United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 20-2790

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jacqueline D. Mills

lllllllllllllllDefendant

Rosie Farr; John Farr

lllllllllllllllllllll Claimants - Appellants

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

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 Submitted: September 24, 2021

Filed: November 18, 2021

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Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Jacqueline Mills of multiple counts of wire fraud, money

laundering, and bribery, parts of a years-long scheme to defraud the United States of

monies intended to feed low-income children. The indictment included criminal
forfeiture allegations, triggering the forfeiture provisions of Rule 32.2 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 982, and 21 U.S.C. § 853. After the jury

found Mills guilty, the government presented evidence relating to the properties it

sought to forfeit. See Criminal Rules 32.2(a), (b)(1). The jury found that fourteen

properties and monies were traceable to the proceeds of Mills’s fraud, including

monies seized from Southern Bancorp account number xxx1086, the property at issue

on this appeal. Pursuant to the jury’s determinations, the district court1 issued a

preliminary order of forfeiture prior to sentencing Mills, directing that these monies

and properties would be forfeited and applied against Mills’s $3.1 million personal

money judgment for her crimes. See Criminal Rule 32.2(b)(2). In accordance with

21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(1), the United States published notice of the forfeiture order and

directly notified Mills’s mother and stepfather, appellants Rosie and John Farr. 

The Farrs timely filed third party petitions asserting interests in various

properties to be forfeited, including monies from Southern Bancorp account number

xxx1086. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2). The petitions commenced proceedings

ancillary to Mills’s criminal case to determine whether either of the Farrs have

ownership interests superior to the government’s forfeiture claims. See Criminal

Rule 32.2(c). The forfeiture order became final as to Mills when she was sentenced,

but it remained preliminary as to the Farrs until the ancillary proceeding concluded. 

See Criminal Rule 32.2(b)(4). 

In the ancillary proceeding, the government exercised its discovery rights under

Criminal Rule 32.2(c)(1)(B), requesting admissions and the production of documents

that would substantiate the Farrs’ ownership claims. Over two years later, when the

Farrs had provided only limited responses and produced no evidence rebutting the

jury finding that the seized assets were derived from Mills’s fraud, the government

1

 The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

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moved for summary judgment, supported by an extensive statement of undisputed

material facts. The Farrs failed to respond. Invoking Eastern District of Arkansas

Local Rule 56.1(c), the local counterpart to Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the district court treated the non-response as admissions, adopted the

government’s factual findings, granted summary judgment dismissing the Farrs’

ancillary third party petitions, and issued a final order of forfeiture regarding the

properties at issue. See Criminal Rule 32.2(c)(2). 

The Farrs appeal the forfeiture of $187,340.67 seized from Southern Bancorp

account xxx1086, a business account in which Mills and the Farrs were joint account

signatories, and $9,000 cash withdrawn from that account and seized from Rosie Farr. 

They urge us to remand for a hearing at which they can show by a preponderance of

the evidence how much of the nearly $200,000 “belongs to them.” Reviewing the

district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, we affirm. Torgerson v. City of

Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (standard of review), cert.

denied, 565 U.S. 978 (2011). 

When a third party files a petition claiming a superior interest in property

subject to a criminal forfeiture order, the petition commences an ancillary proceeding

that incorporates certain procedures prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, such as discovery and motions to dismiss or to grant summary judgment. 

Criminal Rule 32.2(c)(1); see United States v. Moser, 586 F.3d 1089, 1092-94 (8th

Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 907 (2010). The petitioning third party may not

relitigate the underlying forfeiture order against the criminal defendant. Rather, the

third party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she has an

ownership interest in the property that is superior to the government’s forfeiture claim

-- either “a legal right, title, or interest . . . superior to any right, title, or interest of the

defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture,”

or that the third party “is a bona fide purchaser for value.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6). “A

§ 853(n) ancillary proceeding is the only avenue by which a third-party claimant may

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seek to assert an interest in property that has been included in an indictment alleging

that the property is subject to forfeiture.” United States v. Puig, 419 F.3d 700, 703

(8th Cir. 2005). 

In the two years between the Farrs filing their third party petitions and the

government moving for summary judgment, the Farrs failed to present evidence

supporting their claims of a superior ownership interest in Southern Bancorp account

xxx1086. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the government’s

statement of undisputed material facts included, consistent with the testimony of an

FBI forensic accounting expert at trial and at the post-trial forfeiture proceeding, the

fact that funds flowing into Southern Bancorp account xxx1086 during the period in

question were derived from Mills’s fraud. When the Farrs failed to respond, the

district court properly adopted the government’s statement of undisputed facts. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

On this record, the Farrs failed to prove a prior interest in the property under

21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) because “the proceeds of an offense do not exist before the

offense is committed, and when they come into existence, the government’s interest

under the relation-back doctrine immediately vests.” United States v. Timley, 507

F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir. 2007). Nor did the Farrs present evidence they qualify as

bona fide purchasers for value under § 853(n)(6)(B). As in United States v. Porchay,

533 F.3d 704, 709 (8th Cir. 2008), the Farrs’ failure to present evidence of superior

ownership interests “irreparably crippled” their third party claims. 

After the district court granted the government’s motion for summary

judgment, Rosie Farr filed a pro se motion to reconsider, citing her husband’s illness

and her lawyer’s lack of diligence. The district court treated this as a Rule 60(b)(1)

motion and denied it for failure to show “excusable neglect.” On appeal, the Farrs

again argue their failure to respond to discovery requests and the government’s

motion for summary judgment was due to their attorney’s lack of diligence. “It is

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generally held that ‘excusable neglect’ under Rule 60(b) does not include ignorance

or carelessness on the part of an attorney.” Noah v. Bond Cold Storage, 408 F.3d

1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying

that general rule in this case. 

The Farrs further argue their failure to respond was due to the preliminary

forfeiture order citing the criminal forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(3)(F), which

by its terms is inapplicable against third parties. This contention is without merit. A

preliminary forfeiture order is part of the criminal forfeiture process, intended in part

to give third parties notice of the impending forfeiture and an opportunity to claim a

superior interest in an ancillary proceeding governed by rules of civil procedure. If

a third party prevails in the ancillary proceeding, the criminal forfeiture fails as to that

property, and it will be transferred to the third party owner unless the government

commences a successful civil forfeiture proceeding against the third party under 18

U.S.C. § 981. But here, the Farrs’ third party claims failed, and the district court

properly entered a final forfeiture order pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(7) and

Criminal Rule 32.2(c)(2). As in United States v. Waits, it is clear that the Farrs as

third parties had adequate notice the government intended to seek forfeiture, as their

timely third party petitions confirmed. 830 F. App’x 790 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,

-- S. Ct. --, 2021 WL 4508223 (Oct. 4, 2021). 

The Orders of the district court dated June 2 and August 10, 2020 are affirmed.

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