1

 The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-2896

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William Eugene Webb, * 

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

William Hedrick, et al., *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

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Submitted: September 20, 2010

Filed: November 5, 2010

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Before GRUENDER, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Federal inmate William Eugene Webb appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant

of summary judgment on his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Upon de novo review,

Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High Sch., 618 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2010), we affirm.

Webb seeks damages from multiple employees at United States Medical Center

for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri (“MCFP-Springfield”): security officer
2

 Webb made additional claims in his complaint, but he pursues only these four

on appeal.

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Jeff Sims; unit-team manager Scott Klinzing; unit-team counselor Darrell Bradley;

medical practitioners Mark Pearson and Thomas Hare; and warden William Hedrick.

Webb claims violations of the First and Eighth Amendments, alleging that Pearson

acted with deliberate indifference when he approved of Webb’s transfer from MCFPSpringfield in 2003, all the defendants conspired to transfer him from MCFPSpringfield in 2003 and 2004 in retaliation for engaging in protected conduct, Sims

and Bradley retaliated against him by transferring him to administrative segregation,

and Hedrick failed to respond to Webb’s complaints of retaliation and inadequate

medical care.2

Webb failed to create a genuine issue of fact on his claim that Pearson acted

with deliberate indifference when he approved of Webb’s transfer from MCFPSpringfield in 2003. To establish deliberate indifference, Webb must demonstrate that

“he suffered objectively serious medical needs, and the officials actually knew of but

deliberately disregarded those needs.” Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 972-73

(8th Cir. 2006). Webb has asserted no facts from which to infer that Pearson knew of

Webb’s allegedly serious medical need. The facts that Webb does allege—that

Pearson relied on outdated medical information and never reexamined Webb before

authorizing his transfer—prove the opposite. At most, the facts Webb alleges support

a claim that Pearson acted negligently in failing to reexamine Webb before transfer,

but negligence alone is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

As to Webb’s retaliation Bivens claims, we agree with the district court that

retaliation for engaging in protected conduct was not a “but for” factor in Webb’s

transfers from MCFP-Springfield. In raising a retaliatory transfer claim Webb

“face[s] a substantial burden in attempting to prove that the actual motivating factor
3

 Moreover, Webb had not engaged in protected activity before his 2004

transfer. Webb alleges that he was transferred in 2004 after providing legal assistance

to another inmate. However, “an inmate simply does not have the right to provide his

fellow inmates with legal assistance,” and a transfer based on such assistance “would

not constitute the violation of a protected right.” Gassler v. Rayl, 862 F.2d 706, 708

(8th Cir. 1988).

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for his transfer was the impermissible retaliation.” Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737

(8th Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted). Even at summary judgment, “the burden is on

the prisoner to prove that but for an unconstitutional, retaliatory motive the transfer

would have not occurred.” Sisneros v. Nix, 95 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Goff, 7 F.3d at 738)). Here, there is record evidence that Webb was returned to his

permanent medical facility in 2003 and 2004 because he no longer needed the medical

care at MCFP-Springfield. Even if retaliation was one factor in the decision to

transfer Webb, Webb has not shown that his transfer would not have occurred “but

for” the retaliation. See Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding

retaliation not a “but for” cause of transfer where record demonstrated that inmate was

disciplined and transferred due to pattern of misbehavior); Ponchik v. Bogan, 929

F.2d 419, 420 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting retaliatory-transfer claim even where

retaliation was clearly factor in transfer).3

Similarly, Webb’s claim against Sims and Bradley fails because retaliation was

not a “but for” factor in Webb’s placement in administrative segregation pending

investigation. Webb alleges that he was placed in administrative segregation because

Sims, assisted by Bradley, fabricated an incident report in retaliation for Webb filing

administrative grievances. Webb has not alleged, however, any facts to indicate that

Sims or Bradley had personal involvement in his placement in administrative

segregation, and both men deny any connection. Regardless of whether the two

fabricated the disciplinary charge against Webb, neither was responsible for Webb’s

placement in administrative segregation pending investigation. See Griggs v. Norris,
4

 To the extent Webb argues that his placement in administrative segregation

based on a false disciplinary charge constituted cruel and unusual punishment, he

misunderstands the Eighth Amendment requirement. The prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment is focused on the conditions of the administrative

segregation, not on the reasons for placement there. See Brown v. Nix, 33 F.3d 951,

954-55 (8th Cir. 1994). Webb does not allege that the conditions of the administrative

segregation were unconstitutional. 

5

 The Appellees also argue that Webb’s claims are barred because he failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. Because we uphold the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on the merits, we do not answer this question. 

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297 F. App’x 553, 555 (8th Cir. 2008) (unpublished per curium); accord White v.

Bledsloe, 368 F. App’x 273, 275 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished per curium).4

Finally, Webb’s retaliation and deliberate indifference claims against Hedrick

fail because Bivens liability cannot be established solely on a theory of respondeat

superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). Webb alleges that Hedrick

retaliated against Webb when Hedrick failed to respond to Webb’s multiple

complaints of retaliation by Hedrick’s staff. Under Bivens, however, Hedrick’s

inaction must itself have had a retaliatory motivation, see id. at 1948-49, and Webb

has produced no evidence to suggest Hedrick had the requisite intent. Webb also

alleges that Hedrick acted with deliberate indifference when he did not respond to

Webb’s complaints of inadequate medical care. As a non-medical professional,

however, Hedrick is not personally liable for his medical staff’s treatment decisions,

see Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2002), and under Bivens, he

cannot be held vicariously liable for their actions, see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.5

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

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