IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-30643

CLAIMANT ID 100022655, 

 Requesting Party-Appellant,

v.

BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; BP AMERICA 

PRODUCTION COMPANY; BP, P.L.C., 

 Objecting Parties-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:18-CV-3557

Before GRAVES and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.†

PER CURIAM:*

Jesse Lecompte, Claimant ID 100022655, sought compensation under 

the Deepwater Horizon Court Supervised Settlement Program arising from the 

failure of his dry dock business. The settlement administrator denied his 

claim. The District Court denied discretionary review. We affirm. 

 

† This case is being decided by a quorum. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 22, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

Prior to April 2010, Lecompte operated a dry dock business in Chauvin, 

Louisiana. Shrimp fishermen used the dry dock to conduct repairs on their 

vessels. The Deepwater Horizon exploded on April 20, 2010. At some point in 

April 2010, Lecompte ceased operating his dry dock business. 

Lecompte filed a Business Economic Loss (“BEL”) claim under the 

Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement (“Settlement 

Agreement”). But the Claims Administrator—who resolves claims in the first 

instance—reclassified Lecompte’s dry dock claim under the Failed Business 

Economic Loss (“FBEL”) framework. The FBEL framework applies to 

businesses that “ceased operations and wound down” after May 1, 2010, and 

before December 31, 2011. See Settlement Agreement Ex. 6 ¶ I.

Upon review of Lecompte’s evidentiary submissions, the Claims 

Administrator found Lecompte ceased operating his dry dock business prior to 

May 1, 2010. The business was thus ineligible for compensation under the 

FBEL framework. The Claims Administrator therefore denied Lecompte’s 

claim and his request for reconsideration. A Settlement Program Appeals

Panel affirmed. 

Lecompte sought discretionary review in the district court as permitted 

under the Settlement Agreement, and the district court denied review. Our 

Court has determined we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s orders 

regarding claim determinations under the collateral order doctrine. See In re 

Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 1003, 1009 (5th Cir. 2015). We must therefore 

decide whether the district court abused its discretion in denying review. 

II. 

This is not our first opportunity to consider claims for compensation 

under the Settlement Agreement. We have said “[i]t is not an abuse of 

discretion [for the district court] to deny a request for review that ‘involve[s] 

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no pressing question of how the Settlement Agreement should be interpreted 

or implemented, but simply raise[s] the correctness of a discretionary 

administrative decision in the facts of a single claimant’s case.’” Claimant ID 

100212278 v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 848 F.3d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2017) (per 

curiam) (quoting In re Deepwater Horizon, 641 F. App’x 405, 410 (5th Cir. 

2016)). But “[a] district court abuses its discretion if an Appeal Panel decision 

not reviewed by the district court contradicted or misapplied the Settlement 

Agreement, or had the clear potential to contradict or misapply the Settlement 

Agreement.” BP Expl. & Prod., Inc. v. Claimant ID 100094497, 910 F.3d 797, 

800 (5th Cir. 2018). 

A. 

We consider first whether the Claims Administrator erred in denying 

Lecompte’s claim under the FBEL framework. Lecompte does not contend the 

Claims Administrator or Appeals Panel misinterpreted the Settlement 

Agreement’s FBEL framework as a matter of contract law. On this question 

his dispute with the Claims Administrator is purely factual. 

The Claims Administrator found Lecompte ceased operating his dry dock 

business prior to May 1, 2010. Lecompte appears to admit the business ceased 

operations in April 2010. But he says he did not wind down his business until 

2011. In short, Lecompte thinks the Claims Administrator misinterpreted his 

evidence. 

We do not review such factual disputes de novo; instead, we consider 

whether the Claims Administrator’s factual determination was an abuse of 

discretion. See Claimant ID 100212278, 848 F.3d at 410–11. BP points to the 

Settlement Program’s policy that “the Settlement Program will apply 

professional judgment in determining” a business’s “actual failure date.” 

Policy 506 v.2 ¶ II.B.a. That is obviously a deferential standard.

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Lecompte has not challenged Policy 506. Nor does he explain how the 

Claims Administrator failed to exercise “professional judgment” in 

determining the dry dock business failed before May 1, 2010. As BP points 

out—without contradiction from Lecompte—the dry dock business apparently 

did not file a tax return in 2010. That supports rather than undermines the 

Claims Administrator’s judgment. The district court therefore did not abuse 

its discretion in declining to review the Claim Administrator’s determination 

of the business’s actual failure date. Claimant ID 100212278, 848 F.3d at 410.

B.

We turn now to whether Lecompte’s dry dock claim should have been 

considered under the general BEL framework instead of the FBEL framework. 

BP defends the reclassification of Lecompte’s claim (from the BEL 

framework to the FBEL framework). BP says Lecompte’s claim was properly 

reclassified because the BEL framework does not apply to any business that 

failed prior to December 31, 2011. BP does not point to anything in the 

Settlement Agreement itself that dictates that result. Instead, BP again points 

to Policy 506. That policy says the general BEL framework does not apply to 

a business “that ceased operations and wound down . . . prior to December 31, 

2011.” Policy 506 v.2 ¶ II.A. Lecompte admits he “wound down” his dry dock 

business “during 2011.” BP therefore argues Policy 506 prevents him from 

making a general BEL claim and requires reclassification of the claim under 

the FBEL framework. 

There are reasons to doubt BP’s reading of Policy 506. Elsewhere, that 

policy clarifies the status of businesses that fail too early to qualify as a “Failed 

Business”: “[A] claimant that reports that it failed on [rather than subsequent 

to] May 1, 2010 . . . does not meet the definition of a Failed Business . . . under 

the Failed Business Framework and would be treated as a General BEL 

claimant . . . .” Policy 506 v.2 ¶ II.B.a (emphasis added). Taking this context 

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into account, it seems even Policy 506 contemplates applying the general BEL 

framework to a business that failed on or before May 1, 2010—like Lecompte’s 

dry dock.

Moreover, Policy 506 appears to say the BEL framework is the generally 

applicable one—unless the claim falls in one of the exceptions. See Policy 506 

v.2 ¶ II.A. A “failed business” is one exception, so the BEL framework “does 

not apply to . . . failed businesses.” Settlement Agreement Ex. 4C at 1 n.1. But 

as the Claims Administrator found (and we affirmed above), Lecompte’s dry 

dock is not a “failed business” because it failed before May 1, 2010, not after. 

See Settlement Agreement § 38.68 (“Failed Business shall mean a business 

[that failed] subsequent to May 1, 2010 . . . .”). Because the exception for failed 

businesses does not apply to the dry dock, the Settlement Agreement and 

Policy 506 suggest the generally applicable BEL framework does.

We have said the district court abuses its discretion if it fails to review 

“a contradiction or misapplication of the Settlement Agreement.” See 

Claimant ID 100250022 v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 847 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 

2017) (per curiam). The district court may someday be duty bound to address 

the meaning and validity of Policy 506. But today is not that day. Lecompte 

neither raises this issue nor points to evidence he would have been able to 

recover under the general BEL framework.

An appellant’s brief must provide “citations to the authorities and parts 

of the record on which the appellant relies,” FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8), and 

Lecompte’s brief falls far short of that standard. He cites only a single case, 

and he cites it for the proposition that we have appellate jurisdiction. See In 

re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 986 (5th Cir. 2015). More importantly, he fails 

to address Policy 506 and BP’s contention it prevents his claim from being 

considered under the general BEL framework. 

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Even if Lecompte had shown that BP or the Settlement Program 

misinterpreted or misapplied the Settlement Agreement, he has not shown he 

would be entitled to general BEL compensation in any event. Lecompte says 

his dry dock business could have qualified for BEL compensation under the 

Settlement Agreement’s “Decline-Only Revenue Pattern.” Lecompte mentions

the first two requirements for “Decline-Only” causation: (1) a “Downturn”; and 

(2) “[s]pecific documentation identifying factors outside the control of the 

claimant that prevented the recovery of revenues in 2011.” Settlement 

Agreement Ex. 4B ¶¶ II.C.1–2. But there is a third requirement—the 

“Customer Mix Test.” See id. ¶ II.C.3; Claimant ID 100261758 v. BP Expl. & 

Prod., Inc., No. 18-30173, 2019 WL 507588, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 2019) (per 

curiam). The claimant has the burden to submit documentation sufficient to 

satisfy this test. See Claimant ID 100261758, 2019 WL 507588, at *3. 

Lecompte does not mention the Customer Mix Test, argue he satisfied it, or 

point to any documentation in the record to support such a showing. See FED.

R. APP. P. 28(a)(8). He has forfeited this argument. 

Lecompte also suggests he could be entitled to compensation for spillrelated contract cancellations. The “spill-related cancellations” framework, 

however, “only establishes causation for the specific cancellations 

substantiated by the claimant” and requires evidence a “specific contract” was 

cancelled. Settlement Agreement Ex. 4B ¶ II.D. Lecompte argues contracts 

were cancelled due to the oil spill, but he points to no evidence supporting this 

claim. He cites affidavits from about half a dozen onetime customers, but all 

they say is that the customer did not use the dry dock in 2010 due to the oil 

spill—not that a contract was in existence and then cancelled. Moreover, even 

if customers had contracts and canceled them, Lecompte does not point to 

evidence showing how much revenue he lost as a result. See FED. R. APP. P.

28(a)(8). He has forfeited this argument as well. 

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* * *

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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