2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-25-2011

William Kaetz v. Jonathan Mark

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-1127

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Recommended Citation

"William Kaetz v. Jonathan Mark" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1203.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-1127

___________

WILLIAM F. KAETZ

Appellant

v.

JONATHAN MARK, Judicial Officer of Common Pleas

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-02721)

District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 1, 2011

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed May 25, 2011 )

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

William F. Kaetz appeals from the orders of the United States District Court for 

the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint and denying his motion for 

reconsideration. We will affirm.

Kaetz filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the 
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Honorable Jonathan Mark of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, 

Pennsylvania, as the defendant. In his brief filed in support of his complaint, Kaetz stated 

that the action stemmed from divorce and related proceedings to which he was a party 

and over which Judge Mark presided. The issues litigated in the divorce case involved 

the property settlement agreement, child support, and a protection from abuse (“PFA”)

petition. Kaetz alleged that Judge Mark deprived him of his due process rights and 

maliciously abused his judicial discretion by scheduling a child support and PFA 

violation hearing to be held concurrently with a previously scheduled property settlement 

hearing, without giving sufficient notice. Kaetz also asserted that Judge Mark compelled 

him to proceed with ineffective counsel, deprived him of the right of self-representation, 

and made findings against him in retaliation for exercising his rights. Moreover, Kaetz 

asserted that Judge Mark‟s rulings on the child support and PFA matters were based on 

fraudulent evidence, and that Judge Mark falsely imprisoned him for ninety days as a 

result. Kaetz sought compensatory and punitive damages.

Judge Mark filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). Kaetz filed a response in opposition to the motion. By opinion and 

order entered on October 21, 2009, the District Court granted the motion and dismissed 

the complaint on the basis of Judge Mark‟s entitlement to judicial immunity. Kaetz filed 

a timely motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied by opinion and order 

entered on February 9, 2010. Kaetz appeals from both orders.
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise de novo

review over the District Court‟s grant of the defendant‟s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). We accept as 

true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. At 233. We review the District Court‟s denial of 

the motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 

591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).

Upon review of the record, we will affirm for substantially the same reasons set 

forth by the District Court. The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity bars Kaetz‟s

claims against Judge Mark. “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the 

action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; 

rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the „clear absence of all 

jurisdiction.‟” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citation omitted). 

Indeed, the doctrine of judicial immunity applies even to allegations of malice or 

corruption; section 1983 did not abolish the well-settled principle of judicial immunity. 

See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). As the District Court found, none of Judge Mark‟s 

actions at issue in the complaint was taken outside of his judicial capacity in the divorce 

and related proceedings, which are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of 

Common Pleas. Notwithstanding Kaetz‟s arguments to the contrary, Judge Marks‟s 

rulings and other actions in the proceedings are not extra-judicial in nature.
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In addition, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s denial of 

Kaetz‟s motion for reconsideration. Kaetz did not demonstrate any basis for granting the 

motion, such as intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or the need to 

correct clear error of law or fact or prevent manifest injustice. See Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 

669.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court.