Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-841 | January 22, 2019 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stacy R. Uliana

Bargersville, Indiana

Doug Walton

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Mickey Rowe,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 22, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-841

Appeal from the Pike Circuit Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. 

Biesterveld, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

63C01-1707-FA-456

Altice, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-841 | January 22, 2019 Page 2 of 17

Case Summary

[1] In 2007, Mickey Rowe was charged with six offenses, including Class C felony 

incest of his daughter, A.J., and Class D felony maintaining a common 

nuisance. In November 2008, the State amended the charging information to 

add a count of Class D felony obstruction of justice. On or about that date, 

Rowe pled guilty to the maintaining a common nuisance and obstruction of 

justice charges, and the remainder of the counts were dismissed with prejudice. 

In 2017, A.J. contacted authorities and provided a statement describing that 

Rowe had abused her for more than fifteen years. Thereafter, the State charged 

Rowe with Class A felony child molesting and Class A felony criminal deviate 

conduct resulting in serious bodily injury. Rowe filed a motion to dismiss

arguing that, given the 2008 plea agreement and dismissal with prejudice of the 

incest and other charges, the State was barred from prosecuting him by the 

successive prosecution statute, Ind. Code § 35-41-4-4. The trial court denied his 

motion to dismiss, and Rowe filed this interlocutory appeal, claiming that the 

State was barred from prosecuting him for acts stemming from an improper 

sexual relationship with A.J. because that matter had already been prosecuted 

and resolved by plea agreement.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] A.J. is the biological daughter of Rowe and Tracy Mathis (Mother). A.J. was 

born in June 1988, and she lived with Mother and did not know Rowe until 
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1997, when Mother and Rowe reunited and Rowe moved into their Winslow, 

Indiana home. A.J. was around nine years old at the time. At some point, the 

family moved from Winslow to Martinsville, to Terre Haute, to Nashville, 

Tennessee, and then, in 2006, to Petersburg, Indiana. In Petersburg, Rowe and 

Mother owned and operated Rockstar Tattoo Parlor.

[4] In March, April, and May 2007, Officer Steve Nash of the Petersburg Police 

Department spoke to Irwin Glispie, a former employee of Rockstar Tattoo 

Parlor. Glispie reported to Officer Nash that in the fall and winter of 2006, A.J.

told Glispie that she had been having a sexual relationship with Rowe for about 

the past six years, dating back to when A.J. was approximately twelve years 

old. Glispie also told Officer Nash that Rowe admitted to having a sexual 

relationship with A.J. and that other people, including Mother, knew about the 

sexual relationship. Glispie described an incident that occurred at the tattoo 

shop in the winter of late 2006 or early 2007 when Glispie saw blood on the 

floor, and that, as Mother was cleaning it, Rowe commented that the blood was 

from his having sex with A.J. Glispie got fired or quit his job after a dispute 

arose between him and Rowe concerning Rowe’s sexual relationship with A.J.

[5] Following Glispie’s report, police interviewed other individuals, one of whom

was a long-time female friend of A.J.’s who told officers that she had visited the 

family’s homes in Winslow, Terre Haute, Nashville, and Petersburg and had 

seen Rowe touch and grab A.J. in a sexual way. The friend recalled seeing the 

displays as early as when A.J. was in sixth grade. As part of its investigation of 

Rowe, police also viewed Rowe’s conversations on MySpace chatrooms.
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Through their investigation police learned information that supported Glispie’s 

report of an incestuous relationship between Rowe and A.J. The investigation 

also revealed information that Rowe was having sexual encounters with other 

teenage females at the Rockstar Tattoo Parlor.

[6] In May 2007, the State charged Rowe under Cause No. 63C01-0705-FB-299 

(Cause 299) with six offenses: Count I, Class C felony incest; Count II, Class D 

felony maintaining a common nuisance; Count III, Class D felony maintaining 

a common nuisance; Count IV, Class A misdemeanor obscene performance;

Count V, Class D felony dealing in marijuana; and Count VI, Class B felony 

sexual misconduct with a minor. Rowe filed a motion to sever the charges, and 

the parties agreed as follows: Count I, incest, would be tried individually; 

Counts II and III were severed and filed under cause number 63C01-0707-FD439 (Cause 439); Count IV was severed and filed under cause number 63C01-

0707-CM-149; and Counts V and VI were severed and filed under cause 

number 63C01-0707-FB-440. As is relevant here, the language of the incest 

charge (Count I of Cause 299) read as follows:

[O]n or about the months of November, December 2006 and 

January, February 2007, at Pike County, State of Indiana, the 

said MICK ROWE A/K/A HANDSOME MICK ROWE being 

at least Eighteen (18) years of age, to-wit: approximately thirtynine (39) years of age, having been born in the month of August, 

1967, did knowingly engage in Sexual Intercourse with his 

biological child to-wit: a minor with initials [A.J.], all of which 

was contrary to the form of the Statutes in such cases made and 

provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of 

Indiana.
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Appellant’s Supplemental Appendix Vol. 2 at 31.

[7] In the course of discovery, A.J. was deposed in July 2008, and she denied that 

Rowe ever sexually abused her. Her testimony included: 

Q: Have you had sexual intercourse with your dad?

A. Never. That’s disgusting.

Q. Ever?

A. Ever.

Q. Okay.

A. I would not dream of doing so.

Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 78. In her testimony, A.J. confirmed that she had 

given a written statement in which she denied having had sexual relations with 

Rowe. 

[8] On November 24, 2008, the State requested and received permission to amend 

the charging information in Cause 299 to add Count II, Class D felony 

obstruction of justice. The next day, the State entered into a plea agreement 

with Rowe to resolve the charges under all four cause numbers. He pled guilty 

to the following two offenses: (1) Class D felony obstruction of justice (which 

was the later-added Count II of Cause 299), and (2) Class D felony maintaining 
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a common nuisance (Count II in Cause 439).1 The remaining six charges in the 

separate cause numbers were dismissed with prejudice, including the incest 

charge. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Rowe to 

concurrent terms of eighteen months in jail under Cause 299 and eighteen

months in jail under Cause 439, with credit for time served.

[9] In May 2017, A.J. contacted the Pike County Sheriff’s Department and 

requested to meet with law enforcement to report that Rowe had sexually 

abused her, beginning when he moved in with the family in 1997 and lasting 

until she left him in or around 2015. A.J., accompanied by her husband, drove 

from Florida and met with Detective J. Tobias Odom and the Pike County 

Prosecutor on May 12, 2017. Following the hours-long interview, authorities 

 

1 The Class D felony obstruction of justice and Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance charges 

alleged, respectively:

[On] or about May 30, 2008 at Pike County, State of Indiana, the said MICK ROWE 

A/K/A HANDSOME MICK ROWE did knowingly commit Obstruction of Justice by 

knowingly using in a deposition in an ongoing criminal proceeding a false document, 

being a Myspace message purporting to have been made by Irwin Glispie, all with the 

intention that the said false document appear in evidence in the said proceeding, all of 

which was contrary to the form of the Statutes in such cases made and provided and 

against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.

[O]n or about the months of November, December 2006 and January, February 2007, at 

Pike County, State of Indiana, and on multiple occasions therein, the said MICK ROWE 

A/K/A HANDSOME MICK ROWE did knowingly maintain a building for keeping 

and using marijuana to-wit: Rockstar Tattoo Parlor located at 715 Main, Petersburg, Pike 

County, Indiana, all of which was contrary to the form of the Statutes in such cases made 

and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.

Appellant’s Supplemental Appendix Vol. 2 at 31, 34.
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contacted other individuals, including Mother and Glispie. Thereafter, 

Detective Odom prepared a probable cause affidavit and the 2017 charges were 

filed.

[10] During the interview with police, A.J. recalled the first time Rowe touched her 

was in 1997, shortly after Rowe had moved into the home. He touched her 

vagina, over her clothes, which she said he continued to do essentially 

whenever they were alone, and the touching increased in frequency and 

duration. After a few months, the touching progressed from touching outside 

her clothes, to under her clothes, to eventually removing her clothes. A.J. 

reported that, in 1997, while living in Winslow and when A.J. was nine years 

old, Rowe touched her vagina and manipulated her labia. 

[11] When A.J. was eleven or twelve years old, the family moved to Martinsville. 

A.J. told the detective that Rowe continued with the inappropriate touching 

and, by then, Rowe was penetrating her vagina with his fingers. After about six 

months in Martinsville, the family moved to Terre Haute, and after a few days 

of attending school, A.J. began being home schooled by Rowe. She said that 

he had her watch pornography three to five times a week. Rowe continued the 

touching and attempted unsuccessfully to penetrate her with his penis. He 

agreed to give her a dog if she performed oral sex on him, which she did, and 

which lead to repeated demands for it. A.J. recalled that the family moved to 

Nashville, Tennessee when she was around sixteen years old. Rowe continued 

to attempt intercourse but she said he was frustrated that it was not successful 
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due to her tensing up and due to their size difference.2 In 2006, the family

moved from Nashville to Petersburg, Indiana, where she recalled the first 

instance of intercourse with ejaculation, which occurred at Rockstar Tattoo 

Parlor. She said that, thereafter, intercourse became more common. 

[12] A.J. described an incident occurring in June of 2006, shortly before her 

eighteenth birthday. Rowe had learned that A.J. had a crush on a boy near her 

age, and Rowe argued with her about it at the tattoo shop. He pushed her 

down on her stomach, put a hand between her shoulder blades, and forced anal 

intercourse, which caused her to bleed for several days. 

[13] Later, A.J. confided in Glispie that Rowe had been sexually abusing her, and 

Glispie went to law enforcement and the State filed the May 2007 charges 

against Rowe. A.J. stated that Rowe had instructed her what to say in the 2008 

deposition, telling her to deny the sexual relationship with him and placing her 

in fear if she were to tell the truth. 

[14] A.J. stated that, after the incest and other charges were dismissed, she moved 

with Rowe to Oakland City, where he opened another tattoo shop, and then, 

when she was twenty-one, they moved to Evansville. At his instruction, A.J. 

became a stripper, working five or six days a week, and gave him the money, as 

he did not have a regular job. He also began prostituting her. According to 

A.J., Rowe controlled the money and only gave her some when he thought she 

 

2

She estimated that Rowe weighed over 400 pounds.
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deserved or needed it. She was with Rowe until age twenty-seven, when in the 

fall of 2015, A.J. met her current husband and left Rowe. Detectives spoke to 

other individuals, who corroborated that Rowe was manipulative and

brainwashed A.J. and that she was dependent on him. 

[15] Based on their interview with A.J., the State charged Rowe on July 27, 2017 

with Class A felony child molesting and Class A felony criminal deviate 

conduct resulting in serious bodily injury, which, respectively, read as follows:

[O]n or about 1997 in Winslow, Pike County, State of Indiana, 

MICKEY E. ROWE, a person of at least twenty-one (21) years 

of age did knowingly perform deviate sexual conduct with A.J. 

(A Minor), a child under the age of fourteen years, to-wit: nine 

(9) years old with D.O.B. of June 1988, by penetrating the child’s 

sex organ with his fingers, and forcing the child’s labia apart.

[F]rom mid to late June, 2006 in Petersburg, Pike County, State 

of Indiana, MICKEY E. ROWE did knowingly cause A.J. (A 

Minor), to submit to deviate sexual conduct when such other 

person was compelled by force, to wit: after a verbal argument 

escalated, Mickey E. Rowe pushed A.J. (A Minor) down on her 

stomach, put one hand between her shoulder blades, pulled down 

A.J.’s shorts and underwear and forced anal sexual intercourse 

on A.J., said act resulting in serious bodily injury [], to-wit: 

extreme pain and anal bleeding for three (3) days.

Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 29-30.

[16] On December 20, 2017, Rowe filed a motion to dismiss the charges. Rowe 

alleged that the present charges should be dismissed because they were barred 

by I.C. § 35-41-4-4, which provides, in relevant part, that a prosecution is barred 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-841 | January 22, 2019 Page 10 of 17

if “the instant prosecution is for an offense with which the defendant should 

have been charged in the former prosecution.” In his motion to dismiss, Rowe 

asserted that the 2007 and the 2017 allegations were based on the “same fact 

patterns” and that Rowe “should have been prosecuted for the current charges” 

in 2007 when the State filed charges against him in the cause numbers discussed 

above. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 53. He argued, “To take alleged facts that 

were or should have been known to the complaining witness at the time of the 

2007 case and dress[] them up in a different costume by filing as different 

offenses . . . does not change the fact that if Mr. Rowe was to be prosecuted for 

these crimes, the opportunity to have done so was when the original cases were

charged in 2007.” Id. at 59.

[17] The court denied Rowe’s motion on February 9, 2018. In its order, the trial

court found that, at the time the State filed Cause 299 in July 2007, the State 

“was unaware of facts sufficient to constitute probable cause tending to show 

that the defendant had sexually molested A.J. as a nine (9) year old child in 

1997” and “was unaware of facts sufficient to constitute probable cause tending 

to show that the defendant had engaged in an act of forced anal intercourse 

with A.J. in June of 2006.” Id. at 111-12. The trial court’s order further found: 

(1) the 2007 incest charge alleged conduct in November 2006 through February 

2007; (2) the incest charge was based on Glispie’s report to authorities that 

Rowe had been engaging in a sexual relationship with A.J. for six years, dating 

back to when A.J. was twelve, and Glispie did not have specifics as to what sex 

acts or locations of sex acts were involved; (3) A.J. did not cooperate with the 
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2007 incest prosecution and first disclosed it to law enforcement in May 2017; 

and (4) A.J.’s May 2017 disclosure formed the basis of the 2017 charges that 

alleged molestation in 1997 and forced anal intercourse in June 2006.

[18] After the trial court denied his motion to dismiss, Rowe filed a motion to certify 

the order for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. We accepted 

jurisdiction, and Rowe now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[19] Rowe contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 

motion to dismiss. We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of 

discretion. Thompson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 112, 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. 

denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or when the 

court misinterprets the law. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence, and we 

resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial court’s ruling. Schmidt 

v. State, 986 N.E.2d 858, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. We will affirm 

the trial court on any basis apparent in the record. Id.

[20] Under Ind. Code § 35-34-1-4(a)(7), a defendant may move to dismiss a 

prosecution prior to trial on grounds that “[t]he prosecution is barred by reason 

of a previous prosecution.” Likewise, I.C. § 35-34-1-10(d) permits a defendant 

who has been sentenced on a guilty plea to move for a dismissal of an 

information “for a related offense” and that “[t]he motion shall be granted if the 

plea of guilty was entered on the basis of a plea agreement in which the 
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prosecutor agreed . . . not to prosecute other potential related offenses.” Here, 

Rowe sought dismissal, arguing that the 2017 charges were barred under the 

successive prosecution statute, I.C. § 35-41-4-4, as well as by his plea 

agreement. He argues on appeal that “[t]he trial court erroneously interpreted

Ind. Code 35-41-4-4 to permit successive prosecutions based on allegations of 

the same incestual relationship resurrected by the alleged victim’s changed 

story.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. 

[21] Indiana’s successive prosecution statute provides, in relevant part: 

A prosecution is barred if all of the following exist:

(1) There was a former prosecution of the defendant for a 

different offense or for the same offense based upon different 

facts. 

(2) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a 

conviction of the defendant or in an improper termination under 

section 3 of this chapter.

(3) The instant prosecution is for an offense for which the 

defendant should have been charged in the former prosecution.

I.C. § 35-41-4-4(a) (emphasis added). The parties appear to be in agreement 

that subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) have been satisfied, but they disagree as to 

whether Rowe “should have been charged in the prior prosecution” as required 

in subsection (a)(3). Our Supreme Court has held that the words “should have 

been charged” must be read in conjunction with Indiana’s joinder statute. 
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Williams v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2002); State v. McDonald, 954 

N.E.2d 1031, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The joinder statute provides in 

relevant part:

A defendant who has been tried for one (1) offense may 

thereafter move to dismiss an indictment or information for an 

offense which could have been joined for trial with the prior 

offenses under section 9 of this chapter. The motion to dismiss 

shall be made prior to the second trial, and shall be granted if the 

prosecution is barred by reason of the former prosecution.

I.C. § 35-34-1-10(c); Williams, 762 N.E.2d at 1219. Section 9, to which the 

joinder statute refers, reads:

Two (2) or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment 

or information, with each offense stated in a separate count, 

when the offenses:

(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of 

a single scheme or plan; or

(2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts 

connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme 

or plan.

I.C. § 35-34-1-9(a). Generally, “‘where two or more charges are based on the 

same conduct or on a series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, 

they should be joined for trial.’” McDonald, 954 N.E.2d at 1034 (quoting 

Williams, 762 N.E.2d at 1220). In determining whether crimes are part of a 

single scheme or plan, we examine “whether they are connected by a distinctive 
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nature, have a common modus operandi, and a common motive.” Hahn v. 

State, 67 N.E.3d 1071, 1082 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Williams, 762 N.E.2d 

at 1220), trans. denied.

[22] Here, Rowe claims that the 2017 charges are based on the same sexual 

relationship upon which the 2007 incest charge was based and that they are part 

of one single scheme and therefore should have been joined in the 2007

prosecution. He argues, “The State should not be able to seek refuge after 

conducting a shoddy investigation or even rewarding a lying witness[,]” and 

that “[i]f inconsistent statements and new accusations by an adult victim can 

justify successive prosecutions, those accused of sexual offenses will live forever 

under the threat of prosecution.” Appellant’s Brief at 8-9, 12. We reject Rowe’s 

contention that the 2017 charges should have been brought as part of the 2007

prosecution.

[23] The 2007 incest charge alleged that Rowe committed Class C felony incest 

when “during the months of November, December 2006 and January, February 

2007,” he “engage[d] in sexual intercourse” with A.J. Appellant’s Supplemental 

Appendix Vol. 2 at 34. In contrast, the two 2017 charges alleged that Rowe 

committed: (1) Class A felony child molesting, when in 1997, he knowingly 

performed deviate sexual conduct with A.J. by penetrating her vagina with his 

fingers, and (2) Class A felony criminal deviate conduct resulting in serious 

bodily injury, when in June 2006, Rowe knowingly caused A.J. to submit to 

deviate sexual conduct when he forced anal sexual intercourse upon A.J. that 

resulted in extreme pain and bleeding for several days. The 2017 charges were 
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thus based on Rowe’s conduct in 1997 and in June 2006, whereas the 2007 

incest charge alleged conduct that occurred later, “during the months of 

November, December 2006 and January, February 2007.” Accordingly, the 

2017 charges were not only temporally distinct from the 2007 incest charge, 

they were also not based on a series of acts “so connected” to the 2007 incest 

charge “that they constituted parts of a single scheme or plan.” Williams, 762 

N.E.2d 1220.

3

[24] Furthermore, the 2007 charge of incest was based on Glispie’s reports to 

authorities and the ensuing interviews with other individuals; the charge was 

not based on information from A.J., who did not cooperate with the 

investigation because of Rowe’s influence. Because she did not come forward 

to authorities until May 2017, the State was not aware of and did not have 

sufficient evidence in 2007 to charge Rowe with the now-charged 1997 and 

June 2006 conduct. See McDonald, 954 N.E.2d at 1035 (“[t]his is not a case of 

attempted piecemeal prosecution” and “[t]he State simply had inadequate 

 

3

In Williams v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 2002), the Court determined that Williams was entitled to 

dismissal of a second set of charges. There, a defendant sold cocaine to an undercover officer and then fled 

into a nearby vacant apartment, where he was apprehended. When Williams was caught, the officer 

discovered cocaine on him. The State first charged Williams with residential entry and possession of the 

cocaine discovered on him at his arrest, and later, the State charged Williams with delivery of the cocaine to 

the undercover officer and possession of cocaine. Williams pled guilty to the first possession charge and, 

upon conviction, sought to dismiss the second set of charges. Our Supreme Court held that Williams was 

entitled to dismissal of the second set of charges because those charges “were based on a series of acts so 

connected that they constituted parts of a single scheme or plan” and should have been charged in a single 

prosecution. Id. at 1220. We find that, unlike in Williams, the charges filed against Rowe were not based on 

a series of acts so connected that they constitute parts of a single scheme. 
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evidence to support charging McDonald until July 2010”). The trial court did 

not abuse its discretion when it determined that the successive prosecution 

statute did not bar the State from bringing the two charges against Rowe in 

2017. 

[25] Rowe contends that even if the successive prosecution statute does not bar the 

2017 charges, due process and contract principles do because “[t]he language of 

the 2008 plea agreement prevents the State from prosecuting the alleged sexual 

relationship between A.J. and Rowe.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. Rowe pled guilty 

to maintaining a common nuisance and obstruction of justice and agreed to 

serve an eighteen-month jail sentence in exchange for the State dismissing with 

prejudice its charge that Rowe had sexual intercourse with A.J. on or about the 

months of November of 2006 and February of 2007. Apparently in recognition 

of the fact that the dismissed incest charge covered conduct that occurred 

during the months of November 2006 through February 2007, whereas the 2017 

charges covered prior conduct in 1997 and in June 2006, Rowe asserts that 

“[w]hen the parties took depositions in Cause No. [440] . . . they were asking 

about any sexual contact with Rowe at any time” and “[t]hus, when the State 

agreed to dismiss with prejudice Cause No. [440], Rowe had a reasonable 

expectation that the State was resolving all allegations he had a sexual 

relationship with his daughter.” Id. at 18. He claims, “The State agreed to 

drop the charges relating to the alleged incestual relationship in exchange for 

1.5 years of jail time.” Id. 
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[26] Contrary to his suggestion, the State did not agree to drop any and all charges 

“relating to the alleged incestual relationship” between Rowe and A.J. It 

agreed to drop an incest charge alleging that, between the months of November 

2006 and February 2007, Rowe had sexual intercourse with A.J. We reject 

Rowe’s attempt to effectively expand the terms of the plea agreement. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss.

[27] Judgment affirmed. 

Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.