### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 3, 200 6 STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. STEP HEN LEE NOE Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 05-04011 Chris Cr aft, Jud ge

No. W2006-00439-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Dece m ber 27, 2006

T h e Ap p el l an t , S t ep h en L ee No e, p ro ce ed i n g pro s e , appea ls the s entenc ing decision of the Shelby CountyCriminal Court. Noe pled g uiltyto one count of st atutory rape and, following a se ntencing hearing, w as plac ed on a two- y ear period of pr obation. On appe al, Noe a rg ues that t h e t ri al court err ed by not gr anting judicial diversion. Afte r re view, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and R O BERT W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined. Stephen L ee N oe, Pro Se , Memphis, Tennesse e. Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attorne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; B re nt C. Che rry , As sis ta nt Attorne y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and, A landa Dwy er , As sistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
F ac tu al B ac kgr ound The Appe llant, ag e twenty -four , was e mploy ed by the C ity of Memphis and worked i n the “Property and Evidenc e Room” of the Me mphis P olice De partment. Th e Ap p ellant had be en employ ed in t h i s p o s i t i o n fo r over five y ear s at the time of the of fense . The Appe llant met the victim, ag e fifte en, in an internet chat room. He implied to he r that he had a cce ss to drug s that had been seized as evidence, and, beca use of his positi on, he could obtain dr ug s for he r. The A ppellant had a se x ual re lationship with t he victim from Oc tober, 2004 to “Dec ember , early J anuary , 2005.” I nitially , he stated that he believe d she wa s eig hteen y ear s old, but, in November, he le arne d that she was only fiftee n y ear s of ag e. Ne verthe less, he continued to e ng ag e in sexual relations with her f or approximately

four to six wee ks after

learning he r true a g e. Dur ing the same pe riod that theT h e re c o rd d o e s n o t c o n ta in a se x o ff e n d e r e v a lua tio n re p o rt, w h ic h is a p re re q u isite to a d e fen d a n t’s 1

co nsi d erat i o n fo r prob at i o n, pursuant t o t he T enness ee S t and ardized T reat m ent P rogram fo r S ex O f fend ers , i f

he or she h a s b e e n c o n v ic te d o f a “se x u a l o ff e n se ” a s d e fine d b y this a c t. See T

. C. A. § 39- 13- 705( b) ( Su pp. 2004). T h e def i n i t i on of “ s exu al offens e” i ncl udes t he offens e of s t at ut ory r ape. T

. C

. A

. § 39- 13

- 70 3(2) , ( 3) ( 20 03 )

. A convi ct ed s ex offender w ho i s seek i ng p ro b ati o n m ust s ub m i t t o an ev alua t i o n for the p urp o se o f i d en t i f yi ng an d assessing the o f fen d er’s ri sk o f re- o f fend i ng and po t ent i al fo r t reat m ent and t o est ab l i sh a t reat m ent plan and p roce d ures fo r mo ni tori ng be havi o r. St at e v . P i er ce , 138 S. W

. 3d 820 , 824 ( T enn . 200 4); T

. C

. A

. § 39

- 13

- 70 5(b)

. T he eva l uat i on r eport “ s hal l be i ncl uded a s p a rt o f t h e p re -se n te n c e re p o rt a n d sh a ll b e c o n sid e re d b y the c o u rt in d e te rm inin g the se n te n c ing issu e s sta te d in this s ect i on. ” P i er ce , 1 3 8 S .W .3 d a t 8 2 4 (c iti n g T .C .A . § 3 9 -1 3 -7 0 5 (b ))

. -2- Appellant wa s eng ag ed in a sexual re lationship with the fiftee n-y ear -old, he also eng ag ed in sex ual relations with an eightee n-y ear -old, who was a friend of the victim. At the sentenc ing he aring , the Appellant testified that he was awa re his c onduct was unlawful; howeve r, he explained, “ [he] wasn’t thinking straig ht.” The proof at the hearing established that the Appellant wa s single, a high sc hool g raduate, and c urre ntly

employ ed at a

C i t go s er v i ce station in Memphis. The pre-se ntence report ref lects that the Appe llant has no prior c riminal history

. At t h e co nclusion of the sente ncing 1 hearing, the trial court denied the Appellant’ s reque st for judicial diversion a nd imposed a sentenc e of two y ear s, which wa s suspended. Ana lys is
Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -3 13 (2 00 3 & Sup p. 20 04 ), c omm on ly re fe rr e d to a s th e jud ic ia l di ve rs ionstatut e , p ro vid e s th a t: The c ourt may

defe r further proc eeding s ag ainst a qualified de fendant and placesuch defe n d an t on probation upon such r easona ble conditions as it may

requirewithout e nte ri ng a jud g me nt o f g uil ty

a ndwi th the c on se nt o f the qu a lif ie d d e fe nd a nt. A “qua lified defe ndant” is one that is f ound g uilty or pleads g uilty or nolo c ontendre to the offe nse, is not seeking defe rra l or furthe r proc eeding s for a “sexual offe nse” or a C l ass A or B felony , and has not previously

been c onvicted of a

felony o r a C l ass A misdemea nor. T.C.A. § 40-35- 313(a) (1)( B) (i)(a )-( c). Theoffe nse of statutory rape is not listed among the “sexual offe nses” whic h would disqualify

a def endant so the A ppellant is statutorilyelig ible for judicial diver sion. See T.C.A. § 40-35-313( a)( 1)(B )(ii) (Supp. 2004).

T h e A p p el l an tap p ea l s t h e t ri al co u rt 's d en i al o f j u d i ci al d i v er s i o n s p ec i fi ca l l y as s er t i n g: The purp ose of this Appea l is to ask the court to rec onsider the se ntencing of Mr. Noe, due to fac ts that were not acc urate ly prese nted at the time of the Trial an (sic) ult imate ly

theJudg e ba se d th e se nte nc ing on thefa c ts h e ha d b e fo rehim

. Ad dit ion a lly , theAp pe llant a sse rt s o n a pp e a l, “ I a m a sking thec ou rt

to r e c on sid e r m y

se nte nc ing to be re duced f

rom 2 y ear s to 1 y ear

and allow diver sion and to expunge my rec ord.”-3-

Ou r s e nte nc ing a c t pr ov ide s th a t a de fe nd a nt in a c ri min a l c a se ma y app e a l f ro m th e le ng th or manne r of se rvice of the sente nce imposed by the sentenc ing c ourt based upon oneor both of the following gro u n ds: (1) the sente nce w as not imposed in acc ordanc e with this chapter ; or (2) the enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors wer e not weig hed prope rly , and the se ntence is e x cessive unde r the sentenc ing c onsiderations set out in § 40-35-103. T.C.A. § 40- 35-401(b) (1),( 2) (2003)

. I n this appeal, the A ppellant fa ils to articulate how the sentenc ing de cision of the trial c ourt is in con grue nt w iththese nte nc ing a c t a ndfails to i de nti fy a ny se nte nc ing e rr or

by thetria l c ou rt

. Rather, the A ppellant re quests that this court mere ly rec onsider his sentenc e and g rant him judicial diversion, modified by one y ear of probation, in order that he can “go forwar d with [hi s] life and do something c onstructive.” It is not t his court' s prer og ative to “re consider” a def endant' s sentenceon app e a l w he reno se nte nc ing e rr or is i de nti fi e d b y

theAp pe llant. As is o ft e n q uo te d b y thi s c ou rt : U n d e r th e 1 9 8 9 A c t, th is Co u rt may p r e s u me th e tria l c o u rt' s d e te r mi n a ti o n s to be corr ect. I f appe llate re view reflects that the trial c ourt, by following the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, imposed a l awf ul sentence , afte r having g iven due c on sid e ratio n a nd pr op e r we ig ht to the fa c tor s a nd princ ipl e s wh ic h are re le va nt to sentenc ing unde r the Ac t, and that the trial c ourt' s findings of fac t upo n which the sentenc e is based a

re a dequate ly

supported in the record, then w e may not disturb the se nte nc e e ve n if

we wo uldha ve pr e fe rr e d a dif fe re nt r e su lt. State v. Fletc her , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. I n denying the Appellant' s reque st for judicial diversion, the tria l court ente red the following fi nd ing s: I fi ndthat he ’s a mia

ble[sic ] to c or

re c tio n un de r the div e rs ionqu a lif ic a tio ns in S tate vs. Parker . The c ircumstance s of the offe nse wer e somewhat ag g ravated. He ha s no criminal re cord. He ha s a fairly

g ood social history

. . . . [H] e worked in the Property Room for . . . f ive or more y ear s, which g ives him a g ood employ ment history until he wa s f i r e d f o r t h i s , u s i n g h i s j o b t o h e l p h i mg e ta c c e s s t o t h i s g i r l ’ s b o d y. He has g ood phy sical and mental health. I can’ t say that this case ha s much deter rent va l u e, t h er e’ s been no pr oof of that. No oneelse is g oing to say well, I better not ha ve sex with that kid beca use of what happene d to Mr. Noe, be cause it’s not a hig hly

publicized case. Another f actor other than the circ umstances of the offense being somew hat a g g ra vate d o r w he the r j ud ic ia l di ve rs ionwi ll s e rv e theint e re st o f the pu bli c a s w e ll as the a ccuse d, no question would serve his interest. But my problem with diversion is that he’s worke d for the g overnme nt and he’ s misused his posi tion.-4- He’ s had sex with thi s g irl as well as he r friends . . . . [M] y conce rn is is [ sic] that he may

do this ag ain at some point. He may g et a g overnme nt job or a job wher e he abuse s trust ag ain, and I think it would be good: (1) That he have this on his record so t h at h e d o es not ever work for the g overnme nt ag ain; and (2) I think he needs to re port bec ause I think h e n eeds to be reg istering every

y ear as a se x offe nder. And so for that rea son because of the c ircumstance s of the off ense and the fac t that I don’t think diversion will serve the interest of the public is that I ’m g oing to have to deny

his diversion.
I n determining whe ther to g rant judicial diver sion, the trial court must consider the following fac tors: (a) the acc used’s a menability to correc t i o n ; (b) the c ircumstance s of the off ense; (c ) the acc used’s c riminal rec ord; (d) the acc used’s social history ; ( e) the status of the ac cused’ s phy sical and mental he alth; and (f) the deter renc e value to the acc used as we ll as others. Sta te v . Le wis , 978 S.W .2d 558, 5 6 6 (T enn. C rim. App. 1997), perm. to appeal de nied , (T en n . 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Bonestel , 871 S.W .2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) ). The trial court s h o uld also consider whether judicial diversion will serve the ends of justice, and the interest of the public a s well as the acc used. Id . A dd iti on a l f a c tor s w hic h may

bec on sid e re d in c lud e theAp pe llant’ s atti tud e , h is be ha vio r s ince his arr e st, his ho me e nv ir on me nt, c ur re nt dru g us a g e , e mot ion a l st abil ity , p a st employ ment, g ener al re putation, family responsibilities, and the atti t u d e o f law e nforc ement. Id

. (c i t i n g State v. W

ashington , 866 S.W .2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993) ). The de cision of whethe r to g rant a reque st for judicial diversion lies wi thin the sound dis c re tio n o f the tria l c ou rt , a nd thi s c ou rt wi ll no t dis tur b th a t de c isi on on app e a l a bs e nt an a

bu se o f di scre tion. State v. Robinson , 1 39 S.W. 3d66 1, 66 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 04 ); State v. Electroplating, Inc. , 9 90 S.W. 2d21 1, 22 9 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 98 ). An abu se of dis c re tio n e xists if the record contains no substantial evidenc e to s upport the denial. State v. Parke r , 932 S.W .2d 945, 95 8 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ); State v. Hamm ersley , 650 S.W .2d 352, 356 (Tenn. 1993)

. Thereis substantial evidence to support the trial co u rt 's d enial of judicia l diversion. The Appellant wa s twenty -four y ear s old and had be en employ ed by the Memphis Police Depa rtment for over f ive y ear s when he engaged i n sexual relations with a fiftee n-y ear -old g irl. The Appe llant i m p l i ed t h ath e h ad ac ce s s t o d ru gs wh i ch h ad b ee n s e i z ed as ev i d en ce an d i m p l i ed t h att h e d ru gs co u l d b e m ad e a v ai l ab l e t o t h e m i n o r v i ct i m . Fo r t h es e r ea s o n s , we agr e e w i t h t h e t ri al co u rt 's finding that the Appellant “ misused” his position of tru s t as an em p l oy ee of the Memphis Police De pa rt me nt. Mo re ov e r, there c or d d e mon str a te s th a t th e fa c tor s o f the Ap pe llant' s a me na bil ity to c or re c tio n, thec ir c ums ta nc e s o f the of fe ns e , a ndthede te rr e nc e va lue to the Ap pe llant, a s we ll a s to others, militate ag ainst the g rant of judicia l diversion. Acc ording ly , no abuse of discretion is shown.-5- CO NC LU SION
Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the judgme nt of the Shelby CountyCriminal Court is aff irmed.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE