IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ELZUFON, AUSTIN, TARLOV §

& MONDELL, P.A., §

§ No. 47, 2023

Employer Below, §

Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

v. §

§ C.A. No. N22A-03-006

DELISA LEWIS, §

§

Claimant Below, §

Appellee. §

Submitted: September 27, 2023

Decided: December 5, 2023

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and LEGROW, Justices.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. AFFIRMED.

Brandon R. Herling, Esquire, WEBER GALLAGHER SIMPSON STAPLETON 

FIRES & NEWBY LLP, New Castle, Delaware, for Appellant Elzufon, Austin, 

Tarlov & Mondell, P.A.

Tabatha L. Castro, Esquire, THE CASTRO FIRM, INC., Newark, Delaware, for 

Appellee DeLisa Lewis.

LEGROW, Justice:
Elzufon, Austin, Tarlov & Mondell, P.A. (“Elzufon”) appeals from a Superior 

Court Memorandum Opinion and Order affirming a decision of the Industrial 

Accident Board (“IAB” or the “Board”). The appellee, DeLisa Lewis, sustained a 

compensable work injury to her shoulder in 2016, for which she later underwent 

surgery. Elzufon and Lewis entered into an agreement under which Elzufon agreed 

to pay Lewis disfigurement benefits. Following her surgery, Lewis began 

experiencing neck pain for which she sought treatment. After her first treatment, 

however, Elzufon’s workers’ compensation carrier denied Lewis additional 

coverage relating to her neck. 

Lewis petitioned the IAB for a determination of additional compensation due, 

arguing that her neck pain was causally related to the 2016 injury. In opposing the

petition, Elzufon argued that Lewis’s neck injury was not causally related to the 2016 

injury and that, because it concerned a new injury, Lewis’s petition was time-barred 

by a two-year statute of limitations. The IAB ruled in Lewis’s favor, concluding 

that her spine injury was causally related to the 2016 injury and that her petition was 

timely. The Superior Court affirmed.

Elzufon argues on appeal that we should reverse on two grounds. First, 

Elzufon contends that Lewis’s causation expert rendered an opinion that was entirely 

speculative and therefore did not constitute substantial evidence. Because Lewis did 

not introduce other causation evidence, Elzufon argues that we must reverse. 
2

Second, Elzufon asserts that the IAB incorrectly applied a five-year statute of 

limitations and that Lewis’s petition is time-barred under the appropriate two-year 

statute of limitations.

The record below shows that Lewis’s expert’s opinion was not speculative; 

that opinion therefore constituted substantial evidence. In addition, there is 

substantial evidence to support the IAB’s determination that Lewis’s petition was 

timely. We therefore affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Lewis’s Work Injury, Surgery, and Cervical Spine Treatment

Lewis had been working for Elzufon for almost 20 years when she began 

experiencing pain in her right shoulder in August 2016.1 After Lewis reported the 

pain to Elzufon’s human relations office, she was referred for chiropractic 

treatment.2 In 2017, a nurse in the chiropractor’s office advised Lewis to visit Dr. 

Eric Johnson, who diagnosed Lewis with bone spurs in the right shoulder and 

recommended surgery.3 After a round of physical therapy, on June 15, 2018, Dr. 

Johnson performed surgery on Lewis’s shoulder, which was followed by another 

round of physical therapy.4

1 App. to Answering Br. at B56.

2 Am. App. to Opening Br. at A11.

3

Id.

4

Id.
3

Lewis returned to work in September or October 2018.5 Upon her return, she 

began experiencing neck problems,6along with continued right-hand numbness, 

tingling, and tightness.7 When Lewis followed up with Dr. Johnson, he concluded 

that her right-shoulder problems were successfully treated but referred her to Dr. 

Newell for possible neck issues.8

Lewis sought treatment at First State Orthopedics for her neck beginning in 

February 2019.9 On February 12, 2019, Lewis underwent an MRI.

10

 The results of 

the MRI showed a disc osteophyte complex.11 

Dr. Newell began treating Lewis on March 20, 2019.12 During that visit, Dr. 

Newell prescribed further physical therapy.13 Dr. Newell later testified that he was 

considering two potential diagnoses when he began treating Lewis: thoracic outlet 

syndrome and cervical radiculopathy.14 To assist with the diagnosis, and to treat 

Lewis’s symptoms, Dr. Newell recommended steroid epidural injections,15 which he 

administered on April 8, 2019 and April 22, 2019.16 Lewis reported having complete 

5

Id. at A12.

6

Id.

7

Id. at A11.

8

Id.

9

Id. at A8.

10 Id. at A9.

11 Id.

12 Id. at A32.

13 Id. at A11–12.

14 Id. at A35–38.

15 Id. at A11–12.

16 Id. at A8.
4

relief after the injections, which Dr. Newell believed suggested a cervical 

radiculopathy.17 Lewis’s symptoms gradually returned after five or six months.18 

After the first injection, Elzufon’s workers’ compensation carrier denied 

Lewis coverage for further medical treatment.19 Lewis continued with physical 

therapy until it became cost prohibitive.20 

In July 2019, the parties entered into an agreement for disfigurement benefits 

for “surgical scarring to the right upper extremity.”21 The agreement referenced the 

“cause of accident” as “repetitive use of the right arm” and the date of injury as 

August 29, 2016.22 Under the agreement, Elzufon paid Lewis seven weeks of 

disfigurement benefits relating to her shoulder.23 The record does not indicate when 

those payments were made.

Lewis visited Dr. Johnson again on January 8, 2020.24 During that visit, Dr. 

Johnson “assessed a cervical radiculopathy and believed [Lewis’s] neck and 

shoulder spasms were contributing to her symptoms.”25

17 Id.

18 Id. at A12.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id. at A17.

22 Id.

23 Id. at A2.

24 Id. at A19.

25 Id.
5

On May 20, 2021, shortly after Lewis filed her Petition to Determine 

Additional Compensation Due (the “Petition”) with the IAB, Lewis visited Dr. 

Newell.26 During that visit, Lewis reported that her symptoms had improved after 

physical therapy but had never completely resolved.27 She also reported that the 

symptoms were worsening and expressed interest in receiving the same injections 

that Dr. Newell prescribed two years earlier.28 At the time of his deposition on 

January 13, 2022, Dr. Newell had not administered additional injections.29

B. The IAB Proceedings Below

On April 1, 2021, Lewis filed the Petition seeking further medical treatment 

for the cervical spine injury, which she claimed was causally related to her 2016 

work injury.30 Elzufon argued that any injury to Lewis’s spine was not causally 

related to the 2016 injury.31 

The IAB held a hearing on the Petition on January 31, 2022.32 Before the IAB 

took testimony, Elzufon moved to dismiss the Petition, arguing that Lewis’s cervical 

spine injury was unrelated to the 2016 injury and that her Petition was time-barred 

by a two-year statute of limitations.33 After deliberating, but before hearing 

26 Id. at A9.

27 Id.

28 Id.

29 Id. at A45–46.

30 Id. at A2.

31 Id.

32 App. to Answering Br. at B43–77.

33 Id. at B46–47.
6

testimony, the IAB denied the motion on the grounds that a five-year limitations 

period applied and that Lewis filed the Petition within five years of the alleged 

injury.34 The IAB noted that it would provide additional rationale in its written 

decision.35

Dr. Newell testified by deposition on Lewis’s behalf.36 Lewis testified at the 

hearing.37 Dr. Scott Rushton, an orthopedic spine surgeon who had previously 

evaluated Lewis, testified by deposition in support of Elzufon.38

Dr. Newell opined that Lewis’s cervical spine problems were causally related 

to her 2016 work injury.39 He diagnosed Lewis with cervical radiculopathy for 

which treatment was reasonable, necessary, and causally related to her prior work 

injury.40 According to Dr. Newell, Lewis’s neck problems, like many patients who 

undergo shoulder surgery, were an “indirect unfortunate consequence of being 

treated surgically.”41 Dr. Newell’s opinion was partially based on the circumstances 

under which Lewis’s spinal injury arose: she had not sustained an isolated injury to 

her cervical spine, and her complaints began after surgery.42 In Dr. Newell’s view, 

34 Id. at B48.

35 Id.

36 Id. at B48–56.

37 Id. at B56–68.

38 Id. at B69–72.

39 Am. App. to Opening Br. at A7, A10.

40 Id. at A7–8.

41 Id. at A50.

42 Id. at A51–52.
7

if Lewis had not sustained the shoulder injury, she would not have undergone the 

surgery that gave rise to her neck issues.43 

Dr. Newell testified that, during his physical examination of Lewis, she 

demonstrated an abnormal reflex bilaterally, which can be normal, and that she had 

a positive Spurling’s maneuver, which is typical of an injured or entrapped nerve of 

the neck.44 Based on this information, Dr. Newell was considering diagnosing 

cervical radiculopathy affecting the right C6 nerve root between the fifth and sixth 

bones of the neck.45 Dr. Newell testified that he therefore recommended epidural 

steroid injections to settle the nerve and to assist his diagnosis.46 According to Dr. 

Newell, a successful injection would indicate a cervical radiculopathy.47

Dr. Newell testified that he reviewed a previous electromyography (“EMG”) 

that was negative for signs of a pinched nerve in Lewis’s arm or neck.48 According 

to Dr. Newell, this was “fairly common” and often consistent with neck issues.49 He 

testified that the negative findings were not inconsistent with a cervical 

radiculopathy because positive findings appear only in the most severe cases.50

43 Id.

44 Id. at A33.

45 Id. at A33–34.

46 Id.

47 Id. at A35–36.

48 Id. at A32–33.

49 Id.

50 Id. at A39–40.
8

Dr. Newell also acknowledged that the results of the February 12, 2019 MRI 

did not clearly show nerve compression or pinching.51 But he stated that the MRI 

results showed a mild narrowing or “mechanical radiculopathy.”52 He testified that 

a mechanical radiculopathy is an injury, or aggravation of an injury, to a disc that 

causes inflammation, which can “biochemically” irritate a nearby nerve.53

Dr. Newell made several concessions on cross-examination.54 Importantly for 

this appeal, Dr. Newell agreed that he did not have any “medical records” or 

“documents” to support his contention that the surgery caused a cervical 

radiculopathy.55 He reiterated, however, that his assessment was based in part on 

the circumstances surrounding Lewis’s complaints about her neck.56

Dr. Rushton disagreed that Lewis’s neck injury was work-related and opined 

that her 2016 injury was an isolated right-shoulder injury for which surgery produced 

an excellent clinical outcome.57 Dr. Rushton’s opinion was largely based on the lack 

of objective evidence linking a cervical spine injury to the surgery or to repetitive 

work-related movement.58 Specifically, Dr. Rushton stated that there is no support 

51 Id. at A36–38.

52 Id.

53 Id.

54 See id. at A52–74. 

55 Id. at A72–74.

56 Id. at A73 (“So it seems to me [the shoulder surgery is] the big dramatic event that took place 

around the time that her symptoms began.”).

57 Id. at A100–01.

58 Id. at A96–103.
9

for a cervical radiculopathy diagnosis from an objective standpoint based on his 

evaluation of Lewis, the MRI and EMG reports, and her clinical complaints.59 

According to Dr. Rushton, the MRI report showing a disc osteophyte complex with 

mild to moderate central and foraminal narrowing was “relatively” normal.60 Dr. 

Rushton also expressed a belief that the relief Lewis felt after the injections was due 

to a placebo effect.61

On cross-examination, Dr. Rushton acknowledged that he did not ask Lewis 

about any repetitive activities at work that might have caused her pain.62 He

conceded that he examined Lewis on only one occasion, more than two years before 

his deposition,

63 and he had not reviewed any updated treatment records other than 

Dr. Newell’s deposition transcript.64

The IAB concluded that medical treatment to Lewis’s neck was reasonable, 

necessary, and causally related to her 2016 injury.65 The IAB found Dr. Newell’s 

causation opinion to be more convincing than Dr. Rushton’s opinion, based largely 

on the timing of Lewis’s neck problems.66 The IAB’s written decision also 

addressed the reasoning underlying the Board’s denial of Elzufon’s motion to 

59 Id.

60 Id. at A97.

61 Id. at A97–99.

62 Id. at A105–06.

63 Id. at A106.

64 Id.

65 Id. at A17.

66 Id. at A18.
10

dismiss. The written decision explained that the Petition was timely because Lewis

filed it within five years of the 2016 injury, as required by 19 Del. C. § 2361(b).

67

 

In the alternative, the IAB explained, the Petition was timely under 

19 Del. C. § 2361(a) because Lewis filed it within two years of the date on which 

the injury’s “detrimental effect” manifested and Lewis, as a reasonable person, knew 

or should have known it was related to her employment.68 That date, the IAB 

explained, was either January 8, 2020, when Dr. Johnson assessed Lewis for a 

cervical radiculopathy or on either of the dates of the two epidural injections—

April 8, 2019 and April 22, 2019.69 

C. Elzufon Appeals to the Superior Court

Elzufon appealed the IAB’s decision to the Superior Court, asserting two 

grounds for reversal. First, Elzufon argued that the IAB abused its discretion by 

accepting Dr. Newell’s cervical radiculopathy diagnosis because it was not 

supported by documentary or objective medical evidence and therefore was not 

based on substantial evidence.70 Second, Elzufon asserted that the IAB erred by 

denying the motion to dismiss because, according to Elzufon, the Petition was 

related to a new body part and therefore subject to Section 2361(a)’s two-year 

67 Id. at A21.

68 Id. at A21–22.

69 Id.

70 Opening Br. Ex. A (“Superior Court Opinion”) at 12.
11

limitations period.71 Elzufon argued that the limitations period began on 

March 19, 2019, when Dr. Newell diagnosed Lewis with a cervical radiculopathy.72

The Superior Court affirmed the IAB. First, the court held that the IAB’s 

decision was based on substantial evidence.73 In the court’s view, adopting 

Elzufon’s position would require the court “to step outside of its proper role and reweigh the evidence, and make its own credibility and factual findings.”74

 Second, 

the court held that the IAB’s alternative rulings on Elzufon’s motion to dismiss were 

legally correct.75 The court explained that, “[g]iven the [IAB’s] finding that the 

cervical spine injury was causally related to the compensable injury,” the IAB’s 

holding that the Petition was timely under Section 2361(b)’s five-year limitations 

period was “manifestly correct.”76 The court also held that the IAB’s alternative 

holding was legally correct because Lewis filed her Petition within two years of 

when Dr. Johnson assessed a cervical radiculopathy and administered the two 

epidural injections.77

This appeal followed.

71 Id. at 11–12.

72 Id.

73 Id. at 15–16.

74 Id. at 16.

75 Id. at 16–18.

76 Id. at 16–17.

77 Id. at 17–18.
12

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court’s review of a Board decision is generally limited to determining

“whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings.”78 

“Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”79“Weighing the evidence, determining 

the credibility of witnesses, and resolving any conflicts in the testimony are 

functions reserved exclusively to the Board.”

80 On appeal, we review alleged errors 

of law de novo.

81

III. ANALYSIS

Elzufon raises two issues in this appeal. First, Elzufon argues that the IAB’s 

conclusion that Lewis’s spinal injury was causally related to the 2016 injury was not 

based on substantial evidence.82 According to Elzufon, Dr. Newell’s opinion—

which was the only causation evidence supporting Lewis’s position—was “purely 

speculative in nature” and therefore did not constitute substantial evidence.83 

Second, Elzufon argues that the IAB should have dismissed the Petition as timebarred.84

 According to Elzufon, the Board should not have applied 

78 Betts v. Townsends, Inc., 765 A.2d 531, 533 (Del. 2000).

79 Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

80 Noel-Liszkiewicz v. La-Z-Boy, 68 A.3d 188, 191 (Del. 2013).

81 Arrants v. Home Depot, 65 A.3d 601, 605 (Del. 2013). 

82 Opening Br. at 10–15.

83 Id. at 12–13.

84 Id. at 16–18.
13

Section 2361(b)’s five-year limitations period because that provision applies only 

when payments have been made in connection with an accepted injury.85 Because 

Lewis’s neck injury was not related to the 2016 injury, Elzufon argues, 

Section 2361(a)’s two-year limitations period governs the Petition’s timeliness.86 

According to Elzufon, Lewis filed the Petition outside that two-year window because 

she had “actual notice” of a cervical radiculopathy diagnosis on March 20, 2019, 

when she first visited Dr. Newell, but waited until April 1, 2021 to file the Petition.87

A. Dr. Newell’s expert opinion testimony constituted substantial evidence.

“[T]he IAB may adopt the opinion testimony of one expert over another; and 

that opinion, if adopted, will constitute substantial evidence for purposes of appellate 

review.”88 Elzufon stipulated to Dr. Newell’s qualifications as a medical expert,89

Dr. Newell testified in that capacity, and the IAB adopted Dr. Newell’s opinion 

testimony.90 Elzufon nevertheless contends that Dr. Newell’s testimony does not 

constitute substantial evidence because his opinion was “purely speculative,” citing 

Dr. Newell’s admission that his opinion was not based on objective medical 

evidence or records.91 Relying on the Superior Court’s decision in Hinckle v. Shorts 

85 See Reply Br. at 7.

86 Id.

87 Opening Br. at 17–18.

88 Person-Gaines v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., 981 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Del. 2009).

89 Am. App. to Opening Br. at A30.

90 See id. at A18–19, A30.

91 Opening Br. at 12–13.
14

Enterprises, Inc.,

92 Elzufon maintains that, given the speculative nature of Dr. 

Newell’s opinion, the opinion “cannot ‘constitute substantial evidence for purposes 

of appellate review.’”93 

Dr. Newell’s testimony does not resemble the testimony in Hinckle. The

claimant in Hinckle sustained a compensable shoulder injury requiring surgery, 

which his employer agreed to compensate.94 After his surgery, the claimant again 

began experiencing shoulder pain, which necessitated a second shoulder surgery.95 

After the second surgery, the claimant petitioned the IAB to determine additional 

compensation due, and the IAB denied the petition, finding that the second surgery 

was not related to the original work accident.96 That finding was primarily based on 

the testimony of an orthopedic surgeon who examined the claimant.97 Among other 

things, the surgeon “theorized that another accident could have caused” the 

claimant’s second injury, but the surgeon “conceded that no evidence exist[ed] of 

such an accident.”98 On appeal, the Superior Court concluded that the surgeon’s 

92 2004 WL 1731142 (Del. Super. July 28, 2004).

93 Opening Br. at 14 (quoting Hinckle v. Shorts Enters., Inc., 2004 WL 1731142, at *3 (Del. Super. 

July 28, 2004)).

94 Hinckle, 2004 WL 1731142, at *1.

95 Id.

96 Id. at *2.

97 Id.

98 Id. at *3.
15

hypothesis could not constitute substantial evidence because it amounted to 

speculation.99

Unlike the opinion in Hinckle, Dr. Newell’s opinion was not based on 

hypothetical facts that lacked evidentiary support. Although Dr. Newell admitted 

that his opinion was not based on “objective” medical records,

100 that testimony does 

not make his opinion fatally speculative. Dr. Newell was Lewis’s treating physician, 

and based on the timing of Lewis’s neck problems, and Dr. Newell’s familiarity with 

the complications that patients who undergo shoulder surgery confront, he deduced 

that the neck problems may have stemmed from the surgery. Based on that 

deduction, Dr. Newell administered injections, the results of which showed, in Dr. 

Newell’s view, that Lewis experienced a cervical radiculopathy. Elzufon points to 

several inartful soundbites elicited at the end of Dr. Newell’s deposition,101 but a fair 

reading of his testimony shows that his opinion was not based on speculation. The 

Board’s decision therefore was supported by substantial evidence.102

B. The IAB did not erroneously conclude that the Petition was timely.

The IAB denied Elzufon’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Petition was 

not time barred under two alternative provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2361. The primary 

99 Id.

100 Opening Br. at 12–13.

101 See id. at 7; Am. App. to Opening Br. at A72–74.

102 See Person-Gaines, 981 A.2d at 1161; Simmons v. Del. State Hosp., 660 A.2d 384, 388 (Del. 

1995) (“It is entirely proper and appropriate for the Board to accept the medical testimony of one 

expert witness over that of another.”).
16

basis for the IAB’s ruling was that Lewis filed the Petition within the five-year 

limitations period set forth in Section 2361(b).103 In the alternative, the IAB 

concluded that Lewis filed the Petition within the two-year limitations period set 

forth in Section 2361(a) because the limitations period was tolled.104 The Superior 

Court agreed with both rulings.105 Whether a statute of limitations bars a workers’

compensation benefits claim “is a mixed question of law and fact that requires the 

Court to determine: (1) whether the IAB applied the correct legal standard and if so, 

(2) whether the factual findings of the IAB were supported by substantial 

evidence.”106 

We conclude that the IAB correctly applied Section 2361(b) and therefore do 

not address its conclusions as to Section 2361(a). The five-year limitations period 

in Section 2361(b) applies in cases where “payments of compensation have been 

made . . . under an agreement approved by the Board or by an award of the Board.”107 

Section 2361(b) provides:

Where payments of compensation have been made in any case under 

an agreement approved by the Board or by an award of the Board, no 

statute of limitation shall take effect until the expiration of 5 years from 

103 See Am. App. to Opening Br. at A21.

104 See id. at A21–22.

105 Superior Court Opinion at 16–17.

106 Pinnacle Foods v. Chandler, 27 A.3d 552, 2011 WL 3586491, at *3 (Del. Aug. 16, 2011) 

(TABLE) (quoting Smolka v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2004 WL 3958064, at *2 (Del. Super. July 

13, 2004)).

107 19 Del. C. § 2361(b).
17

the time of the making of the last payment for which a proper receipt 

has been filed with the Department [of Labor].

108

Elzufon contends that the five-year limitations period does not apply because 

there is not substantial evidence that the 2016 injury caused Lewis’s neck injury at 

issue in the Petition.109 In other words, Elzufon argues that Section 2361(b) applies 

only if Lewis’s spinal injury relates to her earlier shoulder injury. And because those 

injuries are not related, Elzufon argues, the IAB should not have applied 

Section 2361(b)’s five-year limitations period. Elzufon does not otherwise 

challenge the IAB’s ruling under Section 2361(b).

We already have concluded that the IAB’s causation determination was based 

on substantial evidence. Accordingly, the IAB correctly applied Section 2361(b). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Superior Court’s January 10, 2023 

Memorandum Opinion and Order.

108 Id.

109 Reply Br. at 7.