*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 95-30850

Summary Calendar

 

IN RE: DAVID ALAN DELANEY,

 Debtor.

DAVID ALAN DELANEY,

Appellee,

versus

DANNY CORLEY, JR., a/k/a BO CORLEY,

Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(CA-94-1550)

 

December 21, 1995

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Danny Corley appeals from the United States District Court's

judgment reversing the decision of the United States Bankruptcy

Court and remanding for further proceedings.

I.
2

On the evening of September 24, 1986, David Delaney shot Danny

Corley. In the ensuing state court tort action, the state court

rendered judgment in favor of Corley and awarded $1.4 million in

damages. The Louisiana Court of Appeals modified the judgment,

increasing the percentage of fault assigned to Delaney from 50% to

80%. See Corley v. Delaney, 629 So.2d 1255 (La. Ct. App. 1993),

writ denied, 637 So.2d 156 (La. 1994).

After the state trial court rendered its judgment, Delaney

filed for bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy

Court for the Western District of Louisiana on October 9, 1992. On

January 12, 1993, Corley filed his Creditor's Complaint to

Determine Dischargeability, seeking a declaration that the state

court judgment was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) exempts from discharge any debt "for willful

and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the

property of another entity."

The bankruptcy court rendered judgment for Corley, concluding

that the "debtor clearly committed willful and malicious acts

against the plaintiff." To support its conclusion, the bankruptcy

court reasoned:

It is beyond peradventure that loading a twelve gauge,

double barreled, sawed-off shotgun and pointing it toward

the face of another unarmed person or against a

windshield just beyond the face is wrongful and without

just cause. The facts also support a finding that the

acts were deliberate, intentional and led to the

plaintiff's injuries. The debtor systematically went to

his room and loaded the gun. He briefly put it down when

reprimanded by his father. Even after his father advised

him to relinquish it, he again picked up the weapon, put

his finger on the trigger and headed outside to confront

the plaintiff.
3

On appeal, the district court reversed the judgment of the

bankruptcy court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The district court reasoned:

We have no quarrel with the conclusions that the loading

and pointing were intentional acts. But the factual

findings do not address or evaluate the damage causing

activity, viz: the discharge of the gun upon Delaney's

tapping on the windshield. But for that act, no damage

could have occurred. The shot gun must discharge to

produce the injury suffered by Mr. Corley.

Our reading of the record leads to a finding that

the weapon discharge was inadvertent, unintended, and

totally accidental. We are driven to that conclusion for

many reasons, including the trial testimony of David

Delaney at page 322; the trial testimony of William

Meyers at page 51; and the deposition testimony of the

victim himself at pages 34, 42, and 60. We are

particularly interested in the victim's assertion that

Mr. Delaney "tapped twice to get my attention, I guess to

get my attention." page 60.

Thus, we are left with the inescapable conclusion

that there is no finding of fact to support the decision

that the damage causing act of Mr. Delaney was willful

and malicious. Hence, the decision of the bankruptcy

court is reversed. This matter is returned to the

bankruptcy court for further action not inconsistent with

this opinion.

This timely appeal followed.

II.

Decisions entered by a district court sitting in bankruptcy

are not appealable to the court of appeals unless they are final.

28 U.S.C. § 158(d); In re Aegis Specialty Marketing Inc. of

Alabama, 68 F.3d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1995). "[W]here a district

court's remand entails significant further proceedings, such as

additional fact-finding, then the order should not be considered

final." Id.; see also In re Harrington, 992 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir.

1993) (holding that district court order remanding a case for

further proceedings is not final unless the district court order
4

"resolves all procedural and substantive issues necessary to

conclude the entire appeal").

In this case, the district court's order remanding the case to

the bankruptcy court entails significant further proceedings that

render the district court's order non-final. Although the district

court found, on its review of the record as it stood, that "the

weapon discharge was inadvertent, unintended, and totally

accidental," the district court did not rule out the possibility

that the bankruptcy court would reopen the proceedings to consider

additional evidence on remand. Given this possibility of

additional fact-finding, we are not persuaded that the district

court opinion "resolves all procedural and substantive issues

necessary to conclude" this litigation.

Appeal DISMISSED.