alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [FEMA-1794-DR]

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of Mississippi (FEMA-1794-DR), dated September 22, 2008, and related determinations.

# DATES:

*Effective Date:*                         October 3, 2008.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peggy Miller, Disaster Assistance Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-3886.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of Mississippi is hereby amended to include the following areas among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by the catastrophe declared a major disaster by the President in his declaration of September 22, 2008.

Adams and Wilkinson Counties for Individual Assistance (already designated for Public Assistance).

                        (The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households in Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050 Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036; Disaster Grants—Public Assistance                               ( print page 60309)                            (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.)                    

R. David Paulison,

Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. E8-24088 Filed 10-9-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
#### In the Matter of the Accounting of Poughkeepsie Trust Co., as Executor of F. Eugene Davis, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Dutchess County,

April 26, 1957.

*Albert J. Drake*for executor.

W. Vincent Grady, S.

A petition having been filed with this court by the Poughkeepsie Trust Co., as executor of the will of the above-named decedent praying for the final judicial settlement of its accounts as such, and requesting that the court construe paragraph “SECOND” of said will which states: “ I give and bequeath to my friend, Austin McEntee, now residing at 9 Case Court, in the City of Poughkeepsie, Dutchess County, New York, my Chevrolet automobile. If at the time of my death, I no longer own such Chevrolet automobile, then I give and bequeath to him the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00).” And the executor having appeared by Drake *&*Drake, Esqs., with Albert J. Drake, Esq., of counsel, of Poughkeepsie, New York, and after hearing argument on behalf of the executor, and there being no other appearances, and after having had due deliberation thereon, the court decides and finds as follows:

It appears from the petition filed for judicial settlement under paragraph numbered VI, that the decedent at the time of drawing his will on March 22, 1955 owned a 1951 Chevrolet automobile, and that prior to his death, he sold said automobile and purchased a 1956 Chevrolet automobile which was one of his personal assets at the time of his decease.

The sole question to be determined by the court is whether under the will of decedent, he intended Austin McEntee to receive the Chevrolet automobile he owned when he made his will, or the Chevrolet automobile that he owned at the time of his death.

The general rule is that a will speaks as of the date of death, but, from the ordinary use of the word “ such ”, meaning *955“ before mentioned,” the court concludes that testator intended to give Mr. McEntee that particular automobile owned by him at the time of drawing his will, or in the event that he sold the same, then Mr. McEntee was to get the sum of $500, and the court so construes the intent of testator.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 99-41374 Summary Calendar

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MIKE TORRES,

Defendant-Appellant,

_________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas USDC No. L-98-CR-830-1

_________________________________________________________________
October 26, 2000

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Mike Torres appeals his conviction a fter a jury trial of

possession with intent to distribute marihuana. He argues that the

evidence was insufficien t to support his conviction. In

particular, he contends that the evidence did not establish that he

knew of the marihuana hidden in the tires of the pickup truck he

was driving.2

We review the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction

to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found

that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia

, 443 U. S. 307, 318 (1979). It is the sole

province of the jury to determine the weight and credibility of the

evidence. U nited States v. Casilla , 20 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir.

1994). “It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. But, there must be substantial

e vidence to uphold the verdict of the jury.” U nited States v

.
Espinoza-Seanez

, 862 F.2d 526, 536 (5th Cir. 1988) (citations

omitted). The evidence must be construed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution. U nited States v. Lombardi

, 138 F.3d

559, 560 (5th Cir. 1998).

Considering the t otality of the circumstances, we find that

the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable juror’s finding

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. S ee United States v. R esioTrejo

, 45 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. OlivierBecerril , 861 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1988).

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998             DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998             DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           2,001                   2,924
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   25,060                  20,102
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (320)                   (320)
<INVENTORY>                                     73,565                  77,594
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               104,455                 104,545
<PP&E>                                           9,671                   9,214
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (2,305)                 (2,133)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 124,155                 124,002
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           88,047                  88,732
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            3,478                   3,439
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                             0                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,188                   6,563
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   124,155                 124,002
<SALES>                                        160,617                 474,048
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               160,617                 474,048
<CGS>                                          136,199                 407,074
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  136,199                 407,074
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,071                   5,340
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,290                     510
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (555)                   (446)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                735                      64
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                       735                      64
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.04                  (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.04                  (0.01)
        

</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 2 3 , 2020

s0318 

# Order

Clerk March 2 3 , 2020

160109

- 10 & (51)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee/Cross

- Appellant,

v SC: 160109

- 10

COA: 340464, 340465

Wayne CC: 17

- 003086

- FC;

17

- 003087

- FC

PERRY STANLEY,

Defendant

- Appellant/Cross

- Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On orde r of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 25, 2019

judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as cross

appellant are considered, and they are DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the

questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

M ARKMAN

, J., would grant leave to appeal as to the prosecutor’s cross

- appeal in

Docket No. 160110 to assess whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain

defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery.
#### Earl Wayne POWELL, Petitioner, v. Cass R. WALDEN and Commonwealth of Kentucky, Respondents.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Nov. 19, 1971.

Cecil C. Wilson, Wilson, Herbert, Gar-rnon & Gillenwater, Glasgow, for petition-

John B. Breckinridge, Atty. Gen., George F. Rabe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for respondents.

GARDNER, Commissioner.

Petitioner is under indictment of the Barren Circuit Court on two counts charging illegal possession of dangerous drugs for the purpose of sale and simple illegal possession of dangerous drugs. He is asking this court to prohibit the circuit judge from proceeding with the trial. His argument is novel and without merit.

KRS 217.995(9) provides: “The circuit court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all prosecutions under this Act, except prosecutions within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Since the statute provides that the circuit court shall have *exclusive jurisdiction,*petitioner contends that the issuance of the search warrant, the arrest of the petitioner, and the conducting of.the examining trial were illegal because the proceedings took place in the Barren Quarterly Court.

The only plausible interpretation of the phrase “exclusive jurisdiction” is that the circuit court shall be the only tribunal to conduct the trial of the case. The statute precludes the quarterly court, which under other statutes would have triable jurisdiction of misdemeanors, from trying any case under this statute. To interpret the statute as meaning the quarterly court cannot conduct the usual preliminary proceedings is to read into it something that simply is not there. Petitioner cites no pertinent authority upholding his position.

Petitioner also contends that if the circuit judge is not prohibited from trying the case he will receive irreparable injury because the “exclusive” provision would *148preclude his right of appeal. This contention is also entirely without merit.

The motion for an order of prohibition is denied.

All concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 15.1



Cross Timbers Oil Company:

We are aware that Cross Timbers Oil Company has incorporated by reference in
its Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 33-65238, 33-81766, 333-35229,
333-36569, 333-68775, 333-69977, 333-35830-01 and 333-81849), on Form S-3
(No. 333-46909) of Cross Timbers Oil Company, on Form S-3 (No. 333-56983) of
Cross Timbers Oil Company and Cross Timbers Royalty Trust, and on Form S-3 of
Cross Timbers Oil Company and Form S-1 of Texas Permian Trust (No. 333-85777)
its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2000, which includes our
report dated October 21, 2000, covering the unaudited interim financial
information contained therein. Pursuant to Regulation C of the Securities Act of
1933, that report is not considered a part of the registration statement
prepared or certified by our firm or a report prepared or certified by our firm
within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the Act.



ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Fort Worth, Texas
November 14, 2000
#### John A. Walsh, Doing Business under the Name of Walsh Plumbing & Heating Supply Co., Plaintiff, *v.*Boulder Apartments, Inc., et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Westchester County,

December 7, 1956.

*William F. Horan*and *Alexander J. Broivn*for plaintiff.

*Harold M. Edwards*for Bronxville-Devon Corp., defendant.

Samuel W. Eager, J.

This is a motion by a general contractor to vacate demands by a materialman for statements pursuant to section 36-d of the Lien Law.' The general con*654tractor claims that the materialman furnished the materials to a subcontractor; that there is no privity of contract between it (the general contractor) and the materialman; that there is no payment due directly by it to the materialman; and that, therefore, the materialman is not a person entitled to demand a statement from it under subdivision (4) of section 36-d of the Lien Law.

There is an action pending in this court by the materialman to foreclose his liens. In such action personal judgment is requested against the general contractor in the event the liens are held invalid. By answering affidavit, on this motion, the materialman claims that certain of the materials furnished by him were requested personally by the general contractor because the subcontractor had fallen down on the job and because the general contractor took over the completion of the plumbing work. The materialman also claims payment due directly from the general contractor by virtue of assignment of moneys owing by it to the subcontractor. Thus, we have on this motion disputed issues as to whether or not there is a payment due directly by the general contractor to the materialman.

In any event, the motion is to be and is denied. There is no specific authority for this motion (see *Matter of Rafuse,*274 App. Div. 944), and, while this court may have power to render an order in the pending action binding upon the parties with relation to the subject matter, the court should never act to vacate a demand under section 36-d of the Lien Law where the right to such relief would require the summary resolving of issues of fact in the favor of the applicant.

Settle order on notice.
---

Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 302 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Jon R. Young, of Liberty Star Uranium & Metals Corp.
(formerly Liberty Star Gold Corp.), certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Liberty
Star Uranium & Metals Corp. (formerly Liberty Star Gold Corp.);

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the consolidated financial
statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly
present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;

4. The company's other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and
have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls
and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed
under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the
company's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,
as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change
in the company's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during
the period covered by this annual report that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the company's internal control over
financial reporting; and

5. The company's other certifying officer(s) and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the company's auditors and the audit committee of the
company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material,
that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the
company's internal control over financial reporting.

Date: April 28, 2008



/s/ Jon YoungJon
Young Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting
Officer)

---
#### The State, ex rel. Ellsworth, Exr., *v.*Mong, County Auditor, et al.

(No. 25432

Decided March 4, 1936.)

*Messrs. Morris S McVeigh, Messrs. Squire, Sanders S Dempsey, Mr. Robert F. Denison, Mr. W. Lowric Fleming, Mr. Otis B. Bosworth*and *Mr. John B. Dempsey,*for relator.

*Mr. Herman E. Werner,*prosecuting attorney, *Mr. Robert Pflueger, Mr. Wade DeWoody,*director of law, *Mr. Nathan Koplm*and *Mr. H. A. Sullivan,*for respondents.

By the Court.

This action is an original one seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the Auditor of Summit county to issue a warrant upon the County Treasurer in the sum of $34,505.77 as a refund of overpaid inheritance taxes. All the material allegations of the petition are admitted in the answer, and the *484relator has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in his favor.

Defendants contend that Sections 5339 and 5348-12, General Code, which provide for such refund (called in the statutes a “refunder”) are in contravention of Article XII, Section 9 of the state Constitution, which provides that not less than fifty per centum of inheritance taxes that may be collected by the state shall be returned to the county, school district, city, village or township in which said inheritance tax originates, or to any of the same, as may be provided by law, and also in contravention of Article I, Sections 1 and 19, of the state Constitution, and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, which guarantee the right of private property.

The intent of the inheritance tax law is that inheritance taxes shall be paid promptly with right of refund of such an amount thereof as may later lawfully appear to be overpaid. The tax is computed on the net balance and often after payment further deductions come to light which may be cared for -by refund.

Under the laws of Ohio one-half of the refund was chargeable to the state of Ohio and the remaining one-half to the village of Hudson. The portion chargeable to the state has actually been refunded. This action relates to the half chargeable to the village, decedent’s place of residence.

Nothing in the sections of the General Code referred to is in violation of these constitutional provisions as claimed. There is no vested right to inheritance taxes which have been paid and distributed to the state or a subdivision thereof, such as prevents a refund of payments in excess of those warranted by law.

*485
      *'*The relator is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, and a -writ of mandamus will be issued as prayed for.

*Writ allowed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Stephenson, Williams, Matthias, Day and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.

Jones, J., not participating.