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The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-1003

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

David Paul Gammons, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: September 27, 2002

 Filed: October 2, 2002

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, and MELLOY, Circuit

Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

David Paul Gammons pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute

methamphetamine, distributing methamphetamine, and possessing methamphetamine

with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)-(C), and

846. The district court1

 sentenced him to a total of 168 months of imprisonment and

5 years of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief and moved to
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withdraw as to all but one issue under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

Gammons has filed a pro se supplemental brief.

Gammons is foreclosed from raising claims that he should have received a 3-

level, rather than a 2-level, acceptance-of-responsibility reduction; that he should

have been sentenced based on a smaller amount of methamphetamine; and that he

should not have received a 3-level increase for his role in the offense. Gammons

withdrew his objections to the presentence report (PSR) on these grounds at

sentencing in exchange for the 2-level reduction and a recommendation for a 168-

month sentence. See United States v. Gutierrez, 130 F.3d 330, 332 (8th Cir. 1997)

(right that is intentionally relinquished extinguishes claim altogether); United States

v. Durham, 963 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.) (defendant who voluntarily exposes himself

to specific sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 1023 (1992). In any event, as to the acceptance-of-responsibility claim that

counsel believes is meritorious, Gammons did not meet the conditions for the

additional reduction because he did not present evidence that his proffer statement

was either timely or complete. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b); United States v. Robinson,

73 F.3d 747, 754 & n.8 (7th Cir. 1996) (district court did not err in denying additional

reduction when defendant did not show that she timely demonstrated acceptance of

responsibility).

Gammons further argues that for a variety of reasons the district court lacked

jurisdiction to sentence him to more than 10 years. His arguments fail because the

district court properly adopted the factual findings in the PSR, see United States v.

Beatty, 9 F.3d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1993) (district court may accept as true all factual

allegations in PSR not specifically objected to); the district court stated its reasons for

imposing the 168-month sentence; and his sentence did not exceed the applicable

statutory maximum, see United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 932 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000). Gammons’s pro se allegation of Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 violations fails, as he was properly informed of the
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nature of the charge, and of the applicable statutory maximum and minimum penalty

for each count. His ineffective-assistance claims are not properly raised on direct

appeal. See United States v. Cain, 134 F.3d 1345, 1352 (8th Cir. 1998).

Following our independent review, see Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we

find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw,

we deny Gammons’s motion to supplement the record, and we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.