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# United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Cir c uit

No. 18-1785

U NI T E D S TAT E S O F A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

S P E C TR UM B R AND S , I N C ., Defendant-Appellant.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the

Western Di stri ct o f Wi sco nsi n No . 3 :1 5 -cv -0 0 3 7 1 -wmc — Willia m M. Conle y, Judg e.

A RGU E D N OV E MB E R 1, 2 018

— D E C I D E D M A Y 9, 2019

Befor e W O OD, Ch i e

f Ju d ge, a n d M ANI O N and R OVN E R , Circuit Judges

. R OVN E R , Cir cuit Judge. The di str i ct cour t f ou nd t h a t S pectr um Br ands, Inc. ( “S pectr um”) v i olated secti on 15(b) of the Consumer Pr oduct S afety Act ( “ CPS A” or the “ Act”), 15 U.S

. C. § 2 064(b)(3), when i ts subsi di a r y fai led to ti mely r epor t to the gov er nment a potenti ally hazar dous d efect in i ts Black &2 No. 18-1785

D e cker SpaceMaker c offeemaker despi te y ear s’ w or th of

consumer complaints about the pr oduct. Followi ng a n ev i denti ar y hear ing as to the appr opr i ate r em e d y f o r the r epor ti ng

v i o l a t io n, the c our t enter ed a per manent inj uncti on whi ch, in i ts final for m, r equi r es S pectr um to adher e to i ts n e wlyi mplemented CPS A compli ance p r a cti ces and to r etai n an i ndependent consultant to r ecommend add i ti onal m odi fi cati ons to those pr acti ces. S pectr um appeals, conte n d ing both that t h e gov er nment’s late-r epor ti ng clai m i s b ar r ed by the statute of li mi tati ons, that the di str i ct c our t h ad no a uthor i ty to enter a for w ar d-looki ng in j u n c ti on, and that the cour t other

wi se abused i ts di scr eti on in aw ar ding per manent inj un c t iv e
r eli ef, including the r equi r ement that i t engage the exper t

. Fi nding no m er i t i n any of these challenges , we affi rm the j udgment.
I.
S pectr um i s a global, d i v er si fi ed c onsumer pr odu cts company h eadquar ter ed in Mi ddleton, Wi sconsin. Dur ing the y ear s r elev ant to thi s acti on, Spectr um di str ibuted to r etai ler s
mor e than 24 m i lli on i n di v i dual p r oducts p er y ear acr oss mor e than 500 stock keepi ng uni ts. Among the pr oducts i t s old w as
a l i ne of under -the-cabinet Black & Decker S paceMaker coffeemaker s, di s tr ibuted by i ts s ubsi di ar y , Appli ca Consumer Pr oducts, Inc. (“Appli ca”). 1

1 A ppl i ca i mpo rted the Bl a ck & D ecker co ffeema kers fro m Chi na a nd di s tri b uted them to reta i l ers fro m 20 0 8 t o 2 0 12

. A ppl i ca b eca me a who l l yo wned sub si di a ry of S pectrum i n 2 0 1 0 a n d then m erged wi th S pectrum in 2 0 1 4

. A t the ti me o f the merger, S pectrum a ssumed a l l o f the a ssets a nd (co nti nued...)No. 18-1785 3

As a p ur v ey or of consumer pr oducts, S pectr um i s legally

o b l ig a ted to noti fy the U.S

. Consumer P r oducts S a fety Commi ssi on (“CPS C” or “Commi s si on”) of potenti ally hazar dous defects in any of i ts pr oducts. S peci fi c ally , secti on 15(b) of the C P S A r equi r es a manufactur er , di str ibutor

, or r etai ler of a
consumer pr oduc t “ wh o ob t a in s in fo r m a t i o n whi ch r easonably suppor ts the conclusi on that such pr oduct” contai ns “a defect whi ch—

... could cr eate a s u b stanti al pr oduct h azar d ” to “i m medi ately” i nfor m the Commi ssi on of sai d defect, “unless such manufactu r e r

, di str ib utor

, or r etai l er h as actual knowledge that the C o mm is si on has been adequately infor med of such defect

... .” 15 U.S

. C. § 2064(b)(3). A “substanti al pr oduct hazar d” i s one whi ch poses a “substanti a l r i sk of inj ur y to the publi c.” Id. § 2064(a)(2). The duty to r epor t such a hazar d “i m medi ately” means wi thi n 2 4 hour s of becoming a w a r e of the hazar d. 16 C.F .R. § 1115.14(e). 2 And a manufactur er , di str ibutor

, or r etai ler can be sai d to hav e “actual knowledge” that the Commi ssi on has alr eady been adequately infor med of

a defect (r eli ev i ng i t of the obli gati on to make a r epor t) only i f the manufactu r er

, di str ibutor

, or r etai ler has pr ev i ously

1 (...co nti nued)

o b l i ga t i o ns o f A ppl i ca, a nd there i s n o di spute tha t the a ssumed l i ab i l i ti es i ncl ude A ppl i ca ’s l i ab i l i ty wi th respect to the ev ents underl yi n gthi s ca se. Fo r the sa ke of si mpl i ci ty, then, we ha v e trea ted S pectrum a s the di stri b uto r
o f the co ffeema kers a t i ssue here.

2 The regul a ti ons a l l o w a “ rea so nab l e ti me” fo r a co mpa ny t o i nv esti ga te the pro b l em w i th i ts pro duct when th e i nfo rma ti o n i n i ts po ssessi o n i s “ n ot cl ea rl y repo rtab l e” to the Co mmi ssi o n. 1 6 C.F.R

. § 11 1 5.1 4 (c). A peri o d o f up to ten da ys (ex cl udi ng weekends a nd ho l i da ys) i s deemed a presumpti v el y rea so nab l e ti me peri o d fo r tha t purpo s e. See id

. § § 1 1 1 5.1 4 (a ), (d).4 No. 18-1785

di sclosed the d efect i n a secti on 15(b) r epor t to the CPS C or i f the Commi s si on i tself indi cates that i t h as alr eady b een adequately in f or med of the d efect. 16 C.F .R. § 1115.3(a). S epar ately

, the statute m akes i t unlawful for any per son to “fai l to fur ni sh infor m ati on r equi red by secti on 2064(b).” 15 U.S

. C. § 2068(a)(4). By Febr uar y 2009, S pectr um’s thi rd-pa r ty customer call center had r ecei v ed a number of complaints fr om c o n s umer s
r egar ding the S paceMaker coffeemaker s, including in par ti cular complaints that the plasti c handle on the coffeemaker ’s 12- cup car afe had br oken. In one instance, the fai lur e of a handle had caused a c onsumer to suffer a bur n fr om the hot c offee in th e c a r afe. It appear s fr om the r ecor d that when the car afe handle fai led, typi cally i ts top por ti on (whi ch w as secur ed by

a scr ew) detached fr om the glass car afe, whi le the bottom of the handle (w hich w a s fastened by a m etal band r unning
ar ound the b ottom of the c ar afe) r emained sec u r ely in place. Thi s c aused the car a fe to ti p or w obble in the consumer ’s hand. When the car afe w as full of hot coffee, the sudden mov ement could cause the consumer to spi ll the coffee or dr op the car afe altogether

. In Apr i l 2009, in the face of conti nuing c omplaints about br oken handles, S pectr um commenced an inv esti gati on whi ch culminated i n a deci si on to m odi fy the desi gn of th e ca r a f e handle. The manufactur er w a s i nstr u cted to cease fabr i cati ng the or i gi nal v er si on of the car afe a nd to scr ap any uni ts alr eady i n pr oducti on. S pectr um began stocki ng coffeemaker s wi th the modi fi ed handle begi nning in May

. Rather than ceasing sales of th e o r i gi nal coffeemaker s wi th the pr oblemati c car afe, how ev er , S pectr um i mplemented a “r olling change” pur suantNo. 18-1785 5

to whi ch i t conti nued to sell the older v er si ons so long as they

r emained i n stock. Although S pectr um h as assumed t h a t t he engi n eer i ng change fi xed the pr oblem wi th the car afe handle, the r e is no p r oof i n the r ecor d a s to whether all of the consumer complaints that S pectr um r ecei v ed about the ca r a f e pr i or to the ev entual r ecal l o f the coffeemaker s in 2 012 w er e li m i ted to the or i gi nal v er si on of the car afe.
Meanwhi le, S pec tr um conti nued to r ecei v e complaints about br oken handles on the car afes. B y the end of 2 0 09, i t had

r ecei v ed an addi ti ona l 300 such complaints, whi ch included

mor e than a dozen r epor ts of bur ns or lacer ati ons. Dur ing thi s ti me, the CPS C i tself r ecei v ed a r epor t about a faulty handle, and the Commi ssi on, consi stent wi th i ts pr acti ce, p a ssed the

r epor t on to Spectr um w i thout inv es ti gati on, r eminding the company of i ts duty under secti on 15(b) to noti fy the Commi ssi on i f Spectr um w a s aw ar e of a p o t e nti ally hazar dous defect i n i ts pr oduct. Spectr um di d not fi l e a s ecti on 1 5 (b) r ep o r t a t that ti me. Ov er the cour se of the next tw o y ear s, the c ompany
r emained si lent about the car afe handle ev en as mor e co m
plaints of handle fai lur es and r esulting inj ur i es made thei r w ay to S pectr um. Dur i ng t h i s ti me, the CPS C i tself r ecei v ed and for w ar ded another sev en br oken-handle r epor ts to S pectr um. 3

3 The fa ct tha t Spectrum di d no t respo nd mo re pr o a cti v el y to the stea dy strea m o f co mpl a i nts a ppea rs to ha v e b een the resul t o f b oth askepti ci sm
w i th respect to co nsumer co mpl a i nts genera ll y a s wel l a s an i nt e r n a l pra cti ce a s to when s uch co mpl a i nts meri t e d i n vesti g a to ry fo l l owup. The

co ffeema ker, i ncl udi ng the ca ra fe, h a d b een tho ro ughl y tested b efo re i t w a s (co nti nued...)6 No. 18-1785

Not unti l Apr i l 2012 di d S pectr um finally fi le a secti on 15(b)

r epor t wi th the Commi ssi on. The r epor t w as what the CPS C called a “fast-tr ac k ” r epor t whi ch indi cated the company’s i ntent to r ecall the coffeemaker

. One month ear li er , a c l a ss acti on s ui t had been fi led agai nst S p ectr u m allegi ng that ther e
w as a desi gn defect i n the car afe handle, and that sui t ev i dently per suaded the company that the be st cour se of a cti on w as to

r ecall the pr oduct enti r ely , including models wi t h b o t h the

or i gi n a l and r e-engi neer ed c a r afe handles. The r epor t as amended adv i sed the Commi ssi on that S p ectr um had r ecei v ed

3 (...co nti nued) pl a ced o n the m a rket, so the co mpa ny ha d rea so n t o b el iev e tha t there w a s
no fa ul t i n the desi gn o f the ca ra fe. The testi mo ny presented to the di stri ct

co u rt suggests tha t i t i s no t unco m mo n fo r a co n s umer t o co mpl a i n ab o ut

ab ro ken pro duct a nd seek a refund o r repl a cement b a sed o n apurpo rted defect i n the pro duct, when i n fa ct it i s the co nsumer who h a s c a u s e d the pro duct to b rea k thro ugh hi s o wn mi suse o r c l u ms y ha ndl i ng. S pectrum ( rea l l y, A ppl i ca ) thus h a d a pra cti ce o f n ot i nv esti ga ti ng i ts pro duct s f o r po tenti a l desi gn a n d/ or sa fety fl a w s unl ess a co ns u me r w a s w i l l i ng t o return the br o ken pro duct to the co mpa ny fo r i nspecti o n. Ea rl y o n, two

co n sumers di d return fa i l ed ca ra fes to the c o m p a ny, a nd i t wa s the

co m pa ny’s i nv esti ga ti o n a s to tho se f a i l u r e s tha t resul ted i n the reengi neeri ng o f the ca ra fe ha ndl e i n 2 00 9

. At tha t po int, S pectrum ev i dentl y
co n si dered a ny pro b l em wi th the ca ra fe t o h a v e b een so l v ed. The co mpa ny vi e wed the o n go i ng co mpl a i nts ab o ut the ca ra fe a s a qua l i ty-co ntro l pro bl e m wi th the pro ducti o n o f the ca ra fe ra ther tha n a sa fety i ssue. A nd A ppl ica ’s pri o r ex peri ence wi th a no ther co ffeema ker, a s t o whi ch i t fi l ed a repo rt wi th the Co mmi ssi o n b ut wa s requi red to ta k e n o remedi a l a cti o n , l ul l ed the co m pa ny i nto thi nki ng there w a s no need to fi l e a repo rt a s to the Bl a ck & Decker ca ra fe.No. 18-1785 7

ov er 1,600 complaints of handle fai lur es 4 a n d mor e than 60

r epor ts of associ ated i nj ur i es to consumer s. 5 T w o months later

, i n Ju n e 2 0 12, Spectr um and the CPS C j oi ntly announced a
r ecall of the defecti v e coffeemaker s. 6 By the ti m e the r ecall w as announced, S pectr um had sold some 159,000 of the co ffeemaker s, wi th the maj or i ty of them h a v ing been sold b y December2009. Despi te the r ecall, due to gaps in i t s inv entor y-contr ol pr ocedur es, S pectr um in a dv er tently conti nued to sell the

r ecalled coffeemaker s. 7 By June of 2013, i t had sold a nother 641 such coff e e m a k er s

. A secondar y r ecall w as i mplemented to

r each those coffeemaker s

. At that poi nt, s ales of the pr oduct finally ceased.

4 A l o ng- s e rv i ng CPS C empl o y ee w o ul d l a ter testi fy tha t thi s numb er o f

c o m p l a i n ts wa s ex t remel y hi gh fo r a pro duct—perha ps the mo st h e h a d seen i nhi s two deca des a t the Co m mi ssi o n.

5 S o me 9 0 0 o f these c o m p l a i n t s were recei v ed a fter S pectrum to o k o v er A ppl ica, the i mpo rter a nd di stri b uto r o f the co ffeema kers, i n 2 0 1 0.

6 A secti o n 1 5 (b ) repo rt wo ul d o rdi na ri l y t r i gger a n i nv esti ga ti o n b y the Co mmi ssi on to d etermi ne whether, inter alia , a reca ll o f the pro duct w a s
a ppro pri a t e. Ho w ev er, b eca use S pectrum h a d si gna l ed i ts i ntenti o n t o

v o l unta ri l y reca ll the co ffeema ker, no such i nv esti ga ti o n wa s necessa ry.

7 S pectrum h a d pl a ced a pro duct ho l d o n the reca ll ed co ffeema kers, whi ch sto pped di stri b uti o n o f uni ts a l rea dy o n i ts wa reho use shel v es, b ut the ho l d di d n o t rea ch pro ducts i n tra nsi t fro m Chi na

. When the l a tter uni ts a rri v ed

a t the co mpa ny’s wa reho use, they were erro neo u sl y rel ea sed fo r di stri b uti on.8 No. 18-1785

In June 2015, thr ee y ear s after S pectr um r eca l l e d t he defecti v e coffeemaker s, the gov er nment fi led a ci v i l c omplaint agai nst the company i n the d i str i ct cour t. As relev ant her e, the complaint alleged that S pectr u m, begi nnin g in Febr uar y 2009, obtai n ed infor mati on reasonably suppor ti ng the concl u s ion that the coffeemaker s i t w a s d i str ib uti ng contai ned a hazar dous defect or posed an unr easonable ri sk of inj u r y , fai l ed to s o infor m the CPS C for sev er al y ear s ther eafter , and ther e b y knowi ngly v i olated secti on 15(b) of the Act. § 2 064(b)(3). 8 The complaint also alleged that S pectr um commi tted a s econd

v i olati on of the Act by c onti nuin g to di str ibute or sell c offeemaker s that i t had pr ev i ously r ecalled. See 15 U

. S

. C. § 2068(a)(2)(B).
The CPS A author i zes ci vi l penalti es o f u p to $ 100,000 for each knowi ng vi olati on of the Act, n ot to exceed a cei lin g of $15,150,000 f or “ a n y related ser i es of v i olati ons.” 15 U.S

. C. § 2069(a)(1); 76 Fed. Reg. 71,554, 71,554–55 (N o v

. 18, 2 011) (pr o v i d in g fo r in fl a t i o n
- r e l a t e d in c r e a s e s t o m a x imum penalty). The statute also author i zes the gov er nment to seek i nj uncti v e

8 The sta tute sepa ra tel y requ i res the di scl o s ure o f a defect whi ch “ crea tes

a n unrea so nab l e ri sk o f seri ous i nj ury o r dea th .” § 2 0 6 4 (b )(4 ). The go v ernment’s co mpl a i nt co nta i ned a co unt a l l egi ng tha t S pectrum’s co ffeema ker

co n ta i ned such a defect. Ho wev er, S pectrum di sputed the n oti o n tha t its

co ffeema ker po sed a ri sk o f ca usi ng a nythi ng mo re tha n mi no r i nj uri es; a nd b eca use the di stri ct co urt fo und tha t th e defect i n the co ffeema ker co ul d

cre a t e a “ sub sta nti a l pro duct ha z a rd,” see § 2 0 6 3 (b )(3 ), and S pectrum w a s requi red t o gi v e no ti ce to the Co mmi ssi o n o n tha t b a si s, the co urt s a w no need to determi ne whether no ti ce w a s a ddi ti o n a l l y requi red o n the gro und tha t the pro duct po sed a ri sk o f seri o us i nj ury o r dea th. S ee U nited States v

. Sp ectrum Brand s, Inc. , 2 1 8 F. S upp. 3 d 7 9 4, 8 2 2 n.2 4 (W.D. Wi s. 2 0 1 6 ).No. 18-1785 9

r eli ef i n or der to “[r ]estr ain any v i olati on of” the Act. 15 U.S

. C. § 2071(a)(1). The gov er nment sought b oth for m s of r eli ef in i ts complaint agai nst S pectr um. S pectr um d id not contest i ts li abi li ty for di str ibuting
r eca l l ed pr oducts, and the di str i c t cour t on summar y j udgment deemed the company li able for v i olati ng i ts r epor ti ng obli gati on under secti on 15(b). United States v

. Spectrum B rands, Inc. , 218 F

. S upp. 3d 794, 818–22 (W .D. Wi s. 2 016). The uncontested f a c ts indi cated to the di str i ct cour t that, as ear ly as May 200 9 (when the company had alr eady recei v ed 60 repor ts of b roken

car a fe handles and four consumer bur ns), and cer tai nl y n o later than June 2010 (by whi ch ti me it w a s aw ar e of ov er 700 handle fai lur es and 35 inj ur i es), S pectr um possessed infor mati on suppor ti ng a conclusi on that the c a r a fe handle on the coffeemaker s the c ompany w as di s tr ibuting c ontai ned a defect whi ch could cr eate a substanti al pr oduct hazar d. Id. at 821–22. Y et, S p ectr u m di d not “i mmedi ately” r epor t the p r oblem to the CPS C, as secti on 1 5(b) r equi r ed, b ut in stead delay ed i ts r epor t for another tw o y ear s. See id. at 820–21.
The cour t rej ected S pectr um’s contenti on that the gov er nment’s secti on 15(b) clai ms w er e bar r ed by the appli c able fi v ey e a r statute of l i mi tati ons. 218 F

. S upp. 3d at 815–17; s e e 2 8 U.S .C. § 2 4 62. S pectr um’s theor y w as that the l i mi tati ons per i od began to r un in May 2009, when ( as the d i s tr i ct cour t postulated) i ts duty to r epor t a r guably fi r st ar ose, and expi r ed i n May 2 014, mor e than a y ear befor e the gov er n m ent fi led sui t. Id. at 815. The cour t r easoned that the r epor ti ng obli gati on imposed by secti on 15(b) i s a conti nuing one, such t h a t a company’s v i olati on of i ts duty i s not complete unti l s uch ti me
as the company finally submi ts a r epor t to the Commi ssi on or10 No. 18-1785 acqui r es actual knowledge that the Commi ssi on has other wi se been adequately i nfor m ed of the pr oduct defect. I d

. at 817. Consequently

, i n the di str i ct cour t’s v i ew , a cause of acti on for br each of the r epor ti ng r equi rement does n ot accr u e unti l thi s t im e

. Id. A contr ar y under s tandi n g, the cour t poi nted out,

w ould encour a ge a company that h as not i mmedi ately fi led a
s ecti on 15(b) r epor t w i th the Commi ssi on to contin u e t o wi thhold i nfor mati on about a pr oduct defect unti l such ti me as the li mi tati ons per i od has r un, and ther eby u nder mine the statutor y goal of encour agi ng the ti mely r epor ti ng of pr oduct fai lur es i n or der to pr otect the publi c fr om har m

. Id. Deeming
a fai lur e to r epor t as a di scr ete, t im e-li mi ted v i olati on str uck the cour t a s “nonsensi cal,” par ti cular ly wher e the egr eg i o usness of the fai lur e to r epor t i ncr eases exponenti ally ov er ti me wi th conti nuin g consumer complaints of pr oduct fai l ur es and i nj ur i es, as occur r ed in thi s case. Id.
The c our t l i kewi se r ej ected Spectr um’s contenti on that the

cour t lacked author i ty under the CPS A to i mpose the for w ar dlooki ng i nj uncti v e reli ef on the c ompany that the gov er nment had sought ( i n addi ti on to monetar y penalti es) in i ts pr ay er for

r eli ef. Because the s t a t u te author i zes inj uncti v e r eli ef as
necessar y to “[r ]estr ai n any v i ol a t io n” of the Act, 15 U.S

. C. § 2701(a)(1), the c our t infer r ed that i ts pow er to aw ar d inj u ncti v e r eli ef included the pow er to enj oi n futur e v i olati ons

. 218 F . S upp. 3d at 823–25. The gov er nment, i t concluded, had put for th a p lausi

ble c ase that S p ectr u m’s “knowi ng, ar guably outr ageous, conduct” w ar r anted such an inj uncti on. Id. at 825. The c our t ther ef o r e d e clined to di smi s s thi s por ti on of the gov er nment’s pr a y er for inj uncti v e r eli ef, r eser v ing j udgmentNo. 18-1785 11

as to whether an i nj uncti on w a s w ar r anted pending f ur ther dev elopment of the facts. Id.
Followi ng an ev i denti a r y hear in g as to the a p p r opr i ate

r emedi es for S p ectr um’s v i olatio n s o f the CPS A and a thor

o u g h canv assing of the cr i ter i a set for th in the statute an d

r egulati ons, see 15 U.S .C. § 2069(b); 16 C.F .R. § § 1 119.1, 1119.4; R. 234 at 5–12, the di str i ct cour t i ssued a deci si on i m posing both fi nes and a per manent inj uncti on. The cour t or der ed the company to pay c i v i l penalti es totali ng $1,936,675—$821,675 for the secti on 15(b) r epor ti ng v i olati on and $1,115,000 for the sale of r ecalled p r oducts. R. 234 at 12–16. T h e c o ur t also

con cl uded that the gov er nment had establi shed a r easonable li kelihood of futur e v i olati ons w ar r anti ng a pe r m a nent in jun c t i o n r equi r i ng S pectr um to r efo r m i t s int e rn a l c o m p l i a n c e pr ogr ams a nd pr ocedur e s

. R. 2 34 at 17–21. Th e c our t found that a key pr oblem contr ibuting to the company’s fai lu r e to ti mely repor t the pr oblem wi th i ts pr oblemati c co ff ee car afe

w as a lack of communi cati on a m o n g e m p l oy ees r esponsi ble for

ev aluati n g consumer c o mplaints, those employ ees wi th knowledge of the pr oduct’s desi gn and defec t, and s eni or management per s onnel. R. 2 34 at 1 8–19. S i mi lar communi cati on fai lur es, along wi th the f a il u r e to i mplement r elati v ely si mple measur es to pr ev ent the di str ib uti on o f r ecalled pr oducts, lar gely explai ned Spectr um’s c onti nuing sales of the

r ecalled coffeemaker

. R. 2 34 at 1 9. The c o u r t a cknowledged a
r epor t pr epar ed by S pec t r u m ’ s exper t wi tness i denti fyi ng a number of pr ocedur es the company w a s u t i l i zing to gather , ev aluate, and escalate pr oduct in for mati on that mi ght r equi r e
r epor ti ng to the CPS C. But that repor t di d not addr ess whether these same pr ocedur es w er e in place dur ing pr i or y ear s, when12 No. 18-1785

S pectr um had fai led to r epor t t h e car afe-handle defect to the Commi ssi on despi te ongoi ng r epor ts of handle fai l u r e s and i nj ur i es. Nor di d the r epor t d i s cuss whether these pr ocedur es
w er e wr i tten, d i s s eminated, and enfor c ed wi thi n the c ompany and whether appr opr i ate company per s onnel wer e tr ai ned in these pr ocedur es. R. 234 at 19. Mor e o v e r , s o far as the r ecor d

r e v ealed, S pectr um had not commi s s i oned a n independen t audi t to gauge the effi cacy of these m easur es. R. 234 at 21. The

cour t found i t tel l i ng that seni or engi neer ing and global quali ty per sonnel a t S pectr um c ould not r ecall meaningful di scussi ons of the pr oblems wi th the car afes pr i or to 2012, n otwi thstanding the r ecei p t of consumer complaints begi nning in 2009. R. 234 a t 20. Consequently

, the cour t w as left wi th ser i ous doubts as to the effi cacy of the effor ts Spectr um had under taken to addr ess the faults that had caused the company to v i olate i ts r epor ti ng obli gati ons under s ecti on 15(b) and to pr ev ent the c onti nued sales of r ecalled pr oducts. [Q]uesti ons

... r emain r egar ding the extent to whi ch S pectr um h a s un d e r t a k e n a m e an in g f u l in d e p e n d ent audi t of i ts CPS A r epor tin g a nd recall obli gati ons, and a ddr essed the de f ic i enci es in i ts systems and pr ogr ams that led to i ts v i o l a t i on of these obli gat i ons. Whi le S pectr um appear s to hav e made som e effor ts to pr ev ent si mi l ar v i olati ons fr om occur ri ng i n the futur e, the ser i ousness of i ts offens[es] to date

r equi r e that the systems that i t has in place to c omply wi th the CPS A s h o u l d by n ow be ri gor ous and

w ell-defin ed.

... Accor dingly , t he cour t finds that plainti ff has made an adequate showing of the need for per manent inj uncti v e r eli ef to addr ess S pec-No. 18-1785 13

tr um’s audi ting, compli ance a nd tr ainin g r egar ding compli ance wi th the CPS A’s r epor ti ng requi r ement and post-r ecall sale pr ohib i ti on goi ng for w ar d.
R. 234 at 2 1. The c our t w ent o n t o enter a for w ar d-looki ng per manent i nj uncti on whi ch, among other thi ng s, r equi r ed S pectr um to “main t a in suffi ci ent systems, pr ogr ams, and i nter n a l contr ols to ensur e compli ance wi th the CPS A and the

r egulati ons enfor ced by the CPS C” and to “i mplement a ppr opr ia te i mpr ov ements to i ts compli ance pr ogr ams” wi thi n si x months of the cour t’s or der

. R. 2 3 4 a t 22. Th e or d er also

r equi r ed S p ectr u m to di ssemin a te copi es of the cour t’s s ummar y j udgment and penalty d eci si ons to i ts di r ector s, offi cer s, management per sonnel, a n d in-house counsel to the ext ent they w er e i nv olv ed in t he manufactur ing and di str i buti on of

consumerpr oducts in the Uni ted S tates. R. 234 at 22.
S pectr um fi led a moti on aski ng the cour t for a par ti al stay of i ts j udgment. It asked the cour t to s tay both the penalty i mposed for the secti on 15(b) late-r epor ti ng v i olati on as well as the bulk of the i nj uncti on the cour t had enter ed, both of whi ch i t i ntended to appeal. 9 As to the inj uncti on, S pect r um ar gued that a stay w as w ar r anted, inter a lia , because the ter ms of the i nj uncti on w er e so v ague as to r ender i t n othi n g mor e than a command to “obey the law .” R. 237 a t 5–6; see E

. E .O.C v

. AutoZone, Inc. , 7 07 F .3d 824, 841–42 (7th C i r

. 2013) (outli ning the concer ns pr esented by such a n inj uncti on). Befor e the cour t

r u led on the stay r equest, S pectr um fi led i ts noti ce of appeal.

9 S pectrum d i d n o t seek a sta y a s to the pro v i si o n i n the i nj uncti o n requi ri ng i t to di s tri b ute co pi es o f the co urt’s summa r y j udgment a nd pena l ty o pi ni o ns to a ppro pri a te co mpa ny perso nnel

.14 No. 18-1785

The di str i ct cour t subsequently gr anted the stay r equest in p a r t, agr eei ng to place the late-r epor tin g penalty on hol d b u t not the i nj uncti on. R. 243. The cour t acknowledged that in setti ng for th what the in j uncti on r equi r ed of S p e c tr um, i t mi ght hav e “fall[en] shor t” of the speci fi ci ty r equi red by Feder al Rule of Ci vi l Pr ocedur e 65(d)(1)(B) and ( C). R. 2 43 a t 4. Wi th an ey e to cor r ecti ng that p r oblem, the di str i c t cour t or der ed S p ectr u m to fil e a m e mor andum detai ling the speci fi c steps i t had alr eady taken to ensur e com pl ia n c e wi th the CPS A and the CPS C’s regulati on s; i t also or d er ed the gov er nment to fi le a
r esponse as to the suffi ci ency of the m e a sur es S pectr um had taken along wi th any pr oposals of i ts own. R. 243 at 4.
After r ev i ewing the memor anda the par ti es subsequently submi tted, the c our t i ssued a n opi ni on whi ch modi fi ed the ter ms of the i nj uncti on in or der to clar i fy what speci fi c conduct

w ould consti tute compli ance wi th the inj uncti on’s di r ecti v e to i mpr ov e and maintai n suffi ci ent systems, pr ogr ams, and the li ke to ensur e compli an c e w ith the statute and r egulati ons. United States v

. S p e c t rum Brands, Inc. , 2 018 WL 5 02736 (W .D. W is

. J a n

. 19, 2018). Cogni zant of the li mi ts on i ts author i ty to alter the inj uncti on i n v i ew of S pectr um’s pending appeal, the

cour t pr oceeded on the assumpt io n t ha t i t could, at a mini

mum, “pr eser v e the status quo pending a ppeal and clar i fy the i nj uncti on’s speci fi c r equi r ements.” Id. at *2; see Fed. R. Ci v . P

. 62(d) (as amended effecti v e 12-1-2018); Newton v

. Consol. Gas Co. of N.Y

. , 258 U.S

. 1 6 5 , 1 7 7–78, 42 S

. Ct. 264, 267 (1922); Meinhold v

. U.S. Dep’ t o f D efense , 3 4 F .3d 1469, 1480 n.14 (9th Ci r

. 1994). T

ow ar d that end, t h e c o u r t incor por ated into the inj uncti on si x speci fi c m easur es that Spectr um r epr esented it had alr eady taken to i mpr ov e i ts c ompli anc e p r ocesses andNo. 18-1785 15

whi ch the cour t found to be “consi stent wi th the spi r i t of [i ts]

o r ig in a l per manent in j uncti on, i f not i ts letter .” 2018 WL 502736, at *3. 1 0 As modi fi ed, the in j uncti on r equi r ed S p ectr u m to: (1) Mai ntai n the posi ti on of S e n i o r D i r e c t o r , G lobal Quali ty (or i t s equi v alent) wi th quali fi cati ons
a n d a uthor i ty to moni tor (and i f necessar y , enhance) S pectr um’s poli ci es to ensur e futur e pr oduct quali ty and safety; (2) Regular ly tr ack pr oduc t safety in for mati on, i ncludin g pr oduct r etur n r ates, call center d a ta, and p r oduct “ s tar ” r a ti ngs by consumer s on

v ar i ous w ebsit e s , and ev aluate that infor mati on to deter min e whether i ss u e s ar e being i denti fi ed and appr opr i a tely handled; (3) Document calls and wr i tten communi cati ons
r egar ding potenti al and actual inci dents and in ju r y infor mati on, collect pr oducts that a r e th e subj ect of r epor ts by c o ns u mer s or r etai l par tn er s of potenti a l safety i s s ues, analyze those pr oducts an d b ri ng the r esults of any such analysi s to the attenti on of Spectr um’s S eni or Di r ector , Global Quali ty (o r i ts equi v alent), and

1 0 S pectrum h a d ev i dentl y b egun to i mpl ement so me refo rms to A ppl i ca ’s

c om p l i an c e p r ocedures when A ppl i ca fi rst b eca m e a sub si di a ry of S p e c t ru m i n 2 0 1 0

.16 No. 18-1785

other s as appr opr i a te, to deter mine whether S pectr um has a repor ti ng obli gati on to the CPS C; (4) Implement a for mal “Request for Cor r ecti v e Acti on” pr ocedur e wher eby quali ty engi neer s
a n d p r oducts safety manager s can m ake a
r equest to change a p r oduct based on v a r io u s factor s, includ ing consumer complaints and i nci d ents; (5) Mai ntain a “Pr oduct Hold Pr ocess” (or i ts equi v alent) thr ough whi ch the m a nufactur e and di str ibuti on of pr oducts c an be plac e d on hold for desi gn i ssues, manufactur ing is su es, per for mance i ssues, a n d safety i ssues, includi ng any and all such pr oducts that ma y be

r etur n ed to S p e c t r u m b y a wa r ehouse, di str ib utor , cust o mer or other wi se to pr ev ent the sale of r ecalled pr oducts; and (6) Ensur e c ompli a nce tr aining of r esponsi ble employ ees on CPS A and/or CPS C r egulati ons, par ti cular ly wi th respect to secti o n 15(b)’s

r e po r t i n g r e q ui r ement u nder 15 U.S

. C

. § 2 064( b ) ( 3 )-(4) and the pr ohibi ti on of the sale

o f r e c a l l e d p r o d u c t s un d e r 1 5 U

. S

. C

. § 2068(a)(2)(B).
Id. a t *2–*3, *4–*5 ( emphasi s in or i ginal). The cour t agr eed wi th the gov er nment, h ow ev er , that these measur es by themselv es mi ght not be s uffi ci ent to ensur e S pectr um’s compli ance wi th i ts l egal obli gati ons and av oi d a r epeti ti on of the e v ents thatNo. 18-1785 17

had br ought Spectr um into cour t h er e. Id. a t * 4

. T h e cour t accepted the gov er nment’s sugge s t io n that S pectr um be

r equi r ed to engage a pr ofessi onal consultant fr om outsi d e the company to ev aluate S pectr um’s c o m pli ance pr ocesses and make r ecommendati ons for addi ti onal i mpr ov ements. In t he

cour t’s v i ew

, “[h]i ri ng an outsi de consultant i s a str ai ghtfor

w ar d, speci fi c w a y for S p ectr u m to ensur e i ts good fai th compli ance wi th the per manent inj uncti on, r ather than conti nuin g to li v e u nder the v agueness of the admoni ti on to ‘obey-the-law’ c u r r ently c ontai ned in the per manent inj u ncti on.” Id. The c our t ther efor e added the following command as a final measur e S pectr um w a s r equi r ed to under take: (7) D e fendant shall r etai n, a t i ts own expense, an i ndependent exper t, who, by r eason of b a ckgr ound, tr ai ning and educati on i s quali fi ed to assi st i n r ev i ewin g a n d r e c o m m e n ding changes, i f necessa r y

, to S pectr um’s compr ehensi v e safety pr ogr am for CPS A compli ance, wi th par ti cular emph a s is on compli ance wi th the secti on 15(b) r epor tin g r equi r ement and pr ocedur es necessar y to pr ev en t the sale of

r ecalled pr oducts.

a. The par ti es may hav e 9 0 d ays to agr ee u pon
a n i ndependent exper t, or i f the par t i e s cannot r eac h a gr eement, f or each par ty to desi gnate one exper t wi th whom the cour t wi ll consult to i d enti fy a neutr al exper t. b. Followi ng the r etentio n of the neutr al exper t and that exper t ’ s rev i ew , S p ectr u m18 No. 18-1785

shall h av e 1 20 days to i m plement the r ecommendati ons made by that e x p e r t in good fai th, unless wi thin 30 days of r ece iv in g a
r ecommendati o n, S pectr um fi les a wr i tten challenge in thi s cour t on the basi s that i t i s
unr easonable ( in ti mefr ame or other wi se)

or ov er r eaches t h e number or sev er i ty of defendant’s p a st v i olati ons of the CPS A, in whi ch case S pectr um need only i mplement that r ecomm e ndati on by f u r ther or der of thi s cour t. Id. at *4, *5. The cour t then added the followi ng pr ov i si on: (8) Compli ance wi th ¶¶ 1–7 s hall b e deemed good fai th compli ance w ith thi s per m anent inj u ncti on. Id. The co u r t r ecogni zed that the command to engage an exper t, i n contr ast wi th the other r equi rements i t had i mposed,

w ent bey o nd m ai ntai ning the status quo. It ther efor e stay ed enfor cement of that r equi r ement pendin g appeal. Id. at *4.
In v i ew o f t h ese alter ati ons to the in j uncti on, the gov er nment asked thi s cour t to tr eat the di str i ct cour t’s deci si on a s an i ndi cati v e r ulin g, see Fed. R. Ci v

. P

. 62.1(a)(3), and r emand the

case to the d i str i ct cour t so that the di str i ct cour t could r e-enter the i nj uncti on as modi fi ed and eli minate a n y questi on about t h e di str i ct cour t’s author i ty to do so wi th an appeal alr ead y pending. See Fed. R. App. P

. 1 2.1; S ev enth Ci r cui t Rule 57; In re Cent. Ill. E ner

gy Coop. , 847 F .3d 873, 874 (7th Ci r

. 2017) (Ri pple, J., i n chamber s ); United States v

. Ray, 831 F .3d 431, 436, 4 38 (7th Ci r

. 2016); United States v

. T ay l or , 796 F .3d 788, 792 ( 7 th Ci r

.No. 18-1785 19 2015); Mendez v

. Republic Ban k , 725 F .3d 651, 656, 660 ( 7th Ci r

. 2013). The gov er nment r easoned that although the m aj or i ty of the specifi cati ons the cour t had added to the inj u ncti on
ar gua b l y could b e char a c ter i zed a s si mple clar i fi cati ons that

w er e enti r ely per m i ssi

ble d e spi te the appeal, the di r ecti v e to engage an exper t co n s u ltant w as a mor e substanti v e change that mi ght hav e exceeded the cour t’s li mi ted author i ty

. W e gr a n ted the gov er nment’s moti on, remanded the case to the di str i ct cour t, and di smi ssed S pectr um’s a ppeal. 2018 WL 2228179 (7th Ci r

. Feb. 23, 2018) (Bauer , J.). On r emand, the di str i ct cour t r e
- e n t er ed the inj uncti on as modi fi ed, 2018 WL 1704773 (W

.D. Wi s. Apr

. 9, 2018), and S pectr um took a fr esh appeal fr om the new j udgment.
II.
S pectr um’s app e a l i s focused on tw o aspects of the remedi es the di s tr i c t cour t or der ed for i ts v i olati ons of the CPS A. It contends that the di str i ct cour t lacked author i ty to i mpose the $821,000 p enalty for i ts secti on 15(b) r epor ti ng v i olati on, because the gov er nment’s sui t on that v i olati on w as bar r ed b y the statute of li m i tati ons. S pectr um d oes n o t other wi se challenge the pr opr i ety or calculati on of the pe na l t y f or fai ling to

r epor t, no r does i t challenge in any r espect the $1.1 mi lli on penalty the di s tr ict cour t or der ed f or c onti nuing to sell the S paceMaker coffeemaker s in questi on after they w er e r ecalled. As for the i nj uncti on the cour t ent e r ed, Spectr um p r esses
sev er a l a r guments: t h a t the cour t lacked author i ty to enter for w ar d-looki n g in

j uncti v e r eli ef; that i t abused i ts di scr eti on i n thi n ki ng such r eli ef w as appr opr i ate in thi s case; and that the20 No. 18-1785

cour t abused i ts di scr eti on in requi r in g the company to engage an outsi de exper t.
A. S tatute of li mi tati ons for r epor ti ng v i olati ons S ec t io n 15(b) does not speci fy a li mi tati ons per i od for fai lur e-to-r epor t clai ms, so we look to the d efault, catchall li m i tati ons p r ov i sio n for ci v i l penalty acti ons set for th in 18 U.S .C. § 2462. In r elev ant par t, that p r ov i si on speci fi es that “ an acti on, sui t or pr oceedi ng for the enfor cement of any ci v i l fine, penalty , or for fei tur e, p ecuni ar y or other w is e , shall not be enter tai ned unless commenced wi thi n fi v e y ear s fr om the date when the clai m fi r st accr u ed ... .”
S pectr um ar gues that because i ts duty under secti on 15(b)

w as to “i mmedi a tely” r epor t a p otenti ally hazar dous d efect in i ts pr o d u c t, and because the r egulati on makes clear that

“ i m m e d i a t e l y ” m e a n s w i th in 2 4 hour s of obtai ning in for mat i o n
r e a s o n ably poi nti ng to the exi stence of such a d efect, t he gov er nment’s cause of acti on for S pectr um’s f ai lur e to make a ti mely r epor t fi r st a ccr ued no later th a n M a y 2 009, b y whi ch ti me the c ompany had r ecei v ed fr om consumer s 60 r epor ts of br oken car afe handles and four bur ns associ ate d w i th such f ai lur es. In i ts summar y j udgment deci si on, the cour t fo u nd that Spectr um ar guably had a d u t y t o make a r epor t to the Commi ssi on at that poi nt. 218 F

. Supp. 3d at 821– 2 2

. 1 1 In

1 1 The co urt went o n to fi nd tha t S pectrum ha d a d u t y t o m a k e a secti o n 1 5 (b ) repo rt no l a t er tha n June o f 2 0 10

. 2 1 8 F. S upp. 3 d a t 8 2 2

. But a s S pectrum po i nts out, the co urt fo r purpo ses o f ca l cul a t i ng the mo neta ry pena l ti es i t i mpo sed on the c o mpa ny t oo k into a cco unt the co nsumer
co m pl a i nts recei v ed i n 2 0 0 9 . R . 2 34 a t1 3 . S o fo r the purpo s es o f reso l v i ng (co nti nued...)No. 18-1785 21

S pectr um’s vi ew

, the fi v e y e a rs that secti on 2462 allow ed for fi ling sui t thus began to r u n i n May 2009 a nd expi r ed in May 2014, r oughly 13 m onths befor e the gov er nment actually fi led i ts complaint.
Li ke the di str i ct cour t, an d for the same r easons, w e rej ect S pectr um’s contenti on that the gov er nment fi led sui t too late. Because, as w e shall explai n, Spectr um’s fai lur e to r epor t i s pr oper l y under stood to consti tute a c onti nuing v i olati on of i ts statutor y r epor ti ng obli gati on that di d n ot end unti l S p ectr u m fin a l l y s ubmi tted a secti on 15(b) r epor t in 2012, the statute of li m i tati ons di d n o t begi n to r un unti l that ti me. The gov er nment thus had fi v e y ear s fr om the fi ling of S pectr um’s s ecti on 15(b) repor t to fi le sui t, a nd i t di d so well befor e the l i mi tati ons per i od expi r ed i n 2017.
S pectr um contends that th e S u pr eme Cour t’s deci si on in Gabelli v

. SEC, 568 U.S

. 442, 133 S

. Ct. 1216 (2013), for ecloses the

n o t io n that the fai lur e to make the r epor t r equi r ed by secti o n 15(b) i s a conti nuing v i olati on, but because that case addr essed the di scov er y r ule—whi ch the gov er n ment i s not r elyi ng u pon her e—the case i s, i n ou r v i ew , inapposi te. In Gabelli, the gov er nment h ad fi led a ci v i l enfor c ement acti on char gi ng the defe n dants wi th secur i ti es fr a ud and s eeki ng monetar y penalti es for the fr aud some si x y ear s after the a lleged scheme of secur i ti es fr aud had ended; as her e, se c t io n 2 462 suppli ed the appli cable s tatute of li m i tati ons—fi v e y ear s. The g o v er nmen t co nt e nded the sui t w a s ti mely because i t had only

1 1 (...co nti nued) S pectrum’s a rgument, we sha l l a ssume tha t i ts duty to repo rt a ro se in M a y 2 0 0 9

.22 No. 18-1785

di scov er ed the fr aud after the s cheme w as ov er , and less than fi v e y ear s befor e fi ling sui t. How ev er , a f t e r noti ng that the “standar d r ule” in such cases wa s that a clai m accr ues “when the plainti ff has a complete and pr esent cause o f a c t io n,” i.e. , when the fr a ud occur s, id. at 4 4 8 , 1 33 S

. Ct. at 1220 (quoti ng W allace v

. Kato , 5 49 U.S

. 3 8 4 , 3 88, 1 27 S

. Ct. 1091, 1095 (2007)), the Cour t concluded that thi s w as “the m ost natur al r eadin g of [ s e c ti on 2462],” ibid. The Cour t rej ected the gov er nment’s i nv i tati on to i nv oke the di scov er y r ule in or der to l engthen the ti me in whi ch i t c ould b r i n g a sui t in such a c ase. The Cour t found no “textual, hi stor i cal, o r e q ui table r easons to gr aft a di scov er y r ule onto the statute of li mi t a t io ns of § 2462.” Id. a t 454, 133 S

. Ct. a t 1224. “The di scov er y r ule exi sts in par t to pr e s e r v e t he clai ms of v i cti m s who do not know they ar e i nj ur ed and who reasonably do not inqu ir e a s to any inj u r y .” Id. at 450, 1 33 S

. Ct. at 1 222. The gov er n m ent w as not in a posi ti on to clai m the benefi t of thi s r ule in Gabelli

. The gov er nment w as not a v i cti m seeking r ecompense for

a self-concealing fr aud; rather , i t w a s a r e g ulator seeki n g to enfor ce the s ecur i ti es statutes t hr o u g h ci v i l penalti es. And in the Cour t’s v i ew

, the equi ti es d i d no t w a r r a nt gi vi ng the gov er nmen t i n the latter capaci ty the benefi t of an extended statute of li mi tati ons. Wher eas the typi cal fr aud v i c ti m “ do[es]

n o t l i v e i n a state of constant inv esti gati on” and w i ll hav e no
r eason to cause to sear ch for wr ongdoi ng in the absence of an appar ent i n

j ur y , the v er y p u r p o se of a r egulator y agency li ke the S .E.C. i s to r oot out fr aud, a n d such an agency—unli ke the

or dina r y pr i v ate plainti ff—has a ny number of tools at i ts di sposal to do so. I

d. at 4 50–51, 133 S

. Ct. at 1222. And, wher eas
a p r i v ate v i cti m of fr aud typi c a l l y b r ings sui t seeki ng recom-No. 18-1785 23

pense for h i s inj ur y

, the gov er n ment in an enfor cement acti on seeks “penalti es, whi ch g o bey ond compensati on, ar e intended to puni sh, and label de fe n d ants wr ongdoer s.” I d. at 451–52, 133 S

. Ct. at 1223. Mor eov er , gi v en the ar senal of inv esti g a t o r y tools av ai lable to the gov er nment, deter m ining when i t should hav e been able to di scov er that a fr aud had occur r ed pr esents uni qu e and di ffi c ult questi ons not or d in a r i ly pr esented in a
case of a fr aud per petr ated upon a pr i v ate per son. Id. at 452–53, 133 S

. Ct. at 1223–24. “Applyi ng a di scov er y r ule to Gov er nment penalty acti ons i s far mor e challenging than applyi n g the

r u le to sui ts by defr auded vi cti ms, and w e hav e n o m andate fr om Congr ess to under take that challenge her e.” Id. at 454, 133 S . Ct. at 1224.
The gov er n m ent i n thi s case i s not ar gui n g that the statute of l i mi tati ons should be extended unti l s u ch ti me as i t had

r eason to know of S pectr um’s fai lur e to co m ply wi th i ts

r epor ti ng obli gati on under secti on 15(b). It i s, instead, ar gui ng that S pectr um’s fai l ur e to r epor t the defect in i ts pr oduct w as
a conti nuing v i olati on that di d not cease unti l such ti m e as the

co m p a ny at last fi led a secti on 15(b) r epor t wi th the CPS C. Gabelli sheds no li ght on whether a defendant’s v i olati on of any statute, let alone secti on 15(b), amounts to a cont in u i n g

v i olati on. The di s cov er y r ule and the conti nuing v i olati on doctr ine
ar e both equi table doctr ines, but they ser v e di ffer ent p ur p oses and oper ate i n di ffer ent w a ys. The di scov er y r ule i s desi gned to pr otect a plain ti ff who thr ough no fault of hi s own does not lear n that a defendant has caused hi m har m unti l the li mi tati ons per i od h as alr eady r un; the di scov er y r ule thus delays the

accr ual of hi s cause of acti on unti lsuch ti me as he r easonably24 No. 18-1785

c o u l d h a v e d i s c o v er ed the defendant’s wr ongdoi ng. S e e G a b e l l i, 568 U.S

. at 449, 1 33 S

. Ct. at 1221; Rodrigue v

. Olin Employees Credit Union , 406 F .3d 434, 444 (7th Ci r

. 2 005); Ellul v

. Congregation of Christian Bros. , 774 F .3d 791, 799, 801 (2d Ci r . 2014). The conti nuin g v i olati on do ctr in e, on the other hand, i s ai med a t

ensur i ng that i llegal c o n d u c t i s puni shed by pr ev enti ng a defendant fr om i nv oki ng the ear li est m a ni fe s t ati on of i ts

wr ongdoi ng as a m eans of running out the l i mi tati ons clock on
a c our s e o f mis conduct that per si s ted ov er ti me; the doctr ine
ser v es that end by tr eati ng th e d e fe ndant’s mi sconduct as a conti nuin g wr ong and deeming an a cti on ti m ely so long as the last act ev i dencing a defendant’s v i olati on falls w i thi n the li m i tati ons per i od. See Karraker v

. Rent-A-C e n t e r , Inc. , 411 F .3d 831, 837 (7th Ci r

. 2005); Shanoff v

. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs. , 258 F .3d 6 96, 703 (7th Ci r

. 2001); Selan v

. Kiley, 969 F .2d 560, 5 6 4 (7th Ci r

. 1 992); M iami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v

. Lujan , 832 F

. S upp. 2 53, 256 (N.D. Ind. 1993), j. a ff’d, 2 55 F

. 3d 342 (7th Ci r

. 2001); see also O’Loghlin v

. Cnty

. o f Orange, 229 F .3d 871, 875 (9th Ci r

. 2000). Thus, wher e the v i olati on at i ssue can be char acter

i zed as a conti nuing wr ong, the li mi tati ons p er i od begi ns to

r u n not when a n acti on on the v i olati on c ould fi r st be br ought, but when the cour se of i llegal conduct i s c omplete. T aylor v

. Meirick , 712 F

. 2 d 1 1 12, 1118 (7th Ci r

. 1983) (“the statute of li m i tati ons d oes not begi n to r un on a conti nuing wr ong ti ll the

wr ong i s ov er and done wi th”).
Our deci si on i n United States v

. Y ashar , 166 F .3d 8 73 (7th Ci r

. 1999), addr esses the questi on of when a d efendant’s statutor y tr ansgr essi on i s pr ope r l y under stood to be a conti nuing

v i olati on to whi ch thi s doctr ine w ould a pply

. Y ashar , a cr i minalNo. 18-1785 25

case, 1 2 recogni zed that an offense i s or dinar i l y deemed to hav e been commi tted—thus tr i gger ing the statute of li mi tati ons—when each element of the offense i s pr esent. Id. at 875. But conti nuing offenses, Y ashar r ecogni zed, ar e an excepti on to that r ule. W

e expla in e d t h at a cr i minal offense i s tr eated as conti nuin g only i f the substanti v e cr i m in a l statute expli ci tly compels that conclusi on or i f “‘the natur e of the cr i me inv olv ed i s such tha t C o ngr ess must a ssur edly h av e intended i t be tr eated as a c o n tinuing one.’” Id. (quoti ng T oussie v

. United States , 397 U.S

. 112, 115, 90 S

. C t

. 858, 8 60 (1970)). “The hallmar k of the conti nuing offense i s that i t per dur es bey ond the i ni ti al i llegal act, and that ‘each day br ings a r enewed thr eat of the ev i l Congr ess sought to pr ev ent’ ev en after the elements

necessar y to e s t a b l i sh the cr i me hav e occur r ed.” Id. (quoti ng T ou ssie, 397 U.S

. at 122, 90 S. Ct. at 864). W e later added t h a t when assessing the natur e of an offense, the appr opr i ate focus i s not on the natur e of the defenda nt’s acti ons, but r ather on the statutor y lan g ua g e d e fining the offense. Id. a t 877. “If the statute descr ibes a n offense that by i ts natur e c onti nues after the elements hav e been met, then the offense i s a con t inuing
one r egar dless of the natur e of defendant’s a cti ons bey ond that poi nt.” Id.
In our v i ew

, the ter ms and pur pose of secti on 1 5(b) leav e no doubt that the fai lur e to r epor t a d efect i s a w r ong that conti nues bey ond a compa n y ’s ini ti a l fai lur e to r epor t. The statute

r equi r es a consumer p r o d ucts manufactur er , r etai ler

, or

1 2 The co nti nui ng v i ol a ti o n do ctri n e, o f c o urse, i s no t l i m i ted to the cri mi na l co ntex t

. See, e.g

. , Tay lor , 7 1 2 F.2 d a t 1 1 1 8 ; Miam i Nation , 8 32 F. S upp. a t2 5 6

.26 No. 18-1785

di str ib utor whi ch comes into possessi on of infor m ati on suppor ti n g the conclusi on t h a t i ts p r oduct has a potenti ally hazar dous defect to f ile a r epor t wi th the Commi ssi on; the company i s r eli ev ed of that obli gati on only i f i t knows that the Commi ssi on has a l r e a d y b e e n p r o p e r l y in for m ed of that defect. Although, as S p e c t rum n atur ally emphasi zes, the company’s duty i s to make an immediate r epor t, whi ch the r egulati on d efines to mean wi thin 2 4 hour s of the company coming in t o i nfor m ati on r egar ding the hazar d posed by i ts pr oduct, ther e i s no r eason to thi nk that the company’s d er eli cti on of i ts duty i s a one-ti me defalcati on that i s complete for statute of li mi tati ons pur poses once 24 h our s h av e passed wi thout the fi ling of

a r epor t. The statutor y obli gati on, after a ll, i s to conv ey i nfor m ati on to the Commi ssi on s o t h a t i t may take acti on as
necessar y to pr otect the publi c fr om the potenti al har m posed by the c ompany’s pr oduct. See Zepik v

. T idewater Midwest, Inc. , 856 F .2d 936, 944 (7 t h C ir

. 1 988) ( “The Commi ssi on had come to r ely heav i ly on r epor ts fr om manufactur er s and seller s and

v i ews under r epor ti ng a s a ser i ous pr oblem.”); D r a ke v

. Honeywell, Inc. , 797 F .2d 603, 611 (8th Ci r

. 1986) (“Compli ance by manufactur er s, di str ibutor s, and r etai ler s wi th secti on 15(b) obv i ously i s cr i ti cal to the fulfi llment of t he congr essi onal pur pose, to ‘pr otect the publi c agai nst unr easonable ri s k s of inj ur i es associ ated wi th consumer pr oducts.’”) (quoti ng 1 5 U.S .C. § 2051(b)(1) (1982)); United States v

. Advance Ma c h. Co. , 547 F

. S upp. 1085, 1090 (D. Mi nn. 1982) (“Congr ess intended to i ncr eas e t h e li keli hood that a substanti al pr oduct hazar d wi ll

come to the attenti on of the Commi ssi on in a ti mely fashi on s o that i t c[an] act swi ftly to pr otect the consuming publi c.”). Nothi ng about the s i gni fi cance of that in for mati on or the needNo. 18-1785 27

for gov er nmental i nter v enti on c h a n ges w i th the passage of ti me i n and of i tself: S o l ong as the defecti v e pr oduct i s offer ed for s a l e a nd other wi s e r emains in use by consumer s, the potenti a l d anger pr esented by the pr o d uc t and the need for acti on to addr e s s that danger r emain unabated. Thus, although

a pr oduct d i s tr ib utor may h av e br eached i ts obli gati on under secti on 15(b) b y s i tti ng on infor ma t i o n r egar ding a pr oduct hazar d for mor e than 24 hour s, i ts tr a n s gr essi on co nti nues s o long a s it f ai ls to fi le the r equi si te r epor t wi th the CPS C. T o par aphr ase Y

a shar , once a company has om it t e d to “i m medi

ately” i nfor m the Commi ssi on of a p o t enti ally hazar dous pr oduct d efect, the elements of i ts statutor y b r each ar e pr esent, but the wr ong mani fested by i ts si lence per dur es bey ond the i ni ti al f ai lur e to make a ti mely r epor t. The fact that the statute

r eli ev es the m anufactur er , di str ib utor

, or r etai ler of the duty to

r epor t only when the company has actual knowledge that the Commi ssi on alr eady knows about the de f e ct r ei nfor ces the poi nt: the d u t y i s ti ed to the Commi ssi on’s aw ar eness of the defect r ather than the p assage of any arb i tr ar y per i od of ti me. See United States v

. M ichaels Stores, Inc. , 2 016 WL 1090666, at *2 (N.D. T ex. Mar

. 21, 2016) (duty to r epor t under secti on 15(b) i s conti nuin g one and li mi tati ons per i od d oe s n o t begi n to run unti l defendant has actual knowledge that Commi ss io n i s
a d e quately i nfor med of pr oduct defect); Advance Mach. , 5 4 7 F

. S upp. at 1089–92 (same); cf. Postow v

. OBA F e d

. S a v

. & Loan Ass’n , 627 F .2d 1 370, 1379–80 (D.C. C ir

. 1980) (constr uing
mor tgage lender ’s fai lur e to make speci fi ed di sclosur es to bor r ow er r egar ding cer tai n fees a nd closing costs befor e loan commi tment l etter i s i ssued, as r equi r ed by T r u th-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S .C. § 1639(b) (1976), to consti tute li mi ted conti nuing28 No. 18-1785

v i olati on—in hibi ti ng buy er ’s abi li ty to compar e bank’s offer wi th other s —that lasted b e y o n d i ssuance of c ommi tment letter unti l such ti me as di sclosur e w as made at settlement, at whi ch poi nt bor r ow er could sti ll w alk a w ay wi thout si gni n g loan agr eement).
The facts of thi s c ase r ev eal that S pectr um’s fai lur e to r epor t the potenti al danger pose d b y i ts car a fe w as conti nuing in a second sense. S pectr um di d not come into infor m ati on r ev eali ng the hazar d on one occasi on, but on many occasi ons in the y ear s that i t r emained si lent. Recall that by the ti me S p ectr u m finally fi led i ts secti on 15(b) r epor t, i t had recei v ed ov er 1,600 complaints fr om c ustomer s. Each ti me i t r ecei v ed a consumer complaint r egar din g a car afe fai lur e, S pectr um h a d a fr esh oppor tuni ty and obli gati on to consi der the potenti a lly hazar dous natur e of i ts pr oduct and to r eassess i ts r epor ti ng obli gati on. And wi th each new complaint, it w o uld hav e become

mor e clear to S pectr um that the inci dents i ts c u s t o mer s w er e
r e po rti n g wer e not flukes, and that car afe f ai lur es and con
sumer i nj ur i es w ould conti nue s o l ong as the d efecti v e v er si on
or v er si ons of the c a r afe r emained in ci r culati on. T o say then,

as S pectr um does, that both i ts d u ty to r epor t a nd i ts f ai lur e to

r epor t wer e r i pe at a single poi nt in ti me—May 2009—and that the li m i tati ons p er i od began to ti ck i r r ev ocably at that ti me, i s to i gnor e that the potenti al hazar d posed b y i ts pr oduct p e r si sted bey ond that poi nt, and wi th each addi ti onal c omplaint of a car afe fai lur e, the company w as p laced on r enew ed noti ce of an ev er mor e compel l in g n e e d to act. These c omplaints conti nued r i ght up unti l the ti me that S pectr um finally fi led its secti on 15(b) r epor t wi th the CPS C in 2012. T o p ar a
phr a se Y a shar ’s r ati onale agai n, each day that S pectr um d i d notNo. 18-1785 29

make a r epor t to the Commi s si on br ought a r enew ed thr eat of the ev i l that Congr ess sought to pr ev ent b y requi r in g a company to r epor t a possi ble hazar d wi th i ts pr oduct. 166 F .3d at 875. Whether one v i ews S pectr um’s si lence in r e s ponse to each new complaint as a separ a te v i olati on of secti on 15(b), or i nstead sees the u nending str eam of complaints as a mani festati on of the conti nuing r i s ks posed by the company’s fai lur e to

r epor t the hazar d to the Commi ssi on, i t i s clear that the natur e of S pectr um’s wr ongdoi ng c annot logi cally b e c onfined to one poi nt i n ti me but must be seen as a c ont i nuin g wr ong. See O’Loghlin v

. Cnty

. of Orange, supra , 229 F .3d at 875 (“an i mpor
tant pur pose of the conti nuing v i olati on doctr in e i s to pr ev ent

a defendant fr o m u s ing i ts ear li er i l legal conduct to av oi d li abi l i ty f or later i llegal conduct of the same sor t”); cf. B irkelbach

v

. S.E.C. , 751 F .3d 472, 479 (7th Ci r

. 2014) ( on r ev i ew o f or der di sci plining secur i ti es pr inci pal f or fai lur e to super v i se a ssoci

ate, i t w ould be “absur d” to tr eat fai lur e to super v i se as s ingle i ndi v i si ble act whi ch accr ued, f or li mi tati ons pur poses, on fi r st day of fai lur e to super v i se and to i gnor e fact th a t f a ilur e of super v i si on per si sted ther eafter : “Under [ defendant’s] inter

pr etati on

, i f an u nethi cal super v i sor w er e to av oi d detecti on for fi v e y ear s, he c o u l d conti nue hi s u nethi cal behav i or forever wi thout [the gov er n ment] being able to di sci pline hi m.”). Agai nst thi s logi c S pectr um inv okes our deci si on in United States v

. Midwest Generation, LLC, 720 F .3d 6 4 4 (7 th Ci r

. 2013), whi ch declined to constr ue the fai lur e to obtai n a pr e-constr ucti on per mi t as r equi r ed by statute to be a conti nuing v i olati on. The p r ov i si on of the Clean Ai r Act at i ssue in Midwest G eneration r equi r ed the oper ator of p ow er plan t s a nd other “maj or emi tti ng faci li ti es” to obtai n a constr ucti on per m i t bef or e30 No. 18-1785

commencin g s u bstanti al modi fi c ati ons to thei r faci li ti es. 42 U.S .C. § 7475(a). A per mi t w as requi r ed, in r e l e v ant par t, in
or der to gi v e r egulator s the oppor tuni ty to condi ti on appr ov al of the pr oposed modi fi cati ons upon the installati on of the bestav ai lable pollu ti o n
- r e d u c in g m e a s u r e s

. B e twe e n 1 9 94 and 1999, Commonw ealth Edi son Co. (“ComEd”) made modi fi cati ons to fi v e of i ts coal-fi r ed pow er plan t s w i thout fi r st obtai ning p e r m i t s ; ComEd contended that the natur e of the mod i fi c a t i o n s i t made to the plants di d not r equi r e per mi ts. The gov er nment di sagr eed, but i t di d not fi l e s ui t to enfor ce the per m i t r equi rement unti l 2009, a decade or m or e after the modi fi cati ons w er e made. ComEd i nv ok ed the fi v e-y ear l i mi tati ons per i od speci fi ed b y secti on 2462 a n d ar gued that the sui t w as unti mely

. As r elev ant her e, the gov er nment excused the delay b y
ar guing that ComEd’s fai lur e to obtai n the per mi ts mandated by the s tatute w as a conti nuing v i olati on that per si sted bey ond the poi nt at whi ch w or k on the modi fi c ati ons began.
W e under stood the gov er nment’s ar gument t o p osi t that “ev er y day a plant oper a tes wi thout a § 7475 per mi t i s a fr esh

v i olati on of the Clean Ai r Act.” 720 F .3d at 647, and w e rej ected that contenti on: The v i olati on i s complete when constr ucti on c omme n c es wi thout a per mi t in hand. Nothi n g in the text of § 7475 ev en hints at the possi bi li ty that a fr esh

v i olati on occur s ev er y day unti l th e end of the uni v er s e i f an owner that lacks a constr ucti on per mi t oper ates a completed faci li ty

. Gabel li tells us not to

r ead statutes i n a w ay that w ould aboli sh effecti v e ti me constr ai nts on li ti gati on.No. 18-1785 31

Id. W e w ent on to r ej ect the gov er nment’s f ollow-up contenti on that the sui t w as nonethele s s ti mely because ComEd’s fai lur e to obtai n the r equi s i te per mi ts—the i ssuance of whi ch w ould hav e been condi ti oned on ComEd’s instal l a t ion of the bestav ai lable polluti on contr ol technologi es—had r esulted in conti nuin g inj ur y to the publi c in the for m of pow er plant emi ssi ons that w er e hi gher than they w oul d h a v e been had per mi ts been sought. Cur r ent plant emi ssi ons w er e gov er ned by rules o t her than secti on 7475, w e poi nted out, and those emi ssi ons could not be char a cter i zed as “unlawful” si m p ly because ComEd had n e v er obtai ned constr u cti on per mi ts wi thi n the (expi r ed) li mi tati ons per i od. Id

. at 6 48. “Once the statute of li m i tati ons expi r ed, Commonwealth Edi son w as enti tled to pr oceed as i f i t possessed all r equi r ed constr ucti on per mi ts.” I

d. ; accord Sierra Club v

. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. , 816 F .3d 666, 672 (10th Ci r

. 2016) ( “It i s the act of constr uctin g it s e lf [wi thout a per mi t] that i s unlawful.”).
Midwest Generation i s d i sti ngui sh a b l e in mater i al r espects fr om thi s case. The s t atute at i ssue in Midwest Generation i ncor por ated an expli ci t and obv i ous exter nal deadline for the obli gati on i t i m posed: t h e company w as r equi r ed to obtai n a per mi t befor e constr ucti on c ommenced. Ther e i s no c ompar a
ble deadlin e set for th in se c t io n 15(b): the statute calls for a ti mely ( i.e. i mmedi ate) di sclosur e, b u t i t d oes not ti e that di sclosur e to some other ev en t o r poi n t in ti m e a kin to the commencement of c onstr ucti on. See Colo. Dep’t o f Public Health & Environ. v

. U.S. , 2019 WL 1147601, a t * 8 (D

. Colo. Mar

. 13, 2019). Mor e o v e r

, when the d eadline in M idwest Generations

came and w ent wi th the commence m e nt of constr ucti on, the natur e of the pr oblem changed mater i ally fr om a r eg u lator y32 No. 18-1785 standpoi nt. Once the uti li ty company had m odi fi ed i ts p ow er plants, per mi ts w er e a moot poi nt; ther e w a s no l onger an oppor tuni ty for r egulator s t o r e v i ew the p r oposed m odi fi cati o n s and condi ti on those modi fi cati ons upon the installati on of bett e r polluti on contr ols. The har m post-constr ucti on w as
now h i gher emi ssio ns of pollutants, and that h ar m, as w e poi nted out, w as subj ect to r emed y v ia di ffer ent statutor y p r o v i si ons. By contr ast, the wr ongfulness of S p ectr u m’s fai lu r e to di sclose the potenti al defect in i ts pr oduct nei ther ended nor tr ansmogr i fi ed i nto a di ffer ent for m a s of any par ti cular ti me. At all ti mes, the f ai lur e to di sclose depr i v ed the Commi ssi on of the oppor tuni ty to i nv esti gate the pr oduct and take appr opr i

ate acti on ( in c l u ding a pr oduct r ecall) in or d er to pr otect

consumer s; a nd that wr ong and the hazar d i t p o s e d could be addr essed no matter how long i t took for S pectr um to make i ts di sclosur e to the Commi s si on. Nor ar e we per s uaded by S p e ct r u m’s contenti on that the single expr ess r efer ence to a conti nuing v i olati on in one s ecti on of the CPS A’s ci v i l penalty pr ov i si on, 15 U.S .C. § 2069, rules out tr eati ng a secti on 15(b) v i olati on as a conti nuing wr ong. The pr ov i s i on i n questi on tr eats each fai lur e to keep appr opr i

a t e r ecor ds and allow an inspecti on of those r ecor d s, see 1 5 U.S .C. § 2068(a)(3), as a separ ate v i olati on o f t h e a c t for pur poses of calculating the appr opr i ate penalty (to be capped at $100,000 per vi olati on), and “i f such v i olati on i s a conti nuing one,” t r e a t s each day that the v i olati on per si sts a s a separ ate offense (subj ect to a maxi m u m p e n a lty of $15 mi lli on, as
a dj usted by i nflati on), § 2069(a)(1). The r ecogni ti on that o ne type of v i olati on of the CPS A (a fai lur e of r ecor d-keepi ng) can be a conti nuing offense, for penalty assessment pur p oses, doesNo. 18-1785 33

not r u le out the possi

bi li ty that another v i olati on, including the fai lur e to r epor t a potenti ally hazar dous pr oduct defect, can be

a conti nuing offense f or li mi tati ons pur poses. See Advanced Mach. , 547 F

. S upp. at 1090.
W e hav e not ov er looked a r ecur r ing theme in S pe ctr um’s

ar guments—th a t tr eati ng a f ai lur e to r epor t as a conti nuing

v i olati on i s, i f n othi n g else, inconsi stent wi th the “fi r st accr ues” language of secti on 2462. The company r easons that so long as S pectr um had come into th e r equi s i te infor mati on about a possi ble pr oduct hazar d and fai led to m ake a r epor t wi thi n 24 hour s, i t w as in v i olati on of the statute and all elements of the gov er nment’s cause of acti on w er e e st a b l i shed; thus, the gov er nment’s r epor ti ng cl a i m fi r s t a c cr ued a t that ti me, and the li m i tati ons clock bega n t o ti ck, gi v ing the gov er nment fi v e y ear s fr om that date to commence sui t. Ther e i s a s u per fi ci al logi c to this l ine of ar gument, but i t fai ls to r ecogni ze t he under lyi ng rati onale of the conti nuing

v i olati on doctr i ne. Cases applyi ng thi s d octr ine r ecogni ze that the elements of a cr i me or a ci v i l s tatutor y v io lati on may be pr esent ear ly on i n the cour se of a defendant’s wr ongdoi ng, s o that the gov er n ment, i f i t wer e a w ar e of the wr ongdoi ng,
w o u l d b e fr ee to pur sue a char ge. But gi v en the conti nuing natur e of the under l yi ng wr ong, th e d o c t r in e d elays the accr ual of the gov e r n m ent’s cause of acti on, for limitations purposes , u nti l the defendant’s last act. See United States v

. Elliott, 4 6 7 F .3d 688, 690 (7th Ci r

. 2006) (“All conti nuing offenses w or k the

sam e w ay

. S omeone commi ts the cr i me of conspi r acy b y agr ee in g to commi t a futur e cr i me (and, f or some conspi r acy statutes, by commi ttin g a n ov er t act); he may be pr osecuted

ev en i f he r e p ents er e the clock str i kes mi dni ght. The offense34 No. 18-1785

nonetheless conti nues ( for lim i tati ons pur poses) unti l he wi thdr a ws or i s captur ed. Li kewi se t he cr i me of escape, complete when the pr i soner leav es custody , conti nues unti l he tur ns h im s e l f i n or i s nabbed.”); Y ashar , 1 66 F .3d at 875–76; W omack v

. Brady McCasland, Inc. , 2017 WL 2828708, at *6 (S .D. Ill. June 29, 2017) ( c iv i l case) (applying Illi noi s l aw). S o although nothi ng w ould hav e pr ev ented th e C o m m i ssi on fr om br i ngi n g sui t i n May 2009 had the Commi ssi on been aw ar e of the mater i al facts, th e c o n t inu in g v i o l a t i on doctr ine delay ed the clock fr om r unning on the gov er nm ent’s r i ght to br ing sui t unti l s uch ti me as S pectr um fi led i ts secti on 1 5(b) repor t and i ts ongoi ng v i olati on of the statute ended.
W e r ecogni ze that Gabelliadmoni shes us not to constr ue a statute of li mi tati ons i n such a w ay as to “ aboli sh effecti v e ti me constr ai nts on li ti gati on.” Midwest Generating, 720 F

. 3d at 647. But, for all of the r easons we hav e explai ned, the duty to r epor t

a potenti ally danger ous defect in a pr oduct s o that t he C o m
mi ssi on c an take appr opr i ate acti on to pr otect consumer s i s
necessar i ly an on g o in g duty whi ch, b y the ter ms of s ecti on 15(b ) , d o e s n ot end unti l such ti me as the p r oduct’s maker , d istr ibutor

, or seller ei ther makes a r epor t or actually k n o w s the Commi ssi on has been pr oper ly infor med. At a l l ti m es, i t

w as wi thin S pectr um’s abi li ty to star t the c lock r unning on the gov er nment’s cause of act i o n b y fi ling a secti on 15(b) r epor t. The fi ling of such a r epor t entai l s min i mal ti me and effor t. 1 3 It could not hav e b een the i ntent of Congr ess to tr eat the fai lur e

1 3 Testi mo ny presented to the di stri ct co urt i n di ca tes th a t the a ppro pri a te repo rti ng fo rm ca n b e fi l l ed o ut a nd sub mi tted to the Co mmi s si o n v i athe i nternet wi thi n ama tter o f mi nutes.No. 18-1785 35

to make such a r epor t as a “ one a nd d one” ev ent that confin es
a company’s duty

, for l i mi tati ons pur poses, to the ear li est possi ble poi n t in ti me and effecti v ely ig nor es the str eam of

consumer c omplaints pr esented to the c ompany in the ensuing months and y ear s, the many oppor tuni ti es the company had to

r eev a l uate i ts obli gati on to r epor t, and the mi ssed oppor tuni

ti es for the Commi ssi on to take r e m e di al acti on to pr otect

consumer s. Thi s acti on i s ther efor e t im ely

. For p ur poses of the statute of li mi tati ons, S pect r um’s wr ongdoi ng d i d n ot end, and the gov er nment’ s c ause of acti on di d not fi r st accr ue, u nti l Apr i l 2012, when the c ompany finally compli ed wi th i ts secti on 15(b) obli gati on by fi l i ng a r epor t wi th the Commi ssi on. B. Pr opr i ety of per manent inj uncti on S pectr um al s o challenges the per manent inj uncti v e r eli ef

aw ar ded by the di str i c t c o ur t. As w e hav e noted, S p ectr u m contends i n the fi r st i nstance that the cour t had no a uthor i ty to enter a per manent, for w a r d-looki ng inj uncti on in the ab sence of an ongoi ng v i olati on of the CPS C. Bey ond that, the c ompany
ar gues that i t w as an abuse of di scr eti on for the cour t to or der such r eli ef her e, and in par ti cular to r equi r e the c o m pa n y to engage an exper t to ev aluate i ts compli a nce pr o c e d u r es and make r ecommendati ons for i mpr ov ements.
W e r ej ect at the outset S pectr um’s contenti on that the CPS A does not author i ze for w ar d-l o o k ing inj uncti v e r eli ef. S ecti on 22(a) of the Act a uthor i zes a di str i ct cour t to “[r ]estr ai n any

v i olati on of secti on 2068 of t h i s ti tle.” 1 5 U.S .C. § 2071(a)(1). “Any” i s a br oad ter m that to our m ind, and contr ar y to S pectr um’s under standing, i s not li mi ted to ongoi ng v i olati ons36 No. 18-1785

of the statute but a l so enco mpasses pr ospecti v e v i olati ons as

w ell. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v

. United States , 406 U.S

. 128, 151, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1471 (1972) (r e c o g ni zing that “any” i s
a br oad, inclusiv e ter m); cf. Manning v

. United States , 546 F .3d 430, 436 (7th Ci r

. 2 008) (r ej ecti n g plain t if f’s contenti on that pr ov i s i on of Feder a l T

or t Clai m s Act, 2 8 U.S .C. § 2676, speci fyi ng that j udgment i n FTCA acti on consti tutes a complete bar to “any acti on” by clai mant, appli es only to futur e acti ons: “S ecti on § 2676 appli es to ‘any acti on’; ‘any’ means ‘any ,’

r egar dless of the s e qu e n c in g o f the j udgments.”). Indeed, gi v en that an i n

j uncti on by i ts natu r e r egulates the conduct of the enj oi ned par ty goi ng for w ar d, Shore v

. United States , 282 F

. 857, 859 (7th Ci r

. 192 2 ) (“Reli ef by in j uncti on looks tow ar d the futur e.”), the natur al assumpti on, in the absence of an expr ess li m i tati on on the cour t ’ s pow er , w ould be that Congr ess i ntended to author i ze inj u ncti v e reli ef ai med at a pr ev enti ng a
r epeti ti on of the wr ongful acts that the c our t has found to hav e alr eady occur r ed. See N.L.R.B. v

. Express Pub. Co. , 312 U.S

. 426, 435, 61 S

. Ct. 693, 6 99 (1941) (“A feder a l cour t has br oad p ow er to r estr ai n acts whi ch ar e of the same type or class as unlawful acts whi ch the cour t h as found to hav e been c ommi tted or whose commi ssi on i n the futur e unless enj oi n ed, m ay fai rly be anti ci pated fr om the defendant's conduct in th e p a s t.”); Russian Media Grp., LLC v

. Cable America, Inc. , 598 F .3d 3 02, 307 (7th Ci r

. 2010); Lineback v

. Spurino Mat’ls, LLC, 5 46 F .3d 4 91, 504 (7th Ci r

. 2008). Thus, we a r e not per suaded that th e lack of expr ess statutor y auth o r i z a t i o n fo r fo r wa r d

- l o o k in g inj uncti v e r eli ef, cf. 15 U.S

. C. §§ 77t(b), 7 8 u(d)(1) (author i zing inj uncti ons to

r estr ai n i mminent v i olati ons of s e c u r i ti es laws), depr i v ed the di str i ct cour t of the pow er to enter such an inj uncti on.No. 18-1785 37

Nor has S pectr um per suaded us that the di str ic t cour t abused i ts d is cr eti on in deci ding that in juncti v e r eli ef i s appr o p r ia t e i n thi s case. The bur den of pr oof on thi s poi nt of

cour se belonged to the gov er n me n t, and the cour t di d not i mpr oper ly shi ft the bur den to S pectr um, as the c ompany suggests i t di d. R. 234 at 17 (r ecogni zi ng that bur den belonged t o g ov er nment a s plain ti ff ); R. 234 at 21 (“the cour t finds tha t plainti ff has made an ade quate showing of the n eed for per manent i nj uncti v e r eli ef ...”). Th e bur den w as not oner ous:
once the gov er nment “has demo n s t r a ted a p ast v i olati on, i t need only show that ther e i s a r easonable li keli hood of futur e

v i olati ons i n or der to obtai n inj uncti v e r eli ef.” SEC v

. Y ang, 795 F .3d 674, 681 ( 7th Ci r

. 2015) (quoti ng S.E.C. v

. Ho l s chuh , 694 F .2d 1 30, 144 ( 7 th Ci r . 1982)). The di str i c t cour t di d not clear ly

er r in finding that the gov er nment met thi s b ur den. S p ectr u m descr ibes i ts v i olati ons as an “i solated occur r ence.” S p ectr u m Reply Br

. 22. That may be tr ue in the sense that i ts v i olati ons of the CPS A i nv olv ed a single defect in one line of coffeemaker s. But i t i s not i solated i n any other sense of the w or d. For thr ee y e ar s after S p ectr u m i tself concluded that the or i ginal h a n d l e
o n i ts S paceMaker car afe w as defecti v e and or der ed changes to the desi gn, the company fai l ed to repor t t h e defect to the CPS C, notwi thstanding the many hundr eds of complaints i t conti nued to recei v e dur ing that per i od a n d the knowledge that the handle fai lur es r esulte d in consumer inj u r i es wi th

some r egular i ty

. And when i t finally r ecalled the coffeemaker , S pect r um (inadv er tently) conti nued to sell the pr oduct. The

ev i dence pr oduced at the r emedi es h ear ing show ed—and the di str i ct cour t found—that S pectr um’s v i olati ons of the statute

w er e due to ser i ous and systemi c defalcati ons w it hin the38 No. 18-1785

company , am o ng t hem: a f ai lur e of communi cati on betw een staff who wer e fami li ar wi th the defects in the d esi gn of the

or i g i nal car afe handle and staff who handled customer complaints; a fai lur e among seni or manager s to meaningfully confr ont the si tuati on wi th the coffeemaker ’s car afe unti l 2012 despi te knowi ng as ea r l y as Apr i l 2009 that ther e w er e pr oblems wi th the pr oduct; the lack of s y st e ms to pr ev ent the conti nued di str ibuti on of r ecalled pr oducts; and the fai lur e to tr ai n staff on compli ance wi th the CPS A.
Gi v en the gr av i ty of these fai lur es and the company’s delay i n complyin g wi th i ts r epor ti ng obli gati on, the di str i ct cour t j usti fi ably concluded that ther e w a s a r easonable li keli hood that S pectr um mi g h t agai n c ommi t si mi lar vi olati ons of the statute i n the futur e. T

o be sur e, S p ectr u m by the ti m e of the

r emedi es hear i ng had under taken si gni fi c ant effor ts to addr ess the w eaknesses i n i ts cor por ate cultur e that had r esulted in i ts conti nued sales of the defecti v e coffeemaker and i ts fai lur e to ti mely r epor t the hazar d p o s e d by the defect to the Commi ssi on. But, as the di s tr i ct c o u r t poi nted out, S p ectr u m had not submi tted to a n independent audi t to ev aluate i ts compli ance systems or pr ocesses and to soli ci t exter nal adv ic e a s to what addi ti onal changes, i f any , mi ght be p r udent. Nor , we w ould add, w as ther e ev i dence befor e the cour t as to how effecti v e the

r emedi al measur es under taken b y the c ompany in the w a ke of t h e c offeemaker matter had thus far pr ov en to be in p r acti ce. The cour t r easonabl y concluded that a per manent inj u ncti on
r equi r i ng the company to take speci fi ed categor i es of pr oacti v e
m e a s u r es w as a necessar y and a ppr opr i a te step a i med a t

r educing the li keli hood that the company w ould, in the futur e, commi t v i olati ons si mi lar to those that h ad l ed the cour t to fineNo. 18-1785 39 the company

. And, of cour se, pur suant to Fed. R. Ci v

. P

. 60(b) and Rufo v

. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty

. Jai l , 502 U.S

. 367, 112 S. Ct. 7 48 (1992), S pectr um r etai ns the r i ght to seek a modi fic a t io n and/or li fti ng of the i nj uncti on at a futur e date as any mater i al change in the ci r cumstances war rant.
Fi n a lly , the di s tr i ct cour t d i d not er r in or der ing the company to employ an independent au d i tor a s one of these pr oacti v e measur es. S pectr um’s obj ecti ons to thi s requi r ement fall into tw o categor i es: pr ocedur al and substantiv e. S pectr um’s fi rst contenti on i s that the di str i c t cour t lacked author i ty to amend the inj uncti on to add the c onsultant

r equi r ement. In S pectr um’s v i ew , the r equi r ement c onsti tuted not a mer e clar i fi cati on of the or i gi nal inj uncti on but a new , substanti v e requi rement that r epr esented a substanti a l change fr om the ter ms of the inj un c ti on as or i gi nally enter ed; and although the di str i ct cour t had the author ity to modi fy the j udgment, see Rufo , 502 U.S

. 367, 112 S

. Ct. 748; Protectoseal Co.

v

. Barancik

, 23 F .3d 1184, 1187 (7th Ci r

. 1994), the gov er nment i tself nev er made a moti on pur suant to Rule 60 aski ng the

cour t to enter tai n such a modi fi cati on. Gi v en the sequence of ev ents that l ed to the final inj u ncti on
as amended, h ow ev er

, the di str i ct cour t w as wi thi n i ts r i ghts to consi der a modi fi cati on of thi s natur e. Recall that in i ts f i r st i ter a t io n, the inj uncti on or der ed S pectr um to “maintai n suffi ci ent systems, pr ogr ams, and inter n al co n t r o ls to ensur e compli ance wi th the CPS A and the r egulati ons enfor ced by the CPS C” and, wi thi n a p e r i o d of si x months, to “i mplement appr o p r i a t e i m p r o v e m ents to i ts c ompli ance pr ogr ams.” R. 234 at 22. Wh en S pectr um subsequently sought a par ti al stay of the40 No. 18-1785

di str i c t c o u r t ’ s ju d g m e nt p ending appeal, in cluding most of the

r equi r ements i mposed by the inj u ncti on, the company ar gued among o t h e r thi ngs that the inj uncti on w as i mper mi ssi bly

v ag ue and ov erbr oad. It w as in r esponse to that line of ar gument th a t the cour t, r ecogni zing that i ts inj uncti on may not hav e been as speci fi c and concr ete as i t ought to hav e been, tr eated S pectr um’s moti on as one t o c lar i fy the obli gati ons i mposed by the i nj uncti on. R. 243 at 3–4. Followi n g br i efing as to the natu r e a nd suffi c i ency of the i mpr ov ements S p ectr u m had alr eady made to i ts compli ance p r ocedur es and pr ogr ams, the cour t endeav or ed to do just that. It modi fi ed the inj u ncti on to i nclude s i x speci fi c r equi r eme nt s t r acking the i mpr ov ements S pe ctr um av er r ed w er e alr eady in place; the c our t v i ew ed these i mpr ov ements a s suffi ci ent to resolv e Spectr um’s

concer n s ab out the v aguenes s of the inj uncti on and to ensur e pr eser v ati on of t h e status quo pendin g appeal. 2018 WL 502736, at *2–*3. But the cour t a gr eed wi th the gov er nment that these i mpr ov ements mi ght not be s uffi ci ent, in and of themselv es, to ensur e compli ance wi th the spi r i t of t h e c o u r t’s i nj uncti on and to av oi d a r epeti ti on of the ev ents that led to the company’s vi olati on o f the CPS A. For that r eason, the cour t accepted the gov er nment’s pr oposal that S pectr um also be

r equi r ed to engage an outsi de consultant to assess the effi cacy of i ts compli ance s ystems. Id. at *4. The cour t v i e w e d the consultant as “ a str ai ghtfor w ar d , speci fi c w ay for S p ectr u m to

ensur e i ts good fai th compli ance wi th the pe r m a n e n t inj u ncti on, rather than conti nuing to li v e under the v a gueness of the

a d m oni ti on to ‘obey-the-law’ cur rently contai ned in the per manent i n

j u ncti on.” Id. Recogni zi ng, how ev er , that engag-No. 18-1785 41

i ng a c onsultant w ent bey ond the s tatus quo, the cour t stay ed enfor cement of that speci fi c r equi r ement pending appeal. I d.
T o t he extent the r equi r ement to engage a c onsultant consti tuted a s ubstanti v e modi fi cati on, as opposed to a s i mple clar i fi cati on, of the or i gi nal inj u ncti on, i t w as w ell w it h in the

cour t’s a u t h o r i ty to make thi s modi fi c ati on in r esponse to S pectr um’s ar guments that the inj uncti on’s v agueness made i t i mpossi ble for the company to know how pr eci sely to c omply wi th the cour t’s command. R. 237 at 6. T r ue, S pectr um di d not for mally ask the cour t to modi fy the inj u ncti on and nei ther di d the gov er nment separ ately make such a moti on. But i t w a s w ell wi thi n the cour t’s pow er to look be y o n d the label to the substance of S pectr um’s moti on and to tr e a t the request for a stay n ot only as one to clar i fy the inj uncti on, but also a s one to modi fy the i nj uncti on as necessar y to addr e s s Spectr um’s

concer n s—whi ch i s pr eci s ely how the co u r t c onstr ued the moti on. R. 243 at 3–4 & n.1. Our subsequent r emand of the case to the di str i ct cour t eli min ated any questi on as to whether the

cour t h a d j ur i sdi ct i on to make thi s change and the other amendments to the j udgment. See Doctors Nursing & Rehab. Ctr

. v

. Sebelius , 613 F .3d 672, 6 77–78 ( 7th Ci r

. 2010); Chicago Downs Ass’n v. Chase, 944 F .2d 366, 370 (7th Ci r . 1991); T extile Banking Co. v. Rentschler, 657 F .2d 844, 849–50 (7th Ci r . 1981).
Nor di d the di str i ct cour t abuse i ts di scr eti on in concluding that a n outsi de c onsultant w as w a r r anted. As the par ti es agr ee, thi s pr ov i s i on i s commonly include d in c o nsent decr ees as a
means of insur i ng that the pr oblems that hav e gi v en r i se to li ti gati on ar e, i n f act, r esolv ed. See R. 254 a t 9 n.4 (collecting consent decr ees i n CPS A cases r equi ri ng employment of42 No. 18-1785

outsi de exper ts); NW Enviro n. Defense Ctr

. v

. H &H W

elding, 2015 WL 7820958, a t * 4 ( D. Or e. Oct. 13, 2015); F .T .C. v

. Nat’l Uro logical G rp., Inc. , 2006 W L 8431977, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2006); E.E.O.C. v

. Harvest Med. Clinic, Inc. , 2005 WL 2484668, a t *2 (D. Az. S ept. 14, 2005). S pectr u m , of cour se, di d not enter i nto a consent decr ee, b u t that by no m eans under mines the uti li ty or pr opr i ety of r equi r ing i t to engage an outsi de exper t. See, e.g. , United States v

. Blue Ribbon Smoked Fish, Inc. , 179 F

. S u pp. 2d 30, 50–51 (E.D.N.Y

. 2001) (sustaining gov er nment’s

r equest that d efendant be or der ed ei ther t o pay for a gency i nspecti ons o r to h i r e outsi de consultant to m oni tor food safety), j. a

ff’d in part, vacated in part o n o t h e r g rounds, & remanded, 56 F

. App’x 542 (2d Ci r

. 2003). The omi ssi ons that gav e
r i se to S pe ctr um’s li abi li ty in thi s case w er e si gni fi cant and pr olonged, and unnecessar i ly exposed a s i gni fi c ant number of

consumer s to physi cal har m. Ther e app e a r s to be no d i spute that wholesale refor ms to S pectr um’s r egulator y compli a n c e systems and cultur e w er e called for ; the numberof consumer pr oducts that S pectr um di str ibute s o nl y makes the need for those r efor ms mor e i m per ati v e. Although the company had endeav or ed to make the changes needed, those refor ms, as w e hav e sai d , had not been s ubj ected to independent scr uti ny

. It

w as reasonable for the di str i ct j ud g e t o thi nk that a s econd opi ni on as to the suffi ci ency of these r efor ms w ould be useful

as an addi ti onal means of ensur ing that S pectr um di d not commi t si mi lar v i olati ons in the futur e. Mor eov er , S p ectr u m i tself, i n s eeki ng a par ti al stay of the judgment, had expr essed

concer n about i ts abi li ty to comply wi th the spi r i t of the cour t’s i nj uncti on. It complained of the “di ffic u l t ies inher ent in oper ati n g a lar ge consumer b usiness pur suant to a v agueNo. 18-1785 43

i nj uncti on that does not speci fy what S p ectr u m must do in
or der to ensur e that i t i s complying wi th the Cour t’s or der .” R. 237 a t 6. The adv i ce of an in dependent consultant w ould no doubt help to a dd r e s s thi s v er y concer n. W e a d d, finally

, that the di str i ct cour t i nclud e d a pr ocedur e for j udi ci a l r ev i ew of any pr oposals b y the c onsultant that S pectr um found obj ecti onable, whi ch wi ll ser v e as a che c k on the consultant’s author i ty

. III.
For all of the r easons w e hav e di scussed, the j u dgment of the di str i ct cour t i s AFFIRMED.44 No. 18

‐ 1785

M ANION, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I write separately to note a narrow point of disagreement with the court’s detailed opinion relating to the statute of limitations issue. 1 I agree Spectrum’s 2 conduct amounts to a “continuing violation” that lasted into 2012, and therefore the government’s complaint was timely. I disagree, however, concerning the nature of that continuing violation.
The court relies on United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1999), and concludes a failure to report is a single contin

‐ uing wrong that lasts until a report is filed 3 because the failure “perdures beyond the initial failure to make a timely report.” Maj. Op. at 27. I, on the other hand, view the failure to report
as a series of isolated acts that continue to occur each time when an entity fails to report within 24 hours of obtaining suf

‐ ficient information to trigger the requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b); 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14(e). Nevertheless, given the facts in this case, my understand

‐ ing does not change the outcome. Because Spectrum did not report to the Commission when its duty first arose in 2009, each new consumer complaint and subsequent failure to re
‐ port amounted to a recurring series of violations of the

1 I join in full the court’s opinion as it concerns the appropriateness of the district court’s injunction.
2 Like the court, I treat Spectrum and its former subsidiary Applica Consumer Products, Inc., as one and the same company. See Maj. Op. at 2 n.1.
3 The failure also ends if the requirement to file a report is obviated by the Commission “inform[ing] the subject firm” it is already “ade

‐ quately informed.” 16 C.F.R. § 1115.3(a).No. 18

‐ 1785 45
reporting requirement. 4 Thus, Spectrum’s persistent failure to file a report with the Commission as it continued to obtain information showing its product was dangerously defective

was a “continuing violation” that continued into 2012, 5 and the government’s 2015 complaint was timely. 6 See Shanoff v. Ill. Dept. of Human Servs. , 258 F.3d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The continuing violation doctrine allows a plaintiff to get relief for time

‐ barred acts by linking them with acts within the limitations period.”); Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1992) (announcing the same rule); Taylor v. Meirick , 712 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he statute of limitations does not begin to run on a continuing wrong till the wrong is over and done with

... .”).

*****
From January 2009 to April 2012, Spectrum received 1,620 customer complaints; a rate of more than one per day. Spec

‐ trum could have filed its report to the Commission much

sooner than it did, and that date, at the latest, would be the

4 The court acknowledges this as a possibility, but it does not con
‐ sider it dispositive. See Maj. Op. at 29. I think it is dispositive.
5 When Spectrum finally filed its report with the Commission in April 2012, it definitively prevented further violations of the reporting requirement. At that point, information may have triggered a duty to supplement the report already filed, see 16 C.F.R. § 1115.13(d), but there could no longer be violations of the initial duty to report because the Commission would have knowledge of the defect, see 15 U.S.C. 2064(b).
6 I point out that in February 2014—within the limitations period as
even Spectrum would have it—the government sent Spectrum a letter explaining its belief Spectrum had violated the reporting requirement and penalties were appropriate. Nevertheless, for some reason it delayed filing its complaint until June 2015.46 No. 18

‐ 1785

start of the five

‐ year limitations period. The government would then have five years to file a complaint, probably not

‐ ing that customers continued to complain. If Spectrum and the government had proceeded accordingly, this case would not be here.
But as it is, Spectrum engaged in a series of violations of the reporting requirement that lasted into 2012. It cannot hide behind the untimeliness of its self

‐ imposed delay in reporting

a problem that developed months and years earlier. The gov
‐ ernment timely filed its complaint in 2015.