Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

Order 

December 9, 2011

141858

TORME C. FINDLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 141858

COA: 291402

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, WCAC: 08-000112

n/k/a CHRYSLER GROUP L.L.C.,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On October 4, 2011, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to 

appeal the August 24, 2010 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the 

application is again considered. MCR 7.302(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, 

we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we REINSTATE the March 12, 

2009 order of the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC). The Court 

of Appeals erred in concluding that Aquilina v General Motors Corp, 403 Mich 206 

(1978), remained valid after the 1985 amendments to the Worker’s Compensation 

Disability Act, MCL 418.101 et seq. 

In contrast with the statutory mechanism in place at the time Aquilina was 

decided, the WCAC is now required to treat as conclusive the factual findings of the 

magistrate where those findings are “supported by competent, material, and substantial 

evidence on the whole record.” MCL 418.861a(3). Because the WCAC must now give 

deference to the magistrate’s factual determinations, and may no longer engage in de 

novo fact finding, a WCAC decision does not require a “true majority” “decision based 

on stated facts.” Aquilina, 403 Mich at 214.

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals. Plaintiff was allegedly injured at work and subsequently filed a 

worker’s compensation claim, which was denied by the magistrate. The Workers’ 

Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) later affirmed in a split decision, where 

one commissioner issued the lead opinion, the second commissioner concurred only in 

the lead opinion’s result, and the third commissioner dissented. Plaintiff appealed and 
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

December 9, 2011

t1130

2

the Court of Appeals, relying on MCL 418.274(8) and Aquilina v General Motors Corp, 

403 Mich 206 (1978), vacated and remanded for issuance of a “true majority” decision. 

Findley v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 289 Mich App 483 (2010). 

In my view, the Court of Appeals did not clearly err in applying Aquilina under 

the facts of this case. In Aquilina, the Court held that where two members of the 

predecessor to the WCAC concurred only in the result of what was designated as the 

“controlling opinion,” the opinion was not a “majority decision” as required by the 

Worker’s Disability Compensation Act of 1969. Aquilina, 403 Mich at 212. Notably, in 

rendering its holding, Aquilina focused on the review responsibilities of appellate courts, 

see id. at 213-214, explaining that appellate courts “cannot discharge [their] reviewing 

responsibilities unless a true majority reaches a decision based on stated facts,” and 

specifically noting that “[a] decision is not properly reviewable when some of the 

majority concur only in the result and do not state the facts upon which that result is 

based.” Id. at 214.1

 Although the 1985 legislative amendments brought reforms to the 

Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, as the Court of Appeals recognized, the review 

function of appellate courts remains the same. See, e.g., Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 

Mich 257, 262 (1992). And, even after the legislative amendments, this Court has 

generally recognized the importance of a “carefully constructed opinion by the WCAC” 

in facilitating appellate review. Id. at 268-269. Thus, under the facts of this case, I do 

not believe that the Court of Appeals clearly erred in applying Aquilina where, as in 

Aquilina, a commissioner in the majority did not issue a separate opinion but, instead, 

concurred only in the result reached by the lead opinion. Accordingly, I would deny 

leave to appeal.

MARILYN KELLY, J., joins the statement of CAVANAGH, J. 

HATHAWAY J. (dissenting). 

I dissent from the majority’s decision in this matter. Leave to appeal was not 

granted in this case. Having reviewed the limited briefing and having heard limited oral

argument, I would grant leave to appeal because I believe that the Court would benefit 

from plenary review of the issues before rendering a decision. 

 

1 In order to assist appellate courts in “effectively discharging their responsibilities,” 

Aquilina further encouraged concurring board members to articulate whether they agree 

with the legal standards and rationale applied in reaching the decision. Aquilina, 403 

Mich at 214.