1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 96-30583.

TRICO MARINE OPERATORS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FALCON DRILLING COMPANY, Defendant,

Falrig Offshore Limited, Defendant-Appellant,

Falrig 18, Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit, Movant-Appellant.

June 30, 1997.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Louisiana.

Before W. EUGENE DAVIS, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the question of whether the appellee is

entitled to a maritime lien for its supply boat services it

provided to an offshore drilling vessel. We agree with the

district court that appellee is entitled to a lien. We therefore

affirm.

I.

In October 1992, Century Offshore Management Corporation

(Century) entered into a "Daywork Drilling Contract" (Contract)

with Falcon Drilling Company (Falcon) which provided in par t for

Century's use of the drilling vessel, FALRIG 18. The FALRIG 18 was

owned by Falrig Offshore Limited (Falrig) and operated by Falcon.

The contract, in addition to providing for Century's use of the

FALRIG 18, included passages defining the responsibilities of the

two parties while the vessel was engaged in prospecting for oil in2

the Gulf of Mexico. Century agreed to pay Falcon $15,000 per day

for the use of the vessel with crew. Century personnel, however,

provided gener al supervision to the crew, such as directing the

vessel where to prospect for oil. The contract also delineated the

necessary equipment and supplies each party was obliged to provide

for the operation of the vessel. For example, Century was required

to provide drinking water for the crew, fuel for the drilling

vessel, and the materials essential for drilling operations such as

pipe casing and drilling fluids. Century was also required to

provide vessels to transport the equipment and supplies to the

FALRIG 18 in the Gulf of Mexico.

Century contracted with appellee Trico Marine Operators Inc.

(Trico) to furnish supply boats to transport supplies and equipment

to the FALR IG 18 while she was drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.

Trico provided either the M/V JAMES RIVER or the M/V BIG HORN RIVER

under a time charter to Century to perform these services. These

vessels transported equipment and supplies to sustain the crew of

the FALRIG 18 and support the vessels's drilling activities. Trico

billed Century for the service of the JAMES RIVER and BIG HORN

RIVER. Century owed Trico for these services when Century filed a

Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. In addition to asserting a claim

in Century's bankruptcy proceeding, Trico asserted an in rem claim

against the FALRIG 18. Falcon challenged Trico's right to a

maritime lien on the vessel. The district court overruled Falcon's

objection and recognized Trico's maritime lien. This appeal

followed.3 II.

A.

Under t he Maritime Lien Act (the "Act"), a person providing

necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person

authorized by the owner ( l ) has a maritime lien on the vessel;

(2) may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the lien; and (3)

is not required to allege or prove that credit was given to the

vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a)(Supp.1997). The Act also provides

that in addition to the vessel owner, the master or the person

entrusted with the management of the vessel at the port of supply,

an officer or agent appointed by the owner or a "charterer" of a

vessel is presumed to have authority to procure necessaries for the

vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 31341 (Supp.1997).

In order to determine whether Trico is entitled to a maritime

lien for its supply boat services that it provide d to the FALRIG

18, we must resolve two questions : ( l ) whether Century was

authorized by the owner of the FALRIG 18 to engage the services of

Trico's supply vessels; and, (2) if so, whether the services Trico

provided were "necessaries" within the meaning of the Act.

B.

As indicated above, the Act provides that a "charterer" is

presumed to have authority to procure necessaries for a vessel. We

first consider th erefore whether Century is a "charterer" of the

FALRIG 18 within the meaning of the Act.

The Act does not define "charterer." This court, however,

has described a charter as "an arrangement where one person (the1 Walker v. Braus, 995 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir.1993).

4 "charterer') becomes entitled to the use of the whole of a vessel

belonging to another (the "owner')." 1 Our definition is consistent

with that of the leading commentators. See e.g., Thomas J.

Schoenbaum, Adm iralty & Maritime Law § 11-1 at 169 (2d

Ed.1994)(defining a charter pa rty as a "specialized form of

contract for the hire of an entire ship.... The Party that obtains

the use and ser v ice of the ship is called the charterer or

shipper...."); Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, T he Law of

Admiralty

§ 4-1 (2d ed.1975)(defining charter as the "document in

which are set forth the arrangements and contractual engagements

entered into when one person ("the charterer') takes over the use

of the whole of a ship belonging to another (the "owner')"). Based

in part on these definitions of charter, the district court

concluded that Century was a charterer of the FALRIG 18 and

therefore had presumed authority to procure necessaries from Trico

for the vessel. We agree.

Under the terms of the Contract, Falrig, through Falcon,

provided the drilling vessel FALRIG 18 together with the crew and

equipment to Century at an operating rate of $15,000 per day.

Falcon agreed to furnish the rig for the drilling of one well and

granted an option to Century for the use of the rig for drilling an

additional well. In F ontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207

(5th Cir.1986), we characterized a similar contract for the use of

a drilling vessel as a "charter agreement for a vessel" and

described the parties to that agreement as rig owner and rig2 No language in the contract purports to preclude Century from

incurring a lien.

5 charterer. I d. at 1209, 1214. See also L ewis v. Keyes 3 03, 834

F.Supp. 191, 195 (S.D.Tex.199 3)(holding that a "Daywork Drilling

Contract" was an charter agreement because it provided that Union

Oil would have use of a drilling vessel belonging to another,

Marine Drilling Company).

Falrig argue s that Century cannot be characterized as a

"charterer" for p urposes of the Act because Falcon's arrangement

with Century is neither a time, voyage, nor bareboat charter. We

do not address the merits of this argument, however, because the

Act attaches no significance to t he specific type of charter

agreement entered into by the parties. As indicated above, the Act

simply provides that a "charterer" is presumed to have authority to

procure necessaries for the vessel. Century, by contracting to use

a vessel, FALRIG 18, belonging to another, satisfies the definition

of a charterer; as a result, Century is presumed under the Act to

have authority to procure necessaries for the FALRIG 18. 2

C.

We turn now to the que stion of whether the supply boat

services provided by Trico were "necess aries" under the Act. As

stated above, those supplies included drinking water and food for

the crew as well as drilling equipment and supplies to support the

drilling activities conducted by the vessel. The Act gives an

illustrative list of goods and services that are necessaries,

including "repairs, supplies, towage,

... or any other necessaries,6

to any vessel ...." 46 U.S.C. § 31301(4). In E quilease v. M/V

SAMPSON, 793 F.2d 598, 603 (5th Cir.1986)(en banc), this court

explained that necessaries include "most goods or services that are

use ful to the vessel, keep her out of danger and enable her to

perform her particular function." I d. See e.g., Farrell Ocean

Services, Inc. v. U.S., 681 F.2d 91, 93 (1st Cir.1982)(holding that

Carriage of o ne vessel by another is a necessary); P ort Ship

Service, Inc. v. Int'l Ship Management & Agencies Ser vice, Inc.,

800 F.2d 1418, 1421 (5th Cir.1986)(holding that water taxi services

give rise to a lien).

We agree with the district court that Trico's services of

transporting the supplies and eq uipment which were essential to

sustain t he crew and operations aboard the FALRIG 18 were

necessaries. See E quilease, 793 F.2d at 60 4(stating that since

"insurance is essential to keep a vessel in commerce, insurance is

a "necessary' " under the Act).

III.

In sum, we conclude that Century was a charterer of the FALRIG

18 and thus had presumed authority under the Maritime Lien Act to

procure necessaries for the vessel. We also conclude that Trico's

supply boat services were necessaries under the Act. We therefore

hold that Trico is entitled to a lien on the FALRIG 18 for these

services under 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a)(1) of the Maritime Lien Act.

The district court's order is accordingly affirmed.

AFFIRMED.