NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 20-1475 

__________ 

RANDALL WINSLOW, 

 Appellant 

v. 

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION; 

CHESTER COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION; and WILLIAM P. MAHON 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-4632) 

District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

April 13, 2021 

Before: AMBRO, PORTER and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: May 3, 2021) 

___________ 

OPINION*

___________ 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

PER CURIAM 

 Randall Winslow sued the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, two bar associations, 

and a state trial judge. Winslow sought to invalidate Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1042.3, which requires a certificate of merit (COM) in professional 

malpractice cases. Winslow claimed that his inability to afford a COM means that Rule 

1042.3 creates an unconstitutional barrier to certain types of litigants and litigation. 

Three defendants entered their appearances and moved to dismiss the complaint. The 

District Court granted the motions based on the Rooker-Feldman1

 doctrine, a 

jurisdictional ground raisable in a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1).2

 The District Court determined that Winslow was, in effect, seeking federal 

court review of two state-court malpractice cases that he lost due to lack of COMs. To 

support its determination, the District Court cited our decision affirming the RookerFeldman-based dismissal of Winslow’s virtually-identical-in-substance prior suit. See 

Winslow v. Stevens, 632 F. App’x 721 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); cf. Dist. Ct. Op. at 6 

(“The Third Circuit’s ruling now acts as a collateral estoppel that binds me to conclude 

1

 D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 

413 (1923). 

2

 The District Court dismissed the non-appearing, fourth defendant (the Pennsylvania Bar 

Association) from suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), because it was not 

timely served with process. 
3 

that Plaintiff’s constitutional claim—as applied to his state lawsuit against [one of his 

prior attorneys]—is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”). 

 Winslow appealed. Our appellate jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

See Gomez v. Gov’t of V.I., 882 F.2d 733, 736 (3d Cir. 1989). We review de novo an 

order granting a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) that facially attacks the District Court’s 

jurisdiction. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016).3

 And we may affirm 

on any basis supported by the record. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d 

Cir. 1999). 

 We have carefully reviewed Winslow’s brief, in which he argues at length that the 

District Court misapplied Rooker-Feldman. Winslow’s arguments are ultimately 

unavailing, for at least the three reasons that follow. 

First, this Court already has determined that Rooker-Feldman bars any attempt by 

Winslow to collaterally attack the adverse state court ruling, in his original malpractice 

case, by way of a federal court action to invalidate Rule 1042.3. See Winslow, 632 F. 

App’x at 723. To the extent that Winslow has attempted to do just that (again), the 

District Court was correct to support its jurisdictional ruling by invoking the doctrine of 

issue preclusion. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 

1231–32 (3d Cir. 1995) (outlining the requirements for application of issue preclusion). 

3

 Winslow does not challenge on appeal the District Court’s Rule 4(m) dismissal. 
4 

Second, it matters not that Winslow’s complaint at issue referenced a failed malpractice 

action against an attorney different from the attorney whose alleged malpractice was at 

issue in the prior complaint. To that separate malpractice case Rooker-Feldman applies 

with equal force, using the same rationale previously employed by this Court, see 

Winslow, 632 F. App’x at 723, and by the District Court below. Here too, then, issue 

preclusion bars what appears to be nothing more than a request by Winslow to relitigate 

the past. 

 Third, even if Winslow were right that there is some facet of his case that eludes 

Rooker-Feldman—on the theories that he claims prospective injury or instead an injury to 

the general public—it would not alter our disposition. Winslow lacks constitutional 

standing to press either theory. Cf. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 

(2016), as revised (May 24, 2016) (explaining that “the ‘irreducible constitutional 

minimum’ of standing consists of three elements. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an 

injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and 

(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision”) (citation omitted). 

Specifically, there is still “no foreseeable prospect that Rule 1042.3 will bar some 

hypothetical future lawsuit [Winslow] might assert against an attorney or other licensed 

professional.” Winslow, 632 F. App’x at 724.4 And Winslow cannot demonstrate 

4

 That we previously ruled on Winslow’s standing to challenge Rule 1042.3, based on 

alleged prospective harm, is yet another basis for application of issue preclusion. 
5 

standing by alleging that he seeks vindication for the public generally. Cf. Carney v. 

Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 499 (2020) (explaining that “a plaintiff cannot establish standing 

by asserting an abstract ‘general interest common to all members of the public,’ ‘no 

matter how sincere’ or ‘deeply committed’ a plaintiff is to vindicating that general 

interest on behalf of the public”) (citations omitted). 

 Accordingly, the District Court’s judgment will be affirmed.