COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges O’Brien, Ortiz and Senior Judge Humphreys

Argued at Lexington, Virginia

SAVANNAH ELIZABETH FISHER

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 2144-23-3 JUDGE DANIEL E. ORTIZ

SEPTEMBER 17, 2024

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY

Christopher B. Russell, Judge

Eric Weathers, Assistant Public Defender (Kelsey Bulger, Deputy 

Appellate Counsel; Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on 

briefs), for appellant.

Allison Mentch, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a jury trial, the trial court convicted Savannah Elizabeth Fisher for possessing a 

Schedule I or II controlled substance and sentenced her to four years of imprisonment with three 

years and one month suspended. Fisher argues that the trial court erred in rejecting her proposed 

jury instruction, denying her motion to strike the evidence, and denying her motion to suppress the 

evidence. We find no trial court error and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

“On appeal, we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.” 

Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 564 (2009) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). That principle requires us to “discard the evidence of the 

accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).

UNPUBLISHED
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favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Kelly v. 

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 

Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)).

Late in the evening of June 20, 2022, Deputy Joe Sorrells and Deputy Daniel Trout of the 

Rockbridge County Sheriff’s Office were dispatched to the parking lot of a Quality Inn. The 

front desk clerk at the hotel reported that a female who was not a registered guest was inside a 

blue Suburban parked in the lot and that she had been there for the past few nights. 

When the officers arrived, they found Fisher in the back seat of the Surburban. Fisher got 

out of the car and told the officers that she was waiting to meet her husband. Sorrells advised 

Fisher that she could not drive the Suburban on the highway because it had “farm use” tags on it. 

He then went inside the hotel to speak to the desk clerk. 

Deputy Chris Wade, who had arrived on the scene with his drug-detecting canine, asked 

Fisher if she “had a Fourth Amendment waiver”; she responded that she did not know. Wade 

then asked if there was anything in Fisher’s vehicle that his trained police dog could detect. 

Fisher responded affirmatively that there was a glass smoking device—also known as a 

“bubble”—in the center console of the car. Wade told Trout that a glass smoking device was in 

the car in the center console. Trout searched the vehicle and found a glass smoking device 

wrapped in a washcloth in the cup holder of the center console. The device tested positive for 

methamphetamine in a field test. Laboratory testing confirmed that the seized smoking device 

contained methamphetamine residue. 

ANALYSIS

I. Jury Instruction

Fisher first asserts that the trial court erred in denying her proposed jury instruction. At 

trial, Fisher proffered jury Instruction K.1:
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Ms. Fisher is charged with the crime of possessing 

methamphetamine which is a Schedule II controlled substance. 

The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Ms. Fisher knowingly and intentionally possessed 

methamphetamine.

If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt the crime as charged, then you 

shall find Ms. Fisher guilty but you shall not fix the punishment 

until your verdict has been returned and further evidence has been 

heard by you.

If you find that the Commonwealth has failed to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Fisher knowingly and 

intentionally possessed methamphetamine, then you shall find Ms. 

Fisher not guilty.

The trial court refused Instruction K.1, but granted Instruction 9, which stated: 

The Defendant, Savannah Elizabeth Fisher, is charged with 

crime of possession of methamphetamine which is a Schedule II 

controlled substance.

The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the Defendant, Savannah Elizabeth Fisher, knowingly and 

intentionally possessed methamphetamine.

If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt the crime as charged, then you 

shall find the Defendant Savannah Elizabeth Fisher guilty.

If you find that the Commonwealth has failed to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant Savannah Elizabeth 

Fisher possessed methamphetamine, then you shall find the 

Defendant Savannah Elizabeth Fisher not guilty. 

In addition, the trial court gave Instruction 10, which defined the terms “knowingly and 

intentionally” and possession. Instruction 1 also noted that the “presumption of innocence 

remains with the defendant, Savannah Elizabeth Fisher, throughout the trial and is enough to 

require you to find the defendant Savannah Elizabeth Fisher not guilty unless and until the 

Commonwealth proves each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
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Fisher argues that the instructions granted by the trial court misstated the law and that the 

trial court erred in refusing Instruction K.1. She contends that the final paragraph of Instruction 

9 “omitted the mens rea element required for a conviction” for possessing drugs, leaving the jury 

instructions unclear as to the jury’s obligation to acquit Fisher if the Commonwealth proved only 

possession but not Fisher’s mental state. 

“As a general rule, the matter of granting and denying instructions . . . rest[s] in the sound 

discretion of the trial court.” Dandridge v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 669, 679 (2021)

(alterations in original) (quoting Lienau v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 254, 264 (2018)). “The 

trial court’s ‘broad discretion in giving or denying instructions requested’ is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 580, 586 (2015) (en 

banc)). “Our sole responsibility in reviewing [jury instructions] is to see that the law has been 

clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises.” Pena 

Pinedo v. Commonwealth, 300 Va. 116, 121 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Cooper v. 

Commonwealth, 277 Va. 377, 381 (2009)). But “[p]arties are not entitled . . . to duplicative or 

repetitive instructions covering the same principle of law.” King, 64 Va. App. at 587-88.

Considered as a whole, the granted instructions told the jury that if the Commonwealth 

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Fisher knowingly and intentionally possessed 

methamphetamine, it should find her not guilty. Paragraph two of Instruction 9 listed 

“knowingly and intentionally” as an essential element of the offense, and that element was 

further defined by Instruction 10. While the instructions did not expressly note the jury’s duty to 

acquit if it failed to find this element, Instruction 1 required the jury to find Fisher not guilty if 

the Commonwealth failed to prove every element—including, implicitly, the mens rea. Thus, 

the granted instructions requiring that possession be knowing and intentional were duplicative of 

the statement in proposed Instruction K.1 concerning Fisher’s intent. Considering the other 
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granted instructions, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Instruction 

K.1.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Contending that her possession of methamphetamine was not knowing and intentional, 

Fisher challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her conviction. “In determining 

whether the evidence was sufficient to support a criminal conviction, the appellate court views 

the facts in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.” Green v. Commonwealth, 72 

Va. App. 193, 200 (2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 463 (2017)). 

“Under the governing standard, ‘we review factfinding with the highest degree of appellate 

deference.’” Commonwealth v. Barney, 302 Va. 84, 96 (2023) (quoting Bowman v. 

Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 496 (2015)). Accordingly, “[i]n conducting [its] review, the Court 

defers to the [jury’s] findings of fact unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support them.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 585, 591 (2020). “This deference is 

owed to both the [jury’s] assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the inferences to be 

drawn ‘from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Eberhardt v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 23, 31 

(2021) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 485, 500 (2015)). Our deferential 

standard of review also “‘requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that 

of the Commonwealth[] and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the 

Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn”’ from that evidence.” Green, 72 Va. App. at 

200 (alteration in original) (quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 236 (2016)).

“If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to 

substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the 

finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting 

Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 288 (2017)). “In the end, the appellate court ‘ask[s] 
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whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.”’” Eberhardt, 74 Va. App. at 31 (alteration in original) (quoting Davis, 65 

Va. App. at 500).

“In interpreting the Commonwealth’s basic statutes proscribing possession of drugs, . . .

the applicable legal principles are clear: Possession may be actual or constructive.” Wright v. 

Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 266, 273 (2009); see also Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 

625, 629-30 (2009). “Establishing constructive possession requires proof ‘that the defendant was 

aware of both the presence and character of the [item] and that it was subject to his dominion and 

control.’” Watts v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 217, 232-33 (2010) (alteration in original)

(quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 474, 476 (1984)). 

To support a conviction based upon constructive possession, the 

Commonwealth must point to evidence of acts, statements, or 

conduct of the accused or other facts or circumstances which tend 

to show that the defendant was aware of both the presence and 

character of the contraband and that the contraband was subject to 

his dominion and control.

Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176, 183 (2024). “Possession need not be actual, exclusive, 

or lengthy in order to support a conviction; instead, the statute criminalizes constructive or joint 

possession of illegal [items] of any duration,” regardless of who owns the items. Wells v. 

Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 775, 781 (2000).

After arriving on the scene with his trained drug dog, Deputy Wade asked Fisher if there 

was anything in her vehicle that the canine would detect. Fisher responded that there was a glass 

smoking device in the center console of the car. Deputy Trout searched the Suburban and found 

a glass smoking device in the exact location that Fisher had indicated. The bubble contained 

sufficient methamphetamine to test positive in both field and laboratory tests. Given her 

proximity to the bubble and her knowledge of its location, a reasonable fact finder could 

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Fisher was aware of the presence of the 
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methamphetamine, although merely residue, in the device. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

err in denying Fisher’s motion to strike, as the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that 

Fisher knowingly and intentionally possessed the methamphetamine residue found in the device.

III. Motion to Suppress

Finally, Fisher argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the 

evidence recovered by the police in the warrantless search of the car. “[I]n considering a trial 

court’s ruling on a suppression motion, we view the evidence in the ‘light most favorable to . . . 

the prevailing party below,’ the Commonwealth in this instance, and the decision of the trial 

judge will be disturbed only if plainly wrong.” Greene v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 606, 608 

(1994) (second alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 

1067 (1991)). “Our review of the record includes evidence adduced at both the trial and the 

suppression hearing.” Id. We review the trial court’s legal determinations de novo. Jones v. 

Commonwealth, 279 Va. 665, 670 (2010).

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

“This fundamental right is preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a 

warrant issued by an independent judicial officer.” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390

(1985). “Under the Fourth Amendment, officers cannot search a place without a warrant unless 

one of several delineated exceptions to this warrant requirement apply.” Duncan v. 

Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179 (2009). Thus “[a] warrantless search by the police is 

invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 

requirement.” Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999).

Courts colloquially refer to one such exception as the “automobile exception.” Analysis 

of the automobile exception revolves around two questions. First, is the search location a 
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“vehicle”? If yes, did the officers have probable cause for the search? See Carney, 471 U.S. at 

392 (When it comes to automobiles, “the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily 

lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify 

searches without prior recourse to the authority of the magistrate so long as the overriding 

standard of probable cause is met.”). 

Whether a search location is a “vehicle” for Fourth Amendment purposes depends on two 

factors. First, vehicles are “readily mobile,” such that they may “be quickly moved out of the 

locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Id. at 390 (emphasis omitted) 

(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)). Second, something is a vehicle if it 

is “subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls” as it operates on 

and about public highways, and thus faces a lesser expectation of privacy. Id. at 392 (quoting 

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)). Simply put, the application of the 

automobile exception does not turn on the “uses to which [the] vehicle may be put” but on “the 

ready mobility of the vehicle, and on the presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively 

indicates that the vehicle is being used for transportation.” Id. at 394 (evaluating whether a 

mobile home qualified as a vehicle for the automobile exception).

If the target of the search is a vehicle under these two broad purposes, it does not matter 

whether the vehicle is immobilized, United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985), or whether 

the vehicle is already under police control, Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 260-61 (1982) 

(per curiam); see also United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 591 (4th Cir. 2010). The 

Commonwealth need not prove exigent circumstances to search a vehicle without a warrant. 

Johns, 469 U.S. at 484. If the location being searched qualifies as a vehicle, the Commonwealth 

need only prove probable cause. Id.; Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-94.
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Here, Fisher does not dispute that the officers had probable cause—only that she was in a 

vehicle subject to the automobile exception. She maintains that her car was not readily mobile 

because it was equipped only with “farm use” tags and could not lawfully operate on a highway.1 

But the fact that the car lacked proper licensing to be driven on the highway does not undermine 

the purposes of the automobile exception such that we should consider it to be different from any 

other “vehicle.” Nothing in evidence suggested that the car was not operable or was not actually 

a car which could evade police, nor that the car was not subject to regulations as a vehicle used 

in transportation. The car’s license plate tags do not transmute the Suburban—a vehicle by any 

definition—into something different. 

Because the officers could properly search Fisher’s vehicle under the automobile 

exception, the trial court did not err in denying Fisher’s motion to suppress the evidence.

CONCLUSION

Because the trial court did not err in denying Fisher’s proposed jury instruction, denying 

her motion to strike, or denying her motion to suppress, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

1 Fisher also contends that her vehicle was not “readily mobile” because the police 

surrounded it with their own cars. Fisher did not raise this claim in the trial court as a basis for 

the court to grant her motion to suppress. “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a 

basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the 

ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 

5A:18. “The purpose of th[e] contemporaneous objection requirement [in Rule 5A:18] is to 

allow the trial court a fair opportunity to resolve the issue at trial, thereby preventing unnecessary 

appeals and retrials.” Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 185, 195 (2015). “Specificity 

and timeliness undergird the contemporaneous-objection rule, animate its highly practical 

purpose, and allow the rule to resonate with simplicity . . . .” Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 

730, 743 (2019). “Not just any objection will do. It must be both specific and timely—so that 

the trial judge would know the particular point being made in time to do something about it.” Id.

(quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 351, 356 (2011)). Fisher waived this aspect 

of her argument by not raising it in the trial court, and we do not consider it.