Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1165 | December 16, 2020 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Patrick Magrath

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lydia Golten

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kari A. Spray,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

December 16, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-1165

Appeal from the Jackson Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Richard Poynter, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

36C01-1807-F6-309

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1165 | December 16, 2020 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary

[1] Kari A. Spray appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation. She 

contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation 

because the State presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that she 

violated her probation. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In July 2018, the State charged Spray with two counts of level 6 felony 

performing sexual conduct in the presence of a minor. On June 11, 2019, 

pursuant to a plea agreement, she pled guilty to an amended count of level 6 

felony neglect of a dependent in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. 

The trial court imposed a fully suspended one-year sentence which, after credit 

for time served, resulted in a sentence of 361 days of supervised probation.

[3] A few days later, on June 14, 2019, Jackson County law enforcement officers 

responded to a call from a home on North Cedars Road. The home was 

occupied by Spray’s ex-husband Shane and his new girlfriend Amber Schrader. 

Schrader owned the home and lived there with Shane. Shane called police 

stating that Spray had come to the door of the home looking for their two

children. Spray was also in Schrader’s driveway without permission and 

looked through the windows of the the car parked in the driveway. When 

officers arrived, they located Spray and spoke with her in the roadway outside 

the home. Spray admitted that she had been on Schrader’s property, but she 

continued to argue with officers and refused to leave the area. She wanted the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1165 | December 16, 2020 Page 3 of 7

officers to investigate Shane, and to look in the car in the driveway where she 

claimed she had seen open containers of alcohol. Spray is well known by 

Jackson County law enforcement and had been previously warned, after prior 

entries onto Schrader’s property without permission, that Schrader did not want 

her on the property, and that she would be charged criminally if she entered the 

property again.

[4] That same day, Spray made seven calls to the Jackson County 911 line. In the 

first call, Spray asked if someone could be sent to the North Cedars Road 

address to check on her children, whom she believed were there. The operator 

agreed to send authorities to that address for a welfare check. Spray proceeded 

to make six additional 911 calls within less than one hour. Due to the repeated 

calls, an officer was sent to Spray’s house to speak with her, but she refused to 

open the door. In her third, fourth, and fifth calls, Spray sat silently on the open 

line and said nothing to the 911 operator. In her sixth call, Spray again asked 

about her children, and the operator told her repeatedly that the children had

been checked on and that they were fine. Spray called a seventh time with the 

exact same inquiry.

[5] Spray was subsequently charged with class A misdemeanor criminal trespass 

and class A misdemeanor unlawful use of 911 service. Thereafter, on June 28, 

2019, the State filed a petition to revoke Spray’s probation based upon her 

commission of two new criminal offenses. Following a revocation hearing, the 

trial court found that Spray violated the terms of her probation as alleged by the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1165 | December 16, 2020 Page 4 of 7

State. The trial court ordered Spray to serve 180 days of her previously 

suspended sentence in the appropriate penal facility. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which

a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 

2007). We review probation violation determinations for an abuse of 

discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). An abuse of 

discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the 

law. Id.

[7] Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a 

factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation occurred. 

Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). Second, the court must 

determine if the violation warrants revocation of probation. Id. “A revocation 

hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and the alleged violation only 

needs to be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Smith v. State, 727 

N.E.2d 763, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we use the same 

standard as in any other sufficiency question. When the 

appellant challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis for 

revocation, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the 

credibility of the witnesses. If substantial evidence of probative 

value supports the trial court’s decision that the appellant has 

committed a violation of a condition of his probation, then 

revocation of probation was proper.
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Id. (citations omitted). In short, “[i]f there is substantial evidence of probative 

value to support the trial court’s decision that a defendant has violated any 

terms of probation, the reviewing court will affirm its decision to revoke 

probation.” Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 639-40.

[8] Spray challenges the State’s proof, and the trial court’s finding, that she violated 

her probation by committing the new criminal offenses of criminal trespass and 

unlawful use of 911 service. When the State alleges that the defendant violated 

probation by committing a new criminal offense, the State is required to 

prove—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the defendant committed the 

offense. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 617.

[9] Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-2 provides that a person who, not having a 

contractual interest in the property, “knowingly or intentionally enters the real 

property of another person after having been denied entry by the other person 

or that person’s agent” commits class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. Here, 

Jackson County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Jesse Hutchinson testified that he 

responded to the June 2019 report that Spray had entered Schrader’s property 

and knocked on the door of Schrader’s home. Although Spray was no longer 

on the property when officers arrived, she admitted to Deputy Hutchison that 

she had entered the property and that she had taken a picture while in the 

driveway. Deputy Hutchison stated that Spray had entered the property 

without permission on prior occasions and that Jackson County law 

enforcement officers had specifically warned Spray that Schrader did not want 

her on the property, and that she would be charged criminally if she entered the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1165 | December 16, 2020 Page 6 of 7

property again. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s 

conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence that Spray committed class A 

misdemeanor criminal trespass.

[10] Although proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a revocation of 

probation, Beeler v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. 

denied, we further find that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence that Spray

committed a second probation violation in committing class A misdemeanor

unlawful use of 911 services. Indiana Code Section 36-8-16.7-46 provides that a

person who knowingly or intentionally places a 911 call “for a purpose other 

than obtaining public safety assistance or emergency services” or “to avoid 

communications service charges or fees” commits a class A misdemeanor. The 

record here demonstrates that Spray placed seven 911 calls on the same day in 

the span of one hour. Although she requested assistance during her first call, 

during her second call she only inquired about the officer that was sent to her 

home. During her third, fourth, and fifth calls, Spray simply sat on the open 

line and said nothing. During her sixth and seventh calls, Spray continued to 

question the operator about matters that had already been discussed and 

resolved. Based upon the foregoing, the trial court could have reasonably 

concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of Spray’s

repeated 911 calls was made for a purpose other than obtaining public safety 

assistance or emergency services. Indeed, the multiple calls in which she simply 

sat on the open line and said nothing support such a conclusion regarding an
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1165 | December 16, 2020 Page 7 of 7

alternate purpose. Spray’s contrary assertion on appeal regarding her purpose is

merely an invitation for this Court to reweigh the evidence and reassess 

credibility, and we will not.

[11] In sum, sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Spray violated her probation by committing 

two new criminal offenses. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in revoking Spray’s probation.

[12] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.