J-S59029-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.L., C.L., 

MINOR CHILDREN 

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: D.L., BIRTH FATHER : No. 727 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment entered April 15, 2015, 

Court of Common Pleas, Washington County, 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 63-OC-2013-1517 

and 63-OC-2013-1516 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.L., C.L., 

MINOR CHILDREN 

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: D.L., BIRTH FATHER : No. 728 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order April 15, 2015, 

Court of Common Pleas, Washington County, 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 63-OC-2013-1516 

and 63-OC-2013-1517 

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and FITZGERALD*, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 

 Appellant, D.L. (“Father”), appeals from the order of the trial court 

terminating his parental rights to his two children, C.L. (born June 12, 2010) 

and Ch.L. (born September 14, 2011) (together, the “Children”). For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the petition to 

terminate parental rights filed by the Washington County Children and Youth 

Services Agency (“CYS”). 
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In its written opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Appellate Procedure, the trial court set forth the following facts 

relevant to Father’s appeal: 

The Father is [] from Lakeland, Florida. The Father 

testified that he moved to Washington County in 

2009. (T.T. 11/5/14, P. 63) However, Dr. Lee 

reported in his evaluation of the Father that he 

reviewed records from an inpatient hospitalization of 

Father in Washington Hospital in 2003. (Exhibit 1, P. 

3) The Mother and Father are not married. (T.T. 

11/5/14, P. 27) The Father is married but separated 

from wife Christina. Christina and Father have a 

daughter Nina, born May 2012. Nina is in the 

custody of mother Christina and the Father has 

supervised visitation. The Father has a criminal 

conviction from Florida in 2008; the Father pled 

guilty to “Unlawful Sexual Activity with Certain 

Minors”. Due to this conviction, Father is required to 

report as a Megan’s Law offender under a Tier I 

offense, the lowest category pursuant to Florida law. 

(Exhibit 5) The Father receives social security 

disability (SSI). (T.T. 8/6/14, P. 125; 11/5/14, P. 

21) 

CYS first became involved with the family on 

September 14, 2011, at the birth of Ch.L. The 

hospital staff reported concerns to CYS that Mother

lacked any identification and that Father was very 

controlling of Mother, answering questions for her. 

(T.T. 8/6/14, P. 95) At the time, the Mother, Father, 

the two children and the Father’s wife were all living 

together. (T.T. 11/5/14, P. 29) In early 2012, after 

an argument between Mother and Father’s wife 

Christina, the Mother and [Children] moved to a 

women’s shelter in Allegheny County. (T.T. 

11/13/14, P. 30-32) After a few months, they left 

and returned to the home of the Father. In October

of 2012, CYS located the family and went to the 

residence. CYS found that the home was in a 

deplorable and filthy condition and was inadequate 
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for the seven adults and two children living there. 

(T.T. 8/6/14, P. 99) The Children were removed by 

emergency shelter order and placed in foster care on 

October 16, 2012, where they have remained. (T.T. 

8/6/14, P. 100) 

The Children were adjudicated dependent on 

December 3, 2012. The allegations of dependency 

were deplorable living conditions, the Father’s status 

as a Megan’s Law offender and his serious mental 

health issues and the lack of verifiable identity of 

Mother. (Exhibit 6; Dep. Pet. P. 5 of 5) Over the

course of the dependency case, the parents have 

been ordered to obtain and maintain appropriate 

housing, to complete a parenting educational 

training and to obtain a mental health evaluation and 

follow through with any treatment. The Father was 

also ordered to complete an anger management 

course and obtain a sexual offender assessment and 

follow through with any recommended treatment. 

(Exhibit 6; T.T. 8/6/14, P. 101) 

The parents have moved at least four times in the 

last two years. They lived in a trailer in Canton 

Township, then moved to Washington, then to West 

Alexander and in January of 2014 to Eighty-Four, 

Pennsylvania, where they have remained. (T.T. 

8/6/14, P. 118) Their current housing was found 

with the assistance of CYS and is appropriate, 

although some issues of cleanliness have arisen. 

(T.T. 8/6/14, P. 170) The parents completed the 

parenting program through Justice Works. (T.T. 

8/6/14, P. 105) ... 

The Father completed anger management in 

February 2014. (T.T. 8/6/14, P. 175) During the 

course of treatment for anger management, he 

continued to have outbursts of anger; on November 

25, 2013 he verbalized that he wanted to kill the 

CYS caseworker. (Id.) The Father had a sexual 

offender’s assessment in December 2012 and was 

found to be at a moderate risk for recidivism. 

(Exhibit 3) He did not begin treatment for sexual 
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offenders until June 2014; the treatment consists of 

weekly group counseling sessions and twice monthly 

individual sessions. (T.T. 11/5/14, P. 83, 86) 

Treatment is expected to take two years. (T.T. 

11/5/14, P. 87) 

The Father’s mental health issues date back to his 

teenage years. He had a voluntary psychiatric 

hospital admission in 2003. He was diagnosed as 

bipolar and was prescribed Lithium, Clozaril, 

Depakote and Zyprexa and recommended continued 

treatment. The Father obtained a psychiatric 

evaluation by Dr. Stephen Lee of Washington 

Communities Human Services, Inc. Dr. Lee 

diagnosed the Father with bipolar disorder (Axis I). 

(Exhibit 1) He recommended (urgently) medication 

management and individual therapy. He found that 

Father did not present suicidality, but homicidality 

was present. (Exhibit 1) In the psychological 

evaluation by Dr. Rosenblum in 2014, the Father was

diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychotic 

features (Axis I), impulse control disorder NOS (Axis 

I), and mixed personality disorder with narcissistic, 

antisocial and borderline features (Axis II). (Exhibit 

2) His IQ was found to be 99. The Father began 

mental health counseling in May of 2014. (T.T. 

8/6/14, P. 187) 

Throughout the history of the case, the Father has 

relayed grandiose and incredible statements to the 

many social workers and other professionals involved 

with this family and to this Court in juvenile 

dependency proceedings. The Father has reported 

having a genius IQ, having completed graduate 

school at Brigham Young University, serving in the 

military and being injured in Iraq, and building a 

large home in Marianna, Pennsylvania, all of which 

are not true. 

The parents have weekly supervised visitation for 

five hours. (T.T. 8/6/14, P. 123) Even though the

Children were not dirty, the Father insisted on 

bathing them during each visit, stating the Children 
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got dirty and that they enjoy bath time. (T.T. 

11/13/14, P. 72; 11/5/14, P. 56) The Father 

accused the case aide of inappropriate leering at his 

daughter during the bath time. (T.T. 11/5/14, P. 57) 

Dr. Rosenblum conducted an interactional evaluation

with the parents and the Children and the foster 

parents and the Children. He supported the 

termination of the parents’ rights. (T.T. 8/6/14, P. 

44) The CYS caseworker testified that, in her 

opinion, the Children would not suffer any 

detrimental effects if the parents’ rights were 

terminated. (T.T. 8/6/14, P. 129-30) The Guardian

Ad Litem also supported the termination of the 

parents’ rights. (T.T. 11/13/14, P. 69) 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2015, at 2-5. 

CYS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights on December 

24, 2013. The trial court conducted evidentiary hearings on August 6, 2014, 

November 5, 2014, November 5, 2014, and November 13, 2014. On April 

15, 2015, the trial court issued an order granting CYS’s petition and 

terminating Father’s parental rights. On appeal, Father contends that the 

trial court erred because the evidence presented by CYS was “insufficient to 

sustain” the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. 

We review the appeal from the termination of parental rights in 

accordance with the following standard. 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s 

determination of a petition for termination of 

parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported 
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by the record. If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As 

has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does 

not result merely because the reviewing court might

have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion

only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. 

As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in 

[In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010)], there are 

clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion 

standard of review in these cases. [The Supreme 

Court] observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate 

courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial 

judges are observing the parties during the relevant 

hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, 

even where the facts could support an opposite 

result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the 

urge to second guess the trial court and impose its

own credibility determinations and judgment; 

instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as 

the factual findings are supported by the record and 

the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some internal 

citations omitted). 

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained: 
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[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty 

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come 

to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth 

of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

When deciding a case falling under section 2511, the trial court must 

engage in a bifurcated process. In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 606 (Pa. Super. 

2012). In that analysis, 

[t]he initial focus is on the conduct of the parent. 

The party seeking termination must prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies at least one of the nine statutory grounds in 

section 2511(a). If the trial court determines that 

the parent’s conduct warrants termination under 

section 2511(a), then it must engage in an analysis

of the best interests of the child under section 

2511(b), taking into primary consideration the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs of the

child. 

Id.

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights under section 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). We will analyze the trial court’s decision 

to terminate Father’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(8) and (b). 

These sections provide: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination 
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds: 

. . . 

(8) The child has been removed from the 

care of the parent by the court or under 

a voluntary agreement with an agency, 

12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to exist 

and termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child. 

. . . 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)-(b). 

Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8) requires CYS 

to demonstrate the following factors: (1) the child has been removed from 

parental care, (2) 12 months or more have lapsed from the date of removal; 

(3) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 
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continue to exist; and (4) termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child. In re K.M., 2012 160, 53 A.3d 781, 789 

(Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 

1275–1276 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

The first two elements in this analysis are established, as CYS 

removed the Children from Father’s care in October 2012, and they have 

resided in foster care since that date. N.T., 8/6/2014, at 99. With respect 

to the third element, the certified record on appeal supports the trial court’s 

decision. The reasons for the removal of the Children from Father’s care 

included, inter alia, Father’s need for anger management and mental health 

treatment. Id. at 101-02. While it is true that Father completed anger 

management counseling in November 2013, the trial court questioned its 

effectiveness, pointing out that Father threatened the life of a caseworker. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2015, at 3. The record supports this finding, as 

there was testimony that just three days prior to completing his anger 

management counseling, Father indicated to John Bert of Justice Works that 

he was “going to put a hole in [the CYS caseworker’s] head.” N.T., 

8/6/2014, at 111. 

Regarding his mental health issues, Father delayed beginning his 

treatment for more than a year after the Children had been removed from 

his care, and not until after the petition to terminate his parental rights had 

been filed. Id. at 115. More importantly, Father’s mental health issues are 
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both severe and, with respect to at least one significant diagnosis 

(personality disorder), not amenable to treatment. The trial court found as 

follows: 

He was diagnosed with an Axis II disorder; the Axis

II diagnosis of personality disorder is not responsive 

to treatment and is ingrained and lifelong. That is, 

Father’s serious mental health disorder is not easily 

treatable to behavior modification. The Father is not 

only bipolar, he “displays prominent antisocial 

personality characteristics and evidence of an 

impulse control disorder. He has very few inhibitions 

and tends to be reckless, impulsive and exercises 

poor judgment in his interactions with others.” (Dr. 

Rosenblum’s Report, Exhibit 2). He is 

“tempermental, reckless and evidencing an 

extremely unstable personal adjustment and 

lifestyle.” (Exhibit 2). His ability to benefit from 

treatment is very limited. The Father’s treatment as 

a sexual offender is only in its beginning stages and 

can take upward of two years to complete. 

Additionally, untreated mental issues pose a barrier 

to successful treatment for sexual offenders. Since 

Father had also just begun mental health treatment,

any cognizable progress was yet to be seen. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2015, at 8-9. Based upon our review of the 

certified record on appeal, including the testimony and reports of Dr. 

Stephen Lee and Dr. Neil Rosenblum, the trial court has correctly 

summarized the evidence regarding Father’s current mental health issues 

that CYS presented at the evidentiary hearings. 

On appeal, Father disagrees with the trial court’s findings. He argues 

that CYS’s contentions “can be boiled down to a fear that Father will at some 

time behave erratically and harm his children.” Father’s Brief at 11. Father 
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contends that this “conjecture” is belied by his actions, including the absence 

of any evidence of recent anger outbursts demonstrating ongoing anger 

management issues. Id. at 13. 

Unfortunately, the Father’s arguments amount to an attack on the 

credibility of the opinions of CYS’s mental health experts. As is clear from its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion, however, the trial court found their testimony 

regarding the state of Father’s mental health to be credible. Trial Court 

Opinion, 6/12/2015, at 8-9. This Court is bound by the trial court’s 

determinations in this regard, as “[t]he trial court is free to make all 

credibility determinations, and may believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented.” In the Interests of J.F.M., 71 A.3d 989, 992 (Pa. Super. 

2013). Moreover, the courts of this Commonwealth have long held that a 

child's life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [the parent] will 

summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re 

Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing In Re: 

J.T. and R.T., 817 A.2d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 2003)). As a result, we must 

conclude that the trial court’s decision that Father’s serious mental issues 

and the concomitant need for treatment, which were conditions that lead to 

the removal of the Children, continue to exist and likely will continue to 

persist well into the future. CYS thus presented clear and convincing 

evidence to establish the third element under section 2511(a)(8). 
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The fourth element under section 2511(a)(8) requires CYS to show 

that termination of Father’s parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the Children. Under Section 2511(a), the focus is on the parent, 

whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child. In re Z.S.W., 946 

A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008). The “best interests of the child” analysis 

under Section 2511(a)(8) therefore accounts for the needs of the child in 

addition to the behavior of the parent. In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 956 A.2d 

999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc); In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 12 (Pa. 

Super 2009). This analysis requires consideration of “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). To this end, this Court has indicated that the trial court “must 

also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying close 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.” 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009. The continuity of relationships is important 

because severing close parental ties is often extremely painful. In re 

Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1134 (Pa. Super. ). 

Azure Hixenbaugh, the CYS caseworker, testified that based upon her 

observations, there was no bond between the Children and their parents 

(including Father) that was of benefit to the Children. N.T., 8/6/2014, at 

130. Dr. Rosenblum testified that while he believed that the parents loved 

the Children, he saw no similar loving relationship between the Children and 

their parents. Id. at 46-47. Instead, Dr. Rosenblum described the Children 
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as “comfortable” with their parents, with the older child (C.L.) exhibiting 

more of an attachment than Ch.L. Id. at 46. Both Ms. Hixenbaugh and Dr. 

Rosenblum agreed that severing the relationship between the Children and 

Father would not result in any detrimental effect to the Children. Id. at 47-

48, 130. According to Dr. Rosenblum, the Children have adapted to life with 

their pre-adoptive foster parents, from whom they derive all of their 

“nurturing, direction and emotional support,” and that as a result 

termination was not “something that would cause the children any significant 

adjustment concerns.” Id. at 47-48. Both Ms. Hixenbaugh and Dr. 

Rosenblum also agreed that the Children have strong bonds with their preadoptive foster parents and that termination of parental rights and adoption 

were in the Children’s best interests. Id. at 44, 130; see In re T.S.M., 71 

A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013) (“Common sense dictates that courts considering 

termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive 

home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”). 

Turning to section 2511(b), on appeal Father does not challenge the 

trial court’s factual findings or legal determination under this provision. For 

the reasons set forth hereinabove, including the testimony of Ms. 

Hixenbaugh and Dr. Rosenblum, no basis exists in the certified record to 

conclude that the trial court erred in this respect. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/24/2015