PD-0077-15
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
STEVEN COLE APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS APPELLEE Appeal from Gregg County 124 thDistrict Court No. 41,312-A * * * * * * * * No. 06-13-00179-CR Sixth Court of Appeals 2014 Tex.App.LEXIS 13498, 2014 WL 7183859

* * * * * * * * APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF * * * * * * * *

EBB B. MOBLEY State Bar # 14238000 Attorney at Law 422 North Center Street-Lower Level P. O. Box 2309 Longview, TX 75606 Telephone: 903-757-3331 Facsimile: 903-753-8289 ebbmob@aol.com ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT PD-0077-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 7/21/2015 11:02:53 AM Accepted 7/21/2015 11:21:57 AM

ABEL ACOSTA CLERK1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 REPLY TO QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-4 The Court of Appeals conducted a proper analysis of possible exigent circumstances justifying a warrantles s blood draw. REPLY TO QUESTION THREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 That a warrantless blood draw pursuant to Texas Tra nsportation Code §724.012(b) violates the Fourth Amendmen t has been established in Villarreal v. State, No. PD-0306-14, slip op. 11/26/14, reh’g granted. REPLY TO QUESTION FOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 There is no good faith exception to the Fourth Amen dment requirement for a warrantless blood draw in Texas.
PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 INDEX OF AUTHORITES
Cases Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App. - Houston [14 thDist.] 2014, (en banc) (pet. granted). . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (op. on reh’g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14, reh’g granted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4 Statutes Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.23(b) . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Transportation Code §724.012(b) . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 REPLY TO QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO The Court of Appeals conducted a proper analysis of possible exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw. ARGUMENT In Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, the Supreme Court considered and rejected Missouri’s claim that “so long as the officer has probable cau se and the blood test is conducted in a reasonable manner, it is cat egorically reasonable for law enforcement to obtain the blood sample without a warrant.” 133 S. Ct. at 1560-61. The McNeely Court refused to recognize a per se exigency justi fying a warrantless search and held, “consistent with general Fourth Am endment principles, that exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1556. McNeely reaffirmed that a warrantless search of a person fo r the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal investigation can be justified “only if it falls within a recognized exception” to the warrant requirement, and that this principle applies to compulsory blood collection during a DWI investigat ion. Id. At 1558; The Court did not hold that dissipation of a substance in the bloodstream creates a per se exigency . . . in all drunk driving cases. The State called Justin Schwane as a toxicology e xpert to describe his analysis performed on a blood sample from Responden t. The substance in question was only methamphetamine, not alcohol. Schwane’s t estimony is replete with references to “therapeutic” dosages of methamphetamine in the sample. 4 RR 15, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25. He could not say that Steven Cole was intoxicated. 4 RR 22. Would a significant delay in testing negatively aff ect the probative value of the test results? There is no evidence in this case ab out the dissipation rate of methamphetamine in the blood or the effect of delay in drawing a sample.4 REPLY TO QUESTION THREE That a warrantless blood draw pursuant to Texas sta tutes violates the Fourth Amendment has been established by State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, reh’g granted. ARGUMENT In State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14, slip op. 11/24/14, reh’g granted, this Court held the implied consent and mandatory blood draw statutes in the Transportation Code do not create an exception to the Fourth Amen dment warrant requirement to permit a warrantless taking of blood. The issue in Villarreal focuses on validity of consent as a statutory exc eption to the Fourth Amendment requirement for a search warrant. In this case the issue is on the exigent circumsta nce exception to the search warrant requirement. The State does not challenge the “totality of the circumstances” balancing test approved in McNeely. The question of exigency comes out of the facts at bar hinges on the substance involved - methamphetamine - and its dissipation ra te in the blood of the driver. There is no evidence of this process in the trial r ecord.5 REPLY TO QUESTION FOUR There is no good faith exception to the Fourth Amen dment requirement for a warrantless blood draw in Texas. ARGUMENT The State seeks to involve the “good-faith reliance ” exception to the Fourth Amendment to avoid suppression of the blood test re sults in this case. The opinion below discusses both the federal and Texas good-faith exceptions. The exclusionary rule is not found anywhere in the United State’s Constitution. Rather, it is a court-created remedy for violation s of the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court held that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by th at same authority, inadmissible in a state court.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). “The exclusionary rule w as fashioned as a sanction to redress and deter overre aching governmental conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969). The exclusionary rule is a “last resort” s anction designed to deter police misconduct. Davis v. United States, 131, S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011).

Unlike the federal rule, the Texas good-faith excep tion is a statutory rule that provides an exception to the exclusion of unla wfully obtained evidence only if the law enforcement officer was “acting in objectiv e good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on pro bable cause.” CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(b); see Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App. - Houston [14 thDist.] 2014, (en banc) ( pet. granted). The Texas “Court of Criminal Appeals has previously rejected an effort to broaden the [T exas] good-faith exception using federal precedent . . .” Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 861-62 (citing Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (op. on reh’g) (declining to apply federal good-faith doctrine to Texas statutory good-faith e xception)). Since “the Texas good6

faith exception is more limited than the scope of i ts federal counterpart . . . an officer’s good faith reliance on the law or existin g precedent is not recognized as an exception to the Texas exclusionary rule.” The State seeks a harm analysis in the event that t he warrantless blood draw at bar is found wanting. Such an analysis was perform ed by the majority opinion below at pp. 21.22.7 PRAYER FOR RELIEF Respondent respectfully requests this Honorable Co urt affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted, EBB B. MOBLEY Attorney at Law 422 North Center Street-Lower Level P. O. Box 2309 Longview, TX 75606 Telephone 903-757-3331 Facsimile 903-753-8289 ebbmob@aol.com
/s/ EBB B. MOBLEY EBB B. MOBLEY Attorney for Appellant State Bar License # 14238000
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this reply brief contains 6083 words according to the computer program used to prepare the document. /s/ EBB B. MOBLEY EBB B. MOBLEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of this reply brief was provi ded to Gregg County Assistant District Attorney Zan Brown, 101 East Methvin, Suit e 333, Longview, Texas 75601, and to the Office of the State Prosecuting Attorney , P.O. Box 12405, Austin, Texas 78711 on the 21 st

day of July, 2015, by efile.

/s/ EBB B. MOBLEY EBB B. MOBLEY, Counsel for Appellant Steven Cole