[Cite as State v. Allen, 2018-Ohio-586.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

 No. 105757 

 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs.

SHARONIKA D. ALLEN

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-15-600080-A and CR-16-607905-B 

BEFORE: Blackmon, J., S. Gallagher, P.J., and Celebrezze, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 15, 2018 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David L. Doughten 

David L. Doughten, LPA 

4403 St. Clair Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44103 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Holly Welsh 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Sharonika D. Allen (“Allen”), appeals from her guilty 

pleas in two cases. Allen assigns the following error for our review: 

[Allen’s] guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and 

voluntarily as the trial court misinformed her that the charged offense 

included mandatory time, resulting in the appellant accepting a plea to a 

lesser offense which did not require a mandatory term of incarceration. 

{¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm. The apposite 

facts follow. 

{¶3} On October 23, 2015, Allen was indicted in Case No. CR-15-600080 for one 

count of escape in violation of R.C. 2921.34(A)(3) for failing to report as required under 

the terms of postrelease control ordered in Case No. CR-11-548831. On July 12, 2016, 

Allen and two codefendants were also indicted in Case No. CR-16-607905. As is 

relevant herein, Allen was charged with four counts of trafficking in persons in violation 

of R.C. 2905.32 (Counts 1, 4, 9 and 17), three counts of compelling prostitution in 

violation of R.C. 2907.21(A)(2)(A) (Counts 2, 10, and 18), five counts of kidnapping in 

violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) (Counts 3, 6, 11, 16, and 19), one count of promoting 

prostitution in violation of R.C. 2907.22(A)(2) (Count 5), one count of rape in violation 

of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) (Count 13), and one count of robbery in violation of R.C. 

2911.02(A)(2) (Count 15). 

{¶4} Allen subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the state whereby 

she pled guilty to the escape charge in Case No. CR-15-600080, and one count of 

trafficking in persons in Case No. CR-16-607905, that was amended from a first-degree 
felony to a second-degree felony (reduced Count 1). All remaining charges were 

dismissed. 

{¶5} Allen was subsequently sentenced to a six-month term for escape, to be 

served consecutively to an eight-year term for attempted trafficking in persons. 

Guilty Plea

{¶6} In her sole assigned error, Allen argues that her guilty plea was not 

knowingly and voluntarily made because the trial court improperly informed Allen that as 

originally charged, first-degree felony trafficking in persons carried a mandatory term of 

incarceration, and that by pleading to a lesser included offense that did not require a 

mandatory sentence, she could also avail herself of programs in the prison and possibly 

judicial release. 

{¶7} With regard to the procedural law, we note that if a guilty plea is not made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, then it is unconstitutional under both the United 

States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 

1996-Ohio-179, 660 N.E.2d 450. Under Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court shall not 

accept a guilty plea in a felony case without personally addressing the defendant and: 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty 

involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation 

or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing 

hearing. 

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, 

upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence. 
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to a jury 

trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process 

for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to 

prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the 

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. 

{¶8} In determining whether a plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily, “an appellate court examines the totality of the circumstances through a de 

novo review of the record.” State v. Spock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99950, 

2014-Ohio-606, ¶ 7; see also State v. Petitto, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95276, 

2011-Ohio-2391, ¶ 4. 

{¶9} The trial court must strictly comply with those provisions of Crim.R. 11(C) 

that relate to the waiver of constitutional rights. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 

2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, syllabus; State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 

N.E.2d 115 (1981), at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶10} As to the nonconstitutional rights, substantial compliance is sufficient. 

State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 31; State v. 

Hedenberg, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102112, 2015-Ohio-4673, ¶ 12; Veney at ¶ 14. 

“Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances 

the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is 

waiving.” Id., citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). If 
it “appears from the record that the defendant appreciated the effect of his plea and his 

waiver of rights in spite of the trial court’s error, there is still substantial compliance.” 

State v. Caplinger, 105 Ohio App.3d 567, 572, 664 N.E.2d 959 (4th Dist.1995), citing 

Nero at 108-109. 

{¶11} The nonconstitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11 include the defendant’s 

right to be informed of the “maximum penalty involved.” State v. Tutt, 

2015-Ohio-5145, 54 N.E.3d 619, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). Therefore, where a defendant faces a 

mandatory prison sentence as a result of a guilty or no contest plea, the trial court must 

determine, prior to accepting a plea, that the defendant understands that he or she is 

subject to a mandatory prison sentence and that as a result of the mandatory prison 

sentence, he or she is not eligible for probation or community control sanctions. Id. at 

¶ 19. 

{¶12} In this matter, Allen was originally indicted for trafficking in persons in 

violation of R.C. 2905.32(A)(1), a first-degree felony. R.C. 2905.32(E). 

{¶13} Under R.C. 2905.32: 

Whoever violates this section is guilty of trafficking in persons, a felony of 

the first-degree. Notwithstanding division (A)(1) of section 2929.14 of the 

Revised Code [setting forth the range of prison terms for first-degree 

felonies], the court shall sentence the offender to a definite prison term of 

ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years. (Emphasis added.) 

{¶14} The Ohio Legislative Service states: 

[H.B. 262] raises the level of offense for trafficking in persons from a 

felony of the second degree to a felony of the first degree. A prison term is 

not mandatory for a first or second degree felony unless a statute expressly 

requires one. Normally, a prison term, if one is imposed, is for a definite 

number of years ranging from 2 to 8 for a second degree felony and from 3 
to 11 for a first degree felony. Under the act, a sentencing court must 

impose a mandatory prison term of 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, or 15 years on a 

person convicted of trafficking in persons. 

See https://www.lsc.ohio.gov/analyses 129/12-hb262-129.pdf (accessed January 2018). 

Id., citing to R.C. 2905.32 and 2929.13(F)(4). 

{¶15} R.C. 2929.13(F) in turn states: 

Notwithstanding divisions (A) to (E) of this section, the court shall impose 

a prison term or terms under * * *: 

 

(4) A felony violation of section * * * 2905.32. 

{¶16} As explained by the Ohio State Bar Association: 

In June 2012, the Ohio Legislature passed House Bill 262, Ohio’s Safe 

Harbor Law, to strengthen the trafficking in persons statute. This new 

statute raised the penalty for trafficking in persons from a second degree to 

a first degree felony with a mandatory prison term of 10 to 15 years. 

See https://www.ohiobar.org/OhioLawyer/Pages/ Human-trafficking-in- Ohio (accessed 

January 2018). 

{¶17} In accordance with the foregoing, this record demonstrates that Allen was 

subject to mandatory imprisonment under Count 1 as originally charged, because it 

alleged first-degree felony trafficking in persons. However, after the amendment of this 

count, Allen was charged with attempted trafficking in persons. By operation of the 

attempt statute, R.C. 2923.02(E), the charge became an offense of the next lower degree, 

i.e., a second-degree felony. R.C. 2923.02(E). 

{¶18} Prior to entering her guilty plea, the trial court advised Allen as follows: 
THE COURT: That is a second degree felony. So let’s talk about 

punishment. First of all, second degree felonies carry a presumption that 

you are going to prison. And so it’s not a mandatory prison sentence, but 

the courts are expected to hand out a prison sentence unless you can 

shoulder your burden to prove that seriousness factors are outweighed by 

factors indicating less serious conduct and factors indicating likely to 

commit crime in the future are outweighed by factors indicating you are less 

likely to commit crime in the future. Understood? 

 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

{¶19} In accordance with the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err 

when it advised Allen that she had been subject to mandatory imprisonment under Count 

1 as originally charged, but the amendment of this count to attempted trafficking 

subjected her to the ordinary penalties imposed on a second-degree felony. Therefore, 

we conclude that the trial court substantially complied with its duty to advise Allen of the 

maximum penalty she faced. There is no basis upon which to conclude that the guilty 

plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

{¶20} The assigned error is not well-taken. 

{¶21} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 

 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR