alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
THE CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF MOLECULAR BIOSYSTEMS, INC. 
DATED MARCH 31,1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO 
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.  
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                              APR-1-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                             587
<SECURITIES>                                    40,827
<RECEIVABLES>                                      902
<ALLOWANCES>                                         3
<INVENTORY>                                        342
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                51,407
<PP&E>                                          19,622
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,434
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  70,159
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,564
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           177
<OTHER-SE>                                      51,569
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    70,159
<SALES>                                            626
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                10,851
<CGS>                                            4,748
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   25,702
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 810
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (13,284)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (13,284)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (13,284)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.78)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit
23.1





CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS





We hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form
S-8 (Nos. 333-100282, 333-109020 and 333-131698), and in the related
prospectuses, of First Reliance Bancshares, Inc. of our report, dated March 24,
2009, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of First Reliance Bancshares,
Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2008 and 2007 and the related
consolidated statements of income, comprehensive income, shareholders’ equity,
and cash flows for the years then ended which report appears in the
December 31, 2008 Annual Report on Form 10-K of First Reliance Bancshares,
Inc.





/s/ ELLIOTT DAVIS,
      LLCColumbia,
      South CarolinaMarch
      27, 2009
#### Juan Ramirez RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Nos. 45872, 45873.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 18, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1973.

*79Alfonso E. Alonso, Jr., San Antonio (court appointed), for appellant.

Ted Butler, Dist. Atty., Stephen P. Tak-as and Richard D. Woods, Asst. Dist. Attys., San Antonio, Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., and Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

DOUGLAS, Judge.

These are appeals from orders revoking probation.

The appellant was convicted on the 5th day of March, 1971, for passing as true a forged instrument in two causes. The conditions of the probation included, among other things, that the appellant was to report to the probation officer of Bexar County on the 5th day of each month and that he was to pay court costs in the amount of $260.50.

When the matter was called, the court asked the appellant how he wished to plead to the allegation on failing to report, and he answered, “That’s true. I didn’t go report.” He pled not true to the allegation of failing to pay his court costs.

The State’s proof shows that appellant did not report for the months alleged. Appellant testified that he never reported in person and that in June of 1971 and to the latter part of July he voluntarily went to the hospital for detoxification of heroin and was being treated in the Bexar County rehabilitation unit. On August 11, 1971, he was arrested because of the motion to revoke probation. He testified that he was to do some undercover work. The State’s proof showed that the probation officer had not advised him he did not have to report.

The court revoked probation for his failure to report on the 5th days of May, July and August, 1971. The court found that the appellant failed to pay the court costs but that there was no finding that he had wilfully failed to make the payment. The court also found that he had violated condition No. 2 by using narcotic drugs and had become addicted.

The appellant contends that an abuse of discretion was shown because the trial court did not enter a formal written order revoking probation. The reasons for revoking probation are found in the sentence and no separate written order was entered. Absent a request for such findings by the court, no error is shown. Wilcox v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 477 S.W.2d 900; Marshall v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 466 S.W.2d 582.

The appellant alleges that the court erred in revoking probation on the ground that he used narcotic drugs, because the use of such drugs was excusable since he was to do undercover work.

We hold that the trial court had sufficient proof to revoke probation on the grounds of the failure to report to the pro*80bation officer. It is not necessary to determine whether the court erred in revoking probation on the other ground that was not alleged in the motion to revoke.

The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
EXHIBIT 99.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of First Reliance Bancshares, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, F. R. Saunders, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | To the best of my knowledge, the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | To the best of my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
| | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|/s/    F. R. SAUNDERS, JR.                            
|------------------------------------------------------
|F. R. Saunders, Jr.President / Chief Executive Officer



*****



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of First Reliance Bancshares, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the period ending
December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Jeffrey A. Paolucci, Chief Financial Officer, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (3) |  | To the best of my knowledge, the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (4) |  | To the best of my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
| | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|/s/    JEFFREY A. PAOLUCCI                
|------------------------------------------
|Jeffrey A. PaolucciChief Financial Officer



50
II 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1839 

To require periodic reports on claims related to acts of terrorism against 

Americans perpetrated or supported by the Government of Libya. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 20 (legislative day, JULY 19), 2007 

Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. LEVIN, and Mr. LAUTENBERG) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To require periodic reports on claims related to acts of 

terrorism against Americans perpetrated or supported 

by the Government of Libya. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERIODIC REPORTS ON CLAIMS RELATED TO 

4 ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST AMERICANS 

5 PERPETRATED OR SUPPORTED BY THE GOV6 ERNMENT OF LIBYA. 

7 (a) REPORTS REQUIRED.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after 

9 the date of enactment of this Act, and every 180 


ccoleman on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

•S 1839 IS

1 days thereafter until December 31, 2009, or the Sec2 retary of State makes the certification under sub3 section (b), the Secretary of State shall submit to 

4 the appropriate congressional committees a report 

5 on unresolved claims by nationals of the United 

6 States against the Government of Libya for acts de7 scribed in section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United 

8 States Code. 

9 (2) CONTENT.—Each report submitted under 

10 paragraph (1) shall include— 

11 (A) information on the status of negotia12 tions between the Government of Libya and the 

13 United States claimants; 

14 (B) a description of the specific actions 

15 that the United States Government is taking to 

16 encourage the Government of Libya to resolve 

17 such claims; and 

18 (C) any other information that the Sec19 retary of State considers appropriate. 

20 (b) CERTIFICATION.—The certification referred to in 

21 paragraph (1) of subsection (a) is a certification submitted 

22 by the Secretary of State to the appropriate congressional 

23 committees that all claims by nationals of the United 

24 States described in such paragraph have been resolved. 

25 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 


ccoleman on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
3 

•S 1839 IS

1 (1) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com2 mittees’’ means— 

3 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

4 the Committee on Armed Services, and the 

5 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 

6 and 

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

8 Committee on Armed Services, and the Com9 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep10 resentatives. 

11 (2) The term ‘‘national of the United States’’ 

12 has the meaning given the term in section 

13 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

14 (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)). 

Æ 


ccoleman on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
EXHIBIT 35.1



SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT
PURSUANT TO ITEM 1123 OF REGULATION AB



FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OMAHA



Date: March 26, 2024



The undersigned, a duly
authorized officer of First National Bank of Omaha (the “Servicer”), pursuant to Item 1123 of Regulation AB and Section 3.05(a)
of the Second Amended and Restated Transfer and Servicing Agreement, dated as of September 23, 2016, among First National Funding LLC,
as Transferor, First National Bank of Omaha, as Servicer, and First National Master Note Trust, as Issuer (the “Transfer and Servicing
Agreement”), does hereby certify that:



1.A review of the activities of the Servicer from January 1, 2023 through December 31, 2023 (the “Reporting Period”)
and of its performance under the Transfer and Servicing Agreement has been made under my supervision; and



2.To the best of my knowledge, based on my review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Transfer and Servicing
Agreement, in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.











IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
I have signed this Servicer Compliance Statement the day and year first written above.



| | FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OMAHA, as Servicer
| | -----------------------------------------
| |                                          
| | By                                       
| |                                          
| |
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6184

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER LYNN SHORT,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. 

(4:04-cr-00793-TLW-3; 4:08-cv-70008-TLW)

Submitted: July 28, 2011 Decided: August 2, 2011

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher Lynn Short, Appellant Pro Se. Arthur Bradley Parham, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Lynn Short seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2011) motion. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is 

debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Short has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           2,732
<SECURITIES>                                       847
<RECEIVABLES>                                   34,530
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,577
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                         900,044
<DEPRECIATION>                                 148,851
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 900,681
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                        692,972
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      4,700
<COMMON>                                           115
<OTHER-SE>                                      33,547
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   900,681
<SALES>                                         16,294
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                70,503
<CGS>                                           13,340
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   46,675
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              40,573
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (6,587)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (6,587)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (6,587)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (.71)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.71)


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT
10.13
  PLATINUM
UNDERWRITERS HOLDINGS, LTD.
 ARRANGEMENT
FOR COMPENSATION IN LIEU OF PARTICIPATION IN
 EXCESS
RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN (EXCESS PLAN)
 
 On
October 22, 2008, the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Platinum Underwriters
Holdings, Ltd. (the “Company”) approved a new compensation arrangement for
employees of the Company or Platinum Underwriters Bermuda, Ltd. (“Platinum
Bermuda”) who are taxpayers in the United States of America (“U.S. Taxpayers”)
which provides that, in lieu of their participation in the Platinum Underwriters
Reinsurance, Inc. Executive Retirement Savings Plan (the “Excess Plan”), for
each Plan Year (as defined in the Excess Plan) after 2008 during which a U.S.
Taxpayer participates in the Platinum Underwriters Reinsurance, Inc. Retirement
Savings Plan (the “401(k) Plan”), an amount equal to ten percent (or such other
percent as may be determined by the Company) of the excess of such U.S.
Taxpayer’s Compensation (as defined in the 401(k) Plan) for such Plan Year over
the maximum amount set forth in Section 401(a)(17) of the Code for such Plan
Year, shall be paid to such U.S. Taxpayer directly by his or her Employer (as
defined in the Excess Plan) in cash no later than March 15 following the end of
such Plan Year.
  This new
compensation arrangement was adopted as a result of the adoption of Section 457A
of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the
“Code”).  In accordance with Section 457A of the Code, the Company
made amendments to the Excess Plan intended to eliminate the deferral of income
tax on compensation for services performed after December 31, 2008 by any
employee of the Company or Platinum Bermuda who is a U.S.
Taxpayer.
#### Henry MAYS, Jr., and William R. Kinsley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert E. BRENT, Vice President d/b/a Safeway Finance Company, Inc. of Georgia, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 76-3549

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 9, 1977.

Henry Mays, Jr., pro se.

William R. Kinsley, pro se.

Aaron Cohn, Columbus, Ga., for defendant-appellee.

Before COLEMAN, GOLDBERG and GEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 Rule 18, 5 Cir., see *Isbell Enterprises, Inc.*v. *Citizens Casualty Company of New York et al,*5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

PER CURIAM:

Appellee Safeway Finance Company made two loans to appellants in 1973 and 1974. In 1975 Safeway filed suit in Georgia state court to recover on the loans. Appellants asserted defenses and counterclaims based on various state law grounds and on the federal truth-in-lending statute, 15 U.S. C.A. § 1601 *et seq.*

While the state litigation was pending, appellants filed the federal action at bar, alleging truth-in-lending and other violations, all of which had been raised in the state-court action.1 When the state court granted judgment for Safeway on all points, the district court dismissed the complaint in the instant case on the basis of res judicata.2 Appellants bring this appeal, addressing most of their arguments to alleged errors in the state court judgment.

The correctness of the state court judgment, however, is not before us. The only issue here is whether the federal district court properly applied the doctrine of res judicata. Because the identical causes of action asserted in the case at bar were adjudicated between these parties in the prior state-court action, the district court properly concluded that the Georgia judgment bars the action here. The judgment below is affirmed.3

1

. Also named as a defendant was Robert E. Brent, a vice president of Safeway. Brent’s presence as a party is irrelevant to the issues in the case.

2

. The court also concluded that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.

3

. In light of our disposition of the res judicata issue, we need not reach the district court’s alternative argument that the statute of limitations bars this action.
#### Everett Alphonsa FORD, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 2, 1973.

Everett Alphonsa Ford, pro se.

Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., James M. Ringo, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

Memorandum Opinion of the Court by

Justice STEPHENSON,

Affirming.*
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

BGC PARTNERS, LLC,

Appellant,

v.

GALAXIE6, LLC,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-2294

[June 23, 2022]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Mily Rodriguez Powell, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE19-

008476.

Mark S. Roher of Law Office of Mark S. Roher, P.A., Pembroke Pines, 

for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, FORST and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Jody L. WORTON and Charles Norman Adams, Appellants, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 45254.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 22, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1973.

Tark Cook, Perryton, for appellants.

Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty. and Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Judge.

The offense is robbery by assault with a firearm. Each appellant was sentenced to 99 years’ confinement.

The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged.

We initially note that the record was approved by the trial court on September 10, 1971, and appellants’ brief was not filed until December 1, 1971. Appellants have not complied with Article 40.09, Section 9, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., which states that the appellate brief must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within thirty days after approval of the record by the court, or within such additional period as the court, in its discretion, may authorize. Payne v. State, 487 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Crathers v. State, 487 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Stembridge v. State, 477 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The record reflects no requests for additional time to file a brief, beyond the statutory thirty day period. Also, we note that appellants were represented by the same court-appointed attorney both at the trial level and on appeal.

*117Despite the fact that appellants’ brief was not timely filed, in the interest of justice we have reviewed each and every contention set forth therein. Article 40.09, Section 13, V.A.C.C.P. The allegations presented in counsel’s brief and in supplemental pro se briefs filed with this Court are wholly without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.