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[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 68 (Wednesday, April 26, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5726-S5728]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. McCAIN (for himself and Mr. Lieberman):
  S. 726. A bill to amend the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 
1992 to revise the sanctions applicable to violations of that Act, and 
for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

           the iran-iraq arms nonproliferation amendments act

 Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, 4 years after the defeat of Iraq in 
the Persian Gulf war, Iran has emerged as a growing threat to the 
region. Bellicose statements are issued regularly from Tehran regarding 
the foreign presence in the Persian Gulf. More importantly, this 
rhetoric has been accompanied by disturbing reports of new arms 
shipments to Iran and the deployment of weapons which pose a direct 
threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf.
  Today, Senator Lieberman and I are introducing legislation to assist 
the President in his efforts to deal with this situation. The 1992 
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, which I cosponsored with then-
Senator Gore, established sanctions against third parties which assist 
Iran and Iraq in their efforts to rebuild their weapons capabilities. 
It was a start, but it did not go far enough. Efforts by Senator 
Lieberman and I last year to expand the legislation were unsuccessful.
  The 1992 bill was intended to target not only the acquisition of 
conventional weapons, but weapons of mass destruction as well. In the 
process of amending the bill to the 1993 Defense Act, however, the 
explicit references to weapons of mass destruction were dropped.
  The bill we are introducing today attempts to make these applications 
absolutely clear. It also removes from the proposed sanctions 
exceptions for assistance under the Freedom Support Act, thereby 
removing the benefit of the doubt Congress may have given Russia in 
1992. As I will explain later in my statement, Russia has perhaps used 
this exception to the detriment of United States policy in the Persian 
Gulf.
  To the current list of sanctions against persons assisting Iran and 
Iraq in its weapons programs, which already include procurement and 
export sanctions, the amendments we are offering today add the denial 
of visas, denial of commercial credit, and denial of authority to ship 
products across United States territory. To the list of sanctions 
against countries offering similar assistance, the amendments add the 
denial of licenses for export of nuclear material, denial of foreign 
military sales, denial of the transfer of controlled technology, denial 
of the transfer of computer technology, suspension of the authority of 
foreign air carriers to fly to or from the United States, and a 
prohibition on vessels that enter the ports of sanctioned countries.
  The comprehensive international U.N.-mandated sanctions against Iraq 
make the invocation of sanctions against third party suppliers of Iraq 
unnecessary in the near future, unless of course, the embargo is 
violated or revoked. Presently, the more pressing need with regard to 
Iraq is for the international community to remain firm on the embargo.
  But given the history of the Iraqi military buildup before the gulf 
war, the sanctions included in the Iran-Iraq Act may, at a later date, 
be as important with regard to Iraq as they are currently in the case 
of Iran. Once the embargo is lifted, there will be a great temptation 
for cash-strapped economies to resume sales of military hardware to 
Iraq. Outside forces may once again be compelled to maintain a balance 
in the region through arms sales and a dangerous escalation of 
firepower.
  [[Page S5727]] Before Iraq's efforts to develop weapons of mass 
destruction were ended in the aftermath of the gulf war, it had made 
substantial progress. Iraq had several workable nuclear weapon designs, 
many key components, a multibillion dollar nuclear manufacturing base 
and a global supply network able to exploit lax Western export 
controls. Its Western-trained scientists had produced small amounts of 
weapons grade plutonium and enriched uranium. Even today, despite our 
best efforts, Iraq maintains the equipment and expertise that may 
permit it to resume its pursuit of a nuclear weapon once the embargo is 
lifted.
  Saddam Hussein's efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons 
capabilities are also well known and, as with its nuclear program, 
there is some lingering concern about whether Iraq retains a capacity 
to produce these weapons.
  The Congressional Research Service did two illuminating studies 2 
years ago on the sources of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
programs. The list of Iraq's nuclear suppliers included 3 French firms, 
11 German firms, 2 Italian firms, 2 Swedish firms, 4 Swiss firms, 4 
British firms, and 2 Russian firms. The list of Iraq's chemical weapons 
suppliers included 7 Austrian firms, 2 Belgian firms, 2 French firms, 
34 German firms, 3 Dutch firms, 3 Italian firms, 1 Spanish firm, 3 
Swiss firms, and 1 British firm.
  This is all in the past now. But we should take note that so many 
corporations displayed an interest in supplying Iraq without regard to 
the consequences. These corporations must be confronted with 
disincentives in order to keep them from once again serving as Saddam's 
supplier base.
  It is also vitally important to prevent the reemergence of an Iraqi 
conventional military threat. One need only to observe the origins of 
the weapons which constituted the Iraqi threat in 1990 to know that the 
key to any postembargo containment strategy will depend on our ability 
to influence Iraq's trading partners in Europe, Russia, the People's 
Republic of China, and North Korea.
  It is my hope and intention that the sanctions detailed in this 
legislation help us exercise the influence necessary to prevent another 
dangerous arms buildup in Iraq.
  The threat from Iran is more immediate. Recent reports indicate a 
substantial increase in the Iranian military presence in the Persian 
Gulf. In addition to Silkworm missiles and two Russian-built 
submarines, Iran has deployed on the islands, it controls in the 
Straits of Hormuz thousands of additional troops, surface-to-air 
missiles, and artillery. These reports are particularly disturbing in 
that they are a part of a well-established pattern. Iran is importing 
hundreds of North Korean-made Scud-C missiles. It is expected to 
acquire the Nodong North Korean missiles currently under development; 
and it is reportedly assembling its own shorter-range missiles.
  In the course of preparing this legislation, I asked the 
Congressional Research Service to compile a chronology of reported arms 
shipments to Iran since the passage of the original Iran-Iraq bill in 
1992. The record is quite disturbing. I ask unanimous consent that the 
chronology be inserted into the Record following my remarks.
  Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons are public and well 
established. Successive CIA Directors, and Secretaries Perry and 
Christopher have all testified to the effect that Iran is engaged in an 
extensive effort to acquire nuclear weapons. In February, Russia signed 
an agreement to provide Iran with a 1,000-megawatt light water nuclear 
reactor. The Russians indicate that they may soon agree to build as 
many as three more reactors--another 1,000-megawatt reactor, and two 
440-megawatt reactors.
  I have raised my concerns regarding this sale with the administration 
on a number of occasions. I have maintained that under the Freedom 
Support Act of 1992, which the Iran-Iraq Act of 1992 was intended to 
reinforce, the President must either terminate assistance to Russia or 
formally waive the requirement to invoke sanctions out of concern for 
the national interest.
  The State Department informed me in a letter dated April 21, 1995, 
that ``to the best of its knowledge, Russia has not actually 
transferred relevant material, equipment, or technology to Iran,'' and 
so there is no need to consider sanctions. I was further informed that 
``they are examining the scope of the proposed Russian nuclear 
cooperation with Iran, and as appropriate, they will thoroughly 
evaluate the applicability of sanctions,'' presumably, if at a later 
date they can confirm the transfer.
  I have no reason to question the State Department's evaluation of the 
facts on the ground. However, I would note that there have been public 
reports of as many as 150 Russians employed at the site of the proposed 
reactor. There seems to be a dangerously fine line in determining when 
material, equipment, or technology useful in the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons has actually been transferred, especially when, as is the case 
with Iran, the reactor may already be partially complete.
  At what point in the construction of the reactors does the transfer 
become significant? Do we allow the Russians to build portions of the 
reactor which do not strictly involve the transfer of dangerous 
equipment or technology while Iran obtains the most vital assistance 
from other sources? Although I cannot make this determination myself, 
common sense and an appropriate sense of caution would dictate that any 
assistance provided Iran in its efforts to acquire nuclear technology 
is significant. If the appropriate point to make this decision is not 
when technicians have been dispatched to the site and construction may 
have begun, I hope the administration can identify an equally obvious 
point at which the transfer has become the grounds for sanctions.
  More importantly perhaps, I would point out that although the 
administration may have technical grounds for arguing that it is not 
yet required to invoke sanctions, making a determination on the 
applicability of sanctions sooner, rather than later, would serve as 
necessary leverage in resolving the issue. My intention is not to gut 
United States assistance to Russia. It is to prevent Russia from 
providing Iran dangerous technology. Waiting to make a determination 
until the transfer is complete defeats the purpose of the sanctions.
  Ultimately, I fear that the reason the administration has not made a 
determination is that it does not want to jeopardize our relationship 
with Russia.
  Based on this assumption and anticipating that the State Department 
may at a later date find other ways to avoid compliance with the 
Freedom Support Act, the legislation we are introducing today makes the 
President's legal responsibility under the act more explicit.
  We sent our Armed Forces to war in the Persian Gulf once in this 
decade. They endured hardship to themselves and their families. Some 
will live with the injuries they incurred in service to our Nation for 
the rest of their lives. And as is the case with every war, some never 
returned. With the cooperation of our friends in Europe, whose own 
sacrifices to the effort to free Kuwait should not be forgotten, we 
must see that the service of these brave men and women was not in vain.
  Stability and security in the Persian Gulf is vital to the world 
economy and to our own national interests. Aggressors in the region 
should know that if we must, we will return to the Persian Gulf with 
the full force of Operation Desert Storm. At the same time, our friends 
and adversaries elsewhere in the world should understand that the 
United States will do everything in its power to preclude that 
necessity. It is my sincere hope that this legislation will serve as an 
indication of just how serious we are.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[[Page S5728]]

                                   Congressional Research Service,

                                      The Library of Congress,

                                   Washington, DC, March 30, 1995.
     To: Office of Senator John McCain, Attention: Walter Lohman.
     From: Kenneth Katzman, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and 
         Elizabeth Dunstan, Foreign Affairs and National Defense 
         Division.
     Subject: Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran.

       This memorandum responds to your request to provide an 
     unclassified chronology of reported weapons and technology 
     transfers or agreements to Iran. Please call 7-7612 if you 
     have any questions.

  Chronology of Weapons and Technology Transfers to Iran Using Press 
                     Reports: October 1992-Present

       10/8/92--The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
     reported that China would supply a nuclear reactor under 
     construction at Qazvin in northwestern Iran.
       10/24/92--An editorial in the Washington Times reported 
     Iran bought Sukhoi-24 light bombers from Russia and three 
     diesel submarines, for $750 million per submarine. Most other 
     sources cite a figure of $450 million a piece. Also, F-7 jet 
     fighters were purchased from China. China reportedly agreed 
     on September 10, 1992 to sell Iran a large nuclear reactor.
       11/21/92--According to Defense Weekly, Russia delivered to 
     Iran the first Kilo class submarine with a surface to air 
     missile capacity in the form of manportable SA-14 Gremlin or 
     SA-16 Gimlet.
       2/10/93--According to the Jerusalem Israel Television 
     Network, Iran recently took delivery of some Scud-C surface 
     to air missiles with a range of about 500 km, as well as a 
     number of launching pods, in accordance with a deal signed 
     with North Korea. These are in addition to about 250 Scud 
     missiles supplied to Iran before the Gulf War.
       2/17/93--According to the U.S. Director of Naval 
     Intelligence Iran has been negotiating for the purpose of 
     five mini-submarines from an unspecified source to augment 
     its Kilo submarines.
       4/8/93--According to the New York Times, Iran was close to 
     concluding a deal with North Korea to buy a new intermediate-
     range missile that the Koreans are developing. (The missile, 
     called Nodong I, is said to have a range of 600 miles, 
     although an extended range version may be able to reach up to 
     about 800 miles).
       5/11/93--Iran has taken delivery of eight supersonic, sea-
     skimming cruise missiles from the Ukraine, according to the 
     Washington Times. The Sunburst missiles, to be based in the 
     Strait of Hormuz, have reportedly been bought as part of a 
     $1.5 billion barter agreement between Tehran, Moscow, and 
     Kiev. Also included in the reported deal are 50 MiG-29, and 
     other combat aircraft, more than 200 T-72M1 battle tanks and 
     S-300 air defense system missiles.
       8/8/93--Iran took delivery of its second Russian made Kilo-
     class submarine.
       1/17/94--Defense News reported that Iran was negotiating 
     with China to purchase a rocket-propelled mine called the 
     EM52 that is planted on the sea floor until it detects a 
     target. The report added that Iran had purchased 1,000 modern 
     mines from Russia, including those that detect approaching 
     ships with magnetic, acoustic, and pressure sensors.
       3/28/94--China's Xian Aircraft Corporation will fly its 
     Jian Hong-7 bomber on March 28, 1994, to Iran for a series of 
     flight demonstrations, according to a Chinese defense 
     industry source.
       5/7/94--Iran will take delivery of its third Kilo-class 
     diesel-electric submarine within five months, according to 
     Jane's Defense Weekly. Iran reportedly bought an estimated 
     1,800 mines of various types from Russia when it received its 
     first ``Kilo'' in November 1992.
       9/19/94--Iran has acquired four or five fast attack missile 
     (FACM) boats from China, according to US Vice Admiral Douglas 
     Katz. The Hegu class vessel is 68 tons and is capable of 
     being armed with C-801 and C-802 surface-to-surface missiles 
     (Delivery of the missiles has not been confirmed).
       9/26/94--Director of Central Intelligence James R. Woosley 
     said Iran had acquired MiG29's, Su 24's, and T-72 tanks, as 
     well as two Kilo-class attack submarines, from Russia. He 
     added that Iran had turned to suppliers in ``both East and 
     West,'' using intermediaries to purchase military technology 
     clandestinely.
       9/27/94--A senior U.S. official reportedly said in the 
     Washington Post that Russia has given Iran sophisticated 
     aircraft missiles to go along with the jets it sold to Iran.
       12/14/94--Iran is trying to buy weapons technology in 
     Germany for use in building Scud missiles, according to 
     Reuters. In October 1994, the International Institute for 
     Strategic Studies said Tehran had obtained 20 Chinese CSS-8 
     surface-to-surface missiles, armed with conventional weapons.
       1/5/95--The New York Times reported that Russia had entered 
     into a deal with Iran to provide up to four nuclear power 
     reactors at the Bushehr nuclear reactor complex, a deal 
     valued at nearly $1 billion. Later reports said the first 
     reactor would be a water-pressurized reactor with a capacity 
     of 1,000 megawatts. Russia might construct an additional 
     1,000 megawatt reactor and 2,440 megawatt reactors under the 
     deal. The deal, formally announced January 8, 1995, also 
     provides for Russia to train Iranian nuclear scientists and 
     possibly provide research reactors as well. Russia reportedly 
     is also required to recycle nuclear fuel for Iran. The New 
     York Times report added that China has sold Iran two similar 
     reactors and has provided two research reactors, but that 
     those projects have been delayed. China reportedly has also 
     sold several calutrons-magnetic isotope separation devices 
     that can be used to derive uranium for an atomic bomb. In 
     addition, according to the Times, China was setting up an 
     assembly plant in Iran to produce intermediate range 
     ballistic missiles (M-9's and M-11's).
       1/30/95--The Washington Times reported that Iran has 
     secured the aid of Indian companies in the construction of a 
     poison-gas complex, according to a classified German 
     intelligence report. The Indian companies have told 
     authorities in Europe and elsewhere that they are engaged in 
     building a pesticide factory just outside Tehran.
       2/1/95--Belgian officials impounded a Russian-built surface 
     to air missile bound for Iraq, according to the Washington 
     Times.
       3/2/95--The Associated Press said Israel had claimed Iran 
     signed a contract with Argentina to buy fuel rods for 
     reactors and then negotiated over the purchase of heavy 
     water, considered essential for a nuclear weapons program. 
     The report did not make clear whether or not the United 
     States had succeeded in blocking the deal.
       3/15/95--The New York Times reported that Iran had 
     developed a vast network in Europe, Russia, and the Central 
     Asian Republics to smuggle to Iran weapons parts and nuclear 
     technology.
       3/17/95--Poland announced that it will honor any existing 
     contracts to supply tanks to Iran. Poland did not reveal the 
     details of any tank sale to Iran, however.
       4/3/95--The New York Times reported that the United States 
     had provided intelligence to Russia about Iran's nuclear 
     program, as part of any effort to dissuade Russia from 
     providing nuclear technology to Iran. The intelligence 
     reportedly showed that Iran is importing equipment needed to 
     import nuclear weapons, that it has sought to but enriched 
     uranium from former Soviet republics, such as Kazakistan, and 
     that it is using many of the same smuggling techniques and 
     routes that Iraq and Pakistan used in their efforts to 
     acquire nuclear technology. Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the original 
Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act, I am pleased to join Senator McCain as 
well in this amendment to the 1992 act. Regrettably, Iran and Iraq have 
become no more law abiding during the past 2 years than they were when 
this law was first enacted. On the contrary, Iraq has attempted by 
persuasion or force to get the international community to lift economic 
sanctions while preserving as much as possible its catastrophic weapons 
capability. Iran, meanwhile, has continued its support for 
international terrorism.
  The United States must remain vigilant in its effort to inhibit the 
destructive capability of these two renegade states. We must do 
everything we can to prevent them from receiving assistance from any 
source to pursue international lawlessness.
  I believe this amendment will strengthen the current legislation and 
send a strong signal both to the renegade states and to other states 
which trade with Iran and Iraq that the United States remains committed 
to tight economic sanctions. There will be consequences for those who 
trade in embargoed goods with Iran and Iraq, just as there will be 
consequences for us all if renegade states are able to pursue their 
destructive objectives without hindrance. I urge my colleagues to join 
us in supporting this amendment to strengthen Iran-Iraq 
sanctions.

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