RENDERED: MAY 10, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2023-CA-0533-MR

CITY OF COVINGTON, KENTUCKY APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 23-CI-00171

COVINGTON BOARD OF 

ARCHITECTURAL REVIEW AND 

DEVELOPMENT; DALTON 

BELCHER, IN HIS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS THE ZONING 

ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE CITY 

OF COVINGTON; ELLA FRYE,

JAMES SCHAFER, MD, JANET 

CREEKMORE, LARRY MOSTELLER; 

MICHAEL GENTRY, REBECCA 

WEBER, AND STEVEN CODY 

CHITWOOD, ALL IN THEIR 

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS 

MEMBERS OF THE COVINGTON 

BOARD OF ARCHITECTURAL 

REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT; 

AND SKLO ACQUISITIONS, LLC APPELLEES 
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OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: The City of Covington (“Covington”) appeals from an order 

of the Kenton Circuit Court dismissing its action against the Covington Board of 

Architectural Review and Development (“the Board”) and SKLO Acquisitions, 

Inc. (“SKLO”). We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

SKLO owns property on Russell Street in Covington that it desires to 

rent to a dog kennel business. First, SKLO applied to have the property rezoned 

from Traditional Urban Mixed Use (“TUMU”) to Limited Industrial. The Kenton 

County Planning Commission denied the request. SKLO did not appeal. 

Believing that a kennel qualified as a permissible “Service-Oriented Use” in a 

TUMU district, SKLO’s contractor – hired to renovate the building to make it 

appropriate for the kennel business – applied for a Certificate of Appropriateness 

(“COA”) on behalf of SKLO. The application was denied by Covington’s Zoning 

Administrator. SKLO appealed the decision to the Board, which conducted an 

extensive hearing that included public comment. The Board ultimately reversed 

the decision of the Zoning Administrator. Covington filed an appeal in Kenton 

Circuit Court pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 100.347. SKLO filed 
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a motion to dismiss for lack of standing and the circuit court granted the motion. 

This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

This appeal turns on interpretation of KRS 100.347(1). Statutory 

interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo. Saint Joseph Hosp.

v. Frye, 415 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Ky. 2013).

Analysis

The issue before us is extremely narrow and involves the right to 

appeal a decision of the Board as created by statute. Specifically, KRS 100.347(1) 

provides

[a]ny person or entity claiming to be injured or aggrieved 

by any final action of the board of adjustment shall 

appeal from the action to the Circuit Court of the county 

in which the property, which is the subject of the action 

of the board of adjustment, lies. Such appeal shall be 

taken within thirty (30) days after the final action of the 

board. All final actions which have not been appealed 

within thirty (30) days shall not be subject to judicial 

review. The board of adjustment shall be a party in any 

such appeal filed in the Circuit Court.

The circuit court dismissed the action finding that Covington did not 

have standing because “being a city is in and of itself” insufficient to find that it is 

an entity “which has been injured or aggrieved.” We agree the circuit court should 

have dismissed the action, but for slightly different reasons. 
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Turning to Covington’s complaint filed in the circuit court, we note 

that it claimed to be injured or aggrieved in the following enumerated paragraphs 

of the complaint:

25. The decision of [the Board] is contrary to the 

law and provisions of [KRS Chapter 100], and the 

Zoning Code of Covington.

26. The decision that the use described by [SKLO] 

is a permitted use in the TUMU zone is wrong and is 

arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of [the Board’s] 

delegated powers. The decision was a political decision 

driven by affection for animals and not by law or fact.

27. The decision of [the Board] in overturning the 

denial of a [COA] bears no reasonable relation to the 

intent or the letter of the zoning code.

28. [The Board] misinterpreted the language of 

the Covington Zoning Code in determining that

[SKLO’s] proposed use was permitted in the TUMU 

zone.

Although Covington did use the words “injured or aggrieved” in its 

complaint, use of those words alone is not necessarily required or dispositive. 

Rather, “a complaint pursuant to KRS 100.347(1) must reflect how the plaintiff fits 

into the statutory language authorizing an appeal.” Kenton Cnty. Board of

Adjustment v. Meitzen, 607 S.W.3d 586, 593 (Ky. 2020). Here, Covington’s 

complaint is simply a legal criticism of the Board’s decision. It fails to state how 

Covington is injured or even how it is affected at all by the Board’s decision. 

Further, a
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right to appeal as granted by the General Assembly in 

KRS 100.347(1) creates a jurisdiction issue. While 

admittedly the statute has a standing component – that a 

party must be “injured or aggrieved” by the board’s 

action – in order for a circuit court to exercise 

jurisdiction that party must claim their injury in the 

complaint.

Id. at 598.

In other words, not only does Covington have to be “injured or 

aggrieved” to have statutory standing, but it must claim the injury in the complaint

in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction.

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 Covington failed to do so. 

Simply stating that it is “injured or aggrieved” without any factual basis is not 

enough.

“The right to appeal the decision of an administrative agency to a 

court is a matter of legislative grace.” Nickell v. Diversicare Mgmt. Servs., 336 

S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky. 2011). “[T]he failure to follow the statutory guidelines for 

such an appeal is fatal.” Triad Dev./Alta Glyne, Inc. v. Gellhaus, 150 S.W.3d 43, 

47 (Ky. 2004). Because Covington failed to follow the strict statutory requirement 

of KRS 100.347(1) by claiming how it is injured or aggrieved by the Board’s 

decision, the circuit court was correct to dismiss the action.

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“[I]n order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction, [a plaintiff] must also strictly comply with 

KRS 100.347(1).” Meitzen, 607 S.W.3d at 598.
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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Kenton Circuit Court is 

affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Jeffrey C. Mando

Jennifer L. Langen

David E. Davidson

Sheree E. Weichold

Covington, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SKLO 

ACQUISITIONS, LLC:

Emily Cooney Couch

Cincinnati, Ohio