UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ANTONE LAMANDINGO KNOX, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. TOMMY SHARP, Interim Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 20-7005 (D.C. No. 6:19-CV -00096-RAW-KEW) (E.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , BACHARACH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Antone Knox, an Oklahoma prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s orde r denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. For the reasons explained below, we deny his request and dismiss this

matter. Knox has been an inmate in the Oklahoma prison system since 2002. He asserts that in that time, he has periodical ly applied for and been denied parole. In February 2019, he filed a § 2241 petition in the Western District of Oklahoma.

* This order is not binding precedent, ex cept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collatera l estoppel. But it may be cite d for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 We liberally construe Knox’s pro se filings. But we neither act as his advocate nor excuse his failure to follow procedural rules. See Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 16, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 Construed liberally, Knox’s petition claimed that (1) the parole board violated his First Amendment rights, including his right to access the courts, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by refusing to provide him with the record of his parole denials and transcripts, (2) the retr oactive application of Oklahoma’s Truth in Sentencing Act and other paro le procedures to his sent ence violated the Ex Post Facto clause, and (3) he was wrongfully denied parole in violation of his due-process rights. Shortly after Knox filed his petition, a ma gistrate judge in th e Western District of Oklahoma recommended that the district court transf er Knox’s petition to the Eastern District of Oklahoma because § 2241 petitions “must be filed in the district where the prisoner is confin ed” and Knox is confined in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Bradshaw v. Story , 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996). Over Knox’s objections, the district cour t transferred the case. The respondent then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Knox failed to state a claim and, alternativ ely, that Knox impermissibl y split his claims by raising substantially similar issues in two previous habeas pe titions. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing that Knox failed to state a claim. Specifically, the district court noted that Knox’s “petition is difficult to read and understand” and determined that Knox had “presented no arguments, authorities, or specifics showing how he is in custody in vi olation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States” or “how his sentence is being executed in an unconstitutional manner.” R. 85–86. The distri ct court also concluded that a request3 for “parole records is not appropriate in a habeas petition” a nd that, regardless, respondent “is not the cust odian of those records.” Id. at 86. Finally, th e district court denied Knox a COA. Knox now asks us to issue a COA so he can appeal the district court’s order. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Montez v. McKinna , 208 F.3d 862, 869 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying § 2253(c)(1)(A)’s COA re quirement to § 2241 petitions). As the district court determined th at Knox’s petition stated no constitutional claims, we may grant a COA only if Knox “demonstrate[s] that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of [his] c onstitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In attempting to make such a demonstrati on, Knox first argues that the district court incorrectly concluded that the respon dent need not provide his parole records because the respondent is not the custodian of those records. He notes that “the proper respondent in a habeas petition is the petitioner’s custodian” and explains that he “ha[d] no choice [but] to name th e warden.” Aplt. Br . 6 (first quoting Harris v. Champion , 51 F.3d 901, 906 (10th Cir. 1995), superseded on other grounds by

statute , Fed. Courts Improvement Act of 199 6, Pub. L. No. 1 04-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996)). Knox also contends that the re spondent’s attorney had the “authority” and “power to obtain” his records. Id. at 4. But even if thes e statements are true, Knox does not address the district court’s reason for denying his records-request claim: that a § 2241 petition is not an appropriate mechanism to request documents because “[h]abeas corpus review is available under § 2241 if one is ‘in custody in violation of4 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States’” and a denial of a records request, even if improper, doe s not meet that standard. McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting § 2241(c)(3)). Thus, we decline to issue Knox a COA on this basis. Knox next reasserts his c ontention that he has been illegally denied parole, impliedly arguing that reasonable jurist s could debate the district court’s determination on this constitutional claim b ecause the district court ignored this argument. It is true, as K nox points out, that “a state parole statute can create a liberty interest when the statute’s language and struct ure sufficien tly limits the discretion of a parole board.” Boutwell v. Keating , 399 F.3d 1203, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005). But even if we were to assume that the Oklahoma parole statute creates a liberty interest, Knox did not explain to the district court and doe s not explain to us how any of his parole deni als violate his due-process ri ghts with respect to that liberty interest. For example, he states that he is illega lly being held in a supermax prison, which he explains im pacts his eligibility for paro le, but he does not explain how his placement in a s upermax prison is illegal. 2 We therefore d ecline to issue a COA on this basis.

2 In a similar vein, Knox argues due pr ocess requires paro le authorities to “fu[r]nish to the prisoner a st atement of its reasons for deni al of parole.” Aplt. Br. 15 (quoting Vann v. Angelone , 73 F.3d 519, 522 (4th Cir. 1996)). But in doing so, Knox relies on a case interpreting the Virginia parole statut e. We have found no similar requirement in Oklahoma law requiring the parole board to give reasons for its decisions.5 Knox further argues that we should grant him a COA because of misconduct and procedural irregularities that occurred in the district court. For example, Knox alleged that the district court was biased and that the district-c ourt judge should have recused himself. But his accusations are not hing more than bare conclusions, and he fails to detail any of the c onduct underlying his allegations . Knox also contends that the district court should have granted him discovery and a hearing. But these contentions amount to further requests for hi s parole records. A nd, as noted above, a § 2241 petition is not an appropriate vehicle for requesting records. Accordingly, reasonable jurists could not “find the district court’s assessment of [Knox’s] constitutional cl aims debatable or wrong.” Slack , 529 U.S. at 484. We therefore deny Knox’s request for a COA and dismiss this matter.

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge