PD-0077-15

TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

STEVEN COLE APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS APPELLEE

Appeal from Gregg County

124th District Court No. 41,312-A

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No. 06-13-00179-CR

Sixth Court of Appeals

2014 Tex.App.LEXIS 13498, 2014 WL 7183859

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APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

* * * * * * * *

EBB B. MOBLEY

State Bar # 14238000

Attorney at Law

422 North Center Street-Lower Level

P. O. Box 2309

Longview, TX 75606

Telephone: 903-757-3331

Facsimile: 903-753-8289

ebbmob@aol.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

PD-0077-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 7/21/2015 11:02:53 AM

Accepted 7/21/2015 11:21:57 AM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

REPLY TO QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-4

The Court of Appeals conducted a proper analysis of possible

 exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw.

 

REPLY TO QUESTION THREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

That a warrantless blood draw pursuant to Texas Transportation

 Code §724.012(b) violates the Fourth Amendment has been established 

 in Villarreal v. State, No. PD-0306-14, slip op. 11/26/14, reh’g granted.

REPLY TO QUESTION FOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

There is no good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment 

 requirement for a warrantless blood draw in Texas.

PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
2

INDEX OF AUTHORITES

Cases

Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.]

2014, (en banc) (pet. granted). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979)

(op. on reh’g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

 

State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14, reh’g granted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4

Statutes

Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.23(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Transportation Code §724.012(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
3

REPLY TO QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO

The Court of Appeals conducted a proper analysis of possible exigent

circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw.

ARGUMENT

 In Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, the Supreme Court considered and

rejected Missouri’s claim that “so long as the officer has probable cause and the blood

test is conducted in a reasonable manner, it is categorically reasonable for law

enforcement to obtain the blood sample without a warrant.” 133 S. Ct. at 1560-61.

The McNeely Court refused to recognize a per se exigency justifying a warrantless

search and held, “consistent with general Fourth Amendment principles, that

exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the

circumstances.” Id. at 1556. 

McNeely reaffirmed that a warrantless search of a person for the purpose of

gathering evidence in a criminal investigation can be justified “only if it falls within

a recognized exception” to the warrant requirement, and that this principle applies to

compulsory blood collection during a DWI investigation. Id. At 1558; The Court

did not hold that dissipation of a substance in the bloodstream creates a per se

exigency . . . in all drunk driving cases. 

The State called Justin Schwane as a toxicology expert to describe his

analysis performed on a blood sample from Respondent. The substance in question

was only methamphetamine, not alcohol. Schwane’s testimony is replete with

references to “therapeutic” dosages of methamphetamine in the sample. 4 RR 15, 20,

21, 22, 24, 25. He could not say that Steven Cole was intoxicated. 4 RR 22. 

Would a significant delay in testing negatively affect the probative value of the

test results? There is no evidence in this case about the dissipation rate of

methamphetamine in the blood or the effect of delay in drawing a sample.
4

REPLY TO QUESTION THREE

That a warrantless blood draw pursuant to Texas statutes violates the Fourth

Amendment has been established by State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, reh’g

granted.

ARGUMENT

In State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14, slip op. 11/24/14, reh’g granted, this Court

held the implied consent and mandatory blood draw statutes in the Transportation

Code do not create an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to

permit a warrantless taking of blood. 

The issue in Villarreal focuses on validity of consent as a statutory exception

to the Fourth Amendment requirement for a search warrant.

In this case the issue is on the exigent circumstance exception to the search

warrant requirement. The State does not challenge the “totality of the circumstances”

balancing test approved in McNeely.

The question of exigency comes out of the facts at bar hinges on the substance

involved - methamphetamine - and its dissipation rate in the blood of the driver.

There is no evidence of this process in the trial record.
5

REPLY TO QUESTION FOUR

There is no good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement for a

warrantless blood draw in Texas.

ARGUMENT

The State seeks to involve the “good-faith reliance” exception to the Fourth

Amendment to avoid suppression of the blood test results in this case. The 

opinion below discusses both the federal and Texas good-faith exceptions.

The exclusionary rule is not found anywhere in the United State’s Constitution.

Rather, it is a court-created remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. The

United States Supreme Court held that “all evidence obtained by searches and

seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a

state court.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). “The exclusionary rule was

fashioned as a sanction to redress and deter overreaching governmental conduct

prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724

(1969). The exclusionary rule is a “last resort” sanction designed to deter police

misconduct. Davis v. United States, 131, S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011).

Unlike the federal rule, the Texas good-faith exception is a statutory rule

that provides an exception to the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence only if

the law enforcement officer was “acting in objective good faith reliance upon a

warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause.” CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 38.23(b); see Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App. - Houston

[14th Dist.] 2014, (en banc) ( pet. granted). The Texas “Court of Criminal Appeals

has previously rejected an effort to broaden the [Texas] good-faith exception using

federal precedent . . .” Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 861-62 (citing Howard v. State, 617

S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (op. on reh’g) (declining to apply federal

good-faith doctrine to Texas statutory good-faith exception)). Since “the Texas good
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faith exception is more limited than the scope of its federal counterpart . . . an

officer’s good faith reliance on the law or existing precedent is not recognized as an

exception to the Texas exclusionary rule.” 

The State seeks a harm analysis in the event that the warrantless blood draw at

bar is found wanting. Such an analysis was performed by the majority opinion below

at pp. 21.22.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Respondent respectfully requests this Honorable Court affirm the judgment of

the Court of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

EBB B. MOBLEY

Attorney at Law

422 North Center Street-Lower Level

P. O. Box 2309

Longview, TX 75606

Telephone 903-757-3331

Facsimile 903-753-8289

ebbmob@aol.com

 /s/ EBB B. MOBLEY 

EBB B. MOBLEY

Attorney for Appellant

State Bar License # 14238000

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this reply brief contains 6083 words according to the computer

program used to prepare the document.

 /s/ EBB B. MOBLEY 

EBB B. MOBLEY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this reply brief was provided to Gregg County Assistant

District Attorney Zan Brown, 101 East Methvin, Suite 333, Longview, Texas 75601,

and to the Office of the State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 12405, Austin, Texas

78711 on the 21st day of July, 2015, by efile. 

 /s/ EBB B. MOBLEY 

EBB B. MOBLEY,

Counsel for Appellant Steven Cole