NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

BEATRICE VALENCIA, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

SHAD PARIS GARCIA, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0643 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2020-071518

The Honorable Joseph Kiefer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Beatrice Valencia, El Mirage

Petitioner/Appellee

R.J. Peters & Associates, P.C., Phoenix

By Lowen C. Jones

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 12-6-2022
VALENCIA v. GARCIA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding 

Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Shad Paris Garcia (“Husband”) appeals from the superior 

court’s dissolution decree. He argues that the superior court improperly 

classified his personal property as “community assets.” We disagree and 

affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The superior court found that Husband began serving a 

ten-year prison sentence in 2014. While Husband was in prison, Beatrice 

Valencia (“Wife”) lived in the marital residence until Husband’s father told 

Wife she needed to either start paying rent or leave. Being unable to afford 

the rent, Wife moved out.

¶3 Wife claimed Husband’s father told her she could take 

anything she wanted from the home. Wife also claimed she told Husband 

she was moving out and that he mentioned nothing about preserving the 

property within the home. Husband maintained that Wife did not tell him 

she was moving out until after she left.

¶4 When Wife moved from the home, she placed many of the 

home’s items in a storage unit. Wife asserted that Husband was aware she 

transferred the property into a storage unit and “never made efforts to 

obtain the property.” Wife only paid the storage fees for a few months but 

left the items in storage indefinitely. Wife thought the storage facility took 

the property or auctioned off the items. Wife claimed she did not receive 

profits from the property.

¶5 In the parties’ joint pretrial statement, Husband alleged Wife 

took items from the home that were his “sole and separate property.” 

Husband requested that the items be returned or that he be reimbursed. 

Wife maintained that she did not have “any of Husband’s personal 

property.” At the trial, Husband assessed the items he left in the home with 
VALENCIA v. GARCIA

Decision of the Court

3

approximate values and identified whether each item was acquired before 

or after the marriage.

¶6 The superior court entered a dissolution decree. The court 

awarded Husband the marital residence as his sole and separate property.

The court found Husband “failed to provide any supporting information 

for his claims” that he acquired the personal property inside the home 

before marriage. The court alternatively found that if Husband acquired the 

property before marriage, Husband and Wife “used the personal property 

in the home in support of the community” such that most of the items, 

excluding Husband’s clothes and tools, “became community assets.” The 

court classified Husband’s tools and clothes as his “sole and separate 

property” because Wife did not testify that she used the items.

¶7 The court awarded Wife “the property in her possession from 

when she initially left the home as her sole and separate property.” The 

court found Husband “failed to take reasonable steps to secure items” he 

believed belonged solely to him and “failed to pay his share of the storage 

fees.” Thus, any property value owed to Husband from the items in the 

storage unit was “offset by [his] unpaid share of the cost to store the items.”

¶8 Husband moved for relief from the judgment under Arizona 

Rule of Family Law Procedure 85 (“Rule 85”), arguing that the court

improperly classified the property within the home as community 

property. Denying the motion, the court explained Husband “failed to 

produce any actual invoices or receipts but only a self-made list and his 

own testimony regarding certain personal property items.” The court found 

Husband’s evidence “unpersuasive.” It reiterated that even if he acquired 

the property before marriage, Husband and Wife used most of the property 

“during the marriage such that it was comingled and converted to 

community property.”

¶9 Husband appealed the denial of his motion for relief from 

judgment in October 2021. This court stayed the appeal until the superior 

court filed a signed order, which it did.

¶10 On February 14, 2022, Husband requested the trial 

transcripts. He filed his notice of transcript order with this court on 

February 28, 2022. In the notice, Father claimed the court reporter notified 

him that she would complete the transcript by March 4, 2022. There is no 

evidence Husband secured the trial transcript as they are not in the record 

on appeal.

¶11 We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
VALENCIA v. GARCIA

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DISCUSSION

¶12 Husband argues that this court should reverse the superior 

court’s denial of his motion for relief from judgment because the court 

improperly found the home’s assets were commingled and community 

property.

¶13 We review the denial of a Rule 85 motion for an abuse of 

discretion, and we review interpretations of statutes and rules de novo. Clark 

v. Kreamer, 243 Ariz. 272, 275, ¶ 10 (App. 2017). We view the facts “in the 

light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s order.” Id. We will 

affirm the superior court’s fact-finding unless it is clearly erroneous and 

give “due regard” to the court’s witness credibility assessments. See Ariz. 

R. Fam. Law P. (“ARFLP”) 82(a)(5).

¶14 Property is “separate” if a party acquired it either before the 

marriage or during the marriage by gift, devise, or descent. A.R.S.

§ 25-213(A). All other property acquired during the marriage is community 

property unless demonstrated otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. 

A.R.S. § 25-211(A); Sommerfield v. Sommerfield, 121 Ariz. 575, 577 (1979). If 

community property and separate property are commingled, the property 

is “presumed to be community property unless the separate property can 

be explicitly traced.” See Cooper v. Cooper, 130 Ariz. 257, 259 (1981) (quoting 

Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz. 273, 281 (1948), overruled on other grounds by Cockrill 

v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 53–54 (1979)).

¶15 An appellant must include in the record transcripts or other 

documents necessary to resolve the issues on appeal. ARCAP 11(b), (c); 

State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 30, ¶ 16 (App. 2003). 

“When no transcript is provided on appeal, the reviewing court assumes 

that the record supports the trial court’s decision.” Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 

564, 572, ¶ 33 (App. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. Elson, 192 Ariz. 486, 489, ¶ 11 

(App. 1998)). Additionally, as relevant here, an appellant must order 

transcripts “within 10 days after entry of an order disposing of the last 

timely remaining motion under Rule 9(e).” ARCAP 11(c)(2). An appellant 

must also file a notice of transcript order with the court within 15 days of 

the same order. ARCAP 11(c)(3).

¶16 As noted above, the trial transcripts are not in the appellate 

record. Husband allegedly requested the production of the trial transcripts 

but asked for them too late. Husband requested the trial transcript on 

February 14, more than ten days from the superior court’s signed order 

entered on January 26. Husband filed his notice of transcript order on 
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February 28, more than 15 days from the superior court’s January 26 signed 

order. Moreover, nothing in the record shows Husband followed up with 

the court reporter after she failed to provide the transcript. Not only was

Husband’s transcript request and notice untimely, but he failed to obtain

the transcripts. Because we do not have the trial transcripts, we must 

assume the missing record supports the superior court’s findings. See Kline, 

221 Ariz. at 572, ¶ 33.

¶17 Husband contends he “presented testimony evidence as to 

multiple pieces of his separate property.” No evidentiary record supports 

Husband’s assertion. See ARCAP 13(a)(7) (An appellant must support 

reasons for each issue with “appropriate references to the portions of the 

record on which the appellant relies.”). Husband also claims that he

“provided an inventory . . . of his sole and separate property.” But the 

superior court found the list lacking because Husband failed to support it

with invoices or receipts to show when he purchased the property. Rather, 

next to each listed item, Husband merely flagged whether the property was 

acquired before or during the marriage and how much he believed each 

item was worth. The superior court did not err by finding Husband failed 

to provide enough evidence that the items, other than his clothes and tools,

were his separate property.

¶18 Husband also argues on appeal that Wife lied throughout her 

testimony. Because Husband did not include the trial transcripts in the

appellate record, and we defer to the superior court’s witness credibility 

assessments, we cannot say the superior court erred by rejecting Husband’s 

separate property claims. See Kline, 221 Ariz. at 572, ¶ 33; see also ARFLP 

82(a)(5).

¶19 Husband objects to the superior court’s alternate conclusion 

that the personal property was commingled. Husband is correct that

“[c]ommingling can transmute financial accounts but not tangible assets.”

Brucklier v. Brucklier, 253 Ariz. 579, 584, ¶ 21 (App. 2022). But we will not 

reverse this alternate holding because Husband failed to prove the property

was separate. We cannot meaningfully review the superior court’s analysis 

without a trial record. Because Husband did not provide record evidence 

to support his arguments, we conclude the superior court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying his motion for relief from the judgment.

ATTORNEY’S FEES

¶20 Husband requests attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 25-324. Per

our discretion, we deny the request.
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CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm the judgment.