Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1703-CR-631| April 27, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Vincent L. Scott

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lyubov Gore

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kenneth R. Kranz,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 27, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

29A02-1703-CR-631

Appeal from the Hamilton 

Superior Court

The Honorable Steven R. Nation, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

29D01-1507-FA-5840

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Kenneth R. Kranz (“Kranz”) was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of 

Class A felony child molesting and two counts of Class C felony child 
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molesting in the Hamilton Superior Court. The trial court sentenced Kranz to 

consecutive terms of fifty years for each Class A felony and to concurrent terms 

of six years for each Class C felony for an aggregate sentence of one hundred 

years. On appeal, Kranz argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced him. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] A.K. was born to Kranz and his wife in 1999. The first time A.K. remembers 

her father touching her inappropriately was when she was six years old. A.K. 

woke up in the middle of the night to Kranz covering her mouth and putting his 

fingers inside her vagina. Kranz continued to molest A.K. until she was 16 

years old including exposing himself to her, pinning her to the ground and 

humping her, sleeping in her bed and touching her inappropriately under her 

clothes, and attempting to walk in on her while she was in the bathroom. 

[4] Kranz also began molesting his intellectually disabled daughter K.K., born in 

2002, when she was around nine years old. On one occasion, K.K. was asleep 

in her parents’ car while she and her siblings waited for their mom to get off 

work. While waiting in the car, Kranz touched K.K.’s vagina with his fingers. 

Kranz first had sexual intercourse with K.K. when she was twelve and 

continued to do so several more times. Kranz molested K.K. until she was 

fourteen years old. 
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[5] In the summer of 2015, when A.K. was sixteen, she told a camp counselor 

about her father’s molestation. Law enforcement was informed, and both A.K. 

and K.K. were interviewed. Kranz was arrested and charged with two counts of 

Class A felony child molesting, two counts of Class B felony incest, and two 

counts of Class C felony child molesting. A three-day jury trial commenced on 

January 9, 2017, after which the jury found Kranz guilty as charged. 

[6] At Kranz’s sentencing hearing on March 2, 2017, the trial court identified nine 

aggravating factors including: (1) the ongoing nature of the abuse; (2) that there 

were distinct acts done to both girls; (3) that there were two victims; (4) the 

extent of physical and mental anguish and harm caused by the acts; (5) Kranz’s 

prior criminal history involving sexual matters; (6) that Kranz was in the 

position of care, custody, and control of the girls; (7) that K.K. had special 

needs; and (8) A.K.’s tender age at the time the molestation began. Tr. Vol. 4, 

p. 198. 

[7] Kranz offered mitigating factors for consideration “that his upbringing was 

inappropriate” and that he has “educational, cognitive learning disabilities.” Id.

at 199. However, the trial court declined to find them as mitigating factors 

because “nothing that the Court found concerning the incidents happening to 

these two girls were diminished by any of those factors.” Id. The court then 

sentenced Kranz to fifty years for each Class A felony and to concurrent terms 
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of six years for each Class C felony for an aggregate sentence of one hundred 

years.1

[8] Kranz now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Kranz claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. 

Sentencing decisions are generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). However, a trial court may 

be found to have abused its discretion in sentencing for: (1) failing to enter a 

sentencing statement; (2) entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons 

for imposing a sentence where the record does not support the reasons 

provided; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are both

clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering 

a sentencing statement in which the reasons provided are improper as a matter 

of law. Id. at 490–91. The reasons or omissions of reasons given by the trial 

court for a particular sentence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.

[10] Kranz first argues that “[t]he court here has failed to enter a sentencing 

statement at all.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. Kranz is mistaken. The court provided a 

detailed oral sentencing statement just before pronouncing its sentence: 

The Court finds concerning the sentencing in this cause that the 

Court looks at the aggravating circumstances of the length of the 

 

1 The trial court did not enter judgment on the Class B felony incest counts due to double jeopardy concerns.
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numerous acts, of the ongoing nature of the abuse, that they were 

distinct acts as to both victims, and that there were two victims. 

The extent of physical and mental anguish and harm caused by 

it, prior criminal history involving sexual matters, that he was in 

the position of care, custody, and control of these children. The 

testimony that was presented concerning K.K. being special 

needs and that A.K., the tender age at the time when these 

molestations started. The Court finds, notes for the mitigating 

circumstances that it does note that his upbringing was not 

appropriate and that he does have educational, cognitive learning 

disabilities. But nothing that the Court found concerning the 

incidents happening to these two girls were diminished by any of 

those factors so the Court will note them, but not find them as 

mitigating factors.

Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 198–99. Here, the trial court identified eight aggravating factors, 

and it noted the two mitigating circumstances offered by Kranz, but it declined

to find them as mitigating factors and provided its reason for not doing so. 

[11] The statement proffered allows us to “carry out our function of reviewing the 

trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing” as it provides “reasons for 

imposing the sentence” and facts that are particular to Kranz and the crime he 

committed. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490 (quoting Page v. State, 424 N.E.2d 

1021, 1023 (Ind. 1981)). And the finding of mitigating factors rests within the 

sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490–91. Simply 

put, the trial court’s sentencing statement was sufficient. See id. at 492; Gleason v. 

State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[12] Kranz also contends that the trial court improperly used a material element of 

the offense—A.K.’s age—as an aggravated circumstance justifying the 
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enhanced sentence. We disagree. An element of child molestation is that the 

child is under fourteen years of age, see Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3, and one of the 

aggravating factors that the trial court found here was “the tender age [of A.K.] 

at the time when these molestations started.” Tr. Vol. 4, p. 198. But our 

supreme court has explained “that even where the age of the victim is an 

element of the offense, the very young age of a child can support an enhanced 

sentence as a particularized circumstance of the crime.” Kimbrough v. State, 979 

N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2012). 

[13] Here, A.K. was only six years old when her father began molesting her. This is 

eight years below the statutory threshold for the offense. I.C. § 35-42-4-3. And 

the molestation of A.K. occurred over a ten-year period. Thus, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion when it considered A.K.’s young age as a proper 

aggravating circumstance justifying an enhanced sentence. See Buchanan v. State, 

767 N.E.2d 967, 971 (Ind. 2002) (finding the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion during sentencing when it noted the “victim’s particularly tender 

years (age 5)” as an aggravating circumstance); Reyes v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1124, 

1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it considered the age of the nine-year-old victim who was molested over a 

period of years as an aggravator). 
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Conclusion

[14] The trial court here provided a sufficient oral sentencing statement, and it did 

not abuse its discretion when it found A.K.’s young age as a proper aggravating 

circumstance. Accordingly, we affirm.

Najam, J., and Barnes, J., concur.