NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CINDY M.,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, S.M., S.M., C.M.,

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0224 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD30319

The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Robert D. Rosanelli

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Emily M. Strokes

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 2-2-2021
CINDY M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Cindy M. ("Mother") appeals the juvenile court's order 

terminating her parental rights to Sh.M., So.M., and C.M. (collectively 

"Children"), arguing that the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") failed to 

provide appropriate reunification services. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 "We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding 

the juvenile court's order." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 

547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (citation omitted). 

¶3 In 2018, DCS received three reports that Christian D. was

abusing Mother. The abuse included breaking Mother's finger, "imped[ing] 

[Mother's] breathing," striking Mother while she held C.M. in her arms, and 

injuring Mother by pushing her to the ground. DCS removed the Children 

from the home and initiated dependency proceedings as to Mother. The 

juvenile court found the Children dependent and set a case plan for family 

reunification. 

¶4 DCS referred Mother for several services to help her 

understand the toll domestic violence was having on her Children and to 

help her break away from her abuser. Specifically, DCS offered Mother 

domestic-violence counseling, individual counseling, psychological 

evaluations, and attachment therapy.1 Mother engaged in some of these 

programs, but became pregnant with her abuser's child during the course 

of her domestic-violence counseling. 

1 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's finding that these 

services were offered. See Britz v. Kinsvater, 87 Ariz. 385, 388 (1960) 

("Inasmuch as the trial court's findings of fact are not themselves challenged 

by this appeal, we may assume that their accuracy is conceded.").
CINDY M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 Mother was also referred to parent-aide services, which she

successfully completed in early 2019. The parent aide noted, however, that 

Mother still "did not fully understand the impact domestic violence had on 

her [C]hildren . . . ." The following month, Mother was referred to parentaide services for a second time. This time Mother did not complete the 

program. Mother's new parent aide noted there was "not enough time" to 

complete Mother's services and added that "scheduling conflicts" made it 

difficult for Mother to fully engage in her parent-aide programming. 

¶6 DCS ultimately moved to terminate Mother's parental rights 

to the Children under the fifteen months in an out-of-home placement

ground. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The juvenile court held a three-day trial. 

The court found that DCS had proven the statutory ground, that the 

services DCS offered were appropriate, and that termination was in the best 

interests of the Children. Accordingly, the court terminated Mother's 

rights. The juvenile court noted that "Mom has been through counseling 

multiple times" and "that's really the issue." The court further remarked 

that "[Mother has] had multiple domestic violence relationships, and she 

has been through counseling on multiple occasions. And none of those 

have remedied that situation because she keeps on going back to the same 

types of relationships that caused danger to the [C]hildren." 

¶7 Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under

A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding DCS 

provided appropriate reunification services because Mother should have 

been given the opportunity to complete another round of parenting-aide 

services.2 

¶9 The right to custody of one's child is fundamental but not

absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248-49, ¶¶ 11-

12 (2000). Termination of parental rights is generally not favored and

"should be considered only as a last resort." Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No.

JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 4 (1990). We do not reweigh the evidence but "look 

2 Given that Mother's brief does not raise any other issue, Mother has 

waived all other arguments as to the termination of her rights. See Crystal 

E. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 578, ¶ 6 (App. 2017) ("[W]e adhere 

to the policy that it is generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not 

raised by the appellant.").
CINDY M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the court's ruling." Mary 

Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶10 When seeking termination under the fifteen months in an outof-home placement ground, DCS is required to make a reasonable effort to 

provide the parent with appropriate reunification services. See A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(c). DCS meets this obligation by providing the parent with "the 

time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help her 

become an effective parent." Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 

Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). DCS is only obligated to provide services that 

have a "reasonable prospect of success." Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. 

Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999).

¶11 Mother concedes she was offered myriad services but argues 

DCS did not provide appropriate services because it did not allow her time 

to complete an additional parent-aide program, as recommended by a

psychologist provided by DCS. Mother also points to another psychologist, 

who recommended that Mother attend parenting classes. She effectively 

argues that, once a program is recommended in a psychological evaluation,

reunification services are per se unreasonable unless the recommended 

program is offered and completed.

¶12 But the psychological evaluation on which Mother relies 

reflected that, even upon completion of the recommended services, Mother 

was not likely to obtain minimally-acceptable parenting skills. And the 

record confirms that prediction, as Mother has already completed a 

parenting-aide program meant to address her issues and showed no 

improvement. As the juvenile court noted, "[Mother] sometimes talks the 

talk of domestic violence counseling, but she has not shown that she has 

actually made those changes to protect her [C]hildren or to change the 

situation which has brought those [C]hildren into care on multiple 

occasions." 

¶13 DCS is not obliged "to undertake rehabilitative measures that 

are futile." Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 34. Mother was offered parentaide services, completed that program, and still failed to remedy the 

situation that caused the dependency. Mother fails to show why

completing one more parenting-aide program would lead to a different

result. See supra ¶ 5. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's finding 

that DCS provided reasonable reunification services. As Mother raises no 

other arguments, we affirm the juvenile court's termination of Mother's 

parental rights to the Children.
CINDY M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the reasons above, we affirm the juvenile court's

termination of Mother's parental rights to the Children.