UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4287

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

TONYAL LOCKLEAR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., 

Senior District Judge. (1:13-cr-00231-JAB-3)

Submitted: October 28, 2014 Decided: November 4, 2014

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Harvey A. Carpenter IV, THE LAW OFFICES OF HA (ALEC) CARPENTER 

IV, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kyle David 

Pousson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Tonyal Locklear appeals his conviction and 

thirty-three month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to 

possession of counterfeit federal reserve notes, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 472 (2012). On appeal, Locklear’s counsel has filed 

a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but 

questioning whether the district court abused its discretion in 

(1) denying Locklear’s request for a sentence at the bottom of 

the Guidelines range, and (2) declining to order that the

sentence be served in the North Carolina Department of 

Corrections, concurrently with his undischarged state sentence. 

Locklear was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental 

brief but has not done so. The Government has declined to file 

a response brief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We review Locklear’s sentence for reasonableness, 

applying “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We “must first ensure 

that the district court committed no significant procedural 

error,” including improper calculation of the Guidelines range, 

insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) 

factors, and inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed. 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 

575 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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If we find no procedural error, we examine the 

substantive reasonableness of a sentence under “the totality of 

the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed 

must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy 

the goals of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume 

that a within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable, 

and the defendant bears the burden to “rebut the presumption by 

demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 

445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Counsel first questions whether the court abused its 

discretion in imposing a sentence of thirty-three months, 

instead of the thirty-month sentence he requested. We conclude 

Locklear has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness 

accorded his within-Guidelines sentence. See id. 

Turning to Locklear’s request that his sentence run 

concurrently with the state sentence he was already serving, “if 

a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already 

subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may 

run concurrently or consecutively.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (2012); 

see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 5G1.3(c). The 

court is required to consider the § 3553(a) factors in 

determining whether to run the sentences consecutively or 
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concurrently. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). The Guidelines commentary 

also enumerates a series of factors relevant to this 

determination. USSG § 5G1.3 cmt. n.3(A). Specific 

consideration of these factors, while recommended, is not 

required by either statute or § 5G1.3(c). See United States v. 

Nania, 724 F.3d 824, 838 (7th Cir. 2014); see also United 

States v. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d 451, 451-52 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. 

denied, 134 S. Ct. 1042 (2014).

Here, the court complied with its obligation to 

consider the § 3553(a) factors. While the sentencing court did 

not specifically address the USSG § 5G1.3 factors, this 

information was before the court when it sentenced Locklear, and 

we perceive no error.

Finally, with regard to Locklear’s request that he 

serve his sentence in the North Carolina Department of Adult 

Corrections, the Bureau of Prisons has sole authority to 

determine whether a federal prisoner’s sentence is to be served 

in federal or state court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2012); 

Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2390-91 (2011). 

Therefore, this claim entitles Locklear to no relief.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm Locklear’s conviction and sentence. This 

court requires that counsel inform Locklear, in writing, of the 
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right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Locklear requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Locklear.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED