60612 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 199 / Tuesday, October 14, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

§ 316.402 Procedures for making 

temporary appointments. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(4) Appointment under 5 U.S.C. 3112 

(veterans with compensable serviceconnected disability of 30 percent of 

more). The disability must be 

documented by a notice of retirement or 

discharge due to service-connected 

disability from active military service 

dated at any time, or by a notice of 

compensable disability rating from the 

Department of Veterans Affairs, dated 

1991 or later; 

* * * * * 

[FR Doc. E8–24227 Filed 10–10–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6325–39–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 50 

[NRC–2008–0237] 

Policy Statement on the Regulation of 

Advanced Reactors 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final policy statement. 

SUMMARY: On May 9, 2008 (73 FR 

26349), the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC; Commission) issued, 

for public comment, a draft policy 

statement on the regulation of advanced 

reactors. This final policy statement 

reinforces the Commission’s current 

policy regarding advanced reactors and 

includes new items to be considered 

during the design of these reactors, 

including security, emergency 

preparedness, threat of theft, and 

international safeguards. 

DATE: The effective date is November 13, 

2008. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Wesley W. Held, Rulemaking, Guidance, 

and Advanced Reactor Branch, Division 

of New Reactor Licensing, Office of New 

Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Mail Stop: T–6 C34, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; 

Telephone: (301) 415–1583; fax number: 

(301) 415–5399; e-mail: 

Wesley.Held@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

II. Summary of Public Comments and 

Responses to Comments 

A. General Comments 

B. Attributes To Be Considered During 

Design 

C. Security of Advanced Reactors 

D. Relationship to General Design Criteria 

(GDC) 

E. Other Comments 

III. Final Policy Statement 

I. Background 

On July 8, 1986 (51 FR 24643), the 

Commission published a policy 

statement on the regulation of advanced 

reactors. The Commission had the 

following three primary objectives in 

issuing the advanced reactor policy 

statement (ARPS): 

• To maintain the earliest possible 

interaction of applicants, vendors, and 

government agencies with the NRC. 

• To provide all interested parties, 

including the public, with the 

Commission’s views concerning the 

desired characteristics of advanced 

reactor designs. 

• To express the Commission’s intent 

to issue timely comment on the 

implications of such designs for safety 

and the regulatory process. 

On July 12, 1994 (59 FR 35461), the 

Commission revised the 1986 ARPS by 

addressing the Commission’s policy on 

metrication (57 FR 46202; October 7, 

1992; as revised June 19, 1996 (61 FR 

31169)). 

Since the events of September 11, 

2001, the NRC has assessed potential 

threats and their possible impacts on the 

Nation’s fleet of operating nuclear 

power reactors and has required 

upgrades of physical security measures 

and mitigative strategies through the 

issuance of a series of security orders 

and license conditions. For new nuclear 

power reactors, the Commission 

considers it prudent to provide 

expectations and guidance on security 

matters to prospective applicants so that 

they can use this information early in 

the design stage of new reactors to 

identify potential mitigative measures 

and/or design features that provide a 

more robust and effective security 

posture. Therefore, the Commission 

decided to revise the ARPS to integrate 

these expectations for security and 

emergency preparedness with the 

current expectations for safety. 

The Commission’s expectation for 

advanced reactor designers to consider 

the effects of a large, commercial 

airplane impact is currently being 

addressed through rulemaking 

(Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for 

New Nuclear Power Reactor Designs— 

RIN AI19—Docket ID NRC–2007–0009). 

The Commission believes that reactors 

designed with potential aircraft impact 

considerations resulting from this rule 

would be more robust than if they were 

designed in the absence of this rule. 

The proposed policy statement, 

‘‘Policy Statement on the Regulation of 

Advanced Reactors,’’ was published in 

the Federal Register on May 9, 2008 (73 

FR 26349). The public comment period 

expired on July 8, 2008. This final 

policy statement reflects the pertinent 

comments received on the published 

draft policy statement. 

II. Summary of Public Comments and 

Responses to Comments 

Eight organizations and individuals 

submitted written comments on the 

draft policy statement. The commenters 

represented a variety of interests 

addressing a wide range of issues, and 

included individuals; reactor vendors; 

and citizen, environmental, and 

industry groups. Most commenters 

agreed with the general principle of the 

policy statement, but no commenter 

supported the policy statement exactly 

as proposed. Several commenters 

wanted changes made to the list of 

design attributes to be considered. 

Others suggested linking the design 

attributes to the general design criteria 

(GDC). Another commented on the 

security of nuclear power plants, and 

one commenter described a thorium 

reactor design. 

Comments on this proposed rule are 

available electronically at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. From this page, 

the public can find all the comments 

received by inputting NRC–2008–0237 

into the search field. Comments are also 

available electronically at the NRC’s 

Electronic Reading Room at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. 

From this page, the public can gain 

access to the Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS), which provides text and 

image files of NRC’s public documents. 

The public can search for comments 

using the ADAMS accession numbers 

listed in the table below, which 

includes the commenters’ names and 

affiliations. 

Letter No. ADAMS accession No. Commenter affiliation Commenter name Abbreviation 

1 ................ ML081420201 ............... Private citizen .................................................... Paul Sund ........................................... Sund 

2 ................ ML081420208 ............... University of California—Berkeley ..................... Per Peterson ...................................... UCB 

3 ................ ML081770159 ............... Toshiba .............................................................. Koichiro Oshima ................................. Toshiba 

4 ................ ML081900560 ............... Thorium ElectroNuclear AB ............................... Elling Disen ........................................ TEN AB 


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Letter No. ADAMS accession No. Commenter affiliation Commenter name Abbreviation 

5 ................ ML081900562 ............... North Carolina Waste Awareness and Reduction Network.John D. Runkle ................................... NC WARN 

6 ................ ML081910787 ............... Nuclear Energy Institute .................................... Adrian Heymer ................................... NEI 

7 ................ ML081910796 ............... Union of Concerned Scientists .......................... Edwin Lyman ...................................... UCS 

8 ................ ML081970378 ............... Private citizen .................................................... Ray Van De Walker ........................... Walker 

This document places each public 

comment into one of the following 

categories: 

A. General Comments 

B. Attributes To Be Considered 

During Design 

C. Security of Advanced Reactors 

D. Relationship to GDC 

E. Other Comments 

Within each category, the NRC has 

either repeated comments as written by 

the commenter or summarized the 

comments for conciseness and clarity. 

At the end of the comment or comment 

summary, the NRC references the 

specific public comments and the letters 

by which they were provided to the 

NRC using the NRC-assigned sequential 

comment numbers listed in Table 1. For 

example, specific comments are 

referenced as [XXX]–[YYY], where 

[XXX] represents the commenter’s 

abbreviation and [YYY] represents the 

NRC-assigned sequential comment 

number. 

A. General Comments 

Comment: The commenter believes 

that a fast fuel reactor can help reduce 

the volume of radioactive waste 

currently in storage at reactor sites in 

the United States and hopes that the 

NRC has considered or will consider 

those designs. (Sund-1) 

NRC Response: The NRC neither 

develops nor promotes reactor designs, 

but rather reviews the safety and 

security aspects of designs proposed by 

reactor vendors and designers. The NRC 

has the ability to develop the capability 

to evaluate innovative and advanced 

designs that are presented for NRC 

review (e.g., Toshiba’s 4S reactor 

design). No changes were made to the 

policy statement as a result of this 

comment. 

Comment: The commenter suggests 

that the term ‘‘current generation’’ in the 

first paragraph of the policy statement 

could be misinterpreted because it was 

written in 1986 and does not take into 

consideration plants currently in the 

licensing process. The commenter 

suggests that the term ‘‘current 

generation light-water reactors’’ be 

replaced with ‘‘plants licensed before 

1997.’’ (NEI–2) 

NRC Response: The NRC agrees that 

the term ‘‘current generation’’ may 

cause confusion because it is subjective 

and time-dependent. During previous 

interactions with the industry, the staff 

indicated that ‘‘current generation lightwater reactors’’ refers to those reactors 

that were licensed before 1997. 

Accordingly, a footnote has been added 

to section III, ‘‘Final Policy Statement,’’ 

providing this definition. 

Comment: The commenter suggests 

that the discussion of the pending 

rulemaking on Consideration of Aircraft 

Impacts for New Nuclear Plant Designs 

(Rulemaking Docket NRC–2007–0009) is 

more akin to background information 

than a lasting statement of Commission 

policy and recommends deleting this 

paragraph or relocating it to the 

Background section. (NEI–3) 

NRC Response: The NRC agrees with 

the comment and has moved the 

discussion to the Background section in 

order to alleviate the need to revise the 

statement again as that rulemaking 

progresses. 

Comment: The commenter states that 

the NRC licensing review is a famously 

difficult hurdle for advanced reactors 

and wants the Commission to consider 

a pilot program where commercial 

bureaus would use NRC policies to 

review, license, and inspect new reactor 

designs. (Walker-1) 

NRC Response: The Atomic Energy 

Act of 1974, as amended, describes the 

NRC’s responsibilities. These 

responsibilities include the licensing of 

nuclear reactors; therefore, the NRC 

cannot transfer this responsibility to 

another entity. No changes were made 

to the policy statement as a result of this 

comment. 

Comment: The commenter encourages 

‘‘type-licensing’’ of reactor designs and 

‘‘fast-track combined operating 

licenses.’’ (Walker-2) 

NRC Response: The NRC generally 

agrees with the comment. As the 

commenter noted, the NRC has 

regulations in place that allow these 

regulatory approval processes. In 10 

CFR Part 52, ‘‘Licenses, Certifications, 

and Approvals for Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ the NRC uses the term ‘‘design 

certification’’ to describe the process of 

approving by rulemaking a reactor 

design that may be referenced by 

combined license (COL) applicants. A 

COL is a licensing process that results 

in the granting of a combined 

construction permit and operating 

license with conditions. This process is 

different from the two-step process in 10 

CFR Part 50, ‘‘Domestic Licensing of 

Production and Utilization Facilities,’’ 

which provides for construction permits 

and operating licenses. In addition to 

the benefits gained by using the COL 

process, the NRC has also developed a 

design-centered approach for COL 

reviews that implements a ‘‘one issue, 

one review, and one decision 

philosophy.’’ No changes were made to 

the policy statement as a result of this 

comment. 

Comment: The commenter believes 

that the overall effectiveness of the 

policy will be strengthened if the fourth 

listed attribute (and perhaps to a lesser 

degree, the eighth), emphasizes or 

prioritizes the potential for minimizing 

severe accidents over minimizing the 

consequences of such an accident. This 

may be a small distinction, but the 

commenter believes there is a benefit to 

initially focusing on features to prevent 

an accident although reactor designers 

should not overlook mitigation features. 

(Toshiba-1) 

NRC Response: The NRC agrees that 

accident prevention is preferable to 

accident mitigation and believes that the 

fourth attribute expresses this emphasis 

because the attribute lists design 

features that enhance prevention 

specifically. However, the attribute has 

been modified to place additional 

emphasis on accident prevention. 

Comment: The commenter notes that 

the policy statement makes no mention 

of the use of probabilistic risk 

assessment (PRA) in assessing the 

design of advanced reactors and feels 

that it would be helpful to describe how 

PRA might be used to confirm the 

favorable design attributes suggested. 

The commenter feels that it may be 

helpful to provide advanced reactor 

designers with interim guidance 

regarding NRC efforts for a risk 

informed, technology neutral licensing 

framework to permit designers to 

approach licensing with less uncertainty 

regarding if and/or how PRA should be 

utilized. (Toshiba-3) 

NRC Response: The NRC has 

established specific requirements 

related to the use of PRA in licensing 

new nuclear power plants, which would 

be applicable to advanced reactors. For 

example, in accordance with 10 CFR 


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52.47, ‘‘Contents of Applications— 

Technical Information,’’ applicants for a 

design certification must include in 

their application a description of the 

design-specific PRA and its results. In 

addition, 10 CFR 50.71(h) requires each 

holder of a COL to develop and 

maintain a PRA for their facility and to 

periodically update the PRA to reflect 

plant changes and any NRC-endorsed 

consensus standards on PRA. In 

addition to adopting these regulatory 

requirements, the Commission has also 

issued policy statements on the use of 

PRA in regulatory activities (60 FR 

42622; August 16, 1995), and severe 

accidents regarding future designs and 

existing plants (50 FR 32138; August 8, 

1985). The use of PRA as a design tool 

is implied by the policy statement on 

the use of PRA and the NRC believes 

that the current regulations and policy 

statements provide sufficient guidance 

to designers. No changes were made to 

the policy statement as a result of this 

comment. 

B. Attributes To Be Considered During 

Design 

Comment: The commenter 

recommends that the policy statement 

explicitly discuss the threat of theft, in 

addition to the current focus on threat 

of sabotage of facilities, and encourage 

designers to consider requirements for 

implementing international safeguards 

monitoring early in the design process, 

particularly for reactors that will be colocated with reprocessing facilities. The 

commenter suggested a possible 

addition to the list of design attributes 

included in the policy statement that 

relates to theft and international 

safeguards. (UCB–1) 

NRC Response: The NRC agrees with 

the comment and has added 

expectations that reactor designers 

consider the threat of theft and 

requirements for implementing 

international safeguards monitoring 

early in the design phase. An attribute 

has been added to the list of design 

attributes to be considered during the 

design of advanced reactors to address 

these topics. 

Comment: The commenter suggests 

that the following attributes in the 

current ARPS are not statements of 

design philosophy and are solely a 

restatement of existing regulations and 

should be deleted. 

• Designs with features to prevent a 

simultaneous loss of containment 

integrity (including situations where the 

containment is bypassed), and the 

ability to maintain core cooling as a 

result of an aircraft impact, or 

identification of system designs that 

would provide inherent delay in 

radiological releases (if prevention of 

release is not possible). 

• Designs with features to prevent 

loss of spent fuel pool integrity as a 

result of an aircraft impact. (NEI–1) 

NRC Response: The NRC agrees that 

these attributes are restatements of 

current requirements, but it believes 

that these aspects should be highlighted 

in the policy statement to ensure that 

they are considered early in the design 

phase in order to identify design 

features that could be included to 

prevent or mitigate problems rather than 

relying on operational programs. No 

changes were made to the policy 

statement as a result of this comment. 

C. Security of Advanced Reactors 

Comment: The commenter agrees that 

advanced reactor designers should 

consider potential mitigative measures 

and/or design features that provide a 

more robust and effective security 

posture, which should include the 

possible threat of terrorist attacks and 

aviation attacks at any reactor. 

(NCWARN–1) 

NRC Response: As stated in the 

background section, the Commission’s 

expectation for advanced reactor 

designers to consider the effects of a 

large, commercial airplane impact is 

currently being addressed through 

rulemaking (Consideration of Aircraft 

Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactor 

Designs—RIN AI19–ID Docket NRC– 

2007–0009). The Commission believes 

that reactors designed with potential 

aircraft impact considerations resulting 

from this proposed rule would be more 

robust than currently-licensed reactors. 

However, if the NRC adopts the aircraft 

impact rule in final form, it will be 

applicable to future reactor designs and 

need not be addressed in this policy 

statement. Regarding terrorist attacks, as 

with operating and proposed reactors, 

all licensees—including those using 

advanced reactor designs must be able 

to defend against the design basis threat 

(DBT), which considers terrorist attacks. 

No changes were made to the policy 

statement as a result of this comment. 

Comment: The commenter states that 

it can be concluded from the wording of 

the ARPS that existing reactors and 

reactors currently being proposed 

(AP1000, ESBWR, etc.) do not address 

possible threats of terrorist attacks and 

aviation attacks in any meaningful way. 

(NCWARN–2) 

NRC Response: The NRC disagrees 

with the comment. All operating 

reactors must be able to defend against 

the DBT, which considers terrorist 

attacks. The NRC conducts both routine 

security inspections and force-on-force 

exercises to ensure that the security 

plans at each plant are sufficient enough 

to successfully defend against the DBT. 

In addition, the NRC issued orders in 

2002 to all operating reactors requiring 

them to implement measures to mitigate 

the effects of the loss of large areas of 

a plant caused by large fires and 

explosions. Those orders are currently 

being codified and once finalized will 

be requirements for new reactors as 

well. No changes were made to the 

policy statement as a result of this 

comment. 

Comment: The commenter states that 

it seems an untenable position by the 

Commission to recognize that ‘‘advance 

reactors’’ need to be made safer, more 

robust and effective, yet ignore the clear 

message it is sending the public on the 

lack of safety at the current reactors and 

proposed reactors. The commenter 

provided a list of attributes that he feels 

should be required for current reactors 

and proposed reactors that includes 

many of the items listed in the policy 

statement as appropriate for 

consideration for advanced reactors. 

(NCWARN–3) 

NRC Response: The NRC disagrees 

with the comment. The policy statement 

does not state that advanced reactor 

designs must be safer than the current 

generation of reactors, but rather that 

they must provide the same degree of 

protection of the environment and 

public health and safety and the 

common defense and security that is 

required for current-generation lightwater reactors. The goal of the policy 

statement update is to encourage 

advanced reactor designers to consider 

safety and security in the early stages of 

design in order to identify potential 

design features and/or mitigative 

measures that provide a more robust 

and effective security posture with less 

reliance on operational programs. No 

changes were made to the policy 

statement as a result of this comment. 

Comment: The commenter believes 

that current reactors and proposed 

reactors need to have attributes similar 

to those noted in the policy statement 

for advanced reactors. In addition, the 

commenter believes that the 

Commission needs to guarantee that all 

current reactors meet these minimal 

safety requirements as a top priority, 

and then ensure that the designs for the 

proposed reactors meet these 

requirements prior to the issuance of 

any new reactor license. (NCWARN–4) 

NRC Response: The attributes listed 

in the policy statement are ones that the 

NRC believes should be considered 

during the design stage of advanced 

reactors. Although some of the attributes 

reflect those found in current 

requirements, not all of them are 


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1Current generation LWRs are those nuclear 

power plants licensed before 1997. 

requirements. The NRC believes that it 

would be impractical to force existing 

reactors to modify their designs to 

include all of the design attributes in the 

Advanced Reactor Policy Statement. 

Such changes would essentially result 

in those plants being completely 

redesigned. There is no need for such a 

drastic step, given that the NRC 

continues to believe that all currently 

operating reactors provide reasonable 

assurance of adequate protection. No 

changes were made to the policy 

statement as a result of this comment. 

Comment: The commenter states that 

none of the existing reactors are safe and 

secure and that advanced reactors can 

wait until present deficiencies are fixed 

and proposed reactors are made safe and 

secure. (NCWARN–5) 

NRC Response: The NRC believes that 

the existing fleet of nuclear power 

plants is safe and secure. The NRC also 

believes that advanced reactor designers 

should consider the expectations in the 

policy statement to ensure that security 

and emergency response are considered 

alongside safety during the early stages 

of plant design. The fact that such 

actions might reduce the need for 

operator actions or improve the overall 

risk profile for future plants does not 

mean that the existing operating plants 

are unsafe. No changes were made to the 

policy statement as a result of this 

comment. 

D. Relationship to General Design 

Criteria (GDC) 

Comment: The commenter wants the 

agency to incorporate the ‘expectations’ 

in the policy statement into the 

regulations as additional GDC. (UCS–1) 

NRC Response: The GDC establish 

minimum requirements for the principal 

design criteria for nuclear power plants. 

The goal of the policy statement is not 

to raise these minimum requirements, 

but rather to encourage advanced 

reactor designers to consider safety and 

security matters during the development 

of future reactor designs. No changes 

were made to the policy statement as a 

result of this comment. 

Comment: The commenter believes 

that the utility of the policy could be 

enhanced if the relationship of the 

attributes listed in the policy to the GDC 

of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A is 

provided. (Toshiba-2) 

NRC Response: The NRC believes that 

the attributes identified in the policy 

statement should be used in conjunction 

with the GDC, other NRC regulations, 

and sound design practices to ensure 

that safety and security are 

appropriately considered in the design. 

The attributes do not necessarily 

correspond to any particular GDC or set 

of GDCs, and it is not clear what benefit 

would be obtained if the NRC were to 

now identify ‘‘relationships’’ between 

the design attributes and the GDC. No 

changes were made to the policy 

statement as a result of this comment. 

E. Other Comments 

Comment: The commenter did not 

submit comments on the draft revision 

to the ARPS, but instead submitted 

information on a thorium reactor design. 

(TEN AB–1) 

NRC Response: The commenter did 

not address any topic of the draft 

revision to the policy statement, nor did 

the comment explain why it should 

include design information on a specific 

design concept. No changes were made 

to the policy statement as a result of this 

comment. 

III. Final Policy Statement 

Consistent with its legislative 

mandate, the Commission’s policy with 

respect to regulating nuclear power 

reactors is to ensure adequate protection 

of the environment and public health 

and safety and the common defense and 

security. Regarding advanced reactors, 

the Commission expects, as a minimum, 

at least the same degree of protection of 

the environment and public health and 

safety and the common defense and 

security that is required for current 

generation light-water reactors (LWRs).1

Furthermore, the Commission expects 

that advanced reactors will provide 

enhanced margins of safety and/or use 

simplified, inherent, passive, or other 

innovative means to accomplish their 

safety and security functions. 

Among the attributes that could assist 

in establishing the acceptability or 

licensability of a proposed advanced 

reactor design, and therefore should be 

considered in advanced designs, are: 

• Highly reliable and less complex 

shutdown and decay heat removal 

systems. The use of inherent or passive 

means to accomplish this objective is 

encouraged (negative temperature 

coefficient, natural circulation, etc.). 

• Longer time constants and 

sufficient instrumentation to allow for 

more diagnosis and management before 

reaching safety systems challenge and/ 

or exposure of vital equipment to 

adverse conditions. 

• Simplified safety systems that, 

where possible, reduce required 

operator actions, equipment subjected to 

severe environmental conditions, and 

components needed for maintaining safe 

shutdown conditions. Such simplified 

systems should facilitate operator 

comprehension, reliable system 

function, and more straightforward 

engineering analysis. 

• Designs that minimize the potential 

for severe accidents and their 

consequences by providing sufficient 

inherent safety, reliability, redundancy, 

diversity, and independence in safety 

systems, with an emphasis on 

minimizing the potential for accidents 

over minimizing the consequences of 

such accidents. 

• Designs that provide reliable 

equipment in the balance of plant (BOP) 

(or safety-system independence from 

BOP) to reduce the number of 

challenges to safety systems. 

• Designs that provide easily 

maintainable equipment and 

components. 

• Designs that reduce potential 

radiation exposures to plant personnel. 

• Designs that incorporate the 

defense-in-depth philosophy by 

maintaining multiple barriers against 

radiation release, and by reducing the 

potential for, and consequences of, 

severe accidents. 

• Design features that can be proven 

by citation of existing technology, or 

that can be satisfactorily established by 

commitment to a suitable technology 

development program. 

• Designs that include considerations 

for safety and security requirements 

together in the design process such that 

security issues (e.g., newly identified 

threats of terrorist attacks) can be 

effectively resolved through facility 

design and engineered security features, 

and formulation of mitigation measures, 

with reduced reliance on human 

actions. 

• Designs with features to prevent a 

simultaneous loss of containment 

integrity (including situations where the 

containment is by-passed), and the 

ability to maintain core cooling as a 

result of an aircraft impact, or 

identification of system designs that 

would provide inherent delay in 

radiological releases (if prevention of 

release is not possible). 

• Designs with features to prevent 

loss of spent fuel pool integrity as a 

result of an aircraft impact. 

• Designs with features to eliminate 

or reduce the potential theft of nuclear 

materials. 

• Designs that emphasize passive 

barriers to potential theft of nuclear 

materials. 

If specific advanced reactor designs 

with some or all of the previously 

mentioned attributes are brought to the 

NRC for comment and/or evaluation, the 

Commission can develop preliminary 

design safety evaluation and licensing 

criteria for their safety-related and 


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security-related aspects. Incorporating 

the above attributes may promote more 

efficient and effective design reviews. 

However, the listing of a particular 

attribute does not necessarily mean that 

specific licensing criteria will attach to 

that attribute. Designs with some or all 

of these attributes are also likely to be 

more readily understood by the general 

public. Indeed, the number and nature 

of the regulatory requirements may 

depend on the extent to which an 

individual advanced reactor design 

incorporates general attributes such as 

those listed previously. 

In addition, the Commission expects 

that the safety features of these 

advanced reactor designs will be 

complemented by the operational 

program for Emergency Planning (EP). 

This EP operational program, in turn, 

must be demonstrated by inspections, 

tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria 

to ensure effective implementation of 

established measures. The Commission 

also expects that advanced reactor 

designs will comply with the 

Commission’s safety goal policy 

statement (51 FR 28044; August 4, 1986, 

as corrected and republished at 51 FR 

30028; August 21, 1986), and the policy 

statement on conversion to the metric 

measurement system (61 FR 31169; June 

19, 1996). 

To provide for more timely and 

effective regulation of advanced 

reactors, the Commission encourages 

the earliest possible interaction of 

applicants, vendors, other government 

agencies, and the NRC to provide for 

early identification of regulatory 

requirements for advanced reactors and 

to provide all interested parties, 

including the public, with a timely, 

independent assessment of the safety 

and security characteristics of advanced 

reactor designs. Such licensing 

interaction and guidance early in the 

design process will contribute towards 

minimizing complexity and adding 

stability and predictability in the 

licensing and regulation of advanced 

reactors. 

While the NRC does not develop new 

reactor designs, the Commission intends 

to develop the capability, when 

appropriate, for timely assessment and 

response to innovative and advanced 

reactor designs that might be presented 

for NRC review. Prior experience has 

shown that new reactor designs—even 

variations of established designs—may 

involve technical problems that must be 

solved to ensure adequate protection of 

the public health and safety. The earlier 

these design problems are identified, the 

earlier satisfactory resolution can be 

achieved. Prospective applicants are 

reminded that, while the NRC will 

undertake to review and comment on 

new design concepts, the applicants are 

responsible for documentation and 

research necessary to support a specific 

application. Research activities would 

include testing of new safety or security 

features that differ from existing designs 

for operating reactors, or that use 

simplified, inherent, passive means to 

accomplish their safety or security 

function. The testing shall ensure that 

these new features will perform as 

predicted, will provide for the 

collection of sufficient data to validate 

computer codes, and will show that the 

effects of system interactions are 

acceptable. 

During the initial phase of advanced 

reactor development, the Commission 

particularly encourages design 

innovations that enhance safety, 

reliability, and security (such as those 

described previously) and that generally 

depend on technology that is either 

proven or can be demonstrated by a 

straightforward technology development 

program. In the absence of a significant 

history of operating experience on an 

advanced concept reactor, plans for the 

innovative use of proven technology 

and/or new technology development 

programs should be presented to the 

NRC for review as early as possible, so 

that the NRC can assess how the 

proposed program might influence 

regulatory requirements. 

Finally, the NRC also believes that it 

will be in the interest of the public as 

well as the design vendors and the 

prospective license applicants to 

address security issues early in the 

design stage to achieve a more robust 

and effective security posture for future 

nuclear power reactors. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day 

of October 2008. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E8–24268 Filed 10–10–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION 

ADMINISTRATION 

12 CFR Part 745 

RIN 3133–AD54 

Share Insurance for Revocable Trust 

Accounts 

AGENCY: National Credit Union 

Administration (NCUA). 

ACTION: Interim final rule with request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: NCUA is amending its share 

insurance rules to simplify coverage for 

revocable trust accounts. The 

amendments will make the rules easier 

to understand and apply without 

decreasing coverage, result in faster 

share insurance determinations in the 

event of a credit union closing, and help 

improve public confidence in the credit 

union system. The amendments 

eliminate the concept of ‘‘qualifying 

beneficiaries.’’ Also, for members with 

revocable trust accounts totaling no 

more than $500,000, coverage will be 

determined without regard to the 

proportional beneficial interest of each 

beneficiary in the trust. 

Under the amended rules, a trust 

account owner with up to five different 

beneficiaries named in all of his or her 

revocable trust accounts at one NCUAinsured institution will be insured up to 

$100,000 per beneficiary. Revocable 

trust account owners with more than 

$500,000 and more than five different 

beneficiaries named in the trust(s) will 

be insured for the greater of either: 

$500,000 or the aggregate amount of all 

the beneficiaries’ interests in the 

trust(s), limited to $100,000 per 

beneficiary. 

DATES: This rule is effective on October 

14, 2008. Written comments must be 

received on or before December 15, 

2008. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any of the following methods (Please 

send comments by one method only): 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• NCUA Web Site: http:// 

www.ncua.gov/ 

RegulationsOpinionsLaws/ 

proposed_regs/proposed_regs.html. 

Follow the instructions for submitting 

comments. 

• E-mail: Address to 

regcomments@ncua.gov. Include ‘‘[Your 

name] Comments on Share Insurance for 

Revocable Trust Accounts’’ in the e-mail 

subject line. 

• Fax: (703) 518–6319. Use the 

subject line described above for e-mail. 

• Mail: Address to Mary Rupp, 

Secretary of the Board, National Credit 

Union Administration, 1775 Duke 

Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314– 

3428. 

• Hand Delivery/Courier: Same as 

mail address. 

Public Inspection: All public 

comments are available on the agency’s 

Web site at http://www.ncua.gov/ 

RegulationsOpinionsLaws/comments as 

submitted, except as may not be 

possible for technical reasons. Public 

comments will not be edited to remove 


ebenthall on PROD1PC60 with RULES