In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐1322

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RAMON E. RIVERA,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 15–CR–51 — J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 28, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2017

____________________

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. On December 23, 2014, Rivera and

three others robbed a Milwaukee bar called the Brew City

Tap. They all wore masks; and three of them were armed,

two with BB guns and one with a .40‐caliber handgun. They

left with $857.25.  
2 No. 16‐1322

Four days later, they robbed the Sky Zone Indoor Tram‐

poline Park. This robbery was more successful than the prior

one, netting them over $12,000.

Nearly fifty businesses throughout the Milwaukee area

suffered similar armed robberies between October 2013 and

January 2015. Although various cooperating witnesses im‐

plicated Rivera in thirty of those robberies, the government

sought a reckoning for only five of them. To that end, the

government charged Rivera with five counts of Hobbs Act

robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2. The government

also took the position that Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a

“crime of violence” as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). So

in addition to the five Hobbs Act robbery counts, the gov‐

ernment tacked on five counts of brandishing a firearm in

furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)

and 2. Rivera agreed to plead guilty to two of the crime‐of‐

violence counts in exchange for the government dropping

the other charges. Judge Stadtmueller accepted Rivera’s

guilty plea on November 12, 2015.

On February 4, 2016, Judge Stadtmueller sentenced Rive‐

ra to the mandatory minimum of thirty‐two years’ impris‐

onment.1 He also imposed a five‐year term of supervised re‐

lease, which he said he was “obliged” to do. (R. 196 at 24.)  

Rivera timely appealed his convictions and sentence,

raising two issues: (1) whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies

                                                 

1 The first crime‐of‐violence conviction carried a mandatory minimum

sentence of seven years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The

second one carried a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty‐five years’

imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i).  
No. 16‐1322 3

as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c); and (2) whether

Judge Stadtmueller committed procedural error by saying he

was “obliged” to impose a five‐year supervised‐release term.

With respect to the first issue, we have recently decided

that Hobbs Act robbery indeed qualifies as a “crime of vio‐

lence” under § 924(c) because it “has as an element the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against

the person or property of another.” United States v. Anglin,

No. 15‐3625, 2017 WL 359666, at *6–7 (7th Cir. Jan. 25, 2017)

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)). The Hobbs Act defines

robbery in relevant part as “the unlawful taking or obtaining

of personal property from the person or in the presence of

another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened

force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to

his person or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). Because one

cannot commit Hobbs Act robbery without using or threat‐

ening physical force, we held that Hobbs Act robbery quali‐

fies as a predicate for a crime‐of‐violence conviction. Anglin,

2017 WL 359666, at *7.

We have little to add to the analysis in Anglin, except to

address one additional argument. Rivera contends that the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mathis v. United States

undermines the notion that physical force is an “element” of

Hobbs Act robbery. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). In Mathis, the

Court explained that “[e]lements are the constituent parts of

a crime’s legal definition,” or the things upon which a jury

must agree to convict. Id. at 2248 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “Means,” on the other hand, “spell[] out various

factual ways of committing some component of the offense,”

and a jury need not agree on which way the defendant

committed the offense to convict him. Id. at 2249. Rivera as‐
4 No. 16‐1322

serts that Hobbs Act robbery has three elements—(1) taking

property (2) from another (3) against his will—and several

means by which to commit the “against his will” element,

including force, violence, and threatening injury. For exam‐

ple, he contends that a jury could convict him of Hobbs Act

robbery even if one juror found that he committed robbery

through violence while another found that he committed

robbery by threatening injury. Under this reading of the

statute, Hobbs Act robbery does not have physical force as

an element and thus is not a crime of violence under the force

clause.  

But Rivera takes the Supreme Court’s discussion of

means and elements out of context. Contrary to Rivera’s be‐

lief, the Court did not distinguish between means and ele‐

ments to dictate which parts of a statute matter in a predi‐

cate‐offense analysis. The Court instead made this distinc‐

tion to explain when it is appropriate to use the categorical

approach versus a “modified” categorical approach—an is‐

sue that is irrelevant here. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.

Even if Rivera’s application of Mathis is correct, his ar‐

gument still fails. The distinction between means and ele‐

ments would matter only if one of the ways to commit

Hobbs Act robbery, say, putting another in fear of injury, did

not involve force, so that a juror could find a defendant

guilty irrespective of whether he used force to commit the

crime. But as noted above, one cannot commit Hobbs Act

robbery without using or threatening force. Anglin, 2017 WL

359666, at *7. Because each of the means by which to satisfy

the “against his will” element requires physical force, the

“against his will” element itself requires physical force.
No. 16‐1322 5

We now turn to the second issue on appeal regarding Ri‐

vera’s supervised‐release term. Rivera’s § 924(c) convictions

carry a maximum five‐year term of supervised release fol‐

lowing imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1). The gov‐

ernment concedes that this term is not mandatory. Neverthe‐

less, at sentencing, Judge Stadtmueller said he was “obliged”

to impose a five‐year term. (R. 196 at 24.) Rivera argues that

this statement suggests that the judge erroneously believed

that the law required a five‐year term, so we should remand

for resentencing.  

We review de novo whether a district court committed

procedural error when sentencing a defendant. United States

v. Dorsey, 829 F.3d 831, 836 (7th Cir. 2016). In United States v.

Lyons, we vacated a sentence that included a five‐year su‐

pervised‐release term because the district judge clearly

thought that term was mandatory, when, like here, it wasn’t.

733 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir. 2013). This was evident by the fact

that the judge noted that the defendant would “have to serve

five years of mandatory supervised release” at the sentenc‐

ing hearing, referred to the term as “5 years Mandatory Su‐

pervised Release” in her judgment, and indicated that the

“mandatory minimum sentence was imposed” in her state‐

ment of reasons. Id. at 781. We held that her misunderstand‐

ing constituted a “manifest procedural error.” Id. at 784.   

But that’s not the case here. Although Judge Stadtmueller

said he was “obliged” to impose a five‐year term, this does

not necessarily mean that he thought the term was mandato‐

ry. To be sure, the word “obliged” does connote a legal obli‐

gation; but it also encompasses a moral duty. See Black’s Law

Dictionary 1106 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “oblige” as “[t]o bind

by legal or moral duty”); Webster’s Third New International
6 No. 16‐1322

Dictionary, 1556 (1986) (defining “oblige” as “[t]o constrain

(as another or oneself) by physical, moral, or legal force”). If

Judge Stadtmueller thought he was legally required to im‐

pose a five‐year term, then he committed procedural error;

but if he felt morally bound to impose this term based on the

sentencing factors he considered, then there was no error.

The record indicates that Judge Stadtmueller used the

word “obliged” in the latter way. For instance, at the change‐

of‐plea hearing, Judge Stadtmueller referenced paragraph

six of the plea agreement, which explained that Rivera faced

a maximum five‐year term of supervised release. (R. 195 at 9);

(R. 117 at ¶ 6.) Judge Stadtmueller instructed Rivera to

summarize this paragraph to ensure that Rivera fully under‐

stood the maximum possible sentence. (R. 195 at 9–10.)

Moreover, the presentence investigation report prohibit‐

ed imposing a supervised‐release term exceeding five years,

and cited U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(1), which recommends a two‐ 

to five‐year term. (R. 175 at ¶¶ 138–39.) Judge Stadtmueller

relied on this report at sentencing, saying that Rivera’s pris‐

on term would be “followed by a term of supervised release

of 2 to 5 years.” (R. 196 at 5.)  

Finally, Judge Stadtmueller’s statement of reasons noted

that the supervised‐release range is “[a]t least 2 years but not

more than 5 years.” (R. 184 at 1.) All of this shows that Judge

Stadtmueller understood that a five‐year term was not man‐

datory, but he felt obliged—in a moral sense—to impose this

term nonetheless.  

In United States v. Dill, we addressed a similar challenge

to Judge Stadtmueller’s use of the word “obliged” when im‐

posing a sentence. 799 F.3d 821, 825–26 (7th Cir. 2015). Alt‐
No. 16‐1322 7

hough we noted that “obliged” is an ambiguous word, we

recognized the dichotomy between the legal and moral un‐

derstanding of the word. Specifically, we acknowledged that

“[a] judge pronouncing [a] sentence often explains to a de‐

fendant how the defendant has earned the sentence by his

own choices, which have forced the judge to impose a just

punishment.” Id. We upheld the sentence, holding that

Judge Stadtmueller did not mean “obliged” in the word’s

legal sense.

Judge Stadtmueller could have—and probably should

have—used less ambiguous language when sentencing Ri‐

vera. That said, the record demonstrates that Judge Stadt‐

mueller used the word “obliged” in the moral sense—not the

legal one. And our holding in Dill corroborates this conclu‐

sion. We thus hold that there was no procedural error.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judg‐

ment.