## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Estat

e of Mc Fadden , 2011 IL App (2d) 101157

Appellate Court Caption In re ESTATE OF IAN A.F. McF ADDEN
, a Minor (Tar a Fu l l er , as Guardian of the Estate, Petitioner-Appellee
, v. Kim MacCloskey an d Associates, Responde nt-Appellant).

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-10-1157

Filed Dec ember 30, 2011

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In an action to adjudicate responde nt attorney ’s lien for repr esenting petitioner’s son i n a persona l injury action, the trial court’s judgme nt g rantingpetitioner’s re quest to a djudicate the lien to zer o was a ffirme d,

even though the trial court err ed in fi n d ing the lien invalid, since the minor’s fathe r, purporting to act as next fr iend of his son, reta ined responde nt’s service s to pursue the tort action, but the fathe r had been divorce d from petitioner for sever al year s, did not have custody and was substantially behind in child support and, there fore
, lacke d the ability to

asser t a cla i m fo r h is son, and although that disqualification did not invalidate responde nt’s lien, any work responde nt did afte r being notified that petitioner was the appropriate party to act for the minor was done at responde nt’s own peril, responde nt’s decision t o continue working was
not rea son able, and in the absenc e of evidenc e of the work done, no compensation was war

rante d.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Winnebag o County
, No. 07-P-362; the Hon. L isa Fa

biano, J udg e, pre siding.J udg ment Affir med.

Counsel on Appea l Mary I

. Wood, of Kim MacCloskey & Associates, L L P, of Rockford, for appellant.

Scott A. Calkins and Arthur G. Kielty
, both of R eno & Z ahm L L P, for appellee

.

Panel J USTI CE HUTCHI NSON delivere d the judgme nt of the co urt, with opinion.
J ustice B urke concur

red in the judgment and opinion.
J ustice Schostok specia lly concur red, w ith opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Respondent, the law firm of Kim MacCloskey & Associates, appea ls the trial co u rt ’s ju d g ment that adjudicate d responde nt’s attorney ’s lien to zero and exti nguished respond e nt’ s claim for attorney fee s pursuant to case law and the Attorney s L ien Act (the Act). 770 I L CS 5/1 (West 2006). Respondent contends that the trial court e rre d in interpre ting the Act and abused its discre t i o n when it deter mined that, pursuant to a quantum meruit theory
, responde nt was not entitled to attorney fee s. We affirm. ¶ 2 Thi s m at t er stems from persona l injury litigation on behalf of I an A.F. McF adden, a minor child, whose parents divorce d five year s prior to the child’s injury . On Februar y 13, 2003, petitioner, Tara Fuller
, and J ames McF adden (Jam es ) o b t ained a judgme nt for dissoluti on of marria g e. Petitioner was awa rded full custody of the couple’ s two children, J ames J r. and I an. As of Marc h 1, 2003, J ames was order ed to pa y $367 per month in child support for the be nefit of the c hildren. ¶ 3 Fr om Marc h 1, 2003, through April 30, 2007, J ames was unem p l o y ed an d fa i l ed to satisfy his child support obligations. On J uly 18, 2007, the trial court enter ed an order finding that J ames was $21,671.75 in arr ear s on his child support obligations and it issued a war rant for his ar rest. ¶ 4 One mo n t h l at er , o n August 21, 2007, 10-year -old I an sustained a broken arm a nd multipl e skull fra cture s af t er b eing struck by a tree limb that fell during tree remova l
operations perf

ormed by Tree Care Enterprises, an ag ent employed by the City of Rockford. On September 4, 2007, J ames, purporting to act in his capa city as I an’s fathe r and next friend, r etained the service s of re spondent to pursue a tort action re lating to I an’s injuries.

-2-¶ 5 On September 5, 2007, responde nt sent notices of attorney ’s liens by cer tifi ed m ail to Tree Care E nterprise s and the City of Rockfor d. The notice s provided, in re levant par t: “[Y]ou are h er eb y n o tified that J ames McF adden on behalf of his minor son, I an McF adden, has place d i n m y hands, as his attorney , for suit and collection, a claim, demand or cause of action, ag ainst you growing out of persona l injuries he sustained on or about August 21, 2007, as a result of neg lige nce or other c onduct. J ames McF adden has agree d to pay

me for suc h service s ***.”
There afte r, responde nt alleg es, it perf ormed leg al rese arc h reg arding strict liability based on ultrahazardous a ctivities. ¶ 6 On September 5, 2007, petitioner, also purporting to act in her capa city as I an’s pa

rent and nex t friend, r etained a ttorney Anthony Kielty (petitioner’ s attorney

) of the L aw Of

fice of Reno & Z ahm, L L P, to pursue a persona l injury action on I an’s behalf

. On September 6, 2007, petitioner’s attorney filed on petitioner’s behalf a petition for guardia nship of a minor, seeking to have petitioner appoi n t ed as guardia n of the estate and person of I an for the purpose of

prosec uting I an’s pe rsonal injury claim. ¶ 7 That same day
, S ep t em b er 6, 2007, responde nt filed a complaint in the trial court on behalf of James, both indi vidually and as next frie nd of I an. The complaint alleg ed ag ainst Tree Care Enterpr ises and the City of Rockford neg lige nce, res ipsa loquitur
, strict liability
, and counts under the family expense provision of the Rights of Married P ersons Act (750 I L CS 65/ 15 (West 2006)). ¶ 8 Also on September 6, 2007, afte r re s p o n dent filed the complaint, petitioner’s attorney notified responde nt by letter that he had been reta ined to repr esent petitioner and I an, and he

asser ted petitioner’s right to act as I an’s re p re s en t ative. The letter further informed responde nt that petitioner had filed a petition for guardia nship, that J ames was not the
cust odial pare nt of I an, that J ames was substantially in arr ear s on his court-or dere d ch i l d support obligations for I an’s benefit, and that a warra nt had been i ssued for J ames’s arre st in connec tion with his child support arr ear ag e. The letter direc t ed responde nt to take no further action with re spect to I an’s pe rsonal injury action. ¶ 9 Respondent verifie d the information alleg ed in the letter and spoke with J ames reg arding the need to reme dy the situation. Respondent provided J ames with the names and contact information of sever al attorney s who could offe r James advice reg arding his child support

arr ear ag e. ¶ 10 Acc ording to responde nt’s brief, sometime betwee n September 10, 2007, and September 17, 2007, responde nt draf ted and mailed preliminary written discovery questions and perf ormed re s ea rch and investigation to obtain telephone numbers and addre sses for the witnesses listed in J ames’s discovery answe rs. Respondent obtained I an’s emer g ency room

rec ords, photogr aphs of the injury scene , photogr aphs of I an during h is hospital stay , and photogr aphs of I an afte r discharg e. Respondent cre ated maps of the scene , corr elated to the photogr aphs. Respondent also procur ed and reda cted a deposition transcript from its closed files re g ardinga similar ca se ag ainst Tree Care E nterprise s. ¶ 11 On S eptember 17, 2007, the t rial court appo i n t ed p et itioner as guar dian of I an’s e state for the express purpose of pursuing all claims that I an might have as a result of the persona l

-3-injuries he s u s tained on August 21, 2007. On September 19, 2007, the trial court grante d

responde nt’s reque st to withdraw as counsel. On October 15, 2007, the trial court enter ed an order substitut ing petitioner’s attorney in place of responde nt in I an’s persona l injury case

. After responde nt withdrew from the case , it assembled all of its work product and provided the information to petitioner’s attorney

. ¶ 12 T here afte r, petitioner’s attorney twice amende d the complaint in I an’s persona l i n j u ry

case and prosec uted the matter through its c onclusion. On October 4, 2010, petitioner filed

a petition to adjudicate responde nt’s attorney ’s lien claim. On October 15, 20 1 0
, t he trial
court enter ed an o rd er to settle I an’s persona l injury case for $800,000. On November 5, 2010, the trial court deter mined that responde n t’s lien claim was invalid and grante d petitioner’s reque st to adjudicate responde nt’ s attorney ’s lien to zero and exti nguish responde nt’s claim for a

ttorney fee s. Respondent timely

appea led. ¶ 13 We first addre ss responde nt’s motion to strike petitioner’s brief. Respondent argues that

we should strike petitioner’s brief, beca use its fac ts section is argumentative. See Beitner v. Marzahl
, 354 I ll. App. 3d 142, 145-46 (2004) (argumentative languag e within the statement of fac ts is inappropriate and ag ainst the mandate of the supreme court rules). As responde nt’s motion point s out, briefs that violate the afor ementioned rules may be stricke n in whole or in part, or offe nding portions of such briefs may be disreg arde d. Id. at 146. Thus, as we will disreg ard any argumentative portions of petitioner’s brief, there is no need to strike the brief. We theref ore de ny responde nt’s motion. ¶ 14 At issue in this appea l is whether the trial court err ed when it found that re s pondent’s attorney ’s l i en claim was invalid, adjudicate d responde nt’s attorney ’s lien to zero, and exti nguished responde nt’s claim for attorney fee s. Respondent argues that (1) the trial court

err ed in adjudicating responde nt’s attorney ’s lien to zero and exti nguishing responde nt’s claim for attorney fee s pursuant to the Act and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it d et er m i n ed t hat, pursuant to a quantum meruit theory
, responde nt was not entitled to attorney fee s. Petitioner responds that the trial court co rr ectly adjudicate d responde nt’s attorney ’s l ien t o zero and e x tinguished the claim, because J ames did not have standing to sue on I an’s be half. ¶ 15 Respondent’s first argumen t i s t h at t h e trial court err ed in adjudicatingresponde nt’s attorney ’s lien to zero and exti nguishing responde nt’s claim for attorney fee s pursuant to the Act. Specifica lly
, responde nt argues that it strictly complied with all the require ments of the Act and thus has a valid lien. Petitioner responds that, beca use J ames did not have standing
to sue on I an’s behalf

, pursuant to the languag e of the Act, responde nt could not meet its require ments. As to the construction of the Act, our revie w is de novo

. S olon v. Midwest Medic al Records Ass’n , 236 I ll. 2d 433, 439 (2010). ¶ 16 The Ac t provides:

“§ 1. Attorney s at law shall have a lien upon all claims, demands and cause s of action, including all claims for unliquidated damag e s, which may be place d in their hands by their clients for suit or collection, or upon which suit or action has been instituted, for the amount of any fee which may have been agree d upon by and betwee n such attorney s and their clients
, o r, i n t h e absenc e of such agree ment, for a rea sonable fee
, for the

-4-service s of such suits, cla ims, demands or ca uses of action, plus c osts a nd expenses. In the case of a claim, demand, or cause of action with respe ct to which the total amount of all liens under the Hea lth Care Service s L ien Act meets or exceeds 40% of the sum paid

or due the injured person, the total amount of all liens under this Act shal l n o t ex ce ed 30% of the s um paid or due the injured person. All attorneys shall s h ar e p roportionate
amounts within this statutory limit ation. I f an appea l is taken by any party to a suit based

on the claim or cause of action, howeve r, the at t orney ’s lien shall not be aff ecte d or limit ed by

the provisions of this Act.
To enfor ce such a lie n , s u ch attorney s shall serve notice in writing
, which service
may be made by reg istered or cer tified mail, upon the party ag ainst whom their clients
may have such suits, claims or cause s of action, claiming such lien and stating there in the interest they have in such suits, claims, demands or caus es o f action. Such lien shall attach to any verdic t, judgme nt or order enter ed and to any money or proper ty which may be rec overe d, on acc ount of such suits, claims, demands or cause s of acti on, from and afte r the time of service of the notice. On petition filed by such attorney s or their clients
any court of c ompetent jurisdiction shall, on not less than 5 day s’ notice to the adver se p ar t y , adjudicate the rights of the parties and enforce the lien.” 770 I L CS 5/1 (West 2006). ¶ 17 The primary g oal of statutory interpre tation is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the intent of the leg islature. Solon
, 236 I ll. 2d at 440. The best indicator o f l egi s lative intent is the languag e of the statute, which is g iven its plain and ordinary meaning

. Id. When the statutory languag e is clea

r and unambiguous, it must be applied as written. Id. In interpre ting statutory languag e, courts will not rea d into it exceptions, li m i t at i o n s, or conditions that are absent from the plain languag e of the law. Id. at 441. These g ener al principles r eg ardingstatutory interpre tation apply to the Act, which “must be strictly construed, both as to establishing the lien and as to the right of action for its enfor ceme nt.” People v. Philip Morris, Inc.
, 198 I ll. 2d 87, 95 (2001). ¶ 18 In the curr ent matter, responde nt a rgues that it met the three g ener al require ments for a valid attorney ’s lien. Specifica lly
, responde nt asser ts that J ames place d a cause of action in the hands of responde nt, that written notice of the lien was provided to the opposing parties, and that such written notice was sent by cer t i fi ed mail. See 770 I L CS 5/1 (West 2006). P eti tioner counter s that responde nt failed to meet the require ments of the Act b ec au s e responde nt was not hired by a client with an ability to asser t a claim. Specifica lly
, petitioner
argues that the attorney asser ting the lien must perf

ect the lien by serving written notice upon the party ag ainst whom the client has a claim. See 770 I L CS 5/1 (West 2006); see also Philip Morris, Inc.
, 198 I ll. 2d at 95 (citing Rhoades v. Norfolk & W estern Ry. Co.
, 78 I ll. 2d 217, 227 (1979)) . Acc ording to pe titioner, as J ames was not the guardia n of I an’s e state, he ha d

no cause of action ag ainst the opposing parties in I an’s persona l injury case , and thus responde nt could not perf ect the lien by serving notice on Tree Care Enterprises and the City of Rockfor d. ¶ 19 We deter

mine that responde nt met the requ i re m en t s o f t h e Ac t p ursuant to a strict construction of its languag e. Respondent was hired by J ames, who place d a cause of action,

nam el y , I an’s persona l injury suit, in responde nt’s hands. Taylor
, 375 I ll. App. 3d at 501.

-5-Respondent sent notice of the lien to the oppos i n g p arties by cer tified mail. Although peti t ioner argues that, beca use J ames was later found unauthorized to sue on I an’s behalf
, responde nt failed to per fec t the lien beca use it did not se rve written notice of the lien upon the “par ty ag ainst whom the client has a claim,” the languag e of the Act does not support petitioner’s c laim. Instead, the A ct provides: “To enforc e such a li en, such attorney s shall serve notice i n writing
, which service
may be made by reg istered or cer tified mail, upon the party ag ainst whom their clients
may have such suits, claims or cause s of action, claiming such lien and stating there in the interest they have in such suits, claims, demands or cause s of action.” (Emphasis added.) 770 I L CS 5/ 1 (West 2006).
Whil e J ames was later found without standing to asser t a persona l injury claim on behalf of I an, the languag e of the Act does not make a distinction betwee n a client who has a bona fide claim and a client who m istakenly believes that he or she has a cla im. To the contrary
, the languag e of the Act states that “ser vice may be made by reg istered or cer tified mail, upon the party ag ainst whom their clients may have” a claim. (Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, pursuant to the languag e of the Act, re spondent’s lien is valid. ¶ 20 Petitioner nextasser ts that, beca

use re spondent was not hire d by I an, the a ct of filing a notice of lien was i n s ufficie nt to cre ate a lien under the Act. See In re Chicago Flood Liti gation
, 289 I ll. App. 3d 937, 943 (1997). Citi ng case law from the 1940s, petitioner contends that a minor may make a valid contra ct by himself or through his next friend to hire

an attorney to prosec ute a lawsuit and may agree to pay rea sonable compensa tion. Y ellen v. Bloom , 326 I ll. App. 134, 142 (1945); Goldberg v. Pe rmutter , 308 I ll. App. 84, 87 (1941). Howeve r, acc ording to petitioner, beca use J ames was unauthorized to act as I a n ’ s n e xt f riend,
any contra ct enter ed into betwee n J ames and responde nt is void ab initio

. Illinois State Bar Ass’n Mutual InsuranceCo. v. Coregis Insurance Co. , 355 I ll. App. 3d 156, 164 (2004). ¶ 21 Petitioner further asser ts that, due to a conflict of i ntere s t , J am es could not pursue a ny claim on I an’s be half. Petitioner asse rts that, beca use James failed to pay his child support for I an, J ames was preve nted, as a matter of law, from suing on I an’s b eh al f. As I an is a minor, he was leg ally unable to enter into a contra ct that could be enfor ced ag ainst him and he could not bring a lawsuit in his own name. See Seve rs v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.
, 89 I ll. 2d 515, 520 (1982). Wit h respe ct to the injuries I an suffe red on August 21, 2007, he could pursue litigation only through a guardia n ad litem or “next friend.” Doe v. Montessori School of Lake Forest , 287 I ll. App. 3d 289, 298 (1997). ¶ 22 A minor with a meritorious ca use of a ction is not lef

t to the merc y of a self-c onstitut ed

n ex t friend to enfor ce the child’s rights. Seve rs , 89 I ll. 2d at 520. Rather, in the ca s e o f a pare nt, the law holds that the pare nt may sue on behalf of his or her minor child only if it is in the best interests of the child and the pare nt does not have interests that conflict with those of the child. See Steve nson v. Hawthorne Eleme ntary School, East St. Louis School District
, 144 I ll. 2d 294, 301 (1991). Acc ording to petitioner, for well over 100 year s, it has been the law of this state t hat a next friend whose i n t er ests are hostile to those of hi s or her war d is incompetent to act for the war d. Roodhouse v. Roodhouse
, 132 I ll. 36 0 (1 8 9 0 ). This “no conflict” require ment means that a non cu s t o d ial pare nt with a child support arr ear ag e is

-6-disqualified from serving as his or her minor child’s next friend for purposes of litigating a

tort claim. Steve nson , 144 I ll. 2d at 301-02. The Steve nson court stated: “[The fa t h er ] ca n n o t maintain an action as ‘next friend’ of the child and, at the same t i me, defe nd himself ag ainst the child judgme nt-cre ditor. The conflict of interest i s obvious. In addition, the best interests of the child would not b e s er v ed b y allowing a pare nt who is contemptuously delinquent to prosec ute a tort claim as ‘next friend.’ ” Id. ¶ 23 Respondent does not dispute that a father who is delinquent in child support pay ments cannot act as next friend to pursue a tort claim on behalf of his child. Ins t ea d, responde nt argues that Steve nson does not stand for the proposition that an attorney hired by a delinquent fathe r i s not authorized to file a suit, ca nnot hold a valid attorney ’s lien, and is not entitled to be compensated for his or he r ser vices. ¶ 24 Respondent asser ts that this is a question of standing and offe rs as instructive Dy er v. Zoning Board of

Appeals
, 179 I ll. App. 3d 294 (1989). In Dye r , the plaintiff landowner s who filed suit to reve rse a zoning deter mination wer e found to lack standing to pursue the claim. Id. at 298-300. The defe ndants brought a motion for sanctions ag ainst the plaintiffs, alleg ing that the finding of a lack of standing and the subsequent dismiss al of the plaintiffs’ complaint indicated that the alleg ations in the complaint wer e “base less and not war rante d by exis ting law.” Id. at 301. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s holding and deter mined that the plaintiffs had a rea sonable basis for their argument in favor of standing
, despite their ultimate lack of succe ss. Id. at 302-03. Respondent as s er t s t hat Dye r stands for the principle that a court’s ultimate decision on a party ’s standing is not a per se finding that the cause of action

was improper and thus a barr i er t o re co up fee s. Petitioner responds that the case is inapplicable be cause , here , the trial cour t did not sanction respondent. ¶ 25 In the c u rr ent m atter, although the trial court ult imately found that respondent was not hired by a par t y wi t h t h e ability to asser t a claim on I an’s behalf

, this does not mean that responde nt’s attorne y ’s lien was invalid. Assessment of a client’s standing is not a require ment of the Act. Se e 7 7 0 I L C S 5/1 (West 2006). Instead, attorney ’s liens are invalidated only for failure to strictly follow the plain languag e of the Act. See Rhoades
, 78 I ll. 2d at 227 (holding that an attorney ’s l i en wa s invalid beca use notice of the lien was

serve d on the adver se party afte r the attorney was discharg ed); also see P r o gr essive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Taylor
, 375 I ll. App. 3d 495, 501 (2007) (holding that

an attorney ’s lien was invalid beca use notice of lien was sent by ordinary mail rathe r than
reg istered or cer

tified mail). Petitioner does not offe r and we are unable t o locate any case law holding that a client’s eventua l disqualification from acting as a next friend invalidates

an att o rn ey ’s lien. Thus, we deter mine that the trial court err ed when it deter mined that responde nt’s lien was invalid. ¶ 26 Respondent’s nex t co n t en t i o n i s t h at th e trial court abused its discretion when it deter mined that, pursuant to a quantum meruit theory
, responde nt was not entitled to attorney fee s. Despite responde nt’s contention, the rec ord ref lects that the trial court did not rea ch the question of whethe r re spondent was e ntitled to attorney fee s pursuant to a quantum meruit theory

. Specifica lly
, in making its deter mination that responde nt’s lien was invalid, the trial court stated:

-7-“Ultimately
, [respondent] did not h ave the rea son; did not have the ability to bring the claim, and I don’t think that [respondent] ca n then have an attorney ’s lien when [respondent] had a client; a contra ct with a client who had no right to bring the claim. The quantum meruit

Idon’t have to ge t into, so Iwon’t.” Thus, we de termine that re spondent’s sec ond contention is unfounded. ¶ 27 Although we have deter mined that responde nt’s lien was valid pursuant to strict statutory

co n s t ru ct i o n , we note that responde nt was on notice that its client might not have been authorized to bring the persona l injury claim on I an’s behalf as of September 6, 2007, when responde nt rec eived the letter from petitioner’s attorney informin g re s p o ndent that due to J ames’s child support arr ear ag e he was unable to act as next friend to I an. Respondent’s brief makes clea

r that, upon rec eiving the letter, it verifie d the information alleg ed and spoke with J am es reg arding the need to reme dy the situation. Neve rtheless, responde nt continued working on I an’s persona l injury claim until September 17, 2007, when the trial cour t deter mined that petitioner wa s the appropriate par ty to act as I an’s ne x t friend. ¶ 28 We deter

mine t h at an y wo rk d o n e b y re s pondent afte r September 6, 2007, when it

rec eived notice that J ames was not authoriz ed to file suit on I an’s behalf
, was done at responde nt’s own peril. We will not awa rd fee s to responde nt for work done afte r responde nt

was awa re that J ames could not pursue the action on I an’s behalf b ef o re p aying his child
suppo rt arr ear ag e and clea ring an outstanding arr est war rant. Although responde nt argues that it continued working on I an’s case beca use of the possibili ty that a court would
eventua lly find that J ames was authorized to sue on I an’s behalf
, as responde nt’s brief points out, afte r it verifie d the information alleg ed in the letter, it told J ames that he would need to first reme dy his child support arre ar ag e. It is clea r to this court that responde nt, as of September 6, 2007, was awa re that J ames was not authorized to act as I an’s next friend and could not pursue a claim on I an’s behalf before re m ed y i n g his child support arr earag e. As J ames’s arr ear ag e was $21,671.75 and there was an outstanding war rant for his arrest beca use of his substantial arr ear ag e, we deter mine that responde nt’s choice to continue workingon I an’s pe rsonal injury matter wa s not reasona

ble. ¶ 29 T h e am o u n t of compensation owed to responde nt for work done befor e it was p u t o n notice rema ins undeter

mined. Howeve r, an ex haustive revie w of the rec ord ref lects that responde nt failed to put forth any evidenc e supporting its asser tion that it did work on I an’s
persona l injury claim. The rec ord fails to include time sheets, billing documents, or aff idavits evidenc ing work conducte d by responde nt. Re spondent’s bare -bones asser tion of the work it claims it perf

ormed on I an’s behalf is, without more, unpersua sive. The rec ord ref lects that responde nt’s fee reque st was not based on the amount of work actua lly done by responde nt, but instead was based on a perce ntag e of the s ettlement awarde d to I an. Although we note responde nt’s argument that time sheets are not require d in a persona l injury matter wher e the client will ultimately pay a conting ent fee
, this argument does not exc use responde nt’s failure
to evidenc e its work through aff idavit or other means. Be cause responde nt failed to include in the rec ord any evidenc e that it perf ormed work on I an’s persona l injury suit, we deter mine that responde nt is not entitled to any compensation from t h e u l t i mate awa rd to I an. See Benson v. Stafford
, 407 I ll. App. 3d 902, 912 (2 0 1 0 ) (holding that the appellate court can aff irm on any basis in the rec ord, reg ardle ss whether the trial court relied on that basis or its

-8-rea soning w as cor rec t). ¶ 30 For the rea sons stated, we aff irm the judgme nt of the circ uit court of Winnebag o County

.

¶ 31 Affir

med.

¶ 32 J USTI CE SC HOSTOK, spec ially concur ring : ¶ 33 I agree wit h t h e m aj o ri t y ’s co n cl u s i o n that the responde nt is not entitled to any compensation f

rom I an’s estate. I write separ ately
, howeve r, beca use I believe that, even if the respondent had presented detailed evidence as to how m uch work it h ad done on I an’s
persona l injury claim betwee n September 4, 2007 (the day that the responde nt was reta ined by J ames), a nd September 6, 2007 (the day that the re spondent lear

ned that James was not

a proper party

), the responde nt would not be entitled to any compensation from I an’s estate for that time period. ¶ 34 Supreme court rules should be construed in harmony with applicable statutes whene ver possible. People v. Joseph
, 113 I ll. 2d 36, 58 (1986) (Simon, J
., dissenting)

. I llinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff

. Fe b. 1, 1994) provides in pe rtinent part:
“Eve ry pleading
, motion and other paper of a party repr esente d by an attorney shall be signe d by at least one attorney of rec ord in his individual name, whose addre ss sha ll be stated. *** The signa

ture of a n attorney or party constitutes a cer tificate by him that he has rea d the pleading
, m o t i o n o r o ther paper ; that to the best of his knowledg e, information, and belief formed afte r rea sonable inquiry it is well grounded in fac t and is

war rante d by exis ting law or a g ood-fa ith argument for the extension, modification, or

reve rsal of e x isting law, a nd that it is notinterposed f or any improper pur

pose, such a s to hara ss or to cause unnece ssary delay or nee dless incre ase in the c ost of litigation.” ¶ 35 Reading the Act in conjunction with Rule 137, I believ e t h at , b ef o re t h e re spondent
purpo rt edly did any work on I an’s behalf and sent its notice of lien, the responde nt was require d to do a rea sonable inquiry as to James’s right and ability to prosec ute an action on I an’s behalf. Such a rea sonable inquiry would have disclosed that (1) J ames and the petitioner wer e divorce d; (2) J ames was not I an’s custodial pare nt; and (3) J ames was delinquent in paying child support. Upon lear ning this, the responde nt should have rea liz ed that J ames had no right to prosecute a n action on I an’s behalf (see Steve nson , 144 I ll. 2d at 301-02), and thus no valid cause of action had been place d in the respo n dent’s hands by J ames. As no attorney fee s would have been incurre d on I an’s behalf had the res p o n d ent done a rea sonable inquiry
, the responde nt should not be entitled to any compensation under
t h e Act for work it might have done from September 4 to September 6, 2007. I wo u l d there fore aff

irm for the r easons state d by the trial cour

t.

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