alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Converted by EDGARwiz


Exhibit 4.14
















CONSENT OF CIRCE MALO-LALANDE







Reference is made to the Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended February 28, 2014 (the “Annual Report”) of Virginia Mines Inc. (the “Company”), filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.




I, Circe Malo-Lalande, staff member of Anglo American Exploration (Canada) Ltd., participated in the preparation of the technical report entitled “Technical Report and Recommendations, 2013 Exploration Program, Payne Bay Property, Québec, Anglo American Exploration (Canada) Ltd. – Virginia Mines Inc.” completed in March 2014 (the “Report”), concerning mineralized material in the Payne Bay property for the Company. Portions of the Report are summarized under headings “Item III – Description of the Business – 3.5.4 Geological Setting; 3.5.5 Exploration and Drilling; and 3.5.6 Mineralization” in the Annual Information Form of the Company for the year ended February 28, 2014 (included as Exhibit 1 of the Annual Report, which Exhibit is incorporated by reference herein).




I hereby consent to the inclusion of the foregoing written disclosure and to the references to such disclosure and to my name under the foregoing heading and to all other references to such disclosure and to my name included or incorporated by reference in the Annual Report.







Very truly yours,














				
	 
	/S/

Circé Malo-Lalande

	 
	 

	 
	Name:

Circé Malo-Lalande, M.Sc., Eng.

	 
	 












May 15, 2014
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-85,288-01

IN RE MATTHEW CARLYLE WHITE, Relator

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CAUSE NO. 1267438-A IN THE 230TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Relator has filed a motion for leave to file an application for a writ of mandamus pursuant

to the original jurisdiction of this Court. In it, he contends that he filed an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in the 230th District Court of Harris County, that more than 35 days have elapsed, and

that the application has not yet been forwarded to this Court. Relator contends that the district court

entered an order designating issues on December 2, 2014.

Respondent, the Judge of the 230th District Court of Harris County, shall file a response with

this Court by having the District Clerk submit the record on such habeas corpus application. In the

alternative, Respondent may resolve the issues set out in the order designating issues and then have

the District Clerk submit the record on such application. In either case, Respondent’s answer shall
2

be submitted within 30 days of the date of this order. This application for leave to file a writ of

mandamus will be held in abeyance until Respondent has submitted his response.

Filed: July 27, 2016

Do not publish
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-11-00597-CV

EX PARTE Robert ARREDONDO

Original Habeas Corpus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 24, 2011

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DENIED

On August 16, 2011, relator filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, complaining 

Sheriff Amadeo Ortiz has failed to give him “good time” credit during his 180 day confinement 

after being held in contempt for failure to pay child support. However, a relator is not entitled to 

habeas corpus relief unless he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law, or if we 

conclude the judgment ordering him confined is void. See In re Alexander, 243 S.W.3d 822, 824 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding). Relator has failed to meet his burden to show

 1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2000-EM5-04545, in the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, 

Texas, the Honorable Janet Littlejohn presiding. 
04-11-00597-CV

- 2 -

he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is 

DENIED. 

PER CURIAM
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Honorable R. Brooke Jackson

Civil Action No. 11-CV-02680-RBJ

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MERCK & CO., INC, and MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP.,

Defendants.

ORDER TO SET SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. The parties are ordered to set an initial 

scheduling conference in this Court (with Judge Jackson) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and 

D.C.COLO.LCivR 16.1 no later than 45 days after all responsive pleadings are filed. Each 

party’s lead trial counsel shall attend the conference. The conference shall be held in Courtroom 

A-702, Alfred A. Arraj U.S. Courthouse, 901 19th Street, Denver, Colorado. The parties are 

directed to jointly contact Mary DeRosa by telephone at (303) 844-4694 or by email at 

Jackson_Chambers@cod.uscourts.gov to obtain a scheduling conference date. 

A meeting for the purposes of attempting to agree on a scheduling order and satisfying 

the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) should be held no later than 21 days before the 

proposed scheduling order is tendered. The proposed scheduling order, which should be 

prepared as described in Appendix F to the local rules, should be tendered no later than five days 

before the scheduling conference. The proposed scheduling order should set forth the parties’

agreement or their respective positions on the matters set forth in Appendix F. A copy of 

instructions for the preparation of a scheduling order and a form scheduling order can be 

downloaded from the Court’s website (http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Forms.aspx).

DATED this 18th day of October, 2011.

BY THE COURT: 

___________________________________

R. Brooke Jackson

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02680-RBJ-KLM Document 3 Filed 10/18/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
EXHIBIT
32.1







CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report of
Central Jersey Bancorp (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December
31, 2008 (the “Report”), I, James S. Vaccaro, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:




(1)
            the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of §13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78m or 78o(d),
      and,




(2)
            the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.







Dated:
      March 13, 2009
            /s/ James S. VaccaroJames
      S. VaccaroPresident
      and Chief Executive
Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1820 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1820

 To better provide for compensation for certain persons injured in the 
     course of employment at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory in 
                              California.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 19, 2007

 Mrs. Feinstein (for herself and Mrs. Boxer) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, 
                     Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To better provide for compensation for certain persons injured in the 
     course of employment at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory in 
                              California.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF MEMBER OF SPECIAL EXPOSURE COHORT.

    (a) In General.--Section 3621(14) of the Energy Employees 
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 
7384l(14)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph:
                    ``(D) The employee was so employed for a number of 
                work days aggregating at least 250 work days before 
                January 1, 2006, by the Department of Energy or a 
                Department of Energy contractor or subcontractor at the 
                Santa Susana Field Laboratory in California.''.
    (b) Reapplication.--A claim that an individual qualifies, by reason 
of section 3621(14)(D) of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 
Compensation Program Act of 2000 (as added by subsection (a) of this 
Act), for compensation or benefits under such Act shall be considered 
for compensation or benefits notwithstanding any denial of any other 
claim for compensation with respect to such individual.
                                 <all>
```
#### Spiese, Appellant, *v.*Shee.

*Practice, Supreme Court*— Judgment *on warrant, of*attorney— *Order to strike off*— Failure *of lower court to state*reasons— *Record remitted.*

When a judgment confessed by virtue of a warrant of attorney is opened or stricken ofi, the court’s reasons for disturbing it must appear with the record when an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court; otherwise the record will be remitted.

Submitted Jan. 14, 1915.

Appeal, No. 328, Jan. T.,

1914, by plaintiff, from order of C. P. No. 1, Philadelphia Co., March T., 1914, No. 1805, striking off judgment in case of Franklin Spiese v. Rhoads Shee and Harry C. Dunlap and Henry C. Dunlap.

Before Brown, C. J., Mestrezat, Stewart, Moschzisker and Frazer, JJ.

Remitted.

Rule to strike off judgment confessed by virtue of a warrant of attorney. Before Patterson, J.

The lower court made the rule absolute. Plaintiff appealed.

*Error assigned,*among others, was in making absolute the rule to strike off the judgment.

*Henry J. Scott,*for appellant.

*Henry A. Hoefler, George S. Russel*and *George deB. Myers,*for appellee.

*130February 8, 1915:

Per Curiam,

This appeal is from an order striking off a judgment entered on a warrant of attorney. No opinion was filed by the court below in making the order, and, when the case was called for argument here, it was submitted on the paper books. If we had known, when leave was asked to so submit it, that the court below had given no reason for its action, such leave would not have been granted, but an order would have been promptly made remitting the record, that there might be attached to and returned with it the court’s reason or reasons for striking off the judgment. Except when we assume original jurisdiction we do not exercise it. In the present case we are asked to perform a duty which rested, in the first instance, on the court below, and in remitting the record that such duty may be performed by that court, we do so under what may now be regarded as a settled rule, that whenever a judgment entered on a warrant of attorney is opened or stricken off, the court’s reasons for disturbing it must appear with the record, if an appeal be taken to this court:

Record remitted, with leave to either side to move to advance the hearing of the appeal upon the return of the record with an opinion from the court below stating its reasons for striking off the judgment.
#### Dennis Ray ARMOUR, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 18, 1973.

Dennis Ray Armour, pro se.

Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., Patrick B. Kimberlin, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

CATINNA, Commissioner.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying an evidentiary hearing and refusing to vacate a judgment of conviction under RCr 11.42.

On September 12, 1972, Dennis Armour appeared with counsel in open court and by agreement was permitted to enter a guilty plea to the offense of voluntary manslaughter, although he had been indicted for murder.

On December 31, 1971, Armour, while in a drunken rage, beat a sixteen-month-old child to death. After his arrest he was confined in Central State Hospital for psychiatric evaluation. The medical report from the hospital reads in part as follows:

> “Disposition and Condition on Discharge : Mr. Armour suffered from mental disease or defect at the time of his alleged offense. He did not understand and was unable to understand that he was violating the law. His psychotic manifestation is now in remission as well as his depression. He is now competent to stand trial. He knows the consequences and responsibility of his actions and can aid in his defense.”

The court conducted a rather extensive and comprehensive examination of Armour relative to the voluntariness of his plea. Armour, in his 11.42 proceeding, seeks to have the judgment of conviction set aside because his plea of guilty was not voluntary in that he was not mentally capable of entering such a plea at the time. He also claims that he had ineffective representation by counsel.

*181The record entirely refutes every claim advanced by Armour. As stated above, the trial court carefully examined him at the time of the entry of his plea, and at that time Armour stated to' the court that he was fully aware of the consequences of the plea, that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty, and that he was fully satisfied with the representation that he had received from appointed counsel as well as counsel retained by his mother.

Armour was not entitled to an evidenti-ary hearing upon his motion. Bruner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 138 (1970); Quarles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 456 S.W.2d 693 (1970); Cox v. Commonwealth, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 76 (1971). Cf. West v. Commonwealth, Ky., 494 S.W.2d 749, decided May 4, 1973.

The judgment is affirmed.

PALMORE, C. J., and MILLIKEN, OSBORNE, REED, STEINFELD and STEPHENSON, JJ., sitting.

All concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7567

BRANDON WALLACE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

LEVERN COHEN, individual and official capacity, Warden of 

Ridgeland Correctional Inst; JOHN OZMINT, individual and 

official capacity, Director of SCDC,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (8:10-cv-02856-CMC)

Submitted: March 29, 2012 Decided: April 3, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brandon Wallace, Appellant Pro Se. William Henry Davidson, II, 

Daniel C. Plyler, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, PA, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Brandon Wallace appeals the district court’s order 

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying 

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. We have 

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Wallace 

v. Cohen, No. 8:10-cv-02856-CMC (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2011). We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-1718

SARADINDU MAHAPATRA; ALOK KUMAR,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

R. BRADBURN, Baltimore County Police; G.

DARRELL RUSSELL, Baltimore County District

Court Judge,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson E. Legg, District Judge. (CA-96-

1168-L)

Submitted: November 7, 1996 Decided: November 18, 1996

Before RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Saradindu Mahapatra, Alok Kumar, Appellants Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellants appeal the district court's order denying relief on

their claims, which were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and

the Geneva Convention on Human Rights. We have reviewed the record

and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly we affirm on the reasoning of the district court and deny

Appellants' motion for a jury trial. Mahapatra v. Bradburn, No. CA96-1168-L (D. Md. May 1, 1996). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of CyberOptics Corporation  (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Kathleen P. Iverson, Chief Executive Officer, and Jeffrey A. Bertelsen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.
        The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.
        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/   Kathleen P. IversonKathleen P. IversonChief Executive OfficerMay 8, 2008




/s/   Jeffrey A. BertelsenJeffrey A. BertelsenChief Financial OfficerMay 8, 2008








---
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, James Briscoe, President and Chief Executive Officer of Liberty Star Gold Corp., certify that:

1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB/A of Liberty Star Gold Corp.;

2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4.  The company's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have: 

(a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

(b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the company's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

(c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the company's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by this annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company's internal control over financial reporting; and 

5.  The company's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company's auditors and the audit committee of the company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

(a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the company's internal control over financial reporting. 

Date: January 12, 2006

 

/s/ James Briscoe

James Briscoe

President and Chief Executive Officer

(Principal Executive Officer)
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1



                   CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation of our
report incorporated by reference in this Form 10-K, into the Company's
previously filed Registration Statements File Nos. 333-84097 and 333-25646.

                                   ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Fayetteville, Arkansas
   April 28, 2000

                                       1
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT



TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the periodic report of Rancon Realty Fund V (the
Partnership) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Daniel L. Stephenson, General Partner of the Partnership, hereby certify as of the date hereof,
solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that I perform the functions of chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the Partnership, and that to the best of my knowledge:



(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership at the dates and for the periods indicated.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form with the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Partnership and will be retained by the
Partnership and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



This Certification has not been, and shall not be deemed, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission



|                   |  |                                      
|------------------ |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: May 16, 2005 |  | /s/ Daniel L. Stephenson             
|                   |  | Daniel L. Stephenson, General Partner
|                   |  | Rancon Realty Fund V