1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0572n.06 F iled: August 9, 2007 No. 06-6150 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA P laintif f-App ellee,

v. CHRISTOPHER STO NE, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) O N A P P E A L F R O M T H E U N I T ED STA TES DI STR IC T C OU RT F OR THE WE S TE RN D IS TR IC T OF KENT UCKY

Be for e : K

EN NE DY , G IBBO NS, and M c KEA G UE , C ir c uitJudg e s. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge. Def endant- appel l an t Christopher Stone

c ha lle ng e s th e se nte nc e of 24 0 mo nth s im

pr iso nme nt i mpo se d b y

the dis tr ic t co urt fo llo wi nghis convictions for a violation of the Racke teer I nfluenc ed and Corr upt Org anizations Act (“RI CO”) a nd

c on sp ir a c y

to v iol a te RI CO . St on e argue s th a t th e se nte nc e imp os e d b y the dist ri c t c ourt

wa s b oth proce durally

and substantively

unrea sonable. We find no def ect in the d i s trict court’ s decision, howeve r, and a ffirm. I. On May 22 , 2 00 2, a g ra

nd jur y iss ue d a ten -c ount i nd ic tme nt c ha rg ingSto ne , amon g oth e rs , with (1) a RI CO violation and (2) e ng ag ing in a conspirac y

t o v i o l at e R I CO. Count One of the indictment char g ed Stone, Will iam Anthony J ohnson, and David Dabne y , Sr., with a viol ation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Count Two of the indictment c harg ed S tone, J ohnson, and Da bney with conspiring2

to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) in violation of § 1962(d). T he re maining c ounts alleg ed additional criminal conduct by J ohnson and Dabne y in violation of various fede ral statutes. Count One f urther alleg ed Stone’s involvement in four pr edicate ac ts of rac ketee ring activity : two separ ate a cts of ar son,

one ac t of mail fra

ud related to one of the acts of ar son, and one a ct of murde r re lated to Stone’s

a lle g e d invo lve me nt i n th e mur de r o f S he r B olt e r– on e of his c o- c on sp ir a tor s. I n o rd er to su pp or t a conviction under

§ 1962(c) , the g overnme nt had the burde n of proving , among other thi ng s, that Stone

was criminally responsible for at least two of these predic ate acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (def ining a “pattern of r acke teer ing a ctivity ” as two or more a cts of ra ckete ering ). Following a j u ry t ri al , S tone was c onvicted on both counts and se ntence d to 240 months imp ri so nme nt. Da

bn e y e nte re d a ple a of g uil ty to a ll c ha rg e s a g a ins t hi m, a greed t o c oo pe rate wi th the g ov e rnme nt, and

wa s se nte nc e d to fi ft

y -f ive mon ths imp ri so nme nt. John so n w a s tr ie d s e pa rate ly

and c on vic te d o n mu lti ple c ounts , in c lud ingCounts On e and Tw o. John so n wa s se nte nc e d to lif e in prison on both the RI CO and RI CO conspirac y counts. Stone and Johns on appea led, and a panel of this court aff

irmed their c onvictions but vacate d Stone’ s s en t en ce and re manded his ca se for

rese ntencing in light of United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). United States v. Johnson , 440 F.3d 832 ( 6th Cir. 2006). At t h e re s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt fi rs td et er m i n edt h e ap p ro p ri at e gu i d el i n es ra n ge

a pp lic a ble to S ton e . B e c a

us e th e ju ry in Sto ne ’s c a se re tur ne d o nly a g e ne ra l ve rd ic t of

g uil ty a s to bo th c ha rg e s, it i s n ot c le ar w he the r the jur y fo un d Ston e ’s inv olv e me nt i n e a c h o f t he fo ur pr e dic a te acts c harg ed in Count One beyond a re asonable doubt. The district cour t ag ree d with Stone that the Rule of L enity

mandated r esolving this ambig uity in Stone’s favor

. Thus, the di strict court a ssumed the jury found him r esponsible for the two le ast serious of the four pr edicate ac ts: one act of a rson andT h i s fi n ding is sig nificant be cause , under RI CO, the maxi mum sentence that may be 1 imposed is twenty y ear s unless the j ury finds that a defenda nt committed a predicate act that carr ies the pos sibili ty

of a life sentenc e. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)

. I n such a case , the maxi mum pe nalty for a RI CO violation is life imprisonment. Id. One of the pre dicate a cts with which Stone was c harg ed, murder in violation of Ky . Rev. Stat. § 507.020, is a capital offe nse for which life imprisonment may be imposed upon convic tion. See id. §§ 507.020(2), 532.030(1). I t is not clea

r why the district court, in ca lculating the base offe nse leve l, did not consider 2 the mur de r w ithwh ic h the ind ic tme nt ch arg e d Ston e . App lyingU. S.S. G. § 2 A1 .1 (a ), Sto ne ’s ba se offe nse leve l would have be en for ty -three , and his rec ommended rang e would have been well above the statutory

maxi mum . However, the pa rties do not challeng e the district cour t’s g uidelines calc ulation on appea l, and bec ause the district court imposed the statutory maxi mum, the question of whe ther the district c ourt should have r elied upon a hig her guidelines rang e is irre levant to the dis po sit ion

of thi s a pp e a l. The district cour

t applied this enhanc ement af ter c oncluding that Stone was involved in the 3 murder of Bolter –one of the four predic ate acts char g ed in Count One–for the purpose of

preve nting his further co o p er ation with the g overnme nt’s investigation into t he RI CO activities of Stone and his associates. 3 one ac t of mail fra

ud. The g overnme nt has raise d no objection to the district c ourt’s decision. The 1 dis tr ic t c ourt , a

pp lyingU. S.S. G. §§ 2E 1. 1( a )( 2) , 2 K1 .4 (a )( 1) , c on c lude d th a t Sto ne ’s ba se of fe ns e 2 level wa s twenty -four

and adde d two points pursuant to U.S.S .G. § 3C1.1 based on obstruction of justice. Stone’s criminal history place d him in Categ ory VI

. Given the prec eding , t h e a d v i s o ry

3 sentenc ing r ang e for

Stone’s RI CO and RI CO conspirac y convictions wa s 120-150 months inc arc e ratio n. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt , a ft e r r e vie wi ngthe se nte nc ingfa c tors con tai ned in 1 8 U .S. C. § 3553(a) , exercised its discre tion to is sue a non- g uidelines sentenc e of 240 months incarc eration–the statutory maxi mum and the identical se ntence imposed initi ally . Stone timely appea led. II. Sto ne c ha lle ng e s th e se nte nc e imp os e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

on the grou

nd that it is

un re a so na

ble . Po st- Booke r , the discre tion of a district court in handingdown a se ntence has bee n enhanc ed, and a

sentenc e will be upheld on appea l if that sentenc e is “re asonable .” United States v.4

Jack son , 408 F.3d 301, 304 (6th Cir. 2005). This rea sonablene ss inquiry has both a proc edura l and a substantive compone nt. See U n i t ed S t a t es v. W

ebb , 403 F.3d 373, 383 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Stone al l ege s both procedur al and substantive unr easona bleness, and w e addr ess ea ch inquiry in turn, beg inning with Stone’s proc edura l rea sonablene ss challeng e. A. Th e pr oc e dura l r e a so na

ble ne ss r e qu ir e me nt s e e ks to e ns ur e that a se nte nc ing c ourt e xpla ins its

rea soning to a

sufficie nt deg ree to allow for r easona ble appe llate re view. Jack son , 408 F.3d at 305. Although district c ourts are no longe r bound by the s entenc ing rang es contained in the g uidelines, a district court must, in imposing sentenc e, consider the applica ble g uidelines rang e as one of a numbe r of fac tors enumer ated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

. Id. at 304. The court need not expli citly consider e ach of the § 3553(a ) fa ct o rs ; a s entenc e is proce durally rea sonable if the r ecor d demonstrates that the sentenc ing c ourt addre ssed the re levant fa ctors in re achingits conclusion. See U nited States v. M c B ride , 4 3 4 F

. 3 d

4 7 0 , 4 7 6 n . 3 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g W ebb , 403 F.3d at 383-85). More over, satisfac tion o f t h e procedura l rea sonablene ss require ment does not depe nd on a district cour t’s eng ag ing in a

rote listing or

some other r itualisti c inca ntation of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors. See U nited States v. Collington , 46 1 F .3 d 80 5, 80 9 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; see also United States v . W illiams , 436 F.3d 706, 708-09 (6th Cir. 2006). I n arguing that his sentenc e is proce durally unrea sonable, Stone conte nds that the district court failed to c onsider all of the fac tors outlined in 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a) . Stone’s argument is unpersuasive. A rev i ew o f t h e sentenc ing tr anscr ipt revea ls the district court’s thoug htful review of the e vidence befor e it and thoroug h considera tion of all the rele vant sentenc ing fac tors. I n sentenc ing Stone to the maxi mum term authorized by statu t e an d outside the advisory g uidelines rang e, the district cour tSection 3553(a) (2)( D) dire cts the sentenc ing a uthority to c onsider the need “to provide the 4 def e n d an t w it

h n e e d e d e d u c a ti o n a l o r

v o c a ti o n a l t

r a in in g , me d ic a l c ar e , o r o th e r c o r rec tional treatment in the most effec tive manner .” 5 e xpre sse d it s bel ie f that the se nte nc e wa s nec e ssa ry in lig ht of the se ri ou s n a tur e of the c ha rg e s a g a ins t Stone, Stone’s ext ensive c riminal history , and the compelling evidenc e of his involvement in serious

cr i m es s u ch as a

rson, burg lary , and the intentional murde r of a co-c onspirator. See 18 U. S.C. § 3553(a) (1) (re lating to the “natur e and circ umstances” of the offe nse and the “history and char acte ristics” of the de fenda nt). The district c ourt also observe d that the abse nce of any expression of contrition on Stone’s par t coupled with his extensive and eg reg ious criminal conduct ne cessitated a sente nce g reater than that rec ommended by the g uidelines in order

to (1) r efle ct the ser iousness of his of fe ns e , ( 2) de te r f

utu re c ri min a l c on du c t, ( 3) pr omo te r esp ect fo r t he la w, (4 ) p ro vid e jus t punishment, and (5) pr otect the public f rom future criminal ac tivity

. See § 3553(a) (2)( A)-( C). Whil e the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t e xplic itl y

re fe re nc e e a c h o f t

he § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s, the re c or d is sufficie nt to a llow for mea ningf ul appellate r eview. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . D av is , 4 58 F .3 d 5 05 , 5 10 (6 th Cir . 200 6) (“ [Pro c e dura l re a so na ble ne ss re vie w] re qu ir e s ask ing wh e the r the dis tr ic t c ourt a de qu a te ly

c on sid e re d a

nd e xpre sse d its a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he re le va nt f a c tor s li ste d in

18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ) t o p e rm it meaning ful appe llate re view.”) (interna l quotation marks omi tted). The recor d in this case indicate s the district court’s c onsideration of the rele vant sentenc ing f actor s, a n d th e d is tric t c o u

r t c ommunicated a cle ar r ationale f

or its sentence

. Al tho ug h St on e c on c e de s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt c on sid e re d a

numbe r o f t

he § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s, he ar g u es t h at t he district cour t’s failure to make a spe cific r efe renc e to § 3553(a )(2) (D) a nd § 3 55 3( a )( 6) re nd e rs his se nte nc e pr oc e dura lly unre a so na

ble . H is a

rgume nt i s unava ili ng . As t o § 3553(a) (2)( D), Stone fails to demonstrate how t h i s fac tor was r eleva nt to his particular sente nce. 46

Both in his briefingand at or al ar g ument, Stone has neg lected to of fer any argument as to the re levanc e of this sentencingfac tor. He d o es n o t p oint to any evidenc e re g ardinghis indivi dual nee d for educational, vocational, or me dical ser vices that should have impacted the district court’s se ntencing decision. I t appea

rs Stone seeks to re quire the district c ourt to follow a par ticular scr ipt in im posing

a se nte nc e , r e c iti nge a c h f

a c tor by ro te . S uc h a

n a pp ro a c h h a s b e e n r e

je c te d b y thi s c ourt . B e c a

us e S tone of fe rs no thi ngin t

he wa y of argume nt t o e xpla in h owthi s f a c tor wa s re le v an t to his case , the district court committed no err or in failing to refe renc e it specific ally

. Wit h respe ct to subsection (a )(6) , Stone also has not demonstrated that the district court er red in f a ili ngto r e fe re nc e the “ ne e d to a vo id u nw arr ante d s e nte nc e dis pa ri tie s amon g de fe nd ants wi th simil ar r ecor ds who have been found g uilty of si milar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) . I n his brief, Stone makes a pa ssing r efe renc e to the fa ct that seve ral of his c o-conspirators rec eived se ntence s that differ ed in leng th f

rom his ow n. Stone first directs the c ourt’s attention to J ohnson, who rec eived a life sentenc e re sulting fr om the jury ’s finding that he wa s involved in the murder of Bolter . Stone

rec eived a

signific antly

lighter sentenc e, despite the fac t that the di strict court was convince d that he was also implicated i n this killing, because the Rule of L enity prec luded the district cour t from finding that the jury held him criminally responsible for

this act. S t o n e next notes that Dabney rec eived a sentenc e of only

fifty -five months, but as the g overnme n t o b s er ves in its brief, Da bney was not implicated in the murder

of B olter, ag ree d to plead g uilty to the charg es aga inst him, and coope rate d with the g overnme nt by

testify ing a gai n s t S t o n e and Johnson. As a result of his cooper ation, the g overnme nt filed and the district c ourt g rante d a motion pursua nt to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a downwa

rd depar ture. F inally , Stone c orre ctly observe s that Curtis Ha rdin, one of his c o-conspirators, was ne ver7

prosec uted for his involvement in the c rimin al en t erp ri se. Howe ver, H ardin’s c ooperation with the authorities re sulted his rece iving a g rant of immunity

from prose cution. Whil e Stone has identified a number of se ntencingdisparities, ea ch ca n be explained. Subsection (a) (6) is conce rned w ith unwarranted sentenc ing disparities, and the r ecor d reve als that the disparities identified by

Stone a re f ully justified. Although the district c ourt did not refe r to subsection (a )( 6) dir e c tly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt e xpla ine d it s r e a so ns fo r d e viatin g fr om t he g uid e lin e s. I mpl ic it in it s dis c us sio n is a re c og nit ion of the ne e d to se nte nc e Sto ne in a wa y that r efl ect s h is individual

c ha ra c te ri sti c s and to a vo id dis pa ri tie s that wo uld

be un fa ir or un jus tif ie d. Sto ne c ann ot s uc c e ssf ull y argue that the district c ourt’s failure to a ddress these spec ific disparities or r efe r to subsection (a )(6) by name wa s err oneous. Be cause the district court c lear ly communicated the rea soning unde rpinning its decision and bec ause Stone ha s pointed to no releva nt evidence that the district c ourt should have considere d but did not, the sentenc e is proce durally rea sonable. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . D e

x ta , 470 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2006). B. We next addre ss Stone’s claim that a sente nce of 240 months is substantively unrea sonable. The lawof this circuit dra ws a distinction betwee n sentenc es that ar e within the re commended g u id e li n e s r an g e an d th o s e o u ts id e o f th a t r an g e . Wh e n e v e r a d is tr ic t c o u rt im p o s e s a s e n te n c e that falls within the applicable g uidelines rang e, that sente nce is tre ated with a pres u m p t i o n of

rea sonablene ss; however , the fa ct that the district cour t e lects to se ntence outside of the re commended g uid el i n es range does not rende r the sente nce pr esumptively unrea sonable. See U

nited States v. Hu se in , 478 F.3d 318, 332 ( 6th Cir. 2007). I n evaluating the substantive r easona bleness of a

sentenc e falling outside the rec ommended ra ng e, this circuit has a dopted the conc ept of propor tionality revie w:8

“whe n the district court indepe ndently chooses to deviate from the advisory g uidelines rang e (w hether

a bo ve or be low it) , w e a pp ly a fo rm of pr op or tio na lity re vie w: ‘t

he fa rt he r the jud g e ’s se nte nc e de pa rt s from the guidelines sentenc e . . . the more compelling the justification based on f actor s in section 3553(a) ’ must be.” Un ite d Stat es v. D av is , 4 5 8 F. 3 d 4 9 1 , 4 9 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. De an , 414 F .3 d 7 25 , 7 29 (7 th C ir . 2 00 5) ) ( e lli ps is i n o ri g ina l) ; see also U nited States v. Borho , 485 F.3d 904, 908 ( 6th Cir. 2007). I n it s d e c isi on

to g o a bo ve the g uid e lin e s ra

ng e and se nte nc e Sto ne to t he ma ximumpe na lty allowable unde r the statute, the district c ourt relied on a number of f

actor s: (1) Stone’s extensive criminal history spanning some thirty y ear s; ( 2) evidenc e of Stone’s involveme nt in increa singly more serious cr iminal activity ; (3) the da ng erous c hara cter

of Stone’s cr iminal activity that g ave r ise to the instant indictment: namely , arson a nd murder; ( 4) S tone’s complicity in the murder of Bolter ; (5) the

a bs e nc e of any a pp are nt r e mor se on

Sto ne ’s pa

rt ; (6 ) the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s se ns e that c ri me ha d b e c ome

a wa y of lif e fo r S ton e ; and

(7 ) t he c on se qu e nt n e e d f

or g re a te r p un ish me nt t o d e te r S ton e and to protec t the public from future criminal conduc t on his part. Acc ording to t h e district court, the g uidelines rec ommendation was insuffic ient in two specific r esp ec t s . First, the Criminal History Categ ory o f VI , the maxim um under the guidelines, failed a dequate ly to refle ct the ser iousness of Stone’s prio r cr i m i n al conduct. Second, thoug h the g uidelines rang e included a two-point enhanc ement for

obstruction of justice under U.S

. S .G. § 3C1.1, the deg ree of the e nhance ment was insuffici en t t o ref

lect the e g reg ious nature of the obstructive c onduct g iving r ise to that enhanc ement–that is, Stone’s involvement in the murder of B olter. Whil e Sto ne do e s n ot t a ke iss ue wi th t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s r e g ard ingthe re le va nt f a c tor s, h e ne v er t h el es s ar gu es t h at t h e s en t en ce i mp o s edi s s u b s t an t i v el y

u n re as o n ab l e. C i t i n g Da v is , Stone9

asser ts that the district court’s chosen sentenc e, a sixty perc ent var iance from the top end of the g uidelines rang e, wa s b o t h disproportionate a nd unrea sonable. Unde r propor tionality revie w, the qu e s ti o nth is c o u rt m

u s t a n s w e r is w h e th e r

th e d is tr ic t c o u rt h a s id e n ti f ie d s u f f ic ie n tl y c ompelling circ umstances to justify

the s ubstantial deg ree of its varianc e fr om the g uidelines rec ommendation. Whil e the district c ourt’s decision to sentence Stone to the statutory maxi mum constitut ed a substantial varianc e fr om the top end of the r ang e re commended by the g uidelines, the di strict court’s weig hing of

the re levant fa ctors wa s not unreasona ble. The district c o u rt we i gh ed the r eleva nt evidenc e and ma de a considere d judgme nt that the puni shment rec ommended by the g uidelines was inadequate in this case. There is no question that the district court appropriately considere d Stone’s leng thy and extensive criminal history . I n fac t, the g uidelines themselves c ontemplate an upw ard de parture when the s e n te n c in g c o urt d e te r mi n e s th a t “ r e li a

b le in f o r mati o nin d ic a te s th a t t

h e d e f e n d an t’ s c riminal history cate g ory substantially under- repr esents the se riousness of the de fenda nt’s criminal history

or the lik e lih oo d th a t th e de fe nd ant w ill c omm it o the r cr ime s . . . .” U. S.S. G. § 4 A1 .3 (a )( 1) . In c on tr a st to the sentenc ing c ourt in Da v is , the district c ourt in this case e x erc ised its discretion to vary from the g uidelines rec ommendation based at least in pa rt on a consideration that the SentencingCommi ssion has re cog nized as a prope r g round for depar ture. See Da v is , 458 F.3d at 498 (noting the district court’s partial relianc e on the defe ndant’s ag e in g ranting an extraordinary varia nce from the bottom end of the g uidelines eve n though ag e is not g ener ally considere d a re levant fa ctor for purposes of g ranting

a do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e un de r t

he g uid e lin e s)

. Th e me re fa c t tha t the g uid e lin e s con te mpl a te e xac tly the s ort of action taken by the di strict court does not make its dec ision per se rea sonable, but this fac t does indicate that the district court’s r easoningfalls in line with near ly t we nty y ear s of “c are fulStone’s case stands in stark contra st with our rec ent dec ision in Un ite d Sta tes v. Poy nte r, 5 wher e we reve rsed the district co u rt’s dec ision to sentence the de fenda nt to 720 months , vary

ing from a g uidelines rec ommendation of 188-235 months. United St ates v. Poy nter , N o. 05 -6 50 8, sli p op. at 1-2 ( 6 t h C i r. J u l y 27, 2007). In reve rsing the district court, we noted the abse nce of any meaning ful distinction between the de fenda nt and other repeat sex offe nders that would support the 10 consideration of t he proper sentence f or fe dera l offense s.” United States v. Buc hanan , 449 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J ., concur ring ) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). Alt h o u gh much of Sto ne ’s pr ior

c ri min a l c on du c t a

pp e ars to h a ve be e n n on vio le nt, Sto ne ha s mana g e d to fi nd him se lf on the opposite side of the la w repeate dly over the past thirty y ear s. The district cour t’s descr iption of Stone’s being“involved in cr iminal activity as a w ay of life” is apt. The dist ri ct court also considered the testimony it heard implicating Stone in the murder of Bolter and expressed the belief that the guidelines rang e did not adequately addre ss the seriousness of this conduct and the need to e nsure that Stone w ill be deter red from such be havior in the futur e. Stone has maintained throug hout that the Rule of L enity prec ludes the district court f rom conc luding that the jur yfo un d h im guil ty

of c omm itt ingthi s murd e r, and the dis tr ic t c ourt

a pp are ntly a c c e pte d th is pr op os iti on . H ow e ve r, Sto ne ha s not ch a lle ng e d the dis tr ic t cou rt ’s re lia nc e on its own independe nt fi nd ingthat Sto ne wa s invo lve d in B olt e r’ s murd e r i n a pp lyingthe ob str

uc tio n o f j us tic e e nh anc e me nt, its we i gh ing of

the § 3553(a ) fa ctors, and its ultimate dec ision to vary from the guidelines

r e c o mm e n d a ti on. S

ee Un i t ed States v. G ates , 461 F.3d 703, 708 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (re aff irming the propriety of judicial fa ctfinding based on the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standa rd for sentenc ing)

. Stone’s involvement in the murder of a co-c onspirator sets him a part from other individuals who mig ht be convic ted of s imilar conduct a nd subject to a similar g uidelines rec ommendation. Stone has demonstrated a

continued unwillingne ss to conform his behavior to the require ments of the lawand a willingne ss to sacrific e anothe r’s life in or der to avoid cri m i n al prosecution. Given the district 5district c ourt’s decision to va ry more than 200% from the top e nd of the g uidelines rang e. Id. at 5-6. Moreove r, the district court in Po y nte r failed to ex plain why the par ticular fa cts and c ircumstance s of that ca se wa

rra nted such a

wide var iance –a var iance t h at would have le ft no room in the sentenc ing r ang e ava ilable by statute to acc ommodate more se rious offe nders. Se e id . I n this case, the district court we nt to gr eat leng ths to explain why it be lieved that the g uidelines rec ommendation was inade quate a

nd why the par ticular fa cts of Stone’s ca se wa rra n t ed i m p o s i tion of the statutory maxi mum. Stone’s involvement in a mur der c erta inly place s him in t hat class of RI CO offe nders for whom g reater punishment is warr anted, a nd we f ind no difficulty

with the district court’s d ecision that the statutory

maxi mum was an a

ppropriate sentenc e in this case.

11 court’s f urther obse rvation that Stone rema ins unrepe ntant, these a g g ravating f actor s fully

justify the district court’s decision to issue a non-guidelines sentenc e. When viewe d in its entirety , the district court’s § 3553( a) a

naly sis provides ample support for both its decision to var

y from the guidelines and for the de g ree of its chosen va rianc e. Thus, the sentenc e of 240 months is s ubstantively rea sonable. III

. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m.