UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4284

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JEREMY VASHON TUCKER, a/k/a Nicholas Wilson,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior

District Judge. (7:08-cr-00666-CMC-1)

Submitted: November 20, 2014 Decided: November 24, 2014

Before KING and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bradley M. Kirkland, BRADLEY M. KIRKLAND, LLC, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. David Calhoun Stephens, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jeremy Vashon Tucker appeals the district court’s 

judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 

twenty-four months in prison, which was at the top of Tucker’s 

advisory policy statement range. Tucker’s attorney has filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but 

questioning whether the district court erred by revoking 

Tucker’s supervised release based on criminal conduct for which 

Tucker had not been convicted. Although advised of his right to 

do so, Tucker has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. The 

Government has declined to file a response brief. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm. 

We review a district court’s judgment revoking 

supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th 

Cir. 1999). To revoke supervised release, a district court need 

only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); 

United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). 

The district court found that Tucker violated the 

terms of his supervised release by committing another crime; 

namely, assaulting a police officer and causing injury. 

Specifically, on February 1, 2014, Tucker was arrested and 
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charged with violating S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-320(B) (2003). To 

satisfy its burden of proof at the revocation proceeding, the 

Government presented evidence that, while serving his supervised 

release term, Tucker assaulted an officer of the Spartanburg 

County Sheriff’s Office and injured him. 

Tucker’s lone appellate contention is that the 

district court should not have relied on this conduct to revoke 

his supervised release because he had not yet been convicted in 

state court. But whether Tucker is ultimately convicted of the 

state assault charge simply is of no matter. The district court 

may find that the defendant has violated a condition of his 

supervised release based on its own finding of new criminal 

conduct, even if the defendant is acquitted on criminal charges 

arising from the same conduct or if the charges against him are 

dropped. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 7B1.1, p.s., cmt. n.1

(2008); see United States v. Jolibois, 294 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (“A violation of supervised release is determined on 

the basis of the defendant’s conduct; it may be found whether 

[defendant] was ever indicted or convicted of any particular 

offense.”). Accordingly, we agree that a preponderance of the 

evidence showed that Tucker had committed a crime while on 

supervised release and find no abuse of discretion in the 

district court’s decision to revoke Tucker’s supervised release.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the judgment revoking Tucker’s supervised 

release and imposing a twenty-four-month term of imprisonment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Tucker, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Tucker requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Tucker. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED