IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

December 10, 2014 Session

TYRONE CHALMERS v. WAYNE CARPENTER, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 14180IV Russell T. Perkins, Judge

________________________________

 No. M2014-01126-COA-R3-CV – Filed August 4, 2016

_________________________________

Capital defendant brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution, 

asserting that he meets the statutory criteria of being intellectually disabled and, therefore, is 

ineligible to be sentenced to death. Defendants, the warden of the institution where he is 

incarcerated and the Tennessee Attorney General, moved to dismiss the complaint on the 

grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the suit was barred by the 

doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that the suit failed to state a claim for relief. The trial 

court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Finding no error, we affirm the holding of 

the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

RICHARD H. DINKINS,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D.BENNETT and 

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.

Paul Bruno, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tyrone Chalmers.

Herbert H. Slatery, II, Attorney General and Reporter; Scott C. Sutherland and Nicholas W. 

Spangler, Assistant Attorneys General, for the appellees, Wayne Carpenter, et al.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Tyrone Chalmers was convicted of first degree felony murder and sentenced to death 

in the Shelby County Criminal Court on June 18, 1997. The Tennessee Supreme Court 
2

affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied 

review. Numerous post-conviction and error coram nobis proceedings, as well as a federal 

habeas corpus proceeding, have been denied.1

On February 10, 2014, Mr. Chalmers filed a declaratory judgment action in the 

Davidson County Chancery Court naming Wayne Carpenter, Warden of Riverbend 

Maximum Security Institution, and Robert E. Cooper, Jr., then the Tennessee Attorney 

General (“Defendants”), in their official and individual capacities, as defendants.2 Mr. 

Chalmers sought a declaration that he was ineligible for the death penalty because he met the 

intellectual disability criteria at Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a), and that his execution 

would violate the Tennessee and federal constitutions. The Complaint also sought a 

permanent injunction of the execution. 3

 

1

 See State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. 2000); Chalmers v. State, No. W2003-02759-CCA-R3-PC, 

2005 WL 1249072, (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2005), no perm. app. filed; Chalmers v. State, No. W2006-

00424-CCA-R3-PD, 2008 WL 2521224 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 22, 

2008); Chalmers v. State, No. W2013-02317-CCA-R3-PD, 2014 WL 2993863 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 

2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2014); Chalmers v. State, No. W2013-02329-CCA-R28-PD, (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 15, 2014).

2

 During the pendency of this case, a new Attorney General took office, Herbert Slatery III. “[W]hen a state 

official sued in his official capacity dies or leaves office during the pendency of the action, „the officer‟s 

successor is automatically substituted as a party.‟” Hamilton v. Cook, No. 02A01-9712-CV-00324, 1998 WL 

704528, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1998) (citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.04(1)).

3

 In 1990, the Tennessee General Assembly passed Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203, which prohibited the 

execution of a defendant convicted of first degree murder who had an intellectual disability at the time of 

committing the offense from being executed. Subsection (a) of the statute defines intellectual disability as 

follows:

(1) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional 

intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below;

(2) Deficits in adaptive behavior; and

(3) The intellectual disability must have been manifested during the developmental period, or 

by eighteen (18) years of age.

In 2001, the Tennessee Supreme Court determined that the federal and state constitutions prohibit the 

execution of persons who are intellectually disabled. See Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 812 (Tenn. 2001). 

Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court declared that the federal constitution prohibited the 

execution of the intellectually disabled. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
3

Counts 1 through 3 of the complaint were brought under the Declaratory Judgment 

Act and sought the following declarations:

(1) Tyrone Chalmers meets the criteria for intellectual disability as that 

term is defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a), and he did so on 

August 20, 1994;

(2) Any application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-116 to Tyrone Chalmers 

would violate Article I §§ 8 and 16 of the Tennessee Constitution and 

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution; and

(3) Any execution of Tyrone Chalmers would violate Article I, §§ 8 and 16 

of the Tennessee Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Count 4 of the complaint, based on Article I, §§ 8 and 16 of the Tennessee 

Constitution, and Count V, based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution,sought to have the court determine that he met the criteria for intellectual 

disability at Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a) on August 20, 1994, and to permanently enjoin 

his execution.

Defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Chalmers‟ Complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 

12.01(1) and (6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the criminal court had 

exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, and on the basis of sovereign immunity. 

The court entered an order on May 12, 2014, granting the motion and dismissing the 

case. Mr. Chalmers appeals, contending that the chancery court had subject matter 

jurisdiction to consider whether Mr. Chalmers meets the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a) 

intellectual disability criteria and that the sovereign immunity doctrine does not shield 

Defendants from Mr. Chalmers‟ suit.

I. DISCUSSION

In a related case, Pervis Tyrone Payne v. Wayne Carpenter, et. al, M2014-00688-

COA-R3-CV, this court discussed whether the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction 

to make the determination whether Mr. Payne was intellectually disabled. We held in that 

case that it did not. The issues raised by Mr. Chalmers are the same as those resolved in 
4

Payne, and we therefore adopt the rationale and the holding in Payne, which we set forth 

below:

A. Sovereign Immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity, derived from Article I, Section 17 

of the Tennessee Constitution[

4

] and codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-

102(a),[

5

] prohibits suits against the state, including state officers acting in 

their official capacities, unless specifically authorized by statute. See Colonial 

Pipeline Company v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 848-49 (Tenn. 2008). 

Sovereign immunity, however, does not bar suits to prevent state officers from 

enforcing a statute which is alleged to be unconstitutional; in those incidences 

the officials do not act under the authority of the state, i.e., their actions are 

ultra vires. Id. at 849-52 (citing Stockton v. Morris & Pierce, 110 S.W.2d 480 

(Tenn. 1937)). 

Mr. [Chalmers] does not allege that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 is 

unconstitutional; he contends that Colonial Pipeline does not limit the ultra 

vires exception to sovereign immunity to cases which allege that a statute is 

unconstitutional, but that the exception “applies any time a lawsuit asserts that 

a State official acted or threatened to act outside the scope of his authority.” 

Mr. [Chalmers] alleges that he is mentally disabled as defined in the statute 

and, as a consequence, the Defendants will act outside the scope of their 

authority if they execute him. 

 

4

 [Footnote 6 in original] Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution states:

That all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, 

person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice 

administered without sale, denial, or delay. Suits may be brought against the State in such 

manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.

5

 [Footnote 7 in original] Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a) provides:

No court in the state shall have any power, jurisdiction or authority to entertain any suit 

against the state, or against any officer of the state acting by authority of the state, with a view 

to reach the state, its treasury, funds or property, and all such suits shall be dismissed as to the 

state or such officers, on motion, plea or demurrer of the law officer of the state, or counsel 

employed for the state.
5

We find nothing in Colonial Pipeline to support this proposition; to the 

contrary, Colonial Pipeline clearly and unambiguously held that the ultra vires

exception articulated in Stockton “pertains only to suits preventing the 

enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.” Id., 263 S.W.3d at 850. Colonial 

Pipeline held that the Declaratory Judgment Act grants a court subject matter 

jurisdiction to address constitutional issues and, as necessary, “issue 

declaratory or injunctive relief against the Defendants in their individual 

capacity, so long as the court’s judgment is tailored to prevent the 

implementation of unconstitutional legislation and does not „reach the state, its 

treasury, funds, or property,‟” and sovereign immunity is not waived in a 

declaratory judgment action. 263 S.W.3d at 853 (internal citation omitted; 

emphasis added). The allegation that the official is enforcing an 

unconstitutional statute is a threshold requirement to remove the immunity; 

that threshold is not met here.

The Defendants in this case were sued in their official and individual 

capacities. The only factual allegation relative to Defendant Carpenter is that 

he is the warden of Riverbend Maximum Security Institution and, since 

prisoners are executed at Riverbend, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-116 “requires 

Warden Carpenter to cause Mr. [Chalmers]‟s death.”[

6

] The only allegation 

relative to Defendant Cooper is that he held the position of the Attorney 

General and Reporter for the State of Tennessee. These allegations, in the 

absence of a claim that the statute being enforced is unconstitutional, are not 

sufficient to state a claim against the defendants in their individual capacity for 

the purposes of granting relief to Mr. [Chalmers]. Accordingly, we affirm the 

trial court‟s holding that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity. 

 

6

 [Footnote 8 in original] Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-116(a)(2012) states: 

In all cases in which the sentence of death has been passed upon any person by the courts of 

this state, it is the duty of the sheriff of the county in which the sentence of death has been 

passed to remove the person so sentenced to death from that county to the state penitentiary in 

which the death chamber is located, within a reasonable time before the date fixed for the 

execution of the death sentence in the judgment and mandate of the court pronouncing the 

death sentence. On the date fixed for the execution in the judgment and mandate of the court, 

the warden of the state penitentiary in which the death chamber is located shall cause the 

death sentence to be carried out within an enclosure to be prepared for that purpose in strict 

seclusion and privacy. . . . 
6

Even though we have determined that sovereign immunity bars this suit, 

we will address whether the Davidson County Chancery Court had subject 

matter jurisdiction to consider whether Mr. [Chalmers] meets the intellectual 

disability criteria found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Determine Intellectual Disability

“Whether a particular court can decide certain matters is a question of subject 

matter jurisdiction.” P.E.K. v. J.M., 52 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2001). “Tennessee‟s courts derive subject matter jurisdiction from the state 

constitution or from legislative acts.” Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 739 

(Tenn. 2004). “Courts may not exercise jurisdictional powers that have not 

been conferred on them directly or by necessary implication.” Id. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-101 grants chancery courts “all the powers, 

privileges and jurisdiction properly and rightfully incident to a court of 

equity”; Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-102 adds subject matter jurisdiction, 

concurrent with the circuit courts, over all civil cases with certain exceptions. 

Exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction over all crimes and 

misdemeanors is vested in circuit courts pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10-

102 “unless otherwise expressly provided by statute.” 

Criminal offenses are codified in Title 39 of the Tennessee Code; part 2 

of chapter 13 governs criminal homicide. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-201 

defines criminal homicide and § 39-13-202 defines and prescribes the 

punishment for first degree murder, including death, life imprisonment without 

the possibility of parole, and life imprisonment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 

prohibits defendants with an intellectual disability at the time first degree 

murder was committed from being sentenced to death, with “[t]he 

determination of whether the defendant had an intellectual disability. . . [to] be 

made by the court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 provides that sentencing 

for first degree murder is to be fixed by the jury in a separate sentencing 

hearing, and sets forth the procedures to be used in the hearing and the 

requirement that the judge instruct the jury orally and in writing to weigh and 

consider the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in fixing 

punishment. Criminal procedure is codified in Title 40, chapter 1, which 

governs jurisdiction and venue. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-108 circuit 

and criminal courts “have original jurisdiction over all matters not exclusively 

conferred by law on some other tribunal.” 
7

In addition to the absence of any statute vesting subject matter 

jurisdiction in the chancery courts to adjudicate any aspect of Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 39-13-203, the determination of whether the defendant had an intellectual 

disability at the time of the offense is a part of the prosecution and sentencing 

processes; the statute directs that the determination is to be made by “the 

court.” We do not agree with Mr. [Chalmers] that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-

203 limits the criminal court‟s exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to the point 

where “the prosecution has concluded.” Construed together, the relevant 

statutes operate as a further limitation on the chancery court‟s exercise of 

subject matter jurisdiction over this case.[

7

] In any event, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 

16-10-102 and 40-1-108 require that the grant of subject matter jurisdiction to 

the chancery court be express; there is no such express grant in the intellectual 

disability statute. 

Payne v. Carpenter, M2014-00688-COA-R3-CV, WL (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 

2, 2016).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Davidson County Chancery Court is 

affirmed. 

RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE

 

7

 [Footnote 9 in original] As noted in Tennessee Downs, Inc. v. William L. Gibbons:

Courts of equity are not constituted to deal with crime and criminal proceedings. If the law be 

held valid, they cannot punish the complainant for the offenses committed, or compensate 

those injured by his wrongful action while the hands of the officers of the law are stayed by 

injunction. The exercise of the jurisdiction contended for would greatly confuse and 

embarrass the enforcement of the police power, and, upon sound principles of public policy, it 

ought not to be favored.

15 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting J.W. Kelly & Co. v. Conner, 123 S.W. 622, 635, (1909).