J-S53038-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

GARY MATEER, :

:

Appellant : No. 419 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered on September 24, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Criminal Division, No. CP-22-CR-0000181-1999

BEFORE: DONOHUE, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2015

Gary Mateer (“Mateer”) appeals, pro se, from the Order dismissing his 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. We affirm.

On May 13, 1999, Mateer pled guilty to aggravated assault and 

criminal conspiracy. On September 16, 1999, the trial court sentenced 

Mateer to an aggregate sentence of seven and one-half to twenty years in 

prison, followed by twenty years of probation. Mateer did not file a direct 

appeal. Mateer filed Petitions pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”)1in September 2000 and March 2001. These Petitions were denied.

 

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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On September 5, 2014, Mateer filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. On September 24, 2014, the Petition was dismissed. Mateer filed a 

Notice of Appeal.2

Mateer has set forth numerous questions in his Statement of Questions 

Involved. See Brief for Appellant at 2. To summarize, Mateer contends that 

the mandatory minimum sentence imposed against him under 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9712.1 was illegal based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision 

in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).3 See Brief for 

Appellant at 7-16.

Preliminarily, we note that any petition filed after the judgment of 

sentence becomes final will be treated as a petition filed pursuant to the 

PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 

2011). It is well-settled that the PCRA subsumes the remedy of habeas 

corpus where the PCRA provides a remedy for the claim. See 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 770 (Pa. 2013); see also 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that “[t]he action established in this subchapter 

shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all 

 

2 Mateer’s Notice of Appeal was docketed on November 24, 2015, well 

outside thirty days of the underlying Order. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Mateer

explains that he filed a Notice of Appeal on October 15, 2014, but mistakenly 

sent the Notice to the trial court judge. Because it appears Mateer 

attempted to timely file his Notice, we decline to quash the appeal.

3 The Alleyne Court held that any fact that increases the mandatory 

minimum sentence for a crime is an element that must be submitted to the 

jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155, 

2163.
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other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exists 

when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus.”). In his 

Petition, Mateer challenges the legality of his sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating 

that issues pertaining to Alleyne raise a legality of sentence challenge). 

Because Mateer filed his Petition after his judgment of sentence became 

final, and the PCRA provides a remedy for his claim, the Petition should have 

been treated as a PCRA Petition.

Our standard of review regarding a dismissal of a PCRA petition is 

whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the evidence of record 

and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059, 1061 

(Pa. Super. 2011).

We observe that all PCRA petitions, including second or subsequent 

petitions, must be filed within one year of the defendant’s judgment of 

sentence becoming final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “A judgment 

becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” Id. 

§ 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in 

nature and a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the 

PCRA petition was not timely filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 

1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
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In this case, Mateer’s judgment of sentence became final in October 

1999, after the time to seek review with this Court had expired. Thus, 

Mateer’s September 2014 Petition is facially untimely under the PCRA.

However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely petition 

where the defendant can explicitly plead and prove one of three exceptions 

set forth in the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any PCRA 

petition invoking one of these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the 

date the claim could have been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2); Albrecht, 

994 A.2d at 1094. 

Here, Mateer does not explicitly invoke any of the timeliness 

exceptions in either his Petition or his appellate brief. See Commonwealth 

v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498, 501 (Pa. 2004) (stating that “it is the petitioner’s 

burden to plead in the petition and prove that one of the exceptions applies.” 

(citation omitted, emphasis in original)). While Mateer fails to invoke a 

timeliness exception, he does challenge the legality of the sentence based 

upon the Alleyne decision. Brief for Appellant at 7-16.4

It is well-settled that “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject 

to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time 

limits or one of the exceptions thereto.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 

 

4

It is unclear from the record whether the trial court imposed a mandatory

minimum sentence on Mateer. See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/25, at 1 n.2 

(stating that there was no mention of a mandatory sentence during the 

guilty plea); 3 (stating that the sentence was “substantially in excess of the 

mandatory minimum sentence required by law.”).
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A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999); see also Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 

237, 241 (Pa. Super. 2014). Accordingly, because Mateer did not plead or 

prove any of the exceptions to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time bar, we cannot 

address his legality of sentence challenge. See Fahy, 737 A.2d at 223.5

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Mateer’s Petition, although we do so on grounds other than those 

set forth by the PCRA court. See Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 

1012, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “we may affirm the PCRA court’s 

decision on any basis.”).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/2015

 

5 Even if Mateer properly invoked the new constitutional right exception, he 

failed to file his Petition within 60 days of June 17, 2013, the date on which 

the Supreme Court issued the Alleyne decision. See Commonwealth v. 

Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 763 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that to fulfill the 60-

day requirement, defendants need to file their petitions within 60 days from 

the date of the court’s decision). Moreover, Alleyne is not retroactive to 

cases where the judgment of sentence was final. See Miller, 102 A.3d at 

995 (stating that neither the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor the United 

States Supreme Court has held that Alleyne is to be applied retroactively to 

cases in which the judgment of sentence has become final); see also 

Commonwealth v. Riggle, 2015 PA Super 147, at *3-6 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Thus, Mateer would not satisfy the statutory exception at section 

§ 9545(b)(1)(iii).