NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 20-1475

__________ RANDALL WINSLOW, Appellant

v. SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; PE NNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION; CHESTER COUNTY BAR ASSOCIAT ION; and WILLIAM P. MAHON

___________________ _________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern Distri ct of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-4632) District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

___________________ _________________ Submitted Pursuant to Th ird Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 13, 2021 Before: AMBRO, PORTER a nd SCIRICA, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: May 3, 2021)

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OPINION *

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* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 PER CURIAM Randall Winslow sued the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, two bar associations, and a state trial judge. Winslow sought to invalidate Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3, which requires a certif icate of merit (COM) in professional malpractice cases. Winslow claimed that his inability to afford a COM means that Rule 1042.3 creates an unconstitutional barrier to certain types of litigants and litigation. Three defendants entered their appearances and moved to dismiss the complaint. The District Court granted the motions based on the Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine, a jurisdictional ground raisab le in a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 2 The District Court determined that Wi nslow was, in effect, seeking federal court review of two state-court malpractice ca ses that he lost due to lack of COMs. To support its determination, the District C ourt cited our decision affirming the RookerFeldman-based dismissal of Winslow’s virtua lly-identical-in-substance prior suit. See Winslow v. Stevens, 632 F. A pp’x 721 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); cf. Dist. Ct. Op. at 6 (“The Third Circuit’s ruling now acts as a collateral estoppel that binds me to conclude

1 D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 4 62 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

2 The District Court dismissed the non-appeari ng, fourth defendant (the Pennsylvania Bar Association) from suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), because it was not timely served with process.3 that Plaintiff’s constitutional claim—as applie d to his state lawsuit against [one of his prior attorneys]—is barred by th e Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”). Winslow appealed. Our appellate jurisdic tion is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Gomez v. Gov’t of V.I., 88 2 F.2d 733, 736 (3d Cir. 1989 ). We review de novo an order granting a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) th at facially attacks the District Court’s jurisdiction. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). 3 And we may affirm on any basis supported by the r ecord. Tourscher v. McCullou gh, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). We have carefully reviewed Winslow’s br ief, in which he argues at length that the District Court misapplied Rooker-Feldm an. Winslow’s arguments are ultimately unavailing, for at least the three reasons that follow. First, this Court already has determined that Rooker-Feldman bars any attempt by Winslow to collaterally attack the adverse stat e court ruling, in his original malpractice case, by way of a federal court action to invalidate Rule 1042.3 . See Winslow, 632 F. App’x at 723. To the extent that Winslow ha s attempted to do just that (again), the District Court was correct to support its juri sdictional ruling by invoking the doctrine of issue preclusion. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231–32 (3d Cir. 1995) (outlini ng the requirements for application of issue preclusion).

3 Winslow does not challenge on appeal th e District Court’s Rule 4(m) dismissal.4 Second, it matters not that Winslow’s complain t at issue referenced a failed malpractice action against an attorney di fferent from the attorney whos e alleged malpractice was at issue in the prior complaint. To that sepa rate malpractice case Rooker-Feldman applies with equal force, using the same rationale previously employed by this Court, see Winslow, 632 F. App’x at 723, and by the District Cour t below. Here too, then, issue preclusion bars what appears to be nothing more than a request by Winslow to relitigate the past. Third, even if Winslow were right that th ere is some facet of his case that eludes Rooker-Feldman—on the theo ries that he claims prospective injury or instea d an injury to the general public—it would not alter our disposition. Winslow lacks constitutional standing to press either th eory. Cf. Spokeo, Inc. v. Ro bins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016) (explaini ng that “the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three elements. The plainti ff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fa irly traceable to the challenge d conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a fa vorable judicial decision”) (citation omitted). Specifically, there is still “no foreseeable pr ospect that Rule 1 042.3 will bar some hypothetical future lawsuit [W inslow] might assert against an attorney or other licensed professional.” Winslow, 632 F. App’x at 724. 4 And Winslow cannot demonstrate

4 That we previously ruled on Winslow’s standing to chal lenge Rule 1042.3, based on alleged prospective harm, is yet another ba sis for application of issue preclusion.5 standing by alleging that he seeks vindicatio n for the public generally. Cf. Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 499 (2020) (explaining that “a plaintiff cannot establish standing by asserting an abstract ‘general interest common to all members of the public,’ ‘no matter how sincere’ or ‘deeply committed’ a plaintiff is to vindicating that general interest on behalf of the public”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the District Cour t’s judgment will be affirmed.