alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-6540

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES THOMAS WEBB,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-6095

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES THOMAS WEBB,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:12-cr-00301-D-1; 5:17-cv-00081-D)

Submitted: June 1, 2022 Decided: July 22, 2022

USCA4 Appeal: 21-6540 Doc: 19 Filed: 07/22/2022 Pg: 1 of 3
2

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and THACKER and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Thomas Webb, Appellant Pro Se. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 21-6540 Doc: 19 Filed: 07/22/2022 Pg: 2 of 3
3

PER CURIAM:

James Thomas Webb seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying his motion 

for a certificate of appealability and denying his motion for relief from the district court’s 

prior order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The orders are not appealable unless 

a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); 

United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 400 & n.7 (4th Cir. 2015). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by showing that reasonable jurists could find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 137 

S. Ct. 759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must show both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the 

motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 

565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Webb has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny his motion 

for judicial notice, and dismiss the appeals. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

USCA4 Appeal: 21-6540 Doc: 19 Filed: 07/22/2022 Pg: 3 of 3
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. §
1350

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2008 (the Form 10-K) of
Botetourt Bankshares, Inc. (the Company), we, H. Watts Steger, III, Chief Executive Officer and Michelle A. Alexander, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to our knowledge:



| | (a) | the Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (b) | the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods
presented in the Form 10-K.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|    |  |                              |  |                     
|--- |  | ---------------------------- |  | --------------------
|By: |  | /s/    H. WATTS STEGER,
III  |  | Date: March 26, 2009
|    |  | H. Watts Steger, III         |  |                     
|    |  | Chief Executive Officer      |  |                     
|    |  |                             
|By: |  | /s/    MICHELLE A.
ALEXANDER |  |                     
|    |  | Michelle A. Alexander        |  |                     
|    |  | Chief Financial Officer      |  |
#### FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA v. OCEAN CITY, N. J.

No. 6368.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Dec. 6, 1937.

For former opinion, see 91 F.2d 635.

MacCoy, Brittain, Evans- & Lewis, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Bourgeois & Coulomb, of Atlantic City, N. J., for appellee.

Before THOMPSON and BIGGS, Circuit Judges, and DICKINSON, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

In Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia v. Ocean City, N. J., 91 F.2d 635, our opinion concluded with the sentence: “The judgment of the court below is reversed.”

As was stated by this court in Kosak v. United States, 54 F.2d 72, a mandate which orders judgment reversed may imply a direction for a new trial. In the instant case we intended that the cause be resubmitted to a jury and therefore direct that our opinion and mandate be so construed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Investors
First-Staged Equity L.P. 1997 Second Quarter 10-QSB and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such 10-QSB filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000768834
<NAME> INVESTORS FIRST-STAGED EQUITY L.P.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           3,572
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       13
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                          47,077
<DEPRECIATION>                                  23,179
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  29,789
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                         46,722
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                    (19,423)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    29,789
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,729
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,796
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,189
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (373)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (373)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (1,348)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (373)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (22.70)<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
<F2>Multiplier is 1.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                   Exhibit 16
                        Letter of McGladrey & Pullen, LLP

<PAGE>


McGLadrey & Pullen
Certified Public Accountants

------------------------------


March 25, 2005


Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, D.C. 20549

Commissioners:

We have read Jacksonville Bancorp, Inc.'s statements included under paragraphs 2
and 3 of Item 9 in it's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ending 2004, and
we agree with such statements concerning our firm.


/s/  McGladrey & Pullen, LLP
----------------------------


McGladrey & Pullen, LLP
Champaign, Illinois
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

March 26, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

131784 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver (49) Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 131784 

 COA: 260065 

Genesee CC: 04-014477-FC 

TROY GRANT HALSTEAD,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's January 29, 

2007, order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order 

was entered erroneously. 

l0319 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

March 26, 2007 

 Clerk
#### EXCHANGE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. KIDWELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Inc., Respondent.

No. B-2651.

Supreme Court of Texas.

July 7, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 17, 1971.

Akin, Vial, Hamilton, Koch & Tubb, James A. Knox and Charles J. McGuire, Dallas, for petitioner.

Rain, Harrell, Emery, Young & Doke, Stan McMurry, Dallas, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The application for writ of error in this case is refused with the notation “no re*118versible error”. The court of civil appeals at 463 S.W.2d 465, construed two sections of the Uniform Commercial Code; Sec. 4.-406, Tex.Bus. & Com.Code, and Sec. 3.406, Tex.Bus. & Com.Code. As to the former, the court of civil appeals held that the trial court’s finding that the bank failed to exercise ordinary care in paying certain forged checks was supported by some evidence. The court therefore held that the depositor was not precluded from asserting a claim based upon the forgeries under Sec. 4.406(b). Our disposition of the application for writ of error in this case is not to be interpreted as approval or disapproval of the additional holding of the court of civil appeals that the “depositor is chargeable with a knowledge of such facts as an honest agent would acquire from an impartial examination” of the depositor’s monthly bank statement. That holding does not affect the judgment of the court of civil appeals.

Neither do we approve or disapprove the holding of the court of civil appeals under Section 3.406. The court of civil appeals held that “There is nothing in the record to suggest that * * * any officer of the company was guilty of negligence substantially contributing to [the forger’s] unfaithful conduct” so as to invoke this statute. 463 S.W.2d at 469. This holding may be logically incompatible with the court’s holding, under Section 4.406, that the company was charged with the knowledge of a hypothetical honest agent. We do not reach this issue, however, because the bank has not asserted appropriate points of error against the trial court’s finding that the bank’s payment of the forged checks was not in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. Under our construction of Section 3.406, a negligent depositor is not precluded from asserting a claim if he establishes that the bank’s payment of the forged checks was not in accordance with such standards.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-02-1998
<CASH>                                           1,694
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,046
<ALLOWANCES>                                       172
<INVENTORY>                                     25,473
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                42,712
<PP&E>                                          90,589
<DEPRECIATION>                                  29,500
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 104,890
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           10,632
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        11,809
<OTHER-SE>                                      52,025
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   104,890
<SALES>                                        102,186
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               102,186
<CGS>                                           57,251
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   88,429
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,302
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 12,455
<INCOME-TAX>                                     5,109
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              7,346
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     7,346
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.63
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.61
        

</TABLE>
EX-10.3(c)



 EXHIBIT 10.3(c) 

April 7, 2014 
 Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC 

522 Fifth Avenue, 13th Floor 
 New York, New York 10036 

 

			
	Re:	  	Ceres Managed Futures LLC: Amended Schedules 1 and 2 to the Alternative Investment Selling Agent Agreement

 Ladies and Gentlemen: 

Pursuant to paragraph 13(c) of the Alternative Investment Selling Agent Agreement dated November 12, 2013, as amended from time to time
(the “Agreement”), between, among others, Ceres Managed Futures LLC (“CMF”), the general partner of each of the limited partnerships listed on Schedule 1 thereto (each, a “Partnership,” and together, the
“Partnerships”), and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC (“MSSB”), CMF is hereby confirming that Schedules 1 and 2 to the Agreement are hereby deleted in their entirety and replaced with Schedules 1 and 2 attached
hereto. 
 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Agreement, by signing below MSSB hereby agrees to, acknowledges and accepts the
amendment of the Agreement, effective as of April 1, 2014. 







  Page
 2
 
  
 If the foregoing is
in accordance with your understanding of our discussions, kindly sign and return to us a counterpart hereof (by mail, facsimile or email) as soon as possible. 

 

					
	Sincerely,
		
		 	CERES MANAGED FUTURES LLC
			
		 	By:	 	 /s/ Alper Daglioglu

		 		 	Alper Daglioglu
		 		 	President and Director
		
		 	EACH PARTNERSHIP LISTED ON
		 	SCHEDULE 1 HERETO
			
		 	By:	 	Ceres Managed Futures LLC, the
		 		 	general partner of each Partnership
			
		 	By:	 	 /s/ Alper Daglioglu

		 		 	Alper Daglioglu
		 		 	President and Director


 Confirmed, accepted and agreed to: 
  

			
	MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY LLC
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Jeremy Beal

	Name:	 	Jeremy Beal
	Title:	 	Executive Director








  Page
 3
 
  
 SCHEDULE 1 

 

					
	 PARTNERSHIP
	  	 STATE AND DATE OF ORGANIZATION
	  	 EFFECTIVE DATE

	Fairfield Futures Fund L.P. II	  	New York; December 18, 2003	  	October 1, 2013








  Page
 4
 
  
 SCHEDULE 2 

 

			
	 PARTNERSHIP
	 	 ONGOING SELLING AGENT FEE

	Fairfield Futures Fund L.P. II	 	2.50% per year of the adjusted net assets of the Partnership (computed monthly by multiplying the adjusted net assets of the Partnership by 2.50% and dividing the result thereof by 12)1

  

	1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE SHEET AS
OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 AND THE STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS  FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED
SEPTEMBER  30,  1998 AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY  BY  REFERENCE  TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                              JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                      2,534,765
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 850,408
<ALLOWANCES>                                    5,900
<INVENTORY>                                 4,787,539
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            9,502,701
<PP&E>                                     13,546,725
<DEPRECIATION>                              3,227,532
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             19,824,555
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       6,317,791
<BONDS>                                     5,551,064
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                    9,179,764
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,224,064)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               19,824,555
<SALES>                                    36,850,121
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           36,850,121
<CGS>                                       8,151,181
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               8,151,181
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           26,328,707
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            372,628
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             1,997,605
<INCOME-TAX>                                  779,066 
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         1,218,539 
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                1,218,539
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .12
        




</TABLE>
#### Shurgour & Bacon Const. Co., Inc., Plaintiff, *v.*Empire Development Corp. et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Trial Term, Orleans County,

June 18, 1957.

*Brown, Kelly, Turner & Symons*for plaintiff.

*Francis L. Claus*and *Charles P. Maloney*for defendants.

Gteobge T. Vandermetjlen, J.

This is a motion by the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The complaint is quite difficult to summarize or to fit into any of the standard causes of action with which I am familiar. *696It alleges, in substance, that the defendants, pursuant to a conspiracy to destroy the plaintiff economically, caused damage to the plaintiff by: (1) inducing the plaintiff to enter into four construction contracts at low consideration by stating that cheaper construction work than the contract provided for would be acceptable; (2) refusing to pay for “extra work” performed by the plaintiff; (3) by willfully and maliciously refusing to make payments to the plaintiff provided by the construction contracts; (4) by hiring plaintiff’s superintendent; (5) by making false and malicious statements regarding plaintiff’s financial responsibility, honesty, etc.; (6) by pleading false defenses and counterclaims in a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action brought by the plaintiff; (7) by making false statements to induce plaintiff to settle its lien foreclosure actions. There are other acts and' conduct charged to the defendants, or to some of the defendants, in the complaint. In fact, the complaint impresses me as a sort of shotgun affair, spraying its charges of “improper”, “unlawful”, “intentional”, and ‘ ‘ malicious ’ ’ conduct over some 10 pages.

The defendants recently made a motion before Justice Noonan to require the plaintiff to serve an amended complaint, to make it more definite and certain and separately stating and numbering the causes of action. The motion was denied, the court deciding that only one cause of action was alleged. The court on that motion did not state what the one cause of action was but since the learned Justice quoted from the decision in *Ledwith*v. *Ignatius*(179 Misc. 394) I assume he considered conspiracy to be the one cause of action set forth. As was stated in *Keviczky*v. *Lorber*(290 N. Y. 297, 305), “ no branch of the law seems less clear than that of conspiracy.”

However, the plain question before me is whether or not the complaint alleges a cause of action. It is only necessary to determine whether any cause of action is pleaded, not how many causes of action are pleaded (see *Advance Music Corp.*v. *American Tobacco Co.,*296 N. Y. 79).

There is a cause of action. What kind of cause of action it may be or whether more than one, and whether or not it has been established as a matter of law can only be determined by the Trial Justice after he has heard the evidence.

The motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA Supreme Court No. DA 20-0322 TYLER JACK SNIDER, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE OF MONTANA, Respondent and Appellee. GRANT OF EXTENSION Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the Appellant is given an extension of time until October 28, 2020 to prepare, file, and serve the Appellant’s Opening brief.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 28 2020

09/28/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0322
EX-10.3



 Exhibit 10.3 (1 of 2) 

 
 



 
 April 16, 2014 

Mtro. Emilio R. Lozoya Austin 
 Director General 

Petróleos Mexicanos 
 Avenida Marina Nacional No. 329

 Torre Ejecutiva Piso 44 
 11311 México D.F. 

México 
 Dear Mtro. Lozoya Austin: 

We hereby consent to all references to our firm as set forth in the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Petróleos Mexicanos for the year ending
December 31, 2013 (the “Form 20-F”), under the heading “Exploration and Production (Reserves)”, and to the filing of our audit letter dated February 24, 2014, as an exhibit to the Form 20-F. We have audited the
estimates of proved oil, condensate, natural gas, and oil equivalent reserves owned by the United Mexican States (“Mexico”), as of January 1, 2014, for 29 fields located offshore Mexico in the Northeastern Marine Region. These
estimates were prepared by Pemex-Exploración y Producción in accordance with the reserves definitions of Regulation S-X Rule 4-10(a) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 

 

			
	Sincerely,
	
	NETHERLAND, SEWELL INTERNATIONAL, S. DE R.L. DE C.V.
		
	By:	 	




		 	Robert C. Barg, P.E.
		 	President


 TMS:ART 

1601 ELM STREET, SUITE 4500 —
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201-4754 — PH 214-969-5401 — FAX 214-969-5411 







 Exhibit 10.3 (2 of 2) 

 
 



 
 April 16, 2014 

Mtro. Emilio R. Lozoya Austin 
 Director General 

Petróleos Mexicanos 
 Avenida Marina Nacional No. 329

 Torre Ejecutiva Piso 44 
 11311 México D.F. 

México 
 Dear Mtro. Lozoya Austin: 

We hereby consent to all references to our firm as set forth in the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Petróleos Mexicanos for the year ending
December 31, 2013 (the “Form 20-F”), under the heading “Exploration and Production (Reserves)”, and to the filing of our audit letter dated February 24, 2014, as an exhibit to the Form 20-F. We have audited the
estimates of proved oil, condensate, natural gas, and oil equivalent reserves owned by the United Mexican States (“Mexico”), as of January 1, 2014, for 114 fields located onshore Mexico in the Southern Region. These estimates were
prepared by Pemex-Exploración y Producción in accordance with the reserves definitions of Regulation S-X Rule 4-10(a) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 

 

			
	Sincerely,
	
	NETHERLAND, SEWELL INTERNATIONAL, S. DE R.L. DE C.V.
		
	By:	 	




		 	Robert C. Barg, P.E.
		 	President


 TMS:ART 

1601 ELM STREET, SUITE 4500 —
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201-4754 — PH 214-969-5401 — FAX 214-969-5411