NO. 12-11-00374-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

THE ESTATE OF § APPEAL FROM THE 

MALCOLM RODRIGUES, § COUNTY COURT AT LAW

DECEASED § NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS

NO. 12-11-00375-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

DEBRA IRELAND, INDEPENDENT § APPEAL FROM THE 

EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF

MAXINE PREWITT, DECEASED

V. § COUNTY COURT AT LAW

TIMOTHY RODRIGUES, INDEPENDENT

EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF

MALCOLM RODRIGUES,

DECEASED § NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Debra Ireland, independent executrix of the estate of Maxine Prewitt, deceased, appeals 

from a summary judgment in favor of Timothy Rodrigues, independent executor of the estate of 

Malcolm Rodrigues, deceased, in Ireland’s suit to enforce a Louisiana judgment. In four issues, 

Ireland contends the trial court misconstrued the Louisiana judgment, erroneously determining 

that the judgment had been satisfied. We reverse and render.

BACKGROUND

Maxine Prewitt and her brother, Max Hart, Jr., co-owned timber land in Louisiana. Hart 

contracted with Malcolm Rodrigues to remove timber from the property without the consent of 

Prewitt, or of her guardian, Ireland. Upon discovering that the timber had been removed, Ireland 
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sued Hart and Rodrigues in Sabine Parish, Louisiana, pursuant to a Louisiana statute declaring it 

unlawful to cut another person’s trees without the person’s consent. After a jury trial, Ireland 

recovered a judgment against Hart and Rodrigues for the fair market value of Prewitt’s timber 

interest, plus punitive damages and attorney’s fees. Ireland filed the Louisiana judgment in 

Harris County, pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, rendering it 

subject to enforcement in Texas.

Hart satisfied the portion of the judgment rendered against him. Ireland filed suit to 

establish a claim against Timothy Rodrigues and a creditor’s claim against the estate of Malcolm 

Rodrigues in Nacogdoches County to recover the portion of the Louisiana judgment she 

contends is owed by Rodrigues. Rodrigues moved for partial summary judgment arguing that 

Hart’s payment satisfied the judgment in full and any further payment by him would constitute 

an unlawful windfall for Ireland. Ireland also filed a motion for summary judgment 

acknowledging that the $26,000.00 actual damage portion of the judgment against Rodrigues has 

been satisfied but claiming entitlement to an additional $128,393.13 in penalties and attorney’s 

fees as a matter of law. The trial court agreed with Rodrigues and rendered a take-nothing 

judgment against Ireland. The trial court severed Rodrigues’s request for attorney’s fees, making 

the summary judgment final.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Ireland contends the trial court erred in granting Rodrigues’s motion for summary 

judgment and denying her motion for summary judgment. She argues that the full faith and 

credit clause requires Texas courts to give the same effect to the Louisiana judgment as 

Louisiana courts would. She further contends that, pursuant to Louisiana law, the awards for 

punitive damages and attorney’s fees were not assessed jointly and severally and, therefore, were 

not satisfied by Hart’s payment.

Standard of Review

We review the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Tex. Mun. 

Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2007). The movant for 

traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact concerning one or more essential elements of the plaintiff’s claims and that it is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 

690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). Once the movant has established a right to summary 

judgment, the nonmovant has the burden to respond to the motion and present to the trial court 
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any issues that would preclude summary judgment. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin 

Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678-79 (Tex. 1979). 

Review of a summary judgment requires that the evidence presented by both the motion 

and the response be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment 

was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could and 

disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann 

Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). When, as 

here, both parties move for summary judgment on the same issues and the trial court grants one 

motion and denies the other, the reviewing court considers the evidence presented by both sides, 

determines all questions presented, and if the reviewing court determines that the trial court 

erred, renders the judgment the trial court should have rendered. Valence Operating Co. v. 

Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).

Full Faith and Credit

In her second issue, Ireland asserts that the Louisiana judgment must be construed under 

principles of Louisiana law. Rodrigues acknowledges that Louisiana law applies.

The United States Constitution requires each state to give full faith and credit to the 

public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. A 

copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of congress or a statute of 

this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any court of competent jurisdiction of this 

state. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(a) (West 2008). A properly proven foreign 

judgment must be recognized and given effect coextensive with that to which it is entitled in the 

rendering state. Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1992). 

The validity of the judgment is determined by the laws of the state where it was rendered. Id. at 

795. 

Ireland filed an abstract of the Louisiana judgment in Harris County. No complaint has 

been made regarding the authentication of the judgment. Louisiana law applies to resolve this 

case, and we sustain Ireland’s second issue.

Solidary Liability

Both parties agree that Louisiana law applies. They disagree on whether the trial court 

correctly applied the Louisiana law at issue. Ireland sued Hart and Rodrigues, “in solido,” 

pursuant to a Louisiana statute making it unlawful to cut, destroy, or remove trees on the land of 

another without the consent of the owner. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4278.1 (2012). Further, 

one who willfully violates the statute is liable to the owner for damages in the amount of three 

times the fair market value of the trees that were cut, plus reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. In 

Louisiana’s civil law system, the concept of “in solido” liability is synonymous with the 
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common law phrase “joint and several” liability. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885, 889 

(La. 1993). The primary effect of solidary liability is that any defendant may be compelled to 

pay the entire judgment. Id. at 890. Payment by one solidary obligor relieves all other solidary 

obligors. Id. n.7. An obligation in solido is not presumed, but arises from a clear expression of 

the parties’ intent or from the law. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1796 (2012). It is the 

coextensiveness of the obligations for the same debt that creates the solidarity of the obligation. 

Cutsinger v. Redfern, 12 So.3d 945, 951 (La. 2009)

The thrust of Rodrigues’s argument is that his obligation is in solido because Ireland 

included the phrase in the style of the documents she drafted, including the trial court’s 

judgment. While Ireland sued Hart and Rodrigues in solido, and the term is in the style of the 

case, the judgment never specifically states that the court ordered Hart and Rodrigues solidarily 

liable. Including the term in the style of the case is not alone sufficient to constitute a holding by 

the trial court that the defendants are solidary obligors. See Brandner v. Staf-Rath, L.L.C., 64 

So.3d 812, 825-26 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2011), writ denied, 68 So.3d 523 (La. 2011). 

We next consider the body of the judgment. The first decretal paragraph of the trial 

court’s judgment orders Hart to pay Ireland 

$302,553.39 [representing the fair market value of the timber interest of Maxine 

Hart Prewitt, multiplied by three (3), plus $11,000.00 attorney’s fees, less a 

credit of $15,294.13 . . . and further, less a credit of $1,340.81 . . .] together with 

legal interest. 

The second decretal paragraph orders Rodrigues to pay Ireland “$89,000.00 (representing the fair 

market value of the timber cut by MALCOLM RODRIGUES, multiplied by three (3), plus 

$11,000.00 attorney’s fees) together with legal interest thereon.” The third decretal paragraph 

orders that Rodrigues is awarded judgment against Hart for $11,000.00, together with legal 

interest thereon. The final decretal paragraph orders Hart to pay “the costs in this matter.” 

Accordingly, the judgment does not specifically hold Hart and Rodrigues liable in solido. 

Instead, the judgment specifies amounts each defendant is responsible for paying.

Actual Damages

Hart paid $490,196.80 toward satisfaction of the judgment. Ireland concedes that the 

judgment against Hart includes the value of the timber cut by Rodrigues, and she agrees to credit 

Rodrigues for $26,000.00.1 She contends that the remaining awards of $52,000.00 for punitive 

damages and $11,000.00 for attorney’s fees were not satisfied by Hart’s payment.

 

1

In Hart’s appeal, the Louisiana appellate court set out the jury findings. Prewitt v. Rodrigues, 893 So.2d 

927, 931 (La. Ct. App. 3 Cir. 2005, no writ), overruled in part by Sullivan v. Wallace, 51 So.3d 702 (La. 2010). 

Further, the trial court granted Rodrigues’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that the 
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Punitive Damages

Louisiana courts have determined that the timber piracy statute, as article 3:4278.1 is 

referred to, is punitive in nature and must be strictly construed. Sullivan v. Wallace, 51 So.3d 

702, 707 (La. 2010). Compensatory damages recompense a plaintiff for injury caused by a 

defendant’s act. Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 828 So. 2d 546, 552 (La. 2002). Punitive damages are 

not caused by a defendant’s act and are not designed to make an injured party whole. Id. at 552-

53. Rather, they are meant to punish the tortfeasor and deter specific conduct to protect the 

public interest. Id. at 553. Punitive damages are assessed against an individual defendant based 

on his individual culpability. Id. at 552. Thus, punitive damages cannot be assessed against codefendants in solido. Id. Accordingly, under Louisiana law, the payment by Hart could not have 

satisfied the portion of the judgment ordering Rodrigues to pay punitive damages. We sustain 

Ireland’s third issue. 

Attorney’s Fees

Ireland agrees that Louisiana law allows attorney’s fees to be awarded in solido but 

asserts that the trial court did not do so in this case. The Louisiana judgment does not expressly 

state that attorney’s fees are assessed in solido. The Third Circuit’s opinion explains that the 

jury found that Hart owed $11,000.00 in attorney’s fees and Rodrigues owed $11,000.00 in 

attorney’s fees. Further, the jury was asked if Rodrigues is entitled to be reimbursed from Hart 

for any amount Rodrigues owes Prewitt because of Rodrigues’s detrimental reliance. The jury 

answered yes, $11,000.00. Prewitt, 893 So.2d at 930-31. Based on these answers, the trial court 

ordered Hart to pay Ireland $11,000.00 in attorney’s fees, ordered Rodrigues to pay Ireland 

$11,000.00 in attorney’s fees, and ordered Hart to pay Rodrigues $11,000.00 without specifying 

why. Neither party brought additional evidence relevant to the question of whether attorney’s 

fees were assessed in solido. There is no evidence that the judgment ordered attorney’s fees to 

be paid in solido, and it cannot be presumed. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1796. We sustain 

Ireland’s fourth issue. 

CONCLUSION

After applying Louisiana law, we have determined that, as a matter of law, the Louisiana 

trial court did not order Hart and Rodrigues to pay punitive damages or attorney’s fees in solido. 

Therefore, Hart’s payment to Ireland did not satisfy the judgment in full, and Rodrigues owes 

Ireland $52,000.00 for punitive damages and $11,000.00 for attorney’s fees, together with legal 

 

amount stated as the fair market value of the timber removed by Hart encompasses the amount found as the fair 

market value of the timber removed by Rodrigues. Id.
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interest thereon. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Rodrigues’s motion for partial 

summary judgment and in denying Ireland’s motion for summary judgment. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d 

at 548. We sustain Ireland’s first issue.

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in favor of Ireland.

BRIAN HOYLE

 Justice

Opinion delivered April 30, 2013.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)