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*********************************************** 
VICTOR MELENDEZ, JR. v. FRESH START

GENERAL REMODELING AND

CONTRACTING, LLC, ET AL.

(AC 39373)

Prescott, Bright and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent G appealed to this court from the decision of the Workers’

Compensation Review Board affirming the decision of the Workers’

Compensation Commissioner ordering G to pay workers’ compensation

benefits to the claimant, who allegedly had sustained injuries in a motor

vehicle accident. Specifically, the motor vehicle accident occurred while

the claimant was being driven by G’s girlfriend to G’s home where, for

approximately eleven weeks, the claimant had performed certain work

for G, including, inter alia, helping G move his residence, painting, cutting

down trees, splitting and stacking wood, putting up Sheetrock, assisting

with plumbing and laying tile. On appeal, G claimed that the board erred

in concluding that the claimant was an employee of G and entitled to

bring a claim against him individually under the Workers’ Compensation

Act (act) (§ 31-275 et seq.) and that G was afforded sufficient due process

to hold him personally liable. Held:

1. G could not prevail on his claim that the board erred in affirming the

commissioner’s finding that the claimant was an employee of G under

the act, which was based on his claim that because the claimant was

not regularly employed for over twenty-six hours per week, he was

excluded from coverage pursuant to § 31-275 (9) (B) (iv), and that the

commissioner should have examined the hours worked by the claimant

over a fifty-two week applicable period; because the claimant worked

for G for approximately eleven weeks at the time of his injury, using a

fifty-two week period was not a reasonable period of time to determine

if the claimant was regularly employed by G, and, therefore, the commissioner properly examined the eleven week period of employment to

determine what the usual practice was between the claimant and G,

and found that the claimant had a consistent schedule over the eleven

week period, working four to five days per week for approximately six

to ten hours per day, for an average of thirty-eight and one-half hours

per week, which supported the conclusion that the claimant, who was

regularly employed during the applicable time period for more than

twenty-six hours per week, was an employee of G entitled to benefits

under the act.

2. This court declined to consider G’s claim that the claimant was a casual

laborer who was excluded from coverage under § 31-275 (9) (B) (ii),

which provides that an employee entitled to benefits under the act shall

not be construed to include any person whose employment is of a casual

nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the

employer’s trade or business; although G claimed that the commissioner

improperly concluded that the claimant was not a casual laborer in light

of the findings that the work at G’s house had run its course and that

the working arrangement between G and the claimant was intended to

be short-term, a party seeking to challenge a finding of the commissioner

as incorrect must do so by filing a motion to correct the challenged

finding, and because G did not file a motion to correct any of the

commissioner’s findings following the operative finding and award, nor

did he show good cause for failing to file such a motion, the commissioner was deprived of the opportunity to correct the findings or to

supply omitted facts to those conclusions that G claimed were incorrect

or inconsistent.

3. G could not prevail on his claim that he was deprived of due process

because he was not given reasonable notice that the claimant sought

to hold him personally liable and because he was not mailed a notice

of the pro forma formal hearing and the deadline to submit a brief and

proposed findings on the issue of personal liability; upon receipt of a

form 30C that listed G as the claimant’s employer, G was put on notice
that he, as an individual, was potentially liable to be found as the

employer of the claimant, and even if G was deprived of due process

prior to a 2013 finding and award because he was not afforded notice

of the pro forma formal hearing and an opportunity to file a brief and

proposed findings on the issue of personal liability, G was not entitled

to relief in this appeal because the 2013 finding and award was vacated

and was not the operative award in this appeal, and G suffered no due

process deprivation with regard to a 2015 finding and award that he

challenged in this appeal, as he had a full and fair opportunity to be

heard on the issue of personal liability when he was given an opportunity

to submit a brief and proposed findings to the commissioner prior to

the 2015 finding and award.

Argued November 30, 2017—officially released March 20, 2018

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Eighth District ordering the

respondent Michael Gramegna to pay workers’ compensation benefits to the claimant, brought to the Workers’

Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the commissioner’s decision, and the respondent Michael Gramegna appealed to this court. Affirmed.

John L. Laudati, with whom, on the brief, was P. Jo

Anne Burgh, for the appellant (respondent Michael

Gramegna).

Jon D. Golas, for the appellee (claimant).
Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The respondent, Michael Gramegna1

appeals from the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Review Board (board), affirming the decision of the

Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Eighth

District (commissioner) ordering the respondent to pay

workers’ compensation benefits to the claimant, Victor

Melendez, Jr. The respondent claims that the board

erred in concluding that (1) the claimant was an

employee of the respondent and entitled to bring a

claim against him individually under the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.,

and (2) the respondent was afforded sufficient due process to hold him personally liable. We disagree and,

accordingly, affirm the decision of the board.

The following facts, as found by the commissioner,

and procedural history are relevant to our resolution

of this appeal. The claimant met the respondent in the

fall of 2011. The claimant worked as a self-employed

window washer, as well as a laborer, performing tasks

such as roofing, siding and landscaping. At that time,

the claimant and his girlfriend were expecting a child

and the claimant was looking for additional work. The

respondent owned several rental properties in the Manchester area and worked as a remodeling contractor.

The respondent was the principal and sole member of

two domestic limited liability companies, Fresh Start

General Remodeling & Contracting, LLC (Fresh Start),

and Fresh Start Realty, LLC, both of which list their

business address at 122 Oakland Street in Manchester.

Around the end of October, 2011, the respondent

hired the claimant to assist him in moving from his

house in Manchester to a new house in Bolton. The

claimant helped the respondent pack up items in the

Manchester house and helped get the Bolton house

ready for the move by cleaning up, painting and making

the bathrooms functional. The respondent paid the

claimant $8 an hour in cash for his labor because he

did not have his own tools and required transportation

to and from work each day. For a period of less than

two weeks, the claimant assisted the respondent at a

Fresh Start remodeling job in Avon. The Avon job was

completed by November 17, 2011, and, thereafter, the

claimant went back to helping the respondent with the

residential move. The respondent and his girlfriend

moved into the Bolton house at the end of November,

but he continued to employ the claimant to help make

the house livable. The claimant performed tasks such

as cutting down trees, splitting and stacking firewood,

painting, putting up Sheetrock, and assisting with

plumbing and laying tile. For a period of approximately

eleven weeks, the claimant generally worked four to

five days a week for the respondent and earned an

average of $300 a week.
On January 23, 2012, the claimant filed workers’ compensation claims, pursuant to the act, which stemmed

from injuries that he had sustained in a car accident

that occurred on January 13, 2012, while he was being

driven by the respondent’s girlfriend to the respondent’s

Bolton home where he worked. In accordance with

General Statutes § 31-294c (a), the claimant filed three

form 30Cs2

in order to commence the present action:

the first directed to the respondent; the second directed

to Fresh Start General Remodeling & Contracting, LLC;

and the third directed to Fresh Start Realty, LLC.

On September 14, 2012, a formal hearing was held

before the commissioner on the issue of compensability

of the injuries sustained by the claimant as a result of

the motor vehicle accident. Both the claimant and the

respondent appeared at the contested hearing and testified as to the nature of the employment relationship,

specifically, whether there was an employer-employee

relationship between the claimant and Fresh Start on

the date of the accident.3 The record closed on November 26, 2012, with the claimant having submitted a brief.

The respondent, however, did not submit a brief. On

March 26, 2013, the commissioner issued a finding and

award determining that both the respondent and Fresh

Start were liable for the claimant’s medical bills and

certain benefits (2013 finding and award). On October

29, 2013, Fresh Start filed a motion to open the 2013

finding and award on the grounds that notice to it was

sent to the incorrect address, and that the respondent

was incorrectly named as a respondent. The respondent

subsequently filed a brief in support of the motion to

open, which claimed that, as a result of this clerical

error, he did not understand that the claimant was pursuing the respondent in his personal capacity, he was

never afforded the opportunity to fully respond to the

claimant’s claim and evidence, and he was not notified

of the date to submit a brief and proposed findings. On

March 18, 2015, the same commissioner, then acting

for the eighth district, granted the motion to open, and

vacated the 2013 finding and award, which had determined that the respondent was personally liable for the

claimant’s medical bills and certain benefits.

On April 30, 2015, the respondent submitted proposed

findings and a brief on the merits of the personal liability

claim. The claimant elected to stand on his prior filings.

On that same date, the commissioner deemed the

record of the formal hearing closed and the matter

submitted to the commissioner for a decision. The commissioner issued a finding and award on June 2, 2015,

determining that the respondent was personally liable

as the employer for the claimant’s medical bills and

payment of benefits under the act (2015 finding and

award).

On June 22, 2015, the respondent appealed the commissioner’s 2015 finding and award to the board. On
June 10, 2016, the board affirmed the 2015 finding and

award entered by the commissioner. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

On appeal to this court, the respondent asserts that

the claimant failed to prove that he was an employee

of the respondent and subject to coverage under the

act, and that the respondent was not afforded reasonable due process regarding any notice that he was

potentially liable as an individual. In response, the

claimant argues that the commissioner correctly found

that the claimant was an employee within the meaning

of the act, and that the respondent was afforded due

process sufficient to hold him personally liable as the

employer. We agree with the claimant and, accordingly,

affirm the judgment of the board.

I

The respondent first claims that the board erred in

affirming the commissioner’s finding that the claimant

was the respondent’s ‘‘employee’’ under the act for two

reasons: (1) the claimant did not qualify for compensation under the act because § 31-275 (9) (B) (iv) excludes

from the definition of employee any person engaged in

any type of service in or about a private dwelling provided he is not ‘‘regularly employed’’ by the owner or

occupier over twenty-six hours per week; and (2) the

claimant was a casual laborer excluded from compensation by § 31-275 (9) (B) (ii).

As a threshold matter, we note that ‘‘[t]he principles

that govern our standard of review in workers’ compensation appeals are well established. . . . The board sits

as an appellate tribunal reviewing the decision of the

commissioner. . . . [T]he review . . . of an appeal

from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the

facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the

facts rests on the commissioner . . . . [T]he commissioner is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence

and the credibility of witnesses . . . . Where the subordinate facts allow for diverse inferences, the commissioner’s selection of the inference to be drawn must

stand unless it is based on an incorrect application of

the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference

illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . .

‘‘This court’s review of decisions of the board is similarly limited. . . . The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they

result from an incorrect application of the law to the

subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . . [W]e must interpret

[the commissioner’s finding] with the goal of sustaining

that conclusion in light of all of the other supporting

evidence. . . . Once the commissioner makes a factual

finding, [we are] bound by that finding if there is evidence in the record to support it.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Passalugo v. Guida-Seibert Dairy Co.,
149 Conn. App. 478, 482–83, 91 A.3d 475 (2014). ‘‘[Moreover, it] is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given

to the workers’ compensation statutes by the commissioner and review board.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Sullins v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 315

Conn. 543, 550, 108 A.3d 1110 (2015).

‘‘The entire statutory scheme of the [act] is directed

toward those who are in the employer-employee relationship as those terms are defined in the act and discussed in our cases. That relationship is threshold to

the rights and benefits under the act; a claimant . . .

who is not an employee has no right under this statute to

claim for and be awarded benefits.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Vanzant v. Hall, 219 Conn. 674, 678,

594 A.2d 967 (1991). Section 31-275 (9) (A) defines

‘‘employee’’ as ‘‘any person who . . . (i) [h]as entered

into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer . . . .’’ Section 31-275 (9) (B)

expressly excludes from this definition in subparagraph

(ii) ‘‘[o]ne whose employment is of a casual nature and

who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of

the employer’s trade or business,’’ and in subparagraph

(iv) ‘‘[a]ny person engaged in any type of service in or

about a private dwelling provided he is not regularly

employed by the owner or occupier over twenty-six

hours per week.’’

A

With this background, we first address the respondent’s claim that the claimant was not regularly

employed for over twenty-six hours per week and, thus,

was excluded from coverage under the act pursuant to

§ 31-275 (9) (B) (iv). The respondent argues that the

commissioner should have examined the hours worked

by the claimant over a fifty-two week applicable period

as set forth in Smith v. Yurkovsky, 265 Conn. 816, 830

A.2d 743 (2003).

In Smith, our Supreme Court interpreted the phrase

‘‘regularly employed’’ in § 31-275 (9) (B) (iv), and

rejected the use of averaging the hours per week

worked by the claimant as a means to determine regular

employment. Id., 821. ‘‘Instead of employing averaging,

the commissioner should examine the number of hours

actually worked by the [claimant]. We conclude that

regular employment is to be determined by the employer’s usual practice in using an employee for a majority

of the applicable time period. We look to the practice

during the majority of the applicable period because

we have construed regular employment to be that which

is done most of the time. When it is said that an employer

regularly employs an employee, it is meant that he

usually does so, or that he does so most of the time,

so that such employment becomes the rule and not the

exception.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 826–27. The court also held that
fifty-two weeks, or one full year, was the time period

that was reasonable for determining whether the claimant in that case was ‘‘regularly employed’’ under the

act. Id., 821.

The present case, however, is distinguishable from

Smith because of the difference in the length of employment between the claimant in Smith and the claimant

in the present case. The claimant in Smith had worked

for the respondents as a part-time home health aide

from July 1, 1995, through April 16, 1998; initially, the

claimant worked between four to nine hours per week,

but her hours increased substantially during tax preparation season each year. Id., 818. The court utilized a

fifty-two week period in order to ‘‘moderate the effect

of seasonal and temporary impacts on employment status.’’ Id., 827. By contrast, the claimant in the present

case had only worked for the respondent for approximately eleven weeks at the time of his injury. The holding in Smith requires the commissioner to determine

what the ‘‘usual practice’’ was or what was done ‘‘most

of the time.’’ Id. The fifty-two week period used in Smith

is not a reasonable time period to determine if the

claimant in the present case was regularly employed by

the respondent. The commissioner, therefore, properly

examined the eleven week period of employment to

determine what the usual practice was between the

respondent and the claimant.

The commissioner found that the claimant had a consistent schedule over the eleven week period, worked

an average of thirty-eight and one-half hours per week,

and that his average weekly wage was $310. The commissioner also found that the claimant worked four to

five days each week for approximately six to ten hours

per day. These facts support the commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant was an employee of the respondent entitled to benefits under the act. Although the

commissioner found that ‘‘most of the claimant’s work

was performed for purposes not associated with [the

respondent’s] trade or business,’’ he was regularly

employed during that time for more than twenty-six

hours per week. We already have concluded that the

commissioner’s decision did not result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts, and

we now conclude that the decisions did not result from

an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from

them.4 Therefore, the commissioner’s conclusions on

this issue must stand.

B

We next address the respondent’s claim that the

claimant was a casual laborer who was excluded from

coverage under the act pursuant to § 31-275 (9) (B)

(ii). In challenging the board’s decision, the respondent

argues that the commissioner’s finding that the claimant

was not a casual laborer is not supported by the evidence. An employee is barred from compensation under
the act if the employment is both casual in nature and

not for the purposes of the employer’s trade or business.

Vanzant v. Hall, supra, 219 Conn. 678; see also Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 452, 97 A. 328 (1916). Under

the act, casual employment means ‘‘the occasional or

incidental employment, the employment which comes

without regularity.’’ Thompson v. Twiss, supra, 451.

‘‘Ordinarily . . . where one is employed to do a particular part of a service recurring somewhat regularly with

the fair expectation of continuing for a reasonable time,

the employment is not casual.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Pallanck v. Donovan, 105 Conn. 591,

594, 136 A. 471 (1927).

The respondent specifically challenges as incorrect

the commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant was

not a casual laborer in light of the findings that the

work at the respondent’s house ‘‘had pretty much run

its course’’ and that the arrangement between the

respondent and the claimant ‘‘was intended to be shortterm.’’ The respondent argues that there are no findings

as to the parties’ expectations as to how long the working relationship would have continued if the accident

had not occurred to support the conclusion that the

claimant was not a casual laborer.5 Thus, the respondent

urges this court to remand the matter to the commissioner with direction to decide the issues in the respondent’s favor. We disagree.

A party seeking to challenge a finding of the commissioner as incorrect or incomplete must first do so by

filing a motion to correct the challenged findings. ‘‘A

motion to correct the commissioner’s finding, as provided in § 31-301-46 of the Regulations of Connecticut

State Agencies, is the proper vehicle to be used when

an appellant claims that the commissioner’s finding is

incorrect or incomplete. We have long held that this

motion is not merely a technical requirement and that

the failure to file this motion justifies dismissal of an

appeal, for if an appellant claims that the finding is

incorrect, the matter should first be called to the attention of the commissioner that he may have an opportunity to supply omitted facts or restate findings in view

of the claims made in the motion.’’ (Footnote altered;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Vanzant v. Hall,

supra, 219 Conn. 679; see also Guerrera v. W. J. Megin,

Inc., 130 Conn. 423, 425, 34 A.2d 873 (1943) (failure to

file motion to correct finding of commissioner would,

in itself, justify dismissal of appeal).

The respondent did not file a motion to correct any

of the commissioner’s findings following the 2015 finding and award, nor has he shown good cause for failing

to file such a motion. The respondent has not availed

himself of the opportunity to have the commissioner’s

finding and award corrected prior to his appeal of the

board’s affirmance of that award. He has thereby

deprived the commissioner of the opportunity to cor-
rect the findings or supply omitted facts to those conclusions that the respondent claims are incorrect or

inconsistent. See Vanzant v. Hall, supra, 219 Conn.

681. We, therefore, decline to consider the respondent’s

claim that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner’s finding that the claimant was an employee

under the act based on the exclusion in § 31-275 (9)

(B) (ii) of casual laborers from the act’s definition of

employee.

II

The respondent also claims that he was deprived of

due process because he was not given reasonable notice

that the claimant sought to hold him personally liable

and was not mailed a notice of the pro forma formal

hearing7 and the deadline to submit a brief and proposed

findings on the issue of personal liability. In response,

the claimant argues that the respondent was afforded

due process because the claimant filed a form 30C that

identified the respondent individually as the claimant’s

employer, and the respondent was afforded additional

due process because the commissioner granted his

motion to open and vacated the 2013 finding and award

to allow him to file a brief and proposed findings. We

agree with the claimant.

We now set forth the applicable standard of review

and legal principles. ‘‘The right to fundamental fairness

in administrative proceedings encompasses a variety

of procedural protections. . . . The scope of the right

to fundamental fairness in administrative proceedings,

like the scope of the constitutional right to due process

that it resembles, is a question of law over which our

review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Recycling, Inc. v. Commissioner of Energy & Environmental Protection, 179 Conn. App. 127, 149, A.3d

(2018), citing FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 313 Conn. 669, 711, 99 A.3d 1038 (2014).

‘‘Workers’ compensation hearings must be conducted

in a fundamentally fair manner so as not to violate the

rules of due process. . . . A fundamental principle of

due process is that each party has the right to receive

notice of a hearing, and the opportunity to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Bidoae v. Hartford Golf

Club, 91 Conn. App. 470, 477, 881 A.2d 418, cert. denied,

276 Conn. 921, 888 A.2d 87 (2005), cert. denied, 547

U.S. 1112, 126 S. Ct. 1916, 164 L. Ed. 2d 665 (2006).

‘‘Due process of law requires not only that there be due

notice of the hearing but that at the hearing the parties

involved have a right to produce relevant evidence, and

an opportunity to know the facts on which the agency

is asked to act, to cross-examine witnesses and to offer

rebuttal evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, 62 Conn. App. 733,

740, 774 A.2d 1009 (2001). ‘‘An integral premise of due

process is that a matter cannot be properly adjudicated
unless the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues involved . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 741.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

disposition of this issue on appeal. In commencing the

workers’ compensation action, the claimant mailed

three form 30Cs, one each to the respondent, Fresh

Start, and Fresh Start Realty, LLC, all addressed to 122

Oakland Street in Manchester. The respondent resided

at 65 Shoddy Mill Road in Bolton. Nevertheless, there

is no dispute that the respondent received all three

forms. Upon receipt of the form 30C that listed ‘‘Michael

Gramegna’’ as the employer, the respondent was put

on notice that he, as an individual, was one of three

respondents potentially liable to be found as the

employer of the claimant. The respondent appeared and

represented Fresh Start at the first formal hearing on

September 14, 2012. At that hearing, the commissioner

heard testimony from the claimant, the respondent, and

several witnesses.

When the pro forma formal hearing for submission

of briefs and proposed findings was scheduled for

November 26, 2012, however, notice of the hearing was

only sent to Fresh Start’s business address, 122 Oakland

Street in Manchester, rather than the respondent’s residential address, 65 Shoddy Mill Road in Bolton. It is

undisputed, and was a matter of public record, that the

respondent had moved to Bolton with his family prior

to the date of the claimant’s injury, as the claimant

helped the respondent move as part of his employment.

The notice of the pro forma formal hearing lists ‘‘Mr.

Michael Gramegna’’ as ‘‘Not Notified’’ under ‘‘Other(s),’’

and he is not listed as a respondent. On March 26, 2013,

the commissioner issued the 2013 finding and award,

which inconsistently referred to Michael Gramegna as

‘‘the respondent,’’ or, alternatively, ‘‘the respondent’s

principal.’’ The respondent received the 2013 finding

and award at his Bolton address on April 8, 2013, and

argues that this is the first time he understood that he

could be held personally liable for the claimant’s

injuries.

Even if we assume, without deciding, that the respondent was deprived of due process prior to the 2013

finding and award because he was not afforded notice

of the pro forma formal hearing and an opportunity to

file a brief and proposed findings on the issue of personal liability, we conclude that the respondent is not

entitled to relief in this appeal.8 The 2013 finding and

award is not the operative award in this appeal, and,

in fact, that decision was vacated. The respondent suffered no due process deprivation with regard to the

2015 finding and award that he now challenges. The

respondent had a full and fair opportunity to be heard

on the issue of personal liability when he was given an

opportunity to submit a brief and proposed findings to
the commissioner prior to the 2015 finding and award.

The respondent submitted proposed findings and a brief

to the commissioner on April 30, 2015. The respondent

was also on notice from the 2013 finding and award

that the claimant sought to hold him personally liable

for the claimant’s injuries.

On the basis of the forgoing, we conclude that the

board properly concluded that the claimant was an

employee subject to coverage under the act, and that

the procedures used by the commissioner prior to the

2015 finding and award afforded the respondent sufficient due process to be held personally liable.

The decision of the Workers’ Compensation Review

Board is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Fresh Start General Remodeling & Contracting, LLC, and the Second

Injury Fund are also named as respondents in this appeal. For the purposes

of this opinion, any reference to the respondent is to Michael Gramegna

only. No finding and award was entered with respect to Fresh Start Realty,

LLC. Any references to ‘‘Fresh Start’’ in this opinion are to Fresh Start General

Remodeling & Contracting, LLC, which is not participating in this appeal.

Because neither the respondent nor Fresh Start possessed workers’ compensation insurance coverage, the Second Injury Fund was added as an

interested party to the matter. See General Statutes § 31-355 (h). The Second

Injury Fund is not participating in this appeal.

2

‘‘The workers’ compensation commission created the form 30C for use

in complying with § 31-294c (a).’’ Mehan v. Stamford, 127 Conn. App. 619,

626, 15 A.3d 1122, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 911, 19 A.3d 180 (2011).

3 For example, the following exchange occurred between the claimant

and his attorney during direct examination:

‘‘[The Claimant’s Counsel]: [H]ow did you become employed by Fresh

Start General Remodeling & Contracting?

‘‘[The Claimant]: Mike, Michael Gramegna. . . .

‘‘[The Claimant’s Counsel]: And starting in October of 2011, did you start

going to work for Fresh Start . . . General Remodeling & Contracting?

‘‘[The Claimant]: Yes. . . .

‘‘[The Claimant’s Counsel]: How much was Mr. Gramegna or Fresh Start

. . . going to pay you?

‘‘[The Claimant]: $8 an hour.

‘‘[The Claimant’s Counsel]: And did they . . . actually pay you that

amount of money?

‘‘[The Claimant]: Yeah, he was paying me $8 an hour.’’

4 See, e.g., Gamez-Reyes v. Biagi, 136 Conn. App. 258, 276–77, 44 A.3d

197, cert. denied, 306 Conn. 905, 52 A.3d 731 (2012) (commissioner’s conclusions must stand where burden of proof for affirmative defense correctly

placed on respondent, and facts supported conclusion that respondent had

not met either prong of intoxication affirmative defense).

5 The board also noted the incomplete record on this issue, stating: ‘‘We

concede that the record is devoid of testimony which would illuminate the

parties’ expectations regarding how long the employment relationship might

have continued had it not been terminated by the motor vehicle accident

of January 13, 2012.’’ Nevertheless, the board concluded that the commissioner’s finding that the claimant was not a casual laborer was adequately

supported by the record.

6 Section 31-301-4 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part: ‘‘If the appellant desires to have the finding of the

commissioner corrected he must, within two weeks after such finding has

been filed, unless the time is extended for cause by the commissioner, file

with the commissioner his motion for the correction of the finding and with

it such portions of the evidence as he deems relevant and material to the

corrections asked for . . . .’’

7 A pro forma hearing is one where a hearing is noticed for the submission

of briefs and proposed findings of fact, but no party need appear. See, e.g.,

Merenski v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., Inc., No. 5076, CRB 7-06-4 (June

18, 2007).
8 The commissioner reached the same conclusion in his March 18, 2015

written memorandum of decision, stating: ‘‘On the existing record, there

are sufficient grounds to conclude that [the respondent] did not receive

notice of the pro forma formal hearing for submission of briefs and/or

proposed findings.’’ The commissioner then granted the motion to open and

vacated the 2013 finding and award as to the respondent’s personal liability

to the claimant.