UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4211

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

REGINALD JERRY SHAW,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, Senior District Judge. (5:16-cr-00046-RLV-DSC-4)

Submitted: January 31, 2018 Decided: February 12, 2018

Before MOTZ, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James S. Weidner, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF JAMES S. WEIDNER, JR., Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. R. Andrew Murray, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Reginald Jerry Shaw pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with 

intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2012). The 

district court sentenced him to 151 months’ imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in counsel’s view, there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning the propriety of the sentencing 

enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (2016), and the reasonableness of the sentence imposed. Although informed 

of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Shaw has declined to do so. Upon initial 

review of this case, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the 

propriety of the weapon enhancement. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal 

based on the appellate waiver in the plea agreement. We grant the motion and dismiss the 

appeal.

We review the validity of an appellate waiver de novo. United States v. Copeland, 

707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013). A defendant’s waiver is valid if he agreed to it 

“knowingly and intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 

2010). “To determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, we examine the totality 

of the circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the 

accused’s educational background and familiarity with the terms of the plea agreement.” 

United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Our review of the record confirms that Shaw knowingly and intelligently waived 

his right to appeal his conviction and sentence.
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We will enforce a valid waiver so long as “the issue appealed is within the scope of 

the waiver.” Copeland, 707 F.3d at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted). Shaw waived 

his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, reserving only the right to appeal claims of 

ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct. Contrary to Shaw’s argument in 

opposition to the Government’s motion to dismiss, this waiver is not ambiguous, and it 

unquestionably waives Shaw’s right to appeal the district court’s ruling as to the 

applicability of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) sentencing enhancement. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found 

no unwaived and potentially meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we grant the 

Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal. This court requires that counsel inform Shaw, 

in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. 

If Shaw requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Shaw. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED