Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

CARA SCHAEFER WIENEKE GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana 

Plainfield, Indiana

ELLEN H. MEILAENDER

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

TIMOTHY JOHNSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 33A01-1406-CR-251

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE HENRY CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Mary G. Willis, Judge

Cause No. 33C01-1205-FA-17

December 30, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Judge 
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Case Summary and Issue

In 2014, a jury found Timothy Johnson guilty of two counts of child molesting as 

Class A felonies and two counts of child molesting as Class C felonies. The trial court 

entered judgment of conviction on the two Class A felony counts and sentenced Johnson 

to serve thirty-five years on each count, to be served consecutively. In addition, the court 

found that Johnson was a credit restricted felon. Johnson now appeals, arguing that 

applying the credit restricted felon classification to him violates constitutional 

prohibitions against ex post facto laws. The State concedes, and we agree, that 

classifying Johnson as a credit restricted felon is an ex post facto violation, and we 

reverse and remand to the trial court to amend its sentencing order.

Facts and Procedural History

M.T. was born May 6, 1994. In 1998, her mother married Johnson and they all 

lived together. In 2012, it came to light that Johnson had molested M.T. for several years

beginning when she was six years old. The State charged Johnson in five counts: child 

molesting as a Class A felony and child molesting as a Class C felony for conduct 

occurring between December 1, 2000 and May 5, 2004; child molesting as a Class A 

felony and child molesting as a Class C felony for conduct occurring between May 6, 

2004 and May 5, 2008; and sexual misconduct as a Class C felony for conduct occurring 

between May 6, 2008 and May 5, 2010. 

A jury found Johnson guilty of all four child molesting charges but not guilty of 

sexual misconduct. At sentencing, the trial court entered judgment of conviction against 

Johnson for only the Class A felonies, found they were crimes of violence and that 
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consecutive sentences were appropriate, and stated, “[t]he Court does show that 

[Johnson] is a restricted credit class and I appreciate the date problem. He is a restricted 

credit class as defined by law and the Court recognizes that a portion of the sentence 

would fall within that.” Transcript at 139. Johnson was ordered to serve an aggregate 

sentence of seventy years.

Discussion and Decision

Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit ex post facto laws. U.S. Const. 

art. I, § 10; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 24. These clauses generally prohibit enactment of a law 

“that imposes a punishment for an act that was not punishable when it was committed or 

imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.” Patrick v. Butts, 12 N.E.3d 270, 

271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). To fall within either ex post facto prohibition, “a law must be 

retrospective—that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment—and it 

must disadvantage the offender affected by it.” Upton v. State, 904 N.E.2d 700, 705 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted), trans. denied.

The credit restricted felon statute took effect on July 1, 2008, and applied “only to 

persons convicted after June 30, 2008.” Id. at 704 (quoting Pub. L. 80-2008, § 6). A

“credit restricted felon” is defined by the statute as a person who has been convicted of, 

inter alia, child molesting involving sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct if the 

offender is at least twenty-one years of age and the victim is less than twelve years of 

age. Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-72 (2014). A person who is a credit restricted felon is 

initially assigned to a lower credit class and may not be assigned to certain higher classes, 

thus earning less credit time during imprisonment. See Ind. Code ch. 35-50-6. By its 
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express terms, the statute applies to Johnson because he was convicted of his offenses 

after its enactment. However, this court has held that retroactive application of the credit 

restricted felon statute to a defendant who committed an offense before the effective date 

constitutes an ex post facto violation. Gaby v. State, 949 N.E.2d 870, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2011) (credit restricted felon classification improper upon conviction in 2010 for child 

molesting offenses occurring from 1997 to 2002); Upton, 904 N.E.2d at 706 (credit 

restricted felon classification improper when defendant was convicted after July 1, 2008, 

but committed his offenses no later than December of 2007).

Based upon this precedent, the State concedes and we conclude that Johnson’s 

argument is correct: application of the credit restricted felon statute to Johnson is an 

unconstitutional ex post facto violation because Johnson committed his offenses prior to 

July 1, 2008.

Conclusion

The trial court erred in determining that Johnson qualified as a credit restricted 

felon. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court to amend its sentencing 

order to remove the credit restricted felon classification.

Reversed and remanded.

BAILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.