### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs N

ovember 9, 1998

E. L. REID v. W. G. LUTCHE
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 97-121-III Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

No. M1997-00229-COA-R3-CV - Filed January 24, 2001

This appeal involves a

prisoner’s chal

lenges to the Depa

rtment of Correc

tion’s in mate grieva nce procedures and

to an unfavorabl

e disciplinary decision. After the Depar tment denied his re

quests for a declaratory order, the prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking declaratory

relief and judicial review of the disciplinary proceeding. The trial court dismissed the prisoner’s suit because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

W ILLIAM C. K OCH , J R ., J., delivered th e opinion of the co

urt, in which B EN H. C ANTRELL , P.J., M.S., and P ATRICIA J. C OTTRELL , J., joined.
Eldred L. Reid, Nashville, Tennessee, Pro Se. John R. Miles, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, W.G. Lutche.

OPINION

In June 1991, Eldred Reid r aped a woman he h

ad just met. A Ruther

ford County

jur y convicted him of rape in March 1992, and he was sentenced to serve nine years in the custody of the Department

of Correction. The Court of Criminal Appeals later rev ers ed the conviction. State v. Reid , 882 S.W.2d 423, 430 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Mr. Reid stood trial a second time, and a jury again convicted him of rape. He ag ain received a nine-year sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this

conviction and sentence. State v. Reid , No. 01C01-9511-CC-00390, 1997 WL 311916, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 1997), perm. app, denied, (Tenn. Feb. 23, 1998 & Oct. 11, 1999). Mr. Reid was incarcerated for a time at the N

orthwest Correc

tional Center and i

s currently confined at the Deberry Special Needs Facility in Nashville.

The incident that

gave rise to

this litigation apparently occurred in September 1996 while Mr. Reid was confined at the N

orthwest Correc

tional Center. Ac

cording to Mr. Reid

, he was unable

to1 A copy o f the disciplin ary boa rd’s decisio n in not in the record. M r. Reid alleg es, withou t evidentiar y suppo rt, that the decision adversely affect ed his accumulation of good and honor time.

2 Mr. Reid m ay have attempte d to griev e the discip lin ary b oard’s decision t hrough the prison’s int ernal grievance process. We are unable to rule con clusively on this poin t because Mr. Reid failed to file t he affidavit r

equired by Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-806( a) (1997) st

ating tha t he fil ed a grievance

and providing

a copy o f th e grievance committee’s final dec ision.

3 Mr. Reid has becom e a prolific litiga tor during his incarce ration. He has filed no fewer tha t fifteen sepa rate lawsuits in state and f

ederal cour

t taking correcti

on offici als to t

ask for a var

iety of t hings, i ncluding the

delivery of medical care, the loss o f personal prop erty, and other disciplina ry board action s.

4 Surprisi ngly, the Attorn ey Gen eral did not take issue wit h Mr. Reid’s decision t

o name Mr. Lutche as the sole defend ant. There is substant ial questi

on about whether Mr. Lutche is a proper party, especial

ly in light of

the fact that he has no formal deci sion-making rol e in eit her the gri

evance or dis ciplina

ry process.

One would have thought t hat the proper defendants would h ave been either the warden of the Northw est Correctional Center or the Commissioner.
-2- eat breakfast i

n the prison dining ha

ll because a back

injury hindered hi

s mobility

in the morning. After the prison authorities declined to bring him breakfast in his cell, Mr. Reid began to s ta rt off his day by making himself some chicken noodle soup. One day when spaghetti was the fare in the dining hall, Mr. Reid claims he requested and received a plastic sandwich bag filled with the shredded cheese that was being

served with the spaghetti. Mr. Reid asserts that he intended to take the shredded cheese back to his cell to eat along with his morning cup of chicken noodle soup.

OnSeptember 15, 1996, a correctional officer found approximat ely “a ha lf pound bag of shredded cheese” in Mr. Reid’s possession. After conf irming that the che

ese came from the prison dining hall, the officer charg ed Mr. Reid with lar

ceny. The prison d

isciplinary boar

d held a hearing
on the charge on Sep

tember 18, 1996, a

nd Mr. Reid recei

ved what he char

acterizes as a

n “illegal,
u nconstitutionally

obtained conviction.” The record contains no information regarding th e punishmentMr. Reid received. 1 What happened next is unclear. The record does not show whether Mr. Reid ap pealed the disciplinary board’s decision to the warden and the Commissioner o f Correction

as contemplated in Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 0420-3-1-.10(1)(f) (1999). 2 Mr. Reid asserts that “the completion of the appeal process was not completed

to maintain the time

frame for writ of certiorari from the Commissioner,” and the disciplinary board’s reco rds were “taken” by prison officials to prevent further review of the disciplinary board’s action.

On Janu ary 10, 1997, Mr. Reid filed a pro se action 3 in the Chancery Co

urt for Davidso

n County against W. G. Lutc

he, a legal assist

ant employed in the

Nashville

office of the Department of Correction. He so

ught a declaratory judgment that the prison’s internal grievance procedure was ineffective, and he also sought judicial review of the disciplinary board’s action by either declaratory judgmentor writ of certiorari. The Attorney G eneral and Re porter responde

d with a motion to dismiss asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 4 Mr. Reid responded with a flurry of papers vigorously opposing the dismissal of his complaint.-3-

OnSeptembe r 4, 1997, after wading through Mr. Reid’s papers, the trial court filed a memorandum

and order dismissing Mr. Reid’ s complaint. The trial court found that “[s]uch a gener alized, broad brush challenge fails to state a claim upon which relief can be gra nted. Pu t simply, there is no specific dispute or controve rsy unde r the common law writ of certiorari or declaratory

judgment provisions of the statute for this Court to render a decision on this case.” The court characterized Mr. Reid’s challenge to the disciplinary board’s action as “nothing more than a disagreement

with the intrinsic c

orrectness

of the decision” which was beyond thelimited scope of review under a common-law writ of certiorari. Mr. Reid has appealed.

I. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
Mr. Reid is untrained in the lawand is representing himself in this proceeding. The papers he f iled in the trial court and in this court are quite difficult to understand. Like other legal documents

he has prepared, these papers are “largely incoherent.” Reid v. Lutche , No. 01A01-9803- CH-00168, 1999 WL 166543, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1999) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 applicationf

iled). N onetheless, mindful of Mr. Reid’s practical limitations, we will indulge his work with as much latitude as is practicable, stopping short of crossing the line between fairness to a pro
se prisoner and unf

airness to the State

of Tennessee. W

hile we will

apply a less stringent standard to his pleadings, Fox v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles , No. 01A01-9506-CH-00263, 1995 WL 681135, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. N

ov. 17, 1995) (No T

enn. R. App. P. 11 app

lication filed), w

e willnot excuse him fr om complian ce with the same procedural and substantive rules that represented parties are required to observe. Kaylor v. Bradley , 912 S.W.2d 728, 733 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

T he s tandards for re

viewing the dismissa

l of a complaint pur

suant to Tenn. R. Civ.

P. 12.02(6) are well-settled. The sole purpose of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion is to test the legal sufficiency

of the allegation

s in th e complaint. Sanders v. Vinson , 558 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. 1977); Kaylor v. B radley , 912 S.W.2d at 731. The focus of the inquiry is on the complaint itself, Cook v. Spinnaker’s of Rivergate, Inc. , 878 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tenn. 1994). The

courts must construe the allegations in t he complaint liber

ally and must t

ake them as true. Waller v. Cox , 16 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). No matter how poor lydrafted, a complaint should not be dismissed if it

states a cause of action that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Dobbs v. Guenther , 846 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Even when we construe a complaint in its most f

avorable light, Wilson v. Tennessee Dep’t of Correction , No. 01A01-9806-CH-00302, 1999 WL 652016, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1999) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 applicationfiled); Mack v. Jones , No. 03A01-9806-CV-00215, 1999 WL 172645, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 1999) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed), the complaint must still allege enough facts that give rise to a claim for relief. Jasper Engine & Transmission Exch. v. Mill s , 91 1 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). The adequacy of a complaint’s allegations is a question of law that will be reviewed on appeal without

a presumption of correctness. Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co. , 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997).-4- II. T HE C HALLENGE TO THE I NMATE G RIEVANCE P ROCEDURE
Mr. Reid’s first

challenge appears to bedirected toward the Northwest Correctional Center’s inmategrievance procedure. His complaints donot appear to be grounded in any identifiable set of circumstances involving a particular grievance that Mr. Reid attempted to pursue. As best we can tell, Mr. Reid is now seeking a declaratory judgment exempting himself and the rest of the prisoners “from having to use the grievance process for it is ineffective, does not work at all.”

A.
Decl aratory

judgment proceedings are intended to settle disputes and to afford relief fro m uncertainty

and insecurity with respect to rights, status, or other legal relations arising under deeds, wills, written contracts, municipal ordinances, and statutes. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-14-103, -113 (2000). They are also av ailable to resolve

questions involving t

h e validity orapplicability of the rules or orders of stat

e administrative a

gencies. Tenn. Co

de Ann. § 4-5-225(

a) (1998). These proceeding s enable partie s whose rights are at stake to invoke the aid of the courts to remove uncertainty

from their legal r

elatio ns and, th

us, to clarify and stabilize these rights before irretrievabl e, or at least prejudicial, acts are taken. Delaney v. Carter Oil Co. , 174 F.2d 314, 317 (10th Cir. 1949).

The existence of

a justiciable issue

is a prerequisite

for a declarat

ory judgment. Campbell
v. Sundquist

, 926 S.W.2d 250, 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Parks v. Alexander , 608 S.W.2d 881, 891- 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 198 0). For the purpose of a declarator

y judgment, a justic

iable is sue is a real controversy

between persons with real and adverse interests. Memphis P ubl’g Co. v. City of Memphis , 513 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tenn. 1974); Cummings v. Beeler , 189 Tenn. 151, 156, 223 S.W.2d 913, 915 (1949). It involves present rights that have accrued under presently existing facts. Oldham
v. American Civil L iberties Union Found. of Tenn., Inc. , 910 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Third Nat’l Bank v. Carver , 31 Tenn. App. 520, 527, 218 S.W.2d 66, 69 (1948). Granting a declaratory judgment is a discretionary matter. East Sevie r Util. D ist. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust

Co. , 570 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tenn. 1978); Wunderlich v. Fortas , 776 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 989). Thus, appellate courts will not disturb a trial court’s denial of a declaratory

judgmentunless the trial court acted arbitrarily. State ex rel. Earh art v. City of Bristol , 970 S.W.2d 948, 954 (Tenn. 1998).

B.

Mr. Reid’s complaint fails to articulate a viable declaratory judgment claim for two reasons. First, he has not alleged how any of his presently existing rights have been affected by the operation of the inmate grieva

nce procedure . These grievanc e procedures a

re not c onstitutio nally required. Miller v. Jones , 791 F. Supp. 240, 241 ( E.D. Mo. 1992); Spencer v. Moore , 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Thus, the existence of a grievance pr ocess creates no substantive rights for any5 A prisoner has a li berty interest

only in freedom from restraint imposing atypical

and signif

icant hardship on the inmate compared t

o the ordinar

y incident

s of pris on life. Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct.2293, 2300 (1 995); Orellana v. Kyle , 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995).

6 The Attorney Genera

l, rel ying heavily on Mandela v. Camp bell , 978 S.W .2d 531 (Tenn. 1 998), also insists that Mr. Reid has fai

led to state a c

laim upon which relief can be granted because the inmate di sciplinary procedures
are not rules

withing t

he purview of

the rule- making requirem ents of the U niform Adm inistrative Pro cedures Act. Wh ile the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that t he General Assembly did not envision that the Departm ent’s disciplinary policies and pro cedures should b e prom ulgated a s rules, Mand ela v. Cam pbell , 978 S.W.2d at 535, it i s not at all clear that the same conclusion applies with regard to inmate gr ievance procedures. When the General Assembly directe d the Department

to esta blish an i nmate grievance

system in 1996,

it ins tructed t he Commissioner t

o promulgate t

he rules and regulati ons needed to effectua te the system in accord ance w ith the Uniform Adminis trati ve Procedures Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-818 (1997).Because of the shortcomings in Mr. Reid’s co mplain t that we ha ve alread y discusse d, this appeal d oes not p rovide a p roper oc casion to a ddress this q uestion.
-5- particular prisoner. It gives rise to no protected liberty interest. 5 Mann v. Adams , 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Pryor-el

v. Kelly , 892 F. Supp. 261, 275 (D.D.C. 1995). Because prisoners have no constitutional stake in grievance procedures, Harksen v. Garratt , 29 F. Supp. 2d 272, 280 (E.D. Va. 1998), violations of

grievance proc

edures do not aff

ect a prisoner’s constitutional rights. Spencer
v. Moore , 638 F. Supp. at 316. For that reason, Mr. Reid’s complaint cannot state a claim that his rights are being impaired or threatened by the prison’s administration of the inmate grievance procedure.
Second, Mr. Reid has not demonstrated how he has been harmed

by a statute, rule, or order. By their own terms, both Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-14-10 3 & 4-5-2 25 require persons seeking a declaratory

judgment to allege that a private interest or per sonal righ t has been affected by the enforcement

of a state statute, a rule or regulation promulgated by an administrative agency, or order issued by an administrative agency under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. No matter how charitably we re

ad Mr. Reid’s comp

laint, nowhere does he identify and then challenge or seek
aninterpretation of any

specific state st

atute or Department of

Correction rule o

r order. The closest he comes is the following broadside allegation: “[g]rievance is in violation of Public Chapter No. 913, known as Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-21-801, 41-21-817, 41-21-818.” That passage, which is the apogee of that portion of Mr. Reid’s declaratory judgment complaint, does not embody any claim on which the court

can declare a

party’s rights. 6

III. T HE C HALLENGE TO THE P RISON D ISCIPLINARY B OARD ’ S A CTION
Mr. Reid also seeks judicial review of the disciplinary proceedings involving the theft of the shredded cheese. He asserts

that he is entitled to judicial review through either a Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225 proceeding for declarator y judgment, a statut

ory writ of certi

orari, or a commo

n-law writ of certiorari. Mr. Reid is not entitled to review under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225 or a statutory writ of certiorari. The only vehicle for obtaining j udicial review of the results of a prison disciplinary proceeding is through a common-law writ of certiorari. Rhoden v. State Dep’t of Correction , 984-6-

S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1998); Bishop v. Conley , 894 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Petitions for a common-law writ of certiora

ri must be filed with

in sixty days after the entry of the order or judgm

ent at issue. Tenn

. Code Ann. § 27-9- 102 (2000). This sta tutory time

limit is mandatory

and jurisdictiona

l. Thandiwe v. Traughber , 909 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). Thus, if a petition for common-law writ of certiorari is not tim ely filed, the courts have no jurisdiction to review the contested decision. Turner v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles , 993 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Wheeler v. C ity of Memphis , 685 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Fairhaven Corp. v. Tenness ee Health Facilities Comm’n , 566 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

Mr. Reid’s papers do not clearly set out when the inmate disciplinary board at the Nort

hwest Correctional Center imposed th e punishment on him for stealing the shredded cheese. Our independent

review of the record reveals that this disciplinary decision was made o n or about September

18, 1996. Mr. Reid filed his petition for common-law writ of certiorari on January 10, 1997 – more than sixty days after the date of the disciplinary board’s d ecision. Accord

ingly, his petition was not timely and did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

IV.

We affirm the September 4, 1997 memorandum and order dismissing Mr. Reid’s complaint and remand the caseto the trial court for whatever further proceedings may be required. We tax the costs of this appeal to Eldred L. Reid for which execution, if necessary, may issue.

____________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE