1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 07 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r
. Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s 

### KIMBR O U G H v . UNI TED STAT ES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06–6 33 0. Ar g u ed Oc tober2, 2007—Dec i ded Dec e mber10, 200 7 Under the s t a t ute crimina lizing the man u f ac tu r ean d distr ibu t i onof
coca ine, 2 1 U. S

. C. §8 41 , a n d t h e releva nt Federa l S e nt encing G u ide

lines , adrug tra fficker dea l ing in cra ck co ca ine is s u bj ec tt o t h e sa m e sen t en c eas on e dealin gin10 0 ti mes more powder cocaine. Petitione r Kimbrough pleaded guilty t ofour o ffens es : cons pira cy t odis t rib u te crack and powder; possessio nwith inte nt to distr ibute mor ethan 50 gr ams of c r a ck; possess ionw i thin te nt to distribute powder; and pos

s e s s ion of a firea r min furt hera nce of a drug-trafficking offense. Un

derthe r e lev a nt statute s , Kimbr o ugh’ s plea subjec ted hi m to a mini

mu m pr isont e r mof 15 y e ar s an d a m a xi mum of life. The applicab le adv i sor yGu idelin es r a n g e was 22 8 to 2 70 mon t h s , or19 to 22. 5 yea r s
. The Dis t rict Court found, howe ve r, tha ta s e ntence in this
ra nge would have b een gr ea t e r t h a nneces s a ry t oa c com p lis h t h e pu r p oses of sen t en c i n gset for t hin18 U. S. C. §3553(a). In makin g that de ter m i n ation, the c o ur t r e lied in part on it s view tha t Kimbrough’s case exempl ifie d the “d i s prop ortionate and unjust effect t h a tcra ck coca ine guidelines have in s e ntencing .” The courtnot e d th at if Ki mbr o u gh h a d possessed on lypowder co caine, his Guidelines
r a n g e wou l d hav ebeenfarl o wer : 97 to 106 mon t h s
. Con c lu din gth at the statutor yminimum se ntenc e was long e n ough t oaccomplish §355 3(a)’ s o bj e c t iv es, th e c o u r t sen t en c e d Kimbr o u ghto 15 y e ar s, or 180 mon t h s , i n pr ison

. The Fou r thCir c u it v a c a tedt h e sen t en c e , fin d in gth at a sen t en c eou ts ide the Guidelines range is per s eun r e a sonable when it is based on a di sagreemen t with the sentencing dis

parity for crack and powder offenses. Held: 1. Un der Unit ed Statesv. Booker , 543 U. S. 22 0, th e c o c a in e Gu ide

lines, like a ll o t her Guidelines, are adv i sor yon ly , an d th e Fou r thCir

-2 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Sy llabu s cuit erred in holding the crack/po wder disparity effecti v ely manda

t o ry. A dis t ric tj u dge m u s tinclud e the Guidelines range in the array of factors warranting co nsiderat ion, but the judg e maydeter m ine th at, inth e par t ic u l arc a se, a with in-Guidelines senten ce is “greater than nec e ssar y” to serv e the objec t iv es of sen t en c i n g , §355 3(a). In makingthat d e ter m ination, the ju dge may consider the dispari t y be

tween the Guidelines’ treatment of crack and powder offens es
. Pp. 5– 21. (a) Crack and powder cocaine have the s a me physiolog i cal an d ps ychotropic e ffects , b u t a r e ha ndle d verydifferent ly for s e nt encing purposes. Th e relevantst a t utes and Guidelin es em plo ya 1 00-to- 1 ra t i o t h a tyields s e nt ences for cra ck offe nses three to sixtimes longer than those for offenses involving equal amounts of powder. Thus, a
m a j o r s u pplier of powderm a y receive as h ort e r s e nt enc et h a nalowlev e l dealerwh o bu y s powderan d c o n v er ts it to c r a c k

. Pp. 5–11. (1 ) The cra ck/p owder dis p arit y originated in the Anti-Drug Abu s e Ac t of 198 6 (1 986 Ac t), wh ic h c r e a t ed a two-t i er ed sc h e me o f five- a n d ten- yea rma nda t ory minimum s e ntences for dr ug ma nufa c turing and distribution offe nses. Congress apparentlyadopte d th e 100- to-1 r a tio bec a u s e it be li ev ed th at c r a ck, a r e lativ e lyn e w dr ugin 198 6, was s i g n ific an tlymor edan g er ou s th anpowder

. Thu s , th e 198 6 Ac t’ s fiv e -y earmandator y minimum app lies to anyd e fendant ac

c o u n t able for5 gr ams of c r a c kor500 gr ams of powder , an d its ten

y e arman d ato r ymin i mu m applie s to an ydefen d an t ac c o u n t able for 50 gr ams of c r a c kor5,000 gr ams of powder

. Indev e lopin gGu ide

lines s e nt ences for coca ine o ffens es, the Sentencing Co mmission em

ployed the statute’s weight-driven sc heme, r a therthan its usual e m pirica l a pproach b a s ed on pa s t s e nt encing pra c t i ces
. The s t a t ut e itself specifie s only two qua n tities of e a ch drug, but the Guidelines
u s ed th e 100-t o -1 r a tio to setsen t en c e s for a fu ll r a n g e of dr ugqu an titie s
. Pp. 6–8. (2) Based ona ddition al r e se ar c han d ex per i en c ewiththe 100

- to-1 r a tio, the Commi ssion later det e rm ined t h a tt h e cra ck/powde r differential do es not meet th e object ives of the Sentencing Reform Act
an d th e 1986 Ac t. Th e Com m iss i onalso f o u n dth e dispar ityin c o n s is

tent with the 19 86 Ac t’ s g o al of punishingmajordr ugtr affic k er s m o re s e verelyt h a nlow-level dea l ers , a n d furt herm ore ob s e rved t h at the differential fosters a l a ck of co nfidence in the criminal just ice sys

tem bec a use of a per c e ption that itpromotes an unwarranted diver

g e n c e based onr a c e
. Pp. 8–10. (3) Th e Comm issionh a s sev e r a l time s sou gh tto ac h i ev e a r e duct ion in t h ecra ck/powde rra t i o. Congr e s s rej e ct ed a 1 9 9 5 a m end

ment to the Guidelines thatwould hav ereplac ed the 1 00-to- 1 r a ti o with a 1- to-1 r a tio, but d i r e c t ed the Commission to pro p ose revisio n3 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s of the ratio under the relevant st atute s and Guidelines. Congress took no ac tionafter the Co mmis s ion’ s 19 97 and 2 0 0 2 r e por t s r e c o m mended changing the ratio. The Comm ission ’ s 20 07 r e por t ag ain
u r g e d Con gr e ss to amen d th e 1986 Ac t, bu t th e Commiss ionalso adopted ana m elior a tin gc h an g e in the Guidelines. The modest
amen dmen t, wh ic hbec a me effec t iv e onN o v e mber1, 2007, y i elds sen

tences for crack offenses between tw o and fiv etimes lon g erthan sen

tences for equa l amounts of powd er
. T h e Commi ssio nthus noted that it i s onlya par t ial r e medyto the pr oblems g e ner a ted bythe
c r a c k/powder dispar i t y
. Pp. 10– 11. (b) The federal sentencingstatute, as modified by Bo oker , re quir es a c o ur t to giv er e spectful considerat ion to the Guidelines, but “per mits th e c o u r t to tailorth e sen t en c ei nligh tof other[§3553(a) ]
c o n c er n s as well,” 54 3 U. S., at 24 5– 246. Th e Gov e r n m e n tc o n t en ds th at th e Gu idelin es adopt i n gth e 100-to-1 r a tio ar e anex c e ptionto this general freedom and offers thr ee arguments in supp ort of its po

sition , eac hof wh ic h th is Cou r t r ejec t s. Pp. 11–2 1. (1) The Government argues th at the 19 8 6Act i t self prohibits the Commi ssi on and sentencing cour ts from disagreei ng with the 100- to-1 r a t i o. Th is pos i tio nlac k s gr ou ndin ginth e st atu t e, wh ic h , byits ter m s, mandate s onlyma x i mum and minimum sentenc e s: A per s onc o nv ic t e d of possess i o nw i thin tent to distr ibu te 5 gr ams or m o re of cra c km u s tb es e n t ence d to a minimum of 5 y e ar s and a
max i mum of 40. A per s on with 50 gr ams ormor eof cr ac k mu st be sentenc e d to a minimum of 10 y e ar s and a max i mum of life. The
s t atute sa ys nothing ab o ut appropri ate sen t ences within these brack

ets, and this Cour t dec lines to r e ad any implicit directive into the congressional silence. See Jamav. Immigration a nd Customs En

forcem e n t , 543 U. S. 335, 34 1. Dr awin gm e an in gfr om silen c e is par

t i cula rly ina ppropria t e here, b e ca us e Congres s knows h o w t odirect
sen t en c i n gprac tic e s inex p r ess ter m s. S ee, e.g
. , 28 U. S. C. §994(h)

. Th is c a u t iou s r e adin gof th e 198 6 Ac t dr aws for c efr om Nealv. United States , 516 U. S. 28 4, wh ic hin v o lv ed differen tmeth ods o f c a lc u l atin g lysergic acid diethylamide ( L SD) we ights: The method applicab le i n deter m iningstatutor ymini mum sent ences combined the weight of the pure drug and its carrier me dium, while the one controlling the calculation of Guidelines ra nges pr es um ed a lower weightfor t h e ca r r i ermedium. This Cour t r ejec t ed the ar g u ment that the Guidelines and the st atu t e should be i n ter p r e ted c o nsistently , wit hthe Guide

lines’ presumptive-weight methodcontrolling the mandatory mini

m u mca lcula t ion. Were t h e Governm e nt ’ s currentpos i t i on correct , the Guidelines involved in Nealwould be in serious je opardy. The
same reasons alleged to jus t ify read ing into the 1 9 8 6Ac t an impl icit
c o mman dto th e Commiss io nan d sen t en cin gc o u r ts to applyth e 100

-4 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Sy llabu s t o -1 ra tio t o all cra ck q u a n tit i es could b e urged in s u pportof a na r g u ment that t h e 198 6 Ac tr e quir es the Co mmis s ion to i n c l ude the full weightof t h e ca rrier m e diu min ca lcula t ing LS D wei gh t s
. Yet Neal never questioned the Guidelines’ va lidi t y, and in factendorsed the Commi ssion ’ s fr eedom to ad opt a n e w met h od. If th e 1986 Ac t doe s not r e quir e the Commis s ionto adher eto the Ac t’ s method for deter

mining LS D weights , it does no t require the Commission—or, after Booker , sen t en c i n g c o u r ts—to adh e r eto t h e 100- to-1 r a tio forc r a c k quantitie s oth e rthan those tr ig g e ring the statutory mandatory mini

mu m sen t en c e s. Pp. 13–16. (2) The Gove rnment also argu es t h a tCongres s m a de clea r, in disappr ov in gth e Commi ssi on ’ s 1995 pr oposed Gu ideli n es amen d

men t , th at th e 1986 Ac t r e qu ir ed th e Commis s ionan d c o ur ts to r e spec t th e 100- to-1 r a t i o. Bu t n o th in ginCon gr e ss’ 199 5 ac tion su g g e sted th a tc r a c ksen t en c e s mu st ex ceed p o wder sentences by a rati o of 100 to 1. To th e c o n t r a r y , Congr e ss requ ir ed th e Commis s ionto recommend a revision of the ratio. The G o vernment argues that, by calling for recommendation s to change both the sta t ute and the Gu idelin es, Con gr e ss mean t to baran y Guidelines al t e ration in ad

vance of co ngressional acti on. Bu t the mor elikelyr e adingis tha t Con gr e ss sou gh tpr oposals t oamen d both the statute an d the Guide

lin es bec a u s e th e Comm is si on ’ s c r i tic i sms of th e 100- to -1 r a tio c o n cerned t h e e x o rb i t a nce of t h e cra ck/po w der dis p a r it y in b o t hcont ext s
. M o r eov er , as a r e su lt of th e 2007 amen d m en t, wh ic h Con gr e ss did not disapprove or modify, the Guide lines now deviate f r om the stat

u t e’ s 100- to-1 r a tio, adv a n c in ga r a tio th atv a r i es (at diff er en t offen s e lev e ls) betwee n25 to 1 an d 80 to 1. Pp. 16–1 8. (3 ) Fina lly, t h e Governm e nta r gues t h a t if dis t rict cour t s a r e free to deviate from the Gui d elines base don disagreeme n ts with the
cra ck/powde r ra t i o, “ unwa r r a nt ed s e nt ence dis p a r it ies , ” 1 8U. S

. C. §355 3(a)(6), w ill ensue. Th e Governmentclaim s that, because sen

tenc ingc o ur ts r e main bound bythe 198 6 Ac t’ s manda t or yminimum
sen t en c e s, deviation s fr om t h e 100-to-1 r a tio c o u l d r e su lt insen t en c ing“c liffs” ar ound quantities tr i g g e r i ng the mandator yminimums. For exa m ple, adis t rictcourtcould gra n t as i zab l e dow n wa rd va ri

an c eto a defe n d an t c o n v ic t e d of distr ibu t i n g49 gr ams of c r a c k , bu t would be r e quir ed bythe sta t utor yminimum to i m p o se a muc h higher sentence for only 1 addition al gram. The LS D Guidelines ap proved in Nea l, howe ver, cr ea t easim i la r ris kof s e nt encing“ c liffs .” The Gov e rnment also ma int a ins tha t , if di str i c tc o ur ts a r e per m itted to vary f r om the Guideline s basedon their disagreement with the crack/powde r dispari t y, defendants will receive marke d ly different
s e ntences depending on thepa rticula rj u dge dra w n fo rs e ntencing. While uniformity remains a n im port a n tsent encing goa l , Booker rec -5 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s ognized t h a t som edepa rt ur es fromuniform it y were an e ces s a ry cos t of t h e rem e dyt h a tdecis i ona d opt e d. And a s t ocra ck s e nt ences in pa rt icula r , pos s ib l e va ria t ions a m ong dis t rictcou r t s a r e cons t r a i ned bythe 1 986 Ac t’ s mand ato r yminimums. M o r eov er , t othe ex ten t that the Gov e r n ment c o rr ectlyidentifie s r i sks of “unwar r a nted sen

tenc e dispar it i e s” within the meanin g of § 3353(a)(6), the proper solu

t i on is for dist rictcourt s t o t a ke a ccountof s e nt encing pra c t i ces in otherc o ur ts and the “c liffs” r e sultingfr om the statuto r ymandator y minimum sen t enc e s and weigh thes e dis p ar ities ag ain s t th e oth e r §355 3(a) fac t o r s an d an y un war r a n t ed dispar it ies c r e ated byth e c r a c k/powder r a tio itse lf. Pp. 18–2 0. (c) Booker rendered the Sentencing Gui d elines advisory, 543 U. S., at 245, bu t pr eserv e d a keyr o le forth e Sen t en c i n gCommis

sion. In the ordinary case, the Comm is sion’s recom m e nda t ion of a sentencing ra nge will “reflect a rough approximation of sentences th at migh t ac h i ev e §3553(a) ’ s objec t iv es.” Ritav. Un it edSt at es , 551 U. S. ___, ___ (slip op., at 11). Th e sentencing jud g e, on the other ha nd, is “in as u perior pos i tion tofind facts and judge their import
u n d er§3553(a) ineac hpar t i c u l arc a se.” Gall v. United States , ante , at 13 (in t er n a l qu ota t ionm a r k s omi tte d). In light of these discrete ins t it utiona l st rengt h s , adis t rictcourt ’ s de cis i on t ova ry fromt h e a d

v i sor yGuidelines may attr a c t gr ea test respect when the sentencing j u dge finds a pa rticula rca s e“outside th e ‘hea rtla nd’ to which the Commi ssion i n tends indiv i dualGuidelines to app l y.” Rita , 551 U. S., at ___ ( s lip op ., at 12). On the ot her hand, while the Guidelines are no longer binding, closer revi ew ma y be in order whe nthe sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines base dsol e ly on the ju d g e’s view that the Guidelines range “fail s proper lyto r e flec t §355 3( a) c o n s ider a tions” even ina mine-run case. Ib i d

. Th e cra ck coca in e Guidelines , howeve r, pres entno occa s i on for el abor a t i v edisc ussion of this ma tter because those Guidelines do not ex emplify the Commissi o n’s exe rcise of its characte ristic inst ituti o nal r o le. Giv e n the Commi ssion’ s dep a r t u re fromit s em pirica l a ppr oa ch in form ul a t ing t h e cra c kGuidelines
a n d it s s u bs eq uentcrit i cis mof t h e cra c k/powder dis p a r it y, itwoul d notb ea n ab us e of dis cret i on for adis t r i ctcourtt oconclude whe n s e nt encing apa rt icula rdefenda n tt h a tthe cra ck/pow der dis p a r it y y i elds a sen t e n c e“gr e aterth ann e c e ssar y” to ac h i ev e §355 3(a)’ s pu r poses, ev enin a min e -r u n c a se. Pp. 20–21.

2. Th e 180-mo n t hsen t en c eimposed onKi mbr o u ghsh ould su rv iv e appell ate insp ection. The District Court bega n b yproperly ca lcula t

ing and considering the advi sory Guid eline s range. It then addresse d th e r e lev a n t§ 355 3(a) f a c t or s, in cluding the Sentencing Commi ssion’s
r e por t s c r i tic i zin gth e 100-t o -1 r a tio. Fin a lly , th e c o u r tdid n o t pu r por tto e s t abl i s ha r a tio of i t s own , bu t ap pr opr i atelyfr a m ed i t s f i n a l6 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Sy llabu s determinationin line wi th § 355 3(a) ’s overa rching ins t ru ct ion t o “i m pose a sen t en c esu ffic i en t, bu t n o t gr eater than nec e ssar y” to ac c o m plishth e sen t en c i n gg o als adv a n c ed in§3 553( a)(2). Th e c o u r t thu s r e sted its sen t en c eonth e appr op r i ate c o nsider ations and“c ommitted no procedural error,” Gall, an t e , at 17. Kimbr o u gh ’ s senten c ewas 4.5 years below the bottom of the Guide lines range. But in determining th at 15 y e ar s was th e app r opr i ate pr iso nter m , th e Distr i c tCou r t properly homed in on the particul a rcirc um s t a n ces of Kim b rough’s
ca s ea n d a ccorded weightt o t h e S e nt encing Com m i s s i on’ s cons ist e nt and emphatic position that t h e crack/powd e r disparity is at odds with §355 3(a). Gi v i n gdu e r e spec t to the Di strict Court’s reasoned ap

pr aisal, a r e v i ewin g c o u r t c o u l d n o t r a tion allyc o n c lu de th at th e 4.5

- yea rs e nt ence reduct ion Kimb rough receiv ed q u a lified as a nab u s eof disc r e tion

. Pp. 21–23. 174 Fed. Appx . 798, r e v e r s ed an d r e man d ed.

G IN SB U R G , J., delivered the opinion of the Cour t, in whic h R OBERTS , C. J., and S TEVENS , S CALIA , K ENNEDY , S OUTER , and B REY ER , JJ., joined. S CALIA , J., filed a concurring opinion. T HO MA S , J., an d ALITO , J., filed dissenting opi n ions._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt

NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s
. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–6 33 0


### DER R ICK KIMBR O U G H, P E TIT I ONER v. UNITE D STATE S
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [Dec ember10, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G

### delivered the opinion of th e Court. This Court’s remedial opinion i n UnitedSta t es v. Booker , 54 3 U. S. 220, 244 (20 05), instru cted district courts to read the Unit ed States S e ntencing Guidelines as “effectivelyadvisory,” id. , at 24 5. In accord with 18 U. S. C. §3 553(a), the Guidelines, formerly mandatory,
now serve as one factor amon g several courts must consider in determining an appropriate senten ce. Booke r further instructed tha t“reasonableness” is t h e standard controlling appellate review of the sentences district courts impose. Under the statute criminalizing the manufacture a n d distribution of cra ck cocaine, 21 U. S. C. §8 41, and th e relevant Guidelines prescriptio n, §2D1.1, a drug trafficke r dealing in crack cocain e is subject to the same sentence as one dea ling in 100tim e s more powder cocain e. The question here presented is whether, as the Cou rt of Appea l s held in this case, “a s e ntence .

. . outside the guidelinesrange is per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the s e ntencing disparity fo r cra ck an d powder cocaine offens es.” 174 Fed. Appx. 7 98, 799 (CA42 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### 2006) (per curiam)

. We hold th at, under Booker , the cocaine Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory only, and that the Court of Appe als erred inholding the
crac k/powd e r disparity effectively mandator y. A distric t judge must include the Guideline s range in the array of factors warranting consideration. The judge may determine, how e ver, that, in th e particular ca se, a withinGuidelines sentence is “greater than necess ary” to serve the objectives of senten cing. 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. V). In ma king tha tdetermination, the judge may consider the disparity betwe e n the Guidelines’ treatment of crack and po wder cocaine offenses. I In September 2004, pe titioner De rrick Kimbrough wa s indicted in the United States Dist rict Court f o r the East

ern District of Virginia and cha r ged withfo ur offenses: conspiracy to distribute crack and powder cocaine; poss es sion with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine; possession with inte nt to distribute powder cocaine; and possession of a firearm i nfurtheran ce of a drugtrafficking offense. Kimbrough pleaded guilty to all four charges. Under the relevant statutes, Kimbrough’s plea subjecte d him to ana ggregate se ntence of 1 5 years to l i fe inpriso n : 10 years to life for the t h ree drug offenses, plu s a consecutive term of 5 years t o life for t h e firearm offense. 1 

### In

——————

1 The statutor yr a ng e forposses s ion with intent to di st r ibute mor e th an50 gr ams of c r a c kis teny e ar s to life. See 2 1 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A)(i ii) (200 0 ed. an d Su pp. V). Th e same r a n g e applies to t h e c o n s pir a c yoffen s e. See §846 (2 00 0 ed.). Th e statu t or yr a ng e for posses s ionwit hin ten tto di str ibu te powd erc o c a in e is 0 to 20 y e ar s. See §841(b)(1) ( C) (Supp. V). Finally , the statutory range for posse ssion of afirea r m in furt hera n c e of adrug -trafficking offense is five years to life. See 18 U. S. C. §924(c ) (1)(A)(i). Th e sen t en c e s for th e th r ee dr ug c r i mes mayru n c o n c u r r e n t ly , see §3584( a), bu t th e sen t en c eforth e firearm offense must be consecutive, see §9 24(c)(1)(A).3 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### order to de termine the appropria t e sentence within this statutory range, the Distric t Court firstcalculated Kimbrough’s sentence under th e advisorySentencing Guidelines. 2 

### Kimbrough’s guilty plea acknowledged that he was accountable for 56 grams of cra ck cocai n e and 92.1 grams of powder cocaine. This quantity of drugs yielded a base off e ns e leve l of 3 2 for the t h ree drug charges. Se e United States Sentencing Commis sion, Guidelines Manual §2D1.1(c) (Nov. 2004) (USSG). Finding that Kimbrough, by asserting sole culpability for the crime, had testified falsely at his codefen d ant’s trial , the District Court in

creased his offense level to 34. See §3C1.1. Inaccord with the presentence report, the court deter m ined tha t Kimbrough’s criminal history ca te gory was II. An offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of II yielded a Guidelines range of 16 8 to 210 m o nths for the three drug charges. See id. , ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table. The Guidelines sentence for the firearm offense was the statutory minimum, 60 months. See USSG §2K2.4 (b). Kimbrough’s final advisory Guidelines range was thus 22 8 to 270 months, or 19 to 22.5 years. A sentence in this range, in the District C o urt’s judg

ment, would have been“greater th an necessary” to accom

plish the purposes of sentencing set forth in18 U. S. C

. §3553(a). App. 72. As required by §3553(a), t h e court took into account the “natu r e and circu mstances” of the offense and Kimbrough’s “history and characteristics.” Id. , at 72– 73. The court also commented that the case exemplified the “dispro p ortionate and unjust effect that crac kcocai n e guidelines have in sentencing.” Id

. , at 72. In this regard, the court contrasted Ki mbrough’s Guidelines range of 228

——————

2 Kim b roughw a s s e nt enced in April 2 0 05, t h ree m o nt h s a f t e r our decision in Bookerv. United States , 543 U. S. 220 (200 5) , r e n d er ed th e Guidelines advis o ry. T h e Dis t rict Court employed the version of the Gu idelin es effec t iv e Nov e mber1, 2004.4 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### to 270 months with the range that would have applied had he been accountable for an equiva lent amount of powde r cocaine: 97 to 106 mon t hs, inclusive of the 5- year manda

tory minim u m for the f i rearm char ge, see USS G§2D1.1(c) ; id. , ch. 5, pt. A, Sente n cing Tabl e. Concluding that th e statutory m i nimum sentence was “clearly long enough” to accomplish the objectives listed in §3553(a), the cou r t sentenced Kimbroughto 15 ye ars, or 18 0 months, in prison plus 5 years of supervised release. App. 74–75. 3 

### In an un published p e r cu riam opinion, the Fourth Circuit vaca te d the sente n ce. Un der Cir c ui t p r eceden t, t h e Court of Appeals observed, a sentence “outside the guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the sentenci n gdispari t y f o r cra c kan d powde rco caine offenses.” 174 Fed. Appx., at 799 (citi n g Uni t ed S t a t esv. Eura , 440 F. 3 d6 25, 633–634(CA4 2006)).

We granted certiorari, 551 U. S. ___ (2007), to determine whether th e crac k/powder disparit y adopted i nthe Unite d States Sentencing Guidelines ha s beenren d ered “advisory” by ourdecision in Booker

. 4

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3 The prison sentence consisted of 120 mo nths on each of the three drug count s , t ob es e rved co ncu rre ntly , plus 6 0 months on the firea r m count, to b es e rved co ns ecutiv ely.

4 This question has divided the Courts of Appeal s. Compare United States v. Pi ck ett , 475 F. 3d 134 7, 135 5– 135 6 (CADC 200 7) (Distr ic t Courterred w h en itconcl u ded t h a tithad no dis cret i on t ocons ider t h e cra ck/powde r dis p a r it y in i m pos i ng as e nt ence), a n d Un it e d St at es v. Gunt er , 462 F

. 3d 23 7, 2 48– 249 (CA 3 200 6) (s ame), wit h United Stat es v. Leat ch , 482 F. 3d 790, 7 9 1 (CA5 2 0 0 7 ) (per c u riam )(sentencing court maynot i m po se asentenc eoutside the G u idelines range based on i t s disagreement with the cr ack/powder disparity), United Statesv. J o hn

son , 474 F. 3d 515, 522 (C A 8200 7) (same ) , Unit ed S t at es v. Castillo , 460 F. 3d 337, 361 ( CA2 20 06) (s ame), United S t ates v. Williams , 456 F. 3d 135 3, 13 69 (C A11 20 0 6) (sa m e), United Stat es v. Miller , 450 F. 3d 270, 27 5– 276 (CA7 20 06) (s ame), United States v. Eura , 440 F. 3d 62 5, 633 –6 34 (C A4 200 6) (s ame), an d United St ates v. Pho , 433 F. 3d 53, 62 – 63 (CA 1 200 6) (same).5 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### II We begi n with some background on the differ e nt treatment of crack and powder co caine under th e federal sentencing laws. Crack and powder cocaine are two forms of the sam e drug. Powder cocaine, o rcocaine h y drochlorid e, is genera lly inhaled through the nos e ; it may also be mixed withwater andinjected

. See Unit edStates Se ntencing Commiss ion , Special Rep o rt to Congress: Coca i n e and Federa l Sentencin gPolicy 5, 12 (Feb. 19 95), availab l e at http://www.ussc.gov/crack/e xec.htm (herei nafter 1995 Report). (All Intern et materi als as visited Dec. 7, 2007, and incl uded in Cl erk of Court’ s case file.) Cr ack cocaine,
atype of co ca i n e b a se , i s fo rm ed by dissolving powde r cocaine andbaking soda in b o iling water. Id. , at 14. The resulting solid is divi ded into si ngle-dose “rocks” that users smok e. Ibid. The active ingredient in powder and
crac kcocai n e is the same. Id. , at 9. The two forms of th e drug also have the same physiological and psychotropic effects, but smoking crac kcocai n e allows the body t o absorb the drug much faster than inhalin g powder cocaine, and thus produ c es a shorter, more intense high. Id. , at 15–19. 5 

### Al th ou g hch emi c all y si mil a r, c r a c k a n d p o wde rco cai n e ar e ha nd le d very di ff er ent l y f o rse nt enc i n gpurp os e s
. Th e 10 0-t o -1 rat i o yields se nt ences for cr ack offenses thr ee t o sixtim e s l o ng er th an t h o s e f o r p o wd er off e ns e s inv o lv ing equ a l am ou nts of dr u g s. See U n it ed Stat es Sentenc i ngCommission, Repo rtto Congr e ss: Coc a ine and Federal S e nt encing P o licy iv (M ay 20 0 2 ) , a v a i l a b l e a t h t t p : // www.ussc.gov/r_con gress/02cra ck/ 2002crackrpt.pdf (here i nafter 2002 Report). 6

### T h i s d i s p a r ­

——————

5 Injecting po wder co caine produces effec t s simil a rto sm okin gcr ac k
c o c a in e, bu t v e r yfew powder u s er s in jec tth e dr u g
. See 1995 Repor t18. 6 As ex plainedin Part II– C, infra , the Sentenc i ng Commi ssio n amended the Guidelines and reduce d s e nt ences forcra ckoffens es6 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### ity means that a maj o r supplier of powdercocaine ma y receive a s h orter sentence than a low-level dealer wh o buys powd er from th e supplier but then c o nverts it to crack. See 1995 Report 193–194. A The crack/ p owder disparity originated in the Anti-Dru g Abuse Act of 1986 (1986 Act), 10 0 Stat. 320 7. The 1986 Act create da two-tiered scheme of five- and ten-ye ar mandatory minimum sentences for drug manufacturing and distrib u tion offenses. Congress sought “to link th e ten-year m andatory m i nimum tra fficking pri s on term to major drugdealers and to link the five-year minimum term to seri ous traffickers.” 1995 Report 119. The 1 9 8 6 Act uses the weight of the drugs involved in the offens e a s the sole proxy to iden tify “majo r” and “serio us” dealers. For exampl e, any defe ndant responsible for 100 grams of heroin is subject to the five-year m andatory m i nimum, see 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(B)(i) (2000 ed. and Supp V), and a n y defendant responsible f o r 1,000 grams of h e roin is subject to the ten-year mandatory minimum, see §841 (b)(1)(A)(i). Crack cocai n e was a re latively new drug whe nthe 1986 Act was signed into law, but it was already a matter o f great public concern: “Dru g abuse in gen e ral, and crack cocaine in particular, had become i npublic opinion and in members’ minds a problem of overwhelming dimension s .” 1995 Report 121. Congress apparently believ e d that crack was significantly more dangerous than powder cocaine in that: (1) crack was highly addictive; (2) cra ck users a n d dealers were more likely to be violent than users a n d dealers of other drugs; (3) crack was more harmful to users than powder, pa rticularlyfor children who had been exposed by their mothers’ dr ug us e during pregnancy; (4 )

—————— effec t iv e Nov e mber1, 20 07. Ex c e pt a s not e d, this op inio n refers to the 200 4 Guidelines in effect at the time of Kimbr o ugh’ s sentenc i ng
.7 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### crackuse was especially prevalent among teenagers; a n d (5) crac k ’s potency an d low co st were maki ng it incre asingly popular. See 2002 Report 90. Based on these assu mptions, the 1986 Act adopted a “100-to-1 ra tio” that tre ated every gram of cra ck cocaine as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocain e. The Act’s five-year m andatory m i nimum applies to any defendan t accountable for 5 gram s of crack o r500 gram s of powder, 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)( B)(ii), (iii); its ten-year mandatory minimum applies to any defendant accountable for 5 0 grams of crack or 5,00 0 grams of powder, §8 41(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii). While Con gress was considering adoption of the 1986 Act, the Se ntencing Commission w a s engaged in formulating the Sen t encing Guidelines. 7

### In the main, t h e Commission developed Guidelines senten ces using an empirical approach based ondata about p a st sentencing practice s, including 10,000 presentence investigation reports. See USSG §1A. 1, intro. co mment., pt. A, ¶3. The Commission “modif[ied] and adjust[ e d] past practice in the interests of greater rati onality, avoiding inconsistency, complying with congressional instructions, and the like.” Ri tav. Uni t ed Sta t es , 551 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (sl i p op., at 10). The Commission did not use this empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for dru g -traffic k in g offenses. Instead, it employed the 1986Act’s weightdriven scheme. The G u idelines u s e a drug quantity tab l e based on dr ug type and weight to set base offense levels for drug trafficking of fenses. See USSG §2 D1.1(c). I n setting offense levels for cra c kand powdercocaine, the Commission, in lin e with the 1986 Act, adopted the

——————

7 Congr e ss cr eated the Sente n c i ng Commis s ion and c h arg e d it with pr omu l g a tin gth e Gu idelin es inth e Sen t e n c i n gRefor m Ac t of 1 984, 9 8 Sta t . 198 7, 18 U. S. C. §3551 etseq
. (2000 ed. an d Su pp. V), bu t th e fir s t version of the Guidelines d i d not becom eoperative u n til Novembe r 198 7, see 199 5 Repor tii–iv

.8 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### 100-to-1 ratio. The statute it self specifies only two quantities of eachdrug, but the Guideli n es “go furt her and set sentences f o r the full range of possible dr ug quantities using the same 100-to-1 quantity ratio.” 1995 Report 1. The Guidelines’ drug quantity table sets base offen s e levels ranging from 12, for offenses involving less than 250 milligrams of crack (o r 25 grams of powder), to 38, for offenses involving more than 1.5 kilograms of crack (or 150 kilograms of powder). USSG §2D1.1(c). 8 

### B Although the Commission im mediately used th e 100-to-1 ratio to define base offens e levels for all crack an d powder offenses, it later determined that the c r ack/ powde r sentencing disparity is generally unwarran t ed. Based on additional research and experien ce with the 10 0-to-1 ratio , the Commission concluded that the disparity “fails to meet the sentencing objectiv e s set forth by Congres s in both the Sentencing Reform Act andthe 1986 Act. ” 2002 Report 91. In a series of reports, the Commission identified three problems with the crack/ p owder disparit y. First, the Commission reported, th e 100-to-1 ratio rested on assumptions about “the relative harmfulness of the two drugs and t h e relative prevalence of certain harmful conduct associ ated with their use and distributi o n that more recent research and data no longer support.” Ibid.; see United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 8 (M ay 2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/ cocaine2007 .pdf (herei n a f t e r 2007 Report) (ra t io Congress embedded in the statute far “over s tate[s]” both “the relative harmfu l ness” of crack cocaine, and the “seriousness of

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8 An offense level of 12 res u lts in a Gui d elines range of 10 to 16 months for a first-time offen d er; an offe nse level of 38 results in a range of 235 to 2 9 3 mon t h s forth e same offen d er
. See USSG c h

. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table.9 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### most crac k cocaine offenses”). For example, the Commission found that crack i s associatedwith “significantly less traffic k ing- related violence .

. . th an previously assumed.” 2002 Report 100. It also obs e rved that “the negative effects of prenatal cra ck cocaine exposure are identical to the negative effects of prenatalpowder cocaine exposure. ” Id. , at 94. The Com m ission furthermore noted that “the epidemic of crack cocai n e use by youth never materialized to the extent feared.” Id. , at 96. Second, the Commission c o ncluded that the crack/powder disparity is inconsis tent with the 1986 Ac t’s goal of punishing major drug tr affickers m o re severely than low-level dealers. Drug im porters and major traffickers generally deal in powder cocaine, which is then converted i n to crack by street-level sellers. See 1995 Report 66– 67. But the 100-to-1 ratio canlead to the “anomalous” result th at “retail c r ack dealers get longer sentences than the wh olesale drug distributo r s who supply them the powder cocaine from which their crac kis produced.” Id. , at 174. Finally, the Commissi on stated that the crack/po wde r sentencing differential “fosters disrespect for and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system” because of a “widely-held percep t ion” thatit “promotes unwarran t ed disparity ba sed on race. ” 2002 Rep o rt 103. Approximately 85 percent of defendants convic ted of crac koffenses in federal court are black; thus the severe sentences required by the 100-to-1 ratio are imposed “primarily upon black offenders.” Ibid. Despite these ob servations, theCommissi on’s most recent repo rts do noturge id entica l treatment of crac kan d powder cocaine. In the Commissi on’s view, “some differential in the quantity-based penalties” for the two dru g s i s warran t ed, id. , at 102, because crack is m o re addictive than powder, crack offenses are more likely to involve weapons or bodily inju ry, and cra c k distribution is associ­10 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### ated with higher levels of crime, see id. , at93–94, 10 1– 102. But the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio, the Commission concluded, significantly overst ates the differe nces betwee n the two forms of the drug. Accor d ingly, the Commission recommended that th e ratio be “substantially” reduce d. Id. , at viii. C The Commi ssion has s e veral times sought to achieve a reduction in the cra ck/powder ra tio. In 1995, it proposed amendments to the Gu idelines that would have replaced the 100-to-1 ratio with a 1-to-1 ratio. Complementing that change, the Commiss i on wouldhave inst alled special enhancements for trafficking offe nses involving weapon s or bodily injury. Se e Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25075– 25077 (199 5). Congress, acting pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §994(p), 9

### rejected the amendments. See Pub. L. 104–38, §1, 109 Stat. 334. Simultaneou sly, however, Congre ss directed th e Commission to “pro pose revisi onof the dru g quantity ra tio of crack cocaine to powder cocai n e under the relevant statutes and guidelines.” §2(a)(2), id ., at 335. In response to this d i rective, th e Commission issued reports in 1997 and 2002 recommending th at Congress change the 100-to-1 ratio prescribed in the 19 86 Act. The 1997 Report proposed a 5-to-1 ratio. See United States SentencingCommission, Special Report t o Congress: Cocaine an d Federal Sentencing Policy 2 (Apr. 1997), http://www.ussc.gov/r_congre ss/newcra ck. pdf. The 200 2 Report reco mmended lowering th e ratio “at least” to 20 to 1. 2002 Report viii. Neither proposal prompted congres

sional action. The Commission’s most recent report, issued in 2007,

——————

9 Su bsec tion99 4(p) r e qu ir es th e Commis s i o n to submitGuidelines amendments to Congress and provides th at su c hamen dmen ts bec o me effective unles s “modifie dor di sapproved by Act of Congress.”11 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### again urged Congress to amend th e 1986 Act to reduce the 100-to-1 ratio. This time, however, the Commission di d not simply await congr e ssional action. Instead, the Commission adopted an am eliorating change in th e Guidelines. See 2007 Report 9. Th e alteration, whichbecame effective on November 1, 2007, reduces the base offens e level associated witheach quantity of cra ck by two levels. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guideline s for United States Cou rts, 72 Fed. Reg. 2857 1–28572 (2007). 10

### T h i s modest am endment yields se ntences for crack offenses between two and five times longer than sentences f o r equal am ounts of powder. See ibid

. 11 

### Describing the amendment as “only .

. . a partial remedy” f o r the problems generated by the crac k/po w der dispari t y, the Co mmission not e d that “[a]ny compreh e nsive solut i on requires appropriate legislative action by Congress.” 2007 Report 10. III With this history of the crac k/powd e r sentencing ratio i n mind, we next consider the status of the Guidelines tied to the ratio after our deci sion in United Statesv. Booker , 5 43 U. S. 220 (2005). In Booker , the Court held that the man­

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10 The amended Guidelines s t ill produc e se ntencing ranges keyed to th e man d a t or ymin i mu ms i nth e 19 86 Ac t. Un derth e pr e-2007 Gu ide

lin es, th e 5- an d 50-gr am qu an titie s tha ttr ig g e rthe sta t utor yminimums produced s e ntencing ra nges tha t s lightly exceededthose statu

tor yminimum s
. Underthe amended Gu id elines, in contrast, the 5- an d 50-gr am qu a n tities pr odu c e “base offe nse levels corresponding t o guideline ranges that incl udethe stat utor ymandat or yminimum pen a lties.” 2 0 07 Repor t9.

11 The Commis s i on has not y e t dete rmined whether the amendment will be retroactive to cover d e fendan ts like Kimbrough. Even under the
amen dmen t, h o wev e r , Kimb r o u gh’ s Gu idelin es r a n g e wou l d be 195 t o 218 mon t h s —well abov e th e 18 0-mo n t hsen t en c eimposedbyth e District Court. See Amen dments to the Sentencing Guidelines for Un ited Sta t es Cou r ts, 7 2 F e d. Reg

. 28 57 1–2 85 72 ( 2 0 0 7 ); US SG c h

. 5, pt. A, S e ntenci ng Tab l e.12 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### datory Sentencing Guidelines sy stem violated the Sixth Amendment. See id. , at 226–227. The Booker remedial opinion determined that the ap pr opriate cur e was to se ver and excise the provision of th e statute that rendered th e Guidelines mandatory, 18 U. S. C. §3553(b)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). 12 

### This modification of the federal sentencing statute, we explained, “makes the Guidelines effectivel y advisory.” 543 U. S., at 245. The statute , as modified by Booker , contains an overarching p r ovision instructing dist r i ct courts t o “impose a sentence s u fficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish the goals of sentencing, including “to reflect the serious n ess of the offense, ” “to promote respect for th e law,” “to p r ovide justpunishment for the offense,” “to afford adeq uate deterr ence to cri minal conduct,” an d “ t o protect the public from further crimes of the defendant .” 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. V). The statute further p r ovides that, in determining the appropria t e sentence, the court should consider a number of factor s , including “the nature and circum s tances of the offens e, ” “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” “th e sentencing range established” b ythe Gui d elines, “a ny pertinent policy statement” issued by th e Sentencing Commission pursuant to its statutory autho rity, and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been foun d guilty of similar conduct.” Ibid. I nsum, whil e the statute still requires a court to give re spectful consideration to the Guidelines, see Gall v. UnitedStates , an te , a t 7, 11, Booker “permits th e court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well,” 543 U. S., at 245–246.

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12 The remedial opinion also severed and excised the provision of the sta t ute requiring de novore view of departures from the Guidelines, 18 U. S. C. §3742 (e), bec a u s e th at pr ov isiondepen d ed onth e Gu idelin es’
ma nda t ory s t atus

. Booker , 5 43 U. S., at 24 5.13 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### The Govern ment ackno w ledges tha tthe Guide lines “are now adviso ry” an d tha t , as a gene ral matter, “courts ma y vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations, including d i sagreements with the Guidelines.” Brief for United State s 16; cf. Ritav. Uni t edSta t es , 55 1 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 12) (a district court may consider arguments that “the Guidelines sentence itsel f fails properly to reflect §3553(a) considerations”). But the Government contends that the Guidelines adopting the 100-to-1 ratio are an exception to the “general freedom that sentencing courts have to a pply the [§ 3553(a)] factors.” Brief for United States 16. That is so, according t o the Government, because the ra tio is a “specific polic y determinatio[n] that Congre ss has directed sentencing courts to o b serve.” Id

. , at 25. The Government offers three arguments in support of this position. We consider each in turn. A As its first and most heavily pressed argument, the Government urges tha tthe 1986 Act itself prohibits the Sentencing Commission and se ntencing courts from dis

agreeing wi th the 100-to-1 ratio. 13 

### The Government ack n owledges that the “Congress did not expres s l ydirect th e SentencingCommission to incorporate the 100:1 ratio in the Guideli n es.” Brief for United States 33 (brack ets and internal qu otation ma rks omi tted)

. Nevertheless, it asserts that t h e Act “[i] mplicit[ly]” requires the Commission and sentencing courts to apply th e 100-to-1 ratio. Id. , a t 32. Any deviation, the Govern ment urges, would be “logi­

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13 The Gove rnm e ntconcedes tha ta dist rict courtm a y va ry fromt h e 100- to-1 r a t i o if it doe s so “b ased onth e in div i du alized c i r c u mstan c e[s]” of a particular case. Brief for Unit ed States 45. But the Go vernme nt main ta in s th a tth e 100- to-1 r a tio is bin d i n ginth e sen s e th a t a c o u r t
m a y notgive a n y weightt o it s own viewthat the r a tio i t self i s inc o nsis

ten twithth e §355 3(a) fac t or s.14KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### cally incoherent” whe ncombined with man d atory min i

mum sentences based on the 100-to-1 ratio. Id ., at 33. This argu ment encounters a formidable obstacle: It lacks groun d ing in the text of the 1986 Act. The statute, by its terms, mandates only maximum and minimu m sentences: A person convicted of possessi on w i th intent to distribute 5 grams or more of cra ck cocaine must be sentenced to a minimum of 5 years an d the maxi mum term is 40 years. A person with 50 grams or more of crack cocaine must be sentenced to a minimum of 10 years and th e maximum term is life. The statute says nothi n g about th e appropriate sentences within th ese bracke ts, and we decline to read any implicit directive into that congre ssional si len c e. See Jamav. Im migration and Customs Enforcem en t , 543 U. S. 335, 341 (2005) (“We do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requiremen t s that it nonetheles s intends to apply .

. . .”). Dra w ing m e aning from silence is particularly inappropriate here, for Congres s has shown that it knows how to direct sentencing pra cti ces in express terms. F o r example,Congress has specifically required the Sentencing Commission to set Guidelines sent ences for serious recidivist offenders “a t or near” the statutory maximum. 28 U. S. C. §994(h). See also §994(i) (“The Commission shall assure that the gui d elines spec ify a senten ce to a subs tantial ter m of imprisonment” fo r s p ecified categories of offenders.). Our cautious reading of the 1986 Act draws force fro m Neal v. Un ited States , 516 U. S. 284 (1996). That case involved different methods of ca lculating lysergic aci d diethylamide (LSD) we ights, one applicable in determining statuto r y minimum sentences, the other controlling the calcula t ion of Gui d elines ranges. The 1 986 Act sets mandatory minimum s e ntences ba sed on the weight of “a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount” of LSD. 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A)(v), (B)(v). Prior to Neal , we had interpreted that la nguage to i n clude the weight of the15 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### carrier med i um (usually blotter p a per) on which LS D i s absorbed even though the carrier is usually far heavier than the LSD i t self. See Chapm a nv. United St at es , 50 0 U. S. 453, 468 (1991). Until 1993, the Sentencing Commission had interpret e d the relevant Guide lines in the same way. That year, however, the Commission changed its approac hand “instructed cour ts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier me dium a co nstructive or presumed weight of 0.4 milligra ms.” Neal , 516 U. S., at 287 (citin g USSG §2D1.1(c), n. (H) (Nov. 1 995)). The Commission’s change significantly lowered the Guidelines range applicable to m o st LSD offenses, butdefendants remained subject to higher statutory minimum sentences based on the combined weight of the pure drug and it s carrier medium. The defendant in Neal argued that the revised Guidelines and the statute should be interpreted consis

tently andthat the “ p resumptiv e -weight method of the Guidelines should also control th e mandatory minimum calculation.” 516 U. S., at 287. We rejected that argument, emphasizing that the Commission had not purported to interpret the statute andcould not in any event overrule our decision in Chapman

. See 516 U. S., at 29 3– 295. If the Government’s current position were correct, then the Guideli n es i n volved in Nealwould b e in s e riou s je opardy. We have justrecount edthe reas o n s al legedto justify reading into the 1986 Act a nimplicit command to the Comm issi on andsentenc i ng courts to apply the 100-to-1 ra tio t o a l l q u antities of crack cocaine. Th os e same rea s ons could be urged i ns u p p o r to f a na r g u m e n t that the 1 9 86 Act requ ires th e Co mmiss iont o inc l ude t h e full weight of the ca rrier medi um in cal c ulating th e weight of LSD for Guidelin es pur p ose s
. Yetour opini o n in Nealnever que s ti oned th e validity of the alter e d Guideli n es
. To the contrary, we stated: “Entrusted within its sph e re t o make p o l i c y judgments, the C o m m iss i onma y16 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### abandon it s old method s in favor of what it h a s deem ed a
mo re de sirable ‘approa ch’ to ca lculating LS D quantities.” Id. , at 295. 14 

### If the 1986Act does not require the Commission to adhere to the Act ’ s method for determining LSD weights, itdoes not require the Commission—or, aft e r Booker , sentencing courts—to adh e re to the 100-to-1 ratio for crack co caine quant ities other than those that trigger the statutory mandatory minimum sentences. B In addition to the 1986 Act, the Government relies on Congress’ d i sapproval of the Guid elines amendment tha t the Sentencing Commissionproposed in199 5. Congres s “not only disapproved of the 1:1 ratio,” the Government urges; it also made clear “that th e 1986 Act required the Commission (and sentencing courts) to take drug quantities into ac count, and to do so in a manner that respects the 100:1 ratio.” Brief for United States 35. It is true th at Congress rejected the Commission’s 1995 proposal to place a 1-to-1 ratio in the Guidelin es, and that Congress also expresse d the view that “the sentence imposed for trafficking in a quantity of crack cocaine shou ld

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14 At or al ar g u men t , th e Go v e r n ment s o ught to dis t inguis h Nealv. United States , 51 6 U. S. 284(19 96), onth e gr ou n dth at th e v a lid ityo f the amended Guidelines was not before us in that cas e
. S ee Tr. of Oral Ar g
. 25. Th at is tr u e , bu t on ly b e ca us e the Gove rnme nt did not cha l

lenge the amendment. In fact, th e Gov e r n men t ’ s brief appear ed to acknowledge th at the Commission ma yl e gi tima telydev i ate fr om th e policies and methods em bo died in th e 1986 Act, even if the deviatio n produces s o me incons is tency. See Brief for United St ates in Neal v. United Stat es , O. T. 1995, N o . 94– 908 8, p. 26 (“Wh enth e Comm iss i on ’ s views ab o ut s e ntencingpolicy depa rtf r o mthose of Congress, it may bec o me diffic u lt to ac hiev e entir e lyc o nsistent sentenc i ng , but that is a mat t erforC o ngr e ss, not the c o ur ts, to addr ess.”). M o r eov er , our opinion in Nea l assumed tha tthe amendm ent was a legi timate ex er c i se of th e Commission ’ s au th or ity

. See 516 U. S., at 29 4 (n otin g with appar e n tapp r ov al th e Commis s ion ’ s p o sition that “ t he Guideline s ca lcula t ion is independent of the s t a t utory ca lcula t ion”).17 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### generally exceed the s e ntence imposed for tr afficking ina like quantity of powder cocai n e.” Pub. L. 104–38, §2(a)(1)(A), 109 Stat. 3 34. Bu t no thing in Congress’ 199 5 reaction to the Com m ission-proposed 1-to-1 ratio su ggested that crack sentences mu st exceed powder sentences by a ratio of 100 to 1

. To the c o ntrary, Co ngress’ 1995 action required the Commissiont o recommend a “revisionof the drug quantity ratio of crack cocaine to powder cocaine.” §2(a)(2), id. , at 335. The Govern ment emphasizes that Congress re quired the Commission to propose changes to the 100-to-1 ratio in boththe 1986 Act and the Guidelines. This requirement , the Govern ment contends, implicitly foreclosed any devi ation from the 100-to-1 ratio in th e Guidelines (or by sentencing cou rts) in the absence of a corresponding chan g e in the statute. See Brief for United States 35 –36. But it does not foll ow as the night follows the day that, by calling for recom m endations to chan ge the statu t e, Congre ss meant to bar any Guidelines a l teration in advance of congressional action. The more likely reading is that Congress sought propos als to amen d both the statute and the Guidelines because the Commission’s criticisms of the 100-to-1 ratio, see Part II–B, supr a , concerned the exorbitance of the crac k/powd e r disparityin both contexts. Moreover, as a result of the 2007 a m endment, see supra , at 10–11, the Guidelines now advance a crack/ powde r ratio that v a ries (at differentoffense levels) b e tween 25 to 1 and 80 to 1. See Am endments to the Sentencing Guidelines f o r United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28571–28572. Adopting the Govern ment’s analysis, the amended Gu idelines would conflict wi th Co ngress’ 1995 acti on, and with the 1986 Act, because the current Guidelines ratios devi

ate from the 100-to-1 s t atutory ratio. Congress, however, did not disapprove or modify th e Commission-initiated 2007 amen dment. Ordinarily, we resist rea d ing congre ssional intent into congressional inaction. See Bob Jon es18KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### Univ. v. Un ited S t a t es , 461 U. S. 574, 600 (1983). But in this case, C o ngress fail ed to act ona proposedamendment to the Guidelines in a high-profile area in which it had previously exercised its disa pproval authority under 28 U. S. C. §9 94(p). If n o thing else, this tacit acceptance ofthe 2007 amendment undermines the Government’s position, which is itself b a sed on i m plications drawn fro m congressional silence. C Finally, the Governm e nt argues that if district courts are free to deviate fro m the Guidelines bas e don disagreements withthe crac k/ p owder ra tio, unwarra nted dispar ities of two kinds will ensue. See 18 U. S. C. §3553(a)(6) (sentencing courts shall consider “the need t o avoid unwarran t ed sentence disparities”). First, because sentenc

ing courts remain b o und by the mandatory minimum sentences prescribed in the 1986 Act, deviatio ns from the 100-to-1 ratio could result insentencing “cliffs” around quantities that trigger the mandatory minimums. Brief for United States 33 (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, a district court could grant a s i zable downward va riance to a def e ndant convicted of distributing 49 grams of crack but would be required by the statutory minimum to impose amuch higher sentence on a def e n dant responsible f o r only 1 additional gram. Second, the Government maintains that, if districtcourts are permit

ted to vary from the Guidelines based on t h eir disagreement with the crac k/p owder disp arity, “defe n dants wit h identical real conduct will receive marke d ly different sentences, depending on nothing more than the particul a r judge dra w n for senten cing.” Id. , at 40. Neither of these argu ments persuades us to hold the crack/powder ratio untouchable by sentencing courts. As to the first, the LSD Guidelines we approved in Neal create a similar risk of sentencing “cliffs.” An offender19 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### who posses s es LSD on a carrier medium weighing ten grams is su bject to the ten-year m andatory m i nimum, see 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A)(v), but a noffender whose carri er medium weighs slightly less may receive a considerably lower sentence based on the Guidelines’ presumptiveweight methodology. Concerning the seconddisparity, it is unquestioned that uniformity remains an important goal of s e ntencing. As we explain e d in Booke r , however, advisory Guidelines c o mbined with appellate review for reasonableness and ongoing revi sion of the Guidelines in response to sentencing practi ces will help to “avoid excessive senten cing disparities.” 543 U. S., at 264. Thes e measures will not eli m inate variations bet w een district courts, butour opinion in Booke r recognized that some departures from uniformity were a necessarycost of the remedy we adopted. See id. , at 263 (“We cannot and do not claim that use of a ‘reason ableness’ s t andard wi ll provide the uniformity that Co ngress originally sought to secure [thro u gh manda t ory Guidelines].”). An d as to crac k cocaine sentences in particula r, we note a congressional control on disparities: possibl e v a riations among district courts are constrained by the mandatory mini mums Congress prescribed in the 1986 Act. 15 

### Moreover, to the extent that the Government correct l y identifies ri sk s of “u nwarranted sentencedisparitie s” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. §3353(a)(6), the prope r solution is not to treat the crack/ p owder rati o as mandatory. Secti on 3553(a)( 6 ) directs distri ct cour tsto consider the need to avoid unwarran t ed disparities—along wi th other §3553(a) factors —when im posing sentences. Se e Gall , ante , at 11, n. 6, 16. Under this instruction, district

——————

15 The S e nt enci ng Com m i s s ion report s t h a troughly 7 0 % of cra ck offenders are responsible fo r drug qu anti ties that y i el d ba se offens e levels at or only two levels ab ove those that correspond to the statutory min i mu ms. S ee 2007 Repor t25.20 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### courts mus tta ke ac count of sent encing pra c tices in oth e r courts and the “cliffs” r e sulting from the statu t ory manda

tory minim u m sentences. To rea c h an appropriate sentence, these disparities must be weighed against the other §3553(a) factors and an y unwa rran t ed disparity created b y the crac k/p owder ratio itself. IV While rend ering the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, United Sta t esv. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 245 (2005), we have nevertheless pres erved a k e y role for theSentencing Commission. As explained in Ritaand Gall , dist rict courts musttreat the Guidelines as the “sta rti ng point an d the initial benchmark,” Gall v. U n ited S t a t es , ante , at 1 1

. Congress established the Commission to formulate and constantly refine national sentencing standards. See Rita
v. Uni t ed S t ates , 551 U. S. ___, ___–___ (200 7) (slip op., at 9–11). Carrying out its charge, the Commis sion fills a n important i n stitutional role: It has the capa cit ycour ts lac k to “base its determinations on emp i rical data and national experience, guided by a professiona lstaff with appropriate expertise.” United States v. Prui tt , 502 F. 3d 1154, 117 1 (CA10 2007 ) (McConnell, J., concu rring); see supra , at 7. We have accordingly recognized that, in the ordinary case, the C o mmission’ s recommendation of a sentencing range will “reflect a rough appr oxi m ation of s e ntences that might achi eve §3553( a)’s objectives.” Rita , 551 U. S., at ___ (slip op ., at 11). The sentencing judge, on the other hand, has “greater fam iliarity with .

. . the in dividual case and the in dividual defendant before him than the Co mmission or the appeals court.” Id. , at ___ (sl i p op., at 18). He is therefore “in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under §3353(a)” in each particular case. Gall , an te , at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted)

. I n light of these discrete institutional strength s, a distric t court’s deci sion to vary from the advisory Guidelines may21 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### attrac tg r eatest respectwhen the sentencing judge finds a particular c a se “outside the ‘heartland’ to which the Commission int e nds individual Guidelines to apply.” Rita , 551 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12). On the other h and, while the Guidelines are no long er binding, closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines basedsolely on t h e judge’s view that the Guidelin es range “fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations” even in a mine-run case. Ibid. C f

. T r
. o f O r a lAr g
. i n Gall
v. United States , O. T. 2 007, No. 06-7949, pp. 38–39. The crack cocaine Guidelines, however, present no occasion for elaborative discussion of this matter because those Guidelines do n o t exemplify the Commission’s e x ercise of its c haracteristi cinstitutional role. In formulating Guidelines ranges for crack cocaine offens es, as we earli e r noted, the Commissio nlook ed to the mandatory minimum sentences s e t in the 1986 Act, and did not take account of “empirical data and n a tional experience.” S ee Pruitt , 50 2 F. 3d, at 1171 (McConnell, J., c o ncurring). Indeed, t h e Commission itself has reported that the crac k/powd e r disparity produces disproportionately harsh sanctions, i.e. , sentences for crack cocaine offen s es “greater than nece ssary” in light of the p u rposes of sentencing set forth in §3553(a). See supra , at 8–9. Gi ven all this, it would n o t be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particula r defendant that the
crac k/powd e r disparity yields a sentence “greater th a n necessary” to achieve §3553(a)’s purposes, even in a minerun case. V Taking acco unt of the foregoing discussion in appraisin g the DistrictCourt’s di sposition in this case, we conclud e that the 1 80-month sentence imposed on Kimbrough should survive appellate inspection. The District Cour t began by properly calculating and considering the advi­22 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of theCourt 

### sory Guide lines range. It then addressed the relevant §3553(a) factors. Fi rst, the court considered “the natu r e and circu mstances” of the crime, see 18 U. S. C. §3553(a)(1), which was an unrem arkable drug-traffickin g offense. App. 72–73 (“[T]his defen d ant and another defen

dant were caught sittin gin a car with some crac kcocai n e and powder by two police officers—that’s the sum and substance of it—[and they also ha d] a firearm.”). Second, the court c o nsidered Kimbrough’s “history a n d charac te ristics.” §3553(a)(1). The court no ted that Ki mbrough h a d no prior felony convictions, that h e had s e rved in comba t during Ope r ation Desert Storm an d received a nhonorable discharge from the M a rine Corps, and tha the had a steady history of employment. Furthermor e , the court alluded to the Sentenc i ng Commission’s reports criticizing th e 100-to-1 ratio, cf. §3553(a)(5) (Supp. V), noting that the Commission “recognizes that crac kcocai n e has not caused the damage th at the Justice Departmen t alleges it has.” App. 72. Comparing the Guidelines ra nge to the range that would have applied if Kimbroughhad possessed an equal amount of powder, the court su ggested t hat the 100-to-1 ratio itself created an unwarran t ed disparity within the meaning of §3553(a). Finally, the court did not purport to establish a ratio of its own. Rather, it appropriately fra m ed its final determination in line with §3553(a)’s overarching instruction to “impose a sentence su fficient, but not greater tha n necessary” to accomplish the sentencing goals advanced in §3553(a)(2). See supr a , at 12. Con c luding tha t“the crack cocaine guidelines [drove] the offense level to a point higher than is n e cess ary to do justice in th is case,” Ap p. 72, the District Cour t thus rest ed its sentence on the appropriate considerations and “committed no procedural error,” Gall v. United States , ante , at 17. The ultimate question in Kimbrough’s case is “whether23 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of theCourt 

### the senten ce was reasonable— i.e

. , whether the Distric t Judge abused his discretion in determining that th e §3553(a) fa ctors suppo rted a sentence of [15 years] and justified a substantial deviation from the Guidelin es range.” Ibi d

. The sentence the Di strict Cour t imposed on Kimbroughwas 4.5 years below the bottom of the Guidelines range. But in determining that 15 ye ars was th e appropriate prison term, the District Cou rt properly homed in on the particular circu mstances of Kimbrough’s case and ac corded weight to the S e ntencing Commission’s consistent and emphatic position that the crack/ powde r disparity is at odds wi th §3553(a). See Part II–B, supra
. Indeed, asi d e from its claim that the 100-to-1 ratio is mandatory, the Gover n ment did not attac k the District Court’s downwa rd va riance as u n supported by §3553(a). Giving due respect to the Di strict Court ’ s reasoned appraisal, a r e viewing court co uld not rationally conclude that the 4. 5-year sentence reduct ion Kimbrough receive d qualified as an abuse of discretion. See Gall , ante , at 20– 21; Ritav. United S t ates , 551 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (sl i p op., at 19–20). * * * For the re asons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for th e Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for furt her proceedings consistent with th is opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007)
S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ring 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–6 33 0


### DER R ICK KIMBR O U G H, P E TIT I ONER v. UNITE D STATE S
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [Dec ember10, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### , concu rring. The Court says that “closer re view may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from t h e Guideli n es based sole l yon the judge’s view that the Guidelines ran g e ‘fails properly to reflect §3553(a) considerations’ even in a mine-run case,” but that this case “present[s] no occasion for elaborative discussion of this matter.” Ante, at 21 (quoting Ritav. Uni t ed Sta t es , 551 U. S. ___, __ _ (200 7) (slip op., at 12)). I joi nthe opini o n only because I do n o t take this to be an unannounced abandonmen tof the fol

lowing clear statements in our recent opinions: “[Our remedial opinion] requi res a sentencing court to consider Guidelines r anges, .
. . but it permits the court to tailor the sent ence in light of other statutory concerns as well, see §3 553(a).

. . . . . “[W]ithout this provision—namely the provision that makes ‘the relevant sentencing rules .

. . m andatory and impose[s] binding requiremen t s on all sentencing judges’—the statute falls outsid e the scope of re

quirement.

. . . . . “The district courts, whilenot bound to a p ply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines a n d take2 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES
S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ring 

### them into a ccount when sentencing.” Uni t ed Sta t es v. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 245–246, 25 9, 264 (2005). “Under the system de scribed in J USTICE 

### B RE YE R 

### ’s opinion forthe Court in Booker, judges would no longer be tied to the sentencing ra nge indicat e d in the Guidelines. But they would be obliged to ‘tak e ac count of’ th at range along with the sentencing goals Congress enumerated in the SRA at 18 U. S. C. §3553(a).” Cunningham v. California , 549 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) ( s lip op., at 14). “[The sentencing judge] may hear argum e nts by prosecution or defensethat the Guidelines sentence should not apply, perh aps because (as the Guidelines themselves foresee) the case at ha nd falls outside the ‘heartland’ to which the Commission intends individ

ual Guidelines to apply, USSG §5K2.0, perhaps be

cause the Guidelines sentence it self fai l s properly to reflect §35 53(a) considerations, or perhaps because the case wa rrants adiff erent sentence regar d less. See Rule 32(f).

. . . . . “A nonbinding appellate presumption that a Guide

lines s e ntence is reasonable does not requirethe sen tencing judge to impose that sentence. Still less does it forbidthe sentencin gjudge fro mimposing a sen tence higher than the Guidelines provide for the jurydetermined facts standing alone. As far as the law is concerned, the judge could disregard the Guideline s and apply the same sentence (higher than th e statu

tory mini mum or the bottom of the u n enhanced Guidelines range) in the absenceof the spe c ial facts (say, gun brandishing) which, in the view of the Sen

tencing Commission, would warrant a higher sentence within the statutorily permissible r ange.” Rita, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 12, 14).3 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007)
S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ring 

### These statements mean that the district cou rt is free to make its own reasonable application of the §3553(a) fac

tors, and to reject (af t er due consi d eration) t h e advice of the Guideli n es. If ther e is any thumb on thescales; if t h e Guidelines must be followed even where the district court’s appl ication of t h e §3553(a) factors is entirely rea

sonable; th en the “advisory” Gui d elines would, over a large expanse of their application, enti tle the defendant to a lesser sentence but for the presence of certain additional facts found by judge rather than jury. This, as we said in Booker, wo uld violate the Sixth Amendment._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007)

T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–6 33 0


### DER R ICK KIMBR O U G H, P E TIT I ONER v. UNITE D STATE S
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [Dec ember10, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### , dissenting. I continue to disagree with the remedy fas h ioned in United Sta t es v. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 258–265 (2005). The Court’s post- Book er sentencing cases illustrate wh y the remedial majorityin Booker was mistaken to craft a remedy far broader than nece ss ary to correct constitu

tional error

. The Court is no w confronted with a host of questions ab out how to administ er a senten cing scheme that has no basis in the statute. Because the Court’s decisions inthis area are necessarily grounded in policy considerations rather than law, I respectfully dissent. In Booker , the Court held that t h e Federal Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth Ame n dment insofar as the y permit a judge to make findings that raise a senten ce beyond the level justi f ied by the “ ‘fac ts reflected in the jury ve rdictor admitted by the d e fendant.’ ” Id. , at 232 (quoting Blakelyv. Wa shington , 5 42 U. S. 296, 303 (200 4) (emphasis deleted)). In my view, this violation was more suitably remedied by requiring any such facts to be sub

mitted to the jury. Booker , 5 43 U. S., at 323–3 25 (T HOMAS 

### , J., dissentin g in part). That approach woul d have been consistent with our longstanding presumption of the severability of unconst itutional applications of statutory provisions. Id. , at 322–3 23 (T HOMAS 

### , J., dissen t

ing in part). And it wo uld have achieved compliance with2 KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES

T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### the Sixth Amendment while doi n g the leas t amount o f violence to the mandatory sentencing regi me that Con

gress enacted. Id

. , at 324–326 (T HOMAS 

### , J., dissenting in part). The Court, ho wever, chos e a more sweeping re m edy. Despi t e acknowl e dging that under the mandatory Guidelines not “every senten ce gives rise to a Sixt h Amendment violation,” the Court rendered the Guideline s advisory intheir entir e ty and ma ndated app e llate review of all s e ntences for “reasonablen ess.” Id. , at 268. Because the Court’s “solution fail[ed] to t a ilor the remedy to the wrong,” I dissented from the remedial opinion

. Id. , at 313

. As a result of the Court’s remedial approach, we are n o w called uponto decide amultip licity of questions that have no discernibly legal answers. Las tTerm, in Rita v. Uni t ed Sta t es , 551 U. S. __ (2007), the Court held that a Court of Appeals may treat se ntences wit h in the pr operly calc u lated Guidelines ran g e as pre s umptively reasonable. Today, in Gall v. Uni t ed Sta t es , an te , p. __, the Court holds that aCou rt of Appea l s may notrequire sentences tha t deviate substantially from the Guidelines range to be justified by extraordin a ry circum s tances. And here the Court holds that sentencing court s are free to reject th e Sentencing Guidelines’ 100-to-1 cra ck-to-po wde rratio. These outcomes may be perfectly re asonable as a matte r of policy, but they have no basis in law. Congress did not mandate a reasonableness standard of appellate review— that was a standard the remedial majority in Booker fashioned out of whole cloth. See 543 U. S., at 307–312 (S CALI A 

### , J., dissenting in part). The Court must now give content to that standard, but in so doing it does not and cannot rely on any st atutor y language or congressiona l intent. We are asked here to determine whether, unde r the new advisory Guidelines regime, districtcourts ma y impose sent ences basedin part on their disagreement with a categoric a l policy judgment re flected in the Guidelines. But the Court’s ans wer to tha tq u estion necessarily de

-3 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007)

T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

### rives from s o mething other than the statutory language or congressional intent b e cause Con gress, by making th e Guidelines mandatory, quite clearly intended to bin d district courts to the S e ntenci ng Commission’s categori cal policy judgments. See 18 U. S. C. §3553(b) (2000 ed. an d Supp. V) (excised by Booker). By rejecting th is statutory approach, the Booker r e medial majority has l e ft the Cou r t with no law to apply an d forced it t o assume the legislative role of devis i ng a new sentencing scheme. Although I joined J U S TICE 

### S CALIA

### ’s dissent in Rita accepting t h e Bookerremedial opinion as a matter of “statutor y s t ar e deci sis , ” 551 U. S., at __ (slip op., at 2), I am now convinced that there is no principled way to appl y the Booker remedy—ce rtainly not one based on the stat

ute. Accordingly, I th ink it best to apply th e statute as written, including 18 U. S. C. §3553(b), which makes the Guidelines mandatory. Cf. D i c k ers on v. United Sta t es , 53 0 U. S. 428, 465 (2000) (S CALIA 

### , J., di ssenting). Applying the statute as written, it is clear that th e District Co urt erred by depa rting below the mandatory Guidelines range. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacati ng petitioner’s sentence an d remanding for resentencing._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2007)
ALITO , J., dis s e nting 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–6 33 0


### DER R ICK KIMBR O U G H, P E TIT I ONER v. UNITE D STATE S
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [Dec ember10, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### ALI T O 

### , dissent ing. For the reasons explained in my dissent in Gall v. United Sta t es , ante , p. ___, I would hold that, under the remedial decision in United Sta t esv. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 258–2 65 (2005), a district judge is still required to give significant weight to the policy decisions embodied i n the Guidelines. The Bookerremedial decision, however, does notpermit a court of ap peals to treat the Guidelines’ policy decis i ons as binding. I would not draw a distinction between the Guidelineat issue he re and other Guidelines. Accordin gly , I would v a cate the d e cision of the Court of Appeals and remand for reconsideration.