In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17‐3350

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

GWENDOLYN JACKSON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 08‐cr‐453‐4 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED OCTOBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 26, 2018

____________________

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Gwendolyn Jackson was convicted in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi‐

nois on charges arising out of a scheme to defraud mortgage

                                                 

 After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral ar‐

gument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 17‐3350

lenders. Specifically, a jury found her guilty of two counts of

wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of

mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The district court

sentenced Ms. Jackson to 112 months’ imprisonment on each

of her three counts, to be served concurrently. It also imposed

concurrent three‐year terms of supervised release, along with

a $300 special assessment and restitution in the amount of

$8,515,570.

Ms. Jackson appealed her conviction and her sentence. We

affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence. United States

v. Jackson, 787 F.3d 1153, 1161 (7th Cir. 2015). With respect to

sentencing, we held that the district court erroneously applied

the obstruction‐of‐justice enhancement, given its finding that

Ms. Jackson did not commit perjury at trial. Id. at 1160. At re‐

sentencing, the district court removed the obstruction‐of‐jus‐

tice enhancement and imposed a new sentence of 100 months’

imprisonment. It did not change the remaining elements of

the sentence: Ms. Jackson also received concurrent three‐year

terms of supervised release, a $300 special assessment, and

restitution in the amount of $8,515,570.

Ms. Jackson appealed the terms of her supervised release.

She, along with the Government, brought a motion for sum‐

mary reversal and remand for resentencing. The parties

agreed that certain conditions of the supervised release were

impermissibly vague and ambiguous in light of our decisions

in United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and

United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2016). We granted

this joint motion, vacating Ms. Jackson’s sentence and re‐

manding forresentencing. United States v. Jackson, No. 15‐3443

(7th Cir. June 14, 2016) (order remanding for resentencing).
No. 17‐3350 3

At her third sentencing hearing, Ms. Jackson received a

sentence of seventy‐six months’ imprisonment. The district

court again imposed a $300 special assessment and $8,515,570

in restitution, along with concurrent three‐year terms of su‐

pervised release that complied with Thompson and Poulin. The

district court orally announced the conditions of Ms. Jack‐

son’s supervised release and explained why each condition

was imposed. It did not orally announce any condition requir‐

ing that Ms. Jackson notify a probation officer within sev‐

enty‐two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law en‐

forcement officer. The district court’s written judgment, how‐

ever, included a discretionary supervised release condition

that Ms. Jackson “shall notify a probation officer promptly,

within 72 hours, if arrested or questioned by a law enforce‐

ment officer.”1 Ms. Jackson timely appealed.2

We review allegations of procedural error in a district

court’s imposition of supervised release conditions de novo.

United States v. Moore, 788 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2015).

Ms. Jackson submits, and the Government agrees, that the

district court erred when it imposed a supervised release con‐

dition in the written judgment that was not orally announced

at sentencing.

We have held that when “an inconsistency exists between

an oral and the later written sentence, the sentence pro‐

nounced from the bench controls.” United States v. Alburay,

415 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Bo‐

nanno, 146 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir. 1998)). This rule includes

                                                 

1 R.1349 at 4.

2 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Our jurisdic‐

tion is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
4 No. 17‐3350

conditions of supervised release. See United States v. Kappes,

782 F.3d 828, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Johnson,

765 F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). Because the notification con‐

dition here was not pronounced from the bench, it must be

vacated.

Ms. Jackson asks for a limited remand so that the district

court may enter a corrected judgment without the notification

condition. She submits that there is no need for an additional

sentencing hearing because she will be released to a halfway

house shortly and the logistics of her appearance at such a

hearing could disrupt her transition. The Government agrees

with Ms. Jackson. We have said that, in instances such as this,

“[t]he cleanest way to end the matter is to remand with a cor‐

rective instruction. An additional hearing is not required.” Al‐

buray, 415 F.3d at 788 (citing United States v. Maro, 272 F.3d

817, 825 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Parker, 101 F.3d 527,

528 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Therefore, Ms. Jackson’s sentence is VACATED, and we

REMAND to the district court so that it may enter a corrected

judgment without the supervised release condition that

Ms. Jackson notify a probation officer within seventy‐two

hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement

officer.

It is so ordered.