### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE Se pte m be r 15, 200 9 S es sio n

H.P. LARGE, a nd TE RRANCE R. C RAIG, d/ b/ a G REENFI ELD LAND AN D C ATT LE C OMP AN Y, v. GREEN E C OUN TY, TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Gr eene C ounty No. 05CV754 Hon. Thomas J. Wr ight, Jud ge

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No. E2008-02764-COA- R3-CV- F ILED DECEMBE R 28, 2009

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Pla int if fs a lle g e d th a t de fe nd ant h a d c on str uc te d a br idg e ov e r L ic k Cr e e k which wa s a dja c e nt t o their prope rty , and the bridge had caused their proper ty to repe atedly flood. They further alleg ed that they wer e entitled to re cover

damag es under t h e theory that the County

maintained a te mporary

n u i s an ce wh i ch d am age d t h ei r p r o p e rt y

. De fe n d an tfi l eda M o t i o nfo r j u d gm en to nt h e p l ea d i n gs which cha

rac terized plaintiffs’ cause of action as a n inverse c ondemnation ac tion. Affidavits and other doc uments were f

i l ed in the rec ord and the Trial Court ag ree d with the defe ndant that plaintiffs’ ac tion was based on inve rse c ondemnation and the statute had run on that action. The Trial Judge a lso ruled that the statute had run on the nuisance claim. On appe al, we a ffirm the Tr ial Judg e ’s ho ldi ngthat pl a int if fs ’ a c tio n w a s a

nu isa nc e ty pe takin g and

wa s g ov e rn e d b y

the inv e rs e condemnation statute, a

nd we ag ree that the re cord de monstrates that the statute of limit ations had

ru n o n p la int if

fs ’ c la ims

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ff

ir me d.

H ER S CHEL P ICK EN S F R ANKS , P.J., delivere d the opi nion of the Court, in which D. M I CHAEL S W I NEY , J., joined. Judge C H A RL ES D. S US ANO , J R ., dissented and f iled an opinion.

Ja me s D . Cu lp, Jo hn so n Ci ty, Te nn e sse e , f or app e lla nts

. Roger A. W oolsey, Gre eneville, Te nnessee , for a ppellee.

OP IN ION2 Plaintiffs/appellants are landowner s in Gree ne County Tenne ssee. The p r operties a re adjac ent to L ick Cree k, and they eng ag e in fa

rming operations on their land.

Pla i ntiffs filed suit ag ainst Gree ne County , Tenne ssee, a lleg ing that defe cts in a b r i d g e c o n s t r

u c t e d an d o w n e d b y G r e e n e C o u n t y c a

u s e d L i c k C r e e k t o f l o o d t h e i r p r o p e rt y. Pla int if fs a lle g e d th a t th e br idg e a t is su e wa s bu ilt to re pla c e an old e r br idg e and that it wa s n ot b uil t

a c c or din g to d e sig n plans and sp e c if ic a tio ns that ha d b e e n a

pp ro ve d b y

the De pa rtme nt o f t

he Ar my Corps of Eng ineer s. They further alleg ed that these defe cts cause d the bridg e to ac t as a dam which

re su lte d in

fl oo din g of

L ic k C reek ov er plai nti ff s’ fa m la nd fr om t ime to t ime , w hic h r e su lte d in damag e to their prope rty and ca used the lands to be de valu ed

. The c omplaint chara cter ized the flooding cause d by

the def ects in the bridg e as a “continuing ” nuisanc e. Plaintiffs asked that the bridg e be decla

red a nuisance and that Gre ene County be orde red to take action to abate the nuisanc e. Al te rn a tiv e ly , p la int if

fs a sk e d f or mon e tary c omp e ns a tio n for the de va luatio n o f t he ir land and the ir loss of annual income from the land. The complaint did not pr ovide the date of the construc tion of the bridg e nor doe s it provide the dates of the alleg ed flooding of plaintiffs’ land. The pa rties ag ree d at the hea ring on the motion to dis miss that the bridge construction wa s completed in 1997.

Gre ene County

answe red the complaint and ra ised the af firmat i ve def

ense that the action wa s barr ed by the applicable one y ear statute of limitations set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 16-124 and § 29- 30-305.

The de fenda

nt then fi l ed a m o tion for judg ment on the pleading s, along with the aff idavit s o f M r. L arg e and Mr . Craig . L arg e’s a ffidavit identifies his par cel of land at issue and states that his pr operty has been flooded on sever al occa sions pe r y ear since the completion of the b ri d ge an d t h at t h e fl o o d i n g h as “gr ea t l y i n t er fe re d

wi t h [ h i s ] ab i l i t y

t o u t i l i z e [ h i s ] p ro p er t y ”. L ar ge conclude d in the aff

idavit that “the flooding of L i ck Creek onto [his] proper ty is now a re curr ing pr ob le m, i nv olv ingse ve ra l su c h e pis od e s in a ty pic a l y e ar. Ea c h fl oo din g e pis od e c on sti tut e s a fr e sh int e rf e re nc e wi th t

he us e of [his ] land , a

nd , in [his ] opi nio n a new nu isa nc e .” A co py of a

le tte r t o M r. L ar ge f

ro m Az i m u t h E n gi n ee ri n g, I n c. , d at ed J u n e 2 1
, 2 0 0 0
, wa s at t ac h ed t o t h e a ff i d av i t

. L ar ge

asser ted that “[i] t is plain from the text of that letter that the bridg e wa s not constructed a s specifie d in the pe rm it, and that it se rv e s as an imp e dim e nt to the fl owof wate r o n L ic k Cr e e k. ” Th e a ff ida vit is dated Jul y

22, 2004 and did not provide the date of construction of the bridg e or a ny dates of the al l ege d fl o o d i n g.
Craig ’s af

fi d av i t simi larly

contains a de scription of his proper ty at issue and state s that his property

has flooded se vera l times per y ear s since construction of the bridg e, and attac hed to his affidavit ar e two letters from the Tennessee Depa rtment of Tra

nsportation, dated Ma

rch 10, 20 04 and May

20 , 2 00 3, wh ic h s ta te that th e br idg e wa s n ot b uil t a s d e sig ne d. Th e Cr a ig a ff ida vit is also dated J uly 22, 2004. The mot ion for judgment on the plea dings f iled by Gre en County

states t h at with state assistance , the County undertook to re place the L ink Creek br idge in 1996 and the bridg e wa s completed in 1997, and on N ovember 7, 1997, the Tenne s see D epar tment of Transpor tation, cer tified that the bridge was constructed ac cordingto project plans. F urther, that an3

ins pe c tio n f

ound tha t the br idg e su

bs tanti a lly

c omp lie d w iththe pr oje c t pl ans and sp e c if ic a tio ns

. Th e Cou nty a sse rt e d that wh ile pla int if fs c ha ra c te ri zed the ir c a

us e of a c tio n a s a

nu isa nc e a c tio n, it was in fa ct an inver se conde mnation action, p u rs uant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 16-124, and that plaintiffs wer e time bar

red f rom bring ing the suit ei gh t y ea rs af ter the br idge was c ompleted. Fur ther, de fenda

nt argues that the Gove rnmental Tor t L iability Act (G TL A) provide s that any action br ou g ht a g a ins t a

g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty

mus t be c omm e nc e d w ith in t we lve mon ths a ft e r t

he c a us e arises. Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-20- 305.

A hea ring was he ld on the Motion on October 10, 2008 befor e the Trial Court. The parties a g ree d there wer e no fa cts in dispute for purpose s of the motion.

The Tr ial Court raised the issue of whether the m atter should be tr eate d as a motion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt rathe r tha

n a motio n for

jud g me nt o n th e ple a din g s a s p la int if fs ’ a ff ida vit s and seve ral doc uments attache d to the aff idavits and to defe ndant’s memora ndum in support of the motion were submitted for c onsideration b y t h e C o u rt . Whil e the wr itten judgment state s that defe ndant’s motion for judgme nt on the pleading s was sustained, the judg ment also states that “the

rec ord as a

whole, and statements of Counsel” we re r eviewe d by the Court.

The Tr ial Court observed that the bridg e wa s permane nt in nature and that flooding

cause d by the bridg e we re likew ise perma nent with reg ard to a

nuisance claim. The Court he ld that plaintiffs wer e subject to a three y ear statute of limit ations and that the bridg e wa s constructe d more tha n thr e e y e ars pr ior to the fi lin g of the su it. Al te rn a tiv e ly
, the Court sa id that a “mo re factua lly int e ns e ana ly si s” wou ld re ve a l th a t a takin g ha d o c c ur

re d b e c a us e pla int if

fs we re “ e ff

e c tiv e ly deprive d” of the use of their proper ty and that the statute of

limit ations for a

n inverse c ondemnation suit was one y ear , and that the suit would also be time bar red on that basis.

On a pp e a l, p la int if

fs ra ise tw o is su e s:

A. Whether the Tr ial Court was corr ect in f inding that plaintiffs’ ca

use of a ction was for adver se conde mnation?

B. Whether the Tr ial Court was corre ct i n finding that plaintiffs’ cause of a ction

w a s f o r p e r m an e n tn u i s an c e r a t h e r

t h ant e mp o r ar

y n u i s an c e ?

Th e Tr ia l Co ur

t c on sid e re d th e a ff

ida vit s a nd oth e r d oc ume nts in r e a c hin g its decisio n , an d in effe ct g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of

Gre ene County . When considering

a motion to dismiss broug ht pur suant to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 12.02(6), matter s outside the pleading s are not to be considere d. Trau-Med of A merica, I nc. v. A llstat e Ins. Co., 71 S.W .3d 691, 696 (Tenn. 2002). I f a tria l court does c onsider materials outside the pl eading s, then Rule 12.02 provides that the motion to dismiss “shall be treated as one for summary judgme nt and dis posed of as provided in Rule 56.” As the Trial Court c onsidered materia ls outside the pleading s, we hold that the Trial Court's Judgment wa s a summary judgme nt and we w ill review it on that basis.

Summary judgme nt is awarde d when the moving party can de monstrate that ther e ar e4

no g enuine issues of m ater ial fac t and that it is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law . Tenn R. Civ. P. 5 6. 04 ; By rd

v . H all

, 847 S.W .2d 208, 214 (Tenn. 1993)

. Our re view of a fac tual rec ord af

ter a trial court g rants summary judgme nt r equire s us to vie w the fa cts in the light most favor able to the nonmoving pa

rty

. By rd v . H all

. The plaintiffs, on a

ppeal, insist the ac t i o n i s founded in nuisanc e, and r ely on the holding of Kin d v . J

oh ns on City , 4 78 S. W. 2d 63 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 70 ), and a sse rt that th e statut e of li m i t at ions beg an to run a new a fter e ach f

looding incide nt. I n Kind J ohnson City

had made imp ro ve me nts to a

dr a ina g e sy ste m in

the vic ini ty

of pla int if fs ’ pr op e rt

y wh ic h ca

us e d th e ir pr op e rt y to flood from time to time. The Court of Appe als held that the wr ong ful int er fe renc e with the natura l drainag e of sur fac e water that cause d injury to an adjoining landowner ’s prope rty constituted

an ac tionable nuisance
, Kind a t 65 ; and that a mun ic ipa lity

is l ia ble if it c re a te s a

nu isa nc e e ve n in pursuing a public wor

k projec t. Be cause the cour t f ound that the nuisance cre ated a nd maintained by J ohnson City

was tempora

ry and continuous in cha

rac ter it held that “the very continuation of the n u i s an ce i s a newoffe nse entitling c omplainants' to rec over da mag es ac cruingwithin the statutory period ne x t pr ece ding the suit, a lthough more than the statutory period has ela psed since the cr eation of the nuisance .” Kind at 66.

The Tr ial Court held that as the re place ment bridg e at issue wa s permane nt in nature

as wa s the flooding cause d by the bridg e, and that plaintif fs ’ n u i s an ce c laims were based on a perma nent nuisance which had a three y ear statute of limit ation. There fore the statute of limitations fo r p er m an en t nuisance would bar the plaintiffs from g oing f orwa rd with this case. The Court

a lte r n a t i v e l y h e l d t h a t t h e r e w a s a t a k i n g o f p l a i n t i f f s ’ p r o p e rt y an d t h a t t h e c a s e w a s f or inv e rs e condemnation, which had a one y ear statute of limitations and which had c lear ly run by the time the

c a se wa s f

ile d. Th e Court

did no t add re ss Gr e e ne County ’s c on te nti on that any c la ims so un din g in nuisance would have to be broug ht pur suant to the Gover nmental Tort L iability

Act, which pr ovides for a one y ear statute of limitation.

On a pp e a l, p la int if

fs c on te nd that the Tr ia l Court e rr e d in c ha ra c te ri zingthe ir

c la im

a g a ins t G re e ne County

a s a c la im f or in vers e con de mnatio n. Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court , in E d w a rd s v

. H a l l s d a l e

- P o w e l l

U t i l i t yD i s t

. K n oxC o u nty , 115 S.W .3d 461 (Tenn. 2003) explained the c on c e pts of

e min e nt d oma in a

nd inv e rs e c on de mnatio n in de ta il a s f

oll ow s:

The Te nnessee Constit ution sta t es that “no man' s particular service s shall be de m an d e d
, o r p r o p e rt y t a k e n , o r a p p l i e d t o p u

b l i c u s e , w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n tof his

re pr e se ntativ e s, or

wi tho ut j us t c omp e ns a tio n b e ingma de the re fo r. ” Te nn . C o ns t. a rt

. I , § 21. This constituti onal provisi on rec og nizes the gover nmental rig ht of eminent do ma in. Th e g ov e rnment is p ro hib ite d, ho we ve r, fr om t a kin g pr op e rt y fo r p ri vate purposes and must pay just compensation when property is taken for public use. See Jack son v. Me tro. Knoxville Airport Auth., 922 S.W .2d 860, 861 (Tenn.1996) . The Tenne ssee Ge neral Assembly has implemented this provision by its passag e of eminent domain and inver se conde mnation statutes. See Tenn .Code Ann. §§ 29- 16- 101 to 29-16-127 (2000 & Supp.2002); 29-17-101 to 29-17-1202 ( 2000).5 “Inverse condemnation” is the popular descr iption for a cause of action broug ht by

a pr op e rt y ow ne r to re c ov e r the va lue of re a l pr op e rt y that ha s b e e n take n f

or pu bli c

u s e by a gov ern m en t al d ef en d an tev en th o u gh n o fo rm al co n d em n at i o np ro ce ed i n gs under the g overnme nt's pow er of eminent domain have been instituted. See J ohnson v. City of Greene ville, 222 Tenn. 260, 435 S.W. 2 d 476, 478 (1968). A “ taking ” of

rea l property

occur s when a

g overnme ntal defe ndant wit h t he powe r of e minent domain perf

orms an author ized action that “destroy s, interrupts, or interf ere s w ith the

common and necessar

y use of r eal pr operty

of anothe r.” Pleasant View Util. Dist. v. Vradenburg, 54 5 S. W.2 d 7 33 73 5 ( Te nn .1 97 7)

. No t e ve ry de str uc tio n o r i nju

ry to pr op e rt y c a us e d by g ov e rnme nta l ac tio n, ho we ve r, c on sti tut e s a takin g un de r a

rt ic le I
, section 21 of the Te nnessee Constit ution. See J ackson, 922 S.W .2d at 862 (c iting Pr un e Y ar d S ho pp ing Ctr . v . R ob ins

, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.C t. 2035, 64 L .Ed.2 d 741 (1980)) . Tenne ssee c ourts have r ec og nized two classifications of taking s: phy sical occupation takings a

nd nuisance -ty

pe taking s. See id. at 862-63.

Phy sical occ upation taking s arise w hen a g overnme ntal defe ndant cau s es ei ther a direc t and continuing phy sical invasion of private prope rt y o r a destruction of a plaintiff' s proper

ty rig hts. See generally I

ll. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Moriarity, 135 Tenn. 44 6, 18 6 S. W. 1 05 3 ( 19 16 ); Ba rro n v . Ci ty of M e mp his

, 113 Tenn. 89, 80 S.W. 832 (1904). The c onstruction of a pe rmane nt improvement by a g overnme ntal defe ndant that diverts wat er from a stre am onto private pr operty and ca uses flooding is an example of a dire ct and c on t i n u i n g p h y sical invasion of re al prope rty

. See B arron, 80 S.W. a t 83 2- 33 ; see also Jac kson, 922 S.W

. 2 d at 8 6 2

. We have he ld that such dir e c t and ph y sic a l in va sio ns c on sti tut e a g ov e rnme nta l tak ing wh e n re a l pro pe rt y is

e ith e r a c tua lly

a pp ro pr ia te d o r t

he c omm on

and ne c e ssa ry us e of the p ro pe rt

y is rende red impossibl e or seriously interrupted See B arron, 80 S.W. a t 83 2- 33 ; se e als o Jack son, 922 S.W .2d at 862. Phy sical o cc u p ation taking s may also arise when a g overnme ntal defe ndant ca uses a de struction of a pla intiff's p roper ty rig hts. The destruction of the easement of acc ess t o and from a plaintiff' s home by the closing of a stree t is an example of

a destruc tion of a prope rty rig ht. See M

oriarity, 1 8 6 S. W.

a t 10 53 -5 4; see also Jac kson, 922 S.W .2d at 862. This ty pe of phy sical occ upation

c on sti tut e s a

takin g wh e n th e re is a

dim inutio n in the va lue of re a l pr op e rt y pe c uli a rl y aff ecte d and direc tly invaded that is not share d by the public at larg e. See M oriarity, 18 6 S. W. at 10 54 ; see also Jac kson, 922 S.W .2d at 862.

Tenne ssee courts also rec og nize nuisanc e-ty p e t aking s. See, e .g., Jack son, 922 S.W. 2d a t 86 2; Johnson, 4 3 5 S.W .2d at 480. Such a takingoccur s when the g overnme ntal defe ndant interfe res with a la ndowner ' s benef

icial use and enjoy

ment of the prope rty

. See J

ackson, 92 2 S. W.2 d at 86 2; Johnson, 435 S.W .2d at 480. For

e xamp le , th is C ourt

ha s h e ld t

hat a g ov e rnme nt' s exte ns ion of a ru nw ay that r e su lts in noise, vibration, and pollutants from airpla nes fly i n g at low altitudes to the detriment of near

by private pr operty

may be a taking. Jack

son, 922 S.W .2d at 861, 863-64. In Jack

son, we e stablished the standar d for determining whether a nuisanc e-6 ty pe takinghas occ urre d: the plaintiff must alleg e a dir ect a nd substantial interfer ence with the benef

icial use a

nd enjoy ment of the prope rty ; this i nterfe renc e must be

re pe a te d a

nd no t just oc c a sio na l; the int e rf e re nc e mus t pe c uli a

rl y a ff e c t th e pr op e rt

y in a manner

differ ent than the e ffe ct of the interfe renc e to the public at lar g e; and the interfe renc e must result in a loss of marke t value. Id. at 865.

Ed war ds at 464 - 465.

B a se d o n th e a

bo ve dis c us sio n, the pla int if fs ’ a lle g e d lo ss o f u se of pa rt of the ir proper ties due to the construc tion of the bridg e is classified a s a nuisance -ty pe takingas plaintiffs

a lle g e a dir e c t and

su bs tan ti al in te rf

e re nc e wi th t

he be ne fi c ia l us e and

e njo y me nt o f t he pr op e rt

y beca use of the f

looding. The flooding was a l l eg ed to be r epeated and not just occa sional, and the flooding peculiar ly

aff ecte d their prope rty

as they could not far

m or keep livestock on the par ts of the prope rty

that flooded and the flooding was alleg ed to ha ve resulted in a loss of ma rket va lue of their prope rty . Thus, plaintiffs’ complaint set forth a prima facie case for inver se conve rsion of the nuisa n ce-ty

pe. Jack son, 92 2 S. W.2 d at 86 5; se e als o Pe te rso n v . P utn am Cou nty , No. M2005- 02222-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL3007516 at * 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2006). We conclude the Trial Court did not err w hen it char acte rized the ca use of a ction as inverse condemnation.

Th e inv e r s e c o n d e mn a ti o ns tatute , T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d Se c ti o n2 9

- 1 6-124, require s landowner s to “ commence proce eding s within twe lve (12) months a fter the land has be en actua lly taken possession of a

nd the work of the proposed internal improveme nt beg un.” Under the statute, the trig g ering event for the running of the statute is the landowner ' s knowledg e of the entry onto the l an d o r t h e beg inning of the improvement a ffe cting the land and its use. STS/BAC Joint Venture v . City of Mt. Juliet
, No. M2003-00171-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 2752809 at * 8 - 9 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2004) . The a ffidavits of plaintiffs, w hich wer e sig ned in J uly 2004, stated the flooding had occ urre d “for sever al y ear s, since the completion of the

. . . bridg e” a nd it is undi sputed that the bridg e wa s completed in 1997. There fore , plaintiffs wer e on notice of the flooding sever al
y ear s prior to executing the af fidavits and the Complaint was not f iled until Oc tober 12, 2005. The Trial Court did not err w hen it found that the c laim for inver se con d em n at i o n was time bar red pursuant to the one y ear

statute of limitations.

Fur ther, plaintiffs contend on appea l that the Trial Court should have found that the all ege d common-law nuisanc e of f looding c aused by

the bridg e wa s a tempora ry and continuous nuisance rathe r than a

perma nent nuisance . The pe rmane nt nuisance is subject to the three y ear statute of limitations and would have beg un to run at the time of c ompletion of the bridg e, in 1997. Ru sse ll v . H

owa rd . On the other

hand, if the f

looding wa s found t o be a temporar y and continuing nuisance eac h incidence of flooding would be considere d a new offe nse and the statute of limitations would beg in to run anewat the time of e ach oc curr ence

. Kind v. Johnson City.

Gr e e ne County re sp on ds th at alt ho ugh pla int if fs fr a me d the ir c a

us e of a c tio n a s a temporar y nuisance case , the Tria l C ourt corr ectly char acte rized it as an inverse condemnation where the one y ear

statute of limitations i s applicable . Alternatively , Gre ene Coun t y co n t en ds that any7

claim for nuisa

nce, w hether

perma nent or tempora

ry , broug ht against it must be broug ht pursuant to the Gover

nmental Tort I mmunity

Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-20-2 0 4
, wh i ch has a statute of limit ations of one y ear . Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-305.

This Court rece ntly

considere d the issue of whe ther a plaintiff’s p ro p er cause of action wa s a cla im for inverse condemnation, rather tha n a temporar

y nuisance claim in Peterson v

. Pu tna m C ou nty No. M2005-02222-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL 3007516 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oc t. 19, 2006)

a s f oll ow s:

The fir st issue with respec t to the p l ai n t i ff s' common law nuisanc e cla im- i.e., whether the plaintiffs' proper cause of action was a claim for inverse c ondemnation,

rathe r t ha n a te mpo ra ry nu isa nc e c la im- ha s bee n ad dr e sse d b y the c ourt s o f t

his Sta te

on numerous occ asions. A nui sance has been define d as “any thing which annoy s or disturbs the fre e use of

one' s proper

ty , or which r ender s its ordinary use or phy sical
occupation uncomfortable.” Pate v. City of Martin, 614 S.W .2d 46, 47 (Tenn.1981)

. A tempora

ry nuisance i s o n e t h at “ca

n be cor rec ted by the expenditure of labor

or money .” Id. at 48. The determination t hat a “taking has occurre d [, as opposed to a nuisance ,] depe n d s o n the fa cts of ea ch ca se, spec ifically the nature , extent and duration of the intrusion. ” Burchfield v. State of Tenn essee, 774 S.W .2d 178, 183 (Tenn. Ct. App.1988). Wher e the a dverse eff ect amounts to a

“taking ” of pr operty

by the g overnme nt, the plaintiff' s proper reme dy is one for inver se conde mnation under the eminent domain statutes. See T. C.A . § 29 -1 6- 12 3, 12 4; se e Pl e as an t V ie w U til

. Dist. v. Vrandenburg, 54 5 S.W.2 d 733 (T e nn .1 97 7) ; Monday v . Knox County, 417 S.W. 2d 53 6 ( Tenn. 19 67 ); Smith v. Maury County, No. 01-A- 01-9804-CH-00207, 1999 WL 675135 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed September 1, 1999).

Peterson at * 9.

I n Peterson, this Court found that under the fac ts of the case a takinghad occ urre d and that plaintiff

s we re preclude d from re cover ing on a temporar y nuisance claim. I n the instant

case , we c onclude that plaintiffs state d a pr im a fa c ie case of inverse condemnation, thus, as in the holding in Peterson , th e pla int if fs wo uld be pr e c lud e d f

r o m p u r s uin g the ir

te mpo ra ry nu isa nc e c la im.

Since the fi nding that the cause of ac tion was for statutory inverse c ondemnation which pre cl u d ed plaintiffs from pursuinga ca use of a ction for nuisanc e, we will not consider whether the Trial Court wa s corr ect in finding a per manent nu i s an ce rathe r than a temporar

y nuisance

. We affir

m the J udg ment of the Tr ial court in finding that plaintiffs’ Complaint st ated

a ca use of action for statutory inverse c ondemnation and in its finding that that action was ba rre d by the statut e of

lim itatio ns . We do no t a g ree wi th th e Tr ia l Co ur t in its fi nd ingthat th e pla int if fs ’ stated a c ause of

action for

perman en t n uisance as they wer e pre cluded f

rom bring ing a

nuisance claim conc urre ntly with the inverse c ondemnation claim. This er ror wa s harmless as the Trial Court dismiss ed the nuisanc e cla im as well, based on the statute of limitations.8 For the fore g oi n g re as ons, we a ffirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and r emand, wi t h t h e c o s to f t h e ap p ea l as s es s edt o t h e p l ai n t i ff s , H. P

. L ar ge a n d

T erra n ce R

. C ra i g.

_________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.