NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

ALBERT D.

, Appellant

,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, X.D., Z.D.

,

Appellee s

.

No. 1 CA

- JV 17

- 0505

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 527402

The Honorable Teresa A. Sanders

, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm PLLC

, Scottsdale By Christopher Stavris Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office

, Phoenix By Nicholas Chapman

- Hushek

C ounsel for Appellee

, Department of Child Safety

FILED 5-22-2018ALBERT D. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

B R O W N

, Judge:

¶1 Albert D. (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s order terminating his parental rights to X.D. and Z.D

. Because reasonable

evidence supports the court’s order, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Sarah S. (“Mother”) are the biological parents of

X.D. and Z.D. (“children”) , born in 2010 and 2011 , respectively

. 1 In February 2014, t he Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took the children

in to temporary physical custody after receiving a report of physical abuse and neglect

. 2 Z.D. had unexplained injuries, including bruises on his

forehead , chin, and face, and “long diagonal red ma rks on the top of his

wrists.” DCS placed the children in foster care, where they remained during the proceedings

.

¶3 DCS filed a dependency petiti on alleging Father was unable to parent the children, and after a hearing, the superior court found the children dependent as to Father because he was “unable to parent the child(ren) due to physical abuse and/or failure to protect from physical abuse, domestic violence, neglect, substance abuse and a prior dependency .” Although t he court at that time approved the case plan of reunification concurrent with severance and adoption , the case plan was later changed to reunification

, and final ly to severance and adoption

.

¶4 In August 2015, DCS filed a motion to terminate Father’s parental rights, but b y April 2016, Father had successfully completed all of

the services DCS offered

. Father also obtain ed stable housing and

1 Mother, whose parental rights to the children were terminated in April 2016, is not a party to this appeal.

2 For simplicity, reference s to “ DCS ” encompass the Arizona Department of Eco nomic Security and former Child Protective Services.ALBERT D. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

3 employment

. Although the case plan was not changed

, DCS work ed to reunify Father with the children, allowing him to progress from supervised visits to overnight visit s

. DCS also filed a motion to change physical custody of the children to father, which the court granted.

¶5 But an overnight visit in June 2016 re sulted in a “[h]otline

call

, ” which report ed an injury to Z.D. After this call , Father had only supervised visits with the children until October 2016 , when the children

refus ed to participate in further visits

. DCS then offered a second psychological evaluation to see if Father needed additional services to assist

with reunification but Father did not keep the scheduled appointment s

.

¶6 In January 2017, DCS filed an amended motion for

termination based on the grounds of fifteen months’ time

- in

- care , abuse, and neglect. Th e superior court held a contested severance hearing over a

three

- day period

. The court subsequently granted DCS’s motion to

termin ate Father’s parental rights based on all three grounds an d found

termination was in the children’s best interests. This tim ely appeal

followed.

DISCUSSION

¶7 To terminate parental rights, the superior court must find by clear and convincing evidence at least one statutory ground in Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8

- 533(B), and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child ren ’s best

interests. See Kent K. v. Bobby M. , 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. , 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000). W e will affirm an

orde r terminating parental rights if reasonable evidence supports it. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. , 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009). “[W]e view the evidence and reasonable inferences . . . in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s de cision.” Id. If we affirm one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court ordered termination, we need not

address the other grounds. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. , 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002).

A. Statutory Ground

¶8 Under the fif teen months’ time

- in

- care ground, DCS was required to prove that (1) DCS made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services; (2) the children were in an out

- of

- home placement for at least fifteen months; (3) Father was unable to remedy the

circumstances that caused the children to be in an out

- of

- home placement; and (4) a substantial likelihood existed that Father would not be capable ofALBERT D. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

4 exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.
A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(8)(c). In considering whether DCS proved this ground, the superior court was obligated to “consider the availability of reunification services to the parent and the participation of the parent in

these services.” Id. § 8

- 533(D)

. Below, we address on ly the firs t and fourth

element s because those are the only elements Father challenges.

¶9 As we understand his argument, Father asserts DCS did not

make di ligent efforts because a family reunification team was never implemente d. However, Father h as not directed us to any place in the record where he objected to the adequacy of reunification services based on

DCS having allegedly failed to implement a family reunification team ; he has therefore waived that argument

. 3 See Shawanee S. v. Ariz

. Dep’t of Econ.

Sec. , 234 Ariz. 174, 178

- 79, ¶ 16 (App. 2014) (holding that a parent is precluded from challenging the diligent efforts finding on appeal when the parent does not object to the adequacy of the services in the superior court ) ; ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B) (requiring appellant’ s opening brief to cite portion of record “where the particular issue was raised,” and for rulings requiring an objection, where the objection is located in the record)

.

¶10 Father next argues DCS failed to prove “that there is a

substantial likelihood that he will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care an d control in the near future.” Father points to the adequacy of the services ( such as stating DCS offered no ser vice s that would improve his ability to care for the children) and to his own testimony for support

.

¶11 Most of the evidence Father directs us to is simply conflicting

evi de nce. See Jesus M. , 203 Ariz. at 282, ¶ 12 (“The resolution of such conflicts in the evidence is uniquely the province of the juvenile court as the

trie r of fact; we do not re

- weigh the evidence on review.”)

. Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s findin g that a substantial likelihood existed that Father would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the n ear future

.

¶12 Father acknowledged the children were removed from the

home in 2014 because of domestic violence , which

, at times , occurred

3 As to the family reunification team, Father testified DCS did not just offer a family reunification team but it actually provided one. Only after the overnight visit in June 2016 , which resulted in injuries to Z.D., was the

referral for the team withdrawn.ALBERT D. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

5 between Father and Mother and which the children witnessed

. During one of the dome stic incidents

, Father “forcibly t [ ook ] [X.D. ] out of [Mother’s]

arms becau se she had him in a headlock.” Father testified he has moments

where he struggles with controlling his anger , and sometimes has difficulty with aggression and violence.

¶13 Kimberly Tuttle, t he DCS case mana ger who oversaw the case

from February 2015 to August 2017, testified the children came into DCS’s care because “[t]here was a domestic violence incident between [Father] and [Mother], in which [Z.D.] ended up with some unexplained injuries. ”

Father had access t o Z.D at the time Z.D. suffered the injuries, and both children witnessed the domestic violence between Father and Mother,

which is a “frigh tening situation for a child.” As to services , DCS had

Father complete substance abuse testing and treatment; a psy chological evaluation; counseling that included anger management, domestic violence, and past trauma components; and parent

- aide , which involved

individualized behavior al goals aimed , in part, at helping Fath er with

domestic violenc e and positive discipline

.

¶14 A licensed psychologist, Kathryn Menendez, reported in July

2014 that F ather suffers from a personality disorder that includes aggressive
behavior. Father had “demonstrated a pattern of neglect and poor supervision over his children ,” and “d emonstrated a pattern of aggressiveness in the presence of his children which ha [d] resulted in their injury.” Menendez diagnosed Father with “neglect of a child

, ” which

means he is a “perpetrator of child neglect.”

¶15 Moving forward to 2016, Tuttle testi fied that the children had an overnight visit with Father in June 2016 , but as a result of that visit , DCS

received a hotline call “stating that the youngest child, [Z.D.], had a fist

shaped brui se in the middle of his back.” Shortly there after

, the children

were interviewed ; Tuttle observed an oval

- shaped injury on Z.D.’s back

and heard Z.D. state that Father hit him. Z.D. repeatedly stated

, to Tuttle and others, that Father hit him , and has never indicated it was someone else

. Z.D. ref us ed to visi t Father several months later , continuing to assert
Father had hit him

.

¶16 Based on various pieces of evidence , Tuttle opined th at Father

abused Z.D. and neglected both children. The child r en have “special

needs” ( Z.D. has autism and X.D. has ADHD )

. Because of his aggressi ve behavior and inability to cope with his aggression, Father would not be able to deal with the children’s special needs, which require patience, understanding, and a calm demeanor

. In other words, t he chi l dren’s specialALBERT D. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

6 needs comb ined with Father’s aggression issues would put both children at
risk of being abused by Father if placed in his care

. S ince the June 2016 incident, Father has reverted to how he used to be at the time the children

wer e placed in out

- of

- home care. Father has apparently neither benefitted from any of the services nor demonstrated that he made the behavior al changes necessary to parent the children

.

¶17 Regarding the June 2016 incident, a DCS report states that not only did Z.D. have a bruise on his back but he also had “a diaper rash” and “a bump on the top of his head” that was “swollen with pain

. ” Z.D. “smelled like urine” and “didn’t have a diaper on when [the foster family] picked him up.” In response, DC S fully investigated the abuse and “found

it to be substantiated.”

¶18 Jacqueline Hess, a family nurse practitioner, performed a

forensic medical examination of Z.D. shortly after he returned home from

the overnight visit with Father in June 2016 and after the foster parents , who noticed “bruises on [Z.D’s] back, arms and legs,” had taken Z.D. to urgent

care

. Hess testified that “the pattern of bruises . . . on the back are concerning because of the way they were patterned ” and because the back is “not a common area where a child would receive bruises just from playing .” Z.D. told Hess , who had no reason to doubt Z.D.’s honesty, that “[Father] hit him on the back.”

¶19 Christina Lebovitz, a clinical psychologist that intervi ewed

the children and foster parents in December 2016, testified that Z.D. told

her he was “mad and nervous about visits .” X.D. “was scared to go to [Father’s] house” and “said he saw [Father] hit [Z.D.] and hit [Mother] ”;

X .D. “thought that he might be h it also .” A child suffers emotional or psychological abuse when that “ child is a witness to a sibling or someone else being hurt

. ” I n her written report

, Lebovitz explained that Z.D. told

f oster mother “ that [Father] hit him during” two unsupervised overnight

visits.

¶20 On this record, reasonable evidence supports the superior

court’s determination that a substantial likelihood exist ed that Father

w ould not be capable of exercising proper and effective pa rental care and

control in the near future. A lthough he complet ed most of the service s , Father did not complete a second psychological evaluation or successfully care for the children during overnight visitations. The evidence also shows

that Father was still violent and aggressive after participating in services designed to help him overcome these issues and become an effective parent

, and that both children would suffer neglect and further physical orALBERT D. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

7 emotional abuse if returned to his c are

. Simply because Father testified that

he benefit ted from the services and accepted responsibility for his actions

, does not necessarily mean he is capable of properly and effectively parenting the children in the near future.

B. Best Interests

¶21 Termination o f parental rights is in a child’s best interests if

he or she will “derive an affirmative benefit from termination or incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v.

Oscar O. , 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 6 (App. 2004). “In making the determination, the juvenile court may consider evidence that the child is adoptable or that an existing placement is meeting the needs of the child.” Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. , 227 Ariz. 282, 288, ¶ 26 (App. 2011).

¶22 The superior court found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests because the children were in a
foster home that potentially could adopt them , were in the least restrictive placement

, were adoptable , would “have permanency in a safe and stable home with parents that are able to meet all of their needs

, ” and would be at risk for further abuse and neglect if placed with Father

.

¶23 Father argues the superior court failed t o “mention in its findings any of the testimony regarding th e allegations of physical abuse by the foster placement ,” and that evidence, including Father’s testimony,
shows it would be in the children’s be st interest to be reunified with him.

¶24 Father’s arguments are unpersuasive because he is merely asking us to reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicting evidence , which is

not our role

. See Jesus M. , 203 Ariz. at 282, ¶ 12. To the extent Father challenges the adequacy of the superior court’s finding s , this argument is
waived because Father fails to cite supporting aut hority or explain why the

court was required to issue specific written find ings regarding the alleged abuse by the foster parents , especially when the court found the children

would be in a safe home

. See Melissa W. v. Dep ’ t o f Child Safety , 238 Ariz.
115, 117

- 18, ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (finding arguments waived because mother did not support the arguments “ with citation to relevant authority ”)

.

¶25 Tuttle testified that severance and adoption was in the

children’s best interests , the c urrent foster placement was the least restrictive and meeting the children’s need s , the foster parents were willing to adopt both children , and the children were adoptable

. The children would benefit from termination of Father’s parental rights because theyALBERT D. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

8 woul d have a stable home, which “would really alleviate a lot of worries

for these children.” The children feel safe in their current placement.

¶26 Lebovitz testified that if the children returned to Father, they

would experience “overwhelming anxie ty and s ome further emotional damage.” Joanne Mathlin, a DCS unit supervisor, also testi fied that

severance was in the children’s best interests. Therefore, reasonable

evidence supports the superior court’s finding that termination of Father’s rights was in the children’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the children.