1 

Filed 11/20/23

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Sacramento) 

---- 

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

JAIME MOSQUEDA et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

C097326

(Super. Ct. No. 21FE016941) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Bunmi O. 

Awoniyi, Judge. Reversed with directions. 

 Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri, Tia M. 

Coronado, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

 No appearance for Defendants and Respondents. 

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified 

for publication with the exception of part II of the Discussion. 
2

In New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. __ [142 S.Ct. 

2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387] (Bruen), the United States Supreme Court declared that the 

Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution protect an individual’s 

right to carry a handgun outside the home for self-defense. (Id. at p. 2122.) 

The high court also held that the Second Amendment right is “subject to certain 

reasonable, well-defined restrictions.” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2156.) The court 

clarified a test it had earlier applied in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 

(Heller) for determining whether a government regulation violates that right. The court 

held that “when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the 

Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” (Bruen, at p. 2126.) Accordingly, to 

justify a firearms regulation, the government “must demonstrate that the regulation is 

consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” (Ibid.) A court 

may declare that an individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s 

“ ‘unqualified command’ ” only if the regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical 

tradition. (Ibid.)

Applying that test, the Bruen court held that an element of New York’s handgun 

licensing regime violated the Second Amendment right to carry a handgun in public for 

self-defense. The regime conditioned issuance of a license to carry a concealed firearm 

on a discretionary finding of an individual’s showing of “proper cause,” which New York 

courts had defined as a special need for self-defense. (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at 

pp. 2122-2123.) The Supreme Court concluded that New York did not establish a 

historical tradition of American governments requiring law abiding citizens to 

demonstrate a special need for self-defense different from the general community in order 

to carry arms in public. (Id. at p. 2156.)

California’s handgun licensing regime is similar to New York’s. (Bruen, supra, 

142 S.Ct. at pp. 2123-2124.) Carrying a concealed handgun in public, whether loaded or 

unloaded, is generally prohibited unless the individual obtains a license. (Peruta v. 
3

County of San Diego (9th Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 919, 925, abrogated in part by Bruen, at 

p. 2122.) The county sheriff or chief of police “may issue” a license to carry a concealed 

handgun upon proof that “good cause” exists for issuing the license. (Pen. Code, 

§§ 26150, subd. (a)(2); 26155, subd. (a)(2) [subsequent undesignated references to 

statutes are to the Penal Code; because the licensing requirements in sections 26150 and 

26155 are identical, our references to section 26150 include by this reference the relevant 

provisions in section 26155].) The applicant must be fingerprinted and pass a 

background check and must also prove that he or she is of “good moral character,” 

resides or works in the issuing county or city, and has completed a firearm safety course. 

(§§ 26150, subd. (a)(1), (3)-(4); 26155, subd. (a)(1), (3)(4); 26185, subd. (a); 26195, 

subd. (a).) The People agree that Bruen invalidated the “good cause” requirement in 

California’s licensing scheme. 

Relying on Bruen, individuals charged in California with unlawfully possessing a 

handgun have contended that their charges and resulting convictions are unconstitutional. 

They have argued, unsuccessfully, that Bruen rendered California’s entire licensing 

scheme facially unconstitutional, and as a result, it was unconstitutional to punish 

nonfelons such as them for carrying a firearm in public solely because they did not have a 

license. (See In re T.F.-G. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 893; People v. Miller (2023) 

94 Cal.App.5th 935 (Miller); In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144.)

Defendants and respondents Jaime Mosqueda and Juanita Mosqueda successfully 

raised the same contention against their unlawful possession charges by demurrer in the 

trial court. We agree with our judicial peers that defendants had standing to raise the 

defense by demurrer, but also that Bruen did not render California’s entire licensing 

scheme or the charges against them unconstitutional. The offending “good cause” 

requirement is severable from the remainder of the licensing statute, as is the “good 

moral character” element which we assume only for purposes of argument to violate the 

test laid down in Bruen. Bruen is also not grounds for a facial attack on the discretionary 
4

nature of California’s licensing scheme, and it did not invalidate any of the other 

licensing provisions in section 26150. We reverse the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, 

which concluded otherwise.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

We derive the facts of the arrest from the People’s opposition to defendants’ 

demurrers. After executing a search warrant at a residence, detectives observed 

defendant Juanita Mosqueda drive up to the residence, exit her car, and walk into the 

residence’s side yard. Defendant Jaime Mosqueda also drove up to the residence. 

Juanita exited the side yard with a black bag. She gave the bag to Jaime, who then drove 

away. Detectives stopped Jaime’s car, and they retrieved the bag from the passenger 

floorboard. They found a loaded handgun inside the bag. The handgun was not 

registered to either defendant. 

The People charged each defendant with unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm, 

carrying a loaded firearm on one’s person or in a vehicle, and other charges not relevant 

here. (§§ 25400, subd. (a)(2); 25850, subd. (a).) Defendants pleaded not guilty, but prior 

to the preliminary hearing they filed demurrers pursuant to section 1004, subdivision 4, 

on the ground the facts did not constitute a public offense. They contended section 

26150’s licensure requirements to show “good cause” and “good moral character” were 

unconstitutional under Bruen. And because those licensing requirements were invalid, 

the entire licensing scheme was invalid, and defendants could not be prosecuted for 

carrying a concealed handgun without a license. 

Defendants asserted they had standing to contest the state licensing scheme by 

demurrer whether or not they applied for a license. They faced an injury capable of being 

redressed: imprisonment based on an unconstitutional statute. And First Amendment 

jurisprudence which granted standing to persons affected by unconstitutional licensing 
5

laws whether or not they applied for a license logically applied to similar claims under 

the Second Amendment. 

The trial court sustained the demurrers and dismissed the action. It ruled that 

Bruen wholly invalidated California’s licensing scheme. And because Bruen declared the 

public carrying of firearms to be “presumptively legal,” defendants could not be 

prosecuted under statutes criminalizing public carry without a license. 

The trial court also held that defendants had standing to challenge the licensing 

scheme whether or not they applied for a license. The court relied on First Amendment 

standing law and found it applicable to rights protected under the Second Amendment. 

The People appeal from the judgment of dismissal. They contend the trial court 

erred in finding that defendants had standing because defendants had not applied for and 

been denied a concealed carry license. The People assert the First Amendment standing 

cases relied on by the trial court do not apply. 

The People also contend the trial court erred in holding that Bruen wholly 

invalidated California’s concealed carry licensing scheme. They argue that Bruen

invalidated only the “good cause” requirement. That requirement is severable from the 

rest of the licensing scheme which remains constitutional. The People claim that the trial 

court’s interpretation of Bruen was overly broad. 

Defendants did not file a respondent’s brief.

DISCUSSION

I

Standard of Review

A demurrer challenges defects appearing on the face of the pleading and raises 

only issues of law. (People v. Biane (2013) 58 Cal.4th 381, 388.) We review the trial 

court’s order de novo. (People v. Perlas (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 826, 832.)
6

Although defendants did not file a respondent’s brief, we may decide the appeal 

on the record, the opening brief, and any oral arguments. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.360(c)(5)(B).) As the appealing party, the People bear the affirmative burden to show 

error. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 110, fn. 1.)

II

Standing

The People claim defendants lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of 

the concealed carry licensing scheme by demurer because they did not suffer a 

constitutional injury. Specifically, defendants did not argue that they had applied for 

concealed handgun licenses and been denied. And even assuming Bruen invalidated the 

good cause requirement for a license, the People argue that defendants did not show they 

would have satisfied the remaining valid conditions for obtaining a license had they 

applied. 

We assume, as the California Supreme Court does, that a criminal defendant may 

challenge the validity of the statute under which he or she is being prosecuted by 

demurrer. (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1091, fn. 10; § 1004, subd. 

4.) As part of that demurrer, the defendant may raise a facial challenge against the 

statute’s constitutionality. (See id. at pp. 1091-1092 [defendants charged with violating 

camping ban ordinance could challenge ordinance’s facial constitutionality by 

demurrer].) The defendant may not, however, raise an as-applied challenge on demurrer. 

(Id. at p. 1085.)

Before the trial court, defendants contended they had standing because the state 

was “seek[ing] to impose penal sanctions on a person when one of the required elements 

that the state must prove is unconstitutional. . . . [T]he Defendant has an injury—arrest—

connected to the unconstitutional licensing scheme that can be redressed in our courts.” 
7

Their statement notwithstanding, defendants did not contend that any of the 

elements of the crimes they are charged with committing under sections 25400 and 25850 

are unconstitutional. Rather, they contended the licensing statute under which they could 

have obtained a defense against their prosecutions is wholly unconstitutional under 

Bruen, and that even though they did not attempt to obtain a license and gain that 

defense, the unconstitutionality of the licensing statute renders the criminal enforcement 

of weapons possession laws unconstitutional. They have standing because they are in 

jeopardy of losing their liberty based on the unconstitutional licensing scheme. 

Almost a century ago, the United States Supreme Court held that the standing 

requirement of obtaining a license before challenging the constitutionality of a licensing 

scheme does not apply when an individual is being criminally prosecuted under a facially

unconstitutional statute. (Smith v. Cahoon (1931) 283 U.S. 553, 562 (Smith).) 

In Smith, the defendant was prosecuted under Florida law for operating as a 

private carrier under a contract with a business without having obtained the required 

license. (Smith, supra, 283 U.S. at pp. 556, 561.) At the preliminary hearing, the 

defendant contended the statute as applied to him violated the due process and equal 

protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, but he was held over for trial. (Id. at 

p. 556.) The Supreme Court stated that, in general, when a statute valid upon its face 

requires a license as a precondition to carrying on a business, “one who is within the 

terms of the statute, but has failed to make the required application, is not at liberty to 

complain because of his anticipation of improper or invalid action in administration.” 

(Id. at p. 562.) However, that rule does not apply “where a statute is invalid upon its face 

and an attempt is made to enforce its penalties in violation of constitutional right. In the 

present instance, the appellant has been arrested and held for trial. He is in jeopardy, and 

the state court, entertaining his application for discharge, has denied the constitutional 

right asserted. The question of the validity of the statute, upon which the prosecution is 

based, is necessarily presented.” (Ibid.)
8

The Supreme Court has consistently followed the rule it announced in Smith in 

cases challenging the constitutionality of other licensing schemes where enforcing the 

scheme violated the unlicensed defendant’s First Amendment rights. (See Shuttlesworth 

v. City of Birmingham (1969) 394 U.S. 147, 151 [participating in parade without required 

permit].) The court explained the rule thusly: “ ‘It is settled by a long line of recent 

decisions of this Court that an ordinance which, like this one, makes the peaceful 

enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the 

uncontrolled will of an official—as by requiring a permit or license which may be 

granted or withheld in the discretion of such official—is an unconstitutional censorship or 

prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.’ (Staub v. [City of Baxley (1958)]

355 U.S. 313, 322.) And our decisions have made clear that a person faced with such an 

unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of 

the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license. ‘The 

Constitution can hardly be thought to deny to one subjected to the restraints of such an 

ordinance the right to attack its constitutionality, because he has not yielded to its 

demands.’ (Jones v. Opelika [(1942)] 316 U.S. 584, 602 (Stone, C.J., dissenting), 

adopted per curiam on rehearing, [(1943)] 319 U.S. 103, 104.)” (Shuttlesworth, at p. 151, 

fn. omitted.)

California courts have similarly held that a criminal defendant has standing to 

challenge the facial constitutionality of the licensing statute under which he or she is 

being prosecuted as violative of the First Amendment without having first sought a 

license. (See Dillon v. Municipal Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 860, 866, fn. 6 [parade without 

permit]; Burton v. Municipal Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 684, 688 [operation of movie 

theater without a permit].)

Recently, in In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th 144, the Court of Appeal held that 

standing existed in a case similar to ours. In that case, the juvenile court found true, 

among other allegations, an allegation that the juvenile unlawfully possessed a loaded 
9

firearm in violation of section 25850, subdivision (a). (Id. at p. 149.) On appeal, and 

after Bruen had been announced, the juvenile contended his adjudication had to be 

reversed because section 25850 incorporated the unconstitutional “good cause” licensing 

requirement. (Id. at pp. 161-162.) Like here, the People contended the juvenile lacked 

standing to raise the contention because he had never applied for a concealed carry 

license, and the exception to the standing rule was limited to the unique context of the 

First Amendment. (Id. at pp. 156, 160.)

The Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile had standing. He had standing 

“because he is challenging the facial constitutionality of a criminal statute under which 

he has been convicted.” (In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.) The court relied 

on Smith and the First Amendment cases’ holdings that a criminal defendant need not 

apply for a permit under a law that facially violated the person’s First Amendment rights 

before challenging the law’s facial constitutionality. (Id. at pp. 158-160.) It also 

concluded that due to the Supreme Court’s application of the rule in a non-First 

Amendment context in Smith, it could not conclude the rule was strictly limited to First 

Amendment licensing cases. (Id. at p. 160.) Dicta in Bruen and Heller favorably 

comparing the Second Amendment to the First Amendment suggested the court should 

take a more cautious view of the People’s argument on the issue of standing. (Ibid.)

In In re T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.Ap.5th 893, the Court of Appeal relied on In re 

D.L. to find standing. A juvenile was charged with violating section 25850 and was 

found to be a ward of the court. (Id. at p. 902.) The People contended the juvenile did 

not have standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality because he had not applied 

for a license. (Id. at p. 912.) The Court of Appeal disagreed. Citing to In re D.L., the 

court stated the juvenile was “challenging his wardship adjudication under a penal 

statute—an enforcement mechanism of the regulatory regime that he contends is 

unconstitutional.” (Id. at p. 913.)
10

In Miller, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th 935, another case similar to ours, a panel of this 

court recognized that the exception to the standing rule requiring the defendant first to 

seek a license had been applied mostly in First Amendment cases, and it also recognized 

the holdings in In re D.L. and Smith. (Miller, at p. 942.) However, because the court 

would conclude that the Second Amendment allows a state to prohibit concealed carry 

whether or not the state has a licensing regime, it assumed without deciding that the 

defendant had standing to raise her constitutional claim on demurrer, and it denied her 

claim on the merits. (Ibid.)

We agree with our sister courts that defendants have standing in this instance to 

raise a facial constitutional challenge by demurrer against sections 25400 and 25850. 

They are being criminally prosecuted under statutes they claim are rendered 

unconstitutional on their face due to Bruen’s invalidation of the licensing statute, section 

26150. Sections 25400 and 25850 are the “enforcement mechanism[s] of the regulatory 

regime” they contend is unconstitutional and under which they now risk the loss of their 

liberty. (In re T.F.-G, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 913.) They thus have a concrete and 

actual beneficial interest in a justiciable controversy. 

We recognize that almost all the cases allowing the facial challenge to proceed 

despite the party not having sought a permit arise in the context of the First Amendment. 

But in Heller and Bruen, the Supreme Court indicated that Second Amendment rights are 

entitled to an equal amount of protection. Reviewing historical sources to discern the

meaning of the Second Amendment, the Heller court cited favorably to a 19th Century 

source, stating: “ ‘[G]overnment is forbidden by any law or proceeding to invade or 

destroy the right to keep and bear arms . . . . The clause is analogous to the one securing 

the freedom of speech and of the press.’ ” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 618, quoting J. 

Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States § 239, pp. 152–

153 (1868).) 
11

Later in its opinion, the Heller court stated, “The First Amendment contains the 

freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for 

obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely 

unpopular and wrong headed views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like the 

First, it is the very product of an interest balancing by the people . . . . And whatever else 

it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” (Heller, supra, 

554 U.S. at p. 635.)

The Bruen court explained that the historical tradition test it was applying to 

determine the scope of the Second Amendment was consistent with the test the court 

applied to restrictions on rights protected by the First Amendment. The court stated, 

“This Second Amendment standard accords with how we protect other constitutional 

rights. Take, for instance, the freedom of speech in the First Amendment, to which 

Heller repeatedly compared the right to keep and bear arms. [(Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at 

pp. 582, 595, 606, 618, 634-635.)] In that context, ‘[w]hen the Government restricts 

speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.’ 

[(United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. (2000) 529 U.S. 803, 816; see also 

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986) 475 U.S. 767, 777.)] In some cases, that 

burden includes showing whether the expressive conduct falls outside of the category of 

protected speech. [(See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc. (2003) 

538 U.S. 600, 620, fn. 9.)] And to carry that burden, the government must generally 

point to historical evidence about the reach of the First Amendment’s protections. [(See,

e.g., United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S. 460, 468-471 [placing the burden on the 

government to show that a type of speech belongs to a ‘historic and traditional 

categor[y]’ of constitutionally unprotected speech ‘long familiar to the bar’] (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).)]” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2130.)
12

Bruen concluded its historical analysis of New York’s proper cause provision by 

aligning the Second Amendment with the First: “The constitutional right to bear arms in 

public for self-defense is not ‘a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of 

rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.’ [Citation.] We know of no other 

constitutional right that an individual may exercise only after demonstrating to 

government officers some special need. That is not how the First Amendment works 

when it comes to unpopular speech or the free exercise of religion. It is not how the 

Sixth Amendment works when it comes to a defendant’s right to confront the witnesses 

against him. And it is not how the Second Amendment works when it comes to public 

carry for self-defense.” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2156.)

We infer from the linkages the Supreme Court has drawn between the First and 

Second Amendments that extending First Amendment standing law to rights under the 

Second Amendment is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence. 

Criminal prosecutions under laws that facially violate the Second Amendment offend a 

right the Supreme Court has declared is not a second-class right; it is a right that is above 

all other interests opposing it. With such a right at risk, a defendant in jeopardy of losing 

his or her liberty in violation of that right has standing to challenge the offending law 

facially without first applying for a required license.

The principal case relied on by the People in opposition, United States v. Decastro

(2d Cir. 2012) 682 F.3d 160, does not convince us otherwise. In Decastro, the defendant 

was indicted for transporting firearms into his home state of New York which he had 

acquired outside that state, a violation of federal law. (Decastro, supra, 682 F.3d at 

pp. 161-162.) He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground the federal statute 

facially violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms under Heller, and 

that New York City’s restrictive licensing requirements were tantamount to a ban. (Id. at 

p. 162.) The district court denied the motion and later found him guilty. (Id. at p. 163.) 

On appeal, the defendant contended the federal statute was facially unconstitutional under 
13

the Second Amendment, and, when combined with New York City’s licensing scheme, it 

was unconstitutional as applied to him because it made it practically impossible for him 

to secure a handgun for self-defense. (Ibid.)

Addressing the as-applied argument first, the court of appeal believed the premise 

of that argument was that New York’s licensing scheme was itself unconstitutional. 

However, because the defendant had not applied for a license, he lacked standing to 

challenge the state’s licensing laws. The court stated, “ ‘As a general matter, to establish 

standing to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional policy, a plaintiff must submit to the 

challenged policy’ ” except when applying for a license would have been a futile gesture. 

(Decastro, supra, 682 F.3d at p. 164.) 

Unlike in the case before us, the Decastro defendant was bringing an as-applied 

challenge. Moreover, New York’s licensing laws were not the enforcement mechanism 

for or had any relation to the federal regime under which he was being charged. As the 

court in In re D.L. stated, Decastro is distinguishable because the defendant there “could 

not have avoided the charge (transportation of firearms into New York from another 

state) by simply obtaining a license for possession.” (In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 161.)

Furthermore, the Decastro court then addressed the defendant’s facial challenge to 

the federal statute on the merits and held the statute did not violate the Second 

Amendment. (Id., supra, 684 F.3d at pp. 168-169.) Our conclusion that defendants have 

standing to raise their facial challenge to the licensing scheme is not contrary to 

Decastro.

Similarly, we find the People’s reliance on the trial court decision of People v. 

Rodriguez (2022) 76 Misc.3d 494 [171 N.Y.S.3d 802] unpersuasive. That court relied on 

Decastro to hold that the criminal defendant before it lacked standing to challenge the 

state’s handgun licensing regime when he had not first applied for a license. (Id. at 

pp. 496-497.)
14

III

Constitutionality and Severability

State law generally prohibits carrying a handgun in public, whether the gun is 

concealed or carried openly, and whether the gun is loaded or unloaded. (§§ 25400, 

subd. (a) [concealed firearm in vehicle or on person]; 25850, subd. (a) [loaded firearm in 

public]; 26350, subd. (a) [unloaded and exposed handgun in public].) There are 

numerous statutory exceptions to these prohibitions, but if a law-abiding California 

citizen does not qualify for one of the exceptions, generally the citizen’s only means for 

lawfully carrying a handgun in public for self-defense is to obtain a license to carry a 

concealed handgun under section 26150.1 The restrictions imposed by sections 25400 

and 25850 against carrying a concealed or loaded firearm in public do not apply to a 

person licensed to carry a concealed handgun. (§§ 25655, 26010.) 

Before the trial court, defendants contended that Bruen rendered California’s 

licensing scheme unconstitutional in at least two respects. First, they argued that Bruen

rendered section 26150, the licensing statute, unconstitutional. Bruen declared 

unconstitutional the elements of “good cause” and, they asserted, “good moral character,” 

two of the licensing requirements under section 26150 for obtaining a concealed carry 

license. Further, they argued that because section 26150 is unconstitutional, a person 

may not be prosecuted for violating it. The fact that the licensing statutes are phrased as 

defenses to the general prohibition did not matter because the general prohibition was 

unconstitutional. 

1 We recognize that a citizen may be licensed to openly carry a loaded handgun if, 

among other criteria, the citizen resides in a county that has a population of less than 

200,000, but Sacramento County, the county where defendants committed their crimes, 

does not qualify. (§ 26150, subd. (b)(2).)
15

Second, defendants contended that section 26150’s failure to define “good cause” 

and “good moral character” rendered the statute unconstitutional under Bruen as an 

unlawful prior restraint of Second Amendment rights because it gave licensing authorities 

near unbridled discretion to create whatever definition they pleased. This was 

particularly true because section 26150 states the licensing authority “may issue” a 

license. Defendants asserted that a permissible prior restraint under the Second 

Amendment must not grant a government agency discretion to grant or withhold a 

license. 

Our colleagues in Miller, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th 935, recognized that defendants’ 

arguments at least as to section 25400 were based on the flawed premise that section 

25400’s ban of concealed firearms was unconstitutional if it was not accompanied by a 

valid licensing scheme. (Id. at p. 943.) The nation has a long, historical tradition of 

banning concealed carry, and such bans were lawful so long as citizens were allowed to 

carry firearms openly. (Id. at p. 944; Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at pp. 2146-2147, 2150.) 

Bruen did not address a licensing scheme’s impact on potential criminal charges for 

carrying a firearm without a license. (Miller, at p. 945.) Rather, Bruen recognized that 

historically, if a state banned both open and concealed carry, it was the open carry 

prohibition that conflicted with the constitution and was void. (Miller, at p. 946; Bruen,

at p. 2147; see Nunn v. State (1846) 1 Ga. 243, 251.) 

This point was dispositive in Miller: “Whatever constitutional defects may 

currently exist elsewhere in California’s multifaceted statutory scheme regulating 

firearms, section 25400 is not itself unconstitutional because of them. To the contrary, 

[the defendant’s] arguments that California’s licensing scheme is invalid, if meritorious, 

would suggest other statutes such as the open carry prohibitions in sections 25850 and 

26350 are unconstitutional, but the concealed carry prohibitions in section 25400 would 

remain valid post-Bruen because California would effectively no longer ban open carry.” 

(Miller, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 946.)
16 

We prefer to address the constitutionality of the licensing regime rather than 

suggest the state’s open carry laws might be unconstitutional. Although the People have 

argued that historically, states were allowed to regulate public carry so long as they did 

not bar public carry altogether, they have not conceded that prosecuting defendants under 

section 25400 might have to be conditioned on striking the state’s open carry ban found 

in section 25850, which defendants were charged with violating (although their handgun 

was found inside a bag in a car). We presume the Legislature would prefer to preserve if 

possible the concealed carry regime without putting the open carry ban at more 

constitutional risk than it might already be facing.2 We thus turn our attention to section 

26150, the concealed carry licensing statute, to determine if its good cause and good 

moral character provisions and the discretion it vests in licensing authorities facially 

survive Bruen and whether any unconstitutional provisions can be severed. 

A. Bruen

Bruen arose in New York where the petitioners, law-abiding citizens, 

unsuccessfully applied for licenses to carry handguns in public for self-defense. New 

York law prohibited possessing any firearm inside or outside the home without a license. 

To obtain an unrestricted license to carry a firearm outside the home, the applicant had to 

prove that “proper cause” existed to issue it. (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at pp. 2122-2125.) 

New York courts defined proper cause as a special need for self-protection 

distinguishable from the general community. (Id. at p. 2123.) The petitioners were 

unable to make that showing. 

2 See Baird v. Bonta (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2023) 81 F.4th 1036. Plaintiffs in that action, 

residents of counties with less than 200,000 population, sought licenses to open carry. 

The court of appeals reversed the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for a 

preliminary injunction and directed the district court to consider whether plaintiffs were 

likely to succeed on the merits. 
17

The Supreme Court first explained the test for determining whether a firearms 

regulation offends the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment presumptively 

protects conduct the Amendment’s plain text covers. (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at 

p. 2126.) To justify a firearms regulation, the government “must demonstrate that the 

regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only 

if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court 

conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s 

‘unqualified command.’ ” (Ibid.)

To make that determination, courts will have to reason by analogy and determine 

whether a historical regulation and a modern regulation are “ ‘relevantly similar.’ ” 

(Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2132.) Relevant similarity will depend on “at least two 

metrics: how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed selfdefense . . . [as] ‘individual self-defense is “the central component” of the Second 

Amendment right.’ ” (Id. at pp. 2132-2133; italics omitted.) 

“To be clear, analogical reasoning under the Second Amendment is neither a 

regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check. On the one hand, courts should 

not ‘uphold every modern law that remotely resembles a historical analogue,’ because 

doing so ‘risk[s] endorsing outliers that our ancestors would never have accepted.’ 

[Citation.] On the other hand, analogical reasoning requires only that the government 

identify a well-established and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin. 

So even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still 

may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at 

p. 2133.)

Applying this test, the Supreme Court held New York’s “proper cause” 

requirement to be unconstitutional. After finding that the Second Amendment guaranteed 

a general right to public carry, and after performing an extensive historical analysis, the 

court stated: “[W]e conclude that respondents [New York] have not met their burden to 
18 

identify an American tradition justifying the State’s proper-cause requirement. The 

Second Amendment guaranteed to ‘all Americans’ the right to bear commonly used arms 

in public subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions. [(Heller, 554 U.S. at 

p. 581.)] Those restrictions, for example, limited the intent for which one could carry 

arms, the manner by which one carried arms, or the exceptional circumstances under 

which one could not carry arms, such as before justices of the peace and other 

government officials. Apart from a few late-19th-century outlier jurisdictions, American 

governments simply have not broadly prohibited the public carry of commonly used 

firearms for personal defense. Nor, subject to a few late-in-time outliers, have American 

governments required law-abiding, responsible citizens to ‘demonstrate a special need for 

self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community’ in order to carry arms 

in public.” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2156.) 

B. “Good cause” provision 

The Bruen court made clear that California’s similar “good cause” requirement in section 

26150 was unconstitutional. (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2124 & fn. 2.) On June 24, 

2022, the day after Bruen was released, the California Attorney General issued a legal 

alert recognizing that the good cause requirement in sections 26150 and 26155 was no 

longer constitutional. (Legal Alert OAG-2022-02 (ca.gov) (https://perma.cc/F2MJSXZ2) [accessed Nov. 13, 2023].) The alert instructed local officials not to require proof 

of good cause for issuing a public-carry license effective immediately. (Ibid.) Officials 

were directed to continue to apply the other licensing requirements, including proof of 

“good moral character.” (Ibid.)

Because the good cause requirement of section 26150 is unconstitutional, we must 

determine whether that requirement can constitutionally be severed from the remainder of 

the statute. In the absence of express language confirming or prohibiting severability, 

such as the case here, an unconstitutional statute remains effective to the extent its invalid 
19

portions can be severed from any valid portions. (Hotel Employees and Restaurant 

Employees Intern. Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 613.) An invalid portion can be 

severed “if, and only if, it is ‘grammatically, functionally and volitionally separable.’ ” 

(Ibid.; California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 270-271.)

Grammatical separability “depends on whether the invalid parts ‘can be removed 

as a whole without affecting the wording’ or coherence of what remains.” (Matosantos, 

supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 271.) Functional separability “depends on whether ‘the remainder 

of the statute “ ‘is complete in itself . . . .’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Volitional separability “depends 

on whether the remainder ‘ “would have been adopted by the legislative body had the 

latter foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

Defendants contended at the trial court that the offending portions of section 

26150 could not be severed. They asserted Bruen rendered unconstitutional the “good 

cause” provision, the “good moral character” provision, and the “may issue” language 

allegedly vesting unbridled discretion in the licensing authorities. Severing those three 

provisions, they argued, left a statute that contained no restriction on the executive branch 

and did not make grammatical sense. We agree with the People and the holding in In re 

D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pages 163-165, that the good cause provision is severable. 

The provision is grammatically separable. It is contained in a discrete subdivision, 

subdivision (a)(2) of section 26150. Excising the subdivision does not impair the 

wording or coherence of the remaining provisions in subdivision (a). (Id. at p. 163.) 

The good cause provision is functionally separable. The remaining provisions are 

complete in themselves and can be applied independently. They require an applicant to 

be of good moral character, to reside or work within the city or county where the license 

is being issued, and to have completed a firearm safety course. (§ 26150, subd. (a); In re 

D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.)

The good cause provision is also volitionally separable. In 2010, when the 

Legislature replaced former section 12050 with section 26150, it “included the same 
20 

general requirements for obtaining a license to carry a concealed weapon, which had been 

in former section 12050, without substantive change, but ‘reorganize[d]’ them from a 

single paragraph into distinct paragraphs. [(Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6.)] This 

reorganization illustrates that the Legislature viewed the requirements as separate, and as 

functioning independently of one another.” (In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) 

C. “Good moral character” provision 

Even if the good cause provision is severable, defendants asserted on demurrer 

that the “good moral character” element was also unlawful under Bruen and not 

severable. Defendants argued that the historical analogical analysis performed by the 

Supreme Court in Bruen demonstrated there was no historical analogue for “California’s 

scheme.” Bruen, however, did not address an element comparable to good moral 

character. Its analogical analysis and its holding were focused on reviewing New York’s 

proper cause requirement. (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at pp. 2135, 2156.) The court found 

that American governments from the time of the Colonies through the adoption of the 

Second and Fourteenth Amendments generally did not broadly prohibit public carry of 

commonly used firearms for personal self-defense. (Id. at pp. 2142-2153, 2156.) It also 

found that American governments generally did not require “law-abiding, responsible 

citizens” to show a special need for self-protection. (Id. at p. 2156.) The court, however, 

made no finding on whether American governments traditionally limited public carry to 

persons of “good moral character” or, if they did, whether such a finding was 

discretionary or subject to objective factors. In fact, New York’s licensing scheme for a 

license to possess a firearm at home, a different license than that sought by the Bruen

petitioners, required the applicant to show he was of “good moral character,” but the 

Bruen court did not address that element. (Id. at pp. 2122-2123.) It does not provide the 

necessary historical analysis to determine the validity of the good moral character 

requirement. 
21

Nonetheless, defendants correctly argued that Bruen established the test for 

determining whether a firearms regulation such as the good moral character clause 

violates the Second Amendment. (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2126.) Neither the 

People in opposing defendants’ demurrer nor the trial court engaged in the historical 

analysis required by Bruen to determine the constitutional validity of the good moral 

character clause. Instead, the People argued the element remained constitutional because 

(1) Bruen did not disturb New York’s moral character element; (2) Bruen cited 

Connecticut’s, Delaware’s, and Rhode Island’s “may issue” licensing schemes with 

suitability requirements as examples of schemes that do not grant licensing officials 

unfettered discretion; (3) a pre-Bruen District of Columbia appellate decision (not the 

D.C. Circuit) upheld a suitability requirement; and (4) certain local California agencies 

had developed objective and definite standards for defining good moral character. The 

People make similar arguments before us. 

None of these arguments establish that discretionary statutory authority to deny a 

handgun license based on the applicant’s good moral character is consistent with the 

nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Bruen court’s silence about New 

York’s good moral character clause cannot be interpreted as assent. New York’s clause 

was not placed in issue, as the petitioners in Bruen sought a license under a different 

regime that, as far as the opinion discloses, did not include a good moral character clause. 

(Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at pp. 2122-2123, 2125.) 

However, rather than remand for the People and the trial court to conduct this 

analysis, we will assume for purposes of argument only that the good moral character 

provision is not consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and 

is unconstitutional. In that case, the question before us becomes whether the clause is 

severable from the remainder of section 26150. We conclude it is, for the same reasons 

the good cause provision is grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable. It is 

contained in a discrete subdivision, subdivision (a)(1) of section 26150; the remaining 
22 

provisions can be applied independently; and the Legislature evidenced its intent that the 

clause be separable. (See In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 163-165.) 

D. “May issue” Clause 

Defendants further argued in their demurrer that section 26150’s failure to define 

“good moral character” rendered the law unconstitutional under Bruen because local 

officials had unbridled discretion to define the term how they pleased. Their discretion 

also arose from the statute’s stating that a licensing official “may issue” a license if the 

listed criteria are met, including the establishment of a good moral character. (§ 26150, 

subd. (a).) 

The trial court determined that Bruen invalidated the entire licensing scheme by 

holding as unconstitutional public carry licensing schemes that relied on the 

government’s exercise of discretion to issue the license. These schemes stated the 

government “may issue” a license as opposed to “shall issue” upon proof of narrow, 

objective factors. The trial court held that the “may issue” language in section 26150 was 

at the statute’s heart and was not severable from the remainder of the statute. 

Defendants and the trial court misread the holding in Bruen. The Bruen court 

based its holding on the “proper cause” language in the New York statute, not on that 

statute’s use of the phrase “may issue” or the discretionary nature of the licensing 

scheme. (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at pp. 2138, 2156; In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 166.) The court said as much in a footnote. The dissent had argued that the court 

could not determine the New York statute’s constitutionality without reviewing evidence 

of how much discretion the licensing authorities possessed or how they had exercised 

their discretion. (Bruen, at p. 2135, fn. 8.) The majority disagreed and stated that issue 

was not relevant to its holding: “The dissent does not dispute that any applicant for an 

unrestricted concealed-carry license in New York can satisfy the proper-cause standard 

only if he has ‘ “ ‘a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the 
23

general community.’ ” ’ [Citation.] And in light of the text of the Second Amendment, 

along with the Nation’s history of firearm regulation, we conclude below that a State may 

not prevent law-abiding citizens from publicly carrying handguns because they have not 

demonstrated a special need for self-defense. [Citation.] That conclusion does not 

depend upon any of the factual questions raised by the dissent. [Petitioners] allege that 

they were denied unrestricted licenses because they had not ‘demonstrate[d] a special 

need for self-defense that distinguished [them] from the general public.’ [Citation.] If 

those allegations are proven true, then it simply does not matter whether licensing 

officers have applied the proper-cause standard differently to other concealed-carry 

license applicants; [petitioners’] constitutional rights to bear arms in public for selfdefense were still violated.” (Ibid.)

It is true the Supreme Court commented on the discretionary nature of New 

York’s licensing law. It stated that 43 states are “shall issue” jurisdictions, where 

licensing authorities “must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy 

certain threshold requirements, without granting licensing officials discretion to deny 

licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability.” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at 

p. 2123, fn. omitted.) In comparison, New York, California, and five other jurisdictions 

have “may issue” licensing laws under which authorities have discretion to deny 

concealed-carry licenses “even when the applicant satisfies the statutory criteria, usually 

because the applicant has not demonstrated cause or suitability for the relevant license.” 

(Id. at p. 2124.) 

The Bruen majority, however, did not hold that such “may issue” laws are facially

unconstitutional. In providing examples of acceptable “shall issue” licensing laws, the 

court showed that the mere use of the terms “may issue” in a licensing law did not 

automatically grant the licensing authorities unconstitutional discretion over issuing 

licenses, including when the statutes required a showing of good moral character or 
24

suitability. Whether a “may issue” regime operated as a “shall issue” regime was an 

issue for an as-applied challenge, not a facial challenge.

Specifically, the Supreme Court recognized that three states—Connecticut, 

Delaware, and Rhode Island—have discretionary criteria similar to California’s good 

moral character requirement “but appear to operate like ‘shall issue’ jurisdictions.” 

(Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2123, fn. 1, italics added.) Connecticut’s licensing statute 

at the time Bruen was decided stated the licensing authority “may issue a temporary state 

permit” upon finding the applicant is a “suitable person.” (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-28(b) 

(2021) [2016 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 16-34].) This suitable person standard precluded 

permits “only to those ‘individuals whose conduct has shown them to be lacking the 

essential character of temperament necessary to be entrusted with a weapon.’ (Dwyer v. 

Farrell [(1984) 193 Conn. 7, 12 [].)]” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2123, fn. 1.)

Delaware’s licensing statute states a person of “good moral character” “may be 

licensed” when conditions are met. (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1441(a).) Ultimate 

approval is left to the superior court who “may or may not, in its discretion, approve any 

application.” (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1441(d).) The Bruen court noted that as of the 

date of its opinion, Delaware had “thus far processed 5,680 license applications and 

renewals in fiscal year 2022 and has denied only 112. [(See Del. Courts, Super. Ct., 

Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapon (June 9, 2022), 

https://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?ID=125408.)] Moreover, Delaware 

appears to have no licensing requirement for open carry.” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at 

p. 2123, fn. 1.)

Rhode Island’s licensing statute states the licensing authorities “shall . . . issue” a 

concealed carry license upon finding the applicant is a “suitable person” to be licensed. 

(R. I. Gen. Laws § 11–47–11(a).) The Supreme Court emphasized that the demonstration 

of a proper showing of need is not a requirement of Rhode Island’s statute. (Bruen, 

supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2123, fn. 1.)
25

The Bruen court’s citation to these statutes as “shall issue” statutes demonstrated 

the court was not facially condemning licensing schemes based solely on their use of 

“may issue” language or the exercise of discretion. The court’s language that these 

jurisdictions “appear to operate like ‘shall-issue’ jurisdictions” indicates that, unless it 

can be determined from the face of the provision, whether a licensing scheme vests an 

amount of discretion in licensing authorities that exceeds what the Second Amendment 

allows is an issue best decided in as-applied challenges, not facial challenges. This is 

because the argument of whether discretion was unlawfully exercised would not apply in 

all circumstances. (In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) 

Defendants, of course, could not have raised an as-applied challenge on demurrer. 

(Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1085.) The trial court thus erred in 

finding on demurrer that Bruen invalidated section 26150 based on the statute’s vesting 

of discretion in licensing authorities under the “may issue” language. 

Defendants did not challenge the remaining concealed carry licensing 

requirements. Those requirements advance California’s long-held goals of “ensuring 

Californians who carry firearms are responsible and law-abiding, live in or have 

substantial contact with the licensing jurisdiction (since local law enforcement is tasked 

with licensee compliance), and know how to safely handle a gun.” (In re D.L., supra, 

93 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) The Bruen court noted that “nothing” in its analysis casts 

doubt on the constitutionality of licensing regimes that required applicants to “undergo a 

background check or pass a firearms safety course” as a condition for carrying firearms in 

public. (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2138, fn. 9.)

Because section 26150’s “good cause” and “good moral character” requirements

are severable, and because Bruen did not facially invalidate the statute’s “may issue” 

provision, section 26150 does not facially violate the Second Amendment. Since the 

statute is a valid licensing provision and provides a valid means for citizens to exercise 

their right under Bruen to possess a handgun in public for self-defense, defendants’ 
26 

Second Amendment rights are not violated when the state enforces that provision 

criminally. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed, and the trial court is directed to overrule defendants’ 

demurrers. 

 

HULL, J. 

We concur: 

 

EARL, P. J. 

 

MESIWALA, J.