Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1606-ES-1329 | June 28, 2017 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Patrick J. O’Connell

Mishawaka, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Kevin J. Riley

James R. Schrier

Reiling Teder & Schrier, LLC 

Lafayette, Indiana

Edward Chosnek

Chosnek Law P.C.

Lafayette, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Estate of 

John L. Thompson, Sr.:

Sandra Riggs,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Marcee L. Brody and John L. 

Thompson, Jr.,

Appellees-Plaintiffs.

June 28, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A02-1606-ES-1329

Appeal from the 

Tippecanoe Circuit Court

The Honorable 

Thomas H. Busch, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No.

79C01-1402-ES-6

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Sandra Riggs (“Riggs”) appeals the jury’s verdict, which set aside the will of 

John L. Thompson, Sr. (“Senior”) and assessed monetary damages against 

Riggs and in favor of her siblings, Marcee L. Brody (“Brody”) and John L. 

Thompson, Jr. (“Junior”). Riggs raises several issues, of which we find the 

following dispositive: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

excluded testimony regarding Senior’s testamentary intent as a sanction for the 

violation of a motion in limine. 

[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Junior, Brody, and Riggs are the children of Barbara Thompson (“Barbara”)

and Senior, who divorced in 1970 when the children were still young. In 1972, 

Senior moved in with his girlfriend, Barb Fields (“Fields”), and they lived 

together on property in Lafayette, Indiana (“the Eisenhower property”) until 

2013. Junior lived with Senior at various times during his childhood, while 

Brody and Riggs lived with Barbara during their childhoods. 

[4] Junior testified that he had a good relationship with Senior, that he loved his 

father, and that he believed that his father loved him. Tr. Vol. III at 8, 78. 

Junior also admitted that there was “friction” in his relationship with Senior. 

Id. at 62. In June 1985, when Junior was about nineteen years old, a fight 

occurred between Junior and Senior, in which Junior got drunk and went to 

Senior’s home in the middle of the night and assaulted Senior. Tr. Vol. I at 100-

01; Tr. Vol. III at 8; Def’t’s Ex. A. This incident related to a statement that 
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Senior had made to Barbara at a child support hearing that Senior did not 

believe that Junior was his child. Tr. Vol. I at 102; Tr. Vol. II at 6; Tr. Vol. III at 

8. Junior and Senior later reconciled, and Senior acknowledged to Junior that 

Junior was his son. Tr. Vol. III at 11. 

[5] Brody did not have a close relationship with Senior during her childhood and 

for many of her adult years. One of the reasons for the conflict between Brody 

and Senior was that Senior did not approve of Brody’s decision to join the 

military after high school. From around 1996 until 2000, Brody visited Senior 

occasionally, but stopped making an effort to see him after 2000 because she felt 

Senior was not putting forth any effort into their relationship. Riggs testified 

that she had a good relationship with Senior and had regular contact with him

her entire life. Tr. Vol. IV at 44-46. 

[6] Senior retired in 1993 after he suffered a heart attack, at which time he had 

open heart surgery, and Fields took care of him. From 1993 until 2007, 

Senior’s only income was from disability payments and pension. In March 

1996, Senior opened a checking account with Regions Bank and named Riggs, 

Brody, and Junior as equal beneficiaries under the account. Senior deposited 

most of his disability and pension payments into this account. On August 14, 

2007, Senior opened an annuity with Pacific Life Insurance Company (“the 

Annuity”) and named Riggs, Brody, and Junior as equal beneficiaries under the 

Annuity. Riggs, Brody, and Junior remained equal beneficiaries until 

December 6, 2013. 
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[7] In 2011 or 2012, Fields and Senior discussed giving a portion of the Eisenhower 

property to Junior. Fields testified that paperwork was drawn up to transfer the 

property, but Senior changed his mind in July 2012. Tr. Vol. I at 50. At some 

point, Riggs and Junior discovered that Fields was on the deed to the 

Eisenhower property as Senior’s wife under the name Barbara L. Thompson. 

In June 2013, Riggs prepared a quitclaim deed in order to transfer Fields’s 

interest in the Eisenhower property to Senior, and Fields signed the quitclaim 

deed. 

[8] Senior suffered a stroke in May 2013, and Fields cared for him after the stroke. 

Fields took Senior to a neurologist who diagnosed Senior with short-term 

memory loss likely due to early dementia. Fields told the children about 

Senior’s stroke in June 2013. Shortly after learning about Senior’s stroke, Riggs 

prepared a Durable Power of Attorney (“POA”), which named Riggs as 

Senior’s POA. On August 19, 2013, Riggs and Brody took Senior to another 

appointment with the neurologist, and at that time, the doctor diagnosed Senior 

with advanced dementia; however, the doctor later admitted he may have 

overestimated the degree of dementia that Senior suffered. Appellee’s App. Vol. 

IV at 50. 

[9] On August 9, 2013, Riggs took Senior to Regions Bank to meet with the 

assistant manager, Susan Randall (“Randall”). Randall testified that Senior 

had previously met with her a few months prior because he wanted to withdraw 

all of his money from his checking account to keep it safe from Fields. Tr. Vol. 

III at 198-99. On August 9, Senior was still concerned about keeping his money 
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safe from Fields, so Randall recommended that Senior transfer the money to an 

account opened in Riggs’s name. Randall testified that Senior chose this 

option, and the sum of $200,000 was transferred from the account into a new 

account owned solely by Riggs. Id. at 210. In October 2013, Senior and Riggs 

went to First Source Bank and opened an account in Riggs’s name, and 

transferred the money from the Regions Bank account into the new account. 

[10] Senior began living with Riggs in September 2013. In December 2013, Senior 

and Riggs went to the office of Roger Bennett (“Bennett”) in order to make a 

will for Senior. Bennett spoke with Senior privately to determine Senior’s 

testamentary capacity and who he wanted to leave his estate to. Tr. Vol. III at 

163, 166. Bennett believed that Senior had sufficient testamentary capacity to

execute a will. Id. at 166. Bennett testified that Senior expressed his intent to 

leave his property to Riggs and not to Brody or Junior because they did not 

“care enough about him to come visit regularly.” Id. at 166-67. Bennett 

prepared the will, and a few days later, Senior and Riggs came back to have 

Senior sign the will. When Bennett reviewed the will with Senior and Riggs, 

Riggs objected when she found out that Senior was leaving everything to her

and stated that Senior was “going to make trouble for [Riggs] with [Junior and 

Brody].” Id. at 172. Senior then stated that Junior and Brody “didn’t give a 

damn about him,” but decided to leave them $2,000 each. Id. Revisions were 

made to the will to reflect this change, and Senior signed the will. After the will 

was signed, Riggs and Senior went to First Source Bank and Senior changed the 

beneficiaries of the Annuity from Junior, Brody, and Riggs to only Riggs. 
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[11] Senior died January 10, 2014. On February 7, 2014, Senior’s will was admitted 

to probate, and Riggs was named personal representative of the estate. Junior 

and Brody filed a complaint to contest Senior’s will on March 5, 2014. Junior 

and Brody filed motions in limine, in which they sought to exclude evidence of 

Junior’s alleged alcoholism, his criminal record, and that Junior was not 

Senior’s biological son. In an order entered on May 19, 2016, the trial court 

granted the motions in limine, ordering in pertinent part:

The alcoholism of [Junior] may not be discussed in the presence 

of the jury until further order of this Court. . . . The parties may 

not discuss [Junior’s] criminal record until further order of the 

Court. . . . Evidence concerning [Senior’s] belief or statements 

that [Junior] was not a natural child of [Senior] may not be 

discussed in the presence of the jury until further order of the 

Court. 

Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 77. 

[12] A jury trial was held from May 24, 2016 through May 27, 2016. On the first 

day of trial, after a discussion on the issue of character evidence, the trial court

stated:

So proving generally that [Junior and Brody] are not of good 

character would not be competent evidence but proving that they 

were considered by the testator to be of bad character or 

unworthy would be relevant and competent. So just the fact for 

instance [Junior] had a drinking problem would not be relevant 

but if there were instances in which this was a matter of friction 

between him and his father that would be relevant.
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Tr. Vol. I at 5. Riggs’s counsel asked for clarification regarding the status of the 

motions in limine as to evidence of Junior’s alcohol use and criminal record, 

and the following exchange occurred:

[Trial Court]: [Evidence related to Junior’s alcohol use and 

criminal record] can only come in if it effects [sic] the mind of the 

father. The fact that they are a bad character can’t come in on 

that basis but if they had --

[Riggs’s Counsel]: If he went to visit his son in the prison is that 

admissible? 

[Junior and Brody’s Counsel]: I think that’s more harmful, more 

prejudicial than probative of any evidence. 

[Trial Court]: If he was angry at his son for being a drunk that 

would come in. If they -- the two of them got into quarrels and 

fought that would come in. But just the fact that any of the three 

people -- well any of the -- either of the plaintiffs are bad 

character doesn’t come in just for that reason. So I don’t think 

that his convictions come in except as they -- but the incident--as 

I understand it one of the incidents where the police report was 

made was one where there was friction between the son and 

father. That would certainly come in. 

Id. at 11-12. The trial court also stated that evidence of whether Junior was or 

was not the biological son of Senior should be allowed only as it related to 

Senior’s soundness of mind and the issue of undue influence. Id. at 6. Included 

in the evidence the trial court was going to permit were statements that Senior 

allegedly made to Riggs in the car after he signed the will. Id. at 14.
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[13] During Riggs’s testimony on the final day of trial, she referenced Junior’s 

criminal record in response to a question about whether Senior gave her an 

explanation for giving unequal shares to the children in his will. Tr. Vol. IV at 

147-48. Counsel representing Junior and Brody objected, and a sidebar 

conference was held. At the conclusion of the sidebar, the trial court struck the 

answer and instructed the jury to “disregard the question and answer and 

further . . . to . . . assume that no explanation was given by [Senior] at that time 

or subsequently.” Id. at 150. At the end of the trial, the jury found (1) the will 

to be invalid, (2) the withdrawal from the Regions Bank account on August 9, 

2013 to be invalid, (3) the change of the beneficiaries of the Annuity from 

Junior, Brody, and Riggs to just Riggs only and the corresponding death 

payment to Riggs to be invalid, and (4) as a result, that Riggs is liable to Junior 

and to Brody in the amount of $133,334.06 each. Riggs now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Riggs argues that the trial court erred in its imposition, as a sanction for 

violating the motions in limine, of the exclusion of her testimony regarding

statements Senior made to her after signing the will. A party who violates an 

order in limine may not do so with impunity. Allied Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. 

Good, 919 N.E.2d 144, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. The sanction for 

violating an order in limine is “within the discretion of the trial court and under 

appropriate circumstances might extend to declaration of a mistrial and/or 

punishment for contempt.” Id. 
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[15] Riggs contends that the trial court erred when it excluded any testimony of 

what Senior told her regarding his intent in writing his will. She asserts that the 

central issue at trial was determining Senior’s testamentary intent and that the 

trial court’s action in excluding her testimony meant that the jury was given no 

basis to evaluate the issue. Riggs claims that the trial court’s sanction for her 

violation of the motions in limine denied her due process because it excluded 

testimony concerning anything that Senior said at the time he signed his will or 

immediately thereafter and “virtually eliminated [her] legal ability to prove her 

case.” Reply Br. at 14. She maintains that the trial court’s sanction was an 

excessive punishment for violation of the motions in limine and should be 

found to be an abuse of discretion. We agree.

[16] Here, the trial court granted the motions in limine to exclude evidence of 

Junior’s criminal record. During her testimony on the last day of the trial in 

response to a question as to whether Senior said anything to her when they 

were leaving Bennett’s office to explain his will, Riggs stated, “Yes, he said he 

was very embarrassed for many years of [J]unior’s criminal record.” Tr. Vol. IV

at 148. Counsel for Junior and Brody immediately objected, and the trial court 

told the jury to disregard the question. Id. After a sidebar conference, the trial 

court instructed the jury to “disregard the question and answer and further . . . 

to . . . assume that no explanation was given by [Senior] at that time or 

subsequently.” Id. at 150. 

[17] Therefore, as a sanction for violating the motions in limine, the trial court 

excluded any of Riggs’s testimony regarding what Senior said to her in 
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explanation as to why he wrote his will to essentially exclude Junior and Brody 

and also instructed the jury to assume that Senior gave no explanation, either as 

he left Bennett’s office or at any time thereafter, concerning why he wrote his 

will in that manner. This sanction essentially excluded all of Riggs’s evidence 

supporting her defense as to Senior’s intent in writing his will. Although the 

trial court has discretion in crafting a sanction for the violation of a motions in 

limine, the sanction imposed by the trial court in the present case was severe 

and deprived the jury of hearing evidence that was necessary for it to consider 

in order to properly decide the case. Other less severe sanctions were available 

for the trial court to utilize, including striking the offending testimony, an 

admonishment to the jury to disregard the testimony, a curative instruction, or 

punishment for contempt. Further, in excluding evidence, the trial court 

instructed the jury to assume that Senior never gave an explanation as to his 

intent in writing his will, and then, gave a final instruction that stated, “If a 

party fails to testify about facts, produce a witness or produce documents under 

the party’s exclusive knowledge and control, you may conclude that the 

testimony the witness could have given . . . would have been unfavorable to the 

party’s case.” Appellant’s App. at 36. We conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in its choice of sanction for the violation of the motions in limine. 

We, therefore, reverse the jury verdict and remand for retrial.

[18] Reversed and remanded. 

[19] Mathias, J., and Altice, J., concur.