### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

NO. 03-0 7 -00 135 -CR

Je r r e t A nt honyG om e z , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 264TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 5429 2 , HO NORAB LE MARTH A J. TRUDO , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N

I n J anuar y 2003, appellant J err et Anthony Gomez was indi cted for sexual assault, a second- deg ree felony , with previous fe lony convictions alleg ed for

enhanc ement o f

p u n is hment. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. §§ 12.42(d), 22.011(a) (1)( A), (f ) (West Supp. 2007). I n May 2003, appellant pleade d no contest to the sex ual assault and true to the enha nceme nt alleg ations. Pursuant to a plea barg ain, the district cour

t defe rre d adjudication and place d appellant on community supervision for

seven y ear s. The State’s subsequent motion to adjudicate was hear d in F ebrua ry 2007. The c ourt adjudg ed appe llant guilty afte r he ple aded tr

ue to most of the alleg ed violations of his supervisory

co n d itions. The court rende red judgme nt c onvicting appellant of sexual a ssault a nd im p o s i n g a sentenc e of life imprisonment. W e will aff irm the conviction but r emand the ca use for rea ssessment of punis hme nt.Among other thing s, the trial cour t told appellan t t h at t h e “two prior c onvictions . . . 1 enhanc e the f

irst para g raph from a se cond deg ree to that of a ha bitual offende r which me ans a minimum of 25 y ear s up to life in the penitentiary . . . .” Appe l l an t told the court that he un de rs too d th is. 2

I n his first two points of error , appellant c ontends that the trial cour t erre d by ref using to a llow him to w ithdraw his no contest plea. I n point one , he argues that he ha d an absolute r ight to withdraw the plea, while in point two, he ar g ues that the c ourt abused its discre tion. The rec ord ref lects that appe llant entere d his plea on May 19, 2003, afte r beingproper ly admonished. On that

1 date , th e c ourt acce pte d th e ple a , f ound that th e sti pu late d e vid e nc e su pp or te d a fi nd ingof

g uil t, defe rre d adjudication, and pla ced a ppellant on community

sup er v i s i o n . The c ourt then orde red a prese ntence investigation and rese t the cause for a hear ing to de termine a dditional conditions of probation. I t w as at this late r hear ing, on J uly 18, 2003, that appellant soug ht to withdraw his plea.

Error s relatingto the orig inal plea pr ocee di n g at which the a ccuse d is placed on defe rre d adjudication must be ra ised in an appe al from the defe rre d adjudication orde r. Manuel

v . S tat e , 9 94 S.W. 2d 65 8, 66 1- 62 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). Ev e n if the a lle g e d e rr or we re pr op e rl y befor e us, no er

ror is shown. A de fenda nt may with d ra w a gu i l t y o r no contest plea as a matter of ri g ht o nly

be fo re jud g me nt h a s b e e n p ro no un ced or the c a se ha s b e e n ta ke n und e r a dv ise me nt. J a c k s o n v . S tat e , 590 S.W .2d 514, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Be cause the trial cour t had pr e vio us ly

a c c e pte d a

pp e lla nt’ s p le a , d e fe rr e d a djudi c a tio n, and pla c e d a pp e lla nt o n c omm

un ity supervision, the ca se wa s clea rly under advisement, and appellant did not have a rig ht to withdra w his plea. Se e Lab ib v . S

tate , 239 S.W .3d 322, 331 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). F ur the r, no a bu se of dis c re tio n is sh ow n. Ap pe lla nt g a ve the tr ia l cou rt

no re a so n f

or wa nti ngtoA que sti on ha s bee n ra ise d as to w he the r a rt ic le 46 B .0 04 inc or

po rate s th e “ bo na

fi de do ub t” 2 standard f or compe tency

inquiries that was applied prior to the 2003 ame ndments to the competenc y statute. Se e Gr e e nev . S

tate , 225 S.W .3d 324, 328 n. 3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.); Lawr e nc e v . S

tate , 169 S.W .3d 319, 323 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2005, pet. ref’d). We note that the court of criminal appea ls r ece ntly applied the “ bona fide doubt” standar d in a ca se ar ising unde r article 46B.004. Se e Fu lle r v . S tate , 253 S.W .3d 220, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

3 withdraw his plea. I n his brief to this Court, appellant asserts onl y that the t rial court’s “re collection of the proc edura l history of t he case” was inaccurate i n some unspecifie d way . Points of er ror one and two ar e over

ruled. I n point of err or four , appellant contends that the trial cour t should have conduc ted an informal inqui ry into his competenc y to proce ed to adjudication. Se e Du rg an v . S tate , 240 S.W .3d 875, 877-78 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007) (right to appe al issue of c ompetency at adjudication hearing ). I f evidenc e sug g esting that the defe ndant may be incompetent to sta nd trial comes to the attention of the trial court, the court must ra ise the issue on its own moti on and dete rmine by informal inquiry wh e the r t he re is s ome e vid e nc e fr om any so ur c e that wo uld su pp or t a fi nd ing that the de fe nd ant i s incompetent. Te x . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 46B.004(b) , (c) (West 2006). We reviewthe trial 2 court’s decision not to conduct a competenc y inquiry for an abuse of discretion. Gr e e nev . S tate , 225 S.W .3d 324, 328 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.).

Appellant cites his own testimony at t he adjudication hear ing a s sugg esting that he might have been inc ompetent. Responding to quest i o n s by defe nse counse l, appellant indicate d that he ha d b e e n ta

kin g his me dic a tio n an d that it ha d mad e “ a c omp le te dif

fe re nc e in [h is] a

bil ity to deal with life.” Appellant also re fer s to the prese ntence investigation report pre pare d in 2003, wh ic h me nti on s th a t a

pp e lla nt h a d b e e n d ia g no se d a s havin g bip ola r d iso rd e r a

nd a tte nti on de fi c it4

hy pe ra c tiv ity

dis or de r a

nd too k me dic a tio ns fo r t

he se c on dit ion s. Th e report a lso me nti on s, howeve r, that this diag no sis was made w hen appe llant was four teen y ear s old; it appea

rs that

a p p e ll an t w a s tw e n ty

- s e v e na t t h e ti me o f

th e a d ju d ic a ti o nh e ar in g . We a ls o n o te th a t a p p e lla nt testified at the he aringthat he had me t with his attorney on many occa sions and fully

understood bo th t he natur e of

the he ari ngand

his ri g hts

. The e vidence cited by

appellant doe s not sugg est, under a ny rea sonable standa

rd, that he did no t ha ve a ratio na l and

fa c tua l un de rs tand ingof

the a dju dic a tio n p ro c e e din g s or that he did

n o th av e t h e ab i l i t y

t o co n s u l t wi t h h i s l aw y er wi t h a r ea s o n ab l e d egr ee o f r at i o n al u n d er s t an d i n g. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc

. Ann. art. 46B.003( a) (West 2006) (def ining incompe tence ). Gree ne , on which appellant chief

ly relies, is disting uishable on its facts. Appe llant has not shown that the trial court a bused its discr etion by failing to inf ormally inquire into his compe tence at the adjudication hear ing. Point of er

ror f our is overr

uled. Points of er

ror f ive, six , and seve n relate to the pre vious con v i ct i o n s alleg ed for enhanc ement of punishment. Two pairs of convictions wer e alleg ed. The ear lier convic tions were for two c ounts of “the f

elony offe nse of Rec eivin g S t o l en P roper ty ” in ca use number 97- CR-293, in the court of common pleas of Fa irfield County , Ohio, dated Nove mber 25, 1997. The more re cent convictions wer e for

“the f elony offe nses of B rea

king a nd Enteringand L arc eny” in ca use numbers 9 7 C R S 3437 and 97CRS8003, in t he super ior court of Columbus C ounty , North Carolina, dated May 12 , 1 99 9. Th e ind ic tme nt a lle g e d th a t th e Oh io con vi cti on s w e re fi na l be fo re the No rt h Carolina off

ens es we re c ommitt ed, and that the North Carolina c onvictions were final bef ore appellant c ommitt ed the pr imary offe nse. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 12.42(d).5 As pr e vio us ly

no te d, a pp e lla nt p le a de d tr

ue t o the e nh anc e me nt a lle g a tio ns in May 2003, at the same time that he enter ed his ple a of no contest to the sexual assault. At that tim e, the cour t announce d that it found t he enhance ment alleg ations to be true. The orig inal written orde r de fe rr inga dju dic a tio n id e nti fi e d th e of fe ns e a s “Se xua l Assa

ult (H a bit ua l O ff e nd e r) ,” de sc ri be d th is offe nse as a “Second Degr ee Felony ,” and stated t hat the applica ble punishment rang e wa s “Second Deg ree 2-20 y

rs in prison/max $10,000 fine.” On Dec ember 5, 2006, the State m oved to amend the def err ed adjudication order nunc pro tunc to re flec t that appellant wa s a habitual off en der a nd that the punishment rang e wa s twenty -five to ninety -nine y ear s or life in prison. F ollowing a hear ing on Dec ember

14, 2006, the motion was g rante d. Howeve r, the nunc pro tunc orde r sig ned on D e c e mb e r

1 8 , 2 0 0 6 , r e c i t e d

t h a tth e “ S e x u a l A s s a

u l t( H a b i tu a l O f f e n d e r ) ” w a s a

“ 1 s tD e g r e e F e l o n y”

car rying a punishment rang e of “ First De g ree 5-99 y rs or life/max $10,000 fine.” There the matter stood wh en , i n Februar y 2007, the cour

t hear d the State’s motion to adjudicate. T he er

ror in the Dec ember 18 nunc pro tunc order was broug ht to the court’s attention when the adjudication hear ing beg an. Over appellant’ s objection, the cour t ordere d the pre paration of anothe r nunc pr o tunc orde r. On F ebrua ry 15, 2 0 0 7 , t h e cour

t signe d a sec ond nunc pro tunc de fe rr e d a dju dic a tio n o rd e r, thi s o ne re c iti ngthat th e “ Se xua l A ssa ult (H a bit ua l O ffender) ” wa s a “SECOND DEG REE FEL ONY ( Habitual Offende r)” and that the applicable punishment ra ng e wa s “HAB I TUAL

OFF ENDER (25- 99 YRS OR L I FE I N PRI SON).” I n point of err or five, a

ppellant contends that the trial court e rre d by enter ing the Fe bruar y 15, 2007, nunc pro tunc order b ec au se its plenary jurisdiction had expired. Se e Sta te

v . A gu ile ra , 165 S.W .3d 695, 697-98 (Te x . Crim. App. 2005) (holding that trial court retains plenar y6

power to modify

its sentence if timely motion for new tria l or motion in arrest of judg ment is filed). Appellant notes that he wa s adjudicate d g uilty on Fe bruar

y 9, 2007, and that the tria l court over ruled his mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l on

F e br ua ry 13 , th e same da

y that a pp e lla nt f ile d h is n oti c e of

a pp e a l. Aguil e ra an d

t h e o t h er o p i n i o n s ci t edb y

ap p el l an tad dre s s t h e au t h o ri t y o f at ri al court to alter its sentenc e. That is not w h at h ap p en ed h er e. The rec ord re flec ts that on May 19, 2003, the day appellant enter ed his or igina l ple a of no contest, the trial c ourt found that the e nhance ment alleg ations were true. The Fe bruar y 15, 2007, nunc pro tunc order did n o t ch an ge appe llant’s

se nte nc e be c a

us e the re is no se nte nc e wh e n ad jud ic a tio n is de fe rr e d. Th e nunc pr o tu nc or de r m e re ly

c or re c te d th e c le ri c a l e rr or s th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d in its e arl ie r o rd e rs . Moreove r, we find no harm to appe llant resulting f rom the F ebrua

ry 15 nunc pro tunc order . Appellant had alrea dy been adjudicated guilty and sentenced to li fe imprisonment; the prope r wordingof the defer

red adjudication order

was e ssentially

a moot issue. Appellant ar g ues that but for the nunc pro tunc orde r, the trial c ourt would have been limited to the orig inal two-to-twenty -y ear punishment rang e re cited in the orig inal defe rre d adjudication orde r. This argument ignor es the Dec ember

18, 2006, nunc pro tunc order. I t also overlooks the principle that when ther e is a c onflict betwee n the trial cour

t’s ruling in open court and what is stated i n the writt en judgment or order, the ruling in ope n court c ontrols. See E x parte Madding , 70 S.W .3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Point of error f

ive is overr

uled. I n po int s o f e rr or

six and se ve n, a pp e lla nt a sse rt s th a t hi s p un ish me nt w a s unla wf ull y enhanc ed pursua

nt to section 12.42(d) be cause the re cord a ffirmatively ref lects that the pre vious convictions wer e not fe lonies (point six) a nd beca use the rec ord af

firmatively

shows the abse nce of7

the re quired seque nce of offe nses and convictions (point seven)

. We find no merit to point six , but we sustain point seven.

As a g e ne ra l rul e , a p le a

of tr ue to a n e nh anc e me nt a lle g a tio n r e lie ve s th e State of its burden to prove the alleg ation and for feits the def end an t ’s rig ht to appeal the insuff iciency of the evidenc e in that r eg ard. Ex parte Ric h , 194 S.W .3d 508, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Ther e is an exception to this rule, howe ver, w h en t he re cord a ffirmatively ref lects that the e nhance ment was improper. Id .; Mi k

e l v . S tate , 167 S.W .3d 556, 559 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (h o ld in g th a t w h e r e r e c o r d a f f ir mati v e ly s h o w e d th a t n e c e s s ar y s e qu e n c e o f c o n v ic ti o n s w as not pr ov e d, de fe nd ant’ s p le a

of tr ue did no t prec lude he r f ro m c ha lle ng ingsu ff

ic ie nc y of e vid e nc e to support habitual offe nder f inding) . The State arg ues t hat appellant should have raised these issues in a n appea l f

rom the order defe rring adjudication, but a defe ndant may obtain relief fr o m an unlawful sente nce a

t any time. Rich , 194 S.W .3d at 515. Appellant re lies on the presentence investigation repor t submit ted to and conside red by the tr ial cou rt at th e June 18 , 2 00 3, he ari ngto d e te rm ine the c on dit ion s o f s up e rv isi on . T his do c ume nt r e fl e c ts that in

bo th t he Oh io and No rt

h Ca ro lin a c a se s, a pp e lla nt w a s se nte nc e d to le ss tha n o ne y e ar in the state s’ de pa rtme nts of c or

re c tio ns . App e lla

nt a rgue s th a t th is i s in su ff

ic ie nt t o prove that the offe nses wer e fe lonies. That is not the question. The question is whether the re cord aff irmatively shows that the offe nses wer e not felonies. The indi ctment, to which appe llant pleaded true, a lleg ed that they

wer e, and w e find nothing in the pr esente nce r eport that a ffirmatively shows that the pre vious convictions were not for fe lony offe nses. Point of error

six is overrule d.November 25, 1997, is the date a lleg ed in the indictment. The pr esente nce repor t states 3 that a pp e lla nt w a s c onvic te d in

the Oh io c a

us e s o n D e c e mbe r 1 , 1 99 7. Whic he ve r d a te is c or re c t, the Ohio convictions we re not fina l before the North Car olina offe nses wer e committed. 8 The pre sentenc e re po rt d oes, howe ver, a ffirmatively demonstrate that the previous of fe ns es and co nv ic tio ns we re no t in the re qu ir e d s e qu e nc e . T he re qu ir e d s e qu e nc e wa s: O hio

c on vic tio ns fi na l , N o r

t h C a r o l i n a o f f e ns e s c omm itt e d, No rt

h Ca ro lin a of fe ns e s f ina l, p ri mary

of fe ns e committed. The pre sentenc e re port states t h at ap p el lant was c onvicted in the two Nor th Carolina

cause s on Aug ust 12, 19 9 7, and plac ed on probation for three y ear s; the date a lleg ed in the ind ic t m e n t , M ay 1 2 , 1 9 9 9 , w a s t h e d a t e p r o b a t i o n w a s r e v o k e d an d t h e c o n v i c t i o n s b e c a m e fi na l. Thus, the re cord a ffirmatively shows that the North Car olina offe nses wer e committed bef ore the Ohio convictions beca

me final on Nove mber 25, 1997. The e rror cannot be harmless. See J ordan 3

v . S tat e , 256 S.W .3d 286, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Point of er ror se ven is sustained. B eca use, under the c ir c u ms ta

n c e s o f th is c a s e , th e e r r o r a f f e c ts o n ly th e v a li d it

y o f th e s e n te n c e , the proper reme dy is to remand for

rea ssessment of punishment. See M ikel , 167 S.W. 3d

a t 56 0; se e als o Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 44.29(b) (West Supp. 2007).

I n point of err or t h re e, ap p ellant urg es that the trial c ourt imposed an unlawf ul

se nte nc e . O ur

dis po sit ion

of po int of e rr or se ve n r e nd e rs thi s p oin t mo ot. The judg ment of convic tion is af firmed as to the finding of g uilt. That portion of the jud g me nt i mpo sin g se nte nc e is r e ve rs e d a nd the c a us e is r e mand e d f

or re a sse ssm e nt o f p un ish me nt.9 __________________________________________ W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Waldrop a nd Henson Affir med in part; Rever sed and Rema nded in par

t on Motion for Rehear ing Filed: August 27, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh