IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 4-034 / 13-1953

Filed February 5, 2014

IN THE INTEREST OF B.L.,

Minor Child,

C.T., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Timothy T. 

Jarman, District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights. 

AFFIRMED.

Molly Vakulskas Joly of vakulskas Law Firm, P.C., Sioux City, for 

appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd and Janet L. 

Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Jensen, County Attorney, and 

Ian A. McConeghey, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.

Marchelle Denker, Sioux City, for minor child.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Mahan, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013).
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MAHAN, S.J.

A mother appeals a juvenile court decision terminating her parental rights 

under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) and (l) (2013). We determine there was 

clear and convincing evidence she had not maintained significant and meaningful 

contact with the child or made reasonable efforts to resume care of the child. 

There is sufficient evidence in the record to support termination of the mother’s 

parental rights under section 232.116(1)(e). We also determine it would not be in 

the child’s best interests to delay termination of the mother’s parental rights. We 

affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

Christie and Dustin are the parents of B.L., who was born in 2008. B.L. 

was previously adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance (CINA), and that 

case was dismissed on May 16, 2012. The relationship between the parents 

contained incidents of domestic violence, and Christie has a history of using 

methamphetamine. Christie and B.L. were evicted from their home in September 

2012 and did not have a permanent residence. B.L. was removed from Christie’s

care on October 2, 2012. B.L. was initially placed with his maternal grandparents

and then moved to foster care.

A new CINA petition was filed, and the juvenile court determined B.L. was 

a CINA under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), and (n) (2011). Christie had 

a drug test on October 18, 2012, which was positive for amphetamine and 

methamphetamine. She was scheduled to begin a residential substance abuse 

treatment program in January 2013, but did not show up. As a result, she lost 

her place in the program. She entered a different treatment program at the end 
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of February 2013. She was successfully discharged from that program but did 

not follow through on recommended outpatient treatment. 

Christie’s last visit with B.L. was on April 23, 2013. After that time, she

had only minimal contact with the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) 

and no longer participated in services.

The State filed a petition for termination of parental rights on August 29, 

2013. On September 18, 2013, Christie had a new substance abuse evaluation, 

which again recommended outpatient treatment. The termination hearing was 

held the next day, September 19, 2013. The day after that, September 20, 

Christie had a scheduled appointment for a mental health evaluation.

The juvenile court entered an order terminating Christie’s parental rights 

under sections 232.116(1)(e) and (l) (2013).1 The court determined Christie had 

not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child and there was 

clear and convincing evidence the child could not be returned to her care within a 

reasonable period of time. The court found termination of Christie’s parental 

rights was in the child’s best interests. Christie appeals.

II. Standard of Review

The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re D.W., 791 

N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). Clear and convincing evidence is needed to 

establish the grounds for termination. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 

2006). Where there is clear and convincing evidence, there is no serious or 

substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusion drawn from the 

evidence. In re D.D., 653 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Iowa 2002). “The paramount 

 

1 The juvenile court also terminated Dustin’s parental rights. He has not appealed.
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concern in termination proceedings is the best interest of the child.” In re D.S., 

806 N.W.2d 458, 465 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Christie claims there is insufficient evidence in the record to support 

termination of her parental rights under section 232.116(1)(e) or (l). When the 

juvenile court relies upon more than one statutory ground to terminate a parent’s 

rights, we may affirm based on one of the grounds cited by the court. See In re 

S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).

Parental rights may be terminated under section 232.116(1)(e) when (1) a 

child has been adjudicated CINA, (2) the child has been removed from the 

parent’s care for at least six consecutive months, and (3) there is clear and 

convincing evidence the parent has not maintained significant and meaningful 

contact with the child during the previous six months and has made no 

reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity 

to do so. The term “significant and meaningful contact,”

includes but is not limited to the affirmative assumption by the 

parents of the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. 

This affirmative duty, in addition to financial obligations, requires 

continued interest in the child, a genuine effort to complete the 

responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, a genuine 

effort to maintain communication with the child, and requires that 

the parents establish and maintain a place of importance in the 

child’s life.

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e); see also In re M.B., 595 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 1999).

There is no dispute in the record concerning the first two elements—B.L. 

was adjudicated CINA on December 17, 2012, and at the time of the termination 
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hearing had been removed from Christie’s care for eleven months. We also 

determine there is clear and convincing evidence in the record showing Christie 

has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with B.L. Her last visit was 

on April 23, 2013, almost five months before the termination hearing. Christie 

testified she made two attempts to set up visits after April 2013, but could not 

come to an arrangement for a suitable time with social workers. She stated she 

then gave up and made no other effort to keep in contact with B.L. Furthermore, 

she did not maintain telephone contact with B.L.

We conclude Christie’s meager efforts were not sufficient for her to 

maintain significant and meaningful contact with B.L. Additionally, there is clear 

and convincing evidence Christie had not made reasonable efforts to resume 

care of B.L. At the time of the termination hearing she was temporarily living with 

her parents, did not have a job, and was still in the process of arranging 

outpatient treatment that had been recommended for many months. We 

determine there is sufficient evidence in the record to support termination of 

Christie’s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(e).

IV. Best Interests

Christie contends termination of her parental rights is not in B.L.’s best 

interests. She asserts B.L. might be moved from his current placement in foster 

care and placed in a different prospective adoptive home so it would not be 

detrimental to him to wait an additional six months to permit her more time to 

address her problems.

In considering a child’s best interests, we give primary consideration to the 

child’s safety, to furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to 
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the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child. Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2); In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). “[W]e cannot deprive a 

child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under 

section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be 

able to provide a stable home for the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41. “A parent 

cannot wait until the eve of termination, after the statutory time periods for 

reunification have expired, to begin to express an interest in parenting.” In re 

C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000).

We conclude it would not be in the best interests of B.L. to delay the 

termination of Christie’s parental rights. She had many months to address her 

substance abuse and mental health problems but waited literally until the day 

before the termination hearing to have a new substance abuse evaluation and 

was scheduled to have a mental health evaluation the day after the hearing. As 

we have noted many times, patience with parents may soon turn into intolerable 

hardship for a child waiting for a stable home. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 

175 (Iowa 1997).

We affirm the decision of the juvenile court terminating Christie’s parental 

rights to B.L.

AFFIRMED.