[PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 97-8932 Non-Argument Calendar

________________________ D. C. Docket No. 1:94-CV-2850-WCO RAYMOND B. JACOBS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus AGENCY RENT-A-CAR, INC., and AGENCY AUTO SALES, INC., Defendants-Appellees.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

_________________________ (July 16, 1998)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

Following an adverse jury verdict, Appellant Raymond Jacobs appeals the trial judge’s refusal to permit him to am end the pretrial order to add an additional witness. After a review of Appellant’s c ontentions and the record in this case, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.2 I. BACKGROUNDAt the age of 62, Appellant Raymond Jacobs was hired by Agency Rent-ACar (Agency) to work in retail sales. Appellant was placed in the position of Regional Car Sales Manager and was respons ible for the retail sa les lots in his region. At the time he was hired in Ma rch 1992, Appellant reported to the National Retail Sales Manager, Tom Ciresa. Appellant presented evidence at trial that, in the late fall of 1992, Agency’s Vice President, Kelly Reagan, instructed Cire sa to fire Appellant. The reason given by Reagan was that Agency’s President and Chairman, Sam Frankino, did not like the way Appellant looked because he was too old. Ciresa refused to fire Appellant. In late 1992, Agency embarked on a reorganization plan. Under that plan, Gary Mooney, a personal friend of Chairman Frankino, was put in the new position of National Vehicle Sales Director. Appe llant was promoted to become one of two Regional Directors and Cisera was demo ted to fill the other Regional Director position. Cisera and Appellant reported to Mooney. Mooney, in turn, reported to Reagan. In his new position, Appellant was in charge of all used rental vehicle retail sales in the eastern half of the country. Appellant maintained his home office at the Tucker, Georgia, lot and spent about half of his time there.3 Around January 19, 1993, Mooney made an announced visit to the Tucker lot. While there, Mooney made the following observations: (1) Appellant was neglecting his responsibility of supervising the operations at the Tucker lot; (2) the vehicles on the lot were dirty — some evenhad cigarette butts in the ashtrays; (3) employees at the lot were not following safety precautions to protect the cars; (4) some cars were unlocked and some had ke ys in the ignitions; (5) a radio had been stolen from one vehicle without forced en try; (6) the sales office was dirty, smoky, and disorganized; (7) a car had been damaged by rainwater dripping through a windshield; and (8) the inventory records were a mess. At the time of the visit to the Tucker lot, Mooney had begun to plan a further reorganization of Agency which would lead to elimination of the entire used rental vehicle retail program. On about January 28, 1993, Mooney returned to the Tucker lot and met with Appellant. He informed Appellant that his position was being eliminated and that he was being terminated due to poor job performance. On April 14, 1993, Appellant filed his charge of age discrimination with the EEOC. He filed this lawsuit on October 26, 1994. On June 19, 1995, just after the close of discovery, Agency filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted that motion and Appellant appealed. On December 30, 1996, this Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.4 On April 10, 1997, the parties went to mediation. During mediation, Appellant, for the first time, mentioned a witness who would testify that Mooney made a statement about Appellant’s age on the day he fired Appellant. Appellant’s counsel identified the witness as J.W. Lewis. Lewis worked as a porter at the Tucker lot during the time Appellant worked there. The parties submitted a proposed pretrial order on April 17, 1997. The case was set for trial on May 5, 1997. In the pre trial order, Appellant attempted to add J.W. Lewis to the list of witnesses. Agency objected, claiming that the addition of a previously unidentified witness was untimel y and prejudicial to the defense. The trial judge agreed and sustained Agenc y’s objection at the pretrial conference on April 28, 1997. The trial was subsequently continue d from May 5, 1997 to June 10, 1997 and then again from June 10 to July 14, 1997. On June 17, 1997, Appellant filed an emergency motion in which he sought leave to amend the pretrial order. On that same day, Appellant se rved amended responses to Agency’s first set of interrogatories and listed Lewis as a witness. On July 3, 1997, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion. The trial court found that the addition of the witness would significantly alter the theories and strategies in the case and would necess itate reopening discove ry and postponing the5 trial. The trial court noted that Appellant’s theory to that point had been that Frankino and Reagan wanted him out of the company because of his age and that Mooney had merely been following orders. The trial court found that the addition of a witness willing to testify that Moone y made comments about Appellant’s age could shift the focus of Appellant’s case to include a claim of direct discriminatory intent on the part of Mooney. Such a sh ift would change the framework, the inquiry as to whether Appellant satisfied his burden of proof, as well as the strategies of the parties. The court felt that such a ch ange on the eve of trial was unfair to Agency and would interfere with the court’s schedule. Further, the district court found that no manifest injustice would result from th e exclusion of the witness. The court concluded that Lewis’s testimony was not critical to Appellant’s case because Appellant had demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination. Finally, the court determined that Appellant’s failure to mention Lewis until the eve of trial was due to Appellant’s insufficient discovery response rather than simple mistake or inadvertence. II. DISCUSSION We have previously stated that “w e ascribe to the trial court a broad discretion to preserve the integrityand purpose of the pretrial order.” Hodges v.1 In Bonner v. City of Pritchard , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 6 United States , 597 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1979). 1 “[F]or pretrial procedures to continue as viable mechanisms of court efficiency, appellate courts must exercise minimal interference with trial court discre tion in matters such as the modification of its orders.” Id. More recently, we noted that “[t]here is a presumption that a pretrial order will be ame nded in the interest of justice and sound judicial administration provided there is no substantial injury or prejudice to the opposing party or inconvenience to the court.” United States v. Varner , 13 F.3d 1503, 1507-08 (11th Cir. 1994). If amendment of the pretrial order would result in substantial injustice to the opposing party or inconvenience to the court, the order should be amended only to avoid manifest injustice. Id. at 1508. Appellant argues that the trial c ourt should have granted his emergency motion once the trial date was delayed. He asserts that no new discovery would have been necessary and the trial could have started on schedule. We hold that the trial court did not a buse its discretion. Discovery closed on May 31, 1995. It was not until two years late r that Appellant first told Agency that Lewis would testify about Mooney’s comments concerning Appellant’s age. Agency filed its motion for summary judgment soon after the conclusion of7 discovery, relying on Appellant’s represent ation that his theory of discrimination turned on indirect evidence. With the case in that posture, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Agency. Appe llant appealed and this Court reversed and remanded the case for trial on Decembe r 30, 1996. It was not until four months later that Appellant even suggested that his case would include direct evidence that Mooney was motivated by discriminatory animus. Lewis was not a difficult witness to find; he worked for Agency atthe Tucker lot during Appellant’s period of employment. Although Appellant argues that no new discovery would be necessary, his opponent might not share that view given the fact that the addition of this witness might change the entire focus of the trial. The district court reasonably concluded that the addition of Lewis as a witness less than one month before trial would significantly prejudice Agency and would inconvenience the court. Moreover, the record supports the tr ial court’s conclusion that no manifest injustice would result from denial of Appellant’s motion to amend. III. CONCLUSION Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the record, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discre tion by denying Appellant’s motion to amend the pretrial order. AFFIRMED.