This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 CARLOS SEDILLO, 2 Petitioner-Petitioner, 3

v. No. A-1-CA-35658 4 NEW MEXICO RACING COMMISSION, 5 Respondent-Respondent. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Denise Barela-Shepherd, District Judge 8 Santiago E. Juarez 9 Albuquerque, NM 10 for Petitioner 11 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 12 Santa Fe, NM 13 Audrey K. McKee, Assistant Attorney General 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Respondent 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 VARGAS, Judge. 181 The Dermorphin concentration for one sample was 76.8 nanograms per 18 milliliter, while the other wa s 48.3 nanograms per milliliter. It is unimportant to our 19 analysis on appeal which sample belonged to which horse. 20 2 {1} Petitioner Carlos Sedillo, appeals the district court’s order affirming the New 1 Mexico Racing Commission’s (the Commissi on) decision to suspend him from 2 training horses, fine him, and order the surrender of purses after two horses he trained 3 tested positive for a prohibited Class 1 drug. Sedillo argues that the Commission erred 4 when it relied on drug test results from a lab that had not been approved by the 5 Commission to find that he violated the rules governing horse trainers. Sedillo further 6 contends that his due process rights wereviolated on several grounds. Finally, Sedillo 7 claims that, in the event he did violate the rules, the penalty imposed by the 8 Commission was improper. Concluding that Sedillo failed to show that the 9 Commission’s decision was arb itrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not supported 10 by substantial evidence, or otherwise notin accordance with the law, we affirm. 11 BACKGROUND 12
{2} Sedillo was the trainer of record for tw o horses that ran at the Ruidoso Downs 13 on May 25, 2012. Following each horse’s race, blood and urine samples were taken 14 from them. The urine samples of both horses tested positive for Dermorphin, 1 a Class 15 1 drug. The board of stewards appointed to supervise the races held a hearing on the 16 matter on September 30, 2012, and ruled that Sedillo had violated 15.2.6.9(C)(1) 173 NMAC, 15.2.6.11(A) NMAC, and 16.47.1.10(B)(1) NMAC. See NMSA 1978, § 60- 1 1A-12 (2007) (setting out the powers and duties of stewards); 15.2.3.8 NMAC 2 (authorizing stewards to supervise license s and persons responsible for the conduct 3 of racing to insure compliance with th e New Mexico Horse Racing Act (the Act), 4 NMSA 1978, §§ 60-1A-1 to -30 (2007, as amended through 2018), and its regulations, 5 including authority to discipline violators in accordance with the regulations). Sedillo 6 appealed the board of stewards’ ruling to the Commission. The Commission appointed 7 a hearing officer, who, following a heari ng, issued a report recommending a five-year 8 suspension of Sedillo’s trainer license, a fi ve thousand dollar fine , and a loss of purse 9 for each horse that tested positive for Dermorphin. The hearing officer made several 10 findings, including: 11 5. Iowa State Racing Chemistry Lab (“ISU”) . . . was . . . a 12 Commission approved laboratory. 13

. . . . 14 9. In May and June 2012, ISU did not have the capabilities to 15 test or detect Dermorphin. 16

. . . . 17 13. [University of California, Davis (UC Davis)] is capable of 18 testing for and detecting Dermorphin. 19

. . . . 202 Sedillo makes numerous factual assertions throughout his brief without 17 providing any citations to the record. The citations that Sedill o does make to the 18 record are often inaccurate or fail to o ffer any support to his assertions. Throughout 19 this opinion, we address only those arguments that satisfy our appellate rules, though 20 many do so only by the narrowest of margins. See Rule 12-318 NMRA (requiring 21 briefing to provide citations to relevant au thorities as well as to the record proper). 22 4 16. Testimony was presented and evidence introduced by the 1 Commission that all primary samples of blood and urine taken from the 2 Sedillo Horses (collectively the “Primary Samples”) were sent to UC 3 Davis. [Sedillo] presented no conflicting testimony. 4

{3} The Commission unanimously adopted the hearing officer’s report, including 5 her findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended penalty. Pursuant to Rule 6 1-075 NMRA, Sedillo petitioned the district court to review the Commission’s 7 decision. The district court granted the petition and affirmed the Commission’s 8 decision. Sedillo then sought review by this Court, filing a petition for writ of 9 certiorari, which we granted. See Rule 1-075 NMRA. 10 DISCUSSION 2 11
{4} Sedillo makes several assertions of error that can be summarized into three 12 issues. First Sedillo asserts that the deci sion of the Commission’s director to send the 13 samples to a laboratory at UC Davis rather than one at Iowa State University, was 14 error. Sedillo also argues that his due process rights were violated by the introduction 15 of hearsay and documentary evidence, the failure to follow procedures, the failure to 16 give him notice of prohibited substances, the failure to establish a chain of custody for 175 the samples, and the deprivation of his ri ght of cross-examination. Lastly, Sedillo 1 argues that the penalty assessed against hi m was contrary to the Commission’s rules 2 and regulations. 3
{5} In reviewing the Commission’s decision, “[w]e apply the same administrative 4 standard of review as the district court sitting in its appellate capacity.” Rayellen Res., 5 Inc. v. N.M. Cultural Prop. Review Comm. , 2014-NMSC-006, ¶ 15, 319 P.3d 639. 6 Specifically, we consider whether th e Commission’s decision was “arbitrary, 7 capricious, or an abuse of discretion; not supported by substantial evidence in the 8 record; or, otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 9 citation omitted); see Rule 1-075(R). 10 Agency Director’s Authorityto Designate Laboratory 11
{6} Section 60-1A-14(A) of the Act requires the Commission to adopt rules 12 governing the handling and post-race testing of blood and urine samples. The statute 13 further requires that specimens taken fro m horses be divided into two samples 14 designated as the “official sample” and the “split sample,” with the official sample 15 “tested by the commission or its designated laboratory[.]” Section 60-1A-14(B). In 16 accordance with its mandate, the Co mmission promulgated 15.2.6.10 NMAC, 17 establishing rules and guidelines for sample collection, storage, shipment, and testing, 18 including the requirement that“[a] primary te sting laboratory must be accredited by 196 [the association of racing commissioners international] and approved by the 1 [C]ommission.” 15.2.6.10(B)(2) NMAC. 2
{7} On appeal, Sedillo asserts that the UC Davis laboratory was not “approved by 3 the [C]ommission” as required by 15.2.6. 10(B)(2) NMAC and, instead, was chosen 4 by Vince Mares (Mares), its executive director. Mares, Sedillo argues, did not possess 5 the authority of the Commission to approvethe laboratory; and, the Commission’s 6 failure to comply with the regulatory requirements for approval of testing laboratories 7 precludes it from revoking his license and impos ing penalties on the basis of those test 8 results. 9
{8} Sedillo’s interpretation of the statute and accompanying regulations is too 10

narrow. See Marckstadt v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 147 N.M. 11 678, 228 P.3d 462 (acknowledging the rule thatcourts interpreting the New Mexico 12 Administrative Code apply the same rules as used in statutory interpretation); see also 13 Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp. , 1996-NMSC-038, ¶ 14, 121 N.M. 764, 918 P.2d 350 14 (“We are to read the statute in its entirety and construeeach part in connection with 15 every other part to produce a harmonious whole.”). The Act requires the Commission 16 to adopt rules “to implement the . . . Act and to ensure that horse racing in New 17 Mexico is conducted with fairness and that the participan ts and patrons are protected 18 against illegal practices” on the racing grounds. Section 60-1A-5(A). Among the 197 various rules promulgated as a result of this mandate was 15.2.1.8 NMAC, setting 1 forth the Commission’s purpose, powers, responsibilities, and general authority, 2 including the authority to “delegate to the [Commission’s] director . . . all powers and 3 duties necessary to fully implement the purposes of the Act.” 15.2.1.8(B)(2) NMAC. 4
{9} At Sedillo’s administrative hearing, the hearing officer issued a finding, which 5 Sedillo does not contest, that the Iowa St ate University laboratory was not capable of 6 testing for or detecting Dermorphin—the drug discovered through the UC Davis tests. 7 The Commission concluded that the duties and authority bestowed upon Mares as the 8 Commission’s director, authorized him to desi gnate an alternate laboratory to test for 9 drugs that could not be detected by Iowa State University, the laboratory approved by 10 the Commission, in order “to protect the integrity of horse racing, to ensure the health 11 and welfare of race horses and to safeguard the interests of the public and the 12 participants in racing.” Under the circumst ances, Mares’s decision to have the samples 13 tested by another lab, one capable of detecting more prohibited substances, was 14 necessary to ensure those involved w ith the May 25, 2012 races were protected 15 against illegal practices. See 15.2.1.8(B)(2) NMAC. As Se dillo did not address the 16 Commission’s authority to delegate duties suchas the approval of testing laboratories 17 to its director, we conclude that Sedillo has failed to de monstrate that the 18 Commission’s decision on this matter “was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 198 discretion; not supported by s ubstantial evidence in the record; or otherwise not in 1 accordance with law.” Rayellen Res., Inc. , 2014-NMSC-006, ¶ 15 (internal quotation 2 marks and citation omitted). 3 Due Process 4
{10} We turn now to Sedillo’s due process arguments, beginning with his assertion 5 that the Commission’s decision is not supported by the evidence because the test 6 results on which the Commission relied were in the form of hearsay and documentary 7 evidence. Sedillo also argues that he was deprived of his right to “cross-examine the 8 only evidence introduced against him, name ly the test results.” Presumably, this 9 argument is meant to illustrate the shortcomings of the introduction of hearsay and 10 documentary evidence. Sedillo’s argumen ts, however, ignore the Commission’s rules, 11 which explicitly allow for the presentation and admission of both hearsay and 12 documentary evidence. See 15.2.1.9(B)(6)(b) NMAC and 15.2.1.9(C)(12)(b) NMAC. 13 Indeed, 15.2.1.9(B)(6)(b) NMAC and 15. 2.1.9(C)(12)(b) NMAC allow for the 14 admissibility of hearsay and documentary evid ence if it is “of a type that is commonly 15 relied on by reasonably prudent people.” 15.2. 1.9(B)(6)(b). He fails to demonstrate 16 why those results are not commonly relied on by a reasonably prudent person. See 17 15.2.1.9(C)(12)(b) NMAC. 183 Despite insisting the split samples were improperly handled, Sedillo also 15 asserts that the test results for the sp lit samples did not detect any prohibited 16 substances, though he does so without any c itation to the record. He appears to seek 17 an inference that these samples prove heis innocent of committing the violation at 18 issue in this case. However, ev en if we were to assume th is fact is true, it carries little 19 persuasive value because the Iowa State Univ ersity lab that tested these samples was 20 9 {11} Furthermore, while Sedillo is correct that the rules governing the Commission 1 proceedings provide for and re quire parties to have an opportunity to cross-examine 2 each witness, see 15.2.1.9(C)(10)(f) NMAC , he does not point w ith any particularity 3 to any witness he was unable to question or any line of inquiry that he was unable to 4 pursue. Instead, the record suggests he was given, and indeed availed himself of, the 5 opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, including Dr. Scott Stanley, the chief chemist 6 at the UC Davis testing laboratory who testif ied about the contents of UC Davis’ drug 7 test results, as well as the scientific soundness of the procedures employed by UC 8 Davis. In light of Sedillo’s failure to de velop his argument, we need not address it 9 further. Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 10 P.3d 1076 (declining to review an “undevel oped argument” where the brief relied on 11 several facts but did not cite to the reco rd to support the appellant’s assertions). 12
{12} Sedillo next argues that the procedures used to handle the samples were 13 contrary to the procedures required by the Act and its accompanying regulations. 14 Sedillo’s assertions regarding improper procedure center around the manner in which 15 the split samples were handled. 3 Though he argues that the test results are suspect for 16apparently unable to test for Dermorphin, the presence of which is the basis for the 21 violations in this case. Sedillo was sanc tioned on the basis of the positive test results 22 obtained by UC Davis. 23 10 several reasons related to the handling and storage of the split samples, Sedillo fails 1 to direct us to the portion of the record that supports his argument. See Rule 12- 2 318(A); In re Estate of Heeter , 1992-NMCA-032, ¶ 15, 113 N.M. 691, 831 P.2d 990 3 (stating that we will not search the record to find eviden ce to support a party’s claim). 4 Further, it is unimportant for our purposes on appeal whether some irregularity existed 5 regarding the split samples, as the results fro m the official sample tested by UC Davis, 6 were prima facie evidence that a prohibite d drug was administered to the horses and 7 was present in the horses’ bodies while they participated in their respective races. 8 15.2.6.9(C)(1) NMAC (4/30/2012); see also 15.2.6.9(C)(3) NMAC (4/30/2012) (“[A] 9 person may not administer or cause to beadministered by any means to a horse a 10 prohibited drug . . . during the 24-hour peri od before post time for the race in which 11 the horse is entered.”). The proceduralcompliance regarding the split samples is 12 collateral to and cannot serve as a basis fo r the reversal of the commission’s decision. 13 Cf. Claridge v. N.M. Racing Comm’n , 1988-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 37-38, 107 N.M. 632, 763 14 P.2d 66 (concluding that the challenge alle ging a violation concerning a collateral 15 matter not directly at issue before the Commission did not provide sufficient 16 justification for overturning an administrative agency’s decision). 1711 {13} Sedillo also argues that his due process rights were violated because he was not 1 given notice that certain substances wereprohibited and that the Commission failed 2 to demonstrate a chain of custody for the split sample in compliance with its rules. 3 Sedillo’s briefing on both of these issues relies on facts without citing to the record 4 to support his assertions. We again note that Sedillo’s argument regarding chain of 5 custody focuses primarily on split samples and, is therefore collateral to the issues 6 raised in this case, as it was the originalsample that was the basis for the penalties 7 assessed against him. Cf. id. (discussing collateral matter in administrative agency 8 case). Additionally, while he claims that no list of prohibited substances was posted 9 in the test barn or the racing secretary’s office as required by 15.2.6.9(A) NMAC 10 (4/30/2012), he provides no citations to the record and instead points to a document 11 in the record that he filed with the Co mmission that simply restates, verbatim, the 12 assertion he makes in his brief. We will not search the record for evidence to support 13 Sedillo’s claim and decline to revi ew such an undeveloped argument. See In re Estate 14 of Heeter , 1992-NMCA-032, ¶ 15; Headley , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15; see also Santa 15 Fe Expl. Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm’n , 1992-NMSC-044, ¶ 11, 114 N.M. 103, 835 16 P.2d 819 (cautioning counsel to review and follow appellate rules where brief 17 contained “numerous factual statements without a single citation to the record below,” 18 save for record citation pointing to quoted material from a filing made below). 1912 Penalty 1
{14} Finally, we turn to Sedillo’s argument regarding the penalty imposed against 2 him. Regulation 15.2.6.9 NMAC, which sets forth the classification level of various 3 substances as well as penalty recommendati ons for violations of the rules governing 4 those substances, has undergone various amendments. The most important for our 5 purposes here are the amendments of April 2012 and July 2012. The April 2012 6 version of 15.2.6.9 NMAC, contained a recommended penalty for a Class 1 drug 7 violation of a one to five years’ suspensi on, at least a $5,000 fine, and loss of purse. 8 15.2.6.9(B)(1) NMAC (4/30/2012). In July 2012 the Commission reduced the 9 recommended penalty for a trainer’s first o ffense to a one- to three-year suspension 10 and a fine of $10,000 or loss of purse . 15.2.6.9(C)(1)(a) NMAC (7/31/2012). 11
{15} Sedillo insists that NMSA 1978, Secti on 12-2A-16(C) (1997) of the Uniform 12 Statute and Rule Constructi on Act, prohibits the Commission from imposing the April 13 2012 recommended penalty. Sedillo relies on Section 12-2A-16(C), which provides, 14 “[i]f a criminal penalty for a violation of a statute or rule is reduced by an amendment, 15 the penalty, if not already imposed, must be imposed under the statute or rule as 16 amended.” (Emphasis adde d.) He argues that application of the April 2012 17 recommended penalty is improper because th e penalty itself was imposed after the 18 lower penalty recommendation was adopted. Sedillo’s reliance on Section 12-2A- 1913 16(C) is misplaced, as the violation befo re the Commission was not a criminal matter. 1 Instead, Section 12-2A-16(A) controls. That section states, “[a]n amendment or repeal 2 of a civil statute or rule does not affect a pending action or proceeding or a right 3 accrued before the amendment or repeal takes effect.” (Emphasis adde d.) Section 12- 4 2A-16(A) reflects our Constitution’s protec tion against interference with evidentiary 5 and procedural matters in cases that are inthe process or course of litigation but that 6 have not been concluded or determined by a final judgment. N.M. Const. art. IV, § 34 7 (“No act of the [L]egislature shall affect the right or reme dy of either party, or change 8 the rules of evidence or procedure, in any pending case.”). The races in question 9 occurred in May 2012, and the board of stew ards’ decision was issued in September 10 2012. To apply different regulations on the date of their issuance in July 2012 to a 11 matter that had been pending for months w ould be contrary to both Section 12-2A12 16(A) and our Constitution. 13
{16} Finally, Sedillo claims that the Commi ssion’s imposition of consecutive, rather 14 than concurrent, sanctions is contrary to its own rules and regul ations and “finds no 15 authority in the statutory makeup of the agency.” Notwithstanding that the penalties 16 assessed against Sedillo are civil in nature, he erroneously re lies on criminal law 17 concepts regarding the rehabilitative qualiti es of sentences in making his argument. 18 The Act authorizes the Commission to “suspend, revoke or deny renewal of a 194Nowhere in the record or briefing befo re us does Sedillo assert Dermorphin 18 does not qualify as a Class 1 drug. 19 14 license[,]” as well as impose civil penalties for a licensee’s violation of the Act or its 1 accompanying rules. Section 60-1A-5(C), (D); 15.2.1.9(C)(20) NMAC. The rules 2 authorize the Commission to assess an administrative penalty for violations of the Act 3 and its accompanying rules; and, each occurre nce that amounts to a violation “may be 4 considered a separate violation.” 15.2. 1.9(C)(20)(b) NMAC. The penalties assessed 5 against Sedillo are in accord ance with the penalty recommendations for a violation 6 involving a Class 1 drug. 415.2.6.9(B)(1) NMAC (4/30/2012). We therefore conclude 7 that the penalty assessed agai nst Sedillo in this case was not outside the Commission’s 8 authority under NMAC 15.2.1.9, was not arb itrary or capricious, and was not contrary 9 to the law. 10 CONCLUSION 11
{17} We affirm. 12
{18} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

14 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 15 WE CONCUR: 16

17 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 1815 1 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 2