IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0588

Filed June 5, 2019

IN THE INTEREST OF M.W.,

Minor Child,

S.W., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David F. 

Staudt, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter. 

AFFIRMED.

Joseph G. Martin, Cedar Falls, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anna T. Stoeffler, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Tammy L. Banning of Juvenile Public Defender’s office, Waterloo, 

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
2

POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.

The mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights

to her child, M.W., and the denial of her motion for new trial. M.W. was born in 

April 2018. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s rights to that child 

pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2018) in March 2019.

1

 

After the entry of the termination order, the mother moved for a new trial under 

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004, arguing that a new trial should be granted 

to address the best interests of both M.W. and her half-sibling, who was born the 

day of the termination trial in February 2019. That half-sibling is currently the 

subject of child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) proceedings. The juvenile court 

denied her motion, and the mother now appeals both the denial of her new-trial 

motion and the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights.

I. Standards of Review

We review termination cases de novo. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 

(Iowa 2019). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do 

give them weight.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014).

Denials of motions for new trial are reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re 

Marriage of Wagner, 604 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Iowa 2000). “A district court abuses 

its discretion if it rests its ruling on ‘clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds.’” 

Fry v. Blauvelt, 818 N.W.2d 123, 128 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Lawson v. Kurthals, 

792 N.W.2d 251, 258 (Iowa 2010)). Motions for new trial based on newly 

 

1 The court also terminated the parental rights of the child’s putative father. The putative 

father did not contest the termination and does not appeal.
3

discovered evidence are not favored. In re D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570, 583 (Iowa 

1986).

II. Analysis

A. Termination of Parental Rights

We use a three-step analysis to review termination of parental rights: 

First, we “determine whether any ground for termination under 

section 232.116(1) has been established.” If we determine “that a 

ground for termination has been established, then we determine 

whether the best-interest framework as laid out in section 

232.116(2) supports the termination of parental rights.” Finally, if 

we conclude the statutory best-interest framework supports 

termination, “we consider whether any exceptions in section 

232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of parental rights.”

In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472–73 (Iowa 2018) (citations omitted). The mother

does not argue that the state failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination

under section 232.116(1)(e) and (h), nor does she argue that any of the factors 

weighing against termination under section 232.116(3) apply. As such, we need

not consider either 232.116(1) or (3) here. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 

(Iowa 2010).

The mother only challenges the juvenile court’s best-interest determination 

under section 232.116(2). She maintains delaying permanency to give her an 

additional six months to work toward reunification is in M.W.’s best interests. 

See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (allowing the court to defer permanency for six 

months upon determining the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of 

the delay). In considering the child’s best interests, we “give primary 

consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-
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term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional 

condition and needs of the child.” Id. § 232.116(2). 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that termination of parental rights 

without a delay is in M.W.’s best interest. The mother has had nearly eight 

months to learn how to properly care for M.W. She has yet to show either the 

interest or ability to do so. Of the eighty-six supervised visits with M.W. available 

to the mother, she attended only thirty-four. At the visits she did attend, Iowa 

Department of Humans Services (DHS) personnel often had to urge her to attend 

to M.W.’s most basic needs, which she did not appear to recognize on her own. 

While the mother attended a number of parenting classes, the record does not 

reflect any meaningful improvement in her parenting skills from these classes. 

DHS staff reported the mother was not able to recall or apply parenting skills 

learned in class at the next visit with M.W. “It is well-settled law that we cannot 

deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for

termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be 

a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 

474 (quoting In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014)); accord In re C.K., 

558 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1997) (“Children simply cannot wait for responsible 

parenting.” (quoting In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990)).

Other factors also weigh against granting a deferral of permanency. The 

mother has a number of significant mental-health issues, and she has not 

actively sought treatment or medication for any of them. She has been 

diagnosed as having bipolar disorder, ADHD, multiple personality disorder, and 

schizophrenia. The mother does not take medication for any of her conditions 
5

and does not attend mental-health therapy. The mother also does not appear to 

have the financial means to provide for M.W. DHS noted in its report to the 

juvenile court for the termination-of-parental-rights hearing that the mother 

“struggles to take care of herself” and lacks the ability to “provide for [M.W.’s] 

basic needs.” Finally, the record suggests that the mother’s current significant 

other—with whom the mother lives—does not want M.W. staying with them, and 

it is unclear whether that home would be a safe and nurturing environment for 

M.W. An additional six months would not remedy these concerns. 

The mother raises the presence of M.W.’s half-sibling as an argument 

against terminating the mother’s parental rights in regard to M.W.2 We recognize 

an interest in keeping siblings together. See In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 420 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1994). However, that interest does not override primary 

consideration of the safety and well-being of each child individually. Id. The fact 

that M.W. now has a half-sibling does not mean that it is in M.W.’s best interest 

for the termination to be deferred for six months. There is no relationship 

between M.W. and the half-sibling. M.W. has been in foster care since before 

the half-sibling was born, and it is unclear whether the two have ever even met. 

See id. (“[I]t would not be in [the child]’s best interest to now seek to establish a 

relationship with a sibling he does not even know.”). We do not believe that the 

juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights to M.W. needs to be 

reversed because of the presence of the half-sibling.

 

2 The mother only discusses the presence of M.W.’s half-sibling in the context of her 

motion for new trial, but we discuss it here because the presence of the half-sibling is 

relevant to the best-interest analysis.
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B. Denial of Motion for New Trial 

The mother also argues that the existence of M.W.’s half-sibling is new 

evidence under rule 1.1004(7) and the juvenile court erred in denying her motion 

for a new trial under that provision. We disagree. To succeed on a motion for 

new trial under rule 1.1004(7), a party must show that three prongs have been 

met: 

(1) the evidence is newly discovered and could not, in the exercise 

of due diligence, have been discovered prior to the conclusion of 

the trial; (2) the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or 

impeaching; and (3) the evidence will probably change the result if 

a new trial is granted.

Benson v. Richardson, 537 N.W.2d 748, 762 (Iowa 1995); see Iowa R. Civ. P. 

1.1004(7). The mother has not met this burden. The record demonstrates that 

the juvenile court was aware that the mother was pregnant with M.W.’s halfsibling. The juvenile court noted the mother’s pregnancy in its November 2018 

dispositional order. The mother then testified during the February 2019 

termination hearing that she was pregnant with her current significant other’s 

child. The mother’s pregnancy was not “newly discovered,” and neither was it

evidence that could not have been discovered prior to the conclusion of the trial. 

As such, the fact that M.W. would soon have a half-sibling does not constitute 

newly discovered material evidence within the meaning of rule 1.1004(7). We 

need not consider the second and third prongs. The juvenile court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying the mother’s motion for new trial.

AFFIRMED.