[Cite as State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm., 130 Ohio St.3d 405, 2011-Ohio-6036.] 

THE STATE EX REL. GEORGE, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL 

COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 

[Cite as State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm., 

130 Ohio St.3d 405, 2011-Ohio-6036.] 

Workers’ compensation—Evidence—Inconsistencies in medical reports. 

(No. 2010-1841—Submitted October 18, 2011—Decided November 30, 2011.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 09AP-1099, 

2010-Ohio-4320. 

__________________

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio denied appellee’s, 

Matthew T. George’s, request to authorize further shoulder surgery, after finding 

that the proposed procedure was unrelated to the conditions allowed in his 

workers’ compensation claim. That denial is now at issue. 

{¶ 2} George’s workers’ compensation claim has been allowed 

exclusively for right shoulder conditions. Surgery for those conditions was first 

performed by Dr. Larry W. Watson in 2004. The procedure yielded good results, 

and George returned to work with appellant Honda of America Manufacturing, 

Inc., without medical restriction. 

{¶ 3} George had no further treatment to his right shoulder until 

February 2008, when he returned to Dr. Watson with renewed shoulder 

complaints. Watson felt that these symptoms were related to the industrial injury, 

and he asked self-insured Honda to add new shoulder conditions to the claim and 

to authorize shoulder surgery to correct them. 

{¶ 4} An independent medical examination was performed by Dr. 

Christopher Holzaepfel in response to these requests. Holzaepfel did not believe 

that George’s shoulder complaints were related to the industrial injury, stressing 
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George’s successful recovery from his earlier surgery, his return to Honda without 

restriction, and his 31⁄2 years without treatment. Holzaepfel felt instead that 

George’s symptoms were related to his work with a property-management 

company—a job taken after George left Honda for undisclosed reasons. 

{¶ 5} Honda also had George medically examined by Dr. Walter H. 

Hauser. Hauser found nothing wrong with George’s right shoulder, with every 

facet of his examination eliciting normal results. The exam did, however, reveal a 

ruptured biceps tendon, which is not allowed in the claim. Hauser believed that 

this biceps rupture was the source of George’s complaints and would not be 

corrected by further shoulder surgery: 

{¶ 6} “Therefore, it is my opinion, after taking a history, physical 

examination, and accepting his current allowed conditions in this claim, that he 

has been a very active individual. This is confirmed by the records. Surveillance 

indicates that he has been able to use his right shoulder in a very active manner. 

He has no objective findings on his physical examination other than the rupture of 

the biceps tendon. It is my opinion that the rupture is totally unrelated to his 

work-related injury on 10/02/2003, but to his subsequent activities, including his 

workouts at the health club. Once a biceps tendon has been ruptured, there is no 

indication to do an open repair at this time, and certainly not based on his original 

injury on 10/02/2003. He has excellent strength in his upper extremities, and no 

impairment that can be noted judging by his activities on the surveillance video. 

There is no need to repair his rotator cuff and, hence, in my opinion, absolutely no 

reason for any further surgery and certainly not for the allowed conditions in this 

claim, which were resolved with his prior surgery.” 

{¶ 7} Honda would not authorize shoulder surgery based on Hauser’s 

report. The commission also denied the surgical request based on that same 

document. 

{¶ 8} George filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 

Franklin County. The appellate court granted a limited writ that ordered the 
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commission to reconsider the application, after finding “troubling 

inconsistencies” within Hauser’s report that it believed disqualified the report 

from evidentiary consideration. State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. 

No. 09AP-1099, 2010-Ohio-4320, at ¶ 17. 

{¶ 9} This cause is now before this court on appeals as of right by Honda 

and the commission. 

{¶ 10} Authorization for medical treatment requires a causal relationship 

between the allowed conditions and the proposed services. State ex rel. Miller v. 

Indus. Comm. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 229, 643 N.E.2d 113. The commission did 

not find a causal connection in this case, based on Hauser’s report. The 

evidentiary viability of that report is the sole issue now presented. 

{¶ 11} The commission is exclusively responsible for assessing the weight 

and credibility of evidence. State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 

Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936. It need cite only evidence in support 

of its decision, and the presence of contrary evidence is immaterial. Burley; State 

ex rel. West v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 354, 658 N.E.2d 780. It 

cannot, however, rely on a medical opinion that is equivocal or internally 

inconsistent. State ex rel. Eberhardt v. Flxible Corp. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 649, 

640 N.E.2d 815; State ex rel. Lopez v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 445, 

633 N.E.2d 528. 

{¶ 12} The court of appeals found that Hauser’s report could not support 

the commission’s decision, because it was internally inconsistent in four respects. 

The court’s analysis, however, either ignores or misinterprets our decisions in 

Eberhardt, Lopez, and State ex rel. Domjancic v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio 

St.3d 693, 635 N.E.2d 372. 

{¶ 13} Eberhardt and Lopez were variations on the same theme—medical 

opinions that were contradicted by or inconsistent with other statements that the 

doctor had made either in a previous report or within the same report. In Lopez, 

the challenged physician’s report indicated that the claimant had a very high 
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degree of impairment, but then concluded that he could perform heavy foundry 

labor. We found that the report could not be relied upon to support denial of 

compensation for permanent total disability, because both statements were 

relevant to the question of the claimant’s ability to work, yet neither could be 

reconciled with the other, undermining the reliability of the document as a whole. 

{¶ 14} In Eberhardt, the claimant’s attending physician indicated that 

unless a physical rehabilitation program was approved, there was nothing more he 

could do to help his patient. A commission regional board of review interpreted 

that statement as evidence of maximum medical improvement and used it to deny 

temporary-total-disability compensation. In response, the doctor prepared a 

second report that clarified that he did not believe that the claimant’s condition 

was permanent, because it could be improved through rehabilitation. On appeal, 

however, the commission affirmed the denial of compensation based on the same 

evidence. 

{¶ 15} The two reports were the focus of litigation before this court, 

which gave us an opportunity to discuss the important distinction between 

equivocal opinions and those that were simply ambiguous. Equivocation 

disqualifies an opinion from consideration and occurs “when a doctor repudiates 

an earlier opinion, renders contradictory or uncertain opinions, or fails to clarify 

an ambiguous statement.” Eberhardt, 70 Ohio St.3d at 657, 640 N.E.2d 815. 

Ambiguous remarks, on the other hand, “are inherently different from those that 

are repudiated, contradictory or uncertain. Repudiated, contradictory or uncertain 

statements reveal that the doctor is not sure what he means and, therefore, they are 

inherently unreliable. Such statements relate to the doctor’s position on a critical 

issue. Ambiguous statements, however, merely reveal that the doctor did not 

effectively convey what he meant and, therefore, they are not inherently 

unreliable. Such statements do not relate to the doctor’s position, but to his 

communication skills. If we were to hold that clarified statements, because 

previously ambiguous, are subject to Jennings or to commission rejection, we 
January Term, 2011 

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would effectively allow the commission to put words into a doctor’s mouth or, 

worse, discount a truly probative opinion. Under such a view, any doctor’s 

opinion could be disregarded merely because he failed on a single occasion to 

employ precise terminology. In a word, once an ambiguity, always an ambiguity. 

This court cannot countenance such an exclusion of probative evidence.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id., citing State ex rel. Jennings v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 1 

Ohio St.3d 101, 1 OBR 135, 438 N.E.2d 420. 

{¶ 16} Eberhardt cautioned against an overzealous approach to discarding 

a medical report simply because two statements in it, irrespective of context, are 

inconsistent. Instead, we are asked to consider whether the inconsistency is 

germane to the purpose of the medical exam—what Eberhardt referred to as the 

critical issue. In Lopez and Eberhardt, the doctors were asked to determine 

whether the claimants satisfied the medical criteria for the type of total-disability 

compensation being sought. Accordingly, clarity on the issue of claimant’s work 

capacity was critical in Lopez (permanent total disability), as was the temporary 

nature of the disability in Eberhardt (temporary total disability). Had the 

inconsistency been one in which the date of injury, for example, had been listed as 

both 2001 and 2003, it is highly improbable that anyone would have insisted that 

either report be discarded. Those facts were simply irrelevant to the question 

asked in both cases. 

{¶ 17} The alleged inconsistencies in this case fall into the latter category. 

The critical question asked of Hauser was whether additional shoulder surgery 

was necessary. Hauser opined that it was not, because his physical examination 

revealed nothing wrong with George’s shoulder. Accordingly, the presence of 

inconsistencies within his report that do not contradict that critical opinion are 

harmless. This includes Hauser’s reference to George’s first visit with Dr. 

Watson as having occurred in both 2003 and 2008. It also includes his comment 

on a lack of available medical information after discussing in detail all the 

medical reports in the file. 
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{¶ 18} The court of appeals also erred in accusing Hauser of failing to 

accept all the allowed conditions. To the contrary, Hauser listed all of the allowed 

conditions and expressly stated his acceptance of them. He simply felt that these 

conditions had resolved, a conclusion that, under Domjancic, does not equate to 

nonacceptance. Moreover, it does not matter when Hauser believed the 

conditions resolved—another criticism leveled by the court of appeals. It is not 

germane to his conclusion that George’s physical examination revealed no 

shoulder abnormalities. 

{¶ 19} Ultimately, none of the alleged inconsistencies noted in the Hauser 

report affect the viability of the doctor’s opinion that further surgery is not 

reasonably related to the allowed conditions. The report is therefore evidence 

supporting the commission’s decision. 

{¶ 20} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 

Judgment reversed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL,

LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

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Charles Zamora Co., L.P.A., and Karen D. Turano, for appellee. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Sandra E. Pinkerton, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio. 

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A Minor, for appellant 

Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. 

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