Filed 7/24/13 In re Joshua D. CA2/7 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SEVEN 

In re JOSHUA D., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law. 

 B243452 

 (Los Angeles County 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JOSHUA D., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 Super. Ct. No. TJ20092) 

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Tamara 

Hall, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and 

Connie H. Kan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

____________________ 
2 

 Joshua D. appeals from the juvenile court’s order declaring him a ward of the 

court after finding he had committed robbery. Joshua contends the admission of hearsay 

testimony was prejudicial error. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

1. The Petition 

 Jaime Sanchez, a sidewalk ice cream vendor in Compton, was assaulted and 

robbed of ice cream by several youths. The district attorney filed Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 602 petitions against Joshua, Jasmine W. and A.W., alleging 

each of them had committed the second degree robbery of Sanchez in violation of Penal 

Code section 211. Jasmine admitted the allegation, and the juvenile court sustained her 

petition, declared her a ward of the court and ordered her home on probation. Thereafter, 

Joshua and A.W. were the subjects of a joint jurisdiction hearing. 

2. The Jurisdiction Hearing 

Jaime Sanchez testified he was pushing his ice cream cart out of the park on the 

afternoon of June 4, 2012, when Joshua and another boy called out to him for ice cream. 

Sanchez stopped in front of a house and waited for Joshua and the other boy to come up 

to the cart. As Joshua stood beside Sanchez, the other boy pulled open the lid of the cart, 

threw it on the ground and grabbed some ice cream bars. Sanchez told him to stop and 

shoved the cart towards the boy. Joshua struck Sanchez in the face with his fists. After 

the first punch, Sanchez attempted to hit Joshua with the bells on top of the cart, but he 

was overpowered by Joshua, who continued punching Sanchez in the face, causing him 

to fall back against a fence. Two girls arrived immediately after the assault. They took 

some ice cream bars from Sanchez’s cart and fled with the boy. Joshua left shortly 

thereafter. Sanchez suffered swollen eyes, a broken nose and a cut lip. In a field show 

up conducted by Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputies, Sanchez identified Joshua as 

the person who had punched him and A.W. and Jasmine as the two girls who had taken 

his ice cream bars. 
3 

 Casilda Tovar looked out of her house and saw Joshua punching Sanchez in the 

face. Tovar stood in her doorway and yelled at Joshua to stop the assault. Joshua let 

Sanchez go and stepped back. Two girls came up and were laughing as they took some 

ice cream bars from Sanchez’s cart. Two other boys were standing about 10 feet away 

from Joshua, waiting for him. Joshua, the other boys, and the two girls then left together. 

In a field show up, Tovar identified Joshua to sheriff’s deputies as the person who had 

punched Sanchez, and A.W. and Jasmine as the two girls who had taken the ice cream 

bars. 

 At the close of the People’s evidence, Joshua’s counsel moved to dismiss the 

petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1; the juvenile court heard 

and denied the motion. 

 Joshua did not testify or offer other evidence in his defense.

1 

 With respect to Joshua, the primary issue was whether he had assaulted Sanchez 

for the purpose of aiding and abetting the robbery of Sanchez. Following argument by 

counsel, the juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Joshua had aided and 

abetted the commission of second degree robbery, a felony.2 

 3. The Disposition Hearing 

 The juvenile court declared Joshua a ward of the court, and ordered him into a 

nine-month camp community placement program and calculated the maximum term of 

confinement as five years. 

 

1 A.W. testified in her defense that Joshua, another boy and a girl approached 

Sanchez. According to A.W., the girl opened the lid of Sanchez’s cart, helped herself to 

some ice cream, and fled. Joshua and Sanchez then began fighting. A.W. waited at the 

corner while her friend Jasmine retrieved some ice cream bars that were lying on the 

ground after the fight. 

2 The juvenile court found the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

A.W. had committed second degree robbery and dismissed the petition against her. 
4 

DISCUSSION 

1. The Disputed Testimony 

 On direct examination, Deputy Alejandro Ramirez testified Jasmine had stated 

during an interview “that she was at the park and she saw . . . [Joshua and] . . uh -- 

Dosha? Or Daysha -- and another young Black running toward the ice cream man and I 

believe Daysha said, ‘We’re going to rob the ice cream man.’” Overruling the hearsay 

objection of Joshua’s counsel, the juvenile court admitted the testimony as an admission 

of a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy’s objective pursuant to Evidence Code 

section 12233, an exception to the hearsay rule. 

 2. Admission of the Disputed Testimony Was Harmless Error 

 The People’s theory throughout the jurisdiction hearing was that Joshua had aided 

and abetted the robbery by attacking and injuring Sanchez so Joshua’s accomplices could 

steal Sanchez’s ice cream bars from his cart. By seeking to introduce Deputy Ramirez’s 

testimony of what Jasmine told him had been related to her by Daysha, the People were 

attempting to demonstrate Joshua’s specific intent to permanently deprive Sanchez of his 

property. 

 Joshua contends the juvenile court committed prejudicial error when it failed to 

exclude this disputed testimony.4

 Deputy Ramirez’s testimony regarding what Jasmine 

said had been told to her by Daysha was, without question, a classic example of 

inadmissible “double-hearsay.” (See Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b); People v. Zapien

 

3 Evidence Code section 1223 provides: “Evidence of a statement offered against a 

party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: [¶] (a) The statement was made by 

the declarant while participating in a conspiracy to commit a crime . . . and in furtherance 

of the objective of that conspiracy; [¶] (b) The statement was made prior to or during the 

time that the party was participating in the conspiracy; and [¶] (c) The evidence is 

offered either after admission of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the facts 

specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) or, in the court’s discretion as to the order of proof, 

subject to the admission of such evidence.” 

4 We review the court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. (People 

v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 292.) 
5 

(1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 950-952.) The People do not assert any applicable exception for 

the admission of Jasmine’s statement to Ramirez and for Daysha’s purported statement to 

Jasmine. The latter did not qualify for admission under Evidence Code section 1223 in 

the absence of any independent evidence of a conspiracy involving Daysha and Joshua to 

rob Sanchez. (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 139 [“‘Evidence of a hearsay 

“statement” of a coconspirator is inadmissible against the defendant in the absence of 

“‘independent evidence to establish prima facie the existence of ... [a] conspiracy.’”].) 

Indeed, apart from the disputed testimony, nothing in the record suggested someone 

named Daysha had any connection with Joshua, was present during the robbery, or 

participated in any phase of the crime. While this multiple hearsay testimony was 

therefore not properly admitted, in light of the other evidence before the juvenile court, 

any error was plainly harmless, whether viewed through the prism of federal 

constitutional law (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 

L.Ed.2d 705] or state law (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836). 

 Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another 

from his or her person or immediate presence, and against his or her will accomplished 

by means of force or fear. (Pen. Code, § 211; People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 69.) 

A necessary element of the crime is the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner 

of his or her property. (People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 1002.) An aider and 

abettor of a specific intent crime like robbery shares the perpetrator’s specific intent when 

he or she knows of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and aids, promotes, encourages, or 

instigates the perpetrator with the intent of encouraging or facilitating the commission of 

the crime. (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1224.) Neither mere presence 

when a crime is committed, nor failure to prevent it, is sufficient, although those factors, 

as well as companionship, conduct before and after the offense, and flight may be 

considered in determining a defendant’s criminal responsibility. (People v. Garcia

(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 272-273; In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) 

 Here there was ample evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer 

that Joshua aided and abetted the robbery of Sanchez. Joshua and the other boy, together, 
6 

called out to Sanchez for ice cream and approached his cart. As Joshua stood beside 

Sanchez, the boy removed the lid from the cart and began to remove the ice cream bars. 

When Sanchez yelled and shoved his cart at the boy to stop the theft, Joshua pummeled 

Sanchez in the face, enabling the boy to flee with the ice cream bars. Joshua soon 

followed. 

This evidence, even without the disputed testimony, is sufficient to demonstrate 

Joshua’s specific intent to facilitate the theft of Sanchez’s property by physically 

disabling him. 

DISPOSITION 

 The order is affirmed. 

 ZELON, J. 

We concur: 

PERLUSS, P. J. 

WOODS, J.