J-S57022-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

QUINTON R. CORPREW, 

 Appellant No. 1861 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 8, 2011 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000675-2011 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 6, 2016 

 Appellant, Quinton R. Corprew, appeals nunc pro tunc from the 

judgment of sentence entered following his convictions of one count each of 

aggravated assault-serious bodily injury; aggravated assault-bodily injury 

with a deadly weapon; simple assault; and recklessly endangering another 

person (“REAP”). The crimes stemmed from an altercation Appellant had 

with his girlfriend’s former paramour. We affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this case as follows: 

FACTUAL SUMMARY2

2

 The factual summary is distilled from the testimony 

presented at the September 7-8, 2011, jury trial 

without citation to specific portions of the record. 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
J-S57022-16 

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Dana Jo Snyder (Snyder) testified that on March 12, 2011, 

she was involved in a relationship with [Appellant] and they were 

at her residence when they were joined by the victim McGinnis. 

Snyder testified that she had an on and off relationship with 

McGinnis for approximately twelve years and that he was the 

father of one of her two children. Snyder testified that McGinnis 

did not want their relationship to end and was seeking to 

reconcile with her and was upset she was seeing other men. 

She explained that she allowed McGinnis into the residence to 

avoid problems and to try and convince him that their 

relationship was over. 

Snyder acknowledged that when sober McGinnis was fine 

but that he could become violent when he drank, had broken 

David Herring’s (Herring) leg during a fight, and had been 

violent towards her. She explained that while McGinnis could be 

violent he was not the type to attack anyone but that someone 

had to attack him first and that she warned various people, 

including [Appellant], that they didn’t want to fight McGinnis 

because he would hurt them. Snyder acknowledged that she 

had told [Appellant] of the prior incidents of violence by 

McGinnis, including the breaking of Herring’s leg. 

Relative to the events of March 12-13, Snyder testified 

that after McGinnis arrived at her home, she, McGinnis and 

[Appellant] smoke[d] a marijuana cigar, a blunt, and that 

[Appellant] and possibly McGinnis had a few drinks. Eventually 

they went to the nearby Sue Bee’s Bar because she wanted 

McGinnis out of the house. While at Sue Bee’s[,] Snyder 

testified that she observed McGinnis and [Appellant] playing pool 

and that two or three times she went over to them because it 

appeared they were arguing and she wanted to prevent any 

trouble. Each time she went over the argument stopped and 

everything seemed okay. 

Snyder explained that at some point she went out a side 

door with a few people intending to go home and was followed 

out by McGinnis and then [Appellant]. She accompanied her 

cousin back into the bar leaving McGinnis, [Appellant], and 

Herring outside. A minute or two after reentering the bar she 

testified that McGinnis opened the door and told them to call 911 

[because] he had been stabbed. She testified that she saw 
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McGinnis’[s]shirt covered in blood and that there was a puddle of 

blood on the ground. 

McGinnis testified that he and Snyder had been involved in 

a long-term relationship and that he had hopes of reconciling 

with her. McGinnis acknowledged that he could become violent 

when drunk, that he had broken Herring’s leg during an 

altercation some years before but insisted that he would never 

attack someone first but would respond to violence against 

himself. On March 12 he went to her residence under the belief 

that they had plans to go out together and was surprised that 

[Appellant] was there. While at Snyder’s home he, Snyder and 

[Appellant] had smoked a blunt and shortly thereafter went to 

Sue Bee’s. While at Sue Bee’s he and [Appellant] had a few 

drinks and played a few games of pool. During these games 

McGinnis expressed that he did not approve of [Appellant’s] 

relationship with Snyder and that he intended to try and 

reconcile with her. McGinnis thought things were generally okay 

between him and [Appellant] but admitted to having a verbal 

exchange or two with him. McGinnis denied having threatened 

[Appellant] with a pool cue and denied having any weapons that 

evening. 

McGinnis testified that he followed Snyder outside and that 

[Appellant] followed him. Once outside he and [Appellant] again 

exchanged words over the nature of Snyder and [Appellant’s] 

relationship and the fact that McGinnis did not want [Appellant] 

spending the night at Snyder’s. At some point Snyder and the 

others reentered the bar leaving McGinnis, [Appellant], and 

Herring outside. McGinnis testified that at some point during the 

argument it became clear he and [Appellant] were going to fight 

and that [Appellant] began walking around the corner of the 

building. McGinnis testified that he removed his jacket, threw it 

at Herring, and started to follow [Appellant]. McGinnis testified 

that while walking [Appellant] pulled a knife, turned around and 

stabbed him seven times. McGinnis testified that he tried to 

back away when [Appellant] was stabbing him and denied 

lunging at [Appellant] immediately prior to the stabbing. 

Herring testified that he was in the bar on March 12, that 

he knew both McGinnis and [Appellant], and that McGinnis had 

once broken his leg during a fight. He testified that he saw 

McGinnis holding a pool cue when he was arguing with 

[Appellant] inside the bar. He explained that he followed 
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McGinnis and [Appellant] outside because he thought there 

might be trouble and he wanted to stop it before anyone got 

seriously injured. He testified that McGinnis and [Appellant] 

argued briefly, that McGinnis handed him his jacket and phone, 

that he saw [Appellant] walking away from McGinnis, saw 

McGinnis rush or walk quickly towards [Appellant] apparently 

intending to grab or wrestle him, saw McGinnis fall and at that 

point saw a knife in [Appellant’s] hand. Herring testified that 

everything happened very quickly but that he saw [Appellant] 

stab McGinnis although he did not see the knife until McGinnis 

was starting to fall to the ground. Herring testified that after the 

stabbing [Appellant] immediately fled the scene. 

[Appellant] testified that he had been at Snyder’s 

residence on the evening of March 12 when McGinnis arrived. 

[Appellant] testified that Snyder had told him that McGinnis 

could become violent when he drank and that on one occasion 

McGinnis had struck her. [Appellant] testified that Snyder’s 

mother had also told him that McGinnis can become violent when 

he drank and that he had once assaulted Snyder. He went on to 

say that he knew McGinnis had broken Herring’s leg in [a] fight 

and that he had a knife with him that evening that he had taken 

from his nephew a few weeks prior. [Appellant] described the 

knife as a lock-blade knife whose blade would lock into place 

once unfolded requiring a button to be pressed in order to close 

the blade. [Appellant] acknowledged that as a convicted felon it 

was a violation of his parole to carry the knife. 

[Appellant] testified that while they waited for Snyder to 

get ready he and McGinnis had a few drinks and then the three 

of them smoked a blunt before leaving for Sue Bee’s. While at 

Sue Bee’s [Appellant] testified that he and McGinnis each had a 

few drinks and played a few games of pool. [Appellant] testified 

that during these games McGinnis would become upset about 

[Appellant’s] relationship with Snyder and told him that he 

should not spend the night with her. During one such exchange 

[Appellant] testified that McGinnis brandished the fat end of a 

pool cue at him and told him how easy it would be to split his 

head with it. He testified that after this incident he and McGinnis 

continued to play pool and drink together. 

[Appellant] testified that at some point he noticed that 

Snyder had left the bar and saw McGinnis going outside as well 

so he decided to go out and make sure things were okay. 
J-S57022-16 

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[Appellant] testified that when everyone else went back inside, 

he, McGinnis, and Herring remained outside. [Appellant] 

testified that everything happened very fast when McGinnis took 

his jacket off, threw it at Herring, and rushed at him grabbing 

him in a bear hug. [Appellant] testified that he was facing 

McGinnis at this time and had no opportunity to run. He testified 

that when McGinnis grabbed him and started to bear hug him 

that he pulled the knife out of his right front pocket and started 

stabbing McGinnis until he felt McGinnis’[s] hold loosen at which 

point he stopped stabbing. [Appellant] testified that he thought 

the first stab wounds were to McGinnis’[s] armpit and chest 

while McGinnis was pulling him into a bear hug and the ones to 

the back occurred while McGinnis was squeezing him.

Matthew MacGregor (MacGregor) testified that he is 

employed by the Conemaugh Health System and the Seventh 

Ward Ambulance service as an emergency medical technician 

(EMT) and that he was the first medical responder to the scene. 

MacGregor testified that his initial assessment of McGinnis was 

that he was in critical condition and that he immediately notified 

the Conemaugh Hospital ER that a critical trauma patient was 

inbound. MacGregor testified that the EMTs decided to try and 

control the bleeding and forego other treatment due to the close 

proximity to the ER and allow the trauma team to address 

McGinnis’[s] injuries. MacGregor testified that McGinnis was 

suffering from stab wounds to the left and right flank area on his 

back, near the left armpit, left side of his chest, and a large, 

deep wound to the left upper arm. MacGregor indicated that 

initial breath sounds indicated a slight decrease in the left lung. 

Stephen Lee Miller, M.D. (Miller) testified that he is a 

trauma surgeon with Conemaugh Hospital and was part of the 

team that treated McGinnis. Miller testified that McGinnis had 

two stab wounds on the right back, one to the left chest, one to 

the posterior shoulder, one to the anterior right shoulder, a large 

laceration over the left pleural area, and a laceration to the left 

bicep muscle. In addition he had internal injuries including rib 

and scapular fractures that could only have been caused by 

significant force equivalent to baseball bat like force. Finally, 

Miller testified that McGinnis had a laceration to his left lung that 

resulted in a collapsed lung. Miller explained that the collapsed 

lung was a life-threatening injury and that such an injury can be 

lethal within a few minutes without immediate treatment. Miller 

testified that on the whole it required a significant amount of 
J-S57022-16 

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force to inflict these injuries and they were life threatening in 

nature. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/16, at 3-7. 

 On September 8, 2011, a jury convicted Appellant of the crimes stated 

above. On November 8, 2011, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve 

an aggregate term of incarceration of ten to twenty years and also ordered 

Appellant to pay the costs of prosecution and restitution. Appellant filed a 

timely appeal, and this Court, finding all issues to be waived, affirmed the 

judgment of sentence on December 28, 2012. Commonwealth v. 

Corprew, 64 A.3d 37, 1907 WDA 2011 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished 

memorandum). Appellant then filed a petition for allowance of appeal, 

which our Supreme Court denied on October 9, 2013. Commonwealth v. 

Corprew, 77 A.3d 635 (Pa. 2013). 

 On June 25, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, and the 

PCRA court appointed counsel, who then filed an amended PCRA petition. 

The PCRA court held a hearing on September 4, 2014, and denied PCRA 

relief on November 24, 2014. On appeal, this Court vacated the PCRA 

court’s order and remanded for the reinstatement of Appellant’s direct 

appeal rights on August 19, 2015. Commonwealth v. Corprew, 131 A.3d 

97, 2032 WDA 2014 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum). Upon 

remand, the PCRA court entered an order on October 26, 2015, reinstating 

Appellant’s direct appeal rights and noting that Appellant had thirty days in 

which to perfect his appeal. On November 18, 2015, Appellant filed the 
J-S57022-16 

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instant direct appeal, nunc pro tunc. Both Appellant and the trial court have 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 Appellant presents the following issue for our review: 

1. The evidence presented at trial by the Commonwealth was 

insufficient to sustain a conviction for Aggravated Assault-Causes 

Serious Bodily Injury; Aggravated Assault—Causes Bodily Injury 

with a Deadly Weapon; Simple Assault, and Recklessly 

Endangering Another Person against the Appellant, especially in 

light of the defense of self[-]defense which was raised on behalf 

of the Appellant at trial. 

Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

 Appellant argues that due to his claim of self-defense, he should have 

been acquitted of all charges brought against him. Appellant’s Brief at 10-

36. Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth failed to disprove his 

assertion of self-defense in light of the fact that the victim, Mr. McGinnis, 

initiated an assault on Appellant. Appellant contends that evidence 

established McGinnis was a violent individual and had been threatening and 

menacing to Appellant on the night of the incident.1

____________________________________________ 

1

 To the extent Appellant attempts to present a typical challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, i.e. that the Commonwealth failed to prove 

particular elements of the crimes, we note that such a claim is waived due to 

Appellant’s failure to specify in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement the specific 

elements of any crime which he deems the evidence presented at trial failed 

to establish beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 

959 A.2d 1252, 1257-1258 (Pa. Super. 2008) (finding waiver of sufficiency 

of evidence claim where the appellant failed to specify in Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement the elements of particular crime not proven by the 

Commonwealth). See also Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 

(Pa. Super. 2009) (finding sufficiency claim waived under Williams for 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
J-S57022-16 

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We analyze arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 

under the following parameters: 

Our standard when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable 

inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient 

to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt. We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the evidence 

at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the 

fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant’s 

guilt unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a 

matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. When evaluating the credibility and 

weight of the evidence, the fact-finder is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. For purposes of our review under these 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

failure to specify which elements of crimes were not proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt). Indeed, Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement 

presents the following issue: 

The evidence presented at trial by the Commonwealth was 

insufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault, simple 

assault and recklessly endangering another person against the 

Appellant, especially in light of the defense of self[-]defense 

which was raised on behalf of the Appellant at trial. 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 11/18/15, at 1. In finding Appellant’s issue to 

be waived, the trial court observed that Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

“statement language does not specify how the evidence failed to establish 

[the] element or elements of the offenses for which [Appellant] was 

convicted.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/16, at 8. 

Likewise, Appellant has failed to specify in his appellate brief the 

elements of the crimes which were allegedly not met. Consequently, we 

conclude that any sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue alleging that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove particular elements of various crimes is 

waived. Williams. 
J-S57022-16 

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principles, we must review the entire record and consider all of 

the evidence introduced. 

Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1276-1277 (Pa. Super. 

2006)). 

 We are mindful that “[t]he use of force upon or toward another person 

is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately 

necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful 

force by the other person on the present occasion.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). 

“Although the defendant has no burden to prove self-defense, ... before the 

defense is properly in issue, ‘there must be some evidence, from whatever 

source, to justify such a finding.’” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 

738, 740 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). Once a justification defense is 

properly raised, “the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a 

defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d 

342, 345 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). 

 The Commonwealth sustains its burden if “it establishes at least one of 

the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in 

danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or 

continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the 

retreat was possible with complete safety.” Commonwealth v. 

McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). “It 

remains the province of the [finder of fact] to determine whether the 
J-S57022-16 

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accused’s belief was reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and 

whether he had no duty to retreat.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The Commonwealth can negate a self-defense claim if it proves 

the defendant did not reasonably believe he was in imminent 

danger of death or great bodily injury and it was necessary to 

use deadly force to save himself from that danger. 

The requirement of reasonable belief encompasses 

two aspects, one subjective and one objective. First, 

the defendant must have acted out of an honest, 

bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger, 

which involves consideration of the defendant’s 

subjective state of mind. Second, the defendant’s 

belief that he needed to defend himself with deadly

force, if it existed, must be reasonable in light of the 

facts as they appeared to the defendant, a 

consideration that involves an objective analysis. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations 

omitted). 

 We also note that our legislature has imposed the following limitations 

on the use of self-defense: 

Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.-- 

* * * 

(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section 

unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect 

himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual 

intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if: 

(i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or 

serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force 

against himself in the same encounter; or 

(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity 

of using such force with complete safety by 

retreating, except the actor is not obliged to retreat 
J-S57022-16 

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from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was the 

initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by 

another person whose place of work the actor knows 

it to be. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2)(i)-(ii). 

 Furthermore: 

As the Mouzon Court observed, the use of deadly force itself 

“cannot be viewed in isolation with [the victim] as the sole 

physical aggressor and [the defendant] acting in responsive selfdefense. [T]his would be an incomplete and inaccurate view of 

the circumstances for self-defense purposes.” Id. at 549, 53 

A.3d at 751. To claim self-defense, the defendant must be free 

from fault in provoking or escalating the altercation that led to 

the offense, before the defendant can be excused from using 

deadly force. Id. (emphasis added). 

Smith, 97 A.3d at 787-788. Indeed, we have long explained that the use of 

deadly force in self-defense is limited to those situations in which the actor 

was free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty which ultimately 

results in injury. See Comonwealth v. Alvin, 516 A.2d 376 (Pa. Super. 

1986) (en banc) (discussing applicability of legislative language on selfdefense charge to the jury). 

 Our review of the record reflects that the Commonwealth presented 

testimony from Dr. Stephen Lee Miller, an expert in the field of general 

surgery and trauma services. N.T., 9/7/11, at 151-157. Dr. Miller was 

present when the victim arrived at the hospital, and he offered detailed 

testimony regarding the victim’s stab wounds. Dr. Miller explained that the 

victim suffered a total of seven stab wounds. Id. at 153, 156. In addition, 

the doctor explained that the victim suffered several broken ribs that would 
J-S57022-16 

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have required significant force, similar to “baseball-bat type force.” Id. at 

155. Dr. Miller characterized the victim’s injuries as “life threatening.” Id. 

at 155-156. 

 The Commonwealth also produced the testimony of Mr. David Herring, 

an eyewitness to the incident. N.T., 9/7/11, at 123-144. Mr. Herring 

indicated that Appellant and Mr. McGinnis were engaged in an ongoing fight 

on the evening of the incident. Id. at 126. Mr. Herring stated that when 

they were outside of the bar Appellant and the victim decided to engage in a 

fight. Id. Mr. Herring further testified that it appeared that the victim 

rushed at Appellant. Id. 

 In addition, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Mr. 

McGinnis, the victim of the stabbing. N.T., 9/7/11, at 48-88. Mr. McGinnis 

testified that, on the night in question, he and Appellant had an argument at 

a bar concerning Ms. Snyder. Eventually, Mr. McGinnis and Appellant left 

the bar and went outside. The following is Mr. McGinnis’s account of what 

transpired in response to the questioning of the assistant district attorney: 

Q And after that conversation occurred, what happened? 

A [Ms. Snyder], I seen [Ms. Snyder] going outside so I followed 

her out. She said she was leaving because she didn’t want to 

deal with anything. [Appellant] had came [sic] out after me, and 

we was outside arguing. Then [Ms. Snyder] and everybody else 

goes back into the bar. 

Q Now, at this time [Appellant] and you were arguing? 

A When we got outside, yes, sir, we was arguing. 
J-S57022-16 

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Q And the other people that were outside the bar went back in? 

A They all went back in. 

Q Including -- 

A [Ms. Snyder]. 

Q Was anyone left outside with you and [Appellant] at that 

point? 

A Yes, [Mr. Herring]. 

Q Who? 

A Dave Herring. 

Q So now the three of you are outside. What transpired? 

A We came to the conclusion that we was going to walk around 

the building and fight. 

Q Okay. So it had gotten to that point? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q What did you do – who went around first? 

A [Appellant] started walking first. I was following him. 

Q What happened? 

A He pulled out the knife and turned around and started 

stabbing me. 

Q At that time did you have any weapon on you?

A No.

Q Were you armed at all?

A No.

Q Do you recall how many times you were stabbed? 
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A Seven. 

Q Do you recall that from that night or from the number of 

wounds that you have? 

A Well, I know that because of my scars. 

Q After he stabbed you, what did he do? 

A I didn’t see him after that. Apparently he ran. I was getting 

up off the ground and he was gone. 

Q And what did you do? 

A I went back in the bar to get help. 

N.T., 9/7/11, at 53-55 (emphasis added). 

 In addition, on cross-examination Mr. McGinnis offered the following 

testimony: 

Q So you get into an argument and you’re not sure who started 

it? 

A Right. 

Q What happened next? 

A [Appellant and I] came to the conclusion that we was going to 

go around the bar and fight. 

Q What do you mean -- how do you come to the conclusion? 

What happened? 

A He said, well, I’ll whoop your ass. I said, I’ll whoop your ass, 

let’s go around the building. And we started walking around the 

building. 

Q So you’re following him? 

A I’m following him, yes. 
J-S57022-16 

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Q Do you make it past the corner or are you on that street 

there? 

A We got pretty much right to the corner, just a little off the 

sidewalk. We didn’t make it around the building. 

Q What happens then? 

A He pulled out his knife, turns around and started stabbing me. 

Q He turns around - - 

A With the knife. The knife was already out. When he turned 

around he was cutting me. 

Q And did you recall or do you recall, was anyone else outside? 

A Dave Herring. 

Q And Mr. Herring, how close was he to you and [Appellant]? 

A A few feet behind us. 

Q From the time you saw the knife until the fight was over let’s 

say, how much time lapses? 

A I’m not sure how long. It was that fast (indicating). He 

turned around and it happened that fast. 

Q Now, when you saw this knife what did you do? 

A I put my arms up and tried to back up. I didn’t really see the 

knife until it was too late. He was already swinging it. I just 

seen the blade. 

Q When he turns around and you see the knife, how far apart 

were the two of you? 

A Maybe a foot or two. It was right there. 

Q And did the two of you end up in an embrace? 

A I’m not sure. I started getting cut and tried to get away. 

That’s probably why I was stabbed four times in my back. 
J-S57022-16 

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Q Now, I asked you previously about 2005 -- let’s go back to 

the fight for a second. Was it possible that you lunged initially at 

[Appellant]? 

A No. I didn’t make a move until I was cut. I’m not the type to 

put my hands on somebody first. 

Id. at 83-85. 

 Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden of 

disproving Appellant’s claim of self-defense. After presentation of conflicting 

evidence, the jury was entitled to reject Appellant’s claim that he, either 

subjectively or objectively, reasonably believed that his life was in imminent 

danger, and, even if he did, Appellant did not attempt to retreat before using 

deadly force. Rather, Appellant unreasonably and unjustifiably escalated the 

confrontation when he pulled out a knife and stabbed the unarmed victim 

seven times. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Commonwealth 

sustained its burden of disproving Appellant’s justification defense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Hence, Appellant’s contrary claim lacks merit. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/6/2016