J-A24017-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

AMANDA COLLINS N/K/A AMANDA 

CONNELLY 

Appellant

v.

MICHAEL COLLINS

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1253 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 18, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2018-60181

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2022

Amanda Connelly (“Mother”) and Michael Collins (“Father”) entered into 

a stipulated custody agreement regarding their now five-year-old child, A.C. 

(“Child”), and the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas entered an order 

approving the agreement. The court ultimately modified the custody order, 

allowing Father’s younger sister, C.K., (“Paternal Aunt”) to have unsupervised 

contact with Child during Father’s custodial time and allowing Father’s mother 

(“Paternal Grandmother”) to have supervised contact with Child during 

Father’s custodial time. Mother appeals that modified order, arguing that this 

modification puts Child’s safety at risk and is not in Child’s best interests. She 

also complains the court abused its discretion by finding that Father was not 

in contempt of the order. After review, we find that Mother has either waived 
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her claim or failed to establish the court abused its discretion. We therefore 

affirm.

The facts leading up to the modification of the custody order are not in 

dispute. Mother initially filed a complaint in custody for Child in February 2018, 

and Mother and Father entered into a stipulated custody agreement. The court 

entered a custody order approving that agreement on February 8, 2018. 

Under that order, Mother and Father shared legal custody, with Mother having 

primary physical custody and Father having partial physical custody every 

other Friday night. The stipulated order also specifically provided that “at no 

time during Father’s partial custody or at any other time shall Father have 

[Child] in the company of [Father’s older sister, J.C.] or [Paternal 

Grandmother].” Custody and Stipulation Order, 2/8/18, at 2, ¶ 11.

Mother sought a temporary protection from abuse (“PFA”) order against 

Father in June 2020, which the trial court granted. The PFA order limited 

Father’s contact with Child to phone/Facetime and Zoom calls, and awarded 

temporary sole physical custody to Mother. This PFA order was in effect from 

July 27, 2020 through July 25, 2021. 

On June 17, 2021, Mother filed a petition to modify the custody order, 

seeking sole physical and legal custody of Child. Mother asked that Father only 

be allowed supervised visitation as she had recently become aware that Father 

had been convicted of sexual assault in 2004. 
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Father also filed a petition for modification of the custody order in July 

2021. In this petition, Father sought additional time with Child and requested 

that “there be no restrictions such as supervised visit[ation] nor avoidance of 

[Father’s] family members.” Petition on Behalf of Defendant Michael For 

Modification of a Custody Order, 7/31/21, at 3. The court scheduled a 

conference on both Mother’s and Father’s modification petitions for October 

15, 2021.

Mother and Father, however, entered into another stipulated custody 

agreement, which the trial court entered as an order on October 28, 2021. 

This stipulated order awarded Mother primary physical custody, but it also 

provided Father with additional custody time. Specifically, Father was to have 

physical custody of Child: one weekday from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. every week, 

every other weekend from Friday evening through Sunday evening, on certain 

holidays, and for two weeks of vacation each year. The stipulated order further 

provided that “[u]nder no circumstances shall a person with a violent criminal 

history be permitted around [Child].” Stipulation and Agreement Regarding 

Child Custody, 10/27/21, at 4, ¶ 6. The order also provided that “neither party 

shall disparage the other in front of [Child], nor allow others to do so in 

[Child’s] presence, during his/her respective period of custody.” See id. at 4, 

¶ 10.

Mother filed a petition of contempt just days after the court entered the 

stipulated custody order. In her petition, Mother argued generally that Father 
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had violated the custody order by disparaging her in front of Child and by 

allowing Child to be around individuals with a violent criminal history. She did 

not name those individuals in the petition.

A custody conference was held on the petition, but the parties were not 

able to fully resolve the issues and the matter was listed for a hearing. In her 

report, the custody conference officer noted Mother’s and Father’s unresolved 

dispute regarding whether Paternal Aunt and Paternal Grandmother should be 

permitted any contact with Child. The report included Mother’s concerns 

regarding Paternal Grandmother, who had been convicted of child 

endangerment in 1996, and Paternal Aunt, who had been convicted of armed 

robbery and assault in 2016. The report also noted Father’s position that Child 

should be allowed to have contact with Paternal Grandmother, given the age 

of the endangerment conviction at issue, and that Child should also be allowed 

to have contact with Paternal Aunt, as she had recently been released from 

prison after serving her sentence for the armed robbery. See Report of the 

Custody Conference Officer, 12/16/21, at 2-3.

The matter proceeded to a hearing on April 6, 2022, with the issues 

limited to whether Father was in contempt of the custody order because he 

had made disparaging remarks about Mother or allowed Child to be around 

Paternal Grandmother and Paternal Aunt, and whether the custody order 
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should be modified to allow Child to be in the company of Paternal 

Grandmother and Paternal Aunt during Father’s custodial time.1

Mother testified at the hearing. She essentially maintained that both 

Paternal Grandmother and Paternal Aunt were violent individuals who should 

not have any contact with Child. To that end, Mother testified that Paternal 

Grandmother had been convicted of child endangerment and had a past of 

being violent towards her children, causing their removal from her care at one 

point. Mother further testified that Paternal Aunt had been convicted of 

robbery involving a firearm and then was convicted in November 2021 for an 

offense stemming from her involvement in a physical altercation. Mother also 

maintained that Child had been around both Paternal Grandmother and 

Paternal Aunt during Father’s custody time, which violated the terms of their 

custody order prohibiting contact with individuals with a violent criminal 

history. According to Mother, Father had also violated the custody order by 

making disparaging remarks about her on Facebook posts and in text 

messages, which were admitted into evidence. Mother also testified that she 

had a current PFA order against Father. 

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1 Prior to the hearing, Mother filed a modification and amended contempt 

petition, wherein she requested that the custody order be modified to 

specifically name the individuals who were prohibited from being in Child’s 

presence. Presumably, Mother’s request included Paternal Grandmother and 

Paternal Aunt. In his answer, Father averred that neither Paternal 

Grandmother or Paternal Aunt were violent individuals.
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Paternal Aunt testified after Mother. Paternal Aunt reported she had 

been released from prison for the robbery conviction in August 2020 and 

following that release, had been convicted of disorderly conduct. She shared 

she had a history of drug addiction and mental illness, but was sober and 

attending support programs, though she was not currently in treatment. 

Paternal Aunt further testified she had been removed from the care of Paternal 

Grandmother when she was a child, and agreed she had a “traumatic 

childhood.” N.T., 4/6/22, at 64. However, according to Paternal Aunt, she now 

sees Paternal Grandmother on an almost-daily basis, and Paternal 

Grandmother loves Child very much and does not pose any threat to him. See 

id. at 67.

Father then took the stand. He testified that Mother and Paternal 

Grandmother had a history of fighting. He conceded he had been removed 

from Paternal Grandmother’s care when he was a child due to violence and 

that her behavior can be erratic. Father asserted, however, that he wanted 

Child to have a relationship with Paternal Grandmother and Paternal Aunt 

because they love Child. See id. at 77-78. He insisted he had never seen 

Paternal Grandmother or Paternal Aunt hurt or berate Child. See id. at 78.

Following the hearing, the court entered an order denying the petition 

for contempt, citing insufficient evidence. The court also modified the custody 

order so Paternal Aunt “shall not be restricted from having contact with 

[Child]” and Paternal Grandmother “shall only be allowed to be in the presence 
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of [Child] if Father is physically present with her at the time.” Order, 4/19/22, 

at 2.2

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. Although Mother presents four 

separate questions in her statement of questions presented section, she 

provides only a single argument in the argument section of her brief. In 

essence, Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion by modifying 

the custody order to allow Paternal Aunt and Paternal Grandmother, who 

Mother asserts have criminally violent backgrounds, to have contact with Child 

and also abused its discretion by not finding Father in contempt. We conclude 

Mother has failed to establish that the trial court committed an abuse of 

discretion on either front. 

“Our standard of review over a custody order is for a gross abuse of 

discretion.” A.L.B. v. M.D.L., 239 A.3d 142, 147 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation 

omitted). Such an abuse of discretion will only be found if the “trial court, in 

reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment 

which is manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will as shown by the evidence of record.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Additionally, when we review a custody order: 

We must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by 

competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making 

____________________________________________

2 The order also specifically provided that K.K., Father’s stepfather, is not 

allowed to have any contact with Child. That modification is not contested.
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independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to 

the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses 

first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s 

deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the 

test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as 

shown by the evidence of record. 

Id. at 147-148. (citation omitted). 

As with any custody matter, including petitions for modification, the 

paramount concern is the best interest of the child involved. See Johns v. 

Cioci, 865 A.2d 931, 936 (Pa. Super. 2004). Relevant to the case at hand, if 

it is in the best interest of a child to have contact with a third party, the trial 

court may allow for that contact. See MacDonald v. Quaglia, 658 A.2d 1343, 

1346 (Pa. Super. 1995). 

Here, Mother claims the court erred by modifying the custody 

agreement to allow Child to be in the presence of Paternal Grandmother and 

Paternal Aunt. In support, Mother recites testimony given at the hearing, and 

makes general references to the evidence she presented at the hearing about 

Paternal Aunt’s and Paternal Grandmother’s criminal history, history of drug 

abuse and mental illness and lack of a bond with Child. She summarily asserts 

that this evidence “should be sufficient enough to find a finding that Paternal 

Aunt and Paternal Grandmother should not be around [Child], and can be 

detrimental to [Child’s] wellbeing and safety.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. 

In effect, Mother’s entire argument amounts to no more than a 

disagreement with the court’s determination that, based on the testimony and 
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evidence presented, it was in Child’s best interest to allow Paternal 

Grandmother and Paternal Aunt to be in the company of Child during Father’s 

custodial time. Merely expressing one’s disagreement with the court’s 

decision, as Mother does here, simply does not establish that the court’s 

conclusions were unreasonable in light of the record or that the court 

committed a gross abuse of discretion by allowing contact between Child and 

Child's two paternal relatives. See M.D.L., 239 A.3d at 147-148.

Nor do we discern any abuse of discretion by the trial court, which 

extensively explained its reasons for allowing the contact:

Although there may have been criminal acts in the past by 

Paternal Aunt and Paternal Grandmother, said acts were both 

attenuated in time and place, and had not been directed toward 

[Child]. Further, there was no evidence presented that Paternal 

Aunt had ever been violent toward [Child], or any other child.

Mother did not present any reports or clinical notes from 

therapists, doctors, teachers, or counselors supporting her 

petition to bar Paternal Aunt and/or Paternal Grandmother from 

contact with [Child].

Paternal Aunt conceded that she had been involved in an 

armed robbery for which she completed her sentence. ... Paternal 

Aunt said she had been in therapy for drug addiction, and [had] 

been in [various support] programs.

Paternal Grandmother and Paternal Aunt have both been 

diagnosed as bipolar and are prescribed Seroquel. Paternal Aunt 

credibly testified that Paternal Grandmother loves [Child] and 

does not constitute a threat to him. Nonetheless, the Court did 

place the restriction that Father must be in [the] presence of 

Paternal Grandmother and [Child], at all times, during any periods 

of contact.

***
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Father disputed Mother’s claims that Paternal Grandmother 

and/or Paternal Aunt posed a threat to [Child]. Father testified 

that both the Paternal Grandmother and the Paternal Aunt loved 

[Child] and would never harm [him].

On cross-examination, Father conceded that a video of an 

altercation between Paternal Grandmother and Mother was 

authentic, but he said it dated back to approximately 2017. Father 

testified that Paternal Grandmother had been violent towards him 

when he was a child. Mother testified that she herself had been 

the victim of child abuse in her youth, and that Father and her 

shared a background of having been abused as youngsters.

No evidence was adduced at the April 6, 2022 hearing that 

Paternal Grandmother or Paternal Aunt had ever committed any 

violent act against [Child] or threatened [Child] with violence. 

Also, although Paternal Aunt had been incarcerated for 

participating in a robbery, she had served her time and obtained 

post release counseling. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/22, at 8-10 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

The court stated that after hearing “the testimony and evidence 

presented by both Father and Mother[, it] had reasonably determined under 

the applicable standard of review that the best interests of [Child] were to 

permit contact [with] the Paternal Aunt, and supervised contact [with] the 

Paternal Grandmother.” Id. at 6. Again, we see no abuse of discretion in the 

trial court’s conclusion, and Mother’s bald protests to the contrary do not 

convince us otherwise.

Mother also summarily asserts that Paternal Aunt and Paternal 

Grandmother have no standing in this custody matter, and therefore no 

custodial rights to Child. In the first place, this argument is waived for its sheer 

lack of development. See Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1287 
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(Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that arguments that are not sufficiently developed 

are waived). 

However, even if not waived, the issue lacks merit. As the trial court 

repeatedly stated, it had not vested any independent custodial rights in 

Paternal Aunt or Paternal Grandmother, but rather, had merely allowed them 

to have contact with Child during Father’s custodial time pursuant to Father’s 

custodial rights. That contact was, the trial court explained, merely a 

modification of Father’s custodial rights as outlined in the order. Mother does 

not even address these conclusions by the trial court, much less establish they 

were in any way erroneous. 

We add that neither Paternal Aunt nor Paternal Grandmother filed any 

petition seeking any kind of custodial rights to Child. Rather, it was Father’s 

and Mother’s filings which sought clarification in the custody order as to 

whether Paternal Grandmother and Paternal Aunt were permitted to be in the 

presence of Child during Father’s custody time. The court modified Father’s 

custody rights in the custody order in response to those filings. Accordingly, 

in the end, Mother has failed to show, and we fail to see, an abuse of discretion 

on the trial court’s part when it modified the custody order. 

Mother also argues the court abused its discretion by denying her 

petition for contempt. Much like in her first issue, Mother summarily claims 

the trial court abused its discretion by not finding the evidence she presented 

at the hearing established Father had made disparaging remarks about Mother 
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in front of Child. She points out the trial court found that Father only told 

Mother he was going to make disparaging remarks to Child, not that he had. 

Mother asserts, however, that her testimony and the Facebook posts she 

presented as exhibits at the hearing showed Father had, in fact, done so. 

Nowhere in her brief does Mother specify what testimony or which Facebook 

posts she is referring to, where they are in the record, or how their content 

supports her contentions. This claim is waived. See Love, 896 A.2d at 1287; 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (providing that when an appellate brief references a matter 

appearing in the record, the brief must identify the place in the record where 

the matter appears); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d) (stating that when the refusal to find 

a fact is argued, the argument must “contain a synopsis of all the evidence on 

the point, with a reference to the place in the record where the evidence may 

be found”). 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/22/2022