alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 175 (Friday, September 10, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55306-55307]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-22543]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

RIN 0648-XY86


New England Fishery Management Council; Public Meeting

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce

ACTION: Notice of a public meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The New England Fishery Management Council (Council) is 
scheduling a public meeting of its Habitat/MPA/Ecosystem Committee, in 
September, 2010, to consider actions affecting New England fisheries in 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Recommendations from this group will 
be brought to the full Council for formal consideration and action, if 
appropriate.

DATES: This meeting will be held on Monday, September 27, 2010 at 9:30 
a.m.

ADDRESSES: This meeting will be held at the Hotel Viking, One Bellevue 
Avenue, Newport, RI 02840; telephone: (401) 847-3300; fax: (401) 848-
4864.
    Council address: New England Fishery Management Council, 50 Water 
Street, Mill 2, Newburyport, MA 01950.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul J. Howard, Executive Director, 
New England Fishery Management Council; telephone: (978) 465-0492.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Committee will continue development

[[Page 55307]]

of alternatives to minimize the impacts of fishing on EFH; begin 
development of alternatives to identify and protect deep-sea coral 
zones; review EFH designation updates recommended by the Plan 
Development Team; review SSC comments from 8/25/10 on applications of 
the Swept Area Seabed Impact model and review Advisory Panel feedback 
from 8/12 meeting. Other topics may be discussed at the Chair(s 
discretion.
    Although non-emergency issues not contained in this agenda may come 
before this group for discussion, those issues may not be the subject 
of formal action during this meeting. Action will be restricted to 
those issues specifically listed in this notice and any issues arising 
after publication of this notice that require emergency action under 
section 305(c) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, provided the public has 
been notified of the Council's intent to take final action to address 
the emergency.

Special Accommodations

    This meeting is physically accessible to people with disabilities. 
Requests for sign language interpretation or other auxiliary aids 
should be directed to Paul J. Howard, Executive Director, at (978) 465-
0492, at least 5 days prior to the meeting date.

    Authority:  16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.

    Dated: September 3, 2010.
Tracey L. Thompson,
Acting Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Marine 
Fisheries Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-22543 Filed 9-9-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-22-S
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, November 10, 2015. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, November 10, 2015 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A16I0046. RAY NEAL JOHNSON v. THE STATE.
Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 14CR386
* Hon. Theresa L. Springmann, District Judge for the Northern District of Indiana,

sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

August 16, 2010

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, District Judge*

No. 08‐1401

JOSEPH PRICE, Appeal from the United States

Petitioner‐Appellant,      District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Western Division.

v.

No.  07 C 50111

GUY PIERCE,

Respondent‐Appellee.     Frederick J. Kapala,

Judge.

ORDER

The slip opinion of August 13, 2010, is amended as follows:

On the top of page 10, second line, “§ 2255 ” is deleted and replaced with “§ 2254.”
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 173 (Wednesday, September 8, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 54692]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-22359]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 7155]


Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``Van Gogh, Gauguin, C[eacute]zanne, and Beyond: Post-
Impressionist Masterpieces From the Mus[eacute]e d'Orsay''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, and Delegation of Authority No. 
236-3 of August 28, 2000, I hereby determine that the objects to be 
included in the exhibition ``Van Gogh, Gauguin, C[eacute]zanne, and 
Beyond: Post-Impressionist Masterpieces from the Mus[eacute]e 
d'Orsay,'' imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the 
United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are imported 
pursuant to a loan agreement with the foreign owner or custodian. I 
also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at 
the Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, from on or 
about September 25, 2010, until on or about January 18, 2011, and at 
possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in 
the national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these 
Determinations be published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the exhibit objects, contact Julie Simpson, Attorney-Adviser, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-
632-6467). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, SA-5, L/PD, 
Fifth Floor (Suite 5H03), Washington, DC 20522-0505.

    Dated: September 1, 2010.
Ann Stock,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2010-22359 Filed 9-7-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
## In t he

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 23

- 00073

- CR

HOLLY MICHELLE MESSICK , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 5th District Court

Bowie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 21F0879

- 005

Before Stevens , C.J., van Cleef and Rambin , JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens2 

### ME MORANDUM OPINION

Holly Michelle Messick has filed an untimely no tice of appeal from the trial court’s

judgment r evoking h er community supervision and sent encing h er to two year s’ i ncarceration for

possession of a controlled substance

. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Sentence was imposed in this matter on September 19 , 202 2

, and Messick did not file a

motion for new trial. As a result, Me ss ick ’s notice of appeal was due on or before October 19

,

202 2

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 26.2(a)(1). Messick did not file her notice of appeal until March 24

,

202 3

, well past the deadline for filing such notice. Consequently, M e s sick ’s attempt to appeal

h er re vocation judgment in this matter was untimely. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has

expressly held tha t, without a timely filed notice of appeal, we cannot exercise jurisdiction over

an appeal. See Olivo v. State , 918 S

. W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App

. 1996); see also Slaton v.

State , 981 S.W.2d 208, 209 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam)

.

By letter dated April 17

, 2023, w e notified Messick that h er notice of appeal appeared to

be untimely and that the appeal was sub j e ct to dismiss al for want of j ur isdiction. We gave

Messick twenty days to respond to our letter and to demonstrate how we have jurisdiction over

the appeal notwithstanding the noted defe ct. Messick did not respond to our letter.

Because Messick did not t i mely file h er notice of appea l, we dismiss th e appeal for want

of jurisdiction.

Scott E. Stevens

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: May 15, 2023

Date Decided: May 16, 2023

Do Not Pub lish
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

478 

CAF 12-01943 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

 

IN THE MATTER OF BURKE H. 

------------------------------------------ 

ERIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT; MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 

RICHARD H., RESPONDENT, 

AND TIFFANY H., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

EVELYNE O’SULLIVAN, EAST AMHERST, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

JOSEPH T. JARZEMBEK, BUFFALO, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

DAVID C. SCHOPP, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF

BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (CHARLES D. HALVORSEN OF COUNSEL).

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Erie County (Margaret

O. Szczur, J.), entered August 24, 2012 in a proceeding pursuant to

Family Court Act article 10. The order, insofar as appealed from,

determined Burke H. to be a neglected child. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act

article 10, respondent mother appeals from an order that, insofar as

appealed from, adjudged that she neglected the subject child. 

Contrary to the mother’s contention, Family Court’s finding of

derivative neglect is supported by a preponderance of the evidence

(see Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]; Matter of Brandon T. [Guillaume

T.], 114 AD3d 950, 950-951). Petitioner established that “the neglect

. . . of the child’s older siblings was so proximate in time to the

derivative proceeding that it can reasonably be concluded that the

condition still existed” (Brandon T., 114 AD3d at 950; see Matter of

Jamarra S. [Jessica S.], 85 AD3d 803, 804), and that the mother failed

to address the problems that led to the neglect findings with respect

to her other children (see Matter of Krystal J., 267 AD2d 1097, 1098). 

To the extent that the mother challenges the testimony of petitioner’s

psychologist, it is well settled that the court’s “determination

regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on

appeal, and will not be disturbed if supported by the record” (Matter

of Kanterakis v Kanterakis, 102 AD3d 784, 785, lv denied 21 NY3d 864;

see Matter of Merrick T., 55 AD3d 1318, 1319). We conclude that the

court properly credited the psychologist’s report and opinion, which

were based upon numerous visits with the mother and an extensive
-2- 478 

CAF 12-01943 

review of documentation.

Entered: May 9, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
**EXHIBIT 31.2****CERTIFICATION**I, Thomas J. Hoyer, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Digital Angel Corporation;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;  b. (Intentionally omitted);  c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  d. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter(the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditorsand the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent functions): a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.         /s/ Thomas J. Hoyer   Thomas J. Hoyer   Chief Financial Officer   Dated: May 14, 2007
ex10-30.htm


Exhibit 10.30


 



ASSIGNMENT OF TRADEMARK REGISTRATION




 


WHEREAS, PVM International, Inc. a California corporation having a place of business at 6700 Fallbrook Ave., Suite 289, West Hills, CA 91307 (“Assignor”), has adopted, used, and is using the mark referenced in Schedule A attached hereto, which is registered with U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO;


 


WHEREAS, Medbox, Inc. a Nevada corporation having a place of business at 8439 W. Sunset Blvd. Suite 101, West Hollywood, CA 90069 (“Assignee”) is desirous of acquiring said mark and its registration thereof;


 


NOW THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Assignor does hereby assign all right, title, and interest in and to the said mark together with the good will of the business symbolized by the marks, and the above-identified registration thereof.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have caused this Assignment of Trademark Registrations to be executed as of the later of the dates below.


 


 




	
ASSIGNOR:

	
ASSIGNEE:


	  	  
	
PVM INTERNATIONAL, INC.

	
MEDBOX, INC.


	  	  
	
By: /s/ Vincent Mehdizadeh

	
By: /s/ Guy M. Marsala


	  	  
	
Name: Vincent Mehdizadeh

	
Name: Guy M. Marsala


	  	  
	
Title: CEO

	
Title: CEO


	  	  
	
Date: 7/23/14

	
Date: 7/24/14












 











  





  











  






 


 


SCHEDULE A


 




	
Mark

	
Type

	
Registration Number

	
Registration Date


	
MEDBOX & Design

	
U.S.

	
4,513,331

	
April 15, 2014
**Exhibit 99.7**

**Consent of Independent Auditors**

The Board of Directors 

Theratechnologies Inc. 

We consent to the use ofour report dated February 7, 2012, on the financial statement which comprise the consolidated statements of financial position as at November 30, 2011 and November 30, 2010, the consolidated statements of comprehensive income, changes inequity and cash flows for the years ended November 30, 2011 and November 30, 2010, and notes, comprising a summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory information, which is contained in this annual report on Form 40-Fof Theratechnologies Inc. for the fiscal year ended November 30, 2011. 

/s/    KPMG LLP 

Chartered Accountants 

February 8, 2012

Montréal, Canada
No. 87-6429.

#### Quintero-Gonzalez *v.*United States.

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Exhibit 99.8

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 40-F of Novadaq Technologies Inc. (the Company) for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2014, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Roger Deck, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

1. The Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                     |  |  |  |                        
|-------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Date: March 26, 2015 |  |  |  | /s/ Roger Deck         
|                     |  |  |  | Roger Deck             
|                     |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed July 5, 2018.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D17-1678

Lower Tribunal No. 15-10254

________________



### Jose Diaz,

Appellant,

vs.



### Lino Calvo,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jorge E.

Cueto, Judge.

Cohen Law and Danielle A. Cohen Higgins, for appellant.

Waldman Barnett and Glen H. Waldman and Michael A. Azre, for

appellee.

Before SALTER, EMAS and LOGUE, JJ.

SALTER, J.Jose R. Diaz Duahajre (“Mr. Diaz”) appeals a final default judgment

for $319,252.95 in trebled damages for civil theft, lesser amounts on other

causes of action that are partially duplicative of the civil theft award, and

prejudgment interest. We affirm the final judgment in all significant

respects, but remand for the ministerial correction of a $21.00 error in

computation.

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court’s decision to

strike Mr. Diaz’s defenses and enter a default. Mr. Diaz was shown to have

threatened a key witness and to have attempted to extort the witness into

false testimony. The trial court’s power to impose these extreme sanctions

“is indispensable to the proper administration of justice, because no litigant

has a right to trifle with the courts.” Ramey v. Haverty Furniture Cos., Inc.

,

993 So. 2d 1014, 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quoting Tri Star Invs., Inc. v.

Miele

, 407 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (recognizing that the power

should be exercised cautiously and sparingly). See also Willie-Koonce v.

Miami Sunshine Transfer & Tours Corp.

, 233 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA

2017).

Addressing Mr. Diaz’s arguments that the damages claimed by the

appellee should have been characterized as unliquidated rather than

liquidated, we disagree. The underlying civil theft count claimed

2“$106,410.65 (71,500 euros)” in liquidated damages before trebling,

itemized for each of three transactions. “Where a default is entered, the

defaulting party admits entitlement to liquidated damages, but not

unliquidated damages. Cellular Warehouse[, Inc. v. GH Cellular, LLC ], 957

So. 2d [662,] 666 [(Fla. 3d DCA 2007)]. Damages are liquidated when the

exact amount due may be determined from the pleadings.” 1445

Washington Ltd. P’ship v. Lemontag

, 19 So. 3d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA

2009). Before entry of the final default judgment, the appellee filed a notice

that he would not seek or obtain any unliquidated damages on the counts of

the complaint which did not specify an exact amount.

Trebling the “exact amount” specified in the civil theft count of the

appellee’s complaint produces a total of $319,231.95, rather than the

$319,252.95 figure included within the final default judgment. For this

reason, we remand the case to the trial court for the ministerial purpose of

making the correction (and any necessary adjustment to the amount of

prejudgment interest computed in the final judgment) and amending the

judgment accordingly. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

3
Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

November 17, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice

131439-40 Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE Stephen J. Markman, COMPANY, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 131439 COA: 258240 Saginaw CC: 03-049653-CZ CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL BUERKEL, KAREN BOSHA-WEAVER and AMIE
R. SMITH, Defendants-Appellees,

and

STATE LANES, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

AMIE R. SMITH, Plaintiff,

v SC: 131440 COA: 260775 Saginaw CC: 03-047815-NI CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL BUERKEL, Defendant/Cross-Defendant,

and

KAREN LYNN BOSHAW-WEAVER, Defendant-Appellee,

and

STATE LANES, INC.,Defendant/Cross-PlaintiffAppellant.

_____________ _______________ _____________/_______________________________________ __ 2

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 21, 2006 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consider ed. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the applicati on or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). The parties shall s ubmit supplemental briefs within 35 days of the date of this order addressing whether the Court of Appeals analysis of MCL 257.401(1) paid adequate attention to the statute’s provision that “[t]he owner is not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge ” (emphasis added), and whether the motor vehicl e at issue in this case was being driven with the owner’s “express or implied consen t or knowledge.” The parties should avoid submitting a mere restatement of the arguments made in their application papers.

p1114 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 17, 2006

Clerk