In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19‐2720

MICHAEL MEJIA,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

RANDY PFISTER, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:15‐cv‐1498 — James E. Shadid, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2020 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 19, 2021

____________________

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Illinois inmate Michael Mejia sued

correctional officials in federal court challenging his filthy cell

conditions and constant hallway lighting that prevented him

from sleeping. His primary claim survived dismissal and later

summary judgment and proceeded to trial, with the jury re‐

turning a defense verdict. Six times along the way Mejia asked

the district court to appoint counsel, and each time the court

denied the request. Applying the standards we articulated in
2 No. 19‐2720

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc), the dis‐

trict court observed that Mejia, who had experience with the

litigation process from prior cases, demonstrated through his

many filings that he understood his burden of proof and was

fully capable of assembling evidence and marshaling argu‐

ments to support his contention that the conditions of confine‐

ment within the Pontiac Correctional Center violated the

Eighth Amendment. Seeing no abuse of discretion in the dis‐

trict court’s rulings, we affirm.

I

A

Mejia alleged that his living conditions in Pontiac were

horrific throughout 2015. He described living in multiple

cells—each infested with insects and covered with blood, fe‐

ces, hair, and dirt—and correctional officers declining his re‐

quests for cleaning supplies, telling him to make do with the

two ounces of liquid soap he received each week. These un‐

sanitary conditions, Meija continued, caused him to develop

red bumps all over his body. And he further contended that

Pontiac’s hallway lighting was so bright that it left him sleep

deprived and in time caused depression and memory loss.

Meija made plain in his amended complaint that his regular

protests to Pontiac officials, including to defendants Warden

Randy Pfister, Assistant Warden Guy Pierce, and Correctional

Officer Todd Punke, went ignored. So Mejia turned to federal

court for relief.

Mejia filed his initial complaint in December 2015, invok‐

ing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging that the defendants were de‐

liberately indifferent toward the conditions of his confine‐

ment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Accompanying
No. 19‐2720 3

the complaint was a motion for the recruitment of counsel.

The court dismissed Mejia’s complaint without prejudice dur‐

ing the screening process required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and

denied the accompanying request for counsel as moot. Mejia

filed an amended complaint, and this time his Eighth Amend‐

ment claim survived § 1915A review.

Mejia submitted his second request for counsel on January

3, 2018, more than a year after the close of discovery, two

months after the district court denied the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, and a few weeks before a final settle‐

ment conference. The district court again denied the motion.

Applying the framework from our 2007 en banc decision in

Pruitt, the district court underscored that Mejia, following the

dismissal of his original complaint, “was able to successfully

amend his complaint, obtain needed discovery, and survive

summary judgment with two claims.” From there the district

court observed that the “surviving claims are not complex”

and that Mejia, while not having previously represented him‐

self during any trial, did have “extensive litigation experi‐

ence.” Even more, the district court underscored, Mejia “has

demonstrated he is capable of describing his living conditions

and his complaints about those conditions.” The district court

further added that Mejia would not find himself unable to

present witness testimony at trial, as his inmate witnesses

would be able to testify by video.  

In the ensuing seven months leading to the August 2018

trial, Mejia renewed his request for counsel four more times.

Relying on many of the reasons supporting the earlier denial

of Mejia’s second motion, the district court denied each addi‐

tional request. At the final pretrial conference, and as part of

denying Mejia’s fifth request for counsel, the district court
4 No. 19‐2720

supplemented its prior reasoning by observing that Mejia—

throughout the litigation—“repeatedly demonstrated that he

is capable of describing both his living conditions and his ef‐

forts to alert Defendants,” while also “demonstrat[ing] his un‐

derstanding of his claims, the issues, and the evidence during

the pretrial hearing.”  

On appeal Mejia challenges at least four of the district

court’s denials of his requests for counsel.  

II

When reviewing the denial of a prisoner’s motion to re‐

cruit counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) we ask whether “the

indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel

or [has] been effectively precluded from doing so,” and, if so,

whether “given the difficulty of the case, . . . the plaintiff ap‐

pear[s] competent to litigate it himself.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654.

All agree Mejia satisfied the first prong by trying on his own

to retain counsel. Pruitt’s second prong considers “whether

the difficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the

particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently pre‐

sent it to the judge or jury himself.” Id. at 655. Our review of

a denial of a motion to appoint counsel proceeds under the

deferential abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 658 (citing

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 658 (7th Cir. 2005)).

We see no abuse of discretion in any of the rulings Mejia

now challenges. With Mejia not contesting the district court’s

denial of his first request to appoint counsel, we turn to the

denial of the second motion. The district court began by in‐

voking the Pruitt framework and observing that Mejia had

demonstrated not only his understanding of the factual and
No. 19‐2720 5

legal issues in his case, but also an ability to convey his posi‐

tions with clarity.  

The district court then proceeded to the second half of the

Pruitt analysis and examined the complexity of Mejia’s claims,

finding that they fell on the straightforward end of the spec‐

trum. To prevail Mejia needed to establish the unsanitary con‐

ditions in his cells, constant hallway lighting that caused sleep

deprivation and related mental harms, and the defendants’

awareness of and inaction in response to either or both of

these alleged conditions. See McCaa v. Hamilton, 959 F.3d 842,

846 (7th Cir. 2020).

The district court summarily incorporated and relied on

the reasoning from its denial of Mejia’s second motion in

denying the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth requests for counsel.

At the final pretrial conference, and as part of denying Mejia’s

fifth motion, the district court added to its prior analysis that

Mejia had “demonstrated his understanding of his claims, the

issues, and the evidence during the pretrial hearing.”  

The district court’s rulings adhered to the Pruitt frame‐

work and reflected a reasonable exercise of discretion. The

district judge had before him a pro se inmate who had showed

himself at every phase of the litigation to be capable of com‐

prehending and navigating the litigation process, including

by avoiding dismissal of his amended complaint, adequately

utilizing the discovery process to obtain information from his

adversaries, successfully opposing the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, and ultimately getting his case to trial. In

denying Mejia’s requests for counsel, the district court tapped

its unique vantage point—its close proximity to all aspects of

the pretrial proceedings—by drawing upon its firsthand im‐

pressions of Mejia’s ability to adequately understand and
6 No. 19‐2720

prosecute his claims at each step along the road to trial. This

iterative yet individualized approach to ruling on each of

Mejia’s motions aligns with our prescriptions in Pruitt and re‐

flects no abuse of discretion by the district court at any step.  

In no way do we question that Mejia encountered chal‐

lenges representing himself. Take, for example, what tran‐

spired during discovery. Mejia failed to comply with the dis‐

trict court’s scheduling order and submitted only one discov‐

ery request, which itself was untimely. But the district court

took steps to remedy this failing by granting Mejia’s subse‐

quent request (made orally during a status conference) and

ordering the defendants to produce any policy documents ad‐

dressing cell sanitation and cleaning. At another point the dis‐

trict court ordered the defendants to produce any reports con‐

cerning the cleanliness or sanitation of each of Mejia’s cells.

On another front, Mejia faced the often challenging task of

marshaling evidence to prove the defendants acted with a cul‐

pable state of mind. But in the circumstances presented here,

he showed himself capable of doing so, as he plainly demon‐

strated through his filings and performance at the pretrial

conference that he understood and could present evidence on

this element of his claim. And we see nothing in the record

showing that his subsequent transfers to different prisons pre‐

vented him from gathering the necessary proof. In the end,

Mejia needed to show that the defendants knew about the

conditions of his confinement and failed to act. See McCaa,

959 F.3d at 846. The district court committed no error in find‐

ing that Mejia was capable of shouldering this burden.

Mejia also disagrees with how the district court evaluated

his ability to represent himself at trial. But such disagreement,

absent a “methodological lapse,” does not amount to an abuse
No. 19‐2720 7

of discretion. Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 765 (7th Cir.

2010). No such lapse occurred here. The district court cor‐

rectly observed that Mejia had an extensive litigation history,

including with at least one prior case going to trial, albeit with

appointed counsel. Mejia had difficulty with the discovery

process, but it was well within the judge’s discretion to decide

to overlook his slips and help him rather than try to recruit

counsel. And while Mejia observes that he had never con‐

ducted a trial on his own before, that is true for the vast ma‐

jority of pro se litigants. The district court grounded its deci‐

sion to deny Mejia’s request to recruit trial counsel on its ob‐

servation (during the pretrial conference) of his ability to com‐

prehend and address the facts and issues pertinent to his

Eighth Amendment claim. The court’s reliance on these fac‐

tors shows no abuse of discretion.  

Nor does the fact that some trial witnesses testified by vid‐

eoconference change the analysis. To be sure, we have held

that the added complexities of conducting a trial by videocon‐

ference may in some instances exceed an inmate’s capacity.

See Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2018). But the routine

use of videoconference technology to have two inmate wit‐

nesses testify does not compare to the difficulties of conduct‐

ing a full trial remotely—the situation in Walker. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mejia’s motions

despite this additional technical component of the trial.  

This conclusion eliminates the need to examine fully the

prejudice prong of the Pruitt analysis. We note only that the

standard for prejudice requires more than just a likelihood

that recruited counsel would have performed better than the

pro se litigant, a benchmark that would nearly always be met.

See Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 701 (7th Cir. 2008)
8 No. 19‐2720

(“[S]peculating about how counsel might have done a better

job prosecuting the case is neither necessary nor appropriate.”

(quoting Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir.

2006))). Instead, to show prejudice Mejia must demonstrate

“there is a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel

would have made a difference in the outcome of the litiga‐

tion.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659. Our review of the record—espe‐

cially the paucity of evidence supporting Mejia’s allegations

of deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement—

leaves us confident that he has not carried his burden here.

III

Michael Mejia encountered litigation challenges all too of‐

ten faced by pro se inmates and understandably asked the dis‐

trict court a few times to appoint counsel. And, for its part, the

district court found itself having to make a choice about how

best to allocate scarce resources, for it remains the sad reality

that “there are too many indigent litigants and too few law‐

yers willing and able to volunteer for these cases.” Olson v.

Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). The district court

committed no abuse of discretion in undertaking this difficult

and unfortunate calculus here.  

We close by thanking the Washington University School of

Law Appellate Clinic for representing Mejia on appeal. In ad‐

dition to the two students who ably briefed this appeal, a

third law student, supervised by the Clinic’s director, argued

the case. The students no doubt realized the personal satisfac‐

tion and professional enrichment that comes from pro bono

service—from using their legal talent to help someone in

need. Mejia may not have received what he wished for in the

district court, but he should know he was very well repre‐

sented on appeal.  
No. 19‐2720 9

With these parting observations, we AFFIRM.