alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C., SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Hickory Tech Corporation on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John W. Finke, Chief Executive Officer of HickoryTech, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of HickoryTech.











/s/ John W. Finke


John W. Finke


President and Chief Executive Officer


July 29, 2010
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02613-DME-MEH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

$782,893.49 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY,

Defendant.

ORDER OF REFERENCE TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and F.R.Civ.P. 72(a) and (b), United States 

Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty is designated to conduct proceedings in this civil action as 

follows:

(X) Convene a scheduling conference under F.R.Civ.P. 16(b) and enter a scheduling 

order meeting the requirements of D.C.COLO.LCivR 16.2.

(X) Conduct such status conferences and issue such orders necessary for compliance 

with the scheduling order, including amendments or modifications of the

scheduling order upon a showing of good cause.

(X) Convene such settlement conferences and direct related procedures as may 

facilitate resolution of this case.

(X) Hear and determine pretrial matters, including discovery and other non-dispositive 

motions.

( ) Conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and submit proposed findings of 

fact and recommendations for rulings on dispositive motions.

(X) Conduct a pretrial conference and enter a pretrial order.

IT IS ORDERED that this civil action is referred to the named magistrate judge to proceed 

according to the designations marked (X) above. It is

Case No. 1:11-cv-02613-DME-MEH Document 2 filed 10/13/11 USDC Colorado pg 1 of 2
2

FURTHER ORDERED that, unless service has otherwise been completed or arranged, 

plaintiff=s counsel is directed to effect service of the summons and complaint pursuant to Rule 4 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no later than November 13, 2011, in order for the initial 

scheduling conference to be held promptly. Counsel should expect to be given a firm trial setting 

that is 60 to 120 days from the date of the final pretrial conference with the magistrate judge, and 

should be available for trial accordingly.

DONE AND SIGNED this 13th day of October , 2011.

BY THE COURT:

David M. Ebel

U. S. Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 1:11-cv-02613-DME-MEH Document 2 filed 10/13/11 USDC Colorado pg 2 of 2
Exhibit 32.2


                                  CERTIFICATION
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
           AS ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     I, Joseph A. Orlando, as Treasurer of Leucadia National Corporation -
Arizona (the "Company") certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

     (1) the accompanying Form 10-K report for the period ending December 31,
2003 as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report")
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.





Dated:  March 18, 2004

                                         By:  /s/ Joseph A. Orlando
                                              ----------------------
                                              Joseph A. Orlando
                                              Treasurer
                                              (Principal Financial Officer)
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Ramon M. Ruiz-Comas, President and Chief Executive Officer of Triple-S
Management Corporation (the Corporation), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

1.    The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Corporation for the annual period
      ended December 31, 2005 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements
      of Section 13(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
      78m) and;

2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Corporation.

Date: March 30, 2006                       By:  /s/ Ramon M. Ruiz-Comas
                                                -------------------------
                                                Ramon M. Ruiz-Comas
                                                President and
                                                Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 31.2

                                  Certification

I, Mark Stickney, Chief Financial Officer, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Cosi, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

      (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
      disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
      to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
      its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
      entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
      prepared;

      (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
      and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
      effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
      the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;

      (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
      control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
      most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the
      case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably
      likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over
      financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

      (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
      operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
      reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
      process, summarize and report financial information; and

      (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
      employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
      over financial reporting.

Date: March 29, 2004


By: /s/ Mark Stickney
    -------------------------
Mark Stickney
Chief Financial Officer
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-21-00340-CV

In re Ardell Danny Nelson Junior

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Relator has filed a petition for writ of mandamus complaining of the trial 

court’s purported failure to rule on his motion for forensic DNA testing. Although mandamus

relief is available when the trial court has failed to rule on a properly filed motion within a 

reasonable length of time, see In re Whitfield, No. 03-18-00564-CV, 2018 WL 4140735, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.), such relief is inapplicable here

because the trial court has already denied the motion, see In re Martinez, No. 04-14-00293-CR, 

2014 WL 2548571, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 4, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) 

(per curiam) (holding that a “failure to rule” issue becomes moot once the trial court has acted). 

Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus as moot.

__________________________________________

Thomas J. Baker, Justice

Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Smith

Filed: July 30, 2021
#### James Wesley HEADY et al., Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 12, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1974.

Anthony M. Wilhoit, Public Defender, David E. Murrell, Deputy Public Defender, Frankfort, for appellants.

Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., Carl Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

Appeal from Whitley Circuit Court; Pleas Jones, Judge.

Memorandum Opinion of the Court by Commissioner VANCE, Affirming.*

*

 Opinion ordered not to be published.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
       

<S>                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                         JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                           SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                     531,178
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                            1,679,302
<ALLOWANCES>                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                 86,242
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         2,390,407
<PP&E>                                   2,801,216
<DEPRECIATION>                           2,020,706
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           3,775,215
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      178,900
<BONDS>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                 2,813,248
<OTHER-SE>                                 783,067
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             3,775,215
<SALES>                                  1,779,785
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                         3,204,397
<CGS>                                    1,948,992
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           617,298
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           4,826
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            709,802
<INCOME-TAX>                               109,980
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              0
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                               599,822
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    0
        

</TABLE>
## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________
No. 23

- 2482

___________________________
United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.
Billy Joe Taylor

Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith

____________
Submitted: July 23 , 2024 Filed: July 31, 2024 [ Unpublished ]

____________
Before KELLY
, GRASZ , and STRAS , Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Before Billy Taylor pleaded guilty to money laundering and conspiracy to commit health

- care fraud

, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347

, 1349 , 1957 , the district court 1 refused to release his seized assets and denied his request to change attorneys

. Although h e

1 The Honorable P.K. Holmes, III, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.-2- argues that th e se rulings violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, he cannot challenge them after unconditionally pleading guilty. See Tollett v. Henderson , 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) ( explaining that a guilty plea “break[s]

. . . the chain of events,” meaning it forecloses “independent clams relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights” that “preceded it in the criminal process” ) ; United States v. Dewberry , 936 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that a defendant waived a Sixth Amendment challenge by pleading guilty)

. Nor can he argue that his plea was unknowing or involuntary

, given that he first raised the point in his reply brief. See
Jenkins v. Winter , 540 F.3d 742, 751 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Claims not raised in an opening brief are deemed waived.”). Finally

, his argument that appointed counsel provided ineffective assistance will have to a wait collateral review

. See United States v. Ramirez

- Hernandez , 449 F.3d 824, 8 2 7 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
ineffective

- assistance claims are “more properly raised in a separate motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ”). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-6280

JAMES SNEAD, Petitioner - Appellant, versus THOMAS R. CORCORAN; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson E. Legg, District Judge. (CA-98- 2156-L) Submitted: July 30, 1999 Decided: August 30, 1999 Before ERVIN and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Snead, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr., AttorneyGeneral, Ann Norman Bosse, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the order from which Snead appeals was filed on February 3, 1999, it was entered on the district court’s docket sheet on February 4, 1999. February 4, 1999, is therefore the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 and 79(a); see also Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM: James Snead appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). We have reviewed the record and the district court’sopinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Snead v. Corcoran , No. CA-98-2156-L (D. Md. Feb. 4, 1999). * We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
| Skip to Content*Release Date: September 17, 2009*Release dates |  Coded tables |  Historical dataCurrent release |  Screen reader |  PDF (450 KB)**L.103 Nonfarm Noncorporate Business** |
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```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1212 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1212

   To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to permit direct 
payment under the Medicare program for clinical social worker services 
          provided to residents of skilled nursing facilities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 25, 2007

Ms. Mikulski (for herself, Ms. Stabenow, Mr. Inouye, Ms. Cantwell, and 
 Mrs. Murray) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to permit direct 
payment under the Medicare program for clinical social worker services 
          provided to residents of skilled nursing facilities.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Clinical Social Work Medicare Equity 
Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. PERMITTING DIRECT PAYMENT UNDER THE MEDICARE PROGRAM FOR 
              CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER SERVICES PROVIDED TO RESIDENTS OF 
              SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES.

    (a) In General.--Section 1888(e)(2)(A)(ii) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 1395yy(e)(2)(A)(ii)) is amended by inserting ``clinical 
social worker services,'' after ``qualified psychologist services,''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1861(hh)(2) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(hh)(2)) is amended by striking ``and 
other than services furnished to an inpatient of a skilled nursing 
facility which the facility is required to provide as a requirement for 
participation''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to items and services furnished on or after the date that 
regulations relating to payment for physicians' services for calendar 
year 2008 take effect, but in no case later than the first day of the 
third month beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 12.1  I, Kevin Hanson, Chief Executive Officer, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 20-F of Brockton Capital Corp.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Annual Report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The companys other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d -15(f)) for the company and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and (c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the company's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and (d) Disclosed in this report any change in the companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the companys internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The companys other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the companys auditors and the audit committee of the companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the companys internal control over financial reporting.  Date: October 30, 2006  Kevin Hanson___________ Chief Executive Officer
#### Edgar C. HEALD and John Richard Hall, Plaintiffs in Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant in Error.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Dec. 11, 1970.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court Feb. 16, 1971.

Hal H. Clements, Jr., Eugene Mynatt, Knoxville, for plaintiffs in error.

David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., Lance D. Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Joseph J. Nigro and Donald R. Coffey, Asst. Dist. Attys. Gen., Knoxville, for defendant in error.

OPINION

RUSSELL, Judge.

Plaintiffs-in-error, Edgar C. Heald and John Richard Hall, have perfected an appeal in the nature of a writ of error from their joint trial and conviction of burglary in the third degree.

*243Retained counsel have assigned but one error. It is contended that the indictment should have been quashed, on the premise that burglary is not committed by breaking into the coin box of a pay telephone. We are asked to overrule Fox v. State, 214 Tenn. 694, 383 S.W.2d 25, decided in 1964, which specifically held that the fact that a telephone booth was open to the public and hence lawfully entered did not prevent one breaking into the money receptacle from being guilty of third degree burglary.

We, being an intermediate appellate court, have no authority to overrule a clear and controlling authority promulgated by our Supreme Court. We are satisfied that Fox v. State, supra, controls the single issue presented; and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

MITCHELL and GALBREATH, JJ., concur.