NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0604-18T2

GURBIR S. GREWAL, 

Attorney General of New Jersey, 

and RACHEL WAINER APTER, 

Director, New Jersey Division on 

Civil Rights,1

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. 

WILLIAM AND OTHILIA GREDA

and MAPLE GARDEN, LLC, 

Defendants-Respondents.

_______________________________

Argued February 24, 2020 – Decided May 13, 2020

Before Judges Ostrer, Vernoia and Susswein. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-3414-16.

James R. Michael, Deputy Attorney General, argued 

the cause for appellants (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant 

 

1 The former Attorney General and Director of the New Jersey Division on 

Civil Rights brought this matter in their official capacities. In accordance with 

Rule 4:34-4, we have amended the caption to identify the current Attorney 

General and Director as the proper plaintiffs. 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

May 13, 2020

APPELLATE DIVISION
A-0604-18T2 2

Attorney General, of counsel; Megan J. Harris, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the briefs).

Vincent J. Sanzone, Jr., argued the cause for 

respondents.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

VERNOIA, J.A.D.

Plaintiffs, the New Jersey Attorney General and the Director of the New 

Jersey Division on Civil Rights (Division), appeal from a no-cause jury verdict 

on their claim defendant William Greda (defendant) violated the New Jersey 

Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, by inquiring about 

the religion of Fatma Farghaly, a Muslim woman, during her attempt to lease 

an apartment from him; by refusing to show or lease an apartment to her on the 

basis of her religion; and by making a statement concerning the gender of a 

Division investigator during the investigator's inquiry about leasing an 

apartment from him.

2

 Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by: allowing 

defendant's counsel to cross-examine Farghaly about her religious beliefs; 

refusing to allow introduction of defendant's statements to a news program 

concerning Farghaly, her discrimination claim, and Muslims; barring 

 

2

 Defendant's wife, Othelia Greda, and Maple Shade, LLC, were also named 

defendants. Because the claims against Othelia Greda were later dismissed, 

and the claim against Maple Shade, LLC was rendered moot by the no-cause 

verdict as to defendant, we refer to William Greda as "defendant" for clarity 

and ease of reference.
A-0604-18T2 3

testimony of Division investigators about their perceptions of defendant during 

their interactions with him; allowing cross-examination of Farghaly about her 

income tax returns; and asking prospective jurors if they believed Muslim 

women experience discrimination in the United States. Based on our review of 

the record, we are convinced the trial court made errors depriving plaintiffs of 

a fair trial, and we reverse. 

I. 

The Complaint

Plaintiffs' complaint alleged simple facts that we summarize to place in 

context our discussion of the trial evidence and issues raised on appeal. The 

complaint alleged that in February 2016, defendant and his wife, Othilia 

Greda, owned a seventeen-unit apartment building in Elizabeth.3 Farghaly and 

a male friend, Deyab Elashkar,4 met with defendant at the building because 

Farghaly sought to lease an apartment defendant advertised was available. 

 

3

 The complaint also alleged that following the Division's service of an 

administrative, verified complaint alleging defendant unlawfully discriminated 

against Farghaly, defendant and his wife transferred ownership of the building 

for one dollar to Maple Garden, LLC, a limited liability company for which 

defendant is the registered agent.

4 The complaint identified Elashkar as Farghaly's friend. We refer to him by 

his name for clarity and ease of reference.
A-0604-18T2 4

In accordance with "her religious practice," Farghaly wore a khimar, 

which is "a head covering or head scarf worn by some Muslim women." 5 The 

complaint alleged that after escorting Farghaly and Elashkar into the building, 

defendant asked Farghaly, "[a]re you Muslim[,]" and, when she responded 

affirmatively, defendant "stated, 'I don't rent to Muslims,' and asked [Farghaly] 

and [Elashkar] to leave." Farghaly and Elashkar left the building without 

seeing the apartment. Farghaly reported what occurred to the Elizabeth police, 

and, the next day, she reported it to the Division.

The complaint also alleged the Division began an investigation, and, two 

weeks later, Division investigators Adriana Tobar and Justin Hoffer met with 

defendant, with Tobar posing as a prospective tenant for an apartment 

defendant advertised was available.6 Tobar wore a head scarf, and the 

 

5

 The head-coverings worn by Farghaly and Tobar are variously referred to in 

the record as a khimar, hijab, or headscarf. We recognize there are different 

headscarves traditionally worn by Muslim women, see, e.g., What's the 

difference between a hijab, niqab and burka?

http://www.bbc.co.uk.newsround/24118241 (last visited April 15, 2020). 

Where the record reflects a head-covering was identified by a particular term, 

we use the same term. Where no specific term was used, we employ the 

generic term "headscarf." 

6

 The complaint did not include the names of the four Division investigators 

who interacted with defendant during the Division's investigation, but it 

instead referred to them as "Testers" "one" through "four." In our discussion 

of the allegations in the complaint, we use the names of the Testers for clarity 

and ease of reference. We note that in their brief on appeal, plaintiffs refer to 
A-0604-18T2 5

Division deemed Tobar and Hoffer "suitable to appear as individuals who, like 

[Farghaly], are of Middle Eastern descent and Muslim." The complaint 

alleged defendant showed Tobar and Hoffer a basement apartment but said the 

apartment was "not good for" Tobar because "she is a woman and would need 

to lift things up on bricks in case of flooding."

The complaint further alleged that, later the same day, two other 

Division female employees, Shante Lee and Ada Rollins, posed as prospective 

tenants and met with defendant. Neither of the investigators wore a head scarf 

or otherwise presented themselves as Muslim. The complaint alleged 

defendant showed them the basement apartment, but he did not mention 

flooding or the apartment's suitability for a woman. 

The complaint also asserted that during the Division's investigation, 

defendant and his wife made unsupported claims Farghaly, who is unmarried 

and has no children, asked defendant if her husband or male companion, her 

mother-in-law, and two children could live in the apartment with her. 

Defendant told the Division that when he told Farghaly five people could not 

live in the apartment, Elashkar punched and threatened to kill him. Defendant 

 

(continued)

investigator Adriana Tobar as "Adriana Tovar." We use the former name to 

identify the investigator because it is the name of the investigator, who 

testified at trial, reflected in the trial transcript. 
A-0604-18T2 6

also claimed there were past and present Muslim tenants in the building, but he 

did not provide the Division with any contact information for those tenants.

Plaintiffs' complaint averred that defendants: refused to rent Farghaly an 

apartment because of her creed in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g)(1); made an 

inquiry regarding Farghaly's creed in connection with the rental of real 

property in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g)(3); made statements to Farghaly 

expressing discrimination based on her creed in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-

12(g)(3); made statements to Tobar expressing discrimination based on gender 

in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g)(3); and transferred ownership of the 

apartment building with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud plaintiffs in 

violation of N.J.S.A. 25:2-25(a). In response to the complaint, defendants 

denied liability and filed counterclaims for abuse of process and malicious use 

of process. Defendants also filed third-party claims against Farghaly and 

Elashkar for slander, defamation, assault and battery, and intentional infliction 

of emotional distress. 

The court dismissed the counterclaims prior to trial, severed the thirdparty claims, and stayed the third-party claims pending disposition of 

plaintiffs' claims. After presentation of all the evidence, the court dismissed 

the claims against Othilia Greda because there was no evidence she owned the 

building or participated in the rental of the apartments at issue.
A-0604-18T2 7

The Trial

The five-day trial centered on the conflicting versions of what occurred 

when Farghaly and Elashkar met with defendant to discuss the possible rental 

of the basement apartment, and when defendant later met with the Division 

investigators posing as prospective tenants of apartments he advertised for 

lease. It was, however, undisputed defendant posted an advertisement for a 

one-bedroom apartment in the building, and Farghaly called defendant and 

made an appointment to look at the apartment.

Farghaly testified she was living in another apartment in Elizabeth, was 

having financial difficulties, and sought a new apartment because her landlord 

intended to raise her rent and she had physical difficulties going up and down 

the stairs in her apartment. According to Farghaly, she went to see defendant's 

apartment wearing a hijab, a head covering, in accordance with her custom as a 

Muslim woman. She had never married or had any children, and she went to 

the apartment with Elashkar, who was her supervisor at work and a friend. 

When she and Elashkar arrived at the building, defendant opened the 

door and let them into the building. Farghaly testified that as defendant led 

them up the stairs to the apartment, he asked if she was a Muslim. When 

Farghaly said she was, defendant replied, "I don't rent [to] Muslims." 
A-0604-18T2 8

Farghaly explained she was shocked by defendant's statement, and she 

used her cellphone to record a video because she wanted a recording showing 

defendant turning her down because she was a Muslim. During the video, 

which was played for the jury, Farghaly repeatedly asks defendant, "you don't 

want to rent to me because I'm a Muslim?" The recording shows defendant 

looking past the camera, presumably at Elashkar, saying, "go ahead, hit me." 

Farghaly and Elashkar denied any verbal dispute or physical altercation 

with defendant. Elashkar denied striking defendant or spitting at him. 

Elashkar initially denied saying anything after hearing defendant's statement 

he did not rent to Muslims, but on cross-examination he testified, in 

accordance with a written statement he gave days after the incident, he said 

"seriously?" after defendant's statement and also said he would call the police. 

Elashkar testified he called 9-1-1 and briefly spoke to a dispatcher. 

The video recording shows defendant repeatedly asking Farghaly and 

Elashkar to leave the building. Once defendant, Farghaly, and Elashkar were 

outside of the building, Farghaly states what she alleged occurred in the 

building and tells defendant she intends to post the recording on Facebook.

Farghaly immediately went to the Elizabeth Police Department and 

reported the incident. The next day, she filed an administrative complaint with 

the Division, which then commenced its investigation.
A-0604-18T2 9

Division investigator Tobar testified that two weeks later she made an 

appointment with defendant to look at an apartment he advertised was 

available in the building. When she arrived at the building with Hoffer, Tobar 

wore a head scarf and introduced herself as "Samia Hassan." Defendant did 

not introduce himself, and Hoffer testified defendant "just kind of stared at 

[Tobar]," "appeared . . . fixated on her," and told Hoffer the apartment was for 

one person. They told defendant that Hoffer would not rent the apartment with 

Tobar.

According to Tobar, defendant led them to a basement studio apartment 

that was dirty, in poor condition, and did not appear suitable for human 

habitation. After some discussion about the apartment, defendant said the 

apartment would not be good for Tobar or any woman because it flooded, and 

she would need to lift things and put them on bricks during a flood. Defendant 

explained the apartment last flooded during Superstorm Sandy. Tobar asked 

twice for a lease application, but defendant did not give it to her. Tobar told 

defendant she had other apartments to look at, and she and Hoffer left the 

building.

Division employee Lee testified that, later the same day, she made an 

appointment with defendant to look at an apartment. She went to the 

apartment with Rollins, and defendant showed them the basement apartment he 
A-0604-18T2 10

had shown Tobar. Lee wore pants and a blouse, and she did not wear a 

headscarf. Defendant answered Lee's questions about the apartment and 

repairs defendant was making to it. Lee told defendant she would call him 

later, and then she and Rollins left. Defendant never offered Lee a lease 

application, and Lee did not request one.

Defendant testified he was seventy years old, his first language was 

Polish, and he had recently undergone foot surgery when Farghaly visited the 

building. Defendant disputed Farghaly's and Elashkar's version of the events, 

and he denied he asked Farghaly about her religion. He also testified he had 

Muslim and female tenants in the building.

Defendant explained that when he first spoke with Farghaly on the 

phone, she said she intended to live alone in the apartment, but he heard 

screaming children in the background and was therefore "suspicious." He 

testified he only permitted one or two people to live in his apartments due to 

their size. He greeted Farghaly and Elashkar, thought Elashkar looked like a 

criminal, and walked slowly with them to the apartment. 

Defendant testified he asked Farghaly about the children he heard in the 

background during their telephone call, and she said her mother or mother-inlaw had been watching children. He asked Farghaly how many people she 

intended would reside in the apartment, and she said "there's five of us." 
A-0604-18T2 11

According to defendant, he said "no good," turned around and repeated "no 

good," and then told Farghaly, "it's a small apartment, it's too many - - it's 

overcrowding." 

Defendant held the stairway railing with his hand. He testified that 

immediately after he told Farghaly the apartment was too small, Elashkar 

lightly struck his hand six to eight times. Defendant testified Farghaly 

screamed at him in Arabic; and Elashkar spit on him, said "you dead," and left 

the building. Defendant explained that, as he wiped the spit off of himself, 

Farghaly began recording him on her phone. He attempted to call the police 

but could not dial his phone because his hands were shaking. He asked 

Farghaly to leave the building.

Defendant testified he believed it possible Farghaly and Elashkar 

planned their encounter with him to fabricate a discrimination claim and extort 

money. He had read a story about a Muslim woman who made a false report 

in New York, claiming to have been attacked. He also believed it was possible 

Farghaly and Elashkar belonged to ISIS and planned to use the money they 

were attempting to extort from him to support ISIS or some religious 

organization.

Defendant responded to questions concerning his interactions with the 

Division investigators. He said that when he saw Tobar, whom he identified as 
A-0604-18T2 12

a Muslim, it was only weeks after the Farghaly incident. Defendant testified 

Hoffer carried a bulky attaché case, and he was afraid "two Muslims"—Hoffer 

and Tobar—"were coming to finish [him] off." He testified he nonetheless got 

Tobar a lease application, but she did not take it after he explained the 

apartment flooded. Defendant had no recollection of meeting Lee and Rollins.

Defendant presented Ahmed Eleoridi as a witness. Eleoridi testified he 

is a Muslim and has resided in defendant's building since 2012; defendant has 

treated him fairly and well; and defendant was nice to his family, including 

women wearing hijabs, when they visited in 2017. Defendant testified he was 

not aware Eleoridi was Muslim until his family visited in 2017, when he saw 

female relatives wearing clothing indicative of their faith. Eleoridi also 

testified that three months prior to trial, defendant leased an apartment to a 

Muslim tenant he recommended. 

The jury returned a no-cause verdict on plaintiffs' claims. It found 

plaintiffs failed to prove defendant asked Farghaly about her religion, 

defendant expressed discrimination against Farghaly based on her religion, and 

defendant refused to rent the apartment to Farghaly based on her religion. The 

jury also found plaintiffs failed to prove defendant expressed discrimination by 

referring to Tobar's gender in connection with the rental of an apartment. 
A-0604-18T2 13

The court entered an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. 

Prior to trial, defense counsel advised the court defendants would not pursue 

their third-party claims if there was a defense verdict. Thus, with the court's 

entry of the order dismissing the complaint with prejudice, the court also 

dismissed defendant's third-party claims. This appeal followed.

II.

A.

Plaintiffs claim the court erred by permitting defense counsel to crossexamine Farghaly about her religious beliefs, the tenets of her religion, and the 

use of religious extremist rhetoric. They claim the cross-examination violated 

applicable Rules of Evidence and was unduly prejudicial because it was 

improperly employed to challenge Farghaly's credibility and attack her 

character. We agree. 

"A trial court's evidentiary rulings are 'entitled to deference absent a 

showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of 

judgment.'" Belmont Condo. Ass'n v. Geibel, 432 N.J. Super. 52, 95 (App. 

Div. 2013) (quoting State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)). "On 

appellate review, a trial court's evidentiary ruling must be upheld 'unless it can 

be shown that the trial court palpably abused its discretion, that is, that its 
A-0604-18T2 14

finding was so wide [of] the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" 

Id. at 95-96 (quoting Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)). 

Plaintiffs' challenge to the cross-examination of Farghaly is founded on 

the following questions and testimony. During her direction examination, 

Farghaly was asked if she had ever considered "letting . . . go" of her claims 

against defendant. She responded, stating she had considered doing so because 

her "religion . . . taught [her] how to forgive and forget and [her] parents 

always teach [her] the same thing." She also explained she decided to pursue 

her claims because she did not want others "to go through what [she] went 

through." 

On cross-examination, Farghaly was questioned as follows:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now you told us yesterday 

that you['re] a devout Muslim, you believe in the 

teachings of your faith, correct? 

FARGHALY: Correct. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you follow the teachings 

of the Quran, correct? 

FARGHALY: Correct. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Have you ever heard of the 

principle –

Plaintiffs' counsel objected, and the trial judge held a side-bar 

conference. Defense counsel explained he intended to ask Farghaly about a 
A-0604-18T2 15

section of the Quran that provides "she could lie as a Muslim," and he argued 

Farghaly had opened the door to the questions by previously testifying that 

forgiveness was a tenet of the Muslim faith. Plaintiffs' counsel argued defense 

counsel's questions should be limited to portions of the Quran related to 

forgiveness, but the court said, "no, I can't do that."

The court accepted defense counsel's argument Farghaly opened the door 

to the questions concerning the Quran, and overruled plaintiffs' objection. In 

addition, although the word "infidel" had never been mentioned by Farghaly 

during her direct testimony, defense counsel told the court he intended to ask 

Farghaly whether she had heard the word "infidel," because in the past she 

denied knowing what it meant.7 The court ruled in defendant's favor, stating,

"you can ask her that." 

Based upon the court's rulings, defense counsel questioned Farghaly as 

follows:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: As a practicing Muslim, I'm 

sure you've read the Quran?

FARGHALY: Of course.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Now have you heard 

of the principle in the Quran which establishes by 

Mohammed that there are circumstances that can 

 

7

 During her deposition, Farghaly denied knowing the word "infidel."
A-0604-18T2 16

compel a Muslim to tell a lie? And that's in Quran 

16:106, have you ever heard that principle?

FARGHALY: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You did?

FARGHALY: Yes. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: That a Muslim could lie? 

FARGHALY: Yes. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And in fact, that's called the 

principle and I'm going to have to spell it, T-A-Q-UY-Y-A, correct? 

FARGHALY: Correct. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: In fact, every Muslim sect 

agrees with that principle, cause it's in the Quran? 

FARGHALY: Yes. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now have you ever heard 

Muslims calling non-Muslims, Christians, Jews, 

Buddhists, Hindu, infidels? 

FARGHALY: Infidels? 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Infidels? 

FARGHALY: Infidels? 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes. 

FARGHALY: I don't know that word. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You never heard the word 

infidels? 
A-0604-18T2 17

FARGHALY: Not in English, no I never. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay, what does infidel mean 

in, how do you say it in Arabic? 

FARGHALY: I don't even know what it means in 

English. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You never heard that word? 

FARGHALY: No. I practice the Quran in Arabic, not 

in English. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Okay. So you never 

heard, um, one Muslim, or any Muslim calling a nonMuslim an infidel? You never heard that in social 

media? 

FARGHALY: Okay, I think I get the meaning of it, 

since you already mentioned that. For us Muslims, we 

have to believe in all religions and respect all 

religions. We can't call anybody anything. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: But you've heard many 

Muslims call non-Muslims infidels, isn't that correct? 

PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL: Objection. Asked and 

answered. 

FARGHALY: If they want to, we're not supposed to. 

THE COURT: Overruled. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You've heard that, you've 

heard that, right? 

FARGHALY: Okay. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Have you? 
A-0604-18T2 18

FARGHALY: I haven't heard it personally, but 

they're not supposed to. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You never heard any Muslim 

referring to a non-Muslim as an infidel? 

FARGHALY: If they want to do that, but that's not 

welcome in our religion. We have to respect and 

honor every religion. Like our prophet Mohammed 

says. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: What do you call people who 

are non-Muslims? What do you call them? 

FARGHALY: Christians, Catholic, Atheists, 

Buddhism, Hinduism. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Would you agree that infidel 

is a derogatory term for non-Muslims. 

FARGHALY: No, you call them by what they are. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay, would you, would you 

agree that that word infidel which you've never heard 

before. 

FARGHALY: Um hum. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: But now you know about. 

FARGHALY: Since you described it a little bit, 

explained it yes. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Um hum, yeah, um hum. 

When I deposed you back in July 18, 2018, you told 

me under oath that you never heard, you never heard 

the word infidel? 

FARGHALY: Like I just said now. I never did. 
A-0604-18T2 19

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Would you agree that that 

term is a derogatory term. 

FARGHALY: No, it's not the right term. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Is it a derogatory term? 

FARGHALY: I don't know what's a dog . . . , 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Derogatory term means for 

lack of a better word, a, a reference, a disgraceful 

description of somebody? 

FARGHALY: How can we disgrace if our religion 

orders us to believe in all religions and respect all 

religions? 

Thereafter, on redirect, plaintiffs' counsel asked Farghaly to explain 

what the Quran stated about lying, and she testified the Quran permits Muslims 

to lie about their religion in cases where it is necessary to do so in order to 

remain safe.

On re-cross, defense counsel asked these additional questions:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Isn't it true that the, that the 

Muslim practice of deception only, also implies, also 

applies and is prevalent in Islamic politics? Is it 

al . . ., doesn't, not only does it apply to war, but it 

also applies to politics and other types of deceptions 

when you're dealing with people of non-Muslim faith? 

FARGHALY: That's not true. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Are you familiar with the 

Quran? 

FARGHALY: Of course. 
A-0604-18T2 20

DEFENSE COUNSEL: 16:106 in the Teachings of 

Deception. Have you ever read that paragraph? 

FARGHALY: In Arabic, not in English. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You've read it? 

FARGHALY: In Arabic, not in English. 

The cross-examination about Islam did not end there. While questioning 

Farghaly about her income tax returns, defense counsel asked her to confirm 

the spelling of her accountant's name, "F-A-R-E-S . . . K-A-D-A-N," and then 

asked, "he's Muslim too, right?" When he cross-examined Farghaly about 

treatment by her physician, defense counsel said, "and, just for the record, can 

you please pronounce his last name because I have difficulty with that 

name . . . ." Farghaly responded her physician's name was "Elsharif," and 

defense counsel asked, "Elsharif? He's Muslim, too, as well?" Farghaly 

responded in the affirmative.

The cross-examination of Farghaly about the principles of her religion 

violated N.J.R.E. 610, which plainly and expressly provides "[e]vidence of the 

beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the 

purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness's credibility is 

impaired or enhanced." See, e.g., United States v. Kalaydjian, 784 F.2d 53, 

56-57 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming the court's denial of a request to cross-examine 
A-0604-18T2 21

a witness about his religious beliefs for refusing to swear on the Quran because 

Federal Rule of Evidence 610 prohibits questioning a witness about his or her 

religious beliefs); United States v. Acosta, 924 F.3d 288, 293 (6th Cir. 2019) 

(finding a prosecutor engaged in misconduct by questioning a witness about 

religious prayers and the Ten Commandments); United States v. Jorell, 73 M.J. 

878, 882-84 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2014) (holding the trial court correctly 

barred cross-examination about a witness's Wiccan religious beliefs to impugn 

the witness's credibility). Farghaly also enjoyed a privilege from disclosing 

her "religious belief[s] unless [her] adherence or nonadherence to such . . .

[beliefs] [was] material to an issue in the action other than that of [her] 

credibility as a witness." N.J.R.E. 512; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-24. 

Defense counsel's questioning about Farghaly's religious beliefs and the 

principles in the Quran constituted a clear and direct attack on her credibility. 

Indeed, the questioning sought information that had no substantive, probative 

value to any factual issue presented in the matter. Through the crossexamination, defense counsel sought to establish the Quran, the religious text 

central to Farghaly's faith, directed and condoned lying and telling falsehoods 

as one of its fundamental principles. The cross-examination further sought to 

establish Farghaly's faith included another tenet showing a bias affecting her 
A-0604-18T2 22

credibility as a witness—her religion required she view anyone who did not 

share her faith as an infidel. 

The cross-examination was not intended to affect only Farghaly's 

credibility. Although Elashkar was not asked similar questions, he identified 

as Muslim, and defendant intended that Farghaly's testimony adversely affect 

Elashkar's credibility as well. Defendant acknowledges as much in his brief on 

appeal; he argues the questioning constituted "proper cross-examination 

questions" that "went to [Farghaly's] credibility," and was for the purpose of 

"test[ing]" Farghaly and Elashkar "and pu[ting] those two individuals in a bad 

light." The strategy was not limited to Farghaly and Elashkar -- during crossexamination defense counsel gratuitously suggested Farghaly's accountant is 

Muslim and confirmed her treating physician is Muslim. 

In his brief on appeal, defendant does not dispute the applicability of 

N.J.R.E. 512 or 610, or that they barred the cross-examination of Farghaly 

about her religious beliefs as a means of attacking her credibility. He also 

does not contest the cross-examination about the use of the term infidel, which 

he concedes was for the purpose of putting Farghaly and Elashkar in a "bad 

light," violated N.J.R.E. 608. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451, 466-

67 (2016) (explaining specific instances of conduct that are relevant only as 

tending to prove a character trait are inadmissible to affect a witness's 
A-0604-18T2 23

credibility). Instead, defendant claims plaintiffs' counsel did not cite any 

Rules of Evidence when she objected to the testimony, and the testimony was 

otherwise admissible because Farghaly's direct testimony, that her religion 

taught her forgiveness, opened the door to cross-examination about her 

religious beliefs. We are not persuaded.

"[T]he '"opening the door doctrine" is essentially a rule of expanded 

relevancy and authorizes admitting evidence which otherwise would have been 

irrelevant or inadmissible in order to respond to (1) admissible evidence that 

generates an issue, or (2) inadmissible evidence admitted by the court over 

objection.'" State v. Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. 229, 237 (2003) (quoting State v. 

James, 144 N.J. 538, 554 (1996)). "The doctrine 'allows a party to elicit 

otherwise inadmissible evidence when the opposing party has made unfair 

prejudicial use of related evidence.'" Id. at 237-38 (quoting James, 144 N.J. at 

554). 

The opening the door doctrine "has its limitations." State v. B.M., 397 

N.J. Super. 367, 381 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting James, 144 N.J. at 554). 

Evidence admitted under the doctrine "can be used only 'to prevent prejudice,' 

and may not 'be subverted into a rule for [the] injection of prejudice.'" 

Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. at 238 (quoting James, 144 N.J. at 556). Evidence that 

is otherwise inadmissible may be admitted under the doctrine, but "only to the 
A-0604-18T2 24

extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have 

ensued from the original evidence." Ibid. (quoting United States v. Winston, 

447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). Moreover, such evidence is also 

subject to exclusion under N.J.R.E. 403 where its probative value "is 

substantially outweighed by the risk of . . . undue prejudice, confusion of 

issues, or misleading the jury." B.M., 397 N.J. Super. at 381 (quoting James, 

144 N.J. at 554).

Farghaly's direct testimony about her religion teaching forgiveness did 

not open the door to the challenged cross-examination questions about use of 

the term infidel and the purported principles in the Quran about lying. 

Farghaly's scant direct testimony about forgiveness may have properly opened 

the door to limited questioning about the nature and source of her religious 

beliefs about forgiveness, but, as noted, defense counsel's cross-examination 

was unrelated to any issues raised by Farghaly's direct testimony and was 

unnecessary to remove any purported prejudice resulting from that testimony. 

Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. at 238. 

We are also convinced the cross-examination questions elicited 

testimony inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 403. The evidence had no probative 

value and was highly prejudicial because it improperly permitted the jury to 

weigh Farghaly's testimony about the tenets of Islam and the putative practices 
A-0604-18T2 25

of Muslims in assessing the credibility of each of the witnesses. Thus, even if 

Farghaly had opened the door to such testimony, and she did not, it should 

have been barred under N.J.R.E. 403. 

We are not persuaded by defendant's claim plaintiffs' failure to identify 

the Rule of Evidence supporting the objection to cross-examination requires 

rejection of plaintiffs' argument on appeal. To be sure, plaintiffs' counsel 

might have been more specific and consistent in objecting to the testimony, but

even if no objection had been made, the challenged cross-examination 

questions and testimony require a reversal because they were clearly capable 

of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2.

The claims founded on the incident involving Farghaly's attempt to lease 

the apartment are wholly dependent on the credibility of Farghaly, Elashkar, 

and defendant. They were the only individuals present. The improper crossexamination of Farghaly in violation of N.J.R.E. 403, 512, 608, and 610, and 

defense counsel's acknowledged effort to portray Farghaly and Elashkar in a 

"bad light" based on their religious beliefs and the putative use of the word 

infidels by Muslims, were clearly capable of allowing the jury to conclude, on 

an improper basis, that Farghaly and Elashkar were not credible witnesses. 

The questioning about the use of the term infidels also allowed those members 

of the jury who were not Muslim to inaccurately and improperly perceive that 
A-0604-18T2 26

Farghaly and Elashkar viewed them as infidels. In a case in which the 

credibility of Farghaly and Elashkar was central to the jury's determination, the 

introduction of highly prejudicial evidence directed at their credibility and 

character was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. For those reasons 

alone, we reverse the final order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, and we 

remand for a new trial.

B.

Plaintiffs also contend the court erred by barring admission of a 

recording of statements made by defendant concerning the Farghaly incident 

and Muslims during an interview with a news organization, and by barring 

cross-examination of defendant concerning the statements. Plaintiffs contend 

defendant's statements are probative of his bias towards Muslims and are 

relevant to his credibility because they contradict his trial testimony. The 

recording does not include the entire interview between defendant and the 

news reporter. Plaintiffs subpoenaed the unaired portions of the interview with 

defendant, and the news organization advised that the unaired recorded portion 

of the interview had not been preserved. 

The court granted an in limine motion to bar introduction of defendant's 

recorded statements under N.J.R.E. 403, finding the recording did not include 

the entirety of defendant's interview by the reporter, the recording could have 
A-0604-18T2 27

been unfairly edited, and therefore it would be unduly prejudicial. The court 

also barred any questioning about the interview and defendant's recorded 

statements, but it permitted questioning about defendant's current beliefs 

concerning Muslims. 

The parties do not dispute evidence of defendant's alleged bias against 

Muslims is relevant under N.J.R.E. 401 because plaintiffs allege defendant's 

statements to Farghaly and Elashkar and his purported refusal to lease 

Farghaly an apartment were motivated by anti-Muslim animus in violation of 

the LAD. A party's derogatory statements concerning the specific 

characteristic—in this case, religion—at issue in a discrimination case are 

relevant to proving an LAD claim, see, e.g., Cutler v. Dorn, 196 N.J. 419, 432-

40 (2008) (explaining anti-Semitic statements made in the workplace 

supported an LAD claim for religious discrimination in employment), and they 

are admissible as statements of a party opponent under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1). 

On appeal, the parties' arguments are directed to whether the recorded 

statements should have been admitted under N.J.R.E. 106, which in pertinent 

part provides "[w]hen a . . . recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by 

a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other 

part or any other writing or recorded statement which in fairness ought to be 

considered contemporaneously." Defendant claims the court properly barred 
A-0604-18T2 28

the playing of his recorded statements under the doctrine of completeness 

embodied in N.J.R.E. 106 because plaintiffs did not produce a recording of his 

entire interview. See State v. Gomez, 246 N.J. Super. 209, 217 (App. Div. 

1991) (explaining the object of the "doctrine of completeness" "is to permit the 

trier of the facts to have laid before it all that was said at the same time upon 

the same subject matter").

Where, as here, there was an inadvertent deletion of a portion of a 

statement and there was no additional recording with which to provide the 

complete statement, neither N.J.R.E. 106 nor the doctrine of completeness 

mandates an order barring admission of recorded statements that are available. 

In State v. Nantambu, our Supreme Court discussed the standard for admitting 

recordings of a portion of a party's statements where the balance of the party's 

statements were not recorded or are not available:

Applying the established standards governing the 

admissibility of recordings, we find no basis to 

conclude that exclusion of a recording in its entirety is 

required merely because an omission rendered a 

portion of the recording unduly prejudicial. Rather, 

we hold that a trial court should conduct a hearing 

pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104 to determine, in [its] 

discretion, whether an omission or similar flaw in the 

recording renders all or part of that recording 

unreliable and therefore inadmissible as unduly 

prejudicial under N.J.R.E. 403. The trial court should 

admit the recording to the extent that it contains 

competent and relevant evidence and redact the 

portion of the recording deemed unduly prejudicial.
A-0604-18T2 29

[221 N.J. 390, 406 (2015).]

The trial court did not undertake the analysis required to determine the 

admissibility of the recording of defendant's statements. Instead, the court 

declared it did not have confidence the editing of defendant's statements on the 

recording was done fairly because "news broadcasters are not necessarily 

Walter Cronkites anymore." It was on that erroneous basis the court 

concluded the recording was unduly prejudicial and inadmissible.8 

We vacate the court's order barring admission of the recording of 

defendant's statements and cross-examination of defendant concerning the 

statements. While we generally defer to a trial court's evidentiary rulings, we 

owe no such deference where, as here, they are premised on a misapplication 

of the appropriate legal standard. Id. at 403; see also Villanueva v. Zimmer, 

431 N.J. Super. 301, 310-11 (App. Div. 2013). On remand, the trial court 

shall conduct the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing required in Nantambu, see id. at 406, 

 

8

 We observe defendant was questioned during his deposition about the 

recorded statements. He acknowledged he made the statements and did not 

dispute they were accurately represented on the recording. 
A-0604-18T2 30

and consider the admissibility of defendant's recorded statements under the 

following two-part analysis prescribed by the Court:9

The court must first determine if the omission is 

unduly prejudicial; that is, does the omission 

adversely impact the trustworthiness of the recording. 

That is an objective analysis that should focus on the 

evidentiary purposes for which the recording is being 

offered. If the trial court in its discretion finds the 

omission unduly prejudicial, it must then consider 

whether the omission renders all or only some of the 

recording untrustworthy, and suppress only the portion 

of the recording that is rendered untrustworthy.

[Id. at 410-11.]10

 

9 On remand, the court may also consider such other arguments the parties 

may make concerning the admissibility of the recorded statements and any 

questioning of defendant regarding them.

10 It is unnecessary to determine if the court's order barring admission of the 

recorded statements and cross-examination about them constitutes reversible 

error because we reverse and remand for a new trial on other grounds. 

However, in the absence of those other grounds, we would vacate the court's 

order barring admission of the recorded statements and cross-examination, and 

remand for the court to conduct the hearing required by Nantambu and 

determine the admissibility of the statements and cross-examination under the 

appropriate standard. We would also otherwise find that if the court 

determined on remand the recordings and cross-examination were admissible, 

then the court's final order should be vacated and a new trial held. Because 

resolution of the fact issues depended on the parties' credibility, the exclusion 

of evidence concerning defendant's derogatory statements about Muslims, his 

characterization of Farghaly and Elashkar as terrorists, and his other antiMuslim statements included on the recording, was clearly capable of 

producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. The recorded statements, if admissible, 

confirm defendant's anti-Muslim animus. They also undermine his credibility 

because they appear contradictory to his trial testimony. The recording 

includes defendant's statements Farghaly and Elashkar were Muslim extremists 
A-0604-18T2 31

C.

Plaintiffs also assert the trial court erred by barring testimony of 

Division employees Tobar and Hoffer offering descriptions of defendant's 

actions and their observations during their interactions with defendant at the 

building. More particularly, plaintiffs argue the court erred by sustaining 

defendant's objection to Tobar's anticipated testimony that when she first 

approached defendant, he "stared" at her. The court ruled Tobar could not 

make "subjective statements," explaining the court did not "want adverbs" or 

"adjectives," and just "want[ed] facts." Plaintiffs also assert the court erred by 

barring Hoffer's testimony that he found it "odd" the parking lot at the building 

was empty when he arrived, and by striking Hoffer's testimony that defendant's 

"tone and demeanor" were "unwelcoming" when Tobar and Hoffer interacted 

with defendant and his experience with defendant was "appalling." 

N.J.R.E. 701 permits lay witnesses to offer "opinion[] or inference[]" 

testimony "if it (a) is rationally based on the witness's perception; and (b) will 

assist in understanding the witness's testimony or determining a fact in issue." 

 

(continued)

who belonged to ISIS, and they were part of a broader Muslim conspiracy to 

extort money. 
A-0604-18T2 32

The Rule permits lay witnesses to provide opinion testimony based on their 

perceptions and actual knowledge, Velazquez v. City of Camden, 447 N.J. 

Super 224, 236-27 (App. Div. 2016), including opinions concerning the 

appearance and demeanor of others. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202, 213 

(1971) (permitting lay testimony that an individual was intoxicated); Estate of 

Nicolas v. Ocean Plaza Condo. Ass'n, 388 N.J. Super. 571, 582-83 (App. Div. 

2006) (allowing lay testimony that a decedent was mentally unsound); State v. 

Walker, 216 N.J. Super. 39, 45 (App. Div. 1987) (allowing lay testimony that a 

person was tired, depressed, and in a state of shock).

The court's oft-repeated ruling witnesses would be limited to only the 

"facts," and its apparent prohibition against lay opinion testimony, was 

inconsistent with N.J.R.E. 701. Tobar's testimony defendant "stared" at her 

and Hoffer's testimony defendant was "unwelcoming" were based on their 

perceptions and would have assisted the jury in determining whether defendant 

violated the LAD. It was error for the court to exclude such admissible lay 

opinion testimony.

We are not, however, convinced the court erred by excluding Hoffer's 

testimony it was "odd" the parking lot was empty or that his experience with 

defendant was "appalling." Although this testimony may have been in part 

based on Hoffer's personal perceptions, we discern no basis in the record to 
A-0604-18T2 33

conclude the number of cars in the parking lot or Hoffer's personal opinion 

concerning his interaction with defendant would properly assist the jury in 

determining any facts at issue at trial. N.J.R.E. 701; see, e.g., Piech v. 

Layendecker, 456 N.J. Super. 367, 379 (App. Div. 2018) (finding a violation 

of N.J.R.E. 701 because "the witnesses' subjective belief" concerning the 

foreseeability of an accident "would not assist the jury in determining" the fact 

issues presented).

The court's error in barring Tobar's testimony and Hoffer's testimony 

defendant was "unwelcoming" does not require reversal of the jury's verdict 

because it was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. In 

any event, on remand the court shall permit appropriate lay opinion testimony 

in accordance with N.J.R.E. 701.

D.

Plaintiffs also assert they were deprived of a fair trial because during the 

voir dire of the prospective jurors the court asked the following question: "do 

you feel that Muslims or the Muslim religion in general are a discriminated 

minority in the United States, and if so, explain why you feel that?" Plaintiffs 

argue the court erred by requiring only those prospective jurors who answered 

the question in the affirmative to explain the reasons for their feelings, and by 
A-0604-18T2 34

failing to similarly require prospective jurors answering in the negative to 

explain theirs. 

Plaintiffs' argument is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We note only that we discern no basis to 

conclude the court abused its discretion by asking the question in response to 

defendant's request. See Pellicer ex rel. Pellicer v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 200 

N.J. 22, 41-42 (2009) (explaining trial courts have discretion in conducting 

jury voir dire and determining the qualifications of prospective jurors). 

Moreover, plaintiffs did not object to the question or request the court require 

prospective jurors responding in the negative to explain their answer, and the 

record does not support a conclusion the court's purported error was a plain 

error clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2; State v. Winder, 

200 N.J. 231, 252 (2009). If, on remand, the court asks prospective jurors the 

same question, we do not preclude plaintiffs from requesting the court inquire 

of those answering in the negative to explain the basis for their feelings.

E.

We are also unpersuaded by plaintiffs' claim the court erred by allowing 

defendant access to Farghaly's tax returns, and by permitting defendant to 

cross-examine Farghaly about the returns. Plaintiffs argue the court 

incorrectly permitted defendant to use the tax returns to challenge Farghaly's 
A-0604-18T2 35

credibility on issues—the amount of her income and accuracy of the returns—

that were extraneous to the causes of action and damage claims presented for 

the jury's determination. Thus, plaintiffs assert the questioning of Farghaly 

about the returns violated N.J.R.E. 403 and 608. 

We recognize public policy disfavors disclosure of tax returns, see

Ullmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 87 N.J. Super. 409, 415-16 (App. Div. 

1965), but plaintiffs' argument ignores the record. Contrary to plaintiffs' 

contention, the amount of Farghaly's income was not an extraneous issue about 

which it was improper to inquire. Farghaly's income, and the credibility of her 

testimony concerning it, was placed in issue by plaintiffs during their counsel's 

direct examination of Farghaly. On direct examination, plaintiffs first asked 

Farghaly about her income, and Farghaly reported her income in response to 

plaintiffs' counsel's questions. 

Although the purpose of plaintiffs' counsel's questions concerning 

Farghaly's income is unclear, and the record does not readily reveal the 

probative value of that testimony, we discern no abuse in the court's discretion 

in allowing cross-examination concerning Farghaly's tax returns that revealed 

inconsistencies in her testimony about her income. The cross-examination did 

not constitute a collateral attack on Farghaly's credibility founded on an 

extraneous issue. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 495 (2017) (Albin, J., 
A-0604-18T2 36

concurring) (explaining "a defendant, on trial for aggravated assault, cannot be 

asked whether he misstated his income on his tax returns" as a means of 

challenging credibility); Serrano v. Underground Utils. Corp., 407 N.J. Super. 

253, 275 (App. Div. 2009) (explaining extrinsic evidence concerning an 

extraneous matter is not relevant for purposes of challenging a witness's 

credibility). Instead, the cross-examination properly challenged Farghaly's 

credibility as well as her substantive testimony about her claimed income. See

State v. Feaster, 184 N.J. 235, 248 (2005) (explaining "[o]ne of the essential 

purposes of cross-examination is to test the reliability of testimony given on 

direct-examination").

We are satisfied the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing crossexamination concerning the tax returns based on the testimony and evidence 

presented at the trial. We do not decide or offer an opinion whether 

information concerning Farghaly's income is relevant, admissible evidence at 

the re-trial, and we do not foreclose plaintiffs from arguing on remand that 

cross-examination concerning the tax returns should either be limited or barred 

based on the evidentiary record presented at that time. 

Reversed and remanded for a new trial in accordance with this opinion. 

We do not retain jurisdiction.