UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4900

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HAFAN ANTONIO RILEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (3:12-cr-00251-JFA-1)

Submitted: November 24, 2014 Decided: December 2, 2014

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

G. Wells Dickson, Jr., WELLS DICKSON, P.A., Kingstree, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. William Kenneth Witherspoon, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Hafan Antonio Riley appeals his conviction and the 

240-month sentence imposed by the district court after he pled 

guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 

distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). Riley’s

counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), stating that he has found no meritorious 

grounds for appeal but questioning the denial of Riley’s motion 

to suppress, the adequacy of the plea hearing, the validity of 

the prior convictions used to determine the statutory sentencing 

range, and reasonableness of Riley’s sentence. Although 

informed of his right to do so, Riley has not filed a pro se 

supplemental brief. We affirm the judgment of the district 

court.

We decline to consider Riley’s challenge to the denial 

of his motion to suppress because Riley waived this issue by 

pleading guilty. See United States v. Bowles, 602 F.3d 581, 582 

(4th Cir. 2010). Next, having reviewed the transcript of the 

plea colloquy, we conclude that the district court substantially 

complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and that 

the court’s failure to inform Riley of his right to counsel at 

every stage of the proceedings and the possibility of departing 

from the Guidelines range did not affect Riley’s substantial 
3

rights. See United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th 

Cir. 2009) (providing standard). With regard to the validity of 

the prior conviction, we conclude that the information proffered 

by the Government adequately supported the statutory range 

applied by the district court. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 

851 (2012). Finally, our review leaves us with no doubt that 

there is no substantive or procedural error in the district 

court’s imposition of the statutory minimum sentence of 240 

months’ imprisonment. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

51 (2007).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record for any meritorious grounds for appeal and have found 

none. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment and 

deny Riley’s motion requesting copies of the grand jury 

materials in this case. This court requires that counsel inform 

Riley, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of 

the United States for further review. If Riley requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Riley. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
4

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED