alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**CERTIFICATION REQUIRED BY RULE13a-14(a) OR RULE 15d-14(a), PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTOF 2002**

 

I, Marc Parent, certify that:

1.     I have reviewed this annual report on Form 40-F of CAE Inc.;

2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the issuer asof, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financialreporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for theissuer and have:

(a)               designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the issuer, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)              designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused suchinternal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision,to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financialreporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes inaccordance with generally accepted accounting principles;

(c)               evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and

(d)              disclosed in this report any change in the issuer’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annualreport that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.     The issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theissuer’s auditors and the audit committee of theissuer’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND THE CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FILED AS
PART OF THE ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-03-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-29-2000
<CASH>                                          20,507
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   55,162
<ALLOWANCES>                                     7,518
<INVENTORY>                                    120,129
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               201,250
<PP&E>                                         273,111
<DEPRECIATION>                                 146,911
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 583,124
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          139,576
<BONDS>                                        284,452
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            16
<OTHER-SE>                                     142,653
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   583,124
<SALES>                                        257,771
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               257,771
<CGS>                                           86,328
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  254,673
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,110
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (3,012)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,656)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,356)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,356)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.09)


</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 20.2

                                                              ------------------
[LOGO]    LETTERHEAD LML Payment Systems                         news release
                                                              ------------------

       LEGAL ACTION FILED IN 150/th/ DISTRICT COURT, BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS


VANCOUVER, BC, January 2, 2001 - LML PAYMENT SYSTEMS, INC. (the "Corporation")
(Nasdaq: LMLP), has received a complaint filed by Todd H. Moore ("Moore")
against the Corporation in the 150th District Court, Bexar County, Texas. Moore
is seeking an order directing the Corporation to deliver an option to purchase
250,000 shares of the Corporation's common stock at $1.50 per share, or,
alternatively, damages of $10 million, and certain other relief. Moore alleges
that the Corporation retained him in 1998 to assist in raising media exposure of
the Corporation and that as compensation for such services Moore was to receive
the stock option.

In December 1999, Moore filed a similar suit against the Corporation in the
United States District Court, Western District of Washington, alleging
substantially the same facts as those set forth above. The original suit was
dismissed with prejudice on June 5, 2000. The Corporation contends that as a
result of the dismissal with prejudice in the prior case, Moore is precluded
from bringing substantially the same suit in a Texas court. The Corporation
believes this suit is without merit and intends to defend this action
vigorously.

Statements contained in this news release which are not historical facts are
forward-looking statements, subject to uncertainties and risks. For a discussion
of the risks associated with the Corporation's business, please see the
documents filed by the Corporation with the SEC.

                                     -30-


CONTACTS:      Patrick H. Gaines
               President and CEO             Investor Relations
               LML Payment Systems Inc.      LML Payment Systems Inc.
               (604) 689-4440                (800) 888-2260
EX-4.14



 Exhibit 4.14 

Fifth Amendment to 

Alion Science and Technology Corporation 

Employee Ownership, Savings and Investment Plan 

(As Amended and Restated Effective October 1, 2011) 

WHEREAS, Alion Science and Technology Corporation (the “Company”) maintains the Alion Science and Technology Corporation Employee
Ownership, Savings and Investment Plan (the “Plan”) for the benefit of its employees and employees of other adopting employers, and was last amended and restated as of October 1, 2011; and 

WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the Company, pursuant to Plan Section 15.1 of the Plan, has delegated authority to amend the Plan to
the undersigned officer, provided he determines that the amendment would not materially increase costs of the Plan to the Company or any Adopting Employer; and 

WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan to change from semi-annual to annual valuations for purposes of allocations of employer
contributions, distributions and other purposes of the Plan, to the extent permitted by Section 411(d)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations. 

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers of amendment reserved under Section 15.1 of the Plan, the Plan is hereby amended by the Company,
effective as of October 1, 2014, as follows: 
  

	 	1.	The first sentence of Section 2.5, the definition of “Allocation Date,” is hereby amended to read as follows: 


“September 30 of each Plan Year.” 
  

	 	2.	The second sentence subsection (a) of Section 2.14, the definition of “ Current Market Value,” is hereby amended to read as follows: 


“Current Market Value will generally be based upon an appraisal performed as of a Valuation Date; provided, however, that the ESOP
Committee may order interim valuations, which will be binding as of the relevant date specified therein.” 
  

	 	3.	The second sentence of Section 2.68, the definition of “Valuation Date,” is hereby amended to read as follows: 


“For Common Stock that is not readily tradeable on an established securities market, the term “Valuation Date” means the last
day of the Plan Year (September 30) on which Common Stock is valued by an independent appraiser which meets the requirements of Section 170 of the Code and the regulations thereunder, and such other interim Valuation Dates as declared by the
ESOP Committee.” 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Alion Science and Technology Corporation has caused this Fifth Amendment to
the Plan to be executed on its behalf by the Chief Executive Officer as of the 30th day of September, 2014. 
  

					
	Alion Science and Technology Corporation
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Bahman Atefi

		 	Its:	 	Chief Executive Officer



  
 2 








 The Trustee of the Alion Science and Technology Corporation Employee Ownership, Savings and
Investment Trust hereby acknowledges receipt of the Fifth Amendment and consents thereto. 
  

					
	STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (not in its individual or corporate capacity, but solely as Trustee of the Alion Science and Technology Corporation Employee Ownership, Savings and Investment Trust)
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Monet Ewing

		 	Its:	 	 Vice President




  
 3
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-10130

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

OSVALDO SANCHEZ GARCIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:00-CR-83-11-H)

_________________________________________________________________ October 15, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Osvaldo Sanchez Garcia appeals his convictions for conspiracy

to poss ess, and possession, with intent to distribute narcotics,

see 18 U.S.C. § 2, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846,

asserting that the evidence was insufficient.

Because Garcia did not renew his motion for judgment of

acquittal at the close of all the evidence, we need only determine

whether there was a “manifest miscarriage of justice”, which “would

exist only if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt”.

United States v. Hinojosa

, 958 F.2d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1992)( quoting United States v. Robles-Pantoja

, 887 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th

Cir. 1989)).

The trial testimony indicated that Garcia’s coconspirators

left him alone in a hotel room with a large quantity of cocaine.

See United States v. Garcia-Flores

, 246 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir.

2001); United States v. Arzola-Amaya , 867 F.2d 1504, 1512-13 (5th

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933 (1989). He was present in

the hotel room and witnessed his coconspirators test the cocaine

supply and turn it into crack. Garcia was present during

negotiations for a drug deal. Moreover, a jury reasonably could

have concluded from the testimony of Leopoldo Camacho Perez that

Garcia participated in the negotiation process. S ee United States

v. Dean , 59 F.3d 1479, 1488-89 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516

U.S. 1064 (1996), and cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1082 (1996). Finally,

an Agent from the Drug Enforcement Agency testified that secretly

recorded telephone conver sations indicated that Garcia was the

source of the cocaine supply.

In short, the record is not devoid of evidence pointing to

guilt; far from it. In fact, the evidence was adequate to support

Garcia’s conviction. See U nited States v. Gonzales

, 121 F.3d 928,

935-36 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1063 (1998), and

cert. d enied, 5 22 U.S. 1131 (1998); United States v. PenaRodriguez

, 110 F. 3d 1120, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1997), c ert. denied,

522 U.S. 819 (1997).

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 99.3

REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

To College Loan Corporation Trust I
c/o College Loan Corporation

We have examined the assertion made by management on College
Loan Corporations compliance with Article V, paragraph 1 of Section 5.05
and Article XI, Section 11.01 of the Amended and Restated Indenture of Trust,
dated as of October 1, 2003, between College Loan Corporation Trust I, as
Issuer, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Indenture Trustee, for the
year ended December 31, 2005 included in the accompanying management assertion.
Management is responsible for the Trusts compliance with those
requirements. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on managements
assertion about the Trusts compliance based on our examination.

Our examination was made in accordance with attestation
standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the
Trusts compliance with the requirements and performing such other
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our
examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does
not provide a legal determination on the Trusts compliance with specified
requirements.

In our opinion, managements assertion that the Trust
complied with the aforementioned requirements as of and for the year ended
December 31, 2005 is fairly stated, in all material respects.

/s/ Grant Thornton LLP
March 27, 2006
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, January 22, 2015. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, January 22, 2015 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A15I0100. SOUTHERN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. ADRIAN CONTRERAS et al..
Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 13A08368
| KPMG LLP                       | Telephone                      | (306) 934-6200 |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| Chartered Accountants          | Fax                                                                         | (306) 934-6233 |
| 600-128 4th Avenue South       | Internet                                                               | www.kpmg.ca    |
| Saskatoon Saskatchewan S7K 1M8 |                                                                                                                                    |           |
| Canada                         |                                                                                                                                    |           |

|   | • | our auditors' report dated March 26, 2010 on the consolidated balance sheets of Claude Resources Inc. ("the Company") as at December 31, 2009 and 2008, and the consolidated statements of earnings (loss), comprehensive income (loss), shareholders’ equity, and cash flows for each of the years then ended, |
|--------|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | • | our Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm dated March 26, 2010 on the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2009, |
|--------|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | • | our auditors' report on reconciliation to United States GAAP dated March 26, 2010, and |
|--------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | • | our Comments by Auditors for US Readers on Canada-US Reporting Differences dated March 26, 2010 |
|--------|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### Hank BAKER, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Sept. 28, 1973.

David E. Murrell, Deputy Public Defender, Frankfort, for appellant.

Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., Robert L. Chenoweth, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

PALMORE, Chief Justice.

Hank Baker and James Lowe were jointly indicted, tried and found guilty of storehouse breaking, KRS 433.190. Their punishment was fixed by a jury at one year in the penitentiary. On its own motion, as authorized by RCr 10.02(2), the trial court set the verdict aside and directed a new trial, which again resulted in a finding of guilty and sentence of one year as to each of the two defendants. They appeal from judgments entered accordingly. For convenience, we are disposing of the appeals in separate opinions. This one deals with Baker. See also Lowe v. Com., Ky., 500 S.W.2d 67 (1973).

Baker was a minor. The only entry in the record before us pertaining to the juvenile court proceeding is an order of the Knox County Court dated May 18, 1971, reading as follows:

> “It appearing to the Court that Hank Baker, an infant, over the age of sixteen in [sic] charged with the crime of Store house breaking. After an investigation the Court finds the best interest of the infant, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky will be served if said infant is transferred to the Knox Circuit Court.

> “IT IS ORDERED AND DIRECTED that subject child be and he is ordered transferred to the Knox Circuit Court for trial.”

One of the grounds on which it is contended that Baker’s conviction should be set aside is that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction.

> “We have held in an unbroken line of cases that it should affirmatively appear, in the prosecution in the circuit court of a juvenile charged with a felony, not *70only that the juvenile court had made an order transferring the prosecution to the circuit court, but it also should so appear that all necessary steps to give juvenile courts jurisdiction to render such an order were followed.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 264 Ky. 4, 94 S.W.2d 25, 28 (1936).

> “Failing such a showing, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to proceed against a juvenile in criminal prosecutions.” Anderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1971).

The order here in question does not indicate that a hearing was held or that Baker had counsel. For that reason alone it was insufficient to waive jurisdiction. We need not decide whether it was deficient in other respects. See Whitaker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 592 (1972).

The judgment as to Hank Baker is reversed.

PALMORE, C. J., and JONES, MILLIKEN, OSBORNE, REED, STEINFELD and STEPHENSON, JJ., sitting.

All concur.
#### MARY E. HILL AND GEORGE V. HILL v. HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

October 3, 1985.

Petition for certification denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MARZETTE KING
,
Defendant Below, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE
,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee. § § § § § § § § § § § § § No. 312 , 20 17
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware

ID. No. 1606002410A & B

Submitted: September 12 , 20 18 Decided: September 24 , 2018

Before STRINE , Chief Justice ; VALIHURA and VAUGHN , Justices.

O R D E R

On this 24 th day of September 2018
, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Appellant, Marzette King, appeals from a Superior Court jury verdict
finding him guilty of Drug Dealing, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, three counts

of Pos session of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF), three
counts of Possession of a Firearm By a Person Prohibited, and one count of
Possession of Ammunition By a Person Prohibited.2

(2) King makes three claims, the second two raised for the first t ime on
appeal. First, King contends that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal on the counts of Drug Dealing and PFDCF because the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of Drug Dealing

— the requisite felony for

the thr ee PFDCF charges. Second, he contends that the Superior Court committed
plain error by allowing the jury to consider the PFDCF charges because the evidence
was insufficient to show a nexus between the purported drug dealing activity and the

firearms. Fin ally, he contends that the Superior Court committed plain error by
allowing the jury to consider the Person Prohibited charges because the evidence
was insufficient to show that he had possession of those items on or about June 3,
2016, the date specified in the indictment.
(3) We affirm the Superior Court’s denial of King’s motion for judgment
of acquittal for the reasons given in the court’s bench ruling dated May 10, 2017.
(4) As to King’s second two cla ims, we find no plain error. “To warrant
review on appeal when the issue has not been fairly presented [to the trial court],
there must be ‘plain error.’” 1 “Under the plain error standard of review, the error
complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the

1 Zhurbin v. State , 104 A.3d 108, 113 (Del. 2014).3

fairness and int egrity of the trial process.” 2 “[T]he doctrine of plain error is limited
to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic,
serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of

a substantial r ight, or which clearly show manifest injustice.” 3 There is no such
error here: the Superior Court’s alleged errors do not amount to “ material defects
which are apparent on the face o f the record.” 4
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Su perior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:
/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr Justice

2 Wainwright v. State , 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 3 Id. 4 Id.