TO BE PUBLISHED 

oSttprrntr (Court of rttfurkv 

2014-SC-000197-KB 

DONALD KYLE DESKINS MOVANT 

KBA Member No. 88880 

V. IN SUPREME COURT 

KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION RESPONDENT 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Donald Kyle Deskins (Deskins) moves this Court for a thirty (30) day 

suspension from the practice of law, to be probated for one (1) year with 

conditions, for his admitted violations of SCR 3.130-1.3, SCR 3.130-1.4(a)(3), 

SCR 3.130-1.16(d), SCR 3.130-8.4(c), and SCR 3.130-8.1(b). The Kentucky 

Bar Association (KBA) states no objection to the proposed discipline, which was 

negotiated pursuant to SCR 3.480(2). Finding a thirty (30) day suspension 

from the practice of law, to be probated for one (1) year with conditions, to be 

the appropriate discipline for his misconduct, we grant Deskins's motion. 

Deskins, whose KBA number is 88880 and whose bar address is P.O. Box 368, 

Pikeville, Kentucky 41502, was admitted to the practice of law in the 

Commonwealth of Kentucky on October 19, 2001. 

On December, 3, 2012, the KBA Inquiry Commission issued Deskins a 

five count charge alleging he violated SCR 3.130-1.3, SCR 3.130-1.4(a)(3), SCR 

3.130-1.16(d), SCR 3.130-8.4(c), and SCR 3.130-8.1(b). SCR 3.130-1.3 states, 
"A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 

client." SCR 3.130-1.4(a)(3) states in pertinent part, "[a] lawyer shall . . . keep 

the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter." SCR 3.130-

1.16(d) states, 

Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to 

the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, 

such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 

employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to 

which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of 

fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer 

may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by 

other law. 

SCR 3.130-8.4(c) states in pertinent part, lilt is professional misconduct for a 

lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation." SCR 3.130-8.1(b) states in pertinent part, "a lawyer in 

connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly fail to respond to 

a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, 

except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise 

protected by Rule 1.6." These charges, which are the first against Deskins, 

arose from the facts set forth below. 

Sometime prior to September 2011, Deskins represented Karen Lee 

Thornsberry (Thornsberry) in the dissolution of her marriage. Subsequent to 

the entry of her dissolution decree, Thornsberry discovered problems with a 

quitclaim deed and the property settlement agreement filed in the dissolution 

action. The problems arose because Deskins filed the deed in the wrong 

county. As a result, Thornsberry's ex-husband's name remained on the title to 

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the deed, resulting in liens from his post-dissolution debts being placed against 

the property. 

In September, 2011, Thornsberry went to Deskins seeking a remedy for 

her problems with the deed and liens. Pursuant to Deskins's request, 

Thornsberry faxed copies of the property settlement agreement and additional 

information to him. Deskins informed Thornsberry that he would review the 

documents and then contact her with advice on how to proceed in the matter. 

Because Deskins failed to timely contact her, Thornsberry contacted him 

in February 2012, and again asked Deskins about how to proceed. Deskins 

told Thornsberry he required three checks to proceed—one for court costs, one 

for sheriff's costs, and one for attorney's fees—which Thornsberry forwarded to 

Deskins. Deskins then told Thornsberry that he would file a lawsuit on her 

behalf to try to resolve the problems with the deed, and that he would contact 

her regarding any court dates and further instructions. 

Deskins again failed to timely contact Thornsberry, so she contacted him 

in April 2012. Deskins informed Thornsberry that a court date had been set 

for April 20, 2012; that Thornsberry did not need to appear; and that he would 

call Thornsberry with the results of the hearing. However, Deskins failed to do 

SO. 

On April 30, 2012, Thornsberry called Deskins to inquire about the April 

20, 2012 proceedings. Deskins told Thornsberry that the court date had been 

postponed to May 7, 2012, and he apologized for not informing her. On May 8, 

2012, Thornsberry called Deskins to inquire about the May 7, 2012 

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proceedings. Deskins informed Thornsberry that the matter had again been 

postponed until June 4 or 5, 2012, giving no reason for the delay. On June 6, 

2012, Thornsberry called Deskins to inquire about the June 4 or 5 hearing. 

Deskins told Thornsberry that the matter had been delayed until June 8, 2012. 

Deskins promised to report the results of the June 8, 2012 court date, but 

made no such report. On June 11, 2012, Thornsberry called and left a 

message with Deskins. Deskins returned Thornsberry's call, telling her that 

the matter was not heard by the judge on June 8, 2012, and that he did not 

know why the court had not heard it. Deskins then told Thornsberry the 

matter had been set for July, 17, 2012. On July 18, 2012, Thornsberry again 

called Deskins, but was told he was out of the office until July, 19, 2012 and to 

call back then. 

Thornsberry then contacted multiple clerks' offices to determine whether 

any court date had ever been set in her legal matter. She discovered that 

Deskins had never filed any civil case on her behalf regarding the deed and 

thus no court date had ever been set. On July 19, 2012, Thornsberry again 

called Deskins but was again told he was unavailable. Thornsberry informed 

Deskins's assistant that she knew the case had never been filed, and she 

requested the return of her file. Deskins's assistant told Thornsberry her file 

would be in the mail by the following morning. 

Deskins did not return Thornsberry's file to her at that time, did not 

communicate with Thornsberry regarding her matter, and did not refund any of 

the unearned attorney's fees or expenses. Thornsberry then filed a Bar 

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Complaint against Deskins. It was only then that Deskins returned 

Thornsberry's money. 

On October 20, 2012, the Sheriff served Deskins with a copy of the Bar 

Complaint, to which Deskins never replied. The Disciplinary Clerk then issued 

Deskins a copy of the Charge advising him that the Inquiry Commission, 

through the Office of Bar Counsel, found he violated the five aforementioned 

Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct and that if he did not respond he 

would be subject to further discipline. , 

In his Motion for Suspension, Deskins admits his actions were in 

violation of SCR 3.130-1.3, SCR 3.130-1.4(a)(3), SCR 3.130-1.16(d), SCR 

3.130-8.4(c), and SCR 3.130-8.1(b). In mitigation for his professional 

misconduct, Deskins states he was suffering from anxiety and depressionrelated illnesses corresponding with certain personal and family problems 

during the events giving rise to this case. In April 2012, Deskins voluntarily 

entered,into a two-year Supervision Agreement with the Kentucky Lawyers' 

Assistance Program (KYLAP) and is currently in compliance with the terms of 

that agreement. The KBA made no objection to Deskins's Motion for 

Suspension with conditions and requested this Court grant Deskins's motion. 

Having reviewed this matter, we are also of the opinion that a thirty (30) 

day suspension from the practice of law, to be probated for one (1) year with 

conditions, is sufficient in this case. This Court has often found thirty (30) day 

suspensions to be satisfactory for violations of many of the same rules of 

professional conduct. 

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In Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Justice, 198 S.W.3d 583, 584 (Ky. 2006), a 

lawyer violated our rules of professional conduct when he failed to respond to 

the opposing party's motion to dismiss his clients' civil action, and failed to 

attend court hearings on the aforementioned motion, which resulted in 

dismissal of clients' complaint with prejudice. Id. Justice admitted these 

actions were in violation of SCR 3.130-1.3, SCR 3.130-1.4(a), SCR 3.130-1.4(b), 

SCR 3.130-1.15(a), and SCR 3.130-1.16(d) and that he had been privately 

reprimanded on four previous occasions for such matters as failing to exercise 

reasonable diligence in representing a client and for failing adequately to 

communicate with a client. Id. Justice asked this Court to impose a thirty (30) 

day suspension, which we held was appropriate for these rules violations. 

In Morton v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 230 S.W.3d 328, 329-30 (Ky. 2007), the 

attorney admitted her conduct was in violation of the rules of professional 

conduct. Morton admitted she failed to prepare an agreed order; she failed to 

notify clients in writing that she had been suspended from the practice of law 

for not completing her continuing legal education requirements; she continued 

to represent her clients while her law license was suspended; and she failed to 

file a divorce complaint for a client. Id. Morton acknowledged that these 

actions were in violation of SCR 3.130-1.3, SCR 3.130-1.16(d), SCR 3.130-

3.4(c), SCR 3.130-4.4, SCR 3.130-5.5(a), and SCR 3.130-8.1(b) which 

stemmed from one KBA Charge and SCR 3.130-1.4(b), SCR 3.130-1.16(d), SCR 

3.130-3.4(c), SCR 3.130-5.5(a), SCR 3.130-8.3(b), SCR 3.130-8.3(c), and SCR 

3.130-8.1(b) which stemmed from another KBA Charge. Id. Morton asked this 

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Court to impose a thirty (30) day suspension from the practice of law. We held 

sufficient evidence existed to suspend Morton for thirty (30) days. Id. 

Therefore, because Deskins's conduct is similar to the attorneys' conduct 

in the aforementioned cases, we grant Deskins's motion. 

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

1. Donald Kyle Deskins, KBA Member No. 88880, is found guilty of violating 

SCR 3.130-1.3, SCR 3.130-1.4(a)(3), SCR 3.130-1.16(d), SCR 3.130-

8.4(c), and SCR 3.130-8.1(b) of the Kentucky Rules of Professional 

Conduct; 

2. Deskins is suspended from the practice of law in Kentucky for a period of 

thirty (30) days beginning ten (10) days after entry of this Order, to be 

probated for one (1) year; 

3. Deskins shall adhere to the provisions of the Supervision Agreement 

entered into with KYLAP under KBA File No. 21255; 

4. Deskins shall not commit any crimes, including misdemeanors and 

felonies; 

5. Deskins shall sign authorizations allowing the KBA to review his records 

held by KYLAP, mental health professionals, social workers, and all 

medical records and mental health records; 

6. The Director of KYLAP will file quarterly reports with the Disciplinary 

Clerk of the KBA for distribution to the Office of Bar Counsel. These 

reports shall state whether Deskins is complying with the terms and 

conditions of this Order; 

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7. If at any time the KYLAP Director becomes aware of Deskins's violations 

of any section of this Order or the KYLAP Supervision Agreement, the 

Director shall immediately file a notice of such .violations with the 

Disciplinary Clerk of the KBA for distribution to the Office of Bar Counsel 

and Deskins; 

8. Deskins shall timely pay his KBA membership dues; 

9. Deskins shall timely satisfy all continuing legal education requirements; 

10. Deskins shall pay all court costs associated with the Supervision 

Agreement; 

11. If Deskins violates any section of this Order or the KYLAP Supervision 

Agreement within one (1) year, beginning ten (10) days after entry of this 

Order, or receives a Charge of professional misconduct during the 

probationary period, the KBA may file a motion with this Court 

requesting the issuance of a show cause order directing Deskins to show 

cause, if any, why the thirty (30) day suspension should not be imposed; 

12. If, at the expiration of the probationary period of one (1) year, beginning 

ten (10) days after entry of this Order, Deskins has fully complied with 

this Order, Deskins's suspension shall be lifted. 

13. In accordance with SCR 3.450, Deskins is directed to pay the costs of 

this action in the amount of $399.42, for which execution may issue 

from this Court upon finality of this Opinion and Order. 

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All sitting. All concur. 

ENTERED: June 19, 2014.