1 ... T h e re c o rd c o n ta ins a ju d g m e n t f o r e a c h c o u n t. i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 79 2- CR Fr ank G. SAENZ , Appellant
v . The STA TE of

Te xas , Appellee F ro m th e 22 7th

Judic ia l D ist

ri c t Co ur t, B e xar County , T e xas Trial Court No. 2000-CR-5021 Honora ble Dick Alca la , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini , J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini , J ustice

Steven C. Hilbig , J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d , J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: March 3, 2010 AFF I RMED A jury convicted appellant Frank G. Saenz of t wo counts of a g g ravated sexual assault of a
c hil d. I n f ive iss ue s, Sa e nz argue s the tr ia l court e rr e d in de nyinghis pr e tr ia l w ri t of ha be a s c or pu s, in overrulinghis ob

je c ti ons to ex trane ous offe nse evide nce, a nd in overrulinghis objections to ex pert testimony . We overrule Saenz’s issues and af firm the judg ments of conviction. 104
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- 2- F ACT UAL AND P R OC EDU R A L B ACKG ROUND I n October

2000, Saenz w as indicted for ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild in a six -count indictment. I n Fe bruar

y 2001, a jury

convicted Sae nz of three of the counts in the indictment. The conviction was a ffirme d on appea l. Sa e nz v . S tate , 103 S.W. 3d

54 1, 54 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 03 , pe t. re f’ d) . T he re a ft e r, the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls g ra

nte d Sa e nz’ s a

pp lic a tio n f

or a wr it of habe as cor

pus under a

rticle 11.07 of th e Tex as Code of Criminal Proce dure a nd set aside the conviction bec ause of

ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. See E x p a r te Saenz , No. AP-75461, 2006 WL 1687473, at *1 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006) (not desig nated f or publication). I n O c tob e r 2 00 8, Sa e nz w a s r e pr os e c ut e d o n a n a m e n d e d t hr e e -c ou nt i nd ic tme nt. Tw o c ounts inv olv e d Sa e nz’ s ado pte d da ug hte r, Y. S. O ne c ount i nv olv e d Sa e nz’ s b iol og ic a l da ug hte r, S.S. B oth Y.S. a nd S.S. testified at tria l. Y.S., who was twenty -eig ht y ear s old at the time of trial, testified that duri nghe r c hil dh oo d Sa e nz to uc he d h e r s e xua l or g ans , p e rf or me d ora l sex on

he r, and e ng a g e d in sexual int erc ourse with her. The touching and oral sex beg an whe n Y.S. was about four or five a nd
co ntinued until she was fourte en. The sexual int erc ourse be g an whe n Y.S. was about thirtee n and continued until she was fourtee n. S.S., who was also an a dult at the time of trial, re cante d her e arlier statements that Saenz had sexually abused he r duringher c hildhood, and the trial court grante d a direc ted ver dict on the count involving S.S. The jury found Saenz g ui l t y o f the two c ounts involvi ng Y.S. Punis hment was a ssessed at t e nye ar s an d

o n e d ay i mp r i s o n m e n tf

o r e a c h c o u n t
. T h e s e n t e n c e s w e r e o r d e r e d t o r u nc o n c u r r e n t l y.04
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- 3- P R ETRIAL W R IT OF H A BE A S C ORP US I n his first issue, Saenz arg ues the trial c ourt err ed when it denied his pretria l motion for a writ of habe as cor

pus. I n this motion, Saenz a rg ued his r eprose cution violated the double jeopa rdy pr ov isi on s o f t

he fe de ra l and

Te xas c on sti tut ion s. The double jeopar dy provisions of t he fe dera l and Texas constitutions protect a citizen from repe ated attempts at prosecution for the same c riminal offe nse. Ex parte W heele r , 203 S.W .3d 317, 32 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). Ho we ve r, if a de fe nd ant re qu e sts a mis tr ia l, d ou

ble je op ard

y no rm a lly does not bar r eprose cution. Id
. Under the federa l double j eopar dy clause , a re trial is prohibited after the d e f e n d an tr e qu e s t s an d

i s g r an t e d

a m i s t r i a l o n l y

i f t h e p r o s e c u t i o ni n t e n t i o n a l l y c o m mit s manifestly

improper conduct wit h the intent to provoke that mistrial. Id
. (c i t i n g Oregon v . Kennedy , 456 U.S. 667, 672-73 (1982)) . The same standard a ppli es under the double jeopar dy clause in the Texas constituti on. Le wis v . S tate , 219 S.W .3d 335, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We reviewthe trial cour t ’s ruling on a pre trial writ of ha beas c orpus for a

n abuse of discretion. Ex parte W

heele r , 203 S.W .3d at 322. I n conducting this re view, we view the objec tive fac ts in the light most favora ble to the trial cour

t’s ruling
. Id
. O u r d i s p o s i t i o n o f S a e n z ’ s f i r s t i s s u e i s g o v e r

n e d b y Ex pa rteMi tc he ll , 977 S.W .2d 575, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). L ike Saenz, the appellant in Ex pa rteMi tc he ll moved for a mistrial, which
wa s d en i ed , b u tt h en h adh i s co n v i ct i o ns et as i d e i na p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ab ea s co rp u s p ro ce ed i n g. There afte r, the a

ppellant in Ex

pa rteMi tc he ll filed a pr etrial mot ion for habe as cor pus relief , arguing his reprose cution would violate his rig hts under the f eder al and state constitutions. The trial court04
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- 4- de nie d th e mot ion

and the a pp e llate c ourt

a ff ir me d. I n a ff

ir min g the jud g me nt of the a pp e llate c ourt , the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated, The a ccuse d’s rig ht unde r the double jeopa rdy clause to have his trial complete d by the fi rs t tr ibu

na l is c le arl y

pr ote c te d w he re , a s in

the pr e sent c a se , it

pr oc e e de d to c on c lus ion , i. e ., a

ve rd ic t. O nly

wh e re the pr os e c uto r’ s in te nti on al, an d d e lib e rate mis c on du c t g oa ds the a c c us e d i nto mo vin g fo r a mis tr ia l—a

nd that mo tio n is g rante d—is the acc used’s rig ht to be tried to v e rd ict by the first tribunal, a r ight aff orded him b y t h e double jeopardy clause of the F ifth Amendment, violated. As the re wa s n o mistr ia l in the pr e se nt ca se , we ho ld a pp lic ant’ s d ou

ble je op ard

y ri g hts under the Un i t ed S tates Constitut ion are not violated by the State’s re trial of applicant f

ollowing r ever sal of his conviction. Id . at 579-80 (e mphasis in origina l). I n the pre sent ca se, as in E xp a r t e M

itc he ll , n o mistrial was g ra nte d. B e c a

us e no mis tr ia l w a s g ra

nte d, the re wa s no vio latio n of Sa e nz’ s do ub le je op ard y ri g hts
. Saenz rec og nizes the holding in Ex pa rteMi tc he ll , but argu es , howeve r, that he should be
e nti tle d to re lie f re g ard le ss of wh e the r he ob ta ine d a mistr ia l in th e tr ia l c ourt , a re ve rs a l on

a pp e a l,
or a reve rsal in a post-conviction proce eding
. Thus, acc ording to Sae nz, double jeopardy would be implicated in this case if he could show there was prose cutorial misconduct in his first trial. I n response to Saenz’s arguments, the State points out that t he double jeopa rdy provisions of the fe dera l and Texas constitutions do not prec lude a r e trial following a succ essful post-convic tion
reme dy
. See Lock

hart v. Nelson , 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988) (“It ha s long be en settled, howe ver, that the Double Jeopardy

Clause’s g ener al prohibi tion ag ainst succe ssive prosec utions does not preve nt the go v ern m en tfr o m re t ry i n g a de fe n d an twh o s u cc ee d s i nget t i n g h i s fi rs tco n v i ct i o ns et as i d e, t h ro u gh direc t a ppeal or collater al attack, be cause of some er ror in the pr ocee dings le ading to conviction.”); United States v. Tateo , 377 U.S. 463, 463-64 (1964) (holding the retria l of a c riminal defe ndant who had a c onviction overturne d in collatera l proce eding s d id n o t o f f e n d d o u b le jeopar dy

protec tion). The04
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- 5- State further

argues t hat even if Saenz could claim a double jeopar dy violation by

virtue of having his conviction reve rsed, the r ecor d from the pr etrial ha beas c o rp u s h ea ri ng failed to show ( 1) the commission of intentional prosec utorial misconduct in the first trial, and ( 2) the intent to provoke Saenz into movi ng for a

mistrial. I n fac t, the State points out, Saenz’s convic tion was not reve rsed b e c a u s e o f p r o s e c u to r ia l mi s c o n d u c t, b u t in s te a d b e c a

u s e o f in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o u n s e l. We
a g re e wi th t

he State ’s argume nts
. We hold Saenz’s double jeopardy rig hts were not violated by his retrial followingthe re v e r sal of his conviction i n a p o s t -convic tion procee ding. Se e Ex pa rteMi tc he ll , 977 S.W .2d at 581. Acc ording ly , the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion in denying Sae nz’s pret ri al writ of habe as corpus. Sae nz’s first issue is overruled. E X TR A N EO U S O FF ENSE E VI DE NCE I n his second issue, Saenz argues t he trial court erre d by admitting evide nce of

extraneous offe nses ag ainst Y.S. beca use the probative value of the evidenc e wa s substantially outweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. See T EX . R. E V ID . 403. We review the admission of evidenc e under an abuse of discre tion standard. Mo se s v . S tate , 105 S .W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. C rim. App. 2003). Und e r th is s ta

n d ar d , w e o v e r

r u le c o mp la in ts a

b o u t th e a dmi s s io n o f e v id e n c e , a s lo n g as the trial
c ourt ’s ru lin g wa s w ith in t he zon e of

re a so na ble dis a g re e me nt. Id
. Her e, the indictment alleg ed S aenz s exually assaulted Y.S. on or about J une 1, 1991, and on or about June 1, 1992, when Y.S. was twelve and thi rtee n y ear s old, respec tively . Y.S. testified the J une 1, 1991, incident involved Sae nz causing his penis to contact her vag ina, and the June 1, 1992, incident involved Saenz causinghis penis to penetrate her vag ina. Saenz contends Y.S.’s testimony04
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- 6- should have be en limited to evidence of the two offe nses cha rg ed in the indictment. Saenz argues the tr ia l c ourt a

bu se d its dis c re tio n b y

a llo wi ngY. S. t o te sti fy

a bo ut t he his tor y of he r r e latio ns hip with Saenz, wh i ch i n cl uded re fer ence s to ex trane ous offe nses that occ urre d over the course of approximately

nine y ear s. Over Saenz’s Rule 403 objections, Y.S. te stified about Saenz touc hing he r
va g ina in t he batht ub wh e n sh e wa s a

bo ut f our o r f ive , p e rf or min g or a l se x on h e r whe n s he wa s in elementa ry school, telling he r “that’s what daddie s do,” touchingher va g ina on other oc casions whe n she wa s betwee n the ag es of f ive and f ourtee n, taking inappropriate P olaroid phot os of her , having sexual int erc ourse wi t h her “ [m ]ore than 50, may be more than 100” times, and g iving he r wine cooler s and bee rs to g et her to relax during se x ual interc ourse. Te xas C od e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 38 .3 7 p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art : Notw it h s ta n d in g Ru le s 4 0 4 an d 4 0 5 , T e xa s Ru le s o f E v id e n c e , e v id e n c e o f other crimes , wr ong s, or ac ts committ ed by the def endant a g ainst the child who is the vic timof the a lle g e d o ff

e ns e sh a ll b e a dmi tte d f

or its be ari ngon

re le va nt m a tte rs , i n cl u d i n g: (1) the state of mind of the de fenda nt and the child; and (2) the pr evious and subseque nt relationship betwee n the def endant a nd the child. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 38.37, § 2 (V ernon 2005)
. Upon a pr oper obje ction, the trial cour t may exclude rele vant evidence if the probative value of the e vidence is substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of unfair pr ejudice. See T EX . R. E V ID . 403. Th e Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls h a s li ste d s e ve ra l f a c tor s th a t a

tr ia l c ourt

sh ou ld co ns ide r i n conductinga Rule 403 bala ncing test: (1) the probative value of the e vidence ; (2) the potential of the evidenc e to impress the jury in some irrational, but neve rtheless indelible wa y ; (3) the time the p ro ponent nee ds to develop the e vidence ; and (4) the proponent’s ne ed for the evidenc e. E

r azo v.04
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- 7- Sta te , 144 S.W .3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Mo ntg om e ry v . S tate , 810 S.W .2d 372, 389-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on re h’g ). Rule 403 favors t he admission of re levant evide nce a nd
car ries a pr esumption tha t re l ev an t evidence will be more probative than pre judicial. W

illiams v. Sta te , 958 S.W .2d 186, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). To su sta in t

his iss ue , w e mus t c on c lud e the pr ob a tiv e va lue of th e ev ide nc e wa s so substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice that the decision to admit the evidenc e
was not even within the zone of re asonable disag ree ment. SeeT EX . R. E V ID . 40 3; Moses ,105 S.W .3d at 627. Her e, Saenz does not challeng e the probative value of the evidence presented in this case . To the contra ry , Saenz acknowle dg es the e vidence in qu e s ti o n w a s p r o b a

ti v e . I nstead, Sae nz emphasiz es the pre judicial nature of th e extraneous of fense evidenc e, conte nding Y .S.’s testimony “could not have fa ile d to im pres s the jur y in a wa y that w a s b oth

ir ra tio na l and

un fo rg e tta

ble .” Sa e nz a lso complains about the time it to o k t o d ev el o p the evidenc e, asse rting it took two-thirds of a day for Y.S. to testify

about these e vents. I n light of Sae nz’s arg uments, we c onsider the f actor s pertine n t t o t h e Rule 403 bala ncing test. F ir s t, th e e v id e n c e in qu e s ti o n w a s h ig h ly p r o b a ti v e b e c a u s e it d e mo n s tr a te d th e h is to ry and prog ression of the relationship betwee n Y.S. and S aenz, and pr ovided insight into both of their states of min d. Th is f

a c tor we ig hs in f

a vo r o f t he adm is si on of the e vid e nc e . Se c on d, the po te nti a l to imp re ss the jur

y in s ome ir

ratio na l and

ind e lib le wa

y wa s a lso hig h. As e ve n th e State a c kn ow le dg e s, evidenc e of r epeated sexual assaults by a father on his daug hter beg inning at the age of four or five
and oc c ur ri ngun til the a g e of fo ur

te e n und ou

bte dly ha d a

str on g e mot ion a l e ff

e c t on the jur y . T his fa c tor we ig hs a g a ins t th e a dmi ssi on of the e vid e nc e . T hir d, a lth ou g h th e e vid e nc e too k some tim e develop, we cannot sa

y it diverted the jury ’s at tention from the cr ucial issues in this case. The04
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- 8- primary issue at trial was whether Saenz sexually assaulted Y.S. Another important issue was Y.S.’s state of mind a

nd her delay in disc losing the assaults. The evidenc e in que stion was closely related to t he se iss ue s. Thus , th is f

a c tor is n e utr a l. F ina lly , th e State ’s ne e d f or the e xt rane ous o ff

e ns e
e vid e nc e wa s a lso hig h. Th is f a c tor inv olv e s c on sid e ri ngwh e the r t he State ne e de d th e e vid e nc e in question to establish a fac t of conseq u en ce an d whether that fac t of conseque nce w as in dispute. Mo ntgom e ry , 810 S.W .2d at 390. Her e, the only direc t evidence of the c harg ed off enses wa s from Y.S., who did not disclose the sexual abuse until she was an ad u l t
. T h e defe nse attac ked Y.S.’s
cre dibilit y

and her delay in disclosing the c harg ed offenses. The evidenc e in question was ne cessa ry to help the jury

understand why Y.S. might have delay ed in di sclosing the offe nses cha rg ed in the indictment. This factor w eig hs in favor of the admission of the evide nce. Af te r we ig hin g the re qu ir e d fa c tor s, we c on c lud e the tr ia l c ourt c ou ld hav e reason a bly concluded the probative value of the evidenc e wa s not substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of unfair pr ejudice. T he trial c ourt’s dec ision to admit the ex trane ous offe nse evidence was within the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment, and ther efor e, wa s not an abuse of discretion. Saenz’s sec ond issue is overrule d. I n his third issue, Saenz arg ues the trial c ourt err ed by admitting evide nce of

extraneous offe nses aga inst S.S. beca use the probative value of the evidenc e wa s substantially outweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. See T EX . R. E V ID . 40 3. Th e re c or d doe s not s ho w Sa e nz o bje c te d to this evidence at t h e t i m e o f i t s admission. See T EX . R. E V ID . 103(a) (1) ( stating e rror may not be predic ated upon a

ruling which admits evidenc e unless a timely objection appe ars of rec ord). Sae nz
a c kn owl edges this f

a c t, b ut c on te nd s h e pr e se rv e d th is i ssu e be c a us e he ob ta ine d a

ru lin g on thi s evidenc e by way of a motion in limine or der. We disag ree . Notwithstanding a motion in l imine order,04
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- 9- a def endant r emains oblig ated to make a ti mely and spec ific objec tion when evidenc e is offe red at trial. Se e Gi lc hr est v . S

tate , 904 S. W
. 2 d 9 3 5 , 9 3 8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no pet.) ( holding complaints about the admission of ex t ra n eo u s offe nse evide nce w ere waived by the def endant’ s fa ilure to obj e c t du

ri ngtr ia l) ; Ra wlin gs v . S

tate , 87 4 S.W. 2d 74 0, 74 2- 43 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 1994, no pet.) (“ The g ranting or denying of a motion in limine, without more, pr eser ves nothing for appellate revie w.”) . Saenz’s third issue is overruled. E X PE R T T E S T I M ONY Admission of ex pert testimony is gove rned by

Texas Rule of

Evidence 702. Mo ra le

s v . S tate , 32 S.W .3d 862, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Pursuant to Rule 702, a witness may offe r an e x pert opinion if the witness is qua lified to do so by knowledg e, skill, experienc e, training , or educ ation and the witness possesses scie ntific, technic al, or other specia liz ed knowledg e that will assist the trier of fact t o understand the evidenc e or to deter mine a fa ct in issue. T EX . R. E V ID . 702. I f the trial c ourt deter mines the underlying fac ts or data do not provide a suf

ficient ba sis for the expert’s opinion, the opinion is i nadmissible. See T EX . R. E V ID . 70 5( c ). B e fo re a dmi tti nge xpe rt te sti mony

un de r R ule 702, the trial cour

t must be satisfied that three co n d i t i o n s ar e met: (1) the witness qualifies as a n expert by rea son of his knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or educ ation; (2) the subjec t matter of the testimony

is a n appropr iate one for expert testimony ; a nd (3) admitting the e x pert testimony will a ctually assist the fac t-finder in deciding the ca se. Ro dge rs v . S tate , 2 0 5 S. W. 3 d

5 2 5 , 5 2 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2006). We reviewa tr i al court’s de cision to allow expert opinion testi mony for a n abuse of discretion. Ga llo v . S

tate , 239 S.W .3d 757, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We must uphol d the trial court’s r uling if it wa s within the z one of r easona ble disag ree ment. W

e ath e rre d v . S

tate , 15 S.W .3d04
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- 10- 540, 5 4 2 (T ex . C ri m. App. 2000). More over, w e re view the tria l court’s rulingin light of the evidenc e bef

ore the trial court at the time the ruling was made
. Id
. 1. Te st im onyof C he r i Es tr ada I n his fourth issue, Saenz argues the trial court err ed in allowing expert testimony from Cheri Es t r a d a , a S anA n t o n i o P o l i c e D e p art m e n td e t e c t i v e w h o i n v e s t i g a t e d s e xu a l a s s a

u l tc o mpla int s, including the complaint made by Y.S. Saenz arg ues Estrada was not qualified to r ender an opinion about delayed outcr

y and re can t at i o n by

sexual abuse complainants. In response , the State ar g ues only part of this complaint is prese rved. A ccor ding to the State, Saenz ne ver objected that Estrada
w a s n o tqu a l i f

i e d t o g i v e ane x p e rto p i n i o no nd e l aye d o u t c r y. To pr e se rv e e rr or

fo r a pp e llate re vie w, the c omp la ini ngpa rt y mus t make a

tim e ly an d s p e c i f ic objection at the ear liest oppor tunity . T EX . R. A PP . P. 33 .1 (a )( 1) ; Ac e v e do v . S tate , 255 S.W .3d 162, 167 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref ’d). A spe cific obje ction reg ardingexpert testim o ny must de ta il th e p arti c u la

r d e f ic ie n c y in th e e xp e rt’ s qu a li f

ic a ti o n s o r

th e r e li a b il it y o f th e e xp e rt’ s opinions. Ace vedo , 2 55 S.W. 3d a t 16 7. He re , th e re c or d s ho ws Sa e nz sp e c if ic a lly ob je c te d to Estrada ’s qualifications to provide ex pert testim ony on rec antation; howeve r, the re cord shows no simil ar obje ction was made as to Estrada ’s q u al ifications to provide e x pert testimony on delay ed outcry . I n fac t, by

the time Saenz objected to Estrada ’s qualifications, Estrada had a lrea dy testified
o nd e l aye d

o u t c r y. No ri g id f

or mul a e xist s to eval uate wh e the r a pa rt ic ula r w itn e ss q

ua lif ie s a s an e xpe rt
. Ma tso n v . S

tate , 819 S.W .2d 839, 851 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). A witness may be qualifie d by
rea son of knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, or training , reg ardle ss of

its source. Id . Her e, Estra da testified she held a master’ s deg ree in psy cholog y from Our L ady of the L ake U niversity . To ea rn this deg ree ,04
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- 11- Estrada took courses in c hild development and a bnormal psy cholog y . Estrada ’s prac tical experienc e consisted of twe nty -three y ear s with t h e S an Ant onio Poli ce D epar tment, including a lmost t hree y ea rs i nt h e s ex cr i m es u n i to f t h e S an An t o n i o P o l i ce De p ar t m en t
. E s t ra d a t es t i fi edt h at ev en t h o u gh she had be en moved to anothe r unit she con t i n u ed t o wo rk on som e sex crimes ca ses. Estrada testified she had encounte red numerous complaina nts who made de lay ed outcr ies or who r eca nted alleg ations of sexual a

buse. Estrada also testified she had rea d article s and studies on delay ed outcr y
and re c antatio n b y

c hil d s e xua l a ssa

ult c omp la ina

nts
. The re cord sho ws that even if Saenz had objecte d to Estrada’ s qualifications to provide expert testimony

on delay ed outcr

y , the trial court could have proper ly allowed this testimony . Ba sed
on this re cord, we hold the trial court’s decision to a llow E strada’ s testimony on delay ed outcr y and
rec antation was not a

n abuse of

discretion. Saenz’s four

th issue is overruled. 2. Testim ony of

Dr. Nancy K ellogg I n his fifth issue, Saenz argues t he trial court e rre d in allowing the testimony of Dr. N ancy Ke l l o g g , profe ssor of pediatrics at the Unive rsity of Texas Hea lth Science Cente r, San Antonio. Sa e nz d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e Ke llo g g ’s qu a lif ic a tio ns to pr ov ide e xpe rt op ini on s in chi ld se xua l a bu se
case s. I nstead, Sae nz arg ues the trial court abused its discre tion in allowing Ke llogg ’s testimony be c a us e Ke llo g g “ [w]itho ut s pe a kin g to the c omp la ina nts ” “ ha d inc omp le te data on wh ic h to ba se he r e xpe rt op ini on s. ” Sa e nz f

ur the r a rgue s K e llo g g “ did

no t—a nd c ou ld n ot—

tie the fa c ts o f t

he c a se to the s c i e n t i f

i c p r i n c i p l e s t h a ts h e t e s t i f i e d a b o u t
. ” T h u s , S a e n z e s s e n t i a l l y ar g u e s t h a tb e c a

u se Ke llo g g ne ve r i nte rv ie we d Y .S. , s he c ou ld n ot h a ve tie d th e fa c ts o f t he c a se to t

he scien tif

ic principles about whic h she testified.04
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2 ... D ef ense counsel s t at ed , “I’ m go i ng to o b ject agai n, Jud ge, we’ ve had t hi s b ef o re, but I’ l l have t o co nt i nue t o ob j ect
. W hen we’ r e maki ng s peci f i c opi ni ons on s om ebod y s he’ s ne ver met , ne ver t alke d t o, ne ver done an exa mi nat i on, ne ver got t en t he hi s t ory t hat s he’ s t al ked a bo ut j us t a mi nu t e a go, f r om he r . I ’ m goi ng t o hav e t o ob j ect t hat w e ’re go ing far b e yo n d a n y m e d ic a l d ia g n o sis o r sta n d a rd m e d ic a l d ia g n o sis tha t a d o c to r sh o u ld b e e n tit le d to giv e .”

- 12- Her e, the r ecor d shows Saenz specifi cally objected to Ke llogg ’s testimony based on the expert’s failure to talk to or ex amine Y.S.; howeve r, Saenz did not specifica lly object to Kellog g ’s testimony beca use of the e x pert’s a lleg ed fa ilure to tie the facts of t he case to the scie ntific principles about which she testified. 2 Moreove r, the re cord shows that by the time K ellog g testified, the trial
c ourt ha d h e ard

Y. S.’ s te sti mony . Y .S. te sti fi e d s he did no t dis c los e the se xua l a bu se to a nyon e un til she wa s an adult and living on h er ow n. Y.S. further testified that when she finally disclosed the sexual abuse to her mother , her mo t h er an d S aenz were e x perie ncing marital diffic ulties, and her mother wa s emotionally

supportive of he r and f

acilitated her reporting the s exual abuse to the police. For authority , Saenz relies on Ace vedo , a c a se in whic h we hel d th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s discretion in admitti n g ex p er t testimony on the ef

fec ts cry stal methamphetamine ha d on the defe ndant. 255 S.W.3d at 169. I n Ace vedo , the re cord showe d the expert, a psy chiatrist and pharma cist, possessed no information whatsoever about the par

ticular fa cts of the case; the ex pert had no information about the de fenda nt’s individual chara cter istics, previous drug use, drug tol e r an c e , h o w mu c h o f th e dr u g w a s in g e s te d , w h e n th e dr u g w a s in g e s te d , an d what other substances w ere inge sted. Id
. Under these circ umstances, we conclude d the expert’s testimony was speculative, and ther efor e, unre liable and irr eleva nt. Id . at 169-70. Her e, by contra st, Kellog g testified she revie wed numerous documents prior to f orming her
e xpe rt op ini on in t his c a se , inc lud ing state me nts ma de by Y. S. an d S.S., state me nts ma de by the ir mother, and the transcr ipts of Y.S.’s and S.S.’s testim ony from the f irst trial. Additionally , Kellog g ’s04
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- 13- t es t i m o n y s h o ws s h e h ada t h o ro u gh u n d er s t an d i n g o f t h e p ar t i cu l ar fa ct s o f t h i s ca s e, i n cl u d i n g a familiarity

with Y.S.’s delay ed disclosure of the sexual abuse, the prog ression of abuse alleg ed by Y.S., and the cir cumstance s of S .S.’s outcry and her rec antation. We, there fore , are of the opinion that the trial cour

t could have rea sonably conclude d that Kellog g had sufficient fac ts and data upon
w h ic h to b a s e h e r

o p in ions. See G rif

fit h v . S tate , 983 S.W .2d 282, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (h old ingthe tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

a dmi tti nge xpe rt

te sti mony

wh e n e xpe rt

tol d th e ju ry he re vie we d th e inv e sti g a tiv e re po rt s, c ri me sc e ne ph oto s, a uto ps y ph oto s, wi tne ss statements, and t h e def

endant’ s school and per sonnel rec ords bef ore de veloping an opinion about the def endant’ s future da

ng erousne ss). Additionally , we a

re of the opi nion that even if Saenz had objecte d to Kellog g ’s testimony ba se d o n h e r a lle g e d f

a ilure to tie the fa c ts of thi s c a se to sc ie nti fi c pr inc ipl e s, the tr ia l c ourt c ou ld have pr o p er l y o verr

uled this objection. Ba sed on the doc uments she re viewed, K ellog g stated she would g ive Y.S. a medical diag nosis of sex ual abuse. Kellog g testified her opinion was based on the detail Y.S. provided about what happene d, which wa s “ver y rich a nd consistent.” Ke lloggalso stated her opinion wa s based on the c ircumstance s of Y.S.’s d i s cl osure, whe n Y.S. finally told someone about the abuse, wh en she r eporte d the situation, the family ’s re sponse, and how the family ’s response aff

ecte d Y.S. Kellog g opin ed t hat all of these fac tors wer e consistent with what she had seen in other

children a

nd adolesc ents she evaluated for sexual a buse. Kellog g went on to testify that children ty

pically dis cl o s e s ex u al abuse w hen they cannot take it any

more or when they

fee l safe. Her e, Ke lloggsaid it was her understandingthat Y.S. had sepa rate d herse lf from he r home by the time she disclosed the sexual abuse, a nd she wa s beg inning to dea l with t h e i s s u es an d emotional pr ob le ms c a

us e d b y the se xua l a

bu se . K e llo g g ind ic a te d th a t c hil dr e n, a do le sc e nts , a nd e ve n a du lt04
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- 14- vic tim s o f s e xua l a

bu se de lay

dis c los ur e fo r a

lot of re a so ns . K e llo g g wen t on to s ay that mo st
v i c t i m s d e l ay e d

d i s c l o s u r e b e c a

u s e t h e y w e r e a f r a i d o f w h a tw o u l d

h a p p e nw h e nt h e y

d i d
. In particula r, Ke lloggnoted that when se x ual abuse occur red in a family

situation, the victims feare d disclosure would break u p the family and ca use a lot of turmoil. After revie wing the re cord, w e conclude Kellog g was a

ble to tie the fa cts of this case to her e x pert opinion testimony
. We hold the trial cour t ’s d ec i s ion to admit Kellogg ’s testimony was not an a

buse of discretion. Saenz’s fifth issue is over ruled. C ONCL US I ON The judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

DO NO T PU B L I SH