******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
IN RE JAMES O., JR., ET AL.*

(AC 37739)

Prescott, Mullins and West, Js.

Argued September 8—officially released October 9, 2015**

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Middlesex, Child Protection Session, Elgo, J.)

David J. Reich, for the appellant (respondent
mother).

Frank H. LaMonaca, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general,

for the appellee (petitioner).

Linda K. Herzner, for the minor children.
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. The respondent mother, Marjorie H.,

appeals from the judgments of the trial court rendered

in favor of petitioner, the Commissioner of Children

and Families, terminating her parental rights as to her

son, James O., Jr., and her daughter, Jolene O.1 The

respondent claims that the court improperly (1) compared the relative abilities of the respondent and the

children’s foster mother’s to parent the respondent’s

children in determining whether the respondent had

failed to rehabilitate herself sufficiently; (2) found that

the Department of Children and Families (department)

made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with

her children; and (3) admitted evidence under the hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of

obtaining medical treatment. We affirm the judgments

of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court or as

are undisputed in the record, and procedural history

are relevant. The respondent’s involvement with the

department originated with a series of referrals to the

department. In March, 2004, a referral was made to the

department on the basis of an allegation of physical

neglect of James, Jr. In September, 2008, a referral was

made to the department after the father, James O., Sr.,

was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the

influence. Not only had the father been intoxicated, but

he also had a bloody nose and swollen right eye, and

the rear window of his motor vehicle was broken.

According to the father, the respondent had hit him

and smashed the rear window of the family car.

In September, 2010, James, Jr.’s school made a referral to the department after James, Jr., came to school

with a bruised right cheek. That October, James, Jr.,

who was seven years old at the time, was taken to a

hospital after attempting suicide by jumping off monkey

bars at school. The department investigated the incident

but closed the case after the respondent agreed to

accept services from Intensive In-Home Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Services. The respondent did not

follow through on the agreement.

By April, 2011, James, Jr.’s school psychologist had

made four referrals to the department, reporting that

James, Jr., exhibited extreme behaviors and that both

of the respondent’s children had missed more than forty

days of school. Another referral to the department was

made on May 18, 2011, concerning educational neglect

of both children and medical neglect of James, Jr., by

the respondent. James, Jr., had told school staff that

‘‘he wanted to split his skull open like a watermelon,’’

that he did not know how to stop hurting himself, and

that he heard voices and wanted to kill himself. The

Behavioral Health Center of Waterbury Hospital recommended that James, Jr., be psychiatrically admitted, but
the respondent refused.

On the basis of the school’s referrals, the department

conducted a home visit on June 8, 2011. The respondent

did not answer the social worker’s questions and

claimed that she had officially withdrawn her children

from school. On June 9, 2011, the department filed

neglect petitions, alleging that the children were

exposed to substance abuse and domestic violence, that

James, Jr., had serious mental health issues, that the

parents had failed to provide recommended services to

the children, and that the children had been withdrawn

from school.

On the basis of the allegations of neglect contained

in the petition, the department also sought and received

orders of temporary custody for the children on June 9,

2011.2 Upon first being removed from the respondent’s

custody, both children were placed in foster homes;

however, because of James, Jr.’s mental health issues,

he was subsequently hospitalized at Danbury Hospital

and then later at Yale-New Haven Hospital. In her foster

placement, Jolene demonstrated sexualized behavior,

including constant masturbation, talk about sex, and

inappropriate sexual activities, causing the foster parent to question whether there was a history of sexual

abuse.

On June 23, 2011, prior to the hearing on the order

of temporary custody, the respondent entered into an

agreement with the department to dissolve the order

of temporary custody as to Jolene. Pursuant to the

agreement, James, Jr., was to remain in the department’s custody and was to continue to be hospitalized

at Yale-New Haven Hospital. As a condition of dissolving the order of temporary custody as to Jolene, the

respondent was required to take Jolene to therapy. On

June 24, 2011, at the first scheduled therapy appointment, Jolene disclosed that she had been physically and

sexually abused by her father. In response to these

statements, the department again removed Jolene from

the respondent’s custody and sought a placement for

both children at Safe Home, a short-term care facility

providing clinical services.

While at Safe Home, the staff noted James, Jr.’s suicidal thoughts, tendencies to fixate, high anxiety, and

fragile emotional state, as well as Jolene’s sexual

actions, animal-like behaviors, such as walking on all

fours, aggression, and skewed sense of reality. Safe

Home described Jolene ‘‘as one of the most traumatized

children they have seen.’’ The children’s behavior at

Safe Home led the department to realize that the children needed a caregiver who could understand and

appropriately manage these behaviors and that more

intensive therapeutic support was necessary. In October, 2011, the department placed the children in a therapeutic foster home with Paula M., a licensed therapeutic

foster care provider.
The trial on the neglect petitions was conducted on

March 22, 27, and 28, 2012. The respondent entered

pleas of nolo contendere on June 19, 2012. The court

adjudicated the children neglected and committed them

to the department’s custody. The respondent, who was

represented by counsel at the time, agreed to specific

steps, which the court subsequently approved, to facilitate the respondent’s reunification with James, Jr.,

and Jolene.

The specific steps, in relevant part, required the

respondent to cooperate in individual counseling and

parenting education, to ‘‘[a]cknowledge and take

responsibility for any past anger, domestic violence

and/or controlling behavior (whether as perpetrator or

victim)’’; to ‘‘[a]cknowledge the responsibility you have,

if any, in the removal of your children’’; to ‘‘[d]evelop

insight into why your children are no longer in your

care;’’ to ‘‘[a]ddress issues related to poor boundaries

and sexualized behavior and the impact that it has had

on each member of your family. . . . Explore and

come to thoroughly understand why a perpetrator of

abuse is totally responsible for the abuse . . . . Learn

how to set and maintain appropriate boundaries when

interacting with children who have alleged and/or experienced sexual abuse’’; and to ‘‘[e]ngage in counseling

to increase your understanding of your chronic resentment and anger and improve your communication

. . . .’’

After commitment to the department’s custody on

June 19, 2012, Jolene began trauma-focused cognitive

behavioral therapy (behavioral therapy) treatment.

Throughout her treatment, Jolene consistently alleged

that ‘‘she was physically abused by her father, sexually

abused by both parents, and witnessed domestic violence between her parents.’’ In contrast, James, Jr., had

difficulty talking about his trauma history, especially

the alleged sexual abuse, becoming anxious and tearful

whenever that subject was broached. James, Jr., has

been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder

and autism.

To aid the respondent in fulfilling the court-ordered

specific steps, the department contracted with All

Pointe Care, LLC, to provide an hour of parent education to the respondent over the telephone every week

prior to the respondent’s scheduled visits with her children. In addition to parent education, the department

provided the respondent with supervised visitation with

her children for two hours every week. The department

also provided the respondent with transportation and/

or mileage reimbursement to and from every visitation.

The department also made multiple referrals on

behalf of the respondent in order to help her meet the

requirements of the specific steps, including a referral

to the McCall Foundation for a substance abuse evalua-
tion and a referral to the Wellspring Foundation for

individual therapy. The department also provided both

of the respondent’s therapists with a copy of the courtordered specific steps. The department provided either

transportation or mileage reimbursements to and from

therapy, and went as far as to pay for repairs to the

respondent’s truck.

The department encouraged the respondent to contact and communicate with the children’s school, therapists, and providers. The only therapist that the

respondent was not allowed to contact was the Child

Abuse Treatment Services Program therapist, who

worked with Jolene, because a condition in the program’s grant funding would not allow perpetrators of

trauma or caregivers who would not acknowledge the

source of the child’s trauma to participate in the program. The respondent was permitted and encouraged

to contact Jolene’s outpatient therapist, all of James,

Jr.’s therapists, the children’s school, and the children’s physicians.

On April 24, 2013, the department petitioned the

court, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)

(ii), to terminate the respondent’s parental rights on

the ground that she had failed to achieve the degree of

personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief

that within a reasonable time, considering the age and

particular needs of her children, she could assume a

responsible position in theirlives. A trial on the termination of parental rights petitions was conducted over a

span of eleven days between January 22 and May 23,

2014, with posttrial briefs filed on July 16, 2014.

On November 13, 2014, the court terminated the

respondent’s parental rights. The court found by clear

and convincing evidence that the department had made

reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with

James, Jr., and Jolene, that the respondent had been

unwilling or unable to benefit sufficiently from the

department’s services, and that the respondent had

failed to rehabilitate. The court determined that the

respondent had ‘‘failed to acknowledge responsibility

for the conditions leading to the children’s removal

. . . .’’ The court found it particularly troubling that

the respondent has ‘‘seriously discounted and/or not

acknowledged the extent to which domestic violence

and substance abuse have been a significant source of

trauma to [her] children. Having focused exclusively

on the allegations of sexual abuse, the [respondent has]

failed to acknowledge the degree to which [her] children presented with profoundly disturbing behaviors,

which has not been credibly disputed.’’

This appealfollowed. Additionalfacts will be set forth

as necessary.

I

The respondent first claims that, in reaching its con-
clusion that she had failed to achieve a sufficient degree

of personal rehabilitation as required under § 17a-112

(j) (3) (B) (ii), the court improperly compared her abilities to parent her children with those of the children’s

therapeutic foster mother, Paula M. The respondent

argues that the court’s reliance on a comparison of the

respondent’s and Paula M.’s relative parenting skills in

resolving an aspect of the adjudicatory portion of the

termination proceedings was improper because, in so

doing, the court prematurely focused its analysis on

the best interest of the children rather than limiting

its inquiry to whether clear and convincing evidence

existed that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate.

The department argues that the respondent’s claim

fails because that portion of the court’s decision regarding the respondent’s failure to rehabilitate, read as a

whole, demonstrates that the court properly considered

the specific needs of the respondent’s children in

assessing the adequacy of her rehabilitation, and that

any reference by the court to the children’s current

placement was meant to be illustrative of the level of

care necessary to continue the children’s therapeutic

progress. We are persuaded by the petitioner’s argument and, accordingly, reject the respondent’s claim.

‘‘A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from

both the trial court’s factual findings and from its

weighing of the facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth

in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).’’ In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569,

587–88, A.3d (2015). To the extent that the

respondent claims that the court in the present case

impermissibly considered factors that fell outside the

scope of that inquiry, the respondent raises a legal issue

that requires us to interpret the judgments of the court

as set forth in its memorandum of decision. Accordingly, we employ a plenary standard of review. See In

re Jason B., 137 Conn. App. 408, 414, 48 A.3d 676 (2012).

‘‘A hearing on a termination of parentalrights petition

consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition.

. . . In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the commissioner has proven, by clear

and convincing evidence, a proper ground for termination of parental rights. . . . In the dispositional phase,

once a ground for termination has been proven, the

court must determine whether termination is in the best

interest of the child.’’ (Citations omitted.) In re Vincent

D., 65 Conn. App. 658, 664–65, 783 A.2d 534 (2001).

Although Practice Book § 35a-7 (b) expressly provides

that the court, in its discretion, may hear evidence pertaining to both adjudication and disposition ‘‘in a nonbifurcated hearing,’’ the rule further provides that

‘‘disposition may not be considered until the adjudicatory phase has concluded.’’

As our Supreme Court has cautioned, ‘‘[p]etitions for

termination of parental rights are particularly vulnera-
ble to the risk that judges or social workers will be

tempted, consciously or unconsciously, to compare

unfavorably the material advantages of the child’s natural parents with those of prospective adoptive parents

and therefore to reach a result based on such comparisons rather than on the statutory criteria [governing

the adjudication of parental rights].’’ In re Juvenile

Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 672–73, 420 A.2d

875 (1979).

It is axiomatic that ‘‘[t]ermination of parental rights

does not follow automatically from parental conduct

justifying the removal of custody. The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and

management of their child does not evaporate simply

because they have not been model parents or have

lost temporary custody of their child to the State. . . .

[P]arents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. . . . It bears

emphasis that a judicial termination of parental rights

may not be premised on a determination that it would

be in the child’s best interests to terminate the parent’s

rights in order to substitute another, more suitable set

of adoptive parents. Our statutes and caselaw make it

crystal clear that the determination of the child’s best

interests comes into play only after statutory grounds

for termination of parental rights have been established

by clear and convincing evidence. . . . [A] parent cannot be displaced because someone else could do a better job of raising the child. . . . Although, as a matter

of statutory fiat, consideration of the best interests of

the child cannot vitiate the necessity of compliance

with the specified statutory standards for termination

of parental rights . . . [i]nsistence upon strict compliance with the statutory criteria before termination . . .

can occur is not inconsistent with concern for the best

interests of the child. . . . A child, no less than a parent, has a powerful interest in the preservation of the

parent-child relationship.’’(Citations omitted; emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Baby

Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 279–81, 618 A.2d 1 (1992); see

also In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), supra, 177

Conn. 673 (‘‘[t]he best interests of the child . . . is not

an ingredient of [grounds for termination]’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]).

‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers

to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . . [Section 17a112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent’s]

rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the

particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation

must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. . . .

[The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and

convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he

or she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which

would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future

date [he or she] can assume a responsible position in
[his or her] child’s life. . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has

improved [his or her] ability to manage [his or her] own

life, butrather whether[he or she] has gained the ability

to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.’’

(Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 480,

771 A.2d 244 (2001).

In the present case, the court found that the petitioner

met her burden of showing by clear and convincing

evidence that the respondent had failed to achieve the

necessary level of rehabilitation, given the age and

needs of the children. The court began its analysis by

discussing the special needs of the respondent’s children. The court found that from the time that the children first entered foster care they were ‘‘seriously

disturbed’’ and that ‘‘their home environment was

responsible for their condition . . . .’’ The court found

that James, Jr., had made disturbing statements that

included harming other children, and that Jolene exhibited intense sexual reactivity, which manifested itself

in frequent public masturbation and inappropriate

touching of her brother. The court also found that

Jolene suffered from exaggerated startle responses,

hypervigilance, excessive animal-like behaviors, and

aggression. Jolene also had difficulty focusing and concentrating in school.

The court also found that the children’s disclosures

of sexual abuse to their therapists and to Paula M. were

reliable, especially given that the children understood

the role that these people played in their recovery and

in keeping them safe.3 The court indicated that the testimony of the children’s therapists, which the court found

credible, persuasive and reliable, made it clear that

the children needed a caregiver who could utilize the

therapeutic approaches established in therapy and that

such care was key to the children healing from and

addressing their past trauma. Having determined that

the children had significant and special needs, the court

turned to whether the respondent had demonstrated a

sufficient level of rehabilitation to care for those needs

and to assume a responsible position in the children’s

lives. The court stated that ‘‘[e]ven in the absence of

sexual abuse disclosures, the children’s behaviors

alone, and the [respondent’s] utter failure to acknowledge and appreciate the significance of these behaviors,

are, in and of themselves, an enormous impediment

to reunification.’’

It is at this point in the court’s analysis that the

respondent claims that the court improperly compared

the relative parenting abilities of the respondent and

Paula M. In particular, the respondent points to the

following language from the court’s decision: ‘‘More

important than the disclosures, however, is the clear

and convincing evidence that the children have made
extraordinary progress while living with Paula M., in

an environment that is calm and understanding of the

children’s needs. As both therapists have made clear,

the children have needed a caregiver who is calm,

patient, able to set appropriate limits, willing to participate intensively in the children’s therapy, and able to

help the children with coping skills to manage their

anxiety. The children have also needed someone who

would believe their statements about the source of their

trauma. [One of the therapists] credibly testified that

the behavioral therapy model requires that a child be

understood and treated in the context of their living

environment. As the children’s progress, relationship

and work with Paula M. makes clear, the process of

healing and recovery must also occurin a home environment which the children have come to learn is safe and

caring. Given Paula M.’s training and participation in

therapy sessions, it is clear that this process cannot be

limited to the one hour per week session that a child

has, even with a trusting therapist. In contrast, [the

respondent] is volatile and prone to violence, unable

to set appropriate limits, unwilling to talk with the children’s therapists and, therefore, unable to help them

use coping skills to manage their anxiety and ultimately,

unwilling to believe the children’s statements regarding

the trauma. In short, [the respondent] has none of the

qualities the children have required to stabilize and to

continue to heal from the traumas they experienced

while in [her] care.’’

We agree that, as a general proposition, courts should

refrain from discussing the relative advantages, material or otherwise, that a child might receive as a result

of his or her current or future placement as compared

to the respondent parent in resolving the adjudicatory

portion of a termination of parental rights petition. This

is because such comparisons are likely to be construed,

as the respondent does here, as an improper comparison between a parent and a preadoptive foster parent

or other guardian. We nevertheless are convinced from

our review of the court’s findings and analysis in the

present case that, when read in context, the court properly reached its decision that the respondent had failed

adequately to rehabilitate by considering only those

factors relevant to the respondent’s rehabilitative status

as it relates to the particular needs of the respondent’s children.

We construe the language relied on by the respondent, not as making a direct comparison between the

respondent and Paula M., so much as clarifying that

the children needed and continue to need an environment that is calm, in which their needs are understood,

and in which their caregiver can manage their anxiety in

an appropriate manner. Although the court did indicate

that the level of care that they were receiving from

Paula M. met this criteria, the court never stated at this

point of the analysis (or at any other time) that it would
be in the children’s best interest to remain with Paula

M. Rather than prematurely considering disposition, as

is suggested by the respondent’s argument, the court

maintained its focus squarely upon the respondent, her

rehabilitation, and the particular needs of the children,

ultimately determining that the respondent would be

unable to meet the children’s particular needs because

of her failure to rehabilitate.4

In sum, we reject the

respondent’s claims that the court improperly compared her parenting abilities with those of Paula M. in

reaching its conclusion that she failed to achieve a

sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as required

under § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii).

II

The respondent next claims that the court improperly

concluded that the petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with James, Jr., and Jolene.5

Specifically, the respondent claims that the department’s ‘‘efforts were not reasonable because they were

based on an inaccurate assessment’’ of domestic violence and sexual assault. We are not persuaded.

‘‘To terminate parental rights under [§ 17a-112 (j) (1)]

the department is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it has made reasonable efforts to

reunify the children with the parent unless the court

finds that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit

from reunification efforts. In accordance with [§ 17a112 (j) (1)], the department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the

parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or(3) by a previous judicial determination

that such efforts were not appropriate.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Gabriella A., 154 Conn. App.

177, 181, 104 A.3d 805 (2014), cert. granted on other

grounds, 315 Conn. 914, 106 A.3d 306 (2015).

‘‘ ‘The reasonableness of the department’s efforts

must be assessed in the context of each case. The word

reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s

efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be

adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of

proof. Neitherthe word reasonable nor the word efforts

is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal

act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not

everything possible. . . . [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have

been proven depends on the careful consideration of

the circumstances of each individual case.’ . . . In re

Kyara H., 147 Conn. App. 855, 872–73, 83 A.3d 1264,

cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 468 (2014).’’ In re

Gabriella A., supra, 154 Conn. App. 182–83.

Our Supreme Court recently clarified the standard
of review that we apply with respect to a trial court’s

conclusion that a parent has failed to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B), stating that only the court’s

subordinate factual findings are reviewed for clear

error. In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 587–88. The

court in In re Shane M. made clear that the ultimate

conclusion of whether a parent has failed to rehabilitate

‘‘is drawn from both the trial court’s factual findings

and from its weighing of the facts in assessing whether

those findings satisfy the [reasonable efforts] ground

set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly, we now

[determine] that the appropriate standard of review is

one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is, whether the trial

court could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts

established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence was

sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . .

When applying this standard, we construe the evidence

in a manner most favorable to sustaining the judgment

of the trial court.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Although this recent clarification of the standard of

review was made with respect to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B),

not to § 17a-112 (j) (1), it is logical that the same standard should apply with respect to § 17a-112 (j) (1)

because the trial court is being asked to draw a similar

legal conclusion on the basis of the underlying facts.

Thus, we review the trial court’s subordinate factual

findings for clear error, but we review the court’s ultimate conclusion that the department made reasonable

efforts to reunify the child with the parent on the basis

of whether the cumulative effect of the evidence was

sufficient to justify the ultimate conclusion.

The trial court, in its memorandum of decision,

recounted the various efforts made by the department

regarding reunification. In its findings of facts, the court

found that the department provided the respondent

with individual therapy, parent education, visitation services, transportation, and mileage reimbursement. The

department also ensured that the respondent had

access to the children’s school, therapists, physicians,

and other providers, if possible. On the basis of these

subordinate findings, the court reached the ultimate

conclusion that the department had made reasonable

efforts to reunify the respondent with her children.

The respondent does not dispute that she was provided any of the previously described services, nor does

she claim that she should have been provided some

additional service. The court’s findings as to the services provided are supported by the testimony and evidence in the record, and, therefore, are not clearly

erroneous.

Although she acknowledges that she was provided

with these services, the respondent nevertheless argues

that the department’s efforts at reunification were not
reasonable ‘‘[b]ased on [the department’s] firm belief

that [the respondent] had sexually assaulted [her] children and [the respondent’s] denial of those allegations,

[so that] the department would not seriously move forward with reunification.’’ None of the provided services,

as described previously, required the respondent to

admit to sexually abusing her children. Attending individual therapy and parent education sessions did not

require such an admission. Receiving transportation

and mileage reimbursement to and from therapy and

visitations did not require such an admission. Being

encouraged to communicate with the children’s providers and school did not require such an admission. Even

if the department believed the respondent to be a perpetrator of sexual abuse, that belief never hindered the

department’s provision of these services to her, nor did

it make these provided services unreasonable or insufficient.

The respondent is correct that she could not contact

or participate in the Child Abuse Treatment Services

Program, which provided therapy to Jolene, as long as

the respondent did not acknowledge the source of the

children’s trauma or was believed to be a perpetrator

of the trauma. Thus, there was one service to which

the respondent was not allowed access because of the

department’s belief that the respondent had sexually

abused her children. The court, however,found credible

testimony that the respondent was allowed, and was

encouraged, to contact all of Jolene’s other therapists,

as well as both children’s schools, physicians, and providers. Consequently, the department offered the

respondent access to a number of alternative services

of treatment and therapy, of which she failed to avail

herself. Thus, the respondent’s lack of participation in

the Child Abuse Treatment Services Program did not

make the department’s reunification efforts unreasonable.

The respondent also appears to argue that the courtordered specific steps, which the department’s efforts

and services are meant to address, themselves require

the respondent to admit to sexually abusing her children, and, therefore, any of the department’s efforts to

address these steps were per se unreasonable. First, at

no point did the respondent object to these specific

steps or ask for them to be modified. The specific steps

were court-ordered and agreed to by the respondent,

who was represented by counsel at the time. Second,

the court made no factual findings as to whether the

specific steps required the respondent to admit to participating in sexually abusing her children, and the

respondent did not request an articulation on this issue.

The court did state, in its memorandum of decision,

that it credited the testimony of Jennifer Birden, a

department social worker, who testified at trial that the

respondent need not admit that she sexually abused

her children but, rather, ‘‘[i]f you look at the goal as a
whole, part of that is talking about the appropriate

boundaries for children who have alleged or experienced sexual abuse. Not talking specifically about who

perpetrated that, but understanding that those kids have

disclosed this and then how to relate to them.’’ The

purpose of these specific steps was to ‘‘[focus] on the

needs of her children . . . .’’ The respondent did not

need to admit to sexual abuse; rather, she was required

to come to an ‘‘understanding that the children made

these disclosures, and [an] understanding [of] how to

assist them moving forward, how to cope with the symptoms, whether it be through therapy, or how to handle

a child who’s disclosed sexual abuse.’’ Birden did admit

at trial that one way of satisfying some of the specific

steps would be forthe respondent to admitto participating in sexually abusing her children, but her other testimony made it clear that this was not the only way to

satisfy those specific steps.

In conclusion, the record supports the court’s factual

findings concerning the services the department provided to the respondent. On the basis of these findings

and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the

courtreasonably could have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its

ultimate conclusion that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with her children. Accordingly, we reject the respondent’s claim that

the court improperly concluded that the department

made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with

her children.

III

Finally, the respondent claims that the trial court

abused its discretion by admitting into evidence two

exhibits that contained hearsay statements of the children. In particular, the respondent argues that the court

improperly concluded that the children’s statements

were made for the purpose of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment and, thus, were admissible pursuant

to the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule.

See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (5). We conclude that even

if we assume, without deciding, that the respondent is

correct and that the exhibits in question were improperly admitted into evidence, the respondent has failed

adequately to brief how she was harmed by the erroneous admission. Because the respondent has failed to

brief the issue of harmfulness, we deem the claim abandoned and, accordingly, decline to review it. See Saint

Bernard School of Montville, Inc. v. Bank of America,

312 Conn. 811, 829, 95 A.3d 1063 (2014).

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our discussion. On January 30, 2014,

during the direct examination of the children’s therapeutic foster mother, Paula M., the petitioner offered

into evidence exhibit 16 and exhibit 24, each of which

contained out-of-court statements by the respondent’s
children that tended to corroborate that the children

were the victims of sexual abuse. Specifically, exhibit

16 was a typewritten transcription, prepared by Paula

M., of a recounting by James, Jr., of inappropriate touching of a sexual nature between his family members.

According to Paula M., James, Jr., had requested that

she write down his troubling thoughts, which was one

of several coping mechanism that he had learned during

therapy sessions. Exhibit 24 was a single sheet of paper

that Jolene had obtained from Paula M. while the two

attended a Bible study class and on which Jolene had

made several small drawings. The document also contained some words that Jolene had written contemporaneously with her having made the drawings. The

respondent objected to the admission of both exhibits

on the ground that the children’s out-of-court statements were hearsay that did not fall within the medical

treatment exception as advanced by the petitioner and

because they lacked any other real indicia of reliability.

The court deferred ruling on the admissibility of the

evidence, permitting the parties to brief the issue. The

court held a hearing on February 10, 2014, following

which it ruled that the children’s statements were

admissible under both the medical treatment and residual exceptions to the hearsay rule.

‘‘It is well settled that, absent structural error, the

mere fact that a trial court rendered an improper ruling

does not entitle the party challenging that ruling to

obtain a new trial. An improper ruling must also be

harmful to justify such relief. . . . The harmfulness of

an improper ruling is material irrespective of whether

the ruling is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard or a plenary review standard. . . . When

the ruling at issue is not of constitutional dimensions,

the party challenging the ruling bears the burden of

proving harm.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 824–25; see also In re Amneris P.,

66 Conn. App. 377, 382, 784 A.2d 457 (2001) (respondent

parent challenging admissibility of evidence had burden

of demonstrating harmful error).

In the present case, beyond summarily concluding

that the court’s decision to admit the two exhibits was

harmful, the respondent has failed to address the issue.

The respondent has the burden of demonstrating that

the court’s improper ruling likely affected the outcome

of the trial. ‘‘[W]e are not required to review issues that

have been improperly presented to this court through

an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere

abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Saint Bernard

School of Montville, Inc. v. Bank of America, supra,

312 Conn. 829. Because the respondent has failed to

address harmfulness adequately, we deem her evidentiary claim abandoned.
The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** October 9, 2015, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1

James, Jr., was born in August, 2003, and Jolene was born in August,

2004. We also note that the court terminated the parental rights of the

children’s father, James O., Sr., in the same proceeding, but he is not a party

to this appeal. We therefore referto the respondent mother as the respondent

in this opinion.

2 When the children were first removed, James, Jr., was seven and Jolene

was six years old.

3 The court also credited the testimony of one of the therapists who

indicated that children do not lie about their emotional and physiological

symptoms.

4 To the extent that the language used by the court is open to different

interpretations, and thus is ambiguous, absent an articulation, which the

respondent never sought, we will presume the court applied the correct

legal standard in reaching its decision. See In re Jason R., 306 Conn. 438,

456, 51 A.3d 334 (2012).

5 The respondent also claims that the court improperly concluded that she

was unwilling and/or unable to benefitfrom reunification efforts. Because we

conclude that the court properly determined that the department made

reasonable efforts to reunify, we need not address this additional claim of

error. See In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552–53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).