F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

K E A L I I M A K

E K A U ; J O S E P H K E

N T ; Y O S H I M A S A S E A

N M I T S U I ; P E D R

O K A N A ‘ E G A P E R

O ; M E L I S S A L E I N A ‘ A L A M O N I Z , Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v

.

S T A T E O F H A W

A I I ; D A V I D Y. I G E , Governor; R O B E R

T K. L I N D S E Y , J R ., Chairperson, B o ard of Trustees, Office of Hawaiian Affairs, in his official capacity ; C O L E T T E Y

. M A C H A D O ; P E T E R A P O ; H A U N A N I A P O L I O N A ; R O W E N A M.N. A K

A N A ; J O H N D. W A I H E ‘ E I V; C A R M E N H U L U L I N D S E Y ; D A

N A H U N A ; L E I N A ‘ A L A A H U I S A , Trustees, Office of Hawaiian Affairs, in their official capacities; K

A M A N A ‘ O P O N O C R A B B E , Chief Ex ecutive Officer, Office of Hawaiian Affairs, in his official capacity ; J O H N D

. W A I H E ‘ E I I I , Chairman, Native Hawaiian Roll Commission, in his official capacity ; N A ‘ A L E H U A

N T H O N Y ; L E I K I H O I ; R O B I N D A N N E R ; M A

H E A L A N I W E N D T , Commissioners, Native Hawaiian Roll Commission, in their N o. 17-16360

D.C. No. 1:15-cv-00322- J MS-RL P

OPI NI ONM A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 2

official capacities; C L Y D E W

. N A M U ‘ O , Ex ecutive Director, Native Hawaiian Roll Commission, in his official capacity ; T H E A K A M A I F O U N D A T I O N ; T H E N A ‘ I A U P U N I F O U N D A T I O N , Defendants-Appellees.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii J . Michael Seabrig ht, Chief District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted October 21, 2019

Honolulu, Hawaii

F iled November 26, 2019

B e fore: Susan P. Graber, Milan D. Smith, J r., and Paul J . W atford, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e Graber; Concurrence by

J udg e Milan D. Smith, J r.M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 3

SUMMARY *

A ttorney F ees

Affirming the district court’s denial o f attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the panel rejected Appellants’ assertion that they w ere the prevailing parties because the Supreme Court had entered, under the All W ri t s A c t , an injunction pending appeal in their civil rig hts action.

I n the underly ing action, Appellants challeng ed a planned election in Hawaii that restricted the pools of deleg ates a nd
voters to, among other requirements, people who q u alified a s Native Hawaiians. A ppellants sough t a preliminary injunction to prevent Appellees f rom “unde rt ak ing c ertain
voter reg istration activities a nd from call i n g or holding racially -ex clusive e lections for Native Haw a i i a ns.” The district c ourt denied the injunction and this C o u r t denied Appellants’ motion for an injunction pending a ppeal. The United States Suprem e C ourt subsequently g ranted A p p e llants’ application for an injunction pending a ppea l under the All W rits Act and A ppellees cancelled the deleg ate election a nd ratification vote. Appellants’ pending appeal in this Court was subsequently determined t o be moot, and the district co urt g ranted A ppellants’ motion to voluntarily dismiss their complaint wi t h o u t prejudice. Appellants then
soug h t attorney fees under 4 2 U .S.C. § 1988, arg uing t hat
t h ey were the “prevailing party ” b ecause they obtained a n injunction from the Supreme Court that caused Appellees to cancel the challeng ed election and referendum.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 4

The panel h eld that a plaintiff who obtains a preliminary injunction under the All W r its Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), does
not qualify as a “prevailing p arty ” f or fee- shifting purposes by virtue o f that injunction, where the o r der g ran t i n g injunctive relief makes no m e n t i on of the merits of the plaintiff’s c laims. The panel concluded that in this case there

was simply no indication that the Supreme Court’s injunction order addressed t he merits. Moreover, the panel noted that Appellants soug ht (and r eceived ) a voluntary d ismissal without prejudice in the district court—the oppo s i t e of an adjudication on the merits. The pa n e l c oncluded that Appellants were not the prevailing parties.

Concurring in the result, J udg e M. Smith w rote separately
to e x press his v iew that the k ey leg al issues in this c ase were close to equipoise. J u dg e Smith stated that were it not for the uncertainty surrounding the standard unde r w h ich the Supreme Court g rants injunctions u nder the All W rits Act, he would hold that Appellants were the pre v a i ling parties a nd entitled to attorney

fees.

COUNSEL

Robert D. Popper (arg

ued )

, Paul J

. O rfanedes, L auren M. B urke, and Chris F edeli, J udicial W atch I nc., W ashin gt on, D.C.; Michael A. L illy

, Nin g L illy & J ones, Honolulu, Hawai ‘ i ; H. C h r i s t o p h er C o a t e s , L a w O f fices o f H. Christopher Coates, Charleston, South Carolina; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Robert T. Nakatsuji (arg

ued) and Donna H. Kalama, Deputy Attorney s G e n eral; Russell A. Suz uki, Attorney General;M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 5

Department of the Attorney General, Honolulu, Hawai‘i; for Defendants-Appellees State of Hawaii and David Y. I g e.

Kurt W

. Klein (arg

ued), Robert G. Klein, and J o rda n K

. I nafuku, McCorriston Miller Mukai MacKinnon L L P
, Honolul u, Hawai‘i; Kannon K. Shanmug am and Ellen E. Oberwetter, W illi a ms & Connolly L L P, W ashing ton, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees Robert K. L indsey J r., Colette Y

. Machado, Peter A po, Haunani Ap o l i o na, Rowena M.N. Akana, J o hn D. W aihe‘e I V, Carmen Hulu L indsey

, Dan Ahuna, L e ina‘ala Ahu I sa, Kamana‘opono Crabbe

, J o h n D

. W a ihe‘e I I I
, Na‘alehu Anthony

, L ei Kihoi, Robin Danner, Mahealani W endt, and Cly de W . Namu‘o.

Miy oko T. Pettit-T o l ed o (arg ued) and David J

. Minkin, Mc C o r riston Miller Mukai MacKinnon L L P, Honolulu, Hawai‘i, for Defendant-Appellee Na‘i Aupuni F oundation.

W illiam Meheula and Nat a s ha L .N. B aldauf, Honolulu, Hawai‘i, for Defendant-Appellee The Akamai F oundation.

OP INION

GRAB ER, Circuit J udg e:

W e must decide whether a plaintiff who obtains a p reliminary injunction under the All W rits Act, 28 U.S

. C

. § 1651(a), qualifies as a “prevailing p arty ” for fee

- s hifting
purposes by virtue of that injunction, where the o rder g ranting i n j u n ctive r elief makes no mention of the merits of th e plaintiff’s claims. W e hold that the answer is “no.”M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 6

B ACKGROUND

I n 2011, the Hawaii leg islature enacted measures desig ned “to provide for and to implement the recog nition o f the Native H awaiian people by mean s a n d methods” that would h e lp Native Hawaiians move toward “sel fg overnance.” Haw

. R e v

. Stat. § 10H-2. Those measures included establishing a commission to maintain and p ublish “a roll of qualified Native Hawaiians,” thereby “facilitat[ ing ] the process under which qualified Nati v e H awaiians may independently commence the org aniz ation of a convention o f qualified Native Hawaiians, established for the purpose o f
org aniz ing themselves.” Id. §§ 10H-3(a)(1), 10H-5.

Defendant Na‘i Aupuni, a private nonprofit entity

, supported self-g overnance efforts. Akina v. Hawaii
, 835 F .3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“ Akina I ”). I n 2015, Na‘i Aupuni soug ht and r e c e ived g rant funding from D e f e n dant Office of Hawaiian Affairs (“OHA”), a state ag ency , to use for three events: a deleg a t e e l e ction, a constitutional convention of the elected d e l e g ates, and a referendum to ratify any g overning documents pro d u c e d at the convention. Id. Na‘i Aupuni s ch ed u l ed a vote-by -mail deleg ate e lection to run during November 20 15. Id. Na‘i Aupuni restricted the pools o f d eleg ates and v oters to people who appeared on the c ommission’s roll of qualified Native Hawaiians and who also af fi rmed “the unrelinquished sovereig nty

of the Native Hawaiian people.”

I n Aug ust 2 0 15, Plaintiffs—five reg istered H aw a ii voters—sued the State of Hawaii, OHA, other state ag encies and officials, Na‘i Aupuni, and another private nonprofit that participated in the election efforts. Id. Plaintiffs alleg ed that Na‘i A upuni and the other nonprofit entity became stateM A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 7

actors by conducting the elections and that the State’s involvement i n the self-g overnance process violated the F ourteenth and F ifteenth A mendments and the Voting Rig hts Act of 1965 because of th e r a ce-based restrictions on eli g i bility

. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants “from u ndertaking c erta i n voter reg istration activities a

nd from calling or holding racially

ex c lusive elections for Native Hawaiians.”

T he district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion in Octo b e r 2015. Voting for the deleg ate election beg an o n November 1. On November 19, we denied Plaintiffs’ urg e nt motion for an injunction pending appeal. F our day s later, Plaintiffs, rely ing

o n the All W rits Act, f

iled an emerg ency application for a n injunction pending app e a l in the Supreme Court. On November 27, J ustice K ennedy enjoined ballot-counting in the deleg ate election.

Afte r J ustice Kennedy ’s o rder issued, Na‘i Aupuni

ex t e n ded the voting deadline to D ecember 21, 2015. Plaintiffs notified the Supreme Cour t o f the ex tension. On Decemb e r 2, the Supreme Court g ranted Plaintiffs’
emerg ency

application. I n full, the order stated:

A p plication f

or injunction pendin g appellate review presented to J u stice Kennedy and by him referred to the Court g rant ed. Respondents are enjoined from counting ballots cast in, and certify ing winne r s o f

, the election described in the application, pending final disposition o f the appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 8

J ustice G insburg

, J ustice B r e y er, J ustice Sotomay o r, and J u stice Kag an would deny the application.

Akina v

. H

awaii
, 136 S. Ct. 5 81, 5 81 (2015) (Mem.) (“injunction order”).

I n mid-December, Na‘i Aupuni announced that it h ad “terminated” the deleg ate election and w ould not c ount the votes, but w o u ld continue the self-g overnance process b y inviting all deleg ates to the constitutional convention planned for F ebruary 2016. Plaintiffs filed a motion for civil contempt, arg u ing that Defendants had violated the Supreme Court’s injunction order by certify ing all deleg ates as winners of the election. The Supreme Cour t s u mmarily denied that motion. Akina v. Hawaii , 136 S. Ct. 922 (2016) (Mem.).

The convention took place in F ebruary 2016 a n d produced a proposed constitution. Akina I
, 835 F .3d at 1009. B ut Na‘i Aupuni decided not to hold a ratification vote. Na‘i Aupuni r e t u r ned OHA’s remaining g rant funds, w hich h ad been allocated to cover the c ost of a ratification v ote. Na‘i Aupuni dissolved as an entity in April 2016.

Several months later, we dismissed a s moot Plaintiffs’ appeal of the district court’s d e n i a l o f their preliminary injunction. Id. at 1011. The d i s t r ict court then g ranted Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss their complaint voluntarily and without prejudice under F ederal Rule o f C i vil Procedure 41(a)(2). Plaintiffs subsequently sou gh t attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, arg uing that they were the “ prevailing party ” because they obtained an injunction from the Supreme Court that caused Def

e n d a n ts to c ancel the challeng ed election and referendum. The d istrict court denied Plaintiffs’M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 9

motion, holding that Plaintiffs were not a “prevailing par t y ” within the meaning of the statute.

D I SCUSSI ON

W e review de novo a d istrict cou r t ’s d e nial of attorney fees where, a s here, the denial “turns on an issue of statutory construction—the meaning of ‘ prevailing party .’” Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma
, 7 17 F .3d 712, 715 ( 9th Cir. 2013). To q

ualify as a “prevailing party ” under a fee-shifting statute, a p l a i n t iff must obtain “ actual r elief on the merits” that “materially alters the leg al relationship b e tween the
p arties by modify ing the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the p laintiff.” Id. (quoting Farrar v. Hobby

, 506 U.S. 103, 1 1 1– 12 (1992)). Relief “on the merits” requires some form o f “judicial imprimatur o n the chang e.” Id. ( quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Ca r e H o m e, Inc. v

. W

. Va. Dep’t of Health &Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001)).

According ly

, two q

uestions drive the analy s i s in d etermining whether a p laintiff “who wins a prelimin a r y injunction but does not litig ate the case to final judg ment” is

a prevailing party : (1) wheth e r t h e preliminary injunction

was “sufficiently ‘on the merits’ to satisf y B uckhannon ’s ‘judicial imprima t u r ’ requirement”; and (2) whether the plaintiff “obtained relief sufficiently enduring ” to cause a materia l alteration of the p arties’ leg a l relationship. Id.
at 715–16. B e cause we conclude that the injunction order did

n o t address the merits o f Plaintiffs’ claims, w e answer o n l y the first question.

Under the A ll W rits A ct, a court may issue an injunction only where it is “necessary o r appropriate in aid” o f t h e court’s jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and “the leg al rig htsM A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 10

a t i ssue are indisputably clear,” Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius

, 56 8 U.S. 1401, 1403 (2012) (Sotomay or, J
., in chambers) (internal quotation marks o mitted). Plaintiffs contend that the Supre m e Court alway s must consider the merits when deciding whether to issue a n injunction under the All W r its A ct, whether the Court g rants or d enies relief. Not

so. I n several prior cases, the Supreme Court has ex pressly disavowed any

view of the merits when addressing a party ’s request for an All W rits Act injuncti on. See, e.g. , W heaton College v. Burwell

, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2 807 (2014) (g ranting relief and stating that “this order should not be construed a s

an ex pression of the Court’s views o n the merits”); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius

, 1 34 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 ( 2 0 1 4 ) (Mem.) (same); Hobby Lobby

, 568 U.S.
at 1403 (deny

ing relief and stating : “F irs t , whatever the ultimate merits of the applicants’ claims, their entitlement to relief is not ‘indisputably clear.’” (emphasis added)).

At oral arg ument, Plaintiffs relied on Dunn v. M cNabb

, 138 S. Ct. 369 (2017) (Mem.), for the proposition that the All W r its Act requires a court to consider the me ri t s b efore
g ranting relief. There, the Supreme Court held that the All W r its Act “does not ex cuse a court from making [ cer tain] finding s” before enjoining an inmate’s ex ec u t ion, because “[ i] nmates seeking time to challeng e the manner in which the State plans to ex ecute them must satisfy all of the requirements for a stay

, including a showing of a sig nificant
po s s i bility of success on the merits.” Id. at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted). Read in contex t, Dunn stands only for the unremarkable proposition that the All W rits Act does

n ot e rase separate leg al r equirements for a g iven t y p e o f claim.M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 11

I nmates seeking a stay of ex ecution a lway s must show “a sig nificant possibility of success on the merits.” H ill v

. McDonough

, 547 U.S. 5 73, 584 ( 2006). B ut that r equirement of a merits showing has nothing to do with the All W rits A ct; it applies no matter the vehic l e for an inmate’s claim. See,

e

. g. , id. (addressing a 4 2 U .S.C. § 1 983 claim for a s t ay o f

ex e c ution and stating that the inmate “must satisfy all of the requirements for a stay , including a showing of a sig nificant possibility of success on the merits” ) ; B a refoot v. Estelle

, 463 U.S. 8 8 0
, 8 9 5 ( 1983) (stating that, to obtain a stay o f

ex e c ution, a h abeas petitioner need e d to show b oth “a reasonable p robability that four members of the Court would consider the underly ing issue sufficiently meritorious for the
g ra n t o f certiorari” and “a sig nificant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision”). T his case does not involve an inmate seeking a stay of ex e cution (or any p arty seeking a stay of any

thing ), so Dunn cannot b e a r the weig ht that Plaintiffs ask it to carry

.
Moreover, in “appropriate circumstances,” a court may direct an o rder under the All W rits Act “to p ersons who, th o u gh n ot parties to the orig inal action or eng ag ed in
wrong doing

, are in a p osition to f rustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper a dm i n i s t ration o f justice.” United States v. N.Y

. Tel. Co.
, 434 U.S. 159
, 174 (1977). Plainly

, an order directed to a n o n p arty who eng ag ed in no wrong doing would stem from c o nsiderations separate from the merits of a case.

Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs ’ v i ew, the mere fact that the injunction o rder is sued under the A ll W rits Act does not prove that the Supreme Court found Plaintiffs’ claims to be

even p otentially meritorious. T h ere is simply no indication that the injunction order a ddressed the merits. Aside from theM A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 12

brevity of the order, t h e Supreme Court later denied P l a i ntiffs’ contempt motion in a one-sentence order, whi c h

s trong ly sug g ests that the injunction order was not on t h e merits. And Plaintiffs s o u g ht (and received) a voluntary dis m i s s al without prejudice in the district court—“the opposite” of a

n adjudication on the merits. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
, 5 31 U

. S

. 497, 505 (2001) (stating that Rule 41(a), “in discussing the effect of voluntary di s missal by the plaintiff, makes c lear that an ‘adjudication
upon the mer i t s ’ is the o pposite of a ‘dismissal without prejudice’”). I

n short, Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties.

AF F IRMED.

M. SMI TH, Circuit J udg e , concurring in the result:

I write separately to ex press my view that the key leg al issues i n this case are close to e quipoise. I differ from the majority because I find that the “on the merits” analy sis only narrowly d isfavors Appellants. I would fin d that the “sufficiently

enduring relief” analy sis favors Appellants.

I briefly r ecount the most essential facts. A ppellants, five
reg istered Hawaii voters, sued the State of Hawaii, v arious
state officers including the trustees and director of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), and the nonprofit e ntities Na‘i A upuni and the Akamai F oundation, on constitutional a n d statutory g rounds alleg ing race- a n d viewpoint-based voting discrimination. The Akina lawsuit challeng ed efforts b y Na‘i Aupuni—using g rant f

u nds awarded b y , a n d a voter roll o f “qualified Native H awaiians” maintained by

, OHA—to holdM A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 13

a deleg ate election, a convention, and a r a tification election for purposes of Native Hawaiian self-g overnance.

Appellants unsuccessful l y s o u g h t a p r e l i m i n a r y i njunction from the district court, an d t h e n an injunction pending interlocutory appeal from our court, which d e n ied the injunctions under W

inter v. NRDC
, 555 U

. S

. 7 (2008), 1 primarily f

o r failure to show likelihood of proving that Na‘i Aupuni w as a state actor. Akina v. Hawaii
, 141 F

. Supp. 3d 1 1 0 6
, 1125–35 (D. Haw. 2 015); Akina v. Hawaii
, 835 F. 3 d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2016). As a result, voting in the deleg ate election beg an as scheduled.

Plaintiffs then a p plied to J ustice Kennedy for an emerg ency interlocutor y i n j unction. W ith a few d ay s o f voting remaining

, J ustice Kennedy enjoined b allot counting and certification of winners pending f urther order of the Court, offering no ex planation for h is r easoning

. Id. Na‘i Aupuni publicly a

nnounced the injunction a n d officially

ex tended the voting deadline. On referral, a divided Supreme Court re-entered the same injunction pending resolution o f the appeal to our court, ag ain offering no ex planation. A k ina

v. H awaii
, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015) (mem.). Shortly thereafter, Na‘i Aupuni cancelled the d eleg a te election with several day s of voting remaining

, dec l a r ed that the ballots would not be

coun t e d

, a n d invited all of the deleg ate candidates to a convention. Appellants filed a motion f or civil contempt with the Supreme Court, arg uing that N a‘i Aupuni’s invitation was tantamount to c ertify

ing all of the candidates as w inners. The

1 W in ter co n sid ers (1 ) th e p lain t if f’s l i k elih o o d of p rev ailin g o n th e

m erits, (2 ) w

h eth er th e p lain tif

f w ill su f f er irrep arab le h arm , ( 3 ) th e b alan ce o f eq u i ties a m o n g st th e parties, an d (4 ) th e p u b lic in terest. 5 5 5 U.S. at 2 0

– 22

.M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 14

Court summarily denied the motion. Akina v. Hawaii
, 136 S. Ct. 9 2 2 (2016) (mem.). Na‘i Aupuni held the c onvention a nd the participants produced a document.

Na‘i Aupuni then initiat e d efforts to hold a ratification election, ag ain u sing the disputed voter roll. Appe l l a n ts submitted b riefing t o our court citing the upcoming ratification election a s evidence that the appeal was not moot. B efore we issued a

ny decision, Na‘i Aupuni canc el e d the ratification election, and thereafter dissolved as an en t i t y

. This court dismissed the a ppea l a s m o ot. Akina

, 835 F .3d at 1010–11.

Appellants voluntarily d ismissed their complaint without prejudice a

nd moved for attorney ’s fees as the “ prevailing party ” in a civil rig hts lawsuit. T he district c ourt denied t he motion, concluding that the w rit A p pellants obtained was merely a status quo injunction driven b y considerations
reg arding irreparable harm, and that it was not based on—as required for prevailing party status—the merits of App e l l a n t s ’ claims. This appeal followed.

I. On the Merits

I n certain civil rig hts actions, “the court, in its discretion,
may a llow the prevailing party

. . . a reasonable attorney ’s f ee

as part o f the costs.” 4 2 U. S

. C. § 1988. To determine whether a preliminary injunction without a fina l j udg ment entitles a p l a i ntiff to prevailing party status, we ask two questions: “F irst, is the court’s preliminary injunction ruling sufficiently ‘ on the merits’ to satisfy Buckhannon ’s ‘judicial imprimatur’ requirement? And second, has the plaint i ff

o b t a ined r elief sufficiently enduring to satisfy the ‘materia l alteration of the parties’ leg al r e lationship’ requirement? ”M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

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Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma
, 7 17 F .3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care H ome, Inc. v. W

. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human R e s. , 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001)).

I beg in w ith the first q

uestion. “J udicial imprimatur” can take the form o f “an enforceable judg ment on the merits,” “a court-ordered consent decre e,” or “[ o] ther court-approved actions

. . . , provided they entail a judicial determination that the claims on which the plaintiff obtains relief a re potentially meritorious .” Id. at 715 (emphasis added); see also J ensen v

. City o f San Jose
, 8 06 F .2d 899, 900 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[ T] he benef i t a p arty achieves must come from success on the merits of a civil rig hts claim, not from success on procedural or collateral issues.”).

The judicial determinations on which A ppellants stake their clai m for attorney ’s f ees are the injunctions entered b y J ustice Kennedy and subsequently by the full Supreme Court pursuant to the All W rits A ct, 28 U. S

. C

. § 1651(a). Appellants’ claim narrowly fails because there is a reasonable
arg ument that those injunctions did n o t i nvolve a judicial determi nation that A ppellants’ claims were “potentially meritorious.” Higher Taste
, 7 17 F .3d at 715. F undamentally

, it is unresolved whether such writs require an assessment o f the merits.

A . Writs of

Interlocutory Injunction

The A ll W rits Act a

u thoriz es f

ederal courts to “i s s u e all writs n ecessary or appropriate in aid of their res pective jur i s d i c t ions and ag reeable to the usag es and principles o fM A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 16

law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1 6 5 1 ( a). 2 Relevant to this case is the § 1651(a) writ for an interlocutory injunction.

The first Supreme Court precedent recog niz ing the power of t h e federal c ourts to issue § 1651(a) writs “in the form o f compulsory injunctions ai m e d a t private parties” seems to have been FTC v. Dean Foods Co.
, 384 U.S. 597, 605 & n.3 (1966) (upholding writ enjoining consummat ion of merg er pending final rev i e w by F TC). The Court justified an appellate court’s w rit in that c a s e b a s e d on a threat to the court’s jurisdiction, and notably d i d not discuss the unde rl y i ng merits or a

ny other factor ty

pically relevant to preliminary

injunctions. See id. at 605. 3

B y contrast, in Sam

p s o n v. Murray
, 415 U.S. 61 (1974), the Court readily assumed that the four preliminary injunction factors a pply to status quo injunctions g ranted under the All W r its Act, and held that a heightened version of those f actors should have applied in the contex t at hand. See id. at 83–84 & n.53 ( recog n iz ing the law g overning available relief in the

2 T h is au th o rizatio n su

rv iv es n early u n ch an g ed f ro m th e J u d iciary A ct

o f 1 7 8 9. S ee A ct o f Sep t. 2 4 , 1 7 89 , ch . 2 0 , § 1 4 , 1 Stat. 7 3 , 8 1

– 8 2 . Fo r g reater h i sto rical d etail p ertain in g to th e d iscu ssio n th at f o llo w s, t h ro u g h

n o te 4
, see S am

u el I. Feren c, No te, Clea r Rig hts a n d W o rth y C la ima n t s: Ju d ic i a l In t erven tio n in Ad min istra tive Actio n U

n d er th e All W

rits Act
, 1 1 8 Co lu m . L . Rev . 1 2 7 , 1 3 6

– 6 2 (2 0 1 8 ).

3 T h is om issio n can n o t b e ex p lain ed aw ay as sim

p ly p re- d atin g th e Co u rt’ s 2 0 0 8 articu latio n o f th e f ou r f acto rs i n Wi n t e r

. A s early as Ex Pa rte Yo u n g , th e Co u rt reco g n ized t h at “ n o [p relim in ary ] in

j u n ctio n o u g h t to b e g ran ted u n less in a case reaso n ab l y f ree f ro m d o u b t,” an d ack n o w led g ed th at th e i n

j u n ctio n at h a n d w as j u stif ied b y “ g reat an d irrep arab le in

j u ry ” t o th e co m

p l ain an ts. 2 0 9 U.S. 1 2 3
, 1 6 6

– 6 7 ( 1 9 0 8 )

. S ee g en era lly T h o m as R. L ee, Prelimin a ry In ju n ctio n s a n d t

h e S t a t u s Qu o , 5 8 . W ash . & L ee L . Rev . 1 0 9 (2 00 1 ).M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 17

federal employ

ment dispute contex t). H owever, the Court specifically h e ld that frustra tion of the court’s jurisdiction

was n o t at stake as it was in D ean F o ods

. Id. a t 78–80. Murray did n ot clarify whether an injunction that is justified b y j urisdictional threats mig ht also need to satisfy t h e traditional injunction factors, if not the heig htened version the Court ultimately

applied in that case. 4

Around the same time as Murray
, the J ustices o f the S u preme Court b eg an developing a terse body of case l a w apply ing a unique “indisputably clear” standard to § 1651(a) interlocutory

injunction applications addressed to individual J ustices. See Communist Party of Ind. v. W hitcomb

, 4 09 U.S. 1235, 1 2 35 (1972) (Rehnquist, J
., in chambers) (“the applicants’ rig h t to relief must be indisputably clear”) (citing

no authority

). J ustice Scalia placed this standard in the
contex t of o ther authority in Ohio Citizens for R esponsible Energy, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
, 479 U.S. 1312 (1986) (Scalia, J ., in chambers):

A Circuit J ustice’s issuance of [ a § 1651 (a) writ of injunction]

— which, unlike a

. . . stay,

4 Dif f eren t circu its h av e su

p p l ied d if f eren t an sw ers to th is q u estio n at d if f eren t tim es. S e e , e.g

. , Un ited S t a tes v. BNS In c. , 8 4 8 F.2 d 9 4 5
, 9 4 7 (9 th Cir. 19 8 8 ) (req u irin g b o th j u risd ictio n al t h reat an d irrep arab l e h arm ); W a g n er v. Ta

ylo r , 8 36 F .2 d 5 6 6
, 5 7 1
, 5 7 5

– 76 (D.C. Cir. 1 9 8 7 ) (req u irin g b o t h j u risd ictio n al th reat an d all f o u r p relim in ary in

j u n ctio n f

acto rs) ; V.N.A. o f Grea ter Tift Co u n ty In c. v. Heckler

, 7 1 1 F.2 d 10 2 0
, 1 0 3 0 (1 1 th Cir. 1 9 83 ) (req u irin g bo th j u risd i ctio n al th reat an d a h eig hten ed sh o w in g

o n all f o u r prelim in ary in

j u n ctio n f acto rs); K la y v. Un ited Hea lth g ro u

p , 3 7 6 F.3 d 1 0 9 2
, 1 1 0 0
, 1 1 0 1

– 0 2 n .1 3 (1 1 th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ) (assertin g th at j u risd ictio n ally j u stif

ied w rits req u ir e n o an aly sis o f th e p relim in ary in j u n ctio n f acto rs, u n less th e w

rit is “ in reality ” a p relim i n ary in j u n ctio n ),

ca lled in to d

o u b t b y Ala ba ma v. U.S

. Army C o rp s o f En g in eers , 42 4 F.3 d 1 1 1 7 , 1 1 3 1 n .2 0 (1 1 th

Cir. 2 0 0 5 ).M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 18

does not simply suspend judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judicial intervention
t h a t h a s b e e n w i t h h e l d b y l o w e r courts —deman ds a sig nificantly hig her justification than that described in the

. . . stay

cases cited by the applicant. The C ircuit J ustice’s injunctive power is to be used “sparing ly and only in the most cr itical a nd

e x i g ent c ircumstances,” and only where the leg al rig h ts a t issue a

re “ indisputably clear.” Moreover, the applicant mus t demonstrate that the injunctive r elief is “ n e cessary o r

a p p r o p r i a t e i n a i d o f [ t h e C o u r t ’ s ] jurisdictio[ n] .”

Id. at 1313 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Fishman v

. Schaffer, 429 U.S. 1325, 1326 (1976) (Marshall, J
., in chambers), second q uoting Communist Party
, 409 U.S. at 1235, third quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)).

T houg h many individual J ustice opinions h ave deni e d § 1651(a) interlocutory injunctions b a s e d o n t he “indisputably clear” standard, 5 most relevant to the case at h and are the few

5 S ee, e.g ., Bro wn v. Gilmo re , 5 3 3 U.S. 1 3 0 1
, 1 3 0 3

– 0 4 (2 0 0 1) (Reh n q u ist, C.J
., in ch am b ers) (d en

y in g th e w

rit b ecau se it w as u n clear

w h eth er Virg in ia’ s “ m in

u te o f silen ce” statu t e h ad en o u g h of a secu lar
p u rp o s e to d i stin g u ish

it f ro m an A lab am a statu te p rev io u sly in v alid ated

as m an d atin g sch o o l p ray er) (citin g Wa lla ce v. Ja ffree

, 4 7 2 U.S. 3 8
, 5 6 (1 9 8 5)); Lu

x v. Ro d rig u es , 56 1 U .S. 1 3 06
, 1 3 0 7 (2 0 1 0 ) (Ro berts, C .J
., in ch am b ers) ( d e n y in g th e w

rit b ecau se it w as u n clear w h eth er Virg in ia’ s resid en cy req u i rem en t f o r a p etitio n sig n atu re’ s w itn ess w as d istin g u ish ab l e f

ro m Co lo rad o p etitio n circu latio n restrictio n s p rev io u sly in v alid ated as v io latin g free sp eech rig h ts) (citin g Meyer v. G ra n t , 4 8 6 U.S. 4 1 4
, 4 2 2 (1 9 88 ); Bu ckley v. Am. Co n st. L

. Fo u n d

., In c. , 5 2 5 U .S.M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 19

and far b etween case s in which a J ustice or the Court has actually g ranted the writ. No such case, as far as I could f ind, has ever applied the “indisputably clear” standard.

The most recent § 1651(a) interloc utory injunction o f

w hich I am aware is the 2015 w rit g ranted to Appellants. Akina

, 136 S. Ct. at 581. As is precisely at i ssue here, that order d i d n o t articulate the standard under which it was g ranted, nor did the immedia tely preceding writ issued b y J ustice Kennedy

.

The same can be sa i d of the two similar writs g ranted in 2014. I n both W

heaton College v. Burwell

, 13 4 S

. Ct. 2806 (2014) ( mem.), and Little Sisters of the Poo r H o me for the Aged v. Sebelius

, 5 71 U.S. 1 1 71 (2014) (mem.), the Court
g ranted a § 1651(a) writ enjoining t h e f ederal g overnment from requiring the p laintiff relig ious nonprofit e ntities to fill
out and send a form to their third party insu r e r s re garding their objections to the Affordable Care Ac t ’ s contraceptive
coverag e mandate. 134 S. Ct. at 2807; 571 U

. S

. at 1171. Neither m e m o r andum order hinted a s to the standard the Court h ad applied in g ranting the w r i t. I n b o th cases, the Court ex pressly d irected th a t t he order “not be construed a s

an ex pression o f the Court’s views on the merits.” 134 S. Ct. at 2807; 571 U.S. at 1171.

1 8 2
, 1 8 6

– 87 (1 99 9 )); Ho b by Lo b b y S to res, In c. v. S

eb eliu s , 5 6 8 U .S. 1 4 0 1
, 1 4 0 3 (2 0 12 ) (So to m ay o r, J
., i n ch am b ers) (d en y in g w

rit b ecau se th e Co u rt h ad n o t y et d ecid ed w h eth er “ clo sely h eld f

o r- p ro f it co r p o r atio n s

an d t h eir co n tro l lin g sh areh o ld ers” h av e relig i o u s f ree ex ercise rig h t s). I d isag ree w ith t

h e m aj o rity th at an y o f th ese cases can b e in terp reted as n o t

co n sid erin g th e m erits. S ee id

. (d isclaim in g an y d eterm in atio n o f th e

“ u ltim ate m erits” w h i l e n ev erth eless co n sid erin g th e m erits in ord er to

reco g n ize th at th e m erits w ere n o t “ i n d isp u t ab ly

clear”).M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 20

Althoug h Little Sisters was decided unanimously

, a threeJ ustice dissent criticiz ed the W he aton College majority for failing to apply the “indisputably clear” standard. 1 34 S. Ct.
at 2808 (Sotomay or, J
., dissenti n g) (quoting Turner Broadcasting

, 507 U.S. at 1 303). 6 Notably

, the d issent cited

no precedent in w hich a sing le J ustice or the full C ourt h ad granted a writ af

t e r a pply ing the “indisputably c lear” standard. S

ee id. at 2808, 2810–11 & n.3. 7

Taking the Court at its word, W heaton College and Little Sisters demonstrate that the Court has authority to issue § 1 651(a) interloc u tory injunctions without apply ing the “indisputably clear” standard (whatever that standard may entail), and i n d eed without reaching the merits of the underly ing leg al challeng e. 8

6 T h e d issen t d istin g u i sh ed L ittle S isters b ecau se, “ w h atev er th e

m er i t s o f t h at u n

u su al ord er, it d id n o t af

f ect an y in div id u al’ s access to

co n tracep tiv e co v erag e.” Id

. at 2 8 1 4 n .6 (n o tin g th at L ittle Sisters’ th ird
p arty in s u rer w as a “ ch u rch plan ” th at also h ad n o o b lig atio n to p ro v id e

co n tracep tiv e co v erag e).

7 P rio r to Little S isters
, th e m o s t recen t case I am aw are o f in w h ich

a s in g le J u stice o r th e Co u rt g ran ted a § 1 6 51 (a) in terlo cu to ry i n j u n ctio n

w as Lu ca s v. To wn s en d

, 4 8 6 U.S. 1 3 01
, 1 3 0 4 ( 1 9 88 ) (Ken n ed y , J
., in ch am b ers). Desp ite ru lin g tw o y ears af ter Oh io Citizen s , J u stice K en n ed y in Lu ca s ap p lied th e test ty p ically ap p l ied to a § 1 6 5 1 (a) ap p licatio n f o r a sta y p en d in g certio r ari, in clu d in g “ a f air p ro sp ect th at f

iv e J u s tices w i l l

co n clu d e th at th e case w as erro n eo u sly d ecid ed b elo w .” Id

. Giv en th e in terv en in g th ree d ecad es, it is u n lik ely th at t h e Co u rt w as tacitly ap p ly in g th is stay stan d ard in Little S isters
, W hea to n Co lleg e , o r Akin a

.

8 I ag ree w ith th e m aj ority th at Du n n v

. M c N a b b

, 13 8 S. Ct. 3 6 9 (2 0 1 7) (m em .) d o es n o t p ro v e th at th e Co u rt o r an y in d iv id u al J u stice is
req u ired to f

in d “ a sig n i f

ican t p o ssib i lity o f s u ccess o n th e m erits” b ef ore g ran tin g a § 1 6 51 (a) in terlo cu t o ry in j u n ctio n o u tsid e th e co n tex t o f cap ital
p u n ish m en t stay s. Id

. at 3 6 9 (q u o tin g H ill v. McDo n o u gh

, 5 4 7 U.S. 5 7 3
,M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 21

B. Application

The deleg ate election a nd r e lated self-g overnance processes c halleng ed in the Akina lawsuit beg an to unr a v el only after J ustice Kenne d y a n d then the full Court issued writs of injunction. I have no trouble thus conclud i n g that “judicial imprimatur” w as present. Higher Taste
, 7 1 7 F. 3 d
at 7 1 6. The d ifficulty in this case comes from the uncertainty
reg arding w hether that “judicial imprimatur” repr e s ented a finding that Appellants’ c ivil rig hts claims were “potentially

me r i t o r ious.” Id. at 715 (quoting Buckhannon

, 532 U.S. at 606).

B e cause I find little indication that the Supreme Court

was apply ing the W

i n t er framework, I do not attempt to

reverse eng ineer the Court’s likely assessment of the W

inter factors (which would have to hav e been contrary to this court’s assessment when we denied an interlocutory injunction). Nor will I a ttempt to evaluate whether the Court’s jurisdiction was g enuinely at stake, as I am aware o f

no Supreme Court precedent c learly en d o r s i ng a distinction betwee n j u r i s d i c t i o n al a n d m e r i ts-based § 1651(a) injunctions.

I f J ustice Kennedy or the Court had said any thing at all about the merits of Appellants’ claims, even without making

an ex press f

inding of “probable success on the merits,” I mig ht have some b asis on w hich to state confidently that J ustice Kenn e d y o r the Court considered the claims a t least “potentially meritorious.” Id. B ut, g iven the Court’s clearly

ex p res s e d authority to avoid the merits entirely in W heaton College and Little Sisters
, there is too much u n certainty in the

5 8 4 (2 01 6 )).M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 22

Akina writs’ silence to r each this conclusion. 9 The “indisp utably clear” standard does not appear to be a universal requirement, nor do we have any ex amp l e o f t he Court g ranting a writ under the “indisputably clear” standard that would illustrate its meaning

. According ly

, I concur in t h e denial of attorney ’s fees on the g rounds that the judicial relief obtained provided no indication that Appellants’ claims were potent i a l l y meritorious.

II. Suf

ficiently Enduring Relief

I turn now t o t h e s econd question we ask of a would-be prevailing p a

rty who h as won a preliminary injunction but not litig ated the case to final judg ment: “[ H] a s the p laintiff obtained relief suf

f i ci ently enduring to satisfy the ‘material alteration of the parties’ leg al relationship’ requi re ment? ” Higher Taste
, 717 F .3d at 7 16 (quotin g B u c k hannon

, 532 U .S. at 605). I would h old that Appellants have obtained relief “sufficiently

enduring .” Id.

“A material alteration of the parties’ lega l relationship

o c c u r s when ‘the plaintiff can force the defendant to d o something he otherwise would not have to d o .’ Id. (quoting Fischer v. SJB–P.D. In c

. , 214 F .3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir.

9 I n ote, h o w ev er, th at A p p el l e es arg u ed to th e S u prem e Co u

rt in b rief in g o n th e w

rit th at th e relev an t stan d a r d w a s w h eth er it w as

“ i n d i sp u tab ly

clear” th at A p p ellan ts w ou ld p rev ail u n d er th e W in ter test, in clu d in g co n sid eratio n o f th e m erits. A p p ellees’ co n

v en ien t rev ersal on th is p ositio n

is tro u b lin g

.M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 23

2000)). 1 0 I f a pr e liminary injunction creating such material alteration is rendered moot b y the d e fe ndant’s own a ctions, prevailing party status is not d isturbed. S e e i d

. at 717–18. “The defendant’s action in r endering the case moot ens u r e s tha t the injunction’s alteration of the parties’ leg al relationship will not be undone by subsequent rulings i n the litig ation.” Id. A plaintiff’s “relief sufficiently enduring ” need not encompass all of the dem a n d s made in their complaint. “ [ P] laintiffs may be considered ‘pr e v a iling parties’

. . . if they succeed on any significan t i s s u e in litig ation which achieves some o f the benefit the parties
soug h t in bring ing the suit.” Jensen
, 806 F .2d at 900 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).

Plaintiffs ultimately did g et much of what they soug ht in the Akina laws u i t : t he deleg a te election and the ratification election were both cancelled; no e l e ction based on the disputed voter roll was ever counted o r certified; and no DOI

qualify ing self-g overnance document was produced throug h
processes dependent on the disputed voter roll. However,
most of these victories went bey ond a n y j u dicial ruling

, a nd therefore m u s t b e ex cluded from consideration as an impermissible applicatio n o f t h e “ c a t a l y st theory

. ” Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at 609.

10 Oth er circu its h av e h eld t ha t a p relim i n ary in j u n ctio n g ran tin g tem p o rary relief th at m erely m ain tain s th e s tatu s q u o p en d i n g f in al

reso l u tio n o f th e m erits d o es n ot co n f er p rev ailin g p arty statu s. S ee N. Ch eyen n e Trib e v. Ja ckso n , 43 3 F.3 d 1 0 8 3
, 1 0 8 6 (8 th Cir. 20 0 6) (co llectin g c a s e s )

. W e h av e lef t t h e q u estio n o p en

. Hig h er Ta ste , 7 1 7 F.3 d at 7 1 6 n .1

. I see n o n eed to d istu rb th at silen ce h ere, w

h ere th e Su p rem e Co u rt h ad to f

o resee th at i ts w

rit w o u l d af

f ect th e b eh a v i o r of

v o ters i n th e o n go i n g e l e c tio n

. S ee Pu rcell v. Go n z a lez

, 54 9 U.S. 1
, 4 (2 0 0 6).M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 24

Appellants’ one victory d irectly tied to a judicial ruling

was the enjo ining of vote counting a nd certification o f winners in the 2015 deleg ate election. This was a “sig nificant issue” because a publiciz ed v o t e count and certification o f winners would have effec tuated the results of a race- a nd viewpoint-restricted voting process. Jensen
, 806 F .2d at 900. B y voluntarily then cancelling the deleg ate election before the end of the voting period, N a‘i Aupuni permanently voided it. This action ensured that the Court’s writ would “ n o t be undone by su b s e q u e nt ruling s in the litig a tion.” Higher Taste
, 717 F .3d at 717–18. I t does not matter that Appellees remain able to p ursue various other actions Appellants soug ht
to enjoin throug h their lawsuit (e.g

. hold a new election via a

new nonprofit using the same disputed voter r o l l ), because “some of the benefit” Plaintiffs s o u gh t became permanent. Jensen , 806 F

. 2d at 900.

I disag ree with the district court’s conclusion that Appellants obtained only “ephemeral” r e l i ef. Appellants’ lawsuit soug ht to enjoin the “calling

, holding

, or certify ing o f
any election” using the disputed voter roll. A p pellants successfully enjoined the certify ing of one such election. 1 1 Moreover, our subsequent dismissal of Appellants’ appeal a s moot depended on the conclusion that “ t he alleg edly

wr o ng ful behavior could not reasonably be ex pected to recur.” Akina v. Hawa i i
, 8 35 F .3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2016).

11 T h e Su p rem e Co u rt’ s den ial o f A p p ellan t s’ civ il co n tem

p t m o tio n sh o u ld b e read t o p r e c l u d e t h e th eo ry th at A

p p ellan ts f

ailed to p rev en t certif icatio n o f th e w in n ers o f

th e electio n

. S

ee Akin a , 1 3 6 S. C t. at 9 2 2

. If Na‘ i A u p u n i’ s in v itatio n of all th e deleg ate can d id ates to th e co n v en tio n h ad co u n ted as certif

y i n g th em as w in n ers, th e Co u rt w o u ld h av e g ran ted th e co n tem

p t m o tio n

.M A K E K A U V

. S T A T E O F H A

W A I ‘ I 25

Thus, w ere it not for the uncertainty surrounding the standard o f review applied in the A k i n a writs, I w ould hold that A ppellants a

re prevailing parties and entitled to attorney ’s fees.