IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-1412

Filed May 11, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ARTHUR BARBINE,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Marlita A. Greve, 

Judge.

The defendant challenges his sentences. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.

Arthur Barbine was convicted of three counts of credit card fraud, as a 

habitual offender; four counts of credit card fraud, as an aggravated 

misdemeanor; and one count of theft in the fourth degree, as a serious 

misdemeanor. The district court ordered the habitual offender enhancements be 

served consecutive to each other for a total term of incarceration not to exceed 

forty-five years. Barbine challenges his sentences. 

“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within 

the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only 

be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate 

matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). An abuse of 

discretion occurs if “the decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that 

were clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Id.

Barbine first contends the district court failed to state adequate reasons for 

the imposition of consecutive sentences. In imposing sentence, “[t]he court shall 

state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.” Iowa R.

Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d). The reason stated does not need to be detailed, but “at least 

a cursory explanation must be provided to allow appellate review of the trial 

court's discretionary action.” State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000). 

“The trial court generally has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive 

sentences for convictions on separate counts.” State v. Delaney, 526 N.W.2d 

170, 178 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). “Consequently, the duty of a sentencing court to 

provide an explanation for a sentence includes the reasons for imposing 

consecutive sentences.” Id. “[W]e look to all parts of the record to find the 
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supporting reasons.” Id. The statement of reason or reasons must be sufficiently 

clear to provide notice to the defendant of the reason or reasons for the 

imposition of consecutive sentences and to allow for appellate review of the 

sentencing decision. See State v. Hill, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2016 WL 1612950, 

at *3 (Iowa 2016). The statement of reason or reasons is insufficient if the 

defendant is merely sentenced pursuant to an “overall sentencing plan” that does 

not satisfy both of the aforementioned criteria. See Id. at *5 (overruling State v. 

Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 2010) to the extent Hennings held the 

articulation of an “overall sentencing plan” was a substitute for the required 

statement of reasons for the imposition of consecutive sentences); State v. Bell, 

No. 13–0902, 2014 WL 2342461, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2014) (McDonald, 

J., dissenting) (arguing an independent statement of reasons was required but 

reconciling Hennings with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and prior cases); 

State v. Gasaway, No. 13–0458, 2014 WL 251906, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 

2014) (distinguishing Hennings); State v. Scott, No. 12–1531, 2013 WL 2146226, 

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 15, 2013) (Danilson, J., concurring specially) 

(concluding Hennings is inconsistent with the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure 

and prior cases). In this case, the district court provided an extensive 

explanation of the reasons for the imposition of the defendant’s sentences. 

Barbine’s argument is without merit.

Barbine next contends the district court “abused its discretion by 

improperly punishing the defendant for being mentally ill and drug addicted.” 

There is nothing in the record to support the defendant’s argument that the 

district court “punished” him for the cited reasons. We thus interpret the 
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defendant’s argument to mean the district court did not place enough weight on 

these mitigating factors. In exercising its sentencing discretion, “the district court 

is to weigh all pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the 

nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant's age, 

character, and propensities or chances for reform.” State v. Johnson, 513 

N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994). Although “[a] sentencing court has a duty to 

consider all the circumstances of a particular case,” it is not “required to 

specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant.” State v. 

Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). “Furthermore, the failure to 

acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it 

was not considered.” Id. Here, the district court stated it considered the 

defendant’s age, criminal history, social background, employment status, mental 

health, and substance abuse history. The district court considered proper factors 

and did not consider any improper sentencing considerations. While the district 

court may have not placed as much weight on the mitigating factors as the 

defendant wished, we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion. 

The sentences are affirmed without further opinion. See Iowa Ct. R. 

21.26(1)(a), (c), (e).

AFFIRMED.