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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re IRWIN, Minors. September 13, 2016 

No. 330811 

Kalamazoo Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 2012-000113-NA 

 

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BECKERING, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her 

three minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (j). Because the trial 

court did not clearly err by terminating respondent’s parental rights, we affirm. 

 This case began in March of 2012, when the Department of Health and Human Services 

(DHHS) filed a petition alleging abuse and neglect relating to respondent’s oldest child CBI, 

who is currently nine years old. In June of 2012, CBI was removed from respondent’s care. 

During the next 3-1/2 years, respondent received numerous services from the DHHS aimed at 

reunification, including parenting classes, psychological counseling, domestic violence groups, 

and a parenting coach. At times respondent appeared to cooperate with and benefit from these 

services. Indeed, after respondent gave birth to twins in January of 2014, the twins were released 

to her care and, for a brief period of time beginning in April of 2014, respondent had CBI and the 

twins in her home. However, all three children were removed from respondent in July of 2014 

because respondent showed a marked relapse in concerning behavior and she refused to continue 

further participation in services. At that time, CBI was placed with his grandparents and the 

twins were placed in foster care. Respondent’s parenting time was suspended in March of 2015. 

Ultimately, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights in December of 2015. 

Respondent now appeals as of right. 

 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory 

grounds for termination were proved by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent does not 

address the trial court’s statutory grounds for termination with any specificity, but generally 

argues that respondent has made progress, including recent progress with regulating her 

medications and attending counseling, and that she should be allowed more time to improve, 

particularly in regard to the twins. In connection with this argument, respondent also challenges 

the trial court’s decision to allow suspension of her parenting time in March of 2015. 
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 To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that 

at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established. In re Moss, 301 

Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). We review for clear error a trial court’s finding 

whether a statutory ground for termination has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. 

Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special 

opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 

(2004). 

 In this case, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under several statutory 

grounds, including MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j), which state: 

The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by 

clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following: 

*** 

(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for 

the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to 

provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's 

age. 

*** 

 (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the 

child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of 

the parent. 

 Relevant to these subsections, respondent suffers from mental health issues, including 

bipolar disorder, and her mental and emotional instability have contributed to her failure to 

provide proper care for her children. Given the severity of her mental health issues and her 

failure to consistently benefit from services provided over 3-1/2 years, there is also no reasonable 

expectation that she will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time. 

Indeed, respondent lacks suitable housing for the children and, by her own admission, will need 

another full year before she can provide care. This same evidence also demonstrates a 

reasonable likelihood that the children would be at risk of harm if returned to respondent’s care. 

 In particular, during this case, the most notable recurring barrier to reunification has been 

respondent’s mental and emotional instability, including her bipolar diagnosis. Respondent has 

been given numerous services to address her mental health concerns, but she has had mixed 

success with medication and she has failed to consistently follow through with counseling. 

Despite some progress early in the case, in 2014 respondent stopped complying with services. 

She also began to engage in disruptive and assaultive behavior, sometimes in front of the twins, 

which culminated with her assaulting the children’s guardian ad litem at the June 26, 2014 

hearing. Based on respondent’s conduct, the minor children were removed from respondent’s 

home. Later that summer, respondent assaulted CBI’s father with her car. After her arrest for 

that assault, respondent was incarcerated until February or March 2015. Aside from this 
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assaultive conduct, respondent has also had various outbursts and confrontations with individuals 

involved with providing services to respondent. 

 At the time of the termination hearing, respondent was in jail in relation to an uttering 

and publishing conviction. Respondent estimated that she would probably be in jail for another 

several months, and she believed that it would take a year before she would be able to provide 

for the minor children. Respondent did not have adequate housing for the minor children. 

Respondent’s only potential housing was a trailer, which did not have running water, a 

refrigerator, indoor plumbing, or a working furnace. Additionally, although respondent had 

recently been taking Latuda and attending therapy before she was arrested in October 2015, Dr. 

Randall Haugen testified that respondent, given her mental illness, was likely to have periods of 

regression and significant problems, even with effective treatment. This was consistent with 

evidence that respondent showed progress early in the case but soon regressed to disruptive and 

aggressive behavior. When Haugen evaluated respondent in April 2015, he did not believe that 

respondent was capable of parenting a child over a long period of time given her instability and 

the severity of her mental health issues. He explained that generally individuals with the severity 

of respondent’s mental health issues are unable to raise children unless they are part of a 

household where others are doing much of the caretaking and supervision. Haugen believed that 

the minor children would be in danger if they were placed in respondent’s home. Further, the 

evidence showed that the children had in fact reacted negatively to their most recent visit with 

respondent. Also, Dr. James Henry testified that CBI was a “very traumatized” child, whose 

number one need was a safe and secure environment. He was going to “demand intensity” by a 

caregiver to help him with his behavior and relationships. Henry believed that a return to 

respondent’s home would be devastating to CBI’s long-term development. 

 Under these circumstances, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the 

trial court made a mistake in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that 

respondent failed to provide proper care and custody for the minor children and there was no 

reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody within 

a reasonable time considering the children’s ages, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), or that, based on 

respondent’s conduct or capacity, there is a reasonable likelihood that the minor children will be 

harmed if returned to respondent’s home, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).1

 

 In contesting the termination of her parental rights, respondent also claims that the trial 

court erred when it suspended her parenting time in March 2015. Questions regarding the 

amount of parenting time, if any, and conditions of parenting time following adjudication and 

before the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights are left to the sound discretion of the 

trial court and are to be decided in the best interests of the child. In re Laster, 303 Mich App 

 

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 The trial court also terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), 

(b)(ii), (c)(i). However, because only one ground for termination is required, we need not 

address the additional grounds for termination identified by the trial court. In re Powers Minors, 

244 Mich App 111, 119; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). 
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485, 490; 845 NW2d 540 (2013). No finding of harm to the child is required before suspending 

parenting time. Id. 

 In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the DHHS to suspend 

respondent’s parenting time. At the March 12, 2015 hearing, the caseworker testified that 

respondent had one parenting time visit since her release from jail in February or March 2015. 

According to CBI’s therapist, the child’s grandparents reported that CBI had had trouble sleeping 

for a few nights before the visit and that he had started to wet his bed after the visit, which he had 

not done in the two months before the visit. The therapist believed that the bedwetting was 

related to anxiety. The therapist also testified that CBI had started to make disclosures, including 

that respondent had massaged herself with a dildo in front of him. Additionally, there was 

evidence that, after the visit, the twins had a rough night. They screamed if their foster parents 

left them, and one twin had to be rocked to sleep, something she had not required in months. 

The twins remained clingy the following day. Based on the reactions of the minor children 

following the parenting time visit and the disclosures of inappropriate sexual conduct, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the best interests of the minor children was 

to give petitioner discretion to suspend respondent’s parenting time. Id. Thus, this discretionary 

suspension of respondent’s parenting time did not render the trial court’s termination decision 

clearly erroneous. 

 Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that termination of her 

parental rights was in the best interests of the minor children. “If the court finds that there are 

grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s 

best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights . . . .” MCL 712A.19b(5). We 

review for clear error a trial court’s decision regarding the child’s best interests. In re 

Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 63; 874 NW2d 205 (2015). The trial court must 

determine the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich 

App at 90. “To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, the 

court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child's bond to the parent, 

the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the 

advantages of a foster home over the parent's home.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 

NW2d 61 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Other relevant factors may include the 

risk of harm in returning a child to the parent’s care, In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 142; 

809 NW2d 412 (2011), as well as “the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the 

parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the 

possibility of adoption,” In re White, 303 Mich App at 714. 

 In this case, CBI has been out of respondent’s home since June 2012 with the exception 

of approximately three months in the spring of 2014. Since June 2014, CBI had been living with 

his grandparents. CBI was bonded with them, and he felt safe and secure living there. The 

grandparents were willing to adopt him. The twins have been out of respondent’s home since 

June 2014. They were bonded with their foster family, a potential adoptive family. The children 

had not seen respondent since the summer of 2014, with the exception of one parenting time visit 

in March 2015, and their negative reaction to the visit caused respondent’s parenting time to be 

suspended. Under these circumstances, along with the testimony of Haugen and Henry 

regarding respondent’s inability to parent and the possibility of harm to the minor children if 
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returned to respondent’s home, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of 

respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the minor children. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering