UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

COOK, TELLITOCCI, and HAIGHT 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Sergeant CHAD R. CAMPBELL 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20120850 

Headquarters, 3rd Infantry Division and Fort Stewart (convened) 

Headquarters, Fort Stewart (action) 

Tiernan P. Dolan, Military Judge (arraignment) 

Alexander L. Taylor, Military Judge (trial) 

Lieutenant Colonel Francisco A. Vila, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Imogene M. Jamison, JA; Major Richard E. 

Gorini, JA; Captain Matthew R. Laird (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Lieutenant Colonel James L. Varley, JA; 

Major Catherine Brantley, JA; Captain Daniel M. Goldberg, JA (on brief). 

24 July 2014 

--------------------------------- 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

--------------------------------- 

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

COOK, Senior Judge: 

 A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of conspiracy to commit larceny, one 

specification of larceny, and one specification of wrongful appropriation, in 

violation of Articles 81 and 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 

881, 921 (2006) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The military judge sentenced appellant to a 

bad-conduct discharge, confinement for five months, forfeiture of $1,774 pay per 

month for five months, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority 

approved the bad-conduct discharge, 117 days of confinement, forfeiture of $994 

pay per month for four months, and reduction to the grade of E-1.1

 

 

1 Because appellant was reduced to the grade of E-1, the maximum allowable 

forfeiture was $994 pay per month for 12 months. The convening authority’s action 

cured the military judge’s error of adjudging forfeitures which exceeded the 

maximum authorized amount.
CAMPBELL—ARMY 20120850 

2

 This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

raises one assignment of error, which merits discussion and relief. 

BACKGROUND 

In his lone assignment of error, appellant alleges: 

THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW AND 

FACT TO QUESTION APPELLANT’S PLEA OF 

GUILTY ON CHARGE I (CONSPIRACY) BECAUSE 

THE MILITARY JUDGE DID NOT ELICIT FACTS TO 

SUPPORT THE OVERT ACT OF STEALING. 

 In general, the conspiracy specification alleged appellant and Specialist GA, 

at or near Fort Stewart, Georgia, on or about 22 February 2012, conspired to steal 

copper wire, of a value more than $500, the property of Edwards Electric Service, 

and, in order to effect the object of their conspiracy, they stole copper wire. The 

larceny specification alleged, generally, that appellant, at or near Fort Stewart, on or 

about 24 February 2012, stole copper wire, of a value more than $500, the property 

of Edwards Electric Service. 

 The military judge began appellant’s guilty plea inquiry by attempting to list 

the elements for the conspiracy charge. Although successfully covering the two 

elements associated with a conspiracy and informing the appellant that the 

government was required to prove “every element of the offense of larceny,” the 

military judge failed to list the elements of the offense that the appellant was 

charged with conspiring to commit: the larceny of copper wire. 

 After discussing the concepts of agreement, overt act, and effective 

abandonment with appellant, the following colloquy occurred: 

 MJ: Now I want you to describe all of the elements of the 

 offense of conspiracy as you understand them. 

 ACC: I believe the first element, Your Honor, is that you 

 enter into an agreement with another person to commit a 

 crime. 

 MJ: Right. And while that agreement was in place, what 

 happened? 

 ACC: And then you and the other person carry out and 

 execute the plan. 
CAMPBELL—ARMY 20120850 

3

 MJ: Or you did something to carry it out? 

 ACC: Yes, Your Honor. 

 MJ: An overt act? 

 ACC: Yes, Your Honor. 

 MJ: That’s what I was talking about earlier. And in this case 

 I believe there was an overt act. Was there, and we’re going 

 to [sic] into this the elements of that, a larceny that took place? 

 ACC: Yes, there was larceny [sic]. 

 MJ: Was that the object of the conspiracy? 

 ACC: Yes, Your Honor. 

 MJ: Copper wire? 

 ACC: Stealing copper wire, yes, Your Honor. 

 MJ: All right. So, describe in your own words what you agreed 

 to do and what you did. 

 ACC: We had seen the copper wiring inside of a construction 

 site. We decided or we planned on going to steal it. And we 

 planned it out, and then we executed that. 

 MJ: All right. Let’s go over now the maximum punishment 

 inquiry. 

 

 Later in the providence inquiry, when reviewing the larceny of the copper 

wire offense, the military judge listed and defined the relevant elements for larceny 

and engaged in a colloquy with appellant that covered each element. However, there 

was no discussion as to whether this larceny was the same larceny that constituted 

the overt act of the conspiracy charge. A stipulation of fact was not used in 

appellant’s case. 
CAMPBELL—ARMY 20120850 

4

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

 A military judge’s acceptance of a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Eberle, 44 M.J. 374, 375 (C.A.A.F. 1996); United States 

v. Rogers, 59 M.J. 584, 585 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2003); United States v. 

Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008). “The test for an abuse of discretion is 

whether the record shows a substantial basis in law or fact for questioning the plea.” 

United States v. Schell, 72 M.J. 339, 345 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (citing Inabinette, 66 M.J. 

at 322). 

In order for a “plea of guilty to be knowing and voluntary, the record of trial 

must reflect that the elements of each offense charged have been explained to the 

accused by the military judge.” Id. at 345 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Further, the record must demonstrate that the accused “understood how the law 

related to the facts” of each offense. Id. at 345-46. If the military judge fails to 

explain each element to the appellant, “he commits reversible error, unless ‘it is 

clear from the entire record that the accused knew the elements, admitted them 

freely, and pleaded guilty because he was guilty.’” United States v. Redlinski, 58 

M.J. 117, 119. (C.A.A.F. 2003) (citation omitted). 

 In the instant case, the military judge failed to list the elements of larceny 

when he reviewed with appellant the offense of conspiracy to commit larceny. By 

itself, this omission may not have amounted to harmful error because the military 

judge did list and explain the elements of larceny when he covered the separate 

larceny specification. Id. See United States v. Luby, 14 M.J. 619 (A.F.C.M.R. 

1982)2 

 However, in addition to sufficiently covering the elements of charged 

offenses, the military judge must also establish an adequate factual predicate. “The 

military judge shall not accept a plea of guilty without making such inquiry of the 

accused as shall satisfy the military judge that there is a factual basis for the plea.” 

Rule for Courts-Martial 910(d). In order to establish an adequate factual predicate 

for a guilty plea, the military judge must elicit “factual circumstances as revealed by 

the accused himself [that] objectively support that plea[.]” United States v. 

Davenport, 9 M.J. 364, 367 (C.M.A. 1980). It is not enough to elicit legal 

conclusions. The military judge must elicit facts to support the plea of guilty. 

United States v. Outhier, 45 M.J. 326, 331 (C.A.A.F. 1996). The record of trial must 

 

2

 In Luby, the Air Force Court held the military judge did not commit error during a 

guilty plea inquiry when he failed to cover the elements of the substantive offense 

that was the object of the conspiracy when he immediately covered these elements in 

regards to the same substantive offense separately charged. However, appellant’s 

record does not reflect a “lengthy, accurate, painstaking inquiry” that was present 

and found to be persuasive in Luby. 
CAMPBELL—ARMY 20120850 

5

reflect not only that the elements of each offense charged have been explained to the 

accused, but also “make clear the basis for a determination by the military trial 

judge . . . whether the acts or the omissions of the accused constitute the offense or 

offenses to which he is pleading guilty.” United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535, 

541, 40 C.M.R. 247, 253 (1969). 

 Appellant’s words establish no more than he and some other person “had seen 

the copper wiring inside of a construction site. We decided or we planned on going 

to steal it. And we planned it out, and then we executed that.” 

 We find this inquiry does not establish an adequate factual predicate and note 

the following non-exhaustive list of deficiencies: failure to establish who was 

appellant’s co-actor and co-conspirator; failure to establish when the agreement or 

overt act took place; failure to establish to whom the copper wire belonged; failure 

to establish the value of the copper wire (the specification alleged the property was 

of a value in excess of $500); and failure to establish the taking was with the intent 

to permanently deprive another person of the use of this property. 

 The lack of specificity in appellant’s colloquy is troubling for another reason. 

At sentencing, appellant’s alleged co-conspirator, Specialist (SPC) GA, testified that 

before he entered into his conspiracy with appellant to steal copper wire, appellant 

told SPC GA that appellant and another soldier had recently stolen copper wire from 

an on-post construction site – the same construction site SPC GA and appellant 

would soon victimize. Thus, the record has evidence of two distinct conspiracies to 

steal copper wire involving appellant. However, there is no way to determine which 

conspiracy appellant was discussing during his providence inquiry.3

 

 Additionally vexing, as noted above, is that although the military judge later 

discussed the elements of larceny with appellant, that discussion did not establish 

whether that larceny was the overt act effecting the charged conspiracy. In other 

words, we cannot affirm appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit larceny of 

copper wire just because appellant later entered a provident plea of guilty to larceny 

of copper wire. The plea colloquy did not establish a legal or factual nexus between 

the two offenses. 

 

3

 Furthermore, if we were to affirm a generic specification that at some unknown 

location, on some unknown date, appellant conspired with some unknown person to 

steal copper wire of some value, the property of someone else, and in order to effect 

the object of the conspiracy, did steal copper wire, we have doubts that appellant 

could use the record of trial to protect himself from a subsequent prosecution, given 

the two conspiracies mentioned in the record. Cf. United States v. Dear, 40 M.J. 

196, 197 (C.M.A. 1994) (an appellant “may turn to the entire record of trial in 

raising double-jeopardy protection.”) (citing United States v. Williams, 21 M.J. 330, 

332 (C.M.A. 1986)). 
CAMPBELL—ARMY 20120850 

6

 As such, we find a substantial basis in law or fact for questioning this plea 

and the military judge abused his discretion in accepting it. We will take 

appropriate action in our decretal paragraph. 

 

CONCLUSION 

On consideration of the entire record, the findings of guilty of Charge I and 

its Specification are set aside. The remaining findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. 

We are able to reassess the sentence on the basis of the error noted, and do so after 

conducting a thorough analysis of the totality of circumstances presented by 

appellant’s case and in accordance with the principles articulated in United States v. 

Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013) and United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 

305 (C.M.A. 1986). 

In evaluating the Winckelmann factors, we first find no dramatic change in the 

penalty landscape or appellant’s punitive exposure which might cause us pause in 

reassessing appellant’s sentence. Second, appellant pleaded guilty in a judge-alone 

court-martial. Third, we find the nature of the remaining offenses still captures the

gravamen of appellant’s misconduct. Finally, based on our experience, we are 

familiar with the remaining offenses so that we may reliably determine what 

sentence would have been imposed at trial. 

Reassessing the sentence based on the error noted, the remaining findings of 

guilty, and the entire record, we AFFIRM the sentence as approved by the convening 

authority. We find this reassessed sentence is not only purged of any error but is 

also appropriate. All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellant has been 

deprived by virtue of that portion of the findings set aside by our decision, are 

ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58b(c) and 75(a). 

Judges TELLITOCCI and HAIGHT concur. 

 

 FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: