F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

S H E L L E Y R

U B I N ; M A U R E E N I

. F E L L E R , Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v

.

C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R , a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee

. N o. 11-56318

D.C. No. 2:10-cv-04046- DSF -J C

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dale S. F ischer, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted November 8, 2012—Pasadena, California

F iled March 26, 2013

B efore: Alfred T. Goodwin and Diarmuid F . O’Scannlain, Circuit J udg es, and J ack Z ouhary , District J udg e. *

Opinion by J udg e O’Scannlain

* T h e Ho n o rab le J a ck Z o u h ary , Un ited States District J u d g e f o r th e No rth ern District o f

Oh io , sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 2

SUMMARY * *

Civil Rights

The panel affi rm ed the district court’s bench trial judg ment in favor of the City of L ancaster in plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleg ing that the city council’s practice of opening its meeting s w ith privately led pray ers effected an unconstitutional establishment of relig ion.

The panel analy

zed the City ’s policy and prac t i ce o f soliciting v olunteers from local c ong reg ations to le a d t h e invoc a tions reg ardless of the faith, denomination, or other relig ious beli e f o f t he cong r eg a tion. The panel held that a B ishop’s sing le r eference to J esus in an invocation did no t amount to a violation of the Establishment Clause. The panel applied the history -based a naly sis set fort h in Marsh v

. Chambers

, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and concluded t h a t neither
t he Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh

, nor in Co u n t y o f Allegheny v. ACLU, 4 92 U.S. 573 (1989), categ orically forbids sectarian references in leg islat i v e pray er so long a s leg islativ e pray er—whether sectarian or n o t—does not prosely tiz e, advance, or disp a r ag e one relig ion or affiliate
g overnment with a particular faith.

The p anel a lso rejected plaintiffs’ contention that viewed in contex t , the City ’s unwritten policy

, practice and custom posed a F irst Amendment problem because the majority o f city -council invocations have b een Christian. The panel, focusing on the policy ’ s neutrality a nd the principle of private

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 3

choice, not on the n u m b er o f volunteers from a particular

s e c t , saw n o thing in the record o r in the p ray er policy t o indicate that the City had affiliated itself w ith Christianit y

. Th e panel stated that the City did not choose the content o f the pray ers or the d enomination of the pray er-g ivers and the f a c t t h at most of the invocations h ad been Christian was merely a function of local d e m o graphics and the choice o f relig ious leaders who responded to the Cit y ’ s invitation for volunteers.

COUNSEL

Rog er J on D iamond, Santa Monica, California, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Allison E. B urns (arg

ued), David R. McEwen, a nd J oseph M. Adams, Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth, Newport B each, California, for Defendant–Appellee.

Dean R. B roy les, Nationa l C e n ter for L aw & Policy

, Escondido, California, for amicus curiae National Center for L aw & Policy

.

Steven W. F itschen (arg

ued) and Doug las E. My ers, National L eg al F oundation, V irg inia B each, Virg inia, for a m i c u s curiae W allB u ilders, I n c.

J en Monk, Advocates for F aith & F reedom, Mur r i eta, C alifornia; and Scott W. Gaylord, Elon U niversity L aw School, Gr e e nsboro, North Carolina, for amicus curiae I ndependence L aw Center.R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 4

Deborah J

. Dewart, J ustice and F r eedom F und, Swansboro, North C a r olina; and J ames L

. Hirsen, Anaheim H ills, California, for amicus curiae J ustice and F reedom F und.

Gary S. McCaleb and B rett Harvey
, Alliance Defense F und, S cottsdale, Ariz ona; and Kevin Theriot, Alliance Defense F und, L eawood, Kansas, for amicus curiae Alliance Defense F und.

OP INION

O’SCANNL AI

N, Circuit J udg e:

W e must decide whether a c ity co uncil’s p ractice o f opening its meeting s w ith p rivately led pray ers e f f ects an unconstitutional establishment of relig ion.

I

A

Th e C i t y of L ancaster, California, ty pically beg ins e ach of its city

- council meeti ng s w ith a citiz en-led invocation. 1 F or y ears, that practice h a d b een merely a n informal one. 2 B ut on Aug ust 25, 2009, after receiving a c ease-and-desist letter from th e Am erican Civil L iberties Union, the City

1 T h e relev an t f

acts, w h ich th e d istrict co u rt f

o u n d , are u n d isp u t ed

.

2 Du rin g t h e p erio d in w

h ich th e in v o cati o n p r actice w as in f o rm al, “ a

su b stan tial m aj o rity ” o f th e p ray ers w ere “ Ch ristian i n n atu re,” an d so m e

“ co n tain ed ex p licit l y sectarian relig io u s ref eren ces, in clu d in g sp ecif ic ref eren ces to J esu s Ch rist.”R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 5

decided to c ommit to p aper a n official invocation policy

. That policy sets forth a two-step p rocedure f or soliciting volunteers. F irst, t he city clerk “compile[ s[ and maintain[ s]

a database

. . . of th e r elig ious cong reg ations with an established presence” in L ancaster. T o g ather names o f local
cong reg ations to add to the master list, the clerk r e v i e w s L ancaster’s Y

ellow Pages f

or “churches,” “cong r eg a tions,” and “other relig ious assemblies”; searches the internet for any local “church,” “sy

nag og u e,” “temple,” “chapel ,” o r “mosque”; and consults the reg ional chamber of comme r ce and new s p a p er. All cong reg ations in L ancaster are elig ible
to appear o n the City ’ s list. T he clerk does not probe “the faith, d enomination, or other relig ious belief” o f a cong reg ation before adding its name to the database.

Nex t, the clerk mails all of the listed relig ious g roups an invitation to open a city -council meeting with an invocation. The invitation reads,

This o p portunity is voluntary

, a nd y ou are free
to offer the invo c a tion according to the dictates of y our own conscience. To maintain

a spi r i t of respect and e cumenism, the City Council requests that the p r a y er opportunity
not be ex ploited as an e ffort to convert others

. . . nor to disparag e a n y faith or belief different [ from] that of the invocatio nal speaker.

Elaborating o n i ts a

pparent commitment to e cumenism, the policy states that i t “ is not intended, and shall not be implemented o r construed i n a n y way , to affiliate the City Council with, nor ex p ress the City Council’s preference for,
any faith or relig ious denomination.” I nstead, the policy “ isR U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 6

intended to acknowledg e and e x p r e s s the City Council’s respect for the diversity of relig ious d enominations and faiths represented and p r acticed among the c itiz ens of L ancaster.” To that end, the City allows each cong reg ation only th r ee, nonconsecutive invocations a y ear. N o person who has volunteered to p r ay has been turned down, and no g overnment official has e ver a ttempte d to influence the clerk’s selection or scheduling of volunteers.

I n late 2009, to g aug e public support for the pray er policy

, the City submitted to municipal voters a nonbinding measure (“Me a sure I ”) requesting a y es-or-no vote on this question: “I n response t o a r ecent c omplaint, with respect to the invocations that c ontained a reference to J esus Christ[ ,] shall the City Council continue its invocation policy in ran domly selecting local clerg y of different faiths to deliver the invocation w ithout restricting the c o n t e n t based on their beliefs, including references to J e sus Christ ? ” To aid the citiz enry ’s deliberation, the city attorney sub m i t ted to the public (as was his duty ) an analy sis of t h e pray er policy ’s leg ality

, w hich concluded that the policy stood on f irm constitutional footing

. The may or and vice-may o r also submitted a ballot ar g ument in support of the measure, asserting that e ach pe r s o n has a r ig ht to pray in accordance with his own beliefs and s o m a y p ray “to the deity of [ his] own choosing

. ” The measure was approved.

Sh el ley Rubin, a J e w, and Maureen F eller, a Christian, attended a council meeting on April 27, 2 010. B ishop Henry He a r ns, former may or of L ancaster and then-current “honorary may or,” delivered the invocation. Hearns thanked God f or his many kindnesses, asked God to bless the c ouncil members (among others), and closed wi t h this e ntreaty : “B ring our minds to know y ou and in the precious, holy andR U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

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rig hteous and matchl e s s name of J esus I pray this pray er. Amen a n d Am e n

. G od b less y ou.” B ecause Hearns h ad invoked the name of J esus, Rubin a nd F eller “were upset a

nd offended.” Neither plans to a t t e n d another council meeting until references to J esus are forbidden.

B e tween the day L ancaster ratified its policy and the day of Hearns’s invocation, twenty pray ers were g i v en b y members o f Christian denominati o n s (and each mentioned J esus’s name), four were g iven by a self-identified “metaphy sicist,” one was g iven by a Sikh, and a n o t h e r by a Muslim. Since then, nine invocations have mentioned J esus, and five have not.

B

A week a fter Hearns’s invocation, Rubin and F e ller sued the City of L ancaster in California state court u nder 42 U .S.C. § 1983 and Article I
, Section 4 of the California Constitution. Rubin and F eller specifically requested declara t o ry a nd injunctive relief from the City ’ s policy of permitting pray ers that mention J e sus, arg uing that both the invocations and the policy amounted to an establishment o f r elig ion. The City removed to federal court.

The d i s t rict c ourt h eld a bench trial and rejected Rubin and F eller’s claims. The court r easoned that unless leg islative pray e r prosely tiz e s , advances, or disparag es a particular faith, it does not violate the F irst A m endment simply because it contains s e c t a rian r eferences. The mere mention of J esus in the April 27 invocation, therefore, did not

cross the c onstitutional line. T he d istrict c o u r t also rejected R u b i n and F eller’s arg ument that the pray er practice itself transg ressed the F irst Amendment. “Volunteers o f numerousR U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 8

faiths a re invite d to and h ave g iven invocations before City Council meeting s,” the court n o t e d, “and the selection process does not discriminate a g ainst any f aith.” The court emphasiz ed that the City

—precisely to avoid Establishment Clause p roblems—had declined to reg ulate the content of the
pray ers, requesting only that volunteers not use the opportunity to prosely

tiz e o r d isparag e any one faith. F inally

, the court concluded that their state constitutional claim failed for the same reasons. Rubin and F eller timely appeal.

II

Rubin a n d F eller a

r g ue that the d istrict court wrong ly concluded that both the April 27 invocation a nd the City ’s
pray er practice withstood F irst Amendment s c r u tiny

. 3 W e consider first the pray

er and then the policy

.

A

Rubin and F eller urg e us to declare Hearns’s April 27 i n v o c a t i o n ( s p e c i f

i c a l l y, i t s r e f

e r e n c e t o J e s u s ) unconstitutional and to r everse t h e district court’s contrary conclusion. Rely ing p rincipally on two Supreme Court cases, they c ontend that a n y e x plicit reference to a sectarian f ig ure in leg islati v e p ray er is a per se breach of the Establishment Clause.

3 A lth o u g h Ru

b in an d Feller arg u ab ly w aiv ed th eir ch allen g e t o t h e p ray er p o licy

b elo w , th e d istrict co u rt n o n eth eless ru led o n it. T h e issu e

o f th e p o licy ’ s co n stitu

tio n ality is th eref o re b ef o re u s.R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 9

1

B o th sides rig htly ass u m e that this case falls within the

a mbit of Marsh v. Chambers

, 463 U .S. 783 (1983). T h e r e, the Supreme Court considered w hether the Nebraska L eg islature’s decades-old practice of opening each leg islative day with a pray er delivered by a state-employ ed chaplain violated the Establishme n t Clause. Since 1965, Robert Palmer, a Pre s b y

t e r ian minister, had served as the Nebraska L eg islature’s official chaplain, a salaried position. Each day the leg islature met, Palmer beg an with a pray er. Ernest Chambers, a member of the leg islature, sued to e n j oin that practice. Marsh , 463 U.S. at 784–85.

Althoug h the Eig hth C i rcuit had evaluated N ebraska’s practice under the familiar th r ee p rong s of Lemon v

. Kurtzman
, 4 03 U.S. 6 02 (1971), see Marsh

, 463 U.S. at 786, the Supreme Court took a d ifferent approach, “swe[ eping ]
away ” prevailing Establishment Clause d o c t r ine in f avor o f

a history -based analy sis. 4 Snyder v

. Mu rray City Corp.
, 159 F .3d 1227, 1232 ( 1 0 t h Cir. 1 998) (en banc). “The opening of sessions o f leg islative and ot h e r deliberative public bodies with pray er,” the Marsh Court noted, “is deeply

4 Sin ce Ma rsh

, leg islativ e p ray er h as en j o y ed a “ su i g e n e r i s s t atu s” in Estab lish m en t Clau se j u risp ru d en ce. S n yd er v. Mu rra

y City Co rp

. , 1 5 9 F.3 d 1 2 2 7
, 1 2 3 1 (1 0 t

h C ir. 19 9 8 ) (en b an c); s ee a l so McCrea ry Cn ty.

v. ACLU
, 5 45 U.S. 8 4 4, 8 6 0 n .1 0 (2 0 0 5) (“ Estab lish m en t Clau se d o ctrin e lack s th e co m f

o rt o f categ orical ab so lu tes. In sp ecial i n s t a nc es w e h av e f o u n d g o o d reaso n to h o l d g o v ern m en t al actio n leg it i m ate w h ere its

m an if est p u rp o se w as p resu m ab ly relig io u s. S ee, e.g ., Ma rsh v. Ch a mb ers

. . .”); Ca rd v. C

ity o f Everett
, 5 2 0 F.3 d 1 00 9
, 1 01 4 (9 th Cir. 20 0 8) ( “ M a rsh

. . . sh o u ld b e co n stru ed as carv in g o u t an ex cep tio n to n o r m a l Estab lish m en t Clau se j u risp ru den ce du e t o th e u n i q u e h isto ry of leg islativ e p ray er.” (in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s o m itted )).R U B I N V

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embedde d in the history a nd tradition o f this country

. ” 4 6 3 U .S. at 786. The Continental Cong ress, no less, bega n each of its sessions with an in v o cation delivered by a p aid ch ap l a i n. L ikewise, the F irst Cong ress, in one of its first official acts, arrang ed for daily chaplain-led pray er in both chambers. Day s later, “final ag r eement was reached on the lang uag e of the Bi l l o f Rig h ts.” Id

. at 788. “Clearly

, ” the Court inferred, “the men who wrote the F irst A mendment Relig ion Clau s e d i d not view paid leg islative chaplains a nd opening pray ers as a violation o f that Amendment.” Id. at 789–90. F u r

thermore, the “practice of opening sessions with
pray er has continued without interruption ever since.” Id. at 789. Given this hist o r y , there could be “no doubt” that leg islative pray er was constitutional. Id.

Having upheld leg islative pray er in g eneral, the M arsh Court n e x t considered whether specific features o f Nebraska’s practice pushed it out o f constitu t i o nal bounds. Chambers leveled three complaints: ( 1) t h at Nebraska h ad selected a representative of “only one den o m i n ation” for six teen y ears, (2) that the chaplain was on t h e state pay roll, and (3) that his pray

ers were offered “in the J udeo-Christian tradition.” Id. at 792–93. A ll th r e e objections flopped. Choosing “a clerg y

man of one d enomination” did not “advance[ ] the beliefs” of his sect. Nor did pay ing him. Id.
at 794 (“[ R ] e n u meration is g r ounded in [ the F ramers’] historic practice.”). Nor, even, did the words of th e p r a y ers themselves: “Th e co n t e nt of the pray er is not of concern to judg es where, as here, there is no indication t h at the pray er opportunity has been ex ploited to p rosely tiz e o r advance any one, o r t o disparag e a

ny o ther, faith or belief,” the Court declared. “That being so, i t is not f or us to embark o n a sensitive evaluation o r to parse the co n t ent o f a particular
pray er.” Id. at 794–95.R U B I N V

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A c ursory r ead o f Marsh does not disclose whether all o r only some of Palmer’s pray ers were “not of c o n cern.” I n footnote 14 (the call for which follows the Court’s d escription of the pray ers as “J udeo-Christian”), the Court wrote,

Palmer ch a r ac teriz es his pray ers a s “nonsectarian, ” “J udeo Christian,” a nd with “elements of the American c ivil relig ion.” Althoug h some o f h i s e arlier pray ers were often ex plicitly Christian, Palmer removed all

r e ferences to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a J ewish leg islator.

Id. at 793 n .14 ( citations omitted); see als o V a n Orden v

. Perry
, 5 4 5 U.S. 677, 688 n .8 (2005) ( p lurality opinion) ( “I n Marsh

, the pray e rs were often e x plicitly Christian, b u t the chaplain removed a ll references to Christ the y ear a fter the suit was f i l ed.”). Six y ears later, in County of Allegheny v

. ACLU
, the Court revisited that f ootnote. 492 U. S

. 5 7 3 (1989). There, the Court weig hed the cons t i t u t i onality of a city ’s y early public display o f a Christmas c r è c h e a nd a Hanukkah menorah. Resolving the case under Lemon
, the Court had occasion to address M arsh only in response to o ne of the dissent’s arg

uments:

[ I ] n Marsh itself, the Court recog niz ed that
not even the “unique history ” of leg islative
pray er can justify co n temporary leg islative
pray ers that have the effect of affil i ating the
g overnment wit h a

ny one specific faith o r belief. T he leg islative pray ers involv ed in Marsh did n ot violate t h i s principle because the particular chaplain h ad “removed all references to Christ.”R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

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Id. at 6 03 (internal citations omitted). Rubin and F eller assert that this snippet fro m A l l e gheny both confirms that M arsh upholds only n on s e ctarian leg islative invocations a nd establishes that a sing le sectarian reference in a leg islative
pray er g oes too far.

2

Rubin and F eller misread M arsh a n d misapprehen d the effect of Al l egheny

. F ootnote 1 4 notwithstanding

, M arsh nowhere c onfines its review of Nebraska’s practice solely to the short period in which Palmer delivered only nonsectarian
pray ers. 5 Rather, the Court trained its analy sis on N ebraska’s practice over tim e

. See, e.g., 463 U.S. at 790 (“.

. . Nebraska’s practice o f over a century , cons i s t e nt with two centuries o f national practice

. . .”); id. at 795 (“The unbroken practice

. . . for m o r e than a century in Nebraska

. . . g ives abundant assurance that there is n o real threat

. . . .”). I ndeed, when it took up Chambers’s o bjection to the pray ers’ content, the Court c oncluded—in a telling ly worded sente n c e—that “there is no indication that the pray e r o p portunity has been

ex p loited” to prosely

tiz e , advan c e , or disparag e a relig ion. Id. at 794–95 (emphasis added). That verb (“has been

ex p loited”) is in the present perfect tense, denoting “a time in the indefinite past” or “ a p ast action that c omes up to a nd touches the present.” See Chicago Manual of S tyle 237 (16th ed. 2010). Had the Court wished to avoid sug ge s t i n g t hat Palmer ’ s pre-1980 sectarian pray ers had n ot advanced Christianity

, it would have used either the simple past (“was

5 “ A n d it is n o t ev en clear th at th e r em o v al o f ref eren ces t o Ch rist

r e n d ered all p o st- 1 9 8 0 p ray ers n o n d en o m in atio n al.” Ga llo wa y v. T o w n

o f Greece
, 6 81 F.3 d 2 0
, 3 0 (2 d Cir. 2 0 1 2 ), p etitio n f o r cert. filed

, 8 1 U.S.L .W . 3 3 36 (U.S. Dec. 6 , 2 01 2 ) (No . 1 2

- 6 9 6 ).R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 13

ex p loited”) or past p e r f

ect (“had been ex ploited”) with a qualify ing clause or phrase (e.g

., “there is no indication that, during or after 1980, the pray er opportunity [ was / had been]

ex p loited”). As written, th e o pinion leaves the impression
t h a t none of Palmer’s controversial pray ers, at least vie w e d cumulatively , crossed the line.

B o th d issents in M

arsh r e a d the majority opinion as we do. J ustice B rennan, for ex ample, ar gued that the “controversy

” surrounding the chaplain’s “Christolog ical references” evinced a threat o f s tate “entang lement” with

r elig ion—a meaning less riposte to the majority if on l y F eller’s nonsectarian p ra y ers had been before the Court. Marsh

, 463 U.S. at 799–800 & n.9 (B r ennan, J
., dissenting ). L ikewise, J ustice Stevens faulted the majority for neg lecting
to scrutiniz e Palmer’s overtly Christian supplications: “The Court declines to ‘ embark on a sensi t i v e evaluation or to parse the c o n tent of a particular pray er.’ Perhaps it does so b ecause it w ould be unable to ex plain away the c l e a r l y sectarian content of some of the pray ers g iven by N ebraska’s chaplain.” Id. at 823 & n .2 (Stevens, J
., dissenting ) (internal citations omitted) (citing a pray e r of Palmer’s from 1978 that spoke of “the suffering and death of [God’ s ] son,” “[ t] he
power of the cross,” and “ the wonder of Christ crucified”). Plainly

, n e i t her d issenting justice interpreted f ootnote 14 to leave for another day the constitutional stat u s o f sing le sectarian references in leg isla tive pray ers. See also Van Orden

, 5 45 U.S. at 688 n.8 ( plurality opinion) (“I n Marsh

, the
pray ers were often ex

plicitly Christian . . . .”).

3

W h at is more telling than Marsh ’s lang uag e, however, is
t h a t the very “ history and tradition” anchoring its h old i n gR U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

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reveal a long

- standing practice not only of leg islative pray er g enerally but of sectarian leg islative pray er specifically

. F o r i nstance, the very first invocation before the Continen t al Cong r ess concluded, “All this we ask in the name a nd throug h the merits of J esus Christ.” Rev. J acob Duché, F irst Prayer of the Continental Congress (Sept. 7, 1774), Office o f
t h e C h a p l a i n : U

. S

. H o u s e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , h t t p : / / c h a p l a i n

. h o u s e

. g o v / a

r c h i v e / c o n t i n e n t a l

. h t

m l

. S i m i l a

r l y , Cong r ess’s f

irst Thanksg iving Proclamation beso u ght the colonial citiz enry to “ humble and e arnest supplication that it
may please G od throug h the merits of J esus Christ” to forg ive and bless them. 9 J

o urnals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789 8 5 5 (W orthing ton Chauncey F ord ed., 1907). Ag ain in 1800, to mark t h e d e ath of G eorg e W ashing ton, a leg islative chaplain p e t i t i oned that a ll “may obtain unto the resurrection o f life, throug h J esus Christ our L ord; at whose second coming in g lorious majesty to judge t h e world

. . . t hose who sleep in him shall be

. . . made like unto h i s o w n g lorious body

. ” Henry L ee I I I
, An Address and a Form of Prayer
, in An American Prayer Book 58–59 (Christopher L

. W e b b er ed., 2008).

This practice of sectari a n cong ressional p ray er has
p e r s i s ted. Cf. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (g iving weig ht t o leg islative pray er as an “unbroken practice”). A s one scholar reports, “ fr o m A m e rica’s earliest day s to the present times, the p r a y ers delivered by [ leg islative] chaplains have b een true sacral pray ers, and many o f th em , true Christian p ray ers.” Steven Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism
, 96 Colum. L

. Rev. 2083, 2104 (1996). F or ex ample, between 1990 and 1996, “over two hundred a nd fifty opening pray ers delivered by c ong ressional chaplains

. . . included supplications to J esus Christ.” Id. at 2104 & n.118. And the tradition continues. S ee, e.g., Newdow v. Bush

,R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 15

355 F

. Supp. 2d 265, 285 n.23 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[ T] he leg islative p ray ers at the U.S. C o ng ress are overtly sectarian.”).

This evidence makes it even more d ifficult to read M arsh

as categ o r ically barri n g sectarian leg islative invocations. I ndeed, if “ what matters under M arsh is whether the p ray er to be offered fits within the g e nre of leg islative invocational
pray er that has become part of the fabric of our society ,” then

s u r ely

, as a g eneral matter, sectarian and nonsectar i a n leg islative pray er stand on equal footing

. S i m pson v

. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Sup’rs
, 404 F .3d 276, 282 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Snyder

, 159 F .3d a t 1233) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).

4

Nonetheles s, Rubin a

nd F eller insist that Allegheny dislodg ed Marsh

. W e disag ree. F irst, tho u gh Allegheny commented on Marsh

, it did not—because, in dicta, it could not—supplant Marsh or r estrict its scope. See Simps o n , 404 F

. 3d at 281 n.3 (“

Allegheny concerned r elig ious holiday display s, referencing Marsh to confirm tha t M arsh did not apply in that contex t.”); J o yner v

. Forsyth Cnty.
, 653 F .3d 3 4 1
, 360 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemey er, J
., dissenting) (“ Allegheny ’ s dicta

. . . do not go vern leg islative pray er cases.”), cert. denied

, 132 S. Ct. 1 0 97 (2012). I n a ny event, Allegheny does not in fact say that a leg islative p ray er is constitutional only if nonsectarian

. A leg islative invocation stripped of any mention of J esus, Allegheny sug g ests, would
not have the “effec t o f affiliating the g overnment with” relig ion, but that is not to say that a n ex plicitly sectarian
pray er necessarily would. See Pelphr e y v. Cobb Cnty.
, 547 F .3d 1263, 1271–72 (11th C i r

. 2008) (“ Allegheny doesR U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 16

not require that l e g islative pray er conform to the [ nonsectarian] model in M arsh. Allegheny instead reiterates the lesson of Mar

s h t h a t leg islative pray ers should not ‘demonstrate a [ g overnm e nt] preference for one particular
sect or creed

. . . .’”)

. Rather, so long as leg islative
pray er—whether sectarian or n ot—does not pr osely tiz e , adv a n c e, or disparag e one relig ion ( Marsh ’s lang uag e) o r affiliate g overnment with a p a r ticular faith ( Allegheny ’s reiteration), it withstands scrutiny

. Marsh

, 463 U.S. at 795. F ar from displacing Marsh

, Allegheny merely illuminates its boundaries.

F or these reasons, we join several of our sister circuits in concluding that neither Marsh nor A l legheny categ orically forbids sectarian references in leg islative pray er. 6

5

Rubin and F eller arg ue that Hearns’s April 27 pray er went too far. “ B r ing our minds to know y ou,” Hearns importuned that evening

, “and in the p recious, h o ly and rig hteous a nd matchless name of J esus I pray this p r a y e r.” As Rubin a nd

6 S ee Ga llo wa

y , 6 8 1 F.3 d at 29 (“ [

Alleg h en y ] d o es n ot m ean th at an y

s i n g l e d en o m in atio n al p ray er h as th e f o rb i d den ef

f ect o f af f iliatin g th e g o v ern m en t w ith an y o n e f aith .”); Jo

yn er , 6 5 3 F. 3 d at 3 5 1 (“ [C]o u rts sh o u ld n o t b e in th e b u s in ess o f p o l i c i n g [leg islativ e] pray ers f o r th e

o c casio n al s ectarian ref

eren ce—th at carries th in g s to o f ar.”); Pelp h rey , 5 4 7 F .3 d at 1 2 6 6 (“ T h e tax pay ers arg u e th at th e Estab lish m en t C lau s e p erm i ts o n ly n o n sectarian p ray e rs f o r th e m eetin g s o f th e co m m issio n s, b u t w e d isag ree.”). “ T o th e ex ten t th at [o th er] circu it cases stan d in stead f o r th e p ro p o sitio n th at th e Estab lish m en t Clau se p reclu d es all leg islativ e in v o catio n s th at are d en om in atio n al i n n atu re

. . . w e can n o t ag ree.” Ga llo wa y , 68 1 F.3 d at 2 8 (citin g H in rich s v. Bo sma , 4 4 0 F.3 d 3 9 3
, 3 9 9 (7 th Cir. 2 00 6 ) an d S tein v. Pla i n w ell C mty. S ch s. , 8 2 2 F.2 d 1 40 6 , 1 4 0 9 (6 th Cir. 1 98 7 )).R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 17

F eller have made quite c lear throug hout this litig ation, t hey object to Hearns’s pray er simply b e ca u s e it “mention[ s] the

name of J esus.” “[ T] he Plaintif f s ,” their brief say s, “ were upset and offended b ec a u se Hearns mentioned the name o f J esus.” The district court a ck nowledg ed as much in its disposition below: “Pl aintiffs clarified at trial that they challeng e

. . . only the r e fe r en c e to J esus.” And ag ain: “Plaintiffs have made clear that their contention that the April 27 invocation violates the Establishm e n t Clause r ests solely

on the sing le refere n ce t o J esus.” Consequently

, the district
court concl u d e d that, aside from H earns’s invocation of J esus, “[ p] lai n tiffs have presented n o e vidence or arg ument to sug g est that the April 27” invocation prosely tiz ed, advanced, or disparag ed a

ny f aith, nor have they “contended that it had this purpose or effect.”

So encumbered, Rubin and F eller’s challeng e to the April 27 pray er collapses. Marsh “does not me a n t h at any single denominational pray er has the forbidden effect of affiliating the g overnment w ith any one f aith.” G alloway

, 681 F .3d at 29. Therefore, the district court’s refusal to declare Hearns’s invocation unconstitutional was not error.

B

Rubin and F eller nex t challeng e the d i s t r ict court’s determination that the April 27 pray er vie w e d “ in
contex t”—w hat they c a ll the invocation “policy in practice” — posed n o F irst Amendment problem. They say that it w as n ot just Hearns’s invocation that caused them to
sue, b ut “what preceded” it and “what h as occurred since.” The problem, they alleg e, is the “unwritte n p o licy

, practice and custo m of the City of L ancaster” under w hich theR U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 18

m a j o r i t y o f c i t y- c o u n c i l i n v o c a t i o n s h a v e b e e n Christian—and often ex plicitly so. 7

1

J ust as M arsh evaluated Nebraska’s practice of leg is l a t i v e pra y e rs ( not Palmer’s pray e rs individually ), we n ow must determine whether the City ’s “pray er pract i c e , viewed in its entirety ,” has “advance[ d] a sing le relig ious sect.” Galloway

, 681 F .3d a t 28; see Pelphrey

, 547 F .3d a t 1 2 7 7

– 78. T o resolve this question, two circuits have undertaken something like an observer-based “ frequency ” a naly sis, invalidating any leg islative-pray er practice that, from the vantag e point of the
pray ers’ listeners, h as resu l ted in too larg e a proportion o f sectarian invocations f

rom one particular r elig ious g roup. B ecause the at t endees “hear the pray ers, not the policy ,” the F ourth Circuit has reasoned, “we cannot turn a b l i n d ey e to the practical e ffects of the invocations at issue.” J o y n e r , 653 F .3d at 3 5 4. Adopting a similar a p p r o ac h

, the Second Circuit has asked whether, g iven the predo minance of o ne sect’s p r ay ers (among other factors), “t h e [ g overnment’s] practice, viewed in its totality b y a n ordinary

, reasonable observer, convey ed the view th a t [ i t ] favored or d isfavored certain relig ious beliefs.” Galloway , 681 F .3d at 29.

W e read M

a rsh to require a different inqui ry

. “I n determining what it means to ‘advance’ one relig ion or faith

over others, the touchstone of the analy sis should be whether the government has placed its imprimatur, deliberately or b y

7 W e assu m e w ith o u t d ecid in g (b ecau se th e City m ak es n o arg u m en t to th e co n trary ) th at th e C ity ’ s “ p o licy in p ractice,” as Ru b in an d Fe l ler d escrib e it, is an actio n ab le “ p o licy ” o r “ cu sto m ” u n d er Mo n ell v. Dep artmen t o

f S o cia l S ervices , 4 3 6 U.S. 6 5 8 (1 9 7 8 ).R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 19

implication, on any one faith or relig ion.” Joyner
, 6 53 F. 3 d
at 362 ( Niemey er, J
., dissenting ). Reviewing the F irst Amendment’s ratification history

, the Marsh Court acknowledg ed that, thoug h some F r amers had in fact opposed leg islative pray er because of its possibly disquieting effect on listeners of “divided

. . . r elig ious sentiments,” that concern “was met by Samuel Adams, who state d t h a t ‘ he w a s no big ot, and could hear a pray er from a g entleman of piety a nd virtue, who w a s a t the same time a friend to his country .’” Marsh

, 463 U

. S. at 791–92. That Adams’s view ultimately prevailed confirmed for the Marsh Court that the F ramers, on the w hole, “did not consider opening pray ers as

. . . sy mbo l i c ally placing the g o vernment’s o fficial seal o f approval o n o n e relig ious view.” Id. at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, a sta t e still c ould, throug h its policy or practice, intentionally affiliate itself with

a particular sect, but the question w h ether it has, M arsh
sug g ests, will not pivot on the prac t i c e ’ s effect on the disapproving listener. 8 See id. ( downplay ing the sig nificance of leg islative pray er’s effect on an observer who, a s “an adult, [ is] p resumably not r eadily susce p tible to relig ious indoctrination or peer pressure” (internal citat i o n s a nd

8 C o n t rastin g leg islativ e p ray er w ith pray er d u rin g a h ig h -s c h o o l
g rad u atio n

cerem o n y , th e Co u rt ex p lain ed y ears later,

In h eren t d if

f eren ces b etw een th e p u

b lic sch o o l sy stem

an d a sessio n o f a state leg islatu re d istin g u ish th is case f ro m M arsh v. Ch a m b ers

. . . . T h e atm o sp h ere at t h e

o p en in g o f

a sessio n o f a state leg islatu re w h ere ad u lts

are f ree t o en ter an d leav e w ith little co m m en t an d f

or

an y n u m b er o f reaso n s can n o t co m p are w ith th e

co n s train in g p o ten tial o f t h e o n e sch o o l ev en t m ost im p o rtan t f o r th e stu d en t to atten d.

Lee v. W eisma n , 5 0 5 U.S. 5 7 7 , 5 9 6

– 9 7 (1 9 9 2).R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 20

quotation marks o m i t ted)); see also id. at 798 (B rennan, J
., d i s senting ) (bemoaning the majority ’ s failure to c onclud e, under Lemon ’s “prim a r y effect” prong , that from the perspective of the lis tener, “invocations in N ebraska’s leg islative halls ex plicitly link relig ious belief a n d o bservance to the power and prestig e of the State”).

B y p assing the reasonab l e o bserver, the Marsh Court instead train e d i t s analy sis not only on history but o n the government’s a c tions. F or instance, thoug h the court o f appeals had w orried that Palme r ’ s six teen-y ear tenure h ad “the e ffect o f g iving preferenc e ” to Presby terianism, the Court
, “no more than Members o f the Cong resses of this century , [ could] perceiv e any sug g estion that choosing a clerg y man of one denomination advances the beliefs” of his church. Marsh

, 463 U.S. at 793 (emphasis a d d ed). “To the contrary , the evidence”—which w ent solely to the government ’s reasons for retaining Palmer—sug g ested merely “ that Palmer was reappointed because h i s performance and p ersonal qualities were a c ceptable to the body appointing him.” Id. at 793; se e a l so id. a t 8 23 n.1 (Stevens, J
., dissenting ) ( “[ O] nce ag ain, the Court makes the subjective motivation of leg islators the d ecisive criterion for judg ing the constitutionality of a state leg islative practice.”). T h e majority was similarly unconcerned that Palmer was a paid employ e e of the state, for, reg ardles s of whether remuneration sig nals endorsement, it “is g rounded in historic practice.” Id. at 794. L ikewise, the Court sh r ug g ed off Chambers’s o b

jection to the p ray ers themselves, even thoug h Palmer’s many sectarian references—having actually “led to controversy [ in the leg isla t u r e] along relig ious lines”—at times mig ht have struck listeners a s too favorable to Ch r i s t i a nity

. See id. at 800 (B rennan, J
., dissenting ) (hig hlig hting “a series of [ such] instances” in the record). I nR U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 21

sum, whatever messag e Nebraska mig ht have convey ed throug h its p r a c t i c e of selecting

, pay ing

, and r etaining for six teen y ears a Presby

t e rian c haplain who often delivered

ex p licitly Christian invocations

, the Supreme Court concluded that the leg islature had not advanced Christianity

.
To be sure, had M

arsh applied Lemon , then the question whether Ne b r a ska had advanced Christianity would have depended on the pray ers’ effects a nd the reaso n a b l e observer’s p erceptions. See Lemon
, 403 U.S. at 612; Lynch

v. Donnelly

, 465 U.S. 668, 6 9 2 ( 1984) (O’Connor, J
., concurring ) (reading Lemon ’s effec t prong to forbid
g overnment action that communicates “a messag e of
g overnment endorsement” to the reasonable observer); Bd. of Educ. of W

estside Cmty

. S

c h s

. v. M ergens , 496 U.S. 226, 249–53 (1990) (plurality opinion) (treating Lemon ’s second
prong a nd the endorsement test as th e s a m e inquiry)

. A nd indeed, the Court mig ht well have de termined, as had the Eig hth Circuit, that “[ t] hose w ho hav e observed o r participated in Nebraska’s leg islative pro c es s over the last six teen y ears would have to conclude that the leg islature has

an official view on r elig ion which is ex pressed by its minister and pro m o ted with the u se of state funds.” Chambers v

. Marsh

, 675 F .2d 228, 235 (8th Cir. 1982), r e v ’ d

, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 9 I nstead, the Court left Lemon on the shelf, upholding Nebraska’s practice solely on the basis of orig inal intent, tradition, and the absence of e vidence sug g esting a

9 Bu t see L yn ch

, 4 6 5 U.S. at 6 9 2– 9 3 (O’ C o n n o r, J
., co n cu rrin g ) (b ecau s e

o f its h i sto ry , leg islativ e p ray er is “ n o t u n d ersto o d as co n v ey in g g o v ern m en t ap p ro v al o f p articu lar relig i o u s belief s”); Alleg h en

y , 4 9 2 U .S.
at 63 0 (O’ Co n n o r, J
., co n cu rrin g ) (“ [T ] h e hi s to ry an d u b iq u ity of a p r a c t i c e

. . .p ro v id es p art o f th e co n tex t in w h ich a reaso n ab le o b serv er

ev alu ates w

h eth er a ch a l l en g ed g o v ern m en t p ractice co n v ey s a m essag e

o f en d o rsem en t o f

relig io n .” (in t ern al q u otatio n m ark s o m itted )).R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 22

state-led effort to prosely tiz e, advance, or disparag e any one relig ion.

F or these reasons, we c onclude that the question i n this case is not simply whether, g iven the frequency of Christian invocations, the reasonab l e observer of L ancaster’s city

council meeting s would infer favoritism toward Christianity

. Rather, it is whether the City itself has taken steps to affiliate itself with Christianity

.

2

Rubin and F eller arg u e t h a t the City

, throug h its pray er practice, has pla c e d its “official seal of approval” on Christianity

. Marsh

, 463 U .S. at 792. F ar from it. The City has instead taken every feasib l e p r ecaution—short of the

ex tra step (itself fraug ht with constitutional peril 1 0 ) o f requiring volunteers to refrain a ltog ether fr o m referencing sectarian fig ures—to ensure its own e venha n dedness. F irst, it has codified a litany of neutrality -enforcing safeg u ards: No
person attending a city

- council meeting

, including a city employ e e or official, is required to participate in any pray er. No volunteer is paid to pray

. Neit h e r t h e council nor the clerk may “eng ag e in any p rior inquiry

, review of, o r involvement in, the content of any pray er to be offered.” Moreover, the clerk h as never removed a co ng reg ation’s

name from the list of invitees or refused to include o ne. Cf. Joyner , 653 F .3d at 362–63 (Niemey er, J ., dissenting ) (“I t is undisputed that both t h e County ’s policy and its implementation treat relig ious leaders from all r e l ig ions identically

, and no con g reg ation was ex cluded from the County list.”).

10 S ee in fra Part II.B .4

.R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 23

Second, the City h as taken proactive measures to deliver

o n i t s promise of inclusivity

. The clerk must “make e ve r y reasonable effort to ensure that a variety o f e lig ible invocational speakers a

re sc h ed u l ed” to pray , but “[ i] n any event, n o invocational speaker shall be scheduled to offe r a pray er at consecutive meeting s

. . . or at more than three

. . . meeting s in any calendar y ear.” Cf. Pelphrey

, 547 F .3d at 1266 (p r a y er policies c onstitutional because they “allow volunteer leaders of different relig ions, on a rotating basis, to offer invo c ations with a variety of relig ious ex pressions,” such as references to Allah, Muhammad, and J esus, by far the fig ure most often mentioned). He is to invite every local relig ious g roup that he can find. A nd, a s responses trickle in, he is to schedule appearances on “a f irst-come, first-serve[ d]

or othe r random basis.” No city official has ever attempted to influence the clerk’s scheduling decisions.

Third, the City has stressed, b oth to t h e p ublic and to invited pray er-g ivers, the policy ’s nonsectaria n aims. Desig ned to “acknowledg e a n d ex press the city C o uncil’s respect for [ L ancaster’s] diversity of relig ious denominations and faiths,” a s well as to “solemniz e proceeding s” of the council, the policy states that it “is not intended, and shall not be implemented or construed in a ny w ay , to affiliate the City Council with, nor e x p r e s s

. . . preference for, any faith o r relig ious denomination.” Hence, t h e invitation notes that “[ t] his opportunity

is voluntary , and y ou are free to offer the invocation according to the dictates of y our own conscience.” I t also entreats volunteers to r esp ect the sensitive nature o f the forum: “To maintain a sp irit of respect and ecumenism, the City Council requests o n ly that the pray e r opportunity not be ex ploited as an effort to convert others

. . . nor to disparag e any faith or beli e f d i fferent [ from] that of the invocational speaker.” Not only , then, has the City desig ned its policy toR U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

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heed Marsh ’s strictures. I t also h as asked its volunteers to do the same.

3

Bu t n one of this, Rubin and F eller insist, is enoug h

. I t s facially neutral policy notwithstanding

, the City has advanced Christianity in effect because, as it happens, most of the volun teers so far have been Christian and have g iven Christian invocations. 1 1

This arg u ment misconceives the focus o f o u r inquiry

. W h atever the content of the p ray ers or the denominations of the pray er-g ivers, the City chooses neither. That most so far have b e en Christian is merely a fu n c t i o n o f local “demog raphics and the choices of the relig ious leaders w ho responded out of their own initiativ e t o the [ City ’s]

11 In ad ditio n to t

h ei r e ffe c ts- b ased arg u m en t, Ru b in an d Feller also in sin u ate in p assin g th at th e m a y o r o f L an caster, Rex P arris, is at th e

cen ter of a cam

p aig n to tran sf

o rm L an caster in t o a m in iatu re C h risten d o m

. T h ey p o in t to a sp eech t

h at P arris m ad e b ef

o re a m eetin g o f C h r i st ian

m i n i sters i n 20 1 0
, in w h ich h e said

, “ [W ]e are g ro w in g a Ch ristia n

co m m u n ity

, an d w e sh o u ld n o t sh y a w a y fro m th at.” A cco rd in g to th e d istrict co u rt, P arris later testif ied “ th at h e m ean t a ‘ co m m u n ity w h ere w e lo v e o u r n eig h

b o rs, th at w e t ak e care o f o u r n eig h b o rs, th at w e pro t ect ou r

n eig h b o rs.’ He f

u rth er testif

ied th at th is is h is p o licy ; it is n o t an o f f icial City p o l icy .” Sin ce th en , P arris h as recru i ted m em b ers o f m in o rity (n o n

Ch ristian ) sects to “ sig n u p ” f o r co u n cil in v o catio n s

. Oth erw ise, h e h as h a d n o in v o lv em en t in th e p ray er p o licy ’ s ad m in istratio n

. Fo r t h e se

reaso n s , th e distri c t c ou rt w as rig h t to d o w n p lay th e sig n i f

ican ce of P arris’ s sp eech

.R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

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invitation.” 1 2 Joyner
, 653 F .3d at 3 63 ( Ni emey er, J
., dissent ing ). The City cannot c ontrol which relig ious

c o ng r eg ations settle within its limits. Nor can it com p el leaders of those cong reg ations to acc e pt its invitations. 1 3 Rubin and F eller attack the City for the “policy in practice,” but they have the w rong targ e t: the policy ’s authors a re t he citiz ens themselves. Cf. id. (“[ Plaintiffs] overlook[ ] the real life fact that when F orsy th C o u n ty c alls f

or pray ers from relig ious leaders under a neutral pol i c y t h at is proactively inclusive, the p ray ers will r eflect the r elig ions of the relig ious leaders, not the preferences of the County .”).

I n other Establishment Clause contex ts, the Sup reme Court has stressed this e lement of private choice, holding time and time a g ain that when a neutral g overnment policy o r prog r am merely allows or enables private relig ious a cts, those
acts do not n ecessarily bear the state’s imprimatur. I n the school-vouchers case, for e x ample, the Court ex plained that “where a g overnment aid prog ram is n eutral with respect to relig ion, and provides assistance directly to a broad c l a s s o f citiz ens who, in turn, direct g o vernment ai d to relig ious schools who l l y as a result of their own g enuine a nd independent private choice, the prog ram is not readily subject
t o challeng e under the Establishment Clause.” Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
, 5 36 U .S. 639, 652 (2002). This is because “[ t] he incide n t a l advancement of a r elig ious mission, or the

12 H ere, as in Jo

yn er , “ th ere is n o ev id e n ce to su g g est th at th e [City ]
attem p ted to g am e t h e d em o g rap h ics

. . . b y m an ip u latin g th e list of

re l i g i o u s lead ers to en su

re th at on ly Ch ristian p ray er w ou ld b e of f ered .” Jo yn d er , 6 5 3 F.3 d at 3 63 (Niem ey er, J ., d issen tin g ).

1 3 T h o u g h it m ay en co u

rag e th em to d o s o , as th e m ay o r h as d o n e. A cco rd i n g to th e d istrict co u rt, May o r P arris h as “ en co u rag [ed ] ‘ a lo t of relig io u s lead ers in clu d in g Sik h s, Rab b is, an d Mu slim s to sig n u p .’ ”R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

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perceived endorsement of a relig ious messag e, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the
g overnment.” Id. ( emphasis added). On this log ic, the Court also has rejected a constitutional challeng e to a state tax

ded u c t ion p rog ram covering e d ucation ex p enses even for relig ious private schools: “W h ere, as here, aid to p a r o chial schools is available only as a result of decisions of individual parent s n o imprimatur of State approval can be deemed to have been c onferred on any particular relig ion, or on relig ion
g enerally

. ” Mueller v. Allen

, 463 U .S. 388, 399 (19 83) (internal quotation marks a n d citation omitted). And ag ain,

re s o l v i n g a c h alleng e to a vocational-scholarship prog ram, the Court noted that “[ a] ny aid

. . . that ultima t ely f lows to relig ious institutions does so only as a result of the g enuinely independent and privat e choices of aid r ecipients,” emphasiz ing that the challeng ed “prog ram is made available
g enerally without reg ard to the sectarian–nonsectarian, o r public–nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.” W itters

v. W ash. Dep’t of Servs. for the B lind

, 4 7 4 U

. S

. 481, 488 (1986). These and other c a ses confirm, at the very least, that “a sig n ificant factor in upholding g overnmental prog rams in the face of Establishment Clause a ttack is their neutrality towards relig ion.” Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.

, 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001); see also Zobrest v. Ca t a l i na Foothills Sch. Dist.
, 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (relig ious messag e s

c o m m u n i c a t e d b y a t a x p a y er

- f u n d e d s i gn

- l an gu a ge interpreter working in a paroch i a l s c h o ol did not bear the
g o vernment’s endorsement because the prog ram neutrally provided access to larg e g roup of citiz ens reg a rdless o f relig ious views).

F ocusing here “on [ the policy ’s] neutra l ity and the principle of p rivate choice, not on the number of” volunteers from a p a r t i cular sect, Zelman

, 536 U .S. at 6 52, we seeR U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

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nothing in the record or in the pray er p o l i c y to indicate that the City has affiliated itself with Christianity

.

4

To avoid even the appearance tha t t h e pray er “policy in practice” too closely alig ns the City with Christianity

, Rubin and F eller r equest a ban o n “ p r a y ers in the n ame of J e sus Christ (or a

ny other relig ious fig ure).” 1 4 Presumably

, Rubin and F eller w ould have us order the City to review as a matter of course the tex t of every proposed pray er, ap p r o v i ng for deli v e r y o nly those drafts rid o f all references to saints, disciples, prophets, deities, and the like.

That remedy comes with its own set of F irst A mendment infirmities. F or one thing

, it would a ssig n to the g overnment the task of coauthoring pray ers, precisely what the Court i n Lee v. W eisman declared unconstitutional

. I n Lee
, a rabbi
arg ued that the g overnment crossed the line when it told him th a t his g raduation-ceremony invocation “ should be nonsectarian.” Lee
, 505 U.S. at 588. T h e C ourt ag reed: “I t is a c ornersto ne principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that ‘it is no p art of the business of g overnment to compose official pray ers,’” or “direct[ ] and control[ ] ” their
content. Id. at 5 8 8 ( q

uoting Engel v

. V

itale

, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)). “ A state-imposed requirement that all

1 4 In tru t h

, R u b i n an d F eller’ s req u ests f or relief h av e b een in co n sisten t. In th e f irst p arag rap h o f th eir co m p l a i n t , t h ey ask f

o r d eclarato ry an d i n j u n c t iv e relief o n ly f

ro m p ray ers “ w

h erein th e n am e o f J esu s Ch rist i s in v o k ed .” B u t at th e e n d of t h e co m p lain t, th ey ask th e co u rt t o en j o in L an caster f

ro m “ co n d o n in g , allo w i n g , an d sp on so rin g relig io u s p ray ers.” T h e d istrict co u rt co n clu ded th at plain tif f s “ ch allen g e o n ly th e ref

eren ce to J esu s.” On ap p eal, p lain tif f s n o w ask f

o r an in j u n ctio n ag ain st p ray ers

m en tio n i n g Ch rist o r an y

o th er “ relig io u s f

ig u re.”R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 28

leg islative pray ers be nondenominational

. . . beg ins to sound like the e s t a b lishment of ‘an official or civil relig ion,’” the Second Circuit has ex plained, and “[ t] he problem with s u ch civic relig ious statements lies, in part, in the dang er that such efforts to secure relig ious ‘ n e utrality ’ may produce ‘a brooding a

nd pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive,

or even active, hostility to the relig ious.’” Galloway

, 6 81 F .3d
at 29 (quoting S

ch. Dist. of Abington Twp., P a

. v. Schempp

, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg

, J
., concurring )). Consequently

, “a g overnment may not establish a v ag ue theism a s a state r elig ion any more than it may establish a specific creed.” 1 5 Id. at 29.

Second, the very act of deciding —as a matter o f constitutional law, n o less—who counts as a “relig ious fig ure” or what amounts to a “sectarian reference” n o t o nly embroils judg es in precisely thos e i n t r a r e l ig ious c ontroversies that the Constitution requires us to avoid, but also imposes on

us a task that we are incompetent to perfo r m

. 1 6 S ee Lee
, 505 U.S. at 616–17 (Souter, J
., concurring ). Rubin and F eller ask us to forbid mention of J e sus, since he i s clearly a relig ious fig ure. O stensibly

, th e same is true of “Allah,”

15 Here, ad o p tin g a “ v ag u e th eism ” as civ ic relig i o n w o u ld also risk sh u ttin g o u t t

h o se relig io u s l ead ers w

h o , p erh ap s f

o r d o ctrin al reaso n s, are d isin clin ed to resty le o r d ilu te th eir p ray ers. S ee R o b er t J

. Delah u n ty , “Va r ied Ca ro ls”: Leg isla tive Pra yer i n a Plu ra list Po lity

, 4 0 Creig h to n L

. Rev

. 5 1 7
, 5 2 6

– 2 7 (2 0 07 ) (“ Faced w i th th e ch o ice o f p ray i n g in

co n f o rm ity w ith a g o v ern m en t- im p o sed stan d ard o f o rth o do x y o r n o t p ray in g at all, m an y clerg y (to th eir cred it) w ill ch o o se n o t to p ray at all.”).

16 It also m ay b e th at th e task is sim p l y im po ss i b l e

. S e e G e o f

f rey R. Sto n e, In Op

p ositio n to th e S

ch o o l Pra yer Amen d

men t , 5 0 U. Ch i. L

. Rev

. 8 2 3
, 8 2 9 (1 9 8 3 ) (arg u i n g th at “ th e v ery co n cep t o f a ‘ n o n d en o m in atio n al
p ray er’ is self

- co n trad icto ry ”).R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 29

“Muhammad,” or “B uddha.” B ut do more g eneric relig ious appellations also c r oss the line? “Heavenly F ather” strikes

some as c omfortably ecumenical, see, e.g., Simpson
, 4 04 F .3d
at 284, y et several sects reject the “ f a t h e r hood of God,” see gen e r a lly, e.g. , Eliz abeth A

. J ohnson, She W ho Is: The M y stery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (2002), and some reject e v e n the idea of a heavenly deity

, see generally, e.g. , Paul Harrison, Elements of Pantheism: Religious Reverence of Nature and the Universe (2004). Other seemin gl y “safe” J udeo-Christian monikers, such a s “L ord,” “ J ehovah,” “ Abraham,” and “Moses,” ar e no less problematic. See J

o y n er , 653 F

. 3d at 364 (Niemey e r, J
., dissenting ) (“[ A] dherents to the Hindu or Mus l i m relig ions could assert t hat they are offended b y pray ers in the J udeoChristian tradition, w hich the majority has deemed to be nonsectarian and nonoffensive.”). E v en within the J udeoChristian tradition, some deific titles that seem e cumeni c al
turn out n ot to be. See id. (“[ I ] n Simpson
, we labeled a s nonsectarian references to ‘L o rd of [ l] o rds,’ and “King o f [ k] ing s.’

. . . Yet, those phrases refer t o J e s u s in the New Testament. See Revelations, 19:15.”). As these few

ex a mples show, “[ s] imply by r equ iring the enquiry

, nonpreferentialists invite the courts to eng ag e in comparative theolog y .” Lee
, 505 U.S. a t 6 16–17 (Souter, J ., concurring ). W e “ c a n hardly imag ine a subject less amenable to the competence of the federal judiciary

, or more deliberately to be avoided where possible.” 1 7 Id. Thus, we avoid it here.

17 T h e Elev en th Circu i t ad m itted i n P e lp h rey th at it “ w o u ld n ot k n o w

w h ere to b eg i n to d e m a r c ate th e b o u n dary b etw een sectarian an d

n o n sectarian ex p ressio n s.” 5 4 7 F .3 d at 12 7 2. T h ere, as h ere, th e plain tif f s

o f f ered little g u i d an ce:

Ev en th e in d iv id u al tax p ay ers can n o t ag r e e o n w h ich

ex p ressio n s are “ sectarian .” B ats, on e of th e tax p ay ers,R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 30

III

Rubin and F eller also claim that Hearns’s invocation a nd the City ’s p ray er practice violate Article 1, Section 4 of the C a l ifornia Constitution, which, in relevant p art, mimics t h e Establishment Clause. S e e C a l. Const. art. 1, § 4. This “protection ag ainst the e stablishment of relig ion embedded in the California Constitution [does n ot] cre a t e[ ] broader protections than those of the F irst Amendment,” gi v en that “the California concept of a ‘law respecting an establishment of relig ion’ c oincides with the intent and purpose of the F irst Amendment establishment clause.” E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v

. California

, 13 P.3d 1122, 1138 (Cal. 2000) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, for the same reasons that Rubin and F eller’s F irst Amendment c laim fails, their state c l a im fails as well.

testif ied th at a p ro h ib itio n o f “ sectarian ” re feren ces

w o u l d p reclu d e th e u se o f “ f ath er,” “ A llah ,” an d

“ Z o raster” b u

t w o u ld allo w “ Go d ” an d “ J eh o v ah .” Selm an , an o th er tax p ay er, te stif ied

, “ [Y]o u can ' t say J esu s,

. . . J eh ov ah

, . . . [o r] W i c c a

. . . . ” Selm an also d eem ed “ lo rd o r f

ath er” im p erm issib le.

T h e tax p ay ers’ co u n sel f

ared n o b etter th an

h is clien ts in p ro v i d in g a co n sisten t an d w o rk ab le d ef in itio n of sectarian ex p ressio n s. In th e d istrict co u rt, co u n sel f or th e tax p ay ers d eem ed “ Heav en ly F ath er” an d “ L o rd ”

n o n sectarian

, ev e n t h o u g h h is clien ts testif i ed to th e

co n t rary

. . . . W h en ask ed

. . . w h eth er “ Kin g o f k in g s ”

w as s e c t a r i an , h e rep lied

, “ K in g o f k in g s m ay b e a to u g h o n e

. . . . It is arg u ab ly a ref eren ce to o n e G o d

. . . . I th in k it is s a fe t o c o n c l u d e th at it m ig h t n o t b e sectarian .”

Id

.R U B I N V

. C I T Y O F L A

N C A S T E R 31

IV

The district court correctly determined tha t neither Hearns’s April 27 invoc a t i o n nor the City ’s pray er p olicy constituted an unconstitutional establishment of relig ion.

AF F IRMED

.