```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 298 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 298

    To prevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 13, 2013

  Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Corker, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Rubio, Mrs. 
  Feinstein, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Inhofe, and Mr. Donnelly) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                           Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To prevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``North Korea Nonproliferation and 
Accountability Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On February 12, 2013, the Government of North Korea 
        declared that it had conducted its third test of a nuclear 
        device, following its first self-declared test on October 9, 
        2006, and its second test on May 25, 2009.
            (2) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, 
        adopted on October 14, 2006, condemned the nuclear test 
        proclaimed by North Korea on October 9, 2006, in flagrant 
        disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular Security 
        Council Resolution 1695 (2006), and demanded that North Korea 
        not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic 
        missile; immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal 
        from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
        done at Washington, London, and Moscow, July 1, 1968, and 
        entered into force March 5, 1970 (NPT); and return to the NPT 
        and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
            (3) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 further 
        decided that North Korea shall suspend all activities related 
        to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-
        establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on 
        missile launching; shall abandon all nuclear weapons and 
        existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and 
        irreversible manner; shall act strictly in accordance with the 
        obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms 
        and conditions of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement; shall provide 
        the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these 
        requirements, including such access to individuals, 
        documentation, equipments and facilities as may be required and 
        deemed necessary by the IAEA; and shall abandon all other 
        existing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its ballistic 
        missile program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
        manner.
            (4) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 also 
        required United Nations Member States to prevent--
                    (A) transfers to, and procurement from, North Korea 
                of--
                            (i) items, materials, equipment, goods, and 
                        technology listed in the resolution; and
                            (ii) other items, determined by the 
                        Security Council or the 1718 Committee, which 
                        could contribute to North Korea's nuclear-
                        related, ballistic missile-related, or other 
                        weapons of mass destruction-related programs;
                    (B) certain military equipment or technology 
                transfers related to the prohibited items; and
                    (C) the transfer of luxury goods to North Korea.
            (5) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 further 
        required United Nations Member States to prevent the entry into 
        and transit through their territories of individuals designated 
        by the Security Council or the 1718 Committee as being 
        responsible for North Korea's ballistic missile-related, 
        nuclear-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related 
        programs, and the immediate freezing of funds, other financial 
        assets, and economic resources of persons or entities 
        designated by the Security Council or the 1718 Committee as 
        being engaged in or providing support for such programs, or by 
        persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their 
        direction.
            (6) On May 25, 2009, the Government of North Korea declared 
        that it had conducted a second test of a nuclear device.
            (7) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, 
        adopted on June 12, 2009--
                    (A) decided that North Korea shall abandon all 
                nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a 
                complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner;
                    (B) authorized and required United Nations Member 
                States to seize and dispose of proscribed illicit North 
                Korea items related to its missile, nuclear, and WMD 
                programs identified in inspections called for by the 
                resolution;
                    (C) banned the export to North Korea of all arms 
                and related material other than small arms and light 
                weapons; and
                    (D) decided that Member States shall--
                            (i) prevent the provision of financial 
                        services or the transfer to, through, or from 
                        their territory of any financial or other 
                        assets or resources that could contribute to 
                        North Korea's nuclear-related, ballistic 
                        missile-related, or other WMD-related programs 
                        or activities; and
                            (ii) deny fuel or supplies to service the 
                        vessels carrying them except where necessary on 
                        humanitarian grounds.
            (8) On December 12, 2012, in flagrant defiance of past 
        United Nations Security Council resolutions, the international 
        community, and its Six-Party partners, the Government of North 
        Korea launched a three-stage, long-range missile, which 
        overflew Japanese territory near Okinawa and dropped debris 
        into the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and waters adjacent to 
        the Philippines.
            (9) The United Nations Security Council adopted Security 
        Council Resolution 2087 on January 22, 2013, which condemned 
        North Korea's December 12, 2012, missile launch as a breach of 
        Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, demanded that North 
        Korea ``abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
        programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner,'' 
        and expressed the determination of the Security Council ``to 
        take significant action in the event of a further DPRK launch 
        or nuclear test''.
            (10) The transition to the leadership of Kim Jong-Un after 
        the death of Kim Jong-Il has introduced new uncertainties, yet 
        the fundamental human rights and humanitarian conditions inside 
        North Korea remain deplorable, thousands of North Koreans 
        remain imprisoned in modern-day gulags, North Korean refugees 
        remain acutely vulnerable, and the findings in the North Korean 
        Human Rights Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-333; 22 U.S.C. 7801 et 
        seq.), the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 
        2008 (Public Law 110-346), and the Ambassador James R. Lilley 
        and Congressman Stephen J. Solarz North Korea Human Rights 
        Reauthorization Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-172) remain 
        substantially accurate today.
            (11) There has been extensive military cooperation between 
        the Governments of North Korea and Iran that dates back to the 
        1980s.
            (12) The latest provocative and defiant action by the 
        Government of North Korea represents a direct threat to the 
        United States and to our regional allies and partners.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the test of a nuclear device by the Government of North 
        Korea on February 12, 2013, and the missile launch of December 
        12, 2012, represent flagrant violations of the sanctions regime 
        created by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695 
        (2006), 1718 (2006), and 1874 (2009), the test of the nuclear 
        device on February 12, 2013, is a clear, deliberate, and 
        provocative violation of United Nations Security Resolution 
        2087 (2013), and the Government of North Korea continues to 
        defy the United Nations, its Six-Party partners, and the 
        international community;
            (2) all Member States of the United Nations should 
        immediately implement and enforce sanctions imposed by these 
        resolutions and censure North Korea;
            (3) the Government of North Korea should abandon and 
        dismantle its provocative ballistic missile and nuclear weapons 
        programs, cease its proliferation activities, and come into 
        immediate compliance with all United Nations Security Council 
        resolutions and its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement 
        of the Six-Party Talks;
            (4) restrictions against the Government of North Korea, 
        including sanctions that ban the importation into the United 
        States of unlicensed North Korean products and goods, should 
        remain in effect until the Government of North Korea no longer 
        engages in activities that threaten the United States, our 
        allies and partners, and global peace and stability;
            (5) the United States Government should seek a new round of 
        United Nations Security Council sanctions, including the public 
        identification of all North Korean and foreign banks, business, 
        and government agencies suspected of conduct that violates 
        United Nations Security Council resolutions, and implementing 
        necessary measures to ensure enforcement of such sanctions;
            (6) all United Nations Member States should--
                    (A) further strengthen efforts to prevent the 
                transfer of military and dual-use technologies to North 
                Korea, including an expansion of the list of sanctioned 
                materials identified by the United Nations Panel of 
                Experts on North Korea sanctions and the items on the 
                Nuclear Suppliers Group lists;
                    (B) exercise enhanced vigilance including 
                monitoring the activities of their nationals, persons 
                in their territories, financial institutions, and other 
                entities with or on behalf of financial institutions in 
                North Korea, or of those that act on behalf or at the 
                direction of financial institutions in North Korea, 
                including their branches, representatives, agents, and 
                subsidiaries abroad; and
                    (C) prevent transshipments that relate to North 
                Korean military, missile, and nuclear programs and 
                proliferation activities;
            (7) the United States Government should explore all 
        appropriate measures for enhanced military operations by the 
        United States Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific region, 
        including in partnership with the armed forces of others 
        countries in the region, to safeguard the national interests, 
        security, and livelihood of the United States and its people, 
        as well as those of United States allies and partners in the 
        region; and
            (8) the United States Government, acting through its 
        appropriate diplomatic representatives, should secure the 
        agreement of the United Nations Human Rights Council and 
        General Assembly to adopt the recommendations made in the 
        February 1, 2013, report of Marzuki Darusman, Special 
        Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic 
        People's Republic of Korea, that an inquiry mechanism should be 
        established to investigate North Korea's ``grave, widespread 
        and systematic violations of human rights,'' as well as to 
        analyze whether crimes against humanity are being perpetrated 
        in North Korea.

SEC. 4. REPORT.

    Not later than May 15, 2013, the Secretary of State shall conduct, 
coordinate, and submit to Congress a comprehensive report on United 
States policy towards North Korea based on a full and complete 
interagency review of current policy and possible alternatives, 
including North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and missile 
programs and human rights atrocities. The report shall include 
recommendations for such legislative or administrative action as the 
Secretary considers appropriate in light of the results of the review.
                                 <all>
```