16-2333 Wu v. Sessions BIA Van Wyke, IJ A087 516 173 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**  **ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT**  = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED**  **WITH THIS**  **COURT, A**  **PARTY MUST**  **CITE EITHER**  **THE FEDERAL**  **APPENDIX OR**  **AN ELECTRONIC**  **DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY**  **OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for**  1 **the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States** 2 **Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the** 3 **23 rd**  **day of February, two thousand eighteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **REENA RAGGI,** 7 **DENNY CHIN,** 8 **CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **QUI MEI WU, AKA WUI MEI WU,** 13 Petitioner **,** 14 15 **v. 16-2333** 16 **NAC** 17 **JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,** 18 **UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent **.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER:** Gerald Karikari, New York, NY. 23 24 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 25 Attorney General; Briena L. 26 Stippoli, Senior Litigation 27 Counsel; Timothy Bo Stanton, Trial 28 Attorney, Office of Immigration 29 Litigation, United States 30 Department of Justice, Washington, 31 DC. 322 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 2 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 3

DENIED. 4 Petitioner Qui Mei Wu, a native and citizen of the People’s 5 Republic of China, seeks review of a June 7, 2016, decision of 6 the BIA affirming a December 8, 2014, decision of an Immigration 7 Judge (“IJ”) denying Wu’s application for asylum, withholding 8 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 9 (“CAT”). In re Qui Mei Wu, No. A087 516 173 (B.I.A. June 7, 10 2016), aff’g No. A087 516 173 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 8, 11 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 12 facts and procedural history in this case. 13 Because the BIA agreed with the IJ’s credibility 14 determination and emphasized particular aspects of it, we have 15 reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions, including the 16 portions of the IJ decision not explicitly discussed by the BIA. 17 Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales , 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The 18 applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 19 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder , 562 F.3d 510, 20 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 213 Under the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, in light of 1 “the totality of the circumstances,” base an adverse 2 credibility determination on an asylum applicant’s 3 responsiveness, inconsistencies in her statements, “without 4 regard to whether” those inconsistencies go “to the heart of 5 the applicant’s claim,” and the “inherent plausibility” of her 6 account, among other factors. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); 7 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2008). In 8 conducting “substantial evidence” review, we “defer . . . to 9 an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of 10 the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder 11 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin , 12 534 F.3d at 167. 13 The adverse credibility determination satisfies our 14 review. The agency identified two areas of Wu’s testimony that 15 were vague, lacked detail, and were of questionable 16 plausibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Wensheng Yan 17 v. Mukasey , 509 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n assessing the 18 credibility of an asylum applicant’s testimony, an IJ is 19 entitled to consider whether the applicant’s story is 20 inherently implausible.”). The IJ fulfilled his obligation 21 “to solicit more detail” by asking numerous follow-up 224 questions. Shunfu Li v. Mukasey , 529 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1 2008) (“[A] finding of testimonial vagueness cannot, without 2 more, support an adverse credibility determination unless 3 government counsel or the IJ first attempts to solicit more 4 detail from the alien.”). 5 First, aside from identifying her aunt, Wu was vague about 6 her fellow churchgoers. Wu testified that she told some of her 7 friends about the church, and later saw them there, but denied 8 having brought them. She could not explain which of the 50 or 9 60 other church members recruited her friends, and further 10 suggested that she never thought to ask her friends how they 11 came to attend. In addition to deeming this testimony vague, 12 the IJ was justifiably incredulous. If Wu had told her friends 13 about the church and later ran i nto them there, they would have 14 discussed the topic. Siewe v. Gonzales , 480 F.3d 160, 168-69 15 (2d Cir. 2007). 16 Wu’s testimony about her family members was similarly 17 vague. She identified four relatives who initially attended 18 the church, but could not remember the names of three or four 19 other family members who joined later and were arrested during 20 the raid. When asked, Wu could not say which--or even how 21 many--of her relatives were arrested. Cf. Jin Chen v. U.S. 225 Dep’t of Justice , 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (in pre-REAL 1 ID case, remanding where the IJ and Government “failed to create 2 a record that could support” the IJ’s vagueness-based 3 credibility finding). The IJ reasonably found it implausible 4 that Wu did not ask her mother for this information. Siewe , 5 480 F.3d at 168-69. Moreover, the letter submitted by Wu’s 6 mother said nothing about their relatives being arrested, 7 casting further doubt on Wu’s account. Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d 8 166 n.3 (an omission in a document can ground an adverse 9 credibility determination). 10 Wu argues that the IJ should not have focused on whether 11 she knew that the underground church was illegal. Although the 12 IJ observed that Wu seemed to be differing with the definition 13 of “illegal,” the IJ’s main point was that Wu’s testimony made 14 little sense: how could she not know the church was illegal after 15 her aunt explained that it moved each week to avoid police 16 detection? The IJ asked a further question: if church leaders 17 worried about detection, why would they not warn new members 18 that the church was illegal? Otherwise, new members might talk 19 about it openly. Wu submitted a church attendance certificate, 20 which featured her name, address, and photograph. That 21 document caused the IJ to ask another reasonable question: why 226 would an underground church maintain the photographs and 1 personal identifying information of its members? Wu 2 characterizes the IJ’s questions as speculative, but all are 3 grounded in Wu’s incompatible statements. Siewe , 480 F.3d at 4 168-69. 5 The totality of the circumstances outlined above supports 6 the adverse credibility determination. Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d 7 at 164. Wu’s asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims 8 were all based on the same factual predicate, and so the 9 credibility determination was dispositive as to all three. See 10 Paul v. Gonzales , 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 11 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 12 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion 13 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 14

FOR THE COURT: 15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 16