## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JAN 13 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JOHN R. CARLETON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Angela Nell Carleton, deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellant, and DEBORAH STURDIVAN BAUGHMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, a municipal corporation; MIKE HANLEY; DAN MCSLARROW, Corporal; JOHN DOE, Officer,

Defendants-Appellees.
JOHN R. CARLETON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Angela Nell Carleton, deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellee, and DEBORAH STURDIVAN BAUGHMAN,

Plaintiff, No. 96-5130 (D.C. No. 94-C-1033-E) (N.D. Okla.)-2-

v. CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, a municipal corporation,

Defendant, and MIKE HANLEY; DAN MCSLARROW, Corporal; JOHN DOE, Officer,

Defendants-Appellants.

DEBORAH STURDIVAN BAUGHMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, a municipal corporation; OFFICER MIKE HANLEY, CORPORAL DAN MCSLARROW, OFFICER JOHN DOE, Defendants-Appellees.

DEBORAH STURDIVAN BAUGHMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 96-5140 (D.C. No. 94-C-1033-E) (N.D. Okla.)

No. 96-5131 (D.C. No. 94-C-1034-E) (N.D. Okla.)* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. -3- v. CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, a municipal corporation,

Defendant, and MIKE HANLEY; DAN MCSLARROW, Corporal; JOHN DOE, Officer,

Defendants-Appellants. No. 96-5141 (D.C. No. 94-C-1034-E) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 Because the record on appeal does not contain the c omplaint or any of the

summary judgment pleadings or briefs, we discern th e nature of plaintiffs’ allegations from their brief on appeal. -4- These consolidated appeals arise from suits broughtby plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involving a high speed police c hase. The vehicle pursued by the police crashed into the vehicle driven by Angel a Carleton. Ms. Carleton was killed, and her passenger, Deborah Baughman, was in jured. Plaintiffs brought individual suits, which were later consolidated, ag ainst the officers involved in the chase and the City of Tulsa, alleging violationof plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights as a result of the officers’ reckles s behavior and deliberate indifference to plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and the City’s failure to train the officers. 1 The district court granted summary judgment in favo r of defendants, finding that the officers’ actions were not reckles s and in complete indifference to risk, and, therefore, plaintiffs could show no viol ation of their constitutional rights. The district court also found that, becaus e there was no constitutional violation by the officers, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim s against the City must fail. Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s ruling that defendants did not violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and the officer defendants cross-appeal the district court’s refusal to grant them qualified im munity. Our review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo, see Kaul v. Stephan , 83-5-

F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996), and we may affirmon any basis supported by the record, see United States v. Sandoval , 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994). These appeals were informally abated pending this court’s en banc decision in Williams v. City and County of Denver , No. 94-1190, 1998 WL 380518 (10th Cir. June 26, 1998), which was, in turn, abated pen ding the Supreme Court’s decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998). Lewis governs the outcome of these appeals. In that case , the Court held that “high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under th e Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action under § 1983.” Lewis , 118 S. Ct. at 1720; see also Radecki v. Barela , 146 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying Lewis in holding that officer’s exercise of instantaneous ju dgment in emergency situation did not shock the conscience and was, therefore, no t actionable under § 1983), petition for cert. filed , 67 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1998) (No. 98-69)

. Plaintiffs do not allege that the officers intendedthem physical harm. Consequently, defendants’ actions in the emergency situation surrounding the high-speed chase do not shock the conscience. Ther e was no violation of plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights necessary to maintain an action under § 1983. Because there was no constitutional violat ion, we do not reach the question of whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Lewis , 118-6-

S. Ct. at 1714 n.5. Finally, plaintiffs’ § 1983 cl aim against the City must also fail because there was no constitutional violation by the officers. See Webber v. Mefford , 43 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1994). AFFIRMED

.

Entered for the Court

Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge