UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DEWAYNE ANTOINE ANDERSON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

NAOMI ARNOLD; TRINIDAD 

BALDERAS, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 17-3186 

(D.C. No. 6:16-CV-01376-JTM-GEB) 

(D. Kan.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Dewayne Anderson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action against 

Wichita police officers Naomi Arnold and Trinidad Balderas. Exercising jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I 

Anderson alleges that Arnold used excessive force against him following a 

traffic accident. When Arnold arrived on the scene, she asked for Anderson’s license 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 30, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

and insurance information. But when Anderson reached for his wallet, Arnold 

brandished a taser and told him to remove his hand from his pocket. Anderson 

thought the taser was a gun and said, “Don’t shoot.” Arnold threatened to tase 

Anderson unless he turned around to face her. She then placed her hand on her gun. 

After another officer arrived on scene, Anderson was handcuffed and placed in a 

police car, where he remained for approximately thirty minutes before he was 

escorted to an ambulance. Anderson claims that his treatment constituted 

unnecessary use of force and that he was denied speedy access to medical treatment 

for the injuries he incurred in the car accident. 

II 

 “We review de novo the district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Slater v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 719 

F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 2013). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must 

“plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009). Although “a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 

grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotations, citation, and brackets omitted). 

 We hold that the district court correctly dismissed Anderson’s complaint. 

Claims of excessive force are analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard 
3 

of the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Anderson 

does not claim that Arnold had any physical contact with him. Although Arnold 

brandished a taser, she did not tase Anderson. Further, the neck injuries that 

Anderson endured were caused by the traffic accident, not a police officer. These 

facts do not suffice to state a claim of excessive force, as they do not indicate that 

Anderson suffered an “actual injury that is not de minimis, be it physical or 

emotional.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1129 (10th Cir. 2007). 

III 

 AFFIRMED. 

 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge