422 June 6, 2024 No. 20

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 

STATE OF OREGON

Sandy CHUNG,

 an individual,

and Yvonne Garcia, 

an individual,

Petitioners,

v.

Ellen ROSENBLUM, 

Attorney General, State of Oregon,

Respondent.

(SC S070965)

On petition to review ballot title filed March 21, 2024; 

considered and under advisement on May 7, 2024.*

Kelly Simon, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of 

Oregon, Inc., Portland, filed the petition and reply memorandum 

for petitioners. Also on those filings was Alicia LeDuc Montgomery.

Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 

filed the answering memorandum for respondent. Also 

on the memorandum were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 

General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog, Bushong, James, and 

Masih, Justices.*

DEHOOG, J.

The ballot title is referred to the Attorney General for 

modification.

______________

* Flynn, C.J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024) 423

DEHOOG, J.

Petitioners seek review of the Attorney General’s 

certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 54 (2024) (IP 54), 

contending that the summary does not comply with the 

requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2)(d). We review the 

ballot title to determine whether it substantially complies 

with those requirements. See ORS 250.085(5) (setting out 

that standard). For the reasons explained below, we refer 

the ballot title for IP 54 to the Attorney General for modification of the summary.

I. OVERVIEW OF IP 54

We begin with an overview of IP 54, a copy of which 

is attached as an Appendix. IP 54 would enact an “Oregon 

Crimefighting Act,” which, among other provisions, would 

change current law that applies to the pretrial release of 

persons charged with “serious crime[s].” IP 54 defines a “serious crime” as any felony or Class A misdemeanor charged in 

circuit court. IP 54, Part A, § 1.a.

Part A of IP 54 contains the operative provisions 

relating to pretrial release. It first expressly prohibits release 

before arraignment of any defendant charged with a serious 

crime. IP 54, Part A, § 2. It next provides that, when a defendant is arraigned, the judge shall review the charges and 

the defendant’s record, and then decide whether the defendant shall be released pending trial, based on the following required considerations: (1) the seriousness of both the 

charges and the defendant’s criminal record, which includes, 

to the extent practicable, all arrests and convictions outside 

of Oregon; and (2) rights established in either the state or 

federal constitutions, including the right of a crime victim 

to be reasonably protected from the defendant throughout 

the criminal justice process, Or Const, Art I, § 43(1)(a), and 

to have pretrial release decisions be based on the principle 

of reasonable protection of the victim and the public, as well 

as the likelihood that the defendant will appear for trial, 

id. at (1)(b). IP 54, Part A, § 3. Also at arraignment, for any 

serious crime, the judge is “empowered to establish security 
424 Chung v. Rosenblum

as to the appearance” of a defendant, “without restrictions 

previously imposed by statute.”1 Id. § 4.

Part A includes two other provisions. First, for any 

person arrested and charged with a serious crime in any 

Oregon circuit court, municipal court, or justice court, all 

state or local agencies “shall cooperate with and comply with 

any custodial hold or order associated with such person[,]” 

including one from any other state or territory, any federal 

agency, any other Oregon county, and any tribal agency. Id.

§ 5. Second, “the state shall not approve, facilitate, or recognize any name change” for any person convicted of any 

felony sex crime, first-degree assault, or murder in Oregon, 

or in any United States jurisdiction with substantially similar crimes, unless a court finds that extraordinary circumstances justify a name change. Id. § 6.

Part B of IP 54 provides that local governments 

shall have the power to criminally prohibit or restrict the 

following activities: public intoxication, public drinking of 

alcohol or use of any drug illegal under federal law, disorderly conduct, and trespassing on public property. Id. § 1.

Part C of IP 54 pertains to funding. It first provides that the state, through the Department of Corrections 

(DOC), shall reimburse each county for the cost of pretrial 

incarceration of persons charged with serious crimes (with 

related provisions). Id. Part C, § 1. It also provides that DOC 

shall provide—at the state’s expense and using DOC personnel—incarceration facilities for adults in custody housed 

by a county, for any county jail exceeding 90 percent of its 

capacity for 30 days or more (and continuing until the supervisory authority confirms that the capacity problem has 

been resolved). Id. §5. Part C also sets out a reimbursement 

rate for the cost of pretrial incarceration, id. at §§ 2 - 4, and 

it provides that none of the reimbursement or housing provisions described in Part C may be set off by any other funding obligation of the state to any county. Id. § 6.

1 As do current Oregon statutes, IP 54 uses the term “security” to mean the 

more commonly understood term, “bail.” See, e.g., ORS 135.265(1) (referring to 

“security amount”). In this opinion, we use the term “security release” to refer 

to release on bail, but we use the simpler term, “bail,” to refer to the setting of a 

“security” amount.
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024) 425

If approved by the voters, IP 54 would “supersede[] all inconsistent provisions of Oregon law.” Id. Part 

D. It would become effective on passage and would apply to 

crimes committed on or after January 1, 2025. Id. Part E.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Attorney General prepared a draft ballot title 

for IP 54, ORS 250.065(3), and the Secretary of State circulated that ballot title for public comment, ORS 250.067(1). 

After considering the substantive comments received, 

the Attorney General modified her draft ballot title, ORS 

250.067(2)(a), and certified the following ballot title to the 

Secretary of State:

“Limits pretrial release, increases state incarceration costs; requires enforcement of other jurisdictions’ custodial holds/orders

“Result of ‘Yes’ Vote: ‘Yes’ vote limits pretrial release, 

increasing jail costs; requires enforcing other jurisdictions’ 

custodial holds/orders; transfers county incarceration 

costs/duties to state in certain circumstances.

“Result of ‘No’ Vote: ‘No’ vote retains current pretrial 

release system using risk level assessment, county/state 

incarceration funding system; no requirement to enforce 

other jurisdictions’ custodial holds/orders.

“Summary: Currently, arrested persons may be released 

before first court appearance, depending on crime charged, 

risk level assessment. Counties responsible for pretrial 

incarceration and incarceration sentences under one year. 

State may agree to house county inmate at county expense. 

Persons may legally change name unless change inconsistent with public interest.

“Measure prohibits release of persons charged with felonies/Class A misdemeanors before first court appearance, 

expands judge’s authority to set bail, and requires state to 

pay counties’ pretrial incarceration costs; state/local agencies must enforce custodial holds/orders from other jurisdictions for those persons. State must house county inmates at 

state expense if jail exceeds established capacity threshold. 

Prohibits persons convicted of certain felonies from changing name. Local governments may prohibit/restrict certain 

activities. Other provisions.”
426 Chung v. Rosenblum

Petitioners are electors who timely submitted comments about the Attorney General’s draft ballot title for IP 

54 and who are dissatisfied with the summary of the certified ballot title. See ORS 250.085(2) (describing who may 

challenge certified ballot title). We conclude, as explained 

below, that the summary must be modified.

III. DISCUSSION

The summary of a ballot title for a state measure must contain a “concise and impartial statement” not 

exceeding 125 words that “summariz[es] the * ** measure 

and its major effect.” ORS 250.035(2)(d). Petitioners contend 

that the summary in the certified ballot title for IP 54 does 

not comply with that standard because it neither sufficiently 

nor accurately describes the proposed measure’s impacts, 

which, they contend, “will result in a total revamp of existing law and practice in several significant areas,” most 

notably, the law governing pretrial release and bail. They 

relatedly identify specific aspects of both current law and 

IP 54 that the summary either omits or—they contend—

inaccurately describes. The Attorney General responds that 

the summary substantially complies with ORS 250.035(2)

(d) because it uses the available limited words to both tell 

the voters about current law pertaining to pretrial release 

and then describe the substantive changes that IP 54 would 

make.

A. Comparison of Current Law to IP 54

We first briefly summarize the relevant current law 

governing pretrial release, contrasted against Part A of IP 

54, as that contrast relates to petitioners’ arguments.

As to release before arraignment, current law textually emphasizes statewide consistency, the reduction 

of the reliance on security release, and the balancing of 

an arrested person’s rights and a presumption of pretrial 

release against community and victim safety and the risk 

of failure to appear. See ORS 135.233(1) (presiding judge of 

each judicial district shall issue a pretrial release order that 

categorizes arrested persons and offenses in one of three 

ways—those subject to release on recognizance, those subject to release with special specified conditions (conditional 
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024) 427

release), and those not eligible for release until arraignment 

(hold for arraignment)); ORS 135.233(2) (Chief Justice shall 

establish release guidelines for those pretrial release orders, 

with the stated purposes of providing a consistent release 

decision-making structure statewide, reducing reliance on 

the use of security, and balancing the defendant’s rights and 

“presumption of pretrial release” against community and 

victim safety and the risk of failure to appear).2

 In contrast 

to current law, for any person arrested for a felony or Class A 

misdemeanor, IP 54 would prohibit prearraignment release, 

regardless of the type of crime charged and also regardless 

of any other considerations.3

Then, as to release decisions made at arraignment, 

current law requires consideration of several release criteria, 

including review of the defendant’s prior criminal record. See

ORS 135.230(7); (11) (setting out criteria4

); ORS 135.230(10) 

2 Pursuant to those statutes, a Chief Justice Order (CJO) is in effect that 

establishes guidelines for the judicial district’s pretrial release orders. Among 

other things, that CJO requires considering the categorization of the crime 

charged (recognizance release, conditional release, and hold for arraignment), as 

well as other objective, nondiscretionary, and person-based considerations, permissively including a risk level assessment. CJO 24-014 (May 22, 2024), https://

www.courts.oregon.gov/rules/ Documents/CJO_2024-014.pdf (last accessed May 

30, 2024).

3 Current law does prohibit pretrial release—and describes related decisionmaking procedures—for certain felonies. See ORS 135.240 (person charged with 

murder, aggravated murder, or treason not subject to release when “the proof is 

evident or the presumption strong” that person is guilty; setting out decisionmaking process as to release if those circumstances do not exist; otherwise setting out process for determining whether release shall be denied when defendant 

charged with violent felony and for making related determinations); see also Or 

Const, Art I, § 14 (offenses except murder and treason “shall be bailable by sufficient sureties”; “[m]urder or treason, shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or the presumption strong”); Or Const, Art I, § 43(1)(b) (other than murder, 

aggravated murder, and treason, violent felonies “shall not be bailable” when 

there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the crime 

and the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a “danger of 

physical injury or sexual victimization” to the victim or the public by the defendant while on release).

4 ORS 135.230(7) lists the following “[p]rimary release criteria”: the reasonable protection of the victim or public; the nature of the current charge; the 

defendant’s prior criminal record (if any, but not defined) and whether the defendant appeared for any previously required pretrial appearance; any facts indicating the possibility of violations of law if the defendant were released without 

regulations; and any other facts tending to indicate that the defendant is likely 

to appear. ORS 135.230(11) sets out “[s]econdary” release criteria, including 

the defendant’s employment status history and financial condition, nature and 

extent of family relationships, and past and present residences; the names of 
428 Chung v. Rosenblum

(magistrate makes release decision based on criteria); see 

also ORS 135.240 (distinguishing releasable offenses from 

nonreleasable offenses); ORS 135.245(3) (referring to persons having a “right to release”). Current law also requires 

a judge to (1) release a defendant on their own recognizance, 

unless the release criteria establish otherwise; (2) consider 

whether conditional release is warranted before considering 

whether security release is warranted; and (3) ultimately 

impose the least onerous type of release reasonably likely to 

ensure the safety of the public and the victim, as well as the 

defendant’s later appearance. ORS 135.245(3) - (4). Finally, 

current law requires, when imposing security release, that 

bail be set in an amount “that will reasonably assure the 

defendant’s appearance.” ORS 135.265(1).

As summarized earlier, for persons charged with 

felonies and Class A misdemeanors, Part A of IP 54 would 

apply different requirements at arraignment. First, a judge 

would be required to consider a different list of criteria to 

determine the appropriateness of release (namely, rights 

established in the state and federal constitutions, and the 

seriousness of the new charges and of the defendant’s criminal record).5

 Second, consideration of a criminal record 

would include all arrests and convictions outside Oregon 

(as practicable). Third, the judge would more simply be 

charged with “decid[ing] whether the * ** defendant shall 

be released” pending trial, without sequentially considering 

the appropriate type of release (if any). IP 54, Part A, § 3. 

Finally, the judge would be “empowered to establish security 

* ** without restrictions previously imposed by statute”—in 

contrast to the current requirement that a judge ordering 

security release must impose bail in an amount sufficient to 

reasonably ensure appearance at trial. Id. § 4.

persons who agree to assist the defendant in attending court; and any facts tending to indicate that the defendant has strong ties to the community.

5 While the criteria set out in IP 54 overlap to some extent with the primary 

release criteria set out in ORS 135.230(7), we note that IP 54 does not expressly 

mention or refer to either the criterion of any facts indicating the possibility of 

violations of law if the defendant were released without regulations or the criterion of any other facts tending to indicate that the defendant is likely to appear. 

IP 54 also does not expressly mention or refer to any of the secondary release 

criteria set out in ORS 135.230(11).
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024) 429

B. Parties’ Arguments and Analysis

We turn to the parties’ arguments. Petitioners 

argue that the summary in the ballot title for IP 54 is underinclusive and misleading because it does not fully communicate that IP 54 would “significantly re-writ[e]” Oregon’s 

current pretrial detention and bail system. In petitioners’ 

words, the summary “minimizes” a significant shift toward 

pretrial incarceration that IP 54 would effectuate, while 

also failing to inform voters that IP 54 would repeal current 

law designed to ensure consistent statewide pretrial release 

decision-making, based on objective and nondiscretionary risk assessment tools. Petitioners relatedly highlight 

particular changes that, they assert, collectively amount 

to the “major effect” of IP 54: new and expanded criteria 

that judges must consider when making release decisions 

at arraignment; increased judicial discretion in setting 

bail that would permit setting “unrestricted” amounts; and 

other changes that would result from moving away from the 

current decision-making approach.

The Attorney General disagrees. She contends that 

the summary tells voters that, currently, arrested persons 

may be released before arraignment depending on the crime 

charged and a risk assessment, whereas IP 54 would prohibit prearraignment release for certain crimes. And the 

summary tells the voters that judges have expanded authority to set bail amounts.

As noted earlier, the summary must contain a “concise and impartial statement” not exceeding 125 words that 

“summariz[es] the ** * measure and its major effect.” ORS 

250.035(2)(d). When a measure includes multiple subjects, 

purposes, or effects, they should be recognized to the extent 

permitted by the word limits. Witt v. Kulongoski, 319 Or 7, 

10 n 3, 872 P2d 14 (1994). To identify the actual major effect 

(or effects) of a measure, we consider the changes that it 

would make, “in the context of existing law”; we then examine the disputed ballot title component—here, the summary—to determine whether it “reasonably identifies those 

effects.” Rasmussen v. Kroger, 350 Or 281, 285, 253 P3d 1031 

(2011). In assessing petitioners’ arguments about the summary, we are mindful that its purpose is to help voters both 
430 Chung v. Rosenblum

“understand what will happen if the measure is approved,” 

as well as the “breadth of its impact.” Fred Meyer, Inc. v. 

Roberts, 308 Or 169, 175, 777 P2d 406 (1989).

We begin with petitioners’ argument that the summary does not adequately capture the breadth of the changes 

that IP 54 would effectuate. We agree with petitioners that, 

for persons arrested for felonies and Class A misdemeanors, IP 54 would create a new pretrial release framework 

that would replace the framework set out in current law. 

That potential change is a major effect of IP 54—perhaps its 

predominant effect. See Rasmussen v. Kroger, 351 Or 195, 

202, 262 P3d 777 (2011) (“[a]n ‘effect’ that is at the heart of 

a proposed measure—such as a shift in the existing statutory paradigm for dealing with a subject of interest to 

the government and the public—qualifies as the proposed 

measure’s ‘subject matter’”). Indeed, IP 54 announces that 

major effect by expressly stating that it “supersedes all 

inconsistent provisions of Oregon law.” IP 54, Part D. As an 

initial matter, we conclude that, to accurately convey the 

nature of that replacement, the summary must state that 

IP 54 supersedes, or overrides, current law. See generally 

Mitchell v. Paulus, 292 Or 577, 580, 640 P2d 1390 (1982) (in 

rejecting an argument that the words “would repeal” should 

be removed from a ballot title, court explained that those 

words were “not a statement of arguable consequences of 

the initiative”; rather, they were “a statement of what the 

initiative expressly provides”).6

As discussed next, we also agree with petitioners 

that, to sufficiently convey the scope of the change that IP 

54 would effectuate at arraignment, the summary must 

more fully describe current law and then more fully and 

accurately describe the comparative provisions of IP 54.

In that regard, petitioners first argue that the 

summary must convey that IP 54 adds to the criteria that 

judges are required to consider at arraignment, such as an 

6 Our conclusion should not be understood to mean that, whenever a proposed ballot measure would amend or repeal an existing law, the ballot title summary necessarily must include words such as “amends,” “repeals,” “supersedes,” 

or “overrides.” Some changes can be sufficiently summarized, and major effects 

sufficiently explained, without using those words.
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024) 431

expanded definition of a defendant’s criminal record. More 

generally, they also contend that the summary fails to 

reflect the significant impact on release and bail decisions 

made at arraignment. And, they add, the summary does not 

accurately describe the provision of IP 54 that “increase[s]” 

judicial discretion to impose a bail amount, without any 

restrictions existing in current law.

We agree with petitioners that the summary is 

deficient in that regard as well. Notably, the summary contains no description whatsoever about the current law that 

governs pretrial release decisions at arraignment—namely, 

that the judge must consider certain criteria; must consider 

conditional release before considering security release; and 

must, if ordering security release, set a bail amount that 

will reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance. That 

omission, in turn, means that the voters would have no ability to compare current law governing pretrial release decisions made at arraignment to the new provisions proposed 

in IP 54, applicable to persons arrested for felonies or Class 

A misdemeanors. Compounding the problem, as petitioners 

point out, the summary provides only partial information 

about the provisions of IP 54 that apply to such persons at 

arraignment: It mentions only the judge’s authority to set 

bail; it does not mention that IP 54 changes the criteria that 

the judge must consider before making a pretrial release 

decision. And finally, the information that it does provide—”expands judge’s authority to set bail”—is confusing 

and could be misunderstood; that is, voters could mistakenly 

understand those words to mean that, under IP 54, judges 

would have increased authority to release persons arrested 

for felonies and Class A misdemeanors upon payment of bail 

or otherwise, when, instead, the measure expands the discretion judges have in setting bail in a way that is no longer 

bound by current considerations or limitations.

We conclude that the summary must provide some 

description to the voters about the current law that applies 

to pretrial release at arraignment—including the requirements to consider conditional release before security release 

and to set bail in an amount that will reasonably ensure 

appearance. Further, it must describe, accurately but within 
432 Chung v. Rosenblum

the statutory word limit, the key changes that IP 54 would 

make to that law for persons arrested for felonies and Class 

A misdemeanors, namely, that it changes the criteria that 

the judge must consider and also removes current limits 

on setting bail amounts.7 See Fletchall v. Rosenblum, 365 

Or 98, 116, 442 P3d 193 (2019) (requiring modification of a 

summary “to make the comparison between the current and 

projected decisional arrangements more sensible”).

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, we conclude that, to substantially comply 

with ORS 250.035(2)(d), the summary in the ballot title for 

IP 54 must be modified in several respects. First, the summary must clarify that, for persons arrested for felonies and 

Class A misdemeanors, IP 54 would override existing law. 

Second, as to decision-making at arraignment, the summary must explain that (1) current law requires that conditional release be considered before security release and 

that bail amounts be set to ensure appearance; and (2) IP 54 

would both change the criteria for making prerelease decisions and remove current limits on setting bail amounts.8

The ballot title is referred to the Attorney General 

for modification.

7 We observe that, with the addition to the summary that IP 54 changes the 

release criteria that a court must consider, the summary by implication would 

sufficiently convey that current law imposes certain criteria (which would change 

if the voters were to approve IP 54).

Petitioners in particular emphasize one change to the release criteria—

consideration of an expanded criminal record, which, under IP 54, includes all 

arrests and convictions outside of Oregon (to the extent practicable). To the extent 

that petitioners argue that the summary should include that level of detail, we 

disagree.

8 To modify the ballot title in accordance with this opinion, the Attorney 

General could choose to use fewer words to describe other aspects of IP 54 (in 

particular, the current law and provision of IP 54 relating to name changes).

We have considered petitioners’ other challenges to the summary in the ballot title for IP 54 and have concluded that none has merit under the “substantial 

compliance” standard set out in ORS 250.085(5). We therefore reject those challenges without further discussion. 
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024) 433

APPENDIX

OREGON CRIMEFIGHTING ACT

The People of Oregon hereby adopt the following statute, 

to be known as the “Oregon Crimefighting Act.” This Act 

improves public safety in several ways, and has three principal objectives: End the “Catch and Release” system as to 

those charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors; 

empower counties and cities to pass ordinances to fight local 

crime, including public use of drugs which are illegal under 

federal law; require the state to pay for jail space as to those 

charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors who need 

to be held until the trial process is complete.

Part A. End “Catch and Release” of criminal defendants.

Section 1. For purposes of this Part A of this Act:

a. “Serious crime” means any felony, and any Class A misdemeanor, charged in Circuit Court.

b. “Pretrial release” means a release of a criminal defendant from incarceration (usually jail) before trial.

c. “Arraignment” means an appearance in front of a 

Circuit Court Judge, either in person or by electronic 

means such as video.

Section 2. Each criminal defendant charged with a serious crime shall not be eligible for pretrial release from 

incarceration until the criminal defendant is presented for 

arraignment.

Section 3. When a criminal defendant charged with a serious 

crime appears at arraignment, the Circuit Court Judge presiding at the arraignment shall review the criminal defendant’s record, and the charges pending against the criminal 

defendant, and the Judge shall decide whether the criminal defendant shall be released from incarceration pending 

trial. In making this decision, the judge shall consider:

a. Rights established in the Constitution of the United 

States.

b. Rights established in the Constitution of Oregon; these 

include but are not limited to the provisions of Article I, 
434 Chung v. Rosenblum

Section 43 of the Oregon Constitution which provide 

the right of a crime victim to be reasonably protected 

from the criminal defendant throughout the criminal 

justice process and the right of the public and the victim to have decisions regarding the pretrial release of 

a criminal defendant be based upon the principle of 

reasonable protection of the victim and the public, as 

well as the likelihood that the criminal defendant will 

appear for trial.

c. The seriousness of the criminal defendant’s criminal 

record and the seriousness of the new charges against 

the criminal defendant. The defendant’s criminal 

record shall include all arrests and convictions, and 

all citations in lieu of arrest, in Oregon. The criminal 

record shall also include, to the extent practicable, all 

arrests and convictions outside Oregon.

Section 4. The Circuit Court Judge is empowered to establish security as to the appearance of the criminal defendant 

for trial, without restrictions previously imposed by statute, 

as to any serious crime.

Section 5. As to any person arrested for any felony or any 

Class A misdemeanor charged in any Oregon Circuit Court, 

Municipal Court, or Justice Court, all Oregon State or local 

government agencies shall cooperate with and comply with 

any custodial hold or order associated with such person. This 

includes any custodial hold or order from any other state or 

territory, any federal agency, any other Oregon county, and 

any tribal agency. Each Oregon state or local government 

agency shall, when appropriate, transfer such arrested person to the custody of the jurisdiction presenting the custodial hold or order.

Section 6. In order to prevent certain convicted criminals 

from hiding their identity, the state shall not approve, facilitate, or recognize any name change for any person convicted 

of any felony sex crime, assault in the first degree, or any 

degree of murder. This restriction applies as to any conviction for a crime in any jurisdiction within the United States 

where the crime is substantially similar to any of the listed 

Oregon crimes. This restriction may only be set aside by 

an Oregon court which finds extraordinary circumstances 

which justify a name change.
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024) 435

Part B. Allow local governments to better protect public 

safety.

Section 1. Notwithstanding any other provision of state law, 

local governments have the power to criminally prohibit or 

restrict the following:

a. Public intoxication as to alcohol or drugs.

b. Public drinking of alcohol.

c. Public use of any drug which is illegal under federal 

law.

d. Disorderly conduct.

e. Trespassing on public property.

Section 2. The powers listed in Section 1 of Part B are in 

addition to any power which may be held by a unit of local 

government.

Part C. Ensure sufficient jail space and funding for each 

jail.

Section 1. The state shall reimburse each county for the 

costs of pretrial incarceration of all persons charged with 

felonies or Class A misdemeanors. The reimbursement shall 

cover the costs of incarceration for each day that a person 

charged with a felony or Class A misdemeanor is in in the 

custody of the supervisory authority of the county, from the 

date of the person’s arrest until the resolution of the criminal charge.

Section 2. Every month, the county shall submit to the 

Oregon Department of Corrections a written request 

for reimbursement for the cost of incarcerating persons 

described in Section 1 of this Part C.

Section 3. The Department of Corrections shall reimburse a 

county that submits a request under Section 2 of this Part C 

within 30 days of receiving the request. The reimbursement 

shall occur at the rate of $145 per person per day of incarceration or the actual daily cost of incarcerating a person, 

whichever is higher.

Section 4. If the Department of Corrections determines 

that the reimbursement request by a county under Part C 
436 Chung v. Rosenblum

is excessive, the issue shall be immediately submitted for 

consideration and resolution by the Circuit Court of that 

county. The decision of the Circuit Court as to the amount 

to be reimbursed shall be final and not subject to appeal.

Section 5. If any county jail exceeds 90% of its capacity for 

30 days or more, the supervisory authority for the county 

shall report this to the Department of Corrections, which 

shall provide incarceration facilities, staffed by Department 

of Corrections personnel, to house inmates from that county, 

at state expense. This shall continue until the supervisory 

authority confirms that the capacity problem has been 

resolved.

Section 6. None of the reimbursement or housing of inmates 

provisions of Part C of this Act may be set off by any other 

funding obligations of the state to any county.

Part D. This Oregon Crimefighting Act supersedes all 

inconsistent provisions of Oregon law.

Part E. This Act is effective upon passage. The provisions 

of this Act apply to crimes committed on or after January 

1, 2025.