Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 48A02-1608-CR-1806 | May 30, 2017 Page 1 of 9

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Anthony C. Lawrence

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Deshawn Lamont Redfield,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 30, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A02-1608-CR-1806

Appeal from the Madison Circuit

Court

The Honorable Angela Warner 

Sims, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C01-1406-FB-1086

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Deshawn Lamont Redfield appeals his convictions for unlawful possession of a 

firearm by a serious violent felon, as a Class B felony; possession of cocaine, as 

a Class C felony; pointing a firearm, as a Class D felony; and resisting law 
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enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor. Redfield raises one issue for our 

review, namely, whether an officer violated Redfield’s right to be free from 

unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution1 when the officer seized Redfield for officer safety but 

without pre-existing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We hold that, on 

these facts, the officer’s seizure of Redfield was reasonable. Thus, we affirm the 

trial court’s judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the early morning hours of June 15, 2014, Anderson Police Department 

(“APD”) Officer Gabe Bailey responded to a dispatch report of a subject with a 

firearm at the Birdhouse bar. The report, which was based on an anonymous 

tip,2 described the subject as a black male wearing a gray shirt and a hat. In the 

few moments it took for dispatch to describe the suspect, Officer Bailey had 

already arrived at the Birdhouse, and he immediately observed a person who 

matched that description outside the bar. Officer Bailey radioed for backup.

[3] While awaiting backup, Officer Bailey approached the man, Redfield, who was 

talking to another man, Eric Welker. Officer Bailey attempted to “stall” while 

 

1

 As explained further below, Redfield did not preserve for appellate review an independent analysis under 

Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

2

 After APD officers arrested Redfield, Officer Bailey took a statement from Richard Dawson, who had seen 

Redfield in the Birdhouse pointing a gun at others because Redfield was “upset [that] people were buying 

drinks and he didn’t get a drink bought for him.” Tr. Vol. I at 24. But there is no evidence that Dawson 

made the initial report to the APD or that Officer Bailey knew of the facts that were relayed to him by 

Dawson when Officer Bailey initially confronted Redfield. See id. at 25.
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backup arrived and “made contact with” Welker, “patted him down,” and 

“spoke to him briefly.” Tr. Vol. II at 48. Officer Bailey stated that APD had 

received a call about “somebody with a gun.” Id. At that point, Redfield “took 

a step” away from Officer Bailey and “blade[d] his body away” from Officer 

Bailey’s line-of-sight “several times.” Id. at 48, 51. That is, Redfield moved the 

right side of his body away from Officer Bailey’s vantage point while he walked 

away from Officer Bailey. Further, and while only about five feet from Officer 

Bailey, Redfield made a “drawing motion” with his right hand as if he were 

“drawing for a gun.” Id. at 49. Officer Bailey thought he “was go[ing to] be in 

a gun fight” and immediately drew his sidearm and ordered Redfield to “Stop!” 

and “Let me see your hands!” Id.

[4] Redfield disregarded Officer Bailey’s commands and continued to walk away. 

After Redfield had gone about fifty feet and continued to disregard Officer 

Bailey’s commands, Officer Bailey tased Redfield, which knocked Redfield 

down. Officer Bailey again ordered Redfield to put his hands out, and Redfield 

initially complied. But he then made a quick motion with his right hand and 

grabbed a firearm “[o]ut of the side of his pants.” Id. at 59. Officer Bailey fired 

the taser again, and, while Redfield was momentarily incapacitated by the taser, 

Officer Bailey was able to acquire Redfield’s firearm. 

[5] Thereafter, backup arrived and Redfield was arrested. His firearm was found to 

have been loaded with one hollow-point bullet along with regular ammunition. 

Officer Bailey also discovered crack cocaine on Redfield’s person. 
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[6] The State charged Redfield with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious 

violent felon, as a Class B felony; possession of cocaine, as a Class C felony; 

pointing a firearm, as a Class D felony; and resisting law enforcement, as a 

Class A misdemeanor. Redfield filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the 

grounds that he had been unlawfully seized by Officer Bailey and, as such, the 

evidence obtained pursuant to that seizure was obtained in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, for the same 

reasons, Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court 

denied Redfield’s motion to suppress after a hearing. At his ensuing jury trial, 

Redfield renewed his Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 objections 

to the State’s evidence, and the court overruled his objections. The jury found 

Redfield guilty as charged, and the court entered its judgment and sentence 

against Redfield accordingly. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Redfield’s arguments that “police violated his Fourth Amendment and Article 

1, Section 11 rights” raise “questions of law we review de novo.” Zanders v. 

State, ___ N.E.3d ___, No. 15S01-1611-CR-571, slip op. at 4-5 (Ind. May 4, 

2017). As the United States Supreme Court has explained with respect to the 

Fourth Amendment, “as a general matter determinations of reasonable 

suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal,” while 

“findings of historical fact” underlying those legal determinations are reviewed 

“only for clear error.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). The 

Indiana Supreme Court applies the same standard under Article 1, Section 11. 
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E.g., McIlquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind. 2014). In other words, we 

review whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists “under a standard 

‘similar to other sufficiency issues’—whether, without reweighing the evidence, 

there is ‘substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court’s 

decision.’” Id. (quoting State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Ind. 2010)). 

With that standard in mind,3 we turn to Redfield’s arguments on appeal.

[8] Redfield first challenges the legality of his seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment. The crux of Redfield’s argument on this issue is that Officer 

Bailey had no reasonable suspicion that Redfield was engaged in criminal 

activity when Officer Bailey first encountered Redfield outside of the 

Birdhouse.4 As such, Redfield continues, Officer Bailey had no legal grounds 

subsequently to seize Redfield.

[9] The Indiana Supreme Court recently held that a report of possession of a 

firearm, without more, is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of 

 

3

 In his brief, Redfield describes this appeal as an appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. 

Appellant’s Br. at 6. That is not correct; the evidence was presented to a jury, and Redfield objected to the 

admission of the evidence at trial. Thus, he is appealing from that admission, not from the prior denial of his 

motion to suppress. See Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014). However, in light of that fact, the 

State asserts that our standard of review is for an abuse of discretion, as that is our typical standard of review 

for challenges to the admission of evidence. See Brown v. State, 770 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ind. 2002). But the 

issues in this appeal are constitutional questions and, as such, we review them de novo. See, e.g., Guilmette, 14 

N.E.3d at 40. And given the correct standard of review and Redfield’s arguments on appeal, his mistaken 

characterization of this appeal as an appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress is irrelevant to our 

analysis. See id. at 40 n.1.

4

 The parties also dispute the merits of Officer Bailey’s reliance on an anonymous tip. We assume for the 

sake of argument that the anonymous tip did not establish reasonable suspicion. Generally the “[r]eliability 

of the . . . anonymous tipster . . . must be established by reference to underlying facts and circumstances 

which indicate that the information is trustworthy.” State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (Ind. 2011).
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criminal activity. Pinner v. State, ___ N.E.3d ___, No. 49S02-1611-CR-610, slip 

op. at 5-10 (Ind. May 9, 2017). In Pinner, police received a report of a man with 

a firearm at a theater. The report described no criminal or suspicious behavior 

from the man. Nonetheless, upon arriving at the theater and identifying a 

person, Pinner, who matched the description provided, an officer searched 

Pinner for weapons and discovered a firearm. The State subsequently charged 

Pinner with unlawful possession of a firearm. 

[10] On interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of Pinner’s motion to 

suppress, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the State violated Pinner’s 

Fourth Amendment rights when the officer searched his person at the theater. 

Id. The court concluded that there was “no evidence in the record from which 

an inference of criminal activity can be drawn” because the officer had no 

reason to suspect that Pinner’s possession of a firearm was contrary to Indiana 

law. Id., slip op. at 8. The court also noted that, “[a]lthough nervous, Pinner 

made no furtive or suspicious movements, nor did he reach for the weapon; and 

he made no attempt to flee.” Id., slip op. at 4, 8-10. As such, there was no 

evidence from the encounter itself that gave the officer cause to search Pinner 

for weapons. 

[11] Our facts are materially different from those in Pinner on the latter point. That 

is, while we agree with Redfield that Officer Bailey had no reasonable suspicion 

of criminal activity at the time he initially approached, that fact does not negate 

the reasonableness of Officer Bailey’s ensuing conduct in response to Redfield’s 

behavior during the encounter. It is settled law that, if an officer has 
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commenced “a nonseizure confrontation without a pre-existing reasonable 

suspicion supporting a frisk, but such suspicion suddenly appears (most likely 

because of the suspect’s conduct), then the officer is entitled to frisk for his own 

protection.”5 4 Wayne R. LaFave Search & Seizure § 9.6(a) (5th ed. 2012). 

[12] That is what the facts here demonstrate. Officer Bailey responded to an 

anonymous report of a person with a firearm. Officer Bailey then immediately 

observed a person matching the suspect’s description engaged with another 

man. Officer Bailey approached and patted down the other man, noting that 

APD had received a report of a person with a firearm. Redfield then became 

nervous, “blade[d]” his body away from Officer Bailey, and made a hand 

motion consistent with drawing a firearm. Tr. Vol. II at 48-49. It was at that

moment that Officer Bailey, whose immediate thought was that he was about to 

become engaged “in a gun fight,” id. at 49, seized Redfield6 by drawing his own 

sidearm and ordering Redfield to “Stop!” and show his hands. Id.

[13] Officer Bailey’s initial encounter with Redfield was not a seizure. It became a 

seizure only after Redfield’s own conduct reasonably and suddenly gave rise to 

a fear for officer safety. Thus, Officer Bailey’s seizure of Redfield was lawful 

 

5

 Redfield asserts that “we have held that the defendant’s actions of turning away from a police officer and 

putting something down his pants was not sufficient conduct to justify an investigatory stop.” Appellant’s Br. 

at 17. But neither of the cases Redfield cites in support of that assertion, Bridgewater v. State, 793 N.E.2d 

1097, 1100-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, and Webb v. State, 714 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1999), involves an analysis of a nonseizure confrontation in which the facts then escalate to justify, or not, a 

frisk for officer protection.

6

 We reject Redfield’s argument on appeal that the moment of seizure only happened later when Officer 

Bailey first tased Redfield.
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under the Fourth Amendment. LaFave, supra, at § 9.6(a); see also, e.g., United 

States v. Ellis, 501 F.3d 958, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that an officer did 

not violate the Fourth Amendment when, during the course of a consensual 

encounter, the officer searched the defendant after the officer had asked him if 

he was armed and the defendant then “act[ed] nervously and reach[ed] toward 

his pocket”); Commonwealth v. Stephens, 885 N.E.2d 785, 796-97 (Mass. 2008) 

(holding that an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when, during a 

nonseizure encounter, he searched the defendant for weapons after the officer 

had observed the defendant holding “a black object” in his hands, which he 

“quickly lowered” to the area of his lap). 

[14] Accordingly, Redfield’s decision to disregard Officer Bailey’s lawful command 

and attempt to flee was itself not lawful. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (2013). 

Once Redfield attempted to flee from Officer Bailey’s lawful command, Officer 

Bailey had probable cause to further seize and arrest Redfield. He did so and, 

in turn, lawfully discovered and seized the evidence now in question. We thus 

affirm the trial court’s judgment on the Fourth Amendment issue.

[15] Finally, Redfield asserts on appeal that the seizure of his person violated his 

rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. However, in his 

arguments to the trial court, Redfield mentioned Article 1, Section 11 but did 

not provide any independent analysis under that provision of the law and facts. 

Rather, Redfield’s arguments below were that his state rights were violated only 

for the same reasons his federal rights were violated. Accordingly, we conclude 

that Redfield has not preserved for appellate review any independent claim 
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under Article 1, Section 11. See Wilkins v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ind. 

2011) (“Because he provides no authority or independent analysis supporting a 

separate standard under the state constitution, any state constitutional claim is 

waived.”). Insofar as Redfield may have preserved a claim under Article 1, 

Section 11 for our review, for the same reasons his federal rights were not 

violated, neither were his rights under Article 1, Section 11, and we affirm the 

trial court on this issue as well.

[16] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.