UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

v.

Second Lieutenant DAVID M. CAMPBELL

United States Air Force

ACM 38610

21 August 2015

Sentence adjudged 24 January 2014 by GCM convened at Columbus Air 

Force Base, Mississippi. Military Judge: Shaun Speranza.

Approved Sentence: Dismissal and confinement for 15 days.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Major Jeffrey A. Davis and 

Captain Travis L. Vaughan.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Major Roberto Ramirez and 

Gerald R. Bruce, Esquire.

Before

ALLRED, TELLER, and SANTORO

Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent

under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4.

SANTORO, Judge:

A general court-martial composed of officer members convicted the appellant, 

contrary to his plea, of the wrongful use of cocaine in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ,

10 U.S.C. § 912a. The adjudged and approved sentence was a dismissal and confinement 

for 15 days. Before us, the appellant seeks sentencing relief pursuant to United States v. 

Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002). We disagree and affirm. 
2 ACM 38610

Background

The appellant traveled to Las Vegas, Nevada, to attend a weekend bachelor party. 

Upon his return he was randomly selected to provide a urine sample as part of the 

Air Force’s drug testing program. The metabolite of cocaine was detected in the 

appellant’s urine. Following a rights advisement, the appellant told investigators that he 

had shared a hotel room with several civilians and that some of the civilian attendees 

brought or obtained cocaine and other controlled substances. The appellant said he was 

offered and declined pills but, after initially denying that he used cocaine, eventually told 

investigators that he did ingest cocaine on a single occasion while in Las Vegas.

Post-Trial Processing Delay

Thirty-two days elapsed between the convening authority’s action and the 

docketing of this case before this court. Under United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 142 

(C.A.A.F. 2006), the record should have been docketed with this court within 30 days of 

the convening authority’s action. 

We review de novo an appellant’s claim that he has been denied his due process 

right to a speedy post-trial review and appeal. Moreno, 63 M.J. at 135. Because the 

32-day period in this case is facially unreasonable, see id. at 142, we examine the claim 

under the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972): “(1) the 

length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the appellant’s assertion of the right

to timely review and appeal; and (4) prejudice.” Moreno, 63 M.J. at 135. If we are able 

to conclude directly that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we do not 

need to engage in a separate analysis of each factor. See United States v. Allison, 

63 M.J. 365, 370 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

The appellant does not argue that he has been personally prejudiced by the delay. 

While we agree that Moreno violations are unacceptable, we find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the appellant was not harmed by the two-day delay and is thus not entitled to 

relief under Moreno.

However, that does not end the inquiry, as we may grant sentence relief under 

Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c), even when we find no prejudice in 

unreasonable post-trial delays. United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 224 (C.A.A.F. 

2002); see also United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 362 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (finding 

delays were “such that tolerating them would adversely affect the public’s perception of 

the fairness and integrity of the military justice system”). However, “[a]ppellate relief 

under Article 66(c) should be viewed as the last recourse to vindicate, where appropriate, 

an appellant’s right to timely . . . review.” Tardif, 57 M.J. at 225. 
3 ACM 38610

We have examined the entirety of the post-trial process. Aside from the two-day 

delay in docketing the record with this court, the remainder of the post-trial activities 

occurred within established time standards, and we detect nothing that would suggest this 

is a case in which the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the system could 

reasonably he questioned. We therefore decline to grant Tardif relief.

Conclusion

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error 

materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant occurred. Article 66(c), 

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). Accordingly, the findings and the sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

STEVEN LUCAS

Clerk of the Court