[Cite as State v. Anderson , 2019-Ohio-5220.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. JEFFREY ANDERSON Appellant C.A. Nos. 29275 29276

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE Nos. CR-2018-04-1094 CR-2018-06-2046
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: December 18, 2019

CARR, Judge. {¶1} Appellant, Jeffrey Anderson, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Cour t reverses and remands.
I. {¶2} The instant appeal flows from separate indictments handed down by the Summit County Grand Jury. On April 24, 2018, Anderson was indicted on one count of harassment with a bodily substance, one count of obstructing official business, and one count of assault in Case No. 2018-04-1094. Anderson pleaded not guilty to the charges a t arraignment. The Summit County Grand Jury returned a s econd indictment against Anderson on July 6, 2018. In Case No. 2018-06-2046, Anderson was charged with one count of kidnapping , one count of escape, one count of assault, and one count of obstructing official busines s. Anderson pleaded not guilty to these charges as well.2
{¶3} The cases were combined for the purposes of trial and the jury found Anderson guilty of the all of the charges in both indictments. Prior to sentencing, Anderson filed a motion to merge allied offenses of similar import. {¶4} After holding a sentencing hearing, the trial court issued its sentencing entries in both cases on December 18, 2018. In Case No. 2018-04-1094, the parties agreed that all of the charges merged for sentencing purposes and the trial court impo sed a 12-month term of incarceration for harassment with a bodily substance. In Case No. 2018-06-2046, the trial court found that the count of escape merged with the count of obstruc ting official business and imposed an aggregate three-year prison sentence for the offense s in that case. The trial court also specified that the sentences in Case No. 2018-04-1094 and Case No. 2018-06-2046 were to be served concurrently for a t otal prison sentence of three yea rs. {¶5} On appeal, Anderson raises two assignment of error.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY IMPOSED A SENTENCE UPON DEFENDANT WHEN IT WAS NOT MADE IN OPEN COURT, AND IMPROPERLY SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT ON AN ALLIED OFFENSE WHEN THE STATE DID NOT ELECT THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH DEFENDANT SHOULD BE PUNISHED. {¶6} In his first assignment of error, Anderson asserts that the tri al court erred when it set forth a one-year prison term of escape in its sentencing en try in Case No 2018-06-2046 when no sentence for that offense wa s pronounced at the sentencing h earing. This Court agrees. {¶7} The sentencing hearing in this matter was held on December 14, 2018. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court addressed Anderson’s mot ion to merge certain counts for the purposes of sentencing. With respect to Case No. 2018-06-2046, Anderson initially argued that3 all of the charges should be merged. In the alternative, he ar gued that the kidnapping count should be merged with the assau lt count, and that the escape co unt should be merged with the count of obstruction of official business. The State sharply d isagreed with Anderson’s contention that all of the counts should be merged, particularl y with respect to the counts of kidnapping and assault, which the State maintained were clearly committed with a separate animus. The trial court ultimate ly determined that the counts of kidnapping and assault should not be merged, but the counts of e scape and obstructing officia l business were allied offenses and should be merged. With respect t o merger, the trial court stat ed that it “[would] sentence on the more serious charge left standing.” {¶8} The trial court proceeded to sen tencing and imposed a three-yea r prison sentence for kidnapping and a 12-month prison sentence for assault. Wit h respect to the remaining counts in Case No. 2018-06-2046, the tria l court stated, “Counts Two [ Escape] and Four [Obstructing Official Business] were merged, so the aggregate sentence is th ree years.” The trial court neither mentioned that it was imposing sentence on the count of escape, nor did it indicate the length of the sentence for that offense. {¶9} The parties proceeded to get int o a disagreement with respect t o jail time credit. During the exchange, the trial court stated, “I will tell you w hat. I will meet with counsel after the hearing, and we will discuss it further.” Prior to adjourn ing the hearing, the State sought clarification regarding which c ounts had merged for sentencing purposes. The trial court again indicated that while the counts of kidnapping and assault did n ot merge, the counts of escape and obstructing official business di d, in fact, merge. The State t hen inquired as to whether the trial court had imposed a sentence on the count of assault. The tria l court responded, “I thought I said4

12 months?” Defense counsel confirmed that the trial court had indeed imposed a 12-month term of incarceration for assau lt. The hearing was then adjour ned. {¶10} In its December 18, 2018 sentencing entry, the trial court stat ed that the counts of escape and obstructing official business merged for the purpose s of sentencing, and the State elected to proceed with sentencing on the count of escape. The trial court imposed a three-year prison term for kidnapping, a 12- month prison term for escape, a 12-month prison term for assault, and further ordered that all of the sentences were to be served concurrently. The trial court also ordered that the three-year sentence in Case No. 201 8-06-2046 was to be served concurrently with the one-yea r sentence in Case No. 2018-04-109 4. {¶11} On appeal, Anderson contends that the trial court erred by fail ing to pronounce a sentence for escape on the record at the sentencing hearing and then subsequently imposing a 12- month term of incarceration for that offense in its December 18 , 2018 sentencing entry. In response, the State stresses th at it is Anderson’s burden to pr ovide all necessary parts of the record to this Court and to demonstrate error. The State empha sizes that the trial court indicated at the sentencing hearing that t here would be further discussio n with counsel off the record and “it does not appear that the par ties went back on the record af ter the discussion.” The State speculates that it likely elected to have Anderson sentenced onthe escape charge during the offthe-record discussion and that there may have been an additiona l dialogue regarding the length of the sentence at that time. {¶12} Under the circumstances of this case, we are compelled to susta in Anderson’s assignment of error as the trial court imposed a sentence in it s judgment entry that differed from what was pronounced at the sentencing hearing. Crim.R. 43(A) r equires the defendant to be present at every stage of a criminal proceeding, including sent encing. State v. Wooden , 9th Dist.5 Summit No. 27250, 2015-Ohio-2633, ¶ 16. “[A] trial court errs when it issues a judgment entry imposing a sentence that diffe rs from the sentence pronounced i n the defendant[’]s presence.”
State v. West , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27485, 2015-Ohio-2936, ¶ 51, quoting State v. Aliane , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-840, 2004-Ohio-3730, ¶ 8; see also State v. Meyer , 1st. Dist. Hamilton No. C-100502, 2012-Ohio-145, ¶ 2 (“[A ] trial court must orally impose a sentence for each offense on the record.”). “The remedy for such an error is a r emand for a resentencing hearing.”
West at ¶ 51, citing Aliane at ¶ 9. Here, the trial court erred by imposing a 12-month se ntence for escape in its judgment entry when it did not pronounce that sen tence at the sentencing hearing. We are not persuaded by the State’s suggestion that the trial c ourt may have addressed the sentence for escape during an off-the-record discussion with co unsel. In addition to the fact that it would be inappropria te for the trial court to sua sponte con duct a portion of the sentencing hearing off the record and outside the presence of the defendan t, a review of the transcript suggests that any off-the-record discussion that occurred in th is matter was aimed at resolving issues relating to the calcula tion of jail-time c redit. It fol lows that Anderson’s first assignment of error is sustained. {¶13} The first assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR BY IMPOSING COURT [COSTS] WHEN IT DID NOT DO SO IN OPEN COURT. {¶14} In his second assignment of error, Anderson contends that the t rial court erred when it ordered him to pay court costs in the sentencing entrie s for Case. No. 2018-04-1094 and Case No. 2018-06-2046 when court cost s were not addressed at th e sentencing hearing. This Court agrees.6
{¶15} R.C. 2947.23 requires the trial cour t to impose court costs in criminal cases but a trial court may waive the paym ent of costs upon the motion of a n indigent defendant. See State
v. Vinson , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28313, 2017-Ohio-4275, ¶ 18. While a mo tion to waive court costs must be made at sentencing , the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a defendant is denied the opportunity to request a waiver where the trial court fails to mention courts costs at the sentencing hearing. State v. Joseph , 125 Ohio St.3d 76, 2010-Ohio-954, ¶ 13. A trial court violates Crim.R. 43(A) when it imposes court costs in a sentenc ing entry when it did not address court costs at the sentencing hearing. Id . at ¶ 22. {¶16} Here, the State concedes that the trial court never mentioned c ourt costs at the sentencing hearing and then subsequently imposed court costs in the sentencing entries in Case. No. 2018-04-1094 and Case No. 2018- 06-2046. This Court’s indep endent review of the record confirms that the trial court erroneously imposed court costs i n its sentencing entries after failing to discuss that issue at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, th e trial court erred by imposing court costs without providing Anders on an opportunity to seek waiver of payment. See Vinson at ¶ 19. {¶17} The second assignment of error is sustained.
III. {¶18} Anderson’s first and second assi gnments of error are sustained. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the cau se remanded for further proceedings with this decision. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.7 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the pa rties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket , pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellee.

DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT

TEODOSIO, P. J. SCHAFER, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES: NEIL P. AGARWAL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO GUEST, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.