United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ___________ 

No. 20-50494

___________ 

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Irick Dron Oneal,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:19-CV-96 

______________________________ 

Before Southwick, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Irick Dron Oneal was convicted of sex trafficking of children and 

sentenced to life in prison. The district court denied his Section 2255 petition 

and denied him a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). He moved for a 

COA in this court, was denied, and moved for reconsideration of that denial. 

We granted that motion and now deny his motion for a COA.

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 20, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 20-50494

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Oneal seeks a COA on numerous ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. We reduce them to three categories: (1) ineffective assistance of 

counsel at trial for choice of strategy; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at 

sentencing because Oneal’s sentence was enhanced for various reasons; and 

(3) ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. Oneal also argues that the 

district court erred by not granting him an evidentiary hearing.

To receive a COA, a petitioner must make “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, a petitioner “must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner 

must show (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984). “Because of the difficulties inherent in making the 

evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689.

Oneal first argues that his counsel was ineffective at trial. Courts will 

not second-guess counsel’s decisions of strategy “if based on informed and 

reasoned practical judgment.” Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 

1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). At trial, counsel sought to shift 

responsibility to one of Oneal’s alleged co-conspirators. That shifting 

required Oneal to testify and claim he had made a mistake as to the victim’s 

age because he did not have a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim. 

Trial counsel and the district court informed Oneal of his right not to testify 

and the consequences of doing so. The district court found no constitutional 

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ineffectiveness. Oneal has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists would 

find the district court’s conclusion to be debatable or wrong. 

Oneal next argues that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing for 

failing to request a special jury verdict and for failing to prevent various 

enhancements to Oneal’s sentence. Trial counsel, though, requested an 

unanimity instruction regarding aiding and abetting and preserved it for 

appeal. Trial counsel also timely objected and argued against enhancements 

for Obstruction, Pattern of Activity, and Leadership Role and was overruled. 

Trial counsel was not required to object to the Undue Influence enhancement 

because, given the 27-year age difference between Oneal and his victim, it 

would be a “meritless objection [that could not] be grounds for a finding of 

deficient performance.” Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 429 (5th Cir. 2012) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The district court found 

there was no constitutional ineffectiveness, and Oneal has not demonstrated 

that reasonable jurists would find that assessment debatable or wrong.

Oneal also argues for the first time that his appellate counsel on direct 

appeal was ineffective. We need not, and here do not, “address a claim raised 

for the first time in a COA motion in this court.” See Henderson v. Cockrell, 

333 F.3d 592, 605 (5th Cir. 2003). 

Finally, we hold that the district court did not err in denying an 

evidentiary hearing. A petition “challenging an evidentiary ruling may only 

be entertained as corollary to a constitutional violation.” Norman v. Stephens, 

817 F.3d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 2016). Because we have determined that no such 

violation exists, “we do not address the merits of his request for an 

evidentiary hearing.” Id.

The application for a COA and the request for an evidentiary hearing 

are DENIED.

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