alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit
      32.1**





SECTION
      1350 CERTIFICATION*





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Rurban Financial Corp. (the "Company")
      on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Kenneth
      A. Joyce, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
      Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the consolidated financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




/s/
              Kenneth A. JoycePrint
                Name: Kenneth A. Joyce
              Title:
                Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
              Date:
                November 14, 2008




*
      This
      certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a-14(b) under the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and Section
      1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and shall not be
      deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise
      subject to the liability of that Section. This certification shall not be deemed
      to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of
      1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company
      specifically incorporates it by reference into any such filing.
#### Christine HARRISON, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 17, 1974.

Thomas D. Shumate, Shumate, Shumate & Flaherty, Richmond, for appellant.

Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., Guy C. Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

Memorandom Opinion

PER CURIAM,

Affirming.*
### Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-12-0000505 17-OCT-2013 09:06 AM

SCWC-12-0000505

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI ' I

UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS, AFSCME, LOCAL 636, AFL-CIO, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, 1 

### Governor, State of Hawai ' i; Kalbert K. Young, Director, Department of Budget and Finance, State of Hawai ' i; Barbara A. Krieg, Director, Department of Human Resources Development, State of Hawai ' i; Ted Sakai, Director, Department of Public Safety, State of Hawai ' i; 2 

### DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10 (2009-045), Respondents/Defendants-Appellees.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-12-0000505; CIV. NO. 09-1-2145-09 PWB)

ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, McKenna and Pollack, JJ.)


### Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant United Public Workers,

AFSCME, LOCAL 636, AFL-CIO’s application for writ of certiorari

1 During the pendency of this appeal, Neil Abercrombie, Governor of the State of Hawai ' i, succeeded Linda Lingle. Thus, pursuant to Hawai ' i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 43(c), Abercrombie has been substituted automatically for Lingle in this case.

2 Kalbert K. Young, Director, Department of Budget and Finance, State of Hawai ' i; Barbara A. Krieg, Director, Department of Human Resources Development, State of Hawai ' i; and Ted Sakai, Director, Department of Public Safety, State of Hawai ' i have been substituted as parties to this appeal pursuant to HRAP Rule 43(c). UPW also listed Linda Lingle’s Chief Policy Advisor, Linda Smith, as a Defendant. This title does not exist in Governor Abercrombie’s current cabinet.

### filed on September 13, 2013, is hereby accepted and will be
scheduled for oral argument. The parties will be notified by the
appellate clerk regarding scheduling.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai ' i, October 17, 2013.

Herbert Takahashi, Rebecca Covert, and Davina Lam, for petitioner

James Halvorson and Richard Thomason, for respondents /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
/s/ Simeon R. Acoba, Jr.

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Richard W. Pollack

2
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30527

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MICHAEL TERRANCE PRATHER

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:07-CR-50087-1

Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Michael Terrance Prather pleaded guilty to a single count indictment

charging him with being a felon in possession of two Ruger firearms. Prather

has appealed his sentence, contending that the district court erred by denying

the Government’s motion to reduce his offense level by one level pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). Prather contends that the district court did not have the

discretion to deny the reduction under the circumstances of this case. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 5, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-30527

2

Because Prather’s arguments in the district court were not sufficient to

put the district court on notice of the basis of the argument he has raised on

appeal, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Duhon, 541 F.3d 391,

396 (5th Cir. 2008). Although we have concluded that the district court

committed a clear or obvious error, see United States v. Outlaw, 319 F.3d 701,

705-09 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119, 1123-28 (5th Cir.

1993), and that Prather’s substantial rights were affected, see United States v.

Price, 516 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2008), we decline to exercise our discretion to

correct the error because the error did not affect the fairness or integrity of the

judicial proceedings in light of Prather’s obstruction of justice. See Duhon, 541

F.3d at 396. The judgment is AFFIRMED.
---

Exhibit 32.2

U.S. GEOTHERMAL INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES

CERTIFICATIONS



I, Kerry D. Hawkley, certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to my knowledge:



| | 1. | The annual report for U.S. Geothermal Inc. on Form 10-KSB
      for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2007 (report), which this
      certification accompanies, fully complies with the requirements of Section
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
| | 2. | The information contained in the report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the business issuer.                                                                                                            





|Date: November 5, 2007     | 
|-------------------------- | 
|                           | 
|                           | 
|/s/ Kerry D.
      Hawkley | 
|Kerry D. Hawkley           | 
|Chief Financial Officer    | 

---
| Skip to Content*Release Date: September 17, 2010*Release dates |  Coded tables |  Historical dataCurrent release |  Screen reader |  PDF (450 KB)**F.10 Derivation of Measures of Personal Saving1** |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### Levy Joseph WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 48711.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

July 2, 1974.

Jim Tatum and Joe L. Guyton, Houston, for appellant.

Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., Clyde F. DeWitt, III, Vic Driscoll, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

DOUGLAS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of robbery by assault. Appellant entered a plea of guilty before a jury. His punishment was assessed at seventy-five years.

The sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in overruling his written objection to that part of the court’s charge which reads as follows:

> “You are not to discuss among yourselves how long the defendant would be required to serve this sentence that you imposed. Such matters come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Governor and are no concern of yours.”

In Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Civ.App.1970), reversed on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947, 91 S.Ct. 2291, 29 L.Ed.2d 859 (1971), we held that the giving of an admonitory instruction lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. And, in Hernandez v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 418, 334 S.W.2d 299 (1960), we stated:

> “Appellant complains of an admonitory instruction to the jury to the effect that they should not discuss how long he would be required to serve in order to satisfy the sentence, if any, imposed.

> “The giving of admonitory charges by the trial court, in order to guard against jury misconduct, has been left largely to *65his discretion. Chief among such charges that have been held to he warranted are: that the indictment is no evidence of the guilt of the accused and that the failure of the accused to testify is not to be taken as a circumstance against him. Additional charges left to the trial court’s discretion include those containing matters not in evidence (Villereal v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 61 S.W. 715; Gunn v. State, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 209, 234 S.W. 399) and those where the result of a former trial was no concern of the jury (Hewey v. State, 87 Tex.Cr.R. 248, 220 S.W. 1106) and those charges cautioning the jury against arriving at punishment by lot (24 Tex.Jur., Sec. 128, p. 619).

> “We are unable to agree with the appellant that the giving of the instant charge was error.”

The judgment is affirmed.
#### CITY OF RIVERSIDE, Missouri, Respondent, v. Altone JOHNSON, Appellant.

No. KCD 26718.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District.

March 4, 1974.

Jerry Conkling, Kansas City, for appellant.

*49Witt & Shafer, Don Witt, Platte City, for respondent.

Before DIXON, C. J., and SHANGLER, and WASSERSTROM, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted in Riverside Municipal Court for violation of a city ordinance prohibiting driving while intoxicated. Appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Platte County for a trial de novo. On March 1, 1973, defendant appeared with counsel and waived jury trial. The court heard the evidence for the prosecution, the defendant offered no evidence. Thereafter, the court declared:

> “It is the finding of the court that the man is guilty as charged in the information and is fined $100 and costs.”

Counsel requested a “stay” of fine and costs to permit defendant to make application for a hardship driver’s license. The stay, until April 5, 1973, was granted. On April 5, 1973, defendant filed his motion for new trial, which was overruled on April 7, 1973.- Notice of Appeal to this court was filed on April 13, 1973.

The procedure in the circuit court for appeals from municipal courts— except as to the right of appeal itself — is governed by the rules of criminal procedure. § 98.020 RSMol969, V.A.M.S., City of Clayton v. Nemours, 237 Mo.App. 167, 164 S.W.2d 935 (1942); City of St. Louis v. Meixner, 285 S.W.2d 50 (Mo.App.1955); Kansas City v. Stricklin, 428 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. banc 1968). Criminal Rule 27.20(a), V.A.M.R., mandates that a motion for new trial be filed before judgment and within ten days of rendition of verdict. [See: State v. Ezell, 470 S.W.2d 162 (Mo.App.1972)] Judgment and sentence must be imposed “after the motion for new trial and other presentence procedures have been disposed of.” State v. Absher, 439 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Mo.App.1969); State v. Jaeger, 394 S.W.2d 347, 354 (Mo.1965). A judgment rendered and a sentence imposed before the defendant has exercised his legal right to file a motion for new trial, or before the motion has been timely filed and ruled upon, is illegal and void. State v. Grant, 380 S.W.2d 799 (Mo.1964); State v. Summers, 477 S.W.2d 721 (Mo.1972); State v. Jaeger, *supra.*

No record entry appears which purports to be a final judgment and sentence, other than the remark of the trial court made when the court entered its verdict on the question of guilt or innocence. Therefore, there is no final judgment and the appeal is premature. State v. Myers, 467 S.W.2d 577 (Mo.App.1971); State v. Nichols, 474 S.W.2d 54 (Mo.App.1971); State v. Absher, *supra.*No formal judgment and imposition of sentence having been made, the trial court retains jurisdiction to do so. State v. Grant, *supra,*and case cited therein.

The submission of this case is set aside, the appeal dismissed, and the cause remanded to the trial court with direction to render a final judgment, from which an appeal may be properly taken.
EXHIBIT
            32.2 - CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF BLUEGATE CORPORATION PURSUANT
            TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 AND SECTION 1350 OF
            18 U.S.C.
            63.
 
 I,
            Charles E. Leibold, the Chief Financial Officer of Bluegate Corporation,
            hereby certify
            that Bluegate Corporation's periodic report on Form 10-QSB, for the period
            ending June 30, 2007, fully complies with the requirements of Section
            13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that information
            contained in the periodic report on Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of the operations
            of Bluegate
            Corporation.
 
 
 Date:
                      August 23, 2007
                  /s/
                  Charles E. LeiboldCharles E. Leibold,Chief
                      Financial Officer
##### 



EXHIBIT 10.3
 CAPSTEAD MORTGAGE CORPORATION
 NONQUALIFIED STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT
FOR EMPLOYEES
  R E C I T A L S :
   NOW THEREFORE
 Grant of the Option
 Option Term




---



##### 



Vesting of Stock Options
  Percentage of Shares
    
    CumulativeDate
    
    Vested on Specified Date
    
    Percentage of Shares[]
    
    [___]
    
    [___][]
    
    [___]
    
    [___][]
    
    [___]
    
    [___][]
    
    [___]
    
    [___]
     2




---



##### 



Exercise of the Option
    3




---



##### 



No Right to Continued Employment
 Adjustments Upon Changes in Capitalization or Reorganization
   4




---



##### 



Non-Transferability of the Option
 Compliance with Securities and other Laws
 5




---



##### 



Issuance of Shares
 Alternative Award for Cancellation of the Option
 Notices
 Choice of Law
 Option Subject to Plan
 Amendment of Agreement
 Administration of Plan and Agreement
 Execution in Counterparts
 6




---



##### 



[Signature Page Follows]
 7




---



##### 



IN WITNESS WHEREOF
 CAPSTEAD MORTGAGE CORPORATIONBy:Andrew F. JacobsPresident and Chief ExecutiveOfficer[OPTIONEE][]
 8




---



##### 



CAPSTEAD MORTGAGE CORPORATION
 RESTRICTED STOCK AGREEMENT
FOR EMPLOYEES
    GRANT
 Grant and Acceptance
 Effect of Plan
 RIGHTS IN SHARES
 VESTING
 Vesting




---



##### 



Percentage of Shares
    
    CumulativeDate
    
    Vested on Specified Date
    
    Percentage of Shares[]
    
    [___]
    
    [___][]
    
    [___]
    
    [___][]
    
    [___]
    
    [___][]
    
    [___]
    
    [___]
     Effect of Grantees Death
 Effect of Dissolution or Liquidation
 Effect of Change of Control
 Effect of Forfeiture
 STOCK CERTIFICATES
 2




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##### 



TRANSFER AND REPURCHASES UPON TERMINATION
   WITHHOLDINGS
 ADJUSTMENTS TO AWARD SHARES
 Stock Dividends and Splits and Similar Transactions
 Change in Par Value
 3




---



##### 



Other Capital Adjustments
 GRANTEES REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
     IMPACT ON OTHER BENEFITS
 ADMINISTRATION
 NO AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE IN EMPLOYMENT
 4




---



##### 



AMENDMENT(S)
 FORCE AND EFFECT
 GOVERNING LAWS
 MISCELLANEOUS
   [Signature Page Follows]
 5




---



##### 



IN WITNESS WHEREOF
 CAPSTEAD MORTGAGE CORPORATIONBy:Andrew F. JacobsPresident and Chief Executive Officer[GRANTEE][]
 6
- 1 - 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-2245 

JAMES WALSH, 

Plaintiff, Appellee, 

v. 

ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a ZURICH DIRECT MARKETS, 

d/b/a ZURICH NORTH AMERICA COMMERCIAL, 

d/b/a ZURICH NORTH AMERICA, et al., 

Defendants, Appellants. 

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court issued on February 22, 2017 is 

amended as follows: 

On page 34, line 3: replace "Igham" with "Ingham." 

On page 37, in the concluding paragraph, line 5, replace 

"entitle Walsh" with "give Walsh a right." 

On page 37, in the concluding paragraph, line 9, replace the 

periods with commas following "reasonableness" and "193," and add 

following "193,": "and, if the jury finds a breach of the covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing, the appropriate amount of damages."
| (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;  and |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:      May 6, 2008       |   |
|------------------------------|--------|
|                         |   |
|                         |   |
| /s/ Stephen J. Sperco        |   |
| Stephen      J. Sperco       |   |
| Chief      Executive Officer |   |

----
#### James Edward WHEELER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 46424.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 27, 1973.

James P. Finstrom, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Baskett, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Jim D.

Vollers, State’s Atty., and Robert A. Hut-tash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

DALLY, Commissioner.

The conviction is for the sale of heroin; the punishment, forty-five years imprisonment.

The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged. It was proved that the appellant sold heroin to an undercover agent.

The first ground of error complains of the trial court’s refusal to reduce the appellant’s bail pending trial, from ten thousand dollars to five thousand dollars. It appears that no appeal was taken from the order refusing to reduce bail. That issue has now become moot. See Ex Parte Waddle, 482 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) and Johnson v. State, 478 S.W.2d 954 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). This ground of error is without merit and is overruled.

The remaining grounds of error complain of the trial court’s failure to rule upon an objection during argument and of the prosecutor’s alleged improper argument.

The portion of the record designated by the appellant as showing the error complained of reads as follows:

> “When Jack Frost1 was arrested he wasn’t at home; he was over at the same place where the buy took place three or four months earlier. He didn’t have a job; he didn’t have a job back there on the day that he bought the stuff.

> MR. BARHAM: Judge, I will object to that. There is no testimony in that regard.

> MR. HILL: Well, it is a reasonable deduction from the evidence that he wasn’t working at that time.

> *86MR. BARHAM: He had a job.

> MR. HILL: He certainly did.

> MR. BARHAM: He certainly did; he was working.

> MR. HILL: He had a job; he was selling narcotics to all the people here in Dallas that were addicted to it, to commit crimes every day. Now, that is his job.

> MR. PRICE: Pardon me, Mr. Hill.

> MR. HILL: And you know you are guilty, Jack. As you sit there you know you are guilty of pushing dope, preying on the innocent people of this community. Making them rob, and preying on the innocent people of this community, making them rob and stel (sic) to get more of it.

> Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

> THE COURT: All right. Close the arguments.

> (WHEREUPON, THE ARGUMENTS WERE CLOSED.)

> (THE JURY WAS RETIRED TO THE JURY ROOM TO DELIBERATE ITS VERDICT.)”

Defense counsel’s interruption of the argument with “Pardon me, Mr. Hill,” was not an objection requiring a ruling of the trial court. By failing to object and failing to obtain a ruling of the court, nothing is preserved for review. See Bourg v. State, 484 S.W.2d 724 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) and Thomas v. State, 477 S.W.2d 881 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and the cases there cited.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.

1

. Jack Frost was the alias under which the appellant was indicted.