FILED JULY 29, 2009 

GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of 

GARY E. BUSH, a protected person, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 136617 

 

BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., 

GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, M.D., 

M. ASHARAF MANSOUR, M.D., 

VASCULAR ASSOCIATES, P.C., and 

SPECTRUM HEALTH BUTTERWORTH 

CAMPUS, 

 Defendants, 

and 

JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., and 

WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR 

SURGEONS, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________________________ 

GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of 

GARY E. BUSH, a protected person, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v 

BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., 

 No. 136653 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Opinion Chief Justice: 

Marilyn Kelly 

Justices: 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

Diane M. Hathaway
2

 Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., 

WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR 

SURGEONS, 

GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, M.D., M. 

ASHRAF MANSOUR, M.D., VASCULAR 

ASSOCIATES, P.C., and SPECTRUM 

HEALTH BUTTERWORTH CAMPUS, 

 Defendants. 

____________________________________ 

GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of 

GARY EDWARD BUSH, a protected 

person, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v 

BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., 

JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., 

WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR 

SURGEONS, GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, 

M.D., M. ASHRAF MANSOUR, M.D., and 

VASCULAR ASSOCIATES, P.C., 

 Defendants, 

 No. 136983 

and 

SPECTRUM HEALTH BUTTERWORTH 

CAMPUS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
3

HATHAWAY, J. 

At issue before this Court is the proper interpretation of MCL 600.5856(c), 

as amended by 2004 PA 87, effective April 22, 2004. We have been asked to 

consider whether a defect in a timely mailed notice of intent (NOI), provided to a 

medical malpractice defendant pursuant to MCL 600.2912b, precludes the tolling 

of the statute of limitations on a plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim. We also 

consider whether, and under what circumstances, a plaintiff may take advantage of 

the 154-day statutory waiting period provided under MCL 600.2912b(8). 

We conclude that the 2004 amendments of MCL 600.5856 have 

significantly clarified the proper role of an NOI provided pursuant to MCL 

600.2912b. While the former statute, MCL 600.5856(d), has been interpreted to 

preclude tolling when defects are found in an NOI, the current statute, § 5856(c), 

makes clear that the question whether tolling applies is determined by the 

timeliness of the NOI. Thus, if an NOI is timely, the statute of limitations is tolled 

despite defects contained therein. Moreover, in light of this significant 

clarification of § 5856, we hold that the purpose of the NOI statute is better served 

by allowing for defects in NOIs to be addressed in light of MCL 600.2301, which 

allows for amendment and disregard of “any error or defect” where the substantial 

rights of the parties are not affected and the cure is in the furtherance of justice. 

We hold that the mandates of § 2301 are met when a party makes a good-faith 

attempt to comply with the content requirements of § 2912b. Finally, we hold that 

a plaintiff may take advantage of the 154-day waiting period provided in 
4

§ 2912b(8) where a defendant fails to make a good-faith attempt to reply to the 

plaintiff’s NOI in compliance with the statutory content requirements. 

We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and 

remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The underlying facts and procedural history of this case were well set forth 

by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals summarized: 

On August 7, 2003, Gary E. Bush (Bush), who was 33 at the 

time, had surgery to repair an aortic aneurysm at Spectrum Health’s 

Butterworth Campus. Shabahang and Heiser, who are surgeons 

employed by WM Cardiovascular, performed the surgery. Plaintiff, 

Bush’s guardian, claims that when Shabahang cut open Bush’s chest, 

he lacerated the aneurysm, which made it necessary for Heiser to 

cannulate Bush’s femoral artery and femoral vein so that Bush could 

be placed on a heart-bypass machine before the surgery could 

proceed. Defendants George T. Sugiyama, M.D., and M. Ashraf 

Mansour, M.D., who are vascular surgeons with defendant Vascular 

Associates, P.C., repaired Bush’s femoral artery and femoral vein, 

respectively. According to plaintiff, the injuries Bush suffered 

during the surgery and during his recovery rendered him unable to 

lead an independent life. 

On August 5, 2005, which was just days before the expiration 

of the applicable period of limitations, plaintiff served a notice of 

intent to file a medical-malpractice complaint against Shabahang, 

Heiser, Sugiyama, Mansour, WM Cardiovascular, Vascular 

Associates, and Spectrum Health. Sugiyama, Mansour, Vascular 

Associates, and Shabahang responded to plaintiff’s notice as 

required by MCL 600.2912b(7). On January 27, 2006, which was 

175 days after plaintiff served notice on defendants, plaintiff filed 

his complaint against all defendants. 

Shortly thereafter, Sugiyama, Mansour, and Vascular 

Associates moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), 

(8), and (10). They argued that dismissal was appropriate on two 
5

grounds: (1) plaintiff failed to file a notice that complied with the 

requirements of MCL 600.2912b, and (2) plaintiff failed to wait the 

required 182 days before filing his complaint. Shabahang, Heiser, 

and WM Cardiovascular joined the motion. Spectrum Health later 

filed its own motion for summary disposition based solely on the 

alleged deficiency of the notice. 

In response to these motions, plaintiff argued that the notice 

met the minimum statutory requirements. Plaintiff responded to the 

allegations that the complaint was prematurely filed by arguing that 

the responses to the notice were deficient. Because defendants’ 

responses to the notice were deficient, plaintiff contended that he 

could properly file his complaint after 154 days from the date of 

service of the notice. Hence, plaintiff concluded, his complaint was 

not prematurely filed. 

The trial court determined that the notice was insufficient 

with regard to Sugiyama, Mansour, and Vascular Associates. On the 

basis of that conclusion, the trial court granted summary disposition 

in favor of Sugiyama, Mansour, and Vascular Associates. The trial 

court also granted summary disposition in favor of Spectrum Health, 

but only to the extent that its alleged liability was based on the 

actions of Sugiyama and Mansour. The trial court also granted 

summary disposition in favor of Spectrum Health with regard to the 

claims of negligence on the part of Spectrum Health’s physician 

assistants because plaintiff failed to file a conforming affidavit of 

merit. However, “[a]s to the other doctors and defendants . . . the 

Court’s of the opinion that the [notice] is clearly sufficient, so those 

motions are denied.” The trial court also determined that plaintiff’s 

complaint was not prematurely filed. [1]

Defendants appealed the trial court’s orders. The Court of Appeals 

consolidated defendants’ applications for leave to appeal. On May 1, 2008, the 

Court of Appeals issued a published opinion affirming in part, reversing in part, 

and remanding to the trial court for further proceedings.2

 The Court of Appeals 

 1 Bush v Shabahang, 278 Mich App 703, 706-708; 753 NW2d 271 (2008). 

2 Id. at 726-727. 
6

held that, when read as a whole, the NOI was sufficient to comply with the 

requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4), except with regard to the claims of direct 

liability for training and supervision against West Michigan Cardiovascular. The 

Court also concluded that certain claims for vicarious liability against Spectrum 

Health were inadequately pled.3

 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the 

trial court’s denial of summary disposition on the deficiently pled direct liability 

claims and remanded to the trial court for an order granting the motion for 

summary disposition and dismissing the claims without prejudice. The Court of 

Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed, 

holding that plaintiff could avail himself of the shortened 154-day waiting period 

because the defendants’ response to the NOI was deficient. Defendant Spectrum 

Health’s motion for reconsideration of the opinion was denied. 

Defendants filed three separate applications for leave to appeal in this 

Court. This Court consolidated the appeals and granted oral argument on the 

application.4

 After oral argument on the application, this Court granted leave to 

appeal.5

 3

 The Court of Appeals held that the claims for vicarious liability for the 

physicians’ assistant and the nursing staff were inadequately pled, but the claims 

against Heiser and Shabahang were sufficient. 

4 Bush v Shabahang, 482 Mich 1014 (2008). 

5 Bush v Shabahang, 482 Mich 1105 (2008). 
7

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The issues presented are issues of statutory interpretation. Statutory 

interpretation is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.6

 This Court 

also reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary 

disposition.7

 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. MCL 600.5856(c) and Tolling 

The first issue this Court is asked to address is whether the defects 

identified in plaintiff’s NOI act to bar tolling of the statute of limitations under 

MCL 600.5856(c) as amended by 2004 PA 87, effective April 22, 2004. Our 

analysis necessarily begins with a review of the language of § 5856 before and 

after the 2004 amendments. 

The relevant language of § 5856(d), the predecessor to § 5856(c),8

 provided 

that tolling is operative if the “notice is given in compliance with section 2912b.” 

(Emphasis added.) The relevant language of § 5856(c) currently provides that 

tolling is operative “[a]t the time notice is given in compliance with the applicable 

notice period under section 2912b . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The question arises 

 6 In re Investigation of March 1999 Riots in East Lansing (People v 

Pastor), 463 Mich 378, 383; 617 NW2d 310 (2000). 

7 Herald Co v Bay City, 463 Mich 111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000). 

8

 The former § 5856(d) was renumbered by the amendment and now 

appears as § 5856(c). 
8

whether the amendment mandates compliance with the entirety of § 2912b, such 

that a defective NOI does not get the benefit of tolling, or whether the new 

language focuses on compliance with only the applicable notice period in § 2912b, 

such that a defective NOI tolls the statute of limitations as long as it is compliant 

with the notice period. 

This question was seemingly answered in Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp 

(Roberts I)

9 and Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr,10 both of which held that a defect in an 

NOI precludes tolling of the statute of limitations during the 182-day waiting 

period. Roberts I opined that MCL 600.5856(d) and MCL 600.2912b were 

inextricably tied. The Court held that “the statute of limitations cannot be tolled 

under MCL 600.5856(d) unless notice is given in compliance with all the 

provisions of MCL 600.2912b.”11

However, this holding was foundationally premised on the pre-amendment 

language. The Court explained: 

Section 5856(d) clearly provides that notice must be 

compliant with § 2912b, not just § 2912b(2) as plaintiff contrarily 

contends. Had the Legislature intended only the delivery provisions 

of § 2912b to be applicable, we presume that the Legislature would 

have expressly limited compliance only to § 2912b(2). However, 

the Legislature did not do so. Rather, it referred to all of § 2912b. 

 9 Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 642 NW2d 663 (2002). 

10 Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr, 481 Mich 558, 561; 751 NW2d 44 (2008). 

11 Roberts I, supra at 59. 
9

Since the statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court is 

required to enforce § 5856(d) as written. As a result, the tolling of 

the statute of limitations is available to a plaintiff only if all the 

requirements included in § 2912b are met.[12]

Significantly, Roberts I interpreted the former MCL 600.5856(d), as the 

amendment was not enacted until after Roberts I was decided. Boodt, while 

decided in 2008, made no reference to the 2004 amendment. Rather, it relied on 

the Roberts I interpretation of the former § 5856(d), presumably because the 

complaint in Boodt was filed prior to the 2004 amendment. Neither Roberts I nor 

Boodt addressed the question at issue here, namely, whether the current language 

of § 5856(c) mandates that defects in an NOI act as a bar to tolling of the statute of 

limitations. Since Roberts I and Boodt relied on language of a statute that is no 

longer in existence, examining the correct interpretation of § 5856(c) and its 

interrelationship with § 2912b is an issue of first impression. 

The question this Court addresses is one of statutory construction. 

Assuming that the Legislature has acted within its constitutional authority, the 

purpose of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the 

Legislature.13 In determining the intent of the Legislature, this Court must first 

look to the language of the statute.14 The Court must, first and foremost, interpret 

 12 Id. at 64. 

13 Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 

(1999). 

14 Id. 
10

the language of a statute in a manner that is consistent with the intent of the 

Legislature.15 “‘As far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, 

and word in the statute. The statutory language must be read and understood in its 

grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended.’”16 

Moreover, when considering the correct interpretation, the statute must be read as 

a whole.17 Individual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the 

context of the entire legislative scheme.18 While defining particular words in 

statutes, we must consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase 

and its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.19 A statute must be read in 

conjunction with other relevant statutes to ensure that the legislative intent is 

correctly ascertained.20 The statute must be interpreted in a manner that ensures 

that it works in harmony with the entire statutory scheme.21 Moreover, courts 

must pay particular attention to statutory amendments, because a change in 

statutory language is presumed to reflect either a legislative change in the meaning 

 15 Id. 

16 Herman v Berrien Co, 481 Mich 352, 366; 750 NW2d 570, 579 (2008), 

quoting Sun Valley, supra at 237. 

17 Sun Valley, supra at 237. 

18 Herman, supra at 366. 

19 Id., quoting Bailey v United States, 516 US 137, 145; 116 S Ct 501; 133 

L Ed 2d 472 (1995). 

20 Wayne Co v Auditor General, 250 Mich 227, 233; 229 NW 911 (1930). 

21 Id. at 234. 
11

of the statute itself or a desire to clarify the correct interpretation of the original 

statute.22 Finally, an analysis of a statute’s legislative history is an important tool 

in ascertaining legislative intent.23

To determine the intent of MCL 600.5856(c), we first look at its plain 

language. The pre-amendment version of § 5856 stated: 

The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled: 

 (a) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons 

and complaint are served on the defendant. 

 (b) At the time jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise 

acquired. 

 (c) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons 

and complaint in good faith are placed in the hands of an officer for 

immediate service, but in this case the statute is not tolled longer 

than 90 days after the copy of the summons and complaint is 

received by the officer. 

 (d) If, during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a 

claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not 

longer than a number of days equal to the number of days in the 

applicable notice period after the date notice is given in compliance 

with section 2912b. [Emphasis added.] 

MCL 600.5856, as amended by the Legislature in 2004, states: 

The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled in any of the 

following circumstances: 

 (a) At the time the complaint is filed, if a copy of the summons and 

complaint are served on the defendant within the time set forth in the 

supreme court rules. 

 22 See Lawrence Baking Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 308 

Mich 198, 205; 13 NW2d 260 (1944). 

23 See In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 415; 596 NW2d 164 

(1999). 
12

 (b) At the time jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise 

acquired. 

 (c) At the time notice is given in compliance with the applicable 

notice period under section 2912b, if during that period a claim 

would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose; but in this 

case, the statute is tolled not longer than the number of days equal to 

the number of days remaining in the applicable notice period after 

the date notice is given. [Emphasis added.] 

In comparing the pre- and post-amendment language, it is clear that the 

focus of the operative language has been clarified. Roberts I opined that the focus 

of § 5856(d) was on compliance with § 2912b in its entirety. In contrast, the focus 

of the new § 5856(c) is unquestionably limited to compliance with the “applicable 

notice period.” 

As Roberts I pointed out, if the Legislature had intended to limit the 

applicability of § 2912b, it would have expressly limited compliance in the statute. 

The 2004 amendment of § 5856 does precisely that. It limits compliance to the 

notice period under § 2912b. Thus, pursuant to the clear language of § 2912b and 

the new § 5856(c), if a plaintiff complies with the applicable notice period before 

commencing a medical malpractice action, the statute of limitations is tolled. 

Defendants ask us to disregard the change to the language of § 5856 and 

assume that the change was merely inadvertent. They urge us to interpret the 

amended statute in the same manner that Roberts I and Boodt interpreted the preamended statute. We cannot do so. This Court cannot assume that language 
13

chosen by the Legislature is inadvertent.24 To the contrary, this Court must 

assume that an express legislative change denotes either a change in the meaning 

of the statute itself or a clarification of the original legislative intent of the 

statute.25 We cannot assume that the change means nothing at all. The language 

of the new § 5856(c), “compliance with the applicable notice period under section 

2912b,” clearly and unequivocally sets forth that a plaintiff’s NOI must comply 

only with the applicable notice period. 

In sum, neither the Roberts I nor the Boodt analysis applies in the matter 

before us because both analyses were based on a former version of § 5856 that is 

no longer in existence. The Legislature, in exercising its authority, has changed 

the language of the statute and we must abide by that action. Thus, we hold that, 

pursuant to the clear language of § 2912b and § 5856(c), if a plaintiff files a timely 

NOI before commencing a medical malpractice action, the statute of limitations is 

tolled despite the presence of defects in the NOI. 

 24 Lawrence Baking, supra at 205. 

25 Id. See also Ettinger v City of Lansing, 215 Mich App 451; 546 NW2d 

652 (1996), wherein Justice Markman, then sitting at the Court of Appeals and 

joined by then-Judge Corrigan, opined: 

We note that plaintiffs correctly state the general proposition 

that changes in statutory language presumably reflect a change in 

meaning. Wortelboer v Benzie Co, 212 Mich App 208, 217; 537 

NW2d 603 (1995). However, changes in statutory language may 

reflect an attempt to clarify the meaning of a provision rather than 

change it. Id.; see also Evans v Hebert, 203 Mich App 392, 403; 513 

NW2d 164 (1994). 
14

B. Consequence of a Defective NOI 

In light of the fact that a defective NOI does not bar tolling of the statute of 

limitations under § 5856(c), we must now consider what a court must do when 

presented with a defective NOI.26 

We must again begin our analysis by examining the language of the statute 

itself. MCL 600.2912b states in relevant part: 

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person 

shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a 

health professional or health facility unless the person has given the 

health professional or health facility written notice under this section 

not less than 182 days before the action is commenced. 

(2) The notice of intent to file a claim required under 

subsection (1) shall be mailed to the last known professional 

business address or residential address of the health professional or 

health facility who is the subject of the claim. Proof of the mailing 

constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with this section. If 

no last known professional business or residential address can 

reasonably be ascertained, notice may be mailed to the health facility 

where the care that is the basis for the claim was rendered. 

* * * 

 (4) The notice given to a health professional or health facility 

under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the 

following: 

 26 The Boodt Court opined that because no tolling was afforded in the 

presence of a defect pursuant to § 5856(d), the plaintiff’s action was not 

commenced under § 2912b(1). Boodt, supra at 562-563. Our analysis today 

explains that the Legislature has made it clear that a defective NOI does not 

preclude tolling of the statute of limitations for cases bought under § 5856(c). As 

a result, whether a medical malpractice action is commenced for purposes of 

§ 5856(a) does not depend on the presence or absence of defects within the NOI. 
15

 (a) The factual basis for the claim. 

 (b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the 

claimant. 

 (c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable 

standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional 

or health facility. 

 (d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve 

compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care. 

 (e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the 

standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury 

claimed in the notice. 

 (f) The names of all health professionals and health facilities 

the claimant is notifying under this section in relation to the claim. 

* * * 

(7) Within 154 days after receipt of notice under this section, 

the health professional or health facility against whom the claim is 

made shall furnish to the claimant or his or her authorized 

representative a written response that contains a statement of each of 

the following: 

(a) The factual basis for the defense to the claim. 

(b) The standard of practice or care that the health 

professional or health facility claims to be applicable to the action 

and that the health professional or health facility complied with that 

standard. 

(c) The manner in which it is claimed by the health 

professional or health facility that there was compliance with the 

applicable standard of practice or care. 

(d) The manner in which the health professional or health 

facility contends that the alleged negligence of the health 

professional or health facility was not the proximate cause of the 

claimant’s alleged injury or alleged damage. 

(8) If the claimant does not receive the written response 

required under subsection (7) within the required 154-day time 

period, the claimant may commence an action alleging medical 

malpractice upon the expiration of the 154-day period. 
16

The plain language of § 2912b(1) mandates that a plaintiff shall not 

commence an action for medical malpractice without filing a timely NOI. 

Notably, however, the statute is silent regarding the consequences of filing a 

defective NOI. The statute makes no reference whatsoever to a mandatory 

dismissal penalty in the event of a defect. Thus, our inquiry begins with whether a 

mandatory dismissal with prejudice under § 2912b was the intent of the 

Legislature. In the absence of an express directive within the statute itself, the 

legislative history of § 2912b, the statute’s purpose, its placement within the 

broader statutory scheme, and a review of other relevant statutes are instructive 

guides. 

A review of the legislative history reveals that the Legislature did not 

intend for a defect in an NOI to be grounds for dismissal with prejudice based on 

§ 2912b. The clearest indication for this conclusion was the Legislature’s 

complete rejection of a mandatory dismissal clause. The statute creating NOIs 

was originally introduced as Senate Bill 270 on January 28, 1993.27 NOIs were 

codified in what was then proposed § 2912f. Section 2912d, a proposed 

companion to § 2912f, contained a mandatory dismissal penalty for failure to 

comply with § 2912f. The bill as introduced provided: 

 27 This bill was introduced in the Senate by Senators DeGrow, Van 

Regenmorter, Gast, Cisky, Welborn, Wartner, Emmons, Schwarz, Ehlers, Geake, 

Arthurhultz, DiNello, Koivisto, Bouchard, Dunaskiss, Pridnia, and McManus. 
17

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in an action 

alleging medical malpractice, the court shall dismiss a claim not 

included in the notice required under section 2912f. [Emphasis 

added.] 

 Significantly, this penalty provision did not have sufficient votes to pass. 

Mandatory dismissal was not the will of the Legislature. This Court has 

previously recognized that legislative history may be used to determine legislative 

intent. This Court previously held that “[w]here the Legislature has considered 

certain language and rejected it in favor of other language, the resulting statutory 

language should not be held to authorize what the Legislature explicitly 

rejected.”28 We can draw no conclusion from the omission of the dismissal 

 28 In re MCI Telecom Complaint, supra at 415. Similarly, Univ Med 

Affiliates, PC v Wayne Co Executive, 142 Mich App 135, 140; 369 NW2d 277 

(1985), held that the legislative history of a statute may be considered and, where 

it can be shown that certain language was affirmatively rejected, the court should 

not give the statute a construction that the Legislature plainly refused to give. As 

the Court explained in In re MCI Telecom Complaint: 

[W]e find the meaning of § 312a, standing alone, to be 

unambiguous on its face. The statutory language clearly requires 

that, should interLATA prohibitions be removed, Ameritech must 

provide intraLATA toll dialing parity. There is, however, nothing 

on the face of this statute, or within the language enacted by the 

Legislature, that would hold the reverse to be true. Indeed, where 

the Legislature specifically considered language authorizing such a 

linkage, and rejected it, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in holding 

that the statute inextricably linked intraLATA and interLATA toll 

dialing parity. [Id. at 415-416.] 

See also Nation v WDE Electric Co, 454 Mich 489, 492-493, 495; 563 

NW2d 233 (1997); Miller v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 410 Mich 538, 

566; 302 NW2d 537 (1981); and People v Adamowski, 340 Mich 422, 429; 65 

NW2d 753 (1954). 
18

penalty in § 2912b other than it was not the intent of the Legislature to incorporate 

a mandatory dismissal penalty into § 2912b. 

 The stated purpose of § 2912b was to provide a mechanism for “promoting 

settlement without the need for formal litigation, reducing the cost of medical 

malpractice litigation, and providing compensation for meritorious medical 

malpractice claims that would otherwise be precluded from recovery because of 

litigation costs . . . .”29 To hold that § 2912b in and of itself mandates dismissal 

with prejudice would complicate, prolong, and significantly increase the expense 

of litigation. Dismissal with prejudice would be inconsistent with these stated 

purposes. 

 Further, in determining legislative intent, we must look to § 2912b’s 

context within the broader medical malpractice statutory scheme. To do so, we 

examine the statute as a whole. Our review of the medical malpractice legislation 

indicates that it was designed as a balanced scheme, imposing equivalent 

requirements on both plaintiffs and defendants. Both are required to participate in 

the NOI process and file comparable documents.30 Both are required to file 

comparable affidavits to accompany complaints and answers.31 Both are required 

 29 Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 270, August 11, 1993; House Legislative 

Analysis, HB 4403-4406, March 22, 1993. 

30 See MCL 600.2912b. 

31 See MCL 600.2912d and MCL 600.2912e. 
19

to meet the same expert witness qualifications.32 In light of these comparable and 

balanced requirements, the penalties should likewise be comparable. It is 

significant that the only penalty provision included in § 2912b is very minor: a 

shortening of the defendant’s waiting period by 28 days.33 In light of the minor 

penalty for a defendant, it would be inconsistent with the balanced approach in the 

legislative scheme to assume that the Legislature intended to impose on plaintiffs 

the harshest penalty possible: dismissal with prejudice.34 

 In determining legislative intent, we should also consider other relevant 

statutory provisions. To that end, we consider the Revised Judicature Act (RJA) 

to see if other appropriate remedies exist that are consistent with the intended 

purpose of § 2912b. We have long recognized that the RJA does provide a 

mechanism to cure certain defects within pleadings in MCL 600.2301. We note 

that the language of § 2301 goes beyond the limited concept of amendment of 

 32 MCL 600.2169. 

33 MCL 600.2912b(8). 

34 Given the Legislature’s clear rejection of dismissal as a penalty in 

§ 2912b, and its amendment of § 5856(d), we question whether the Legislature 

ever intended § 5856(d) to preclude tolling of the statute of limitations in the 

presence of defects in an NOI. The timing of the amendment, the language 

chosen, and the legislative history support the conclusion that the change was 

intended to be a clarification of the original intent of the statute rather than it being 

representative of a change from the original intent. Accordingly, we question 

whether Roberts I and Boodt were correctly decided, as they failed to consider the 

entire legislative scheme and the legislative history involved. However, because 

the NOI and filing in this case occurred after 2004, this issue is not before us and 

we will refrain from deciding this issue in the present case. 
20

“pleadings” and allows for curing of certain defects in any “process, pleading or 

proceeding.” 

MCL 600.2301 states: 

The court in which any action or proceeding is pending, has 

power to amend any process, pleading or proceeding in such action 

or proceeding, either in form or substance, for the furtherance of 

justice, on such terms as are just, at any time before judgment 

rendered therein. The court at every stage of the action or 

proceeding shall disregard any error or defect in the proceedings 

which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 

Service of an NOI is clearly part of a medical malpractice “process” or 

“proceeding” in Michigan.35 Section 2912b mandates that “an action alleging 

medical malpractice” in Michigan “shall not commence . . . unless the person has 

given the health professional or health facility written notice . . . .”36 Since an NOI 

must be given before a medical malpractice claim can be filed, the service of an 

NOI is a part of a medical malpractice “proceeding.” As a result, § 2301 applies 

to the NOI “process.”37 As Justice Cavanagh opined in his dissent in Boodt, this 

 35 See Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (After Remand), 470 Mich 679, 

691; 684 NW2d 711 (2004) (Roberts II) (“[W]e acknowledge that the notice of 

intent is provided at the earliest stage of a medical malpractice proceeding.” 

[Emphasis supplied.]); Boodt, supra at 561. 

36 MCL 600.2912b(1). 

37 We note that the majority in Boodt engaged in some limited discussion 

of § 2301 in a footnote. Boodt, supra at 567 n 4. However, as we previously 

indicated, the Boodt majority did not reach this issue in light of its holding that, 

because the NOI was deficient, no action was pending, and § 2301 only applies to 
21

Court has for several decades applied MCL 600.2301 or its predecessor (which 

contained nearly identical language) to allow amendment of documents that, 

although not aptly characterized as pleadings, might well fall under the broad 

category of a “process” or “proceeding.”38 Accordingly, we hold that § 2301 may 

be employed to cure defects in an NOI. 

 We recognize that § 2301 allows for amendment of errors or defects, 

whether the defect is in form or in substance, but only when the amendment would 

be “for the furtherance of justice.” Additionally, § 2301 mandates that courts 

disregard errors or defects when those errors or defects do not affect the 

substantial rights of the parties. Thus, the applicability of § 2301 rests on a twopronged test: first, whether a substantial right of a party is implicated and, second, 

whether a cure is in the furtherance of justice. If both of these prongs are satisfied, 

 

pending actions. Again, as this analysis is based on the former § 5856(d), it is no 

longer applicable. 

38 Boodt, supra at 567-572 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). See also Tudryck v 

Mutch, 320 Mich 99, 107; 30 NW2d 518 (1948) (applying the predecessor statute 

of MCL 600.2301 to allow amendment to a settlement agreement); Fildew v 

Stockard, 256 Mich 494, 498-499; 239 NW2d 868 (1932) (applying the 

predecessor statute of MCL 600.2301 to allow amendment of an affidavit for a 

writ of garnishment that was required to be filed before commencement of that 

action); Hopkins & Son v Green, 93 Mich 394, 395-396; 53 NW 537 (1892) 

(applying the predecessor statute of MCL 600.2301 to allow amendment of a 

bond); Bole v Sands & Maxwell Lumber Co, 77 Mich 239, 241-242; 43 NW 873 

(1889) (holding that a summons could be amended pursuant to the “process, 

pleading or proceeding” language of the predecessor statute of MCL 600.2301). 
22

a cure will be allowed “on such terms as are just.”39 Given that NOIs are served at 

such an early stage in the proceedings, so-called “defects” are to be expected. The 

statute contemplates that medical records may not have been turned over before 

the NOI is mailed to the defendant.40 Defendants who receive these notices are 

sophisticated health professionals with extensive medical background and training. 

Indeed, these same defendants are allowed to act as their own reviewing experts. 

A defendant who has enough medical expertise to opine in his or her own defense 

certainly has the ability to understand the nature of claims being asserted against 

him or her even in the presence of defects in the NOI. Accordingly, we conclude 

that no substantial right of a health care provider is implicated. Further, we hold 

that the second prong of the test, which requires that the cure be in the furtherance 

of justice, is satisfied when a party makes a good-faith attempt to comply with the 

content requirements of § 2912b. Thus, only when a plaintiff has not made a 

good-faith attempt to comply with § 2912b(4) should a trial court consider 

dismissal of an action without prejudice. 

 We must now turn to the instant NOI to determine the nature of the defect 

and whether § 2301 may be invoked. The NOI is 13 pages long. Plaintiff made a 

good-faith attempt to address each of the subsections enumerated in § 2912b(4). 

The Court of Appeals held, and we agree, that the vast majority of plaintiff’s NOI 

 39 MCL 600.2301. 

40 MCL 600.2912b(5) provides for the exchange of medical records. 
23

was in compliance with § 2912b(4).41 The Court of Appeals held that the NOI 

was defective with respect to the claims made against defendant West Michigan 

Cardiovascular for direct liability for training and supervision, and also with 

respect to the claims for direct liability asserted against Spectrum Health for its 

nurses and physician assistants. In analyzing these defects, the Court of Appeals 

stated: 

Plaintiff’s notice does not adequately address the standard of 

care applicable to WM Cardiovascular under a direct theory of 

liability for failure to properly train or hire. The notice merely 

provides that WM Cardiovascular should have hired competent staff 

members and properly trained them. But the notice identifies no 

relevant standard for determining competency or properly training 

staff persons. Nor can the standard be gleaned from the other 

sections of the notice: plaintiff failed to state how WM 

Cardiovascular’s hiring and training practices violated that standard, 

failed to state which hiring practices or training methods it should 

have employed, and failed to state how those improper practices 

proximately caused Bush’s injuries. For this reason, to the extent 

that plaintiff’s claims rest on these theories, the trial court should 

have granted summary disposition in favor of WM Cardiovascular. 

* * * 

Although plaintiff’s notice alleges errors on the part of 

Spectrum Health’s nursing staff and physician assistants, the notice 

does not purport to state a separate standard of care for the nurses 

and physician assistants. This problem is compounded by the fact 

that the notice does not delineate the specific actions taken by the 

nursing staff or physician assistants that purportedly breached the 

standard of care. Rather, plaintiff’s notice generally asserts that the 

staff should have performed monitoring, charting, assessing, and 

 41 The court found no defects with regard to the claims against the 

individually named doctors, the vicarious liability claims against West Michigan 

Cardiovascular Surgeons, and the vicarious liability claims against Spectrum 

Health for Heiser and Shabahang. 
24

reporting and engaged in advocacy for the patient and otherwise 

challenged the actions of physicians. Finally, the notice does not 

state the manner in which the identified breaches proximately caused 

Bush’s injuries. Thus, even when the notice is read as a whole, it 

does not adequately address the standard of care applicable to 

Spectrum Health’s staff other than Heiser and Shabahang. For that 

reason, we agree with Spectrum Health that the trial court erred 

when it concluded that plaintiff’s notice met the minimum 

requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4)(b) with regard to Spectrum 

Health’s nursing staff and physician assistants. Likewise, to the 

extent that plaintiff purported to give notice that Spectrum Health 

could be held directly liable for Bush’s injuries on the basis of the 

theories that it negligently hired or failed to train its staff, for the 

same reasons we explained with regard to WM Cardiovascular, we 

conclude that the notice did not meet the requirements of MCL 

600.2912b.[42]

 We agree with the Court of Appeals that these omissions do constitute 

defects in the NOI. However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals regarding the 

appropriate remedy. We are not persuaded that the defects described by the Court 

of Appeals warrant dismissal of a claim. These types of defects fall squarely 

within the ambit of § 2301 and should be disregarded or cured by amendment. It 

would not be in the furtherance of justice to dismiss a claim where the plaintiff has 

made a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirement of § 2912b. A 

dismissal would only be warranted if the party fails to make a good-faith attempt 

to comply with the content requirements.43 Accordingly, we hold that the alleged 

defects can be cured pursuant to § 2301 because the substantial rights of the 

 42 Bush, 278 Mich App at 711, 716-717 (citations omitted). 

43 See defendant’s response to plaintiff’s NOI, infra at 27, which provides 

an example of a failure to demonstrate a good-faith attempt to comply with the 

content requirements. 
25

parties are not affected, and “disregard” or “amendment” of the defect is in the 

furtherance of justice when a party has made a good-faith attempt to comply with 

the content provisions of § 2912b.44

C. MCL 600.2912b(7) and Defective Responses to an NOI 

Next, given that the Court of Appeals held that defendant Shabahang’s 

response to plaintiff’s NOI was defective because it did not meet the requirements 

of MCL 600.2912b(7), the question arises whether plaintiff was required to wait 

the full 182-day period before filing his medical malpractice action, or whether he 

could avail himself of the shortened 154-day period. Our analysis again begins by 

examining the text of MCL 600.2912b(7).45 The statute is clear that a defendant 

must provide the plaintiff with a written response within 154 days of receipt of the 

NOI. This provision is mandatory. The response must include a statement of the 

factual basis for the defense, the standard of care that the health professional 

claims applies, the manner in which it is claimed that the health professional 

complied with the standard of care, and the manner in which the health 

professional contends that the alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of 

the plaintiff’s injuries. If the plaintiff does not receive the written response 

 44 Section 2301 provides that any amendment shall be made “on such terms 

as are just.” We note that in light of this provision, justice would be served by 

having any amendment relate back to the time that the original NOI was mailed in 

accord with the treatment afforded to pleadings when amended under MCR 

2.118(D). 

45 See part III(B) of this opinion for the full text. 
26

required under MCL 600.2912b(7) within the 154-day waiting period, the plaintiff 

may file suit after the 154-day waiting period has expired.46

 According to the Court of Appeals, Shabahang’s response was defective 

and did not comply with the statute. Despite this response, Shabahang argues that 

plaintiff was still required to wait the full 182-day waiting period before filing suit 

because plaintiff received a response to the NOI. Plaintiff, on the other hand, 

argues that because the notice did not meet the requirements of § 2912b(7), it was 

proper to commence his suit upon the expiration of the 154-day period, as allowed 

under MCL 600.2912b(8). Shabahang counters that plaintiff could not unilaterally 

determine that the response was inadequate, contending that a judge must 

adjudicate the issue before plaintiff may file the complaint early. 

 Once again we turn to the standards set forth in § 2301 for guidance. 

Section 2301 similarly allows for “amendment” or “disregard” of defects in 

responses to NOIs, as long as the cure is in the furtherance of justice and does not 

affect the substantial rights of the parties. Significantly, defendants must make a 

good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements of the statute to avail 

themselves of § 2301. 

 46 MCL 600.2912b(8) provides: “If the claimant does not receive the 

written response required under subsection (7) within the required 154-day time 

period, the claimant may commence an action alleging medical malpractice upon 

the expiration of the 154-day period.” 

We note that our holding today does not conflict with Omelenchuk v City of 

Warren, 461 Mich 567, 575; 609 NW2d 177 (2000) (holding that the statute of 

limitations remains tolled for the full 182 days even if the plaintiff takes advantage 

of the shortened waiting period). 
27

Shabahang’s one-page response to the NOI was utterly lacking in a goodfaith attempt to comply. The entire substantive portion of Shabahang’s response 

stated: 

1. Factual Basis for Defense to Claim

The medical records involved in this case, together with 

deposition testimony, will form the primary defense to this case. 

Briefly, Dr. Shabahang contends that he properly evaluated, assessed 

and treated Gary Bush. The actions of Dr. Shabahang were well 

within the standard of care. 

2. Standard of Care and Compliance

The standard of care required Dr. Shabahang to do things 

demonstrated in the medical records, which may be further 

augmented by deposition testimony. At all times, he acted within 

the standards of care in his care and treatment of Gary Bush. 

3. Manner of Compliance

See § 2 above. The manner in which Dr. Shabahang 

complied with the applicable standard of care is outlined in the 

medical records, and will be further augmented by sworn deposition 

testimony. 

4. Proximate Cause

It is the position of Dr. Shabahang that his actions did not 

within a reasonable degree of medical probability contribute in any 

way to the complications alleged by Gary Bush. Additionally, it is 

the position of Dr. Shabahang that the current medical condition of 

Gary Bush was not in any way caused or contributed by the 

activities of Dr. Shabahang. 

 Shabahang was required to make a general statement of the factors 

contained in § 2912b(7). He failed to do so. Shabahang’s response is nothing 

more than a blanket denial of any wrongdoing. Indeed, Shabahang himself does 

not defend his efforts or the content of the response in his arguments to this Court. 
28

Rather, defendant takes the position that the content of the response is irrelevant. 

We disagree. The purpose of the NOI waiting period is to provide a cost-saving 

method to resolve meritorious claims. If a defendant does not wish to use that 

process, the plaintiff is entitled to accelerate the filing of the complaint. A 

defendant can either advise the plaintiff of the decision to waive47 or the defendant 

may do nothing at all, either of which triggers the shortened waiting period. 

However, we cannot allow a defendant to so flagrantly disregard the process and 

fail to make a good-faith attempt to comply, yet still take advantage of the full 

waiting period. As Shabahang did not make a good-faith attempt to comply with 

§ 2912b(7), he cannot avail himself of either § 2301 or the full 182-day waiting 

period. 

 This result is fully consistent with the statutory NOI scheme. It makes little 

sense to continue a settlement period when one party has indicated that he or she 

has no interest in settlement. When a defendant has made little or no attempt to 

comply with the statute, we will not afford the same benefits as if he or she had 

made an attempt to comply. 

 Finally, defendant asserts that plaintiff does not have the right to 

unilaterally make a determination on the validity of a response. We agree with the 

Court of Appeals that a plaintiff who unilaterally makes such a decision does so at 

his or her own peril. If a court ultimately determines that the response is not 

 47 See MCL 600.2912b(9). 
29

defective, plaintiff’s complaint may be deemed untimely. However, given the 

limited time period involved, it would be virtually impossible for a Court to 

adjudicate this issue on a timely basis. By the time the parties could schedule a 

hearing and brief the issue, the shortened time period afforded by § 2912b would 

be lost. Therefore, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a plaintiff may choose 

to make his own determination regarding the sufficiency of a response, but he does 

so at the risk of having a court later determine that the defendant’s response was 

indeed adequate. We conclude that § 2912b(7) allows a plaintiff to file a 

complaint early if the defendant’s response to the NOI is defective. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

We hold that pursuant to MCL 600.5856(c), as amended by 2004 PA 87, 

effective April 22, 2004, when an NOI is timely, the statute of limitations is tolled 

despite defects contained therein. Moreover, in light of the legislative clarification 

of § 5856(c), we hold that the purpose of the NOI statute is better served by 

allowing for defects in NOIs to be addressed in light of § 2301, which permits 

“amendment” or “disregard” of “any error or defect” where the substantial rights 

of the parties are not affected, as long as the cure is in the furtherance of justice 

and on terms that are just. A cure is in the furtherance of justice when a party 

makes a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements of § 2912b. 

Finally, we hold that a plaintiff may take advantage of the 154-day waiting period 
30

provided in § 2912b(8) where a defendant fails to make a good-faith attempt to 

reply to the plaintiff’s NOI in compliance with the statutory content requirements. 

We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and 

remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Diane M. Hathaway 

Marilyn Kelly 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of 

GARY E. BUSH, a protected person, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 136617 

 

BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., 

GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, M.D., 

M. ASHARAF MANSOUR, M.D., 

VASCULAR ASSOCIATES, P.C., and 

SPECTRUM HEALTH BUTTERWORTH 

CAMPUS, 

 Defendants, 

and 

JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., and 

WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR 

SURGEONS, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________________________ 

GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of 

GARY E. BUSH, a protected person, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v 

BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., 

 Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

 No. 136653 
2

JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., 

WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR 

SURGEONS, 

GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, M.D., M. 

ASHRAF MANSOUR, M.D., VASCULAR 

ASSOCIATES, P.C., and SPECTRUM 

HEALTH BUTTERWORTH CAMPUS, 

 Defendants. 

____________________________________ 

GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of 

GARY EDWARD BUSH, a protected 

person, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v 

BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., 

JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., 

WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR 

SURGEONS, GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, 

M.D., M. ASHRAF MANSOUR, M.D., and 

VASCULAR ASSOCIATES, P.C., 

 Defendants, 

 No. 136983 

and 

SPECTRUM HEALTH BUTTERWORTH 

CAMPUS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

MARKMAN, J. (dissenting). 

 Because I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the notice-tolling 

provision in MCL 600.5856, as well as with its interpretation of MCL 600.2912b 
3

regarding a defendant’s permissible response to a plaintiff’s notice of intent to sue, 

I respectfully dissent. 

I. FACTS AND HISTORY 

 Plaintiff underwent surgery on August 7, 2003, for an aortic aneurysm and 

a heart valve replacement. Plaintiff alleges that during the surgery defendant 

Behrooz-Bruce Shabahang, M.D., “cut into the aortic aneurysm causing a 

laceration” and defendant John Charles Heiser, M.D., “improperly clamped [a] 

vessel causing vascular damage.” Defendants George T. Sugiyama, M.D., and M. 

Ashraf Mansour, M.D., “were called in to repair the vein and artery.” Plaintiff 

alleges that the injuries caused by the surgery have caused him to become “unable 

to live without supervision and assistance.” 

 On August 5, 2005, two days before the two-year period of limitations 

expired, plaintiff served defendants, including Spectrum Health Butterworth 

Campus (the facility where the surgery took place), West Michigan 

Cardiovascular Surgeons (the entity to which Shabahang and Heiser belonged), 

and Vascular Associates, P.C. (the entity to which Sugiyama and Mansour 

belonged), with notices of intent to file suit. Shabahang responded to plaintiff’s 

notice, as did Sugiyama, Mansour, and Vascular Associates, but Heiser, Spectrum 

Health, and West Michigan Cardiovascular did not. On January 27, 2006, 175 

days after serving notice, plaintiff filed his complaint against all defendants. 

 The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Sugiyama, 

Mansour, and Vascular Associates because plaintiff’s notice did not include a 
4

standard of care for Sugiyama and Mansour.1

 For that same reason, the trial court 

granted partial summary disposition in favor of Spectrum Health for its alleged 

liability based on Sugiyama’s and Mansour’s alleged malpractice.2

 The trial court, 

however, did not grant summary disposition in favor of Shabahang, who argued 

that the complaint was filed prematurely. 

 The Court of Appeals initially denied leave but, after remand by this Court, 

477 Mich 934, 935 (2006), issued an opinion affirming in most respects the trial 

court’s decision regarding the sufficiency of plaintiff’s notice. Bush v Shabahang, 

278 Mich App 703; 753 NW2d 271 (2008). The Court of Appeals, however, held 

that the notice was defective for the direct liability claims against defendants 

Spectrum Health and West Michigan Cardiovascular Surgeons, which were based 

on their alleged failure to properly hire and train staff. With respect to those 

claims, the Court remanded for dismissal without prejudice, concluding that the 

statute of limitations had been tolled by the defective notice and that the 

“applicable limitations periods remain tolled until entry of the grants of summary 

disposition.” Id. at 727. With respect to the timing of plaintiff’s complaint, the 

court held that plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed, although Judge Fitzgerald 

would have held that plaintiff was required to wait 182 days after giving notice 

 1

 Plaintiff did not appeal this decision and thus it is not before the Court. 

2

 The court also granted summary disposition in favor of Spectrum Health 

on the negligence claims based on Spectrum Health’s physician assistants because 

plaintiff failed to file a conforming affidavit of merit with those claims. 
5

before commencing the suit. Id. at 727-729 (Fitzgerald, P.J., concurring in part 

and dissenting in part). 

 This Court consolidated these cases and initially heard oral argument on 

defendants’ applications for leave to appeal regarding: (1) whether the Court of 

Appeals remand for dismissal without prejudice was inconsistent with Boodt v 

Borgess Med Ctr, 481 Mich 558; 751 NW2d 44 (2008); and (2) whether plaintiff’s 

complaint was filed prematurely. 482 Mich 1014 (2008). During oral arguments, 

a question arose regarding the 2004 amendment of the tolling statute, MCL 

600.5856. Accordingly, we granted leave to hear full oral argument as follows: 

 (1) whether the plaintiff’s defective notice of intent as to 

defendants West Michigan Cardiovascular Surgeons and Spectrum 

Health tolled the period of limitations pursuant to MCL 600.5856(c), 

as amended by 2004 PA 87, effective April 22, 2004; and (2) 

whether defendant Shabahang’s defective response to the plaintiff’s 

notice of intent, MCL 600.2912b(7), was presumed valid such that 

the plaintiff was required to wait the full 182-day period before 

filing his medical malpractice action. [482 Mich 1105 (2008).] 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court reviews questions regarding summary disposition “de novo to 

determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden 

v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). We also review questions 

of statutory interpretation de novo. Miller v Mercy Mem Hosp, 466 Mich 196, 

201; 644 NW2d 730 (2002). 
6

III. TOLLING STATUTE 

A. Analysis 

 A claim for medical malpractice must be brought within two years from the 

time the alleged malpractice takes place.3

 Solowy v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 454 

Mich 214, 219; 561 NW2d 843 (1997). A claimant, however, can toll this 

limitations period by complying with MCL 600.5856.4

 Specifically, § 5856(c) 

allows tolling during the interlude to commencing a medical malpractice action 

required by § 2912b if the statute of limitations would otherwise expire during that 

period.5

 Absent tolling, however, an action commenced after two years is 

“barred.” MCL 600.5838a(2). Accordingly, for plaintiff’s claims to survive 

summary disposition, the statute of limitations must have been tolled, because 

plaintiff filed his complaint more than two years and five months from the date of 

the alleged malpractice. 

 3

 The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims provides that a 

person “shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to 

persons or property unless . . . the action is commenced within [2 years].” MCL 

600.5805(1), (6). 

4

 Tolling extends the time during which a claim can be brought by 

temporarily suspending the statute of limitations. 

5

 MCL 600.2912b(1) states: 

 Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall 

not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a 

health professional or health facility unless the person has given the 

health professional or health facility written notice under this section 

not less than 182 days before the action is commenced. 
7

 MCL 600.5856(c) provides: 

 The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled in any of the 

following circumstances: 

*** 

 (c) At the time notice is given in compliance with the 

applicable notice period under section 2912b, if during that period a 

claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose; but in 

this case, the statute is tolled not longer than the number of days 

equal to the number of days remaining in the applicable notice 

period after the date notice is given.[6] 

Previously this provision read: 

 The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled: 

*** 

 (d) If, during the applicable notice period under section 

2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or 

repose, for not longer than a number of days equal to the number of 

days in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given in 

compliance with section 2912b. [MCL 600.5856(d).][7]

In Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 64-66; 642 NW2d 663 (2002) 

(Roberts I), this Court held that in order to toll pursuant to the pre-amendment 

provision, plaintiff’s notice must comply with MCL 600.2912b(4).8

 The instant 

 6

 Generally, this is known as the notice-tolling provision. 

7

 2004 PA 87 amended MCL 600.5856. The amendment deleted previous 

subsection (c). 

8

 Subsection (4) states: 

 The notice given to a health professional or health facility 

under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the 

following: 
8

question is whether under the post-amendment provision, the notice must also 

comply with § 2912b(4). The majority holds that under the amended noticetolling provision a defective notice, i.e., one that does not satisfy § 2912b(4), will 

nonetheless toll the statute of limitations. I do not agree and believe instead that 

the notice-tolling provision still requires a notice that is compliant with § 2912b(4) 

in order to effectively toll. 

 The Court’s obligation in interpreting a statute is to “give effect to the 

Legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute.” Pohutski v City of 

Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). “[L]anguage does not 

stand alone, and thus it cannot be read in a vacuum. Instead, ‘it exists and must be 

read in context with the entire act . . . .’” G C Timmis & Co v Guardian Alarm Co, 

468 Mich 416, 421; 662 NW2d 710 (2003). “Statutes that address the same 

 

 (a) The factual basis for the claim. 

 (b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the 

claimant. 

 (c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable 

standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional 

or health facility. 

 (d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve 

compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care. 

 (e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the 

standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury 

claimed in the notice. 

 (f) The names of all health professionals and health facilities 

the claimant is notifying under this section in relation to the claim. 
9

subject or share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together 

as a whole” to fully reveal the Legislature’s intent. People v Harper, 479 Mich 

599, 621; 739 NW2d 523 (2007); see also Turnbull v Prentiss Lumber Co, 55 

Mich 387, 394; 21 NW 375 (1884). The notice-tolling provision and the notice 

statute, § 2912b, are in pari materia because the notice-tolling provision was 

enacted with § 2912b, see 1993 PA 78, and directly references § 2912b. 

Accordingly, the notice-tolling provision must be interpreted in light of the overall 

statutory scheme within which it was placed. 

 The notice-tolling provision tolls “[a]t the time notice is given in 

compliance with the applicable notice period under section 2912b.” The 

applicable notice period under § 2912b is 182 days from the filing of the notice 

during which a complaint may not be filed, MCL 600.2912b(1); Omelenchuk v 

City of Warren, 461 Mich 567, 573; 609 NW2d 177 (2000), and only begins once 

“the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under 

this section.” MCL 600.2912b(1). Notice is only considered “written notice 

under this section” if it complies with § 2912b(4), which states that “notice . . . 

under this section shall contain a statement” regarding substantive aspects of the 

alleged malpractice. See Boodt, 481 Mich at 562-563 (“[A] plaintiff cannot 

commence an action before he or she files a notice of intent that contains all the 

information required under § 2912b(4).”). For the notice to be given in 

compliance with the “applicable notice period,” that period necessarily must exist. 

Because giving notice as required by § 2912b(4) constitutes the only manner by 
10

which the applicable notice period is brought into existence, it seems logical to 

conclude that the Legislature intended the notice-tolling provision to be triggered 

only by the plaintiff filing such notice. 

 Furthermore, allowing the notice-tolling provision to be triggered by a 

defective notice makes little sense considering that the provision only applies “if 

during [the applicable notice period] a claim would be barred by the statute of 

limitations.” MCL 600.5856(c). One cannot fairly say that a claim would be 

barred “during” the notice period when the notice period has not begun due to the 

plaintiff’s failure to file a sufficient notice. Further, the tolling period is equal to 

the “number of days remaining in the applicable notice period after the date notice 

is given.” MCL 600.5856(c). Because a defective notice does not create an 

applicable notice period under § 2912b(1), the number of days remaining in that 

period cannot be determined. Thus, if a defective notice is allowed to toll, the 

notice-tolling provision would provide no guidance for determining the tolling 

period. The only manner by which the notice-tolling provision can be given 

meaningful effect is to interpret it as requiring the notice specifically contemplated 

in § 2912b(4), which creates the applicable notice period to which the tolling 

provision repeatedly refers. Accordingly, contrary to the majority, I believe that a 

defective notice cannot toll the statute of limitations under § 5856(c). 

 Here, plaintiff’s notice was defective because it did not contain any 

statement regarding the standard of care for claims alleging direct liability against 

West Michigan Cardiovascular and Spectrum Health. Plaintiff’s failure to include 
11

any statement regarding the standard of care for Sugiyama’s and Mansour’s 

alleged malpractice also makes the notice defective for vicarious liability claims 

against Spectrum Health based upon their malpractice. Because plaintiff’s notice 

was defective in this regard, the statute of limitations for those claims was not 

tolled by § 5856(c). Moreover, because the statute of limitations was not tolled, 

and because plaintiff’s complaint was filed more than two years after the alleged 

malpractice, these claims are time-barred and should be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. Response to the Majority 

 The majority’s interpretation is at odds with its own assertion that “[t]he 

statute must be interpreted in a manner that ensures that it works in harmony with 

the entire statutory scheme.” Ante at 10. By focusing only on the amended 

language in the notice-tolling provision’s first clause, the majority disregards the 

implications of the remaining portion of the provision. Ante at 12-14. Such an 

analysis is incomplete in light of the direct correlation that the remaining portion 

of the provision has with § 2912b and its notice period. Although the legislative 

amendment may only have altered parts of § 5856(c), the whole scheme 

nonetheless must be considered in order to determine the Legislature’s intent. The 

numerous references to the notice period in § 5856(c) necessarily mean that the 

period established by § 2912b(1) must have come into being in the first place for 

those references to be given any effect, and this can only take place when notice 

that complies with § 2912b(4) has been supplied. The majority, however, 

interprets the notice-tolling provision in a manner that bears no logical relationship 
12

with the statute that requires that notice be given in the first place. Thus, rather 

than adopting an interpretation that “works in harmony with the entire statutory 

scheme,” the majority instead adopts an interpretation that raises an insoluble 

tension between the tolling provision and the notice statute that will only be 

resolved by years of litigation, which perhaps is the whole point of the majority’s 

exercise. 

 This tension arises most clearly in the form of MCL 600.2301, which the 

majority employs to sustain its conclusion that a defective notice can toll the 

statute of limitations, because a court can thereby “disregard any error or defect” 

in the notice. MCL 600.2301 provides: 

 The court in which any action or proceeding is pending, has 

power to amend any process, pleading or proceeding in such action 

or proceeding, either in form or substance, for the furtherance of 

justice, on such terms as are just, at any time before judgment 

rendered therein. The court at every stage of the action or 

proceeding shall disregard any error or defect in the proceedings 

which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. [Emphasis 

added.] 

Without reference to any language from the tolling or notice statutes, the majority 

ascertains that a “good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements of § 

2912b” allows tolling under § 5856(c), ante at 22, because any defect “should be 

disregarded or cured by amendment.” Ante at 24. 

As this Court explained in Boodt, 481 Mich at 563 n 4, “§ 2301 only 

applies to pending actions.” As discussed above, § 2912b(1) provides that a 

person “shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a 
13

health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health 

professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 

days before the action is commenced.” Section 2912b(4) states that the “notice 

given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a 

statement of at least all of the following . . . .” Therefore, “a plaintiff cannot 

commence an action before he or she files a notice of intent that contains all the 

information required under § 2912b(4).” Boodt, 481 Mich at 562-563. An action 

is not “pending” if it cannot be “commenced,” and § 2912b(1) clearly prohibits a 

plaintiff from commencing an action before giving sufficient notice. I would not 

allow a plaintiff who is out of compliance with § 2912b, and thus not in 

compliance with the medical malpractice reforms enacted by our Legislature, to 

take advantage of the amendment provision. Accordingly, § 2301 is inapplicable, 

and a plaintiff cannot retroactively “amend” the notice of intent, and the courts 

cannot “disregard any error or defect” in the notice of intent. 

 Although I disagree in almost all respects with the majority’s analysis 

regarding the amended notice-tolling provision, I note in particular the following 

difficulties with this analysis: 

 (1) The majority states that it “cannot assume that language chosen by the 

Legislature is inadvertent” or that a “change means nothing at all.” Ante at 12-13. 

Why exactly is “interpret[ing] the amended statute in the same manner [as] . . . the 

pre-amended statute” something that this Court “cannot do”? Ante at 12. The 

beginning point for interpreting a statute must always be its language. Wickens v 
14

Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). Even after an 

amendment, the statute must continue to control, because it constitutes the law of 

this state. In light of the majority’s position that any amendment must exact some 

change in meaning, what choice does the Legislature have if it wishes to make 

minor amendments to clarify a certain portion of a statute consistent with the 

Court’s interpretation? The majority’s position is especially dubious when the 

Legislature, as it did here, makes minor changes to one part of a statute at the same 

time that it makes major changes to another part.9

 

 While in many and perhaps most instances it undoubtedly is 

the legislative intent, in enacting an amendment, to change existing 

law, there are, as undoubtedly, other instances, particularly if 

uncertainty exists as to the meaning of a statute, when amendments 

are adopted for the purpose of making plain what the legislative 

intent had been all along from the time of the statute’s original 

enactment. [Detroit Edison Co v Janosz, 350 Mich 606, 614; 87 

NW2d 126 (1957).] 

 9

 The major change made to MCL 600.5856 was the amendment to the 

provision that begins tolling when a complaint is filed. That provision now states 

that “[t]he statutes of limitation or repose are tolled . . . [a]t the time the complaint 

is filed, if a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant 

within the time set forth in the supreme court rules.” MCL 600.5856(a). 

Previously, the statute of limitations was tolled “[a]t the time the complaint is filed 

and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant.” The 

amendment also completely deleted previous subsection (c), which allowed tolling 

when the complaint was filed and “placed in the hands of an officer for immediate 

service.” This reflects the Legislature’s focus on returning complaint tolling to the 

way it previously operated, which Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 

594; 664 NW2d 705 (2003), found inconsistent with the pre-amendment version 

of § 5856(a). 
15

Indeed, it seems most reasonable that the Legislature’s minimal changes to the 

notice-tolling provision were intended only to clarify the precise moment at which 

the statute of limitations would be tolled. The pre-amendment version, by stating 

that the “statutes of limitations or repose are tolled . . . [i]f, during the applicable 

notice period under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of 

limitations or repose,” MCL 600.5856(d), clearly described the circumstances by 

which the statute of limitations could be tolled, but was less clear regarding at 

what point in time the tolling actually began. Conversely, the other tolling 

provisions did not suffer from this same infirmity by stating that the “statutes of 

limitations or repose are tolled . . . [a]t the time” a specific action occurred. See 

pre-amendment MCL 600.5856(a) through (c). With this amendment, the 

Legislature changed the notice-tolling provision so that it too now states that the 

tolling starts “[a]t the time” the specified action occurs. In light of the identity to 

the other tolling provisions created by the amendment, I believe the amendment is 

best interpreted as effecting the same meaning that the identical language carries. 

Adding the phrase “[a]t the time” clearly denotes that the tolling begins upon the 

occurrence of the specified act. Interpreting the amendment as such clarification 

does not render it “inadvertent,” ante at 12. Instead, this recognizes that the 

Legislature sought to enhance the clarity of the notice-tolling provision to the level 

of the other provisions and did so through a minor alteration. 

 (2) The majority creates a new standard for determining whether a notice 

complies with § 2912b(4) by stating: “A defendant who has enough medical 
16

expertise to opine in his own defense certainly has the ability to understand the 

nature of the claims being asserted against him or her even in the presence of 

defects in the NOI.” Ante at 22. This new subjective standard based on the 

defendant’s “medical expertise” is not only divorced from the statute, but it is also 

inconsistent with the current standard set forth in Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp 

(After Remand), 470 Mich 679, 701; 684 NW2d 711 (2004) (Roberts II): “[T]he 

claimant is required to . . . provide details that are responsive to the information 

sought by the statute and that are as particularized as is consistent with the early 

notice stage of the proceedings.” (Emphasis in original.) The majority thereby 

clumsily disposes of a standard that required a plaintiff to comply with all the 

statutory requirements in favor of one that requires the plaintiff to follow the law 

only to the extent that the court believes a defendant’s “medical expertise” can fill 

the gaps of the plaintiff’s noncompliance, all without explaining even 

perfunctorily why the new standard is consistent with the law actually enacted by 

the Legislature, as opposed to the statute the majority wishes had been adopted. 

 (3) The majority’s amendment process allows a plaintiff to commence his 

action 182 days after giving defective notice despite the fact that § 2912b(1) 

disallows a plaintiff from commencing suit unless he has given “written notice 

under this section.” In other words, the majority has rewritten § 2912b(1) to 

enable a plaintiff to commence his suit 182 days after giving defective notice if it 

manifests the plaintiff’s “good-faith attempt to comply with § 2912b(4).” Ante at 

22. Cf. Roberts I, 466 Mich at 66 (holding that a “plaintiff must fulfill the 
17

preconditions of § 2912b(4) in order to maintain a medical malpractice action”). 

By this revision, the majority rejects the Legislature’s intention that notice “shall 

contain [specific] statement[s]” and substitutes its own goal of allowing plaintiffs 

to commence their actions despite obvious omissions that completely frustrate the 

purpose of the legislative notice procedure.10 The majority never explains how the 

tolling statute amendment compels this rewriting of the notice statute, most likely 

because no valid explanation exists. The majority cannot cite anything in the 

amendment that altered the clear language in § 2912b(1), nor can it cite anything 

that indicates the Legislature intended that such language be ignored. 

 (4) The majority questions in dictum “whether Roberts I and Boodt were 

correctly decided” based on its interpretation of the amended notice-tolling 

provision, ante at 19 n 34, even after acknowledging that those cases “relied on 

language of a statute that is no longer in existence,” ante at 9. The majority’s 

disagreement with Boodt seems to be based largely on its misunderstanding of that 

decision. Boodt held that a plaintiff’s complaint does not toll the statute of 

 10 The majority provides no guidance regarding how lower courts should 

evaluate “good faith,” beyond the dubious guidance afforded by its conclusion in 

this case that plaintiff’s notice meets this threshold even though the majority 

agrees that plaintiff wholly omitted the statements required by § 2912b(4)(b)-(e) 

for direct liability claims against Spectrum Health and West Michigan 

Cardiovascular and those required by § 2912b(4)(b), (c), and (e) for vicarious 

liability claims against Spectrum Health. Ante at 22-24, citing 278 Mich App at 

711, 716-717. The only real guidance that can be gleaned from this conclusion is 

that the Legislature’s words are no longer much relevant to understanding the law 

of this state. 
18

limitations pursuant to § 5856(a) after defective notice has been given, because § 

2912b(1) disallows a plaintiff from commencing an action unless the plaintiff has 

given “written notice under this section.” Boodt, 481 Mich at 564. The majority, 

however, interprets Boodt as holding that “no tolling was afforded in the presence 

of a defect pursuant” to the notice-tolling provision, and thus “the plaintiff’s action 

was not commenced under § 2912b(1).” Ante at 14 n 26. Thus, notice-tolling was 

never an issue in Boodt, yet the majority inexplicably finds that its interpretation 

of the notice-tolling provision throws Boodt into question. As for Roberts I, the 

majority never explains any possible errors in that decision other than to say that it 

“opined,” rather than “held,” that “the focus of § 5856(d) was on compliance with 

§ 2912b in its entirety.” Ante at 12. The majority thus attempts to diminish the 

validity of Roberts I by characterizing this decision as simply an expression of one 

possible opinion among many, rather than actually analyzing the law in any 

coherent manner to demonstrate why Roberts I may be incorrect.11 Although the 

majority makes clear that it disagrees with the results reached in Roberts I and 

Boodt, it does not deign to explain why the law does not support those results. 

 11 The Court’s decision in Roberts I that the pre-amendment notice-tolling 

provision required notice compliant with § 2912b to toll was supported by all 

seven justices, including three currently in the majority who now question it. See 

Roberts I, 466 Mich at 67; Roberts I, 466 Mich at 72 (Kelly, J., dissenting) ( “[T]o 

begin the tolling of the MCL 600.5856(d) statute of limitations, a plaintiff must 

fully comply with the requirements of MCL 600.2912b.”). 
19

 (5) By finding that § 2912b “is silent regarding the consequences of filing 

a defective NOI [and] makes no reference whatsoever to a mandatory dismissal 

penalty in the event of a defect,” the majority raises an irrelevant issue concerning 

“whether a mandatory dismissal with prejudice under § 2912b was the intent of 

the Legislature.” Ante at 16. However, this Court has never held that a defective 

notice alone requires “mandatory dismissal with prejudice.” By phrasing its 

inquiry as it does, the majority obviously misapprehends the procedure by which 

plaintiff’s claims were dismissed. 

 First, the majority overlooks the interplay between the statute of limitations 

and the notice-tolling provision. The Legislature clearly created a two-year 

limitations period for medical malpractice actions, and then clearly stated that an 

action cannot be commenced after that period has expired. It also clearly created a 

tolling provision that allows the limitations period to be suspended if a claimant 

gives notice pursuant to § 2912b. If notice is not given, then tolling is not 

triggered. If tolling is not triggered and the statute of limitations expires, the latter 

operates in the same manner that it does in every other action: it bars claims from 

being commenced after its expiration. 

 Second, even if a defective notice does not toll the statute of limitations, 

this Court has never held that the defect requires “mandatory dismissal with 
20

prejudice.” Ante at 16 (emphasis added). 12 In fact, current caselaw supports the 

exact opposite proposition, namely that a plaintiff filing a defective notice can 

avoid dismissal with prejudice by simply correcting the notice so that it complies 

with § 2912b(4) before the statute of limitations has expired. In Mayberry v Gen 

Orthopedics, PC, 474 Mich 1, 3; 704 NW2d 69 (2005), this Court held that “a 

second notice of intent to sue, sent with fewer than 182 days remaining in the 

limitations period, can initiate tolling under § 5856(d) as long as the first notice of 

intent to sue did not initiate such tolling.” Thus, under these circumstances, 

nothing would bar a claimant from filing a second notice to take advantage of the 

notice-tolling provision. 

 Here, rather than not tolling because there were more than 182 days 

remaining in the limitations period, plaintiff’s notice, filed within the last 182 days 

of the limitations period, did not toll because it was defective. Although plaintiff 

only had two days in which to correct the defects, had he done so within that time, 

the statute of limitations would have been tolled and he could have timely 

commenced his action after the 182-day waiting period. Thus, any time a 

defective notice is filed, the plaintiff always has the opportunity to revise the 

 12 This Court has held that “dismissal is an appropriate remedy for 

noncompliance with the notice provisions.” Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp, 471 

Mich 745, 753; 691 NW2d 424 (2005). Whether the dismissal is with prejudice

depends on whether the plaintiff can “still comply with the applicable statute of 

limitations.” Id.
21

notice to comply with § 2912b(4), at least until the expiration of the statute of 

limitations, and the defect alone does not mandate dismissal with prejudice. 

 (6) Without regard to the fact that a provision for “mandatory dismissal 

with prejudice” is unnecessary in § 2912b due to the dismissal necessitated by the 

statute of limitations, the majority proceeds with its misguided, and fruitless, 

search for direction from the Legislature that a defective notice requires 

“mandatory dismissal with prejudice.” Unsurprisingly, the majority finds no such 

mandate, but rather concludes that the Legislature rejected a “mandatory 

dismissal” based on its interpretation of a provision of the initial notice legislation 

that the Legislature never adopted. Ante at 16-17. 

 Although “actions of the Legislature in considering various alternatives in 

language in statutory provisions before settling on the language actually enacted” 

may constitute a legitimate form of legislative history, In re Certified Question, 

468 Mich 109, 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003), the majority’s use of it here 

exemplifies well the shortcomings inherent in such approach. To reasonably 

discern legislative intent from rejected language, the rejected provision should be 

considered as a whole, rather than partially as the majority does by only looking at 

the first sentence of the provision. The full provision stated: 

 Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in an action 

alleging medical malpractice, the court shall dismiss a claim not 

included in the notice required under section 2912f. This subsection 

does not apply to a claim that results from previously unknown 

information gathered during discovery. 
22

As an initial matter, this seems entirely unrelated to the statute of limitations under 

which dismissal is granted. The Legislature’s rejection of an unrelated provision 

can hardly be used to alter the clear meaning of a statute. It seems far more 

reasonable to conclude that the Legislature rejected this provision in favor of § 

2912b(3), which provides for similar treatment of the same subject matter: 

undiscovered claims.13 Rather than considering this to be the Legislature’s 

rationale for rejecting the initial provision, the majority concludes that it “can 

draw no conclusion from the omission . . . other than it was not the intent of the 

Legislature to incorporate a mandatory dismissal penalty into § 2912b.” Ante at 

17-18. Most other observers of this same legislative history would without much 

difficulty be able to draw an “other conclusion,” and would almost certainly be far 

closer to reality than the majority. How can the majority draw an informed 

conclusion concerning legislative history from a provision never enacted without 

even considering a provision that has been enacted and actually substituted for the 

never-enacted provision? 

 (7) The majority concludes that “to hold that § 2912b in and of itself 

mandates dismissal with prejudice . . . would be inconsistent with” § 2912b’s 

“stated purpose of . . . promoting settlement.” Ante at 18. However, the majority 

 13 Subsection (3) provides a shortened notice period for a claim not in the 

initial notice only if the plaintiff “did not identify, and could not reasonably have 

identified a health professional or health facility to which notice must be sent” 

before filing the complaint against the other parties. 
23

does not explain how allowing a defective notice to substitute for the notice 

required by § 2912b(4) in any way “promot[es] settlement.” Ante at 18. The 

likelihood of settlement almost certainly increases with the amount of information 

that the parties have regarding the subject of settlement. How can the majority’s 

interpretation conceivably encourage settlement when it compels defendants to 

proceed on the basis of incomplete information? 

IV. WAITING PERIOD 

 The second major issue concerns how long a plaintiff must wait after giving 

notice before filing his complaint. The relevant statutory provisions state: 

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person 

shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a 

health professional or health facility unless the person has given the 

health professional or health facility written notice under this section 

not less than 182 days before the action is commenced. 

*** 

(7) Within 154 days after receipt of notice under this section, 

the health professional or health facility against whom the claim is 

made shall furnish to the claimant or his or her authorized 

representative a written response that contains a statement of each of 

the following: 

(a) The factual basis for the defense to the claim. 

(b) The standard of practice or care that the health 

professional or health facility claims to be applicable to the action 

and that the health professional or health facility complied with that 

standard. 

(c) The manner in which it is claimed by the health 

professional or health facility that there was compliance with the 

applicable standard of practice or care. 
24

(d) The manner in which the health professional or health 

facility contends that the alleged negligence of the health 

professional or health facility was not the proximate cause of the 

claimant’s alleged injury or alleged damage. 

(8) If the claimant does not receive the written response 

required under subsection (7) within the required 154-day time 

period, the claimant may commence an action alleging medical 

malpractice upon the expiration of the 154-day period. [MCL 

600.2912b.] 

After receiving plaintiff’s notice, Shabahang responded, but his response did not 

satisfy the requirements of § 2912b(7).14 Plaintiff then commenced his action 175 

days after giving notice. I agree with the majority that a plaintiff can make a 

tentative determination regarding the sufficiency of a defendant’s response 

pursuant to § 2912b(7), and I also agree with the Court of Appeals that plaintiff 

did not need to challenge the sufficiency of Shabahang’s response before filing his 

complaint pursuant to the shortened waiting period established by § 2912b(8). 

 A plaintiff can file his suit after 154 days if he “does not receive the written 

response required under subsection (7)” within 154 days after giving notice. MCL 

600.2912b(8). Importantly, the response a plaintiff must receive is that “required 

under subsection (7),” which clearly states that the defendant “shall furnish” a 

response “that contains” specific statements. Thus, similar to the requirements for 

a plaintiff’s notice, § 2912b(7) places the burden on the defendant to provide a 

written response that includes the requisite statements. See Roberts II, 470 Mich 

 14 Shabahang’s response clearly did not satisfy the substantive requirements 

of § 2912b(7), because it was completely unresponsive to those requirements. See 

ante at 27. 
25

at 686; Roberts I, 466 Mich at 66. If the defendant does not provide those specific 

statements, then the response cannot be said to be the one required by § 2912b(7). 

Plaintiff, therefore, may file his complaint after 154 days, because he did not 

receive the proper response. 

 However, to require a plaintiff to wait for a judicial determination regarding 

the sufficiency of defendant’s response would effectively nullify the requirements 

of § 2912b(7). That is, a defendant could give a response that failed to comply 

with § 2912b(7) and suffer no consequences, because the only possible statutory 

consequence, plaintiff’s early filing, would be unavailable until the court 

determined that the defendant’s response was defective, and by that time, the 28 

days between the 154-day period and the 182-day period would almost certainly 

have elapsed. Accordingly, plaintiff here properly filed his complaint against 

Shabahang based on his own determination that he never received the response 

required by § 2912b(7).15

 Rather than adopting this straightforward understanding of § 2912b(8), the 

majority feels the need to additionally read into the law an entirely concocted and 

gratuitous “good faith” standard in determining whether the defendant’s response 

is sufficient. That is, rather than assessing the defendant’s response, and 

comparing it to the requirements of the statute, a plaintiff must now consider 

 15 A plaintiff makes such determination at his own peril. If a court later 

determines that the response was not defective, then the plaintiff’s complaint is 

subject to dismissal because he did not wait the full 182 days. 
26

whether defendant’s response constituted a “good-faith attempt to comply with the 

content requirements of the statute.” Ante at 26. In the place of a clear rule of 

law, the majority interposes an obscure and vague standard by which a plaintiff, 

who probably desires nothing more than to know what is statutorily required of 

each party, must now assess the mindset of the defendant. The majority, of 

course, supplies no guidance for how to satisfy its new standard, which poses a 

particular conundrum for plaintiffs, because, if a court determines that a response 

was made in “good faith,” the majority holds that the trial court should allow 

defendant to amend his response. Ante at 26. This means that if the plaintiff 

relied on his own assessment that the response was defective, and filed before the 

182-day period had expired, defendant’s amendment could retrospectively make 

the complaint untimely. Doubtlessly, however, the majority will “correct” this 

problem in some later decision by a new word formula that is equally disregardful 

of the language of the statute. By contrast, I would simply hold that a plaintiff 

may avail himself of the 154-day filing option if the defendant’s response does not 

comply with the requirements of § 2912b(7), without regard to whether the 

defendant has or has not made a “good faith” effort to comply with that provision. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 In summary, my concerns with the majority opinion are: (1) it ignores the 

great bulk of the language of the notice-tolling provision in interpreting that 

provision; (2) it ignores the larger statutory scheme within which the notice-tolling 

provision is located; (3) it creates a new “rule” whereby legislative amendments 
27

must be interpreted to alter the meaning of the amended statute even if the 

statute’s clear language suggests otherwise; (4) it creates a new standard for 

determining a notice’s sufficiency that bears no relationship to the actual 

requirements set forth by the Legislature in § 2912b(4), in the process also giving 

no consideration to the standard set forth in Roberts II; (5) it gratuitously questions 

the validity of Roberts I and Boodt even though they interpreted a different version 

of the notice-tolling provision that has no bearing on the instant case; (6) it has 

interpreted an amendment of one statute to completely alter the meaning of 

another statute; (7) it allows proposed legislation that was never enacted to trump 

the meaning of legislation that was actually enacted; and (8) it reads words into a 

statute that are not there by concocting a “good faith” requirement in § 2912b(7). 

 I dissent and would hold that tolling can only be effected pursuant to § 

5856(c) by a plaintiff’s notice of intent that complies with the requirements of § 

2912b(4). Accordingly, dismissal should be with prejudice with regard to West 

Michigan Cardiovascular and Spectrum Health, because plaintiff’s notice did not 

toll the statute of limitations for those claims and his complaint was filed after the 

limitations period had expired. Further, I would hold that a plaintiff may 

commence an action 154 days after giving notice if the defendant’s response does 

not comply with the requirements of § 2912b(7), rather than introducing a new 
28

“good faith” requirement in assessing such response. Because Shabahang’s 

response did not comply with the requirements of § 2912b(7), plaintiff properly 

commenced his action 175 days after giving notice. 

Stephen J. Markman 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr.