COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Humphreys 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

TEDDY WOLDELASSIE ARAYA 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0044-02-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 DECEMBER 17, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge 

 Mark S. Thrash for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 A jury convicted Teddy Woldelassie Araya (appellant) for the 

murder of his ex-wife, Minat Habte (Habte), in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-32, and for use of a firearm in the commission of a murder, 

in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. Appellant contends that the 

trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence an 

affidavit in which Habte predicted that appellant would kill her.1 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

1

 On brief, appellant also contended that the trial court 

erred by failing to give a cautionary instruction but withdrew 

this ground at oral argument. 
I. 

 On July 10, 2000 appellant had a chance encounter with his 

ex-wife, Habte. Appellant later told police that Habte insulted 

him, told him to stop following her, and left. Appellant became 

angry, followed Habte and a high-speed car chase ensued. 

Habte's eyes were "really big and wide and she was gripping the 

steering wheel." Appellant "was scowling" while he gave chase. 

Shortly after seeing the two cars pass, witnesses heard "popping 

noises" and saw Habte's car roll backwards downhill; it crashed 

into a retaining wall. "[S]omebody . . . appeared to be chasing 

the car from the front." 

 After the shooting, appellant returned to his apartment, 

called 911 and told the dispatcher he just shot his wife. He 

gave the dispatcher his name; told her where the shooting 

occurred, including directions; and gave her a description of 

Habte's car. Police went to both the scene of the shooting and 

appellant's apartment. Appellant told police he followed Habte 

"for about one or two blocks" and shot her "eight or nine times, 

until he ran out of ammunition in the gun." Habte suffered "a 

number of gunshot wounds," at least two of which were fatal. 

One of Habte's wounds indicated the shooting was from "close 

range." 

II. 

 Appellant admitted that he killed Habte; but he argued that 

he did so as a result of an "irresistible impulse." At trial, 

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Dr. Neil Blumberg, appellant's expert, opined "to a reasonable 

degree of medical certainty, that [appellant] does suffer from 

. . . actually two serious mental diseases, . . . and that as a 

result of those disorders he was unable to resist the impulse to 

commit the crime." Specifically, he stated that appellant 

suffered from 

a major depressive disorder, single episode, 

severe with psychotic features. And . . . 

post traumatic [sic] stress disorder, 

chronic. . . . In fact these two disorders 

had been present for some time prior to the 

offense, but certainly were present at the 

time of the offense and, in my opinion, 

directly led to his being unable to control 

the impulse to commit the crime. 

Dr. Blumberg also stated that appellant was "a pretty 

non-violent person" and a "peaceful law-abiding citizen." 

Dr. Blumberg opined that the shooting was "so grossly out of 

character for [appellant]" that he viewed the shooting as "an 

explosive outburst." 

 During cross-examination of Dr. Blumberg, the Commonwealth's 

attorney sought to introduce into evidence an affidavit made by 

Habte in September 1998 as the basis for a protective order 

against appellant.2 The Commonwealth argued the affidavit, which 

the expert conceded he had reviewed, was admissible to show the 

expert's bias. The affidavit states: 

 2

 The trial court had already admitted into evidence a 

redacted version of the affidavit during the Commonwealth's 

case-in-chief over appellant's hearsay objection. Whether the 

redacted version was properly admitted is not before us. 

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On 9/24/98 my husband came in evening at 

8:00 p.m. and he was staying in his own 

bedroom until 10:30 p.m. After he calls me 

in the bedroom and he starting [sic] 

fighting and hitting me in my heart surround 

and I was fented [sic] so that quickly I 

called the police they came at 11:30 and 

they asked him and he says this is not true. 

After the police said this the 1st time we 

just live [sic] him like that if there is 

anything happened please call us they said. 

But after them left he started fighting and 

insult. 

* * * * * * * 

Secondly I would like to request if there is 

any thing [sic] happened he is the one he 

killed me because after the police depart "I 

will show you I will kill you said to" so 

that please give him the first and last 

warning. 

* * * * * * * 

He said I will show you he might be kill me. 

* * * * * * * 

1) I am so afraid because he is in the house 

so that he will [sic] hitting me or kill me. 

2) He has to be far from my house and around 

my job. 

3) For the last and the end the government 

may asked to far away from my surround. 

 Habte signed the affidavit under oath before the intake 

officer of the Arlington County Juvenile and Domestic Relations 

District Court.3 Over appellant's objection, the trial court 

 3

 The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for 

Arlington County granted a protective order for one year on 

October 13, 1998 after a hearing at which both appellant and 

Habte appeared. Police found a copy of the protective order in 

the glove compartment of appellant's car after the shooting. 

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admitted the affidavit in evidence and permitted the 

Commonwealth to question appellant's expert about the contents 

to establish his bias. 

 The jury convicted appellant of murder and use of a firearm 

in committing murder. The trial court sentenced appellant to 

twenty-two years for the murder and three years for the use of 

the firearm, in accord with the jury's recommendation. 

III. 

 Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting the affidavit into evidence. Appellant argues the 

affidavit and the statements contained therein were not 

probative of the expert's bias. We disagree. 

 "Justice does not require exclusion of evidence that is 

probative of the central issue on trial and that the accused 

himself chooses to interject." Kirk v. Commonwealth, 21 

Va. App. 291, 298, 464 S.E.2d 162, 165-66 (1995). Dr. Blumberg 

testified on direct that appellant was "a pretty non-violent 

person" and that, but for the shooting, he was "an otherwise 

peaceful law-abiding citizen." When appellant elicited these 

statements, he opened the door for the Commonwealth to 

cross-examine Dr. Blumberg on instances of appellant's violence 

toward the victim. See, e.g., Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 

220, 252, 421 S.E.2d 821, 840 (1992); Newton v. Commonwealth, 29 

Va. App. 433, 456, 512 S.E.2d 846, 856-57 (1999). 

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Once a party has "opened the door" to 

inquiry into a subject, the permissible 

scope of examination on the subject by the 

opposing party is "a matter for the exercise 

of discretion by the trial court," and we 

will not disturb the court's action on 

appeal unless it plainly appears that the 

court abused its discretion. 

Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 545, 391 S.E.2d 276, 282 

(1990) (quoting Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 438, 304 

S.E.2d 271, 279-80 (1983)). "In determining the weight to be 

given the testimony of an expert witness, the fact finder may 

consider the basis for the expert's opinion. The credibility 

and weight of witnesses' testimony is determined by the fact 

finder." Parrish v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 607, 613, 567 

S.E.2d 576, 578-79 (2002) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

permitting the Commonwealth to cross-examine Dr. Blumberg on 

appellant's "peaceful" nature, as this testimony was probative 

of Dr. Blumberg's bias and whether he properly considered it in 

the formulation of his expert opinion at trial.4

 "The bias of a witness . . . is always a relevant subject 

of cross-examination." Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 465, 

470 S.E.2d 114, 129 (1996) (citing Norfolk & Western Railway Co. 

v. Sonney, 236 Va. 482, 488, 374 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1988); Brown v. 

 4

 "[E]xperts in criminal cases must testify on the basis of 

their own personal observations or on the basis of evidence 

adduced at trial." Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 197, 

427 S.E.2d 379, 392 (1993) (citing Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 

Va. 389, 416, 384 S.E.2d 757, 773 (1989)). 

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Commonwealth, 246 Va. 460, 464, 437 S.E.2d 563, 564-65 (1993)). 

"The issue whether a particular question may be asked about a 

witness' bias is a matter submitted to the trial court's 

discretion." Id. (citing Shanklin v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 862, 

864, 284 S.E.2d 611, 612 (1981)). Here, the Commonwealth had 

the right to test Dr. Blumberg's bias by attempting to show the 

jury that Dr. Blumberg improperly discounted the information 

contained in the affidavit regarding appellant's prior acts of 

violence. 

IV. 

 Moreover, even assuming admission of the affidavit was 

error, we hold that any error was harmless. "The effect of an 

error on a verdict varies widely depending upon the 

circumstances of the case. Each case must, therefore, be 

analyzed individually to determine if an error has affected the 

verdict." Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1009, 407 

S.E.2d 910, 913 (1991) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). "In this case, in order to determine if it plainly 

appears that the error did not affect the verdict, we must 

review the record and the evidence and evaluate the effect the 

error may have had on how the finder of fact resolved the 

contested issues." Id. at 1007, 407 S.E.2d at 912. "An error 

does not affect the verdict if we can determine, without 

'usurping the jury's fact finding function, that, had the error 

not occurred, the verdict would have been the same.'" Hanson v. 

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Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 173, 190, 416 S.E.2d 14, 24 (1992) 

(quoting Lavinder, 12 Va. App. at 1005, 407 S.E.2d at 911). 

 Erroneously admitted evidence may be harmless when it tends 

to prove an undisputed fact that is also proven by other 

independently derived evidence. Hooker v. Commonwealth, 14 

Va. App. 454, 457-58, 418 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1992). The decisive 

issue in this case was whether appellant's mind was "so impaired 

by disease that he [was] totally deprived of the mental power to 

control or restrain his act." Godley v. Commonwealth, 2 

Va. App. 249, 251, 343 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1986) (citing Thompson 

v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 718, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (1952)). 

 Appellant's expert opined that appellant suffered from two 

mental defects and that these conditions "directly led to his 

being unable to control the impulse to commit the crime." The 

Commonwealth's expert, on the other hand, stated that appellant 

did "not meet the criteria for either a cognitive impairment or 

a volitional impairment that would rise to the level that's 

typically associated with a finding of insanity" even if he had 

a mental disease. Thus, the question before the jury was 

whether appellant suffered from an irresistible impulse at the 

time of the shooting, not whether the victim feared him.

 "'Even though testimony is objectionable as hearsay, its 

admission is harmless error when the content of the 

extra-judicicial declaration is clearly established by other 

competent evidence.'" West v Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 906, 

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911, 407 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1991) (quoting Schindel v. Commonwealth, 

219 Va. 814, 817, 252 S.E.2d 302, 304 (1979)). See also Bowman 

v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 204, 212, 503 S.E.2d 241, 245 

(1998); Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 9, 12, 427 S.E.2d 

442, 444 (1993). Thus, we must review the evidence to determine 

whether the affidavit was merely cumulative and whether the 

information it contained was clearly established by other 

evidence. Extensive other evidence established that the victim 

feared appellant and was afraid he intended to kill her. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. See Juares v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 

493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997). So viewed, the evidence proved that 

appellant had many violent confrontations with Habte during their 

marriage and after their divorce in December 1999. Habte told at 

least three people at different times that appellant hit her. 

Habte's sister testified appellant came home one evening and "he 

started arguing with [Habte] . . . he's pulling . . . and he 

wanted to hit her again. . . . And she was running." Appellant 

also "insulted her that she is sleeping with a man — with 

different men in front of me." Habte also told her sister that 

appellant "hit her . . . in her breast." Similarly, the 

parties' neighbor stated that the police were called to the 

marital home twice. On one occasion, Habte appeared at the 

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neighbor's door claiming appellant hit her. Habte stayed with 

the neighbor until the police arrived. When the neighbor later 

asked appellant why he hit Habte, appellant replied he had not 

hit her; rather, "he merely threw a book at her." Appellant 

also told the neighbor "that [Habte's] family is a family of 

whores." After Habte went to stay with a family friend for a 

week, appellant admitted to the friend he had hit Habte, "he say, 

The way I hit her, it wasn't that big, or a big issue to make of 

it." 

 In September 1998, after one of these confrontations, Habte 

sought and received the protective order that required appellant 

to "refrain from committing further acts of family abuse." 

Numerous witnesses, including Habte's sister and members of 

appellant's family, testified about the protective order. 

Police found copies of the protective order and Habte's affidavit 

in support of the order in appellant's glovebox and among his 

personal papers. Under these circumstances, we find that the 

affidavit was merely cumulative of other evidence that appellant 

had a history of violence toward Habte and that she sought the 

help of others, including the courts, for protection. 

 Additionally, the evidence showed that appellant was in 

control of his actions immediately after he shot Habte. 

Appellant called the 911 dispatcher and told her he killed his 

wife, provided the dispatcher with directions and a description 

of Habte's car, and was still on the phone with the 911 

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dispatcher when police arrived at his apartment. He later 

revised his version of how the shooting occurred, claiming he 

"blacked out." Appellant told the Commonwealth's expert: 

He remembered that she was insulting to him, 

. . . that she called him an obscene name 

. . . . He remembers getting very angry 

with her at this. He remembers that she 

took something and threw it and hit him in 

the face, some type of small white object. 

He's not sure what it was. 

And then he said that is really the last 

thing that he remembered, that there was 

then a blank in his memory, a complete 

blank, and that the next thing that he 

remembered is that he was sitting in his own 

apartment, . . . with his handgun, and that 

he noticed that his handgun was empty when 

previously it had been fully loaded. 

These actions support the Commonwealth's expert's opinion that 

appellant's actions were not the product of an "irresistible 

impulse." 

 Lastly, Dr. Blumberg testified that the content of the 

affidavit was "entirely consistent with my assessment of 

[appellant's] mental state." He stated that the affidavit 

showed appellant "was out of touch with reality and delusional 

about their relationship, viewing [Habte] as cheating on him, 

conspiring against him when in fact he was having major 

difficulties controlling his behavior with her." Thus, 

appellant's expert conceded that the affidavit merely supported 

his theory of irresistible impulse. Clearly, the record 

supports that "[t]he parties have had a fair trial on the merits 

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and substantial justice has been reached." Lavinder, 12 

Va. App. at 1010, 407 S.E.2d at 914. Accordingly, the judgment 

of the trial court is affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

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