UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 02-30486

(Summary Calendar)

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PECAN ACRES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP I; PECAN ACRES

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP II,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

CITY OF LAKE CHARLES; CITY COUNCIL OF LAKE

CHARLES; MIKE HUBER, Individually & in his official capacity as

City Councilman of City of Lake Charles; ERNEST BROUSSARD,

Individually & in his offi cial capacity as Director of Planning and

Economic De velopment Office of Zoning and Land Use; NOEL

MOSS, Individually & in his official capacity as Assistant Director of

Planning and Economic Development Office of Zoning and Land Use,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Louisiana

01-CV-918

November 29, 2002

Before DAVIS, WIENER, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R.

47.5.4.

-2- PER CURIAM: *

Pecan Acres Limited Partnerships I and II (“Pecan Acres”) appeal the district court’s grant

of summary judgment for the defendants. The basis of this suit is Pecan Acres’s attempts to build low

income hous ing o n parcel of land that is partially in the City of Lake Charles and partially in the

neighboring Calcasieu Parish. Pecan Acres argues the district court erred by granting summary

judgment because (1) it failed to find a material factual dispute as to whether the defendants violated

the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.

, and the Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act,

L A

. R EV

. S TAT

. A NN

. §§ 51:2601 et seq.

, by engaging in a continuous pattern of discrimination; (2) it

held there was no violation of Pecan Acres’s due process rights when Pecan Acres was denied a

hearing before one of its minor conditional use permits (“MCUP”) was revoked; and (3) it held that

Pecan Acres had not stated a claim of detrimental reliance, which is actionable under L A

. C IV

. C ODE

art. 1967.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and

. . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as matter of law.” F E D

. R. C IV

. P. 56(c). We have

r eviewed de novo the district court’s judgment, the record, and the briefs, and find no error in th e

district court’s judgment.

The continuing violation doctrine of the Fair Housing Act applies “where a plaint iff, pursuant

to the Fair Housing Act, challenge s no t just o ne incident of conduct violative of the Act, but an

unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period.” H avens Realty Corp. v. Coleman

, 455

U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982). Pecan Acres has not shown that the continuing violation doctrine applies-3-

to the facts at hand. The first permit issued by the defendants, MCUP #96-43, was conditioned on

Lake Charles’s abilit

y to annex the land that was not under its jurisdiction. When the annexation

attempt failed, this permit essentially lapsed. Pecan Acres did not attempt to appeal or litigate that

outcom e. The second permit, MCUP #98-02, was issued for a separate, smaller development on the

part of the land within Lake Charles’s jurisdiction, and it was conditione d on the provision of

appropriate dra inage plans. The two permits involved two different parcels of land, different

proposed structures, and separate permit requirements. Accordingly, they are not connected and do

not comprise a continuing scheme of discrimination.

Without proof of a continuing violation, the acts and circumstances surrounding MCUP #96-

43 are time-barred by the Fair Housing Act’s two-year statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C.

§ 3613(a)(1)(A). In addition, Pecan Acres has not raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the

conditional g r ant of the second permit, MCUP #98-02, stemmed from any discriminatory policy,

procedure, or practice. Lake Charles requires that all major developments maintain existing drainage

performance, and it granted a permit once Pecan Acres provided the necessary drainage plans. Pecan

Acres has provided no evidence that the conditional grant of MCUP #98-02 was discriminatory in

intent or effect. For the same reasons, Pecan Acres’s has failed to prove a violation of the Louisiana

Equal Housing Opportunity Act.

Pecan Acres also alleges that Lake Charles’s failure to hold a hearing when the first permit,

MCUP #96-43, was revoked was a violation of Pecan Acres’s due process rights and thus actionable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under Louisiana law, §1983 claims must be brought within one year. E .g.

,

Harris v. Hegmann

, 198 F.3d 153, 158 (5th Cir. 1999); L A

. C IV

. C ODE A NN

. art. 3492. Thus, Pecan

Acres’s § 1983 claims are time-barred.-4-

Finally, Pecan Acres has not made out a detrimental reliance claim under L A

. C IV

. C ODE art.

1967. Reliance must be reasonable, s ee id.

, and it was not reasonable for Pecan Acres to rely on the

a conditional permit before the affec t ed landowners had voted on the annexation. There was no

formal contract between Lake Charles and Pecan Acres, and both parties were aware that annexation

was a necessary condition to development of the land.

Thus, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.