IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-10500

Summary Calendar 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee 

v. 

JERRY K. REED, 

Defendant - Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas 

USDC No. 3:13-CR-481-6 

Before BARKSDALE, HAYNES and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Jerry K. Reed pleaded guilty to conspiring to unlawfully distribute 

hydrocodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(E)(i), and 

was sentenced to, inter alia, 216 months’ imprisonment. In addition to the 

drug-distribution conspiracy charge, Reed was also indicted for: brandishing 

a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and conspiring to brandish a firearm during a drug-

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 20, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-10500

2 

trafficking crime, in violation of § 924(o). In exchange for his written 

agreement pleading guilty to the distribution charge, the firearm-related 

charges were dismissed on the Government’s motion. Reed claims, for the first 

time on appeal, his guilty plea was unknowing and should be vacated because 

the district court failed to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 11. 

 And, Reed concedes, because he did not raise these issues in district 

court, review is only for plain error. E.g., United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 

537, 546 (5th Cir. 2012). Under that standard, Reed must show a forfeited 

plain (clear or obvious) error that affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he does so, we have the discretion 

to correct the reversible plain error, but should do so only if it “seriously 

affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id. 

 The court failed to inform Reed that: the Government could use any of 

his statements under oath in a prosecution for perjury; he had a right to 

counsel, appointed by the court if necessary, at every stage of the proceeding; 

and the court was obliged to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing 

factors. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(A), (D), (M). Reed, however, has not 

shown that any of these Rule 11 failures affected his substantial rights because 

he has not shown “a reasonable probability that, but for the error[s], he would 

not have entered the [guilty] plea”. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 

542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004).

Reed neither asserts he is being threatened with a perjury charge, nor 

articulates how this error prejudiced his guilty plea. Therefore, the district 

court’s omission of the perjury warning is harmless and does not require 

reversal. See United States v. Law, 633 F.2d 1156, 1157 (5th Cir. 1981). Reed 

likewise offers no explanation for how his lack of notice regarding his right to 

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3 

court-appointed counsel at all stages of his case and the court’s required 

consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors affected his decision to plead 

guilty. 

In short, Reed’s conclusory assertion that there is a reasonable 

probability he would not have pleaded guilty but for the Rule 11 errors is 

insufficient to establish the requisite reversible plain error. See Dominguez 

Benitez, 542 U.S. at 80–85; United States v. Meza, 642 F. App’x 332, 333–34 

(5th Cir. 2016). 

AFFIRMED. 

 Case: 16-10500 Document: 00513917430 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/20/2017