UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ WILLIAM A. COYLE, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CYNTHIA A. JACKSON, NP (official and individual); BRIAN “DOE” (official and individual), Defendants - Appellees. No. 17-1152 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-00333-LTB) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before PHILLIPS , McKAY , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ William A. Coyle, a pro se litigant, 1 appeals from the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of his sec ond amended complaint. Exerci sing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. And because we agree with the district court that this

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Ci r. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Mr. Coyle is proceeding pro se , we construe his filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “[T]his ru le of liberal c onstruction stops, however, at the point at which we begin to serve as his advocate.” United States v. Pinson , 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 appeal was not taken in good faith, we deny Mr. Coyle’s request for in forma pauperis status on appeal. BACKGROUND I. Mr. Coyle filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado asserting that he was discha rged from a treatment center in Littleton, Colorado, in October 2014 becau se of his color, religion, and disability, in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and various criminal statutes. His complaint did not name speci fic defendants, but simply stated “WHOS NAME IS UNKNOWN, and WHOS NAME IS UNKNOWN.” A magistrate judge concluded the comp laint was deficient because Mr. Coyle (1) failed to identify whom he was suing and (2) failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by not “alle g[ing] specific facts in support of his claims that demonstrate he was the target of any unlawfu l discrimination on the basis of his color, religion, or disability.” The judge noted that although we liberally construe pro se plaintiff’s pleadings, we are not “required to guess in order to determine what claims are being asserted and what sp ecific factual allegations support those claims.” The magistrate judg e ordered Mr. Coyle to file an amended complaint within thirty days. Mr. Coyle filed a motion to reconsider, 2 arguing that amending his complaint “would potentially devalue” the purpose of his original compla int. The magistrate

2 Mr. Coyle also filed a motion for a te mporary restraining or der asserting that Cynthia A. Jackson, a person not named as a defendant in the complaint, participated3 judge denied the motion to reconsider be cause Mr. Coyle “cite[d ] no authority that would allow him to proceed in this ac tion without complying with the pleading requirements of Rule 8.” Mr. Coyle then filed an amended compla int, listing Cynthia A. Jackson and Brian “Doe” as defendants. Bu t the magistrate judge conc luded the “claims asserted in the amended complaint appear to be identical to the clai ms asserted in the original complaint.” The judge then provided Mr. Coyle “one mo re opportunity to file an amended pleading that comp lies with the pleading re quirements of Rule 8 as previously directed.” Mr. Coyle then filed a second amended complaint. A district court judge concluded that Mr. Coyle’s cl aims continued to “lack speci fic factual allegations that demonstrate his rights have been violated.” The court noted that despite giving Mr. Coyle two opportunities to amend the complain t and specific instruc tions to include a short and plain statement of any claims showi ng he is entitled to re lief, he still failed to comply with Rule 8 becau se his “disjointed, confusi ng, vague, and conclusory factual allegations do not provide fair notic e of the specific clai ms he is asserting against Defendants.” Accordingly, the district court judge dismissed Mr. Coyle’s complaint without prejudice. The court further certified that because any appeal fr om its order would

in the alleged violations of Mr. Coyle’s rights. The magistrate judge denied this motion because Ms. Jackson was not named as a party to the lawsuit and Mr. Coyle’s “vague and conclusory allegations” did not demonstrate an immediate and irreparable injury that would entitle him to a temporary restraining order.4 not be taken in good faith, in forma pauperis status would be denied on appeal. Mr. Coyle now appeals, and moves for in forma pauperis status on appeal. DISCUSSION II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(b) authorizes a district court 3 to dismiss an action that fails to comply with any asp ect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents , 492 F.3d 1158, 1161 ( 10th Cir. 2007). The district court concluded Mr. C oyle failed to comply with Rule 8, and we must affirm this dismissal unless we conclude the dist rict court abused its discretion. Id. at 1161–62. We are especially deferential where, as here, the district cour t dismissed the complaint without prejudice. See id. at 1162 (“Employing Rule 41( b) to dismiss a case without prejudice for failure to co mply with Rule 8 of course allo ws the plaintiff another go . . .; accordingly, a district court may, without abusing its dis cretion, enter such an order without attention to any particular procedures.”); see also Carbajal v. City and Cty. of
Denver , 502 F. App’x 715, 716 (10th Cir. 20 12) (unpublished) (“A dismissal without prejudice under Rule 8 is w ithin the sound discretion of the trial court.” (quoting Atkins v. Nw. Airlines, Inc. , 967 F.2d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1 992))). A district court abuses its discretion when it “issues an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly

3 Although the text of Rule 41(b) requires the defendant to file the motion to dismiss, “the Rule has long been interpreted to permit courts to dismiss actions sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or comp ly with the rules of civil procedure or court’s orders.” Olsen v. Mapes , 333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we reject Mr. C oyle’s argument on appeal that the district court could not sua sponte dismiss his claims.5 unreasonable judgment.” Rocky Mountain Christian Chur ch v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs , 613 F.3d 1229, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here the district court cited heav ily from Mr. Coyle’s second amended complaint and concluded that—even after two warnings and two opportunities to correct the deficiencies—Mr. Coyle still failed to connect specific facts to a violation of any legally recognized right. The court concluded these “disjo inted, confusing, vague, and conclusory factual allegations do not provide fair notice of the specific claims he is asserti ng against Defendants.” Mr. Coyle contends the district court fa iled to construe hi s pro se pleadings liberally. We disagree. Both the magistra te judge and the district court judge specifically noted they were construing Mr . Coyle’s pleadings liberally, but, as the magistrate judge correctly poi nted out, “[v]ague and conclu sory allegations that his rights have been violated do not entitle a pro se pleader to a day in court regardless of how liberally the court construes such pleadings.” And we have emphasized that it is “not the district court’s job to stitch t ogether cognizable claims for relief from . . . wholly deficient pleading[s] . . . [and] we are loath to revers e a district court for refusing to do the litigant’s job.” See Mann v. Boatright , 477 F.3d 1140, 11 48 (10th Cir. 2007). After thoroughly reviewing Mr. Coyle’s pleading s below, we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Mr. Coyle’s second am ended complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8. Mr. Coyle’s remaining arguments on appeal are meritless. He first contends that he did not consent to the magistrate judge ’s involvement in his case as required by6 28 U.S.C. § 636. But the magi strate’s involvement in this case did not implicate the subdivisions of § 636 requiring parties’ consent. Instead, the district court has authority to “designate a magistrate judge to hear and de termine any pretrial matter pending before the court,” subject to certain exceptions not applicable here. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). And this authority does not re quire the parties’ consent. Next, Mr. Coyle argues the district court erred in not requiring the defendants to answer the complaint w ithin twenty-one days of his co mplaint, as required by Federal Rule of Procedure 12. 4 Mr. Coyle also contends the court unfairly advocated for the defendants by dismissing the complaint before the defendants answered. But the court enjoyed discretion to dismiss the complaint without requiring defendants to answer the complaint. Cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1992) (explaining that a district court is allowed to manage its docke t by sua sponte dismissing a complaint “so as to achieve the orderly and expe ditious disposition of cases”); see also Butler v. Broward Cty. Cent. Examining Bd. , 367 F. App’x 991, 993 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“[T]he defendants were not required to file an answ er because the district court dismissed the case for failure to state [a] claim.”). Lastly, Mr. Coyle contends the district c ourt unfairly denied him leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The district court conc luded that any appeal from its order would not be taken in good faith, and b ecause Mr. Coyle has failed to show “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the

4 Mr. Coyle also asserts that the district court violat ed defendants’ due process rights, but he lacks standing to a ssert their constitutional rights.7 issues raised on appeal,” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan , 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991), we agree with the district court. Mr. Coyle has utterly failed to addre ss the deficiencies in his second amended complaint that led to the district court’s dismissal of his claims without prejudice, and none of the errors Mr . Coyle alleges on appeal demonstrates an abuse of discretion. CONCLUSION III. We AFFIRM the district court’s dism issal without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce dure. And because we agree with the district court th at this appeal was not ta ken in good faith, we DENY Mr. Coyle’s request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge