[Cite as Steiner v. Piero-Silagy, 2017-Ohio-7669.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

VICKI A. STEINER : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

 : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

ANNE PIERO-SILAGY, ESQ., : 

GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE : 

OF DELORES A. HOUCHIN : Case No. 2017CA00050 

UNDER STARK COUNTY PROBATE : 

CASE NO. 224336 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 2016CV00371 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: September 18, 2017 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

JOHN V. BOGGINS JOHN J. RAMBACHER 

1428 Market Avenue North MICHAEL J. KAHLENBERG 

Canton, OH 44714-2616 825 South Main Street 

 North Canton, OH 44720 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 2 

Wise, Earle, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Vicki Steiner, appeals the March 27, 2017 judgment 

entry of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio finding in favor of DefendantAppellee, Anne Piero-Silagy, Esq., Guardian of the Estate of Delores A. Houchin, on her 

action in quiet title. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} In 1985, appellant and her former husband purchased a 12.09 acre parcel 

of vacant land in Nimishillen Township. In 1988, they refinanced and constructed a 

home on the property. In 1992, the marriage was dissolved and appellant refinanced 

the property to pay her former husband in exchange for a quitclaim deed for his interest 

in the property. 

{¶ 3} In 2011, appellant sought to refinance the property and obtain a separate 

equity line of credit and made application with American First Bancorp, Inc. American 

First required a cosigner. Appellant's mother, Delores Houchin, agreed to cosign. At 

the closing on August 16, 2011, American First presented a quitclaim deed to appellant 

and Ms. Houchin for both of them to sign which they did, placing both of their names on 

the deed to the property. The deed was recorded on August 22, 2011. Appellant and 

her mother received a loan of $90,000.00 from American First and an equity line of 

credit loan in the amount of $78,000.00 from U.S. Bank National Association N.D. 

{¶ 4} On February 7, 2013, the Stark County Probate Court found Ms. Houchin 

incompetent by reason of mental and physical disabilities resulting in impairment and 

appointed a guardian for her. On September 1, 2015, the Probate Court appointed 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 3 

appellee as Ms. Houchin's guardian. Appellee, on behalf of Ms. Houchin, claimed an 

equity in the property. 

{¶ 5} On February 16, 2016, appellant filed an action in quiet title, claiming the 

quitclaim conveyance was an accommodation only and the parties intended appellant 

alone remain the equitable and legal owner of the property. 

{¶ 6} On November 15, 2016, appellee filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings and/or to dismiss, claiming appellant failed to file requisite title evidence, 

failed to furnish a summary report of her expert, failed to join necessary and 

indispensable parties, and failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On 

December 2, 2016, appellant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming genuine 

issues of material fact did not exist. By judgment entry filed December 14, 2016, the 

trial court denied appellee's motion. By judgment entry filed January 30, 2017, the trial 

court denied appellant's motion. 

{¶ 7} A bench trial was held on March 7, 2017. Findings of fact and conclusions 

of law were filed on March 22, 2017. By judgment entry filed March 27, 2017, the trial 

court ruled in favor of appellee, finding appellant did not meet her burden under her 

quiet title claim. 

{¶ 8} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for 

consideration. Assignments of error are as follows: 

I 

{¶ 9} "THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING 

THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHERE THE 

DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, IN HER REPLY TO THE PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLANT'S 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 4 

MOTION, SUBMITTED NO ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO 

PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY CIV.R. 56. BECAUSE 

THE ONLY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT WAS THAT OF THE 

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT VICKI STEINER, SHE WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A 

MATTER OF LAW." 

II 

{¶ 10} "THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 

AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, AS THE COURT 

DREW AN IMPROPER INFERENCE THAT DOLORES HOUCHIN EXPECTED TO BE 

JOINED IN TITLE BECAUSE SHE CONTRIBUTED FINANCIALLY TO HER 

DAUGHTER VICKI, WHERE THE ONLY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT WAS 

THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN VICKI STEINER AND HER 

MOTHER TO CONVEY A ONE-HALF INTEREST IN VICKI'S HOME IN EXCHANGE 

FOR HER MOTHER'S FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE." 

III 

{¶ 11} "THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY BASING ITS 

DECISION UPON THE INFERENCE THAT DOLORES HOUCHIN WISHED TO BE 

JOINED IN TITLE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, AND 

UPON THIS INFERENCE THEN CONCLUDING DOLORES WISHED TO BE NAMED 

CO-GRANTEE IN EXCHANGE FOR PAST AND FUTURE FINANCIAL 

CONTRIBUTIONS TO HER DAUGHTER VICKI." 

{¶ 12} Appellee filed a cross-appeal and assigns the following error: 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 5 

CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

{¶ 13} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS." 

I 

{¶ 14} In Assignment of Error I, appellant claims the trial court erred in denying 

her motion for summary judgment. We disagree. 

{¶ 15} As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Continental Insurance Co. v. 

Whittington, 71 Ohio St.3d 150, 642 N.E.2d 615 (1994), syllabus: "Any error by a trial 

court in denying a motion for summary judgment is rendered moot or harmless if a 

subsequent trial on the same issues raised in the motion demonstrates that there were 

genuine issues of material fact supporting a judgment in favor of the party against whom 

the motion was made." 

{¶ 16} Based on our review of the record, as further set forth infra, we find 

genuine issues of material fact favoring appellee were presented at trial; therefore, we 

find the Continental holding to be applicable in this case. 

{¶ 17} Assignment of Error I is denied. 

II, III 

{¶ 18} In Assignments of Error II and III, appellant claims the trial court erred in 

ruling in favor of appellee. We disagree. 

{¶ 19} Specifically, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion, the 

decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the trial court based its 

decision on the improper inference that Ms. Houchin intended to be joined in title 

because there was no evidence to the contrary. 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 6 

{¶ 20} In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine the trial court's 

decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable and not merely an error of law 

or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶ 21} On review for manifest weight, the standard in a civil case is identical to 

the standard in a criminal case: a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh 

the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and 

determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury [or finder of fact] 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

[decision] must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 

172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). In State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990), the 

Supreme Court of Ohio explained the following: 

 Weight of the evidence concerns "the inclination of the greater 

amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the 

issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party 

having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing 

the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible 

evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. 

Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in 

inducing belief." (Emphasis sic.) 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 7 

{¶ 22} In weighing the evidence, however, we are always mindful of the 

presumption in favor of the trial court's factual findings. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio 

St .3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517. 

{¶ 23} R.C. 5303.01 governs action to quiet title and states the following: 

 An action may be brought by a person in possession of real 

property, by himself or tenant, against any person who claims an interest 

therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse 

interest. Such action may be brought also by a person out of possession, 

having, or claiming to have, an interest in remainder or reversion in real 

property, against any person who claims to have an interest therein, 

adverse to him, for the purpose of determining the interests of the parties 

therein. 

{¶ 24} Appellant's position was that the quitclaim deed was executed at the 

behest of American First to complete the loan transaction and in no way did the parties 

intend for Ms. Houchin to have an ownership interest in the property; therefore, 

appellant is entitled to quiet title. In her March 6, 2017 trial brief at 4, appellant noted 

the trial court "most certainly has the authority to impose a constructive trust" for her 

benefit. 

{¶ 25} Appellee argues by virtue of the quitclaim deed voluntarily signed by 

appellant, Ms. Houchin and appellant became tenants in common and Ms. Houchin is a 

one-half owner of the property under R.C. 5302.19 which states in pertinent part: "if any 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 8 

interest in real property is conveyed or devised to two or more persons, such persons 

hold title as tenants in common and the joint interest created is a tenancy in common." 

{¶ 26} It is undisputed appellant voluntarily signed the quitclaim deed, adding her 

mother as a record owner of the property. What is disputed is that appellant was 

"forced" by American First to sign the deed and it was not the parties' intention to have 

Ms. Houchin be a one-half owner of the property. 

{¶ 27} Appellant testified American First required a cosigner on the refinance and 

the equity line of credit because her debt to income ratio was too high. T. at 15. Her 

mother agreed to be the cosigner. T. at 16. During the closing on the loan, American 

First presented appellant with a quitclaim deed to add Ms. Houchin on the title. T. at 17-

18; Plaintiff's Exhibit H. The deed was prepared by Attorney John Wargo from Berea. 

T. at 18. Appellant did not know this attorney and never had any dealings with him. Id. 

Although appellant testified she wanted to "get up and walk" and she should have, she 

signed the deed because obtaining the loan cut her house payment nearly in half. T. at 

14, 18-19. She felt she did not have any choice but to sign the deed. T. at 24-25. She 

acknowledged she had gone to another bank, but she thought the closing costs were 

excessive. T. at 19, 65. Appellant testified at no time was there an understanding 

between her and her mother that she was giving half of the property to her in exchange 

for anything she did. T. at 22-23, 66. Appellant never intended that her mother would 

"be an actual owner of this property and have an interest in it." T. at 25. Appellant was 

aware of what quitclaim deeds were, as she executed one after her divorce. T. at 11-

12, 41; Plaintiff's Exhibit D. Appellant testified she never took any action to remove her 

mother from the title afterwards because "family chaos ensued and it went to the back 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 9 

of the burner with my dad." T. at 41-42. She then explained she did attempt to remove 

her mother from the deed and went to another attorney, accompanied by her sister, but 

those efforts were unsuccessful because the situation was "this big legal mess." T. at 

42-43. 

{¶ 28} Unfortunately, due to her incompetence, Ms. Houchin was unable to 

testify. Appellant did not present any evidence or testimony from anyone from 

American First that it required Ms. Houchin be placed on the title. T. at 61. 

{¶ 29} William Sparks, an attorney called by appellant, testified on crossexamination the deed identified the record owners of the property as appellant and her 

mother, as tenants in common, giving each party an undivided half interest in the 

property. T. at 68, 75-76. Mr. Sparks agreed the stated consideration of ten dollars in 

the deed for the transfer was legally sufficient consideration. T. at 81. 

{¶ 30} On cross-examination, appellant admitted that after the appointment of a 

guardian, she took her mother to the bank and $9,059.50 was withdrawn from Ms. 

Houchin's account. T. at 52-53, 55. Also, Ms. Houchin helped appellant financially, with 

appellant receiving monthly payments from her mother pretty consistently between 2008 

and 2011 varying from $200.00 to $600.00. T. at 58-60. The deed was executed on 

August 16, 2011. T. at 17. 

{¶ 31} In its findings filed May 22, 2017, the trial court found the following in 

pertinent part: 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 10 

 6) Steiner claims that American would not grant the loan unless 

Houchin's name was listed on the title. The loan officers presented 

Steiner with a quit claim deed with both names as grantees. 

7) Steiner testified she was furious, but signed the document 

anyway, feeling she had no other option. 

8) On or about August 16, 2011, Steiner executed a quit claim 

deed, transferring the record title to the property to herself and also to 

Houchin as tenants in common. 

 9) The deed is devoid of any conditions and/or restrictions relating 

to and/or otherwise encumbering Houchin's ownership interest into the 

property as tenant in common with Steiner. 

 11) The mortgage loans are unpaid and outstanding, and the 

mortgagee securing the mortgage loans are presenting valid, subsisting 

liens encumbering the record title of Steiner and Houchin to the property. 

In order to obtain the mortgage loans and benefits therefrom, Steiner 

needed Houchin to provide good credit and become a co-obligor with 

Steiner, jointly and severally liable under/upon the mortgage loans. 

 12) Prior to the deed to Houchin, Steiner had sole, full and 

complete possession of [the] property. 

 15) No testimony, nor evidence, was presented as to Houchin's 

intentions relating to the loan or deed and Houchin is presently 

incompetent. 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 11 

 17) From August 16, 2011 until the present action, Plaintiff took no 

steps to remove Houchin from the deed. 

{¶ 32} The trial court then concluded the following in part: 

 From this Court's viewpoint, by virtue of Steiner taking the action of 

listing her mother Houchin's name on the deed and the conveyance, she 

has now made Houchin a tenant in common and record holder of the 

property. Although Steiner feels that she was forced into this decision by 

American, there was no testimony from American representative that 

Steiner was required to take this action or was under duress. 

 Due to the unavailability of Steiner's mother Houchin, there is no 

testimony that Houchin agreed to be listed on the mortgage and note with 

her daughter with no expectation of being listed on the deed. 

The Court considers the fact that Steiner received thousands of 

dollars over a three-year period from Houchin, which would indicate to this 

Court that Houchin may have had a reasonable expectation to be named 

on the deed in return for the payment that she had been providing to 

Steiner. Steiner did receive a benefit by Houchin cosigning on the 

documents. It was Houchin's good credit that convinced American to 

provide the two loans to Steiner. 

 The Court cannot equitably divest Houchin of/from Houchin's record 

interest (as a co-tenant) in the property which, a) Houchin provided and 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 12 

exposed personal credit for the new mortgage loans; b) Houchin 

periodically provided personal funds to the Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff 

unilaterally obtained Houchin's funds for Plaintiff's personal benefit (both 

before and/or after the date of the deed and new mortgage loans; and c) 

Houchin cosigned the new mortgage loans (in and of itself constituting 

consideration for Plaintiff's conveyance to Houchin of an interest in the 

property), and Houchin became (and remains) jointly and severally liable 

upon for the new mortgage loans. 

 Wherefore, since Houchin's name is on the deed and Houchin has 

now become a tenant in common with equal and co-existing rights, 

Houchin and/or her Estate are entitled to record title to the property under 

R.C. 5302 and 5303. The Plaintiff has not met her burden under the quiet 

title claim. In addition, the Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence 

that would require this Court to impose a constructive trust. 

{¶ 33} No testimony or evidence was presented from American First or the 

attorney who prepared the deed surrounding the circumstances of the deed and 

substantiating appellant's claim that she was "forced" to sign it. Appellant admitted she 

could have received financing elsewhere, but the terms were not as favorable compared 

to what American First was offering. We do not find any evidence to establish that 

appellant was "forced" to sign the quitclaim deed. 

{¶ 34} The gravamen of this case is what did the parties intend in signing the 

quitclaim deed? 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 13 

{¶ 35} "The principles of deed construction dictate that a court presumes that a 

deed expresses the intentions of the grantor and grantee at the time of execution. * * * A 

court cannot interpret the parties' intent in a manner contrary to the clear, unambiguous 

language of the deed. * * * " American Energy Corp. v. Datkuliak, 174 Ohio App.3d 398, 

2007-Ohio-7199, 882 N.E.2d 463, ¶ 50 (7th Dist.). (Citations omitted.) What evidence 

is in the record to rebut this presumption and substantiate appellant's claim of the 

parties' intentions? 

{¶ 36} There is a quitclaim deed with no conditions and/or restrictions relating to 

Ms. Houchin's ownership interest in the property. The quitclaim deed named appellant 

and her mother as tenants in common, with each party having an equal interest in the 

property. Appellant was aware of the effect of a quitclaim deed, and did nothing after 

the signing to rectify the matter. There was one and one-half years between the signing 

of the deed and the appointment of a guardian wherein appellant did not attempt to 

change the deed while her mother was still competent. We do not find any evidence to 

support appellant's claimed intention that her mother was not to have an equal interest 

in the property. 

{¶ 37} We find the trial court's "inference" (as argued by appellant) regarding 

monies to appellant from her mother and the conclusion in "(b)" cited above in ¶ 32 not 

to be relevant or material to the issue. 

{¶ 38} As for a constructive trust, appellant "bears the burden of producing clear 

and convincing evidence justifying it." University Hospitals of Cleveland, Inc. v. Lynch, 

96 Ohio St.3d 118, 2002-Ohio-3748, 772 N.E.2d 105, paragraph three of the syllabus. " 

'A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 14 

expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of 

the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts 

him into a trustee.' " Ferguson v. Owens, 9 Ohio St.3d 223, 225-226, 459 N.E.2d 1293 

(1984), quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 

378 (1919). We do not find any clear and convincing evidence in the record to support 

the creation of a constructive trust. Ms. Houchin is jointly liable on the note and 

financially obligated to pay the note in the event appellant defaults on the loans. 

{¶ 39} Upon review of the evidence presented, we are unable to conclude that 

the trial court abused its discretion or created a manifest miscarriage of justice in this 

case. 

{¶ 40} Assignments of Error II and III are denied. Cross-Assignment of Error I is 

moot. 

 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00050 15 

{¶ 41} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio is 

hereby affirmed. 

By Wise, Earle, J. 

Gwin, J. and 

Hoffman, J. concur. 

EEW/sg 809