COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE L ORI W. W ILL V ICE C HANCELLOR L EONARD L. W ILLIAMS J USTICE C ENTER 500 N. K ING S TREET , S UITE 11400 W ILMINGTON , D ELAWARE 19801

- 3734 June 17, 2024
Joseph L. Christensen , Esquire Meg han M. Do ugherty, Esquire Christensen & Dougherty LLP 1201 N. Market St reet , Suite 1404 Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Robert L. Burns, Esquire Daniel E . Kaprow, Esquire Kyle H. Lachmund, Esquire Nicole M. Henry, Esquire Nicholas F. Mastria, Esquire Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. 920 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801

RE: William J. Brown v. Matterport, Inc., et al.
, C.A. N o

. 2021

- 0595

- LWW

Dear Counsel:
I write regarding plaintiff William J. Brown’s m otion for r econsideration
(the “Motion”)

. 1 Brown contends that th is court erred in fixing the rate of

post

- judgment interest applicable to damages awarded in a May 28, 2024
memorandum opinion. T hat decision set the rate of both pre

- and post

- judgment

interest at 5.25%. 2
Brown’s Motion is brought under Court of Chancery Rule 59(f). “To
succeed and obtain reargument, the moving party must demonstrate that the

1 Pl. William J. Brown’s Mot. for Recon s. with Respect to Post

- J

. Interest Rate (Dkt. 328 ) (“Mot.”).

2 Mem

. Op

. (Dkt. 327) 51.C.A. No. 2021

- 0595

- LWW

June 17, 2024 Page 2 of 3
Court’s decision was predicated upon a misunderstanding of a material fact or a misapplication of the law.” 3
Brown argues that in adopting a post

- judgment interest rate of 5.25%, I
“overlooked a controlling decision or principl e of law that would have a
controlling effect.” 4 He correctly states that 6 Del. C. § 2301 requires the rate of

post

- judgment interest to be based on the legal rate in effect when a judgment is

entered. 5 Based on that rule, he implores me to reconsider adopting the same rate
for both pre

- and post

-

judgment interest.
Brown would have a point if I had yet to enter a judgment. But I granted a
partial final judgment on Count I

— the claim for which he was awarded damages

— on January 12, 2022
, after the phase one trial. 6 The F ederal D iscount R ate on the

date of that partial judgment was 0.25% , which happens to be the same rate that
applied on November 22, 2021 when pre

- judgment interest began to accrue. 7 The

3 Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal , 2008 WL 2721743, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2008) (citation omitted), aff’d , 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009) (TABLE).

4 Mot. ¶ 2 (quoting Pharmerica Long Term Care Inc. v. New Castle RX, LLC , 2010 WL 5130746, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2010)).

5 See Noranda Aluminum H ld g

. Corp. v. XL Ins. Am., Inc. , 269 A.3d 974, 979 (Del. 2021) (holding that Section 2301(a) “unambiguously requires that post

- judgment interest accrue at the legal rate that was in effect on the date of judgment”).

6 Order and Partial Final J

. (Dkt. 12 5 ).

7 Nasdaq, Federal Discount Rate (DISC) Historical Data , https://www.nasdaq.com /

mar ke t

- activity /fixed

- income /disc/historical ?page=7&rows _per_page=100&timeline=y5 (last visited June 1 6 , 2024).C.A. No. 2021

- 0595

- LWW

June 17, 2024 Page 3 of 3
final order I have yet to enter concerns the amount of damages for th e prior partial
judgment and judgment in Matterport’s favor on the remaining counts. 8

Post

- judgment interest was therefore appropriately set based on the date of
judgment on Count I . No controlling principle of law was overlooked. The

Motion is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Lori W. Will

Lori W. Will Vice Chancellor

8 I nterest rates have risen dramatically since the phase one partial fina l judgment. See supra note 7 (reflecting that the current Federal Discount Rate is 5.50%). T o separate the date for setting p ost

-

judgment interest from the date that judgment was entered would risk inter est rate arbitrage.