54918 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 174 / Thursday, September 9, 2010 / Notices 

Event Scale Report to the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (per NRC 

Management Directive 5.12), and there 

are unique or unusual aspects of the 

licensee’s performance that warrant 

additional NRC oversight (e.g., a 

significant event, which requires an 

incident investigation team (IIT) or 

augmented inspection team (AIT)); or 

(3) Performance Trend—Licensee has 

multiple and/or repetitive significant 

program issues identified over more 

than one inspection, or inspection 

period, and the issues are supported by 

severity level I, II, or III violation, as 

described in the NRC Enforcement 

Policy (including equivalent violations 

dispositioned by Alternative Dispute 

Resolution). And, there are unique or 

unusual aspects of the licensee’s 

performance that warrant additional 

NRC oversight (e.g., oversight panel 

formed for order implementation). 

Proposed Criteria for Determining 

Materials Licensees for the AARM 

The NRC is proposing the following 

revision to the existing criteria for 

determining materials licensees with 

significant performance issues: (1) 

Strategic Plan—Licensee has an event 

that results in the failure to meet a 

strategic outcome for safety and security 

in the NRC Strategic Plan (NUREG– 

1614); (2) Significant Issue or Event— 

Licensee has an issue or event that 

results in an abnormal occurrence report 

to Congress (per NRC Management 

Directive 8.1), or a severity level I or II 

violation, as described in the NRC 

Enforcement Policy (including 

equivalent violations dispositioned by 

Alternative Dispute Resolution), or a 

level 3 or higher International Nuclear 

Event Scale Report to the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (per NRC 

Management Directive 5.12), and there 

are unique or unusual aspects of the 

licensee’s performance that warrant 

additional NRC oversight (e.g., a 

significant event, which requires an IIT 

or AIT); or (3) Performance Trend— 

Licensee has multiple and/or repetitive 

significant program issues identified 

over more than one inspection, or 

inspection period, and the issues are 

supported by severity level I, II, or III 

violation, as described in the NRC 

Enforcement Policy (including 

equivalent violations dispositioned by 

Alternative Dispute Resolution). And, 

there are unique or unusual aspects of 

the licensee’s performance that warrant 

additional NRC oversight (e.g., oversight 

panel formed for order implementation); 

or (4) Identified for Discussion at 

Previous AARM—Licensee corrective 

actions did not address or were 

ineffective in correcting the underlying 

issues that were previously discussed at 

the AARM. 

You can find NRC’s strategic plan 

(NUREG–1614) and the referenced 

management directives and enforcement 

policy on NRC’s public document 

collections Web page at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day 

of August 2010. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Cynthia A. Carpenter, 

Deputy Director, Office of Federal and State 

Materials and Environmental Management 

Programs. 

[FR Doc. 2010–22481 Filed 9–8–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2010–0288] 

Draft Regulatory Guide, DG–1247, 

‘‘Design-Basis Hurricane and 

Hurricane Missiles for Nuclear Power 

Plants’’ and Supporting Technical 

Basis Documents NUREG/CR 7004 and 

7005 

DG–1247 is a proposed new 

regulatory guide. Issuance and 

Availability; Correction and Comment 

Period Extension: 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of issuance; correction 

and comment period extension. 

SUMMARY: On August 31, 2010 (75 FR 

53352), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) published a notice 

of issuance and availability of Draft 

Regulatory Guide (DG)—1247, ‘‘DesignBasis Hurricane and Hurricane Missiles 

for Nuclear Power Plants.’’ This Federal 

Register Notice did not provide all the 

information regarding the supporting 

technical basis documents NUREG/CR 

7004 and 7005. Due to this correction 

the comment period has been extended 

to November 5, 2010. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Robert G. Carpenter, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone (301) 251– 

7483, or e-mail 

Robert.Carpenter@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing for public 

comment a draft guide in the agency’s 

‘‘Regulatory Guide’’ series and the 

supporting technical basis documents, 

NUREG/CR 7004 and 7005. This series 

was developed to describe and make 

available to the public such information 

as methods that are acceptable to the 

NRC staff for implementing specific 

parts of the NRC’s regulations, 

techniques that the staff uses in 

evaluating specific problems or 

postulated accidents, and data that the 

staff needs in its review of applications 

for permits and licenses. 

The draft regulatory guide (DG), 

entitled, ‘‘Design-Basis Hurricane and 

Hurricane Missiles for Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ is temporarily identified by its 

task number, DG–1247, which should be 

mentioned in all related 

correspondence. DG–1247 is a proposed 

new regulatory guide. 

This guide describes a method that 

the NRC staff considers acceptable to 

support reviews of applications that the 

agency expects to receive for new 

nuclear reactor construction permits or 

operating licenses under 10 CFR Part 50; 

design certifications under 10 CFR Part 

52, ‘‘Early Site Permits; Standard Design 

Certifications; and Combined Licenses 

for Nuclear Power Plants’’ (Ref. 9); and 

combined licenses under 10 CFR Part 52 

that do not reference a standard design. 

Specifically, this regulatory guide 

provides new guidance that the staff of 

the NRC considers acceptable for use in 

selecting the design-basis hurricane 

windspeeds and hurricane-generated 

missiles that a new nuclear power plant 

should be designed to withstand to 

prevent undue risk to the health and 

safety of the public. This guidance 

applies to the contiguous United States 

but does not address the determination 

of the design-basis hurricane and 

hurricane missiles for sites located 

along the Pacific coast or in Alaska, 

Hawaii, or Puerto Rico; the NRC will 

evaluate such determinations on a caseby-case basis. This guide also does not 

identify the specific structures, systems, 

and components that should be 

designed to withstand the effects of the 

design-basis hurricane or should be 

protected from hurricane-generated 

missiles and remain functional. Nor 

does this guide address other externally 

generated hazards, such as aviation 

crashes, nearby accidental explosions 

resulting in blast overpressure levels 

and explosion-borne debris and 

missiles, and turbine missiles. NUREG/ 

CR 7004 is the technical basis for 

regulatory guidance on design-basis 

hurricane-borne missile speeds and 

NUREG/CR 7005 is the technical basis 

for regulatory guidance on design-basis 

hurricane wind speeds for new nuclear 

power plants. 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 174 / Thursday, September 9, 2010 / Notices 54919 

II. Further Information 

Nuclear power plants must be 

designed so that they remain in a safe 

condition under extreme meteorological 

events, including those that could result 

in the most extreme wind events 

(tornadoes and hurricanes) that could 

reasonably be predicted to occur at the 

site. Initially, the NRC solely considered 

such conditions for tornadoes in 

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.76, ‘‘DesignBasis Tornado for Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ issued April 1974. The designbasis tornado windspeeds were chosen 

so that the probability that a tornado 

exceeding the design basis would occur 

was on the order of 10¥7 per year per 

nuclear power plant. In March 2007, the 

NRC issued Revision 1 to RG 1.76, 

‘‘Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado 

Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants.’’ 

Revision 1 to RG 1.76 relied on the 

Enhanced Fujita Scale which was 

implemented by the National Weather 

Service in February 2007. The Enhanced 

Fujita Scale is a revised assessment 

relating tornado damage to windspeed 

which resulted in a decrease in designbasis tornado windspeed criteria in 

Revision 1 to RG 1.76. 

Since design-basis tornado 

windspeeds were decreased as a result 

of the analysis performed to update RG 

1.76, it was no longer clear that the 

revised tornado design-basis 

windspeeds would bound design-basis 

hurricane windspeeds in all areas of the 

United States. This prompted an 

investigation into extreme wind gusts 

during hurricanes and their relation to 

design-basis hurricane windspeeds. The 

NRC commissioned a report, NUREG/ 

CR 7005, that considers peak-gust 

windspeeds and estimates maximum 

hurricane windspeeds for hurricanes 

that originate in the Atlantic and make 

landfall along the Atlantic and Gulf 

coasts of the contiguous United States. 

The NRC staff has determined that the 

design-basis hurricane windspeeds 

should correspond to the exceedance 

frequency of 10¥7 per year, calculated 

as a best estimate. This is the same 

exceedance frequency used to establish 

the design-basis tornado parameters in 

Revision 1 to RG 1.76. This exceedance 

frequency is also consistent with the 

Standard Review Plan (NUREG–0800) 

Section 2.2.3 (Evaluation of Potential 

Accidents) criterion for identifying 

design-basis events involving hazardous 

materials or activities on site and in the 

vicinity of a proposed site. 

To ensure the safety of new nuclear 

power plants in the event of a hurricane 

strike, NRC regulations require that a 

nuclear power plant design consider the 

impact of hurricane-generated missiles, 

in addition to the direct action of the 

hurricane wind. Hurricanes are capable 

of generating missiles from objects lying 

within the path of the hurricane wind 

and from debris of nearby damaged 

structures. To evaluate the resistance of 

barriers to penetration and gross failure, 

the hurricane missile velocities must 

also be defined. The NRC commissioned 

a report, NUREG/CR 7004, on designbasis hurricane-borne missile velocities. 

This report describes the method used 

to calculate velocities associated with 

several types of missiles considered for 

different hurricane windspeeds. The 

selected design-basis hurricane missile 

spectrum for nuclear power plants is the 

same as the design-basis tornado missile 

spectrum presented in RG 1.76. This 

spectrum includes (1) a massive highkinetic-energy missile that deforms on 

impact (an automobile), (2) a rigid 

missile that tests penetration resistance 

(a pipe), and (3) a small rigid missile of 

a size sufficient to pass through any 

opening in protective barriers (a solid 

steel sphere). 

The hurricane missile analyses 

presented in NUREG/CR 7004 are based 

on missile aerodynamic and initial 

condition assumptions that are similar 

to those used for the analyses of 

tornado-borne missile velocities 

adopted for Revision 1 to RG 1.76. 

However, the assumed hurricane wind 

field differs from the assumed tornado 

wind field in that the hurricane wind 

field does not change spatially during 

the missile’s flight time but does vary 

with height above the ground. Because 

the size of the hurricane zone with the 

highest winds is large relative to the size 

of the missile trajectory, the hurricane 

missile is subjected to the highest 

windspeeds throughout its trajectory. In 

contrast, the tornado wind field is 

smaller, so the tornado missile is subject 

to the strongest winds only at the 

beginning of its flight. This results in 

the same missile having a higher 

maximum velocity in a hurricane wind 

field than in a tornado wind field with 

the same maximum (3-second gust) 

windspeed. For example, the massive 

high-kinetic-energy tornado missile (a 

1810 kg (4000 lb) automobile) in RG 

1.76 is assigned a velocity of 41 m/s (92 

mph) in tornado intensity Region I 

which has a design-basis tornado 

windspeed of 103 m/s (230 mph). The 

same missile is assigned a velocity of 68 

m/s (152 mph) in a hurricane wind field 

with the same design-basis windspeed 

of 103 m/s (230 mph). The 1810 kg 

automobile missile will have a kinetic 

energy of 1.5×10 6 joules in the tornado 

wind field versus 4.2×10 6 joules in the 

hurricane wind field. 

The NRC staff would like to point out 

that the missile speed analyses for both 

the tornado and hurricane massive highkinetic-energy missile (the 1810 kg 

automobile) assume the missile starts its 

motion with zero initial velocity from 

an elevation of 40 meters above ground. 

Forces tending to increase the elevation 

of the hurricane missile with respect to 

the ground level (e.g., updrafts) are 

assumed to be negligible. However, 

rooftop mechanical (e.g., HVAC) 

equipment that is kept in place only by 

gravity connections is a source of heavy 

deformable debris when displaced 

during extreme-wind events. Buildings 

not designed for the hurricane winds 

can also continue to break up during the 

buildup of hurricane winds. Failures 

progress from the exterior building 

elements inward to the structural 

members (e.g., trusses, masonry units, 

beams, and columns). According to 

Section 7.1.1 (Debris Potential at Safe 

Room Sites) of the Second Edition 

(August 2008) of FEMA 361 (Design and 

Construction Guidance for Community 

Safe Rooms), the literature on 

hurricanes as well as tornadoes contains 

numerous examples of large structural 

members that have been transported by 

winds for significant distances by the 

wind field when a portion of exterior 

sheathing remains connected and 

provides an aerodynamic sail area on 

which the wind can act. An automobile 

hurricane missile with an initial 

elevation of 40 meters above ground 

could be considered a surrogate for such 

equipment and structures which can be 

found throughout a nuclear power plant 

site. 

Applications for new power plants 

will be expected to show that their 

applicable structures can independently 

withstand both the total design-basis 

tornado load and the total design-basis 

hurricane load as extreme 

environmental conditions. The staff 

plans to eventually revise the 

corresponding sections the Standard 

Review Plan to indicate that the designbasis hurricane windspeeds and 

hurricane-generated missiles specified 

in DG–1247 should be considered as 

loads to be sustained during extreme 

environmental conditions. 

The NRC staff is soliciting comments 

on DG–1247 and NUREG/CR 7004 and 

7005. Comments may be accompanied 

by relevant information or supporting 

data and should mention DG–1247 in 

the subject line. Comments submitted in 

writing or in electronic form will be 

made available to the public in their 

entirety through the NRC’s Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS). 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES

54920 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 174 / Thursday, September 9, 2010 / Notices 

1Although the Board has determined that 

Contention EC–2 otherwise meets the admissibility 

criteria of 10 CFR 2.309(f)(1), no evidentiary hearing 

will be held on this contention unless the 

Commission rules that SLOMFP’s request for 

waiver of certain key regulations is warranted under 

10 CFR 2.335. That waiver request is now pending 

before the Commission. 

2Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.323(f)(1) the Board 

referred Contention EC–4 to the Commission. 

DATES: The comment period closes on 

November 5, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any one of the following methods. 

Please include Docket ID NRC–2010– 

0288 in the subject line of your 

comments. Comments submitted in 

writing or in electronic form will be 

posted on the NRC Web site and on the 

Federal rulemaking Web site 

Regulations.gov. Because your 

comments will not be edited to remove 

any identifying or contact information, 

the NRC cautions you against including 

any information in your submission that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed. 

The NRC requests that any party 

soliciting or aggregating comments 

received from other persons for 

submission to the NRC inform those 

persons that the NRC will not edit their 

comments to remove any identifying or 

contact information, and therefore, they 

should not include any information in 

their comments that they do not want 

publicly disclosed. 

Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for documents filed under Docket ID 

NRC–2010–0288. Address questions 

about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 

301–492–3668; e-mail 

Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. 

Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, 

Chief, Rules, Announcements and 

Directives Branch (RAD), Office of 

Administration, Mail Stop: TWB–05– 

B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, or by fax to RAD at (301) 492– 

3446. 

You can access publicly available 

documents related to this notice using 

the following methods: 

NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR): 

The public may examine and have 

copied for a fee publicly available 

documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1 

F21, One White Flint North, 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. 

NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access 

and Management System (ADAMS): 

Publicly available documents created or 

received at the NRC are available 

electronically at the NRC’s Electronic 

Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, 

the public can gain entry into ADAMS, 

which provides text and image files of 

NRC’s public documents. If you do not 

have access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC’s 

PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 

301–415–4737, or by e-mail to 

pdr.resource@nrc.gov. DG–1247 is 

available electronically under ADAMS 

Accession Number ML100480890. In 

addition, electronic copies of DG–1247 

are available through the NRC’s public 

Web site under Draft Regulatory Guides 

in the ‘‘Regulatory Guides’’ collection of 

the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

doc-collections/. The regulatory analysis 

may be found in ADAMS under 

Accession No. ML102310249. 

Regulatory guides are not 

copyrighted, and NRC approval is not 

required to reproduce them. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day 

of September 2010. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Harriet Karagiannis, 

Acting Chief, Regulatory Guide Development 

Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of 

Nuclear Regulatory Research. 

[FR Doc. 2010–22490 Filed 9–8–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–275–LR and 50–323–LR; 

ASLBP No. 10–890–01–LR–BD01] 

In the Matter of Pacific Gas & Electric 

Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear 

Power Plant, Units 1 and 2); Notice of 

Hearing (Application for License 

Renewal) 

September 1, 2010. 

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

Before Administrative Judges: Alex S. 

Karlin, Chairman, Nicholas G. 

Trikouros, Dr. Paul B. Abramson. 

This proceeding concerns the 

November 23, 2009, application of 

Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) 

to renew Operating License Nos. DPR– 

80 and DPR–82 for the Diablo Canyon 

Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, 

near San Luis Obispo, California. PG&E 

seeks to extend these licenses for an 

additional twenty years beyond the 

current expiration dates of November 2, 

2024 and August 26, 2025. 

On January 21, 2010, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

published a notice of opportunity to 

request a hearing concerning the PG&E 

license renewal application. 75 FR 3493 

(Jan. 21, 2010). On March 22, 2010, the 

San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 

(SLOMFP), a local public interest group, 

filed a request for hearing and asserted 

five contentions challenging various 

aspects of PG&E’s application. On April 

8, 2010, this Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Board was established to 

conduct this adjudication. See 75 FR 

20,010 (Apr. 16, 2010). On May 26, 

2010, the Board heard oral argument 

from SLOMFP, PG&E, and the NRC Staff 

in San Luis Obispo, California, relating 

to the admissibility of the proposed 

contentions. On August 4, 2010, the 

Board issued a memorandum and order 

granting SLOMFP’s request for a hearing 

and admitting four of its contentions. 

LBP–10–15, 72 NRC l (slip op.) (Aug. 

4, 2010). 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.105(e)(2), please 

take notice that the Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Board will conduct an 

evidentiary hearing on SLOMFP’s 

challenge to PG&E’s application to 

renew its licenses. The matters of fact 

and law to be considered at the hearing 

are the contentions that have been duly 

admitted. As of this time, the four 

admitted contentions are as follows: 

Contention EC–1: PG&E’s Severe Accident 

Mitigation Alternatives (‘‘SAMA’’) analysis 

fails to satisfy 40 CFR 1502.22 because it fails 

to consider information regarding the 

Shoreline fault that is necessary for an 

understanding of seismic risks to the Diablo 

Canyon nuclear power plant. Further, that 

omission is not justified by PG&E because it 

has failed to demonstrate that the 

information is too costly to obtain. As a result 

of the foregoing failures, PG&E’s SAMA 

analysis does not satisfy the requirements of 

the National Environmental Policy Act 

(‘‘NEPA’’) for consideration of alternatives or 

NRC implementing regulation 10 CFR 

51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L). 

Contention EC–2: PG&E’s Environmental 

Report is inadequate to satisfy NEPA because 

it does not address the airborne 

environmental impacts of a spent fuel pool 

accident caused by an earthquake adversely 

affecting DCNPP.1

Contention EC–4: The Environmental 

Report fails to satisfy the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because it 

does not discuss the cost-effectiveness of 

measures to mitigate the environmental 

impacts of an attack on the Diablo Canyon 

reactor during the license renewal term.2

Contention TC–1: The applicant, Pacific 

Gas & Electric Company (PG&E), has failed to 

satisfy 10 CFR 54.29’s requirement to 

demonstrate a reasonable assurance that it 

can and will ‘‘manage the effects of aging’’ in 

accordance with the current licensing basis. 

PG&E has failed to show how it will address 

and rectify an ongoing adverse trend with 

respect to recognition, understanding, and 

management of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear 

Power Plant’s design/licensing basis which 

undermines PG&E’s ability to demonstrate 

that it will adequately manage aging in 

accordance with this same licensing basis as 

required by 10 CFR 54.29. 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES