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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

RENTAL PROPERTIES OWNERS
ASSOCIATION OF KE NT COUNTY, 3830 G, L.L.C., RUSTY RICHTER, AFFORDABLE HOUSING COALITION, CHARLIE CURTIS, JEFF FORTUNA, JAMES KANE, DANIEL HIBMA, KEYSTONE REALTY GROUP, L.L.C., GREG McKEE, JOSH BECKETT, and MICHAEL BECKETT,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, FOR PUBLICATION December 18, 2014
9:00 a.m.

v No. 314256
Kent Circuit Court KENT COUNTY TREASURER, COUNTY OF KENT, and KENT COUNTY LAND BANK AUTHORITY, LC No. 12-009669-CH

Defendants-Appellees,
and

KENT COUNTY TAXPAYERS ALLIANCE,

Amicus Curiae.

KENT COUNTY LAND BANK AUTHORITY,

Petitioner-Appellee,
v No. 314318
Kent Circuit Court 3830 G, L.L.C., RUSTY RICHTER, AFFORDABLE HOUSING COALITION, CHARLIE CURTIS, JEFF FORTUNA, JAMES KANE, DANIEL HIBMA, KEYSTONE REALTY GROUP, L.L.C., GREG McKEE, JOSH BECKETT, and MICHAEL BECKETT,, LC No. 12-008120-CH

Appellants.-2- RENTAL PROPERTIES OWNERS
ASSOCIATION OF KE NT COUNTY, 3830 G, L.L.C., RUSTY RICHTER, AFFORDABLE HOUSING COALITION, CHARLIE CURTIS, JEFF FORTUNA, JAMES KANE, DANIEL HIBMA, KEYSTONE REALTY GROUP, L.L.C., CIERIA CHAVEZ, ROSIE BAKER, and SHARON HALL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and

GREG McKEE,

Plaintiff,

v No. 319733
Kent Circuit Court KENT COUNTY TREASURER, CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS, and KENT COUNTY LAND BANK AUTHORITY, LC No. 13-006798-CH

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: S HAPIRO , P.J., and W HITBECK and S TEPHENS , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.
In these consolidated appeals, various indi viduals, companies, and associations involved in property ownership, rehabilitation, and de velopment in Kent County (the 3830 G parties) 1 seek to invalidate tax deeds executed by the Ke nt County Treasurer (the Treasurer) to Kent County (the County) and the city of Grand Rapids (the City) and from the County and the City to Kent County Land Bank Authority (KCLBA), cl aiming that their actions deprived the 3830 G parties of the opportunity to purch ase the properties. The appealedorders were all decided by the same circuit court judge on different dates.

1 For clarity purposes, the various individuals, companies, and associ ations that are plaintiffs in docket nos. 314256 and 319733 and appellants in docket no. 314318 are collectively referred to as “the 3830 G parties” even though there is a slight variance in th e named plaintiffs and appellants in the three cases, respectively. Where necessary the parties are identified individually.-3- In Docket No. 314256, the 3830 G parties appeal as of right the December 20, 2012 trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of the appellees. We affirm.

In Docket No. 314318, the 3830 G parties appeal as of right the tria l court’s December 26, 2012 order denying their motion to set aside the quiet-title a nd foreclosure judgment entered in favor of petitioner, KCLBA. We affirm.

In Docket No. 319733, the 3830 G parties appeal as of right the tria l court’s December 6, 2013 order granting summary disposition in fa vor of all appellees. We affirm.

This Court ordered the appeals consolidated. 2

I. BACKGROUND

Docket Nos. 314256, 314318

In 2012, the Treasurer foreclosed on numerous properties in Kent County (the County properties). On June 28, 2012, and July 12, 2012, th e County adopted resolu tions authorizing the County to purchase county tax-fo reclosed properties and sell those properties to KCLBA, allegedly as the result of an agreement betw een the County, the Treasurer, and KCLBA. The Treasurer conveyed the county pr operties to KCLBA on July 18, 2012. KCLBA filed a petition for expedited quiet title and foreclosure of the County properties on August 29, 2012. The trial court granted KCLBA’s petition on October 19, 2012, noting that KCLBA had complied with all notice, service, and publ ication requirements.

The 3830 G parties filed a complaint agains t Kent County Treasure r, Kent County, and KCLBA in Kent Circuit Court on October 17, 2012, and filed a first amended complaint on December 6, 2012, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the Treasurer, the County, and KCLBA’s actions violated MC L 124.755 and deprived the 3830 G parties of an opportunity to bid on and purchase any of the County properties. The 3830 G parties also alleged that Kent County violat ed its own policies and breached its fiduciary and Constitutional duties with respect to the purchase an d resale of the County properties.

The 3830 G parties filed a motion to set aside the October 19, 2012 quiet-title and foreclosure judgment pursuant to MCR 2.603 (D), MCR 2.611(A)(1)(a) and (e), or MCR 2.612(1)(a), (b), and (f), to intervene in KCLB A’s quiet-title and foreclosure action, and to consolidate that action with the 3830 G parties’ December 6, 2012 case. The trial court denied the 3830 G parties’ motion to set aside the quiet- title and foreclosure j udgment, concluding that:

[the motion is] not timely because [it was] not filed prior to the October 19 Order quieting title; procedurally defective in that plaintiffs failed to submit a pleading as required by MCR 2.209(C)(2), no legiti mate basis here. The Legislature

2 Rental Props Owners Ass’n of Ke nt Co v Kent Co Treasurer , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 25, 2014 (Docket Nos. 314256, 314318, 319733).-4- created a specific statutory scheme which excludes more general remedies. And there’s no violation here of due process.

The 3830 G plaintiffs were aware of the expedited quiet title and foreclosure action, at least as early as October 9. A nd even if the argument could be made that they lacked actual notice, the public notice provid ed by posting and publication satisfies due process requirements.

The County and the Treasurer filed a jo int motion for summary disposition in 12-00969 on November 30, 2012, and KCLBA filed a moti on for summary disposition on December 10,
2012.

The trial court granted the motions for summary disposition, reasoning:

First, the Court’s of the opinion thatthis motion should be granted. [3830 G parties] lack standing, due to both their failure to identify an actual controversy as required by [MCR] 2.605, and the Cour t’s determination that [the 3830 G parties] do not have a special injury rightor substantial inte rest that would be detrimentally affected in a manner differe nt from the citizen ry at large.

Next, the Court finds no actions by the County Treasurer or Kent County itself that exceeded the powers conferred by the Constitution and laws of this
State.

Finally, the Court’s October 19 Order quieting title in the properties bars [the 3830 G parties’] attempts to challenge that title. Summary disposition is granted . . . pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5), (7) and (8).

Docket No. 319733

In 2013, the Treasurer foreclosed on numerous properties (the Grand Rapids properties) in the city of Grand Rapids as a result of the owners’ failure to pay real property taxes and assessments. The properties were not redeemed from the foreclosures. On June 18, 2013, Grand Rapids entered into a development agreemen t with KCLBA to acquire the Grand Rapids properties. KCLBA placed money in escrow fo r the City to purchase the Grand Rapids properties from Kent County Treasurer. The City adopted a resolution determining that acquisition of the Grand Rapids pr operties constituted a public purpose under the city’s policy in connection with its obligation to provide for the health, safety a nd welfare of the community and authorized their purchase from the County Treasurer. The prope rties were thereafter conveyed by the City to KCLBA to “fulfill the public purpose of restoring bli ghted properties and neighborhoods and providing housing on tax-revertedabandoned properties.” The Grand Rapids properties were thereafter sold to KCLBA by the City for the amount paid by the City to the County Treasurer for the properties, pl us the cost of recording fees.

The 3830 G parties filed a complaint in Kent Circuit Court on July 19, 2013, against Kent County Treasurer, Grand Rapids, and KCLBA, and a first amended complaint on September 27,-5- 2013. The 3830 G parties sought inj unctive relief and a writ of mandamus, claiming that Kent County, Kent County Treasurer, an d KCLBA’s actions in acquiring the Grand Rapids properties violated MCL 124.755 because the City never in tended to own the properties, many of the properties were not blighted, an d KCLBA paid a fraction of th e value of the Grand Rapids properties. The 3830 G parties also claimed that they were denied due process because the City was merely a conduit and not a ge nuine purchaser of the Grand Rapids properties, depriving them of the opportunity guaranteedby the statute and the Constitution to participate in an open, reasonable and fair bidding pr ocess on the subject properties. Finall y, the 3830 G parties asserted that by disposing of the Grand Rapids prope rties at less than fair market value, the city breached its fiduciary duty to its residents a nd violated Const 1963, art 7, § 26, which prohibits an entity from lending cred it to another entity.

On motion by Kent County Treasurer, Gra nd Rapids, and KCLBA, this case was reassigned to the judge to whom docket nos . 314256 and 314318 were assigned. On August 23, 2013, the Treasurer, the City, and KCLBA filed a joint motion for summary disposition on counts I and II of the 3830 G parties’ complaint a nd the City filed a separate motion for summary disposition on count III of the 3830 G parties’ complaint. A second joint motion for summary disposition was filed on November 15, 2013. Follo wing a hearing on all of the motions, the trial court granted the motions for summary disposition, reasoning:

All right. The Court has viewed the briefs and heard the arguments here today, and the Court sees essentially no difference between this year’s case and last year’s case. The Court sees no viol ation of the statutes here with what the County Treasurer and the City of Gra nd Rapids and [KCLBA] have done, so motion for summary dis position is granted.

This Court consolidated this case wi th docket nos. 314256 and 314318 in an unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entere d February 25, 2014 (Docket Nos. 314256, 314318, 319733).

II. STATUTORY COMPLIANCE

The trial court granted summary dispositi on to the Kent County Treasurer, County of Kent, the City of Grand Rapids, an d the Kent County Land Bank Authority, 3 and dismissed the 3830 G parties’ amended complaint based on MCR 2.116( C)(5), (7), and (8). The essence of the appellant’s argument is that the process throu gh which KCLBA obtained title to the City and County foreclosed properties was inviolation of the law. Their fi rst claim is that the properties
were obtained in direct contravention of the auth ority granted to the units of government and the governmental officer under MCL 211.78m and MC L 124.755(6). They also argue that the county Treasurer, the County, and the City violated ordinances, policie s or resolutions. In both cases we disagree. This is an issue of first impression.

3 These parties will collectively be referred to as “the defendants”. Where necessary the parties
are identified individually.-6- In docket no. 319733, the 3830 G parties first argue that, under MCL 124.755(6), the Kent County Treasurer could not transfer the ta x-foreclosed properties to KCLBA until after the properties were sold at public au ction. We conclude otherwise.

With respect to statutory interpre tation our Supreme Court has stated:

The primary goal of statutory interpre tation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the statutory language. The first step
in that determination is to review the language of th e statute itself. Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into accountthe context in which the words are used. We may consult dictionary definitions to give words their common and ordinary meaning. When given their common and ordinary meaning, the words of a statute provide the most reliab le evidence of its intent[.] [ Krohn v HomeOwners Ins Co , 490 Mich 145, 156-157; 802 NW 2d 281 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).]

Thus, if the statute’s language is clear and una mbiguous, judicial construc tion is not required or permitted. In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes, Special Projects Procurement v Continental Biomass Indus, Inc) , 468 Mich 109, 113; 659 NW2d 597 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, “nothing may be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the act itself.” Mich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing) , 489 Mich 194, 217; 801 NW2d 35 (2011).

A foreclosing governmental unit may not tran sfer property subject to foreclosure under MCL 211.78 to MCL 211.78p to a land bank authority “ until after the property has been offered
for sale or other transfer under [MCL 211.78m] and the foreclosing governmental unit has retained possession of the property under [M CL 211.78m(7)].” MCL 124.755(6). Under the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., the phrase “foreclosing governmental unit” means (1) the treasurer of a county, or (2) this state (under circumstances not present in this case). MCL 211.78(8). In this case, Kent Count y Treasurer is the fore closing governmental unit. The 3830 G parties assert that Kent Count y Treasurer, in its role as the foreclosing governmental unit, effectively violated the MC L 124.755(6) prohibition because transfer of the tax-foreclosed properties without an auction to Kent County was a “sham,” with the “real” transferee being KCLBA.

MCL 124.755(6), which is part of the Land Bank Fast Track Act, MCL 124.751 et seq.

, read in conjunction with the GPTA provides that a foreclosing governmental unit may not transfer property subject to foreclosur e under MC 211.78 to MCL 211.78p “until after the property has been offered for sale or other transfer under [MCL 211.78m] and the foreclosing governmental unit has retained possession of the property under [MCL 211.78m].”

Under the GPTA, when property taxes are delinquent for two years, the property is forfeited to the county treasurer. MCL 211.78a ; MCL 211.78g. The governmental unit in which the tax-delinquent property is lo cated may foreclose after the prope rty taxes are delinquent for at least two years. MCL 211.78a ; MCL 211.78g; MCL 211.78h. Once t itle is vested in the foreclosing governmental unit, the state is granted the right of fi rst refusal to purchase the tax--7- foreclosed property at the greater of the minimum bid or its fair market value. MCL 211.78m(1). However, if the state elects not to purchase the property

a city, village, or township may purc hase for a public purpose any property located within that city, village, or town ship set forth in the judgment and subject to sale under this section by payment to the foreclosing govern mental unit of the
minimum bid. If a city, village, or township doe s not purchase that property, the county in which that property is locate d may purchase that property under this section by payment to the foreclosing go vernmental unit of the minimum bid. If property is purchased by a city, vill age, township, or county under this subsection, the foreclosing governmental unit shall convey the property to the purchasing city, village, townsh ip, or county within 30 days . If property purchased by a city, village, townshi p, or county under this subsection is subsequently sold for an amount in ex cess of the minimum bid and all costs incurred relating to demolition, renovati on, improvements, or infrastructure development, the excess amount shall be returned to the delinquent tax property sales proceeds account for the year in which the property was purchased by the city, village, township, or county or, if this state is the foreclosing governmental unit within a county, to the land reutilization f und created under section 78n. Upon the request of the foreclosing governme ntal unit, a city, village, township, or county that purchased property under this subsection shall provide to the foreclosing governmental unit without costinformation regarding any subsequent sale or transfer of the property. This subsection applies to the purchase of property by this state, a city , village, or township, or a county prior to a sale held under subsection (2) . [MCL 211.78m(1) (emphasis added).]

In this case, in accordance with MCL 211.78m(1), Kent County purchased the Kent County taxforeclosed properties for the minimum bid; it th ereafter transferred the properties to KCLBA. The Kent County tax-foreclosed properties were never available for public auction, nor were the 3830 G parties ever specifically rejected from the bidding process. Thus, Kent County had authority to purchase the Kent County tax-forecl osed properties from the Kent County Treasurer
for the minimum bid.

MCL 211.78m(2) next provides:

Subject to subsection (1), . . . the fo reclosing governmental unit . . . shall hold at least 2 property sales at 1 or more convenient locations at which property foreclosed by the judgment entered under section 78k shall be sold by auction sale, which may include an auction sale conducted via an internet website . Notice
of the time and location of the sales sh all be published not less than 30 days before each sale in a newspaper published and circulated in the county in which the property is located, if there is one. If no newspaper is publis hed in that county, publication shall be made in a newspaper published and circulated in an adjoining county. Each sale shall be completed before the first Tuesday in November immediately succeeding the entry of judgm ent under section 78k vesting absolute title to the tax delinquent property in th e foreclosing governmental unit. Except as provided in subsection (5), property shall be sold to the person bidding the highest-8- amount above the minimum bid. The fo reclosing governmental unit may sell parcels individually or ma y offer 2 or more parcel s for sale as a group. The minimum bid for a group of parcels shall equal the sum of the minimum bid for each parcel included in the group. The fo reclosing governmental unit may adopt procedures governing the conduct of the sale and may cancel the sale prior to the
issuance of a deed under this subsection if authorized under the procedures. The foreclosing governmental unit may require full payment by cash, certified check, or money order at the close of each day' s bidding. Not more than 30 days after the date of a sale under this subsection, the foreclosing governmental unit shall convey the property by deed to the pers on bidding the highest amount above the minimum bid. The deed shall vest fee simp le title to the property in the person bidding the highest amount above the minimum bid, unless the foreclosing governmental unit discovers a defect inthe foreclosure of the property under
sections 78 to 78l. If this state is the foreclosing governmental unit within a county, the department of natural resour ces shall conduct the sale of property
under this subsection and s ubsections (4) and (5) on be half of this state. [Emphasis added.]

In brief, if the city, village, township, or c ounty does not purchase the tax-foreclosed property, a public auction is held, with the tax-foreclosed property sold to the person bidding the highest amount above the minimum bid. MCL 211.78m(2). Reading MCL 211.78m(1) and (2) together, the language clearly provides that subsection (1) applies sp ecifically to those situations where the tax-foreclosed property has been purchased from the foreclosing governmental unit by either the state, or the city, village, or township, or th e county in which the tax-foreclosed property was located. The final sentence in MCL 211.78m(1) s upports this conclusion: “This subsection applies to the purchase of property by this stat e, a city, village, or township, or a county prior to a sale held under subsection (2) .” Thus, the Kent County tax-foreclosed properties were properly purchased by Kent County from the Kent County Treasurer.

Contrary to the 3830 G part ies’ argument, MCL 211.78m(2) did not require Kent County to offer for sale by public auction the Kent County tax-foreclosed properties. Rather, MCL 211.78m(2), by its own language, requires the for eclosing governmental unit to hold public auctions to sell the foreclosed properties. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass'n (On Rehearing) , 484 Mich 1, 13; 795 NW2d 101 (2009) (stating that the first criterion in determining th e Legislature’s intent is the sp ecific language of the statute). Because the term “foreclosing governmental unit” is defined in MCL 211.78(8), that definition
controls. Haynes v Neshewat , 477 Mich 29, 35; 729 NW2d 488 (2007 ). In this case, the Kent County Treasurer, and not Ke nt County, was the foreclosing governmental unit. MCL 211.78(8). Thus, once Kent County purchased the ta x-foreclosed properti es from Kent County Treasurer pursuant to MCL 211.78m( 1), there was no requirement that its later sale of those properties be by public auction. Notwithstanding the 3830 G parties’ argument that Kent County
acted as a “straw-man” in the tr ansaction, requiring the state, a city, village, or township, or a county to subsequently sell by public auction for eclosed properties it had purchased under MCL 211.78m(1), would inappropriately read language into MCL 211.78m (2); by its express words, subsection 2 specifically applies to sales by the foreclosing govern mental unit after the state, a city, village, or township, or a county have not exercised their respectiv e right to purchase the property under MCL 211.78m(1). See Mich Ed Ass’n , 489 Mich at 217.-9- The 3830 G parties also misinterpret MC L 124.755(6) as requiring Kent County to hold an auction before it sold the tax-foreclosed pr operties to KCLBA. The Land Bank Fast Track Act authorizes a land bank authority to purcha se real property. MCL 124.755(1). It also authorizes a land bank authority to purchase property from a forecl osing governmental unit under the GPTA. The Land Bank Fast Track Act also provides:

A foreclosing governmental unit may not transfer property subject to forfeiture, foreclosure, and sale un der . . . MCL 211.78 to MCL 211.78p, until after the property has been offered for sa le or other transfer under . . . MCL 211.78m, and the foreclosing governmental unit has retained possession of the property under . . . MCL 211.78m. [MCL 124.755(6) (emphasis added).]

The language is clear and unambiguous and must be interpreted as written. In re Certified Question , 468 Mich at 113. MCL 124.755(6), which states that the procedures under MCL 211.78m must be followed, by its very term s only applies to tran sfers of foreclosed properties by the foreclosing governmental unit. As stated earlier in this discussion section, Kent County Treasurer is the foreclos ing governmental unit in this case, not Kent County. Kent County Treasurer did not retain po ssession of the tax-foreclosed prope rties, rather, it sold them to Kent County pursuant to MCL 211.78m(1). Acco rdingly, Kent County did not violate MCL 124.755(6) when it sold the tax-foreclosed prop erties to KCLBA. We find no support for a requirement that a public auction be held after th e purchase of a foreclosed property by either the city or the county.

The 3830 G parties essentially assert that Kent County was not a true owner of the properties before they were then sold to KCLB A and that Kent County Treasurer is the party who actually sold the properties to KCLBA, c ontrary to MCL 124.755(6). While their concerns are understandable, it does not negate the fact that Kent County did in fact purchase the properties from Kent County Treasurer a nd that MCL 124.755(6) and MCL 211.78m do not place restrictions on, or even address, a local govern mental unit’s use or subsequent sale of such properties. This Court may not read language into the statutes to prevent the transactions in this

case. Mich Ed Ass’n , 489 Mich at 217. See also Robinson v Detroit , 462 Mich 439, 474; 613 NW2d 307 (2000) (CORRIGAN, J., c oncurring) (“If the Legislatur e acted unwisely in enacting the statute or failing to adequate ly debate its merits, the judi ciary may not act to save the Legislature from its folly”).

Thus, the trial court did not err by concl uding that Kent Count y did not violate MCL 211.78m(1) and (2), and MCL 124.755(6) when it purchased the tax-fo reclosed properties from Kent County Treasurer and thereafter so ld those same properties to KCLBA

The 3830 G parties again argue here that Grand Rapid’s purchase of the properties was a “ruse” to disguise the violation, that KCLBA inappropriately funded Grand Rapid’s purchase of the properties from the Kent County Treasurer, a nd that the Legislature did not intend for local governmental units to act as a “straw man” to avoid a public sale of th e properties. The 3830 G parties rely on Rutland Twp v City of Hastings , 413 Mich 560; 321 NW2d 647 (1982), to argue that this Court should reject th e “straw-man” transaction and l ook at the real transaction.-10- In Rutland , the plaintiff township filed an action, seeking a declaration that a purported annexation of a parcel of land by the defendant city was void. The property was originally owned by the private defendants, who conveyed the property to the defendant city. On the same date, the defendant city gave the private defe ndants an option to repu rchase the property and adopted a resolution annexing th e parcel. The private defenda nts exercised the option and repurchased the property. Id . at 562. The transaction was rep eated one month la ter to exclude a portion of the property that included buildings, contrary to MCL 117.9(8). Id . at 562-563. The defendant city admitted “that the sole purpose of its purchase of the parcel was to permit annexation of the parcel withou t seeking the approval of the to wnship or the State Boundary
Commission.” Id . at 563. The Court invalidated the annexation, concluding that the “city’s purported ‘ownership’ was a mere subterfuge to avoid the sa feguards found in the annexation statutes by taking advantage of what is meant to be a narrow exception for vacant city-owned property.” Id . at 565.

The 3830 G parties’ reliance on Rutland Twp is misplaced because Rutland Twp is factually dissimilar this case. Unlike Rutland , which involved an analysis of MCL 117.9(8) (annexation of property by a city under the Home Rule City Act, MCL 1 17.1, et seq.), this case involved the interplay between MCL 124.755 (L and Bank Fast Track Act) and MCL 211.78m (General Property Tax Act). Also, unlike Rutland , in which the city defendant admitted that the sole purpose of the transaction was to avoid s eeking approval from the township or the boundary commission, Grand Rapids has notadmitted that it purchased the properties to avoid a public auction. In fact, Grand Rapids purchased the prope rties as part of its obligation to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of its community and then conveyed them to KCLBA to fulfill the public purpose of restor ing blighted properties and neighborhoods and to provide housing on taxforeclosed properties. Language cannot be read into MCL 211.78m to proscribe how Grand Rapids chooses to effectuate the public purpo se. Although Grand Rapids entered into an agreement with KCLBA before purchasing the properties from Kent County Treasurer, and KCLBA placed the money in escrow for Grand Rapids to purchase the properties from Kent County Treasurer, it doe s not follow from the Rutland Twp analysis that the transactions should be invalidated under MCL 124.755(6) as a “sham.”

Reading MCL 124.755 and MCL 211.78m together , the GPTA creates a scheme where the foreclosing governmental unit must offer the ta x-foreclosed properties for sale to the state first, then the city, village, or township, then the county in which the property is located. MCL 211.78m(1). Any purchase by the city, village, township, or county must be for a public purpose. MCL 211.78m(1). The purchase in this case was for a public purpose, which was to restore blighted properties and to provide housing on tax-foreclosed properties. Other than the restriction that the purchase be for a public purpose, the Legislatur e did not restri ct in any way how the city may convey the prope rty thereafter. MCL 211.78m. The existing contract to sell the property to KCLBA immediately after it purchased the properties, as well as the terms related to financing the sale, do not inva lidate Grand Rapid’s purchase of the tax-foreclosed properties. The Land Bank Fast Track Act, MCL 124.751 et se q., grants land banks broad authority to acquire by purchase, “or otherw ise on terms and conditions a nd in a manner the authority considers proper,” real property. MCL 124.755(1). The act contains no language limiting a land bank’s authority to provide interim funding for a local government to pur chase tax-foreclosed properties. MCL 124.755(6). The act also broadly grants the land bank authority to “implement the purposes, objectives, and provisions of this act,” and to “enter into contracts and other-11- instruments necessary, incidental, or convenient to the performance of its duties and the exercise of its powers . . .” MCL 124.754(1)(d). Thus, the trial court did not err by concluding that Grand Rapids, like Kent C ounty, did not violate MCL 1 24.755(6) or MCL 211.78m when it purchased the Kent County tax-foreclosed properti es from the Kent Country Treasurer and then immediately sold them to KCLBA.

The 3830 G parties also err oneously rely on MCL 124.773 to argue that, by using Kent County to allow the Kent County Treasurer to transfer property to KCLBA, KCLBA exceeded the authority granted to county land banks. Howe ver, as noted by Kent County and Kent County Treasurer in their appeal brie f (p 19), MCL 124.773 does not even apply to KCLBA as a local board authority; rather, the statute explicitly states that it applies to the state authority (as defined MCL 124.753(p) and MCL 124.765). Thus, the 3830 G parties cannot rely on MCL 124.773 to argue that Kent County’s sale of the tax-foreclosed properties to KC LBA violated Michigan law.

III. MANDAMUS

The 3830 G parties’ challenge to the validity of the tax-foreclosed property deeds by way
of mandamus also fails. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on
a writ of mandamus. Coalition for a Safer Detroit v Detroit City Clerk , 295 Mich App 362, 367; 820 NW2d 208 (2012). However, the first two elemen ts required for issu ance of a writ of mandamus—that defendants have a clear legal duty to perform and plaintiffs have a clear legal right to performance of the requested act—are reviewed de novo as a question of law. Id

.
To obtain the extraordinary re medy of a writ of mandamus, th e plaintiff must show that: (1) the plaintiff has a clear, legal right to performance of the specif ic duty sought, (2) the defendant has a clear legal duty to perform, (3) the act is minist erial, and (4) no other adequate legal or equitable remedy exists that might achieve the same result.” Hanlin v Saugatuck Twp

, 299 Mich App 233, 248; 829 NW2d 335 (2013). In rela tion to a request for mandamus, “a clear legal right” is “one clearly founded in, or grante d by, law; a right which is inferable as a matter
of law from uncontroverted facts re gardless of the difficulty of the legal question to be decided.” Univ Med Affiliates, PC v Wayne Co Executive , 142 Mich App 135, 143; 369 NW2d 277 (1985) (quotation marks and citation omitt ed). “Even where such a right can be shown, it has long been the policy of the courts to deny the writ of mandamus to compel the performance of public duties by public officials unless the specific right i nvolved is not possessed by citizens generally.” Id

.
Again as in docket no. 314256, the Kent Coun ty Treasurer was notrequired by MCL 211.78m to offer the tax-foreclosed properties for sale at public auctio n because Grand Rapids purchased the properties first. Thus, the 3830 G parties did not have a clear, legal right to performance of the specific duty sought, Hanlin , 299 Mich App at 248, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request for mandamus, Coalition for a Safer Detroit , 295 Mich App at 367.

The trial court did not err by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The trial court did not err by concluding that Grand Rapids, like Kent County, did not violate MCL 124.755(6) or MCL 211.78m when it purchased the Kent County tax-foreclosed properties from th e Kent Country Treasurer and then immediately sold them to
KCLBA.-12- IV. DUE PROCESS AND CONS TITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS

Next, the 3830 G parties argue that the pr ocess by which KCLBA obtained the properties violated due process and otherwise ran afoul of Constitutional guarantees. Again, we disagree.

The trial court granted summary dispositi on under MCR 2.116(C)(8) in both docket nos. 314256, regarding Kent County, and 319733, regarding th e City of Grand Rapids. This Court reviews de novo motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Spiek v Mich Dep’t of Transp , 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) “tests the legal sufficiency of the claim on the pleadin gs alone to determine whether the plaintiff has
stated a claim on which re lief may be granted.” Id . “The motion must be granted if no factual development could justify the plaintiffs’ claim for relief.” Id . This Court also reviews de novo issues of law involving statutory construction. Klooster v Charlevoix , 488 Mich 289, 295-296, 795 NW2d 578 (2011).

MCL 124.759 provides the procedure by which a land bank authority may initiate an expedited quiet title and foreclos ure action. The land bank authorit y must record a notice of the pending expedited quiet title and fo reclosure with the register of deeds in the county in which the property is located. MCL 124.759(1) . Among other things not atissue here, the notice must include a statement that any legal interests in the property may be extinguished by a circuit court order vesting title to the property in the authority. Id . After notice is recorded, the authority
shall initiate a search of record s to identify the owners of a prope rty interest in the property who are entitled to notice of the qui et title and foreclosure hearing. MCL 124.759(2). The owner of a property interest is entitled to notice under this section if that ow ner’s interest was identifiable before the authority recorded notice. Id . The authority must search county register of deeds land title records, county treasurer tax records, local assessor tax records, and local treasurer tax records to identify the owner of a property interest who is entitled to notice of the expedited quiet
title and foreclosure action. Id . The authority may file a petition in the circuit court, listing all the property for which the authority seeks to quiet title; the petition must “include a date, within 90 days, on which the authority requests a hear ing on the petitioner.” MCL 124.759(3). The clerk is required to immediately set the date, tim e, and place for a hearin g on the petition and the hearing shall not be more than 10 days after the date requested by the authority inthe petition. MCL 124.759(4).

The 3830 G parties argue under MCR 2.612(a) and (f) that the quiet-title and foreclosure judgment should be set aside because they were not given notice of the pe tition hearing date in the manner required by MCL 124.759(3). This argum ent has no merit. The 3830 G parties were not entitled to notice of the proceedings because only the owner of a property interest in the taxforeclosed properties was enti tled to notice of the petition being filed. MCL 124.759(2). To hold otherwise would inappropriately read language into the statute. Mich Ed Ass’n , 489 Mich at 217. Because they were not entitle d to notice, the quiet-title a nd foreclosure judgment cannot be set aside under either MCR 2.612(C )(1)(a) or (f) on the basis that the notification-of-petitioner requirement was violated.

Moreover, even if they were entitled to not ice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the judgment should not be se t aside on the basis that KCLBA allegedly violated their due proces s rights when it did not immediately request a hearing date as required-13- by MCL 124.759(3). No person may be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. US Const, Am V; US Const, Am XI V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. Due process generally requires notice and an oppor tunity to be heard. Dusenbery v United States , 534 US 161, 167; 122 S Ct 694; 151 L Ed 2d 597 (2002); Republic Bank v Genesee Co Treasurer , 471 Mich 732, 742; 690 NW2d 917 (2005). MCL 124.759(19) specifica lly states that the failure of the authority to follow a requirement in MCL 124.759 relating to the quiet- title and foreclosure proceeding under that section does not create a cause of action ag ainst an authority “unless the minimum requirements of due proc ess . . . are violated.”

The 3830 G parties’ due process rights were not violated by the notice provided in the petition and the quiet-title and foreclosure pr oceedings. KCLBA’s petition was filed on August 29, 2012, requesting that a hearing be held within 90 days, c ontrary to MCL 124.759(3), which requires the petition to include a sp ecific date on which the hearing will be held. While the date was not specified within the petition, notices of the proceedings were posted at each of the Kent County tax-foreclosed properties, notice of the October 19, 2012 hearing was published for each parcel of property on September 19, Septem ber 26, and October 3, 2012, and notices of expedited quiet title and foreclosure proceedin gs were also mailed by certified mail and first class mail to the “occupants” of each parcel of property. Each of the no tices indicated that the hearing on KCLBA’s petition was scheduled for October 19, 2012. In addition, the circuit court register of actions indicates on October 11, 2012 that th e motion to quiet title was scheduled for October 19, 2012.

These notices provided the 3830 G parties notice of an opportunity to be heard in relation to the petition sufficient to satisfy due process. Dusenbery , 534 US at 167; Republic Bank , 471 Mich at 742. In addition, the 3830 G parties ha d actual notice of the October 19, 2012 motion to quiet title hearing before the judgment was entered, which al so satisfies the fundamental requirements of due process. See Alycekay Co v Hasko Constr Co, Inc , 180 Mich App 502, 506; 448 NW2d 43 (1989) (concluding that where the trustee received actual notice of the claim, the service of process that was effected “satisfiedfundamental requirements of due process and was not a substantial defect” in the process).

V. KENT COUNTY FIDUCIARY DUTY

The 3830 G parties also argue that Kent C ounty exceeded its authority and violated its fiduciary duties to its taxpayers when it sold th e tax-foreclosed properties to KCLBA at a price allegedly below their market values. The 3830 G parties did not raise these arguments in their statement of questions presented and thus they are not properly presented for appellate review. Bouverette v Westinghouse Electric Corp , 245 Mich App 391, 404; 628 NW2d 86 (2001). Regardless, these arguments are without merit.

First, the resolutions passed by Kent Count y’s board of commissioners did not violate county resolutions regarding the sale of county-ow ned property. It is the policy of Kent County to seek to maximize the benefits to the taxpayers in the sale, disposal, or transfer of any property-14- owned by Kent County. Kent County Resoluti on 12-12-02-191, ¶ I.1.a. While in general the minimum price accepted for real property to be sold by Kent County must be based on an appraisal, property that is reque sted by other public entities may be sold by Kent County without requiring competitive proposals and upon the approval of the board of commissioners. Id . at II.3.c. and II.5. Because KCLBA is a public en tity, MCL 124.773(6)(a), contrary to the 3830 G parties’ argument, Kent County did not violate its policies when it sold the tax-foreclosed properties to KCLBA without first obtaining competitive proposals.

Second, Kent County stated a county purpose behind it s purchase of the Kent County taxforeclosed properties. It is a valid public purpose for a land bank fast track authority, like KCLBA, to acquire tax-reverted property as a way to strengthen and revitalize the economy of
where it is located. MCL 124.752. The minutes from the meeting in which the board voted to purchase the properties from Kent County Treasurer provide in full:

WHEREAS, 64 properties . . . are part of 325 parcels that have all been foreclosed by the Kent County Treasurer for nonpayment of real property taxes in 2012; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to MCL 211.78m, Kent County has the right to acquire tax-foreclosed properties prior to them being offe red for sale at auction by paying the minimum bid price. Kent Count y has the right to sell these properties to the Kent County Land Ba nk Authority (KCLBA); and

WHEREAS, KCLBA has reviewed the entire list of 325 parcels and has now identified 43 properties t hat either meet the criteria for following its strategic plan or have been requested to be acquire d on behalf of the local unit where it is
located ; and

WHEREAS, four local non-profit developers are interested in acquiring and redeveloping 21 additional properties . Treasurer Parish requests that the County acquire and transfer ownershi p of these parcels to KCLBA; and

WHEREAS, no recording fees are requi red for a transfer to the KCLBA. Corporate Counsel will review and appr ove the transfer documents before
execution.

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RE SOLVED that the Board of Commissioners hereby exercise its right to purchase 64 parcels for the minimum bid price and sell them to the KCLBA atthe same minimum bid price for future redevelopment and sale and that the Treasur er be authorized to sign the necessary documents. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, because Kent County resolved that the ta x-foreclosed properties meet KCLBA’s strategic plan, were requested by the local government, or for redevelopment, and KCLBA’s acquisition of property is a valid public purpose invol ving the revitalization of the economy, MCL 124.752, Kent County’s sale of the properties to KCLBA did fulfill a valid county purpose of
revitalization.-15- Further, the 3830 G parties cannot rely on MCL 46.11 and MCL 46.358 to argue that Kent County exceeded its authority when it sold th e tax-foreclosed properties to KCLBA. MCL 46.11(c) provides that Kent County’s board of commi ssioners has the authority to sell real estate belonging to the county. MCL 46.358 grants a c ounty commission authority to acquire real property for public parks, preserves, etc., on beha lf of the county. Neither of these provisions limits a county’s authority to purchase tax-forecl osed properties from Kent County Treasurer and then resell them to KCLBA at the same price. Moreover, the Michigan Constitution provides that constitutional provisi ons relating to counties “shall be lib erally construed in their favor.” Const 1963, art VII, § 34. In a ddition, “[p]owers granted to count ies . . . by [the] constitution and by law shall include those fairly implied and not prohibited by [the] constitution.” Id

. Because MCL 211.78m(1) authorizes a foreclosi ng governmental unit to sell tax-foreclosed property to a county, Kent Count y by implication had au thority to purchase the tax-foreclosed properties. Const 1963, art VII, § 34. Furthermore, the statut e does not prohibit a county from reselling tax-foreclosed properties it purchased; to hold otherwise would inappropriately read language into the statute. Mich Ed Ass’n , 489 Mich at 217.

Kent County did not violat e its policies or resolutions when it purchased the taxforeclosed properties from Kent County Treasurer and then sold them to KCLBA without a competitive-bid process.

VI. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The 3830 G parties argue that the trial court erred when it dete rmined that their claims in docket no. 314256 were barred by the quiet-title a nd foreclosure judgment obtained by KCLBA in docket no, 314318. We agree, but find the error ha rmless in light of our affirmance of the trial court’s order summarily dismissing the 3830 G parties’ amended complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(8), above.

KCLBA argued that the 3830 G parties’ complaint in docket no. 314256 was barred by the prior quiet-title and foreclosure judgment and the trial court addresse d this issue when it granted summary disposition in favor of all defendants in part based on MCR 2.116(C)(7).

“This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) to dete rmine whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Duncan v Michigan , 300 Mich App 176, 194; 832 NW2d 761 (2013). The application of legal doctri nes, like collateral estoppel, is a ques tion of law that th is Court reviews
de novo. Estes v Titus , 481 Mich 573, 578-579; 751 NW2d 493 ( 2008). Even if the trial court erred by granting summary disposition under a particul ar subrule, this Cour t will not reverse if the error was harmless; this Court must determin e “whether declining to grant a new trial, set aside a verdict, or vacate, modify, otherwise disturb a judgment or order appears to the court to be inconsistent with substantial justice.” Chastain v Gen Motors Corp , 254 Mich App 576, 586; 657 NW2d 804 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

A land bank authority like KCLBA may initiate an expedited quiet title and foreclosure action to quiet title to real property by recordi ng notice of the pending acti on with the register of deeds in the relevant county. MCL 124.759(1). Th e land bank authority must initiate a search of records to identify the owners of a property intere st in the property who ar e entitled to notice of-16- hearing on such an action and any identified property-interest owner is entitled to notice of the action. MCL 124.759(2). The land bank authority may file a petiti on in the circui t court listing all the properties subject to the expedited quiet title and foreclosure action and seeking a judgment in favor of the land bank authority; th e petition must include a date within 90 days on which the authority requests a hearing. MCL 124.759(3).

If a petition for expedite d quiet title and foreclosur e is filed under MCL 124.759(3), a person claiming an interest in a parcel of property set fo rth in the petition w ho desires to contest that petition must “file written objections with the clerk of the circui t court and serve those objections on the [land bank] authority before the date of the hearing.” MCL 124.759(11). The judgment must specify, in part, that all existing r ecorded and unrecorded inte rest in that property are extinguished (except in certain limited circumst ances not at issue in this case) and that fee simple title to the foreclosed property is vest ed absolutely in the land bank authority. MCL 124.759(11)(b) and (e); MCL 124.759(12). Under MCL 124.759(12) the judgment may not be modified, stayed, or held invalid except as provided in MCL 124.759(13), which allows a land bank authority or person claiming to have a property interest under MCL 124.759(2) to appeal the trial court’s foreclosure order within 21 days to the court of appeals. Moreover, if the judgment of foreclosure is entered under MC L 124.759(12), “the owner of any extinguished recorded or unrecorded interest in that property who claims that he or she did not receive notice of the expedited quiet title and foreclosure action shall not bring an action for possession of the property against any subsequent owner, but ma y only bring an action to recover monetary damages as provided in this subsection.”

The 3830 G parties claim that their compla int in 12-009669-CH is not barred by the foreclosure judgment obtained by KCLBA in 12-008120-CH because the foreclosures procedures outlined in MCL 124.759 apply only to part ies asserting an existing property interest, unlike the 3830 G parties who assert a right in bidding at the public auction proceeding required by statute (MCL 124.755(6) and MCL 211.78 m). It is unnecessary to address this aspect of their argument because the 3830 G parties were no t a party in the 12-008120-CH foreclosure proceeding and the judgment in that action ca nnot be used to collaterally estop the 3830 G’s complaint in 12-009669-CH.

Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent , different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the issue was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding. Leahy v Orion Twp , 269 Mich App 527, 530; 711 NW2d 438 (2006). Co llateral estoppel is a flexible rule intended to relieve parties of multiple litigatio n, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication. Detroit v Qualls , 434 Mich 340, 357 n 30; 454 NW2d 374 (1990).

Generally, application of collateral estoppel re quires (1) that a ques tion of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality. Monat v State
Farm Ins Co , 469 Mich 679, 682-684; 677 NW2d 843 (2004).

In the subsequent action, the ultimate issue to be concluded must be the same as that
involved in the first action. Qualls , 434 Mich at 357. The issues must be identical, and not merely similar. Keywell & Rosenfeld v Bithell , 254 Mich App 300, 340; 657 NW2d 759 (2002).-17- In addition, the common ultimate issues must have been both actually and necessarily litigated. Qualls , 434 Mich at 357.

To be actually litigated, a question must be put into issue by the pleadings, submitted to the trier of fact, and de termined by the trier. VanDeventer v Mich Nat'l Bank , 172 Mich App 456, 463; 432 NW2d 338 (1988). The parties must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issues in the first action. Keywell & Rosenfeld , 254 Mich App at 340.

For collateral estoppel to apply, the parties in the second action must be the same as or privy to the parties in the first action. VanVorous v Burmeister , 262 Mich App 467, 480; 687 NW2d 132 (2004). A party is one w ho was directly interested in the subject matter, and had a right to defend or to control the proceedings and to appeal from the judgment, while a privy is one who, after the judgment, has an interest in the matter aff ected by the judgment through one of the parties, as by inherita nce, succession, or purchase. Husted v Auto-Owners Ins Co , 213 Mich App 547, 556; 540 NW2d 743 (1995), aff’d 459 Mich 500 (1999).

In this case, the October 19, 2012 judgmen t quieting title of the Kent County taxforeclosed properties in KCLBA 12-008120-CH does not bar the 3830 G parties’ amended complaint in 12-009669-CH. Collatera l estoppel does not apply because the parties in this action
are not the same as those involv ed in the first action. While KCLBA was involved in both the quiet-title and foreclosure actio n and this action, the 3830 G par ties were not involved in the quiet-title and foreclosure action. While the 3830 G parties were in terested in the subject matter in the quiet-title and foreclos ure action, they did not have a right to defend or control the proceedings. Id . In fact, the trial court denied their motion to intervene in the quiet-title and
foreclosure action and as a resu lt the 3830 G parties also did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues raised in their complaint relative to the facts surrounding the sale of the Kent County tax-foreclosed properties in the first ac tion; thus, the issue of KCLBA’s ownership of those properties was not actually litigated. Keywell & Rosenfeld , 254 Mich App at 340. Accordingly, the trial court erre d by concluding that the 3830 G part ies’ complaint was barred by the prior quiet-title and forecl osure judgment under MCR 2.116(7).

While the trial court erred by granting summar y disposition to defendants on the basis of collateral estoppel, the error was harmless becau se summary disposition was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Chastain , 254 Mich App at 586.

VII. THE QUIET-TITLE ACTION

In docket no. 314318, the trial court denied the 3830 G parties’ motion to set aside the quiet-title and foreclosure judgment on the basi s that (1) it was not tim ely filed, (2) the 3830 G parties failed to submit a pleading as require d by MCR 2.209(C)(2), an d (3) there was no dueprocess violation because actual notice was achieve d. Upon review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the 3830 G parties’ motion to set aside the judgment brought under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a), (b), and (f). Further, that th e trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the 3830 G parties’ motion to set aside under 2.611(A)(1 )(a) and (e), albeit for the wrong reasons. Finally, that the trial c ourt’s failure to set aside the quiet title and foreclosure judgment under MCR 2.611(A)(1)(g) did not constitute plain error affecting the 3830 G parties’ substantial rights.-18- This Court reviews for an abuse of discre tion a trial court’s decision on a motion to set aside judgment under MCR 2.612. Alken–Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury Headers Corp , 461 Mich 219, 227, 600 NW2d 638 (1999). This Court also re views for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to grant or deny mo tions for a new trial under MCR 2.116. Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 761; 685 NW2d 391 (2004). “A trial court abuses its
discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Bay City v Bay Co Treasurer , 292 Mich App 156, 164; 807 NW2d 892 (2011). The determination whether a party has been afforded due process is a question of law subjec t to de novo review on appeal. Elba Twp v Gratiot Co Drain Comm'r , 493 Mich 265, 277; 831 NW2d 204 (2013); In re
Moroun , 295 Mich App 312, 331; 814 NW2d 319 (2012).

In addition, this Court also reviews de novo issues of law involving statutory construction, Klooster , 488 Mich at 295–296, as well as the pr oper interpretation and application of a court rule, Henry v Dow Chem Co , 484 Mich 483, 495; 772 NW2d 301 (2009). Finally, unpreserved error may be considered if (1) failure to do so would re sult in manifest injustice, (2) consideration is necessary for a proper determination of the cas e, or (3) the issue involves a question of law, and the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented. Johnson Family Ltd Partnership v White Pine Wireless, LLC , 281 Mich App 364, 377; 761 NW2d 353, 362 (2008). An unpreserved nonconstituti onal claim of error is review ed for plain e rror affecting substantial rights. People v Grant , 445 Mich 535, 552-553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994); Veltman v
Detroit Edison Co , 261 Mich App 685, 690; 683 NW2d 70 7 (2004) (applying the unpreserved plain error standard to civil cases).

A. MCR 2.611

In docket no. 314318, the 3830 G parties argue that the trial court abus ed its discretion by denying their “motion to set as ide” brought under MCR 2.611(A)(1)( a) and (e). We conclude
that the trial court reached the correct result of denying 3830 G parties’ motion to set aside the quiet title and foreclosure judgment under M CR 2.611(A)(1)(a) and (e), but for the wrong

reasons.

Our Supreme Court has stated:

This Court uses the principles of st atutory construction when interpreting a Michigan court rule. We be gin by considering the plain la nguage of the court rule in order to ascertain its meaning. The inte nt of the rule must be determined from
an examination of the court rule itself and its place within the structure of the Michigan Court Rules as a whole. [ Henry , 484 Mich at 495 (quotation marks and citations omitted.]

In relevant part, MCR 2.611(A)(1) provides:

A new trial may be granted to all or some of the parties, on all or some of the issues, whenever their substantial right s are materially affe cted, for any of the following reasons:-19- (a) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or prevailing party, or
an order of the court or abuse of discre tion which denied the moving party a fair
trial.

* * *

(e) A verdict or decision against th e great weight of the evidence or contrary to law. [Emphasis added.]

By its plain language, MCR 2.611(1) applies onl y to judgments reached following a trial. Henry , 484 Mich at 495. In 12-008120-CH, the tr ial court entered judgment on KCLBA’s petition for quiet title and foreclosure of the ta x-foreclosed properties; there was no trial and there was thus no judgment following a trial to be set aside. Thus, by its very terms, a motion under this rule must be preceded by a trial on th e merits, which did not occur in this action and the 3830 G parties were not entitl ed to relief under this cour t rule. MCR 2.611(1)(a) and (e); Henry , 484 Mich at 495. Although the trial court erred by addressi ng the 3830 G parties’ motion to set aside the quiet title and foreclosure judgment on the merits under MCR 2.611, the right result (denial of motion to set aside the j udgment under MCR 2.611(1)(a and (e)) should be
affirmed. See Gleason v Mich Dep’t of Transp , 256 Mich App 1, 3; 662 NW2d 822 (2003) (“A trial court's ruling may be upheld on appeal wher e the right result issued, albeit for the wrong reason.”).

B. MCR 2.612

MCR 2.612 governs how a party may obtain re lief from a judgment or order. MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a) and (f) provide in part:

(1) On motion and on ju st terms, the court may relieve a party or the legal representative of a party from a fina l judgment, order, or proceeding on the following grounds:

(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

* * *

(f) Any other reason ju stifying relief from the ope ration of the judgment.

As noted earlier in the Due Pr ocess section, the 3830 parties premised their argument that the trial court erred in denying them relief from judgment on the mistaken assertion that they were not given the proper notice regarding the petitions to expedite pursuant to MCL 124.759. Again, since they were not entitled to notice, th e 3830 parties cannot demons trate any error in the underlying judgment that entitles them to relief under this court rule.-20- VIII. OTHER CLAIMS OF ERROR

The 3830 G parties also argue, for the firs t time on appeal, that the quiet title and foreclosure judgment entered in 12-008120-CH s hould also be set aside under MCR 2.611(1)(g), which provides that a new trial may be granted when a party’s substantial rights are affected because of an “[e]rror of law occu rring in the proceedings, or mist ake of fact by the court.” As stated earlier, the 3830 G parties are not entitled to relief under MCR 2.611(1), Henry , 484 Mich at 495, because the judgment in 12-008120-CH is not the result of a trial. Thus, they cannot demonstrate plain error affecting their substantial rights and the trial court’s denial of the 3830 G motion to set aside judgment will not be reversed on this basis. Grant , 445 Mich at 552-553;
Veltman , 261 Mich App at 690.

The 3830 G parties also offered numerous arguments regarding the trial court’s determination that they lacked standing. The question of standing is only significant in relation to the ability to bring the rejected assertions of statutory, policy and constitutional error. Therefore, we need not address standing to resolve this case.

IX. CONCLUSION

In docket nos. 314256 and 319733, we affirm th e trial court’s order granting summary disposition. In docket no. 314318, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside the quiet-title a nd foreclosure judgment.

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro /s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens

Whitbeck, J., not participating, having resigned from the Court of Appeals effective November 21, 2014.