COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Lemons 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LAKIESHA ENIKA GODBOLD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2829-97-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 FEBRUARY 23, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Steven D. Benjamin (Betty Layne DesPortes; 

Benjamin & DesPortes, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Lakiesha Enika Godbold was indicted and tried on the charges 

of attempted capital murder and felony obstruction of justice in 

violation of Code § 18.2-460(C). The trial judge convicted 

Godbold of the offense of attempted murder, a lesser offense of 

attempted capital murder, and of felony obstruction of justice. 

Prior to sentencing, the trial judge set aside the attempted 

murder conviction and instead convicted Godbold of assault. On 

appeal, Godbold contends that (1) her convictions for both crimes 

constituted double jeopardy because assault is a lesser-included 

offense of felony obstruction of justice and (2) the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain the conviction for felony obstruction of 
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justice. Because neither issue was properly raised before the 

trial judge, we affirm the convictions. 

 I. 

 Officer O'Conner testified that he and Officer Musslewhite 

drove a marked police car into a parking lot at night and saw 

Godbold and her brother standing by a telephone. As O'Conner 

exited his vehicle and said "Hello," he observed Godbold "brush[] 

against" her brother and hand the telephone to her brother. With 

her left hand by her side in a fist, Godbold walked toward a car 

that was facing a fence with its engine idling. O'Conner 

testified that when Godbold sat in the driver's seat, she 

appeared to move something from her left hand to her right hand 

and place it on the console. He testified, however, that at no 

time did he actually see anything in Godbold's hands. 

 As Musslewhite talked with Godbold's brother, O'Conner 

approached the driver's side of the car and shined a flashlight 

into the car. O'Conner informed Godbold that they had received a 

complaint about drug activity in the area, and he asked Godbold 

if guns or drugs were in the car. Godbold responded "no," and 

refused O'Conner's request to search the car. O'Conner testified 

that he pointed his flashlight toward the console and saw a tied 

bag containing what appeared to be an ounce of cocaine. O'Conner 

opened the car door and told Godbold to "step out." 

 Godbold placed the car in reverse and accelerated backward. 

As the car made a sharp reverse U-turn, the door struck O'Conner, 

lifted him off his feet, and carried him backward. O'Conner 
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regained his footing, withdrew his gun, and pointed his gun at 

Godbold. When Godbold accelerated the car forward and drove 

away, O'Conner moved out of the car's path and unsuccessfully 

attempted to give chase. The following day, the police found 

Godbold and the car she was driving. No cocaine was recovered. 

 At the conclusion of the evidence, Godbold's trial counsel 

moved to strike the evidence on the murder charge because the 

evidence failed to prove intent to kill. He also moved to strike 

the obstruction of justice charge because no evidence proved 

cocaine was in the car. The trial judge denied the motions and 

convicted Godbold of attempted murder and felony obstruction of 

justice. Acting on trial counsel's written motion to set aside 

the attempted murder conviction, the trial judge set aside the 

attempted murder conviction and convicted Godbold of assault. He 

sentenced Godbold to twelve months in jail for assault and five 

years in prison for felony obstruction of justice, suspending two 

years of that sentence. 

 II. 

 Godbold first contends that assault is a lesser-included 

offense of felony obstruction of justice and that convictions for 

both offenses violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 

Amendment. Godbold also contends that the evidence was 

insufficient to support a conviction for felony obstruction of 

justice. The Commonwealth counters that Godbold did not 

adequately raise and preserve these issues before the trial judge 
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and that Rule 5A:18 bars those issues. We agree with the 

Commonwealth. 

 "No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a 

basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with 

the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good 

cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends 

of justice." Rule 5A:18; see also Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 

App. 433, 434, 357 S.E.2d 742, 743 (1987). 

 The main purpose of requiring timely 

specific objections is to afford the trial 

court an opportunity to rule intelligently on 

the issues presented, thus avoiding 

unnecessary appeals and reversals. In 

addition, a specific, contemporaneous 

objection gives the opposing party the 

opportunity to meet the objection at that 

stage of the proceeding. 

Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 44, 400 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1991) 

(citation omitted). 

 The record fails to indicate that Godbold ever argued before 

the trial judge the two issues she now raises on appeal. At the 

close of evidence, Godbold moved to strike both charges. After a 

lengthy discussion that focused almost exclusively on the 

attempted capital murder charge, the following colloquy occurred: 

 [JUDGE]: On the evidence heard by the Court, 

the Court will find [Godbold] not guilty of 

attempted capital murder but guilty of 

attempted murder, as charged in the 

indictment. 

 [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: Judge, there is 

also the felony obstruction while in the 

course of engaging in a violation of 248, 

which is the drug -- 
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 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would suggest that 

would run together. I don't see how you can 

obstruct and then -- the obstruction is -- 

 [JUDGE]: I think it's entirely different. 

Well, I am going to find her guilty of 

obstructing on the felony. All right. You 

want a presentence report? 

 Prior to sentencing, the trial judge set aside the attempted 

murder conviction and convicted Godbold of the lesser offense of 

assault. Thus, we need not decide whether the argument cited 

above was sufficient to preserve the issue whether Godbold was 

exposed to double jeopardy by being convicted of both attempted 

murder and felony obstruction of justice. The trial judge's 

action necessarily rendered Godbold's prior double jeopardy 

argument moot because she no longer was convicted both of 

attempted murder and felony obstruction of justice. 

 After the trial judge modified the conviction, Godbold's 

trial counsel failed to raise any new double jeopardy claim 

either at the hearing or within twenty-one days of her sentencing 

pursuant to Rule 1:1. Therefore, Godbold failed to "call to the 

attention of the trial judge the error complained of, the reason 

therefor, and the relief sought." Robinson v. Commonwealth, 13 

Va. App. 574, 576, 413 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1992). 

 We reach the same conclusion on the issue whether the 

evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of felony 

obstruction of justice. A person who "knowingly" obstructs a 

police officer "lawfully engaged in his duties" commits a 

misdemeanor and may be prosecuted under Code § 18.2-460(B). 
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However, if a person "knowingly" obstructs a police officer 

investigating drug trafficking, then he or she has committed a 

felony and may be prosecuted under Code § 18.2-460(C). Godbold 

argues on appeal that because no evidence proved she knew or 

should have known that O'Conner was investigating drug 

trafficking, she should not have been convicted of the felony. 

This issue was never argued before the trial judge. 

 At the close of evidence, Godbold's trial counsel argued 

that "there was no evidence there was any cocaine in the vehicle. 

No cocaine was ever recovered. I would ask the Court to dismiss 

[the felony obstruction of justice] charge, as well." This 

statement speaks to a different issue than the one Godbold now 

raises. Contending that the evidence did not prove the 

"knowledge" element of the statute, Godbold seeks reversal of her 

conviction. An accused's knowledge is an essential element of 

all three subsections of the obstruction of justice statute. See

Code § 18.2-460. However, whether cocaine was in the vehicle, 

the argument advanced at trial, is not a necessary element to 

prove guilt under Code § 18.2-460(C). See Turner v. 

Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 713, 717, 460 S.E.2d 605, 607 (1995) 

("hold[ing] that in order to convict an accused of obstructing 

justice under Code § 18.2-460(C) the Commonwealth need not prove 

the underlying offenses . . ."). Godbold, therefore, failed to 

raise before the trial judge the issue that she now raises on 

appeal. 
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 III. 

 Despite Godbold's failure to properly preserve these two 

issues, we nevertheless will consider them if "good cause [is] 

shown or to enable [us] to attain the ends of justice." Rule 

5A:18. This exception "is a narrow one that allows consideration 

when the record affirmatively shows that a miscarriage of justice 

has occurred." Reed v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 65, 70, 366 

S.E.2d 274, 277 (1988). "[T]he appellant must demonstrate that 

he or she was convicted for conduct that was not a criminal 

offense or the record must affirmatively prove that an element of 

the offense did not occur." Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 

215, 222, 487 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1997). In making this 

determination, we must look to the entire record. Johnson v. 

Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 529, 532, 365 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1988). 

 It is a longstanding principle in Virginia that assault is 

not a lesser-included offense of obstruction of justice. See

Love v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 492, 494, 184 S.E.2d 769, 771 

(1971); Polk v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 590, 593-94, 358 S.E.2d 

770, 772 (1987). In Polk, we specifically stated the following: 

 The plain language of [the statute] provides 

that threats constitute a violation of the 

statute when they are knowingly made in an 

attempt to intimidate or impede law 

enforcement officers who are performing their 

duties. Thus, it is the threats made by the 

offender, coupled with his intent, that 

constitute the offense. The resulting effect 

of the offender's threats, such as fear, 

apprehension, or delay, is not an element of 

the crime defined in Code § 18.2-460. By the 

express terms of the statute, it is 

immaterial whether the officer is placed in 
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fear or apprehension. The offense is 

complete when the attempt to intimidate is 

made. 

Id.

 Similarly, Godbold's second claim that no evidence proved 

she knew or should have known that O'Conner was investigating 

drug trafficking is not persuasive. The record includes a taped 

recording of the encounter between O'Conner and Godbold. The 

tape indicates that O'Conner specifically asked Godbold whether 

there were guns or drugs in the car. Furthermore, both the tape 

and the testimony of O'Conner at trial proved that when O'Conner 

first approached Godbold, he told her that he was investigating 

complaints concerning drug activity in the area. 

 Because Godbold failed to properly preserve the issues of 

double jeopardy and sufficiency of the evidence, and because no 

exception to Rule 5A:18 is satisfied, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.