Th e H on or ab le Sh ira A. Sc he in dl

in , o f t he Unit edSt at es Di st ric t C ou rt for th e S ou th er n * Di st ric t o f N ew

Yo rk, si tt in g by de si gna ti on . 1 09-5174

- cv O ’ N eil v . P o n z i-F lett UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

## SU MM AR

Y O RD ER Rulings by summary order do not have prec edential effect . Citation to summary orde rs filed onor af te r Ja nu ary 1 , 20 07, is pe rm it te d a nd is gov er ne d b y F ed er al Rule of A pp ella te Pro ce du re 32. 1 a nd th is co ur t’ s Lo cal R ul e 3 2.1 .1. Wh enci ti ng a

su mm ary o rd er

ina d oc um en t f

ile d w ith thi s court, a party must

cite eithe r the Federal Appendix or an ele ctronic databa se (with the notation “summary order”). A party c iting a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party

not re pr es en te d b y c ou ns el

. At a stat ed term of the Unite d States Court of Appe als for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United Stat es Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the Cit y of New York, on the first day of Octobe r, two thousand and te n. PRESENT:
J OHN M. W

ALKE R , J R ., J OSÉ A. C AB RANES ,

Circuit Judges

, S HI RA A. S C H E IN D L IN ,

District Judge. *

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x A I MEE O’ N E IL ,

Plaintiff-Appellant

, M.O. Appellant

,

-v.
- No . 09 -51 74
F L OYD W EE NO P ONZI , M ARY P O N Z I F LETT Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xO’Neil filed a notice of appeal from “a terminat ed order” on Decembe r 14, 2009, after 1 entry of the Re port and Recomme ndation of the Magistrate Judge, but be fore entry of the judgment of the District Court. Ac cordingly, consistent with the “special solicitude” shown to pro se litigants, see Tries tman v. Fed. Bureau of Pr

isons , 470 F.3d 4 71, 475 (2d Cir. 2 006), we construe O’Ne il’s notice of appeal as “filed after the Court announc es a decision . . . but before the entry of the judgment ” pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2). The not ice of appeal is therefore treated as t imely and filed on th e d at e o f a nd af

te r the en try o f fi nal ju dgm en t. Id

. 2 FO R PL AI NTI FF -A

PP EL LA NT: Ai me e O ’N eil, Min et to , N Y, pr o se. Ap pe al fro m a Fe br ua ry 9, 2 010 ju dgm en t o f t he Un it edSt at es Di st ric t C ou rt for th e N or th er n Di st ric t o f N ew

Yo rk ( Gl en n T . Su dd ab y, Ju dg e ).
UP ON DU E C ON SI DE RA TI ON , I T I S H ERE BY ORDE RED , A

DJ UD GED , A

ND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be AFFIRMED.
Pla in ti ff- ap pe lla nt

Ai me e O ’N ei l, pro se , brought this civil action in forma paupe ris under the Ra ck et ee r In flu en ce d a nd Co rru pt Orga ni za ti on s A ct

(“ RI CO ”) , 18 U.S .C . § § 1 961 , et seq . After pr ov id in g O ’N ei l w

ith a n o pp or tu ni ty

to am en d h er

co mp lain t, th e D is tr

ic t C ou rt —a ct in g sua spon te pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)—dismissed O’Neil’s amended c omplaint as frivolous and for faili ng to me et th e r equi re me nt s o f Fe de ra l R ul es of C ivil Pr oc ed ur e 8 (a )( 2) an d 1 0( b) . O ’N eil’s no ti ce of a pp eal, liberally construed, challenges the February 9, 2010, order of the District Court. We assume the parties’ 1 fa mi lia rit y w it h the un de rly

in g fa ct s a nd pr oc ed ur al

hi st ory o f t he ca se . We review de

no vo a district court’s sua spon te dismissal of a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 915 (e ). Giano v. Goord

, 250 F.3d 1 46, 149-5 0 (2d Cir. 2001). Though we read pro se complaints with “sp ec ia l s ol

ic it ud e” an d i nt er pr et

th em to rais e the “stro nge st argum en ts th at

th ey su gge st ,” Triestman , 470 F.3 d a t 4 74- 76 (

2d Ci r. 2 006 ) (

in te rn al qu ot at io n m ar ks om it te d) , aco mp lain t m us t p le ad“e no ugh fa ct s t o s ta te a c laim to re lie f t ha t i s p la us ib le onit s fa ce .” Be ll A tl . C or p. v. T wo mb ly , 55 0 U. S. 5 44, 570 (2007). We must dismiss pro se co mp lain ts th at ar e f riv ol ou s o r fa

il t o s ta te a c laim

. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(

B) ([a] c ourt “shall dismiss” a complaint filed in for ma pa up er is “a t a ny ti me if the co ur t determines that ... the act

ion ... (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be gra nt ed ; o r (

iii ) s ee ks mo ne ta ry

re lie f a gain st

a d ef en da nt wh o i s i mm un e f

ro m s uc h r el

ie f.” ); Neitzke v. Williams, 49 0 U. S. 3 19, 325 (1 989 ). A p lain ti ff a ss er ti ng a

RI CO vio la ti onmu st

de mo ns tr at e “ (1 ) the de fe nd an t’ s v io la ti onof [ 18 U.S.C.] § 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiff’s business or property, and (3) causat ion of the injury by the de fe nd an t’ s v

io la ti on .” Lerner

v. Fleet Bank, N.A. , 459 F.3d 2 73, 283 (2d Cir. 2 006) (citations and inte rnal quotation marks omitte d; alteration in original). To adequately ple ad the causa tion element of a RICO cl ai m, th e p lain ti ff m us t alle ge th at th e d ef en da nt ’s co nd uc t w as th e “ le ga l, o r p ro xim at e, ca us e o f [ he r] in ju ry , a s w ell a s the lo gic al , o r ‘b ut for ,’ c au se .” Id. at 283-84 (citing Co mm er ci al Cl ea ni ng Se rv s. , L .L .C . v. Colin Serv. Sys. , 271 F.3d 3 74, 380 (2d Cir. 2 001)).3

O’ Ne il’ s a me nd edco mp lain t, ev enwh enre adlib er ally , fa ils to co nt ai n a“ash or t a nd pl ai n stateme nt of the claim” entit ling her to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P ro. 8(a)(2). Inste ad, O’Neil indulges in a pr ol ix a nd unin te lli gib le “c on sp ira cy th eo ry no ve l,” Gollomp v. Spitzer

, 56 8 F. 3d 355 , 37 1-7 2 (

2d Ci r. 200 9) (i nt er nal quo ta ti onma rks om it te d) , whi ch fails to alle ge th at de fe nd an ts ’ c on du ct

wa s the le ga l, much less the logical, cause of her injury. Thus, while we have “repeate dly cautioned against sua spon te di sm is sals of pro se

. . . co mp lain ts pr

io r t o r equi ring

th e d ef en da nt s t o a ns we r,” Salahuddin v. Cuomo , 86 1 F.2d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 1988), it is well settled that “where leave to a mend has previously been given and the
su cc es si ve pl ea di ngs re ma

in pr ol ix a nd unin te lligib le

. . . or wh er e the su bs ta nc e o f t he cl ai m p le ad edis fri vo lo us onit s fa ce ,” id

. at 42, § 1915(e) permits a district court to dismiss the c omplaint sua spon te . We therefore conclude that the District Court correc tly dismissed O’Neil’s amende d complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons state d above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the D istrict Court. FOR THE COURT,
Ca th er in e O ’H ag anWo lfe , C le rk o f Co ur t