FILED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T HC IR C U IT MAY 8 , 2006 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H]
I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 05- 11896 N on -A rgum entC al endar

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U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , P la in tif f

- A p p e lle e , v ersu s G E R M A N D E A R M A S , D e fe n d a n t- A p p e lla n t.

________________________ A pp ea l fr om t he U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt for t he M i ddl e D i s tr i c tof F l or i da

_________________________ ( M a y 8, 2006) ON P E T I T I ON F OR RE HE AR I NG B efo re D U B IN A , H U L L an d M A R C U S , C i rcu i tJu d g es. P E R C U R I A M:We h avealre a dy re je c te d th eg ov ernme nt’ s a rgument that w edo no t havejurisdic tio n to 1 revie w the rea sonablene ss of a sentenc e within the advisory Guidelines rang e. See Uni t ed S t at es v. Martinez, --- F.3d - --, 2006 WL 39541 *3 (11th Cir. J an. 9, 2006) (reje ctingg overn ment’s argument that this C ourt

lac ks jurisdic tio n to re vie w s e ntenc e s f or re a so na blene ss u nd er 1 8 U .S. C. 2 N o j udge i n r e gul a r a c t i ve s e r vi c e on t he C our tha vi ng r e que s t e d t ha tt he C our tbe pol l e d on r e he a r i ng e n ba nc , F e d. R . A pp. P . 35, acco rd i ngl y , r e he a r i ng
e n b a n c is D E N I E D . A p p e l la n t’s p e titio n fo r p a n e l r e h e a r in g is G R A N T E D . W e V A C A T E ou r pri or op i ni on i n t hi s c as e a nd subst i tut e the fol l ow i ng i n i t s pl ac e: G e r m a n D e A r m a s a ppe a l s hi s 135- m ont h s e nt e nc e a nd c onvi c t i ons for po ss es si on w i t h i nt entt o d i stri bu t e 5 ki l og ra m s or m ore of a mi xt ure a nd sub stance
c ont a i ni ng a de t e c t a bl e a m ountof c oc ai n e w h i l e o n boa r d a ve s s e l s ubj e c tt o t he j ur i s di c t i on of

t he U ni t e d S t a t e s , i n vi o l at i on of 46 U . S . C . A pp. § 1903( a ) , ( g) , a nd 2 1 U .S .C . § 9 6 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( B ) ( ii) ( C o u n t 1 ) , a n d c o n s p ir a c y to p o s s e s s w ith in te n t to d is tr ib u te 5 k ilo g r a m s o r m o r e o f a m ix tu r e a n d s u b s ta n c e c o n ta in in g a d e te c ta b le
am ou nt o f co ca i ne w hi l e on b oard a vess el subj ec tt o t he j uri sdi ct i on of t he U ni t ed S t a t e s , i n v i ol a t i on of

§ 1903, ( a ) , ( g) , (

j ) , a nd § 960( b) ( 1) ( B ) ( i i ) ( C ount2) . T he 135- m ont h s e nt e nc e D e A r m a s r e c e i ve d w a s t h e l ow e s tpos s i bl e t e r m w i t hi n t he
a p p lic a b le 1 3 5 to 1 6 8 m o n th s ’ a d v is o r y G u id e lin e s r a n g e . O n a ppe a l , D e A r m a s a r gue s t ha t : ( 1) hi s s e nt enc e w a s unr e a s ona bl e i n l i ght of t he 18 U . S . C . § 3 5 5 3(a) fa ct ors a nd t he S up re m e C ou rt ’ s dec i si on i n U ni t ed S t a t e s v. B ooke r , 543 U . S . 2 2 0 (2 005) ; a nd ( 2) t he di s tr i c tc our t ’ s i m pos i t i on of 1§ 3742); see also United States v. Mickelson, --- F.3d - --, 2006 WL 27687 *2 (8th Cir. J an. 6, 2006) (same) . As for D e Armas’s arg ument that the district court lac ked subjec t-matter jurisdiction

2 over theinstant case be cause the Maritime Drug L aw Enf orce ment Act (“ MDLEA”) represente d an ultra vires e x erc ise of Congressional power u n d erthe Piracie s and F elonies Clause of the Constitution, after denovo revie w, we disc ern no error . Cf. United States v. Perez, 956 F.2d 1098, 1011 (11th Cir. 1992) (re viewingissue of di strict court’s subjec t matter jurisdiction de novo). The Constitution empowers Congress “ [t ]o define and punish Piracie s and F elonies on the hig h Seas, and Of fens e s ag ains t th eL aw o f N atio ns .” U. S. Cons t., art . I , § 8, c l. 1 0. We h aveno te d th at “ thi s circ uit an d o th er c irc u it s h av e n o t e mb e ll is h e d th e M D LE A w ith [th e re qu ire men t o f ] a ne x us [between a

defe ndant’s criminal c onduct and the United States].” United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U .S. 1035 (2004); see also United States v. MorenoMo ri llo , 3 34F .3 d 8 19 , 8 24(9 th C ir . 2 00 3) (h oldingthat Congres s ac te d w ithin c on sti tution ally conferre d authority in enac ting MDLEA); United States v. Ledesma -Cuesta, 347 F.3d 527, 532 ( 3d Cir. 2003) (“Congress had authority to enac t [ the MDLEA], pur suant to its constitutional power to: ‘def ine and punish Piracie s and F elonies committed on the high se as, and O ffe nses ag ainst the L aw of Na t i o n s . ’ Inasmuch a s the traf fickingof narcotics is condemne d universally by law-a biding nations, we see no rea son to c onclude that it is ‘fundamentally unfair’ for Congress to provide f or the punishment of per sons apprehended w ith na rcotics on the high se as.” ( quoting United States v. Martinez-Hidalg o, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 ( 3d Cir. 1993))). Simply put, the district court did not err by failingto hold sua sponte that the MDLEA wa s unconstitutional beca use Cong ress had exceede d its authority

under thePiracies and Fe lonies Clause. We also m u s t re

j ect DeArma s’s argument that the MDLEA is unconstitutional in l ight of United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995)
. As De Armas recog nizes, we expressly addre ssed and re je c te d his po sition in Unite d State s v. Ti no c o, 30 4 F .3 d 10 88 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 2) . B e c aus e“ on ly the Supreme Court or this Court sitti ng en banc can judicially overr ule a prior panel decision,” w e must follow Tinoco. See United States v. Marte, 356 F .3d 1336, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing prior-prece dent rule)
. 3 sen t e nc e a nd r e tr oa c t i ve a ppl i c a t i on of B ooke r vi ol a t e d e x pos tfa c t o a nd due p r o c e s s p r i n c i p l e s . A f

t e r c a r e f u l r e v i e w , w e a f

f i r m. 2 W e “ re vi ew for unreas on abl enes s” a s ent ence i m po se d p o st -B oo ker. B oo ker, 5 4 3 U . S . at__ _, 12 5 S . C t . at76 5 (qu ot at i on and al t er at i on om i t t ed); se e al so U ni t ed S t at es v. C ra w ford, 4 0 7 F . 3d 11 74 , 11 78 (11t h C i r. 20 05 ) ( no t i ng t hat

“ B oo ker e stab l i shed a ‘ re as on abl enes s’ st andard for the se nt ence fi nal l y i m po se dIn support of this claim, De Armas hig hlights the pre senceof the followingfac tors as 3 supporting a

sentenc e below the advisory Guidelines rang e: (1) he has no criminal history ; (2) the sentenc e that he sug g ested, 108 months’ i mp ri sonment, adequately would have refle cted the seri ou sn e ss of the of

fens eandprov ide d b othsp e c if ic andg e neral deterre nc e ; ( 3) heplaye d a small ro lein a larg ec on sp ir ac y ; ( 4) here c e ive d a sig nif ic antl y higher sen tencethan his c od e fend ants based solely on the fact that he wa s the ca ptain of the ve ssel; and (5) his ba se off ense le vel was the same ba se off

ense le vel as that of a

“‘kin gp i n ’ o f a larg e-sc ale org anization,” even though he had no equity or ownership i ntere st in the drug s, was not ea rninga commission off of thesale of the drug s, and did not have a leadership position i n the larg er dr ugorg anization 4 o n a d efendant ”) . In m aki ng ou r r ea sonabl enes s r evi ew , w e c on si der the fi nal
sen t en ce, i n i t s e nt i r e t y , i n l i ghtof t he § 3553( a ) fa c t or s . S e e U ni t e d S t a t e s v. W i nni nge a r , 422 F . 3d 1241, 1 2 4 5 ( 11t h C i r . 2005) ( “ W e do nota ppl y t he
r e a s ona b l en es s s t a nda r d t o e a c h i ndi vi dua l de c i s i on m a de dur i ng t he s e nt e nc i ng pr oc e s s ; r a t he r , w e r e vi e w t he f i na l s e nt e nc e for r e a s ona b l en ess . ” ) . W e r e vi e w de
no vo a def

endant ’ s c l ai m th athi s s ent ence vi ol at ed ex po stfa ct o p ri nci pl es . S ee U ni t e d S t a t e s v. A br a ha m , 386 F . 3d 103 3 , 1 0 3 7 (1 1 t h C i r . 2004) , c e r tde ni e d, 126 S . C t . 41 7 (20 05 ). F i r s t , D e A r m a s a r gue s t ha thi s s e nt e nc e w a s unr e a s ona bl e i n l i ghtof t he § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) fa c to r s a n d th e S u p r e m e C o u r t’s d e c i s io n in B o o k e r . A s fo r h is c la im 3 t h a tt h e d i s tr i c tc o u r td i d n o ta d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r a l l o f t h e § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) fa c t o r s , we
r e c e n tly h e ld th a t “n o th in g in B o o k e r o r e ls e w h e r e r e q u ir e s th e d is tr ic t c o u r t to
s t a t e on t he r e c or d t ha ti tha s e xpl i c i t l y c ons i de r e d each of the § 3553( a ) fa c t or s or t o di s c us s e a c h of

t he § 3553( a ) fa c t o rs. ” U ni t e d S t a t e s v. S c ot t , 426 F . 3d 1324,5

13 29 (11t h C i r. 20 05 ). A cc ordi ng l y, a di stri ctco u rt’s fa i l ure t o exp re ss re fe re nce
ea ch an d ev er y one of t he § 3 55 3(a) fa ct ors does notconst i t ut e e rr or un der B oo ker.

I n a n y e v e n t, h e r e , a t th e s e n te n c in g h e a r in g , th e d is tr ic t c o u r t e x p r e s s ly st ated t hati thad con si dere d al l of t he fa ct ors i n § 35 53 (a ). A l t ho ug h t he di stri ct
c our tdi d notde t a i l t he w ei g h t t h ati tha d a c c or de d t o e a c h i ndi vi dua l s e nt e nc i ng fa c t or , i tw a s notr e qui r e d t o do s o. S e e S c ot t , 426 F . 3d a t 1 3 2 9 . O n t hi s r e c or d,
w e a r e s a t i s f

i e d w i t h the di s tr i c tc ou r t ’ s e xp r e s s s t a t e me nt s t ha ti tha d c on si dere d De Ar m a s ’ s c o d e fe n d a n t s ’ s e n t e n c e s , s e e § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) ( 6 ) , a s we l l a s t h e fa c t s t h a tDe A rm as h ad n o eq u i t y i n t ere s t in t h e d ru g s, n o ro l e i n t h e d i stri b u t i o n o f t h e d ru g s, and no r ol e i n the pl a nn i ng of t he c on s pi r a c y . A l l of

t he s e fa c t s w e r e r a i s e d before th e d istrict co u rt an d p lain ly th e c o u rt co n si d e r e d th em . S im p ly p u t, D e A rm as ’s
se n ten ce w as n o t u n re as o n ab le an d is fu ll y s u p p o rted b y th e d istrict co u rt’s
s e nt e nc i ng c ons i de r a t i ons a nd fa c t ua l f i ndi ngs . W e c a n f

i nd no B o o k er err or i n t he di stri ctcourt ’ s c on si dera t i on of t he § 3 55 3(a) fa ct ors her e. W e li k ew i se ar e unp er suaded by D e A rm as ’ s a rgum entt hatt he di stri ctcourt vi ol a t e d e x pos tfa c t o a nd due pr oc e s s pr i nc i pl e s w he n i ts en t en ced hi m t o 135
m o n th s ’ im p r is o n m e n t b e c a u s e th e m a x im u m s e n te n c e th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u r t c o u ld h av e i m p o sed b ased so l el y o n t h e fact s ch arg ed i n t h e in d ic tm e n tw as 8 7 m o n t h s’To the extent De Arma s sugg ests that the district court violated his Six th Amendment 4 rig hts by enhanc ing his sente nce ba sed on facts that were not alleg ed in his indictment or admitted by him, the district court did not err by findi n g fa cts supporting e x tra-verdict enhanceme nts since it sentence d De Armas under an advisory g uidelines scheme
. See United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejec ting a defe ndant’s arg ument that, under an advisory g uidelines scheme , the Six th Amendment prohibits a sentenc ing c ourt from findingfac ts supporting e x traverdic t enhanc ements). 6 im p r is o n m e n t. D e A r m a s r e c o g n iz e s th a t w e r e je c te d a s i m ila r a r g u m e n t in 4 U ni t e d S t a t e s v. D unc a n, 400 F . 3d 1297 ( 11t h C i r . ) , c e r t . d en i ed, 126 S . C t . 432 (200 5) . I n tha tc a s e , t he de fe nd a nta r gu e d tha tr e tr oa c t i ve l y a pp l y i ng t he r e me di al ho l di ng o f th e B oo ker deci si on -- w hi ch al l ow s for se nt ence enhancem ent s bas ed up on j ud i ci al fact -f

i nd i ng so l on g as the gu i del i nes a re appl i ed i n an adv i sory
m anner -- di d n otgi ve hi m “ fa i r w ar ni ng ” of t h e p o ten ti al se nt ence , and t hu s, ac t ed
as an ex po stfa ct o l aw , i n v io lati o n o f hi s due proces s r i gh t s. D un ca n, 40 0 F . 3d at 1 3 0 7 . I n D unc a n, l i ke he r e , t he e s s e nc e of t he de fe nda nt ’ s arg u m en t s ought
re tr oa c t i ve a pp l i c a t i on of Book e r ’ s Si xth A me nd me ntho l di ng , bu tno ti t s r e medi al ho l di ng . Id . at13 06 . W e c on cl ud ed D un ca n h ad “ suff i ci entw ar ni ng ” thatl i fe i m pr i s onm e ntw a s a pot e nt i a l c ons e que nc e t o hi s a c t i ons t o s a t i s f y due pr oc ess a nd
e x p o s t fa c to c o n c e r n s b e c a u s e , a t th e tim e o f th e o f fe n s e , ( 1 ) t h e a p p lic a b le s ta tu te p r o v id e d fo r a s e n te n c e o f life im p r is o n m e n t; ( 2 ) th e G u id e lin e s p r o v id e d t h a t a j ud ge w ou l d eng age i n fac t -f i nd i ng t o d eterm i ne se nt ence and cou l d i m po se aThe “ fair w arning ” factors of D uncan also are present here. When DeArmas c ommitt ed 5 the drugoffe nses, (1) themaxi mum term of impriso n m en t for DeArmas’ offe nses was life i mp ri s o n m en t , s ee2 1 U. S . C . § 9 6 0 (b )( 1 )( B) (i i ); (2 ) th e G u i d el i n es i n fo rm edDeArm as th ata j u d ge would eng age in f

act- findingto determine his sente nce and could impose a sente nce of up to life imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 3 5 5 1 , et s eq. (providing that the se ntencingcourt c ould consider specifie d fac tors, including theg uidelines, in imposing sentenc e); and (3) the relevant max imum at the time when De Armas committed his off ense w as the statutory

maxi mum enacte d in the United States Code , n o t th e maximu m e s ta b li s h e d p u r s u an t to th e g u id e li n e s . Se e D u n c an , 4 0 0 F . 3d at 1308. 7 s e n te n c e o f

life i m p r is o n m e n t; a n d ( 3 ) a lth o u g h m a n d a to r y G u id e lin e s w e r e in p lace , th e l aw of t hi s C i rc ui tt hen recogni ze d t he U ni t ed S t at es C od e a s the source of t he m axi m um se nt ence , w hi ch, i n D un ca n’ s c as e, w as a li fe se nt ence . Id. at 1307- 08. D e A r m a s r e c ogni z e s t ha tour hol di ng i n D unc a n i s di s pos i t i ve he r e a nd

5 sugg es t s thatD un ca n w as w ro n g ly deci ded. A cc ordi ng t o o ur w el l -e st abl i shed pri or-pre ce dentrul e, “ [o] nl y the S up re m e C ou rtor t hi s C o u rt sitt i ng en banc can j udi c i a l l y o v e r r i d e a p r i o r p a n e l d e c i s i o n . ” U n i t e d St a t e s v . W r i g h t , 3 9 2 F . 3d 1 2 6 9 , 1 2 8 0 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 4 ) ( in te r n a l q u o ta tio n s a n d c ita tio n s o m itte d ) , c e r t. d e n ie d , 1 2 5 S . C t . 1 7 5 1 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . T h u s , p u r s u a n t to D u n c a n , w e f in d n o e x p o s t fa c to
or due pr oc e s s vi ol a t i on ba s e d on a ppl i c a t i on of t he B ooke r de c i s i on. A FFI R M ED .