SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1955-18T2

BURROUGH'S MILL

APARTMENTS,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RYAN ARMSTRONG,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted October 28, 2019 – Decided May 21, 2020

Before Judges Moynihan and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Docket No. LT-008859-18.

Ryan Armstrong, appellant pro se.

Dale W. Keith, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Dale W. 

Keith, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Ryan Armstrong appeals from the trial judge's November 15, 

2018 decision indicating that the judge would issue a judgment of possession to 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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plaintiff Burrough's Mill Apartments unless defendant paid all outstanding rent 

and related charges. He also appeals the judge's December 6, 2018 decision

denying his motion for reconsideration. We affirm, substantially for the reasons 

stated in the trial judge's oral opinions. We add only the following comments.

Defendant, as a tenant in plaintiff's apartment complex, entered into two 

lease agreements. The first lease was for a period of one year ending on May 3, 

2018 at a rate of $1390 a month. In April 2018, defendant executed a second 

lease for a term of four months ending on September 3, 2018 at a monthly rate 

of $1810. The second lease provided: "This [l]ease [c]ontract will automatically 

renew month-to-month unless: (1) We give you written notice(s) of termination 

that may include a rent increase or other reasonable contract changes . . . or (2) 

you give us [sixty] days['] notice of your intent to terminate the lease and move 

out." 

Before the second lease expired, plaintiff offered defendant the option to 

renew the lease for a one-year term at the $1810 monthly rate. Defendant 

declined the offer and did not sign a new lease. Therefore, under the terms of 

the second lease, defendant's tenancy converted to a month-to month on the same 

terms as the four-month lease. 
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Believing it unfair to continue paying the $1810 monthly rate, defendant 

unilaterally chose to make reduced monthly payments of $1390. Plaintiff then 

brought this action under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a), seeking to evict defendant for 

unpaid rent. After a trial, the judge entered an order and oral decision directing 

that defendant pay plaintiff unpaid rent, together with costs and fees, and that if 

he failed to pay this amount, a judgment of possession would be entered against 

him. Defendant vacated the apartment and moved to reconsider this decision.

1

The trial judge denied defendant's motion. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN 

CONSIDERING AN UNCONSCIONABLE 

RENT INCREASE BY PUTTING THE 

BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE TENANT.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN 

CONSIDERING . . . DEFENDANT A HOLD 

OVER TENANT BY IGNORING . . . 

DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AGAINST 

UNCONSCIONABLE RENT INCREASE. 

III. THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS PAST 

MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE AND 

UNFAMILIAR WITH LAW AND CASE LAW. 

 

1

 On November 19, 2018, defendant filed a notice of motion to vacate 

default/default judgment. We infer that because there was no default, the trial 

judge decided to construe this motion as one for reconsideration of his

November 15 decision. 
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We conclude defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the 

reasons set forth by the judge in his well-reasoned decision. We add the 

following brief remarks.

In an appeal from a bench trial, "[t]he scope of [our] review of a trial 

court's fact-finding function is limited." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 

205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998)). 

We review final determinations made by the trial court "premised on the 

testimony of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial, in accordance with 

a deferential standard[.]" D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013). 

The factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge are not disturbed 

"unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or 

inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to 

offend the interests of justice." In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated Dec.

20, 1961, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs 

Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). We owe no deference to a trial court's 

interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established 

facts. Maldonado, 216 N.J. at 182-83 (citing Manalapan Realty L.P. v. Twp. 

Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). 
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Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a), 

"[n]o lessee or tenant . . . may be removed by the 

Superior Court from any . . . tenement leased for 

residential purposes . . . except upon establishment of 

one of the following grounds as good cause: a. The 

person fails to pay rent due and owing under the lease 

whether the same be oral or written[.]" 

In contrast, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) establishes that a tenant may be removed if 

the tenant "has failed to pay rent after a valid notice to quit and notice of increase 

of said rent, provided the increase in rent is not unconscionable and complies 

with any and all other laws or municipal ordinances governing rent increases."

A "holdover tenant" is generally defined as "[s]omeone who remains in 

possession of real property after a previous tenancy . . . expires[.]" Holdover 

Tenant, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Newark Park Plaza 

Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Newark, 227 N.J. Super. 496, 499 (Law Div. 1987) ("It 

is well-settled law in New Jersey that when a tenant continues to occupy a 

premises after the termination of a lease, his status becomes that of a month-tomonth holdover tenant."). The rights and duties of a holdover tenant are 

governed by the terms of the expired lease, absent a contrary agreement. 

Newark Park Plaza, 227 N.J. Super. at 499. 

It is simply indisputable that under the plain terms of the May 2018 lease 

agreement, and consistent with well-established case law, defendant was a 
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holdover tenant subject to the terms of the last effective lease. See generally

Whalen v. Schoor, DePalma & Canger Grp., Inc., 305 N.J. Super. 501, 505-09

(App. Div. 1997) (explaining that under freedom of contract, agreements should 

be enforced unless contrary to public policy); see Newark Park Plaza, 227 N.J. 

Super. at 499. In that regard, the lease's exceptions to a month-to-month 

holdover renewal are not present in this case because the landlord never 

terminated the lease and defendant never provided notice of an intent to 

terminate the lease and move out. We also conclude that the judge was 

unquestionably correct in finding that the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f), 

prohibiting unconscionable increases in rent "after a valid notice to quit," simply 

do not apply because there was no notice to quit and there was no increase in 

rent after defendant voluntarily entered into a lease agreement at the monthly 

rate of $1810. 

For the same reasons, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his 

discretion in denying defendant's motion for reconsideration. See Guido v. 

Duane Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87 (2010).

Reconsideration should be utilized only for 

those cases which fall into that narrow 

corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has 

expressed its decision based upon a 

palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) 

it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not 
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consider, or failed to appreciate the 

significance of probative, competent 

evidence . . . .

[Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 

384 (App. Div. 1996) (third alteration in 

original) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 

N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).] 

In this case, on his motion for reconsideration defendant simply continued to 

press his unfounded claims of unconscionability, which the judge correctly held 

do not apply to the facts of this case. 

To the extent that we have not addressed defendant's remaining 

arguments, we conclude that they also lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion 

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.