Supreme Court of Texas 

══════════

No. 22-0242 

══════════

Eve Lynn Baker, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Terry Lee Bizzle, 

Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the 

Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas 

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued September 13, 2023

JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court. 

JUSTICE LEHRMANN filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice 

Busby and Justice Young joined. 

JUSTICE YOUNG filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice 

Hecht and Justice Blacklock joined. 

The issue in this divorce proceeding is whether the trial court 

rendered judgment in an email sent only to the parties’ lawyers. The 

court of appeals held that it did not, and we affirm. “Generally, a 

judgment is rendered when the [court’s] decision is officially announced 

orally in open court, by memorandum filed with the clerk, or otherwise 
2 

announced publicly.”1 A written or oral ruling shared only with the 

parties or their counsel in a nonpublic forum is not a public 

announcement of the court’s decision and, therefore, does not constitute 

a rendition of judgment. 

I. Background 

After nearly twenty years of marriage, Eve Lynn Baker (Wife) 

and Terry Lee Bizzle (Husband) filed cross-petitions for divorce. 

Because no children were born of the marriage, the divorce action was 

limited to (1) termination of the marital relationship and (2) division of 

the marital estate. Each spouse alleged fault and no-fault grounds for 

divorce, and both sought a disproportionate share of community 

property. 

The divorce action was tried to the bench on September 17, 2019. 

Following the close of evidence, the trial court informed the parties that 

a same-day ruling would not be possible and that the court would “e-mail 

the parties with the decision” at the end of the following week, at the 

earliest. The parties were initially excused, but at their request, the 

court orally rendered judgment in open court that “[t]he parties are 

divorced” “as of today” and “entry of the final decree of divorce will be 

ministerial in nature.” The court’s oral pronouncement did not, 

however, include the grounds on which divorce was granted or purport 

to divide the marital estate.2

1 Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002). 

2 See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 6.001–.007 (authorizing courts to dissolve a 

marriage on satisfaction of statutory requirements), 7.001 (requiring a decree 

of divorce to include a just-and-right division of the parties’ estate). 
3 

On October 4, the court sent the following email to the parties’ 

attorneys: 

The court did not copy the court clerk on this email or otherwise submit 

it to the clerk for filing or entry in the record. 

Baker/Bizzle divorce ruling 

Granted on the ground of insupportability. 

1) Neither party proved by clear and convincing evidence their claims for 

reimbursement. 

2) H cashed out and used his two retirements without proving how much, if 

any, was separate. 

3) W awarded the CD in the amount of $7,745[.] 

4) Using wife’s Exhibit 1, I believe the only items on the list that are not agreed 

to were those highlighted on a copy for the court. Those disputed items 

are awarded to W. 

5) Each party keeps the motor vehicles in their possession and any debt 

thereon. 

6) The TN house and its contents with any debts or liens thereon to H. House 

valued at $98,000[.] 

7) The TX house with all contents except those specifically awarded to H. 

House valued at $217,000. Second mortgage of approximately $35,000 

debt to wife. 

8) The wife’s $12,500 school loan is community debt; awarded to W. 

9) H awarded all items listed on H Ex. 3 entitled H’s “Requested items from 

Carrollton Residence”, except the Maytag washer & dryer. 

10)Each party pays their own attorney’s fees, and their own credit card debt, 

and any lien or other debt encumbering any item they were awarded. 

[Wife’s counsel] to prepare the Decree. If I have missed something, please visit 

between yourselves and designate one of you to send an email to me. Please do 

not send separate emails. 

Thank you for your courtesy, 

Judge Barnes 
4 

The email did not state a deadline for tendering the written 

decree, but two months of ostensible inaction prompted the trial court to 

twice warn the parties that the case would be dismissed for want of 

prosecution if the decree was not submitted by a certain date. Shortly 

after the second dismissal notice, Wife passed away on or about 

December 19, 2019. 

A week later, Wife’s counsel submitted a fourteen-page final 

divorce decree accompanied by a motion to sign. Husband responded 

with a plea in abatement and motion to dismiss, urging that Wife’s death 

had mooted the proceedings and divested the trial court of 

subject-matter jurisdiction before the court rendered judgment 

disposing of all contested issues. In support of abatement and dismissal, 

Husband asserted that (1) a cause of action for divorce does not survive 

if either spouse dies before rendition of judgment because divorce is 

“purely personal to the parties”;3 (2) the trial court did not render a full 

3 See Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 

780, 784 (Tex. 2006) (noting that a cause of action that is “personal in nature 

typically does not survive” the death of either party); Jones v. Jones, 97 S.W.2d 

949, 951 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1936) (describing a divorce action as “purely 

personal to those parties”); see also Whatley v. Bacon, 649 S.W.2d 297, 299 

(Tex. 1983) (after a party’s death, “a divorce action and its incidental inquiries 

of property rights and child custody” is abated and must be dismissed);

Garrison v. Tex. Com. Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“It is well settled that a cause of action for a 

divorce is purely personal and that the cause of action for a divorce terminates 

on the death of either spouse prior to the rendition of a judgment granting a 

divorce. A judgment to be final must dispose of all issues and parties in the 

case.” (internal citations omitted)); cf. TEX. R. CIV. P. 150 (a cause of action that 

survives “may proceed to judgment” and need not be abated or dismissed if a 

party dies before the court’s decision or a verdict “is rendered”). 
5 

and complete disposition of the divorce action before Wife died; and 

(3) on her death, Wife ceased to have any interest in the divorce action.4 

The central dispute was whether the trial court had rendered 

judgment fully resolving the divorce action before Wife died. Husband 

argued that the trial court had not, so signing the proposed divorce 

decree would be an untimely, and therefore void, rendition of judgment. 

Wife’s counsel characterized the proposed decree as a “ministerial” 

memorialization of decisions the court had rendered on September 17 

and October 4, which collectively disposed of all claims and finalized the 

divorce action before Wife’s death. The trial court ultimately signed a 

modified version of Wife’s proposed final decree, declaring the parties 

divorced on insupportability grounds and dividing the marital estate. 

The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment that the 

postmortem divorce decree was void for want of subject-matter 

jurisdiction because the trial court had not rendered judgment 

completely resolving the divorce action before Wife died.5 In dismissing 

the case, the appellate court determined that neither the September 17 

oral pronouncement nor the October 4 email “either standing alone or in 

4 On death, a deceased spouse’s separate property and undivided 

one-half interest in the community estate vest immediately in the decedent’s 

devisees or heirs at law, even as to jointly owned property. See TEX. EST. CODE

§§ 101.001–.002; Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus 

Christi 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Upon the death of [wife], her property passed 

immediately to her heirs at law and/or the beneficiaries of her Will as the case 

might be.”); see also TEX. EST. CODE § 201.003(c) (describing a deceased 

spouse’s interest in the community estate as an “undivided one-half interest”). 

5 ___ S.W.3d ___, 2022 WL 123216, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 

13, 2022). Resolving the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, the court did not 

reach Husband’s complaints about the property division. Id. at *7. 
6 

combination” rendered a full, complete, and final rendition of judgment 

disposing of the divorce action before Wife’s death.6 In addition to 

holding that the September 17 oral pronouncement was merely 

interlocutory,7 the court agreed with Husband that the language in the 

October 4 email did not express a present—as opposed to future—intent 

to render a full, final, and complete judgment.8 Among other things, the 

court found it notable that the email’s “ten brief rulings” expressly 

“allowed for the possibility of further rulings and clarifications” if the 

trial court had “missed something.”9 The opinion also referenced 

authority requiring a written rendition to be filed with the clerk, but the 

trial court’s failure to file the email was not central to the court’s 

analysis or disposition.10

On petition for review, Wife challenges the court of appeals’ 

construction of the October 4 email and asserts that the marriage was 

dissolved when the trial court fully adjudicated the divorce action in 

either the October 4 email or through the combined force of the 

September 17 and October 4 rulings.11 In addition to urging the email’s 

6 Id. at *7-8. 

7 Id. at *3-4 (observing that neither the grounds for divorce nor the 

property division were delivered orally in open court and that the trial court 

had “orally reserved ruling on all property issues until a later date”). 

8 Id. at *7. 

9 Id.

10 Id. at *6. 

11 Wife does not dispute that the trial court’s September 17 oral 

pronouncement was interlocutory because the property division remained open 

at that time. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001; Ex parte Scott, 123 S.W.2d 306, 313 
7 

linguistic and substantive sufficiency to effectuate a present, full, and 

complete rendition of judgment, the petition contends that the trial 

court publicly announced its October 4 decision by emailing it to the 

attorneys of record, who then “acknowledged it.” Further, or in the 

alternative, the petition contends that Husband’s filing of the October 4 

email as an exhibit to a post-judgment motion was a public 

announcement of the court’s decision that “related back” to the date of 

the email. 

II. Discussion 

The issue presented is narrow: does the trial court’s October 4 

email qualify as a rendition of judgment? 

Reducing a decision to final judgment has three phases: 

(1) rendition; (2) signing; and (3) entry.12 Rendition and signing are 

judicial acts that can, but need not, occur at the same time.13 Entry, on 

(Tex. 1939) (construing section 7.001’s predecessor as mandating division of 

property in a divorce decree); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Home Transp. Co., 654 

S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. 1983) (observing that a judgment is final only when it 

disposes of all issues before it and settles the controversy between the parties); 

Vautrain v. Vautrain, 646 S.W.2d 309, 315-16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, 

writ dism’d) (holding that oral rendition of judgment terminating the marital 

relationship was “interlocutory” because it did not include a division of the 

marital estate). 

12 Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978) (“The day a 

judge signs an order is frequently, perhaps usually, after the time the 

judgment is rendered and surely it is before the judgment is entered.”); see 

Coleman v. Zapp, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. 1912); Henry v. Cullum Co., 891 

S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied). 

13 Burrell, 570 S.W.2d at 384 (“Judges render judgment; clerks enter 

them on the minutes. The entry of a judgment is the clerk’s record in the 

minutes of the court. ‘Entered’ is synonymous with neither ‘Signed’ nor 
8 

the other hand, is a clerical act undertaken by the clerk of the court.14 

A judgment’s “rendition” is “the judicial act by which the court settles 

and declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue.”15 

Rendition of judgment requires a present act, either by spoken word or 

signed memorandum, that decides the issues on which the ruling is 

made.16 If the judge’s words only indicate an intention to render 

judgment in the future or to provide guidelines for drafting a judgment, 

the pronouncement cannot be considered a present rendition of 

judgment.17

‘Rendered.’” (internal citations omitted)); Henry, 891 S.W.2d at 792 

(distinguishing rendition from judicial signing and clerical entry). 

Although judgment can be rendered orally or in writing, certain 

deadlines—like plenary jurisdiction and the deadline for appealing—run from 

the date a final judgment is signed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a; TEX. R. APP. P. 

26.1; Goff v. Tuchscherer, 627 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. 1982) (noting that 

procedural rules providing that appellate steps run from the day the judge 

signs a judgment, decision, or order “were adopted for the purpose of making 

more definite the time from which an appeal had to be perfected”). But while 

the date of signing is critical to a trial or appellate court’s jurisdiction, signing 

does not establish a judgment’s effective date for all purposes. See TEX. R. CIV.

P. 306a; see also, e.g., In re R.A.H., 130 S.W.3d 68, 70 (Tex. 2004) (noting that 

the “effective date” of a judgment acknowledging or adjudicating fatherhood is 

the date the judgment was rendered (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.609(b))). 

14 Supra note 13. 

15 Coleman, 151 S.W. at 1041. 

16 Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. 1976). 

17 Id.; see S&A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1995) (trial 

court’s comments on the record approved a settlement but did not render 

judgment because the words spoken stated a future intent to render a “full, 

final, and complete” judgment only by signing the judgment); Mixon v. Moye, 

860 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ) (holding that the 

trial court’s letter was not a rendition of judgment because “it only indicate[d] 
9 

Words reflecting the judge’s present declaration of a decision are 

necessary, but not sufficient, to effect the rendition of a judgment. 

“Generally, a judgment is rendered when the decision is officially 

announced orally in open court, by memorandum filed with the clerk, or 

otherwise announced publicly.”18 For writings, courts have held that a 

letter to counsel could constitute a pronouncement of judgment if the 

letter (1) uses language reflecting a present intent to render judgment, 

(2) provides sufficient detail to state the court’s decision on the matters 

at issue, and (3) is filed with the clerk of court.19 Other cases seemingly 

the court’s intention to render judgment in a certain way and set[] out 

guidelines by which counsel [were] to draw a judgment”). 

18 Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002). 

19 See, e.g., Gregory v. Foster, 35 S.W.3d 255, 256-57 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2000, no pet.); see also Genesis Producing Co. v. Smith Big Oil 

Corp., 454 S.W.3d 655, 660 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) 

(email might have rendered judgment except it was never filed with the clerk 

or otherwise publicly announced and was followed by a written order signed 

and filed with the clerk); Key Energy Servs. v. Shelby Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 428 

S.W.3d 133, 144-45 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2014, pet. denied) (a letter to counsel 

may constitute pronouncement of judgment “if it is in sufficient detail to state 

the court’s decision on all the matters at issue and filed with the clerk,” but the 

court’s letter to counsel met neither standard); Mixon, 860 S.W.2d at 210 

(unfiled letter to counsel with one short paragraph of general guidance for 

preparing an order is not a rendition of judgment); Abarca v. Roadstar Corp. 

of Am., 647 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1982, no 

writ) (holding a letter to the parties filed with the clerk was a rendition of 

judgment); Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1975, no writ) (letter to counsel was not a rendition because it was not 

filed with the clerk and the “very general” provisions, including failure to state 

which party was granted a divorce, indicated the judge’s intent that the letter 

be guidance for a written judgment, not a rendition).
10 

hold, or at least suggest, that letter rulings may suffice even if they are 

shared only with the parties or their counsel.20

In terms of the vehicle, we see little difference between a written 

memorandum of law and a written letter or email ruling. If a judgment 

may be rendered in the former as our cases have long held, it can just as 

surely be rendered in the latter. The form of writing is not important; 

the critical inquiries concern the court’s use of language indicating a 

present intent to render a full, final, and complete decision and whether 

the court officially announced that decision publicly.21 The issue here is 

not whether an email or letter to counsel is the kind of writing by which 

a judge may render a decision but (1) whether the October 4 email 

substantively did so and (2) whether a private communication 

constitutes a public announcement. 

In concluding that the October 4 email did not amount to a 

rendition of judgment, the court of appeals found the email’s language 

20 See Estes v. Carlton, 708 S.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that the trial court’s unfiled letter to the 

attorneys transmitting a signed, but unfiled, judgment was a rendition of 

judgment); Ortiz v. O.J. Beck & Sons, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex. Civ. 

App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (holding that judgment was rendered by 

letter filed with the clerk but stating, more broadly, that “a decision announced 

by letter from the court to the parties when no announcement is made in open 

court or any memorandum filed with the clerk, would constitute rendition”); 

see also Rhima v. White, 829 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, 

writ denied) (citing Estes for the proposition that an unfiled letter ruling can 

constitute a rendition of judgment); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Exxon, 663 S.W.2d 858, 

863 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983) (citing Ortiz in holding that a trial 

court decision was “publicly announced” both through an initialed docket entry 

and an ex parte letter to the movant), rev’d on other grounds, 678 S.W.2d 944 

(Tex. 1984). 

21 See supra notes 19 and 20. 
11 

insufficient and further mentioned, but did not hang its hat on, the 

communiqué’s private transmission.22 Without deciding whether the 

October 4 email was substantively sufficient as a present, complete, and 

final decision, we find the email fatally deficient as a rendition of 

judgment because there was no judicial action to publicly announce the 

court’s decision on the matters at issue. 

It is undisputed that the trial court did not orally announce, in 

open court, its decision on the issues addressed in the October 4 email. 

Nor is it alleged that the court delivered the email to the clerk of the 

court for filing, entry, or inclusion in the public record or took any 

actions reasonably calculated to effectuate such delivery. Wife 

nonetheless asserts that the court’s decision was “otherwise announced 

publicly” in either of two ways: (1) disclosure to counsel of record, who 

“acknowledged it”; or (2) by attachment to Husband’s post-judgment 

motion to reconsider and vacate the final divorce decree. We disagree 

on both counts. 

Public announcement does not refer to judicial actions that only 

give notice to the parties or their counsel; it requires judicial action 

intended to make the decision accessible to the general public. This 

conclusion comports with the long-articulated requirement that an oral 

pronouncement of judgment be made in open court—rather than 

privately—or, if made in a memorandum of law, that the court deliver 

that writing to the clerk of the court, in his or her official capacity, for 

22 ___ S.W.3d ___, 2022 WL 123216, at *5, *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

Jan. 13, 2022). 
12 

filing in the public record.23 Although “filing” is not the only way a 

document can be made public, the commonality between these 

well-settled methods of rendition is official action by the court 

reasonably calculated to make the decision accessible to the general 

public.24 This is no happenstance. 

The public generally has a right to access judicial proceedings 

except for those rare cases in which competing rights or interests 

outweigh the public’s interest.25 This right, which “is a fundamental 

element of the rule of law,”26 is recognized under the common law,27

23 See, e.g., Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 

1970); Knox v. Long, 257 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. 1953), overruled on other 

grounds by Jackson v. Hernandez, 285 S.W.2d 184, 191 (Tex. 1955); Coleman 

v. Zapp, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. 1912). 

24 See Knox, 257 S.W.2d at 292 (the court’s delivery of the official 

decision to the court clerk imposes a duty on the clerk to enter it “forthwith”).

25 HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source, Inc., 622 S.W.3d 254, 267 n.10 (Tex. 

2021) (noting that “[p]ublic access to courtrooms themselves is protected by the 

First Amendment, but like the common-law right of access to records and 

documents, this right of access is not absolute” and is “subject to reasonable 

limitations imposed to protect countervailing interests, such as the 

preservation of trade secrets” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 

263-64 (“The public’s right of access to judicial proceedings is a fundamental 

element of the rule of law because monitor[ing] the exercise of judicial 

authority helps maintain[] the integrity and legitimacy of an independent 

Judicial Branch.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 

see, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.003(b) (allowing the court in a contested suit 

affecting the parent–child relationship to “limit attendance at the hearing to 

only those persons who have a direct interest in the suit or in the work of the 

court”). 

26 HouseCanary, 622 S.W.3d at 263 (quoting Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 

F.3d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 2021)). 

27 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (“[T]he 

courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 
13 

constitutionally guaranteed,28 and incorporated into our procedural 

rules requiring court proceedings and court records to be open to the 

public.29 In that vein, and particularly germane here, Rule 76a(1) of the 

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[n]o court order or opinion 

issued in the adjudication of a [civil] case may be sealed.” If the court 

need not make a writing announcing its adjudication available to the 

general public, that adjudication would effectively be sealed contrary to 

the rule.30 To the extent some cases can be read as holding that a private 

communication can constitute a rendition of judgment, we disapprove 

them.31

We also reject the notion that Husband’s attachment of the trial 

court’s email to his post-judgment filing satisfies the requirement of a 

public announcement. That filing certainly had the effect of making the 

email part of the public record when it otherwise would not have been 

and in doing so made it accessible to the general public. But rendition 

records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” (footnote 

omitted)). 

28 HouseCanary, 622 S.W.3d at 263-64; see TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (“All 

courts shall be open[.]”). 

29 See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 21d(f), 76a, 500.10(e); see also TEX. R. JUD.

ADMIN. 12, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. F app. (public access to 

judicial records). 

30 Although “documents filed in an action originally arising under the 

Family Code” are excluded from the definition of “court records” for purposes 

of Rule 76a(1)’s standard for sealing court records, Rule 76a(1) is categorical in 

prohibiting the sealing of any “order or opinion issued in the adjudication of a 

[civil] case.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1), (2)(a)(3). Discrete exceptions may exist 

under other law, but no one has argued that the trial court’s decision in this 

case may or must be made privately. 

31 See supra note 20. 
14 

is an official judicial act, not something that can be accomplished by the 

parties’ unilateral or concerted actions in filing a writing or spreading 

the word. Aside from the necessity of judicial action as a legal matter, 

allowing only the trial court’s actions to effectuate a rendition 

encourages communication between the court and counsel while helping 

to create a more certain line between mere guidance for drafting the 

judgment and an official rendition of judgment.32

Because the trial court did not announce its October 4 decision 

publicly—whether by oral pronouncement, filing, or otherwise—the 

court’s email did not constitute a rendition of judgment, and Wife’s 

subsequent death divested the trial court of jurisdiction to thereafter 

render judgment.33

III. Conclusion 

Public pronouncement of the trial court’s decision is not a mere 

formalism but, rather, an official judicial action affording the decision 

legal significance. Because the trial court did not render judgment in 

the privately communicated October 4 email, the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to render judgment in the postmortem final divorce decree. 

32 See United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v. Evans, 668 S.W.3d 627, 637 (Tex. 

2023) (“We should strive throughout the law for easily administrable 

bright-line rules, which can be followed by parties with confidence and applied 

by judges with predictability.”). 

33 Although the divorce proceedings were not concluded on the merits, 

neither the property dispute nor Wife’s community interest goes away; it just 

goes somewhere else. That is, Wife’s property interests in the marital estate 

must now be divided and distributed according to Texas probate law rather 

than in the divorce action. See TEX. EST. CODE §§ 101.001–.002.
15 

Though our analysis differs from the court of appeals, we affirm its 

dismissal judgment.34

 

John P. Devine 

 Justice 

OPINION DELIVERED: March 1, 2024 

34 This opinion should not be construed as commenting on the unargued 

issues addressed in Justice Lehrmann’s concurring opinion. See Pike v. Tex. 

EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 782 (Tex. 2020) (observing that courts serve 

as neutral arbiters of the issues the parties have framed for decision rather 

than as advocates who decide cases on unargued points).