Supreme Court of Texas 

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No. 20-0393 

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James Fredrick Miles, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Texas Central Railroad & Infrastructure, Inc. and 

Integrated Texas Logistics, Inc., 

Respondents

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On Petition for Review from the 

Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas 

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CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT, joined by Justice Young, concurring. 

The Texas Central Entities1 argue that they are an “interurban 

electric railway company” with the power of eminent domain under 

Chapter 131 of the Texas Transportation Code to acquire property for a 

high-speed railway between Dallas and Houston. The Court agrees and 

thus does not need to reach the Texas Central Entities’ additional 

argument that they are a “railroad company” with the same power under 

1 I adopt the Court’s short-form reference for respondents Texas Central 

Railroad & Infrastructure, Inc. and Integrated Texas Logistics, Inc. 
2 

Section 81.002 of the Code.2 I join the Court’s opinion in full but write 

briefly to explain why I agree with the Texas Central Entities’ Section 

81.002 argument. 

 Section 81.002 defines a railroad company to include, in 

subsection (1), “a railroad incorporated before September 1, 2007,” and, 

in subsection (2), “any other legal entity operating a railroad”.3 Miles 

argues that “operating a railroad” means running trains on tracks. 

Consequently, Section 112.053’s authorization to a railroad company to 

“acquire property by condemnation” extends only to entities with trains 

and tracks.4 The chicken-and-egg illogic is obvious: an entity cannot 

obtain a right-of-way on which to run trains on tracks without first 

running trains on tracks. 

The answer, Miles argues, is that an aspiring railroad company 

can simply partner with an existing railway. In other words, 

Section 81.002 banned all new railways in Texas incorporated after 

September 1, 2007. Miles points to nothing in Texas’ history of railway 

regulation suggesting that the Legislature had so draconian an intent 

in enacting Section 81.002. 

But we need not speculate whether that somehow could have been 

the Legislature’s purpose, however unlikely. The illogic of Miles’ 

argument is firmly rebutted by Section 112.053’s full text, which states: 

(a) A railroad company may acquire property by 

condemnation if the company cannot agree with the 

owner for the purchase of the property and the 

2 TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 81.002. 

3 Id. 

4 Id. § 112.053(a). 
3 

property is required for any of the following 

purposes: 

(1) the incorporation of the railroad; 

(2) the transaction of company business; 

(3) depots, station buildings, and machine and 

repair shops; 

(4) the construction of reservoirs for the water 

supply; 

(5) the right-of-way, or new or additional right-ofway; 

(6) a change or relocation; 

(7) a roadbed; 

(8) the shortening of a line; 

(9) the reduction of grades; 

(10) the double tracking of the railroad or the 

construction and operation of tracks; or 

(11) any other purpose connected with or 

necessary to the building, operating, or 

running of the railroad.5

A railroad company may condemn property for “the right-of-way” and 

“roadbed”—that is, before tracks are laid.6 It may condemn property 

before incorporating—that is, before doing any business at all.7 And it 

may condemn property for “any other purpose connected with or 

5 Id. 

6 Id. § 112.053(a)(5), (a)(7). 

7 Id. § 112.053(a)(1). 
4 

necessary to the building . . . of the railroad”, as well as for operating 

and running it.8

 Clearly from these provisions, the meaning of “operating a 

railroad” cannot be restricted to running trains on tracks. Rather, it 

must extend to the operation of the railroad business from its inception, 

including the acquisition of tracks, trains, and other facilities. This is 

consistent with the statutory extension of the power of eminent domain 

to common carriers,9 including one that “owns, operates, or manages a 

pipeline”.10 By Miles’ logic, any would-be pipeline operators could never 

own, operate, or manage a new pipeline because the pipeline must 

already be in use to acquire a right-of-way. Miles’ argument would not 

only shut down new railways, but new pipelines as well. 

 Thus, while I join fully in the Court’s opinion that the Texas 

Central Entities may condemn property for a high-speed railway as an 

“interurban electric railway company” under Chapter 131, I would also 

hold that they may do so as a “railroad company” under Section 81.002. 

 

 Nathan L. Hecht 

 Chief Justice 

OPINION FILED: June 24, 2022 

8 Id. § 112.053(a)(11) (emphasis added). 

9 TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 111.019(a) (“Common carriers have the right 

and power of eminent domain.”). 

10 Id. § 111.002.