### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs O ct obe r 30, 200 7
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KA RL DA NIEL FO RS S
Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Cocke County No. 9950 Rex He nry Ogle, Judge

No. E2007-01349-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Janu ary 30, 2008

Th e Ap pe lla

nt, Ka rl Da nie l F or ss, a

pp e a ls t he se nte nc ingdecision

of the Coc ke County

Cir c uit Court. Under the terms of a plea a g ree ment, For ss entere d “open” pleas of guilty to the offe nses of attempted ag g rav at ed robbe ry , ag g ravated assault, and a g g ravated cr iminal trespass. The ple a ag ree ment provided that the le ng th and manner of the sente nces w o u ld be deter mined by the trial
c ourt , th a t F or ss wo uld

be se nte nc e d a s a

Rang e I , s tand ard

of fe nd e r, that th e a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult conviction would merg e with the attempted a g g ra v at ed ro bbery conviction, and that the mis de me ano r s e nte nc e fo r t he a g g ra vate d cr imi na l tre sp a ss co nv ic tio n w ou ld r un c on c ur re ntl y wi th the attempted a g g ravated robbe ry conviction. Followingthe sen t en cing hea ring , the trial cour

t imposed an ef

fec tive sentenc e of six y ear s in confine ment. For ss now appeals the leng th and manner of his six -y ear

felony sentenc e. Af

ter a thoroug h revie w of the r ec o rd and the arguments of the parties, we modify

For ss’ six -y ear

sentenc e for

attempted ag g ravated robbe ry to refle ct a se ntence of four y ear s. We a ffirm the denial of alternative sentenc ing. We remand to the tria l court for entry of an a mended judg ment to refle ct this sentencingmodification.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Modifi ed in Par t; Affirm ed in Par t

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., joined. D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J ., filed a dissentingopinion.

B arr y H. Va le nti ne , N e wp or

t, T e nn e sse e , f

or the Ap pe lla

nt, Ka rl Da nie l F or ss.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Da

vid H. F ind le y , A s s i s t a

nt A tt o rn e y Ge ne ra l; Al C. Schmutz er, Jr., District Attorney Gene ral; J ames B. Dunn and Amanda H. Inman, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

O nJ u l y 1 0 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e A p p e l l an tw a s i n d i c t e d o n o n e c o u n t o f a t t e mp t e d a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r y, one count of ag g ravated assault, and one count of a g g ravated cr iminal trespass. On September 18,W e no t e t hat t he p roo f at t he sent enci ng heari ng est ab l i shed t hat t he victi m at t em p t ed t o s ho o t ab o ve t he 1
A p p el l ant ’ s head as he st ruck her d o o r wi t h t he ham m er, but t he f o rt y y ear- o l d p i st o l s he was us i ng had jamm ed

. She t est i f i ed t hat s he had t hen st o o d at her wi nd o w scr eam i ng f o r hel p and t hat s he saw t he A p p el l ant co m i ng o ut o f t he f ront d o o r of t he res i d ence and t hat he l o o ked at her. T he vi ct i m t est i f i ed t hat s he b egan p ul l i ng t he t ri gger agai n, “ spray [i ng] t he whol e n ei gh bo r hood wi t h bul l et s , ” bef ore t he A pp el l ant f

l ed t he propert y

. A ccor di ng t o t he A pp el l ant , once he s t r uck the vic tim ’s d o o r w ith the ha m m e r, h e “so m e w h a t [c a m e ] to [h is] se n se s” a n d ra n o u tsid e

.

T he vi ct i m st at ed that she hel d no il l feel i ngs t o ward the Ap p el l ant but t hat hi s act i o ns changed her l i f e, and 2 sh e no lo n g e r fe lt sa fe in he r o w n ho m e . T h e vic tim im p a c t state m e n t f u rth e r n o te s, “[I ]t is m y h o p e tha t i f [A p p e llan t] i s gi ven j ai l t i me, he ca n a cce pt t he j ai l t i me as bei ng a r es ul t of wh at he di d and t he choi ces he made. ”
-2- 20 06 , th e Ap pe lla

nt e nte re d o pe n g uil ty ple a s to the se c ha rg e s in the Coc ke County

Cir c uit Court

. The plea ag ree ment provided that the Appellant would be sente nced a s a Rang e I , standard of fende r and that the leng th and manner of the sente nce w ould be deter mined by the t ri al court. The ag ree ment also provided that the a g g ravated assault convic tion would m erg e into the attempted ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction and that the se ntence for a g g ravated c r im in a l t r e s p a s s w o u ld

b e ser ved
c on c ur re ntl y wi th t he se nte nc e fo r atte mpt e d a g g ra vate d r ob bery

. At th e ple a he ari ng , th e State
summa ri zed its pr oo f a s f

oll ow s: [O] n April 31st of 2006, the [ Appellant]

. . . went to Patsy Nea l’s residenc e . . . here in Cocke County . He wa s a ne ighbor of Ms. Nea l. At 10:05 p.m. he kn o c k e d o nth e d o o r

an d a s k e d to u s e th e p h o n e

. Sh e d id r e c o g n iz e [th e Ap p e ll an t]

. She g ave him her cell phone and he asked to come insi de because he said he couldn’t see the numbers on the phone. Once he stepped inside he shut the door a nd locked it. The [Appellant] pulled out a hammer and dema nded money

from Ms. Nea l and the key s to her ca

r.

Ms. Ne a l atte mpt e d to c a lm the [Ap pe lla nt] by sp e a kin g to him . H e be c a me ang ry and hit the wall with the hammer next t o h er h ea d

. At that time she went upstairs and [the Appellant] followed her up the stairs. He attempt ed t o enter the room afte r she shut the door a nd locked it by bang ing on the door with the hammer at that time. Ms. Nea l retrie ved a g un that was in the room and fired it. When she fired the g un [t he Appe llant] fled the r esidenc e. She then ca lled 911. 1

A senten ci n g h ea ring was he ld on J anuar y 8, 2007, at which the vic tim and the Appellant testified, an d

a c o ll e c ti v e e xh ib it

w a s a dmi tt e d

into e v id e n c e

. T h e e xh ib it s in c lu d e d a le n g thy handwr itten letter fr om the Appe l l an t d irec ted to the victim, a pre sentenc e re port prepa red by the Stat e o f T e n n e s s e e B o ar d o f Pr o b a ti o n an d Pa r o le , a le tt e r f

r o m th e c u r

r e n t e mp lo y e r of the Appellant, and a victim impac t statement. Following the sentenc ing he aring , the trial cour t imposed 2 the maxim um sentence of six y ear s for attempted ag g ravated robbe ry , a Class C felony , and ele ven months and twenty -nine day s for ag g ravated criminal trespass, a Class A m isdemeanor

. As provided by the plea a g ree ment, the sentenc es we re or dere d to run conc urre ntly

.
Ana lys is-3-

When a def

endant c halleng es the leng th, r ang e, or manner of service of a sente nce, it is the duty of this court to conduc t a d e novo re v iew on the r ecor d with a pre sumption t hat the deter minations made by the court fr om which the appe al is taken a re c orre ct. T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d) (2006). As the SentencingCommi ssion Com ments to this s ection note, the burden is on the appea ling pa

rty to show that the s entenc ing is improper. T.C.A. § 40- 35-401, Sentenc ing Comm’n Comments. This m eans that if the trial cour t followed the statutory

sentenc ing pr ocedur e, made finding s of fa cts that are adequately supported in the rec ord, and g ave due consideration and proper weig ht to the fac tors and princ iples that are rele vant t o sentenc ing, we may not disturb the sentenc e even if a diffe rent re sult was pref err ed. Sta te v . R os s , 49 S.W .3d 833, 847 (Tenn. 2001) . The p re s u mp t i o nd o es n o tap p l y t o t h e l e g a l co n cl u s i o n s re ac h edb y t h e t ri al co u rt i ns en t en ci n g a defe ndant or to the deter

minations made by the trial court that are predic ated upon uncontrove rted fac ts. State v. De an , 7 6 S.W.3 d 352 , 377 (T e nn . Crim . App . 2 00 1) ; State v. Butler , 900 S.W .2d 305, 31 1 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Sta te v . S mi th , 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

.
I n conductinga de novo revie w of a sentenc e, we must c onsider: (1) a ny evidenc e re ceive d at the trial and/or sentenc ing hear ing; (2) the prese ntence repor t; (3) the princ iples of sentenc ing a nd arguments as to sentenc ing a lternat i v es ; (4) the nature a nd char acte ristics of the off ense; (5) any mitigating or enha

nceme nt fac tors; (6) any

statements made by

the def end an t o n h i s or her

own behalf ; and (7) the pot ential for reha bilitation or treatment. See T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0 ( 20 06 ); Sta te v. Taylor , 63 S.W .3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)

. On appe al, the Appellant argues that the trial cour t misapplied certa in enhanc ement fa ctors and fa iled to apply

applicable mitigating fac tors in rea ching its decision to sentenc e the Appe llant to six y ear s’ i ncar cer ation. The Appellant further submits that the trial cour t abused its discretion in d e te rm ini ngthat a

se nte nc e of c on fi ne me nt w a s n e c e ssa ry to a vo id d e pr e c iatin g the se ri ou sn e ss of the off ense, thus denying the Appellant any form of alternative sentenc ing. Finally , the Appellant
asser ts that certa in comments of the trial judg e during sente ncingevince his improper consider ation of re ligion in re achingits decision.
I. Length of

Sentence

We first addre ss the Appellant’s a rgument that the tria l c o u

r t m is a p plied enhanc ement fa ctors and fa iled to apply

mitigating fac tors at sentenc ing, r esulting in the maxi mum possible sente nce of six y ear s as a Rang e I , standard offe nder. The Appellant’s criminal conduct, which is the subject of thi s a pp e a l, o c c ur

re d s ub se qu e nt t o th e e na c tme nt of the 20 05 a me ndme nts to t he Se nte nc ingAc t, which bec ame e ffe ctive June 7, 2005. The leng th of a sente nce ma y only be appe aled unde r the 2005 amendments upon g rounds (1) “ that the sentenc e wa s not imposed in accor dance with this chapter” or (2) that the sentenc e is excessive under th e sentenc ing c onsiderations of Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-210. SeeT.C.A. § 40-35-401( b)(1) , (2).

The 2005 Ame ndment deleted a ppellate r eview of

the weig hing of

th e en h an ce ment and mitigating fac tors, as it rende red the enhanc ement and mitigating fac tors mere ly advisory and non-I t i s un cl ea r wh et h er t h i s cr i me i s cl as s i f i ed a s a f el on y or mi s deme an or un der N ew J er s ey l aw

. T h e di s pos i t i on 3

re flec ts a se n te n c e o f “1 d a y in ja il, 2 ye a rs p ro b a tio n , f ine a n d c o st.”
-4- binding in the se ntencingdeter mination. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that e rror in the application of an enha ncing fac tor or fa ctors will not nece ssarily require modification of the se n t ence if the sentenc ing r ecor d ref

lects that in deter

mining the spe cific se ntence leng th, the trial court c onsidered the provisions of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-210 (b)( 1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), a nd (7). I ncluded within these subse ctions is the require ment that the trial co u rt i s to consider “ [e] vidence and information offer ed by the parties on the m itigating and enhance ment fac tors set out in § T.C.A. 40 -35-1 13 and

40 -3 5- 11 4. ” T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0( b) (5 ). Un de r t he se g uid e lin e s, we pr oc e e d to revie w the Appe llant’s argum en t t h at the misapplication of e nhance ment fac tors and the nonapplication of mitig ating fac tors resulted in an e rrone ous sentence

. At the sentenc ing he aring , the trial cour t applied two enha

ncingfac tors: ( 1 ) that the Appellant ha s a p r e v io u s h is to r

y o f c r im in a l c o n v ic ti o n s o r b e h a v io r ; an d ( 2 ) th a t th e Ap p e llant had no hesitation about commi tting a crime when t he risk to hum an life w as hig h. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114 (1 ), (1 0) (2 00 6) . T he Ap pe lla nt c on c e de s th e a

pp lic a tio n o f f

a c tor (1 ), no ne the le ss, he ur g e s u s to consider the fac t that none of his prior c onvictions were violent. T h e re co rd reflects that the App e ll an t h a s th e f

o ll o w in g p r io r c o n v ic ti o n s : ( 1 ) a 1 9 9 7 D U I c o n v ic ti o n in T e n n e s s e e ; ( 2) three prior DUI convictions in New J erse y ; a nd (3) a 1994 conviction in N ew J erse y for “ taking a motor
ve hic le wi tho ut co ns e nt. ” B a se d upo n the se pr ior c on vic tio ns , we c on c lud e that th e re c or d s up po rt s 3 application of e nhance ment fac tor (1). H oweve r, wit h reg ard to e nhance ment fac tor (10), w e co n cl u d e t h at ap p l i ca t i o no f t h i s fa ct o r w as erro r. T h i s co u rt h as h el d t h at “t h er e i s n ec es s ar i l y

a h i gh risk to human life and the g reat potential for bodily injury whene ver a

deadly wea pon is used.” Sta te
v . Ni x , 9 22 S.W. 2d

89 4, 90 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); see also State v. Brian Eric Mc Gowen , No. M2004-00109-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App. at Na shville, Aug . 18, 2005) (the hig h risk to human life is inhere nt in the offense of espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

).
On appe al, the State ar g ues that, “e ven assuming t he misapplication of [enhanc ement fa ctor (10)], the rec ord undoubtedly supports the conc lusion that [t he Appellant] . . . abused a position of trust as the victim’s neig hbor.” See T.C.A. § 40-35-114( 14). How ev er, in State v. Gutierrez , 5 S

. W

. 3 d 6 4 1 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 9 ) , o u r

s u p r e m e c o u rth e l d

t h a t , “ [a ]p p l i c a t i o no f

[t h i s ] f a c t o r re qu ir e s a finding , first, that the defendant occupied a position of t rust, either public or private .” 5 S.W.3d at 64 5. Th e po sit ion

of pa re nt, ste p- pa

re nt, ba by sitte r, te a c he r, c oa c h a

re but a fe w o bv iou s e xamp le s. Id . The de ter m i n at i o n of the e x istence of a position of trust does not depend on the leng th or formality of the re lat i o n s h i p b u t, rather , upon the nature of the re lationship. Id . I n State v. Edd Stepp , No. E2005-02178-CCA-R3-CD, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, Nov. 2, 2006), a panel of this court held, “[t] he mer e existence of a friendship

. . . does not e stablish “ private trust.” See als o Gu tie rre z, 5 S.W .3d at 646 (holding that a ‘live- in’ relationship, where two pe ople live tog ether as man and wife, does not e stablish a ‘private trust’).” Simi larly , we conclude that t h e m ere re latio ns hip of

“ ne ig hb or ” is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a fi nd ingof

pr ivate tr us t.-5-

No mitigatingfac tors wer e applied by the trial cour

t following the sentenc ing he aring . At the he ari ng , a

nd on app e a l, t

he Ap pe lla

nt a rgue s th a t th e fo llo wi ngmit ig a tin g pr oo f s up po rt s application of the catc hall mitigating fac tor (13): (1) “The [Appellant] has under g one tre atment and has complete d the Adult I ntensive Outpatient program at Cherokee Heal t h S y stems” and ( 2) “the [Ap pe lla nt] h a s une quiv ocal ly

a c c e pte d f

ull re sp on sib ili ty

fo r h is c on du c t.” Th e re c or d c on fi rm s that, s ub se qu e nt t o th e c ha rg e s in the ins tant ap pe a l, t

he Ap pe lla

nt v olu nta ri ly a tte nd e d a

tw o- mon th
ou t p at i ent s ubstance abuse pr og ram, whic h he succ essfully completed on August 14, 2006. Moreove r, t h e re co rd supports the Appe llant’s contention that he ha s repe atedly expressed to the vic tim , b oth

pr ior to the se nte nc ing he ari ng and a t the se nte nc ing he a ri ng , his sin c e re re mor se fo r h is conduct. Ac cording ly , we c onclude that a pplication of mitigating f actor (13) is wa

rra nted.

T h e p r o o f at the se ntencinghear ing f urther e stablished that the thirty -three y ear old Appellant dropped out of hig h school in the tent h g rade . The Appe llant resides with his g irlfriend, a nd they
are the par ents of a one-y ear -old child. The Appellant’s employ er reporte d that the Appellant “ is an asset to our c ompany

[and] . . . has a g reat attendanc e re cord.”

Our Sentenc ing A ct provides that “[t] he minimum sentence w ithin the rang e of punishment i s t h e s en tence that should be imposed . . . .” T.C.A. § 40-35- 210(c) (1). The Act also states that “[t] he sente nce le ng th within the rang e should be a djusted, as appropriate, by the presence or abse nce of mitigating a

nd enhanc ement fa ctors set out in section 40-35- 113 and 40-35- 114.” Id . at (c )(2)

. T h e s en t en ce l en gt h fo r t h e C l as s C fe l o n y o ff en s e o f a t t em p t edaggr av at edro b b ery wi t h i nR an ge Iis three to six y ear s.
Followin g de novo review of the se ntencingproof, a s previously noted, we f

ind that the application of one enhanc ement fa ctor, fa ctor (1) , and the a pplication of one mitigating f actor , fac tor (13), a re suppor ted by the rec ord. Following our statutory duty to beg in with the minim um sentence of three y ear s and “a djust” for the pr esenc e of enhanc ement factor ( 1) and the prese nce of mitigating fa c tor (1 3) , w e c on c lud e tha

t a se nte nc e of

fo ur y e ars is a

pp ro priat e aft er consid e ratio n o f a ll sentenc ing pr inciples and re levant fa cts.

II. De nia l of A lt e r nat ive Se nt e nc ing

We n e xt tur

n to the Ap pe lla

nt’ s argume nt t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y no t a llo wi nghim

to
se rv e his se nte nc e thr ou g h p ro batio n o r s pli t c on fi ne me nt. A d e fe nd ant who do e s n ot p os se ss a c ri min a l hi sto ry

sh ow ing a c le ar dis re g ard fo r the laws and mor a ls o f s oc ie ty , w ho ha s n ot f a ile d p a st
re ha bil itatio n ef

fo rt s, and wh o is an es pe c ia lly mit ig a te d o r s tand ard

of fe nd e r c on vic te d o f a

Cla ss C, D, or E felony

is presumed to be a

favor able c andidate f

or alter native sente ncingoptions in t he absenc e of evidenc e to the contra ry

. See T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 10 2( 6) (2 00 6) ; State v. Fields , 40 S.W .3d 435, 440 (Tenn. 2001) . As held by our supre me cour

t in Fields , this presumption of alternative sentenc ing ma y be re butted by

“evide nce to the
c on tr ary .” Gu ida

nc e a s to wh a t c on sti tut e s e vid e nc e to t he c on tr ary

may be fo un d in-6-

the following sentenc ing c onsiderations conta ined in Ten n es s ee Code Annotated
se c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 03 (1 ) ( 19 97 ): (A) Confine ment is n ecessary to protect socie ty

by restra ining a

defe ndant wh o h a s a lon g his tor

y of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nec essary to avoid depre ciatingthe seriousne ss of the off ens e or c on fi ne me nt i s e sp e c ia lly su ite d to pr ov ide an e ff e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to others likely

to commit si milar offe nses; or (C ) M e a sure s le ss r e str icti ve th an c on fi ne me nt h a ve fr e qu e ntl y or re c e ntl y been a pplied unsucce ssfully

to the defe ndant.

Fields , 40 S.W .3d at 440. The guilty

pleas entered by the Appellant resulted in convictions for attempted ag g ravated
r o b b e r y an d a g g r av a t e d

c r i m i n a l t r e s p a s s , a

C l a s s C f e l o n y an d C l a s s A m i s d e m e an o r , r e s p e c t i v e l y. Acc ording ly , the Appellant is entitled to the pre sumption t hat h e i s a favorable candidate for
a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing . A t th e c on c lus ion of the se nt enci ng he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d th a t a sentenc e other

than conf

inement would depr eciate the ser iousness of the off ense.

I n order to deny an alter native sente nce ba sed on the ser i o u sness of the of fense , the ci rc u m s t an ce s o f t h e o f

f e n s e a s co m m i t t edm u s tb e e s p ec i al l y v i o l en t , h o rr i fy i n g, s h o ck i n g, repr ehensible, of

fensive, or

otherwise of

an excessive or

exagg erated deg ree , and the nature of the offe nse must outweig h all other factors favoring a sentence other t han confinement. State v. Trotter , 2 0 1 S. W. 3 d

6 5 1 , 6 5 4

- 5 5 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 6 ) ( c it a ti o n s o mi tt e d )

. Wh il e in n o w ay a tt e mp ti n g to mi n im iz e the nature of the criminal conduc t involved, the rec ord indicate s that the Appellant ne ver touc hed the victim, nor, for that matter, neve r ev en t hreatened the vic tim with harm. Accor dingly , we a re un a ble to c on c lud e fr om the pr oo f be fo re us that the Ap pe lla nt’ s c on du c t w a s so e sp e c ia lly vio le nt, horrify ing, or repr ehensible, a s defined in Trott er , to deny an alter native sente nce. Notwithstanding our

con c lu s io n

th a t t h e p r o o f f a il s to s upport an inca

rce rative se ntence under the statut or

y c on sid e ratio ns of Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d sec tio n 4 0- 35 -1 02 (b ), we , n on e the le ss, conclude that an inca

rce rative se ntence is w arr anted under subse ction (c) . Subsection (c) provides that a sente nce of

confine ment may

be imposed whe n “[m] easur es less re strictive than conf inement have f reque ntly or re cently

been a pplied unsucce ssfully

to the defe ndant.” The Appe llant’s criminal history ref lects that he has fre quently rec eived se ntence s in which pr ob a tio n w a s g ra

nte d. I n 1 99 7, the Ap pe lla nt w a s p la c e d o n pro batio n for on e y e ar f

oll ow inghis
co n viction f

or DUI

. I n 1994, the Appellant was place d on probation for two y ear s follo wi n g a conviction in New Jersey . The Appe llant acknowle dges t h at h e h as routinely abused a lcohol and drug s and that he w as “r eally high on cra ck coca ine” on the date of the instant crimes. Ag ain, the
rec ord reflec ts that the Appellant has r ece ived treatment in the past on multi ple occ asions without
succe ss. I ndeed, the pre- sentenc e re port indicates that, “ [T] he def endant ha s relate d past treatment
on a t le a st thr e e oc c a sio ns

. B a se d on the se ob se rv a tio ns and

re sp on se s o f t

his De fe nd ant h e wo uld-7-

be conside red a

high r isk to be succe ssful on any ty pe of sup er v i s ed release .” Ac cording ly , we c on c lud e that a

se nte nc e of

c on fi ne me nt i s w arr ante d und e r t he fa c ts.

III . I m pr ope r Co nsid e r at ion of R e lig ion in Se nt e nc ing Finally , the Appellant contends that the trial court improperly considere d relig ion in reac hing its sentencing decision. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-102(4) (2 0 0 6 ) provides that “[s] entenc ing should e x clude all considerations respe cting

. . . relig ion

. . . of t he individual.” At the sentenc ing hear ing, the prosec utor questioned the Appe llant as follows reg ardingthe contents of a le tte r t hat he ha d w ri tte n to the vic tima po log izin g to h e r f

or his a c tio ns : Q. Fur

ther in y our letter, a

nd I ’ll ref er the Court to p age 3 , y o u t old Ms. Neal that, “I deser ve whatever

punishment is handed down to me;” is that true? A. Ye s. Q. An d th a t y ou

be lie ve Go d a llo we d th is t o h a pp e n to y ou

and Ms. Ne a l? A. Ibelieve – Q. I s that true? A. Ye s.

L a te r at th e he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt state d in pa rt :
Th ro ug ho ut h is state me nts , thro ug ho ut h is t e sti mony , th e [Ap pe lla nt] t a lks a bo ut h is druguse. In looking at the probation or p re -s entenc e re port, he obviously has had druguse for

some period of time, ha s, he said, boug ht or obtained c ocaine and used it, wh ic h is ill e g a l poss e ssi on of dr ug s, wh ic h me ans he ’s de a lin g wi th d ru g de a le rs

. H e b l a m e s e v e r

yt h i n g o ndr

u g s

. W e l l , w h i l e dr

u g s m ay i n h i b i t

h i m f r o m a l w ays rec og nizi ng the seriousne ss of hi s offe nses, drugs and alcohol ar e no excuse for doing
any ty pe of c ri me and

no de fe ns e to a cr ime

. Th e Court jus t a bo ut f e ll o ut o f h is c ha ir when he said that God allowe d this to happen. Fo r s o m e reason I bet Ms. Nea l doesn’t look at it that way

. I suspect that she f eels like proba

bly that God allowed he r to s ur viv e . A nd whi le I ’m

no t makin g any

jud g me nt a

bo ut whe the r o r n ot t

hat, i n fac t, happens one way

or anothe r, the Court is incre dulous over that stateme nt. The Appe llant relies solely upon the latter rema rks by the trial court in suppor t of his a rgument on this iss ue. I n response , the State ar g ues that “the rec ord supports the conc lusion that the trial court found that the [Appellant] was trying to de flec t responsibility for his c rime by

contendingthat since Go d all ow e d the c ri me to ha pp e n, the [Ap pe lla

nt] w a s a bs olv e d o f a

ny bla me .” Th e State su

bmi ts t h a t t h i s s t a t e d

b e l i e f o f t h e A p p e l l an te v i n c e s a

f a i l u r e t o a c c e p tr e s p o n s i b i l i t y an d , a c c o r d i n g l y, bear s on the Appellant’s r ehabilitative prospe cts, which wer e proper ly considere d by

the trial cour

t under pr inciples of sente ncing

. The c omments of the trial cour t relied upon by

the Appellant, as t o his claim that the trial court improper ly

considere d relig ion in sentencing , related to the Appellant’ s testimony at the-8-

sentenc ing he aringand we re ma de with spec ific re fer ence to a letter written by the Appellant to the
v i c t i m i nt h i s c a s e

. S t a t e m e n t s m a d e b y a d e f e n d an to nh i s o w nb e h a l f m ay b e c o n s i d e r e d

b y a sentenc ing c ourt. SeeT. C.A . § § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (b ); State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991)

. We conclude that the transcr ipt of the sentenc ing he aringclea rly ref lects that the trial c ourt did not improperly

consider the Appellant’s r elig ious beliefs in rea ching its sentenc ing decision. This issue is without m erit.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing a nd the reco rd as a whole, we modify the Appellant’ s six -y ear sentenc e for

attempted ag g ravated robbe ry to refle ct a se ntence of four y ear s. The trial court’ s denial of an a lternative sentence is affirme d. We remand the case for e ntry of an a mended judg ment consistent with this opi nion.

___________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE