## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

O F T E X A S

N O

. A P

- 7 6

, 9 5 9

I N R E : J E F F E R I E A N T E R I E S D A N I E L

, R e l a t o r

O N P E T I T I O N F O R A W R I T O F M A N D A M U S

I N C A U S E N O

. 2 0 0 0 C R 1 2 4 7 I N T H E

3 9 9 D I S T R I C T C O U R T O F B E X A R C O U N T Y T H

P R IC E

, J

. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n f o r a u n a n i m o u s C o u r t

.

O P I N I O N

T h i s c a s e c o n c e r n s a b i l l o f c o s t s p u r p o r t i n g t o o r d e r t h e r e i m b u r s e m e n t o f a t t o r n e y

f e e s s o m e n i n e y e a r s a f

t e r j u d g m e n t w a s e n t e r e d a g a i n s t t h e a p p l i c a n t

. I t c o m e s b e f o r e u s

i n t h e g u i s e o f a p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s p u r s u a n t t o A r t i c l e

1 1

. 0 7 o f t h e T e x a s C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e

, b u t

, f o r r e a s o n s w h i c h w e s h a l l p r e s e n t l y 1

e x p l a i n

, w e w i l l t r e a t i t i n s t e a d a s a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t o f m a n d a m u s a n d g r a n t c o n d i t i o n a l

r e l i e f

.

1

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 11.07.DANI EL— 2

T h e j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d a g a i n s t t h e a p p l i c a n t r e f l e c t s t h a t h e w a s c h a r g e d w i t h t h e

o f f e n s e o f f

o r g e r y o f a c h e c k i n c a u s e n u m b e r 2 0 0 0 C R 1 2 4 7

, a l l e g e d l y c o m m i t t e d o n

S e p t e m b e r 2 7

, 1 9 9 9

. A j u r y c o n v i c t e d h i m o f t h a t o f f e n s e o n J a n u a r y 3 1

, 2 0 0 2

. O n A p r i l 2

1 2

, 2 0 0 2

, h e p l e d t r u e b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o u n s p e c i f i e d e n h a n c e m e n t p r o v i s i o n s

, a n d t h e

t r i a l c o u r t a s s e s s e d a s e n t e n c e o f t w e n t y y e a r s ’ i n c a r c e r a t i o n i n t h e p e n i t e n t i a r y

. T h e 3

j u d g m e n t a l s o r e f

l e c t s t h a t c o u r t c o s t s w e r e a s s e s s e d a g a i n s t t h e a p p l i c a n t o n t h a t d a t e i n t h e

a m o u n t o f $ 2 9 5

. 2 5

. I n t h e s p e c i f i c c a t e g o r y o f “ A P P O I N T E D A T T Y

, ” h o w e v e r

, t h e t r i a l

c o u r t a s s e s s e d n o c o s t a g a i n s t t h e a p p l i c a n t i n t h e j u d g m e n t

. T h e j u d g m e n t r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e

a p p l i c a n t w a s r e p r e s e n t e d b y c o u n s e l a t t r i a l

, b u t d o e s n o t s p e c i f y w h e t h e r c o u n s e l w a s

r e t a i n e d o r a p p o i n t e d

.

M o r e t h a n n i n e y e a r s l a t e r

, o n J u l y 2 7

, 2 0 1 1

, t h e B e x a r C o u n t y D i s t r i c t C l e r k i s s u e d

a “ B i l l o f C o s t ” w i t h r e s p e c t t o c a u s e n u m b e r 2 0 0 0 C R 1 2 4 7

. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e $ 2 9 5

. 2 5 t h a t

w e r e s p e c i f

i c a l l y a s s e s s e d i n t h e j u d g m e n t a s c o u r t c o s t s i n 2 0 0 2

, t h i s b e l a t e d “ B i l l o f C o s t ”

a l s o a s s e s s e d a c o s t f

o r “ A P P O I N T E D A T T Y ” i n t h e a m o u n t o f $ 7

, 9 4 5

. 0 0

. T h e a p p l i c a n t

s u b s e q u e n t l y f

i l e d a p l e a d i n g d e n o m i n a t e d a s a p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t o f h a b e a s

2

There is no copy

of the indictment in the re cord pr esently befor e us.

3

The judgme nt ref

lects that the applicant was char g ed with forg ery punishable as a state jail

felo n y u n d er S ec t ion 32.21(d) of the Texas Penal Code. T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 32.21(d). The

judgme nt also ref

lects, in the cate g ory of “PL EA TO E NH AN C E MENT,” that the applicant pled

“TRUE TO HAB I TUAL ,” while in the cate g ory “F I NDI NG ON ENHAN CEMENT,” the trial court

acc ording ly found “TRUE TO HAB I TUAL .” Wit hout the indictment befor e us, we cannot prec isely

deter mine how the applicant beca me susceptible to a twenty -y ear sentenc e, but he does not challeng e

that sentenc e in any

respe ct in this procee ding.DANI EL— 3

c o r p u s

, o n t h i s C o u r t ’ s p r e s c r i b e d f o r m

, c h a l l e n g i n g t h e d i s t r i c t c l e r k ’ s a p p a r e n t l y u n i l a t e r a l 4

a s s e s s m e n t o f a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y f e e s a s a c o s t o f c o u r t o n d u e p r o c e s s g r o u n d s

. T h e

a p p l i c a n t a l l e g e d t h a t

, a s o f t h e t i m e o f h i s t r i a l a n d a p p e a l

, h e h a d b e e n “ d e c l a r e d i n d i g e n t

a n d h a s h a d n o m a t e r i a l c h a n g e i n h i s f i n a n c i a l s t a t u s ” s i n c e t h a t t i m e

. R e l y i n g u p o n A r t i c l e

2 6

. 0 5 ( g ) o f t h e C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e

, a s w e l l a s t h i s C o u r t ’ s o p i n i o n i n M a y e r v

. 5

S t a t e

, t h e a p p l i c a n t c l a i m e d t h a t

, b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s n e v e r m a d e a f i n d i n g t h a t h e i s 6

a b l e t o p a y t h e c o s t o f h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

, t h e “ B i l l o f C o s t ” s h o u l d b e d e l e t e d

. T h e t r i a l 7

c o u r t f o r w a r d e d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s C o u r t w i t h a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t h a t i t s i m p l y b e

d i s m i s s e d f

o r f a i l i n g t o s t a t e f

a c t s t h a t

, e v e n i f t r u e

, w o u l d e n t i t l e h i m t o r e l i e f f r o m t h e

j u d g m e n t o f c o n v i c t i o n a g a i n s t h i m

. I n e s s e n c e

, t h e t r i a l c o u r t w o u l d h a v e u s d i s m i s s t h e

a p p l i c a n t ’ s p u r p o r t e d w r i t a p p l i c a t i o n b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t s t a t e a c l a i m t h a t i s c o g n i z a b l e i n

f e l o n y p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n h a b e a s p r o c e e d i n g s u n d e r A r t i c l e 1 1

. 0 7

.

4

See T E X

. R. A P P

. P. 73.1(a).

5

Effe ctive January

1, 2002, this provision reads:

(g ) I f the court deter

mines that a defe ndant has financ ial resour ces that enable

him to offse t in part or in whole the costs of l eg al s ervic es provided, including any

expen s es an d co sts, the court shall order the defendant to pay during the pendency

of the c harg es or, if convicted, as court costs the amount that it finds t he def endant

is able to pay

.

Acts 2001, 77 L eg ., ch. 906, § 8, p.1808, ef f. Jan. 1, 2002. t h

6

309 S.W .3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

7

See Def endant’ s Br ief in Support of 11.07 Ha beas Petition at 5.DANI EL— 4

R a t h e r t h a n i m m e d i a t e l y a c c e p t i n g t h a t r e c o m m e n d a t i o n

, a n d w i t h o u t s p e c i f i c a l l y

a d d r e s s i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s c o n c e r n w i t h t h e c o g n i z a b i l i t y o f t h e a p p l i c a n t ’ s c l a i m

, t h i s C o u r t

r e m a n d e d t h e c a u s e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r f a c t d e v e l o p m e n t

. T h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s n o w 8

f o r w a r d e d a m e n d e d f

i n d i n g s o f f

a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w t o t h i s C o u r t

. R e l y i n g u p o n

“ p e r s o n a l r e c o l l e c t i o n

, ” b u t w i t h o u t a d d r e s s i n g w h e t h e r t h e a p p l i c a n t w a s i n d i g e n t a n d 9

r e p r e s e n t e d b y a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l a t t r i a l

, t h e t r i a l c o u r t m a d e a n e x p r e s s f i n d i n g o f f

a c t t h a t

t h e a p p l i c a n t w a s d e t e r m i n e d t o b e i n d i g e n t f o r p u r p o s e s o f a

p p e a l o n M a y 6

, 2 0 0 2

, a n d t h a t

c o u n s e l w a s d u l y a p p o i n t e d t o r e p r e s e n t h i m f o r a p p e l l a t e p u r p o s e s o n M a y 2 1

, 2 0 0 2

.

M o r e o v e r

, t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d

, “ [ t ] h e r e i s n o r e c o r d t h a t t h e c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a n y

8

See Ex parte Daniel

, 2012 WL 4449425 (No. W R-54,101-06, Tex. Crim. App., delivered

September 26, 2012) (not desig nated for publication). Observing that “[t] here is no indication that

the trial court ever signe d an order imposing [attorney fee s as court] costs or comply ing with” Article

26.05(g ), we found that the applicant had “alleg ed fac ts that, if true, might entitle him to relief .” We

rema nded the c ause a ccor dingly , with the following instructions:

T he trial court shall make finding s of fac t as to whether Applicant wa s

decla red indige nt at the time of his trial and appea l and if so, when, if at all, the trial

court order ed that Applicant repa y attorney fee s from his tria l or appea l. I f the trial

court order ed Applicant to repa y attorney fee s, the trial court shall find whether any

deter mination as to Applicant’s ability to pay was made prior to imposing those fee s,

and whether Applicant had the ability to appea l the imposit ion of such fee s. The trial

court shall also make any other finding s of fac t and conclusions of law that it deems

rele vant and a

ppropriate to the dispositi on of Appli cant’ s claims for ha beas c orpus

relief

.

Id . at *1.

9

See T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C

. art. 11.07, § 3(d) (to re solve controve rted issues of fact, trial

court “may order aff

idavits, depositions, interrog atories, additional fore nsic t es t ing, and hearing s,

as well as using persona l rec ollection”). The same judge who signe d the judgme nt of conviction in

2002 has also pre sided over the se purpor ted Article 11.07 proce eding s.DANI EL— 5

h e a r i n g o r f

i n d i n g s i n t o [ t h e a p p l i c a n t ’ s ] a b i l i t y t o p a y h i s c o u r t

- a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y f e e s a f t e r

[ h e ] w a s d e t e r m i n e d t o b e i n d i g e n t

. ” O n t h e b a s i s o f t h e s e a m e n d e d f i n d i n g s

, t h e t r i a l c o u r t

n o w r e c o m m e n d s t h a t w e g r a n t h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f b y d e l e t i n g t h e “ B i l l o f C o s t

. ”

I n Ma y e r v

. S t a t e

, w e o b s e r v e d t h a t “ t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s f

i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s a n d a b i l i t y

t o p a y a r e e x p l i c i t c r i t i c a l e l e m e n t s i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e p r o p r i e t y o f

o r d e r i n g r e i m b u r s e m e n t o f c o s t s a n d f e e s ” u n d e r A r t i c l e 2 6

. 0 5 ( g )

. T h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s 1 0

c o n c e d e d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C l e r k ’ s 2 0 1 1 “ B i l l o f C o s t ” i s n o t p r e d i c a t e d u p o n a n y f i n d i n g s

w h a t s o e v e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s e “ c r i t i c a l e l e m e n t s

. ” B e c a u s e n o s u c h f i n d i n g s w e r e m a d e

d u r i n g t h e n i n e y e a r s b e t w e e n t h e e n t r y o f t h e j u d g m e n t a n d t h e C l e r k ’ s i s s u a n c e o f t h e “ B i l l

o f C o s t

, ” t h e r e i s n o b a s i s f o r t h e a s s e s s m e n t o f a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h e l a t t e r

. 1 1

W e d e c l i n e t o g r a n t p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f u n d e r A r t i c l e 1 1

. 0 7

,

h o w e v e r

. O n r e f

l e c t i o n

, w e c o n c l u d e

, a s d i d t h e c o n v i c t i n g c o u r t i n i t s i n i t i a l

1 0

309 S.W .3d at 556. See also Armstrong v. State

, 340 S.W .3d 759, 765-66 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011) (quoting Maye r ).

1 1

Assuming, without deciding

, that the applicant’ s claim would be subject to ordinary notions

of proce dural defa

ult, we note that he has raised his claim at the ear liest opportunity afte r the District

Clerk issued its unilatera l “B ill of Cost.” Moreove r, we need not decide whether the District Clerk’s

“B ill of Cost” would have been valid had it actua lly been predic ated on a finding by the trial court,

nine y ear s afte r the fac t, tha t the applicant can now aff ord to r eimburse the State for the cost of his

court-a ppointed repr esenta tion. I n Curry v. W ilson

, 853 S.W .2d 40, 44-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993),

we h el d t h at a trial court’s jurisdiction persists, even afte r the entry of a judgme nt of acquittal, t o

order the repa

y ment of county funds under Article 26.05(g ) (then Article 26.05(e) ). We pla ced no

specific time limit s on this “continuing authority .” The provision was amende d in 2002, howeve r,

to require that any such order be made “during the pendenc y of the char g es or, if convicted, as court

costs[.] ” Acts 2001, 77 L eg

., ch. 906, § 8, p. 1808, eff

. J an. 1, 2002. Whether this lang uag e t h

qualifies our holding of “continuing authority ” in Curry v. W ilson is an issue we need not prese ntly

decide , g iven the trial c ourt’s conc ession that no such orde r has e ver be en ente red in this case

.DANI EL— 6

r e c o m m e n d a t i o n

, t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t ’ s c h a l l e n g e t o t h e “ B i l l o f C o s t ” i n n o w a y i m p l i c a t e s t h e

f a c t o r d u r a t i o n o f h i s c o n f i n e m e n t p u r s u a n t t o h i s c o n v i c t i o n i n c a u s e n u m b e r 2 0 0 0 C R 1 2 4 7 ;

f o r t h i s r e a s o n

, i t i s n o t t h e p r o p e r s u b j e c t o f a s t a t u t o r i l y g o v e r n e d p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n

a p p l i c a t i o n f

o r w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s

. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d

, i f t h e D i s t r i c t C l e r k ’ s “ B i l l o f 1 2

C o s t ” h a s a n y v a l i d i t y a t a l l

, i t c o u l d b e o n l y b y v i r t u e o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s a u t h o r i t y u n d e r

A r t i c l e 2 6

. 0 5 ( g )

, a n d q u e s t i o n s o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f o r d e r s e n t e r e d u n d e r t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h i s

p r o v i s i o n

, w e h a v e h e l d

, c o n s t i t u t e “ c r i m i n a l l a w m a t t e r s ” f o r p u r p o s e s o f o u r m a n d a m u s

j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r A r t i c l e V

, S e c t i o n 5 ( c )

, o f t h e T e x a s C o n s t i t u t i o n

. I t h a s l o n g b e e n o u r 1 3

p r a c t i c e w i t h r e s p e c t t o p l e a d i n g s i n e x t r a o r d i n a r y m a t t e r s t o l o o k t o t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e

p l e a d i n g

, n o t i t s d e n o m i n a t i o n

. C o n s i d e r i n g t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e p r e s e n t a p p l i c a n t ’ s 1 4

1 2

See

, e. g

. , E

x p arte Lockett

, 956 S.W .2d 41, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (this Court lacke d

jurisdiction under Article 11.07 to enter tain a claim that assessment of a d ru g tax ag ainst the

applicant violated double jeopar dy beca use his “drug -tax claim does not reque st a chang e of either

the fac t or leng th of his confine ment”); Ex parte Bake r

, 185 S.W .3d 894, 897-98 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006) (Ar ti c le 1 1

. 0 7 h a

beas corpus relief “not available ” to challeng e eff ectivene ss of counsel during

post-conviction DNA

- te s ti n g proce eding s beca use those proce eding s do not, in themselves, “impose

an indep en dent confine ment”); Geor g e E. Dix & J ohn M. Schmolesky

, 43B T E X A S P R A C T I C E :

C R I M I N A L P R A C T I C E A N D P R O C E D U R E § 58:3, at 713-14 (3 ed

. 2 0 11) (“U se of the Article 11.07 r d

proce dure is

. . . limit ed to eff orts to challeng e either the fac t or leng th of the confine ment resulting

from a f elony conviction.”)

.

1 3

Johnson v. Tenth Judicial District Court of Appeals

, 280 S.W .3d 866, 869 (Tex. Crim. App.

2 0 0 8 ); Curry v. W

ilson

, supra

, at 43; Smith v. Flack

, 728 S.W .2d 784, 788-89 (Tex

. Crim. App

. 1987); T E X

. C O N S T

. art. V, § 5(c). Cf

. Armstrong

, supra

, at 767 (holding that sufficie ncy of the

evidenc e to support order to reimburse attorney fee s under Article 26.05(g ) constituted a “cr iminal

law matter ” for

purposes of invoking court of a ppeals’s a uthority to resolve c riminal appea ls).

1 4

E.g.

, Houlihan v. State

, 579 S.W .2d 213, 216-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Broggi v. Curry

, 571 S.W .2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); State ex rel. Vance v. Claws on

, 465 S.W .2d 164, 168-69

(Tex. Crim. App. 1971).DANI EL— 7

p l e a d i n g

, w e w i l l t r e a t i t a s a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t o f m a n d a m u s t h a t a s k s u s t o c o m p e l t h e

B e x a r C o u n t y D i s t r i c t C l e r k t o a m e n d t h e “ B i l l o f C o s t ” c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o c a u s e n u m b e r

2 0 0 0 C R 1 2 4 7 t h a t w a s f i l e d o n J u l y 2 7

, 2 0 1 1

.

B e f o r e w e m a y g r a n t e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e l i e f o n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n a s a w r i t o f m a n d a m u s

,

t h e a p p l i c a n t m u s t f

u l f i l l t w o p r e r e q u i s i t e s

. F i r s t

, h e m u s t s h o w t h a t h e l a c k s a n a d e q u a t e

l e g a l r e m e d y

. B e c a u s e t h e D i s t r i c t C l e r k ’ s “ B i l l o f C o s t ” c a m e n i n e y e a r s a f t e r t h e 1 5

j u d g m e n t o f c o n v i c t i o n w a s e n t e r e d

, l o n g a f t e r t h e a p p l i c a n t c o u l d h a v e c h a l l e n g e d i t i n t h e

c o u r s e o f a n o r d i n a r y a p p e a l

, b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t n o w c o n s t i t u t e a n i n d e p e n d e n t l y 1 6

a p p e a l a b l e o r d e r

, a n d b e c a u s e w e h a v e h e l d t o d a y t h a t i t c a n n o t b e c h a l l e n g e d i n a p o s t

1 7

c o n v i c t i o n h a b e a s c o r p u s p r o c e e d i n g

, w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t h a s s a t i s f i e d t h e

s h o w i n g t h a t h e h a s n o a d e q u a t e l e g a l r e m e d y a v a i l a b l e

. S e c o n d

, h e m u s t s h o w t h a t h e h a s

a c l e a r e n t i t l e m e n t t o t h e r e l i e f h e s e e k s

. I n t h e a p p a r e n t a b s e n c e o f a n o r d e r f r o m t h e t r i a l 1 8

c o u r t u n d e r A r t i c l e 2 6

. 0 5 ( g ) m a n d a t i n g t h e r e i m b u r s e m e n t o f a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y f e e s

— n o t

1 5

E.g.

, Bowen v. Carnes , 343 S.W .3d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

1 6

The a ppellant in Armstrong

was a ble to appea l the assessment of a ttorney fee s, but in that

case

, the bill of costs that included those fee s was “pre pare d” the day afte r the appellant’ s defe rre dadjudication probation was revoke d and the trial court signe d the judgme nt proce eding to

adjudication. 340 S.W.3d at 762.

1 7

The rig ht to appea l is confe rre d by statute. Johnson

, supra

, at 873, n.38. We a re awa re of

no statute confe rring a rig ht to appea l from a bill of costs independe ntly of the appea l o f t he

judgme nt of conviction in a c riminal case , as in Armstrong

.

1 8

Bowen

, supra

.DANI EL— 8

t o m e n t i o n t h e n e c e s s a r y f i n d i n g t h a t a p r e v i o u s l y i n d i g e n t a p p l i c a n t h a s t h e p r e s e n t f i n a n c i a l

w h e r e w i t h a l t o p a y t h o s e a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y f e e s

— t h e D i s t r i c t C l e r k l a c k e d a n y a u t h o r i t y

t o a s s e s s a t t o r n e y f

e e s a s p a r t o f t h e b e l a t e d “ B i l l o f C o s t ” f i l e d o n J u l y 2 7

, 2 0 1 1

. 1 9

A c c o r d i n g l y

, w e w i l l c o n d i t i o n a l l y g r a n t m a n d a m u s r e l i e f a n d o r d e r t h e B e x a r C o u n t y

D i s t r i c t C l e r k t o d e l e t e t h e a s s e s s m e n t o f c o s t s f o r a t t o r n e y f

e e s i n t h e a m o u n t o f $ 7

, 9 4 5

. 0 0

f r o m t h e “ B i l l o f C o s t ” t h a t w a s f i l e d o n t h a t d a t e

, c o r r e s p o n d i n g w i t h t h e j u d g m e n t i n c a u s e

n u m b e r 2 0 0 0 C R 1 2 4 7

, w h i l e l e a v i n g i n t a c t t h o s e c o s t s

, i n t h e a m o u n t o f $ 2 9 5

. 2 5

, t h a t w e r e

e x p r e s s l y i m p o s e d b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n t h e j u d g m e n t

.

W e a s s u m e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C l e r k w i l l i m m e d i a t e l y c o m p l y w i t h o u r o r d e r ; t h e w r i t

o f m a n d a m u s w i l l i s s u e o n l y i n t h e e v e n t t h a t s h e s h o u l d r e f u s e t o d o s o

. M a n d a m u s r e l i e f

i s c o n d i t i o n a l l y g r a n t e d

.

D E L I V E R E D : A p r i l 1 7

, 2 0 1 3

P U B L I S H

1 9

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 26.05(g ); Maye r

, supra

, at 556. I n Armstrong , we he ld that

“attorne y fee s as set forth in a cer tified bi ll of costs are eff ective whether or not incorporated by

ref ere nce in the written judgme nt.” 340 S.W .3d at 767. Even so, Article 26.05(g ) contemplates an

express order from the trial court to require a def endant to re imburse to the State “the a mount that

it finds [he] is able to pay .” The trial court has conce ded that it made no finding with respe ct to the

applicant’ s ability

to pay prior to the District Clerk’ s filing of the “B ill of Cost ” in this case.