Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:

LESLIE C. SHIVELY ALLYSON R. BREEDEN

Shively & Associates, P.C. KEITH W. VONDERAHE

Evansville, Indiana ROBERT L. BURKART

 Ziemer Stayman Weitzel & Shoulders,LLP

 Evansville, Indiana

 JOHN A. HAMILTON

 Evansville, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

VFW POST 2953, et al, )

)

Appellants-Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) No. 82A01-1206-PL-255

)

CITY OF EVANSVILLE AND )

EVANSVILLE COMMON COUNCIL, )

)

Appellees-Defendants. )

APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Judge

Cause No. 82C01-0602-PL-86

February 15, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
2

Case Summary

VFW Post 2953, American Legion Post 265, Owls Nest #30, River City Eagles 4023, 

VFW Post 1114, Amvets Post 84, Riverbend Association, The Council of Clubs, and 

Germania Maennechor (collectively, “Fraternal Organizations”) sought injunctive relief and 

a declaratory judgment that City of Evansville Ordinance G-2012-1 Amended violates Article

1, Section 231and Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution.2 The trial court denied 

relief and Fraternal Organizations appeal. We affirm.

Issues

Fraternal Organizations present two issues for review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Ordinance did not 

violate Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution; and

II. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Ordinance did not 

violate Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution.

Facts and Procedural History

 

1 A group of tavern owners who joined Fraternal Organizations in challenging the Ordinance, including Paul 

Stieler Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Harbor Bay, have separately appealed the order and pursued their claim that the 

Ordinance violates Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution, in Cause No. 82A01-1205-CT-242. 

2

In their Amended Complaint, Fraternal Organizations provided a caption identifying one of their counts as 

alleging a violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The First Amendment provides 

that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or the right of the people to peaceably 

assemble, and has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and as such applies to all states. Helton 

v. State, 624 N.E.2d 499, 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)), trans. 

denied. 

 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that citizens have a First Amendment right to associate in 

two situations: (1) “intimate association,” when individuals “enter into and maintain certain intimate human 

relationships,” and (2) “expressive association,” when individuals “associate for the purpose of engaging in 

those activities protected by the First Amendment – speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, 

and the exercise of religion.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).

 In the proceedings below, Fraternal Organizations presented argument and authority relative to First 

Amendment associational rights. However, on appeal, Fraternal Organizations claim only a violation of Article

1, Section 23 and Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. 
3

In 2006, the Evansville Common Council (“the Council”) adopted an ordinance that 

prohibited smoking in workplaces and other public places in the City of Evansville (“the 

City”) but exempted bars, private clubs, and riverboats. On February 13, 2012, the Council 

adopted City of Evansville Ordinance G-2012-1 Amended, with an effective date of April 1, 

2012 (“the Ordinance”). The Ordinance prohibits smoking in bars and private clubs but 

permits smoking on riverboats.3 Casino Aztar is the sole riverboat as defined by the 

Ordinance within the corporate limits of the City. 

Fraternal Organizations and a group of tavern owners filed a complaint seeking 

preliminary and permanent injunctions against enforcement of the Ordinance and additionally 

seeking a declaration of its unconstitutionality. The City filed a motion to dismiss. 

On March 28, 2012, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion for 

a preliminary injunction. The court heard evidence that Casino Aztar was the only casino 

meeting the definition of riverboat, most of the patrons came from outside the City, Casino 

Aztar generated significant income to provide for capital improvements in the City, and 

Casino Aztar had installed a major ventilation system. The court also heard testimony that 

Fraternal Organizations had voluntary members with common interests, in some cases 

functioned as support groups for members, and could expect to lose significant revenue from 

the extension of the smoking ban to their premises. 

On March 30, 2012, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

 

3 The Ordinance defines a riverboat as “a boat on which lawful gambling is authorized pursuant to Indiana 

Code 4-33, as amended.” The surrounding restaurants and bars owned and operated by Casino Aztar are not 

exempted from the Ordinance.
4

order denying injunctive relief. The trial court concluded that, although the organizations 

and taverns had understandable concerns about a negative impact upon their income, which 

might legitimately be presented in a legislative or political arena, the judiciary could not 

substitute its opinion for the legislative process, and there was no reasonable likelihood of 

success in establishing the unconstitutionality of the Ordinance.

On May 15, 2012, the trial court entered a final judgment upholding the Ordinance 

and denying injunctive relief, incorporating the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 

March 30, 2012 order.4 This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause

Fraternal Organizations claim that the Ordinance violates Section 23 of the Indiana 

Constitution, the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause, which provides:

The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, 

privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong 

to all citizens.

When a statute is challenged under the Indiana Constitution, it stands “clothed with the 

presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a contrary showing.” Boehm v. 

Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind. 1996). The party challenging the 

constitutionality bears the burden of proof, and all doubts will be resolved against that party. 

Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind. 2009). Municipal ordinances enacted pursuant 

to a proper delegation of power are likewise presumptively valid and “stand on the same 

 

4 By agreement, the trial court dismissed Right of Privacy and Due Process claims brought by Tavern Owners.
5

footing as acts of the legislature” when subjected to constitutional scrutiny. City of 

Indianapolis v. Clint’s Wrecker Serv., Inc., 440 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 

“The requirements of Article 1, § 23 govern not only state statutes, but also the 

enactments and actions of county, municipal, and other governmental agencies and their 

equivalents.” Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236, 238 (Ind. 2003). However, 

“the question of classification under [Section 23] is primarily a question for the legislature” 

and “legislative classification becomes a judicial question only where the lines drawn appear 

arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.” Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 701, 310 N.E.2d 

867, 869 (1974). To overcome the presumption of constitutionality under Section 23, the 

challenger bears the burden to negate every conceivable basis which might have supported 

the classification. Mahowald v. State, 719 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

A statute may be the subject of a claim under Section 23 when it either grants unequal 

privileges or imposes unequal burdens. Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1280 (Ind. 

1999). The Ordinance extends to Casino Aztar (and any other riverboat to acquire a gaming 

license) a privilege in the form of an exception to the smoking ban that is unavailable to 

Fraternal Organizations. Fraternal Organizations claim that the grant of unequal privileges is 

arbitrary and manifestly unreasonable.

Observing that they, like Casino Aztar, face decreased revenues and have patrons who 

bear like risks from second-hand smoke, Fraternal Organizations maintain that they are 

similarly situated to Casino Aztar. According to Fraternal Organizations, the decision to 

exempt riverboats was necessarily motivated by the City’s financial dependence upon casino 
6

revenue and this does not provide a rational basis for disparate treatment.

In Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994), the Indiana Supreme Court “engaged in 

a comprehensive review of the history and purposes animating the adoption of Section 23 as 

part of Indiana’s 1851 Constitution and of the subsequent case law[.]” League of Women 

Voters of Ind. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 769 (Ind. 2010). “Synthesizing history, text, and 

subsequent case law, [the Court] adopted a superseding analytical formulation that, when 

statutes grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing persons or classes of persons, the 

Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause imposes two requirements[.]” Id. at 769-70. The 

formulation provides:

“First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably 

related to inherent characteristics [that] distinguish the unequally treated 

classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and 

equally available to all persons similarly situated.” [Collins, 644 N.E.2d] at 

80. In addition, “in determining whether a statute complies with or violates 

Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative 

discretion.” Id.

Rokita, 929 N.E.2d at 770. Accordingly, Fraternal Organizations bore the requirement of 

showing (1) that the Ordinance’s disparate treatment of riverboats and private clubs is not 

reasonably related to their distinguishing inherent characteristics, or (2) the exemption 

accorded riverboats is not uniformly applicable and equally available to all those similarly 

situated.

The first Collinsfactor “involves considering both the nature of the characteristics that 

distinguish the classes and the relationship between the disparate treatment and such 

characteristics.” Rokita, 929 N.E.2d at 770. A statute may result in different treatment for 
7

different classifications of people without offending Section 23 if both (a) the disparately 

treated classifications are rationally distinguished by distinctive, inherent characteristics, and 

(b) such disparate treatment is reasonably related to such distinguishing characteristics. Id.

(citing Ledbetter v. Hunter, 842 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Ind. 2006) and Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 79).

As for the inherent characteristics distinguishing the Fraternal Organizations and 

Casino Aztar, Fraternal Organizations essentially contend they do not exist. In making this 

claim, Fraternal Organizations focus only upon the negative financial impact, insisting that 

they would suffer from a smoking prohibition as much or more than Casino Aztar. There 

was evidence presented that a ban on smoking would cause Casino Aztar to lose 

approximately 30% of its revenue. According to Fraternal Organizations, 70 to 80% of their 

members are smokers and they likewise expect to lose significant revenue. 

They do not contest the facts that Casino Aztar tenders $1 of its $3 per patron 

admittance fee to the City or that Casino Aztar leases property from the City. Thus, revenue 

generated by Casino Aztar brings revenue for the City of Evansville apart from and in 

addition to food and beverage taxes. The majority of that revenue is derived from the 

operation of slot machines. Accordingly, the casino is in direct competition with other 

casinos but not local clubs, which lack slot machines. Casino Aztar is a major employer in 

the City.

Moreover, Fraternal Organizations ignore the evidence that Casino Aztar, a large 

multi-level venue, maintains a non-smoking level and has installed a large and modern 
8

ventilation system. Also, approximately 87% of the patrons of Casino Aztar are drawn from 

areas outside the City. 

As to disparate treatment, Fraternal Organizations argue that the purpose of a smoking 

ban is health protection and thus special treatment to one group of patrons does not further

this purpose. However, focus upon a law’s “purpose” is not determinative. Rokita, 929 

N.E.2d at 770-71. Collins requires only that the disparate treatment accorded by the 

legislation, not the purposes of the legislation, be reasonably related to the inherent 

characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Dvorak, 796 N.E.2d at 239.

According to the evidence and public commentary presented to the Commission, the 

health risks of second-hand smoke to patrons of either social venue is a valid consideration. 

However, exact exclusion and inclusion is impractical in legislation. Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 

80. “Collins, its precursors, and its progeny all indicate that we look at the Legislature’s 

balancing of the competing interests involved” and we accord considerable deference to the 

manner in which the legislature has balanced those interests. Humphreys v. Clinic for 

Women, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 247, 254-56 (Ind. 2003). We must determine whether the 

challenger has negated every conceivable basis which might have supported the 

classification. Ledbetter, 842 N.E.2d at 814.

Judicial inquiry is appropriate only where the lines drawn appear to be either arbitrary 

or manifestly unreasonable, and so long as the classification is based upon substantial 

distinctions with reference to the subject matter, we do not substitute our judgment for that of 

the legislature. Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80. Nor will we inquire into the legislative motives 
9

for such classification. Id. Even so, “fiscal considerations are a legitimate basis for 

legislative line-drawing” and we do not substitute our belief as to the wisdom of a particular 

statute for that of the Legislature even if a statute was apparently ‘“born of unwise, 

undesirable, or ineffectual policies.”’ Mahowald, 719 N.E.2d at 426 (quoting State v. 

Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (Ind. 1992)).

Fraternal Organizations and Casino Aztar have different clientele and primary sources 

of revenue, differing obligations as to payments due to the City from their revenue, and 

distinct differences in their physical premises. Casino Aztar, a larger venue, has a halfmillion-dollar ventilation system to partially address the specter of second-hand smoke. 

Thus, the classifications are rationally distinguished by distinctive, inherent characteristics. 

Fraternal Organizations did not negate every conceivable basis which might have supported 

the classification here.

As for the second Collins factor, Fraternal Organizations do not seem to dispute that 

the preferential treatment (an exemption from the smoking ban) is “uniformly applicable and 

equally available to all people similarly situated.” Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80. At this time, 

there are no other riverboats with a gaming license within the corporate limits of the City and

the parties appear to be in complete agreement that the exemption from the smoking ban 

would be applicable to any other riverboat licensed for gaming in the future. 

Finally, in determining whether Section 23 is violated, courts are to exercise 

substantial deference to legislative discretion. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d at 772 (citing Collins, 644 

N.E.2d at 80). For example, in Rokita, “the possible absence of precise congruity in 
10

application to all voters represent[ed] a legitimate exercise of legislative discretion 

warranting our deference.” Id. 

Here, it is true that an individual who patronizes Casino Aztar may smoke or may be 

exposed to second-hand smoke although if he or she chooses to patronize a private club in 

the City, smoking is banned. Fraternal Organizations observe that smoking in either place 

impacts patrons’ health. Clearly, however, Fraternal Organizations’ petition for relief is not 

targeted toward expanding the ban such that riverboat patrons are free of second-hand smoke. 

Rather, Fraternal Organizations seek a declaration that the ban is facially unconstitutional. 

Arguing that there are pervasive and equal health risks of second-hand smoke does not 

advance this position. Nonetheless, when 87% of riverboat patrons are non-city residents, 

City legislation has greatly diminished impact on their lifestyle and health choices. In these 

circumstances, the absence of precise congruity in legislation is entitled to deference. 

Fraternal Organizations have not satisfied their substantial burden to demonstrate that 

the challenged ordinance violates the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana 

Constitution.

Right to Speak Clause5

 

5 The City asserts that Fraternal Organizations lack standing to pursue a Section 9 claim on behalf of individual 

members, none of whom are a named plaintiff. Relying upon Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 

U.S. 333, 343 (1977), the City refers to “limited circumstances” when an organization can assert constitutional 

claims for individuals: (a) members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, (b) the interests 

the organization seeks to protect are germane to the organizations’ purpose, and (c) neither the claim asserted 

nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. According to the City, 

Fraternal Organizations bore the burden of showing no conflict of interest or diversity of views preventing the 

organizations from effectively representing the membership. In the proceedings below, there was no timely 

challenge to standing leading to the development of a record regarding the existence or absence of any such 

circumstances. 
11

In the Amended Complaint, Fraternal Organizations alleged that the smoking ban 

violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of 

the Indiana Constitution, the Right to Speak Clause. Fraternal Organizations made no 

specific claim under Article 1, Section 31 of the Indiana Constitution, which guarantees the 

right to peaceably assemble. 

In argument before the trial court, Fraternal Organizations claimed that the smoking 

ban constitutes an “encroachment” upon a fundamental right of free association; they urged 

the trial court to apply a strict scrutiny analysis to the federal constitutional claim and 

heightened scrutiny to the state constitutional claim. (Tr. 245.) However, Fraternal 

Organizations provided no authority to suggest a violation of Indiana’s Right to Speak 

Clause. The trial court proceeded to address the First Amendment challenge. 

In upholding the Ordinance, the trial court concluded that it regulates conduct, there is 

no fundamental right to engage in the conduct of smoking, and the smoking ban has only a 

remote or incidental impact on the rights of Fraternal Organizations members to freely 

associate. Rejecting Fraternal Organizations’ contentions that smoking is a protected activity 

or that the smoking ban unduly interferes with rights of association, the trial court relied upon 

the reasoning of Fraternal Order of Eagles v. City and Borough of Juneau, 254 P.3d 348 

(Alaska 2011). 

The City of Juneau had enacted an ordinance prohibiting smoking in certain places, 

and the Fraternal Order of Eagles (“Eagles”) had argued that the ban infringed upon their 

freedom of association under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 
12

351. Claiming that 85% of their members smoked, the Eagles argued that there was an 

undue interference with their right to “intimate association” because the ordinance essentially 

directed members to go elsewhere to engage in their associations. Id. at 353. 

The Eagles Court reviewed cases of other jurisdictions, including a case that it found 

to be of “the closest factual analogy,” Am. Legion Post # 149 v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 

164 Wash.2d 570, 192 P.3d 306 (2008):

Although the Washington Supreme Court considered the relevant factors and 

determined that American Legion Post # 149 was not an intimate association 

because of its large membership, the court indicated that there would be no 

violation of the group’s rights even if it had been deemed an intimate 

association: “Even if the Post were deemed to facilitate intimate human 

relationships, the ban does not directly interfere with such relationships or a 

person’s ability to join the Post. Instead, it merely prohibits smoking in the 

Post’s building when employees are present.”

Eagles, 254 P.3d at 355 (quoting Am. Legion Post # 149). The Eagles Court then concluded:

 We agree with these other courts that an ordinance banning smoking in 

private clubs does not implicate the right to intimate association under the First 

Amendment. Even assuming the Eagles’ relationships are of the highly 

personal type that receive heightened constitutional protection, the ordinance 

does not regulate or interfere with the members’ “choices to enter into and 

maintain” those relationships. The ordinance does not regulate the 

membership of Aerie 4200 or who may associate with whom; it only regulates 

the conduct of members in certain places.

 The Eagles argue that the ordinance unduly interferes with “how, when, and 

where club members choose to partake of their intimate associations.” The 

Eagles essentially urge us (1) to adopt the “association plus” theory in spite of 

the uniform decisions of other courts and (2) to hold that “the right of intimate 

association includes a right to engage in any lawful activities the participants 

may choose.” But the First Amendment protects the ability to choose one’s 

intimate associates freely, not the ability to engage in any conduct in any place 

so long as one is interacting with his or her intimate associates.

Id. (internal citations omitted). 
13

On appeal, Fraternal Organizations concede that their members lack a fundamental 

right to smoke “but assert that the smoking ban negatively impacts their constitutionally 

protected right to free association.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Nonetheless, Fraternal 

Organizations provide no argument directed to a First Amendment claim. Having abandoned 

any First Amendment claim on appeal, they specifically contend that the Ordinance violates 

Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution, the Right to Speak Clause, which provides:

No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and 

opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject 

whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.

“Common in state constitutions, this formulation is sometimes called the ‘freedom-andresponsibility standard,’” according to which a legislature may not impair the flow of ideas 

but is to sanction individuals who commit abuse. Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind. 

1993). “The right to speak clause focuses on the restrictive impact of state action on an 

individual’s expressive activity.” Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Ind. 1996). 

Article 1, Section 9 is implicated when the State imposes a direct and significant burden on a 

person’s opportunity “to speak his or her mind, in whatever manner the speaker deems most 

appropriate.” Id.

Accordingly, “the Indiana Constitution more jealously protects freedom of speech 

guarantees than does the United States Constitution.” Lach v. Lake Cnty, 621 N.E.2d 357, 

358 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied. Article 1, Section 9 claims are addressed under a 

two-step analysis: first, we determine whether the state action has restricted a claimant’s 

expressive activity and second, if it has, we decide whether the claimant’s restricted activity 
14

constituted an “abuse” of the right to speak. Ogden v. Robertson, 962 N.E.2d 134, 141 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. The level of scrutiny varies depending upon whether the 

expressive activity is political or non-political. Blackman v. State, 868 N.E.2d 579, 585 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Generally, the State’s determination that an expression was an 

abuse of the right of free speech under the Indiana Constitution need only be found to be 

rational. Id. However, where the claimant successfully demonstrates that his speech was 

political (having as its aim to comment on government action), the State must show that it did 

not materially burden the claimant’s opportunity to engage in political expression. Id. 

Here, Fraternal Organizations do not point to a particular expression entitled to state 

constitutional protection. Fraternal Organizations present the following appellate argument:

 The evidence is without dispute that the purpose of the Fraternal 

Organizations is to provide a facility where veterans can meet and socialize 

sharing common experiences and essentially acting as a support group. This 

purpose is accomplished in the bars of said establishments where seventy to 

eighty percent (70%-80%) of the bar patrons are smokers.

 Undisputed evidence was presented that the smoking ban will reduce the use 

of the bars by the members thus negatively impacting the purposes of the 

Fraternal Organizations and impacting negatively the right to free association.

 The legislative history relative to Ordinance G-2012-A Amended contains no 

evidence justifying an “interest of vital importance justifying said 

encroachment.” Moreover, at trial neither the City nor Council presented any 

evidence to justify said encroachment.

 The trial court [erred] in concluding that Ordinance G-2012-1 Amended did 

not violate Article 1 Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution based [on] its 

determination on [sic] conclusion of law number 55, stating that “there has 

been no authority cited to this court nor can the court find any authority that 

smoking is a fundamental right.”

 The Fraternal Organizations respectfully assert that the trial court 

misconstrues the argument of the Fraternal Organizations. The Fraternal 

Organizations do not assert a fundamental right to smoke but assert that the 

smoking ban negatively impacts their constitutionally protected right to free 

association.
15

Appellant’s Br. at 10-11. Accordingly, while Fraternal Organizations describe their purpose 

and in a cursory fashion assert an encroachment upon a right to free association, they stop 

short of identifying expressive activity restricted by state action or developing a 

corresponding argument. As best we can discern their argument, Fraternal Organizations 

contend that the smoking ban unduly interferes with their right of free association by 

encouraging members to go elsewhere. In other words, they claim an indirect infringement 

upon associational rights guaranteed by the Indiana Constitution.

Unlike the United States Constitution, the Indiana Constitution contains a separate 

provision, apart from the Right to Speak Clause, guaranteeing the right to peaceably 

assemble. Article 1, Section 31 provides:

No law shall restrain any of the inhabitants of the state from assembling 

together in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; nor from 

instructing their representative; nor from applying to the General Assembly for 

redress of grievances.

Nonetheless, Fraternal Organizations have made no claim under Article 1, Section 31, the 

Rights of Assembly Clause. Moreover, having identified no expressive activity, Fraternal 

Organizations have failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating that the Ordinance violates 

Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution.

Conclusion

The Fraternal Organizations did not show that the Ordinance violates Article 1, 

Section 23 or Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court did not err in 

denying Fraternal Organizations’ request for a declaratory judgment.
16

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, J., and BROWN, J., concur.