NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

STEWART EDWARD YOUNAN, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0042 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2009-006960-003 

The Honorable Sherry K. Stephens, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By David A. Simpson 

Counsel for Appellee 

Janelle A. McEachern Attorney at Law, Chandler 

By Janelle A. McEachern 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. YOUNAN 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould, Judge John C. Gemmill, and Judge 

Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court. 

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Stewart Edward Younan appeals his convictions for two 

counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and two counts of 

participation in a criminal syndicate. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 Younan befriended Blaine McNeese, who at the time was a 

Department of Public Safety officer. Younan introduced himself as “Rosko

Castellano,” explained that he owned several businesses, and gave 

McNeese a one-hundred dollar bill on which he had written his telephone 

number. Younan later asked McNeese to find the address of R.A., whom 

he identified as an ex-girlfriend.

2 Although it was unlawful to do so, 

McNeese used law enforcement resources to obtain the woman’s address, 

which he gave to Younan. McNeese also generated two false police reports 

at Younan’s request. Additionally, McNeese provided Younan with 

information about an individual Younan wanted to “strong arm” or kidnap 

for ransom and gave Younan zip ties and handcuffs to use in the 

kidnapping.3 In 2001, Younan was arrested for a probation violation, and 

McNeese helped get him released from jail by contacting his probation 

officer. Younan gave McNeese $4,000 for his efforts. 

¶3 In January 2005, Detective A. joined an investigation into 

McNeese’s criminal activities, which triggered an investigation into 

Younan’s criminal syndicate. Investigators discovered that Younan had 

 

1 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant.” State v. Nihiser, 191

Ariz. 199, 201 (App. 1997). 

2 In fact, R.A. was a prosecutor assigned to several of Younan’s 

criminal cases. 

3 McNeese was convicted of several crimes stemming from his 

association with Younan. See State v. McNeese, 1 CA-CR 10-0122, 2011 WL 

2462937 (Ariz. App. June 21, 2011) (mem. decision). 
STATE v. YOUNAN 

Decision of the Court 

3

directed his subordinates to commit numerous felonies, including burglary, 

armed robbery, kidnapping, transportation of marijuana for sale, and drug 

“rips.” After learning that one of Younan’s “bodyguards” — K.H. — was 

in custody, Detective A. interviewed K.H. Detective A. later testified: 

[A]bout halfway through the interview, [K.H.] began 

describing a group of guys that he was with, [Younan] being 

one of them, plotting to take out or to kill a detective. He 

continued to tell me in more detail and describe the residence 

and the vehicles and the goings on at that particular 

residence, and at that point I realized that he was talking 

about me. 

¶4 Investigators learned that, at Younan’s behest, subordinates 

had procured a car and a gun, driven past Detective A.’s home numerous 

times, and dug a grave in the desert to bury his body, as well as the body 

of J.K. — whom Younan believed had “snitch[ed]” on him. Detective A. 

ceased involvement in the Younan-related investigations and moved with 

his family to a new residence. In the meantime, Younan was arrested for a 

separate offense, and, while incarcerated, hired a private investigator to 

obtain personal information about Detective A. and his wife, including their 

new address. 

¶5 In June 2009, Younan was charged with two counts of 

conspiracy to commit first degree murder — class 1 felonies — and two 

counts of participation in a criminal syndicate — class 2 felonies. Younan 

moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting violations of his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel. The court commenced an evidentiary hearing 

at which Younan testified. The court ordered Younan to undergo a 

competency evaluation pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. 

After Younan was evaluated and deemed competent, the court completed 

the evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to dismiss. 

¶6 In the meantime, Younan filed a motion to change counsel, or, 

alternatively, to proceed in propria persona. Younan requested counsel from 

“out of state so there’s no conflict.” The court declined to appoint substitute 

counsel but permitted Younan to represent himself with the assistance of 

advisory counsel. 

¶7 A jury trial ensued. During voir dire, the court granted 

Younan’s request to reinstate his advisory counsel as his trial counsel. After 

the State began presenting its case, the defense orally moved to sever the 

count alleging participation in a criminal syndicate through use of a public 
STATE v. YOUNAN 

Decision of the Court 

4

servant. The court denied the motion as untimely. The court further found 

that joinder was proper under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3(a). 

¶8 The jury found Younan guilty as charged. The court 

sentenced him to concurrent life terms for the conspiracy convictions, with 

a possibility of parole after 25 years, and imposed a 20-year concurrent term 

for one of the participation in a criminal syndicate counts; and for the other 

such charge, the court imposed a consecutive 20-year sentence. Younan 

timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss 

¶9 Younan asserts in cursory fashion that the superior court 

erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on asserted violations of his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He does not identify any portion of the 

record that supports this claim. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.13(c)(1)(vi) 

(Appellant’s brief shall include “[a]n argument which shall contain the 

contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the 

reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 

record relied on.”). He merely refers to “complain[ts]” and “assert[ions]” 

raised in his motion to dismiss and points generally to the “facts 

referenced” in his 60-page “Statement of Case and Facts” section of the 

opening brief. Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate brief is 

insufficient. Opening briefs must present significant arguments, supported 

by authority. The failure to so argue a claim usually constitutes 

abandonment and a waiver of that claim. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 452 

n.9, ¶ 101 (2004). 

¶10 Moreover, during a court hearing on November 4, 2011, 

defense counsel withdrew the argument that the charges should be 

dismissed based on problems Younan experienced contacting counsel.4 

 

4 Furthermore, the sheriff explained how jail personnel became aware 

of certain calls. It was not by listening to them, but occurred when calls 

were dropped because Younan and his lawyer attempted to bypass the jail’s 

prohibition against three-way calls. According to the sheriff, the jail’s 

phone system detects such attempts and terminates the calls. The sheriff 

further explained that because defense counsel’s telephone number was 

registered in a database of “legal numbers,” the jail’s phone system 
STATE v. YOUNAN 

Decision of the Court 

5

And Younan cites nothing in the record that supports his assertion that law 

enforcement “eavesdropped” on conversations with his counsel and 

investigator. To the extent he offered such testimony at the evidentiary 

hearing, it is apparent that the superior court did not find it credible. See 

State v. Gallagher, 169 Ariz. 202, 203 (App. 1991) (the credibility of a witness 

is for the trier of fact and not the appellate court). 

¶11 For these reasons, we reject Younan’s contention that the 

superior court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. 

II. Appointed Counsel 

¶12 Younan was represented by at least six attorneys. Two of his 

lawyers withdrew due to irreconcilable conflicts with Younan. Younan 

nevertheless contends the trial court erred by denying his request to once 

again substitute counsel in July 2012. 

¶13 A trial court’s ruling on a request for substitute counsel “will 

not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 

181, 186, ¶ 27 (2005). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not 

guarantee a defendant a “meaningful relationship” with his attorney, but 

rather demands that a defendant’s rights be balanced “against the public 

interest in judicial economy, efficiency and fairness.” Id. at 186–87, ¶¶ 28, 

31. In ruling on a request for substitute counsel, a trial court considers 

factors such as “whether an irreconcilable conflict exists . . . whether new 

counsel would be confronted with the same conflict; the timing of the 

motion; inconvenience to witnesses; the time period already elapsed 

between the alleged offense and trial; the proclivity of the defendant to 

change counsel; and quality of counsel.” Id. at 187, ¶ 31. To establish an 

irreconcilable conflict, “the defendant must present evidence of a severe 

 

recognized the number and did not record calls to that number. Younan 

presented no controverting evidence. Regarding calls to the investigator, 

the record reflects that for a period of time, they were not considered legal 

calls because the investigator had not registered her phone number with 

the jail to be included in the database of legal numbers, and when Younan 

called her, he received an automated message advising that, if he was 

attempting to make a legal call, to hang up and dial another number. 

Younan did not do so, but instead chose to speak with the investigator. At 

some point before the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the investigator 

apparently registered her number as a protected legal call. 
STATE v. YOUNAN 

Decision of the Court 

6

and pervasive conflict with his attorney or evidence that he had such 

minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful communication was not 

possible.” State v. Hernandez, 232 Ariz. 313, 318, ¶ 15 (2013). “A colorable 

claim must go beyond personality conflicts or disagreements with counsel 

over trial strategy.” Id.

¶14 Younan did not establish the requisite irreconcilable conflict. 

The record reflects — and Younan admits — that he “refused to speak with 

his attorney at one point” because he was more concerned about his 

conditions of confinement than the impending trial. See Thomas v. 

Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A defendant, by 

unreasonable silence or intentional lack of cooperation, cannot thwart the 

law as to appointment of counsel.”). During the time trial counsel served 

as advisory counsel, the court observed: 

Your advisory counsel is going above and beyond in terms of 

meeting with you and going over the evidence hours and 

hours on end. 

In my years of practicing law, I have never seen an attorney 

spend so much time with a defendant working on a case. 

Ever. So I think you’re very fortunate. I know you feel like 

your rights are being trampled, but truthfully, I think you’re 

getting a lot of accommodations that other defendants don’t 

receive. 

 

¶15 Although Younan and his counsel disagreed about trial 

strategy and whether to file certain motions, counsel spent days with 

Younan reviewing the State’s evidence before trial — maintaining far more 

than minimal contact. Additionally, given Younan’s proclivity to change 

counsel, nothing in the record suggests he would not assert the same 

disagreements with yet another attorney. Finally, Younan’s trial counsel 

actively participated in voir dire, made numerous objections to the State’s 

evidence, thoroughly cross-examined the State’s most significant witnesses 

(sometimes for days), and made lengthy closing arguments to the jury. 

¶16 The trial court acted within its considerable discretion in 

denying Younan’s request to substitute counsel. See, e.g., State v. Henry, 189 

Ariz. 542, 547 (1997) (“When a defendant has repeatedly claimed 

‘irreconcilable conflict’ with a series of attorneys, the court may deny a 

motion for yet another lawyer where the orderly administration of justice 

so requires.”); State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, 487 (1987) (no abuse of 

discretion in denying motion to remove counsel in light of lengthy pretrial 
STATE v. YOUNAN 

Decision of the Court 

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delay and the fact that “counsel had already been changed once”); Daniels 

v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1198 (9th Cir. 2005) (a defendant is entitled to 

new counsel only if communication broke down “with legitimate reason” 

and not from “unreasonable contumacy”).

III. Motion to Sever 

¶17 Younan argues the court erred in denying his motion to sever 

the count alleging participation in a criminal syndicate “by an act or 

omission by Blaine McNeese, a public servant, in violation of his official 

duty.” We conclude otherwise. 

¶18 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.4(c) provides, in 

relevant part: “A defendant’s motion to sever offenses . . . must be made at least 

20 days prior to trial . . . and, if denied, renewed during trial at or before the 

close of the evidence. . . . Severance is waived if a proper motion is not 

timely made and renewed.” (Emphasis added.) Younan did not move to 

sever until after the State began presenting its case-in-chief at trial. As such, 

his motion was untimely and was properly denied on that basis alone.5

 

5 The court also properly denied the severance request on substantive 

grounds. As charged, “A person commits participating in a criminal 

syndicate by . . . [i]ntentionally promoting or furthering the criminal 

objectives of a criminal syndicate by inducing or committing any act or 

omission by a public servant in violation of his official duty.” A.R.S. 

§ 13-2308(A)(4). Trial evidence established that Younan directed a criminal 

syndicate to commit felonies for financial gain. To prevent investigations 

and prosecutions, Younan instructed his syndicate associates to murder 

certain individuals. By causing McNeese to search for and provide 

personal information regarding a deputy county attorney who had 

prosecuted him, and by inducing McNeese to obtain Younan’s early release 

from jail and provide zip ties and handcuffs to effectuate a kidnapping, the 

offense at issue is “based on the same conduct or [is] otherwise connected 

together in [its] commission” to the other charged offenses. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 13.3(a). Further, the court instructed the jury to consider each 

offense separately and advised that the State must prove the offenses 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The record thus suggests no prejudice arising 

from denial of the severance request. See State v. Martinez-Villareal, 145 

Ariz. 441, 446 (1985); see also State v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108, 115 (1985) (instruction 

that jury should consider evidence of each count separately supports 

finding defendant received fair determination of guilt). 
STATE v. YOUNAN 

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IV. Mistrial Requests

¶19 Finally, Younan contends the trial court erred by denying his 

“motions for mistrial based on admission of ‘other act’ evidence pursuant 

to [Arizona Rule of Evidence] 404(b).” He argues that although the State 

“could have shown that Mr. Younan was in charge of a group of individuals 

committing crimes for his benefit . . . [i]t did not need to go overboard on 

the Mafia allegations, which is what happened.” 

¶20 Younan does not cite any portion of the record where he 

requested a mistrial based on the introduction of so-called “Mafia” 

evidence, and our independent review has not disclosed any such request. 

We therefore confine our review to fundamental error. Younan has the 

burden of establishing that: “(1) error exists, (2) the error is fundamental, 

and (3) the error caused him prejudice.” State v. James, 231 Ariz. 490, 493, 

¶ 11 (App. 2013).

¶21 Under Rule 404(b), evidence of other acts is not admissible “to 

prove the defendant’s propensity” to commit the charged offense. State v. 

Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 415, ¶ 20 (1999). “Evidence of prior acts is 

admissible if relevant and admitted for a proper purpose, such as to prove 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident.” State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, 337, ¶ 14 

(App. 2003). “The list of ‘other purposes’ in [R]ule 404(b) . . . is not 

exclusive; if evidence is relevant for any purpose other than that of showing 

the defendant’s criminal propensities, it is admissible even though it refers 

to his prior bad acts.” State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 417 (1983). 

¶22 The evidence Younan challenges was relevant to explain 

testimony from co-conspirators and members of the criminal syndicate that 

they followed his instructions to commit crimes because he appeared 

powerful, and they were both loyal to and afraid of him. C.S. testified he 

believed he “was working for one of the Castellanos . . . [and] you can say 

no to a regular human being, you cannot say no to a Castellano.” C.S. 

further testified he and other members of the syndicate did not question 

Younan’s decisions because “we believed he’s the grandson of Paul 

Castellano and you don’t mess with him.” 

¶23 Even if the challenged evidence could be fairly classified as 

other-act evidence under Rule 404(b), it was relevant and admissible to 

explain and corroborate the testimony of Younan’s co-conspirators. See 

State v. Williams, 183 Ariz. 368, 376 (1995) (“Evidence which tests, sustains, 

or impeaches the credibility or character of a witness is generally 
STATE v. YOUNAN 

Decision of the Court 

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admissible, even if it refers to a defendant’s prior bad acts.”); Jeffers, 135 

Ariz. at 417 (evidence of defendant’s prior acts of violence against witnesses 

properly admitted under Rule 404(b) because it explained witnesses’ fear 

and bolstered their credibility). The superior court did not err by failing to 

declare a mistrial. 

CONCLUSION

¶24 We affirm Younan’s convictions and sentences.