55852 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 117 and 121 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–1093; Notice No. 10– 

11] 

RIN 2120–AJ58 

Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest 

Requirements 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA is proposing to 

amend its existing flight, duty and rest 

regulations applicable to certificate 

holders and their flightcrew members. 

The proposal recognizes the growing 

similarities between the types of 

operations and the universality of 

factors that lead to fatigue in most 

individuals. Fatigue threatens aviation 

safety because it increases the risk of 

pilot error that could lead to an 

accident. The new requirements, if 

adopted, would eliminate the current 

distinctions between domestic, flag and 

supplemental operations. The proposal 

provides different requirements based 

on the time of day, whether an 

individual is acclimated to a new time 

zone, and the likelihood of being able to 

sleep under different circumstances. 

DATES: Comments are due November 15, 

2010. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical issues: Dale E. Roberts, Air 

Transportation Division (AFS–200), 

Flight Standards Service, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–5749; e-mail: 

dale.e.roberts@faa.gov. For legal issues: 

Rebecca MacPherson, Office of the Chief 

Counsel, Regulations Division (AGC– 

200), 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–3073; e-mail: 

rebecca.macpherson@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Later in 

this preamble under the Additional 

Information section, we discuss how 

you can comment on this proposal and 

how we will handle your comments. 

Included in this discussion is related 

information about the docket, privacy, 

and the handling of proprietary or 

confidential business information. We 

also discuss how you can get a copy of 

this proposal and related rulemaking 

documents. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules on 

aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the 

United States Code. This rulemaking is 

promulgated under the authority 

described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), 

which requires the Administrator to 

promulgate regulations and minimum 

safety standards for other practices, 

methods, and procedures necessary for 

safety in air commerce and national 

security. 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary 

II. Background 

A. Statement of the Problem 

B. NTSB Recommendations 

C. International Standards 

1. Amendment No. 33 to the International 

Standards and Recommended Practices, 

Annex 6 to the Convention on 

International Civil Aviation, Part I, 

International Commercial Air 

Transport—Aeroplanes (ICAO Standards 

and Recommended Practices (SARP)) 

2. United Kingdom Civil Aviation 

Authority Publication 371 (CAP–371) 

3. Annex III, Subpart Q to the Commission 

of the European Communities Regulation 

No. 3922/91, as Amended (EU OPS 

Subpart Q) 

III. General Discussion of the Proposal 

A. Applicability 

B. Joint Responsibility 

C. Fatigue Training 

D. Flight Duty Period 

E. Acclimating to a New Time Zone 

F. Daily Flight Time Restrictions 

G. Mitigation Strategies 

1. Augmentation 

2. Split Duty Rest 

H. Consecutive Nighttime Flight Duty 

Periods 

I. Reserve Duty 

J. Cumulative Duty Periods 

K. Rest Requirements 

1. Pre-Flight Duty Period Rest 

2. Cumulative Rest Requirements 

L. Fatigue Risk Management Systems 

M. Commuting 

N. Exception for Emergency and 

Government Sponsored Operations 

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

I. Executive Summary 

As discussed in greater detail 

throughout this document, this 

rulemaking proposes to establish one set 

of flight time limitations, duty period 

limits, and rest requirements for pilots 

in part 121 operations. The rulemaking 

aims to ensure that pilots have an 

opportunity to obtain sufficient rest to 

perform their duties, with an objective 

of improving aviation safety. 

Current part 121 pilot duty and rest 

times differ by type of operation 

(domestic, flag, and supplemental). A 

general summary of current versus 

proposed flight time limits, duty time 

limits, and rest time requirements are 

included in the table below. 

Scenario 

Rest time Duty time Flight time 

Minimum rest 

prior to duty— 

domestic 

Minimum rest 

prior to duty— 

international 

Maximum flight 

duty time— 

unaugmented 

Maximum flight 

duty time— 

augmented 

Maximum flight 

time— 

unaugmented 

Maximum flight 

time—augmented 

Current Part 121 .... Daily: 8–11 depending on 

flight time.

Minimum of 8 

hours to twice 

the number of 

hours flown.

16 ........................ 16–20 depending 

on crew size.

8 .......................... 8–16 depending 

on crew size. 

NPRM .................... 9 .......................... 9 .......................... 9–13 depending 

on start time 

and number of 

flight segments.

12–18 depending 

on start time, 

crew size, and 

aircraft rest facility.

8–10 depending 

on FDP start 

time.

None. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55853 

1 57 FR 26685; June 15, 1992. 

2Flightcrew Member Duty Period Limitations, 

Flight Time Limitations and Rest Requirements 

notice of proposed rulemaking (60 FR 65951; 

December 20, 1995). 

3 74 FR 61067. 

4A ‘‘flightcrew member’’ is defined in 14 CFR 1.1 

as a pilot, flight engineer, or flight navigator 

assigned to duty in an aircraft during flight time. 

5 In this document, the terms ‘‘certificate holder’’ 

and ‘‘carrier’’ are used interchangeably. Technically, 

one could be a ‘‘certificate holder’’ under part 121 

without also being an air carrier. Accordingly, the 

draft regulatory text only uses the term ‘‘certificate 

holder’’. 

6See http://www.faa.gov/about/office%5Forg/

headquarters%5Foffices/avs/offices/afs/afs200/ for 

the ARC Charter. 

7While tasked to consider part 135 operations, 

the ARC did not consider these operations, and this 

proposal does not address them either. 

8A copy of the ARC recommendations can be 

found in the docket for this rulemaking. 

9See proposed § 117.3 (Definitions) were the term 

‘‘Reserve Flightcrew Member’’ is defined. 

10This proposal may be found in attachment 1 to 

the ARC report. 

11This proposal may be found in attachment 2 to 

the ARC report. 

A summary of the FAA estimates of 

the costs and benefits associated with 

the provisions in this rule can be found 

in the table below. 

Nominal costs 

(millions) 

PV costs 

(millions) 

Total Costs (over 10 years) ..................................................................................................................... $1,254.1 $803.5 

Benefits Nominal benefits 

(millions) 

PV benefits 

(millions) 

$6.0 million VSL ....................................................................................................................................... 659.40 463.80 

$8.4 million VSL ....................................................................................................................................... 837 589 

The FAA began considering changing 

its existing flight, duty and rest 

regulations in June 1992, when it 

announced the tasking of the Aviation 

Rulemaking Advisory Committee 

(ARAC) Flightcrew Member Flight/Duty 

Rest Requirements working group.1 The 

tasking followed the FAA’s receipt of 

hundreds of letters about the 

interpretation of existing rest 

requirements and several petitions to 

amend existing regulations. While the 

working group could not reach 

consensus, it submitted a final report in 

June 1994 with proposals from several 

working group members. Following 

receipt of the ARAC’s report, the FAA 

published a notice of proposed 

rulemaking in 1995 (1995 NPRM).2 The 

FAA received over 2000 comments to 

the 1995 NPRM. Although some 

commenters, including the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 

NASA, Air Line Pilots Association, and 

Allied Pilots Association, said the 

proposal would enhance safety, many 

industry associations opposed the 1995 

NPRM, stating the FAA lacked safety 

data to justify the rulemaking, and 

industry compliance would impose 

significant costs. The FAA never 

finalized the 1995 rulemaking, and on 

November 23, 2009, the agency 

withdrew it because it was outdated and 

raised many significant issues that the 

agency needed to consider before 

proceeding with a final rule.3

On June 10, 2009, Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) Administrator J. 

Randolph Babbitt testified before the 

Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, 

Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, 

Safety, and Security on Aviation Safety 

regarding the FAA’s role in the 

oversight of certificate holders. He 

addressed issues regarding flightcrew 

member 4 training and qualifications, 

flightcrew fatigue, and consistency of 

safety standards and compliance 

between air transportation certificate 

holders.5 He also committed to assess 

the safety of the air transportation 

system and to take appropriate steps to 

improve it. 

In June 2009, the FAA chartered the 

Flight and Duty Time Limitations and 

Rest Requirements Aviation Rulemaking 

Committee (ARC) 6 comprised of labor, 

industry, and FAA representatives to 

develop recommendations for an FAA 

rule based on current fatigue science 

and a thorough review of international 

approaches to the issue. The FAA 

chartered the ARC to provide a forum 

for the U.S. aviation community to 

discuss current approaches to mitigate 

fatigue found in international standards 

and make recommendations on how the 

United States should modify its 

regulations. The ARC consisted of 18 

members representing airline and union 

associations. The members were 

selected based on their extensive 

certificate holder management, direct 

operational experience, or both. 

Specifically, the FAA asked the ARC 

to consider and address the following: 

• A single approach to addressing 

fatigue that consolidates and replaces 

existing regulatory requirements for 

parts 121 and 135.7

• Generally accepted principles of 

human physiology, performance, and 

alertness based on the body of fatigue 

science. 

• Information on sources of aviation 

fatigue. 

• Current approaches to address 

fatigue mitigation strategies in 

international standards. 

• The incorporation of fatigue risk 

management systems (FRMS) into a 

rulemaking. 

The ARC met over a 6-week period 

beginning July 7, 2009. Early on, the 

FAA told the ARC members it was very 

interested in the ARC’s 

recommendations, but that the agency 

retained the authority and obligation to 

evaluate any proposals and 

independently determine how best to 

amend the existing regulations. The 

agency reiterated that participation on 

the ARC in no way precluded the ARC 

members from submitting comments 

critical of the NPRM when it was 

published. On September 9, 2009, the 

ARC delivered its final report to the 

FAA in the form of a draft NPRM.8

The ARC’s goal was to reach as much 

agreement as possible on the 

prospective regulation. However, the 

members recognized early on that they 

would not be able to reach consensus on 

all issues. They were, however, 

generally successful in agreeing upon 

broad regulatory approaches and were 

able to reach consensus on two issues— 

how to address reserve 9 and the role of 

commuting in any proposed regulations. 

The Cargo Airline Association (CAA) 

presented a separate proposal for FAA 

consideration to address the unique 

operations of its members.10 According 

to the CAA, cargo operations are subject 

to different operational and competitive 

factors than scheduled passenger air 

carrier operations, including flight 

delays and schedule changes outside of 

the control of the certificate holder. The 

National Air Carrier Association 

(NACA) also submitted an alternate 

proposal to the ARC.11 NACA proposed 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55854 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

12A bibliography of available studies has been 

placed in the docket for this rulemaking. 

that the regulations contained in subpart 

S to part 121 continue to apply to 

certificate holders conducting 

unscheduled supplemental operations. 

In addition, it proposed to include a 

requirement that such operators develop 

and implement FRMS. 

To assist the ARC with its goal of 

developing proposed rules to enhance 

flightcrew member alertness and 

employ fatigue mitigation strategies, the 

following experts in sleep, fatigue, and 

human performance research presented 

a brief overview of the existing science 

and studies on sleep and fatigue to the 

ARC: 

• Dr. Gregory Belenky, M.D., Sleep 

and Performance Research Center, 

Washington State University and Dr. 

Steven R. Hursh, Ph.D., President, 

Institutes for Behavior Resources, 

Professor, Johns Hopkins University 

School of Medicine presented 

information on sleep, fatigue, and 

human performance. 

• Dr. Thomas Nesthus, Ph.D., FAA 

Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) 

presented an overview of the current 

FAA fatigue studies. 

• Dr. Peter Demitry, M.D., 4d 

Enterprises, addressed questions from 

the ARC but did not make a 

presentation. 

The ARC members considered the 

information presented by the scientists 

as well as other available scientific 

information and used their substantial 

operational experience knowledge base 

to develop the ARC proposals. 

Following their presentations, the 

scientific experts encouraged the ARC to 

consider the entire body of scientific 

studies in developing any proposed 

limitations and requirements, rather 

than any one scientific study.12

On August 1, 2010, the President 

signed the Airline Safety and Federal 

Aviation Administration Extension Act 

of 2010, Public Law 111–216 (the Act). 

In section 212 of the Act, Congress 

directed the FAA to issue regulations no 

later than August 1, 2011 to ‘‘specify 

limitations on the hours of flight and 

duty time allowed for pilots to address 

problems relating to pilot fatigue.’’ 

The Act directed the FAA to consider 

several factors that could impact pilot 

alertness including time of day, number 

of takeoffs and landings, crossing 

multiple time zones, and the effects of 

commuting. In addition, the agency was 

directed to review the available research 

on fatigue, sleep and rest requirements 

recommended by the NTSB and NASA, 

and applicable international standards. 

Finally, the agency was to explore 

alternate procedures to facilitate 

alertness in the cockpit, air carrier 

scheduling and attendance policies 

(including sick leave), and medical 

screening and treatment options. 

The FAA has developed a proposal 

for addressing the risk of fatigue on the 

safety of flight based on an evaluation 

of the available literature, existing 

regulatory requirements in both the 

United States and other countries, and 

the broad personal, professional 

experience of the ARC members and 

FAA staff, as well as the 

recommendations of the NTSB and 

NASA. Today’s proposal is consistent 

with the statutory mandate set forth in 

the Act and takes a new approach 

whereby the distinctions between 

domestic, flag, and supplemental 

operations are eliminated. Rather, all 

types of operations would take into 

account the effects of circadian rhythms, 

inadequate rest opportunities and 

cumulative fatigue. 

The FAA believes its proposal 

sufficiently accommodates the vast 

majority of operations conducted today, 

while reducing the risk of pilot error 

from fatigue leading to accidents. In 

some areas, the FAA proposes to relax 

current requirements, while in others, it 

strengthens them to reflect the latest 

scientific information. The agency 

proposes to provide credit for fatiguemitigating strategies, such as sleep 

facilities, that some certificate holders 

are currently providing with no 

regulatory incentive. The agency has 

also tentatively decided that certain 

operations conducted under the existing 

rules are exposing flightcrew members 

to undue risk. 

Today’s proposal sets forth a matrix 

that addresses transient fatigue (i.e., the 

immediate, short-term fatigue that can 

be addressed by a recuperative rest 

opportunity) by establishing a 9-hour 

minimum rest opportunity prior to 

commencing duty directly associated 

with the operation of aircraft (flight duty 

period, or FDP), placing restrictions on 

that type of duty, and further placing 

restrictions on flight time (that period of 

time when the aircraft is actually in 

motion—flight time is encompassed by 

FDP). 

The proposal provides carriers with a 

level of flexibility not afforded today by 

permitting a limited extension of FDP 

and a limited reduction in the minimum 

rest opportunity in circumstances that 

are neither within the carrier’s control 

nor reasonably foreseeable. In order to 

assure that carriers are adequately 

scheduling flightcrew member’s work 

days, so as not to overuse the extension, 

carriers would be required to report on 

both their overall schedule integrity and 

specific crew-pairing schedule integrity 

on a bi-monthly basis. Should a carrier 

fail to meet the required levels of 

integrity, it would have to adjust its 

schedule to make it more reliable. 

The proposal addresses cumulative 

fatigue by placing weekly and 28-day 

limits on the amount of time a 

flightcrew member may be assigned to 

any type of duty, including FDP. 

Further 28-day and annual limits are 

placed on flight time. Flightcrew 

members would be required to be given 

at least 30 consecutive hours free from 

duty on a weekly basis, a 25 percent 

increase over the current requirements. 

In addition, today’s proposal 

addresses the impact of changing time 

zones and flying through the night by 

reducing the amount of flight time and 

FDP available for these operations. More 

flight time and FDP would be available 

for certificate holders that add 

additional flightcrew members and 

provide adequate rest facilities to allow 

flightcrew members an opportunity to 

sleep aboard the aircraft. Credit would 

also be available to certificate holders 

that provide sufficient ground-based rest 

facilities. 

All carriers would have to develop 

training programs to educate all 

employees responsible for developing 

air carrier schedules and safety of flight 

on the symptoms of fatigue, as well as 

the factors leading to fatigue and how to 

mitigate fatigue-based risk. 

For those operations that cannot be 

conducted under the proposed 

prescriptive requirements, today’s 

proposal also allows a carrier to develop 

a carrier-specific fatigue risk 

management system (FRMS). An FAAapproved FRMS would allow a 

certificate holder to customize its 

operations based on a scientificallyvalidated demonstration of fatiguemitigating approaches and their impact 

on a flightcrew member’s ability to 

safely fly an airplane beyond the 

confines of the proposed rule. Finally, 

today’s proposal provides a limited 

exception for certain emergency 

operations or operations conducted 

under contract with the United States 

government that cannot otherwise be 

conducted under the prescriptive 

requirements proposed here. In order to 

assure there is no abuse, and that the 

exception is necessary, the proposal 

includes a reporting requirement. 

II. Background 

A. Statement of the Problem 

Fatigue is characterized by a general 

lack of alertness and degradation in 

mental and physical performance. 

Fatigue manifests in the aviation context 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55855 

13Recovery sleep does not require additional 

sleep equal to the cumulative sleep debt; that is, an 

8-hour sleep debt does not require 8 additional 

hours of sleep. 

14Rosekind MR. Managing work schedules: an 

alertness and safety perspective. In: Kryger MH, 

Roth T, Dement WC, editors. Principles and 

Practice of Sleep Medicine; 2005:682. 

15On February 2, 2010, the NTSB released a press 

release summarizing the results of its investigation 

into the Colgan Air crash of February 12, 2009, 

which resulted in the death of 50 people. The NTSB 

did not state that fatigue was causal factor to the 

crash; however, it did recommend that the FAA 

take steps to address pilot fatigue. 

not only when pilots fall asleep in the 

cockpit while cruising, but perhaps 

more importantly, when they are 

insufficiently alert during take-off and 

landing. Reported fatigue-related events 

have included procedural errors, 

unstable approaches, lining up with the 

wrong runway, and landing without 

clearances. 

There are three types of fatigue: 

transient, cumulative, and circadian. 

Transient fatigue is acute fatigue 

brought on by extreme sleep restriction 

or extended hours awake within 1 or 2 

days. Cumulative fatigue is fatigue 

brought on by repeated mild sleep 

restriction or extended hours awake 

across a series of days. Circadian fatigue 

refers to the reduced performance 

during nighttime hours, particularly 

during an individual’s window of 

circadian low (WOCL) (typically 

between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.). 

Common symptoms of fatigue 

include: 

• Measurable reduction in speed and 

accuracy of performance, 

• Lapses of attention and vigilance, 

• Delayed reactions, 

• Impaired logical reasoning and 

decision-making, including a reduced 

ability to assess risk or appreciate 

consequences of actions, 

• Reduced situational awareness, and 

• Low motivation to perform optional 

activities. 

A variety of factors contribute to 

whether an individual experiences 

fatigue as well as the severity of that 

fatigue. The major factors affecting 

fatigue include: 

• Time of day. Fatigue is, in part, a 

function of circadian rhythms. All other 

factors being equal, fatigue is most 

likely, and, when present, most severe, 

between the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. 

• Amount of recent sleep. If a person 

has had significantly less than 8 hours 

of sleep in the past 24 hours, he or she 

is more likely to be fatigued. 

• Time awake. A person who has 

been continually awake more than 17 

hours since his or her last major sleep 

period is more likely to be fatigued. 

• Cumulative sleep debt. For the 

average person, cumulative sleep debt is 

the difference between the amount of 

sleep a person has received over the 

past several days, and the amount of 

sleep they would have received if they 

got 8 hours of sleep a night. A person 

with a cumulative sleep debt of more 

than 8 hours since his or her last full 

night of sleep is more likely to be 

fatigued. 

• Time on task. The longer a person 

has continuously been doing a job 

without a break, the more likely he or 

she is to be fatigued. 

• Individual variation. Individuals 

respond to fatigue factors differently 

and may become fatigued at different 

times, and to different degrees of 

severity, under the same circumstances. 

There is often interplay between 

various factors that contribute to fatigue. 

For example, the performance of a 

person working night and early morning 

shifts is impacted by the time of day. 

Additionally, because of the difficulty 

in getting normal sleep during other 

than nighttime hours, such a person is 

more likely to have a cumulative sleep 

debt or to not have obtained a full 

night’s sleep within the past 24 hours. 

Scientific research and 

experimentation have consistently 

demonstrated that adequate sleep 

sustains performance. For most people, 

8 hours of sleep in each 24 hours 

sustains performance indefinitely. Sleep 

opportunities during the WOCL are 

preferable, although some research 

indicates that the total amount of sleep 

is more important than the timing of the 

sleep. Within limits, shortened periods 

of nighttime sleep may be nearly as 

beneficial as a consolidated sleep period 

when augmented by additional sleep 

periods, such as naps before evening 

departures, during flights with 

augmented flightcrews, and during 

layovers. Sleep should not be 

fragmented with interruptions. In 

addition, environmental conditions, 

such as temperature, noise, and 

turbulence, impact how beneficial sleep 

is and how performance is restored. 

When a person has accumulated a 

sleep debt, recovery sleep is necessary 

to fully restore the person’s ‘‘sleep 

reservoir.’’ Recovery sleep should 

include at least one physiological night, 

that is, one sleep period during 

nighttime hours in the time zone in 

which the individual is acclimated. The 

average person requires in excess of 9 

hours of sleep a night to recover from 

a sleep debt.13

Several aviation-specific work 

schedule factors 14 can affect sleep and 

subsequent alertness. These include 

early start times, extended work 

periods, insufficient time off between 

work periods, insufficient recovery time 

off between consecutive work periods, 

amount of work time within a shift or 

duty period, number of consecutive 

work periods, night work through one’s 

window of circadian low, daytime sleep 

periods, and day-to-night or night-today transitions. 

The FAA believes its current 

regulations do not adequately address 

the risk of fatigue. Presently, flightcrew 

members are effectively allowed to work 

up to 16 hours a day, with all of that 

time spent on tasks directly related to 

aircraft operations. The regulatory 

requirement for 9 hours of rest is 

regularly reduced, with flightcrew 

members spending rest time traveling to 

or from hotels and being provided with 

little to no time to decompress. 

Additionally, certificate holders 

regularly exceed the allowable duty 

periods by conducting flights under part 

91 instead of part 121, where the 

applicable flight, duty and rest 

requirements are housed. As the NTSB 

repeatedly notes, the FAA’s regulations 

do not account for the impact of 

circadian rhythms on alertness, and the 

entire set of regulations is overly 

complicated, with a different set of 

regulations for domestic operations, flag 

operations, and supplemental 

operations. 

B. NTSB Recommendations 

The NTSB has long been concerned 

about the effects of fatigue in the 

aviation industry. The first aviation 

safety recommendations, issued in 1972, 

involved human fatigue, and aviation 

safety investigations continue to 

identify serious concerns about the 

effects of fatigue, sleep, and circadian 

rhythm disruption. Currently, the 

NTSB’s list of Most Wanted 

Transportation Safety Improvements 

includes safety recommendations 

regarding pilot fatigue. These 

recommendations are based on two 

accident investigations and an NTSB 

safety study on commuter airline 

safety.15

In February 2006 the NTSB issued 

safety recommendations after a BAE– 

J3201 operated under part 121 by 

Corporate Airline struck trees on final 

approach and crashed short of the 

runway at Kirksville Regional Airport, 

Kirksville, Missouri. The captain, first 

officer, and 11 of the 13 passengers 

died. The NTSB determined the 

probable cause of the October 19, 2004 

accident was the pilots’ failure to follow 

established procedures and properly 

conduct a non-precision instrument 

approach at night in instrument 

meteorological conditions. The NTSB 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55856 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

concluded that fatigue likely 

contributed to the pilots’ performance 

and decision-making ability. This 

conclusion was based on the less than 

optimal overnight rest time available to 

the pilots, the early report time for duty, 

the number of flight legs, and the 

demanding conditions encountered 

during the long duty day. 

As a result of the accident, the NTSB 

issued the following safety 

recommendations related to flight and 

duty time limitations: (1) Modify and 

simplify the flightcrew hours-of-service 

regulations to consider factors such as 

length of duty day, starting time, 

workload, and other factors shown by 

recent research, scientific evidence, and 

current industry experience to affect 

crew alertness (recommendation No. A– 

06–10); and (2) require all part 121 and 

part 135 certificate holders to 

incorporate fatigue-related information 

similar to the information being 

developed by the DOT Operator Fatigue 

Management Program into initial and 

recurrent pilot training programs. The 

recommendation notes that this training 

should address the detrimental effects of 

fatigue and include strategies for 

avoiding fatigue and countering its 

effects (recommendation No. A–06–10). 

The NTSB’s list of Most Wanted 

Transportation Safety Improvements 

also includes a safety recommendation 

on pilot fatigue and ferry flights 

conducted under 14 CFR part 91. Three 

flightcrew members died after a Douglas 

DC–8–63 operated by Air Transport 

International was destroyed by ground 

impact and fire during an attempted 

three-engine takeoff at Kansas City 

International Airport in Kansas City, 

Missouri. The NTSB noted that the 

flightcrew conducted the flight as a 

maintenance ferry flight under part 91 

after a shortened rest break following a 

demanding round trip flight to Europe 

that crossed multiple time zones. The 

NTSB further noted that the 

international flight, conducted under 

part 121, involved multiple legs flown 

at night following daytime rest periods 

that caused the flightcrew to experience 

circadian rhythm disruption. In 

addition, the NTSB found the captain’s 

last rest period before the accident was 

repeatedly interrupted by the certificate 

holder. 

In issuing its 1995 recommendations, 

the NTSB stated that the flight time 

limits and rest requirements under part 

121 that applied to the flightcrew before 

the ferry flight did not apply to the ferry 

flight operated under part 91. As a 

result, the regulations permitted a 

substantially reduced flightcrew rest 

period for the nonrevenue ferry flight. 

As a result of the investigation, the 

NTSB reiterated earlier 

recommendations to (1) finalize the 

review of current flight and duty time 

limitations to ensure the limitations 

consider research findings in fatigue 

and sleep issues and (2) prohibit 

certificate holders from assigning a 

flightcrew to flights conducted under 

part 91 unless the flightcrew met the 

flight and duty time limits under part 

121 or other applicable regulations 

(recommendation No. A–95–113). 

In addition to recommending a 

comprehensive approach to fatigue with 

flight duty limits based on fatigue 

research, circadian rhythms, and sleep 

and rest requirements, the NTSB has 

also stated that FRMS may hold promise 

as an approach to dealing with fatigue 

in the aviation environment. However, 

the NTSB noted that it considers fatigue 

management plans to be a complement 

to, not a substitute for, regulations to 

address fatigue. 

C. International Standards 

There are a number of standards 

addressing flight and duty time 

limitations and rest requirements that 

have been adopted by other 

jurisdictions, as well as the 

International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO), and these 

standards were reviewed by the ARC to 

determine if any of their philosophy or 

structures could be adopted by the FAA. 

While the ARC found many of the 

requirements useful, it also determined 

that the U.S. requirements would need 

to address the U.S. aviation industry 

and that the existing standards could 

not fully achieve that objective. The 

FAA agrees that none of the existing 

standards fully address the U.S. aviation 

environment. Nevertheless, the existing 

standards do serve as the basis of many 

of the provisions proposed today. 

Accordingly, specific provisions of 

these standards are discussed 

throughout the rest of this document 

and a copy of each standard has been 

placed in the docket. 

1. Amendment No. 33 to the 

International Standards and 

Recommended Practices, Annex 6 to the 

Convention on International Civil 

Aviation, Part I, International 

Commercial Air Transport—Aeroplanes 

(ICAO Standards and Recommended 

Practices (SARP)) 

The ICAO SARP for Contracting 

States (States) provide that a certificate 

holder should establish flight time and 

duty period limitations and rest 

provisions that enable the certificate 

holder to manage the fatigue of its 

flightcrew members. The ICAO SARP do 

not provide specific numerical values 

for these provisions but set forth a 

regulatory framework for member States 

to use as guidelines in establishing 

prescriptive limitations for fatigue 

management. Member States are 

required to base their regulations on 

scientific principles and knowledge 

with the goal of ensuring that flightcrew 

members perform at an adequate level of 

alertness for safe flight operations. The 

ICAO SARP do not address fatigue risk 

management programs currently; 

however, these programs are currently 

under development. 

2. United Kingdom Civil Aviation 

Authority Publication 371 (CAP–371) 

Air Navigation Order 2000, Part VI, as 

amended, requires a certificate holder to 

have a civil aviation authority-approved 

scheme for regulating the flight time of 

aircrews. CAP–371 provides guidance 

on this requirement and recognizes that 

the prime objective of a flight limitation 

scheme is to ensure flightcrew members 

are adequately rested at the beginning of 

each Flight Duty Period (FDP) and are 

flying sufficiently free from fatigue so 

they can operate efficiently and safely in 

normal and abnormal situations. When 

establishing maximum FDPs and 

minimum rest periods, certificate 

holders must consider the relationship 

between the frequency and patterns of 

scheduled FDPs and rest periods, and 

the effects of working long hours with 

minimum rest. 

3. Annex III, Subpart Q to the 

Commission of the European 

Communities Regulation No. 3922/91, 

as Amended (EU OPS subpart Q) 

EU OPS subpart Q prescribes 

limitations on FDPs, duty periods, block 

(flight) time, and rest requirements. Like 

the previous standards discussed, EU 

OPS subpart Q recognizes the 

importance of enabling flightcrew 

members to be sufficiently free from 

fatigue so they can operate the aircraft 

satisfactorily in all circumstances. In 

establishing flight and duty limitation 

and rest schemes, EU OPS subpart Q 

requires certificate holders to consider 

the relationship between the frequencies 

and pattern of FDPs and rest periods, 

and the cumulative effects of long duty 

hours with interspersed rest. Certificate 

holders must take action to revise a 

schedule in cases where the actual 

operation exceeds the maximum 

scheduled FDP on more than 33 percent 

of the flights in that schedule during a 

specified period. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55857 

16A flightcrew member is a certified pilot or 

flight engineer assigned to duty aboard an aircraft 

during a flight duty period. 

III. General Discussion of the Proposal 

A. Applicability 

The FAA is proposing to limit this 

rulemaking to part 121 certificate 

holders and the flightcrew members 16

who work for them. While fatigue is a 

universal problem that applies to all 

types of operations and to all safety 

sensitive functions, the agency has 

decided to take incremental steps in 

addressing fatigue. Thus, future 

rulemaking initiatives may address 

fatigue concerns related to flight 

attendants, maintenance personnel, and 

dispatchers. 

In addition, part 135 certificate 

holders should pay close attention to 

both this NPRM and any final rule. This 

is because part 135 operations are very 

similar to those conducted under part 

121, particularly part 121 supplemental 

operations. The FAA does not 

intuitively see any difference in the 

safety implications between the two 

types of operations, although it 

acknowledges there may be less overall 

risk to the flying public in part 135 

operations than part 121 operations. 

Accordingly, the part 135 community 

should expect to see an NPRM 

addressing its operations that looks very 

similar to, if not exactly like, the final 

rule the agency anticipates issuing as 

part of this rulemaking initiative. 

Today’s proposal applies to all flights 

conducted by part 121 certificate 

holders, including flights like ferry 

flights that are historically conducted 

under part 91. While these types of 

flights can continue to operate under the 

general rules of part 91, the flight, duty, 

and rest requirements proposed here 

would also apply. 

In addition, the FAA has tentatively 

decided against adopting different 

requirements based on the nature of the 

operation. The FAA has designed the 

flight, duty and rest scheme proposed 

today to enhance flightcrew member 

alertness and mitigate fatigue. The 

agency’s existing regulatory scheme 

provides different rules for domestic 

operations, flag operations, and 

supplemental operations. This 

hodgepodge of requirements developed 

over time to address changing business 

environments and advances in 

technology that allowed for longer 

periods of flight. Thus, in domestic 

operations, flight time is essentially 

calculated based on time at the controls, 

while in supplemental operations, the 

regulations contemplate restrictions 

based on ‘‘time aloft’’ since a flightcrew 

member may not be at the controls for 

the entire flight; crew augmentation is 

prohibited in domestic operations; and 

the regulations governing flag 

operations, where augmentation is 

largely assumed, allow certificate 

holders to liberally increase the amount 

of flight time based on the presence of 

additional flightcrew members, 

regardless of whether those individuals 

can actually fly the airplane. 

Fatigue factors, however, are 

universal. The sleep science, while still 

evolving and subject to individual 

inclinations, is clear in a few important 

respects: most people need eight hours 

of sleep to function effectively, most 

people find it more difficult to sleep 

during the day than during the night, 

resulting in greater fatigue if working at 

night; the longer one has been awake 

and the longer one spends on task, the 

greater the likelihood of fatigue; and 

fatigue leads to an increased risk of 

making a mistake. 

The FAA recognizes there are 

different business models and needs 

that are partly responsible for the 

differences in the current regulations. It 

is sympathetic to concerns raised within 

the ARC by cargo carriers and carriers 

engaged in supplemental operations that 

new regulations will disproportionately 

impact their business models. However, 

the FAA also notes that the historical 

distinction between the types of 

operators has become blurred. Cargo 

carriers conduct the vast majority of 

their operations at night, but passenger 

carriers also offer ‘‘red eyes’’ on a daily 

basis. Some carriers operate under 

domestic, flag or supplemental 

authority, depending on the nature of 

the specific operation. Additionally, in 

some instances, the FAA has authorized 

a carrier to conduct supplemental 

operations under the flag rules. 

Today’s proposal is designed to 

recognize the growing similarities 

between the kinds of operations and the 

universality of factors that lead to 

fatigue in most individuals. Thus, the 

proposal provides different 

requirements based on the time of day, 

whether an individual is acclimated to 

a new time zone, and the likelihood of 

being able to sleep under different 

circumstances. If today’s proposal is 

adopted, the FAA expects that most part 

121 operators will be required to make 

changes to their existing operations, and 

some will need to make more changes 

than others. However, the FAA also 

believes that the proposal is sufficiently 

flexible to accommodate the vast 

majority of operations conducted today 

without imposing unreasonable costs. 

B. Joint Responsibility 

Fatigue mitigation is a joint 

responsibility of the certificate holder 

and the flightcrew member. Today’s 

proposal recognizes the need to hold 

both certificate holders and pilots 

responsible for making sure flightcrew 

members are working a reasonable 

number of hours, getting sufficient 

sleep, and not reporting for flight duty 

in an unsafe condition. Many of the 

ways that carriers and flightcrew 

members will negotiate this joint 

responsibility will be handled in the 

context of labor management relations. 

Others will not. Today’s proposal is 

drafted in a manner that directly 

imposes the regulatory obligations on 

both the certificate holders and the 

flightcrew members. It is unfair to place 

all the blame for fatigue on the carriers. 

Pilots who pick up extra hours, 

moonlight, report to work when sick, 

commute irresponsibly, or simply 

choose not to take advantage of the 

required rest periods are as culpable as 

carriers who push the envelop by 

scheduling right up to the maximum 

duty limits, assigning flightcrew 

members who have reached their flight 

time limits additional flight duties 

under part 91, and exceeding the 

maximum flight and duty limits by 

claiming reasonably foreseeable 

circumstances are beyond their control. 

One important element of this 

proposal is that flightcrew members 

may not accept an assignment that 

would consist of an FDP if they are too 

fatigued to fly safely. Likewise a 

flightcrew member may not continue 

subsequent flight segments if he or she 

has become too fatigued to fly safely. 

Certificate holders also must assess a 

flightcrew member’s state when he or 

she reports to work. If the carrier 

determines a flightcrew member is 

showing signs of fatigue, it may not 

allow the flightcrew member to fly. 

Flightcrew members should be 

cognizant of the appearance and 

behavior of fellow flightcrew members, 

including such signs of fatigue as 

slurred speech, droopy eyes, requests to 

repeat things, and attention to the length 

of time left in the duty period. If a 

flightcrew member (or any other 

employee) believes another flightcrew 

member may be too tired to fly, he or 

she would have to report his or her 

concern to the appropriate management 

person, who would then be required to 

determine whether the individual is 

sufficiently alert to fly safely. 

In addition, under today’s proposal, 

carriers would need to develop and 

implement an internal evaluation and 

audit program to monitor whether 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55858 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

17Bio-mathematical modeling of fatigue and 

performance can assist in providing objective 

metrics, which are conspicuously lacking in fatigue 

science. The rationale for modeling is that 

conditions that lead to fatigue are well known. A 

model simulates specific conditions and determines 

if fatigue could be present. Models can estimate 

degradations in performance and provide an 

estimate of schedule-induced fatigue risk that 

considers many dynamically changing and 

interacting fatigue factors. 

18The SAFE model, developed by Mick Spencer 

of the United Kingdom, has been validated in the 

aviation context. 

flightcrew members are reporting to 

work fatigued. The FAA anticipates that 

the program would look at both the 

number of instances in which this 

happens as well as the reasons 

contributing to the problem. The FAA is 

aware of anecdotal reports of pilots 

flying when fatigued because they are 

short on sick leave, as well as instances 

when pilots have called in sick when 

the true problem was fatigue. As part of 

the internal audit, a carrier may need to 

delve into the reasons flightcrew 

members call in sick to make sure it is 

capturing accurately incidents of pilot 

fatigue. It could choose to create a 

separate fatigue category to mitigate the 

risk of pilots calling in sick when in fact 

they are fatigued. 

A carrier would be required to take 

steps to correct any fatigue problem that 

it identifies. For example, if the carrier 

became aware that flightcrew members 

were commuting during their WOCL, 

the carrier could require that all 

flightcrew members spend the night 

prior to starting a series of FDPs within 

the local commuting area. The carrier 

could also implement other measures to 

address problems associated not only 

with commuting, but any behavior that 

could lead to flightcrew members 

reporting for FDPs unfit for duty. 

Several ARC members urged that 

these requirements be encapsulated in a 

non-punitive fatigue policy. While the 

FAA certainly supports such policies, it 

also recognizes that requiring carriers to 

develop and implement non-punitive 

fatigue policies is challenging from a 

regulatory perspective. Carriers are 

entitled to investigate the causes for an 

employee’s fatigue. If a carrier 

determines that the flightcrew member 

was responsible for becoming fatigued, 

it has every right to take steps to address 

that behavior. To the extent the fatigue 

may be a function of the carrier not 

following the regulatory requirements, 

the FAA certainly would investigate and 

possibly initiate enforcement action. In 

addition, self-reporting could be 

encapsulated in a carrier’s voluntary 

disclosure program under the FAA’s 

Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), 

which has certain non-punitive 

provisions built into the program. 

C. Fatigue Training 

The FAA believes fatigue-based 

training requirements are critical to 

informing flightcrew members how their 

personal behavior can unwittingly lead 

to fatigue, and how to mitigate the risk 

of fatigue in an industry that does not 

follow a traditional 9-to-5 work day. 

Fatigue training is not currently 

required under any regulatory regime. In 

the presentation to the ARC by the sleep 

specialists, all specialists noted that 

people regularly underestimate their 

level of fatigue, often to dangerous 

levels. The ARC generally agreed that 

fatigue training was a good idea, and 

several members noted that such 

training should extend to all 

‘‘stakeholders’’, e.g., employees of the 

certificate holder responsible both for 

scheduling and for safety of flight, 

rather than just flightcrew members. 

The FAA agrees that flightcrew 

members do not bear sole responsibility 

for making sure they are adequately 

rested and that they are not the only 

employees of the carrier who need to be 

trained on the impact of fatigue on the 

safety of flight. The agency is proposing 

to require fatigue training for each 

person involved with scheduling 

aircraft and crews, all crewmembers and 

management personnel. The FAA is 

proposing to require 5 hours of initial 

training for all newly-hired, covered 

employees prior to starting work in that 

capacity and 2 hours of annual, 

recurrent training. This training would 

be approved through the agency’s 

Operations Specifications (OpSpec) 

process. 

The training curriculum would 

address general fatigue and fatigue 

countermeasures along with the 

following subject areas: 

• FAA regulatory requirements for 

flight, duty and rest, and NTSB 

recommendations on fatigue 

management; 

• The basics of fatigue, including 

sleep fundamentals and circadian 

rhythms; 

• The causes of fatigue, including 

medical conditions that may lead to 

fatigue; 

• The effect of fatigue on 

performance; 

• Fatigue countermeasures, 

prevention and mitigation; 

• The influence of lifestyle, including 

nutrition, exercise, and family life, on 

fatigue; 

• Familiarity with sleep disorders 

and their possible treatments; 

• The impact of commuting on 

fatigue; 

• Flightcrew member responsibility 

for ensuring adequate rest and fitness 

for duty; and 

• The effect of operating through and 

within multiple time zones. 

In addition, the FAA recognizes that 

the study of fatigue and fatigue 

mitigation is on-going. Changes may 

need to be made to training programs 

even after approval by the FAA. 

Accordingly, whenever the 

Administrator finds that revisions are 

necessary for the continued adequacy of 

an approved fatigue education and 

training program, the certificate holder 

must, after notification, make any 

changes in the program that are deemed 

necessary by the Administrator. The 

FAA anticipates that such changes 

would be implemented through the 

agency’s OpSpecs as provided for in 14 

CFR 119.51, providing carriers with an 

opportunity to provide input and appeal 

rights. 

D. Flight Duty Period 

There are numerous studies that 

generally address fatigue, as well as 

models 17 that have been developed. 

The models predict fatigue-based 

performance degradation based on data 

input such as when a flight begins, how 

long it lasts, whether there is a rest 

opportunity, and the local time of day 

at departure and landing. Only one of 

these models has been validated in the 

aviation context,18 although there is 

general validation in the railroad and 

motor carrier industries. The available 

validations are not directly applicable to 

aviation because of the impact of 

relatively rapid movement within 

multiple time zones. 

While there is ample science 

indicating that performance degrades 

during windows of circadian low and 

that regular sleep is necessary to sustain 

performance, there is no evidence that 

flying multiple segments is more 

fatiguing than flying one or two 

segments per duty period. However, 

multiple segments require more time on 

task because there are more take-offs 

and landings, which are both the most 

task-intensive and the most safetycritical stages of flight. Also, pilots 

appear to generally agree that flying 

several legs during a single duty period 

could be more fatiguing. 

One approach to addressing fatigue is 

to link the length of duty directly 

related to flight to the time of day and 

the number of legs that are scheduled to 

be flown. This approach recognizes the 

additional fatigue introduced by nighttime flying and by flying several legs, 

with multiple take-offs and landings. As 

discussed earlier, the current regulatory 

system in the United States provides 

variability based on whether a given 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55859 

19Training conducted in accordance with the 

certificate holder’s approved ground training 

program would be considered duty outside of an 

FDP. 

20 Deadhead transportation means transportation 

of a crewmember as a passenger, by air or surface 

transportation, as required by a certificate holder, 

excluding transportation to or from a suitable 

accommodation. 

operation is flown under domestic, flag 

or supplemental rules; but within each 

category of operation there is little to no 

variability in permissible flight time 

based on the particular operation. 

Other jurisdictions have largely 

eliminated the concept of a uniform 

flight time in favor of a variable FDP 

that encompasses flight time but also 

includes other duties directly related to 

flight. An FDP is duty consisting of 

training required by the certificate 

holder’s approved flight training 

curriculum and qualification segment to 

be conducted in a simulator, flight 

training device and aircraft training,19 as 

well as pre-flight deadheads 20 without 

an intervening rest, and all duties from 

the time the flightcrew member is 

required to report for duty to fly until 

the last movement of the aircraft. An 

FDP begins when a crewmember is 

required to report for duty that includes 

a flight, series of flights, or positioning 

flights (including part 91 ferry flights) 

and ends when the aircraft is parked 

after the last flight and there is no plan 

for further aircraft movement by the 

same crewmember. 

Under the UK’s CAP–371 an FDP is 

limited to no more than 13 hours under 

a minimum crew pairing, but may be 

increased through augmentation or split 

duty rest, and is reduced based on flying 

in the WOCL or flying multiple legs. 

The minimum FDP is 9 hours, unless 

flying multiple night-time operations, 

when FDP is reduced to 8 hours. A pilot 

in command may extend the FDP up to 

3 hours due to unforeseen 

circumstances. Any duty immediately 

preceding flight check-in is also 

considered FDP, as is simulator training 

conducted during the same duty period 

if prior to flying, regardless of whether 

there is a break. 

Under EU–OPS subpart Q, the 

maximum FDP is 13 hours, reduced at 

30-minute increments per segment after 

the second segment down to a 2-hour 

reduction. One-hour extensions are 

permitted, except when an FDP has 

more than six segments, when no 

extension is permitted. There is a more 

complicated formula that applies when 

encroaching on the WOCL. There are no 

more than two extensions during any 7- 

day period. Schedule robustness is 

addressed by requiring that actual 

operations not exceed FDP more than 33 

percent of the time (i.e., actual flights 

are within the FDP limits at least 67 

percent of a scheduling season). A 2- 

hour extension is permitted at the 

discretion of the entire crew for 

unforeseen circumstances. 

The pending EASA proposal on flight 

duty and rest would adopt the same 

FDP concept as CAP–371 and EU–OPS 

subpart Q. Like those standards, the 

maximum FDP is 13 hours unless a 

mitigation strategy such as 

augmentation is adopted, and the FDP is 

reduced based on time of day and 

number of legs flown. Unlike the CAP– 

371, and similar to EU–OPS subpart Q, 

the EASA proposal contemplates that 

schedules that do not regularly meet the 

maximum-allowable FDP will be 

changed. The CAP–371 merely requires 

a pilot in command to report when the 

FDP is exceeded. 

The ARC members generally agreed 

with the approach adopted in CAP–371 

and by EASA, although they could not 

agree on how conservative maximum 

FDPs should be. Tables A(1) and A(2) 

depict the two ranges of FDP discussed 

by the ARC, with Table A(1) generally 

representing the labor position, and A(2) 

generally representing the carriers’ 

position. Both tables reduce the amount 

of FDP during the nighttime hours to 

address flying during one’s WOCL, and 

both reduce the amount of FDP once a 

flightcrew member has flown more than 

four legs. Flightcrew members would 

enter the table based on the time at their 

home base (i.e., the city where they 

regularly fly from) unless they have 

acclimated to a different time zone, at 

which point they would enter the table 

based on local time. In addition, the 

FDP would be reduced by 30 minutes 

for unacclimated flightcrew members. 

Extensions no greater than 2 hours 

(possibly as many as 3 hours 

internationally or for augmented flights) 

beyond a scheduled FDP would be 

allowed for circumstances beyond a 

carrier’s control. The decision to extend 

would rest on both the carrier and the 

pilot in command, although specific 

coordination might not be required in 

every instance. In addition, there would 

be limits on the number of times a crew 

pairing could be extended in any 168- 

hour period, with discussion of whether 

that limit should be once or twice, but 

general agreement that it should not be 

allowed on consecutive days. A 

flightcrew member could not continue 

an FDP beyond the extension except 

under emergency circumstances. 

TABLE A(1)—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: UN-AUGMENTED OPERATIONS

Time of start 

(Home base or 

acclimated) 

Maximum flight duty period (hours) 

for lineholders based on number of flight segments 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 

0000–0359 ........................................................................... 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 

0400–0459 ........................................................................... 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 

0500–0559 ........................................................................... 11 11 11 11 10 9.5 9 

0600–0659 ........................................................................... 12 12 12 12 11.5 11 10.5 

0700–1259 ........................................................................... 13 13 13 13 12.5 12 11 

1300–1659 ........................................................................... 12 12 12 12 11.5 11 10.5 

1700–2159 ........................................................................... 11 11 10 10 9.5 9 9 

2200–2259 ........................................................................... 10.5 10.5 9.5 9.5 9 9 9 

2300–2359 ........................................................................... 9.5 9.5 9 9 9 9 9 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55860 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

21A 3-hour extension would be allowed for 

augmented operations. 

22Some carriers have moved to virtual home 

bases, or have no home base. This is most common 

among supplemental operators. In those instances, 

the proposal contemplates that the carrier would 

name a home base somewhere within the 

continental United States, and that home base 

would be considered the flightcrew member’s home 

base. 

TABLE A(2)—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: UN-AUGMENTED OPERATIONS

Time of start 

(Home base) 

Maximum flight duty period (hours) 

for lineholders based on number of flight segments 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 

0000–0159 ........................................................................... 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 

0200–0459 ........................................................................... 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 

0500–0659 ........................................................................... 12 12 12 12 11.5 11 10.5 

0700–1259 ........................................................................... 13 13 13 13 12.5 12 11.5 

1300–1659 ........................................................................... 12 12 12 12 11.5 11 10.5 

1700–2159 ........................................................................... 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 

2200–2259 ........................................................................... 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 9 9 9 

2300–2359 ........................................................................... 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9 9 9 

In order to assure that the extensions 

are not abused and that carriers are 

creating schedules contemplating 

circumstances that may be beyond their 

control, but that are reasonably 

foreseeable (e.g., seasonal weather 

trends, planned runway construction, 

chronically-delayed airports or 

markets), a carrier would provide the 

FAA with scheduled FDPs for all its 

crew pairings and the actual FDPs, 

including any extensions, on a regular 

basis. Some argued this cycle should be 

as little as once a month, while others 

argued a quarterly reporting cycle was 

sufficient. Should the carriers’ actual 

FDPs fail to meet the scheduled FDP too 

many times during the reporting cycle, 

they would be required to change the 

scheduled FDPs to more realistic levels. 

The ARC agreed that 95 percent of a 

carrier’s schedules would need to fall 

within the maximum FDP depicted in 

Table A(1) or A(2). In order to identify 

specific crew pairings that were 

problematic, each crew pairing would 

need to fall within the limits in the 

tables for a lesser percentage of the time, 

somewhere between 70 percent and 85 

percent. 

The FAA has decided to propose the 

more conservative FDPs depicted in 

Table A(1), with a 2-hour extension for 

unforeseeable circumstances beyond the 

carrier’s control permitted once in a 

168-hour period.21 Since the entire 

flightcrew is impacted by the extension, 

only one flightcrew member needs to 

have utilized the extension in the 

previous 168 hours for it to no longer be 

available. 

If the extension is less than 30 

minutes, the FAA anticipates permitting 

multiple extensions during the 168-hour 

period. The FAA has tentatively 

determined that short incursions into 

the permissible extension are unlikely 

to be fatiguing given the other 

requirements of today’s proposal and 

that limiting a flightcrew member to a 

single weekly extension that could be as 

small as five or ten minutes is 

unreasonable. However, the extensions 

are intended to address unforeseeable 

circumstances beyond the carrier’s 

control. Such circumstances should be 

of sufficiently short duration that the 

carrier could not reasonably make 

schedule adjustments. Thus, while the 

FAA contemplates that adverse weather 

could fit within the criteria because it is 

beyond the control of the certificate 

holder, it would not always be 

considered unforeseeable. Carriers 

should anticipate thunderstorms in 

many parts of the United States during 

the summer months. Likewise, heavy 

snow in the northern parts of the 

country should be anticipated during 

the winter, and the jet stream follows 

basic seasonal patterns. By the same 

token, carriers are not responsible for air 

traffic delays; however, if they are 

operating out of chronically delayed 

airports, air traffic delays are clearly 

foreseeable. To the extent even small 

extensions are regularly occurring, the 

schedule reliability requirements 

discussed by the ARC should require 

schedule adjustments, even when 

encroachments beyond the times in the 

FDP table are very small. 

The FAA recognizes that adopting the 

numbers in Table A(1) is a conservative 

approach. The FAA has decided to 

propose the more conservative numbers 

because it has little experience with this 

type of regulatory regime. However, the 

numbers contemplated under both 

tables are very similar, and the FAA is 

open to arguments that a more 

expansive FDP is merited. The agency 

also recognizes that upon completion of 

an FDP, a flightcrew member could be 

assigned other duties as long as he or 

she is provided with a required rest 

opportunity prior to commencing his or 

her next FDP. The underlying premise 

of today’s proposal is to ensure 

flightcrew members are adequately 

rested during the time they are 

responsible for the operation of aircraft. 

To the extent other duties are not 

directly related to the safe operation of 

flight, the FAA believes there is no need 

to reduce the current implied daily duty 

limit of 16 hours in un-augmented 

operations, as long as those duties do 

not introduce the potential for fatigue 

during flight. 

The reduction in maximum FDP 

during nighttime hours is broadly 

supported by existing sleep science. 

Although not addressed by sleep 

studies, the FAA has also tentatively 

decided to reduce the amount of 

available FDP depending on the number 

of legs flown (flight segments) because 

of a general agreement among the ARC 

members and FAA staff previously 

employed as pilots by commercial air 

carriers that multiple take-offs and 

landings are more fatiguing. Much of the 

available science is based on laboratory 

studies, with exceptionally limited 

validation in the aviation context; 

accordingly, the FAA has tentatively 

decided to rely on the experience of 

these individuals rather than assuming 

no adverse impact on safety. The FAA 

is not proposing to make any 

adjustments for the first four flight 

segments based on this same 

experience. The linear reduction 

contemplated in the EASA regulations 

(which is used for multiple purposes) 

appears to have more to do with 

regulatory simplicity than with any 

actual experience or science. 

As recommended by the ARC, a 

flightcrew member would enter the FDP 

table based on home base time, unless 

acclimated to a different time zone. 

Thus, if a flightcrew member ordinarily 

flies out of Chicago, the flightcrew 

member would enter an FDP as though 

he or she were in Chicago, regardless of 

where he or she is physically located.22


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55861 

23 In some areas of the world, time zones change 

in one half hour increments rather than one hour 

increments. Accordingly, one would have to 

experience a time change of at least four hours as 

well as five time zones. 

24Physiological night’s rest means the rest occurs 

between the hours of 0100 and 0700 local time. 

This definition assures an opportunity to sleep 

during the WOCL. 

A 10 a.m. crew pairing out of Heathrow 

would be treated as if it commenced at 

4 a.m., because of the 6-hour time 

difference between Chicago and 

London. If the operation requires the 

flightcrew member to cross more than 

four time zones, he or she would be 

considered unacclimated, and there 

would be a 30-minute reduction in the 

maximum FDP. 

The FAA has also decided to propose 

the reporting requirements discussed by 

the ARC to assure realistic scheduling. 

The agency has tentatively decided that 

reports be filed with the FAA every two 

months. The ARC discussed a range of 

one to three months. The FAA believes 

a monthly reporting requirement could 

be excessively burdensome to both the 

certificate holders and the FAA. By the 

same token, if the reporting interval is 

too long, carriers may avoid addressing 

common delay scenarios, simply 

waiting them out. 

Under today’s proposal, carriers must 

first demonstrate that 100 percent of the 

scheduled crew pairings fall within the 

limits in the FDP table. Actual systemwide FDPs should not exceed the 

maximum levels in the FDP table more 

than five percent of the time. Each crew 

pairing would need to fall within the 

FDP table 80 percent of the time. The 

agency believes a 20 percent variation 

for a specific crew pairing provides 

carriers with sufficient flexibility to 

address multiple yet small excursions 

beyond the FDP table, while still forcing 

the carriers to recognize when a 

particular crew pairing is problematic. 

Because no flightcrew member may 

exceed the limits in the FDP table 

beyond 30 minutes more than once in 

any 168-hour period, the FAA does not 

believe a 20 percent variation will result 

in any immediate adverse safety 

situation. 

Should any of the three proposed 

reporting requirements be exceeded, a 

carrier would be required to readjust the 

problematic crew pairings to more 

realistic schedules. These adjustments, 

which could be seasonal in nature, 

would be on-going and would apply to 

subsequent years. To the extent a carrier 

could immediately implement measures 

to improve schedule fidelity, it should 

do so. However, the ability of carriers to 

immediately address the scheduling 

issue is difficult to evaluate without 

understanding the impact of published 

schedules on resolving the problem. The 

FAA has notionally proposed that 

changes be made within 60 days, but it 

is interested in better understanding the 

impact of such a requirement on 

carriers’ schedules. 

Below, and throughout this 

document, we invite commenters to 

address specific questions, along with 

any other matters they consider 

relevant. We are particularly interested 

in receiving recommendations that 

would provide the same or better 

protection against the problems of 

fatigue at lower cost. We may 

incorporate any such recommendation 

in a Final Rule in this proceeding. 

With that in mind, the FAA seeks 

comment on the following: 

(1) Please comment on adopting 

maximum FDPs. Should the maximum 

FDP vary based on time of day? Should 

it vary based on the number of 

scheduled flight segments? Should the 

proposed limits be modified up or 

down, and to what degree? Please 

provide supporting data. 

(2) Please comment on permitting 

flightcrew members and carriers to 

operate beyond a scheduled FDP. Is the 

proposed 2-hour extension appropriate? 

Is the restriction on a single occurrence 

beyond 30 minutes in a 168-hour period 

appropriate? Should a flightcrew 

member be restricted to a single 

occurrence regardless of the length of 

the extension? Please provide 

supporting data. 

(3) Please comment on the proposed 

schedule reliability reporting 

requirements. Should carriers be 

required to report on crew pairings that 

exceed the scheduled FDP, but not the 

maximum FDP listed in the FDP table? 

(4) Should carriers be required to 

report on more parameters, such as 

cumulative duty hours or daily flight 

time? If so, why? 

(5) What should be the interval 

between reporting requirements? 

(6) How long after discovering a 

problematic crew pairing should the 

carrier be afforded to correct the 

scheduling problem? 

E. Acclimating to a New Time Zone 

Unlike other forms of transportation, 

where an individual moves gradually 

through multiple time zones over the 

course of the day, the nature of aviation 

allows an individual to traverse several 

time zones over a relatively short period 

of time. This phenomenon exposes 

flightcrew members to a greater sense of 

disorientation or jet lag than employees 

in other forms of transportation. For 

trips with short turn around times, a 

flightcrew member likely would not 

acclimate, and would simply enter the 

FDP table based on his or her home base 

time. However, flightcrew members 

remaining in a new theater for longer 

periods of time may need to acclimate 

to the new theater. 

During the question and answer 

session with ARC members, the sleep 

specialists explained how an individual 

acclimates to time zones when flying 

long range operations. They stated that 

having sleep opportunities during a 

physiological night is the most 

important fatigue mitigation strategy for 

global travel. They also noted that an 

individual attempting to acclimate to a 

new time zone will adjust his or her 

clock approximately 1 hour per day for 

each hour of time zone difference. The 

ARC members noted that based on their 

collective personal experience, one 

could acclimate much more quickly if 

one managed his or her sleep 

opportunity appropriately. The sleep 

specialists also noted that even if an 

individual consciously decided not to 

acclimate to a new time zone, given 

enough time, the individual would 

begin to acclimate anyway because of 

the differences in exposure to daylight. 

The ARC discussed various 

approaches to determine whether a 

flightcrew member is acclimated before 

accepting an assignment for an FDP. 

The ARC originally defined the unacclimated condition as flying across 

five or more time zones.23 Moving 

beyond these constraints would qualify 

as moving into a new theater of 

operations. The ARC members agreed 

that the continental United States 

should constitute a single theater so that 

a flightcrew member would always be 

acclimated when flying domestically. 

The ARC concluded that to reset from 

an un-acclimated condition to an 

acclimated condition a flightcrew 

member would require either three 

consecutive physiological night’s rest,24

during which period the flightcrew 

member could fly, or a 30 to 36 hour 

layover rest period. Some ARC members 

noted that a flightcrew member could be 

on duty during the period encompassing 

3 local nights, but not during local 

nighttime hours. 

As noted previously, sleep science 

has not been validated in the aviation 

context. The members of the ARC 

universally rejected the premise that it 

would take between six and 9 days to 

acclimate to a European time zone. The 

FAA is inclined to agree with the ARC 

members’ experience, especially given 

the limited scientific information 

specific to aviation. The FAA also 

recognizes that assuring that length of 

time to acclimate to a new theater is 

impractical in the aviation context. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55862 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

25These pairings do not always involve a return 

to a home base, but could be a return to another 

city within the time zone for or adjacent to the 

flightcrew member’s home base. They can also 

occur when the flightcrew member has adjusted to 

a new theater and an airport within that theater 

effectively becomes the home base. 

26Some carriers argued that no limit should be 

placed on flight time and some labor 

representatives argued that the maximum limit 

should be variable, but should never exceed eight 

hours. 

The FAA proposes to permit a carrier 

to adjust where the flightcrew member 

enters the FDP as an acclimated crew 

member if the individual has been in a 

new theater of operations for 72 hours 

or has been given at least 36 consecutive 

hours free from duty. Remaining in the 

same theater for 72 hours allows for 

three physiological night’s rest. A 36 

consecutive hour break in duty does not 

allow for the same amount of rest, but 

allows the individual to structure the 

available rest opportunity in a manner 

that best suits his or her personal sleep 

patterns. The FAA is not proposing to 

stipulate that an unacclimated 

flightcrew member will only become 

acclimated when continuing to fly 

within a new theater as long as that 

flightcrew member does not fly at night. 

This strikes the agency as an 

unnecessary constraint. 

While the continental United States is 

considered a single theater, operations 

from one part of the United States could 

trigger the need to acclimate sooner than 

operations from another part of the 

United States. Thus, a flight from New 

York to Hawaii could trigger a need to 

acclimate in Hawaii, while a flight from 

Los Angeles to Hawaii would not. 

The ARC discussed the amount of rest 

needed for flightcrew members 

returning to their home base after 

becoming acclimated in another theater. 

The ARC members noted that the 

flightcrew member is not truly 

acclimated to the new theater but also 

is no longer acclimated to his or her 

home base. Ultimately, the ARC 

members agreed that a flightcrew 

member must always find at least 30 to 

36 continuous hours free of duty in any 

168 consecutive hours and that once a 

flightcrew member is given this rest, the 

flightcrew member is considered 

acclimated to local time. Based on this 

discussion, the FAA has decided against 

imposing any unique restrictions on a 

flightcrew member simply because he or 

she has returned to his or her home 

base. Acclimation to a home base is 

treated the same as any other 

acclimation to a new theater. 

However, the FAA is proposing to 

require a greater rest opportunity when 

a flightcrew member has been away 

from his or her home base for more than 

168 hours. In this instance, the FAA 

proposes to require a rest period that 

includes 3 physiological nights, rather 

than 36 hours free from duty or 

permitting the flightcrew member to fly 

during that approximately 72-hour 

period. This decision is based on the 

ARC members’ consideration of the 

amount of rest being dependent on how 

long the flightcrew member was away 

from home base. The ARC reviewed the 

current regulation, which requires a 

flightcrew member who exceeds 12 

flight hours to receive twice the amount 

of rest upon return to home base. 

The ARC members also discussed the 

impact of multiple consecutive roundtrip flights where flightcrew members 

would fly consecutive flights to an 

international destination, lay over for a 

day, and then return to the home base 

(e.g., Houston, Texas, to Paris, France, 

and return to Houston).25 These types of 

pairings are common, with a flightcrew 

member potentially flying three 

roundtrips in a week. The concern was 

that these types of flights will typically 

have layovers from 20 to 28 hours. The 

length of the layovers is primarily based 

on scheduling concerns. 

The length of the layover does not 

initially appear problematic, 

particularly in light of the current 

regulations which only require one 24- 

hour break in duty in a 7-day period. 

However, when the flights are 

particularly long, a layover of 

approximately 24 hours becomes a 

problem because the flightcrew member 

is constantly flipping his or her internal 

clock. When one runs the scenario 

through the SAFTE/FAST model with a 

three-person augmented crew, the 

flightcrew member reaches high fatigue 

limits during the second round-trip 

flight and is dangerously fatigued 

during the third round-trip flight. 

However, when the flights are not 

particularly long flights, flightcrew 

members appear to have no problem 

flying three roundtrip flights, even with 

the 24-hour layovers. 

The ARC developed a draft regulatory 

proposal to address operations so long 

that they almost trigger a fourth 

flightcrew member. Under that 

proposal, if the flight assignment is for 

a three pilot flight crew and the layover 

is between 20 and 28 consecutive hours 

and the two FDPs, separated by the 

layover rest, are greater than 22 to 24 

hours, then the flight crew requires two 

physiological night’s rest or one 

physiological night’s rest with an 8-hour 

restriction on the next FDP. 

Upon reflection, the FAA has decided 

that the ARC proposal is unduly 

complicated and only addresses a small 

number of potential operations. The 

agency has decided against proposing it. 

However, as part of the required training 

program proposed today, carriers should 

be educated on the risks associated with 

flipping a flightcrew member’s internal 

clock, particularly when conducting 

operations that are on the cusp of 

requiring an additional flightcrew 

member. 

The FAA requests comments on the 

following: 

(7) Is a 3-day adjustment to a new 

theater of operations sufficient for an 

individual to acclimate to the new 

theater? 

(8) Is a 36-hour break from duty 

sufficient for an individual to acclimate 

to a new theater? 

(9) Should flightcrew members be 

given a longer rest period when 

returning to home base than would 

otherwise be provided based on moving 

to a new theater? 

(10) Should the FAA have different 

requirements for flightcrew members 

who have been away from their home 

base for more than 168 hours? If so, 

why? 

(11) Should the FAA require 

additional rest opportunities for 

multiple pairings between two time 

zones that have approximately 24-hour 

layovers at each destination? What if the 

scheduled FDPs are well within the 

maxima in the applicable FDP table or 

augmentation table? 

F. Daily Flight Time Restrictions 

Initial ARC discussion of FDPs 

assumed that, as is the case in CAP–371 

and the EASA regulations, there would 

be no daily limit on flight time. Instead 

flight time would effectively be limited 

to approximately 2 hours less than the 

FDP because FDP assumes a flightcrew 

member will report for duty an hour and 

a half before flying and will spend 

approximately 30 minutes after 

completing all flying for the day 

completing paperwork. In that context, 

the maximum amount of time flying 

during the middle of the day could 

increase from the current 8 hours to as 

much as 11 hours, almost a 50 percent 

increase. The ARC noted that the FAA 

may decide that daily limits on flight 

time are still needed and proposed a 

variable flight time based on the hour of 

the day. Tables B(1) and B(2) represent 

potentially acceptable flight time 

limitations within FDPs. Table B(1) 

generally represents the position of the 

carriers, while Table B(2) generally 

represents the position of labor.26


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55863 

27Because the domestic rules do not allow for any 

extension of flight time, augmentation is not used 

domestically. 

TABLE B(1)—MAXIMUM FLIGHT TIME

LIMITS

Time of start 

(home base) 

Maximum flight 

time 

(hours) 

0000–0159 ...................... 7 

0200–0459 ...................... 8 

0500–0659 ...................... 10 

0700–1259 ...................... 11 

1300–1659 ...................... 10 

1700–2159 ...................... 9 

2200–2259 ...................... 8 .5 

2300–2359 ...................... 7 .5 

TABLE B(2)—MAXIMUM FLIGHT TIME

LIMITS

Time of start 

(home base) 

Maximum flight 

time 

(hours) 

0000–0459 ........................ 7 

0500–0659 ........................ 8 

0700–1259 ........................ 9 

1300–1959 ........................ 8 

2000–2359 ........................ 7 

In addition, the CAA presented an 

alternate regulatory approach, whereby 

flight time limits for all-cargo operations 

would be more expansive and would 

differ dependent on whether the 

particular operation was a domestic 

operation or an international operation. 

The numbers proposed by the CAA are 

presented in Tables B(3) and B(4). 

TABLE B(3)—MAXIMUM FLIGHT TIME

LIMITS, DOMESTIC ALL-CARGO

Time of 

start 

(home 

base) 

Maximum 

flight time 

(hours) 

1–4 sectors 

Maximum 

flight time 

(hours) 

5+ sectors 

0000–0459 8 7 

0500–1459 11 9 

1500–1659 10 8 

1700–2359 8 7 

TABLE B(4)—MAXIMUM FLIGHT TIME LIMITS, INTERNATIONAL ALL-CARGO

Maximum 

flight time 

(2 pilot) 

Maximum 

flight time 

(2 pilot, 

1 engineer) 

Flight time includes WOCL ...................................................................................................................................... 8 12 

Flight time does not include WOCL ........................................................................................................................ 10 12 

The FAA has decided to propose a 

variation of the more conservative 

maximum daily flight time limits for 

unaugmented operations in Table B(2). 

The agency proposes to extend the 

number of hours reflected in Table B(2) 

by one hour. This approach melds the 

different approaches in Tables B(1) and 

B(2), allowing for slightly higher flight 

time limits during early morning and 

daytime hours than are currently 

allowed, but not permitting extensions 

that, at some hours, come close to a 50 

percent increase over the current limits. 

Because current unaugmented 

operations are limited to 8 hours, the 

FAA’s ability to evaluate the impact of 

significantly longer flight time limits on 

aviation safety is limited. Accordingly, 

the FAA believes it is appropriate to 

propose overall limits that are more 

conservative than those depicted in 

Tables B(1), B(3) and B(4). 

The FAA recognizes that it has 

allowed up to 12 hours of flight time in 

circumstances that it has considered 

augmented operations, even though the 

third flightcrew member is not able to 

fly the plane. This has occurred in 

supplemental and flag operations when 

the flightcrew consists of two pilots and 

a flight engineer, and was more common 

when the fleet of aircraft requiring flight 

engineers was larger. Accordingly, this 

data set is much smaller than the set 

based on the 8-hour domestic limitation. 

Nevertheless, based on the safety history 

of these operations, it may be possible 

to demonstrate that longer flight time 

limits will not adversely affect safety, 

particularly during daytime hours when 

the flightcrew had an opportunity to 

sleep through their WOCL the previous 

night. 

The FAA also recognizes that daily 

flight time limits will have the greatest 

impact on crew pairings that consist of 

a single leg. This is because when flying 

multiple segments, more of the FDP will 

be spent on layovers. Thus, for a single 

segment pairing, almost all of the FDP 

will consist of flight time, while for a 

pairing with three or four legs, much of 

the FDP will not consist of flight time. 

As a carrier adds legs, the FDP becomes 

more of a constraint than the flight time 

limit. 

The FAA has decided against 

proposing special rules for all-cargo 

operations because there are no 

physiological differences between pilots 

who fly cargo planes and pilots who fly 

passenger planes. As noted before, the 

FAA believes the distinctions between 

domestic and international operations 

are largely irrelevant. To the extent they 

are truly distinct (generally due to the 

length of the trip), those differences are 

better addressed through augmentation 

rather than simply by extending the 

allowable flight time. Augmentation is 

discussed in greater detail in the next 

section. 

The FAA seeks comment on the 

following: 

(12) If the FAA adopts variable FDP 

limits, is there a continued need for 

daily flight time limits? 

(13) If the FAA retains daily flight 

time limits, should they be higher or 

lower than proposed? Please provide 

data supporting the answer. 

(14) Should modifications be made to 

the proposed flight time limits to 

recognize the relationship between 

realistic flight time limits and the 

number of flight segments in an FDP? 

G. Mitigation Strategies 

1. Augmentation 

Even with the variable FDP and flight 

time, there will continue to be a need to 

augment crews for longer flights. 

Ideally, augmentation should follow the 

same approach as FDP, i.e., circadian 

rhythms, acclimation to time changes, 

and multiple flight segments should be 

considered in determining how much 

augmentation is required. Further 

consideration should be given to the 

quality of the available rest facility. 

Essentially, the current regulations 

require augmentation beyond 8 hours of 

scheduled flight time. Under the FAA’s 

flag and supplemental rules, 

augmentation permits the following 

increases in flight time above the 8-hour 

limitation contemplated under the 

agency’s domestic rules: 27

• If there are three flightcrew 

members (one of whom may be an 

engineer), maximum flight time is 

extended to 12 hours. There is no 

requirement for a rest facility. 

• If there are four pilots (or three 

pilots and two flight engineers), 

maximum flight time is extended to 16 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55864 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

28Sitting up increases blood flow to the brain and 

causes emission of norephrenephrine, which is 

stimulative instead of relaxing. 

29This constraint would likely keep the rest 

facility out of the coach or economy section of the 

aircraft. 

30CAA would give partial credit for coach seats. 

hours. There must be an FAA-approved 

rest facility on board the aircraft 

(generally a bunk). 

• There are no hard constraints on 

flight time that exceeds 16 hours. 

Instead, the FAA has addressed the 

carriers’ fatigue mitigation practices on 

a case-by-case basis. 

The FAA believes that its current 

approach to augmentation fails to 

consider several pertinent factors. It 

fails to adequately consider the 

qualifications of all of the flightcrew 

members, giving credit for individuals 

who are not qualified to operate the 

controls; it fails to consider the varying 

quality of sleep facilities below a 12- 

hour flight time limit; it fails to 

recognize that, provided an opportunity 

for sleep is provided, some domestic 

operations could benefit from 

augmentation; and, as is the case 

generally with the agency’s flight and 

duty regulations, it fails to consider the 

impact of circadian rhythms. 

The FAA proposes to amend the 

existing regulations by varying the 

levels of augmentation credit depending 

on the quality of the rest facility, except 

that no credit would be given for rest in 

coach seats. The level of extensions 

would also vary based on when the 

flight takes place to account for 

circadian rhythms and whether the 

flight crew is acclimated. Domestic 

augmentation would be permitted if a 

sufficient rest opportunity is provided. 

Finally, all flightcrew members would 

have to be type-rated as a second-incommand (SIC) or pilot-in-command 

(PIC) and throughout the flight at least 

one crewmember on the flightdeck 

would have to be type-rated as a PIC. 

The FAA would also continue to permit 

extensions in flight time based on the 

number of flightcrew members, with 

greater credit given for four-man 

flightcrews than for three-man crews. 

The FAA believes this approach will 

provide carriers with a significant 

amount of flexibility. Should the carrier 

decide not to invest in superior rest 

facilities, it could opt to provide a lesser 

quality rest facility and add additional, 

qualified flightcrew members to extend 

the augmentation period. 

The FAA’s proposal is largely based 

on the general recommendation of the 

ARC. In reaching its conclusions, the 

ARC members reviewed the scientific 

material regarding augmentation that 

was presented during its meetings. 

Following are key points made by the 

sleep specialists during their 

presentations. 

• In-flight naps with augmented 

flightcrews are dramatically helpful in 

mitigating sleep debt. 

• When extending the FDP with an 

augmented flightcrew, augmented 

flightcrew members are presented with 

an opportunity for in-flight sleep, 

however the flightcrew members must 

take advantage of this sleep opportunity 

because augmentation is of no value if 

the entire flightcrew is awake. 

• The value of augmented flightcrew 

operations depends on the available 

sleep facility, with a quiet, flat bunk 

being the most desirable. 

• In-flight sleep has restorative value, 

and the flatter one is able to lie, the 

more beneficial the sleep.28

• To divide in-flight duty and rest 

among the flightcrew appropriately, 

route guides for positioning of sleep 

should be developed for augmented 

flightcrews (i.e., not all crewmembers 

need to be provided for equal sleep 

opportunities; rather pilots responsible 

for more complicated duties such as 

take-offs and landings may need more of 

a sleep opportunity, and may need that 

opportunity at a more ideal time in the 

flight). 

In establishing the maximum 

scheduled FDP limitations for an 

augmented flightcrew, the ARC 

discussed the relative merits and safety 

of operations conducted with 

augmented flightcrews receiving inflight rest, as compared to 

conventionally scheduled operations. 

The ARC noted that the type of rest 

facility needs to be addressed in the 

proposed rule and in advisory material. 

The most comprehensive evaluation 

of available sleep facilities was 

conducted by the Dutch government in 

2007 to provide science-based advice on 

the maximum permissible extension of 

the FDP related to the quality of the 

available onboard rest facility and the 

augmentation of the flightcrew with one 

or two pilots. Extension of Flying Duty 

Period by In-flight Relief (July 29, 2007) 

(TNO Report). The TNO report 

benchmarked existing research in 

arriving at its recommended values. The 

TNO report evaluated the quality of 

existing sleep facilities to determine 

how much sleep a flightcrew member 

could reasonably expect to get. The 

evaluation ranged from coach seats (a 

class IV rest facility) to bunks that were 

isolated from the rest of the crew and 

passengers (a class I rest facility). Based 

on the quality of the facility, the TNO 

Report assigned different values that 

would allow for an extension of the 

FDP. Based on its research, TNO 

decided against giving any credit for 

class IV rest facilities. 

The ARC noted that both the TNO 

Report and CAP–371, to varying 

degrees, assign value to in-flight rest 

opportunities that depend on the quality 

of the rest facility available on the 

aircraft. The ARC determined that there 

are approximately 20 different 

combinations of facilities among various 

certificate holders. The ARC members 

developed a rating system dependent on 

the ability to lie in a horizontal, flat 

position; control the amount of light and 

noise; and rest in a temperaturecontrolled environment; as well as the 

flightcrew member’s time off task. 

Depending on the amount of points 

assigned to these areas, the amount of 

credit for receiving rest in a type of seat 

could be calculated. The ARC members 

suggested a Type I, II, and III scheme, 

resulting in the following classes of 

sleep facilities: 

• Class 1 rest facility: A bunk or other 

surface that allows for a flat sleeping 

position, is separated from both the 

flight deck and passenger cabin to 

provide isolation from noise and 

disturbance and provides controls for 

light and temperature. 

• Class 2 rest facility: A seat in an 

aircraft cabin that allows for a flat or 

near flat sleeping position (around 80 

degrees from the seat’s vertical 

centerline),29 is separated from 

passengers by a minimum of a curtain 

to provide darkness and some sound 

mitigation, and is reasonably free from 

disturbance by passengers and/or 

flightcrew members. 

• Class 3 rest facility: A seat in an 

aircraft cabin or flight deck that reclines 

at least 40 degrees, provides leg and foot 

support, and is not located in the coach 

or economy section of a passenger 

aircraft. 

Accordingly, the ARC revised the 

sleep credit for the class rest facility to 

more closely align the percentages with 

the TNO Report recommendations as 

follows: 

• Class 1: 75 percent. 

• Class 2: 56 percent. 

• Class 3: 25 percent. 

• No credit for coach seats.30

The ARC determined that 

augmentation should be required when 

either the maximum scheduled FDP or 

flight time hour limit depicted in Tables 

A and B of this document is insufficient 

for the planned operation. The ARC 

considered that longer flights crossing 

multiple time zones or overnight flights 

could be better indicators of the need to 

augment than flight times. For example, 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55865 

an 8-hour, 45-minute flight during the 

day could be safely operated by an unaugmented flightcrew, but a 7-hour, 30- 

minute overnight flight should perhaps 

be augmented. One ARC member 

proposed that any planned pairing with 

greater than 6.5 block hours where the 

FDP infringes on the normal sleep cycle 

require augmentation. 

The ARC developed Table C, which 

combines the limits from the first (single 

flight segment) column of the proposed 

FDP table (Table A) with principles 

from the TNO Report. 

TABLE C—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: ACCLIMATED AUGMENTED FLIGHTCREW

Time of start 

(home base) 

Maximum flight duty period (hours and minutes) based on rest facility and number of pilots 

Class 1 rest facility Class 2 rest facility Class 3 rest facility 

3 pilots 4 pilots 3 pilots 4 pilots 3 pilots 4 pilots 

0000–0559 ............................................... 13:50 16:05 12:55 14:20 11:45 12:15 

0600–0659 ............................................... 15:10 17:40 14:10 15:40 12:55 13:25 

0700–1259 ............................................... 16:30 19:20 15:25 17:05 14 14:30 

1300–1659 ............................................... 15:10 17:40 14:10 15:40 12:50 13:20 

1700–2359 ............................................... 13:50 16:05 12:55 14:20 11:45 12:15 

The ARC discussed placing an 

absolute cap of 16 or 18 hours (for a 

three- or four-man flightcrew, 

respectively) on the FDP, even though 

the TNO Report scheme results in a 

higher FDP. The ARC determined that 

higher FDPs could be achieved only by 

use of an FRMS. Under such a 

constraint, only augmented operations 

commencing between the hours of 7 

a.m. and 1 p.m. would be constrained 

beyond Table C, and then only when the 

highest quality rest facility is provided. 

The ARC stated that its prescriptive 

approach could apply to most 

operations, but certificate holders 

engaged in ultra-long range operations 

could use an FRMS to develop an 

alternate means of fatigue mitigation 

tailored to their specific operations. The 

ARC members noted that some types of 

operations, such as air cargo operations, 

which operate under different demands 

and circumstances, might approach 

augmentation and fatigue differently 

than other types of operations. 

The maximum scheduled FDP 

limitations for augmented flightcrew 

member operations with an 

unacclimated flightcrew are set forth in 

Table D. 

TABLE D—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: UNACCLIMATED AUGMENTED FLIGHTCREW

Time of start 

(home base) 

Maximum flight duty period (hours and minutes) based on rest facility and number of pilots 

Class 1 rest facility Class 2 rest facility Class 3 rest facility 

3 pilot 4 pilot 3 pilot 4 pilot 3 pilot 4 pilot 

0000–0559 ............................................... 13:15 15:20 12:20 13:35 11:15 11:45 

0600–0659 ............................................... 14:30 17 13:35 15 12:15 12:50 

0700–1259 ............................................... 15:50 18:30 14:50 16:25 13:30 14 

1300–1659 ............................................... 14:30 17 13:35 15 12:20 12:45 

1700–2359 ............................................... 13:15 15:20 12:20 13:35 11:15 11:40 

The ARC calculated the maximum 

scheduled FDPs in Table D for 

augmented flightcrew members who are 

not acclimated based on the same 

methodology provided for acclimated 

flightcrew members in Table C above. 

However, for unacclimated flightcrew 

members there is a roughly 30-minute 

reduction in the planned maximum FDP 

for augmentation calculation. The 

absolute cap of 16 and 18 hours would 

correspondingly be reduced to 15.5 and 

17.5 hours, respectively. 

The FAA has decided to propose the 

augmentation levels proposed by the 

ARC in Table C, except that the 

numbers have been rounded up or down 

to the closest half hour for regulatory 

efficiency. As suggested by the ARC, 

acclimated operations are capped at 16 

hours if only a three-man crew is 

available and 18 hours if a four-man 

crew is available. In addition, the FAA 

is not proposing to implement Table D 

into the regulatory text because it is 

essentially a thirty minute reduction 

from Table C. Rather, the regulatory text 

specifies that the numbers in Table C 

are reduced by 30 minutes if a crew is 

not acclimated. This approach is 

consistent with the one proposed for unaugmented operations. 

The ARC noted that augmentation 

should be used strictly for long flights 

and not to extend the FDP for multiple 

short flight segments. The ARC 

discussed whether more than two flight 

segments should be permitted in 

augmented flight operations and, if so, 

should an FRMS be required to do so. 

Some members of the ARC cautioned 

that augmentation should not be 

permitted to facilitate unnecessary 

additional flight segments or eliminate 

crew swaps. These individuals argued 

that augmentation was initially 

permitted to address those flights that 

could not reasonably be conducted 

within the existing rules at that time 

because the distances involved 

prevented long layovers or crew swaps. 

This issue was particularly relevant to 

the discussion of whether augmentation 

should be used for domestic operations. 

The primary concern related to multisegment augmented flights was the 

available sleep opportunity for 

flightcrew members. Everyone 

acknowledged that flightcrew members 

are not going to sleep during take-off 

and landing. Accordingly, flight 

segments need to be sufficiently long to 

permit the flightcrew members to 

actually sleep. The ARC agreed that a 

flightcrew member assigned to a multisegment trip needs a specific amount of 

available time to rest to fly the multiple 

segments. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55866 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

31However, they also noted that there is an 

overhead involved in getting to sleep, and that split 

sleep multiplies that overhead. Therefore, split 

sleep with 4 hours at night and 4 hours during the 

day would, over time, result in a cumulative sleep 

debt. 

32The presenters stated that it is less clear if a 

split sleep involving a 2-hour sleep segment and a 

6-hour sleep segment is equivalent to eight hours 

of continuous sleep. 

The FAA agrees that short flight 

segments will not permit a flightcrew 

member to sleep. Thus, too many flight 

segments, even within an extended FDP, 

would not allow a meaningful sleep 

opportunity for the flightcrew. The FAA 

is proposing that a certificate holder not 

schedule an augmented crew pairing 

with more than three segments 

(including FDPs that include required 

technical stops such as stopping for fuel 

or to clear customs). In addition, two 

consecutive hours must be available for 

in-flight rest for the flightcrew member 

manipulating the controls during 

landing; a 90-minute consecutive period 

must be available for in-flight rest for 

each flightcrew member; and the last 

flight segment must provide a two 

consecutive hour rest period. The 

proposed requirement for the 2-hour 

rest opportunity on the last flight 

segment is designed to address a 

common recognition among the ARC 

members that, even on a flight with only 

two segments, the last segment is often 

of such duration that there is no realistic 

rest opportunity, even though this is 

when the crew is likely to be the most 

fatigued. 

The ARC discussed the qualifications 

of the relief flightcrew member used in 

augmented operations. Some ARC 

members emphasized that there must be 

one type-rated flightcrew member on 

the flight deck at all times. One ARC 

member noted that current regulations 

require only one type-rated flightcrew 

member on the aircraft. Another ARC 

member stated that under no 

circumstances should a flight engineer 

serve as a relief flightcrew member. The 

ARC proposed that at least one 

flightcrew member type-rated in the 

aircraft be on the flight deck at all times. 

The ARC largely deferred to the FAA in 

deciding whether to allow augmentation 

based on the presence of a flight 

engineer. 

As mentioned earlier in this section, 

the FAA does not believe a flight 

engineer may serve as a relief flightcrew 

member unless he or she is qualified as 

a PIC or SIC and type rated. The 

purpose of a relief flightcrew member is 

to have someone available to help fly 

the airplane when another flightcrew 

member is at rest. In order for him or 

her to do this, the relief flightcrew 

member must know how to actually 

operate the aircraft. 

The FAA seeks comment on the 

following: 

(15) Should augmentation be allowed 

for FDPs that consist of more than three 

flight segments? Does it matter if each 

segment provides an opportunity for 

some rest? 

(16) Should flight time be limited to 

16 hours maximum within an FDP, 

regardless of the number of flightcrew 

members aboard the aircraft, unless a 

carrier has an approved FRMS? 

(17) Should some level of credit be 

given for in-flight rest in a coach seat? 

If so, what level of credit should be 

allowed? Please provide supporting 

data. 

(18) Is there any reason to prohibit 

augmentation on domestic flights 

assuming the flight meets the required 

in-flight rest periods proposed today? 

(19) Are the proposed required rest 

periods appropriate? 

(20) Should credit be allowed if a 

flightcrew member is not type-rated and 

qualified as a PIC or SIC? 

2. Split Duty Rest 

The concept of allowing mitigation for 

split duty sleep is similar to that for 

augmentation, in that a crewmember 

can regenerate to some extent because of 

the ability to sleep for a period of time 

during his or her FDP. In fact, the 

quality of the sleep facility may be 

significantly better than the quality of a 

sleep facility aboard an aircraft. 

However, the initial theory behind 

augmentation was that it was impossible 

to simply place a fresh crew aboard the 

aircraft. While that may be true in some 

instances where split duty rest is 

contemplated, it is not universally true. 

In any case, current regulations provide 

no incentive for a carrier to provide its 

flightcrew members with a rest 

opportunity outside of the mandatory 

rest requirements. Nevertheless, some 

carriers have spent considerable 

amounts of money developing rest 

facilities for their employees, and others 

provide hotel rooms, even though not 

required by the FAA. Carriers have 

taken these steps recognizing that, even 

though not required, providing the rest 

facilities increases the level of safety. 

The ARC discussed the concept of 

split sleep with the sleep specialists to 

assess the value of the type of rest 

obtained on a split duty trip. The 

scientists noted that split sleep is an 

area of intensive work. All other factors 

being equal, if the total amount of actual 

sleep is the same, split sleep is 

theoretically as valuable as continuous 

sleep.31 However, the presenters noted 

that the value of sleep is impacted by 

where it falls in the circadian cycle. 

They stated that split sleep with 4 hours 

sleep during a circadian night is better 

than 8 hours of continuous sleep during 

the day. However, the larger portion of 

split sleep ideally would fall during the 

WOCL, and they reiterated that split 

sleep with a component at night is 

better than consolidated sleep during 

the day. This is because the ability to 

sleep effectively is diminished during 

daytime hours because it is very 

difficult to get continuous sleep during 

this time. They also stressed that actual 

sleep is important, and noted that a 4- 

hour sleep opportunity may only net 2 

hours of actual sleep.32

The ARC discussed extending the 

FDP based on the opportunity for sleep 

during the duty period and the 

mitigations needed to extend the FDP. 

These mitigations would apply to split 

duty trip pairings (including continuous 

duty overnights, also known as CDOs), 

in which a flightcrew member has a 

downtime of several hours between 

flights within the same FDP. 

Some members of the ARC rejected 

the concept of a regulatory credit for 

split duty sleep, while others noted that 

it is fully consistent with the concept of 

extending FDPs based on augmentation. 

The ARC considered allowing a 

certificate holder to extend the FDP up 

to 50 to 75 percent of time that a 

flightcrew member spent resting in a 

suitable accommodation up to a 

maximum FDP of 12 to 13 hours as long 

as certain conditions were met. First, 

the sleep facility should be a single 

occupancy, temperature-controlled 

facility with sound mitigations that 

provide a flightcrew member with the 

undisturbed ability to sleep in a bed and 

to control light. Second, the flightcrew 

member must be given an actual, not 

simply scheduled, sleep opportunity in 

the suitable accommodation. Some ARC 

members also suggested that there 

should be a requirement that the sleep 

facility be approved by the FAA, there 

be an employee feedback process to 

assure the facilities were adequate, and 

that the opportunity for rest coincide 

with the flightcrew member’s circadian 

rhythms. 

The FAA is proposing to permit credit 

for split duty sleep consistent with the 

proposal presented by those members of 

the ARC supporting credit. A reasonable 

sleep opportunity must actually be 

provided (as opposed to simply 

scheduled), and the sleep facility must 

be adequate to reasonably allow sleep. 

A carrier could extend an FDP by 50 

percent of the actual available sleep 

opportunity if it provides at least 4 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55867 

33As a practical matter, the 12-hour limitation on 

FDP makes split duty sleep desirable only for 

nighttime operations or operations that begin late at 

night and restart very early in the morning. The 

FAA believes it is unlikely a carrier would rely on 

split duty sleep opportunities in the middle of the 

day because there would be no additional credit. 

34A copy of the technical report evaluating the 

model has been placed in the docket. See also, 

Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Graeber, R.C., 

Connell, L.J., Gregory, K.B., Miller, D.L., & Barnes, 

R.M. (1998). Crew factors in flight operations: The 

initial ASA-Ames field studies on fatigue. Aviation, 

Space, and Environmental Medicine, 69 (2), B1– 

B60. Thomas, M.J.W., Petrilli, R.M., Roach, G.D. 

(2007). The Impacts of Australian Transcontinental 

‘‘Back of Clock’’ operations on sleep and 

performance in commercial aviation flight crew 

(B2005/0121). Adelaide/Whyalla, Australia: 

University of South Australia, Centre for Applied 

Behavioural Science. Gander, P.H., Gregory, K.B., 

Connell, L.J., Miller, D.L., Graeber, R.C., & 

Rosekind, M.R. (1996). Crew factors in flight 

operations: VII. Psychophysiological responses to 

overnight cargo operations (NASA/TMm1996– 

110380). Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research 

Center. 

35This model is widely used, with approximately 

14 major carriers and sixteen governmental agencies 

world-wide having used the model to evaluate 

fatigue in aviation and other industrial settings. 

hours sleep opportunity. However, the 

FDP could not be extended beyond 12 

hours.33 The sleep opportunity is 

calculated from the time the flightcrew 

member actually reaches the sleep 

facility, rather than when it is 

scheduled. This is because a scheduled 

sleep opportunity may be reduced 

considerably if there are delays or an 

unanticipated need for further aircraft 

movement. As with all other instances 

when transportation to or from a rest 

facility is involved, the period of time 

engaged in transportation does not 

count as duty, but it also does not count 

as rest. 

The rest facility must be adequate to 

reasonably permit the flightcrew 

member with an opportunity to rest. To 

that end, it must be quiet, temperaturecontrolled, and light-controlled. The 

FAA considered whether to require that 

it also be a single occupancy facility. 

The agency has tentatively decided 

against such a requirement because it 

understands that there are currently 

facilities where there may be more than 

one bed per room, and it believes this 

is fundamentally a labor-management 

issue. Flightcrew members regularly 

spend the night near their home base in 

houses or apartments where there may 

be multiple beds in a single room. If this 

dormitory-type housing is sufficient for 

full rest periods, it should, from a 

regulatory perspective, be sufficient for 

a split rest facility. 

The FAA seeks input on the 

following: 

(21) Please comment on whether a 

single occupancy rest facility provides a 

better opportunity for sleep or a better 

quality of rest than a multiple 

occupancy facility such as a multi-bed 

crew sleeping facility or multi-bed 

living quarters. Please provide 

supporting data. 

H. Consecutive Nighttime Flight Duty 

Periods 

There was a discussion among ARC 

members on whether there should be a 

limitation on the number of consecutive 

nights that a pilot could fly, based, in 

part, on a presentation to the ARC that 

performance falls off under the SAFTE/ 

FAST model after the third night. 

Currently the FAA places no restrictions 

on the number of allowable consecutive 

nighttime operations, as long as the 

crewmember receives 24 consecutive 

hours free from duty in a 7-day period. 

CAP–371 provides a scheme whereby 

flight duty periods are reduced based on 

the number of previous consecutive 

nights flown. The FAA is unaware of 

the basis for this scheme, and it is not 

readily apparent from a reading of the 

requirement. 

Modeling indicates that consecutive 

nights of nighttime work will lead to a 

decrease in productivity over a 

relatively short period of time 

(approximately 3 days). The modeling 

notes a steady deterioration in 

performance because it is very difficult 

for most people to sleep effectively 

during the day.34 The members of the 

ARC who had flown nighttime 

operations generally agreed that the first 

night of multiple nighttime operations 

was the most difficult because they were 

unaccustomed to being awake all night. 

During the ARC discussion, the cargo 

contingent of the part 121 community 

asserted that if one changes the 

assumption in the SAFTE/FAST model 

and assumes that one can train oneself 

to sleep effectively during the day, it 

may be possible to work more 

consecutive nights without a significant 

degradation in performance. This may 

be particularly true if an individual is 

provided an opportunity to sleep during 

the night while packages are being 

sorted from one plane to the next. The 

cargo carriers asserted that higher levels 

of sleep pressure brought on by the 

longer period of wakefulness on day one 

of the pairing act to offset the general 

inability to sleep effectively during the 

day, particularly when people have 

been trained to understand the need to 

take advantage of the sleep pressure to 

improve their ability to sleep during the 

day. The FAA has asked Dr. Hursh, who 

developed the SAFTE/FAST model,35 to 

input these assertions into the model. 

Dr. Hursh determined that, given a 

sufficient sleep opportunity at night, a 

person can sustain his or her 

performance at acceptable levels for five 

consecutive nights. However, the 

smaller the nighttime sleep opportunity, 

the lower level of performance, 

particularly by night five. In addition, 

training on how to maximize sleep 

opportunities is critical because an 

individual needs to get enough sleep 

during the day to make up for the 

nighttime sleep deficit. A copy of Dr. 

Hursh’s analysis has been placed in the 

docket for this rulemaking. 

The FAA has decided to take a 

comprehensive approach towards 

consecutive nighttime operations that it 

believes addresses the concerns by both 

contingents within the ARC. The agency 

proposes to permit consecutive 

nighttime flying, constrained only by 

30-hour consecutive rest required for 

any 168-hour period, as long as there is 

an opportunity to rest in a suitable 

facility during the flight duty period. As 

proposed, this sleep opportunity would 

have to comport with the proposed split 

duty requirements for extending a flight 

duty period. Should no such 

opportunity be provided, a carrier could 

not assign a flightcrew member to more 

than three consecutive nightime FDPs. 

While this approach is more restrictive 

than currently permitted, it permits 

cargo carriers who provide adequate rest 

facilities to continue their current 

operations. It also assures that 

flightcrew members are given an 

opportunity for limited nighttime rest. 

The FAA has concerns that simply 

limiting nighttime operations to three 

consecutive nights could result in a 

significant increase in the number of 

first night operations, since presumably 

carriers will not change the nature of 

their operations, but simply will 

schedule more multiple-night crew 

pairings to accommodate the existing 

operations. Thus, a flightcrew member 

who is currently assigned two 5-night 

pairings in a 2-week period could 

potentially be assigned three 3-night 

pairings in the same 2-week period, 

increasing the risk associated with the 

first night of operations by 50 percent 

during that timeframe. Certainly longstanding industry practice has been to 

fly more than three consecutive nights. 

The FAA is concerned that taking an 

approach that may appear safer in 

modeling could lead to adverse safety 

impacts in the real world. 

The ARC contingent advocating 

restrictions on consecutive night flight 

duty periods suggested a fourth night 

was acceptable as long as a 14-hour rest 

was provided between nights three and 

four. The FAA notes that a 14-hour rest 

opportunity would limit a flightcrew 

member to a maximum 10-hour duty 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55868 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

36Although today’s proposal does not 

contemplate a 24-hour day, the FAA assumes that 

consecutive nighttime operations would generally 

be scheduled at approximately the same time each 

day. 

37The word ‘‘airport’’ was added to standby to 

differentiate between the ICAO term ‘‘standby,’’ 

which is the equivalent of ‘‘reserve’’ in U.S. 

terminology. 

38These same variables apply to airport/standby 

reserve but are addressed there by the maximum 

FDPs in the FDP table. 

period, excluding the time required for 

local commuting.36 The FAA is not sure 

that this approach would provide a 

meaningful FDP for the fourth night. 

The FAA requests input on the 

following: 

(22) Should there be any restriction 

on consecutive nighttime operations? If 

not, why? 

(23) If the nighttime sleep opportunity 

is less than that contemplated under the 

split duty provisions of this notice, 

should a carrier be allowed to assign 

crew pairing sets in excess of three 

consecutive nights? Why or why not? 

(24) If the nighttime sleep opportunity 

meets the split duty provisions of this 

notice, should the carrier be allowed to 

extend the flight duty period as well as 

the number of consecutive nighttime 

flight duty periods? Why or why not? 

(25) Should a fourth night of 

consecutive nighttime duty be permitted 

if the flightcrew member is provided a 

14-hour rest period between nights three 

and four? 

I. Reserve Duty 

While the term ‘‘Reserve’’ has been 

used for years in the air carrier industry, 

the term is not addressed at all in part 

121. The agency has issued 11 legal 

interpretations on the subject of reserve, 

which range from examples of whether 

a crewmember is on duty and, if 

applicable, whether the required rest 

associated with that duty period is 

impeded by being in a reserve status. 

The ARC discussed various 

definitions of reserve and initially 

proposed that reserve means that a pilot 

that does not have a regular flying 

schedule and is available for flight when 

contacted by the company. That pilot 

has no telephone or reporting 

responsibility to the company. The ARC 

refined the definition of ‘‘reserve’’ to 

read ‘‘a flightcrew member that is 

required by a certificate holder to be 

available to receive an assignment for 

duty.’’ In addition, the ARC established 

the following types of reserve duty: 

Long-call, short-call, and airport/ 

standby. The ARC noted that the 

policies that apply to reserve flightcrew 

members vary significantly between 

certificate holders, but also found that 

there are some relatively consistent 

conditions. 

CAP–371 places restrictions on 

‘‘Standby Duty’’, which is generally the 

equivalent of short-call reserve 

discussed below. When standby duty is 

undertaken at home, or in a suitable 

accommodation provided by the 

operator, during the period 2200 to 0800 

hours local time and a crew member is 

given 2 hours or less notice of a report 

time, the allowable FDP starts at the 

report time for the designated reporting 

place. EASA recognizes ‘‘standby duty’’, 

but does not place any regulatory 

restrictions on this type of duty. 

Reserve duty is inherently based on 

unpredictable events, such as covering 

trips for flightcrew members who 

become ill, have difficulty traveling to 

the airport for an assignment because of 

weather or other reasons, or are 

stranded due to severe weather creating 

flightcrew member shortages throughout 

a certificate holder’s system. The very 

nature of reserve duty makes injecting 

predictability into a reserve flightcrew 

member’s schedule a challenge. 

The ARC set a goal to make reserve 

duty as predictable as possible, and to 

manage fatigue as much as possible. The 

proposal on how to address reserve 

limits was one of two areas of consensus 

by the ARC. The ARC concept includes 

defining limits associated with flight 

duty period, duty period and rest 

limitations. 

One of the most fatiguing elements of 

reserve duty is the lack of predictability. 

Unlike a flightcrew member who has a 

set schedule (a line-holder), a flightcrew 

member on reserve may spend several 

hours on-call and then, once called, be 

expected to report to the airport ready 

to commence his or her duty day. The 

lack of predictability means the reserve 

crewmember cannot schedule naps or 

otherwise control his or her sleep 

opportunities to assure the reserve 

crewmember is adequately rested when 

he or she reports to work. 

The ARC asked the sleep specialists 

what impact this lack of predictability 

has on a reserve flightcrew member 

compared to a line-holding flightcrew 

member. The presenters responded that 

depending on when a reserve flightcrew 

member is called and how much notice 

is given, he or she may not have the 

same opportunity to nap that a lineholder would have, because the lineholder would know about the trip and 

could plan his or her rest accordingly. 

A reserve flightcrew member also might 

not nap, even if he or she thought a call 

was unlikely, because this uncertainty 

may disrupt his or her sleep schedule. 

The ARC asked the scientists how a 

reserve flightcrew member could best 

prepare for a potential assignment, 

without knowing when he or she may 

be called. They recommended a normal 

night’s sleep through the WOCL and a 

late afternoon nap in the minor WOCL. 

The ARC also asked the presenters if 

there was a maximum duty time that 

should be set for reserve duty. The 

scientific presenters noted that the 

ability to successfully manage time-onduty is dependent on rest. If 8 hours 

sleep in the WOCL is available, then 16 

hours of duty is theoretically possible. 

Short-Call and Airport/Hotel Standby 

Reserve 

Airport/standby reserve 37 is known 

by several terms among various 

certificate holders, but ultimately 

involves a flightcrew member on call at 

an accommodation or other facility at or 

near an airport. The flightcrew member 

is not at home and is not resting. The 

purpose of such reserve duty is to have 

an available flightcrew member close to 

the operation in case of a schedule 

irregularity. Flightcrew members on 

these assignments can receive notice to 

report to work in as little as 1 hour 

before departure time, requiring them to 

be in a constant state of readiness. 

Because of the unique nature of these 

assignments, and the fact that the 

flightcrew member is not resting, an 

airport/standby reserve assignment is 

considered to be an FDP, regardless of 

whether a flying assignment is 

ultimately received by the flightcrew 

member. 

Short-Call Reserve 

A short-call reserve flightcrew 

member typically receives an 

assignment on relatively short notice, 

meaning he or she would not be 

provided an adequate time for a legal 

rest period before reporting for duty. 

Report times are typically within two to 

3 hours from notification. Short-call 

reserve differs from airport/standby 

reserve in that the flightcrew member is 

likely to be at home and available for 

contact by the certificate holder, rather 

than at the airport or a hotel actively 

awaiting an assignment. Although the 

flightcrew member may be at home, the 

opportunity for sleep before reporting 

for duty cannot be guaranteed. 

Therefore, the ARC deemed a limit on 

the amount of time spent on short-call 

reserve duty as necessary. 

The ARC noted that a number of 

variables may impact the maximum FDP 

for a short call reserve.38 These variables 

include: 

• Timing of on-call period within a 

circadian day. Where an on-call period 

starts in relation to standard circadian 

rhythms can affect alertness and state of 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55869 

39The ARC defined a long-call reserve as ‘‘a 

reserve flightcrew member whose obligation to 

report for an FDP following notification contains a 

legal rest period before report time.’’ 

40The ARC notes that ‘‘assigned’’ and ‘‘scheduled’’ 

are one in the same; therefore, when a certificate 

holder assigns a reserve flightcrew member a trip, 

that certificate holder has given that flightcrew 

member a schedule. This prevents a certificate 

holder from assigning a trip to a flightcrew member 

and stating that the term assigned does not fall 

under the definition of scheduled. It also prevents 

certificate holders from only assigning trips and not 

scheduling any trips. 

rest. Generally, short call availability 

periods may be classified as very early 

morning, daytime, or night. The ARC 

considered that daytime reserve 

flightcrew members can be presumed to 

be well-rested and alert at the start of 

their reserve period because they can get 

a regular night’s sleep. For the other 

classifications, circadian factors may 

make flightcrew members less alert and 

rested than those on daytime reserve. 

One ARC member suggested that 

flightcrew members called to report 

during overnight hours should have a 

reduced maximum FDP. 

• Length of on-call period. Not all 

carriers have the same reserve policies. 

Some certificate holders have relatively 

short on-call periods, lasting only a few 

hours, while other certificate holders 

may require flightcrew members to be 

on call for 12 hours or more. 

• Timing of call and report time in 

relation to on-call period and length of 

duty day. One ARC member noted that 

during an on-call period, the time the 

flightcrew member is called and the 

time the flightcrew member is expected 

to report may affect the flightcrew 

member’s alertness and rested state (e.g., 

called at 5 a.m. to report at 3 p.m. vs. 

called at 10 a.m. to report at noon). 

• Recent on-call history. The ARC 

noted that reserve flightcrew members 

with on-call schedules often change 

schedules from day to night, or viceversa, within a short period of time. 

Such changes, especially if given with 

short notice, can result in reserve 

flightcrew members failing to obtain 

proper rest before their on-call periods. 

Long-Call Reserve 

Long call reserve 39 pilots are given 

relatively substantial advance notice of 

when they are to fly. This notice may be 

from 9 hours to over 24 hours. A longcall reserve flightcrew member typically 

receives an assignment for duty well in 

advance and will have a sleep 

opportunity before reporting for duty, 

and may have enough notice of the 

assignment to plan his or her rest 

accordingly. The ARC recognized, 

however, that depending on the timing 

of notice and the report time in relation 

to circadian rhythms, reserve flightcrew 

members may not be able to obtain a full 

8 hours of sleep, despite the opportunity 

to do so. The lack of predictability of 

when the flightcrew member will be 

required to report for duty makes it 

difficult for the reserve flightcrew 

member to plan ahead in his or her 

sleep rest cycles. 

The ARC considered two reserve 

systems developed by working groups 

consisting of ARC members representing 

industry and labor groups. 

One working group proposed a WOCL 

Aware Reserve System to the ARC. 

Some key points of the system are as 

follows: 

• Any reserve flightcrew member 

called between 2200 and 0600 will 

receive a minimum of 10 hours of rest 

before reporting for duty. 

• Any reserve flightcrew member 

called to fly into the WOCL would have 

to be contacted within the first 6 hours 

of his or her reserve duty. 

• If normal sleep time is not 

interrupted and a reserve flightcrew 

member is not being called to fly into 

the WOCL, he or she would have the 

same FDP limit as a line-holder because 

they received similar rest. 

• Airport/standby reserve is to be 

treated like a trip assignment and is 

considered as an FDP. No part of 

airport/standby reserve may be 

considered rest, even if the flightcrew 

member is at a hotel. 

The proposal for a Predictable Reserve 

System with Circadian Stability 

(Predictable System) is based on three 

prongs: Science, circadian stability, and 

adequate rest. The proposal incorporates 

provisions from CAP 371, and provides 

some recommendations from a reserve 

rest ARC that convened in 1999. The 

second proposal contained the 

following elements: 

Reserve Limits 

• Created several definitions 

applicable to reserve including ‘‘reserve 

availability period’’ (RAP), ‘‘reserve duty 

period’’ (RDP), ‘‘short call reserve’’, and 

‘‘long call reserve.’’ 

• Maximum RDP is 16 hours. 

• Maximum reserve availability 

period (RAP) for short call reserve is 14 

hours. 

• Carrier receives half credit for not 

calling a reserve crew member on phone 

availability between 0000 and 0600; 

maximum 3 hours. 

Shifting RAP 

• Later—12 hour maximum in any 

168 consecutive hours. 

• Earlier—3 hour maximum into the 

WOCL; 5 hour maximum otherwise. 

• Not allowed on consecutive days. 

Concerns were expressed regarding 

individuals on phone availability being 

called during the window of circadian 

low. However, it was noted that based 

on scientific modeling, for a reserve 

called during the window of circadian 

low, a 4-hour lookback (the period in 

which the carrier must contact the 

reserve from the start of the RAP to use 

the entire available FDP) actually would 

be better than the 6-hour lookback 

originally proposed under the WOCL 

Aware proposal. 

A scenario was also posed of a pilot 

with a RAP starting during the window 

of circadian low, but not called until 

after the window of circadian low had 

passed. It was proposed that some credit 

be given for the sleep obtained before 

being called. After brief discussion, the 

ARC decided to move forward with a 

maximum FDP limit of 16 hours after 

the start of the RAP. 

After considering the above proposals 

and other discussions, the ARC 

proposed the following requirements for 

reserve duty: 

• ‘‘Scheduled’’ is defined as times 

assigned by a certificate holder when a 

flightcrew member is required to report 

for duty. ‘‘Assigned’’ is defined as 

scheduling by a certificate holder when 

a flightcrew member is required to 

report to duty.40

• Airport/standby reserve counts as 

part of the flightcrew member’s FDP. 

• RAP and RDP only apply to short 

call reserve. 

• The maximum RDP for unaugmented operations is the flightcrew 

member’s possible FDP under the FDP 

table plus 4 hours, or 16 hours, 

whichever is less. 

• The maximum RDP for an 

augmented flight crew is the flightcrew 

member’s possible FDP under the 

augmented FDP table plus 4 hours. 

• A carrier receives half credit for not 

calling a reserve crew member on phone 

availability between midnight and 6 

a.m. up to a maximum of 3 hours (e.g., 

if the crew member is on reserve starting 

at 1 a.m., but isn’t called until 3 a.m., 

the RAP is extended by 1.5 hours). 

• A short-call reserve duty period in 

which the crewmember is not called to 

report to work may not exceed 14 hours. 

• Conversion from long-call to shortcall reserve assignment must be 

preceded by a legal rest period. 

• A long-call reserve flightcrew 

member must receive a legal rest prior 

to reporting for duty and at least 12 

hours notice of an assignment of a trip 

pairing that will extend into the 

window of circadian low. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55870 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

41This issue was not discussed by the ARC and 

there appears to be a general agreement in the 

aviation community that reserve is neither rest nor 

duty. The FAA agrees this approach is appropriate 

for long-call reserve and acknowledges that calling 

short-call reserve ‘‘duty’’ could have adverse 

implications if there were a daily duty limit. 

However, the FAA also believes that some portions 

of industry have developed reserve policies that 

increase the likelihood of fatigue because the 

reserve crewmember can spend long periods of time 

on reserve with no anticipation of a rest 

opportunity prior to reporting to work. 

• A reserve flightcrew member’s RAP 

may be shifted under the following 

conditions: 

—A shift to a later RAP may not exceed 

12 hours. 

—A shift to an earlier RAP may not 

exceed 5 hours, or if the shift will 

move the availability into the 

flightcrew member’s window of 

circadian low, it may not exceed 3 

hours. 

—A shift to an earlier RAP may not 

occur on consecutive days. 

—The total amount of shift in RAPs for 

a flightcrew member may not exceed 

12 hours (regardless of direction) in 

any 168 consecutive hour period. 

Tables E(1) and E(2) are visual 

depictions of the maximum RAP 

discussed above based on the two FDP 

tables contemplated by the ARC. 

TABLE E(1)—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD RESERVE: TWO FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS, OPTION 1 

Time of start 

(home base) 

Maximum flight duty period reserve (hours) based on number of flight segments 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 

0000–0359 ................................. 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 

0400–0459 ................................. 14 14 13 13 13 13 13 

0500–0559 ................................. 15 15 15 15 14 13 .5 13 

0600–0659 ................................. 16 16 16 16 15 15 14 .5 

0700–1259 ................................. 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 

1300–1659 ................................. 16 16 16 16 15 .5 15 14 .5 

1700–2159 ................................. 15 15 14 14 13 .5 13 13 

2200–2259 ................................. 14 .5 14 .5 13 .5 13 .5 13 13 13 

2300–2359 ................................. 13 .5 13 .5 13 13 13 13 13 

TABLE E(2)—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD RESERVE: TWO FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS, OPTION 2 

Time of start 

(home base) 

Maximum flight duty period reserve (hours) based on number of flight segments 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 

0000–0159 ................................. 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 

0200–0459 ................................. 14 14 14 14 13 13 13 

0500–0659 ................................. 16 16 16 16 15 .5 15 14 .5 

0700–1259 ................................. 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 .5 

1300–1659 ................................. 16 16 16 16 15 .5 15 14 .5 

1700–2159 ................................. 15 15 15 15 13 13 13 

2200–2259 ................................. 14 .5 14 .5 14 .5 14 .5 13 13 13 

2300–2359 ................................. 13 .5 13 .5 13 .5 13 .5 13 13 13 

Because this was one of only two ARC 

consensus areas, the FAA has decided 

to propose the ARC recommendation 

with only a few changes. 

First, the agency has decided against 

adding Table E to the regulatory text. 

The agency believes the regulatory text 

is sufficiently clear. Also, the table does 

not include the credit that could be 

given for not calling during the reserve 

crew member’s window of circadian 

low and could be misleading. Carriers 

(and the pilot associations) are of course 

free to draft whatever tables they think 

are helpful to understand the regulatory 

requirements. 

Second, the ARC did not consider 

time within the RAP to be duty. 

However, the FAA believes that it may 

be appropriate to designate time spent 

in a short-call reserve status as duty.41

While in a short-call reserve status, the 

crewmember can expect that he or she 

will not receive an opportunity to rest 

prior to commencing a flight duty 

period. The crewmember also is 

required to limit his or her actions 

sufficiently so that he or she can report 

to his or her duty station within a fairly 

short timeframe. Accordingly, the FAA 

believes this time needs to be accounted 

for within the cumulative duty limits 

discussed later in this document. 

While the FAA is proposing the ARC 

recommendation on reserve, it also 

notes some concern with the level of its 

complexity. The agency is particularly 

concerned that the partial credit given 

for not calling during the window of 

circadian low will be difficult to 

implement. It may make more sense to 

simply assign a credit for not calling 

during the window of circadian low. 

The agency also has some concern that 

the RDP for augmented operations could 

extend to 22 hours. While there would 

be some opportunity to rest on board the 

aircraft, this proposal would permit 

some reduction in the overall rest 

opportunity. 

The FAA seeks comment on the 

following: 

(26) Please comment on whether a 16 

maximum hour FDP for long call reserve 

is appropriate when the maximum FDP 

for a lineholding flightcrew member is 

13 hours. 

(27) Please comment on whether the 

proposed maximum extended FDP of 22 

hours for an augmented flightcrew 

member is appropriate. If not, please 

provide an alternative maximum FDP. 

(28) Please comment on whether a 

certificate holder should receive credit 

for not calling a flightcrew member 

during the WOCL while on reserve. 

(29) Should minimum required rest 

while on reserve status be greater than 

the amount of rest required for a 

lineholding flightcrew member? If so, 

please provide supporting data, if not, 

please provide rationale. 

(30) Please comment on the level of 

complexity on the proposed reserve 

system. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55871 

42 Krueger, G.P. (1989). Sustained work, fatigue, 

sleep loss and performance: a review of the issues. 

Work & Stress. 3, (2), 129–141. Galy, E., Melan, C., 

& Cariou, M. (2008). Investigation of task 

performance variations according to task 

requirements and alertness across the 24-h day in 

shift workers. Ergonomics, 51 (9), 1338–1351. 

Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Gregory, K.B., Smith, 

R.M., Miller, D.L., Oyung, R., Webbon, L.L., & 

Johnson, J.M. (1996). Managing fatigue in 

operational settings 1: Physiological considerations 

and countermeasures. Behavioral Medicine, 21, 

157–165. Graeber, R.C. (1986). Crew factors in flight 

operations: IV. Sleep and wakefulness in 

international aircrews (NASA/TMm1986–88231). 

Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. 

Gander, P.H., Graeber, R.C., Connell, L.J., & Gregory, 

K.B. (1991). Crew factors in flight operations: VIII. 

Factors influencing sleep timing and subjective 

sleep quality in commercial long-haul flight crews 

(NASA/TMm1991–103852). Moffett Field, CA: 

NASA Ames Research Center. 

43Except that no curtain need be provided if the 

crewmember is being deadheaded commercially, 

since this would be beyond the certificate holder’s 

control. 

J. Cumulative Duty Periods 

The FAA’s current regulations do not 

impose a cumulative restriction on duty, 

although as a practical matter, a 

flightcrew member engaged in domestic 

operations is effectively limited to a 16- 

hour duty day and all flightcrew 

members are entitled to 24 consecutive 

hours free from duty during a 7-day 

period. Rather, the FAA has historically 

placed limitations on the number of 

flight hours a flightcrew member may be 

assigned on a daily, weekly, monthly, 

and annual basis. Depending on 

whether one is operating under 

domestic, flag or supplemental rules, 

flight time is limited to 30–32 hours a 

week, 100–120 hours a month, 300–350 

hours a quarter, and 1,000 hours a year. 

CAP–371 and EU–OPS subpart Q 

impose more restrictions on cumulative 

duty, with weekly limits ranging from 

55 to 60 hours, biweekly limits of 95 

hours (CAP–371 only), and slightly less 

than monthly limits of 190 hours 

(calculated against 28 days rather than 

an actual month). The ICAO SARP 

recommend that member states restrict 

duty hours within any seven 

consecutive days or a week and 28 

consecutive days or a calendar month. 

Scientific studies suggest that long 

periods of time on duty infringe upon 

an individual’s opportunity to sleep, 

thus causing a ‘‘sleep debt’’ which is also 

known as cumulative fatigue.42 Some 

conclusions are based on experiments in 

sleep labs, and there is limited data 

either supporting or refuting that the 

amount of cumulative duty has a direct 

effect on cumulative fatigue. 

Despite the lack of validated data, the 

FAA believes it is appropriate to take a 

conservative approach and is proposing 

to impose cumulative limitations on 

duty, flight duty periods, and flight 

time. Not only are cumulative limits 

consistent with current regulations here 

and abroad, but they offer protections 

against practices common in the 

aviation industry, where pilots 

commonly work more than an 8-hour 

day, often at varying times in a single 

week. The FAA proposes to set 

maximum duty limitations, flight duty 

periods, and flight time (block) periods 

based on specific time intervals. Fewer 

hours on duty can be equated to more 

opportunity for rest, which can mitigate 

the amount of cumulative fatigue 

experienced by a flightcrew member. 

The proposed limits decline over 

extended periods of time, i.e., the 28- 

day limits are less than four times the 

weekly limits. This approach would 

allow flightcrew members to work long 

hours over a relatively short period of 

time, but prevent long duty periods over 

extensive lengths of time. 

The ARC defined duty as ‘‘any task 

that crewmembers are required by the 

certificate holder to perform including, 

but not limited to: Flight duty, 

administrative work, ground training, 

ancillary training, positioning, and 

airport standby.’’ The FAA believes this 

definition appropriately details the type 

of work commonly required of 

crewmembers except that, as discussed 

earlier, it believes that time spent on 

short-call reserve should apply to the 

cumulative duty limits proposed today. 

Under today’s proposal, duty time 

would be limited to 65 hours in any 

consecutive 168-hour period (7 days) 

and 200 hours in any consecutive 672- 

hour period (28 days). The FAA is 

proposing consecutive hourly limits that 

equate to 7 and 28 days because the 

current requirements assume that a day 

starts just after midnight, which is an 

arbitrary constraint that does not work 

well for carriers. As a result, carriers 

have been allowed to define when their 

‘‘day’’ begins. This approach is 

unwieldy. As a practical matter, the 

FAA expects that carriers and flightcrew 

members will base their ‘‘week’’ on the 

time the flightcrew member reported for 

duty after completing his or her 

extended rest period. 

The weekly limit could be extended 

by up to 10 hours to 75 hours during a 

rolling 168 hours and the 28-day limit 

could be extended to 215 hours if the 

duty period includes deadhead 

segments in a rest seat outside the flight 

deck meeting or exceeding the 

provisions of class 2 rest facility.43

Allowing an additional 10 hours duty 

time for non-FDP deadhead flights when 

adequate sleeping accommodations are 

provided seems to be a reasonable 

accommodation to that sector of the 

industry that relies on deadheading to 

position pilots to areas outside of the 

U.S. Since the extension is limited to no 

more than 10 additional hours, there 

should be sufficient fatigue mitigation. 

Since short-call reserve periods are 

tentatively considered to be duty, the 

FAA also believes it is appropriate to 

allow carriers to increase the maximum 

cumulative duty periods to account for 

the time spent on short-call reserve, 

while still recognizing that time spent 

on reserve is less strenuous than time 

actively spent on duty. 

The FAA also notes that it may be 

appropriate to provide the same 

accommodation to management 

personnel. The rationale for allowing 

longer duty periods based on deadhead 

segments centered on the fact that 

deadheading in a ‘‘rest seat’’ provided 

mitigation in the form of an opportunity 

to rest; office work would not allow for 

such mitigation, but limiting the duty 

period to 65 hours a week for 

management could have an adverse 

safety impact (e.g., force flying shorter, 

unaugmented flights) since the 

management workload likely will not be 

reduced. 

The extension of the maximum duty 

limit would only be extended by the 

amount of time spent engaged in the 

type of duty allowing for an extension. 

Thus, if a flightcrew member spent 5 

hours on short-call reserve, the 

maximum weekly duty period would 

only be extended by 5 hours, to a total 

of 70. 

The proposed cumulative limitation 

on flight duty periods is largely 

consistent with the approach already 

adopted by the British and EASA. 

Specifically, the ARC recommended 

that flight duty period be limited to 60 

hours in any consecutive 168 hours (7 

days) and 190 hours in any 672 

consecutive hours (28 days). The ARC 

decided there was no need to 

implement a biweekly requirement, as 

exists in CAP–371, instead endorsing 

the approach adopted by EASA. The 

FAA agrees that a weekly and monthly 

approach sufficiently mitigates the 

effects of cumulative fatigue and is 

proposing the limits suggested by the 

ARC. The FDP is a sub-set of duty, and 

the maximum FDP limits are subsumed 

within the maximum duty limits. To the 

extent any duty other than that 

encompassed in the definition of a FDP 

cannot be completed within the time 

dedicated to non-FDP duty (typically 5 

hours a week or 10 hours in a 4-week 

period), the amount of FDP is 

correspondingly reduced. Thus, during 

a 168-hour period, if a flightcrew 

member spent 30 hours in ground 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55872 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

44Akerstedt, T., & Gillberg, M. (1981). The 

circadian variation of experimentally displaced 

sleep. Sleep, 4 (2), 159–1659. Akerstedt, T., & 

Gillberg, M. (1990). Subjective and objective 

sleepiness in the active individual. International 

journal of neuroscience, 52 (1–2), 29–37. Gander, 

P.H., De Nguyen, B.E., Rosekind, M.R., & Connell, 

L.J. (1993). Age, circadian rhythms, and sleep loss 

in flight crews. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 

Medicine, 64 (3), 189–195. 

45Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Gregory, K.B., 

Smith, R.M., Miller, D.L., Oyung, R., Webbon, L.L., 

& Johnson, J.M. (1996). Managing fatigue in 

operational settings 1: Physiological considerations 

and countermeasures. Behavioral Medicine, 21, 

157–165. 

46Caldwell, J.A., Mallis, M.M., Caldwell, J.L., 

Paul, M.A., Miller, J.C., & Neri, D.F. (2009). Fatigue 

countermeasures in aviation. Aviation, Space, and 

Environmental Medicine, 69 (1), 29–59. 

47 Gander, P.H., Myhre, G., Graeber, R.C., 

Anderson, H.T., and Lauber, J.K. (1985). Crew 

factors in flight operations: I. Effects of 9-hour timezone changes on fatigue and the circadian rhythms 

of sleep/wake and core temperature (NASA/TMm 

1985–88197). Moffett Field, CA. NASA Ames 

Research Center. 

48Lamond, N., Petrilli, R.M., Dawson, D., and 

Roach, G.D. (2006). Do short international layovers 

allow sufficient opportunity for pilots to recover? 

Chronobiology International, 23(6), 1285–1294. 

Lamond, N., Petrilli, R.M., Dawson, D., and Roach, 

G.D. (2005). The impact of layover length on the 

fatigue and recovery of long-haul flight crew. 

Adelaide/Whyalla, Australia: University of South 

Australia, centre for Sleep Research. 

49See also, Gander, P.H., Graeber, R.C., Connell, 

L.J., and Gregory, K.B. (1991). Crew factors in flight 

operations: VIII. Factors influencing sleep timing 

and subjective sleep quality in commercial longhaul flight crews (NASA/TMm 1991–103852). 

Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. 

Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Gregory, K.B., Smith, 

R.M., Miller, D.L., Oyung, R., Webbon, L.L. and 

Johnson, J.M. (1996). Managing fatigue in 

operational settings 2: An Integrated Approach. 

Behavioral medicine, 21, 166–170. 

training, the available amount of FDP 

for that period would only be 35 hours. 

‘‘Flight time’’ retains the meaning in 

14 CFR 1.1. While the ARC largely 

agreed on a 100 hour limitation in any 

672 consecutive hours (28 days), it was 

unable to agree on a maximum annual 

limit. Some argued that the constraints 

on cumulative duty and flight duty 

periods obviated the need for any limit. 

This argument was particularly strong 

with regard to annual limits on flight 

time. However simple calculations of 

the proposed weekly and 28-day limits 

revealed that absent an annual limit, a 

flightcrew member could potentially 

accrue as many as 2,000 flight hours in 

a 12-month period. Based on this 

assessment, those arguing against any 

limit conceded that some annual limit 

may be appropriate, but that in any case 

the current limit of 1,000 hours per year 

could be relaxed to 1,200 hours. Others 

argued that the current annual limit is 

too high and urged the FAA to consider 

a 900 hour limit. The FAA has 

tentatively decided to retain the current 

annual flight time limitation of 1,000 

hours in any 365 consecutive days 

because the ARC members were unable 

to agree and the current limit is within 

the limits presented by the ARC. 

(31) The FAA seeks input on the 

appropriate cumulative limits to place 

on duty, flight duty periods and flight 

time. Is there a need for all the proposed 

limits? Should there be more limits (e.g., 

biweekly, or quarterly limits)? 

(32) The FAA also asks for comments 

on measuring limits on an hourly rather 

than daily or monthly basis. Does this 

approach make sense for some time 

periods but not for others? 

K. Rest Requirements 

1. Pre-Flight Duty Period Rest 

Adequate rest is the most critical 

component of fatigue mitigation. As 

such, it is critical that the FAA 

implement unambiguous rest 

requirements that address both the 

potential for fatigue on a daily basis and 

the risk posed by cumulative fatigue. 

Currently, 14 CFR part 121, subparts Q, 

R and S address rest limits within a 24- 

hour period. However, certificate 

holders conducting operations with 

airplanes having a passenger seat 

configuration of 30 seats or fewer and a 

payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or 

less, may comply with the less stringent 

requirements of 14 CFR sections 

135.261 through 135.273. Perhaps the 

largest problem with the existing 

regulations is that there is no 

mechanism to assure that rest is 

provided prior to flight, and there is no 

guarantee that the 9-hour rest 

requirement results in 8 hours of actual 

sleep opportunity. 

In addition, the existing requirements 

do not adequately apprise the regulated 

community on what constitutes being 

free from duty. The FAA has issued 55 

legal interpretations regarding rest that 

apply to pilots, flight attendants and 

dispatchers, many of which relate to 

whether a crew member is at rest when 

required to answer phone calls or pagers 

or otherwise be in contact with the 

carrier. 

CAP–371 defines rest as a period of 

time before starting a flight duty period 

which is designed to give crew members 

adequate opportunity to rest before a 

flight. The minimum rest period must 

be as long as the preceding duty period, 

or 12 hours, whichever is greater. After 

being called out from reserve, the length 

of minimum rest is determined by the 

length of reserve duty, time spent on 

positioning, and any completed FDP. 

EASA defines a rest period as a 

continuous and defined period of time, 

subsequent to and/or prior to duty, 

during which a crew member is free of 

all duties. Certificate holders are 

required to ensure that rest periods 

provide sufficient time for flightcrew 

members to overcome the effects of the 

previous duties and be well rested for 

the next FDP. In addition, a certificate 

holder must ensure that the effects on a 

flight crew passing through different 

time zones are compensated for with 

additional rest. As is the case with 

CAP–371, the EU OPS subpart Q 

requires that minimum rest for an FDP 

beginning at home base must be at least 

as long as the preceding duty period or 

12 hours, whichever is greater. If the 

FDP begins away from home base, the 

rest must be as long as the preceding 

duty period or 10 hours, whichever is 

greater. Within this rest period, a 

certificate holder must provide at least 

8 hours of opportunity for sleep. EU 

OPS subpart Q also requires certificate 

holders to increase the minimum rest 

periodically to a weekly rest period. The 

pilot-in-command also may reduce rest 

in the event of unforeseen 

circumstances. 

As discussed earlier, the study of 

sleep science is somewhat settled on the 

following points: The most effective 

fatigue mitigation is sleep; an average 

individual needs to have an 8-hour 

sleep opportunity to be restored; 8 hours 

of sleep requires more than 8 hours of 

sleep opportunity; and daytime sleep is 

less restorative than nighttime sleep.44

For most people, 8 hours of sleep in 

each 24 hours sustains performance 

indefinitely.45 There is a continuous 

decrease in performance as sleep is lost. 

Examples of this reduction in 

performance include complacency, a 

loss of concentration, cognitive and 

communicative skills, and a decreased 

ability to perform calculations. All of 

these skills are critical for aviation 

safety.46

The scientific presenters stated that 

during long pairings with significant 

time zone shifts, a minimum of 24 hours 

off would be necessary for flightcrew 

members to find an adequate sleep 

opportunity, and sufficient time free 

from duty.47 A minimum of two nights 

of sleep might be necessary to acclimate 

to a different time zone.48

The scientific presenters noted that an 

individual’s circadian clock is sensitive 

to rapid time zone changes. They added 

that long trips present significant issues 

requiring mitigation strategies.49

Twenty-four or 48 hours of rest may not 

be adequately restorative during a trip 

pairing where a flightcrew member is 

working 20 days separated by 24-hour 

layovers. In some cases, shorter rest 

periods, such as 18 hours or less, may 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55873 

be more restorative because of circadian 

issues. 

In defining a rest period, the ARC 

included the condition that a flightcrew 

member be free from all contact during 

a rest period. The proposed definition 

means that the certificate holder cannot 

contact a flightcrew member nor can the 

flightcrew member be required to 

contact the certificate holder during a 

rest period. 

The ARC members agreed on a 

general approach towards rest without 

agreeing on the number of hours one 

needed to be free from duty to assure an 

8-hour sleep opportunity. On the lower 

end, they developed a domestic rest 

requirement of 10 hours by working out 

in each direction from an 8-hour sleep 

opportunity, with 30 minutes on each 

end for transportation, and 30 minutes 

on each end for physiological needs 

such as eating, exercising and 

showering. Others on the ARC noted 

that a longer rest period was required to 

assure an 8-hour sleep opportunity. 

For international operations, some 

members of the ARC suggested this rest 

requirement should increase to 12 

hours. They noted that flightcrew 

members may require a longer rest 

period at international layovers because 

of issues with time zone changes and 

possible difficulties obtaining sleep 

because the flightcrew member is nonacclimated. There were also concerns 

raised with a potential for increased 

stress associated with communicating 

with air traffic control in countries 

where English is not the native 

language. Some ARC members 

acknowledged that the minimum period 

captures the same elements as the 10- 

hour requirement discussed above but 

includes an additional 2 hours to transit 

customs and immigration or travel a 

long distance to hotel accommodations 

in foreign destinations. 

The ARC discussed permitting the 

minimum rest time to be reduced to a 

lower level due to unforeseen 

circumstances. On the one hand, this 

would allow the carrier to recover a 

schedule; on the other hand, the need 

for reduced rest may be based on 

factors, such as poor weather or 

mechanical problems with the aircraft, 

which are potentially more fatiguing 

than normal operations. Ultimately, the 

ARC members proposed to allow 

certificate holders to reduce a minimum 

rest period from 10 to 9 or 12 to 11 

hours for operational flexibility in 

unforeseen circumstances, but to limit 

the number of times rest could be 

reduced to once in a 168-hour period. In 

addition, the decision to reduce 

minimum rest would be a joint decision 

between the pilot in command and the 

certificate holder. 

The FAA is proposing flightcrew 

members be provided with a minimum 

of 9 hours rest prior to commencing a 

flight duty period. The agency has 

tentatively decided against proposing 

different requirements for domestic and 

international operations. Time 

associated with clearing customs and 

immigration or traveling longer 

distances to a hotel has been addressed 

by refining the time at which the rest 

requirement begins and ends, as 

discussed below. While the FAA agrees 

that changes in time zones and the need 

to acclimate require additional 

safeguards, the agency believes that it 

has already accommodated that 

additional risk in other provisions to the 

proposed rule. As to concerns raised 

with air traffic controllers who do not 

speak English as their primary language, 

the FAA is unconvinced that providing 

an additional 2 hour sleep opportunity 

after the flight has ended would have 

any impact on the stress associated with 

communicating with air traffic control 

after entering foreign air space. Based on 

the available sleep studies, it does not 

appear that a longer rest period 

immediately prior to commencing a 

flight in non-U.S. airspace would be 

necessary since presumably the 

flightcrew member has received the 

requisite amount of sleep to report to 

duty refreshed and well-rested. 

As suggested by the ARC, the rest 

opportunity could be reduced by 1 hour 

once in any 168-hour period, but only 

if agreed to by the pilot in command. 

Under no circumstances may the 

opportunity to rest be reduced by more 

than 1 hour because such reductions 

would seriously encroach upon the 8- 

hour sleep opportunity. Should the time 

period between the beginning of the rest 

period and the time the flightcrew must 

report for transportation to the airport 

be less than 8 hours, the carrier would 

need to delay the next day’s flight or 

make other crewing arrangements. 

This proposal does not exactly mirror 

the ARC recommendation, because the 

FAA is proposing that transportation 

time to or from a duty station not be 

included in the minimum rest periods; 

nor would it be considered duty. Rather, 

the rest period would begin once the 

flightcrew members reach the hotel. The 

FAA’s proposal does not change the 

intent of the ARC to generally assure an 

8-hour sleep opportunity. However, the 

FAA believes that time in transit is not 

rest. In addition, the agency is 

concerned that allowing this time to be 

included in the rest period could result 

in a reduction in actual rest opportunity 

below 8 hours. The ARC members 

recognized this possibility and 

considered an approach whereby any 

time exceeding 30 minutes would not be 

considered in the rest period. 

Ultimately, the impact is the same; it is 

simply clearer from a regulatory 

perspective to acknowledge that time in 

transit is not rest. The FAA has decided 

against treating this time as duty 

because it recognizes that the 

permissible amount of cumulative duty 

is only nominally higher than the 

permissible amount of FDP and that the 

location of a rest facility is a lifestyle 

issue that is typically negotiated 

between the carriers and their unions. 

The FAA seeks comment on the 

following: 

(33) If transportation is not 

considered part of the mandatory rest 

period, is there a need for a longer rest 

period for international flights? 

2. Cumulative Rest Requirements 

Much as there should be cumulative 

limits on the amount of work a 

flightcrew member can be expected to 

perform in a week, there also needs to 

be an opportunity for rest that exceeds 

the amount of rest required on a daily 

basis. The scientific presenters to the 

ARC stated that cumulative fatigue is 

fatigue brought on by repeated mild 

sleep restriction or extended hours 

awake. They noted that the repeated 

infringement of duty time on the 

opportunity to sleep results in 

accumulated sleep debt and that the 

operative factor in recovery from 

cumulative fatigue is sleep. When a 

person has accumulated a sleep debt, 

recovery sleep is necessary. Recovery 

sleep requires an opportunity to obtain 

sufficient sleep to fully restore the 

person’s ‘‘sleep reservoir.’’ Recovery 

sleep should include at least one 

physiological night, that is, one sleep 

period during nighttime hours in the 

time zone in which the individual is 

acclimated. 

The ARC discussed what would 

constitute rest sufficient to act as a 

restorative rest reset for the 168 

consecutive hour rolling window. The 

ARC noted that current regulations 

require 24 hours free of duty in any 7 

consecutive days dependent on the type 

of operation. The ARC considered 

whether reset rest should (1) incorporate 

a minimum of two physiological nights’ 

rest, which would be variable based on 

when the FDPs began and ended, or (2) 

be a fixed number of hours ranging from 

30 to 48 hours. The ARC proposed that 

a 30 to 36 hour rest during any 168 

consecutive hours constitutes a 

restorative rest period. Those arguing for 

a 36 hour rest period noted that the 30 

hour period would only rarely afford 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55874 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

50The FAA anticipates that all FRMS proposals 

would be evaluated and approved at headquarters 

by individuals within AFS–200 dedicated to 

overseeing FRMS. 

51 You may view the AC at http://www.faa.gov/ 

regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/ 

go/document.information/documentID/319218. 

one the opportunity for two 

physiological nights rest. Those 

supporting 30 hours noted that this time 

frame would allow for one physiological 

night’s rest and at least one additional 

sleep opportunity, albeit less than a full 

8 hours. 

The FAA is proposing to impose a 30 

hour continuous rest requirement for 

each rolling 168-hour period. This 

approach does not guarantee two 

consecutive physiological nights rest in 

a 7-day period. Rather, it provides for a 

single physiological night rest and a rest 

opportunity immediately preceding or 

following that night. Although this is 

less rest than suggested by some 

members of the ARC, it still represents 

a 25 percent increase over current 

requirements. In addition, the FAA 

believes the cumulative limits on duty 

and FDP during the same 7-day period 

should adequately mitigate the effects of 

cumulative fatigue. 

L. Fatigue Risk Management Systems 

A Fatigue Risk Management System 

(FRMS) is a carrier-specific method of 

evaluating how to best mitigate fatigue 

based on active monitoring and 

evaluation by the carrier and flightcrew 

members. This cooperative approach 

has the potential to provide a 

cooperative and flexible means of 

monitoring and mitigating fatigue 

during operations when the prescriptive 

approach is not optimal. An FRMS 

requires a carrier to develop numerous 

processes and structures within an 

operation. These measures lead to an 

effective management and mitigation of 

fatigue on the part of both the carrier 

and its employees that might affect the 

operation. 

An FRMS requires that a baseline of 

fatigue effects be identified for the 

affected population, scientific modeling 

of respective work schedules, education 

and management of the process for all 

stakeholders, and effective evaluation 

and validation of the instituted policies. 

As a continuously improving system, 

the knowledge gained in developing and 

validating fatigue data should result in 

regular improvements in how the 

certificate holder and its employees 

manage and mitigate fatigue. 

No country has adopted FRMS as a 

regulatory alternative. However, ICAO is 

actively considering requiring member 

states to implement some alternative 

means of compliance with existing 

rules, and EASA has proposed requiring 

FRMS as an integral part of an 

operator’s management system. 

Permitting FRMS as a regulatory 

alternative to today’s proposal is widely 

supported by industry, with several 

organizations requesting that the FAA 

adopt FRMS as a means of addressing 

fatigue. Theoretically, a carrier could 

apply its FRMS to all of its operations. 

Realistically, it would likely only be 

used when the carrier cannot meet the 

more prescriptive rules because of the 

nature of the specific operations. 

The FAA has decided to include an 

FRMS option in today’s proposal. A 

certificate holder may utilize this option 

when it has developed an FAAapproved equivalent level of safety for 

monitoring and mitigating fatigue 

specific to those operations.50 The 

proposed regulatory text provides broad 

performance requirements that a 

certificate holder would need to 

demonstrate it met prior to the FAA 

granting approval. These requirements 

include an additional FRMS-specific 

training element above and beyond the 

general requirement proposed today. 

The extent of the additional training 

would be determined as part of the 

overall approval process. 

While FRMS is not fully matured, the 

general concepts are well understood 

and have been developed in other 

contexts. For example, the approach 

used to obtain ultra-long range OpSpecs 

is essentially an FRMS, except that it 

does not contemplate flightcrew 

members providing feedback to the 

certificate holder or a system of 

accountability. The FAA’s Advanced 

Qualification Program, which has been 

in place since 1990, also incorporates 

many aspects of an FRMS. In addition, 

ICAO is currently working on 

developing FRMS standards. The FAA 

is actively engaged in the development 

of these standards, as are at least two 

members of the ARC. Accordingly, the 

FAA believes that FRMS will be 

sufficiently robust to be implemented 

for operations that cannot otherwise be 

accommodated under the rule by the 

time the rule takes effect. 

Generally, a certificate holder would 

need to demonstrate that its FRMS has 

an education and awareness training 

program; a fatigue reporting system; a 

system for monitoring flightcrew 

fatigue; a performance evaluation; and 

possibly an incident reporting process. 

The FAA issued advisory circular (AC) 

120–103 entitled Fatigue Risk 

Management Systems for Aviation 

Safety 51 on August 3, 2010 outlining the 

types of data and processes a certificate 

holder would need to develop to receive 

FRMS approval from the agency. I 

As is the case with the proposed 

training requirements, whenever the 

Administrator finds that revisions are 

necessary for the continued adequacy of 

an FRMS, the certificate holder would 

have to make any changes in the 

program deemed necessary by the 

Administrator after being notified that 

such changes are needed. This would 

likely be done through the OpSpec 

process. 

The FAA requests comment on: 

(34) Whether some elements of an 

FRMS, such as an incident reporting 

system, would be better addressed 

through a voluntary disclosure program 

than through a regulatory mandate? 

M. Commuting 

The impact of commuting to a duty 

station has been linked to increased 

fatigue, most recently in the crash in 

Buffalo, New York. Commuting is 

common in the airline industry, in part 

because of lifestyle choices available to 

pilots by virtue of their being able to fly 

at no cost to their duty station, but also 

because of economic reasons associated 

with protecting seniority on particular 

aircraft, frequent changes in the 

flightcrew member’s home base, and 

low pay and regular furloughs by some 

carriers that may require a pilot to live 

someplace with a relatively low cost of 

living. While commuting to a duty 

station can be handled responsibly 

(particularly assuming one has the 

means), it is also subject to abuse. 

The only current impediment to 

irresponsible commuting in the FAA’s 

regulations is the general requirement in 

part 91 that pilots report to work fit for 

duty. CAP–371 provides that if journey 

time from home to normal home base is 

more than 1.5 hours, crew members 

should consider making arrangements 

for temporary accommodation nearer to 

base. This provision is not mandatory. 

The ARC unanimously recommended 

that pilots be reminded of their existing 

obligations under part 91 to report to 

work fit for duty, but that the FAA 

impose no new requirements. The FAA 

has tentatively rejected this approach. 

Commuting is fundamentally a fitness 

for duty issue. If a flightcrew member 

commutes irresponsibly, it is possible 

that he or she may become fatigued. A 

responsible commuter plans his or her 

commute to minimize its impact on his 

or her ability to get meaningful rest 

shortly before flying, thus fulfilling the 

proposed requirement that he or she 

reports for an FDP rested and prepared 

to perform his or her assigned duty. 

The FAA considered proposing a 

requirement similar to the one in CAP– 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55875 

52The FAA notes that cost is not the critical 

factor since a regulatory impact on crew costs 

would more than likely be passed on the 

Department of Defense via the uniform rate process, 

resulting in no increase in cost to the carrier. While 

crew costs are typically based on historical costs, 

the FAA has been informed that the uniform rate 

process is sufficiently flexible to allow projected 

costs when the cost increase is the result of a 

regulatory action. 

53CRAF is currently not activated. 

371 mandating that pilots arrive at the 

pilot’s domicile airport in time to 

receive the pre-flight rest period in that 

area prior to commencing flight. At first 

blush, this approach has appeal, in that 

it would require a flightcrew member to 

have an opportunity for rest 

immediately prior to commencing an 

FDP. However, because commuting 

constitutes an activity conducted by a 

pilot on his or her own time, it is 

difficult to regulate. In addition, a strict 

commuting regulation, such as one that 

requires a pilot to report to a duty 

station area well in advance of the 

scheduled flight, would not necessarily 

result in more responsible commuting. 

A pilot could choose to commute during 

times that interfere with his or her 

WOCL (for example, taking a red eye for 

an afternoon flight), leaving him or her 

less rested for flight. This approach 

could also discourage responsible 

commuting. For example, today a 

flightcrew member can catch a midmorning flight to his or her duty station 

and then commence his or her flying 

shortly after arrival a couple of hours 

later. The flightcrew member would 

have received a full night of sleep, and 

would be in a much better position to 

work than the individual who had taken 

an overnight or very early morning 

flight. While the irresponsible 

commuter would be available to fly by 

mid-afternoon, the mid-morning 

commuter would not be available to fly 

until late evening, just as he or she is 

beginning to tire. 

The FAA does believe that it is 

unreasonable to assume that an 

individual is resting while commuting. 

Accordingly, time spent commuting, 

either locally or long-distance, is not 

considered rest, and a certificate holder 

will need to consider the commuting 

times required by individual flightcrew 

members to ensure they can reach their 

home base while still receiving the 

required opportunity for rest. This 

approach is consistent with that taken 

for transportation to and from a sleep 

facility other than home discussed 

earlier in this document. 

The FAA also believes it is 

inappropriate to simply rely on the 

existing requirements in part 91 to 

report to work fit for duty. The FAA 

believes a primary reason that pilots 

may engage in irresponsible commuting 

practices is a lack of education on what 

activities are fatiguing and how to 

mitigate developing fatigue. The FAA 

has developed a draft fitness for duty 

AC that elaborates on the pilot’s 

responsibility to be physically fit for 

flight prior to accepting any flight 

assignment, which includes the pilot 

being properly rested. Additionally, the 

AC outlines the certificate holder’s 

responsibility to ensure each flightcrew 

member is properly rested before 

assigning that flightcrew member to any 

flight. That document has been placed 

in the docket for this rulemaking. 

Additionally, the proposed training 

program discussed earlier contains an 

element on the impact of commuting on 

fatigue. 

N. Exception for Emergency and 

Government Sponsored Operations 

The ARC discussed various types of 

supplemental operations that may not 

be adequately addressed by the 

proposed requirements.52 These 

operations range from moving armed 

troops for the U.S. military and 

conducting humanitarian relief, 

repatriation, Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

(CRAF), Air Mobility Command (AMC), 

and State Department missions. Many of 

these types of supplemental operations 

fly into hostile areas, while others are 

conducted into politically sensitive, 

remote areas without rest facilities. The 

ARC recognized the uniqueness of these 

operations and noted that today some 

AMC and emergency operations are 

conducted under a deviation authority 

contained in 14 CFR 119.55 and 119. 57. 

Currently, all flights operated by an 

air carrier under contract with a U.S. 

Government agency must comply with 

part 121 or part 135, including flight 

and duty time regulations. These 

operations include, but are not limited 

to: 

• AMC contracts and other 

Department of Defense (DOD) contracts; 

• State Department contracts; 

• Department of Homeland Security 

contracts, including FEMA, 

humanitarian flights and Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement deportations; 

and 

• Department of Justice contract 

flights. 

Activation of the CRAF would allow 

military use of civil aircraft. CRAF is 

activated by presidential order in a time 

of war.53 Under CRAF, air carriers are 

required to operate their aircraft at the 

direction of DOD. However, the 

activation of CRAF does not obviate the 

air carrier’s responsibility to operate 

under part 121, including the flight and 

duty time regulations. 

14 CFR 119.55 allows the FAA 

Administrator to authorize an air carrier 

who has a contract with AMC a 

deviation to any part of part 119, 121, 

or 135 for the operation under that 

contract. AMC reviews an air carrier’s 

request for a deviation and either 

supports it or does not support it before 

AMC forwards the request to the FAA 

for a final decision. 

14 CFR 119.57 allows the FAA 

Administrator to authorize deviations 

during an emergency under certain 

conditions. The FAA has used this 

authority in the past. For instance, an 

OpSpec was used during Hurricane 

Katrina to allow humanitarian flights 

into and out of New Orleans. This 

authority is issued on a case by case 

basis during an emergency situation as 

determined by the Administrator. 

Neither of these current regulatory 

options fully address the needs of 

carriers who occasionally need to 

exceed the allowable FDP (with 

extensions) or who are operating under 

contract to a U.S. government agency 

other than AMC. These operations are 

distinguishable from tourism operations 

or operations where cargo shows up late 

to the aircraft for loading. 

The FAA recognizes that all carriers 

could encounter circumstances that 

would require a flightcrew member to 

exceed the limits in the FDP, including 

extensions. The most likely scenario 

probably would be a diversion into an 

area where, for whatever reason, it 

would not be safe for the crew or 

passengers to stay. In addition, the FAA 

recognizes that there is a public policy 

interest in permitting the United States 

government to contract out certain 

operations to air carriers. If these 

operations were conducted on military 

aircraft, the pilots would generally be 

subject to a 16-hour duty day, almost all 

of which could be flight time. 

Currently, if a military pilot flies a 

similar operation into a hostile area and 

must fly an aircraft out of theater due to 

a military exigency, and doing so would 

cause that pilot to exceed the militarymandated flight and duty time limits, 

that pilot can call his or her or her 

central command for permission to do 

so. A similar system, with FAA 

involvement, seems to make sense. In 

the event that there is no time to call 

back to the air carrier, the captain’s 

emergency authority would allow the 

captain to move the airplane to safety, 

with a report to the FAA. Likewise, the 

pilot in command is always authorized 

to address emergency situations. 

The concern of the FAA is not that 

circumstances may arise that require 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55876 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

pilots to take emergency action, but 

rather that air carriers should know that 

delays in certain operations for the U.S. 

government are possible and plan 

accordingly. Air carriers should mitigate 

the chances of such an event, for 

instance by staging crews at other 

airports or installing rest facilities on 

the aircraft to allow augmentation, in 

order to ensure that flight crews will not 

exceed FDP limits. Fundamentally, a 

carrier needs to have performed 

adequate planning for the mission, 

including having the appropriate 

onboard rest facilities or number of 

flightcrew members for the length of the 

duty day, and the emergency should not 

be self-induced. If a certificate holder 

chooses not to equip an aircraft with 

adequate rest facilities, then the 

certificate holder should not be able to 

claim an inability to comply with 

requirements because of the lack of 

those facilities. 

The FAA proposes to allow air 

carriers operating commercial flights 

and who are not under contract with a 

U.S. government agency to ask for a 

‘‘one time deviation’’ to the FDP limits 

under part 121 for a one time event in 

exceptional circumstances. Each event 

of this type would be reported to the 

FAA. The number of ‘‘one time 

deviations’’ would be tracked by the 

FAA, as would the rationale for needing 

the deviation. If the Administrator 

determines that the carrier is relying 

excessively on this deviation authority, 

the air carrier would have to change its 

operations or develop an FRMS in order 

to mitigate the chances of such events 

happening in the future. There would be 

extra rest requirements after such an 

event. 

For operations under contract with a 

U.S. government agency that cannot be 

conducted consistent with the general 

rules because of unique circumstances 

(such as when operating into an SFAR 

area, or when there is a declared 

military exigency that necessitates 

operations outside the scope of what the 

regulation contemplates), a different 

approach is proposed. Such operations 

could be conducted under an exception 

to the FDP and flight time limits, but not 

to the cumulative restrictions on FDP, 

flight time and duty. In addition, 

additional rest would be required and 

the carrier would have to demonstrate 

why the operations could not have been 

adjusted to prevent exceeding the daily 

limits. This could be done with a bimonthly reporting requirement. 

By tracking these events, the FAA can 

determine if the air carrier is properly 

planning its operations and mitigating 

the chances of its flight crews exceeding 

the FDP limits. The proposed regulation 

contemplates that the air carrier will 

develop an FRMS if it cannot 

restructure its operations so that only 

very few of those operations continue to 

need the exception. Sections 119.55 and 

119.57 would remain unchanged and 

used as they are today. 

(35) Are there other types of 

operations that should be excepted from 

the general requirements of the 

proposal? If so, what are they, and why 

do they need to be accommodated 

absent an FRMS? 

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

Regulatory Impact Analysis, Regulatory 

Flexibility Determination, and 

Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Order 12866 directs that 

each Federal agency shall propose or 

adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs. 

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires 

agencies to analyze the economic 

impact of regulatory changes on small 

entities. Third, the Trade Agreements 

Act (Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits agencies 

from setting standards that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. In 

developing U.S. standards, the Trade 

Agreements Act requires agencies to 

consider international standards and, 

where appropriate, that they be the basis 

of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–4) requires agencies to prepare a 

written assessment of the costs, benefits, 

and other effects of proposed or final 

rules that include a Federal mandate 

likely to result in the expenditure by 

State, local, or tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

$100 million or more annually (adjusted 

for inflation with base year of 1995). 

This portion of the preamble 

summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the 

economic impacts of this proposed rule. 

The FAA suggests readers seeking 

greater detail read the full regulatory 

impact analysis, a copy of which the 

agency has placed in the docket for this 

rulemaking. 

In conducting these analyses, the FAA 

has determined that this proposed rule: 

(1) Has benefits that justify its costs, (2) 

is an economically ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ as defined in section 

3(f) of Executive Order 12866, (3) is 

‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) 

would have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities; (5) would not create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States; and (6) 

would impose an unfunded mandate on 

State, local, or tribal governments, or on 

the private sector by exceeding the 

threshold identified above. These 

analyses are summarized below. 

Benefits of the Rule 

During the past 20 years, there have 

been over 18 aviation accidents caused 

by pilot error where pilot fatigue was a 

factor. NTSB has identified five 

accidents where the flight crew started 

the day in a state of fatigue. We 

statistically identified 4.6 accidents 

where the flight crew became fatigued 

during a long flight-duty period (NTSB 

cited pilot fatigue as a contributing 

factor in three of those accidents). We 

have also statistically estimated that 

some of the 6.2 accidents that occurred 

between midnight and 6 a.m. involved 

some degree of pilot fatigue. Two of 

these have already been accounted for 

in the previously discussed analyses. 

There were also three accidents where 

the pilot became fatigued due to being 

awake for many hours. Lastly, there 

were two accidents where chronic 

fatigue was a contributing factor. In 

summary, we project there would be at 

least 18.8 accidents (13 passenger 

airplane accidents and 5.8 cargo 

airplane accidents) during the next 20 

years where pilot fatigue would be a 

contributing factor to the accident. 

Having projected the possible extent 

of fatigue based on the historical record, 

we estimate the likelihood of accidents 

happening in the future using 

simulation techniques. We also use 

simulation techniques to estimate future 

casualties, which we monetize. In this 

way, we estimate the potential benefits 

of the proposed rule. Finally, we model 

risk of fatigue for current pilot 

schedules, and compute the number of 

hours in higher risk categories with and 

without the rule. The projected 

reduction in fatigue exposure is 

corroborating evidence supporting this 

proposal. Pilot fatigue is a serious 

problem. If nothing is done about this 

problem, we can expect from one to 

possibly six aviation accidents a year 

where pilot fatigue will be a 

contributing factor. Pilot fatigue will be 

a contributing factor in many accidents 

that could potentially cost billions of 

dollars. 

Using simulation analysis, the mean 

is 28.9 airplane accidents in a ten-year 

period. These accidents would result in 

a mean of 174.7 deaths. The estimated 

cost of these accidents would be a mean 

value of $1.581 billion ($1.121 billion, 

present value). These numbers represent 

an estimate of the likely number of 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55877 

future accidents, deaths, and costs from 

future accidents with fatigue as a factor. 

The above analysis establishes an 

estimate of the number and range of 

fatigue related accidents if no action is 

taken to address the problem. It is 

seldom the case that a rule is 100 

percent effective at addressing an 

identified problem. In particular, fatigue 

is rarely a primary or sole cause of an 

accident, and therefore this rule, if 

adopted, is not likely to prevent all 

future accidents that include fatigue as 

a factor. 

FAA reviewed all NTSB accident 

reports on part 121 accidents that 

occurred from 1990 through 2009 to 

assess the likely capacity of the NPRM 

to have averted those accidents. The 

FAA’s Office of Accident Investigation 

& Prevention assessed the effectiveness 

of this rule to prevent accidents like 

those in the historical database. Most 

reports on major accidents (hull losses 

or non-hull losses that resulted in 

multiple fatalities) provided extensive 

data on flight crews’ duty tours and 

recent rest periods, which facilitated 

relatively strong assessments. 

The FAA’s Office of Accident 

Investigation and Prevention (AVP) 

rated each accident by conducting a 

scoring process similar to that 

conducted by the Commercial Aviation 

Safety Team (CAST), a well documented 

and well understood procedure. All the 

accidents that have had final National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

reports published have been scored 

against the CAST safety enhancements. 

When these accidents were not well 

defined in the probable cause or 

contributing factors statements of the 

NTSB reports, AVP used a Joint 

Implementation Monitoring Data 

Analysis Team (JIMDAT)-like method. 

Following this scoring, the proposed 

rule would be 40 percent effective at 

preventing passenger airplane accidents 

where pilot fatigue was a contributing 

factor and would be 58 percent effective 

at preventing cargo airplane accidents 

where pilot fatigue was a contributing 

factor. Accordingly, the above estimate 

of the benefits of avoiding passenger 

airplane accidents where pilot fatigue 

was a causal factor have been reduced 

from their above stated values. The 

revised estimated benefits of avoiding 

passenger and cargo airplane accidents 

would be a mean value of $659.4 

million ($463.8 million, present value). 

Cost of the Rule 

The total estimated cost of the 

proposed rule is $1.25 billion ($804 

million present value using a seven 

percent discount rate) for the ten year 

period from 2013 to 2022. The FAA 

classified costs into four main 

components and estimated the costs for 

each component. We obtained data from 

various industry sources; the sources of 

the data used in cost estimation are 

explained in each section. We were very 

fortunate that several carriers ran two 

alternatives to the proposed rule 

through their crew scheduling 

programs. Their estimates provided 

some comparison data to calibrate and 

validate our costing approach. Without 

their help, we would have likely missed 

some cost elements. The table below 

provides a summary of the four main 

cost components. Flight operations cost 

makes up about 60 percent of the total 

cost of the rule. Each of the main cost 

components are explained in-depth in 

the following sections of this document. 

In addition to the costs presented in 

this table, there may be costs of a fatigue 

risk management system (FRMS). The 

FAA is not imposing an FRMS 

programrequirement on Part 121 

carriers, but is allowing them the option 

of developing and implementing such a 

program. Operators might do this for 

ultralong flights, which have flight time 

over 16 hours. Operators might develop 

an FRMS program as an alternative to 

the flight and duty period rules 

proposed by this rulemaking when the 

crew scheduling cost savings equal or 

exceed the costs of the FRMS program. 

The FAA estimates that an FRMS 

program would cost between $0.8 and 

$10.0 million for each operator over ten 

years. The FAA believes that about 35 

operators have at least partially adopted 

an FRMS program at this time. The FAA 

estimates the total cost would be $205.7 

million ($144.9 million present value), 

which would be more than offset by a 

reduction in crew scheduling costs. 

Accordingly, the cost is not added to the 

total costs imposed by this rule. The 

FAA calls for comment on this aspect of 

the proposal as it has not assigned a cost 

to the cumulative maximums. 

Summary of Benefits and Costs 

Following NTSB recommendations 

regarding pilot fatigue, labor and 

industry worked together to provide the 

basis of this rulemaking. Furthermore, 

Congress has directed the FAA to issue 

a rule addressing pilot fatigue. We have 

validated the need for this rule in the 

benefit discussion. Based on the 

expected effectiveness of this proposed 

rule at preventing fatigue accidents with 

an averted fatality valued at $6 million, 

the simulation methodology produced 

benefits of $659.4 million with $463.8 

million in present value. The total 

estimated costs of the proposed rule 

over 10 years are $1.25 billion ($804 

million at present value). There is over 

a 7 percent probability that 

undiscounted cost of avertable 

passenger airplane accidents would 

exceed $1.25 billion and over a 10 

percent probability the present value of 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2EP14SE10.006</GPH>
55878 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

the cost of avertable passenger airplane 

accidents would exceed $804 million. 

The benefits from a near term 

catastrophic accident in a 150-passenger 

airplane with average load factor 

exceeds the cost of this rule. If $8.4 

million were used for VSL, the 

undiscounted benefits would be $837 

million and the present value of those 

benefits would be $589 million. When 

the value of an averted fatality increases 

to $12.6 million, the present value of the 

benefits equals the present value of 

compliance costs. In addition, the FAA 

has identified two additional areas of 

unquantified benefits: preventing minor 

aircraft damage on the ground, and the 

value of well rested pilots as accident 

preventors and mitigators. Due to data 

limitations, the FAA was unable to 

estimate the cumulative effect of 

preventing minor aircraft damage on the 

ground, but if the rule were to reduce 

damage by about $600 million over 10 

years ($340 million present value) it 

would break even in terms of net 

benefits using a $6 million VSL. These 

considerations lend weight towards 

moving ahead with this proposal. FAA 

invites comment on this issue. 

Alternatives Considered 

FAA examined a number of 

alternatives to the proposed rule, 

scheduling alternatives and a training 

alternative. Since crew scheduling costs 

comprised the largest share of costs, 

most of the alternative analysis focused 

on these costs and these will be 

discussed first. Alternatives were 

selected using industry-proposed limits 

resulting from the ARC, as well as FAAproposed limits. The table below 

summarizes each of the alternatives. For 

each of the scheduling alternatives, FAA 

developed a crew scheduling cost 

estimate using the same methodology as 

was used to determine the crew 

scheduling costs of the proposed rule. 

Summary of Crew Scheduling 

Alternatives 

Scenario A 

FAA provided a sample of carriers 

with a draft version of the proposed rule 

in fall 2009. The carriers estimated the 

cost of this version of the proposed rule 

using their own crew scheduling models 

and processes. FAA also estimated the 

costs of the same version of the 

proposed rule for the entire industry 

using the crew scheduling model and 

process outlined in the crew scheduling 

costs sub-section of the flight operations 

cost section described in the full 

regulatory evaluation. Scenario A table 

below presents the annual crew 

scheduling resource costs for the 

Scenario A alternative. As we were able 

to accomplish our safety objectives at a 

lower cost, we rejected this alternative. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2EP14SE10.007</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55879 

Scenario B 

FAA examined another, more 

restrictive version of the proposed rule. 

The main difference was that the 

minimum required rest for international 

duty periods was eleven hours. Scenario 

B table presents the final, adjusted crew 

scheduling resource costs of the 

Scenario B alternative. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2EP14SE10.000</GPH> EP14SE10.001</GPH>
55880 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

Summary of Crew Scheduling 

Alternatives 

The summary table below provides 

the ten-year total crew scheduling 

resource costs for the proposed rule and 

each of the alternatives. The proposed 

rule represents the lowest-cost 

alternative and achieves the FAA safety 

objectives. 

Fatigue Training Cost Analysis of 

Alternatives to the Proposed Rule 

Fatigue training costs account for 

approximately 20 percent of the total 

cost of the proposed rule. The FAA 

examined two scenarios for fatigue 

training requirements, ultimately 

selecting the lower-cost scenario for the 

proposed rule. The table below shows 

the different fatigue training 

requirements for each of the two 

scenarios. 

Scenario C 

The fatigue training requirements of 

Scenario C differed significantly from 

the fatigue training requirements of the 

proposed rule. The required number of 

both initial and annual recurring fatigue 

training hours was substantially higher. 

Fatigue training was to take place in a 

classroom rather than through distance 

learning, which would result in higher 

costs due to the need to pay instructors, 

and the need to provide hotel and per 

diem compensation to flightcrew 

members receiving the fatigue training. 

As a result the costs are substantially 

higher. The FAA reviewed the 

recommended training requirements 

and decided to reduce the initial 

training requirements from 8 hours to 5 

hours and reduce the recurrent training 

hours from 4 to 2 hours. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2EP14SE10.002</GPH> EP14SE10.003</GPH> EP14SE10.004</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55881 

The FAA seeks comments on the 

alternatives analysis conducted to 

develop this proposal. In addition, it is 

requesting comments on possible 

approaches designed to reduce the costs 

of this rule while maintaining or 

increasing the benefits. 

Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

and Analysis 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of 

regulatory issuance that agencies shall 

endeavor, consistent with the objective 

of the rule and of applicable statutes, to 

fit regulatory and informational 

requirements to the scale of the 

business, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation.’’ To achieve that principle, 

the RFA requires agencies to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of 

small entities, including small 

businesses, not-for-profit organizations 

and small governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a proposed or final 

rule would have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. If the determination is that it 

would, the agency must prepare a 

regulatory flexibility analysis as 

described in the RFA. 

However, if an agency determines that 

a proposed or final rule is not expected 

to have a significant economic impact 

on a substantial number of small 

entities, section 605(b) of the RFA 

provides that the head of the agency 

may so certify and a regulatory 

flexibility analysis is not required. The 

certification must include a statement 

providing the factual basis for this 

determination, and the reasoning should 

be clear. 

The FAA believes that this proposed 

rule would have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities and therefore has performed an 

initial regulatory flexibility analysis as 

required by the RFA. The Small 

Business Administration small entity 

criterion for small air carrier operators 

is 1,500 or fewer employees. The FAA 

invites comment from affected small 

entities and others to aid us to make an 

assessment of these impacts. In 

particular, the FAA invites more 

information on the financial stability 

and competitive positions of small 

entities. 

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

Under Section 603(b) of the RFA, the 

initial regulatory flexibility analysis 

must address: 

• Description of reasons the agency is 

considering the action 

• Statement of the legal basis and 

objectives for the proposed rule 

• Description of the record keeping 

and other compliance requirements of 

the proposed rule 

• All federal rules that may duplicate, 

overlap, or conflict with the proposed 

rule 

• Description and an estimated 

number of small entities to which the 

proposed rule will apply 

• Analysis of small firms’ ability to 

afford the proposed rule 

• Conduct a disproportionality 

analysis 

• Conduct a competitive analysis 

• Estimation of the potential for 

business closures 

• Description of alternatives 

considered 

Reasons the Rule Is Proposed 

The objective of the proposed rule is 

to increase the margin of safety for 

passengers traveling on U.S. part 121 air 

carrier flights. Specifically, the FAA 

wants to decrease diminished flight 

crew performance associated with 

fatigue or lack of alertness brought on by 

the duty requirements for flightcrew 

members. 

The Legal Basis and Objectives 

The legal basis for the proposed rule 

is found in 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 et 

seq. Specifically 49 U.S.C. Section 

44701 (a)(4) requires the Administrator 

to promote safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

in the interest of safety for the 

maximum hours or periods of service of 

airmen and other employees or air 

carriers. Among other matters the FAA 

must consider as a matter of policy the 

maintaining and enhancing of safety in 

air commerce as its highest priority (49 

U.S.C. Section 40101(d)). 

The Projected Reporting, 

Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 

Requirements of this NPRM 

This proposed rule would increase 

reporting and recordkeeping. In 

addition to changes in crew schedules, 

there would be a minor increase in 

documenting crew rest. 

All Federal Rules That May Duplicate, 

Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed 

Rule 

There are no Federal Rules that may 

duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the 

proposed rule. 

Description and an Estimated Number 

of Small Entities 

The proposed rule would apply to all 

certificate holders operating under part 

121. There are 96 such operators of 

which 45 operators have fewer than 

1,500 employees. Among these 45 

operators, 25 are small entities that 

provide all air-cargo scheduled service 

competing with larger operators, codeshare passenger service for large 

operators, and charter service. 

Affordability 

The FAA expects wide variability in 

cost impacts on small entity operators. 

The sample crew scheduling changes 

provide only a rough proxy for the 

impact on pilots’ time and availability. 

Current crew schedules vary by 

operator, labor contract, and size of pilot 

pools. The agency understands that 

many smaller operators have maximized 

their pilot time in the cockpit and may 

have little flexibility with potential new 

flight and duty regulations. Operators 

needing to hire more pilots would incur 

the cost of hiring, wages, overhead, and 

training. Some captains from smaller 

operators could be lured away by other 

operators, especially the larger operators 

with better benefit packages. That 

outcome might be mitigated by the 

recent extension of pilots being able to 

work to age 65 and the inherent 

flexibility of the larger carriers. 

The FAA requests that small entity 

operators provide estimated impacts of 

the proposed changes on their existing 

crew schedules. The FAA requests that 

all comments be accompanied by clear 

supporting data. For now the agency 

expects some small operators would 

likely need to hire more pilots. This 

increase in the demand for pilots may 

eventually raise pilot wages. Based on 

small operators who would need to hire 

more pilots and the resulting pressure 

on overall wages, there could be a 

significant economic impact. 

Disproportionality Analysis 

Part 121 operators would need to 

provide more rest for pilots which 

overall could result in the need to hire 

more pilots. The proposed changes to 

flight and duty time would be more 

difficult to accommodate for operators 

with small pilot staffs. While the 

changes to flight and duty may be 

measured in hours per week for 

operators with small, fully employed 

staffs, such changes can be difficult to 

accommodate. To be in compliance with 

the proposed changes small airlines may 

need a fraction of a new pilot’s time to 

meet requirements. In this case, the 

airline would need to hire and train an 

additional pilot or reduce the number of 

operations. This added pilot would 

account for a larger percentage of the 

cost of pilots for the small airline than 

is likely to be the case for a major 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55882 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

airline. The FAA believes that this may 

be the case for many small operators. 

Moreover, the smaller the operator, the 

more likely this situation will occur. 

Thus, the proposed rule is likely to have 

a disproportionate economic impact on 

small entities. 

Competitiveness Analysis 

The competitiveness analysis 

examines whether a small airline is 

under a competitive disadvantage from 

the implementation of the proposed 

rule. This proposed rule would impose 

significant costs on some small entities, 

and as a result it is likely to worsen such 

entities relative competitive position. 

A major criterion in a competitiveness 

analysis is the ability of an airline to 

pass on the costs imposed by the rule to 

their customers. The extent to which an 

airline can pass costs on to its customers 

is determined by the elasticity of 

demand of the service by the customer. 

The elasticity of demand for a product 

is a measure of the responsiveness to 

price that consumers have in their 

buying habits. The elasticity of demand 

is defined as the percentage change in 

quantity demanded resulting from a 1 

percent change in price. If the demand 

for airline travel is relatively elastic, 

then the airlines would have less 

capacity to transfer the added cost of the 

rule to their passengers without losing 

significant revenue. For operators with 

a niche market, the demand for their 

services will be less elastic and more of 

the cost can be transferred. For instance, 

specialty cargo carriers have niche 

markets and some ability to pass on 

costs. Other operators would have little 

flexibility. In the most extreme case are 

operators who provide scheduled 

service for larger carriers generally 

under contract. Overall the 

disproportionate impact is likely to 

weaken small entity operators’ 

competitive situation, but the FAA is 

unable to provide a measure of how 

much. 

While the preceding discussion points 

out potential impacts of the proposed 

rule on the competitiveness of small 

entities, the FAA is uncertain about this 

impact on the level of competition 

within the U.S. airline industry. The 

FAA has very little firm-specific flight 

crew schedule data and route structure 

market data to refine this analysis and 

asks commenters to provide information 

on the impact this proposed rule would 

have on the continued capacity of small 

airlines to compete in their current 

markets. The FAA invites comment 

from affected airlines and other parties 

that might better inform the agency on 

this competitiveness issue. 

Business Closure Analysis 

Even if there is a disproportionate 

impact and a loss in competitive 

positioning does not mean a firm would 

have to close because of this proposed 

rule. While small entity operators are 

likely to experience a significant 

economic impact, changes to crew 

schedules are difficult to assess. Further 

complicating this business closure 

analysis are the external changes as 

upswings in traffic demand or declines 

in the price of fuel quickly improve the 

bottom-line. 

The FAA solicits comments from the 

aviation community regarding the 

likelihood of business closure. As noted 

previously, the FAA requests that all 

comments include supporting data. 

Alternatives Considered 

In accordance with the RFA, the FAA 

considered alternatives to the proposed 

rule to mitigate or eliminate significant 

economic impacts on small entities. 

Alternative One—The FAA is 

promulgating this rule because the 

status quo alternative subjects the 

society to an unacceptably high aviation 

accident risk. 

Alternative Two—The FAA 

considered extending the compliance 

time, but again the purpose of this 

proposed rule is to reduce the accident 

risk and postponing the compliance 

period extends this risk. 

Alternative Three—The FAA did 

consider expanding the rule to include 

part 135 operators. All or nearly all of 

these operators are small entities. As the 

economic impact may be more severe, 

the agency wants to study the impact on 

these operators before proposing a 

rulemaking. 

The FAA has tentatively determined 

that there are no reasonable alternatives 

to this rulemaking that would lessen the 

potential impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. The agency 

seeks comment on this assessment. 

Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more (in 

1995 dollars) in any one year by State, 

local, and tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector; such 

a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently 

uses an inflation-adjusted value of 

$143.1 million in lieu of $100 million. 

This proposed rule contains such a 

mandate; therefore, the requirements of 

Title II apply. The alternatives 

considered by the FAA are discussed 

above in the Summary of Benefits and 

Costs section. 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

This proposal contains the following 

new information collection 

requirements. As required by the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted 

the information requirements associated 

with this proposal to the Office of 

Management and Budget for its review. 

Title: Flightcrew Member Duty and 

Rest Requirements. 

Summary: The FAA is proposing data 

collection from air carriers certificated 

under Title 14 Code of Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 as 

prescribed in 14 CFR part 117, Flight 

and Duty Limitations and Rest 

Requirements: Flightcrew Members. 

Two sections in the proposal drive this 

requirement, 14 CFR part 117, § 117.7 

Schedule Reliability and § 117.31 

Operations in Unsafe Areas. In 

accordance with these two sections, 

each affected air carrier is required to 

submit a report to the FAA detailing: 

• Schedule reliability for each air 

carrier ongoing reportable of 2-month 

intervals, 

• For those air carriers conducting 

operations under contract for the United 

States Government and exceeding the 

proposed requirements, ongoing 

reportable periods of 2-month intervals, 

and 

• For those air carriers conducting 

operations not under contract for the 

United States Government and 

exceeding the proposed requirements, 

within 14 days of each occurrence, the 

air carrier relied on the relief granted 

under § 117.31 to reposition the aircraft 

to a safe region. 

Use of: Maintaining schedule 

reliability is a critical element to fatigue 

mitigation. Air carriers build flight 

schedules projected to meet the 

constraints of individual FDP. If, 

however, actual flight time exceeds the 

projected (scheduled) flight time, the 

validity of the air carrier’s scheduling 

process may come into question. This 

proposal places accountability upon 

each air carrier with regard to their 

scheduling practices and provides a 

means for the FAA to oversee the 

reliability of the air carrier’s scheduling 

process relative to the flightcrew 

members actual FDP as opposed to the 

flightcrew member’s scheduled FDP. 

The proposal defines a flight duty 

period as a period that begins when a 

flightcrew member is required to report 

for duty that includes a flight, a series 

of flights, or positioning flights, and 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55883 

ends when the aircraft is parked after 

the last flight and there is no intention 

for further aircraft movement by the 

same flightcrew member. If the air 

carrier’s system-wide actual FDPs 

exceed the scheduled flight by more 

than five (5) percent or any actual FDP 

that exceeds the pairing-specific 

schedule by more than twenty (20) 

percent, the air carrier will be required 

to make adjustments to its schedule 

factoring in the actual time exceeded in 

order to reflect a more realistic schedule 

based upon actual data. Under the 

proposal, each air carrier must make 

scheduling reliability adjustments to its 

schedule any time the aforementioned 

limitations have been exceeded. 

Additionally, each air carrier must 

submit an ongoing report on 2-month 

intervals detailing its overall schedule 

reliability and pairing-specific 

reliability. 

This proposal provides relief for air 

carriers conducting operations into 

unsafe areas and repositioning the 

aircraft to another region for safety or a 

safe location where another crew can 

relieve the current crew from duty. As 

a result, these circumstances may result 

in a flightcrew member’s FDP being 

exceeded for the day. The proposed 

section grants the air carrier authority to 

operate beyond the limits of the 

flightcrew’s FDP to the extent of 

reaching a safe location where the crew 

must be relieved and/or go into required 

rest. However, by exercising such relief, 

the air carrier must report the 

occurrence to the FAA. The reporting 

requirements are different for air 

carriers operating under a contract with 

the United States Government and those 

who are not. 

Air carriers under contract with the 

United States Government must submit 

a report every sixty (60) days detailing 

the number of times during the 

reporting period the air carrier relied on 

this relief, and for each occurrence, the 

reason for exceeding the FDP, the extent 

the FDP was exceeded and the reason 

the operation could not be completed 

consistent with part 117. If an air carrier 

does not rely on the proposed relief, 

there would be no obligation to report. 

If the air carrier is not under contract 

with the United States Government and 

relies on the proposed relief, it must 

submit a report within fourteen (14) 

days of each occurrence detailing the 

reason the FDP was exceeded, the extent 

the FDP was exceeded and the reason 

the operation could not be completed 

consistent with part 117. 

Respondents (including number of): 

The number of likely respondents is 92. 

The likely respondents to this proposed 

information requirement are part 121 

certificate holders. 

Frequency: The FAA estimates each 

part 121 certificate holder will need to 

provide schedule reliability data every 

two months. Certificate holders 

regularly providing service to the 

United States government into unsafe 

areas may need to file reports as often 

as every two months. The FAA 

anticipates that certificate holders 

would only rarely need to fly into 

unsafe areas for reasons other than in 

support of U.S. government operations 

and estimates that fewer than five such 

reports would be filed each year. 

Annual Burden Estimate: 

This proposal would result in an 

annual recordkeeping and reporting 

burden as follows: 

a. Number of respondents: 92. 

Scheduling and Schedule Reliability 

Reporting: 92. 

b. Total annual responses: 552. 

(92 carriers reporting 6 times each 

year: 92 × 6 = 552) 

Scheduling and schedule reliability 

reporting: 552. 

1. Percentage of these responses 

collected electronically: 100%. 

Scheduling and Schedule Reliability 

Reporting: 100%. 

c. Total annual hours requested: 4,416 

hours. 

(92 air carriers requiring 1 employee 

8 hours to complete report: 

92 × 1 × 8 = 4,416 hours). 

Scheduling and schedule reliability 

reporting: 4,416. 

d. Current OMB inventory: 0 hours. 

Scheduling and schedule reliability 

reporting: 0. 

e. Difference: 4,416 hours. 

Scheduling and Schedule Reliability 

Reporting: 4,416. 

Annual reporting and recordkeeping 

cost burden (in thousands of dollars) 

a. Total annualized capital/startup 

costs: $20,645. 

Scheduling and Schedule Reliability 

Reporting: $15. 

Fatigue Training. 

Fatigue Risk Management Systems: 

$20,630. 

b. Total annual cost ((O&M): $23,902. 

Scheduling and Schedule Reliability 

Reporting: $482. 

Fatigue Training: $23,420. 

Fatigue Risk Management Systems: 

$0. 

c. Total annualized costs requested: 

$44,547. 

Scheduling and Schedule Reliability 

Reporting: $497. 

Fatigue Training: $23,420. 

Fatigue Risk Management Systems: 

$20,630. 

d. Current OMB inventory: $0. 

Scheduling and Schedule Reliability 

Reporting: $0. 

Fatigue Training: $0. 

Fatigue Risk Management Systems: 

$0. 

e Difference: $44,547. 

Scheduling and Schedule Reliability 

Reporting: $497. 

Fatigue Training: $23,420. 

Fatigue Risk Management Systems: 

$20,630. 

The agency is soliciting comments 

to— 

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed 

information requirement is necessary for 

the proper performance of the functions 

of the agency, including whether the 

information will have practical utility; 

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

(4) Minimize the burden of collecting 

information on those who are to 

respond, including by using appropriate 

automated, electronic, mechanical, or 

other technological collection 

techniques or other forms of information 

technology. 

Individuals and organizations may 

send comments on the information 

collection requirement by November 15, 

2010, and should direct them to the 

address listed in the Addresses section 

at the end of this preamble. Comments 

also should be submitted to the Office 

of Management and Budget, Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Attention: Desk Officer for FAA, New 

Executive Building, Room 10202, 725 

17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 

20053. 

According to the 1995 amendments to 

the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 

1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not 

collect or sponsor the collection of 

information, nor may it impose an 

information collection requirement 

unless it displays a currently valid OMB 

control number. The OMB control 

number for this information collection 

will be published in the Federal 

Register, after the Office of Management 

and Budget approves it. 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this proposed 

rule under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The 

agency has determined that this action 

would not have a substantial direct 

effect on the States, on the relationship 

between the national Government and 

the States, or on the distribution of 

power and responsibilities among the 

various levels of government, and, 

therefore, would not have federalism 

implications. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55884 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

Environmental Analysis 

Environmental Analysis FAA Order 

1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are 

categorically excluded from preparation 

of an environmental assessment or 

environmental impact statement under 

the National Environmental Policy Act 

in the absence of extraordinary 

circumstances. The FAA has 

determined this proposed rulemaking 

action qualifies for the categorical 

exclusion identified in paragraph 312f 

and involves no extraordinary 

circumstances. 

Regulations That Significantly Affect 

Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use 

The FAA has analyzed this NPRM 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The 

agency has determined that it is not a 

‘‘significant energy action’’ under the 

executive order because while a 

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under 

Executive Order 12866, it is not likely 

to have a significant adverse effect on 

the supply, distribution, or use of 

energy. 

Additional Information 

Comments Invited: 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. It also invites comments relating 

to the economic, environmental, energy 

or federalism impacts that might result 

from adopting the proposals in this 

document. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

proposal, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. To ensure the docket 

does not contain duplicate comments, 

please send only one copy of written 

comments, or if filing comments 

electronically, please submit your 

comments only one time. 

The FAA will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

concerning this proposed rulemaking. 

Before acting on this proposal, the 

agency will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. It will consider comments 

filed after the comment period has 

closed if it is possible to do so without 

incurring expense or delay. The FAA 

may change this proposal in light of the 

comments we receive. 

Proprietary or Confidential Business 

Information 

Do not file in the docket information 

that you consider to be proprietary or 

confidential business information. Send 

or deliver this information directly to 

the legal contact person identified in the 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section of this document. You must 

mark the information that you consider 

proprietary or confidential. If you send 

the information on a disk or CD ROM, 

mark the outside of the disk or CD ROM 

and also identify electronically within 

the disk or CD ROM the specific 

information that is proprietary or 

confidential. 

Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when the 

FAA is aware of proprietary information 

filed with a comment, the agency does 

not place it in the docket. It is held in 

a separate file to which the public does 

not have access, and a note is placed in 

the docket that the agency has received 

it. If the agency receives a request to 

examine or copy this information, it 

treats it as any other request under the 

Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 

552). The FAA processes such a request 

under the DOT procedures found in 49 

CFR part 7. 

Availability of Rulemaking Documents 

An electronic copy of rulemaking 

documents may be obtained using the 

Internet by— 

1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking 

Portal (http://www.regulations.gov); 

2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies web page at http:// 

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or 

3. Accessing the Government Printing 

Office’s Web page at http:// 

www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html. 

Alternatively, a copy may be 

requested directly from the FAA by 

sending a request to the Federal 

Aviation Administration, Office of 

Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence 

Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or 

by calling (202) 267–9680. Make sure to 

identify the docket number or notice 

number of this rulemaking. 

All documents the FAA considered in 

developing this proposed rule, 

including economic analyses and 

technical reports, are located in the 

docket for this rulemaking and may be 

viewed on the internet through the 

Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced 

in paragraph (1). 

List of Subjects 

14 CFR Part 117 

Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements, Safety. 

14 CFR Part 121 

Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, 

Aviation safety, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

proposes to amend Chapter I of Title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations, as follows: 

1. Part 117 is added to read as follows: 

PART 117—FLIGHT AND DUTY 

LIMITATIONS AND REST 

REQUIREMENTS: FLIGHTCREW 

MEMBERS 

Sec. 

117.1 Applicability. 

117.3 Definitions. 

117.5 Fitness for duty. 

117.7 Fatigue risk management system. 

117.9 Schedule reliability. 

117.11 Fatigue education and training 

program. 

117.13 Flight time limitation. 

117.15 Flight duty period: Un-Augmented 

operations. 

117.17 Flight duty period: Split duty. 

117.19 Flight duty period: Augmented 

flightcrew. 

117.21 Reserve status. 

117.23 Cumulative duty limitations. 

117.25 Rest period. 

117.27 Consecutive nighttime operations. 

117.29 Deadhead transportation. 

117.31 Operations into unsafe areas. 

Table A to Part 117—Maximum Flight Time 

Limits for Un-Augmented Operations 

Table B to Part 117—Flight Duty Period: UnAugmented Operations 

Table C to Part 117—Flight Duty Period: 

Augmented Operations 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 

44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–44711, 

44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 46901, 44903– 

44904, 44912, 46105. 

§ 117.1 Applicability. 

This part prescribes flight and duty 

limitations and rest requirements for all 

flightcrew members and certificate 

holders conducting operations under 

part 121 of this chapter. This part also 

applies to all flightcrew members and 

part 121 certificate holders when 

conducting flights under part 91 of this 

chapter. 

§ 117.3 Definitions. 

In addition to the definitions in §§ 1.1 

and 119.3 of this chapter, the following 

definitions apply to this part. In the 

event there is a conflict in definitions, 

the definitions in this part control. 

Acclimated means a condition in 

which a crewmember has been in a 

theater for 72 hours or has been given 

at least 36 consecutive hours free from 

duty. 

Airport/standby reserve means a 

defined duty period during which a 

crewmember is required by a certificate 

holder to be at, or in close proximity to, 

an airport for a possible assignment. 

Augmented flightcrew means a 

flightcrew that has more than the 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55885 

minimum number of flightcrew 

members required by the airplane type 

certificate to operate the aircraft to allow 

a flightcrew member to be replaced by 

another qualified flightcrew member for 

in-flight rest. 

Calendar day means a 24-hour period 

from 0000 through 2359. 

Certificate holder means a person who 

holds or is required to hold an air 

carrier certificate or operating certificate 

issued under part 119 of this chapter. 

Crew pairing means a flight duty 

period or series of flight duty periods 

assigned to a flightcrew member which 

originate or terminate at the flightcrew 

member’s home base. 

Deadhead transportation means 

transportation of a crewmember as a 

passenger, by air or surface 

transportation, as required by a 

certificate holder, excluding 

transportation to or from a suitable 

accommodation. 

Duty means any task, other than longcall reserve, that a crewmember 

performs on behalf of the certificate 

holder, including but not limited to 

airport/standby reserve, short-call 

reserve, flight duty, pre- and post-flight 

duties, administrative work, training, 

deadhead transportation, aircraft 

positioning on the ground, aircraft 

loading, and aircraft servicing. 

Duty period means a period that 

begins when a certificate holder requires 

a crewmember to report for duty and 

ends when that crew member is free 

from all duties. 

Fatigue means a physiological state of 

reduced mental or physical performance 

capability resulting from lack of sleep or 

increased physical activity that can 

reduce a crewmember’s alertness and 

ability to safely operate an aircraft or 

perform safety-related duties. 

Fatigue risk management system 

(FRMS) means a management system for 

an operator to use to mitigate the effects 

of fatigue in its particular operations. It 

is a data-driven process and a 

systematic method used to continuously 

monitor and manage safety risks 

associated with fatigue-related error. 

Fit for duty means physiologically 

and mentally prepared and capable of 

performing assigned duties in flight 

with the highest degree of safety. 

Flight duty period (FDP) means a 

period that begins when a flightcrew 

member is required to report for duty 

with the intention of conducting a 

flight, a series of flights, or positioning 

or ferrying flights, and ends when the 

aircraft is parked after the last flight and 

there is no intention for further aircraft 

movement by the same flightcrew 

member. A flight duty period includes 

deadhead transportation before a flight 

segment without an intervening 

required rest period, training conducted 

in an aircraft, flight simulator or flight 

training device, and airport/standby 

reserve. 

Home base means the location 

designated by a certificate holder where 

a crew member normally begins and 

ends his or her duty periods. 

Lineholder means a flightcrew 

member who has a flight schedule and 

is not acting as a reserve flightcrew 

member. 

Long-call reserve means a reserve 

period in which a crewmember receives 

a required rest period following 

notification by the certificate holder to 

report for duty. 

Physiological night’s rest means the 

rest that encompasses the hours of 0100 

and 0700 at the crewmember’s home 

base, unless the individual has 

acclimated to a different theater. If the 

crewmember has acclimated, the rest 

must encompass the hours of 0100 and 

0700 at the acclimated location. 

Report time means the time that the 

certificate holder requires a 

crewmember to report for a duty period. 

Reserve availability period means a 

duty period during which a certificate 

holder requires a reserve crewmember 

on short call reserve to be available to 

receive an assignment for a flight duty 

period. 

Reserve duty period means the time 

from the beginning of the reserve 

availability period to the end of an 

assigned flight duty period, and is 

applicable only to short call reserve. 

Reserve flightcrew member means a 

flightcrew member who a certificate 

holder requires to be available to receive 

an assignment for duty. 

Rest facility means a bunk, seat, room, 

or other accommodation that provides a 

crewmember with a sleep opportunity. 

(1) Class 1 rest facility means a bunk 

or other surface that allows for a flat 

sleeping position and is located separate 

from both the flight deck and passenger 

cabin in an area that is temperaturecontrolled, allows the crewmember to 

control light, and provides isolation 

from noise and disturbance. 

(2) Class 2 rest facility means a seat 

in an aircraft cabin that allows for a flat 

or near flat sleeping position; is 

separated from passengers by a 

minimum of a curtain to provide 

darkness and some sound mitigation; 

and is reasonably free from disturbance 

by passengers or crewmembers. 

(3) Class 3 rest facility means a seat 

in an aircraft cabin or flight deck that 

reclines at least 40 degrees and provides 

leg and foot support. 

Rest period means a continuous 

period determined prospectively during 

which the crewmember is free from all 

restraint by the certificate holder, 

including freedom from present 

responsibility for work should the 

occasion arise. 

Scheduled means times assigned by a 

certificate holder when a crewmember 

is required to report for duty. 

Schedule reliability means the 

accuracy of the length of a scheduled 

flight duty period as compared to the 

actual flight duty period. 

Short-call reserve means a period of 

time in which a crewmember does not 

receive a required rest period following 

notification by the certificate holder to 

report for a flight duty period. 

Split duty means a flight duty period 

that has a scheduled break in duty that 

is less than a required rest period. 

Suitable accommodation means a 

temperature-controlled facility with 

sound mitigation that provides a 

crewmember with the ability to sleep in 

a bed and to control light. 

Theater means a geographical area 

where local time at the crewmember’s 

flight duty period departure point and 

arrival point differ by no more than 4 

hours. 

Unforeseen operational circumstance 

means an unplanned event beyond the 

control of a certificate holder of 

insufficient duration to allow for 

adjustments to schedules, including 

unforecast weather, equipment 

malfunction, or air traffic delay. 

Window of circadian low means a 

period of maximum sleepiness that 

occurs between 0200 and 0559 during a 

physiological night. 

§ 117.5 Fitness for duty. 

(a) Each flightcrew member must 

report for any flight duty period rested 

and prepared to perform his or her 

assigned duties. 

(b) No certificate holder may assign 

and no flightcrew member may accept 

assignment to a flight duty period if the 

flightcrew member has reported for a 

flight duty period too fatigued to safely 

perform his or her assigned duties or if 

the certificate holder believes that the 

flightcrew member is too fatigued to 

safely perform his or her assigned 

duties. 

(c) No certificate holder may permit a 

flightcrew member to continue a flight 

duty period if the flightcrew member 

has reported himself too fatigued to 

continue the assigned flight duty period. 

(d) Any person who suspects a 

flightcrew member of being too fatigued 

to perform his or her duties during flight 

must immediately report that 

information to the certificate holder. 

(e) Once notified of possible 

flightcrew member fatigue, the 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55886 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

certificate holder must evaluate the 

flightcrew member for fitness for duty. 

The evaluation must be conducted by a 

person trained in accordance with 

§ 117.11 and must be completed before 

the flightcrew member begins or 

continues an FDP. 

(f) As part of the dispatch or flight 

release, as applicable, each flightcrew 

member must affirmatively state he or 

she is fit for duty prior to commencing 

flight. 

(g) Each certificate holder must 

develop and implement an internal 

evaluation and audit program approved 

by the Administrator that will monitor 

whether flightcrew members are 

reporting for FDPs fit for duty and 

correct any deficiencies. 

§ 117.7 Fatigue risk management system. 

(a) No certificate holder may exceed 

any provision of this part unless 

approved by the FAA under a Fatigue 

Risk Management System that provides 

at least an equivalent level of protection 

against fatigue-related accidents or 

incidents as the other provisions of this 

part. 

(b) The Fatigue Risk Management 

System must include: 

(1) A fatigue risk management policy. 

(2) An education and awareness 

training program. 

(3) A fatigue reporting system. 

(4) A system for monitoring flightcrew 

fatigue. 

(5) An incident reporting process. 

(6) A performance evaluation. 

(c) Whenever the Administrator finds 

that revisions are necessary for the 

continued adequacy of an FRMS that 

has been granted final approval, the 

certificate holder must, after 

notification, make any changes in the 

program deemed necessary by the 

Administrator. 

§ 117.9 Schedule reliability. 

(a) Each certificate holder must adjust 

within 60 days — 

(1) Its system-wide flight duty periods 

if the total actual flight duty periods 

exceed the scheduled flight duty 

periods more than 5 percent of the time, 

and 

(2) Any scheduled flight duty period 

that is shown to actually exceed the 

schedule 20 percent of the time. 

(b) Each certificate holder must 

submit a report detailing the scheduling 

reliability adjustments required in 

paragraph (a) of this section to the FAA 

every two months detailing both overall 

schedule reliability and pairing-specific 

reliability. Submissions must consist of: 

(1) The carrier’s entire crew pairing 

schedule for the previous 2-month 

period, including the total anticipated 

length of each set of crew pairings and 

the regulatory limit on such pairings; 

(2) The actual length of each set of 

crew pairings, and 

(3) The percentage of discrepancy 

between the two data sets on both a 

cumulative, and a pairing-specific basis. 

§ 117.11 Fatigue education and training 

program. 

(a) Each certificate holder must 

develop and implement an education 

and training program, approved by the 

Administrator, applicable to all 

employees of the certificate holder 

responsible for administering the 

provisions of this rule including 

flightcrew members, dispatchers, 

individuals involved in the scheduling 

of flightcrew members, individuals 

involved in operational control, and any 

employee providing management 

oversight of those areas. 

(b)(1) Initial training for all 

individuals listed in paragraph (a) of 

this section must consist of at least 5 

programmed hours of instruction in the 

subjects listed in paragraph (b)(3) of this 

section. 

(2) Recurrent training for all 

individuals listed in paragraph (a) of 

this section must be given on an annual 

basis and must consist of 2 programmed 

hours of instruction in the subjects 

listed in paragraph (b)(3) of this section. 

(3) The fatigue education and training 

program must include information on— 

(i) FAA regulatory requirements for 

flight, duty and rest and NTSB 

recommendations on fatigue 

management. 

(ii) Basics of fatigue, including sleep 

fundamentals and circadian rhythms. 

(iii) Causes of fatigue, including 

possible medical conditions. 

(iv) Effect of fatigue on performance. 

(v) Fatigue countermeasures. 

(vi) Fatigue prevention and 

mitigation. 

(vii) Influence of lifestyle, including 

nutrition, exercise, and family life, on 

fatigue. 

(viii) Familiarity with sleep disorders 

and their possible treatments. 

(ix) Responsible commuting. 

(x) Flightcrew member responsibility 

for ensuring adequate rest and fitness 

for duty. 

(xi) Operating through and within 

multiple time zones. 

(c) Whenever the Administrator finds 

that revisions are necessary for the 

continued adequacy of a fatigue 

education and training program that has 

been granted final approval, the 

certificate holder must, after 

notification, make any changes in the 

program that are deemed necessary by 

the Administrator. 

§ 117.13 Flight time limitation. 

No certificate holder may schedule 

and no flightcrew member may accept 

an assignment or continue an assigned 

flight duty period if the total flight time: 

(a) Will exceed the limits specified in 

Table A of this part if the operation is 

conducted with the minimum required 

flightcrew. 

(b) Will exceed 16 hours if the 

operation is conducted with an 

augmented flightcrew. 

§ 117.15 Flight duty period: Un-augmented 

operations. 

(a) Except as provided for in § 117.17, 

no certificate holder may assign and no 

flightcrew member may accept an 

assignment for an unaugmented flight 

operation if the scheduled flight duty 

period will exceed the limits in Table B 

of this part. 

(b) If the flightcrew member is not 

acclimated: 

(1) The maximum flight duty period 

in Table B of this part is reduced by 30 

minutes. 

(2) The applicable flight duty period 

is based on the local time at the 

flightcrew member’s home base. 

(c) In the event unforeseen 

circumstances arise: 

(1) The pilot in command and 

certificate holder may extend a flight 

duty period up to 2 hours. 

(2) An extension in the flight duty 

period exceeding 30 minutes may occur 

only once in any 168 consecutive hour 

period, and never on consecutive days. 

§ 117.17 Flight duty period: Split duty. 

For a split duty period, a certificate 

holder may extend and a flightcrew 

member may accept a flight duty period 

up to 50 percent of time that the 

flightcrew member spent in a suitable 

accommodation up to a maximum flight 

duty period of 12 hours provided the 

flightcrew member is given a minimum 

opportunity to rest in a suitable 

accommodation of 4 hours, measured 

from the time the flightcrew member 

reaches the rest facility. 

§ 117.19 Flight duty period: Augmented 

flightcrew. 

The flight duty period limits in 

§ 117.15 may be extended by 

augmenting the flightcrew. 

(a) For flight operations conducted 

with an acclimated augmented 

flightcrew, no certificate holder may 

assign and no flightcrew member may 

accept an assignment if the scheduled 

flight duty period will exceed the limits 

specified in Table C of this part. 

(b) If the flightcrew member is not 

acclimated: 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55887 

(1) The maximum flight duty period 

in Table C of this part is reduced by 30 

minutes. 

(2) The applicable flight duty period 

is based on the local time at the 

flightcrew member’s home base. 

(c) No certificate holder may assign 

and no flightcrew member may accept 

an assignment under this section unless 

during the flight duty period: 

(1) Two consecutive hours are 

available for in-flight rest for the 

flightcrew member manipulating the 

controls during landing; 

(2) A ninety minute consecutive 

period is available for in-flight rest for 

each flightcrew member; and 

(3) The last flight segment provides an 

opportunity for in-flight rest in 

accordance with paragraph (c)(1) of this 

section. 

(d) No certificate holder may assign 

and no flightcrew member may accept 

an assignment involving more than 

three flight segments under this section 

unless the certificate holder has an 

approved fatigue risk management 

system under § 117.7. 

(e) At all times during flight, at least 

one flightcrew member with a PIC typerating must be alert and on the flight 

deck. 

(f) In the event unforeseen 

circumstances arise: 

(1) The pilot in command and 

certificate holder may extend a flight 

duty period up to 3 hours. 

(2) An extension in the flight duty 

period exceeding 30 minutes may occur 

only once in any 168 consecutive hour 

period. 

§ 117.21 Reserve status. 

(a) Unless specifically designated 

otherwise by the certificate holder, all 

reserve is considered long-call reserve. 

(b) For airport/standby reserve, all 

time spent in a reserve status is part of 

the flightcrew member’s flight duty 

period. 

(c) For short call reserve, 

(1) All time within the reserve 

availability period is duty. 

(2) The reserve availability period 

may not exceed 14 hours. 

(3) No certificate holder may schedule 

and no reserve flightcrew member on 

short call reserve may accept an 

assignment of a flight duty period that 

begins before the flightcrew member’s 

next reserve availability period unless 

the flightcrew member is given at least 

14 hours rest. 

(4) The maximum reserve duty period 

for un-augmented operations is the 

lesser of— 

(i) 16 hours, as measured from the 

beginning of the reserve availability 

period; 

(ii) The assigned flight duty period, as 

measured from the start of the flight 

duty period; or 

(iii) The flight duty period in Table B 

of this part plus 4 hours, as measured 

from the beginning of the reserve 

availability period. 

(iv) If all or a portion of a reserve 

flightcrew member’s reserve availability 

period falls between 0000 and 0600, the 

certificate holder may increase the 

maximum reserve duty period in 

paragraph (c)(4)(iii) of this section by 

one-half of the length of the time during 

the reserve availability period in which 

the certificate holder did not contact the 

flightcrew member, not to exceed 3 

hours. 

(5) The maximum reserve duty period 

for augmented operations is the lesser 

of— 

(i) The assigned flight duty period, as 

measured from the start of the flight 

duty period; or 

(ii) The flight duty period in Table C 

of this part plus 4 hours, as measured 

from the beginning of the reserve 

availability period. 

(iii) If all or a portion of a reserve 

flightcrew member’s reserve availability 

period falls between 0000 and 0600, the 

certificate holder may increase the 

maximum reserve duty period in 

paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of this section by 

one-half of the length of the time during 

the reserve availability period in which 

the certificate holder did not contact the 

flightcrew member, not to exceed 3 

hours. 

(d) For long call reserve, 

(1) The period of time that the 

flightcrew member is in a reserve status 

does not count as duty. 

(2) If a certificate holder contacts a 

flightcrew member to assign him or her 

to a flight duty period or a short call 

reserve, the flightcrew member must 

receive the required rest period 

specified in § 117.25 prior to reporting 

for the flight duty period or 

commencing the short call reserve duty. 

(3) If a certificate holder contacts a 

flightcrew member to assign him or her 

to a flight duty period that will begin 

before and operate into the flightcrew 

member’s window of circadian low, the 

flightcrew member must receive a 12 

hour notice of report time from the air 

carrier. 

(e) An air carrier may shift a reserve 

flightcrew member’s reserve availability 

period under the following conditions: 

(1) A shift to a later reserve 

availability period may not exceed 12 

hours. 

(2) A shift to an earlier reserve 

availability period may not exceed 5 

hours, unless the shift is into the 

flightcrew member’s window of 

circadian low, in which case the shift 

may not exceed 3 hours. 

(3) A shift to an earlier reserve period 

may not occur on any consecutive 

calendar days. 

(4) The total shifts in a reserve 

availability period in paragraphs (e)(1) 

through (e)(3) of this section may not 

exceed a total of 12 hours in any 168 

consecutive hours. 

§ 117.23 Cumulative duty limitations. 

(a) The limitations of this section on 

flightcrew members apply to all 

commercial flying by the flightcrew 

member during the applicable periods. 

(b) No certificate holder may schedule 

and no flightcrew member may accept 

an assignment if the flightcrew 

member’s total flight time will exceed 

the following: 

(1) 100 hours in any 28 consecutive 

calendar day period and 

(2) 1,000 hours in any 365 

consecutive calendar day period. 

(c) No certificate holder may schedule 

and no flightcrew member may accept 

an assignment if the flightcrew 

member’s total Flight Duty Period will 

exceed: 

(1) 60 flight duty period hours in any 

168 consecutive hours and 

(2) 190 flight duty period hours in any 

672 consecutive hours. 

(d) Except as provided for in 

paragraph (d)(3) of this section, no 

certificate holder may schedule and no 

flightcrew member may accept an 

assignment if the flightcrew member’s 

total duty period will exceed: 

(1) 65 duty hours in any 168 

consecutive hours and 

(2) 200 duty hours in any 672 

consecutive hours. 

(3) If a flightcrew member is assigned 

to short-call reserve or a certificate 

holder transports a flightcrew member 

in deadhead transportation in, at a 

minimum, a seat in aircraft cabin that 

allows for a flat or near flat sleeping 

position, the total duty period may not 

exceed: 

(i) 75 duty hours in any 168 

consecutive hours and 

(ii) 215 duty hours in any 672 

consecutive hours. 

(4) Extension of the duty period under 

paragraph (d)(3) of this section is 

limited to the amount of time spent on 

short-call reserve or in deadhead 

transportation. 

§ 117.25 Rest period. 

(a) No certificate holder may assign 

and no flightcrew member may accept 

assignment to any reserve or duty with 

the certificate holder during any 

required rest period. 

(b) Before beginning any reserve or 

flight duty period, a flightcrew member 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55888 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

must be given at least 30 consecutive 

hours free from all duty in any 168 

consecutive hour period, except that: 

(1) If a flightcrew member crosses 

more than four time zones during a 

series of flight duty periods that exceed 

168 consecutive hours, the flightcrew 

member must be given a minimum of 

three physiological nights rest upon 

return to home base. 

(2) A flightcrew member operating in 

a new theater must receive 36 hours of 

consecutive rest in any 168 consecutive 

hour period. 

(c) No certificate holder may reduce a 

rest period more than once in any 168 

consecutive hour period. 

(d) No certificate holder may schedule 

and no flightcrew member may accept 

an assignment for reserve or a flight 

duty period unless the flightcrew 

member is given a rest period of at least 

9 consecutive hours before beginning 

the reserve or flight duty period 

measured from the time the flightcrew 

member reaches the hotel or other 

suitable accommodation. 

(e) In the event of unforeseen 

circumstances, the pilot in command 

and certificate holder may reduce the 9 

consecutive hour rest period in 

paragraph (d) of this section to 8 

consecutive hours. 

§ 117.27 Consecutive nighttime 

operations. 

No certificate holder may schedule 

and no flightcrew member may accept 

more than three consecutive nighttime 

flight duty periods unless the certificate 

holder provides an opportunity to rest 

during the flight duty period in 

accordance with § 117.17. 

§ 117.29 Deadhead transportation. 

(a) All time spent in deadhead 

transportation is considered part of a 

duty period. 

(b) Time spent in deadhead 

transportation is considered part of a 

flight duty period if it occurs before a 

flight segment without an intervening 

required rest period. 

(c) Time spent entirely in deadhead 

transportation during a duty period may 

not exceed the flight duty period in 

Table B of this part for the applicable 

time of start plus 2 hours unless the 

flightcrew member is given a rest period 

equal to the length of the deadhead 

transportation but not less than the 

required rest in § 117.25 upon 

completion of such transportation. 

§ 117.31 Operations into unsafe areas. 

(a) This section applies to operations 

that cannot otherwise be conducted 

under this part because of unique 

circumstances that could prevent 

flightcrew members from being relieved 

by another crew or safely provided with 

the rest required under § 117.25 at the 

end of the applicable flight duty period. 

(b) A certificate holder may exceed 

the maximum applicable flight duty 

periods to the extent necessary to allow 

the flightcrew to fly to a destination 

where they can safely be relieved from 

duty by another flightcrew or can 

receive the requisite amount of rest 

prior to commencing their next flight 

duty period. 

(c) The flightcrew shall be given a rest 

period immediately after reaching the 

destination described in paragraph (b) of 

this section equal to the length of the 

actual flight duty period or 24 hours, 

whichever is less. 

(d) No extension of the cumulative 

fatigue limitations in § 117.3 is 

permitted. 

(e) If the operation was conducted 

under contract with an agency or 

department of the United States 

Government, each affected air carrier 

must submit a report every 60 days 

detailing the— 

(1) Number of times in the reporting 

period it relied on this section to 

conduct its operations. 

(2) For each occurrence, 

(i) The reasons for exceeding the 

applicable flight duty period; 

(ii) The extent to which the applicable 

flight duty period was exceeded; and 

(iii) The reason the operation could 

not be completed consistent with the 

requirements of this part. 

(f) If the operation was not conducted 

under contract with an agency or 

Department of the United States 

Government, each affected air carrier 

must submit a report within 14 days of 

each occurrence detailing— 

(1) The reasons for exceeding the 

applicable flight duty period; 

(2) The extent to which the applicable 

flight duty period was exceeded; and 

(3) The reason the operation could not 

be completed consistent with the 

requirements of this part. 

(g) Should the Administrator 

determine that a certificate holder is 

relying on the provisions on this 

section, the Administrator may require 

the certificate holder to develop and 

implement a fatigue risk management 

system. 

TABLE A TO PART 117—MAXIMUM FLIGHT TIME LIMITS FOR UNAUGMENTED OPERATIONS

Time of start 

(Home base) 

Maximum flight time 

(hours) 

0000–0459 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 8 

0500–0659 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 9 

0700–1259 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 10 

1300–1959 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 9 

2000–2359 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 8 

TABLE B TO PART 117—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: UNAUGMENTED OPERATIONS

Time of start 

(Home base or 

acclimated) 

Maximum flight duty period (hours) 

for lineholders based on number of flight segments 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 

0000–0359 ........................................................................... 9 9 9 9. 9 9 9 

0400–0459 ........................................................................... 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 

0500–0559 ........................................................................... 11 11 11 11 10 9.5 9 

0600–0659 ........................................................................... 12 12 12 12 11.5 11 10.5 

0700–1259 ........................................................................... 13 13 13 13 12.5 12 11 

1300–1659 ........................................................................... 12 12 12 12 11.5 11 10.5 

1700–2159 ........................................................................... 11 11 10 10 9.5 9 9 

2200–2259 ........................................................................... 10.5 10.5 9.5 9.5 9 9 9 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules 55889 

TABLE B TO PART 117—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: UNAUGMENTED OPERATIONS—Continued 

Time of start 

(Home base or 

acclimated) 

Maximum flight duty period (hours) 

for lineholders based on number of flight segments 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 

2300–2359 ........................................................................... 9.5 9.5 9 9 9 9 9 

TABLE C TO PART 117—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: AUGMENTED OPERATIONS

Time of start 

(local time) 

Maximum flight duty period (hours) based on 

rest facility and number of pilots 

Class 1 rest facility Class 2 rest facility Class 3 rest facility 

3 Pilots 4 Pilots 3 Pilots 4 Pilots 3 Pilots 4 Pilots 

0000–0559 ....................................................................... 14 16 13 14.5 12 12.5 

0600–0659 ....................................................................... 15 17.5 14 15.5 13 13.5 

0700–1259 ....................................................................... 16 18 15.5 17 14 14.5 

1300–1659 ....................................................................... 15 17.5 14 15.5 13 13.5 

1700–2359 ....................................................................... 14 16 13 14.5 12 12.5 

PART 121—OPERATING 

REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, 

AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS 

2. The authority citation for part 121 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 

44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–44711, 

44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 46901, 44903– 

44904, 44912, 46105. 

Subpart Q [Removed and Reserved] 

3. Remove and reserve subpart Q, 

consisting of §§ 121.470 and 121.471. 

Subpart R [Removed and Reserved] 

4. Remove and reserve subpart R, 

consisting of §§ 121.480 through 

121.493. 

Subpart S [Removed and Reserved] 

5. Remove and reserve subpart S, 

consisting of §§ 121.500 through 

121.525. 

Issued in Washington, DC on September 3, 

2010. 

Raymond Towles, 

Acting Director, Flight Standards Service, 

Aviation Safety. 

[FR Doc. 2010–22626 Filed 9–10–10; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2