United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 19-1696

___________________________ 

Business Leaders In Christ, an unincorporated association

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

The University of Iowa; Lyn Redington, in her official capacity as Dean of 

Students and in her individual capacity; Thomas R. Baker, in his official capacity 

as Assistant Dean of Students and in his individual capacity; William R. Nelson, in 

his official capacity as Executive Director, Iowa Memorial Union, and in his 

individual capacity

 Defendants - Appellees

------------------------------ 

Foundation for Individual Rights in Education; 24:7; Chi Alpha; Christian Medical 

& Dental Associations; Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty; Ratio Christi; 

Asma T. Uddin

 Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s)

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport

____________ 

Submitted: September 22, 2020

 Filed: March 22, 2021 

____________ 
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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, BENTON and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Business Leaders in Christ (“BLinC”) filed suit against the University of Iowa 

(“University”); Lyn Redington; Thomas Baker; and William Nelson,1 alleging that 

the University defendants violated its First Amendment rights through the 

application of the University’s Policy on Human Rights (“Human Rights Policy”). 

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the University 

defendants violated BLinC’s First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive 

association, and free exercise of religion. As a result, the court granted BLinC 

permanent injunctive relief, thereby prohibiting the University defendants from 

enforcing the Human Rights Policy against BLinC under certain conditions. But the 

court granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on BLinC’s moneydamages claims, concluding that the law on free speech, expressive association, and 

free exercise of religion was not clearly established. 

BLinC appeals, arguing that the district court erred in granting qualified 

immunity to the individual defendants because its free speech, expressive 

association, and free exercise rights were clearly established. We hold that the 

district court erred in granting qualified immunity to the individual defendants on 

BLinC’s free-speech and expressive-association claims; however, it correctly 

granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on BLinC’s free-exercise 

claim. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

1

We will refer to the University, Redington, Baker, and Nelson collectively as 

“University defendants.” We will refer to Redington, Baker, and Nelson collectively 

as “individual defendants.”
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I. Background

A. University’s Policies

As a state institution of higher education, the University permits students to 

form student organizations. A student organization is defined as “a voluntary special 

interest group organized for educational, social, recreational, and service purposes 

and comprised of its members.” App. Volume I-B of Pl.’s Statement of Material 

Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 114, Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, 

No. 3:17-cv-00080-SMR-SBJ (S.D. Iowa 2018), ECF No. 71-3. These groups “are 

separate legal entities from the University” and may “exist [on campus] whether or 

not the University endorses them.” Id.

The University registers student organizations under its “Registration of 

Student Organizations” policy. Id.2 To become a registered student organization

(RSO), the applying group must be 80 percent University students; obey local, state, 

and federal law; and have purposes consistent with the University’s educational 

objectives. An RSO enjoys several benefits, including eligibility to apply for funds 

from mandatory Student Activity Fees, inclusion in University publications, 

utilization of the University’s trademarks, and eligibility to use campus meeting 

facilities and outdoor spaces. A student organization interested in registering as an 

RSO must “write a constitution” and “hold a Pre-registration meeting with 

appropriate [University] staff.” Id. at 115. Thereafter, University staff review the 

student organization’s proposed constitution and application for RSO status and 

submit it to the University’s Student Organization Review Committee for final 

review. 

The RSO policy provides that every RSO must “adhere to the mission of this 

University, its supporting strategic plan, policies, and procedures.” Id. at 114

(underline omitted). One of those policies is the University’s Human Rights Policy. 

It states, in relevant part:

2

The policy cited herein is the one that was in effect when BLinC first 

registered. 
-4-

The University of Iowa brings together in common pursuit of its 

educational goals persons of many nations, races, and creeds. The 

University is guided by the precepts that in no aspect of its programs 

shall there be differences in the treatment of persons because of race, 

creed, color, religion, national origin, age, sex, pregnancy, disability, 

genetic information, status as a U.S. veteran, service in the U.S. 

military, sexual orientation, gender identity, associational preferences, 

or any other classification that deprives the person of consideration as 

an individual, and that equal opportunity and access to facilities shall 

be available to all. These principles are expected to be observed in the 

internal policies and practices of the University; specifically in the 

admission, housing, and education of students; in policies governing 

programs of extracurricular life and activities; and in the employment 

of faculty staff and personnel. Consistent with state and federal law, 

reasonable accommodations will be provided to persons with 

disabilities and to accommodate religious practices. The University 

shall work cooperatively with the community in furthering these 

principles.

Pl.’s Resp. to the Individual Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Fact at 4, Bus. 

Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, No. 3:17-cv-00080-SMR-SBJ (S.D. Iowa 2018), 

ECF No. 84-1. 

The University does not have an “all-comers policy.” See Christian Legal Soc. 

Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 

668 (2010).

3 Instead, the University’s RSO policy’s membership clause provides:

It is the policy of the University that all registered student organizations 

be able to exercise free choice of members on the basis of their merits 

as individuals without restriction in accordance with the University 

Policy on Human Rights. The University acknowledges the interests of 

students to organize and associate with like-minded students, therefore 

3

An all-comers policy “mandate[s] acceptance of all comers.” Id. at 671. This 

type of policy requires school-approved groups to “allow any student to participate, 

become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of [his 

or her] status or beliefs.” Id. (quotation omitted). 
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any individual who subscribes to the goals and beliefs of a student 

organization may participate in and become a member of the 

organization.

App. Volume I-B of Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. 

J. at 115. In addition, the RSO policy sets forth the following nondiscrimination 

clause:

Membership and participation in the organization must be open to all 

students without regard to race, creed, color, religion, national origin, 

age, sex, pregnancy, disability, genetic information, status as a U.S. 

veteran, service in the U.S. military, sexual orientation, gender identity, 

associational preferences, or any other classification that deprives the 

person of consideration as an individual. The organization will 

guarantee that equal opportunity and equal access to membership, 

programming, facilities, and benefits shall be open to all persons. 

Id. The University requires all organizations to include this nondiscrimination clause 

in their constitutions to earn RSO status. 

Although the RSO policy requires that an RSO “must be open to all students 

without regard to” the protected traits set forth in the Human Rights Policy, including 

race, creed, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity, id., the 

University has approved constitutions of at least six RSOs that expressly limit access 

to leadership or membership based on race, creed, color, religion, sex, and other 

characteristics that the Human Rights Policy protects. First, Love Works requires 

leaders to sign a “gay-affirming statement of Christian faith.” Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s 

Statement of Material Fact at 7, ¶ 17, Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, No. 

3:17-cv-00080-SMR-SBJ (S.D. Iowa 2018), ECF No. 82-2. Second, 24-7 requires 

leaders to sign and affirm a statement of faith and live according to a code of conduct, 

including abstaining from sexual conduct and relations outside of traditional 

marriage. Third, House of Lorde holds membership “interview[s]” to maintain “a 

space for Black Queer individuals and/or the support thereof.” Id. at 11, ¶ 24

(alteration in original). Fourth, the Chinese Students and Scholars Association limits 
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membership to “enrolled Chinese Students and Scholars.” Id. Fifth, the 

Hawkapellas, an “all-female a cappella group” requires a “vocal audition[]” for 

membership. Id. Sixth, the Iowa National Lawyers Guild requires all members to 

agree with the group’s goal of bringing about “basic change in the structure of our 

political and economic system.” Id. at 8, ¶18.

4

B. BLinC

In spring 2014, students from the University’s Tippie College of Business 

formed BLinC. BLinC registered as an RSO that fall. “BLinC was founded as a 

religious organization to help ‘seekers of Christ’ learn ‘how to continually keep 

Christ first in the fast-paced business world.’” Id. at 34, ¶ 99. BLinC members 

participate in weekly meetings, which include prayer, Bible discussion, and spiritual 

reflection. BLinC represents that it is a “Bible-based group that believes the Bible is 

the unerring Word of God.” Id. at 40, ¶ 126. It believes that homosexual relationships 

are “outside of God’s design” and “that every person should embrace, not reject, 

their God-given sex.” Id. at 65, ¶ 222. “BLinC’s beliefs are based on its sincere 

religious interpretation of the Bible, and are not something it can ‘change’ simply 

because the University disagrees with them.” Id. at 67, ¶ 230.

BLinC’s officers are responsible for leading its members in prayer, Bible 

discussion, and spiritual teaching. They must also implement and protect BLinC’s 

religious mission and model BLinC’s faith to the group and to the public. BLinC 

maintains that its leaders screen prospective officers “to ensure that they agree with 

and can represent the group’s religious beliefs.” Id. at 38, ¶ 116. 

4

Nelson admitted that when certain groups, such as the Iowa National 

Lawyer’s Guild, exclude individuals because of their political views, they violate 

the Human Rights Policy by discriminating based on an individual’s creed. 
-7-

In March 2016, Marcus Miller, a BLinC member, approached BLinC’s thenpresident Hannah Thompson to discuss his interest in becoming an officer for the 

next school year. In April 2016, Thompson met with Miller for approximately two 

hours to “find out if he was ready to provide spiritual leadership.” App. Volume IIIA of Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 108, ¶ 16, 

Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, No. 3:17-cv-00080-SMR-SBJ (S.D. Iowa 

2018), ECF No. 71-6. According to Thompson, Miller disclosed to her that he was 

gay. She said that Miller was forthcoming about his desire to engage in same-sex 

relationships. In addition, Miller told Thompson that he had been struggling with the 

Bible’s teachings on that topic.

Thompson discussed Miller’s interest in becoming an officer with the other 

members of BLinC’s executive board. According to Thompson, the board members 

expressed concern about Miller not sharing BLinC’s views on the Bible’s sexualconduct teachings. They determined that Miller fundamentally disagreed with 

BLinC’s faith and, as a result, could not lead BLinC’s members “with sound doctrine 

and interpretation of Scripture.” Id. at 109, ¶ 19.

Thompson met with Miller again. At that meeting, she restated BLinC’s view 

on the Bible’s authority and its teachings about sexual morality. She asked Miller 

whether he would be willing to forgo romantic same-sex relationships. Miller 

responded that he was not willing to do so. Thompson replied that Miller could be a 

part of BLinC but could not join BLinC’s executive leadership. 

On February 20, 2017, Miller filed a complaint with the University in which 

he stated that BLinC denied him a leadership position because he was “openly gay.”

Id. at 132. He demanded that the University “[e]ither force BLinC to comply with 

the non-discrimination policy (allow openly LGTBQ members to be leaders) or take 

away their status of being a student organization.” Id. 

The University initiated an investigation of Miller’s complaint against BLinC. 

University Compliance Coordinator Constance Shriver Cervantes, from the 
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University’s Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, was assigned to the 

investigation. Cervantes, along with then-Associate Dean of Students Thomas 

Baker, interviewed Thompson.5 During the interview, Thompson maintained that 

BLinC denied Miller a leadership position because he “disagreed with, and would 

not agree to live by [BLinC’s] religious beliefs.” Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Responses to 

Pl.’s Statement of Material Fact at 55, ¶ 168, Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, 

No. 3:17-cv-00080-SMR-SBJ (S.D. Iowa 2018), ECF No. 91-1. Cervantes 

disagreed, concluding that BLinC denied Miller a leadership position because of his 

sexual orientation. 

On September 1, 2017, Jacob Estell, BLinC’s new president,6 met with Dr. 

William Nelson, then-Executive Director of the Iowa Memorial Union,7 and Dean 

Baker. At the time of the meeting, Dr. Nelson was responsible for registering student 

groups on campus. BLinC’s vice president, Brett Eikenberry, and two of BLinC’s 

lawyers also attended the meeting. BLinC was still an RSO at that time. Dean Baker 

began the meeting by noting the investigation’s finding that BLinC had denied 

Miller a leadership position because he was gay and stating that BLinC’s action 

violated the University’s Human Rights Policy. Dean Baker informed Estell and 

Eikenberry that BLinC could remain a registered organization in good standing if it 

understood the Human Rights Policy and was willing to comply with it going 

forward. 

The meeting primarily focused on what the Human Rights Policy permitted. 

This included discussion of the “difference between discriminating on the basis of

‘status’ and choosing leaders based on ‘beliefs’ and ‘conduct.’” Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s 

5

Both Cervantes and Baker are lawyers. Baker has held several titles during 

his employment with the University. 

6

Estell replaced Thompson as BLinC’s president after Thompson graduated 

in May 2017.

7

Dr. Nelson is currently the Associate Dean of Students. 
-9-

Statement of Material Fact at 61, ¶ 207. Dr. Nelson and Dean Baker agreed that a 

student group could require its leaders to abstain from sexual relationships outside 

of marriage—or abstain only from same-sex sexual relationships—if the 

requirement “was applicable to all.” Id. at 59, ¶ 201. Dr. Nelson later testified that 

BLinC would not have violated the Human Rights Policy if it had denied Miller a 

leadership position based on his disagreement with BLinC’s “religious philosophy” 

instead of his status as a gay man. App. Volume I-B of Pl.’s Statement of Material 

Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 19. 

The University’s policy was “that student groups could require their leaders 

to embrace the group’s mission,” provided the group did not “pursue illegal 

activity.” App. Volume I-A of Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Mot. for 

Summ. J. at 45, Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, No. 3:17-cv-00080-SMRSBJ (S.D. Iowa 2018), ECF No. 71-2. Consistent with this policy, Estell and 

Eikenberry told Dr. Nelson and Dean Baker that BLinC screened its leaders based 

on their beliefs and conduct, not their status, and that they intended to require 

BLinC’s leaders to abide by the group’s beliefs about sexual activity outside of 

marriage. 

Nelson inquired whether BLinC’s beliefs were in writing and suggested that 

potential members know about BLinC’s beliefs before joining. Estell and Eikenberry 

agreed to detail BLinC’s beliefs in its constitution. “Dr. Nelson indicated that, once 

they did so, ‘that would resolve [his] concerns about any ongoing violation of the 

Human Rights Policy.’” Defs.’ Resps. To Pl.’s Statement of Material Fact at 63, 

¶ 216 (alteration in original).

On September 13, 2017, BLinC received a letter from Dr. Nelson “affirm[ing] 

that BLinC would be permitted ‘to function as a registered student organization in 

good standing’ if it complied with” certain criteria. Id. at 64, ¶ 221. Specifically, 

BLinC had to
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1. Commit to ongoing compliance with the University of Iowa Human 

Rights Policy at all times in the future;

2. Submit a basic list of qualifications for leaders of [its] organization 

designed to prevent future disqualifications based on protected 

categories and to ensure that persons who identify as nonheterosexuals are not categorically eliminated from consideration; 

and

3. Submit an acceptable plan for ensuring that group officers who 

interview leaders will ask questions relevant to the vision statement 

that are not presumptive of candidates based upon their sexual 

orientation.

Id. at 64–65, ¶ 221. 

In response, BLinC revised its constitution. It “renam[ed] its ‘Vision 

Statement’ as a ‘Statement of Faith.’” Id. at 65, ¶ 222. It also added a paragraph to 

its Statement of Faith under the heading “Doctrine of Personal Integrity,” which 

provided: 

We believe God’s intention for a sexual relationship is to be between a 

husband and a wife in the lifelong covenant of marriage. Every other 

sexual relationship beyond this is outside of God’s design and is not in 

keeping with God’s original plan for humanity. We believe that every 

person should embrace, not reject, their God-given sex.

Id. In addition, BLinC memorialized in its constitution an obligation that BLinC’s 

leaders “accept and seek to live BLinC’s religious beliefs.” Id. at 65, ¶ 223. 

Additionally, BLinC included in the revised constitution a formalized process 

whereby all nominees for leadership positions had to be interviewed by its president 

and sign a copy of BLinC’s Statement of Faith. 

On October 19, 2017, Dr. Nelson rejected the changes via letter. Dr. Nelson 

advised BLinC that its revised constitution failed to satisfy the requirements set forth 
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in Dr. Nelson’s earlier letter “for BLinC to remain as a registered student 

organization in good standing.” Id. at 66, ¶ 227. He added that BLinC’s Statement 

of Faith facially failed to “comply with the University’s Human Right’s policy since 

its affirmation, as required by the Constitution for leadership positions, would have 

the effect of disqualifying certain individuals from leadership positions based on 

sexual orientation or gender identity, both of which are protected classifications.” 

Id. Dr. Nelson instructed BLinC that it could remain an RSO only if it revised its 

Statement of Faith to comply with the Human Rights Policy. Dr. Nelson testified 

that if BLinC would have removed from its Statement of Faith the three sentences 

excerpted above, he would have accepted BLinC’s constitution. 

BLinC appealed to Dr. Lyn Redington, then-Assistant Vice President and 

Dean of Students. On November 16, 2017, she affirmed Dr. Nelson’s decision and 

revoked BLinC’s RSO status. In affirming Dr. Nelson’s decision, Redington 

repeated Dr. Nelson’s finding that BLinC’s Statement of Faith was facially invalid. 

Since that time, the University defendants have admitted that “a student could 

‘publicly acknowledge’ or identify as being gay and still be [a] leader with BLinC 

so long as the student agreed with, and ‘agreed to live by, BLinC’s statement of 

faith.’” Id. at 43, ¶ 135. The University defendants qualified this admission by stating 

that “the ‘openly gay’ individual would have to regard his or her innate attraction to 

members of the same sex as ‘sinful’ in order to participate as a member of BLinC’s 

leadership team.” Id. 

C. Procedural History

BLinC filed its complaint against the University defendants on December 11, 

2017. The complaint asserted various counts against the University defendants under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of BLinC’s First Amendment rights to freedom of 

speech and expressive association, freedom of assembly, free exercise of religion, 

and, separately, the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. In addition, BLinC 

asserted claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 

Clause, the federal Higher Education Act, the Iowa Human Rights Act, and various 

provisions of the Iowa Constitution. 
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On December 13, 2017, BLinC moved for a preliminary injunction. The 

district court granted the motion on January 23, 2018. The court ordered the 

University defendants to restore BLinC’s RSO status for a period of 90 days.

In response to the court’s order, “the University adopted a ‘Student Org Clean 

Up Proposal,’ whereby it decided to review all student organization constitutions in 

late January and early February 2018 for compliance with the [Human Rights] 

Policy.” Id. at 107, ¶ 408. This review was meant to make sure that RSOs’ governing 

documents contained “all required statements,” including the “‘Human Rights 

Clause’ and a required ‘Financial Statement.’” Id. at 107, ¶ 409. Reviewers were 

instructed to look for any language that might contradict the Human Rights Clause, 

including language that requires leaders or members to embrace certain 

“beliefs/purposes.” Id. at 108, ¶ 414. Reviewers were also told that, although RSOs 

could have purposes or mission statements related to specific classes or 

characteristics of the Human Rights Clause, membership or leadership could not “be 

contingent on the agreement, disagreement, subscription to, etc., of stated 

beliefs/purposes which are covered in the [Human Rights] Clause.” Id. at 108, ¶ 415. 

“Dr. Nelson admitted that this guidance was inappropriate and inconsistent with the 

Policy itself, and that the review was based on a false premise, because the Policy 

only prohibits status-based discrimination, not belief-based requirements.” Id. at 

108–09, ¶ 416. 

The University deregistered 30 groups as a result of its review. But many of 

those groups were either defunct or failed to timely resubmit their constitutions with 

a complete version of the Human Rights Policy. The University re-registered many 

of these groups after they added the required language to their constitutions. 

Ultimately, the University “approved the constitutions of dozens of organizations 

that explicitly restrict or control access to leadership or membership based on race, 

national origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, status as a U.S. veteran, 

and/or military service.” Id. at 11, ¶ 24. Among them are Hawkapellas, House of 

Lorde, and the Chinese Students and Scholars Association. And, as the district court 

noted, “Love Works, which in many respects is the ideological inverse of BLinC, 
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remains registered.” Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 3d 885,

894 (S.D. Iowa 2019). The University has suspended the registration of several 

religious student organizations pending this litigation’s outcome.

On March 23, 2018, the district court granted the parties’ joint motion to 

extend the preliminary injunction through June 30, 2018. Then, in anticipation of the 

preliminary injunction’s expiration date, BLinC filed a renewed motion for a 

preliminary injunction to enjoin the University defendants from interfering with 

BLinC’s RSO status during the pendency of this litigation. On June 28, 2018, the 

district court granted the motion and ordered the University defendants “to maintain 

BLinC’s registered student organization status until the [c]ourt renders a judgment 

in this litigation.” Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, No. 3:17-cv-00080-SMRSBJ, 2018 WL 3688981, at *2 (S.D. Iowa June 28, 2018). 

Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

BLinC sought summary judgment on its First Amendment free speech, expressive 

association, free exercise, and Religion Clauses claims. BLinC sought nominal 

damages and a permanent injunction “prohibiting enforcement of the University’s 

Human Rights Policy against BLinC based on the content of BLinC’s Statement of 

Faith and leadership selection policies.” Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3, Bus. Leaders 

in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, No. 3:17-cv-00080-SMR-SBJ (S.D. Iowa 2018), ECF No. 

71.

It also requested a declaration that the individual defendants were personally 

liable for the constitutional violations at issue and requested that the court set a trial 

date for the determination of any further damages against them. The individual 

defendants moved for partial summary judgment in their favor on the grounds of 

qualified immunity.

The district court granted BLinC’s motion for summary judgment on its freespeech, free-association, and free-exercise claims, holding that the University 

defendants violated BLinC’s constitutional rights. On BLinC’s free-speech and 
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expressive-association claims, the court determined “that the University deliberately 

exempted [some] groups from [its Human Rights P]olicy.” Bus. Leaders in Christ, 

360 F. Supp. 3d at 899. According to the court, “the undisputed evidence show[ed] 

BLinC was prevented from expressing its viewpoints on protected characteristics 

while other student groups ‘espousing another viewpoint [were] permitted to do so.’” 

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Phelps-Roper v. Ricketts, 867 F.3d 883, 897 (8th 

Cir. 2017)). “That,” the court held, “is viewpoint discrimination.” Id. 

The court also held that the University defendants infringed on BLinC’s 

religious exercise for similar reasons. It noted that, “by Defendants’ own admission, 

the University grants student groups secular exceptions to the Human Rights Policy” 

and that, “[i]n declining to grant BLinC an exception for its sincerely held religious 

beliefs, the University . . . made a value judgment that BLinC’s beliefs do not support 

[the educational and social] purposes [of the forum].” Id. at 902. 

The district court concluded that the University defendants’ infringement of 

BLinC’s rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise failed strict 

scrutiny. While the court concluded that the University had a legitimate interest in 

“allow[ing] students to engage with other students who have similar interests” 

without having to “fear rejection . . . because of their membership in a protected 

class,” the court determined that there was “no appreciable difference in the potential 

harms caused by BLinC and those caused by the various RSOs that [were] permitted 

to limit leadership or membership based on protected characteristics.” Id. at 903. 

Therefore, the court determined that the University’s “interest given in justification 

of the restriction [was] not compelling.” Id. (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 

Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)). Furthermore, the court was “not 

convinced that revoking BLinC’s registration was narrowly tailored to promote the 

University’s stated interests in its RSO program and [its] Human Rights Policy” 

because instead of “burden[ing] BLinC’s constitutional rights, the University could, 

for example, [have] neutrally and consistently appl[ied] its Human Rights Policy.” 

Id. Or, the court suggested, the University “could [have] adopt[ed] an ‘all-comers’ 
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policy, a change which would dramatically promote its goals of diversity and equal 

access to academic opportunity.” Id. 

The district court denied BLinC’s motion for summary judgment on its claims 

that its selection of religious leaders was protected from governmental interference

under the Religion Clauses. The court also granted the individual defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment based on qualified immunity because it concluded that the 

law was not clearly established. However, the court characterized its conclusion as 

“a close call.” Id. at 909. The district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the 

individual defendants “only applie[d] to the extent [BLinC] s[ought] money 

damages. Qualified immunity d[id] not apply to [its] claims for injunctive relief.” 

Id. BLinC appeals.8

 

II. Discussion

We note at the outset what is not at issue in this appeal. The University 

defendants have not appealed the district court’s holding that they violated BLinC’s 

First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise 

through their disparate application of the University’s Human Rights Policy. Instead, 

the focus of this appeal is limited to whether, for purposes of qualified immunity, 

the law was clearly established that the individual defendants’ conduct violated those 

rights. 

On appeal, BLinC maintains that the individual defendants’ “actions violated 

clearly established law” by “engag[ing] in a ‘textbook violation’ of BLinC’s First 

Amendment rights.” Appellant’s Br. at 27. According to BLinC, “the controlling 

precedent of the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly confirmed that 

RSOs have a right to exercise their freedom of speech, association, and religion free 

from religious viewpoint discrimination.” Id. 

8

Prior to this appeal, the district court granted BLinC’s motion to dispose of 

the remaining claims following the court’s order on the parties’ cross-motions for 

summary judgment. 
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“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) 

(emphasis added) (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam)). 

The clearly established inquiry focuses “on whether the offic[ial] had fair notice that 

her conduct was unlawful”; the reasonableness of the official’s actions “is judged 

against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted); 

see also Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 2017). The Supreme “Court’s 

caselaw does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established”; 

however, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 

question beyond debate.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quoting White, 137 S. Ct. at 

551).9 The Supreme Court has admonished lower courts “not to define clearly 

established law at a high level of generality.” Id. (quoting City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76 (2015)).10 A court must not deny 

an official qualified immunity based on “constitutional guidelines [that] seem 

inapplicable or too remote.” Id. at 1153.

To prove that the law was clearly established at the time that the individual 

defendants violated BLinC’s constitutional rights of free speech, expressive 

association, and free exercise, BLinC must “point to existing circuit precedent that 

9

The Supreme Court has advised that “[s]pecificity is especially important in 

the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes 

difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, [such as] 

excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Id. 

(quotation omitted); see also City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 

(2019) (noting that specificity as to a clearly established right “is particularly 

important in excessive force cases”). The present case, however, is not an excessive 

force case. But even in those cases, the Court “does not require a case directly on 

point for a right to be clearly established.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152. 

10“Of course, general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of 

giving fair and clear warning to officers,” but these “general rules . . . do not by 

themselves create clearly established law outside an obvious case.” Id. at 1153 

(quotations omitted). 
-17-

involves sufficiently similar facts to squarely govern [the individual defendants’] 

conduct in the specific circumstances at issue, or, in the absence of binding 

precedent, to present a robust consensus of persuasive authority constituting settled 

law.” Graham v. Barnette, 970 F.3d 1075, 1090 (8th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

We first address whether BLinC’s free-speech and expressive-association 

claims are undergirded by clearly established law. 

 

A. Free Speech and Expressive Association

In its complaint, BLinC alleged that the University defendants violated its 

right to free speech and right to expressive association. “[I]ts expressive-association 

and free-speech [claims] merge: Who speaks on its behalf . . . colors what concept is 

conveyed.” Martinez, 561 U.S. at 680. Based on the facts of this case, we look to 

“limited-public-forum precedents” in determining whether BLinC’s “speech and 

association rights” were clearly established. See id. 

The State, “like the private owner of property, may legally preserve the 

property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated.” Rosenberger v. Rector 

& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. 

Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993)). “The necessities of 

confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created 

may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain 

topics.” Id. The State “establish[es] [a] limited public forum[] by opening property 

limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain 

subjects.” Martinez, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11 (quotation omitted). But when the State 

creates a limited public forum, it is nonetheless prohibited from “exercis[ing] 

viewpoint discrimination.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. “Once it has opened a 

limited [public] forum . . . the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself 

set. The State may not . . . discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint.” 

Id. “[V]iewpoint discrimination . . . is presumed impermissible when directed 

against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.” Id. at 830. 
-18-

1. Supreme Court Precedent

The Supreme Court has previously “considered clashes between public 

universities and student groups seeking official recognition or its attendant benefits.” 

Martinez, 561 U.S. at 683 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Widmar v. 

Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1972); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819). In Healy, Widmar, 

and Rosenberger, the Court “ruled that student groups had been unconstitutionally 

singled out because of their points of view.” Id. at 685 (emphasis added). First, in 

Healy, the Supreme Court held that a public college’s unjustified denial of official 

recognition to a student group desiring to form a local chapter of Students for a 

Democratic Society (SDS) violated the First Amendment. 408 U.S. at 194. In that 

case, a state college had created a limited public forum for student groups. Id. at 

172–76. To receive official recognition, student groups had to “affirm in advance its 

willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law.” Id. at 193. The benefits of official 

recognition included the right to place announcements in the student newspaper and 

on campus bulletin boards and the right to hold meetings in “campus facilities.” Id. 

at 176. When a group of students requested official recognition for a chapter of the 

SDS, the college’s president denied that request because “[h]e found that the

organization’s philosophy was antithetical to the school’s policies.” Id. at 174–75. 

Specifically, the SDS “‘openly repudiate[d]’ the College’s dedication to academic 

freedom.” Id. at 176. The college president associated the SDS chapter with other 

SDS chapters known for “disruptive and violent campus activity” and “considered 

that affiliation itself [a] sufficient justification for denying recognition.” Id. at 185. 

The Supreme Court acknowledged that “[a] college administration may 

impose a requirement . . . that a group seeking official recognition affirm in advance 

its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law,” which includes “reasonable 

standards respecting conduct.” Id. at 193. But the Court rejected the college’s 

reasons for denying recognition, holding that a public college “may not restrict 

speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to 

be abhorrent.” Id. at 187–88. It reasoned that “the vigilant protection of 

constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 

schools.” Id. at 180 (cleaned up). “The college classroom with its surrounding 
-19-

environs,” the Court explained, “is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we 

break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to 

safeguarding academic freedom.” Id. at 180–81.

Second, the Court “later relied on Healy in Widmar.” Martinez, 561 U.S. at 

684. Widmar held that a public university engaged in impermissible viewpoint 

discrimination by excluding a Christian student organization from the forum “based 

on [the student organization’s] desire to use a generally open forum to engage in 

religious worship and discussion,” which “are forms of speech and association 

protected by the First Amendment.” Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269. The “public 

university, in an effort to avoid state support for religion, had closed its facilities to 

a registered student group that sought to use university space for religious worship 

and discussion.” Martinez, 561 U.S. at 684 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264–65). 

The public university did so pursuant to a “regulation . . . prohibit[ing] the use of 

University buildings or grounds ‘for purposes of religious worship or religious 

teaching.’” Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265. 

While the Court acknowledged that “a university[] [has the] authority to 

impose reasonable regulations compatible with [the university’s educational] 

mission upon the use of its campus and facilities,” id. at 267 n.5, the Court applied 

strict scrutiny to the university’s regulation because it “singled out religious 

organizations for disadvantageous treatment.” Martinez, 561 U.S. at 684–85 (citing 

Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269–70). The Court was “unable to recognize the State’s 

interest” “in achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured 

under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution” “as sufficiently 

‘compelling’ to justify content-based discrimination against [the Christian student 

organization’s] religious speech.” Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277–78. 

Third, “in Rosenberger, [the Court] reiterated that a university generally may 

not withhold benefits from student groups because of their religious outlook. The 

officially recognized student group in Rosenberger was denied student-activity-fee

funding to distribute a newspaper because the publication discussed issues from a 
-20-

Christian perspective.” Martinez, 561 U.S. at 685 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 

825–27). In that case, the student group requested that the student activities fund pay 

for the costs of printing its newspaper. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827. But the student 

council denied the request, determining that the student group “was a ‘religious 

activity’ within the meaning of the Guidelines, i.e., that the newspaper ‘promote[d] 

or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or ultimate reality.’” Id.

(alterations in original). The student council based its decision on its examination of 

the first published issue of the student group’s newspaper that discussed newsworthy 

matters from a Christian perspective. Id. The university sustained the denial of 

funding. Id.

The Court determined that “[b]y the very terms of the [student association 

funding] prohibition, the University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but 

selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious 

editorial viewpoints.” Id. at 831. The Court held that the university had engaged in 

“viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against 

speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.” Id. at 830. 

Fourth, and most recently, the Supreme Court, in Martinez, held that a public 

law school’s all-comers policy—a policy “mandat[ing] acceptance of all comers”— 

constituted “a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the studentorganization forum.” 561 U.S. at 671, 669. The Christian Legal Society (CLS) 

applied for RSO status and submitted a “set of bylaws mandated by CLS-National.” 

Id. at 672. The bylaws “require[d] members and officers to sign a ‘Statement of 

Faith’ and to conduct their lives in accord with prescribed principles.” Id. Those 

principles included “the belief that sexual activity should not occur outside of 

marriage between a man and a woman” and “exclude[ed] from affiliation anyone 

who engages in ‘unrepentant homosexual conduct.’” Id. CLS also excluded students 

with religious beliefs different from those set forth in the Statement of Faith. Id. The 

law school rejected CLS’s application because its bylaws failed to comply with the 

all-comers policy by barring students based on their sexual orientation and religion. 
-21-

Id. CLS subsequently requested an exemption from the all-comers policy, which the 

law school denied. Id. at 673. 

The Supreme Court found it “hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy 

than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers.” Id. at 694. It 

distinguished “Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger, in which universities singled out 

organizations for disfavored treatment because of their points of view” from the law 

school’s “all-comers requirement[, which] draws no distinction between groups 

based on their message or perspective. An all-comers condition on access to RSO 

status . . . is textbook viewpoint neutral.” Id. at 694–95. The Court determined that 

the law school’s “requirement that student groups accept all comers” did not 

“reference . . . content or viewpoint of the regulated speech.” Id. at 696 (cleaned up). 

The all-comers policy focused on “the act of rejecting would-be group members 

without reference to the reasons motivating that behavior.” Id. It was “CLS’s 

conduct—not its Christian perspective,” the Court explained, that “st[ood] between 

the group and RSO status.” Id. As a result, the Court held that the law school’s 

“open-access condition on RSO status [was] reasonable and viewpoint neutral” and 

therefore “reject[ed] CLS’s free-speech and expressive-association claims.” Id. at 

697. 

2. Eighth Circuit Precedent

Like the Supreme Court, this court has also applied the limited-public-forum 

analysis to universities’ treatment of student speech. For instance, in Gay & Lesbian 

Students Ass’n v. Gohn, we held that a university engaged in viewpoint 

discrimination by making funding available to student groups but thereafter denying 

that funding to a group advocating for gay and lesbian rights. 850 F.2d 361, 362–65 

(8th Cir. 1988). We explained “that a public body that chooses to fund speech or 

expression must do so even-handedly, without discriminating among recipients on 

the basis of their ideology.” Id. at 362. To support our holding, we cited the 

following: “the fact that the university followed an unusual funding procedure that 

was specific to the gay and lesbian group, some of the decisions makers ‘freely 

admitted that they voted against the group because of its views,’ and ‘[u]niversity 
-22-

officials were feeling pressure from state legislatures not to fund’ the group.” 

Gerlich, 861 F.3d at 707 (alteration in original) (quoting Gohn, 850 F.2d at 367). 

The “record le[ft] no reasonable doubt that funds were denied because of 

disagreement with the [student group’s] speech.” Gohn, 850 F.2d at 368. 

More recently, we held that a university engaged in viewpoint discrimination 

by denying the use of the university’s trademarks to a student group that advocated 

for the reform of marijuana laws. Gerlich, 861 F.3d at 707. In that case, the 

university “grant[ed] student organizations permission to use its trademarks if 

certain conditions [were] met. The [university’s] student chapter of the National 

Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws . . . had several of its trademark 

licensing requests denied because its designs included a cannabis leaf.” Id. at 700. 

The student group asserted that the university and its officials violated its First 

Amendment rights by engaging in viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 704. The district 

court permanently enjoined the university defendants “from enforcing trademark 

licensing policies against Plaintiffs in a viewpoint discriminatory manner and from 

further prohibiting Plaintiffs from producing licensed apparel on the basis that their 

designs include the image of a . . . cannabis leaf.” Id. at 703 (alteration in original). 

It also denied the university officials qualified immunity. Id. 

On appeal, we first held that the university’s rejection of the student group’s 

“designs discriminated against that group on the basis of the group’s viewpoint.” Id.

at 705. We then addressed whether such “rights were clearly established.” Id. at 708. 

We framed the inquiry as “whether plaintiffs’ right not to be subject to viewpoint 

discrimination when speaking in a university’s limited public forum was clearly 

established.” Id. (emphasis added). Based on Martinez and Rosenberger, we 

concluded that the “plaintiffs’ right not to be subjected to viewpoint discrimination 

while speaking in a university’s limited public forum was . . . clearly established at 

the times in question.” Id. at 709. “Because defendants violated plaintiffs’ clearly 

established First Amendment rights,” we held that “the district court did not err by 

denying qualified immunity to defendants and granting plaintiffs summary judgment 

on their First Amendment claims.” Id. 
-23-

3. Persuasive Precedent

Cases from our sister circuits concerning a university’s selective enforcement 

of its nondiscrimination policy to student speech also provide guidance as to the law 

at the time the individual defendants acted in the present case. See Christian Legal 

Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006); Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. 

Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The Seventh Circuit, four years before Martinez, reversed a district court’s 

denial of a preliminary injunction, holding that CLS showed a likelihood of success 

on its claims that the public law school violated CLS’s free speech and expressive 

association rights by revoking its official status based solely on the ground that 

CLS’s requirement that its voting members and officers sign a statement of faith 

abjuring homosexual conduct violated the university’s nondiscrimination policy. 

Walker, 453 F.3d at 867. Addressing CLS’s free speech claim, the court observed 

that while the nondiscrimination policy was “viewpoint neutral on its face,” “strong 

evidence [existed] that the policy ha[d] not been applied in a viewpoint neutral way.” 

Id. at 866. The court concluded that the law school had “applied its 

antidiscrimination policy to CLS alone, even though other student groups 

discriminate[d] in their membership requirements on grounds that [were] prohibited 

by the policy.” Id. 

Additionally, in Reed, decided one year after Martinez, the Ninth Circuit held 

that “a narrower nondiscrimination policy that, instead of prohibiting all 

membership restrictions, prohibited membership restrictions only on certain 

specified bases, for example, race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation” “is 

constitutional.” 648 F.3d at 795. However, it held that “a triable issue of fact 

[existed] as to whether the narrower policy was selectively enforced in this particular 

case, thereby violating [the student groups’] rights under the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments.” Id. 
-24-

4. Analysis

An important task in determining whether the law was clearly established at 

the time the individual defendants acted is to avoid defining the law at a “high level 

of generality.” See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152. In the present case, the appropriate 

inquiry is “whether [BLinC’s] right not to be subject to viewpoint discrimination 

when speaking in a university’s limited public forum was clearly established.” 

Gerlich, 861 F.3d at 708. This inquiry takes into account the undisputed facts of the 

present case: the University’s creation of a limited public forum for student speech 

and subsequent viewpoint discrimination against BLinC, a student organization, 

within that forum. 

First, “it was clearly established at the time of these events” that the 

University’s recognition of RSOs constituted a limited public forum. Id. “As the 

Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out, a university ‘establish[es] limited public 

forums by opening property limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to 

the discussion of certain subjects.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Martinez, 

561 U.S. at 679 n.11). Second, “it was clearly established that a university may not 

discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in a limited public forum.” Id. at 709. 

Martinez, Rosenberger, Widmar, Healy, and Gerlich all place “beyond debate,” id.

at 708 (quotation omitted), that BLinC had a “right not to be subjected to viewpoint 

discrimination while speaking in [the] [U]niversity’s limited public forum.” Id. at 

709. As the district court recognized, “the individual [d]efendants should have been 

aware that their actions implicated BLinC’s First Amendment rights; and, indeed, 

the record shows that they were.” Bus. Leaders in Christ, 360 F. Supp. 3d at 908

(emphasis added). 

Nonetheless, the individual defendants argue that there is no clearly 

established law “definitively decid[ing] the issue of the uneven enforcement of a

nondiscrimination policy against registered student organizations on a university 

campus.” Appellee’s Br. at 60 (emphasis added). But Walker and Reed both 

recognized the legal principle that a nondiscrimination policy neutral on its face 

violates a student group’s rights to free speech and expressive association if not 
-25-

applied in a viewpoint-neutral manner. See Walker, 453 F.3d at 866; Reed, 648 F.3d 

at 803. 

To be sure, Walker and Reed contemplated further proceedings to 

conclusively determine whether the schools selectively enforced their 

nondiscrimination policies against the student groups. But Walker and Reed express

a clear legal tenet: “The neutral enforcement of a legitimate school curriculum 

generally will satisfy [the] requirement” that schools “may limit student speech in 

school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related 

to pedagogical concerns”; however, “the selective enforcement of such a curriculum 

or the singling out of one student . . . based on hostility to her speech will not.” Ward 

v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). 

Indeed, Walker’s and Reed’s recognition that a school’s selective enforcement of a 

nondiscrimination policy violates the student group’s free speech is supported by 

Supreme Court precedent. See Martinez, 561 U.S. at 685 (“In [Healy, Widmar, and 

Rosenberger], we ruled that student groups had been unconstitutionally singled out

because of their points of view.” (emphasis added)).11 

In summary, we are satisfied that Supreme Court precedent, existing Eighth 

Circuit precedent, and “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority,” 

“squarely govern[ed] [the individual defendants’] conduct in the specific 

circumstances at issue.” Graham, 970 F.3d at 1090 (cleaned up). As a result, we hold 

that the district court erroneously granted the individual defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity on BLinC’s free-speech and 

expressive-association claims.

11Martinez does not detract from the clearly established law that a school is 

prohibited from selecting enforcing its nondiscrimination policy against a student 

group. In that case, “[n]either the District Court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed an 

argument that [the university] selectively enforce[d] its all-comers policy.” 

Martinez, 561 U.S. at 697. The Supreme Court determined that it was “not the proper 

forum to air the issue in the first instance” and instructed that the Ninth Circuit could, 

on remand, “consider [the petitioner’s] pretext argument if, and to the extent, it is 

preserved.” Id. at 697–98.
-26-

B. Free Exercise

BLinC also maintains that its free-exercise rights were clearly established. 

Three Supreme Court cases concerning student speech in a university’s limited 

public forum are instructive in determining whether it was clearly established that 

the individual defendants’ selective enforcement of its nondiscrimination policy 

against BLinC violated BLinC’s free-exercise rights. See Martinez, 561 U.S. at 697 

n.27; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841–42; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 n.13. 

First, in Widmar, the Christian student organization brought suit against the 

public university for violations of its “rights to free exercise of religion . . . and 

freedom of speech” after the university “informed the group that it could no longer 

meet in University buildings” because a regulation “prohibit[ed] the use of 

University buildings or grounds ‘for purposes of religious worship or religious 

teaching.’” 454 U.S. at 266, 265. The Supreme Court declined to address the freeexercise claim, stating: 

This case is different from the cases in which religious groups 

claim that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives 

them of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. Here, the 

University’s forum is already available to other groups, and 

respondents’ claim to use that forum does not rest solely on rights 

claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents’ claim also 

implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, and it is 

on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the case. 

Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which free 

exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation. 

Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if state

accommodation of free exercise and free speech rights should, in a 

particular case, conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment 

Clause.

Id. at 273 n.13. 

Second, in Rosenberger, the student group brought suit against the university 

for its withholding of authorization for payments to a printer for its Christian-
-27-

perspective newspaper, alleging “that refusal to authorize payment of the printing 

costs of the publication, solely on the basis of its religious editorial viewpoint, 

violated their rights to freedom of speech and press, to the free exercise of religion, 

and to equal protection of the law.” 515 U.S. at 827. Despite the student group 

bringing free-speech and free-exercise claims, the Court focused almost exclusively 

on the free-speech claim and did not separately analyze the free-exercise claim. See 

id. at 828–37.12 

Finally, in Martinez, in addition to bringing a free-speech claim, CLS also 

asserted that the school’s “all-comers condition violates the Free Exercise Clause.” 

561 U.S. at 697 n.27. But, in a footnote, the Court determined that a prior decision 

“foreclose[d] that argument.” Id. (citing Employment Div., Dept. of Human 

Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–882 (1990) (holding that the Free 

Exercise Clause does not prohibit the enforcement of an otherwise valid regulation 

of general applicability that incidentally burdens religious conduct)). According to 

the Court, CLS’s request for “an exemption from [the school’s] across-the-board allcomers policy” was a request for “preferential, not equal treatment; it therefore 

[could not] moor its request for accommodation to the Free Exercise Clause.” Id. 

None of these cases make clear that BLinC would have a free-exercise 

claim—as opposed to a free-speech claim—against the University defendants for 

selectively enforcing its nondiscrimination policy against BLinC in a limited public 

forum. In fact, Widmar expressly declined to “inquire into the extent, if any, to which 

12The Court mentioned the Free Exercise Clause one time when it addressed 

the university’s argument that funding the student group would violate the 

Establishment Clause. See id. at 841–42 (“Government neutrality is apparent in the 

State’s overall scheme in a further meaningful respect. The program respects the 

critical difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the 

Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free 

Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect. In this case, the government has not 

fostered or encouraged any mistaken impression that the student newspapers speak 

for the University.” (cleaned up)).
-28-

free exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation.” 454 

U.S. at 273 n.13.

BLinC cites several other cases in support of its argument that the law clearly 

established that the individual defendants’ conduct violated BLinC’s free-exercise 

rights, but none of them involve student speech in a limited public forum.13 We may

13See, e.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 

(2020) (holding that the ministerial exception, grounded in the First Amendment’s 

Religion Clauses, applies to laws governing the employment relationship between a 

religious institution and certain employees and barred claims brought by teachers at 

two Catholic elementary schools against their school employers because, even 

though neither teacher held the title of minister, both performed vital religious duties, 

including educating and forming students in the Catholic faith, praying with and 

attending Mass with their students, and preparing students for their participation in 

other religious activities, and both schools viewed the teachers as playing a crucial 

part in carrying out the church’s mission); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 

Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (holding that the denial by the Missouri 

Department of Natural Resources of application by the church, which operated a 

preschool and daycare center, for a grant to purchase rubber playground surfaces, 

which denial was based on Department’s policy of denying grants to religiously 

affiliated applicants, was denial of the church’s free-exercise rights; “Missouri’s 

policy preference for skating as far as possible from religious establishment 

concerns” was not a compelling interest); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 

Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (holding that the ministerial exception 

under the Religion Clauses barred the employment discrimination claim brought by 

an elementary teacher against a religious school where she taught); Lukumi, 508 U.S. 

at 546 (striking down an ordinance designed to ban religious practice involving 

alleged animal cruelty and explaining that a law “target[ing] religious conduct for 

distinctive treatment or advanc[ing] legitimate governmental interests only against 

conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases”); 

Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding that although interests 

advanced by a state university to support its parietal rule generally requiring fulltime freshmen students to live on campus were legitimate, they did not rise to the 

level of compelling state interests for purposes of withstanding a Free Exercise 

Clause challenge by a student wishing to reside off-campus for religious reasons, as 

university’s own implementation of the rule, allowing exceptions to over a third of 

the students affected by it, undercut any contention that the interest was compelling, 
-29-

not “define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. 

at 1152 (quotations omitted), and to apply the general principles derived from those 

cases to the present case would contravene the Supreme Court’s directive.

Because the law was not clearly established at the time that the individual 

defendants’ conduct violated BLinC’s free-exercise rights, we hold that the district 

court did not err in granting qualified immunity to them on BLinC’s free-exercise 

claim. 

 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the 

individual defendants on BLinC’s free-speech and expressive-association claims but 

affirm its grant of qualified immunity to the individual defendants on BLinC’s freeexercise claim. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

KOBES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

Administrators at the University of Iowa discriminated against religious 

student groups. The University and individual defendants do not appeal that finding. 

I join the well-written majority opinion in denying qualified immunity on BLinC’s 

free speech and association claims, but I write separately because I think the law is 

clearly established on its free exercise claim, too. 

To satisfy the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, a law or policy 

must be both neutral and generally applicable. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of 

Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–82 (1990). A policy is not generally applicable if it 

is underinclusive—in other words, if exemptions are made for secular but not 

religious reasons. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 

U.S. 520, 542–46 (1993). 

and other campuses in the university system did not enforce any such residency 

requirement). 
-30-

The majority says Widmar, Rosenberger, and Martinez do not clearly 

establish a free exercise violation under the specific facts of this case. I think these 

cases are mostly beside the point. In both Widmar and Rosenberger, the Court found 

violations of the religious groups’ right to free speech without comment on the free 

exercise claims. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1981); Rosenberger 

v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 827–28 (1995). And in 

Martinez, the Court found that the “all-comers” policy did not violate the group’s 

right to free speech or right to free exercise because the policy was both reasonable 

and viewpoint neutral. Christian Legal Soc’y of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of 

Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010). Just because these cases have some 

facts similar to this case does not mean they tell us what is clearly established here. 

Instead, I look to cases that do rest on free exercise grounds.

 

What the individual defendants did to BLinC has been done before. In 

Lukumi, the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance regulating the killing of 

animals because it targeted the Santeria religion and its ritual of sacrificial animal 

slaughter. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542–46. The ordinance specifically punished the 

“unnecessary” killing of animals, supposedly to protect public health and prevent 

animal cruelty. Id. at 527–28; 543. The Court held that the underinclusive ordinance 

violated the Free Exercise Clause because it specifically exempted slaughtering 

animals for secular and some religious reasons—commercial operations and kosher 

food preparation—but not for the Santerians. Id. at 545. The Court concluded that 

a law is not generally applicable and violates the Free Exercise Clause “when a 

legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of 

being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation.” Id. at 542–43. 

Here, the individual defendants’ choice to deny BLinC an exemption from the 

Human Rights Policy—while allowing exemptions for other secular and religious 

groups (that they approve of)—shows that they sought to advance their interests only

against specific religious conduct. A policy cannot be generally applicable when it 

is deliberately enforced unequally. What the city council could not do in Lukumi, 

the individual defendants cannot do to BLinC. 

 
-31-

 In Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, thenJudge Alito, writing for a unanimous panel, reiterated that granting secular but not 

religious exemptions from a neutral policy violates the Free Exercise Clause. 170 

F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cir. 1999). That policy required male police officers to shave 

their beards and granted exemptions for medical but not religious reasons. Id. at 

360–61. The problem was the police department “made a value judgment that 

secular (i.e., medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important enough to 

overcome its general interest in uniformity but that religious motivations are not.” 

Id. at 366. Reaffirming the holdings from Smith and Lukumi, Judge Alito found that 

the State’s value judgment against religious conduct was a “clear” violation of the 

Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 365. 

The same thing happened here. The individual defendants decided that 

student groups with leadership qualifications based on race, gender, or political 

ideology were not subject to the Human Rights Policy, but BLinC was. That kind 

of “value judgment in favor of secular motivations, but not religious motivations 

. . . must survive strict scrutiny.” Id. at 366. The individual defendants do not—and 

cannot—explain how what they did meets strict scrutiny. 

The rule from Lukumi and Fraternal Order clearly establishes that granting 

secular but not religious exemptions from a neutral policy violates the Free Exercise 

Clause. But if those cases were not enough, the Supreme Court’s decision in Trinity 

Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer puts the question beyond debate. 137 

S. Ct. 2012 (2017). Missouri offered grants to qualifying organizations to resurface 

playgrounds. Id. at 2017. Trinity Lutheran operated a religious preschool and 

applied for a grant but was turned away because the Missouri Constitution prohibited 

the state from giving money to religious institutions.14 Id. at 2017–18. The Court 

held that when the State denies an otherwise generally available benefit “solely on 

14Other than being a religious institution, Trinity Lutheran met all the criteria 

to qualify for the grant. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017–18. It ranked fifth out 

of 44 applicants to receive the grant and was denied solely because it “was deemed 

categorically ineligible to receive a grant” due to its religious character. Id. at 2018.
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account of religious identity” without satisfying strict scrutiny, it violates the Free 

Exercise Clause. Id. at 2019.

BLinC was entitled to all the benefits that came with being a registered student 

organization. Secular groups that required their leaders to affirm certain beliefs or 

have a specific characteristic (like race, gender, or political ideology) were exempted 

from the Human Rights Policy. BLinC was not. Like Trinity Lutheran, BLinC 

“assert[ed] a right to participate in a government benefit program without having to 

disavow its religious character.” Id. at 2022. Denying BLinC that right while 

allowing secular groups—and other religious groups like Love Works—to access 

that benefit “inevitably deters or discourages the exercise of First Amendment 

rights.” Id. (cleaned up).

The purpose of qualified immunity is to shield good-faith actors who make 

mistaken judgments about unresolved issues of law, and it protects “all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 

563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (citation omitted). But we do not need the benefit of 

hindsight to know that the individual defendants’ choices were prohibited by the 

Constitution. They had more than “fair warning” that their conduct was 

unconstitutional. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (citation omitted). In 

fact, they knew it was. See Maj. Op. 24.

 The law is clear: state organizations may not target religious groups for 

differential treatment or withhold an otherwise available benefit solely because they 

are religious. That is what happened here. The individual defendants may pick their 

poison: they are either plainly incompetent or they knowingly violated the 

Constitution. Either way, they should not get qualified immunity.

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