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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

CITY OF DEARBORN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 15, 2018

v No. 336710

Wayne Circuit Court

SHAEFA MOHAMED, LC No. 16-008130-AV

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: TALBOT, C.J., and METER and TUKEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by leave granted a January 6, 2017, order by the circuit court 

dismissing this matter for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm. 

This appeal arose from a property-tax foreclosure and judgment of possession granted in 

plaintiff’s favor. A March 20, 2015, uncontested judgment of foreclosure provided that fee 

simple title to the property in question would vest in the Wayne County Treasurer unless 

redemption occurred by March 31, 2015. On March 31, 2015, defendant entered into an 

installment-payment plan but subsequently defaulted on that plan. 

Pursuant to a right of first refusal provided for in MCL 211.78m, a provision of the 

General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., the Wayne County Treasurer conveyed 

the property to plaintiff by quitclaim deed on August 26, 2015. Defendant remained in the 

home, and on September 28, 2015, plaintiff filed a notice to quit and sought to recover 

possession of the property. In November 2015, plaintiff filed and served on defendant a districtcourt complaint to recover possession of the property.

On May 26, 2016, defendant moved for summary disposition of the district-court action

under MCR 2.116(C)(10). She argued that in conducting the tax foreclosure involving her 

property, the Wayne County Treasurer violated her constitutional rights. She claimed, among 

other things, that she did not receive adequate notice of the foreclosure proceedings and an 

opportunity to appear. She argued that the deed conveyed to plaintiff was invalid and noted that 
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she was participating in a federal action challenging the foreclosure.1 Defendant argued that the 

summary proceeding for possession should be dismissed or stayed pending the outcome of the 

federal action. In the alternative, she requested leave to file a counterclaim to quiet title to the 

property. Plaintiff, in response, argued that defendant received adequate notice and, more 

importantly, never challenged or appealed the judgment of foreclosure. Plaintiff argued that it 

was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2).

The district court held a hearing on June 16, 2016. Defendant argued that because title to 

the property remained disputed and was being litigated in federal court, plaintiff’s action for 

possession of the property should be dismissed without prejudice. In response, plaintiff argued 

that it held title to the property after entry of the judgment of foreclosure and through Wayne 

County’s conveyance of it to plaintiff under plaintiff’s right of first refusal. It emphasized that 

the action in question was not an action to quiet title but was an action for possession, and it

noted once again that defendant neither appealed the judgment of foreclosure nor moved to set it 

aside. The district court noted that “as far as the County is concerned . . . there was a default in 

the payments” due under the installment-payment plan. The court stated that it was treating the 

proceedings as a motion for summary disposition, and it stated, “the [c]ourt believes that there is 

sufficient evidence to indicate that the [p]laintiff in this case is the proper title holder; they 

complied with the Michigan Court Rules governing summary proceedings in landlord tenant 

matters.” The court stated that “some other [c]ourt” may have to make a ruling regarding 

foreclosure irregularities, but not the district court. The district court granted plaintiff a 

judgment of possession. 

On December 16, 2016, defendant filed an appeal in the circuit court, arguing that the 

district court should not have “conducted a summary proceeding . . . for possession despite 

[defendant’s] claims concerning the validity of the tax foreclosure and her entitlement to present 

equitable claims and defenses to preclude being dispossessed of her home.” She asked the 

circuit court to vacate the judgment of possession and either order the dismissal of plaintiff’s 

action or stay the proceedings pending the resolution of the title controversy. In its January 6, 

2017, opinion and order, the circuit court dismissed defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 

finding that it had no jurisdiction to grant relief from the judgment of foreclosure. The circuit 

court reasoned:

Circuit courts are presumed to have original, subject-matter jurisdiction, 

except where exclusive jurisdiction is given to some other court, or where 

jurisdiction is expressly prohibited. MCL 600.605.

[Defendant] has raised the issue that she was unable to challenge the 

Judgment of Foreclosure in the District Court. [She] asks that this Court, sitting 

as an appellate court, make a finding that the lower court erred in not allowing 

[her] to contest the vesting of title in the City. This it cannot do.

 1 In the federal action, defendant raised various claims, arguing, in part, that there had been a 

taking without just compensation. The federal court subsequently dismissed the claims. An 

appeal of that decision is pending.
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The statutory scheme presented in the [GPTA] was designed to completely 

govern all proceedings involving the foreclosure of property in Michigan, to the 

exclusion of all other civil claims and remedies. [MCL 211.78k], subparts (5)(b) 

and (6) of the statute, indicate that property foreclosed by a judgment under the 

Act vests absolutely in the foreclosing governmental unit, and the foreclosing 

governmental unit shall have absolute title to the property.

The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that the legislative intent behind 

the Act was to provide finality to foreclosed judgments, and to quickly return 

property to the tax rolls. . . . Judgments may not be modified other than through 

the limited procedures provided under the Act. . . .

[Defendant] had several opportunities to challenge the foreclosure process, 

but chose not to file a written objection, or appear at the Show Cause Hearing or 

the Judicial Foreclosure Hearing. The Act also afforded [defendant] a third 

opportunity to object to the foreclosure. Under MCL 211.78k(7), the foreclosing 

governmental unit, or a person claiming to have a property interest in property 

foreclosed under the Act, may appeal the [c]ircuit [c]ourt’s Judgment of 

Foreclosure to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

Appellant did not avail herself of any of the remedies provided under the 

Act. The Supreme Court has stated that if a property owner does not redeem the 

property or appeal the judgment of foreclosure within 21 days, MCL 211.78k(6) 

deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction to alter the judgment of foreclosure.

The circuit court concluded that plaintiff was a “bona fide purchase for value” under the GPTA 

and that the court had no jurisdiction to alter the judgment of foreclosure. It dismissed the appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its ruling because “the GPTA in no way 

divests a circuit court of appellate jurisdiction over decisions from a summary proceeding 

regardless of the fact that it may implicate a judgment of foreclosure entered pursuant to the 

GPTA.” She claims that she never asked the circuit court to modify a judgment of foreclosure 

but merely asked “whether it was proper for the district court to enter a judgment of possession 

when the issue of title was being litigated in another court.” 

We review de novo constitutional issues, statutory interpretation, matters of subjectmatter jurisdiction, and grants of summary disposition. Harvey v State, Dept of Management & 

Budget, Bureau of Retirement Servs, 469 Mich 1, 6; 664 NW2d 767 (2003); In re Petition by 

Wayne Co Treasurer, 478 Mich 1, 6; 732 NW2d 458 (2007); Bank v Michigan Ed Assoc-NEA, 

315 Mich App 496, 499; 892 NW2d 1 (2016).

The GPTA governs the foreclosure of property for nonpayment of property taxes. MCL 

211.78k addresses proceedings related to obtaining a judgment of foreclosure. MCL 211.78k(1)

refers to the filing of a petition for foreclosure pursuant to MCL 211.78h, notice of the 

foreclosure hearing under MCL 211.78j, and other matters. MCL 211.78k(2) and (3) provide a 

process by which persons claiming an interest in the property may challenge the validity or 
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correctness of the unpaid taxes and otherwise object to the foreclosure. MCL 211.78k further 

provides:

[(5)](g) A judgment entered under this section is a final order with respect 

to the property affected by the judgment and except as provided in subsection (7) 

shall not be modified, stayed, or held invalid after the March 31 immediately 

succeeding the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property under this section, or 

for contested cases 21 days after the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property 

under this section.

(6) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (5)(c) and (e), fee simple 

title to property set forth in a petition for foreclosure filed under section 78h on 

which forfeited delinquent taxes, interest, penalties, and fees are not paid on or 

before the March 31 immediately succeeding the entry of a judgment foreclosing 

the property under this section, or in a contested case within 21 days of the entry 

of a judgment foreclosing the property under this section, shall vest absolutely in 

the foreclosing governmental unit, and the foreclosing governmental unit shall 

have absolute title to the property. . . . The foreclosing governmental unit’s title 

is not subject to any recorded or unrecorded lien and shall not be stayed or held 

invalid except as provided in subsection (7) or (9).

(7) The foreclosing governmental unit or a person claiming to have a 

property interest under section 78i in property foreclosed under this section may 

appeal the circuit court’s order or the circuit court’s judgment foreclosing 

property to the court of appeals. An appeal under this subsection is limited to the 

record of the proceedings in the circuit court under this section and shall not be de 

novo. The circuit court’s judgment foreclosing property shall be stayed until the 

court of appeals has reversed, modified, or affirmed that judgment. . . . [Emphasis 

added.]

The circuit court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to disturb the judgment of 

foreclosure. It viewed the relief requested by defendant as dependent on the validity of the 

judgment of foreclosure. MCL 211.78k supports that determination. Defendant failed to pay the 

delinquent taxes, interest, penalties, and fees in accordance with MCL 211.78k(6), and fee 

simple title to the property vested in Wayne County, the foreclosing governmental unit. 

Defendant did not file an appeal in this Court, pursuant to MCL 211.78k(7). Thus, Wayne 

County held fee simple title to the property, and it properly conveyed the property to plaintiff, 

which had exercised its right of first refusal pursuant to MCL 211.78m.

Quite simply, pursuant to subsection (6), fee simple title to the property vested in Wayne 

County and defendant did not appeal this vesting. Defendant relies on In re Petition by Wayne 

Co Treasurer to argue that we may not rely on MCL 211.78k(6) to affirm the circuit court’s 

ruling. In that case, the property owner challenged a judgment of possession that was entered 

under the provisions of the GPTA. In re Petition by Wayne Co Treasurer, 478 Mich at 5-6. The 

Court recognized that the GPTA “reflect[s] a legislative effort to provide finality to foreclosure 

judgments and to quickly return property to the tax rolls,” but it found that when “the property 

owner is not provided with constitutionally adequate notice of the foreclosure[,] . . . MCL 
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211.78k(6) serves to insulate violations of [the constitutional rights to due process] from judicial 

review and redress, thereby completely denying the property owner procedural due process.” Id. 

at 4. It determined that, as applied to those property owners who have been denied due process 

with regard to tax foreclosure, the provision limiting modification of judgments of foreclosure is 

unconstitutional. Id. at 4, 10.

We find In re Petition by Wayne Co Treasurer distinguishable from the present case. As 

noted, the judgment of foreclosure was entered on March 20, 2015, and listed a redemption date 

of March 31, 2015. Thereafter, on March 31, 2015, defendant entered into a “stipulated payment 

agreement.” Defendant initialed a box stating, “I realize these payments must be made on/before 

due dates.” Before her signature, the payment-plan document states: “By your signature you 

hereby acknowledge that you have read the instructions and agree to the terms of this 

agreement.” The document further states:

If Taxpayer fails to pay at least 60% of the 2012 and prior TIPF by June 2, 

2015, this property will be foreclosed and offered to the State of Michigan, 

local municipality, county and/or auctioned. Taxpayer shall be in default of 

this Stipulated Agreement and cause the extended period of redemption to expire 

on that date, and the property shall vest in the Treasurer by the fee simple absolute 

title pursuant to the Judgment of Foreclosure to be filed upon default under 

Wayne County Circuit Court Case No. 14-007672-CH. Taxpayer hereby waives 

notice of and period to cure the default . . . .

4. It is acknowledged by the undersigned Taxpayer and/or representative 

that any right the Taxpayer may have to contest or object to the Petition of 

Foreclosure or any Judgment based upon said Petition to foreclose the 

property . . . including the right, if any, to a hearing . . . is hereby knowingly 

and voluntarily waived. [Underlining and bolding in original.]

The lower-court record contains an August 18, 2015, letter written from an occupant of the home 

“on behalf of [defendant].” The letter writer admits that defendant missed payments and 

“attempted to pay off the outstanding balance” in July 2015. In addition, and more significantly,

at a November 25, 2015, hearing, defendant’s son, explicitly “speaking on her behalf,” admitted 

that defendant defaulted on the payment agreement.

Under the unique circumstances of this case, In re Petition by Wayne Co Treasurer is 

distinguishable as a matter of law; indeed, that case applies to “cases where the taxing authority 

has denied the taxpayer due process,” id. at 11, and uncontested facts show that such a denial did 

not occur in the present case.2 

 2 While the circuit court may have worded its ruling differently, because it technically had 

jurisdiction over the appeal from the district court, it did correctly rule that the judgment of 

foreclosure was not subject to being vacated. We affirm a court that reaches the correct outcome 

for an incorrect reason. Taylor v Laban, 241 Mich App 449, 458; 616 NW2d 229 (2000). 
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Defendant argues that “[t]he [d]istrict [c]ourt erred by denying [defendant’s] motion to 

dismiss or stay the summary proceedings pending the outcome of the federal action and to 

otherwise permit her to assert equitable claims and defenses regarding title.”3 She states that 

“entry of the judgment of possession in this case was improper because [defendant] was 

litigating the issue of title in another court.” Defendant, however, cites only nonbinding caselaw 

in support of her argument.4 The unpublished case on which defendant primarily relies involved 

significant procedural irregularities and ample evidence of a competing claim to title of the home 

in question. No such circumstances are present here. In light of the dearth of caselaw or other 

authority provided, and under the factual circumstances—with defendant entering into an

explicitly-worded payment agreement as discussed above and defaulting on that agreement—we 

find no basis on which to disturb the lower-court rulings in this case.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Talbot

/s/ Patrick M. Meter

/s/ Jonathan Tukel

 3 As stated in footnote 2, infra, defense counsel did not ask the court, at the district-court motion 

hearing, to rule on the equitable issues but argued only that the case should be dismissed or 

stayed because of the federal action.

4 Defendant does cite three published Michigan cases (dealing with mortgage foreclosures): 

Federal National Mortgage Ass’n v Wingate, 404 Mich 661; 273 NW2d 456 (1979),

Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corp v Snell, 142 Mich App 548; 370 NW2d 401 (1985), and 

Reid v Nusholtz, 264 Mich 220; 249 NW 831 (1933). However, these cases are inapposite. 

Federal National Mortgage Ass’n, 404 Mich at 672, involved one issue: whether appeal bonds 

concerning a mortgage foreclosure were reasonable. While the Court tangentially discussed “the 

availability of invalidity of foreclosure as a defense to summary proceedings,” it did not rule on 

the issue. Id. at 676. In Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corp, 142 Mich App at 553, the 

Court did state that “[t]he district court has jurisdiction to hear and determine equitable claims 

and defenses involving the mortgagor’s interest in the property,” but, significantly, at the June 

16, 2016, hearing, defense counsel in the present case argued that the district court should not 

determine the equitable claims and that the case should simply be dismissed or stayed in light of 

the action in federal court. Similarly, Reid, 264 Mich at 224, referred to “test[ing] the validity of 

[a foreclosure] sale in the summary proceedings,” but again, defense counsel did not advocate for 

this and instead argued for a dismissal or stay based on the federal action.