J-S08027-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

VINCENT CAMPBELL

Appellant No. 2023 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order of July 7, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-15-CR-0001329-2001

CP-15-CR-0001401-2001

CP-15-CR-0001616-2001

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 03, 2015

Vincent Campbell appeals the July 7, 2014 order dismissing his second 

petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, as untimely. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the procedural history of this case as 

follows:

On September 25, 2001, [Campbell] entered a negotiated guilty 

plea to aggravated assault, resisting arrest, flight to avoid 

apprehension and driving under the influence. He was 

sentenced that day to serve a term of imprisonment of six to 

twelve years[’ imprisonment]. [Campbell] did not appeal his 

sentence. Approximately eleven years later, on July 30, 2012, 

[Campbell] filed his first [PCRA] petition [], and was appointed 

PCRA counsel. On February 19, 2013, [the PCRA court] 

dismissed his PCRA petition as untimely. On November 13, 

2013, [this Court] affirmed the dismissal, also finding 

[Campbell’s] PCRA petition untimely. [See Commonwealth v.
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Campbell, No. 712 EDA 2013, slip op. at 1, 6 (Pa. Super. Nov. 

13, 2013).]

On March 14, 2014, [Campbell] filed a second PCRA petition. 

Again, [the PCRA court] reviewed the petition and the record, 

found that the petition was also untimely, and on June 19, 2014, 

notified [Campbell] of [the court’s] intent to dismiss his petition 

[pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907]. Although [Campbell] responded 

to [the Rule 907 notice,] his response established entitlement to 

no PCRA timeliness exception. Accordingly, [the PCRA court] 

dismissed his PCRA petition on July 7, 2014.

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/4/2014, at 1-2. 

On July 17, 2014, Campbell filed a notice of appeal. In response, the 

PCRA court directed Campbell to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On August 18, 

2014, Campbell timely complied. On September 4, 2014, the PCRA court 

issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Campbell raises the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the lower trial courts followed the sentencing code?

2. Whether the sentence imposed is illegal and unconstitutional 

under the United States Constitution and [the] Pa. 

Constitution?

3. Whether [Campbell’s] sentence left him therefor unlawfully 

imprisoned? 

4. Did [Campbell] show just cause for review pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)/42 Pa.C.S. [§ 9545](b)(i)(ii)?

5. Whether [Campbell’s second] PCRA was timely?

Brief for Campbell at 3 (commas omitted for clarity). 

Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is well-settled:
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This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s order is 

whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the 

evidence of record and is free of legal error. Great deference is 

granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will 

not be disturbed unless they have no support in the certified 

record. Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing 

on the petition if the PCRA court determines that a petitioner’s 

claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in 

either the record or from other evidence.

Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

Before we can consider the merits of Campbell’s issues, we first must 

determine whether his second PCRA petition was timely filed, thereby 

conferring jurisdiction upon the PCRA court to rule upon the petition in the 

first instance. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, we articulated the 

timeliness standards under the PCRA as follows:

The PCRA “provides for an action by which persons convicted of 

crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences 

may obtain collateral relief.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. When an 

action is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the “sole 

means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other 

common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose[.]” 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.

In order for a court to entertain a PCRA petition, a petitioner 

must comply with the PCRA filing deadline. See 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 

2003). The time for filing a petition is set forth in 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b), which provides in relevant part:

(b) Time for filing petition.—

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second 

or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the 

date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition 

alleges and the petitioner proves that:
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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution 

or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States 

or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time 

period provided in this section and has been held by 

that court to apply retroactively.

* * *

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

“[T]he time limitations pursuant to . . . the PCRA are 

jurisdictional.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 

(Pa. 1999). “[Jurisdictional time] limitations are mandatory and 

interpreted literally; thus, a court has no authority to extend 

filing periods except as the statute permits.” Id. “If the petition 

is determined to be untimely, and no exception has been pled 

and proven, the petition must be dismissed without a hearing 

because Pennsylvania courts are without jurisdiction to consider 

the merits of the petition.” Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 

A.2d 1284, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518-19 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Instantly, Campbell was sentenced on September 25, 2001. Campbell 

did not file a direct appeal. Thus, his judgment of sentence became final on 

or about October 25, 2001. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (“a judgment 

becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”). To be 
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timely, Campbell had to file a PCRA petition within one year of that date, on 

or before October 25, 2002. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (“[a]ny petition 

under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be 

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.”). Campbell 

filed the instant petition on March 14, 2014. Consequently, Campbell’s 

second PCRA petition is facially untimely by approximately eleven and onehalf years. 

Nonetheless, as noted above, an untimely PCRA petition will be 

deemed to be timely filed if the petitioner has pleaded and proven in his 

PCRA petition one of the three enumerated exceptions to the PCRA’s time 

bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (“[a]ny petition under this subchapter, 

including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of 

the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the 

petitioner proves [one of the three exceptions.]) (emphasis added). The 

PCRA court noted in its opinion that Campbell has failed to demonstrate that 

one of the exceptions applies. See PCRA Court Opinion, supra at 2. We 

agree with the PCRA court.

The crux of Campbell’s claim for relief, as set forth in his PCRA petition 

and in his brief to this Court, is his contention that he was illegally sentenced 

on his DUI conviction. In his PCRA petition, Campbell argued that, as a 

result of research in the prison law library, his discovery that his sentence 

was illegal constituted a newly discovered fact for purposes of the relevant 

exception to the PCRA’s time limits. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). The 
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newly discovered fact exception “requires [a] petitioner to allege and prove 

that there were ‘facts’ that were ‘unknown’ to him” and that he could not 

have ascertained those facts by the exercise of “due diligence.” 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270-72 (Pa. 2007). The 

focus of the exception is “on [the] newly discovered facts, not on a newly 

discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 863 A.2d 423, 427 (Pa. 2004) (emphasis in 

original), abrogation on different grounds recognized by Commonwealth v. 

Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007).

Campbell has failed to explain, either in his PCRA petition or in his 

brief to this Court, why he could not have ascertained the purported illegality 

of his sentence at an earlier date, or how he nonetheless acted with due 

diligence in the eleven and one-half years between the date that the 

sentence was imposed and the date that he filed his PCRA petition. Indeed, 

Campbell proffers no analysis of the necessary elements of the exception, 

and offers no meaningful discussion as to how he has satisfied those 

elements. Hence, we agree with the PCRA court that Campbell has not 

established that he is entitled to the application of the exception. 

Campbell also argues that the jurisdictional elements of the PCRA have 

been satisfied because his claim represents a challenge to the legality of his 

sentence, which is a non-waivable challenge. However, it is well-settled that 

such a claim does not, ipso facto, provide a PCRA court with jurisdiction. 

Although it is true that claims regarding the legality of a sentence generally 
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cannot be waived, Commonwealth v. Foster, 960 A.2d 160, 163 (Pa. 

Super. 2008), waiver and jurisdiction are separate matters. “Though not 

technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may nevertheless be lost 

should it be raised for the first time in an untimely PCRA petition for which 

no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction over 

the claim.” Commonwealth v. Slotcavage, 939 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) 

(“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, 

claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions 

thereto.”)).

Campbell cannot establish the PCRA court’s jurisdiction to grant relief 

on his untimely PCRA petition. The petition at issue herein was filed 

approximately eleven and one-half years after Campbell’s judgment of 

sentence became final. Campbell has not proved the applicability of any of 

the enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time limits. Thus, the PCRA court 

lacked jurisdiction over his petition, and did not err or abuse its discretion in 

dismissing the petition on that basis.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/3/2015