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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RALPH STEPHEN COPPOLA; R.S. 

COPPOLA TRUST - OCT. 19, 1995,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICES; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-16212

D.C. No. 

3:21-cv-00281-MMD-CSD

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 2, 2023**

Las Vegas, Nevada

Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,***

District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern 

District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

OCT 10 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Ralph Coppola (Coppola), as trustee of the R.S. Coppola Trust and sole 

beneficiary, appeals the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor 

of National Default Services (NDS) and Wells Fargo. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

“We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion for judgment on 

the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).” Daewoo Electronics 

Am. Inc. v. Opta Corp., 875 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 

“Dismissal under Rule 12(c) is warranted when, taking the allegations in the 

complaint as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . .” 

Id. (citation omitted). “We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision 

to dismiss with prejudice.” Oregon Clinic, PC v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 75 

F.4th 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be 

granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with 

the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Id. (citation 

omitted).

1. Coppola argues that the district court accepted NDS’s facts as true 

rather than Coppola’s facts. But, the record reflects that the district court accepted 
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the facts from Coppola’s complaint and judicially noticed facts.1 See Cafasso v. 

Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011) (“When 

considering a Rule 12(c) dismissal, we must accept the facts as pled by the 

nonmovant . . .”) (citations omitted). 

2. The district court did not err in dismissing Coppola’s adverse 

possession claim. “In order to claim adverse possession under NRS 11.150, the 

claimed property must be occupied and claimed for five years, continuously, and 

the claimant must pay all taxes assessed against the property for that same time 

period. . . .” Potts v. Vokits, 692 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Nev. 1985) (per curiam). 

Contrary to Coppola’s assertion, he did not pay the property taxes. Rather, Wells 

Fargo paid the taxes. Therefore, Coppola failed to establish a plausible claim for 

adverse possession. See id. (determining that “payment of taxes is an absolute 

requirement for claiming land through adverse possession”).

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1The district court granted NDS’s unopposed motion to take judicial notice of 

“publicly-recorded documents, official letters from government agencies 

responsible for banking administration, and documents in state and federal courts.” 

See Prescott v. Santoro, 53 F.4th 470, 485 n.8 (9th Cir. 2022) (granting unopposed 

motion for judicial notice).

2Coppola also argues that the district court erroneously applied mortgage standards 

rather than standards for a deed of trust. However, under Nevada law, a deed of 

trust is considered a type of mortgage. See Edelstein v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon, 286 

P.3d 249, 254 (Nev. 2012). 
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3. To establish breach of contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) the 

existence of a valid contract, (2) that the plaintiff performed, (3) that the defendant 

breached, and (4) that the breach caused the plaintiff damages.” Iliescu Fam. 1992 

Tr. v. Regional Transp. Comm’n of Washoe Cnty., 522 P.3d 453, 458 (Nev. App. 

Ct. 2022) (citations omitted). Here, Coppola did not perform his obligation under 

the contract. Coppola acknowledged in his complaint that he did not make 

payments to Wells Fargo as required by the loan agreement. Because Coppola 

failed to perform his obligation under the contract, he cannot establish breach of 

contract on the part of Wells Fargo. See id.

4. Coppola argues that NDS “violated the impartiality requirement of 

NRS § 107.028(6)” because Wells Fargo and NDS are “one and the same.”

However, as the district court determined, this conclusory statement did “not meet 

the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” See Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). 

Additionally, Coppola raises for the first time on appeal that NDS violated 

NRS § 107.028(6). See In re America West Airlines, Inc., 217 F.3d 1161, 1165 

(9th Cir. 2000) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, we generally will not consider 

arguments raised for the first time on appeal . . .”) (citations omitted).
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AFFIRMED.3

3Coppola challenged in his Opening Brief the district court’s dismissal of his 

wrongful foreclosure claim. However, he abandoned the claim in his Reply Brief.