2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-14-2013

USA v. John Grzyminski

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 13-1199

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1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-1199

___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JOHN GRZYMINSKI,

 Appellant

_______________________

On Appeal from the District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

D.C. Criminal No. 2-12-cr-00465-001

(Honorable Stewart Dalzell)

______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 12, 2013

Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Filed: November 14, 2013)

_________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________________
2

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

Defendant John Grzyminski pleaded guilty to possession of unregistered firearms

in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). He appeals his sentence of 30 months imprisonment, 

3 years of supervised release, a fine of $500, and a special assessment of $100. Because 

his sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, we will affirm.

I.

On May 9, 2012, Grzyminski’s mother, Catherine Wilson, returned to the house

she shared with her son after a brief hospital stay. Upon arriving, Wilson and her other 

son, Michael Grzyminski, discovered defendant had openly displayed numerous guns 

around the house. Soon after, defendant got into an argument with Wilson and Michael, 

which prompted Wilson to call the Warrington Township police. The police informed 

Wilson and Michael they could not remove the firearms because Grzyminski had a 

license to possess them.

After the police left, Wilson and Michael noticed a pipe bomb sitting on the 

kitchen counter with a butane lighter nearby. Wilson called the police again. In addition 

to the Warrington police, the Philadelphia Police Department Bomb Disposal Unit and 

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives responded to the scene. After 

evacuating the neighborhood, the Bomb Disposal Unit searched the house and discovered 

two more pipe bombs in a spare bedroom upstairs. Grzyminski left the scene during the

Bomb Disposal Unit’s search, but the Solebury Township police arrested him without 

incident the next day.

On September 17, 2012, Grzyminski pleaded guilty to one count of possession of 
3

unregistered firearms in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) for possession of the three pipe 

bombs. At his plea hearing, defendant told the court he used pipe bombs for recreational 

purposes on July 4th and New Year’s Eve.

1

 Based on his offense level and criminal 

history category, the United States Probation Office in its Presentence Investigation 

Report calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months imprisonment.2

At the sentencing hearing on January 4, 2013, Grzyminski requested a sentence of 

time served—at the time, 8 months. He argued the Guidelines range was “excessive” 

because he did not intend to hurt anyone and did not have a criminal history. (App. 20.) 

The Government contended a Guidelines sentence was appropriate based primarily on the 

circumstances of the offense—in particular, leaving a pipe bomb near a lighter, which 

required law enforcement to evacuate the neighborhood. After hearing from the 

Government, defense counsel, and Grzyminski himself, the District Court sentenced him

to 30 months imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release, a fine of $500, and a special 

assessment of $100. This timely appeal followed.3

II.

Grzyminski contends the District Court’s Guidelines range sentence of 30 months 

imprisonment was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He argues the sentence 

 

1

In an interview with the Warrington police after his arrest, defendant said he 

used pipe bombs to hunt bears and threw them into lakes for entertainment.

2 Grzyminski had an adjusted offense level of 19 and a criminal history category 

of I.

3

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4

was procedurally unreasonable because the court did not meaningfully consider his 

personal characteristics and the circumstances of the offense. He contends the sentence 

was substantively unreasonable because the court did not reasonably apply the sentencing 

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

As the party challenging the sentence, Grzyminski has the burden of showing 

unreasonableness. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 

We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the District Court’s sentence

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).

Our review of a district court’s sentencing decision has two steps. We first review

the sentence for procedural error, which requires ensuring the district court “(1) correctly 

calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, (2) appropriately considered any 

motions for a departure under the Guidelines, and (3) gave meaningful consideration to 

the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 411 (citation omitted). If 

the sentence is procedurally sound, we then review for substantive reasonableness. Id. 

Under the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard, a sentence is substantively 

reasonable if “‘the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the 

factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).’” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (quoting United 

States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)).

Turning first to the procedural reasonableness of Grzyminski’s sentence, he does 

not argue the District Court incorrectly calculated his Guidelines range or improperly 

considered any motions for a departure. Accordingly, we only address his argument that 
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the court did not give meaningful consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in § 

3553(a), namely, his personal characteristics and the circumstances of the offense.

Here, the District Court considered these factors in great depth during the 

sentencing hearing. The court raised defendant’s lack of criminal history and the severity 

of his offense in its initial interaction with defense counsel. (See App. 20 (“This is quite 

a puzzling matter to me because, on the one hand, your client has no criminal record to 

speak of, but, on the other hand, when he decided to go over the line, he did it big 

time.”).) The court and defense counsel then discussed this juxtaposition between the 

severity of the offense and defendant’s lack of criminal history for the next six pages of 

the sentencing transcript. (Id. at 20–21.) Finally, the court addressed these factors with 

Grzyminski himself before imposing its sentence. (Id. at 22).

Although Grzyminski disagrees with the weight the court accorded his personal 

characteristics and the circumstances of the crime, the record shows the court 

meaningfully considered these factors in its sentencing decision. Because the sentence 

was procedurally reasonable, we evaluate whether it was substantively reasonable.

The record reflects the District Court’s “‘rational and meaningful consideration of 

the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).’” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (quoting Grier,

475 F.3d at 571). The court took into account Grzyminski’s lack of criminal history, 

weighed this factor against other § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and 

circumstances of the crime and the need to protect the public by deterring similar 
6

conduct, and concluded a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range was justified.

4

 

Defendant argued his crime should be punished less severely because he intended 

to use the pipe bombs for recreational, not criminal, purposes. Despite defendant’s 

characterization of his actions, the court was troubled by several aspects of the offense. 

The court highlighted that Grzyminski placed three pipe bombs in a home in a residential 

area and left one of the bombs near a butane lighter. (App. 20, 22.) In addition, the court 

noted his actions “horrified” his mother and “hugely affected” his neighbors, as they had 

to evacuate their homes while law enforcement searched defendant’s house and disabled 

the bombs. (Id. at 22.) The court also stressed the need to protect the public by deterring

others from engaging in similar conduct. (See id. (“[W]e absolutely have to protect the 

public from crimes like this and deter people, whether because [using pipe bombs is] 

amusing or people think it’s amusing.”).)

 

4

In an argument first raised on appeal, Grzyminski contends the current 

Guidelines range is substantively unreasonable because it is not based on empirical data 

or experience. (Br. Appellant 17–18 (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 

(2007)).) While not entirely clear, his argument appears to be that the current Guidelines 

range is unreasonable because the firearm offense to which he pleaded guilty was 

punished less severely in the past. (Id.) Because defendant failed to raise this objection 

at sentencing, we review for plain error. United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252–53 

(3d Cir. 2002).

Defendant’s argument rests on an incorrect reading of Kimbrough. As we 

explained in United States v. Lopez-Reyes, 589 F.3d 667 (3d Cir. 2009), “Kimbrough

does not require a district court to reject a particular Guidelines range where that court 

does not, in fact, have disagreement with the Guideline at issue.” Id. at 671 (emphasis 

added). The District Court never, at any time during Grzyminski’s sentencing, voiced a 

policy disagreement with the sentencing Guideline applicable to a conviction for 

possession of an unregistered firearm. Nor did the District Court commit plain error in 

failing to consider the historical development of the unregistered firearm sentencing 

Guideline. See id. (noting that “a district court is not required to engage in ‘independent 

analysis’ of the empirical justifications and deliberative undertakings that led to a 

particular Guideline.”).
7

Based on the § 3553(a) factors, the court found sentencing defendant at the bottom 

of the Guidelines range was “warranted.” (Id. at 22.) Because this 30-month sentence 

“falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered reasonable in 

light of the § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 

(3d Cir. 2008).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.