F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

A L AS K A R EN T -A-C AR , I NC ., Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP , I NC ., FKA Ce nd ant C or

po ratio n; AV I S B UDG ET C A R R EN TAL , L L C, FKA Cenda nt Car Rental Gr oup, Inc., F KA Ce nd ant C ar R e nta l Gro up , L L C,

De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts

. No. 10-35137

D.C. No. 3:03-cv-00029- TM B

A L AS K A R EN T -A-C AR , I NC ., Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP , I NC ., FKA Ce nd ant C or

po ratio n; AV I S B UDG ET C A R R EN TAL , L L C, FKA Cenda nt Car Rental Gr oup, Inc., F KA Ce nd ant C ar R e nta l Gro up , L L C,

De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts

. No. 10-35615

D.C. No. 3:03-cv-00029- TM B

OPI NI ONA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

2

T h e or i g i n al pa n el , c on s i s t i n g of Ju dg e B

. Fl et ch er , Ju dg e K l ei n f el d, *
a n d J u d g e C a l l a h a n , h e a r d o r a l a r g u m e n t o n J u l y 2 5 , 2 0 1 1

. J u d g e B. Flet cher died o n O ct o b er 22 , 20 1 2 , whi l e t he d eci si o n was pend i ng, and Jud ge R awli nson was drawn t o replace her. Jud ge R awli nson has r ead t he b rie fs, re v ie w e d the re c o rd , an d li ste n e d to the tap e o f o ra l ar g u m e n t.

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. Appea l from the United States District Court

for the D istrict of Alaska Timothy M. Bur g ess, District J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted July 25 , 2 01 1— San F ra

nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia
Filed Ma rch 6, 2013
Be fore : AndrewJ . Kleinfe ld, J ohnnie B . Rawlinson, *
and Con su e lo M . Ca lla

ha n, Cir c uit Judg e s. Op ini on by Judg e Kl e inf

e ld

SUMMAR

Y **

St at e Law / Da ube rt / Bat so n / Attor neys’ F ees
Th e pa ne l a ff ir me d th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt, followinga par

tial summary

judgme nt and a jury t rial, in an
ac ti o na ll e g in gb r e a c ho f a s e tt le me n t a g r e e me n t, and
re m an ded for

the district court to re duce the prejudg ment interest aw ard.A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 3

Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

held th at A la sk a

Re nt- A- Car w a s a party to a settlement agree ment, an d t h at Avis had bre ache d the agree ment by

using the same pe rsonnel to se ll and marke t both Avis and Budg et R ent-A- Car ca rs. The pa

nel held that Alaska Rent- A-Car

was a p arty

to the settlement agree ment b y v i rtu e o f i t s s u f

f i c i e n t l y t i m e l y j o i n d e r
. T h e p an e l a lso held that it was not err or wh en during jury selec tion the district court applied

Batson v. Kentuck

y , 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and re jected one of Avis’s per emptory challeng es t o one of two Alask a Natives on the pane l. AddressingAvis’s objection under Fe d . R. Evid. 702 and Da ub e rt v . M

e rre ll D o wPh a rm a c e u t i c a ls , 50 9 U .S. 57 9 ( 19 93 ), the pa ne l he ld that the district court did not abuse its discr etion by allowing the jur y to li s te n to A la s k a Re n t- A

- Ca r ’ s e xp e rt w it

n e s s on damag es a s w e ll a s A v is ’ s
. T h e p an e l a ls o h e ld th at unde r Ne w Y or k la w, the re wa s su ff

icien t evi de nc e to e sta

bli sh
rea sonable c erta inty

for the a mount of dama g es aw arde d by the jury to Alaska Rent-A -Car. The panel f urt h erheld that the law o f t

he fo rum, A la sk a , p ro pe rl y a ppli ed to div e rs ity
case s broug ht in or removed to the Unit ed S t at es District Court for the District of

Alaska, and the district court did not
err by applying A laska Rule of Civil Procedure 8 2 to the attorney s’ fe e aw ard.

CO UN SEL Christopher L andau (argued), Stephe n S. Schwartz, Kirkland & E llis L L P, W ashing ton, D .C.; How ard S. Tric key , Matthew Singer , J erma in, Dun n ag an & Owens, P.C., Anchor ag e, Al a sk a , f or Ap pe lla nts

. S u s anO r l an s ky, J e f

f r e y M

. F e l dm an , F e l dm an O r l a n s ky & Sanders, Anc horag e, Alaska , for Appe llee.A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

4

D au ber tv. M er r el lD ow P ha r m

. I nc. , 50 9 U

. S. 57 9 (19 9 3 ). 1

B ats on v. Ken t ucky , 47 6 U

. S. 79 (19 8 6 ). 2

Al as k a Ci v i l Pr oce du r e Rul e 82. 3

“ W e r ec ou n t t h e r el ev an t f ac t s i n t h e man n er mos t f av or abl e t o t he 4 j ur y ’ s ve r di ct

. ” Uni t ed St at es v. H i cks , 21 7 F.3d 10 3 8 , 10 4 1 (9t h C i r. 2 0 0 0 ), cer t

. deni ed , 53 1 U

. S. 10 3 7 (20 0 0 ).

OP IN ION
KL EI NFE L D, Senior Circuit J udg e:
Severa l state law que stions arise in this appeal, a nd three fede ral law questions, whether expert testimony should have been e x cluded unde r D a u b e rt , whether disallowance of a 1 pe re mpt ory

c ha lle ng e wa s Batson e rr or and if so wh e the r i t 2
w a s h ar m l e s s , an d w h e th e r A l a s k a “ E n g l i s hR

u l e ” at t o r n e ys fee awa rds m ay be aw arde d in a diversity action whe re 3 Alaska is the forum state but another state’s law

g overns the dispute.

F AC TS 4
Al a sk a Re nt- A- Car’ s p re de c e ssor be g an d oin gbu sin e ss as an Avis licensee in 1956, three y ears befor e Alaska attained state hood. Most other Avis licensee s had a de fined territory i n a l ocality , not an entire state, within which they ha d th e e xclu siv e ri g ht t o r e nt c ars on be ha lf of Av is. Av is
re a so na bly c on sid e re d A la sk a

dif fe re nt.
In its 1959 ag ree ment, t h e Alaska Avis licensee was entitled to ope rate in the “entire State of Alaska ,” about 20% of the e ntire United States, but a neg ligible perc entag e of theA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 5

natio n’ s r oa ds . T he lic e ns e wa s r e newed in 19 65 , th is t ime g ivi ng Al a sk a

Re nt- A- Car e xclu siv e ri g hts in s pe c if ic locations within Alaska. A 1976 amendment adde d additional locations to the license a g ree ment, and g ave Alaska Rent- A-Car

a right of fi rst ref

usal for c ontrol of any lic e ns e Av is p lann e d to g ra nt a ny wh e re in A la sk a . I t als o g ave A laska Rent-A -C ar the rig ht to ex pand into new territory , such as temporar y camps during the c onstruction of the oil pipeline from Prudhoe B ay to Valdez duringthe 1974- 19 77 pe ri od . T he 19 76 ame ndme nt s tate d:

I t i s additionally

agree d: (a) T hat Alaska conditions of terra in and weather a s we l l as chang ing a

nd cyclical e conomic conditions may resu lt in customer demands for quick service in new and e ven tempora ry locations or camps. I t is understood that L icense e may u t i l ize his floating fle et to meet such demands, with full re po rt ing of such
c ir c ums tanc e s to Av is.
Av is bought a

c omp any

c a lle d A g e nc y

Re nt- A- Car i n 1995. Some of Avis’s license es cla im ed that Avis wa s brea chingth ei r license a g ree ments by operating a

nother
re nta l c ar c omp any

in t hei r te rr ito ri e s. To pr ote c t it se lf ag ainst these cla ims, Avis sued thirteen of its licensee s, and
so ught c la ss c e rt if

ic atio n, to o bta in a

jud g ment th at its purcha se of Agenc y

Rent-A-Car

and its chang ed oper ations did no t vi olat e li c e ns e e ri g hts . A vis and name d d e fe nd ants settled in 1997, without ever litigating to cla ss cer tification or judgme nt. Our ca se ar i s es out of that settlement, which allows Avis to purcha se additional re ntal car companies, but
re qu ir e s th at “ the sa le s, mark e tin gand re se rv atio n a c tiv iti e s, operations and personne l of and for the Avis Sy stem will notA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

6

T h e t wo appe l l an t s i n t h i s l i t i g at i on ar e Avi s B u dg et Car Ren t al , LL C 5
a n d it s p a re n t co m p a n y, t h e n H F S C a r R e n ta l, la te r C e n d a n t, n o w A v is B ud get G roup , Inc. W e ref er t o a p p el l ant s co l l ect i vel y here as A vi s, but not e t hat t he s et t l ement ag r eement ’ s r es t r i ct i ons on buy i ng an addi t i onal
c a r re n ta l co m p a n y w e re re stric tio n s o n the p a re n t co m p a n y. be utiliz ed to market , p ro vide, and/or make ava ilable ca r renta l service s” for

any additional re n t al car compa ny purc ha se d b y

Av is. T he settlement a g ree ment protec ted

5 Av is l ic e ns e e s f

ro m th e ri sk of Avis us ingits pe rs onne l to steer c ustomers and potentia l cust omers towar ds another br an d

. L ic e n s e e s w o u ld ty p ic a ll y o n ly r e n t A v is c ars, but Av i s m i g h to w na

c o mp e t i t o r

o p e r at i n gi nth e s am e loc a lit y under a differ ent name.
Avis bo ught B ud g e t Re nt- A- Car o ut o f b ank ru ptc y in 2002. I t then restruc tured its centr al operations, putt ing the Av is a nd B ud g e t ma

rk e tin gte ams u

n d e r un if ie d ma na g e me nt, cre atinga si ng le team to answ er c alls to both Avis and Budg et reservation lines, and combining t he Avis and B udg et natio na l c or

po ra te sa le s f or c e s. Th e ob vio us thr e at f ro m th e se actions to Avis’s license es wa s that Budg et would bl eed of f
so me of the ir c us tom e rs and

po te nt ia l c us tom e rs . Pe op le ty pic a lly re nt c ars on lin e or by te le ph on e fr om a natio na l si te or 800 number, a

nd g over nments and bigcorpor ations ty pically neg otiate with the national e n t i t y , beca use they ty pically rent c ars f

or use a way from home.
Al a s k a Re n t- A

- Ca

r s u e d A v is c la im in g th at A v is had indeed br eac hed the se ttlement ag ree ment, causingAlaska business to be switched to B udg et Rent-A- Car, its local competitor. The district c ourt g rante d a part ial summary jud g me nt, e sta

bli sh ingthat A la sk a

Re nt- A- Car w a s a

pa rt y to the settlement agree ment, and that Avis had br eac hed theA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 7

See Sul l i van v. D ol l ar T ree S t o res, I

nc. , 62 3 F.3d 77 0 , 77 6 (9t h C i r. 6 2 0 1 0 ). agree ment by

using the same pe rsonnel to s el l and mar ket bo th Av is and B ud g e t c ars . D ama g e s w e re le ft fo r j ur y tr ia l. The jury returne d a ver dict in favor of Alaska Rent-A-Car

for $1 6 mi lli on . A vis a

pp e a ls.
AN AL YSI S
I. Wa s A la sk a Re nt -A -C ara pr om ise e unde r th e sett lem ent agre em ent? The que stion whether the 1995 se ttlement ag ree ment included Alaska Rent-A-Car was de cided by partial summary judgme nt, so we re view de novo. Avis argues on appe al that 6 A l a s k a R e n t

- A

- C ar

w a s n o ta

p arty. First, Avis ar gues that Ala s k a Rent-A- Car could not be embra ced by

the sett l ement agree ment, beca use the
a g re e me nt p ro te c te d o nly lic e ns e e s w ith“ e xclus ive ” lic e ns e agree ments, that is, with ex clusive terr itories wi t hin which Av is c ou ld not pr omo te c omp e tit or s to the lic e ns e e e xce pt t o the extent the settlement ag ree ment allowed. This ar gument is entirely

without merit. One re ason why is that Alaska Rent-A-Car

plainly di d h ave exclusi ve ter ritories, the desig nated a

nd permitted l ocations wit hin the State of Ala ska. Were Ala ska Rent-A- Car to use the Avis brand to open a
co u n ter at the Seattle airpor t, it would viol ate its licensing agree ment, just as any

other Avis licensee would if it opened a counte r at the Anchora g e air port. The other

rea so n is that
we c an find no languag e limit i n g p ermiss ion to join i n the settlement agree ment to licen s ee s with ex clusive licensing
a g re e me nts

. Th e se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt wa s of fe re d to “a llA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

8

See , e

. g. , St er ng ass v. M ai s el , 5 1 9 N

. Y

. S.2d 5 6 9 , 5 7 0 (N

. Y

. A p p
. D i v. 7 1 9 8 7 ). Cf

. i d. a t 5 7 0 ; B/

R Sal es Co. v

. Kr ant or Cor p. , 640 N

. Y

. S. 2d 204, 205 8 (A p p
. D i v. 19 9 6 ). Avis Sy stem licensee s/franc hisees,” which Alaska Rent-ACar indisputably

was.
Avis also makes the more substantial argument that Al a sk a Re nt- A- Car’ s jo ind e r w a s unti me ly

. What c olo r t his
argume nt ha s ari se s fr om the fa c t tha t Al a sk a Re nt- A- Car d id
no t se nd in a signe d join de r to the se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt u nti l J uly 2001, almos t fo u r year s after the settlement and thre e and a ha lf y ea rs af

t er Avis had sent its licensees a letter inv iti ngthe m to joi n in

the se ttl e me nt.
Avis’s letter wa s an off er, a nd Al as ka Rent-A- Car’s response was a

n acc eptanc e. The parties do not dispute that New Y ork law c ontrols on the timeliness of acc eptanc e, and New Y ork law e stablishes th e usual rule, that a cce ptance must be within a “rea sonable” time. Under New Y ork law, 7
rea sonablene ss is normally a question for

a jury . Howeve r, a cour t may decide it as a matter of lawwhen r ational jurors could re ach only

one conc lusion. 8
Three o r fo u r year s might we ll be unrea sonable in many circ umstances, but not in this one. First , t h e o ffe r stated no time li m i t on acc eptanc e, thoug h Avis could ea sily have
e xpre ssl y lim ite d th e du ratio n o f i ts o ff e r. Th e re a so na

ble inf e re nc e fr om Avis ’s fa ilure to i mpo se a tim e lim it i s th at it did not intend for there to be a time limit, because it saw advanta g e to joinders whe never they came in. Second, four and a half year s after

Alaska Rent- A-Car

joined, eig ht y ear sA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 9

E v e r sin c e the m a n y a b o rig ina l p e o p le s in A la sk a , in c lud ing In u p ia t, 9 Y u p ik, se v e ra l gr o u p ing s o f A tha b a sk a n s, H a id a , T sim sh ia n , T ling it, A l eu t, a n d m any o t hers uni t ed duri ng t he st ruggl e f o r what be cam e t he A l as ka N at i ve C l ai ms Set t l ement A ct , t hei r and ot her s ’ cus t om ha s been t o r e f e r t o “ Al a s k a Nat i v e s ” a s a u n i t i n g t e r m.

B ats on v. Ken t ucky , 47 6 U

. S. 79 (19 8 6 ). 10 afte r the off

er w as made , Avis asked the court ove rsee ing the Ag ency settlement to decla

re the o ff er terminated, implying that Alaska Rent-A-Car ’s joinder came in ple nty o f t ime. Third, Avis’s intent that no t i m e limitshould apply may be inf e rr e d f ro m it s wri tte n c on fi rm atio n o f a c c e pta nc e s b y six other licensee s who sent in the ir acc eptanc es afte r Al aska Re nt- A- Car d id. F ou rt

h, Av is’ s p re vio us re pr e se ntatio ns in this l i tigation that Alaska Rent-A- Car had joined in the settlement imply

that it too int erpr eted its own off er to be open to ac cep t an ce and timely acc epted by

Alaska Rent- ACar. Avis has c ited no New Y ork ca se involving a ny thing l i k e p ar a l l e l f

a c t s w h e r e an a c c e p t an c e w a s d e e m e d un t i m e l y, and a r ational j uror could only conclude from Avis’s a ctions that Alaska Rent-A-Car’ s acc eptanc e wa s made within a
rea sonable ti me. The dist rict court was c orre ct in rulingthat Alaska Rent- A-Car

was a party to th e settl ement agree ment by virtue of its sufficie ntly

timely joinder.
II. Batson
. During jury selec tion, Avis made pere mptory challeng es of the on ly tw o Al a sk a Nativ e s on th e pan el. The district 9
co urtac ce p t edo n e b u td en i e d th e o th er , ap p l yi n g Batson v. K entuck y
. A v is ar gu e s th at d e n ia l o f it s p e r e mp tor

y 10 challeng e of the second A laska Native juror, who sat on the trial jury , was a Batson err or re quiringreve rsal. We reject theA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

10

argument on alternative g rounds, that there was no err or, and that e ve n if

the re ha d b e e n, it w ou ld b e ha rm le ss.
Since liability was established by summary judgme nt, the only issue for the jur

y was whe ther Ala ska Rent-A- Car had proved da mag es, and if so, how much. Avis had to start off
on the wr on gfo ot, that it

ha d ma de a

pr omi se to A la sk a

Re ntA- C ar an d b ro k en i t

. Fa ce d wi th th e p ro b l em o f j u s t i fy i n g a ze r o o r l o w d am a g e s aw ar d d e s p i t e h av i n g b r o k e n it s promise, Av i s neede d a jury willing to deny

an aw ard to the vic timof a br ok e n p ro mis e . A vis ’s atto rn e y us e d v oir dir e to tr y to avo id jur or s who wo uld punis h th e br ok e n p ro mis e even if no damag es we re pr oved.
Avis asked prospec tive jurors whether any of them had “a strongbelief or hold a strongopinion that if someone bre aks
a pr omi se that th e y

sh ou ld be punis he d fo r that by havin gto pay damag es? ” The first of the two Native ven i re m en, Numbe r 6 , s a id s he a g re e d th at so me on e wh o b re aks a promise should be punished by havingto pay damag es, eve n if there was no proof of any loss. But at a sideba r, Number

6 sa id she wo uld ne ve rt

he le ss fo llo w the jud g e ’s ins tr uc tio ns if they wer e to t he contr ary . Avis exercised a pere mptory challeng e agai n s t her. D espite a Batson challeng e fr om Al aska Rent-A-Car, the judge allowed Avis to use that pere mptory

challeng e. The judge acc epted Avis ’s lawyer’ s re pr e se ntatio n th at he wa s n ot s atis fi e d th at he r f e e lin g s, about how dama g es oug ht to be awa rded f o r b re ach of
c ontr a c t r e g ard le ss of wh e the r ac tua l lo ss w a s p ro ve d, wo uld not affe ct her verdic t. No issue has bee n raised in this appe al about allowingthat challeng e.
T h e i s sue g oes to the cha lleng e of the other Native
ve nir e man, Numbe r 1 5. Whe n inf or me d that he wa s a lmo stA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 11

out of ti me to qu e s ti o np r o s p e c ti v e ju r o r s , A v is ’ s c o un s el chose to que stion Number 15, who said t h at whether she would punish someone who broke a promise without harming anyone “w ould depend on how the promises wer e made and wh at’ s b e e n b ro ke n. ” Tw o non -m ino ri ty jur or s sa id substantially

the same t hing. B ut both of the uncha lleng ed jurors assured counse l they would obey

the cour

t’s instructi o n s re g ardle ss of their fe eling s. Number 15 did not say she wo u l d o bey

the instructions despite her persona l views, but bec ause the court’s tim e li mit ran out, she w as not asked.
Re sp on din gto A la sk a

Re nt- A- Car’ s Batson challenge , Avis’s lawyer sa id his gut fe elingwas that Numbe r 15 viewe d p un i s h m e n ta s a

p p r o p r i at e f

o r b r e a c ho f

c o n tr a c tr e g ard le ss of whe ther ther e wa s any harm. He p o i nted out that there
we re no ra c ia l is su e s in

thi s c omm e rc ia l dis pute , and sa id h is challeng e wa s not based on ra ce. A laska Rent- A- C ar ’s lawyer a nd the judg e both expressed the i r co nfidenc e that Av is’ s la wye r w a s n ot r a c ia lly

mot ivated ( the tr ia l w a s in Alaska, where the lawyers a nd judge s often have substantial profe ssional experience with, ag ainst, and before e ach othe r). But the judg e disallowed the challeng e. The court a c kn ow le dg e d th at A vis ’s lawye r h a d n ot ha d s uf fi c ie nt t ime for a dialogue on voir dire with Nu m b er 15, to see whethe r she would follow instructions about damag es despite he r vie ws to t

he c ontrary , b ut t

he c ourt wa s n ot s atis fi e d w ith striking both Native jurors on the re cord be fore him.
Th is Batson iss ue is d if fi c ult be c a us e of the e xplic it findingthat Avis’s lawyer did not ac t wi t h a ra cial motivation. The court did not expressly find the evil to whichA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

12

Uni t ed St at es v

. Col l i ns , 5 5 1 F

. 3 d 9 1 4 , 9 1 9 (9 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( q uo t at i o ns 11
a n d c itatio n s o m itt e d ); acc or d Bats on , 476 U

. S. a t 86, 98.

E dm on s on v. Lees vi l l e Co ncr et e Co

. , I nc. , 50 0 U

. S. 61 4 (19 9 1 ). 12

Bats on , 4 7 6 U .S . at 9 3

– 9 8 ; Col l i ns , 551 F. 3d a t 919. 13

S e e L e w is v . L e w is , 3 2 1 F .3 d 8 2 4 , 8 3 0

– 3 1 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 ); see a lso 14 M i l l er
- E lv. D r et ke , 54 5 U

. S. 23 1 , 24 1 (20 0 5 ). Batson is dire cted, “purpose ful rac ial discrimination.” The 11 jud g e me re ly

ind ic ate d th at he wa s unc omf or ta ble in thi s c a se with a jury

from w h i ch all Natives ha d been e x cluded by pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e s.
Batson a pp lie s to c ivi l a s w e ll a s c ri min a l c a se s. Av is 12
wa s e nti tle d to its per e mpt or y c ha lle ng e un le ss it e xer c ise d it in a manner

violative of Batson

. Th e tr ou bli ngiss ue he re is ste p thre e of

the thr e e -p art Batson test (prima fac ie ca se, ra ceneutra l explanation, finding of pr etext). Were it not for the 13 express ag ree ment by

the judg e and c ounsel th at Avis ’s lawye r, wh om t

he y lik e ly a ll k ne w, wa s n ot per so na lly mot ivate d b y

e thn ic dis c ri min atio n, pr e te xt wo uld str on g ly sug g est itself. Venire man 15 said just what two uncha lleng ed
n o n - N at i v e j ur o r s s a i d , s o “ c o mp ar at i v e j ur o r an a l y s i s” 14 would support an i n fe re n ce of “purpose ful rac ial discrimination.” And whe n Avis’s lawyer sa w that time was runningout, he chose to question Number 15 ins tead of another venire man.
We are never

theless not persua ded that th e district cour t err ed. We re view application of Batson law to factsA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 13

Bats on , 476 U

. S. at 98 n
. 21 ( “ [ A] f i n di n g of i n t en t i on al di s cr i mi n at i on 15 is a fi n d ing o f fac t e n tit le d to a p p ro p ria te d e fer e n c e b y a re v ie w ing c o u rt. Since t he t ri al judge’ s f i nd i ngs i n t h e c o n te xt unde r consi d erat i o n here la rg e ly will tu rn o n e v a lua tio n o f c re d ib ili ty, a r e v ie w ing c o u rt o rd ina rily sho u l d gi ve t ho se f

i nd i ngs great de f

erence. ”) ( q uo t at i o ns and ci t at i o ns o m itt e d ); Unit ed S t a t es v. B au er , 84 F. 3d 1549, 1555 ( 9t h Ci r
. 1996) (noti ng that a tr i al c o urt ’ s f i nd i ngs regardi ng purp o sef ul dis cri m i nat i o n are ent i t l ed t o great de f

erence).

M i l l e r
- El , 54 5 U

. S. at 26 7

– 6 8 (20 0 5 ) ( B rey er, J. , co ncurri ng). 16

Bats on , 476 U

. S. a t 87. 17 de fe re nti a lly and note that pa rt three of the Batson test “asks 15 jud g e s to e ng a g e in the a wk wa rd , s ome tim e s h op e le ss, ta sk
o f s e c o n d

- gu e s s in g a [l aw y e r ’ s ] in s ti n c ti v e ju d g me n t

– the underlying ba sis for which may be invisible even to the [l aw y er] exercisingthe cha lleng e.” I t seems evident that 16 althoug h the district judge believed that Avis’s lawyer ha d no subjective purpose of ra cial discrimination, he wa s conce rned that an o bje c tiv e ob se rv e r w ou ld i nf e r f rom th e fa c ts – compar ative an al y sis of the substantially simil ar r esponses from two uncha lleng ed non-N ative ju r o r s , s k ip p ing ove r other venire men to g et to Number 15 – t hat there was purpose ful discrimination. S u ch a conce rn is amongthe re asons for Batson . “The harm fr om discriminatory jury selec tion extends bey o n d t h at i nflicted on the de fenda nt and the excluded juror to touch the entire community . Selection proce dures that purposef

ully exclude [m inorities] from juries undermine public confidenc e in the fairness of our sy stem of justice.” 17 Objective a

naly sis is also more reliable th an subj ective
ana ly sis . Ajud g e , li ke any pe rs on , is ill -e qu ipp e d to se e int oA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

14

See , e

. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. V an ce , 62 F.3d 11 5 2 , 11 5 8 (19 9 5 ). 18

Uni t ed St at es v. Li nd s ey , 6 3 4 F .3 d 5 4 1 (9 th C ir. 2 0 1 1 ), cer t

. deni ed , 19 1 3 1 S. C t

. 24 7 5 (20 1 1 ).

R iv e ra v . Illi n o is , 55 6 U

. S. 14 8 (20 0 9 ). 20

Uni t ed St at es v

. Anni goni , 96 F.3d 11 3 2 (9t h C i r. 19 9 6 ) ( en b anc). 21

Li nd s ey , 634 F. 3d a t 549. 22

I d. a t 550. 23 pe op le s’ he art s. Tr ia l ju dg e s are g e ne ra lly ve ry re luc tant t o 18 call a la wy er a liar, by findingthat the justificat i o n for a pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e is no t cre dib le . B ut a tr ia l ju dg e is i n a very g oo d p os iti on

to e va luate ob

je c tiv e ly and imp art ia lly what the r ecor d would establish, from the point of view of a rea sonable obser

ver. In t h is case, the trial judg e found the absenc e of subjec tive rac i al bias, but the pre sence of an
a pp e ara nc e of purp os e fu l di sc ri min atio n. Th at su ffi c e s to just if y den ia l of

a pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e , at le a st i n a

c ivi l
case
. Even if ther e we re e rror , we he ld in United St a t es v. Lindsey th atanerro n eo u s d en i al o f ap er emp t o ry ch al l en ge 19 do e s n ot r e qu ir e auto matic re ve rs a l. We he ld t hat Rivera v

. Il lin ois overr

uled our holding in United States v. Annigoni 20 21 th at denial of

a per emptory

challeng e re quired re versa l, and stated that “the Ri v e ra Court dir ectly underc uts our prec edent by deter mining that the e rrone ous denial of a pere mptory challeng e may

indeed be subject to harmless- err or re view.” 22 We c on c lud e d th at Rivera allowed us to “ apply the standar d of re view that is appropr iate under t h e circ umstances of

the district court’s e rror .” In Lindsey , we ap p lied plain err or 23A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 15

Da u b e r tv

. Me r r e l lDo w P h a r m. , 50 9 U

. S. 57 9 (19 9 3 ). 24 revie w, as L indsey

failed to objec t to the district c ourt’s er ror de pr ivi nghim

of a pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e . H ere, Av is d id ob je c t. The right to pe remptory challeng es in civil case s exi sts by vir tue of F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 47 (b ) a

nd 28 U. S.C. § 1870, three challeng es per party or si de, not by virtue of the Constitution. E rr oneous denia l of a c halleng e is there fore
su bje c t to F e de ra l Ru le of

Ci vil Pr oc e dure 61 on

ha rm le ss err or, re quiringus to disre g ard err or not aff ecting“substantial rig hts.”

T h i s c a s e i n v o l v e d

n o t h i n gb e ar i n go nr a c e o r e th n i c i ty. Number 15 was not c halleng ed for cause , and the fe eling s she expressed about damag es we re substantially identical to at least two other j u rors’ f

eeling s. The district cour t allowed Avis’s attorney

to use his third peremptory challeng e on another juror if he wi shed, but counsel wa ived the op po rt un ity , th e re by

a llo wi ngthr e e pe op le wi th t he same uneasine ss about brea ch without damag es to stay on the jury ins te a d o f t

wo
. Th e ve rd ic t wa s un anim ou s. We a re un a ble to s e e any

wa y that “ su bs tanti a l r ig hts ,” tha

t is , r ig hts aff ectingthe substance of the c ase as o p posed to the proce dural right to three peremptory challeng es, could have been a ffe cted by

err oneous denia l of this challeng e.
III
. Da ube rt. Eac h side put on testimony of an e x per t witness on damag es. Avis objecte d under Fede ral Rul e of Evide nce 702 and Da ub e rt v

. Me rre ll Dow Phar ma c e uti c als and

its 24 prog eny to allowing A laska-Re nt-A-Car ’s expert to testify

.A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

16
Be fore i t allowed Ala ska Rent-A- Car’s e x pert to testify about hi s o p i nion on damag es, the c ourt g ave Avis the opportunity

to conduct a le ng thy

voir dire to inquire into the fac ts and data unde rlying the expert’s conc lusions. After that
v o ir dire, the c ourt made a Da ub e rt g ate w ay d e te r mi n ation. I t concluded that “there ’s en oug h underlying data and . . . a
su ff ic ie nt c a us a l c onne c tio n to a llo w [th e e xpe rt ’s ] testimony . . . . Ithink he’s qualified to g ive t he testi mony
. I thi nk his te sti mony wi ll a ssi st the tr ie r o f f a c t and Ithi nk his opinion is t he re sult of reliable pr inciples and m ethods

. . . . [C ]l ear ly , [Avis has] a

rea s for cross examination , an dthat’s what it’s g oing to be subject to.” The task, fo r b oth sides, was to figure out how muc h business and how much profit Alaska Rent-A-Car had lost on
a c c ount o f Avis ’s br e a c h o f t he se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt . Avi s had bre ache d when it boug ht Budg et Rent-A- C ar out of bankruptc y

in 2002 and t h en m erg ed much of the two companies’ national sales a nd marke ting staf

fs into one.
As in a ny dama g e s c a se , th e c a lc ulatio n ha d to a dd re ss a hy pothetical wor ld that never exis ted, one i n which other things re mained the same but the bre ach had not occur red. To c a lc ulate dama g e s f ro m th e br e a c h, as op po se d to damag es fr om competition, Alaska Rent-A- Car’s e x pert wi tne ss c omp are d A vis ’s and B ud g e t’ s exper ie nc e wi th Alamo-National’s (Alamo) e x perie nce a fter Ce rber us boug ht Alamo out of bankr

uptcy at ar ound the s ame tim e. His t heory was that Alamo and B udg et both g ot inf usions of capital a

nd manag ement ena

bling them to compe te, but differ ed i n that Cerber us did not rent car s throug h any other c ompan y , and Av i s d i d , th r o u g hB u d g e t

. T hu s A l am o c o u l d n o tb e n e fi t from mer g ing sa les and mar ketingacti v it ie s b eca

use Cerbe rus ha d n o o th e r c ar r e nta l c omp any , b ut B ud g e t c ou ld. Hi sA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 17

assumption wa s that Budg et would have perf ormed much like Alamo but for the bene fit of a unifie d Avis-B udg et sales a nd
mark e tin ge ff

or t.
B ud g e t r e bo un de d mu c h f a ste r t ha n Al amo. Th e wi tne ss in e ff e c t tr e ate d th e fa ste r r e bo un d o f B ud g e t a s attr ibut able to the brea ch of the settlement agree ment. He used Alamo’s nation al ra te of re bound as a r oug h approximation of how Budg et, had it not had the benef it of the brea ch, would have per f o r me d in A la s k a
. H e th e np r o

je c te d h o wmu c hma

rket share Budg et g ained eac h y ear due to the bre ach. H e testified that he used A lamo’s national rate o f rebound as an approximation for how Budg et in Alaska w ould have pe rf or me d. He reas on e d th at th e re nta l c ar m ark e t is a national marke t, a

nd that national rebound rate s would not be sk e we d b y

idi os y nc ratic loc a l f

a c tor s.
Acc ordingto Alaska Rent-A -Car’ s wit n ess, Alamo’s
natio na l market sh are dr op pe d 3 5% a ft e r i t w e nt i nto ba nk ru ptc y , s low ly

re c ov e ri nga ft e r C e rb e ru s b ou ght it

. Budg et was in ba

nkruptcy a shorter time, and re cover ed fa ster afte r Avis boug ht it. The witness, saying that he wante d to be
c on se rv ativ e in h is e sti mate s, a ssume d th at B ud g e t w ou ld have lost 32.5% of its market share (slightly less than Alamo) had Avis boug ht it out of bankruptcy but not breac hed the
se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt.
Be cause the re vitaliz ed B udg et would dra w customers fr om o the r c ar re nta l com

pa nie s too, no t ju st Avis , th e wi tne ss picked the Juneau airport to appr ox imate how much of the bite would come out of Alaska Rent-A-Car . J uneau ha d the advanta g e of simplicity , beca use he c ould examine a marke t be f o r e B u d g e t e n t e r e d an d a f t e r B u d g e t e n t e r e d , to approximate how much business it took from Alaska- Rent- A-A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

18
Car. Ove r

th e f ir s t t h r e e y e ar s o f

it s e n tr y into th e Juneau marke t, Budg et g ot an ave rag e of 23.3% of the Juneau re ntal
car marke t. About 48% of that marke t sha re g ain came from Alaska Rent- A-Car

customers, 52% from Her tz and other compe ti to r s
. So to g e t a

s tate w id e f

igur e , th e w it

n e s s made the a ssumpt ion that a ft e r the br e a c h, B ud g e t g ot a bo ut ha lf its customers fr om Alaska Rent-A-Car statewide. H e ca lculated Budg et’s market share afte r t he bankruptcy , assumed that but fo r t he br e a c h B ud g e t’ s rate of mark e t sh are re c ov e ry

wo uld have be en s i m ilar to Alamo’s national rate of rec overy , and assumed that about ha lf of its faster rec overy came at the expense of Alaska

Rent-A-Car . These as sumptions and infere nces g ener ated l o s t profits calc ulations of $4.079 mil lio n f ro m 20 03 to 2 00 8 d

ue to the br e a c h, and

futur e los t profits, discounted to pre sent value, of $11.708 milli on. Avis challeng es the ex p ert’s a ssumptions and compar isons. I t argues that differ ence s betwee n Alamo and Budg et, such a s the much long er dur ation of Alamo’s ba nk ru ptc y , a nd many oth e r fa c tor s, ma de Al amo a n inva lid compar ison. Avis also argues that applying a national mar ket share compar is on to Alaska ove rlooked ve ry signific ant differ ence s in how the national and Alaska marke ts worked. And it argues that Alaska Rent-A-Car ’s extr ap o lation from the J uneau ma

rket e x perien ce ignor ed the diff ere nces betwee n this small m arke t, only 5 % o f t he statew ide re ntal
car marke t, and the mar

ket elsewhere in the state, whe re r oads
connec ted t o wn s (unlike Juneau), and doingbusiness more often re quired a

renta l car . Of c ourse, Ala ska Rent-A- Ca r’s expert g ave rea sons f

or his use of all these c omparisons, such as by p o i n t ing out the c larity with which the Juneau marke t could be e x amined. Be cause Budg et enter ed Juneau in 2000, J u n ea u could clearly

show how much business B udg et took from Avis there

.A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 19

F e d . R . E v . 7 0 2 (2 0 0 9 ). S tyli stic c h a n g e s w e re m a d e to R u le 7 0 2 in 25 20 11 , af t er t hi s cas e had gone t o t r i al

. T he cha ng es wer e n ot s ubs t ant i ve. W e u s e t h e l an g u ag e as i t w as w h en t h i s c as e wa s de ci ded.

Da u b e r tv

. Me r r e l lDo w P h a r m. , 50 9 U

. S. 57 9 (19 9 3 ). 26

Pr i m i ano v

. Cook , 59 8 F.3d 55 8 , 5 6 4 (9t h C i r. 20 1 0 ) ( q uo t i ng 27 D a u b ert , 50 9 U

. S. at 59 7 ) ( f o o t no t es and ci t at i o ns o m i t t ed ). All of Avis’s cha lleng es to Alaska Re nt-A-Car ’s expert
are c olo ra ble, but no ne g o to a dmi ssi bil ity . T he y amou nt t o impeachme nt. Under F eder al Rule of Evidenc e 702 the trial court may exercise discr etion to allow expert testimony if the testimony “will assist the trier of f act to under stan d the evidenc e or to de termine a fac t in issue;” (1) it is “ba sed upon
su ff ic ie nt f a c ts or data ;” (2 ) i t is “ the pr od uc t of re lia ble principles and me thods;” and (3) the ex pert “ has applied the principles and me thods reliabl y to the fac ts of the ca se.” 25 This listof re quirements make s the task of de termining adm i s sibili ty

sound more mec hanica l and less judg mental than it rea lly

is. Under Daubert v. M errell Dow Ph ar ma c e uti c als and its prog eny ,

26 [T]he c ourt

must asse ss [a

n e xpe rt ’s ] rea soning or m et h o d o l o gy , u sing a s a p p r o p r i at e s u c hc r i t e r i a a s t e s t a

b i l i ty, publication in pe er revie wed literature , and g e ne ra l a c c e pta

nc e , b ut t

he i nquir

y is a flexibl e one. Shaky

but admissible evidence is to b e att a c k e d

b y c r o s s e xami n ation, contra ry evidenc e, and attention to the burden of proof , not exclusi on. In sum, the trial court
mus t a ssu

re tha t th e e xpe rt

te sti mo ny

“ bo th rests o na r e li a b le f o un d ati o nan d

is r e le v ant to the task at hand.” 27A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

20

I d. a t 5 6 5 (quo t i ng Un i t ed S t a t es v

. S a n d o va l -M en d o za , 472 F. 3d 645, 28 6 5 4 (9t h C i r. 20 0 6 ))

.
K um ho Ti r e Co

. Lt d. v. Ca r m i chael , 52 6 U

. S. 13 7 , 14 1 (19 9 9 ). 29

Pr i m i ano , 5 9 8 F .3 d a t 5 6 4 (quo t i ng K u m h o Ti re , 526 U

. S. a t 151, 30 1 5 0 ). “E x p erto p i n i o nt es t i m o ny i s r e l e v an ti f t h e kn o wl ed ge un d e r l yi n gi th a s a

v a l i d c o nn e c t i o nt o th e p e rt i n e n ti n qu i r y. An d it is re lia

ble if the kn ow le dg e un de rl yingit h a s a re lia ble basis in the knowledg e and ex perie nce of the re levant discipline.” 28
The Da ub e rt

r e li a b il it y r e qu ir e me n t “ is f

le xib le ” and

“ Da ub e rt ’s list o f s p ecif

ic fa ctors neither

nece ssarily

nor ex cl usively

applies to all experts or in ever y case .” “The

29 ‘list of fac tors was mea

nt to be helpful, not definitive’ and the trial court ha s discretion t o decide how to test an expert’s reliability as we ll as whether

the testimony is r eliable, ba sed on ‘the pa rticular c ircumstance s of the par ticular c ase.’ ” 30

Ba sically , the judg e is sup p o s ed t o scre en the jury from unreliable nonsense opinion s , but not ex clude opinions
me re ly be c a us e the y are imp e a c ha

ble . T he dis tr ict cou rt is
n o tt as k ed wi th d ec i d i n g wh et h er th e e x p erti s ri gh to r w ro n g, just whether his testimony has substance such that it would be helpful to a jury . Avis does not chall en ge Alaska Rent- ACar’ s e xpe rt ’s c re de nti a ls a nd qu a lifi c atio ns . N or

do e s it challeng e his g ener al methodology , compar ing the unknown to an ana logous known experienc e. Instead, Avis cha lleng es three aspec ts of the witnesses testimony : using Alamo as the compar ator, using the national rather than the Alaska ma rket
as a baseline, a

nd extrapolating f

rom the Juneau marke t to theA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 21

I d. at 56 8 (quo t i ng S a n d o va l -M en d o za , 47 2 F.3d at 65 4 ). 31 entire A laska mar

ket. None of

these c hall en ges make the district jud ge’s de cision to admit the testimony an abuse of dis c re tio n. Th e y

a ll g o to the we ig ht of the te sti mony and its
cre d i b i l ity , not its admiss ibilit y . Avis g ave the jury g ood arguments for re

jectingthe test imony , but the district court did n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y a l l o w i n g th e j ur y t o l i ste n to A la s k a Re n t- A

- Ca

r ’ s e xp e rt a s w e ll a s A v is ’ s
. “ G ive n that the jud g e is ‘ a

g ate ke e pe r, no t a

fa c t fi nd e r, ’ t

he g ate c ou ld not be closed to this relevant opinion offe red w ith sufficient foundation by

one qualifie d to give it.” 31

IV
. Ce r ta int y o f dam ag e s. The jury returne d a unanimous $16 million verdict for Al a sk a Re nt- A- Car, sli ghtl y

mor e tha n th e $1 5, 78 7, 18 2 in damag es t hat Alaska

Rent-A-Car ’s expert witness ca lculated. Avis’s expert witness offe red no total number at al l t o the jury , just critiques of the other expert ’s assum ptions and calc ulations, w ith some numbers differ ing from hi s for component par

ts. Avis thus presented the case to the jury as a $16 milli on or nothing choice

. Avis argued in its close that the burde n of proof

on damag es wa s on Alaska Rent-A -Car, and that its expert was ef

fec tively impeache d by theirs, so no damag es should be aw arde d.
The district cour

t found, and ne ither side dis p u t es, that New Y ork law c ontrols on the standard of cer tainty require d for damag es for

brea ch of c ontrac t. Avis mov ed
unsucce ssfully for judgment as a matter of l aw that damag es had not bee n proved w ith suf fi cient ce rtainty

or for a new trial. We revie w denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law d e n o v o , b u t dr aw a ll in f e r e n c e s in f

av o r o f theA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

22

H angar t er v

. Pr ovi dent Li f e & Acc

. I

ns

. Co. , 3 7 3 F .3 d 9 9 8 , 1 0 0 5 (9 th 32 C i r. 20 0 4 ).

W hi t e v. F o rd M o t o r Co. , 312 F. 3d 998, 1010 ( 9t h Ci r
. 2002) 33 (quo t at i o n om i t t ed ).

E. E. O

. C. v

. G o D ad dy So f t w are , I nc. , 5 8 1 F.3d 95 1 , 96 2 (9t h C i r. 34 2 0 0 9 ) ( q uo t at i o n om i t t ed ).

A s hl an d M

gm t

. I nc. v. Jani en , 60 4 N

. Y

. S.2d 91 2 , 91 6 (N

. Y

. 19 9 3 ). 35 ve rd ic t. “The test is whether the evidenc e, construe d in the

32 light most favor able to the nonmovingparty , permits only one rea sonable c onclusion, and that conclusion i s contra ry to that of the jury .” We reviewa rulingon a motion fo r n ew trial

33 for a buse of discr etion, and re verse “only if the re cord contains no evide nce in support of the ver dict or if the district court made a mistake of la w.” 34

Un de r N e w Y or

k la w, in o rd e r t o r e c ov e r l os t pr of its Alaska Rent- A-Car

must prove that “( 1) the damag es were cause d by the brea ch; (2) the alleg ed loss must be capa ble of proof wi t h rea sonable c erta inty , and (3) the par ticular d am ages w ere within the contemplation of the pa rties to the contra ct at the tim e it was made .” “Damag es re sulting fr om 35 the loss of future profits are often a n approximation. The law does not r equire that they be deter mined wi t h mathematica l prec ision. I t require s only that d am ages be capa

ble of
measure ment based upon r eliable f actor s witho u t undueA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 23

I d. a t 9 1 5 ; see a lso 3 6 N .Y . Ju r. 2 d D a m a g e s § 1 0 7 ( “ T h e p la intiff 36

m u st s up p l y s o m e b asi s o f co m p ut at i o n f

o r as cert ai ni ng t he l o ss w ith
ce r t ai n t y
. . . . T h e pl ai n t i f f mu s t of

f er s ome r ea s on abl e b as i s f or as ce r t ai n i n g t he am o unt of pr of i t l os t ; a n a l l owa n ce t h er ef or c an n ot be
m a d e o n the b a sis o f gu e ssw o rk o r c o n je c tur e . A b so lute c e rta inty o f d a ta up o n whi ch l o ss of f

ut ure p ro fit s are t o be est i m at ed i s no t requi red, but
som e f ai rl y de f i ni t e b asi s f

o r co m p ut at i o n m ust b e supp l i ed

. . . . N o hard and f ast rul e i n t hi s regard can b e l ai d do wn b ecause s u ch l o ss es ar e d eterm i ne d ac co rd i ng t o t he circum st an ce s o f e ac h p arti cu l ar c ase
. B ut l o st p rof i t s canno t b e p roved where a m ul t i t ud e o f ass um p t i o ns und erl y i ng t he p la intiff ’s cla im m a k e s it im p o ssib le to sa tisf y the ‘re a so n a b le c e rta inty’ t est , even i f

t he b usi ness were co nsi d ered t o be an exi st i ng busi ness ”).

See , e

. g. , K e n

fo rd C o

. v . C o u n ty o

f E rie , 5 0 2 N. Y. S

. 2 d 1 3 1 , 1 3 3 ( N. Y. 37 1 9 8 6 ) ( cl ai m f

o r l o st pro f

i t s f o r s ta d ium too s p ecul at i ve b ecause t he
s t adi um ha d not been bui l t y et , an d l ost prof i t s c alcul at i on as s umed
suc ce ssf ul o p era t i o n of t he st ad i um , att rac t i ng sp o rti ng ev en t s, m ee t i ng s, c o n fer e n c e s, a n d o the r f o rm s o f e n te rta inm e n t o v e r a 2 0 ye a r sp a n ); Bl i nds t o Go ( U. S

. ) , I

n c

. v

. Ti me s Pl a z a De v e l o p me n t , L

. P. , 88 A. D

. 3d 838, 841 (N

. Y

. A p p
. D i v. 20 1 1 ) ( revers i ng an award of l o st pro f i t s b ecause, “ [i ]n l i gh t of t he t ena nt ’ s ad mi s s i on t hat i t l eas ed t he s ubj ect p r emi s es t o break i n to a new m arket , and i t s o wn exp ert ’ s t est i m o ny de m o nst rat i ng t he d iff e re n c e s b e tw e e n the su b je c t p re m ise s a n d t h e a lleg e d ly co m p a ra b le sto re s, the e v id e n c e o n lo st p ro fit s w a s so lac k in g t h a t t h e ve rd ic t co u ld
n o t ha v e b e e n re a c h e d o n a n y fair in te r p r e ta tio n o f t h e e v id e n c e .” ). W e no t e, howev er , t hat “ [ T ] her e i s no per s e r ul e pr ecl udi ng a n ew bus i ne ss f r om r ecove r i ng l ost prof i t s
. ” C ifo n e v . C ity o f P o u g h k e e

p sie , 6 5 0 N .Y .S.2 d 7 9 7 , 7 9 8 (N .Y

. A p p
. D i v. 1 9 9 6 ) (“A claim b ase d o n the lo ss of an t i ci pat ed prof

i t s i n conne ct i on wi t h a t hwa r t ed bus i nes s ven t ur e may b e p ro ve d b y m e th o d s o t he r t ha n b y ref ere nc e to t he ac t ua l p ast p rof i t

- m aki ng ‘ exp eri ence’ of t he ent erpri se i n que st i o n, p rovided t hat t he speculation.” Av is’ s argume nt i s a contin uatio n o f i ts 36 Da ub e rt at t a c k o nA l a s k a

R e n t

- A

- C ar ’ s e x p e rt ’ s t e s t i m o ny.
New Y ork cour

ts ge nera lly

reje ct lost prof

its for (1) ne w bu sin e ss v ent ur e s a s b e ingba se d o n im pe rm iss ibl e speculation, such as profits from a contemplated stadium that
wa s n e ve r b uil t and (2) established businesses pr ojecting 37A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

24

f ut ure pro f

i t s can b e cal cul at ed wi t h reas o nab l e cert ai nt y
. ”) ( q uo t at i o n and ci t at i o n om i t t ed ).

See , e

. g. , Li

f eWi s e M as t er Fundi ng v. Tele bank , 374 F. 3d 917, 932 38 ( 10t h Ci r
. 2004) ( appl y i n g N ew Y or k l aw a n d r ej ec t i n g l os t pr of i t s a s t oo sp ec ulati ve b ec au se “[e]v en assum i ng t ha t L i f eW i se c o uld sho w l o st p r o fits d am ag es d esp i t e n ev er h av i ng b ee n p ro f i t ab l e, i t ha s no t d o ne so here i n a m anner t hat sat i sf i es N ew Y o rk’ s p rohibi t i o n of speculat i ve d am ag es. In i t s d am ag es re p o rt, L i f eW i se ha s fa iled t o co nn ec t i t s p ast l o sses wit h it s p ro p o sed f uture ea rnings. It rem ai n s a f ac t t ha t L i f

eW i se su sta i ned l o ss es i n every y ear of i t s o ver f i ve y ears o f

exi st ence, and f r equen t l y ex peri enc ed capi t al i zat i on probl ems, y et t he da m age s mo del p redict ed only uni nt errupt ed f ut ure gr o wt h. ”).

See , e

. g. , G r eas

y Spo on , I

nc. v. Je f f ers on Tow ers , I

nc. , 552 N

. Y

. S. 2d 39 92, 94 ( N

. Y

. 1990) ( “ Pl ai n t i f f e s t abl i s h ed at t r i al t h at i t w as a l r ea dy op er at i ng a s ucc es s f

ul r es t aur ant bus i nes s at a c om merc i al l y des i r abl e s i t e. F u rth e r, p la intiff ’s w itne sse s g a v e e v id e n c e , b a se d up o n e x p e rie n c e , as to the lev e l o f p ro fit s tha t co u ld re a so n a b ly b e a n ticip a te d

. . . . U n like in K en f o rd , wh er e l ost prof

i t s f r om a muni ci pal i t y ’ s deci s i on not t o cons t r uct
a s t adi um wer e den i ed i n part b eca us e t her e wer e t oo m any un det er mi ned
va riab l es, i n t his ca se m o st o f t he va riab l es t ha t wo uld aff ec t t he succ ess o f t he t hwart ed b usi ness vent ure, i

. e. , l o cat i o n, cap i t al i zat i o n and exi st i ng o r p o t en t i al cli en t ele, we re e st ab l i she d t hr o ug h c o m p eten t p ro o f

. T hu s, the e v id e n c e a t t ria l wa s su ff ic ie n t t o re m o v e p la intiff ’s lo st p ro fit c la im fro m the re a lm o f i m p e rm issib le sp e c u la tio n .” ); cf

. Wat hne I

m por ts , Lt d.
v. P R L U

SA , I nc. , 95 3 N

. Y

. S.2d 7 (N

. Y

. A p p
. D i v. 20 1 2 ). futur e p r o f

it s w it h o u t a p a s t h is to r

y o f p r o f it s , s u c h a s one th at i n i t s f

i v e y e ar s o f e xi s t e n c e h a d n e v e r m a d e apr of it. 38 Al as k a R en t -A -C ar w a s n ei th er
. I th adb ee no p er at i n g a succe ssful business sin ce befor e statehood. And New Y ork courts have upheld the aw ard of lost profits, where , as her e, past perf ormanc e combined wi th some indicia of likelihood
o f f u tur e s u c c e s s w e r e p r e s e n t e d t o th e j ur

y. Th is c a se is 39 analog ous to Greasy Spoon , wher e the plaintiff was a l re adyA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 25

G r eas y Spoon , 552 N

. Y

. S. 2d a t 94. 40

Sus ann e D i P i et r o & T er es a W

. C ar ns , A l as ka’ s E ng l i s h R ul e: 41 At t or n ey ’ s Fe e Sh i f

t i n g i n C i v i l Cas es , 13 Al as k a L. Rev

. 33, 38–39 ( 1996) ( ci t i n g Fr ede r i c E. B r own , T h e Sou r ce s of t h e Al as k a an d O r eg on Codes Par t I I : T h e Codes a nd A l as k a, 1867–1902, 2 U CLA- Al as k a L. R ev. 87 , 88 (19 7 3 ))

. Edw ar ds v

. Al as ka Pul p Cor p. , 9 2 0 P .2d 75 1 , 75 5 (Alas ka 1 9 9 6 ); 42 B enj ami n J

. Ro es ch, E r i e Si mi l ar i t i es : Al as ka C i vi l Rul e 68, “ D i rect C o l l i si o ns,” an d t he P ro b l em o f N o n-A l i gn i ng B ac kg ro un d A ssum p t i o ns, 2 3 A l aska L. R ev. 81 , 81 (20 0 6 ). operating a

succe ssful restaur ant (de spite the name) and the projec tion of lost profits was from addinga sidewa lk caf é. 40 A jury might have been pe rsuade d by the impeac hment testimony , reje cted Ala ska Rent-a -Car’ s expert’s damage s ana ly sis and c a lc ulatio n, and awa rd e d no thi ng
. B ut it w a s n ot, and the jur

y wa s e nti tle d to de c ide . D ra wi nga ll i nf

e re nc e s in the favor of the non-movi ngparty , as we must, the evidence – including but not limited to the expert testimony – suffice d to establish rea sonable c erta inty for the da

mag es aw arde d.
V. At to r ne y’ s F e e s
Alaska ha s, since Cong ress a pplied the g ener al laws of Ore g on to the Terr itory

of Alaska

in 1884, followed the Eng lish Rul e rather than the Am er i can Rule on attorney ’s fee s. A l a s k a

i s th e o n l y

s t at e th atf

o l l o w s th e E n g lis h 41 Rule, that the pre vailing pa rty is ge nera lly

entitled to an 42 attorney ’s fe es aw ard, though many fede ral and state statutesA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

26

See , e

. g. , A ly e sk a P ip e lin e S e rv ic e C o . v. Wild e rn e ss S o c ie ty , 421 U

. S. 43 2 4 0 , 26 1

– 6 2 (19 7 5 ).

See e

. g. , A nd rew J. K l ei nf el d , A l aska: W here th e L o se r P ays t he 44 W i nner’ s Fe es, 24 Jud ges’ J. 4 (1 9 8 5 ).

Al as k a Ci v i l Pr oce du r e Rul e 82( a) ( “ Exc ept a s ot h er wi s e pr ov i ded by 45 l aw or a g r ee d t o by t h e par t i es , t h e pr ev ai l i n g pa r t y i n a c i v i l c as e s h al l be award ed at t o rney ’ s f

ees cal cul at ed unde r t hi s rul e. ”).

A la sk a C o n st. ar t. IV , § 1 5 ; s ee al s o S t at e v. Nat i ve Vi l l age of 46 Nunapi t chuk , 15 6 P

. 3 d 38 9 , 39 5 (Alas ka 2 0 0 7 ).

A l t houg h D i s t r i ct of A l as ka Local R ul e 54

. 3(b) no l onger p ro vides 47
e x p re ssly, a s it d id un til 2 0 0 6 , t h a t “In a d ive rs ity c a se the c o u rt w ill a p p ly R ul e 82, Al as ka R ul es o f C i vi l P r ocedur e, ” i t appear s t o as s ume t hat s uch f ees wi l l s t i l l be awa r ded, s i nce i t p r ovi des t hat mo t i ons f or a t t orn ey ’ s f

ees mus t “ s et f

ort h t he aut hor i t y f

or t he awar d, whe t her R ul e 82, Al as ka R ul es of Ci vi l P r ocedur e” or s om e ot her s our ce. pr ov ide fo r a

wa rd s in de signate d c ir cumstanc e s. T h o u gh 43 sometimes criticized, the rule r emains robustly in force

. 44

Pr e se nt A la sk a

pr a c tic e is s e t out in

Al a sk a Rul e of Civ il Procedur e 82, which g ener ally require s the award of
atto rn e y ’s fe e s to the pr e vail in g p art y in c ivi l c a se s. The 45 Al a sk a Sup re me Court

ha s p ro mul g ate d Ru le 82 purs ua nt t o its c onstitut ional authority to “ make and promulg at e ru les g overning prac tice and proce dure in c ivil and criminal ca ses in all courts.” 46
The United St ates District Court for the District of Alaska ha s it se lf fo r m any y e ars tr e ate d A la sk a Rul e 82 a s g e ne ra lly applicable in civil procee dings wh er e fede ral lawdid not provide other

wise. The district cour t followed its usual 47 prac tice in th i s case , awa rding$1,605,000 in attorney ’s fe esA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 27

R yan e x r el

. Synd i cat es an d I ns. C om pa ni es Su bsc r i bi ng t o P o l i cy 48 P H P 91

- 46 99 v. Sea A i r I

nc. , 90 2 F

. S up p
. 10 6 4 , 10 7 0 (D

. A l aska, 19 9 5 ).

K l op f ens t ei n v. P arget er , 59 7 F.2d 15 0 , 15 2 (9t h C i r. 19 7 9 ). 49

42 1 U

. S. 24 0 (19 7 5 ). 50

30 4 U

. S. 64 (19 3 8 ). 51 ba se d u po n the Rul e 82 fo rm

ula . A s th e dis tr ic t c ourt

he ld i n Ry an v . S e a A ir , “Alaska

follows the Eng lish Rul e, by virtue of wh ic h th e pr e va ili ng pa

rt y a lw ay s re c ov e rs a

po rt ion of its fee s from the losingparty ,” an d t h e United States District Court tr e ats this Al a sk a

pr a c tic e a s “ bin din gin d ivers ity
case s” brought there. Ryan c i t e s o ur 1 9 7 9 d e c i sio n in 48 Klopfenstein v. Pargeter , in wh ic h we up he ld an Al a sk a Rul e 82 attorne y ’s fees awa

rd in a diver sity

case , beca

use “[i] n a diversity action the question of attorney s fee s is gove rned by state law.” 49
Two issues ar ise in this case. First, should feder al law or state law a

pp ly to a n atto rn e y ’s fe e s awa

rd ? Se c on d, if

state l awa p p l i e s , s h o u l d

A l a s k a l awo r N e wY o r k l awc o n tr o l ?
The fir st question is easily answe red. A s both parties agree , state law a

pplies. The Supreme Court he ld in Alyesk a Pi pe lin eSe rv ic eCo. v . W ild e rn ess S oc ie ty th at f

or Er ie 50 Railroad Co. v. Tompk

ins purposes, state law on attorne y ’s 51 fe e s is su bs tanti ve , s o s tate law a

pp lie s in diver si ty c a se s. “[I ]n an ordinary

diversity case wher e the state lawdoes not run counte r to a va lid feder al s t at u t e or rule of c ourt, and usually it will not , state law de nying the rig ht to attorney ’s fee s or g iving a

rig ht thereto, whic h ref lects a substantialA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

28

Al ye s ka Pi pel i ne , 421 U

. S. at 259 n. 31 ( quot i ng 6 J. M oo r e, Feder al 52 P ract i ce 5 4

. 7 7 (2), pp
. 17 1 2

- 1 7 1 3 (2d ed

. 19 7 4 ))

.
See , e

. g. , M

RO Com m uni cat i ons , I nc. v

. A m eri can Te l

. & Te l

. Co. , 53 1 9 7 F .3d 1 27 6, 128 2 (9t h Ci r
. 199 9) ( “ I n a n a ct i on i nv ol vi ng s t at e l aw c la im s, w e a p p ly t h e law o f th e fo ru m sta te to d e te rm ine w h e the r a p a rty is e n tit le d to a tto rn e ys’ fee s, un le ss it co n fli c ts w ith a va lid fed e ra l statu te
o r proc ed ural rul e. ”).

See , e

. g. , Kl axon Co. v. St ent or El ec t r i c M anuf act ur i ng Co. , 313 U

. S. 54 48 7, 496 ( 19 41 ) ( “ T he conf l i ct of l aws r ul es t o be app l i ed by t he f eder al
c o u rt in D e la w a re m u st c o n fo rm to tho se p re v a ili n g in D e la w a re ’s state
cou r t s
. . . . An y o t h e r r u l i n g w o u l d d o v i o l e n c e t o t h e p r i n c i pl e of
un i f ormi t y wi t hi n a s t at e u po n w hi ch t he Tompki ns de ci si o n i s b ased.”).

S e e, e

. g. , G u a ra n t

y T ru stC o

. o

f N ew Y o rk v

. Y o rk , 326 U

. S. 99, 55 1 0 8

– 1 0 (1 9 4 5 ); Sun O i lCo. v

. Wor t m an , 486 U

. S. 717, 726 ( 1988) (“ G u a ra n t

y T ru sti t s el f

r ej ect s t he not i on t hat t her e i s an equi va l en ce bet ween what is sub s t ant i ve un der t he E rie d o c trine a n d w h a t i s subst ant i ve f

o r purpo ses of co nf

l i ct of l aws. ”). policy of the state, should be followed.” We h ave of c ours e 52
s ai d th e s am e t h i n g. 53
Th e se c on d q

ue sti on , A la sk a

law or New Y or

k la w, is more intricate. The rule i s that the federa l court in which the
case is lit igated should apply the forum state ’s choice of law
ru le s. The p ar t i es agree that Alaska c hoice of law rule s 54
a p p l y.
Th ou g h f e de ra l law e sta

bli sh e s th at atto rn e y ’s fe e s la w i s substantive for Er ie purposes, it is not nece ssarily substantive fo r c ho ic e of

law p ur po se s. Whether i t i s s ubstantive or

55 proce dural for

choice o f l aw purposes depe nds on how the Sup re me Court

of th e fo rum st ate wo uld c ha ra c te ri ze i t. Some state Supreme Courts co n s ider their r ules g overningA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 29

See , e

. g. , Ki rwa n v

. C h i ca go Ti t l e I ns

. Co. , 624 N

. W

. 2d 644, 653 56 ( N eb. 20 01 ) ( a pp l y i n g a Neb r a s k a s t a t u e on a t t or n e y ’ s f e e s i n i n s u r anc e act i o ns, de spi t e t he f

act t hat So ut h D ako t a l aw go verned t he und erl y i ng di s pu t e, be ca u s e N ebr as k a dee ms i t s a t t or n ey ’ s f ee s s t at u t e t o be p ro c e d u ra l); Nor t h Ber gen Rex Tr ans

po rt , I nc. v

. Tr ai l er Le as i ng Co. , 7 3 0 A .2 d 8 4 3 , 8 4 8 (N .J . 1 9 9 9 ) (a p p lying N e w J e rs e y la w o n a tto rn e y’s f ees desp i t e t he f

act t hat ano t her s t at e’ s substant i ve l aw go verned t he und erl y i ng dis p ut e, be cause “ at t o rney s’ f ees are a m at t er o f

practi ce and p roce d ure, rat her t han o f s ub st ant i ve l aw.”)

. Eh re dtv

. D eHavi l l and Ai r cr af tCo. of Canada, Lt d. , 705 P. 2d 446, 57 4 5 2 n.8 (A la sk a 1 9 8 5 ) (“T h u s, e v e n if w e a p p lied F lo rid a law , C ivil R u le 8 2 wo ul d co nt rol an award of at t o rney ’ s f ees. ”).

See Ace ve s v

. Al ls t at e I ns

. Co. , 68 F. 3d 1160, 1 1 6 4 (9 t h Ci r
. 1995) 58 (“T h e d istric t co u rt, li k e u s, is b o u n d to fo llo w the c o n sid e re d d ic ta a s w e ll
a s the ho ld ing s o f th e C a lif o rn ia S u p re m e C o u rt w h e n a p p lying C a lif o rn ia l aw.”)

. atto rn e y s f

e e s to be pro c e dura l f

or c ho ic e of law p ur po se s. 56 I f the Ala ska Supreme C ourt would consider its attorney ’s fee s rule proce dural, then Alaska law, the Eng l i s h Ru le,
wo uld a pp ly . I f, ho we ve r, the Al a sk a Sup re me Court

wo uld consider its attorne y ’s fe es rule substantive, the n New Y ork law, the Ame rica

n rule, would a

pply

. And that too is intricate. The Alaska Supreme Court has
ne ve r hel d th at A la sk a Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 82 is pr oc e dura l f

or Al a sk a c ho ic e -o f- law p ur

po se s. How ever, i t has stated in dicta in Ehredt v. De Havilland that“attorney ’s fe e are no t an it e m of

dama g e ,” and

tha t it w ou ld t

hu s a pp ly Rule 82 even if another state’s subst antive law a pplied. We

57 must follow the c onsidered dic ta, as we ll as the holdings, of the Alaska Supreme Court whe n applying A laska law

. The 58 Alaska Supre me Court has also held, in State v. NativeA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

30

15 6 P

. 3 d 38 9 (Alas ka 2 0 0 7 ). 59

I d. a t 395, 402. 60

I d. a t 3 9 5

– 9 6 (q u o ting A la sk a C o n st. ar t. IV , § 1 5 ) (e m p h a sis in 61
o ri gi nal ).

See , e

. g. , Sav age Ar m s , I nc. v

. Wes t er n Aut o Suppl y Co. , 18 P. 3d 49, 62 53 ( Al as k a 2001) ( “ W e l ook t o t h e Res t at ement (Second) of Conf l i ct of La ws f o r gui d ance i n res o l vi ng cho i ce- o f

- l aw i ss ues. ”).

Res t at eme n t ( Se con d) Conf l i ct of La ws § 122. 63
Nunapi t chuk , 156 P. 3d a t 398. 64 Village of Nunapit chuk, that Rule 82 is procedur al, not 59
su bs tanti ve , th ou g h not in the c ho ic e of law c onte xt. 60 Nunaptichuk

dealt with whethe r Rule 82 is procedural for purposes of the Alaska Constitution, which “commits the
enac tment of all substantive law – that is all law exc ept rules of prac tice and proce dure – to the leg islature” but a uthorizes the Supreme Court to “promulg ate ‘ rules g overningprac tice and proc edure in civil and criminal ca ses in all courts.’” 61

Inan al y z i n g Nunapitchuk, w e no te that Al a sk a g e ne ra lly fo llo ws the Re state me nt ( Se c ond) of Con fl ic t of

L aws , 62 which say s that “[a] c o urt usually applies its own local law rules pre scribinghow litigation shall be c onducted e ven whe n it applies the local lawrules of another state to resolve other issues in the case .” Avis urg es us to hold that Rule 82 is not 63
a ru le “ pr e sc ri bin g ho w liti g atio n sha ll b e c on du c te d” be c a us e the Al a sk a

Sup re me Court

ha s sa id t

hat Rule 82 has a partially compensatory

purpose. We r ej ect this argument beca use Nunapitchuk

de eme d Rul e 82 to b e “ pr ima ri ly
con c e r n e d w it h

. . . an e f

f e c ti v e an d e f

f ic ie n t s y s te m for the administration of

justice” despite its compensatory purpose. 64A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 31

N

. Y

. C. P. L. R. § 5004. 65 Ba sed on the dicta

in Ehredt and the ho ldi ng and

ana ly sis in Nunapitchuk, we conclude that the A laska Supreme Court would hold, for purpose s of choice of law, that its attorney ’s fee s rule is p ro ce du ral. Rule 82 is thus substantive for Er ie purposes, proc edura l for Alaska constitutional purpos es of allocatingauthority

as betwe en the c ourts and the legislature , and pr oc e dura l f

or c ho ic e of law pur po se s. We t

he re fo re ho ld that th e law o f t

he fo rum, Al aska, pr op e rl y a pp lie s to diversity case s broug ht in or remove d to the Unit ed S t ates District Court for the District of Alaska. The district court did no t e rr by a

pp lying Al a sk a Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 82 to the attorne y ’s fe e aw ard.
VI. P rej udgme nt Intere st.
The dist rict cour

t awar ded pre

judgme nt interest pursuant to Ne w Y or

k la w o f 9 % p e r a

nnum. The c ourt used Alaska

65 Rent-A-Car ’s expert’s analy sis to separate lost profits before judgme nt, 2003 to 2008, from lost profits projected to oc cur afte r the 2009 judg ment. The c ourt then ap p l i ed the New York intere st rate to the pr ofits lost before t h e v erdict on a y ear by y ear basis (appr ox imately

6 y ear s interest on 2003 profits, 5 y ear s interest on 2 0 0 4 profits, and so for th). The total interest awa

rded was $1,478,519.23. The c ourt awa rded an additional $ 5 7,739.51 as intere st on lost profits from the date of the ve rd ic t to the date ofjud g me nt, plu s $86 ,4 80 .1 7 in interest o n the entire judgme nt from the date of the ve rdict throug h th e d ate of judgme nt. The par ties ag ree that the $57,739.5 1 wa s an er

ror, double c ounting, a

nd that the jud g me nt s ho uld

be re du c e d b y

that amou

nt.A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

32

T he part i es do not di s put e t hat N ew Y ork l aw a pp l i es t o t hi s i s s ue. 66

N

. Y

. C

. P

. L.R

. § 5 0 0 1 (a). 67

N

. Y

. C

. P

. L.R

. § 5 0 0 1 (b). 68

N

. Y

. C

. P

. L.R

. § 5 0 0 1 (c). 69 Avis argues that the district c ourt err ed in one a dditional
re sp e c t, m akin gits own ju dg me nt o n h owto separat e pa st from future lost profits, because the jury was not aske d to do so by specia l verdict. The argument is unpersuasive.
New York law provides for the court to make just such 66
a ca lculation as t h e district court made . By statute, prejudg m en t interest “sha ll” be aw arde d for br eac h of
c ontr a c t. The statute pr ovides that wher e dama g es “w ere

67 incurre d at var ious tim es, intere st shall be comput ed upon
eac h item from the date it was incurr ed or upon al l o f the damag es fr om a sing le re asonable intermediate date.” The 68 statut or y langua g e do e s n ot r e qu ir e jur ie s to d e te rm ine the se v ar io u s d ate s o r

th e “ s in g le r e a s o n a

b le inte r me d iate d ate .” Instead, “[i] f a jury is discharg ed without specify ing the date, th e court upon mot ion shall fix the date.” The Ne w York 69 pr a c tic e a pp e ars to b e fo r t

he tr ia l c ourt

to m ake a

re a so na ble calc ulation based on the evidenc e, as provided in the statutory lan gua g e , d ir e c tin gthe c ourt to c ho os e a

“ re a so na

ble intermediate date” or to “upon motion .

. . fi x the date” imp lie s. Avis argues that two N ew York de cisions establish that preju d g me n t i n te r e s t c ann o t b e aw ar d e d o na v e r d ic t t hat includes both past and future damag es. These c ases, HelmanA L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP 33

H e lm a n v . M a rk o

ff , 8 N .Y .S .2 d 4 4 8 (A p p . D iv. 1 9 3 8 ), af f ’ d per 70

cur i am , 20 N

. E

. 2 d 10 1 2 (N

. Y

. 19 3 9 ).

Br andtCor

p. v

. War r en Aut o. C o nt r ols Cor p. , 322 N

. Y

. S. 2d 291 71 (A p p
. D i v. 19 7 1 ).

A vi s R ep l y B ri ef

at 13 (emp hasi s i n ori gi nal ). 72 v . M ar k off and Br an dt Cor

po ra tio n v . W

arre n A uto ma tic 70 Controls Corporati on , should be distinguished. In Brandt , 71 the plaintiff re cover ed a g ener al ver dict on two theories, one of wh ic h wa s re ve rs e d on

a pp e a l, s o th e re wa s n o r e a so na ble way to tell whether muc h or all of the da mag es we re on the invalid theory . In H

e lm an , p laintiff re cover ed a g ener al
ve rdi ct on tw o c a

us e s o f a c tio n, on ly

on e of wh ic h w ou ld
a llo w a n aw ard of pr e

jud g me nt int e re st. B y c ontr a st, in t his
case , no theory

of re cover

y on which the damag es aw ard w as based is re v ersed, and the theor y of re cover

y , brea ch of contra ct, is one for which New York require s a pre judgme nt interest aw ard.
The district court had a rea sonable basis in the rec ord for allocatingportions of the judg ment to diffe re n t y ear s and calc ulating interest as it did. Alaska Rent-A-Car ’s expert provided pre cisely

such a br eakdow n , with a y ear by y ear ta ble that th e court

us e d. Th e jur

y ’s ve rd ic t w a s so c los e to the e xpe rt

wi tne ss’ s c a lc ulatio n th at th e c ourt c ou ld
rea sonably

infer that the jury

acc epted the substantial
corr ectne ss of his testimony , espec ial l y s ince Avis’s e x pert witness provided no a lternative c alculation. Avis’s alternative, no prejudg ment interest, assumes that “the jury may have a war ded no damag es at a ll subject to prejudg ment interest,” an assumption unsupportable on the r ecor d.

72A L AS K A R EN T -A-C A R V

. A V I S B UD GE T G R OUP

34
Denial o f p rejudgment intere st would be contra ry to the New Y ork statute provi d i ngthat it “shall” be a war ded for brea ch of contrac t. Since t he breac h and dama g e beg an about six y ear s befor e the ve rdict, some sort of c alculation of p re j u d gm en t i n t er es t wa s re qu i re d b y Ne w Y o rkl aw
. T h o u gh Avis essentially

faults Al aska Rent- A-Car for not obtaining a spec ial verdic t to fac ilitate the calculation, Avis also did not reque s t a spec ial verdic t separating out past a nd future damag es. Avis g ambled on an a ll or nothing a rgument, the jury awa rded a ll, and Avis had not asked f or an instruc tion requiringthe j u ry t o brea k out the pre a

nd post-verdic t am o un t

. I tcann o t

n o w f au l tth e c o u r t f

o rm ak i n g a rea sonable a llocation based upon evidenc e in the re cord that provided g ood support for the c alculation it made.

CO NC LU SION
Th e jud g me nt i s AF F IRM ED , except that we r emand fo r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

to r e du c e the pr e

jud g me nt i nte re st awa rd by $5 7, 73 9. 51 . Co sts are awa rd e d to Al a sk a

Re ntA-Car

.