*

Honorable James H. Hancock, Senior U.S. District Judge for

the Middle District of Alabama, sitting by designation. 

 1Quinones also contends that there was an insufficient

factual predicate for his conviction on Count Two, charging him

with using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug

offense. Our review of the transcript of the plea hearing

reveals that there was a sufficient factual predicate to convict

Quinones of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug

offense.

Quinones further contends that his plea to Count Two

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-4302.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Juan Ramon QUINONES, Defendant-Appellant.

Oct. 10, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida. (No. 94-8023-CR-DTKH), Kenneth L. Ryskamp,

District Judge.

Before TJOFLAT and COX, Circuit Judges, and HANCOCK*

, Senior

District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Juan Ramon Quinones appeals from a judgment of conviction

entered on his guilty plea to one count of possession with intent

to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count

One), and one count of using or carrying a firearm during and in

relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c) (Count Two). Quinones contends that his plea to Count

Two, the firearm charge, was not made knowingly and intelligently

because the district court failed to inform him of the nature of

that charge as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c).1

 Therefore, he
was involuntary and thus obtained in violation of the Fifth

Amendment. In light of our disposition of this appeal, we

need not address this contention. 

 2Quinones does not request that we vacate his conviction on

Count One. 

contends, his conviction on Count Two must be vacated. 2 We

conclude that the district court committed plain error in failing

to inform Quinones of the nature of the charge to which he was

pleading guilty.

I.

Officers from the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office observed

Quinones meeting another individual, whom they had under

surveillance, at an Amoco gas station. After the individual

entered Quinones's vehicle, the officers saw Quinones pour cocaine

rocks out of a vial and show them to the other individual. The

officers arrested both men for possession of and trafficking in

cocaine. The officers searched Quinones, finding on his person a

small quantity of crack cocaine and a loaded North American Arms

.22 caliber revolver and ammunition. A search of the vehicle

revealed crack and powder cocaine.

Quinones entered into a written plea agreement with the United

States. He agreed to plead guilty to both Count One and Count Two.

The United States agreed to recommend a three-level reduction in

Quinones's sentencing offense level based on Quinones's acceptance

of responsibility.

At Quinones's plea hearing, the district court asked Quinones

whether he had received a copy of the indictment and reviewed it

with his attorney. Quinones responded that he had. The court
informed Quinones of the minimum and maximum sentences possible and

of the applicability of the federal sentencing guidelines.

The government then made its proffer of what the evidence

would be if the case went to trial. Quinones objected to the

government's characterization of the transaction as a sale, arguing

that he was going to give the other individual the cocaine.

Otherwise, Quinones agreed with the substance of the government's

account of the transaction. After ensuring that Quinones

understood that a conviction of possession with intent to

distribute cocaine did not require that money change hands, the

district court accepted Quinones's plea. Quinones said, "I plead

guilty I guess." (R. 2 at 12.) Throughout the hearing, the

district court never mentioned the elements of the § 924(c) charge

of using or carrying a firearm in connection with a drug

trafficking crime.

II.

On this direct appeal, Quinones contends that the district

court failed to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1) when it accepted

his guilty plea. Rule 11(c) provides:

(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or

nolo contendre, the court must address the defendant

personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and

determine that the defendant understands, the following:

(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is

offered ...

The government argues that any deviation from Rule 11(c) at

Quinones's plea hearing was harmless error under Rule 11(h). See

Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h) ("Any variance from the procedures required by

this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.").

 On a direct appeal, our analysis of whether the district

court's failure to comply with Rule 11 was harmless error is

conducted solely on the basis of the record of the Rule 11

proceedings. United States v. Hourihan, 936 F.2d 508, 511 (11th

Cir.1991); Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h) advisory committee's note. Our

review of the record of Quinones's plea hearing reveals that the

district court failed to inform Quinones of the nature of the

charge in Count Two. The record, moreover, gives no indication

that Quinones knew or understood the elements comprising a charge

of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug

trafficking crime. Thus, the district court failed to comply with

Rule 11(c)(1).

 The issue, then, is whether the district court's failure to

inform Quinones of the nature of the charge entitles him to

withdraw his plea to Count Two. Quinones did not move in the

district court to withdraw his guilty plea; he raises the district

court's failure to comply with Rule 11(c) for the first time on

this appeal. Usually, when an objection is not made in the

district court, our review is confined to review for plain error.

See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or defects affecting

substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to

the attention of the court."). Plain error is error that is clear

or obvious and affects substantial rights. United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 732-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777-78, 123 L.Ed.2d 508

(1993). Plain error analysis differs from harmless error analysis

in that the defendant bears the burden of persuasion with respect
 3

The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have applied plain error

review when a defendant fails to object to violations of Rule 11

in the district court. United States v. Chan, 82 F.3d 921, 923

(9th Cir.1996); United States v. Cross, 57 F.3d 588, 590 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 406, 123 L.Ed.2d

324 (1995). According to the D.C.Circuit, however, the absence

of a contemporaneous objection does not trigger plain error

analysis; any deviation from Rule 11 is reversible unless the

government demonstrates that it was harmless error. United

States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1321, 1322 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1995). The

First Circuit has not resolved the appropriate standard when

there was no objection in the district court. United States v.

Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1219 (1st Cir.1995), cert.

denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1343, 134 L.Ed.2d 492 (1996). 

to prejudice. Id. at 734-36, 113 S.Ct. at 1778.

 We have not addressed whether a defendant who fails to assert

a Rule 11 violation in the district court must show plain error on

a direct appeal.3 We see no reason why the plain error rule should

not apply in the Rule 11 context, though we recognize that many

non-technical deviations from Rule 11 will constitute plain error.

We hold that a defendant who has not presented his objection to the

district court—for example, through a motion to withdraw the

plea—must show plain error on direct appeal.

 In this case, the district court's failure to comply with

Rule 11 was plain error because the court failed to address a core

concern of Rule 11. We have identified three core objectives of

Rule 11: (1) ensuring that the guilty plea is free of coercion;

(2) ensuring that the defendant understands the nature of the

charges against him; and (3) ensuring that the defendant is aware

of the direct consequences of the guilty plea. United States v.

Zickert, 955 F.2d 665, 668 (11th Cir.1992). Failure to satisfy any

of the core objectives violates the defendant's substantial rights.
 4

In Hourihan, we suggested that Rule 11(h) harmless error

analysis may not be applicable when a district court completely

fails to address a core concern of Rule 11. 936 F.2d 508, 511 n.

4. However, because we found that the error in that case was not

harmless, we did not resolve whether Rule 11(h) may excuse a

failure to satisfy Rule 11's core concerns. In holding that a

defendant's substantial rights are violated whenever Rule 11's

core concerns are not met, Zickert resolves the issue. 

 5

This court follows a holistic approach to sentencing

following a review on direct appeal of convictions and sentences

under a multicount indictment. See United States v. AlvarezMoreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1414 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494

U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 1484, 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990); United States

v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1520-21 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,

493 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 566, 107 L.Ed.2d 560 (1989); United

States v. Lail, 814 F.2d 1529, 1530 (11th Cir.1987). See also

United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012, 1015 n. 6 (11th

Cir.1989). We therefore conclude that vacation of the sentence

on Count Two will require vacation of the sentence on Count One

because the sentences on both counts were part of a single

sentencing package. 

Id.4 In this case, the district court failed to satisfy the core

objective that Quinones understand the nature of the charge against

him. Quinones's substantial rights were violated, therefore, and

the district court's error was plain error.

III.

We remand with instructions that the district court permit

Quinones to withdraw his guilty plea on Count Two. Should Quinones

elect to withdraw his plea on Count Two, the district court should

vacate the sentence imposed on Count One and resentence Quinones on

that count either immediately or upon the disposition of the Count

Two charge.5

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.