[Cite as State v. Brooks, 2017-Ohio-5518.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

EUGENE BROOKS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NO. C-160743 

TRIAL NO. 16TRD-32914A 

 

 O P I N I O N.

 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Appellant Discharged 

 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 28, 2017 

Paula Boggs Muething, City Solicitor, Natalia Harris, City Prosecutor, and 

Christopher Liu, Appellate Director, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Demetra Stamatakos, 

Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

2

MYERS, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Eugene Brooks appeals his conviction for driving 

under a 12-point license suspension, in violation of R.C. 4510.037(J). The state 

concedes that the conviction must be reversed. 

{¶2} At trial, the state presented the testimony of a police officer who stopped 

Brooks on July 28, 2016, and cited him for driving under a 12-point suspension. The 

state’s evidence included a copy of Brooks’s driving record from the Ohio Bureau of 

Motor Vehicles (“BMV”). The driving record reflected a 12-point suspension for the 

period of May 3, 2016 to October 30, 2016, but did not reflect that Brooks had been 

notified of the suspension. 

{¶3} In his first assignment of error, Brooks challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his conviction. He asserts that the state failed to prove that he had 

been notified of his 12-point license suspension, which he argues is a predicate to a 

lawful suspension under R.C. 4510.037(J). 

{¶4} In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any 

rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the crime proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 

(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶5} R.C. 4510.037(J) prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle if his 

driver’s license has been suspended as a repeat traffic offender under the section: 

Any person whose driver’s * * * license * * * [is] suspended as a repeat 

traffic offender under this section and who, during the suspension, 

operates any motor vehicle upon any public roads and highways is guilty 

of driving under a twelve-point suspension, a misdemeanor of the first 

degree. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

3 

{¶6} The term “repeat traffic offender” is not separately defined in R.C. 

Chapter 4510. However, under R.C. 4510.037(E), if a person’s driving record indicates 

that 12 or more points have been charged against him within a two-year period, “it is 

prima-facie evidence that the person is a repeat traffic offender,” and the registrar shall 

suspend the person’s driver’s license pursuant to R.C. 4510.037(B). 

{¶7} R.C. 4510.037(B) requires the registrar of motor vehicles to “send a 

written notice” to any person who has 12 or more points charged against him within a 

two-year period, and to impose a class D suspension of the person’s license: 

When the registrar determines that the total points charged against 

any person under section 4510.036 of the Revised Code within any 

two-year period beginning on the date of the first conviction within the 

two-year period is equal to twelve or more, the registrar shall send a 

written notice to the person at the person's last known address by 

regular mail. The notice shall list the reported violations that are the 

basis of the points charged, list the number of points charged for each 

violation, and state that, because the total number of points charged 

against the person within the applicable two-year period is equal to 

twelve or more, the registrar is imposing a class D suspension of the 

person's driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or 

nonresident operating privileges for the period of time specified 

in division (B)(4) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The notice 

also shall state that the suspension is effective on the twentieth day 

after the mailing of the notice, unless the person files a petition 

appealing the determination and suspension in the municipal court[.] 

{¶8} To summarize, R.C. 4510.037(B) requires written notice to the offender. 

And that written notice must include: (1) a list of the reported violations that are the 

basis of the points charged; (2) a list of the number of points charged for each violation; 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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(3) a statement that because the total number of points charged against the person 

within the applicable two-year period is equal to 12 or more, the registrar is imposing a 

class D suspension of the person’s license for the period of time specified in R.C. 

4510.02; and (4) a statement that the suspension is effective on the twentieth day after 

the mailing of the notice, unless the person appeals the determination and suspension. 

{¶9} A 12-point suspension under R.C. 4510.037(B) requires notice be mailed 

to the offender. See Townsend v. Dollison, 66 Ohio St.2d 225, 228, 421 N.E.2d 146 

(1981) (interpreting analogous former R.C. 4507.40(K)). To prove a violation of R.C. 

4510.037(J), the state must prove that the registrar complied with the notice provisions 

of R.C. 4510.037(B). See State v. Roberts, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-800135, 1981 WL 

9650 (Feb. 25, 1981) (notice of a 12-point license suspension is required to prove a 

lawful suspension and is necessary to support a conviction under former R.C. 4507.40). 

{¶10} The state concedes that it failed to prove that the registrar complied with 

the notice provisions of R.C. 4510.037(B). Therefore, we hold that Brooks’s conviction 

under R.C. 4510.037(J) was based upon insufficient evidence. 

{¶11} We sustain the first assignment of error. We reverse the judgment of the 

trial court and discharge Brooks from further prosecution. Our disposition of the first 

assignment of error renders the second assignment of error challenging the weight of 

the evidence moot. 

 Judgment reversed and appellant discharged. 

MOCK, P.J., and MILLER, J., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.