Filed 6/30/15 (unmodified opinion attached) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MIRA OVERSEAS CONSULTING LTD.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
MUSE FAMILY ENTERPRISES, LTD. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants;
CARMEN COPPLE SILVA, Individually and as Trustee, etc.,
Defendant and Respondent. B254298
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC476282)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT: *

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on June 2, 2015, be modified as follows:
On page 2, the first sentence of the last full paragraph, the words “(whom he later remarried),” are deleted so the sentence now reads:
Meanwhile, during the divorce proceedings, David’s former wife claimed that he hid assets from her, including the property.
There is no change in the judgment.

Plaintiff and respondent’s petition for rehearing is denied.

* BOREN, P. J. ASHMANN -GERST, J. CHAVEZ, J.Filed 6/2/15 (unmodified opinion) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MIRA OVERSEAS CONSULTING LTD.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
MUSE FAMILY ENTERPRISES, LTD. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants;
CARMEN COPPLE SILVA, Individually and as Trustee, etc.,
Defendant and Respondent. B254298
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC476282)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County. Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Reversed.

Locke Lord, Jon L. Rewinski; and Christopher Dove for Defendants and Appellants.

Law Offices of Saied Kashani and Saie d Kashani for Defendant and Respondent.

Kendrick Jan; Chassman & Seelig a nd Mark B. Chassman for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________ ____________2 The question presented is: Does a judgme nt granting a fraudulent transfer claim, as well as monetary damages, relate back to the date on which the claimants recorded a lis pendens? We conclude that it does. Follo wing a bench trial on reciprocal claims for declaratory relief regarding the priority of j udgment liens, the trial court determined that the judgment lien of respondent Mira Overseas Consulting, Ltd. (Mira) had priority over appellants’ Muse Family Enterprises, Ltd. (the Muse Parties) judgment lien because it was filed first. We reverse, finding that th e Muse Parties’ judgment lien relates back to the date they reco rded a lis pendens.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND The Underlying Facts 1

The Muse Parties are 20 investor entities th at made loans to BTM Funding, Inc. (BTM), a company wholly owned by David T. Smith (David). In 20 08, David used BTM to purchase a residence in P acific Palisades, California (the property) for approximately $10 million. David had BTM take title to the property to hide it from his former wife during their contentious divorce proceedings. David married respondent Carmen Copple Silva (Carmen), who is also trustee of the Carmen Copple Silva Revocable Living Trust (trust). In November 2008, David caused to be executed a quitclaim deed which transferred the property from BTM to hims elf. On the same day, David signed a quitclaim deed transferring th e property to Carmen. A ye ar later, Carmen executed a quitclaim deed transferring th e property from herself to he r trust. None of these quitclaim deeds were recorded until 2009, after financial pr oblems with BTM surfaced. Because David had listed the property as the primary asset of BTM, the effect of the quitclaim deeds was to render BTM insolvent. Meanwhile, during the divorce proceedings, David’s former wife (whom he later remarried) claimed that he hid assets from her, including the property. She and David eventually settled the issue by having Mira, a British Virgin Islands entity, originally beneficially owned by Da vid transferred to her.

1 These facts are taken from our earlier opinion. ( Muse Family Enterprises, Ltd. v. BTM Funding, Inc . (Sept. 30, 2014, B2 47757) [nonpub. opn.].)3 The Los Angeles Action On September 14, 2010, the Muse Parties filed a comp laint in the Los Angeles Superior Court against BTM, David, Carmen and her trust (the Los Angeles Action). The complaint alleged causes of action for br each of contract and fraud, and also sought to set aside the quitclaim d eeds as fraudulent transfers. On September 16, 2010, the Muse Parties recorded in th e county recorder’s office a “Notice of Pendency of Action” (the lis pendens), advising that the Los Angeles Action “affects title to or right to possess” the property.
David let BTM’s default be taken. In Ju ly 2011, the remaining parties entered into a stipulation that BTM breached contracts w ith the Muse Parties, causing damages of approximately $16 million plus interest. A judgment foll owing this stipulation was entered on October 22, 2012. The case then proceeded to tr ial in October and November
2012 on the issues of fraudulent transfer and alter ego. A jury found that David was the alter ego of BTM, that the transfer of th e property from BTM to David was fraudulent, and that David caused $10 million in damages with respect to th e fraudulent transfer. An amended judgment was entered on Janua ry 25, 2013, awarding damages of $21,280,561.27 to the Muse Parties agains t BTM and David as its alter ego. The amended judgment also nullified all of the qu itclaim deeds as fraudulent transfers, which resulted in title to the property reverting back to BTM. The amended judgment was
recorded with th e county recorder on February 26, 20 13. BTM, David, Carmen and her trust appealed the amended judgm ent, which we affirmed. ( Muse Family Enterprises, Ltd. v. BTM Funding, Inc
., supra, B247757.)
The Santa Monica Action On March 4, 2011, about six months after the Los Angeles Action commenced, respondent Mira, which was no w owned by David’s former wife, filed a first amended complaint (FAC) in the Los Angeles Superior Court in Santa Monica against BTM, David, Carmen and her trust (the Santa Monica Action). The FAC alleged breach of contract, seeking to recover a $4.66 million loan made to BTM for the purchase of the4 property, which David had assumed. The FAC also asserted a fraudulent transfer claim, challenging the same title transfer s as the Muse Parties challenged. A few months later, Mira and the defend ants in the Santa Monica Action entered into a written agreement, and a stipulated ju dgment was entered on June 6, 2011. The defendants stipulated to a money judgment against themselves for $5,428,900, and Mira stipulated that it would enfo rce the judgment only through levy on the property. An abstract of Mira’s judgment wa s recorded on July 15, 2011.
The defendants in the Santa Monica Ac tion were the same defendants in the Los Angeles Action and were represented by th e same counsel. None of the defendants, however, filed a notice of related case in e ither action or otherwise notified the Muse
Parties of the Santa Monica Action. The Muse Parties first learned about the Santa Monica Action when they took David’s depo sition on August 29, 2011, at which time David’s counsel provided copies of the settle ment agreement, the stipulated judgment, and the recorded abstract of judgment from the Santa Monica Action.
The Instant Action Mira initiated the instant action by filing a complaint against the Muse Parties, BTM, David, Carmen and her trust on Januar y 3, 2012, seeking a declaration that its judgment lien was superior and senior to a ny lien that might be obtained by the Muse Parties with respect to the property. The Mu se Parties filed a cro ss-complaint, seeking a declaration that their anticipat ed judgment lien related back to the recording of their lis pendens and was therefore s uperior. The Muse Parties al so sought a declaration that Mira’s judgment was collusi ve and therefore void.
The instant case was tried to the court in April 2013. On November 20, 2013, the court issued a lengthy statement of decision, finding that the Muse Parties’ judgment did not relate back to the lis pendens and th at the Mira judgment was not void due to extrinsic fraud. Judgment was entered on De cember 17, 2013. The Muse Parties timely filed this appeal.5 DISCUSSION
I. Lis Pendens As our Supreme Court explained in Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642 ( Kirkeby ): “‘A lis pendens is a recorded docu ment giving constructive notice that an action has been filed affecting title or right to possession of the real property described in the notice.’ [Citation.] A lis pendens may be filed by any party in an action who asserts a ‘real property claim.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.20.) Section 405.4 defines a “‘Real property claim’” as ‘the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property . . . .’ ‘If the pleading filed by the claimant does not pr operly plead a real pr operty claim, the lis pendens must be expunged upon motion under CCP 405.31.’ [Citation.]” ( Kirkeby,

supra , at p. 647, fn. omitted.) Because a lis pendens provides cons tructive notice of the litigation, “any judgment later obtained in the action relates back to the filing of the lis pendens.” ( Slintak v. Buckeye Retirem ent Co., L.L.C., Ltd. (2006) 139 Cal.App. 4th 575, 586.) “A lis pendens clouds title until the litigation is re solved or the lis pendens is expunged, and any party acquiring an interest in the proper ty after the action is filed will be bound by the judgment.” ( Id . at pp. 586–587; Stagen v. Stewart-West Coast Title Co. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 114, 123 [“A judgment favorable to the plaintiff relates to, and receives its priority from, the date the lis pendens is reco rded, and is senior and prior to any interests in the property acquired after that date”].) As set forth in Code of Civil Procedure,
section 405.24: “From the time of record ing the notice of pendency of action, a purchaser, encumbrancer, or other transferee of the real property de scribed in the notice
shall be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the noticed action as it relates to the real property and only of its pendency against pa rties not fictitiously named. The rights and interest of the claimant in the property, as ultimat ely determined in the pending noticed action, shall relate back to the date of the recording of the notice .” (Italics added.)6 II. Fraudulent Conveyance A fraudulent conveyance claim is set forth in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) (Civil Code section 3439 et seq.). As Kirkeby explained, “‘[a] fraudulent conveyance is a transfer by the debtor of prop erty to a third person undertaken with the intent to prevent a creditor from reaching that interest to satisfy its claim.’” ( Kirkeby
, supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 648.) Ci vil Code section 3439.07 sets forth the remedies in a fraudulent conveyance action, including “Avoida nce of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy th e creditor’s claim.” (Civ. Co de, § 3439.07, subd. (a)(1).)
III. The Kirkeby Case
In Kirkeby , our Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a fraudulent conveyance claim affects title to or the right to possess real property thereby supporting the recording of a lis pendens. ( Kirkeby
, supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 645.) The Supreme Court concluded that it does. ( Ibid .) The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging 27 causes of action, including a fraudulent conveyance cause of action, an d recorded a lis pendens. ( Kirkeby
, supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 646.) The complaint requested that the alleged fraudulent transfers be voided to the extent necessary to satisfy th e other claims set forth in th e plaintiff’s complaint. ( Ibid .) That remedy was the plaintiff’s only interest in the property. The trial court granted a motion to expunge the lis pendens and the appe llate court affirmed, finding that the basis of the complaint was to recover money and ha d nothing to do with real property. ( Id . at pp. 646–647.) The Supreme Court reversed: “[A] fraudul ent conveyance claim requesting relief pursuant to Civil Code section 3439.07, subdivision (a)(1), if successful, may result in the voiding of a transfer of title of specific real property. By definition, the voiding of a transfer of real property will affect title to or possession of real property. Therefore, a fraudulent conveyance action seeking avoidan ce of a transfer under subdivision (a)(1) of Civil Code section 3439.07 clearly ‘affects ti tle to, or the right to possession of’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.4) real property and is ther efore a real property claim for the purposes of the lis pendens statutes.” ( Kirkeby
, supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 649.)7 IV. The Muse Parties’ Judgment Lien Relates Back to th e Recording of the
Lis Pendens In ruling on the parties’ co mpeting claims for priority of their judgment liens, the
trial court in the instant action stated that Kirkeby was “silent as to whether a judgment
obtained on a fraudulent transfer claim relates back to the filing of the lis pendens in instances where the judgment cr editor did not allege a direct interest in the property.”
The trial court also stated th at the Muse Parties only sou ght a money judgment and filed
their fraudulent transfer claim merely to obtain re turn of the title in the property to BTM so that their eventual judgment could be levi ed against BTM’s interest in the property.
The trial court also noted that the Muse Pa rties did not seek any provisional remedies such as attachments, injunctions, or the appointment of receivers. But the trial court’s analysis ignores that the instant action involves the same type of property claim as Kirkeby . The plaintiff in Kirkeby , like the Muse Parties here, only
filed a fraudulent transfer claim to void the tr ansfers “to the extent necessary to satisfy
the claims set forth in her complaint.” ( Kirkeby
, supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 646.) In Kirkeby
, there were 26 other claims that did not involv e the real property. Yet, because the UFTA specifically allows the remedy of “[a]voidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the cr editor’s claim” (Civ. Code, § 3439.07, subd. (a)(1)), the Kirkeby court held that a fraudulent conveyance cl aim seeking avoidance of a transfer “is therefore a real property claim for the pur poses of the lis pendens statutes.” ( Kirkeby
, supra , at p. 649.) The necessary corollary to this rule is th at a successful claimant’s rights and interests in the property relate back to the recording of the claimant’s lis pendens. Additionally, there is no requirement that a party filing a fraudulent transfer claim pursue other remedies under the UFTA. “T he UFTA expressly provides for remedies such as attachments, injunctions, a nd the appointment of receivers.” ( Kirkeby
, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 651–652.) “‘[A]lthough [t he UFTA] does not provide for notices of lis pendens, it does not exclude them either.’” ( Kirkeby, at p. 652.) The Kirkeby court described the language in Civil Code sec tion 3439.07, subdivis ion (a)(3)(C) that a8 creditor bringing a UFTA claim is entitled to “[a]ny other relief the circumstances may require” as “broad,” supporting the recording of a lis pendens. ( Kirkeby, at p. 652.) Thus, the Kirkeby court saw nothing wrong with the plai ntiff’s election of the lis pendens remedy instead of the attachment or other express remedies of the UFTA. In sum, we conclude that because the Mu se Parties indisputably had the right to record a lis pendens with re spect to their fraudulent tran sfer claim, their rights and interest in the property (i.e., the avoidance of transfers of the prop erty to satisfy their claims) relate back to the da te they recorded th eir lis pendens. Because this date was
earlier than the date Mira reco rded its abstract of judgment , the Muse Parties’ judgment lien has priority. In reaching this conclusion, we acknow ledge the argument of respondent Carmen, as individual and trustee, that the Muse Par ties have no lien on the property because they never recorded an abstract of judgment. Ca rmen correctly notes that, except in certain situations not applicable here, a judgment lien on real property is created by recording an
abstract of judgment, rather than recording the judgment itself. (Code Civ. Proc., § 697.310. subd. (a).) Carmen points out th at the Muse Parties never produced a recorded abstract of judgment during the tr ial court litigation in the instant case. However, it is clear from the record, as Carm en concedes, that the trial court and the parties treated the Muse Parties’ recorded amended judgment as an abstract. In any event, the Muse Parties record ed an abstract of judgment on November 5, 2012, which abstract was originally issued on October 31, 2 012. This is the orig inal judgment against BTM following the stipulation. The Muse Pa rties then recorded an abstract of the amended judgment on February 7, 2014, which abstract was issued on February 6, 2014, relating to the issues later decided at trial. The Muse Parties have asked us to augment
the record to include their firs t recorded abstract of judgment , which is part of the record
in the instant case as an exhi bit to the Muse Parties’ objections to the statement of decision. They have also asked us to take ju dicial notice of their se cond recorded abstract of the amended judgment. We grant these re quests. Carmen did not raise this issue9 below. Had she done so, the Muse Parties co uld have easily pointed to the recorded abstract of judgment. 2
DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. The Muse Par ties are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

__________ ________________, J. ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________ _____________, P. J. BOREN

___________________ _________, J. CHAVEZ

2 In light of our conclusion, we need not address the Muse Parties’ argument that the Mira judgment should have been set aside as the product of extrinsic fraud.