UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ JOSEPHINE McGOWAN, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. WAL-MART STORES, Defendant - Appellee. No. 18-1397 (D.C. No. 1:18- CV-01564-LTB) (D. Colo.)

__________________ _______________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

__________________ _______________ Before BACHARACH , MURPHY , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ Ms. Josephine McGowan asserted pro se claims against Wal-Mart Stores for a slip-and-fall on its property. The district court dismissed the action without prejudic e, ruling that the claims were barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine and Colorado’s sta tute of limitations. Though the

* Because oral argument would not materially aid our considerati on of this appeal, we have decided the appeal based on Ms. McGowan’s brief and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgme nt does not constitut e binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and colla teral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited as otherwise appropriat e. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and Tenth Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 19, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Rooker-Feldman doctrine doesn’t apply, the claims are un timely. So we affirm the dismissal.
1. Background Ms. McGowan alleges that she injured her self in 2013 when she slipped in a Wal-Mart store. She first sued Wal-Mart in Colorad o state court. Almost five years after t he alleged slip-and-fall, Ms. M cGowan brought this feder al lawsuit against Wal-Mart.
2. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine The district court ruled tha t Ms. McGowan’ s claims were jurisdictionally barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. On t his issue, we engage in de novo review. Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Ct. , 528 F.3d 785, 788–89 (10th Cir. 2008). I n conducting this review, we conclude that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits feder al suits that amount to appeals of state-court judgments.” Bolden v. City of Topeka , 441 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 2006). This prohibition is triggered when the s tate court’s judgment caused the alleged injury. Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin , 441 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006). Thus, t he doctrine applies when th e plaintiff asks a federal court to alte r a state court’s judgment. See, e.g. , Mann v. Boatright , 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that requests fo r federal declaratory j udgments nullif ying state court orders “ar e precisely the types of claims encompassed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”).3 But the doctrine applie s only to claims res ting on allegations involving the state-court proc eedings. If a federal action mere ly realleges claims adjudicated earlier in s tate court, the law of preclusio n applies rather than the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Exxon Mobil Corp . v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280 , 292 (2005); Bolden , 441 F.3d at 1139. Ms. McGowan’s federal claims do not rest on a state-court order ; in fact, her federal complaint does not even mention the state-cou rt lawsuit against Wal-Mart. Though the claim s in the federal and state la wsuits appear duplicative, the potential defect in the federal suit wo uld involve claim preclusion rather than the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 1 So the district court erred in basing the dismissal on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
3. Statute of Limitations The district court als o regarded Ms. McGowan’s federal claims a s untimely. We agree. As the district court explained, Colorado law provides a two-ye ar period of limitations. M s. McGowan alleges that the wrongful ac t occurred

1 Claim preclusion is not jurisdictional. See Skinner v. Switzer , 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011) (“If a federal plaintiff presents an indep endent claim, it is not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction that the same or a related question was earlier aired between the parties in state court.” (quotations and brackets omitted)).4 in 2013, and she waited al most five years to sue. 2 So the action is timebarred.
4. Allegations of Conspiracy For the first time on appeal, Ms . McGowan generally alleges a conspiracy between Wal-Mart and at least some of the attorneys who represented her in state court. M s. McGowan asks our court to i nvestigate. Appellant’s Br. at 2–3. Ms. McGowan forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in dist rict

court. Pro se litigants are bound by the ge nerally applicab le rules of procedure, Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2005), and w e consider arguments newly raised on app eal only in the “most unusual circumstances,” Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety , 875 F.3d 1347, 1351 (10th Cir. 2017 ). Ms. McGowan has not ident ified any “unusual circumstances” here, so we decline to consider this ne wly presented allegation of a conspiracy.

2 The district court gave Ms. M cGowan an opportu nity to argue equitable tolling. But she did not present such an argument.5 * * * The district court properly dismissed the action as untimely, s o we affirm. 3
Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge

3 A dismissal based on timeliness would ordinarily be with prejud ice. See United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg. Health Ctr., Inc. , 543 F.3d 1211, 1226 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding that because the state- law claims were barred by the statute of lim itations, the district court s hould have dismissed these claims with prejudice). Here the dismissal was without prejudice. But because we are upholding dism issal based on time liness, the dismissal functions effectively as a dismissal with prejudice. See AdvantEdge Bus. Grp. v. Thomas E. Mestmaker & Assocs., Inc. , 552 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2009 ) (“This court has recognized that a dismissal without prejudice can have the practical effect of a dismissal with prejudice if the statute of limitations has expired.”).