UN IT ED ST AT ES CO UR T O F A PP EA LS FO R V ET ER AN S C LA IMS

N O . 04 -24 96 (E ) M EL VI N A PONTE , A P P EL LA NT ,

V . R. J A M ES N I CHOL S ON , S ECR ETA RY OF V ETER A N S A FF AI RS , A PP ELL EE .
On Ap pe llant' s App lic ati on

fo r A tto rne y F ees an d E xp en ses (Argued July 10, 2007 Decided September 24, 2007 )

Ro be rt V . C his ho lm , o f Pr o v i de nc e, Rho de Is la nd , wi th who m Elizabeth H. Goldberg , of Hy att sv ill e, Mar

yland , w as o n th e p lea din g, fo r th e ap pe llant. Kerry J. Loring , wi th who m Tim S. McClain , Ge ne ral Counse l; R. Ra nd all Ca mp be ll , As sistantGeneral Counsel; and Br ian B. Ri pp el , De puty As sis tant G en era l C ouns el, all of W ash ing ton , D .C ., we re o n th e p lea din g, fo r th e ap pe lle e. Before MOORMAN , LANCE , and SCHOELEN, Ju dges . SCH OELEN, Judge , filed the opini on of the Court. LANCE, Judge , f ile d a dis senting opinion. SCHOEL EN, Judge : Pe nd ingb ef ore th e Co urt

is Mel vin Ap onte' s ap pli cat ion

fo r attor ne y fees and expenses purs uant to the Equal Access to Just ic e Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). He
see ks a tota l of

$1 3, 89 7. 74 in atto rne y f ees an d e xp en ses fo r w ork pe rf orm ed byatt orn ey Elizabeth H. Goldber g. For the following rea sons, we wi ll grant Mr. Aponte 's application i n the reduced amount of $12,621.74

.
I. BACKGROUND Mr. Aponte appeal ed a December 15, 2004, Board of Veterans' A pp ea ls (Board) deci sion that de nie d an in cre ase d d isa bil ityrat ingg reater

th an2 0% fo r t

he rig ht l eg an d 1 0% f

or t he lef t le g2

for compartment syndrome, status post -fasciotomy. On Novem ber 28, 2005, the parties filed a j oint
m oti on fo r re m an d (J MR), i n whic h th eyag ree d th at t he re we re err ors in

th e De cem

be r 20 04 Bo ard decisio n an d in a M arch 2003 VA medical examination. The Court granted t he JMR on December 5, 2005. On De cem be r 19 , 2 00 5, Mr. Ap onte, thr ou ghc ouns el, f ile d an a pp lic ati on

fo r attor ne y f ees and expenses underthe EAJA. In his appli cation, he se eks r ei mbur se ment for (1) 76.7 hours for "A tto rne y w ork " pe rf

orm ed b y att orn eyE liz ab eth

H

. Go ldb erg and

b ill ed at the rat e o f $ 15 9. 52 pe r hour; (2) 14.6 hour s for "Paralega l work" performed by Ms. Goldberg and bil led at the rate of $110 pe r ho ur; an d (3 ) $5 6. 56 in e xp en ses in curre d f

or p ho toc op yin g, po sta ge , p ark ingfe es, an d s ub way fares . App ell ant' s App lic ati on fo r A tto rne y F ees an d E xp en ses (Appl.) at 6, 17. In r esp on se t o Mr. Ap onte' s E AJA a

pp lic ati on , th e Secr etary c on ced es t hat an EA JAaw ard

is w arr anted

in t his case and conte sts only the amount that Mr. Aponte seeks, whic h he contends is "unreasonabl e" and "ex ces siv e o n it s f

ace ." S ecr etary' s R esp on se ( Re sp .) at 1- 2. Th e S ecr etary a lso sp eci fi cal ly o pp os es time billed for resea rch, brief writ ing, and prepar ation of the JMR. Id. at 3 -4. In r ep ly, Mr. Ap onte
ar gu es th atth e S ec re ta ry do es no t s ub st an ti at e h is al le ga tions rega rdi ng th e e xc es si ve ne ss of t he ti me billed. Reply a t 5-6. In January 2007, t he Court ordere d supplemental briefing to a ddress the e ffe ct of Ri ch lin Se cu rit y S erv iceCo . v . C

he rto ff , 472 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006), reh 'g de nie d , 482 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007), pe tit ion for

cer t. f ile d , (U.S. June 25, 2007) ( No. 06-1717) , on the clai m of reimburse ment for "par alegal work" in the inst ant case. I n Ri ch lin , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fe de ral Ci rcu it ( Fe de ral Circ uit ) hel d that "paral eg al se rvi ces are no t rec ov era ble as fe es, but ar e on ly r eco ve rab le a s expe ns es at co st t o th e attor ne y. " Id. at 1 38 1. The Court or de red Mr. A po nte to provide t he Court with the cost of parale gal s ervices to hi s at torney and to present ar gument why Ri ch lin would not be control ling. In res po ns e, M r. Ap onte arg ue s th at Ri ch lin is not appl icable in t his c ase be cause unlike the paralegal tas ks billed i n Richlin, the tasks billed as "paralegal work" in this case were performed by
anatt orney, and that he so ug ht t he "paral eg al r ate " on ly i n th e ex erc ise of bil lin g ju dg m ent. Ap pe llant' s S up ple m ental (Su pp l.) App l. at

3-7. At oral argum ent, Mr . Ap onte f urt he r clarif ied his position by st ating thatmuch of the work bill ed as "parale gal work" could have bee n provided by a p ara leg al; ho we ve r, h e ar gu ed that m uc h o f t he wo rk i n th is c ase lies in t he "g ray are a" o f w ork3

that can b e p erf

orm ed by either a paraleg al o r an att orn ey . T he Se cre tar

y re sp on ds that, u

nd er Ri ch lin , paralegal services may only be recovered as an expens e to the a ttorney, r egardless of who pe rf orm s th e w ork . S ecr etary' s S up pl. Re sp . at 3, 9. The Secretar y submi ts t hat th e C ourt c an cal cu lat e th e co st o f paral eg al ser vic es to anatto rne y byre so rti ng to th e U .S . D ep artm ent of La bo r, Bureau of Labor Statist ics (BLS), the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the Natio na l A sso ciatio n o f L eg al A ssi stants (N AL A) . T he Se cretary argue s th at an a pp rop riate r ate fo r re co ve ry o f paral eg al se rvi ces wou ld be : (1) Ac co rdi ng to O PM , $ 18 .6 0 to $2 2. 51 pe r ho ur i n the W ash ing ton , D .C ., are a; ( 2) a cco rdi ng to BL S, $2 3. 12 pe r ho ur i n th e W ash ing ton , D .C ., are a; and (3) accor ding to NALA a national aver age of $21.33 per hour. Id. at 1 0-1 1. Th e S ecr etary a lso cites a c ase from the U.S. District Court for the Dis trictof Columbi a aw ar di ng $35 per hourfor paralegal services

. Id. at 11 (cit ing Kooritzky v. Herman , 6 F. Su pp . 2 d 1 3, 20 (D .D .C . 1 99 8))

. After briefing was completed, Mr. Apo nt e fi le d a supplemental affidavit in which he pro vid ed a s am pli ng o f the c os t o f o bta ini ng paral eg al s erv ice s f rom thr ee e m plo ym ent ag en cie s in the W ash ing ton , D .C ., are a. Th e av era ge sam ple wa s $ 35 .1 7 p er h our (w ith a h igh er o ve rti m e rate)

. Th e S ecr etary f

ile d an o pp os iti on

s tat ingth at tho se pri ces h av e a p rof it t o th e em

plo ym ent ag en cy bu ilt int o th em

an d, the ref

ore , are n ot i nd icativ e o f a ctu al c os t.

II. AN AL YS IS A. Ap pli cab le L aw Th is C ourt h as j uri sd ict ion to award atto rne y f

ees pursuant to 28 U .S .C . § 24 12 (d) (2) (F ). Mr. Ap onte' s E AJA a

pp lic ati on

wa s f ile d w ith in t

he 30 -day E AJA a

pp lic ati on

period s et f

ort h in 28 U .S .C . § 24 12 (d) (1) (B ), and the ap pli cat ion

m eet s th e st atutor

y c ontent re qu ire m ents b eca us e it
co nta ins (1) a show ingthat he is a pre va ili ng party ; (2 ) a s ho wi ng that he is a partyeli gib le f

or an aw ar d b ec au se hi s n etwor th do es no t e xc ee d $ 2, 00 0, 00 0; (3 ) a n a ll eg at io n t ha t t he Se cr et ary's position was notsubsta nt ia lly just ified; and (4) an itemized state ment of the attorney fees and expenses sought. Se e 2 8 U. S. C. § 2 41 2(d )(1 )(A ), (1) (B ), ( 2)( B) ; Scarborough v. Princi pi , 541 U.S. 401, 408 (2004). The Secret ary present s no argument with respectto prevai li ng -p art y status or whether the Secr etary's positi on was substanti ally just ified. The Secreta ry di sputes only t he
rea so na ble ne ss o f t

he fe e.4

Therefore, the Court must determine what amount constitut es reasonable at torney fees and expenses in t his case. Se e 28 U. S. C. § 2 41 2(d )(2 )(A ); Pe rry v . We st , 11 Ve t.A

pp . 3 19 , 3 27 (19 98 ). "T he Co urt

ha s w ide dis cre tio n in

the aw ard

of att orn eyfees unde r th e E AJA. " Ch ess er v . We st , 11 Ve t.A pp . 4 97 , 5 01 (19 98 ). "T he ' pro du ct o f r eas on ab le h ours t im es a rea so na ble rat e' no rm all y pro vid es a

' rea so na ble ' att orn ey ' s f

ee. " Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984) (quoti ng He ns ley
v. Ec ker ha rt , 4 61 U. S. 42 4, 43 4 (1 98 3)) . "T he [C ourt] m us t det ermine n ot j us t th e ac tua l ho urs expe nd ed by counse l, but which of those hours were reasonabl y expended in the l itigat ion." Ramos v. Lamm , 7 13 F. 2d 54 6, 55 3 (1 0th

Ci r. 1 98 3). In that r eg ard , th e C ourt w ill co ns ide r whe the r the ho urs cla im ed

we re ( 1) unrea so na

ble o n the ir fa ce, (2 ) o the rw ise c ontra ind icated b y the fa cto rs itemized in He ns ley , 4 61 U.S. at 43 0 n .3 , o r Ussery v. Brown , 10 Vet.App. 51, 53 (1997), for measuring reasonablene ss, or(3) pers uasively opposed by the Secret ary. Se e C hesse r , 11 Vet.App. at 5 01 -02 . In

ad dit ion , th e C ourt m ayred uc e th e n um be r of ho urs cla im ed

fo r "d up lic ati ve , un org an ize d, or o the rw ise un pro du cti ve ef

fo rts ." Vidal v. Brown , 8 Ve t.A pp . 48 8, 493 (1996 ). "'Hours that are notproperly bi lled to one's client are notproperly bi lled to one's advers ary pursuant to st atutor y autho rity. ' " He ns ley , 461 U.S. at 434 (quoting Co pe lan d v . Ma rsh all , 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D .C . C ir. 19 80 ) (e n b an c)) . T he ap pe llant b ears the burdenof de m on str ati ng the rea so na ble ne ss of the fee request. See Blum , 465 U.S. at 897. In Sandoval v. Brown , 9 Vet.App. 177 (1996), this Court held that, for the Washington, D.C., area (i n which Ms. Goldberg pra ctices) , th e prevail ing market rate for para legal ser vices may be cal cu lat ed

by ref err ingto what is co mm on ly k no wn as t he La ffe yMatrix, a matrix published by the U.S. Attorney's Off

ice for the Dist rict of Columbia setting forth whatmay be considered a "reasonabl e" attor ney fee rate for att orneys of varying exper iences, par alegals, a nd law clerks. Id. at 181 (cit ing Co vingto n v . D ist. o f C olu mb ia , 8 39 F. Su

pp . 89 4, 90 4-0 5 (D .D .C . 1 99 3)) ; seeLa ffe y v. No rth west A irl ine

s, Inc

. , 5 72 F. Su

pp . 3 54 , 37 1 (D .D .C

. 19 83 ). O the r c ourts h av e als o loo ke d to the reasonable market rate for bil ling p ar alegal se rvices t o determine the appropr iate ra te for rei m burse m ent un de r t

he EA JA . S

ee, e. g. , R oleMod

els Am ., Inc . v . B ro wn lee , 353 F.3d 962, 970 (D .C . C ir. 20 04 ); Jean v. Nelson , 8 63 F. 2d 75 9, 778 (11t h Cir. 19 88 ); Hines v. Sec'y of Health & Hu ma n S erv s. , 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 755-56 (1991). Bu t se e K oo rit zky , su pra (awar ding reimbursement fo r paral eg al s erv ice s as anexpe ns e at co st t o th e attor

ne y rathe r th anas a

fe e).R ic h lin ef f ect i vel y over r ul ed Sandovali nsof ar a s t he C our t m ay no l onger us e t he Laf f ey M at r i x t o det er m i ne 1 t he ap propri at e r at e of r ei m bu r sem ent f or w ork perf

orm ed b y pa r al ega l s. Our d i s s en t i ng c ol l ea gu e pl ac es wei gh t u po n t he f ac t t ha t t he F ed er al Ci r cu i t i n R ic h lin di d not r equi r e a 2 d e ta iled sh o w in g re g a rd in g th e a c tu a l ex p e n se o f e m p lo y in g p a ra le g a ls. It is tru e th a t t h e B o a rd o f C o n tra c t A p p e a ls had no i nf

or m at i on r egar di ng t he a ct ual cos t t o t he f i r m of t he pa r al egal s er vi ces i n R ic h lin an d t h at it ch o se t o aw ard w hat i t cons i der ed a r eas onabl e c ost of such par al egal ser vi ces t o t he f i r m r at her t han deny e nt i r el y r ecove r y f or par al egal se rv ic e s. See Ri chl i n Sec

. Ser vs . C o. v. U

. S. D ep' t

. of Jus t i ce , 2005- 2 B

. C

. A

. ( C C H ) ¶ 33, 021 ( D

. O

. T. B

. C

. A

. June 30, 5 In Ri ch lin , th e F ed era l C irc uit he ld t hat th e E AJA d id n ot a llo w r eco ve ry at the m ark et r ate for paralegal fees. Instead, t he Federal Cir cuit held t hat t he EAJA al lows only for reimbursement for paralegal servic es a t th e costto the att orney. Ri ch lin , 472 F.3d at 1381. In so holdi ng, the Fe de ral Ci rcu it f

ound that w ork don e b y a

paral eg al c ou ld n ot b e co ns ide red "attor ne ys fe es" un de r 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Id. at 1377. Furthermore, the Federal Circui t disti nguished the hol ding of the U.S. Suprem e Court in Missouri v. Jenkins , 4 91 U.S . 27 4 (19 89 ), th at re im burse m ent at th e m ark et rate for paral egal services was appropriat e in civi l rights cases. Id. at 1 37 5-7 6. Th e F ed era l C irc uit fo un d th at b oth

the lan gu ag e o f t

he E AJA an d its le gis lat ive h ist ory su pp ort ed the co nc lus ion

that paral eg al s erv ice s co uld

on ly b e rec ov ere d as an

exp en se at th e co st t o th e attor ne y, rathe r th anas a f ee at th e m ark et r ate
. Id. at 1377-81. 1 B. Whe the r th e $ 11 0 P er H our R ate Is A pp rop riate Mr. Ap onte s eek s re im

burse m ent at

a re du ced

rat e o f $ 11 0 p er h our fo r wh at he ter m ed in his origi nal EAJA appli cation as " paralegal work" performed by his attorney – the market rate for bil lin g p ara leg al s erv ice s in the W ash ing ton, D.C. , area , a s in dic ate d in the La ffe yMatrix. Ap pe llant' s S up pl. Ap pl. at 1 8, E xh ibi t. (E xh .) A. Ha d tho se ser vic es be enp rov ide d b y a

paral eg al, the result in this case would be clear – Ri ch lin dict ate s that Mr . Apo nte co uld on ly r eco ve r th e ac tua l cost of paralega l servic es to his at torney. Se e 472 F.3d at 1381. Howeve r, i n this case , the tasks de sig nated

as " paral eg al w ork " w ere act ua llype rf orm ed byan attorney. Thus , th e C ourt m us t de ter m ine the ap pro pri ate rat e f or r eim burse m ent, i f any , f

or t he se t ask s. At the outse t, w e rej ect

the S ecr etary' s ar gum ent th at t he tim e b ill ed

in t his cas e at

the low er rat e is rec ov era

ble on ly a s an

expe ns e. Si m

ply put, t he re is no re aso ne d b asi s b y whic h th e C ourt
can measure an "e xp en se" inc urr ed byanatt orn eype rf

orm ingparal eg al s erv ice s. Un lik e the attorneys in Ri ch lin , who cle arl y in curred so m e expe ns e b y e m plo yin g p ara leg als , M s. Go ldb erg inc urr ed no "expe ns e" whe n s he he rse lf pe rf orm ed paral eg al s erv ice s. Sh e d id n ot p aya p ara leg al 22005)

. H ow ever , t he i ss ue of w hat w as a r eas onabl e or a ppr opr i at e expens e f or par al egal s er vi ces w as not bef or e t he Feder al C i r cui t i n R ic h lin b e c a u se th e a p p e llan t d id n o t rais e th e iss u e o n a p p e a l. S e e R ic h lin , 4 7 2 F .3 d a t 1 3 8 1 ("R ic h lin d o es no t ch all en g e the B o ard [ of C o n t rac t A p p ea l s' ] $3 5 pe r ho u r co st f i g u re."). A ss um i ng M s. G ol dber g' s ent i r e pr act i ce i s bas ed upon c ont i ngent
- f ee w or k ( and w e ha ve no know l edge of 3 t h e n atu re o f he r prac t i ce ex ce p t t h at sh e is a so l o pra cti t i o n er), he r bil l i n g rat e w o u l d no t b e a p arti cu l arly g o o d m ea su re of her opp ort un i t y co st beca use she w ou l d co l l ect a f ee on l y i n cases w here her cl i ent prevai l s. 6 a salary. She did not enterinto a contr act for paral egal servi ces. She expended nothi ng but her own ti me do in g wo rkth atsh e be li ev edc ou lda ls o ha ve b ee n do ne b y apa ra le ga l. To be su re , h erti me has value. The val ue of her time can be measured by the opportunity cost – that is, the value of the forgone opportunity to per form other work duri ng the 14.6 hours she bi lled as " paralegal work." An approximate measure of Ms. Goldberg's opportunity costis her attorney bill ing rate, presuming she could have bil led anotherclient for t he 14.6 hours s he spentdoing this work. However, allowing 3 a p rev ail ingpartyto re co ve r " expe ns es" h is att orn eyin curre d in pro vid ingp ara leg al s erv ice s b ase d up on the op po rtunit

y c os t to the att orn eycan

cre ate the pe rve rse resu lt th at th e pre va ili ng party is rei m burse d at a r ate gre ate r th anthe EA JA ' s m ax im um att orn ey -f

ee r ate be cause th e E AJA attorney- fee limitation does not apply to expenses . That we will not al low. Th at d oe s n ot en d the m att er, h ow ev er, b eca us e the S ecr etary' s ar gum ent is no t si m ply that Mr. Ap onte m ayrec ov er f or " paral eg al t ask s" o nly

as an e xp en se. T he S ecr etary co nte nd s th at e ve n if we all owrec ov ery

fo r the se ta sk s as a f

ee, not as exp en ses , w e m us t re du ce t

he rat e o f r eco ve ry to that which would be recoverabl e had the wo rka ct ua ll y been per form ed by a parale gal. The Se cre tar y d raw s su pp ort fro m a deci sio n of

the U .S . Co urt

of App eal s fo r the Fif

th C irc uit , whic h was later quot ed favorably by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jenkins

.

It ha s fr eq ue ntl y b een

rec og niz ed

in t he low er c ourts that paral eg als are cap ab le of carrying out many tasks, under t he s up er vi si on of an attorney, tha t might other wi se b e p erf

orm ed bya lawy er and

bil led at a hig he r rate. Su ch

wo rk m ight include, for example, factual inve stigati on, including l ocating and i nterviewing witnesses; assista nce with deposit ions, interrogatori es, and document production; co m pil ati on of statis tic al and

fi nanc ial data; ch eck ing leg al c itatio ns ; an d drafting co rre sp on de nc e. Mu chsu chwor k lie s in a g ray are a o f t ask s th at m ight ap pro pri ate ly be p erf orm ed e ith er byan att orn eyo r a p ara leg al. T o the e xte nt that f ee applicants un de r [ the c ivi l r ights statut e] are no t p erm itt ed to b ill f or the w ork

of paral eg als at m ark et r ate s, it would

no t be surpr isi ng to s ee a gre ate r am ount o f s uc h w ork performed by attorneys themselves, thus i ncreasing t he overall cost of liti gation.7 Of co urs e, purely cle ric al o r se cre tar ial tas ks sh ou ld n ot b e b ill ed at a paral eg al rate, re gardless of who performs them. W hat the c ou rtin Jo hn so n v . G eo rg ia Hi gh wa y E xpress, In c. , 488 F.2d 714, 717 ([5th Cir.] 1974), said in r egard to the wo rk o f atto rne ys is appli cab le b y ana log y to paral eg als : "I t is ap pro pri ate to distingui sh between legal work, in t he st rict se nse, and invest igation, cl erical work, co m pil ati on of fa cts an d s tat ist ics an d o the r w ork wh ich can of ten be acc om pli sh ed byno n-l awye rs b ut whic h a lawye r m ay

do be cau se he h as no o the r h elp av ail ab le. Su ch n on -l egal work may command a lesser rate. Its do lla r va lueis n ot e nh an ced jus t be ca us e a law

yer do es i t ." Jenkins , 4 91 U. S. at 2 88 n. 10 (em ph asi s ad de d). The Court is mindful of the Supreme C ourt's concern , ex pres sed in Jen kin s, that tas ks ord inaril y p erf

orm ed byparal eg als m ight m igr ate to att orn ey s so that th eycan be bil led at an attorney r ate in orde r to rece ive incre ased reimbursemen t forfees and expenses inc urred duri ng litiga tion. See id. The Court is als o guided by the Feder al Ci rc uit's concern in Ri ch lin that the rei m burse m ent of

p ara leg al tas ks in

th e ab sen ce of

a s tat uto ry cap m ight g ive a

bu sin ess or l awfi rm the in centiv e to sh if

t w ork f rom atto rne ys to p ara leg als in o rde r t o inc rea se its potential EAJA award. Se e R ich lin , 472 F.3d at 1380-81. The Court shares these concerns and has no int ention of endorsing any pr actice wher e work is character ized as billed by an individual within an organization
m ere ly a s an

att em pt t o rec eiv e inc rea sed

EA JArei m

burse m ent. H ere , M r. A

po nte ' s attor

ne y w as not employed by a firm or business that has par alegals on s taff. Mo reo ve r, t o re du ce the rate Mr. Apo nte m ayre co ve r f or wh at Ms. Go ldb erg de scr ibe d a s "paral eg al w ork " in th e ini tia l app lic ati on , we wou ld have to m ak e a fi nd ing that the wo rk p erf

orm ed was "parale gal work" and tha t suc h "p aralegal work" can be dist inguished from "attorney work." Th at w e w ill no t do. Firs t, we are no t co nv inc ed bythe Se cre tar

y' s ar gum ent th at M r. A

po nte
co nc ed ed in h is i nit ial ap pli cat ion

that the wo rk b ill ed

as " paral eg al w ork " can o nly be bil led at a paralegal rate. In Mr. Aponte' s reply, his pleadi ng filed in respons e to Ri ch lin , an d at o ral arg um ent, he has maintained thatthe label "parale gal work" was not i ntende d to h av e such si gnificance, but was merely intended to reflect an exer cise of billi ng judgment. W e agr ee wit h Mr. Aponte tha t heO ur di ss ent i ng col l eague r el i es on Z P v . B r o wn , 8 V et
. A pp. 303 ( 1995) ( per cur i am or der ) , f or t he pr oposi t i on 4 t hat a c onces si on by a par t y t hat a pa r al egal m i ght have per f or m ed c er t ai n t as ks i s bi ndi ng on a pa r t y. A l t hough he c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e l a n g u a g e f r o m ZP a s t he h ol di ng o f t he Cour t , t he C our t i n ZP dec i ded onl y t he i ss ue of ent i t l em ent t o an EA JA aw ar d and t hen di r ect ed t he s chedul i ng of a c onf er ence t o r es ol ve t he mat t er of t he am ount of

t he f ees aw arded. B eca use t he l anguage r el i ed upon by our col l eague i n ZP i s no t r el ev an t t o t he Cour t ' s ho l di ng , i t i s ob i t er di ct um a nd i s not bi ndi ng on t he C our t
. Even i f w e w er e bound by ZP , i t i s d istin g u ish a b le fro m th is c a se b e c a u se , i n ZP , t he a ppel l ant conc eded t hat t he w or k per f or m ed s houl d be c om pens at ed a t a l es se r r at e and, i n t hi s cas e, t he a ppel l ant h a s m a d e n o su c h c o n c e ss io n , b u t h a s o n ly so u g h t a le ss e r ra te in th e e x e rc ise o f b ill in g ju d g m e n t. 8 did no t co nc ed e in

his ini tia l ap pli cat ion that the work don e in thi s ca se c anbe bil led

on ly at a paral eg al r ate
. 4 Mo re s ign if

icantl y, ho we ve r, w e w ill no t dr awanarb itr ary dis tin cti on

be tw een "paraleg al
wo rk" an d "atto rne y w ork ." T he re is an abu nd an ce of task s that can

be per fo rm ed

bybo th p ara leg als or attor ne ys . H ow ev er, th ere is n o cle ar lin e be tw een p ara leg al tas ks and

atto rne y tas ks

. Se e Jenkins , 491 U.S. at 288 n.10. Thus, it does not foll ow that it i s unreasonable for an attorney, esp eci all y a

so lo p rac tit ion er s uc h a s Ms . G old be rg, to b ill fo r w ork

that can b e p erf

orm ed bybo th a paralega l and an att orney. Moreover , given the broa d range of tasks tha t a paral egal is capable of doing and the la rge number of tasks that might be p er for med by eit her a paral egal or an at torney, the re i s n o w ayfo r th e C ourt t o d ef ine that whic h is purel y "p aralegal wor k, " an d th ere bylim it "attor ne y w ork " to that w hic h c anne ve r be pe rf orm ed bya p ara leg al. In c ontra st, the Co urt

ha s d ist ing uis he d leg al wo rk fr om n on leg al wo rk an d h as d ete rm ine d that nonlegal work is not com pensable underthe EAJA. See Baldr idge v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 227, 236 (2005) ("Applicant s are not perm itted to bill for and coll ect fees for cler ical work and t he work of general support staff."). Our dissenting coll eague reli es on Jenkins to s up po rt h is v iewthat an attorne y may not recover a fee g re at er than $35 perhour for "paral egal work." However, the quot at io n fr om Jenkins he rel ies up on on ly a dd res ses the dis tin cti on

be tw een leg al and no nle ga l
wo rk t hat th e C ourt a lre ad

y re co gn ize s an d d oe s n ot a dd res s the d ist inc tio n b etw een att orn eywo rk and paralega l work. See Jenkins , 4 91 U. S. at 2 88 n.10 (" 'It is app rop riate t o d ist ing uis h b etw een legal work, in t he stric t sen se , and investi gation, cle rical work, c ompilation of facts and statis tics . . . .'" (quoti ng Johnson , 4 88 F. 2d at 7 17 )). The tasks at issue in this case lie in the "gra y area" of legal tasks rec ognized in Jenkins that might be perform ed, from tim e to time, either by a paralegal or by an attor ney. Because it is not ina pp rop riate f

or an atto rne y to pe rf

orm this wor k an d be cau se th ese tas ks we re, in f act , p erf orm edI t i s not i m m edi at el y cl ear how t he Secr et ar y c am e t o t he t ot al of 23. 4 hour s and i t i s not cl ear w het her al l s uch 5 hour s w er e bi l l ed at t he r at e of $159. 52 per hour or w het her s om e of t hat t i m e w as bi l l ed a t t he r educe d r at e of $110 per hour

. The l ack of cl ar i t y as t o w hi ch pa r t i cul ar ent r i es t he Sec r et ar y obj ect s t o i n t hi s cas e c ont r i but es , i n par t , t o t he un persuasi ven ess of

t he S ecret ary' s ar gu m ents. 9 byanatt orn ey , M r. A

po nte m ight b e rei m

burse d fo r t

he se t ask s at

the fu ll atto rne y rate. Ho we ve r, this Court has encouraged at torneys to e xercise bi lling judgment, a nd, in this case, the exe rcise of bil lin g ju dg m ent le d to a cl aim of a red uc ed rate for the ho urs of

wo rk at is su e. W e f

ind the ex erc ise of thi s b ill ingjud gm ent reasonable in t his cas e. Th ere fo re, Mr. Ap onte i s entit led to r eco ve r att orn ey s f

ees un de r th e E AJA f

or t he se t ask s at

the $1 10 pe r ho ur r ate he so ug ht. Although we are mindful of the words of the U.S. Suprem e Court that a liti gant should not recover a higher fee based upon who does a par ticulartask, see Jenkins , 491 U.S. at 288 n.10, we wi ll n ot c reate what w ou ld n ece ssaril y be an arb itr ary li ne be tw een

"paral eg al w ork " an d "atto rne y work." Rather, for thes e tasks tha t might fall in the gray a rea, we will ant icip at e th e ex er ci se of
rea so na ble bil lin g ju dg m ent w he re c irc um stanc es m ak e it rea so na ble for the w ork to b e p erf

orm ed by an attorne y. C. Re aso na ble ne ss o f t

he To tal Fe e Turning to the r easonablene ss o f t he total fee sought , we first find that, cont rary to t he Se cre tar y' s su gg est ion , th e am ount s ou gh t by Mr. Ap onte i s n ot u

nre asonable on it s f

ace . In fa ct, the Secret ary provides no justificat ion whatsoever for hi s ass ertion that the fee is unreasonable on its fa ce. The Court ha s rep eat ed ly he ld th at "[ u] ns up po rte d all eg ati on s of ex ces siv e ti m e expe nd ed
are ins uf fi cie nt t o ju sti fy

a re du cti on

of ho urs ." Us ser

y , 10 Vet .App . at 5 4; seePe rry , 11 Vet.App. at 3 28 ; Sandoval , 9 Vet.App. at 181. The Secreta ry also sugges ts that t he 23 .4 hours bill ed for "br ief ing a si ng le i ssu e in cre ase d rating clai m" a nd the 5 h ours b ill ed

fo r dr af tin g th e JM R are unreasonable

. Resp. at 4. The Court rej ects thes e challenge s for the same reason.

5 Tw o s pe cif

ic and rel ate d c ha lle ng es byth e Se cre tar y are p art icu lar ly un

pe rsu asi ve and

m eri t fu rth er d isc us sio n. Fi rst , th e S ecr etary b ald ly a sse rts that "alth ou ghcouns el f

or A pp ell ant br ief

ed the issues on appeal, her br ief was filed with the ca veat thatnegotiati ons ford ev eloping a joi nt
m oti o nf o r re m an d

w e re p ro c e e d in g w it

hth e l ik e li h o o d

o f s u c c e s s . " R e s p . at 3

. S im il arly , in ch all en gin g th e to tal fe e, the Se cre tar y a sse rts that "the am ount of fees requested is .

. . gro ssl y unrea so na

ble in l ight of

the req uis ite lim ite d li tig ati on ." Id. at 4 -5. Bo th o f t he se argum ents are10

pre sented wi th th e ben ef

it of hind sig ht. Th e Co urt

has he ld th at "ju dg m ents a bo ut whe the r w ork

is duplicati ve 'm

ust be made in light of the needs of the lit igation as presented t o the attorneys at the tim e th e ho urs of se rvi ce w ere pe rf orm ed ' an d n ot i n te rm s o f an in qu isi tio n into e xa ctl y whic h h ours we re n ece ssary f

or t he pre cis e re su lt l ate r ob tai ne d. " Baldridge , 19 Vet.App. at 241(quoting Romon v. Korson , 1 99 6 U .S . D ist. LEXIS 19956, at * 1 7 (W .D . M ich . N ov . 1 5, 19 96 )). It w ou ld border on professi onal malpractice t o require a n appellant 's attorney to spen d les s time drafting a br ie f ba se d upo n t he po ss ib il it y, ho we ve r r ea so nabl e, of e nt er in g i nt o aJM R. D es pi te th e S ecr et ary's
co ntr ary rep res entat ion s at

ora l ar gum ent, i t is c lear f rom the ple ad ing s th at the Se cre tar y argu es t hat reduction of the fee i s warranted be cause Ms. Goldber g reason ab ly s ho uld have believed t hat the Se cre tar y wo uld e nte r i nto a

J MR

. Ho we ve r, b ase d u

po n a rev iewof the e-m ail s su

bm itt ed wi th M r. Ap onte' s re ply , it

ap pe ars that th e p ers ua siv en ess of Mr. Ap onte' s b rie f, at l east in par t, p rom pte d
co un sel fo r th e S ecr etary t o a gre e to a JMR

. R ep ly Ap pe nd ix at xii

. T hu s, the Co urt wi ll n ot r ed

uc e the fee sought s imp ly because t he partie s ultimately agre ed to a JMR. Se e S ca rb orou gh v. Nicholson , 1 9 V et. Ap p. 25 3, 26 6 (2 00 5) ( co ns ide rin g th e re su lt o bta ine d in determining whe the r hours were rea sonably expended ( citing He ns ley , 4 61 U. S. at 4 34 )). Ho we ve r, i n o ur r ev iewo f the to tal f ee so ug ht, we fi nd

that th e re du cti on

of the ho url y rate sought for the tas ks bill ed as " paralegal work" does not sufficient ly account for the duplicati ve natur e o f t

he wo rk and

ex ces siv e num

be r of ho urs fo r whic h the a

pp ell ant se ek s re im

burse m ent. Included in t he time billed at t he reduced r at e ar e tw o en tries t otaling 8.1 hour s for creati ng a de tailed syno ps is o f t

he m ed ica l re co rds , an e ntr y f or 0 .5 ho urs fo r as cer

tai nin g whic h p riv ate medical records were associat ed with the c laims file in Ma rch 2003, and an entry for 0.5 hours for making a list of medical records added t o the c laims file between February 1999 a nd March 2003. Appl. at 9, 13. We find that the creation of a synopsis of the m edical r ecords and the determination of which records were cr eated at whattime dupl icates t he time spent reviewing t he entire record. Accordingly, we will deny re imbursem ent for the 9.1 hours bi lled for those t asks. See Vidal , su pra . Ad dit ion all y, Mr. Ap onte s eek s rei m burse m ent f

or thr ee ho urs s pe nt dra ft ingthe tab le o f a uth ori tie s in h is b rie f. Ap pl. at 1 5. W e fi nd th e tim e bil led

f or that t ask

to be ex ces siv e. Ac co rdi ng ly, we wi ll disallow 2.5 hours of reimbursem ent sought for drafti ng the table of authoritie s, reducing t he am ount billed for tha t task to 0.5 hour s. Se e C hesse r , su pra . In sum, we will d isa llo w $ 1, 27 6 o f t he fe es11

sought, repre senting a r eduction of 11.6 hours, all of which were billed at the r educed rate of $110 pe r ho ur. Finally, in o urr evie w of Mr. Aponte's EAJAapplicat ion, we observed an error in the cal cu lat ion

of the ho urs bil led

. In his a

pp lic ati on

s um m ary , he s eek s rei m

burse m ent f

or 1 4. 6 h ours of work billed at t he reduced ra te of $110 per hour . Appl. at 6. However, examination of the itemized billi ng statement reveal s that the actual t otal of work bille d at th e reduced rat e is 16.1 ho urs . App l. at 8- 17 . Whe n a sk ed ab out th is di scr ep an cyat o ral arg um ent, M r. A po nte ' s attor

ne y stated t hat 1.5 hours of work bi lled at t he re duced r ate on the itemized bil ling statement shoul d have been designat ed as "no ch ar ge " based upon bill ing judgment. W e observe a si ngle entry for 1.5 ho urs bil led

at the red

uc ed rat e f or r ev iew ing the rec ord

on ap pe al " to ensur e th at a ll c ounte rdesignated materia ls have been i ncluded, and that nothing has bee n added or del eted." Appl. at 13. Ba sed upo n th e re pre sentat ion s m ad e at ora l ar gum ent, w e p res um e th at M s. Go ldb erg ne gle cte d to designate t his entry a s "no charge," and we award no fees for this 1.5 hours of work.

III . C ON CL US ION Fo r th e f ore go ingrea so ns , M r. A

po nte's EA JAap pli cat ion is G RA NT ED in t

he red uc ed amount of $12,621.74.
LANCE, Judge , dissenti ng: As I believe the decisi ons of the U.S. Supreme C ourt and the Federal Circ uit are onpoi nt and controll ing, I res pectfully dissent. This case pre sents the que stion of wh at h ourlyrate may be used whe n sh if

tin g expe ns es un de r EA JAfro m an app ell ant to taxpaye rs fo r w ork that co uld

have be enpe rf

orm ed bya p ara leg al, but w as per form ed byanatt orn ey . It req uir es c on sid eri ng the Fe de ral Ci rcu it' s re cent de ter m inatio n th at p ara leg al s erv ice s ar e compensated as an expense ra ther than a fee under EAJA. Ri ch lin v. Ch ertoff , 472 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Ci r. 2 00 6). He re, th e ap pe llant s ub m itt ed anap pli cat ion

fo r attor ne y f ees an d e xp en ses un de r E AJA in whic h h e so ug ht r eim burse m ent f

or t wo cla sse s o f t ask s: " [a ]ttorney wor k" and "[ p] ara leg al work." In his appl ication, t he appellantidentified t he " [a] ttorney work" as performed by "E liz ab e th

H

. G o ld b e rg " an d

id e n ti f ie d th e "[ p ] ara le g a l w o rk " a s p e rf o rm e d b ya"1 9 9 5 law graduate." Fourteen months after filing his applicat ion, in supplemental b ri efing rega rding the12

applicabi lity of Ri ch lin , the a pp ell ant i de nti fi ed

th e "19 95 law gra du ate " f or the f irs t time as h is attorney, El izabeth H. Goldberg. The appellantreque sted compensation for the " [p]aralegal work" atan hourly rat e of $110. This C ourt ha s pre vio us ly he ld wo rk do ne b y laws tud ents, s up erv ise d byatto rne ys , co uld be
co m pe ns ate d und er E AJA at the rate set f ort h in the " La ffe yMat rix ." Sandoval v. Brown , 9 Vet.App. 17 7, 18 1 (1 99 6). Th e ap pe llant c alc ulated the req ue ste d h ourlyrat e f

or t he "[ p] ara leg al wo rk" ba sed
on the "m ark et rat e" lis ted

in th e " La ffe yMat rix. " H ow ev er, the Fe de ral Ci rcu it r ece ntl y d ete rm ine d "paral eg al s erv ice s ar e n ot r eco ve rab le as fees, but are o nly rec ov era ble as e xp en ses ." Ri ch lin , 472 F.3d at 1381. In doing so, the Federa l Circuitabrogated t his Court's decision i n Sandoval , in which the Court found the appel lant enti tledto attorney fe es for work performed by attorneysu pe rvi sed lawstu de nts at the pre va ili ng m ark et b ill ing rat e f or p ara leg als

. In supplemental brie fing, Mr. Aponte argued t he reque ste d hourly rat e of com pensation ($110) was as an " exercise in billi ng judgment." Appellant's Supplement at 3. "Here, [the a]ppellant ide nti fi ed tho se t ask s p erf

orm ed byhis att orn eywh ich , in

his jud gm ent, c ou ld h av e b een pe rf orm ed byeithe r an

att orn eyor a

paral eg al. " Id . at 5. At oral argument, the appellant 's counsel argued the "[p]aralegal ta sks" were thos e that fell i n a "gray ar ea" and could r easonably be per form ed ei ther by
anatt orn eyor b y a

paral eg al und er the su

pe rvi sio n o f an atto rne y. He did no t, n or c ou ld h e, ba sed on his applic ation, asse rt thatthe tasks r equired the skill and t raining of an att orney. In ano the r ca se, thi s C ou

rt h as b ound

a partyto t he co nc ess ion

that ta sk s co uld

be pe rf orm ed by a p ara legal for the purpose of assigning the appropriat e hourly rat e. ZP v. Brown , 8 Vet.App. 303, 304 (1995). In ZP, the Courtordered the parties to resolve difference s in t he amount of att orn eyfe es and

e xp en ses in

co nf ere nc e w iththe Co urt ' s C entra l L eg al s taf f k eep ing in m ind

that the ap pe llant h ad

co nc ed ed

the tas ks co uld

have be enpe rf

orm ed bya p ara leg al; [I t is ] O RD ERED that a con fe ren ce w iththe C ourt' s C entra l L eg al S taf f b e sc he du led pursu ant to Ru le 3 3 of

the Co urt Ru les so that th e p art ies m ayres olv e any d if fe ren ces in the amount of the attorney fees a nd expense s to be awarde d. In this conne ction, the Court notes the concession of the appellant's counsel at oral argument on May 23, 19 95 , th at a

su bs tantia l num

be r of hours f or re co rd re vie w that he bil led as atto rne y time could have been performed by a paralegal and, therefore, shoul d be compensated at the appropr iate par alegal r ate. Se e A ction on Sm ok ing an d H ea lth v. C.A.B. , 7 24 F.2 d 21 1, 220 -21 (D. C. Ci r.1 98 4) (h ours "are no t re aso na bly expe nd ed if an atto rne y du

pli cat es wo rk do ne e arl ier b y ano the r attor

ne y, if anatt orn eytak es13

ex tra ti m e du e to ine xp eri en ce, o r i f anatto rne y pe rf orm s tas ks th at are norm ally pe rf orm ed byparal eg als , c ler ica l pe rson ne l[ ,] or o the r no n-atto rne ys .")

. Id

. Th e ch ara cte riz ati on

bythe m ajo rity o f t

he ZP or de r a s o bi te r d ic ta re ga rd in g t he ap pe ll an t's
co nc es si ondo es no t d imi ni sh it s p er su as iv en es s orpr ov id e are as on edba si s t o i gn or e t he ap pe ll an t's concessions t hro ug ho ut the c ourse of proceedings that the t asks could have be en performed by a paralegal in this case. In Ri ch lin , the Federal Circuit r eviewed a Board of Contract Appeal s decision finding $35 a r easonable hourly expense for paralegal services

. Ri ch lin , 472 F.3d at 1374. Notably, the Bo ard of Co ntr act Ap pe als an d F ed era l C irc uit co ns ide red

no ev ide nc e re garding the act ua l expense to Richl in's counsel of employing a paralegal. Id . T he Fe de ral Ci rcu it unam big uo us ly h eld par al eg al services are rei mbursed at the expense to a n attorney. The Courtshould deter mine whether the a bs ence of an easily qua ntifiable amount, because the tasks wer e performed by the ap pe llant' s attor

ne y, wi ll b ar r eco ve ry f

or t ho se s erv ice s. The nature of the ta skp er for med, not the person who performs it, determines the
co m pe ns ati on rate . If I rep lac e a lig ht f ixt ure in m y o wn ho us e, it d oe s n ot m ean

that m y s alary a s a ju d g e i s t o b e e qu a te d

w it hth e m ark e t rate f

o r ane le c tr ic ian . R a th e r, i t m e re lym ean s th at I pe rso na llyva lue the m on eyI have in h an d m ore than th e ti m e I w ou ld s av e b y h iri ng so m eo ne els e to d o the w ork

. P eo ple e ve rywhe re r outin ely pe rf orm s ta sk s th em sel ve s ev entho ug h th eycan hir e so m eo ne els e to pe rf

orm the wo rk at an

ho url y rate l ess than th at t he y re cei ve fo r th eir

pro fe ssi on al
ser vic es. Th ere fo re, I wou ld h old that whe n a

qu antif ied expe ns e is no t av ail ab le, anEA JA ap pli cant m aybe co m

pe ns ate d at th e re aso na

ble m ark et e xp en se f

or a paral eg al, for

wor k th at c ou ld have be endo ne bya p ara leg al. It is appr opriate t o dis ti nguish between le gal work, in the s trictsense, and inv est igatio n, cle ric al w ork , co m pil ati on of f act s and stat ist ics and

oth er w ork

wh ich can often be a cc ompl ishe d by non-lawyers butwhich a lawyer may do because he ha s no othe r help av ail ab le. Su chno n-l eg al w ork m ayco mm an d a

les ser rat e. Its do llar va lue is n ot e nh an ced jus t be cau se a

lawye r do es i t. Missouri v. Jenkins , 4 91 U. S. 27 4, 28 8 n .1 0 (1 98 9). The appellantstated atoral argument t hat, ha d the "[p]aralegal work" been performed by a paralegal , Ri ch lin wou ld co ntr ol an d the expe ns e f or t he ser vic es w ou ld b e re co ve rab le at $3 5 p er ho ur f or t he ho urs rea so na

bly expend ed . H en ce, the arg um ent th at the Co urt is a cce pti ng in t

his de cis ion is that th ere are tw o d if fe rent rates of

co m pe ns ation avai lable fo r su chwo rk u nd er14

EAJA–one when attorney performs the work and one when a paral egal performs the same work. Pursuant to Missouri v. Jenkins , I wo uld h old th e Co urt

m ayn ot aw ard

$ 11 0, rathe r th an$3 5, pe r ho ur f or t he tas ks that can b e p erf orm ed bya p ara leg al sim

ply bec ause t

he ap pe llant' s attor

ne y pe rf orm ed the wo rk h ers elf

rathe r th and ele gatin g it to a paral eg al. Ho we ve r, b arr ingall rec ov ery for performance of the paralegal ta sks wo uld also cont ravene the i nquiry dict ated by Missouri v. Jenkins into the work per form ed and improperly place t he focus on who performed the work. Moreover, suc h a resultis not requi red by Ri ch lin

. The Federal Circui t i n Ri ch lin did not req uir e a d eta ile d s ub m iss ion fr om Ri ch lin's counsel of t

he act ua l expe ns e to em

plo y p ara leg als

. Rathe r, i t aw ard ed

co m pe ns ati on at a "re aso na ble co st t o th e f

irm ." Ri ch lin , 472 F.3d at 1374. I be lie ve the fo cu s bym

y co lle ag ue s on

th e res ource s imm ed iat ely ava ila ble to the att orn ey is m isp lac ed . F irs t, th e app ell ant' s att orn eyis not a party to th e p roc eed ing ; on ly i f s he we re w ou ld the Co urt b e req uir ed to ta ilo r i t d eci sio n to he r si tuatio n. It i s th e ap pe llant, no t ap pe llant' s co un sel , who incurred fees and expe nses in li tigati on that are partial ly reimbursed by a n award under EAJA. Se e Ri ch lin , 4 72 F. 3d

at 1 37 9. Se co nd , I w ou ld n ot f ind –as the majority ap parentlydo es– that compensating the appell ant for "paral egal work" at the p ara leg al e xp en se r ate is undercompensation; parti cu lar ly whe re " the purpo se of E AJA is no t t o rei m

burse all of

the co sts of

the pre va ili ng party but to rei m

burse co sts on ly whe n th e g ov ernm ent' s p os iti on was not s ub stanti all y ju sti fi ed an d e ve n the n to pro vid e on ly fo r p art ial re im burse m ent." Id . The appellantchose the hourl y rate of $110 for "paral eg al w ork " ba sed

on the La ffe yMat rix . App lic ati on

at 5 n. 1. Th e La

ffe yMat rix"is int en de d to b e u sed

in cas es i n whic h a

"f ee- sh if tin g" s tat ute pe rm its the pre va ili ng partyto r eco ve r

' rea so na ble ' att orn ey ' s f

ees ." A pp lic ati on

Ex hib it D n. 2. Mycoll eagues arrive at the sam e ex act hourly rat e as the re asonably reduc ed r at e fora ttorney work, not withstanding t hat "itwould be inc on sis tent w iththe purpo se o f E AJA t o re im burse paral eg al f

ees at th e f

ull ho url y rate c harge d to the cli en t." Ri ch lin , 47 2 F. 3d at 137 9. I wo uld

fin d co m pe ns ati ng for

"paral eg al w ork " at

$1 10 pe r ho ur e xc ess ive , particularly whe re " the purpos e o f E AJA w as n ot t o m ak e th e p rev ail ingparty wh ole ." Id

. Awarding compensation for tasks that can reasonably be perform ed by eithera paralega l or an attorne y at a higherrate, as t he majority does here, simply because the tasks were performed by
anatto rn e y , o r d e n y in g c o m p e n s a ti o nb e c au s e th e re i s n o i te m iz e d e xp e n s e f

o r th e w o rk, co uld
cre ate anincentiv e f

or an a pp ell ant to sh if

t w ork fr om paral eg als to atto rne ys in o rde r to inc rea se15

the po tentia l EA JAaward. It co uld also create an

ince nti ve to charac ter ize the wo rk p erf orm ed in an ambig uo us f

ash ion in o rde r t o m ak e it ap pe ar to be atto rne y wo rk rathe r t han paral eg al work. Th ere fo re, I w ou ld award co m pe ns ati on for the pe rf orm an ce of

the "[ p] ara leg al w ork " f

or a red uc ed
num be r of ho urs at the rea so na

ble ho url y m ark et e xp en se r ate of $3 5 a s Ri ch lin req

uir es.