Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-456 | July 19, 2018 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Catherine S. Christoff

Christoff & Christoff Attorneys

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Involuntary Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of: P.L., C.B.(1), C.B.(2), K.P., 

and D.R. (Minor Children), 

and

P.M.L. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

July 19, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-456

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Charles F. Pratt, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

02D08-1705-JT-100

02D08-1705-JT-101

02D08-1705-JT-102

02D08-1705-JT-103

02D08-1705-JT-104

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-456 | July 19, 2018 Page 2 of 10

[1] P.M.L. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her relationship 

with P.L., C.B.(1), C.B.(2), K.P., and D.R. (collectively, the children), her 

minor children. Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting the 

termination. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.

Facts

[2] On September 29, 2014, the children were removed from Mother’s care and 

custody after Mother left then-three-year-old D.R. at home alone, marijuana 

paraphernalia was found in the home, and Mother was arrested. The 

Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging the children to be 

children in need of services (CHINS) on October 1, 2014. 

[3] On October 27, 2014, Mother admitted that the children were CHINS based on 

the following: (1) Mother left three-year-old D.R. at home alone for hours; 

(2) Mother sped away from law enforcement, driving around a stopped school 

bus that was letting children, including her own, off of the bus; (3) Mother was 

arrested and ultimately pleaded guilty to resisting law enforcement, criminal 

recklessness, reckless driving, and operating a vehicle without a license; 

(4) there were marijuana blunts and paraphernalia in the home in reach of the

children; and (5) Mother smokes marijuana. At the dispositional hearing, the 

trial court ordered Mother to submit to a diagnostic assessment and a substance 

abuse assessment and comply with any recommendations; participate with 

home-based case management; submit to random drug screens; and attend 

supervised visitation with the children.
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[4] Mother completed a diagnostic assessment and a substance abuse assessment. 

It was recommended that she participate in individual counseling, random drug 

screens, and home-based case management. Shortly thereafter, Mother moved 

to Chicago. DCS referred her services to a nearby location, but she never 

followed up to initiate the services.

[5] Mother had “an abundance of no-shows” at the provider that administered her 

random drug screens. Tr. Vol. II p. 167. She submitted to screens through 

DCS after court hearings and sporadically at other times, continuing to test 

positive for marijuana throughout the case.

[6] Mother’s visits with the children were inconsistent. When she attended, the 

visits were chaotic, Mother failed to discipline the children, and Mother 

frequently made negative comments about the children’s foster parents. In July 

2015, the visits became therapeutically supervised visits because of Mother’s 

behavior. After Mother failed to attend multiple therapeutically supervised 

visits, the service was closed because it was stressful to the children that they 

expected to see Mother but she failed to show. Between October 2014 and June 

2016, Mother attended only sixteen visits and had multiple no shows. Mother’s 

last visit with the children occurred in October 2016. The children did not 

express a desire to visit with anyone outside of their sibling group.1

 

1 C.B.(1), C.B.(2), and K.P. were placed in the same foster home. P.L. and D.R. were placed together in a 

different foster home.
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[7] In June 2016, Mother’s services were transferred to another provider to better 

accommodate her geographical location—she lived in Chicago and was 

employed in Merrillville. She began working with a home-based case manager, 

who met with Mother in Merrillville at her place of work. Mother was initially 

motivated to participate, but her attendance became sporadic and she 

eventually stopped participating altogether. In May 2017, Mother contacted 

the home-based case manager and asked to restart the service. Mother met with 

the case manager once and then stopped participating again; the service was 

closed as unsuccessful.

[8] During the underlying CHINS case, Mother’s housing was unstable. She had 

sporadic periods of homelessness, moved between Fort Wayne and Chicago 

multiple times, and often lived with different relatives. At the time of the 

termination hearing, Mother was living in a one-bedroom apartment in 

Chicago. Her employment was also inconsistent. At one point during the 

CHINS case she was employed at a nursing home and a restaurant, but at the 

time of the termination hearing, she had been unemployed for months.

[9] On June 1, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. 

The termination hearing took place on November 6 and 8, 2017. At that time, 

all the children were thriving in their respective foster placements. The Family 

Case Manager (FCM) and the children’s Court Appointed Special Advocate 

(CASA) each testified that they believed termination was in the children’s best 
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interests. On February 7, 2018, the trial court issued an order terminating 

Mother’s parental rights. Mother now appeals.2

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[10] Our standard of review with respect to termination of parental rights 

proceedings is well established. In considering whether termination was 

appropriate, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. 

K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). We will 

consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn 

therefrom in support of the judgment, giving due regard to the trial court’s 

opportunity to judge witness credibility firsthand. Id. Where, as here, the trial 

court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the 

findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. In making that 

determination, we must consider whether the evidence clearly and convincingly 

supports the findings, and the findings clearly and convincingly support the 

judgment. Id. at 1229-30. It is “sufficient to show by clear and convincing 

evidence that the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by 

 

2 The parental rights of the father of C.B.(1) and C.B.(2) were also terminated; he is appealing in a separate 

cause. The parental rights of the father of D.R. were also terminated; he is appealing in a separate cause. 

The parental rights of K.P.’s father were terminated, but he did not appeal. The identity of P.L.’s father was 

unknown at the time of termination.
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the respondent parent’s custody.” Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 

839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. 2005).

[11] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires that a petition to terminate 

parental rights for a CHINS must make the following allegations:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at 

least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 

that reasonable efforts for family preservation or 

reunification are not required, including a 

description of the court’s finding, the date of the 

finding, and the manner in which the finding was 

made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and 

has been under the supervision of a local office or 

probation department for at least fifteen (15) months 

of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, 

beginning with the date the child is removed from 

the home as a result of the child being alleged to be 

a child in need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons 

for placement outside the home of the parents will 

not be remedied.
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(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment 

of the child.

DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. 

K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230.

[12] Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s 

findings that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in 

the children’s removal will not be remedied; and (2) termination is in the 

children’s best interests.

II. Conditions Resulting in Removal

[13] Mother first argues that the evidence does not support the trial court’s 

conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the children’s initial removal and continued placement outside her care and 

custody will not be remedied.

[14] The children were initially removed from Mother’s care and custody because of 

her arrest, her decision to leave three-year-old D.R. at home alone for hours, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-456 | July 19, 2018 Page 8 of 10

and the drug paraphernalia found in the home in reach of the children. They 

have continued to be placed outside of her care and custody because of her 

failure to comply with court-ordered services, inconsistent visitation with the 

children, and instability in housing and employment.

[15] The record reveals that Mother failed to successfully complete any of her courtordered services, including random drug screens, home-based case 

management, and individual counseling. When Mother did provide drug 

screens, they were regularly positive for marijuana. She did not consistently 

visit with the children. Indeed, at the time of the termination hearing, she had 

not seen them for over a year. It is apparent that despite years to do so, Mother 

has not addressed any of the underlying issues in this case. This evidence 

readily supports a conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the children’s initial and continued removal from 

Mother’s care and custody will not be remedied. See Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of 

Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a 

“pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with 

those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged condition, will 

support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions 

will change”).

[16] Mother argues that her geographical location—in Chicago, a three-hour drive 

away from where the children lived in Fort Wayne—made “both visits with her 

children and completion of services difficult.” Appellant’s Br. p. 23. She 

argues that as in In re B.L.P., 91 N.E.3d 625, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), we 
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should find that termination is unwarranted where it was based on the facts that 

“a parent lives out of state, works full-time, and cannot afford to fly to another 

state and home again in the same day . . . .” As in B.L.P., Mother insists that 

she is being punished for her “geographic location and economic wherewithal.” 

Id.

[17] We find B.L.P. to be distinguishable. Here, unlike in B.L.P., DCS made every 

effort to transfer Mother’s services to a geographically convenient location. She 

still failed to participate consistently. And we acknowledge that although a 

multiple hour drive to visit with the children is challenging to do regularly, she 

could at least have done so occasionally. At the time of the termination 

hearing, she had not seen her children for over a year. Whereas in B.L.P. the 

father lived in Georgia, meaning that travel was a major (and expensive) 

undertaking, in this case, Mother was just a few hours away by car. We can 

appreciate that the distance involved made things challenging for Mother, but 

she did not even take advantage of the opportunities available to her. We do 

not find this argument to be compelling.

III. Best Interests

[18] Finally, Mother contends that the trial court erred by concluding that 

termination is in the children’s best interests. At the time of the termination 

hearing, the children had been in foster care for three years and deserved 

permanency. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235 (observing that permanency and 

stability are key considerations in determining the best interests of a child). 
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Mother had all that time to begin to address the issues underlying the CHINS 

case and simply failed to do so. She failed to complete a single court-ordered 

service successfully. She tested positive for marijuana throughout the case. She 

had not seen the children in over a year at the time of the termination hearing. 

The children no longer even wished to see her. The children’s CASA and FCM 

both testified that they believed termination is in the children’s best interests. 

We find that this evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination 

is in the children’s best interests. Mother’s arguments to the contrary merely 

amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we may not do.

[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

May, J., and Robb, J., concur.