alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Charles C. Merritt and Robert D. Merritt, Executors, etc., v. Arthur B. Keeler, Impleaded with Byron E. Merritt.

*Pleading*— Declaration—Action *by executors,*

In a suit by executors, the declaration must aver the promise to have been made to their testator in his life-time to admit proof of that fact. *Barnum v. Stone,*27 Mich. 332.

Error to St. Joseph. (Loveridge, J.)

Argued April *12,*1889.

Decided June 21, 1889.

Assumpsit by executors. Defendant Keeler brings error.

Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

*Howell, Carr & Barnard,*for appellant.

*F. W. Knowlen*and *Dallas Boudeman,*for plaintiffs.

Champlin, J.

Suit was commenced by summons by plaintiffs against Arthur B. Keeler and Byron E. Merritt; *315and afterwards a declaration was filed in the cause, in which the plaintiffs styled themselves—

> “ As executors of the last will and testament of William E, Merritt, deceas, d.”

It contained only the common counts in assumpsit, in which the promises are alleged to have been made to the plaintiffs.

A bill of particulars was filed containing several items, without stating any year. The first item reads as follows:

> “March 8. To collection money, Geo. Mathias note, $5.00.”

The other items are the same, except as to date and person, and except that opposite some of them, instead of “note,” the abbreviation “acct.” is placed. There are also two items for rent of store.

On the trial the plaintiffs were permitted, against the objection of counsel for defendant Keeler (the other defendant making no defense), to prove that the defendants were copartners, and had collected money for the plaintiffs’ testator during his life-time, and used the same in their business, and this action was brought to recover the amount, besides some rent due from the partnership to the plaintiffs’ testator during his life-time. No proof was introduced, or claim made, that defendants had ever promised to pay the executors after their appointment.

The declaration, as drawn, will not permit evidence of a promise express or implied, made to the testator in his lifetime, as a ground of recovery.

It was competent for the plaintiffs to sue in their representative character, as they have done, but they must allege the promise to have been made to the testator in his life-time to admit proof of that fact. *Barnum v. Stone,*27 Mich. 332.

As this disposes of the case as the declaration now stands,. *316it will not be necessary to notice the several other grounds of error alleged.

The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs of both courts.

The other Justices concurred.
#### STATE v. REED

No. 232PA01

Case below: 143 N.C. App. 155

Petition by the Attorney General for writ of supersedeas allowed 7 June 2001. Petition by Attorney General for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 allowed 7 June 2001. Conditional petition by defendant pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 as to additional issues denied 8 June 2001.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .83
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .83
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.9


                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



We consent to the use of our audit report dated April 21, 1999 with respect to
the consolidated financial statements of travelbyus.com, ltd. [formerly
LatinGold Inc.] in the Registration Statement on Form S-4 of Aviation Group,
Inc. [the "Registration Statement"] and to the reference to our firm under the
heading "Experts" in the Registration Statement.




                                       /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP
October 9, 2000                        Ernst & Young LLP
Toronto, Canada                        Chartered Accountants
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. VINCENT C. NEWMAN.

May 14, 1985.

Petition for certification denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

WAYNE N. LONG,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 472 MAL 2021

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of February, 2022, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
#### STATE v. IVEY

No. 501A98

Case below: Robeson County Superior Court

Motion by defendant to withdraw proposed record on appeal denied 18 January 2001 without prejudice to defendant’s right to refile his motion based upon the outcome of defendant’s review of the existing proposed record, or to file an amended record or a substituted proposed record. Without objection by the State, defendant is granted an extension of time to and including 15 February 2001 to investigate the circumstances of the preparation of the transcript of the trial and to file any such motion or record. The State shall respond to any such motion or filing by defendant on or before 22 March 2001.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Jamelle Andrea Peterkin v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01

- 1 8

- 01090

- CR

Trial court case number: 1548100

Trial court: 351st District Court of Harris County

Appellant, Jamelle Andrea Peterkin, has filed a motion to extend time to file a

supplemental brief until 30 days after a supplemental reporter’s record is filed. Appellant’s

motion does not indicate if and when he requested the court reporter to prepare the

supplemental rec ord or an estimated date the record will be filed. Accordingly, we grant

appellant’s motion and order that he file a supplemental brief, if any, no later than March

11, 2020

.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Evelyn V. Keyes

 Acting individually Acting for the Court

Date: January 30, 2020
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EMILIANO LOPEZ,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 13-17492

D.C. No. 1:11-cv-00107-LJO-DLB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 21, 2015** 

Before: CANBY, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Emiliano Lopez appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional

claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. 

Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 

FILED

AUG 04 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We may affirm on any ground

supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116,

1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Lopez’s access-to-courts claim was proper because Lopez

failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he suffered an actual injury as a result

of any defendants’ alleged inaction. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996)

(requiring factual allegations showing actual injury in order to state an access-tocourts claim); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010)

(although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present

factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

The district court properly dismissed Lopez’s claim regarding the denial of

meaningful review of his grievances because there is no constitutional right to

receive a particular type of prison grievance review. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement

to a specific prison grievance procedure.”); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,

1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability).

AFFIRMED.

2 13-17492
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2259 

To amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to allow 

for data collection about military-connected students. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 28, 2014 

Mrs. MURRAY (for herself, Ms. CANTWELL, and Mr. CARDIN) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 

of 1965 to allow for data collection about military-connected students. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Helping Military Chil5 dren Succeed in Schools Act’’. 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2259 IS

1 SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE ELEMENTARY AND SEC2 ONDARY EDUCATION ACT. 

3 Section 1111(h)(1)(C) of the Elementary and Sec4 ondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6311(h)(1)(C)) 

5 is amended— 

6 (1) in clause (vii) by striking ‘‘and’’ after the 

7 semicolon; 

8 (2) in clause (viii) by striking the period at the 

9 end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

10 (3) by inserting after clause (viii) the following: 

11 ‘‘(ix) information regarding the num12 ber of military-connected students which, 

13 for the purposes of this clause, shall mean 

14 students with a parent who serves in the 

15 Armed Forces, including the National 

16 Guard and Reserve Forces, and informa17 tion regarding academic achievement for 

18 such students, except that such informa19 tion shall not be used for school or local 

20 educational agency accountability purposes 

21 under section 1116.’’. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### HANKINS v. MERCY HOSP.

No. 476P00

Case below: 139 N.C. App. 835

Petition by plaintiff for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 20 December 2000.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 167 (Monday, August 30, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 53012-53013]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-21567]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 7140]


Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``Treasures of Moscow: Icons From the Andrey Rublev 
Museum''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, and Delegation of Authority No. 
236-3 of August 28, 2000, I hereby determine that the objects to be 
included in the exhibition ``Treasures of Moscow: Icons from the Andrey 
Rublev Museum,'' imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within 
the United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are 
imported pursuant to a loan agreement with the foreign owner or 
custodian. I also determine that the exhibition or display of the 
exhibit objects at the Museum of Russian Icons, Clinton, MA, from on or 
about October 23, 2010, until on or about July 25, 2011, and at 
possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in 
the national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of

[[Page 53013]]

these Determinations be published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the exhibit objects, contact Julie Simpson, Attorney-Adviser, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-
632-6467). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, SA-5, L/PD, 
Fifth Floor (Suite 5H03), Washington, DC 20522-0505.

    Dated: August 23, 2010.
Ann Stock,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2010-21567 Filed 8-27-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

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<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-2000             FEB-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-2000             OCT-31-2000
<CASH>                                          36,947                  36,947
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,530,509               9,530,509
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                 13,484,346              13,484,346
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            23,603,196              23,603,196
<PP&E>                                      19,170,987              19,170,987
<DEPRECIATION>                              10,795,571              10,795,571
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              34,931,727              34,931,727
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,579,635               9,579,635
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                34,931,727              34,931,727
<SALES>                                     25,230,850              77,876,456
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<CGS>                                       19,014,433              59,350,070
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               19,014,433              59,350,070
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,775,516              16,752,832
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             372,893               1,129,206
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 68,008                 644,348
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                       0
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<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                    68,008                 644,348
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.01                    0.09
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 99.1



PARTHUSCEVA, INC.



Certification Pursuant To

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant To

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of ParthusCeva, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year
ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Kevin Fielding, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18, United
States Code, that this Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.



By:

/s/    KEVIN
FIELDINGKevin Fielding President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)




|Date:    March |  | 27, 2003
|-------------- |  | --------



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to ParthusCeva, Inc. and will be retained by ParthusCeva, Inc.
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

GEORGE ALBERTO BELTRAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 16-50232 

D.C. No. 3:12-cr-00002-MMA 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Michael M. Anello, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 11, 2017**

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. 

George Alberto Beltran appeals pro se from the district court’s order 

denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Beltran contends that he is entitled to a sentence reduction under 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 19 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-50232 

Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. We review de novo whether a 

defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2). See United 

States v. Paulk, 569 F.3d 1094, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009). Beltran is not eligible for a 

sentence reduction because his sentence was not “based on a sentencing range that 

has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2). Rather, his sentence was based on the statutory mandatory minimum 

under 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B). Thus, the district court properly denied relief. 

See Paulk, 569 F.3d at 1095.

Beltran’s additional claims are not cognizable under section 3582(c)(2). See 

Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 831 (2010) (alleged sentencing errors are 

“outside the scope of the proceeding authorized by § 3582(c)(2)”). 

AFFIRMED.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. FRANK T. MILLER.

March 4, 1985.

Petition for certification denied.
#### STATE v. HEADEN

No. 92P00-2

Case below: 130 N.C. App. 613

Petition by defendant for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals denied 1 February 2001.
#### Lee *v.*Averill.

Under the act to abolish imprisonment for debt, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant, issued before the service of the summons by which the suit is commenced, is void.

On discharging a party arrested under such a warrant, the judge cannot impose as terms, that he shall not bring an action.

Nov. 1848.

Motion before a justice of the court at chambers, to discharge a defendant from arrest upon a warrant issued under the act of 1831, to abolish imprisonment for debt in certain cases. The summons and complaint were delivered to the sheriff to be served on the defendant, before application was made for the warrant, but the warrant was issued, before either the summons or complaint were served. In fact the sheriff served all three at the same time.

*622
      *J. W.*Gilbert, for the defendant.

*P. Reynolds,*for the plaintiff.

Vanderpoel, J.

The warrant was clearly void. Section 106 of the code (of 1848,) applies, and the suit was not commenced when it was issued. The 79th section relates merely to saving the statute of limitations. The defendant must be discharged. I am asked to impose as a condition that he will not sue for false imprisonment, but I have no control over the matter.

Defendant discharged.
Exhibit 32.2

                  Certification of Principal Executive Officer
                           Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350
                 (Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

I, Kirk Blosch, Chief Accounting Officer of OCIS Corp. (the "Registrant") do
hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge, based upon a review of the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the
period December 31, 2006 of the Registrant, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"):

 (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

                                     By: /s/ Kirk Blosch
                                      -----------------------------------
                                     Kirk Blosch
                                     Chief Accounting Officer

February 26, 2007

 * A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to OCIS Corp. and will be retained by OCIS Corp. and furnished to the
Securities Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.