UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ PETER MARIO GOICO, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. STATE OF KANSAS, Defendant - Appellee. No. 19-3116 (D.C. No. 6:19-CV -01055-JTM-GEB) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before CARSON , BALDOCK , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ In March 2019, Plaintiff Peter Goico filed a complaint against the State of Kansas, alleging the State’s “att empts” to legalize marijuana a re unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the com plaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) because the action wa s frivolous, i.e., “lack[ed] an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” ROA, 70 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). The court explained that federal cour ts do not have the power to pr eempt prospective

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in t he determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is t herefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgme nt is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 legislation. Id. at 70–71 (citing McChord v. Cincinnati, New Orleans, & Tex. Pac. Ry.
Co. , 183 U.S. 483, 496 (1902)). Plaintiff’s claim rested upon “pu re speculation of future legislation” and, thus, Pl aintiff was impermissibly seek ing “an advisory opinion as to whether future legislation would be preempted by various constitutional rights.”
Id. (quotations omitted). Thus, the dis trict court dismissed Plain tiff’s action. On appeal, Plaintiff argues his complaint challenged, not only future legislation, but also a law that was indeed passed in 2016 that lowered the penalties for possession of marijuana. While Plaintiff mentioned the governo r of Kansas was “trying to lower penalties” in h is complaint, Plaintiff was cle arly challenging the “attempts” to “legalize marijuan a”—not lowering penalties for p ossession of marijuana. ROA, 7 (“I always believed that marijuana legalizat ion was a problem, but now the unconstitutional attempts to do so are threatening a di rect financial injury to me.”); id. (challenging “state level laws that legalize marijuana”); id. (“Kansas Governor, Laura Kelly, has become the latest to announce her in tentions to legalize Marijuana . . . .”); id. at 8 (“I can prove that my state ’s unconstitutional attempts to legalize a dangerous substance ar e directly threatening me.”). Any effort to change course and now challenge the 201 6 law—something neither argued nor ruled upon below—is waived. See United States v. Kearn , 863 F.3d 1299, 1313 (10th Cir. 2017). To the extent Plaintiff argues he is able to challenge potentia l future legislation, the district court was correct in it s holding. We have nothing fur ther to add to the court’s discussion, except to point out t o Plaintiff that the place to engage in the political process is with his state legis lature, not with this Court.3 Plaintiff also argues the distri ct court erred in its holdings on anonymity. Plaintiff sought to seal the r ecord or proceed anonymously mult iple times before the district court. These motions w ere rejected because Plaintiff’ s mental condition “was not sufficiently embarrassing to w arrant the extraordinary reme dy of maintaining the action anonymously” and because P laintiff’s “condition was not logically linked to the merits of the action.” We have previously stated: Lawsuits are public events. A plaintiff should be permitted to proceed anonymously only in those excepti onal cases involving matters o f a highly sensitive and personal na ture, real danger of physical h arm, or where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a resul t of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s id entity. The risk that a plaint iff may suffer some embarrassment is not enough.
Femedeer v. Haun , 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 ( 10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Doe v. Frank , 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992)). We agree with the district co urt that this is not an exceptional case that warrants an onymity. Accordingly, the dis trict court did not err in denying Plaintiff’s request for anonymity.
AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge