14-540 

Yousuf v. Holder 

BIA

A096 014 174

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the

11th day of March, two thousand fifteen.

PRESENT:

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

GERARD E. LYNCH,

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________

NAVEED YOUSUF, AKA SHAFQAT KHAN,

Petitioner,

v. 14-540

NAC

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

 

FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, New York.

FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Senior 

Litigation Counsel; Nicole N. Murley, 

Trial Attorney, Kamille Go, Law Clerk, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, 
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Civil Division, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington D.C.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED.

Petitioner Naveed Yousuf, a native and citizen of Pakistan, 

seeks review of the BIA’s February 10, 2014, decision denying 

his motion to reopen. In re Naveed Yousuf, No. A096 014 174 

(B.I.A. Feb. 10, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity 

with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

The applicable standards of review are well established. 

See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 

2008). An applicant may file a motion to reopen within 90 days 

of the date on which a final administrative decision was 

rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is 

undisputed that Yousuf’s motion to reopen was untimely because 

it was filed in December 2013, more than one year after his June 

2012 final removal order. However, the time limitation does

not apply when a motion “is based on changed country conditions 
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arising in the country of nationality or the country to which 

removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was 

not available and would not have been discovered or presented 

at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);

accord, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

As observed by the BIA, the record evidence was replete with 

examples of increased violence in Pakistan. However, as the 

BIA ruled, such evidence did not constitute a material change 

in country conditions because general violence and civil strife 

are, standing alone, insufficient to demonstrate a well-founded 

fear of future persecution or a likelihood of torture. See 

Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999) 

(“General violence in [a country] does not constitute 

persecution, nor can it form a basis for petitioner’s 

well-founded fear of persecution.”); Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 

320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that country 

conditions evidence demonstrating some incidents of torture is 

insufficient to establish an applicant’s eligibility for CAT 

relief absent evidence that someone in the applicant’s 

“particular alleged circumstances is more likely than not to 

be tortured”). And, Yousuf’s conclusory assertion that there 
4

is evidence of violence against similarly situated individuals 

with perceived connections to the United States is not supported 

by the record. 

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 

conclusion that Yousuf failed to show a material change in 

country conditions, and therefore it did not abuse its 

discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 

168-69. 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, Yousuf’s pending 

motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as 

moot. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk