1

Filed 11/18/21 In re J.T. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re J.T., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A160626

 (Solano County

 Super. Ct. No. 

J44953)

Defendant J.T. challenges several probation conditions imposed by the 

juvenile court at his reentry and disposition hearing following his release 

from commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Specifically, 

J.T. challenges a curfew condition, several aspects of a gang-related 

condition, and a police-contact condition as unreasonable under People v. Lent 

(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent)

1 and as unconstitutional. 

We conclude both the gang-activity condition, and the police-contact 

condition are currently infirm and remand the case to the juvenile court for 

removal or refinement of these conditions. We otherwise affirm. 

1 Superseded on another ground by Proposition 8 as stated in People v. 

Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403, footnote 6.
2

BACKGROUND

On a July 2014 morning, J.T., then 14 years old, and another juvenile 

confronted a mother and her son in Richmond. J.T. yelled at the boy, 

“ ‘Empty out your pockets!’ ” and then started to “punch [him] in the chest 

numerous times” before reaching into his pockets and removing $40. The boy

fell to the ground, and J.T. “kick[ed] him two more times in the ribs and 

nose.” As J.T. was confronting the boy, his cohort “punch[ed the mother] 

about four times in the stomach and kick[ed] her two more times in her 

thighs” before grabbing her cellphone. Minor and his friend then fled the 

scene. Months later, the two victims identified J.T. as one of the assailants, 

and he was detained.

The Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging two counts of second degree 

robbery along with two criminal street gang enhancements (Pen. Code, 

§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).

2 During an interview with 

probation, J.T. initially stated he “associates with gang members” and in a 

subsequent interview, admitted to being a Sureño gang member. He pleaded 

no contest to one count of second degree robbery, and the juvenile court 

sustained the petition as to that count.3 J.T. was adjudged a ward of the 

court and committed to Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (Orin Allen) 

for a period not to exceed nine months. 

Two months after his release from Orin Allen, J.T. violated his 

probation. Around midnight on an October 2015 night, J.T. was found in 

2 All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

indicated.

3 The juvenile court granted the district attorney’s motion to dismiss 

the second count of second degree robbery and the two gang enhancements. 
3

possession of a “five inch knife with a brass knuckles handles,” and it was 

alleged he was “breaking . . . street lamps at the park.” He admitted to 

associating with Sureño gang members, including at the time of his arrest. 

Probation recommended another 60-day term at Orin Allen. All parties 

agreed to dismiss the probation violation, and that no new petition would be 

filed. The court continued J.T. as a ward of the court, committed him to Orin 

Allen for 60 days, and modified his probation terms upon release to include a 

“no assoc[iation] w[ith] anyone known to be a gang member” term. 

(Capitalization omitted.) 

A few days before the disposition hearing for the October violation, J.T. 

again violated his probation by “being involved in a physical altercation with 

another ward,” who was a Norteño gang member. J.T. also admitted this

violation, and the court added another 30 days at Orin Allen to his 

commitment time. 

Two months after his release from Orin Allen, J.T. again violated 

probation.

4 Around 2:00 a.m. on an April 2016 morning, a Contra Costa 

Sheriff’s deputy stopped a vehicle that had been reported stolen. J.T. was 

driving the car, and in a subsequent interview, admitted “he knew the vehicle 

was a ‘hot boy car’ (street terminology for stolen vehicle).” (Capitalization 

omitted.) One of the passengers in the car associated with Sureño gang 

members. The district attorney filed a supplemental wardship petition 

alleging one count of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, 

§ 10851, subd. (a)). J.T. pleaded no contest, and the court sustained the 

petition, and committed J.T. to the Youth Offender Treatment Program (the 

4 J.T. violated two probation terms—that he (1) Obey all laws; and (2) 

“Be at legal residence between the hours of 7:00PM and 6:00AM unless 

accompanied by a parent/guardian.” 
4

Program) for a maximum time of four years 165 days or until J.T. turned 21 

years of age. 

Two days before the stolen car incident, J.T. and two other friends had 

been involved in an attempted shooting. The three minors arrived at the 

home of the victim’s mother, attempting to fight the victim’s brother. 

Realizing they were outnumbered by the victim’s family members, the minors

fled after first threatening to return and “ ‘pop’ ” the brother. The brother 

stated the three were Sureño gang members because they yelled “ ‘Sur trece’ 

and ‘WSL’ ” at him before leaving. Later that day, the victim and her three 

children left her mother’s home. While the victim was driving, another car 

accelerated around her and then stopped in front of her, in an attempt to 

block her in. A suspect leaned out of the car and attempted to fire a gun

towards the victim’s car, but the gun jammed. The police later found J.T. in 

the vehicle described by the victim. 

In an interview with police, J.T. initially denied having a firearm but 

later admitted he was the attempted shooter. He stated he thought the 

person they “had [a] funk with was in the car.” J.T. stated when he tried to 

shoot, he realized the safety was on. “At no time,” did J.T. “express[] remorse 

for [his] actions,” rather he “described his mistake as being ‘trigger happy’ ” 

and maintained they “ ‘only shot the gun one time’ ” and that no one had been 

hurt. J.T. also admitted his family members were members of the VFL 

Southerners gang and he was a member of the West Side Loco gang—both 

off-shoots of the Sureños. 

The district attorney filed an amended second supplemental wardship 

petition5 alleging one count of felony assault with a semiautomatic weapon

5 Originally, the district attorney filed a criminal complaint alleging 

one count of felony assault with a semiautomatic weapon, and one count of 
5

(§ 245, subd. (b)) and one count of felony assault with a firearm (§ 245, 

subd. (a)(2)), with special allegations of street terrorism and personal use of a 

firearm (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B), 12022.5, subd. (a)) as to both counts. J.T.

later pleaded no contest to the felony assault with a firearm count and 

admitted the gang enhancement allegation as to count 1.

6 The court 

committed him to the DJJ for a maximum term of 10 years eight months or 

until the age of 23 with credit for time served of three years 78 days. 

Two years later, the probation department recommended DJJ 

jurisdiction be terminated and probation be reinstated. J.T. was regarded as 

“ ‘one of the model youths,’ ” and as a result of “his completion of treatment 

requirements, his overall reduction of risk to reoffend and improved 

strengths and behavior,” the parole board granted J.T.’s discharge. After a

reentry hearing, DJJ’s jurisdiction was terminated, and the juvenile court 

continued J.T. as a ward of the court, transferred his wardship to Solano 

County, and placed him on probation, subject to various terms and 

conditions. 

DISCUSSION

“[W]e ‘ “review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.” ’ 

[Citation.] Specifically, we review a probation condition ‘for an indication 

that the condition is “arbitrary or capricious” or otherwise exceeds the bounds 

of reason under the circumstances.’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 

1118 (Ricardo P.).) 

felony assault with a firearm, with special allegations of street terrorism and 

personal use of a firearm. Next, the district attorney moved to transfer J.T.’s 

case to adult court, as he was 17 years old at the time. Later, the criminal 

matter was suspended due to “Proposition 57 and remanded back to juvenile 

court.” 

6 The remaining count and enhancements were dismissed. 
6

The trial court may impose “reasonable conditions, as it may determine 

are fitting and proper . . . generally and specifically for the reformation and 

rehabilitation of the probationers.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) Under Lent, a 

condition of probation is unreasonable if it: “ ‘(1) has no relationship to the 

crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not 

in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably 

related to future criminality.’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) “Lent’s 

third prong requires more than just an abstract or hypothetical relationship 

between the probation condition and preventing future criminality” and 

instead “contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden 

imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the 

condition.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1121-1122.) And as the 

Supreme Court has acknowledged, “courts may properly base probation 

conditions upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about 

future criminality unrelated to a prior offense.” (Id. at p. 1122.)

“When a probation condition imposes limitations on a person’s 

constitutional rights, it ‘ “must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose 

of the condition” ’—that is, the probationer’s reformation and rehabilitation—

‘ “to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” ’ [Citations.] 

‘The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit 

between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes 

on the [probationer]’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that 

perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will 

justify some infringement.’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘Even conditions which infringe on 

constitutional rights may not be invalid [as long as they are] tailored 

specifically to meet the needs of the juvenile.’ ” ’ ” (In re P.O. (2016) 

246 Cal.App.4th 288, 297.) A constitutional challenge to a probation 
7

condition raises an issue of law, which we review de novo. (In re Shaun R. 

(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)

Curfew Condition

Before the reentry and disposition hearing, the probation department 

recommended a curfew condition (condition No. 8) as one of the conditions of 

supervision upon release from the DJJ. At the hearing, defense counsel 

objected to the condition as invalid under Lent. 

The juvenile court, addressing counsel’s objection, stated, “I do think a 

curfew is important and I am going to impose one. [J.T.] is leaving a very 

structured program and I believe that this will assist him in his re-entry.” 

The juvenile court then imposed the following condition: “curfew of 10 p.m. to 

6 a.m. unless approved by the Deputy Probation Officer.” The condition was 

to be reviewed by probation after 45 days, and J.T.’s curfew could be 

“extended for necessary school, work, or family functions if accompanied by a 

parent or responsible adult, but may not be extended for Wards past 

10:00 p.m. unless the minor is accompanied by a parent, legal guardian or 

other adult having legal care and or custody of the minor pursuant to section 

729.2(c) W&I.” 

On appeal, J.T. renews his Lent challenge to the condition. He 

concedes the condition meets the first and second prongs of Lent, but 

maintains it fails the third because it “forbids conduct which is not 

reasonably related to future criminality.” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) 

J.T. first asserts that “since being out at night is not in any way 

connected to [his] criminal conduct or personal history, there is no reason to 

believe that the imposition of a curfew would prevent [him] from engaging in 

any future criminal acts.” Second, relying on Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th

1113, he maintains the condition imposes a burden on his right to travel that 
8

is “substantially disproportionate to the countervailing interest of furthering 

his rehabilitation and protecting society.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

p. 1119.) 

In Ricardo P., after placing the minor on probation, the juvenile court 

imposed a warrantless electronic search condition “solely to enable probation 

officers to monitor whether Ricardo is in communication about drugs or with 

people associated with drugs.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1119.) The 

Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether the electronic search 

condition was reasonably related to future criminality as is required under 

Lent. (Id. at pp. 1118–1119.) In holding it was not, the court observed the 

record, which contained “no indication that Ricardo had used or will use 

electronic devices in connection with drugs or any illegal activity,” was 

“insufficient to justify the substantial burdens imposed” by the search 

condition. (Id. at p. 1116.)

In contrast to the electronic search condition at issue in Ricardo P., a 

curfew condition is statutorily required in a juvenile case. Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 729.2 provides, in pertinent part, “If a minor is 

found to be a person described in Section 601 or 602 and the court does not 

remove the minor from the physical custody of the parent or guardian, the 

court as a condition of probation, except in any case in which the court makes 

a finding and states on the record its reasons that that condition would be 

inappropriate, shall: [¶] . . . [¶] Require the minor to be at his or her legal 

residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. unless the minor is 

accompanied by his or her parent or parents, legal guardian or other adult 

person having legal care or custody of the minor.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 729.2, subd. (c).)
9

J.T. acknowledges that Welfare and Institutions Code section 729.2 

requires a curfew condition and that the courts have “upheld probation 

conditions that infringe on a minor’s right to travel at night.” But he 

maintains those cases “are not applicable here because [he] is a 20-year-old 

adult.” 

J.T.’s argument is based on a faulty premise—that he is an adult 

probationer. He is not. J.T. remains under the jurisdiction of the juvenile 

court. He was under the age of 18 when he committed his offenses (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a); Rucker v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 

197, 200), and the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over him until the 

age of 25. (§ 607, subd. (b); In re Maria A. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 901, 903-

904.) Therefore, despite having reached the age of majority, J.T. is 

nonetheless a juvenile probationer. (See In re Victor L. (2010) 

182 Cal.App.4th 902, 927-928 (Victor L.) [no-tattoo condition did not unduly 

impair defendant’s First Amendment rights even though he was 18, so long 

as he remained under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction].)

J.T. also asserts the application of Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 729.2 “would actually result in a more restrictive curfew” because 

under that section a ward is allowed to go out past curfew if “ ‘accompanied 

by his or her parent or parents, legal guardian, or other adult person’ ” but 

here as an “adult . . . he does not have a legal guardian and may not even be 

living with his parent(s) throughout the duration of his probation.” This is 

speculative and not, in any event, the case at present. J.T. was released to 

his mother’s home and cannot move without probation department approval. 

Accordingly, under the terms of Welfare and Institutions Code section 729.2, 

J.T. is still allowed out of the house past 10 p.m. when accompanied by his 

parents, and the condition is no less restrictive for wards under the age of 18. 
10

In any case, regardless of the application of Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 729.2, the probation condition is reasonable. The trial court 

stated it was imposing the curfew condition to facilitate J.T.’s rehabilitation 

and reentry. J.T. had a long and escalating criminal history, beginning when 

he was 14 years old. He had only recently turned a corner. Initially, when he 

arrived at DJJ he struggled, he received nine behavior reports in five months

“for engaging in . . . gang related physical altercations, participating in group 

disturbances, gang activity resulting in Use of Force, disruptive behavior and 

an assault of a staff member.” But in his last year at DJJ, he was transferred 

to a new hall and began making positive changes, including “disassociating 

himself from other gang-affiliated youth.” On this record, the trial court 

could reasonably conclude a curfew would help bridge the gap between the 

structured program J.T. was leaving, and his status on probation. (See In re 

Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 [juvenile court “has wide discretion to 

select appropriate [probation] conditions and may impose ‘ “any reasonable 

condition that is ‘fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and 

the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced’ ” ’ ”].)

J.T. additionally maintains the curfew condition “could easily be 

counter-productive to his reentry” because it could “interfere with . . . 

attend[ing] school or job training at night.” However, as the trial court 

informed J.T., “there may be occasions because you are working or because of 

some other activities that you are participating in that the Deputy Probation 

Officer is fine with you being out pas[t] 10:00,” the “key is that you need to 

make sure that that approval is provided before you are out” after curfew. 

For the first time on appeal, J.T. contends the curfew condition is 

unconstitutionally overbroad and infringes on his right to travel. For the 

reasons set forth above, there is no merit to this belated argument. The 
11

condition was imposed specifically to promote J.T.’s rehabilitation by 

providing some structure to his daily life. Additionally, the condition is 

reviewable after 45 days, and as discussed above, J.T. is allowed to go out 

after 10:00 p.m. or before 6:00 a.m. so long as he seeks preapproval or is 

accompanied by his parents. 

Gang-Related Condition

The probation department recommended the following gang-related 

condition (condition No. 13) which we have, for ease of reference, broken into 

lettered subparts: (a) J.T. “shall not knowingly associate with anyone known 

to the minor to be a gang member or associated with a gang, or anyone who 

the [probation officer] informs [him] to be, a gang member or associated with 

a gang;” (b) J.T. “shall not knowingly participate in any gang activity

and shall not visit or remain in any specific location known by [him]

to be, or that the [probation officer] informs [J.T.] to be, an area of 

gang-related activity;” (c) “[J.T.] shall not knowingly possess, display, 

or wear any insignia, articles of clothing, caps, hats, jackets, shoes, 

belts, flags, scarves, bandanas, shirts, logos, emblems, badges, 

buttons, music, photographs, pictures, art, drawings, images, lyrics, 

symbols, colors, numbers, monikers, patterns or brands, nor display 

any gang signs or gestures that [he] knows to be, or that the 

[probation officer] informs [him] to be, gang-related;” (d) “[J.T.] shall 

not knowingly obtain any new tattoos that [he] knows to be, or that the 

[probation officer] informs [him] to be, gang-related;” (e) “[J.T.] shall not 

knowingly use, post, display, or transmit on any social media networking site 

or transmit via any electronic means, including all electronic communication 

devices, whether it is yours or someone else’s, any symbols, graffiti, pictures, 

photos, drawings, lyrics, symbols, images, hand signs or gestures, or other 
12

items or information, that [he] knows to be, or the [probation officer] informs 

[him] to be, gang-related, unless for use as part of a court-ordered or schoolrelated educational paper, or other research for educational purposes which 

have been approved by the [probation officer]; For the purposes of these 

probation conditions, the words ‘gang’ and ‘gang-related’ mean a ‘criminal 

street gang’ as defined in penal code section 186.22, subdivision (f).”

(Boldface & italics added.)

Before imposing the gang conditions, the trial court heard from counsel. 

Defense counsel objected to the gang conditions “not under the ‘Lent’ test” but 

rather “on vagueness and overbroad grounds” because “it is impossible for 

[J.T.] to know when these items, many of which are commonly possessed, 

carried and worn, are actually gang related.” Counsel recognized there was a 

“knowledge requirement” but did not believe the “Probation Officer informing 

the minor to be gang-related” language met “constitutional muster because it 

doesn’t appear to me that there would be any restraint on a Probation Officer 

from directing [J.T.] not to wear or listen to certain music or possess certain 

artwork that in the Probation Officer’s opinion is gang-related.” Counsel also 

asserted “some” of the prohibited items “related to free expression and terms 

of music, artwork, clothing, et cetera, so I would also register an objection 

under the First Amendment to No. 13 as phrased.” 

In imposing the condition, the trial stated, “I know these are the 

standard gang terms that seem to be appropriate. There’s no question that 

there was gang-related activity in the underlying offense. [¶] I also 

understand when [J.T.] initially was adjusting to DJJ, that he was suffering 

some influences and was falling into some gang-related type interactions, and 

that, [J.T.], luckily you changed, and that’s why you are being discharged, so 

the gang terms are important. [¶] . . . I think they are important for your
13

rehabilitation, and to make clear that you need to stay as far a[way] from any 

gang-related activity that you possibly can. And there was a sustained gang 

enhancement.” The court then went through each part of the gang condition, 

and stated “So the key is if you know certain things are gang related, you are 

not to possess them or wear them. If the Deputy Probation Officer tells you 

specifically that there are certain things you should not be wearing or other 

things of that nature because they are gang related, don’t do it. [¶] [J.T.], 

because of the fact that there is no question that you have engaged in gangrelated activities before, you know a number of things that you should not be 

doing. The Deputy Probation Officer is potentially going to tell you to avoid 

other things, but this is not a situation where you are entirely naïve of what 

is gang related.” In any event, the court stated, “gang related” meant a 

“criminal street gang as defined by Section 186.22, subdivision F.” 

On appeal, J.T. challenges several aspects of the gang-related 

conditions, specifically condition No. 13 “(c)” and “(b)” (see the bold and 

italicized portions), as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. 

Condition No. 13 “(c)” 

He asserts condition No. 13 “(c)” is vague because it contains “a long 

litany of items” he must avoid, and it is “impossible for [him] to know when 

these items, many of which are commonly possessed, carried, and worn, are 

gang-related.” 

“[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process 

concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the 

due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing 

adequate notice to potential offenders’ [citation], protections that are 

‘embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California 

Constitutions. (U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.)’ ” 
14

(Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) “A probation condition ‘must be 

sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and 

for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to 

withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.” (Ibid.) Probation 

conditions are given “ ‘ “the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, 

objective reader.” ’ ” (In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261.) Thus, the 

mere fact that there “ ‘ “ ‘may be difficulty in determining whether some 

marginal or hypothetical act is covered by [a condition’s] language’ ” ’ ” does 

not render the condition “impermissibly vague.” (Ibid.)

Courts have routinely found gang conditions that incorporate a 

knowledge requirement to pass constitutional muster. (See, e.g., In re 

Vincent G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 238, 247 [probation condition modified to 

direct the defendant “ “not to possess, wear or display any clothing or 

insignias, emblems, badges, or buttons that you know, or that the probation

officer informs you, are evidence of affiliation with or membership in a 

gang’ ”]; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 [probation condition 

modified to forbid the minor’s association “ ‘with any person known to you to 

be a gang member’ ”].) 

Here, as J.T. acknowledges, the condition at issue includes such a 

requirement. It specifically states J.T. must not knowingly possess, wear, or 

display such items that he “knows to be, or that the [probation officer] 

informs [him] to be, gang-related.” J.T. cites no legal authority indicating 

this knowledge requirement is insufficient.7 

7 For this reason, we also reject J.T.’s assertion that condition No. 13

“(c)”, as written, “gives the probation officer no ‘explicit standards’ to ensure 

this condition does not result in ‘arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” 

Each portion of the gang condition contains a knowledge requirement and is 
15

J.T. also asserts specific terms used within the condition are vague, 

including the terms “music,” “lyrics,” “patterns,” “brands,” and “monikers.”

For example, he provides several definitions for the term “pattern,” 

noting it can be used in reference to clothing but may mean “ ‘a form or model 

proposed for imitation,’ ” “ ‘the grouping made on a target by bullets’ ” or “ ‘a 

reliable sample of traits . . . or other observable characteristics of a person, 

group, or institution’ ” among others. In the context of the gang-related 

condition, he maintains he does not know whether he should avoid 

“knowingly possess[ing], display[ing], or wear[ing]” a “pattern” of “clothing,”

“[a] behavioral pattern,” or a “patten of rhythm and rhyme?” 

“ ‘When interpreting a probation condition, we rely on “context and 

common sense.” . . .’ [Citation.] Probation terms must be ‘given “the 

meaning[s] that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader” ’ [citation], 

and interpreted in context and with the use of common sense [citation]. A

probation condition ‘should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague 

“ ‘ “if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its 

language” ’ ” ’ or if its terms may be reasonably certain by reference to 

‘ “ ‘other definable sources.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Rhinehart (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 

1123, 1129.) In context and in light of common sense, the words J.T. 

complains of are specific enough to provide him notice of what is required of 

him.

Next, J.T. maintains the inclusion of the terms “music” and “lyrics” is 

overbroad and thus violates his First Amendment rights. He maintains this 

condition impermissibly “regulat[es] what music and lyrics” he may listen to

sufficiently specific so as to put J.T. on notice of what is required of him and 

to prevent arbitrary enforcement. 
16

and bars him “from listening to music about important social issues that may 

affect him.”

However, the condition does not impose such limitations. Rather, it 

prohibits him from “knowingly possess[ing], display[ing], or wear[ing]” music 

or lyrics he “knows to be, or that the [probation officer] informs” him to be 

gang related. It does not prohibit him from listening to any music regardless 

of content. Even assuming that were the case, the condition is sufficiently 

narrow so as to leave J.T. with a wide range of music available to him to 

enjoy, including many rap and hip-hop songs. 

Condition No. 13 “(b)”

J.T. contends the portion of the second gang-related condition No. 13

“(b)” prohibiting him from “knowingly participat[ing] in any gang activity” 

and “visit[ing] or remain[ing] in any specific location known by the minor to 

be, or that the [probation officer] informs the minor to be, an area of gangrelated activity” is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and should be 

modified” in accordance with Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 902. 

In Victor L., Division Two of this court held that a condition ordering

the minor to stay away from area known to him for “gang-related activity”

was unconstitutionally vague, even with a knowledge requirement, because 

the condition was not sufficiently precise to inform him of what locations or 

activities were prohibited. (Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 913-917.) 

The court modified the condition to read, “ ‘The Minor shall not be in any 

areas where gang members are known by Minor to meet or get together, or 

areas known by Minor for gang-related activity (or specified by his probation 

officer as involving gang-related activity), nor shall he participate in any 

gang activity.’ ” (Id. at pp. 931-932, italics omitted.)
17

The Attorney General “submits that, as ordered, the complained about 

probation condition inherently contemplates advance notice by probation.” 

He also asserts J.T. has “fair notice of what activity is prohibited” given that 

he is “well-versed in gang-activity.” Nonetheless, the Attorney General “has 

no objection to modification of the condition as requested.” 

We shall follow the approach of Victor L. and remand the matter for 

further refinement of this condition. 

Police-Contact Condition

J.T. is also required to “[n]otify probation of any police contacts within 

24 hours.” (Condition No. 16.)

Citing People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188 (Relkin) and In re 

I.M. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 929 (I.M.), J.T. argues, and the Attorney General 

concedes, this condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 

In Relkin, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th 1188, the appellate court held that a 

probation condition requiring the defendant to “ ‘report to the probation 

officer . . . any . . . contacts with or incidents involving any peace officer’ ” was 

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it failed to give fair warning 

of what constituted a “contact.” (Id. at pp. 1196-1197.) 

In I.M., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 929, Division Three of this court held a 

virtually identical condition as the one imposed on J.T. here—that the minor 

“report any police contacts” to the probation officer within 24 hours—was 

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. (Id. at p. 936.) The court, relying on 

Relkin, remanded the matter to the juvenile court to determine whether to 

strike or modify the condition to avoid constitutional defects. (Id. at pp. 936-

937)
18

We agree with these two courts and remand the matter to the juvenile 

court to either modify or strike the condition in accordance with I.M., supra, 

53 Cal.App.5th 929. 

DISPOSITION

This matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to either 

strike or modify the probation requirements that read: J.T. “shall not 

knowingly participate in any gang activity and shall not visit or remain in 

any specific location known by [him] to be, or that the [probation officer] 

informs [J.T.] to be, an area of gang-related activity” and J.T. shall “Notify

probation of any police contacts within 24 hours.” In all other respects, the 

order is AFFIRMED.
19

_________________________

Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Humes, P.J.

_________________________

Margulies, J.

A160626, In re JT