J-A22011-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KYLEE SHAWN LANKFORD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 261 WDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0011414-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 29, 2022

Appellant, Kylee Shawn Lankford, appeals from the order entered on 

February 1, 2022, dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the PostConviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

We previously explained the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows:

[Appellant] was charged ... in connection with a robbery and 

murder[s] that occurred in the early morning hours on September 

1, 2017. Melanie Robb and Kimberly Lesko died in the robbery as 

a result of gunshot wounds [they sustained during the episode]. 

Another victim, Mark Jordan, was shot in the face during the 

robbery and sustained serious bodily injury. Robert Brown was 

also present in the home when the robbery and murders occurred. 

While not legally married, Mr. Brown lived with Ms. Robb for 

approximately 22 years and the two considered themselves 

husband and wife. Mr. Brown was not physically harmed in this 

incident.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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[Appellant] committed the robbery and murder[s] with his 

co-defendant, Miras Kelly, who testified that [Appellant] shot all 

of the victims.

The jury returned guilty verdicts for [two counts of second-degree 

murder, three counts of robbery, and one count each of burglary, 

conspiracy, and firearms not to be carried without a license1] and 

the trial court sentenced [Appellant] to life imprisonment.

Commonwealth v. Lankford, 237 A.3d 452, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(unpublished memorandum). This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence in an unpublished memorandum filed on May 14, 2020. Id. 

Appellant did not appeal that determination to the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court.

On March 24, 2021, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. Appointed counsel filed 

an amended PCRA petition on October 4, 2021. On November 3, 2021, the 

trial court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without an 

evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. In response, Appellant

requested leave to file a supplemental PCRA petition raising an additional 

claim. The PCRA court granted leave and accepted the supplemental PCRA 

petition. On January 11, 2022, the PCRA court again issued notice of its intent 

to dismiss the PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 

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1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a)(1)(i), 3502(a)(1)(i), 903, and 6106, 

respectively.
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not respond. On February 1, 2022, the PCRA 

court entered an order denying Appellant relief. This timely appeal resulted.2

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

Did the [PCRA] court abuse its discretion in denying the PCRA 

petition, as amended, without a hearing, insofar as there was a 

genuine issue concerning material facts; specifically, that trial 

counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission of the 

videotape of the police interrogation, or requesting a mistrial, and 

for not objecting to or requesting a mistrial during the 

[Commonwealth’s] closing argument upon the exploitation of 

[Appellant’s] post-arrest silence?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the PCRA is 

two-fold which he summarizes as follows:

[T]rial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission 

of the videotape of the police interrogation, or requesting a 

mistrial, where [Appellant] stated that he did not want to speak 

to the police, and the sole purpose of showing the jury the tape 

was to highlight [Appellant’s] silence by refusing to implicate 

anyone in the commission of the crime. Counsel was also 

ineffective for not objecting to or requesting a mistrial during the 

[Commonwealth’s] closing argument, which exploited 

[Appellant’s] post-arrest silence. [Appellant] was prejudiced due 

to counsel’s omissions insofar as it was likely that the jury was led 

to improperly consider [Appellant’s] silence as a tacit admission 

of guilt[].

Id. at 8. Appellant argues that because “there is no record of trial counsel’s 

rationale for not objecting ... the order dismissing [Appellant’s PCRA] petition 

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2

 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on February 28, 2022. On March 14, 2022, 

Appellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On March 22, 2022, the PCRA court filed an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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should be vacated and the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 

19-20.

We adhere to the following standards:

In reviewing the PCRA court's denial of relief, we examine whether 

the determination is supported by the record and free of legal 

error. We will not disturb the court's findings unless there is no 

support in the record. It is an appellant's burden to persuade us 

that the PCRA court erred and that relief is due.

[...C]ounsel is presumed to be effective, and a PCRA petitioner 

bears the burden of proving otherwise. To obtain relief based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must establish: (1) 

the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) there was no 

reasonable basis for counsel's action or failure to act; and (3) but 

for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. Failure to satisfy any 

of the three prongs is fatal to the claim. It is well-settled that 

counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless 

claim.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 270 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(internal citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted).

Appellant presents one issue, with two subparts, pertaining to trial 

counsel’s representation. We will examine each part of Appellant’s claim in 

turn. Regarding the videotaped police interview, Appellant asserts:

During the videotape[d police interview], [Appellant] told the 

police that he didn’t want to talk to them anymore. He also didn’t 

implicate anyone, including himself, in the commission of the 

shooting. In contrast, the jury heard that others, specifically 

Cameron Kirk, Miras Kelly, and Dalyn Jackson, did talk to the 

police about their role in the shooting, minimized their 

involvement, and pointed the finger [at Appellant]. 
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Id. at 10 (record citations and original brackets omitted). Accordingly, 

Appellant claims that the jury was led to conclude that his silence was an 

adverse inference of guilt, trial counsel’s failure to object constituted 

ineffective assistance, and, therefore, he was entitled to a new trial. Id. at 

18.

On this portion of Appellant’s claim, the PCRA court determined:

[... Appellant] alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the admission of the videotape of [Appellant’s] police 

interrogation. However, it is clear from the [trial] transcript that 

trial counsel had a strategic purpose for permitting this testimony. 

Trial counsel for [Appellant] cross-examined the detectives 

involved in the interrogation at great length, eliciting testimony 

from [one] detective that he lied to [Appellant] and used 

techniques to “break” [Appellant]. It appears a reasonable 

strategy of tr[ia]l counsel to permit the testimony of the detective 

in an effort to paint the picture that the interactions between 

[Appellant] and the police were pressured or coerced and 

therefore improper or corrupt. Accordingly, [the PCRA c]ourt 

[found] there was a reasonable strategic basis for trial counsel to 

permit the videotape of the police interrogation [to be entered into 

evidence].

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/22/22, at 6.

Upon review, we agree with the PCRA court’s assessment. There is no 

dispute that Appellant did not incriminate himself or implicate another during 

the recorded police video. Instead, Appellant flatly denied his involvement. 

After the video of the police interview with Appellant was played for the jury, 

defense counsel questioned the investigating detective at length about the 

interview techniques used by the police. N.T., 7/20/2018, at 20-30. The 

investigating detective admitted that the police lied to Appellant by telling him 
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there were eyewitnesses to the crimes as “part of the ruse to get a person to 

confess” and “designed to break down a person’s will.” Id. at 20-22. The 

investigating detective acknowledged that he continued questioning Appellant 

even though Appellant asked to stop the interview. Id. at 29-30. However, 

the investigating detective also admitted that Appellant adamantly told the 

police that he did not commit the crimes. Id. at 30.

Moreover, during closing argument, trial counsel argued:

You [] heard from [the investigating detective who interviewed 

Appellant]. And you saw the interview of [Appellant]. You got to 

hear [Appellant’s] voice and you got to see him during that 

interview. And the detective told you we'll lie, we'll make stuff up, 

we'll try to intimidate on occasion. He said he didn't do it here, 

but they will on occasion. They would try to ingratiate on occasion 

and said he didn't do it here. You saw the interview. During the 

interview, if you need -- if you want to help yourself, you got to 

tell us what you did. We have evidence, we know they certainly 

tried to make [Appellant] believe that the two surviving witnesses 

could tell on him and say that he was the person who did it. And 

I would submit to you if [Appellant] had done it and there were 

two surviving people, he would be afraid of that. But what did he 

say? He said I didn't do this. My life is over. I'm being blamed for 

this. I'm being arrested for two white women getting killed. My 

life is done, but I didn't do this. This isn't me, this isn't my family, 

my family are good people, they are my parents, they're God 

fearing they're involved in church. I don't do this stuff. Well, they 

saw you and you need to tell us --maybe you can explain, tell us 

if you saw a guy with a gun, if you tell us that, maybe that could 

be your reason why [you] fired, that you were afraid, and that 

maybe that would mitigate it for you. Right? I mean, we heard 

this on the tape. And [Appellant] doesn't break down and say I 

did it, that was me, you're right, if there's eyewitnesses they must

have seen me. Obviously if that man saw me shoot him, then he's 

going to be able to identify me. I better say I saw somebody with

a gun, like you suggested, or it wasn't me who shot, it was the 

other guy. He doesn't do any of that. He doesn't try to lay it off 

on somebody else. He says, I didn't do this, it wasn't me.
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Whatever you feel about the strategy utilized by [the investigating 

detectives] in trying to get this confession, and I know I have my 

own feelings, there is a lot of talk in legal circles about the 

propensity, especially amongst young men of false confessions 

after being made fearful by police and being told the only way to 

get out of it, the only way to see daylight, the only way for you to 

not lose the rest of your life is to admit it, and suggesting what 

might have happened and giving those kind of cues. I have my 

own feelings about that, because I think it's wrong. And I don't 

think we should engage in that, but obviously to some degree it's 

legal, although what sense does it make when you read Miranda

warnings and tell an individual you can stop whenever you want. 

And [Appellant] said I don't want to talk anymore, but he doesn't 

give the magic "lawyer" word, and so we'll keep going. We'll keep 

trying to make him talk. It doesn't matter if he says he wants to 

stop, even though we told him he could stop if he wanted to, I 

guess that's okay. You guys can think about whether that's okay, 

but that might even be a subject for another day, because despite 

that and despite that we know -- despite the fact we know that on 

occasion that coerces false confessions. Here [Appellant] said I 

didn't do it.

N.T., 7/20/2018, at 71-74.

Taken altogether, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in 

rejecting Appellant’s claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness. Trial counsel had 

a reasonable strategy for allowing the jury to see and hear the recorded police 

interview. In that interview, Appellant consistently denied his involvement in 

the crimes at issue, even when faced with admittedly coercive police tactics. 

Eventually, Appellant requested that the police end the interview. In closing 

argument, trial counsel urged the jury to find Appellant not guilty because, as 

the video confirmed, he repeatedly denied involvement despite pressure from 

police interrogators. Under these circumstances, we reject Appellant’s 

suggestion on appeal that trial counsel lacked a reasonable strategy in 

forgoing an objection to the video tape because “the sole purpose of showing 
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the jury the tape was to highlight [Appellant’s] silence by refusing to implicate 

anyone in the commission of the crime” or that the “jurors were likely to view 

[Appellant’s] silence as a tacit admission of guilt.” Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. 

Here, Appellant adamantly disavowed his role in the robbery and shootings to 

the police before exercising his right to remain silent. As such, we agree with 

the PCRA court that counsel pursued a reasonable trial strategy, i.e. one that 

furthered the interest of his client, in using the video to visually and audibly 

demonstrate for the factfinder how the police improperly or corruptly 

pressured or coerced Appellant during the interrogation. Moreover, in the 

absence of Appellant’s live testimony at trial, the video allowed the jury to 

observe Appellant, in his own voice and image, disavow his involvement to 

police. Based upon our review of the record and applicable law, it cannot be 

said that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of 

the videotaped police interrogation because trial counsel had a reasonable 

strategy. As such, the first portion of Appellant’s claim fails.

Next, in support of his argument that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the Commonwealth’s closing argument, Appellant submits:

During closing argument, the [Commonwealth] highlighted 

[Appellant’s] silence by arguing, “When he’s in that interview 

room he doesn’t say, look, this is me, this is my life, it was 

Cameron. He doesn’t say that.”

Id. at 10. Appellant claims that “the Commonwealth told the jury what it 

believed [Appellant] should have said if in fact he were innocent and he knew 

that someone else committed the crime.” Id. at 17; see also id. at 15 (“By 
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the prosecutor suggesting what he believed [Appellant] should have but did 

not say to police, this amounted to the Commonwealth commenting on 

[Appellant] exercising his federal and state constitutional right to remain 

silent.”). As a result, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the Commonwealth’s closing argument. Id. at 17.

Our Supreme Court previously determined:

a claim of ineffective assistance grounded in trial counsel's failure 

to object to a prosecutor's conduct may succeed when the 

petitioner demonstrates that the prosecutor's actions violated a 

constitutionally or statutorily protected right, such as the Fifth 

Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination or the 

Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, or a constitutional interest 

such as due process. To constitute a due process violation, the 

prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to 

result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. The 

touchstone is fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 

prosecutor. Finally, not every intemperate or improper remark 

mandates the granting of a new trial; reversible error occurs only 

when the unavoidable effect of the challenged comments would 

prejudice the jurors and form in their minds a fixed bias and 

hostility toward the defendant such that the jurors could not weigh 

the evidence and render a true verdict.

* * *

[Our Supreme Court] has recognized that counsel [is] not 

constitutionally required to forward any and all possible objections 

at trial, and the decision of when to interrupt oftentimes is a 

function of overall defense strategy being brought to bear upon 

issues which arise unexpectedly at trial and require split-second 

decision-making by counsel. Under some circumstances, trial 

counsel may forgo objecting to an objectionable remark or seeking 

a cautionary instruction on a particular point because objections 

sometimes highlight the issue for the jury, and curative 

instructions always do.
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Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 144-146 (Pa. 2012) (internal 

citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted). Furthermore, “[a] 

prosecutor does not engage in misconduct when his statements are based on 

the evidence or made with oratorical flair.” Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 

A.2d 220, 237 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). “Additionally, a prosecutor must 

be permitted to respond to arguments made by the defense.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Finally, it is well settled that “[i]n reviewing prosecutorial remarks 

to determine their prejudicial quality, comments cannot be viewed in isolation 

but, rather, must be considered in the context in which they were made.” 

Commonwealth v. Sampson, 900 A.2d 887, 890 (Pa. Super.2006) (citation 

omitted).

Initially, the PCRA court noted that Appellant “mischaracterizes the 

statement made by counsel for the Commonwealth” during closing argument 

by relying upon an isolated comment and omitting the statements made 

thereafter. PCRA Court Opinion, 3/22/22, at 7. More specifically, the PCRA 

court recognized:

The statement alleged by [Appellant] in his PCRA [petition] is as 

follows: “When [Appellant’s] in the interview room he doesn’t say, 

look, this is me, this is my life, it was Cameron. He doesn’t say 

that.” However, this [was] not the end of the sentence, [] the 

Commonwealth continues to say[,] “He doesn’t say that. 

[Appellant] says he was with Miras and we all know where Miras 

was.” Thus, [Appellant] mischaracterizes the statement made by 

counsel for the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth was not 

“exploiting” [Appellant’s] post-arrest silence, [it] was pointing out 

inconsistencies/consistencies in the testimony of witnesses and 

addressing the arguments made by trial counsel for [Appellant] in 

his closing.
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Id.

We agree with the PCRA court’s analysis. Appellant misconstrued the 

closing statement at issue and isolated a single comment out of context. In 

total, the comments challenged on appeal related to the evidence presented 

at trial and constituted fair response to defense counsel’s closing remarks as 

set forth above at length in our examination of Appellant’s first contention on 

appeal. The Commonwealth simply did not comment on Appellant’s silence. 

Rather, the Commonwealth focused on what Appellant actually said to the 

police when he admitted that he was with co-defendant, Miras Kelly, at the 

time of the crimes. As such, we conclude the Commonwealth did not commit 

prosecutorial misconduct and there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Commonwealth’s closing 

argument. 

We also recognize that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that 

“the arguments of counsel are not evidence.” Commonwealth v. Philistin, 

53 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). Hence, an “appellant [is] not 

prejudiced by [the Commonwealth’s closing] remark[s when] the trial court 

instruct[s] the jury in its general cautionary instruction following closing 

arguments that none of the closing arguments [is] evidence since the jury is 

the sole finder of facts from the evidence presented at trial and the sole judge 

of a witness' credibility.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 A.2d 492, 511 

(Pa. 1997) (citation omitted) (our law presumes that juries follow the court's 

instructions as to the applicable law). Here, the trial court instructed the jury 
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that the arguments of counsel were not evidence and that the jurors were the 

sole factfinders. N.T., 7/20/2018, at 99-100. As such, we presume that the 

jury followed the trial court’s instruction. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing 

reasons, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant is not entitled to relief 

on his interrelated claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness.

Finally, we reject Appellant’s argument that an evidentiary hearing was 

required in order to determine whether trial counsel had a reasonable 

strategy. Our Supreme Court has held that “generally, the [PCRA] court 

should not glean from the record whether counsel had a reasonable basis for 

his action or inaction absent an evidentiary hearing, and that it is only in the 

most clear-cut cases that the reasons for counsel's conduct are apparent from 

the record.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 442 (Pa. 2011) 

(citation omitted). In this case, as detailed above, trial counsel’s strategy was 

clear-cut and entirely apparent from the record based upon his opening 

statement, his cross-examination of the various witnesses at trial, and his 

closing argument. Thus, an evidentiary hearing was unwarranted. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/2022