COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00113-CV

LUIS R. COLON APPELLANT

V.

WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND 

SOCIETY, FSB, D/B/A CHRISTIANA 

TRUST, NOT INDIVIDUALLY BUT 

AS TRUSTEE FOR PRETIUM 

MORTGAGE ACQUISITION TRUST

APPELLEE

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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 2015-005687-1

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. Introduction

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

In four points in this forcible detainer appeal, Appellant Luis R. Colon 

appeals the trial court’s judgment of possession for Appellee Wilmington Savings 

Fund Society, FSB, D/B/A Christiana Trust, Not Individually but as Trustee for 

Pretium Mortgage Acquisition Trust (Wilmington). We affirm.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Colon obtained a mortgage, secured by a deed of trust, on the property at 

issue, 12634 Bay Avenue, Euless, Texas, 76040. After Colon defaulted on the 

mortgage, Wilmington purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. 

Wilmington issued notices to vacate and then filed a petition for forcible 

detainer in the justice court after Colon failed to vacate the premises.

2

In 

response, Colon filed a plea in abatement and an original answer subject to that 

plea. In his plea in abatement, Colon complained that Wilmington’s petition did 

not comply with rule of civil procedure 510.3(a), that Wilmington could not prove 

that it was properly in the property’s chain of title, that Wilmington was not 

entitled to treat him as a tenant at sufferance, and that there was a title dispute 

that deprived the justice court of jurisdiction. 

At the trial de novo in the county court at law, Wilmington offered, and the 

trial court admitted into evidence, a certified copy of the deed of trust signed by 

 

2Wilmington’s original petition for forcible detainer is not in the record 

before this court, but it filed an amended petition for forcible detainer that was 

verified by its attorney, and this was the live pleading at trial. 
3

Colon,3 a certified copy of the substitute trustee’s deed reflecting the sale of the 

property to Wilmington, and a business records affidavit attached to the notices 

to vacate sent to each borrower by both regular and certified mail and to all 

occupants by first class mail. The trial court awarded possession of the property 

to Wilmington. After a hearing, the trial court denied Colon’s motion for new trial, 

and this appeal followed. 

III. Analysis

In his first point, Colon contends that Wilmington’s pleading was not a valid 

pleading on which judgment could have been granted because it was not “sworn 

to by the plaintiff” as required by rule of civil procedure 510.3(a). In making this 

argument, Colon urges this court to revisit our decision in Norvelle v. PNC 

Mortgage, 472 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.). In Norvelle, 

we held,

[T]he petition filed in the justice court contained a verification sworn 

to by the Bank’s counsel, stating her authority to make the affidavit 

and swearing that the facts contained in the pleading were both 

within her personal knowledge and true and correct. As she acted 

as the Bank’s corporeal agent for purposes of instituting the action, 

this was sufficient to meet rule 510.3(a)’s requirements. 

 

3The deed of trust specifically provides that if the property is sold under the 

foreclosure paragraph, “Borrower or any person holding possession of the 

Property through Borrower shall immediately surrender possession of the 

Property to the purchaser at that sale. If possession is not surrendered, 

Borrower or such person shall be a tenant at sufferance and may be removed by 

writ of possession.” 
4

Id. at 449. Wilmington’s amended petition for forcible detainer was signed by its 

counsel and contained a verification by her, stating her authority to make the 

petition and verification and swearing that the facts contained within the 

amended petition for forcible detainer were within her personal knowledge and 

true and correct. Declining Colon’s invitation to reconsider Norvelle, we overrule 

his first point.

In his remaining points, Colon argues that Wilmington’s pleading was 

invalid because Wilmington lacked standing to prosecute its claim, that 

Wilmington was not entitled to rely on the deed of trust’s tenancy-at-sufferance 

language because it was not in privity of contract with Colon, and that 

Wilmington’s business records should not have been considered. 

Colon’s standing argument goes to the validity of title, not of the eviction, 

which was the only issue before the trial court and now before us as Colon failed 

to provide any evidence in the trial court to support the existence of a title dispute 

sufficient to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. See Deubler v. Bank of New 

York Mellon, No. 02-16-00390-CV, 2017 WL 2290193, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth May 25, 2017, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); A Plus Invs., Inc. v. Rushton, No. 

02-03-00174-CV, 2004 WL 868866, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 22, 2004, 

no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The justice courts and the county courts at law are only 

deprived of jurisdiction to adjudicate a forcible detainer action if the question of 

title is so intertwined with the issue of possession that possession may not be 
5

adjudicated without first determining title.” (citing Mitchell v. Armstrong Capital 

Corp., 911 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied))). 

Furthermore, as we stated in Deubler, “‘[t]o prevail in a forcible detainer 

action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show 

sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate 

possession.’” 2017 WL 2290193, at *2 (quoting Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 

709 (Tex. App. —Dallas 2001, no pet.)); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e) (stating that 

in a forcible-detainer action, “[t]he court must adjudicate the right to actual 

possession and not title”); Kaldis v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 01-09-00270-CV, 

2010 WL 2545614, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 24, 2010, pet. 

dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (holding that plaintiff in forcible-detainer suit who 

purchased property in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale need not prove a clear chain 

of title to it to prove its superior right to possession in relation to the defendant). 

Here, Wilmington presented as evidence (1) a certified copy of the August 

25, 2008 deed of trust signed by Colon that included a provision that upon a 

nonjudicial foreclosure sale, Colon would become a tenant at sufferance if he did 

not surrender possession of the property to the buyer; (2) a substitute trustee’s 

deed reciting that the property secured by the deed of trust was sold to 

Wilmington at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and conveying the property to 

Wilmington; and (3) evidence of the notices to vacate sent to Colon. Colon 

presented no evidence. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support 
6

Wilmington’s standing and a judgment in its favor on the issue of possession. 

We overrule Colon’s second point.

As to Colon’s tenancy-at-sufferance argument, and specifically with regard 

to his privity argument, we have previously stated,

[N]o privity was required. See ICM Mortg. Corp. v. Jacob, 902 

S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, writ denied) (explaining 

that tenant at sufferance is “not in privity with the owner” of the 

property). Gaydos became a tenant at sufferance when he refused 

to surrender possession of the property to Fannie Mae, who as the 

purchaser of the property, had a superior right to possession. See 

id. (“A tenant at sufferance is one who wrongfully continues in 

possession of property after his right to possession has ceased and 

does not assert a claim to superior title.”); see also Jimenez v. Fed. 

Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 02-15-00229-CV, 2016 WL 3661884, at *2–3 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting 

similar argument).

Gaydos v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, No. 02-16-00003-CV, 2016 WL 7405809, 

at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also

Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.002(a)(2) (West 2014) (providing that a person who 

refuses to surrender possession of real property on demand commits a forcible 

detainer if he “is a tenant at will or by sufferance, including an occupant at the 

time of foreclosure of a lien superior to the tenant’s lease”); Dyhre v. Hinman, No. 

05-16-00511-CV, 2017 WL 1075614, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 22, 2017, 

pet. filed) (mem. op.) (holding that the transfer from the deed of trust trustee to 

the new buyer, which transferred all deed of trust rights, including the tenancy-atsufferance rights, to the new buyer, “was sufficient to establish the Owners’ 

landlord-tenant relationship with Occupants and Owners’ correlative rights to
7

enforce the deed of trust’s tenancy-at-sufferance clause against Occupants”); 

Lenz v. Bank of Am., N.A., 510 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, 

pet. denied) (stating that the Lenzes’ continued possession of the property 

following the Bank’s notice to vacate created a tenancy at sufferance and that 

their “status as tenants at sufferance under the deed’s Foreclosure Procedure 

section did not require that the Bank be a beneficiary of the original Deed of Trust 

in favor of MERS or the owner of the lien when it was foreclosed”). Accordingly, 

we overrule Colon’s third point.

Finally, at trial Colon did not object to the admission of the business 

records on any ground. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); see also Tex. R. Evid. 

103(a)(1). We therefore overrule Colon’s final point because he has failed to 

preserve it for our review. See Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 

1991) (op. on reh’g).

IV. Conclusion

 Having overruled all of Colon’s points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

BONNIE SUDDERTH

JUSTICE 

PANEL: SUDDERTH, KERR, and PITTMAN, JJ.

DELIVERED: July 27, 2017