### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 12, 200 6
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LISA MA RIE B UTL ER
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 04-00222 Chris Cr aft, Jud ge

No. W2005-01964-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Novem ber 7, 2006

A Shelby Countyjury

convicted the defe ndant, L isa Marie Butler , of first deg ree felony murder a nd ag g ravated child abuse , see T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, - 15-402 (2003) , in connec tion with the J une 17, 2003 death of her eig ht-month-old child, Dewa y ne B utler. The tr ial court sente nced the defe ndant
a s a Vi ole nt O ff

e nd e r t o lif

e imp ri so nme nt at 10 0 pe rc e nt fo r the fe lon y mur de r co nv ic tio n a ndto 20 y ear s and six months at 100 perc ent for the ag g ravated child abuse conviction, with concur rent service of the sente nces. On appeal, t he defenda nt contests the leg al suffic iency of the c onvicting evidenc e at trial and arg ues that her sentenc e for the a g g ravated child abuse conviction is excessive. Af te r o ur re vie w o f the re c or d a ndthe pa rt ie s’ br ie fs , w e a ff

ir m th e de fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio ns

.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t a r e Affir m e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., deli vere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Robert J ones, District Public Defe nder, a nd Trent Ha ll, As s istant Publ ic Def ender (at trial) ; and Phy llis Aluko, Assi stant Publi c De fende r (on a ppeal) , for the A ppellant, L isa Marie Butler

. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Sophia S. L ee, A ssistant Att o rn e y G e n e r a l; William L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Alanda Dwy er, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

Vi e we d in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the Sta te , th e e vid e nc e a t tria l di sc los e d th a t in 2003, Deway ne Holl o wa y l i v ed in a two be droom apa rtment at 400 South L auder dale in Shelby County . Holloway ’s g irlfriend, the defe ndant, lived with h i m as did two of Holloway ’s childre n, four- y ear -old J oshua Holloway and eig ht-month-old Dewa y n e Butler. The defe ndant was the infant’s mother.-2- Holloway had full-tim e em p loy ment as an automotive technician a t I nside Out Transmission where his work schedule was “basic ally nine to f ive.” On J une 17, 2003, Holloway
we nt t o w or

k a t 8: 00 a .m. a ndle ft

wo rk a t app ro xima te ly 4:3 0 p. m. He pla nn e d to g o h ome , d re ss, and then a ttend the ceremony for his g raduation from Tennessee Tec hnology Center, whe re he had completed automotive technolog y classes. H olloway

testified that the def

end an t and the infant vic tim ha d a c c omp a nie d h im t o w or k tha t day , an d on the wa y ho me , Hol low a y sto pp e d “ a t a c ou ple of plac es” looking to purcha se film for the de fenda n t ’s camera beca use she ha d ag ree d to take photogr aphs at Hollowa y ’s g raduation. Holloway was unable to loc ate came ra film, and bec ause he neede d to go home and dre ss, he declined to stop a t any other plac es. Holloway

stated, “A nd afte r we c ouldn’t find film, . . . [ the def endant] just kind of got upset.”

When the g roup arrived at the apa rtment, Holloway

noticed that his teena g e childre n, Christ op he r an d Phoe nix, we re sit tin g a nd wa iti ng on the po rc h. Th e de fe nd a nt w e nt d ir e c tly int o the apa rtment, leaving the victim in his ca r seat. Holloway remove d the victim from his vehicle, a nd Phoenix car

ried him into the apartment. H olloway then car ried the victim to the upstairs be droom and plac ed him in a play pen that also ser ved as the victim’s crib. Holloway prepa red to take a shower, but f

irst he aske d the def

endant to cle an his shoes. The de fenda nt “basica lly said no,” a nd Holloway asked his son Christopher to pe rfor m the task. Holloway mentioned to the def

endant that the victim’s diaper neede d to be chang ed, and the defendant said that she would do so. Howeve r, afte r Holloway showere d, he noticed that the defe ndant had not c hang ed the vict i m ’s d iaper

. Holloway asked the defe ndant a se cond ti me to chang e the diape r, but the def endant did not re spond. The de fenda nt did tell Holloway that she would not be attending his gr aduation, and H olloway and the older c hildren left the apartment at a pproxi mately 4:50 p.m. to drive to Missi ssippi Boulevar d Christian Church wher e the c ere mony was be ing he ld.

Once at the chur ch, Holloway turned off

his cellular tele phone a s re q u es t ed bythe ins truc tor s. Th e c e re mon y la ste d a pp ro xima te ly

on e ho ur , a nd a ft e rw ard s, Ho llo wa y turne d o n h is cellular telephone a nd d i s co vere d that he had r ece ived 10 messag es fr om the defe ndant and a neig hbor advising that the victim “had a acc ident” and was be ing ta ken to the hospital. Holloway contac ted the def

endant who e x plained that the victim ha d choked while being fed, that she rushe d the victim to the hospital, and that the victim died at the hospital. Holloway drove to the hospital wher e he e ncounter ed the de fenda nt and the def endant’ s family . Severa l day s later, the de fenda nt admitted to Ho l l o wa y t h at she ha d struck the victim once in the stomach and onc e in the hea d beca use the victim “wa s hollering and wouldn’t shut up.”

Hol lo w a y r e late d th a t e ar li e r th a t s a me y e ar in A p r il , th e v ic ti m h a d s u s ta in e d a fra cture d skull and broken wrist. At the time of those injuries, Holloway was inca rce rate d, and the defe ndant told him that the injuries wer e cause d when the de fenda nt’s 11-y ear -old sister droppe d the infant.

At the time of t ri al , Hol loway and the de fenda nt were eng ag ed to be mar ried. On
cross-e x amination, Holloway char acte rized the defe ndant as a “g ood mother.”-3- Terri Fr azier was sitti ng on her apartment por ch visiting with her cousin on J une 17, wh e n at ap pr oxima te ly 6:0 0 p.m. , th e de fe nd a nt “ c a me aro un d th e c orne r w a lki ng , . . . fi dg e tin g wi th he r h a nd s. ” F ra zie r ha d ne ve r be fo re me t the de fe nd a nt, bu t th e de fe nd a nt a pp ro a c he d a nda sk e d to borrow a telephone. Fr azier testified at trial that the de fenda nt expl ained that she neede d a telephone “to ca ll her baby daddy cause her ba by wasn’t br eathing .” F razier ha nded the de fenda nt a telephone and advise d her to fir s t co n t act E 911. The defe ndant ig nored the advice , and dialed a nd redia led
a number without suc cess. Frazier de scribed the defe ndant as une motional. Fra zier’s sister g rabbe d the telephone , dialed E 911, a nd handed the telephone ba ck to the def endant. The defe ndant re ported to E 911 that the victim had stopped bre athing

.

I n an ef fort to assist, Fr azier’s cousin and the cousin’s daug hter a sked the de fenda nt wher e she lived. The defe ndant pointed t owar d the apartment, and the cousin and c ousin’s daug hter
ran a nd tried to g et inside the apa rtment. The door s, howeve r, wer e locked. Fr azier stated that she and the de fenda nt then walked to the a partment, a nd the def

endant unlocke d the door. The de fenda nt said that the victim was upstairs, a nd Fr azier and he r re latives locate d the vi ctim in the play pen. Fr azier desc ribed the victim as “gr een and hi s stomach wa s swollen.” F razier’ s cousin picked up the victim and place d him on the bed. The woman “blew into his mouth[ ,] and he threw up a littl e bit[,] and she w iped the puke out of his mou t h , an d then she did it ag ain.” The para medics ar rived a nd be g a n tr e a tin g the vic tim

.

Fr azier’s c ousin, Tonni Burt, te stified at trial and c orrobor ated the e vents of June 17. Burt testif

i ed that while she wa s try ing to r esuscitate the victim, the defe ndant mere ly stood back without emotion. The para medics we re a ble to establish a hea

rt bea t in the vi ctim, and they rushed the c hi l d t o t h e a m b u l a n c e

. B u r t h e ar d h e r c o u s i n t e l l t h e d e f e n d a n t t o g o w i t h t h e p ar a me dic s to chec k on the victim. Burt ne ver sa w the def endant c ry ing or

display ing e motion.
Memphis Poli ce homicide investigator Natha n Be rry man interview ed the de fenda nt on J une 20, thre e da y s af ter the vic tim’s death. Afte r ac knowledg ing a nd waiving her rights, the defe ndant was que stioned at the police department homicide office . I nvestig ator B erry man testified that initiallythe def

endant de nied any

involvement in the vi ct i m’s death but ultimately admitted pu nc hin g the vic tim in the sto ma c h a ndhe a d. Th e de fe nd a nt t oldhim that sh e wa s u ps e t be c a us e she d i d n ot have c amer a film to photogr aph Holloway ’s g raduation. After Hollowa y left the apartment, the defe ndant remove d the victim f rom the play

pen intending to chang e the diape r, but when the vic tim bega n crying, she punched him in the hea d and stomach, place d h i m b ac k in the play pen, and w ent downstairs.

At trial, Investig ator B err

yman identified a

written, four -p age s t at em en tt h at re co u n t ed the def endant’ s version of e vents. I nvestig ator B erry man read t he st atement to the jury in which the defe ndant spoke of H olloway hara ssing her by his repea ted re quests for he r to attend the g raduation. Th e de fe nd a nt sa id that Ho llo wa y ’s be ha vio r ma de he r “ ma d a nd up se t,” su c h that w he n th e vic tim started c ry ing, she hit the vi ct i m and place d him in the playpen fa ce dow n. The de fenda nt went downstairs and ma de a sa n d wich. L ater , when she returne d to the bedroom, she notice d that the victim was not brea thing a nd had vomit on his f ace

. She remove d the victim from the play pen and-4-

place d him on the bed. She t ried shaking the victim, but he was unresponsive. The de fenda nt moved the vic tim

ba c k to the plaype n, a ndsh e fo un d h e r k e y s a ndra n o ut the f ro nt d oo r. She a sk e d to borrow a telephone f

rom “some ladie s standing [nea rby ] on t he porc h.” The defe ndant told the investigator that she plac ed a c all to E 911.

The fina l part of the sta tement that I nvestig ator B err y man re ad to the jury

consisted of the fo llo wi ng qu e sti on s a nda ns we rs :

Q U E S T IO N : W h e r e d i d yo u h i tt h e b ab y?

ANSWER: I

hit him i n the hea d once a nd in the stomach.
QUESTI ON: What part of the he ad did y ou hit him i n?

ANSWER: The rig ht side.
QU E S T I ON : Di d y o u h i th i m wi t h an y t h i n g?

AN SWER: I

jus t hi t hi m w ith my

fi st.
QU EST I ON : Was he ly ing on his ba c k w he n y ou hit him ?

AN SWER: Ye s. QU EST I ON : Af

te r y ou hit the ba

by wh ile y ou we re ly ing [sic ] him d o wn i n t h e p l ay p en , h o w w as h e a ct i n g?

AN S W E R : He wa s s n i ff l i n g. QUESTI ON: Did the baby cry o r m ak e any

other noise while y ou we re do wn sta ir s?

ANSWER: No.
QUESTI ON: Had y ou ever struck the ba

by befor e in this manner?

ANSWER: No.
Q U E ST I O N : Ha v e y o u e v e r s e e n D e w a y n e ab u s e th e b ab y or any

other c hildren?

ANSWER: No.-5- QU EST I ON : Do y ou fe e l li ke y ou ’v e be e n tr e a te d f a ir ly du ri ng thi s interview?

AN SWER: Ye s. QU EST I ON : Di d y ou g ive thi s st a te me nt f re e ly a ndvo lun tari ly without any

threa ts, promises, or coe rcion?

AN SWER: Ye s. QU EST I ON : I s th e re a nythi ng e lse that y ou wo uldlik e to a ddto

y our statement that would aid us in this investi g ation?

ANSWER: I ’m sorry

for wh at I did to mybaby . I should have
ne ve r h it h im.

The State’s f

inal witness was Dr . Tere sa C ampbell who perf ormed the autopsy

on the victim. The autopsy

reve aled blunt trauma

to t h e victim ’s hea d as evide nced by multipl e hea d contusions of various a g es and by skull frac tures. Doc tor C am p b el l t est ified that she f ound one
rec ent skull frac ture in the rig ht back of the hea d and a he aling skull frac ture on the left side of the he a d. She a lso fo un d a

“ ve ry oldskull fr a c tu re” o n th e ri g ht s ide of the he a d th a t w a s a lmo st completely

heale d. The victim had a

“re cent lef

t six rib fra cture ” and a fra cture of the arm bone, and Dr. Campbell obser ved “[s]cattered sc ars to the c hest and the a rms and the leg s.”
Doctor Campbe ll identifie d the fata l injury as the blow on the rig ht side of the hea d and behind the rig ht ear . That injury fra cture d the skull resulting in bra in swelling a nd difficulties with brea thing a nd heart rate. I n her opinion, the fatal fra cture was c onsistent with a “blow with the fist to the back of [ the vi ctim’s] head.” On cr oss-examination, Dr. Campbell ag ree d that with a prior brain injury

and then a

second blow to the head, the brain “is more susceptible to being injured more
sever ely if it’s alre ady injured.” She also ac knowledg ed the “ possibili ty ” that the victim could have survived the r ece nt trauma in the a bsence of the e arlier

or older tr auma.
At the conclusion of t he S tate’s case, the defe nse re sted without offering a dditional proof. From the evide nce elicited, the jury deliberated and found the defe ndant g uiltyof first deg ree felony murder in the pe rpetration of ag g ravated child abuse o f a ch i l d s i x y ear s of ag e or le ss and ag g ravated child abuse

. I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence
Th e de fe nd a nt a ssails the e vid e nc e a t tr ia l a s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

he r f ir st de g re e fe lon y

mur de r a nda g g ra va te d c hil d a bu se c on vic tio ns

. We me a su re tho se c on te nti on s w ith
a fa mil iar l e g a l y ard sti c k. Whe n a n ac c us e d ch a lle ng e s the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , a n a pp e lla te court inspec ts the evidentiary landsca pe, including the direc t and circumstantial contours, fr om the-6-

vantag e point most ag ree able to the pr osecution. The r eviewing court then d ec i d es wh ether the evidenc e and the infere nces tha t flow there from permit any rational fa ct finder

to conclude be y ond
a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant is g uiltyof the c harg ed cr i m e. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) ; J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2791-92 (1979).

I n d et er m i n i n g s u ff

i ci en cyo f t h e p ro o f, t h e ap p el l at e co u rt d o es n o t re p l ay o r r ew ei gh t h e evide nce. Se e Sta te v . M att he ws , 8 05 S.W. 2d77 6, 77 9 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 90 ). Witn e ss cre dibilit y , the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, and fac tual disputes a re entrusted to the finder of fac t. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W. 2d83 2, 83 5 ( Te nn . 1 97 8) ; Lia k as v . S tat e , 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286 S.W. 2d85 6, 85 9 ( 19 56 ); Fa rm e r v . S tat e , 57 4 S.W. 2d 49 , 51 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 78 ). S imp ly stated, the re viewing court will not substit ute its judgment for that of the trier

of fa ct. I nstead, the
c ou rt e xten ds to the Sta te of

Te nn e sse e the stro ng e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e c on ta ine d in the re cord a s well as all re asonable and leg itimate infere nces tha t may be dra wn from the e vidence

. See Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d at 835.

With the se pr inc ipl e s in min d, we turn to the sp e c if ic c on vic tio n o ff

e ns e s.

F ir st d e g re e fe lon y

mur de r, a s re le va nt he re , is the “ kil lin g of a no the r c omm itt e d in the per petra tion of or attempt to perp etra te any . . . ag g ravated child abuse .” T.C.A. § 39-13-202( a)( 2) (2003). For felony murder, “ [n] o culpable me ntal state is require d for c onviction
. . . ex ce p t the intent to commit the enumera ted offe nse[] .” Id . §39-13-202( b). The of fense of ag g ravated child abuse is define d as “child abuse” that “re sults in serious bodi ly injury to the child.” T

. C

. A

. § 3 9

- 1 5

- 4 0 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 3 )

. C h i l d ab u s e , a s r e l e v a n ti n t h e c a s e , i s d e f i n e d a s “ k n o w i n g l y, other than by

acc idental means, trea t[ ing] a child

. . . in suc h a manner as to inflict injury .” Id . § 39- 15-401(a ). Child abuse is g rade d acc ording to the ag e of the child. For an abused child with serious b o d i l y i n j u r y, s u c h a s i n t h i s c a s e , w h o i s s i x ye ar s o f a g e o r l e s s , t h e p e n a l t y i s a C l a s s A f

e l o n y. Id . § 39-15-402( b).

The de fenda nt attacks he r convic tions on two grounds. F irst, s h e arg ues that the prosec ution introduced no evide nce to show tha t she understood that the risk of excessive swe lling exis ted in light of the ear lier injury to the victim when he wa s dropped by the def endant’ s sister. She int e rp re ts the e vid e nc e a s sh ow ing that sh e a c te d o ut of “ fr us tr a tio n” rathe r tha n a n int e nt to c a us e serious bodily injury

. Second, she maintains that the evidenc e is insufficient to esta blish bey ond a
rea sonable doubt that the blow, which she inflicted to the infant’ s head, w as “the actua l cause of the swelling of the bra in resulting in de ath.”

I n State v. Duc ker , 2 7 S. W. 3 d 8 8 9 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ) , th e T e n n e s s e e Su p r e me Court deter mined that

the Tenn es see c hild abuse and ne g lect statute is clea r that “kn owin g ly ” mod if

ie s “ tr e a ts” or

“ ne g le c ts. ” Th e a c tus re us is modified by

t he clause “othe r than by acc idental means.”-7- Acc ording ly , the s tatute requires t hat t he act of t reating a child in an
abu siv e ma nn e r o r n e g le c tin g the c hil d mu st b e kn ow ing c on du c t.

Id . at 897. As a r esult, Ducker p l ainl y decla res that it is the ac tual act of trea ting a

child in an
abu siv e ma nn e r tha t mu st b e kn ow ing c on du c t; a de fe nd a nt, in oth e r wo rd s, ne e d no t kn ow that hi s or her conduct will re sult in serious bodilyinjury

. Se e id

. Ducker disposes of the defe ndant’s arg ument that the evidenc e failed to show that she understood the r isk of excessive s welling exis ted. The prose cution was not re quired to prove that the def endant knew that repe atedly striking the infant would re sult in serious bodilyinjury . Rather, the prosec ution needed only to prove be y ond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant’s tre atment of the infant wa s knowing conduct. The evidenc e in this case a mply supports that conclusion.

The de fenda nt expresslyadmit ted in her state ment g iven to I nvestig ator B erry man that sh e kn ow ing ly

str uc k th e inf

a nt be c a us e the inf

a nt wo uld no t c e a se c rying . Sh e state d, “ B y me a lr e a dy be ing ma d a ndup se t, I hit him

. I g ot – he g ot to cry ing e ve n loud e r an d I hit him a g a in i n the stomach a

rea .” F urthermor e, the e vidence is uncontested that the infa nt was s olely in the defe ndant’s ca

re w hen the injuries we re inflicted and that when Holloway left to attend g raduation, the infant wa s uninjured.

The de fenda nt’s arg ument that the evidenc e failed to show that striking the inf ant on the hea d was the a ctual ca use of de ath is also unavailing . To be sur e, Dr

. Campbell cata logue d
sever al injuries of various ag es to the infant’ s head. D octor Campbell, howe ver, w as spec ific in her testimonythat “the injury that killed the child was a blow to the head that cause d a fr actur e to the bone in the hea d with r esulting swelling of the brain. The swelling of the bra in would have c aused pr ob le ms w ith br e a thi ng a ndhis he art rate .” F ro m th e re c or d b e fo re us , w e no te that im me diate ly afte r Dr. Ca mpbell’s statement, the trial c ourt clarified, “For the rec ord, she pointed to the ba ck of the do c tor ’s he a d o n th e ri g ht s ide be hin d th e ri g ht e ar. ” Th e de fe nd a nt, in h e r s ta te me nt t o I nvestig ator B erry man, identified the loc ation wher e she struc k the infant in the head a s “[t] he rig ht side.” From this evidence , a rational jury could ce rtainly

conclude that the defe ndant struck the f atal blow to the rig ht side of the infa nt’s head.

I n summary , viewing the evidenc e in a light most favora ble to the prosec ution, and le a vin g the re so lut ion of a ny inc on sis te nc ie s to the jury , we c on c lud e that a ratio na l tr ie r o f f a c t c ou ld conclude bey ond a rea sonable doubt tha t the defe ndant committed the offe nses of fir st deg ree felony
mur de r d ur ing the pe rp e tr at i o n o f a g g ra va te d c hil d a

bu se a nda g g ra va te d c hil d a bu se . T he de fe nd a nt,
acc ording ly , is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.

II. Se nt e nc ing

The de fend an t i s aggrieved of the se ntence imposed by the trial court for the ag g ravated child abuse conviction. The tria l court found a nd applied one e nhance ment fac tor, that the def endant ha d abused a

position of trust. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114( 14) (Supp. 2005). The tr ial-8-

court found no mitig ation other than the re lative y outh of the def endant. B alanc ing the enhanc ement fa c tor a ndthe we a k mi tig a tio n f a c tor , th e tr ia l c ou rt imp os e d a Ra ng e I se nte nc e of 20 y e ars a ndsix months. Se e id

. § 40-35-112( a)( 1) (2003) (Rang e I sentenc e for

Class A felony

is not less than 15 y ear s nor more tha n 25 y ear s).

On appe al, the def

endan t co m p l ains that the trial court placed too much w eig ht on the e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor a nd faile d to a ssi g n pr op e r we ig ht t o th e de fe nd a nt’ s r e la tiv e y ou th. She a lso arg ues that the trial c ourt err oneously failed to a cknowledg e her admitted remorse

. Whe n th e re is a

c ha lle ng e to the ma nn e r o f s e rv ic e of a se nte nc e , it is the du ty

of thi s court to conduct a de novo revie w of the record with a pr esumption that the determinations made by the trial court a

re c orre ct. T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d) (2003) . This presumption is conditioned upon the
a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t the t ri a l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing pr inc ipl e s a nda ll rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . The burde n of showing that the sentenc e is improper is upon the appellant. Id . In th e e ve nt the re c or d f a ils to demonstrate the require d considera tion by the trial court, revie w of the sentenc e is purely de novo. Id . I f appellate revie w, howeve r, re flec ts that the trial court prope rly considere d all rele vant fa ctors and its findings of

fac t a re adequately supported by the rec ord, this c ourt must affirm the se ntence , “eve n if we w ould have pr efe rre d a diffe rent re sult.” State v. Fletc her , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

The sente ncing court must consider ( 1) the evidenc e, if any , rec eived at the trial and the sentenc ing he aring , (2) the prese ntence report, (3) the principles of sentenc ing and ar g uments as to sentencing a lternatives, ( 4) the na ture a nd char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved, (5) evidenc e and information offe red by the parties on the enhanceme nt and mitiga ting f actor s, (6) a ny statements the def

endant wishe s to make in the def endant’ s behalf ab o u t sentenc ing, a nd (7) the potential for r ehabilitation or treatment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210(a ), (b) & - 35-103(5) (2003).

Th e de fe nd a nt i n th is c a se ha s n ot c arrie d h e r bu rd e n of sh ow ing that he r se nte nc e is imp ro pe r. F ir st, the we ig ht to be g ive n to any ind ivi du a l enh a nc e me nt or mit ig a tin g fa c tor

is w ith in the s ound discretion of the s entenc ing court. State v. Alder , 71 S.W .3d 299, 306 (Tenn. Crim. App. 20 01 ); State v. Hay es , 899 S.W .2d 175, 185 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . The de fenda nt does not point out how or why

the trial court abused its discretion in assig ning s u b s t antial weig ht to the enhanc ement fa ctor of a

buse of position of trust. Likewise, the de fenda nt does not expl ain why her ag e, which w as 18-y ear s old at the time of t he off ense, is entitled to or c ommands signific ant mit ig a tio n w e ig ht.

Se c on d, we are un able to a sse ss the defe nd ant’s c la im tha t th e tr ia l c ou rt fa ile d to consider he r admitted remorse. The recor d befor e us does not contain the pr esente nce inve stiga tion report, and the sente ncing hearing itself w as ra ther brie f. The only ref ere nce to remorse that we ha ve discovere d is attributable to the prosec ution at sentencing when it noted th at despite the
overw helming e vidence at trial and the defe ndant’s conf ession to law enf

orce ment office rs, the-9-

defe ndant “told Pre-Sente nce pe ople that she’s don e n o t h ing w rong .” The trial court then commented that it did not find that the defe ndant was r emorsef ul.

I t is the appellant’s duty

to include those m ater ials in the appe llate re cord w hich ar e nece ssary to convey

a fa ir, ac curate, an d complete a ccount of what tra nspired in the trial c ourt rela tive to the issues raised on appea l. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 2 4; State v. Troutman , 979 S.W .2d 271, 274 (Tenn. 1998) . The pre sentenc e re port is evidence which is consider ed by the tri al co u rt and there fore is ne cessa

ry to c onvey a fair, acc urate , and complete acc ount of the proceed i n gs b el ow. See T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0( b) (2 00 3)

. I n the abs e nc e of a n ad e qu a te re c or d o n a pp e a l, this c ou rt

mus t presume tha t the trial court’s ru l i n gs wer e supported by sufficie nt evidence

. State v. Oody , 823 S.W .2d 554, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. Conclusion

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

____________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE