J-S07023-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JASON GORDON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 469 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 18, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000854-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 30, 2018

Jason Gordon appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas following a guilty plea. Gordon 

challenges the discretionary aspects of the trial court’s sentence. Additionally, 

Gordon’s counsel of record, John Belli, Esquire, has filed a petition to withdraw 

from representation and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We 

affirm the judgment of sentence and grant Attorney Belli permission to 

withdraw.

The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. In November 

2015, Gordon pled guilty to Aggravated Assault, Robbery, Kidnapping for 

Ransom, Conspiracy, and Possession of an Instrument of Crime. The trial court 

deferred sentencing to permit Gordon to aid the police in identifying his coconspirators in exchange for a reduced sentence. However, despite his stated 
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desire to do so, Gordon failed to cooperate with the police. Therefore, on 

August 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced Gordon to nine to twenty years’

imprisonment, followed by a ten-year term of probation. Immediately 

following sentencing, the trial court noted it would consider amending 

Gordon’s sentence if he provided the police with accurate information 

regarding the identity of his co-conspirators. 

Gordon filed a timely motion to reconsider his sentence. In his motion, 

Gordon alleged he had information that would lead to the apprehension of a 

co-conspirator. At a hearing on the motion, the detective assigned to Gordon’s 

case noted that even if Gordon were willing to identify a co-conspirator, they 

would not consider using any information provided by Gordon due to his 

history of providing the police with inaccurate information in this matter. 

Based upon this testimony, the trial court denied Gordon’s motion. This timely 

appeal follows. 

Prior to addressing the merits of Gordon’s appeal, we must first examine 

Attorney Belli’s request to withdraw. Attorney Belli has substantially complied 

with the mandated procedure for withdrawing as counsel. See Santiago, 978 

A.2d at 361 (articulating Anders requirements); Commonwealth v. 

Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010) (providing that counsel must 

inform client by letter of rights to proceed once counsel moves to withdraw 

and append a copy of the letter to the petition) (citation omitted). Gordon has 

not filed a response to counsel’s petition to withdraw.
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Counsel has identified one issue Gordon believes entitles him to relief. 

Namely, Gordon contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion to reconsider because Gordon met the trial court’s condition for 

reconsideration by providing information to the police. This raises a challenge 

to the discretionary aspects of sentencing. 

“A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be 

considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a 

claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under 

the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted; brackets in original).

Here, Gordon’s claim fails, as he did not present this court with a 

substantial question for our review. “A substantial question exists only when 

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 
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process.” Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]e cannot look beyond 

the statement of questions presented and the prefatory statement to 

determine whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v.

Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Gordon’s sole assertion is that his 

sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion due to the trial court’s failure to 

reduce his sentence based upon the information he provided to police. This, 

essentially, constitutes an argument that the trial court failed to adequately 

consider a mitigating factor. This argument does not raise a substantial 

question. See Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1266 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (en banc). Consequently, Gordon has failed to invoke our 

jurisdiction, and we cannot review the merits of his sentencing claim.1 See 

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170. 

After undertaking an independent review of the record, we concur with 

counsel’s assessment that the appeal is wholly frivolous. 

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1 We note that even if we had the authority to review Gordon’s claim, it would 

not succeed. Contrary to Gordon’s claim, the trial court did not promise to 

amend his sentence if he provided the police with information; rather the trial 

court noted that it would consider amending his sentence if Gordon aided the 

police. See N.T., Sentencing, 8/18/16, at 28-29. 

 It is clear from the hearing on Gordon’s motion that the trial court considered 

the information Gordon alleged he provided to the police. See generally N.T., 

Hearing, 12/15/16. Thus, any argument that the trial court did not consider 

Gordon’s efforts would be utterly without merit. 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/30/18