Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 17, 2020.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-19-00734-CV

GREGORY GREEN, Appellant

V.

HOUSTON FIREFIGHTERS’ RELIEF AND RETIREMENT FUND, 

Appellee

On Appeal from the 129th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2017-46605

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Gregory Green sought pension benefits from appellee the Houston 

Firefighters’ Relief and Retirement Fund (“the Fund”). After the Fund denied 

Green’s request, he appealed that decision to the trial court. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 

Ann. art. 6243e.2(1) § 12(a). The trial court denied Green’s requested relief and this 

appeal followed. In two issues Green asserts the trial court erred because: (1) the 

Fund’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) he was denied 
2

due process in which to present his case for pension benefits. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Green’s appeal is authorized by article 6243e.2(1) of the Texas Revised Civil 

Statutes (“the Act”), which established a “Firefighters’ relief and retirement fund” 

in each incorporated municipality with a population of at least 1,600,000 and a fully 

paid fire department. The Act calls for a ten-member board of trustees (“the Board”), 

six of whom constitute a quorum for transacting business of the Board. Id. § 2(b), 

(j). The Board consists of the mayor or an appointed representative of the mayor, the 

city treasurer, five firefighters who are members of the Fund and elected by 

members, a retired firefighter who is elected by other retired firefighters, and two 

citizens elected by the other trustees. See id. § 2(b)–(e). The role of the Board is to 

receive, manage, and disburse the Fund, hear and determine applications for

benefits, and designate the beneficiaries or persons entitled to participate as provided 

by the Act. See id. § 2(k). The Act prescribes a variety of powers and duties bestowed 

on the Board to accomplish this purpose. See id. § 2, 3. The Act also prescribes 

standards regarding eligibility for retirement, disability, and death benefits and the 

amount of such benefits, see id. §§ 4–12, 14–16, 18, requirements for membership 

in the Fund, see id. § 13, and standards for calculating member and city 

contributions. See id.

One of the extensive Act’s many subsections permits a member to apply for 

an on-duty disability pension. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1) § 6(a). Upon 

application, if the Board determines that a member is not capable of performing the 

usual and customary duties of his or her classification or position because of the onduty disability, the member is entitled to a monthly disability pension of roughly 50 
3

percent of the member’s average salary. Id. at § 6(b)(1).1If the Board determines a 

member is not capable of performing any substantial gainful activity because of the 

on-duty disability, the monthly disability pension is roughly 75 percent of the 

member’s average salary. Id. at § 6(c)(1). The determining factor between the two 

levels of on-duty disability is whether the member’s on-duty disability prohibits the 

member from performing firefighter work, or any job at all. 

On November 2, 2016, Green, a 17-year paramedic with the Houston Fire 

Department, applied for disability pension benefits with the Fund. Green sought onduty disability benefits pursuant to section 6(c) of article 6243e.2(1), which provided 

benefits if the Fund’s board “determine[d] that a member is not capable of 

performing any substantial gainful activity because of the member’s on-duty 

disability.” Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1) § 6(c). Green’s application was 

accompanied by a certification and diagnosis from Dr. Ashley Woolbert, Green’s 

treating physician. On November 29, 2016, Green was terminated from the Houston 

Fire Department due to medical disability. 

Woolbert submitted a letter with Green’s application in which she stated that 

she was treating Green for Major Depressive Disorder and Chronic Post-Traumatic 

Stress Disorder. Woolbert stated that Green was responding to outpatient treatment 

and had been gradually improving until experiencing a traumatic event while on a 

paramedic call on May 22, 2016. On that date Green was dispatched to a scene in 

which an individual had been brutally beaten and killed. Woolbert described the

event as Green being “exposed to [the] body of [a] man who was violently beaten to 

death[.]” Woolbert stated that this exposure triggered acute stress disorder resulting 

in suicidal ideation. Green was subsequently admitted to a hospital “as a direct result 

1 The amount of the monthly disability pension is determined by the firefighters’ years of 

service. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1) § 5 & 6.
4

of the mental health effects from this event.” Woolbert also attached a letter in which 

she stated, “At this time due to [Green’s] current medical condition, recommended 

intensive treatment program, and side effects from medications it is not 

recommended that patient maintain full time employment.” Woolbert spent more 

than 40 hours treating Green over the course of one and a half years and noted that 

his symptoms worsened since the traumatic event on May 22, 2016, “and eventually 

led to symptoms which became life threatening.” 

In response to Green’s application for on-duty disability, the Board asked Dr. 

Edwin Johnstone to perform a psychiatric disability/fitness evaluation on Green. 

Johnstone interviewed Green and reviewed medical records and official documents 

provided by the Board, including medical records from the Veterans Administration. 

During Johnstone’s interview of Green, Green gave a full biographical 

history. Green reported that his work as an EMT for the Houston Fire Department 

had been an emotional strain. Green described the event on May 22, 2016, when he 

accompanied emergency medical personnel to a “grisly murder scene.” After 

witnessing that scene Green drove his fire department vehicle to Houston Methodist 

Hospital and was admitted for a one-week stay on the psychiatric ward. Upon

Green’s discharge from the hospital Woolbert diagnosed him with PTSD, Major 

Depressive Disorder, and Acute Stress Disorder. 

To complete its review the Board asked Johnstone to answer certain questions. 

Johnstone responded to the Board’s questions as follows: 

1. What is the current medical condition and prognosis?

Despite the content of documents from care providers, I am unable to 

be certain whether or not Mr. Green actually has the conditions that 

have been diagnosed. It appears to me that he has a personality disorder 

marked by persistent interpersonal clashes in a variety of settings. His 

story to me strongly suggests that he, at least in the past couple of years, 
5

has resorted to making exaggerated and dramatized comments to 

manipulate other persons into believing that he is desperately disturbed 

so that he can gain attention and gain benefits of being thought to be 

disabled. His stories of consistently excellent performance are not

verifiable in the documents I saw. It is common for persons with 

deceptive motives to present themselves as higher performers than they 

really were in school and at work. They commonly report heroic events 

that never occurred, or academic degrees they never earned.

*****

2. Is the condition likely to be permanent?

Even if both the diagnosis of Major Depression and the diagnosis of 

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder were accurate, it is not true at all that 

they are permanent. 

Mr. Green didn’t give anyone a story of an endogenous depressive 

disorder; he related the reputed depressive symptoms (all of which are 

invisible and unverifiable) entirely to situational influences. There is no 

reason whatsoever to imagine that a depressive state, even if it were 

genuine, would persist after Mr. Green is away from those 

circumstances. In most cases of genuine depression, even those with 

endogenous causes, patients achieve a durable remission of symptoms 

that can be maintained with continuing medication. 

Despite currently popular misconceptions, Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder is not a permanent condition. The chapter on mental disorders 

in the second edition of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Disease 

and Injury Causation cites an abundance of medical research studies 

showing that most persons with that condition are free of the condition 

after six months, and that almost all cases have recovered by a year.

The majority of cases resolve without seeking any treatment at all. 

Furthermore, studies have shown that the majority of patients actually 

report a beneficial feeling of personal growth, rather than a decline in

mental health, after going through the experience.

3. Is condition duty-related?

The condition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as narrated by Mr.

Green would be duty-related, and attributable to multiple exposure to 

ghastly scenes and to heart-rending failed efforts to save lives. Mr.

Green didn’t mention any combat experiences to me. If his story at the 

hospital were to be shown to be fictional, none of his claims can be 
6

considered trustworthy.

The reputed depressive condition would be attributable to a 

combination of factors, the most powerful of which were losses of 

loved ones through suicide.

4. Please comment on whether or not member can maintain any 

gainful employment, in any occupation (any fulltime 40 hour or more 

per week job) due to condition.

Mr. Green is capable, both physically and mentally, of maintaining 

adequate performance of an abundance of jobs except possibly ones 

that would involve unusual exertions of his left shoulder.

After giving this initial report Johnstone received additional medical records 

for Green. One of the records reviewed by Johnstone was a 1997 report from a VA 

psychologist who conducted a clinical interview, Beck Depression Inventory, 

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Incomplete Sentences Blank, and 

House-Tree-Person Drawings. The report was requested in connection with Green’s 

disability claim. The report noted that Green served one year in Desert Storm and 

denied witnessing death or significant injuries. Green underwent two previous 

psychiatric evaluations and “had a number of disciplinary actions.” Green reported 

distressing dreams of Desert Storm events associated with sleep disturbance but 

otherwise reported no significant psychiatric symptoms. 

Johnstone also reviewed another VA psychologist’s report that was prepared

two years later. At that time Green reported “thinking about combat.” Contrary to 

his report two years earlier Green said that during his military service he was almost 

killed and “nearly blown up.” Green further reported being sent on “secret missions” 

during Desert Storm. 

Ten years later Green underwent another psychological evaluation while he 

was working for the City of Houston. At that time Green reported that during his 

military service he witnessed the killing of enemies, comrades killed by friendly fire, 
7

and his unit was mortared frequently. Green reported that his reconnaissance unit 

was intermittently “dropped off in unknown desert areas such as Bahrain, Kuwait 

and Saudi Arabia.” Green reported recurring dreams of putting prisoners in “Chinese 

handcuffs” and a comrade dying in his platoon. The report reflected diagnoses for 

PTSD and Generalized Anxiety Disorder.

After reviewing the additional medical records, Johnstone filed an addendum 

to his report answering the first two questions as follows:

1. Is Mr. Green’s condition considered to be a pre-existing 

condition?

Yes, the only genuine psychiatric disorder I see in these records is a 

Personality Disorder that has persisted, guided, and dominated Mr.

Green for all of his life from childhood onward. The pathological 

personality traits are the force behind motivation to exaggerate and/or 

to present false stories of conditions that don’t exist, in hopes of 

achieving a collection of diagnoses that appear severe enough to gain 

disability benefits.

2. Is the incident that occurred in HFD on May 22nd, 201[6] a 

separate incident that caused his PTSD or could this incident be a 

continuation from the military?

In the first place, there is no credible evidence that Mr. Green ever had 

genuine PTSD from the service experiences. The old records plainly 

show the fact that he belatedly concocted a fictional account of 

experiences designed to resemble psychological trauma. None of the 

stories he gives about effects of trauma exposure could emanate from 

events that didn’t occur. In light of his having duped providers and 

examiners about military-derived PTSD, Mr. Green’s more recent 

claims that a PTSD condition arose from his exposure to disturbing 

sights during work for the Houston Fire Department can’t be trusted to 

be truthful.

The information from these documents reinforces the impressions I 

expressed in the original report.

Because Johnstone’s report conflicted with Woolbert’s report, the Board’s

policies and procedures provided for an evaluation by a third-party advisory 
8

physician. According to the policies and procedures, the advisory physician was to 

be agreed upon by Woolbert, Green’s treating psychiatrist, and Johnstone. The 

advisory physician was to conduct an independent psychiatric examination of Green. 

However, Green and the Board were unable to agree on an advisory physician to 

conduct the examination. Subsequently, Woolbert notified the Board that another 

examination conducted for a “nontherapeutic” purpose would be detrimental to 

Green’s mental health; therefore, Green would not subject himself to evaluation by 

an advisory physician. 

On May 16, 2017, with Woolbert’s and Johnstone’s conflicting reports, the 

Board denied Green’s application for on-duty disability benefits, which Green 

appealed to the Board. On June 20, 2017, the Board denied Green’s appeal of their 

denial of his request for disability. 

Green then filed notice of appeal to the trial court pursuant to section 12 of 

the Act. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1) § 12. Following briefing by 

both parties, the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision to deny benefits to Green. 

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In two issues Green asserts (1) the Board’s decision was not supported by 

substantial evidence; and (2) the Board’s process deprived Green of due process.

I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The Fund is not subject to the Texas Administrative Procedures Act because 

it is not a state agency as defined by the statute. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §

2001.003(7). Instead, the Fund is governed by its enacting statute. See Tex. Rev. 

Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1). We review the Board’s and the trial court’s decision 

under the “substantial evidence” rule. See City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm’n, 
9

883 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. 1994) (providing for review under the substantial 

evidence review in appeal from agency decision not subject to the Administrative 

Procedures Act). 

A court conducting substantial evidence review of an administrative order 

must presume the agency decision is valid and that substantial evidence supports it. 

See Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 988 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1998). 

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a 

preponderance of the evidence. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Torch Operating Co., 912 

S.W.2d 790, 792–93 (Tex. 1995). In determining whether the Board’s conclusions 

or decisions are reasonably supported by substantial evidence, the issue for the 

reviewing district court is not whether the Board reached the correct conclusion, but 

rather whether some reasonable basis exists in the record for the action taken by the 

Board. See City of El Paso, 883 S.W.2d at 185. Thus, the existence of substantial 

evidence turns on the question of reasonableness. Id. (“At its core, the substantial 

evidence rule is a reasonableness test or a rational basis test.”). Thus, in conducting 

review for substantial evidence, the district court must determine whether the 

evidence as a whole is such that reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion 

the Fund reached in order to justify taking the disputed action. Id. at 186. 

Under this deferential standard, we presume that the Board’s order is 

supported by substantial evidence, and Green bears the burden of proving otherwise. 

See Texas Health Facilities Comm’n v. Charter Med.-Dall., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 

453 (Tex. 1984). “Although substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, the 

evidence in the record actually may preponderate against the decision of the agency 

and nonetheless amount to substantial evidence.” Id. at 452 (internal citation 

omitted). Substantial-evidence review “does not allow a court to substitute its 

judgment for that of the agency.” R.R. Comm’n, 912 S.W.2d at 792. 
10

II. The Fund’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

On appeal Green argues that Johnstone’s reports are not reliable under the 

Texas and Federal Rules of Evidence and that Johnstone’s reports are conclusory. 

While section 12 allows the trial court to “fix a date for hearing the appeal,” Tex. 

Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1) § 12(b), the record does not reflect whether the 

trial court held a hearing on Green’s appeal. If a hearing was held, no record of it 

was filed with this court. In conducting a substantial evidence review we rely on the 

briefing and evidence filed in the trial court. 

A. Reliability of expert testimony

Relying on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) and 

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549. 556 (Tex. 1995), 

Green argues that Johnstone’s expert report was not reliable under the standards set 

forth in those cases. 

Texas Rule of Evidence 702, entitled “Testimony by Experts,” provides, “If 

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in 

the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Tex. R. Evid. 702. Expert testimony is 

admissible if the expert is qualified and the testimony is relevant and based on a 

reliable foundation. Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001). 

Once the party opposing the expert testimony objects, the proponent bears the 

burden of demonstrating admissibility of the testimony. See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 

at 557.

Here, Green did not object to Johnstone’s evidence before the Board or in the 

trial court. The Board argues that the rules of evidence do not apply to proceedings 
11

before the Board or to appeals to the trial court from the Board’s decision. In an 

appeal under the APA, a motion for rehearing in an administrative proceeding is a 

statutory prerequisite to appeal in a contested case. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 

2001.145(a) and the standard for preservation of error is “fair notice.” Upper Trinity 

Reg’l Water Dist. v. Natl Wildlife Fed’n, 514 S.W.3d 855, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). While the Fund is not subject to the APA, we find no 

authority that permits an appellant to raise the issue of reliability of expert testimony 

for the first time on appeal. 

The Act provides that, “The final decision or order of the district court is 

appealable in the same manner as are civil cases generally.” Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 

Ann. art. 6243e.2(1) § 12(c). The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require that, 

absent exceptions that do not apply in this case, any error be preserved in the trial 

court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Error is preserved with regard to a ruling that admits 

evidence if the opponent of the evidence makes a timely, specific objection and 

obtains a ruling. Serv. Corp. Intern. v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 234 (Tex. 2011). 

The trial court’s ruling does not have to be express; error is preserved as long as “the 

record indicates in some way that the trial court ruled on the objection either 

expressly or implicitly.” Richard Nugent & CAO, Inc. v. Estate of Ellickson, 543 

S.W.3d 243, 259–60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

Here, Green asserts that he gave “fair notice” of his objection to the reliability 

of Johnstone’s reports by sending a letter to the Board after its ruling on Green’s 

disability application. The letter stated that the “only evidence” offered by the Fund 

to controvert the records and affidavits of Green’s treating physician was “a hired 

‘expert’ from an out of state firm who ignored over 7 plus separate healthcare 

providers[.]” The letter went on to assert that “the [Fund] physician” claimed 

Green’s illness “was being made up without one medical test to support his opinion 
12

except his personal interview[.]” Green’s letter to the Board was insufficient to 

preserve error on appeal in that it was not timely or specific and Green failed to 

obtain a ruling from the trial court. Green therefore waived error with regard to his 

challenge to the reliability of Johnstone’s evidence. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

B. Conclusory reports

At the trial court and on appeal Green asserts that Johnstone’s reports amount 

to no evidence because they are conclusory. 

A conclusory statement asserts a conclusion with no basis or explanation. 

Windrum v. Kareh, 581 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Tex. 2019). Bare or baseless opinions 

cannot support a judgment, even if there was no objection over their admission into 

evidence. See City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex. 2009). An 

“expert must explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusions to the facts.” 

Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. 1999); see also Jelinek v. Casas, 328 

S.W.3d 526, 536 (Tex. 2010). An expert’s statement or opinion is conclusory when: 

(1) he asks the fact finder to take his word that his opinion is correct but offers no 

basis for his opinion or the bases offered do not actually support the opinion; or (2) 

he offers only his word that the bases offered to support his opinion actually exist or 

support his opinion. See Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 536. The line determining whether 

an expert opinion is conclusory is difficult to draw, and “[c]lose calls must go to the 

trial court.” See Larson v. Downing, 197 S.W.3d 303, 304 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). 

When the evidence falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the court may 

not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 

168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005).

In Johnstone’s report he noted that he conducted a two-hour interview with 

Green and reviewed medical records and official documents provided by the Board. 

Johnstone noted that Green acknowledged that they had adequately discussed every 
13

major aspect of Green’s life. Green brought his own records to the interview and 

made copies for Johnstone’s review. Johnstone explained to Green that the records 

had been requested but had not yet arrived, but Green insisted on making copies and 

providing them to Johnstone. Johnstone reviewed 49 pages of a 249-page medical 

record from Green’s five-day stay at Methodist Hospital. Johnstone also reviewed 

documents sent by the City of Houston. Before filing a supplemental report 

Johnstone also reviewed psychological evaluations from the VA. 

In answering the questions posed by the Fund, Johnstone referenced official 

diagnostic manuals for mental disorders and the American Medical Association 

Guides to the Evaluation of Disease and Injury Causation. Johnstone did not ask the 

Board and the trial court to take him at his word; Johnstone extensively interviewed 

Green, reviewed medical and employment records, and referenced medical reference 

books in arriving at his recommendation. We conclude Johnstone’s report was not 

conclusory as to Green’s ability to work at any job. See Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 536.

C. Substantial evidence

The evidence before the Board and subsequently before the trial court was in 

direct conflict. Woolbert opined that Green experienced disability to the degree that 

he could not perform any full-time work. Johnstone, on the other hand, opined that 

Green’s only limitation in performing full-time work was the physical limitation of 

his shoulder. In a substantial evidence review the agency’s action will be sustained 

if the evidence is such that reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion that 

the agency must have reached to justify its actions. Texas Health Facilities Com’n, 

665 S.W.2d at 453. Because the evidence was conflicting, the Board could have 

determined after reviewing Johnstone’s reports that Green did not qualify under the 

Act for on-duty disability. See id. (If there is evidence to support either affirmative 

or negative findings on a specific matter, the decision of the agency must be upheld). 
14

We overrule Green’s first issue.

III. Green’s due-process claim is facially invalid.

In Green’s second issue he argues that the Board’s procedures lacked 

sufficient due process. Green did not specify at the trial court and does not specify 

on appeal whether his due process claim is predicated on the United States or Texas 

Constitution. 

The due course of law guarantee of the Texas Constitution provides:

No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, 

privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the 

due course of the law of the land.

Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. 

The Texas due course clause is nearly identical to the federal due process 

clause, which provides:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 

process of law.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

While the Texas Constitution is textually different in that it refers to “due 

course” rather than “due process,” the Supreme Court of Texas regards these terms 

as without meaningful distinction. Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 

S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995). Before any substantive or procedural due-process 

rights attach, however, Green must have a liberty or property interest that is entitled 

to constitutional protection. Id. A constitutionally protected right must be a vested 

right, which is “something more than a mere expectancy.” Klumb v. Houston Mun. 

Employees Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. 2015) (quoting City of Dallas v. 

Trammell, 101 S.W.2d 1009, 1014 (Tex. 1937).
15

The court’s decision in Klumb, is dispositive of Green’s due-process claim. In 

that case, the supreme court re-affirmed its decision in City of Dallas v. Trammell, 

that an individual has no vested property right to future pension distributions. Klumb, 

458 S.W.3d at 15–16. The court held directly in City of Dallas that a pensioner has 

no vested right to future installments of a pension. 101 S.W.2d at 1017. 

Green acknowledges Klumb’s holding but questions its application to him 

because he may be entitled to pension benefits under the Act other than the disability 

benefits for which he applied. Specifically, Green asserts that he is eligible for 

benefits under section 8(a) of the Act, which entitles him to a deferred pension. See

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243e.2(1) § 8(a). Green asserts that, unlike the 

petitioners in Klumb, he has a vested interest in a pension from the Fund. Green did 

not make this argument to the trial court. Instead, Green asserted in the trial court

whether the decision in Klumb remained viable after the enactment of section 66 of 

the Texas Constitution in 2003. 

By failing to make this argument to the trial court Green waived consideration 

of such argument by this court. The complaint presented on appeal must comport 

with the complaint raised in the trial court. See Doan v. TransCanada Keystone 

Pipeline, LP, 542 S.W.3d 794, 807 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) 

(issue waived because appellate complaint that condemnor made no bona fide offer 

of an amount within the trial court’s jurisdiction did not comport with trial-court 

complaint that condemnor made no bona fide offer at all); Moran v. Mem’l Point 

Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 410 S.W.3d 397, 407 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2013, no pet.) (trial objection that witness was not identified as a fact witness did 

not preserve appellate complaint that witness was not identified as an expert).

Even if Green had made this argument in the trial court, the court would not 

have erred in rejecting it. The fact that Green may be able to apply for pension 
16

benefits under a different portion of the Act does not give him a constitutionally 

protected property right subject to a due process claim. Those benefits are not vested 

benefits and are subject to the holding in Klumb just as the disability benefits are not 

vested property rights. Because Green has no vested rights in the disability benefits 

at issue, we hold his due-process claim is facially invalid. We overrule Green’s 

second issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Green’s two issues on appeal we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court.

/s/ Jerry Zimmerer

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jewell, and Zimmerer.