SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1432 

CAF 11-01663 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, WHALEN, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF MALIK S. 

------------------------------------ 

ONONDAGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SERVICES, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT; 

 

JANA M., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PHILIP ROTHSCHILD OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

GORDON J. CUFFY, COUNTY ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (SARA J. LANGAN OF

COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Onondaga County (Martha

E. Mulroy, J.), entered August 8, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to

Social Services Law § 384-b. The order, inter alia, revoked a

suspended judgment and terminated the parental rights of respondent. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the matter is

remitted to Family Court, Onondaga County, for a dispositional hearing

in accordance with the following Memorandum: In appeal No. 1,

respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, revoked a

suspended judgment and terminated her parental rights with respect to

the child who is the subject of this proceeding. In appeal No. 2, the

mother appeals from an order setting forth the terms and conditions

regarding posttermination contact with the child. 

With respect to appeal No. 1, it is well settled that, during the

period of a suspended judgment, a parent “ ‘must comply with [the]

terms and conditions set forth in the judgment that are designed to

ameliorate’ ” the circumstances which resulted in the original finding

of permanent neglect (Matter of Kaleb U., 280 AD2d 710, 712). If the

agency establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that there has

been noncompliance with any of the terms of the suspended judgment,

Family Court may revoke the suspended judgment and terminate parental

rights (see Matter of Gracie YY., 34 AD3d 1053, 1054; Matter of

Nikkias T., 32 AD3d 1220, 1221, lv denied 7 NY3d 716). Here,

petitioner met that burden inasmuch as the evidence established that

the mother violated numerous terms of the suspended judgment (see

Matter of Elizabeth J. [Jocelyn J.], 87 AD3d 1406, 1406, lv denied 18

NY3d 804; Matter of Ronald O., 43 AD3d 1351, 1352). 
-2- 1432 

CAF 11-01663 

The mother’s contention that petitioner was required to submit

medical or psychological evidence establishing that termination of her

parental rights was in the best interests of the child is unpreserved

for our review and without merit (see generally Matter of McCullough v

Brown, 21 AD3d 1349, 1349). The mother also failed to preserve for

our review her contention that the court should have extended the term

of the suspended judgment (see Family Ct Act § 633 [b]; see generally

Matter of Sean W. [Brittany W.], 87 AD3d 1318, 1319, lv denied 18 NY3d

802).

Nevertheless, petitioner and the mother allege new circumstances

and request that we remit this matter to the court for a dispositional

hearing. It is well settled that “changed circumstances may have

particular significance in child custody matters,” and we may take

notice of those new circumstances (Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299,

318). Here, the alleged new circumstances include allegations that

the adoptive placement was disrupted and the child is currently living

in a group home, that no other adoptive placement has been located,

that the child no longer wishes to be adopted, that the child has

reestablished contact with his maternal grandmother, and that the

maternal grandmother intends to pursue legal custody. In light of

those alleged new circumstances, “ ‘it is not clear that termination

of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests’ ”

(Matter of Shad S. [Amy C.Y.], 67 AD3d 1359, 1360; see Matter of

Arthur C., 66 AD3d 1009, 1010). We therefore reverse the order in

appeal No. 1 and remit the matter to Family Court for a dispositional

hearing to determine the child’s best interests.

With respect to appeal No. 2, in light of our determination in

appeal No. 1, we reverse the order granting posttermination contact. 

Entered: December 28, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court