alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1896 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AUGUST 4, 2007 

Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 11 Central Street in Hillsborough, New Hampshire, as the ‘‘Officer Jeremy Todd Charron Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


cnoel on PRODPC75 with BILLS
2 

S 1896 RFH

1 SECTION 1. OFFICER JEREMY TODD CHARRON POST OF2 FICE BUILDING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 11 Central Street in 

5 Hillsborough, New Hampshire, shall be known and des6 ignated as the ‘‘Officer Jeremy Todd Charron Post Of7 fice’’. 

8 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg9 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

10 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

11 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Officer Jeremy Todd 

12 Charron Post Office’’. 

Passed the Senate August 3, 2007. 

Attest: NANCY ERICKSON, 

Secretary. 


cnoel on PRODPC75 with BILLS
|   |        |                                                                   |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                                   |   |
|        |        | /s/      Kenneth A. Joyce                                              |   |
|   |   | Print      Name: Kenneth A. Joyce                                      |   |
|   |   | Title: Chief      Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) |   |
|   |   | Date: August      13, 2009                                        |   |

| * | This      certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a-14(b) under the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and      Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and      shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act      or otherwise subject to the liability of that Section.  This      certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any      filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act,      except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by      reference into any suchfiling. |
|---|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Alan F. Krock hereby certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in my capacity as an officer of
PMC-Sierra, Inc. (PMC), that, to my knowledge, this Quarterly Report of PMC on Form 10-Q for the period ended July 3, 2005, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that
the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of PMC.



|                    |  |     |  |                   |  |                             
|------------------- |  | --- |  | ----------------- |  | ----------------------------
|Date: July 26, 2005 |  | By: |  | /s/ Alan F. Krock
|                    |  |     |  |                   |  | Alan F. Krock               
|                    |  |     |  |                   |  | Vice President, Finance     
|                    |  |     |  |                   |  | Chief Financial Officer and 
|                    |  |     |  |                   |  | Principal Accounting Officer
#### Ex parte William J. WHITE.

No. 46198.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 1, 1972.

*302James H. Pearl, San Antonio, for appellant.

Ted Butler, Dist. Atty., Steve Takas and Antonio G. Cantu, Asst. Dist. Attys., San Antonio, Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., and Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ONION, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from an order entered in a habeas corpus proceeding in the 186th District Court of Bexar County denying reduction of the amount of bail upon a complaint charging appellant with murder.

It has been made to appear that, subsequent to the entry of the order appealed from, an indictment has been returned charging appellant with said offense. The question of appellant’s right to bail upon the charge by complaint has, therefore, become moot. Ex parte Tullos, 445 S.W.2d 744 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), and cases there cited.

Appellant also complains that the court erred in refusing to require the State to show probable cause for holding him; in refusing to allow him to show he was not guilty, and that State’s evidence was illegally obtained, etc.

The record reflects that prior to the habeas corpus proceeding, there had been an examining trial in which probable cause had been established. Further, the return of the indictment established probable cause and renders moot any contention of the appellant at the habeas hearing.

The appeal is dismissed.
#### LOUISVILLE TITLE MORTGAGE COMPANY, Individually, Title Insurance and Trust Company, Individually, and as Trustee, All Corporations, Appellants, v. LOUISVILLE STORAGE COMPANY, a Corporation, H. M. Denton, Thomas S. Dawson, Charles Schimpeler, Thomas B. Bullitt and F. J. Miller, Appellees.

No. 7354.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Jan. 7, 1938.

For opinion below, see 21 F.Supp. 897.

Elliot Lee Maddox and Andrew M. Sea, Jr., both of Louisville, Ky., for appellants.

H. M. Denton and Thomas S. Dawson, both of Louisville, Ky., for appellees.

Before MOORMAN and HICKS, Circuit Judges, and SWINFORD, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The order appealed from herein is affirmed.
#### Robert Earl BURRELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 45386.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 22, 1972.

Larry W. Murphree, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., and Mike G. McCollum, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, and Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ONION, Presiding Judge.

The conviction was for burglary with intent to commit theft with the punishment being assessed at two and one-half years by the jury.

In his sole ground of error, appellant contends the court erred in admitting into evidence State’s Exhibit No. One — a rough draft depicting the area of the alleged burglary.

On direct examination, Officer Palmer identified the exhibit as a “rough” draft, meaning that it was not drawn to scale, but that it accurately depicted the scene of the burglary and was “in proportion.” When the State offered the exhibit, the appellant’s counsel took the witness on voir dire and then objected. The court then determined from the witness that the exhibit accurately depicted the location that he had been testifying about and overruled the objection.

In Jackson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 879, 880 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), this court wrote:

> “We fail to understand why the court initially refused to admit these drawings into evidence. Diagrams are admissible to explain and clarify a witness’ testimony. Holding v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 460 S.W.2d 133. These drawings were not offered as exact scale replicas of the scene but were offered merely to show the layout of the apartment and make the officer’s testimony clearer. Any inaccuracy in the scale of the drawings would not, under the circumstances, affect their admissibility. Chapin v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 390, 320 S.W.2d 341. . . .”

It is clear that the trial court did not err in admitting State’s Exhibit No. One.

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 10.3

                          LIGHT MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.

Starz Investments Ltd.
C/o 13/F Silver Fortune Plaza                         3 April 2002
1 Wellington Street
Central
Hong Kong


RE:   ADDENDUM (2) TO REG S STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT DATED 15 FEBRUARY 2002
                      -----------------------------------------------------

Gentlemen:

This Addendum sets forth the removal of the "Floor Price" as defined in section
1.1.2 of the Reg S Stock Purchase Agreement (the Agreement) dated February 15,
2002 between Light Management Group (The Company), the registered address of
which is Suite 301, 3060 Mainway, Burlington Ontario, L7M 1A3 Canada and Starz
Investments Limited a Belize corporation (the Purchaser), the registered address
of which is 60 Market Square, PO Box 364, Belize City, Belize whereby the
Company may alter or remove the Floor Price as defined in the Agreement,
provided the Company acts in accordance with the terms and conditions provided
in the Agreement.

NOW, THEREFORE, the Company is removing the Floor Price from the Agreement for
the first 10,000,000 shares only and all other terms and conditions of the
Agreement will remain in full force and effect.

          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company hereto has executed this Addendum (2)
          to the Stock Purchase Agreement dated 15 February 2002.

          LIGHT MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.


    /s/ Barrington L. Simon                                    4/15/02
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          BARRINGTON L. SIMON (SIGNATURE)                       DATE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Philip A. Brimmer

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02759-PAB-KMT

ROCKY MOUNTAIN TRACKING, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD D. FRY, an Individual,

MARK PHILLIPS, an Individual, and

ROBERT PHILLIPS, an Individual,

Defendants.

_____________________________________________________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

_____________________________________________________________________

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss With

Prejudice [Docket No. 27]. The Court has reviewed the pleading and is fully advised in

the premises. It is

ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice [Docket No. 27] is

GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a), this matter, and all claims

asserted therein, is dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own attorneys’

fees and costs. 

DATED January 30, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

 s/Philip A. Brimmer 

PHILIP A. BRIMMER

United States District Judge
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAUL PELAYO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

B. GREER; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-15223 

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-04135-RS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Richard Seeborg, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 2, 2023**

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Saul Pelayo appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court's 

summary judgment de novo. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 

2004). We affirm. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 2 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Pelayo’s retaliation claims fail as the Appellees’ actions in disciplining Pelayo 

for perceived sexual misconduct reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal. 

See Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that “reducing 

sexual harassment of prison employees is a legitimate penological interest”). 

Moreover, Pelayo failed to establish that the Appellees acted out of retaliation. See 

Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have repeatedly held that 

mere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient.”).

Pelayo’s due process claims also fail. Even if there was any procedural error 

in Pelayo’s first disciplinary hearing, the prison corrected this error by vacating that 

hearing and holding a second disciplinary hearing. See Frank v. Schultz, 808 F.3d 

762, 764 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a prisoner has no due process claim where 

“any procedural error was corrected through the administrative appeal process”). 

Nor was Pelayo denied due process when certain witnesses and questions were 

excluded during the second disciplinary hearing, as Pelayo has not established how 

the excluded witnesses and questions were relevant. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 

U.S. 308, 321 (1976) (holding that prison disciplinary officers can exclude irrelevant 

evidence and witnesses). Last, Pelayo was not denied due process during the 

investigation of his filed grievances, as there is no due process right to “a specific 

prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). 

AFFIRMED.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7168

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus SERGIO ANTONIO BLANCO, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CR-90-144) Submitted: November 19, 1998 Decided: December 3, 1998 Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Sergio Antonio Blanco, Appellant Pro Se. Laura Ann Colombell, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Sergio Antonio Blanco appeals the district court’s order denying his request for a downward departure. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Blanco , No. CR-90-144 (E.D. Va. June 11, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 5, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00440

- CV

Joe and Janie GOMEZ,

Appellant s

v.

Thomas L. DASHIELL,

A ppellee

From the County Court at Law, Kendall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15

- 241

- CCL

Honorable Bill R. Palmer, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The Appellant ’ s Emergency Stay of Writ of Possession is DENIED.

____ _____________________________ Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 5th day of August, 2015

.

_____ ______________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Gregory E. A. Morrison, President and Chief Executive Officer of Platinum
Underwriters Holdings, Ltd., hereby certify to the best of my knowledge and
belief that this Annual Report on Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78m(a) or 78o(d)) and that the information contained in this Annual Report on
Form 10-K fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of Platinum Underwriters Holdings, Ltd.

Date: March 15, 2005                       /s/  GREGORY E. A. MORRISON
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Gregory E. A. Morrison
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer

                                        1
#### John BROWN, Jr., Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 22, 1971.

Ralph H. Ruch, Jr., Louisville, for appellant.

John B. Breckinridge, Atty. Gen., Douglas Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

OSBORNE, Judge.

This is a belated appeal granted the appellant, John Brown, Jr., from a conviction for armed robbery and a sentence to life imprisonment. This is the second appeal of this conviction. See Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 357 S.W.2d 681 (1961). Sentence was entered on the second trial, the one now before us, on January 14, 1963.

Appellant’s only alleged ground of error is that the Commonwealth was erroneously *261permitted by the court to introduce evidence of felonies previously committed by him, contrary to our rule stated in Cowan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 407 S.W.2d 695, and modified by Cotton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 454 S.W.2d 698. Appellant was convicted in 1963. Cowan was decided by this court in 1966 and Cotton in 1970. These cases are not retroactive. The court and Commonwealth properly followed the procedure in effect at the time the appellant was convicted and since the Cowan case and the Cotton case are not retroactive the judgment will have to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

All concur.
```

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 200 (Wednesday, October 15, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 61186]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-24459]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 6397]

Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``Raphael to Renoir: Drawings From the Collection of 
Jean Bonna''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236 
of October 19, 1999, as amended, and Delegation of Authority No. 257 of 
April 15, 2003 [68 FR 19875], I hereby determine that the objects to be 
included in the exhibition ``Raphael to Renoir: Drawings from the 
Collection of Jean Bonna,'' imported from abroad for temporary 
exhibition within the United States, are of cultural significance. The 
objects are imported pursuant to loan agreements with the foreign 
owners or custodians. I also determine that the exhibition or display 
of the exhibit objects at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, NY, 
from on or about January 21, 2009, until on or about April 26, 2009, 
and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, 
is in the national interest. Public Notice of these Determinations is 
ordered to be published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the exhibit objects, contact Carol B. Epstein, Attorney-
Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State 
(telephone: 202/453-8048). The address is U.S. Department of State, SA-
44, 301 4th Street, SW., Room 700, Washington, DC 20547-0001.

    Dated: October 7, 2008.
C. Miller Crouch,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, Department of State.
[FR Doc. E8-24459 Filed 10-14-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```
Order entered May 19, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01061-CR

KEVIN WAYNE DICKSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F12-57075-K

ORDER

The Court ORDERS the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine why appellant’s 

brief has not been filed. In this regard, the trial court shall make appropriate findings and 

recommendations and determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal, whether 

appellant is indigent, or if not indigent, whether retained counsel has abandoned the appeal. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b). If the trial court cannot obtain appellant’s presence at the hearing, the 

trial court shall conduct the hearing in appellant’s absence. See Meza v. State, 742 S.W.2d 708 

(Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (per curiam). If appellant is indigent, the trial court is 

ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation, which 

may include appointment of new counsel.
We ORDER the trial court to transmit a record of the proceedings, which shall include 

written findings and recommendations, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this 

order.

This appeal is ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with the above order. The 

appeal shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are 

received, whichever is earlier.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

Certification Pursuant

To 18 U.S.C. 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cyanotech Corporation (the“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed withthe Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Jeffrey H. Sakamoto, Vice President – Finance and Administration ofthe Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1)             The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act (15U.S.C. 78m or 78o (d)); and

 

2)             The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material aspects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date:  | August 13, 2004 |   |   | /s/ Jeffrey H. Sakamoto   |   |
|--------|----------------------|--------|--------|---------------------------|--------|
|   |                 |   |   | Jeffrey H. Sakamoto       |
|   |                 |   |   | *Chief Financial Officer* |

 

1

----
Exhibit 21.1



SUBSIDIARIES OF MTC TECHNOLOGIES, INC.



|                                |  |                       
|------------------------------- |  | ----------------------
|Subsidiary                      |  | State of Incorporation
|                                |  |                       
|MTC Technologies, Inc.          |  | Ohio                  
|AMCOMP Corporation              |  | California            
|International Consultants, Inc. |  | Ohio                  
|Vitronics Inc.                  |  | New Jersey            
|Command Technologies, Inc.      |  | Virginia              
|OnBoard Software, Inc.          |  | Texas                 
|Manufacturing Technology, Inc.  |  | Florida               
|MTC Guam, LLC                   |  | Guam