Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1503-DR-89 | November 20, 2015 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

James L. Bullock

Valparaiso, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Christina J. Miller

Lucas, Holcomb & Medrea, LLP

Merrillville, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James L. Bullock,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Natasha Bullock,

Appellee-Petitioner

November 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A03-1503-DR-89

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Elizabeth F. 

Tavitas, Judge

The Honorable Nanette Raduenz, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

45D03-1202-DR-108

Baker, Judge.
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[1] James Bullock appeals from the trial court’s order dissolving the marriage of 

James and Natasha Bullock. James raises twelve arguments on appeal, which 

we combine and restate as follows: the trial court erred by (1) prolonging the 

dissolution litigation and entering an unfair provisional order; (2) awarding 

spousal maintenance to Natasha; (3) distributing the marital assets in an unfair 

way; (4) granting Natasha sole legal custody of the parties’ child; (5) ordering 

that he pay a portion of Natasha’s attorney fees; and (6) refusing to entertain 

James’s motion to modify the dissolution because the appeal was already 

pending. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] The parties have been engaged in an on-and-off romantic relationship since 

1999, when they began living together. In 2000, Natasha was diagnosed with 

multiple sclerosis, and it is undisputed that James was aware of the diagnosis. 

Their daughter (Child), the sole child born of the marriage, was born in 2001. 

Natasha and James were married on April 15, 2004. On February 10, 2012, 

James filed a petition to dissolve the marriage; on February 27, 2012, Natasha 

filed a counter-petition to dissolve the marriage, seeking child support and 

spousal maintenance.

[3] Natasha is a licensed nurse, and although she was able to work for periods of 

time during the marriage, she is currently unemployed and unable to work 

because of her multiple sclerosis. Natasha receives $935 per month in disability 

benefits, and Child receives an additional $192 per month in disability benefits 
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because of Natasha’s condition. Child lives with Natasha, and James stipulated 

that Natasha should have primary physical custody. James and Natasha 

struggle to communicate and cooperate with one another in healthy and 

appropriate ways. James is employed by U.S. Steel and has an average annual 

income of $112,000.

[4] After filing the petition and counter-petition, James and Natasha attempted to 

reconcile and agreed to continue the provisional hearing. Their reconciliation 

was unsuccessful, however, and the provisional hearing took place in October 

2012. A number of status hearings were held in the early months of 2013. In 

June 2013, Natasha sought to extend all deadlines, including discovery, because 

of her ongoing illness. In September 2013, Father hired a new attorney, 

necessitating a continuance of a hearing set later that month. In December 

2013, the parties agreed to vacate the final hearing, which had been set for 

December 2, 2013. On May 20, 2014, the parties agreed to a general 

continuance of the final hearing, which had been set for May 19, to be reset on 

the motion of either party, as they were engaged in settlement negotiations. To 

keep things moving, the trial court, on its own motion, set a telephonic status 

conference with counsel in August 2014. On September 5, 2014, Father 

requested that a final hearing be set. The trial court granted the request and set 

the hearing for January 6, 2015, and the hearing was finally held on that date.

[5] Following the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On 

February 11, 2015, the trial court issued its order. In pertinent part, the trial 

court ordered as follows:
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 Natasha is to have sole legal custody of Child.

 The parties stipulated that there is no equity in the marital residence, and 

James is awarded that residence.

 Natasha is awarded 60% of the value of James’s U.S. Steel pension and 

401(K).

 The parties stipulated that Natasha qualifies for spousal maintenance 

because she is physically incapacitated and unable to support herself. 

Natasha’s reasonable monthly expenses are $2,900, which exceeds her 

monthly income by $550.1 James is to pay spousal maintenance to 

Natasha in the amount of $550 per month.

 Having considered all relevant factors, Natasha’s attorney fees of 

$9,707.50 were reasonable. She has paid $2,926 of those fees, leaving a 

balance of $6,781.50. James is able to contribute to those fees and is 

ordered to pay the balance of $6,781.50.

Appellant’s Supp. App. p. 1-12. James now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[6] At the outset, we note that James is representing himself on appeal. It is well 

established in Indiana that pro se litigants are held to the same standard as are 

licensed lawyers. See, e.g., Akiwumi v. Akiwumi, 23 N.E.3d 734, 740 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014). In this case, James has made many arguments that wholly lack 

cogency. He has neglected to cite to any legal authority and repeatedly directs 

our attention to documents that were not submitted as evidence to the trial 

 

1 The trial court found that Natasha’s monthly income consists of $935 in disability benefits, $384 that her 

two children (one of her children has a different father) receive due to her disability, and $1,031 in child 

support.
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court.2 These issues aside, we will endeavor to discern his central arguments 

and address them to the best of our ability.3

[7] Here, the trial court entered findings sua sponte. In such a situation, the

standard of review is well-established:

specific factual findings control only the issues that they cover, 

while a general judgment standard applies to issues upon which 

there are no findings. It is not necessary that each and every 

finding be correct, and even if one or more findings are clearly 

erroneous, we may affirm the judgment if it is supported by other 

findings or is otherwise supported by the record. We may affirm 

a general judgment with sua sponte findings upon any legal 

theory supported by the evidence introduced at trial. Although 

sua sponte findings control as to the issues upon which the court 

has found, they do not otherwise affect our general judgment 

standard of review, and we may look both to other findings and 

beyond the findings to the evidence of record to determine if the 

result is against the facts and circumstances before the court.

As for review of the accuracy of findings that have been entered, 

we first consider whether the evidence supports them. Second, 

we consider whether the findings support the judgment. We will 

disregard a finding only if it is clearly erroneous, which means 

the record contains no facts to support it either directly or by 

inference. A judgment also is clearly erroneous if it relies on an 

incorrect legal standard, and we do not defer to a trial court’s 

 

2 Natasha has filed a motion to strike the portions of James’s appendix that contain documents, some of 

which are confidential by statute, that were not submitted as evidence to the trial court. By separate order we 

grant that motion.

3

James has not provided this Court with a transcript of any of the hearings below, including the provisional 

hearing and the final evidentiary hearing. Our effort to address his arguments is significantly hampered by 

the absence of a transcript.
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legal conclusions. However, we must give due regard to the trial 

court’s ability to assess the credibility of witnesses and will not 

reweigh the evidence, and must consider only the evidence most 

favorable to the judgment along with all reasonable inferences 

drawn in favor of the judgment. 

We also note that we “give considerable deference to the findings 

of the trial court in family law matters....” MacLafferty v. 

MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. 2005). Whether 

reviewing a case for “clear error” or “abuse of discretion,” this 

appellate deference is, first and foremost, a reflection that the trial 

court is in the best position to judge the facts, ascertain family 

dynamics, and judge witness credibility and the like. “Secondly, 

appeals that change the results below are especially disruptive in 

the family law setting.” Id. at 940. “But to the extent a ruling is 

based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence, it is 

reversible, and the trial court has no discretion to reach the 

wrong result.” Id. at 941.

Stone v. Stone, 991 N.E.2d 992, 998-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (some internal 

citations omitted), aff’d on reh’g, 4 N.E.3d 666.

II. Matters Arising Before the Final Hearing

[8] First, we turn to James’s arguments that the trial court erred by “allow[ing] the 

divorce proceedings to last for 35 months” and by calculating the amount of 

child support owed by James in the provisional order. Appellant’s Br. p. 8. As 

for the length of the proceedings, James does not direct our attention to a single 

request for a final hearing date—or, indeed, any hearing date—that was denied 

or not ruled upon in a timely fashion by the trial court. Instead, as fully 

explained above, the parties repeatedly requested continuances for various 
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reasons and made multiple joint requests to vacate and/or reset hearings. At 

one point, the trial court set a status conference on its own motion because it 

was concerned that settlement negotiations were taking too long. We see no 

error whatsoever in the way the trial court managed this litigation.

[9] As for the amount owed by James in the provisional order, he seems to be 

arguing that, in ordering James to pay child support and household bills during 

the provisional period, the trial court failed to take into consideration that 

Natasha returned to work for a brief period of time. He also argues that the 

trial court did not take Natasha’s disability payments into consideration. 

[10] As James has not provided us with the transcript of the provisional hearing or 

the provisional order itself, we have no way of knowing what evidence was 

presented to the trial court, or even what, precisely, it ordered. In the 

dissolution decree, the trial court found as follows with respect to these 

arguments:

Husband’s Verified Petition for Modification of Provisional 

Hearing (sic), filed on September 4, 2014, should be denied. 

Husband claims that he overpaid support and maintenance 

during the provisional period because Wife returned to work. 

Although Wife did return to work for a short period of time, her 

disability benefits were placed on hold during this period. Wife 

received approximately $280.00 per week net income while she 

was working. Wife lost her disability benefits of $216.00 per 

week during that same time period. This additional $66.00 per 

week is not a substantial change in circumstances that would 

render the support payments of the provisional Order 

unreasonable.
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Supp. App. p. 8. We have no basis aside from James’s contention that the 

provisional order is “unfair and unjust” to second-guess the trial court’s 

statements above. Appellant’s Br. p. 8. We find no error on this basis.

III. Spousal Maintenance

[11] Next, James argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay spousal 

maintenance. To the extent that he contends he should not be required to pay 

spousal maintenance at all, he has waived this argument by stipulating to the 

trial court that Natasha is entitled to spousal maintenance. 

[12] To the extent that James contends that the trial court erred in calculating the 

amount of maintenance he is required to pay, we note that he is essentially 

arguing that Natasha’s evidence of her monthly expenses was “fictitious” and 

that the expenses were “unreasonable.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. It is evident 

from reviewing the trial court’s order that it conducted a thorough review of the 

parties’ respective financial resources as well as Natasha’s expenses. Because 

we do not have the transcript, we are unable to evaluate the evidence provided 

to the trial court to support its conclusions with respect to Natasha’s expenses. 

And in any event, James’s argument amounts to a request that we reweigh 

evidence and assess witness credibility—a request we decline. We find no error 

with respect to the award of spousal maintenance.

IV. Distribution of Marital Assets

[13] Next, James turns to the trial court’s division of the marital assets. First, he 

complains that the trial court ordered that the marital residence was James’s 
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sole property. James argues on appeal that there was negative equity in the 

home that should have been divided equally between the parties. He has 

waived this argument, however, given that he stipulated that there was no 

equity in the residence and that he should be awarded the residence as his sole 

and exclusive property. Supp. App. p. 3. 

[14] Second, James argues that the trial court should not have awarded 60% of the 

value of his pension and 401(K) to Natasha and also quarrels with its 

distribution of household property. James stipulated to the distribution of 

household property and has waived the argument. In any event, all of his 

arguments regarding property and asset distribution amount to a request that 

we reweigh evidence and assess witness credibility by discounting Natasha’s 

testimony and evidence and favoring James’s. We decline to do so. We find 

no error with regard to the distribution of marital assets.

V. Legal Custody of Child

[15] Next, James argues that the trial court erred by awarding Mother sole legal 

custody of child. Husband contends that the trial court erred when it found that 

“Wife has historically made the decisions regarding the child’s education, 

medical treatment and religious upbringing.” Supp. App. p. 2. James insists 

that the evidence before the trial court does not support this conclusion. But 

given that we do not have the transcript or exhibits admitted into evidence, we 

have no way of evaluating this argument. The trial court considered all 
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required statutory factors and concluded that Mother should be awarded sole 

legal custody. We find no error in this portion of the trial court’s order.

VI. Attorney Fees

[16] Next, James contends that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay the 

balance of Natasha’s attorney fees. In essence, he argues yet again that the trial 

court did not adequately review the evidence of Natasha’s income, insisting that 

she should have been able to pay more of her attorney fees than she did. This is 

yet another request that we reweigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, 

which we again decline to do. The trial court did a painstaking evaluation of 

the parties’ financial resources and the disparity between them, and did not 

abuse its discretion in ordering James to pay a portion of Natasha’s attorney 

fees.

VII. Modification of Dissolution Decree

[17] Finally, James argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to modify 

the dissolution decree. Although wholly unclear from the sparse record on 

appeal, it appears that James filed a motion to modify the decree either shortly 

before or shortly after he filed his Notice of Appeal. On June 11, 2015, the 

court reporter notified this Court that James was not requesting that a transcript 

be prepared. Since that time, this Court, rather than the trial court, has had 

jurisdiction over this cause. Ind. Appellate Rule 8. Both parties assert that the 

trial court denied James’s motion because of a lack of jurisdiction. Although 

we are unable to verify this assertion because the trial court’s order is not 
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included in the record before us, we find that the trial court properly denied 

James’s motion to modify because it will not regain jurisdiction over this cause 

until the appeal is completed and certified. 4

[18] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

 

4

James notes that the trial court found that James has an interest in a trust and that he “agreed not to change 

the beneficiaries of this Trust.” Supp. App. p. 6. Additionally, James “agreed . . . to maintain” his life 

insurance policy with Child as the sole beneficiary, and was ordered to do so until she completes college. Id.

at 11. James argues that “[t]hese statements were not made in trial court, nor was it even spoken about or 

discussed at the final hearing. This statement was just inserted into the divorce decree. James is asking the 

Appellate Court to remove this statement and all reference of the statement from the divorce decree in its 

entirety.” Appellant’s Br. p. 11. We decline to do so, given that we do not have a transcript of the hearing 

and therefore cannot address this argument. James states that he has since cancelled the life insurance policy, 

and we express no opinion on Natasha’s right to seek a contempt finding for his failure to comply with the 

trial court’s order.