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STEVE MARTORELLI v. DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION

(SC 19307)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Robinson, Js.

Argued January 15—officially released April 28, 2015

Michael Feldman, with whom was Steve Martorelli,

self-represented, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Gregory T. D’Auria, solicitor general, with whom

were Charles H. Walsh, assistant attorney general, and,

on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, and Jane

R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

ROGERS,C. J. The primary issue that we mustresolve

in this appeal is what livery service permit applicants

must demonstrate in order to establish that ‘‘public

convenience and necessity will be improved’’ by the

proposed service pursuant to General Statutes § 13b103 (a).1 The plaintiff, Steve Martorelli, appeals from

the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal

and affirming the decision of the defendant, the Department of Transportation (department), denying his application for a livery service permit. On appeal, the plaintiff

claims that the trial court improperly affirmed the

department’s finding that the plaintiff failed to fully

satisfy the statutory requirements for obtaining a permit

because the department improperly interpreted the

‘‘public convenience and necessity’’ provision of § 13b103 (a). We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court in part.

The record sets forth the following undisputed facts

and procedural history relevant to our resolution of

this appeal. On April 5, 2011, the plaintiff submitted an

application to the department for authority to operate

two motor vehicles in a new intrastate livery service

located in Meriden. In the plaintiff’s application, he

declared that he would be the sole proprietor of the

livery service, and would offer livery services by van

and a ‘‘super stretch’’ limousine, both of which had a

capacity of ten passengers. The plaintiff also submitted

a fiscal analysis balance sheet demonstrating his financial assets, liabilities and capital.

After receiving the plaintiff’s application, the department issued notice for a public hearing on the plaintiff’s

application, which it held on June 28, 2012. A representative of a local limousine service, A Premier Limousine

Services, Inc. (Premier), attended the hearing and was

granted intervenor party status pursuant to General

Statutes § 4-177a.2 The plaintiff called eight witnesses

to testify on his behalf and testified himself as to his

financial ability and suitability, his ability to manage a

livery service, and his proposed plan to offer lower

rates than existing livery services. The plaintiff testified

specifically that his services would be less expensive

than existing livery services in Meriden and would

attract local businesses as customers seeking to transport employees or clients. The department took administrative notice of the plaintiff’s proposed rates and

Premier’s rates.

Following the hearing, the department concluded

that the plaintiff did not satisfy his burden of proving

the statutory requirement that his livery service would

improve present or future public convenience and

necessity. The department considered general statutory

factors for granting permit applications, including ‘‘the

suitability of the applicant . . . the financial responsi-
bility of the applicant, the ability of the applicant efficiently and properly to perform the service for which

authority is requested and the fitness, willingness and

ability of the applicant to conform to the provisions of

the statutes and the requirements and regulations of

the department thereunder, in accordance with . . .

§ 13b-103.’’ The department then determined that the

plaintiff had sufficient assets to cover his start-up costs

and was a suitable applicant based upon his business

experience in other business ventures and his clean

criminal record. The department found, however, that

while the plaintiff ‘‘spent a good deal of time attempting

to prove the public need for his livery service by pointing out problems he found with [Premier] . . . such

[problems] . . . are minor in nature and do nothing to

prove a need for the [plaintiff’s] service.’’ The department concluded that, ‘‘[w]hile it is certainly clear that

the [plaintiff] is well liked, the testimony of [his] witnesses falls short [of] proving need and necessity. Few

of the witnesses had any real need for a livery service;

in fact, taxicab service could have taken care of most

of their needs and been far less expensive. Most of

these individuals had not called other livery services

and had little experience with getting livery service in

the [local] area and therefore their lack of experience

shed little light onto the livery situation.’’ The department thereafter denied the plaintiff’s application based

upon his failure to demonstrate that his service would

improve public convenience and necessity as required

by § 13b-103 (a) (1).

The plaintiff appealed from the department’s decision

to the trial court, claiming that the department improperly concluded that he failed to establish that public

convenience and necessity would be improved by his

proposed livery service. He further claimed that § 13b103 (a) (4), which allows persons who have already

held an intrastate livery permit for at least one year

to obtain up to two additional vehicle authorizations

without a hearing and without written notice of the

pendency of the application, violates the equal protection clause of the United States and Connecticut constitutions, the interstate commerce clause of the United

States constitution, and the due process clauses of the

United States and Connecticut constitutions. The trial

court concluded that § 13b-103 was constitutional and

that the department properly determined that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that public convenience

and necessity would be improved by his livery service,

and, accordingly, the court affirmed the department’s

decision and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal. This

appeal followed.3

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court

improperly: (1) affirmed the department’s denial of the

plaintiff’s livery permit application;(2)found that § 13b103 (a) (4) did not violate the equal protection clauses

of the United States and Connecticut constitutions; (3)
found that § 13b-103 (a) did not violate the interstate

commerce clause of the United States constitution; and

(4) found that § 13b-103 (a) was not constitutionally

void for vagueness in violation of the due process

clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions. We agree with the plaintiff’s first claim but affirm

the trial court’s judgment on the remaining claims.

I

The plaintiff contends that the evidence he presented

of his ability to offer rates lower than those of existing

livery service providers satisfied the public convenience

and necessity requirement of § 13b-103 (a) (1), and that

the department’s conclusion to the contrary was ‘‘unreasonable and arbitrary . . . .’’ He also contends that the

phrase ‘‘public convenience and necessity’’ is undefined

and that the department never explained what facts or

evidence would be sufficient to meet this standard.

Finally, the plaintiff claims that the department improperly relied on the fact that the plaintiff presented no

witnesses who were refused service by existing livery

service providers as the sole factor for finding that he

failed to satisfy the public convenience and necessity

requirement, and that this requirement to show specific,

individualized need is wholly inconsistent with Briggs

Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 148 Conn. 678,

682, 174 A.2d 529 (1961), wherein this court interpreted

public convenience and necessity to mean a ‘‘benefit

to the public generally, and . . . upon the whole public

instead of a small part of it . . . .’’

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of

review. ‘‘Judicial review of [an administrative agency’s]

action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act [General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.] . . . and

the scope of that review is very restricted.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Palomba-Bourke v.Commissioner of Social Services, 312 Conn. 196, 202, 92 A.3d

932 (2014) ‘‘Ordinarily, this court affords deference to

the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute’s

purposes. . . . Cases that present pure questions of

law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than

is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of

the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 203. ‘‘[A]n agency’s interpretation of a statute is accorded deference when the

agency’s interpretation has been formally articulated

and applied for an extended period of time, and that

interpretation is reasonable.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 284 Conn. 149, 164, 931 A.2d 890 (2007).

The department has not formally articulated its interpretation of the phrase ‘‘public convenience and necessity’’ in § 13b-103 (a)(1) and, in fact, department hearing

officers have utilized different standards in prior deci-
sions.4 Accordingly, the department’s interpretation of

§ 13b-103 is not entitled to special deference. See Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission,

supra, 284 Conn. 166 (agency interpretation accorded

deference when it is ‘‘both time-tested and reasonable’’). We therefore apply a de novo standard ofreview.

Id. ‘‘When construing a statute,[o]urfundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to

determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z5 directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes.’’ (Footnote in original; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Stone-Krete Construction,Inc. v. Eder,

280 Conn. 672, 677, 911 A.2d 300 (2006). ‘‘When a statute

is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative

policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles

governing the same general subject matter . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gilmore v. Pawn

King, Inc., 313 Conn. 535, 543, 98 A.3d 808 (2014). ‘‘We

make every effort to construe a statutory scheme as a

consistent whole.’’ Powers v. Ulichny, 185 Conn. 145,

149, 440 A.2d 885 (1981).

We conclude that the phrase ‘‘public convenience

and necessity’’ is ambiguous in that it does not establish

factors that the department must consider when

determining whether an applicant has established that

the new service will improve public convenience and

necessity. Because the language of § 13b-103 is ambiguous, we may considerits legislative history. The relevant

portion of § 13b-103 (then General Statutes § 16-326)

was enacted in 1959 to address competition that public

service motor vehicle owners faced from livery service

carriers.6 Public Acts 1959, No. 599. In the sparse legislative history on the provision, Senator John F. Pickett,

Jr., offered that adding the phrase ‘‘public convenience

and necessity’’ was ‘‘designed to assist in some small

way . . . public transportation operators and owners

of this state . . . [in facing] the competition [that] mass

transportation system owners receiv[e] from persons

operating livery services in competition with our bus

lines.’’ 8 S. Proc., Pt. 7, 1959 Sess., p. 3212. The Joint

Standing Committee Hearings on transportation provided more insight into the legislature’s intent. See

Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Transportation, 1959 Sess., pp. 195–96,remarks of Attorney Reubin

Kaminsky. According to Kaminsky, bus and taxi operators whose livelihood depended upon their employment

in existing public service carrier companies suffered

financial hardship when livery service providers, who
operated their services only periodically or ‘‘merely for

the purpose of making an extra penny ortwo,’’ attracted

customers away from those companies. Id., p. 196.

Frank T. Healey, Jr., of the Connecticut Motor States

Association, testified that, while public service providers with regular routes were required to show public

convenience and necessity, ‘‘[a]nyone today can come

. . . even [onto] our very own routes [and] get a livery

permit to pick up people that they contract to or otherwise, and we lose the passenger.’’ Id., p. 197.

The legislature’s focus was thus on protecting public

service carriers such as public bus companies, who

were required to demonstrate public convenience and

necessity before commencing operations, from competition by incoming livery service providers who previously had not been required to demonstrate that their

services would improve or satisfy public convenience

and necessity. The legislative history, however, sheds

little light on the meaning of that phrase.

Accordingly, we considerthe meaning of ‘‘public convenience and necessity’’ as used in a similar statute

dealing with motor vehicle carrier services. In Briggs

Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, 148 Conn.

682, this court interpreted the phrase ‘‘public convenience and necessity,’’ as used in General Statutes (1958

Rev.) § 16-2837 governing common carriers, to mean

that ‘‘the benefits to be derived from the operation will

not be limited to a few persons in a particular locality.

It means benefit to the public generally, and, in the

determination of public convenience and necessity, the

effect of the [Public Utilities Commission’s] action upon

the whole public instead of a small part of it must be

considered.’’8

(Emphasis added.) Although this interpretation is somewhat general, we are able to glean

several points from it. First, while the department’s

action if it were to deny a permit application will benefit

‘‘a few persons in a particular locality’’—namely, the

existing permittees with whom the applicant would

compete if the application were granted—that effect

will not, in and of itself, justify the denial. Instead, the

department’s decision must be based on benefiting the

public generally. Second, because there are few, if any,

services that directly benefit the public as a whole, it

is implicit in Briggs Corp. that the department may

considerthe indirect benefits to the public as a whole of

granting a permit application. In other words, because it

is unlikely that any livery service would provide services

directly to a significant portion of the state’s population,

the department may consider the general public interests that would be indirectly advanced by granting an

application, including the public’s interest in creating

efficient and competitive markets. See, e.g., Atlanta

Greyhound Lines of Virginia, Inc. v. Silver Fox Lines,

204 Va. 360, 362, 131 S.E.2d 284 (1963) (considering

public convenience and necessity to be improved where

permit applicant’s service could be readily available to
local public, applicant’s service was located locally with

equipment readily available, and applicant could meet

needs of those desiring service as described ‘‘more economically, conveniently and satisfactorily than can

the objectors’’).

We find persuasive the analysis from other states that

have reached similar conclusions. The Virginia Supreme

Court has recognized that unless the legislature has

‘‘established public policy to the contrary, it must be

presumed that the emergence of a new, innovative competitor will stimulate existing carriers to serve the public convenience and necessity more efficiently and more

economically.’’ Blanton’s Package Delivery, Inc. v.

Pony Express Courier Corp. of Virginia, 219 Va. 280,

285, 247 S.E.2d 397 (1978). The court reasoned that

public convenience and necessity required consideration of ‘‘the effect certification of a new carrier will

have upon the public, not the effect it will have upon

existing carriers’’; (emphasis omitted) id.; and that

requiring permit applicants to show that their services

would improve public convenience and necessity by

demonstrating that existing permit holders are unable

or unwilling to serve the public would ‘‘equate the

vested economic interests of certificated carriers with

the necessity and convenience of the public.’’ Id., 286.

The Utah Supreme Court has considered public convenience and necessity through the lens of competition

among service providers, reasoning that ‘‘competition

is almost always an affirmative factor in furthering the

public convenience and necessity . . . and . . .

diversion ofrevenue from existing carriers by additional

competition is not a valid reason by itself to justify a

denial of additional authority.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 1376–77 (Utah 1986).

The court concluded that competition may carry with

it benefits ‘‘such as the potential beneficial effect upon

rates, customer service, the acquisition of equipment

more suitable to customer needs, the efficient use of

equipment, greater responsiveness in meeting future

shipper needs, and greater efficiency in the use of route

structures and interlining arrangements.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 1376.

Finally, the Arkansas Supreme Court has considered

the convenience and necessity of the public as distinguished from that of an individual or any number of

individuals, and has reasoned that necessity does not

require that a service is essential or absolutely indispensable, but only that the service will improve the

existing mode of transportation. Santee v. Brady, 209

Ark. 224, 229, 189 S.W.2d 907 (1945).

Returning to § 13b-103, we find that evidence that is

solely directed at demonstrating that an existing livery

service will be disserved by the granting of a new permit

is not an adequate basis for denial of a permit. Indeed,
§ 13b-103 should be construed to avoid anticompetitive

effects to the greatest extent possible, consistent with

general legislative policy.9 Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union

Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210, 217 (1860) (‘‘A grant of a

monopoly is odious in the eyes of the law making power,

and therefore should never be inferred in a legislative

grant when not plainly expressed. And it is equally odious, in modern times, in the eyes of the courts. It is

regarded as an act of improvident legislation.’’ [Internal

quotation marks omitted.]).

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that, in

determining whether it should grant an application for

a livery service permit, the department should consider

whether a permit applicant has provided evidence on

whether the service will benefit the relevant class of

users and whether the proposed service is more efficient, more economical, more convenient, more satisfactory, or different than the services offered by existing

service providers; see Blanton’s Package Delivery, Inc.

v. Pony Express Courier Corp. of Virginia, supra, 219

Va. 285; Atlanta Greyhound Lines of Virginia, Inc. v.

Silver Fox Lines, supra, 204 Va. 362; whether the new

service would create a potentially beneficial effect upon

rates and customer service and whether the acquisition

of equipment would be more suitable to customer

needs; see Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service

Commission, supra, 720 P.2d 1376–77; whetherthe population in the area that the applicant proposes to service

is increasing and whether potential customers have

requested a service like that suggested by the applicant;

see Almeida Bus Lines, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities,

348 Mass. 331, 342–43, 203 N.E.2d 556 (1965); and

whether the proposed service will improve the existing

mode of transportation. See Santee v. Brady, supra,

209 Ark. 229.

With this framework in mind, we turn now to the

present case. It is clear that the department did not

apply the proper standard, instead stating conclusorily

that the plaintiff had failed to present witnesses who

had experienced difficulty obtaining livery services

from other service providers and thus he did not prove

‘‘need and necessity.’’ In affirming the department’s

decision, the trial court also used an improper standard

when it found that the phrase ‘‘public necessity’’ is ‘‘an

actual need or a need that will likely occur within the

immediate or reasonably foreseeable future.’’10 Because

neither the department nor the trial court applied the

proper standard, we reverse the trial court’s judgment

upholding the department’s finding that the plaintiff

failed to establish that his service would improve public

convenience and necessity, and we conclude that this

case must be remanded to the department for a new

hearing at which it should apply the proper standard

as articulated in this opinion.

II
We next address the plaintiff’s argument that § 13b103 (a) (4) violates the equal protection clauses of the

United States and Connecticut constitutions. The plaintiff contends that the statute unreasonably favors

existing permittees, who may obtain up to two additional vehicle authorizations without proving ‘‘public

necessity and convenience’’ at a departmental hearing,

and irrationally discriminates against suitable first time

applicants such as the plaintiff. We disagree.

‘‘Article first, § 20, of the constitution of Connecticut,

as amended by articles five and twenty-one of the

amendments, provides: No person shall be denied the

equal protection of the law . . . . As a general matter,

this court has interpreted the state constitution’s equal

protection clause to have a like meaning and [to] impose

similar constitutional limitations as the federal equal

protection clause. . . . To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff first must establish that the state

is affording different treatment to similarly situated

groups of individuals.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility

Control, 301Conn. 56, 68, 23A.3d 668 (2011)‘‘Legislative

classifications that are not drawn along suspect lines

and that do not burden fundamental rights are reviewed

under the deferential rational basis standard. . . .

Under rational basis review, the [e]qual [p]rotection

[c]lause is satisfied [as] long as there is a plausible

policy reason for the classification . . . the legislative

facts on which the classification is apparently based

rationally may have been considered to be true by the

governmental decisionmaker . . . and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated

as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational . . . .

Further, [equal protection] does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the

purpose or rationale supporting its classification. . . .

[I]t is irrelevant whether the conceivable basis for the

challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. . . . To succeed, the party challenging the legislation must negative every conceivable basis which might

support it . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 69–70.

As we now construe ‘‘public convenience and necessity,’’ a new applicant need only show that the service

meets the standard set forth in part I of this opinion.

Even though an existing permittee can add new vehicles

without applying for a permit, the burden on new applicants is relatively light and the classification is justified

by the need for administrative efficiency. Indeed, the

legislature’s decision to not require existing permittees,

who have already proven suitability and convenience

and necessity, to undergo a hearing is rationally related

to the goal of easing administrative costs. We thus affirm

the trial court’s conclusion that § 13b-103 does not vio-
late the equal protection clauses of the United States

or Connecticut constitutions.

III

The plaintiff’s third claim is that § 13b-103 violates

the dormant commerce clause, or the negative implications of the commerce clause, of article one, § 8, of the

United States constitution, by creating barriers to livery

service market entry and by protecting existing permittees to the exclusion of new applicants. ‘‘To determine

whether a law violates [the dormant commerce clause],

we first ask whether it discriminates on its face against

interstate commerce. . . . In this context, discrimination simply means differential treatment of in-state and

out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former

and burdens the latter. . . . Discriminatory laws motivated by simple economic protectionism are subject to

a virtually per se rule of invalidity . . . which can only

be overcome by a showing that . . . [there is] no other

means to advance a legitimate local purpose . . . .’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid

Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 338–39,

127 S. Ct. 1786, 167 L. Ed. 2d 655 (2007).

In the present case, § 13b-103 applies to all in-state

and out-of-state livery service providers. The plaintiff

has offered no evidence of any burden on interstate

commerce, save for one witness’ offering that he might

use the plaintiff’s livery service to travel to out-of-state

job sites, and the department considered that evidence

irrelevant to the plaintiff’s intrastate application. We

thus reject the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court

improperly concluded that § 13b-103 does violate the

interstate commerce clause.

IV

The plaintiff’s final claim is that § 13b-103 violates

the due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions because the ‘‘public convenience

and necessity’’ standard is so ambiguous that it is void

for vagueness. We disagree.

This court previously has recognized that ‘‘[t]he test

of a [statutory standard] is whether the criteria contained in [it] are as reasonably precise as the subject

matter requires and are reasonably adequate and sufficient to guide the [agency] and to enable those affected

to know their rights and obligations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ghent v. Planning Commission,

219 Conn. 511, 517–18, 594 A.2d 5 (1991). ‘‘A statute is

not void for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is unconstitutional, making every presumption in

favor of its validity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frank v. Dept. of Children & Families, 312 Conn.

393, 417, 94 A.3d 588 (2014). ‘‘If the meaning of a statute

can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for

vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inher-
ent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases

there lurk uncertainties. . . . Moreover, an ambiguous

statute will be saved from unconstitutional vagueness if

the core meaning ofthe terms atissue may be elucidated

from other sources, including other statutes, published

or unpublished court opinions in this state orfrom other

jurisdictions, newspaper reports, television programs

or other public information . . . .’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeCiccio,

315 Conn. 79, 87–88, 105 A.3d 165 (2014).

We conclude that the phrase ‘‘public convenience

and necessity’’ set forth in § 13b-103 (a) (1), read in

light of the legislative history, related statutes, and

existing case law of Connecticut and sister state courts

on the subject, provides adequate notice of the factors

that the department must consider in determining public convenience and necessity. Accordingly, we affirm

the trial court’s conclusion that § 13b-103 does not violate the due process clauses of the United States or

Connecticut constitutions.

The judgment is reversed only with respect to the

dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal from the department’s

denial of his permit application and the case is

remanded to the trial court with direction to remand

the case to the department for a new hearing consistent

with this opinion; the judgment is affirmed in all

other respects.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 General Statutes § 13b-103 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) No person,

association, limited liability company or corporation shall operate a motor

vehicle in livery service until such person, association, limited liability company or corporation has obtained a permit from the Department of Transportation, specifying the nature and extent of the service to be rendered and

certifying that public convenience and necessity will be improved by the

operation and conduct of such livery service. . . . (4) Notwithstanding the

provisions of subdivision (1) of this section, the department shall issue to

any person who has an intrastate livery permit for at least one year, upon

the application of such person, up to two additional vehicle authorizations

each year without a hearing and without written notice of the pendency of

the application . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

2 General Statutes § 4-177a (b) provides: ‘‘The presiding officer may grant

any person status as an intervener in a contested case if that officer finds

that: (1) Such person has submitted a written petition to the agency and

mailed copies to all parties, at least five days before the date of hearing;

and (2) the petition states facts that demonstrate that the petitioner’s participation is in the interests of justice and will not impair the orderly conduct

of the proceedings.’’

3 The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the

appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice

Book § 65-1.

4 At the plaintiff’s hearing, the department noted only that it would ‘‘rather

have [the plaintiff] and [his] witnesses testify about the need for[the plaintiff]

than to spend a lot of time talking about what [competing, existing permittees] are doing . . . wrong . . . .’’ The department suggested that the plaintiff could demonstrate public convenience and necessity by presenting

‘‘witnesses, who have used [existing livery services] and . . . have had a

problem with [those services],’’ but not through criticizing existing permittees’ vehicle conditions and rates, unless ‘‘the witness had a rate issue with

[existing permittees] . . . .’’ The department offered that the plaintiff should

be ‘‘reaching out’’ to businesses in the state to try to determine whether

they might be in need of the plaintiff’s services. The department further

explained that ‘‘[the plaintiff] can prove there’s a need for [the plaintiff’s

services by providing] . . . witnesses that have had difficulty getting ser-
vice,’’ but added that the plaintiff should provide witnesses with ‘‘an actual

trip experience . . . .’’

In prior decisions, the department has determined that livery service

applicants would improve public convenience and necessity and thus

granted applications where, for example: the permit applicant offered no

witnesses to attest to public convenience and necessity; see State ofConnecticut, Dept. of Transportation, Final Decision on Application of Friendly

Car & Limo Service, LLC (November 3, 2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/

dot/lib/dot/documents/dadminlawunit/0712-n-198-l_friendly_car__limo_

service_llc.pdf (last visited April 16, 2015); neither of the applicant’s witnesses could attest to having trouble obtaining a livery service from existing

service providers or to being unhappy with the services they had received,

and one witness had not attempted to utilize any prior livery service; see

State of Connecticut, Dept. of Transportation, Final Decision on Application

of MJ Limousine Service, LLC (September 11, 2007), available at http://

www.ct.gov/dot/lib/dot/documents/dadminlawunit/0612-n-126-l.pdf (last visited April 16, 2015); the applicant already held interstate service permits;

see State of Connecticut, Dept. of Transportation, Final Decision on Application of A-1 Limousine Service, Inc. (May 1, 2008), available at http://

www.ct.gov/dot/lib/dot/documents/dadminlawunit/0710-n-155-l.pdf (last visited April 16, 2015); and where the applicant held an interstate permit and

offered one witness who testified that he was a client of the applicant and

would like to use the applicant’s proposed service for intrastate trips. See

State of Connecticut, Dept. of Transportation, Final Decision on Application

of A Limo Company, LLC (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/

dot/lib/dot/documents/dadminlawunit/0712-n-189-l.pdf (last visited April 16,

2015). On the other hand, the department has also denied an application

where the applicant’s witness used a livery service several times per year

and was once unable to obtain service from existing providers. See State

of Connecticut, Dept. of Transportation, Final Decision on Application of

Rose City Livery, LLC (March 13, 2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/dot/

lib/dot/documents/dadminlawunit/0809-n-154-l_rose_city_livery_llc.pdf

(last visited April 16, 2015).

5 General Statutes § 1-2z provides: ‘‘The meaning of a statute shall, in the

first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and

does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the

meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’

6 General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 16-1 defines ‘‘ ‘public service motor vehicle’ ’’ to include ‘‘all motor vehicles used for the transportation of passengers

for hire’’; while General Statutes (1958Rev.) § 16-324 defined ‘‘ ‘motor vehicle

in livery service’ ’’ in part as ‘‘every motor vehicle used for the transportation

of passengers for hire, except any motor bus and any taxicab operated

under a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the commission . . . .’’

7 General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 16-283 provides: ‘‘No person shall operate

any motor vehicle in the transportation of property for hire as a motor

common carrier without first having obtained from the [Public Utilities

Commission], after hearing, a certificate of public convenience and necessity

to so operate.’’

8 The court in Briggs Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, 148

Conn. 681, distinguished a ‘‘motor common carrier’’ from a ‘‘motor contract

carrier’’: a motor common carrier is required to obtain a certificate of public

convenience and necessity and includes ‘‘any person who operates motor

vehicles . . . [for] transportation of property for hire by the general public’’;

id; while a ‘‘motor contract carrier’’ is defined as ‘‘any person, not a motor

common carrier, who operates vehicles over the highways of this state in

the transportation of property for hire under special and individual contracts.’’ Id. While the livery service permittees are more closely related to

a motor contract carrier because they operate under individual contracts,

livery service permittees must, like motor common carriers, demonstrate

how their service will improve public convenience and necessity. A motor

contract carrier is not required to prove that its proposed operation would

benefit public convenience and necessity, but is subject to a less stringent

burden that its operation is ‘‘not inconsistent with the public interest . . . .’’

Id., 683.

9 We acknowledge that the statute was intended to have some inherent

anticompetitive effect. See 8 S. Proc., supra, p. 3212, remarks of Senator

Pickett. We further recognize that ‘‘[i]t is possible . . . that the competitive

effect upon existing carriers will be so disabling as to disserve the public

interest.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Blanton’s
Package Delivery, Inc. v. Pony Express Courier Corp. of Virginia, supra,

219 Va. 285. We note, however, that the concern expressed in the legislative

history was addressed to competition between mass transportation services

and livery services as opposed to competition between livery services which

is what is at issue in the present case.

10 The trial court derived this standard from the interpretation of ‘‘public

convenience and necessity’’ in Rudy’s Limousine Service, Inc. v. Dept. of

Transportation, 78 Conn. App. 80, 97, 826 A.2d 1161 (2003). In that case, the

Appellate Court first relied on Briggs Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission,

supra, 148 Conn. 682, to conclude that public necessity is a term that implies

a benefit to the public generally. Rudy’s Limousine Service, Inc. v. Dept.

of Transportation, supra, 97. The Appellate Court went on, however, to cite

as support Wilson Point Property Owners Assn. v. Connecticut Light &

Power Co., 145 Conn. 243, 261, 140 A.2d 874 (1958), wherein the phrase

‘‘ ‘public convenience and necessity’ ’’ was construed as a ‘‘relative’’ term

that referred to an ‘‘ ‘immediate public need . . . .’ ’’ (Emphasis added.)

This courtin Wilson Point Property OwnersAssn., which involved electricity

generating facilities, drew this language from In re Application of Shelton

Street Railway Co., 69 Conn. 626, 629, 38 A. 362 (1897), in which the court

considered the public necessity for laying out necessary public highways,

a duty charged to municipalities. Id., 630–31; see Wilson Point Property

Owners Assn. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., supra, 261. We conclude,

however, that the definition of public convenience and necessity as it relates

to services upon which our society relies on a daily basis, e.g., roads and

electricity, does not apply to a limousine service that, as the plaintiff points

out in his reply brief, is a luxury. Unlike the builders of roads, for example,

a livery service demands no public taking of private property, and unlike

electric utilities, is not a product upon which the public would reasonably

be expected to rely on a daily basis. Thus, in the present case, we conclude

that the trial court’s interpretation of the phrase ‘‘public necessity,’’ to the

extent that it is based upon the Appellate Court’s citation in Rudy’s Limousine Service, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 97, to Wilson Point

Property Owners Assn., to be an ‘‘ ‘actual need or a need that will likely occur

within the immediate or reasonably foreseeable future,’ ’’ was misplaced.