J-S21006-15

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

HOWARD JACKSON,

Appellant No. 2802 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 10, 2012

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008007-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, JENKINS, and PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2015

Howard Jackson appeals from the judgment of sentence of one year 

probation that was imposed after he was convicted of possession of a 

controlled substance. We reject his challenge to the suppression court’s 

ruling herein and affirm. 

The interdiction leading to Appellant’s arrest on the possession charge 

at issue herein was described as follows. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on 

October 21, 2010, Philadelphia Police Officers Kyle Cross and Frederick 

Clough saw a black Buick SUV parked in the northbound traveling lane of the 

7700 block of Lowber Street, Philadelphia. Appellant was seated in the front 

seat of the car, a passenger was next to him, and Appellant was rummaging 

around in the car. The driver’s side door was open. Believing that Appellant 
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might be breaking into the vehicle, Officers Cross and Clough initiated an 

investigatory detention. 

Officer Cross drove his cruiser behind the SUV and activated the police 

car’s lights and sirens. The police officers then approached the car. As they 

did so, Officer Cross saw Appellant reach from the front seat to the rear seat 

of the car, place a black bag on his lap, and stuff a clear plastic Ziploc bag 

into his pants crotch. Appellant was removed from the vehicle. The Ziploc 

bag was partially protruding from Appellant’s pants. Officer Cross observed 

a smaller blue plastic bag containing a powdery substance inside the 

exposed part of the bag. Based on a belief that it contained cocaine, the 

bag was seized, and Appellant was arrested. The black bag contained amber 

pill bottles, and every bottle but one indicated that they contained drugs 

prescribed for Appellant. In the pill bottle not bearing Appellant’s name, 

police recovered fifty-eight Xanax pills. 

Appellant was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He 

moved to suppress the drugs seized as a result of the interdiction. The 

municipal court granted that motion, and the Commonwealth appealed to 

the court of common pleas, where it prevailed. At an August 13, 2012 

nonjury trial, Appellant was convicted of the charged offense, and he was 

sentenced on October 10, 2012. This appeal followed. Appellant raises this 

contention: “Is the Defendant entitled to a remand to the Trial Court for a 

new trial where the Suppression Court erred when it failed to grant the 
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Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence as the result of an illegal traffic 

stop [and] a subsequent illegal search and seizure?” Appellant’s brief at 3. 

We first elucidate the pertinent standard of review: 

An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is 

limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported 

by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from 

those facts are correct. [Because] the prosecution prevailed in 

the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the 

trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if 

the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Postie, 2015 WL 663437, *3 (Pa.Super. 2015). 

Herein, the suppression court noted that both Officer Cross and Officer 

Clough “testified that they were conducting an investigation on the night in 

question, with Officer Clough clarifying that the officers were concerned that 

someone was breaking into the car.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/1/14, at 4. The 

court continued that the officers articulated that the vehicle door was ajar, 

the SUV was parked in a traffic lane, it was one o’clock in the morning, and 

“someone was rummaging through the backseat.” Id. The court concluded 

that, “[g]iven these articulated observations, this court believes the officers 

were reasonable in concluding that someone may have been breaking into 

the car.” Id. at 5-6. The court therefore upheld the interdiction as an 
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investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspicion that a crime was 

being committed. 

On appeal, Appellant does not challenge this finding. Instead, 

Appellant believes that the investigatory detention was premised upon the 

fact that the car was stopped in a traffic lane. Appellant sets forth two 

provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code that prohibit stopping in a travel lane.1 

____________________________________________

1 Specifically, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3351, with an exception for disabled vehicles, 

provides:

(a) General rule.--Outside a business or residence district, no 

person shall stop, park or stand any vehicle, whether attended 

or unattended, upon the roadway when it is practicable to stop, 

park or stand the vehicle off the roadway. In the event it is 

necessary to stop, park or stand the vehicle on the roadway or 

any part of the roadway, an unobstructed width of the highway 

opposite the vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other 

vehicles and the vehicle shall be visible from a distance of 500 

feet in each direction upon the highway.

Appellant notes that there was no proof that he was outside a business or 

residence district. 

Appellant also insists that there was no proof that his stop of his SUV 

constituted a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3353, which states in pertinent part:

(a) General rule.--Except when necessary to avoid conflict 

with other traffic or to protect the safety of any person or vehicle 

or in compliance with law of the directions of a police officer or 

official traffic-control device, no person shall:

(1) Stop, stand or park a vehicle: 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(i) On the roadway side of any vehicle 

stopped or parked at the edge or curb of 

a street except that: 

(A) A pedalcycle . . . . 

(B) Standing or parking for 

the purpose of loading or 

unloading persons or 

property may be authorized 

by local ordinance . . . . 

(ii) On a sidewalk except that a 

pedalcycle may be parked as provided in 

section 3509(b)(2). 

(iii) Within an intersection. 

(iv) On a crosswalk. 

(v) Between a safety zone and the 

adjacent curb within 30 feet of points on 

the curb immediately opposite the ends of 

a safety zone, unless a different length is 

indicated by official traffic-control devices. 

(vi) Alongside or opposite any street 

excavation or obstruction when stopping, 

standing or parking would obstruct traffic. 

(vii) Upon any bridge or other elevated 

structure upon a highway or within a 

highway tunnel. 

(viii) On any railroad tracks. 

(ix) In the area between roadways of a 

divided highway, including crossovers. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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His argument on appeal is devoted solely to refuting that the evidence 

established that he violated those provisions. 

Police may conduct a vehicular stop based upon reasonable suspicion 

that a crime is being committed. Commonwealth v. Anthony, 977 A.2d 

1182 (Pa.Super. 2009). In this case, the officers involved in the interdiction 

did not premise their investigation to any extent on the fact that Appellant’s 

SUV was parked in a traffic lane. Rather, they articulated that they 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(x) At any place where official signs 

prohibit stopping. 

(2) Stand or park a vehicle: 

(i) In front of a public or private 

driveway. 

(ii) Within 15 feet of a fire hydrant. 

(iii) Within 20 feet of a crosswalk at an 

intersection. 

(iv) Within 30 feet upon the approach to 

any flashing signal, stop sign, yield sign 

or traffic-control signal located at the site 

of a roadway. 

(v) Within 20 feet of the driveway 

entrance to any fire station or, when 

properly sign posted, on the side of a 

street opposite the entrance to any fire 

station within 75 feet of the entrance. 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3353 
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investigated the SUV based upon a belief that Appellant may have been 

stealing the contents of that vehicle, and the trial court accepted that belief 

as reasonably premised upon the articulated facts. Appellant does not assail 

that finding and is therefore not entitled to relief. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/12/2015