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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41617

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHRISTIAN ALONZO,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY

Fred Van Soelen, District Court Judge

Raúl Torres, Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

Van Snow, Acting Deputy Solicitor General

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1} Defendant appeals the district court’s determination that Defendant’s conviction 

for abandonment of a child resulting in death was a serious violent offense, under the 

earned meritorious deductions statute (EMD), NMSA 1978, Section 33-2-34(L)(4)(o)(8) 

(2015). In this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, we proposed to summarily 

reverse. The State has filed a memorandum in opposition, which we have duly 

considered. Remaining unpersuaded, we reverse. 
{2} The State’s memorandum in opposition asserts that the district court’s findings 

were adequate to support its determination that Defendant’s conviction was a serious 

violent offense. [MIO 6] When making its decision, the district court verbally highlighted 

the “nature of the offense, and the nature of what caused [th victim] to die, and then the 

resulting harm.” [MIO 3] The district court also listed the victim’s injuries and opined that 

designating the crime as a serious violent offense was “not really a difficult decision.” 

[CN 4; MIO 3] In listing the victim’s injuries, the district court included partially-healed 

injuries that had occurred in the past. [MIO 3] 

{3} As noted in our proposed disposition, the district court was required to make 

“[e]xpress findings [to] demonstrate that the crime was committed in a physically violent 

manner either with an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of 

knowledge that one’s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm.” State v. 

Branch, 2018-NMCA-031, ¶ 56, 417 P.3d 1141 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). According to the State, a recklessness determination was implicit in the district 

court’s findings regarding the victim’s injuries, and such an inference satisfies the 

purposes for which findings are required—to inform Defendant of the factual basis on 

which his good time credit is being substantially reduced and to allow this Court to 

conduct meaningful appellate review. [MIO 5-6] We disagree. The State’s memorandum 

in opposition has not identified any findings addressing Defendant’s intent to do serious 

harm or his recklessness in the face of knowledge that serious harm would result. See 

State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027, ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421, 759 P.2d 1003 (“A party 

responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out 

errors of law and fact,” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this 

requirement.), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 

2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3, 297 P.3d 374. Accordingly, we conclude the district court’s 

findings in this case failed to tie the victim’s injuries to the “intent or recklessness in the 

face of knowledge standard” required by State v. Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, 131 N.M. 

530, 39 P.3d 747, and its progeny. [CN 4] See State v. Loretto, 2006-NMCA-142, ¶¶ 14, 

19, 140 N.M. 705, 147 P.3d 1138 (stating that the district court is required to make 

specific findings regarding both the nature of the offense and the resulting harm). 

{4} Furthermore, even assuming the State is correct in asserting that there is a basis 

for the necessary findings in this case, it is not for this court to make such findings for 

the first time on appeal. See Branch, 2018-NMCA-031, ¶ 56 (“Even where support 

exists in the record for the district court to make such a determination, it is up to the 

district court in the first instance to make the required findings.”); State v. Scurry, 2007-

NMCA-064, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 591, 158 P.3d 1034 (“[T]he district court is required to explain 

its conclusions and findings and not leave it up to the appellate court either to speculate 

as to what the court relied on or to itself engage in judicial fact finding.” (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, though the district court’s findings 

regarding the victim’s injuries may bear on the nature of the offense, we cannot 

ascertain from them Defendant’s intent or degree of recklessness without considerable 

inference. See Scurry, 2007-NMCA-064, ¶ 12 (concluding that findings might bear on 

the nature of the offense, but failed to indicate the basis for the district court’s 

conclusion that the defendant acted with intent or recklessness); see also Branch, 2018-
NMCA-031, ¶ 56 (stating that the purpose of specific factual findings in this context is 

“to permit meaningful and effective appellate review of the [district] court’s designation” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

{5} The State also argues that we should overturn Morales and its progeny because 

the legal basis for the rule stated therein is “unclear” and not required by statute. [MIO 

6] The State’s argument, however, does not acknowledge that this Court’s judicial 

obligation to follow precedent “lies at the very core of the judicial process of interpreting 

and announcing law.” See Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 33, 125 

N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305 (explaining the importance of stare decisis in the maintenance 

of a sound judicial system). Moreover, overturning precedent demands special 

justification, and the State does not explain how the law has developed or facts have 

changed since we decided Morales. See id. ¶ 34 (discussing the special justification 

necessary to depart from prior precedent). Accordingly, we have no basis for overruling 

Morales and decline the State’s request to do so.

{6} For the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and herein, we 

reverse the district court’s designation of child abandonment resulting in death as a 

serious violent offense and remand for sentencing in accordance with the EMD.

{7} IT IS SO ORDERED.

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge