ORIGI AL 

3Jn tbe miniteb ~tate~ ([ourt of jf eberal QI:latm~ 

JOHN HALE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE UNITED STATES, 

No. 15-903C 

(Filed: September 2, 2015) 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

) 

) 

) 

FILED 

SEP - 2 2015 

U.S. COURT OF 

FEDERAL CLAIMS 

) Pro Se Complaint; Sua Sponte 

) Dismissal for Want of Jurisdiction; 

) Transfer; 28 U.S.C. § 1631 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

~~~~~~~~~-) 

John Hale, Owensboro, KY, pro se. 

ORDER 

CAMPBELL-SMITH, Chief Judge 

Before the court is the complaint of prose plaintiff John Hale filed August 19, 

2015. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs complaint states in full: 

I, John Hale, am filing a lawsuit against the Federal Government and the 

[National Security Agency (NSA)] over targeted, invasive surveillance and 

abrasive harassment/terrorism that has been directed at me over the past 5 

years and most severely from the time of December 2014 to the present date 

of August 2015. Supporting documents and evidence included. I am seeking 

compensation for damages over mental and physical torment and torture, 

stolen time, financial resources, relationships, and intellectual property. 

Id. at 1. The "[ s ]upporting documents and evidence" to which plaintiff refers consists of 

nineteen pages of documents printed from the internet, including an article titled "Covert 

Operations of the U.S. National Security Agency"; a WorldCat.org 1 screenshot of the 

"WorldCat is the world's largest network of library content and services." What 

is WorldCat? http://www.worldcat.org/whatis/ (last visited September 1, 2015). 
book Psychiatry and the CIA: Victims of Mind Control; a list of the purported effects of 

"psycho-electronic weapons"; and a chart purporting to depict "Mind Control 

Information Feedback Paths." Id., Attachs. 1-4. 

I. Legal Standards 

"Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time by the parties or by the 

court sua sponte." Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing 

Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see also 

Metabolite Labs, Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 

2004) ("Subject matter jurisdiction is an inquiry that this court must raise sua sponte, 

even where, as here, neither party has raised this issue."). "In deciding whether there is 

subject-matter jurisdiction, "the allegations stated in the complaint are taken as true and 

jurisdiction is decided on the face of the pleadings."' Folden, 379 F.3d at 1354 (quoting 

Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 

Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are often held to "less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see 

Vaizburd v. United States, 384 F.3d 1278, 1285 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that 

pleadings drafted by pro se parties "should ... not be held to the same standard as 

[pleadings drafted by] parties represented by counsel"). However, pro se plaintiffs must 

still meet jurisdictional requirements. Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499 

(2004), affd, 98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Kelley v. Dep't of Labor, 812 

F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[A] court may not similarly take a liberal view of [a] 

jurisdictional requirement and set a different rule for pro se litigants only."). If the court 

determines that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the claim. 

Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) 12(h)(3). 

The Tucker Act provides for this court's jurisdiction over "any claim against the 

United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any 

regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the 

United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 

28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l) (2012) (emphasis added). A plaintiff must "identify a substantive 

right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act itself' 

for the court to exercise jurisdiction over a claim. Todd v. United States, 3 86 F .3d 1091, 

1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The substantive source oflaw allegedly violated must '"fairly be 

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government."' United States v. 

Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 

400 (1976)). 

2 
II. Discussion 

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3), and the court finds that a transfer 

of plaintiffs case to another federal court is not appropriate. 

A. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs Claims 

Plaintiffs demand for "compensation for damages over mental and physical 

torment and torture, stolen time, financial resources, relationships, and intellectual 

property" falls outside this court's jurisdiction. Plaintiffs demand for compensation is 

based on allegations of "invasive surveillance and abrasive harassment/terrorism" on the 

part of the NSA. To the extent plaintiffs claims sound in tort, see Zhengxing v. United 

States, 71 Fed. Cl. 732, 739 (2006), affd, 204 F. App'x 885 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the Tucker 

Act plainly excludes tort claims from the court's jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l); 

Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993). To the extent plaintiffs claims 

are based on an allegation that the United States, acting through the NSA, has engaged in 

criminal activity, "[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims has 'no jurisdiction to 

adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code."' Zhengxing, 71 Fed. 

Cl. at 739 (quoting Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 

Moreover, plaintiff has not identified "a provision of the Constitution, a statute, an 

Executive order, or a regulation that mandates a payment of money to the plaintiff," see 

Raney v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 666, 667 (2007), which is necessary for this court to 

exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims, see Todd, 386 F.3d at 1094. 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed pursuant to 

RCFC 12(h)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

B. Transfer of the Case to Another Court Is Not Appropriate 

The court now considers whether "it is in the interest of justice" to transfer 

plaintiffs complaint to another court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See 

Tex. Peanut Farmers v. United States, 409 F.3d 1370, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating 

that the Court of Federal Claims should consider whether transfer is appropriate once the 

court has determined that it lacks jurisdiction). Section 1631 states in pertinent part: 

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this 

title ... and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, 

if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action ... to any other such court 

in which the action . . . could have been brought at the time it was filed or 

noticed .... 

3 
28 U.S.C. § 1631; see 28 U.S.C. § 610 (defining courts as "courts of appeals and district 

courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal 

Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United 

States Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of International Trade"). "The phrase 'if it 

is in the interest of justice' relates to claims which are nonfrivolous and as such should be 

decided on the merits." Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. 

Cir. 1987); see id. (stating that "[f]rivolous claims include 'spurious and specious 

arguments"' (quoting Devices for Med., Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 

1987)). "A decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the transferor court, 

and the court may decline to transfer the case '[i]f such transfer would nevertheless be 

futile given the weakness of plaintiffs case on the merits."' Spencer v. United States, 98 

Fed. Cl. 349, 359 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Faulkner v. United States, 43 

Fed. Cl. 54, 56 (1999)). 

Because the court can discern no identifiable nonfrivolous cause of action that 

would potentially have merit in another court, transfer of plaintiffs complaint is not in 

the interest of justice. 

C. Plaintiffs Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

In addition to his complaint, plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed In F orma 

Pauperis (IFP). ECF No. 2. Plaintiffs IFP application states that "the amount of [his] 

salary or wages per month" is "40k." Id. at 1. The court understands that plaintiff has an 

annual salary of $40,000, which approximately equates to a monthly salary of $3,333. 

Although instructed to do so in the application, plaintiff does not identify his employer. 

Id. In response to the question, "Do you own any cash, or so you have money in 

checking, savings, or any other accounts," plaintiff states that he has $273. Id. at 2. 

Plaintiff also states that he owns a "2006 Chevy Malibu," but fails, as instructed, to "state 

its approximate value." Id. Plaintiff does not identify any dependents. Id. 

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that plaintiff has sufficient resources 

to satisfy the court's filing fee. See Walls v. United States, No. 05-533C, 2005 WL 

6114552, at *2 (Fed. Cl. July 28, 2005) (concluding same given plaintiffs monthly salary 

of $3700); cf. Moore v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 411, 414-15 (2010) (granting the 

plaintiffs IFP application given that she had three dependents and an annual salary of 

$16,800, which placed her "below the 2009 poverty guidelines for a four-person family 

[($22,050)]"); Annual Update on the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 3236, 3237 

(Jan. 22, 2015) (identifying an annual income of $11, 770 as the 2015 poverty guideline 

for family of one living in the 48 contiguous states). "[A]lthough [a] litigant need not be 

absolutely destitute, granting IFP status calls for showing that paying for the costs of the 

suit would make it difficult to afford the 'basic necessities of life."' See Murphy v. 

United States, No. 14-536C, 2014 WL 3510222, at* 1 n.1 (Fed. Cl. July 16, 2014) 

(quoting Williams v. Court Servs. & Offender Supervision Agency for D.C., 878 

4 
F.Supp.2d 263, 266 (D.D.C. 2012)), recons. denied, No. 14-536C, 2014 WL 3841874 

(2014). Accordingly, plaintiffs IFP application is DENIED. 

Nevertheless, because the court lacks jurisdiction, see supra Part II.A, the fee need 

not be paid for the purpose of filing the instant complaint. Plaintiff is advised that, based 

on his current financial status, any future filings will be subject to the court's $400 filing 

fee. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs 

claims. The Clerk of Court is directed to DISMISS plaintiffs complaint for lack of 

jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court will enter judgment for defendant. No costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

5 

~0~J~~~1vi PA RICIA E. CAMPBELL!SMITH 

Chief Judge