N OTE : This order is nonprecedential

. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

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In re : CREEKVIEW IP LLC, Petitioner

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2023

- 108

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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in No s . 1:22

- cv

00426

- CFC and 1:22

- cv

- 00427

- CFC, Chief Judge Colm F. Connolly.

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ON PETITION

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Before D YK , B RYSON , and P ROST , Circuit Judges

. P ER C URIAM

. O R D E R

Creekview IP LLC filed these suits in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware . On September 12, 2022, the district court ordered Creekview’s managing member to attend a hearing to determine whether Creekview complied with the court’s standing order s concerning (1) disclosure of owners, members, and partners of nongovernmental enti ties that are parties before the court and (2) disclosure of certain third

- party funding arrangements in litigation before the court . Creekview petitions Case: 23-108 Document: 30 Page: 1 Filed: 01/04/2023IN RE : CREEKVIEW IP LLC 2

this court for a writ of mandamus that would direct the district court to cancel the hearing and end its “judicial inquisition.” Pet. at 5.
“As the writ [of mandamus] is one of the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal, three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue”: the petitioner must show (1) there is “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires,” (2) the “right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable,” and (3) “the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C. , 542 U.S. 367, 380

– 81 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations

om itted). Th at standard has not been met.
Creekview argues that the district court clearly overstepped its authority when it enter ed the standing orders. But a direct challenge to those orders at this juncture is premature, as Creekview has not been found to violate those orders

, and it will have alternative adequate means to raise such challenges if, and when, such violations are found to occur.

Creekview further argues that it has an indisputable right to terminate the district court’s inquiry because bothcases have been dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). On September 28, 2022, the parties in Creekview IP LLC v. Skullcandy Inc. , No. 1:22

- cv

- 0 0427 (D. Del.) filed a joint stipulation to dismiss. O n October 6, 2022, Creekview filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) in Creekview IP LLC v. Jabra Corp. , No. 1:22

- cv

- 00426 (D. Del.) . Creekview subsequently filed a motion to s tay both cases pending the disposition of a petition for a writ of mandamus in In re Nimitz , No. 2023

- 103 (Fed. Cir.), another case challenging the district court’s standing orders. The district court granted the motion, staying the litigation pending the termination of the Federal Circuit’s stay in the Nimitz case, and canceled the evidentiary hearing that had been ordered for December 6, 2022. Meanwhile, this court denied the Nimitz petition, Case: 23-108 Document: 30 Page: 2 Filed: 01/04/2023IN RE : CREEKVIEW IP LLC 3

noting that a challenge to the standing orders was premature, and the district court has taken no further action in th ese case s since that time.
Here, as in Nimitz , the petition is premature. Given that the district court has taken no further action in th ese

case s since its September 12 order, other than to grant Cr eekview’s motion for a stay, the court has not addressedCreekview’s argument that in light of the notice of voluntary dismissal and stipulation of dismissal the court may not conduct the proposed inquiry into the accuracy of Creekview’s corporate disclosu re statements and compliance with the court’s standing order on third

- party litigation funding. Creekview’s contention that the district court may not continue its inquiry following the dismissal s and that mandamus should be granted on that ground is ther efore premature.
Notably, there is no absolute prohibition on a district court’s addressing collateral issues following a dismissal. Rather, “[i]t is well established that a federal court mayconsider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending ,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp ., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990)

. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (a district court has authority to regulate practice before it ). Creekview has not shown that the court has taken any action in this case that is so far outside its authority to warrant th e extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus

. Accordingly

, I T I S O RDERED T HAT : The petition is denied.

January 4 , 202 3 Date F OR THE C OURT

/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner Peter R. Marksteiner Clerk of Court Case: 23-108 Document: 30 Page: 3 Filed: 01/04/2023