COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JOHN HAMPTON CAMP, JR.,

 Appellant, 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee. 

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§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

No. 08-22-00206-CR

Appeal from the 

207th Judicial District Court

of Comal County, Texas 

(TC# CR2019-077) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Appellant John Hampton Camp, Jr. of two counts of sexual assault of a 

child. Appellant raises two issues challenging his convictions. First, he argues the evidence is 

legally insufficient to support his convictions. Second, he argues the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying him the opportunity to cross-examine a State’s witness regarding biases. For 

the following reasons, we affirm Appellant’s convictions.1

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual background 

1. R.M.’s testimony 

1 This case was transferred from our sister court in Austin, and we decide it in accordance with the precedent of that

court to the extent required by TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 
2

The victim in this case, R.M.,2 was nineteen years old at the time of trial and fifteen years 

old at the time of the offenses. Appellant was R.M.’s stepfather. Appellant and R.M.’s mother,

Jennifer Camp, lived with R.M. and her siblings in a house in New Braunfels, Texas. R.M. testified

that while she lived there, Appellant “took advantage of [her] and touched [her] inappropriately” 

by “us[ing] his fingers to touch [her] vagina.” R.M. recalled that the abuse initially consisted of

Appellant touching her vagina with his fingers, which was “almost a daily occurrence.” Appellant 

would use his fingers to touch R.M. “[i]nside the inner labia, occasionally within the vaginal canal 

and along the clitoris.”3 R.M. also testified that in 2016, Appellant performed oral sex on her for 

the first time: he “would place his tongue inside the vaginal canal, [and] brush along the outer labia 

and along the clitoris.” This also occurred on an “almost daily” basis and it was “kind of hard to 

count” how often Appellant touched R.M.’s vagina with his fingers and mouth over a period of at 

least several months in 2016. Appellant also attempted to touch R.M. with his penis on one 

occasion. Appellant would pretend he was sleeping when he would touch R.M., but R.M. did not 

think that Appellant was actually sleeping. The abuse usually occurred when Jennifer was at work. 

On the evening of September 13, 2018, R.M. was in her bedroom when Appellant laid 

down on her bed “pretending to be tired and exhausted from the day’s work and had placed himself 

between [R.M.’s] legs.” Appellant pretended to fall asleep, shoved her shorts and underwear aside, 

and “started to orally touch [R.M.’s] vagina” by using his tongue to “brush[] against the labia and 

the clitoris occasionally inserting his tongue into the vaginal canal.” R.M. was using her sister’s 

cell phone during the incident and was “trying [her] best to pretend it wasn’t happening.” At some 

2 To protect the victim’s identity, we refer to her by her initials in place of her true name. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10.

3 When the prosecutor asked R.M. how she knew these anatomical terms, R.M. responded that she learned them from

Jennifer, who is a nurse.
3

point, Jennifer walked into the room and everybody “kind of froze,” while Appellant attempted to 

“pretend like nothing was happening.” Jennifer told R.M. to leave the room. Jennifer later asked 

her what was going on, and R.M. initially had difficulty responding. R.M. subsequently explained 

to Jennifer what had happened and told Jennifer she was sorry and did not know how to explain 

the abuse. 

Jennifer sent R.M. and her siblings to her grandmother’s house, and the following day R.M. 

had a sexual-assault examination performed by a nurse. When asked why she did not tell anybody 

about the abuse, R.M. explained that she did not want to harm her family or force her siblings to 

go through a divorce between Appellant and Jennifer. R.M. also recalled that Appellant told her 

his livelihood and their family would be ruined and it would be R.M.’s fault if anybody found out 

about the abuse.

2. Jennifer Camp’s testimony

Jennifer testified that she married Appellant in October 2006. At the time of the offenses, 

Appellant and Jennifer’s marriage was “a little bit strained.” They were not spending a lot of time 

together; Appellant would frequently sleep in the game room at their house. 

Regarding the September 13, 2018 incident, Jennifer went to work in the morning and left 

R.M. and her stepbrother, Isaiah Camp, at the house. When Jennifer returned home earlier than 

usual that afternoon, she asked Isaiah where Appellant was, and Isaiah told her Appellant was in 

R.M.’s room. Isaiah had a “worried” look on his face at the time. Jennifer went to R.M.’s room, 

opened the door, and saw R.M. laying on her bed “with [Appellant’s] face at her genitals.” 

Jennifer saw that Appellant had R.M.’s shorts and underwear pulled over and “had his left hand 

moving her labia kind of up and out of the way. He was performing oral sex and had his finger in 

her vagina.” Neither R.M. nor Appellant said anything when Jennifer went into the room, and 
4

Appellant removed his finger from R.M.’s vagina, turned over on the bed, and closed his eyes “as 

if to demonstrate he was sleeping.” Jennifer did not believe Appellant was sleeping. R.M. and 

Jennifer left the room and went downstairs. Jennifer asked her, “[D]id I just see what I think I 

saw,” and R.M. nodded yes. Jennifer asked R.M. if Appellant had done this before and asked her 

a few more questions while they were in Jennifer’s bedroom. Appellant knocked on the door and 

asked if everything was okay. Jennifer had a brief conversation with Appellant outside the room. 

He was not very forthcoming. Jennifer told Appellant to go to his father’s house and she would 

speak to him there. 

While at Appellant’s father’s house, Appellant gave Jennifer conflicting explanations for 

the incident in a long conversation, contending he either could not do what he was accused of or 

he did not remember anything. Jennifer told Appellant to go back to their house and pack some 

clothes so he could stay elsewhere. Jennifer went to the Comal County Crisis Center the next day

to seek counseling for R.M.

3. SANE nurse’s testimony

That evening, on the day after the incident, R.M. underwent a sexual-assault examination

performed by Crystal Schwerdtfeger, a registered sexual-assault nurse examiner (SANE). 

Schwerdtfeger testified that during the examination, R.M. told her that Appellant “put his fingers 

in her nether region” and similarly used “[h]is mouth on [her] nether region.” When Schwerdtfeger 

examined R.M.’s vagina, she found erythema on the fossa navicularis and vaginal vestibule, which 

Schwerdtfeger explained meant “redness” that was not caused by a disease in the “space between 

the hymen and the perineum . . . [and] in the same area [in] the opposite direction.” 

Schwerdtfeger’s observations of R.M.’s vagina were “[a]bnormal” and “could be consistent with 
5

the types of sexual acts as described by [R.M.],” but Schwerdtfeger acknowledged that the redness 

she observed has different potential causes in females R.M.’s age.

4. Defense witnesses’ testimony

In his case-in-chief, Appellant presented testimony from his sister, Stephanie Eichmann, 

who testified that Appellant had a good relationship with R.M. Eichmann recalled that Appellant 

and Jennifer’s relationship deteriorated over the years. Eichmann, a mandatory reporter herself,

stated she never saw anything that would have indicated Appellant was abusing R.M. Appellant’s 

son Quentin also testified that Appellant and Jennifer’s marriage deteriorated as time went on. And 

his son Isaiah testified that it was common for Appellant to go into R.M.’s room and play on a 

keyboard with her because they shared a common interest in music. 

B. Procedural history

The State of Texas charged Appellant with one count of continuous sexual abuse of a young 

child (Count I) and two counts of sexual assault of a child (Counts II and III). During Jennifer’s 

cross-examination testimony, Appellant attempted to question her regarding her “extravagant 

purchases” over the past years, and the State objected on relevance grounds. The trial court 

sustained the objection, and defense counsel explained the question was “relevant to show the state 

of mind of this complainant and the possible biases regarding her testimony.” The trial court 

disagreed and sustained the objection. The jury found Appellant guilty of both counts of sexual 

abuse of a child but found him not guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The jury assessed 

punishment of twenty years’ imprisonment on both counts of sexual assault of a child. This appeal 

followed. 

Appellant challenges his convictions in two issues, arguing (1) the evidence is legally 

insufficient to support his convictions, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by preventing 
6

defense counsel from cross-examining Jennifer regarding her recent purchases because the line of 

questioning was appropriate to expose her bias to testify. 

II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

In his first issue, Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions, arguing the evidence showing his commission of the charged offenses was 

“inconsistent and in large part crafted by [Jennifer],” and R.M.’s testimony contained many 

inconsistencies thus undermining her allegations against him.

A. Standard of review and applicable law

The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee requires that legally sufficient 

evidence support every conviction. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1979); Brooks 

v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In a legal-sufficiency challenge, we focus 

solely on whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, would 

permit any rational jury to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 (establishing legal sufficiency under

Jackson v. Virginia as the only standard for review of the evidence).

Applying that standard, we recognize the jury as the sole arbiter of witness credibility and 

the weight attached to witness testimony. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2020); Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Only the jury acts “to resolve 

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic 

facts to ultimate facts.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, the jury may choose to 

believe or disbelieve any testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts 
7

in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2014) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). In conducting a legal-sufficiency review, 

“[w]e are not to sit as a thirteenth juror reweighing the evidence or deciding whether we believe 

the evidence established the element in contention beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” Blankenship v. 

State, 780 S.W.2d 198, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Instead, “we test the evidence to see if it is at 

least conclusive enough for a reasonable factfinder to believe based on the evidence that the 

element is established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Here, Appellant challenges his convictions for sexual assault of a child. In particular, the 

State alleged in Count II that on or about September 13, 2018, Appellant intentionally or 

knowingly penetrated R.M.’s sexual organ with his finger or fingers. In Count III, the State alleged 

in two separate paragraphs that on the same day, Appellant intentionally or knowingly penetrated 

R.M.’s sexual organ with his mouth or tongue and caused R.M.’s sexual organ to contact his mouth 

or tongue. 

As applicable here, an actor commits sexual assault of a child if he intentionally or 

knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means or if the 

actor causes the sexual organ of a child to contact the mouth of another person, including the actor. 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011(a)(2)(A), (C). A “child” means a person younger than seventeen

years of age. Id. § 22.011(c)(1). 

B. Analysis

R.M. testified that she was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged offenses in 2018. 

Regarding Count II (penetration by Appellant’s finger or fingers), although R.M. testified that 

Appellant penetrated her vagina with his finger on numerous prior occasions, she did not testify 
8

that Appellant penetrated her vagina with his finger during the incident on September 13, 2018. 

Nevertheless, the State established penetration by Appellant’s finger during that particular incident 

through other means. Jennifer testified that when she entered R.M.’s bedroom, she observed that 

Appellant “had his left hand moving her labia kind of up and out of the way . . . and had his finger 

in her vagina,” and she saw Appellant remove his finger when she told R.M. to go downstairs. 

Schwerdtfeger also wrote in her SANE report and testified at trial that R.M. told her during the 

September 14, 2018 SANE examination, Appellant had “put his fingers in [R.M.’s] nether region”

the previous evening. Schwerdtfeger understood R.M.’s use of the term “nether region” referred

to “female genitalia.” Schwerdtfeger also testified that R.M.’s vagina had redness that could be 

consistent with R.M.’s description of Appellant’s abuse.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, this evidence is sufficient to allow a jury 

to rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed sexual assault of a child by 

intentionally or knowingly causing the penetration of R.M.’s sexual organ with his finger as 

alleged in Count II. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2)(A) (an actor commits sexual assault 

of a child if he intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a 

child by any means).

As for Count III (penetration by Appellant’s mouth), R.M. testified that on September 13, 

2018, she was in her bedroom when Appellant came into the room, pretended to be asleep, and 

“started to orally touch [R.M.’s] vagina” by using his tongue to “brush[] against the labia and the 

clitoris occasionally inserting his tongue into the vaginal canal.” Jennifer also testified that she saw 

Appellant “performing oral sex” on R.M. when she entered her bedroom, and Schwerdtfeger

testified that R.M. told her during the SANE examination that Appellant used his mouth on her 

“nether region” on the night in question. 
9

Again, this evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict is sufficient to allow 

a jury to rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed sexual assault of a 

child as alleged in Count III. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2)(C) (an actor commits 

sexual assault of a child if he intentionally or knowingly causes the sexual organ of a child to 

contact the mouth of another person, including the actor). 

On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his 

convictions because the evidence was “inconsistent and in large part crafted by the Appellant’s 

former partner[,] Jennifer Camp[.]” Appellant also asserts that R.M.’s testimony contained 

“multiple discrepancies” in her description of the relevant events and her recollections about her 

age when they occurred, thus rendering it impossible for a rational jury to have found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the alleged offenses. Finally, he claims that no rational 

trier of fact could believe that Appellant could perform the acts in R.M.’s bedroom, which 

contained multiple entryways, often with a door left open, through which other people could have

entered and observed him committing the abuse.

Under the appropriate standard of review, we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our 

judgment for the jury’s. Instead, we must presume the jury resolved any conflicts in the evidence 

in favor of the verdict and defer to the jury’s factual determinations from the evidence. See Clayton, 

235 S.W.3d at 778; Blankenship, 780 S.W.2d at 207. And given the jury’s guilty verdict, we 

consider Appellant’s theories that Jennifer fabricated her testimony or that he could not have 

abused R.M. in her bedroom without being caught as being impliedly rejected by the jury. See 

Maillart v. State, No. 08-20-00232-CR, 2022 WL 970334, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 31, 

2022, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (because a reviewing court cannot reweigh the 

evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder, any inconsistencies in the evidence 
10

supporting a defensive theory should be treated as impliedly considered and rejected by the fact 

finder in light of its verdict).

In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that 

any rational jury could have found each of the elements of sexual assault of a child in Counts II 

and III beyond a reasonable doubt, thus legally sufficient evidence supports Appellant’s 

convictions for sexual assault of a child.

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.

III. LIMITATION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION

In his second issue, citing to a sole page in the trial transcript, Appellant argues the trial 

court abused its discretion by denying Appellant “an opportunity to effectively cross examine the 

witness Jennifer Camp to show that she had an interest the [sic] outcome of the divorce and child 

custody proceedings and motive to exaggerate or fabricate testimony against Appellant to gain a 

benefit in the pending divorce proceedings.”

A. Appellant did not preserve his complaint for our review

The relevant exchange at trial is as follows.

Defense counsel: [W]hen you took the stand you indicated that [Appellant] is still your 

husband?

Jennifer: Yes

Defense counsel: Okay. Y’all are not divorced?

Jennifer: Not yet. 

Defense counsel: Okay. Is that in the—in the process?

Jennifer: Sort of. It’s difficult to say. We—we initially started the process. I was advised 

by my attorney to try to get through this first that being before the pandemic shut down the 

world for two years.
11

Defense counsel: Isn’t it true in the last couple of years you bought—had some extravagant 

purchases?

State: Objection; relevance again.

The Court: Sustained

Defense counsel: Your Honor, I believe it’s relevant to show the state of mind of this 

complainant and the possible biases regarding her testimony.

The Court: I sustained it. That doesn’t make any sense at all. 

Defense counsel: I’ll pass the witness . . . .

The State argues that this issue is not preserved for our review because Appellant failed to 

make an offer of proof regarding the substance of the excluded testimony. We agree. To preserve 

a complaint regarding the exclusion of evidence, a party must make an offer of proof setting forth 

the substance of the proffered evidence. Lopez v. State, Nos. 03-18-00713-CR, 03-18-00714-CR, 

2020 WL 3468149, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication) (citing Mays, 285 S.W.3d at 889); see TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2) (requiring a party 

to inform the trial court of the substance of excluded evidence by “an offer of proof” unless its 

substance was apparent from the context). “The primary purpose of an offer of proof is to enable 

an appellate court to determine whether the exclusion was erroneous and harmful. A secondary 

purpose is to permit the trial judge to reconsider his ruling in light of the actual evidence.” Mays 

v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

If the offer of proof is in the form of a statement from counsel, the proffer “must include a 

reasonably specific summary of the evidence offered and must state the relevance of the evidence 

unless the relevance is apparent, so that the court can determine whether the evidence is relevant 

and admissible.” Id. (quoting Warner v. State, 969 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The offer of proof must include more than the anticipated questions the 
12

party intends to ask the witness and must reveal, “with some degree of specificity, the substantive 

evidence [the complaining party] intended to present[.]” Id. at 890. Absent an offer a proof, “there 

is nothing before the appellate court to show reversible error in the trial court’s ruling.” Price v. 

State, No. 03-17-00056-CR, 2018 WL 5629129, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 31, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, defense counsel cross-examined Jennifer extensively regarding her marriage to 

Appellant, which was “strained” at the time of the offenses in 2018. After questioning Jennifer 

about the incident on September 13, 2018, and subsequent events, defense counsel asked whether 

Jennifer had divorced Appellant, and she indicated that she was still married to him and that the 

trial and the COVID-19 pandemic had impeded progress on the divorce. Defense counsel then 

asked, “Isn’t it true in the last couple of years you bought—had some extravagant purchases?” to 

which the prosecutor objected on the relevance grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. 

Defense counsel responded that the question was “relevant to show the state of mind of this 

complainant and the possible biases regarding her testimony.” The trial court disagreed and again 

sustained the prosecutor’s objection. Defense counsel then ended his cross-examination of Jennifer 

and did not make an offer of proof regarding the specific nature of the testimony regarding 

“extravagant purchases” and how it was “relevant to show the state of mind of [R.M.] and the 

possible biases regarding her testimony.”

For the first time on appeal, Appellant argues that defense counsel’s line of questioning 

would have exposed Jennifer’s bias to testify and undercut her credibility because it would have 

demonstrated that “she had an “interest [in] the outcome of the divorce and child custody 

proceedings and motive to exaggerate or fabricate testimony against Appellant to gain a benefit in 

the pending divorce proceedings.” But these assertions were not present in defense counsel’s 
13

response to the trial court’s ruling, nor did they appear elsewhere in the record. For these reasons, 

this issue is not preserved for our review. See Lopez, 2020 WL 3468149, at *3–4 (defendant’s 

complaint regarding excluded testimony was not preserved for appellate review where defense 

counsel did not make an offer of proof summarizing what a witness’s excluded testimony would 

have been); Price, 2018 WL 5629129, at *4 (same).

B. Any error was harmless

Even if the trial court erred by excluding Jennifer’s testimony, any error would have been 

harmless. Generally, the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is nonconstitutional error 

reviewed under the harmless-error standard in TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). See Morales v. State, 32 

S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). However, the exclusion of evidence may rise to the level 

of constitutional error if the excluded evidence “forms such a vital portion of the case that 

exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense.” Potier v. State, 68 

S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). As noted above, Appellant was permitted to crossexamine Jennifer extensively on difficulties in their marriage and defense counsel later contended 

in his closing argument that Jennifer’s desire to gain an advantage in the impending divorce formed 

the motive for Jennifer to fabricate her testimony against Appellant. Because Appellant was not 

totally precluded from presenting his defensive theory associated with the purported error, we 

review the error under TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). See Morales, 32 S.W.3d at 867.

Under Rule 44.2(b), we must disregard an error arising from the exclusion of evidence 

unless it affected the defendant’s “substantial rights.” Runels v. State, No. 03-18-00036-CR, 2018 

WL 6381537, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 6, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b)). A substantial right is not affected “when, after 

examining the record as a whole, the reviewing court has a fair assurance that the error did not 
14

influence the jury or had but a slight effect.” Id. (quoting McDonald v. State, 179 S.W.3d 571, 578 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing an error arising from 

the admission or exclusion of evidence for harm, we review (1) the character of the alleged error 

and how it might be connected to other evidence, (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the 

verdict, (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt, and (4) whether the 

State emphasized the complained of error. Id. (citing Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2002)). “The reviewing court may also consider the jury instructions, the State’s theory 

and any defensive theories, closing arguments and even voir dire, if applicable.” Id. (quoting

Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the exclusion of Jennifer’s testimony regarding her expensive purchases may have 

bolstered the notion that her marriage to Appellant was strained by providing another ground of 

marital conflict between Jennifer and Appellant. But Jennifer did not dispute that she and 

Appellant had difficulties in their marriage or that there was an impending divorce between them. 

Thus, any benefit to Appellant’s defense from eliciting this testimony would have been minimal. 

Moreover, defense counsel was permitted to cross-examine Jennifer and other witnesses at length

on the marital difficulties she had with Appellant, and defense counsel was not precluded from 

presenting his defensive theory during closing arguments that Jennifer had motive to fabricate her 

testimony against Appellant to secure an advantage in a future divorce. Finally, as recounted 

above, the evidence supporting Appellant’s convictions was strong and did not rest solely on 

Jennifer’s testimony, but also came in the form of testimony from R.M. and Schwerdtfeger as well 

as Schwerdtfeger’s SANE report. 

Because there is a fair assurance that the purported error did not influence the verdict or 

had only a slight effect, if any, we cannot say that Appellant’s substantial rights were affected by 
15

the error. We conclude that any purported error from the exclusion of Jennifer’s testimony would 

have been harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); see also Montgomery v. State, 383 S.W.3d 722, 

728–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (any error in excluding witness testimony 

regarding her bias to testify was harmless where, inter alia, the defendant was otherwise “freely 

permitted” to cross-examine the witness and strong evidence supported the conviction).

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgments supporting Appellant’s convictions.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

May 23, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Soto, J., and Marion, C.J. (Ret.)

Marion, C.J. (Ret.) (sitting by assignment)

(Do Not Publish)