2024 IL App (1st) 220864

Nos. 1-22-0864 and 1-22-0865 (cons.) 

Opinion filed August 12, 2024 

FIRST DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ANTOINE ANDERSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 99 CR 147 and 

 99 CR 148 (cons.) 

The Honorable 

Thomas J. Hennelly, 

Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion. 

Justices Lavin and Coghlan concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant Antoine Anderson appeals following his resentencing in 2022 on two convictions 

for first degree murder arising from separate incidents that occurred one week apart in 1998, when 

defendant was 17 years old. This resentencing occurred based on the State’s acknowledgement in 

postconviction proceedings that defendant’s original sentences, which were 50 years on the first 

conviction and natural life on the second conviction, did not comport with Miller v. Alabama, 567 

U.S. 460 (2012), and the line of Illinois cases that followed it. Defendant’s resentencing resulted 

in new sentences of 37 years and 40 years, to run consecutively. Defendant now argues that these 
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sentences, which in aggregate total 77 years, are unconstitutionally excessive. He requests this 

court to reduce the sentences or to remand for a second resentencing hearing. For the reasons that 

follow, we reject defendant’s arguments and affirm the sentences imposed.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The evidence adduced at defendant’s two trials is set forth in detail in this court’s earlier 

decisions on direct appeal. In November 1998, defendant was a member of the Gangster Disciples. 

Both shootings occurred near the Ida B. Wells Homes housing project, when defendant was 

seeking revenge after his brother was shot in the leg by a member of the Black Disciples, a rival 

gang. On November 6, 1998, defendant and a fellow Gangster Disciple obtained a rifle, and both 

men used it to fire shots at persons they believed were members of the Black Disciples. In the 

course of shooting the rifle, defendant shot and killed an uninvolved man named Harry Hudson, 

who was walking alone nearby. Defendant’s girlfriend testified that defendant said the next day 

that Hudson “ ‘shouldn’t have been in the way while they were shooting.’ ” Defendant was 

convicted of first degree murder for which he was originally sentenced to 40 years in prison. 

¶ 4 On November 13, 1998, near the same location, defendant saw a vehicle that he believed 

belonged to the Black Disciples member who had shot his brother. Defendant borrowed a revolver 

and shot it several times at the front driver’s side of the car. Neither the driver of the car nor any 

of its passengers were members of the Black Disciples, and none of them were involved in the 

shooting of defendant’s brother. Rather, the driver was a man named Leroy Causey, who died from 

a gunshot wound to the head. Defendant made a written statement confessing to killing Causey, 

but he testified at trial that the statement was a false product of police brutality. Defendant was 

convicted of first degree murder. Based on the law existing at that time, defendant’s prior 

conviction for first degree murder resulted in a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison for the 
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conviction involving Causey.

¶ 5 Defendant filed direct appeals to this court, challenging both of his convictions based on 

assertions of trial error. On April 18, 2003, this court entered an order affirming defendant’s 

conviction for first degree murder involving Hudson. People v. Anderson, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1151 

(2003) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). On November 26, 2003, 

this court affirmed the conviction for first degree murder involving Causey. People v. Anderson, 

343 Ill. App. 3d 1282 (2003) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 6 In 2005, defendant filed a postconviction petition relating only to the case involving Causey. 

In 2006, this court affirmed the trial court’s summary dismissal of that petition, rejecting the 

argument that defendant had presented sufficient new evidence that his confession was coerced by 

police brutality. People v. Anderson, 368 Ill. App. 3d 1215 (2006) (table) (unpublished order under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Leave to appeal was thereafter denied by the supreme court. 

People v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 639 (2007) (table). 

¶ 7 The resentencing that is the subject of the present appeal arose in the course of postconviction 

proceedings that were first filed in 2007, involving both convictions. Over the long timeframe that 

those proceedings pended in the trial court, substantial developments occurred in the law involving 

sentencing of juveniles convicted of serious crimes. Most significantly, in 2012, the United States 

Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., 

amend. VIII) prohibits sentencing schemes in which sentences of life without parole are mandatory 

for offenders under age 18 at the time of their crimes. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. The holding of 

Miller and the line of Illinois cases that followed it ultimately led the State in this case to agree 

that defendant was entitled to resentencing on both of his convictions. 

¶ 8 Defendant’s resentencing occurred on March 4, 2022. It resulted in the trial court 
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resentencing him to 37 years on the conviction for the first degree murder of Hudson and 40 years 

on the first degree murder of Causey. The trial court further determined in its discretion that the 

sentences must run consecutively for the protection of the public. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c) (West 

2022). The trial court’s explanation of its reasoning is set forth in detail in the analysis below. Infra 

¶ 18. Defendant thereafter filed a motion to reconsider these sentences, which the trial court 

denied. This appeal then followed.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court’s resentencing of him to an aggregate of 77 

years for offenses he committed at age 17 is unconstitutionally excessive in violation of his rights 

under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the 

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). Defendant 

advances an identical argument under both the federal and state constitutional provisions, which 

is that his sentences are the result of the trial court’s failure to properly apply (1) the juvenile 

sentencing factors of Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78, (2) the overruled case of People v. Holman, 2017 

IL 120655, ¶ 46, overruled by People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, and (3) section 5-4.5-105(a) of 

the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022)).1

¶ 11 Given the current state of the law in the area of juvenile sentencing, the court has some 

difficulty tracking defendant’s exact argument as to the asserted constitutional shortcoming in his 

sentences. First, this case presents an unusual situation in that defendant’s 77-year prison term is 

the product of two consecutive sentences imposed for separate convictions, stemming from 

separate incidents. Considered individually, neither the 37-year sentence for the first degree 

1Defendant does not raise a “traditional” proportionate penalties argument that his sentences are 

“cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the 

community.” See People v. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002). 
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murder of Hudson nor the 40-year sentence for the first degree murder of Causey qualifies as a 

de facto life sentence, which is one that exceeds 40 years. See People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, 

¶¶ 40-41. Accordingly, neither sentence alone is long enough to enable defendant to make the 

“threshold showing” that a juvenile offender is required to make to mount a Miller-based challenge 

under the eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause, which is that “his or her sentence 

is a life sentence or de facto life sentence.” People v. Hill, 2022 IL App (1st) 171739-B, ¶ 42; 

accord People v. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶ 68. Only if defendant’s two consecutive 

sentences can be considered in the aggregate is he arguably subject to a de facto life sentence. 

However, the ability to mount a constitutional challenge by aggregating multiple sentences arising 

from different incidents is a dubious proposition under both the eighth amendment (see State v. 

Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d 34, 41-42 (Ariz. 2020) (collecting cases)) and the proportionate penalties 

clause (see People v. Elliott, 272 Ill. 592, 600 (1916) (proportionate penalties clause “does not 

apply in any manner to the aggregate of the punishments inflicted for different offenses”); accord 

People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 529-30 (2001)). Further, the fact that defendant is statutorily 

eligible for parole after 20 years is an additional reason why his two sentences do not amount to a 

de facto life sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2022); Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 

220066, ¶ 43; People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56. 

¶ 12 Second, even if defendant’s claim overcomes the hurdle described above, his ability to mount 

a Miller-based constitutional challenge to his sentences immediately encounters a second hurdle, 

which is that no part of his sentences was imposed under a mandatory sentencing scheme. Instead, 

the 77-year aggregate length of defendant’s prison term is the result of the trial court’s 

determination in its discretion that his two sentences for first degree murder must run consecutively 

for the protection of the public. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(1) (West 2022). 
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¶ 13 As referenced above, Miller holds that the eighth amendment prohibits sentencing schemes 

in which life without parole is mandatory for offenders who committed crimes as juveniles. It 

requires that “youth and attendant characteristics” be part of a sentencing court’s consideration 

when determining that life without parole is a proportionate sentence to impose. Miller, 567 U.S. 

at 479, 483. This eighth amendment principle extends also to mandatory de facto life sentences, 

i.e., “a mandatory term of years that is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of 

parole.” People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9. 

¶ 14 Under current law (which defendant acknowledges was the law by the time he filed his 

opening brief in this case), the fact that defendant was resentenced under a sentencing scheme that 

granted the trial court the discretion to consider defendant’s “youth and attendant circumstances” 

and to impose a sentence of less than de facto life is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional 

requirements of Miller. People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶¶ 38, 44 (citing Jones v. Mississippi, 

593 U.S. 98, 105 (2021)); accord People v. Morris, 2023 IL App (1st) 220035, ¶ 55. The 

discretionary sentencing scheme itself is constitutionally sufficient unless the sentencing court 

“ ‘expressly refuses as a matter of law to consider the defendant’s youth (as opposed to, for 

example, deeming the defendant’s youth to be outweighed by other factors or deeming the 

defendant’s youth to be an insufficient reason to support a lesser sentence under the facts of the 

case).’ ” Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 38 (quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 115 n.7). 

¶ 15 We recognize that the present law, as set forth in the preceding paragraph, reflects an 

overruling of the prior rule, which was that Miller applied to sentences of life without parole 

imposed on juvenile offenders under discretionary sentencing schemes. See Holman, 2017 IL 

120655, ¶ 40, overruled by Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42. The prior rule also required a trial court 

to apply Miller by making certain findings pertaining to “youth and its attendant characteristics” 
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when imposing a discretionary sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender. Id. ¶ 46. 

Consideration of these factors is also a requirement of Illinois statutory law (see infra ¶ 17). See 

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022); Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 45-46. However, in Wilson, 

our supreme court made clear that such additional findings are not a matter of constitutional 

entitlement under Miller. See Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶¶ 36, 38, 42 (citing Jones, 593 U.S. at 

114, 116). 

¶ 16 Third, even under the prior rule (which reflected Illinois law at the time of defendant’s 

resentencing), it is clear that defendant received the full constitutional protections of Miller, in that 

his sentences aggregating 77 years were imposed at a hearing in which consideration of his “youth 

and its attendant characteristics” were front-of-mind for the trial court. In other words, the trial 

court’s comments demonstrate that it fully understood its task of resentencing defendant in 

conformance with the requirements of Miller and the factors to be considered under Holman and 

section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022)). 

See Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 45-46. 

¶ 17 In resentencing defendant, the trial court began by stating that it had considered the evidence 

presented at trial, the presentence investigation report that had been prepared in 2002,2 the 

comments at sentencing by the judge who had originally sentenced defendant(Judge Schultz), the 

evidence presented in aggravation and mitigation,3 and defendant’s statement in allocution. The 

trial court further stated that it had reviewed and considered Miller and the line of cases that 

followed it. The court also recognized that defendant had already served 20 years of his sentence, 

2Defendant executed waivers of his right to an updated presentence investigation and report. 

3Multiple comments by defendant’s counsel and by the trial court indicate that a hearing occurred

at which the trial court heard arguments in aggravation and mitigation. This apparently occurred on either 

June 9, 2021, or August 16, 2021. No transcripts from either court date are included in the record on appeal 

or mentioned by either party in their briefs. 
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meaning that he was eligible to apply for parole regardless of the sentences it imposed. See 730 

ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2022). The trial court then read word-for-word the nine factors of 

section 5-4.5-105(a), which requires a trial court to consider the following additional factors in 

mitigation when sentencing a person under age 18 at the time of an offense: 

“(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, 

including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of 

cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any; 

(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure, 

familial pressure, or negative influences;

(3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social background, 

including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma; 

(4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both; 

(5) the circumstances of the offense;

(6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including the 

level of planning by the defendant before the offense; 

(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense; 

(8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and 

(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an expression 

of remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person, on advice of counsel chooses not to make 

a statement, the court shall not consider a lack of an expression of remorse as an aggravating 

factor.” Id. § 5-4.5-105(a). 

¶ 18 After reciting the above preliminary considerations, the trial court provided the following 

explanation of its decision in resentencing defendant: 
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“Well, to apply the facts to the statute, I think what is informative and instructive is the 

Pre-Sentence Investigation that was prepared *** on behalf of Mr. Anderson back in January 

of 2002 and the sentencing judge’s review and comments. And I think they’re illustrative. 

And to begin with, I’m going to quote Judge Shultz prior to his imposition of the 

sentence, some of the things that he observed and he discussed while reviewing the PreSentence Investigation. And I say that because I think they’re germane to answering some 

of the issues and some of the questions presented in the sentencing of individuals under the 

age of 18 when a crime is committed. The statute that I just recited. 

* * * 

In his review of the pre-sentence, Judge Shultz observed: You described your 

childhood as a good one, not having suffered abuse by your family. Sometimes that is a 

potential explanation for the rage and the aggressiveness individuals show and that is a 

product of their environment. You indicate that that was not the case in your case. You 

indicate that you don’t have any family members that have any substance abuse problems. 

Again, growing up in an environment where your mother and father and other relatives all 

in and out of jail or dealing with drugs or substance abuse could have also had a very 

depressing effect on your ability to nurture or grow. But you don’t have any of that either. 

You didn’t take very much opportunity or advantage of the occasional opportunities 

that were placed in front of you. You dropped out of high school, suspended from high school 

at least twice and having had to repeat the 9th grade. You have no explanation as to why you 

dropped out of school. 

You say that you’re in good health, even though you suffered from a previous gunshot 

wound. It seems to me that having previously shot yourself or had been shot yourself that 
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that might put you in a better position to realize the impact of your actions with regard to Mr. 

Causey or Mr. Hudson, the two victims in the murder cases he was convicted of. But, 

apparently, being the victim of a gunshot wound yourself, it didn’t have much significance, 

based upon the way you viewed life and how you were going to act among the law-abiding 

citizens of a decent community. 

You don’t have any mental health issues, as evidenced by your statements in the PreSentence Report. *** [A]lthough you’re a young man in good health, you didn’t have the 

opportunity or desire to serve your country in the military. 

* * * 

What I do see is with these Miller cases—and I’ve had the privilege of resentencing 

several people on Miller cases and I think the philosophy or the driving force behind Miller

was two killings that occurred at the same instance. And that is why I think that paragraph 

for impetuosity, level of maturity at the time of the offense, ability to consider risks and 

consequences is generally very, very important. Because oftentimes these Miller cases 

concern a single incident in which two people were killed. That is not the case in Mr. 

Anderson’s situation. These were two separate incidents that were several days apart. 

And, also, to add parenthetically, as the pre-sentence indicates, on October the 28th of 

1998, Mr. Anderson was placed on a period of probation by Judge Shultz. It was Second 

Chance Drug Probation, an opportunity for Mr. Anderson to put a possible felony conviction 

behind him, to serve his probation appropriately and then have the matter removed from his 

record. It was a golden opportunity for Mr. Anderson to take the intervention of the court 

system and the Probation Department and to better his life. 

To show you how he responded to that intervention and to that opportunity, ten days 
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later, on November the 6th of 1998, he put a bullet in the head of his first victim. The ink 

being barely dry on Judge Shultz’s probation order granting him the second chance probation 

when he committed this first murder. That to me speaks volumes as to the type of person that 

Mr. Anderson was and how he profits from attempts to assist him in making his life a better 

place. 

Also, what I find to be particularly disturbing in Mr. Anderson’s case, as I alluded to, 

this was not a situation where there were two killings in one instance. The first instance 

occurred on November the 6th, in the Ida B. Wells Housing Project[.] *** [I]n retaliation 

and in an effort to kill *** a member of the Black Disciples gang, Mr. Anderson and a 

confederate—by the way, he used his confederate for both of these murders—procured a 

firearm, went to an area, being Ida B. Wells, where he and his confederate, his companion in 

crime, believed that the Black Disciples congregated.

And this weapon was a rifle, and they took turns firing the rifle. Fortunately for his 

confederate, he hit no one. And then it was Mr. Anderson’s turn to fire the rifle and, once 

again, *** as occurs in these cases, the person struck with the rifle by Mr. Anderson was not 

a Black Disciple but it was 45-year-old [Harry] Hudson, a man who lived and *** had family 

in the Ida B. Wells Project. 

In further aggravation to this, after completing this act, Mr. Anderson bragged to 

witnesses about the act and took pride in what he did. *** [T]his act was cold, calculated, 

planned and deliberate. This is not the act of impetuosity and a lack of a level of maturity. 

But it becomes even worse because after he commits this murder, what does Mr. 

Anderson do? On November the 13th, seven days later, he recruits the same gang 

confederate. They also, again, acquire firearms and once again they go into the Ida B. Wells 
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Housing Project to commit another murder. 

And like the prior murder, when Mr. Anderson was not careful to make sure no—not 

that that’s in mitigation, to make sure that there’s no innocent people in the way of a shooting, 

he mistook what he believed to be *** an automobile belonging to a Black Disciple, without 

bothering to determine if he was correct or not and he fired into *** the driver’s side windows 

of an automobile, killing the second victim, which was Mr. Causey. 

Leroy Causey, who was at the time a Navy veteran and a postman. He had a family in 

the Ida B. Wells that he was raising. Once again, another example not of impetuosity or 

immaturity. It’s something that was cold, calculated, planned and deliberate. 

I also read the statements made on behalf of the family by Mr. Causey’s brother, Dexter 

Causey. That was read to Judge Shultz at the time. It was not done before me. I had the 

impact statements from Mr. Causey’s daughter, and I had impact statements from a Ms. 

Anderson, on behalf of Mr. Hudson. 

The statement and the testimony given by Mr. Causey was, in my view, not only 

eloquent but incredibly moving and emotional. And it describes in painful detail the pain that 

will never go away for the Causey family, the wounds that will never heal for the Causey 

family. You cannot help but be moved by reading or listening to his words and the tragedy 

and the suffering that they have to undergo, based on the defendant’s actions. I’ve also 

considered that. 

So the determination for the Court is I don’t find that any of these factors in this case 

apply under [section 5-4.5-105(a)]. I find the circumstances of the offense to be horrific and 

without feeling and without caring. His participation—he engineered and planned and 

directed this whole thing and there’s nothing in there, whether environmentally or any level 
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of maturity, that would cause me to make that a consideration in mitigation. And, frankly, I 

find his actions to be very aggravating and infuriating. 

What Mr. Anderson did on both of those days, he acted as a predator, with the Ida B. 

Wells as his own private hunting ground and he didn’t care if he killed a Black Disciple. It 

didn’t matter to him. He was out to kill someone and it just so happened that neither victim 

was a Black Disciple but they were innocent people, law-abiding people going about their 

lives in this project.

It is my view that the people of the Ida B. Wells Project need to be protected from the 

likes of Mr. Antoine Anderson and his ilk. They are the ones who follow the law and live 

their lives every day in compliance with the law, and they have a right to expect that the law 

will safeguard and protect them from people like the defendant. It is those people that I 

believe the Court has an obligation to protect. 

Quite frankly, I think protecting the Black Disciples is also a corollary to this but my 

real view on this is what is happening to these poor people who live in these housing projects, 

who have to live day in and day out, raise their families and be subjected to this kind of 

violence by gang members like Mr. Anderson.

Now, as the State points out in their memo, Mr. Anderson’s cases are not mandatorily 

consecutive because murder became a triggering offense in 2000. It was after Mr. Anderson 

was sentenced and after this was committed. Normally, this would have been a mandatory 

consecutive sentence, but it is not mandatory consecutive.” 

At that point, the trial court cited and read section 5-8-4(c)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections, 

which provides that a court may impose consecutive sentences if, having considered the nature 

and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant, it is the opinion 
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of the court that consecutive sentences are required to protect the public from further criminal 

conduct by the defendant. Id. § 5-8-4(c)(1). The court then concluded its resentencing of defendant

by stating: 

“I’ve already put forth in the record *** how his conduct affects the people who live 

and work in Ida B. Wells and it is the Court’s opinion that this provision of the permissive 

consecutive statute is appropriate in Mr. Anderson’s two cases. Therefore, based on that and 

based on everything that I have indicated, the Court is of the opinion the appropriate sentence 

for Mr. Anderson in Case No. 99 CR 147 is 37 years in the Illinois Department of 

Corrections; and that that sentence is to be served consecutively to, for the reasons 

enumerated, with the sentence in Case No. 99 CR 148. And the sentence in that case is 40 

years in the Illinois Department of Corrections and including three years of mandatory 

supervised release.”

¶ 19 We find that the above statements by the trial court at resentencing demonstrate that 

defendant’s sentences are the product of a hearing in which he fully received the protections to 

which he was constitutionally entitled under Miller and progeny. In other words, factors of 

defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics were the foremost consideration for the trial 

court. The fact that the trial court found these youth-related factors to be outweighed by 

defendant’s “horrific” conduct in killing two men uninvolved in the nonfatal shooting of his 

brother and by the need to protect the public from further crimes, thereby finding defendant’s youth 

to be an insufficient reason to support a shorter sentence, does not mean that these factors were 

not given appropriate consideration by the trial court. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶¶ 38, 44. 

¶ 20 Turning to the specific points raised by defendant, the only argument that we deem to be of 

constitutional magnitude is his overarching assertion that the trial court incorrectly applied the 
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factors of section 5-4.5-105(a) to the point of “almost express non-compliance.” He argues that 

the trial court’s sentencing rationale indicates that it was “either ignorant of the statute’s purpose, 

or unwilling to abide by its requirements.” However, for the reasons set forth in the preceding 

paragraph, we flatly reject any argument that the trial court’s overall application of the statutory 

factors was constitutionally deficient.

¶ 21 Instead, defendant’s argument that he received an excessive sentence as a result of errors in 

the trial court’s application of the statutory factors is reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. 

Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 26 (citing People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 

(2010)). A sentence will be deemed an abuse of discretion where it is “ ‘greatly at variance with 

the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’ ” 

Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212 (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000), citing People 

v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 54 (1999)). The trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a 

sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference. Id. Because the trial judge 

has a better opportunity to observe factors such as the credibility and demeanor of witnesses than 

does a reviewing court relying on the cold record, we give great deference to the trial court’s 

sentencing decision. Id. at 212-13. A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of 

the trial court merely because the reviewing court would have balanced the sentencing factors 

differently. Id. at 213. 

¶ 22 Defendant argues that the trial court misapplied the provision of the statute providing that “if 

the person, on advice of counsel chooses not to make a statement, the court shall not consider a 

lack of an expression of remorse as an aggravating factor.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(9) (West 

2022). In its remarks upon resentencing defendant, the trial court stated nothing about defendant’s 

remorse or lack thereof. At the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the trial court made the 
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statement that in the trial court’s view, defendant had not shown remorse. Defendant argues on 

appeal that it is “crystal clear” that the trial court “chose to consider a lack of remorse, not merely 

as an aggravator, but as a basis for upping the ante” to make the sentences consecutive “because 

of a factor it was instructed not to consider in aggravation.” 

¶ 23 We reject this argument that the trial court erred in considering lack of remorse as an 

aggravating factor. By its own terms, the cited provision is inapplicable because defendant made 

a statement in allocution. Defendant stated: 

“Yeah, I just send my condolences out to the victims’ family and things like that. You 

know, I just ask that—you know, to be back out there with my family and my kids. And I 

just ask for, you know, any type of leniency to be able to be back out there with them and, 

basically, take care of my granny, who’s actually 77 years old, and live my life. I appreciate 

that, your Honor.” 

The trial court was in the best position to evaluate the effect of defendant’s statement on its 

resentencing decision. As remorse was not mentioned in the trial court’s sentencing remarks, we 

have no basis for stating that it played any role in its decision, let alone an improper one. 

¶ 24 With respect to the statutory factor concerning age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the 

time of the offense (id. § 5-4.5-105(a)(1)), defendant argues that the trial court erred by deferring 

to the statements and findings of fact made by Judge Schultz when he originally sentenced 

defendant. He makes a related argument as to the factor assessing “potential for rehabilitation or 

evidence of rehabilitation, or both.” Id. § 5-4.5-105(a)(4). Defendant argues that the trial court’s 

reliance on Judge Schultz’s statements and findings was error because his comments were made 

in a context where he was imposing a mandatory natural life sentence; he had no reason to assess 

the impact of defendant’s youth on his actions. He argues also that Judge Schultz’s statements 
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were made nearly a decade prior to the recognition in Miller that the science of juvenile brain 

development has an effect in sentencing. He argues that, as the role of the trial court here was to 

fashion new Miller-compliant sentences by retroactively assessing defendant’s mental state as of 

1998 (and not to review the original sentences), there was simply no need or basis for deferring to 

Judge Schultz’s conclusions. Regarding rehabilitation, defendant argues that the trial court’s 

deference to Judge Schultz’s comments robbed it of significant information about “what path 

[defendant] has charged since originally sentenced in 2002.” He argues that it was “nonsensical” 

for the trial court to deny itself access to such pertinent information about rehabilitation when 

resentencing a juvenile offender in the context presented here. 

¶ 25 We reject defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly deferred to statements or 

findings made by Judge Schultz when he originally sentenced defendant for his second conviction. 

In our review of the record, we find nothing to suggest that the trial court failed to undertake its 

own evaluation of the evidence and argument concerning the statutory factors and reach its own 

conclusions as to an appropriate resentencing of defendant. Contrary to defendant’s argument, all 

that the trial court stated was that it found “some of the things” that Judge Schultz observed and 

discussed in his review of defendant’s presentence investigation were “germane” to the statutory 

factors it was called upon to address. This included defendant’s statements that he had a good 

childhood; that his family and home environment had not included physical abuse, substance 

abuse, drug dealing, or relatives in jail; that his educational background included dropping out of 

school in the 9th grade; that he was in good health, despite being the victim of a gunshot wound 

himself; and that he had no mental health issues. These are relevant facts appropriately considered 

under the statute. Judge Schultz’s statements did not comprise the totality of the trial court’s 

consideration, and it is clear that the trial court considered factors beyond those mentioned by 
Nos. 1-22-0864 and 1-22-0865 (cons.) 

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Judge Shultz. As defendant points out, the trial court here also had before it information from the 

presentencing report that defendant’s father was killed when he was only five years old, that he 

had been abandoned by his mother to the custody of his grandmother, and that he was raised in a 

bad neighborhood. Defendant also cites evidence of his gang involvement, arguing it is undeniable 

the pressure that gang membership had on his actions. As this was all evidence before the trial 

court and nothing affirmatively indicates the trial court did not consider it, we presume that the 

trial court considered this evidence as part of its resentencing determination. People v. Cornejo, 

2020 IL App (1st) 180199, ¶ 142. 

¶ 26 We find inapposite the case relied upon by defendant, which is People v. Hernandez, 298 Ill. 

App. 3d 36 (1998). There, in postconviction proceedings, a juvenile witness who had testified for 

the State at the defendant’s trial provided an affidavit stating he had given a false statement due to 

abuse by police in questioning him. Id. at 38-39. Although the judge presiding over the 

postconviction proceedings had not presided at trial, the postconviction petition was dismissed at 

the second stage without an evidentiary hearing. This court reversed, reasoning that it was “not 

plausible that the postconviction court could assess [the recanting witness’] credibility based on a 

cold reading of the trial transcript and affidavits.” Id. at 40. In the present case, by contrast, no 

issue of credibility was before the trial court when it referenced Judge Schultz’s statements from 

the original sentencing of defendant. Accordingly, Hernandez provides no support for defendant’s 

argument in this instance. 

¶ 27 Defendant argues that the circumstances of the two offenses and the minimal planning (see 

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(5), (6) (West 2022)) show that his efforts to exact revenge for his 

brother’s shooting were so poorly executed that they must be considered the impulsive acts of a 

juvenile driven by anger he could not control. He argues that his immaturity is shown by the fact 
Nos. 1-22-0864 and 1-22-0865 (cons.) 

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that he committed the two offenses in his own neighborhood, in front of witnesses who knew and 

could identify him. He argues that the trial court was wrong to characterize his conduct as cold 

and calculated; rather, he contends that it shows a youthful inability to rationally process his own 

experiences and learn from his mistakes. We reject this argument. The trial court’s remarks make 

clear that it appropriately considered the seriousness of defendant’s offenses and his level of 

participation and planning of them, and defendant’s argument is nothing more than an improper 

request that we substitute our judgment for that of the trial court and reweigh these factors 

differently. See Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213. 

¶ 28 Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously “attempted to excuse the length of 

the aggregate sentence by presuming a parole remedy might eliminate any harshness.” In the trial 

court’s preliminary remarks in resentencing defendant, it noted that because defendant had already 

served 20 years of his sentence, he was statutorily eligible to apply for parole, regardless of the 

sentences imposed. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2022). We find nothing improper about 

the trial court’s recognizing that defendant was eligible for parole. Under our case law, eligibility 

for parole is a relevant consideration and a proper factor in evaluating whether the length of a 

sentence is excessive. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 59. Under the circumstances of this 

case, we find also that defendant’s parole eligibility after 20 years supports the conclusion that the 

sentences imposed at his resentencing were not excessive. Id.; accord People v. Kendrick, 2023 IL 

App (3d) 200127, ¶ 53. 

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

¶ 31 Affirmed.
Nos. 1-22-0864 and 1-22-0865 (cons.) 

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People v. Anderson, 2024 IL App (1st) 220864 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 99-CR147, 99-CR-148; the Hon. Thomas J. Hennelly, Judge, 

presiding. 

Attorneys

for 

Appellant:

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, Matthew B. Chapman, and 

Robert Hirschhorn, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of 

Chicago, for appellant. 

Attorneys

for 

Appellee:

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique 

Abraham, David H. Iskowich, and Retha Stotts, Assistant 

State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.