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### I N TH E CO U R T O F APPEA LS OF TEN N ESSEE

A T K N O X V I LLE M a r c h 24 , 200 4 Se s s i on
RUBY TUES DAY, I NC. v . GERALD LARGEN Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Roane County
F RA NK W. WI LLIA M S, I II, CH AN CE LLOR
No. E2003-01795-COA- R3-CV - F I LED JUNE 30, 2004

This case started out as a

dispute over the title to a twe nty to thirty -five f

oot wide strip along a state hig hway . The Chanc ery Court of Roane County held t hat the def endant he ld the title, but that the plaintiff had a n acc ess ea sement over the prope rty . The d ef

en d ant asserts on appea l that the Court erre d beca

use the plaintiff ne ver c laimed an e asem en t i n i t s pleading s and that the Court simplycre ated one. The plainti ff asserts t hat t he C ourt err ed in finding that the def endant he ld the tit le to the pr op e rt y . We a ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed
BEN H. C AN T RE LL, RETI RED J UDG E, delivere d the opinion of the court in which HERSCHEL P. FRANKS , J. and D. MIC HAEL SWINEY, J . concur red.
Ger ald L arg en, King ston, Tennessee , pro se.
R. L ouis Crossley , J r., Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee Ruby

Tuesday , I nc.

OP IN ION

I.
Prior to 1953, Ernest and Mildred Kubas owned a trac t of land in Roane County . I n that y ear the y g ra nte d to the Te nn e sse e Va lle y Au tho ri ty a n e a se me nt ov e r pa rt of the pr op e rt y

to b e us e d to reloc ate St ate Highway 61. TVA ult imately transfe rre d the easement to Roane County . After the cre ation of the e aseme nt, Mr. and Mrs. Kuba s convey ed a tr ac t o n t h e northern side of the ne w highw ay to Thomas and Wilma W alker , described as “appr ox imately Two and One Half ( 21⁄2) ac res o f g r o u n d

. . . a n d b e i n g a l l o f t h e p r o p e r t y o f

t h e g r a n t o r s o n t h e n o r t h w e s ts i d e o f S t a t e H i g h w a y #2 J: \ O PI N I O N S\ C U R R EN T\ r u by t

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p. ” Th is pr op e rt y is now ow ne d by the plaint if f, Rub y Tu e sd a y , I nc . The de e d to Ruby Tuesday , howeve r, desc ribed the southern boundary of t he prope rty

as “the northern bounda

ry of the Sou th R oa ne Str e e t r ig ht- of -w a y .” Hi g hw a y

61 a t th e plaint if

fs loc a tio n is kno wn a s “ Sou th Roane Stree t,” and the me tes and bounds desc ription in RubyTuesday ’s deed follows the northern boundary of the orig inal ease ment g iven to TVA.
B y 1 9 6 4 t h e d e f

e n d a n t , G e r a l d L ar g e n h a d a c q u i r e d t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e Ku b a s p r o p e r t y. Hi s d e e d d e sc ri be s th e tot a l a c re a g e the y ow ne d, le ss the pr op e rt y the y ha d c on ve y e d in prior

de e ds

. On e of the se c on ve y a nc e s, of c ou rs e , wa s the plaint if fs ’ pr op e rt y c on ve y e d ori g ina lly to the Wal ke rs
. I n Aug ust of 2001 the State of Te nnessee ex ecute d and plac ed of r ecor d a De clar ation of Abandonment c overing a twenty to thirty -five foot wide st rip on the northern edg e of the ease ment running in f

r o n t o f Ru b y T u e s d a y ’ s r e s ta

u r a n t. T h e ab a n d o n e d s trip c o v e r e d a ll o f th e r e s ta urant fr on ta g e e xce pt f

or a tw e nty -f oo t w ide drive way

Rub y Tu e sd a y

sh are d w ith a n a djo ini ng bu sin e ss at one e nd of its lot. Ruby Tuesday and Mr. L arg en both claimed the abandone d strip. On M arc h 21, 2002, Ruby Tuesday filed a c omplaint in the Chancery Cou rt o f R o an e County seeking a dec lara tion of owner ship of t he property and a rig ht to acc ess over it to South Roane S tree t. Mr. L arg en answ ere d the complaint and asserted ti tle to the property

. He a lso denied that the plaintiff w as entitled to any relief

. On Marc h 10, 2003, the C hance llor enter ed a judgme nt decla ring that Mr. L arg en owne d the aba nd on e d s tr ip, bu t tha t Ruby Tu e sd a y ha d an e a se me nt f or ing re ss ande g re ss o ve r the pr op e rt y to the stree t.
II.
TITL E Ruby Tuesday bases its a ssertion that it ha s titl e to the prope rty on the long -standing rule of de e d c on str

uc tio n in thi s st a te that a c on ve y a nc e of

pr op e rt y bo rd e ri ng on a

str e e t or hig hw a y is eff ective to g rant title to the middle of the roa dway

. See City of Nas hville v. Lawrence , 2 8 4 S. W. 882 (Tenn. 1926). This rule is sometimes stated as a r ebuttable pr esumption. id at 888. The r eason for the r ule/presumption as stated in 12 Am. J ur. 2d Bounda ries § 34 is that public policy frowns on le a vin g iso la te d s tr ips of

la ndin div e rs e ow ne rs hip

. B ut, in any e ve nt, theint e nt o f the pa rt ie s is to be c arrie d o ut a ndthe ru le /pr e su mpt ion is s imp ly a de vic e to h e lp i n a sc e rt a ini ng that in te nt. Vanderbilt University v. W illiams , 280 S.W

. 689 (Tenn. 1926). When sma ll parce ls of property are convey ed and the distances a re g iven with extreme ac cura cy , the pre sumption may be over come a nd the distance s held to control. id at 690.
Wher e th e li n e s ar e s o s h o r t a s e v id e n tl y to b e s u s c e p ti b le of entire acc urac y in their measur ement, and are define d in suc h a manne r as3 J: \ O PI N I O N S\ C U R R EN T\ r u by t

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to indicate an e x erc ise of ca re in de scribing t h e p re m ises, such a descrip t i o n is reg arde d with gr eat c onfidenc e as a means of asce rtaining what is intended to be c onvey ed.
28 0 S. W. a t 69 0 ( qu oti ng fr om W hite v. Luning, 93 U.S. 514). Passing over the question of whe ther the origina l deed f rom Kubas to the Walker s transfe rre d all of the Kuba ses’ prope rty to the cente r of the hig hway , the subsequent de eds in Ruby Tuesday ’s chain of title are dr awn with g reat prec ision and ref er s p ecif ically to the edg e of the highw ay e a se me nt. Rub y

Tu e sd a y ’s de e d set s out the dis ta nc e s re a c hin g to the e a se me nt andre c ite s th a t it convey s a trac t of land including “55,554.97 squar e fe et” of are a. It appea

rs from a n inspection of the plats in the rec ord that if the de ed convey ed the property to the cente r of the hig hway , the ar ea would be nea

rly twice that.
We ar e c o n v i n c e d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t R u b y T u e s d a y ’ s d e e d d o e s n o t e n c o m p a s s t h e str ip abandone d by the s tate. There fore , the chancellor was cor rec t in deciding that Ruby Tuesday did not have title to the prope rty

. Wit h respe ct to Mr

. L arg en’s owner ship. the question is not as clea r. F or him to prevail, the Court would have to find that the dee d from Mr. a nd Mrs. Kubas to the Walker s did not cover the pr op e rt y to the c e nte r lin e of the hig hw a y
. Mr

. L arg e n, thr ou g h his pr e de c e sso rs in tit le too k o nly the prope rty

Mr. and Mrs. K

ubas re tained whe n they made the convey ance to the Walkers, among others. Walkers’ deed does not contain pre cise mea surements; the de ed simply ref err ed to a 21⁄2 a cre l o ta n d r e f

e rr e d t o i ta s “ A l l o f

t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e g r a n t o r s o n t h e n o r t h w e s t s i d e ” o f t h e h i g h w a y. I t is possi ble, of c ourse, that Mr. a nd Mrs. Kubas meant “side” of the hig hway

to refer to t he ease ment, and if ther e is proof in the recor d to support that finding , then M r. L arg en is corr ect. A de e d d oe s n ot c arry tit le to the c e nte r o f the str e e t w he re it c a lls sp e c if ic a lly fo r the sid e of

the str e e t. Iron Mountain R. Co. v. Bingham, 11 S.W . 705 (Tenn. 1889)

. I n construing a dee d the Chance llor’s duty is to ascertain the g rantor’ s int ention from the words used in the de ed and in c onsi d er at i o n of the surr ounding c ircumstance s. Ru sse ll v . B ro wn , 260 S.W . 2d 2 5 7 (T en n
. 1 9 53). I n this case the Cha ncellor a pplied that test and found that the Kubase s did not int end to conve y the prope rty

to the cente r line of the stree t. The Chance llor relied on the fa ct that th e Kubases retaine d some property , now owned by Mr. L arg en, ac ross the roa d. This fac tor was c onsidered an important indication in Vanderbilt University v. W illiams , 2 8 0 S. W. 689 (Tenn. 1926) , that the g rantor did not intend to conve y an inter es t i n an al l ey way when he c on ve y e d a

bu ild ing a c ro ss the a lle y

fr om his ow n pr op e rt y
. I t app e ars , ho we ve r, that th e pr op e rt y ou tsi de of the ro a dw a y e a se me nt at the tim e of the Wal ke r de e d, sti ll own e d by the Ku ba se s a c ro ss Hig hway 61, was so small that it is not m uch of a fac tor.
But other fac tors may

be more of a ke y . As we ha ve noted, whe n Ruby Tuesday ’s pr e de c e sso r’ s in tit le (T he Wal ke rs a ndB ro wd e rs ) c onvey ed th eir pr op e rt y , th e y we re c are fu l to include a de scription that rea ched only to the highw ay

ease ment. We think this fa ct bring s into play4 J: \ O PI N I O N S\ C U R R EN T\ r u by t

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prac tical construc tion. Probably the best evide nce of what was intended to be convey ed by a deed is the c onstruction place d on the dee d by the parties themselves. Thornton v. Thornt on , 28 2 S.W. 2d

. 36 1 (T e nn
. Ap p. 19 55 ). Sin c e the Wal ke rs tr e a te d th e ir de e d a s a c on ve y a nc e on ly

to the “side” of the hig hway , we think t h e C h ance llor could log ically infer that that construction repr esente d the mutual intent of the parties in the orig inal convey ance
. III . THE E ASEMENT
After finding that Mr. L arg en and not Ruby Tuesday had title to the abandone d strip of highw ay property , the Chance llor ruled that Ruby Tuesday , n evertheless, had a n acc ess ea sement acr oss the property . Mr. L arg en attac ks that part of the order on the g rounds that Ruby Tuesday had not sought a n ease ment and that the f acts did not support the Chance llor’s dec ision.
A. T h e P l ea d i n gs
Mr. L argen as s er t s t h at since Ruby Tuesday did not seek an e aseme nt in its pleading s, the Cha nc e llo r e rr e d in su a

sp on te a wa

rd ing a n e a se me nt. Th e su pp ort for this a sse rt ion is f ou ndin Du nc an , et al. , v. Qu all s, e t al

. , No. M2002-00520-COA- R3-CV, filed in Nashville June 4, 2003. I n that case , the pleading s described a boundary line dispute and the plaintiffs admitted o n appea l that they did not seek an ease ment. When the C hance llor decide d that the defendants had the better position on t he boundary line, he aw ar d ed t h e plainti ffs a n ease ment acr oss the disputed are a. Wit hout a transcript or st atement of the evidence, the Court of Appeals found t hat the aw ard of the ease ment should be reve rsed. The Court said:

I n this case, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs did not seek any type of e a se me nt o ve r the B arb e r’ s la nd ; r a the r, the y so ug ht o nly

to establish that they

owned it. I t is possi ble, of c ourse, f or such a n issue to be tried by implied c onsent of the pa rties. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02. I n this case, howe ver, the P l ai ntiffs did not arg ue that the issue was t ri ed by

consent. Indeed, e ven if they had, ther e is no transcript or s tatement of the evidenc e to support such a n assertion. I n view of the fac t that the Plaintiffs did not se ek an ease men t o v er the B arbe rs’ land, this portion of the tria l co u rt ’s decision must be reve rsed. Duncan, e t al., v. Qualls, et al., at * 3
I n this c ase we are convince d that the issue of Ruby Tuesday ’s ac cess a cross the a bandoned property was a ctually tried. I n both the original and the amended complaints Ruby Tuesday asked for a decla ratory judgme nt on the question: “Does plaintiff ha ve a right of acc ess ac ross the5 J: \ O PI N I O N S\ C U R R EN T\ r u by t

. opn abandone d are a to reach Sout h Roane S tree t? ” I t is true that Ruby Tuesday ’s claim of a cce ss was based on its claim of ow nership, but the Chanc ellor did not cre ate the e aseme nt out of thin air.
The re cord shows tha t RubyTuesday and its prede ce s s o rs i n title had acc ess to the stree t acr oss the abandone d strip if they neede d it. I f the hig hway had bee n abandone d altog ether , Ruby Tuesday would still have a n ease ment over the abandone d roadw ay fo r p u rp o s es of ing ress a nd e g r e s s
. T h e p r i n c i p l e h a s b e e n s t a t e d t h i s w a y:

Ab utt ing ow ne rs of

a pu bli c ro a d h a ve the ri g ht of ing re ss a nde g re ss. This is a private right, which ca nnot be taken a way from them without compensation. I t is true the county may abandon the road a s a public roa d, and no long er w ork i t, but it cannot deprive the owner s of the pr ivat e ri ght a

bo ve me nti on e d. Th is rig ht i s in its orig in differ ent from the ea s ement which one man ac quires throug h the lands of anothe r by

contra ct or pre scription. I t a rises out of the fa ct that the owner

is an abutting owner

upon a public roa d.
Hill v . Ho f f man , 5 8 S. W. 9 29 a t 93 2 ( Ct. Ch. Ap p. 18 99 ). Th is r ule ha s b e e n c on sis te ntl y followed in t his state. See Knierim v . Leatherwood , 5 42 S.W. 2d80 6 ( Te nn . 1 97 6) ; Hi ll v . P ipp in , 98 4 S.W. 2d 61 7 (T e nn
. Ap p. 19 98 ). Th e re fo re , the Cha nc e llo r wa s simply statin g a le g a l princ ipl e that had bee n rec og nized for more tha n a ce ntury

. CO NC LU SION The judg ment of the lower court is aff irmed and the cause i s rema nded to the Chance ry Court of Roane County

for any further proce eding s that may

become nece ssary . Tax the costs on appea l equally to the appellant a nd the appe llee.

BE N H. CAN TRE LL, JUDGE