NO. 93-371 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1995 

BRUCE GALBREATH, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

GOLDEN SUNLIGHT MINES, INC., 

PLACER DOME U.S., INC., and 

COMPENSATION ADJUSTERS, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Silver Bow, 

The Honorable Dale Cox, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Erik B. Thueson and John A. Kutzman, 

Thueson and Lamb, Helena, Montana 

Michael Cotter, Cotter & Cotter, 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Donald C. Robinson, Poore, Roth & Robinson, 

Butte, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: January 12, 1995 

Decided: February 15, 1995 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Appellant Bruce Galbreath appeals from a jury verdict and 

judgment of the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, 

finding that: (1) appellant failed to prove that respondent Golden 

Sunlight Mine, Inc. (GSM) , discharged appellant for filing a 

workers1 compensation claim; (2) appellant failed to prove that 

respondent Compensation Adjusters violated their obligations to 

appellant during the adjustment of his workers' compensation claim; 

and (3) appellant failed to prove that he was terminated without 

good cause. 

We reverse and remand to the District Court for further 

proceedings. 

While appellant raises several issues on appeal, the following 

issue is dispositive of the case: 

Did the District Court err in allowing evidence that appellant 

was discharged for reasons other than the one set forth in the 

discharge letter? 

Respondent Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc., employed appellant 

Bruce Galbreath as an instrument technician from 1982 until GSM 

terminated his employment on September 7, 1989. Following the 

on-the-job death of co-worker, Terry Olind, in 1987, appellant and 

co-workers, Joe Robertson and Denis Shaw, pressured GSM to address 

a variety of alleged work place safety violations. GSM terminated 

the employment of Robertson and Shaw at different times in 1988. 

On May 22, 1989, appellant injured his left knee at work after 

stepping on a ball bearing while climbing down a ladder. Appellant 
returned to work the next day after Dr. Reiff of Whitehall examined 

his knee. On May 31, 1989, co-worker Mike Gallagher found 

appellant lying head down on a stairwell with his legs protruding 

through the opening between the top two stairs. There were no 

witnesses to the accident which, according to appellant, occurred 

after his previously injured left knee buckled, causing him to 

fall. GSM's Quick Response Team, accompanied by safety supervisor 

Ron Dovall, took appellant to Dr. Reiff, who discovered a bump on 

appellant's head, and diagnosed a tender neck and an abnormal 

curvature of the cervical spine. After appellant became 

disoriented and his pupils began to dilate, Dr. Reiff referred 

appellant to St. James Community Hospital where he was examined by 

Dr. Pius Baggenstos, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Baggenstos diagnosed a 

lump on appellant's head, an acute cervical sprain, and injury to 

appellant's left knee. Appellant lost consciousness during the 

examination. 

From the date of the accident on May 31, 1989, appellant 

received his full salary under GSM's short-term disability policy 

which provided for full pay up to four months for bona fide medical 

absences. Under that policy, GSM reserved the right to request 

verification of medical absences. GSM informed appellant that 

during short-term disability there was no light-duty work 

requirement. During appellant's absence from the mine, he worked 

regular shifts at a restaurant he and his wife had recently 

purchased. On August 23, 1989, Compensation Adjusters recommended 

accepting liability for appellant's May 31, 1989, accident. 
On August 4, 1989, Dr. Humberger performed arthroscopic 

surgery on appellant's injured left knee to remove debris. On 

August 28, 1989, appellant reported to work for the first time 

since May 31, 1989, with a release to return to work from Dr. 

Reiff. Later that day, GSM's Maintenance Superintendent, Paul 

Dale, delivered a letter to appellant explaining that before 

appellant could return to work, he was required to submit 

unconditional work releases from Dr. Reiff, Dr. Humberger, and the 

Ridgeview Clinic, along with a verified letter from each of the 

above explaining appellant's absence from work from May 31, 1989, 

through August 28, 1989. 

In an effort to comply with Dale's request, appellant returned 

to work on several occasions and presented Dale with a variety of 

medical documentation. On each of those occasions, Dale rejected 

appellant's medical documentation and denied appellant's request to 

return to work. Appellant was discharged on September 8, 1989, for 

failing to provide specific documentation explaining his absence 

from work from May 31, 1989, through August 28, 1989. 

On May 23, 1990, appellant filed a complaint alleging: 

(1) that he had been terminated without good cause under Montana's 

Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, § 39-2-901, MCA; (2) that 

his termination violated § 39-71-317, MCA, which prohibits 

employers from terminating workers for filing workers' compensation 

claims and requires employers to give job preference to employees 

returning to work after an industrial accident; (3) that his 

termination and its relationship to his workers' compensation claim 
violated Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 33-18-201, MCA; 

and (4) that all of the defendants acted fraudulently, 

oppressively, and maliciously in violation of Montana's Punitive 

Damages Act, 5 27-1-221, MCA. 

The jury returned a special verdict finding that appellant was 

not terminated for filing a workers1 compensation claim; that 

Compensation Adjusters did not violate Montana's Unfair Trade 

Practices Act; and that appellant was terminated for good cause. 

The District Court entered judgment for respondents on all of 

appellant's claims. Thereafter, the District Court denied 

appellant's motion for a new trial and a judgment n.0.v. Appellant 

appeals. 

Did the District Court err in allowing evidence that appellant 

was discharged for reasons other than the one set forth in the 

discharge letter? 

We review evidentiary rulings by the district court to 

determine whether the district court abused its discretion. State 

v. Parma (l993), 261 Mont. 338, 341, 863 P.2d 378, 380; State v. 

Crist (1992), 253 Mont. 442, 445, 833 P.2d 1052, 1054. The 

district court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence 

is relevant and admissible, and absent a showing of abuse of 

discretion, the trial court's determination will not be overturned. 

Parma, 863 P.2d at 380; Crist, 833 P.2d at 1054. 

GSM discharged appellant for failure to provide specific 

documentation explaining his absence from work from May 31, 1989, 

through August 28, 1989. Paul Dale, appellant's supervisor and 
author of the discharge letter, testified that appellant was 

terminated solely for the reason set forth in the discharge letter. 

Following CompensationAdjusterTs recommendation, GSM accepted 

liability for appellant's May 31, 1989, accident. Prior to opening 

arguments, the court expressed concern in chambers over the fact 

that although GSM had accepted liability for appellant's injuries 

prior to trial, they intended to show that appellant's May 31, 

1989, accident was staged. As a result, the court narrowed the 

scope of inquiry about the accident to physical facts surrounding 

the accident. The court ordered that expert testimony or opinion 

testimony about the accident would be excluded. 

Despite its order, the court allowed speculative testimony 

suggesting that appellant's May 31, 1989, accident was staged. The 

court also allowed GSM to present evidence suggesting that 

appellant was discharged for reasons other than the sole reason set 

forth in the discharge letter. For example, the court allowed 

testimony that appellant had been boating shortly after the May 31, 

1989, accident; that appellant appeared to be working full-time at 

his restaurant during his absence from work; and that appellant's 

injury was not severe enough to prevent him from working at GSM. 

GSM argues that this speculative evidence was offered to 

demonstrate why Dale requested medical verification, rather than to 

suggest additional reasons for appellant's discharge. The issue, 

however, was not why GSM requested medical verification, but 

whether appellant's discharge was wrongful, given the medical 

verification appellant provided to GSM. 
In Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hospital (1979), 182 Mont. 

414, 597 P. 2d 702, we concluded that in a wrongful discharge action 

the only reason for discharge the district court could consider was 

the reason set forth in the discharge letter. Reasons other than 

the reason stated in the discharge letter were irrelevant and 

excluded from evidence. Swanson, 597 P. 2d at 704. By allowing the 

above testimony in the present case to go to the jury, the court, 

in effect, permitted the jury to decide whether the discharge was 

wrongful based on reasons other than, or in addition to, the sole 

reason stated in the discharge letter. Any collateral reasons 

suggested by the evidence, other than the sole reason stated in the 

discharge letter, were irrelevant, and therefore, inadmissible. 

Rule 402, M.R.Evid.; Swanson, 597 P.2d at 704. 

We hold that the District Court erred in allowing GSM to offer 

evidence suggesting that appellant was discharged for reasons other 

than the reason set forth in his discharge letter. 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the single 

issue of whether appellant was discharged for the reason set forth 

in his discharge letter. 

Justice 

We concur: 

Chief Justice 

Justice Fred J. Weber dissents as follows: 

The majority opinion concludes that the District Court 

improperly allowed evidence which suggested that the appellant was 

discharged for reasons other than those set forth in the discharge 

letter to him. The foundation for this holding is Swanson v. St. 

John's Lutheran Hospital (1979), 182 Mont. 414, 597 P.2d 702. It 

is true that in Swanson this Court concluded that the only reason 

for discharge which the District Court could consider was the 

reason set forth in the discharge letter and that reasons other 

than those stated in the discharge letter were irrelevant. 

However, I contend that Swanson is not appropriate authority for 

our case 

The distinction from the present case is that in Swanson the 

employee had demanded a letter stating the reasons for her 

discharge and such a letter had been written and delivered to her. 

Swanson specifically applied § 39-2-801, MCA (1979), which states: 

Employee to be furnished on demand with reason for 

discharge. It is the duty of any person after having 

discharged any employee from his service, upon demand bv 

such discharqed employee, to furnish him in writinq a 

full, succinct, and complete statement of the reason of 

his discharqe and if such person refuses so to do within 

a reasonable time after such demand, it is unlawful 

thereafter for such person to furnish any statement of 

the reason of such discharge to any person or in any way 

to blacklist or to prevent such discharged person from 

procuring employment elsewhere . . . (Emphasis supplied. ) 

In considering the foregoing statute, Swanson stated: 

Under § 41-1311, RCM 1947, now § 39-2-801, MCA, upon such 

demand, the employer must furnish to the discharqed 

employee a "full, succinct, and complete reason of 

discharqe." The letter of August 23, 1977, was the 

employer's compliance with that statute. . . . Where, as 
in Montana, the purpose of the statute is to prevent 

"blacklisting", it is our duty to interpret former § 41- 

1311 requiring a "full, succinct, and completeH statement 

to mean exactly what it says, Therefore, in the case at 

bar, the only reason which could be considered by the 

District Court was the reason set forth in the letter of 

August 23, 1977, . . . (Emphasis supplied. ) 

Swanson, 182 Mont. at 422, 597 P.2d at 706. In the present case, 

there was no request or demand on the part of the appellant for a 

statement of the reasons for his discharge. As a result § 39-2- 

801, MCA, is not applicable. The only request was made by Golden 

Sunlight Mines (GSM) when it requested appellant to furnish 

specific medical documentation explaining his absence from work for 

a period of several months. When he failed to furnish such 

additional medical documentation, he was given his letter of 

termination which in pertinent part stated: 

You have been asked to provide specific documentation 

explaining your absence from work from May 31 to August 

28, 1989. We do not have documentation substantiating 

this absence and we have reason to believe that not a11 

of this period was attributable to illness or injury. 

Since you have been unable to furnish this documentation 

in a reasonable period, August 25 to September 7, 1989, 

and given your statement on September 7 that you will not 

supply any further information, we cannot allow you to 

return to work. This being the case, we have no option 

but to terminate your employment effective September 8, 

1989. 

1 conclude that § 39-2-801, MCA, is not applicable in the present 

case and as a result Swanson is not authority for the conclusion 

reached in the majority opinion. The letter given in the present 

case is not in any way comparable to the letter in Swanson which is 

required under the code sections pertaining to blacklisting and 

protection of discharged employees. The majority opinion has 

provided no appropriate legal support for its determination that 
the court abused its discretion by permitting testimony of other 

possible reasons for the dischaxge. 

I therefore dissent from the majority opinion. 
February 15, 1995 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the 

following named: 

Erik B. Thueson, Esq. 

Thueson & Lamb 

P.O. Box 535 

Helena, MT 59624-0535 

Michael Cotter, Esq. 

Cotter & Cotter 

P.O. Box 3425 

Great Falls, MT 59403-3425 

Donald C. Robinson, Esq. 

Poore, Roth & Robinson 

1341 Harrison Ave. 

Butte, MT 59701 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF MONTANA 

BY: 

Deputy