# FILED
October 17, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON OCTOBER SESSION, 1997

JAMES EDWARD LOPER, ) ) No. 02C01-9611-CC-00398 Appellant ) ) LAKE COUNTY vs. ) ) Hon. JOE G. RILEY. JR., Judge BILLY COMPTON, Ward en, ) and STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) (Writ of Habeas Corp us) Appellee )
For the Appellant : For the Appellee : JAMES EDWARD LOPER , Pro Se CHARLES W. BU RSON Register Number 253396 Attorney General and Repor ter Route 1, Box 330 Tiptonville, TN 38079-9775 KENNETH W. RUCKER Assistant Attorney Gener al Criminal Justice Div

ision 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Nashville, TN 37243-0493
C. PHILLIP BIVENS District Attorney General P. O. Drawer E Dyersburg, TN 38024

OPINION FILED: AFFIRMED
David G. Hay

es Judge2 OPINION
The appellant, James Edward Loper, appeals the trial court’s dism issal of his pro se application for writ of habeas corpus. On September 5, 1995, the appellant pled guilty in the M adison County Circuit Court to one count of rape of a chil d, one count of aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated s exual battery. The appellant is currently

serving an effective fifteen y ear sentence at the Lake County Regional Correctional

Facility for these offenses. On October 11, 1996, the appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus al leging that the judgments entered against him are v oid because the indictment failed t o allege the mens rea

of the offenses charged. On October 14, 1996, finding that “allega tions concerning the sufficiency of the indictments are not subject to h abeas corpus relief,” the trial court dismissed the appellant’s petition. The appellant now appeals the trial court’s dismissal.

After a review of the rec ord, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed the appellant’s petition for fail ure to state a ground for which habeas relief was available. The appellant asserts, relying exclusively upon federal habeas corpus law, that the “defect ive” indictment against him effectively

denied the tr

ial court t he jurisdi ction to ente r a judgment against hi m, thereby, rendering hi s convictions voi d. We reject this argument by the appel lant. In Tennessee, habeas corpus relief is only available when a conviction is void because the convicting court was without j urisdiction or authorit y to sentence a defendant, or

that a defendant's sentence has expired and he is being illegally restrained. Archer v. State , 851 S.W.2d 157, 16 4 (Tenn. 1993). It is wellestablished that allegati ons concerning the sufficiency of the indictment are not the proper subject of state habeas cor pus relief. See Haggard v. State , 475 S.W.2d3

186, 187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Brown v. State , 445 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); Barber v. State , No. 01C01-9408-CR-00281 ( Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Feb. 23, 1995) . Clearly, the appell ant is attempting to expand the scope of habeas corpus in Tennessee to that w hich applies in the federal cou rts. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241 et seq. However, we a re not obligated to incor porate federal habeas limits and laws i nto our state procedure. Turks v. State , No. 02C01-9502- CR-00035 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Jan. 3, 1997). This ar gument is without merit.

Moreover, we find the s ubstance of the appellant’s clai m to be without merit. The appellant, in his applicati on for writ of habeas corpus, alleges that the judgments entered against hi m for the offenses of rape of a child, aggr avated rape, and aggravated sexu al battery are void because the indictment fails to al lege the
mens rea

of the offenses charged. In order for an indictment to satisfy both constitutional and statutory guidelines, it must cont ain the material elements of the offense and must sufficiently apprise the accused of the offense he is called upon t o defend. State v. Tate , 912 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see also Tenn. Code Ann. §40-13-202 (1990); State v. Perkinson , 867 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). No requisite mental state is included in the definition of these offenses. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522 (1994 Supp .); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-502 (1994 Supp.); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504 (1994 Supp.). When the legislature fails to define a specific mental state in the defini tion of an offense, permitting proof of either intent, knowledge, or rec klessness, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-301(c)(1991), an allegation of criminal conduct w ill provide the accus

ed constitutionally adequate notice of the facts constitu ting the offense. Moreover, since under these circumsta nces, the accused's mental stat e is not a material element of the offense an d need not be included in the indictment, the app ellant’s challenge is not juri sdictional in nature, i.e. , a defect that renders the indic tment void. State v. Dison , No. 03C01-9602-CC-00051 ( Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle,4

Jan. 31, 1997) (citations omitted). Other panels of this c ourt have upheld the vali dity of indictments under similar c hallenges. See, e.g. , Slagle v. State , No. 03C01- 9704-CR-00145 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p. at Knoxville, June 25, 1997); State v. Vann , No. 03C01-9602-CC-00066 (Tenn. Cr im. App. at Knoxville , June 10, 1997); State v. James , No. 01C01-9601-CR-00016 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Mar. 27, 1997); State v. Burrell , No. 03C01-9404-CR-00157 ( Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, Feb. 11, 1997).
Contrary to the appellant's assertions, the allegations in the indictment sufficiently apprise the acc used of the offenses of rape of a child, aggr avated rape, and aggravated sexu al battery. Consequent ly, we find the indictment valid. The trial court's dismissal of the appellant's petition fo r writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.

____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Jud ge

CONCUR:5

___________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, Judge

___________________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, Ju dge