual income. Id. at 172-73, 178, 562 S.E.2d at 358, 361. Thus, the trial court attempted, in equitably distributing husband’s pension, to ensure that husband had a sufficient income and the abili ty to pay the court-ordered spousal support to the wife without having to liq uidate his asset base. Id. at 181, 562 S.E.2d at 362-63. Given that factual context, we found the trial court’s ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 181, 562 S.E.2d at 363. The instant cas e does not involve the same fa ctual scenario or cash flow concern and is thus distinguishable. For these reasons, we reverse the equ itable distribution award and remand for reconsideration.
IV. SPOUSAL SUPPORT Husband further contends the trial cour t erred in awarding wife $400 per month in spousal support because the record contains insu fficient evidence to supp ort that award and the trial court failed to provide any rationale for the award. We agr ee that the trial judge failed to provide the requisite wr itten findings and conclusions supporting the award. Code § 20-107.1(F) provides, in pertinent part, that, “[i]n contested cases in the circuit courts, any order granting, rese rving or denying a request for spousal support shall be accompanied by written findings and conclusions of the court identifying the factors in subsection E which support the court’s order.” T hus, while a trial court is not “required to quantify or elaborate exactly what weight or considerati on it has given to each of the statutory factors” in Code § 20-10 7.1(E), Woolley v. Woolley , 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986), it is required, under C ode § 20-107.1(F), to identify those factors listed in Code § 20-107.1(E) that support the cour t’s award of spousal support.- 11 - Here, the trial judge explai ned his award to wife of $400 per month in spousal support solely as follows: The Court does not find th at Mrs. Kennedy’s actions surrounding the separation of the pa rties were such that they would bar her from recovering spousal support or of the nature that they would constitute an independent gro und for divorce. In making the award of spousal support, the Cour t carefully considered the factors enumerated in [Code] § 20-107.1. Because this explanation fails to include any findings and conclusions identifying the factors listed in Code § 20-107.1(E) that support the tr ial judge’s award of spousal support, we conclude the judge erred in failing to comply with Code § 20-107.1(F). 1 Accordingly, we reverse the spousal suppor t award and remand for r econsideration. Moreover, where, as here, the “equitable distribution award is re versed on appeal and ‘the provisi ons with regard to the marital property are to be considered on remand, the cour t must necessarily re-examine spousal support in the light of whatever new or different considerations flow fr om the additional proceedings.’” Robinson v. Robinson , 46 Va. App. 652, 671, 621 S.E.2d 147, 156 (2005) (en banc) (quoting McGinnis v. McGinnis , 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 338 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1985)).
V. ATTORNEY’S FEES Husband also contends the tria l court abused its discretion in awarding wife $2,500 in attorney’s fees and co sts because that award was unsupported by the evidence. We agree. “Courts have the power to aw ard counsel fees incurred in divorce cases where contempt proceedings have to be initiated and conducted to enforce an order of the court.” Carswell v.
Masterson , 224 Va. 329, 332, 295 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1982). “In such cases, an award of attorney’s fees is a matter submitted to the sound discretion of the trial judge and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretio n.” Sullivan v. Sullivan , 33 Va. App. 743, 753, 536 S.E.2d 92 5, 930 (2000).

1 Given the trial judge’s failure to provide any factual basis for the spousal support award, we are unable to determine whether the record co ntains sufficient evidence to support that award.- 12 - “[T]he key to a proper award of counsel fees [i s] reasonableness under all of the circumstances revealed by the record.” McGinnis , 1 Va. App. at 277, 338 S.E.2d at 162. “In determining a reasonable fee, the fact finder should consider such circumstances as the time consumed, the effort expended, the nature of the services rende red, and other attending circumstances.” Mullins v. Richlands National Bank , 241 Va. 447, 449, 403 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1991). Although evidence of time expended by counsel and the charges made to the client is the pref erred basis upon which a trial judge can formulate a reasonable award, it is not the only basis. A trial court is not unmindful of the usua l charges within its jurisdiction, and when viewed in the light of the circumstances of a particular case, a relatively modest award may be found to be reasonable. McGinnis , 1 Va. App. at 277, 338 S.E.2d at 162. Here, it is undisputed that the trial judge ha d the authority to award wife the attorney’s fees and costs she incurred “inc ident to contempt proceedings in stituted and conducted to obtain enforcement of” the December 19, 2003 pendente lite order directing husband to pay wife $1,000 per month in spousal support. Carswell , 224 Va. at 332, 295 S.E.2d at 901. In awarding wife $2,500 in attorney’s fees and costs, the trial judge stated in his le tter opinion as follows: On February 28, 2005 , the parties appeared before the Court for a Show Cause hearing. Mr. Kennedy was in arrears on his spousal support pa yments as ordered by the Court in the amount of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00). The Court granted the Show Cause but withheld a finding at th at time. Mrs. Kennedy filed a second Motion for Show Cause on May 26, 2005 relating to that arrearage. The parties stipulate and agree that an arrearage still remains. Mrs. Kennedy is awarded her atto rney’s fees an d costs in the amount of two thousand five hund red dollars ($2,500.00) relating to her Show Cause motions, hearin gs, and inconvenience. Mr. Kennedy did not pay support as orde red by the Court; therefore, such attorney’s fees are fair and equitable. Th e Court finds that the amount of the fees is fair and reasonable.- 13 - It is clear from this ruling th at the trial judge intended to li mit the scope of the award of attorney’s fees and costs to those fees and cost s incurred by wife incident to her two show cause motions and the hearings held thereon. At trial, wife offered into ev idence an itemized “Statement of Services” prepared by her counsel listing the attorney’s fees and costs incurred by wife in the case prio r to trial. That statement reflected a total of $1 ,200 in attorney’s fees and costs incurr ed by wife for the enforcement of the December 19, 2003 spousal support or der. They consiste d of two hours at $200/hour on November 12, 20 04, for the “Prepara tion of Motion for Sh ow Cause regarding spousal support arrearag e”; two hours at $200/hour on Decem ber 13, 2004, for a “Court Hearing [on] Motion for Show Cause”; and two hours at $200/hour onFebruary 28, 2005, for a “Court Hearing [on] Motion for Show Cause.” The “Statement of Servi ces” made no reference to the second motion for a rule to show ca use filed by wife on May 26, 2005. Nonetheless, as noted above, the trial judge specifically included the second show cause motion in his award to wife of at torney’s fees and cost s. Indeed, given the difference between the total award ($2,500) and the fees and costs reported in the “Statement of Services” for the other show cause motions and hearings ($1,200), it appears the trial judge awarded wife $1,300 in attorney’s fees and costs for the second show cause motion. Our review of the record reveal s that such an award for the second show cause motion is unsupported by the evidence. Except for the insert ion of a different date and the correction of appellant’s name, the second show cause motion wa s identical to the origin al November 15, 2004 show cause motion. Ind eed, as the “Statement of Services” indicates, wife’s counsel did not even charge wife for the preparation of the second motion. Moreover, as reflected in the trial judge’s ruling, the fact that husb and owed wife a spousal support arrear age of $2,000 was not in dispute. The parties stipulated at trial that there was “a $2,000 arrearage in spou sal support payments by- 14 - husband.” The only evidence presented at trial pe rtaining to the enforcement of the December 19, 2003 spousal support order was husband’s admission on cross-examination th at he continued “to be $2,000 in arrears . . . on spousal support.” Hu sband requested that the arrearage be deducted “from his equitable distribution award.” No other evidence or ar gument was presented with regard to the second show cause motion. In light of the apparent “time consumed, the effort expended, the natu re of the services rendered, and other attending circumstances,” Mullins , 241 Va. at 449, 403 S.E.2d at 335, we conclude that the trial judge’s award of $1,300 for the second show cause motion is excessive. Accordingly, we hold the trial j udge abused his discretion in ma king that award, and we reverse the award of attorney’s fees and costs and remand for reconsideration. Husband also seeks an award of his appellat e attorney’s fees and costs. However, he offers no reason to require wife to pay any of his appellate expenses. Because nothing in the record indicates wife “generated unnecessary dela y or expense in pursuit of [her] interests” in defending this appeal, Esta te of Hackler v. Hackler , 44 Va. App. 51, 75, 602 S.E.2d 426, 438 (2004), we deny husband’s request for appell ate attorney’s fees and costs. See O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin , 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996).
VI. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we affirm the trial c ourt’s decision awarding wife a divorce on the ground of cruelty; we reverse th e trial court’s equitable distribution award, spousal support award, and award of attorney’s fees and costs and remand those matters for reconsideration consistent with this opinion; and we deny husband ’s request for appellat e attorney’s fees and

costs. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.