NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVIER GARCIA MARTINEZ, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-71507

Agency No. A205-467-268 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 18, 2021**

San Francisco, California

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, and MOLLOY,

***

District Judge.

Javier Garcia Martinez seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the 

District of Montana, sitting by designation.

FILED

NOV 22 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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that he is ineligible for withholding of removal or for relief under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we 

review both the BIA and IJ decisions, see Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 

(9th Cir. 2016), under the “substantial evidence” standard, see INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 

502 U.S. 478, 481, 483–84 (1992); Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir. 

2012); Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny the petition 

for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Garcia Martinez 

failed to show that he had suffered “past persecution,” which gives rise to a

presumption of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). The two armed 

robberies that Garcia Martinez endured in Mexico were reprehensible and 

undoubtedly frightening, but he provides no evidence that compels the conclusion 

that he was targeted because of his membership in a protected social group, nor does 

he demonstrate that these incidents rise to the stringent standard of egregiousness 

required to constitute persecution. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059–60

(9th Cir. 2009).

Nor does the additional evidence of robberies and threats against Garcia 

Martinez’s family members compel such a conclusion. Although harm inflicted 

upon close family members may be evidence supporting a claim of past persecution, 

see Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2010), this harm must 
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“create a pattern of persecution closely tied to the petitioner,” Arriaga-Barrientos v. 

INS, 937 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1991). In this case—where the threats to his family 

were inconsistently tied to Garcia Martinez and occurred while he was living in the 

United States—substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Garcia 

Martinez was the victim of “harassment by criminals motivated by theft,” which

“bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th 

Cir. 2010); see also Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“[P]urely personal retribution is, of course, not persecution on account of [a 

protected ground].”); Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1093 (“[H]aving already moved to the 

United States at the time of the alleged persecution, Tamang was far removed from 

the persecution that his [family] suffered and was not directly impacted in any 

way.”).

Substantial evidence likewise supports the agency’s conclusion that Garcia 

Martinez failed to show a clear probability of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 

1208.16(b)(2). Garcia Martinez has provided no evidence of a nexus between the 

threat of future robberies and a protected ground. See Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1016; 

Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated in part on other 

grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 

Further, the fact that his family in Mexico remains unharmed is “‘substantial 

evidence’ supporting the Board’s finding that [Petitioner] lacks a well-founded fear 
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of future persecution based on family membership.” Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 

F.3d 738, 743–44 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated in part on other grounds by HenriquezRivas, 707 F.3d 1081.

Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Garcia 

Martinez failed to show a clear probability of torture “inflicted by, or at the 

instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an 

official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. §§

1208.16(c), 1208.17, 1208.18(a)(1). Garcia Martinez was not previously tortured in 

Mexico. The threat of future robberies “does not provide a sufficient basis to 

conclude that any harm ... would rise to the level of torture.” Lopez v. Sessions, 901 

F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018). And Garcia Martinez has provided no 

particularized evidence that any such harm will be inflicted by or with the complicity 

of public officials, other than general statements about conditions in Mexico. See 

Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).

PETITION DENIED.