NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOEL ANTHONY HOLLEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

E. EVANS, Captain; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 16-16012 

D.C. No. 3:15-cv-01077-VC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Vince G. Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 11, 2017**

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. 

California state prisoner Joel Anthony Holley appeals pro se from the district 

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate 

indifference to his safety and due process violations. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 19 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 16-16012 

(9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson 

v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Holley’s 

deliberate indifference claim because Holley failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to 

Holley’s safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (the prison 

official must both be aware there are facts to support a serious threat to an inmate’s 

safety and infer there is an actual threat).

To the extent that success on Holley’s due process claims stemming from his 

disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary 

proceeding, Holley’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 

(1994), because Holley failed to allege facts demonstrating that his disciplinary 

sentence has been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 

(1997) (extending Heck to prison disciplinary proceedings where good time credits 

have been forfeited). To the extent that success on Holley’s due process claims 

would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction, the 

district court properly granted summary judgment because Holley failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was deprived of a cognizable 

liberty interest. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (due 

process procedural protections “adhere only when the disciplinary action 
 3 16-16012 

implicates a protected liberty interest”); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (“There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance 

procedure.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Holley’s request to 

continue summary judgment for further discovery or his motion to compel 

additional discovery because Holley failed to show how additional discovery was 

necessary to preclude summary judgment. See Blough v. Holland Realty, Inc., 574 

F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009) (denial of continuance to conduct further 

discovery is appropriate when the district court considers the merits of the motion 

and concludes there is no point in pursuing the requested discovery); Tatum v. City 

& County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2006) (requirements 

for obtaining additional discovery under former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)).

AFFIRMED.