UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C U IT
JOSHUA JOEL ZAM OR A GONZALES, Pe t i tione r-Appe lla

nt,
v. C ONNIE GIPSON, W arde n,

R e sponde nt-Appe lle e . No. 13-56498 D.C . No. 5:12-c v-00862-B R O-PLA C e ntra l Distric t of C a lifornia , R ive rside
ORDER
B e fore : PR EGER SON, D.W . NELSON, a n d C ALLAHAN, C irc u it Judge s. Appe lla nt’ s pe tition for re he aring is G RANT E D and the pe tition for
re he aring e n ba

nc is de nie d a s m oot. JudgeC a lla ha n vote s to de ny

the pe tition for
re he aring a

nd the pe tition for re he aring e n ba n c . The m e m orandum

disposition a

nd disse nt file d August 11, 2016, is withdra wn. A m e m oran dum disposition sha ll be file d c onc urre ntly

with this orde r. W ith the filing of thene w m e m orandum disposition, the

pa rtie s sha l l be
a llowe d to file pe titions for re he a ring a n d/or re he a

ring e n ba nc . SO ORDER ED. 

# F IL ED
APR 18 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALSN O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
JOSHUA JOEL ZAM OR A GONZALES, Pe titione r - Appe lla nt,
v. C ONNIE GIPSON, W arde n, R

e sponde n t - Appe lle e . No. 13-56498

D.C . No. 5:12-C V-00862-B R OPLA
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Sta t e s Distric t C ourt for the C e ntra l Distric t of C a lifornia B e ve rly R e id O’ C onne ll, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d an d Subm i tte d De c e m be r 7, 2015 Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : PR EGER SON, D.W
. NELSON, a nd C ALLAHAN, C i rc uit Judge s. Joshua Joe l Za

m ora Gonz a le s (“ Gonz a le s ” ) a ppe a l s the distric t c ourt’ s de nia l of his fe de ra l ha

be a s pe tition, c h a lle n ging his c onvic tion for thre e c ounts of
a tte m pte d m urde r a nd one c ount of shooting from a m otor ve hic le on insuffic ie nc y of the e vide nc e grounds. W ith re spe c t to e a c h of the se c ounts, thejury found true 

# F IL ED
APR 18 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.that

Gonz a le s “ pe rsona lly

and inte ntiona lly

disc ha rge d a fire arm , a

ha ndgun, whic h
c a use d gre a t bodily

injury to” the vic tim s. The jury a lso found tha

t he c om m itte d the c rim e s within the

m e aning of C a l ifornia ’ s ga ng e n ha nc e m e nt sta

tute . The tria l
c ourt se nte nc e d

Gonz a l e s, who wa s just 17 y e ars old whe n the c rim e s we re
c om m itte d, to a

n a ggre ga te te rm

of 86 y e a rs a nd 8 m onths to life

in sta te prison. W e have jurisdic tion pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 2253. W e re vie w the distric t
c ourt’ s de c ision to gra

nt or de ny

the ha be a s pe tition denovo, S

olis v . Garc ia , 219 F.3d 922, 926 (9th C ir. 2000) (pe r c uriam ), and the la st-re a sone d sta te c ourt’ s
a djudic a tion of the ha

be a s c l a im

for whe t he r it wa s c o ntra

ry to or a n unre a sona

ble
a pplic a tion of c le a

r Supre m e C ourt pre c e d e n t, Boy e r v . Be lle que , 659 F.3d 957, 964 (9th C i r. 2011). W e re ve rse the distric t c o urt a nd gra nt Gonz a le s’ s pe tition for ha be a s re lie f.

“ To pre va i l on a

n insuffic ie nc y

of e vide nc e c la im , a ha

be a s pe titione r m

ust show tha t ‘ upon the re c ord e vide nc e a dduc e d a t the tria l[,] no rationa l trie r of fa c t
c ould ha v e found proof of guilt be y ond a re a sona ble doubt.’ ” B r ic e no v . Sc ribne r , 555 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th C ir. 2009) (quoting J ac k son v . Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (a lte ra tion in origina l)). B e c a use the Antite rrorism and Effe c tive De a th Pe na lty Ac t (“ AEDPA” ) a

pplie s to this pe tition, “

we owe a ‘ double dose of de fe re nc e ’ ” to the sta

te c ourt’ s judgm e nt. Long v . J ohnson , 736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th
2C ir. 2013) (quoting Boy e r , 659 F.3d a t 964). To gra

nt ha be a s re lie f, we the re fore
m ust a l so c onc lude tha

t “ the sta te c ourt’ s de te rm ination tha t a ra t iona l jury

c ould have found tha

t the re wa s suffic ie nt e vide nc e of guilt, i.e
. , tha t e a c h re quire d
e le m e nt wa s prove n be y o n d a re a s ona ble doubt, wa s obje c t ive l y unre a s ona b le .” Boy e r , 659 F.3d a

t 965. W hile this is a

n “ e xtre m e ly

high ba r” to ove rc o m e , the ba

r

“ is not insurm

ounta ble .” O’Laughlin v . O’Brie n , 568 F.3d 287, 304 (1st C ir. 2009). Inde e d , we have an “ obliga tion unde r J

ac k son to ide ntify

those ra re
oc c a sions in whic h ‘ a

prope rly instruc te d jury

m ay . . . c onvic t

e v e n whe n it c an be
sa id tha t no ra t iona l trie r of fa c t

c ould find guilt be

y ond a re a sona b le doubt[.] ’ ” Unite d State s v . N e v ils , 598 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th C ir. 2010) (quoting J a c k s on , 443 U.S. a t 317 (a lte ra tions in origina l)).

“ Although our suffic ie nc y of the e vide nc e re v ie w is grounde d in the Fourte e nth Am e ndm e nt, we unde rta ke the inquiry with re fe re nc e to the e le m e nts of the c rim ina l offe nse a s se t forth by sta te la w.” J uan H. v . Alle n , 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th C ir. 2005) (c iting J a c k son , 443 U.S. a

t 324 n.16). He re , the a tte m pte d
m urde r c o nvic t ions re q

uire d proof tha

t Gonz a le s: (1) ha d the spe c ific inte nt to kill;
and (2) c om

m itte d a dire c t but ine ffe c tua l a c t towa rd a c c om plishing this goa

l. Pe oplev . Millbrook

, 166 C a l. R

ptr. 3d 217, 229 (C a l. C t . App. 2014); se e also C a l. Pe na l C ode §§ 187, 664. The shooting from

a m otor ve hic le c onvic tion re q uire d 3proof tha

t Gonz a le s: (1) willfully

and m a lic i ously

disc h arge d a

fire arm from

a
m otor ve h ic le (2) a t a

nothe r pe rson othe r tha

n a n oc c upa nt of a m otor ve hic le . C a l. Pe na l C ode § 26100(c ). The e vide nc e a ga inst Gonz a l e s c onsiste d of the following: Gonz a le s wore a ba se ba ll c a

p to a pa rty , whe re he introduc e d him se lf a s “ Knuc kle s ” and a ssoc ia te d with m e m be rs of the Pla

y boy z ga ng. Afte r the pa

rty e nde d, shots we re fire d from
a da rk c o lore d ve hic le tha

t wa s le a ving the are a . Thre e vic tim s we re wounde d. W itne sse s re c a lle d se e ing two shoote rs, one shooting from

the ba c kse a t of the da

rk
c olore d ve hic le and the othe r ove r the hood. No witne ss c ould ide ntify the shoote rs, but a

t le a st one be l ie ve d the shoote r in the ba c kse a t wore a ba se ba ll c a p. Gonz a le s a dm i tte d to he a ring m e n on the stre e t “ ta lking shit” and to he a

ring shots
a s he wa s le a ving the pa

rty in the ba c kse at of his frie n d’ s light re d C a d illa c , but witne s se s te stifie d tha

t m an y c ars we re le a ving the are a a t the tim e of the shooting. Although the re c ord doe s not re fle c t what prom

pte d polic e to inve stiga

te Gonz a le s
a s a suspe c t, polic e arrive d a t Gonz a le s ’ s house the following da y and a rre ste d him . The y found no we a

pons in his hom

e or on his pe rson. Afte r a prolonge d inte rroga tion a

t the polic e sta

tion, whe re Gonz a le s like ly c onta c te d num e rous
c onta m i na te d surfa c e s, a

gunshot re sidue te st re v e a le d only two gunshot re sidue pa rtic l e s on Gonz a le s’ s right ha nd.
4C onside ring “ the re c ord e vide nc e a dduc e d a t the tria l ,” J ac k s on , 443 U.S. a

t 324, we c onc lude tha

t t ha t e vide nc e is c onstitutiona l ly insuffic ie nt to support Gonz a le s’ s c onvic tions. First, no e y e witne ss te s tifie d tha t Gonz a le s wa s the shoote r or c ould ide ntify
any of the oc c upa

nts of the ve hic le from

whic h the shots we re fire d. One witne ss
e xplic itly sta te d tha t Gonz a le s wa s not the pe rson who “ gav e the he a ds up or wha t’ s up” to the vic tim s a nd tha t he wa s not

the shoote r. Two othe rs spe c ific a lly te stifie d tha

t the y did not se e Gonz a le s in the c ar from whic h the shots we re fire d, le t a l one se e him

with a gun. Se c ond, te stim ony

c onc e rning Gonz a l e s’ s ba se ba ll c a p a nd ga ng a ffilia tion doe s not distinguish him

from othe r pe o ple pre se nt on the night of the shooting. Various witne sse s te stifie d t ha t m any pe ople (one witne ss thought it wa s 100)
a tte nde d the pa

rty . No witne ss te stifie d tha t the shoote r wore a

ba se ba ll c a

p tha t
m a tc h e d the one Gonz a le s wore tha t night. The

e vide n c e did not e sta

b lish tha t a pe rson known a s “ Knuc k le s” wa s c onne c te d with the shooting, nor tha t the vic tim s
we re shot to be ne fit the Pla y boy z ga ng spe c ific a lly . Evide nc e of ga ng a ffilia tion
a lone c annot c onstitute suffic i e nt grounds for c onvic tion. Se e Unite d State s v . Garc ia , 151 F.3d 1243, 1244 (9th C ir. 1998).

5Third, witne sse s’ de sc riptions of the c ar from whic h the shots we re fire d did not m a tc h de sc riptions of the c ar in whic h Gonz a le s c la im e d he wa s a pa sse nge r. All witne sse s sta

te d tha t the ve h ic le from

whic h the shots we re fire d wa s bla c k or da rk c olore d, but Gonz a l e s c o nsiste ntly sta te d tha t he le ft the pa

rty in his frie nd’ s light re d C a dilla c . He a lso re p e a te dly de nie d e ve r shooting a

gun or se e ing a

ny one fire a gun from the c ar he wa s in. Fourth, a lthough Gonz a le s sta te d during his polic e sta

tion inte rvie w tha

t he
wa s the re ar pa sse nge r in a c ar that drove by

som e m e n on the stre e t who we re

“ ta lking shit”

and tha t he late r he ard gunshots, he did not c l e arly a dm it tha

t he
e xc ha nge d words with or motione d to a ny one from the ba c kse a t of his frie nd’ s light re d C a dilla c . At one point during the inte rvie w, Gonz a le z e xplic i tly de nie d
sa y ing a ny t hing to the

m e n on the stre e t. Furthe r, witne sse s te stifie d tha t num e rous
c ars pa sse d by

the vic tim s be fore the shooting oc c urre d
. Fifth, the two pa

rtic le s of gunshot re s idue on Gonz a le s’ s right ha n d do not
c onne c t him

to a ny gun fire d on the night of the shooting. The

polic e ne ve r loc a te d
a gun m atc hing the she l l c a sings found a t the sc e n e of the shooting. Furthe r, the le a d de te c tive use d a

gunshot re sidue te s t kit to c o lle c t the pa rtic le s of gunshot
re sidue from

Gonz a le s 12 hours a fte r the shooting – a fte r polic e a llowe d Gonz a le s to go to the

ba throom

and wa sh his ha

nds whe n he arrive d a t

the polic e sta

tion. 6The prose c ution’ s e xpe rt (who wa s not the one who a dm iniste re d the gunshot

re sidue te st) e xpre sse d surprise tha t the pa rtic le s survive d, te s tify ing tha t he

“ would e x pe c t the 12 hours . . . to re m ove a ll of [the pa rtic le s] and wa shing a

t tha t point to kind of finish the job.” The e x pe rt a lso te stifie d tha t it wa s just a s like ly the p artic le s c a m e from

c onta c ting a

surfa c e c onta

m inate d with gunshot re sidue a s from firing a fire arm , ha

n dling a fire arm , or be ing in c lose proxim ity to a disc ha rge d fire arm . Sixth, de spite a

thorough se arc h, polic e offic e rs found no we a pons, bulle ts, gun m a ga z i ne s, gun c le aning de vic e s, or othe r fire arm pa ra phe rna lia a t Gonz a le s’ s hom e .

“ In c onduc ting our inquiry , we are m indful of the de fe re nc e owe d to the trie r of fa c t a n d, c orre spondingly , the sha rply lim i te d nature of c onstitutiona l suffic i e nc y

re vie w.” J

u an H. , 408 F.3d a

t 1275 (c ita

tions a nd inte rna l quota

tion
m arks om itte d). Howe ve r, “ [o] ur de fe re nc e . . . is not without lim it.” Id. “ W e have he ld, for e xam

ple , tha t e vide nc e is insuffic i e nt to support a ve rdic t whe re
m e re spe c ulation, ra

the r tha n re a sona ble infe re n c e , supports the gove rnm e nt’ s
c a se [.] ” N

e v ils , 598 F.3d a

t 1167; s e e also O’Laughlin , 568 F.3d a t 301 (“ A
re vie wing c ourt should not give c re d e nc e to e vide ntia

ry inte rpre t a tions a

nd illa t ions tha t a re unre a sona

ble , insupporta

ble , or ove rly

spe c ulative .” (c ita

tion a nd
7a lte ra tions om i tte d)). W he re a de fe n da nt’ s c onduc t is c onsiste nt with both guilt
and innoc e nc e , the gove rnm e nt ha s the burde n to “produc e [] e vide nc e tha t would
a llow a ra tiona l trie r of fa c t to c onc lude be y ond a re a s ona ble doubt tha

t the gove rnm e nt’ s e x pla

na tion of [the de fe nda

nt’ s] a c tions, ra

the r tha n [the de fe nda n t’ s] innoc e nt e xpla

n a tion[,] . . . is thec orre c t one .” Unite d State s v . Bautista-Av ila , 6 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th C ir. 1993).

“ C irc um sta

ntia l e v ide nc e and infe re nc e s dra wn from it m ay be suffic ie nt to susta in a c onvic tion. Howe ve r, m e re suspic ion or spe c ulation c annot be the ba sis for c re a tion of logic a l infe re nc e s.” Unite d State s v . Le w is , 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th C ir. 1986) ( c ita

tions om itte d); se e also J

uan H. , 408 F.3d a

t 1279 (“ Spe c ulation a

n d c onje c ture c a

nnot ta ke the pla c e of re a sona

ble infe re nc e s a

nd
e vide nc e . . . .” ). Suc h is the c a se he re . Eve n re solving a ll c o nflic ting fa c tua l infe re n c e s in fa

vor of the prose c ution, a s we m ust do unde r J

ac k son , 443 U.S. a

t 326, the e vide n c e doe s not pe rm it a ny ra tiona l trie r of fa c t

to c onc l ude tha

t Gonz a le s wa s guilty

be y ond a re a sona b le doubt. Gonz a le s’ s c onvic tions re st on a spe c u l a tive and we a k c h a i n of infe re nc e s that he wa s the shoote r a n d tha t he pe rsona lly disc ha

rge d a fire arm . As the C a lifornia C ourt of Appe a l e xpla ine d:

8[W ] itne s se s te s tifie d tha t the re ar pa sse n ge r in a

m oving c ar shot a

t the m . Furthe rm ore , a lthough the vic tim s c ould not ide ntify de fe nda nt a s the shoote r, anothe r witne s s . . . ide ntifie d de fe nda n t a s the pe rson who introduc e d him se lf to he r a s “ Knuc kle s” a t the . . . pa

rty and who wa s dre sse d like a

Pla y boy z ga ng m e m be r a nd a ssoc ia ting with othe r gang m e m be rs. In c onjunc tion with [this witne ss’ s] te stim ony are de fe n da nt’ s a dm issions to the polic e tha t he a tte nde d the pa

rty , dre sse d a s she de sc ribe d him , a nd tha t he wa s in a

c ar, pa ssing by

a group of m e n on the stre e t a t the tim e of the shooting. The fore going e v ide nc e , c om bine d with de fe nda

nt’ s positive gunshot re sidue te st, is suffic ie nt to e sta b lish . . . de fe nda

nt’ s ide ntity a s the shoote r. This e vide nc e is not inc onsiste nt with the possibility tha t Gonz a le s wa s the shoote r. Howe ve r, ta

ke n individua lly

or c olle c tive ly , the se pie c e s of c irc u m sta ntia l
e vide nc e do not e sta

b lish the infe re nc e tha

t Gonz a l e s wa s the shoote r be y ond a
re a s ona ble doubt. W e hold tha

t the C a lifornia C ourt of Appe a l unre a sona bly de te rm i ne d tha

t a ra tiona l jury

c ould ha ve found suffic ie nt e v ide nc e of guilt. The e vide nc e in this c a s e is not m e re l y “ fa r from ove rwhe lm ing,” a s the
m a gistra te judge obse rve d. R a t

he r, it is c onstitutiona

lly insuffic ie nt. Ac c ordingly , vie w ing the e vide nc e in the light m ost fa vora ble to the prose c ution a s re quire d by J ac k son , and with de fe re nc e to the sta t e c ourt de c ision a s re quire d by AEDPA, we hold tha t no ra tiona l trie r of fa c t c ould ha ve found proof of Gonz a le s’ s guilt be y ond a re a sona

b le doubt a

nd tha t the C a lifornia

C ourt of Appe a l’ s c onc l usion that the c irc um sta

ntia l e vide nc e wa s suffic i e nt to support Gonz a le s’ s c onvic tions
wa s obje c tive ly

unre a sona

ble
. 9W e re ve rse the judgm e nt of the distric t c ourt a nd re m and the c a se to the distric t c o urt with instruc tions to gra nt the pe tition for a

writ of ha

be a s c orpus. RE V E RSE D and RE M A NDE D.

1 01 Gonzales v. Gipson , No. 13

- 56498 CALLAHAN, J., dissenting. In finding the evidence constitutionally inadequate to sustain Joshua Gonzales’s convictions for attempted murder and shooting from a motor vehicle , the majority improperly substitutes its view of the evi dence for that of the California Court of Appeal . In doing so, the majority commits the exact error for which the Supreme Court has repeatedly chastised us
. See Davis v. Ayala , 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2202 (2015) (reminding us that “[t]he role of a fe deral habeas court is to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not to apply de novo review of factual findings and to substitute its own opinions . . . .”) (citation and quotation omitted))
. I therefore respectfully dis sent. In refusing to defer to the Court of Appeal, the majority pays only lip service to the “double dose of deference” required under the AEDPA standard of review. Under AEDPA, a sufficiency of the evidence claim “face[s] a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because [it is] subject to two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman v. Johnson , 566 U.S. 650, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam). “First, on direct appeal, ‘it is the responsibility of the jury

— not the court

— to decide what conclusio ns should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact c ould have agreed with the jury.’” Id. 

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APR 18 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 (quoting Cavazos v. Smith , 565 U.S. 1, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam)). This inquiry requires “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution . . . .” Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “And second, on habeas review, ‘a federal court may not overturn a s tate court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was objectively unreasonable.’” Coleman , 132 S. Ct. at 2062 (quoting Cavazos , 565 U.S. at 4). T he evid ence of Gonzales’s guilt is more than sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Gonzales was guilty of attempted murder and shooting from a vehicle
. The jury heard evidence that :
• Gon zales and two other individuals were in a car in the area at the time of the shooting.

• Gonzales was seated in the backseat of the car in which he was a passenger .
• Gonzales told the police that he saw some men on the street “talking shit” and “mad[

- dogging] some other fool” when a car backed up toward them.

• Gonzales exchanged some words with the men on the street, who began to approach the car he was in.

• Gonzales claimed that he heard shooting as the car he occupied drove away, but denied that any shots were fired from his car.

• O ne person shot from the back seat of the car in question , and a front passenger got out of the car and fired a handgun from over the hood.3 • Two different caliber shell casings were found at the sce ne.

• Prior to the shooting, a person in the vehicle asked the victims for their gang affiliation.

• On the night in question, Gonzales as wearing a baseball cap featuring the Pirates “ P” logo in support of t he Playboyz gang.

• A person in the backseat of the car from which shots were fired was wearing a baseball cap.

• At the party, there was a dispute that may have been gang

- related, and Gonzales was “mingled” in with its participant s.

• Gonzales tested positive for gunshot residue during his interview with police the next day.

• In his interview with the police, Gonzales continually denied participation in the shooting, while at the same time expressing his fear of retaliation. T here may be alternative explanations for what hap pened the night of the shooting s and for the presence of guns hot residue on Gonzales’s hands. But , f aced with these facts, it can hardly be said that “no rational trial of fact could have found proof of gui lt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Briceno v. Scribner , 555 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jackson , 443 U.S. at 324 ). Indeed, t he California Court of Appeal stated: [I]t is undisputed that someone committed a crime by firing a gun from a ca r at th e three wounded victims. The witnesses testified that the rear passenger in a moving car shot at them. Furthermore, although the victims could not identify defendant as the shooter, another witness, Yesenia, identified defendant as the person who introduc ed himself to her as “Knuckles” at the Colton party and who was dressed like a Playboyz gang member and associ ating with other gang members. In conjunction with Yesenia’s testimony are defendant’s admissions to the police that he attended the party, dresse d as she described him, and that he was in a car, passing by a4 group of men on the street at the time of the shooting. The foregoing evidence, combined with defendant’s positive gunshot residue test, is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of defend ant’s four crimes and defend ant’s identity as the shooter. Similarly, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant was an occupant of the car from whic h the shots were fired. Sufficient evidence supports defendant’s three convictions for attempted murder and one conviction for shooting from a motor vehicle. T his determination is not “objectively unreasonable
. ” 1 Boyer v. Belleque , 659 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2011)
. R ather than come to grips with what the prosecution’s evidence against Gonzales was and the Court of Appeal’s reasons for finding it constitutionally sufficient, the majority, engaging in a de novo review , finds fault in what the evidence against Gonzales w as not . See Mem Dispo at 5

– 7. For example, the majority looks to the testimony of the gunshot residue expert to dismiss the significance of the presence of two particles of gunshot residue on Gonzales’s hands
. This view of the evidence directly conflict s with the repeated direction that our task is not to determine “whether the evidence excludes every h ypothesis except that of guilt
. . . .” United States v. Nevils , 598 F.3d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010). V iewed in the light most favorable to the prosecut ion, the

1 To the contrary, not only did twelve jurors find Gonzales guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on these facts, five judges

— three Justices of the California Court of Appeal, the Magistrate Judge, and the District Judge

— have all agreed that this evidence was sufficient to permit a “ rational trial of fact [to find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Briceno , 555 F.3d at 1078.5 presence of gunshot residue on Gonzales’s hands the morning following the shooting is strong evidence of his guilt. T he majority further errs in faulting the evidence supporting Gonzales’s conviction as resting on a “speculative and weak chain of inferences
. ” S ee Mem Dispo at 7

– 8
. This conclusion requires turning a blind eye to the di rect evidence of Gonzales’s guilt , which includes not only Gonz ales’s own admission to the police that he wa s at the scene of the shooting, but also eye - witness testimony about the shooting and the shooter’s appearance. 2 The majority further ignores that , even if the evidence was only circumstantial, such evidence a nd the “inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Ngo v. Giurbino , 651 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Walters v. Maass , 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995)). It is therefore the majority’s decision, and not Gonzales’s conviction, that is grounded in “mere suspicion or speculation.” United States v. Lewis , 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986). This is exactly what AEDPA prohibits. Applying the AEDPA standard of review, as directed by the Supreme Court, I would find that the Court of Appeal’s determination that a rational trier of fact could agree with the jury was objectively, and eminently, reasonable. See

2 The majority’s discussion of the inferences that may be drawn when the evidence of guilt is only circumstantial is therefo re inapposite . See Mem Dispo at 8 (citing United States v. Bautista

-Avila , 6 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lewis , 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986)).6 Coleman , 132 S. Ct. at 2062
. This conclusion is inescapable when the evidence presented at trial is viewed

— as it must be

— in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319. Both a magistrate judge and a district j udge , applying the correct AEDPA standard of review , so found
. In reversing the district court ’s decision , the majority allows Gonzales

— a defendant found guilty of attempted m urder beyond a reasonable doubt

— to walk free. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reve rse the district court and grant Gonzales’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.