### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 21

- 00029

- CR

Michael Wayne Williams , Appellant

v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF LAMPASAS COUNTY NO. 21282 , THE HONORABLE RANDALL J. HOYER , JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R A N D M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

PER CURIAM Appellant Michael Wayne Williams , who was arrested for driving while
intoxicated (DWI) , second offense , s ee Te x. P enal Code § 49.04(a) , appeals the trial court ’ s order de nyin g his motion to suppr es s. A fter ruling on the motion, the trial court

— on Will iam s ’ request

— ente red findings of fact and conclusions of law :

FACTS: On September 26, 2019, Lampasas Police Department 911 received a call reporting a possible DWI. The caller provided a descriptio n of the vehicle, license plate number and location of where the vehicle was going. This information was relayed to Officer Bowman by Lampasas PD Dispatch. Officer Bowman shortly thereafter lo cated a vehicle similar in description in the general location p rovided to him by dispatch. Officer Bowman conducted an investigative detention of limited scope and duration and observed an odor of alcohol. With assistance from Officer Montgomery, the defe ndant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicl e in a public place while intoxicated.2 CONCLUSION: While the vehicle make and model, as well as license plate number provided in the 911 call were not 100% accurate, the description of the vehicle and location were close enough for the officer to find the re ported vehicle and driver. Based off the evidence presented and testimony provided at the hearing, I believed the arresting officer's actions met the minimal level of objective justification and reasonable suspicion for making the stop. I therefore rul ed to deny the motion to suppress. For the following reasons , we will abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court so that it may make additional findings and conclusions necessary to the disposition of this appeal. “Upon request of the losi ng party, a trial court must issue essential findings of fact
and conclusions of law that justify its ruling.” State v. Copeland , 501 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting State v. Cullen , 195 S.W.3d 696, 698

– 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006));
accord S ta te v. Saenz , 411 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “‘Essent ial findings’ means that ‘the trial court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate to provide an appellate court with a basis upon which to review the trial court’s appli ca tion of the law to the
facts.’” Copeland , 501 S.W.3d at 613 (quoti ng State v. Elias , 339 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)); accord Saenz , 411 S.W.3d at 495. “In issuing its essential findings, trial courts have an obligation to ensure that they a re ‘adequate and complete, covering every potentially dispositive issu e that might reasonably be said to have arisen in the course of the suppression proceedings,’” Copeland , 501 S.W.3d at 613 (quoting Elias , 339 S.W.3d at 674), including “explicit credib il ity determination[s]” regarding the witnesses who testified at the

su ppression hearing, State v. Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “The
essential

- findings rule exists to ensure that appellate courts resolve issues presented on appeal
‘b ased on the reality of what happened at the trial court level rather than on appellate3 assumptions that may be entirely fictitious.’” Copeland , 501 S.W.3d at 613 (quoting Elias , 339 S.W.3d at 674); see Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d at 671 (explaining that require me n t that trial court make specific findings of fact “ensure[s] that reviewing courts need not presume, assume, or guess at what historical facts a trial judge actually found when making a ruling in a motion to suppress hearing”). An appellate court may no t “ presume factual findings that may be dispositive in a case when a trial court’s findings are an inadequate basis upon which to make a legal conclusion and when those findings have been properly requested by a losing party.” Saenz , 411 S.W.3d at 495 (ci ti ng Elias , 339 S.W.3d at 674; Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d at 673; Cullen , 195 S.W.3d at 699). Instead, “an appellate court must abate for additional findings of fact when a party has requested findings of fact and the findings that are made by a trial court are so in complete that an appellate court is unable to make a legal determination.” Id. (citing Elias , 339 S.W.3d at 674; Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d at 673; Cullen , 195 S.W.3d at 699). “Rule 44.4 authorizes the court of appeals to
remand the case to the trial court s o tha t the court of appeals is not forced to infer facts from an unexplained ruling.” Cullen , 195 S.W.3d at 698 (citing Tex. R. App. P. 44.4).
This case concerns the interaction between Williams and an officer in a gas station pa rking lot. T he un disput ed evidence intr oduced at th e suppression hearing sh ows tha t William s ’ neighbor made a 911 call alleging that Williams was possibly driving while
intoxicated. A responding officer found Williams parked in his truck with its b rake lights
acti vated

. The of fi cer parked behind Williams and approached the truck ; a DWI investi gation subsequen tly ensued , a nd Williams was arrested and charged w ith DWI, second offense

. The par ties ’ arguments on appeal raise issues involving the legality of the
interaction and ar rest , including whether the initial contact was con sensual or amount ed to an4 inv esti gative detention ; whether a reasonable person in Wil liam s ’ position would have felt free

to leave; if th e o ffic er detained Willia m s, wh ether t he officer had reasonable susp icio n for the detention; w hethe r a t the time of William s ’ arres t officers ha d probable cause to arrest him;

w hether Williams was s ubject to a custodial inter rogat ion and, if so, whether the officer provided
him with th e required constituti onal an d st at uto r y wa r nings ; and whether during the initial
in t eraction the officer was acting pursuant to his community

- caretakin g function.
The evidence admitted at the hearing included testimony from the officer who first interacted with Williams at the gas station , a s econ d officer who assisted with the DWI
investi gation, and Williams h imself ; a recording of the 911 cal l made by Williams ’ neighbor; the Lampas as Police Depar tment activity log and d ispatch report; dash

- camera video from both
officers ’ patrol v ehicles; an d a D WI case report of the i ncident. Based on this evidenc e, Williams a rgued that his initial interaction with the first officer was non - consensual and was not a welfare che ck but an investigatory detention , f or which the officer lacked rea sonable suspicio n
. T he S tate replied that it was willing to concede that the of ficer lacked reasonable suspicion bu t contended that the interaction had not amounted to a stop and was instead consensual. In its findings an d conclusions, t he trial cour t provided a br ief a nd li mited
narrative of the facts and concluded that the “ arresting officer ’ s actions met the minimal level of objective justification and reasonable suspicion fo r makin g the stop. ” The trial court d id not , however, mak e factual f in ding s concerning numero us si gnificant i ssues raised by the evidence at the hearing

— many of which were contested

— i ncluding the p recise content and language of the
911 call ; the time of day and lo cation of the interactio n ; how the vehicle de scr iption and license plate number provi ded b y dispatch differed from t hose of the vehicle in which t he officer found
Williams ; whether dispatch relayed informa tion about the vehicle ’ s driving ; h ow many offic ers5 and vehicles w ere present during the interaction; w hether the overhead lights or si r en of either
officer ’ s patrol vehicle we re on ; wheth er either officer drew his service weapon durin g the
int eraction; what v olum e and tone of voice the fir st res po ndin g off icer used during the interaction; whether the officer issued any c ommands or orders to Wi l liams; whether either officer saw Williams driving ; the credibility of the first officer ’ s test imony re garding wh y he positioned his pa trol vehicle as he did ; the location of each off icer ’ s vehicle with resp ect to William s ’ vehi cle ; w hether Williams ’ vehi cle could ha ve left the parking lot before the second
officer arr ived ; w hether Williams ’ vehicle could ha ve left the parking lot after the second officer

arr ived ; the exten t to which Will iams ’ attempting to l e ave before the second officer arrived
woul d hav e risked a collision with t he first officer ’ s vehicle ; the cred ibilit y of both officers ’ testimony concerning William s ’ ability t o drive away without hitting a police vehicle ; th e
pr esence of any in dica tors other than the odor of alcohol that Will iams ha d been dri nking ; whether the firs t officer saw Williams ’ activated brake lights ; whether the activated brake lights
indicated that that the vehicle was in operation; whether either officer saw ke y s in the ignition of
Williams ’ vehicle; the pres ence of a ny in di cat ors that Williams was operating the v ehic le ; the credibility of the first o fficer ’ s testimony that his investigation was “ a wel fare concern . . . [u]ntil he establish[e s ] the fact that [Williams i s] intoxicated ” ; the presence of any evidence indi catin g that Williams was in need of assistance or medical at tention; the cred ibility of Willi am s ’ testimony that h e was not drinking the morning of the incident, that he h ad never bee n drunk around his neighbor, and that his neighbor could not have seen hi m dri n king that day; wh ether the 911 caller witnessed Williams driving ; the credibility of William s ’ testimony that he did not
feel free t o leav e when the first officer approached hi s vehic le; the credibility of William s ’ testimony that he could not have b ack ed up; w hether Williams told the first officer that he did6 not wish to speak to him ; whether William s was subject to standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs) ; if so, which tests were taken by Williams and the results of the tests ; w hether Will iams

cons ented to any SFSTs; whether Williams ’ arres t was warrantless ; whether Williams provided a breath sample, cons ented to pr ovide such a sample, and the results of any testing of the sample ; and wh ether Williams provided a blood sample, consented to pro vide su ch a sample, and the results of any testing of th e sample . In addition, the tr ial court di d not e xplai n which evidence i t had considered in ma king it s findings or, t o the extent that it relied on testimony , wh ich

t est i mony or po rtions o f testimony it foun d to be c redi b l e. See Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d at 672 (concluding that trial court’s fact findings were inadequate because “these factual findings [did] not find many historical facts, nor [did] they find that [the officer’s] beliefs and feelings were objecti v ely r easonable ones” and “[t]hey also contain[ed] no credibility assessment of [the officer’s] testimony”).
Lik e wise, although the trial court found that the “ arresting officer ’ s actions met the mi nimal level of objective justif ication and reasonable suspi cion for making the s top , ” the
trial court failed to make other necessary le gal conclusions regarding potent ially dis positive
issues , including whether the 911 caller was reliable ; whethe r th e in itial int era ction between
Will iams and the first responding o ffic e r was consensual , was a n investi gatory detention , or was
an arrest ; if it w as a detention , when the detention began; whether a reasonable person in
Williams ’ position would have felt free to leav e during the interact ion ; whether the State ’ s

s tatement that it was willing to concede tha t the first officer lacked reasonable suspicion foreclosed the trial court from ruling on that basis ; if William s was detained, whether the detention was justified by the officer ’ s community

- caretaking function ; whether Wi lliam s w as subject to a custodial interrogation; if so, whether he received the required constitutional and7 statutory wa rning s bef orehand ; whether , at the time of Williams ’ arrest, officers had probable
cause to arrest hi m; and whether any breath o r bl o od spe ci mens provided by Williams were
obtained lawf ully

.

Accordingly, we abate this appeal and remand the cause to the trial court to make
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this order. See Elias , 339 S.W.3d at 676

– 77; see al so Te x. R. App. 44.4; see, e.g., Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d at 673 (remanding case to court of appeals with instructions to abate it to trial court for further entry of fact findings that clarify ambiguous factual fin dings, make explicit credibility determination s,

an d “dispel any confusion about precisely what historical facts the trial judge found and whether [the judge] found [the officer’s] beliefs and conclusions objectively reasonable, based on the
historical fac ts”); State v. McMahan , No. 03

- 19

- 00824

- CR, 20 20 WL 5392751, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Austin Sept. 4, 2020, no pet.) (per cu riam) ( mem. op. , not des ignated for publication) (concluding that trial court’s fact findings were inadequate because they were “conclusory and ambiguous” and did not contain informat ion esse ntial for determination of whether off icer had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant violated Trans portation Code section at issue)

. A supplemental clerk’s record containing the additional findings of fact and conclusions of law
shall be fil ed wi th this Court by October 24, 2022

. Th is appeal will be reinsta ted after the supplemental clerk’s record is filed.
It is so ordered September 29, 2022

.8 Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Baker , Smith
Aba ted and Remanded
Filed: September 2 9 , 2022
Do Not Publish