Opinion issued April 4, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-18-00182-CR

———————————

JASON ALLEN VIA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 412th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 82367-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant Jason Via guilty of possession of a controlled 

substance (methamphetamine) in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 

grams, a second-degree felony, which was enhanced to a first-degree felony by at 
2

least one prior felony conviction. The jury assessed punishment at 50 years’ 

imprisonment. 

On appeal, Via’s first two issues assert that the trial court erred in overruling 

his motion to suppress. In his third issue, Via argues that the evidence is insufficient 

to support his conviction. We affirm.

Background

Lake Jackson Police Officer Z. Jacoby testified at the suppression hearing and 

at trial that, on the evening of July 13, 2017, he was on patrol and was surveilling a 

home known for recent drug activity (the Jenkins residence) when he noticed a red 

2006 Dodge Caravan that he had recently located narcotics (methamphetamine) in.

He stopped the Dodge Caravan after observing the driver fail to signal within 100 

feet of a turn. The officer asked Via, the driver, for his driver’s license and proof of 

insurance. Via replied that he had left his license at his mother’s residence in 

Freeport, Texas, but he did provide Officer Jacoby with his name, license number, 

and date of birth. Via also told the officer that he was staying at the Jenkins residence

after first stating his mother had kicked him out and he was staying with a friend in 

Freeport. Officer Jacoby did not detect any narcotics odor in the vehicle. 

Because Via appeared nervous to Officer Jacoby—“more nervous” than 

people commonly are when stopped by police—he asked Via to get out of the Dodge 

Caravan and to move to its front. The officer then contacted dispatch to verify that 
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Via had provided accurate personal information. At trial, Officer Jacoby testified 

that Via provided conflicting information about where he was coming from, where 

he was going to, and where he was living; Via’s story was “not adding up” and he 

thought Via was not being honest.

While waiting for a response for verification of Via’s personal information, 

the officer conducted a pat-down search of Via’s clothing for weapons after Via had 

denied having any weapons on his person. While conducting the pat-down, Officer 

Jacoby felt something in Via’s left front pocket. When the officer asked Via what 

was in his pocket, Via replied that it was a cell phone and a lighter underneath the 

phone. Officer Jacoby testified that he asked Via for consent to remove the item from 

his pocket and that Via consented.

The video of the pat-down from Officer Jacoby’s body camera reflects that, 

after Via said that a cell phone and then a lighter were in his pocket, Officer Jacoby 

asked: “I’m gonna grab it, okay?,” to which Via replied, “Okay, go ahead.” He then 

recovered what he observed to be a small bag of marihuana from Via’s pocket. Via 

admitted to Officer Jacoby that the substance was marihuana.

The front-seat passenger was Krista Glockzin; Officer Jacoby had recently 

stopped her in the same vehicle and found methamphetamine. When Officer G. Soria 

arrived as back-up, Officer Jacoby had Via sit on the ground while Glockzin was 

removed from the vehicle. Officer Jacoby then asked Via if there was anything else 
4

in the vehicle, and Via replied that there was a “roach”—a partially smoked

marihuana cigarette. Glockzin also told Officer Jacoby that there was a “roach” in 

the vehicle.

Officer Jacoby searched the Dodge Caravan for narcotics based on Via’s 

statement that there was marihuana in it. During that search, he found a green, Crown 

Royal bag inside a larger purse-type bag that was between the front passenger seat

and the driver’s seat; that bag contained a large quantity of methamphetamine 

wrapped in three separate packages. He also recovered a small digital scale from 

inside the bag that had a white crystal-like residue that indicated it had been used to 

weigh methamphetamine.

Officer Jacoby then detained Via in the back of Officer Soria’s patrol car 

while he further searched the Dodge Caravan. Officer Soria’s patrol car was 

equipped with video surveillance that recorded Via while he was detained in the 

back seat. Despite being handcuffed behind his back, Via was able to answer several 

calls on his cell phone, and during one call was recorded saying, “I’m in the back of 

a . . . cop car. They caught me.”

Officer Jacoby asked Via and Glockzin if the narcotics belonged to either of 

them, and initially they both denied responsibility for the methamphetamine and 

were arrested. After she was arrested and was being placed in his patrol car, Glockzin 

told Officer Jacoby that the methamphetamine was Via’s. Laboratory analysis later 
5

confirmed the recovered substances to be between four and two hundred grams of 

methamphetamine and less than two grams of marihuana.

Via was indicted for the offense of possession of a controlled substance with 

intent to deliver—habitual. Glockzin, meanwhile, pled guilty. At trial and after the 

jury was seated, Via filed a motion to suppress. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial 

court denied the motion. The trial court found that Officer Jacoby was objectively 

justified in conducting the pat-down search and that Via had consented to the 

officer’s search and seizure of the items in his pocket.

The jury found Via guilty of the lesser-included offense of possession of a 

controlled substance. At punishment, Via pled true to the two enhancement 

paragraphs. The jury assessed punishment at 50 years confinement in the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division, and a fine of $10,000.

Suppression

Via’s first issue asserts that Officer Jacoby’s pat-down was an unreasonable 

search. His second issue contends that the trial court erred in finding that Via 

consented to the search and seizure of the item in his pocket.

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated 

standard of review. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018). We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion but 

review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. at 190. We 
6

give deference to the trial court’s factual determinations because the trial court is the 

sole trier of fact and judge of witness credibility and the weight to be given their 

testimony. Id.; Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Our 

deferential review also applies to the trial court’s conclusions regarding mixed 

questions of law and fact that turn on credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382 

S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We review de novo mixed questions of 

law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor, as well as purely legal 

questions. State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

When the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, we determine whether the 

evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports 

the findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We afford 

the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 

571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably 

supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. 

Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190; State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2014).

The trial court’s findings of fact relevant to Via’s first issue are:
7

• Officer Jacoby was watching the Jenkins residence as part of a narcotics 

investigation.

• During his surveillance, he saw a 2006 Dodge Caravan that he 

recognized from a recent encounter in which the van contained 

narcotics.

• Officer Jacoby stopped the vehicle for failing to properly signal a turn.

• When he approached the vehicle, Officer Jacoby did not smell 

narcotics.

• The vehicle was being driven by Via.

• Via did not have a driver’s license or proof of insurance with him, but 

he provided his name and date of birth to Officer Jacoby.

• Officer Jacoby had not had any prior encounters with Via.

• Officer Jacoby believed that Via appeared more nervous than most 

people stopped for traffic violations.

• Via gave conflicting statements regarding the location of his driver’s 

license and residence. Via said he left his license at his mother’s house, 

but his mother had kicked him out. He then said he was staying with a 

friend in Freeport and later said he was staying at “Spencer’s house.” 

Via’s stated route did not match the course he was driving.

• Spencer and his sister were the targets of Officer Jacoby’s narcotics 

investigation.

• While awaiting confirmation on Via’s identity, Officer Jacoby 

conducted a pat-down search of Via.

• Officer Jacoby asked Via if he had any weapons. While Officer Jacoby 

did not testify that he requested the pat down for officer safety, it can 

be inferred that this was his concern because he asked Via if he had any 

weapons.
8

• During the pat-down, Officer Jacoby felt an item in Via’s pocket, and 

Via said it was a lighter.

• Officer Jacoby requested permission to remove the item, and Via gave 

him permission.

• Officer Jacoby removed the item and found it to be marihuana.

• Officer Jacoby asked Via if there was anything in the vehicle, and he 

responded that there was a “roach”: a marihuana cigarette.

The trial court made the following relevant conclusions of law:

• During this time it was reasonable to conduct a pat down search for 

officer safety given the totality of the circumstances known to Jacoby, 

those being that (1) the vehicle had been previously stopped with 

narcotics in it; (2) that Defendant [Via] was staying with persons who 

were the object of a drug surveillance; (3) that he had previously seen

this vehicle operating in the same area earlier that evening; (4) that 

Defendant [Via] provided several conflicting statements concerning the 

absence of his driver’s license as well as a plausible explanation of

where he was going; and (5) that the area had frequent drug purchases. 

A reasonably prudent person under these same circumstances would be 

warranted in believing that his safety, or the safety of others, was in 

danger.

• Defendant [Via] gave consent forJacoby to remove the bag of marijuana

from his pocket.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and a 

stop-and-frisk by law enforcement implicates the Fourth Amendment’s protections. 

Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)). A Fourth 

Amendment analysis of an officer’s stop-and-frisk has two prongs: (1) whether the 

officer’s action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the search and seizure 
9

were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the 

first place. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).

During the course of a detention, an officer may, in certain 

circumstances, conduct a pat-down search of an individual to determine 

whether the person is carrying a weapon. In order to justify a pat-down, 

the officer must reasonably believe that the suspect is armed and 

dangerous, such that the officer can point to specific and articulable 

facts which reasonably lead him to conclude that the suspect might 

possess a weapon. Reasonable suspicion in this context is based on an 

objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and 

circumstances surrounding the detention. The officer’s subjective level 

of fear is not controlling. The question is whether a reasonably prudent 

person would justifiably believe that his safety or the safety of others 

was in danger.

The purpose of the pat-down search is to protect the officer’s safety 

during interactions such as this, when the suspect is in close quarters 

with the officer. The Supreme Court has noted that it would be 

unreasonable to require police officers to take unnecessary risks in 

performing their duties and that traffic stops are “especially fraught 

with danger to police officers.”

Id. at 191 (citations in footnotes omitted).

Reasonable suspicion does not require that the officer “be absolutely certain 

that the individual is armed.” O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2000). And “there is ‘no legal requirement that a policeman must feel ‘scared’ by 

the threat of danger’ because ‘[s]ome foolhardy policemen will never admit fear.’”

Id. (quoting United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976), overruled 

in part on other grounds by United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987)).
10

Via argues that Officer Jacoby’s pat-down of his pocket was not based on 

specific and articulable facts that he might possess a weapon. The Court of Criminal 

Appeals has addressed pat-downs in the context of drug trafficking several times.

Relying on Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) and O’Hara, 

the court stated:

We have recognized that it is objectively reasonable for a police officer 

to believe that persons involved in the drug business are armed and 

dangerous. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d at 330 and cases 

cited (objectively reasonable for police to believe that seller of 

narcotics might be armed because concealed weapons are part and 

parcel of the drug trade). We decline to hold that this does not apply 

when a police officer has not known a specific drug-dealer to carry 

weapons in the past. It still is objectively reasonable for a police officer 

to believe that this person could still be armed and dangerous at any 

time he is engaged in the business of selling drugs especially when this 

drug-dealer had been arrested for the same offense just two days before 

and moves his hand toward his pocket during an investigative detention 

based on reasonable suspicion. We decline to hold that it is objectively 

unreasonable for a reasonably prudent officer to protect himself by 

frisking a possibly violent drug-dealer for weapons even though the 

officer conducting the frisk in the case at hand testifies that he was not 

subjectively afraid of the suspect. See O’Hara, 27 S.W.3d at 

551 (police officer not legally required to testify that he was afraid of 

the suspect because some policemen will never admit fear).

Griffin v. State, 215 S.W.3d 403, 409–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (footnotes 

omitted);

1

see also Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 880-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) 

 

1

In support, the Griffin court noted the following: “For example, according to 

a December 2, 2002, Federal Bureau of Investigation press release, 

approximately 23% of the 69 police officers killed in the line of duty in 2001 

in incidents not related to the events of September 11th were investigating 
11

(holding that pat-down for weapons of suspected drug user with nervous demeanor 

in “high drug, high crime” area was reasonable); Lemons v. State, 135 S.W.3d 878, 

884 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (finding pat-down proper when 

officer testified that, among other things, when he is involved in narcotics situations, 

he conducts pat-downs to check for weapons because there is greater chance of 

weapons being present).

The suppression-hearing evidence and the trial court’s fact findings reflect: 

Officer Jacoby was surveilling a residence known for narcotics trafficking; the 

vehicle being driven by Via had just left that residence; Via told the officer he was 

staying at the residence; Officer Jacoby had recently stopped the same vehicle and 

found narcotics; Via gave the officer conflicting information about his route and 

where he was living, which made the officer question Via’s honesty; and Via was 

more nervous than most in a traffic stop. Based on the applicable law, we conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Via’s motion to suppress.

The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in concluding that a reasonable 

officer in Officer Jacoby’s situation, considering all of the circumstances, would be 

justified in fearing for his safety and therefore conducting a pat-down search of Via 

for weapons. See Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 192; Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 880-81. We 

 

“drug-related matters” or “suspicious persons.” Griffin, 215 S.W.3d at 409 

n.7.
12

overrule Via’s first issue.

Via’s second issue challenges the trial court’s ruling that Via consented to 

Officer Jacoby’s search and removal of the item in Via’s pocket. 

Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, a search 

conducted without a warrant based on probable cause is “per se 

unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” One of those exceptions is a search conducted 

with the person’s voluntary consent. The validity of a consent to search 

is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. A 

person’s consent to search can be communicated to law enforcement in 

a variety of ways, including by words, action, or circumstantial 

evidence showing implied consent. “But the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or 

implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.” The voluntariness of 

a person’s consent is also a question of fact that is determined by 

analyzing all of the circumstances of a particular situation. The trial 

judge must conduct a careful sifting and balancing of the unique facts 

and circumstances of each case in deciding whether a particular consent 

search was voluntary or coerced.

Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 458–59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Via argues that his statement to Officer Jacoby to go ahead and grab the item 

in his pocket was “mere acquiescence” to Officer Jacoby’s command. We, like the 

trial court, have reviewed the video-recorded interaction between Officer Jacoby and 

Via from Officer Jacoby’s body camera. To repeat, the video reflects that, after Via 

said that a cell phone and then a lighter were in his pocket, Officer Jacoby asked: 

“I’m gonna grab it, okay?,” to which Via replied, “Okay, go ahead.” The tones and 

the words of both Officer Jacoby and Via in this interaction demonstrably support 

the trial court’s finding that Officer Jacoby asked for permission and Via gave 
13

permission. Because the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding 

consent, we overrule issue two.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his third issue, Via argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

jury’s guilt finding on the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled 

substance. He specifically argues that the evidence does not support the conclusion 

that he exercised care, control, or management over the controlled substance or that 

he was a party to another’s commission of the offense. 

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires that we identify the 

essential elements of the charged offense and ask whether the evidence and 

reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

conviction, would permit a rational juror to find each element of the charged offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Braughton v. State, __ S.W.3d __, __, 2018 WL 

6626621, at *11 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2018). A reviewing court considers all 

of the evidence adduced at trial, whether it was admissible or inadmissible. See 

Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Whether a 

conviction rests on direct or circumstantial evidence, the sufficiency standard 

remains unchanged. Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 

The analysis requires us to keep in mind that the jury is the sole judge of the 

evidence’s weight and credibility. Braughton, __ S.W.3d at __, 2018 WL 6626621, 
14

at *11. We presume that the jury resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the 

verdict. Id. Although this standard mandates great deference to the jury, we do not 

defer to a jury’s conclusions that are based on “mere speculation or factually 

unsupported inferences or presumptions.” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 

9, 15–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

A criminal conviction may be based upon circumstantial 

evidence. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Miller v. State, 566 S.W.2d 614, 

617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). “Circumstantial evidence is as probative 

as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and 

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.”

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);see Clayton,

235 S.W.3d at 778. In circumstantial evidence cases, it is not necessary 

that every fact and circumstance “point directly and independently to 

the defendant’s guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the 

combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances.”

Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Gibbs v. 

State, 555 S.W.3d 718, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

To prove unlawful possession, the State must establish that the accused 

(1) exercised care, control, or management over the contraband and (2) knew that 

the substance was in fact contraband. See Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 466 

S.W.3d 166, 173 & n.32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Henry v. State, 409 S.W.3d 37, 42 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). The State may prove these elements 

through direct or circumstantial evidence, but the evidence must establish that the 
15

accused’s connection with the substance was more than merely fortuitous. See 

Blackman v. State, 350 S.W.3d 588, 594–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Le v. State, 

479 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

In Henry, this court articulated applicable Texas law on possession of a 

controlled substance:

Possession need not be exclusive. Wiley v. State, 388 S.W.3d 

807, 813 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). “When the 

accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the contraband 

is found, then additional, independent facts and circumstances must 

link the defendant to the contraband in such a way that it can reasonably 

be concluded that [the defendant] had knowledge of the contraband and 

exercised control over it.” Kibble v. State, 340 S.W.3d 14, 18 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d); see also Roberts v. State, 

321 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. 

ref’d). The evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, “must establish, 

to the requisite level of confidence, that the accused’s connection with 

the drug[s] was more than just fortuitous.” Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 

405–06 (quoting Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1995)). “This rule simply [states] the common-sense notion that a 

person—such as a father, son, spouse, roommate, or friend—may 

jointly possess property like a house but not necessarily jointly possess 

the contraband found in that house.” Id. at 406. The accused’s presence 

at the scene where contraband is found is insufficient, by itself, to 

establish possession. Roberts, 321 S.W.3d at 549 (citing Evans v. State, 

202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). However, when 

combined with other direct or circumstantial evidence, presence or 

proximity may be sufficient to establish the elements of possession 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Additionally, when narcotics are 

secreted, the State must address whether the accused knew of the 

existence of the secret place and its contents. Id. (citing Medina v. State, 

242 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.)).

Links that may establish knowing possession include: (1) the 

defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the 

substance was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the 
16

accessibility of the substance; (4) whether the defendant was under the 

influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant 

possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the 

defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether 

the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive 

gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether 

other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the 

defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the 

substance was found; (12) whether the place where the substance was 

found was enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large 

amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant 

indicated a consciousness of guilt. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162, n.12. The 

“number of . . . links proven is not as important as the logical force that 

they collectively create.” Wiley, 388 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting Hubert v. 

State, 312 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. 

ref’d)). “The absence of various affirmative links does not constitute 

evidence of innocence to be weighed against the affirmative links 

present.” Id. (quoting James v. State, 264 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d)). 

Henry, 409 S.W.3d at 42–43; see also Le, 479 S.W.3d at 467–68.

We turn to the evidence in this case. The methamphetamine was found inside 

a vehicle being driven by Via at the time of the traffic stop that led to the seizure. 

Via had just left a house known to the officer to be involved in drug trafficking, Via 

claimed to be living at that house, and Via was more nervous than common for a 

traffic stop. The methamphetamine was inside a bag between the driver’s seat and 

the front passenger seat. Clearly, Via was present at the time the methamphetamine 

was discovered, was in close proximity to it, and had access to and control over the 

enclosed space where the methamphetamine was found. See, e.g., Le, 479 S.W.3d at 

465–68 (affirming pickup truck driver’s possession conviction where marihuana was 
17

found in the bed of the truck, as well as lesser amounts in several places inside the 

truck’s cab, including a lunch box located between the driver’s and the passenger’s 

seats, the glove box, behind the passenger’s seat, and in the passenger’s-side cup 

holder, and passenger had stipulated in is guilty plea that marihuana belonged to both 

him and the driver); Robinson v. State, 174 S.W.3d 320, 326 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (affirming possession conviction of front-seat passenger 

in truck where cocaine was located in factory compartment in back wall of truck, 

and noting that cocaine was within vicinity and easily accessible to passenger); see 

also Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 412 (“The mere fact that a person other than the 

accused might have joint possession of the premises does not require the State to 

prove that the defendant had sole possession of the contraband, only that there are 

affirmative links between the defendant and the drugs such that he, too, knew of the 

drugs and constructively possessed them.”). In addition to being in close proximity 

to Via, the methamphetamine was conveniently accessible to him. See Robinson, 

174 S.W.3d at 326 (for contraband to be conveniently accessible, it must be “within 

the close vicinity of the accused and easily accessible while in the vehicle so as to 

suggest the accused had knowledge of the contraband and exercised control over 

it”).

Furthermore, other contraband (marihuana) was found on Via’s person, and 

Via told the officer that more marihuana was in the vehicle. Via indicated a 
18

consciousness of guilt in his recorded phone call in which he said, “They caught 

me.” And last, Glockzin told Officer Jacoby that the methamphetamine was Via’s.

Based on these links and the cumulative force of the evidence, a rational jury 

could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Via exercised actual care, 

custody, or control of the methamphetamine. We overrule issue three.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Richard Hightower

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Lloyd, Kelly, and Hightower.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).