Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 24 4



## ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION II
No. C V
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- 277

THOMAS SPOON AND MARIA SPOON APPELLANT S
V.
CHESTER LEE BOLDS AND LINDA BOLDS APPELLEE S Opinion Delivered April 26, 2023
APPEAL FROM THE PULAKSI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT , SEVENTEENTH DIVISION [ NO. 60CV

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- 1614 ]
HONORABLE MACKIE M. PIERCE , JUDGE

AFFIRMED
MIKE MURPHY, Judge Appellants Thomas Spoon and Maria Spoon appeal from the February 16, 2022 Pulaski County Circuit Court order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees
Chester Lee Bolds and Linda Bolds in the Boldses ’ civil suit for damages related to insurance proceeds

. We affirm.
Th is c ase concerns the Spoons ’ entitlement to insurance proceeds paid on an insurance claim on a house after the Spoons sold the house to the Bolds es . The Bolds es purchased the Spoons ’ house by warranty deed on July 2, 2020. In November 2020, t he
Boldses filed a n insurance claim because they discovered the roof was leaking . The Bolds es ’ insurance coverage would not pay because there was preexisting damage to the roof. The
Bolds es then filed a claim against the Spoons ’ homeowner’s insurance. That insurer accepted2

the claim but paid the money in dispute ($5,219.48) to the Spoons. When the Spoons failed to turn the money paid on the insurance claim over to the Boldses, the Boldses filed suit, raising claims of breach of c ontract, declaratory judgment, and unjust enrichment.
The Bolds es then moved for summary judgment , arguing that the Spoons did not retain any interest in the house after they sold it by warranty deed, including an insurable interest. In response to the mo tion, the Spoons argued there is no privity of contract between
the Bolds es and the Spoons’ insurance carrier . The Spoons also contend they are entitled to the money because they were the owners of the property at the time of loss. They claim that
unjust e nrichment cannot equitably apply because the Bolds es did not pay for the insurance policy. In granting summary judgment, the court’s order found that any and all interest the Spoons may have had in the house was terminated and extinguished upon the sale of the
house to the Bold se s , and it ordered the Spoons to reimburse the Boldses for the roof repairs.
Our law is well settled that summary judgment is to be granted by a circuit court only
when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lookabaugh v. Hanna Oil & Gas Co. , 2014 Ark. App. 445, at 5

– 6, 442 S.W.3d 1, 4. Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitleme nt to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the
existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On appellate review, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate by deciding whether the evidentiary items presented by the
moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id. We view the3

evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving
all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. Our review focuses not only on the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties. Id. On appeal, the Spoons argue that summary judgment was not proper because the
court did not address the issue s of privity of contract, standing, statute of frauds, or timing. To support their argument, they contend the general rule is that insurance policies are personal contracts between the insured and the insurer and that the Bolds e s were not a party to the original contract or privy to it. Their argument focuses on the theory of contract law rather than the equitable claim of unjust enrichment. W hile this argument might be
persuasive i n a breach
- of

- contract analysis, the Spoons argument ignores the alternate theory of unjust enrichment upon which the lower court could have granted relief.
Our courts have recognized that when a circuit court grants a summary - judgment

motion without expre ssly stating the basis for its ruling , that ruling encompasses all of the issues presented to the circuit court by the briefs and arguments of the parties. Windsong

Enter s . , Inc. v. Red Apple Enter s. Ltd. P ’ ship , 2018 Ark. App. 39, at 5, 542 S.W.3d 177, 180

. Here the issues of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and declaratory judgment were
briefed to the circuit court. The written order simply provided that the motion should be granted without stating the theory it was relying on . Therefore, we have no alternative but
to conclude that the circuit court ’ s grant of the motion for summary judgment constituted a ruling on all of the issues raised by the parties

.4

To find unjust enrichment , a party must have received something of value to which
he or she is not entitled and which he or she must restore. GM Enter s. , LLC v. HCH Toyota,

LLC , 2018 Ark. App. 607, at 10, 567 S.W.3d 878, 884. There must also be some operative act, intent, or situation to make the enrichment unjust and compensable. Id. One who is
fr ee from fault cannot be held to be unjustly enriched merely because he or she has chosen to exercise a legal or contractual right. Id. Further, if one has money belonging to another, which, in equity and good conscience, he ought not to retain, it can be recovered although
there is no privity between the parties. Patton v. Brown

- Moore Lumber Co. , 173 Ark. 128, 292 S.W. 383 (1927).
Here, it is undisputed that the Spoons received the insurance money that was distributed for repair of the roof of a house the y no longer have an interest i n . Unjust enrichment amounted to an alternative, independent basis for the circuit court’s ruling, which has gone unchallenged by the Spoons. When an appellant fails to challenge a circuit

court ’ s alternative, independent basis for its ruling, we will affirm

. Edward D. Jones & Co.,

LLC v. Lewis , 2020 Ark. App. 327, at 6

– 7

. Accordingly, we affirm , and the Bolds es are entitled to the reimbursement.
Affirmed

. A BRAMSON and G RUBER , J J ., agree.
The Brad Hendricks Law Firm , by: Lloyd W. Kitchens , for appellants.
Bennie O’Neil , for appellees.