J-S06040-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STEPHEN STEPHEN SMITH,

Appellant No. 975 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order May 14, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0000996-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2016

Stephen Smith (“Appellant”) appeals from an order denying him 

collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546 (“PCRA”). Specifically, he contends counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance at the hearing on his motion to suppress evidence obtained 

during a parole officer’s search of his residence. We affirm.

In our disposition of Appellant’s direct appeal, we related the following 

factual and procedural history of Appellant’s case:

On August 1, 2010, Agents Ronald Thompson 

(“Thompson”) and Frank Horvath (“Horvath”) of the 

Commonwealth’s Board of Probation and Parole, arrived at 

Appellant’s home in Auburn, Schuylkill County, for an 

unannounced home visit. They had received an anonymous 

phone call that there were drugs and a gun in the home where 

Appellant was residing and that Appellant was using drugs. A 

few days prior, Thompson had determined that Appellant had 

three outstanding traffic citations [from Ocean City, Maryland] 

which were all violations of Appellant’s parole. Upon arrival at 
J-S06040-16

- 2 -

the home, the agents requested Appellant to come outside and 

meet them at the patrol car to discuss Appellant’s status further. 

Appellant admitted that he had recently been out of state which 

was also a parole violation. [According to Thompson, Appellant 

also admitted to using cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol, and an 

instant urinalysis tested positive for cocaine and marijuana.

The agents then handcuffed Appellant, cleared the house

of other people, took Appellant into the home.] The [a]gents 

then discovered the various items of contraband in . . . 

Appellant’s bedroom, after which they took . . . Appellant into 

custody and alerted the State Police. The State Police arrived 

and conducted the search of the home as well as an adjacent 

recreational trailer situate in the back yard. Based upon the 

search, they arrested . . . Appellant, and charged him with [ten 

counts pertaining to possession and possession with intent to 

deliver]. The Complaint and Information were filed and 

proceeded through the Court of Common Pleas to jury trial. . . . 

[The trial] concluded on October 24, 2012, with the jury’s verdict 

finding Appellant guilty on all ten charges. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 2212 MDA 2012, unpublished memorandum 

at 2, (Pa.Super. filed March 31, 2014) (citing Trial Court Opinion, filed 

2/6/2013, at 3-5). 

Sentenced to an aggregate term of 8 to 16 years’ imprisonment, 

Appellant filed a direct appeal challenging, inter alia, the order denying his 

motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, Appellant argued that the search 

of his property was invalid because agents neither possessed reasonable 

suspicion to believe he had committed a parole violation nor obtained their 

supervisor’s prior approval to conduct the search. Id. at 5. In our 

memorandum decision, we noted the suppression court’s following 

observations on evidence developed during counsel’s cross-examination of 

Agent Thompson:
J-S06040-16

- 3 -

[Appellant’s] argument rests on the paper records of the day [of 

the search], consisting of handwritten notes and a typed report 

created by Agent Thompson. The handwritten notes are 

completely silent regarding [Appellant’s] admission to the agents 

that he was using drugs and the positive instant urinalysis. The 

typed report entitled “Notice of Charges and Hearing” dated 

August 3, 2010 fails to state when [it was], during the sequence 

of events, that [Appellant] admitted he was using drugs. The 

report is completely silent as to the positive drug test. An 

accompanying “Technical Violation Arrest Report” dated August 

3, 2010 also indicates in a check-marked box that prior 

supervisor approval for the search was not obtained.

Id. at 5 (citing Suppression Court Opinion, filed 1/25/2013, at 2). 

Agent Thompson, however, denied that his notes and arrest report 

recounted all events preceding the search, and he insisted he also obtained 

his supervisor’s approval and secured Appellant’s positive urinalysis test 

result and admission of drug use beforehand. N.T. Suppression, 9/6/12, at 

22-23. Testifying consistently with this account, Agent Horvath recalled how 

Agent Thompson asked Appellant whether he would test “hot” on a urine 

test if he took one at the scene, which prompted Appellant to admit he was 

using cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. N.T. at 41. Agent Thompson 

administered the instant urine test immediately, Agent Horvath continued, 

and the results were positive for marijuana and cocaine. Id.

The suppression court deemed the Agents’ testimonies credible in all 

respects and discounted conflicting paperwork on the issue of prior 

supervisor approval as the result of a typographical error. See Suppression 

Court Opinion at 5. Adhering to precedent calling for appellate court 

deference to a suppression court’s credibility determinations, see
J-S06040-16

- 4 -

Commonwealth v. Simmen, 58 A.3d 811, 817 (Pa.Super. 2012), we 

discerned no error with the suppression court’s order denying Appellant’s 

motion.

Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition and obtained a hearing before 

the PCRA court, at which he assailed the adequacy of suppression counsel’s 

cross-examination of Agent Thompson and examination of Appellant’s 

landlord, Richard Keller. Specifically, PCRA counsel argued that prejudice 

resulted from suppression counsel’s failure to draw attention to both a 

technical violation arrest report and a criminal arrest and disposition report 

filed by Thompson just prior to Appellant’s 2012 suppression hearing. The 

two reports listed only the anonymous tip and Appellant’s illicit travel as 

reasons offered for supervisor approval. Had Thompson actually acquired 

Appellant’s admission of guilt and a positive urinalysis test as he claimed at 

the suppression hearing, PCRA counsel posited, he would have said so on 

the 2012 reports, for they made the strongest case for gaining the 

supervisor’s approval. Failing to offer this evidence to impeach Agent 

Thompson’s suppression hearing testimony constituted ineffective assistance 

of counsel, PCRA counsel concluded. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/12/15 at 11-12.

PCRA counsel also attacked suppression counsel’s failure to call 

landlord Keller to testify that Agents Thompson and Horvath never apprised 

him of Appellant’s admission or positive urinalysis. At the PCRA hearing, 

Keller testified that Thompson informed him about only the anonymous tip 
J-S06040-16

- 5 -

and Appellant’s admission of leaving the state. N.T. at 32-33. Revealing 

this limitation in the conversation between Keller and Thompson was 

likewise critical to impeaching the agents’ testimonies regarding Appellant’s 

admission of guilt and urinalysis, PCRA counsel maintained.

The PCRA court deemed suppression counsel’s advocacy 

constitutionally sound despite Appellant’s contentions to the contrary. It 

was the court’s opinion that suppression counsel aptly cross-examined Agent 

Thompson on the inconsistencies between what he reported and what he 

later said with respect to his pre-search investigation of Appellant. 

Nevertheless, the PCRA court reasoned, the suppression court exercised its 

authority as finder of fact to credit Thompson’s testimony that the 

admission, urinalysis, and supervisor’s approval all occurred despite his 

failure to include them in his written reports. Moreover, the PCRA court 

minimized the importance of Keller’s PCRA testimony because the agents 

had no legal obligation to apprise a landlord as to every reason supporting 

their search of the tenant’s residence. Accordingly, the court entered an 

order denying collateral relief, although it granted relief on an unrelated 

issue concerning the imposition of an unlawful mandatory minimum 

sentence, and it remanded the matter for resentencing. PCRA Court 

Opinion, filed May 14, 2015, at 6-7. This timely appeal followed. 

Reiterating the positions taken in his PCRA petition and at his hearing, 

Appellant contends suppression counsel rendered constitutionally deficient 
J-S06040-16

- 6 -

assistance in his cross-examination of Agent Thompson and examination of 

Richard Keller. Our standard of review from the grant or denial of postconviction relief is limited to examining whether the PCRA court's 

determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free 

of legal error. Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. 1997). 

“The PCRA court's factual determinations are entitled to deference, but its 

legal determinations are subject to our plenary review.” Commonwealth v. 

Hawkins, 894 A.2d 716, 722 (Pa. 2006); see also Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 293 (Pa. 2006) (“the findings of a post-conviction 

court, which hears evidence and passes on the credibility of witnesses, 

should be given great deference”); Commonwealth v. White, 734 A.2d 

374, 381 (Pa. 1999) (appellate court is bound by credibility determinations 

of PCRA court where determinations are supported by record).

Our standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is 

well settled. Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the burden of 

demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on the appellant. Commonwealth v.

Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa.Super. 2010). A petitioner must show (1) 

that the underlying claim has merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic 

basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for counsel's errors or 

omissions, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different. Id. The failure to prove any one of 

the three prongs results in the failure of the petitioner's claim. Id.
J-S06040-16

- 7 -

Central to the PCRA court’s decision rejecting both issues was an 

appropriate adherence to a standard of review prohibiting it from overriding 

a credibility-based finding of fact made by the suppression court. See 

Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 305 (Pa.Super. 2011) 

(acknowledging appellate court not at liberty to reject finding of fact based 

on credibility determination). At the hearing on Appellant’s motion to 

suppress, suppression counsel conducted lengthy cross-examination laying 

bare the inconsistencies between Agent Thompson’s written reports and his 

testimony with respect to whether he obtained an admission to drug use, 

urinalysis results, and his supervisor’s approval prior to searching Appellant’s 

residence. Moreover, suppression counsel also gained the Agent’s 

agreement that Appellant’s four prior urinalysis test results between March 

and June of 2010 were clean, the original impetus of the investigation was 

an anonymous tip, there was no other official investigation into Appellant’s 

conduct at the time, and the Agent believed Appellant’s traffic citations, 

alone, gave him reasonable suspicion to search Appellant’s residence. N.T. 

at 14-34. 

Nevertheless, such evidence was still reconcilable with the agents’ 

testimonies if the suppression court credited the agents’ explanations and 

viewed Thompson’s written reports as simply containing a minimally 

adequate account of events justifying the search, which is what the court 

did. On direct appeal, this Court upheld the denial of Appellant’s motion to 
J-S06040-16

- 8 -

suppress on this basis, Smith, supra at 6. In the present collateral 

challenge to suppression counsel’s performance, the PCRA court reviewed 

two additional reports in which Agent Thompson omitted reference to 

Appellant’s admission of drug use and the administration of an instant 

urinalysis, and it found such evidence to be cumulative to previously 

admitted evidence on the limitations and inconsistencies of Agent 

Thompson’s notes and reports. This Court agrees with the PCRA court’s 

assessment, and we note, additionally, that Appellant develops no argument 

supported by authority compelling us to disturb the PCRA court’s rejection of 

the claim underlying Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel challenge. 

Accordingly, we discern no merit to the present appeal.

Order is AFFIRMED.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/11/2016