[Cite as State v. Reynolds, 2020-Ohio-1122.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 108376 

 v. : 

 

TIMOTHY REYNOLDS, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 26, 2020 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-18-634838-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Michael Lisk, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Myriam A. Miranda, for appellant. 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.: 

Defendant-appellant, Timothy Reynolds (“Reynolds”), appeals his 

four-year prison sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

In 2018, Reynolds was charged with two counts of aggravated 

robbery, three counts of robbery, and one count of theft, stemming from an 
incident during which Reynolds held up a gas station attendant, leading her to 

believe he had a weapon, and stole $90 and a carton of cigarettes. The aggravated 

robbery and robbery charges carried one- and three-year firearm specifications. 

Reynolds entered into plea negotiations with the state of Ohio and agreed to plead 

guilty to one count of robbery with no specifications. The trial court ordered a 

presentence investigation report and substance abuse report (“TASC assessment”) 

and continued the matter for sentencing. 

At the sentencing hearing, the court stated that it had read and 

considered the presentence investigation report and TASC assessment. The 

parties discussed Reynolds’s severe addiction problem, which included heroin, 

cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. The TASC assessment recommended a clinically 

managed, high-intensive residential treatment program. Defense counsel 

highlighted the fact that Reynolds did not use a weapon to commit the robbery, 

despite leading the cashier to believe he had something in his pocket. Counsel also 

informed the trial court that while Reynolds was in county jail, he began the 

process of resolving his pending municipal court cases. Reynolds expressed 

remorse for his actions. 

The trial court expressed doubt that Reynolds would benefit from 

drug treatment since he had been offered treatment in the past but relapsed. The 

court stated that it was considering “everything it knew” about the case, including 

the oral record, presentence investigation report, TASC assessment, and relevant 

sentencing laws and imposed a four-year prison sentence. 
Reynolds filed this appeal, raising one assignment of error for our 

review: 

I. Appellant’s sentence is contrary to law and not supported by the 

record. 

In Reynolds’s sole assignment of error, he contends that his 

sentence is contrary to law and the record does not support his sentence. 

It is well settled that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit this court 

to review a felony sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bush, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 106392, 2018-Ohio-4213, ¶ 24. Instead, we may disturb a felony 

sentence only if we clearly and convincingly find that either “the record does not 

support the sentencing court’s findings” under relevant statutes or “the sentence is 

otherwise contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 

516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1. 

If an appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 

record does not support the sentencing court’s findings pursuant to R.C. 

2929.13(B) or (D), R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or R.C. 2929.20(I), or if the 

court finds that a sentence is contrary to law, then the appellate court “may 

increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this 

section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court 

for resentencing.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)-(b). 

A sentence is contrary to law if it falls outside the statutory range for 

the particular degree of offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes 
and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing 

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Pawlak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103444, 

2016-Ohio-5926, ¶ 58. The record must indicate that the trial court considered all 

relevant factors required by the sentencing statutes, but the trial court has no 

obligation to state reasons to support its findings. State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 

209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, syllabus. 

Under R.C. 2929.11(A), there are three purposes of felony 

sentencing: “to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to 

punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender 

using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those 

purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government 

resources.” To achieve these purposes, the sentencing court must consider “the 

need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future 

crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the 

offense, the public, or both.” Id. The sentence imposed shall be reasonably 

calculated to achieve these overriding purposes, “commensurate with and not 

demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the 

victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by 

similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B). 

Reynolds’s four-year sentence falls within the statutory range for 

second-degree robbery. See R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) and former R.C. 2929.14(A)(2). 
Reynolds claims that his sentence is contrary to law because the trial court did not 

consider the relevant sentencing factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. 

The court’s sentencing journal entry in this case reflects that the 

court “considered all required factors of the law” and found that “prison is 

consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.” The court’s statements that it 

considered the requisite statutory factors, alone, satisfy its obligations under the 

sentencing statutes. State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107041, 2018-Ohio4600, ¶ 7, citing State v. Bush, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106392, 2018-Ohio-4213, ¶ 

23. Moreover, in sentencing Reynolds to four years in prison, the court stated at 

the sentencing hearing that it was taking “into account the sentencing laws of 

Chapter 2929 of the Ohio Revised Code.” Thus, we cannot say that the sentence 

was contrary to law. 

Next, we establish whether Reynolds was sentenced under any 

relevant statutes listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) to determine whether the record 

supports the sentencing court’s findings under that statute. The court sentenced 

Reynolds to a prison term for a felony of the second degree; therefore, R.C. 

2929.13(D) applies to this case and we consider whether the record supports the 

sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.13(D). 

R.C. 2929.13(D) provides, in pertinent part, that there is a 

presumption in favor of a prison term “in order to comply with the purposes and 

principles of sentencing under section 2929.11 of the Revised Code” for a felony of 

the second degree. After a thorough review of the record in this case, we cannot 
say that we clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the 

sentencing court’s findings. 

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor spoke for the victim and 

expressed that while the victim was upset by the robbery, she did not “feel that this 

defendant should spend an extraordinary amount of time in prison.” The 

prosecutor expressed that the victim supported “the lower end” of the two-toeight-year sentencing range for a second-degree felony. The prosecutor took the 

position that a prison sentence was necessary, but that the robbery was “pretty 

consistent with drug-seeking behavior,” and that the state would defer to the court 

on sentence. 

Defense counsel told the court that Reynolds took it upon himself to 

address his outstanding court cases by sending notices of availability to three 

municipal courts. According to counsel, Reynolds was able to resolve one case, 

had a court date in a second case, and was waiting to hear from the court on the 

third case. Counsel expressed that Reynolds was addicted to heroin, alcohol, 

marijuana, and cocaine and needed drug treatment. Counsel stated that Reynolds 

was interested in using naltrexone to address his heroin addiction and requested 

that Reynolds be placed on community control sanctions and placed in an 

intensive residential treatment program. 

Reynolds addressed the court and said that he had hit “rock 

bottom,” was “very remorseful,” was “drunk and high” during the commission of 
the crime, and needed help to combat his addiction to drugs. Reynolds indicated 

that he was a hard worker and was ready for treatment. 

In sentencing Reynolds, the court noted that Reynolds had been 

given previous opportunities to receive drug treatment while on probation but 

violated his probation by using drugs. The court stated that it did not think that 

anything had changed, i.e., the court did not believe that Reynolds would go to 

treatment if sentenced to community control sanctions. The court also expressed 

that many drug addicts did not commit “armed robbery.”1 The court stated that it 

was taking into consideration the record, the parties’ statements, the presentence 

investigation and substance abuse reports, and sentencing laws. The court then 

imposed a sentence of four years in prison with credit for time served. 

A review of the TASC assessment shows that Reynolds was 

diagnosed with severe opioid and alcohol use disorders, moderate cocaine use 

disorder, and mild marijuana use disorder. Reynolds had previously overdosed 

“five or six times,” and had received lifesaving treatment with naloxone (commonly 

known as Narcan) each time. Reynolds was recommended for “clinically managed 

high intensity residential services.” The assessor noted that Reynolds agreed with 

his diagnoses and treatment recommendations. 

A review of the presentence investigation report shows that 

Reynolds’s lengthy criminal history dates back to 2007 and includes numerous 

 1Reynolds pleaded guilty to robbery, R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), which provides that no 

person shall commit or attempt to commit a theft offense with a deadly weapon on or 

about his or her person or under his or her control. Again, Reynolds did not possess a 

weapon during the robbery. 
misdemeanor convictions for driving under the influence, theft, consumption in a 

motor vehicle, assault, disorderly conduct, and endangering children, and multiple 

felony convictions for obstructing justice and breaking and entering. In 2015, 

Reynolds was sentenced to 12 months in prison after violating his probation in a 

prior case and has violated probation in at least four prior cases. Although he 

received drug treatment as part of his sentence in a prior case, he was discharged 

from that program for noncompliance. 

We note that prior to his arrest, Reynolds was living at a men’s 

shelter and was without a stable residence. He was also unemployed. Reynolds 

reported that he began drinking alcohol when he was 12 years old and drank a 12 

pack of beer and a bottle of vodka daily, began taking opiate pills at the age of 20 

and took as many as available a “couple times per month,” and began using heroin 

when he was 27. He consumed about a gram a day of heroin. The presentence 

investigation report concluded that Reynolds was at a “high” risk for reoffending.2 

We are cognizant that this was a serious crime. The victim in this 

case thought Reynolds should be sentenced to the “lower end” of the two-to-eightyear sentencing range. The prosecutor thought the crime was “pretty consistent 

with drug-seeking behavior.” In 2018, the General Assembly amended R.C. 

2929.11(A) to add a third purpose to felony sentencing, which is “to promote the 

 2Reynolds was arrested on November 25, 2018 and his TASC assessment was 

completed on March 5, 2019. Although he had been in jail for over three months and 

presumably not using drugs or alcohol while incarcerated, Reynolds reported in his 

TASC assessment that he would “pick up” alcohol and drugs again “the same day he was 

released from incarceration.” 
effective rehabilitation of the offender.” In considering the principles and 

purposes of sentencing, perhaps they would be better served if Reynolds’s drug 

problem was addressed through a suspended prison sentence and strict 

community control sanctions that included intensive inpatient drug treatment. It 

is doubtful that his severe drug problem will be addressed during his term of 

incarceration. That said, we do not clearly and convincingly find that the record 

does not support the trial court’s findings. 

The sentence imposed in this case is not contrary to law and we do 

not clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the trial court’s 

findings under R.C. 2929.13(D). Accordingly, the sole assignment of error is 

overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the 

trial court for execution of sentence. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE 

RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR