MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 9 ME 8 Docket: Pen

- 17

- 549 Argued: July	19,	2018 Decided: January	22,	2019 Revised: July	16 ,	2019 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY, JJ. Majority: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ. Concurrence:	SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	J.

ERIC	RING

v. DANIEL	LEIGHTON

v. CLINTON	Mc GAW

MEAD ,	J. [ ¶1] On	February	8,	2016,	Clinton	McGaw,	driving	a	vehicle	owned	by Eric	 Ring,	 was	 on	 his	 way	 to	 pick	 up	 a	 customer	 in furtherance	 of Ring’s
business	 whe n	 he	 was	 involved	 in	 a	 collision with	 a	 vehicle	 driven	 by Daniel Leighton. In	a small	claims	matter filed	b y	Leighton	against McGaw ,	the
District	 C ourt (Lincoln, Stitham,	 J. ) found	 that McGaw was	 negligent	 and awarded	Leighton	just	over	$3,9 00	in	damages and	costs .		No	appeal	was	filed and	the	judgment	was	paid.		Ring	then	filed	a	complaint	in	the	Superior	Cour t asserting	 that Leighton was	 negligent	 and	 had	 caused	 Ring economic harm.2 Ring	 appeals	 from	 a	 summary	 judgment	 entered	 by	 the	 Superior	 Court (Penobscot County, A. Murray,	J. )	i n favor	of	Leighton	on	Ring’s	complaint.		Ring
contends	 that	 the	 court	 erred in	 applying the	 common	 law	 doctrine	 of

res judicata	to	the earlier	small	claims	judgment	obtained	by	Leighton	against
McGaw	and thereby determining that	the	judgment	conclusively	resolved	the issue	of	which	driver	was	at	fault. [¶ 2 ]		In	this	matter	of	fir st	impression,	we	conclude	that claim	preclusion
cannot, because	of	the	unique	limitations	of	small	claims	procedure, operate	to bar a subsequent suit	brought	in	District	or	Superior	Court	by	a	person	who

was	not an	actual party	 to the	small	claims	action , but	rather	was	at	most	in privity	with	the	defendant	in	the	small	claims	case .		Accordingly,	we	vacate	the summary	judgment	and	remand	for	further	proceedings	in	the	trial	court.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 3 ]		The	facts	are	drawn	from	the	summary	judgment	record, taken	in the	light	most	favorable	to	Ring	as	the	nonprevailing	party. See Estate	of	Frye	v.
MMG	Ins.	Co. , 2018	ME	44,	¶	8,	182	A.3d	158.		Following	the	accident	between McGaw	and	Leighton, Leighton	filed	a small	claims	action	against	McGaw	in	the
District Court (Lincoln) .		 Leighton’s	 statement	 of	claim,	 seeking	 $3,795.57	in damages	plus	costs,	alleged	that	McGaw	had	negligently	caused	the	accident.3 [¶ 4 ] At the	hearing	on	Leighton’s	claim, Ring’s	insurer	provided	McGaw with	counsel	and	a	defense; Ring att ended	and spoke	to	McGaw	and	McGaw’s
counsel. T he	court found	that	McG aw	was	at	fault in	the	accident and entered judgment in	 favor	 of	 Leighton in	 the	 full	 amount	 that he had	 requested

— $3,795.57,	 plus	 $106.30	 in	 costs. The	 judgment	 did	 not	 make	 any findings regarding	Ring,	or	McG aw’s	relationship	to	Ring. A	satisfaction	of judgment	was filed	on	November 17,	2016

. [¶ 5 ]		In	January	2017,	Ring	filed	a	negligence	complaint	against	Leighton in	the	Superior	Court	seeking	unspecified	damages,	alleging	th at	Leighton,	not McGaw,	 had	 been	 at	 fault	 in	 the	 accident.	 	 Leighton’s	 answer	 denied	 the substantive	 allegations	 of	 the	 complaint	 and	 asserted	 as	 defenses,	inter	 alia, that	 Ring’s	 claim	 was	 barred	 by	 the	 doctrines	 of	 res	 judicata	 and	 bar	 and merger.	 	 Leigh ton	 then	 filed	 a	 third

- party	 complaint	 against	McGaw	 seeking indemnification	if	he	were	found	to	be	liable	to	Ring, asserting that	the	small claims	judgment	established	McGaw’s	negligence. [¶ 6 ]		In	July	2017,	Leighton	moved	for	summary	judgment	“based	upo n the	fact	that	responsibility	for	[the]	accident	was	previously	adjudicated	in	the
Lincoln District	Court.”		Ring	opposed	the	motion, arguing that	the	small	claims judgment	had	no	res	judicata	effect	as	to	him,	in	part	because	he	was	not	a	party4 to	that	a ction.		Following	a nontestimonial hearing , the	court	granted	Leighton’s motion	and	entered	a	summary	judgment, concluding that	“the	issue	of	fault	for the	accident	in	question	has	already	been	determined	by	a	prior	final	judgment in	the	2016	Small	Claims proceeding,”	and	that	“Ring	had	a	fair	opportunity	and incentive	 to	 litigate	 the	 issue	 in	 a	 prior	 proceed ing.”	 	 (Quotation	 marks
omitted )

. The	court	concluded	 that	 “collateral	estoppel	precludes	Ring	 from relitigating	 the	 factual	 issue	 of	 who	 was	 at	 fault for	 the	 accident [;]

.	 .	 . [t]herefore,	Ring	cannot	establish	 that	 Leighton	breached	a	duty	 to	him,	 and therefore cannot	establish	all	the	necessary	elements	of	a	prima	facie	case	for negligence.”		Ring	appealed.
II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 7 ] In	the	ordinary case,	the	claim	preclusion	prong	of	the	res	judicata doctrine	“prohibits	relitigation	of	an	entire	cause	of	action	between	the	same parties	 or	 their	 privies,	 once	 a	 valid	 final	judgment	has	been	 rendered	in	an earlier	 suit	 on	 the	 same	 cause	 of	 action.” 1 P ushard v.	 Bank	 of	 Am.,	 N.A. , 2017 ME 230,	 ¶	 19,	 175	 A.3d 103	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted). We	 have	 not

1 Because Ring’s	 argument	 that 14	 M.R.S.	 §	 7485 (2017)	 prohibits	 giving	 the	 small	 claims judgment	preclusive	effect	in	the	Superior	Court	“ depends	on	the	legal	effect	of	the

.	.	. [District	Court] cause	of	action,	as	opposed	 to	particular	 factual	issues	litigated	in	connection	with	 that	claim,	 the question	 here	 involves	 claim	 preclusion. ” Pushard	 v.	 Bank	 of	 Am.,	 N.A

. , 2017 ME	 230,	 ¶	 19, 175 A.3d 103.5 previous ly addressed	the situation presented	here,	where	the	person	filing	suit in	the	Superior	Court subsequent	to the entry	of	judgment	in	the	small	clai ms

case — based	on	the	same	core	set	of	facts

— was	not a party	in the	small	claims proceeding. 2 [¶ 8 ] Leighton,	 as	 the	 party	 asserting the	 affirmative	 defense	 of

res judicata,	bears	the	burden	of	proving	its	applicability. See M.R. Civ. P.	8(c) ; ABN	AMRO Mort.	Gp.	v.	Willis ,	2003	ME	98,	¶	5,	829 A.2d 527. “We	review	the supported	facts	in	the	summary	judgment	record	in	the	light	most	favorable	to [Ring],	as	the	nonpr evailing	party,	to	determine	de novo	if	any	genuine	issue	of material	 fact	 exists	 for	 tria l	 and	 whether,	 based	 on	 the	 undisputed	 facts, [Leighton]	 was	 entitled	 to	 a	 judgment	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 law.” Estate	 of	 Frye , 2018 ME	44,	¶	8,	182 A.3d	158.		Likewise, “[ w ] e	review	decisions	regarding	the effect	 of	 a	 prior	 judgment	 on	 a	 present	 action, which	 i s	 a	 question	 of	 law,
de novo.” Thibeault	v.	Brackett ,	2007 ME	154,	¶	7,	938	A.2d 27. [¶ 9 ]		Ring	contends	that	the	court	erred	in	granting	Leighton	summary judgment	 because,	 for	 two	 reasons,	 the	 small	 claims	 judgment	 in	 Leighton’s favor	did	not	have	precl usive	effect	in	the	Superior	Court:	(1)	the	Small	Claims

2 In	fact,	we	have	only	addre ssed	this	issue	where	the	person	bringing	the	second	suit	was	the plaintiff in	 the	 small	 claims	 action. See	 Thibeault	 v.	 Brackett ,	 2007	 ME	 154,	 ¶	 4,	 938	 A.2d	 27; Caporino v.	Lacasse ,		511	A.2d	445,	446	(Me.	1986).6 Act,	14	M.R.S.	§§ 7481

- 7487 (2017), requires	that	result;	and	(2)	Ring	was	not a	party	 to	 the	 small	claims	action,	nor	was	he	in	privity	with	McGaw	in	 that separate	matter.		If	fault	for	the	accident	is	not	established	as	a	matter	of	law, Ring	reasons,	then	it	remains	a	material	fact	in	disp ute	and	summary	judgment is	 precluded. See M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 56(c) ; Estate	 of	 Frye ,	 2018	 ME 44,	 ¶ 8,
182 A.3d 158

. [¶1 0 ]		Because	litigation	of	a	small	claim	is	u nlike	other	civil	litigation	in several	important	respects,	before	addressing the	merits	of	Ring’ s	arguments we	begin	our	analysis	with	a	review	of	the	chara cteristics	and	limitations	that make	 “small	 claims	 proceedings	 .	 .	 .	 unique	 and	 different	 from	 other proceedings	conducted	in	the	District	Court.” Thomas	v.	BFC Marine/Bath	Fuel
Co. ,	2004	ME	27, ¶	11,	843	A.2d	3. [¶1 1 ]		Small	claims	proceedings	are	a	creature	of	statute,	established	by the	Legislature	with	jurisdiction	given	to	the	District	Court	“for	the	purpose	of providing	a	simple,	speedy	and	informal	court	procedure	for	the	resolution	of

sma ll	 claims.”	 	 14	 M.R.S.	 §	 7481.	 	 It	 is	 an	 alternative,	 not	 exclusive,	 way	 to resolve	 a	 “small	 claim,”	which	is	 a	 claim presently subject to	 a	jurisdictional7 maximum	of	$6,000, 3 exclusive	of	interest	and	costs,	that	does	not	involve	title
to	real	estate.		14 M.R.S.	§§	7481

- 7482. [¶1 2 ]	 	 Pursuant	 to	 statute,	 “small	 claims	 proceedings	 are	 governed	 by separate,	 succinct	 procedural	 rules” that	 we	 have promulgated

. Midland Funding	 LL C	 v.	 Walton ,	 2017	 ME	 24, ¶	 16,	 155	 A.3d	 864;	 14	 M.R.S. § 7484

- A(1); see Maine	Rules	of	Small	Claims	Procedure .		In	keeping	with	the Legislature’s	 directive	 mandating	 simplicity	 and	 expediency, see 14 M.R.S. § 7481,	 those	 rules	 must	 be	 “construed	 to	 secure the	 just,	 speedy,	 and inexpensive	 determination	 of	 every	 action	 in	 a	 simple	 and	 informal	 way.” 4 M.R.S.C.P.	1,	15. [¶1 3 ]		Accordingly,	in	stark	contrast	to	the	procedure	used	in	other	civil cases,	the	rules	of	evidence,	other	than	with	respect	to	privileg es,	do	not	apply in	 a	 small	 claims	 hearing;	 “[t]he	 court	may	 receive	 any	 oral	 or	 documentary evidence	[that	is ]	not	privileged”; the presiding	judge	is	required	to “assist i n developing	all	 relevant	 facts ” ;	and	 the	court	is	not	 required	 to	articulate	 any
f

indings	 of	 fact	 or	 conclusions	 of	law	 following	 the	 hearing. M.R.S.C.P. 6(b);

3 The	jurisdictional	limit	is	reviewed	by	the	Legislature	every	four	years. 14	M.R.S.	§	7482 (2017).

4 We	have	observed	that the	Maine	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure,	which	govern other	civil	actions	in the	 District	 Court	 or	 Superior	 Court ,	 do	 not	 contain	 a	 s imilar	 specification	 that	 proceedings	 be informal. Thomas	v.	BFC	Marine/Bath	Fuel	Co. , 2004	ME	27,	¶	11,	843	A.2d	3; see M.R.	Civ.	P.	1

.8 M.R. Civ.	P.	52(a),	81(b)(2)(A) ; M.R. Evid. 101(b)(4).		At	the	conclusion	of	the hearing,	the	court	must	“promptly	enter	judgment	for	the	prevailing	party	for
the	relief	to which	that	party	is	entitled,	even	if	that	party	has	not	demanded such	relief.”		M.R.S.C.P. 8(c). [¶1 4 ] Either party	may	appeal a small	claims	judgment	to	the	Superior
Court , 14	M.R.S.	§	7485 ; M.R.S.C.P. 11(a) ,	but the plaintiff may	app eal “ questions of law	only ,” and	a	plaintiff’s	appeal	“ shall	be	determined	by	the	Superior	Court without	 jury.”	 	 M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1).	 	 An	 appeal	 taken	 by the defendant	 on questions	of	law may	likewise	be	resolved	by	the	court , but if	the defendant’s appeal	 concerns	 factual issues those	 issues	 may be	 resolved	 “by	 jury	 trial
de novo	 at	 the	 election of	 the	 defendant.”	 	 M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2).	 	 A	 defendant requesting	a	jury	trial	must	file	affidavits	sufficient	to	“set[]	forth	specific	facts showing	that	there	is	a	genuine	issue	of material	fact	as	to	which	there	is	a	right to	trial	by	jury.” Id. In	that	event,	the	small	claims	judgment	becomes	a	nullity and	the	case	is	tried	to	a	jury

. Id

. In accordance	with M.R. Civ. P. 80L , 5 however,

at that	trial many	of	the	rules	of	civil	procedure still do not	apply;	the	defendant

5 Maine	Rule	of	Civil	Procedure	80L	is	a	special	rule	“govern[ing]	proceedings	in	jury	trials	de novo on	appeal	to	 th e	Superior	Court	 from	judgments	of	the	District	Court	in	small	claims	actions.		The other	provisions	of	the	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure	do	not	apply	to	such	proceedings	except	as	provided in	[Rule	80L].”		M.R. Civ.	P.	80L(a).9 may	not	add	counterclaims; 6 and,	regardless	of	the	size	of	the	jury’s	verdict,	any judgment	 remains	 subject	 to	 the	jurisdictional	limit	 set	 by	 14	M.R.S.	 §	 7482

. M.R. Civ. P. 80L (a),	(d)(2); M.R. Civ. P. 80L	Advisory	Committee’s	Notes	1986

. [¶1 5 ] We now	 turn	 to	 Ring’s	 arguments ,	 keeping	 in	 mind	 the	 unique characteristics	and	significant	limitations	of	small	claims	procedure. [¶1 6 ]		Ring	 first	argues	 that	 the	plain	language	of the	Small	Claims	Act prevents	 the	 District	 Court’s	 judgment	 from	 having	 preclusive	 effect	 in	 the Superior	Court	action.		Section	7485	of	the	Act	provides: Any	 fact	 found	 or	 issue	 adjudicated	 in	 a	 proceeding	 under	 this chapter may	not	be	deemed	found	or	adj udicated	for	the	purpose	of any	other	cause	of	action. The	judgment	obtained	is	res	judicata	as to	the	amount	in	controversy.		If	a	plaintiff	has	reduced	the	amount of	 a	 claim	 or	 contract	 to	 meet	 the	 jurisdictional	 limits	 of	 this chapter,	the	judgment	obt ained	is	res	judicata	as	to	the	full	amount of	the	debt	or	contract	in	controversy.		The	only	recourse	from	an adverse	decision	is	by	appeal.

6 The Maine	Rules	of	Small	Claim s	Procedure provide	very	specific	rules	for “Commencement	of Proceedings” (Rule	2)	and “ Pleadings ” (Rule	3). The	reference	in	Rule	3(b)	to	responsive	pleadings by	 the	defendant	 falls	under	 the	heading	 of	 “Defenses”	and the	 rule notably	does	not	provide	 for claims	by	a	defendant	against	a	plaintiff by counterclaim. Additionally,	t he Advisory	Committee’s	notes	accompanying M.R. Civ. P

. 80L	make	clear	that	the rules	governing	small	claims	appeals do	not	anticipate	counterclaims: Rule	 80L(d)(2)	limits	 the	 amount	 of	 judgment	 that	 may	 be	 entered	 to	 reflect	 the jurisdictional	limitations	of	the	Small	Claims	Act,	14	M.R.S.A.	§§	7481,	7482

. The	limit controls	regardless	of	the	size	of	the	jury’s	verdict. This	limit	is	imposed,	because to do	 otherwise	 would	 require	 that	 the	 defendant	 be	 allowed	 to	 amend	 to	 add counterclaims. M.R.	Civ.	P.	80L	Advisory	Committee’s	Notes	1986.10
14	M.R.S.	§	7485 (emphasis	added)

. [¶1 7 ]		Ring	is	correct	in	asserting	that	the	statute	plainly	bars	the	Distric t Court’s	finding	that	McGaw	was	at	fault	in	the	accident 7 from	being	res judicata in	“any other cause	of	action

. ” I d. (emphasis	added). In the	two cases	where	we have	addressed	this	section,	we	have	focused	on	the	“cause	of	action”	language,
and held	that	“the	doctrine	of	bar	and	merger	applies	to	section	7485,	and	.	.	.	a small	claims	judgment	does	bar	relitigation	of	the same cause	of	action	.	.	.	even when	different	relief	is	sought	and	different	theories	are	advanced.” Thibeault , 2007	 ME	 154, ¶	 7,	 938 A.2d	 27	 (citation	 omitted); see Caporino	 v.	 Lacasse , 511 A.2d	 445,	 447 (Me. 1986)	 (holding	 that	 the	 phrase	 “‘any	 other	 cause	 of action’	.	.	.	does	not	prevent	application	of	bar	and	merger	to	the	instant	case that	represents	the	identical	cause	o f	action	for	the	claimed	negligence	.	.	.	as did	the	prior	small	claims	proceeding”). [¶1 8 ] In	 both Thibeault and Caporino , however, the	 plaintiff	 in	 the subsequent civil case had	 also	 been	 the	 plaintiff	 in	 the earlier small	 claims
action , and	our analysis	was	narrowly	directed	to the	question	of	whether	the

7 Although	the	District	Court’s	small	claims	notice	of	judgment	does	not	contain	an	express	finding that	McGaw was	wholly	 at	 fault	in	 the	 accident,	 the	 court	 necessarily	made	 that	 finding	when	it awarded	Leighton	the	entire	amount	he	 requested	after	claiming	that	McGaw	 “negligently	caused [the]	automobile	accident.”11 second case	was	based	on	the	same	cause	of action. Thibeault ,	2007 ME	154, ¶ ¶	4,	8,	938	A.2d	27 ; Caporino ,	511 A.2d	at 44 6

- 4 7

. 8 Here,	Ring

— the plaintiff
in	the	second	case

— was	not	the	plainti ff,	or	even	a	party,	in	the	small	claims
action. We	have	not	had	occasion	to	c onstrue	14 M.R.S.	§	7485 in	a	case	where a	small	claims	judgment	is	asserted	as	a	bar	against	a	small	claims defendant , let	alone	a nonparty who	was at	most	in	privity	with	the defendant. 9 [¶1 9 ] In	 this	 case	 of	 first	 impression we	 address	 section	 7485	 in	 the context	 of	 (1)	 a	 nonparty	 who	 would,	 at	 most,	 be	 deemed	 a	 privy	 to	 the defendant	 in	 the	 small	 claims	 case;	 (2)	 the	 existence	 of potential damages claimed	 by	 that	 party	 that would	 exceed	 the	jurisdictional	limit	 of	 the	 small claims	court;	and	(3)	distinctions	between	court rules governing small	claims

case s in	 the	 District	 Court and civil	 suit s to	 which	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Civil Procedure	apply

.

8 In Thibeault ,	the	initial	small	claims	action brought	by	Thibeault	sought	the	return	of	certain items	of	personal	property	claimed	to	be	in	the	defendant’s	possession. Thibeault ,	2007 ME	154,	¶	4, 938	A.2d	27.		The	subsequent	action,	filed	in	Superior	Court	by	Thibeault,	alleged	breach	of	contract and	unjust	enrichment	arising	out	of	her	claimed	improvements	to	real	estate. Id. We	concluded	that the	 two	 matters	 did	 not	 involve	 the	 sam e	 cause	 of	 action	 and	 14	 M.R.S.	 §	 7485	 prevented	 the application	of	the	doctrine	of	bar	and	merger. Id. ¶¶	7

- 8.		By	contrast,	in Caporino both	the	small claims	 action,	 in	 which	 Caporino	 recovered	 a	 judgment	 of	 $163.95,	 and	 a	 subsequent	 action	 in District Court	involved	identical	claims	for	injuries	sustained	by	Caporino	on	premises	owned	by	the defendant. Caporino ,	 511	 A.2d	 at	 446

- 47.	 	 We	 thus	 concluded	 that	 section	 7485	 allowed	 the application	of	bar	and	merger	and	that	Caporino’s	second	suit	was	barred. Id. at	447

- 48.

9 The	question	of	whether	Ring	was	McGaw’s	privy	in	the	District	Court	is	contested	by	the	parties; for	purposes	of	this	opinion,	we	assume

— without	deciding

— that	Ring	was	McGaw’s	privy.12 [¶ 20 ] As	 noted	 above,	 s mall claims	 judgment s result	 from	 special proceeding s governed	 by	 unique	 rules	 and	 procedures	 and are subject	 to	 a strict	statutory	limitation	on	recoverable	damages.		Here,	Leighton	made	 the choice	to	pursue	a	small	claim	solely	against	McGaw	in	the	District	C ourt.		He could	have	chosen	a	different	forum,	or	joined	Ring	as	a	defendant	in	the	small claims	 action	 if	 he	 believed,	 as	 he	 attempted	 to	 establish	 in	 the	 summary judgment	 record,	 that	 McGaw	 was	 acting	 as	 Ring’s	 agent	 or	 employee. See M.R.S.C.P.	3(e);	14 M.R.S.	§ 7481	(stating	that	a	small	claims	proceeding	is	“an alternative,	not	an	exclusive,	proceeding”). [¶ 2 1 ] Once	Leighton	chose	his	forum	and	his	defendant, even if	Ring	had sought	 to	intervene	in	 the	 small	 claims	 proceeding	 to	 protect	 his	 own	 claim against	 Leighton , neither	 the	 Small	 Claims	 Act	 nor	 the	 small	 claims	 rules provide	a	basis	for	doing	so

. 10 More	importantly,	if	Ring	were	able	to intervene

10 The	small	claims	statutes	make	no	provision	for an	interested	party	to	intervene. See 14 M.R.S. §§ 7481

- 7487 (2017)

. As	for	the	Maine	Rules	of	Small	Claims	P rocedure , Rule	3(e) provides : Joinder	of	Parties. Persons may	join	as	plaintiffs	or	be	joined	as	defendants	in	one small	claims	action	if	 the	claims	asserted	by	or	against	each	arise	out	of	 the	same transaction,	occurrence,	or	series	of	transactions	or	occurrences	and	if	any	quest ion of	law	or	fact	common	to	all of	these	persons	will	arise	in	the	action. The	specific	use	of	the	active	voice	relating	to joining as	plaintiffs	and	the	passive	voice	relating	to being joined as	defendants	suggests	that	a	party may join	as	a	plaintiff	as	a	matter	of	right,	but	can on ly be joined	as	a	defendant by an	existing	party. Furthermore,	contrary	to	Leighton’s	suggestion	at	oral	argument,	Ring	could	not	have appealed from	an	action	to	which	he	was	not	a	party. See M.R.S.C.P.	11(a)	(“an	aggrieved party may	appeal13 indirectly by	filing	a	separate	small	claim against	Leighton	that	could	be	joined with	 Leighton’s	 ac tion	 against	 McGaw, see M.R.S.C.P.	 6(c)(1) , as	 a	 practical matter	 his	 claim	 against	 Leighton	 would	 then have	 been adjudicated	 in	 an informal,	 nonjury	 hearing	 where	 the	 rules	 of	 evidence	 did	 not	 apply 11 and, significantly,	 his	 recoverable	 damages	 would have been limited	 by	 a	 $6,000 statutory	 cap.	 	 14 M.R.S.	 §	 7482;	 M.R.S.C.P.	 6(b).	 	 Ring would	 have	 lost	 his opportunity	 to choose	 his	 forum	 because	 a	 small	 claims	 action	 cannot	 be removed	 to	 the	 Superior	 Court. Ela	 v.	 Pelletier ,	 495	 A.2d	 1225,	 1227 (Me. 1985); see 14	M.R.S.	§	7481	(“The	District	Court	shall	have	jurisdiction	of small	 claims	 actions.”).	 	 Regardless	 of	 whether	 Ring	 sought	 to	 intervene	 in Leighton’s	action	against	McGaw	directly,	or	sought	to	intervene	indirectly	by having	his	own	small	claim	again st	Leighton	joined	with	Leighton’s	claim,	either alternative	 produces	 manifest	 injustice:	 Ring	 would	 be	 precluded	 from	 ever

from	a	judgme nt	of	the	District	Court	in	a	small	claims	action”	(emphasis	added));	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80L(e) ( “ [a] party entitled	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	Law	 Court	 from	 a	decision	 of	 the Superior	Court	may	 do	 so” (emphasis	added)).

11 We	note	that	t he	motion	practice	that	routinely	occurs	during	litigation	in	the	trial	courts	is	not consistent	with	the	Small	Claims	Act’s	objective	of	providing	simplicity	and	expediency, see 14 M.R.S. §	7481 ,	or	with	 the	 rules’	stated	objective that	 they be	 “construed to	secure	 the	just,	speedy,	and inexpensive	determination	of	every	action	in	a	simple	an d	informal	way.”		M.R.S.C.P.	1, 15

.14 seeking	 to	 recover	whatever	damages	he	may	 have	 suffered	in	 excess	 of	 the statutory	cap. 12 14 M.R.S.	§	7482;	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80L(d)(2). [¶ 22 ] Under	 these	 circumstances,	 Ring’s	 action	 against	 Leighton	 for damages	exceeding	the	small	claims	jurisdictional	limit,	for	which	he	could	not effectively	 intervene	 as	 a	 claimant	 against	 Leighton	 in	 small	 claims	 court, is within	the	scope	of	the phrase	“any	other	cause	of	action”	as	used	in	14 M.R.S. § 7485.		His	action	is	not	barred	by	the	doctrine	of	res judicata	or	the	language of	Section	7485. To the	extent	that Thibeault and Caporino suggest	otherwise, we	clarify	the	holdings	of	those	cases and	now	hold	that	14	M.R.S.	§	7485	does not	operate	to	bar	an	action	against	a	small	claims	plaintiff	by	a	nonparty	who was	at	most	in	privity	with	a	small	claims	court	defendant. [¶ 23 ] Because	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 Leighton	 was	 at	 fault	 in	 the acciden t	and	thereby	breached	a	duty	remains	a	genuine	issue	of	material	fact in	dispute,	Leighton	was	not	entitled	to	a	judgment	as	a	matter	of	law	on	Ring’s complaint	alleging	negligence.		M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(c); see	Estate of Frye ,	2018	ME	44, ¶	8,	182 A.3d 158.

12 Although	 the	 specific	 amount	 of	 Ring’s	 claimed	 damages	 does	 not	 appear	 in	 the	 summary judgment	 record,	in	 his	 opposition	 to	 the motion	 for	 summary	judgment	 Ring	 asserted	 that	 “the $6,000	jurisdictional	limit	.	.	.	is	far	below	what	Mr.	Ring	hopes	to	obtain	in	a	judgment.”15 [¶ 24 ] We	recognize	that in	this	case the small	claims	process	result s in Leighton	being	required	to	relitigate	liability	issues	previously	addressed	in	his earlier	small	claims	case	against	McGaw

— a	result	that ,	in	other	contexts, would ordinarily	be	precl uded	by	res	judicata	principles	if	Ring	were	found	to	be	in privity	 with	 McGaw. See	 Pushard ,	 2017 ME	 230,	 ¶¶ 19

- 20,	 175	 A.3d	 103. However, that	 said,	 Leighton	made	 the	 choice	 to	pursue	 a	 small	claim	 solely against	McGaw	in	small	claims	court.		Having	sou ght	the	benefits	of	the	small claims	process,	Leighton	is subject	to	the	limitations of	14	M.R.S.	§	7485. 13 The	entry	is: Judgment	 vacated;	 remanded	 to	 the Superior	 Court	 for	 further	 proceedings consistent	with	this	opinion.

___________________________ SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	with	whom	ALEXANDER,	J.,	joins	concurring. [¶ 25 ] We	 reluctantly	 concur,	 but	 we	 write	 separately	 to	 address	 the confusion	and	potential	inequities	that	today’s	opinion	exposes	regarding	small claims	 actions.	 	 The	 Court’s	 effort	 to	 parse	 through	 the	 thicket	 of	 the

13 We	expressly	limit	our	holding	to	the	facts	of	this	case,	where res	judicata has	been	asserted against	a	no nparty	to	the	small	claims	action	who	was	at	most	a	privy	of	the	defendant	in	that	matter. We	do	not	opine	upon	the	effect,	if	any,	of	section	7485	when	the	doctrine	of	res	judicata	has	been asserted	as	a	bar	to	a	subsequent	action	by	a	person	who	was	a	d efendant	in	an	earlier	small	claims action.16 intersecting	statutory	provisions	of	title 14,	chapter	738	of	the	Maine	Revised Statutes	is	laudable.		It	has,	however,	disclosed	a	latent	unfairness	to	Leighton created	by	the	design	of	the	small	claims	proceedings. [¶26] The	facts	are	simple	enough.		Leighton	suffered	property	damage
when	his	c ar	was	hit	by	a	car	that	was	driven	by	McGaw	and	owned	by	Ring. Leighton	 brought	 suit	 against	 McGaw	 in	 small	 claims	 court.	 	 The	 court adjudicated	 the	 issues	 presented

— who	 was	 negligent	 and	 what	 were	 the damages

— and	Leighton	was	awarded	a	judgment	of	just less	than	$4,000.		Ring was	 present,	 aware	 of,	 and	 active	 in	 the	 case.	 	 The	 damages	 were	 paid,	 and Leighton	went	on	with	life. [¶27]		Unfortunately,	given	results	of	the	current	statutory	small	claims process,	 Leighton	 now	 finds	himself	in	 Superior	Court, this	 time	 facing	Ring, again	 to	resolve	 the	same	dispute	adjudicated	in	 the	small	claims	case

— who was	negligent	and	what	were	the	damages.		The	small	claims	decision	will	not be	admissible	in	the	case,	and	there	is	no	cap	on	the	damages	that	Leighton	may

n ow	be	required	 to	pay	Ring	if	a	different	 fact

- finder	concludes

— contrary	 to the	 small	 claims	 judge’s	 finding

— that	 it	 was	 Leighton	 who	 was	 at	 fault,	 not
McGaw.17 [¶28]	 	 The	 small	 claims	 statutes,	 in	 effect	 for	 several	 decades, 14 have rarely	 been	 challenged	 in an	 appellate	 context,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 odd circumstance	that	Leighton	finds	himself	in	has	not	been	previously	addressed by	 the	Court.		We	are	 forced	by	 the	language	 of	 the	 statute	 to	agree	 that	 the
Court	 has	 done	 the	 best	 that	 it	 can.	 	 The	 Court’s	 ho lding,	 however,	 is	 cold comfort	to	Leighton	who	believed	that	he	had	resolved	the	matter	in	the	small claims	proceeding.		Moreover,	the	Court’s	analysis	has	exposed	additional	traps for	the	unwary. 15 [¶29]		Therefore,	while	we	cannot	conclude	that	claim	pre clusion	applies to	 small	 claims	 actions	 to	 bar	 a	 subsequent	 suit	 brought	 in	 the	 District	 or Superior	Court	by	 a	person	who	was	not	an	 actual	party	 to	 the	 small	claims action,	we	can	say	that	the	unfairness	of	this	situation

— the	cost	of	the	second suit	brou ght	by	Ring	and	the	second	adjudication	of	exactly	the	same	action

—

14 See P.L.	1981,	ch.	667	(effective	Nov.	1,	1982).

15 The	small	claims	statutes	appear	to	be	additionally	flawed	in	that	they	seem	to	restrict	the	small claims	defendant’s	right	to	a	jury	 trial;	a	preliminary	review	of	 the	statutory	restrictions	indicates that	a	small	claims	defendant’s	jury	trial	right	on appeal	from	that	small	claims	judgment would	be limited	by	the	statutory	cap	of	$6,000	 for	damages,	s ee 14	M.R.S.	§	7482	(2017),	a	restriction	that does	 not	apply	 to	Ring	in	 this	 suit.	 	 Thus,	 although	it	is	likely	 unintended	 by	 the	 Legislature,	 the current statutory	 provision	 may	 encourage	 a	 race	 to	 the	 small	 claims	 courtroom	 that	 could, potentially	in	violation	of	the	constitution,	eliminate	a	party’s	right	to	a	previously	available	jury	trial seeking	 reasonable	 damages.	 	 The	 potential	 confusion	 and	 loss	 o f	 rights	 should	 encourage	 the Legislature	to	clarify	the	small	claims	statutes.18 should	 encourage	 the	 Legislature	 to	 review	 and	 amend	 the	 small	 claims statutes	to	avoid	further,	duplicative	adjudication	of	the	same	issue. [¶30]	 	 Small	 claims	 proceedings	 were	 created	 “fo r	 the	 purpose	 of providing	a	simple,	speedy	and	informal	court	procedure	for	the	resolution	of small	claims.”		Court’s	Opinion	¶	11	(quoting	14	M.R.S.	§	7481).		By	allowing Leighton	to	be	subjected	to	a	complete	and	unrestricted	re

- adjudication	of	the
dete rmination	 of	 negligence	 and	 damages,	 the	 statutes’	 procedures	 directly conflict	with	the	Legislature’s	goal	regarding	small	claims	actions.		We	urge	a thorough	review	of	the	small	claims	statutes.

Zachary	 J.	 Smith,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Lawsmith	 Legal	 Servi ces,	 LLC,	 Bangor,	 for appellant	Eric	Ring Thomas	 G.	 Mundhenk,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Mundhenk	 &	 Bell,	 LLC,	 Portland,	 for appellee	Daniel	Leighton

Penobscot	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV

- 2017

- 06 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY