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[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 71 (Tuesday, May 2, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E899-E901]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                    UNITED STATES POLICY ON ALGERIA

                                 ______

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                          Tuesday, May 2, 1995
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, the terrible civil violence in Algeria has 
claimed perhaps 30,000 lives in the past 3 years. Both the Algerian 
Government and the underground Islamist opposition reject a dialog and 
appear determined to resolve their differences by force. In the 
process, thousands of innocent civilians have been killed. The United 
States 
[[Page E900]] has important commercial interests in Algeria's petroleum 
and natural gas industries, as well as strategic interests in the 
stability of North Africa and the southern coast of the Mediterranean.
  I wrote to the State Department on February 24, 1995, to raise a 
number of questions about United States policy toward Algeria. I 
received a detailed response to my questions on March 29, 1995. The 
text of the correspondence follows:

         Committee on International Relations, House of 
           Representatives,
                                Washington, DC, February 24, 1995.
     Hon. Warren Christopher,
     Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: I am concerned about the deteriorating 
     situation in Algeria. The death toll in the Algerian civil 
     war has now reached a weekly casualty rate greater than that 
     experienced at the height of the Algerian war of 
     independence.
       I would like to ask a number of questions:
       1. What is U.S. policy toward Algeria today? In current 
     circumstances, what purposes does an American Embassy in 
     Algeria serve? Do you think that this conflict can be 
     resolved militarily or is a political solution the only 
     effective course? What do you see as the outlines of a 
     plausible political solution?
       2. Can outside actors, including the United States, play a 
     helpful and important role in promoting a peaceful resolution 
     of the Algerian political crisis? Does the U.S. favor or 
     oppose an international conference on Algeria in which all 
     major parties to the conflict participate? If you favor such 
     a conference, how can you convince the Algerian government to 
     participate?
       3. What is U.S. policy on contacts with the various Islamic 
     groups in Algeria? Are there organizations with which we can 
     have a constructive dialogue? Do you support or oppose a 
     dialogue with the Armed Islamic Group (AIG)? What is your 
     understanding of the relationship between the Islamic 
     Salvation Front (FIS) and the AIG? What is your view of the 
     French government's allegation that the FIS representative in 
     the U.S. is a senior member of the Islamic Salvation Group?
       4. What is U.S. policy concerning upcoming IMF and Paris 
     Club talks with Algeria? Is there a role for an important 
     U.S. and G-7 political message to Algeria in those talks, and 
     what should that message be?
       5. What do you see as the impact of developments in Algeria 
     on some of its neighbors in the region: Morocco, Tunisia, and 
     Egypt? France and Spain?
       I appreciate your consideration of these questions and look 
     forward to an early reply.
       With best regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                  Lee H. Hamilton,
     Ranking Democratic Member.
                                                                    ____

                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                   Washington, DC, March 29, 1995.
     Hon. Lee H. Hamilton,
     House of Representatives.
       Dear Mr. Hamilton: Thank you for your recent letter to 
     Secretary Christopher concerning the situation in Algeria. We 
     welcome the opportunity to address your specific questions 
     and to share our perspective on the worsening crisis in that 
     country. Because of the nature of your questions, we have 
     attached, in question and answer format, our response.
       We hope you find this information helpful. If you would 
     like to discuss these issues at greater length, we would be 
     happy to arrange for appropriate officials to meet with you 
     at your convenience. Please do not hesitate to contact me if 
     we can be of further assistance.
           Sincerely,

                                             Wendy R. Sherman,

                                               Assistant Secretary
                                              Legislative Affairs.
       Enclosure.
       What is U.S. policy toward Algeria today?
       The United States Government seeks to encourage an Algerian 
     solution which will provide stability for the country and 
     assure that the crisis does not spill over into Algeria's 
     neighbors. We remain concerned over the steady increase in 
     violence both from government security forces and from the 
     armed Islamist groups trying to topple the regime. For the 
     past three years, in numerous contacts both in Algiers and in 
     Washington, we have actively worked to promote a dialogue 
     between the government and the major opposition parties, 
     which we believe offers the best chance for a non-violent 
     solution.
       While we continue to engage the regime in discussions on 
     political strategies which might reverse the downward spiral, 
     the U.S. gives no direct economic assistance or military 
     support to Algeria.
       We have made clear that the U.S. deplores violence from any 
     quarter and have urged strict respect for human rights by all 
     groups in Algeria.
       In current circumstances, what purposes does an American 
     Embassy in Algeria serve?
       Our diplomatic mission in Algiers accomplishes a number of 
     essential functions, including: Preserving access to Algerian 
     Government officials at all levels, unobtainable elsewhere, 
     to seek GOA views and deliver U.S. policy messages; 
     maintaining a U.S. presence to show continuing concern over 
     the Algerian crisis and to demonstrate both to Algerians and 
     to other foreign governments which keep embassies in Algiers 
     that we do not believe a collapse of the state is imminent; 
     serving as the U.S. Government's ``eyes and ears'', producing 
     irreplaceable reporting and intelligence which guides U.S. 
     policy towards the crisis; enabling U.S. companies to 
     continue their involvement in Algeria's oil and gas industry 
     through projects which total billions and will play a major 
     role in any economic recovery--much of their involvement 
     would end if the Embassy closed; providing services and 
     representation for the 500-600 American citizens in Algeria.
       Do you think that this conflict can be resolved militarily, 
     or is a political solution the only effective course?
       We are convinced that attempts to suppress the insurgency 
     through military means alone will fail. On the contrary, this 
     approach will only intensify the cycle of violence and spur 
     further radicalization of the Islamist movement. This is the 
     lesson of the past three years, during which time the 
     regime's campaign to eradicate the opposition through 
     repression has led to an exponential growth in insurgent 
     operations. At the same time, we do not believe an Islamist 
     military victory is likely in the near term.
       In our view, a strategy which gives the main opposition 
     groups--including Islamist leaders willing to seek a non-
     violent solution--a voice in a political process which 
     prepares an eventual return to elections is essential to 
     broaden the extremely narrow base upon which the Algerian 
     regime rests. Such a strategy offers the best chance to 
     reinforce pragmatic tendencies within the Islamist movement 
     and to marginalize the most violent extremists.
       What do you see as the outlines of a plausible political 
     solution?
       The Algerian parties themselves must determine, through 
     negotiation, the outlines of a political process. It would be 
     inappropriate for the U.S. Government to put forward a 
     preconceived notion of the form which such an accord might 
     take.
       In general, we share with the main Algerian parties the 
     conviction that a political solution must be designed to 
     prevent the most radical outcome of the conflict. We believe 
     that a viable solution must prepare Algeria for an eventual 
     return to elections while providing concrete guarantees that 
     no party can abuse the democratic process or impose a 
     dictatorship in the future. We recognize that there is a need 
     to rally non-extremist forces around a process which allows 
     for the expression of different political views and enables 
     the parties to work out their differences in a non-violent 
     context. We were encouraged by the platform which the 
     principal opposition parties signed after meeting in Rome in 
     January, which was meant to serve as a starting point for 
     talks with the regime.
       Can outside actors, including the United States, play a 
     helpful and important role in promoting a peaceful resolution 
     of the Algerian political crisis? Does the U.S. favor or 
     oppose an international conference on Algeria in which all 
     major parties to the conflict participate? If you favor such 
     a conference, how can you convince the Algerian government to 
     participate?
       We are already making every effort to press all sides to 
     engage in dialogue aimed at opening up a political process. 
     It is important, however, to understand the limits of outside 
     influence on what is essentially an internal conflict among 
     Algerians. Neither the regime's leaders nor opposition groups 
     would welcome an attempt by the U.S. or European governments 
     to mediate between them, and it might be unwise for the U.S. 
     to try to insert itself more aggressively into this 
     situation.
       What is U.S. policy on contacts with the various Islamic 
     groups in Algeria? Are there organizations with which we can 
     have a constructive dialogue?
       We have long maintained working-level contacts with a broad 
     spectrum of Algerian public opinion, including with elements 
     of the political opposition not linked to terrorism. The 
     President affirmed publicly last year that the U.S. has had 
     such contact with representatives of the Islamic Salvation 
     Front (FIS).
       Do you support or oppose a dialogue with the Armed Islamic 
     Group?
       Unlike the FIS, the Armed Islamic Group rejects compromise 
     and embraces the use of indiscriminate terrorism to advance 
     its extremist agenda. We do not maintain a dialogue with the 
     GIA.
       What is your understanding of the relationship between the 
     Islamic Salvation Front and the GIA?
       Prior to being banned in 1992, the FIS actively 
     participated in the democratic process, winning a plurality 
     of seats in the first round of legislative elections in 
     December 1991. Since the suspension of the electoral process, 
     the FIS has continued to advocate dialogue and a return to 
     elections. By contrast, the GIA opposes dialogue and has 
     openly claimed responsibility for terrorism against 
     foreigners and Algerian civilians since the summer of 1993. 
     We have no evidence that FIS leaders exercise control over 
     the GIA. On the contrary, it appears that the FIS and GIA are 
     rivals for control of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in 
     Algeria.
       What is your view of the French allegation that the FIS 
     representative in the U.S. is a senior member of the Armed 
     Islamic Group?
       An individual who calls himself the FIS representative in 
     the U.S.--but who has no legal status as such--has made 
     statements on several occasions implying sympathy for some of 
     the actions of the GIA. At other 
     [[Page E901]] times, however, he has categorically condemned 
     violent acts attributed to the GIA. We have no evidence--and 
     neither the French nor any other government has provided 
     any--that this individual is a ``senior member'' of the GIA. 
     In fact, he served as the official FIS representative at the 
     two recent conferences of Algerian political parties in Rome.
       What is U.S. policy concerning upcoming IMF and Paris Club 
     talks with Algeria? Is there a role for an important U.S. and 
     G-7 political message to Algeria in those talks, and what 
     should that message be?
       Recognizing that economic reform is essential for the long-
     term well-being of the Algerian people, we have pressed for 
     Algeria to move towards a market system which could provide 
     adequate housing, food, and employment for all Algerians, 
     thereby weakening the appeal for extremism. The U.S. has 
     therefore welcomed the GOA's implementation of economic 
     reforms and has supported IMF and World Bank agreements and 
     Paris Club debt rescheduling, which create a positive 
     macroeconomic environment and lay the groundwork for 
     fundamental reform and growth.
       Our ``political message'' to Algerian leaders has been 
     clear. We have repeatedly stressed that political progress 
     and an improvement in the security situation are essential 
     prerequisites to sustainable economic recovery. Any attempt 
     to use the IMF, World Bank, or Paris Club to increase 
     pressure on the Algerian regime would require close 
     coordination with our European allies on an issue of vital 
     importance to them.
       What do you see as the impact of developments in Algeria on 
     some of its neighbors in the region--Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, 
     France, Spain?
       The Algerian crisis has provoked concern in neighboring 
     countries and raised the obvious question of whether events 
     in Algeria threaten stability elsewhere in the region. We 
     take seriously such concerns. This is one reason why we would 
     oppose the imposition of any kind of extremist regime in 
     Algeria. These regional concerns, however, do not alter our 
     analysis that Algeria's predicament is driven by conditions 
     indigenous to Algeria, which has had a very different history 
     from its neighbors. The appeal of fundamentalism in Algeria 
     is rooted in frustration arising from three decades of 
     political exclusion, social injustice, and economic misery. 
     Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt each have significant strengths 
     that are not shared by Algeria. King Hassan II of Morocco has 
     stated publicly that he shares this analysis. Successes by 
     Algerian Islamists undoubtedly embolden Islamist opponents in 
     other countries, but there is no reason to assume a 
     ``domino'' effect.
       France and Spain fear that worsening instability in Algeria 
     could lead to a flood of refugees across the Mediterranean. 
     Moreover, the French fear repercussions within France's large 
     Muslim community, which is mostly of Algerian origin. 
     Nonetheless, both Paris and Madrid, with which we consult 
     closely on this issue, have joined the U.S. in calling for 
     political solution based on dialogue and a return to the 
     electoral process.
     

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