alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

            In connection with the Annual Report of the registrant on Form 10-K
for the period ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned certifies
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


Date:  March 29, 2004                          By:      /s/ Donald A. Pitcher
                                                    ----------------------------
                                                    Donald A. Pitcher
                                                    EVP /Chief Financial Officer

            A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906,
or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Temecula Valley
Bancorp Inc. and will be retained by Temecula Valley Bancorp Inc. and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
cytori_exhibit901.htm




 


EXHIBIT 4.1


 


AMENDMENT TO WARRANT TO PURCHASE COMMON STOCK


 


This Amendment (“Amendment”), dated effective May 13, 2014 (the “Amendment Date”), amends the Warrant to Purchase Common Stock, dated May 14, 2009 (the “Warrant”), issued by Cytori Therapeutics, Inc., (the “Company”) to purchase ______ shares of the Company’s common stock, $0.001 par value per share. Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meaning given to them in the Warrant.







 


WHEREAS, Holder and the Company desire to enter into this Amendment in accordance with Section 15(c) of the Warrant with respect to certain changes to the terms of the Warrant from and after the date hereof.


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Company and Holder do hereby agree as follows:


 


1. The definition of “Expiration Date” set forth in the first paragraph of the preamble to the Warrant is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows: “5:30 P.M., New York City time, on May 14, 2015”.


 


2. The exercise price of the Warrant set forth in the first paragraph of the preamble to the Warrant is hereby deleted and replaced with an exercise price of “$3.50” per share.


 


3. Holder represents and warrants to the Company that Holder is the record and beneficial owner of the Warrant listed below Holder’s signature and is legally authorized to execute this Amendment with respect to such Warrant.


 


4. Holder acknowledges that Holder’s signature below constitutes Holder’s consent to this Amendment to the extent required by the terms of the Warrant.


 


5. The term “Warrant” as used in the Warrant shall be deemed to refer to the Warrant as amended hereby.


 


6. Except as specifically modified herein, the remaining provisions of the Warrant remain in full force and effect.


 


7. This Amendment may be executed in counterparts, all of which shall constitute one and the same Amendment.  This Amendment may be executed by signatures delivered by facsimile or electronic mail, each of which shall be fully binding on the signing party.


 







 




  





  











  











 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have caused this Amendment to be duly executed as of the date first set forth above.


 









	
HOLDER:

	  
CYTORI THERAPEUTICS, INC.


	
By:                                                      

	By:
	
Name:                                                      

	 
Name: Mark E. Saad


	
Title:                                                      

	Title: Chief Financial Officer





   


 


 


Warrant No.:                                ________________________
State of Vermont 

Superior Court—Environmental Division 

========================================================================== 

E N T R Y R E G A R D I N G M O T I O N 

========================================================================== 

In re Losier Variance Application Docket No. 79-4-08 Vtec 

(Appeal from ZBA decision) 

 

Title: Motion for Writ of Attachment (Filing No. 10) 

Filed: April 6, 2011 

Filed By: William P. Neylon, Attorney for Appellee Town of Maidstone 

Response in Opposition filed on 5/9/11 by Oliver L. Twombly, Attorney for Appellants/Applicants John 

and Paulette Losier 

 __ Granted _X_ Denied ___ Other 

 For the same reasons as those contained in our Entry Oder issued today denying the Town of 

Maidstone’s (“Town”) motion to enforce judgment, we also DENY the Town’s motion seeking a writ of 

attachment against the real property owned by John and Paulette Losier. 

There is no pending matter before the Court in regards to which the Town is likely to “recover 

judgment.” See V.R.C.P. 4.1(b)(2) (authorizing a court to approve a request for a writ of attachment upon 

finding “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover judgment”). Consequently, this 

motion can be DENIED without a hearing. 

_________________________________________ August 1, 2011_ _____ 

 Thomas S. Durkin, Judge Date 

=========================================================================== 

Date copies sent to: ____________ Clerk's Initials _______ 

Copies sent to: 

 Oliver L. Twombly, Attorney for Appellants/Applicants John and Paulette Losier 

 William P. Neylon, Attorney for Appellee Town of Maidstone 

 Interested Person Brenda J. Tilton 

 Interested Person Norman A. Vashaw
# Consent of Independent
Registered Public Accounting Firm

The Board of
DirectorsTierOne Corporation:

We consent to the use of our reports
dated March 4, 2005, with respect to the consolidated statement of financial
condition of TierOne Corporation as of December 31, 2004 and 2003, and the related
consolidated statements of income, stockholders equity, and cash flows for each of
the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2004, managements
assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of
December 31, 2004, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting
as of December 31, 2004, included herein.

# /s/ KPMG LLP

Lincoln, NebraskaMarch 8,
2005
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LARRY MCGEE.

September 5, 1985.

Petition for certification denied.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

HAROLD VAUGHN,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee.

'

'

'

'

'

'

No. 08-11-00036-CR

Appeal from the

371st District Court

of Tarrant County, Texas

(TC# 1186711D)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the 

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. This decision shall be certified 

below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 13TH DAY OF MARCH, 2013.

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Antcliff, JJ.

Antcliff, J., not participating
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 169 (Wednesday, September 1, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 53724-53725]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-21799]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT OFFICE


Proposed Collection; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) Form, Demographic Information on Applicants, OMB 3046-0046; 
Correction

AGENCY: U.S. Office of Personnel Management.

ACTION: Notice; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The published document in the Federal Register of August 2, 
2010,

[[Page 53725]]

concerning Proposed collection. The document contained incorrect dates.

DATES: Effective on September 1, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 
Employment Services, USAJOBS, 1900 E Street, NW., Washington, DC 20415, 
Attention: Patricia Stevens or send electronic mail to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e5958491978c868c84cb96918093808b96a58a9588cb828a93"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5121302523383238307f22253427343f22113e213c7f363e27">[email protected]</span></a>.

Correction

    In the Federal Register of Monday, August 2, 2010, at 75 FR 45173, 
in the third column, correct the DATES section to read:

DATES: Effective on December 12, 2010.

    U.S. Office of Personnel Management.
Angela Bailey,
Deputy Associate Director for Recruitment and Diversity.
[FR Doc. 2010-21799 Filed 8-31-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6325-39-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
Exhibit 31.1 CERTIFICATION

I, William L Sklar, Treasurer, Chief Financial Officer of PaperFree Medical
Solutions, Inc.. certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of PaperFree Medical
Solutions, Inc.

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

         a)     designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;\

         b)     evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of
this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

         c)     presented in this annual report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
function):

        a)      all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of
internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

        b)      any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
controls; and

6. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have indicated in this annual
report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in
other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to
the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with
regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date: July 15, 2006        /s/ William L Sklar
--------------------------------------------------------


                                       34
524 A.2d 1052

#### Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant *v.*Cynthia Alessi, Appellee.

Argued February 24, 1987,

before Judges Craig, Doyle (P) and Barry, sitting as a panel of three.

*454
      *Gwendolyn T. Mosley,*Deputy Attorney General, with her, *Andrew S. Gordon,*Chief Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Litigation Section, *John G. Knorr, III,*Senior Deputy Attorney General, and *LeRoy S. Zimmerman,*Attorney General, for appellant.

*Dennis C. McAndrews,*for appellee.

April 24, 1987:

Opinion by

Judge Doyle,

This is an appeal by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County directing that Cynthia Alessi, a twenty-one year old mentally retarded young woman, be committed for one year to the Royer-Greaves School for the Blind (Royer-Greaves), a private residential facility. The order also directed that the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) was to fund Ms. Alessi’s inpatient care based upon a regular schedule established for such care by Royer-Greaves. The common pleas court issued its civil commitment order pursuant to Section 406 of the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (Act), Act of October 20, 1966, P.L. 96, *as amended,*50 P.S. §4406. The trial courts authority to order commitment under *455Section 406 of the Act is not in question here. What is in question is that portion of the trial courts order which directed the DPW to fund the care for such commitment.

There is no dispute that prior to its order the trial court directed that a hearing be held before a Mental Health Review Officer and that such hearing was held and resulted in the recommendation for commitment adopted by the trial court. There is also no dispute that neither DPW nor the Commonwealth was a party to those proceedings. Once DPW learned of the order that it fund Ms. Alessis care, it “appealed” to this Court.

We must quash DPW’s appeal, however, inasmuch as Pa. R. A.P. 501, with certain exceptions not applicable here, permits an appeal to this Court *only by a party.*The Alessis argue that DPW is never a party to a commitment action unless it intervenes and that it could have done so here. Be that as it may, it did not intervene and hence is not a party.

We hasten to add that our decision today should in no way be construed as an indication that a trial court cannot order a commitment. Nor do we reach the substantive issue of whether it has concommitant authority to order DPW to provide funding. We hold only that where one is not a party to the proceedings below it cannot appeal to this Court.

Order

Now, April 24, 1987, the appeal in the above captioned matter is hereby quashed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TERRY WILLIAMS

,

Plaintiff

- Below,

Appellant,

v.

THE BLUFFS LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP

,

Defendant

- Below

, Appellee. §

§

§

§ No. 291, 2014

§

§ Court Below : Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware,

§ in and for New Castle County

§ C.A. No. N13C

- 10

- 359

§

§

§

Submitted: June 11 , 2014

Decided: July 1 , 2014

Before STRINE , Chief Justice, HOLLAND

, and RIDGELY , Justices.

O R D E R

This 1st da y of July 2014, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Terry Williams, has petitioned this Court, under

Supreme Court Rule 42, to accept an interlocutory appeal from a S uperior Court

order dated May 13, 2014

. The Superior Court order granted the motion of the

appellee, The Bluffs Limited Partne rship (“The Bluffs”), 1 to vacate a default

judgment obtained b y Williams

.

1 According to papers filed by the appellee in the Superior Court, The Bluffs Limited Partnership

is incorrectly named in the caption of the Superior Court complaint. The appellee appears to

have indic ated that the relevant entity is The Bluffs Apartments , which is owned by Sheldon

Limited Partnership, LP and managed by RIMSI Corp.2

(2) Williams filed an application for certification of an interlocutory

appeal and /or a stay of the proceedings in the Superior Court on May 19, 2014.

The Bluffs responded to the certification application on May 29, 2014. Williams

filed this interlocutory appeal on June 2, 2014

.

(3) On June 5, 2014, t he Superior Court denied Williams’ application for

certification of an interlocutory appeal and/or a stay of the proceedings

. On June

11, 2014, Williams filed a supplemental notice of appeal with the Superior Court’s

order denying his certification application.

(4) Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound

discretion of this Court and are granted only in exceptiona l cir cumstances. 2

Having considered the Superior Court’s May 13, 2014 order and the Superior

Court’s denial of Williams’ certification application, this Court has concluded that

the application for interlocutory review does not meet the requirements of Su preme

Court Rule 42 and should be refused

.

2 Supr. Ct. R. 42.3

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this interlocutory appeal is

REFUSED

.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice
Exhibit 10.1

                                 Lease Agreement

March 02, 2014

The following sets forth our agreement with regard to the grant by Leszek Piekut
or an affiliate thereof (The "Leaser") to you (the "Sub-Leaser) Artex Corp.
under the following terms and conditions:

1.   The Leased Premises area covers approximately 6 (six) square meters. The
     Leased Premises is located on the first floor of the building at St. Rynek
     Staromiejski 36/38, Warsaw, 85-001, Poland.

2.   The Agreement shall be for a term of three (3) years, starting on March 02,
     2014 and ending on March 02, 2016.

3.   Artex Corp. is given an option to renew the Lease for an additional term of
     two (2) years by giving the lesser written notice on or before ninety (90)
     days before the expiration of the primary term of this lease. The renewal
     lease is to be upon the same terms, covenants, and conditions contained in
     this Lease except as to Rent as provided in Paragraph 3 of the Lease.

4.   For the first year of the agreement the annual rent is $2,400 dollars plus
     applicable taxes payable in advance on the first day of every month, in
     twelve (12) equal and consecutive installments of $200 each plus applicable
     taxes.

5.   For the second and third year of the agreement the annual rent is $2,400
     dollars plus applicable taxes payable in advance on the first day of every
     month, in twelve (12) equal and consecutive installments of $200 each plus
     applicable taxes.

6.   A late charge of $10 per day shall be paid as additional rental for any
     rental payment delivered or received more than three (3) days after the
     first day of any calendar month during the term of this lease.

7.   Lesser agrees to provide, at its expense, to or for the Premises, adequate
     heat, electricity, water, air conditioning, ventilation, replacement light
     tubes, trash removal service, and sewage disposal service, in such
     quantities and at such times as is necessary to Lessee's comfortable and
     reasonable use of the Premises.

8.   Any holding over after the expiration of the term of this lease shall be
     deemed to constitute a tenancy from month to month only, and shall be on
     the same terms and conditions as specified in this Lease.

Yours truly,

Leszek Piekut


/s/ Leszek Piekut
--------------------------------
<PAGE>
I/we, the undersigned, hereby agree with the forgoing terms and conditions.

Signed in the City of: Warsaw the 2 day of March 2014



Leszek Piekut / President                       /s/ Leszek Piekut
--------------------------------                --------------------------------
PRINT NAME & TITLE                              SIGNATURE



Jacek Niezgoda /President                       /s/ Jacek Niezgoda
--------------------------------                --------------------------------
PRINT NAME & TITLE                              SIGNATURE

                                       2
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. BRIAN LESLIE.

September 10, 1985.

Petition for certification denied.
#### Samuel Martinez CABRERA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 46799.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 9, 1973.

Ricardo Garcia, Harlingen, for appellant.

Fred Galindo, Dist. Atty., Menton Murray, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Brownsville, Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., and Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

DOUGLAS, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order revoking probation.

*178On June 18, 1971, the appellant was found guilty of attempting to pass as true a forged instrument. His punishment was assessed at a term of two years, probated. A condition of probation was that he commit no offense against the laws of this State. On May 22, 1972, a motion to revoke probation was filed. It alleged that appellant had violated the terms of his probation by being drunk in a public place on nine separate occasions.

Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because the evidence is insufficient to prove the alleged acts and by permitting the State to amend its motion to revoke.

Officer Donald Duncan of the Har-lingen police department testified that the appellant was drunk in the Los Amigos Bar on August 8, 1971, and that he was drunk again on October 8, 1971, in BG’s Tavern. Officer Robert Archer testified that in the early hours of the morning on August 17, 1971, the appellant was drunk and passed out in his car on Van Burén Street. Officer Isidro Cavazos testified that on the evening of January 18, 1972, the appellant was drunk at the Lopez Hotel. Officer David Knight testified that the appellant was drunk during the early hours of the morning on April 15, 1972, in front of the Gulf Welding Supply Company in Harlin-gen. The officers testified that they arrested the appellant for being drunk on each occasion mentioned above.

The court had more than sufficient evidence to revoke the probation.

Next, appellant urges that it was improper for the trial court to permit an amendment to the motion to revoke after the hearing began to show the correct date of the judgment.

The original motion alleged that appellant had been convicted on June 13, 1971, as amended it recites June 18, 1971. He urges that the same standards applicable to amending an indictment or information are applicable to a motion to revoke probation.

The original motion informed appellant of the judgment of probation. There is no showing of surprise or a request for additional time to prepare for the hearing. Trial amendments are permissible in revocation of probation proceedings. Banks v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 491 S.W.2d 417. It was proper in the present case. The rules applicable to the amendment of indictments do not apply.

No abuse of discretion being shown, the judgment is affirmed.