IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

In re the Marriage of:

TIMOTHY L. WALTERS,

Appellant,

and

PATRICE R. WALTERS,

Respondent.

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No. 39339-9-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — This appeal and cross appeal challenge the trial court’s 

division of property and award of spousal maintenance. We affirm, but remand for the 

trial court to make a small correction to its maintenance award.

FACTS

In November 2020, Timothy Walters filed a petition for dissolution of his 29-year 

marriage to Patrice Walters. After trial, the court awarded 50 percent of the community 

estate to each spouse, along with their separate property. Ms. Walters’ separate property 

consisted of a kayak and bedroom furniture. Mr. Walters’ separate property consisted 

solely of a 45.1 percent interest in his Washington State Patrol (WSP) pension. The 

FILED

JANUARY 30, 2024

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
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court’s ruling acknowledged the parties’ monthly Social Security benefits—$1,406 for 

Mr. Walters and $1,126 for Ms. Walters—but did not allocate those benefits. At the time 

of divorce, no children remained in the Walters’ home. 

In addition to the above awards, the trial court ordered Mr. Walters to pay Ms. 

Walters $1,250 per month in spousal maintenance as a means of equalizing the parties’ 

postdissolution incomes. Citing the parties’ ages and the duration of their marriage, the 

court ordered maintenance payments to continue for life. The court considered awarding 

Ms. Walters the full community share of Mr. Walters’ WSP pension in lieu of 

maintenance, but decided not to.

The court’s dissolution order expressly considered every mandatory factor 

enumerated in RCW 26.09.080 and RCW 26.09.090.

Contested assets

The trial court distributed much of the Walters’ estate without objection from the 

parties. However, the court’s characterization of several assets draws scrutiny on appeal:

• Family residence: The Walters sold their home prior to trial with net 

proceeds of $462,337.20. Each spouse claimed a $100,000.00 advance 

from those proceeds. After satisfying other debts, $214,656.00 remained to 

be distributed. The trial court’s oral ruling mischaracterized this 
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$214,656.00 as the total proceeds from the sale itself, rather than the 

undistributed remainder. However, the court’s final ruling corrected this 

misstatement. The court awarded each spouse $107,328.00 as their final 

share from the sale of the home. 

• Vehicles: The trial court valued the Walters’ Ford pickup at $6,000 and 

Subaru Outback at $7,000. It awarded the pickup to Mr. Walters and the 

Outback to Ms. Walters. Because the pickup was too old to command 

trade-in value, Mr. Walters proposed using its low retail value. For the 

Outback, Mr. Walters proposed using its clean trade-in value. Ms. Walters 

proposed using average retail for the pickup and average trade-in for the 

Outback. The court’s valuations split the difference between these requests. 

• Boat: The trial court valued the Walters’ boat at $15,000 and awarded it to 

Mr. Walters. Fifteen thousand dollars was higher than the $13,845 low 

retail value Mr. Walters proposed and lower than the boat’s $15,695 

average retail value. Ms. Walters valued the boat at $19,119. However, 

Ms. Walters’ valuation reflected the book value for a more expensive boat 

than the model the couple owned. Noting this error, the court did not factor 

Ms. Walters’ valuation into its own appraisal. Instead, the court’s $15,000 
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valuation balanced the boat’s age and usage against improvements the 

Walters had made to the boat. 

• All-terrain vehicle (ATV): Prior to trial, Mr. Walters sold the couple’s 

ATV for $2,800. Because Ms. Walters believed the vehicle was worth 

$4,000, Mr. Walters gave her $2,000 of the proceeds and kept only $800 for 

himself. The trial court’s oral ruling incorrectly stated that Ms. Walters 

herself had sold the ATV for $4,000, rather than stating Mr. Walters had 

sold it for $2,800. In that ruling, the court valued the ATV at $4,000 and 

charged each party with $2,000 in proceeds from the sale. 

While the trial court’s final ruling did not correct any misstatements 

concerning the ATV, the court’s denial of reconsideration stated accurately 

that Mr. Walters had sold the vehicle for $2,800. Nevertheless, the court 

defended its $4,000 valuation and $2,000 credits to each party. It argued 

$4,000 represented a compromise between the value Ms. Walters sought1

 

1 The ruling stated that “Ms. Walters testified that the [ATV] was valued in excess 

of $4,000.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 193. Ms. Walters’ response to Mr. Walters’ motion 

for reconsideration echoes this assertion, stating that Ms. Walters proposed a value for the 

ATV that was “well in excess of $4,000.” CP at 156. However, both Ms. Walters’ 

testimony at trial and the parties’ joint trial management report indicate Ms. Walters only 

valued the ATV at or near $4,000, and not “in excess” of that figure. 
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and the vehicle’s $3,555 low retail value. The court furthermore argued its 

$2,000 credits were fair in light of Mr. Walters’ decision to sell the ATV at 

below market value. The court’s $4,000 valuation also split the difference 

between the vehicle’s low retail and average retail values. 

• WSP pension: The Washington Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) 

offered a time-rule calculation determining 45.1 percent of Mr. Walters’ 

WSP pension was his separate property, whereas 54.9 percent was 

communal. Ms. Walters objected to this division, arguing the court should 

characterize the entire pension as community property because Mr. Walters’ 

highest-earning years at WSP—from which pension payments are 

calculated—occurred during the marriage. The court disagreed and adopted 

the DRS calculation. Despite this decision, the trial court’s oral ruling 

overstated Mr. Walters’ separate share of the pension as 49.1 percent. As a 

result, the oral ruling inflated Mr. Walters’ postdissolution income by $236 

per month.2 In turn, this error skewed the trial court’s maintenance award. 

 

2 Mr. Walters’ correct postdissolution income was $4,764 per month: $1,406 

(Social Security benefits) + $1,270 (half of community share of pension) + $2,088 

(separate share of pension). The trial court’s oral ruling determined Mr. Walters’ income 

was $4,944 per month, which it rounded to $5,000.
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Because Ms. Walters’ postdissolution earnings were $2,396 per month,3the 

court concluded $1,250 per month was necessary to equalize the parties’ 

incomes. In fact, $1,184 would have achieved this goal. The court’s final 

ruling did not correct these calculations.

• Separate property contribution: Although 45.1 percent of Mr. Walters’ 

WSP pension was his separate property, he contributed this portion of the 

pension to the community from 2005 to 2022. As a result, over $330,000 of 

Mr. Walters’ separate property merged with the community estate. 

Earning potential

At the time of divorce, Mr. Walters was 66 years old and retired. Before retiring, 

he had served as Chief of Police at Eastern Washington University and had conducted 

active shooter trainings through his Training for Survival, LLC. As of 2020, Mr. 

Walters’ LLC was defunct. 

Ms. Walters at the time of divorce also was of retirement age. For most of the 

Walters’ marriage, she had worked as a homemaker. Toward the end of their marriage, 

Ms. Walters had occasionally accepted part-time or seasonal employment. However, 

 

3 $1,126 (Social Security benefit) + $1,270 (half of community share of pension) = 

$2,396. 
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since 2008, Ms. Walters had suffered from multiple sclerosis (MS). She testified that this 

condition caused pain and numbness in her hands. As a result, she believed it was “not 

practical or reasonable for [her] to work.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 114.

While Mr. Walters conceded Ms. Walters’ MS diagnosis, he argued the condition 

did not prevent her from working. In support of this assertion, Mr. Walters cited the parttime and seasonal jobs Ms. Walters had accepted in recent years. He also cited a 

Facebook post wherein Ms. Walters purportedly claimed to have been healed. Ms. 

Walters admitted in testimony that she was healthy enough to kayak and take vacations. 

In its oral ruling, the trial court concluded Ms. Walters’ health prevented her from 

supplementing her income through employment. Conversely, the court found Mr. 

Walters could supplement his income by conducting active shooter trainings.

Procedural history

Mr. Walters moved for reconsideration, challenging the trial court’s valuation of 

several assets and calculation of spousal maintenance. He argued the latter impermissibly 

invaded his separate property and Social Security benefits. In her own motion for 

reconsideration, Ms. Walters asked the court to award her a greater share of the WSP 

pension in lieu of spousal maintenance. She argued this arrangement would be more 
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equitable because it would provide her with cost-of-living adjustments and because it 

would alleviate the need for ongoing contact with Mr. Walters. 

The trial court denied both motions. In its denial, the court noted that receiving 

maintenance payments did not require Ms. Walters to disclose her physical address to Mr. 

Walters, as she could receive her payments via direct deposit or at a post office box. 

Mr. Walters timely appeals the trial court’s dissolution order and denial of 

reconsideration. Ms. Walters cross appeals these same orders. 

ANALYSIS

A. DIVISION OF PROPERTY

Mr. Walters argues the trial court’s division of property erred by (1) mischaracterizing

his separate property, (2) relying on erroneous asset valuations, and (3) incorporating 

faulty calculations. Ms. Walters argues the court erred by characterizing too much of 

their estate as Mr. Walters’ separate property and by not awarding one-half of his pension 

to her, as equity demanded. 

Standard of review

We review a trial court’s division of marital property for abuse of discretion. In re 

Marriage of Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d 795, 803, 108 P.3d 779 (2005). A trial court 

operates within its discretion when its findings derive from the factual record, its 
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conclusions apply sound law, and its decisions are not manifestly unreasonable. In re 

Marriage of Bowen, 168 Wn. App. 581, 586-87, 279 P.3d 885 (2012). A decision is 

manifestly unreasonable when it lies “‘outside the range of acceptable choices.’” Id. at 

586 (quoting In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997)). 

Breadth of discretion

Under RCW 26.09.080, a trial court must divide marital property in a manner that 

“appear[s] just and equitable after considering all relevant factors.” Factors the court 

must consider include: (1) the nature and extent of community property, (2) the nature 

and extent of separate property, (3) the duration of the marriage, and (4) the parties’ 

relative economic circumstances. RCW 26.09.080(1)-(4).

A correct division of property may or may not result in equal shares but must result 

in fairness. See In re Marriage of Nicholson, 17 Wn. App. 110, 118, 561 P.2d 1116 

(1977). A division is fair when it is the product of “‘wise and sound discretion’” rather 

than “‘set or inflexible rules.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wn. App. 805, 

810, 538 P.2d 145 (1975)). While the separate or communal character of marital property 

is one factor the trial court must consider, it is not controlling. In re Marriage of Konzen, 

103 Wn.2d 470, 478, 693 P.2d 97 (1985). Instead, “all property is brought before the 

court for a ‘just and equitable’ distribution.” In re Marriage of Farmer, 172 Wn.2d 616, 
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625, 259 P.3d 256 (2011). 

One exception to the Farmer rule is Social Security benefits, which under 

42 U.S.C. § 407(a) are inalienable by the recipient. In re Marriage of Tupper, 15 Wn. 

App. 2d 796, 801, 478 P.3d 1132 (2020). While a trial court may consider Social 

Security benefits when assessing the parties’ relative economic circumstances, it may not 

“calculate a specific formal valuation” of Social Security benefits and award “a precise 

property offset based on that valuation.” In re Marriage of Zahm, 138 Wn.2d 213, 222, 

978 P.2d 498 (1999).

Within this framework, the court below was empowered to distribute the Walters’ 

marital assets in any manner, provided it (1) considered all relevant factors under 

RCW 26.09.080 and (2) did not divide the parties’ Social Security benefits. Additionally, 

the court’s factual findings required support from the record, its conclusions needed to 

rest on sound law, and its decisions could not be manifestly unreasonable. Bowen, 168 

Wn. App. at 586-87.

i. Consideration of relevant factors

The trial court expressly considered every RCW 26.09.080 factor when it divided 

the Walters’ marital assets.
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The court considered the “nature and extent of community property” when it 

admitted exhibits tabulating the Walters’ community assets and debt. RCW 26.09.080(1). 

The court heard testimony from the parties concerning the value of their assets. In its 

findings of fact, the court delineated each community asset and assigned a value to it. 

The court’s final opinion embraced the communal nature of this property by apportioning 

it evenly between the Walters.

The trial court considered the “nature and extent of separate property” when it 

carved out Ms. Walters’ kayak and bedroom furniture as separate property acquired by 

gift and before marriage, respectively. RCW 26.09.080(2). Likewise, the court used 

DRS’s line-rule calculation to carve out 45.1 percent of Mr. Walters’ WSP pension as his 

separate property acquired before marriage. Mr. Walters correctly alleges the court in its 

oral ruling misstated his interest as 49.1 percent, but the court corrected this error in its 

findings of fact and final ruling. 

As to both parties’ separate property, the trial court excluded these assets from its 

calculation of community property while noting the disparity they created between the 

parties’ respective financial outlooks. The court also noted Mr. Walters’ contribution to 

the community of over $330,000 in separate-property pension payments between 2005 

and 2022. Because these contributions flowed into the community, they became 
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community property; the court did not allocate them to Mr. Walters. Nevertheless, the 

attention the court paid to the disposition of those funds evinces its thorough 

consideration of the Walters’ separate assets.

The trial court considered the duration of the Walters’ marriage when it recited 

the three-decade history of that marriage during its oral ruling, taking care to 

acknowledge the agreements, expectations, and contributions that accrued over that time. 

RCW 26.09.080(3). The court also weighed the duration of the Walters’ marriage when 

it awarded spousal maintenance on the grounds that “this is a 29-plus-year marriage 

involving retired folks.” RP at 230.

Finally, the trial court considered the parties’ relative economic circumstances as a 

result of the divorce. RCW 26.09.080(4). Specifically, the court concluded Mr. Walters’ 

postdissolution income would outstrip Ms. Walters’ postdissolution income because of 

his separate share of the WSP pension and his larger Social Security benefit. 

Additionally, Mr. Walters could augment his income with active shooter trainings, 

whereas MS prevented Ms. Walters from earning any supplemental income. Although 

the court’s property disbursement did not itself offset this disparity, the court’s findings of 

fact and award of spousal maintenance indicate it was a consideration. 
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In sum, RCW 26.09.080 imposes no requirements the trial court did not satisfy.

ii. Social Security benefits

The trial court properly considered “‘the amount of [S]ocial [S]ecurity benefits’”

the Walters received as a means of “‘evaluat[ing] the economic circumstances.’” Zahm, 

138 Wn.2d at 223 (quoting In re Marriage of Zahm, 91 Wn. App. 78, 85, 955 P.2d 412 

(1998), aff’d, 138 Wn.2d 213). The court did not, as Zahm forbids, “calculate a specific 

formal valuation” of Mr. Walters’ Social Security benefit and award “a precise property 

offset based on that valuation.” Id. at 222.

In its oral ruling, the trial court acknowledged Mr. Walters’ $1,406 Social Security 

benefit and noted it was $300 higher than Ms. Walters’ $1,126 benefit. The court’s 

acknowledgment of these amounts remained squarely within the zone of “consideration” 

permitted by Zahm. Id. at 223. The acknowledgment did not stray into “calculat[ing] a 

specific formal valuation” of Mr. Walters’ benefit because, plainly, no such valuation 

occurred. Id. at 222. Valuating Mr. Walters’ monthly benefit would have entailed 

discounting future payments over the span of Mr. Walter’s life expectancy to determine 

the present value of his Social Security entitlement now, at dissolution. See In re 

Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 244, 170 P.3d 572 (2007). Subsequently, a 

“precise property offset” would have manifested as a lump-sum award to Ms. Walters 
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effectively extracting the benefit’s value from Mr. Walters’ share of the estate. Zahm, 

138 Wn.2d at 222. An examination of the court’s property division analysis reveals no 

calculations like these and no offset like this. Accordingly, the trial court’s property 

division did not divide either party’s Social Security benefits.

iii. Factual record

The trial court’s division of the Walters’ property rested on findings derived from 

the factual record. Bowen, 168 Wn. App. at 587. Such findings are proper when 

substantial evidence supports them. Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. at 242. Evidence is 

substantial when it is of sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of 

the truth of the declared premise. Id. 

Mr. Walters challenges the trial court’s findings on the grounds that they relied on 

faulty valuations of several assets—namely, the parties’ home, vehicles, boat, and ATV. 

However, as to each of these assets, the value the court assigned derived coherently from 

the Walters’ testimony and exhibits.

The trial court valued the proceeds from the Walters’ home, minus sums paid to 

creditors, at $414,656. Noting each party’s $100,000 advance from those proceeds, the 

court divided the remaining $214,656 equally, awarding $107,328 to each spouse. All of 

this was consistent with admitted testimony and exhibits. Mr. Walters correctly alleges 
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the court misstated the amount of home proceeds in its oral ruling, but the findings of fact 

and final ruling cured those misstatements. 

Regarding community vehicles, the trial court valued Mr. Walters’ Ford pickup at 

$6,000 and Ms. Walters’ Subaru Outback at $7,000. These values bear a coherent 

relationship to the valuations each party assigned the vehicles. Mr. Walters challenges 

these valuations on the grounds that his truck received retail valuation, whereas Ms. 

Walters’ vehicle received trade-in valuation. Because retail values outpace trade-in 

values, Mr. Walters contends the trial court inflated the value of the asset it charged to 

him. 

However, it was Mr. Walters himself who furnished an appraisal schedule for the 

pickup that included no trade-in value. Moreover, Mr. Walters testified that the Subaru 

should receive clean trade-in value. The court considered this evidence when it arrived at 

the valuations it did. There was no error and, if there was, it was invited. In re Marriage 

of Blakely, 111 Wn. App. 351, 360, 44 P.3d 924 (2002) (a party may not challenge an 

error he himself set up).

As to the Walters’ boat, the trial court used age, usage, and accessories—all in the

record—to arrive at a value of $15,000. This figure is higher than low retail for the boat 

and lower than average retail. Mr. Walters correctly argues Ms. Walters based her 
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$19,119 valuation of the boat on a more expensive model than the one the Walters

owned. However, Mr. Walters incorrectly argues the trial court’s $15,000 valuation “split 

the difference” between his $13,845 request and Ms. Walters’ misguided $19,119 request. 

Br. of Appellant at 45. Had the trial court split the difference in this regard, it would 

have valued the boat at $16,482—a figure nearly 10 percent higher than the value the 

court actually assigned. Instead, the trial court apparently did exactly what it claimed to 

have done—it accepted Mr. Walters’ low retail value for the boat, in light of its age and 

usage, but then increased that value incrementally in light of improvements the Walters 

made to the boat. Ms. Walters’ erroneous valuation did not ostensibly influence the trial 

court’s analysis. The court made a reasonable assessment derived from the factual record.

The trial court valued the Walters’ ATV at $4,000, which it said was “in the 

ballpark” of the vehicle’s $3,555 low retail value. RP at 224. This valuation is consistent 

with the valuation Ms. Walters requested from the court. It also represents the price Ms. 

Walters believed she and her husband should have sought for the ATV when they sold it. 

Instead of seeking that price, the couple agreed to sell the ATV for $2,800, at which 

point Mr. Walters would “make up for the difference” to Ms. Walters by paying her 

$2,000 of the proceeds. RP at 145. In light of this agreement, the court was justified in 

concluding $4,000 was a good-faith valuation for the ATV. If that valuation had been 
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absurd, Mr. Walters likely would not have offered to make up the difference to his wife. 

Moreover, the record indicates average retail value for the ATV was $4,675. For all these 

reasons, the record supports the trial court’s $4,000 valuation.

Mr. Walters correctly alleges the trial court in its oral ruling misstated certain facts 

related to the ATV. Specifically, the court stated that Ms. Walters herself sold the ATV 

for $4,000, rather than stating, as it should have, that Mr. Walters sold the vehicle for 

$2,800. The court did not correct this misstatement in its final ruling, where it credited 

each party with $2,000 in proceeds from the sale of the ATV. 

However, the court did correct this misstatement in its denial of reconsideration. 

The court in that order also clarified its valuation of the ATV, stating that $4,000 

represented a balancing of the vehicle’s low retail value—offered in evidence—against 

Ms. Walters’ own valuation. It is not clear whether such a balancing truly occurred, since 

Ms. Walters appears only to have valued the ATV at $4,000, rather than valuing it in 

excess of that sum. Even if the trial court simply honored Ms. Walters’ $4,000 request, 

however, the record—as discussed above—amply supports the reasonableness of that 

valuation.

The court’s denial of reconsideration also explained the $2,000 credits it allocated 

to each party. According to the order, the court credited Ms. Walters with $2,000 because 
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she received that amount and credited Mr. Walters with $2,000 in consideration of his 

decision to sell the ATV at below market value. In other words, Mr. Walters received 

$2,000 in value because he received $800 in cash along with the $1,200 convenience of 

accepting a lowball offer over his wife’s objection. The trial court’s $4,000 valuation of 

the ATV and respective $2,000 credits accordingly find support in the record and were 

not in error. 

iv. Sound law

The trial court divided the Walters’ property according to sound law. Bowen, 168 

Wn. App. at 587. Specifically, the court, as discussed above, considered every factor 

required by RCW 26.09.080 and fashioned an equitable property distribution within the 

broad discretion afforded by that statute. Additionally, the court followed the dictates of 

Zahm when it considered Social Security benefits without precisely offsetting them.

Mr. Walters argues the trial court misunderstood case law to impose a requirement 

that parties from long-term marriages emerge from a divorce in identical financial 

positions. We agree no such requirement exists. In re Marriage of Doneen, 197 Wn. 

App. 941, 950, 391 P.3d 594 (2017) (Rockwell does not mandate equal financial positions 

following the dissolution of a long-term marriage.). However, nothing in the record 
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indicates the trial court felt constrained in this way.4 Instead, the court in its own 

discretion simply allotted equal shares of the Walters’ community estate. While it is true 

the court in its spousal maintenance analysis elected to equalize the Walters’ incomes 

postdissolution, nothing indicates the court ordered this maintenance in compliance with 

any controlling case. Indeed, neither the court’s oral ruling nor its final ruling cites any 

law at all besides RCW 26.09.080 and RCW 26.09.090. The court’s denial of 

reconsideration does cite Zahm, but only to justify the court’s comparison of the parties’ 

Social Security benefits. 138 Wn.2d at 223. 

While Rockwell and other cases do not require equal financial positions in 

circumstances like that of the Walters, those cases certainly do not forbid equal division 

either. The trial court was empowered to award equal shares and did so.

v. Reasonableness

The trial court’s division of the Walters’ property was not manifestly unreasonable 

because the court’s ruling lay within “‘the range of acceptable choices.’” Bowen, 168 

Wn. App. at 586 (quoting Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 47). The court’s principle in dividing 

 

4 The court did state that Ms. Walters was “entitled to an award of spousal 

maintenance to equalize the economic condition of the parties post-dissolution.” RP at 

230. However, stating that Ms. Walters was “entitled” to such equalization falls short of 

citing case law requiring it. Obviously the court believed Ms. Walters was “entitled” to 

the spousal maintenance it awarded, or else the court would not have awarded it.
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the Walters’ property was to (1) preserve each party’s separate property and Social 

Security benefits and (2) award each party one-half of the community estate. Such a 

methodology honors the character of all property involved and protects each party’s 

interest in that property. While such equal division is not mandatory, it is certainly 

acceptable. 

Ms. Walters disagrees, arguing the trial court erred by not awarding her one-half of 

the total WSP pension, as equity demanded. We agree with Ms. Walters that such an 

award would have been within the court’s power, as “all property is brought before the 

court for a ‘just and equitable’ distribution.” Farmer, 172 Wn.2d at 625. We also agree 

that an increased share of the pension would have better protected Ms. Walters’ long-term 

security, as a pension offers cost-of-living adjustments whereas maintenance payments do 

not. Moreover, the trial court could have ordered such an award without invading Mr. 

Walters’ separate portion of the pension.5 

However, equity would merely have permitted such an award and did not require 

it. The trial court’s broad discretion under RCW 26.09.080 empowered it to divide the 

Walters’ property in any just and equitable fashion, provided it met the other requirements 

 

5 Ms. Walters could have taken 91 percent of the community share of the 

pension—equaling 50 percent of the total pension—leaving Mr. Walters with 9 percent of 

the community share along with his full separate share.
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already discussed. Ms. Walters’ preference for an alternative division does not, without 

more, undermine the legitimacy of the one the court ordered. 

Ms. Walters’ argument that an augmented share of the pension would better 

protect her privacy than spousal maintenance also is without merit. As the trial court 

indicated in its denial of reconsideration, Ms. Walters may already take measures to 

protect her privacy. She may receive spousal maintenance payments via direct deposit or 

at a post office box.

Ms. Walters further argues the trial court should have characterized the entirety of 

the WSP pension as community property, as the pension funds commingled over the 

course of the Walters’ marriage, and as Mr. Walters’ highest-earning years—from which 

pension payments are calculated—occurred during the marriage. Ms. Walters’ 

contentions are without merit, however, because Washington courts have adopted the 

time-rule method for dividing separate portions of a pension from community portions. 

Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. at 251, 254 (“If the pension was accumulated partly prior to 

marriage and partly after marriage, it is proportionately classified, with the portion 

acquired during marriage characterized as community property.”). 

In sum, the trial court’s assignment of separate property and equal division of 

community property were manifestly reasonable.
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B. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE

Mr. Walters also argues the trial court’s spousal maintenance order impermissibly 

invaded his separate assets, lacked sufficient evidentiary basis, improperly sought to 

equalize the parties’ incomes, and, impropriety notwithstanding, failed to equalize those 

incomes. 

Standard of review

We review a trial court’s spousal maintenance order for abuse of discretion. In re

Marriage of Condie, 15 Wn. App. 2d 449, 459, 475 P.3d 993 (2020). Our preceding 

discussion defines the scope of this review.

Breadth of discretion 

Under RCW 26.09.090(1), a trial court may order spousal maintenance “in such 

amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just . . . after considering all 

relevant factors.” Factors the court must consider include: (a) the receiving party’s 

financial circumstances, (b) the time necessary for the receiving party to retrain and seek 

appropriate employment, (c) the standard of living established during the marriage, 

(d) the duration of the marriage, (e) the age, health, and financial obligations of the party 

receiving maintenance, and (f) the financial circumstances of the paying party. 

RCW 26.09.090(1)(a)-(f).
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A trial court may award maintenance is any amount or for any duration provided 

the award is just. In re Marriage of Valente, 179 Wn. App. 817, 821, 320 P.3d 115 

(2014). While permanent maintenance awards are disfavored, “a lifetime maintenance 

award in a reasonable amount is proper ‘when it is clear the party seeking maintenance 

will not be able to contribute significantly to . . . her own livelihood.’” Id. at 822

(alteration in original) (quoting In re Marriage of Mathews, 70 Wn. App. 116, 124, 853 

P.2d 462 (1993)).

Within this framework, the trial court was empowered to award Ms. Walters 

spousal maintenance in any amount or for any duration, provided the award was just and 

provided the court considered all relevant factors under RCW 26.09.090(1). The court 

moreover was empowered to award lifetime maintenance if Ms. Walters was “‘not 

. . . able to contribute significantly to . . . her own livelihood.’” Id. (second alteration in 

original) (quoting Mathews, 70 Wn. App. at 124). Finally, the court’s factual findings 

required support from the record, its conclusions needed to rest on sound law, and its 

decisions could not be manifestly unreasonable. Bowen, 168 Wn. App. at 586-87.

i. Consideration of relevant factors

The court below considered every factor required under RCW 26.09.090(1). The 

court considered factors (a) and (f) when it determined Mr. Walters’ monthly income 
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postdissolution would be roughly double that of Ms. Walters. The court considered factor 

(b) when it concluded Ms. Walters was retired and would not be seeking future 

employment. The court considered factor (c) when it determined “both parties had a 

comfortable standard of living during the marriage.” RP at 229. The court considered 

factor (d) when it acknowledged that the 29-year duration of the Walters’ marriage 

influenced its spousal maintenance award. Finally, the court considered factor (e) when it 

concluded Ms. Walters’ MS diagnosis prevented her from supplementing her retirement 

income. 

ii. Justness of award

After considering the RCW 26.09.090(1) factors, the trial court awarded Ms. 

Walters lifetime maintenance of $1,250 per month. This award was just because the court 

used it to equalize the Walters’ incomes postdissolution. While case law does not require 

a trial court to equalize spouses’ incomes in this way, nothing prevents it from doing so. 

See Doneen, 197 Wn. App. at 950-51. Even the unpublished case Mr. Walters cites 

states expressly that “it is permissible for the trial court to try to place the parties to a 

long-term marriage on equal footing moving forward.” In re Marriage of McMaster, 

No. 37176-0-III, slip op. at 11 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2022) (unpublished), 

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/371760_unp.pdf.
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iii. Lifetime maintenance

The trial court’s award of lifetime maintenance comported with Valente because 

Ms. Walters’ age and health prevented her from “‘contribut[ing] significantly to . . . her 

own livelihood.’” 179 Wn. App. at 822 (alteration in original) (quoting Mathews, 70 Wn. 

App. at 124). While lifetime maintenance is disfavored, the court was empowered to 

make such an award in this circumstance. Id.

iv. Factual record

The trial court’s maintenance order rested on findings derived from the factual 

record. Bowen, 168 Wn. App. at 587. We discern no error besides a mathematical one 

the court may easily correct.

Mr. Walters argues the trial court erred when it concluded without evidence that 

Ms. Walters was unable to work. However, the record supported the court’s conclusion 

in this regard. First, Ms. Walters offered uncontradicted testimony that she had suffered 

from MS for 14 years. Ms. Walters also testified that her primary duties throughout the 

marriage were as a homemaker—rather than as a breadwinner—suggesting diminished 

professional prospects. Finally, the court properly inferred from testimony that Ms. 

Walters was of retirement age, leaving her ill-suited for long-term employment.
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The court heard other evidence suggesting Ms. Walters could work. Mr. Walters 

testified that his wife was physically capable, despite her diagnosis. He also testified that 

Ms. Walters had accepted part-time employment in the recent past and had celebrated her 

recovery from MS. Ms. Walters admitted to being healthy enough to kayak and take 

vacations. 

Given the breadth of evidence before it, the trial court could have properly 

concluded Ms. Walters could work or could not. It concluded she could not.

Mr. Walters similarly argues the trial court erred by concluding without evidence 

that he was able to work. Specifically, Mr. Walters contends the court had no evidentiary 

basis for its finding that he could use his defunct LLC to supplement his income. Without

disputing the LLC’s defunct status, however, the court merely inferred from the LLC’s 

existence that Mr. Walters possessed a marketable skill—namely, conducting active 

shooter trainings. This was a fair conclusion to draw from Mr. Walters’ own testimony,

where he admitted earning income from such trainings just two years prior to trial.

Finally, Mr. Walters argues the trial court erred by failing to calculate a 

maintenance payment that fulfilled its goal of equalizing the Walters’ incomes. After 

reviewing the record, we agree with Mr. Walters that the trial court erroneously 

concluded a $1,250-per-month maintenance payment would “equalize the economic 
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condition of the parties post-dissolution.” RP at 230.

The error arose when the trial court mistakenly characterized 49.1 percent of the 

WSP pension as Mr. Walters’ separate party, rather than 45.1 percent. As a result, the 

court determined Mr. Walters’ postdissolution monthly income to be $4,944, which it 

rounded to $5,000. Because this sum exceeded Ms. Walters’ income by approximately 

$2,500, the court ordered a $1,250 equalization payment.

Although the court in its final ruling and denial of reconsideration correctly stated 

that Mr. Walters’ separate share of the pension was 45.1 percent, neither order 

recalculated the maintenance award to reflect that correction. Had the court done so, it 

would have determined Mr. Walters’ postdissolution income to be $4,764 per month 

rather than $4,944. Because Ms. Walters’ postdissolution income was $2,396, the 

resulting equalization payment should have been $1,184 rather than $1,250.

Sixty-six dollars is not a tremendous sum within the context of a large marital 

estate. However, because Mr. Walters must pay this maintenance monthly until he or Ms. 

Walters dies, the overage as a result of the trial court’s error could prove substantial. Mr. 

Walters is 66 years old. According to Social Security Administration actuarial tables, he 

may expect to live another 16 years.6 In that time, he would pay $12,672 more in 

 

6 https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html.
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maintenance than the court had intended him to pay. 

v. Sound law

The trial court’s maintenance order remained within the requirements of 

RCW 26.09.090 and all applicable case law. Mr. Walters disagrees, arguing case law 

forbade the trial court from invading his separate property and Social Security benefits.

While Mr. Walters correctly states that Zahm forbids trial courts from reassigning 

Social Security benefits, case law does not forbid a court from reassigning separate 

property. As Farmer makes clear, “all property is brought before the court for a ‘just and 

equitable’ distribution.” 172 Wn.2d at 625. While RCW 26.09.080(2) requires courts to 

consider “the nature and extent of the separate property” as one factor in their distribution 

analyses, what guides a court’s division order is fairness, not the preservation of any 

separate estate. Konzen, 103 Wn.2d at 478. 

Mr. Walters cites Stokes v. Polley in support of his position, which states that 

“Washington courts refrain from awarding separate property of one spouse to the other if 

a just and equitable division is possible without doing so.” 145 Wn.2d 341, 347, 37 P.3d 

1211 (2001). However, we need not determine in this case whether equity compelled the 

trial court to reassign Mr. Walters’ separate property, as the court made no such 

reassignment. Nor did the court reassign Mr. Walters’ Social Security benefit.
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Under the trial court’s dissolution order, Mr. Walters retained three sources of 

income: (1) his 45.1 percent separate share of the WSP pension ($2,088 per month); 

(2) his 50 percent share of the community portion of the pension ($1,270 per month); and 

(3) his $1,406 Social Security benefit. The court’s maintenance award was $1,250 per 

month. Accordingly, Mr. Walters’ $1,270-per-month share of the community portion of 

the pension was sufficient to defray the maintenance award without reducing his separate 

property pension payment or Social Security payment by even one dollar. 

Mr. Walters proposes an alternative interpretation whereby the court’s $1,250 

maintenance award resulted specifically from leveling the parties’ Social Security 

benefits and halving Mr. Walters’ separate share of the pension. While this interpretation 

enables Mr. Walters to assign dual errors—invasion of separate property and invasion of 

Social Security—it also requires our court to divine which dollars in a pot of money came 

from which sources, which we are unable to do. A deferential interpretation of the trial 

court’s order—which abuse of discretion review requires—is that the order touched only 

community property.

vi. Reasonableness

The trial court’s decision to place the Walters on equal footing postdissolution is 

manifestly reasonable. To conclude otherwise would be to prohibit equal outcomes for 
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In re Marr. of Walters 

equal partners in a marriage. 

C. REQUEST FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 

Ms. Walters requests attorney fees on appeal. RCW 26.09.140 grants trial and 

appellate courts discretion to award a party their reasonable attorney fees. In exercising 

our discretion, we consider the merit of the issues on appeal and the parties' respective 

financial resources. In re Marriage ofC.MC., 87 Wn. App. 84, 89, 940 P.2d 669 (1997), 

aff'd, 136 Wn.2d 800, 966 P.2d 1247 (1998)). We decline Ms. Walters' request, largely 

because the trial court's property and maintenance awards placed the parties on equal 

financial footing. 

Affirmed, but remanded for correction. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Cooney, J. 

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