J-A10016-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

STREAMLINE SOLUTIONS, LLC, 

STREAMLINE CONSTRUCTION 

MANAGEMENT, LLC, STREAMLINE 

GROUP, LLC, US CAPITAL 

INVESTMENTS 7, LLC, LION 

CONSTRUCTION, LLC, AND MICHAEL 

STILLWELL 

 Appellants 

 v. 

STUART GREEN AND MICHAEL 

TRUMBO 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1912 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Order Entered June 20, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 230400946 

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., BECK, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED AUGUST 30, 2024

Five corporate entities—Streamline Solutions, LLC; Streamline 

Construction Management, LLC; Streamline Group, LLC; US Capital 

Investments 7, LLC (“Seller”); and Lion Construction, LLC (“General 

Contractor”) (collectively, the “Streamline Entities”)—and Michael Stillwell 

(“Stillwell,” and together with the Streamline Entities, “Appellants”) appeal 

from the order confirming the arbitration award against Appellants in favor of 

Stuart Green and Michael Trumbo (together, “Buyers”). Appellants challenge 

the legal standard used by the trial court to deny its petition to vacate or 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
J-A10016-24 

- 2 - 

modify the award (the “Petition”), the trial court’s confirmation of the award 

against Stillwell despite the lack of an agreement to arbitrate, and the trial 

court’s confirmation of the award despite the Buyers’ release of claims against 

Appellants. Upon review, we affirm. 

On October 15, 2018, Buyers entered into an agreement of sale 

(“Agreement”) with Seller to purchase a townhouse on Darian Street in 

Philadelphia (“the Home”). The Home was one of six newly constructed 

townhouses in a development on an urban lot subdivided into six parcels. The 

Home “had been marketed, developed, constructed, warrantied, and sold by 

various entities owned by ... Stillwell and marketed under the ‘Streamline’ 

brand.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/10/2023, at 2. Only Seller and Buyers were 

listed as parties to the Agreement, with Steve Kosloski1 signing the Agreement 

on behalf of the Seller. Stillwell, who was an owner and vice president of 

Seller, as well as partial owner of Streamline Solutions, LLC, Streamline 

Construction Management, LLC, and General Contractor, was listed in the 

Agreement as Seller’s real estate broker/agent.2

____________________________________________ 

1

 Although his title or capacity is not listed in the Agreement, Stillwell testified 

at the arbitration that Steve Kosloski was one of the Seller’s vice presidents. 

Buyers’ Answer to Petition, 5/5/2023, at Exhibit W (N.T., 12/12/2022, at 230). 

2

 The Agreement stated that Buyers were purchasing the property “as is” and 

that Seller disclaimed various warranties and representations other than a 

limited one-year warranty provided by Seller. Petition, 4/6/2022, at Exhibit 

B (Agreement at 4). Additionally, tacked on to the end of the Agreement was 

another reference to the “as is” sale and a broadly worded release, wherein 

Buyers agreed to release a multitude of claims against “Seller, all brokers, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
J-A10016-24 

- 3 - 

The Agreement contained the following arbitration clause: 

11. ARBITRATION: Buyer[s], on behalf of Buyer[s] and all 

residents of the [Home], including minor children, hereby agree 

that any and all disputes with Seller, Seller’s parent company or 

their partners, subsidiaries, or affiliates arising out of the [Home], 

this Agreement, the Home Warranty, any other agreements, 

communications or dealings involving Buyer[s], or the 

construction or condition of the Premises including, but not limited 

to, disputes concerning breach of contract, express and implied 

warranties, personal injuries and/or illness, mold-related claims, 

representations and/or omissions by Seller, on-site and off-site 

conditions and all other torts and statutory causes of action 

(“Claims”), shall be resolved by binding arbitration. 

(a) All disputes arising out of the Home Warranty or any other 

express warranties shall be resolved by binding arbitration in 

accordance with the rules and procedures set forth in the Home 

Warranty. 

(b) All other Claims, regardless of the amount in dispute, shall be 

resolved by binding arbitration by the American Arbitration 

Association (“AAA”) and in accordance with its Expedited 

Procedures of the Commercial Arbitration Rules, which Rules can 

be viewed at www.adr.org. If AAA is unable to arbitrate a 

particular claim, then that claim shall be resolved by binding 

arbitration by AAA’s successor or an equivalent organization 

mutually agreed upon by the Parties. 

(c) The provisions of this paragraph shall be governed by the 

provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1, et seq. and 

shall survive settlement. 

(d) In addition, Buyer[s agree] that Buyer[s] may not initiate any 

arbitration proceeding for any Claim unless and until Buyer[s] first 

[provide] a copy of the Demand for Arbitration stating specific 

written notice of each claim (sent to Streamline Solutions, LLC, 

2301 Washington Ave., Suite 111, Philadelphia, PA 19146 Attn.: 

____________________________________________ 

their licensees, employees, and any officer or partner of any one of them and 

any other person, firm or corporation who may be liable by or through them.” 

Id. (Agreement at 20). 
J-A10016-24 

- 4 - 

Legal Department via certified mail only) and gives Seller a 

reasonable opportunity after receipt to cure any default. 

Petition, 4/6/2022, at Exhibit B (Agreement at 6). 

After the Home developed leaks, Buyers initiated arbitration 

proceedings on May 17, 2022. Buyers brought claims against Appellants3

averring that the entities operated as alter egos of the others, which 

warranted piercing their corporate veils. See Petition, 4/6/2022, at Exhibit A 

(Statement of Claims, 5/17/2022, at 2 n.1, 6-9). Buyers asserted the 

following causes of action against Appellants: 

(1) fraud, fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation 

and/or intentional misrepresentation; (2) violation of the 

Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 

[(“UTPCPL”), 73 P.S. §§ 201-1–201-9.3;] (3) bad faith; (4) 

negligence, (5) negligence per se; (6) breach of express warranty; 

(7) breach of implied warranties, (8) breach of contract, (9) and 

breach of contract under third-party beneficiary theories. 

Id. (Statement of Claims, 5/17/2022, at 10). Buyers contended that the 

claims arose from “defective construction of the Home” and “unfair and 

deceptive trade practices” that occurred before and after the sale regarding 

“the advertisement, marketing, sale, and construction of the Home” and the 

“ongoing failure to properly repair” and/or “refusal” to repair “the interior and 

exterior of the home.” Statement of Claims, 5/17/2022, at 3. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 The statement of claims also named other entities and an individual. The 

arbitrator dismissed Sean Frankel, Frankel Property Management, Darien 

Partners, LLC, and 1305 Kater LLC from the arbitration proceedings prior to 

the award. The arbitrator expressly determined that no relief was due from 

the other entities named by the Buyers: Streamline, LLC; Lion Construction 

Management, LLC; Coulbee, LLC; and Streamline Philly Construction, LLC. 
J-A10016-24 

- 5 - 

 Appellants filed a submission in response to the statement of claims 

(“Answering Statement”) with a variety of arguments, including, pertinently, 

that only Seller and General Contractor, and not any of the other “improperly 

joined parties,” had any involvement with the sale and construction of the 

home. Answer to Petition to Vacate, 5/5/2023, at Exhibit AA (Answering 

Statement at 2). To the extent any documents referred to other “Streamlinerelated entities,” Appellants sought dismissal of “claims against entities other 

than [Seller]” because they were “agents for a disclosed principal” and not 

separately liable. Id. (Answering Statement at 3-4) (citing Bash v. Bell 

Telephone Co., 601 A.2d 825 (Pa. Super. 1992) (holding that an agent for a 

disclosed principal is not personally liable unless agent agreed to liability in 

the principal’s contract)). 

 Appellants filed a separate motion to dismiss claims related to a certain 

wall on the property, contending that the AAA lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate 

claims involving a certain common “party wall.” Answer to Petition to Vacate, 

5/5/2023, at Exhibit J (Motion to Dismiss at 1). Notably, Appellants 

acknowledged that AAA arbitration was otherwise “the proper forum for a 

determination of the various construction related claims asserted by the 

[Buyers].” Id. (Motion to Dismiss at 5). 

A single arbitrator presided over the four-day arbitration hearing in 

December 2022. On January 27, 2023, the arbitrator entered a partial award 

in favor of the Buyers, which included certain actual damages related to 
J-A10016-24 

- 6 - 

remediation and repair of the Home and treble damages pursuant to the 

UTPCPL. The arbitrator assessed Buyers’ attorneys’ fees against Appellants, 

indicating that it would issue a final award after receiving submissions from 

the parties regarding the amount of the fees. 

Appellants filed a motion for modification of the award pursuant to Rule 

50 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, insisting that Stillwell’s inclusion 

within the liable parties must have been a “typographical or clerical error 

resulting from the sheer multitude of parties to the case” because there was 

no evidence that Stillwell communicated with the Buyers or that he 

perpetrated a fraud. Motion to Modify, 2/14/2023, ¶ 5. They requested that 

the arbitrator correct the award to omit Stillwell as a liable party. Id., ¶¶ 4-

6. The arbitrator denied the motion to modify, explaining that it intended to 

include Stillwell. The arbitrator further found the argument that there was no 

factual or legal basis to hold Stillwell liable in his individual capacity was simply 

an invitation to redetermine the merits of the dispute, which Rule 50 expressly 

prohibited. Arbitration Order, 3/8/2023, at 2. 

The arbitrator entered a final award in the Buyers’ favor on March 8, 

2023 (“the Award”). The Award provided that the Buyers could recover 

$503,146.25 from Appellants, jointly and severally, which included actual and 

treble damages from the partial award and the Buyers’ attorneys’ fees. The 

arbitrator denied all remaining claims. 
J-A10016-24 

- 7 - 

Appellants filed a petition to vacate the Award in the Philadelphia County 

Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”), requesting that the trial court vacate 

and/or modify the Award pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 7314(a)(1)(v) because 

there was no agreement to arbitrate between Buyers and Stillwell.4 

Alternatively, Appellants argued that the arbitrator did not rationally derive 

the Award from the Agreement because Buyers released all claims outside of 

the limited one-year warranty. Buyers filed an answer. On June 20, 2023, 

the trial court entered an order denying the petition and confirming the Award. 

Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court and Appellants 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 Appellants ask this Court to resolve the following questions: 

A. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by applying 

the more restrictive standard of review applicable to common 

law arbitration awards instead of the broader standard of 

review of applicable to statutory arbitration awards under 42 

Pa.C.S. § 7314? 

B. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion when it denied 

the petition to vacate and confirmed the Award against 

[Stillwell] because no agreement to arbitrate exists or existed 

by and between [Stillwell and the Buyers] and [Stillwell] cannot 

be compelled to arbitrate under any applicable theory of 

contract or agency law? 

____________________________________________ 

4

 In the petition to vacate, Appellants also contended that there was no 

agreement to arbitrate between Buyers and five of the corporate entities 

(Streamline Solutions, LLC, Streamline Construction Management, LLC, 

Streamline Group, LLC, and General Contractor). However, in its appellate 

brief, Appellants have abandoned the argument as to these five corporate 

entities because the brief references only Stillwell. See Appellants’ Brief at 6, 

15-16, 23-39. 
J-A10016-24 

- 8 - 

C. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion when it denied 

the petition to vacate and confirmed the arbitration award 

against Appellants because the award is not rationally derived 

from the [Agreement] and the arbitrator exceeded its powers 

for the following reasons: (1) Buyers’ statement of claims did 

not assert any claims against [Stillwell] and the Arbitrator, 

therefore, did not have the power to enter an award against 

[Stillwell]; and (2) the Award cannot be reconciled with the 

agreement of sale’s clear and unambiguous terms, which 

preclude Buyers’ claims? 

Appellants’ Brief at 6-7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a petition to vacate or modify 

an arbitration award, we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion or error 

of law. PennEnergy Res., LLC v. Winfield Res., LLC, 301 A.3d 439, 452 

n.17 (Pa. Super. 2023). 

In the first issue, Appellants argue that the trial court committed 

reversible error by applying the standard of review applicable to common law 

arbitrations instead of the standard of review applicable to statutory 

arbitrations. Appellants’ Brief at 16-21. Based upon this error, Appellants 

assert that this Court must remand for the trial court to decide its petition to 

vacate under the proper standard of review. Id. (citing MGA Ins. Co. v. 

Bakos, 699 A.2d 751, 753 (Pa. Super. 1997) (determining that, in an 

arbitration governed by the rules of statutory arbitration, the “trial court erred 

as a matter of law ... by employing the more narrow standard of review 

applicable to a common law arbitration” and remanding for the trial court to 

review the award pursuant to the correct standard)). 
J-A10016-24 

- 9 - 

As noted above, Seller and Buyers expressly agreed in the Agreement 

that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-402, governed 

arbitration. Without some other basis for federal jurisdiction, “parties to an 

arbitration agreement created under the FAA are required to submit an appeal 

from an arbitration award to state trial courts in the first instance.” 

Trombetta v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 A.2d 550, 563 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). If a party enforces an arbitration agreement that provides for 

the FAA’s governance in state court, state law procedure, including the 

standard of review, applies. See Moscatiello v. Hilliard, 939 A.2d 325, 328 

(Pa. 2007). 

In Pennsylvania, a trial court’s standard for reviewing an arbitration 

award varies depending upon whether the arbitration is classified as common 

law, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7341-42, or statutory under the Uniform Arbitration Act 

(“UAA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7301-7320. In general, an agreement to arbitrate a 

controversy entered into prior to July 1, 2019,5 is “conclusively presumed” to 

be an agreement to arbitrate as a common law arbitration. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 7302(a). If the arbitration agreement expressly provides in writing for 

____________________________________________ 

5

 The General Assembly passed the Revised Statutory Arbitration Act 

(“RSAA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7321.1-.31, which phases out common law 

arbitration in this Commonwealth in favor of the provisions in RSAA. See 

Foster v. Nuffer, 286 A.3d 279, 284 n. 3 (Pa. Super. 2022). The RSAA 

applies to all arbitration agreements made on or after July 1, 2019. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 7321.4(a). The UAA continues to govern agreements that predate July 1, 

2019, such as the Agreement in the instant case, unless the parties expressly 

agree otherwise. See id. § 7321.4(b)(1)-(2). 
J-A10016-24 

- 10 - 

arbitration pursuant to the UAA’s statutory arbitration provisions “or any other 

similar statute,” such as the FAA, the UAA’s provisions apply. Id.; 

Moscatiello, 939 A.2d at 328. 

Section 7314 of the UAA sets forth the trial court’s standard of review 

of a statutory arbitration award, which provides, in pertinent part, that a trial 

court “shall vacate an award” upon application of a party where: 

(i) the court would vacate the award under section 7341 (relating 

to common law arbitration) if this subchapter were not applicable; 

(ii) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a 

neutral or corruption or misconduct in any of the arbitrators 

prejudicing the rights of any party; 

(iii) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 

(iv) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon good 

cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material 

to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, 

contrary to the provisions of section 7307 (relating to hearing 

before arbitrators), as to prejudice substantially the rights of a 

party; or 

(v) there was no agreement to arbitrate and the issue of the 

existence of an agreement to arbitrate was not adversely 

determined in proceedings under section 7304 (relating to court 

proceedings to compel or stay arbitration) and the applicant-party 

raised the issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate at 

the hearing. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 7314(a)(1). The grounds upon which a trial court may vacate 

an award in a statutory arbitration are “exclusive” to those listed in section 

7314. Schwarz v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, 58 A.3d 1270, 1274 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). 
J-A10016-24 

- 11 - 

Section 7341, on the other hand, provides that a common law 

arbitration award is “binding and may not be vacated or modified unless it is 

clearly shown that a party was denied a hearing or that fraud, misconduct, 

corruption or other irregularity caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable 

or unconscionable award.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7341. As compared to section 7341, 

the trial court’s standard of review under section 7314 is broad. MGA Ins. 

Co., 699 A.2d at 753. Nevertheless, there is overlap between the grounds for 

vacatur in common law arbitrations and statutory arbitrations. See Martin 

v. PMA Grp., 617 A.2d 361, 363 (Pa. Super. 1992). 

Because the Agreement specified that the arbitration fell under a statute 

similar to the UAA, the arbitration was statutory, requiring application of the 

standard of review set forth in section 7314. See Moscatiello, 939 A.2d at 

328. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, however, the trial court set forth the 

more limited standard for vacating a common law arbitration award, citing to 

section 7341 and a common law arbitration case in support. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 10/10/2023, at 3 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 7341; Roccograndi v. Martin, 

214 A.3d 251, 256 (Pa. Super. 2019)). Significantly, however, the trial court 

also recognized two additional grounds to vacate an arbitration award: if the 

arbitrator exceeded his power or if there was no agreement to arbitrate. Id. 

As noted above, these are two of the grounds applicable to statutory 
J-A10016-24 

- 12 - 

arbitrations and are also the grounds for reversal raised by Appellants.6 See 

42 Pa.C.S. § 7314(a)(1)(iii), (v); see also Appellants’ Brief at 22-43. 

Although the trial court did not explicitly reference subsections 

7314(a)(1)(iii) and (v), it did consider the Petition under the grounds relied 

upon by Appellants. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/10/2023, at 3. Thus, unlike 

in MGA Ins. Co., where the standard of review applied by the trial court could 

have impacted the outcome of the case,7 remand is unnecessary under the 

circumstances of this case. The sole grounds raised by Appellants not only 

apply to reviews of a common law arbitration award and a statutory arbitration 

award, but were expressly considered by the trial court. See Civan, 180 A.3d 

at 493; 42 Pa.C.S. § 7314(a)(1)(iii), (v). Thus, no relief is due on the first 

issue. 

____________________________________________ 

6

 These two grounds are referenced in Civan v. Windmere Farms, Inc., 

wherein this Court held that, notwithstanding the limited judicial standard of 

review applicable to common law arbitrations set forth in section 7341, the 

trial court may vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator exceeded its power 

by rendering an award against a person or entity who was not subject to a 

valid agreement to arbitrate. Civan v. Windmere Farms, Inc., 180 A.3d 

489, 493 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

7

 In MGA Ins. Co., a party contested the arbitrator’s apparent failure to 

review video recordings and transcripts of medical expert witnesses before 

rendering its award. See MGA Ins. Co., 699 A.2d at 752-53. The arbitrators 

had more procedural discretion under section 7341 than they did under 

section 7314, which requires vacatur if the arbitrations refuse to hear all 

material evidence. Compare 42 Pa.C.S. § 7341 with 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 7314(a)(1)(iv). 
J-A10016-24 

- 13 - 

Appellants next argue that the trial court erred and/or abused its 

discretion by declining to vacate the arbitration award against Stillwell 

pursuant to section 7314(a)(1)(v) because no agreement to arbitrate between 

Stillwell and the Buyers existed. See Appellants’ Brief at 22-39. As a nonsignatory to the Agreement, Appellants argue that Stillwell cannot be bound 

to arbitrate except through the following traditional principles of contract and 

agency law: incorporation by reference; assumption; agency; piercing the 

corporate veil; acting as an alter ego; or estoppel. Id. at 22-29. In particular, 

Appellants insist that the Buyers did not include within their statement of 

claims a claim that Stillwell was bound by a veil piercing/alter ego theory, let 

alone prove such a claim with evidence. Id. at 27-29. As “part-time owner 

and officer” of Seller, Stillwell is not Seller’s parent company, partner, 

subsidiary, or affiliate, which are the only entities besides Seller that are 

encapsulated by the Agreement’s arbitration clause. Id. at 29-33. 

Furthermore, Appellants contend, Stillwell did not consent to arbitration and 

preserved his objection in his pre-hearing submissions and during the hearing. 

Id. at 37-38. 

According to the trial court, however, Appellants never properly raised 

before the arbitrator the issue of whether the Agreement bound Stillwell to 

arbitrate Buyers’ dispute. Trial Court Opinion, 10/10/2023, at 4. From the 

trial court’s perspective, Stillwell waived this objection by submitting to 

arbitration, staying silent throughout the proceedings, and raising an objection 

only after the arbitrator issued the Award against him. Id. at 4-5. 
J-A10016-24 

- 14 - 

The law is clear that if a party disputes whether a valid agreement binds 

it to arbitrate the matter in a statutory arbitration case, the party must raise 

the issue (1) in advance of the arbitration in a motion to compel or to stay 

arbitration pursuant to section 7304 or (2) after arbitration in a petition to 

vacate pursuant to section 7314(a)(1)(v). See Patton v. Hanover Ins. Co., 

612 A.2d 517, 519 (Pa. Super. 1992). Pursuant to the UAA, the party may 

only wait until after arbitration to contest the applicability of the arbitration 

agreement in a statutory arbitration if the trial court did not already adversely 

decide the matter upon a section 7304 motion and if the petitioner “raised the 

issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate at the hearing.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 7314(a)(1)(v). Requiring a party to first raise the issue of a valid arbitration 

agreement before the arbitrator “comports with our well-established rule that 

questions not raised before a lower tribunal are deemed waived.” W. Shore 

Educ. Ass’n v. W. Shore Sch. Dist., 456 A.2d 715, 717 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983). 

Raising the issue preserves it for the trial court’s review and, ultimately, our 

review. See Patton, 612 A.2d at 519; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co. v. Dill, 108 A.3d 882, 886 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (holding that 

appellate waiver rules requiring a “timely and specific objection at the 

appropriate stage of the proceedings” before the lower tribunals “apply to 

arbitration hearings with the same force as they do to any other adversarial 

proceeding”). 

Here, Stillwell could have filed a section 7304 motion with the trial court 

seeking to stay the arbitration based upon his contention that the Agreement’s 
J-A10016-24 

- 15 - 

arbitration clause did not apply to him. He did not. Instead, he participated 

in the arbitration by obtaining joint counsel with the Streamline Entities, 

appearing at each hearing, and testifying as a witness. 

Moreover, although Stillwell argues that he “raised the issue of the 

existence of an agreement to arbitrate at the hearing,” the record indicates 

otherwise. Rule 7 of the AAA’s commercial rules requires that “a party must 

object to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator or to the arbitrability of a claim or 

counterclaim no later than the filing of the answering statement to the claim 

or counterclaim that gives rise to the objection.” Answer to Petition to Vacate, 

5/5/2022, at Exhibit K (AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules). Nowhere in 

Stillwell’s Answering Statement is a specific objection to the jurisdiction of the 

arbitrator to adjudicate the claims against Stillwell or even to the arbitrability 

of the claims in general. Instead, the answering statement focused upon 

factual and legal assertions concerning liability: that Stillwell and the named 

entities other than Seller and General Contractor had no involvement with the 

sale and construction of the home; that any award to Buyers should not 

include fees spent on “uninvolved parties”; and that to the “extent other 

Streamline-related entities are identified in the records including the warranty 

portal,” claims against all “entities other than [Seller]” should be dismissed 

because they were “agents for a disclosed principal” that had not agreed to 

assume separate liability and were not “responsible for construction defects 

or warranty claims.” Answer to Petition to Vacate, 5/5/2023, at Exhibit AA 
J-A10016-24 

- 16 - 

(Answering Statement at 2-4). Stillwell raised no objection based upon 

jurisdiction or arbitrability. 

Appellants also direct our attention to their counsel’s closing arguments 

to the arbitrator. There, however, counsel simply reiterated the arguments 

set forth in the Answering Statement (that Stillwell “never had any interaction 

with any of the claimants, no e-mails, no conversations”; that “he didn’t sign 

anything personally”; and that he only signed the deed as part of the sale) 

and that because of this non-involvement, Stillwell had “no personal liability.” 

Petition, 5/5/2022, at Exhibit D (N.T., 12/14/2022, at 86) (emphasis added). 

Even assuming arguendo that raising the issue in a closing argument after

the close of evidence could be considered a timely objection, an assertion that 

Stillwell did not have personal liability does not amount to a specific objection 

to the arbitrator’s power to decide the issue. To the contrary, it indicates that 

Appellants desired for the arbitrator to adjudicate the question of Stillwell’s 

liability. It was only once the arbitrator ruled adversely to Stillwell that 

Appellants contested the applicability of the arbitration clause to Stillwell. This 

does not comport with the statutory obligation to raise “the issue of the 

existence of an agreement to arbitrate at the hearing.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 7314(a)(1)(v). Having forgone the opportunity to challenge the arbitration 

clause at the appropriate times, Appellants failed to preserve their objection 

that the Agreement did not bind Stillwell to arbitrate the claims against him. 

See id; Patton, 612 A.2d 517, 519. Accordingly, by virtue of the statutory 

language, the trial court did not err by denying the Petition as to Stillwell. 
J-A10016-24 

- 17 - 

In their next claim of error, Appellants argue that the trial court erred 

by not vacating the Award against Stillwell pursuant to section 7314(a)(1)(iii) 

because the arbitrator exceeded its powers under the Agreement. Appellants’ 

Brief at 39-43. Appellants argue that the trial court should have vacated the 

Award because it was not “rationally derived” from and does not draw its 

“essence” from the Agreement because the Buyers did not state any claims 

against Stillwell in his individual capacity in their statement of claims. Id. at 

40-43. 

This argument is wholly belied by the record. Stillwell’s contention that 

Buyers did not include him in their statement of claims ignores that Buyers 

defined references to “Streamline Entities” or “Respondents” to include 

Stillwell, and so Stillwell is named throughout Buyers’ statement of claims, as 

well as in the caption of the statement of claims. See Petition, 4/6/2022, at 

Exhibit A (Statement of Claims, at 1). No relief is due on this claim. 

In their final issue, Appellants again attack the confirmation of the 

Award pursuant to section 7314(a)(1)(iii), this time claiming that the 

arbitrator exceeded his powers under the Agreement by ignoring clauses 

indicating that Buyers purchased the property “as is” and that Buyers released 

claims against Appellants beyond the Agreement’s limited one-year warranty. 

See Appellants’ Brief at 42-48. Appellants argue that the arbitrator cannot 

ignore the clear and unambiguous language of the contract to fashion new 

remedies for the parties. Id. at 48. They also claim that any damages to 
J-A10016-24 

- 18 - 

Buyers under “tort or statutory theories are barred by the gist of the action 

and economic loss doctrines.” Id. at 48-49. 

These arguments do not present a claim pursuant to section 

7314(a)(1)(iii). Instead, Appellants complain that the arbitrator erred in its 

interpretation of the Agreement and failed to properly apply contract law 

“disguised” as a claim that the arbitrator exceeded its power. See Toll Naval 

Assocs. v. Chun-Fang Hsu, 85 A.3d 521, 529 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

Dissatisfied with the arbitrator's interpretation of the release provisions and 

as-is sale clauses in the Agreement, Appellants attempt to shoehorn their 

claim into an argument concerning the arbitrator’s “power.” Section 7314’s 

list of grounds upon which a court can vacate a statutory arbitration award, 

however, does not include vacating an award based upon a claimed 

misapplication of the law. Martin v. PMA Grp., 617 A.2d 361, 362–63 (Pa. 

Super. 1992). As this Court has recognized, section 7314(a)(2) “expressly 

states that ‘the fact that the relief awarded by the arbitrators was such that it 

could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground 

for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.’” Id. “Errors of law and fact, 

and the unavailability of appellate review of such errors, are the risks of 

arbitration.” Toll Naval Assocs., 85 A.3d at 529. 

Having reviewed each claim presented by Appellants, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in 

confirming the Award for the reasons stated. As such, we affirm the trial 

court’s order confirming the arbitration award in Buyers’ favor. 
J-A10016-24 

- 19 - 

Order affirmed. 

Judge Colins did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 

case. 

Date: 8/30/2024