alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Glen Edward ROSS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 46378.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 20, 1973.

Rehearing Denied July 11, 1973.

*79David R. Siversten, Kerry P. Fitzgerald, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., W. T. West-moreland, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., and Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is murder with malice; the punishment, life.

Appellant’s first ground of error relates to a variance between the indictment and the proof. In the indictment, the deceased’s name appears as Aguiar. The proof showed it to be Aguilar. Appellant contends this constitutes a fatal variance.

The question of a variance is raised for the first time on appeal. We have concluded that appellant could not have been misled by the spelling. We find the names to be idem sonans. Christopher v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 281; Raseley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 470 S.W.2d 899; Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 468 S.W.2d 824.

Appellant’s second ground of error relates to final argument. He contends the prosecutor personally endorsed the officers who took a written statement from appellant by referring to the fact that they “put their very lives on the line each day . (B)oth of them were shot by sniper some 3 weeks ago.” Appellant remonstrated at the time the remarks were made by saying “There’s no evidence in this case . ” The court responded and admonished the prosecutor to “Stay in the record”. When the court ruled favorably, appellant failed to request further relief. “[He] did not pursue the matter until he received an adverse ruling from the court, which was the requisite in order to preserve reversible error.” Burks v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 432 S.W.2d 925. Appellant was apparently satisfied with the court’s admonition since he requested no further relief. Baker v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 368 S.W.2d 627.

Thereafter, during the argument the prosecutor without objection again referred to “the various risks they [the officers] put their lives through every day . ” In Cobb v. State, 386 S.W.2d 811, this Court held that where the prosecutor made the same statements, or those of like effect, without objection, elsewhere in the argument, that error was not reflected by the argument to which an objection was made.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
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</TABLE>
#### Alfred H. Bloom, Claimant, *v.*State of New York, Defendant.

(Motion No. M-4369.)

Court of Claims,

July 31, 1957.

*Harvey M. Lewin*for claimant.

*Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General (Richard A. Foster*of counsel), for defendant.

Alexander Del Gtorno, J.

This is a motion for an order permitting the claimant to file his claim in accordance with the provisions of subdivision 5 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act.

The proposed claim sets forth that on the 31st day of December, 1956, the claimant, while ice skating on a rink adjacent to the Bear Mountain Inn in the Bear Mountain State Park, New York, suffered personal injuries because of the alleged negligence of the State. The injuries sustained consisted among other things of fractures of the tibia and fibula. Claimant alleges that the officers, agents and employees of the State in charge of the Bear Mountain State Park knew and *554were told of the accident and of the facts and circumstances thereof and that the State has records of the accident.

After the accident, claimant was hospitalized for approximately three weeks in Cornwall Hospital, New York, and Lenox Hill Hospital, New York City; that thereafter he was home for three months; that he is still under his doctor’s care and is compelled to wear a brace upon his leg and that he is still unable to perform and assume his regular duties.

The affidavit of the physician to whom his family doctor referred him, verified the 8th day of July, 1957, indicates that claimant has been under his care continuously from January 1, 1957 until the present and will be treated by him necessarily for a considerable period in the future; that during all that time the claimant was incapacitated and unable to move about normally and that during such period he was not in proper physical condition to assume his regular duties in a wholly normal manner.

The claimant did not consult his attorney with respect to the claim until July 2,1957.

The State concedes that it has not been prejudiced substantially by the failure of the claimant to file his claim within the 90-day period prescribed by the Court of Claims Act.

The court holds that a reasonable excuse for the failure to file the notice of claim has been presented, by reason of disability.

The motion is granted. The claimant is permitted to file the claim on or before the 30th day of August, 1957.

Settle order on notice.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
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<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-03-1998
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.43
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.42
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                                 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, the undersigned officer of Serologicals
Corporation (the "Company"), hereby certifies that the Company's Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2002 (the "Report") fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

This certification is given to the knowledge of the undersigned.

Dated:August 13, 2002


                     Name:/s/ David A. Dodd
                          -----------------
                     Title: President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
                           -------------------------------------------------
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                             776
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,291
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        275
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,374
<PP&E>                                           8,648
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,895
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   9,649
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,370
<BONDS>                                            908
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               49
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             2
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,320
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     9,649
<SALES>                                          5,972
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 5,972
<CGS>                                            2,784
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,784
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  63
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,737
<INCOME-TAX>                                         8
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,729
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,729
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .12
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1
                                                                    ------------


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Zond-PanAero Windsystem Partners I, a
California Limited Partnership (the "Partnership") on Form 10-Q for the three
months ended June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jesse E. Neyman, Chief Executive Officer
of Zond Windsystems Management LLC, as General Partner of the Partnership,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:

      (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
           15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
           material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
           of the Partnership for the three months ended June 30, 2006.


Date: August 14, 2006
                                 /s/ JESSE E. NEYMAN
                                ------------------------------
                                Jesse E. Neyman
                                Chief Executive Officer
                                Zond Windsystems Management LLC, as General
                                Partner of Zond-PanAero Windsystem Partners I, a
                                California Limited Partnership
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Cash Plus I
Financial Statements for the nine months ended September 30, 1996 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       4,401,270
<SECURITIES>                                 4,519,885
<RECEIVABLES>                                  512,408<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               206,260
<PP&E>                                      45,932,959
<DEPRECIATION>                            (16,810,212)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              38,762,570
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,363,058
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    37,399,512<F2>
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                38,762,570
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,765,449
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,583,635<F3>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,181,814<F4>
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0<F4>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F4>
<FN>
<F1>Includes all receivables included in "other assets" on the balance sheet.
<F2>Represents total deficit of the General Partners ($152,963) and equity of
 the Limited Partners $37,552,475.
<F3>Includes operating expenses of $1,392,422, real estate taxes of $679,269 and
depreciation expense of $1,511,944.
<F4>Net income allocated $23,636 to General Partners $1,158,178 for the nine 
months ended September 30, 1996.  Average net income is $.29 per unit.
4,000,000 Units outstanding.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

 

 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

 DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED 

 

FRANK D. USINA AND NORTH BEACH 

INVESTMENT, INC., 

 Appellants, 

v. Case No. 5D15-3860 

510 14TH ST. LAND TRUST, 15TH ST. 

LAND TRUST, 402 THIRD ST. LAND TRUST 

AND J. RUSSELL COLLINS, 

 Appellees. 

________________________________/ 

Opinion filed March 24, 2016 

Non-Final Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for St. Johns County, 

Howard M. Maltz, Judge. 

James G. Whitehouse, of St. Johns Law 

Group, St. Augustine, for Appellants. 

No Appearance for Appellees. 

PER CURIAM. 

 AFFIRMED. See City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439, 446-47 

(Fla. 1978) (holding Marketable Record Title Act is not concerned with quality of title 

conveyed by root of title so long as root purports to convey estate claimed). 

LAWSON, C.J., ORFINGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.
#### Ex parte Eunice Lee COLEMAN.

No. 46373.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 29, 1972.

John Mustochio, Houston, Harry Walsh, Roy Greenwood, Huntsville, for appellant.

Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ONION, Presiding Judge.

This is a post conviction application for writ of habeas corpus brought under the provisions of Article 11.07, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P.

The petitioner was convicted by a jury of the offense of rape and assessed a punishment of 50 years. Sentence was imposed on March 19, 1958. No appeal was taken.

Without the necessity of detailing prior habeas corpus proceedings in both state and federal courts, we observe that petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the convicting court alleging, in effect, that he had been indigent at the time of his conviction ; had been represented by appointed counsel; had not been advised of his right of appeal, and had been deprived of his right of appeal.

The trial court appointed counsel for petitioner and then determined that the petitioner was entitled to an out-of-time appeal, but that such was impossible since the transcription of the court reporter’s notes had been lost since the time of petitioner’s conviction in 1958.

We agree with the trial court’s findings. Since a transcription of the testimony of petitioner’s trial is no longer available and he cannot be granted an effective out-of-time appeal, his conviction for rape is void. The habeas corpus petition is granted, the conviction is set aside and the petitioner is ordered remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Harris County to answer the indictment in Cause No. 82,087 in the 176th District Court. See Ex parte Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).

It is so ordered.

ODOM, J., not participating.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Consolidated Statements of Income found on pages 2, 3 and 4 of the Company's
10-Q for the year-to-date, and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           1,184
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   25,340
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (185)
<INVENTORY>                                     31,532
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                58,159
<PP&E>                                          48,820
<DEPRECIATION>                                (20,287)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  95,691
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           32,383
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            58
<OTHER-SE>                                      38,831
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    95,691
<SALES>                                         30,398
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                30,415
<CGS>                                           22,734
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   26,954
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (547)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,913
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,123
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,790
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,790
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .29
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .29
        

</TABLE>
#### Elijah W. RATCLIFF, Relator, v. Hon. Lewis DICKSON, Judge, 125th District Court, Respondent.

No. 16156.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

March 19, 1973.

Elijah W. Ratcliff, pro se.

*36EVANS, Justice.

Relator, plaintiff in the trial court, filed an original proceeding in this court seeking leave to file Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to enter summary judgment in his favor. Relator’s motion for leave to file must be denied.

Relator’s motion indicates notification to opposing counsel as to time for hearing on his motion for summary judgment but does not reflect any request upon the trial court to set such motion for hearing nor that the trial court neglected or refused to act thereon. Thus, Relator has failed to establish the predicate requisite to the right of relief by writ of mandamus. Cozby v. Clifton, 265 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.Civ.App. — Ft. Worth 1954); Dozier v. Wray, 222 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1949). Furthermore, even if a hearing upon relator’s motion for summary judgment and a denial thereof by the trial court be assumed, the record reflects that this court is without jurisdiction to grant relief by mandamus. Relator’s motion for summary judgment is based upon a claim of title under Article 5509, Vernon’s Ann. Texas Revised Civil Statutes, the five year statute of limitation. The courts of civil appeals have power to compel the trial judge to proceed to trial and judgment in a cause, Article 1824, T.R.C.S., but not the power to control the character of the judgment. Jones v. Smith, 470 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston, 1st Dist., 1971). The authority of the court of civil appeals, insofar as concerns ordering the entry of judgment, is limited to the ministerial act of entry of judgment upon established facts. Its authority upon petition for mandamus does not extend to the judicial function of determining whether the evidence demonstrates that a judgment should be rendered as a matter of law. Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Company v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Civ.App.) ; 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Sup.1967); Knox v. Craven, 248 S.W.2d 955 (Tex.Civ.App. — Galveston 1952).

The Relator’s motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus is denied.