II 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2725 

To address noncompliance by the Russian Federation of its obligations under 

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 31, 2014 

Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Mr. RISCH, Mr. HATCH, and Mr. WICKER) introduced 

the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 

on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To address noncompliance by the Russian Federation of its 

obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

(INF) Treaty. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Consequences for Rus5 sia’s Arms Control Violations Act of 2014’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) A public report in The New York Times on 

9 January 29, 2014, revealed that the Russian FedVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:26 Aug 09, 2014 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2725.IS S2725

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1 eration is no longer in compliance with the Treaty 

2 Between the United States of America and the 

3 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimi4 nation of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter5 Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 

6 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988 (com7 monly referred to as the ‘‘Intermediate-Range Nu8 clear Forces Treaty’’ or ‘‘INF Treaty’’). 

9 (2) On April 29, 2014, Acting Assistant Sec10 retary of State for Arms Control, Verification and 

11 Compliance Anita E. Friedt stated in testimony be12 fore the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 

13 of Representatives that, ‘‘[w]e have concerns about 

14 Russian compliance with the INF Treaty. We have 

15 raised them with Russia and are pressing for clear 

16 answers in an effort to resolve our concerns because 

17 of the importance of the INF Treaty to Euro-Atlan18 tic security. We’ve briefed our NATO allies on our 

19 concerns and will continue to coordinate with them 

20 on this and other matters that affect our common 

21 security. We have been keeping Congress informed 

22 on this matter through briefings with relevant con23 gressional committees and will continue to do so. We 

24 will continue to work with Russia to resolve our con25 cerns, and to encourage mutual steps to help foster 


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1 a more stable, resilient, transparent security rela2 tionship. We’re not going to drop the issue until our 

3 concerns have been addressed.’’. 

4 (3) On March 5, 2014, Deputy Assistant Sec5 retary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense 

6 Policy Elaine Bunn said to the Committee on Armed 

7 Services of the Senate, ‘‘[W]e are concerned about 

8 Russian activity that appears to be inconsistent with 

9 the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 

10 We’ve raised the issue with Russia. They provided 

11 an answer that was not satisfactory to us, and we 

12 will, we told them that the issue is not closed, and 

13 we will continue to raise this.’’. 

14 (4) On April 2, 2014, the Commander, U.S. 

15 European Command, and Supreme Allied Com16 mander Europe, General Breedlove, stated, ‘‘A 

17 weapon capability that violates the INF, that is in18 troduced into the greater European land mass is ab19 solutely a tool that will have to be dealt with . . . 

20 I would not judge how the alliance will choose to 

21 react, but I would say they will have to consider 

22 what to do about it. . . . It can’t go unanswered.’’. 

23 (5) The Russian Federation succeeded to the 

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1 cialist Republics in a declaration issued at Biskek, 

2 Kyrgyzstan, in October 1992. 

3 (6) The flight test or deployment of any INF4 banned weapon delivery vehicle by the Russian Fed5 eration constitutes a militarily significant violation 

6 of the INF Treaty. 

7 (7) The INF Treaty has unlimited duration, 

8 but, under the terms of the Treaty, inspections and 

9 continuous monitoring of Russian missile production 

10 under the Treaty ceased on June 1, 2001, thus the 

11 Treaty no longer offers any verification to detect any 

12 militarily significant violations. 

13 (8) A major problem exists with respect to the 

14 application of the INF Treaty to any new ballistic 

15 or cruise missile that is flight tested or otherwise 

16 flown once at a range not prohibited by the Treaty 

17 (that is a range less than 500 kilometers or more 

18 than 5,500 kilometers) but will be flown at a range 

19 that is banned by the Treaty (at a range that is be20 tween 500 and 5,500 kilometers) as a weapon deliv21 ery vehicle. 

22 (9) President Barack Obama has not made use 

23 of any INF Treaty-provided means to address Rus24 sian Federation noncompliance with the Treaty, to 

25 include convening a meeting of the Treaty’s Special 


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1 Verification Commission under Article XIII of the 

2 Treaty. 

3 (10) The Committee on Foreign Relations of 

4 the Senate noted in its 1988 report on the INF 

5 Treaty, ‘‘In the event Soviet actions appear to con6 tradict their obligations under the treaty, Congress 

7 should be kept fully informed. Any questionable ac8 tivity should be fully discussed in the Special 

9 Verification Commission. If the Soviet Union has 

10 not, after a sufficient period of time, satisfied 

11 United States concerns or ceased the activity in 

12 question, and if the Soviet activity is deemed to be 

13 militarily significant, the President should propose 

14 implementation of an appropriate and proportionate 

15 response.’’. 

16 (11) The Administration has not made any seri17 ous or credible effort, over several years, to respond 

18 to violations by the Russian Federation of its obliga19 tions under the INF Treaty. 

20 (12) The INF Treaty is no longer effectively 

21 verifiable. 

22 (13) The Russian Federation’s actions, as de23 tailed in the January 29, 2014, report of The New 

24 York Times, have defeated the object and purpose of 

25 the INF Treaty. 


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1 (14) Continued noncompliance by the Russian 

2 Federation with its obligations under the INF Trea3 ty and continued United States adherence to the 

4 INF Treaty, in light of failure to respond in a timely 

5 manner to Russian Federation noncompliance, 

6 places the supreme interests of the United States 

7 and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza8 tion (NATO) in jeopardy. 

9 (15) The Russian Federation has violated its 

10 obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum 

11 on Security Assurances and has rendered null the ef12 fect and assurances of the NATO–Russia Founding 

13 Act of 1997. 

14 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

15 It is the sense of Congress that— 

16 (1) the Russian Federation, through its flight 

17 testing of both a ballistic missile intended for inter18 mediate-range targets as well its flight testing of a 

19 ground-launched cruise missile prohibited by the 

20 INF Treaty, has acted contrary to the object and 

21 purpose of a central purpose of the Treaty and is 

22 therefore in material breach of its obligations under 

23 the Treaty; and 

24 (2) the President, after consultation with 

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1 sian Federation ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, 

2 should take such actions as the President determines 

3 to be necessary to deny the Russian Federation any 

4 militarily significant advantage resulting from its 

5 noncompliance with the INF Treaty. 

6 SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, 

7 OR ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S.-RUSSIA BILAT8 ERAL PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION. 

9 No funds made available to the Department of State 

10 may be used to carry out programs, projects, or activities 

11 of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission until 

12 the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 

13 committees that the Russian Federation as of the date of 

14 the certification has not flight tested a ballistic missile at 

15 strategic range in a configuration (booster stages, post16 boost vehicle, or reentry vehicles) that is unlike a configu17 ration that is used for remaining tests of the system at 

18 ranges that are prohibited under the INF Treaty. 

19 SEC. 5. PROGRAM TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOP GROUND20 LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE AND GROUND21 LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILI22 TIES. 

23 (a) PROGRAM REQUIRED.—The President shall es24 tablish and carry out a program to research and develop 

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1 listic missile capabilities, including by modification of 

2 exiting United States military capabilities, with a range 

3 between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. 

4 (b) STUDY AND REPORT.— 

5 (1) STUDY.—The President shall conduct a 

6 study for potential sites of the cruise missile and 

7 ballistic missile capabilities specified in subsection 

8 (a). In conducting the study, the President shall 

9 consider selecting sites on United States overseas 

10 military installations and sites offered by United 

11 States allies. 

12 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the 

13 date of the enactment of this Act, the President 

14 shall submit to the appropriate congressional com15 mittees a report that contains the results of the 

16 study. 

17 (c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require18 ment to establish and carry out the program under sub19 section (a) if, on or before October 1, 2014, the President 

20 certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 

21 that— 

22 (1) the Russian Federation is in compliance 

23 with all of its obligations under the INF Treaty; and 

24 (2) the Russian Federation has verifiably and 

25 completely eliminated any military system that it has 


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1 developed, flight tested, and deployed in violation of 

2 the INF Treaty. 

3 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

4 authorized to be appropriated to the President 

5 $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2015 to carry out the pro6 gram under subsection (a). 

7 SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE RESPONSES TO RUSSIAN 

8 FEDERATION’S VIOLATION OF INF TREATY. 

9 The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Aegis 

10 Ashore sites in Romania and Poland are deployed, con11 sistent with the timelines established in the Ballistic Mis12 sile Defense Review of 2010, with an operational capa13 bility to defend against short-, medium-, and intermediate14 range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles launched by the 

15 Russian Federation. 

16 SEC. 7. SANCTIONS. 

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—If, on or before the date that is 

18 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, 

19 the President does not certify to the appropriate congres20 sional committees that the Russian Federation is not de21 veloping or deploying any military system that violates or 

22 circumvents the INF Treaty, the President shall impose 

23 the sanctions described in subsection (b). 

24 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions referred 

25 to in subsection (a) are the following: 


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1 (1) The President shall suspend any coopera2 tion with the Russian Federation related to any as3 pect of the United States program for national, the4 ater, or regional missile defense, including any provi5 sion of any data generated by the United States in 

6 any test of any missile defense technology. 

7 (2) The President shall deny any license pursu8 ant to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 

9 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077 b.) for the export of any nu10 clear material, equipment, or technology to the Rus11 sian Federation. 

12 (3) The President shall terminate the United 

13 States of the Agreement Between the Government of 

14 the United States of America and the Government 

15 of the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the 

16 Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, entered 

17 into force January 12, 2011, in accordance with the 

18 provisions of Article 20(1) of that Agreement. 

19 (4) The President shall not award any United 

20 States Government contract to a private or public 

21 entity incorporated in the Russian Federation. 

22 (c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require23 ment to impose sanctions under this section beginning on 

24 or after the date on which the President certifies to the 

25 appropriate congressional committees that the Russian 


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1 Federation has provided to the United States the fol2 lowing: 

3 (1) A list of all intermediate-range and shorter4 range missiles, as such terms are defined in the INF 

5 Treaty, as well as their launchers, support struc6 tures, and support equipment that are not inter7 mediate-range and shorter-range missiles listed 

8 under Article III of the Treaty as existing types and 

9 which have been designed, developed, flight tested or 

10 deployed by the Russian Federation since June 1, 

11 2001. 

12 (2) A list of all deployment bases for any inter13 mediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as such 

14 terms are defined in the INF Treaty, including in 

15 particular, any base for any road-mobile, ground16 launched ballistic and cruise missiles that are not 

17 bases at which such missiles were located on June 

18 1, 2001. 

19 (3) A list of all flight tests carried out by the 

20 Russian Federation for any new type of ground21 launched ballistic or cruise missile which has been 

22 flight tested at one or more times below a range of 

23 500 kilometers or above 5,500 kilometers. 


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1 (4) A list of all production facilities used for the 

2 design and development of any ballistic or cruise 

3 missile that is prohibited under the INF Treaty. 

4 (5) A description of the reasons that the Gov5 ernment of the Russian Federation has provided for 

6 undertaking the design, development, and deploy7 ment of any ballistic or cruise missile that is prohib8 ited under the INF Treaty. 

9 SEC. 8. RESTRICTION ON AGREEMENTS ON FURTHER RE10 DUCTION OF NUCLEAR FORCES. 

11 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

12 United States to not engage in further negotiations with 

13 the Russian Federation to reduce nuclear forces until the 

14 Russian Federation is in full compliance with all existing 

15 bilateral nuclear agreements with the United States, in16 cluding the INF Treaty. 

17 (b) RESTRICTION.—Notwithstanding any other provi18 sion of law, the President shall not enter into any agree19 ment with the Government of the Russian Federation with 

20 respect to the reduction of nuclear forces except with the 

21 advice and consent of the Senate pursuant to article II, 

22 section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. 

23 SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS. 

24 In this Act: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com3 mittees’’ means— 

4 (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the 

5 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 

6 on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select 

7 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep8 resentatives; and 

9 (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the 

10 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 

11 on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee 

12 on Intelligence of the Senate. 

13 (2) INF TREATY OR TREATY.—The term ‘‘INF 

14 Treaty’’ or ‘‘Treaty’’ means the Treaty Between the 

15 United States of America and the Union of Soviet 

16 Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their In17 termediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, 

18 signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and en19 tered into force June 1, 1988. 

Æ 


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