1995 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-3-1995

Walker v Vaughn

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 94-1367

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Recommended Citation

"Walker v Vaughn" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 118.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/118
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 No. 94-1367 

 

 RONALD WALKER, 

 Appellant

v. 

 DONALD T. VAUGHN; 

 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; 

 DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

 

 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

 D.C. No. 92-cv-01616 

 

 Argued January 24, 1995 

 Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, HUTCHINSON 

 and LEWIS, Circuit Judges

 (Opinion Filed May 3, l995 ) 

Michael J. Kelly (Argued) 

Defender Association of Philadelphia 

Federal Court Division 

Philadelphia, PA 19106-2414 

 Attorney for Appellant 

Donna G. Zucker (Argued) 

Office of District Attorney 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 

 Attorney for Appellees 
 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 

SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 

 Appellant Ronald Walker appeals the district court's 

denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Walker's petition alleges ineffective 

assistance of counsel in the state trial and direct appeal, 

primarily for their failure to press a claim on his behalf under 

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (barring racially 

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors). 

Although we will affirm the ruling of the district court, the 

procedural history of this case presents an important issue about 

the procedure to be followed by a federal court reviewing a 

habeas corpus petition when a dormant state proceeding is 

reactivated. The relevant procedural facts are necessarily set 

forth in detail. 

I. 

 Facts and Procedural History

 In November 1985, appellant Ronald Walker, armed with a 

double-barrelled shotgun and a handgun, entered the home of his 

estranged wife in Philadelphia. Walker proceeded to hold his 

wife's mother, sister and daughter hostage in the home for a 

period of approximately twenty-four hours. After a long standoff 

with police, Walker released the hostages and surrendered. He 

was then charged with crimes arising out of the incident. 
 On October 9, 1986, after a jury trial in the 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Walker was convicted of three 

counts of kidnapping, one count of attempted kidnapping, 

burglary, simple assault and possession of an instrument of 

crime. The judgment and sentence in the case was entered on May 

20, 1987. On April 13, 1989, Walker's conviction was affirmed on 

direct appeal in an unpublished opinion by the Pennsylvania 

Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 561 A.2d 823 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 1989). 

 Walker did not file a petition for allocatur to the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Instead, on February 28, 1990 he 

filed a pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq.

(hereinafter "PCRA action"), alleging that both his trial counsel 

and his appellate counsel had been ineffective. 

 Walker's court-appointed counsel in the PCRA action, 

however, failed to prosecute the PCRA petition promptly, 

resulting in a delay of more than two years.1 Thus, on March 19, 

1992, Walker filed this petition for habeas corpus in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

and listed as respondents Donald T. Vaughn by name (the 

Superintendent of the State Correctional Institute at 

 

1. Based on the record provided to this court, it appears that 

between February 1990 and May 1992, the state PCRA court listed 

the action approximately eleven times in an effort to move the 

matter towards resolution, but Walker's court-appointed counsel 

failed to appear on several occasions and arranged continuances 

of other hearings. 
Graterford), the District Attorney of Philadelphia, and the 

Attorney General of Pennsylvania (hereinafter referred to jointly 

as the "State"). In his petition, Walker alleged that the delay 

in the resolution of his PCRA action rendered that action 

ineffective to protect his rights, and that therefore his failure 

to exhaust his state post-conviction remedy should be excused. 

 On April 20, 1992, the state court presiding over the 

PCRA action scheduled a hearing for July 2, 1992 and issued an 

order to compel Walker's counsel to attend. The State, in 

responding on May 14, 1992 to Walker's federal petition, notified 

the district court of this latest development in the PCRA action 

and argued that Walker's obligation to exhaust his state remedies 

should not be excused. On June 5, 1992, the federal magistrate 

judge issued a Report and Recommendation that, due to the 

pendency of the PCRA action, Walker's habeas petition should be 

denied and dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust his 

state court remedies. The district court, however, took no 

immediate action regarding this Report and Recommendation, and 

Walker's federal habeas petition remained pending. 

 Walker's court-appointed PCRA counsel did not appear at 

the state PCRA hearing on July 2, 1992. The state court 

therefore took a number of steps, including threatening the 

imposition of sanctions, in order to force Walker's counsel to 

appear. While those efforts were largely unsuccessful, Walker's 

PCRA counsel did file an amended PCRA petition on September 30, 

1992. That amended petition, however, was not accompanied by the 

supplemental memorandum required by Pennsylvania law. After 
several additional missed appearances, the state court ordered 

Walker's PCRA counsel to attend a hearing on December 15, 1992, 

and warned counsel that he risked being held in contempt if he 

did not appear on that date. 

 While the state court was still attempting to compel 

Walker's state counsel to appear in the PCRA proceedings, the 

district court ordered the parties in the federal habeas 

proceeding to appear for a hearing on December 15, 1992 regarding 

the status of Walker's state PCRA action. The state court then 

changed its hearing to December 14, 1992, and at that hearing 

heard testimony on the merits of Walker's PCRA claim. 

 The following day, December 15, 1992, the district 

court held its hearing on the magistrate judge's report 

recommending dismissal of the federal action because Walker had 

failed to exhaust his state remedies. Walker testified that his 

PCRA counsel had represented him at the PCRA hearing the previous 

day, and that his original trial counsel had testified as a 

witness. The district court made no decision at that time. See

Transcript of Proceedings, December 15, 1992, at 32. 

 On December 22, 1992, the state court removed Walker's 

court-appointed PCRA counsel, apparently because of his prior 

lack of diligence, and thereafter appointed a replacement. This 

marked renewed movement in the PCRA action. 

 On January 8, 1993, the district court held another 

hearing, at which Walker's former PCRA counsel testified, and 

advised the court he had been replaced. See Transcript of 

Proceedings, January 8, 1993, at 6-8. The district court 
acknowledged that "things are beginning to move" in the state 

proceeding, id. at 16, but expressed doubt about whether the 

state proceeding would be resolved expeditiously. Id. at 9. 

After receiving a supplemental brief addressing the exhaustion 

question,2 the district court issued an order on January 15, 1993 

that disapproved the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate 

judge and ruled, instead, that the delay in the state PCRA 

proceeding was sufficient to waive Walker's exhaustion 

requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). The district court then 

directed Walker to file an amended habeas petition. 

 On February 1, 1993, with the assistance of his 

federally-appointed habeas counsel, Walker filed an amended 

habeas petition raising thirty-one issues. After the State filed 

a response to the amended petition, the district court ordered 

Walker to file an offer of proof and brief citation to authority 

in support of each of the thirty-one claims which Walker intended 

to pursue. See Order of February 26, 1993. Before Walker 

responded to the district court's order, his appointed habeas 

counsel filed a motion to withdraw in the federal action. The 

district court therefore continued Walker's obligation to file 

 

2. The State's supplemental brief, which was filed on January 

11, 1993, conceded there had been some prior delays, but argued 

that Walker's PCRA action was now proceeding rapidly through the 

state court system, with additional evidentiary hearings set for 

February 1993. See Supplementary Response on Issue of 

Exhaustion, January 11, 1993, at 5. The State proposed that the 

federal court dismiss Walker's habeas action without prejudice to 

renew it if the state proceedings were not fully resolved within 

a reasonable time frame. Id. at 6-7. 
the offer of proof and citation to authority pending the 

resolution of the motion to withdraw. 

 While Walker's federal action was stalled for this 

reason, Walker's state PCRA action was proceeding. Walker's 

newly-appointed PCRA counsel was permitted to file a new amended 

petition, and between December 1992 and April 1993 the state 

court heard testimony regarding Walker's claims for postconviction relief. Because there was no transcript of the voir

dire that had been conducted for Walker's trial, the state court 

permitted Walker to present testimony regarding the merits of the 

alleged ineffective assistance/Batson violations. See App. at 

101. 

 Walker testified that during voir dire, allegedly on 

October 6, 1986, the assistant district attorney who tried the 

case against him "had a problem with black males," App. at 102; 

that the jury ultimately selected was composed of "mainly 

females," App. at 107; that he was "very unhappy" about the 

selection process and complained about the process to his trial 

counsel "several times," App. at 107-08; and that his trial 

counsel told him to "shut up" and declined to object to the 

prosecutor's actions. App. at 108. The State objected to this 

testimony, in part because Walker had made no offer of proof 

regarding the number of people on the jury, the number of black 

jurors, and the number of black individuals who were stricken 

from the jury. Walker's counsel responded that he expected 

testimony or an affidavit on this issue by Walker's trial 

counsel. However, when Walker's trial counsel did testify on 
April 21, 1993, he was not questioned on any Batson-related 

issues. 

 On June 29, 1993, the state court issued an order 

denying Walker's PCRA claim. The court rejected Walker's 

ineffective assistance/Batson claim, concluding that Walker 

"failed to sustain his burden of proof on this issue." 

Commonwealth v. Walker, Nos. 8601-2553-2575, Memorandum Opinion 

at 10 (Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, filed June 29, 1993). 

 On July 8, 1993, Walker filed an amended federal habeas 

petition containing approximately thirty-three claims. One of 

the claims asserted by Walker was "that the makeup of the jury 

was prejudicial against petitioner." At a hearing before the 

district court on July 23, 1993, the State argued that Walker's 

petition did not state a claim for relief, relying upon the 

testimony and record produced in the PCRA proceeding. Among 

other things, the State argued that Walker failed to create a 

record in the PCRA action that would be sufficient to support his 

ineffective assistance/Batson claim, and asked the federal court 

to "stay its hand" because the PCRA action, which had concededly 

been delayed for some time, could "no longer legitimately be 

called ineffective to protect [Walker's] rights." See App. at 

61. 

 While the issue was pending in the district court, the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected Walker's appeal and, on 

February 2, 1994, affirmed the denial of relief under the PCRA. 

The Superior Court held that Walker's failure to provide the 

notes of testimony or a statement pursuant to Pa. R. App. P. 1923 
in lieu of a transcript precluded appellate review of the claim. 

See Commonwealth v. Walker, No. 02523 Philadelphia 1993, 

Memorandum Opinion at 6 (Pa. Super. Ct., filed February 2, 1994). 

Walker then filed a petition for allocatur to the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court.3

 On February 16, 1994, while Walker's petition in the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court was still pending, the federal 

district court issued its order denying Walker's federal habeas 

petition. With respect to Walker's ineffective assistance/Batson

claim, the court stated that "[t]here is no record of how many 

blacks were in the venire, how many were struck by the 

prosecution and the defense, how many blacks sat on the jury, or 

how many peremptory challenges the prosecutor used. Petitioner's 

insufficient showing precludes review by this court." Memorandum 

& Order of February 16, 1994 at 15-16. The district court 

therefore found that Walker had failed to make a sufficient 

record in the PCRA proceeding to support the claim. 

 The district court also commented in another portion of 

its opinion that: 

 [P]etitioner did not avail himself of the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Appellate Procedure that provide an 

opportunity to reconstruct the record for purposes of 

appeal. Pa. R. App. Pro. 1923, 1924. Petitioner also 

failed to supplement the record during the PCRA 

proceedings, although he had ample opportunity to do 

so. Because petitioner does not demonstrate cause for 

failing to develop the record in state proceedings, he 

cannot do so for the first time by federal habeas 

 

3. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Walker's petition for 

allocatur on November 30, 1994, after Walker's appeal before this 

court had been filed and fully briefed. 
action. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.Ct. 1715 

(1992). 

 

Memorandum & Order of February 16, 1994 at 13. While this 

portion of the district court's opinion did not specifically 

address Walker's ineffective assistance/Batson claim, it appears 

to have supported the court's conclusion regarding that claim. 

 The district court granted Walker's motion for a 

certificate of probable cause, and this appeal followed. In the 

appeal, Walker challenges only the district court's dismissal of 

his claim for habeas relief on the grounds of ineffective 

assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to object to 

the prosecutor's practice of racial discrimination in jury 

selection. 

 We have jurisdiction over Walker's appeal pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 405 (3d 

Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 593 (1994). Where a district 

court has denied a state prisoner's habeas corpus petition 

without a hearing on the merits, our review is plenary. See

Smith v. Freeman, 892 F.2d 331, 338 (3d Cir. 1989). 
II. 

 Discussion

 On appeal, Walker concedes that the record before the 

district court was insufficient to support either a substantive 

Batson claim or a claim for ineffective assistance based on 

defense counsel's failure to raise a Batson claim. He argues, 

however, that it was unfair for the district court to dismiss his 

action in light of the State's failure to produce any record of 

the jury selection despite the district court's prior order 

requiring it to do so. Walker contends that the district court 

should have held an evidentiary hearing on the whereabouts of the 

record of jury selection, and, if necessary, should have given 

him an opportunity to reconstruct that record.4

 In response, the State contends that the district 

court's decision followed the Supreme Court's recent decision in 

Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), holding that, 

absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a federal court may not 

provide a habeas petitioner with an evidentiary hearing where the 

petitioner had an adequate opportunity to develop the relevant 

facts in state court proceedings. Id. at 1721. Thus, the State 

reasons, Walker's failure to develop the facts relevant to his 

ineffective assistance/Batson claim during the PCRA proceeding 

 

4. Walker cites no relevant authority to support this position. 

He refers only to Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), in 

which the Supreme Court held that a state's failure to provide an 

indigent criminal defendant with defense counsel in his direct 

appeal was unconstitutional. 
precludes the district court from granting him the opportunity to 

do so in this habeas proceeding. 

 Were this the paradigmatic federal habeas proceeding, 

where the petitioner has fully exhausted state remedies prior to 

filing a federal habeas petition, the State's argument would be 

indisputable. Walker's failure to establish a factual record 

during the PCRA proceeding would be subject to the Tamayo-Reyes

cause and prejudice standard, and his inability to demonstrate 

cause for his failure to develop the factual record during the 

PCRA action would therefore support the district court's decision 

to reach the merits of his claims without holding an evidentiary 

hearing. 

 This case does not fit neatly within the Tamayo-Reyes

rule because the Court there addressed a habeas petitioner's 

failure to develop a factual record in a post-conviction state 

proceeding that was exhausted prior to the filing of the federal 

habeas petition. Id. at 1716-17. In contrast, here the district 

court concluded that Walker had not demonstrated cause for his 

failure to develop an adequate state court record to establish 

his claim by relying, somewhat paradoxically, upon the 

opportunity presented to Walker at a state proceeding that the 

district court had excused Walker from exhausting.5 We thus must 

consider, apparently as a matter of first impression, the proper 

application of the Tamayo-Reyes rule in these circumstances. 

 

5. The district court's waiver of the exhaustion requirement in 

this case has not been challenged by the State on appeal. Thus, 

despite our questions about the district court's ruling on that 

issue, we do not reach it here. 
 To do so, we return to basic principles. In general, a 

habeas petition may not be granted "unless it appears that the 

applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of 

the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). The exhaustion rule is not 

jurisdictional. See Story, 26 F.3d at 405. Rather, the rule is 

"rooted in considerations of federal-state comity." Preiser v. 

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973). The rule "is principally 

designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of 

federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial 

proceedings." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982).6 The 

exhaustion rule also serves the secondary purpose of facilitating 

the creation of a complete factual record to aid the federal 

courts in their review. Id. at 519. 

 Similarly, Tamayo-Reyes explained that the cause and 

prejudice rule regarding evidentiary hearings "appropriately 

accommodate[s] concerns of finality, comity, judicial economy, 

and channeling the resolution of claims into the most appropriate 

forum." Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1719. The Court also 

commented that its rule was "fully consistent with and gives 

meaning to the requirement of exhaustion" by ensuring that 

factual issues are addressed by the state courts "in the first 

instance." Id. at 1720. The exhaustion rule and the Tamayo-

 

6. In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), the 

Supreme Court noted that "[c]omity concerns dictate that the 

requirement of exhaustion is not satisfied by the mere statement 

of a federal claim in state court. Just as the State must afford 

the petitioner a full and fair hearing on his federal claim, so 

must the petitioner afford the State a full and fair opportunity 

to address and resolve the claim on the merits." Id. at 1720. 
Reyes rule are therefore animated in part by the same concerns: 

comity to the state courts and ensuring that an adequate factual 

record is developed in the state courts. 

 On the other hand, the habeas corpus statute provides 

that exhaustion of state remedies may be excused where there is 

"an absence of available State corrective process or the 

existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to 

protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). The 

principal instance for excusal of exhaustion is inordinate delay 

rendering the state remedy "effectively unavailable." See

Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d 353, 354 (3d Cir. 1986); see also

Story, 26 F.3d at 405-06 (listing cases). In such circumstances, 

the comity and record-creation concerns of the exhaustion rule 

yield to the federal courts' obligation to serve as a forum for 

the protection of the petitioner's fundamental federal rights. 

See Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1218 (3d Cir. 1987). 

It is unclear whether, once the district court determines 

exhaustion can be excused because of undue delay, the concerns as 

to comity and record-creation remain sufficiently relevant to 

require application of the Tamayo-Reyes rule, the issue presented 

by this appeal. 

 Because most habeas petitions filed during the pendency 

of state proceedings are dismissed for lack of exhaustion, no 

principles have been developed to guide the district court in a 

habeas proceeding as to reliance on a state evidentiary 

proceeding that occurred after the exhaustion requirement has 

been excused. Cf. Wojtczak, 800 F.2d at 356 n.3 (noting that 
after federal court found inexcusable delay in Pennsylvania state 

court post-conviction proceeding and permitted habeas petition to 

proceed, the state court stayed the post-conviction proceeding 

pending the disposition of the federal case). The issue would 

not have arisen in this case had the district court accepted the 

State's suggestion that it stay all federal proceedings pending 

the resolution of the state court action once it became apparent 

that the state PCRA action had been reactivated. As a matter of 

general practice, we assume that a district court which has 

excused exhaustion but has not yet embarked upon proceedings of 

substance will stay its hand once there is reliable evidence that 

the state action has been reactivated. Cf. Picard v. Connor, 404 

U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (noting that states generally must be given 

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of 

their prisoners' federal rights); see also Burkett, 826 F.2d at 

1218 (affirming a district court's dismissal for lack of 

exhaustion where the petitioner's state case was "proceeding 

normally," but excusing exhaustion where there was no indication 

that state court would soon dispose of petitioner's case). 

 An examination of the Tamayo-Reyes opinion suggests the 

appropriate manner to resolve the issue presented in this case. 

Clearly, the Court wanted to limit a defendant's opportunities 

"to relitigate a conviction." Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1719. 

More significantly, the Court noted that the cause and prejudice 

rule regarding evidentiary proceedings "serves the interest of 

judicial economy" by preventing defendants from using the scarce 

judicial resources of the federal courts to "duplicate 
factfinding" that could have been performed in state court. Id. 

This focus on judicial economy is consistent with other Supreme 

Court pronouncements regarding the use of the limited resources 

of the federal judiciary in habeas cases. See Schlup v. Delo, 

115 S. Ct. 851, 864 (1995) (suggesting that review of petitions 

for habeas corpus requires consideration of the "systemic 

interests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial 

resources"); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (noting 

that federal collateral litigation places a heavy burden on 

scarce judicial resources, and threatens the capacity of the 

system to resolve primary disputes).7 

 Thus, a decision to apply the Tamayo-Reyes rule should 

be guided not only by comity and record-creation concerns but 

also by an interest in encouraging judicial economy and avoiding 

duplicative procedures in the state and federal court systems. 

See United States ex rel. Senk v. Brierley, 471 F.2d 657, 660 (3d 

Cir. 1973) (record of a then-pending state proceeding should be 

considered by the district court on remand if the state 

proceeding was final at the time the district court rendered its 

decision). 

 We need not decide in this case what effect should be 

given to state court findings following a state evidentiary 

 

7. See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 260-61 

(1973) (Powell, J., concurring) ("To the extent the federal 

courts are required to re-examine claims on collateral attack, 

they deprive primary litigants of their prompt availability and 

mature reflection. After all, the resources of our system are 

finite: their overextension jeopardizes the care and quality 

essential to fair adjudication.") 
hearing in which the petitioner did not participate because the 

federal court excused exhaustion. Walker did participate fully 

in the state PCRA hearings that occurred after the filing of his 

habeas petition. At those hearings, Walker was represented by 

counsel who called various witnesses, including Walker himself, 

to testify in Walker's behalf. Indeed, a review of the 

transcript of the PCRA proceeding suggests that Walker was given 

every opportunity to create a record sufficient to establish any 

constitutional claims. Having availed himself of that 

opportunity by appearing and presenting evidence, it would be 

inconsistent with the interests of judicial economy expressed in 

Tamayo-Reyes and other Supreme Court decisions regarding federal 

habeas proceedings to give Walker a second evidentiary hearing in 

federal court. 

 We do not hold that a habeas petitioner must 

participate in a state proceeding that the district court has 

held need not be exhausted, an issue we leave for another day. 

We merely hold that application of the Tamayo-Reyes rule is 

appropriate in this case, where the state prisoner has appeared 

at the state hearing and has had an adequate opportunity to 

develop a record to establish his claim. 

 We recognize that the district court rendered its 

decision relying upon the opportunity provided by the state PCRA 

action while a petition for allocatur in that action was still 

pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.8 Arguably, relying on 

 

8. The district court may have so acted because of concern about 

further delay. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently taken 
a state action that is not yet final poses some risk. 

Regardless, at oral argument before this court, the parties 

agreed that Walker's petition for allocatur was denied by the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court on November 30, 1994, while this 

appeal was pending. Thus, the district court's reliance upon a 

then-pending state proceeding in reaching its decision cannot now 

provide a basis for the reversal of its decision. 

 We therefore conclude that the district court's 

dismissal of Walker's ineffective assistance/Batson claim was 

proper. The state court record is insufficient to establish the 

claim, and, having fully participated in the PCRA action, Walker 

is unable to demonstrate cause for his failure to reconstruct 

that record in state court, nor is there any suggestion that a 

miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the issue in the district court. TamayoReyes, 112 S.Ct. at 1721. 

(..continued) 

steps to reduce the delays in reviewing petitions for allocatur 

by appointing a committee to address the problem and adopting new 

internal operating procedures. See Supreme Court Internal 

Operating Procedures, Pennsylvania Law Weekly, Nov. 7, 1994, at 

12; see also Ralph J. Cappy et al., Allocatur Review Must Be 

Perceived As Objective, Pennsylvania Law Weekly, Nov. 21, 1994, 

at 6 (first part of Final Report and Recommendation of the 

Allocatur Study Committee of the State Supreme Court); Ralph J. 

Cappy et al., High Court Needs Central Staff, Funding, 

Pennsylvania Law Weekly, Nov. 28, 1994, at 6 (second part of 

Final Report and Recommendations of the Allocatur Study Committee 

of the State Supreme Court). 
III. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 

court's order of February 16, 1994, denying Walker's petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus. 

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