IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ID Nos. 1705004684 and 1705004742

)

)

)

KORI THOMAS, )

)

Defendant. )

Submitted: October 22, 2022

Decided: February 28, 2023

COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT

DEFENDANT’S AMENDED MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 

SHOULD BE DENIED

Timothy Maguire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 

Delaware, Attorneys for the State.

Natalie Woloshin, Esquire, Woloshin, Lynch & Associates, P.A., Wilmington, 

Delaware, counsel for Defendant.

Kori Thomas, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se.
1

SALOMONE, Commissioner 

This 28

th day of February 2023, upon consideration of Defendant Kori 

Thomas’ (“Defendant” or “Thomas”) Amended Motions for Postconviction Relief, 

it appears to the Court that: 

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. In April and May of 2017, there were a series of gun-point robberies at several 

convenience stores, gas stations, and liquor stores in New Castle County, Delaware. 

2. On May 8, 2017, Thomas was arrested in connection with those crimes and 

charged with the following: (i) thirteen (13) counts of Robbery in the First Degree; 

(ii) fourteen (14) counts of Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a 

Felony (PFDCF); (iii) one (1) count of Attempted Murder in the First Degree; (iv) 

thirteen (13) Counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP); 

and (v) thirteen (13) Counts of Wearing a Disguise during the Commission of a 

Felony. 

3. Following plea negotiations between the parties, Thomas plead guilty to three

charges: (i) one (1) count of Robbery in the First Degree (Habitual), (ii) one (1) count 

of Robbery in the First Degree (Non-Habitual), and (iii) one (1) count of Attempted 

Assault in the Second Degree.
2

4. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to declare Defendant a habitual offender 

pursuant to 11 Del. C. §4214(c) as to the charge of Robbery in the First Degree.

1

 On 

November 1, 2018, the Court granted the State’s application and sentenced 

Defendant to 25 years of Level V incarceration, with credit for 541 days previously 

served as to Robbery First Degree (Habitual). As to the Robbery First Degree, nonhabitual offender charge, Defendant was sentenced to 25 years at Level V, 

suspended after 3 years, for 6 months at Level III. Finally, as to Assault Second 

Degree, Defendant was sentenced to 8 years at Level V, suspended for 6 months at 

Level III.2 

5. On December 26, 2018, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Modification of 

Sentence, which was denied by this Court on March 22, 2019.3

6. Defendant did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence. 

RULE 61 MOTION

7. On July 23, 2019, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief 

pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”), seeking to 

withdraw his guilty plea and raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.4

1

In Criminal ID No. 1705004684: Superior Court Criminal Docket Index No. 48 (hereinafter 

“D.I. ___”).

2 D.I. 50-52.

3 D.I. 52, 54, 58.

4 D.I. 59. 
3

8. On August 5, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel in 

connection with his postconviction relief, which was denied by the Court on 

November 21, 2019.5 That same day, the Court directed Defendant’s prior defense 

counsel, Natalie Woloshin, Esquire, to submit an Affidavit responding to

Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.6

9. On January 21, 2020, defense counsel filed an Affidavit in Response to 

Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel denying those claims.

7

 

10. On February 24, 2020, the State filed its Response to Defendant’s Motion for 

Postconviction Relief.8

11. On May 4, 2020, Defendant filed five separate Motions which collectively 

sought to amend Defendant’s initial Rule 61 Motion (collectively, the “Amended 

Motion”).

9

 With the Amended Motion, Thomas filed a second motion for 

appointment of counsel for purposes of his postconviction relief.

5 D.I. 60-61

6

Id.

 

7 D.I. 63.

8 D.I. 64.

9

 D.I. 65-69. Through the Amended Motion, Thomas requested that the five motions be accepted 

as the “operative Rule 61 and related motions.” D.I. 65. As such, to the extent that additional or 

different claims were made in the Rule 61 filed on July 23, 2019 which were not included in the 

Amended Motion, the Court does not address those claims.
4

The Amended Motion also sought to have the record expanded to include the 

following: (i) a transcript of the April 27, 2018 hearing at which time Thomas 

entered his guilty plea and (ii) an Order requiring defense counsel to respond to 

specific questions raised by the Defendant.

10

 On November 30, 2020, the Court 

granted the Amended Motion to Expand the Record, in part, and ordered that a 

transcript of the April 27, 2018 proceedings be made part of the record.11 While 

Thomas only requested the plea colloquy transcript from the April 27, 2018 hearing 

be made part of the record, Defendant’s plea colloquy was, in fact, conducted over 

the course of two days. As such, the Court sua sponte expanded the record to also 

include the transcript from the April 30, 2018 hearing. The plea colloquy transcript 

from the April 30, 2018 hearing was filed and docketed on December 14, 2020.12 

The plea colloquy transcript from the April 27, 2018 hearing was filed and docketed 

on March 12, 2021.13 

12. On August 26, 2021, after receiving copies of the two plea transcripts, 

Defendant filed a Memorandum of Law in support of his Amended Motion and 

10 D.I. 68-69. The Court did not order counsel to respond to the specific questions raised by the 

Defendant in his Amended Motion as she had previously filed an Affidavit in Response to 

Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on January 21, 2020 in which she denied

those claims.

11 D.I. 72.

12 D.I. 73.

13 D.I. 74.
5

renewed his request for appointment of counsel.

14

 His claims as set forth in the 

Amended Motion and Memorandum of Law can be fairly summarized as follows: 

(1) Ground One: Judicial Coercion. Defendant asserts that the 

statements made by the Court to him during the plea colloquy regarding the 

maximum penalties he faced if he were to proceed to trial and be convicted 

constituted a threat and/or scare tactic designed to coerce him into accepting the plea 

offer from the State and relinquishing his Constitutional right to proceed to trial. 

Thomas also contends that the decision by the Court to continue the plea hearing to 

allow Thomas more time to speak with his counsel was a further act of coercion.15 

(2) Ground Two: Judicial Abuse of Discretion. Along the same vein, 

Defendant contends that the alleged admonishments and/or threats made by the 

Court were outside of the Court’s role as a neutral arbiter and constituted judicial 

abuse of discretion.16 

(3) Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Thomas contends 

(i) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object during the plea colloquy to 

the alleged judicial coercion and abuse of discretion and (ii) defense counsel 

14

 D.I. 67.

15 D.I. 65-66.

16

 Id. Defendant alleges that the judge admonished him during the plea colloquy, refused to accept 

his rejection of the plea on three separate instances and employed fear tactics to coerce him into 

accepting the plea. 
6

completed the coercion by requesting additional time to discuss the plea and related 

matters with the Defendant. According to the Defendant, when taken together, the 

Court and defense counsel coerced him into taking a plea in violation of his Sixth 

Amendment right to trial.17 

Due to the foregoing actions, Defendant asserts that his plea was not entered 

voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. That is, but for the alleged deficiencies and 

coercion, Defendant would have withdrawn his plea and proceeded to trial.18 

13. Defendant’s renewed Motion for Appointment of Counsel was denied on 

October 25, 2022.19

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS

14. Before considering the merits of the claims, the Court must first determine 

whether there are any procedural bars to the Rule 61 Motion.20 Pursuant to Super. 

Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) and (4), any ground for relief that was not previously raised is 

deemed waived, and any claims that were formerly adjudicated, whether in the 

proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction 

proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, are thereafter barred.21 

17 Id. 

18 Id.

19 D.I. 82.

20 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).

21 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) and (d)(2)(i), (ii).
7

However, ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be raised at any earlier 

stage in the proceedings and are properly presented by way of a motion for 

postconviction relief.22

15. This is Defendant’s first motion for post-conviction relief and it was timely 

filed.23 No procedural bars prevent the Court from reviewing his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims on the merits but procedural bars do exist with respect 

to his claims of judicial coercion and abuse of discretion. 

16. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

defendant must satisfy the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v. 

Washington.24 This test requires the defendant to show: (a) counsel’s deficient 

performance, i.e., that his attorney’s performance fell below “an objective standard 

of reasonableness,”25 and (b) prejudice.26

17. Under the first prong, judicial scrutiny is highly deferential. Courts must 

ignore the distorting effects of hindsight and proceed with a strong presumption that 

22 Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del. Apr. 28, 2016); State v. Evan-Mayes, 2016 WL 

4502303, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 25, 2016).

23 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (motion must be filed within one year of when conviction 

becomes final); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2) (If the defendant files a direct appeal, the judgment 

of conviction becomes final when the mandate is issued).

24 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

25 Id. at 688.

26 Id. at 694. 
8

counsel’s conduct was reasonable.27 The Strickland Court explained that a court 

deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s 

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of 

counsel’s conduct.28

18. Under the second prong, in order to establish prejudice, the movant must show 

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is 

a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.”29 In other 

words, not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome 

undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding.30 The court must consider 

the totality of the evidence and must ask if the movant has met the burden of showing 

that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the 

errors.31 “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 

counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process 

that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”32

27 Id. at 689.

28 Id. at 690.

29 Id. at 694.

30 Id. at 693.

31 Dale v. State, 2017 WL 443705, * 2 (Del. 2017); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695-

696 (1984).

32 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 840 (Del. 2009)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
9

19. In the context of a plea challenge, it is not sufficient for the defendant to claim 

simply that his counsel was deficient. The defendant must also establish that 

counsel’s actions were so prejudicial that there was a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s deficiencies, the defendant would not have taken a plea but would have 

insisted on going to trial.33 

20. The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the defendant.34

Mere allegations of ineffectiveness will not suffice; instead, a defendant must make 

and substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice.35 

21. For the reasons set forth below, the claims raised in the Amended Motion were 

all waived upon the entry of Defendant’s plea, the first two claims are procedurally 

barred, and all his claims are without merit.

Thomas’ Claims Were Waived Upon the Entry of His Plea

22. A defendant is bound by his answers on the guilty plea form and by his 

testimony at the plea colloquy in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the 

contrary.36 In the subject action, the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, Plea 

33 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Hickman v. State, 1994 WL 590495 

(Del.) (applying Strickland to guilty pleas).

34 Oliver v. State, 2001 WL 1751246 (Del.).

35 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).

36 State v. Harden, 1998 WL 735879, *5 (Del. Super.); State v. Stuart, 2008 WL 4868658, *3 

(Del. Super. 2008).
10

Agreement and plea colloquy reveal that Thomas knowingly, voluntarily and 

intelligently entered a guilty plea.

23. At the time of the plea, Thomas represented that he had reviewed the plea 

agreement and Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form with his attorney and that he 

understood the Constitutional rights he was giving up by entering the plea, as well 

as the potential penalties he was facing by entering his plea.

37

 

24. At the plea hearing, Thomas admitted his guilt to the three charges comprising 

the plea agreement. He admitted that while committing theft on two separate

occasions he used or threaten the immediate use of force upon each of Sevil Kangel

and Hareesh Nadendla with the intent to compel each to deliver up property and, in 

the course of doing so, displayed what appeared to be a firearm during commission 

of Robbery in the First Degree (2 counts). Thomas also admitted that he 

intentionally attempted to cause physical injury to Sakinder Singh by firing a 

handgun at his head during the commission of Assault in the Second Degree.38

25. Thomas further represented that neither his lawyer, the State, nor anyone else 

threatened or forced him to enter his plea.39 

37 April 30, 2018 Plea Transcript, at pgs. 6-8.

38 April 30, 2018 Plea Transcript, at pgs. 9-12.

 

39 Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, dated April 30, 2018.
11

26. The Court accepted Thomas’ guilty plea only after finding that he entered into 

his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.40

27. As confirmed by the plea colloquy, Plea Agreement and Truth-in-Sentencing 

Guilty Plea Form, Thomas entered his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. 

He has not presented any clear, contrary evidence to call into question his testimony 

at the plea colloquy, Plea Agreement or answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty 

Plea Form.

28. Thomas’ valid guilty plea waived his right to challenge any alleged errors, 

deficiencies or defects occurring prior to the entry of his plea, even those of 

constitutional proportions.41 

29. All of Defendant’s claims presented herein stem from allegations of 

misconduct and deficiencies which existed at the time of the entry of the plea. 

Therefore, all of his claims presented in the Amended Motion were waived when he 

knowingly, freely and intelligently entered his plea. 42

40 April 30, 2018 Plea Transcript, at pg. 19.

41 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997); Modjica v. State, 2009 WL 2426675 (Del. 

2009); Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2004).

42 See, Mills v. State, 2016 WL 97494, at *3 (Del.).
12

Thomas’ Claims Are Both Procedurally Barred and Without Merit

30. In addition to Thomas’ claims having been waived, the first two claims are 

also procedurally barred, and all the claims are without merit. Because all three 

claims are intertwined, they will be discussed together. 

31. Thomas alleges that there was judicial coercion during his plea colloquy 

(which forced him to accept the guilty plea) and that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the alleged coercion. 

32. In addition to having waived these claims, the claims for judicial coercion and 

abuse of discretion are procedurally barred. Thomas was required to raise any claims 

of judicial coercion or abuse of discretion on direct appeal if he genuinely believed 

the claims had merit. He failed to do so. Therefore, such claims are now 

procedurally barred. 

33. The Defendant alleges that the statements made by the Court during his plea 

colloquy coerced or forced him to accept the guilty plea but the record shows that 

those statements were merely a recitation of the facts. 

34. Defendant was charged with at least thirteen counts of each of First Degree

Robbery, Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony, Possession 

of a Firearm by Person Prohibited, Wearing a Disguise during the Commission of a 
13

Felony, and one count of Attempted Murder in the First Degree. The chart below43

reflects the potential range of incarceration time the Defendant faced if convicted of 

the most significant charges, depending upon whether he was found to be a habitual 

offender:

35. After the minimum mandatory and maximum prison time was reviewed with 

the Court by defense counsel during the April 27, 2019 hearing, the Court addressed 

the Defendant to make sure he had reviewed the plea agreement and to further 

explain the risks associated with going to trial. The Court’s colloquy included much 

discussion, but with respect to Defendant’s specific claim of judicial coercion, the 

Court stated the following, in pertinent part:

43 The information in the chart is derived from the Plea Colloquy Transcript, dated April 27, 2018, 

which was made part of the record by the Court. Defense counsel also provided the information 

to the Defendant in writing prior to the hearings.

Charge If Declared a 

Habitual Offender

If Not Declared a 

Habitual Offender

First Degree Robbery 

(13 counts)

3 to 25 years for each 

count (for a total of 39 to 

325 years)

25 years to life for each 

count (for a total of 325 

years to 13 life 

sentences)

Possession of a Firearm 

during the Commission 

of a Felony (14 counts)

5 to 25 years for each 

count (for a total of 70 to 

350 years)

25 years to life for each 

count (for a total of 350 

years to 14 life 

sentences)

Attempted Murder in the 

First Degree (1 count)

15 years to life Life

Possession of a Firearm 

by Person Prohibited (13 

counts)

65 to 195 years for each 

count (for a total of 845 

to 2535 years)

15 years to life for each 

count (for a total of 195 

years to 13 life 

sentences)
14

THE COURT: All right. So, Mr. Thomas, you have 

reviewed that plea agreement with Ms. Woloshin, correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And you have had opportunity to discuss 

the pros and cons. And I want to make sure, because we 

are getting very close to trial and I want to be certain that 

you have read what Ms. Woloshin sent you, that she 

indicated she sent you, and that she’s reviewed with the 

Court at the Court’s insistence. And I want to make sure 

you understand that we’re headed to trial and this will go 

to a jury. And if you’re found guilty of these charges,

you’re looking at spending - - just through the minimum 

mandatories, you’re looking at spending the rest of your 

life in prison. You will die in prison if you’re convicted 

of all these charges. You will probably die in prison if 

you’re only convicted on half, given the significant 

minimum mandatory attached to these charges. And once 

we go through a trial, once we start a trial, there’s not 

going to be an opportunity to say, wait a minute, I’ve 

changed my mind. . .

44

36. The statement by the Court regarding the likelihood of the Defendant dying 

in prison if convicted of all or only a portion of the charges he was facing accurately 

reflected Defendant’s circumstances. That is, if convicted of all or only one of the 

charges, Defendant would live out the rest of his natural life in jail. Given the 

accuracy of the statement, defense counsel would have no basis to object and such a 

44 April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 9-10.
15

statement cannot be reasonably construed as tantamount to judicial coercion on the 

part of the trial judge.

45

37. After further discussion regarding (i) the fact that the Court intended to deny 

a pending Motion to Sever as well as (ii) the Defendant’s review of the State’s 

evidence, the Court continued as follows:

THE COURT: Good. I just wanted to make sure. So you 

have seen some of the evidence I’m anticipating the 

State’s going to introduce. And I am sure you and Ms. 

Woloshin have had discussions. But now is the time, sir, 

where you need to decide whether you wish to accept the 

plea offer or reject it. And if you reject it, we’re heading 

to trial, and you will be presumed innocent unless and until 

proven guilty with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And 

if you accept it, you are pleading guilty to three charges, 

but avoiding significant jail time that would ensue if you 

are convicted by a jury.

 So this case has been going on quite some time, and I 

know you’ve had multiple conversations with Ms. 

Woloshin. Now would be the time where you decide and 

you tell the Court your decision about whether or not you 

wish to accept this plea offer that would have you serving 

– well, if the Court follows the plea agreement, the State’s 

planning to recommend that you serve no more than the 

minimum mandatory, which is 28 years, versus - - you 

heard the math. What do you want to do?

THE DEFENDANT: I’m going to have to go to trial.

45 Thomas cites two cases which purport to support the notion that the statements made by the 

judge constituted coercion sufficient to vitiate the voluntariness of his subsequent guilty plea, but 

neither case supports that proposition. See Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459 (1995) (finding trial 

court’s participation in plea negotiations did not render plea involuntary); see also Brown v. 

Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (1970) (holding that a judge’s participation in a plea discussion is a factor 

which must be considered in determining whether a guilty plea is voluntary but does not per se

render the plea involuntary). 
16

THE COURT: I’m sorry?

THE DEFENDANT: I’m going to have to go to trial, Your 

Honor.46

38. Immediately thereafter, counsel to the Defendant explained to the Court the 

reason why she believed Thomas was rejecting the plea. Specifically, Defendant 

wanted counsel to present the Court with a certain Motion to Suppress, but counsel 

advised Thomas that such a Motion could not be presented pretrial, but rather was 

an issue the jury would have to resolve relating to credibility of the police officers.47 

Counsel then advised the Court that Thomas wished to speak with her regarding the 

plea and requested that the Court take a brief recess to allow her time to do so.48 The 

Court granted the requested recess and thereafter continued the hearing until April 

30, 2019.49

39. After continuing the hearing, the Court addressed the import of her decision.

THE COURT: While I recognize it’s inconvenient to the 

State, I also recognize that this is a very, very, important 

life-altering decision for him to make. And he has 

expressed a need for more time to consult with his counsel, 

and I think it’s important that he has it and he has time to 

think about it, even though this is - - this case has been 

46 April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 13-14.

47 April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 14-15. 

48 April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 15-17.

49 April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 17-20.
17

going on for a long time, but I’m glad you’re taking it 

seriously, as you should; right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. And I appreciate your giving 

me the time to figure out what I am going to do. It’s not 

like something that I can easily say let’s do it, you know, 

so I appreciate that. I want to thank you.50

 

40. On April 30, 2019, Thomas signed the plea agreement and the Truth in 

Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and the Court proceeded with the colloquy it had begun

on April 27th.51 Without any issue or further request for a trial, the Defendant 

unequivocally pled guilty to three counts in open court.52

41. Defendant’s own words in his plea colloquy as well as his executed Truth in 

Sentencing Form bely his allegations here. For these reasons, the Court cannot find 

defense counsel’s failure to object during the colloquy to be so prejudicial that there 

was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged deficiency, the Defendant 

would not have taken the plea. Moreover, the presiding judge’s decision to continue 

the plea colloquy until April 30th was the antithesis of coercion. The Court was 

mindful and sensitive to the life-altering nature of such a decision and gave the 

Defendant the time he needed to consult with counsel to understand all the facts and 

circumstances of his case in order to make a fully informed decision to pled guilty. 

50 April 27, 2018 Plea Transcript at 20.

51 April 30, 2018 Plea Transcript at 6-21.

52 Id.
18

42. It is important to note that in his original Rule 61 Motion Thomas also claimed

that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file the Motion to Suppress (which 

he abandoned in his Amended Motion). Specifically, Defendant was of the view 

that the police did not have probable cause to follow him on the day he was 

ultimately arrested. According to defense counsel, Thomas’ argument that the police 

lacked probable cause to follow and arrest him was factually inaccurate and she 

explained the reasons such a Motion to Suppress was without merit to him numerous 

times prior to the plea.53 The police did, in fact, have reasonable, articulable 

suspicion to stop the Defendant based upon the similarities of all the robberies and 

the Defendant’s unique physical characteristics as described by the victims.54 

Moreover, even if a Motion to Suppress had been filed by counsel and granted by 

the Court with respect to the robbery charge on the day of the arrest, Defendant faced 

a multitude of other felony charges for earlier robberies.

55

 Therefore, filing a Motion 

53 Woloshin Aff. at 2. On the day of Defendant’s arrest on May 8, 2017, he had been under 

surveillance for the string of robberies that had been committed in the area. The police saw his 

vehicle around the 300 block of North Union Street and a short time later a convenience store 

robbery was committed by a man meeting the Defendant’s description near that location. His car 

was followed for a long period of time and then eventually stopped by police at which time a 

handgun was found on the front passenger floorboard. In addition, the Defendant was dressed in 

the clothes described as being worn by the suspect of the earlier robbery. D.I 63. 

54 Id. Defendant has a crippled right arm which can be seen on many of the surveillance videos 

and was a trait identified by several of the victims. See State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion 

for Post Conviction Relief, pg. 5, D.I. 64. 

55 Woloshin Aff. at 2. D.I 63.
19

to Suppress to argue the police lacked probable cause to follow and arrest the 

Defendant under such circumstances did not fall below the standard of 

reasonableness and would not have changed the outcome of the proceedings. Nor 

would it have resulted in a change in counsel’s defense strategy or her 

recommendation to Defendant to take a plea offer.

43. As both the State and defense counsel contend, the evidence against the 

Defendant was overwhelming. Many of the alleged offenses were caught on 

surveillance tape. His face can be clearly identified in photos taken in connection 

with the robberies and surveillance footage of the robberies.56 The surveillance 

videos also showed a person pointing a gun at the victims.57 Defense counsel filed 

a Motion to Sever offenses, but advised the Defendant that it was highly unlikely the 

Court would grant that motion, due to the evidence that all the robberies were 

“carried out in a similar manner and the videos and descriptions show that they were 

carried out by the same person.”58 As previously noted, on the record during the 

hearing on April 27, 2018, the Court indicated it was not granting the Motion to 

Sever.

56 Woloshin Aff., Exh. A. D.I. 63.

57 Id.

58 Id.
20

44. Defense counsel sent the Defendant a thorough overview of the indictment, 

the potential penalties he could face as both a habitual offender and non-habitual 

offender, the State’s evidence, and her assessment of Defendant’s best option 

moving forward.59 

45. Based on the weight of evidence against the Defendant, defense counsel 

concluded from a strategic point of view that if Defendant proceeded to trial, he 

would be convicted of all charges.

60

 Moreover, Defendant was eligible to be 

sentenced as a habitual offender thereby making his situation even more perilous.

61

 

46. After a comprehensive review of the State’s evidence, defense counsel 

concluded that the most prudent defense strategy was to attempt to reduce the 

significant amount of jail time Defendant faced if convicted at trial by negotiating a 

plea agreement.

62

 Such a strategy was “objectively reasonable” under the 

circumstances given the significant number of indicted felony charges Defendant

was facing and the strength of the State’s evidence. 

47. “If an attorney makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law 

and facts relevant to plausible options’ that decision is ‘virtually unchallengeable’ 

59 Id.

60 Id.

61 Woloshin Aff., Exh. A.

62 Woloshin Aff. at 1.
21

and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable 

precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations 

on investigation.”63

48. The Court ultimately imposed a sentence of 28 years at Level V, which is a 

substantially better result than the potential life imprisonment that Defendant could 

have faced had he proceeded to trial and been unsuccessful. 

49. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that counsel’s performance was 

objectively reasonable under the circumstances and, as such, Defendant fails to 

establish the first prong of the Strickland test. 

50. With respect to the second prong of the Strickland test, Defendant has also

failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. “It is not enough to ‘show that the errors had 

some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding,’”64 the defendant must 

show a reasonable probability of a different result but the alleged errors of counsel.65

51. Although the Court finds that defense counsel did not commit any errors, as 

previously noted, a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged errors 

63 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 840, 852 (Del. Super. 2013) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 690-91 (1984).

64 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

65 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
22

or defects occurring prior to entry of the plea.66 After pleading guilty, a defendant 

cannot reopen his case to make claims that do not address guilt.67

52. “[A] Defendant’s statements to the Superior Court during the guilty plea 

colloquy are presumed to be truthful.”68

53. Here, Thomas voluntarily entered a guilty plea after the Court conducted a 

colloquy with him prior thereto. Defendant signed a Truth in Sentencing Plea Form 

and admitted guilt in open Court. The Court, in turn, accepted the plea as being 

offered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. As such, the Defendant waived any 

alleged defects of counsel that occurred prior to the entry of the plea and, therefore, 

there can be no finding of prejudice under Strickland.

54. Moreover, Defendant’s acceptance of the plea was a rational decision to avoid 

a trial where the downside could have resulted in a significantly greater prison 

sentence if convicted. Defendant obtained a benefit by entering into the plea in that 

the lion’s share of the charges against him were nolle prossed and the State agreed 

to ask for no more than the minimum sentence required by the charges for which he 

plead guilty. Indeed, in light of the facts and circumstances of this case, it was 

66 Cooper v. State, 2008 WL 240404, at 1* (Del. June 16, 2018); Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 

1232 (Del. 2003).

67 Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1202 (Del. 2015).

68 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).
23

unlikely Defendant would have prevailed at trial and the plea was his best option. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to meet the Strickland test 

with respect to his claims of a coerced plea. 

55. In conclusion, Defendant’s plea represented a rational choice given the 

pending charges, the evidence against him, and the possible sentences he was facing. 

Defendant entered into his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The Court 

finds that the trial judge did not coerce Thomas into taking a plea or otherwise abuse 

its discretion nor was counsel deficient in any respect in her representation of 

Defendant. Thomas’ claims are without merit.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief 

should be DENIED.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

 

/s/ Janine M. Salomone 

The Honorable Janine M. Salomone

cc: Prothonotary

Timothy Maguire, Esquire

Natalie Woloshin, Esquire

Mr. Kori Thomas, pro se