NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AARON HAHN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

DOUG WADDINGTON; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-35819 

D.C. No. 3:14-cv-05047-RJB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 15, 2019**

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Washington state prisoner Aaron Hahn appeals pro se from the district 

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate 

indifference to his health and safety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 21 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-35819 

affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants 

Waddington and Russell because Hahn failed to raise a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to whether these defendants personally participated in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he was personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation or there was “a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Martin 

because Hahn failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

Martin was deliberately indifferent to Hahn’s health or safety regarding Hahn’s 

placement at Washington State Penitentiary. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 837 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of 

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both 

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hahn’s motion to 

compel because Hahn failed to demonstrate that the denial of discovery resulted in 

actual and substantial prejudice to him. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
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342 F.3d 1080, 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and 

explaining that a district court’s “decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed 

except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and 

substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hahn’s request to

continue summary judgment because Hahn failed to comply with the requirements 

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). See Tatum v. City & County of San 

Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100-1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (standard of review); see 

also Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 2018) (requirements of 

Rule 56(d)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hahn’s motion for 

default judgment because Hahn did not obtain entry of default and defendants did 

not fail to plead or otherwise defend. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 

(9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review and two-step process required for

entry of default judgment); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (permitting entry of 

default when a defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend”). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hahn’s motion for 

leave to amend his complaint because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes 

v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting 
4 18-35819 

forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when 

amendment would be futile). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hahn’s motion to 

strike and considering defendants’ late-filed response to his motion for leave to 

amend his complaint. See Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973

(9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for motions to strike pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(f)); Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258, 

1261 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and equitable analysis to 

determine whether a party’s failure to meet a deadline constitutes excusable 

neglect).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.