NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CAMELIA SCOTT, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

ERIC R. NEAL, Respondent/Appellant,

STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel. THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF 

ECONOMIC SECURITY, Intervenor/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0636 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. DR1997-004421

The Honorable Veronica W. Brame, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Eric R. Neal, Indianapolis, IN

Respondent/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Carol A. Salvati

Counsel for Appellee
SCOTT v. NEAL

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Eric Neal (Father) appeals from the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to vacate a child support order entered in September 1997. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In May 1997, following genetic testing, the trial court entered 

a paternity order establishing Father as Child’s natural father. Thereafter, 

Camelia Scott (Mother) immediately filed a petition to establish custody 

and child support. Mother purportedly served Father with the petition 

and related documents by leaving them with a person of suitable age and 

discretion at 4610 South 16th Street in Phoenix. Although Father did not 

appear at any proceedings related to that petition, the trial court found he

had received “adequate notice,” and entered a final order in September

1997 that required Father to pay $532 per month in child support.

¶3 In June 1999, the State brought an enforcement action on 

Mother’s behalf to collect unpaid child support arrearages. Father was 

personally served with the petition and related documents, and appeared,

with counsel, at the proceedings, where he denied having any knowledge 

of the underlying child support order “until [the] order of assignment was 

received by his employer.” Father did not argue the support order was 

void for lack of personal jurisdiction or improper service, but instead

requested the court modify the support order. Following a hearing, the 

trial court determined Father had known about the child support order 

and willfully failed to comply. The court entered judgment against Father 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial

court’s ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment. Goglia v. Bodnar, 156

Ariz. 12, 20 (App. 1987) (citing Camacho v. Gardner, 104 Ariz. 555, 559 

(1969)).
SCOTT v. NEAL

Decision of the Court

3

in the amount of $12,637.53, held him in contempt, and ordered his 

incarceration until he paid a purge amount of $1,000. Father personally 

appeared for several subsequent review hearings, and continuing orders 

of contempt were entered. 

¶4 In late 1999, Father filed a petition for modification of the 

child support order, and the trial court scheduled a hearing in January 

2000. However, the court was unable to address the merits of Father’s 

petition at the hearing because he had not served Mother, who had a 

protected address, with the necessary documents. Father did not further 

pursue the 1999 modification request, despite being specifically advised 

he could serve Mother through the court clerk. He filed a second petition 

for modification in October 2004, which was also dismissed for a lack of 

service upon Mother. 

¶5 Nearly ten years later, in April 2014, Father filed a motion to 

set aside the 1997 child support order, alleging (1) the order was obtained 

fraudulently because Mother purposely provided an incorrect address for 

service, and (2) the order was void for lack of personal jurisdiction 

because he was never served with the 1997 petition to establish child 

support.

2 The trial court denied the motion as untimely. Father filed a 

timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona 

Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1)3 and -2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶6 We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to set aside a 

judgment for an abuse of discretion. Goglia, 156 Ariz. at 16. We will 

affirm the trial court’s ruling on a motion to set aside if it is correct for any 

 

2 At the court’s direction the State filed a response. Although the 

State conceded it was not involved with the service of Mother’s 1997 

petition, it argued Father submitted to the court’s jurisdiction, through his 

participation in the 1999 enforcement action, and thereby waived any 

purported defect in service. The State has an interest in an action that may 

affect the payment of child support, and remains a party to this appeal. 

See State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Dodd, 181 Ariz. 183, 185 (App. 1994) 

(finding State had right to maintain appeal challenging revocation of 

order of assignment for payment of child support).

3 Absent material revisions from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version.
SCOTT v. NEAL

Decision of the Court

4

reason. See Delbridge v. Salt River Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 182 

Ariz. 46, 54 (App. 1994) (citing Rancho Pescado v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins., 140 

Ariz. 174, 178 (App. 1984)). Unless it is evident that the trial court acted 

arbitrarily, unreasonably, or clearly abused its discretion, “the trial court’s 

refusal to vacate a judgment must stand.” Goglia, 156 Ariz. at 16 (citing 

Indus. Park Corp. v. U.S.I.F. Palo Verde Corp., 19 Ariz. App. 342, 346 (1973)).

I. The 1997 Child Support Order Was Not Void.

¶7 Father argues the 1997 child support order is void for three 

reasons. First, he argues the child support order was obtained by reason 

of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by Mother. Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 

85(C)(1)(c). A motion on this basis, however, is required to be brought 

“within a reasonable time,” and within six months from entry of the order. 

Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 85(C)(2). It is undisputed that Father’s motion was filed 

well outside of this time limit, and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying relief on this ground.

¶8 Second, Father alleges the judgment is void under Arizona 

Rule of Family Law Procedure 85(C)(1)(d) because the trial court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over him. Father is correct that, unlike Rule 

85(C)(1)(c), timeliness is not a factor when Rule 85(C)(1)(d) is invoked; on 

this ground, the court must vacate a judgment or order it determines to be 

void, even if the party unreasonably delayed in seeking relief. See 

Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 233, ¶ 18 (App. 2012) (citing Martin v. 

Martin, 182 Ariz. 11, 14 (App. 1994)). And, the trial court must obtain 

personal jurisdiction over each party before it can enter enforceable orders 

regarding child support. Taylor v. Jarrett, 191 Ariz. 550, 552, ¶ 9 (App. 

1998) (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91-101 (1978)); see also 

Endischee v. Endischee, 141 Ariz. 77, 79 (App. 1984) (“A judgment is void 

and subject to direct and collateral attack if the court rendered it without 

jurisdiction due to lack of proper service.”) (citing Koven v. Saberdyne Sys., 

Inc., 128 Ariz. 318, 321 (App. 1980)). We review the trial court’s 

jurisdiction over the person de novo. Davis v. Davis, 230 Ariz. 333, 335, 

¶ 13 (App. 2012) (citing State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 

27, 29, ¶ 8 (App. 2003)). 

¶9 Father alleges the address reported by the process server in 

1997 — 4610 South 16th Street — did not and does not exist, with the 

nearest permitted structure being a billboard located on the adjacent 
SCOTT v. NEAL

Decision of the Court

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property.4 Even assuming Father’s allegation to be true, it does not 

change our ultimate conclusion that the trial court properly exercised 

personal jurisdiction over Father.

¶10 In the absence of formal service of process, personal 

jurisdiction may be exercised over a party who consents to jurisdiction, 

“enters a general appearance, or files a responsive document having the 

effect of waiving a contest to personal jurisdiction.” Burton, 205 Ariz. at

29, ¶ 8 (citation omitted); Austin v. State ex rel. Herman, 10 Ariz. App. 474, 

476 (1969) (“For a judgment to be valid and binding the party affected 

must have been legally serve[d] with process or must have voluntarily 

appeared.”) (emphasis added); see also A.R.S. § 25-1221(A)(2) (addressing 

bases for jurisdiction over non-resident in proceeding to establish or 

enforce support order). Generally, “any action on the part of a party 

except to object to personal jurisdiction that recognizes the case [i]s in 

court will constitute a general appearance,” Burton, 205 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 8 

(citing Tarr v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 349, 351 (1984), and Austin, 10 Ariz. 

App. at 477), and “it is a rule of ancient and universal application that a 

general appearance by a party who has not been properly served has 

exactly the same effect as a proper, timely and valid service of process.” 

Montano v. Scottsdale Baptist Hosp., Inc., 119 Ariz. 448, 452 (1978) (citations 

omitted). 

¶11 Here, Father appeared in the 1999 matter, without raising 

the issue of jurisdiction, and thereby waived any objection to the authority

of the trial court to enter valid orders. He was personally notified of the 

enforcement proceedings in 1999, appeared for multiple hearings without

objecting to personal jurisdiction, and did not raise the personal 

jurisdiction issue at any other time in the next fifteen years. Additionally,

Father filed his own petitions seeking modification of the existing child 

support order in both 1999 and 2004. Although he did not follow through 

with service of those requests, Father appeared for at least one 

modification hearing, and both recognized and submitted himself to the 

court’s jurisdiction by affirmatively placing the issue of support before the 

court. Burton, 205 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 12 (holding party “consented to personal 

jurisdiction by purposely availing himself of the Arizona courts to seek a 

downward adjustment in child support and participating in a hearing on 

the issue”). 

 

4 Father admits that his mother lived at 4610 South 16th Place in 1997.
SCOTT v. NEAL

Decision of the Court

6

¶12 Father’s participation in the proceedings, purposeful 

availment of the court, and failure to limit his appearance were sufficient 

to confer jurisdiction as to all issues encompassed within the support 

action, including later enforcement. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 12; A.R.S. § 25-1222 

(noting “personal jurisdiction acquired by a tribunal of this state” in a 

child support proceeding “continues as long as the tribunal of this state 

has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order or continuing 

jurisdiction to enforce its order”). Therefore, the order establishing child 

support is not void by virtue of Father’s submission to personal 

jurisdiction, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Father’s motion to set it aside.

¶13 Finally, Father argues, for the first time in his reply brief, the 

order is void because the trial court judge was not fair and impartial. This 

allegation is based upon a comment Father purportedly overheard, while 

the judge was addressing another litigant in a separate action, “that child 

support comes before eating or hav[ing] a roof o[ve]r your head.” 

Although issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are generally 

deemed waived, in our discretion, we address it. State v. Lopez, 217 Ariz. 

433, 438 n.4, ¶ 17 (App. 2008) (citing State v. Ruggiero, 211 Ariz. 262, 267 

n.2, ¶ 22 (App. 2005), and Muchesko v. Muchesko, 191 Ariz. 265, 268 (App. 

1997)). 

¶14 In Arizona, “every person has the duty to provide all 

reasonable support for that person’s natural and adopted minor, 

unemancipated children.” A.R.S. § 25-501(A). “The obligation to pay 

child support is primary and other financial obligations are secondary.” 

A.R.S. § 25-501(C); Beck v. Jaeger, 124 Ariz. 316, 317 (App. 1979). Accepting 

as true that Father properly attributes the statement to the trial court 

judge, it is not an inaccurate statement of law, and not indicative of any 

“hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will” sufficient to establish bias or partiality. 

In re Guardianship of Styer, 24 Ariz. App. 148, 151 (1975).

II. Father Received Adequate Due Process.

¶15 Father also argues he was not given an opportunity to 

present argument on the motion to set aside prior to the court’s ruling, in 

violation of his right to due process. But oral argument is not mandatory, 

even when requested. Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 35(C)(1) (affording court 

discretion to order, allow or deny oral argument). And where a litigant

does not make a request for oral argument, as was the case here, he cannot 

complain he is denied the opportunity to speak. See Nunnally v. Moore, 

116 Ariz. 508, 511 (App. 1977). 
SCOTT v. NEAL

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s motion to vacate 

the 1997 child support order. 

¶17 Father requests his costs on appeal, but he is not the 

prevailing party, and his request is denied. As the prevailing party, the 

State may recover its costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.