SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4358-16T3

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,

as indenture trustee, not in

its individual capacity but

solely as indenture trustee

for GREENPOINT HOME EQUITY

LOAN TRUST SERIES 2004-1,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KAREN SAINT,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

MR. SAINT, unknown spouse of

KAREN SAINT and SLOMIS'S, INC.,

Defendants.

______________________________

Submitted March 13, 2018 – Decided July 9, 2018

Before Judges Sumners and Moynihan.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Middlesex County, Docket 

No. F-037841-14.

Karen Saint, appellant pro se.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, LLP, 

attorneys for respondent (Jacqueline Aiello 

and Eric M. Hurwitz, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Karen Saint appeals from a March 4, 2016 order 

denying her cross-motion to dismiss plaintiff Bank of New York 

Mellon's (Mellon) foreclosure complaint; a June 24, 2016 order 

granting Mellon's motion for summary judgment, striking 

defendant's answer, entering default judgment against defendant, 

and forwarding the matter to the Office of Foreclosure to proceed 

as uncontested; a March 6, 20171 order denying defendant's motion 

to cancel the mortgage;

2 and a final judgment of foreclosure 

entered on April 3, 2017.

Defendant argues:

POINT 1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION CONCLUDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF 

MORTGAGE DEMONSTRATES THE MORTGAGE WAS 

ASSIGNED TO PLAINTIFF.

 

1 The notice of appeal incorrectly dates this order as March 3, 

2017.

2 Defendant did not brief this issue and we will not consider an 

argument not properly advanced. Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. 

Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011). We, nonetheless, state our 

agreement with the trial judge's rationale and holding in denying 

defendant's motion.
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POINT 2

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION CONCLUDING PLAINTIFF POSSESSED THE 

ORIGINAL NOTE ON SEPTEMBER 9, 2014.

POINT 3

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION CONCLUDING PLAINTIFF POSSESSED THE 

ORIGINAL NOTE ON SEPTEMBER 9, 2014.

POINT 4

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION 

WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 

CONCLUDE PLAINTIFF MET ALL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS 

UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAW.

POINT 5

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION BY NOT FOLLOWING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

CIVIL PROCEDURE.

We conclude these arguments are meritless and affirm.

Defendant first contends the trial judge abused her 

discretion in concluding the assignment of mortgage demonstrated 

that the mortgage was assigned to Mellon, arguing the 

certifications submitted by employees of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC 

(Ocwen),

3 did not sufficiently establish that Mellon and the 

assignee were the same so as to support the grant of summary 

judgment. The judge declined that argument, finding "not even a 

scintilla of information that would support that argument." We 

 

3 Ocwen was plaintiff's loan servicer.
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agree. The judge considered an assignment to Mellon, "[formerly]

known as Bank of New York as trustee, for the certificate holders 

of Greenpoint Loan Trust 2004[-]1" recorded on January 26, 2010.

The March 31, 2016 certification submitted by Ocwen employee Jesse 

Rosenthal4 addressed defendant's contention that "Greenpoint Home 

Loan Trust" and Mellon were "two different trust[s]," explaining

Mellon, formerly known as "The Bank of New York as Trustee for the 

Certificateholders of GreenPoint Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1 and 

[Mellon], as Indenture Trustee, not in its individual capacity but 

solely as Indenture Trustee for Greenpoint Home Equity Loan Trust 

2004-1 are one in the same entity."

Defendant's argument that the judge abused her discretion by 

concluding plaintiff possessed the note on the date the foreclosure 

complaint was filed — September 9, 2014 – is without merit. The 

judge initially found the certification of Ocwen employee Samantha 

Ball to be insufficient to prove plaintiff's possession of the 

note at the time the complaint was filed. Rosenthal's

certification presented that his review of the loan documents 

revealed Ocwen, since the date the complaint was filed, had been 

in "possession, custody, and control" of the original note 

 

4 The judge directed plaintiff to file a supplemental 

certification.
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defendant executed; specifically, since September 8, 2014.5 We 

reject defendant's argument that the certification is 

contradictory as to those dates. Rosenthal merely referenced the 

date the complaint was filed and the date the note came into 

possession.

"[W]e [have] held that either possession of the note or an 

assignment of the mortgage that predated the original complaint 

confer[s] standing." Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Angeles, 428 

N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Deutsche Bank Tr. 

Co. Ams. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 216 (App. Div. 2011)). 

There is ample proof regarding both the note and the assignment; 

plaintiff had standing.

We determine the balance of defendant's arguments6 – that the 

judge abused her discretion in finding there was sufficient 

evidence to conclude defendant defaulted on April 1, 2009; erred 

in concluding plaintiff met the notice requirements under State 

and federal law; and erred by accepting plaintiff's deficient 

certifications – are without sufficient merit to warrant 

 

5 Rosenthal's certification was included in defendant's appendix. 

Both exhibits Rosenthal referenced as support for his contentions 

were not, however, included in the record.

6 We do not see that any of these arguments were raised to the 

trial judge. Although we need not consider them, Nieder v. Royal 

Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973), we address them briefly.
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discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Rosenthal's certification 

complied with Rule 4:64-1(a)(2) and -2(a) through (c), and set 

forth the date of the default and that a Notice of Intent to 

Foreclose (NOI) was sent to defendant on March 28, 2014 in

accordance with the Fair Foreclosure Act,

7 N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56. They 

were properly considered by the judge.

"The only material issues in a foreclosure proceeding are the 

validity of the mortgage, the amount of the indebtedness, and the 

right of the mortgagee to resort to the mortgaged premises." Great 

Falls Bank v. Pardo, 263 N.J. Super. 388, 394 (Ch. Div. 1993), 

aff'd o.b., 273 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1994).

A mortgagor opposing summary judgment has a duty to present 

facts controverting the mortgagee's prima facie case. Spiotta v. 

William H. Wilson, Inc., 72 N.J. Super. 572, 581 (App. Div. 1962). 

Unexplained conclusions and "[b]ald assertions are not capable of 

. . . defeating summary judgment." Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. 

Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 97-98 (App. Div. 2014). As the motion 

judge found, defendant has raised nothing more than bald 

 

7 Again, the exhibit supporting Rosenthal's contentions was not 

included in this record; a copy of the NOI, however, is included 

in defendant's appendix.
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assertions. We apply the same standard8 but do not defer to the 

trial court's conclusion granting or denying summary judgment. 

Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015). Having addressed 

defendant's contested issues, and there being no material issues 

otherwise raised, we conclude the judge correctly granted summary 

judgment and entered final judgment of foreclosure.

Affirmed.

 

8 The standard that governs the trial court, requires denial of 

summary judgment when "the competent evidential materials 

presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to 

resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving 

party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 

(1995).