### FI LED U.S . COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CI RCUIT March 11, 2004 THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK [P UBLI SH] IN THE UNIT ED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VEN TH C IRCU IT

________________________ No. 03-14817 Non-A rgument Calendar

________________________ D. C. Docke t No. 02-0 0015- CR-T-1 7-TBM UN ITE D S TA TE S O F A M ER ICA , Plain tiff-A ppe llee,
versus M EL VI N J UN IO R R AI NE Y, De fend ant-A ppe llant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States Distri ct Court for the Middle Dist

rict of Flori da

_________________________ (March 11, 2004) Before D UB INA , CAR NE S and H UL L, Circuit Judges. PER CUR IA M: Appellant Melvin Junior Rainey appeal s his 180-month sentence, imposed upon resentencing f

ollowing hi s convic tion f or posses sion of a

fire arm or
amm unitio n by a con victed felon , in vio lation of 1 8 U .S.C . §§ 9 22( g) an d 92 4(e)
.2

Rainey a ppeals the di stri ct cour

t’s deter minati on, upon remand, that a 1987 Flori da
conv iction for attempted arson is a violen t felony u nder § 924 (e), and the cou rt’s sub sequ ent im pos ition o f an a rme d-ca reer -crim inal en han cem ent, p ursu ant to U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.4. On appeal, Rainey argues that at tempted arson is neither an “enumerated offense” under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i i), nor a “ qualifying offense” under § 924(e)(2 )(B)(i). Rainey argu es that his actions did not constitute arson becau se he burned only his ow n clothing because o f bedbug s and as an act of p rotest protected by t

he First Amendment. He asserts that the dist rict c ourt fail ed to notice this evi dence by not examining the charging document. Rainey contends that , had the cour t revi ewed the document , it could not

have cl assi fied hi s offens e as ar son beca use n o ev iden ce of

inten tiona l harm to an y per son or str uctu re ex isted. Finally, Rai ney argue s that the t erms “c rime of vi olence ,” as used in t he Sentencing Guideli nes, a nd “viol ent fe lony” unde r § 924(e)( 2)(B) are not interchangeabl e. Thus, Rainey contends t hat the fac t that

he was convicted of a crime of viole nce does not

necess itate a f

inding t hat he a lso commit

ted a vi olent felon y. “W e rev iew the d istrict co urt’s f actua l find ings for c lear er ror a nd its application of the Sentenc ing Gu idelines to those facts de novo .” United States v. Miles , 290 F.3 d 13 41, 1 346 (11 th C ir.), cert. denied , 537 U.S . 108 9 (2 002 ). W e3

al so re vi ew de novo whether a particul ar offense constitutes a vi olent fel ony under 18 U .S.C . § 92 4(e)
. United St ates v . Wilk

erson , 286 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th C ir.), cert. denied , 537 U.S . 892 (20 02)
. Sec tion 9 24( e) pr ovid es tha t: (1) In t he case of a pers on who violat es sec tion 922( g) of thi s ti tleand has thr ee previ ous convic tions by any cour t ref erred to in sec tion 922 (g)( 1) o f this title for a viole nt felo ny . . . , su ch p erso n sh all be . . . imp rison ed n ot less than fifteen years . . . .

. . . (B) [T]he term “vi olent

felony ” means any

crime puni shableby imp rison men t for a term exce edin g on e year . . . that— (i) ha s as an e lement

the use , at

tempte d use, or

threatened us e of physic al force against t

he person of

another ; or (ii ) is burglary , ars on, or extorti on, involves use of explosives, or otherwis e invol ves conduct that present s a serious pot enti al ri sk of phy sical in

jury to ano ther . . . . 18 U .S.C . § 92 4(e) (1), ( e)(2 )(B ). Secti on 4B1.4 of theSentencing Guideli nes provi des that “[ a] def endant who is subject to an enhanced sent ence under the provisi ons of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) is an a rmed care er criminal. ” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4( a). Sec tion 4B1. 4 incorpor ates by reference t

he definition of “viole nt felony” in § 924(e)(2), but also provides that the def inition of “ viole nt fel ony” in § 924( e)(2) i s not i denti cal to the def inition of “crim e of v iolen ce” in § 4B 1.2. U .S.S .G. § 4B 1.4, c om men t. (n.1 ). Se ction 4B 1.2 provides a defi niti on for “c rime of vi olence ,” a term used i n U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the4

caree r-offe nder guide line , that is virt ually identicalto § 924(e) ’s def inition of “viol ent fe lony. ” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2( a). The only diff erence in thetwo definitions i s t hat§ 4 B1. 2 s t at es “ bu rg l ar y o f a dwe l l i ng , ” n ot

j us t“ bu rg l ar

y. ” U. S. S. G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Florida law, at

the ti me of Rainey’s attempted arson convicti on, provided that: (1) Any person who will fully and unla wfully, by fir e or expl osion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occu pied or n ot, or its con tents; [ or] (b ) A ny str uctu re, or con tents there of, where pe rsons ar e normally prese nt, s uch as: jai ls, prisons , or detenti on centers . . . is guilty of arson in t he first degree, which con stitutes a felo ny o f the f irst de gree . . . . Fla. S tat. A nn. § 806 .01( 1) (1 987 ). Se ction 806 .01( 2) p rov ided that [a]ny person who will fully and unla wfully, by fir e or expl osion, dam ages or ca uses to be dam aged any s tructu re, w heth er the pro perty of h imse lf or a noth er, un der a ny cir cum stanc es no t refer red to in subsection (1), is guilt

y of arson in the se cond degree, which con stitutes a felo ny o f the s econ d de gree . . . . Fla. St at. Ann. § 806.01(2) ( 1987). Florida l aw also provi ded that if a de fendant was convicted of an at

tempt to commit a f

irst degree f elony, he would be guilty of
a seco nd d egre e felo ny an d tha t if he w as co nvic ted o f an a ttemp t to co mm it a
seco nd d egre e felo ny, h e w ould be g uilty o f a thir d de gree felon y. Id. § 777.04(4)(b), (c) (1987). In Taylor v. United State s , 4 95 U. S. 5 75, 602 , 1 10 S. Ct. 214 3, 216 0, 109 L.5

Ed. 2d. 607 (1990), the Supreme Cou rt held t hat, when determining whether a partic ular o ffen se is a v iolen t felon y, § 9 24( e) “ge nera lly req uires the tria l cou rt to look only to the fact o f con victio n an d the statuto ry de finitio n of the p rior o ffen se,” not to the p articu lar fac ts of th e defend ant’s c onv iction . 495 U.S . at 60 2, 11 0 S . Ct. at 2160. We have no t addressed t he issue of whether an att empt to commit an
enu mer ated felon y un der § 924 (e) c ons titutes a viole nt felo ny u nde r § 9 24( e). However, two of our pri or deci sions provide helpful gui dance. In Wilker son , the defendant recei ved an armed-career-criminal enhancement pursuant t o § 924(e), due in pa rt to a p rior F lorid a con victio n fo r con spira cy to c om mit ro bbe ry. Wilker son , 286 F.3d at

1325. We firs t note d that we had deter

mined in a

previous decis ion th at rob bery itself is a viole nt felo ny u nde r § 9 24( e)(2 )(B ) bec ause it pres ents a serio us ris k of phy sical in

jury to ano ther. Id. (citing United States v. Jac kson , 57 F .3d 10 12, 10 17-1 8 (11 th Cir. 1 995 )). W e then h eld that “a conspir acy t

hat has as it s objec t theoffense of robbery like wise pres ents s uch a risk.” Id. The defendant argued that because Flori da law did not require an overt act in f urth eran ce of

the co nsp iracy, th e offense did n ot co nstitu te a vio lent fe lony
. Id. We disagree d, noting that “[w]hen one reache s an agre ement wit h a co-conspirator

to commit

a robbery , and for

mulate s the intent

to commit

the6

robbery, his conduc t pres ents at le ast a potentialrisk of

physic al i njury wit

hin the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).” Id. at 1325-26. In Un ited S tates v . Mend oza -Ce celia , 963 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th C ir. 1992), abrogated on ot

her grounds , Colem an v. Singletary , 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994), we held that attempted arson is a “ crime of violence ” as defined under § 4B 1.2. I n rea chin g this decis ion, w e no ted th at arso n is an enu mer ated o ffen se in the defini tion of “crime of violence, ” and the commentary to § 4B1.2 provides that attem pts to com mit th e enu mer ated felon ies are also c rime s of v iolen ce. Id. ; see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, comment. (n.1). While theterms “ crime of viole nce” and “viole nt felo ny” a re no t interc han geab le, Mend oza -Ce celia provides helpful guid ance beca use th e def inition s for both term s are v irtually iden tical. Secti on 924(e)(2) (B)(ii ) enumerates ars on as a vi olent felony . Foll owing the reasoning of Wilker

son and Mend oza -Ce celia , we conclude that att empted ar son should al so be consi dered a vi olent felony . Atte mpt, l ike cons pirac y, pre sents the potential risk of physical injury to another. Becau se attempted arson pr esents a serious potential ri sk of injury t o another person, we hold that t he distri ct court correctly concluded that it is a vi olent fel ony under § 924(e). As such, we affirm Rainey’s sent ence. AFFI RMED.