NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

JESUS DANIEL MOLLINEDA SANCHEZ, 

Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0335

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2013-445240-001

The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Janelle A. McEachern, Chandler

By Janelle A. McEachern

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. SANCHEZ

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 Jesus Daniel Mollineda Sanchez appeals his conviction and 

the resulting sentence for trafficking in stolen property in the second 

degree, a class three felony. Pursuant to Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S. 738 (1967) 

and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), Sanchez’s counsel has filed a brief 

indicating she searched the entire record and finding no arguable question 

of law, asks this court to review the record for fundamental error. Sanchez

was given the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona,

but has not done so. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On May 11, 2013, Validity employee J.J. noticed that several 

computers were missing from Validity’s office. J.J.’s co-worker, R.D.,

searched the internet for the missing computers using their serial numbers.

R.D. found one of Validity’s computers for sale on E-Bay for $540. The 

E-Bay seller also listed the other missing computers. R.D. then discovered 

that the seller was connected to the Youtube account of Sanchez, who 

resided in Phoenix. Validity employees reported this information to the 

police. 

¶3 Detective Goldman with the Phoenix Police Department 

learned that Sanchez cleaned Validity’s office the night before J.J. noticed 

the computers were missing. Detective Goldman located Sanchez, who

explained that he had already sold one of the computers on E-Bay,1 but the 

other four computers remained in his storage unit. Sanchez refused to tell 

Detective Goldman how he obtained the computers. Detective Goldman 

returned the computers to Validity, but the hard drives were missing.

Sanchez subsequently returned the hard drives. 

 

1 The sold computer was later returned by the buyer. 
STATE v. SANCHEZ

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 Sanchez was charged with burglary in the third degree and 

trafficking in stolen property.2 At trial, Sanchez testified that he received 

the computers from his manager, Hilda,

3 who he thought had purchased 

the computers from a bulk electronics auction. Sanchez, who was familiar 

with fixing computers and electronics, agreed to sell the computers for 

Hilda, and he would keep a percentage of the profits. Sanchez testified he 

never thought that Hilda could be involved in theft, but he also did not ask 

if the computers were stolen.

¶5 J.J. testified that the hardware for each of the five stolen 

computers was valued between $1000 and $1750 and that the value of the 

data stored on the machines was between $100 to $200 million. J.J. further 

testified that Validity purchased $6000 worth of replacement computers 

and twenty designers were left with no work for two weeks, causing the 

company to suffer financial harm. 

¶6 The jury found Sanchez guilty of trafficking in stolen property

in the second degree. The jury found four aggravating factors: the value of 

the property taken was sufficient to be an aggravating circumstance,

Sanchez committed the offense in consideration of the receipt of pecuniary 

value, the victim suffered physical, emotional or financial harm, and 

Sanchez was on probation at the time of his offense. As mitigating factors, 

the trial court considered Sanchez’s family, his young age, his potential for 

rehabilitation, and his cooperation with law enforcement in returning the 

stolen property. The trial court also found Sanchez had two historical prior 

felony convictions.

¶7 At sentencing, the trial court found that the aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances were essentially equivalent. The trial court 

imposed the presumptive sentence of 11.25 years’ incarceration for the 

trafficking in stolen property offense. In addition, because Sanchez was on 

probation for his two historical prior felonies at the time of this offense, the 

trial court sentenced Sanchez to two more years of imprisonment, one year 

for each count. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for all three 

offenses and gave Sanchez eighty-two days’ presentence incarceration 

credit.

 

2 The trial court dismissed the burglary charge pursuant to Rule 20, 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

3 Hilda moved to Brazil in December 2013 and was unavailable at trial.
STATE v. SANCHEZ

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 Sanchez timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised 

Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21.A.1, 13-4031, and -4033.A.1 (West 2016).4 

DISCUSSION

¶9 Sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed “in the light most

favorable to sustaining the conviction.” State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 552 

(1981). All reasonable inferences are resolved against the defendant. Id. A 

reversal of a conviction based on insufficiency of evidence requires a clear 

showing that there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

conclusion under any hypothesis whatsoever. State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 

228, 231, ¶ 6 (App. 2004).

¶10 Under A.R.S. § 13-2307.A, “[a] person who recklessly traffics 

in the property of another that has been stolen is guilty of trafficking in 

stolen property in the second degree.” A violation of this statute “in the 

second degree is a class 3 felony.” A.R.S. § 13-2307.C. To conclude that an 

action is recklessly performed requires a showing that “a person is aware 

of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 

result will occur or that the circumstance exists.” A.R.S. § 13-105.10(c). 

Furthermore, the risk must be “of such nature and degree that disregard of 

such risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 

reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id.

¶11 The State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

verdict. Sanchez sold one of the stolen computers on E-Bay and his name 

was the only name on the storage facility that contained the other four 

computers. The jury was instructed that “[p]roof of the purchase or sale of 

stolen property at a price substantially below its fair market value, unless 

satisfactorily explained, may give rise to an inference that the defendant 

was aware of the risk that it had been stolen.” Evidence was presented that 

Sanchez had knowledge of computers, but listed them for a sale price

substantially below fair market value. This evidence was sufficient for the 

jury to find Sanchez guilty of trafficking in stolen property.

¶12 The State also presented sufficient evidence to support the 

jury’s verdict of the aggravating circumstances. Under A.R.S. § 13-701.D.6, 

the jury must determine and the trial court must consider as an aggravating 

factor whether “[t]he defendant committed the offense as consideration for 

 

4 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
STATE v. SANCHEZ

Decision of the Court

5

the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary 

value.” Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding on the first factor.

Sanchez testified that he expected to get a percentage of the profit from the 

computers sold on E-Bay.

¶13 The State also alleged three other aggravating factors: the 

value of stolen goods, harm to the victim, and Sanchez’s probation 

violation. Under A.R.S. § 13-701.D.25, the State can allege as aggravating 

circumstances “[a]ny other factor that . . . is relevant to the defendant’s 

character or background or to the nature or circumstances of the crime.” 

Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict on the other three 

aggravating circumstances. J.J. testified in trial that the hardware for each 

of the five stolen computers was valued between $1000 to $1750 and that 

the value of the computer data was between $100 to $200 million. A jury 

could reasonably find that Sanchez’s offense was harmful and involved the 

taking of property in an amount sufficient to be an aggravating 

circumstance given the evidence. Also, Sanchez’s probation officer testified 

that Sanchez was on probation at the time of the trafficking in stolen 

property offense.

¶14 Although the trial court considered Sanchez’s family, his 

young age, his potential for rehabilitation, and his cooperation with law 

enforcement in returning the stolen property as mitigating circumstances, 

the trial court found that the four aggravating factors were essentially 

equivalent and imposed the presumptive sentence. Because of the two 

prior historical felonies, Sanchez was a category three repetitive offender 

under A.R.S. § 13-703.C. Therefore, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703.J, the trial 

court properly imposed the presumptive sentence.

¶15 The trial court also properly revoked Sanchez’s probation for

his two prior historical felony offenses, sentencing him to two additional 

one-year sentences, and correctly applied the eighty-two days’ presentence 

incarceration credit to only the first count. See State v. Sodders, 130 Ariz. 23, 

29-30 (App. 1981) (relating that credit should not be given on each 

consecutive sentence). Under A.R.S. § 13-711.A, the trial court correctly

ordered these three sentences to run consecutively. The trial court properly 

calculated Sanchez’s sentences and gave him the correct number of days of 

presentence incarceration credit.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We have read and considered counsel’s brief. We have 

carefully searched the entire appellate record for reversible error and have 
STATE v. SANCHEZ

Decision of the Court

6

found none. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 541, ¶ 49 (App. 1999). All of 

the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. We find substantial evidence supported the jury’s 

guilty verdicts. Sanchez was represented by counsel at all critical stages of 

the proceedings. At sentencing, Sanchez and his counsel were given an 

opportunity to speak, and the trial court imposed a legal sentence. For the 

foregoing reasons, Sanchez’s conviction and sentences are affirmed.

¶17 Counsel’s obligations pertaining to Sanchez’s representation 

in this appeal have ended. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584 (1984). 

Counsel need do nothing more than inform Sanchez of the status of the 

appeal and his future options, unless counsel’s review reveals an issue 

appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for 

review. See id. at 585. Sanchez has thirty days from the date of this decision 

to proceed, if he so desires, with an in propria persona motion for 

reconsideration or petition for review.