UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ DEWAYNE ANTOINE ANDERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. NAOMI ARNOLD; TRINIDAD BALDERAS, Defendants - Appellees. No. 17-3186 (D.C. No. 6:16-CV -01376-JTM-GEB) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , BALDOCK , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Dewayne Anderson appeals the district co urt’s dismissal of his action against Wichita police officers Naomi Arnold and Trin idad Balderas. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. I Anderson alleges that Arnold used ex cessive force agai nst him following a traffic accident. When Arnold arrived on th e scene, she asked fo r Anderson’s license

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 30, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 and insurance information. But when Anderson reach ed for his wallet, Arnold brandished a taser and told him to remove his hand from his pocket. Anderson thought the taser was a gun a nd said, “Don’t shoot.” Ar nold threatened to tase Anderson unless he turned around to face her. She then placed her hand on her gun. After another officer arri ved on scene, Anderson was handcuffed and placed in a police car, where he remain ed for approximately thirty minutes before he was escorted to an ambulance. Anderson claims that his treatment constituted unnecessary use of force and that he wa s denied speedy access to medical treatment for the injuries he incu rred in the car accident. II “We review de novo the district cour t’s granting of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Proce dure 12(b)(6).” Slater v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 719 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 2013). To surviv e a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alle ged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although “a complaint attack ed by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations , a plaintiff’s obliga tion to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elem ents of a cause of action w ill not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quo tations, citation, a nd brackets omitted). We hold that the district court corr ectly dismissed Anderson’s complaint. Claims of excessive force are analyzed under the objective reas onableness standard3 of the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 39 5 (1989). Anderson does not claim that Arnold had any physi cal contact with him. Although Arnold brandished a taser, she did not tase Ande rson. Further, the neck injuries that Anderson endured were caused by the traffic accident, not a police officer. These facts do not suffice to state a claim of excessive force, as they do not indicate that Anderson suffered an “actual in jury that is not de mini mis, be it physical or emotional.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1129 (10th Cir. 2007). III AFFIRMED

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Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge