COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

LORI W. WILL

VICE CHANCELLOR

LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER

500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734

June 17, 2024

Joseph L. Christensen, Esquire

Meghan M. Dougherty, Esquire

Christensen & Dougherty LLP

1201 N. Market Street, Suite 1404

Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Robert L. Burns, Esquire

Daniel E. Kaprow, Esquire

Kyle H. Lachmund, Esquire

Nicole M. Henry, Esquire

Nicholas F. Mastria, Esquire

Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.

920 North King Street

Wilmington, Delaware 19801

RE: William J. Brown v. Matterport, Inc., et al.,

C.A. No. 2021-0595-LWW

Dear Counsel:

I write regarding plaintiff William J. Brown’s motion for reconsideration

(the “Motion”).

1

 Brown contends that this court erred in fixing the rate of 

post-judgment interest applicable to damages awarded in a May 28, 2024 

memorandum opinion. That decision set the rate of both pre- and post-judgment 

interest at 5.25%.2

Brown’s Motion is brought under Court of Chancery Rule 59(f). “To 

succeed and obtain reargument, the moving party must demonstrate that the 

1 Pl. William J. Brown’s Mot. for Recons. with Respect to Post-J. Interest Rate (Dkt. 328) 

(“Mot.”).

2 Mem. Op. (Dkt. 327) 51.
C.A. No. 2021-0595-LWW

June 17, 2024

Page 2 of 3

Court’s decision was predicated upon a misunderstanding of a material fact or a 

misapplication of the law.”3

Brown argues that in adopting a post-judgment interest rate of 5.25%, I 

“overlooked a controlling decision or principle of law that would have a 

controlling effect.”4 He correctly states that 6 Del. C. § 2301 requires the rate of 

post-judgment interest to be based on the legal rate in effect when a judgment is 

entered.5 Based on that rule, he implores me to reconsider adopting the same rate 

for both pre- and post-judgment interest.

Brown would have a point if I had yet to enter a judgment. But I granted a 

partial final judgment on Count I—the claim for which he was awarded damages—

on January 12, 2022, after the phase one trial.6 The Federal Discount Rate on the 

date of that partial judgment was 0.25%, which happens to be the same rate that 

applied on November 22, 2021 when pre-judgment interest began to accrue.7 The 

3 Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, 2008 WL 2721743, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2008) (citation 

omitted), aff’d, 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009) (TABLE).

4 Mot. ¶ 2 (quoting Pharmerica Long Term Care Inc. v. New Castle RX, LLC, 2010 WL 

5130746, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2010)).

5 See Noranda Aluminum Hldg. Corp. v. XL Ins. Am., Inc., 269 A.3d 974, 979 (Del. 2021) 

(holding that Section 2301(a) “unambiguously requires that post-judgment interest accrue 

at the legal rate that was in effect on the date of judgment”).

6 Order and Partial Final J. (Dkt. 125).

7 Nasdaq, Federal Discount Rate (DISC) Historical Data, https://www.nasdaq.com/

market-activity/fixed-income/disc/historical?page=7&rows_per_page=100&timeline=y5 

(last visited June 16, 2024).
C.A. No. 2021-0595-LWW

June 17, 2024

Page 3 of 3

final order I have yet to enter concerns the amount of damages for the prior partial 

judgment and judgment in Matterport’s favor on the remaining counts.8 

Post-judgment interest was therefore appropriately set based on the date of 

judgment on Count I. No controlling principle of law was overlooked. The

Motion is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Lori W. Will

Lori W. Will

Vice Chancellor

8

Interest rates have risen dramatically since the phase one partial final judgment. See 

supra note 7 (reflecting that the current Federal Discount Rate is 5.50%). To separate the 

date for setting post-judgment interest from the date that judgment was entered would 

risk interest rate arbitrage.