DeRUITER v TOWNSHIP OF BYRON Docket No. 158311. Argued on applica tion for leave to appeal O ctober 3, 2019. Decided April 27, 2020. Christie DeRuiter, a registered qualifying medical marijuana p atient and a registered primary caregiver to qualifying patients, brought an action in the Kent Circuit Court against Byron Township, alleging that the township’s zoning ordinance—which r equired that a primary caregiver obtain a permit before cultivating medical marijuana and that t he caregiver cultivate the marijuana within a dwelling or garage in a residentially zoned area withi n the township as part of a regulated home occupation at a full-time re sidence—directly conflicted wi th and was therefore preempted by the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (the MMMA), MCL 333.26421 et seq . DeRuiter cultivated marijuana in an enclosed, locked facility at a comme rcially zoned property she rented in the township; she did not obtain a permit from the township before cultivating the medical marijuana as a primary caregiver. At the township’s direction, DeRuiter’s landlord ordered her to stop cultivating medical marijuan a at the property or face lega l action. When the township attempted to enforce its zoning or dinance, DeRuiter filed the i nstant action, seek ing a declaratory judgment regarding the ordinance’ s legality; the township count ersued, seeking a declaration that the ordinance did not conflict with the MMMA. Both parties mov ed for summary disposition, and the court, Paul J. Sullivan, J., granted summary disposition in favor of DeRuiter, holding that the ordinance directly conflicted w ith the MMMA and that it was the refore preempted by the act. The Court of Appeals, H OEKSTRA , P.J., and M URPHY and M ARKEY , JJ., affirmed the trial court order, concluding that the MMMA preempted defendant’s home-occupation zoning ordinance because the ordinance directly conflic ted with the MMMA by prohibiting what the MMMA permitted and because the ordinance improperly imposed regulations and penalt ies upon persons who engage in the MMMA-compliant medical use of marijuana. 325 Mich App 275 (2018). Byron Township applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the appli cation or take other action. 503 Mic h 942 (2019). In a unanimous opinion by Justice B ERNSTEIN , the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held : Under the conflict-preemption doctrine, the MMMA does not null ify a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate l and use under the Michigan Zoni ng Enabling Act (MZEA), MCL 125.3101 et seq ., as long as (1) the municipal ity does not prohibit or penaliz e the cultivation of medical marijuana and (2) the municipality does not impose regu lations that are unreasonable and Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Syllabus Chief Justice: Bridget M. McCormack

C hief Justice Pro Tem:

David F. Viviano Justices: Stephen J. Markman Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court b ut has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisi ons for the convenience of th e reader. Reporter of Decisions: Kathryn L. Loomisinconsistent with regulations established by state law. MCL 33 3.26424(b)(2) states that primary caregivers and qualifying patient s must keep their plants in an enclosed, locked facility in order for those individuals to be entitled to the MMMA protections in MCL 333.26424(a) and (b). Because an enclosed, locked facility may be found in various lo cations on various types of property, the township’s ordinance limiting where medical marij uana must be cultivated within the locality did not directly conf lict with the MMMA’s requirem ent that marijuana plants be kept in an enclosed, locked facility. The township’s ordinance requ iring primary caregivers to obtain a permit and pay a fee before using a building or structure wit hin the township to cultivate medical marijuana also did not directly conflict with the MMMA because the ordinance did not effectively prohibit the medical use of marijuana. 1. Generally, local governmen ts may control and regulate matt ers of local concern when that power is conferred by the state. However, state law may p reempt a local regulation either expressly or by implication. I mplied preemption can occur when the state has occupied the entire field of regulation in a certain area (field preemption) or whe n a local regulation directly conflicts with state law (conflict preemption). A direct conflict exists when the ordinance permits what the statute prohibits or the ordinance prohibits what the statute p ermits; there is no conflict between state and local law when a locality enacts regulations that are not unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state law so long as the state regulatory scheme does not occupy the field. That is, while a lo cal ordinance is preempted when it bans an activity that is authorized and regulated by state law, a local governmental unit may add t o the conditions in a statute as long as the additional requirements do not contradict the requiremen ts set forth in the statute. A court must review both the statute and the local ordinance to determi ne whether conflict preemption applies. 2. MCL 333.26424(a) and (b) provide that qualifying patients and primary caregivers are immune from arrest, prosecution, or penalty in any manner, incl uding, but not limited to, civil penalty or disciplinary action for the medical use of marijuana in accordance with the MMMA. In turn, MCL 333.26424(b)(2) provides that primary caregivers and qualifying patients must keep their plants in an enclosed, locked facility in order to qualif y for the immunity. This requirement sets forth the type of structure marijuana plants must be kept and grown in for a patient or a caregiver to be entitled to the MMMA protections in MCL 333.264 24(a) and (b), but the provision does not address where marijuana may be grown. Under Ter Beek v City of Wyoming , 495 Mich 1 (2014), a local ordinance conflicts with the MMMA when the or dinance results in a complete prohibition of the medical use of marijuana; however, the MMMA does not foreclose all local regulation of marijuana. In that regard, the act does not null ify a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate land use under the MZEA as long as (1) the municipa lity does not prohibit or penalize the cultivation of medical mariju ana and (2) the municipality d oes not impose regul ations that are unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by s tate law. Because an enclosed, locked facility may be found in various locations on various ty pes of property, a local regulation limiting where medical marijuana must be cultivated within a lo cality does not conflict with the statutory requirement that marijuana plants be kept in an enclo sed, locked facility. In this case, the township’s ordinance allowed for the medical use of marijua na by a registered primary caregiver but placed limitations on where the caregiver could c ultivate marijuana within the township. The ordinance’s geographical restriction added to an d complemented the limitations imposed by the MMMA; it did not directly conflict with the MMMA . While the ordinance went further in its regulation than the MMMA, the township appropria tely used its authority under theMZEA to craft an ordinance that did not directly conflict with the MMMA’s provision requiring that marijuana be cultivated in an enclosed, locked facility. The township also had authority under the MZEA to require zoning permits and permit fees for the use of buildings and structures within its jurisdiction. The township’s ordinance requiring primary c aregivers to obtain a permit and pay a fee before using a building or structure within the township to cultivate medical marijuana did not directly conflict with the MMMA because the ordinance did n ot effectively prohibit the medical use of marijuana, and DeRuiter did not argue that the r equirements for obtaining a permit were so unreasonable as to create a conflict. To the extent th at DeRuiter argued that the immunity provisions of the MMMA contribute d to a blanket prohibition on local governments regulating the medical use of marijuana with respect to time, place, and manne r of such use, that argument sounded in field preemption; but neit her the trial court nor th e Court of Appeals reached the issue of field preemption, and DeRuiter conceded that her appeal did not concern the issue of field preemption. The Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of DeRuiter.

Reversed and remanded to the tri al court for further proceedin gs.

©2020 State of MichiganFILED April 27, 2020

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

CHRISTIE DeRUITER,

Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellee,

v No. 158311 TOWNSHIP OF BYRON,Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellant.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

B ERNSTEIN , J. In this case, we address whether defendant-counterplaintiff Byr on Township’s zoning ordinance, which regulates the location of registered me dical marijuana caregiver activities and requires that a “primary caregiver” 1 obtain a permit before cultivating

1 For purposes of the Michigan Me dical Marihuana Act, MCL 333.26 421 et seq ., a “primary caregiver” means “a per son who is at least 21 years ol d and who has agreed to Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# OPINION Chief Justice: Bridget M. McCormack

Chief Justice Pro Tem:

David F. Viviano Justices: Stephen J. Markman Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh2 medical marijuana, is preempted by the Michigan Medical Marihua na Act (the MMMA),

MCL 333.26421 et seq

. 2 Specifically, Byron Township’s o rdinance requires that medica l marijuana caregivers cultivate ma rijuana as a “home occupation” at a full-time residence. Byron Township Zoning Ordinan ce, § 3.2.H.1. Plaintiff-counterd efendant, Christie DeRuiter, a registered qualifying patient 3 and primary caregiver under the MMMA, 4 cultivated medical marijuana on re nted commercially zoned prope rty. DeRuiter’s landlord was directed by the Byron Township supervisor to cease and desi st the cultivation of medical marijuana or face legal action. After Byron Township a ttempted to enforce its zoning ordinance, DeRuiter sought a declaratory judgment regard ing the ordinance’s legality. Byron Township counters ued and also sought a declara tory judgment regarding the ordinance’s legality, arguing that the ordinance did not co nflict with the MMMA. The trial court held that § 3.2 of Byron Township’s zoning ordinanc e directly conflicted with, and was therefore preempted by, the MMMA. The trial court gran ted DeRuiter’s motion for summary disposition and denied Byron Township’s motion for summary disposition.

assist with a patient’s medical use of marihuana . . . .” MCL 333.26423(k). Primary caregivers with a registry iden tification card possess immunity from criminal prosecution under Michigan law for cultiva ting marijuana for their qualifyi ng patients. MCL 333.26424(b).

2 This opinion addresses zoning in the context of medical mariju ana use and the MMMA. It does not address any zoning issues that may arise from the v oter-initiated legalization of recreational marijuana. See 20 18 IL 1, effective December 6, 2 018.

3 “Qualifying patient” means “a person who has been diagnosed by a physician as having a debilitating medical con dition.” MCL 333.26423( l ).

4 Although DeRuiter is both a registered qualifying patient and a primary caregiver, her challenge to Byron Township’s z oning ordinance concerns only he r rights as a primary caregiver.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a published op inion. DeRuiter v Byron Twp , 325 Mich App 275, 287; 926 NW2d 268 (2018). Because we conclude that the Byr on Township Zoning Ordinance do es not directly conflict with the MMMA, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgme nt and remand this case to the trial court for proceedi ngs consistent with this opinion

. I. FACTS Christie DeRuiter, a licensed qualifying patient and registered primary caregiver under the MMMA, began growing m arijuana on rented commercially zoned property because she did not want to grow marijuana at her residence. D eRuiter grew the marijuana in an “enclosed, locked facility .” See MCL 33 3.26423(d). After learning of DeRuiter’s cultivation of medical marijuana o n commercially zoned property, the Byron Townsh ip supervisor determined that D eRuiter’s growing operation constituted a zoning vio lation under the Byron Townsh ip Zoning Ordinance. The zoning ordinance contains a locational restriction 5 that allows for the cultivation of medical marijuana by primary caregivers, but only as “a home occupation .” Byron Township Zoning Ordinan ce, § 3.2.H.1. 6 “Home occupation” is defined by Byron Township as

follows:

5 We use “locational restriction” in this opinion to denote a zo ning restriction that regulates where an activity may occ ur within a municipality.

6 The township amended § 3.2 of t he Byron Township Zoning Ordina nce on July 11, 2016. The postamendment version of the zoning ordinance is at issue i n this case.4 An occupation or profession that is customarily incidental and secondary to the use of a dwelling. It is customarily conducte d within a dwelling, carried out by its occ upants utilizing equipment cust omarily found in a home and, except for a sign allowed by this Ordinance, is generally not distinguishable from the outside. [Byron Township Zoning Ordin ance, § 2.5.] Under this home-occupation requirement, the ordinance mandates that the “medical use” of marijuana by a primary caregiv er be “conducted entirely with in a dwelling [7] or attached garage, except that a registered primary caregiver may keep and cultivate [medical marijuana], in an enclosed, locked facility. . . .” Byron Town ship Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2.H.2.d (quotation marks omit ted). The ordinance also requ ires that “[t]he medical use of marijuana shall comply at a ll times with the MMMA and the MM MA General Rules, as amended.” Byron Township Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2.H.2.a. Furthermore, Byron Township requires that primary caregivers ob tain a permit to grow medical marijuana. Byron Township Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2 .H.3. If a primary caregiver who holds a permit departs from the requirements of e ither the ordinance or the MMMA, their permit can be revoked. Byron Township Zoning Ordin ance, § 3.2.H.3.c. Byron Township’s zoning ordinanc e clarifies that a permit is no t required for a qualifying patient’s cultivation of marijuan a for personal use and that a permit is not required for a qualifying patient’s possession or use of marijuana in their dw elling. Byron Township

7 The term “dwelling unit” is defined as “[a] building or portio n of a building, designed for use and occupancy by one family for living and sleeping purpose s and with housekeeping facilities. A recreational vehicle, vehicle chassis, tent or o ther transient residential use is not considered a dwelling.” Byron Township Zoning Ordinance, § 2.3. Byron Township’s zoning ordinance does not permit dwellings by right in commerci ally zoned districts. See Byron Township Zoning Ordi nance, §§ 6.1 and 6.2.5 Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2.H.5 and § 3.2.H.6. DeRuiter did not ob tain a permit from Byron Township before cultivating medi cal marijuana as a primary care giver. In March 2016, Byron Township sent DeRuiter’s landlord a letter , directing the

landlord to cease and desist DeR uiter’s cultivation of medical marijuana and to remove all marijuana and related equipment or be subject to enforcement ac tion. The letter asserted that violations of the zoning ordi nance were a nuisance per se. In May 2016, DeRuiter filed a complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment that Byron Township’s zoning ordinance was preempted by the MMMA and that it was, therefore, unenforceable. She took issue with the ordinance’s permit requ irement and locational restriction. She also sought in junctive relief to prevent Byro n Township fro m enforcing the ordinance. Byron Township f iled a counterclaim, seeking a declaratory judgment and abatement of the alleged nuisance. The trial court granted DeRuite r’s motion for summary dispositi on, denied Byron Township’s motion fo r summary disposition, and dismissed Byron Township’s counterclaim. The trial court held that the zoning provisions in question directly conflicted with the MMMA and that, as a result, those provisions were pree mpted and unenforceable. Specifically, the trial court held that Byron Township’s zoning ordinance impermissibly subjected primary caregivers to p enalties for the medical use o f marijuana and for assisting qualifying patients with the medical use of marijuana regardles s of a caregiver’s compliance with the MMMA. According to the trial court, these penalties clearly conflicted with the MMMA, which prohibits penalizing qualifying patients and primary caregivers who are in complian ce with the MMMA. See MCL 333.26 424(a) and (b). The trial court also determined that Byron Township could not prohi bit what the MMMA6 explicitly authorized—the medical use of marijuana under MCL 33 3.26427(a). According to the trial court, Byron Township ran afoul of these principle s by requiring that a primary caregiver obtain a permit to cu ltivate marijuana, placing locat ional restrictions on that cultivation, and subjecting caregi vers to fines and penalties f or noncompliance. Byron Township appealed. The Cou rt of Appeals affirmed the tri al court in a published opinion, holding tha t “the trial court did not err by ruling that a direct conflict exist[s] between defendant’s ordinance and the MMMA resulting i n the MMMA’s preemption of plaintiff’s hom e-occupation ordinance.” DeRuiter , 325 Mich App at 287. Byron Township filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court. We ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address “ whether the defendant’s zoning ordinance pertaining to th e location of registered medic al marijuana caregivers is preempted by the [MMMA].” DeRuiter v Byron Twp , 503 Mich 942 (2019).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW “Whether a state statute preempt s a local ordinance is a questi on of statutory interpretation and, therefore, a question of law that we review de novo.” Ter Beek v City of Wyoming , 297 Mich App 446, 452; 823 NW2d 864 (2012) ( Ter Beek I ), aff’d 495 Mich 1 (2014). “We also review de novo the decision to grant or den y summary disposition and review for clear error factual findings in support of that deci sion.” Ter Beek v City of Wyoming , 495 Mich 1, 8; 84 6 NW2d 531 (2014) ( Ter Beek II ) (citations omitted). The MMMA was enacted by voter referendum in 2008. “Statutes en acted by the Legislature are interpreted in a ccordance with legislative inte nt; similarly, s tatutes enacted7 by initiative petition are interpreted in accordance with the i ntent of the electors.” 8 People

v Mazur , 497 Mich 302, 308; 872 NW 2d 201 (2015). “We begin with an e xamination of the statute’s plain language, wh ich provides ‘the most reliable evidence’ of the electors’

intent.” Id ., citing Sun Valley Food s Co v Ward , 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). “If the statutory language is unambiguous, . . . [n]o further judicial construction is required or permitted because we must conclude that the elector s intended the meaning clearly expressed.” People v Bylsma , 493 Mich 17, 26; 825 NW2d 543 (2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original).

III. ANALYSIS Generally, local governments may control and regulate matters o f local concern when such power is conferred by the state. City of Taylor v Detroit Edison Co , 475 Mich 109, 117-118; 715 NW2d 28 (2006). State law, however, may pree mpt a local regulation either expressly or by implication. Mich Gun Owners , Inc v Ann Arbor Pub Sch , 502 Mich 695, 702; 918 NW2d 756 (2018), citing Detroit v Ambassador Bridge Co , 481 Mich 29, 35; 748 NW2d 221 (2008). Implied preemption can occur when the state has occupied the entire field of regulation in a certain area (field preemption) or when a local regulation directly conflicts with state law (conflict preemption). Mich Gun Owners , Inc , 502 Mich at 702. In the context of conflict preemption, a direct confli ct exists when “the ordinance

8 The Legislature subsequently amended the MMMA. See 2012 PA 51 2, effective April 1, 2013; 2012 PA 514, effective April 1, 2013; 2016 PA 283, eff ective December 20, 2016. Because these amendments do not concern preemption or local zon ing restrictions, we are primarily concerned with the electorate’s intent when determini ng whether a direct conflict exists between the MMMA and the Byron Township Zoning Ordinance

.8 permits what the statute prohibits or the ordinance prohibits w hat the statute permits.” People v Llewellyn , 401 Mich 314 , 322 n 4; 257 NW2d 902 (1977). We only address whether the MMMA is in direct conflict with the township’s zoning ordinance. We do not address field preemption because t he trial court did not base its preemption ruling on that doctrine. See DeRuiter , 325 Mich App at 287 (declining to address field preemption because “ the trial court never based i ts ruling on field preemption of zoning”). Likewise, we do not consider express preemption b ecause DeRuiter has not argued that the MMMA expressly preempts the zoning ordinance at issue. Conflict preemption applies if “the ordinance is in direct conf lict with the state statutory scheme[.]” Llewellyn , 401 Mich at 322. An examination of whether the MMMA directly conflicts with the zoning ordinance must necessarily b egin with an examination of both the relevant provisions of t he MMMA and of the ordinance. The MMMA affords certain protections under state law for the me dical use of marijuana. MCL 333.26424. The MMMA defines the phrase “medica l use of marihuana” as “the acquisition, possession, c ultivation, manufacture, extr action, use, internal possession, delivery, transfer, or transportation of marihuana, marihuana-infused products, or paraphernalia relating to the administration of marihuana to treat or alleviate a registered qualifying patient’s debilitating medical condition or symptoms associated with the debilitating medical condition.” M CL 333.26423(h). The MMMA s tates, in pertinent part, that a qualifying patient “is not subject to arrest, prosecutio n, or penalty in any manner, or denied any right or privilege, including, but not limited to, c ivil penalty or disciplinary

action . . . for the medical use of marihuana in accordance wit h this act[.]” MCL 333.26424(a). The MMMA also prov ides the same immunity to a pr imary caregiver in9 “assisting a qualifying patient . . . with the medical use of m arihuana in accordance with this act.” MCL 333.26424(b). As a condition of immunity under either subsection, the MMMA requires a primary caregiver or qualifying patient who cul tivates marijuana to keep their plants in an “enclos ed, locked facility.” MCL 333.2 6424(a); MCL 333.26424(b)(2). 9

Both lower courts held that the zoning ordinance here directly conflicts with the MMMA because the ordinance allows Byron Township to sanction a registered primary caregiver’s “medical use of mariju ana” when that use occurs in a commercially zoned location. In affirming the trial court’s holding, the Court of Appeals relied on our decision

in Ter Beek II . Like the case before us, Ter Beek II involved a challenge to a local zoning

ordinance on the basis that the ordinance was preempted by the MMMA. In that case, we were tasked with deciding wheth er the city of Wyoming’s zoning ordinance conflicted with, and was thus preempted by, the immunity provisions of the MMMA, MCL 333.26424(a) and (b). Ter Beek II , 495 Mich at 19. We said yes. The zoning ordinance in Ter Beek II prohibited land uses that were contrary to federal law and subj ected such land uses to civil s anctions. Because the manufacture and possession of marijuana is prohibited under fed eral law, the Wyoming

ordinance at issue in Ter Beek II had the effect of banning outright the medical use of

9 An “enclosed, locked facility” may be a “closet, room, or othe r comparable, stationary, and fully enclosed area . . . .” MCL 333.26423(d). The facili ty may be outdoors “if [marijuana plants] are not visib le to the unaided eye from an a djacent property when viewed by an individual at ground level or from a permanent str ucture and are grown within a stationary structure that is enclosed on all sides, except fo r the base,” or it may be in a vehicle under certain conditions. Id

.10 marijuana in the city. As a result, there was no way that pati ents and caregivers could engage in the medical use of marijuana under the MMMA without s ubjecting themselves to a civil penalty. The Byron Township ordinance is different than the ordinance we considered in Ter

Beek II . It allows for the medical use of marijuana by a registered p rimary caregiver but places limitations on where the caregiver may cultivate marijua na within the township (i.e., in the caregiver’s “dwelling or attached garage” as part of a r egulated “home occupation”). See Byron Township Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2.H.1 and § 3.2.H.2.d. But despite the differences, DeRuiter argues that the Byron Township ordinance is in direct conflict with the MMMA because the act protects a registered caregiver from “ penalty in any manner” for “assisting a qualifying patient . . . with the medical use of marihuana” so long as the caregiver abides by the MMMA’s volume limitations and restricts the cultivation to an “enclosed, locked facility.” See MCL 333.26424 (b). The Court of Appeals agreed. Admittedly, our preemption analysis in Ter Beek II considered the MMMA’s prohibition on the imposition of a “penalty in any manner.” Ter Beek II , 495 Mich at 24. But while we sided with the plaintiff in Ter Beek II , we cautioned that “Ter Beek does not argue, and we do not hold, that the MMMA forecloses all local r egulation of marijuana[.]”

Id . at 24 n 9. Were we to accept DeRuiter’s argument, the only allowable restr iction on where medical marijuana could be cultiv ated would be an “enclosed, lo cked facility” as that term is defined by the MMMA. MCL 3 33.26423(d). Because the MMMA do es not otherwise limit cultivation, the argument goes, any other limitation or r estriction on cultivation11 imposed by a local unit of government would be in conflict with the state law. 10 We disagree. The “enclosed, locked facility” requirement in the M MMA concerns what type of structure marijuana plants mus t be kept and grown in for a p atient or caregiver to be entitled to the protections offere d by MCL 333.26424(a) and (b) ; the requirement does not speak to where marijuana may be grown. In other words, because an enclosed, locked facility could be found in various locations on various types o f property, regardless of zoning, this requirement is not i n conflict with a local regula tion that limits where medical marijuana must be cultivated.

This result is not at odds with Ter Beek II , which involved an ordinance that resulted in a complete prohibition of the medical use of marijuana, desp ite the MMMA’s authorization of such use, see MCL 333.26427(a). A local ordin ance is preempted when it bans an activity that is authorized and regulated by state l aw. For example, in Nat’l

Amusement Co v Johnson , 270 Mich 613, 614; 259 NW 342 (1935), we considered a city ordinance that banned a person from “ ‘tak[ing] part in any amu sement or exhibition which

shall result in a contest to test the endurance of the particip ants.’ ” We concluded that the ordinance was preempted by a state statute that regulated “endu rance contests” and made it unlawful to participate in suc h contests “except in accordan ce with the provisions of this

act.” Id . at 615 (quotation marks omitted). We explained: Where an amusement, which has been lawful and unregulated, is n ot evil per se but may be conducted in a good or bad manner, is the subject o f

10 DeRuiter argues that the MMMA p ermits her to cultivate medical marijuana in any enclosed, locked facility. She does not contend that it was im possible or impractical for her to cultivate marijuana in her home in accordance with Byron Township’s zoning ordinance. Consequently, we do not address this latter possibi lity.12 legislation, regulatory, not prohibitory, it would seem clear t hat the legislature intended to permit continuance of the amusement, su bject to statutory conditions. The statu te makes it unlawful to conduct a walkathon only in violation of certain con ditions. This is merely a comm on legislative manner of saying that it is lawful to conduct it if the regulat ions are observed. [ Id . at 616-617.] We presumed that “the city may add to the conditions” in the st atute but found it impermissible that “the ordinance attempt[ed] to prohibit what the statute permit[ted].” Id

. at 617. As with the ordinance in Nat’l Amusement , Wyoming’s ordinance in Ter Beek II had the effect of wholly prohibiting an activity (the medical u se of marijuana) that the

MMMA allows. But that does not mean that local law cannot “add to the conditions” in

the MMMA. Id

. DeRuiter’s argument would result in an interpretation of the MM MA that forecloses all local regulation of marijuana—the exact out come we cautioned against

in Ter Beek II . See Ter Beek II , 495 Mich at 24 n 9. DeRuiter nevertheless emphasizes our statement that “the [Wyomi ng] Ordinance directly conflicts with the MMMA by permitting what the MMMA expressl y prohibits—the imposition of a ‘penalty in any manner’ on a registered qualifying patient whose medical use of marijuana falls within the scope of § 4(a)’s immunity.” Id . at 20. We appreciate the appa rent contradiction and take this opportunity to clarify. Our analysis in Ter Beek II —in particular, our focus on whether the MMMA permitted the city to impose a sanction for violating the Wyoming ordinance— suggested that the MMMA’s immun ity language was the source of t he conflict. That was

true in Ter Beek II because the ordinance left no room whatsoever for the medical use of marijuana.

In Ter Beek II , the conflict giving rise to that preemption can be viewed as whether the city of Wyoming had complete ly prohibited the medical use o f marijuana that the13 electors intended to permit when they approved the MMMA. 11 That view meshes with our caselaw, as indicated in our discussion of Nat’l Amusement . More recently, we declined to find a conflict between state and local law when a locality enacted regulations that are

not “unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state law,” so long as the state regulatory scheme did not occupy the field. Detroit v Qualls , 434 Mich 340, 363; 454 NW2d 374 (1990) (holding that a city ordinance regulating t he quantity of fireworks a retailer may store was not in conflict with a state law that limited possession to a “reasonable amount”). Similarly, in Miller v Fabius Twp Bd , 366 Mich 250, 255-257; 114 NW2d 205 (1962), we held that a l ocal ordinance that prohibited powerboat racing and water skiing between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and 10:00 a.m. was not preempted by a state law that prohibited the activity “ ‘during the period 1 hour af ter sunset to 1 hour prior to sunrise.’ ” In both cases, we quoted favorably the following p roposition: The mere fact that the State, i n the exercise of the police pow er, has made certain regulations does not prohibit a municipality from exacting additional requirements. So lon g as there is no conflict betwe en the two, and the requirements of the municipal bylaw are not in themselves p ernicious, as being unreasonable or discrimin atory, both will stand. The fac t that an ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of a statute by requirin g more than the statute requires creates no conflict th erewith, unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases to its own prescription. Thus, where both an ordinance and a statute are prohibitory and the only difference between them is that the ordinance goes furthe r in its prohibition, but not counter to the prohibition under the statute, a nd the municipality does not at tempt to authorize by the ordinance what t he legislature has forbidden o r forbid what

11 While this Court has stated that “[t]he MMMA does not create a general right for individuals to use and possess marijuana in Michigan,” People v Kolanek , 491 Mich 382, 394; 817 NW2d 528 (2012), the act plainly evinces an intent to permit that use, under certain circumstances, by person s who have a legitimate medical need. See MCL 333.26422 (findings and declarations).14 the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the provisions of the statute and the ord inance because of which they cannot coexist and be effective. Unless legislat ive provisions are contradictory in the sense t hat they cannot coexist, they a re not deemed inconsistent because of mere lac k of uniformity in detail. [ Miller , 366 Mich at 256-257, quoting 37 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations, § 165, p 790. See also Qualls , 434 Mich at 362, quoting 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, § 374, pp 408-409.] Under this rule, an ordinance is not conflict preempted as long as its additional requirements do not contradict the requirements set forth in th e statute. 12 Plaintiff has not argued that t he state’s authority to regulate the medical use of marijuana is exclusive. The geo graphical restriction imposed b y Byron Township’s zoning ordinance adds to and complement s the limitations imposed by th e MMMA; we therefore

do not believe there is a contradiction between the state law a nd the local ordinance. As in Qualls and Miller , the local ordinance goes further in its regulation but not in a way that is

counter to the MMMA’s conditional allowance on the medical use of marijuana. We therefore hold that the MMMA does not nullify a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate land use under the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA) , MCL 125.3101 et

seq ., 13 so long as the municipality does not prohibit or penalize all medical marijuana

12 See Nat’l Amusement Co , 270 Mich at 616, quoting 43 C. J., p 218 (“In order that ther e be a conflict between a State enactment and a municipal regulat ion both must contain either express or implied conditions whi ch are inconsistent and irreco ncilable with each other. Mere differences in detail do not render them conflicting. If either is silent where the other speaks, there can be no conflict between them. Where no confli ct exists, both laws stand. . . . As a general rule, additional regulation to that of a State law does not constitute a conflict therewith.”) (q uotation marks omitted).

13 The MZEA provides that “[a] local unit of government may provi de by zoning ordinance for the regulation of land de velopment and . . . regulate the u se of land and structures . . . .” MCL 125.3201(1). Moreover, even i f the “enclosed , locked facil ity” requirement did15 cultivation, like the city of Wyom ing’s zoning ordinance did in Ter Beek II , and so long as the municipality does not impose regulations that are “unreason able and inconsistent with regulations established by state law.” Qualls , 434 Mich at 363. In this case, Byron Township appropriately used its authority under the MZEA to cra ft a zoning ordinance that does not directly conflict with the MMMA’s provision requiring that marijuana be

cultivated in an enclo sed, locked facility. 14 DeRuiter also argues that Byron Township’s permit requirement d irectly conflicts with the MMMA because it impermissibly infringes her medical us e of marijuana. Again, we disagree. As with the zoning ordinance’s locational restric tion, the permit requirement does not effectively prohibit the medical use of marijuana. 15 The MZEA allows Byron

concern where marijuana must be grown, this would not necessari ly preclude a local governmental unit from imposing additional locational restricti ons. Rental Prop Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v Grand Rapids , 455 Mich 246, 262; 566 NW 2d 514 (1997) (“The mere fact that the state, in the exer cise of the police power, has m ade certain regulations does not prohibit a municipality from exacting additional requiremen ts.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

14 We do not decide whether Byron Township’s ordinance conflicts with other aspects of the MMMA. Nor do we decide if the ordinance, which also preclu des cultivating medical marijuana outside or in a struct ure detached from a residence, see Byron Township Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2.G.1 and § 3.2.H. 2.d, has the practical consequ ence of prohibiting DeRuiter from cultivating the numb er of marijuana plants she is expressly permitted by the MMMA, see MCL 333.26426(d); MCL 333.26424(a); MCL 333.26424(b)( 2).

15 Byron Township’s zoning ordina nce provides that “[t]he operati ons of a registered primary caregiver, as a home occupation, shall be permitted onl y with the prior issuance of a Township permit.” Byron Township Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2.H.3 . Additionally, “[a] complete and accurate appli cation shall be submitted . . . and an application fee in an amount determined by resolution o f the Township Board shall be paid.” Byron Township Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2 .H.3.a. To obtain a permit from the tow nship, a caregiver must demonstrate that their grow oper ation is located in a full-time residence and provide state identification, their MMMA registry identification card, inform ation about the equipment16 Township to require zoning permits and permit fees for the use of buildings and structures within its jurisdiction. 16 Accordingly, Byron Township may require primary caregivers to obtain a permit and pay a fee before they use a building or str ucture within the township

for the cultivation of medical marijuana. We express no opinio n on whether the requirements for obtaining a pe rmit from the township are so un reasonable as to create a conflict with the MMMA because that argument has not been prese nted to us. To the extent DeRuiter argues that the immunity provisions of t he MMMA contribute to a blanket prohibitio n on local governments regula ting the “medical use” of marijuana with respect to time, place, and manner of such use, that argument sounds in field preemption. DeRuiter made this claim in the trial court. But because the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was conflict p reempted, neither court

reached the issue. 17 Accordingly, we decline to address it at this time.

IV. CONCLUSION We hold that Byron’s Township’ s home-occupation zoning ordinanc e does not directly conflict with the MMMA. Accordingly, we reverse the C ourt of Appeals’ holding

used to cultivate marijuana, and a description of the location being used to grow medical marijuana. Byron Township Zoning Ordinance, § 3.2.H.3.b. “A p ermit shall be granted if the application demonstrates com pliance with [th e] Ordinance, t he MMMA and the MMMA General Rules.” Id

.

16 The MZEA authorizes municipalities to “charge reasonable fees for zoning permits as a condition of granting author ity to use . . . buildings . . . an d structures . . . within a zoning district established under t his act.” MCL 1 25.3406(1).

17 At oral argument before this Court, DeRuiter conceded that her appeal does not concern field preemption.17 to the contrary and remand to the trial court for further proce edings consistent with this opinion. We do not reta in jurisdiction.

Richard H. Bernstein Bridget M. McCormack Stephen J. Markman Brian K. Zahra David F. Viviano Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh