[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 96-4970 Non-Argument Calendar

________________________ D. C. Docket No. 96-138-CR-EBD UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus DAVID ADAMS, a.k.a. David B. Adams, Defendant-Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________ (March 26, 1998) Before BIRCH, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Appellant David Adams was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Adams appeals his conviction on the ground that the government failed to produce any evidence that the firearm was1 The parties stipulated that Adams wa s convicted of a felony in Florida in October 1986, and that the shotgun was transported in interstate commerce. 2 operable. After review, we affirm.
FACTS On January 13, 1996, Adams entered the Royal Pawn Shop in Miami, Florida with a Winchester 12 gauge pum p shotgun. Adams testified that he went to the pawn shop to sell a VCR, but was approached by a stranger outside the pawn shop who asked Adams to pawn the shotgun. The st ranger offered Adams half the proceeds of the sale and Adams agreed. Adams subseque ntly sold the shotgun to the attendant on duty at the pawn shop. On February 16, 1996, Adams was indictedby a federal grand jury and charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 1 At trial, the government presented two witness: (1) Joel Valasquez, the pawn shop attendant; and (2) Detective Gregory George of the Metro- Dade Police Department. Both witnesses testified that Adams sold the firearm in i ssue, but neither witness testified that the firearm was operable. At the close of the government’s case, Adams moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing, inter alia , that the government failed to produce any evidence that the firearm in question was operable. The district court denied Adams’s motion,3 stating “[t]here is something to what you say, counsel. But I believe the law in this Circuit indicates that you do not have to s how that the firearm is tested . . . .”
DISCUSSION Whether the government is required to show that a firearm is operable for purposes of § 922(g)(1) is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Our starting point is the language of the statute itself. See United States v. Wells , ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 921, 926 (1997); United States v. McArthur , 108 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11 thCir. 1997); see also United States v. Fern , 117 F.3d 1298, 1305-06 (11 thCir. 1997). Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, as follows: (g) It shall be unlawful for any person– (1) who has been convicted inany court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a te rm exceeding one year; to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For purposes of § 922(g)(1), a firearm is defined to include any weapon which will or is designed to or may be readily converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive, as follows:2 Adams also contends that the governmentfailed to show that the firearm met the statutory definition of a weapon that “may readily be converted to expel a projectile . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). Ho wever, the statute defines a firearm as a weapon “ which will or is designed to or may readily be conve rted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The actual firearm was in evidence and the pawn shop attendant testif ied that this firearm was a “Winchester blue 12 gauge shotgun.” This was suffici ent evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was designe d to expel a projectile. See United States v. Reed , 114 F.3d 1053, 1057 (10 th Cir.), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 316 (1997); United States v. Munoz , 15 F.3d 395, 396 (5 th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Rouco , 765 F.2d 983, 996 (11 thCir. 1985) (construing similarly worded Florida statute, the court stated that “[t]estimony by an experienced federa l law enforcement officer familiar with handguns that the defendant carri ed a .38 caliber pistol cer tainly authorized the jury to find that the defendant possessed a firear m, defined as a weapon ‘designed to . . . expel a projectile.’”). 4 (a) As used in this chapter– (3) The term “firearm” means (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or ma y readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such term does not include an antique firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). 2 Nothing in either § 922(g )(1) or § 921(a)(3) requires the government to show that the unlawfully possessed firearm is operable. Further, Adams fails to point anything in the legisl ative history of § 922(g)(1) which indicates that the unlawfully possessed firearm must be operable for purposes of the statute. While this alone is sufficient to lead us to the conclusion that the government need not show that a firearm is operable fo r purposes of § 922(g)(1), we also note that every circuit addressing the issue has reached the same conclusion. See United States3 Adams relies on Unite d States v. Munoz , 15 F.3d 395 (5 thCir. 1995), and United States v. Reed , 114 F.3d 1053 (10 thCir. 1997), but neither case is applicable. Munoz did not address whether the firearm in issue had to be operable, but only whether the firearm met the statutor y definition of a firearm. Munoz , 15 F.3d at 396. Reedaddressed only whether a defendant mu st know that the firearm he possesses meets the statutory definition of a firearm. Reed , 114 F.3d at 1056-58. 5 v. Maddix , 96 F.3d 311, 316 (8 thCir. 1996) (“Title 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) does not require a firearm to be operabl e.”); United States v. Yannott , 42 F.3d 999, 1006 (6 th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he law is clear that a weapon does not need to be operable to be a firearm.”); United States v. Morris , 904 F.2d 518, 519 (9 thCir. 1990) (“The statute imposes no requirement that the gun be load ed or operable.”) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez , 800 F.2d 895, 899 (9 thCir. 1986)); United States v. Perez , 897 F.2d 751, 754 (5 th Cir. 1990) (“An inoperable firearm is none theless a firearm.”). We join these circuits and hold that the government was notrequired to show that the firearm was operable for purposes of § 922(g)(1). 3
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Adams’s conviction under § 922(g)(1) is

AFFIRMED.