O r al a r g u men t was he ar d i n t h i s ca s e on A pr i l 8, 2004, i n C h ar l ot t e, D i ck s on Coun t y , T en n es s ee , a s pa r t of 1 this C o u rt' s S .C .A .L .E .S . ( S upr eme C o u rt A d vanci ng L e g a l E d ucat i o n fo r S tud e n ts) p ro je c t.



### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 8, 200 4, S es sio n H eard a t C ha rl ott e 1



### LAR RY EU GEN E BEN TON v. TH E V AN DER BILT U NIV ERS ITY
Appeal by Per m ission from the Court of Appeals, Midd le Section

Circuit Court

for Davidson County No. 99C-1906 C arol L. Soloman, Judge

No. M2002- 00085-SC-R11- CV - F iled Jun e 28, 2004

A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J

. , d i s s en t i n g.
Be cause I am firmly convince d that Be nton c annot be forc ed into a rbitration ac cording to the te rm s of the c on tr a c t un de r s ub mis sio n, I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt f ro m th e ho ldi ng of

a ma jority of my c oll e a g ue s.
The a rb i tration provision in this case provides tha t “[i] f a dispute . . . a rises betwe en the parties of this Agr eeme nt involving a c ontention by either pa rty that the other ha s failed to per form its obli g ations and re sponsibili ties under this ag ree ment” (e mphasis added) , then af ter following the proper proce dure, the parties sha ll submi t to b i nding a rbitration. The la ng uag e of this provision
c le arl y ind ic a te s th a t th e re are tw o p art ie s b ou ndto this a g re e me nt– Va nd e rb ilt a ndB lue Cr os s.
I n a s im il ar c a s e , Rath v
. M a n a g e d H e a lth N e tw o rk , I n c
. , th e ar b it r a ti o n p r o v is io n of the contra ct provided tha t any controve rsy “betwe en the pa rties to this Agr eeme nt” shall be submitted to binding ar

bitration if the parties are unable to settle the controversy informally

. 844 P.2d 12, 12- 13 (I daho 19 92 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he I daho Sup re me Cou rt he ld tha t be c a us e the thi rd -p art y benef iciarie s did not sign the contr act a nd wer e not listed in the contrac t as “parties,” the y could not be for ced to a

rbitrate t h ei r cl ai m s
. I d. at 13. The I daho court held that “the lang uag e in the Ag ree ment expressly

limit [ed] the ar

bitration clause to the ‘ parties’ to the Ag ree ment.” I d.

I ag ree with the rea soning in Rath. I n the inst an t ca s e, Be nton was not a “ party ” to the contra ct; thus, he could not be fo rc ed t o submit t o arbitration. I n addition, “[u] nder the Uniform Arbitration Ac t, the law is clea r that per sons who are not parties to an a rbitration ag ree ment cannot be c omp e lle d to pa

rt ic ipate in a

rb itr a tio n. ” City

of Pe ru v. I ll. Pow e r Co. , 630 N. E. 2d45 4, 45 7 ( I ll. App. Ct. 1994).-2-

Whil e I do not sugg est that a third-party benef iciary may never be compe lled to arbitrate , the lang uag e in t his contrac t clear ly limit s arbitra tion to the “parties” of the c ontrac t. Be cause Be nton was never listed nor ref

err ed to in the contra ct as a “party ,” he should not be f orce d into arbitration. “B eca use ‘a rbitration is a matter of

contra ct[,] . . . a party cannot be require d to submit to arbitration any d i s p u t e wh i ch he has not a g ree d so to submit .’” Frizz ell Constr. Co. v. Gatlinburg, L .L .C., 9 S.W .3d 79, 84 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting AT & T Tec hs., I nc. v. Communi cations Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 89 L

. Ed. 2d 648 (1986)) ; see a lso EEOC v. Waffle House , I nc., 534 U.S. 279, 294, 122 S. C t. 754, 151 L . Ed. 2d 755 (2002) ( rec og nizi ng that the Fe deral Arbitration Act (" FAA ") does not requir e parties to arbitrate when ther e is no ag ree ment to do s o , d espi te the g ener al fe dera l policy

favor ing a rbitration).

Acc ording ly , an d based upon the fore g oing, I am unable to c oncur in the holding of the majority

.

___________________________________ AD OLPHO A. B I RCH , JR., JUSTI CE