[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 18

- 10655 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:17

- cv - 00350

- WKW

- DAB

DARRELL LAMAR MARSHALL, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, W. HAROLD ALBRITTON, III, United States District Judge, in his official capacity, MYRON H. THOMPSON, United States District Judge, in his official capacity, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, in their official capacity, THE FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTER, in their official capacity,
Defendants

- Appellees.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle Distr ict of Alabama

________________________ (March 4, 2019) Case: 18-10655 Date Filed: 03/04/2019 Page: 1 of 52 Before WILLIAM PRYOR , JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Darrell Marshall appeals pro se the sua sponte dismissal of his complaint

. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Marshall challenges the denial of his motion f o r the magistrate judge to recuse and the treatment of his action as raising constitutional
claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed eral Bureau of
Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971) . Marshall also argues that the summary disposition of his complaint violated his right to due process

. We affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Marshall’s motion to recuse. Marshall alleged that the magistrate judge was “bias[ed],” but Marshall failed to file an affidavit stating that t he magistrate judge was prejudiced against him or that the magistrate judge possessed personal knowledge of the case that required recusal. See 28 U.S.C. § 144. Marshall’s status as a pro se litigant did not excuse him from provi ding an affidavit in support of his motion. See Albra v. Advan, Inc. , 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). Marshall also alleged that the magistrate judge engaged in “misconduct . . . [by] misconstru[ing] [the] Civil Rights Complaint as a Bivens action and recommend[ing] that the case be dismissed,” but Marshall’s disagreement with the magistrate judge’s adverse

Case: 18-10655 Date Filed: 03/04/2019 Page: 2 of 53 rulings did not constitute a valid ground for recusal. See Draper v. Reynolds , 369 F.3d 1270, 1279 (11 th Cir. 2004).
The district court reasonably construed Marshall’s complaint as a Bivens action. Civil actions against state officers for violatin g a plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights are governed by a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , while
Bivens recogniz e s a cause of action against federa l officers for violations of federal constitutional rights. Abella v. Rubino , 63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. 1995). Marshall did not allege that any defendant violated his federal constitutional rights while acting under color of state law as required to state a claim under section 1983. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan , 526 U.S. 40, 49

– 50 (1999)

. As the district court stated, Bivens offered Marshall his “best hope for relief” because he alleged wrongdoing by federal actors. Marshall complain ed that t wo federal district judges, the United States Attorney’s Office, the Federal Medical Center, and the United States of America conspired to conceal his mental disabilities, discriminated against him because of his mental disability, and vi olated the Americans With Disabilities Act. The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismiss ing Marshall’s complaint as frivolous. When an “action . . . is frivolous,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), by being “without arguable merit either in law o r fact,” Napier

Case: 18-10655 Date Filed: 03/04/2019 Page: 3 of 54 v. Preslicka , 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver , 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) ), the district court must dismiss the action and may do

so sua sponte before service of process, Vanderberg v. Donaldson , 259 F. 3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001). Marshall’s complaint i s frivolous because the d istrict judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity, see Bolin v. Story , 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000), and because Bivens d oes not provide for an action a gainst federal agencies like t he United States Attorney’s Office and the Federal Medical Center, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994), or against the United States, McCollum v. Bolger , 794 F.2d 602, 608 (11th Cir. 1986) , all of which enjoy

s overeign immunity

. Marshall does not challenge the dismissal of his claim under the Disabilities Act, so we deem abandoned any argument he could have made contesting that adverse ruling. See Timson v. Sampson , 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“ While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned . . . .”). The district court did not violate Marshall’s right to due process by sua sponte dismissing his complaint

. “[D]ue process req uires, at a minimum, that .

. . persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Boddie v. Connecticut , 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971). The screening procedure under which the district court

Case: 18-10655 Date Filed: 03/04/2019 Page: 4 of 55 dismiss ed Ma rshall’s complaint as frivolous , 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), d oes not violate due process. See Vanderberg , 259 F.3d at 1323

. The district court reviewed Marshall ’s object ions to the recommendation of the magistrate judge before entering its final order that dismissed t h e complaint

. See Link v. Wabash
R.R. Co. , 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962) ( sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute did not “offend[ ] due process” given “the availability of a corrective remedy”). And we have reviewed the dismissal of Marsh all ’s complaint de novo . These post decisional procedures provided Marshall ample “meaningful opportunit[ies] to be heard.” See Boddie , 401 U.S. at 377.
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Marshall’s complaint. Case: 18-10655 Date Filed: 03/04/2019 Page: 5 of 5