COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

CAROLYN M. SNYDER 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2585-95-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 NOVEMBER 19, 1996 

VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION 

 and BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD 

 (TRIGON) 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 

Robert P. Doherty, Jr., Judge 

 David D. Beidler (Nancy L. Brock; Legal Aid 

Society of Roanoke Valley, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Patricia H. Quillen, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General; Lisa J. Rowley, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee Virginia 

Employment Commission. 

 No brief of argument for appellee Blue Cross 

and Blue Shield (Trigon). 

 Carolyn M. Snyder (claimant) appeals the Virginia Employment 

Commission's (VEC) denial of unemployment benefits based upon its 

 finding that she left work voluntarily without good cause. The 

claimant contends that she did not receive a fair hearing because 

the VEC in reaching its decision relied upon "investigatory" 

documents compiled by a deputy of the VEC. She further contends 

that the evidence presented to the VEC was insufficient to 

support its findings of fact. We find no error and affirm the 

VEC's decision. 
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 I. 

 In making their findings of fact, the appeals examiner and 

the VEC relied upon documents included in the "Record of Facts 

Obtained by Deputy." Snyder argues that she was denied the 

opportunity to confront or rebut the evidence contained in the 

"Record of Facts" because these documents were not introduced 

into evidence or expressly made part of the record by the appeals 

examiner during the evidentiary hearing. She argues, therefore, 

that the documents in the "Record of Facts" were not a part of 

the record which the VEC could consider and, thus, the hearing 

was unfair. We disagree. 

 The VEC is not bound by the common law or statutory rules of 

evidence. Baker v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 11 Va. App. 419, 426, 

399 S.E.2d 630, 634 (1990). Code § 60.2-623 provides that: 

 [t]he manner in which disputed claims shall 

be presented . . . shall be in accordance 

with regulations prescribed by the Commission 

for determining the rights of the parties. 

Such regulations need not conform to common 

law or statutory rules of evidence and other 

technical rules of procedure. 

The VEC has adopted rules governing the adjudication of claims 

pursuant to its authority under Code § 60.2-623. See VR 300-01-8 

Section 2.F (1994) ("The appeals examiner shall conduct the 

hearing in such a manner as to ascertain the substantive rights 

of the parties without having to be bound by common law, 

statutory rules of evidence, or technical rules of procedure."). 

 The rule regarding appeals to the VEC states that, "[e]xcept 
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as otherwise provided by this rule, all appeals to the VEC shall 

be decided on the basis of a review of the record." VR 300-01-8 

Section 3.B (1994) (emphasis added). Snyder contends that the 

record referred to in VR 300-01-8 Section 3.B includes only the 

transcript and exhibits from the evidentiary hearing conducted 

before the appeals examiner. We disagree. 

 The VEC's rules use the term "record" in two different 

instances. First, the regulations governing first level appeals 

state that "the record in connection with the claim . . . shall 

be assigned to an [appeals examiner]." VR 300-01-8 Section 2.B 

(1994). This "record" that is sent to the appeals examiner 

contains the "record of facts of the proceeding [before the 

deputy]." VR 300-01-8 Section 1.B (1994). See also Code 

§ 60.2-619 (A)(2) ("the deputy shall promptly transmit his full 

finding of fact with respect to that subsection to any appeal 

tribunal . . . ."). Second, the regulations addressing the 

evidentiary hearing before the appeals examiner refer to "the 

record" as the transcript and exhibits offered during the 

hearing. See VR 300-01-8 Sections 2.F and 2.F.4 (1994). 

 We hold that the "Record of Facts Obtained by Deputy" was a 

part of the record and the documents contained therein were 

properly considered by both the appeals examiner and the VEC in 

making their findings of fact. The documents were placed in the 

VEC's file and became part of the VEC record for purposes of the 

VEC's determination of the claim. At the evidentiary hearing, 
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the appeals examiner noted for the record that Trigon had chosen 

not to appear and made it known that Trigon had submitted a 

letter stating that "the documentation we have previously 

submitted fully states the company's position regarding Ms. 

Snyder's past employment, and should give a complete picture of 

our efforts and interactions with her." When Snyder's attorney 

was asked if there were any objections, he did not object to 

proceeding in this manner, which allowed the appeals examiner to 

consider the documentation previously submitted by Trigon. The 

purpose of the examiner introducing Trigon's letter was to put 

the claimant on notice that Trigon was relying on documents 

already in the VEC's files. This action gave the claimant an 

opportunity to review those documents and informed her that the 

appeals examiner was going to consider those documents when 

making his decision. If the claimant had chosen to do so, she 

could have inspected the file before or during the hearing, 

stated her objection to any documents or statements therein, and 

offered rebuttal evidence. 

 We find that Snyder's right to a fair hearing was not 

violated. By not reviewing or inspecting the documents in the 

record, Snyder chose not to exercise the options available to 

her. Klimko v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 216 Va. 750, 763, 222 

S.E.2d 559, 569-70 (1976). To the extent that the "claimant did 

not enjoy the right of confrontation and cross-examination or any 

of the other rights available to [her] under the laws and 
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regulations, it was not because they were denied [her]; it was, 

insofar as the record discloses, only because [she] did not 

pursue them." Id. Moreover, the record indicates that Snyder's 

attorney had the documents which she complains she had no 

opportunity to review or rebut. As the record shows, Snyder's 

counsel's questions made reference to the forms that she 

complains she did not know were part of the record: 

 Q: [O]n the . . . form that . . . Blue 

Cross that Miss Cardna filled out 

. . . apparently her impression was 

that the last time you, you were 

released . . . by your doctor to go 

back to work on October 10th 

 . . . . 

To the extent that Snyder now objects to the appeals examiner 

having proceeded without an employer's representative being 

present, Snyder could have objected at the hearing or could have 

subpoenaed a representative of her employer to appear. See

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971) (holding that 

claimant was precluded from complaining that he was denied the 

rights of confrontation and cross-examination because he did not 

take advantage of the opportunity to subpoena adverse witnesses 

who had previously submitted reports); Baker, 11 Va. App. at 

426-27, 399 S.E.2d at 634 (same). She failed to do so and her 

claim will not be considered for the first time on appeal. 

 Snyder next contends that Trigon's evidence was hearsay and 

as such, was insufficient to sustain Trigon's burden of proof. 

Although the letters and the deputy's investigatory documents are 
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hearsay, hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative 

proceedings before the VEC. Baker, 11 Va. App. at 425, 399 

S.E.2d at 634. Therefore, the VEC did not err in considering 

this hearsay evidence. 

 Snyder argues that hearsay evidence alone is not sufficient 

to meet the employer's burden of proof. Regardless of whether 

hearsay alone is insufficient, in this instance sufficient 

non-hearsay evidence was before the VEC to support its finding 

that Snyder voluntarily quit her job without good cause. Snyder 

testified that she received a letter from Trigon dated 

November 3, 1994 which stated, "unless you are able to return to 

work or return the short-term disability forms to us by 

November 10, 1994, we will have no alternative but to consider 

this a voluntary resignation by you." Further, she testified 

that she did not send the forms to the Roanoke office, but 

instead sent them to Richmond, and that, although she called, she 

never spoke to anyone in Roanoke after receiving the November 3 

letter. 

 The appeals examiner asked Snyder directly about Trigon's 

allegations. 

 Q: Well Miss Cardna had notified the 

Commission that . . . they could 

not get you to respond to . . . 

them. They couldn't . . . make any 

contact with you. Would you like 

to respond to that? 

 A: Yes, sir, I did too. I didn't even 

know that she was in charge, you 

know. . . . 
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The testimony of Snyder's sister corroborated Trigon's attempts 

to get in touch with Snyder and have her fill out the short-term 

disability forms. Finally, the documents that were submitted 

into evidence by Snyder also supported Trigon's claims. This 

non-hearsay evidence supported Trigon's assertions that the 

claimant had voluntarily quit. 

 II. 

 Claimant also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the VEC's finding that she voluntarily quit her job 

without good cause. 

 Code § 60.2-618 (1) states that: 

 An individual shall be disqualified for 

benefits upon separation from the last 

employing unit . . . if the Commission finds 

such individual is unemployed because he left 

work voluntarily without good cause. 

Determining whether an employee voluntarily quit without good 

cause is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable on appeal. 

Virginia Employment Comm'n v. Fitzgerald, 19 Va. App. 491, 493, 

452 S.E.2d 692, 693 (1995). 

 When determining whether good cause existed 

for a claimant to voluntarily leave 

employment, the commission and the reviewing 

courts must first apply an objective standard 

to the reasonableness of the employment 

dispute and then to the reasonableness of the 

employee's efforts to resolve that dispute 

before leaving the employment. In making 

this two-part analysis, the claimant's claim 

must be viewed from the standpoint of a 

reasonable employee. . . . Factors that . . . 

are peculiar to the employee and her 

situation are factors which are appropriately 

considered as to whether good cause existed. 
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Umbarger v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 12 Va. App. 431, 435-36, 

404 S.E.2d 380, 383 (1991) (citations omitted). 

 The VEC did not err when it found that Snyder quit her 

employment without good cause. In Shuler v. Virginia Employment

Comm'n, 9 Va. App. 147, 151, 384 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1989), we 

stated that "absence from work without authorization will 

constitute a voluntary abandonment of a job if done with notice 

that a discharge will result . . . ." (Citations omitted). 

 Here, Snyder had notice that if she did not return her 

short-term disability forms to Trigon, she would be considered to 

have resigned. When Trigon proved that Snyder had notice that 

her absence from work without authorization would constitute a 

voluntary resignation, Snyder had the burden of going forward 

with the evidence to prove that she provided Trigon the required 

authorization. Snyder acknowledges that she knew of Trigon's 

policy requiring her to provide medical verification after five 

days of medical leave that her continued absence was due to a 

medical disability. Furthermore, Snyder testified that she 

received a letter from Trigon dated November 3, 1994 which 

stated, "unless you are able to return to work or return the 

short-term disability forms to us by November 10, 1994, we will 

have no alternative but to consider this a voluntary resignation 

by you." 

 Although Snyder testified that she sent the short term 

disability forms to Richmond rather than the Roanoke office, 
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Trigon had no record of having received the forms. The short 

term disability form which she ultimately submitted was dated 

December 5, 1994, which was after the date on which she was told 

that her failure to file would be considered a voluntary 

resignation and after she was told that Trigon considered that 

she had resigned from her job. Although the VEC made no finding 

as to whether the claimant had previously filed a short term 

disability form with Trigon at its Richmond office as Snyder 

claimed, the form that she ultimately submitted indicated that 

Dr. Wayne Fralin had seen her on November 29, 1994, which was 

after the date on which she was to have submitted authorization 

for her absence or be considered to have voluntarily resigned 

from her job. Snyder claimed to have previously faxed a copy of 

a disability form, but she provided no other form other than that 

of Dr. Fralin, to support her claim or to show that she had 

timely filed the necessary proof. 

 Because Snyder did not prove that she timely returned the 

forms to Trigon and because no evidence was offered to show good 

cause for not returning them, Trigon met its burden of proof and 

the VEC was correct in finding that Snyder voluntarily quit her 

job without good cause. 

 In conclusion, the claimant received a fair hearing and the 

evidence presented was sufficient to support the VEC's 

determination. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 

circuit court. 
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 Affirmed.