alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.1


            CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Michael S. Pagnano, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual
Report of The World Golf League, Inc., formerly Novus Laboratories, Inc. on Form
10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2002 fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that
information contained in such 10KSB fairly presents in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of The World Golf League, Inc.,
formerly Novus Laboratories, Inc.


                                   By: /s/ Michael S. Pagnano
                                       ----------------------
                                   Name: Michael S. Pagnano
                                   Title: Principal Executive Officer

<PAGE>
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, the undersigned officer of Serologicals Corporation (the "Company"), hereby certifies that the Company's Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 26, 2004 (the "Report") as filed on the date hereof with the securities and Exchange Commission fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:
November 3, 2004

| | /s/ David A. DoddDavid A. Dodd
President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
| | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---



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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-7522

In Re: JERMAINE JERRELL SIMS, a/k/a Justice,

a/k/a Jus,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CR-98-45)

Submitted: December 16, 2002 Decided: December 23, 2002

Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jermaine Jerrell Sims, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Jermaine Jerrell Sims petitions for a writ of mandamus,

alleging the district court has unduly delayed acting on his 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2000) motion pending since May 15, 2002. He seeks

an order from this court directing the district court to act. We

find that mandamus relief is not warranted because the delay is not

unreasonable. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in

forma pauperis, we deny the petition without prejudice to the

filing of another such petition if the district court does not act

expeditiously. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

PETITION DENIED
#### J. E. BRADY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.

June 22, 1954.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-13-00030-CV

Tomas G. GOMEZ, Jr.,

Appellant

v.

Anna Belle Guajardo GOMEZ,

Appellee

From the 63rd Judicial District Court, Kinney County, Texas

Trial Court No. 3,949

Honorable Enrique Fernandez, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE MARTINEZ, JUSTICE ALVAREZ, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED. Costs of 

the appeal are taxed against appellant Tomas G. Gomez, Jr. 

SIGNED April 24, 2013.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
389 A.2d 690

#### Wassell v. Wassell, Appellant.

Submitted June 13, 1977.

Samuel M. Tollen, and Tollen and Tollen, for appellant;

Gerald J. Spitz, for appellee.

Decree affirmed on the opinion of the court below.

WATKINS, former P. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-02584-RPM 

(Coordinated with cases 11-cv-02817-RPM; 11-cv-02819-RPM,

 12-cv-00876-RPM;12-cv-01069-RPM; and 12-cv-01724-RPM) 

KEVIN STRINGER, 

RYAN O?NEILL, 

JOAQUIN MARTINEZ, 

CHRISTIOPHER ANDERSON, and 

WILLIAM LEGER III, individually and 

on behalf of others similarly situated

Plaintiffs,

v. 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant.

________________________________________________________________________

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

________________________________________________________________________

Pursuant to this Court’s Order on February 15, 2013, at the hearing on the

plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the parties proceeded on judicial review of the

claim of plaintiff Ryan o’Neill and, as this Court observed at the hearing on the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on that claim, there are sufficient differences

among these claims that class certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 would be inappropriate

and it is therefore

ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is denied and that on

 or before January 21, 2014, counsel for the parties shall submit an agreed schedule for

judicial review of the claims of other plaintiffs in this and the coordinated civil actions,

11-cv-02817-RPM, 11-cv-02819-RPM, 12-cv-00876-RPM, 12-cv-01069-RPM and 

Case 1:11-cv-02584-RPM Document 87 Filed 12/13/13 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
12-01724-RPM.

Dated: December 13th, 2013

BY THE COURT:

s/Richard P. Matsch

______________________________

Richard P. Matsch, Senior District Judge 

Case 1:11-cv-02584-RPM Document 87 Filed 12/13/13 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
Exhibit31.1

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I,Martha L. Long, certify that:

 

1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Davidson Income RealEstate, L.P.;

 

2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4.   The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financialreporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)), for theregistrant and have: 

 

(a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

(b)  Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internalcontrol over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, toprovide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reportingand the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordancewith generally accepted accounting principles;

 

(c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

(d)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscalquarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)that has materially affected or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5.   The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

(a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and
| Skip to Content*Release Date: September 17, 2010*Release dates |  Coded tables |  Historical dataCurrent release |  Screen reader |  PDF (450 KB)**F.113 Banks in U.S.-Affiliated Areas1** |
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THE STATE OF TEXAS

MANDATE

TO THE 5TH DISTRICT COURT OF CASS COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Court of Appeals District of Texas, on the 10th 

day of April, A.D. 2015, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your Judgment was determined; 

and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

Christopher Alexander Vujovich, 

Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

No. 06-14-00143-CR

Trial Court No. 2013-F-00484

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant, Christopher Alexander Vujovich, has adequately indicated his 

inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court in this 

behalf, and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

WITNESS, the Hon. Josh R. Morriss, III, Chief Justice of our said Court of Appeals, with 

the seal thereof annexed, at the City of Texarkana, this the 15th day of June, A.D. 2015.

DEBRA K. AUTREY, Clerk
216 La. 755

#### HUMBLE OIL & REFINING COMPANY v. STATE MINERAL BOARD et al.

No. 39648.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 9, 1949.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1950.

Nelson Jones, Houston, Tex., Charles Janvier, Tinsley Gilmer, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.

Bolivar E. Kemp, Jr., Atty. Gen., Carroll Buck, 1st Asst. Atty. Gen., John L. Madden, Asst. Atty. Gen;, for defendant-appellee.

McCALEB, Justice.

This case was consolidated for all purposes with the suit of The Texas Company v. State Mineral Board et al., 216 La. 742, 44 So.2d 841. The decision in that matter controls here.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

JESUS ANTONIO VIRREY-CAMEZ,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-10025

D.C. No. 4:11-cr-01952-JGZ

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 14, 2014** 

Before: LEAVY, GOULD, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

Jesus Antonio Virrey-Camez appeals from the 48-month sentence imposed

on resentencing following his guilty-plea conviction for possession with intent to

distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

FILED

OCT 20 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Virrey-Camez contends that the district court imposed a substantively

unreasonable sentence because it gave too much weight to the facts underlying the

dismissed importation count. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

imposing Virrey-Camez’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007). A court may consider dismissed counts at sentencing. See U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.4; United States v. Barragan-Espinoza, 350 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing

factors, the below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. See Gall, 552

U.S. at 51.

AFFIRMED.

2 14-10025
II 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1832 

To reauthorize the African Elephant Conservation Act, the Rhinoceros and 

Tiger Conservation Act of 1994, and the Asian Elephant Conservation 

Act of 1997. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 19, 2007 

Mr. LIEBERMAN (for himself, Mr. WARNER, and Mrs. BOXER) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

A BILL 

To reauthorize the African Elephant Conservation Act, the 

Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act of 1994, and 

the Asian Elephant Conservation Act of 1997. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Multinational Species 

5 Conservation Funds Reauthorization Act of 2007’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF AFRICAN ELEPHANT CON7 SERVATION ACT. 

8 Section 2306(a) of the African Elephant Conserva9 tion Act (16 U.S.C. 4245(a)) is amended by striking 


ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
2 

•S 1832 IS

1 ‘‘2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007’’ and 

2 inserting ‘‘2007 through 2012’’. 

3 SEC. 3. REAUTHORIZATION OF RHINOCEROS AND TIGER 

4 CONSERVATION ACT OF 1994. 

5 Section 10(a) of the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conserva6 tion Act of 1994 (16 U.S.C. 5306(a)) is amended by strik7 ing ‘‘2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007’’ and 

8 inserting ‘‘2007 through 2012’’. 

9 SEC. 4. REAUTHORIZATION OF ASIAN ELEPHANT CON10 SERVATION ACT OF 1997. 

11 Section 8(a) of the Asian Elephant Conservation Act 

12 of 1997 (16 U.S.C. 4266(a)) is amended by striking 

13 ‘‘2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007’’ and 

14 inserting ‘‘2007 through 2012’’. 

Æ 


ccoleman on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
Dismiss and Opinion Filed June 22, 2018 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-00103-CV 

MOISES LAZALDE D/B/A C & M TIRE & WHEEL, Appellant 

V. 

OMNI SOURCE UNITED, INC., Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-17-05517-E 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Evans, and Justice Brown 

Opinion by Chief Justice Wright 

The clerk’s record in this case is past due. By letter dated May 25, 2018, we informed 

appellant the clerk’s record had not been filed because appellant had not paid for the clerk’s record. 

We directed appellant to provide verification of payment or arrangements to pay for the clerk’s 

record or to provide written documentation appellant had been found entitled to proceed without 

payment of costs within ten days. We cautioned appellant that failure to do so would result in the 

dismissal of this appeal without further notice. To date, appellant has not provided the required 

documentation nor otherwise corresponded with the Court regarding the status of this appeal. 

 
 –2– 

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b); 42.3(b), (c). 

180103F.P05 

 

/Carolyn Wright/ 

CAROLYN WRIGHT 

CHIEF JUSTICE 
 –3– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

MOISES LAZALDE D/B/A C & M TIRE 

& WHEEL, Appellant 

No. 05-18-00103-CV V. 

OMNI SOURCE UNITED, INC., Appellee 

 On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 5, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-17-05517-E. 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wright. 

Justices Evans and Brown participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee OMNI SOURCE UNITED, INC. recover its costs of this 

appeal from appellant MOISES LAZALDE D/B/A C & M TIRE & WHEEL. 

Judgment entered June 22, 2018.
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#### The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, *v.*Max Schirtzer, Defendant.

Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York, Queens County,

May 3, 1957.

*Irving Lawrence Berlin*for defendant.

*Frank D. O’Connor, District Attorney (Moses Yam*of counsel), for plaintiff.

Joseph J. Kozinn, J.

The motion of the defendant to set aside the judgment of conviction for the crime of book-making upon the ground that the evidence presented at the trial was insufficient in law and fact to warrant said judgment, is denied. I know of no authority that permits a Trial Judge of this court to set aside a conviction on the grounds urged; were such authority conferred upon me, as the Trial Judge, I would hold, after reading the minutes of the trial, that the conviction should stand. The remedy of the defendant, if he feels aggrieved and wishes to urge such grounds, is by appeal. “ There was no inherent power in any court to grant new trials under the common law and this power can only be conferred upon a court by statute ” *(People*v. *Lamboray,*152 Misc. 206, 207). Subdivision *4*of section 31 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act authorizes this court to apply the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the practice and procedure in this court, and therefore, a motion for new trial is governed by the provisions thereof with the exception hereinafter noted. This section reads as follows: *‘‘*All sections of the code of criminal procedure consistent with this act regulating and controlling *562the practice and procedure of the court of general sessions of the peace in the city and county of New York shall apply, as far as may be, to the practice and procedure in the court of special sessions, and shall regulate and control the practice and procedure of the said court, in so far as its jurisdiction and organization will permit.” If we are to consider this an application in arrest of judgment, the defendant fails to meet the requirements of section 331 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, statutory authority to grant new trials on the ground of newly discovered evidence, may be found in subdivision 8 of section 31 of the said New York City Criminal Courts Act, which in part, provides as follows: *“*The court of special sessions shall have power to grant a new trial where it is made to appear, by affidavit, that upon another trial the defendant can produce evidence such as, if before received, would probably have changed the verdict or judgment; if such evidence has been discovered since the trial, is not cumulative, and the failure to produce it on the trial was not owing to want of diligence ”. If, therefore, the defendant seeks relief upon the ground of newly discovered evidence pursuant to said section, he has failed to say so, and also has failed to meet the requirements therein set forth.