UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

PETER MARIO GOICO, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF KANSAS, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 19-3116 

(D.C. No. 6:19-CV-01055-JTM-GEB) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before CARSON, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

In March 2019, Plaintiff Peter Goico filed a complaint against the State of 

Kansas, alleging the State’s “attempts” to legalize marijuana are unconstitutional. The 

district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 

§ 1915A(b) because the action was frivolous, i.e., “lack[ed] an arguable basis either in 

law or in fact.” ROA, 70 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). The 

court explained that federal courts do not have the power to preempt prospective 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 24, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

legislation. Id. at 70–71 (citing McChord v. Cincinnati, New Orleans, & Tex. Pac. Ry. 

Co., 183 U.S. 483, 496 (1902)). Plaintiff’s claim rested upon “pure speculation of 

future legislation” and, thus, Plaintiff was impermissibly seeking “an advisory opinion 

as to whether future legislation would be preempted by various constitutional rights.” 

Id. (quotations omitted). Thus, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s action. 

 On appeal, Plaintiff argues his complaint challenged, not only future 

legislation, but also a law that was indeed passed in 2016 that lowered the penalties for 

possession of marijuana. While Plaintiff mentioned the governor of Kansas was 

“trying to lower penalties” in his complaint, Plaintiff was clearly challenging the 

“attempts” to “legalize marijuana”—not lowering penalties for possession of 

marijuana. ROA, 7 (“I always believed that marijuana legalization was a problem, but 

now the unconstitutional attempts to do so are threatening a direct financial injury to 

me.”); id. (challenging “state level laws that legalize marijuana”); id. (“Kansas 

Governor, Laura Kelly, has become the latest to announce her intentions to legalize 

Marijuana . . . .”); id. at 8 (“I can prove that my state’s unconstitutional attempts to

legalize a dangerous substance are directly threatening me.”). Any effort to change 

course and now challenge the 2016 law—something neither argued nor ruled upon 

below—is waived. See United States v. Kearn, 863 F.3d 1299, 1313 (10th Cir. 2017). 

To the extent Plaintiff argues he is able to challenge potential future legislation, the 

district court was correct in its holding. We have nothing further to add to the court’s 

discussion, except to point out to Plaintiff that the place to engage in the political 

process is with his state legislature, not with this Court. 
3 

Plaintiff also argues the district court erred in its holdings on anonymity. 

Plaintiff sought to seal the record or proceed anonymously multiple times before the 

district court. These motions were rejected because Plaintiff’s mental condition “was 

not sufficiently embarrassing to warrant the extraordinary remedy of maintaining the 

action anonymously” and because Plaintiff’s “condition was not logically linked to the 

merits of the action.” We have previously stated: 

Lawsuits are public events. A plaintiff should be permitted to proceed 

anonymously only in those exceptional cases involving matters of a 

highly sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or 

where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the 

disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity. The risk that a plaintiff may suffer 

some embarrassment is not enough. 

Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 

F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992)). We agree with the district court that this is not an 

exceptional case that warrants anonymity. Accordingly, the district court did not err 

in denying Plaintiff’s request for anonymity. 

 AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge