# U n ited S ta tes C o u rt o f A p p ea ls

FO R TH E D IST R IC T O F C O L U M B IA C IR C U IT
Argued May

9, 2006 Dec ided August 15, 2006

No. 05-1087
E AR TH L I NK , I

NC ., P ETI TI ONER

v.
F ED ER A L C O M M U N I CA T I O N S C OMMI S S I ON AN D U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA , RE S P ON DE NT S
B ELL S OUTH C OR PO R ATI ON , E T AL .,

I N T ERV EN O RS

On Petition for Review of a n Orde r of the Fe dera l Comm unications Commis sion

Mark J . O'Connor argue d the c a

us e fo r p e tit ion e r. Withhim on the brief

s were Do nn a N. Lam pe rt and J e nn ife r L. Phurrough

. Nand a n M. Joshi , Counsel, Fede ral Communications Commi ssion, argued the c ause f or responde nt. O n the brief wer e Tho ma s O. Barn e tt , A ssi sta nt Atto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, U .S. Depa rtment of J u s t i ce, Catherine G. O'Sullivan and Nan c yC. Garrison , Attorney s, Samuel L. Fede r , Gene ral Coun s e l, F e d e ral Communi cations Comm i s s ion, J ac ob M. Le wis , A sso c iate2 Gene ral Counsel, J

oh n E. I ngle , Deputy

Associate G ener al Counsel, and Laurence N. Bourne , Co un se l. Scott H. Angstreich argued the c ause f or interve nors B e llSo uth Cor po ratio n, e t al. in sup po rt of the re sp on de nt. With hi m on the brief

s were Mi c ha e l K. Ke llogg , M ar k L. E v an s, Ge off re yM. Klin e be rg

, S e an A. Le v

, M ic ha e l E. G lov e r, Ed

war d Shakin, Jame

s D. Ellis, Gary L. Phill ips , and Be nn e tt L. Ro ss
. B e fo re : S EN T ELLE and B ROWN , Circuit Judges , and E DW AR DS , Senior Circuit Judge

. O p i n i o nf

o r th e C o urtf

i l e d b y Ci r cu i t

JudgeB ROWN
. B ROWN , Circuit Judge : Traditionally (if that can be said of any thing in the information ag e), ma ny internet user s lumbered a lon gvia dia l- up c onne c tio ns ov e r s tand ard c op pe r p ho ne lin e s. Incre asing ly , howeve r, broadba nd internet service is b ecoming available , providingsignific antly highe r ac cess spe eds. Two of the most widesprea d m et h o ds of deliver ing br oadband se rvice are digital subscri b er line (DSL ), which utilizes the highfre quency porti o n o f copper

lines, and ca

ble modem servic e. Other technolog ies, such as fiber optics, are steadily gaini ng g round.
In the c a se be fo re us , the F e de ra l Commun ic atio ns Commission (FCC) agree d not to require the Be ll Operating Companies (B OCs) to provide th eir competitors with “unbundled” acc ess to cer

tain fiber- based ne t wo rk fa cilities. See 47 U. S.C. § 271(c) (2)( B) . EarthL ink, Inc., an inter net servic e provide r that benef its from such unbundling, c hall enges the FCC’s orde r. Persuade d that the ag ency ’s interpre tation and application of the statutory scheme are permissible, we deny the petition for revie w.3
I Until the 1990s, local telephone companies ope rate d as monopolies. Se eAT& T Cor p. v . I owa Ut ils

. Bd. , 525 U.S. 366, 37 1 ( 19 99 ); AT& T Cor

p. v . FCC , 220 F.3d 607, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The local ex change car riers in a g iven ar ea owned “the l o ca l loops (wires conne ctingtelephones to switche s), the switches (e quipment directingcalls to their destinations), a nd the transpor

t trunks (wire s car

rying c alls betwee n switches) that constitute a local exchang e networ k.” Io wa U

til s
. Bd. , 5 25 U. S. at 371. Cong ress pa ssed the Te lecommunications Ac t of 1996, Pub. L . No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (“the Act”) (a m en d i ngthe Communi cations Ac t of 193 4 , 4 7 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. ), to “promote c ompetitio n and reduce regulation in order to sec ure low e r p ri c e s and

highe r q ua lity se rv ic e s f

or Am e ri c an te le c ommunications consumers a nd encour ag e the r apid deploy ment of new tele communications technologies.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ( USTA I ) (quotingAct pmbl.) (interna l quotation marks omitted).
Under 47 U.S.C. § 251, the FC C has authority to require inc umb e nt l oc a l e xch ang e c arrie rs (IL ECs ) to pr ov ide a c c e ss t o the ir ne tw or k f a c ili tie s a nd c a pa bil iti e s o n a

n “ un bund le d” ba sis to competitive local e x chang e ca rrier s (CL ECs). Id. § 251(c) (3), (d)( 2). I n de te rm ini ngwh at un bund le d n e tw or

k e le me nts mus t be made available , the FCC considers “at a minimum , whether . . . the fa ilure to provide a cce ss .
. . would impair the ability of the [C L E C] to p r o v id e th e s e r v ic e s th at i t s e e k s to o f f er.” Id . § 25 1( d) (2 )( B ); see id. § 153(29) (def ining “ network e lement” as “a f

acility or equipment used in the pr ovision of a telecommunications service” ).
Th e Ac t a lso c onta ins pr ov isi on s a pp lic a ble sp e c if ic a lly to the B OCs (a subset of IL ECs), al l owingthem to enter long distance markets for

bidden to them under the antitrust consent4

S ee 4 7 U

. S

. C . § 1 5 3 ( 2 1 ) ( d ef i n i n g “i n t er LA T A s er vi ce” as 1 “t e l e c o m m uni c a t i o ns b et wee n a po i nt l o c a t e d i n a l o c a l a c c e s s a nd tran sp o rt are a a n d a p o in t l o ca ted ou tsi d e su ch are a” ); id

. § 271( b) ( 1) ( “i n - r egi on ” r ef

er s t o s er vi ces th at ori gi n at e w i t h i n t h e B O C ’s g eo g rap h ic reg ion ).
4 7 U .S .C . § 1 6 0 (a) an d (b ): 2 ( a) R eg u latory f

l exi b i l i t y [

. ]

. . . [ T ] h e [ F C C ] s h al l f or b ear f r om app l y i n g any r egul at i on or any provi si on of t h i s cha p ter to a t el ecom m u n i cat i on s car r i er or tel ecom m u n i cat i on s se r vi ce, or decr ee that broke up AT& T in the ea rly 1980s. S e eA T &T , 220 F .3 d at 61 0- 12 . Und e r 4 7 U .S. C. § 27 1, BOC s seekingto provide c erta in long- distance se rvice s—namely , in-region

“ int e rLAT A s e rv ic e s” —mu st o bta in p e rm iss ion fr om t he F CC, 1 id. § 271(d)( 1), premised upon, among other thing s, the BO C’s compliance with a “[ c]ompetiti ve che cklist,” id. § 271(c) (2)( B)

. Che c klist it ems fo ur

thr ou g h s ix an d te n r e qu ir e B OC s to provide unb u n d led ac cess to loca l loops, local transport, loca l s wi t ch i n g, an d

ca l l -r el at edd at ab ases. Id. § 271(c) (2)( B) (iv)-( vi), (x). These par

ticular oblig ations are independe nt of any unbundling required by

§ 251. U. S. Te le c om Ass’n v . FCC , 359 F.3d 554, 588 ( D.C. Cir. 2004) ( U S TA II ); cf. 47 U. S.C. § 271(c) (2)( B) (ii) (incor

p o ra t ing by

ref ere nce the unbundling require ments of § 251(c )(3) ). Notwithstanding the fore g oing, unde r 47 U.S.C. § 160, the FCC must fo rb ea r fr om applying a g iven provision of the Communi cations Ac t to a telecommunications car rier “in any

or so me of its

. . . g e ogra

ph ic mark e ts, ” if

thr e e c on dit ion s a

re me t: (1) e nforc ement is no tnece ssary to ensure that char g es and prac tices ar e just, rea sonable a nd non-discrim inatory ; (2) enfor ceme nt “is not nece ssary for the pr otection of c onsumers”; an d (3) f orbea ranc e “is c onsistent with the public interest.” Id. § 160(a)

. As to the t h ird prong , the FCC “sha ll consider

25

c l a s s o f t el e c o m m uni c a t i o ns c a r r i e r s o r t e l e c o m m uni c a t i o ns s e r v i c e s , i n a ny o r s o m e o f i t s o r t he i r g e o g r a phi c mar k e t s , i f t he [ F C C ] d e te r m in e s th a t-- (1 ) enf or cem ent of

s u ch re gu l at i on or provi si on i s n ot nec e s s a r y t o e nsur e t hat t he c har ge s , pr a c t i ces, c la ss ific a tio n s, o r re g u la tio n s b y, fo r, o r in c o n n e c tio n w ith t ha t t e l e c o m m uni ca t i o ns c a r r i e r o r t e l e c o m m uni c a t i o ns se r vi ce ar e j u stand r eas on abl e a n d ar e n ot un just l y or u n r e a s o n a b ly d is c r im in a to r y; ( 2 ) enfor cem ent of

s u ch re gu l at i on or p r ovi si on i s n ot ne c e s s a r y f

o r t he pr o t e c t i o n o f

c o ns um e r s ; a nd ( 3 ) f or b ear ance f

r om app l y i n g su ch p r ovi si on or r egul at i on is c o n sis te n t w ith th e p u b lic in te re st. ( b) C o m pe t i t i v e e f

f e c t to b e we i g he d[

. ] I n mak i ng t he d e t e r mi na t i o n u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n ( a ) ( 3 ) o f t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e [ F CC] shal l consi d er w h et h er f or b ear ance f

r om enfor ci n g t h e provi si on or r egu l at i on w i l l p rom ote com p et i t i ve m arket con d i t i on s, i n cl u d i n g t h e e x t ent t o w h i ch s u ch for b ear ance w i l l enh ance c o m p e ti ti o n a m o n g p r o v id e r s o f te le c o m m u n ic a ti o n s s e r v ic e s . If th e [F C C ] d e t e rm in e s th a t su c h fo rb e a ra n c e w ill p ro m o te com p et i t i on am on g p rovide rs of t el ecom m u n i cati on s se rvi ces, t h at det er m i n at i on m ay b e t h e basi s f or a[ n ] [ F C C ] f

i n d i n g t h at fo rb e a ra n c e is in th e p u b lic in te re st. whe th e r f o r b e ar an c e
. . . w il l p r o mo te c o mp e ti ti v e ma rket c on dit ion s, inc lud ingthe e xtent to wh ic h s uc h f or be ara nc e wi ll enh an c e c o mp e ti ti o namo n gp r o v id e r s o f te le c o mm

un ic ati o ns s erv i ces.” Id. § 160(b). Te lecommunication ca rrier s may petition for f orbea ranc e and, i f t h e FCC declines to a ct within a year (subject to a 90- day

extension), t h e p eti tion is deemed grante d as a matter of law

. Id. § 160(c)

. Fur thermore , section 706 of t he Act sets forth the f ollowing6

T h e F C C ’ s p rior attem p ts w ere u n su cc es sfu l. S ee Io w a U t i l s. 3 Bd ., 5 2 5 U .S . 3 6 6 ; UST A I , 290 F. 3d 415. overa rchingdirec tion:
Th e [ FCC ]

. . . s ha ll e nc ou ragethede plo y me nt on a rea sonable a

nd tim el y basis of adva

nced te lecommunicat i o n s c a p ab i l i ty t o a l l A m e r i c an s
. . . b y utiliz ing . . . r eg u la to r y forbearance , me asure s that promote competition in the local telecommunications marke t, or other r egulating me tho ds that r e mov e ba

rrie rs to i nf

ra str uc tur e inv e stm e nt. Act § 706(a ) (empha sis a dded) (re produce d at 47 U.S.C. § 157 no te ); see Act § 706(c) (1) ( defining“adva nced te lecommunicatio ns c a pa bil ity” a s “ high- sp e e d, sw itc he d, br oa db and te le c ommun ic ati o n s c a

p a b il it y th at e n a

b le s u s e r s to o r ig in ate and rec e iv e h igh-quality

voice, data, graphic s, and video tele communications using a

ny technology”).

A
In 2 00 3, in i ts Triennial Rev iew Order , the FCC attempted to implement the unbundling require ments of § 2 5 1 (c )(3)

. Rev iew of theSection 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Loc al E x c ha ngeCar

rie rs , 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978 (2003) ( Triennial Rev iew Order). I n pe rt ine nt p art , th e a g e nc y re lie ve d th os e 3 obligation s o n a nationwide ba sis with respect to ce rtain new fiber br oadband ne twork ele ments. Specifica lly , the FCC did not re qu ir e I L ECs un

bund le fi be r-to- the -h ome (F TT H) loo ps ( i.e ., loops ex tendingfrom the I L EC’s centr al office all the way to the customers’ pr emises) in plac es whe re f iber l o o p plant had not pr e vio us ly

e xiste d: “ g re e nf

ie ld” sit uatio ns ( i.e ., new r esidential are as whe re no lines ha d exis ted) a nd “over build” situations ( i.e ., locations wher e only copper loop plant was in place ). Id . at 17,142. In the latter, how ever , if the IL EC decides to re tire the7 incumbent coppe r loops, it mustthen make its fiber lo o ps available—albeit only

for na rrowba nd, not br oadband use s. Id

. T h e F CC a ls o d e c li n e d

to r e qu ir e unb un d li n ga s to th e “ n e xt g ener ation network, pa cketized ca pabilities” of hy

brid loops ( i.e. , lo op s co mp ri se d o nly pa rt ia lly of fi be r) and

“ pa c ke tswitching .” Id . at 17,149, 17,321.
In t h e age ncy ’s view, ba lancingthe costs and be nefits of unbundling, with par

ticular attention to incentivizing new f iber inv e stm e nt b y

bo th I L ECs and CL ECs , th e sc a le s ti pp e d a g a ins t mandatingunbundling. Se e, e .g., id . at 1 7 ,121-22, 17,141-53. T h e F C C e mp h a s i z e d

th ati t s “ o b l i g at i o nt o e n s ur e th e d e p l o yment of adva

nced telecommunications capability under se ction 706 war rant s d i ffe rent a

pproac hes with reg ard to e x isting [copper] loop plant and new [fiber] loop plant.” Id. at 17,126.
In USTA II

, while vac atingmuch of the Triennial Review Order , we uphe ld the FCC’s nationwide de cision to refr ain from re qu ir ing§ 2 51 un

bund lin ga s to the fi be r b roadban d e le me nts d e s c r ib e d a b o v e
. US T

A II , 359 F.3d at 578-87. The F CC had re a so na bly de te rm ine d, fo r exa mple , th at “ any dama g e to broadba nd competition from deny ing unbundle d ac cess to the broadba nd capa cities of hy

brid loops is li kely

to be mitigate d by the availability

of loop alternatives or intermodal c ompetition.” Id . at 58 2. As to t

he latte r, we no te d th at c a ble c omp anie s, havingroughly

a 60% sha

re of the nationwide br o adb and mark e t, p ro vid e d “ ro bu st i nte rm od a l c ompetit ion ” to IL ECs , which occ upied a se condar y marke t positi on. Id.
Fur thermore , we held that the FCC “reasona bly interpre ted § 2 51 (c )( 3) to a llo w i t to wi thh old un bund ling o rders, e ve n in the fa c e of

so me imp a ir

me nt , wher e su c h unb un dli ngwo uld pose excessive impediments to infrastruc ture investment,” id . at 58 0, be c a us e “ [s]e c tio n 7 06 (a) i de nti fi e s o ne of the Ac t’ s g oa ls be yon d f os te ri ngc omp e tit ion

pig g y -b a c ke d o n I L EC f

a c ili ti e s,8 namely , removingbarriers t o infrastruc ture investment,” id. at 579. Even if the F CC’s judgment “enta ils incr easingconsumer costs today

in or der to stimulate technolog ical innovations,” we opined, “there is nothing in the Act barring suc h trade -off s.” Id. at 581. That is, F CC may weigh the “costs of unbundling ” (e .g ., inv e stm e nt d isi nc e nti ve s) a g a ins t th e “ be ne fi ts o f r e mov ingthi s barrier to compe tition.” Id. at 57 9 (d isc us sin ghy br id l oo ps ); see id. at 58 3 ( “ [T]he [se c tio n] 70 6 c on sid e ratio ns
. . . are e no ugh to justify the [FCC’s] decision not to unbundle FTT H.”)

. In turn, we f

ound rea sonable the FC C ’s conc lusion that requiringunbundling of

the eleme nts a tissue would, indeed, produce undesirable incentives a s it is “likely to delayinfrastr uc tur e inv e stm e nt, wi th C L ECs te mpt e d to wa it f or I L ECs to de plo y F TT H a nd I L ECs fe arf

ul t hat CL EC a c c e ss w ou ld undermine the investments’ potential retur n.” Id . at 584. Acc ording ly , we uphe ld the FCC’s re fus al t o unbundle the broadba nd fiber e lements, “e ven in the fa ce of some CL EC impairment, in light of e vidence that unbundling would ske w investment incentives in undesira ble way s and that intermodal competition from ca

ble ensure s t h e p ersistenc e of substantial competition in broadband.” Id . at 585.
After we de cided U

S TA II , the F CC e xten de d th e same § 2 51 un bund lin g re lie f to f

ibe r- to- the -c ur

b ( F TT C) loo ps ( i.e ., hy br id l oo ps in whic h f

ibe r r un s n e arl y , b ut n ot a ll the wa y , to th e cust ome rs ’ p re mis e s) and loo ps to m

ult i- dw e lli ngun its

. Triennial Review Order , Or de r on Re c on sid e ra tio n, 19 F .C. C.R

. 20 ,2 93 (2 00 4) ; Triennial Review Order , Orde r on Reconside ration, 19 F.C.C.R. 15,856 (2004).9

For s i m pl i c i t y , “V er i zo n” r e f e r s t o t he V e r i z o n t e l e pho ne 4
com p an ie s— t h e l ocal exch ange car r i er s af f i l i at ed w i t h V er i zon C om m u n i cat i on s, I n c.
I n 2005, SB C C o m m uni c a t i o ns a c qui r e d A T& T Cor p. ( f o r m i ng 5 A T & T I n c.).
U po n be i ng di v e s t e d by A T& T as r e qui r e d by t he 1982 c o ns e nt 6 de c r e e , t he B O C s we r e c o ns o l i da t e d i nt o s e v e n r e g i o na l ho l di ng co m p an ies an d , d u e to m erg ers, th at n u m b er h as sin ce d ro p p ed to fou r. S e e A s s ’ n o

f C o m m c ’ n s E n t e rs
. v
. F CC , 2 3 5 F

. 3 d 6 6 2 , 6 6 3

- 6 4 ( D. C. C ir. 2 0 0 1 ); A T &T , 2 2 0 F .3 d a t 6 1 0 -1 1 . T h e re m ig h t so o n b e o n ly th ree
. S ee D i o n n e S e a r c e y e t a l. , A R e b o rn A T &T to B uy B e llS o u th , W ALL S T

. J. , M a r
. 6, 2006, a t A 1. B
T h e BO Cs filed four pe titions —one ea ch for Ver izon; 4 AT & T Inc . ( fo rm e rl y

SB C Co mmunic atio ns , Inc .) ; Qw e st 5 Communi cation s I

nter n a ti o n a l, Inc.; and B ellSouth Telecommunicat i o n s , Inc.—see king f orbea ranc e under

§ 160 from the a dd iti on a l un

bund lin gre qu ir e me nts of

§ 2 71

. Af

te r c on so lid at- 6 i n g the petitions, the FCC, in the Order un d e r r e v ie wh e re, agree d to forbe ar from applying § 271’ s independe nt unbundling ob lig atio ns to t

he br oa db and

e le me nts that th e FCC h a d p re viously “re lieved from unbundling [on a national b as i s ] under [§] 25 1: F TT H l oo ps , FT TC loo ps , th e pa c ke tize d f un c tio na lity of hy brid loops, and pac ket switching .” Pe tit ion for Fo rb e aran c eof t heVe riz on Te le

ph on eCom

pa nie s P ur su an t to 47

U. S. C. § 160( c) , 19 F.C.C.R. 21,496, ¶ 12 (2004) ( Order). At the outset, the F CC made clea r that its forbea

ranc e an al y s i s i s “i n fo rm ed ” b y s ec t i o n7 0 6 ’s m an d at e t o en co ura ge deploy ment of broa dband ser

vices. Id. ¶ 20 (ci t i n g Act pmbl., § 7 06 ; De

ployment of W

ireline Servs. O

ffering Advance d Te le c om ms . Ca

pa bil ity , 13 F.C.C.R. 24,012, 24,047 (1998)10 (discussingthe re lationship between § 160 a nd section 706)). Th ro u g hth atp r i s m , th e F C C th e na p p l i e d § 1 6 0 ( a ) ’ s tr i p art ite inquiry , deter

mining that unbundling the broadba nd fiber e le me nts is n ot n e c e ssa

ry e ith e r t o e ns ure ju st a

nd re a so na ble rate s or to protec t consumers, a nd that forbe ara

nce is in the public interest. Id. ¶¶ 19- 36. The F CC’s analy sis wa s simil ar f or all three pron gs , balanc ing shor t-term compe titive effe cts and future de velopments. See, e .g ., id . ¶ 31 (“ [T]he [F CC] la

wf ull y may focus on future consumer benefits anticipated by its curre nt p o l i cy d ec i s i o n s
. ” ( ci t i n g USTA II , 359 F.3d at 581)).
The FCC acknow ledg ed the important role that compe tition play s in ensuringrea sonabl e rates, protec ting c onsumers, and furthering th e p ub l i c intere st. Id. ¶¶ 24 , 3 0, 33 ; see als o 47 U.S.C. § 16 0 (b ). The a g ency deter mined, howeve r, that the BO Cs have only

“limited competi tive advanta g es” in the marke t. Id . ¶ 30. Consideringthe “whole sale market in conjunctio n w ithc omp e tit ive c on dit ion s in the do wn str e am r e ta il broadba nd marke t,” the FCC looked to severa l fac tors, including the emerg ing nature of the broadba nd marke t, i n whi ch “the pr e c on dit ion s f

or mon op oly are no t pr e se nt” ; th e fa c t th at c a ble modem providers, not I L ECs, “contr ol a majority of all residential and small-business lines”; the expected ri se of other int e rm od a l br oa db and comp e tit ion , s uc h a s f ixed wi re le ss, sate lli te , a

nd br oa db and ov e r po we rl ine ; and the CL ECs’ c o nti nu e d a

b il it y to c o mp e te in th e b r o a d b an d ma r k e t by deploying the ir own fiber loops or acc es s i n g I L ECs’ leg acy copper elements. Order

¶¶ 2 1 -2 3. Ultimately , the FCC concluded that a

ny short-term e ffect s on competition are offse t by the prospec t of additional i ntermodal c ompetition and the be ne fi ts that f

or be ara nc e wi ll p ro vid e : in c e nti ve s f or bo th IL ECs and CL ECs to invest in a

nd deploy broadba nd fac iliti es, which will increa se compe tition goingforwa rd and ther eby

keep r ates re a so na ble , b e ne fi t c on sume rs , a

nd se rv e thepu

bli c int e re st.11
Ea rt hL ink , a n inte rn e t ser

vic e pr ov ide r t

hat r e lie s o n CL ECs and I L ECs (i nc lud ing the B OC s) fo r l a st- mil e a c c e ss t o c on sumer s, petitions for revie w of the Order

. V e r iz o n , A T & T and B e llSo uth int e rv e ne in s up po rt

of the F CC.
II
EarthL ink raises a

number of c halleng es to the F CC’s interpre tation and application of the statutory forbe arance provision. We conclude the F CC’s decision (1) survive s Chevron ana ly sis , ( 2) is n e ith e r a rb itr ary no r in c on sis te nt w ith FCC prec edent, a

nd (3) is supported by

the re cord.
A First, Ea rthL ink argues the Order runs af oul of § 160(a)

. We examine the FCC’s interpre tation u n d er the familiar Chevron fra

mework. Che v ro n U

.S .A ., In c
. v
. Natural Re

s. De f. Council, Inc ., 46 7 U.S. 837 (1 98 4) ; Cellular T elec omms. & In te rn e t Ass’n v . FCC , 3 30 F .3 d 5 02 , 5 07 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 3) . F ir st, if the statu t e u nambiguously controls the “pr ecise question at issue,” then we need g o no further

. Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-43. Se c on d, wh e re the agency e xer c ise s d e le g ate d a

uth or ity to resolve statutory ambiguity , we will uphold the FCC’s interpre

tation a s long as it is re asonable , se eid . at 843-44, e ven if “ there may be other rea sonable, or e ven more rea sonable, view s,” A T &T , 220 F.3d at 621 ( internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted). Se eals o A T& T Cor p. v . FCC , 3 4 9 F.3d 692, 698- 99 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“ Chevron defe renc e i s due . . . only if the ag ency has ac ted pursuant to ‘de leg at ed author ity ’ and the ag ency action has the ‘for ce of

law.’”(citations omitted)).
Ac c or din gto E art

hL ink , th e statut e pe rm it s th e F CC to g rant for bear ance o n ly

afte r a “ painstakinganaly sis of market c on dit ions” in “ pa

rt ic ula r g e ogra ph ic mark e ts a

nd fo r s pe c if

ic12

S ee , e.g
. , P etit ion er ’s B r
. 34

- 3 5 ( F C C ca n n ot r el y on 7

“‘ i nv e s t m e nt di s i nc e nt i v e s ’ t o j us t i f y f o r be a r a nc e ” be c a us e § 160( a ) ( 1) “do e s no t pe r m i t t he FC C e i t he r t o i g no r e o r c o unt e r ba l a nc e ” t he sh o rt-ter m e ffe c t o n “ ‘ r a t e s a n d c h a rg e s’ in o rd e r to a c c o m m o d a te o th e r g o a ls, e v e n w o rth y go a ls s u c h a s b ro a d b a n d d e p lo ym e n t” ); i d.
a t 3 6 (F C C can n ot con cl u d e “ ‘the p rot ecti on of con su m ers’ is ad eq u ately ad d r e s s e d in th e h ere an d n o w b y th e p ro m ise o f fu tu re altern ative s b ro ad b an d n etw o rk s y et to b e b u il t”). telecommunications s ervic es.” We disagree . On its face , the statute im p o s e s n o p arti c u la

r mo d e o f ma r k e t a n a ly s is o r level of g eographic rig or. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (re quiringforbe aranc e in “ any

or some of [a c arrie r’ s] g e ogra

ph ic mark e ts” if thr e e c on dit ion s are me t) . Se izin gon the phra se “ g e ogra

ph ic marke ts” in § 160(a) , EarthL ink contends the de cision to forbea r on a nationwide basis—without consideringmore loca liz ed re g io ns ind ivi du a lly

—is per se imp ro pe r. Th is a rgume nt i s tenuous, at best. In context, the langua g e simply contempl at es that the FCC might som etimes forbe ar in a subset of a c arrier’s marke ts; itis silent about how to deter m i n e wh en such pa rtial relief is appropriate. Simil arl y , the statute does not re quire considera tion of s p ecific servic es. See id. (per mitti ngforbe aran c e a s to a “ c las s of

te le c omm

un ic atio ns c arrie rs or

te le c ommunications service s” (e mphasis added) ). Instead, we are persua ded the a g ency

rea sonably

interpre ted the statute to allow the fo rb e ara

nce analy sis to v ary

de pe nd ingon

the c ir c umsta nc e s.
Insofar as Ear thL ink sugg ests the statute does not pe rmit the FCC to make the f

orbea ranc e d ec ision with an eye to the future—by

acc ounting f

or sec tion 706’s goa ls and assessing likely marke t developments—the a rgument also fails. Nothing 7 in § 160 prohibits weighing suc h considerations in assessing the imp a c t of

fo rb e ara nc e on ra

te s, c on sume rs , a

nd the pu bli c interest. See 47 U. S.C. § 1 60(a)( 1) , ( 2) , ( 3) ; id . § 160(b).13
F urthe r, sec ti o n7 0 6 e xp li c it ly d ir e c ts th e F CC to “ uti li z[e ]” forbe ara nce to “ encour ag e the deploy ment on a rea sonable a

nd tim e ly ba sis of a dv anc e d te le c omm

unica tions c a

pa bil ity to a ll Americ ans.” A s the p re ci se interplay betwee n section 706 and the three -par

t forbea ranc e inquiry

is not s el f- evident from the te xt, it is pr e c ise ly the ty

pe of ambi guit

y e ntr us te d to re a so na

ble agency c on str uc tio n. Th e langua g e of

se c tio n 7 06 su g g e sts a forwa rd-lookingapp roac h and, re adingthe two statutory pr ov isi on s tog e the r, we c ann ot fa ult the F CC fo r i nte rp re tin git to i nf or m th e § 1 60 ana ly sis

. Th i s co nclusion finds support in USTA II wh e re we he ld that the FCC prope rly

considere d section 706’s g oals in deciding not to require § 251 unbundling

. See 3 5 9 F

. 3 d at 579-80 (interpr eting§ 251(d)( 2)’s “ at a minimum” clause ). We rejec ted the ar gume n t th at th e A c t p r o h ib it s “ ‘ a d h o c ’ b a la n c in gof the statute ’ s p r o - c o mp e ti ti o ng o a ls w it hana ll e g e d ly

c o n f li c ting g oal der ived from [ section] 706,” holdi ng instead t hat “[s] ection 706(a) identifies one of the Act’ s g oals beyond fostering competition piggy -bac ked on I L EC f acilities, namely , removing barriers to infrastruc ture investment.” Id . at 579. Simil ar tra deoffs a re a lso reasona

bly inco rp o rated into a decision to forbe ar fr om § 2 7 1 unb un d l i n g
. W h i l e th e F C C ’ s p r i o r d e c i s i o nto relieve § 251 unbundling doe s not automatically make it prope r to forbea r fr om the separ ate § 271 unbundlingrequire ments, the F CC p e rmis sib ly

c on str ue d th e statut or

y sc he me to p e rm it weighing similar c onsiderations in ea ch ca se.
B Next, EarthL ink argues the Orde r “ar bitrarily assessed broadba nd competition in an irrational a nd ad hoc ma

nn e r
. ” We revie w the F CC’s a

pplication of the Act pursua nt to the defe rential “ar bitrary and ca

pricious” standa

rd. See Cel l u l ar Telecomm s. &Internet Ass’n , 3 30 F.3 d at 50 7- 08 ; 5 U .S. C.14 § 706 (2 )( A) . Our

ro le in t his re g ard is a lim ite d o ne and

we wi ll not substitute our judgment for that of the ag ency
. Cellular Telecomm s. & Internet Ass’n , 330 F.3d at 507. We must ensure the FCC has “ considere d the re levant fa ctors and ‘ articulate[d] a rational con n ec tion between the fac ts found and the c hoice mad e. ’” A T

&T , 2 2 0 F. 3 d

at6 1 6 (qu o t i n g Mo tor

Ve hic leMf

rs. Ass’n v . S

tateFa rm Mu t. A uto . I

ns . Co ., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983 )). We will reve rse “ only if the ag ency ’s dec ision is not supported by

substantial evidence , or the a g ency has m ade a clea r er ror in judg ment”; i ndeed, an extra measur e of de fer ence is warran t ed where the decision involves a “ high le vel of technica l expertise” in an ar ea of “ra pid technological a

nd competitive cha

ng e.” Id

. (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted).
Simi lar to its statutory

interpret ati on argument, EarthL ink contends “ competit ion” ca n only rationally

be asse ssed by focusingon more spec ific produc t and g eographic marke ts and by conductinga “tr aditional m ar ket ana ly sis (including ma rket sh are , d e mand

and su pp ly e la sti c ity , a

nd oth e r f a c tor s) .” Whil e su c h a n ana ly sis is no do ub t a

pp ro pr iate in s ome c ir c ums ta nc e s, we c annot say

the FCC was unreasona

ble i n takinganother

tack here , tailoringthe forbe ara nce inquiry

to the situation at hand.
Gi ve n th e F CC’ s v ie w o f t he br oa dband

mark e t a s st ill emer g ing a

nd developing , it reasona bly esche wed a more e la bo rate sn a

ps ho t of the c ur re nt m ark e t in de c idi ngwh e the r t o forbe ar w ith respec t to the fiber network elements at issue her e. Cf. Inquiry Concerning High-Spee d Acc ess to the Internet ov er Cable and Other Facilities , 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4847-48 (2002) (s ug g e sti ngfo rb e ara

nc e f r o m c omm on

c arrie r r e gulatio ns wo uld be proper on a nationwide basis with r espec tt o cable-modem service ). Guided by

section 706, t he age ncy

decide d to balance the future benef

its a g ainst short term impact. Cf. Petition of U.S. W est Commc’ns, Inc. for a De clar a t o r y Ruling Regarding the15
Pr o v is io n o

f N a t’ l D ire c to r

yA s s istance , 14 F.C.C.R. 16,252, 16,277 (1999) (basingforbe ara nce de cision in part on whe ther “pro- consumer be nefits . . . out weigh any potential competitive advanta g e that may

acc rue” t o the ca

rrier reque sting for

bear

ance ). The F C C t h en appropriately stepped through the three

part for bear ance inquiry , at ea ch step e x plaining its view that forbe ara nce w ould onl y h ave a “modest” impac t that was outweighed by

forwa rd-lookingbenef

its (increa sed compe tition and fibe r deploy

ment).
Nor is the Or

de r inconsistent with FCC prece dent. The de c isi on s p ro ff

e re d b y Ea rt hL in k a re no t di re c tly

a pp lic a ble to the pr e se nt c ir c ums tanc e s; f or e xamp le , ma

ny of the m a dd

re ss dominant car

rier r egulation rather

than u nb undling r equire

ments, see, e .g. , W

or ldC om , I nc . v . FCC , 238 F.3d 4 4 9 , 459 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 1) (n oti ng , in dic ta, that th e F CC r e qu ir e s a “painstakinganaly sis of market c ondi tions” when “ an L EC seeks c lassification as a

non-dominant ca

rrier or the for bear ance of do min ant c arrie r r e gulatio n” ); AT& T Cor p. v . FCC , 236 F.3d 729, 735-36 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ( explaining that, i n making dominance c lassif

ications, FCC’s traditional mar ket power inq uir y loo ks to f

a c tor s su c h a s c arrie r’ s market sh are , s up ply and dema

nd elasti ci ty , and ca

rrier ’s cost structure , siz e and resour ces) , or ar e other

wise distinguishable , see , e.g. , Applicatio n s f o r Consent to the Transf

er of Control of

Licensee s and Section 214 Authorizations by Time W arner In c. and Ame rica Online, Inc ., Transferors, to AOL Time W arner Inc., Transferee , 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6578 (2001) (finding, in me rge r analy sis, the “re levant g eographic marke ts f or residential high- speed I nterne t acc ess servic es ar e loca l”).
EarthL ink’s relianc e on Qw es t Omaha , a po st- Order decision, is particula

rly inapt as that ca s e h i ghlights the F CC’s capacity and prope nsity

to adapt for

bear ance decisions to the ci rcumstanc es. Petition of Qwest Cor p. for Forbearance16 Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160( c) in the Omaha Me tro. Statistical Area , 20 F.C.C.R

. 19,415 (2005) ( Qwest Omaha ). F ir st, wh ile the FCC acknow ledg ed that a decision to forbe ar f rom dominant car rier r egulation is “informe d by the [FCC’s] traditional marke t power analy sis,” id. at 19,425, the ag ency was quick to note that such ana ly sis “ do e s n ot bind [t he F CC’s § 160] forbe ara nce analy sis,” id. at1 9 , 4 2 5 n
. 5 2 (e mp h as i s ad d ed ) ( ci t i n g A T &T Co rp. , 2 3 6 F

. 3 d

at 7 3 6

- 3 7 )

. Se c o n d , wh e na d dr e s s in gf o r b e ara nc e f r o m § § 2 5 1 an d 2 7 1 , th e F C C d i d n o t i nv o k e i t s “ tr a ditional market powe r” a

naly sis, see, e .g. , id . at 19, 4 4 3 -19,470, ins te a d n oti ngat on e po int that th e F CC’ s “ unbundling ana ly sis ” is “instructive for

purposes of r endering [its § 160(a)] determination,” id

. at 19,446 (empha sis added)

. Third, i n denying f orbearance from § 271, Qwest Omaha specific all y distinguished the Order : The rea soning that formed the basis of the [FCC’s] decision [i n the Order ] t o forbe ar from applying the [§] 271 network acc ess re quirements to ce rtain of the B OCs’ broadba nd fa c ili tie s d oe s n ot e xten d to

. . . le g a c y e le me nts . T he su

pp ly mark e t f or le g a c y se rv ic e s is q

uit e dif fe re nt f ro m th e su

pp ly mark e t fo r br oa db and

se rv ic e s. As e xplic itl y

re c ognize d in se c tio n 7 06 , it is imp or

tant fo r [the F CC] to r e mov e inv e stment disincentives that apply to broadba

nd service s in order to encourage the construction of ne x t ge neration facilities to customers nationwide. In contra st, the policies of sec tion 70 6 d o n ot a

pp ly to a lr e a dy-c on str

uc te d le g a c y

e le me nts

. Id. at 19,469. Thus, insofar a s the later Qwest Omaha decision is releva nt at all, cf

. AT& T I nc . v . FCC , 452 F .3 d 8 30 , 8 39 (D .C. Cir. 2006) (examining subseque nt ag ency action to show pattern of argua bly inc on sis te nt d e c isi onmaki ng), it l e nd s c re de nc e to the FCC’s ac tion in the present matter

. In s um, Ea

rt hL ink po int e d to no case spea

kin gdir e c tly

to17

V a r i o us r e l a t e d a r g um e nt s war r a nt l i t t l e di s c us s i o n. Ear t hLi nk 8 cont end s t h at “t h e FC C prof f er ed [§] 27 1 un b u n d l i n g as an ef f ect i ve b acks t o p for c om p et i t or s i n l i gh t of t h e [ T ri enn i a lR evi ew O rder ’s] el i m i n at i on of

[ § ] 25 1 un b u n d l i n g. ” H ow ever , i n t h e pass age Ear t hLi nk c i t e s i n s up p o r t , t he FC C mer e l y c o nc l ude d t ha t § 271
o b li g ation s are in d ep en d en t f ro m th o se in § 2 5 1 , n o t t h at t h e f or m er m u st rem a in in p lace w h ere v er th e latter h av e b ee n li fted

. S ee T ri enn i a lR evi ew O rder , 1 8 F .C .C .R . at 1 7 ,3 8 5

- 8 6

. A l so, ac cor d i n g t o E ar t h Link, t h e FC C f ai l ed t o proper l y consi d er th e w h o lesa le m ark et. N o t so . T h e F C C e x p lain ed its l ac k of c o n ce rn in th e w h o le s a le m a r k e t ; in its v ie w , t h e C L E C s h a v e a lt e r n a te w a ys to c o m p e te a n d th e B O C s w ill b e in c lin e d t o o ffe r re a so n a b le whol e s a l e r a t e s be c a us e t he y f a c e “i nt e ns e i nt e r m o da l c o m pe t i t i o n” i nduc i ng t he m , “e v e n i n t he abs e nc e of [ §] 271 unbundl i ng , ” t o “f i nd
w ay s t o kee p t r af

f i c ‘on- n et

. ’” O rder ¶ 2 6 ; s e e al s o i d. ¶ 28 ( r e

j e c t i ng arg u m en t t h at “ a fu ll y co m p etit ive w h o lesa le m a r k et is a m an d ato ry p rec u rso r” to fo rb ea ran ce ). the pre sent circ umstances, a nd we fi nd no “abr

upt depar ture” from F CC prece dent. W

is. Valley Improv eme nt v. FERC , 236 F .3 d 7 38 , 7 48 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 1) ; se eals o M oto r V e hic leMf rs. Ass’n , 4 63 U. S. at 42 ; Gre ate r B os ton Te le v isi on Cor p. v . FCC , 44 4 F .2 d 841 , 8 52 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 0) (“ [A]n a g e nc y c ha ng ingits course m ust supply

a re asoned a

naly sis indicating that pr ior policies and standa

rds ar e being deliberately chang ed . . . .”)

. R at h er, the ag ency

rea sonably

tailored its analy sis to the situation at hand. 8
C
F ina lly , th e re c or d s up po rt s the F CC’ s f or be ara nc e de te rm ination. Given the F CC’s forwar d-lookinginterpre tati on and appl ic ati o n o f th e s tatute , th e a g e n c y o n ly n e e d e d to s h o wthat the po sit ive sh or

t- te rm imp a c t of

un bund lin gwo uld be o utwe ighe d b y

the lon g e r- te rm

po sit ive imp a c t th at not

unbundling18 would have on r ates, c onsumers, and the public interest. The rec ord her e is up to the task.
The F CC reasonably

conclude d the bene fits of unbundling wer e “mo d es t , ” pointing to, among othe r thing s, evidenc e of intermod al competit ion indicating that cable mode m service—not I L ECs—is the nationwide broadba nd marke t leader with a solid majority

. See, e .g. , Or de r ¶ 22 (c iting Industry Analy sis and Tec hnology Division, FCC, H

ig h

- S p e e d S e rv ic es for Internet Acce

ss: Status as of June 30, 2003 , tbls. 3, 4 (De c. 2003)). Indeed, the FCC relied on a re port that is a later iteration of the study relied upon in the Triennial Review Order to find a sufficie ntly

“compe titive environment,” 18 F.C.C.R. at 17,151- 52 —a fi nd ingwe up he ld i n r e so un din gte rm s: [W]e a g re e wi th the [F CC] tha t ro bu st int e rm od a l c omp e titio n f ro m ca ble p ro vid e rs —th e e xiste nc e of wh ic h is supported by

very strong rec ord evidenc e, including c able’ s maintenanc e of a

broadba nd marke t s h are on the orde r of 60%—mea

ns that even if a ll CL ECs were driven from the broadba nd marke t, mass market c onsumers wil l still have the bene fits of competition betwee n cable providers a nd I L ECs

. UST A II , 359 F.3d at 582 (citation omitted). It can ha rdly be irrational, then, to sim ilarly find sufficie nt competition in the pr e se nt c a se . T hat is, it is re a so na ble to c on c lud e that th e B OC s’ seconda ry marke t positi on relative to cable inter net provider s ten d s to mi ti g ate th e im p a c t o f f o r b e ar an c e o n th e s tate of c omp e tit ion in the br oa db and mark e t, e sp e c ia lly where cab le internet provide rs themselves a re not re quired to unbundle.
EarthL ink’s proff

ere d evidenc e and statis t i ca l analy sis are not to the contrar

y and its fra

ntic cla i m t h at t he Order is p re m i sed on a “ momentous new ec onomic theory”—one that19 “re verse [s] deca des o f communications prece dent” by finding that “duopoly

now equates to rig orous comp e ti ti o n ”—misses the mark. The FCC nowher e asse rts that cable ’s majority marke t share alone is dispositive, only that, in light of the var ious other circ umstances, it l ends support to the forbear ance decision in the prese nt case

. In t h e agency ’s view, “ [t ]he broadband ma rket is still an e me rg ingand

c ha ng ingmark e t, whe re , a s the [F CC] pr e vio us ly ha s c on c lud e d, the pr e c on dit ion s f or mon op oly

are no t pr e se nt. I n p arti c u la

r , a c tu a l a

n d p o te n ti a l i n te r

mo d a l c o mp e ti tion inf or ms r atio na l c omp etitor s’ de c isi on s c on c e rn ingne xtg ener ation broadba

nd techn o logie s.” Order ¶ 2 2 ( fo otn ote omitted). The F CC cited its prior decision in which it elaborated on that th ou g ht:
The fa cts that diffe rent c ompanies ar e usingdiffer ent technolog ies to bringbroadba nd to residential consum ers andth atea chex i s t i n g b ro adb an d t ec hn o l o gy

h as adv antage s and disadva

ntag es as a

means of de live ry to mill ions of customers ope ns the possibili ty of intermodal c ompetition, like that betwee n trucks, tra ins, and planes in transportation.

. . . Anti -compe tit ive c oo rd inatio n amon gc omp e tit or s is dif fi c ult in s uc h ma

rk e ts.
In qu iry Con c e rn ing

theDe plo y me nt o f A dv an c e d Te le c om ms
. Capability , 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2423-24 (1999) (footnotes o m i tt ed ) ( ci t i n g Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &W illiamson Tobacco Corp. , 509 U.S. 209, 238 (1993) (“ Tac it coordination is f a c ili tate d b y

a sta ble mark e t e nv ir onme nt, fu ng ibl e pr od

uc ts, and a small number of va riables upon whic h the firms see king to c oo rd inate the ir

pr ic ingmay

fo c us.” )) ; see also Rulem aking to Amend Part 1, 2, 21, and 25 of the Commission’s Rules , 15 F.C.C.R. 11,857, 11,864-65 (2000). This r ep r e sents the ag ency ’s expert assessment, and w e examine “n ot whether the FCC’s20

Cf

. W. Co a lT

r a f f i c L e a g u e v
. S u r

f a c e T r a n s p
. Bd

. , 16 9 F. 3d 9 7 7 5 , 77 8

- 7 9 ( D

. C

. C ir. 19 9 9 ) ( u p h ol d i n g age n cy ’s concl u si on t h at m er ger w ou l d r es u l t i n “ri val r y , n ot col l u si on ”; age n cy had exp l ai n ed t ha t “‘ t he o ut c o m e w he r e jus t t wo c o m pa ni e s of f e r t he o nl y s i g ni f

i c a nt com p et i t i ve a l t er n at i ves i n a m ar ket m ay r ange a ll th e w ay f r om i nt e ns e r i v a l r y t o c o l l us i o n, de pe ndi ng o n t he ci r c um s t a nc e s o f t he i n d u str y’ ” (c ita tio n o m itte d )); FT C v
. H

. J

. He i nz C o. , 2 4 6 F. 3 d 708, 7 1 7 ( D

. C

. C i r
. 20 0 1 ) ( st at i n g t h at w h er e d i st r i ct court f ou n d “t h er e had b een n o s i gn i f

i cant ent r i es i n t h e b aby f ood m ar ket i n decades a n d t h at n e w e n try w a s ‘ d iffic u lt an d im p r o b a b le ,’ ” th is fin d in g “ la rg e ly
e l i m i na t e s t he po s s i bi l i t y t ha t t he r e duc e d c o m pe t i t i on c a us e d by t he [ t h r ee- t o- t w o ] m er ger w i l l be am el i or at ed b y new com p et i t i on f r om o u tsi d ers” (cit ation om it ted )). e c on omi c c on c lus ion s are c or re c t or are the on e s th at w e wo uld rea ch on our own, but only whether they are rea sonable.” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc ., --- F.3d -

--- , 2006 WL1789003, at *10 ( D

. C. Ci r
. Jun e 3 0 , 2 0 0 6 )

. We f in d th e F CC ’ s e xp la

n ation rea sonable. 9
Nor a re w e g iven suffic ient caus e to sec ond-guess the FCC’s pre dictions. “[A] n ag ency ’s pre dictive judg ments about are as th at a

r e w it h in th e a g e n c y ’ s f

ie ld o f d is c r e ti o nand expertise are entitled to particularly deferential revie w, as long as they are rea sonable,” id. at *12 (e mp h asi s added) (interna l quotation marks and c itation omit ted), a nd nee d n ot rest on “pure fac tual deter

minations,” FCC

v . W NCN L is te ne rs G uil

d, 450 U.S. 582, 594 (1981). Se eTim eW ar ne r E ntm ’t Co. v . FCC , 240 F.3d 1126, 1133 ( D.C. Cir. 2001) (“ S ubstantial evidenc e does n o trequire a complete fac tual rec ord—we must give a pp ro pr iate de fe re nc e to pr e dic tiv e jud g me nts th at nec e ssa ri ly involve the expertise and e x perie nce of the ag ency .”).
Her e, the F CC’s predictions about the development of new broadba nd technolog ies and a

bou tthe incentives f

or incre ased deploy ment (and, in turn, incr ease d competition) flowingfrom21

Ear t hLi nk ’ s s ug ges t i o n t ha t f o r be a r a nc e f

r o m § 271 10 cont r avenes F C C prec eden t by den y i n g C LE C s t h e prot ect i on s of § § 20 1 and 20 2 i s m er i t l es s. T h e O rder g ra n te d fo rb e a r a n c e a s to § 271, no t §§ 201 a nd 202. an abse nce of

unbundling a

re w ell within the ag enc y ’s ar ea of ex pertise. Indeed, the y

echo pr edictions made in the Tr ie nnial Re v ie w O rd

e r an d up h el d in USTA II

. See, e .g. , USTA II

, 359 F.3d at 584 (“Abse nce of

unbundling . . . will g ive all par ties an inc e nti ve to t ake a sh ot at thi s p ote nti a lly luc ra tiv e mark e t.” ); id

. at 581 (re jectingCL EC’s argument that decision re sted on “pure sp ecul atio n” ); Triennial Review Order , 18 F.C.C.R. at 17,144 (a nti c ipatin g ne w techno log ie s) ; cf. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 6 9 F .3 d 7 52 , 7 63 n. 4 (6 th Cir

. 19 95 ) (d e c lin ingto d e fe r t o F CC’ s p re dic tiv e ju dg me nt a bo ut i nc re a se d c omp e tit ion in cellular marke t). Moreove r, FCC is f ully capa ble of re assessing the situation if its pre dictions are not bor ne out. See O rder

¶ 26 n.84.
EarthL ink contends that invocation of the disincentiv es associate d with § 251 unbundling is improper beca use they are more acute than those assoc iated with § 271 unbundling. Sec tion 251, EarthL ink points out , require s I L EC s to provide the n et w o rk el em en t s atco s t -b as ed(s o -c al l ed“T E L R I C ”) p ri ci n g, while § 271 oper ates unde r the more relax ed “just and r easonable” standard of

47 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 202. S e e U S TA II , 359 F .3 d at 58 9- 90 ; 47 U. S.C. § 2 52 (d)( 1) . N on e the le ss, e ve n if unbundling unde r § 271 would produc e mar g inallyless disincentive, the FCC rea sonably conclude d there would still be a signific ant deter

rent due to costs inherent in complying w ith any unbundling mandate. See, e .g ., Order ¶¶ 25, 34. 10
In sum , the FCC, re asonably weighed pre sent conditions and future dev elopments in determiningwhat is nec essar y for just and rea sonable rates, “ne cessa ry for the pr ot ection of22

c on sume rs ,” and

“ c on sis te nt w iththe pu

bli c int e re st, ” 47 U. S.C. § 1 60 (a), and

made a “ratio na l c onne c tio n b e tw e e n th e fa c ts fo und and the c hoice made .” AT& T Corp. , 2 2 0 F

. 3 d at 616 (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted).
III
For the fore g oing r easons, Ea rthL ink’s petition for re view is
Denied

.