United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-1045 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

NICHOLAS WEBSTER, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE 

[Hon. George Z. Singal, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

 Torruella and Barron, Circuit Judges. 

Sarah A. Churchill and Nichols & Webb, P.A., on brief for 

appellant. 

Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, and 

Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, on brief for 

appellee. 

April 13, 2016 
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This case concerns whether 

the district court abused its discretion when it imposed sex 

offender treatment on Nicholas Webster ("Webster") as a condition 

of supervised release. Webster was convicted of attempted gross 

sexual assault and solicitation of a child by computer in Maine 

state court in 2007. He was subsequently convicted for failing 

to register as a sex offender in Maine and New Hampshire state 

courts. 

In 2012, Webster pleaded guilty to charges in the United 

States District Court for the District of New Hampshire stemming 

from his failure to register as a sex offender, as required by the 

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), 18 

U.S.C. § 2250(a), after moving from Maine to New Hampshire. 

In 2014, Webster pleaded guilty in the United States 

District Court for the District of Maine to violating the 

conditions of supervised release that were imposed on him due to 

his SORNA violation. Namely, Webster pleaded guilty to: (1) 

failing to stop for a police officer; (2) driving to endanger; (3) 

criminal mischief; (4) operating under the influence of alcohol; 

(5) driving without a license; and (6) consumption of an unknown 

quantity of alcoholic beverages. The district court sentenced him 

to eleven months of incarceration and a supervised release term of 

120 months, subject to a number of conditions. These included 
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that Webster participate in sex offender treatment and undergo 

random periodic polygraph exams if required by the therapeutic 

program. He appeals the sex offender and polygraph conditions 

imposed. 

I. 

In 2007, Webster was convicted of attempted gross sexual 

assault and solicitation of a child by computer in Cumberland 

County Superior Court in Maine. Specifically, he was found guilty 

of arranging a meeting with a thirteen-year-old female in order to 

engage in sexual acts.1 During the course of the conversation 

between Webster and the individual posing as an underage female, 

Webster provided sexually explicit descriptions of his own 

anatomy, and informed the minor that he could "teach her how to 

please a man." Police arrested Webster as he drove to meet the 

underage female at a prearranged meeting place. 

Webster was sentenced to a term of five years 

imprisonment, with all but fifteen months suspended, to be followed 

by a probation term of three years. Webster was also required to 

register as a sex offender.

 

1 The record reveals that Webster was in fact communicating with 

an individual working for Perverted Justice, an organization 

devoted to catching sex offenders online, who was posing as a 

thirteen-year-old child.
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After completing his incarceration, Webster's probation 

was revoked on two separate occasions in Maine state court.2 

Webster's second probation revocation was due in part to his 

failure to register as a sex offender with the Maine Sex Offender 

Registry. Additionally, Webster was convicted of failing to 

register as a sex offender in the state of New Hampshire. In 

addition to his state convictions for failing to register as a sex 

offender, Webster has a 1998 state conviction for Reckless Conduct, 

which involved domestic violence, various motor vehicle offenses, 

and multiple counts of Burglary and Theft by Unauthorized Taking. 

On December 12, 2012, a federal grand jury returned a 

one-count indictment against Webster, charging him with traveling 

in interstate commerce while knowingly failing to register as a 

sex offender in the state of New Hampshire, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2250(a). On June 25, 2013, Webster pleaded guilty to one 

count of failure to register as a sex offender, and was sentenced 

 

2 Three parole revocation petitions were filed in Maine state 

court. However, his second and third revocation petitions were 

adjudicated together. Webster's second revocation petition 

alleged that he failed to notify the Maine Sex Offender Registry 

of a change of address, which led to him being charged with a new 

offense. The second revocation petition also alleged that Webster 

changed his address without permission, failed to report as 

directed, and failed to undergo sex offender treatment. His third 

revocation petition alleged that Webster committed theft, failed 

to identify himself as a probationer to law enforcement, provided 

a false name to a police officer, and failed to refrain from the 

use or possession of marijuana. 
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to 18 months imprisonment and 15 years of supervised release. The 

district court recommended that he participate in sex offender 

treatment during his incarceration, but did not mandate sex 

offender treatment as a supervised release condition. 

On March 7, 2014, Webster was released from custody and 

began serving his term of supervised release. On April 2, 2014, 

the District of Maine assumed supervision of Webster's terms of 

release.3

On April 5, 2014, a Maine State Police trooper pulled 

Webster over for travelling at seventy-four miles per hour in a 

fifty-five mile per hour zone. The trooper stepped out of his 

cruiser and, as he approached the rear side door of the vehicle, 

Webster drove away. Following a brief chase, the trooper found 

the vehicle with two female passengers inside, who informed the 

officer that the driver had absconded on foot. Another officer 

subsequently apprehended Webster who "smelled of alcohol" and had 

"glassy and bloodshot" eyes. Although one of the passengers 

attested to Webster's alcohol consumption, Webster did not consent 

to a breathalyzer test. 

Thereafter, on April 7, 2014, the United States 

Probation Office filed a Petition for Warrant or Summons for 

 

3 Previously, the United States District Court for the District 

of New Hampshire had jurisdiction over Webster's supervision. 
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Offender Under Supervision alleging six parole violations. 

Specifically, the petition adduced that Webster violated the 

following conditions of supervision: (1) eluding an officer;4 (2) 

driving to endanger; (3) criminal mischief; (4) operating a vehicle 

under the influence of alcohol; (5) driving without a license; and 

(6) consuming an unknown quantity of alcoholic beverages.

The district court conducted a revocation hearing on 

December 19, 2014. At the start of the hearing, Webster admitted 

that he committed all six violations. Probation Officer Kristin 

Cook5 testified that sex offender treatment is generally not 

imposed as a release condition in the District of New Hampshire. 

However, "[e]very case that has a prior sex offense or is convicted 

of failure to register" in the District of Maine is ordered to 

undergo sex offender treatment as a condition of release. The 

treatment includes a psychosexual assessment, as well as a 

polygraph exam. Ms. Cook added that, without the polygraph, 

probation officers would be forced to take sex offenders on their 

word.

 

4 The charge for eluding an officer was later re-filed as failure 

to stop for a police officer.

5 The transcript of the proceedings incorrectly refers to the 

Probation officer as "Crystal Cook," however, her name is Kristin 

Cook. 
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Webster retained Dr. Peter Donnelly ("Dr. Donnelly"),6

a psychologist, to perform competency and criminal responsibility 

evaluations, as well as a psychosexual risk assessment. 

Dr. Donnelly diagnosed Webster with schizoaffective disorder, a 

serious mental illness. Further, Dr. Donnelly testified that 

Webster's responses to his questions failed to correlate to those 

of "known child molesters or known rapists." In Dr. Donnelly's 

view, Webster's sexual deviance was subsequent to Webster's 

primary issues of mental health and substance abuse. However, 

Dr. Donnelly noted that Webster can "fall into criminal problems" 

including sexual offenses when he is engaging in substance abuse 

or not properly managing his mental illness. Dr. Donnelly's 

written report did not address whether sex offender treatment would 

be beneficial. Nonetheless, Dr. Donnelly conceded that Webster 

could benefit from sex offender treatment in his testimony. 

 

6 We note that Dr. Donnelly also evaluated Webster in 2007 in 

relation to the sex offense charges brought against him in Maine 

state court. In his 2007 report, Dr. Donnelly noted that Webster 

acknowledged committing a sex offense and that Webster endorsed 

the position that his sex offense "happened because [he] knew the 

person already had sexual experience and they wanted it" and that 

his "sexual offense happened because of stress in [his] life." 

Webster also admitted to "some sex play between [himself] and the 

person who accused [him] but the truth is the person invited it 

and wanted it." As part of his recommendations, Dr. Donnelly 

noted that therapeutic efforts will need to be tailored to ensure 

that Webster achieves greater self-awareness "of how he could have 

made himself vulnerable to committing a sex-related crime."
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Although Dr. Donnelly initially questioned the effectiveness of 

polygraph exams, he ultimately acknowledged their helpfulness. 

During his allocution, Webster sought to explain his 

previous transgressions. He told the court that he was undergoing 

a "dark period" in December of 2006 due to his divorce and engaging 

in alcohol abuse. He admitted to inappropriate sexual behavior 

in his past, but claimed that it did not involve minors. According 

to Webster, the person he spoke with online in 2007 did not have 

an age profile and he did not "remember all of the circumstances" 

regarding what transpired. Webster also denied that he was 

driving to meet the purported minor with whom he was chatting 

online. Instead, he was driving to meet adults whom he also had 

met online. 

Webster also sought to explain why he failed to register 

with the Maine sexual offender registry. In his view, he did not 

blatantly refuse to register or attend treatment, but did so as a 

result of his circumstances. He told the court that he was living 

with his father at the time and the police told him to leave after 

his father assaulted him. Instead of going home, Webster "ended 

up [. . .] with friends that were not right."

Webster also told the court that he did not maliciously 

break the law during his most recent supervised release violation 

because he thought he had a valid driver's license. Finally, 
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Webster expressed that he felt that sex offender treatment was 

"counterproductive," because in his view his principal issues are 

substance abuse and depression. 

After listening to witness testimony and Webster's 

allocution, the district court sentenced Webster to eleven months 

imprisonment and a 120-month period of supervised release. In 

addition, the district court ordered Webster to undergo sex 

offender treatment and periodic polygraph examinations, if 

required by the therapeutic program, as conditions of his 

supervised release.

The district court ably explained that sex offender 

treatment and polygraph examinations were necessary in light of: 

(1) Webster's self-medication and mental health issues; (2) the 

court's understanding that Webster had not been forthright; (3) 

Webster's statement to Dr. Donnelly that he thought he was chatting 

with a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old girl and "was doing a quick 

two-step with regard to when he was arrested and how he was 

arrested;"(4) the fact that Webster's sex offense conviction is at 

odds with Webster's statement to Dr. Donnelly that he never had 

sexual interest in a child or engaged in deviant sexual behavior; 

(5) Dr. Donnelly's statement that sex offender treatment could be 

beneficial; (6) sex offender treatment had been previously ordered 

by the Maine state court; and (7) the court's concern that 
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Webster's refusal to register as a sex offender could indicate 

that Webster sought to deny or rationalize his past sexual 

misconduct. 

While the court noted that the scientific community is 

divided on the usefulness of polygraphs, the court found that its 

use is appropriate where a sex offender lacks candor. Given 

Webster's less than forthcoming allocution, the district court 

reasoned that the polygraph component was necessary.

II. 

We review challenges to conditions of supervised release 

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d 

71, 72 (1st Cir. 2013). 

"There are two basic kinds of supervised release 

conditions. The first kind are mandatory conditions. By 

operation of statute, mandatory conditions are automatically 

imposed in every case in which a defendant receives supervised 

release as part of his sentence." United States v. Medina, 779 

F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). The 

second kind are those special conditions imposed at the discretion 

of the court. Id. 

District courts enjoy "significant discretion to impose 

special conditions of supervised release." Id. However, district 
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courts may impose a special condition only if the court determines 

that the condition: 

(1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth 

in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), 

and (a)(2)(D); 

(2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than 

is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth 

in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and 

(a)(2)(D); and 

(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§] 994(a). 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 

Section 3553(a)(1) requires that the district court take 

account of "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant." District courts 

must also take account of the need "to afford adequate deterrence 

to criminal conduct," id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), "to protect the public 

from further crimes of the defendant," id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), and 

"to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 

treatment, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 

most effective manner," id. § 3553(a)(2)(D); see also Medina, 779 

F.3d at 60. Thus, district courts may impose a special condition 

only if the condition will further at least one of the goals of 

supervisory release, which include: (1) the need to protect the 

community; (2) deterrence; and (3) the effective educational, 

vocational, medical, or other correctional treatment of the 
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defendant. United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2004) 

(citing U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1)); see also Medina, 779 F.3d at 60-

61. 

"The critical test is whether the condition is 

reasonably related to one or more of the goals of supervised 

release." Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d at 74 (citing York, 357 F.3d at 

20). Importantly, sex offender treatment may be imposed in a case 

in which the underlying crime is not a sex offense. York, 357 

F.3d at 19-20. 

Webster contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by requiring that he participate in sex offender 

counseling and submit to polygraph testing as part of his 

supervised release.7 More specifically, Webster argues that the 

court imposed sex offender treatment on him as a matter of policy 

even though this condition is not reasonably related to the conduct 

that triggered his violation of supervised release. Secondly, 

Webster emphasizes that because his conviction for sexually 

 

7 Arguably, Webster waived his challenge to the polygraph testing 

condition by failing to develop his argument in his brief. To the 

extent that he is alleging that the polygraph condition is 

unreasonable, we discuss his objections to the polygraph testing 

condition in tandem with his objections to the imposed sex offender 

treatment. Nonetheless, we note that the district court tailored 

the polygraph condition to ensure the protection of Webster's Fifth 

Amendment rights, as well as any concern that violation proceedings 

may arise solely from Webster's failure to pass a polygraph exam. 

See York, 357 F.3d at 23-25. 
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deviant behavior took place in 2007, it is too remote in time to 

support the imposition of sex offender treatment or polygraph 

testing.8 Thus, Webster contends that the imposed conditions are 

not tailored to his particular history and characteristics. 

In Morales-Cruz, the defendant violated the conditions 

of his supervised release by failing to register as a sex offender 

as required by SORNA. The district court sentenced the defendant 

to 48 months of imprisonment and a ten-year term of supervised 

release, which included participation in sex offender treatment 

and/or mental health treatment programs. The majority upheld the 

imposition of sex offender treatment as a condition of supervised 

release even though the underlying sex offense was sixteen years 

old. According to the majority, the defendant's multiple 

convictions for failure to register as a sex offender in three 

different jurisdictions warranted the imposition of sex offender 

treatment because it permitted a reasonable inference that the 

defendant "presented a recidivism risk and warranted deterrent 

 

8 Webster cites the dissenting opinion in Morales-Cruz to support 

his argument that when the sexually offending behavior is 

temporally removed from the events that trigger the sentencing, a 

strong nexus between the need for sex offender treatment and the 

defendant's circumstances must be shown. 712 F.3d at 77 (Torruella, 

J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Dougan, 684 F.3d 1030, 

1036 (10th Cir. 2012)). Even under the dissent's reasoning, 

however, Webster's argument fails because the district court 

provided a sufficient nexus between Webster's characteristics and 

the need for sex offender treatment. 
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punishment." Id. at 75. The majority also noted that the 

defendant had a recent conviction for battery on the woman with 

whom he lived.9 Id. at 72. 

Unlike the defendant in Morales-Cruz, Webster did not 

violate his supervised release conditions because of a failure to 

 

9 As part of its analysis, the majority distinguished the 

defendant in Morales-Cruz from cases in our sister circuits in 

which supervised release conditions were reversed because the 

conditions were premised on behavior that was too remote to justify 

sex offender or mental health conditions. See United States v. 

Sharp, 469 F. App'x 523 (9th Cir. 2012)(sex offender conditions 

reversed where the sex offense was more than a decade old, the 

defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, no suggestion of prior sex offender registration 

convictions, and the district court failed to provide 

justification for the sex offender condition); United States v. 

Carter, 463 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2006)(sex offender conditions 

reversed where the defendant was convicted of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, the defendant's prior sex offense was 17 

years old); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 2001) 

(sex offender conditions reversed where the defendant was 

convicted of armed robbery and the sex offense was 15 years 

removed); United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 2000) 

(reversing mental health conditions because they were unrelated to 

the mail fraud conviction and there was no evidence in the record 

to suggest that mental health counseling would further the goals 

of deterrence or public protection); Dougan, 684 F.3d 1030 

(reversing imposed sex offender conditions because previous 

convictions for sexual battery took place 17 years prior); United 

States v. Rogers, 468 F. App'x 359 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) 

(reversing sex offender conditions because the sex offense was 

over twenty years old and there was no suggestion that the 

defendant had chronically failed to comply with sex offender 

registration requirements). 

 The majority emphasized that these cases were distinguishable 

because they did not involve a defendant with a recent conviction 

for domestic violence. Moreover, in four of the cases the 

challenged conditions "bore no relationship to the offense of 

conviction and the defendant's recent criminal history provided no 
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register under SORNA. Nor was Webster's supervised release 

violation a sexual offense. Nonetheless, we find that the 

district court sufficiently articulated the need for sex offender 

treatment and polygraph testing in this case. As mentioned 

earlier, the district court provided a detailed accounting as to 

why the imposed conditions were appropriate. 

In light of Dr. Donnelly's testimony and Webster's 

allocution, we find that the record supports that the sex offender 

treatment and polygraph conditions are in fact tailored to the 

nature and circumstances of Webster's sex offense and Webster's 

particular characteristics. Webster's refusal to accept 

responsibility for his sex offense, lack of candor towards the 

court, and continued self-medication pose a real risk of 

recidivism. See United States v. Roy, 438 F.3d 140, 143 (1st Cir. 

2006) (describing statement by a treatment counselor that with sex 

offenders, dishonesty is commonly a risk factor for recidivism). 

We have previously highlighted that sex offender treatment has 

been linked to reduced recidivism. See United States v. Mercado, 

777 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Morales–Cruz, 712 F.3d 

at 75; York, 357 F.3d at 21). Further, Dr. Donnelly's testimony 

linked Webster's mental illness and substance abuse to his sexual 

 

basis for the conditions." Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d at 75. 
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deviance. Thus, we conclude that the imposed conditions are 

reasonably related to Webster's offense and his characteristics. 

We also find that the imposed conditions are sufficiently related 

to the supervised release goals of rehabilitation and the need to 

protect the community. 

Webster's argument that his 2007 sex offense is too 

remote to be reasonably related to the imposition of sex offender 

treatment also fails. In Morales-Cruz, the majority affirmed the 

imposition of sex offender treatment when the underlying sex 

offense was sixteen years old. 712 F.3d at 72. We are well aware 

that "our sister circuits continue to take a dim view of equivalent 

sentencing conditions based on temporally remote sex offense 

convictions where there has been no subsequent similar conduct." 

United States v. Del Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d 48, 59 (1st Cir. 2015). 

The imposition of sex offender conditions is troubling when the 

underlying sex offense conviction is temporally remote. However, 

in this case, we find that the district court properly articulated 

the need for sex offender treatment in light of Webster's personal 

characteristics. As has been repeatedly mentioned throughout this 

opinion, the court found that Webster's lack of candor, denials of 

responsibility, continued self-medication, and the testimony from 

his own retained therapist necessitated the imposed conditions. 

Thus, even though Webster's underlying sex offense conviction 
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dates back to 2007, his history and characteristics support the 

district court's imposed conditions. Further, the record amply 

supports that Webster will likely benefit from sex offender 

treatment as part of his rehabilitation. Similarly, Webster's 

allocution indicates that his refusal to accept responsibility for 

his conduct and his continuing self-medication present a danger to 

the community. 

Because we find that the sex offender treatment and 

polygraph testing conditions were warranted by Webster's 

individual characteristics and that such conditions were also 

necessary to achieve the goals of supervised release, we conclude 

that affirmance is appropriate in this case. 

III. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's imposition 

of sex offender treatment and polygraph examination. 

Affirmed.