J-S12034-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DAVID MARKS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 172 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0903681-1995

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JUNE 24, 2022

Appellant, David Marks, appeals from the Order entered on December 

15, 2020, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-

46. We affirm. 

On March 19, 1996, the trial court convicted Appellant at a bench trial 

of Third-Degree Murder and Possession of an Instrument of Crime, based on 

proof that Appellant beat his friend to death with a hammer. The court 

sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.1In a published 

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1 Before the instant murder conviction, Appellant pleaded guilty to two 

murders in New York. Commonwealth v. Marks, 704 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Pa. 

Super. 1997). The court, therefore, sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a), which mandates the sentence for “any 

person convicted of murder of the third degree in this Commonwealth who 

has previously been convicted at any time of murder . . . in any other 

jurisdiction[.]” 
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Opinion, this Court affirmed Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence, and, on March 

31, 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal.

Commonwealth v. Marks, 704 A.2d 1095 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied,

772 A.2d 1056 (Pa. 1998). 

On January 30, 2019, Appellant pro se filed a Motion for DNA Testing, 

which the court construed as Appellant’s second PCRA petition. By order dated 

February 7, 2019, the PCRA court appointed counsel. Despite appointment of 

counsel, Appellant pro se filed amended Petitions on April 12, 2019, and May 

29, 2019. On September 14, 2020, counsel filed a Petition to Withdraw, which 

the PCRA court granted. 

The PCRA court assigned new counsel who, on December 5, 2020, filed 

a Turner/Finley2 “no merit” letter and accompanying Petition to Withdraw.

Finding that counsel satisfied the dictates of Turner/Finley, the PCRA court 

granted counsel’s request to withdraw and dismissed Appellant’s Petition as 

meritless. 

Appellant pro se timely filed a Notice of Appeal and both he and the trial 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did PCRA counsel err when stating petition was untimely 

without merit and impossible for present counsel to file 

amendment petition.

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2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 
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2. Did the PCRA Court err in concluding that order was dismissed 

without merit.

Appellant’s Br. at 2. 

Unfortunately, deficiencies in Appellant’s pro se brief preclude our 

review. An appellate brief must conform in all material respects to the briefing 

requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (requiring conformity with Rules of Appellate Procedure). 

Where briefing defects inhibit our review, we may dismiss the appeal. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

Additionally, “it is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are 

sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with 

pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citation to legal 

authorities.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (internal citation omitted). We “will not act as counsel and will not 

develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Id. Where briefing defects 

“impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss 

the appeal entirely or find certain issue to be waived.” Id.

Finally, while a pro se litigant is granted the same rights, privileges, and 

considerations as those accorded an appellant represented by counsel, pro se

status does not confer any advantage upon a party. Commonwealth v. 

Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014). Thus, “[a]lthough the courts may 

liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant . . . a court cannot be 

expected to become a litigant’s counsel or find more in a written pro se

submission than is fairly conveyed in the pleading.” Id.
J-S12034-22

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Appellant’s brief lacks any “separately and distinctly entitled” statement 

of the case, summary of argument, argument, or conclusion sections, and 

does not include a copy of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement or the PCRA 

court’s underlying order, all of which is required by Pa.R.A.P. 2111.

Additionally, in his “Statement of Scope and Standard of Review,” Appellant

fails to accurately set forth this Court’s scope and standard of review. 

Appellant’s Br. at 1-2. 

Included with his Statement of Questions, Appellant presents an 

underdeveloped argument confined to his assertion of PCRA counsel 

ineffectiveness.3 Id. at 2-5. Appellant seems to be arguing that PCRA counsel 

was ineffective for not filing (1) an amended PCRA petition or motion for DNA 

testing, and (2) an appeal on Appellant’s behalf. See id. at 4-5. Appellant 

fails, however, to analyze these claims with citation to the record or relevant

case law and provides no analysis under the well-established test applicable 

to review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

4 See Commonwealth 

v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 780 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (“To 

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3 Appellant makes no argument in support of his second issue, that the court 

“err[ed] in concluding that order was dismissed without merit.” Appellant’s Br. 

at 2. As a result, this issue is waived. See Hardy, 918 A.2d at 771. 

4 Appellant cites to one case, Commonwealth v. Cooley, 444 A.2d 711 (Pa. 

Super. 1982), in support of his ineffectiveness claims. In Cooley, the 

appellant’s counsel refused to file a direct appeal on his behalf and failed to 

seek to withdraw representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967). Id. at 712. By contrast, in the instant case, Appellant’s counsel 

properly filed a Turner/Finley “no merit” letter with the PCRA court, 

accompanied by a Petition to Withdraw, which the court granted. Cooley is, 

therefore, not relevant to the instant appeal. 
J-S12034-22

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prevail on an [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim, a PCRA petitioner must 

plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the underlying 

legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for acting 

or failing to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered resulting prejudice.”); 

Commonwealth v. Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 2007) (reiterating 

that appellants continue to bear the burden of pleading and proving each of 

the ineffective assistance of counsel elements on appeal to this Court).

Appellant has, thus, failed to provide this Court with the factual and legal 

framework from which to analyze his claims.

Significant defects in Appellant’s brief preclude our review. As a result,

Appellant waived the issues raised in this appeal and we affirm the PCRA 

court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/24/2022