PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

BIGLER JOBE STOUFFER, II, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

KEVIN DUCKWORTH, Interim Warden, 

Oklahoma State Penitentiary,*

 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 14-6211 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 5:07-CV-01312-C) 

John T. Carlson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public 

Defender for the Districts of Colorado and Wyoming, Denver, Colorado (Virginia L. 

Grady, Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Districts 

of Colorado and Wyoming, Denver, Colorado, and Mark H. Barrett, Law Offices of Mark 

H. Barrett, Norman, Oklahoma, with him on the brief), appearing for Appellant. 

Jennifer J. Dickson, Assistant Attorney General (E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General, with 

her on the brief), Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, appearing for Appellee.

Before LUCERO, O’BRIEN, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

 

*

 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Kevin Duckworth replaced Jerry Chrisman 

as Interim Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, effective May 9, 2016. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 17, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
MATHESON, Circuit Judge. 

Bigler Jobe Stouffer was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first-degree murder 

and shooting with intent to kill. The jury sentenced him to death for the murder charge. 

After his direct appeal and state post-conviction proceedings were unsuccessful, Mr. 

Stouffer filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus application in federal court, alleging a 

juror had improperly communicated with her husband about the case during the penalty 

phase of trial. In Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2013), we held the 

district court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Stouffer’s claim of 

jury tampering. We therefore remanded to the district court to conduct a hearing and rule 

on Mr. Stouffer’s claim. Based on evidence presented at a day-long evidentiary hearing, 

the district court determined Mr. Stouffer’s right to an impartial jury had not been 

violated and denied his § 2254 application. 

Mr. Stouffer now appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we 

affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On January 24, 1985, Mr. Stouffer visited Doug Ivens’s house to borrow a pistol. 

Stouffer, 738 F.3d at 1212. He used that pistol to shoot Mr. Ivens three times and Mr. 

Ivens’s girlfriend, Linda Reaves, twice. Id. Mr. Ivens survived. Id. Ms. Reaves died 

from her injuries. Id. 
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A. Proceedings up to the 2008 Federal Habeas Application 

In 1985, an Oklahoma state court jury convicted Mr. Stouffer of first-degree 

murder and shooting with intent to kill, for which it imposed sentences of death and life 

imprisonment, respectively. Id. His direct appeal and state post-conviction petition 

failed. Concluding he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, we granted Mr. 

Stouffer’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus application in 1999. Id. 

At Mr. Stouffer’s 2003 retrial, another jury convicted him of the same two counts. 

Id. It “sentenced him to death for Ms. Reaves’s murder and to 100 years of imprisonment 

for shooting Mr. Ivens.” Id. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) 

affirmed Mr. Stouffer’s convictions and sentences. Id. Mr. Stouffer then filed a motion 

for post-conviction relief in state court, which the OCCA denied. Id. 

B. The 2008 Federal Habeas Application 

On September 8, 2008, Mr. Stouffer filed a § 2254 application for a writ of habeas 

corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Id. The district 

court denied relief on all nine grounds raised in the application but granted a certificate of 

appealability with respect to four of them: jury tampering, prosecutorial misconduct, 

victim impact testimony, and cumulative error. Id. at 1212-13. On appeal, we affirmed 

except on the jury tampering claim, on which we reversed and remanded to the district 

court for an evidentiary hearing. Id. 

C. Basis for Remand to District Court 

Our decision to remand was based on the following facts, which we took from the 

transcript of Mr. Stouffer’s second trial: 
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Toward the end of the penalty stage of Mr. Stouffer’s second trial, 

defense counsel noticed the husband of Juror Stacey Vetter in the 

courtroom. Mr. Vetter was “laughing, joking, handshaking, and embracing” 

with a former roommate of shooting victim Doug Ivens. 2nd Stage Tr. Vol. 

IV at 605. The roommate was sitting with Mr. Ivens’s family. According to 

the prosecutor, the roommate knew that Mr. Vetter’s wife was a juror. 

Defense counsel approached Mr. Vetter and asked him about his 

relationship with Mr. Ivens’s family and friends. Mr. Vetter responded that 

he had met them about thirty minutes earlier. As soon as defense counsel 

turned away, Mr. Vetter “disappeared out of the courtroom,” id. at 607, and 

an assistant attorney general watched him “scoot[ ] to the elevator,” id. at 

615. 

When proceedings resumed, defense counsel informed the court of 

Mr. Vetter’s presence and activity in the courtroom and asked to question 

the Vetters as to whether they had communicated about the case. The 

prosecutor conceded it was appropriate to question Mr. Vetter and the 

roommate, and the trial court agreed to allow it. The attorneys discovered, 

however, that both men had left the building immediately after defense 

counsel had spoken with Mr. Vetter. Defense counsel then suggested taking 

testimony from another individual who had observed Mr. Vetter in the 

courtroom—Deputy Boles, the sheriff’s deputy responsible for escorting 

Mr. Stouffer during the trial. 

Deputy Boles testified in camera and under oath that he had been 

present throughout the trial and had observed repeated non-verbal 

communication between Juror Vetter and her husband. The deputy saw Mr. 

Vetter repeatedly nod and wink at Juror Vetter throughout the penalty stage 

testimony and closing arguments. At one point during the prosecution’s 

final closing argument, Juror Vetter looked to her husband with “a 

questioned look in her face.” Id. at 608. Mr. Vetter responded by nodding 

and rolling his eyes. 

The deputy attempted to testify that this and other exchanges 

between the Vetters occurred in response to particular statements by the 

prosecution that Deputy Boles described as “good points,” and that Mr. 

Vetter expressed agreement with the prosecutor. Id. at 609, 612–13. The 

trial court stopped this testimony, saying that it was speculative and thus 

inadmissible. The prosecutor interceded, telling the court “I don't have a 

problem. They have got to make a record here. This [is about the] deputy’s 

perspective. He’s a human being. He ought to be able to offer his opinion.” 

Id. at 613. The court relented and permitted limited testimony from the 

deputy. 

Deputy Boles then testified that when Juror Vetter had given her 

husband the questioned look, it was in response to a “strong point” by the 

prosecutor. Id. at 613. From the deputy’s perception, the communication 
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between the Vetters expressed agreement with the prosecution and 

indicated to the deputy that Mr. Stouffer was “screwed.” Id. at 614. 

In response to this testimony, the defense asked for a mistrial or 

alternatively to conduct “further inquiry,” id. at 615, or to “cross examine” 

Juror Vetter, id. at 622. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and 

failed to respond to the alternative requests for more investigation into the 

Vetters’ communication. The trial court concluded that the defense had 

produced nothing more than “a lot of speculation.” Id. at 615. The court 

seemed to confine its analysis to whether Deputy Boles’s testimony proved 

that Juror Vetter had spoken with her husband about the case outside the 

courtroom. The court did not say clearly whether the non-verbal 

communication in the courtroom during proceedings constituted improper 

juror contact. 

Id. at 1215-16 (brackets in original) (footnotes omitted). 

We held “the Vetters’ repeated non-verbal communications—which occurred 

inside the courtroom, during proceedings, and apparently concerned the attorneys’ 

closing arguments—were . . . improper.” Id. at 1217. “[T]he timing and context of the 

Vetters’ non-verbal communications and the deputy’s specific observations,” we wrote, 

“strongly indicate they were discussing matters pending before the jury.” Id. 

We concluded the state trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing and create an 

adequate record made it impossible “for us to conclude that Mr. Vetter’s communications 

with Juror Vetter did not prejudice Mr. Stouffer” or to determine whether any prejudice 

that may have resulted from those communications was harmless. Id. at 1217-19. As a 

result, we held the federal district court “erred in conducting a harmlessness analysis 

without holding an evidentiary hearing” to “uncover the facts and circumstances of the 

contact, including the substance and extent of Juror Vetter’s communication with her 

husband about the case, whether other jurors were aware of this communication, and 
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whether they influenced her decision or other jurors’ decisions about Mr. Stouffer’s 

sentence.” Id. at 1219. 

We therefore remanded to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.

at 1220. 

D. Proceedings on Remand 

On September 3, 2014, the district court held a day-long evidentiary hearing to 

explore the issues we identified in Stouffer. At the beginning of that hearing, the court 

announced it read our Stouffer opinion as establishing “the presumption of prejudice” and 

placing on the State “the burden of showing . . . the existence of harmless error.” ROA, 

Vol. 2 at 20. 

1. Stipulations 

Before the hearing, the parties stipulated that if called, jurors Daniel Dale 

Andrews, Holly Rea Parker, and David Knight would testify they were not aware of any 

improper communications between Juror Vetter and her husband during trial. The 

district court also admitted into evidence the obituaries of two other jurors from Mr. 

Stouffer’s 2003 retrial. 

2. The State’s Witnesses 

The State presented testimony from all remaining jurors from the 2003 retrial, as 

well as Juror Vetter’s husband, George Brian Vetter. 

a. Juror Judith Reann Douglass 

Judith Reann Douglass, who served as a juror at the 2003 retrial, testified that 

Juror Vetter pointed out her husband to fellow jurors during trial. As the jurors were 
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getting settled in the jury box one day—Juror Douglass could not remember exactly 

which day—Juror Vetter allegedly looked out into the gallery, smiled, and nodded at her 

husband, who “looked back and smiled.” ROA, Vol. 2 at 25-26. Although the Vetters 

did not exchange words, Juror Douglass testified that Juror Vetter and Mr. Vetter “did 

head movements” toward one another. Id. at 27. Juror Douglass thought Juror Vetter 

mouthed “I love you” to her husband, but other than that, she “did not know exactly what 

they were saying.” Id. at 28. She said she “assumed” they were communicating about 

Mr. Stouffer’s case. Id. at 29. 

On cross-examination, Juror Douglass testified she saw Mr. Vetter sitting with Mr. 

Ivens’s family and talking to Mr. Ivens in the courtroom gallery. She also said she saw 

Mr. Vetter shake Mr. Ivens’s hand during a break in trial. 

Juror Douglass admitted on redirect that in 2005 she had pled guilty to falsifying a 

police report. 

b. Juror Stacey Vetter 

Juror Vetter testified that Mr. Vetter attended trial only on the last day of the guilt 

stage. While he was in the courtroom, she had no communication with him, either verbal 

or nonverbal, she said. Nor did he share information about the case with her at any time 

during the entire course of trial. At no point did she “have anybody else there that [she] 

knew that was a male that was not a juror that [she] would be talking to.” Id. at 53. Juror 

Vetter testified she never received “any outside information from anybody in the 

gallery.” Id. at 54. The only communication she remembered having with her husband 

during trial came when she phoned home one night to inform him she would be staying at 
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a hotel because the jury had been sequestered.1

 According to Juror Vetter, her vote to 

impose the death penalty was not based on any evidence she received from “an outside 

party.” Id. at 55. 

On cross-examination, Juror Vetter said she could not remember whether her 

husband had sat with Mr. Ivens’s family when he attended trial. When presented with a 

diagram of the state courtroom, however, she confirmed Mr. Vetter had sat in the 

“approximate spot” of an “X” indicating where Mr. Ivens’s family had been located. Id.

at 62. 

c. George Brian Vetter 

Mr. Vetter was adamant he attended the trial only on the day the jury announced 

its guilty verdict. He testified he entered the courtroom on his own and stayed for no 

more than 30 minutes. He said he never communicated about the case with his (now ex-) 

wife or attempted to influence her decision while she was serving as a juror, though he 

did wink at her when she entered the courtroom and took her seat in the jury box. 

According to Mr. Vetter, the wink, to which his wife responded with a smile, was 

intended only as a greeting and was not designed to influence her vote in the case. While 

in the courtroom, he said, he did not observe any witness testimony or argument by the 

attorneys. 

 

1

 When asked whether she would have any reason to disagree with the state court 

record if it indicated she received a second phone call from her husband during trial, she 

said she would not. 
- 9 - 

Mr. Vetter testified an “elderly lady” in the gallery asked him whether he “was a 

part of the defense or the family,” to which he responded his wife was on the jury. Id. at 

73. This “elderly lady” introduced herself as Mr. Ivens’s mother. In addition, he said he 

was approached by “a big gentleman” on Mr. Stouffer’s defense team, who asked Mr. 

Vetter’s name. Id. at 76. After that brief encounter, Mr. Vetter left the courthouse 

because he had to return to work. 

On cross-examination, Mr. Vetter testified he was “not joking with anybody or 

hugging anybody,” and did not have his arm around anybody while he was at the trial. 

Id. at 86. He said the only people whose hands he shook were Mr. Ivens’s mother and 

Mr. Stouffer’s attorney, Mr. Anderson. 

d. Other Jurors 

The State presented testimony from the remaining members of Mr. Stouffer’s jury. 

No juror testified to (1) seeing Juror Vetter communicate with anyone in the courtroom 

gallery or (2) recalling discussion by Juror Vetter about extraneous information during 

deliberations. Nothing in the jurors’ testimony suggests they based their decision to 

impose the death penalty on anything other than the evidence at trial. 

3. Mr. Stouffer’s Witnesses 

a. Deputy Ralph Manuel Boles 

Deputy Boles testified that during Mr. Stouffer’s trial he would “occasionally look 

at the gallery.” Id. at 155. He did so because his security training had taught him to keep 

an eye out for “anything that could go wrong” in cases featuring in-custody defendants 
- 10 - 

like Mr. Stouffer. Id. Accordingly, he “pick[ed] [his] seat in the courtroom so that [he] 

could have a good view of everything, including the gallery.” Id. 

Deputy Boles said that on “the day of closing arguments,” he witnessed Juror 

Vetter repeatedly making eye contact with someone in the gallery with whom she had 

entered the courtroom that morning. Id. at 156. He could not remember whether the 

closing arguments were those of the first or second stage of trial. 

After the prosecutor made a certain point to the jury, “Juror Vetter look[ed] to the 

gallery at this unknown male, and then he kind of look[ed] back, and they kind of roll[ed] 

their eyes at each other.” Id. Deputy Boles believed the eye-rolling expressed Juror 

Vetter and her companion’s belief that Mr. Stouffer was “screwed.” Id. at 157. This 

exchange was the most “obvious” communication between Juror Vetter and the man in 

the gallery, but in total they exchanged glances or nods on “three to four occasions.” Id. 

According to Deputy Boles, it was “clear . . . that they were communicating about the 

case.” Id. at 160. Based on what he witnessed, it would be “[im]possible . . . for anyone 

to conclude that the communication between the Vetters was limited to a wink and a 

smile.” Id. 

According to Deputy Boles, Juror Vetter and her husband communicated 

nonverbally during both sides’ closing arguments. The Vetters “acknowledg[ed] strong 

points that the defense made as well,” and their nods and glances “were not one-sided.” 

Id. at 167. But the “most prominent communication was the one that basically said ‘he’s 

screwed.’” Id. at 168. More exchanges were pro-prosecution than pro-defense. 
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Deputy Boles testified that after witnessing these exchanges, he talked with Mr. 

Stouffer’s attorneys, who asked him whether he had seen, as they had, Juror Vetter 

communicating with someone in the gallery. Deputy Boles said he later learned, at the 

trial judge’s in camera conference, that the man he saw communicating with Juror Vetter 

was her husband. But even before that, he had suspected the man was Juror Vetter’s 

“significant other of some kind,” based on their interactions with each other and “the[ir] 

body actions as they c[a]me in” the courtroom together that morning. Id. at 162. He had 

no memory of seeing Mr. Vetter on any day other than the day of closing arguments. 

On cross-examination, Deputy Boles described the look the Vetters exchanged as 

“kind of like, duh.” Id. at 163. It was therefore possible, he agreed, that “Ms. Vetter 

already had her mind made up about whether she thought the [prosecutor’s] point was a 

good point or not.” Id. 

b. JoAnn Grider 

JoAnn Grider, then a private investigator working pro bono for Mr. Stouffer’s 

defense team, attended almost all of the 2003 retrial. During the last week of the guilt 

phase, she observed Juror Vetter “and a man in the audience making signals, nodding 

their head to each other.” Id. at 174. Ms. Grider said she did not know who the man was, 

but she assumed it was Juror Vetter’s husband because the two of them “would go to 

lunch together.” Id. at 175. According to Ms. Grider, the man was seated behind the 

prosecution table, about 15 feet from where Juror Vetter was seated. She did not see him 

interact with any of the people sitting nearby. 
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On cross-examination, Ms. Grider said she has sent Mr. Stouffer letters in prison. 

Ms. Grider at first denied ever sending those letters in attorney’s envelopes, which are not 

monitored by jail staff. But she later admitted she had “an agreement” with one of Mr. 

Stouffer’s attorneys whereby if she had something to send to Mr. Stouffer, she would 

hand it to the attorney for mailing in a privileged envelope. Id. at 186. 

c. Defense Attorney Gary James 

Gary James was lead defense counsel at Mr. Stouffer’s 2003 retrial. Several times 

while he was at the lectern, he “caught out of the periphery of [his] vision that [Juror] 

Vetter would have turned towards her right . . . towards the audience, no longer looking 

towards the bench nor the witness.” Id. at 190. The victims’ families, “most of the 

prosecution,” and the victim witness coordinator were seated in the area toward which 

Juror Vetter turned. Id. at 191. Although he could not be sure, Mr. James believed he 

saw Juror Vetter turn toward the audience during the penalty stage, rather than the guilt 

stage, of the trial. 

On the last day of the penalty phase, Mr. James testified, a man entered the 

courtroom, sat down by the victims’ families and Mr. Ivens’s former college roommate, 

and appeared to shake hands and introduce himself. At some point—either then or at the 

end of jury instructions—Mr. James saw this man “hugging” the family members, 

“slapping [them] on the back,” and placing his arm around them as if they were friends. 

Id. at 194. Mr. James testified he took Mr. Stouffer’s other counsel, Mr. Anderson, out 

into the hall and said he thought “there[ was] something up between [Juror] Vetter and 
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the man and the people—the victim’s family. There[ was] something going on.” Id. at 

195. 

Mr. James acknowledged on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge 

of the man’s identity. Rather, he later learned from Mr. Anderson that the man was Juror 

Vetter’s husband. 

d. Defense Attorney Richard Anderson 

Mr. Stouffer’s last witness was defense counsel Richard Anderson, who served as 

second chair at the 2003 retrial. At some point during the penalty phase, “it was brought 

to [Mr. Anderson’s] attention that [Juror] Vetter was there with a man that—the way they 

were engaged, it appeared it was obviously her husband.” Id. at 201.2

 He then observed 

“some communication” between Juror Vetter and somebody in the portion of the 

courtroom where Mr. Ivens’s family was seated. Id. 

Suspecting Juror Vetter was communicating with her husband, Mr. Anderson 

approached a man who “was in a very congratulatory, handshaking-type manner and was 

communicating with members of the Doug Ivens group.” Id. at 202-03. That man 

confirmed to Mr. Anderson that he was Juror Vetter’s husband, Mr. Anderson testified. 

When Mr. Anderson approached him, Mr. Vetter was with one of the people he had 

placed his arm around previously, who introduced himself as Ted Roland. Mr. Anderson 

 

2

 Mr. Anderson changed his story slightly on cross-examination, saying he himself 

observed Juror Vetter and the unidentified man enter the courtroom that morning. 
- 14 - 

said he later learned Mr. Roland was Mr. Ivens’s former roommate. Mr. Anderson asked 

Mr. Vetter to remain in the courthouse, but Mr. Vetter departed. 

On cross-examination, Mr. Anderson said he could not remember whether he 

observed communication between Juror Vetter and the man with whom she entered the 

courtroom, and whom Mr. Anderson later presumed to be her husband. 

4. The District Court’s Ruling 

On September 25, 2014, the district court entered a short order denying Mr. 

Stouffer’s § 2254 jury tampering claim. The order contained the following “findings of 

fact”: 

Mr. Vetter and Juror Vetter had no verbal conversations about the 

case other than a short telephone call during the second stage of trial when 

Juror Vetter was informing her husband the jury was to be sequestered. 

During that call Mr. Vetter told Juror Vetter his father informed him there 

was a newspaper article about the jurors. Juror Vetter told her husband she 

could not talk about it and nothing more was discussed. Mr. Vetter did not 

see his wife until she entered the courtroom. He did not talk with his wife 

about the case and did not witness any of the testimony presented or 

attorneys’ arguments. The only “communication” between the two 

consisted of a wink and smile from Mr. Vetter to his wife when the jury 

was entering the courtroom before the first stage verdict, to which she 

mouthed that she loved him. He meant the gesture as a greeting and was 

not attempting to influence her in any manner. Juror Vetter only saw her 

husband that one day of trial and did not communicate or learn anything 

about the trial or [Mr. Stouffer] from her husband or from anyone in the 

gallery. 

. . . None of the jurors witnessed any verbal or non-verbal communication 

between Juror Vetter and anyone in the gallery. 

. . . [A]ll of the jurors based their decisions and verdict on the evidence and 

testimony presented in court. 

The Court finds Juror Douglas’s [sic] testimony regarding 

communication between the Vetters . . . to be less than credible. . . . 
- 15 - 

ROA, Vol. 1 at 472-74. To support its conclusion that Juror Douglass was not credible, 

the district court noted her 2005 conviction for falsifying a police report. 

 Based on these findings, the court concluded any communication between the 

Vetters was harmless: 

Assuming some improper communication to have occurred during the 

second stage of [Mr. Stouffer’s] trial, [the State] has demonstrated any and 

all communication to be harmless. Other than a brief recognition and 

salutation between the Vetters, no jurors witnessed any communication 

between any member of the jury and anyone in the gallery. . . . [None] of 

the jurors [was] improperly influenced by outside communication. The 

verdict was the result of deliberations based on the evidence and testimony 

presented during trial and was the collective product of each juror’s noninfluenced determination. Any possible improper communication was 

harmless. 

ROA, Vol. 1 at 474. 

 On September 25, 2014, the district court entered judgment in favor of the State 

and denied a certificate of appealability. Four days later, at the State’s urging, the district 

court entered a “Corrected Order” revising two aspects of its original order that are 

immaterial to this appeal. 

Mr. Stouffer filed a notice of appeal on October 24, 2014. On July 8, 2015, we 

issued a certificate of appealability limited to the question “whether the district court 

erred in its resolution of the jury tampering issue that this court remanded on December 

26, 2013.” Doc. 10284932. 

II. DISCUSSION 

The district court’s order offers brief analysis, but its denial of relief is 

appropriate. The order does not discuss the state court evidence or Mr. Stouffer’s 
- 16 - 

evidence from the evidentiary hearing. And according to Mr. Stouffer, it mistakenly 

finds that Mr. Vetter did not attend trial on the final day of the penalty stage, despite the 

state court record establishing otherwise. Even assuming Mr. Stouffer is correct, his 

arguments would not change the outcome of this appeal. The State presented testimony 

at the hearing demonstrating that no juror, including Juror Vetter, based his or her vote on 

anything other than the evidence produced at trial. Mr. Stouffer’s evidence showed incourt non-verbal communication between the Vetters, but not any effect on Juror Vetter’s 

vote. The record therefore does not show prejudice to Mr. Stouffer, and the district court 

did not err in determining that any improper communication between the Vetters was 

harmless. 

A. Legal Background 

1. Law of Juror Bias 

a. Right to an Impartial Jury 

“The Sixth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 

the right of a trial by jury in all state criminal cases.” Goss v. Nelson, 439 F.3d 621, 627 

(10th Cir. 2006). “In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a 

fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Id. (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 

U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). “Included in that right is the right to a jury capable and willing to 

decide the case solely on the evidence before it.” United States v. Brooks, 569 F.3d 1284, 

1288 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). “Though no trial can be perfect, one 

touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact.” United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 

F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation, quotation, and brackets omitted). 
- 17 - 

“Because impartial jurors are the cornerstone of our system of justice and central to the 

Sixth Amendment’s promise of a fair trial, we guard jealously the sanctity of the jury’s 

right to operate as freely as possible from outside unauthorized intrusions purposefully 

made.” Stouffer, 738 F.3d at 1213 (quotations omitted). 

b. Remmer Hearings 

Faced with “credible evidence of jury tampering”—that is, “improper external 

communication with a juror about a matter pending before the jury”—“a trial court has a 

duty to investigate.” Id. “When a trial court is apprised of the fact that an extrinsic 

influence may have tainted the trial, the proper remedy is a hearing to determine the 

circumstances of the improper contact and the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the 

defendant.” Id. at 1214 (quotation omitted). 

These hearings are known as “Remmer hearings,” after the Supreme Court’s 

seminal decision in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). There, the Court held 

that “[i]n a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or 

indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for 

obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial.” Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. As we 

explained in Stouffer, “[t]he presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily 

upon the Government to establish, after notice to and a hearing of the defendant, that 

such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.” 738 F.3d at 1214 n.5 

(quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229). “Once the government rebuts the presumption of 
- 18 - 

prejudice in a Remmer hearing, the burden then shifts to defendant to show actual 

prejudice.” United States v. Armendariz, 922 F.2d 602, 606 (10th Cir. 1990).3

 

After presentation of the parties’ evidence, the district court analyzes the substance 

of any improper communications in light of “the entire record.” United States v. Aguirre, 

108 F.3d 1284, 1288 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of Wichita, 

Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 924 (10th Cir. 1992) (calling for holistic examination of “all of the 

facts and circumstances of the case”). The court’s inquiry should be “objective,” asking 

only how a reasonable person in the jurors’ position would be affected by the improper 

communications. United States v. Klein, 93 F.3d 698, 703 (10th Cir. 1996). 

c. Remedy for Violation of Right to an Impartial Jury 

If a defendant’s right to an impartial jury has been violated, he is entitled to a new 

trial. See United States v. Scull, 321 F.3d 1270, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003). But “not every 

incident [involving bias] requires a new trial. The test is whether . . . the misconduct has 

prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial.” United States 

v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 904 (10th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (quotation 

omitted). 

 

3

 We have said “the presumption of prejudice approach relieves the moving party 

of any burden and forces the nonmovant to prove any exposure was harmless.” Smith v. 

Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 2000). But this comment appeared in 

a discussion of “the placement of the initial burden of proof” under Remmer. Id. at 1241 

(emphasis added). Smith did not displace our holding in Armendariz that once the 

government rebuts the Remmer presumption, a defendant must introduce affirmative 

evidence of prejudice. See United States v. Muessig, 427 F.3d 856, 865 (10th Cir. 2005) 

(explaining government has “the initial burden of proof” under Remmer (emphasis 

added)). 
- 19 - 

In conducting the fair-trial analysis, we recognize that “the Constitution ‘does not 

require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising 

situation . . . [because] it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or 

influence that might theoretically affect their vote.’” United States v. Day, 830 F.2d 

1099, 1103 (10th Cir. 1987) (alterations in original) (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 

114, 118 (1983) (per curiam)). “Surmise and suspicion may not be used to assail the 

integrity of a jury; it is presumed that jurors will be true to their oath and will 

conscientiously observe the instructions and admonitions of the court.” Vigil v. Solano, 

947 F.2d 955, 1991 WL 230177, at *4 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1991) (unpublished) (quoting 

United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 515 (10th Cir. 1979)).4

 Accordingly, “something 

more than ‘unverified conjecture’ [is] needed where only potentially suspicious 

circumstances are shown.” Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1173 

(10th Cir. 1983)). 

2. Federal Habeas Review of State Court Decisions 

When a prisoner’s habeas claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, 

§ 2254 relief is available only if the prisoner satisfies the demanding standards contained 

in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 

F.3d 1064, 1073 (10th Cir. 2008). But “[i]f the state court did not decide the claim on the 

 

4

 Although not precedential, we find the reasoning of this and the other 

unpublished opinions cited in this opinion to be instructive. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1 

(“Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive 

value.”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. 
- 20 - 

merits, the stringent principles of deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are inapplicable.” Id.

at 1074. In that case, federal habeas courts review the claim de novo. Fairchild v. 

Trammell, 784 F.3d 702, 712 (10th Cir. 2015). 

Because the Oklahoma courts did not address Mr. Stouffer’s jury-tampering claim 

on the merits, Stouffer, 738 F.3d at 1213, we review that claim unconstrained by AEDPA 

deference. 

B. Standard of Review 

When a district court conducts an evidentiary hearing in a § 2254 case, we review 

its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Cannon v. Trammell, 

796 F.3d 1256, 1271 (10th Cir. 2015). 

“We will reverse for clear error only if the district court’s finding was without 

factual support in the record or we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been made.” United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 464 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th 

Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). A district court’s factual finding is also clearly erroneous 

“if it is simply not plausible or permissible in light of the entire record on appeal.” 

United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d 930, 935 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). 

C. The District Court’s Order 

After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the district court properly 

determined Mr. Stouffer’s right to an impartial jury was not violated. 
- 21 - 

1. Date of Mr. Vetter’s Attendance 

The State, for reasons that are unclear, insists on defending the district court’s 

finding that Mr. Vetter attended only the last day of the guilt phase. But the state court 

record unambiguously refutes that proposition. 

Transcripts from state court clearly establish Mr. Anderson alerted the trial judge 

to possible improper communications on the last day of the penalty stage. 2d Stage Tr. 

Vol. IV at 604. When Mr. Anderson informed the court of his concerns, the attorneys 

had just finished delivering their closing arguments as to the appropriate punishment. Id.

at 539, 553, 574. The jury had already rendered its guilty verdict. Id. at 554. Mr. 

Anderson told the court during an in camera conference that he had approached the man 

he saw associating with the Ivens attendees in the gallery, and that man introduced 

himself as Juror Vetter’s husband. Id. at 605. The prosecutor confirmed during that 

conference that he had spoken with Mr. Roland, who said he was approached that 

morning by a man who introduced himself as the husband of a juror. Id. at 617. 

The district court’s order did not mention this contemporaneous evidence from the 

state court record. In concluding Mr. Vetter attended only the last day of the guilt stage, 

the order discussed only the Vetters’ testimony, which was offered 11 years after the 

events in question. Such dated testimony is often less probative than transcript evidence 

generated at or near the time of the events in question. See E.E.O.C. v. Sperry Corp., 852 

F.2d 503, 508 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Contemporaneous documentation is more reliable than a 

witness’ memory of an event which occurred years earlier.”). 
- 22 - 

2. Other Factual Findings 

Among other things, the district court also found that (1) Mr. Vetter “did not talk 

with his wife about the case and did not witness any of the testimony presented or 

attorneys’ arguments”; (2) the “only ‘communication’ between the two consisted of a 

wink and smile from Mr. Vetter to his wife when the jury was entering the courtroom 

before the first stage verdict, to which she mouthed that she loved him”; and (3) “Juror 

Vetter only saw her husband that one day of trial and did not communicate or learn 

anything about the trial or [Mr. Stouffer] from her husband or from anyone in the 

gallery.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 472-73. 

These findings conflict with other evidence from the September 2014 evidentiary 

hearing. In particular, Deputy Boles testified that on three or four occasions, he saw 

Juror Vetter exchange nods or glances with a man in the gallery, whom he later learned to 

be Mr. Vetter. Deputy Boles said at least one of these exchanges—all of which he 

thought pertained to the case—indicated Juror Vetter thought Mr. Stouffer was 

“screwed.” ROA, Vol. 2 at 157. Most of them were pro-prosecution. The Vetters’ 

communication, in Deputy Boles’s view, was not “limited to a wink and a smile.” ROA, 

Vol. 2 at 160. 

In addition, Juror Douglass and Ms. Grider testified to seeing Juror Vetter nod her 

head at a man in the audience. And Mr. Anderson testified that during the penalty phase, 

he witnessed Juror Vetter communicating nonverbally with people in the section of the 

gallery where Mr. Ivens’s family was seated. After the jury left to deliberate, he 

approached one of those people, who identified himself as Juror Vetter’s husband. 
- 23 - 

The district court’s order does not attempt to (1) reconcile this testimony with the 

Vetters’ testimony or (2) fully explain why it is not credible.5

 In fact, the order does not 

mention this testimony or the testimony presented at the state court on this issue. 

Due to the foregoing, we consider the entire record in the following analysis. 

D. Analysis 

Even if Mr. Stouffer’s evidence is accepted as true, the record does not show he 

was deprived of his right to an impartial jury. We therefore affirm dismissal of Mr. 

Stouffer’s § 2254 habeas application. 

1. The Record Does Not Show a Violation of Mr. Stouffer’s Right to an Impartial 

Jury 

Juror Vetter and Mr. Vetter should not have communicated about the case. But 

assuming they did, “no trial can be perfect,” Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d at 1258, and the 

record does not show that Mr. Stouffer did not receive a fair trial. 

Detective Boles testified about the Vetters’ nonverbal communications (1) in 

2003, at the state trial court’s in camera hearing, and (2) in 2014, at the evidentiary 

hearing in federal district court. Although he testified at greater length and was subject to 

cross-examination at the latter hearing, he did not add materially to his 2003 testimony, 

which the trial judge found “speculative.” Stouffer, 738 F.3d at 1215 & n.7, 1216 n.8. 

 

5

 As explained above, the district court did find Juror Douglass’s testimony “less 

than credible” in light of her prior conviction and statements she made that were 

inconsistent with other witnesses’ testimony. ROA, Vol. 1 at 474. The court also could 

reasonably have discounted testimony from Ms. Grider. In any event, Mr. Stouffer does 

not rely on the testimony of either Juror Douglass or Ms. Grider on appeal. 
- 24 - 

We remanded so the parties could develop the record as to whether any nonverbal 

communications affected Juror Vetter or any of her fellow jurors. As to the latter, the 

State’s evidence and the overall record show they were not aware of any communications 

between the Vetters, and Mr. Stouffer does not contest the district court’s finding to that 

effect. As to Juror Vetter, the State’s evidence shows no outside influence on Juror 

Vetter and the overall record shows that any influence Mr. Vetter’s nonverbal 

communication may have had on her is speculative. Nothing that has come to light since 

2003 suggests Mr. Stouffer was deprived of his right to an impartial jury. 

Deputy Boles said at the 2014 hearing that he saw the Vetters exchange glances or 

nods at most four times, a majority of which seemed to be “pro prosecution.” ROA, Vol. 

2 at 168. It was “clear” to him that the Vetters were communicating about the case, and 

at one point they rolled their eyes in a manner that suggested Mr. Stouffer was 

“screwed.” Id. at 157, 160. Taking Deputy Boles’s testimony as true, it does not indicate 

Mr. Vetter’s views affected his wife’s consideration of the evidence, and we must 

presume Juror Vetter followed the trial court’s instruction to decide the case solely on the 

basis of the evidence presented. See Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133, 1150 (10th Cir. 

2012). Indeed, Deputy Boles described the look the Vetters exchanged as “kind of like, 

duh,” ROA, Vol. 2 at 163, which suggests she may already have made up her mind 

regarding Mr. Stouffer’s culpability. Even if she had not, the record does not show her 

husband’s non-verbal communications altered her performance as a juror. To conclude 

these communications undermined Juror Vetter’s impartiality, we would have to engage 

in impermissible “surmise” and “unverified conjecture.” Vigil, 1991 WL 230177, at *4. 
- 25 - 

The same goes for the testimony of Mr. Stouffer’s trial attorneys. Mr. James said 

he saw Juror Vetter look toward a section of the gallery in which the victim’s family, as 

well as a man who had entered with her that morning, were seated. He did not testify to 

observing Juror Vetter communicate with anyone in the gallery. Mr. Anderson did say he 

saw “some communication” between Juror Vetter and somebody seated in the gallery. 

ROA, Vol. 2 at 201. But he did not identify Juror Vetter’s interlocutor, nor did he 

suggest the communication concerned Mr. Stouffer’s case. On the basis of this 

testimony, only forbidden “unverified conjecture” could establish that Mr. Stouffer was 

prejudiced by the Vetters’ nonverbal communication. Vigil, 1991 WL 230177, at *4. It 

would require yet further prohibited speculation and conjecture to conclude any prejudice 

was so great that Mr. Stouffer “has not received a fair trial.” Lawrence, 405 F.3d at 904.6

 

 

6

 The parties disagree about whether our opinion remanding this case placed on 

the State the burden of overcoming a presumption of prejudice. We need not resolve this 

dispute because it does not affect the outcome. Although “this presumption generally 

does not apply” in habeas proceedings, Malicoat v. Mullin, 426 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th 

Cir. 2005), we arguably suggested the district court should apply the presumption on 

remand. Even if the State was required to rebut the Remmer presumption, the State 

carried its burden by presenting evidence showing the Vetters’ communications were 

limited and did not affect Juror Vetter’s consideration of the case. The State put on 

evidence regarding all living jurors in Mr. Stouffer’s case, as well as Juror Vetter’s 

husband, none of whom suggested Mr. Vetter interfered with any of the jurors’, including 

Juror Vetter’s, impartial performance of their duties. The burden then shifted to Mr. 

Stouffer to introduce evidence showing “actual prejudice.” Armendariz, 922 F.2d at 606. 

For the reasons explained above, we conclude the record does not show prejudice or lack 

of fair trial. Whether the Remmer presumption applies or not, therefore, Mr. Stouffer is 

not entitled to a new trial. 

Mr. Stouffer also contends that by receiving evidence on whether the Vetters 

communicated during trial, the district court violated the mandate rule, which “requir[es] 

trial court conformity with the appellate court’s terms of remand.” Dish Network Corp. 

v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 772 F.3d 856, 864 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). 

Continued . . . 
- 26 - 

2. Harmless Error and No Showing of Prejudice 

The district court order concluded that “[a]ny possible improper communication 

[between the Vetters] was harmless.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 474. We have determined the 

record does not show that any improper communications between the Vetters affected 

Juror Vetter’s impartial consideration of the evidence and therefore caused any prejudice 

to Mr. Stouffer or otherwise undermined his right to a fair trial. This determination leads 

us to affirm the district court’s harmlessness conclusion. 

When a § 2254 applicant alleges violation of his constitutional rights, “we apply 

the harmless-error standard articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 

1710, 123 L.Ed. 2d 353 (1993), and in O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S. Ct. 

992, 130 L.Ed. 2d 947 (1995).” Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1073. Under this standard, “relief is 

only proper if the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

 

According to Mr. Stouffer, the district court’s “job was not to revisit the existence or 

content of the historical facts but to decide whether, as this Court instructed, the Vetters’ 

‘improper communication influenced the jury.’ The facts were fixed; the question was the 

harm they produced.” Aplt. Br. at 39. 

This argument misunderstands the law and our previous opinion. “The scope of 

the mandate . . . is carved out by exclusion: unless the district court’s discretion is 

specifically cabined, it may exercise discretion on what may be heard.” Cook v. Rockwell 

Int’l Corp., 790 F.3d 1088, 1101 (10th Cir. 2015) (ellipsis in original). Because we did 

not “specifically cabin[]” the district court to examining prejudice, it was free to receive 

testimony on “historical facts.” Moreover, we held in Stouffer that the district court had 

erred by failing to hold “a hearing to uncover the facts and circumstances of the contact, 

including the substance and extent of Juror Vetter’s communication with her husband 

about the case, whether other jurors were aware of this communication, and whether they 

influenced her decision or other jurors’ decisions about Mr. Stouffer’s sentence.” 738 

F.3d at 1219 (emphasis added). The district court was therefore not only permitted but 

also required to consider the historical facts regarding the Vetters’ communication during 

trial. 
- 27 - 

the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Under the Brecht/McAninch test a habeas 

petitioner obtains plenary review to determine whether a trial error resulted in actual 

prejudice.” Welch v. Workman, 639 F.3d 980, 992 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). 

The record does not show the Vetters’ communications “had substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1073 

(quotation omitted).7

 

III.CONCLUSION 

Our review of the state record and the district court’s evidentiary hearing does not 

show a violation of the right to an impartial jury. We therefore affirm denial of Mr. 

Stouffer’s § 2254 habeas corpus application. 

 

7

 At the evidentiary hearing, Juror Douglass testified that during deliberations, 

Juror Vetter (1) told other jurors “we need to put [Mr. Stouffer] back on death row,” 

ROA, Vol. 2 at 31, and (2) harassed Juror Douglass by standing over her, yelling, and 

calling her names. The district court discredited this testimony and found (1) “[t]he 

subject of whether [Mr. Stouffer] was on death row was never discussed during 

deliberations,” and (2) the other jurors “were not influenced by [Juror Vetter] or any 

other juror in determining their verdict.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 486. It also found “[n]one of 

the jurors witnessed any verbal or non-verbal communication between Juror Vetter and 

anyone in the gallery.” Id. Mr. Stouffer does not challenge these findings on appeal, and 

we therefore do not address them.