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P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ocke t N o . 02-4272

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IN T HE UNI TED ST ATES C OURT OF

APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

____________
No. 02-4272

____________
IN R E: AUTOMOTI VE REF INI SHI NG PAI NT ANTI TRUST LI TI GATI ON

BASF A G an d BAS F COATI NGS AG, Ap pellan ts

____________ Appeal from the United State s District

Cou rt For th e Ea stern D istrict of P enns ylvania D.C. No.: MDL 1426 Distri ct Judge: Honorable R. Barcl ay

Surric k

____________ Argued: December 15, 2003

Bef or e: ROTH, McKEE, an d ROS ENN,

Circuit Judges

(Fil ed February13, 2004 )

Stephen Fis hbein (Argued) Shearman & Sterli ng 599 Lexington Avenue New Y ork, NY 10022

Edw ard W . Mad eira, Jr. Matthew J. Hamilt on Pepper Hamilt on 18 th & A rch S treets 3000 T wo L ogan S quare Philadelphia, PA 19103 Raymond A . Just Shearman & Sterli ng 55 California Str eet 20 th Floor San Francis co, CA 94104

Counsel for Appell ant

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr . (Argued) Universi ty of Pennsy lvania The Law School 3400 Chestnut St

reet Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204

Gerald J. Rodos Barrack, Rodos & Bacine 2001 Market Stree t 3300 T wo C omm erce Squ are Philadelphia, PA 19103

Wa rren R ubin Law O ffices of Bernard M . Gross 1515 Locust Str eet, Suite 200 Philadelphia, PA 19102

Joseph C. Kohn Robert J. LaRocca Kohn, Swift & Graf One South Broad Street , Suite 2100 Philadelphia, PA 19107

Howard I. Langer Columb, Honik & Langer 121 So uth Bro ad S treet , 9 th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appell ees

Willi am T. Hangley Ha ngley, A ronc hick, S egal & Pud lin One Logan Square, 27 th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Amicus- Appellant Fedr. German Ind.2

James J. R odgers Dilworth Paxson 1735 Market Stree t 3200 The Mellon Bank Center Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Amicus- Appellant Fed. Republi c Germany

____________
OPINI ON OF THE COURT

____________
ROSENN , Circ uit J udge.

This certified interlocu tory appeal, aris ing out of a llege d unlawful price- fixing by

both domesti c and foreign c orporations, rais es questions of considerable importance in antit rust litiga tion inv olv ing for eign natio nals

. Three of the i ssues ar e of firs t impres sion to thi s Court. The first

issue i s whether worldwide ser vice of pr ocess authorized under Secti on 12 of the Clay ton Act, 15 U.S .C. § 2 2, upo n fo reign c orpo rations is independent

of the spec ific venue provisi on contai ned in that st atute . The second issue is whe ther a federa l court’s personaljuri sdiction over a f oreign corporation in ant

itr ust l iti gation maybe predicated o n the foreign corporation’s contacts with the United States as a whole (nati onal cont acts ana ly sis) , rat her than with t

he specif ic forum i n which the
court s its (localcontact s analy sis) . The final issue i s whether j urisdi ctiona l discovery fr om foreign nationals may proc eed u nder the F edera l Rule s of C ivil Procedure wit

hout fir st re sorti ng to the Hague Convention on the Taki ng of Evidence Abroad in Ci vil or Commercial Matters ( Hague Convention or Co nve ntio n). 2 3 U .S.T . 255 5, repri nted in 28 U .S.C . § 17 81 N ote. The Distri ct Court de nied the motions t o dismis s for l ack of personal jurisdiction and the join t motion fo r a protect ive order file d by two German corporations, BASF A ktienge sell schaft (BASF A G) and BASF C oatings Aktiengesellschaft (BASF C oatings) (collec tively “app ellants” ), defe ndan ts in the underl yi ng antit

rust l iti gation. The Distri ct Court c onstrue d Section 12 of the Clay ton Act as aut

horizi ng worldwide service of process independently of the spec ific venue provisi on contai ned in that st atute . The Court als o held that pers onal jurisdi ction over the f

oreign cor

porati ons would be measured on the ir cont acts wit h the Un ited Sta tes as a wh ole, rath er than with the fo rum state. Th e Co urt fina lly rejected a rule f avor ing firs t resort to Hague Convention procedures for juri sdictional di scoveryof foreign defendants . BASF AG and BASF Coatin gs t

ime lyapp eal ed. We af

fi rm.

I.

The underlying federal anti trust class litigati on involves sixty- three acti ons fil ed in fi ve states, Penns yl vania, New Jersey, Ohio, Kentucky , and Delaware, by private parties. Those acti ons were tr ansferr ed to, and consoli dated i n, the United States District Court for t

he Eastern Distri ct of Pennsyl vania for

pre-t rialpurposes by the Judi cial Panel on Multi dist rict Liti gation. 1 The class a ction c omplaint

1 The de fe nda nt s, in ad di ti on to the two app ellan ts he re, ar e: P PG Ind ustri es, In c.; E. I. D uP on t d e N em ou rs a nd C om pa ny; Du Po nt P erfo rma nce Co ating s, Inc .; Sherwin-Will iam, Co.; Sherwin-Will iam Automotive Fi nishes Corpor ation; Akzo Nobel Car Refinis hers B.V., a Dutch

com pan y; Ak zo N obe l Co ating s, Inc ., a3

alleges that

from 1993 to at least December 31, 2000, t

he forei gn and domestic defendants conspired to raise and maintai n the pri ces of aut omotive refini sh paint

throughout

the Unite d States . All de fendants, except the
appe llants, ha ve stipu lated to certi fication of a national c lass c onsisting of all direct

purchaser s of automoti ve refinishes from the defendants.

The appe llants filed mo tions to dism iss purs uant to Fed eral R ule of Civil Procedure 12( b)(2) f

or lack of

personal juri sdiction. I n support of their motions to dis miss, the appel lants submitted affidavi ts st ating t

hat the y di d not have presence i n the st ate of Pennsy lvania and never sol d any automotive re finis h paint to anycustomers in Pennsy lvania . The plaintiff s replied that the appr opriate forum for measuring the appellants’
contact s for purpos es of pers onal jurisdict ion is the United States as a whole, rat

her than t

he forum state of Pennsyl vania. The plaintiffs oppos ed the motions t o dismis s and als o served juri sdictional di scoveryrequest s pursuant to the Fede ral Rule s of CivilProcedure, seek ing p rodu ction o f do cum ents

conc erning the ap pellan ts’ con tacts w ith the U nited Sta tes a s a w hol e.

The plaintiff s sub mitted pub licly availa ble inf orm ation to show a thres hold case of pers onal jurisdi ction ba sed on the appell ants’ contact s with the United States and support

their request for ju ris di cti on al d isc ov er y. 2 In resp onse to

the pla inti ffs’ re quest for juri sdictional discovery, the appel lants file d a joint motion for a

protect ive order , cont ending that t he plai ntiff

s’ dis covery request

was overlybroad and burdens ome. They argued al so that

any j urisdi ctiona l discovery shoul d proceed fi rst unde r the Hague Convention, of whic h the Unite d Sta tes a nd G erm any a re sig nato ries.

The reasons pr offered bythe appellants’ exp ert, Martin R eufels, we re that Germany, unlike t

he United States, viewed the gathering of evidence as a jud icial, r athe r tha n pr ivate , fun ction

. Therefore, Germany had a sove reign

U.S. c orpor ati on; a nd BASF Co rpora tion, a U .S. corp oration base d in New Jerse y, which i s part of t he BASF Group, a globalnetwork of corpor ations that i nclude the two German
corp oration s, wh ich are the on ly
appe llants in th is interloc utory app eal. 2 The Distri ct Court noted the fol lowing facts s ubmitt ed by t

he plai ntiff

s: the appell ants ar e the hol ders of numerous paten ts in the U nited S tates; in its publicl y r elease d documents, such as the forms fil ed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and annual

re por ts , a nd i ts web si te , B ASF AG
prese nts itself a s part o f a glo bally integr ated group, BASF or BA SF Group, consist ing of BASF AG , the parent corporation in t

he group and it s 153

co ns ol id at ed su bs id iari es ; B ASF AG owns 100 percent

of the shar es of BASF Corporati on, a domestic corpor ation located in N ew Jerse y; BASF AG ’s pub licly released docu men ts show that it sold appr oximatel y $1. 5 bill ion in goods to i ts whol lyowned subs idi ary , BASF Co rpora tion, in 2 000 ; acco rding to BAS F’s website, BASF C oatings has a “sign ifican t mark et pos ition[ ] in No rth America”; BASF Coatings mai ntains an offic e in M ichiga n; and acco rding to BASF A G’s 2001 annual r eport, the BASF G roup expli citl y endor ses the “exchange of st aff among BASF G roup

com panie s” as b eing “ critical” in ach ievin g its w orld wid e co rpo rate g oals

.4

interest i n keeping di scoveryconducted with in its bo rders in conf orm ity with its laws. Accordi ng to Reufels , compell ing the ap pellan ts to pro duce docu men ts pursu ant to th e Fed eral R ules o f Civ il Proced ures w ould off end G ermany’s

sov ereig n in teres ts.

In it s order a nd careful accompanyi ng opinion, the Dist rict Co urt, Surric k

, J. , deni ed without prejud ice the appe llants’ m otions to dismiss. Rejecti ng the appellants’
contrary ar guments, t

he Court const

rued Section 12 of

the Clay ton Act as authorizing worldwide service of process independently of the spec ific venue provisi on contai ned in that st atute . The Court held t

hat the releva nt forum for purposes of pr oof of personaljuri sdiction was the United St ates as a whole, rather than the f oru m s tate o f Pe nns ylvan ia. The Court conclude d that t he plai ntiff

s had made a thres hold showing of personaljuri sdiction that warranted ju ris di cti on al d isc ov er y. 3 In a se parate order and ac companyi ng opinion, the Court denie d the appel lants ’ joi nt moti on for a protecti ve order r equiri ng the plaint iffs t o conduct their j urisdi ctiona l discovery fi rst unde r the Hague Convention proc edures, rather than the Fed eral R ules of C ivil P roc edu re.

Bo th the D istrict Co urt and this Court granted the appel lants ’ peti tion for interlocutor

y appea l pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The appellants raise
two issues f or rev iew o n this interloc utory app eal. Th e first issu e is whether a pl ainti ff may i nvoke the worldwide ser vice of pr ocess provi sion contai ned in Section 12 of the Clayton Act and, thus, national contact s analysi s, without s atis fyi ng the speci fic venue
pro visio n als o co ntain ed in that s tatut e. The second iss ue is whether a plai ntiff may be permitt ed to seek j urisdi ctiona l discovery fr om foreign defendant s under the Fede ral Rules of Civil Proce dure without first resorting to t he Hague Convention. We agree with the Distri ct Court and answer bot

h in the affirmative. 4

II.

The first issue r aised bythe 3 The appella nts have not appealed fr om the Court’ s ruli ng that t he plai ntiff

s have shown a prima faci e case of per sonal juri sdiction. Accordi ngly , we do not

rev iew that r ulin g. “P rior to disc ove ry, a plaintiff may defeat a motion to dismiss based on lega lly

suffici ent al legations of juri sdiction.” In re Magneti c Audiotape Antitr ust Litig. , 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003) . The District Court rej ected the pla inti ffs’ ar guments that the jurisd ictiona l con tact s of BASF Co rpora tion, the wh olly ow ned d om estic subsidi ary of BASF A G, should be imputed t o BASF A G and that the jurisdict ional contacts of the appell ants’ alle ged co-conspi rator s should be imputed to the appellants. 4 The Distri ct Court ha s origi nal feder al questi on subject

matter juri sdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over

this class acti on brought under

15 U.S.C. § 1 (s ecti on 1 of the Sherman Act) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26 (sections 4 and 16 of t he Clay ton Act). We have appel late juri sdiction und er 28 U.S .C. § 1 292 (b) ov er this interlocutor

y appea l. Becaus e the certified issues on a ppeal invo lve pure questi ons of law, we revi ew the District Court’s rulings de novo

. Bowers v. Nationa l Collegiate A thletic Ass’n , 346 F.3d 40 2, 410 (3d Cir. 2003 ).5

appe llants inv olves two conc eptua lly distin ct, tho ugh inter twi ned , sub -issu es. On e is w hethe r the D istrict Co urt erred in ruling that t

he service of process provisi on contai ned in Section 12 of the Clayton Act is i ndependent of t he venue
pro visio n als o co ntain ed in that s tatut e. Two is whether the Court err ed in rul ing that i n federal antit

rust l iti gation, personaljuri sdiction shoul d be assess ed on th e bas is of th e app ellants’ c ontac ts with the U nited S tates as a wh ole (nati onal cont acts ana ly sis) , rat her than with the fo rum state (loc al con tacts analysis). The two su b-issues are intertw ined b ecau se if the re is no spec ific venue limitati on in federal antit rust litigation in volv ing a f oreign corp orate defe ndan t, the def enda nt can be su ed in any fed eral distric t court b ased on its aggregat e contact s with the United States as a whole. Becaus e theyare intertwined and because the appell ants pr esent t hem as a single int egrated issue, we discuss them tog ether. 5

A.

Section 12 of

the Clay ton Act provides:

Any suit , action, or

proceedi ng und er the a ntitrust law s aga inst a corporation may be brought not only in the j udicia l dis tri ct whereof it

is an i nhabita nt, but also i n any di stri ct wherei n it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cas es may be served i n the dis tri ct of which it is an inh abitan t, or w herev er it

ma y be f oun d.

15 U .S.C. § 22 (em phasis add ed). 6

5 The Co mmittee to Support the Antitrust Law s, a no npro fit corp oration base d in the Dist rict of Columbia, ha s submitted

an amicus curi ae brief i n support of the plaint iffs’ position on the two certif ied issues . The amicus curi ae briefs in support of

the appel lants ’ posit

ion, submitted by t

he Federal Republic of Germany and the Federation of German Industries, do not address the first certi fied i ssue. 6 Section 12 pe rmits venue in anyfederal dist rict in which a corporati on is an “inhabi tant, ” may be “found, ” or “transacts busine ss.” Those terms are defined as follows:

Bein g an “ inhab itant” is h eld to

mea n i nc orpor at ed und erth e l aws of th at jur isdic tion

. E.g.

, Aro M anuf acturin g C o. v. A utom obile Body Researc h Corp. , 352 F.2d 400 , 404 (1st C ir. 19 65)

, cert. denied , 383 U .S. 947 , 86 S . Ct. 119 9, 16 L. E d. 2d 210 (19 66)

. Bein g “fo und ” in a d istrict is general ly equated with “doing business ” there , and requires greate r contac ts than does “trans acti ng business .” E.g.

, Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc. , 507 F. Supp. 112 8 (D . Nev . 1980 ); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc.

, 403 F . Supp. 12 3 (D.N .H. 1975 ); Friends of

Animals Inc. v. American Veteri nary Medical Ass’n , 310 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N .Y. 1970 ).

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bucy rus-Eri e Co. , 550 F. Sup p. 103 7, 104 1 n. 5 ( S. D. N. Y. 198 2). A corp oration is “fou nd” w here it has “pres ence” and “continuous l ocal activ ities” in th e dis trict. Caribe Trai ler Sy st ems , I nc. v. Pue rt o Ri co Maritime Shipping Auth. , 475 F. Supp. 711. 7166

Section 12, a long sentence, cons ist s of
two sepa rate clau ses, the f irst relating to venue and the s econd concerni ng servi ce of process and, therefore, personal juri sdiction. I t is undisput ed that the second clause authorizes nat ionwide, indeed worldwide , service of pr ocess on a defendant cor

porati on in feder al antit rust l iti gation. The clause pr ovides that t he defendant maybe served “wherever it may be found,” that is, wherever it

is “doi ng business .” See

, e.g. , Go -V ideo , Inc . v. A kai E lec. C o., Ltd. , 885 F.2d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir . 1989) (Secti on 12 “authori zes worldwide service of p rocess”).

The parti es dispute whether the two clauses of Secti on 12 should be r ead

as an integra ted w hole o r indep ende ntly of ea ch oth er. Sp ecifica lly, they dispute wh ether th e ven ue pr ovisio n con tained in the fi rst c lause of Sec tion 12 must be satisfied befo re the p laintiffs could avail themselve s of the aut

horizat ion of worldwide ser vice of pr ocess cont ained in the s econd claus e. As explai ned by

one c ourt:

[t]he di spute centers on whether the jurisdi ction pr ovisi on operate s independently from the

ve nu e p ro vi sio n, s pe cif ica lly, whether “i n such cases ” in the

seco nd cla use re fers to “any su it, acti on, or pr oceeding under the antitrust la ws a gains t a corporation” or only to antitr ust acti ons agains t corpor ations brou ght in a judicia l district in which the corporati on is ei ther an “inhabi tant, ” “may be found” or “transacts business .” If the fir st inter pretat ion is adopted, plaint

iffs can rel y on 28 U.S. C. § 1391(d) [the Ali en Venue Statut e] which provides for venue in antitrust acti ons agains t forei gn corporations “i n any di stri ct” and on the second c lause of Sec tion 12 for pers onal jurisdi ction ove r defendants based on a mini mum conta cts ana lysis consid ering th eir
contact s with the United States as a whole. If

the second inter pretat ion prevai ls the servi ce provisi on is onl y effe ctive when, pursuant to Section 12’s firs t clause, the action is brought i n a dist rict where the defendant reside s, is fou nd o r transa cts business.

In re Magnetic Aud iotape Antitrust Liti g. , 171 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184 (S.D .N.Y . 200 1), vacated s ub nom. on other gr ounds

, Texas Int’l Magnetics, Inc. v. BASF A ktienge sell schaft , 31 Fed. App x. 738, 200 2 W L 385 569 (2d Cir. M arch 1 2, 200 2). Th e plain tiffs dis pute whether the present

litigati on can onlybe brought i n a federaldist rict where the appell ants ar e “resi dents, ” may be “found,” or

“trans act[ ] business ” based on their contact s with the forum dist rict
or state. They cont end that it maybe brought i n any fede ral di stri ct based on the ap pellan t’s “m inimu m co ntacts” with the Unite d States as a whole.

Currentl y, two sister Courts of Appeals diffe r as t o the const ructi on of Sectio n 12 . The plaintiff -app ellees re ly on the deci sion i n Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co. , Ltd. , 885 F.2d 1406 (9 th Cir. 1989), and a maj ority of r ecent Dist rict Co urts’ op inions to sup port the ir argument that the service or process
prov ision is in depe nden t of the spec ific venue provis ion. On the other hand, appell ants r elyon the deci sion i n GTE (D.D.C. 1979) ( quoting Fox-Keller , Inc. v. Toyot a Motor Sales, U. S. A., I nc. , 338 F. S upp . 812 , 815 (E.D . Pa. 1 972 )).7

Ne w M edia S ervice s Inc. v . Bellso uth Corp. , 199 F.3d 1343 (D .C. Cir. 2000 ), where the Court

wrote:

The langu age o f the sta tute is pl ai n, and it s me ani ng s eems clear: T he cla use b efore the sem icolon rel ates t o a supplement al basis f or venue in a ctions under the Clay ton Act; t

he clause after the sem i-colon relates to nation wid e serv ice of proc ess in antit rust c ases; and invocation of the nationwide service clause
rest s on sati sfy ing the ve nue provisi on.

Id. at 13 50.

The GTE cour t “align ed” itse lf with the pos iti on taken bythe Second Circuit fortyyear s ago in Goldlawr, I nc. v. Heiman , 288 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1961) (hol ding in di cta that the expansive servi ce of process provisi ons was contin gent o n satisf action of the spec ific

ven ue p rov ision ), rev’d on other grounds

, 369 U .S. 463 (196 2). 7 The GTE court clai med that i ts const ructi on of Secti on 12 of the Clay ton Act was the result of a “plai n” or “unadorne d” readi ng of the language of t

he stat ute, and impli ed that the Go-Video court’ s constr uction was the res ult of “ literal c onvoluti ons.” GTE

, at 1351.

The Go-Video court di d not find the la nguage of Secti on 12 to be cl ear or

una mb igu ous

. Go-Video , 885 F.2d at 141 2 (qu oting J udg e Stew art’s ling uistic analy sis of t

he sy ntactic st

ructur e of Section 12 i n Gen. Elec. Co. v. BucyrusErie Co. , 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1042, 1042 n.7 (S .D.N .Y. 19 82), w ithout n ecess arily endorsing his analysis). 8 Inste ad of

7 The Gol dl awr

court conc luded that Section 12

spec ifies w here s uit aga inst a corporation under the antit rust laws may be br ought, na mely, in a dist rict where it i s an inhabi tant and also where “ it maybe found
or tr ansacts business .” Conversely , it

should fol low that if a corporati on is not

an inhabit ant of, is not

found in, and does not t

ransact business in, t

he distri ct, suit

may not be so brou ght. B y statutory gran t if suit is brou ght as presc ribed in this secti on ‘allprocess i n such cases may be served in the dist rict of which it ( the corpor ation) is an

inhabit ant, or wherever i t may be fou nd.” Th us, ‘in suc h ca ses,’ Congress has s een fit

to enlarge the limit s of the otherwise
restricted territorial areas of
process. In other

words, the
extrate rritorial serv ice priv ilege is given only

when the other requir ements are sati sfied.

Gol dl awr , 288 F.2d at

581.

8 Judge Stewart

wrote that

“the usual rules of sy ntax” would favor the
construction of

Section 12 t

hat the servi ce of process clause i s independent of the venue cl ause:

The word “such” means “the aforementi oned,” We bster’s Third International D ictionary (unabr. ed. 1963). Thus, when “such”
prece des a nou n it is assu med to refer to a parti cular a ntecedent noun and any de pendent adj ecti ve or adjec tivalclauses modifyi ng that noun, bu t not to any other part of the pre ceding cl ause or8

rely ing on it s own way of readi ng of the language of Sect

ion 12, a s the GTE court did, t he Go-Video cour t foun d it

nece ssary to “in terpret a passa ge in which antecede nts and co nseque nts are unclear by r eference t o the cont ext and purpose of the stat

ute as a whole .” Id. The Go-Video court di d not find t he sparse l egisl ative hist ory of the Clay ton Act conclusi ve on the i ssue. 885 F.2d at 1410. There was evi dence, however, that “Congress vi ewed the questions of venue and s ervice of p roces s sepa rately, with the latter issue of subsidi ary importanc e.” Id.

The Go-Video cour t foun d it more helpfulto rel y on the general inter pretat ion that courts have given Sec tion 12. Id. “[C]ourts have viewed the sec tion’s m ain co ntributio n to b e its expansion of t

he bounds of venue. ” Id. (citing United States v. ScophonyCorp. of Am. , 333 U .S. 795, 806 -808 (19 48) ( Se cti on 12 su bs titu ted br oa d, p ra cti ca llyfound ed ven ue tests for the old er, “hairspli tti ng legal techni cali ties ” of the Sherm an A ct); 15 W right & M iller, Federal Pr acti ce and Procedur e, § 3818, at 109-10 ( 1976) (venue pr ovisi ons of Clayton Ac t wer e “clea rly broad ening in [their] effect”)). 9 See also Paper Systems, Inc. v. Mitsubi shi Corp. , 967 F. Supp. 364, 368 ( E.D. Wis. 1997) (“In the case of the anti trust

laws, i t makes no
sense t o tie a

dist rict court’ s juri sdiction to the s tate in which it

sit s; i t neit

her promotes the enforcement of the antitrust laws no r the man agem ent of litigation.”); Prof’l Adjusti ng Systems of America, Inc. v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc

. , 352 F. Supp. 648, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (“The reas on for the br oad scope of the Clayton Ac t venu e pro vision s wa s to give p laintiff th e w idest po ssible selectio n of venu e for h is ben efit, to promote a ‘private attorney gene ral’ ty pe policy for exposi ng and polic ing comb inations in restraint of trade.”). In light of the above aut

hority and comment, the Go-Video court found its elf “r eluct ant to a dopt a const ructi on of secti on 12 which would, bylimi ting the avai labil ity

of the val ued tool of

wo rldw ide ser vice o f pro cess, re cast its venue provis ion as a r estricti ve, rat her than a broa dening, provisi on and might prevent pl ainti ffs from pursui ng

senten ce. A pplying th is rule t o secti on 12, “i n such cases” would r efer t o “any suit , action, or

proceedi ng und erth e a nt it

ru st la ws against a corporat

ion,” and
not to a nything e lse in secti on 12’s fi rst c lause.

Bu cyrus-E rie , 550 F. Supp. at 1042 n. 7.

9 As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Scophony Corp. , 333 U. S. 795, 808 (1948), the third and fina l prong of “trans act[i ng] busine ss” in Sec tion 12 was enacted byCongress with t he remedialpurpose of enl arging t he venue juri sdiction of the federal courts by substituting “practical, business concepti ons for the previous hairs plit ting legal techni cali ties encrust ed on the ‘found’-‘present’-‘ carryi ng-on-business’
sequence.

. . . ” Id. The Court noted t hat the Congressional enactment “relieve[s]
perso ns inju red thr oug h cor pora te violat ions of the anti trust

laws from the ‘often i nsuperabl e obstacl e’ of res orti ng to dis tant f

orums for re dress of wrongs done in the places of their business resi dence. A forei gn corporation no long er cou ld com e to a d istrict, perpetuate the re the i njuri es outl awed, and then byretr eati ng or even without
retr eati ng to it s headquarters defeat or delaythe ret

ribution due. ” Id.9

legiti mate claims under the antitr ust laws.” 885 F. 2d at 1410-11.

The Go-Video court al so rel ied on the Supreme Court ’s case law regardi ng the rel ations hip between federal venue stat

utes of gene ral applic ation a nd specifi c venue provi sions
conta ined in individ ual statu tes to support i ts hol ding that

the provi sion for

wo rldw ide ser vice o f pro cess is independent

of the spec ific venue provisi on in Secti on 12 of the Clay ton Act. “[A]s a ge neral matter, courts have interpre ted sp ecial v enue prov isions to supplement, rather

than pree mpt, gener al
venue stat

utes. ” Id. at 1409 (ci ting 15 W righ t & M iller, supra , at 108-109) (“Supreme Court ha s held t hat speci al
venue stat

utes ar e supplement ed by, and are to be read in l ight of, liber aliz ing provisi ons of the gene ral venue stat utes”) (citing Pure Oil v. Suarez , 384 U.S. 202 (1966)).

Of partic ular r elevance to the GoVideo court w as the Sup reme C ourt’s discuss ion of the relat

ionshi p between the A lien V enu e St atute , 28 U .S.C . § 1391(d), a venue provi sion of gener al applic abili ty , and the specif ic venue provision, 28 U.S.C . § 1400(b ), concerni ng acti ons for pat ent infri ngement, i n Brunette Mach. W orks, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., I nc. , 406 U. S. 706 (197 2). Th e Su prem e Co urt held that t he specif ic venue pr ovisi on did not bar the s uit under

which venue had been sati sfied under

Section 1391( d), t

he Alien Venue Stat

ute, even though the Court h ad p re vi ous lyhel d t hat th e s ame patent venue stat

ute did preclude the applic ation o f the g enera l corpo rate

ven ue p rov ision of § 139 1(c ). Bru nette
, at 713-14 ( distinguis hing Fourco Glass Co. v. Trans mirra Pr ods. Corp. , 353 U. S. 222 (19 57) ). Section 1391( d) is not like ot her
gen eral v enu e pr ovi sion s. Bru nette held that “ Section 1391( d) is not derived f

rom the gener al venue st atute s that [a speci al venue provis ion might

otherwis e be read as] i ntended t o replac e.” Id. at 71 3. Rather , S ect

io n 13 91( d) deriv es fr om a tradi tion goi ng “back to the beginni ng of the Republic” under which “suits against aliens w ere lef t unres tricted, an d cou ld be tri ed in anydist

rict , subj ect onl y t o the requir ement of ser vice of pr ocess. ” Id. at 708. “The Bru nette court i nterpr eted § 1391(d) t o stat e ‘a pri nciple of broad and overri ding appli cati on’ which prevented an ali en defendant fr om using a narr ower venue provision in another statut e as a ‘shie ld agai nst sui t.’ ” Go-Video ,885 F.2d at 1409- 10 (citing Bru nette , at 71 4). “Absent some expres s congress ional intent to the c ontrary, a specia l venue provisi on should not , under t he clear language of Bru nette be deemed exclusi velycontrol ling when the defendant i nvolved is an ali en. The princi ple that an al ien may be sued in any district is sim ply too de eply roote d to assume otherwise.” Bu cyrus-E rie , 550 F. Supp. at 1040 ( citi ng Bru nette , at 714);

see also Go-Video , at

1410.

The approach of the Go-Video and Bu cyrus-E rie courts is convi ncing and well re asoned in t

heir cons truction of Sectio n 12 of the Clayton Ac t. 10 W e,

10We are not pers uaded by t he conclusi ons drawn by t

he GTE and Gol dl awr

courts for the reasons discuss ed by t

he Go-Video and BucyrusErie courts . Fir st, because we do not find the language of Sect ion 12 to be clear and unambiguous, we are not persuaded bythe “pl ain” or “ unadorned” reading of

the st atutor

y l anguage by the GTE cour t. We , theref ore, be lieve th at it is nece ssary to co nside r the ov erall10 therefore, hold that the service of process
prov ision o n fo reign c orpo rations is indepen dent of, and does no t require sati sfacti on of, the specifi c venue provisi on under Secti on 12 of the Cla yton A ct.

B.

We also reject the appellants ’ argument that the Distri ct Court doe s not have personaljuri sdiction over t hem beca use th ey do no t have conta cts w ith the S tate of Pen nsylvan ia. In this instanc e, Pen nsylvan ia is the f orum state because the underlying cla ss actions have been tra nsferr ed and consoli dated for pretrialpurposes. 11 At least two sister Courts of Appeals have held that when purpose of the stat

ute in c onstrui ng the
stat utorylanguage. Second, we agree with the a naly sis made i n severalDistri ct Courts’ de cisi ons that

the concl usions of GTE and Gol dl awr

are not pe rsuasi ve beca use th e def enda nt corp oration s in those two cases were not al ien corporations and were, inst ead, out -ofstate co rpora tions. T he dis tinction is crucia l. “ The general ve nue provis ion of [28 U.S.C. § 1391(c )] governing such dom estic corporations i s, i n contras t to [§ 1391(d)] gove rning alie n corporations,

more diffi cult to sati sfy than the [S]ecti on 12 venue requi rements. ” Bu cyrus-E rie , 550 F. Supp. at 1041 (first
two emp hase s add ed, the last em phas is in origi nal). That is be cause the added
pron g of “trans acting busin ess” in Section 12 i s easi er to s atis fy t han the tradi tionalprongs of bei ng an “inhabi tant” or “doing bus iness. ” Id. at 1041 n.5 (“‘ doing busi ness’ . . . requires greate r contac ts then does ‘t ransacting business ’”). Because Gol dl awr did not involve a n alie n corporation, t he Gol dl awr

court, not surprisi ngly , did not need to consi der the i mpact of the
gen eral v enu e pr ovi sion of § 139 1(d ). As the Go-Video court obs erved, t he Gol dl awr

cour t’s con clusion is
unp ersua sive re gard ing the relation ship of venue and jurisdi ction unde r Secti on 12 f or tw o re aso ns. “ Firs t, [ Gol dl awr ’s

con cl usi on i n t hi s r egard ] i s di ctum, unrelated to the actualholdings of the case. S econ d, and mo re imp ortant, Gol dl awr

was decided befor e the Supreme Court’s decisi ons in Pure Oil and Bru nette , deci sions i n which the Sup reme Co urt clarif ied the relation ship between speci fic st atutor y venue provisi ons and the gene ral fe deral ve nue stat utes [for alie n corporations].

. . . ” Go-Video , 885 F.2d at

1411. For the

same reasons , the GTE holding, which involved onl y out -of-st ate dom estic

cor por ation s, is u npe rsua sive

. 11 Underly ing the appella nts’ argument for the l ocal cont acts ana ly sis i s an assumpti on that t

he court’ s personal jurisdictio n is limite d to the state to which the cl ass action has been transf erred. T hat ass um ption is unwarranted. Consolidation of the und erlying clas s action in Pe nnsylva nia is only fo r pretrial p urpo ses pu rsuan t to 28 U .S.C. § 140 7. A s corre ctly concluded bythe Dist

rict Court, t he
trans feree court can exer cise per sonal juri sdiction to t

he same extent

that t he
tran sfe ror c our t cou ld. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liabili ty Liti g. , 818 F.2d 145 , 163 ( 2d C ir. 1987 ); In re Telectr onics Paci ng Systems Inc. , 953 F. Supp. 909 (S. D. Ohio 1997). Even under the loc al cont acts ana ly sis, personal jurisdict ion should be assessed at least based on the appella nts’ c ontact s with the five st ates where t

he indivi dual actions were brought, New Jersey, Ohio, De law are, K entu cky, a nd P enn sylvan ia.11

personaljuri sdiction is invoked under t he Clayton Act, j urisdi ction i s based on the defendants ’ contac ts with the Unite d Sta tes a s a w hol e. Access Telecom, I nc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp. , 197 F.3d 694, 718 (5th Cir . 199 9), cert. denied , 531 U.S . 917 ( 200 0) (“W hen ju risdiction is invoked under the C layton Act, the court

exam ines the defe ndan t’s con tacts w ith the Unite d States as a whole to de termine whether the requirements of due process have been met. ”) (ci ting Go-Video ); GoVideo , 885 F.2d at

1415 (affirming the Distri ct Court’ s holdi ng that “ worldwide servic e pro vision of § 12 ju stifies its conclusi on that pe rsonal juri sdiction may be establ ished i n any di stri ct, given the exist ence of suffi cient

nationa l

con tacts ”).

We find support f

or our construction of

Section 12 of

the Clay ton Act in the courts ’ constructi on of Secti on 27 of the Securiti es Exchange Act of 1934. This s ecti on, modeled after Section 12 of

the Clay ton Act, provides in relev ant pa rt:

Any suit or acti on to enforc e any liability or duty cre ated b y this chapter or rul es and regul ations thereunde r, or

to enjoi n any violat ion of such chapter or

rules and regulations , may be brought in anysuch dist

rict or in t he district w herein the de fend ant is found or is an inhabi tant or transacts business , and process in such cases may be served in any other di stri ct of which the defendant i s an inhabi tant or wherever the defendant maybe fou nd.

15 U.S.C. § 78aa ( emphasis added) . The
two section s are re mark ably simila r in their provisi ons for venue and s ervice of process. 12

In the context of const

ruing Sectio n 27 , this Co urt has held b road ly that “ a federalcourt’ s personal jurisdictio n m ay be ass essed on th e bas is of the defendant ’s national c ontact s when the pla inti ff’s cl aim rest s on a federal
stat ute authorizi ng nationwide servi ce of
process. ” Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd.

, 292 F.3d 361, 369 ( 3d Cir. 2002) . Then Chief Judge Becker wrot e in Pinker :
Where Congress has spoke n by authori zing nationwide service of
process,

. . . as it

has in t he Securities Act, the jurisdi ction of a federalcourt nee d not be confined by the defend ant’s
contact s with the state in which the f ede ral co urt si ts. See DeJames v. Magnificenc e Carrier s, I nc. , 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d C ir. 1981 ). Follow ing this

reaso ning , the distric t courts with in this C ircuit ha ve rep eated ly held th at a “n ationa l conta cts analy sis” i s appropri ate “when
appr aising p erson al jurisdic tion in

a case arisi ng under a feder al
stat ute that conta ins a nationwide servi ce of process provisi on.”

12 See

, e.g. , Go Video , 855 F.2d at 1414; Leasco Data Proces sing Equip. Corp. v. M axw ell , 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 n.10 (2d Cir. 19 72); Bu cyrus-E rie , 550 F. Supp. at 1043. Construing Secti on 27 of the Se cu riti es Ex ch an ge A ct, Ju dg e F rie nd ly, writi ng for the c ourt, concluded that the phra se “in s uch c ases” in that sta tute is independent

of the venue pr ovisi on and “speaks expr essly

only to service of
process. ” Leasco , at

1340 (citing United States v. Scophony Corp. , 333 U.S. 795 (19 48) ).12

AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Calif. , 924 F. Supp. 34, 36 (D.N .J. 1996 ); see also Green v. Willi am Mason & Co. , 996 F. Supp. 394, 396 ( D.N.J.1998) (“[A]n asses sment of pers onal jurisdiction under [ a statutory provisi on authori zing nationwide servi ce of process ] necess itates an inquiry into the def endan t’s
contact s with the nationa l forum.”). We too are pers uaded by the reasoni ng of our pri or opinions on the subj ect, and, consistent with s everal of our sister court s of appeal s, hol d that a federalcourt’ s personal juri sdiction may be assess ed on the basis of the defend ant’s nationa l conta cts when the plaint iff’s clai m rests on a

federal
stat ute authorizi ng nationwide

serv ice o f pr oce ss.

Pinker , at 369 -70 (e mp hasis in original). 13 See also Dardana Ltd. v. A.O. Yuganskneftegaz , 317 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2003) (when persona l jurisdictio n ov er a fo reign c orpo ration is based in es sence on the federal lon g-arm stat ute, due process analy sis i nvolves contacts with the United States as a wh ole); Uni te d St at es v. Swis s Am. Bank, Ltd. , 191 F.3d 30, 36 (1st C ir. 199 9) (sam e); Fitzs immons v. Bart on , 589 F .2d 330, 33 3 n.4 (7th C ir. 1979); M ariash v. M orrill , 496 F.2d 1138, 1142- 43 (2d Cir. 1974) (service of process under § 27 of Securi ties Exchange Act requires exam ination of de fendan t’s contacts with the United States as a whole)

. We agree with the holdings of our foregoing s ist er Courts of Appeals and the rat ionale of our deci sion i n Pinker that ha ve constr

ued the si milarl y worded Section 27 of

the Securi ties Exchange Act. We hold that pers onal jurisdi ction in feder al antitr

ust l iti gation i s asses sed on th e bas is of a d efen dant’s aggr egate contacts with the United States as a whole. Our holdi ng in Pinkerand o n this
appe al is con sistent w ith the F edera l Rule of Civ il Procedure 4 (k)(2). 14 Personal 13 Pinker , 292 F.3d at

369-70 (ci ting Republic of Panama v. BCCI H oldings (L uxe mbo ur g) S. A. , 119 F.3d 935, 946- 47 (1 1th C ir. 1997 ); Busch v. Buchman, Buch man & O’B rien Law Firm , 11 F.3d 125 5, 125 8 (5th Cir. 19 94); United Liberty Lif

e Ins. Co. v. Ry an , 985 F.2d 132 0, 133 0 (6th Cir. 19 93); Un ited E lec., Radio & M ach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp. , 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st C ir. 1992 ); Sec. Inves tor Protecti on Corp. v. Vigman , 764 F.2d 1309, 1316 (9th Cir . 198 5), rev’d on other grounds

, Holmes v. Sec. Invest or Prote ction Corp. , 503 U .S. 258 (199 2); Autoscri be Corp. v. Goldman & Stei nberg, I nc. , 1995 WL 56662, at *3 (4th Ci r. Feb. 3, 199 5) (pe r curiam ) (not p reced ential) (citing Hogue v. Milodon Engineeri ng, Inc. , 736 F.2d 989, 991 (4th Cir. 1984 )). 14 Federal Rul e of CivilProcedure 4( k)(2) provides:

If the e xercis e of ju risdiction is consistent with t

he Constit

ution and laws of the Un ited States, servi ng a summons or fil ing a waiver of service i s also e ffecti ve, with res pect t o clai ms arisi ng under federal law, to establi sh personaljuri sdiction over t he
perso n of any def enda nt w ho is not subj ect t o the jurisdi ction of the court s of generaljuri sdiction of any s tate

.13

juri sdiction therein is not li mited t o the defendant’ s contact s with a particul ar fed eral j udi cial d istrict or th e fo rum state

. We hold further

that pe rsonal juri sdiction under Secti on 12 of the Clay ton Act is as broad as the limi ts of due pr ocess under the F ifth A me ndm ent. See Go-Video

, 885 F.2d at 1415 ( “Under the due
proc ess co mp onen t of the Fifth Amendment, a court

must consi der whether the maintenance of the sui t (i .e. the exer cise of pe rsonal juri sdiction over the defendant s to the suit ) offends tradi tionalnotions of fair pl ay and substant ial j usti ce.”) (citing Omni CapitalInt’ l v. Rudol f Wolff & Co., Ltd.

, 484 U.S . 97, 10 2-10 3 (19 87); Int’ l Shoe Corp. v. Washi ngton , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 15 III.

The seco nd issu e certifie d in this appeal is whether we should adopt a first
resort rule i n favor of the procedures under the Hague Conventi on, rat her than the Federa l Rules of Ci vil Pr ocedure, for juri sdictional discovery fr om foreign defe ndan ts in fo reign s ignato ry “host” nations . The appell ants ar gue that juris dicti ona l disc ove ry in G erm any, a Convention signatory nati on, should first proceed under

the Conventi on procedures , rat

her than t

he Federal Rules. The Convention pres cribes
certa in procedures by which a judi cial authori ty in one contracti ng nation may request evidence l ocated i n another nation. Our Supreme Court rej ected a firs t res ort rule in f

avor of the Convention i n a case where per sonal juri sdiction was not contested and t he discovery sought

involved onl y the

me rits o f the cas e. Soc iete N ationa le Industriell e Aerospati ale v. United States Dis t. Cou rt

fo r t he S. Dis t. of

Io wa , 482 U.S. 522 (1987) . The appell ants ar gue spec ifically that w e sho uld ca rve o ut a narrow exception to t

he Ae rospa tiale decisi on where, as here, pers onal juri sdiction has y et to be establ ished and the dis covery sought i s li mited t o proof of juri sdiction. 16

A. “Under this provisi on, a defendant sued und er fed eral law may be subje ct to juri sdiction based on i ts cont acts wit h the United States as a whole, when the defendant i s not subj ect t o personal juri sdiction in any

stat e. Rule 4( k)(2) confers p ersonal jurisdiction ov er a defendant s o long as t

he exerci se of juri sdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fi fth Amendment.” Dardana , 317 F.3d at

207 (citing 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Pr acti ce and Proced ure § 10 68.1, at 612, 61 6 (2002 ); Chew v. Dietri ch , 143 F.3d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir .), cert. denied , 525 U.S . 948 (19 98) ).

15 We note, as di d the Go-Video cour t, th at th e Su pr eme Cou rt

ha s o n t wo occasions explic itl y decl ined to de cide the co nstitution ality of natio nal co ntacts

ana lysis. See 885 F.2 d at 1 414 n.8 (citing Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd. , 484 U.S. 97, 102-103 n.5 (1987); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court , 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (plurality opinion)). 16 The Federal Republ ic of Germany and the Federation of German I ndustri es have submitted briefs as amicus curi ae in support of

the appel lants ’ posit

ion for this second is sue on appeal , urgi ng

revers al of the District Court . The bri ef of amicus curi ae submitted by t he Comm it te e t o Su ppo rt

th e An ti tr

us t L aws supports the pla inti ffs’ posi tion, urging affirmation o f the D istrict Court

.14

Ae rospa tiale holds that the Hague Convention does not

provide exc lusi ve procedures for obtai ning documents and information located in a foreign sign ator y natio n’s te rritor y. Ae rospa tiale first rejects a rule of exclus ive use or a rule of first use as a m atter of law in favor of the Convention on the ground that ne ither

the la nguage nor the negotiating hi story

of the Conventi on sup por t suc h ru les. Ae rospa tiale , 482 U .S . at 53 3- 36 . S pe cif ica lly, Ae rospa tiale holds that the C onven tion’s plain l anguage, as well as t he hist ory of its proposal and rati fication by the Unite d States , unambiguousl y suppor ts the conclusion that it

was “intended as a permissi ve supplement , not apreempti ve replac ement, for

other means of obtaini ng evidence l ocated abr oad.” Id. at 536 (emphasi s added). The Convention’s preamble spe aks in nonmandatory terms, speci fying it s purpose to “faci lit ate” di scoveryand to “i mprove mutual j udicia l co-oper ation. ” Id. at 53 4. Similarly , it s text

uses permi ssive language, and does not expressly modify the law o f contracting states o r require them to use t

he specif ied proce dures or cha nge their ow n pr oce dur es. Id. Accordingly , the Convention does not depr ive the Distric t Cou rt of its juri sdiction to or der, under the Federa l Rules of Civi l Procedur e, a for eign nation al party to th e pro ceed ing to produce evi dence phy sical ly locat ed wit hin its terr itory. Id. at 53 9-4 0.

Ae rospa tiale rejec ts next a rule of firs t res ort favoring the Convention on grounds of i nternat

ional c omityand respect for the “ judici al sovereignty ” of the si gnatorynation i n which evidence

sou ght is loc ated

. Id. at 54 2-4 3. Intern ationa l com ity does no t require in all inst ances that American litigant s first
resort to the Convention procedures befo re initiating disco very pu rsuan t to our Fed eral R ules

. Id. at 542-44. The concept of comi ty requir es in t his cont ext “a more particularized a naly sis” of the respective int erests of the foreign host nation a nd the reque sti ng nation t han a blan ket f irst re sort r ule w oul d ge ner ate. Id. at 54 3-4 4. Ae rospa tiale notes that in many si tuati ons, the Convention procedures would be undulytimecons um ing an d exp ensiv e, and less likely to produce ne eded evidence than direct

use of th e Fe der al R ules

. Id. at 54 2-4 3. How ever, the Convention’s procedures, althou gh n ot ma ndato ry, are ava ilable whenever theywill fa cili tate the gatheri ng of evidence, and applyin the
sense that the y ar e one method of seeki ng evid enc e tha t a co urt m ay elec t. Id. at 541

. Ae rospa tiale declines to hold “as a blanket m atter that comity requires resort to Hague evidence conventi on procedure. ” Id. at 544. Therefore, the determi nation of

whether to resort

to the Co nven tion req uires “ prior sc rutiny in each case of the particular fact s, soverei gn interests, and like lihood t hat such resor

t willprove effective. ” Id. (est ablis hing the t

hree-pr ong test

for determi ning whether to resort to the Con vention).

Ae rospa tiale acknowledges that “both the discovery rules se t fort h in the Federal Rul es of CivilProcedure and t he Hague Convention are t he law of the United States.” Id. at 533. However, the Federal Rules are “the normal methods” for federa l li tigat

ion invol ving forei gn nationa l parties unl ess the “optiona l” or “supplement al” Conventi on procedures prove to be c onducive t o discovery under

som e circ um stan ces

. Id. at 536 (“t he Convention was intended as a permissi ve supplement , not apre-empti ve replac ement, for

other means of obtaini ng evidence l ocated abr oad”) (em pha sis ad ded ), 538 (both t he text and negotiating hi story

of the Conventi on15

show that “it was intended to establi sh optionalproc edur es that w ould facilitate the taking of evi dence abroad”) (emphasis added), 541 ( “the optional Co nven tion pro cedu res are availa ble whenever theywill fa cili tate the gatheri ng of evidence by the means authori zed in the Convention”) (emphasis added), 542 ( “the normal methods of the Fed eral R ules o f Civ il Proced ure”) (emp hasis adde d).

Notwithst anding it s rej ecti on of the f irst re sort r ule, Ae rospa tiale instruc ts the American cour

ts t o “exerci se speci al vigil ance to pr otect

foreign l iti gants fr om the da nger that un nece ssary, or un duly burdensome, di scoverymay pla ce them in a dis advantageous position.” Id. at 546. “Jud icial supervision of discovery shou ld alw ays seek to min imize its costs and inconveni ence and to pr event imp rop er u ses o f dis cov ery req ues ts. When it is ne cessary t o seek evide nce abroad, however, the distri ct court must supervi se pret

rialproceedi ngs particularly closely to prevent discovery abuses. ” Id.

Ae rospa tiale has n ot exp licitly addresse d, however, the is sue of which partybears the burden of convi ncing the court of a n “optiona l” and “supplement al” use of

the Conventi on procedures in a part

icular case. Nor has Ae rospa tiale , invol ving forei gn defendants over whom the tri al court had undisput ed personaljuri sdiction, addr essed the issu e of w hat pro cedu res to follow in a case, as here, w here jurisdiction is contested an d discove ry sought i s li mited onl y t o proof of juri sdiction.

B.

The appella nts ar gue that the Distri ct Court e rred i n extendi ng the Ae rospa tiale holding t o the underl yi ng litigati on where theyhave contes ted jurisdictio n and the disc over y sough t is limi ted to pr oof of juri sdiction. The appell ants se ek our revi ew of only t he Distri ct Court’ s legalconclusi on that t he Ae rospa tiale hold ing ap plies eq ually to juri sdictional di scovery . This c erti fied is su e i nvo lv es a p ur e q ue stio n of la w, subject to our pl enary and de novo

rev iew

. Specifi call y, the appel lants argue that Ae rospa tiale is not ap plicab le to jurisdictio nal disc over y and tha t this Co urt sho uld ad opt a f irst resort ru le in favor of the Hague Convention procedures based on consi derati ons of internationa l comity and r espect f or the Germ an sove reignty, the host signatory nation where discovery i s to be conducted. They ar gue that the Ae rospa tiale balan cing a ppro ach is premised expressly

on the exi stence of personal jurisdiction in tha t case. Wh ere juri sdiction is disput ed and not y et establ ished, theyassert

the bal ancing approach must yield to a rul e of first
resort.

The appella nts st ress t he spli t of autho rities am ong fede ral district c ourts and state courts regardi ng the ext ension of Ae rospa tiale to jurisdi ctiona l disco very. Th ey cite for s upp ort GeoCul tu re , I nc . v . S ia m In v. Mgmt . S .A

. , 936 P.2d 1063, 1067 ( Or. Ct. App. 1997) (requi ring pl ainti ff to conduct ju ris di cti on al d isc ov er y, at lea st i ni tia lly, only through t

he Hague Convention, noting t hat pla inti ff had fail ed to al lege a prima faci e basis for asse rti ng jurisdictio n ov er the d efen dant); Jenco v. Martech Int ’l, Inc. , No. Civ. A. 86-4229, 1988 WL 54733 at *1 (E.D. La. May 19, 1988) (hol ding, wit

h almost no

mea ning ful an alysis, that certa in juri sdictional di scoveryrequest s must be16

made under the Hague Conventi on because “[w]hi le judi cial economy may dictate th at the F edera l Rule s of C ivil Procedure s hould be used, the interest s of protect ing a fore ign li tigant

in li ght of the jurisdictional problem s are paramount”) 17 ; and Knight v. For d Motor Co. , 615 A .2d 297, 30 1 n.11 (N .J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) ( noting, in dict a, that “[i]f jurisdiction does n ot exist over a foreign party

. . . the Conventi on may provide t he onlyrecours e for obta ining evidence ”).

The appella nts re ly also on a report by the SpecialCommission of the Hague Conference att ended, among others , by delegations fr om the United Sta tes a nd G erm any. See Hague Con fe re nc e o n Priv at e I nt er na ti ona l L aw: Special Commission Report on t he Operation of

the Hague Servi ce Convention and t

he Hague Evidence Co nve ntio n, A pril 1 989

, reprin ted in 28 Int’ l Law Material s 1556 (1989). The
repo rt stated th at wh ile view s varie d as to whether the Hague Convention “occup ied the field and therefore exclu ded a pplica tion of dom estic proceduralrules ,” “the Commission thought that in allContracting States, whatever their vi ews as to i ts excl usive applic ation, p riority shou ld be g iven to the proce dures offer ed by t he Convention when evidence loc ated abr oad is bei ng sought. ” Id. at 1564, 1569. The appell ants ar gue that

the st atement i n the
repo rt that “p riority” sho uld b e give n to the C onv ention shou ld be e ntitled to substant ial de ference.

The appella nts ar e correc t that Ae rospa tiale makes numerous refe rences to the e xist ence of persona l jurisdi ction in that case. We dis agree, however, that the Ae rospa tiale holding i s dependent on personaljuri sdiction. As concl uded by the Dist rict Court here a nd the Dist rict Court for t

he District of

Columbia, which consider ed the same ar gument rai sed by the same defenda nt, BASF AG, in In re Vitamins Anti trust

Liti g. , 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2000), a t rialcourt has auth ority to dete rmin e its ju risdi ction

. See Ins. Corp. of Ir eland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxite s de Guinee , 456 U.S . 694, 7 06 (1 982 ) (“B y subm itting to the jurisdi ction of

the Court f

or the limi ted purpos e of chall enging jurisdictio n, the d efen dant a grees to abide bythat c ourt’ s determinati on on the is sue of jurisdi ction” ). Because the District Court has j urisdicti on over these foreign de fendants to the ext ent necessary to determ ine wh ether they are subject to pers onal jurisdi ction, we see no legal barri er to exe rcis ing the discr etion gi ven to trial c ourts by Ae rospa tiale in cases of juri sdictional disc ove ry. See In re Vit amins , at 49.

We agree with the majorit y of t rial
courts ’ decis ions that the re shoul d be no excepti on to the Ae rospa tiale holding for juris dicti ona l disc ove ry. See In re Vitamins , at 49; Rich v. KIS Cali fornia, Inc. , 1 21 F. R.D. 254 , 2 60 ( M.D. N.C. 1988) ( Ae rospa tiale “did not c arve out any exc eption f

or disputes invol ving
perso nal jurisd iction” ); Fish el v. BASF Group , 1 75 F .R .D . 5 25, 529 (S .D . I owa 1997) ( Ae rospa tiale provides that t he Hag ue Co nvention p rocedure s are optionaland do not dive st feder al dis tri ct courts of au thority to order discovery und er the F edera l Rule s); In re Bed ford 17 Jenco left

undisturbed a portion of the magistr ate’s opinion al lowing interrog atories a nd d ocum ent req uests directed at a for eign part y t o proceed under the Fede ral Rule s and overturned only the magist

rate’ s ruli ng allowing depositions t o be taken under the Federa l Rules.17

Computer Corp. , 114 B .R. 2, 5-6 (Ba nkr. D.N.H. 1990) (ci ting Rich and all owing discovery l imit ed to jurisdi ctiona l is sues to p roc eed und er th e Fe der al R ules ).

Unlike Geo -Culture , rel ied on by the appel lants , where the plaint iff fai led to all ege even a pri ma facie cas e of personal jurisdiction, the D istrict Court found that

the pla inti ffs here had establ ished a prima facie case of pers onal juri sdiction, aconclusi on not chal lenged by the appellant s. The plaintiffs’ allegations am ounted, theref ore, to more than “mere blanket fishing expeditions” and were “not the ty pe of bare-bone d allega tions th at pote ntially could lead to the fi shing expedi tions of obvious
concern t o the si gnatorycountri es.” In re Vitamins , 120 F. Supp. 2d at 50.

The appella nts al so rel ied on the Federal Rul es to chal lenge the District Cou rt ’s pe rs ona l j ur is di ctio n. As we have stated above, i t is well est ablis hed that t he tri al court

has inher ent power and juri sdiction to dec ide whether it has juris dicti on. Ins. Corp. of Ir eland , 456 U.S . at 706 . The appe llants’ arg um ents are al so premise d on the ass umption that there is n o per sona l jurisdictio n in this case. Such an assum ption is prem ature and unwarrante d unless t he resul t of the
pe ndi ng j ur is di ctio na l d is co ve rysh ows otherwis e. At this st age, where t he
appe llants ha ve vo luntarily ap peare d in the court to chal lenge j urisdi ction a nd juri sdictional di scoveryis pendi ng, the Distri ct Court i ndisput ablyhas jurisdictio n to d eterm ine w hethe r there is personaljuri sdiction upon completion of juri sdictional di scovery . Moreover, the denial of resort to Hague convention
proc edur es fo r jurisdic tional d iscov ery is not unfai r to t

he appell ants because they “[ha d] take n adv antag e of th e [F edera l] [R]ule allow ing them a preliminary hearing a nd determi nation of the is sues rais ed in the ir moti on.” See Fishel , 175

F.R.D. at 529.

Accordingly , the distincti on drawn by the appell ants between “me rits” disc over y and “ju risdiction al” discovery, predicated on a false dichotomyof having and not having juri sdiction, a mounts to no r eal differe nce because t

he court ha s ju ris di cti on fo r e ith er typ e o f d isc ov er y. 18 The undispute d presence of pe rsonal juri sdiction in Ae rospa tiale is, theref ore, tange ntial to its h olding and irr eleva nt to the issue of w hether Ae rospa tiale applie s als o t o j ur isd ict io na l d isc ov er y.

There are ot

her reas ons supporting our conclus ion that

the Ae rospa tiale balanci ng approach appl ies equal ly to the determi nation of

whether the Hague Convention proc edures shoul d be used initia lly for ju risdi ction al dis cov ery. First , where Ae rospa tiale has categ orically rejec ted a f irst resort ru le for “meri ts” di scovery , which we can expect t o be more comprehensi ve or burdensome than j urisdi ctiona l disco very, there is mo re justific ation to reject a first resort rule for the m ore limi ted and l ess int

rusive juri sdictional disc ove ry. See Fishel , 175 F.R. D. at 529 (“The ascertainment

of facts be aring on personaljuri sdiction normall y i nvolves the least intrusive type of inqu iries.”).

Second, where Ae rospa tiale has rejec ted the firs t res ort rule even though the French de fendants t here may have

18 No one w ould dispu te that if juri sdiction dis covery yi elds no evi dence suffici ent to e stabl ish per sonal juri sdiction, t

he court must

dismis s the underlyi ng action against the appell ants, rather than deci ding which set of
pr oc ed ur al r ul es to ap pl y.18

faced possi ble penalsancti on under France’s “blocking statute, ” there is l ess justification for us to ad opt a first resort rule where t

he appell ants her e face no such sanction because Germany has no “blo ckin g sta tute.” 19 Ae rospa tiale reiterate s the well -settled vi ew that “[blocki ng] statutes do not depri ve an Am erican cou rt of the pow er to order a partysubject

to it s juri sdiction to pr oduce evidence eve n though the a ct of producti on may viol ate that st atute .” 482 U.S. at 544- 45 n.29 (concluding that “the enactment of

such a st atute by a foreign nation ” can not b e allow ed to “ graft a rule of firs t res ort ont o the Hague Convention, or otherwise to pr ovide the nationa ls of suc h a country with a preferred stat

us in our c ourts” ). Neit her the appellants nor their supporters, Germany or t

he Federation of German Industries, have disputed the plainti ffs’
stat ement that

Germany, unl ike France

, doe s no t hav e a “ blo ckin g sta tute,” crimin al or civ il, that spec ifically proh ibits pro ductio n of docu men ts in connecti on with forei gn judici al or administ rati ve proceedi ngs. Nor have theyidenti fied a si ngle ins tance where a German nationalhas been pros ecuted, penali zed, or s ancti oned under German law fo r comp lying with discovery orders from a United St ates j udicia l or administ rati ve proceedi ng pursuant to the Federal Rules.

Third, where Ae rospa tiale has rejected the adopti on of a blanket first
resort rule bas ed on the prof

fered rea sons of re sp ec tin g t he “ju di cia l so ve re ig nt y” of the si gnatoryhost nation and
pr eve nt in g di sc ove ryabu se , t he s ame reasons pro ffered b y the appellants here must failas well. 482 U.S. at 543- 44 (findi ng no textua l support in the Hague Convention for

a firs t res ort rule and opting for

a three -prong bal ancing approach), 545-46 (sugges ting t hat burden some o r intrusive discove ry practi ce is not

a suffici ent ground for adopting t

he firs t res ort rule becaus e the trial cou rt has a n inh erent d uty to supervi se disc overy and prevent disc ove ry abu se).

The appe llants an d their supporte rs argue general ly that Germany is a ci vil l aw country where the gathering of evidence i s a judi cial functi on and that pursuing di scoverywithout r esort to the Co nven tion m ay be de eme d an a ffron t to Germany’s soverei gnty . The Ae rospa tiale Court, a s well as other
courts , has found s uch argument “unpersuas ive. ” Id. at 543 ; see also Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Harnischfeger

Corp. , 1990 WL 147066, at *2 (N .D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1990); Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH , 531 N.Y .S. 2 d 18 8, 19 1 (N .Y. S up. C t. 19 88)

. As observed by the court in In re Vitamins , 120 F . Sup p. 2d a t 50, the re is
no reason t o assume that discovery under the F edera l Rule s wo uld ine vitably offend G ermany’s sovereign int erest because pre sumably Germany, l ike the United States, would pr ohibit the al leged price-f ixing c onsp iracy and wo uld welcome investigation of such antitrust vio latio n to the f ulles t exte nt. See 19 Ae rospa tiale , 482 U.S . at 52 6 n.6 (quoti ng Articl e 1A of the French “blocki ng stat

ute, ” French Penal Code Law No. 80-538) (“Subjec t to t reati es or interna tional a greem ents an d app licable laws and regul ations , it is prohibited f

or any party to re ques t, seek o r disclo se, in writi ng, oral ly or otherwise, economi c, commercial, indust

rial , financial or techni cal documents or information leadi ng to the c onsti tuti on of evidence with a vie w to foreign j udicia l or adm inistrative proc eedin gs or in

con nec tion ther ew ith.”)

.19

Germany’s Act Against Rest raint s of Competiti on § 1; Treaty Est ablis hing the Euro pean Eco nom ic Co mm unity, Art. 81(1 ). The re is also no re ason to “be lieve that t he s ove reig n in teres ts of

. . . forei gn signat ory nations would be any more offended by [the] narrower jurisdictio nal disc over y than the y wou ld be by t he broader, merits -rel ated di sc ov er y all ow ed by Aerospati ale. ” In re Vitami ns , 12 0 F

. Su pp

. 2d at 51

. We likewise conclude that the appell ants’ general argument i s unpersuas ive. 20

Similarly , foll owing the Ae rospa tiale holding, we also find unpersuasi ve the appel lants ’ argument that a firs t res ort t o the Hague Co nven tion is req uired to avoid poss ible burden some o r intrusive discove ry pra ctice und er U nited Sta tes la w. Ae rospa tiale , 482 U .S. at 54 5-46 ; see also Great Lakes , 1990 WL 147066, at *2, and Scarminach , 531 N.Y.S. 2d at 191. Discovery abus e is an i nsuffici ent reason t o avoid the Federal Rul es beca use th e app ellants h ave re med ies in the District Cou rt to restrict discovery abuse. W e expec t that the District Cou rt wil l f ol lo w Ae rospa tiale ’s ins truction and “ exerc ise spe cial vig ilance ” to protec t appe llants fro m u ndu ly bur den som e or abu sive disc ove ry. Ae rospa tiale , at

546.

We agree w ith the District Cou rt’s legal conclusi on that t

he Ae rospa tiale balan cing te st app lies equ ally to jurisdictio nal disc over y and tha t there is no firs t res ort rule in f

avor of the Hague Convention proc edures for juri sdictional di sc ov er y.

C.

The appella nts al so argue alte rnati velythat e ven if the Ae rospa tiale balan cing a ppro ach a pplies to juri sdictional di scovery , the three- prong test would favor fir st use of the Convention proc edures i n this case. The Distric t Cou rt rejected that arg um ent, ruli ng that t

he appell ants bor e the burde n of persuasion under the balancing test and that t hey f ailed to sa tisfy th e bu rde n. The court concl uded alt ernati velythat even if the plai ntiff

s bore the burden of
persu asion , they had subm itted ad equa te evidence to show that the balancing test disfavor ed firs t use of t he Convention
proc edur es fo r jurisdic tional d iscov ery in this c ase

. We agree firs t with t

he District Court’s c onclusi on of law that the appell ants bear

the burden of

persuasi on as to t he optiona l use of t

he Convention
pro ced ure s. See Ae rospa tiale , 482 U. S. at 547 (s tati ng that t

he court s hould give “the f oreign litigant a f ull and fair opportuni ty to dem onstra te appr opriate reasons f or employ ing Conventi on pr oce dur es in th e fi rs t i nst anc e, for som e aspects of the di scoveryprocess” ) (e mpha si s a dde d) . Th is la ngu age se ems 20 Ap pellan ts and espe cially their supporte rs, Germany and the Federation of German Industries, stre ss the
controver sialcharact er of the “narrow majorit y” dec isi on in Ae rospa tiale and prof ess the ir strong disag reem ent w ith the Ae rospa tiale holding t hat the Hague Convention proc edures ar e merelyan opt ion al su ppl em ent to the F ede ral R ules

. We mu st reject th eir invita tion to d eviate fr om Ae rospa tiale bas ed o n t he s ame proffered reasons, found insuffi cient by the Ae rospa tiale Court, of respecti ng internationa l comity and pr eventi ng disco very abu se. A s a sub ordin ate co urt,

we are bound by the Suprem e Cou rt’s
prece dent.20

to imply that the propo sing party bears the b urd en o f pe rsua sion

. See also In re Vitamins , 120 F. Supp. 2d at 51-52 (holdi ng that pr oposing party bears the burden ); Valois of Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp. , 183 F.R. D. 344, 346 (D. Conn. 199 7) (sam e); Dos te r v . S ch en k A. G.

, 141 F.R.D. 50, 51-52 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (“[I]t is m ore p ractical, if n ot logic al, to place the burden of pers uasion on t he proponent of us ing the Hague Co nven tion.”); Rich , 121 F.R. D. at 257- 58 (sam e); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp. , 118 F.R. D. 386, 389 (D.N .J. 1987) (sam e); but see Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & C o. , 117 F.R .D. 33 , 38 (N .D.N .Y. 19 87); Knight

, 615 A.2 d at 3 00.

We also agree wit

h the Dist

rict Co urt’s co nclus ions th at the a ppella nts have fail ed to satisfytheir burden of persuasi on under the Ae rospa tiale balanci ng test

and that the evi dence on record di sfavors t

he firs t use of t

he Convention proc edures for juri sdictional disco very. Th e cou rt’s con clusion s in these two instances are revi ewed only for abuse of dis creti on, and we find none.

IV.

For the for egoing rea sons, t he orders of the Dist rict Court cert

ifie d for review on th is interloc utory app eal w ill be affirmed. Costs are taxed agai nst the
app ellan ts.

ROTH , Circ uit J udge, concur ring 21 :

I wri te se par at el y to exp re ss my

concern thatthe Hague Convention ha s been gi ven sho rt

shrif t s in ce t he S upr eme Cou rt’s dec is ion in Soc iété N ationa le

I ndu strielle Aerospati ale v. United States Distri ct Cou rt for the Sou thern Distri ct of Io wa , 482 U.S. 522 (1987) . The servi ce provisi ons of the Hague Conventi on were adopted by the Presi dent and appr oved by

a una ni mo us vote of the Senate i n 1972. Id. at 530. The provisi ons then bec ame the “l aw of the l and,” coexi sti ng with other federal law suc h as the Fe dera l R ules of Civil Pro ced ure

. U.S. C onst. art. VI, cl. 2. In Ae rospa tiale , t he Hague Convention

wa s referr ed t o as a “permi ssive
supp leme nt” and an “opti onal proce dure. ” Id. at 536. However the Hague Convention is onl y as “optiona l” as decidi ng to use the F edera l Rule s is “optio nal” in such a ca se. The Convention does not o verw rite the Federal Rul es of Civil Proc edur e, but it is i n no way inferior to th em

.

U nf or tu na tel y, I belie ve the language used in Aero spatia le has unin te ntiona lly compounded the probl em inherent with the Conve n tion: that “relative ly few judges are e xperienc ed i n the area [ of in tern ationa l law] and t he proced ur es of foreign legal systems are often poorlyunderst ood.” Aer os patiale

, 482 US. at 552 (B lackmu n, J., dissenting). Many times, rather

than wade thr ough the mire of a complex set

of foreign s tatutes and case la w, jud ges m argina li ze the Convention as an unnecess ary “option. ” I b elie ve the Ae rospa tiale decisi on shou l d be reexamined t o ensure that lower cour ts

are in fact e xercis ing “s pecia l vigilan ce to prot ect fore ign li tigant s” an d demonstrating respect

“for any soverei gn interest expresse d by the forei gn state .” Id. at 485

. Currentl y, I fear t hat many

cour ts ar e s im pl y d iscar ding the t reaty as

an unnecessary has sle.

Our sage coll eague, Judge Jos eph F. Weis, Jr. , has opined that f irst resort to the Hague Convention is in fact appropri ate: 21 Judge McKee shares the conc erns expr essed herein and jo ins this concurri ng opinion.21

The arguments mustered against giving priority to C onvention procedures ar e

n ot persu asiv e whe n balanced with th e

o verri ding interests

, nationa l and in t ernatio nal, i n mo re eff ectiv e implementa tion of th e Evidence Con vention. It

s hou ld be remembered, after all, tha t the trea ty negotiated by the United Sta tes and t he othe r signat ories is for th e bene fit o f priva te litigants

as a whole – som e inconveni ence or expense to an indivi dual li tigant shou ld not suffi ce to jeopardi ze an arrangement which bene fit s m any

. Moreov er, throug h rati fication, the Unite d States has agr ee d to honor the commitments which the treaty con ta in s. The judiciary shou ld no t lightly
perm it a pri v ate litigan t to under mine expr e s s

na tio na l p ol icy.

Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Rul es and the Hagu e Co n ventions : Concerns of Co nfo rmity and C om ity , 50 U

. P itt. L. Rev. 90 3, 931 (Sp ring, 1989).

Judge Weis’s vi ew mirrors t he conclusi ons of the Special Commission of the Hague Conference of A pril 198 9, that, whateverthe vie ws of the deleg ates as to applic a t ion of domestic procedural rules, “prior ity should be gi ven to the pr ocedures offered by the Convention when evidenc e locat ed abroad is being sou ght.” Hague Conference of P riv at e I nt er na ti ona l L aw: Special Commission Report on t he Operation of th e Hague S ervic e Convention and the Hague Evidence Convention, Apr i l 19 89, reprin ted in 28 Int’l Law Ma terials 1556, 156 9 (1989 ). Among the del egates at the 1989 meetin g of the Spe c ial Commissi on was one from the U nited Sta tes.

I reco gni ze that

we are bound by Ae rospa tiale but I believ e that it is time for the Supreme Court to r evisi t that decisi on

– parti cularl y because I per ceive that many of our c ourts h ave n ot exe rcis ed th e “specia l vig ila nce to protect for eign liti gants” that th e Su pr eme C o ur t antic ipate d.

Finall y, under the precedent of Ae rospa tiale , I do not opp ose the pan el’s conclusi on that t

he burden of pers uasion lies with the partyadvocati ng the use of the Hague Convention. In an idea l world, however, if the treat y were t o be given the priorit

y to which its status as a rati fied treaty

entitles i t, Ido not beli eve that the burd en of persu asion shou ld lie with the pr oponent of the Hague Convention procedures.