alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S FINANCIAL STATEMENT INCLUDED IN THIS QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q,
AND QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       1,593,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,368,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   174,000
<INVENTORY>                                  1,124,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,386,000
<PP&E>                                         720,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               (325,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,947,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,653,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        69,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,225,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,947,000
<SALES>                                     14,219,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            14,219,000
<CGS>                                       13,397,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               13,397,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               551,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              23,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,174,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,174,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,174,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.33)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.33)


</TABLE>
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-21-00135-CV

BIG BLUE PROPERTIES WF, LLC,

Appellant

V.

WORKFORCE RESOURCE, INC., D/B/A 

WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS NORTH 

TEXAS A/K/A TEXAS WORKFORCE 

SOLUTIONS, Appellee

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 78th District Court

of Wichita County (DC78-CV2020-0243)

June 2, 2022

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the trial court’s judgment 

is affirmed.

It is further ordered that Appellant Big Blue Properties WF, LLC must pay all 

costs of this appeal.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By __/s/ Elizabeth Kerr_________________

 Justice Elizabeth Kerr
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

KEVIN MICHAEL TAYLOR, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-10235

D.C. No. 4:09-cr-00398-SBA-4

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Saundra B. Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 10, 2019**

San Francisco, California

Before: SCHROEDER, M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and RAYES,*** District 

Judge.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Douglas L. Rayes, United States District Judge for the 

District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 14 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Defendant-Appellant Kevin Michael Taylor appeals the district court’s 

revocation of his supervised release. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.

1. The district court had jurisdiction to revoke Taylor’s supervised release. 

18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(h)–(i); see United States v. Wing, 682 F.3d 861, 864–65 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (“In 18 U.S.C. § 3583, Congress has established a scheme where 

separate and distinct terms of supervised release may be imposed upon a repeat 

offender of supervised release conditions.”). 

2. Taylor’s due process rights were not violated by the delay in his 

revocation hearing. Although a supervised releasee has a due process right to have 

his revocation hearing held “within a reasonable time,” Fed. R. Crim P. 32.1(b)(2), 

“relief is not called for unless there was both unreasonable delay and prejudice,” 

United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2008). Even if we were to 

assume that Taylor’s revocation hearing was unreasonably delayed, the delay 

caused no prejudice. Taylor was not in custody during this time, and he identifies 

no concrete way in which the delay prejudiced him or his defense.

3. Balancing Taylor’s interest in confrontation against the Government’s 

cause for denying it, the district court did not violate Taylor’s due process rights by 

considering hearsay evidence during the revocation hearing. See United States v. 

Comito, 177 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1999). Although the evidence at issue was 
3

important to the district court’s ultimate finding, the Government’s interest in 

presenting this evidence through Taylor’s probation officer, rather than divert drug 

testing and treatment employees from their work, sufficiently outweighed Taylor’s 

interest in confrontation, which was lessened by the fact that he did not contest the 

authenticity or credibility of the evidence before the district court, and evidence 

like the drug treatment center’s no-show reports is generally considered reliable. 

See United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. 

Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 314 (9th Cir. 1993). 

AFFIRMED.
1 This minute order is issued pursuant to the express authority of the Honorable Robert E. 

Blackburn, United States District Judge for the District of Colorado. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Criminal Case No. 11-cr-00422-REB-02

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

2. HAI MANH DO,

Defendant.

MINUTE ORDER1

A Notice of Disposition was filed in this matter. On June 27, 2012, commencing

at 10:00 a.m., the court shall conduct a telephonic setting conference to set this matter

for a change of plea hearing. Counsel for the government shall arrange, initiate, and

coordinate the conference call necessary to facilitate the setting conference.

Dated: June 11, 2012

Case 1:11-cr-00422-REB Document 139 Filed 06/11/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
* After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would notmaterially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted w ithout oral argument. This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. T he court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R . 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 23 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT
ANN MICHELE CABRERA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMAS J. HORGAS and DANIEL S. MCCONKIE, Defendants-Appellees. No. 98-4231 (D.C. No. 98-CV-773) (D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , EBEL and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. This is a non-prisoner pro se appeal from the distr ict court’s order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff-appe llant Ann Michele Cabrera filed a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 a nd 1985, and also filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees u nder 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The- 2 -

district court denied Cabrera’s application on grou nds that she appeared to have sufficient means to pay the required filing fees. The decision to grant or deny in forma pauperis sta tus under § 1915 lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Se e Cross v. General Motors Corp. , 721 F.2d 1152, 1157 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 466 U.S. 980 (1984); Burns v. Veterans Admin. , No. 98-5069, 1998 WL 704704, *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 5 , 1998) (unpublished disposition). Upon review of the affidavit originally submitted b y Ms. Cabrera in support of her application, as well as her arguments on app eal, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Ms. Cabrera’s Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees.

The mandate shall issue forthwith. ENTERED FOR THE COURT

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge
#### AROND v. GROSSMAN.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June Term 1953.

Certiorari denied without opinion.
#### Win, Appellant, *v.*Atlantic City Railroad Company.

*Negligence*— Railroads—Assault *by brakeman on*passenger— *Nonsuit.*

Where a passenger on a railroad car was assaulted by a brakeman, his action against the company to recover damages for personal injuries thus sustained, was properly nonsuited where the assault was wilful and malicious and nothing was shown from which it could have been reasonably inferred that it had been committed in the line or discharge of any duty to the defendant.

Argued Jau. 15,1915.

February 8, 1915:

Appeal, No. 306, Jan. T., 1914, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. No. 3, Philadelphia Co., March T., 1897, No. 773, refusing to take off nonsuit in case of Jonas Win, Administrator of Jacob Win, deceased, v. Atlantic City Railroad Company.

Before Brown, C. J., Mestrezat, Stewart, Mosohzisker and Frazer, JJ.

Affirmed.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before Ferguson, J. •

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

The court entered a nonsuit which it subsequently refused to take off. Plaintiff appealed.

*Error assigned*was in refusing to take off nonsuit.

*Harry D. Wescott,*of *Wescott, Wescott & McManus,*for appellant.

*William Clarke Mason,*for appellee.

Per Curiam,

On March 9, 1897, Jacob Win, while on a car of the defendant company, was assaulted by a brakeman in its employ. He promptly brought suit against it for the injuries inflicted upon him by the brakeman, but the case *135was not called for trial until February, 1910, when a verdict was returned for the defendant. The following March a hew trial was granted. Win died December 3, 1913, and his administrator was shortly after substituted as plaintiff. On the second trial, which took place in March, 1914, — seventeen years after the assault — a judgment of nonsuit was directed by the trial judge, for the reason that it did not appear that the brakeman was acting in the line of his duty at the time he assaulted the deceased. From the refusal of the court below to disturb the nonsuit we have this appeal.

Nothing .is to be found in the brief testimony submitted by the plaintiff which would have justified the learned trial judge in submitting to the jury the question of the railroad company’s responsibility for the act of its brakeman. All that appeared was that he had committed a wilful and malicious assault, but as nothing was shown from which it could have been reasonably inferred by the jury that it had been committed in the line or discharge of any duty to his employer, the motion for the judgment of nonsuit could not have been denied: Berryman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 228 Pa. 621; Rohrback v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 244 Pa. 132.

Judgment affirmed.
DC: 5624465

- 6 NO. 04- 14 -00606- CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

ARGO GROUP US, INC., COLONY MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., COLONY INSURANCE COMPANY, COLONY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, COLONY SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, COLONY AGENCY SERVICES, INC., AND ARGO GROUP INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, LTD.,

Appellants,

v.

LOUIS D. LEVINSON, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., GUILFORD SPECIALTY GROUP, INC., GUILFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, AND THE BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellees.

Appeal from the 221st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2014- CI -09550 Hon. Antonia Arteaga, Presiding

AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR APPELLEES’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUR- REPLY TO APPELLANTS’ REPLY TO APPELLEES’ RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING ACCEPTED 04-14-00606-CV FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 3/27/2015 3:14:13 PM KEITH HOTTLE CLERK2

The undersigned counsel certifies that Appellee s ’ Sur

- Reply contains 1 508

words (counting all parts of the document , including footnotes ). The body text is

in 14 point font and footnotes are in 14 point font.

Respectfully submitted,

Lawrence Morales, II State Bar No. 24051077 The Morales Law Firm, P.C. 115 E. Travis, Suite 1530 San Antonio, TX 78205 Tel: (210) 225

- 0811 lawrence@themoralesfirm.com

ATTORNEY FOR LOUIS D

. LEVINSON /s/ Julia W. Mann

________________ Julia W. Mann State Bar No. 00791171 Jackson Walker L.L.P. 112 E. Pecan Street, Suite 2400 San Antonio, TX 78205 Tel: (2 10) 978

- 7700 jmann@jw.com

Anthony Herman
Pro Hac Vice Covington & Burling LLP One CityCenter 850 Tenth Street NW Washington, DC 20001 Tel: (202) 662

- 5280 aherman@cov.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELL EES INTERNATIONAL FINANC IAL GROUP, INC., GUILFOR D SPECIALTY GROUP, INC., GUILFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, AND THE BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Th is is to certify that on this 2 7 th day of March, 2015, a true and correct co py of the AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUR

- REPLY was served via electronic service or email upon:

Jonathan D. Pauerstein Stephen K. Lecholop II Rosenthal Pauerstein Sandoloski Agather LLP 755 E. Mulberry, Suite 200 San Antonio, Texas 78212 (210) 225

- 5000 (210 ) 354

- 4034

– Fax ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Steven L. Manchel Michael G. Donovan 100 River Ridge Drive, Suite 308 Norwood, MA 02062 (617) 796

- 8920 (617) 796

- 8921

– Fax OF COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS

/s/ Julia W. Mann Julia W. Mann
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02357-WYD-MEH

CS CAPITAL CORP., d/b/a THE INVOICE BANKERS CORP.,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOCAL SENIOR SERVICES, and

RANDY KALANI FAHILGA,

Defendants.

ORDER

Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor’s Second Ex Parte Motion to Depose Bank of America, N.A.

[filed March 18, 2015; docket #73] is granted as follows.

Rule 69 governs executions of judgments. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2) states:

Obtaining Discovery. In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor

or a successor in interest whose interest appears of record may obtain discovery

from any person—including the judgment debtor—as provided in these rules or

by the procedure of the state where the court is located.

Here, the Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor seeks to depose a representative of the bank at which the

Defendants purportedly hold accounts, and who may have information regarding transactions about

which Mr. Fahilga testified he had no knowledge. In Colorado, Rule 69 also governs the execution

of judgments and post-judgment proceedings. Colo. R. Civ. P. 69 provides, in pertinent part:

Witnesses. Witnesses may be subpoenaed to appear and testify in accordance with

C.R.C.P. 45.

Depositions. After entry of a final money judgment, the judgment creditor, upon

order of court which may be obtained ex parte, may take the deposition of any person

including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these Rules. 

Case 1:11-cv-02357-WYD-MEH Document 75 Filed 03/19/15 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
Colo. R. Civ. P. 69(h) & (i). Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor’s motion

to serve a subpoena upon a representative of Bank of America, N.A. for the purpose of obtaining

discovery through a deposition as to the accounts held by Defendants Local Senior Services and

Randy Kalani Fahilga.

Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 19th day of March, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

 

 

Michael E. Hegarty

United States Magistrate Judge

2

Case 1:11-cv-02357-WYD-MEH Document 75 Filed 03/19/15 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLICACCOUNTING FIRM**

** **

Weconsent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-98073on Form S-8 of Community Valley Bancorp of our report, dated April 15,2010 relating to our audit of the consolidated financial statements whichappears in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Community Valley Bancorp forthe year ended December 31, 2009.

 

 
|                    | /s/  Perry-Smith LLP |
|-------------------------|----------------------|
|                    |                 |
| Sacramento,  California |                 |
| April 15,  2010    |                 |

 

----
#### PALM COURT HOTEL v. HARDY.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June Term 1953.

Dismissed without opinion.
Exhibit 24.1
 POWER OF ATTORNEY
 KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
   Signature
    
    Title/s/ Peter A. Edison

(Peter A. Edison)
    
    Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer, President and
Director (Principal Executive Officer)/s/ Charles R. Daniel, III

(Charles R. Daniel, III)
    
    Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer,
Controller, Treasurer and Secretary
(Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)/s/ Timothy F. Finley

(Timothy F. Finley)
    
    Director/s/ Harry E. Rich

(Harry E. Rich)
    
    Director/s/ Scott C. Schnuck

(Scott C. Schnuck)
    
    Director
Exhibit 23.1

 

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

 

The Board of Directors

HSBC Finance Corporation

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No. 333-138404 and No. 333-138404-01) on Form S-3 of HSBC Private Label Card Master Note Trust (USA) I of our attestation report dated March 3, 2008 with respect to HSBC Finance Corporation’s (the Company) assessment of compliance with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB applicable to the servicing of asset backed securitization transactions backed by private label credit card receivables, except for the criteria set forth in Sections 1122(d)(1)(ii), 1122(d)(1)(iii), 1122(d)(2)(i), 1122(d)(2)(iii), 1122(d)(2)(vi), 1122(d)(3)(i)(D), 1122(d)(4)(i), 1122(d)(4)(ii), 1122(d)(4)(iv), 1122(d)(4)(vi), 1122(d)(4)(vii), 1122(d)(4)(viii), 1122(d)(4)(ix), 1122(d)(4)(x), 1122(d)(4)(xi), 1122(d)(4)(xii), 1122(d)(4)(xiii), 1122(d)(4)(xiv), and 1122(d)(4)(xv), whichthe Company has determined are not applicable to the Company’s activities with respect to HSBC Private Label Card Master Note Trust (USA) I, as of and for the period from February 14, 2007 (date of issuance of the initial asset-backed securitization transaction covered by this report) through December 31, 2007, which report appears in the December 31, 2007 annual report on Form 10-K of HSBC Private Label Card Master Note Trust (USA) I.  

 

/s/ KPMG LLP

 

Chicago, Illinois

March 24, 2008
Case 1:11-cv-02626-CMA Document 7 Filed 10/26/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 3
Case 1:11-cv-02626-CMA Document 7 Filed 10/26/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 3
Case 1:11-cv-02626-CMA Document 7 Filed 10/26/11 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 3
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-50102 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JOSE MARIO FRAUSTO-PEREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. DR-00-CR-308-1-FB

-------------------- August 23, 2001 Before KING, Chief Judge, and POLITZ and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Jose Mario Frausto-Perez appeals the 46-month term of imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Frausto-Perez argues that his sentence should not have exceeded the two-year maximum term of imprisonment prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Frausto-Perez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), butNo. 01-50102 -2- seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review in light of the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres

. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1214 (2001). FraustoPerez’s argument is foreclosed. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that the judgment of the district court be affirmed and that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.