Reimbursement for Costs of Attending Certain Banquets

E m p lo y ees in the U nited S tates A ttorneys offices m ay properly be reim bursed for the co sts o f attending 

retirem en t b an q u ets for state law enforcem ent officials u n d e r appropriate circu m stan ces. H ow ever, 

re im b u rse m e n t fo r a tte n d an c e at such fu n c tio n s should be lim ited to circum stances w here the n a ­

ture o f the cerem o n ial e v e n t in question p ro v id e s good re a so n to believe that the e m p lo y e e ’s a tte n ­

dance a d v an c e s th e a u th o riz e d functions o r p ro g ram s o f the office

Septem ber 23, 1993

M e m o r a n d u m O p in io n f o r t h e D ir e c t o r

E x e c u t iv e O f f ic e f o r U n it e d S t a t e s A t t o r n e y s

Y o u have asked for our opinion whether employees in the United States Attorneys offices may be reimbursed for the cost of attending retirement banquets for 

state officials. Your inquiry focuses on the Opinion of the Comptroller General in 

Richard W. Held, B-249249, 1992 W L 387431 (C.G. Dec. 17, 1992), which concluded that the cost of an FBI official’s attending such a banquet is properly reimbursable. We believe that the Comptroller General’s holding was correct and 

would be applicable to an employee o f a United States Attorney’s Office attending 

the same kind of event under like circumstances. However, we caution that application of the Held ruling should be carefully limited to closely similar factual circumstances, where the nature of the ceremonial event in question provides good 

reason to believe that the official or employee’s attendance advances the office’s 

authorized functions.

I. THE H ELD OPINION

In the Held ruling, the Comptroller General concluded that a FBI Special Agent 

in Charge could properly be reimbursed for the cost ($35) of attending a retirement 

banquet for the Police C hief of Fremont, California. The opinion noted that the 

FBI had “a long-standing tradition to recognize state and local police officials’ 

contributions to the FB I’s public service mission” and that the Special Agent, who 

was invited to the function in his capacity as head of the FBI’s San Francisco Office, “would be expected to participate in such ceremonies.” Id. 1992 WL 387431, 

at *1. At the banquet, the Special A gent presented the retiring Police Chief with a 

plaque provided by the FBI and a personal letter from the FBI Director.

The Comptroller General ruled that reimbursement for the cost of attendance 

was proper even though the banquet took place within the limits of the Special 

Agent’s official station area and Federal Travel Regulations generally do not 

authorize reimbursement for employee meal or lodging expenses incurred within

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Reimbursement fo r Costs o f Attending Certain Banquets

those area limits. 41 C.F.R. §§ 301-7.5(a), 301-8.1(d) (1992). In support of this 

ruling, the Comptroller General relied upon a number of his prior opinions which 

have upheld reimbursement for meals within the station area where such meals are 

necessitated by attendance at certain “meetings” for which expenses are reimbursable under 5 U.S.C. § 4110. E.g., Internal Revenue Service - Meal Costs, 68 

Comp. Gen. 348 (1989); Gerald Goldberg, B -198471, 1980 WL 16668 (C.G. May

1, 1980). Applying § 4110’s standards to the FBI Special A gent’s attendance at 

the banquet in question, the Comptroller General concluded:

[I]t is clear that his attendance was in furtherance of the functions or 

activities for which the agency’s appropriations are made, and we 

have no objection to reimbursing Mr. Held the $35 cost of the banquet.

Held, 1992 WL 387431, at *2.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Applicability o f 5 U.S.C. § 4110

5 U.S.C. § 4110 provides:

Appropriations available to an agency for travel expenses are available for expenses of attendance at meetings which are concerned 

with the functions or activities for which the appropriation is made 

or which will contribute to improved conduct, supervision, or management of the functions or activities.

The applicability of this section to attendance at banquets honoring state and local law enforcement officials first depends upon whether such banquets can properly be considered as “meetings.” The term “meeting” is a very broad one. For 

example, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) defines it to include “a gathering for business, social, or other purposes.” Id. at 1404. Interpreted 

in this ordinary sense, the term “meeting” appears broad enough to encompass retirement banquets and similar ceremonial functions.

An argument for a narrower interpretation might be based upon the fact that 

§ 4110 was enacted as part of the Government Employees Training Act, Pub. L. 

No. 85-507, § 19(b), 72 Stat. 327. 336 (1958), and is located in chapter 41, entitled 

“Training,” of title 5, United States Code. Since the sections surrounding it are 

primarily concerned with “training” activities for government employees, it might 

be argued that the term “meeting” as used in § 4110 refers only to meetings at

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which some kind of “training” occurs. However, two fundamental considerations 

militate against that narrowing interpretation.1

First, the text of the section limits the broad term “meetings” only to the extent 

that they must be concerned with, or supportive of, agency functions or activities 

for which the agency’s appropriations are made; language requiring that covered 

meetings must specifically be concerned with “training” could easily and naturally 

have been included (as in the sections surrounding § 4110), but was not. Second, 

the legislative history does not provide any clear evidence that, contrary to the 

plain wording of the section, the term “meeting” was intended to be limited to 

meetings concerned with training.2

In addition to qualifying as “meetings,” banquets of the kind described in Held

must also satisfy the functional-relationship criteria of § 4110. It is reasonable to 

conclude that banquets honoring law enforcement personnel will generally be 

“concerned with the functions or activities” covered by FBI or U.S. Attorney appropriations, since they are likely to include speeches and discussions concerning 

law enforcement. We also believe that attendance by federal law enforcement 

agency personnel at such banquets would generally “contribute to improved conduct, supervision, or management” of functions encompassed by their agency’s 

appropriations. Attendance by suitable federal representatives at such events is 

likely to promote the exchange of information and ideas about the interaction of 

federal and state law enforcement offices and thus to help cultivate and maintain 

good working relationships between federal officials, on the one hand, and state 

and local law enforcement agencies and their personnel on the other. Such good 

relationships advance the broad law enforcement functions of the FBI and the U.S. 

Attorneys’ offices.3

1 T his O ffice has previously opined that 5 U S C. § 4110 is not limited to meetings attended or conducted for training purposes. M emorandum for Edwin M. Zim m erm an, A ssistant A ttorney General, Antitrust D ivision, from Frank M W ozencraft, A ssistant A ttorney General, O ffice o f Legal Counsel, Re:

Authorin' o f F ederal Agencies to Become M em bers o f Private O rganizations (N ov. 14, 1968)

2 H R. Rep. N o 85-1951, at 26 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U S C C A N. 2909, 2931-32 The sectionby-section analysis in the H ouse Report describes the section o f the G overnm ent Em ployees Training Act 

(§ 19(b)) that w as codified as 5 U.S C § 4110 as follows:

Section 19(b) provides that, on and after the date of enactm ent of the bill, any appropriation 

available to any departm ent (as defined in and to the extent covered by the bill) for travel expenses also shall be available for expenses of attendance at meetings, if these meetings are concerned with the functions or activities for which the appropriation is made or will contribute to 

im proved conduct, supervision, or m anagem ent of those functions or activities

Id

1 T he D epartm ents o f C om m erce. Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies A ppropriations 

Act, 1993, Pub. L No. 102-395, 106 Stal 1828 (1992), broadly provides appropriations for, inter alia, 

“expenses necessary for the legal activities o f the Departm ent o f Justice,” id. at 1831, and for ‘‘necessary 

expenses of the O ffice o f the United States A ttorneys,” id at 1832.

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Reim bursem ent fo r Costs o f A ttending Certain Banquets

B. Legitimacy o f the Expense

Having determined that ceremonial banquets of the kind described may constitute “meetings” covered under 5 U.S.C. § 4110, we must decide whether the cost 

of attending the banquet (which we assume will normally be in the form of a single 

charge for the entire event, with no lesser or separate charge for the “meal”) is 

properly reimbursable.

The Comptroller General’s opinion states that the test for determining whether 

an employee may be reimbursed for the cost of such a banquet is “whether the meal 

was an incidental part of the event or the event was incidental to the meal.” Held,

1992 WL 387431, at *2. Under this test, the availability of reimbursement depends upon whether the meal is found to be merely' “incidental” to what might be 

called the main event. While that test may be appropriate when applied to 

“working lunches” or meals taken during the course of a conference or training 

event, we consider it inapposite when applied to ceremonial banquets. A banquet 

is a meal, albeit a ceremonial and elaborate one, and it is therefore not readily understandable how it can be concluded that “the meal is clearly incidental to the 

[banquet].” Id.

In the case of an official ceremonial banquet, we believe that the question 

whether the meal is “incidental to the event” is subsumed by the broader question 

whether the particular banquet qualifies as a “meeting” that is legitimately related 

to the agency’s functions under 5 U.S.C. § 4110. In the case of a banquet for 

which a single cost of attendance is paid, the event is inseparable from the meal. 

We therefore believe that determinations whether such events are eligible for reimbursement should focus upon the legitimacy of their relationship to the functions of 

the attendee’s agency rather than abstract consideration of whether a meal may be 

“incidental” to a banquet.

In the Held ruling, there was strong reason to believe that the Special A gent’s 

attendance at the banquet would help to foster or maintain good working relationships with the local law enforcement community. Id. Therefore, the costs of attendance were properly reimbursable. We believe that an employee of a United 

States Attorney’s office could properly be reimbursed for attending a similar banquet under like circumstances, since we see no fundamental difference between the 

FBI’s need to maintain good working relationships and exchange information 

about official duties with state and local law enforcement agencies and the comparable need of United States Attorneys’ offices.

C. Limitations

While we agree that the cost of attending the banquet described in the Held ruling was properly reimbursable, we would caution that the ruling does not necessarily apply to a law enforcement agency employee’s attendance at all arguably

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comparable functions. In that regard, we would suggest that the following factors 

reflected in the Comptroller General’s opinion are pertinent in determining whether 

the expenses of attendance at a given banquet or ceremonial meal are properly reimbursable under 5 U.S.C. § 4110:

1) the function was held to honor or commemorate the personnel, achievements, 

or operations of a law enforcement agency with which the attending employee’s 

agency has significant working relationships;

2) the function was officially sponsored, formally scheduled, and ceremonial in 

nature;

3) the agency official or employee was invited to the function or attends the 

function in a representative capacity;

4) the attendance of a representative of the employee’s agency was to some degree expected by the agency sponsoring the function; and

5) the attending employee was a suitable representative of the agency.

Application of such criteria should help to identify the circumstances where attendance at a banquet or similar function is legitimately related to the agency’s 

authorized functions. In particular, where the agency-function criterion is based on 

cultivating good relationships with state or local agencies — as opposed to the 

training or information-gathering purposes normally served by meetings covered 

by 5 U.S.C. § 4110 — it is reasonable to require that the event be of significant 

official stature. Otherwise there would be no manageable standard for distinguishing informal social functions from those ceremonial events where representation of the agency is truly important from the standpoint of inter-agency working 

relationships.

Finally, we would note that an agency is not required to authorize an employee’s reimbursable attendance at functions of this kind merely because the expenses may be properly reimbursable. See U.S. General Accounting Office, I 

Principles o f Federal Appropriations Laws 4-31 (2d ed. 1991). Thus, an agency 

may adopt a general policy against authorizing reimbursable attendance at such 

functions even if attendance at particular functions of that kind may be reimbursable under the governing statute.

WALTER DELLINGER 

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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