Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 

Koontz, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 

CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

v. Record No. 961285 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 February 28, 1997 

ERIC M. SIEBERT 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

John K. Moore, Judge 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether a municipality has 

a right of appeal to the circuit court from a general district 

court judgment dismissing a charge of refusal to submit to a 

blood or breath alcohol test. 

 In January 1995, Eric M. Siebert was arrested in the City of 

Virginia Beach (the City) for driving under the influence of 

alcohol. He also was charged with refusing to take a blood or 

breath alcohol test, in violation of Virginia Beach City Code 

§ 21-338(c).1 The general district court dismissed the refusal 

charge, and the City appealed the dismissal to the circuit court. 

 In the circuit court, Siebert filed a motion to dismiss the 

City's appeal on the ground that Code § 16.1-106 does not 

authorize the City to appeal a dismissal of a refusal charge.2

 

 1Virginia Beach City Code § 21-338(c) contains essentially 

the same language as Virginia Code § 18.2-268.3. 

 2Code § 16.1-106 provides, in relevant part, for an appeal 

of right to a court of record 

 [f]rom any order entered or judgment rendered in a 

court not of record in a civil case in which the matter 

in controversy is of greater value than fifty dollars, 

exclusive of interest, any attorney's fees contracted 

for in the instrument, and costs, or when the case 
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The trial court granted Siebert's motion and entered an order 

dismissing the case. 

 The City argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing 

its appeal. The City asserts that, since this Court has ruled 

that a municipality may appeal the dismissal of a refusal charge 

from the circuit court to this Court, the City must also have a 

right of appeal to the circuit court from the general district 

court. See City of Norfolk v. Brown, 218 Va. 924, 925, 243 

S.E.2d 200, 200 (1978). The City also contends that Code § 18.2-

268.4, which guarantees the right to a jury trial in a refusal 

case "if requested by either party on appeal to the circuit 

court," implicitly acknowledges that either party has a right of 

appeal from a general district court judgment in a refusal case. 

 We first observe that a charge of refusal to take a blood or 

breath alcohol test is civil and administrative in nature. Cash 

v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 46, 49, 466 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1996); 

Commonwealth v. Gray, 248 Va. 633, 635-36, 449 S.E.2d 807, 809 

(1994); Commonwealth v. Rafferty, 241 Va. 319, 321-22, 402 S.E.2d 

17, 19 (1991); Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 293, 170 

S.E.2d 199, 204 (1969). Thus, we consider Code § 16.1-106, which 

governs the right of appeal in civil cases from the general 

district courts. We must determine whether the omission of a 

(..continued) 

involves the constitutionality or validity of a statute 

of the Commonwealth, or of an ordinance or bylaw of a 

municipal corporation, or of the enforcement of rights 

and privileges conferred by the Virginia Freedom of 

Information Act (§ 2.1-340 et seq.) . . . . 
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reference to refusal cases in that statute precludes a right of 

appeal in such cases to the circuit court. 

 In conjunction with the provisions of Code § 16.1-106, we 

consider Code § 8.01-670, which governs the right of appeal in 

civil cases from the circuit courts to this Court, and Code 

§ 18.2-268.4, which establishes the procedure for trial of 

refusal cases in the circuit court. We must construe these three 

statutes, if possible, in a manner that harmonizes and gives 

effect to each of them. See First Virginia Bank v. O'Leary, 251 

Va. 308, 312, 467 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1996); Albemarle County v. 

Marshall, Clerk, 215 Va. 756, 761, 214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975). 

 We conclude that the three statutes, considered 

collectively, demonstrate a legislative intent to provide either 

party a right to appeal to the circuit court an adverse judgment 

in a refusal case. Code § 16.1-106 provides the same rights of 

appeal to plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases. Therefore, 

if the City does not have a right of appeal to the circuit court 

in a refusal case, the defendant also has no right of appeal. 

 Code § 18.2-268.4, however, details procedures for the trial 

of appeals of refusal cases in the circuit courts. If neither 

party can appeal from a general district court's judgment in a 

refusal case, the procedures set forth in this statute would be 

rendered meaningless. We will not construe a statute in a manner 

that deprives another statute of effect or meaning. See County 

of Greensville v. City of Emporia, 245 Va. 143, 149, 427 S.E.2d 
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352, 356 (1993); Marchand v. Division of Crime Victims' 

Compensation, 230 Va. 460, 463, 339 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1986). 

 In addition, unless a party has a right to appeal an adverse 

judgment to the circuit court in a refusal case, that party could 

never exercise an appeal to this Court. However, this Court has 

recognized that in refusal cases, both municipalities and the 

Commonwealth have a right of appeal from the circuit court to 

this Court. See Rafferty, 241 Va. at 323-24, 402 S.E.2d at 20; 

City of Norfolk v. Brown, 218 Va. at 925, 243 S.E.2d at 200. 

This right is granted to municipalities and the Commonwealth, as 

well as to defendants, by Code § 8.01-670(A)(3), based on their 

status as "person[s] . . . aggrieved . . . [b]y a final judgment 

in any other civil case." 

 We conclude that the language of Code § 16.1-106 can be 

construed to avoid such statutory inconsistencies. We interpret 

the monetary controversy provision of Code § 16.1-106 as language 

intended to exclude a right of appeal in those civil cases 

involving an insignificant monetary controversy. A refusal case 

does not fall within this category of excluded cases because the 

right at issue does not involve a monetary controversy. 

 The legislative intent to provide for an appeal to the 

circuit court in refusal cases is manifest when Code § 16.1-106 

is considered together with the following directive of Code 

§ 18.2-268.4: 

 The procedure for appeal and trial [of refusal cases] 

shall be the same as provided by law for misdemeanors; 

if requested by either party on appeal to the circuit 
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court, trial by jury shall be as provided in Article 4 

(§ 19.2-260 et seq.) of Chapter 15 of Title 19.2, and 

the Commonwealth shall be required to prove its case 

beyond a reasonable doubt. [Emphasis added.] 

Thus, we hold that Code § 16.1-106 allows the City a right of 

appeal to the circuit court from an adverse judgment in a refusal 

case. This conclusion harmonizes the three statutes under 

consideration and gives full effect to their provisions. 

 For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 

judgment and remand the case for trial on the refusal charge. 

Reversed and remanded.