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No. 15-569C

Filed November 5, 2015 FILED

Nov - 5 2015

ISAAC A. POTTER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

THE LNITED STATES,

U.S. COURT OF

FEDERAL CLAIMS

Pro Se; Rule 12(bXl), Subject-Matter

Jurisdiction; Rule 41(b), Failure to

Prosecute; Claims Against a Private Party;

28 U.S.C. $ 1631, Motion to Transfer; In

Forma Pauneris.

Defendant.

Isaac A. Pouer, Jr., Orlando, FL, plaintiffpro se.

Melissa L. Baker, Trial Attomey, Brian A. Mizoguchi, Assistant Director, Robert E'

Kirschman, Jr., Director, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attomey General,

commercial Litigation Branch, civil Division, united states Department of Justice, washington,

DC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRIGGSBY. Judge

I, INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff, Isaac A. Potter, Jr., brought this action seeking unspecified monetary

damages and other relief for alleged misconduct by a private health care services provider in

connection with medical treatment provided to his spouse. The govemment has moved to dismiss

the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule l2(b)(1) ofthe Rules ofthe

United States Court of Federal Claims C'RCFC'). Plaintiff has also moved to proceed in this matter

informa pauperls and to transfer this matter to the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia. For the reasons set forth below, the Cou( GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss,

GRANTS plaintiff s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and DENIES plaintiff s motion to

transfer.
il, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND'

A, Factual Background

Plaintiff pro se, isaac A. Potter, Jr., commenced this action on June 3, 2015. See generally

Compl. Plaintiff alleges numerous causes of action in the complaint including: false allegations,

retaliatory conduct, conspiracy to harm a patient and the patient's family, emotional distress, mental

anguish, slander, violation of the patient's and spouse of the patient's constitutional rights,

discriminatory acts, various malicious negligent acts, negligent misdiagnoses, and violation of the

patient's bill ofrights for the hospital industry according to law. Id.aI l-2. Plaintiff also alleges

violations of various Florida state laws; the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act,

42 U.S.C. $ 1395dd; I 8 U.S.C. $ 242; and the United States Constitution. Id. at 1' 5-8' l0'

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that, during the period 201i-2015, Adventist Health system

(,,Adventist")-a private health care services provider-engaged in various wrongdoing related to the

treatment ofhis spouse for a recurring staph infection and other maladies. /d. Plaintiff also alleges

that Adventist's conduct led !o, among other things, his spouse experiencing "[flever and/or chills,"

"blood in urine," and "urine output is less than usual amount'" Id' at 10'

B. ProceduralBackground

Plaintiff filed the complaint inthis matter on June 3,2015. See generally compl. on

Jwe24,2015, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff s complaint for iack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, pursuant to RCFC 12(bX1). See generally Def. Mot. on June 16,2015, plaintiff

attempted to file a collection of documents entitled "Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of

Service of Summons." Because there is no provision in the court's Rules for the filing of such

documents, the Court directed the Clerk's Office to retum the documents to plaintiff unfiled on

June 17,2015. See June 17,2015 Order.

On July 1, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to transfer this case to the United States District

court for the District of columbia.2 see generaily Pl. Mot. On July 6, 2015, the govemment filed

I The facts recited in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are taken from plaintifPs complaint ("Compl' at

_"); defendant's motion to dismiss ("Def. Mot. at-"); plaintiffs motion to transfer ("Pl Mot. at-");

oerenaunt's opposition to plaintiff s motion to transfer ("bef. opp. to Pl. Mot. at 

-"); 

plaintiff s August l7'

201 5 notice 1,lpl. Notice ai _"); and defendant's response to plaintiff s notice ("Def. Resp. to Notice at 

-").

2 ln the motion to transfer, plaintiffrefers to Rule l9 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-which pertains

to required joinder of partiis. See generally Pl. Mot.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. But, plaintiff does not identiff a
an opposition to plaintiff s motion to transfer. See generally Def. Opp. to Pl. Mot. Plaintiff did not

file a timely response to the defendant's motion to dismiss. And so, on August 4, 2015, the Court

issued an order instructing plaintiffto show cause on or before August 18, 2015, as to why this

action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b). See generally Order

to Show Cause.

On August 17,2015, plaintiff filed a notice with the Court which restates his request to

transfer this case to district court. See general/y Pl. Notice. On August 3l ,2015, defendant filed a

response to plaintiffs notice. See generally Def. Resp. to Notice. Plaintiffhas not filed a response

to the defendant's motion to dismiss, or to the Court's Order to Show Cause.

III, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Pra Se Litigants

Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se. The Court recognizes that parties proceeding

pro se are granted greater leeway than litigants represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding that pro se complaints are held to "less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). Nonetheless, "[w]hile a court should be rcceptive ro pro se

plaintiffs and assist them, justice is ill-served when ajurist crosses the line from finder offact to

advocate." Demesv. United States,52 Fed. Cl.365,369 (2002). And so, while the Court may

excuse ambiguities in plaintiff s complaint, the Court does not excuse the complaint's failures. See

Henke v. United States,60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

In addition, this Court has long recognized that "the leniency afforded to a pro se litigant

with respect 1o mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements."

Minehan v. united States,75 Fed. Cl.249,253 (2007). For this reasorl, a pro se plaintiff-like any

other plaintiff-must establish the Court's jurisdiction to consider his claim by a preponderance of

the evidence. Rilesv. United States,93Fed. Cl. 163, 165(2010).

B. Rule 12(b)(l)

When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter judsdiction, this Court must

assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable

inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Erickson v. Pardus,55l U.S.89,94(2007);United Pac.

party to bejoined in his motion to transfer. And so, the Court does not read plaintiff s motion to also seek

the joinder of parties.
Ins.Co.v. IJnitedStates,464F.3d1325,1328(Fed.Cir.2006); RCFCl2(bxl). Plaintiffbearsthe

burden ofestablishing subject-matter jurisdiction, and must do so by a preponderance of the

evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv.,846F.2d746,748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)' And so,

should the Court determine that "it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, it must dismiss the

claim;' Matthews v. United States,72Fed. Cl..274,278 (2006).

In this regard, the United States Court ofFederal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction and

"possess[es] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . ." Kokkonen v. Guardiqn

Life Ins. Co. ofAm.,511U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Specifically, the Tucker Act grants the Court

jurisdiction over:

[A]ny claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any

Act ofCongress or any regulation ofan executive department, or upon any express

or implied conftact with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages

in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. g 1a91(a)(1). The Tucker Act, however, is "a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any

substantive right enforceable against the united states for money damages . . . . [T]he Act merely

confers jurisdiction upon [the United States Court ofFederal Claims] whenever the substantive right

exists." United States v. Testan, 424 rJ.5.392,398 (1976). And so, to come within the

jurisdictional reach and waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identifu a separate source of

substantive law that creates the right to money damages. Fisher v. United States, 402 F .3d 1167 ,

1172 (F ed. Cir. 2005). If the Court finds that the source of law alleged is not money-mandating, the

Court must dismiss the case for lack of iurisdiction. /d at 1173; RCFC 12(bxl)

C. Rule 41(b)

Rule 4l(b) ofthe Rules of the United States Court ofFederal Claims provides that:

Ifthe plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, the

court may dismiss on its own motion or the defendant may move to dismiss the

action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a

dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule-except one

for lack ofjurisdiction or failure to join a party under RCFC 19-operates as an

adjudication on the merits.

RCFC 41(b). Rule 4l (b) is a necessary tool to ensure efficient docket management and to prevent

the undue delay of the litigation. Linkv. I{abash R. Co'370 U.S.626,629-30 (1962)("The

authority ofa federal trial court to dismiss a plaintilf s action with prejudice because ofhis failure

to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted."). In addition, the Cout's authority to dismiss a
complaint "sua sponte for lack ofprosecution has generally been considered an inherent power,

'govemed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own

affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition ofcases."' Claude E. Atkins Enters.,

Inc. v. [Jnited States,899 F.2d I I 80, I 185 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Link,370 U.S. at 630-31).

IV. DISCUSSION

A, Dismissal Is Warranted For Failure To Prosecute

As an initial matter, dismissal of plaintiff s complaint for failure to prosecute this matter is

warranted under Rule 41(b). RCFC 41(b). Rule 41(b) provides in pertinent part that:

If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, the

court may dismiss on its own motion or the defendant may move to dismiss the

action or any claim against it.

RCFC 4l(b). "While dismissal of a claim is a harsh action, especially to apro se litigant, it is

justified when a party fails to pursue litigation diligently and disregards the court's rules and show

cause order." Whiting v. United States,99 Fed. Cl. 13, 17(2011).

Dismissal of plaintiff s complaint pursuant to RCFC 4l(b) is justified here. Despite the

passage of several months since plaintiff s responsive filing was due, plaintiff has not responded to

the jurisdictional concems raised in the defendant's motion to dismiss.3 Plaintiffhas also failed to

comply with the Court's August 4, 2015 Order to Show Cause why the matter should not be

dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Court is cognizant of plaintiffs pro se status. But, given

plaintiffs failure to diligently pursue this litigation and plaintiffs total disregard of the Court's

order to Show cause, the court must conclude that dismissal of this matter is justified. ,se€

Ilhiting, gg Fed. Cl. at 17. And so, the court dismisses the complaint pursuant to Rule 4l(b).

RCFC 41(b).

B. This Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiff s Claims

Notwithstanding plaintiff s failure to prosecute this matter, dismissal of the complaint is also

warranted because the Court does not possess jurisdiction to consider plaintiff s claims. RCFC

3 The deadline for the filing of plaintiffs response to the defendant's motion to dismiss was July 27, 2015.

See RCFC 7(b). On August 17,2015, plaintifffiled a notice withthe Court, which quotes the Federal Rules

of Bankruptcy Procedure regarding dismissal and change ofvenue, and appears to restate his request that the

Court tranifei this matter to the United States District Court for the District of Cohtmbia. See generally Pl

Notice. But, this filing does not address, or respond to, any of the j urisdictional issues raised in the

defendant's motion to dismiss. 1d.
12(bxl). In this regard, the government has moved to dismiss plaintiff s complaint upon two

grounds: First, the government argues that the Court does not possess judsdiction to consider

plaintiff s claims against a private party. Def. Mot. at 4-5. Second, the govemment also argues that

the Court does not possess jurisdiction to consider the claims alleged in the complaint. Id.at5'8.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees that it does not possess jurisdiction to consider

this matter.

1. The Court Does Not Possess Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiff s Claims

Against A Private Party

As a threshold matter, it is well established that this Court does not possess jurisdiction to

consider claims asserted against a private party. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 5 88

( 1941) (The Court ofFederal Claims "is without jurisdiction ofany suit brought against private

parties . . . ."). Rather, the United States is the only proper defendant in cases brought in the United

States Court of Federal Claims. Pikutin v. United States,97 Fed. CI.71,75 (2011); Stephenson v.

[Jnited States,58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003) ("[T]he only proper defendant for any matter before this

court is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual.").

A plain reading of the complaint here shows that plaintiff is asserting claims against a

private health care services provider-Adventist Health Systems. See generally Compl. In fact, the

factual allegations in the complaint pertain solely to the alleged conduct of Adventist in connection

wirh the treatment of plaintiffs spouse. 1d (Plaintiff alleges that, during the period 2011-2015,

Adventist engaged in various wrongdoing related to the treatment ofhis spouse for a recurring staph

iniection and other maladies). And so, even the most generous reading of plaintiffs complaint

makes clear that plaintiffhas not alleged any substantive claims against the United States

government, or any of its agencies.a Id. Given this, the court does not possess jurisdiction to

consider plaintiff s claims. MayCo. v. UnitedStates,38 Fed. CI.414,416 (1997)(Plaintiff listed

the United States as a defendant but the complaint contained no "substantive allegations at all

asainst the United States" and therefore the Court lacked jurisdiction.).

a plaintiffs co.plaint initially identified the Department of Health and Human Services as the defendant in

this matter. See generally Compl. But, the complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing on the part of

the Deoartment &Health and Human Services, or any other federal government agency - Id.
2. The Court Does Not Possess Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiff s Tort,

State Law Or Criminal Law Claims

Dismissal ofthis matter is also warranted because the Court does not possess jurisdiction to

consider plaintiff s tort law, state law,5 or criminal law claims. See Compl. at1-2,7'11.

As an initial matter, to the extent that plaintiffis asserting tort law claims, it is well

established that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to consider such claims. Shearin v. United

States,992 F.2d 1195, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("lt is well settled that the [United States Court of

Federal Claimsl lacks... jurisdiction to entertain tort claims."); see also28 U.S.C. $ 1491(a). In the

complaint, plaintiff alleges numerous tort law claims including, "false allegations," "emotional

distress," "mental anguish," and "slander." Compl. at 1. This Court does not possess jurisdiction to

entertain claims sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. $ 1491(a) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims

shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either

upon the Constitution, or any Act ofCongress or any regulation ofan executive department, or

upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated

damages in case not sounding in tort."). As a result, the Court must dismiss plaintiff s tort law

claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 1d.; RCFC l2(bXl).

The Court also does not possess jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs state law claims.

Souders v. S. Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth.,497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Claims founded on

state law are also outside the scope ofthe limited jurisdiction of the Court ofFederal Claims.")

(citing United States v. Mitchell,463 U.S. 206,215-18 (1983)). In this regard, plaintiff alleges

violations of the Florida Mental Health Act, commonly known as the Baker Act. Compl. at 8;

Collins v. State, 125 So. 3d 1046, 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). This state law claim falls outside

of the limited jurisdiction of this Court. Souders,497 F.3d at 1307. And so, the Court must also

dismiss plaintiff s state law claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. RCFC 12(bxl).

This Court is similarly without jurisdiction to consider plaintiff s criminal law claims. See

Joshua v. [Jnited States, 17 F.3d 3?8, 3 79 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (the Court of Federal Claims "has no

jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code"); see also Jones v.

s Specifically, plaintiff alleges "violation ofFla. State Ann. Subsection 415.1I I S. 775.083 or S. 775.082";

violation of,,health care surrogat€ subsection 7 65-201-765-205"; violation of"the Baker Act

2S7.057(3)(eXb)"; and violation ofthe "20l4 Florida Statutes Title XXX Social Welfare Chapter 415."

Comnl. at l. 8.
Ilnited States,440 F. App'x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir.2011). In his complaint, plaintiff alleges a violation

of title I 8, United States Code, section 242, which makes it a crime for a person acting under color

of law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of

theUnitedStates. 18U.S.C.$242; Compl.atS-9;Hardinv.UnitedStates,2015WL6437379,at

*4(Fed. Cl. Oct.22,2015). But, it is well established that this Court does not possess jurisdiction

to adjudicate plaintiff s criminal law claim. Joshua, l'1 F.3d at 379. And so, the Court must also

dismiss plaintiff s criminal law claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. RCFC 12(b)(1).

3. Plaintiff Fails To Identify A Money-Mandating Provision Of Law

Dismissal of plaintiff s complaint is also warranted because plaintiff has not identified any

money-mandating provisions of federal law that confer j urisdiction on this Court. In this regard, the

Tucker Act confers jurisdiction for this Cou( to entertain:

[A]ny claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any

Act ofCongress or any regulation ofan executive department, or upon any express

or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages

in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. $ 1a91(aX1). As discussed above, the Tucker Act is "a jurisdictional statute; it does not

create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages . . . . [T]he

Act merely confers jurisdiction upon [the United States Court ofFederal Claims] whenever the

substantive right exists." [Jnited states v. Testan, 424 U.S.392,398 (1976). Andso,tobringa

claim pursuant to the Tucker Act, plaintiff must show that the constitutional provisions, statutes, or

regulations upon which he relies are money-mandating. Fisher,402F.3dat1172.

ln this regard, plaintiff improperly relies upon the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active

Labor Act C'EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. $ l395dd, to establish jurisdiction. Compl. ar5,7; see 42

U.S.C. $ l395dd. In the complaint, plaintiff cites to section 1395dd(dx2) of the EMTALA-a

federal statute that ensures public access to emergency medical services regardless ofability to pay.

Roberts v. Galen of virginia, \nc.,525 U.S.249,250 (1999). While the provision cited by plaintiff

does permit private parties to bring civil claims for personal injury against a hospital that violates

the EMTALA, the EMTALA is not a money-mandating statute that creates a substantive right to

bring claims against the United States. See 42 U.S.C. $ 1395dd(dx2). And so, plaintiff cannot

properly rely upon this statute to establish this Court's jurisdiction over his claims' Testan,424

U.S. at 398.
Plaintiffalso cannot rely upon the cursory references to a constitutional violation in the

complaint to establish jurisdiction. Compl. at 1 , 10. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges, without

further explanation, a "violation of the patient's and spouse of the patients constitutional rights." 1d.

at l. Plaintiff also alleges a "taking ofproperty ordained by maniage;' Id.at 10. But, such fleeting

references to constitutional violations in the complaint are insufficient to establish this Court's

jurisdiction.

Indeed, it is well established that a constitutional claim must be a claim for money damages

against the United States to be cognizable under the Tucker Act. See Mitchell,463 U.S. at216; see

also Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States,521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir' 2008)

(,,[p]laintiff must . . . identify a substantive source of law that creates the right to recovery of money

damages against the United States."). while the complaint does generally allege a violation of

constitutional rights, plaintiff fails to identify a specific, money-mandating provision of the

Constitution that would create a right to recover money damages against the United States in this

case. See generally Compl. Because ofthis failure, the Court must dismiss plaintiff s constitutional

claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . See Fisher,402 F.3d at1173; Russell v. United States,

78 Fed. Cl. 281,285 (2007) ("plaintiff must establish more than the mere existence ofa statute or

constitutional provision to bring himself within the jurisdiction of this court")'6

C. Transfer Of Plaintiff s Complaint Is Not Appropriate

Transfer of this matter to a district court is also not warranted. Perhaps in anticipation of the

Court's determination that it does not possess jurisdiction to entertain his claims, plaintilfhas also

moved to transfer this matter to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See

generallyPl. Mot. Title 28, United States Code, section 1631, provides that:

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section

610 of this title or an appeal, including a petition for review of

administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a court

and that court finds that there is a want ofjurisdiction' the

court shall, if it is in the intercst ofjustice, transf'er such action

or appeal to any other such coutl in which the action or appeal

6 plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Adventist engaged in a 'laking of property ordained by, marriage."

Compl. at 10.1o the extent ihat this claim could be construed as a takings claim againsl the.United States'

plainiifffails to identif any action on th€ part ofthe government that could constitute the alleged taking.

)do^, u. United Statei,3g l F.3d 1212, Itl 8 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("A claimant under the Takings Clause must

show that the government, by some specific action, took a private property interest for a public use without

just compensation.").
could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed,

and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in

or noticed for the court to which it is transfened on the date

upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court

fiom which it is transferred.

28 U.S.C. $ 1631. And so, transfer of this case to a district court would be appropriate if"(l) the

transferor court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the action could have been brought in the transferee court at

the time it was filed; and (3) transfer is in the interest ofjustice." Zoltek Corp. v. United States,672

F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir.2012); see also spencer v. united states,98 Fed. Cl. 349, 359 (2011).

In addition, the United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the

phrase,,in the interest ofjustice" set forth in section 1631 "relates to claims which are

,,nonfrivolous and as such should be decided on the merits." Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States,

834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). This Court has also held that the "decision

to transfer rests within the sound discretion ofthe transferor court, and the court may decline to

transfer the case '[i]fsuch transfer would nevertheless be futile given the weakness of plaintiffs case

on the merits."' spencer, g8 Fed. Cl. at 359 (quoting Fa ulkner v. IJnited States,43 Fed. CI 54, 56

(1ee9)).

In light ofthe above standards, the Court concludes that the transfer of this matter to the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia-or to any other district court-would not be

in the interest ofjustice, given the weakness of plaintiffs claims against the United States- As

discussed above, a plain reading of the complaint makes clear that plaintiff does not allege any

wrongdoing on the part of the United states, or any federal govemment agency. see generally

Compl. Rather, plaintiff s claims are against Adventist Health System. /d. Because plaintiff

asserts no substantive claims against the United Sates in the complaint, a transfer of this case to a

district court would be futile. See Faullcner,43 Fed. Cl. at 56. And so, the Court denies plaintiff s

motion to transfer.?

7 Transfer ofthis matter to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia would also appear to

be inappropriate, because plaintiff is a resident of Florida and all of his claims are based upon events that

occurred in the state of Florida. See generally Compl.' see also 28 U.S.C. $ l39l(e)(l) (actions against the

United States or its agencies may be ;broughi in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action

,".ia"r, <S) a substaniial part ofihe events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial

part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is

involved in the action").

10
D. Plaintiff s Motion For Leave To Proceed 1z Forma Pauperis Satisfies The

Statutory Requirement

Lastly, plaintiffhas filed a motion to proceed informa paupens, in which he requests a

waiver ofthe Court's filing fee because he lacks the financial resources to pay the fee. See

generally PI. Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. This Court may authorize commencement of a

suit without prepayment offees when a person submits an affidavit including a statement of all

assets, a declaration that he or she is unable to pay the fees, and a statement ofthe nature of the

action and a belief that he or she is entitled to redress. .See 28 U.S.C. $ 195 1(a); see also 28 U.S.C.

$ 2503(d). Due to the Court's summary disposition of this case, and plaintiffspro se status, the

Court finds that plaintiff satisfies the requirements to proceed in forma paupens for the purpose of

resolving the defendant's motion to dismiss. And so, the Court grants plaintiffs motion to proceed

in forma pauperls for the limited purpose of resolving the defendant's motion to dismiss.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, dismissal of plaintiffls complaint pursuant to RCFC 41(b) is warranted in this matter

because plaintiffhas failed to prosecute this case and failed to comply with the Court's August 4,

2015 Order to Show Cause. Notwithstanding plaintiff s failure to prosecute this matter, dismissal

ofthe complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is also warranted, because plaintiff has not

met his burden to show that the Court possesses jurisdiction to consider his claims. RCFC 12(bX1)

In this regard, a plain reading of the complaint shows that plaintifPs claims are claims

against a private party. This Court does not possess jurisdiction to consider such claims Similarly,

plaintiff s tort law, state law, and criminal law claims are jurisdictionally precluded, because the

Court does not possess jurisdiction to entertain these claims'

Plaintiff also fails to show that the Court possesses jurisdiction to entertain his health care

discrimination and constitutional claims, because he cites to no money-mandating source of law that

confers jurisdiction upon this court to consider those claims. And so, for all of these reasons,

plaintiff has not met his burden to establish that the Court possesses jurisdiction to entertain his

claims and thc Court must dismiss the complaint. RCFC 12(bxl)'

In addition, a transfer of this matter to the united states District court for the District of

Columbia is not appropriate, because the complaint does not assert any substantive claims against

the United States and, as a result, a transfer of this matter would be futile. Lastly, in light of the

Court's summary disposition of this case-and plaintiff s representation that he is unable to pay the

ll
Court's filing ferthe Court finds that ptaintiff may proceed in fonna pauperis fot the limited

purpose ofresolving defendant's motion to dismiss.

And so, for the foregoing reasons, the Court:

(l) GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss;

(2) DENIES plaintiffs motion to transfer; and

(3) GRANTS plaintiffs motionto proce'ed informa pauperis.

The Clerk's Office is directed to ENTER final judgrnent in favor of defendant,

DISMISSING thc complaint. No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

12