[J-59 B-2013]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

IN RE: PHILADELPHIA TRAFFIC 

COURT JUDGE CHRISTINE SOLOMON

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No. 62 EM 2013

Petition of the Judicial Conduct Board to 

Stop, Suspend or Stay Proceedings on the 

Rule to Show Cause or, in the Alternative, 

for Permission to Appear, Participate and 

Be Heard at Any Proceedings before the 

Appointed Master

ARGUED: September 10, 2013

DISSENTING STATEMENT

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE CASTILLE FILED: December 19, 2014

The Court today discharges its rule to show cause entered upon the Honorable

Christine Solomon, Judge of the Philadelphia Traffic Court, and vacates this Court’s 

related per curiam orders of May 21 and July 12, 2013. Today’s order does not 

specifically address the petition of the Judicial Conduct Board (the “JCB” or “Board”), 

which is technically the matter at issue on appeal; however, the Court’s disposition of 

the underlying orders issued upon Judge Solomon essentially renders the JCB petition 

moot. For the reasons that follow, I cannot join the per curiam disposition. In my view, 

it is vital that the Court retains responsibility to the Pennsylvania Constitution to 

vindicate its authority over the Unified Judicial System. 

By way of background, Judge Christine Solomon was elected to the Philadelphia 

Traffic Court bench in November 2011, and began hearing cases in March 2012.1

 Her

 1 Judge Solomon’s term ends on December 31, 2017. PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(a)). 

The General Assembly has amended Title 42 to provide that the composition of the 

(continued...)
[J-59 B-2013] - 2

election coincided with the turmoil generated by the federal investigation and indictment 

of nine Philadelphia Traffic Court judges on felony charges predicated upon allegations 

that judges of that court and others engaged in ex parte communications and gave 

preferential treatment to certain ticketholders, “most commonly by ‘fixing’ tickets for 

those with whom they were politically and socially connected.” See U.S. v. Sullivan, 

2013 WL 3305217 (E.D. Pa. 2013). Having taken the bench after the federal crimes 

charged occurred, Judge Solomon, of course, was not among the indicted jurists. 

However, the federal investigation prompted the First Judicial District (the “FJD”)

-- acting upon authority delegated by this Court -- to commence review of Traffic Court 

operations. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701, 1721, & 102 (Supreme Court may delegate 

administrative authority to any court or other officer of Unified Judicial System). The 

immediate goal of the review was to secure and preserve evidence, to facilitate full 

cooperation with the federal investigation, and to reestablish the probity of Traffic Court 

operations. The administrative review was to be supervised by the newly appointed 

Administrative Judge of the Traffic Court, the Honorable Gary S. Glazer, Judge of the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. This Court, via correspondence this 

author sent as liaison Justice to the FJD, informed the President Judge of Traffic Court, 

then-Judge Thomasine Tynes, of the expanded mandate of the FJD and that the full 

cooperation of all Traffic Court personnel was expected. 

As an aspect of the review, Judge Glazer and the FJD’s consultant, Chadwick 

Associates, conducted interviews with Traffic Court employees and judges, including 

 

(...continued)

Philadelphia Traffic Court is limited to “two judges: (1) who are serving on the court on 

the effective date of this subsection; and (2) whose terms expire on December 31, 

2017.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 1321. Section 1321 thus specifically addresses the tenures of the 

last two elected Traffic Court Judges: Judge Solomon and Judge Michael J. Sullivan. 
[J-59 B-2013] - 3

Judge Solomon. The subsequent report prepared by Chadwick Associates (“FJD 

Report”) alleged that Judge Solomon had refused to cooperate with the administrative 

review, by failing to respond or by failing to respond forthrightly to questions. 

On April 18, 2013, premised upon the conclusions of the FJD Report, the Court 

entered upon Judge Solomon a Rule to Show Cause why Judge Solomon “should not 

be subject to a suspension from her judicial duties without pay for a period of ninety (90) 

days based upon her refusal to cooperate with the [Supreme] Court-ordered 

administrative review of the Traffic Court.” The rule was returnable on April 29, 2013. 

On April 24, 2013, Judge Solomon answered the Rule to Show Cause, challenging the 

conclusions of the FJD Report. On May 21, 2013, upon review of Judge Solomon’s 

answer, this Court appointed the Honorable William H. Platt, Senior Judge of the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania, to serve as the Court’s Master, and directed Judge 

Platt to “gather necessary factual information and consider pertinent legal questions,” 

and to “forward his Report and Recommendations, detailing proposed findings of fact 

and conclusions of law, as soon as practicable.” The Administrative Office of 

Pennsylvania Courts was instructed to attend any hearings and participate as 

necessary. See In re Solomon, 66 A.3d 764 (Pa. 2013) (per curiam). Judge Solomon 

asked the JCB to participate. 

In June 2013, Judge Solomon and the JCB (“petitioners”) filed an application

which, in relevant part, challenged the authority and jurisdiction of this Court to enter the 

rule to show cause upon Judge Solomon. According to petitioners, such authority was 

reposed exclusively in the Court of Judicial Discipline (the “CJD”). The JCB also 

represented that it was pursuing an investigation of Judge Solomon in light of the FJD 

Report, even though such an investigation by the Board presumably is confidential. The 

Court permitted the JCB to participate and, in October 2014, the Court resolved the 
[J-59 B-2013] - 4

broad constitutional claims raised by petitioners in the companion case implicating 

Judge Mark A. Bruno. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635 (Pa. 2014). 

In Bruno, the Court held that the supervisory and administrative authority 

articulated in Section 10(a) of Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution is a legacy 

aspect of the Court’s King’s Bench authority, which persists as a legal predicate for 

gathering information via a special master and, upon review of the master’s 

recommendations, for any additional actions by our Court, including the suspension of a 

sitting jurist. Employing the King’s Bench authority is discretionary and, in cases of 

judicial misconduct for which Article V, Section 18 provides a disciplinary mechanism, 

the exercise of discretion is appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances. The 

separate Bruno matter focused largely upon the residual role of the Court in a case in 

which a sitting jurist is charged with felonious offenses (in Bruno, relating to conduct on 

the bench), a circumstance that raises the prospect of an interim suspension pending 

resolution of the criminal charges. Interim suspensions are addressed expressly by 

Article V, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and squarely implicate the 

competing authority of the CJD. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d). By contrast, the central 

issue in dispute involving Judge Solomon is whether an inquiry into a jurist’s compliance 

with administrative directives from this Court (here, relating to cooperation with the 

FJD’s efforts to reform the Philadelphia Traffic Court) is a task best undertaken by this 

Court’s Special Master, or whether the Court should defer to the judicial disciplinary 

mechanism of the JCB and the CJD. 

This case obviously raises concerns for this Court that are distinct from those 

in Bruno. Solomon originated purely from the exercise by this Court of its constitutional 

administrative and supervisory responsibilities. Judge Solomon’s alleged failure to 

respond, or to respond forthrightly, to court-appointed interviewers whose task was 
[J-59 B-2013] - 5

recommending reform measures in light of evidence of pervasive corruption in the very 

court upon which she sat -- if proven -- would be an apparent “unjustified defiance” of 

this Court’s express delegated authority to conduct a review of Traffic Court 

operations. See In re Assignment of Avellino, 690 A.2d 1138, 1143-44 (Pa. 1997) 

(“Avellino I”) (footnote omitted). A factual inquiry by this Court, via a special master, into

Judge Solomon’s conduct is a logical extension of the administrative review already 

conducted by the FJD. Whether disciplinary action by the JCB or the CJD was also 

appropriate is a separate matter. See Bruno, 101 A.3d at 686-87. 

The JCB’s petition revealed that it was investigating Judge Solomon; but for that 

representation, forwarded to the Court only because of the Rule to Show Cause we 

issued upon the jurist, we would have no knowledge whether the Board was 

investigating Judge Solomon for her alleged refusal to cooperate. It appears that, while 

this matter was pending, and unbeknownst to the Court, the JCB and Judge Solomon 

have settled the judicial disciplinary issue arising under Article V, Section 18 of the 

Constitution. Thus, on December 5, 2014, the Board and Judge Solomon filed a postsubmission communication informing the Court that, Judge Solomon having waived the 

confidentiality that would otherwise apply to JCB proceedings, the Board’s investigation 

has “concluded” and has “resulted in a dismissal of the complaint filed in relation to 

Judge Solomon, with a Letter of Caution,” which is “a private warning of judicial 

misconduct.” The post-submission communication does not detail the precise nature of 

the complaint the Board actually pursued and what its findings were; from the judicial 

disciplinary point of view, the matter will remain confidential, as mandated by Article V, 

Section 18(a)(8) (“All proceedings of the board shall be confidential except when the 

subject of the investigation waives confidentiality.”). 
[J-59 B-2013] - 6

In light of the conclusion of the JCB investigation, the Court today vacates our 

order appointing Judge Platt and discharges the rule to show cause issued upon Judge 

Solomon, thereby ending the case as an administrative matter. In my view, the notion

that the Court must, or even should, defer to the investigation and outcome of the 

judicial disciplinary apparatus in a case involving whether a member of the minor 

judiciary has defied this Court’s administrative directive is misguided. We do not know, 

for example, if the JCB found as fact that Judge Solomon did not defy our authority; or, 

if the Board instead found that she did defy the Court but, in the Board’s estimation, 

such defiance was excusable or de minimus. Or, it could be that, given the JCB’s 

limited resources, resolution by agreement seemed to be the best resolution. Indeed, 

we do not even know the standard by which the Board measures defiance, assuming 

Judge Solomon’s alleged defiance was the focus of the Board’s endeavor. I think the 

Court, and the public, have a right to know precisely what happened in this instance, 

and the confidential process and outcome resolving the judicial disciplinary matter here 

is insufficient. I cast no aspersions on the Board‘s action in this matter; it has a different 

constitutional charge and responsibility. But, I do believe the situation here 

demonstrates the unforeseen consequences arising from the amendment to Article V, 

Section 18(a)(8) of the Constitution.2

 

 2 This author is not the first to recognize the difficulties inherent in the task of the JCB, 

as presently constituted. In its recommendations respecting judicial discipline, the 

Interbranch Commission on Juvenile Justice stated, in relevant part:

2. Long term recommendations:

With regard to the long term recommendations, the commission has come 

to two inescapable conclusions: (1) the Judicial Conduct Board lacks 

sufficient oversight to assure that it is fulfilling its constitutional duties and 

obligations; and (2) the existing confidentiality provisions relating to the 

(continued...)
[J-59 B-2013] - 7

 

(...continued)

work of the Judicial Conduct Board prohibit any meaningful oversight and 

accountability.

In order to effectuate the needed reforms to the Judicial Conduct Board, 

the commission recommends the creation of a group, perhaps similar to 

the composition of the Beck Commission, to conduct a constitutional 

review and study to determine what changes are necessary to assure 

oversight and accountability of the Judicial Conduct Board. In particular, 

the commission emphasizes the following areas for review:

a. The appointment process for board members and the 

general board composition;

b. The powers and duties of the board;

c. Determination if the general rules governing the conduct 

of its members are adequate to discharge the members' 

constitutional mandate and if they are being adequately 

implemented;

d. The creation of an appellate mechanism to the Court of 

Judicial Discipline for review of the Judicial Conduct 

Board's decision to dismiss a complaint; 

e. A careful review and revision of Article V, Section 

18(a)(8) as it relates to confidentiality and accountability 

of the Judicial Conduct Board in fulfilling its constitutional 

obligations;

f. The creation of an outside administrator and record 

keeper. Such an administrator would be bound by the 

confidentiality standards mandated for the board and 

would, therefore, have access to details about complaints 

and their handling. The administrator would then be in a 

position to audit the board's specific performance. When 

warranted, the administrator could promptly question the 

failure to address complaints, or why investigations were 

allowed to languish.

(continued...)
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Furthermore, the Court has confronted similar situations in the past and has 

acted to vindicate the authority of the Court and to assure the proper functioning of the

judicial system. See, e.g., In re Assignment of McFalls, 795 A.2d 367, 373 (Pa. 2002)

(common pleas judge failed to comply with judicial assignment; Court imposed thirtyday suspension without pay as “proper response” to jurist’s defiance and, additionally, 

referred matter to JCB); In re Avellino, 690 A.2d 1144, 1145-46 (Pa. 1997) (“Avellino II”)

(judicial officer refused to comply with assignment to preside over criminal trials in 

“felony-waiver program” of court of common pleas; three-month suspension without pay 

appropriate remedial sanction). This is not a typical case of alleged judicial misconduct. 

To the extent Bruno applies at all -- except to reaffirm our authority -- the circumstances 

of Judge Solomon’s alleged resistance to the FJD’s reform efforts, and by extension her

supposed defiance of the legitimate authority delegated by this Court, if proven, are 

certainly “extraordinary” and require, in my opinion, further action to vindicate our 

authority.

Given the nature of the JCB resolution, any information gathered by the Board

will remain confidential and the Court has no opportunity to make a reasoned decision 

whether its administrative authority has been vindicated. If our historical and 

constitutional powers of supervision are to be effective, when affronts to our authority 

occur, such as that alleged here of Judge Solomon, it is essential, at a minimum, to 

develop a factual record of the matter which would be available to this Court. In this 

vein, I reiterate the observation of the Justices of the Court in 1862 on its King’s Bench

 

(...continued)

Interbranch Commission on Juvenile Justice, Report, at 45 (May 2010), available online 

at www.pacourts.us/Links/Public/InterbranchCommissionJuvenileJustice.htm (last 

visited December 16, 2014).
[J-59 B-2013] - 9

power, which is equally applicable in this context: because the Court’s authority “is a 

trust for the people of Pennsylvania, judges have no right, from motives of ease and 

convenience, to surrender, weaken, or obscure, by judicial refinements, one single one 

of the powers granted.” Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 403, 411 (Pa. 1862). 

In light of these considerations, my preference remains to continue the 

proceedings before Judge Platt as outlined in our April 18, 2013, Order. This resolution 

has the advantage of allowing the Court access to information necessary to determine 

whether any action, including imposition of our own administrative sanction, is 

appropriate. See Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 338 (Pa. 2000) (review of 

master’s findings and recommendations is de novo where Court exercised and did not 

relinquish plenary jurisdiction; although findings are not binding upon this Court, they 

are afforded due consideration).

I respectfully dissent.