SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2941-21 

BARBARA POULARD, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

LUCIEN POULARD, JR., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________ 

Argued February 13, 2024 – Decided April 8, 2024 

Before Judges Whipple, Enright and Paganelli. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County, 

Docket No. FM-01-0800-17.

Kelly T. McGriff argued the cause for appellant (Kelly 

McGriff Law, LLC, attorneys; Kelly T. McGriff, of 

counsel and on the briefs). 

Brian D. Winters argued the cause for respondent 

(Keith, Winters, Wenning & Harris, LLC, attorneys; 

Brian D. Winters, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2941-21

Defendant Lucien Poulard appeals from certain alimony, equitable 

distribution, and other provisions of an April 13, 2022 post-judgment 

matrimonial order. We vacate paragraph eleven of the April 13 order, which 

directed defendant to pay $24,410 to plaintiff Barbara Poulard for his dissipation 

of a vehicle acquired during the marriage, and affirm the challenged order in all 

other respects, substantially for the reasons set forth in the trial court's 

thoughtful eighty-one-page opinion. 

I.

 Because we write for the parties, and considering the trial court fully 

detailed the parties' personal and financial circumstances in its comprehensive 

written decision, we only summarize the pertinent facts. The parties were 

married on October 2, 1979, and lived together intermittently until they 

separated for the last time in 2002. They have two adult children, both of whom 

are emancipated. 

 Plaintiff is sixty-seven years old, and defendant is sixty-six years old. 

Plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, 

generalized anxiety disorder, and dysthymic disorder. She last worked in 1997 

and receives Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits totaling $1,381 per 
3 A-2941-21

month. The trial court found she "is not expected to regain employment in the 

future." 

Defendant was declared disabled by the Social Security Administration in 

or around 1987 and receives SSD benefits of approximately $1,515 per month. 

The trial court found he also "operates a used car business." 

In May 2017, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint for divorce, requesting an 

award of alimony, equitable distribution, and reimbursement for the following: 

(1) $2,800 in parking tickets incurred by defendant in plaintiff's name, 

plus a $100 fee to reinstate her driver's license; 

(2) a 2000 XJ8 Jaguar Sedan that defendant allegedly sold for parts and 

fraudulently reported stolen to the parties' insurance company; 

(3) $17,000 in social security disability payments that plaintiff claimed 

defendant stole from her; 

(4) half of the value of a $279,000 Merrill Lynch account that defendant 

allegedly liquidated after forging plaintiff's signature; 

(5) $169,000 for a house in Elizabeth, which the parties sold; 

(6) a gold watch, diamond anniversary necklace, and earrings; 

(7) funds from a joint account, which included plaintiff's and the children's 

disability proceeds; and 

(8) $7,000 for a dining room set plaintiff claimed defendant stole. 

Additionally, plaintiff asked the trial court to order defendant to satisfy all 

mortgages he obtained against any marital real estate to fund his automobile 
4 A-2941-21

business, and that defendant "[c]lear all the [b]ad credit" in her name. 

In September 2017, defendant filed a certification, acknowledgment of 

service, and answer to the complaint. He also requested dismissal of plaintiff's 

complaint, claiming the parties were divorced in 2007 under a decree he 

obtained from the Republic of Haiti, and that he remarried twice thereafter. 

 The judge presiding over the parties' matter denied defendant's request for 

dismissal. She found the parties were divorced in Haiti, but the divorce decree 

provided the parties with no other relief except permission for plaintiff to resume 

her maiden name. Accordingly, in March 2018, the judge entered a case 

management order directing the parties to exchange discovery and file current 

case information statements (CIS). In July 2018, the judge entered another order 

directing the parties to file CISs or risk suppression of their pleadings. Although 

plaintiff filed a CIS, defendant never did. Therefore, his answer was stricken 

on the first day of trial. 

The ten-day trial began in September 2018 and ended in October 2019. 

Both parties, as well as their daughter and plaintiff's friend, testified at trial. A 

significant portion of plaintiff's testimony focused on her purchase of a 2000 

XJ8 Jaguar in April 2000. She stated she was able to buy the car with settlement 
5 A-2941-21

proceeds she received from a lawsuit against her former employer, Avenel, 

noting her portion of the net proceeds totaled approximately $57,000. 

Plaintiff testified the title to the Jaguar initially was placed in defendant's 

name, but he intended to transfer it to her name after completing "all the title 

work." Plaintiff stated she could not drive the car at the time, due to her poor 

health, but she was its sole owner. She also testified she instructed defendant 

not to drive the car because it was hers. 

According to plaintiff, when she looked out of her window one morning 

in October 2002, she noticed the 2000 XJ8 Jaguar was no longer in her driveway 

and had been replaced with another Jaguar. She suspected defendant removed 

her car because he did not want her driving it. Later that night, defendant came 

home to tell her that her "car got stolen in New York." Thereafter, the New 

York Sanitation Department called plaintiff to tell her that because the Jaguar 

was stripped and found in a derelict condition, the Sanitation Department took 

possession of the damaged vehicle and "crushed it." 

Plaintiff testified she thought defendant "took [her] car to New York and 

had it stripped." Additionally, she produced a police report from October 19, 

2002, showing that on the day her Jaguar disappeared from the driveway, 

defendant told the Union City police he drove the vehicle to a local store, parked 
6 A-2941-21

it in the lot, and after shopping for approximately forty-five minutes, he returned 

to the lot to find the car gone. At a subsequent hearing, plaintiff also produced 

a letter to verify the parties filed an insurance claim for the loss of the Jaguar, 

but the carrier denied the claim based on the parties' failure to submit certain 

documentation. 

When the trial continued in February 2019, the judge entered an order 

extending the time for the parties to exchange additional discovery. The judge 

also directed plaintiff to provide defendant with a copy of "her current exhibits" 

within two weeks. On May 7, 2019, the judge entered another order directing 

plaintiff to provide the court and defendant with proof she provided defendant 

with certain discovery and ordered defendant to submit a certification a week 

later to confirm whether he received plaintiff's discovery. 

Three weeks later, the judge conducted a case management conference. 

Plaintiff appeared; defendant did not. Accordingly, the judge entered an order 

finding defendant's "outstanding discovery issue [wa]s deemed moot" because 

he failed to communicate with the court and "provide any indication that 

[his] . . . discovery matter [wa]s still at issue[,] . . . per the order of May 7, 2019." 

The judge heard an additional five days of testimony before the trial ended on 

October 1, 2019. 
7 A-2941-21

On April 13, 2022, the court entered a final order: (1) finding plaintiff's 

request for a judgment of divorce was moot, based on the 2007 Haitian divorce 

decree; (2) ordering defendant to pay plaintiff open durational alimony of $260 

per week, retroactive to the date of plaintiff's complaint, plus $100 per week 

toward arrears, based on defendant's ability to earn approximately $32,900 per 

year from selling cars; (3) awarding plaintiff $24,410 as reimbursement for the 

loss of the 2000 XJ8 Jaguar sedan; and (4) directing defendant to reimburse 

plaintiff the sum of $2,097.05 for motor vehicle tickets he incurred in her name. 

The judge denied plaintiff's remaining requests for relief as either unsupported 

or barred under "the equitable principle of laches." 

 In finding plaintiff was entitled to an award of $24,410 for the 2000 XJ8 

Jaguar, the judge explained: 

[d]efendant told Union City police he was driving the 

Jaguar on October 19, 2002, [and] it was stolen from a 

parking lot in Union . . . when he went into a store for 

approximately [forty-five] minutes. The car was 

discovered stripped in Queens the same day, removed

by the Sanitation Derelict Vehicle Operations on 

October 21, 2022, and crushed or dismantled . . . . 

Defendant . . . did not testify about the 2000 

[XJ8] Jaguar, provide any evidence of his own [about 

it], or refute [p]laintiff's claims concerning her belief 

that he "had it stolen." . . . It appears, from the face of 

[p]laintiff's evidence, that her Jaguar was reported 

stolen by [d]efendant to the police department in Union 
8 A-2941-21

City, New Jersey, at [7:38 p.m.], over [six] hours after 

the vehicle was reported as tagged for removal in 

Queens, at [1:18 p.m.]. It appears that [d]efendant's 

report to police that he had been in a store for about 

[forty-five] minutes and came out to find the vehicle 

gone was patently false. Plaintiff also offered 

uncontroverted testimony that [d]efendant . . . told her 

the vehicle was stolen in "New York," when he had 

reported it stolen from Union City. 

After finding the purchase price of the Jaguar was $24,410, the judge stated: 

[t]he court accepts that this [amount] was paid with the 

proceeds of [p]laintiff's personal injury lawsuit[,] . . . 

which the court deems exempt from equitable 

distribution in this matter, notwithstanding the title to 

the car at some point [was] in the joint names of the 

parties. Defendant shall pay the sum of $24,410 to

[p]laintiff within 180 days. 

II. 

 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) finding plaintiff's 

alimony claim "was not barred by the doctrine of laches"; (2) imputing income 

to defendant; and (3) denying his motion to dismiss the complaint after plaintiff 

repeatedly "fail[ed] to comply with discovery deadlines." Additionally, 

defendant contends for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in: (1) 

concluding plaintiff's alimony claim "was not barred by the doctrine of equitable 

estoppel"; (2) "requiring [him] to reimburse plaintiff for the Jaguar" and certain 

motor vehicle tickets without the court examining the appropriate equitable 
9 A-2941-21

distribution factors; (3) determining that he dissipated the Jaguar without the 

court having applied the factors set forth in Kothari1; and (4) converting 

plaintiff's complaint into a Rule 4:50 motion and granting her relief without 

compelling plaintiff to satisfy the Rule's requirements. 

Other than defendant's contentions about the Jaguar, none of his 

arguments have sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We also need not address the arguments defendant failed to 

raise to the trial court because they are not "jurisdictional in nature," nor do they 

"substantially implicate public interest." State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 

1

 Kothari v. Kothari, 255 N.J. Super. 500, 507 (App. Div. 1992). In Kothari, 

the court held that "[w]here property has been dissipated during the marriage[,] 

the asset subject to distribution may take the form of a cash indebtedness to be 

imposed by the court upon one spouse in favor of the other." Id. at 510. The 

court also identified the following "most commonly" applied factors in 

determining whether one spouse dissipated a marital asset at the expense of the 

other spouse: 

(1) the proximity of the expenditure to the parties' 

separation, (2) whether the expenditure was typical of 

expenditures made by the parties prior to the 

breakdown of the marriage, (3) whether the expenditure 

benefitted the "joint" marital enterprise or was for the 

benefit of one spouse to the exclusion of the other, and 

(4) the need for, and amount of, the expenditure. 

[Id. at 507.] 
10 A-2941-21

410 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 

(1973)). Thus, we limit our discussion to whether the judge mistakenly awarded 

plaintiff $24,410 for her claims related to the Jaguar. 

We begin with the standards that govern our analysis. Our scope of review 

of Family Part orders is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). 

We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of its 

special expertise in family matters. Id. at 413. Deference is especially 

appropriate in bench trials when the evidence is "largely testimonial and 

involves questions of credibility." Id. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons 

to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). A trial judge who observes witnesses and 

listens to their testimony is in the best position "to make first-hand credibility 

judgments about the witnesses who appear on the stand." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). 

Therefore, we will not disturb a trial court's factual findings unless "they 

are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] 

and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 

154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 

N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, we do not accord such deference to legal 
11 A-2941-21

conclusions and review such conclusions de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 

227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). 

"Accurate, complete and current information is essential at every stage of 

a litigated matrimonial matter," and "[t]he quality of every judicial decision 

depends heavily on the information presented to the court." Pressler & Verniero, 

Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 5:5-2 (2024). Therefore, pursuant to Rule 

5:5-2(a), a CIS "shall be filed and served in all contested family actions . . . in 

which there is any issue as to . . . support, alimony[,] or equitable distribution." 

A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court's decision on distribution 

of property "as long as the trial court could reasonably have reached its result 

from the evidence presented, and the award is not distorted by legal or factual 

mistake." La Sala v. La Sala, 335 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 2000). 

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1: 

In making an equitable distribution of property, the 

court shall consider, but not be limited to, the following 

factors: 

a. The duration of the marriage or civil 

union;

b. The age and physical and emotional 

health of the parties; 

c. The income or property brought to the 

marriage or civil union by each party; 
12 A-2941-21

d. The standard of living established 

during the marriage or civil union; 

e. Any written agreement made by the 

parties before or during the marriage or 

civil union concerning an arrangement of 

property distribution; 

f. The economic circumstances of each 

party at the time the division of property 

becomes effective; 

g. The income and earning capacity of 

each party, including educational 

background, training, employment skills, 

work experience, length of absence from 

the job market, custodial responsibilities 

for children, and the time and expense 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or 

training to enable the party to become selfsupporting at a standard of living 

reasonably comparable to that enjoyed 

during the marriage or civil union; 

h. The contribution by each party to the 

education, training[,] or earning power of 

the other; 

i. The contribution of each party to the 

acquisition, dissipation, preservation, 

depreciation[,] or appreciation in the 

amount or value of the marital property, or 

the property acquired during the civil union 

as well as the contribution of a party as a 

homemaker; 
13 A-2941-21

j. The tax consequences of the proposed 

distribution to each party; 

k. The present value of the property; 

l. The need of a parent who has physical 

custody of a child to own or occupy the 

marital residence or residence shared by 

the partners in a civil union couple and to 

use or own the household effects; 

m. The debts and liabilities of the parties; 

n. The need for creation, now or in the 

future, of a trust fund to secure reasonably 

foreseeable medical or educational costs 

for a spouse, partner in a civil union 

couple[,] or children; 

o. The extent to which a party deferred 

achieving their career goals; and 

p. Any other factors which the court may 

deem relevant. 

[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1.] 

Before fixing an equitable distribution award, the trial court must first 

decide which property qualifies as marital property and which property, if any, 

belongs separately to either spouse. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 ("[T]he court shall 

make specific findings of fact on the evidence relevant to all issues pertaining 

to asset eligibility or ineligibility, asset valuation, and equitable distribution, 

including specifically, but not limited to, the factors set forth in this section."). 
14 A-2941-21

As the Court in Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232 (1974) explained, when 

fixing an equitable distribution award, 

a trial judge enters upon a three-step proceeding. 

Assuming that some allocation is to be made, [the 

judge] must first decide what specific property of each 

spouse is eligible for distribution. Secondly, [the 

judge] must determine its value for purposes of such 

distribution. Thirdly, [the judge] must decide how such 

allocation can most equitably be made. 

 A Family Part judge will presume that property acquired during the 

marriage is marital property subject to equitable distribution. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-

23.1 ("It shall be a rebuttable presumption that each party made a substantial 

financial or nonfinancial contribution to the acquisition of income and property 

while the party was married."). Importantly, however, when a court determines 

how to divide marital assets, there is no presumption the assets should be 

distributed equally. Rothman, 65 N.J. at 232 n.6; see also Wadlow v. Wadlow, 

200 N.J. Super. 372, 377 (App. Div. 1985). 

"[T]he burden of proof to establish the immunity of an asset from 

[equitable] distribution rests upon the spouse asserting the immunity." Dotsko 

v. Dotsko, 244 N.J. Super. 668, 676 (App. Div. 1990) (citing Painter v. Painter, 

65 N.J. 196, 214 (1974)). Nonetheless, the Court has made clear that a party's 

personal injury recovery for pain and suffering is not equitably distributable. 
15 A-2941-21

Landwehr v. Landwehr, 111 N.J. 491, 501 (1988). Instead, only that portion of 

a personal injury settlement attributable to lost wages and "assets . . . expended 

for medical expenses" is subject to equitable distribution. Id. at 502. 

Finally, it is axiomatic "that a party 'in equity must come into court with 

clean hands and . . . must keep them clean . . . throughout the proceedings.'" 

Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 77 (App. Div. 2012) (omissions in original) 

(quoting Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis, 260 N.J. Super. 50, 53-54 (App. Div. 

1992)). 

 Governed by these principles, we affirm all but paragraph eleven of the 

April 13, 2022 order, granting plaintiff a $24,410 award for the Jaguar. We are 

constrained to vacate this award and remand for further proceedings to allow the 

trial court to reconsider this distribution as it relates to the statutory factors under 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1. 

In reaching this conclusion, we discern no reason to disturb the judge's 

finding that plaintiff credibly testified she bought the Jaguar using settlement 

funds she received from a personal injury suit. But the basis for the judge 

finding the settlement funds were "exempt from equitable distribution" is 

unclear. Moreover, the parties' testimony sheds little light on this issue. 

Similarly, it is not clear from the record why the judge found defendant 
16 A-2941-21

"dissipated" the Jaguar, as her opinion does not explicitly state defendant was 

responsible for the Jaguar's destruction. 

Therefore, on remand, we direct the judge to reconsider the nature of 

plaintiff's settlement funds and more fully address the statutory factors set forth 

under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1—including the dissipation factor set forth under 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1(i)—to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to 

reimbursement for the full purchase price of the Jaguar. We understand the 

judge's analysis of the statutory factors may be hampered due to the parties' 

limited testimony and proofs regarding the Jaguar, not to mention defendant's 

blatant violation of the judge's orders and Rule 5:5-2, compelling him to file a 

current CIS. Thus, although we do not direct the judge to elicit further testimony 

from the parties on the remaining issues, she may do so if she feels it is 

appropriate. 

 Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.