Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 1 of 27

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Joseph Lee Young,

Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

October 4, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-CR-2544

Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court

The Honorable Douglas B. Cummins, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

41D03-2303-F2-16

Opinion by Judge May

Judges Brown and Foley concur.

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 2 of 27

[1] Joseph Lee Young appeals following his convictions of Level 2 felony dealing 

methamphetamine in an amount of ten grams or more1 and Level 6 felony 

unlawful possession of a syringe2 and his adjudication as a habitual offender.3

Young presents four issues for our review, which we revise, restate, and reorder 

as:

1. Whether the warrantless search of Young’s vehicle, which included 

looking inside a loose door panel, violated Young’s rights under:

1.1. the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; or 

1.2. Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution; 

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that the 

State established an adequate chain of custody to support admission of 

the items law enforcement collected during the search of Young’s 

vehicle;

3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Young’s 

convictions; and

1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(e) (2017).

2 Ind. Code § 16-42-19-18 (2015).

3 Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (2017).
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4. Whether Young’s aggregate thirty-five-year sentence is inappropriate 

in light of the nature of his offenses and his character.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History4

[2] On March 8, 2023, Franklin Police Department (“FPD”) officers conducted 

long-range surveillance of Young because there was an outstanding warrant for 

Young’s arrest. The officers observed Young sitting in the front seat of a 

Chevrolet Trailblazer while it was parked on the street outside of Young’s 

residence, and after Young sat in the car for about an hour, Detective Kody 

Martin of the FPD parked his patrol vehicle behind the Trailblazer, ordered 

Young out of the vehicle, and handcuffed Young. Detective Martin conducted 

a pat down search of Young and found approximately half a gram of a 

substance later determined to be methamphetamine and a substance Detective 

Martin believed was marijuana. 

[3] Multiple other law enforcement officers arrived at the scene including 

Lieutenant Christopher Tennell of the FPD and Detective Andrew Eggebrecht, 

a K-9 officer with the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office. Detective Eggebrecht 

4 We heard oral argument in this case on Constitution Day, September 17, 2024, at the University of 

Evansville. We commend counsel for their advocacy and thank University of Evansville President 

Christopher Pietruszkiewicz as well as the university’s faculty, staff, and students for their warm reception 

and hospitality. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 4 of 27

used his police dog to perform a free air sniff around the Trailblazer. The police 

dog gave a positive indication near the rear passenger-side door of the vehicle, 

so Detective Eggebrecht and Detective Martin searched the vehicle, while 

Lieutenant Tennell stood with Young. Detective Eggebrecht searched the area 

near the rear passenger-side door and found a “marijuana-branded tray that had 

residue on it.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 234.) There were tools and wires scattered 

throughout the vehicle and the center console had been disassembled. As the 

officers were searching near the driver’s door, Lieutenant Tennell noticed that 

Young’s behavior changed. Young had been ignoring the search, but Young 

became more attentive at that point. Detective Eggebrecht found “a magnetic 

box” near the vehicle’s instrument cluster “stuck on the side of it where there 

was an air vent that was missing.” (Id. at 234-35.) The officers found red 

baggies, marijuana cigarettes, and a pipe inside the magnetic box. 

[4] The officers continued searching the vehicle and Detective Martin noticed the 

plastic interior door panel of the driver’s door moved away from the door and 

was “super loose.” (Ex. 1 at 24:04-:06.) Detective Eggebrecht noticed “there 

was a plastic clip that was holding the bottom of that door panel in rather than 

the normal number of clips that hold it all the way around the perimeter.” (Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 236.) Detective Martin pulled the loose plastic panel away from the 

door and a bag containing approximately nineteen grams of methamphetamine, 

small baggies with methamphetamine inside them, a scale, a latex band, 

syringes, and numerous unused plastic baggies fell out. The officers then used 
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their fingers to unscrew the door panel, but they did not find any additional 

evidence secreted behind the door panel.

[5] Detective Martin sorted the evidence at the scene and placed it into plastic bags. 

He then transported the evidence to FPD headquarters. Detective Martin gave 

the evidence to FPD Detective Jess Harris. Detective Harris tagged each bag of 

evidence with the case number and an item number, initialed and dated each 

bag, and placed the bags into an evidence locker used for temporary storage. 

The evidence technician was the only person who could retrieve the bags from 

the evidence locker. 

[6] On March 14, 2023, the State charged Young with Level 2 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine and Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe. 

Evidence Technician Mark Riley removed the bagged evidence from the 

evidence locker on March 16, 2023, processed the evidence, and then stored the 

evidence in the FPD’s secure property room. On June 16, 2023, the State filed 

an information alleging Young qualified for a habitual offender sentence 

enhancement. 

[7] On July 20, 2023, Young moved to suppress the narcotics and syringes found 

inside his vehicle alleging the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional. The 

trial court held a hearing on Young’s motion on July 21, 2023. During the 

hearing, Young explained he was not seeking to suppress evidence of the drugs 

found on his person or in the magnetic black box found near the instrument 

cluster. He clarified that he was only seeking to suppress the evidence found 
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inside the door panel. Young argued that taking apart the door was an 

“invasive search” that required a warrant. (Id. at 43.) 

[8] On July 24, 2023, the trial court issued an order denying Young’s motion to 

suppress. The trial court ruled that a warrant was unnecessary because of the 

automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court noted that the 

vehicle was in a public place and was operational. In addition, the police had 

already arrested Young and were preparing to take him to jail. The trial court 

also ruled that removal of the loose door panel did not exceed the scope of a 

lawful warrantless search: “Having found the rolling tray where [the police dog] 

indicated and the partially hidden metal box containing additional narcotics, 

noticing that the door panel was only secured by a single screw gave rise to the 

officer’s suspicion that additional illegal substances may be hidden in that 

compartment[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 61.) 

[9] The trial court held Young’s jury trial from August 8, 2023, to August 10, 2023. 

During Detective Martin’s testimony, Young objected to admission of the 

portion of Detective Martin’s bodycam footage that showed him pulling on the 

loose interior door panel on the basis that that portion of the search was 

unconstitutional, but the trial court overruled Young’s objection. Young 

further objected on the same basis when the State sought to admit the evidence 

discovered inside the loose door panel, and the trial court overruled each of 

Young’s objections. Dakota Altepeter testified he sold the Trailblazer at issue 

to Young in January 2023, he cleaned out the vehicle before attempting to sell 

it, the door panel was not loose at that time, and there were no illegal drugs in 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 7 of 27

the vehicle when he sold it. In addition, the State entered into evidence several 

recordings of phone calls Young had made while incarcerated in the Johnson 

County Jail. During these phone calls, Young stated officers “found all my 

shit,” “they got me with an ounce almost . . . yeah they got me,” and that he 

knew he “did this[.]” (Ex. 19 at 1:27-29; Ex. 20 at 1:23-30; Ex. 22 at 00:33-36). 

The jury found Young guilty of both Level 2 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine and Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe. After 

the jury read its verdict, Young pled guilty to the habitual offender sentence 

enhancement. 

[10] On September 25, 2023, the trial court held Young’s sentencing hearing. The 

trial court found Young’s criminal history and Young’s commission of these 

offenses while on bond to be aggravating circumstances. The trial court noted 

Young seemed remorseful but stated “I can’t give you any credit for being 

remorseful at this point because it’s one thing to be remorseful before your

sentence and another thing to sit there and go I’m lookin’ at 50 years and now 

I’m really remorseful.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 152.) The trial court also observed that 

Young twice had been ordered to receive drug treatment but continued to abuse 

drugs. The trial court found as a mitigating factor that Young pled guilty in two 

other cases and that Young pled guilty to the habitual offender enhancement in 

the instant case. For Young’s Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine 

conviction, the trial court sentenced Young to twenty-five years and enhanced 

that sentence by ten years because of the habitual offender finding. The trial 

court also sentenced Young to a term of one year for his Level 6 felony 
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unlawful possession of a syringe conviction. The trial court ordered Young to 

serve the sentences concurrently for an aggregate term of thirty-five years. The 

trial court also recommended that Young participate in the Recovery While 

Incarcerated program and stated “I’m gonna give you a chance to modify at 

some point.” (Id. at 154.) 

Discussion and Decision 

1. Vehicle Search 

[11] Young contends the officers’ search of his vehicle violated his rights under both 

the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution5 and Article 1, 

section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

6

 He asserts “the police’s action in 

dismantling Young’s vehicle and conducting a warrantless search of it was 

unreasonable.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) While Young filed a motion to suppress 

challenging the constitutionality of the vehicle search prior to trial, which the 

5 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 

upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

6 Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 

be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
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trial court denied, he subsequently proceeded to trial and renewed his objection 

to the constitutionality of the search at trial. Therefore, Young’s “appeal is best 

framed as challenging the admission of evidence at trial.” Clark v. State, 994 

N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). 

[12] We generally review a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence 

at trial for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 260. An abuse of discretion occurs 

when the trial court’s decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Id. 

“When, however, admissibility turns on questions of constitutionality relating 

to the search and seizure of that evidence, our review is de novo.” Jacobs v. 

State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 849 (Ind. 2017).

1.1 Fourth Amendment 

[13] Young asserts the officers “exceeded the bounds” of the Fourth Amendment 

“by dismantling the door panel.” (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) The Fourth 

Amendment protects citizens from search or seizure absent a warrant supported 

by probable cause unless a well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement 

applies. Tigner v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1064, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “The 

State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement 

applies for evidence obtained during a warrantless search to be admissible at 

trial.” Id. One such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile 

exception, which our Indiana Supreme Court discussed in State v. Hobbs:
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The ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement allows 

police to search a vehicle without obtaining a warrant if they 

have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found 

in the vehicle. This doctrine is grounded in two notions: 1) a 

vehicle is readily moved and therefore the evidence may 

disappear while a warrant is being obtained, and 2) citizens have 

lower expectations of privacy in their vehicles than in their 

homes. One reason for this diminished expectation of privacy in 

a car and its contents is that cars travel along public highways 

and are subject to pervasive government regulation.

933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ind. 2010) (internal citations omitted). 

[14] A search pursuant to the automobile exception “is not defined by the nature of 

the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the 

object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe 

that it may be found.” U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). The scope of a 

search pursuant to the automobile exception “is no broader and no narrower 

than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable cause 

justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every 

part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” 

Id. at 825. This includes the contents of closed containers inside the vehicle. 

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580-81 (1991). “When there is probable 

cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers . . . to 

examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable 

cause for each one.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999). 
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[15] Young argues the officers at the scene “should not have dismantled the door 

panel of the vehicle without a search warrant,” (Appellant’s Br. at 15), and he 

likens his case to Bell v. State, 818 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), reh’g denied, 

trans. denied. In Bell, the police conducted a traffic stop of Bell’s vehicle because 

Bell’s passenger had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Id. at 482. The 

officers handcuffed Bell and his passenger and placed them in separate police 

cruisers. Id. at 483. The officers then searched Bell’s vehicle. Id. During the 

search, the officers “dismantled” Bell’s glove compartment “enabling the 

officers to look behind the glove box and into the chassis of the vehicle.” Id. 

The officers found a bag of cocaine inside the vehicle’s chassis. Id. 

[16] Bell filed a motion to suppress arguing that the search of his car was 

unconstitutional, and the trial court denied Bell’s motion. Id. at 483-84. The 

State argued on appeal that the warrantless search of Bell’s vehicle fell within 

the Fourth Amendment’s search incident to arrest exception because it followed 

the arrest of Bell’s passenger. Id. at 484-85. We held the search was 

unconstitutional because it went beyond “the opening and searching of the 

closed glove box, consoles, receptacles, luggage, boxes and bags found within 

the vehicle’s passenger compartment,” the officers “dismantled the glove box to 

view behind it into the vehicle’s chassis.” Id. at 485. 

[17] However, Bell is readily distinguishable from the instant case. Whereas the 

officers in Bell exceeded the scope of a lawful warrantless search incident to 

arrest by searching beyond the immediate area where Bell’s passenger was 

seated, id. at 485, the officers who searched Young’s vehicle did not exceed the 
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scope of a lawful search pursuant to the automobile exception. “Where there is 

probable cause to search a vehicle, a search is not unreasonable if it is based on 

facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not 

been obtained.” Meister v. State, 933 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ind. 2010). “Probable 

cause to issue a search warrant exists where the facts and circumstances would 

lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search would uncover 

evidence of a crime.” Id. 

[18] Before Detective Martin pulled on the loose door panel, the police had found 

drugs on Young’s person, a police dog had alerted to the presence of drugs 

inside Young’s vehicle, the officers had found a marijuana-branded rolling tray 

near the rear passenger-side door, and the officers had also found a magnetic 

box containing narcotics and paraphernalia secreted inside a dismantled air 

vent near the vehicle’s instrument cluster. Moreover, prior to police arriving, 

the vehicle’s center console had been disassembled, and there were wires and 

tools scattered over the two front seats of the vehicle. Thus, a reasonably 

prudent person could conclude additional drugs could be hidden behind a loose 

door panel. Because probable cause existed to justify looking behind the door 

panel, Detective Martin’s act of pulling on the loose door panel did not violate 

Young’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.7

 See, e.g., Cheatham v. State, 819 

7 Young also asserts on appeal that the search did not fall within the search incident to arrest exception to the 

Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and that “[a]s for any alleged probable cause established by the 

canine, the search was unreasonable because the purpose of the stop was complete prior to the dog sniff.” 

(Appellant’s Br. at 18.) However, Young did not raise these arguments before the trial court, and therefore, 
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N.E.2d 71, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding probable cause existed to justify 

search of defendant’s car pursuant to the automobile exception when officers

observed rolling papers in plain view and smelled the odor of marijuana, and a 

police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle).

1.2 Article 1, section 11

[19] Young also argues the search was unreasonable under Article 1, section 11 of 

the Indiana Constitution. While the text of Article 1, section 11 is nearly 

identical to the text of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, “we evaluate a search under our state constitution based on the 

reasonableness of the conduct of the law enforcement officers under the 

circumstances, rather than on the expectation of privacy that is commonly 

associated with analysis under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jones, 191 

N.E.3d 878, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. 

We evaluate whether a search is unconstitutional under the Indiana 

Constitution by balancing three factors: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or 

he is precluded from raising them for the first time on appeal. See Finnegan v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1186, 1197 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“A party may not raise an argument or objection on appeal that was not raised before 

the trial court.”). Waiver notwithstanding, a warrantless search is constitutional if it fits into one exception 

to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016) (“the 

State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement 

applies”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the State proved the search fell within the automobile 

exception, the State did not also need to prove the search fell within the search incident to arrest exception. 

In addition, when the dog sniff occurred, the vehicle was parked on a public street, and the police had already 

arrested Young because of the outstanding warrant. The dog sniff did not prolong Young’s detention, and 

officers are permitted to walk dogs past vehicles parked in public because a dog sniff is not a protected search. 

See Danh v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1055, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“A dog sniff sweep of a vehicle is not a search 

protected by the Fourth Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. 
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knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method 

of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the 

extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 

2005).

[20] Young argues the warrantless search of his vehicle is similar to the search our 

Indiana Supreme Court held violated the Indiana Constitution in Brown v. State, 

653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995). In Brown, an individual robbed a drug store in 

Indianapolis, and a witness reported seeing the getaway car. Id. at 78-79. The 

next day, officers found a vehicle matching the witness’s description of the 

getaway car parked outside of Brown’s house. Id. at 79. The officers 

“impounded and ‘inventory-searched’” the vehicle and found several pieces of 

incriminating evidence. Id. Brown argued the search was unconstitutional, the 

trial court overruled his objection, and this court affirmed the trial court. Id. 

However, our Indiana Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 80. The Court held that 

the search was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution and the officers 

should have obtained a warrant before conducting the search. Id. The Court 

noted the car was parked in a residential neighborhood and was surrounded by 

police cars. Id. For that reason, it was unlikely the car would have been 

moved while the officers sought a warrant, and there was neither a shortage of 

time nor an emergency that would have made seeking a warrant impractical. 

Id. While Brown did not explicitly evaluate the search of Brown’s vehicle in 

light of the Litchfield factors, our Supreme Court clarified in Hardin v. State that 

the search of Brown’s vehicle was unconstitutional because of “low police 
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suspicion or concern and a lack of law-enforcement needs (Litchfield factors one 

and three)[.]” 148 N.E.3d 932, 945 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied 141 S. Ct. 2468 

(2021). 

[21] In contrast, in Hobbs, our Indiana Supreme Court held the Litchfield factors 

supported finding the search of Hobbs’s vehicle was reasonable. 933 N.E.2d at

1287. The police arrested Hobbs on an outstanding warrant when Hobbs was 

inside the Pizza Hut restaurant where he worked. Id. at 1284. When Hobbs 

refused to consent to a police search of his vehicle, the police summoned a K-9 

officer to the scene. Id. The police dog alerted, and the police then searched 

Hobbs’s vehicle. Id. The officers found marijuana and paraphernalia inside the 

car. Id. Hobbs challenged the search, but our Indiana Supreme Court held the 

search did not violate the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 1287. The Court 

explained police had a high degree of suspicion or concern that a violation of 

law occurred when the police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in Hobb’s 

vehicle. Id. In addition, the Court noted the search of Hobb’s vehicle did not 

disrupt his normal activities because he was already under arrest on an 

outstanding warrant at the time of the search, and the Court explained “the 

same considerations underlying the federal automobile exception support 

permitting the officers to secure the evidence without delay.” Id. The Court 

distinguished the search of Hobbs’s vehicle from the search in Brown because 

“although the car [in Brown] appeared to be the one used in the robbery, there 

was no probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of a crime, and 
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there was no certainty that detaining the car would not inconvenience its 

owner.” Id. 

[22] With respect to the search of Young’s vehicle, the police had a high degree of 

suspicion or concern that a violation of law occurred when a police dog alerted 

to the presence of drugs in Young’s vehicle, and that concern only heightened 

as the police found drugs and drug paraphernalia inside the vehicle. Like

Hobbs, Young was already under arrest on an outstanding warrant at the time 

of the search of his vehicle, and therefore, the search constituted a minimal 

disruption of his normal activities. In addition, the police have a significant 

need to intervene and remove illicit drugs because “distributing or possessing 

even small amounts of drugs threatens society.” State v. Timbs, 169 N.E.3d 361, 

373 (Ind. 2021). Therefore, the warrantless search of Young’s vehicle was not 

unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution. See, e.g., McKinney v. State, 212 

N.E.3d 697, 707-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding search of defendant’s vehicle 

was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances when dog alerted to the 

presence of drugs in vehicle, defendant’s vehicle was already set to be 

impounded at the time of the search, and law enforcement need to find 

evidence of drug activity was high), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 
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2. Chain of Custody

[23] Young also asserts the trial court erred in admitting the evidence Detective 

Martin collected at the scene8 because the State did not sufficiently prove the 

chain of custody for that evidence. Our standard of review regarding chain-ofcustody claims is well-settled:

An adequate foundation establishing a continuous chain of 

custody is established if the State accounts for the evidence at 

each stage from its acquisition, to its testing, and to its 

introduction at trial. Under the chain of custody doctrine, an 

adequate foundation is laid when the continuous whereabouts of 

an exhibit is shown from the time it came into the possession of 

the police.

To establish a proper chain of custody, the State must give 

reasonable assurances that the evidence remained in an 

undisturbed condition. However, the State need not establish a 

perfect chain of custody, and once the State strongly suggests the 

exact whereabouts of the evidence, any gaps go to the weight of 

the evidence and not to admissibility. Moreover, there is a 

presumption of regularity in the handling of evidence by officers, 

and there is a presumption that officers exercise due care in 

handling their duties. To mount a successful challenge to the 

chain of custody, one must present evidence that does more than

raise a mere possibility that the evidence may have been 

tampered with.

8 Specifically, Young challenged Exhibit 4 (scale), Exhibit 5 (syringes), Exhibit 6 (latex band), Exhibit 7 

(black magnetic boxes), Exhibit 8 (baggies), Exhibit 9 (methamphetamine found in the door panel), Exhibit 

10 (methamphetamine found in Young’s pocket), and Exhibit 11 (baggies found in Young’s pocket). 
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Espinoza v. State, 859 N.E.2d 375, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

[24] In K.W. v. State, we discussed the varying foundational requirements the State 

must prove to establish an adequate chain of custody for fungible and 

nonfungible items: 

“For fungible items such as blood and drugs, an adequate 

foundation is laid when the whereabouts of an exhibit is shown 

from the time it came into the possession of the police.” Mateo v. 

State, 981 N.E.2d 59, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. For 

fungible items, the State lays a proper foundation when “a 

witness is able to identify the item, . . . the item is relevant to the 

disposition of the case[,] . . . [and the State] provid[es] a 

reasonable assurance that the evidence was undisturbed as it 

passed from the custody of one person to the next.” Id. at 66-67. 

“If the State presents evidence that strongly suggests the exact 

whereabouts of the evidence at all times, that is sufficient.” Id. at 

67. In contrast, for “nonfungible items like guns and vehicles, 

the State need only show that the item is what it is purported to 

be and that it is in a substantially unchanged state” from when it 

was initially collected by police. Id. 

216 N.E.3d 505, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (all quotation marks, citations, and 

brackets in original), trans. denied.

[25] Young notes that, although the police arrested him on March 8, 2023, the first 

entry on the chain of custody form Young received on the eve of trial was dated 

March 16, 2023. Young relies on Graham v. State, 255 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. 1970), 

to argue that the State’s proof of the chain of custody was insufficient. In 

Graham, our Indiana Supreme Court held that an unexplained six-day break in 
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the chain of custody “precluded a finding that the white powder substance 

allegedly received by a ‘buyer’ from appellant was in fact the same white 

powder found to contain heroin in the police laboratory.” Id. at 653.

[26] However, unlike Graham, there is not an unexplained absence in Young’s case. 

Detective Martin testified that he took possession of the items at the scene, 

bagged them, and personally transported them to FPD headquarters. Narcotics 

Detective Harris testified that he received the items from Detective Martin, 

packaged and sealed the items, placed an evidence tag with an incident number 

and date on each item, and placed the evidence in a secure drop box. Evidence 

Technician Riley testified he removed the evidence from the secure drop box on 

March 16, 2023. He processed the items, including starting a chain of custody 

form, and placed the items in storage in the secure property room. Thus, officer 

testimony established the whereabouts of the bagged evidence between March 

8, 2023, and March 16, 2023, and we hold the State laid an adequate 

foundation regarding chain of custody to support admission of the bagged 

evidence at trial. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)

(holding State met burden of establishing chain of custody of fungible DNA 

samples through officer testimony), trans. denied.

3. Sufficiency of Evidence

[27] Young contends the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his 

convictions of dealing in methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a 

syringe. When faced with challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we apply a 
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“well settled” standard of review that leaves determination of the weight of the 

evidence and credibility of the witnesses to the fact-finder. Teising v. State, 226 

N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). “We consider only the evidence most favorable to 

the trial court’s ruling and will affirm a defendant’s conviction unless ‘no 

reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 

2000)).

[28] A person who knowingly or intentionally possesses, with intent to deliver, at 

least ten grams of methamphetamine commits Level 2 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1. Likewise, a person who possesses 

with the intent to commit a drug offense a hypodermic syringe or needle or an 

instrument adapted for the use of a controlled substance or legend drug by 

injection in a human being commits Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a 

syringe. Ind. Code § 16-42-19-18. “We have long recognized that a conviction 

for possession of contraband may be founded upon actual or constructive 

possession.” Griffin v. State, 945 N.E.2d 781, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “Actual 

possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over an item. 

Constructive possession occurs when a person has (1) the capability to maintain 

dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion 

and control over it.” Eckrich v. State, 73 N.E.3d 744, 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

[29] “In cases where the accused has exclusive possession of the premises on which 

contraband is found, an inference is permitted that he or she knew of the 
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presence of contraband and was capable of controlling it.” Griffin, 945 N.E.2d 

at 784. “A trier of fact may likewise infer that a defendant had the intent to 

maintain dominion and control over contraband from the defendant’s 

possessory interest in the premises, even when that possessory interest is not 

exclusive.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). However, in the 

case of non-exclusive possession of the premises on which the contraband is 

found, the State must support the inference that the defendant intended to 

exercise dominion and control over the contraband “with additional 

circumstances pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of the presence and the 

nature of the item.” Id. at 174-75. Such additional circumstances include:

(1) a defendant’s incriminating statements; (2) a defendant’s 

attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of 

contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) 

the item’s proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of 

contraband within the defendant’s plain view; and (6) the 

mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.

Id. at 175. In addition, other factors beyond the six listed above may support a 

finding that the defendant had constructive possession of contraband. Canfield 

v. State, 128 N.E.3d 563, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[30] Young argues that while “he had been in the proximate area where the drugs 

and paraphernalia were found inside the door panel of the SUV, there was no 

evidence he knew of their existence.” (Appellant’s Br. at 12.) Young notes that

Altepeter testified that someone had lived in the vehicle before it was 

abandoned in the tow yard. Young contends that “[a]lthough Altepeter stated 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 22 of 27

that he did not observe any issues with the doors and that nothing was loose, he 

acknowledged that he had not taken the panel off, did not know what was 

there, and he didn’t know if the previous owner put something in there.” (Id.) 

[31] However, we agree with the State that “several circumstances allowed the jury 

to find that [Young] had the intent and capability to maintain dominion and 

control over the items” found behind the driver’s door panel. (Appellee’s Br. at 

14.) Young was the only person in the vehicle when the police arrested him, 

and he had been sitting in the driver’s seat for at least an hour before the police 

arrested him. Further, Young does not challenge the drugs and paraphernalia 

police found on his person and in a magnetic box concealed in a missing air 

vent near the vehicle’s instrument cluster, and the items found in the door panel 

are of the same character as those items. Young also appeared to be actively 

disassembling the center console of the vehicle at the time of his arrest, 

presumably because he was trying to create additional places in the vehicle to 

hide contraband. While the vehicle was still registered to Altepeter at the time 

of Young’s arrest, Altepeter testified he had not transferred title to Young at 

that point because Young had not yet paid the full purchase price to Altepeter 

[32] Young also made incriminating statements in his phone calls to friends and 

family from the jail. For example, Young’s statement “they got me with an 

ounce almost . . . yeah they got me,” (Ex. 20 at 1:23-30), implicitly 

acknowledges his possession of the large amount of methamphetamine found 

behind the door panel because the total weight of methamphetamine found in 

Young’s possession only approaches an ounce if that amount is included in the 
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calculation. Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude Young constructively 

possessed the methamphetamine and syringes found in the door panel, and 

consequently, we hold the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain 

Young’s convictions. See, e.g., Parks v. State, 113 N.E.3d 269, 274 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2018) (holding the State presented sufficient evidence defendant 

constructively possessed gun and drugs found in the backseat of his car given 

the defendant’s proximity to the items, his incriminating statements, the strong 

odor of marijuana, and the presence of items suggestive of manufacturing or 

dealing). 

4. Inappropriate Sentence

[33] Last, Young asserts his aggregate sentence of thirty-five years is inappropriate 

given the nature of his offenses and his character. Pursuant to Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the 

trial court’s decision, [we] find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our determination 

“turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, 

the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a 

given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

Our review is deferential to the trial court’s decision, and our 

goal is to determine whether the appellant’s sentence is 

inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more 

appropriate. We consider not only the aggravators and 

mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors 

appearing in the record. The appellant bears the burden of 

demonstrating his sentence [is] inappropriate. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 24 of 27

George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations 

omitted), trans. denied. Our review is “holistic” and takes into consideration 

“the whole picture before us.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024). 

Appellants need not prove their sentence is inappropriate for both their 

character and offense, but “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates 

against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify 

relief.” Id.

[34] “Our analysis of the nature of the offense requires us to look at the nature, 

extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 

656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). As our Indiana Supreme Court has explained, 

“compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense 

(such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality)” may lead to a 

downward revision of the defendant’s sentence. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 

111, 122 (Ind. 2015). 

[35] “When considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory 

sentence for the crime.” McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2020). A Level 2 felony is punishable by imprisonment “for a fixed term of 

between ten (10) and thirty (30) years, with the advisory sentence being 

seventeen and one-half (17 1⁄2) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. Here, Young’s 

twenty-five-year sentence for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine was 

above the advisory term for that level of offense, but it was below the maximum 

sentence. That sentence was subject to an enhancement of between six and 

twenty years because the trial court adjudicated him to be a habitual offender, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 25 of 27

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1) (2017), but the trial court only enhanced his 

sentence by ten years. In addition, the trial court imposed the advisory sentence 

for Young’s Level 6 felony illegal possession of a syringe conviction. See Ind. 

Code § 35-50-2-7 (Level 6 felony punishable by imprisonment “for a fixed term 

of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 1⁄2) years, with the advisory 

sentence being one (1) year.”). 

[36] Young argues the nature of his offenses merits a lesser sentence because he 

“acknowledged ownership of the drugs on his person” and “[n]o one was 

injured regarding these offenses.” (Appellant’s Br. at 23-24.) We disagree. 

Young possessed twenty-two grams of methamphetamine, which is over twice 

the amount required for his offense, and he possessed other paraphernalia and 

items consistent with drug dealing. He also made significant efforts to hide his 

criminal activity from police by concealing his contraband in the voids of his 

vehicle. Young moreover committed these crimes while released on bond. All

these facts render the nature of Young’s offenses worse than the “typical” 

versions of each offense. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 182 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2022) (holding nature of defendant’s offense was more egregious than a 

typical version of that offense because of the large amount of 

methamphetamine defendant sold). Thus, we cannot say Young’s sentence is 

inappropriate for his offenses.

[37] With respect to an offender’s character, one relevant fact is the defendant’s 

criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

Young’s criminal history is significant. He has two prior felony convictions and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 26 of 27

ten misdemeanor convictions, and Young’s history also includes violations of 

his terms of probation. While Young has a long history of substance abuse and 

expressed a desire at his sentencing to receive treatment, his history shows 

continued abuse of substances even after receiving treatment. Young contends 

he is employable because he has a GED and various work-related certifications. 

He also stated at sentencing that he worked as a cook while incarcerated in jail. 

However, Young’s employment history does not merit a lesser sentence. See 

Jones, 218 N.E.3d at 16 (“Lastly, Jones claims that his gainful employment is 

evidence of his positive character. We have held before that most people are 

employed such that this consideration does not warrant a lesser sentence.”).

Therefore, we hold Young’s sentence also is not inappropriate for his character. 

See, e.g., Murray, 182 N.E.3d at 279 (defendant’s twenty-five-year sentence was 

not inappropriate given his character, particularly his prior criminal history and 

repeated failures to abide by his terms of probation).

Conclusion 

[38] The search of Young’s vehicle, which included pulling on the loose door panel 

attached to Young’s front driver’s side door, was permissible pursuant to the 

Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception, and the search was also 

reasonable under the Indiana Constitution. Moreover, the testimony of 

Detective Martin, Detective Harris, and Evidence Technician Riley laid an 

adequate foundation regarding the chain of custody of the items Detective 

Martin collected for those items to be admissible at trial. In addition, the State 

presented sufficient evidence to prove Young constructively possessed the drugs 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2544 | October 4, 2024 Page 27 of 27

and paraphernalia found in the vehicle’s door panel. Finally, Young’s 

aggregate thirty-five-year sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of 

his offenses and his character. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

[39] Affirmed.

Brown, J., and Foley, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Carlos I. Carrillo

Carrillo Law LLC

Greenwood, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Indiana Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana