COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JERMAINE SHORED DAVIS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0453-97-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 FEBRUARY 24, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Donald W. Lemons, Judge 

 Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 Ruth Ann Morken, Assistant Attorney General 

(Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Jermaine Shored Davis was convicted in a bench trial for 

robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, entering 

a bank with intent to commit a larceny, and felonious wearing of 

a mask to conceal his identity to the public. He contends the 

evidence is insufficient as a matter of law: (1) to identify him 

as a perpetrator of the robbery, and (2) to support the 

conviction for use of a firearm in the commission of robbery. We 

find that the evidence is sufficient to prove that appellant was 

one of the robbers and that Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of 

his claim regarding use of a firearm. Accordingly, we affirm the 

convictions. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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IDENTITY

 "On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 

438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). Viewed accordingly, the 

evidence proved that Regina Halstead and Julia Gregory were at a 

Signet Bank branch to make a deposit for their employer. As they 

entered the bank, they observed two men dressed in dark clothes 

standing by a public telephone near the entrance of the bank. 

Less than five minutes later, two men wearing dark clothing and 

dark masks entered and robbed an employee of the bank at 

gunpoint. 

 The Commonwealth introduced two sets of photographs taken by 

the bank's surveillance cameras. One set of photos taken outside 

the bank showed two men standing by the pay phone. The face of 

one man is clearly shown. The second set of photos taken inside 

the bank depicted the two robbers wearing dark clothes identical 

to those worn by the men shown standing near the pay phone in the 

first set of photos. The photographs inside the bank show very 

clearly the face of the second man. Nothing distinguishes the 

men who robbed the bank from the men who were outside the bank. 

 Halstead testified that there was "no doubt in [her] mind" 

that the two men that she had seen standing by the phone were the 

same men she saw inside the bank who committed the robbery. She 

testified that the only difference in their appearance was that 
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they were wearing masks when they entered and robbed the bank. 

Both Halstead and Gregory testified that the appellant was one of 

the two men they had seen standing by the pay phone. Moreover, 

Halstead positively identified appellant as one of the men 

depicted in the photographs taken outside the bank. The 

Commonwealth also presented evidence that a fingerprint lifted by 

police from the pay phone matched appellant's fingerprint. 

 We find that the evidence supports the trial court's 

conclusion that appellant was one of the men who robbed the 

bank's tellers. Halstead's identification testimony and the 

photographic evidence proved that the two men seen by the pay 

phone were the men who committed the robbery and that one of them 

was the appellant. Both Halstead and Gregory identified 

appellant as one of the men standing by the pay phone. The 

identification of appellant was corroborated by the presence of 

his fingerprint on the pay phone. 

 Neither Gregory nor the bank tellers could identify 

appellant as one of the bank robbers. However, Halstead did. 

Halstead identified appellant as one of the men in photographs 

using the telephone outside the bank. The photographs clearly 

show that the two men inside the bank were dressed identically to 

the men using the telephone outside the bank. Although the 

Commonwealth failed to ask any witness whether either of the 

persons depicted in the photographs inside the bank was the 

appellant, the trier of fact had the opportunity to view 
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appellant and the photographs. The weight to be given to the 

evidence was a question for the fact finder to decide. See

Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 

601 (1986). Considering the totality of the circumstances, and 

granting to the Commonwealth the inferences fairly deducible from 

the record, the Commonwealth's evidence is sufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was one of the two men 

who committed the robbery. 

USE OF A FIREARM IN THE COMMISSION OF ROBBERY - RULE 5A:18

 Appellant also contends the evidence is insufficient to 

prove that the firearm used in the commission of the robbery was 

capable of firing. Appellant failed to raise the issue to the 

trial court in arguing his motion to strike the Commonwealth's 

evidence. Rule 5A:18 provides that "[n]o ruling of the trial 

court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the 

objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the 

time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or . . . to 

attain the ends of justice." Because the record does not reflect 

a reason that we should invoke the good cause or miscarriage of 

justice exceptions to the rule, Rule 5A:18 precludes our 

consideration of the firearm issue. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.