J-S67016/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF T.E.J.-H., JR., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 A Minor : PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: J.H. and J.C.R. : No. 763 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered March 31, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Juvenile Court Division, at No. CP-06-DP-0000315-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and PLATT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED JANUARY 19, 2016

J.H. and J.C.R. (Appellants)1appeal from the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Berks County, entered March 31, 2015, which denied their 

petition to intervene in the matter of the dependency of T.E.H.-J. (Child), 

born in August of 2014. We affirm. 

Berks County Children and Youth Services (CYS) assumed emergency 

custody of Child and placed him in kinship care with Appellants upon his 

discharge from the hospital on August 8, 2014. The trial court adjudicated 

Child dependent and awarded temporary custody of Child to CYS on August 

20, 2014. Child’s concurrent goals were reunification and adoption. CYS 

removed Child from Appellant’s home on November 26, 2014, and placed 

him in a traditional foster home due to numerous concerns about Appellants. 

Richard F. Small, Ph.D., evaluated Appellants on October 21, 2014. 

Dr. Small noted that J.H. demonstrated “great warmth and interest” in Child 

 



 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

J.H. is Child’s maternal aunt; J.C.R. is her partner.
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while J.C.R. demonstrated none. See Small Report, at 6. Dr. Small had 

significant concerns regarding the Appellants’ ability to follow CYS’ 

directives. Dr. Small opined specifically:

[Appellants] had a poor experience with a foster child and 

remain bitter. They have unrealistic expectations as to how 

difficult raising [Child] is likely to be. [Appellants] seem to have 

a stable relationship, and raising a child might put great strains 

on that. Given the previous experience, if such strains appear, 

preserving the relationship might prove more important than the 

psychological well-being of [Child].

Id.

Matt Shollenberger, Ph.D., evaluated J.C.R. on November 14, 19 and 

25, 2014. Dr. Shollenberger opined that J.C.R. had severe emotional issues 

and needed to be thoroughly assessed for suicidal ideations, depression and 

personality disorders. See Schollenberger Report, at 7. He further opined 

that J.C.R. had “difficulty simply getting out of a chair,” and therefore she 

needed to address the physical issues that inhibit her from normal daily 

functioning. Id. Dr. Shollenberger specifically noted that J.C.R. is, “plagued 

with mental and physical concerns,” and noted that those concerns were so 

profound that he did not believe that J.C.R. was “a suitable foster parent for 

any child.” Id.

On November 18, 2014, Appellants filed a Petition for Placement 

Pending Adoption, Intervention and for Custody. The trial court denied that 

petition. Appellants filed their notice of appeal on April 3, 2015, and, in 
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response to an order of the trial court, their concise statement of errors 

complained of on May 7, 2015.2

Appellants present the following questions for our review.

A. Whether the lower court’s refusal to recognize standing of 

family members to intervene in dependency cases is contrary to

the laws and regulations of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

and the United States[?]

B. Whether the Pennsylvania courts’ interpretation of ‘party’ 

with respect to dependency matters violate[s] the constitutional 

rights of citizens to familial relationships[?]

Appellants’ Brief, at 4.

Appellants ask us to consider a pure question of law. “As with all 

questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo and the 

appellate scope of review is plenary.” B.K.M. v. J.A.M., 50 A.3d 168, 172 

(Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

Dependency proceedings are closed to the public in Pennsylvania and 

only a party to a dependency may participate in them. This Court has stated

that 

[u]nder the Juvenile Act [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6336(d)], attendance at 

and participation in dependency proceedings are restricted. 

Dependency hearings are closed to the general public. Only a 

“party” has the right to participate, to be heard on his or her 

own behalf, to introduce evidence, and/or to cross-examine 

witnesses. Although the Juvenile Act does not define “party,” 

case law from this Court has conferred the status of party to a 

dependency proceeding on three classes of persons: (1) the 

 

2

 There was no objection or claim of prejudice from Appellee as a result of 

this late filing, so we have accepted it in reliance on our decision in In re 

K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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parents of the juvenile whose dependency status is at issue; (2) 

the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency status is at 

issue, or (3) the person whose care and control of the juvenile is 

in question.

In the Intertest of L.C., II, 900 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citations omitted).

In their first claim, Appellants argue that persons who are “family 

members,” and bear no other relation to a dependent child, should be 

allowed to intervene in dependency proceedings. In support of this claim, 

Appellants cite a section of the Pennsylvania Code and a section of the Social 

Security Act that each speak of reuniting a child with his or her family.

The Appellants first cite to Chapter 55, section 3130 of the 

Pennsylvania Code that provides, in relevant part: 

(c) Each county is responsible for administering a program of 

children and youth social services that includes: 

 

. . . 

(3) Services designed to reunite children and their families 

when children are in temporary, substitute placement.

55 Pa. Code § 3130.12(c)(3). 

Appellants then cite to sections of the Social Security Act3that they 

claim, “in relevant part, require that a judge must find that the state has 

made ‘reasonable efforts’ to prevent placement of the child or to reunite the 

 

3

 We have attempted, without any success, to locate the parts of the Social 

Security Act to which Appellants refer from the citations in their brief. We 

assume, for the sake of argument, that the referenced statutes say what 

Appellants claim they say. 
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child with his or her family.” Appellants’ Brief, at 8 (emphasis added by 

Appellants).

Appellants conclude their first argument by stating, 

Petitioners argue that as demonstrated by the above 

citations, the term ‘family’ is used frequently in both the Federal 

and Pennsylvania statutes relating to dependent children. 

Therefore, Petitioners seek standing to proceed in the 

dependency hearings for the purposes of having T.J.-H. continue 

to be placed in their care.

Appellants’ Brief, at 8.

Appellants argue that they should be given party status because our 

law encourages the reuniting of children with their families. Their argument, 

however, fails to address the question of why we should expand the 

definition of party in L.C., II, above, to permit individuals who are no more 

than members of a dependent child’s family to participate in that child’s 

dependency proceeding. Appellants’ first argument is without merit.

In their second issue, Appellants claim that this Court’s definition of, 

“whom [sic] is a proper party with standing to intervene in dependency 

matters violates the constitutional rights of citizens to familial relationships.” 

Appellants’ Brief, at 8.4 To support this claim, Appellants cite cases ranging 

from Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down race-based 

barriers to marriage, to Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 

U.S. 816 (1977), in which the United States Supreme Court stated that the 

 

4 We note that Appellants fail to state whether their exclusion from Child’s 

dependency proceeding violates the constitution of this Commonwealth or of 

the United States. 
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“liberty interest in family privacy has its source . . . in intrinsic human 

rights,” 431 U.S. 816, 845, while again including the Pennsylvania Code 

section cited above for good measure. Citing cases, however, is all that 

Appellants do to support their argument; they fail to relate those cases to 

the facts of this case to develop a coherent legal argument in support of 

their claim that we should grant them party status simply because they are 

members of Child’s family. 

They conclude by claiming they

were never afforded an opportunity to become a member of the 

classes of individuals currently recognized and granted party 

status in dependency proceedings because CYS gained custody 

of the child through a Dependency Petition and Order prior to 

[Child] being released from the hospital. Thus, it was impossible 

for any family member desirous of caring for the child and 

becoming the legal custodian of the child to exercise the right to 

do so. Since an order was already in place declaring [Child] 

dependent and giving CYS legal custody of [Child], no family 

member (other than the parents) was able to gain standing to 

intervene in the dependency proceedings. Here, the Appellants 

are Maternal Aunt and her partner, clearly within the familial 

bloodline and the definition of ‘family’ as defined by the Courts. 

In refusing to grant standing to Appellants to Intervene and 

participate in the Dependency Matter, the lower court has 

applied the laws and regulations in such a way that it violates 

the Constitutional Rights of Appellants. 

Appellants’ Brief, at 16. 

Our case law confers party status on three classes of individuals in a 

dependency proceeding: “(1) the parents of the juvenile whose dependency 

status is at issue; (2) the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency 

status is at issue, or (3) the person whose care and control of the juvenile is 
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in question.” L.C., II, supra. Appellants admit that they are not members 

of any of those classes. And they fail to demonstrate how the law they cite 

supports their contention that persons who are no more than family 

members of dependent children have a constitutional right to party status in 

a dependency proceeding. Appellants’ second argument is without merit. 

 Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/19/2016