An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1368

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 20 May 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Wake County

Nos. 11 CRS 11876, 221347-50

KASIN JERRELL MILLER

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 10 April 2013 by 

Judge Carl R. Fox in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the 

Court of Appeals 18 March 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 

General Richard E. Slipsky, for the State.

Amanda S. Zimmer for defendant-appellant.

BRYANT, Judge.

Where the trial court’s findings of fact were based on a 

law enforcement officer’s testimony that while attempting to 

detain defendant for further investigation, defendant suddenly 

drove away almost hitting the officer, such findings support the 

conclusion that the pursuit and eventual seizure of defendant 

was based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion of assault 

on an officer, and we affirm the order of the trial court. 
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Where defendant led law enforcement officers in a high speed car 

chase ending in a collision of defendant’s vehicle which 

defendant promptly abandoned, and officers thereafter observed 

what appeared to be cocaine on the floor of the vehicle, there 

existed probable cause to search the vehicle, including the 

trunk.

On 24 and 25 October 2011, defendant was indicted on 

charges of possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana, 

possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, speeding to 

elude arrest, possession of drug paraphernalia, assault with a 

deadly weapon on a government official, and attaining habitual 

felon status. On 4 January 2012, defendant was arraigned and 

entered a plea of not guilty.

Subsequently, defendant filed two motions to suppress: a 

“Motion to Suppress Evidence Based on Unlawful Stop”; and a 

motion to suppress “evidence seized pursuant to the warrantless 

search of the trunk of the Defendant’s vehicle.” These matters 

came on for hearing during the 8 April 2013 session of Wake 

County Superior Court, the Honorable Carl R. Fox, Judge 

presiding.

By final order entered 9 August 2013, both motions to 

suppress were denied. Judge Fox found that on 10 September 
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2011, a ranking Senior Officer with the Raleigh Police 

Department was in uniform and working when he stopped his marked 

patrol car at the Exxon Station at 9409 Glenwood Avenue for gas. 

The officer observed two men sitting in a vehicle. “[T]hey were 

passing something back and forth between them.” When the two 

men noticed noticed the officer, “they appeared to be placing 

things underneath their seats and in their door pockets.” The 

officer moved his vehicle so that he could read the vehicle’s

license plate number. Defendant, who was seated in the driver’s 

seat, repositioned the vehicle by driving around the parking lot 

and backing into a parking space behind a row of parked cars. 

The passenger exited the vehicle. The officer approached the

vehicle and requested defendant’s driver’s license, which 

defendant was unable to produce. Defendant said he was waiting 

on a friend; he did not know the name of the person who had been 

sitting in the passenger seat; and he was not the registered 

owner of the vehicle. Defendant also stated there was nothing 

illegal in the vehicle. Defendant was informed that he would be 

detained for further investigation and that a canine unit was 

being requested. Suddenly, defendant drove away while the 

officer was standing beside the vehicle, “nearly striking him 

with his car.” The officer returned to his patrol car and 
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pursued defendant with lights and siren activated. Defendant 

traveled on Lumley Road entering onto I-540 traveling at speeds 

in excess of 90 mph. As they traveled down the highway, 

“Defendant was reaching around inside the car and putting 

something into his mouth”; “Defendant’s left hand was outside 

his window and he was releasing things from his hand”; and the 

officer observed white powder striking his patrol car. 

Defendant’s vehicle ultimately struck another vehicle, and 

defendant jumped out of his vehicle and ran. However, defendant 

was apprehended after a short foot chase. Another law 

enforcement officer looking though the open driver’s side window 

of defendant’s vehicle observed a small plastic baggie 

containing a white powder consistent with cocaine on the 

floorboard. The officers informed defendant that his vehicle 

would be searched. Defendant did not consent. In the trunk, 

the officers found digital scales, marijuana, empty baggies, and 

cocaine.

As to defendant’s initial detention in the gas station 

parking lot, Judge Fox concluded that there was no violation of 

defendant’s rights against unreasonable seizure. Judge Fox also 

concluded that during the car chase, there arose grounds for a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant had 
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assaulted a government official with a deadly weapon and was 

possessing and / or selling or delivering a controlled 

substance, obstructing an officer, fleeing to elude an officer, 

and engaged in reckless driving. Further, as to the search of 

defendant’s car trunk, Judge Fox concluded that the officers had 

probable cause to search the vehicle. Accordingly, defendant’s 

motions to suppress were denied.

Following entry of the order denying defendant’s motions to 

suppress, defendant entered a guilty plea as to the charges of 

possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana, possession 

with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, speeding to elude 

arrest, possession of drug paraphernalia, assault with a deadly 

weapon on a government official, and obtaining habitual felon 

status. Defendant also reserved his right to appeal from the 

order denying his motions to suppress. Accepting defendant’s 

pleas of guilty, Judge Fox entered a consolidated judgment, 

sentencing defendant to a term of 127 to 162 months. Defendant 

appeals from the denial of his motions to suppress.

1

 

1 Defendant filed with this Court a petition for a writ of 

certiorari to correct a technical defect in trial counsel’s 

notice of appeal from the order denying defendant’s motions to 

suppress rather than from the judgment entered against 

defendant. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b) (“An order finally 

denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an 

appeal from a judgment of conviction, including a judgment 
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________________________________

On appeal, defendant raises the following issues: whether 

the trial court erred in (I) determining there was a factual 

basis for defendant’s guilty plea; (II) finding the law 

enforcement officer had a reasonable suspicion to warrant 

stopping defendant; and (III) concluding that the search of 

defendant’s car trunk was reasonable.

I

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in 

determining whether there was a sufficient factual basis given 

for the trial court to accept defendant’s guilty plea to the 

charge of assault on a government official with a deadly weapon. 

First, we must consider whether this argument is properly before 

us.

Petition for writ of certiorari

Contemporaneous with his brief, defendant filed with this 

Court a petition for a writ of certiorari to address the first 

argument presented in his brief.

Acknowledging in his petition that he is not entitled to 

appeal as a matter of right the issue of whether the trial court 

 

entered upon a plea of guilty.”). To the extent that the notice 

of appeal was technically deficient, we grant defendant’s 

petition for writ of certiorari and hear defendant’s appeal from 

the judgment entered pursuant to his guilty plea.
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properly accepted his guilty plea, defendant nevertheless 

requests that we grant him a writ of certiorari. We decline 

defendant’s request.

The writ of certiorari may be issued in 

appropriate circumstances by either 

appellate court to permit review of the 

judgments and orders of trial tribunals when 

the right to prosecute an appeal has been 

lost by failure to take timely action, or 

when no right of appeal from an 

interlocutory order exists, or for review 

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c)(3) of an 

order of the trial court denying a motion 

for appropriate relief.

N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) (2014).

This Court has previously issued writs of certiorari to 

address a challenge to a trial court’s compliance with General 

Statutes Chapter 15A, Article 58 – Procedures Relating to Guilty 

Pleas in Superior Court. See State v. Rhodes, 163 N.C. App. 

191, 592 S.E.2d 731 (2004). Specifically, writs have been 

issued to address a challenge to the sufficiency of the factual 

basis given in support of a guilty plea. See State v. Keller, 

198 N.C. App. 639, 641, 680 S.E.2d 212, 213 (2009); State v. 

Flint, 199 N.C. App. 709, 724, 682 S.E.2d 443, 451 (2009).

Defendant contends that that there were insufficient 

grounds presented to support the charge of assault with a deadly 

weapon on a government official. While defendant acknowledges 
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that the testifying officer stated “that he was nearly struck by 

the vehicle and that he was afraid he would be hit by the back 

portion of the vehicle as [defendant] drove off[,]” defendant 

contends that “a reasonable person in his position would not 

have been in fear of immediate bodily harm.” Defendant’s 

argument raises only the contention that the trial court erred 

in finding the officer’s testimony more credible than

defendant’s interpretation of the evidence. Compare Flint, 199 

N.C. App. at 726, 682 S.E.2d at 453 (holding the trial court 

erred in accepting the defendant’s guilty plea where there was a 

lack of a factual basis given that would allow for the trial 

court to make an independent decision as to defendant’s guilt). 

We deny defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari as to this 

issue. As such, defendant’s first argument is dismissed.

II

Next, appealing from the denial of his first motion to 

suppress, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 

concluding that the law enforcement officer had reasonable 

suspicion to stop defendant after defendant terminated a 

consensual encounter with the law enforcement officer. We 

disagree.
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“An order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may 

be reviewed upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction, 

including a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty.” N.C.G.S. § 

15A-979(b). “Generally, an appellate court's review of a trial 

court's order on a motion to suppress is strictly limited to a 

determination of whether its findings are supported by competent 

evidence, and in turn, whether the findings support the trial 

court's ultimate conclusion.” State v. Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 

129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735 (2004) (citation and quotations 

omitted).

We first note that the trial court found that the officer’s 

initial approach and discussion while defendant was sitting in a 

parked car did not amount to a detention or seizure. 

Acknowledging that the officer informed defendant he was “being 

detained” while a canine unit was summoned, the trial court 

stated “these words, standing alone, did not result in the 

functional equivalent of detention, or an ‘unreasonable 

seizure’” because among other things defendant remained in the 

automobile; was not handcuffed, removed from the automobile, or 

otherwise restrained from movement; defendant’s ignition keys 

were not seized; the detention lasted three to five minutes, and 
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defendant voluntarily left the area. Therefore, he “did not 

believe he was not free to leave.”

However, as to what happened after defendant drove away 

from the officer in the parking lot, we find the following 

findings of fact pertinent:

21. Officer Larsen went to his vehicle 

and pursued the Defendant because the

Defendant’s car nearly struck him as he 

exited the parking lot of the convenience 

store.

. . .

22. . . . Both vehicles were traveling 

at speeds in excess of 70 mph on Lumley road 

and increased speed once they got onto I540.

. . .

27. The Defendant’s vehicle was 

switching lanes left to right and right to 

left, cars were braking to avoid collisions 

with the Defendant’s vehicle. . . .

28. As they traveled down the 

highway, the Defendant was reaching around 

inside the car and putting something into 

his mouth.

29. As they were traveling in excess 

of 80 mph down the highway, bags of white 

substance began striking Officer Larsen’s 

car. The Defendant’s left hand was outside 

his window and he was releasing things from 

his hand.
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Defendant’s vehicle stopped after colliding with another 

vehicle, and defendant was apprehended by law enforcement 

officers after a short foot chase.

Sergeant Michael F. Schabel, employed with the Raleigh 

Police Department for fifteen years, responded to the Officer 

Larsen’s call for assistance. Following the collision and 

defendant’s abandonment of his vehicle, Sergeant Schabel 

observed “a small plastic baggie with white powder . . . he 

recognized as being consistent with cocaine,” in the driver’s 

side floorboard.

The trial court concluded that Officer Larsen’s initial 

approach and discussion with defendant did not amount to a 

seizure and detention. However, based on the events occurring 

after defendant drove away from Officer Larsen, the court 

concluded the following:

[U]nder the totality of the circumstances, 

[there] form[ed] in the mind of a reasonable 

and prudent man/officer that there was a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that 

criminal activity was afoot in that 

Defendant had/was (1) possession and/or 

selling or delivering a controlled 

substance, (2) assaulted a government 

officer with a deadly weapon, (3) obstructed 

an officer, (4) fleeing to elude an officer 

and (5) engaged in reckless driving.
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The findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion 

that the law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to 

stop defendant. See Roberson, 163 N.C. App. at 132, 592 S.E.2d 

at 735. Accordingly, defendant’s argument is overruled.

III

In his appeal from the denial of his second motion to 

suppress, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it 

relied on an inventory search of defendant’s vehicle as a basis 

for upholding the search of the trunk. Defendant’s argument 

ignores the trial court’s conclusion that there existed probable 

cause to search defendant’s vehicle. The trial court’s 

conclusion that an inventory search was proper was an 

alternative basis to uphold the search and based on our probable 

cause analysis that alternative basis need not be addressed.

The Fourth Amendment proscribes all 

unreasonable searches and seizures, and it 

is a cardinal principle that searches 

conducted outside the judicial process, 

without prior approval by judge or 

magistrate, are per se unreasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few 

specifically established and well-delineated 

exceptions. One such exception is the 

automobile exception. A police officer in 

the exercise of his duties may search an 

automobile without a search warrant when the 

existing facts and circumstances are 

sufficient to support a reasonable belief 

that the automobile carries contraband 

materials. If probable cause justifies the 
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search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it 

justifies the search of every part of the 

vehicle and its contents that may conceal 

the object of the search.

State v. Mitchell, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 735 S.E.2d 438, 441 

(2012) appeal dismissed, review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 740 S.E.2d 

466 (2013).

Here, defendant led police officers on a car chase that 

reached speeds in excess of 90 mph. In unchallenged findings of 

fact, the trial court found that while defendant was driving 

down the highway he was observed eating something and releasing 

something from his hand outside of the driver’s side window, 

“when bags of white substance began striking Officer Larsen’s 

car.” Following defendant’s abandonment of his vehicle and 

attempt to flee on foot, Sgt. Schabel observed inside 

defendant’s vehicle in plain view “a small plastic baggie with 

white powder . . . he recognized as being consistent with 

cocaine[.]” Therefore, we hold the trial court’s findings of 

fact support a conclusion that pursuant to the automobile 

exception the law enforcement officers had probable cause to 

justify the search of every part of defendant’s vehicle that may

have concealed cocaine, including the trunk. See id. 

Accordingly, defendant’s argument is overruled.

Affirmed.
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Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and Judge STEELMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).