This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 1 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 2 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 3 deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 4 filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 GLENN WILCOX, 7 Plaintiff-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 30,010 9 NEW MEXICO BOARD OF 10 ACUPUNCTURE AND ORIENTAL 11 MEDICINE, 12 Defendant-Appellee. 13 APPEAL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULES ADOPTED BY THE NEW 14 MEXICO BOARD OF ACUPUNCTURE AND ORIENTAL MEDICINE 15 Anita Villegas, Board Administrator 16 Glenn Wilcox 17 Placitas, NM 18 Pro Se Appellant 19 Gary K. King, Attorney General 20 John Adrian Terry, Assistant Attorney General 21 Santa Fe, NM 22 for Appellee 23 MEMORANDUM OPINION 24 FRY, Chief Judge. 252 Glenn Wilcox, Appellant, appeals the promulgation of a number of regulations 1 by the New Mexico Board of Acupuncture and Oriental Medicine (the Board). In our 2 notice, we proposed to reverse and set aside the regulations as not having been 3 adopted in accordance with law. The Board has timely responded. We have 4 considered its arguments and, not being persuaded, we reverse. Appellant’s Second 5 Motion to Amend the Docketing Statement to correct a typographical error is granted. 6 First, the Board argues that summary disposition is inappropriate in this case. 7 It argues that because of the factual complexity of this cas e, it is inappropriate for the 8 summary calendar. In fact, our review doe s not rely on the complexities of the facts 9 here. Rather, we proposed to conclude th at legal error occurre d requiring reversal. 10 We did not even attempt to review the reco rd for sufficiency of the evidence because, 11 as we pointed out in our notice, we coul d not engage in a proper review where the 12 Board had not indicated what facts and circumstances it considered in adopting the 13 regulations. This appeal concerns the co mplexity of the facts only as an underlying 14 basis for proposing to reverse here. Further, we point out that the entire record from 15 the administrative agency is before the Court at this time. Thus, there would be no 16 other facts available to us if we were to assign it to the ge neral calendar. Finally, there 17 is nothing in the record that prevents the Board from responding to our proposal to 183 reverse on legal grounds. Therefore, we conc lude that this case is appropriate for 1 decision on the summary calendar. 2 Second, the Board contests our legal c onclusions. In particular, it argues that 3 there is nothing in the law requiring it to provide reasoning for adopting regulations. 4 It argues that we did not recognize the dis tinction between legislative and adjudicatory 5 functions of an administrative agency. It argues that the law requiring the statement 6 of reasons does not apply to legislative f unctions, such as rule-making. In our 7 calendar notice, we cited several cases in which the admini strative agency was 8 required to state its reasons for adopting regulations. See N.M. Mun. League v. N.M. 9 Envtl. Improvement Bd. , 88 N.M. 201, 539 P.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1975); City of Roswell 10 v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm’n , 84 N.M. 561, 505 P.2d 1237 (Ct. App. 1972). 11 The Board argues that those cases do not apply because they involved specialized 12 agencies, whose authorizing statutes requirethem to consider a number of factors in 13 making their regulations. SeeNMSA 1978, §§ 74-1-9(B) (1985), -6-4(E) (1993) 14 (amended 2009). 15 The cases we cited, however, did not re ly on those statutes as the basis for 16 requiring the agency to give an indication of its reasoning or as the basis upon which 17 the regulations were adopted. Rather, th e reason we require reasons supporting the 18 regulations is that we cannot effectively perform the review authorized by statute 194 unless the record indicates what facts and circumstances were considered and the 1 weight given to those facts and circumstances. City of Roswell , 84 N.M. at 565, 505 2 P.2d at 1241. Thus, the requi rement does not come from the authorizing statute, but 3 rather from the need to facilitate the reviewof the regulations that is authorized by 4 law. We are unpersuaded thatprofessional licensing agencies do not need to provide 5 reasoning for adoption of their regulations. See Rivas v. Bd. of Cosmetologists , 101 6 N.M. 592, 594, 686 P.2d 934, 936 (1984). Our case law is clear that the record must 7 disclose the Board’s reasoning and the ba sis on which it adopted the regulations. Id. 8 As we pointed out in our notice, our revi ew of the record does not disclose the 9 Board’s reasoning or the basis on which it adopted these regulations. [CN 3] The 10 Board’s response does not point us to the reasoning, but rather argues that it does not 11 have to provide it. We disagree. There mu st be something in the record to which we 12 can point as explanation for why the Board deemed it necessary to amend its 13 regulations. This is especially true wh ere the regulations as amended appear to 14 conflict with NMSA 1978, S ection 61-14A-8.1(C) (2007). 15 The Board also argues that due process requirements do not apply to the Board 16 in its adoption of regulations. Again, wedisagree. The Unif orm Licensing Act itself 17 sets out certain due process requirement s, including notice and opportunity to be 18 heard. NMSA 1978, Section 61-1-29 (B), (C), (D) (1981). The Act provides that all 195 interested persons shall be given a reas onable opportunity to submit data, views or 1 arguments, as well as to examine witnesses testifying at the hearing. Section 61-1- 2 29(D). Thus, although there is no fundamentalright to due process before an agency 3 adopts a rule, Livingston v. Ewing , 98 N.M. 685, 688, 652 P.2d 235, 238 (1982), the 4 general notions of notice and opportunity to be heard have been made applicable by 5 statute. Any failure to comply with th ese requirements results in adoption of a 6 regulation in violation of law. 7 As we noted in our calendar notice, we could find nothing in the record 8 suggesting that interested persons, incl uding Appellant, were denied the right to 9 question testifying witnesses. We did note that Appellant was not allowed to question 10 the Board member who was the proponent of the regulations. However, it was not 11 clear whether she was a witness presenting testimony in support of the regulations. 12 Finally, the Board argues that there wa s substantial evidence to support the 13 adoption of the regulations. It points to the nearly 800 pages of record and the public 14 hearing as support for that assertion. However, we did not make any determination 15 on the sufficiency of the evidence in our cal endar notice. As we pointed out in our 16 notice, there is a good deal of informati on in the record, but we have no way of 17 knowing why the Board relied on some of the evidence and not other. The record is 18 replete with conflicting points of view, but nowhere does the Board explain how it 196 resolved those conflicts. We recognize th at a number of meetings and a good deal of 1 discussion preceded the public hearing and adoption of the regulations. However, 2 there is nothing in the record explaining the Board’s reasons for adoption of the 3 regulations in the face of what appears from the record to be some strong opposition. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons stated herein and inthe notice of proposed disposition, we 6 reverse and set aside the regulations. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8

9 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge 10 WE CONCUR: 11

12 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 13

14 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 15