In addition to the parties’ c ross-motions for summary judgme nt, the following additional 1 pa pe rs have be e n s ub mitte d b y the pa rt ie s in c on jun c tio n w iththe se mot ion s: ( 1) the Pla int if fs ’ Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary J udg ment (“Pls.’ Mem.”) , (2) the Plaintiffs’ Stateme nt of Mater ial Fa cts Not in Dispute in Support of Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt ( “ Pls. ’ S tmt .” ), (3 ) t he De fe nd ants ’ O pp os iti on to P la int if

fs ’ Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt ( “ De fs .’ Op p’ n” ), (4 ) t he De fe nd ants ’ R e sp on se to P la int if fs ’ State me nt o f M ate ri a l F a c ts ( “ De fs .’ Re sp .” ), (5 ) t he Pla int if

fs ’ R e ply in R e sp on se to Def endants’ O pposition t o Plaintiffs’ Cross Motion for Summ ary J udg ment (“Pls.’ Reply”), ( 6) the Def endants’ Me morandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary J udg ment (“D efs.’ Mem.”), ( 7) the De fenda nts’ Statement of Mater ial Fa cts Not in Genuine Dispute (“D efs.’ Stmt .”), ( 8) the Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defe ndants’ Motion for Summary Judg me nt ( “ Pls. ’ O pp ’n ” ), (9 ) t he Pla int if

fs ’ S up ple me nta l State me nt o f M ate ri a l F a c ts N ot i n Dispute in Support of Motion for Summary J udg ment (“Pls.’ Supp. Stm t.”), a nd (10) the Def endants’ Re ply

to Plainti ffs’ O pposition t o Def endants’ Motion for

Summary

J udg ment (“D efs.’ Reply ”). UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

_______________________________________ RI CHARD GONZ AL EZ and ) RAC HE LGO NZA L E Z, ) ) Pla int if fs , ) ) v . ) Ci v il A c ti o nN o . 0 7
- 0 5 9 3 ( RB W) ) DEPARTMENT OF L AB OR, et al., ) ) De fe nd ants . ) _______________________________________) Mem orandum Opini on This matter is befor e the Court on the pa rties’ c ross-motions for summary judgme nt (“Pls.’ Mot.” and “ Def

s.’ Mot.,” re spectively

) pursua nt to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 1 The plaintiffs br ing this lawsuit ag ainst the Depa rtment of L abor ( “L abor” ) and its Secr etar y seekingdecla

ratory and injunctive re lief. Afte r ca ref ul reviewof the seve ral filing s submitt ed by the par ties, the Court conclude s that the Depa rtment of L abor pr operly

conclude d that the plaintiffs rec eived a

joint award to whic h the re g ulatory framework w ithin the Fede ral Employ ees-2-

Com pe ns atio n A c t ( “ F ECA ” ), 5 U .S. C. § § 8 10 1 ( 20 06 ), a pp lie s, but th at th is d e te rm inatio n d id
no t c re ate a

de bt o bli g atio n p ri or

to t he re so lut ion

of thi s la ws uit . T he re fo re , th e de fe nd ants ’ motion for summary

judgme nt is gra

nted with reg ard to Mrs. Gonzalez’s F ECA claim, but denied with re g ard to the de bt collection claim under the Fe dera l Debt Collection Procedur es Ac t (“F DCPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3308 (2006). F urthermor e, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgme nt is denied as to the F ECA claim. I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound The followingfac ts are undisputed by the par ties. On J une 11, 1997, Rac hel Gonzalez was injured in a

n elevator while per formingher duties at the United States Embassy in Mex ico City , Mexi co. Pls.’ Stmt . ¶ 1; Def s.’ Stmt. ¶ 1. As a result of he r injuries, L abor grante d worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits to Mrs. Gonzalez under the FE CA. Pls.’ S tmt. ¶ 4; Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 2. Mrs. Gonzalez was still receivingthese be nefits when this ca se wa s filed. Pls.’ Stm t. ¶ 4; Def s.’ Stmt. ¶ 4. The leg al history

of this case dates ba ck to Marc h 21, 2000, when Mrs. G onzalez and her husband, Richar d Gonzalez, filed a third-pa rty lawsuit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbi a ag ainst ABM Industries, Incorpor ated ( “AB M Industries”), A mtech Elevator Service s (“A mtech”) , and Interna cional de E levador es S.A., de C.V. (“ International”), the c ompanies that service d the elevator that malfunctioned, c ausingMrs. Gonzalez to sust ain multiple injuries. Pls.’ St mt. ¶¶ 1-2, 5; De fs.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 5; Defs.’ Mem., Exhi bit (“Ex.”) B ( Superior Court Complaint) ¶¶ 7-8, 10-11, 15- 16. In the Superior Court lawsuit, Mrs. Gonzalez soug ht damag es for he r injuries, and Mr . Gonzalez sought dama g es for loss of consortium. Pls.’ S tmt. ¶ 5; Defs.’ Stmt . ¶ 5.5 U .S. C. § 81 32 state s, in p e rt ine nt p a rt : 2 I f a n in jur y or de ath f or wh ic h c omp e ns atio n is pa y a ble un de r th is sub c ha

pte r i s (continued...) -3- On September

25, 2002, the Superior Court dismissed the claims ag ainst International, a Mexi can c ompany , for lac k of per sonal jurisdiction. Pl s.’ Stmt. ¶ 8; Defs.’ Mem., Ex. C (S up e ri or Court Me mor and

um a nd Or de r) ; se e a lso Go nza le z v. Inte rn a c ion a l de El e va do re s, S.A ., 89 1 A .2 d 2 27 , 2 41 (D .C. 20 06 ) ( a ff ir min gthe dis mis sa l) . T he Go nza le zes the n e ng a g e d in settlement neg otiations with ABM Industries and Amtec h, which re sulted in a settlement ag ree ment beingenter ed into on May 8, 2003. Pls.’ St mt. ¶ 12; Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 6; Defs.’ Mem., Ex . D (Settlement Ag ree ment). Pursuant to the settlement agree ment, the Gonzalezes dismissed all of their c laims ag ainst ABM Industries and Amtec h, in consideration for $625,000. Pls.’ Stmt . ¶ 12; Def

s.’ Stmt. ¶ 6. Despite this joi nt dismi ssal, the Gonzalezes direc ted that the entire settlement awa

rd be ma de to Mr. Gonzalez. Pls.’ St mt. ¶¶ 12-13; De fs.’ Mem., Ex. D (Settlement Ag ree ment) at 10, ¶ 13. Spec ifically , Paragraph 13 of the settlement agree ment state s: De fe nd ants un de rs tand that Pla int if

fs a s b e tw e e n th e mse lve s a n d i n c on su ltatio n w ith their attorney s have a llocated the c onsideration paid unde r this Ag ree ment to Richard Gonzalez whose claims will be dismissed in the i r en t i re t y with prejudice . Rache l Gonzalez shall continue to prosecute her claim for damag es onl y ag ainst I DESA . . . . This decision is entir ely the re sponsibili ty

of Plaintiffs and their attorney s and shall not otherwise a ffe ct their promises c ontained her ein. Def s.’ Mem., Ex. D (Settlement Ag ree ment), ¶ 13. Followingthe settlement agree ment, L abor c ontacted the Gonzalezes’ counse l and explained that under 5 U.S.C. § 8132 (2006), Mrs. G onzalez was require d to remit a spec ified
am o un to f

th e s e t t l e m e n tf

un d s t o L a

b o r . P l s . ’ S t m t . ¶

¶ 1 4
- 1 9 ; D e f

s . M e m . , E xs . J- 2(...continued) 2 cause d under c ircumstance s cre ating a lega l liability in a per son other than the United States to pay

damag es, and a

benef iciary enti t l ed to compensation from the United States for that injury

or death rec eives money

or other proper

ty in satisfaction of that l i a b i l i ty a s th e r e s u l to f

s u i to r s e t t l e m e n tb y h i mo r i nh i s b e h a l f

, th e b e n e f

i c i ar y, aft er ded uc tin gthe re fr om t he c os ts o f s uit

and a re a so na ble atto rn e y ' s f

e e , s ha ll ref und to the United States the amount of c ompensation paid by the United States and c re dit any surp lus on

futur e pa y me nts of c omp e ns atio n p ay a

ble to him fo r the same i n j ur y.

-4- M. Despite L abor’ s position, t he Gonzalezes cla imed that the languag e of Par ag raph 13 in the settlement ag ree ment provided that the se ttlement funds would be paid e x clusively to Mr. Gonzalez, precludingany reimburse ment obligations by Mrs. Gonzalez. Pl s.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 14-15; Def s.’ Mem., Exs. J -M. Alternatively , L abor c laimed that the settlement a g ree ment satisfied both of the Gonzalezes’ c laims, thereby entitling them to re tain only a portion of the a

war d. Pls.’ Stmt . ¶ 19; Def

s.’ Mem., Ex. M. To resolve the matter , Mrs. Gonzalez requeste d a for mal deter mination by

the Off ice of Workers’ Compensation Prog ram (“ OWCP or Workers’ Comp. Prog ram” ), an a dminist rative body within L abor, c oncer

ning how much she wa s obligated to pay L abor f rom the funds re ceive d pursuant to the settlement a g ree ment and for a dete rmination of what amount of the awa

rd wa s attributable to Mr. Gonzalez’s lose of c onsortium claim. Pls .’ Stmt . ¶ 20; Def

s.’ Stmt. ¶ 8; Defs.’ Mem., Ex. L
. On J anuar

y 3, 2005, the Workers’ Comp. Prog ram de termined that the e ntire amount of the settlement funds ha d been jointly awa rded to the G onzalezes. Pl s.’ Stmt. ¶ 21; Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 8; Defs.’ Mot., Ex . Q (F ormal De cision). Pursuant to the FE CA regulations that structure the allocation of joint third-par ty settlements, the Workers’ Comp. Prog ram limited Mr. Gonzalez’s
rec overy from the se ttlement ag ree ment to $156,250, which re prese nted twenty -five pe rce nt ofL abor a lso asserts that Mrs. Gonzalez owes a ten per cent de bt to the United States on 3 the value of

FECA be nefits she re ceive d pursuant to the F DCPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3308, and asks the Court to enter

a rulingto that effe ct. Def s.’ Mem. at 19. -5- the total settlement awa

rd. Pls.’ Stm t. ¶ 21; Defs.’ Stmt . ¶ 8; Def s.’ Mot., Ex . Q (F ormal De c isi on ). Mr s. Go nza le z ap pe a le d th e Wor ke rs ’ C omp . Pr og ra

m’ s d e c isi on

to t he Em plo y e e s’ Compensation Appeals B oard ( “Appe als Boa rd”) , which af

firmed the Worke rs’ Comp. Prog ram deter mination. Pl s.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 24-25; Defs.’ Stmt . ¶ 10. The G onzalezes then challeng ed the Ap pe a ls’ B oa

rd ’s de c isi on

wi th t he fi lin gof

thi s la ws uit
. Th e de fe nd ants ans we re d th e pla int if fs ’ complaint and filed a

counter -cla im seekinga dec laration that Mrs. Gonzalez i s liable to the United States for the sum of $152,091.16, plus interest, which re prese nts the total amount of FECA be nefits Mrs. Gonzalez had re ceive d at the time of filingof this lawsuit. Def s.’ Mem. at 3 19. II. Stand ard of Review Rul e 56 pr ov ide s th at summa ry jud g me nt “ sh a ll b e re nd e re d f or thw ithif the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to i nte rr og ator ie s, and a dmi ssi on s o n f

ile , to g e the r w iththe a ff

ida vit s, if
any , s ho w that th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and that th e mov ingpa

rt y is
e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a

matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ). A m ate ri a l f a c t is on e that is
c a pa ble of a ff e c tin gthe outc ome of

the lit ig atio n. An de rs on

v. L ibe rt y L ob by , Inc ., 47 7 U .S. 242, 248 (1986). A g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts if “a re asonable jury could re turn a
ve rd ic t f or the no nmo vin gpa

rt y .” I d. Th e pa

rt y mov ingfo r s umm ary

jud g me nt m ay

no t r e ly solely on conclusory

alleg ations but must s et forth f acts that a re sig nificantly

probative. I d. at 24 9- 50 . “ Cr e dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns , th e we ig hin gof the e vid e nc e , a

nd the dr awi ngof

le g iti mate infere nces f

rom the fa cts are jury

functions, not those of a judg e . . . .” I d. at 255. Thus, when-6-

c on sid e ri nga

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, a

c ourt mus t “ vie w the e vid e nc e in t he light m os t favor able to the nonmovingparty and dra w all re asonable influence s in [ that party ’s] favor.” Galvin v. Eli L illy

& Co., 488 F .3d 1026, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (inter nal quotation and citation omitted). Neve rtheless, “ [t ]he mere e x istence of a scintilla of evide nce in support of the [nonmov ingpa

rt y ’s ] pos iti on

wi ll b e ins uf

fi c ie nt; the re mus t be e vid e nc e on wh ic h th e jur

y c ou ld
rea sonably

find for the plaintiff.” Ande rson, 477 U.S. at 252. III. Discussion The F eder al Employ ees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8152 (2006), provide s
c omp e ns ator

y be ne fi ts t o f

e de ra l e mpl oye e s w ho are inj ur e d in the c ours e of

pe rf or min gthe ir of fi c ia l dutie s. 5 U .S. C. § 81 02 . T he Se c re tary of L a bo r ( “ Se c re tary” ) h a s th e a uth or ity to “dec ide all questions arisingunder [the FE CA],” 5 U.S.C . § 8145, and to promulg ate r egulations to administer and enf

orce the FE CA prog ram, 5 U.S.C. § 8149. “[T] o minimi ze the cost of the F ECA prog ram to the F eder al Gover nment,” United States v. L orenzetti, 467 U.S. 167, 177 (1984), the Sec reta ry may require employ ees who wer e injured by third parties to pursue persona l injury claims ag ainst those third parties. 5 U.S.C. § 8131. Howeve r, re g ardle ss of whethe r the Sec reta ry require s the filing of

a lawsuit, a F ECA benef iciary who re ceive s compensation throug h a third-pa rty lawsuit must reimburse L abor f or fe dera l funds alre ady paid to the bene ficiar

y as compe nsation for a

n injury . 5 U.S.C. § 8132. I f that compensation ex cee ds the cost of the f eder al funds alr eady

paid to the employ ee, the employ ee must provide a cr edit for f uture F ECA expenses, except that a minimum of one-fifth of the net
awa rd plu s r e a so na

ble atto rn e y ’s fe e s ma

y be re ta ine d b y

the be ne fi c iary . I d. I f t

he thi rd -p art

y claim re sults in a joint settlement that does not allocate the aw ard a mong se vera l plaintiffs, the-7-

Wor ke rs ’ C omp . Pr og ra

m and the Se c re tary

re se rv e the ri g ht t o “ de te rm ine the a pp ro pr iate amount of the F ECA benef iciary ’s g ross rec overy .” 20 C.F.R. § 10.712(b) (2008). Al tho ug h th e F ECApr e c lud e s ju dic ia l r e vie w o f b e ne fi t de te rm inatio ns ma de by L a bo r, it does not prec lude judicial re view of r eimbursement de terminations. See 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b) (“ Th e a c tio n o f t

he Se c re tary

or his de signe e in a llo wi ngor de nyinga

[F ECA ] pay

me nt . . . is final and c onclusive for

all purposes a

nd with respec t to all questions of law and fa ct; and not subject to [judi cial] review . . . .” ); L orenzetti, 467 U.S. at 173-79 (re viewinga re imbursement decision without ref

ere nce to § 8128( b)); Gr een v. United States, 775 F.2d 964, 968-70 ( 8th Cir. 1985) (same); Ostrowski v. U.S. Dep’ t of L abor, O ffice of Workers Comp. Prog rams, 653 F .2d 22 9, 22 4- 31 (6 th C ir . 1 98 1) (s ame ). Un de r L or e nze tti , L a bo r m us t satis fy tw o r e qu ir e me nts befor e see king r eimbursement f rom a F ECA benef

iciary ’s third-par

ty rec overy . 467 U.S. at 173- 74. “The first is that the employ ee must have suffe red a n injury or death under c ircumstance s
c re atin ga le g a l li a bil ity in a thi rd pa rt y to p ay dama g e s. Th e se c on d is that th e e mpl oye e or his benef iciarie s must have re ceive d money or other pr operty

in satisfaction of that liability .” I d. A. Th e pla int if

fs a dv anc e va

ri ou s th e or ie s a s p art

of the ir ov e ra ll a rgume nt t hat Mr s. Go nza le z is n ot o bli g ate d to re imb ur se L a bo r a ny mon e y fr om t he se ttl e me nt a

wa rd . T he ir the or ie s are a s f

oll ow s: ( 1) 5 U .S. C. § 81 32 do e s n ot a pp ly to M r. Go nza le z be c a

us e he is n ot a FECA be nefic iary , (2) L abor’ s application of § 8132 to Mr. Gonzalez exceede d L abor’ s statutory authority under the FECA, ( 3) a spousa l relationship is not a basis for re quiring reimburse ment
un de r § 81 32 , ( 4) L a

bo r l a c ke d th e a

uth or ity to i nte rp re t th e te rm s o f t he se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, (5 ) r equ i ri n g M r. Go n z al ez t o re i mb urs e Lab o r w i thh i s s et t l em en taw ar d v i o l at es th e T ak i n gs-8-

Cla us e of the F if th A me ndme nt, (6 ) L a

bo r c ann ot a sse rt

its re imb ur se me nt r ig hts be c a us e it d id
no t e xer c ise its ri g ht t o inte rv e ne in t he thi rd -p art

y lia bil ity su it, (7 ) r e qu ir ingMr . G on zal e z to
re imb ur se the fe de ra l g ov e rnme nt f ro m hi s lo ss o f c on so rt ium awa rd un c on sti tut ion a lly

pr e e mpt s state law g overningthe loss of consortium claim, (8) L abor e x cee ded its statutory authority by arbitra rily deter mining that Mr. Gonzalez should rec eive only twenty -five pe rce nt of the settlement awa

rd, and ( 9) L abor e x cee ded its statutory authority by limit ing Mr s. Gonzalez’s attorney ’s fe es to what it dee med re asonable . Pls.’ Mem at 9-24. Be cause many

of these a

rguments assume that L abor imprope rly order ed Mrs. Gonzalez to reimburse L abor f

rom an a war d made solely

to Mr. Gonzalez, the Court will first address the plaintiffs’ four

th argument–that L abor a cted be y ond its authority in determiningwhether

the settlement ag ree ment was a joint award. Pls.’ Mem. at 15- 17. I f L abor ha d the authority to make this determination, and ther efor e the se ttlement ag ree ment resulted in a joint awa rd, the plaintiffs’ first, sec ond, third, fifth, and seve nth arguments, which re ly upon the conc lusion that L abor ha s inappropriately attempted to obtain re imbursement from a settlement awa

rd made exclusively

to Mr. Gonzalez, will be render ed moot. Ag a in, the pla int if

fs ’ f ourt h th e or y in s up po rt

of why the y have no ob lig atio n to re imb ur se L abor f rom the settlement funds is that L abor a cted be y ond its authority when it deter

mined that the settlement re sulted in a joint award. Pls.’ Mem. at 15-17. The plaintiffs c laim that L abor la c ke d th e a

uth or ity to i nte rp re t th e se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt b e c a us e the “ F ECAmake s n o s pe c if ic mention of ca ses of ‘joint re cover y ’ or how [L abor] should handle such sc enar ios.” Pls.’ Mem. at 15 -1 6. On

the oth e r h and , L a

bo r a sse rt s th at un de r t

he F ECAit h a s th e “ dis c re tio na ry a uth or ity to a dmi nis te r a

nd de c ide a ll q

ue sti on s a ri sin gun de r F ECA ” and

thu s it “ c or re c tly a pp lie d it s-9-

g overningregulations and proce dures” when it made its dec ision reg ardingthe Gonzalezes’ ca se. Def s.’ Mem. at 2. Thus, L abor a rgues that the plaintiffs’ asser tion that its deter

mination was beyond its authority

“is without merit.” Def

s.’ Opp’n at 5. Moreover , L abor a rgues that the settlement awa

rd re sulted in a joint award to the G onzalezes beca use “the underly

ing c ase w as br ou g ht b y

bo th [p ]la int if

fs [] an d th e se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt i nc lud e d r e le a se s o f b oth [p]la int if fs ’ rig hts relatingto Ms. Gonzalez’s workplace injury .” De fs.’ Mem. at 2. As wi th a ny jud ic ia l r e vie w o f a

n a dmi nis tr ativ e a g e nc y

de c isi on , th e Court

tur ns to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. De fense Council, I nc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in de termining whether L abor a cted within its statutory authority . Under

the two-pa

rt Chevron test, the Court
mu s tf i r s ta s k w h e th e r C o n g r e s s d i r e c t l y

a d dr e s s e d

“ th e p r e c i s e qu e s t i o nati s s u e . ” Id
. at8 4 2
. If Con g re ss h a s n ot d ir e c tly a dd re sse d “ the pr e c ise qu e sti on at is su e ,” the Court

mus t th e n a sk “whe ther the a g ency ’s answe r is based on a permissible construc tion of the statute.” I d. at 843. I f either question results in the aff irmative re sponse, then the a g ency acte d within its statutory authority . I d. at 843-44. The Court concludes that L abor a cted a ppropriate ly
. Pursuant to the FECA, the Sec reta ry has the e x press a

uthority to “dec ide all questions arisingunder [the FE CA].” 5 U.S.C . § 8145. The plaintiffs a re c orre ct that this deleg ation does
no t e xpre ssl y

a uth or ize L a

bo r t o inte rp re t ambi g uo us se ttl e me nt a g re e me nts ; ho we ve r, the statut e does expressly

allow L abor to “ decide all questions arisingunder [the FE CA].” Here , L abor interpre ted the settlement a g ree ment to determine whether a F ECA benef

iciary was re quired, pursuant to § 8132, to reimburse L abor f or her previous and f

uture F ECA pay

ments from funds
rec eived in a third- party

lawsuit. Be cause this was a “que stion[ ] arising unde r [the FECA],” L abor’ s interpre tation of the settlement agree ment was, at a minimum, “permissible.” Chevron,-10-

467 U.S. at 843. Havingconclude d that L abor ha d the authority to interpret the se ttlement ag ree ment, the Court now turns to whether L abor’ s interpre tation of the agree ment was prope r. Contract law guides the interpr etation of settlement a g ree ments. Makins v. District of Columbi a, 277 F .3d 544, 546 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Gaine s v. Cont’l Mortga g e & Inv. Corp., 865 F.2d 375, 378 ( D.C. Cir. 1989). When interpretinga contr act, the pla in lang uag e and mutual intent of the par

ties are para

mount. Mesa Air Gr oup, Inc. v. De p’t of Tra nsp., 87 F.3d 498, 503 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) ; N RM Co rp . v . H e rc ule s, Inc ., 75 8 F .2 d 6 76 , 6 81 -8 2 ( D. C. C ir . 1 98 5) . T hu s, if the terms of a

contra ct ar e unambiguous, “interpr etation of a fac ially clea r contra ct is considere d a question of law

and is for the court.” NRM Corp., 758 F.2d at 682. Ac cording ly , “whe n the parties’ intent is ‘wholly

unambig uous’ on the fa ce of the agree ment, dispositi on on a motion for summary judgme nt may

be appr opriate.” I d. (citation omitted). In this case, the pla in lang uag e of the settlement ag ree ment clea rly indicates that the parties mutually

ag ree d upon a joint awar d beingmade to the Gonzalezes. The languag e of the ag ree ment states that both Gonzalezes were dismiss ing a ll of their claims ag ainst ABM a nd Amtech in conside ration for a joint settlement awa

rd fr om these two def

endants. At lea st three aspec ts of the agree ment support this conclusion. First, the agree ment stated that it was “by and b e tw e e nRi c h ar d

F
. G o n za le z an d

Ra c h e l G o n za le z [a

n d A B M an d

A mt e c h ]. ” D e f

s . ’ M e m. , E x. D at 1. Second, A BM a

nd Amtech a g ree d to “pay Plaintiffs the total sum of Si x Hundre d and Twenty -F ive Thousand Dollar s.” De fs.’ Mem., Ex. D at 3 (empha sis added). Thir d, both Mr. and Mrs. Gonzalez rele ased a ll of their claims ag ainst ABM a nd Amtech. De fs.’ Mem. Ex. D at 4. No ne the le ss, the pla int if fs a sse rt that Pa ra g ra ph13 of the se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt r e fl e c ts a-11-

mutual ag ree ment betwee n the par ties that the funds we re be ing pa id to Mr. Gonzalez alone. Pls.’ Mem. at 7. Howeve r, by its plain langua g e, Para g raph 13 ma de cle ar that the “Plaintiffs as betwee n themselves . . . allocated the conside ration paid unde r [the] Ag ree ment” and that the decision to direc t the awa rd to Mr. Gonzalez “[was] entirely the re sponsibili ty

of the Plaintiffs and their attorney s and shall not otherwise a ffe ct their promises [t] here in.” Pls.’ Mem. at 7; Def s.’ Opp’n at 2. To conclude that Paragraph 13 limits the scope of the settlement ag ree ment and the a war d made pur suant to it to Mr. Gonz alez alone would r equire the Court to ignor e the plain languag e of the ag ree ment as a whole. This the Court cannot do. Moreove r, two additional re asons support the conc lusion that the settlement ag ree ment
was a joint award to Mr. a

nd Mrs. Gonzalez. First, Mr. Gonzalez’s loss of consortium claim was derivative of Mrs. Gonzalez’s per sonal injury claim. See Ha

rbury v. Hayden, 444 F . Supp. 2d 19, 43-44 (D.D .C. 2006) (noting that loss of consortium claims are derivatives of direc t personal injury claims); Fe irson v. District of Columbia, 362 F. Supp. 2d 244, 254 (D.D.C. 2005) ( same). I t would be illogica l to conclude that the pa rties intended f

or the e ntire settlement aw ard to be
so le ly fo r a de ri vativ e c la im, and

no t a lso fo r t

he c la im that g ave ri se to t hat c la im, wh e n b oth claims wer e dismissed as par t of the settlement agree ment, at least in the a bsence of cle ar l an g u a g e t o th e c o n tr ar

y. Second, the only

leg ally permissible interpre tation of the settlement agree ment is that the
se ttl e me nt f

un ds we re be ingpa id t o b oth Go nza le zes . T his re so lut ion is c a lle d f

or be c a us e
c on tr a c ts s ho uld

be c on str ue d b a se d o n th e pr e sumpt ion that th e pa

rt ie s inte nd e d to c on fo rm to all applicable statutes and re g ulations. See Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408 (1977). Unde r the FE CA, “[n] o court, insure r, attorne y , or other pe rson shall pay or distribute to the bene ficiar yAl tho ug h th e re c or d d oe s n ot i nd ic ate the a c tua l amou nt o f F ECAbe ne fi ts M rs . 4 Gonzalez had rec eived at the time of the settlement agree ment, the re cord doe s indicate that she beg an re ceivingFECA be nefits well bef ore the settlement ag ree ment was re ache d. See, e.g ., Pls.’ St mt. ¶ 4 (ac knowledg ing that Mrs. Gonzalez had rec eived F ECA benef its); Defs.’ Me m., Ex . D (Settlement Ag ree ment) ¶ 10 ( requiringthat the Gonzalezes hold the elevator companie s “har mless for any

amounts or liens owed to the D epar tment of L abor.” ).
-12- or his desig nee the proce eds of suc h suit or settlement without first satisfying or assuring satisfac tion of the interest of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 8132 (empha sis added). A d d i t i o n a l l y, “ a

F E C A b e n e f

i c i ar y mu s t. . . [ r ] e f

u s e t o s e t t l e o r

d i s m i s s [ a

th i r d

- p arty l i a

b i l i ty]
c a se fo r a ny amou nt l e ss t ha n th e amou

nt n e c e ssa

ry to r e pa y OWCP ’s re fu

nd a ble dis burs e me nts . . . without rece iving pe rmission from OWCP or [Secreta ry of L abor] .” 20 C.F.R. § 10.707(c ) (2008) ( emphasis adde d). Read c ollectively , these provisions pre vented the pa rties without permission of the United States, fr om settling Mrs. Gonzalez’s claim for less than the amount of her the n-existi ngFECA be nefits. Thus, the only rea sonable interpr etation of the se ttlement ag ree ment is that the parties a g ree d to settle, at a minimum, Mrs. Gonzalez’s personal injury
c la ims
. 4 Ha vin gde te rm ine d th at th e se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt c onve y e d mo ne y to b oth Go nza le zes , it is unnece ssary

to addre ss the five theor ies adva nced by the plaintiffs that er

roneously rely on the presumption that the agree ment conveyed a unilate ral a war d to Mr. Gonzalez. W hat follows then is an assessment of the plaintiffs’ six th, eig hth, and ninth arguments, which ar e indepe ndent from that presumption. Th e pla int if

fs ’ s ixth p os iti on

argue s th at 5 U .S. C. § 81 31 , whic h a llo ws L a bo r t o d ir e c t a F ECAbe ne fi c iary

to a ssi g n h e r t

hir d- pa rt y lia bil ity c la im t o L a

bo r, re qu ir e s L a

bo r t o p ur su e its litigation rig hts ag ainst third parties or de fer to the outcome of the third-par ty litigation. Pls.’-13-

Mem. at 18-20. The defe ndant, howeve r, re sponds that the FECA doe s not provide for or require int erve ntion. I t is specific ally provided in [the Act] th at th e e mp lo y e e s h a ll a s s ign [h e r ] r igh t o f a c ti o n to th e U n it e d St ate s or the Gover nment shall require the bene ficiar y to prosecute the ac tion in [ her] own name. Th e re is n o p ro vis ion

fo r i nte rv e nti on

by the Un ite d St ates in a t hir d p art y proce eding
. Def s.’ Opp’n at 3-4 (interna l citation and quotations omitt ed). Th e Sup re me Court

and the Ei g hth

Cir c uit have bo th c on c lud e d th at L a bo r’ s f a ilure to
e xer c ise its ri g ht t o a ssi g nme nt o f a F ECAbe ne fi c iary ’s c la im d oe s n ot d isc ount i ts r ig ht t o reimburse ment. L orenzetti, 467 U.S. at 175-76; Gre en, 775 F .2d at 970. The L orenzetti Court reje cted a position si milar to the Gonzalezes’ ar g ument, stating: “ [pl aintiff] has not expl ained . . . why § 8 13 2 s ho uld

be c on str ue d to dim ini shthe sc op e of the Un ite d St ate s’ re imb ur sa ble int e re st when a third-par ty action is maintained by

the employ ee himself.” L orenzetti, 467 U.S. at 175- 76. The Eig hth Circuit, following the le ad of L orenzetti, conclude d that “the f eder al g overnme nt has unfe ttered discr etion to determine whether to require an assig nment of the be nefic iary ’s claim under

[§] 8131 or to seek r eimbursement f rom the bene ficiar

y under [§] 8132.” Gree n, 775 F .2 d at 97 0. Th e se a

uth or iti e s r e qu ir e the Court to c on c lud e that L a

bo r’ s d e c isi on

to r e ma in uninvolved in the Gonzalezes’ liability lawsuit has no bea

ringon its right to demand reimburse ment from the subseque nt settlement awa rd. The plaintiffs a ssert in their eighth argument that L abor imprope rly promulg ated 20 C.F.R. § 10.711, which they contend a

rbitrar ily assig ned a twe nty -five pe rce nt limi t to Mr. Gonzalez’s awar d. Pls.’ Mem. at 22-23. The pla intiffs contend that this exceeds L abor’ s statutory authority under the FECA. I d. As an in iti a l matte r, it b e ars no tin gthat th e pla int if fs ha d th e op po rt

un ity to d e mon str ate20 C.F.R. § 10.711(a) (2) state s that the Secre tary may “[s] ubtrac t the amount of 5 attorney ’s fe es ac tually

paid, but not more than the max imum amount of attorney ’s fe es (continued...) -14- why a g reater pe rce ntag e of the settlement awa rd should have be en allocated to Mr. Gonzalez. See 20 C.F.R. § 10.712 (2008) (allowingFECA be nefic iaries to show g ood cause for a ltering L abor’ s initi al joint allocation deter mination). Throug hout the administrative proc ess, the plaintiffs attempted to make this showing by raisingthe same a

rguments advanc ed her e re g arding the settlement agree ment amounting to a n awa rd solely to Mr. Gonzalez. See, e.g ., Def s.’ Mem., Ex . O at 5. F or the re asons outlined above, this ar g ument esche ws the plain languag e of the settlement ag ree ment, and ther efor e must be re jected. T hus, the administrative dec isions reje ctingthis argument wer e cor rec t. Th e de c isi on

to a llo c ate tw e nty -f

ive pe rc e nt o f t

he joi nt a wa rd fa lls pr op e rl y

wi thi n L abor’ s authority . Ag ain, it is unnecessa ry for L abor to re ceive an express dele g ation of its entire authority . See Chevron, 467 U .S. at 843-44. Rather, it is only nece ssary

that L abor a ct “per missibl y ” within the statutory authority g rante d to it. I d. at 843. The F ECA authorizes L a bo r t o “ de c ide a ll q

ue sti on s ari sin gun de r [the F ECA ],” 5 U .S. C. § 81 45 (2 00 6) , a nd to promulg ate r egulations to assist i n these e ffor ts, id. § 8149. I n allocatingthe awa rd betwe en Mr. and Mrs. Gonzalez, L abor “ decide [d] [a question] arisingunder [the FE CA],” namely , how much money eac h party

to the joint settl ement aw ard r ece ived. The plaintiffs’ ninth argument asser ts that L abor e x cee ded its statutory authority by pr omu lg atin g20 C.F .R. § 1 0. 71 1 ( 20 08 ). Pls. ’ M e m. at 23 -2 4. Th e pla int if fs e xpre ss s pe c if

ic
conce rn about the pa

rt of 20 C.F.R. § 10.711 that allows L abor to limit a FECA be nefic iary ’s attorney ’s fe es to an amount that is reasonable
. I d. This argument lacks mer it because § 8132 of 5(...continued) 5 c on sid e re d b y

[the Wor ke rs ’ C omp . Pr og ra

m] or [the Se c re tary] to b e re a so na ble , f ro m th e g ro ss rec overy .” -15- the F ECApe rm its be ne fi c iari e s w ho are ob lig ate d to re imb ur se L a bo r f ro m th ir d- pa

rt y settlements to retain “ rea sonable attorney ’s fe e[s] .” 5 U.S.C. § 8132. Congr ess expressly

deleg ated the pow er to “ presc ribe rule s and re g ulations nece ssary for the administration and enf orce ment of [the FECA]” to the Secre tary . 5 U.S.C. § 8149. As part of this authorization, t he Secr etar y has the a uthority to construct a f

rame work for

reimbursingthe g overnme nt from third-par ty liability lawsuits. This framew ork is g uided by § 8132 of the FECA, whic h imposes two limi tations on the Secre tary reg ardingmonetary

awa rds obtained by benef iciarie s. The first re quirement is that the bene ficiar y must be permitted to reta in one-fif th of the se ttl e me nt a

mou nt. I d. Th e se c on d r e qu ir e me nt i s th at th e be ne fi c iary mus t be pe rm itt e d to reta in “an amount equivalent to a re asonable attorney ’s fe e propor tionate to the re fund to the Un ite d St ate s. ” I d. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he pr ov isi on in 2 0 C. F .R. § 1 0. 71 1 th at a llo ws a F ECA be ne fi c iary

to r e ta in a

re a so na ble atto rn e y ’s fe e is d ir e c tly a uth or ize d b y

§ 8 13 2, be c a

us e it allows a F ECA benef

iciary to retain that pa

rt of a mone tary

awa rd that is “re asonable ” for the p aym e n to f

anat t o r n e y. As support for the ir position, the plaintiffs rely on Sandoval v. Mitsui S empaku K.K
. Toky o, 460 F.2d 1163, 1170 ( 5th Cir. 1972), which held that the r easona bleness of attorney ’s fee s in FECA third-pa

rty liability suits is a question for

the cour ts, and not the administrative ag ency . After

arr iving at this conclusion, the Sandoval court he ld “that a one -third conting ency fee meets the test of r easona bleness under

[§] 8132.” I d. In this case, the pla intiffs’ attorne y ’s fee s were reduc ed to one- third of Mrs. Gonzalez’s portion of the ove rall settlement aw ard.-16-

De fs .’ Me m. E x. N. In th e a bs e nc e of any oth e r a uth or ity , th is C ourt

fi nd s n o r e a so n to pa

rt wi th the Fif th Circuit’s conclusion in Sandoval that (like the attorney fee awa rd made here ) one- third of a third- party

awa rd wa s a re asonable attorney ’s fe e. B. L a bo r a sse rt s th at Mr s. Go nza le z no w o we s a te n p e rc e nt d e bt o n th e va lue of Mr s. Gonzalez’s reimburseme nt pursuant to the FD CPA, 28 U.S.C . §§ 3001-3308. De fs.’ Mem. at 19. Un de r t he F DC PA, a

de bt i s:
an amou nt t hat is ow ingto t

he Un ite d St ate s o n a c c ount of a fee, duty , le a se , r e nt, s e r v i c e , s a l e o f

r e a l o r p e r s o n a l p r o p e rty, o v e r

p a y m e n t , f i n e , a s s e s s m e n t , p e n a l ty, restitution, da

mag es, interest, tax, bail bond forf eiture, reimburse ment, rec overy of a cost incur

red by the United St at es , o r o ther sourc e of inde btedness to the United States, but that is not owing under the terms of a contra ct originally enter ed into by on ly pe rs on s o the r t

ha n th e Un ite d St ate s. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B ). Of import in this determination is whether a debt “ is owing.” The leg islative history

of the F DCPA indicates that it was ena cted f or the purpose of re imbursing the fede ral g overnme nt for “de linquent debts.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-736 ( 1990). With t he exception of pr e jud g me nt d e bts , whic h a

re on ly ava ila ble wh e n th e amou

nt o we d ma

y be c ome un ava ila

ble thr ou g h th e c ours e of

lit ig atio n, no thi ngsu g g e sts that th e int e nt o f t he F DC PA w a s to imp os e additional financ ial obligations upon parties eng ag ing in ong oing litig ation. Practica l rea sons support this conclusion. Under the de fenda nts’ interpre tation of the FDCPA, which w ould allow the def endants to re ceive a ten pe rce nt surchar g e on the se ttlement
awa rd, not only

would the g overnme nt rec eive a n additional ten per cent windf all ever y time an administrative appe al is lost, but s uch a r esult would discourag e bene ficiar ies from e x erc ising the ir ri g hts to p ur su e an a

pp e a l. N oth ingin t

he le g isl ativ e his tor

y su g g e sts that th is a ligns wi th-17-

cong ressional intent. The de fenda

nts rely on Bd. of Gover nors of the F ed. Reser

ve Sy s. v. Pharaon, 169 F .3d 110 (2d Cir. 1999) (“ Pharaon I I ”), a s support for their position. Def s.’ Mem. at 19. In Pharaon I I , the Second Circuit upheld the a ssessment of a te n perc ent surcha rg e on a de bt owed by

the de fe nd ant. I d. at 11 3- 14 . H ow e ve r, in t hat c a se , th e de fe nd ant h a d a lr e a dy e xer c ise d h is r ig ht t o appea l the administrative assessment of a “de bt.” I d. at 112. In the ea rlier r uling, the D istrict of Columbi a Circuit upheld the c ivil penalties that had bee n levied ag ainst Pharoan, se e Phara on v. Bd. of Gover nors of the F ed. Reser

ve Sy s., 135 F.3d 148, 154-57 ( D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Phar aon I ”), who there afte r fa iled to pay the re quired a ssessment, Pharaon I I , 169 F.3d at 112. I n this case, the plaintiffs initiated this action as a c halleng e to the ag ency ’s dec ision, and unlike the defe ndant in Pharaon, Mrs. Gonzalez is still exercisingher le g al rig ht to challeng e the a g ency ’s dec ision. Pharoan, on the other ha

nd, had alr eady

exhausted his judicial challeng es to the asse ssment of a monetary civil penalty . There fore , even unde r Phara on I I , until Mrs. Gonz alez exhausts her appea ls, she does not owe a “debt” under § 3002( 3)(B ).

IV. Conclusion F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Cou rt c on c lud e s th at th e De pa

rtme nt o f L a

bo r p ro pe rl y conclude d that the plaintiffs re ceive d a joint awar d within the regulatory framework of

the FECA, but that this determination will not become a debt under

the FD CPA unti l the Gonzalez’s available judicial challeng es ar e re solved. Be cause the Court has conc luded that Mrs. Gonzalez’s FECA oblig ation is not a debt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B ) until the plaintiffs’ judicial challeng es ar e exhausted, the plaintiffs’ reque st for summary judgme nt on their prayer f or injunctive relief

is GRANTED in par

t and DENI ED in part. Ac cording ly , the Court will gr ant-18-

the plaintiffs’ r equest that Mrs. Gonzalez’s future FECA be nefits, if she is still eligible to re ceive further benef its, shall not be reduce d due to her pursuit of leg ally

available judicial revie w. F ur the rm or e , a s a

re su lt o f t

he Court ’s c on c lus ion s, the pla int if fs ’ s umm ary

jud g me nt c la im
se e kin gde c larator

y jud g me nt, wh ic h r e lie s u po n th e c on c lus ion

that L a bo r a c te d in a

pp ro pr iate ly or without authority , must fail. On the oth e r h and , th e de fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt i s g ra

nte d a s to Mr s. Gonzalez’s FECA cla im, but denied as to its ten perc ent debt collec tion counterc laim under § 30 11 (a ) o f t

he F e de ra l D e bt C oll e c tio n Pr oc e dure s A c t, 2 8 U .S. C. § 30 11 (a ). Thus , M rs . Gonzalez is l iable to the United States of A merica for the r eimbursement sum of $152,091.16, plu s any po st- jud g me nt i nte re st that a c c ru e s f oll ow ingthe e xha

us tio n o f t

he pla int if

fs ’ l e g a lly available judicial challeng es. SO OR DE RE D
.

REGGI E B. WAL TON Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge