alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### KELLAN v. ESHLEMAN.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June Term 1953.

Dismissed without opinion.
EXHIBIT21

SUBSIDIARIES OF THEREGISTRANT

|                               |  |                             |  |  |  |  |
|-------------------------------|--|-----------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Nameof Subsidiary             |  | Jurisdiction ofOrganization |
| Primus(Bermuda), Ltd.         |  | Bermuda                     |
| Primus GroupHoldings, LLC     |  | Delaware                    |
| Primus FinancialProducts, LLC |  | Delaware                    |
| Primus AssetManagement, Inc.  |  | Delaware                    |
| Primus Re,Ltd.                |  | Bermuda                     |
| PRS Trading Strategies,LLC    |  | Delaware                    |
| Primus Guaranty (UK),Ltd.     |  | England                     |
|                               |

----
**Exhibit32.2**

 

Certification of CFO under Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

I certify that this periodic report containing theissuer’s financial statements fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) andthat information contained In this periodic report fairly presents in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theissuer.

 

 
|   | By:    | /s/ John F Coger                  |   |
|--------|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|
|   |   | John F Coger                      |
|   |   | Executive Vice President, CFO/COO |
|   |   | October 4, 2005                   |

 

----
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 164 (Wednesday, August 25, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 52314]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-21109]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Docket No. DoD-2009-OS-0170]


Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department of Defense has submitted to OMB for clearance, the 
following proposal for collection of information under the provisions 
of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35).


DATES: Consideration will be given to all comments received by 
September 24, 2010.
    Title and OMB Number: Department of Defense National Survey of 
Employers; OMB Number 0704-TBD.
    Type of Request: New.
    Number of Respondents: 24,000.
    Responses per Respondent: 1.
    Annual Responses: 24,000.
    Average Burden per Response: 25 minutes.
    Annual Burden Hours: 10,000 hours.
    Needs and Uses: The Department of Defense National Survey of 
Employers is designed to determine ways of supporting employers when 
Guard and Reserve employees are absent due to military duties, 
determine general attitudes toward Guard and Reserve employees and 
their contributions to employers, and examine knowledge of and 
compliance with Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 
Act.
    Affected Public: Business or other for-profit; not-for-profit 
institutions; Federal Government; State, local or Tribal government.
    Frequency: One-time.
    Respondent's Obligation: Voluntary.
    OMB Desk Officer: Ms. Jasmeet Seehra.
    Written comments and recommendations on the proposed information 
collection should be sent to Ms. Seehra at the Office of Management and 
Budget, Desk Officer for DoD, Room 10236, New Executive Office 
Building, Washington, DC 20503.
    You may also submit comments, identified by docket number and 
title, by the following method:
    <bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency 
name, docket number and title for this Federal Register document. The 
general policy for comments and other submissions from members of the 
public is to make these submissions available for public viewing on the 
Internet at http://www.regulations.gov as they are received without 
change, including any personal identifiers or contact information.
    DOD Clearance Officer: Ms. Patricia Toppings.
    Written requests for copies of the information collection proposal 
should be sent to Ms. Toppings at WHS/ESD/Information Management 
Division, 1777 North Kent Street, RPN, Suite 11000, Arlington, VA 
22209-2133.

    Dated: July 6, 2010.
Patricia L. Toppings,
OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2010-21109 Filed 8-24-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
#### Russell LEHRMAN, Appellant, v. James WITTICH, d/b/a Minnesota Daily, Appellee.

No. 15990.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Nov. 2, 1972.

*164No brief filed for appellant.

William A. Petersen, Jr., Houston, for appellee; Lapin, Totz & Mayer, Houston, of counsel.

COLEMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment rendered in a suit on a sworn account. The judgment allowed full recovery plus the sum of $150.00 as an attorney’s fee.

Appellant filed his transcript in this court on June 2, 1972. On June 8, 1972, ap-pellee filed a remittitur of the $150.00 allowed as an attorney’s fee. On July 20, 1972, appellant filed a document accepting appellee’s remittitur and asking this court to dismiss the appeal subject to the remittitur. On August 24, 1972, appellee filed a motion to amend the remittitur whereby $100.00 would be allowed as an attorney’s fee on authority of Superior Stationers Corporation v. Berol Corporation, 483 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston, 1st, 1972). Appellant objects to the amendment of the remittitur. On September 14, 1972, the case was set for oral argument on October 26, 1972.

Rule 414, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that appellant file his brief within thirty days after the filing of the transcript in this court. The brief was overdue when appellant accepted the re-mittitur and requested that the appeal be dismissed. However appellant was not precluded from filing his brief by reason of a reliance on the remittitur since this court has the power to permit the brief to be filed late. Hoke v. Poser, 384 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.1964).

The case had not been set down for hearing on the date the motion to amend the remittitur was filed. Appellant has filed no motion for an extension of time within which to file a brief on the merits of his appeal, and has filed no such brief.

There is no rule concerning the withdrawal or amendment of releases filed in the Court of Civil Appeals as authorized by Rule 439, T.R.C.P. We consider that the allowance of such action is a matter of discretion with the Court. The record does not compel a finding that appellant failed to file his briefs by reason of a reliance on the proffered remittitur.

The court will permit the amendment of the remittitur. The judgment of *165the trial court is revised by reducing the award of attorney’s fee to the sum of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars. As modified the judgment is affirmed. The costs of court on appeal are adjudged against appellant.

Modified and affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C., SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Hickory Tech Corporation on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John W. Finke, Chief Executive Officer of HickoryTech, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of HickoryTech.











/s/ John W. Finke


John W. Finke


President and Chief Executive Officer


October 26, 2010
1 STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) vs. ) No. SD34113 ) RYAN K. GUSKE, ) Filed: November 22, 2016 ) Defendant-Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PHELPS COUNTY Honorable William E. Hickle, Circuit Judge

AFFIRMED Ryan K. Guske (“Defendant”) was charged and convicted of the class D felony of driving while revoked. In his sole point on a ppeal, Defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s statement that the driving

record of Defendant had been “redacted.” Defendant claims that the statement of the prosecutor planted the idea in jurors’ minds that Defendant had committed previous crimes, thus, unfairly and irretrievably prejudic ing the jury. We find no error and affirm the judgment. Prior to trial, the trial court agreed that numerous past convictions contained in the driving record (Exhibit 1) should be redacted so the jury would not see the convictions;2 however, the jury was allowed to see various revocations appearing on two pages of the driving record. (The third and fourth pages were omitted from the five-page document.)

The trial court indicated that a “white out” s hould be used instead of a black marker to redact the offenses. As Exhibit 1 was being admitted into evidence, the prosecutor stated: “With that, the affidavit of the Department ofRevenue from the records custodian is selfauthenticating and I believe we have sufficien tly redacted the necessary information.” Defendant requested a mistrial because of that statement a bout the redaction. The State argued that it was obvious the driving record had been redacted because it skipped from page 2 to page 5. The court offered to instru ct the jury to disregard the statement but Defendant declined any further mention of the redaction. That the document was

redacted was not further mentioned. We start with the well-known proposition that a mistrial is a drastic remedy to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstan ces in which the prejudice to a defendant

cannot be otherwise removed. State v. Wright , 383 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo.App. W.D. 2012). We review the trial court’s refusal to gran t a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Johnson , 901 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Mo. banc 1995). We cannot see any prejudice to Defendant. It is mere supposition that the ju ry would ascribe any other crimes to the redacted information. Clearly, Defendant had done something that caused his license to be revoked. That is a logical and relevant conclusion fo r the jury to draw. The explanation that the State gave to the court in offering an exhibit was vague, did not mention any crimes and only one word—redacte d-- is complained about by Defendant. We do not find any prejudice to Defendant a nd no abuse of discretion by the court in refusing to grant a mistrial. The point is denied. The judgment is affirmed.3 Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, J. - Opinion Author Gary W. Lynch, P.J. - Concurs William W. Francis, Jr., J. - Concurs
| (1) | The Report fully complies with      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934,and |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The information contained in the      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition      and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods      indicated. |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:    August 14,      2009 | /s/      Shi Huashan                                                           |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                   | Shi      HuashanChief      Executive Officer(Principal      Executive Officer) |

----
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1732 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 298
110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1732

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 301 Boardwalk Drive in Fort Collins, Colorado, as the ``Dr. Karl E. 
                     Carson Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 28, 2007

Mr. Allard (for himself and Mr. Salazar) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

                             August 1, 2007

              Reported by Mr. Lieberman, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 301 Boardwalk Drive in Fort Collins, Colorado, as the ``Dr. Karl E. 
                     Carson Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DR. KARL E. CARSON POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 301 Boardwalk Drive in Fort Collins, Colorado, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Dr. Karl E. Carson Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Dr. Karl 
E. Carson Post Office Building''.
                                                       Calendar No. 298

110th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1732

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 301 Boardwalk Drive in Fort Collins, Colorado, as the ``Dr. Karl E. 
                     Carson Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             August 1, 2007

                       Reported without amendment
```
#### CLARK v. SMITH.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January Term 1954.

Dismissed without opinion
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________ No. 95-40812 Summary Calendar

_____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus RAUL MONTES, Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

(C-92-CR-172-1)

_________________________________________________________________ September 25, 1996 Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Raul Montes, #61361-079, appeals the dismissal of his motion
to vacate , set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Montes’ contention that it was improper to refer to the § 2255 motion to the magistrate judge for findings of fact and a recommendation is without merit. His assertion that the district
court’s summary denial of his moti on violated the notice- 2 -

requirements of F ED . R. C IV . P. 56 is also without mer it, because Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provide the applica ble procedure for summarily dismissing his § 2255 motion. Montes’ assertion that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel prior to his guilty plea and during sentencing is without merit. S ee Kimmelman v. Morrison , 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). And, the district court did not err by failing to conduct

an evidentiary hearing, because Montes’ motion and the record show conclusively that he is not entitled to relief. S ee United States
v. Drummond , 910 F.2d 284, 285 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1104 (1991). Accordingly, Montes’ motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED, and the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           12-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                06-30-1997
<CASH>                                       4,774,801
<SECURITIES>                                 4,078,311
<RECEIVABLES>                                  596,490<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               129,660
<PP&E>                                      46,341,951
<DEPRECIATION>                             <18,348,165>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              37,573,048
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,128,436
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    36,444,612<F2>
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                37,573,048
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,211,197<F3>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,667,482<F4>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   543,715<F5>
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0<F5>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F5>
<FN>
<F1>Includes all receivables in "other assets" on the balance sheet.
<F2>Represents deficit of the General Partners of <$177,899> and total equity
of the Limited Partners of $36,622,511.
<F3>Includes all revenues of the Partnership.
<F4>Includes all expenses of the Partnership.
<F5>net income allocated $10,875 to the General Partners and $532,840 to the
Limited Partners.  Average net income is $.13 per unit.  4,000,100 units
outstanding.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
[No. 34845.

*EnBanc.*

March 5, 1959.]

#### Warren N. Winslow, *Respondent,*v. E. J. Mell *et al., Appellants.**1*

*O’Leary, Meyer & O’Leary,*for appellants.

*Foster & Foster, B. Franklin Heuston,*and *Wright & Wright,*for respondent.

1

 Reported in 336 P. (2d) 132.

Per Curiam.

This action for damages resulting from a breach of a logging contract was previously reviewed by this court. See *Winslow v. Mell,*48 Wn. (2d) 581, 295 P. (2d) 319 (1956). This court limited the retrial solely to a determination of the amount of Winslow’s damage resulting from his loss of profit occasioned by the breach. The jury determined the amount of Winslow’s damage to be $14,940. Mell has appealed from the judgment based upon the verdict.

Appellant Mell’s sole contention on this appeal is that, upon the retrial, the court erred in refusing to permit him to prove certain offsets.

In the original trial (in which present counsel for appellant did not participate), the offsets here claimed (and others) were considered by the court and the jury. On the first appeal of this cause, these offsets were likewise considered by this court. When sending the cause back for retrial upon the limited issue, this court determined, from the record before it, that appellant Mell had been fully compensated for all offsets claimed at the time Mell breached *697the contract, because of logs which Winslow had actually delivered and placed in the pond, logs which he had felled and bucked and left on the premises, work crew quarters he had constructed and booming and logging facilities he had built and left installed on Mell’s timber property. The retrial was, therefore, limited in its scope as indicated in the decision.

The court did not err in its interpretation of the scope of the retrial and properly denied appellant’s offered proof.

Likewise, we find no merit in respondent’s cross-appeal. The retrial was to determine not only the number of board feet in the area (not exceeding six million), but also the amount of respondent’s loss of profit resulting from Mell’s breach of the contract, which denied Winslow the right to log the timber at the agreed price of eighteen dollars a thousand.

The judgment is affirmed. Since respondent does not prevail on his cross-appeal, neither party will recover costs.

Foster, J., did not participate.
Exhibit 23.1


Stan J.H. Lee, CPA
(a member firm of DMHD Hamilton Clark & Co.)
2182 Lemoine Avenue                                      Tel: 760-612-1269
Suite 200                                                Fax: 815-846-7550
Fort Lee, NJ 07024                              e-mail: stanL@dmhdxcpa.com






To the Board of Directors
and Management of
Ridgefield Industries Corporation
Edison, NJ


               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT



I hereby consent to the use of my report dated March 24, 2003 relating to
the independent auditor's reports and audited interim financial statements of
Ridgefield Industries Corporation as of December 31, 2002 and for the period
beginning March 8, 2002 (Inception) to December 31, 2002 as appears in such
Form 10-K in the Company's filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.


/s/ Stan J.H. Lee, CPA/s/
-------------------------
Stan J.H. Lee, CPA
Fort Lee, New Jersey
March 24, 2003
#### CITY OF NORTH MIAMI v. LOFTIN.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June Term 1953.

Dismissed without opinion.