alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**19 CA 15-00751**  PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

NICHOLAS BOWMAN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V ORDER
JEANETTE E. ZUMPANO, JOHN S. ZUMPANO, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

ATHARI & ASSOCIATES, LLC, NEW HARTFORD (MO ATHARI OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
FELDMAN KIEFFER, LLP, BUFFALO (ALAN J. BEDENKO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (Patrick F. MacRae, J.), entered April 5, 2015. The order, inter alia, granted the motion of defendants Jeanette E. Zumpano and John S. Zumpano for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint against them.
Now, upon reading and filing the stipulation of discontinuance signed by the attorneys for the parties on January 13, 2016,
It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed without costs upon stipulation.

Entered: February 11, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
#### ROBERT SCHENFELE v. WILLIAM KULICK.

October 15, 1985.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Hobart GARDNER, Jr. v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 2, 1973.

Hobart Gardner, Jr., pro se.

Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., Mary Ann Delaney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

Memorandum Opinion of the Court by

Commissioner GARDNER,

Affirming.*

*

Opinion ordered not to be published.
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<PAGE>
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<NAME>        KARA INTERNATIONAL, INC.        
       
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#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JORGE RODRIGUEZ.

September 23, 1985.

Petition for certification denied.
II 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1856 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to make technical corrections to 

the new border tunnels and passages offense. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 23, 2007 

Mrs. FEINSTEIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice, 

considered, read the third time, and passed 

A BILL 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to make technical 

corrections to the new border tunnels and passages offense. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. OFFENSE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 27 of title 18, United 

5 States Code, is amended by redesignating section 554 

6 added by section 551(a) of the Department of Homeland 

7 Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109–295; 

8 120 Stat. 1389) (relating to border tunnels and passages) 

9 as section 555. 


cprice-sewell on PRODPC60 with BILLS
2 

•S 1856 IS

1 (b) TABLE OF SECTIONS.—The table of sections for 

2 chapter 27 of title 18, United States Code, is amended 

3 by striking the item relating to section 554, ‘‘Border tun4 nels and passages’’, and inserting the following: 

‘‘555. Border tunnels and passages.’’. 

5 SEC. 2. CRIMINAL FORFEITURE. 

6 Section 982(a)(6)of title 18, United States Code, is 

7 amended by striking ‘‘554’’ and inserting ‘‘555’’. 

8 SEC. 3. DIRECTIVE TO THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 

9 COMMISSION. 

10 Section 551(d) of the Department of Homeland Secu11 rity Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109–295; 120 

12 Stat. 1390) is amended in paragraphs (1) and (2)(A) by 

13 striking ‘‘554’’ and inserting ‘‘555’’. 

Æ 


cprice-sewell on PRODPC60 with BILLS
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.2


                        Consent of Independent Auditors


We consent to reference to our firm under the caption "Experts" in the
Registration Statement Form S-3 and related Prospectus of Triad Hospitals Inc.
for the registration of 340,000 shares of common stock reserved for issuance
upon the exercise of options, and to the incorporation by reference therein of
our report dated February 26, 1999, with respect to the combined balance sheet
of the net assets and operations to be contributed to Triad Hospitals, Inc. as
of December 31, 1998 and the related combined statements of operations, equity
and cash flows for each of the two years in the period ended December 31, 1998,
included in its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1999
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.



                                               /s/ Ernst & Young LLP


Nashville, Tennessee
August 4, 2000
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<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF HOLLYWOOD CASINO SHREVEPORT AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001096352
<NAME> HOLLYWOOD CASINO SHREVEPORT
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                            <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  3-MOS                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1999             DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                            APR-01-1999             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                              JUN-30-1999             JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                            502                     502
<SECURITIES>                                        0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       0                       0
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                         0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  502                     502
<PP&E>                                          5,013                   5,013
<DEPRECIATION>                                      0                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  5,515                   5,515
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             581                     581
<BONDS>                                             0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                         0                       0
<COMMON>                                            0                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                      4,934                   4,934
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    5,515                   5,515
<SALES>                                             0                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    0                       0
<CGS>                                               0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       0                       0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   22                      76
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (15)                    (45)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (7)                    (31)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                (7)                    (31)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0                       0
<CHANGES>                                           0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                       (7)                    (31)
<EPS-BASIC>                                         0                       0
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</TABLE>
#### DARRAH FOOD SERVICES, INC. v. LAMBERTVILLE HOUSE, INC.

October 3, 1985.

Petition for certification denied. (See 202 *N.J. Super.*447)
#### Henry ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 46685.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 20, 1973.

Rehearing Denied July 11, 1973.

Ben Grant, Marshall, for appellant.

Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., and Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

*87OPINION

DOUGLAS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of driving a motor vehicle on a public highway while intoxicated. The jury assessed punishment at $50.00 and three days in jail, and then recommended probation of both the fine and the confinement. The court probated his punishment for six months under the provisions of Article 42.13, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.

The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged.

Appellant’s sole contention is that he was denied his right to counsel in violation of Article 1, Section 10, Vernon’s Ann.St., of the Constitution of the State of Texas and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The record before this Court reflects that appellant was arrested in the early morning of June 3, 1972; that before being taken to the Harrison County jail he requested his wife, Linda, to call his attorney. His attorney called the jail and asked the jailer if he could see his client but was advised that he would not be able to see him until after eight o’clock that morning because it was jail policy not to allow visitors during the early hours in the morning. Meanwhile, the arresting officer had requested that the appellant submit to a breathalyzer test. Appellant refused. Appellant testified that had his attorney been present and advised him to take the breathalyzer test he would have done so. Appellant’s attorney testified that he did not attempt to call the sheriff or his chief deputy. No statement was taken from appellant.

Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Texas guarantees to an accused the right to counsel, and it Is an offense under Article 1176, Vernon’s Ann.P. C., for an officer to prevent an accused from consulting with his counsel. This right should not be denied. An attorney representing a client should not be classed as a visitor or denied access to his client.

We hold that under the circumstances of this case the denial of counsel at one time during the middle of the night where one has been charged with an offense involving drunkenness and no confession or other incriminating evidence was obtained does not necessitate a reversal.

The judgment in the instant case recites that appellant pled guilty and waived his right to a trial by jury. The record showed that appellant pled not guilty as well as requested and received a trial by jury. The judgment is reformed to recite that appellant pled not guilty and that he was convicted by a jury.

No reversible error being shown, the judgment, as reformed, is affirmed.
Exhibit 12.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED  PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report of Aurelia Energy N.V. on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Kees Voormolen, Vice President, Finance & Administration of Bluewater Energy Services B.V., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

|Dated: April 15, 2003 |  | By: | /s/KEES VOORMOLENKees Voormolen Vice President, Finance & Administration
Bluewater Energy Services B.V.
|--------------------- |  | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63
of title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---

QuickLinks
#### Willie James MASON, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 44496.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 23, 1971.

*16John F. Evans, Breckenridge, for appellant.

T. J. Rodgers, Dist. Atty., Graham, and Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

MORRISON, Judge.

Appellant was originally convicted of assault with intent to murder; a probated sentence of eight (8) years imprisonment was assessed by the trial court. This is an appeal from the order revoking appellant’s probation.

In his first three grounds of error appellant’s able counsel urges this court to reject the well-established rule recently restated by this court

> “ * * * that probation may be revoked upon a finding by the court that the terms of probation have been violated and no necessity exists for there first to be a trial and a valid conviction for the offense which is the basis of the revocation [cases cited omitted].” Hall v. State, 452 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).

This we decline to do. See Balli v. State, 460 S.W.2d 424 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) (concurring opinion); Rosaschi v. State, 471 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Amaya v. Beto, 424 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.1970).

Appellant’s last ground of error alleges that the trial judge abused his discretion in revoking appellant’s probation because the evidence was not sufficient to justify revocation. The record reveals that included in the terms of appellant’s probation was the following condition:

> “ * * * that said defendant, during the term of his probation, shall:

> “(1) Commit no offense against the laws of this state or any other state of the United States.”

The motion to revoke reads in part as follows:

> “That thereafter when the officer located the said defendant, in Breckenridge, Texas, and attempted to arrest him, he put up a fight with the officers, assaulting the Chief of Police, Bob Whitely (sic) by biting him on the arm hear (sic) the shoulder such assault being aggravated in that it was committed upon a police officer while in the course of his official duties.”

Officer Freeman testified that while he was in company with Chief Whitley, and armed with an arrest warrant for appellant’s arrest, he encountered the appellant. Testimony revealed that subsequent to Freeman’s asking the Chief to help in making the arrest, the appellant scuffled with the two officers and bit the Chief twice before he was subdued.

Chief Whitley testified that Freeman asked for his aid and that he was bitten by the appellant. This constituted an aggravated assault, Young v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 159, 338 S.W.2d 720 (1960), in violation of condition one (1) of appellant’s probation. A sufficient ground for revocation of appellant’s probation was shown. Williams v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 575, 342 S.W.2d 763 (1961).

Appellant’s fourth ground of error is overruled.

Finding no abuse of discretion, the judgment is affirmed.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 1**  **4 -**  **6 198** 

EDWARD LEE BOONE , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. HAROLD W. CLARKE , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Ea stern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. Robert E. Payne , Senior District Judge. ( 3 :1 3

- cv - 0 0 510

- REP )

Submitted : April 17, 2014 Decided: April 22, 2014

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN , Circuit Judges.

Dismiss ed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Edward Lee Boone , Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Edward Lee Boone seeks to appeal the district court ’ s order denying as second or successive his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The or der is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (A) (2012) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “ a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. ” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatabl e, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Boone has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certifica te of appealability , deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately3 presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisio nal process.
DISMISSE D
| Skip to Content*Release Date: December 6, 2007*Release dates |  Coded tables |  Historical dataCurrent release |  Screen reader |  PDF (450 KB)**F.7 Distribution of National Income1** |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Exhibit 31                  Rule 13a-14(d) Certification

                                  CERTIFICATION

     I, Thomas G. Lehmann, a First Vice President of Washington Mutual
Mortgage Securities Corp., certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all reports on Form
8-K  containing  distribution  or servicing  reports filed in respect of periods
included  in the year  covered  by this  annual  report,  of  WASHINGTON  MUTUAL
MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP. MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2002-AR1;

     2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as a
whole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state
a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading as of the
last day of the period covered by this annual report;

     3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing information
required to be provided to the trustee by the servicer under the pooling and
servicing, or similar, agreement, for inclusion in these reports is included in
these reports;

     4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicer
under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement and based upon my
knowledge and the annual compliance review required under that agreement, and
except as disclosed in the reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations
under that agreement; and

     5. The reports disclose all significant deficiencies relating to the
servicer's compliance with the minimum servicing standards based upon the report
provided by an independent public accountant, after conducting a review in
compliance with the Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers or
similar procedure, as set forth in the pooling and servicing, or similar,
agreement, that is included in these reports.

     In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
provided to me by the following unaffiliated third parties acting as servicers
and sub-servicers:


Everhome Mortgage Company,  Associated  Mortgage,  Inc, ABN-AMRO Mortgage Group,
Aurora Loan Services,  Branch Banking & Trust Co, Cendant  Mortgage Corp,  Chase
Mortgage Services,  Inc, Columbia National,  Countrywide Home Loans, J.P. Morgan
Chase & Company, Fir


Dated: March 29, 2005
                                     /s/ Thomas G. Lehmann
                                     ----------------------------------------
                                     Thomas G. Lehmann,
                                     First Vice President
EXHIBIT 17.1



October 13, 2005



U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission

450 5th Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20549



Ladies and
Gentlemen:



On October 10, 2005, the undersigned received a draft copy of
Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2005, to be filed by Nano Chemical Systems Holdings, Inc. (the Company) (Commission File No. 000-26067) wherein the Company disclosed under Part II, Item 8.B, Other
Information, the resignation of the undersigned as the Companys Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Director. After reviewing the draft of the Companys Form 10-KSB, I have no disagreements with the statements made therein.



|                   
|-------------------
|Yours truly,       
|                   
|/s/ Katrina Cleburn
|Katrina Cleburn
EXHIBIT 13.2



906 Certification



Securities and Exchange Commission

100 F Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20549



Ladies and Gentlemen:



The certification set forth below is being
submitted in connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2015 (the “Report”) for
the purpose of complying with the Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
Act”) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.



Benjamin Tseng, the Chief Financial Officer
of AU Optronics Corp., certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:



1. the Report fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and



2. the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of AU Optronics Corp.



Date: March 21, 2016



|By: | /s/ Benjamin Tseng
|--- | ------------------
|    | Name:             
|    | Title:            



The foregoingcertificationis not deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act and is not deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing
under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act.