# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 7, 2005

Decided October 27, 2005

Before

Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Chief Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 03-3305

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v.

MARK K. VINCENT,

Defendant-Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District

of Illinois

No. 02 CR 30042

Richard Mills,

Judge

.

O R D E R

A jury con

victed defendant-appellant Mark K. Vincent of four counts of wire

fraud, two counts of mail fraud, and two counts of making false statements to obtain

a loan. On August 8, 2003, the district count sentenced defendant to 46 months

imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently. This sentence was in the

middle of the Sentencing Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The district court also

sentenced

defendant to five years supervised release and ordered him to pay

$684,475.97 in restitution and an $800.00 special assessment.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. On July 25, 2005, this Court affirmed

defendant’s convictions, but ordered a limited remand to the district court pursuant

to the procedures set forth in United States v. Paladino

, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005),

to determine whether that court would have imposed the same sentence had it known

that the Sentencing Guidelines were advisory. After considering the parties’ briefs UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53No. 03-3305 Page 2

and the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court issued an opinion stating that

it would have imposed the same sentence under an advisory guidelines regime.

Defendant’s sole argument is that further remand is necessary because the

district court did not give any weight to the “history and characteristics” element of 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a). According to defendant, the district court erred in defendant’s initial

sentencing by refusing to grant a downward departure based on defendant’s alcohol

addiction, family ties and responsibilities, and community involvement. Defendant

argues that the district court erred on remand by refusing to lower his sentence based

on these same factors. Defendant maintains that his sentence therefore is

unreasonable.

The government contends that the district co urt correctly found that defendant’s

46-month sentence is reasonable, based on a consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.

We agree with the government. First, the sentence imposed by the district court

was properly calculated and within the Sentencing Guidelines range and thus enjoys

a presumption of reasonableness. U nited States v. Mykytiuk

, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th

Cir. 2005). Defendant does not challenge the district court’s determination of this

range.

Second, defendant has not identified any basis for finding that the presumption

of reasonableness has been overcome in this case. The district court heard the parties’

arguments and explicitly found that it would have imposed the same sentence had it

understood the Guidelines to be advisory. The district court explained:

[T]he range of 41 to 51 months properly took into account important

sentencing factors, such as the amount of loss, the Defendant’s abuse of

his position of trust, and the Defendant’s perjury at trial. Additionally,

the range reflected that the Defendant did not take responsibility for his

criminal conduct, instead deciding to go to trial. . . .

. . . In determining that the sentence previously imposed remains

the appropriate sentence, the Court has deemed particularly relevant

factors such as the seriousness of the Defendant’s criminal conduct, the

need to provide just punishment and the need to afford adequate

deterrence.

United States v. Vincent , No. 02-30042, at 5-6 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2005).

This expl anation is sufficient to demonstrate that defendant’s sentence was

reasonable. The district court was not obligated to provide this Court with a detailed

explanation of its consideration of each of the factors listed in §3553(a). Nor was the

district court required to accept or give any particular weight to defendant’s argumentNo. 03-3305 Page 3

that he deserves a lower sentence based on his alcoh ol addiction and family and

community commitments. See United States v. Dean , 414 F.3d 725, 729-30 (7th Cir.

2005) (judge’s duty to conside r the statutory factors is not a duty to make findings);

United States v. George

, 403 F.3d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Judges need not

rehearse on the record all the considerations that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists; it is enough

to calculate the range accurately and explain why (if the sentence lies outside it) this

defendant deserves more or less.”). The district court quite reasonably found that the

needs of just punishment and adequate deterrence should be given heavy weight in

this case. Defendant’s crimes resulted in a loss of almost $700,000 borne by multiple

victims, defendant abused his fiduciary position as an attorne y and title insurance

agent to commit fraud, and defendant attempted to avoi d responsibility by lying at

trial.

Because the district court would have i mposed the same sentence post- B ooker

and because the sentence is reasonable, we conclude that defendant’s sentence was not

the result of plain error. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.