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NO. CAAP-22-0000596

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JAMES GREEN, JR., Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

(CASE NO. 1CPC-21-0000417)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant James Green, Jr. (Green) appeals 

from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence (Judgment), entered 

by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit on September 13, 2022.1 

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by 

the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments 

advanced and the issues raised, we affirm without prejudice to 

1 The Honorable Paul B.K. Wong presided.

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-22-0000596

20-NOV-2023

07:51 AM

Dkt. 63 SO
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Green's filing of a Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) 

Rule 40 petition, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

On April 14, 2021, Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawaiʻi 

(State) charged Green by criminal indictment with two counts of 

Sexual Assault in the Third Degree in violation of Hawaii 

Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-732(1)(b) (2014),2 as follows,

COUNT 1: On or about October 8, 2020, in the City and 

County of Honolulu, State of Hawaiʻi, JAMES GREEN, did 

knowingly subject to sexual contact, [complaining witness 

(CW)], a person who was less than fourteen years old, by 

placing his hand on her buttock, thereby committing the 

offense of Sexual Assault in the Third Degree, in violation 

of Section 707-732(1)(b) of the Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes.

. . . .

COUNT 2: On or about October 8, 2020, in the City and 

County of Honolulu, State of Hawaiʻi, JAMES GREEN, did 

knowingly subject to sexual contact, [CW], a person who was 

less than fourteen years old, by placing his hand on her 

genitalia, thereby committing the offense of Sexual Assault 

in the Third Degree, in violation of Section 707-732(1)(b) 

of the Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes.

Following a four-day trial, the jury returned a 

verdict finding Green guilty of both counts. On September 13, 

2022, the circuit court sentenced Green to an indeterminate 

2 HRS § 707-732(1)(b) (2014) states, in pertinent part,

Sexual assault in the third degree. (1) A person commits 

the offense of sexual assault in the third degree if:

. . . .

(b) The person knowingly subjects to sexual contact 

another person who is less than fourteen years old 

or causes such a person to have sexual contact 

with the person[.]
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five-year term of imprisonment for each count, with both terms 

to run concurrently.

Green contends on appeal that the circuit court 

committed plain error, and that Green's court-appointed trial 

counsel was ineffective. We consider these contentions in turn, 

and conclude that no plain error was committed below, and affirm 

the Judgment without prejudice to Green's filing of a petition 

for post-conviction relief, pursuant to HRPP Rule 40.

II. Discussion

A. Plain Error

"[A]n appellate court may recognize plain error when 

the error committed affects substantial rights of the 

defendant." State v. Metcalfe, 129 Hawaiʻi 206, 222, 297 P.3d 

1062, 1078 (2013) (cleaned up); see HRPP Rule 52(b). This court 

"will apply the plain error standard of review to correct errors 

which seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings, to serve the ends of 

justice, and to prevent the denial of fundamental rights." 

State v. Nichols, 111 Hawaiʻi 327, 334, 141 P.3d 974, 981 (2006) 

(citations omitted). An appellate court's "power to deal with 

plain error is one to be exercised sparingly and with caution 

because the plain error rule represents a departure from a 

presupposition of the adversary system--that a party must look 

to his or her counsel for protection and bear the cost of 
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counsel's mistakes." Metcalfe, 129 Hawaiʻi at 222, 297 P.3d at 

1078 (citation omitted). Green contends three points of plain 

error, as follows,3 

(1) Green contends that "[p]lain error occurred where 

the Court began jury empaneling with only 25 prospective jurors 

present, leaving room for only 11 of those prospective jurors to 

be excused while still meeting the 12-jurors-plus-2-alternates 

requirement." Green contends that, despite the selection of a 

jury panel of 12 jurors and 2 alternates, the "small pool" of 25

prospective jurors created "challenges" for counsel. 

The record reflects that the State and Green could 

have each exercised three peremptory challenges.4 The State 

exercised three, and Green exercised one. Green does not 

contend that he would have exercised additional peremptory 

strikes had the jury pool been larger. Moreover, Green does not 

contend that, of the twelve jurors and two alternates who were 

empaneled, any should have been dismissed for cause. 

The selection of jurors from a 25-person pool of 

potential jurors does not, without more, constitute a "per se" 

violation of Green's right to a fair and impartial jury. Even 

3 Green asks this court to find plain error because he did not 

object to the contentions of error below. See State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 

479, 515, 849 P.2d 58, 75 (1993) ("where plain error has been committed and 

substantial rights have been affected thereby, the error may be noticed even 

though it was not brought to the attention of the trial court").

4 Pursuant to HRPP Rule 24, in criminal jury trials "each side is 

entitled to 3 peremptory challenges." HRPP Rule 24.
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assuming that a smaller-than-average jury pool constitutes an 

irregularity in the jury selection process, Green does not show 

improper motive or prejudice. State v. Mara, 98 Hawaiʻi 1, 12, 

41 P.3d 157, 168 (2002) ("[I]f the jury finally impaneled in the 

case at bar consisted wholly of qualified jurors, a mere 

irregularity in the process is not itself a ground for reversal, 

absent a showing of improper motive or prejudice.") We 

conclude, on this record, that the selection of jurors from a 

25-person jury pool was not plainly erroneous. 

(2) Green contends that "[p]lain error occurred where 

the Court allowed an expert opinion from [the State's] expert 

despite no foundation being laid, and where the Court allowed an 

expert opinion outside of [the expert's] expertise." 

The record reflects that the State, without objection, 

called Penny Kremer (Kremer) to testify as an expert in serology 

and forensic DNA testing. Green agrees that Kremer was 

qualified as an expert in serology and DNA testing. Kremer 

testified that she is a criminalist, and that she works at the 

Honolulu Police Department's (HPD) Scientific Investigation 

Section, Forensic Biology Unit. She earned her Ph.D. in cell 

and molecular biology from the University of Hawaiʻi at Manoa, 

and her "duties and responsibilities" for HPD include 

"examin[ing] items of evidence for DNA." Kremer testified that 

she has performed DNA analyses "hundreds of times," and that HPD 
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has an accredited DNA laboratory that meets "national and 

international standards for DNA testing." She testified that 

DNA testing was performed in the laboratory, and that all 

standard operating procedures were followed to conduct the DNA 

testing. She testified, moreover, that her work was reviewed by 

another analyst before she documented that work.

Kremer testified that she took a dozen DNA samples 

from CW's blanket taken at the crime scene, that two of the 

samples contained a protein found in semen, and that Green 

"could not be excluded" from one of the samples.5 Kremer 

explained that she had also done a statistical analysis because 

"[w]hen we find someone -- or a comparison that can't be 

excluded, we do stats on -- to find out what would be the 

probability of a person having all those markers." Kremer 

testified that probability to be "one in greater than 8 

trillion[,]" meaning that Kremer "would have to test greater 

5 Kremer explained that Green "could not be excluded" from the 

sample as follows,

That means when I compared him –- his profile, his known 

profile, through that profile I obtained from that sample, 

that he had all the markers. Even though it was partial, 

he had all those markers. So he could not be excluded.

. . . .

[W]hen we develop a profile, it's like an individual's 

telephone number, so you've got different numbers. It's 

represented by numbers at different sections. So –- and 

his profile will have different numbers at each section. 

And so when I put them next to each other and I compared

them, he has all the markers that were on that questioned 

sample.
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than 8 trillion people to find someone that . . . could not be 

excluded from that sample." 

Green did not object to Kremer's testimony during 

trial and, accordingly, we deem the issue waived. "[O]bjections 

to the admission of incompetent evidence, which a party failed 

to raise at trial, are generally not subject to plain error 

review." Metcalfe, 129 Hawaiʻi at 225, 297 P.3d at 1081 (citing 

State v. Wallace, 80 Hawaiʻi 382, 410, 910 P.2d 695, 723 (1996))

("It is the general rule that evidence to which no objection has 

been made may properly be considered by the trier of fact and 

its admission will not constitute ground for reversal. It is 

equally established that an issue raised for the first time on 

appeal will not be considered by the reviewing court. Only 

where the ends of justice require it, and fundamental rights 

would otherwise be denied, will there be a departure from these 

principles.") On that basis, we conclude that the circuit court 

did not plainly err in its admission of Kremer's unobjected-to 

expert testimony, including the statistical analysis. 

(3) Green contends that "[p]lain error occurred where 

the Court failed to sufficiently support its reasoning behind 

Appellant's five-years-of-imprisonment sentence." Green agrees 

that the circuit court "'addressed' each of the factors [a court 
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considers in imposing a sentence],"6 but contends that "it did 

not 'articulate' anything relative to those factors[.]"7 Green 

relies upon State v. Kong, 131 Hawaiʻi 94, 102, 315 P.3d 720, 728

(2013), to support his contention.

In Kong, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held, in the context 

of a trial court's imposition of a consecutive term sentence of 

imprisonment that,

[Defendant] characterizes the circuit court's justification 

for imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment as "terse, 

conclusory, and lasting two words." However, the 

sentencing court is not required to articulate and explain 

its conclusions with respect to every factor listed in HRS 

§ 706-606. Rather, it is presumed that a sentencing court 

will have considered all factors before imposing concurrent 

or consecutive terms of imprisonment under HRS § 706-606. 

Thus, the sentencing court is required to articulate its 

6 It appears that Green references the "[f]actors to be considered 

in imposing a term of probation" set forth by HRS § 706-621(2) (2014), and 

the "[f]actors to be considered in imposing a sentence" set forth by HRS 

§ 706-606 (2014). 

7 The circuit court explained, in imposing the sentence,

Having considered all the statements this morning as 

well as the arguments of counsel, in determining whether or 

not probation is the appropriate sentence in this case, the 

Court is guided by Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 706-621. 

There are ten factors to weigh to determine whether 

or not probation is appropriate. The tenth factor, 706-

621(2)(j) is not applicable 'cause this is not expedited 

sentencing. 

With respect to the other nine factors to balance and 

consider, (2)(e) weighs in favor of a probation term in 

that the defendant has no history of criminal activity and 

has led a law-abiding life prior to the commission of this 

crime. All other factors weigh in favor of imprisonment. 

And accordingly, in Counts 1 and 2, Mr. Green is 

sentenced to serve the indeterminate terms of incarceration 

of five years in each case. He will get credit for time 

served. All of the terms are concurrent with each other 

and any other term that defendant might have to serve. The 

mittimus will issue forthwith.
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reasoning only with respect to those factors it relies on 

in imposing consecutive sentences.

131 Hawaiʻi at 102, 315 P.3d at 728 (cleaned up) (emphasis 

added). When imposing non-consecutive terms of imprisonment, 

the sentencing court is not required to "articulate and explain 

its conclusions" with regard to every sentencing factor. Id. 

The circuit court sentenced Green to two indeterminate five-year 

terms of imprisonment, with both terms to run concurrently. The 

circuit court did not plainly err with respect to its imposition 

of Green's indeterminate concurrent prison sentence.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Green next contends that his appointed trial counsel 

was ineffective. Pursuant to article I, section 14 of the 

Hawaiʻi Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, defendants in a criminal proceeding have a 

constitutionally guaranteed right to the effective assistance of 

counsel at every critical stage of the prosecution. State v. 

Salavea, 147 Hawaiʻi 564, 576, 465 P.3d 1011, 1023 (2020).

Green raises the issue of ineffective assistance of 

counsel for the first time in this direct appeal. In such 

cases, "the appellate court may consider the merits of the 

appeal de novo if the record is sufficiently developed to 

determine whether there has been ineffective assistance of 

counsel." Id. at 575, 465 P.3d at 1022 (cleaned up). 
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"The standard for determining the adequacy of 

counsel's representation is whether, when viewed as a whole, the 

assistance provided is within the range of competence demanded 

of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. at 576, 465 P.3d at 1023

(cleaned up). "The burden of establishing ineffectiveness rests 

with the defendant[,]" and "[defendant's] claim of inadequate 

assistance will be upheld only if he can show there were 

specific errors or omissions . . . reflecting counsel's lack of 

skill, judgment, or diligence, and these errors or omissions 

resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a 

potentially meritorious defense." State v. Smith, 68 Haw. 304, 

309, 712 P.2d 496, 500 (1986) (cleaned up). 

Green specifically alleges the following:

(1) "Court-appointed counsel was ineffective where he 

failed to object to the absurdly low number of prospective 

jurors called for jury duty, and where he also only used 1 of a 

total of 4 peremptory challenges on the jury venire"; 

(2) "Court-appointed counsel was ineffective where he 

failed to elicit testimony that the children in question had 

twice before falsely accused [Green]";

(3) "Court-appointed counsel was ineffective where he 

failed to ask any questions of [CW] and [CW's brother] regarding 

discrepancies in their stories"; 

(4) "Court-appointed counsel was ineffective where he 

failed to argue that the DNA could have come from the White 
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Claw, and where counsel never questioned the DNA expert as to 

other origins of the DNA besides semen";8

(5) "Court-appointed counsel was ineffective where he 

failed to voir dire or object to [the State's] expert witness"; 

(6) "Court-appointed counsel was ineffective where he 

offered no objection and no counter to [mother's] speculative 

and unfounded testimony";

(7) "Court-appointed counsel was ineffective where he 

apparently had zero trial experience as he made no motions for 

judgment of acquittal"; 

(8) "Court-appointed counsel was ineffective where he 

did not utilize the statements taken by police from the children 

in question"; 

(9) "Court-appointed counsel was ineffective where he 

essentially offered no argument at sentencing versus 12 pages of 

argument presented by [the State]";9 and,

8 Green's reference to "the White Claw," is to an alcoholic 

beverage can that Green testified to allegedly finding "partly under [CW's] 

leg." On appeal, Green appears to contend that trial counsel should have 

argued below that the DNA on the blanket, which Kremer testified as 

containing a protein found in semen, could have come from DNA on the White 

Claw can.

9 We disregard this contention because Green's opening brief 

presents no discernible argument on this point of error. Kahoʻohanohano v. 

Dep't of Hum. Servs., State of Haw., 117 Hawaiʻi 262, 297 n.37, 178 P.3d 538, 

573 n.37 (2008) (Hawaiʻi appellate courts will "disregard a particular 

contention if the appellant makes no discernible argument in support of that

position") (cleaned up); Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP)

Rule 28(b)(7) ("Points not argued may be deemed waived."). 
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(10) "Court-appointed counsel was ineffective where he 

allowed his client to enter stipulated facts negating [the 

State's] requirement to prove DNA chain-of-custody and DNA 

testing procedure, and where counsel stipulated to the grant of 

all of [the State's] motions in limine and motion to determine 

voluntariness."

We conclude that the record is not sufficiently 

developed for this court to determine whether Steven Slavitt's 

(Slavitt) representation was ineffective as to contentions 2 

through 8, and 10. We reject Green's first contention, relating 

to counsel's lack of objection to the "low" number of 

prospective jurors, for the reasons discussed supra. We deem 

Green's ninth contention waived, as explained in footnote 9.

State v. Silva, 75 Haw. 419, 439, 864 P.2d 583, 592 (1993) 

("[N]ot every trial record is sufficiently developed to 

determine whether there has been ineffective assistance of 

counsel; indeed, a defendant is often only able to allege facts 

that, if proved, would entitle him or her to relief[.]"). 

It appears, moreover, that Green's trial counsel, 

Slavitt, was not provided notice of, nor the opportunity to 

respond to, the ineffective assistance allegations that Green 

raises for the first time on appeal.10 On this record, we are 

10 It appears that Slavitt was not served with a copy of the opening 

brief, as required by HRAP Rule 28(a). See HRAP Rule 28(a) ("If a brief 

raises ineffective assistance of counsel as a point of error, the appellant 

(continued . . .)
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unable to discern as to whether "the assistance provided is 

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases[,]" "there were specific errors or omissions reflecting 

counsel's lack of skill, judgment, or diligence[,]" and these 

"errors or omissions resulted in either the withdrawal or 

substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense." 

See Salavea, 147 Hawai‘i at 576, 465 P.3d at 1023 (cleaned up).

We thus affirm the Judgment without prejudice to 

Green's filing of a petition for post-conviction relief, 

pursuant to HRPP Rule 40, to allow for service of Slavitt, and 

the development of a factual record as to those contentions of 

ineffective assistance. Silva, 75 Haw. at 439, 864 P.2d at 592-

93 ("[W]here the record on appeal is insufficient to demonstrate 

ineffective assistance of counsel, but where: (1) the defendant 

alleges facts that if proven would entitle him or her to relief, 

and (2) the claim is not patently frivolous and without trace of 

support in the record, the appellate court may affirm

defendant's conviction without prejudice to a subsequent Rule 40 

petition on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.").

 

(. . .continued)

shall serve a copy of the brief on the attorney alleged to have been 

ineffective.").
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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's 

Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, entered on September 13, 

2022, is affirmed, without prejudice to Green's filing of an 

HRPP Rule 40 petition, and remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this summary disposition order.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, November 20, 2023.

On the briefs:

Kai Lawrence,

for Defendant-Appellant.

Brian R. Vincent,

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

City and County of Honolulu,

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

/s/ Katherine G. Leonard

Presiding Judge

/s/ Karen T. Nakasone

Associate Judge

/s/ Kimberly T. Guidry

Associate Judge