Filed 12/17/18

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION∗

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

BEVERLY JEAN GASSNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

LORETTA L. STASA,

Defendant and Respondent;

LAW OFFICES OF MARC E. 

GROSSMAN,

Objector and Appellant.

E068058

(Super.Ct.No. CIVRS1200136)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Sachs, 

Judge. Reversed.

Law Offices of Marc E. Grossman, Marc E. Grossman, and Eva M. Hollands for 

Objector and Appellant.

Borton Petrini and Joseph L. Richardson for Defendant and Respondent.

∗ Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this 

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts III and IV.

 
The Law Offices of Marc E. Grossman (Grossman firm) represented the plaintiff 

in this action. After the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice, the 

trial court awarded costs — not only against the plaintiff, but also against the Grossman 

firm. The plaintiff moved to vacate the costs order, but the trial court denied that motion.

The Grossman firm appeals.

The bulk of this opinion is devoted to appealability, because it poses a more 

difficult issue than do the merits.

With regard to the order awarding costs, there is a split of authority as to whether 

such an order is appealable when it is made after a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. 

We will follow the case law holding that it is appealable. The Grossman firm, however, 

failed to file a timely appeal from that order.

With regard to the order denying the motion to vacate, ordinarily such an order is 

not appealable on grounds that could have been raised in an appeal from the underlying 

order. This bar does not apply, however, when the underlying order is void. Moreover, 

the appeal is timely with respect to this order.

Finally, on the merits, we will hold that the order awarding costs against the 

Grossman firm was indeed void, because the Grossman firm was not a party. 

Accordingly, we will reverse.

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I

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2012, Beverly Jean Gassner, an attorney, filed this action against Loretta Stasa, 

her former client, for unpaid fees. Gassner was represented by the Grossman firm. In 

2016, Gassner voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice.

Stasa filed a memorandum of costs, seeking $2,698.91 in ordinary costs. At the 

same time, she also filed a motion for attorney fees. The notice of motion asked that she 

“be . . . awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . in addition to $2,698.91 in other costs 

. . . .” The notice of motion did not specify against whom the attorney fees and costs 

should be awarded. The memorandum of points and authorities, however, stated: 

“Defendant requests that Plaintiff, Beverly Gassner or its [sic] counsel Law Offices of 

Marc E. Grossman, be ordered to pay attorney’s fees . . . in addition to other costs of 

$2,698.91.”

Gassner did not file a motion to tax costs. However, she did file an opposition to 

the motion for attorney fees. It did not discuss whether attorney fees or costs could or 

should be awarded against the Grossman firm.

On August 4, 2016, at the hearing on the motion for attorney fees, the trial court 

ruled: “I am going to deny the attorney’s fees and award that portion of the cost bill that 

does not relate to attorney’s fees.” It signed and entered a proposed order, prepared by 

counsel for Stasa, which stated, “Plaintiff, Beverly Jean Gassner or its [sic] counsel Law 

Offices of Marc E. Grossman, is ordered to pay other costs in the sum of $2,698.91.”

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On August 31, 2016, Gassner filed a motion under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 473, subdivision (b) to vacate the costs order based on mistake, inadvertence, 

surprise or excusable neglect. The only mistake, etc. that she asserted was her failure to 

file a motion to tax costs. Once again, the motion did not discuss whether costs could or 

should be awarded against the Grossman firm.

On October 3, 2016, after hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion, 

orally and in a minute order, and directed Stasa to give notice. On October 4, 2016, Stasa 

served a notice of ruling.

Later, Stasa also submitted a proposed order stating, once again, “Plaintiff, 

Beverly Jean Gassner or its counsel the law offices of Marc E. Grossman, is ordered to 

pay costs . . . in the sum of $2,698.91 forthwith . . . .”

Gassner filed objections to the proposed order, arguing that it was inaccurate 

because the trial court had never actually awarded costs against counsel. However, she 

did not argue that it lacked the power to do so.

On January 30, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the objections. It concluded 

that the proposed order was accurate because its August 4, 2016 order had, in fact, 

awarded costs against both Gassner and her counsel. It therefore ruled that the cost 

award was “[j]oint and several as to both.” It signed and entered Stasa’s proposed order.

On March 29, 2017, the Grossman firm filed a notice of appeal, purportedly from 

the January 30, 2017 order denying the motion to vacate.

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II

APPEALABILITY

There is a significant preliminary issue as to whether this appeal was taken from 

an appealable order in a timely manner. We gave the parties the opportunity to submit 

supplemental briefs on this issue; only the Grossman firm chose to do so.

The trial court made three orders that are relevant: (1) the August 4, 2016 order 

on Stasa’s motion for attorney fees; (2) the October 3, 2016 minute order on Gassner’s 

motion to vacate; and (3) the January 30, 2017 formal order on Gassner’s motion to 

vacate. The Grossman firm’s notice of appeal stated that it was appealing exclusively 

from the January 30, 2017 order. Nevertheless, because a notice of appeal must be 

liberally construed (rule 8.100(a)1), we consider whether the appeal is valid with respect 

to any of these three orders.

A. General Legal Principles.

Ordinarily, “a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of:

“(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of 

appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the 

judgment, showing the date either was served;

1 This and all further citations to rules refer to the California Rules of Court.

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“(B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a 

party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of 

the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or

“(C) 180 days after entry of judgment.” (Rule 8.104(a)(1).)

Although there are several exceptions to this rule, the only one relevant here is 

rule 8.108(c), which provides:

“If, within the time prescribed by rule 8.104 to appeal from the judgment, any 

party serves and files a valid notice of intention to move — or a valid motion — to vacate 

the judgment, the time to appeal from the judgment is extended for all parties until the 

earliest of:

“(1) 30 days after the superior court clerk or a party serves an order denying the 

motion or a notice of entry of that order;

“(2) 90 days after the first notice of intention to move — or motion — is filed; or

“(3) 180 days after entry of judgment.”

For purposes of both rules, “‘judgment’ includes any judgment or order that may 

be appealed.” (Rule 8.10(4).)

“The entry date of a judgment is the date the judgment is filed . . . , or the date it is 

entered in the judgment book.” (Rule 8.104(c)(1).)

“The entry date of an appealable order that is entered in the minutes is the date it is 

entered in the permanent minutes. But if the minute order directs that a written order be 

prepared, the entry date is the date the signed order is filed; a written order prepared 

6
under rule 3.1312 or similar local rule is not such an order prepared by direction of a 

minute order.” (Rule 8.104(c)(2).)

B. The August 4, 2016 Order Awarding Costs.

1. Appealability.

There is a split of authority as to whether an order either allowing or taxing costs 

(costs order) is appealable when it is made after a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.

Mon Chong Loong Trading Corp. v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 87 

held that such an order is not appealable. (Id. at p. 92.) It explained: “An order on a 

motion to tax costs is ordinarily ‘separately appealable as an order after final judgment.’ 

[Citations.] That is, an appeal may be taken from a postjudgment order. ([Code Civ. 

Proc.,] § 904.1 subd. (a)(2).) Here, however, there has been no judgment, only a 

dismissal, and the entry of dismissal by the clerk is a ‘ministerial, not a judicial, act, and 

no appeal lies therefrom.’ [Citation.] Therefore, the order taxing costs follows a 

nonappealable voluntary dismissal, and is similarly nonappealable.” (Ibid.)

Mesa Shopping Center-East, LLC v. O Hill (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 890, however, 

held that such an order is appealable. There, the trial court stayed the action pending 

arbitration. (Id. at p. 895.) The plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice. 

The defendants prevailed in the arbitration, but the trial court denied their motion to 

vacate the voluntary dismissal and to award attorney fees. (Id. at p. 897.)

The appellate court acknowledged Mon Chong Loong as holding “that an order 

taxing costs following a nonappealable voluntary dismissal was not appealable. 

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[Citation.]” (Mesa Shopping Center-East, LLC v. O Hill, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 898.)

It also acknowledged cases holding that an order granting or denying a motion to 

vacate a voluntary dismissal is nonappealable. (Mesa Shopping Center-East, LLC v. O 

Hill, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 897-898, citing H.D. Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of San 

Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1364-1366 [order granting a motion to vacate a 

voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable]; Gray v. Superior Court (1997) 

52 Cal.App.4th 165, 170-171 [order denying a motion to vacate a voluntary dismissal 

without prejudice is not appealable].)2 It stated: “[T]he . . . logic precluding appeal of an 

order denying a motion to vacate a voluntary dismissal would seem to apply equally to an 

order denying an award of attorney fees or costs, as such an order would also lack an 

appealable judgment to which to attach itself.” (Mesa, supra, at p. 898.)

It continued, however: “In our view, the law has taken a wrong turn . . . . [W]e 

conclude that a voluntary dismissal in conjunction with the postdismissal rulings made 

here are appealable as a judgment and orders attached thereto.” (Mesa Shopping CenterEast, LLC v. O Hill, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 898.) It explained: “Once . . . 

arbitration began on the merits of the parties’ dispute, the possible recovery of attorney 

fees by one of the parties was one of the few potential remaining issues in this action. 

2 Mesa also noted Basinger v. Rogers & Wells (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 16, 

20-21, which held, to the contrary, that an order granting a motion to vacate a voluntary 

dismissal (with prejudice, in Basinger) is appealable. (Mesa Shopping Center-East, LLC 

v. O Hill, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 897-898.)

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The court’s order denying the [defendants’] request for attorney fees, issued in tandem 

with the denial of their request to vacate the dismissal, constituted the final determination 

of the issues in this case. There was nothing interlocutory about the court’s rulings. 

[Citation.] Common sense dictates that we forego a hypertechnical interpretation of 

[Code of Civil Procedure] section 904.1 that would leave the [defendants] without the 

right to appeal despite an adverse judicial ruling ending the action and their right to seek 

attorney fees. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 899.)

In our view, Mesa is more persuasive than Mon Chong Loong. Mon Chong Loong

jumped to the conclusion that a costs order after a voluntary dismissal without prejudice 

is appealable — if at all — only as a postjudgment order under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2). While the vast majority of costs orders are entered 

after a final judgment and are therefore appealable on that theory, Mesa correctly 

recognized that a costs order may be appealable on some other theory, including, if it 

qualifies, as a final judgment.

“A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or 

proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 577.)

A plaintiff may dismiss an action “[w]ith or without prejudice, upon written 

request . . . to the clerk . . . or by oral or written request to the court at any time before the 

actual commencement of trial . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (b)(1).) “All 

dismissals ordered by the court . . . shall constitute judgments . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 581d, italics added.) “[T]he county clerk, in entering the order for dismissal, acts in a 

9
mere ministerial capacity and exercises no judicial function.” (Riley v. Superior Court of 

Orange County (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 365, 367.)

Arguably, a voluntary dismissal by the clerk with prejudice is a judgment — at 

least for some purposes — because it is a final determination of the parties’ rights. (See 

Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco v. Countrywide Financial Corp. (2013) 214 

Cal.App.4th 1520, 1527 [voluntary dismissal with prejudice is a final judgment for 

purposes of res judicata]; Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899, 

905-907 [voluntary dismissal with prejudice is a final judgment for purposes of offer to 

compromise under Code Civ. Proc., § 998]; but see Yancey v. Fink (1991) 226 

Cal.App.3d 1334, 1342-1343 [voluntary dismissal with prejudice is not an appealable 

final judgment].)

A voluntary dismissal by the clerk without prejudice, however, is clearly not a 

judgment. (Cook v. Stewart McKee & Co. (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 758, 760-761 [“there is 

no kinship of a voluntary dismissal to a final judgment”]; see also In re Tomi C. (1990) 

218 Cal.App.3d 694, 697-698 [voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not a judgment 

for purposes of appealability]; Gray v. Kay (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 562, 564-565 

[voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not a judgment for purposes of attorney fees 

under Civ. Code, § 1717]; Associated Convalescent Enterprises v. Carl Marks & Co., 

Inc. (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 116, 121 [same].)

It follows that a costs order following a voluntary dismissal by the clerk without 

prejudice is not appealable as a postjudgment order under Code of Civil Procedure 

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section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2). For the same reason, however, such a costs order is the 

final determination of the parties’ rights; hence, it is a judgment and appealable as such 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1).3

This is sufficient to distinguish People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior 

Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1505. In that case, an eminent domain action (id. at 

p. 1508), the parties entered into a stipulated judgment. (Id. at p. 1509.) Thereafter, the 

trial court awarded attorney fees to the defendants as litigation expenses under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1250.410. (Id. at pp. 1509-1511.) The appellate court held that 

the award was not appealable, because the underlying stipulated judgment was not 

appealable. (Id. at pp. 1509-1510.) There, however, the award of litigation expenses 

could not be viewed as a judgment, because the stipulated judgment, while not 

appealable, was nevertheless a judgment. “It is settled that as a general rule there can be 

only one final judgment in a single action. [Citations.]” (Nicholson v. Henderson (1944) 

25 Cal.2d 375, 378.) Here, however, as discussed, a voluntary dismissal without 

prejudice is not a judgment; thus, it leaves the field open for a later costs order to be the

final judgment.

This brings us to the cases, discussed in Mesa, dealing with motions to vacate a 

voluntary dismissal. As noted, these cases are not entirely consistent with each other. In 

3 Because we conclude that the August 4, 2016 order is appealable as a 

judgment, we express no opinion on whether it is appealable under the collateral order 

doctrine. (See In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368.)

11

 
any event, we do not agree with Mesa that the “logic” of these cases “would seem to 

apply equally” here. An order granting or denying a motion to vacate a nonappealable 

judgment or order is itself nonappealable because “appealability cannot be created by 

moving to reconsider or vacate a nonappealable order and then appealing from an order 

denying the motion. [Citations.]” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals 

and Writs (The Rutter Group 2018) ¶ 2.151, p. 2-94.) By contrast, reviewing a costs 

order after a voluntary dismissal does not require any review of the underlying dismissal. 

Thus, it presents no threat of back-door review of a nonappealable order.

To the contrary, as Mesa reasoned, there is every reason to allow review of a costs 

order made after a voluntary dismissal. Such a costs order is not interlocutory; it cannot 

be reviewed in an appeal from some subsequent final judgment. There is a need for some 

kind of review, but there is no need for the speedy and often summary review that a writ 

petition entails.

We therefore conclude that the August 4, 2016 order, awarding costs after the 

voluntary dismissal of the action, was appealable.

2. Timeliness.

Unless rule 8.108 extended the time, the latest date to appeal from the August 4, 

2016 order was 180 days after entry of the order (rule 8.104(a)(1)(C)); this time expired 

on January 31, 2017.

Gassner did file a motion to vacate. (See Shisler v. Sanfer Sports Cars, Inc.

(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, fn. 2 [motion under Code Civ. Proc., § 473 is a motion to 

12
vacate for purposes of extending time to appeal].) Moreover, she filed the motion on 

August 31, 2016 — well within the time to appeal from the August 4, 2016 order. 

However, this could extend the time to appeal, at most, to 180 days after entry of the 

order, which, again, expired on January 31, 2017. (Rule 8.108(c)(3).)

Either way, then, the notice of appeal, filed on March 29, 2017, was filed too late 

to obtain review of the August 4, 2016 order.

C. The October 3, 2016 Minute Order and the January 30, 2017 Written 

Order Denying the Motion to Vacate.

1. Appealability.

Had the order awarding costs been nonappealable, an order refusing to vacate that 

order would likewise be nonappealable. “‘If the original ruling is not final and 

appealable in its own right, then it is not a judgment and an order denying reconsideration 

cannot be appealable. “‘“[A]n appeal may not be taken from a nonappealable order by 

the device of moving to vacate the order and appealing from a ruling denying the 

motion.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (I.J. Weinrot & Son, Inc. v. Jackson (1985) 40 Cal.3d 

327, 331.)

As we held in part II.B.1, ante, however, the order awarding costs was appealable 

as a judgment. Thus, the later orders refusing to set it aside were appealable, if at all, as 

postjudgment orders.

“A postjudgment order cannot be appealed on issues that could have been 

reviewed on appeal from the prior judgment; a new issue must be raised. . . . Otherwise, 

13
the parties would effectively be allowed two appeals from the same ruling.” (Eisenberg 

et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2018) ¶ 2:152, 

p. 2-94, citing Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651 and 

Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 161.) The Grossman firm could have 

appealed from the order awarding costs on the same grounds as it is raising in this appeal. 

Ordinarily, this would mean the later orders were not appealable.

“‘ . . . [H]owever, an exception to this general rule applies when the underlying 

judgment is void. In such a case, the order denying the motion to vacate is itself void and 

appealable because it gives effect to a void judgment.’ [Citation.]” (311 South Spring 

Street Co. v. Department of General Services (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1014; 

accord, Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 684, 691.)4 Here, the Grossman firm is 

appealing from the orders denying the motion to vacate on the ground that the order 

awarding costs was void. (And in an unpublished portion of this opinion, we will hold 

that it was, in fact, void.) While Gassner’s motion to vacate did not specifically argue 

that the order awarding costs was void, “[a] judgment that is void on the face of the 

record is subject to either direct or collateral attack at any time. [Citations.]” (OC 

4 An order denying a motion to vacate a void judgment is appealable as a 

postjudgment order. (John Siebel Associates v. Keele (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 560, 564, 

fn. 3.) But an order denying a motion to vacate a nonappealable order is not appealable, 

because the underlying order is not a judgment, even if it is void. (See ibid.)

This is why we had to determine, in part II.B.1, ante, whether the August 4, 2016 

order was appealable, even though we also determined that the appeal from that order 

was untimely.

14

 
Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1327.) 

Accordingly, one of the orders denying the motion to vacate — either the October 3, 

2016 minute order or the January 20, 2017 formal order — was appealable.

2. Timeliness.

On October 3, 2016, when the trial court orally denied the motion to vacate, it did 

not direct anybody to prepare a written order. It merely directed Stasa to give notice, 

which is not the same thing. Admittedly, under rule 3.1312(a), Stasa was required to 

prepare a written order; rule 8.104(c)(2), however, specifically provides that the 

preparation and entry of a written order under rule 3.1312 does not reset the entry date of 

an oral order that has been entered in the minutes. Thus, the Grossman firm’s time to 

appeal started running on October 3, 2016, when the oral order was entered in the 

minutes, and not on January 30, 2017, when the formal order was entered.

On October 4, 2016, Stasa served a “Notice of Ruling,” giving notice of this order. 

However, because it was not entitled “Notice of Entry” and did not attach a file-stamped 

copy of the trial court’s minute order, it did not trigger the 60-day deadline to appeal 

under rule 8.104(a)(1)(B). (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.)

The Grossman firm therefore had 180 days to appeal from the October 3, 2016 

order denying the motion to vacate — i.e., until April 3, 2017. Its notice of appeal, filed 

on March 29, 2017, was timely.

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III

THE GROSSMAN FIRM’S LIABILITY FOR COSTS

The Grossman firm contends that the trial court erred by awarding costs against it. 

We agree.

“[C]osts are not assessable against nonparties . . . .” (Crampton v. Takegoshi

(1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 308, 320, disapproved on unrelated grounds in Phelps v. Stostad

(1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 34; accord, Banks v. Manos (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 123, 129; see 

also Whitten v. Dabney (1915) 171 Cal. 621, 632-633 [intervener is not liable for costs 

incurred before his intervention].) Stasa does not argue otherwise.

Stasa does argue, however, that the Grossman firm was “in effect” a party, 

because it had purchased Gassner’s accounts receivable. (Capitalization altered.) We 

need not decide whether this theory is viable, because it is not supported by the record. 

Stasa cites Gassner’s sopposition to the motion for attorney fees, which stated: 

“Plaintiff’s counsel herein, Law Offices of Marc Grossman . . . took over the handling of 

the Plaintiff’s receivables in approximately 2010.” “Handling” would seem to mean that 

the Grossman firm, as attorney, was representing Gassner, as client, in her collection 

matters. This statement is not substantial evidence that it was the Grossman firm, rather 

than Gassner, that had the ultimate beneficial interest in the receivables.5

5 Indeed, in the same paragraph, the opposition also stated that the case had 

not settled because Gassner was “in [her] 80s and in failing health and could not benefit 

from [the] payment plan [proposed by Stasa] that barely covered the interest accruing on 

the obligation.” Thus, it indicated that Gassner still held the beneficial interest.

16

 
If Stasa truly believed the Grossman firm was the real party in interest, she could 

have obtained an order substituting it into the action as such. (Hearn Pacific Corp. v. 

Second Generation Roofing, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 117, 134; Weil & Brown, Cal. 

Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2018) ¶ 2:509, p. 2-114.) 

Indeed, Weil and Brown warn: “This is good practice if you represent the opposing 

party. Otherwise, you run the risk that any judgment obtained for costs or damages may 

not be enforceable against the transferee.” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 2:509, p. 2-114, 

italics added.)

Stasa does not argue that the Grossman firm forfeited this argument by failing to 

raise it below. It did not. An unauthorized award of costs against a nonparty —

including a party’s attorney — is simply void and can be attacked at any time. (Moore v. 

Kaufman (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 604, 615-616.)

In sum, then, on this record, the order awarding costs against the Grossman firm 

cannot be sustained.

IV

FRIVOLOUS APPEAL SANCTIONS

In her respondent’s brief, Stasa asks us to award frivolous appeal sanctions against 

the Grossman firm.

We decline to do so, for the obvious reason that the appeal is meritorious. 

However, we also deny it for an additional, alternative reason. Under California Rules of 

Court, rule 8.276(b), there is a clearly prescribed procedure for obtaining frivolous appeal 

17
sanctions; it requires a timely motion, as well as a declaration supporting the amount of 

sanctions sought. Stasa has disregarded this rule without any apparent good cause.

V

DISPOSITION

The order appealed from, to the extent that it awards costs against the Grossman 

firm, is reversed. The Grossman firm is awarded costs on appeal against Stasa.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

RAMIREZ

P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON

J.

RAPHAEL

J.

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