F OR P UB LIC AT ION



### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

J AN E T F. B ELL ; B R I AN S. C AR S ON ; R OB E R T M A R T IN ; LAWRENC E L EE S MI TH ; R OB E R T ANDE R S ON ; P A M ELA S. H AWKE S ; J A M ES M. G ODFR EY ; B A SI L E. H UM PHREY ,

Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts ,

v.
C I T Y O F B O I SE ; B OI S E P O LI CE D EP AR TMENT ; M I CHAEL M AS TER S ON , in

his of fi c ia l c a pa c ity as Chief of Police,

Defendants-A

ppellees

. No. 11-35674

D.C. No. 1:09-cv-00540- REB

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court

for the D istrict of I daho Ronald E. Bush, Ma g istrate Judge, Pre siding

Argued and Submitted August 7, 2012—Seattle, Washington

Filed Ma rch 7, 2013B ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

2

T h e H on or abl e Su s an H

. B l ac k , U n i t ed St at es Se n i or Ci r cu i t J u dg e f or * t he E l event h C i rcui t , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. Be fore : Susan H. Blac k, Susan P. Graber , and * Johnnie B . Ra

wl ins on , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e B lack

SUMMAR

Y **

Civil Rights The pa nel re verse d the district court’s summar y judgme nt and re manded in t h is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which plaintiffs, who either

are or have been homeless, alleg ed that police off

icer s enfor ced two loc al camp i n gand slee ping
or d i n an c e s a g a i n s tth e m , i nv i o l at i o no f th e E i gh th Am e ndme nt.
Plaintiffs contended that defe ndants’ policy , custom, and p rac tice of e nforc ing the se ordinanc es had the eff ect of criminalizing homelessne ss and constituted crue l and u n u sual punis hme nt. Th e pa

ne l re ve rs e d the dis mis sa l of p la int if fs ’
c la ims fo r re tr os pe c tiv e re lie f, de te rm ini ngthat th os e c la ims
wer e not bar

red by the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. The panel held that although plaintiffs soug ht relief designed to remedy injuries suffe red f

rom a state c ourt j u d gment, they did not alleg e that the state court committed le g al err or, nor did they seek r elief f

rom the state c ourt judg ment its elf. Rather,B ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE 3

T he p art i es co nsent ed t o p roce ed i ng b ef o re a m agi st rat e ju d g e in 1

ac cor dan ce w i t h t h e pr ov i s i on s of 28 U

. S. C. § 636( c) an d Fe der al Rul e of Ci v i l Pr oce du r e 73. plaintiffs asser

ted as a lega l wrong an alleg edly illega l act by an adve rse pa rt y : the City ’s alleg edly unconstitutional
e nf or c e me nt o f t

he or din anc e s.
Th e pa ne l als o re ve rs e d the dis mis sa l of pla int if fs ’ c la ims fo r p rospective relief

beca use those cla ims had not been mooted by

defe ndants ’ vol untary

conduct. In reve rsing , the p an e l d i d n o t r e a c h th e m e r i t s o f p l a i nt i f f s ’ Ei g hth Amendment clai m s

. Rather, the pa nel held that jurisdiction exis ted as to plaintiffs’ E i ghth Amendment claims and remand ed for

a c on sid e ratio n o f t

he me ri ts i n th e fi rs t instance.

CO UN SEL

Howar d A. Be lodoff, I daho L eg al Aid Service s, In c. , Boise, I da ho , f or Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts

. Scott B . Muir, Assistant Cit y Attorney , Boise City

Attorney ’s Of fi c e , B ois e , I da

ho , f or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.

OP IN ION

BLACK, Circuit J udg e: Plaintiffs appea l the court’s order granting summary 1 ju d gm ent t o Def

endants City

of B oise, Boise Police Depa rtme nt, and

Mic ha e l Ma ste rs on

in h is o ffici a l c a

pa c ityB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

4

See D

. C. Cour tof

Appeal s v

. Fel dm an , 460 U

. S. 462, 103 S. Ct

. 1303 2 (1 9 8 3 ); Rooke r v

. Fi d. Tr us tCo. , 26 3 U

. S. 41 3 , 44 S. C t

. 14 9 (19 2 3 ). as Chief of Police. Plaintiffs’ a mend ed complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleg ed De fenda nts enforc ed two local ordina

nces in viol ation of the Eighth Amendment t o the Constitut ion. The cour t held the R o o k

e r
-F e ld m an 2 doctrine deprived it of subjec t matter jurisdiction o ver Pla int if fs ’ c la ims fo r r e tr os pe c tiv e re lie f. Th e c ourt a lso found Plaintiffs’ cla ims for prospec t i ve injunctive and de c larator y re lief “larg e ly

moo t” be c a

us e the City

of B ois e amende d one ordina

nce a nd the Chief of Police is s u ed an int e rn a l poli c y re g ard ing the e nf or c e me nt o f b oth

or din anc e s.
We reve rse the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ cla ims for retrospe ctive relief because those claims are not barre d by the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. We a lso rever se the dismiss al of Pla int if fs ’ cl a ims fo r pr os pe c tiv e re lie f be c a us e tho se c la ims h av e n o tb e e nm o o t e d

b y D e f e n d ant s ’ v o l unt ar

y c o n d u c t

. In
re ve rs ing , w e do no t r e a c h th e me ri ts o f P la int iff s’ Ei ghth Amendment cha lleng es. Rather , we hol d that jurisdiction exis ts as to Plainti ffs’ E ighth Amendment claims and re mand for a consideration of the merits in the first instance

.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs Rober

t Anderson, J anet Be ll, B rian Carson, Pamela Ha wkes, Basil Humphrey , Robert Martin, and L awr ence L ee Smith are individuals who either ar e or have been home less in Boise. Plaintiffs have all been c ited orB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE 5

O n t he r ecor d bef

ore us , t her e i s not hi ng t o s uppo r t t he al l ega t i on t hat 3 P l ai nt i f f James G od f

r ey was ci t ed o r ar r es t ed f or a vi ol at i on of

t he l ocal ordi nan ces at i s s ue on appeal

. T hu s , an y i nju ry suff er ed by G od f

r ey
can not be l i nk ed t o t he cha l l eng ed act i ons of D ef endan t s , an d G od f

r ey the re fo re lac k s sta n d ing to se e k r e lief. See D avi s v

. Fed. El ec t i on C o m m ’n , 5 5 4 U .S

. 7 2 4 , 7 3 3 , 1 2 8 S . C t. 2 7 5 9 , 2 7 6 8 (2 0 0 8 ) (“ T o q u a lif y f or s t andi ng , a c l ai m an t mus t pre s ent an i nj ur y t hat i s conc r et e, p a rtic u la riz e d , an d a c tua l o r i m m ine n t; fair ly tra c e a b le to the d e fen d a n t’s chal l enged be havi o r; and likel y t o be redress ed by a f avo rable r ul i ng. ”). A c c o rd ing ly, w e a ff

irm the d ism issa l o f all cla im s a s to G o d fre y.

T he B o i se Cit y C o d e i s avai l ab l e at : ht t p :// c i t y cl erk. ci t y o f b o i se. o rg/ 4

c ity- c o d e /. arr e s te d f o r v io lati n g o n e o r b o th o f th e lo c a l o r d in an c e s at iss ue on a pp e a l. 3

B e tw e e n 20 06 and 20 09 , Pla int if fs An de rs on , Be ll, Hawke s, Humphrey , Martin, and Smit h wer e cited or arr ested for violating Boise City

Code § 9-10-02 ( 1993) (the Camping Ordinanc e). D uri n g that period, the CampingOrdinanc e provided:

It sh a ll b e un lawf ul f or any pe rs on to u se any o f th e s tr e e t s , s i d e w a l k s , p ar k s o r p u b l ic place s as a c ampingplace at an y t ime . . . provided that this section shall not prohibit the operation of a sidewa lk caf é pu rsuant to a permit issued by

the City Clerk.

Boise City Code § 9-10-02 (1993). Viol ation of the Camping Ordinanc e wa s (and is) a misdemeanor. Boise City Code § 9- 10-20. 4

Be tween 2007 a

nd 2009, Plaintiffs Carson, Hawke s, and Martin wer e cited f

or violating Boise City Code § 6-01-05( A)B ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

6 (the SleepingOrdinanc e). The SleepingOrdinanc e criminalizes as a mis d emeanor “disorde rly conduct,” which i n cl u d es “[ o ] cc u

p yi n g, l o d gi n g o r s l ee p i n g i nan y b u i l d i n g, structure or place , whether public or private , or in any motor vehicle w ithout the pe rmission of the owner or per son entitled to possession or in control there of.” Boise City Code § 6-01- 05(A).

On J une 28, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an ame nded complaint challeng ing the Camping a nd SleepingOrdinances (c oll e c tiv e ly , th e Or din anc e s) and se e kin gre lie f pur su ant t o 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs’ amende d complaint alleg ed that D e f e n d ant s u s e d

th e O r d i n an c e s “ t o c i t e an d ar re st ind ivi du a ls who c ann ot a vo id v iolati ng the se laws be c a us e the y are ho me le ss. ” Pla int if fs c onte nd e d that De fe nd ants ’ policy , custom, and pra ctice in e nforc ing the se ordinanc es “has the eff

ect of ‘criminaliz ing’ homeles s n ess” and constitutes “cr

uel and unusua l punish m ent i n violation of Pla int if fs ’ we ll e sta

bli sh e d r ights un de r t he Ei ghth Amendment.” Plaintiffs sought declar ato ry and injunctive
re lie f t o e njo in e nf

or c e me nt o f t

he Or din anc e s. Pla int if

fs a lso soug ht an orde r (1) “compe lling the City of B oise authorities to s e e k e xpun g e me nt o f t he re c or ds of

any ho me less individuals unlawfully

cited or a

rre sted” unde r the Ordinanc es, and ( 2) re quiringthe reimbursement of any
c ri min a l f

ine s o r c os ts o f i nc arc e ratio n p a id by ho me le ss ind ivi du a ls a s a

re su lt o f u

nla wf ul c itatio ns and

arr e sts

. Pla int if fs fu rt he r so ught an “ [a]w ard of dama g e s a c c or din gto proof.”

Ce ntr al to Pla int if

fs ’ c la ims is the a lle g e d unava ila bil ity
o f o v e r n igh t s p a c e in

B o is e ’ s h o me le s s s h e lt e r s

. T hree primary homeless shelters ope rate in Boise. B oise Rescue Mission (BRM) oper ates two of the shelters—City L ight f orB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE 7

Pl ai n t i f f s ’ or i g i n al c ompl ai n t w as f i l ed on O ct ober 22, 2009. 5 Women and Children (City L ight) and River of L ife. During the summer, both B RM shelters restr i ct the length of time a pe rs on may sta y wi tho ut p art ic ipatin gin c e rt a in p ro grams. City L ight p ro vid e s sh elt er fo r w ome n a nd c hil dr e n, wh ile River of L ife provide s shelter for men. Interfa ith Sanctuary (Sanctua ry ) oper ates the t h i rdshelter. Sanc tuary cannot guara ntee she lter for

ever y person who r equests it, and fre quently

turns awa y people when full . Howeve r, Sanctua ry employ s a rese rvation sy stem for those who have s t ay edthe prior eve ning. People who stayed the pr evious nig ht are guara nteed the s am e beds, provided they “show up by

9:00 pm or make specia l a

rra ng ements.” Otherw ise, the beds a re g ive n to tho se on

the wa it lis t. S anc tua

ry do e s n ot a

pp e ar t o restric t a per son’s lengt h o f stay , g iven that Plaintiff A n d e r s o ns p e ntthr e e ye ar s l i v i n gatS an c tu ar y.
On Novembe r 10, 2009, af ter this litigation had
commence d, the City

amende d the Camping O rdinanc e by 5 addinga def

inition of “camp” and “c amping ”:

The ter m “camp” or “ca

mping” shall mean the use of public p roper

ty as a te mporary

or perma nent place of dwe lling, lodg ing, or residenc e, or a s a living a ccommodation at
any tim e be tw e e n s un set and sunri se , o r a s a sojourn. Indicia of camping may include, but
are not limi ted to, storag e of pe rsonal bel o ng ings, usingtents or other te mporary struc tu r e s f o r s le e p in go r

s to r a g e o f

p e r s o n al belong ings, c arr

ying on c ooking a ctivities or makingany

fire in a n u n authorized are a, or any of th e se a c tiv iti e s in

c omb inatio n w ithB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

8

o n e anothe r or in combination with either sleepingor makingprepa rations to sleep (includingthe laying down of bedding for the purpose of

sleeping ). Boise City

Code § 9-10-02 ( 2009).

No change s were made to the SleepingOrdinanc e. Howeve r, the B oise Police Depa rt m en t’s Chief of Police issued a “Specia l O rder ,” with instruc tions to post the o rder in the 2009 Policy

Manual a ccompa

nied by a han dwritten note that the policy reg arding enfor ceme nt of the Ordina nces “is modified by

Special Or der 10-03, eff

ective a t 0001 hours on J anuar y 1, 2010.” The Special Orde r is not ref ere nced or inc or po rate d into t

he Or din anc e s. Al th ough th e re c or d is vag ue as to exa c tly

ho w the Spe c ia l O rd e r w a s c re ate d, it i s clea r fr om the rec ord that the Chi ef of Police has the exclusive authority

to establish policy

for the B ois e P olice Depa rtme nt.
The Special Orde r prohibits of fice rs from enfor cingt he Campi ngand

Sle e pin gOr din anc e s whe n a pe rs on is o n p ub lic proper ty and ther e is no ava ilable o v ern i ght shelter. The Special Or der de fines “a vailable ove rnight s h elt er” as “a public or pri v at e shelter, with an a vailable ove rnight space , open to an individual or fa mily unit ex perie ncing homelessness at no c harg e. To qualify as ava ilable, the spac e must take into acc ount sex , marital and f amilial status, and disabiliti es.” The Special Or der further pr ovides that, if an ind ivi du a l c ann ot us e ava ila ble sp a c e be c a

us e of a dis a bil ity or a she lter’s leng th-of-stay restric tions, the space should not be conside red a

vailable. The s p ac e will be considere d
ava ila ble if theind ivi dual c ann ot u se the sp a c e “ du e toB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE 9

T he S peci al O r der do es not def i ne “ f ul l ” or “ f

ul l s pace c apaci t y ”; 6 rat her, t hese t erm s are used o n the “O verni ght S hel t er C ap aci t y A d vi sory Pr ot oc ol ” f

or m.

T h e c o u rt n o te d tha t Jones was va c a te d a s a res ul t of a set t l em ent 7 ag r ee men t a n d t h u s n ot bi n di n g

. H owe v er , i t c on cl ud ed the de ci s i on

“ s hed l i gh t o n t he i s s ue and h ow t he N i nt h Ci r cui t mi gh t approach s uch

c h a llen g e s in th e fu tur e .” A s sta te d p re v io u sly, w e d o n o t r e a c h the m e rits

o f Pl ai n t i f f s ’ Ei g h t h Amen dmen t ch al l en g es t o t h e en f or ce men t of

t he O r di nan ces

. Li kew i s e, we do n o t addres s t he propri et y of t he Jones

an alysi s. vo lun tar y a c t i o n s s u c ha s i nt o xi c at i o n , dr u gu s e o r unr u ly behavior .”

Al l thre e ho me le ss s he lte rs a g re e d to repo rt vo luntari ly

to Boise State University Dispatch on e vening s they deter mined t h ei r shelters were “full.” B ois e State Un ive rs ity a gre e d to 6 then send a

n e-ma il to the Boise Police Depa rtment advising office rs that a she lter had r eporte d beingfull. No written
a gre e me nt e xists be tw e e n D e fe nd ants and the sh e lte rs

. Af ter e xten s iv e discove ry , the amendme nt of the Camping Ordinanc e, and the adoption of the Spec ial Orde r, the c ourt gr ante d D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. The
co urt , ci t i n g Jones v. City of Los Angeles , 4 44 F .3 d 1 11 8 ( 9th C ir. 2006), vacate d, 5 0 5 F

. 3 d 1 0 0 6 ( 9 th

Ci r

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( o rder ), recognized t

hat a le g a l ba sis e xiste d f

or Pla int if fs ’ E ighth A m e n dm e ntc h a l l e n g e t o th e O r d i n an c e s. The c ourt then 7 conclude d Plaintiffs’ Eig hth Amendmen tclaims for prospec tive relief wer e “mooted in pa rt and other

wise fa il as a matter of law.”

In analy zing Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims for pr os pe c tiv e re lie f, the c ourt distin guis he d b e tw e e n d ay tim eB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

10

e nf or c e me nt o f t

he Sle e pin gOr din anc e and night tim e e nf or c e me nt o f t

he Sle e pin g and Campi ngOr din anc e s. With respe ct to the day

time enforc ement of the Sleepi ng Ordinanc e, it deter

mined “the undisputed fa cts ref lect that the home le s s ma

y s le e p in th e p ar

k s d ur in g th e d ay ( wh e the r or not shelter spac e is ava i lable).” Acc ording ly , the cour t
c on c luded the d ay

tim e a sp e c t of

Pla int if fs ’ E ighth Amendment cla ims failed as a matter of la

w.
With re sp e c t to nightt ime e nf or c e me nt o f b oth Ordinanc es, the c ourt held that Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims for pr ospective r elief w ere mooted by the adoption of t h e S p ec ial Orde r. The c ourt rea soned that the a doption of the Sp e c ia l O r d e r a ll o w e d th e h o me le s s to s le e p in p ar k s at night if she lter spac e wa s unavailab l e, which made it “no longe r re asonable to expect that the B oise Police Depa rtment
w il l e n f o r c e th e

. . . O r d in an c e s a g a in s t h o me le s s p e o p le at night whe n shelter spa ce is unavailable.” Acc o rd i ng ly , the court found that adoption of the Specia l Orde r mooted the night ti me enfo rcem ent a sp e c t of Pla int if fs ’ E ighth Amendment cla ims for prospec tive relief

. T he cour

t noted th ati t s “d ec i s i o nd o es n o tb ar P l ai n t i ff s fr o mb ri n gi n g a future a ction contendingthat Def end ants are not following the policy set forth in the Spec ial Orde r.”

The c ourt als o concluded that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine ba

rre d considerati on of Plaintiffs’ cla ims for retrospe ctive re lief, including Plaintiffs’ reque st f or an or der compellingexpungeme nt of Pla i n t iffs’ c riminal rec ords and Plaintiffs’ reque st f

or damag es. The court rea so n edt h at be c a us e Pla int if

fs ’ r e qu e ste d r e lie f w a s “ de signe d to compensate Plaintiffs for the injuries occa sioned bythe statecourt judgments,” their retrospe ctive cla ims “would serve as an end- run ar ound the state c ourt appe llate proc ess,” andB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE 11

T he co urt als o he l d th a t P la i nti f f s’ ri gh t t o t rav el claim s f ail ed as a 8 mat t er o f

l aw, t he C amp i ng O r di nan ce was not un cons t i t ut i onal l y va gu e, t he o verbread t h d o c trine did no t ap p l y outs i d e t he Fir st A m end m ent cont ext , an d t he I daho cons t i t ut i onal cl ai ms f ai l ed f or t he s ame reas ons as t hei r f ed eral coun t er part s

. Pl ai nt i f f s ha ve wai ved a pp eal of t hes e i s s ues b y failing to c h a lle n g e the se ru ling s in th e ir o p e n ing b rie f. See Ts ao , 698 F. 3d a t 1137 n

. 13. “ser ve as a defac to appea l from the state c ourt.” F urther, Plaintiffs’ claims would have required the cour t “to revie w and re ject [the] j udg ment in eac h Plaintiff’s [criminal] case .” T hu s , th e court found Rooke r-Feldman p rohibited
e xami na tio n o f t he me ri ts of Pla int if

fs ’ r e tr os pe c tiv e c la ims

. The c ourt grante d su m m ary judgme nt to Defe ndants on the re mainder of

Plaintiffs’ claims and dismissed the amende d complaint. This timely appea l f ollowed. Plaintiffs do no t a

pp e a l the court ’s de c isi on that th e ir

Ei ghth Amendment cla ims concer ning da y time enforc ement of the Sleeping Ordinanc e failed as a matter of law. S ee T s a o v. Dese rt Palace, Inc

. , 698 F.3d 1128, 1137 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012) (notingthat an appellant waives appea l of an issue not raised in an openingbrief)

. Rather, Plaintiffs’ a ppeal f o cuses on 8 the cour t’s finding s with reg ard to moot ness and the Ro ok e rFeldman doctrine.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW

Wer e v iew

an application of the Rooke r-Feldman d o ctrine de novo. Carm o n a v. Carmona , 6 03 F .3 d 1 04 1, 10 50 (9 th C i r

. 2 0 1 0 )

. W e a l s o r e v i e w d e n o v o qu e s t i o n s o f A rt i c l e III justiciability , includ i n g mootness. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman , 646 F.3d 1161, 1176 ( 9th C i r. 2011). F actua l deter minations underlying the district court’s de cision areB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

12

A s d i scus sed earl i er, t he co urt co ncl ud ed P l ai nt i f f s’ E igh th 9 A m end m ent cl ai m s f

o r prosp ect i v e r el i ef

co ncerni ng da y t i m e enf o rcem ent
o f t h e S le e p ing O r d in a n c e f a iled a s a m a tter o f l a w . P la intiff s faile d to
a p p e a l t h is issu e , t h u s, o n re m a n d , t h e c o u rt n e e d o n ly co n sid e r th e m e rits of Pl a i n t i f

f s ’ Ei gh t h Ame n dm e n t c l a i ms c on c e r n i n g n i g h t t i me enf o rcem ent of t he O rdinances

. O ur hol d i ng i s l i m i t ed t o jur i sdi ct i o n;
no t hi ng i n t hi s o p i ni o n s ho ul d be co nst rued as pa ss i ng judgm ent on t he

m erit s o f P l ainti f f s’ claim s. revie wed for clea

r er ror. W olfson v. Brammer , 616 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010).

DI SCU SSIO N

We f ir st d isc us s th e c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of Pla int if fs ’ E ighth Amendment cla ims for r etrospec tive relief under the Ro ok

e rFeldman doctrine. We d etermine the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine is i na

pp lic a ble be c a us e Pla int if

fs ’ s uit is not

a f o r b id d e nd e f

a c to a p p e a l. We th e nd is c u s s th e c o urt’s dismiss al of Plaintiffs’ Eigh t h Amendment cla ims for prospec tive relief

on mootness gr ounds . We conclude Def endants have fa iled to meet their he avy burden of de mon str atin gtha

t th e Spe c ia l O rd e r e lim inate s a l lr e a s o n a ble expectations of re curr ence of the a lleg edly unconstitutional enfor ceme nt of the Ordina nces. Be cause we hold that jurisd ic tio n e xists ov e r Pla int if fs ’ Ei g hth Am e ndme nt c la ims for r etrospec tive and prospe ctive re l i ef, we re mand for a
c on sid e ratio n o f t

he me ri ts o f t

he se c la ims

. 9

A. Rooker-Feldm an

T h e c o urt d is mi s s e d

Pl a inti f f s ’ c la im s f

o r r e tr o s p ective relief under the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine a ft e r f ind ingtho se “re quests for relief are designed to compensate Plaintiffs for the injuries occ asioned by the state-c ourt judg ments.” OnB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE 13

T h e S u p re m e C o u rt a p p ro v e d o f Noel ’ s a ppr oac h t o Rooke r
- Fel dm an 10 i n Exx on M obi lC or

p. v. Saudi B as i c I

ndus t r i es Cor

p. , 544 U

. S. 280, 293, 1 2 5 S. C t

. 15 1 7 , 15 2 7 (20 0 5 ). appea l, Plainti ffs contend the cour t incorre ctly

applied the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. We a g ree

. The Rooke r-Feldman do c tr in e fo rb ids a los ingpa

rt y in sta t e court fr om filing suit in fede ral district cour t
c o mp l a i n i n go f

ani n j ur y c a u s e d b y a s t at e c o urtj u dg me nt, and see king f

ederal court review

and re jection of that judgme nt. Skinne r v. Switzer , __ U.S. __, 131 S. C t. 1289, 1297 (2011). To de termine whe ther the Rooke r-Feldman bar is applicable, a district c ourt first must de termine whether the action conta ins a forbidde n d e fa cto appe al of a state cour

t decision. Noe l v . H

all , 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). 10 A de fa c to a

pp e a l e xists wh e n “ a

fe de ra l pl a int if

f a sse rt s a s a le g a l wro ng an a lle g e dly

e rr on e ou s d e c isi on

by a state c ourt , and see ks relief

from a state cour

t judgment ba sed on that decision.” Id. at 1164. In co n t rast, if “ a fe dera l plaintiff
asser ts as a leg al wrongan alleg edly illega l act or omission by an adverse par

ty , Rooke r-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.” Id. Th u s , ev en if a plaintiff se eks re lief fr om a state c ourt

jud g me nt, su c h a

su it i s a forbid de n d e fa c to appea l only

if the plaintiff als o alleg es a le gal err or by the state court. Ma ldo na do v . H arris , 370 F.3d 945, 950 ( 9th Cir. 20 04 ); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc. , 35 9 F .3 d 11 36 , 11 40 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] plain t i ff m u s tseek not only to set aside a state cour t judgment; he or

she must also alleg e a le g al er ror by the state c ourt as the ba sis for that re lief.”)

.
I f “ a fe de ra l pla int if

f s e e ks to b ri nga

fo rb idd e n d e fa c to appea l, . . . that fed er al p l aintiff may not seek to litigate an issue that is ‘inext rica

bly intertwined ’ with the state c ourtB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

14

O n a p p e a l, n e ithe r p a rty a rg u e s w h e the r p re c lus io n p rin c ip le s a p p ly. 11 S ee H en ri ch s v. V

al l ey V i ew D ev. , 474 F. 3d 609, 613 ( 9t h Ci r

. 2007) (“ Rooke r
- Fel dm an d o e s n o t o v e r r id e o r su p p la n t i ssu e a n d c la im p re c lus io n d o c trine s.” ). P re c lus io n p rin c ip le s a re no t ju risd ic tio n a l. jud ic ia l dec isi on

fr om whic h th e fo rb idd e n d e fa c to a pp e a l is brought

. ” Noel , 3 41 F .3 d at 11 58 . T he “ ine xtri c a bly int e rt wi ne d” languag e fr om Feldman is n ot a te st t o deter mine whether

a cla im is a de facto appea l, but is rather
a sec ond and distinct step in the Rooke r-Feldman ana ly sis. See id. Sh o u ld

th e a ction not c onta in a fo rb idd e n d e fa c to appea l, the Rooke r-Feldman inquiry ends. See M

anufactured Ho me Cm ty

s. In c

. v

. City of Sa n Jo se , 420 F.3d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005).

The c ourt err ed by

dismiss i n g P l aintiffs’ c laims for retrospe cti ve re lief under the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. Although Plaintiffs sought relief designed to reme dy injuries
s u ff er edfr o ma s t at e c o urtj u d gm e n t , th ey d i d n o tal l ege befor e the c ourt that the state c ourt committed le g al error, nor did they seek r elief f

rom the state c ourt j u d gment itself. Rather, Plaintiffs asse rt “as a leg al wrongan alleg edly illega l
a c t . . . b y

an a dv e rs e pa

rt y” —th e City ’s a lle g e dly
un c o n s ti tuti o n a l e n f

o r c e me nt o f th e O r d in an c e s

. N o el , 34 1 F .3 d at 11 64 . Witho ut a dir e c t c ha llenge to a

state
c ourt ’s fa c tua l or

le g a l c on c lus ion , Pl a int iff s’ su it i s n ot a forbidden de fac to appea l, and R ooker-Feldman is inapplicable. Se eMa nu

fac ture d H

om eCm ty

s. , 420 F.3 dat 10 30 (“ MH C’ s c omp la int do e s n ot d ir e c tly c ha lle ng e a state court’s f actua l or leg al conc lusion. MHC’s complaint to the district court is, there fore , no ta for bidden appe al under Rooke r-Feldman .” ); see also Maldonado , 370 F.3d at 950; Ko ugasian , 359 F.3d at 1140. We therefor e re verse the dismiss al of Plaintiffs’ c laims for re trospective r elief. 11B ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE 15

Sas s on v

. Sok ol of

f ( I n r e Sas s on) , 4 2 4 F .3 d 8 6 4 , 8 7 2 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 5 ). W e t her ef ore decl i ne t o cons i der t hei r appl i cat i on t o t hi s ca s e.

T h e p a rtie s a lso fa il to a d d re ss the a p p lica tio n o f H eck v. H um ph r ey ’s “fa v o ra b le -ter m ina tio n ” re q u ire m e n t. See 512 U

. S. 477, 486–87, 114 S. Ct

. 2364, 2372 ( 1994) ( “ W e h ol d t h at , i n orde r t o r ec ov er da mag es f or al l eged l y unco nst i t ut i o nal co nvi ct i o n or i m p ri sonm ent , or f o r o t her harm

ca u s ed b y ac t i on s w h os e u n l aw f u l n es s w ou l d r en der a c on v i ct i on or
s en t en ce i n v al i d, a § 1983 pl ai nt i f f mu s t pr ov e t h at t h e con v i ct i on or sent ence has b een revers ed o n d i rect a p p eal , exp unged by execut i ve o rder, d ecl ared i nval i d b y a st at e t ri b unal aut ho ri zed t o m ake such det erm i nat i o n,
or c al l ed i nt o q ues t i on by a f eder al cour t ’ s i s s uan ce of a w r i t of

ha beas

co rp us, 2 8 U .S.C

. § 2 2 5 4 .” (f o o t no t e o m i t t ed )). T he co urt m ay a d d ress t h i s i s s u e o n r e m a n d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r Pl a i n t i f f s h a v e r a i s ed a “c o g n iz a b le ” § 1 9 8 3 c la im

. H eck , 512 U

. S. a t 483, 114 S. Ct

. a t 2370.

D ef end ant s al so co nt end P l ai nt i f f s’ cl ai m s have b een m o o t ed by t he 12

a m e n d e d d e finiti o n o f “ca m p ing ” i n t h e C a m p ing O rd ina n c e . W e di s agr ee. Al t houg h t he amended provi s i on provi des addi t i onal gu i dance f o r t he p ub l i c and po l i ce, and was s ub ject t o a m o re r i go rous i m p l em en t ati o n p ro ce ss, i t d o es no t , st an d i ng alo ne , m o o t P l ainti f f s’ req ue st f o r p ro sp e c t i ve reli ef und er the E i gh t h A m en d m en t

. P l ainti f f s’

r eques t f or pr ospect i ve r el i ef

un der t he E i gh t h A m endment r es t s on an B. M oo tn e ss
The c ourt dismissed Pl aintiffs’ c laims for prospe ctive relief as moot after

concluding the Spec ial Orde r wa s “su f f ic ie nt to f o r e c lo s e any r e a s o n a

b le e xp e c tati o n th at the alleg ed illega l a ction will r ecur .” Specifica lly , t h e c ourt found it was no long er r easona ble to expect the Ordina

nces would be enf

orce d ag ainst the hom eless at night when shelter space was unavailable. On appea l, Plainti ffs a rgue the c ourt fai le d to a p p ly th e s trin g e nt s ta

n d ar d f o r e v a lu ati n gwhether
a defe ndant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged p ractice
re nders a ca se moo t. D e fe nd ants c onte nd Pla int if fs ’ c la ims have be en mooted by

the Special Or der. 12B ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

16

al l egat i o n t hat enf

o rcem ent of t he C am p i ng O rdinance ef f ect i ve ly cri m i nal i zed t hei r s t at us as hom el ess i nd i vi d ual s. M ere c l ari f i cat i o n o f

t he C am p i ng O rd i na nc e d o es no t ad d ress t he ce ntral co nc ern s o f P l ainti f f s’ E igh th A m e n d m e n t cla im s. T h u s, D e fen d a n ts ha v e faile d to c a rr y the ir h ea v y bu r den of

de mon s t r at i n g t h at “ t h e ch al l en g ed co nd uct c an n ot
r eas onabl y be ex pect ed t o s t ar t up ag ai n. ” F r i ends of t he E art h, I nc

. v. Lai dl aw E nvt l

. Ser vs

. ( TO C )
, I nc. , 528 U

. S. 167, 189, 120 S. Ct

. 693, 708 (20 0 0 ) ( i nt ernal quo t at i o n m arks om i t t ed ). “The voluntary

cessation of challeng ed conduct does not ordinari l y render a c ase moot bec ause a dismiss al for mootness would permit a re sumption of the ch all eng ed conduct a s soon as the c as e is dismiss ed.” Knox v. Se rv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000 , __ U.S. __, 132 S. C t. 2277, 22 87 (2 01 2) ; see also F

r i en d s of the Earth, Inc. v . Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (

TOC), I nc. , 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S. Ct . 693, 708 (2000) ( “It is well settled that a defen dant’s voluntary
cessation of a challeng ed pra ctice doe s not deprive a fede ral court of its powe r t o d eter mine the leg ality

of the pra ctice.” (interna l quotation marks omitted)). The standa rd for de te rm ini ng wh e the r a de fe nd ant’ s v olu nta ry c on du c t mo ots
a ca se is “string ent: A ca se mig ht become moot if subseque nt events made it absolutely clea r that the a lleg edly

wrong ful behavior could not rea sonably be expected to r ecur .” Friends of t heEa rth , 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S. Ct

. at 7 08 (interna l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ; see also W h i te v. Lee , 227 F.3d 12 14 , 124 2–44 (9 th C ir . 2 00 0) . T he “ he avy burd e n” lie s w ith the par ty asser ting mootness to demonstrate that, afte r a voluntary cessation, “the cha lleng ed conduc t cannot
r e a s o n a b ly b e e xp e c te d to s ta

rt u p a g ain.” Friends of the Ea rth , 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S. Ct. at 708 (int erna l quotation marks omitted). This he avy burden applies to a g overnme ntB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE 17

A ltho u g h w e p re su m e a go v e rn m e n t en tit y is ac ting in g o o d faith 13

w h e n it c h a n g e s its p o licy, s ee A m

. C argo Trans p. , I nc. v. Uni t ed St at es , 62 5 F. 3d 117 6, 118 0 (9t h Ci r

. 201 0), t he gover nment ent i t y s t i l l mus t meet its he a v y b u rd e n o f p ro o f, W h ite , 227 F. 3d a t 1244. e nti ty that vo luntari ly c e a se s a lle g e dly ill e g a l c on du c t. W hite , 227 F.3d at 1243–44. 13

Th e c ourt ’s moo tne ss a

na ly sis re lie d u

po n o ur de c isi on in Nat iv eVi lla

geof N oa tak v . B latc hfo rd, 38 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1994). Noatak, howeve r, involved Alaska ’s re peal of a challeng ed statute a

nd was “ not a ca se whe re a defe ndant voluntarily

cea ses cha lleng ed ac tion in response to a law suit.” Id. at 1508, 1 5 1 1

. Noatak re c ognize d th e g e ne ra l princ ipl e that, “ if a chal le ng e d la

w i s r e pe a le d o r e xpir e s, the c a se become s moot.” Id. at 1510.

Noatak ’s g ener al principle na rrowingthe volunt ary c e ssatio n e xce pti on

is lim ite d to “ state le g isl ativ e e na c tme nts that otherwise moot a c ontroversy .” Se eChe m. Prod uc e rs & Distribs. Ass’n v. He lliker , 463 F.3d 871, 878 ( 9th Cir. 2006) (noting the vol untary cessation exception has bee n narr owed in t he se c ir c ums tanc e s) . F or state le g isl ativ e e na c tme nts , “ ‘[a ] statut ory

c ha ng e

. . . is us ua lly

e no ugh to re nd e r a

c a se moot, even if the le g islature possesses the power to ree nact the statute af

ter the la wsuit is dis missed.’” Id. (quoting Noatak, 38 F.3d at 1510). By contras t , h o wever, re peal or amendment of

an ordinanc e by a local g overnme nt or ag ency do e s n ot n e c e ssa

ri ly “depri ve a

fe de ra l c ourt

of its po we r t o deter mine the leg ality

of the pra ctice.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted).

We are not presente d with a cha ng e to a state l egislative
enac tment , n o r are we prese nted with the re peal of theB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

18

chall e n g e d

O r d in an c e s

. D e f

e n d ants r e ly

o nth e a d o p ti o nof the Special Orde r, which is not analog ous to either a state or loc a l le g isl ativ e e nactm e nt. Ge ne ra lly sp e akin g , a

statut e is “[ a] l aw pa ssed by

a leg islative body .” Black’ s Law Di c tio na ry

1542 (9th ed. 2009). I daho’s statutes are codified in the I daho Code, a

nd the leg islative power to enact the la ws of the State is ve ste d in

a se nate and

ho us e of repr e se ntativ e s. I daho Const. art. I I I§ 1. The I daho Constituti on provides that “no bill s h all become a law w ithout the concurr ence of a majority of the membe rs pre sent,” id. § 15, and the pe ople of I daho re serve “the power

to approve or re

ject at the polls any act or measure passed by

the leg islature,” id. § 1.

Simi larly , the City

of Boise define s ordinanc es as “formal leg islative acts of the Council [ t o be] used whene ver the Council intends to pass a regulatory measure , espec ially

when it provides a pena lty

for a viol at i o n.” City

of B oise, http:// cit y cler

k.cityofboise.org/city -code / (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). The pr ocedur es for adopting an ordina

nce a re outlined in the I daho Code a nd “must be s t ri ct ly

followed.” Id. A majority vote of the city council is requir ed to pass or adopt an or dinance , and the subjec t of the ordinanc e must be clea rly expressed in the title

. I d ah o Code. § 50-902. The I dah o C o d e a l s o i mp o s e s c e rt a i np u b l i c at i o nr e qu i r e m e nts befor e an or dinance may

take e ffe ct. I daho Code §§ 50-901, 50-901A. The Spec ial Orde r is n o t gove rned by any analog ous proce dures. Although policies in the Bo i s e Police Depa rtment Policy

Manual may b e cre ated by a “policy committee,” the Chief

of Police has the ultimate, a nd
e xcl usive , a

uth or ity to “ e sta bli shpo lic y

and to d ir e c t a ll actions of the D epar

tment and its employ ees.” SeeMasterson Dep. 27: 1–4, 28: 6-8, Aug . 12, 2010. The Spec ial Orde r wa sB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE 19

N o thin g in this o p in io n s h o u ld b e c o n stru e d a s h o ld ing tha t m e re ly 14

re fer e n c ing o r in c o rp o ra ting th e S p e c ia l O rd e r in the O rd ina n c e s w o u ld hav e r ender ed t hi s ca s e moo t

. As not ed prev i ous l y , t he “ nea r ca t egor i cal rul e o f m o o t ness ” reco gni zed i n Noat akap p l i es i n cases of st at e st at ut o ry ch an g e, w h i l e “ l oca l g ov er n men t or a dmi n i s t ra t i v e ag en cy r epe al or
a m e n d m e n t” d o e s n o t ne c e ssa rily “d e p riv e a fed e ra l co u rt o f i ts p o w e r to det er mi ne t he l ega l i t y of t he prac t i ce. ” C h em

. P ro d u ce rs , 463 F. 3d a t 878 (i nt ernal quo t at i o n m arks om i t t ed ). iss ue d b y the B ois e Pol ic e Depa rtme nt’ s Ch ie f o f P oli c e wi th ins tr uc tio ns to p os t t he ord e r i n th e 20 09 Pol ic y Manu a l. Em plo ye e s w e re the n in str

uc te d to inc lud e a ha

nd writt e n n ote that th e po lic y

re g ard inge nfor c e me nt o f t he Or din anc e s “ is modified by

Special Or der 10- 03, eff

ective a t 0001 hours on J anuar y 1, 2010.” The re co rd is vague as to e x actly how the Special Or der w as cr eate d. W e do not know what func tion, if any , the poli cy

committee serve d in cre atingthe Special Or de r. What we do kn owis that th e Chi e f o f P oli c e , a nd on ly the Chief of Police, ha s the “a uthority to establish policy

for the police de partment.” Masterson Dep. 28: 10–11.

Th e Spe c ia l O rd e r i s an in ter na l po lic y

that pu rp or ts t o curb the discretion of off

icer s to enforc e the Or dinance s when “[t] here is no available ove rnight shelter.” It is not a for mal written ena ctment of a

leg isla tive body

and thus was not subject to any

proce dures that would ty

pically acc ompany

the
enac tment of a law . Nor is the Specia l Order refere nced or inc or po rate d in t

he Or din anc e s. Ev e n a ssumin gDe fe nd ants 14 have no intention to alter or aba ndon the S p ec ial Orde r, the
e a se wi th wh ic h the Chi e f of Pol ic e c ou ld do so couns e ls ag ainst a finding of mootness, a s “a case is not easily mooted wh e re the g ov e rnme nt i s o the rw ise un c on strained s ho uld it later de sire to re en ac t t h e provision.” Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnt y. , 941 F.2d 910, 928 ( 9th Cir. 1991).B ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

20 The Spec ial Orde r is also distinguishable f rom the “entr enche d” and “perma nent” policy

issued in W

hite

. 227 F.3d at 1243. In W

hite , the Department of Housingand Ur ba n D e ve lop me nt (H UD ) a do pte d a ne w po lic y in r e sp on se to the plaintiffs’ alleg ations that HUD investig ators violated their F irst Amendment r i gh t s

. Id. at 1225. The ne w policy was de signe d to protect the F irst Amendment rights of parties subject to HUD inve stigations, and the policy was c irculate d in a memora

ndum, announced by

press re lease , and incorpora t ed i n t o a fie ld handbook. Id. at 1242. We found the policy chang e to be “per manent” based on t h e b road scope and unequivoc al tone of the new policy

. Id. at 1243. We a lso note d the new policy , which had been rene wed on a n annua l ba sis and

in p la c e fo r mor e tha

n fi ve ye ars , wa s “ fu lly supportive of F irst Amendment rights,” “a ddre sse[d] all of the ob je c tio na ble me a sure s th at H UD of fi c ial s took a g a ins t the pla int if

fs ,” and “ev e n c on fe sse [d] th at [pl a int if fs ’] c a se was the cata ly st f

or the ag ency ’s adoption of the ne w policy .” Id. & n. 25 . B a se d o n th e se fa c ts, we he ld H UD ha d me t it s heavy burden of

provingthe cha lleng ed condu ct could not
re a so na bly be e xpe c te d to re c ur , s uc h th at the pla int if fs ’ claims wer e mooted by

the new policy

. Id. at 1244. Although W

hiteestablishes that a policy chang e may

be
su ff ic ie nt t o me et the s tr ing e nt s tand ard fo r p ro vin ga

c a se has bee n mooted by

a def endant’ s v o l u n tary

conduct, id. at 12 43 –4 4, the Spe c ia l O rd e r l a c ks the a ssu ra nc e s p re se nt i n W hite

. Significa

ntly , in W hite , the new policy

addre ssed “ all of the ob je c tio na ble me a sure s th at HU D of fi c ia ls too k a g a ins t the plaintiffs.” Id. at 1243 (emphasis added)

. In contra st, the Spe c ial Ord e r f

a ils to f ull y a dd re ss P la int if

fs ’ a lle g atio ns in the ir ame nd e d c omp la int

wi th r e gard to D e fe nd ants ’ nighttime enf

orce ment of the Or dinance s

. Moreove r, as discussed above , the authority to establish policy

for theB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE 21

D ef endan t s ar gu e P l ai nt i f

f s ar e no l onger homel es s and t her ef ore l ack 15

s t a n d i n g t o s e e k i n

j u n c t i v e o r d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f

. De f e n d a n t s a r e n ot
en t i t l ed to summ ar y j u dg men t on t h i s g r ou n d. T o de f ea t a mot i on f

or
summ ary judgm ent , P l ai nt i f f s, a s t he p art y ass ert i ng f ed eral co urt ju risd ic tio n , “ne e d no t es ta b lish th a t t h e y in fa c t ha v e sta n d in g , b u t o n ly tha t t h e re is a g e n u ine issu e o f m a te ria l f a c t as to th e sta n d ing e le m e n ts.” C ent

. D el t a W

at er A gency v. Uni t ed St at es , 30 6 F.3d 93 8 , 9 4 7 ( 9 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ). V i ewing t he evi d ence i n t he l i g h t m o st favorab l e t o t he

n on mo v a n t , Pl a i n t i f

f s h a v e me t t h i s s t a n da r d f or pu r po s e s of t h e i r c l a i ms f or pr ospect i ve reli ef

. O n r emand, t he cour t may conduc t f ur t her d i scovery o n the st and i ng is sue f o r p urpo ses of P l ai nt i f

f s’ i njunct i ve and d ec l ara t o ry rel i ef claims. Boise Pol ic e D e p artm e nt i s v e s te d e nti r e ly in th e Ch ie f

of Police, such that the ne w policy reg arding enfor ceme nt of the Ordinanc es could be easily abandone d or alter ed in the future. Coral Constr. Co. , 9 41 F .2 d at 92 8. Simp ly put, D e fe nd ants have f ailed to establish with the clar ity prese nt in W

hitethat the n e w p o li c y is th e k in d o f p e r ma n e nt c h an g e th at pr oves voluntary cessation.

On the rec ord bef

ore us, we conclude the implementation of the Spe c ia l O rd e r i s in su ff ic ie nt t o mo ot P la int if

fs ’ E ighth Amendment claims for pr ospective r elief. Def endants have 15 failed to meet their heavy

burden to make it “absolutely clea r t h at t he alleg edly

wrong ful behavior”—the a lleg ed unconstitutional enforc ement of the Or dinance s—“could not
rea sonably

be expected to recur.” Fr ie nd s o f th eEa rth , 52 8 U. S . at 189, 120 S. Ct. at 708 (internal quotation marks omi tte d) ; see also DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 196 F.3d 958, 963 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (adoptingthe
rea soning of Sefick v . Gardner , 164 F.3d 37 0 , 372 (7th Cir. 19 98 ), wh ic h c on c lud e d a c ha ng e d po lic y wa s ins uf

fi c ie nt t o moot a controve rsy

beca use the policy , adopted after the
c omm e nc e me nt o f t

he su it, wa s “ ' no t im

ple me nte d by

statut eB ELL V

. C I T Y O F B O I SE

22

or re gulatio n a

nd c ou ld b e c ha

ng e d a g a in' ” ); Gluth v. Kangas , 951 F.2d 1504 , 1 5 0 7 (9th Cir. 1991) (c oncludinga vague policy enac ted duringlitigation di d “not deprive the cour t of a justiciable c ontroversy”).

CO NC LU SION

We reve rse the c ourt’s dismissal of Plainti ffs’ c laims for retrospe ctive re lief bec ause those claims are not ba rre d by the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. Fur ther, we conclude jurisdiction exis ts as to Plainti ffs’ c laims for prospe ctive relief reg arding the nighttime enforc ement of the Ordinanc es. We rema nd the
case for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.

REVERSED AND REMAND ED.