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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/198NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT
No: 03-2460

UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v. CONTENT S OF T WO SHI PPI NG CONTAI NERS S EI ZED AT E LI ZABET H, NEW JERSEY ON O R AB OUT DECE MB ER 20, 1990, INCLUD ING ON E 1900 NIS SAN 30 0ZX ( VIN J N1RZ2 6A3 LX01 064 3) AND VARI OUS I TEMS OF

FURNITURE AND PERSONAL EFFECTS

DA NIE L O RIA KH I, Appellant
App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the Dis tri ct of New Jersey (D.C. No. 01-cv- 05823 ) Distric t Judg e: Ho nora ble W illiam H . Wa lls

Argued March 24, 2004 Be for e: R OT H, A M BR O a nd C HE RT OF F, Circuit Judges (Opinion fi led: Oct ober 26, 2004) Joseph M. Bernst ein, Esquire (Argued) 800 North King Stre et, Suite 302 Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel f

or Appell ant

### 2

Peter G. O’Malle y, Esquire (Argued) Office of United St ates Attorney 970 Broad Street , Room 700 Newark, NJ 07102 Counsel for Appellee

O P I N I ON

RO TH , Circuit

Judge Daniel Oriakhi appe als t he judgment of t

he United States Dist

rict Court forthe Dist

rict of Ne w Je rsey, gran ting su mm ary judgm ent in favor of the U nited S tates on this civil forfeiture acti on of the conte nts of tw o s hi pp in g c on tai ne rs, se ize d i n E liz ab eth , N ew Je rse y. Oriakhi limi ts hi s argument on appe al to t he prop ositi on th at the g over nm ent’s c ivil forfeiture acti on was barred bythe st atuteof limi tati ons found at 18 U .S.C.§ 983 (e)(2)(B)(ii). We reject this argu men t and w ill affirm the jud gm ent of the D istrict Co urt. II. Background and Procedural Hist ory The back grou nd o f this ca se is pro vided in an opinion fro m the F ourth C ircuit Court of Ap pea ls in a relat ed c rimi nal a ction , United Stat es v. Ori akhi , 57 F .3d 1 290 , 12 94, 1297 (4th Cir. 1995) . Brie fly , the content s of the two container s invol ved in this c ase we re origina lly seized i n December 199 0 by th e U nited Sta tes C usto ms Ser vice
. Id. at 1294. The
owner of the cont ents of t he c ont ai ne rs wa s later dis covered t o be Daniel Ori akhi. See id
.1 

### If a tim ely claim is filed, the adm

inistr ative for feiture processstops and t

he Attorney General is requi red to ins titute

judicial forfeitur e proceedings. 19 U.S.C.§1 603(b). H owever, if no timely claim is filed, the agency must, by default, declar e the prope

rty forfeited. 19 U.S.C. ( 1609)(a). Subject to exceptionsnot relevant here, no for

feiture action m ay be comm enced m ore than five years a

fter the underly ing alleged offense wasdiscover ed, or m ore than t wo ye ars aft

er the involveme

nt of the property in the alleged offens e was dis covered, whichever is lat er. 19 U.S. C. §1621. 3 Oriakhi was indicted and convicted in theUnited States District Court for the Dis tri ct of Maryland for conspiracy t o import heroin into the United States. Id. at 1294-95. Customs offi cial s effected forfe iture of the con tents of the tw o shipping containers pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), which provides for forfeiture of, among other things, all prop erty trace able t o an ill egal drug t ransaction. See Alli -Balogun v. United Stat es , 281 F.3d 362, 364-65 (2d Cir. 2002). The offi cial s were requi red to pr ovide publi cati on and written noticeof their intent

to forfei t the propertyto anypartyappeari ng to have an i nteres t in t he pr op er ty. 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a ) 1 . In 19 91, the gov ernm ent attem pted to send thr ee notice s to Oria khi. Oriakhi cl aims he never recei ved these not

ices and the government does not contest this clai m. Oriakhi fail ed to make a ti mely c laim on the property, and the co nt en ts of th e t wo containers were administ rati velyforfeited i n May and Au gus t of 1 991
. See 19 U. S. C. §§1603(b) & 1609 (a). [App. II 26, 32] In 1997, Oria khi w ent to the Unite d States Distri ct Court f or the Dis tri ct of New Jersey to seek compensation for t he content s of the two container s. I n Aug ust 1999, the c ourt concluded that t

he government’ s thre e att empted noti ces in 1 991 we re no t “reaso nably calcul ated” to ale rt O riak hi to the im pen din g fo rfei ture . The court s et asi de the admini strative

### 4

forfeit ure, but , rat

her than order the government to compensat e Oriakhi f or the val ue of the property, the court directed the government to initiate judicial forfei ture proceedings. Oriakhi appealedand w e aff irmed the D istrict Co urt in August 2001 in an unpubl ished percuriam decisio n. W e reaso ned th at the D istrict Co urt did n ot abu se it s discr et ion by direct ing the government

to ini tiate judic ial f

orfeit ure procee din gs rather than ordering
co m pe ns ati on fo r th e im pr op er ly fo rf eit ed pr op er ty. The government i niti ated j udicia l forfei ture pr oceedings i n D ecember2001 and moved for summ ary judgmen t in January 2002 . Oriakhi argu ed that the prop erty in the containers
was not subj ect t o forfeit ure and that the gove rnment’s new judici al for f eiture acti on was barredby the 5-y ear st atuteof limi tati ons at U.S. C.§ 162 1. Th e D is tri ct Court he ld that Oriakhi was c ol la te ra ll y es to ppe d fr om m aking the firs t argument and that the st atute of limi tati ons should be e quitabl y t olled. Oriakhi appe aled. III. Jurisdic tion and Standard of Review. The Distric t Cou rt had f edera l ques tion jurisd iction p ursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction un der 28 U .S.C. § 129 1. We exerc ise pl en ary review over a n order, gr antin g su mmary ju dgme nt , appl y in g the s ame test that th e district c ourt sh ould have applie d. Assaf v. Fields , 178 F.3d 170, 171 (3d Cir. 1999 ); Chipollini v. Spencer Gift s, I nc. , 814 F.2d 89 3, 896 (3d Cir. 1987 ) (en banc ). If we determ ine that “there is no genuine i ssue
as to any m aterial fa ct” an d that th e mo vant is e ntitled to ju dgm ent at a matte r of law , we w ill aff irm t he d istrict cou rt’s g ran t of s um ma ry judg me nt. F ed. R . Civ . P. 5 6(c ).2 

### We normally refuse t o consider

argume nts on appea

l that we re not ra ised in t he District Court, ab sent exception al circumstances. E.g., Hormel v. Helver ing , 312 U.S. 53, 557 (1941); Franki Foundation Co. v. Alger-Rau & Assoc’s, Inc. , 513 F.2d 586, (3d Cir. 1975 ). This rule is “on e of discretion rather than ju risdiction.” Selected Risks In s. Co. v. Bruno , 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d C ir. 1997) (internal quotation omitt ed). We think the ends of justice would be promoted by r eaching Oriakhi’s new argume nt. In our e arlie

r decis ion in thiscase we suggested that, due

to the com

plexity of the issues, including any

statute defense, Oria

khi should request appointment of counsel in District Court. Oriakhi m oved for appointment of counsel in the District Court imm ediately following our decision a nd renewed hi s moti on two monthslater . The District Court never ruled on these m otions, perhaps because Oriakhi filed them under the original docket

number a ssocia

ted with hi s acti on seeking c ompensa tion for the administrat

ively forfeited property , rather than under the new docket number opened when the g overnment initiated judicial fo rfeiture pro ceedings in D ecember 2001
. However, the same judge presided over both cases a nd was apprised by our ear lier decisi on of the possi

bility that Ori akhi might reques t appointm ent of counsel. Oria

hki might not have been entitled to appointme nt of counsel, see Taborn v. Grace , 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993)(decis ion to deny counsel in civil c ases r

eviewed for

abuse of discretion), bu t the District Cou rt should h ave ruled on his requests. Pro se status by

no means create s an automatic exception to the waiver rule, see United Sta tes v. Garth , 188 F. 3 d 99, 10 5-06 (3d Circ. 1999 ), but we hav e relied on this factor to relax the waiver rule in the past, see Tabor , 6 F.3d at 153 n.2, and the unusual circumstances described above make the argument for r elaxing the ru le especially compelling here . We furt her note t hat the wa

iver rule may

be rela xed where, as here , the new argumen t presents pure q uestions of law that do n ot require an d would not benefit from factual development in the district court . See Trailwa ys Lines, Inc. v. Tra ilways, Inc., Joint Council of Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO , CLC 785 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1986) ; see a

lso In re Amer

ican Biomate rials Cor

p. , 954 F. 3d 919, 927-28 ( 3d Cir. 1992) (waiver r

ule applied with “a

dded force whe

re the t imel y r aising of t

he issue would have permitted the partie s to develop a factual record”). 5 IV. Discussi on Oriakhi argued beforethe Dist rict Court that

the li mitations period found at19 U. S. C. § 162 1 barr ed th e g ove rn men t’ s j udi ci al fo rf ei tu re ac ti on. He abandon s thi s argument on appeal and now conte nds th at a dif feren t limitation s prov ision, fo und in 18 U .S.C. § 983 (e)(2 (B)(ii), bars the government’ s acti on. 2 Section 983 was adde d to Title 18 bythe Civil Asse t Forfeiture Reform A ct of 2000 (CA FRA ). This appeal presents two q uesti ons. Does CAFR A apply t o this case? If so, does the l imit ations period at § 983(e)( B)(ii ) apply ? The

### 6

an sw er s a re yes an d n o, r es pe cti ve ly. A. CA FRA Applies. First, CAFRA applies here, C AF RA applies to “any forf eiture proceedi ng commenced
on or afte r” August 23, 2000, 120 day s after CAFR A was signed int o law. Pub. L. No. 106- 185, §21 , 114 S tat. at 225 (cod ified at 8 U .S.C. §132 4 (note)); United Stat es v. One “Piper” Aztec “F” De Luxe M odel 250 PA 23 Aircraft Beari ng SerialNo. 27-7654057, 321 F. 3d 355, 257-358 (3d Cir. 20 03) . The gov ernm ent co mm ence d its jud icial for feiture action in December 2001, aft er CAFRA ’s effect ive dat e.
Oriakhi correctly contends t hat the1991 administ

rati ve forfei ture pr oceeding does not affect t he determinati on of CAFR A’s appli cabil ity . Administ rati ve forfeit

ures set as ide for inade quate not ice a re v oid
. Un ited S tates v. O ne Toshiba Co lor T elev ision , 213 F. 3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 200 0). A void judgment “i s one which, from its i ncepti on, wa s a co mp lete nu llity and without l egal effec t.” Ra ym ark Ind ustr ies, In c. v. L ai, 973 F. 2d 112 5, 1132 (3 d Cir. 1992). Relyi ng on the dat e of inception of the administ rati ve proceedi ng to dete rmine CAFRA’ s applic abili ty would improperl y gi ve some “legaleffect” to a void proce eding. Further, legislative history indicates t hat “for purposes of t

he effecti ve date pr ovisi on, the da te
on which a forf eiture p rocee ding is com men ced is th e date on which the fi rst a dminist rati ve noticeof forfeiture relat ing to the se ized p roperty i s sent. ” 146 Cong. Rec. H2040, H2051 (daily ed. April11, 2000) ( statement of Re p. Hyde). In this cas e, no c onstitu tionally ade quate noticewas ever sent , and theref ore the administ

rati ve proceedi ng never le gally “commenced”3 Section 983 c learl y di sti nguishes be tween forfei ture pr oceedings — which, by

definition, may only be initiated by the gov ernmen t — and m otions, like Oriakh i’s mo tion , to se t asid e de clara tion s of for feitu re. See 18 U.S.C. § 983 (e )(1) ( providi ng that any “pe rson e ntitled to w ritten no tice in an y nonju dicial civ il forf eitur e proceedi ng under a civi l forfei ture s tatute who does not rece ive such notice may file a motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture”) (em phases ad ded). 

### 7 at all.
The Un ited Sta tes do es no t dispu te this po int but a rgue s instea d that the re levant proceedi ng for determ ining CA FRA ’s applic abili ty is Oriakhi’s 1997 a ctionto set aside t he administ rati ve forfeiture. Th is argume nt ru ns co unter to the plain langua ge and legi slative history of the effec tive date provi sion. The eff ect iv e da te pr ovi si on s ta te s that CAFRA applie s to “any forfeiture proceedi ng commenced on or after ” August 23, 2000, 120 days after CAFRA wa s signe d in law. 8 U.S. C. §1324 (note) (emphasis added). Only the government may initiateforfeit

ure procee dings. If any thing, Oriakhi’ s motion t o recover propertyin 1997
wa s an anti- forfeit

ure procee ding. 3 Also, as noted above, legis lati ve hist ory provides tha t “for purposes of t

he effecti ve date pr ovisi on, the date o n which a forf eitur e proceedi ng is
commenc ed is the date on which t he first administrative noti ce of forfei ture relating to th e seizedproperty i s sent. ” 146 Cong. Rec. H2040, H2051 (dail y ed. April 11, 2000) (st atement of Rep. Hyd e) (e mp has es a dde d). This stateme nt indicates that the statutory term “fo rfeiture proceedi ng” refers to the go vernm ent’s action to forf eit property, not anysubsequent acti on by a cl aimant t o set as ide an admini strative f orfeit ure.4 

### The full tex t of 18 U .S.C. § 98 3(e) is as follow s:

e) Motion to set aside forfeiture.-- (1) Any person entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute who does not receive such notice may file a motion to set a side a declarat ion of forfeiture with respect to that pers on’s inter

est in the prope rty , which mot

ion sh all be gra nted if– (A) the Governm

ent knew, or

reasona bly should have known, of the moving party’s interest and failed to take reasonab le steps to prov ide such party with notic e; and (B) the moving party

did not know or have reason to know of the seizure with in su ffi cien t time t o fi le a ti mely claim. (2)(A) No twithstandin g the expiratio n of any applicab le statue of limitations, if the court grants a motion unde

r paragr aph (1), t he court shall se

t aside the declar ation of forfe

iture a s to the interes t of the m oving party

without prejudice to the ri ght of the Gover nment t o comm ence a subsequent fo rfei tu re pr oc ee di ng as to th e i nt er es t o f t he mo vi ng pa rt y. (B) Any pr

oceeding de scribed in subpara graph (A) shall be c omme nced– (i) if nonjudicia

l, within 60 day s of the ent ry of the order

granting t

he moti on; or (ii) if judicia

l, within 6 months of t

he entry of the order

granting t

he moti on. (3) A motion unde

r paragr aph (1) may

be filed not

later than 5 years a

fter the da te of fi na l p ub li ca ti on of

no ti ce of se iz ur e o f t he pr op er ty. (4) If, at the tim

e a motion made under para graph (1) is granted, the forfeited prope rty as been disposed

of by the Go vernm

ent in acc ordance with la w, the Governm

ent ma y institut e proceedings against a subs titute sum of 8 B. The Limi tation s Per iod at Su bsec ti on 983 (e) (2) (B) (i i) Does Not Apply. Oriakhi w in s th e b att le c on ce rn in g C A FR A ’s a pp lic ab ilit y, but ultimatel y l oses, the
war beca use th e limitatio ns pe riod at § 983 (3)(2)(B )(ii) does not ap ply to this ca se. Th is secti on provides tha t if the district court grants a mo tion brough t under § 983 (e)(1) to set as ide
an administrative de claration of fo rfeiture based on inade quate notice, the government mu st
com men ce a su bseq uent ju dicial fo rfeiture proc eedin g w ithin six months of the e ntryof the ordergranting the § 983(e)(1) m otion. See 18 . U.S.C. § 9 83(e)(2)(B )(ii). 4 Oriakhi argues that

### money equal to the value of the moving party ’s interest in the property a t the t ime the pr opert y was di sposed of. (5) A motion filed under t his subsection sha

ll be the exclusive rem

edy for seeking to set aside a dec laration of forfeiture under a civil forfeiture statute. 9 the government mis sed the six- mo nth deadli ne by more t han a ye ar because the order setting aside the forfeiture was entered in August 199 9 and the go vern men t waite d un til December 2001 to comm ence judicial forfei ture proceedings.
How ever, the go vern men t correc tly argues th at sub secti on 983 (e)(2) d oes n ot app ly here beca use su bsec tion 98 3(e)(1 ) wa s nev er invo ked. T he lan guag e of th e statute plainly indicates that t

he limi tati ons peri ods provide d in § 983 (e)(2)(B ) app ly only to a “subsequent forf eiture proc eedin g” de scribe d in § 983 (e)(2)(A ), and th at such a pro ceed ing is o nly authori zed if a m otion b roug ht un der § 983 (e)(1) is g ranted by the co urt. Thu s, the six -mo nth limi tati ons period at

§ 983(e)( 2)(B)(i i) does not ap ply if a § 983(e )(1) motion is never made. C lea rly, no § 983(e)( 1) motion was made in thi s case. Rather, Oriakhi fi led his motion under Fed. R. Crim. Pr o. 41(e) in 1997, t hree y ears before CAFR A was enacted. Thus, even though CAFRA applie s to this cas e for the reasons di scussed above , the six- mo nth limi tati ons peri od at § 98 3(e)(2 )(B)(ii) d oes n ot.
Ori ak hi implie s that be caus e he o btaine d the re lief au thorize d by § 9 83(e )(1), albe it before that sec tion ex isted, the limitation s perio d at § 983 (e)(2)(B )(ii) ought to appl y. Oriakhi offers neithe r argu men t nor su ppo rt for this position. The Supr eme Court has explai ned that

### 10

the plain m eanin g of a statute is con clusive “exc ept in the rare ca ses [i n which] the l iter al applic ationof a sta tute w ill produ ce a re sult dem onstra bly at odd s with the inte ntions of its dra fter .” Un ited S tates v. R on P air E nter s., 4 89 U.S. 235, 242 ( 1989) (i nternalquotati ons omitted). There is no reason to think that Congress intende d th e li m ita tio ns pe rio ds by § 98 3( e) (2 )(B ) to ap pl y to a c as e w he re § 9 83 (e )(1 ) d oe s n ot - a nd co ul d n ot - a pp ly.
IV. Conclusion
For th e reaso ns state d abo ve, w e w ill affirm the jud gm ent of the D istrict Co urt.