SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5292-18T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MELQUAN KENT and 

MAURICE LOWERS,

Defendants-Respondents.

______________________________

Submitted December 4, 2019 — Decided

Before Judges Koblitz, Whipple, and Mawla.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior 

Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland

County, Indictment No. 19-02-0173.

Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County 

Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Stephen Christopher

Sayer, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

Clarence J. Mattioli, Jr., attorney for respondent 

Melquan Kent.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 19, 2019
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Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

respondent Maurice Lowers (Dinaz Akhtar, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

On leave granted, the State appeals from a June 17, 2019 order granting 

defendants Melquan Kent's and Maurice Lowers' motion to suppress a gun and 

narcotics evidence seized pursuant to a motor vehicle stop. We affirm. 

Millville City Police Detective Ryan Stroup was the sole witness to testify 

at the suppression hearing. He testified that in June 2018, he witnessed Lowers 

driving a car and Kent in the passenger seat. Stroup stated he knew Lowers had 

a suspended license because he "check[ed] constantly, different subjects who 

are regularly investigated." Therefore, he stopped the vehicle on suspicion of 

driving with a suspended license. Stroup obtained Lowers' credentials and 

returned to his vehicle to prepare a motor vehicle summons. Stroup checked 

with dispatch to confirm Lowers' license was suspended and began to write the 

motor vehicle summons.

In the meantime, other officers began to arrive at the scene. Prior to 

completing the summons, a canine unit appeared and began a canine sniff of the 

vehicle defendants occupied. Stroup testified he did not summon the canine unit 

but paused writing the summons and exited his vehicle to assist the other officers 
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and oversee the removal of defendants from the vehicle so officers could safely 

complete the canine sniff. Stroup believed his assistance was necessary because 

defendants were "very close associates of a very violent street gang . . . ."

When defendants exited the vehicle, both were patted down because 

"Lowers [was] known to be in possession of firearms in the past." During the 

pat-down, police observed the barrel of a handgun protruding from underneath 

the passenger seat, where Kent was sitting. Defendants were arrested. After the 

arrest, the canine sniff revealed the presence of narcotics in the vehicle. Police 

recovered narcotics from Lowers' person.

Defendants argued the evidence was seized unlawfully because the canine 

sniff was unrelated to, and prolonged, the motor vehicle stop. They argued 

police lacked probable cause to compel them to exit the vehicle, pat them down, 

and search the vehicle. The State argued the stop was not prolonged and it 

duration was "immaterial because as soon as [the canine] alerted, that car is 

going to be searched . . . [and] that gun is going to be located, so the discovery 

of the gun is inevitable at that point."

The motion judge disagreed the gun was inevitably discoverable. He 

stated:

That's not the point at all. The point is, why are they 

being detained beyond the traffic stop? The officer 
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testified there was no reason to arrest them. They had 

no reason to hold them. There was no reason to detain.

And the problem is . . . that as soon as he stopped 

writing the ticket, that was a delay in the issuance of 

the summons and the delay was engendered by the sniff 

itself and there was no articulable suspicion of current 

criminal activity, even if he recognized . . . Lowers as 

a gang-affiliated individual.

The State raises the following points on appeal:

THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT SHOULD 

BE DISTURBED IN THIS CASE, WHERE THAT 

COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS.

A. THE MOTOR VEHICLE STOP WAS 

NOT "PROLONGED" BY THE OFFICER'S DE 

MINIMIS MOMENTARY DIVERSION FROM 

COMPLETING THE TRAFFIC TICKET IN THIS 

CASE, AND THUS NO SEPARATE BASIS OF 

REASONABLE SUSPICION WAS REQUIRED IN 

ORDER TO VALIDATE THE SUBSEQUENT 

DISCOVERY OF EVIDENCE OBSERVED IN PLAIN 

VIEW FROM WITHIN THE MOTOR VEHICLE.

B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 

SUPPRESSING THE EVIDENCE DUE TO THE 

DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCOVERY (NOT 

RAISED BELOW).

C. THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE ARE 

NOT SERVED BY DISINCENTIVIZING OFFICERS 

FROM BEING MINIMALLY INTRUSIVE DURING 

TRAFFIC STOPS AND PRIORITIZING OFFICER 

SAFETY (NOT RAISED BELOW). 
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I.

"An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal 

case must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision, 

provided that those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the 

record.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017) (quoting State v. Scriven, 

226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016)). It does so "because those findings 'are substantially 

influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 

"feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Gamble, 218 

N.J. 412, 424-25 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 

N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). "An appellate court should disregard those findings only 

when a trial court's findings of fact are clearly mistaken." State v. Hubbard, 222 

N.J. 249, 262 (2015) (citing Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162). However, legal 

conclusions are reviewed de novo. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010) 

(citation omitted); see also State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015).

A.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. "A lawful roadside stop by a police officer constitutes a 

seizure under both the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions." State v. Dunbar, 
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229 N.J. 521, 532 (2017). "To be lawful, an automobile stop 'must be based on 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense, including a minor traffic 

offense, has been or is being committed.'" State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 103 

(2017) (quoting State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639-40 (2002)).

"[I]n those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable 

suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed . . . stopping an automobile and detaining 

the driver in order to check his driver's license" is reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). During such a 

stop, police officers are permitted to "inquire 'into matters unrelated to the 

justification for the traffic stop.'" Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 533 (quoting Arizona v. 

Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2008)). However, "[a]uthority for the seizure . . .

ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have 

been—completed." Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015).

"Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary 

inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer's traffic 

mission." Id. at 1615. Absent articulable, reasonable suspicion, the 

unreasonable extension of a motor vehicle stop to conduct a canine sniff 

constitutes an unreasonable seizure. Id. at 1614-15 (holding that the time of the 

motor vehicle stop must be the time reasonable to complete "tasks tied to the 
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traffic infraction."). The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted this federal 

standard in Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 533-34.

The Dunbar Court held "an officer does not need reasonable suspicion 

independent from the justification for a traffic stop . . . to conduct a canine 

sniff[,]" but reasonable suspicion is required if the canine sniff administration 

would "prolong[] a traffic stop beyond the time required to complete the stop's 

mission." Id. at 550. The articulable, reasonable suspicion must be independent 

from the underlying motor vehicle stop to be able to continue detention beyond 

the stop's mission to administer a canine sniff. Id. at 536; see also State v. 

Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 554-55 (2019) (finding the officer had reasonable 

suspicion to justify the delay based upon the defendant's nervous behavior, 

conflicting explanations of his itinerary, a tip from ATF that someone fitting 

defendant's description would be transporting controlled dangerous substances, 

large bags in the cargo hold, the overwhelming odor of air freshener, and the 

defendant's prior record of narcotics arrests).

A motor vehicle stop can become an investigatory Terry1stop if 

circumstances give rise to an articulable, reasonable suspicion. See Nelson, 237 

N.J. at 552. However, to conduct an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle, there 

1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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must be some objective manifestation the suspect was, or is, involved in criminal 

activity. State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997). Independent, articulable, and

reasonable suspicion is necessary because the law "discourage[s] the police from 

turning a routine traffic stop into a 'fishing expedition for criminal activity 

unrelated to the stop.'" Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Co., 351 N.J. Super. 577, 614 

(App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted).

Stroup had articulable, reasonable suspicion for stopping defendants;

namely, he knew the driver had a suspended license based on an inquiry he 

conducted in the recent past. However, there was no articulable, reasonable 

suspicion to conduct the canine sniff because there was no nexus between the 

motor vehicle violation and drug activity, or any circumstances evidencing 

possible drug use, or the presence of drugs. The canine unit's arrival on scene 

the prolonged, delayed, and ultimately interrupted the mission of the motor 

vehicle stop because Stroup ceased writing the summons, exited his vehicle, and 

aided the administration of the canine sniff. The judge's findings in this regard 

were not an abuse of discretion.

B.

Unlawfully obtained evidence is admissible if the State can clearly and 

convincingly show the evidence would have been lawfully discovered 
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independently of the unlawful means. State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 552 

(2015). The State must prove

(1) proper, normal and specific investigatory 

procedures would have been pursued in order to 

complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of 

the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of 

the procedures would have inevitably resulted in the 

discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the 

evidence through the use of such procedures would 

have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of 

such evidence by unlawful means.

[State v. Sugar (III), 108 N.J. 151, 156-57 (1987) 

(quoting State v. Sugar (II), 100 N.J. 214, 235 (1985)).]

To determine whether evidence from an illegal search warrants 

suppression, courts focus on whether "the connection between the lawless 

conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has 'become 

so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 487 

(quoting Nardone v. U.S., 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). The United States 

Supreme Court identified three factors courts should consider in that 

determination: (1) the temporal proximity between the illegal conduct and the 

challenged evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the 

flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct. Brown v. Ill., 422 U.S. 590, 

603-04 (1975); see also State v. Lee, 190 N.J. 270, 278 (2007).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court held, if an officer's initial inquiries reveal 

the driver of a car does not have a valid license, an officer is justified in detaining 

the driver for a period to issue the summons and has an objective reasonable 

basis to detain the car and its occupants to assure the car is driven only by a 

properly licensed driver. State v. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623 (App. Div. 

2000). Additionally, in instances of driving with a suspended license, "arresting 

the driver is consistent with an officer's duty to make certain that the offender 

cannot continue to drive. Even if other licensed drivers are present, the severity 

of the penalties imposed . . . would ordinarily justify the arrest of a violator[,]" 

so long as such arrest would not violate the fundamental constitutional rights 

guaranteed to all citizens. State v. Piercer, 136 N.J. 184, 207 (1984).

Ordering a person out of a car during a traffic stop constitutes a seizure. 

State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 498 (1986). A court must balance the driver's 

interest in privacy against the State's interest in protecting its police officers. 

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). The State's interest in protecting 

the safety of its officers far outweighs the driver's interests. Id. at 111. This 

applies to passengers as well. State v. Conquest, 243 N.J. Super. 528 (1990). 

In State v. Smith, the Court held, in some circumstances, with less than 

reasonable suspicion, police may order passengers out of a lawfully stopped 
11 A-5292-18T1

vehicle, if they believe the passengers are engaged in criminal activity and are 

armed and dangerous. 134 N.J. 599, 617 (1994).

Here, police had articulable, reasonable suspicion Lowers' license was 

suspended. However, the record lacks any evidence that Stroup intended to do 

anything other than issue Lowers a motor vehicle summons. Indeed, the State 

offered no testimony from Stroup of the steps he intended to take to assure 

Lowers did not drive the car away from the scene after receiving the motor 

vehicle violation. No evidence exists that Stroup intended to arrest Lowers for 

the motor vehicle violation, or either Lowers or Kent for criminal conduct. 

Defendants were removed solely because of the canine sniff, which was 

unsupported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.

Moreover, we disagree with the State's argument that it was unable to 

prove inevitable discovery because the motion judge restricted it from making 

the argument. As we noted, the State raised the inevitable discovery argument 

in summation. However, the judge properly found the argument did not apply 

because the State failed to adduce the necessary testimony to support it. For 

these reasons, the motion judge correctly concluded the weapon and narcotics 

were not inevitably discoverable.
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The remainder of the State's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.