Filed 4/3/14 Gonzaga v. Burlington Ins. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

JAYSON GONZAGA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent. B246019
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC457448)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Su perior Court of Los Angeles County, Kevin Brazile, Judge. Affirmed.

Grassini & Wrinkle and Roland Wr inkle for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Weston & McElvain, Aaron C. Agne ss and Edmond Sung for Defendant and Respondent.

___________________ ___________________2 INTRODUCTION This is an appeal from the judgment entered after the trial court granted the defendant insurance company’s motion for su mmary judgment on th e grounds its policy provided no coverage and no du ty to defend based on a clea r and conspicuous assault and assault and battery exclusion. Based on ou r review of the relevant policy provisions, along with the undisputed facts in the record, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Jayson Gonzaga filed a complaint agai nst The Burlington Insurance Company (among other defendants), alle ging causes of action for (1) tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful refusal to settle and wrongful failure to defend; (2) breach of insurance contract—fa ilure to pay indemnity and (3) breach of
insurance contract—failure to defend. Ac cording to the allegations of Gonzaga’s operative (first amended) complaint, he had previously filed a complaint (Los Angeles Sup. Ct., Case No. GC 040820) against Capita l Protection, Inc. (Capital, also known as Superior Protection Guest Relations, Inc.) for personal injuries he sustained on April 20, 2007. Capital, a California corporation, wa s an armed security se rvice—in the business of providing businesses with security and pa trol services. In the underlying action, Gonzaga alleged Capital had failed to provide fo r his safety and security so as to cause his injuries. Gonzaga alleged his claims were cove red with respect to both indemnity and defense under the Burlington general liab ility insurance policy Capital obtained from Burlington (a commercial general liab ility insurance policy number 160 BW07353 effective July 1, 2006 to July 1, 2007), with policy limits of $1 million. He attached a copy of the policy as Exhibit A to his compla int, in which he said Burlington described and classified Capital as a “Security and Patr ol Agenc[y],” describe d its work as “Armed Security Service” and underwro te, charged premiums (of mo re than $58,000 per year) and issued the policy on that basis. Gonz aga further alleged Capital properly submitted Gonzaga’s claim and tendered the defense of Gonzaga’s lawsuit to Burlington, but Burlington breached its obligations to its insured by wro ngfully and in bad faith failing to3 defend its insured or to effectuate a reas onable settlement; instead, Gonzaga alleged, Burlington denied coverage and defense, claiming the allegations of the underlying complaint “arose ‘out of assault or battery or out of any act or omission in connection with the prevention or suppression of an assau lt or battery’ (which wa s the insured’s very
business and which was described as the bus iness activities of the insured) under an exclusion in the policy, Form No. BG-G-042 0203 which a ppears on page 40 of the policy.” As such it was not called to the in sured’s attention; it was not clear, plain or conspicuous; it would not be expected by the ordinary and reasonable insured; it would violate the reasonable expectations of the in sured; and its application would defeat the very purpose of the insuran ce contract, would render the promised coverage illusory and would be legally and fact ually unconscionable. At arbitration of the underlying action, it was determined that Capital was liable to Gonzaga because it and its employees acted neg ligently and such neg ligence was a direct and proximate cause of Gonzaga’s injuries and damages; judgment was then entered against Capital and in favor of Gonzaga on February 24, 2011, in the amount of $4,986,621 plus interest at the rate of 10 percen t. (He attached a copy of the judgment to his complaint as Exhibit B.) Capital assigne d its claims against Bu rlington, including but not limited to all rights under th e Burlington policy, to Gonzag a. In addition, based on the judgment against Capital, Gonzaga alleged his entitlement as judgment creditor to the Burlington policy limits plus costs and intere st based upon his bodily injury allegedly covered under the policy Burli ngton issued to Capital. Burlington filed its answer and later moved for summary judgment on the grounds it had no duty to defend or indemnify Capi tal in connection with Gonzaga’s underlying
action. In its separate statement, Burlingt on submitted evidence in support of the following facts: Gonzaga alleged he was attendi ng a party at Dave & Buster’s in the City of Arcadia on April 20, 2007, when he “was shot by an assailant who had entered the defendants’ [Gonzaga named both Dave & Bust er’s and Capital as defendants] premises and business.” After the parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration, the4 arbitrator found Capital had negligently failed to preven t or deter the foreseeable shooting, resulting in a to tal award of $4,986,621. 1 In addition, Burlington noted, Capita l and Dave & Buster’s had a service agreement which specified that Capital’s officers were contracted to provide the following services (with Burlington adding emphasis as follows): uniformed officers stationed will conduct foot patrols of the ar ea and will be in direct communications with our dispatch facility or a supervisor on du ty at all times; imme diate intervention and
notification of proper authorities dur ing emergency situations; securing and locking of
the facilities’ doors and gates with frequent and regular monitoring of such areas while officers are on duty; constant patrols of all parking facilit ies, while maintaining high visibility with continual notation of irregularities and incidents; comprehensive incident reports as necessary, which will be turned in to management for review and proper notification; instant notification to the gene ral manager of all serious security issues, areas of concern, serious maintenance issues , and all potential issues of liability observed by security officers while on duty. (Bold emphasis added by Burlington.) The policy Burlington issu ed to Capital and identifie d in Gonzaga’s complaint contained a commercial general liability cove rage form, Form No. CG 00 01 10 01, which expressly provides:

“ SECTION I—COVERAGES
“COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY
“AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
“LIABILITY “1. Insuring Agreement

1 In exchange for a covena nt not to execute on the arbitrati on award, Capital assigned its rights against Burlington to Gonzag a. According to the partial settlement agreement, Capital assigned its rights against its own insurance broker to Dave & Buster’s under a separate settlement agr eement; Gonzaga was not assigned the rights to proceed against Capital’s insurance broker fo r negligent failure to properly obtain coverage on Capital’s behalf.5 “a . We will pay those sums that the in sured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘b odily injury’ or ‘propert y damage’ to which this insurance applies.
“. . .
“b. This insurance applies to ‘bodily injury’ and ‘pro perty damage’ only if: “(1) The ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property da mage’ is caused by an ‘occurrence’ that takes place in the ‘coverage’ territory’; and . . . [¶] “‘Occurrence’ is defined in the po licy as ‘an accident, in cluding continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the sa me general harmful conditions.’” (Bold emphasis in original.) In addition, the policy co ntains an endorsement en titled “Exclusion—Assault or Battery,” Form No. BG-G-042 0203 , which provides in part:
“THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES TH E POLICY. PLEASE READ IT
CAREFULLY.
“EXCLUSION – ASSAULT OR BATTERY
“*** “This insurance does not apply to: “a. Expected Or Intended In jury, Or Assault Or Battery “‘Bodily injury’ . . . “(1) Expected or intended from the standpoint of any insured; or “(2) Arising out of an assault or battery, or out of any act or omission in connection with the preventio n or suppression of an assault or battery.” (Bold emphasis in original.) In opposition, Gonzaga argued Burlington underwrote this risk on the express basis: “Description of Risk: Security Guards .” After underwriting this risk, Burlington determined it would charge a premium of a bout $60,000, commensur ately reflecting the
risk assumed. He said the policy’s original “Expected or Intended Injury” exclusion (Section 1.[A][a]) did not include the exclus ion Burlington asserts here, which was added as an endorsement, and is fo und nowhere in the body of the policy. Gonzaga further6 argued the asserted exclusion is buried among 30 endorsemen ts and exclusions (and they are listed), “buried on page 40 of a 58 page policy.” “One of the 30 endorsements and exclusions slapped onto the 58-page policy wa s ‘Exclusion—Security Service, Detectives and Patrol Agents’ including ‘t he maintenance and use of fi rearms’; another exclusion was for the “‘rendering or failure to render any professional service’”; still another was for “‘Exclusion—Designated Work . . . . Description of yo ur work: Armed Security Service’” and yet another was for “‘propert y of others . . . entrusted to you for safekeeping.’” After hearing argument (and commenting th at the assault and battery exclusion would “jump out” at anyone who simply looke d at the policy—“I don’t know how much clearer they could have made it”), the trial court granted Bu rlington’s summary judgment motion. The trial court found the policy’s a ssault and battery exclus ion was plain, clear and conspicuous and that it precluded coverage for claims arising out of the failure to prevent or suppress an assau lt or battery. Moreover, the tr ial court determined Gonzaga had failed to present any evidence that the a ssault or battery exclus ion rendered the policy illusory, noting Gonzaga failed to present any evidence the scope of Capital’s work was limited to preventing assault or battery; a nd he presented no evidence to show the premium for the policy was unreasonable, that Capital was unaware of the exclusion, that Capital did not get the exact policy it had requ ested and bargained for or that the policy
was unconscionable. 2

2 The trial court sustained Burlington’s objections to paragra phs 5 and 6 of the declaration of an expert regarding insuranc e brokers (Elliot Rothman, who said Capital’s insurance broker (Hull) had an obligation to disclose the assa ult or battery exclusion and Hull failed to do so) and one paragraph of th e declaration of Gonzaga’s counsel (Roland Wrinkle) purporting to authenticate a differe nt Burlington insurance policy discussed in one of the authorities cited by Burlington (and involving Burlington as a defendant). Gonzaga does not challenge thes e rulings in this appeal. Ac cordingly, issues relying on the evidence ruled inadmiss ible are waived. (See Yanowitz v. L’Oreal U.S.A., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1027.)
We note however, that Bur lington did not file objections to the remainder of the evidence submitted with plain tiff’s counsel’s declaration, which included Capital’s7 Gonzaga appeals from the judgment subsequently entered.

DISCUSSION
The Standard of Review. We review the trial court’s gran t of summary judgment de novo. ( Monticello Ins.
Co. v. Essex Ins. Co. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385.) The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law to be determined by the court. ( Waller v. Truck Ins.
Exch. Ins. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18.) “Absent a fact ual dispute as to the meaning of policy language,” which, as we will explain, we do not have in th is case, “the interpretation, construction and application of an insurance contract is strictly an issue of law.” ( Century Transit Systems, Inc. v. Amer ican Empire Surplus Lines Inc. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 121, 125, citation omitted.) Rules of Policy Interpretation. An insurance company has the right to lim it the coverage of a policy it issues and when it has done so, “the plain language of the [policy] must be respected.” ( Continental
Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 423, 432.) As our Supreme Court explained in Haynes v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1198 ( Haynes ), “‘“While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts to which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply.”’ ( Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1109, 1115 [90 Ca l. Rptr. 2d 647, 988 P.2d 568].) Accordingly, in interpreting an insurance policy, we seek to discern the mutual intention of the parties and, where possible, to infer th is intent from the terms of the policy. (Civ. Code, §§ 1636, 1639.; Palmer v. Truck In s. Exchange, supra , at p. 1115.) When interpreting a policy provision, we give its wo rds their ordinary and popular sense except where they are used by th e parties in a technical or other special sense. ( AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 822 [274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253].)

insurance application and do cuments relating to the policy’s renewal and insurance binder.8 “In the insurance context, ‘we begin with the fundamental princi ple that an insurer cannot escape its basic duty to insure by means of an exclusionary clause that is unclear. As we have declared time and again “any exception to the performance of the basic underlying obligation must be so stated as clearly to apprise the insured of its effect.”’ ( State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jacober (1973) 10 Cal.3d 193, 201 [110 Cal. Rptr. 1, 514 P.2d 953].) Coverage may be limited by a valid endorsement and, if a conflict exists between the main body of the policy and an endorsement, the endorsement prevails. ( Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co . (1997) 17 Cal.4t h 38, 50, fn. 4 [70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118, 948 P.2d 909 ].) But to be enforceable, any provision that takes away or limits coverage reasonably expected by an insured must be ‘conspicuous, plain and clear.’ ( Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862, 878 [27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377 P.2d 284] ( Steven ).) Thus, any such limitation must be placed and printed so that it
will attract the reader’s atten tion. Such a provision also must be stated precisely and understandably, in words that are part of the working vocabulary of the average layperson. ( National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stewart (1990) 223 Cal. App. 3d 452, 458 [272 Cal. Rptr. 625]; Ponder v. Blue Cross of Southern California (1983) 145 Cal. App. 3d 709, 719, 723 [193 Cal. Rptr. 632].)” ( Haynes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1204.)
The “words in an insurance policy are to be read in their plain and ordinary sense. [Citation.] Ambiguity cannot be based on a stra ined instead of reasonable interpretation of a policy’s terms.” ( McKee v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 772, 776.) “Policies of insurance, like other contract s, must be read as a whole, with each part being read in conjunction with other portions thereof.” ( Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (1998) 211 Cal.App.3d 1285, 1298.) “‘The “clear and explicit” meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their “ordinary and popular sense,” unless “used by th e parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage” ([Civ. Code], § 1644) controls judicial interpretation. ( Id ., § 1638.)’ ( AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 821-822 [274 Cal.Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253]; Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800,9 807 [180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 764].) This reliance on co mmon understanding of language is bedrock.’ “Equally important are the requirements of reasonableness and context. “First, ‘An insurance policy provision is ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions both of which are reasonable.’ ( Suarez v. Life Ins. Co. of North
America (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1396, 1402 [254 Cal.Rptr. 377], italics added.) ‘Courts will not adopt a strained or absurd interpreta tion in order to create an ambiguity where none exists.’ ( Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta, supra , 30 Cal.3d 800, 807.) “Second, ‘[L]anguage in a contract must be construed in the context of that instrument as a whole, and in the circumstan ces of that case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract.’ ( Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra , 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1265, original italics, quoting Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co . (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 916, fn. 7 [226 Ca l.Rptr. 558, 718 P.2d 920].) ‘There cannot be an ambiguity per se, i.e. an ambiguity unre lated to an application.’ ( California State Au to. Assn. InterIns. Bureau v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 855, 859, fn. 1 [223 Cal.Rptr. 246].)” ( Bay Cities Paving & Grading v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 867.) The burden of making coverage exceptio ns and limitations c onspicuous, plain and clear rests with the insurer. ( Haynes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1204, citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jacober, supra , at pp. 201–202; furthe r citation omitted.) The Assault or Battery Exclusion. Capital’s Burlington policy includes an endorsement entitle d “Exclusion—Assault or Battery,” Form No. BG-G-0 42 0203. The exclusion is e xpressly identified as “BG-G042 02 03 Exclusion-Assa ult/Battery” on the Listing of Fo rms and Endorsements as part of the policy at its inception. It was expressly indentified as “BG-G-042 02 03 Exclusion-Assault/Battery” on the quote as we ll as the binder issued before the policy
was obtained. The Assault or Battery Exclusion states:
“THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY.10 “PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.
“ EXCLUSION – ASSAULT OR BATTERY
“*** “This insurance does not apply to:
“ a. Expected Or Intended Inju ry, Or Assault Or Battery “‘Bodily injury’ . . . “(1) Expected or intended from the standpoint of any insured; or “(2) Arising out of assault or battery, or out of any act or omission in connection with the prevention or suppressi on of an assault or
batter y.” (Italics added.) According to Gonzaga, the “prevention or suppression of an assault or battery” exclusion is not “clear, plain and conspicuous” and is ther efore unenforceable under “the Haynes doctrine.” ( Haynes, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1198. We disagree. Gonzaga says the location, drafting, layo ut, type size, font and spacing of the exclusion are “designed to make the insured believe it is a standard assault or battery exclusion excluding assaults or batteries by a ny insured or employee of an insured and to hide the fact it also purports to exclude someth ing very different, i.e., ‘or out of any act or omission in connection with the prevention or suppression of an assault or battery’”— amounting to “an unfair, hindsight game of ‘Where’s Waldo?’” As the trial court observed, a review of the policy defeats Gonzaga’s argument. The Assault or Battery exclusion in th e Burlington policy before this court is nothing like the exclusion considered in Haynes , supra, 32 Cal.4th 1198—purportedly limiting permissive user coverage in a declar ations page by identifying an endorsement only as “S9064,” then obscu ring the limitation under the unusual subheading “Other Insurance” (which would sugg est more, not less coverage) and then incorporating multiple amendments to multiple policy forms such that a reader would not have any indication the endorsement would limit coverage —rather than setting ou t the exclusion in the manner accomplished here. ( Id. at pp. 1202, 1206.)11 Burlington notes (and Gonzaga presents no authority to the contrary): “Every California court, and every federal court, analyzing the Assault or Battery exclusion
under California law based on a factual scenar io similar to the one in the Underlying Action, has had no problem enforcing it.” (See e.g., Century Transit Systems, Inc. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 121 ( Century ); Zelda,
Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1252 ( Zelda ); see also Essex Ins. Co. v.
Yi (N.D. Cal. 1992) 795 F. Supp. 319 [applyi ng California law].)
In Century, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 121, the “policy expressly excluded coverage
for “. . . any claim . . . based on assault and battery . . . .’” ( Id. at p. 126, original italics.) Consequently, the court observed, “this case involves something more than a simple ‘intentional act’ exclusion. . . . This langua ge places the focus no t upon an insured’s conduct or intent, but rather u pon the type of even t in which a plaintiff has sustained an injury. [Cita tion.] [¶] We can find no ambiguity in this language. ” ( Ibid., italics added.)
The Century court affirmed a grant of summary judgment, stating: “[N]o California case has considered the application of the [Assault and Battery] exclusion, but given its lack of ambiguity and its plain clear meaning , courts in other states have had no trouble concluding that such an exclusion provides coverage of any claim based on assault and battery irrespec tive of the legal theory a sserted against the insured.

. . . Every court that has considered a similar or identical clause agrees. One court considering identical language stated that to interpret it ot herwise ‘would be to “torture” it to create ambiguities where such do not exist.’” ( Id. at p. 127, and p. 128, fn. 4 [noting
“based on” has the same eff ect as “arising out of”].) “We find this plethora of authority to be persuasive and we see no reason not to give a similar effect in California to this very clear exclusionary language. The assault and battery is clearly the basis for the action against [the insured cab company]; the fact
that the claim also includes separate negligent acts by [the insured] cannot avoid the exclusion. Those alleged acts of neg ligence were based on the assault and battery committed by [a cab driver employe d by the insured] on the plaintiffs. The exclusion therefore applies and [the insure d] cannot rely upon the allegations of12 negligence to create a poten tial for coverage.[]” ( Century, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 128, footnote omitted.) Furthermore, in Zelda, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 1252, Divisi on Four considered an exclusion virtually identical to the one presented in this case; that is, there was “no coverage for ‘“[b]odily injury ” or “property damage”: [¶] (1) expected or intended from the standpoint of any insured. [¶] (2 ) arising out of assault or battery, or out of any act or omission in connection with the prevention or suppressi on of an assault or battery .’” ( Id. at p. 1260, italics.) The Zelda court determined that “clause (2), by its plain language
, covers injury or damage aris ing when someone (not necessari ly an insured) commits an act of assault or battery, or is in the cour se of committing an assault or battery.” ( Id. at p. 1261, quoting Century, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 126, original italics [“[w]ith respect to similar clause” (comparing clauses in Zelda and Century ): “[W]e can only construe the exclusionary language one way: a suit based on assault and battery is excluded no matter who commits it. It is the happening of that event which comp els application of the exclusion”].) In this case, just as in Zelda
, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 1252, Ca pital was sued for its alleged negligence in failing to prevent or su ppress the battery on Gonzaga. “[B]y its plain language,” coverage for such claims is expressly excluded under the Burlington policy’s assault or battery exclusion. ( Zelda, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261; and see Century, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 126.) Indeed, Gonzaga argues for a convoluted c onstruction of the exclusion that simply
does not follow without “torturing” it to create ambiguity where none exists—by treating subparagraph (2) as a “sub-excl usion” rather than giving “t his plain language” its plain meaning. ( Zelda, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260; and Century, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 127 [“this very clear language”].) “T he ‘clear and explicit’ meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their ‘ordinary and popular sense,’ controls judicial interpretation unless ‘used by th e parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage.’ [Citations.]” ( Zelda, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259.) As there is no such evidence of a technical or sp ecial meaning given to the “plain language”13 used in this case, we conclude the “meaning a layperson would ascribe to the language of [Burlington’s] contract of in surance [with Capital] is clear and unambiguous, ” and therefore apply its plain meaning: there wa s no coverage under the Burlington policy for bodily injury “[a]rising out of assault or battery, or out of any act or omission in connection with the preven tion or suppression of an assault or battery.” ( Zelda, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261; Century, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 126.) Gonzaga says Burlington charged a small armed security guard service an annual premium of more than $60,000 and then deni ed coverage for the very reason the insured bought the policy—namely, claims “arising ou t of the prevention or suppression of an assault or battery.” Gonzaga’s arguments re ly on a finding that the policy language is ambiguous, notwithstanding case law to the contrary ( Century, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 121; Zelda, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 1252) and then spec ulation as to what Capital may have thought instead of what the policy actually says. “If the meaning a layperson would ascribe to the language of a contract of in surance is clear and unambiguous, a court will apply that meaning.” ( Montrose Chem. Corp. of Ca lif. v. Admiral Ins. Co. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 645, 666-667; Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mut. Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 867 [“This relianc e on common understanding of language is bedrock”].) Because we fi nd no ambiguity, we need not address Gonzaga’s remaining arguments (and Gonzaga has no ev idence to support them in any case). “It is not our role to speculate on the policyholder’s abstract expe ctations, but rather to consider reasonable expectations defined by the insu rer’s policy language .” ( Haynes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1210-1211, italics added.)

As Justice Croskey wrote in Century, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at page 130, the insurer (American) “had no duty to indemnify or defend [the insured, Century] because the claim asserted by the plaintiffs was base d on an assault and battery and a clear and unambiguous exclusion precluded coverage as a matter of law. The trial court therefore properly granted summary judgment.”14 DISPOSITION

The judgment and order granting Burlin gton’s motion for su mmary judgment are affirmed. Burlington is to recover its costs on appeal.

WOODS, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J. ZELON, J.