[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 17-15558

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cr-00154-SLB-SGC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

FREDERICK LAMAR BURNETT, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(January 11, 2019)

Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Case: 17-15558 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 1 of 6 
2

Frederick Lamar Burnett appeals his convictions and 48-month sentence for 

three counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Burnett contends the

district court abused its discretion by excluding testimony about his consultations

with prior legal counsel, in violation of the rules of evidence and his constitutional 

right to present a complete defense. He further contends that, because the excluded 

testimony would have been probative of his intent to defraud the Government, its 

exclusion was not harmless. Burnett also contends the district court abused its 

discretion by imposing a 48-month sentence, which he asserts is procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable, because the district court erroneously calculated the 

loss amount attributable to his fraud under the Guidelines. After review, we 

affirm.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Exclusion1

“[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful 

opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 

(1986) (quotation omitted). Thus, a court may not exclude evidence that is crucial, 

relevant, and necessary to establish a valid defense. United States v. Todd, 108 

F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1997). A criminal defendant must nevertheless 

 1 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Watkins, 880 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018). “This standard grants the court substantial 

leeway; reversal is appropriate only when the law, facts, or procedure was incorrectly applied or 

when there is an otherwise clear error in judgment.” Id. 

Case: 17-15558 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 2 of 6 
3

“comply with the procedural and evidentiary rules designed to facilitate a search 

for the truth.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (en 

banc). “[T]he Constitution leaves to the judges who must make these decisions 

wide latitude to exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant or 

poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.” Crane, 

476 U.S. at 689–90 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Kimberly Ford’s 

testimony. Burnett could not establish good-faith reliance on the advice of his 

counsel because he did not “fully disclose[] to his attorney all material facts that 

[we]re relevant to the advice for which he consulted the attorney.” See United 

States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 851 (11th Cir. 2011).

Moreover, the legal advice Burnett sought to admit was given in the limited 

context of responding to a competitor’s bid challenge on only one of the three 

contracts at issue. Its relevance beyond that context was, at best, marginal. 

Indeed, Ford did not recall Burnett receiving any advice concerning the Berry 

Amendment or its applicability. And Ford stated Burnett told his counsel he would 

utilize only “very small” or “minute” foreign components when fulfilling the 

backpack contract. Ford concluded that, had Burnett disclosed the true nature of 

his plan to import substantial portions of the backpacks from China, his counsel

likely would have provided different advice.

Case: 17-15558 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 3 of 6 
4

In any event, the thrust of what Ford remembered about the advice of 

Burnett’s counsel—that Burnett could comply with the Buy American Act even if 

he imported some of his components from China—was admitted through other 

evidence. Thus, Ford’s testimony was largely cumulative. Given the marginal 

relevance of Ford’s testimony on the issue of Burnett’s understanding of his 

broader contractual obligations (particularly under the Berry Amendment), the 

district court was within its discretion to determine that the probative value of 

Ford’s testimony was outweighed by the risk of confusing the jury as to the scope 

and legal effect of the advice Burnett received from his former counsel.

B. Sentencing2

We need not determine whether the government-benefits rule should have 

applied in this case. Nor must we determine the amount of loss properly attributed 

to Burnett’s fraud. The district court stated that even “if [it] accepted the 

defendant’s argument that the loss calculation should be zero, with the resulting 

guideline range of four to ten months, the Court would have either varied or 

upwardly departed to the sentence imposed.” USDC Doc. 101 at 37. And we have 

held that an error in calculating a Guidelines range is harmless if: (1) the district 

court stated it would impose the same sentence even if it decided the Guidelines 

issue in the defendant’s favor; and (2) under the corrected Guidelines range, “the 

 2 We review the reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Thompson, 702 F.3d 604, 606–07 (11th Cir. 2012). 

Case: 17-15558 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 4 of 6 
5

final sentence resulting from consideration of the § 3553(a) factors would still be 

reasonable.” United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006). 

“Our review for reasonableness is deferential, and the party challenging the 

sentence has the burden of establishing unreasonableness. United States v. Clay, 

483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). Moreover, “[t]he weight to be accorded any 

given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district 

court.” Id. We will not “remand for resentencing if we are [not] left with the 

definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of 

judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies 

outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id.

The district court in this case concluded a 48-month sentence was necessary 

to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide a just 

punishment for Burnett’s crime, and deter similar conduct. It also was influenced 

by its determination that Burnett perjured himself during the trial. In the end, its 

sentence was far below the statutory maximum. See United States v. Stanley, 739 

F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A sentence imposed well below the statutory 

maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.”). And there is nothing 

to suggest the district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors in its 

analysis, which it specifically stated would not change even if it were to consider 

the lower Guidelines range advocated by Burnett. Under the circumstances, “we 

Case: 17-15558 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 5 of 6 
6

are [not] left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a 

clear error of judgment” in arriving at a 48-month sentence, which was within “the 

range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” See Clay, 483 

F.3d at 743.

II. CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Ford’s testimony 

or imposing a 48-month sentence.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 17-15558 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 6 of 6