IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STEFANI MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE BOARD, et al., Respondents/Appellees.

__________________________________

CITY OF PHOENIX, Real Party in Interest/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0469 

FILED 6-23-2022

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. LC2020-000308-001

The Honorable Timothy J. Thomason, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Steven J. Serbalik, Esq., Scottsdale

By Steven J. Serbalik

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Gammage & Burnham, PLC, Phoenix

By Richard K. Mahrle

Counsel for Respondents/Appellees City of Phoenix Civil Service Board

Ryan Rapp Underwood & Pacheco, PLC, Phoenix

By Polly S. Rapp

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee City of Phoenix
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Vice Chief Judge David B. Gass 

joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Retired City of Phoenix Police Sergeant Stefani McMichaelGombar appeals from the superior court’s order declining special action 

jurisdiction over her complaint against the City of Phoenix (“City”), the 

City of Phoenix Civil Service Board (“Board” or “Civil Service Board”), and 

the individual members of the Board, for failing to allow her to present 

evidence that a sanction against her violated her First Amendment rights.

¶2 We hold, as a matter of first impression, that the unique 

language of the Phoenix City Charter requires the Civil Service Board to 

consider McMichael-Gombar’s argument and evidence that a sanction 

against her violated her First Amendment rights as a citizen. We therefore 

vacate the superior court’s order and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 The City suspended McMichael-Gombar for twenty-four

hours for a post she made on her private Facebook page that allegedly 

violated the Phoenix Police Department’s Social Media Policy. The 

substance of her post is not in the record. She appealed the suspension to 

an appointed hearing officer through the City’s personnel system. See 

Phoenix Interim Personnel Rule (“IPR”) 22(d). McMichael-Gombar did not 

dispute making the post but argued the Social Media Policy was 

“overbroad and unconstitutional” and the sanction “excessive” given that 

her post was private. See id. at (e)(3)(B). The City moved in limine to 

preclude her from presenting evidence on the constitutionality of the 

Social Media Policy or “how it impacted her ability to participate in her

private affairs and express her First Amendment rights” at the hearing. The 

hearing officer granted the City’s motion and subsequently upheld her 

suspension.
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

3

¶4 McMichael-Gombar appealed the hearing officer’s rulings to 

the Civil Service Board. See id. at (i). She asserted that the Social Media 

Policy was “overbroad and unconstitutional - both on its face and as

applied.” The Board’s attorney advised the Board that, consistent with the 

Board’s legal position since 1979, its role did not include considering 

constitutional issues, noting that “[w]e have volunteers from the 

community on the Civil Service Board. They are not constitutional 

scholars.” The Board upheld the hearing officer’s grant of the motion in 

limine and McMichael-Gombar’s sanction without considering 

McMichael-Gombar’s constitutional arguments.

¶5 McMichael-Gombar sought discretionary special action 

review in the superior court. The court declined to take jurisdiction,

reasoning in favor of the Board’s position: “[t]he Board had the obligation 

to ensure that the City proved that the charges against petitioner were true 

and that the level of discipline was appropriate. Petitioner was free to 

present evidence that was relevant to these matters. The Board did what it 

was required to do.”

¶6 McMichael-Gombar timely appealed the superior court’s 

final order. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–2101(A)(1).

See also Bridgeman v. Certa, 251 Ariz. 471, 473, ¶¶ 2-3 (App. 2021) (discussing 

A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1)).

DISCUSSION

¶7 McMichael-Gombar argues that the Board erred when it

prohibited her from raising her constitutional arguments to the Board. We 

agree. The Board relied on an incorrect reading of the Phoenix City Charter 

in concluding that it could not consider McMichael-Gombar’s 

constitutional arguments.

I. Standard of Review

¶8 This action comes as an appeal from a denial of jurisdiction 

over a special action. “We conduct a bifurcated review of an appeal taken 

from a non-statutory special action initiated in the superior court.” Files v. 

Bernal, 200 Ariz. 64, 65, ¶ 2 (App. 2001) (citing Bazzanella v. Tucson City Ct., 

195 Ariz. 372 (App. 1999)). If the superior court declined jurisdiction, we 

ordinarily limit our review to whether the superior court abused its 

discretion, and if so, remand for the court to take jurisdiction. Bilagody v. 

Thorneycroft, 125 Ariz. 88, 92 (App. 1979) (citing Genda v. Super. Ct., 103 Ariz. 

240 (1968)). “But, when the superior court’s ruling hinge[s] on pure issues 
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

4

of law, we review its legal conclusions de novo.” Ariz. Libertarian Party, Inc. 

v. Bd. of Supr’s of Cochise Cnty., 205 Ariz. 345, 346, ¶ 2 (App. 2003) (cleaned 

up). 

¶9 The superior court based its ruling declining jurisdiction on a 

finding that the Board had not abused its discretion, assessing the merits of 

the special action claim. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 3(c). Because this is a

question of law, we must address the merits de novo. Ariz. Libertarian Party, 

205 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 2 (quoting Norgord v. State ex rel. Berning, 201 Ariz. 228, 

230, ¶ 4 (App. 2001)).

II. The City Charter requires the Civil Service Board to 

consider employees’ constitutional arguments when

reviewing disciplinary actions.

¶10 The critical issue is whether the Board’s action was “illegal in

that it was arbitrary, capricious orinvolved an abuse ofdiscretion.” Woerth v.

City of Flagstaff, 167Ariz.412, 417(App. 1990) (quoting City of Tucson v. Mills, 

114 Ariz. 107, 111 (App. 1976)). A review of acitypersonnel board decision

is limited. Woerth, 167 Ariz. at 417. The court’s role is not to “consider the

propriety of the [Board’s] findings nor substitute its judgment forthat ofthe

[Board].” Id. (quoting Mills, 114 Ariz. at 111). An error of law, however,

constitutes an abuse of discretion. Hubert v. Carmony, 251 Ariz. 531, 533,

¶ 7 (App. 2021) (citing State v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 228, ¶ 9 (2015)); see 

Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. v. Maricopa Cnty. Emp. Merit Sys. Comm’n, 211 

Ariz. 219, 224, ¶¶ 22-24 (2005) (reversing merit commission decision based 

on an incorrect application of the law). We review questions of law de 

novo, including the interpretation of a city charter. Piccioli v. City of Phoenix, 

249 Ariz. 113, 118, ¶ 15 (2020) (citing Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Leija, 244 Ariz. 

493, 495, ¶ 10 (2018)).

a. The City Charter and Personnel System

¶11 A city charter is “effectively, a local constitution.” City of 

Tucson v. State, 229 Ariz. 172, 174, ¶ 10 (2012) (citing Ariz. Const. art. 13, 

§ 2). When interpreting a city charter, we give words their ordinary 

meaning, Piccioli, 249 Ariz. at 118, ¶ 15 (citing Wade v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys., 

241 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 14 (2017)), unless the context suggests otherwise.

Piccioli, 249 Ariz. at 118, ¶ 15 (citing Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509, 

¶ 7 (2017)). In interpreting a specific city charter provision, we also examine 

associated charter provisions. Piccioli, 249 Ariz. at 118, ¶ 15 (citing 

Stambaugh, 242 Ariz. at 509, ¶ 7).
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

5

¶12 A merit board “is bound to act in accordance with” the City 

Charter provision which created it, “and the rules and regulations which 

[the board] has established under” that authority. See Stant v. City of 

Maricopa Emp. Merit Bd., 234 Ariz. 196, 200, ¶ 13 (App. 2014) (quoting City 

of Phoenix v. Sittenfeld, 53 Ariz. 240, 245 (1939)). “As a City Charter 

institution, the [Phoenix] Civil Service Board’s authority and powers are 

pre-eminent over any board, commission or institution created by City 

ordinance when touching upon the same subject matter.” City of Phoenix v. 

Phoenix Emp. Rels. Bd., 207 Ariz. 337, 341, ¶ 12 (App. 2004) (citing Paddock v. 

Brisbois, 35 Ariz. 214 (1929)).

¶13 Here, the superior court correctly looked to the City of 

Phoenix Charter and the Board’s duties in its analysis. See generally 

Phoenix, Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXV, “Personnel System,” §§ 1 (Purpose and 

policy), 2 ([Composition of the] Civil Service Board), 3 (Powers and duties 

of the Board).

¶14 Chapter XXV, Section 1 of the City Charter requires the City 

to establish a merit system according to specified merit principles. Section 

2 creates the Civil Service Board, consisting of “five (5) residents, citizens 

and electors of the City.” Section 3 enumerates the Board’s specific powers 

and duties. For example, Section 3(2)requires the Board to submit advisory 

reports to the Phoenix City Council “regarding the activities of the Board as 

they relate to the application of merit principles in City personnel management.” 

(Emphasis added). Section 3(3) provides that “the Board shall hear appeals 

from disciplinary demotions, discharges, and suspensions by classified 

employees who have completed the prescribed probationary period. The 

Board may delegate the authority to conduct hearings to hearing officers. 

The decisions of the Board shall be final and binding.” Section 3(5)

authorizes the Board to “[h]ear appeals from classified employees from 

interpretations of the personnel rules approved by the Council.” Section 6 

designates the City Manager as the City’s Personnel Official, responsible for 

“[a]dminister[ing] all the provisions of [Chapter XXV] and of the personnel 

rules not specifically reserved to the Civil Service Board.”

¶15 The personnel system is governed by the “merit principles” 

outlined in Chapter XXV, § 1, including the obligation to protect the 

constitutional rights of applicants and employees as citizens. Phoenix, 

Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXV, § 1(2). Unique among merit principles, only 

Section 1(2)(e) specifically mentions that it is to be applied in “all aspects of 

personnel administration.” Similarly, among city government divisions 

given responsibility pursuant to Chapter XXV, only the Board is expressly
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

6

charged with any specific duty concerning the merit principles as a whole.

Id. at § 3(2).

b. The language of the City Charter is uniquely protective of 

constitutional rights in personnel administration.

¶16 When interpreting a statute or constitutional provision, “[w]e 

will give effect to each sentence and word so that provisions are not 

rendered meaningless.” Comm. for Pres. of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 

213 Ariz. 247, 249, ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (citing Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464, 

¶ 11 (2003)). “In interpreting statutes, we look to the plain language as the 

most reliable indicator of meaning.” Powers v. Carpenter, 203 Ariz. 116, 118, 

¶ 9 (2002) (citing State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 100 (1993)).

¶17 The cornerstone of our analysis is the “Purpose and Policy” 

provision of Chapter XXV of the City Charter which provides: 

Sec. 1. Purpose and policy.

1. It is the purpose of this chapter to designate those City 

employees in the classified services; set forth the rights and 

privileges of those employees; and to state the City’s 

obligations in establishing and maintaining a merit system.

2. The City has determined the necessity of establishing a 

merit system of personnel administration based on merit 

principles and professional methods governing the 

appointment, tenure, promotion, transfer, layoff, separation, 

discipline, and other incidents of employment relating to City 

employees. These merit principles include:

a. Recruiting, selecting and advancing employees on 

the basis of their relative ability, knowledge, and skills, 

including open consideration of qualified applications 

for initial appointment;

b. Providing equitable and adequate compensation;

c. Training employees, as needed, to assure highquality performance;

d. Retaining employees on the basis of the adequacy 

of their performance, and separating employees whose 

inadequate performance cannot be corrected;
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

7

e. Assuring impartial treatment of applicants and 

employees in all aspects of personnel administration

without regard to political affiliation, race, color, 

national origin, sex, religious creed or handicap, and 

with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional 

rights as citizens[]

. . . .

Phoenix, Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXV, § 1 (emphasis added).

¶18 To determine the ordinary meaning of the Phoenix Charter, 

we look to established and widely used dictionaries. See Stout v. Taylor, 233 

Ariz. 275, 278, ¶ 12 (App. 2013) (citing Special Fund Div. v. Indus. Comm’n of 

Ariz., 232 Ariz. 110, 113, ¶ 12 (App. 2013)). As relevant here, “assure” means 

“to cause to know surely; reassure,” “to pledge or promise; give surety of;

guarantee,” “to make (a future event) sure; ensure,” or “to secure or 

confirm; render safe or stable.” Assure, Random House Webster’s 

Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001). To give proper “regard” is “to have 

or show respect or concern for” or “to take into account; consider,” or “to 

pay attention.” Regard, Webster’s, supra. And this constitutional-rights 

merit principle permeates the inquiry in “all aspects of personnel 

administration.” See Phoenix, Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXV § 1(2)(e). Thus, while 

other merit principles may fall under the Section 6 City Manager delegation 

provision, this provision is specifically applicable to all Chapter XXV 

personnel administration mechanisms. See id.

¶19 The Charter’s directive to the Phoenix personnel system to 

“[a]ssur[e] impartial treatment . . . with proper regard for [employees’] 

privacy and constitutional rights as citizens” is unique among the personnel

systems adopted by Arizona’s charter cities. See generally id. Including 

Phoenix, four Arizona charter cities have adopted a Civil Service Board or 

Commission system as part of their personnel management systems, but 

only Phoenix has adopted language requiring its personnel system to 

“[a]ssur[e]” employees’ and applicants’ constitutional rights and privacy

are given “proper regard” “in all aspects of personnel administration.”

Compare id., with Bisbee, Ariz., Charter, Art. IV, § 4.06(c); and Scottsdale, 

Ariz., Charter, Art. V, § 2 and Scottsdale Rev. Code § 14-1.1; and Tucson, 

Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXII.

¶20 Phoenix’s language regarding constitutional rights is also

unique even considering the four charter cities (Chandler, Douglas, Mesa, 

Tempe) that have adopted a Merit System Board. Compare Phoenix, Ariz.,
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

8

Charter, Ch. XXV, § 1(2)(e), with Chandler, Ariz., Charter, Art. IV, § 4.02 and 

Chandler City Code § 4.02; and Douglas, Ariz., Charter, Art. IV, § 6 and 

Douglas City Code, Ch. 2.64; and Mesa, Ariz., Charter, Art. IV, §§ 402-403 

and Mesa City Code, §§ 2-5-1, 2-18-1—3; and Tempe, Ariz., Charter, Art. IV, 

§§ 4.01-.02. All remaining charter cities have adopted a personnel system 

that does not establish a Merit System Board or Civil Service Board. See 

Charter Government Provisions in Arizona Cities, League of Ariz. Cities &

Towns (May 2015), 

http://azleague.org/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/250.

¶21 We cannot construe this Charter assurance as “mere 

surplusage.” See Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of Supr’s, 251 Ariz. 519, 524, ¶ 15 

(2021) (citing Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568, ¶ 11 (2019)). Thus, the 

Phoenix Charter required the Board to treat McMichael-Gombar 

impartially, give proper regard to her constitutional rights as a citizen, and

take these rights into account and consider them when adjudicating her 

sanction.

c. The City’s arguments concerning delegation and relief fail.

¶22 The City contends that because there is no express delegation 

of power to the Civil Service Board to enforce merit principles, the 

responsibility for this role is delegated to the City Manager acting as 

Personnel Officer. See Phoenix, Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXV, § 6(1). This 

argument fails for two reasons. 

¶23 First, the Section 1(2)(e) merit principle applies to “all aspects 

of personnel administration.” Id. at § 1(2)(e). We, therefore, distinguish 

Phoenix’s constitutional-rights merit principle from merit principles that 

apply to limited circumstances. These limited principles include

“[r]ecruiting, selecting and advancing employees,” with which the Board 

has no express or implied charter or code role and therefore must fall under

the purview of the City Manager or Phoenix City Council. Compare id. at 

§ 1(2)(e), with § 1(2)(a)-(d), (f). Those other merit principles also lack the 

proviso requiring consideration by “all aspects” of the personnel system.

The superior court read this clause in isolation—finding that because this 

merit principle applies to the whole system, the Board need not apply it.

But the language of the Charter does not contain a limitation on which 

aspects of the personnel system apply this merit principle. In fact, as noted 

supra at ¶¶ 14-15 and infra at ¶ 24, Section 3 directly contradicts the superior 

court’s interpretation. See id. at § 3(1)-(3). The delegation to the City 

Manager of other powers and duties does not constrain consideration of an 

otherwise universal principle.
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

9

¶24 Second, we do not read the merit principles to be “powers” or

“duties” delegated under Section 6(1). Of all the city government divisions 

identified in Chapter XXV, only the Civil Service Board is regularly 

required to report to the City Council “regarding the activities of the Board

as they relate to the application of merit principles in City personnel 

management.” See id. § 3(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the merit principle 

not only applies to the Board in its role as a component of personnel 

administration, but the Charter expressly requires the Board to report on its 

application of these principles to the City Council. Indeed, no similar 

language clarifies the City Manager’s role or Council’s role in applying 

merit principles. To the extent any conflict can be read between the 

delegation provision and the constitutional-rights merit principle or the 

duties of the Board, we view the latter provisions as being specific

reservations of power to the Board, and therefore controlling over a more 

general delegation provision. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183-88 (2012) (discussing the 

general/specific canon of construction).

¶25 Here, the Board upheld the hearing officer’s preclusion of

evidence and testimony relating to the alleged violation of McMichaelGombar’s constitutional rights. The Board’s attorney stated that based on 

the City’s longstanding position, the Board did not address constitutional 

rights, which were reserved for vindication by the courts. But the City’s 

policy of limiting evidence on constitutional rights, longstanding as it may 

be, ignores the Board’s directive to assure the constitutional treatment of 

employees. The Board is empowered to secure and make safe the rights 

and fair treatment of employees and applicants by the City Charter. See 

Phoenix, Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXV, §§ 1(2)(e), 3(1)-(3). But the Board and 

hearing officer purported to excuse themselves from giving any regard to 

McMichael-Gombar’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment

through their interpretation of the Phoenix Charter, which was error. See 

generally U.S. Const. amend. I. The Phoenix Charter plainly requires the 

Board to consider and take evidence and argument concerning McMichaelGombar’s constitutional rights when evaluating her sanction.

¶26 The City argues that McMichael-Gombar changed her 

requested relief from demanding the Board find the Social Media Policy 

unconstitutional to requesting the superior court allow her simply to 

“present relevant evidence related to the merit principle contained in the 

Phoenix City Charter” and back again. The record is less than clear on this 

point, but the Board, in its answer to the special action complaint, admitted 

McMichael-Gombar’s claim that she “was not allowed to . . . present 

evidence . . . [as to] how [the Social Media Policy] impacted her ability to 
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

10

participate in her private affairs and express her First Amendment rights.”

And the Board unequivocally argued to the superior court that it need not 

consider the merit principle of giving proper regard for constitutional

rights. Whatever else McMichael-Gombar requested, the Board owed 

“proper regard” of her constitutional rights when taking evidence and 

evaluating her suspension. To the extent she argues the Board can declare 

a policy unconstitutional in a manner that binds future Boards or city 

agencies, as discussed below, we do not agree.

d. How the Board is to apply Section 1(2)(e)’s Merit Principle.

¶27 Under Chapter XXV, § 1(2)(e) of the Phoenix Charter,

regardless of whether the Board ultimately rejects the substance of 

McMichael-Gombar’s First Amendment claims, it must at least take 

evidence and argument concerning whether the sanction gives proper 

regard to those rights.

¶28 Both the City and the Board argue that such a directive would 

take the Board beyond its role by requiring it to consider legal issues. We 

disagree. The Board’s primary role is that of a factfinder, but the City 

concedes that in affirming the hearing officer’s rulings the Board separately

affirmed the preclusion of McMichael-Gombar’s evidence and argument—a 

purely legal issue that required the Board to act as more than a factfinder.

Cf. Felder v. Physiotherapy Assocs., 215 Ariz. 154, 166, ¶ 55 (App. 2007)

(reviewing evidentiary ruling predicated on a question of law de novo

(citing Yauch v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 198 Ariz. 394, 399, ¶ 10 (App. 2000))). The 

apparent longstanding practice and interpretation of the City’s charter by 

the City or the Board does not supplant this court’s obligation to view the 

City charter as “a local constitution” governing the exercise of the Board’s 

power. See Wolkin v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of Tucson, 21 Ariz. App. 341, 344-45 

(1974) (“When the rules promulgated by the Commission are violative of 

the Charter provisions the Commission lacks jurisdiction to implement the 

rules.”). The Board erred as a matter of law by finding that it need not 

consider the merit principle of “proper regard for [employees’] privacy and 

constitutional rights as citizens” when McMichael-Gombar raised it.

¶29 The superior court noted that “[c]onstitutional issues should 

be decided by the courts, not boards or panels of citizens.” This is only 

partially correct. The non-lawyer or volunteer composition of a board does 

not render it incapable of considering the impact of its decisions on the 

exercise of the constitutional rights of those appearing before it. Cf. Ariz. 

Const. art. 2, § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the people, and 

governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and 
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

11

are established to protect and maintain individual rights.”). This is 

especially true, where, as here, the text of the Phoenix Charter nonetheless 

requires the Board to consider constitutional and privacy concerns. See 

Phoenix, Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXV, § 1(2)(e).

¶30 We are aware of no authority that establishes a bright-line 

rule elevating constitutional rights beyond those legal issues—for instance, 

jurisdiction or the application of ordinances—that a state or city board 

similarly staffed with laypersons or members of non-legal professions 

necessarily considers in the lawful exercise of its power. See e.g., A.R.S. 

§§ 32-106(A)(6), -1307(B)(3) (allowing the Arizona Board of Technical 

Registration and the State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers to 

compel witness attendance and take testimony concerning matters coming 

“within [their] jurisdiction”); see also Wonders v. Pima Cnty., 207 Ariz. 576, 

578, ¶ 7 (App. 2004) (County Board of Adjustment empowered by statute 

to interpret zoning ordinances (citing A.R.S. § 11-807(B)(1))). “[M]erit 

boards . . . are not judicial bodies, but administrative bodies performing 

judicial functions” and these functions necessarily include interpreting their 

governing law and applying legal principles. Woerth, 167 Ariz. at 416 (citing 

Farish v. Young, 18 Ariz. 298, 303-04 (1916)) (emphasis added); see City of 

Phoenix v. Wright, 61 Ariz. 458, 462-63 (1944) (explaining the Board has

“jurisdiction to determine the status of plaintiff in regard to the civil service 

laws, rules and regulations” and its decisions were to be given “the same 

respect as the judgments of other legal tribunals.” (quoting City of Phoenix 

v. Sanner, 54 Ariz. 363 (1939))). Indeed, IPR 22(l) already delegates the 

interpretation of personnel rules, in part, to the Board. In dealing with legal 

matters, the Board has the aid of its attorney, the arguments of the parties 

and counsel before it, and is not charged with seeking out and resolving 

constitutional issues not presented. See Phoenix, Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXV, 

§ 1(2)(e); IPR 22(i)(5). Thus, this charter provision does not leave the Board

unaided when it conducts the constitutional interpretation with which it is 

charged.

¶31 In sum, the Phoenix Charter gives the Phoenix Civil Service 

Board a necessarily more expansive role than mere factfinder. The people 

of Phoenix have chosen to require the Board to ensure that covered 

employees’ discipline respects their constitutional rights and privacy. The 

Board need not determine whether the Social Media Policy itself is 

unconstitutional either facially or as applied. It need only determine 

whether the sanction gives “proper regard” to McMichael-Gombar’s 

constitutional rights. Indeed, the power of the Board is only the power to 

review an individual sanction; it possesses no mechanism to bind future 

Boards or other agencies. See generally Phoenix, Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXV, 
MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v. PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE, et al.

Opinion of the Court

12

§ 3; IPR 22(j) (with respect to Board decisions only “a record of the final 

action” is retained among the rest of the written record). Thus, we do not 

agree with the City that this will require the Board to opine at length on 

constitutional law or issue opinions discoursing on Cleveland Board of 

Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) or Pickering v. Board of Education 

of Township High School District 205, Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 

The Board’s rules do not require it to state how it weighed the evidence or 

balanced constitutional principles. See generally IPR 22(i)–(j). Giving 

“proper regard” to constitutional rights and privacy is all this merit 

principle requires the Board to do, and the Board’s structure does not

necessarily require lengthy, technical explanations of its rationale. See 

Phoenix, Ariz., Charter, Ch. XXV, § 1(2)(e).

e. Relief on Remand

¶32 The parties do not ask us to decide the merits of the 

disciplinary action, nor could we on this record. But because the Board 

abused its discretion by declining to consider McMichael-Gombar’s 

constitutional rights in reviewing her sanction, the superior court erred in 

affirming the Board’s decision. Accordingly, we vacate the superior court’s 

ruling. We further direct the superior court to accept jurisdiction of the 

special action, issue an order vacating the Board’s determination, and 

remand the disciplinary matter for reconsideration. On remand, the Board 

must consider McMichael-Gombar’s constitutional rights in evaluating her 

sanction and allow her to submit evidence and argument accordingly.

CONCLUSION

¶33 We vacate the superior court’s order and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.