J-A13043-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SPENCER GENE RUDOLPH 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 747 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 14, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-16-CR-0000164-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: May 30, 2024

Appellant, Spencer Gene Rudolph, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed on April 14, 2023, after this Court vacated Rudolph’s prior 

judgment of sentence and remanded for further proceedings. According to 

Rudolph, the trial court misinterpreted this Court’s remand order and erred by 

not suppressing evidence obtained from the illegal execution of a search 

warrant at Rudolph’s home. After careful review, we affirm.

We summarized the following pertinent facts and procedural history in

our decision in Rudolph’s prior appeal in this case, CP-16-CR-0000164-2019 

(case 164-2019), and a related, previously-consolidated case docketed at CP16-CR-0000165-2019 (case 165-2019): 

At the preliminary hearing, the Chief of Police of Clarion Borough, 

Chief William Peck, was the only person to testify. Peck confirmed 

he began investigating the death of [William] Stout from a 

fentanyl overdose on November 20, 2018. See N.T., 4/9/19, at 

22-23. Peck recounted that he looked through Stout’s phone and 

saw a contact for “Spencer.” See id. at 25-26. He testified he 
J-A13043-24

- 2 -

had separately received information that Rudolph was dealing 

drugs out of his house, see id. at 25, and that a “light bulb went 

off” connecting that information to the “Spencer” name in Stout’s 

phone. Id. at 26. He entered the phone number associated with 

“Spencer” in Stout’s contact list into Facebook Messenger, and 

Rudolph’s Facebook profile emerged. See id. At that point, Peck 

began focusing his investigation into Stout’s death on Rudolph. 

See id.

Peck testified he conducted surveillance of Rudolph’s house and 

“observed numerous vehicles com[e] to the house, go inside, 

come back out within minutes and leave.” Id. at 11. Peck 

recounted that he applied for a search warrant for Rudolph’s house 

on February 11, 2019, and the warrant was issued that same day. 

See id. at 6-7, 13. The warrant was then executed on February 

13, 2019. See id. at 7. Regarding the warrant’s execution, Peck 

testified he waited in his police vehicle while the Pennsylvania 

State Police “SWAT” team executed the warrant at approximately 

6:05 a.m. on February 13, 2019. See id. at 14-15. When asked 

if the state police knocked or waited for a response, Peck replied: 

A. I was in a vehicle. 

Q. So you don’t know? 

A. The protocol is they knock and announce. I heard them 

verbally yelling stuff, so that would be announcing to me, 

and they were yelling prior to going in. 

Q. Did you witness anybody knocking, or no? 

A. I did not. 

Id. at 15-16. 

Peck testified the state police made a forced entry and found 

Rudolph inside the house. See id. at 16-17. Peck entered the 

house afterwards. During a search of the house, the police found 

multiple controlled substances and drug paraphernalia, including 

one-half to three-quarters of a pound of marijuana packaged in 

different amounts, suspected cocaine, as well as stamp bags and 

other packaging material. See id. at 8. Peck interviewed 

Rudolph, and according to Peck, Rudolph told Peck that he both 

used and sold drugs. See id. at 9, 19-20. Rudolph also told Peck 

he had worked with Stout. Peck testified that Rudolph originally 

denied selling heroin or fentanyl to Stout, but then admitted to 
J-A13043-24

- 3 -

selling him five stamp bags of heroin on November 19, 2018. See 

id. at 28. Peck recounted that Stout was found dead inside his 

home on November 20, 2018. See id. at 33. 

Peck proceeded to testify about his subsequent investigation into 

Stout’s death and drug activity involving Rudolph. That 

investigation “revealed a network of drug distribution that 

spanned multiple counties,” [Rudolph’s] Brief at 8, and included 

Rudolph as a “runner” for that network.

These two events that Peck testified to at the preliminary hearing 

- the search of Rudolph’s house and the subsequent investigation 

into the larger drug network and its connection to Stout’s death -

led to two separate filings of charges against Rudolph. First, 

following the search of Rudolph’s house, Rudolph was charged on 

February 15, 2019[,] with multiple drug offenses [in case] 165-

[]2019. Specifically, he was charged with four counts of 

[possession with intent to deliver], two counts of conspiracy, three 

counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of 

possession of paraphernalia. Then, on March 15, 2019, Rudolph 

was charged [in case] 164-[]2019 with drug delivery resulting in 

death, corrupt organizations, conspiracy to commit corrupt 

organizations, criminal use of a communications facility and 

involuntary manslaughter. All of the charges in both cases were 

held for court following the preliminary hearing. 

Rudolph filed several pre-trial motions: 1) a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus; 2) a motion to suppress his statement - corpus 

delicti; and 3) a motion to suppress evidence based on an unlawful 

search and seizure.

Commonwealth v. Rudolph, Nos. 699 & 700 WDA 2021, unpublished 

memorandum at *3-6 (footnote omitted) (hereinafter, “Ruldolph I”).

Notably, for purposes of the issues raised in the present appeal, we 

mention that in Rudolph’s “Motion to Suppress Statement – Corpus Delecti,” 

the thrust of his argument was challenging the validity of the search warrant 

and the legality of the officers’ execution thereof. While Rudolph mentioned, 

in stating the facts of his cases, that he was questioned by Peck after the 

search of his residence, and he also cursorily claimed that all evidence seized 
J-A13043-24

- 4 -

as a result of the unlawful police entry must be suppressed as fruits of an 

unlawful search which violated his rights, Rudolph did not develop any

argument that his statement to Peck should be suppressed as fruit of the 

illegal search of his home. 

Likewise, Rudolph did not address any basis to suppress his statement 

to Peck in his “Motion to Suppress – Unlawful Search and Seizure.” Instead, 

in that motion,

Rudolph challenged the search warrant for his house on several 

fronts. He argued that the search warrant was not supported by 

probable cause, that the warrant was defective as it did not mark 

the date and time of its issuance, and that the search warrant had 

been unlawfully executed. As to this last assertion, the 

suppression motion specifically averred the police “failed to 

provide [Rudolph] with sufficient time to open the door and allow 

them to enter,” and that the police entry was therefore 

unreasonable under the “knock and announce” rule. Motion to 

Suppress - Unlawful Search and Seizure, 8/14/19, at 4 

(unpaginated). 

Rudolph I, Nos. 699 & 700 WDA 2021, unpublished memorandum at *6.

In response to Rudolph’s pretrial motions to suppress,

[t]he trial court ... held a joint suppression hearing on all three 

motions on October 7, 2019. At the beginning of the hearing, the 

Commonwealth stated: 

[T]here are three separate motions that were filed. [One] 

motion was the motion to suppress unlawful search and 

seizure. That was based on a warrant that was issued for 

the search in [] Rudolph’s residence in which [Rudolph 

argued that the warrant] was not supported by probable 

cause, and therefore, the fruits of that search shall be 

suppressed. That would be the four corners of the search 

warrant issue, so I’ll just move to admit Commonwealth’s 

Exhibit A which is that search warrant. It is two pages: the 

front cover and the affidavit of probable cause. 
J-A13043-24

- 5 -

N.T., 10/7/19, at 3-4. When defense counsel was asked if there 

was any objection, he replied there was not. See id. at 4. 

The court admitted the search warrant into evidence. The affidavit 

of probable cause provided more information supporting the 

search warrant in addition to that testified to by Peck at the 

preliminary hearing. For instance, Peck stated in the affidavit that 

a confidential informant had initially provided Peck with the 

information that Rudolph was dealing drugs out of his house, and 

that there were text messages between the confidential informant 

and Rudolph. Peck also elaborated on the surveillance he had 

conducted on Rudolph’s house. He recalled that on February 8, 

2019, he had seen three vehicles pull up to Rudolph’s house in a 

manner that he described as consistent with drug-related activity. 

Lastly, Peck averred in the affidavit that on February 9, 2019, the 

police contacted a confidential informant to arrange a controlled 

drug buy with Rudolph, and the confidential informant then 

purchased ten stamp bags of purported heroin/fentanyl inside of 

Rudolph’s house that same day. 

After the search warrant was admitted into evidence, Peck was 

called to testify at the suppression hearing. As with the 

preliminary hearing, Peck was the only witness the 

Commonwealth called to testify at the suppression hearing. 

Peck’s suppression hearing testimony, however, was not relevant 

to the motion to suppress based on an unreasonable search and 

seizure. Instead, Peck’s testimony primarily focused on a 

discussion of stamp bags and their use in drug-related activity.

Following the suppression hearing, the court asked the parties for 

briefs. In its brief-in-opposition, the Commonwealth recognized 

Rudolph had specifically argued in his suppression motion and his 

brief-in-support that the execution of the search warrant had 

violated the “knock and announce” rule. The Commonwealth also 

acknowledged it had relied on the four corners of the search 

warrant at the suppression hearing to establish the 

constitutionality of the search warrant. It recognized in its brief, 

however, that this reliance on the search warrant itself was not 

sufficient to establish that the warrant had been lawfully executed 

and that it had “mistakenly overlooked” Rudolph’s issue regarding 

the warrant’s execution. 

Despite its mistake, the Commonwealth noted there had been 

testimony at the preliminary hearing that briefly touched on the 

execution of the warrant. The Commonwealth argued that such 
J-A13043-24

- 6 -

testimony, which had been incorporated into the suppression 

hearing record, was sufficient to refute Rudolph’s claim that the 

police had violated the “knock and announce” rule. In the 

alternative, the Commonwealth asserted that because the issue 

was “mistakenly not addressed at the time of the [suppression] 

hearing,” the court should essentially remand for a second 

suppression hearing in the event that it “need[ed] further 

testimony before making a decision” on Rudolph’s challenge to the 

constitutionality of the warrant’s execution. Commonwealth’s 

Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motions, 

10/28/19, at 9-10.

The trial court did not remand for further testimony. Instead, it 

denied all three of Rudolph’s pre-trial motions. In denying the 

motion to suppress based on an unreasonable search and seizure, 

the court found the search warrant had been supported by 

probable cause and that it had been properly executed. As for the 

latter, the court concluded Peck’s testimony that the protocol for 

the state police was to “knock and announce” and that the police 

had yelled before entering Rudolph’s house was sufficient to 

establish there had been no violation of the “knock and announce” 

rule. 

The matters proceeded to two separate jury trials. [In case] 165-

[]2019, the jury found Rudolph guilty of two counts of PWID, three 

counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of 

possession of drug paraphernalia. [In case] 164-[]2019, the jury 

convicted Rudolph of all counts with the exception of involuntary 

manslaughter, which had been nolle prossed. The court held a 

joint sentencing hearing for both dockets on August 26, 2020. The 

court sentenced Rudolph at both cases to an aggregate term of 

imprisonment of 169 months to 392 months. Rudolph appealed 

from both judgments of sentence, and this Court sua sponte

consolidated the two. Rudolph raise[d] the following singular 

issue in both appeals: 

Whether the lower court erred in denying [Rudolph’s] 

suppression motion related to a search warrant for one or 

more of [three] reasons: 1) lack of probable cause for 

issuance; 2) defect in application and approval; and 3) 

violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 207 [codifying the “knock and 

announce” rule].
J-A13043-24

- 7 -

Rudolph I, Nos. 699 & 700 WDA 2021, unpublished memorandum at *6-10

(footnote omitted).

In Rudolph I, we ultimately concluded that the Commonwealth had 

failed to “meet its burden of proving that, contrary to what Rudolph explicitly 

alleged in his suppression motion, the police complied with Rule 207 when 

executing the warrant to search his house.” Id. at *13 (footnote omitted). 

Thus, we found “that the trial court erroneously denied Rudolph’s suppression 

motion....” Id. at *17. Notably, the Rudolph I panel made no mention of 

the suppression of Rudolph’s post-search statement to Peck, presumably 

because Rudolph did not present any developed argument — either before this 

Court or in any of his pretrial motions or briefs filed in the trial court — that 

his statement should have been suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ of 

the illegal search of his home. In the end, the Rudolph I panel issued the 

following order: 

Judgments of sentence vacated. Order denying suppression of 

evidence obtained during the search of [Appellant’s] home

reversed. Remanded to the trial court to conduct proceedings 

consistent with this Memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Id. at *18 (emphasis added). 

On remand, Rudolph filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” He

contended that, “to comply with the terms of the Superior Court Opinion, this 

... [c]ourt should make a determination as to what evidence should be 

suppressed.” Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 3/6/23, at 1 (unnumbered). 

Specifically, Rudolph argued his post-search statement to Peck, as well “as his 
J-A13043-24

- 8 -

cell phone” that was allegedly “seized as a result of the warrant” should be 

suppressed.1 Id. at 1-2 (unnumbered). The court conducted a hearing that 

same day. At the hearing, the Commonwealth essentially argued that our 

decision in Rudolph I was “very specific” and applied only to “the controlled 

substance[s] and contraband [found] at the house.” N.T. Hearing, 3/6/23, at 

10. Conversely, Rudolph argued that our decision applied to his statement 

and “all pieces of evidence that were obtained by law enforcement as a result 

of the interviews that directly resulted from the search that took place in his 

home.” Id. at 12. Ultimately, the trial court observed that “the only thing 

the Superior Court based its opinion and order on was the suppression 

motion[,]” and not the other two pretrial motions Rudolph had filed, including 

his “Motion to Suppress Statement – Corpus Delecti.” Id. at 14. The court

reasoned:

You know the issues with his statements, I think the Superior 

Court didn’t address, they addressed just the suppression motion 

and said, you know, we need to act in accordance with that. So, 

as far as that’s concerned, I do think in trying to act in accordance 

with the opinion we received from the Superior Court, I’ve been 

tasked with determining what evidence should have been 

suppressed due to the fact that the search warrant was not 

properly executed. And so, in reading the opinion, and then 

looking specifically at that warrant and what information was 

obtained, or what, I guess, material was obtained in connection 

with that warrant, I do agree that all the charges at [c]ase 165[-

2019] are directly related to the substances that were confiscated 

during the search, and so all of those charges have to go. At 

[c]ase 164[-2019], ... there’s been reference to the fact that the 

____________________________________________

1 Rudolph presents no developed argument on appeal regarding this cellphone suppression claim. Accordingly, we do not address it.
J-A13043-24

- 9 -

warrant was served[,] and I certainly understand [Rudolph’s] 

argument that things that happened after the warrant were served 

are kind of connected, but purely looking at the Superior Court’s 

opinion, they don’t address those things. They don’t address the 

impact of the service o[f] the warrant on anything that would have 

happened after [] Rudolph would have been in detention, and for 

that reason, I don’t really see the items being seized through the 

search having really any impact on the charges at [c]ase 164[-

2019]. I do think though, in light of the opinion, that [] Rudolph 

will now need to be re-sentenced on the charges at that case, but 

I don’t think that the suppression of evidence obtained from the 

search has really any impact on the verdict in those cases, mainly 

due to the fact that the substances ... that are at issue in that case 

were not the substances that were found in his home. And ... I 

think that the Commonwealth still could have made reference to 

the fact that a warrant was served even if the items obtained by 

that warrant were suppressed. So, I am going to obviously grant 

the petition as far as all the charges at [c]ase 165[-2019]. Case 

164[-2019], I don’t see there really being any impact, so I am 

going to deny the motion as far as the charges at [that c]ase ... 

are concerned....

Id. at 15-16.

Accordingly, the charges against Rudolph in case 165-2019 were 

dismissed, and on April 14, 2023, the court re-sentenced Rudolph at case 164-

2019 to 35 to 72 months’ incarceration. Rudolph filed a timely, post-sentence 

motion, which the court denied. He then filed a timely notice of appeal,2 and 

complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

____________________________________________

2 Rudolph’s notice of appeal incorrectly states he is appealing from “the Order 

entered in this matter on the 14th day of May, 2023.” Notice of Appeal, 

6/26/23, at 1 (unnumbered). This mistake appears to be inadvertent, and 

therefore, we will overlook it. See Commonwealth v. Whitmire, 2021 WL 

1157198, at *3 n.4 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 25, 2021) (stating that, “although 

the notice had the wrong order date, this appears to be inadvertent and did 

not affect the notice’s validity”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that 

unpublished, non-precedential memorandum decisions of this Court filed after 

May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).
J-A13043-24

- 10 -

statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court thereafter issued a 

Rule 1925(a) statement indicating its reliance on its March 6, 2023 order 

denying Rudolph’s petition for writ of habeas corpus to support its decision.3 

Herein, Rudolph states one issue for our review: “Whether the lower court 

erred in failing to suppress all evidence that resulted from the illegal execution 

of a search warrant?” Rudolph’s Brief at 4.

The main focus of Rudolph’s argument is that on remand, the trial court 

should have suppressed his post-search statement to police because it was

“fruit of the poisonous tree,” i.e., the illegal search of his home. Id. at 8, 12-

18 (discussing cases to support his argument that his statement should have 

been suppressed due to the illegal execution of the warrant in this case, 

including Commonwealth v. Chambers, 598 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991); 

Commonwealth v. Rudisill, 622 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. 1993); and 

Commonwealth v. Rood, 686 A.2d 442 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)). Rudolph also 

argues the trial court erred by making “no determination as to the extent of 

evidence to be suppressed” based on our decision in Rudolph I. Id. at 18. 

Essentially, Rudolph claims that on remand, the trial court should have 

____________________________________________

3 That order essentially reiterates the rationale expressed by the court at the 

hearing on remand, quoted supra. See Order, 3/6/23, at 1 (unnumbered 

single page) (“At [c]ase 164[-]2019[, u]pon review of the record, the items 

obtained from the search that have been suppressed were not introduced at 

the trial at [c]ase 164[-]2019. The only evidence regarding the search were 

passing references to the fact that the search warrant was executed. 

Therefore, the suppression of evidence would have no impact on the verdict 

at [c]ase 164[-]2019. The [p]etition for [w]rit of [h]abeas [c]orpus regarding 

the charges at [c]ase 164[-]2019 is denied.”).
J-A13043-24

- 11 -

assessed whether his post-search statement to Peck should be suppressed in 

light of the illegality of the search of his home. He contends that had the court 

conducted this assessment, it would have found his statement to Peck (as well 

as other “evidence obtained from a cell phone or phones collected”) should 

have been suppressed. Id. at 21. Thus, Rudolph demands either a new trial 

with his at-issue statement suppressed or, alternatively, a second “remand ... 

to the lower court with direction that a full suppression hearing take place, 

whereby the lower court can properly determine what evidence is to be 

suppressed based on the unlawful execution of the search warrant.” Id. at 

22.

No relief is due. Initially, “[i]t is axiomatic that the court below, on 

remand, must comply strictly with the mandate of the higher court.” 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 877 A.2d 471, 475 (Pa. Super. 2005). Here,

the trial court did not err in concluding our remand in Rudolph I excluded

consideration of Rudolph’s claim to suppress his post-search statement. We 

reiterate that Rudolph did not develop any meaningful argument before the 

trial court, or this Court on appeal in Rudolph I, that his statement (or any 

other, post-search evidence) should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous 

tree” of the illegal search of his home.4 See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 

____________________________________________

4 This is in contrast to the defendants in the Rood and Chambers cases, cited 

by Rudolph herein. See Chambers, 598 A.2d at 540 (reviewing an order 

granting a motion to suppress that sought, “inter alia, to suppress the 

evidence obtained through the execution of the search warrant[,]” including 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A13043-24

- 12 -

128 A.3d 1231, 1241 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that “suppression motions ...

must be made with specificity and particularity as to the evidence sought to 

be suppressed and the reasons for the suppression”) (citation omitted);

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“When 

briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an appellant’s duty 

to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief 

must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the 

record and with citations to legal authorities.”). 

Instead, Rudolph’s appeal in Rudolph I was premised on the trial 

court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search 

of his home.

5

 Rudolph I, Nos. 699 & 700 WDA 2021, unpublished 

memorandum at *6 (stating that “the only motion at issue in this appeal” was 

____________________________________________

“drugs and drug paraphernalia [that] were seized and several statements 

[that] were obtained from [] Chambers” during the search of his home) 

(emphasis added); Rood, 686 A.2d at 446 (reviewing an order granting in 

part, and denying in part, Rood’s motion seeking suppression of evidence that 

“included, inter alia, statements made by Rood” on the basis “that this 

evidence was the fruit of an unconstitutional entry onto Rood’s property and 

a subsequent unconstitutional search”) (emphasis added). 

5 On remand, Rudolph expressed his disagreement with the Rudolph I panel’s 

conclusion that he was only challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion 

to suppress the evidence recovered from inside his home. See N.T. Hearing 

at 14 (Rudolph’s counsel’s claiming “that’s not all that was raised” before the 

Rudolph I panel). However, Rudolph did not file a petition for reconsideration 

of our decision in Rudolph I on the basis that we overlooked, or 

mischaracterized, any of his arguments. Accordingly, we are bound by our 

decision in Rudolph I. See Interest of S.W., --- A.3d ----, 2024 WL 

1081646, at *7 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 13, 2024) (“[A] panel of the Superior 

Court cannot overrule another panel of the Superior Court.”) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Beck, 78 A.3d 656, 659 (Pa. Super. 2013)).
J-A13043-24

- 13 -

the court’s denial of Rudolph’s “motion to suppress evidence based on an 

unlawful search and seizure” in which Rudolph only developed an argument 

seeking suppression of the evidence seized from his home during the 

execution of the search warrant). Because Rudolph did not develop any 

meaningful argument, in either the at-issue suppression motion or on appeal 

to this Court in Rudolph I, that his post-search statement to Peck should also 

be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, this Court in Rudolph I did not 

review whether the trial court erred by not suppressing that statement. The 

Rudolph I panel was very clear in reversing only the trial court’s order

denying suppression of the evidence obtained during the search of Rudolph’s

residence. See Rudolph I, supra, at *18 (“Order denying suppression of 

evidence obtained during the search of Rudolph’s home reversed.”) 

(emphasis added). 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court correctly applied our remand 

order in assessing only whether any mention of the evidence seized during

the illegal search of Rudolph’s home, or any reference to the search itself, 

warranted a new trial in case 164-2019. The court did not err in declining to 

address Rudolph’s argument that his post-search statement to Peck should

have also been suppressed, as Rudolph did not develop that issue in pretrial 

motions or on appeal in Rudolph I. Likewise, we need not address Rudolph’s 

argument that his statement to Peck should have been suppressed as fruit of 

the poisonous tree of the illegal search of his home.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
J-A13043-24

- 14 -

DATE: 05/30/2024