IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-51128

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

BLANCA JOSEFINA RONQUILLO-CORRALES,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:12-CR-149-2

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Blanca Josefina Ronquillo-Corrales was convicted by a jury of three counts

of aiding and abetting the unauthorized access of a protected computer in

furtherance of fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). She was sentenced

to 11 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release, and she

was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $37,763.67. Ronquillo-Corrales

argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for judgment of

acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 because the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 30, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. She contends that the record

is full of references that she had no knowledge of what her co-defendant Jose

Maria Delbosque was doing.

At the close of the Government’s case, Ronquillo-Corrales moved for a

judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. She did not introduce any

evidence or call any witnesses. Thus, the issue of sufficiency of the evidence is

preserved for appellate review. See United States v. DeLeon, 247 F.3d 593, 596

n.1 (5th Cir. 2001). We will uphold the jury’s verdict if a reasonable trier of fact

could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were

established beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979). The evidence, both direct and circumstantial, is viewed “in the light most

favorable to the jury verdict,” and “[a]ll credibility determinations and

reasonable inferences are to be resolved in favor of the verdict.” United States

v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1995). The credibility of the

witnesses and the weight of the evidence is exclusively for the jury to decide, not

for this court on review. United States v. Garcia, 995 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir.

1993).

Ronquillo-Corrales was charged with and the jury found her guilty of three

counts of aiding and abetting the unauthorized access of a protected computer

for fraudulent purposes pursuant to § 1030(a)(4). In order to prove an individual

guilty of aiding and abetting, the prosecution must prove (1) that the elements

of the substantive offense occurred; (2) that the defendant associated with the

criminal venture; (3) that the defendant purposefully participated in the

criminal venture; and (4) that the defendant sought by her actions to make the

criminal venture successful. United States v. Moore, 708 F.3d 639, 649 (5th Cir.

2013). “[I]t is not necessary to prove the defendant had knowledge of the

particular means by which the principal in the crime would carry out the

criminal activity.” United States v. Westbo, 746 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1984). 

For the association element, the prosecution must show that Ronquillo-Corrales

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shared in the principal’s criminal intent. United States v. Percel, 553 F.3d 903,

911 (5th Cir. 2008). Ronquillo-Corrales does not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence that the substantive offense occurred, nor her participation in it. She

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing that she had knowledge that

what Delbosque was doing was criminal. 

Despite Delbosque’s testimony attempting to suggest that RonquilloCorrales was not fully aware of what he was doing, the jury was free to reject

this testimony as not credible in light of the other evidence in the record showing

that Ronquillo-Corrales was aware of the criminal nature of his activities. By

her own admission to Sergeant Byrne, Ronquillo-Corrales admitted that once

she overheard Delbosque’s conversations with customers, she figured out that

he was engaged in criminal activity. Delbosque’s letter to his attorney, in which

he stated that “she had given way too much information from one of her

interviews with these idiots” confirms that Delbosque was less than truthful in

his attempt to avoid “implicating [his] co-defendant.” Delbosque testified that

“[Ronquillo-Corrales] understood that I went out and had my key and I turned

the switch and I had people come in and, you know, fill up. And I would give

her, you know, prices, gallons. She understood that.” When discussing their

contact with Scott Taylor on January 3, 2011, when Taylor chased their vehicle

at high speed, Delbosque said that Ronquillo-Corrales was “scared out of her

mind” and “wanted to stop doing what [they] were doing.” This evidence

supports the jury’s inference that Ronquillo-Corrales was aware of the criminal

nature of Delbosque’s activities.

The prosecution corroborated Ronquillo-Corrales’s admission of conscious

association with circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably

infer that she knowingly associated with the criminal venture. The Government

presented evidence that Ronquillo-Corrales was present for the three thefts by

Delbosque’s testimony, Ronquillo-Corrales’s cell phone records, and video

surveillance showing that Ronquillo-Corrales was atthe scene. The Government

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presented Ronquillo-Corrales’s hand written notes calculating and recording the

amount of money that each customer owed. Sgt. Byrne testified that RonquilloCorrales was able to identify the phone numbers of customers and the tools that

Delbosque used to break into the FMU fuel pumps. Such specific knowledge

concerning Delbosque’s operation further supports the jury’s inference that

Ronquillo-Corrales knowingly took action to further Delbosque’s criminal

scheme.

The evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that Ronquillo-Corrales was guilty of aiding and abetting the

unauthorized access of a protected computer in furtherance of fraud. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

AFFIRMED.

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