Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30094

Summary Calendar

BRENDA GANHEART,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

XAVIER UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA; NORMAN FRANCIS, President;

LARRY CALVIN, Director of Human Resources; ROBERT SKINNER,

Library Director; GENNICE W KING, Associate Director; ADRIENNE

WEBBER, Assistant Director, Access Services; WAYNE HARRIS, Dean,

College of Pharmacy; ELIZABETH BARRON, Doctor, Vice President,

Academic Affairs, 

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

No. 2:07-CV-9703

Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Brenda Ganheart, proceeding pro se, appeals a summary judgment

dismissing all of her claims arising from Xavier University’s termination of her

employment as a part-time library technician. We review the grant of summary

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 10, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 09-30094

2

judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Strong v.

Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 2007). Summary

judgment is proper if the record reflects “that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

The magistrate judge dismissed all of Ganheart’s Title VII, Title IX, 42

U.S.C. § 1983, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) and state law claims as time-barred.

Ganheart’s brief is comprised almost entirely of arguments disputing the

magistrate judge’s factual findings. However, the date used by the magistrate

judge to calculate whether her claims were time-barred is not a disputed fact. 

The only argument she raises in response to her claims being time-barred

is a passing reference to the Lilly Ledbetter Act of 2009 (the “Act”). The Act,

which is retroactive to May 28, 2007, provides: 

For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice

occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation

of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other

practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a

discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an

individual is affected by application of a discriminatory

compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages,

benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part

from such a decision or other practice.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A). 

Assuming, without deciding, that the Act is applicable to Ganheart’s

claims, it nonetheless does not make any of Ganheart’s claims timely. The

magistrate judge began his calculations with Ganheart’s last day of employment

at Xavier University, not the date that she was first subject to any alleged

discriminatory compensation decision. In other words, the magistrate judge’s

method of calculating the statute of limitations period comported with the Act.
No. 09-30094

3

Even if we were to liberally construe Ganheart’s brief, see Grant v. Cuellar,

59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Although we liberally construe briefs of pro se

litigants and apply less stringent standards to parties proceeding pro se than to

parties represented by counsel, pro se parties must still brief the issues and

reasonably comply with the standards of Rule 28.”), we find no error in the

magistrate judge’s conclusion that all her claims were time-barred. Accordingly,

there is no need to review the magistrate judge’s alternative conclusions

regarding Ganheart’s failure to state a claim as to many of these actions.

Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment.