IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-20275

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

BRAD CARROLL,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:16-CR-155-1

Before BARKSDALE, OWEN, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pursuant to his conditional guilty plea, Brad Carroll challenges

convictions for one count of receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) and (b)(1), and one count of possession of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). He contends 

the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in

a search of his computer. 

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 10, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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In an investigation into a child-pornography website, FBI agents 

identified a website user named “Marlbororo” linked to an internet-protocol 

(IP) address assigned to Donna Carroll at 8750 Point Park Drive, Houston, 

Texas, 77095. An affidavit supporting the FBI’s search warrant averred there 

was probable cause that “TIMOTHY CARROLL or a user of the Internet 

account at 8750 Point Park Drive . . . has been linked to an online community 

of individuals who [commit] child pornography [offenses]”. 

The ensuing warrant permitted, inter alia, a search of all “[c]omputers 

or storage media used as a means to commit the [child-pornography] 

violations” at the above address, where, unknown to the FBI agents, Brad 

Carroll lived with his brother, Timothy Carroll, and his mother, Donna Carroll. 

After the FBI agents entered the apartment, both Brad and Timothy Carroll 

confessed to child-pornography offenses, and the agents seized and searched 

both Brad and Timothy Carroll’s computers.

Carroll contends the affidavit in support of the warrant authorizing the 

search of the apartment established probable cause only as to Timothy Carroll, 

because only his computer was capable of accessing the particular website the 

FBI agents had been investigating. He also asserts the search warrant was 

overbroad because it allowed for the seizure of any computer, whether or not it 

belonged to, or was under the control of, Timothy Carroll. In addition to 

contesting Carroll’s assertions, the Government, as it did in district court, 

relies upon the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

“Where a district court has denied a motion to suppress evidence, we 

review its factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” 

United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2010). “We view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed below”, and “may affirm 

the district court’s decision on any basis established by the record”. Id.

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“This [c]ourt conducts a two-part inquiry to determine whether a seizure 

conducted pursuant to a search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.” 

United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 835 (5th Cir. 2010). First determined is

whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Id. If it

does, no further analysis is conducted; and the district court’s denial of the 

suppression motion will be affirmed, “unless the case presents a novel question 

of law whose resolution is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement 

officers and magistrates”. United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 343 (5th Cir. 

2006) (internal quotation omitted). If the exception does not apply, next 

determined is “whether the magistrate issuing the warrant had a substantial 

basis for believing there was probable cause for the search”. Allen, 625 F.3d at 

835 (internal quotation omitted). 

The good-faith exception provides: “evidence obtained by officers in 

objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search warrant is admissible, 

even though the warrant was unsupported by probable cause”. Mays, 466 F.3d 

at 343 (internal quotation omitted). There is no “good-faith reliance” if:

(1) the issuing-judge was misled by information in an 

affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have 

known was false except for his reckless disregard of 

the truth; (2) the issuing-judge wholly abandoned his 

judicial role in such a manner that no reasonably well 

trained officer should rely on the warrant; (3) the 

underlying affidavit is bare bones (so lacking in indicia 

of probable cause as to render official belief in its 

existence entirely unreasonable); or (4) the warrant is 

so facially deficient . . . that the executing officers 

cannot reasonably presume it to be valid[.]

Id. (internal quotation omitted).

Although the district court did not address the Government’s reliance, 

inter alia, on the good-faith exception, we may, as noted supra, affirm on any 

basis supported by the record. (Here, the Government again relies in part on 

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the exception. It is not discussed in Carroll’s opening brief on appeal, nor did 

he file a reply brief in which the Government’s reliance on the exception could 

have been addressed.) Pack, 612 F.3d at 347. 

As shown in the record, as reflected supra, the executing agents’ reliance 

upon the warrant was objectively reasonable and made in good faith. United 

States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. 

Perez, 484 F.3d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 2007) (There was probable cause to search 

residence “to which the IP address was assigned, [because] it remained likely 

that the source of the transmissions was inside that residence”); and United 

States v. Reichling, 781 F.3d 883, 886–88 (7th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, no 

further analysis is required.

AFFIRMED.

 

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