J-A27040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JONATHAN GONZALEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1357 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 18, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0004947-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: MARCH 29, 2023

Appellant, Jonathan Gonzalez, appeals from the judgments of sentence 

that were imposed after a non-jury trial for possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver (cocaine), knowing or intentional possession 

of a controlled substance (cocaine), possession of a small amount of 

marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and failing to signal.1 He 

challenges the denial of a pre-trial suppression motion. Upon careful review, 

we vacate the judgments of sentence, reverse the trial court’s suppression 

order, and remand for further proceedings. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(31)(i), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), and 75 Pa.C.S. § 3334(a), 

respectively. 
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At 9:09 p.m., on November 6, 2019, Police Officer Christopher Fortin 

stopped a car that Appellant was driving in the 1000 block of North 11th Street 

in the city of Reading after the officer viewed Appellant commit a traffic 

violation three blocks earlier. N.T. 2/18/20, 4-5. Appellant was the sole 

occupant. Id. at 5. Officer Fortin approached the car on the driver’s side 

while another officer named Baker approached on the passenger-side. Id. 

Upon speaking with Appellant, Officer Fortin observed that he appeared “to be 

very nervous.” Id. at 6. He noticed that Appellant’s chest “was moving rather 

fast” and that he was sweating. Id. Appellant became agitated from the 

officer’s questions about the car and his identification. Id. Appellant stated 

that the car belonged to his friend, but he could not provide that individual’s 

name. Id. 

The area where the car stop took place was described by Officer Fortin 

as a “very high drug, high crime area,” where the officer had made numerous 

prior drug arrests. N.T. 2/18/20, 6. During his interaction with Appellant, he 

saw that Appellant was wearing a fanny pack strapped across his chest. Id. 

During his five-to-six-years as a police officer, he had recovered drugs and 

weapons from fanny packs on other individuals. Id. at 7. When he went to 

conduct a warrant and license check on Appellant, Officer Baker asked 

Appellant, “What’s in the bag,” with respect to the fanny pack. Id. Upon his 

return to the driver’s side of the car, Officer Fortin smelled the odor of 

marijuana when Appellant unzipped the fanny pack. Id. Officer Fortin also 

saw a large amount of money in the fanny pack before Appellant zipped the 
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pack closed. Id. Appellant stated that he had “a little bit of weed in the bag” 

and had a “medicinal card or [a] medical card.”2 Id. at 8.

Officer Fortin later testified that the opening and the closing of the fanny 

pack was an “indicator” that Appellant “was trying to conceal something such 

as a weapon or narcotic inside the bag. N.T. 2/18/20, 7-9. He had Appellant 

exit the car and place his hands on the top of the car for “a quick pat[-]down.” 

Id. at 9. Officer Fortin unzipped the fanny pack, placed it on the car roof, and

handcuffed Appellant. Id. Officer Baker waited with Appellant while Officer 

Fortin searched the car and found an iPhone. Id. Officer Fortin then returned 

to Appellant and searched the fanny pack. Id. Inside, he recovered the 

money had had seen before, which totaled $8,600, along with marijuana that 

was packaged in a material that was “gold reflective” on one side and clear on 

the other side. Id. at 8-10. Upon intending to arrest Appellant for the 

marijuana and search his person, Officer Fortin asked Appellant “if he had 

anything else illegal on him.” Id. at 9-10 (“At that point he was under arrest 

and I was about to search him...”). Appellant admitted to having some cocaine 

on him. Id. at 10. The police recovered a “little over” sixty grams of cocaine 

from an “airtight bag” in the front right pocket of Appellant’s jacket. Id.

In his suppression motion, Appellant claimed that the seizure of the

evidence from his person was unlawful because: (1) he did not consent to the 

search; (2) the police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him and 

____________________________________________

2 The General Assembly enacted the Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”), 35 P.S. 

§§ 10231.101-10231.2110, with an effective date of May 2016. 
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search the vehicle upon noticing the odor of marijuana from his fanny pack; 

(3) the seizure of the evidence from his person was based on a search 

unrelated to officer safety and the location of a weapon; and (4) the search of 

his person was not based upon probable cause. Omnibus Pre-trial Motion, 

12/31/19, ¶¶ 24-27. He thus claimed that the admission of the evidence 

recovered after the search of the car and the fanny pack violated his rights 

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 

¶ 29. 

At a hearing on the motion, Appellant’s counsel clarified that they were 

not contesting the validity of the traffic stop but were contesting the search 

and seizure of the drugs from Appellant’s person. N.T. 2/18/20, 3. Officer 

Fortin testified to the above-summarized facts. Id. at 4-10. 

The suppression court’s findings of facts largely tracked Officer Fortin’s 

direct examination testimony with the exception of its finding that Appellant 

provided a medical marijuana card to Officer Fortin in between Appellant’s

closing of the fanny pack and his admission to having some marijuana before 

Officer Fortin asked him to exit the car. Findings of Fact, 4/21/20, 2-3. On 

direct examination, the officer was unsure whether Appellant had provided 

him the card prior to the arrest. N.T. 2/18/20, 9 (Officer Fortin, in response 

to a question about placing Appellant in handcuffs, testified, “I don’t recall if 

he had shown me his medicinal card at that point, but he did state that he 

had one.”). On cross-examination, the officer agreed that Appellant showed 
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him a medical marijuana card prior to the officer asking Appellant to exit the 

car. Id. at 12-13. Officer Fortin confirmed that a medical marijuana card,

that had been issued to Appellant by the Pennsylvania Department of Health 

on July 9, 2019, and was marked and moved into evidence, was similar to the 

card that Appellant had showed him. Id. at 12, 27; Defense Exhibit 1 (Medical 

Marijuana Card). The suppression court resolved the timing of Appellant’s

display of the medical marijuana card consistent with Officer Fortin’s crossexamination testimony. Findings of Fact, 4/21/20, 3. On cross-examination, 

Officer Fortin also confirmed that he asked Appellant to exit the car because 

he was “concerned for officer safety” that Appellant may have had a weapon 

in the fanny pack. N.T. 2/18/20, 13. 

Appellant testified that Officer Fortin asked him to open the fanny pack 

and that, before doing so, he told the officer that he had a medical marijuana 

card and that the fanny pack contained “a little bit of U.S. currency and a little 

bit of [his] medical marijuana.” N.T. 2/18/20, 20-21. He asserted that he 

then showed the officer his medical marijuana card and then opened the fanny 

pack, while he was still in the car, to let the officers look inside the bag. Id.

at 21. He recalled that the officer conducted a pat-down search of him that 

did not yield any weapons, a search of the car, and then a search of the fanny 

pack that yielded the money and the marijuana. Id. at 21-22. He alleged 

that, while he was handcuffed, Officer Fortin searched his pockets resulting in 

the recovery of more money and the cocaine from his jacket pocket. Id. at 

22-23. He denied that he admitted to the officer that he had been in 
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possession of the cocaine. Id. at 23. The suppression court did not credit 

that denial. Findings of Fact, 4/21/20, 3.

After hearing the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the 

suppression court deferred issuing its ruling to another date so that it could 

issue an opinion setting forth its findings and conclusions. N.T. 2/18/20, 30. 

On April 21, 2020, the court denied the suppression motion. Order, 4/21/20, 

1. The court concluded that there was reasonable suspicion to extend the 

traffic stop based on the “high crime and high drug area” in which the events 

were taking place, the testimony about Appellant appearing nervous, 

Appellant’s inability provide a name for the car’s owner, the officer’s detection 

of the marijuana odor, and his observation of the money when Appellant 

opened the fanny pack. Conclusions of Law, 4/21/20, 4-6. The court also 

included that the factors supporting the reasonable suspicion to extend the 

traffic stop, in addition to the fact that the stopped car was owned by a third 

party that was not present in the car, supported probable cause permitting 

Officer Fortin’s search of the fanny pack. Id. at 6-10.

The court issued the following findings of fact:

1. On November 6, 2019, Officer Fortin was employed by the 

Reading Police Department. He was on patrol in full uniform 

and displaying a badge of authority.

2. While on patrol, Officer Fortin observed a vehicle commit a 

traffic violation in the 700 block of 11th Street, Reading, 

Berks County, Pennsylvania. This is a high drug and high 

crime area where Officer Fortin has made numerous drug 

arrests.
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3. Officer Fortin initiated a traffic stop and came into contact 

with [Appellant], the operator of the vehicle. He was the 

sole occupant.

4. Officer Baker was also present on scene and he approached 

the passenger side of the vehicle.

5. Officer Fortin looked inside of the vehicle and observed that 

[Appellant] appeared nervous. [Appellant]’s chest was 

moving fast and he was sweating. 

6. Officer Fortin asked [Appellant] for his identification and 

inquired about the vehicle. [Appellant] became agitated by 

the questioning. 

7. [Appellant] stated that the vehicle belonged to his friend but 

he couldn’t provide that individual’s name.

8. While interacting with [Appellant], Officer Fortin noticed that 

[Appellant] was wearing a fanny pack across his chest. 

During his time as a police officer, Officer Fortin has 

recovered drugs in fanny packs from other individuals.

9. As Officer Fortin moved away from the vehicle to check 

[Appellant] for warrants and run his license, Officer Baker 

asked [Appellant] what he had in the fanny pack. Officer 

Fortin returned to the vehicle and [Appellant] unzipped his 

fanny pack. Officer Fortin immediately smelled the odor of 

marijuana. He also observed a large amount of U.S. 

currency in the fanny pack. 

10. After [Appellant] unzipped the fanny pack, he immediately 

closed it. [Appellant] informed the officers that he had a 

little bit of weed and that he had a medical card for it. 

[Appellant] provided Officer Fortin with a medical marijuana 

card. Officer Fortin believed that [Appellant] was 

attempting to conceal a weapon or narcotics. 

11. After seeing [Appellant]’s medical marijuana card, Officer 

Fortin asked [Appellant] to exit his vehicle. [Appellant] was 

patted down for the safety of the officers and placed into 

handcuffs. Officer Fortin testified that he was concerned 

that [Appellant] may have a weapon in the fanny pack. 
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Officer Fortin also testified that [Appellant] was being 

investigated for possession of marijuana. 

12. During the pat-down of [Appellant], Officer Fortin did not 

notice anything indicative of a weapon or contraband. 

13. Due to the odor of marijuana, [Appellant]’s vehicle was 

searched but nothing else was located. [Appellant]’s fanny 

pack was also searched revealing marijuana. The marijuana 

was located in a gold, reflective bag that was see-through 

on one side. There were no markings on the bag or 

packaging indicating that the marijuana originated from a 

dispensary. 

14. Officer Fortin approached [Appellant] and he admitted that 

he had cocaine on his person. Officer Fortin recovered the 

cocaine which weighed a little over 60 grams. 

15. In addition to the narcotics, Officer Fortin discovered 

$8,600.00 in U.S. currency and an iPhone.

Findings of Fact, 4/21/20, 2-3.

Prior to trial, Appellant filed four motions for reconsideration of the 

denial of the suppression motion. First Reconsideration Motion, 6/8/20;

Second Reconsideration Motion, 7/13/20; Third Reconsideration Motion, 

11/30/20; Fourth Reconsideration Motion, 1/13/21. The suppression court 

denied the motions. Order, 7/15/20, 1; Order, 1/14/21, 1; Order, 2/16/21, 

1. 

On October 6, 2021, Appellant proceeded to be tried without a jury and 

was found guilty of the above-referenced offenses. Verdict of the Court, 

10/6/21, 1. On the same date, the court sentenced Appellant to eleven and 

one-half to twenty-three months of imprisonment for possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver and one year of probation for 
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possession of drug paraphernalia, and fines for possession of a small amount 

of marijuana and the summary traffic offense; the sentences were stayed 

pending appeal.

3

 Sentence Order (Possession of a Controlled Substance with 

Intent to Deliver), 10/6/21, 1; Probation Order (Possession of Drug 

Paraphernalia), 10/6/21, 1; Sentence Upon Conviction (Possession of a Small 

Amount of Marijuana), 10/6/21, 1; Sentence Upon Conviction (Failing to 

Signal), 10/6/21, 1. Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions and 

timely filed a notice of appeal.4 Notice of Appeal, 10/19/21, 1. He 

subsequently filed a timely statement of matters complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Rule 1925(b) Statement, 11/12/21, 1; Rule 

1925 Order, 10/29/21, 1 

Appellant’s lone issue for our review challenges the denial of his 

evidence suppression claims: “Whether the Court’s denial of the motion to 

suppress and denial of the motion to reconsider the motion to suppress were 

in error?” Appellant’s Brief at 7. Our standard of review on this issue is wellsettled:

____________________________________________

3 Knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance merged for 

sentencing purposes. 

4 Appellant’s notice of appeal referenced the judgments of sentence imposed 

on October 6, 2021, however, the trial court filed an amended/corrected 

sentencing order on October 18, 2021. In cases where the trial court amends 

the judgments of sentence during the period it maintains jurisdiction pursuant 

to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, the direct appeal lies from the amended judgments of 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Garzone, 993 A.2d 1245, 1254 & n.6 

(Pa. Super. 2010). Accordingly, the caption of this memorandum reflects that 

this appeal is from the amended judgments of sentence. 
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Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of a 

suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the 

prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record. 

Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, 

we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 498-99 (Pa. Super. 2021) 

(en banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Bumbarger, 231 A.3d 10, 15 (Pa. 

Super. 2020) (citation and ellipses omitted).

Appellant’s argument section consists of four subparts. First, he argues 

the Officer Fortin lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that he was armed 

and dangerous and thus the officer lacked the justification to conduct a limited 

search for weapons in the car. Appellant’s Brief at 15-17. Second, he argues 

that the search of the car, the fanny pack, and his person were not supported 

by probable cause. Id. at 17-24. Third, he argues that the cocaine recovered 

from his person should have been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous 

tree, i.e., that it was the product of an unlawful arrest and unconstitutional 

searches. Id. at 24-25. Lastly, he argues that the Commonwealth did not 

prove that exigent circumstances permitted the warrantless search of the car, 

his person, and the fanny pack. Id. at 25. We will review our applicable 

standards permitting the types of searches conducted in this case and address

Appellant’s arguments in the order in which they are presented.
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The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee individuals freedom from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. See Commonwealth v. Singletary, 

267 A.3d 1267, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2021). “A warrantless search or seizure of 

evidence is ... ‘presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and 

Article I, § 8, subject to a few specifically established, well-delineated 

exceptions.’” Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 546 (Pa. Super. 

2019) (citation omitted). 

The law recognizes three distinct levels of interactions between 

police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an 

investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop, see 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); 

and (3) a custodial detention.

A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction 

between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry 

by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that 

it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond and therefore 

need not be justified by any level of police suspicion. 

In contract, an investigative detention carries an official 

compulsion to stop and respond. Since this interaction has 

elements of official compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of 

unlawful activity.

Finally, a custodial detention occurs when the nature, duration and 

conditions of an investigative detention become so coercive as to 

be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest. 

This level of interaction requires that the police have probable 

cause to believe that the person so detained has committed or is 

committing a crime. 

Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1247-48 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(en banc) (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted).
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“In reviewing whether reasonable suspicion ... exists, we must ... 

examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there exists 

a particularized and objective basis for suspecting an individual [ ] of criminal 

activity.” Commonwealth v. Epps, 608 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Pa. Super. 1992). 

Even innocent factors, viewed together, may arouse suspicion that criminal 

activity is afoot. Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa. 1999); 

see also Commonwealth v. Riley, 715 A.2d 1131, 1135 (Pa. Super. 1998) 

(“[A] combination of circumstances, none of which taken alone would justify 

a stop, may be sufficient to achieve a reasonable suspicion.”). Moreover, “in 

determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due 

weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 

‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw 

from the facts in light of his experience.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27.

An investigative detention may develop into a custodial detention. 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2019). “The 

key difference between an investigative and a custodial detention is that the 

latter involves such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional 

equivalent of an arrest.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 887 

(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court 

considers the totality of the circumstances to determine if an encounter is 

investigatory or custodial. See Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 

299, 306 (Pa. Super. 2011). 
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A motor vehicle stop is generally an investigative detention. 

Commonwealth v. Spence, --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 2002292, *9 (Pa. Super., 

filed Feb. 25, 2023). “During a traffic stop, it is inherently reasonable for an 

officer to order the driver of the vehicle to alight from the car.” Id., citing 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 654 A.2d 1096 (Pa. Super. 1995). 

It is well settled that an officer may pat-down an individual whose 

suspicious behavior he is investigating on the basis of a 

reasonable belief that the individual is presently armed and 

dangerous to the officer or others. To validate a Terry frisk, the 

police officer must be able to articulate specific facts from which 

he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and 

dangerous. In determining whether a Terry frisk was supported 

by a sufficient articulable basis, we examine the totality of the 

circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Gray, 896 A.2d 601, 605-606 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(citations and footnote omitted). Under that standard, police may conduct a 

limited pat-down of a person’s outer clothing “in an attempt to discover the 

presence of weapons which may be used to endanger the safety of police or 

others.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 927 A.2d 279, 285 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the United States 

Supreme Court applied the principles set forth in Terry to a search of a 

passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons. The Long Court held that

“the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those 

areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police 
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officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific, and articulable facts 

which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 

warrant the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect 

may gain immediate control of weapons.” Id. at 1049 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man 

in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that 

of others was in danger.” Id. at 1050 (citation omitted). 

“In evaluating the validity of an officer’s investigative or protective 

conduct under Terry, the touchstone of our analysis is always the 

reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular governmental intrusion 

of a citizen’s personal security.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1051 (citation, internal 

quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). “Therefore, the balancing required by 

Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search 

of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess 

an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially 

dangerous.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1051. The Long court also emphasized that 

a Terry investigation is “at close range, when the officer remains particularly 

vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and 

the officer must make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others 

from possible danger.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
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Our courts in Pennsylvania previously recognized the federal automobile 

exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, which permitted police to conduct a warrantless search or 

seizure of an automobile solely based on probable cause without any need for 

a separate finding of exigent circumstances. At the time of the car stop in this 

case, the automobile exception was valid in Pennsylvania pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 138 (Pa. 2014) (plurality opinion). 

Since then, our Supreme Court overruled Gary in Commonwealth v. 

Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 2017 (Pa. 2020), concluding that Article I, Section 

8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection and only 

permits warrantless vehicle searches upon a showing of probable cause and 

exigent circumstances. To be entitled to retroactive application of a new 

constitutional rule, such as the one in Alexander, a defendant must have 

raised and preserved the issue in the court below. See Commonwealth v. 

Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 347-48 (Pa. Super. 2022). 

With respect to custodial detentions,

“Probable cause” is a practical, non-technical concept. To 

establish probable cause, the Commonwealth must demonstrate 

that a search meets the requirements of the ‘totality-of-the 

circumstances’ test. Pursuant to that test, when presented with 

an application for a warrant, “[a] magistrate is to make a practical, 

common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set 

forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis 

of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is 

a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place.” 
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Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 40 (Pa. 2021) (citations omitted). 

“The police have probable cause where the facts and circumstances within the 

officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in 

the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth 

v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007), quoting Commonwealth 

v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1192 (Pa. 2004). 

In the first part of his argument, Appellant alleges that the police 

testimony did not support a reasonable belief that he was armed and 

dangerous for purposes of permitting a protective search for weapons in the 

car under Michigan v. Long. Appellant’s Brief at 15-17. Citing 

Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), 

he asserts that a nighttime car stop, his appearance of nervousness, and the 

police officer’s awareness of other persons using fanny packs to store 

weapons, did not support a limited frisk for weapons in the car. Appellant’s 

Brief at 16-17. 

As an initial matter, we note that Appellant does not explain how a 

limited frisk for weapons in the car was material in this instance. Here, the 

certified record contains only the notes of testimony from the hearing on his 

suppression motion and does not include any notes of testimony from his trial. 

The suppression hearing transcript reveals only that a cellular telephone was 

recovered from the car but does not address whether any information from 

the phone was ever used as evidence of his guilt in connection with the drug 
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and drug paraphernalia charges that concerned the contraband recovered 

from his person. N.T. 2/18/20, 9 (“I believe there was an iPhone, but nothing 

else relevant inside the vehicle.”). With the factual scenario presented in this 

case, it is not immediately apparent that any contraband recovered from 

Appellant’s person was the fruit of any improper search of the car. Even 

assuming that any material evidence was recovered from a limited frisk of the 

car, we would not agree with Appellant’s assessment that a limited frisk of the 

car was not supported by a reasonable belief that he was possibly armed and 

dangerous. 

Appellant fails to make his argument consistent with the facts found by 

the suppression court. First, he fails to address additional factors for 

consideration such as his agitation at the officer’s questioning of his identity 

and information about the car and the fact he could not provide the name of 

the car’s third-party owner, beyond saying that it was a friend. N.T. 2/18/20, 

6. Second, his characterization of the opening of the fanny pack does not 

match the officer’s testimony and the court’s findings. The officer’s testimony 

did not support the assertion that Appellant opened the fanny pack so the 

officer could view its contents. Id. at 7-9. The manner in which he opened 

and closed the fanny pack made the officer believe that he was trying to 

conceal something in it. Id. at 7 (“Immediately after he -- the defendant 

opened it, it appeared that he zipped it back closed. I can’t speak for why he 

did that, but that was an indicator to me that he was trying to conceal 
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something such as a weapon or narcotic inside the bag.”). The suppression 

court’s findings noted that he immediately closed the pack after opening it. 

Findings of Fact, 4/21/20, ¶ 10.

In Cartagena, this Court, sitting en banc, found that an officer lacked 

reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective weapons search of the passenger 

compartment of a vehicle where: (1) the stop occurred at night, (2) the 

defendant’s vehicle had tinted windows, and (3) the defendant appeared to 

be nervous. Id. at 304. The Cartagena court noted that there was no 

testimony indicating, inter alia, that the defendant had made furtive 

movements and that the stop occurred in a high-crime area. Id. at 304-06; 

see also Commonwealth v. Moyer, 954 A.2d 659, 669-70 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc) (holding that evidence that a vehicle’s occupants engaged in 

furtive movements and a defendant appeared nervous was insufficient to 

establish reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 

1196, 1206 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (same). The instant case does not 

closely align with Cartagena as Appellant suggests. 

Appellant’s location in a “high crime area” and his sweating, which 

implies nervousness, are factors that may be considered in determining 

whether the police officer possessed reasonable suspicion. See 

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 276 A.3d 282, 295 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en 

banc); Cartagena, 63 A.3d at 304 n.24; Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 

A.2d 357, 361 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc). The fact that the car was owned 
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by a third-party and Appellant failed to provide the name of the owner were 

additional permissible factors for purposes of a determination on reasonable 

suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1254-55 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc) (among factors providing reasonable suspicion during 

a car stop for a traffic code violation where a state trooper detected an odor 

of raw marijuana included the fact that the vehicle used by passenger Kemp 

and his associate driver was a vehicle owned by a third-party and Kemp did 

not provide the correct name of the car’s owner); Commonwealth v. 

Benitez, 218 A.3d 460, 477-78 (Pa. Super. 2019) (among factors for 

reasonable suspicion was the fact that Benitez could not identify the owner of 

the car he was using whom he claimed was his friend). The fact that the traffic 

stop was happening at nighttime, which was one of the few relevant 

circumstances present in Cartagena, was another adequate factor for 

consideration. See In re O.J., 958 A.2d 561, 566 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en 

banc) (“The vehicle stop occurred at night, which creates a heightened danger 

that an officer will not be able to view a suspect reaching for a weapon.”).

Moreover, the quick motion to open and close the fanny pack would 

appear to be akin to furtive movements along a waistline because a person 

could use a fanny pack to holster and conceal a weapon just as one may tuck 

a gun or weapon in their waistband. Furtive movements such as that can be 

an additional acceptable factor for determining reasonable suspicion. See 

Foglia, 979 A.2d at 361 (concluding that reasonable suspicion for an 
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investigative detention and Terry pat-down existed in part because the 

defendant “touched his waist area and sat down on a stoop behind some 

females ... [and t]he police officer was aware, based upon his experience with 

armed suspects, that weapons are often concealed in a person’s waistband[ 

]”). “Among the circumstances that can give rise to reasonable suspicion are 

the [officer]’s knowledge of the methods used in recent criminal activity and 

the characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices.” 

Commonwealth v. Bozeman, 205 A.3d 1264, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2019), 

citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563 (1980). 

Accordingly, the officer’s stated familiarity with defendants using fanny packs 

to conceal weapons and contraband was relevant to the suppression court’s 

review. N.T. 2/18/20, 6 (Officer Fortin testifying with respect to fanny packs, 

“Due to my training and experience, it’s known to me that a lot of people who 

are associated with criminal activity carry narcotics and weapons in those 

bags.”), 7 (“Q. Had you ever in your experience ever recovered drugs and/or 

weapons from a pack like that? A. Yes, both.”).

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the officers had 

reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down frisk of Appellant and a protective 

weapons search of the passenger compartment of the car he was driving. See 

Commonwealth v. Buchert, 68 A.3d 911, 916-17 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(holding that furtive movement along with extreme nervousness and a nighttime stop was sufficient to warrant a reasonable police officer to believe that 
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his safety was in danger and that the defendant might gain immediate control 

of a weapon); see also Commonwealth v. Simmons, 17 A.3d 399, 404 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (finding reasonable suspicion where the traffic stop was 

conducted at night in a high-drug and high-crime area, and the officer 

witnessed the defendant make a furtive movement of reaching under his seat 

and then towards his chest, consistent with concealing a weapon). 

Appellant next argues that there was not probable cause to search the 

car, his person, and his fanny pack. Appellant’s Brief at 17-24. He makes the 

following points: (1) the smell of marijuana alone did not give rise to probable 

cause; (2) “it [was] not enough for the Commonwealth to rattle off facts and 

circumstances; the facts and circumstances relied upon must come together 

and allow the officer to form a particularized suspicion of criminal activity;” 

and (3) because he produced his medical marijuana card, the officer did not 

have “a particularized suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, let alone 

probable cause.” Id. He reasons that there was a lack of probable cause to 

permit his arrest and the search of his person and things; the smell of 

marijuana was the only reason for the search; and the fruits of the “unlawful 

searches” should have been suppressed. Upon our review of the totality of 

the circumstances, we agree with Appellant that the evidence did not support 

probable cause. 

Here, the suppression court’s findings of fact agree that, after Appellant 

informed Officer Fortin about his possession of “a little bit of weed” and 
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provided the officer with a medical marijuana card, the officer asked Appellant 

to exit the car. Findings of Fact, 4/21/20, ¶ 10-11. Thereafter, the police 

conducted a pat-down search of Appellant that did not indicate the possession 

of weapons or contraband, and searched the car and fanny pack. Id. at ¶ 12-

13. The officer’s testimony notes that, at the time of the pat-down search, he 

unzipped the fanny pack and placed it in on the car’s roof. N.T. 2/18/20, 9. 

Officer Fortin searched the fanny pack, discovering its contents of marijuana 

and a large amount of money, after searching the car. Id.

The suppression court found that there was probable cause to search 

the fanny pack based on the odor of marijuana coming from it, in addition to 

the factors addressed in our reasonable suspicion analysis:

In the case at bar, this court finds that Officer Fortin possessed 

probable cause to believe that the fanny pack possessed 

contraband. ... Here, in addition to the odor of marijuana 

emanating from the fanny pack, the following additional factors 

were present: 1) high crime area; 2) Gonzalez’s nervous 

behavior; 3) the vehicle was owned by a third-party not present 

in the vehicle; 4) Gonzalez’s inability to provide the name of the 

friend who owned the vehicle; and 5) large amount of U.S. 

currency present. Therefore, in consideration of the totality of the 

circumstances, this court finds that Officer Fortin had probable 

cause to search Gonzalez’s fanny pack.

Conclusions of Law, 4/21/20, 10. In this situation, we do not agree that the 

odor of marijuana was evidence in support of an ongoing crime that permitted 

a warrantless search of the fanny pack and that the stated factors – absent 

the odor of marijuana – otherwise supported a finding of probable cause. 
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In our above analysis of the question of reasonable suspicion and the 

appropriateness of a vehicle frisk under Michigan v. Long, we declined to 

address the aspect of the odor of marijuana as a contributing factor. This is 

because our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 

(Pa. 2019), that “conduct in which hundreds of thousands of Pennsylvanians

are licensed to engage lawfully” is, on its own, “an insufficient basis for 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 945. Further, in 

Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2011), our Supreme Court 

recognized that the passage of our Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”) “makes 

abundantly clearly that marijuana no longer is per se illegal” and “the odor of 

marijuana may be a factor, but not a stand-alone one, in evaluating the 

totality of the circumstances for purposes of determining whether police had 

probable cause to conduct a warrantless search.” Id. at 41. In our recent 

decision in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. 

2022), we took note of a holding in an unpublished opinion that “the smell of 

fresh marijuana cannot objectively suggest anything more than possession of 

a substance that many Pennsylvanians can legally possess.” 

Appellant produced a medical marijuana card to the officers in between 

their detection of the marijuana odor and the search of the fanny pack which 

uncovered a supply of marijuana. Findings of Fact, 4/21/20, ¶ 9-11. After 

the presentation of the medical marijuana card, the odor should not have been 

considered as a reflection of possible criminal conduct. The Commonwealth 
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notes that while Appellant possessed a medical marijuana card, his possession 

of marijuana was still illegal because it was not in proper packaging required 

by the MMA. Commonwealth’s Brief at 14, citing 35 P.S. § 10231.303(b)(6), 

(8). That assertion does not support a notion that the odor of marijuana 

supported a reason for a search here because the officers could only confirm 

the existence of the improper packaging by conducting a search of the fanny 

pack which required probable cause as a prerequisite to the search. 

Acceptance of the Commonwealth’s argument on that point would permit a 

search for marijuana upon any odor detection to ensure its proper packaging 

and that would fly in the face of our Supreme Court’s holding in Barr and the 

Commonwealth’s established search and seizure jurisprudence.

5

Given our reasonable suspicion analysis, the police officers undoubtedly 

could have conducted a pat-down of the fanny pack to deduce whether it 

contained any weapons that would have placed the officers in danger. That 

did not occur. The only proof of illegal conduct giving rise to probable cause 

was the discovery that Appellant’s marijuana was not in proper packaging 

____________________________________________

5

If there were evidence in this case of paraphernalia used for smoking 

marijuana in the car or the officers had smelled burnt marijuana then the 

existence of a marijuana odor would have a relevant factor for considering 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See 35 P.S. § 10231.304(b) (“It is 

unlawful to: (1) Smoke medical marijuana”); see also Cunningham, 287 

A.3d at 10 (addressing unpublished decisions of this Court appreciating that 

the MMA does not permit the smoking of marijuana). The police testimony 

here did not give any impression that the odor was of burnt marijuana. See

N.T. 2/18/20, 7, 11.
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under the MMA. To learn that fact, however, the police improperly conducted 

a warrantless search of Appellant’s fanny pack. That is where the suppression 

court’s analysis went awry. 

As for the fanny pack, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that 

searches of closed containers (i.e., personal luggage) intrude upon protected 

privacy interests as a matter of law.” Commonwealth v. Perel, 107 A.3d 

185, 189 (Pa. Super. 2014), citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337

(1985) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every 

container that conceals its contents from plain view.”) (citation omitted). In 

this instance, Appellant used the fanny pack as a repository for his marijuana 

and a large amount of money and shielded those items privately in a closed 

container worn on his person. See Perel, 107 A.3d at 190 (“Indeed, the 

obvious function of an opaque zippered bag is to safeguard the privacy of the 

personal effects contained therein. ... The contents of persons’ closed 

containers are obscured from public view and generally are recognized as 

private.”). Appellant’s subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of this 

baggage, as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances, is one that society 

would recognize as reasonable. 

Even if there was evidence sufficient to permit an arrest of Appellant –

and we do not agree that the evidence supported probable cause – the 

warrantless search of the fanny pack was improper. It is axiomatic that absent 

a warrant, a search may only be justified if there is a recognized exception to 
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the general warrant requirement. Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 A.2d 796, 

798 (Pa. 1986). In this instance, there was no applicable exception that would 

have applied to the fanny pack. To the extent that the officers could look in 

the fanny pack when Appellant momentarily opened it, they only saw a large 

amount of money in the container which, by itself, did not give rise to an 

apparent crime. Accordingly, the plain view exception did not apply. 

Moreover, there was no obvious basis for an arrest prior to the search of the 

fanny pack and thus the search incident to arrest exception did not apply.

In any event, there was no adequate basis for a warrantless search. In 

Commonwealth v. Shiflet, 670 A.2d 128, 131-32 (Pa. 1995), our Supreme 

Court held that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 

requirement did not justify the warrantless search of a passenger’s purse

under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. The driver and another 

passenger of a car in which Shiflet was a passenger were arrested. Id. at 

129. Shiflet was not arrested at the scene of the car stop. Id. When Shiflet 

accepted a ride from a state trooper to a police barracks, the trooper seized 

her purse and searched it without any consent requested. Id. The trooper

found that the purse contained a leather pouch and, upon requesting her 

consent to open the pouch, the trooper found a small amount of marijuana 

and drug paraphernalia in it. Id. Our Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s 

decision that declined to extend the search incident to arrest warrant 
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exception to circumstances where the property being search was in the 

possession of a person who has not been arrested. Id. at 131-32. In so 

holding the Supreme Court noted, “Where is there is no lawful arrest, and 

therefore no ‘reasonable intrusion’ on the back of which the warrantless search 

rides, the intrusion resulting from the warrantless search cannot be accepted 

lightly.” Id. at 132. 

Applying Shiftlet to the case at hand, we cannot view the warrantless 

search of the fanny pack as proper and permitting the basis for the arrest 

leading up to the questioning resulting in the recovery of the cocaine from 

Appellant’s person. We are mindful of the dangers that police officers face, 

especially during nighttime traffic stops that occur in high crime areas. We 

would not have disagreed with the appropriateness of a Terry pat-down of 

the fanny pack during the investigative detention in this case, however, we 

fail to see that a warrant exception applied to the search of the fanny pack. 

The search was not incident to an arrest and, in the absence of the search of 

the fanny pack leading to the discovery of the improper packaging of 

Appellant’s marijuana, we do not glean a basis for probable cause that would 

have permitted an arrest and a search of Appellant, his fanny pack, and the 

car that he was driving. Compare with Commonwealth v. Runyan, 160 

A.3d 831, 838 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2017) (distinguishing Shiflet where police had 

probable cause to search a vehicle and properly searched a purse contained 

therein where it was capable of concealing the object of the search). 
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In the third section of his argument, Appellant asserts that he was 

subject to an unlawful arrest and an unconstitutional search of his vehicle and, 

accordingly, the cocaine he subsequently admitted to having on his person 

should have been suppressed “as fruit of the poisonous tree.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 24-25. We agree that the cocaine was discovered as a result of an 

illegal search.

Here, the Commonwealth argues that the cocaine was “properly 

discovered on [Appellant’s] person incident to arrest” and that the marijuana 

was discovered in the improper packaging “[i]n the frisk of the fanny pack.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 16. The Commonwealth reasons that Officer Fortin had 

probable cause to arrest Appellant for the possession the marijuana, given its 

improper packaging, and thus any subsequent search of Appellant was proper 

as it was incident to his arrest. 

We do not agree with the Commonwealth’s assessment. The testimony 

of Officer Fortin does not support the notion that the improper packaging of 

the marijuana was discovered as a result of a lawful frisk. It indicates that 

the officer put the fanny pack aside from Appellant during the time for frisking 

Appellant’s person and that the officer then merely went into the fanny pack 

to observe its contents without any attempt to frisk the fanny pack before or 

after it was removed from Appellant’s person:

Q. Okay. So let’s go back to the stop itself then. After he made 

the statements about the marijuana and zipped the bag back up, 

what did you do next?
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A. Like I previously mentioned, that’s an indicator to me that 

someone is trying to conceal a weapon or additional narcotics or 

evidence. I had the individual exit his vehicle. It’s common 

practice for me to have someone place their hands on top of the 

vehicle so I can do a quick patdown. At that point I was going 

to detain him in handcuffs, so I unzipped his fanny pack, 

placed it on the roof, and I placed him in handcuffs and I

brought him back to the front of my patrol car. 

...

A. So when I went back to him after I searched the vehicle, I 

searched the fanny pack and located the marijuana, a large 

amount of U.S. currency. I went to him. At that point he was 

under arrest and I was about to search him, I asked him if he had 

anything else illegal on him. And he admitted to something to the 

extent of he had some coke on him referring to cocaine. 

N.T. 2/18/20, 8-9 (emphasis added).

The testimony did not support the Commonwealth’s suggestion that the 

marijuana was recovered as a result of a frisk for weapons. It suggests that 

the officer merely opened the fanny pack because he smelled an odor of 

marijuana coming from the container and he wanted to examine the 

marijuana. That happened after Appellant already admitted to having “a little 

bit of weed in the bag,” see N.T. 2/18/20, 8, and Appellant provided the officer 

with a medical marijuana card. See Findings of Fact, 4/21/20, ¶ 10. By 

presenting the medical marijuana card, Appellant essentially rendered inert 

the criminal nature of the odor of marijuana. There was no probable cause 

for an arrest prior to the search of the fanny pack and, absent the discovery 

of the packaging of the marijuana which was detected after the unlawful 

search of the fanny pack, there was no basis for a lawful arrest prior to the 
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search incident to arrest that yielded the cocaine on Appellant’s person. 

Accordingly, we agree with Appellant that the cocaine was the fruit of the 

poisonous search of the fanny pack. 

When an officer effectuates an unlawful arrest, “any evidence seized 

during a search incident to the arrest must be suppressed. Consequently, the 

propriety of a search depends upon the validity of the arrest.” 

Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248, 1251 (Pa. 1999) (internal citation 

omitted). The unlawful arrest following the unconstitutional search of the 

fanny pack here should have compelled the trial court to suppress the cocaine 

seized incident to the improper arrest. 

In the final section of his argument, Appellant asserts that the 

Commonwealth failed to articulate any exigent circumstances for a 

warrantless search of his person, the car, and the fanny pack pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020). Appellant’s Brief 

at 25. As acknowledged above, the car stop in this case occurred prior to the 

issuance of the Alexander opinion, at a time in which our Supreme Court’s 

plurality opinion in Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014),

permitted warrantless searches of automobiles so long as police have probable 

cause. The suppression court acknowledges that Appellant preserved a claim 

concerning the retroactive application of Alexander, referring to its denial of 

Appellant’s final reconsideration motion based on that case. Trial Court 

Opinion, 12/2/21, 2 n.6. The suppression court and the Commonwealth 
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advise us that Alexander did not apply or was inapposite because no items 

of contraband were found pursuant to a vehicle search. Id. at 3 n.6; 

Appellee’s Brief at 13 n.2.

Alexander applies retroactively in this case because Appellant asserted 

its application in a motion for reconsideration below concerning the denial of 

his suppression motion:

[W]here an appellate decision overrules prior law and announces 

a new principle, unless the decision specifically declares the ruling 

to be prospective only, the new rule is to be applied retroactively 

to cases where the issue in question is properly preserved at all 

stages of adjudication up to and including any direct appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)

(citation omitted); compare with Commonwealth v. Grooms, 247 A.3d 31, 

37 (Pa. Super. 2021) (finding that Grooms waived any claim pursuant to

retroactive application of Alexander where he only disputed the existence of 

probable cause and did not raise the issue of exigent circumstances or 

challenged the validity of Gary in the trial court).

To the extent that the lower court and the Commonwealth quickly 

dispense with Appellant’s Alexander claim by saying that that case did not 

apply or was inapposite, we must dwell on that phrasing momentarily in this 

case. Gary, as the precursor rule to Alexander, had a bearing on more than 

just items recovered from vehicles – it was also applicable to items in certain 

containers in vehicles. In In re I.M.S., 124 A.3d 311 (Pa. Super. 2015), this 

Court recognized that as our Supreme Court in Gary had adopted the federal 
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warrantless automobile search exception, courts in this Commonwealth should 

also follow the United States Supreme Court precedent that authorized officers 

to search any containers in a vehicle so long as they have probable cause to 

search the vehicle generally. Id. at 317 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 

U.S. 295 (1999)); see also Commonwealth v. Runyan, 160 A.3d 831, 837 

(Pa. Super. 2017) (under I.M.S., “if [the o]fficer [ ] had probable cause to 

search the vehicle at issue for contraband he was also permitted to search any 

container found therein where the contraband could be concealed, including 

[the defendant’s] purse”). In Commonwealth v. Scott, 210 A.3d 359 (Pa. 

Super. 2019), this Court narrowed the authority of law enforcement to search 

a closed container within a vehicle where the potential illegal activity that 

afforded the officer probable cause to engage in the search had been 

accounted for by contraband already collected during the vehicle search. Id.

at 364 (holding that the odor of burnt marijuana and a small amount of 

contraband recovered from the passenger compartment of a vehicle was 

insufficient to establish probable cause to search the trunk of the vehicle).

Presuming that there was probable cause to search the car that 

Appellant had been driving – and we concluded above that there was not –

the application of Gary as opposed to Alexander would have mattered as it 

would have not required a showing of exigent circumstances to permit a 

warrantless search of the car. If a warrantless search of the car was 

permissible under Gary then a search of the fanny pack as a container in the 
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passenger compartment could have been appropriate under I.M.S. and 

Houghton. Alexander undoubtedly applied here, given Appellant’s assertion 

of a claim pursuant to that case in a reconsideration motion, so the warrant 

exception for car searches under Gary could not excuse the search of the 

fanny pack in the absence of a warrant or a combination of probable cause 

and exigent circumstances.

We find that there was insufficient probable cause for a warrantless 

search of the fanny pack so a determination on the sufficiency of exigent 

circumstances under Alexander is immaterial. At the same time, we note 

that the Commonwealth does not bother to argue that there was any support 

for exigent circumstances for the fanny pack search because it believed that 

the marijuana was properly recovered as a result of a Terry frisk and that the 

recovery of the cocaine was already covered by the search incident to arrest 

warrant exception. We disagree that the record supports that a Terry frisk of 

the fanny pack occurred or that the search of the fanny pack was proper. 

Presuming for the sake of argument that there was probable cause to search 

the fanny pack, Appellant is correct that the Commonwealth failed to articulate

exigent circumstances for the warrantless search of the fanny pack. Because 

the cocaine was recovered incident to an unlawful arrest as a result of the 

improper search of the fanny pack, we agree with Appellant that the 

suppression motion should have been granted. 
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Judgments of sentence vacated. Order reversed. Case remanded. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/29/2023