19-673

Lin v. Garland

BIA

Poczter, IJ

A208 928 272 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 9th 4 day of July, two thousand twenty-one.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 

8 JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 

9 Circuit Judges,

10 NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS,

District Judge.* 11

12 _____________________________________

13

14 LIN HANG BIN, AKA HANGBIN LIN,

15 Petitioner,

16

17 v. 19-673

18

19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

21 Respondent.

22 _____________________________________

23

* Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis, of the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2

1

2 FOR PETITIONER: Zhen Liang Li, Esq., New York, NY.

3

4 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant

5 Attorney General; Derek C. Julius, 

6 Assistant Director; Bernard A. 

7 Joseph, Senior Litigation Counsel, 

8 Office of Immigration Litigation, 

9 United States Department of 

10 Justice, Washington, DC.

11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

12 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

13 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

14 is DENIED.

15 Petitioner Lin Hang Bin, a native and citizen of the 

16 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a 2019 decision 

17 of the BIA affirming a 2017 decision of the Immigration Judge 

18 (“IJ”), which denied asylum, withholding of removal, and 

19 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re 

20 Lin Hang Bin, No. A 208 928 272 (B.I.A. Feb. 21, 2019), aff’g

21 No. A 208 928 272 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Nov. 22, 2017). We 

22 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 

23 procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to 

24 explain our decision to deny the petition.

25 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions 

26 “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of 
3

1 Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). In denying 

2 asylum, the IJ concluded that Lin did not carry his burden of 

3 proof because his testimony was not credible and he did not 

4 otherwise proffer sufficient evidence. See 8 U.S.C. 

5 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“In determining whether the applicant 

6 has met the applicant’s burden, the trier of fact may weigh 

7 the credible testimony along with other evidence of 

8 record.”). Lin challenges in this petition only the adverse 

9 credibility determination. See Pet. Br. at 6.

10 We review this determination for substantial evidence, 

11 “which requires that [a determination] be supported by 

12 reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record 

13 when considered as a whole.” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 

14 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

15 “We defer to an IJ's credibility determination unless, from 

16 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 

17 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 

18 ruling.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations 

19 omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (An IJ’s “findings of 

20 fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 

21 be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”). 

22 An IJ may base an adverse credibility determination on 
4

1 the “the totality of the circumstances” and “all relevant 

2 factors.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii). They include:

3 . . . the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 

4 the applicant or witness, the inherent 

5 plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s 

6 account, the consistency between the applicant’s 

7 or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , 

8 the internal consistency of each such statement, 

9 the consistency of such statements with other 

10 evidence of record (including the reports of the 

11 Department of State on country conditions), and 

12 any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, 

13 without regard to whether an inconsistency, 

14 inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the 

15 applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.

16

17 Id. “Even where the agency relies on discrepancies or 

18 lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters collateral 

19 or ancillary to the claim, the cumulative effect may 

20 nevertheless be deemed consequential” to adverse credibility.

21 Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 77 (internal quotation marks 

22 omitted).

23 We deny the petition for review because the IJ’s adverse 

24 credibility determination was reasonable and supported by the 

25 record. See id. at 76; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(4)(B). Among 

26 other things, the IJ relied on discrepancies in Lin’s account 

27 of his Christian practice in China, the sole basis for his 

28 asylum claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (providing 

29 that applicants may be granted asylum if “[their] religion . 
5

1 . . was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting 

2 the applicant[s]”). In Lin’s written statement, he described

3 “contact[ing] the [Christian] church for the first time” 

4 “[i]n February 2015.” Cert. Admin. R. (“CAR”) at 191. At 

5 that time, as Lin wrote, his friend Lin Jianping (“Jianping”)

6 “led” him to an “underground” illegal church in China. CAR 

7 at 191. On his third visit to this church, seven months 

8 later in September 2015, Lin was arrested in a police raid 

9 and detained for fifteen days. CAR at 191-92. 

10 As Lin admitted at his asylum hearing, this written 

11 statement contains numerous discrepancies. Although the 

12 written statement implies that Lin’s three visits to the 

13 illegal church were his primary experience of Christianity, 

14 Lin testified that he had belonged to a “formal church” in 

15 China as well. CAR at 44. As the IJ explained, citing a 

16 2016 State Department report on China, “millions of Chinese 

17 citizens . . . practic[e] Christianity” openly at such 

18 churches. CAR at 50. When the IJ asked Lin why he had not 

19 disclosed this experience before, Lin inaccurately testified 

20 that he had. CAR at 44. 

21 Furthermore, Lin admitted at the hearing that Jianping 

22 did not in fact introduce him to the illegal church, but to 
6

1 the formal church. CAR at 45; see Pet. Br. at 17-18

2 (conceding that Lin’s written account about Jianping’s role 

3 was wrong). Lin instead testified that an individual named 

4 Chen Hao brought him to the illegal church. CAR at 45. When 

5 the IJ asked Lin why he had never mentioned Chen Hao before, 

6 Lin testified inaccurately that he had referred to Chen Hao 

7 namelessly as a “church brother” in his written statement.

8 CAR at 45. But the written statement attributes Lin’s 

9 introduction to the illegal church only to Jianping. CAR at 

10 191.

11 The IJ reasonably determined that the shifting nature of 

12 Lin’s account and his inaccurate testimony to explain these

13 discrepancies undercut his credibility. Although Lin argues 

14 the discrepancies concern small details, an IJ is entitled to 

15 consider discrepancies “without regard to whether [they] go[]

16 to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 

17 (b)(1)(B)(iii). In any case, we consider significant that 

18 the discrepancies pertain to the consequential, dangerous,

19 and presumably memorable decision by Lin to join the illegal 

20 church from the formal church. In this context, the IJ 

21 reasonably could find that such discrepancies reflected

22 adversely on Lin’s credibility, rather than were just
7

1 inadvertent or immaterial. 

2 We also credit the IJ’s direct observations of Lin’s 

3 demeanor, candor, and responsiveness. See id. The IJ

4 observed that Lin was “unable to provide detail” about the

5 critical events at issue. CAR at 45. Lin seemed to “use[] 

6 the same terminology” to answer different questions as though 

7 he “had committed to memory the general aspects of [his] claim 

8 but was not able to provide specific detail regarding the 

9 story.” CAR at 45. 

10 In light of the totality of this record, we conclude that 

11 the IJ made a reasonable adverse credibility determination as 

12 to Lin. We have reviewed his remaining arguments and find 

13 in them no basis for granting the petition.

14 The petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions 

15 and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. 

16 FOR THE COURT: 

17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

18 Clerk of Court

19