alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Davidson
Income Real Estate, L.P. 1999 First Quarter 10-QSB and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such 10-QSB filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000768598
<NAME> DAVIDSON INCOME REAL ESTATE, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                           1,141
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                          24,744
<DEPRECIATION>                                (11,290)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  15,706
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                         11,872
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,421
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    15,706
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,219
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,130
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 249
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       128
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     4.63<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
<F2>Multiplier is 1.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 189 (Monday, September 29, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 56613]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-22882]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration


Importer of Controlled Substances; Notice of Registration

    By Notice dated June 19, 2008 and published in the Federal Register 
on June 27, 2008 (73 FR 36571), Aptuit (Allendale) Inc., 75 Commerce 
Drive, Allendale, New Jersey 07401, made application by renewal to the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to be registered as an importer 
of Noroxymorphone (9668), a basic class of controlled substance listed 
in schedule II.
    The company plans to import the basic class of controlled substance 
for clinical trials and research.
    No comments or objections have been received. DEA has considered 
the factors in 21 U.S.C. 823(a) and 952(a) and determined that the 
registration of Aptuit (Allendale) Inc. to import the basic classes of 
controlled substances is consistent with the public interest, and with 
United States obligations under international treaties, conventions, or 
protocols in effect on May 1, 1971, at this time. DEA has investigated 
Aptuit (Allendale) Inc. to ensure that the company's registration is 
consistent with the public interest. The investigation has included 
inspection and testing of the company's physical security systems, 
verification of the company's compliance with state and local laws, and 
a review of the company's background and history. Therefore, pursuant 
to 21 U.S.C. 952(a) and 958(a), and in accordance with 21 CFR 1301.34, 
the above named company is granted registration as an importer of the 
basic class of controlled substance listed.

    Dated: September 22, 2008.
Joseph T. Rannazzisi,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug 
Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. E8-22882 Filed 9-26-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, August 02, 2022. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, August 02, 2022 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A22A1495. KUNTERRIUS WOODARD v. THE STATE.
The appellant in this case failed to comply with the notice of docketing mailed by this Court and with Court of Appeals Rule 23 (a), regarding the filing of an enumeration of errors and brief within twenty days after the appeal was docketed. See also Court of Appeals Rule 13. On June 24, 2022, this Court ordered the appellant to file an enumeration of errors and a brief no later than July 11, 2022. As of the date of this order, the appellant's enumeration of errors and brief still have not been filed. Accordingly, this appeal is deemed abandoned and is hereby ordered DISMISSED. Court of Appeals Rules 7, 23 (a).
#### Moises L. SAMORA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 44423.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 21, 1971.

Allen Moore, Odessa, for appellant.

John H. Green, Dist. Atty., and J. A. Bobo, Asst. Dist. Atty., Odessa, and Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ODOM, Judge.

This appeal is from a conviction for the offense of burglary; the punishment, enhanced under Article 63, Vernon’s Ann. P.C., life.

Appellant’s sole ground of error is that “The indictment, which is the basis of this prosecution against him is fundamentally defective, in that the indictment contains *no*description of the property alleged to have been taken other than ‘corporeal personal property’.”

Appellant recognizes and cites cases in his brief “that a burglary indictment need not describe property alleged to have been taken. Stephens v. State, 69 Tex.Cr.R. 379, 154 S.W. 1001 (1913); Summers v. State, 9 Tex.Cr.App. 396 (1880); Davis v. State [Tex.Cr.App.], 23 S.W. 687 (1893).” He contends that these cases should be overruled and a “more logical, fair, and reasonable attitude towards indictment for the crime of Burglary With The Intent To Commit Theft be substituted. Appellant urges this, even in'view of the fact that no motion to quash appears in the record.”

We overrule appellant’s contention and hold that there is no requirement to describe property alleged to have been taken in a burglary indictment. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to vitiating a burglary conviction when a person was caught inside a store he had just burglarized unless it could be shown what particular item or items he intended to steal. This we decline to do.

The judgment is affirmed.
**EXHIBIT
      23.1**




**CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**





We
      hereby
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on
      Form
      S-8 of Asia Global Holdings Corp. (formerly known as BonusAmerica Worldwide
      Corp.) of our report dated April 19, 2006, except for Notes 1, 2, and 11 which are dated as of September
      11, 2006, relating to the financial statements as of December 31, 2005 and
      for
      the preceding two years then ended, which appear in the Annual Report to
      Shareholders and incorporated in this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB, as
      amended.





/s/
      Clancy and Co., P.L.L.C.


Scottsdale,
      Arizona





April
      20, 2007
```

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

  Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.ss.1350)

Pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 (18  U.S.C.ss.1350),
the  undersigned,  Isaac J. Gaon,  Chief Executive  Officer of Datatec  Systems,
Inc.,  a Delaware  corporation  (the  "Company"),  does hereby  certify,  to his
knowledge, that:

            The  Quarterly  Report on Form  10-Q for the  three  month
            period ended July 31, 2002 of the Company  (the  "Report")
            fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of  1934,  and the
            information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in
            all material respects, the financial condition and results
            of operations of the Company.

                                  /s/ Isaac J. Gaon
                                  ---------------------
                                  Isaac J. Gaon
                                  Chief Executive Officer

                                  Dated:  November 7, 2002
```
#### In re CAMPBELL’S ESTATE.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division A.

July 16, 1954.

Brannon & Brown, Lake City, for appellants.

Ferguson & Jopling, Lake City, for ap-pellees.

MATHEWS, Justice.

Harry E. Campbell died intestate on July 22, 1952. Lizzie Mae Campbell claimed to be the common-law wife of Harry E. Campbell and a dispute arose in the County Judge’s Court. Mack Campbell was the only brother of Harry E. Campbell. There were no sisters and the mother and father had predeceased him. Mack Campbell would have been the sole heir of Harry E. Campbell unless Lizzie Mae Gaskin Campbell was the common-law wife of Harry E. Campbell.

Based upon proper pleadings a hearing was had by the County Judge after which he entered his order to the effect that Lizzie Mae Gaskin Campbell was the lawful common-law wife of Harry E. Campbell at the time of his death. Mack Campbell took an appeal from the County Judge’s order and the Circuit Judge made and entered an order affirming the order of the County Judge. This appeal is from that order of the Circuit Judge.

No good purpose would be served by reciting in detail, or even summarizing, the testimony in this case. Such testimony was sufficient, if believed by the County Judge, to sustain his order and the order of the Circuit Judge affirming the order of the County Judge.

This case is controlled by the cases of Le Blanc v. Yawn, 99 Fla. 328, 126 So. 789; Spinella v. Spinella, Fla., 57 So.2d 588; and Chaachou v. Chaachou, Fla., 73 So.2d 830.

Affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., TERRELL, J., and MURPHREE, Associate Justice, concur.
<PAGE>

                                 Exhibit 10.42


                 AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO THE 1994 STOCK OPTION PLAN

                           OF LIFELINE SYSTEMS, INC.



     The third sentence of Section 3 of the 1994 Stock Option Plan (the "Plan")
of Lifeline Systems, Inc., which states "The maximum number of shares with
respect to which options may be granted to any employee during the term of the
Plan shall not exceed 75,000 shares of common stock," is hereby amended and
restated in its entirety, subject to stockholder approval, to provide as
follows:

          "Subject to adjustment as provided in Section 14 below, the maximum
          number of shares with respect to which options may be granted to any
          employee under the Plan shall not exceed 50,000 shares of common stock
          during any calendar year."

     Section 4 of the Plan is hereby amended, subject to stockholder approval,
to increase from 300,000 to 600,000 the number of shares of Common Stock
authorized for issuance and sale under the Plan.



                                    Adopted by the Board of
                                 Directors on January 31, 1996
"Date","Total","Federal","Nonfederal Total","Nonfederal Households","Nonfederal Business","Nonfederal State and local govts"
"1996",5.2,6.7,6.2,-1.5,4.0,
"1997",5.3,5.8,9.0,4.3,0.6,
"1998",6.8,7.8,12.3,6.3,-1.4,
"1999",6.4,8.4,10.7,3.4,-1.9,
"2000",4.9,9.0,9.2,1.3,-8.0,
"","","","","","",""
"2001",6.3,9.4,6.0,8.8,-0.2,
"2002",7.2,10.6,2.5,11.0,7.6,
"2003",8.2,11.6,2.6,8.3,10.9,
"2004",8.9,11.6,5.9,7.4,9.0,
"2005",9.5,11.7,7.7,10.2,7.0,
"","","","","","",""
"2005Q1",9.3,9.6,6.5,9.9,13.0,
"2005Q2",8.2,11.9,7.7,7.4,0.6,
"2005Q3",9.7,11.9,8.1,12.3,5.8,
"2005Q4",9.6,11.7,7.7,9.7,8.0,
"","","","","","",""
"2006Q1",9.5,9.6,9.6,3.5,11.3,
"2006Q2",6.4,9.1,7.6,6.6,-2.4,
## NO. 12

- 19

- 00216

- CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS

LARRY COLEMAN HICKS, APPELLANT

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE §

§

§ APPEAL FROM THE 114T H

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM On June 3, 2019, Larry Coleman Hicks, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal regarding
trial court cause number 4

- 95

- 481

. However, Appellant previously appealed from this cause number and, on April 10, 2019, we informed Appellant that this Court lacks jurisdiction over that
cause number and any further attempts to file a n appeal in such cause number would be deemed
an abuse of the judicial process

. See Hicks v. State , No. 12

- 19

- 00106

- CR, 2019 WL 1760115, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Tyler Apr. 10, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Pursuant to our inherent power to control this Court ’ s docket, we direct ed Appell ant to refrain from filing additional appeals from trial court cause number 4

- 95

- 481

. See id

. Because Appellant ignored this Court’s directive in our April 10, 2019, opinion, we conclude that Appellant engaged in dilatory and bad

- faith abuse of the judicial process by once again appealing from trial court cause number 4

- 95

- 481. See Brager v . State , No. 0365

- 03, 2004 WL 3093237, at * 3 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2004) (en banc) (not designated for publication)

. Due to this abuse, under our inherent power to sanction, this Court will not accept or file any future appeals pertaining to trial cou rt cause number 4

- 95

- 481. See id. , at *2 ; see also McDonald v. State
, 401 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2013, pet. ref ’ d) ; Meyer v. State , 310 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (concluding appellant engaged in abuse of the judicial

proc ess and refusing to permit appellant to “attempt to further manipulate the appellate system”).2 This appeal is dismissed for abuse of the judicial process

. See Johnson v. State , 166 S.W.3d 372, 373 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2005, no pet.) (dismissing criminal appea l for abuse of judicial process). Opinion delivered June 5, 2019. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

( DO NOT PUBLISH )

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JUNE 5 , 2019

NO. 12

- 19

- 00216

- CR

LARRY COLEMAN HICKS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 4

- 95

- 481) THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record; and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this Court that this appeal should be dismissed for abuse of the judicial process

. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this Court that this appeal be, and the same is, hereby dismissed for abuse of the judicial process ; and that this
decision be certified to the court below for observance. By per curiam opinion

. Panel consis ted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.
#### Marran’s Paint Store, Inc., Respondent, *v.*Lee Minarich, Appellant.

County Court, Suffolk County,

June 26, 1957.

*Rockwell D. Colaneri*for appellant.

*Louis L. De Lia*for respondent.

*649Fbed J. Mundeb, J.

The plaintiff-respondent moves to dismiss an appeal from a default judgment taken in the Justice’s Court, Town of Brookhaven, for “ failure to bring the appeal to a hearing and argument within the required statutory-period

The appellant asks for a denial of the plaintiff’s motion, and cross-moves for an order directing that a new trial be held in the Justice’s Court.

That the appeal was properly perfected in accordance with all the requirements of article 19 of the Justice Court Act is not questioned.

Section 450 of the Justice Court Act provides the practice for the hearing and dismissal of appeals taken to the County Court in cases where trial *de novo*is not demanded. (See *Szoth*v. *Green,*155 Misc. 210.) This section provides that the appeal may be brought to a hearing by *either*party upon a notice of not less than eight days, and further, that it must be placed upon the calendar, and if “ *after*being regularly placed upon the calendar, neither party brings it to a hearing before the end of the second term thereafter * * * the court must dismiss the appeal”. (Italics supplied.)

In the instant case it does not appear that it was ever placed on the calendar, a step which either party is afforded the privilege of taking in order to dispose of the appeal. Having not exercised that privilege the plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain.

The appeal having been duly taken in accordance with all statutory requirements, this court now has jurisdiction to entertain the motion to set aside the default. *(Cahaney*v. *O’Brien,*153 Misc. 800; see, also, *Baker R. & L. Co.*v. *Buel,*188 App. Div. 822.)

The appellant has established by affidavit sufficient excuse for his default and has set forth sufficient facts indicating a meritorious defense to the action. He therefore is entitled to his day in court.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

The cross motion to vacate the default and for a new trial in the Justice’s Court is granted.

Submit order.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from 1626 New
York Associates Limited Partnership and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<MULTIPLIER>      1

       
<S>                                                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                 6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                       DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                          JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                            JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                                    6,090,000 <F1>
<SECURITIES>                                                      0
<RECEIVABLES>                                               684,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                               (315,000)
<INVENTORY>                                                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                  0
<PP&E>                                                  215,118,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                         (106,483,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                          140,296,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                             0
<BONDS>                                                 268,019,000 <F2>
<COMMON>                                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                             0
<PREFERRED>                                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                             (136,755,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                            140,296,000
<SALES>                                                           0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         35,292,000 <F3>
<CGS>                                                             0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            13,750,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                  0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       12,544,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                           8,695,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                                      0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      8,695,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                  0
<CHANGES>                                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                             8,695,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                             6,720.90
<EPS-DILUTED>                                             6,720.90
<FN>
<F1>       Cash includes $5,964,000 of restricted cash.
<F2>       Includes accrued interest of $57,713,000.
<F3>       Revenues include gain on sale of property of $17,046,000.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
#### Franklin National Bank of Franklin Square, Plaintiff, *v.*Takis Jeannopulos et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County,

February 26, 1957.

*Bernhardt, Sahn, Shapiro S Epstein*for plaintiff.

*Kaplan <& Econom*for defendants.

Marcus G. Christ, J.

This is a motion for summary judgment by a bank upon a note which it claims to have acquired as a holder in due course.

The defendants bought storm windows from the payee Best Window Co., now out of business. The defendants claim the work of installation was unfinished and defective.

Defendants, a physician and his wife well able to understand the purport and effect of a promissory note, are not to be excused from the effects of its enforcement because they say that they neither read it, nor was it read to them. However, enough has been shown to defeat this motion for summary judgment (Negotiable Instruments Law, § 98).

Defendants say that when they signed the paper there was written across the face of it in pencil the words “ 90 days cash ”. There was no other writing or typed matter on the printed form.

There is a question of fact as to the condition of the note when it was signed, delivered to the payee and when it was presented to the bank. The erasure of this phrase would be a material alteration, which if made at the bank would destroy its status as a “ holder in due course ”, or, at best, if the alteration were made without the bank’s knowledge the instrument would be enforcible only according to its original tenor (Negotiable Instruments Law, § 205). A full trial of the facts is required. Motion denied.

Submit order.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Chief Judge Marcia S. Krieger

Criminal Action No. 11-cr-00412-MSK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

1. HILARIO QUINTERO-RODRIGUEZ,

 a/k/a “The Big Guy,”, a/k/a “Santa Claus,”

2. ABEL SANCHEZ-LEON,

 a/k/a Joel Lopez,

 A/k/a Raul Marez-Ortiez,

3. OCTAVIO QUEZADA-PEREZ,

 a/k/a “Tavi,”

4. FLODINA BELETSO GALLEGOS,

5. GUADALUPE RUIZ-GUARDADO,

 a/k/a “Lupe,”

6. JULIO MARES-RUIZ,

 a/k/a “Mariano,”

7. LUIS JORGE MARTINEZ-VALDIVA, and

8. ROBERT MASON BYAS,

 a/k/a “Robin,”

Defendants.

 

ORDER AND NOTICE OF CHANGE OF PLEA AND SENTENCING HEARINGS

 

THIS MATTER comes before the Court following the filing of a Notice of Disposition 

(#531) on May 4, 2013, by Defendant Julio Mares-Ruiz. The Court construes this Notice as a

motion to change his/her plea and to have the Court consider the terms of the parties’ plea

agreement.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) and (I), the speedy trial clock is tolled
1

 In criminal cases originating from the Grand Junction or Durango Jury Divisions of this Court, counsel

shall be prepared to advise the Court at the time of the change of plea hearing whether a written request to have the

sentencing hearing conducted at the courthouse in either Grand Junction or Durango will be filed. See

Administrative Order 2007-8.

pending determination of those matters. 

2. A Change of Plea hearing is set for July 23, 2013, at 10:30 a.m. and a Sentencing

hearing is set for October 15, 2013, at 3:00 p.m. in the United States District

Court for the District of Colorado, Courtroom A901, Alfred A. Arraj U.S.

Courthouse, 901 19th Street, Denver, Colorado.1

DATED this 7th day of May, 2013.

BY THE COURT:

Marcia S. Krieger

Chief United States District Judge