[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4269.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4269

THE STATE EX REL. BONNLANDER, APPELLANT, v. HAMON ET AL.,

APPELLEES. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon, Slip Opinion No. 

2020-Ohio-4269.] 

Workers’ compensation—Whether a claimant has voluntarily retired or has 

abandoned the workforce is a question of fact for the Industrial Commission 

to determine—A court must uphold a factual determination by the 

commission so long as it is supported by some evidence in the record, 

regardless of whether evidence supporting a contrary conclusion also 

exists, even if the contrary evidence is greater in quality or quantity—Court 

of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 

(No. 2019-1386—Submitted August 4, 2020—Decided September 2, 2020.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 18AP-501, 

2019-Ohio-3861. 

________________ 
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Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellee Industrial Commission denied the request of appellant,

Timothy Bonnlander, for permanent-total-disability (“PTD”) compensation, 

because the commission found that Bonnlander had voluntarily abandoned the 

workforce. Bonnlander asked the Tenth District Court of Appeals for a writ of 

mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its decision and grant his request. 

The Tenth District denied the writ because it found that the commission’s decision 

was supported by evidence in the record. Bonnlander appealed. We affirm the 

Tenth District’s judgment. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} Bonnlander sustained severe injuries in a work-related vehicle 

accident in 1992. His workers’ compensation claim was allowed for physical and 

psychological conditions. Bonnlander worked as a laborer and construction worker 

from 1994 through 2000. He worked for the United States Postal Service from 

2000 through 2009, first as a mail carrier and then as a custodian. He has not 

worked since 2009. 

{¶ 3} In February 2014, Bonnlander applied for PTD compensation. The

commission denied that request in September 2014, finding that he could perform 

sedentary work for up to four hours a day. In its order, the commission noted that 

Bonnlander’s failure to pursue vocational rehabilitation had reflected negatively on 

his application. In October 2014, Bonnlander sought a writ of mandamus from the 

Tenth District vacating the commission’s order. See State ex rel. Bonnlander v. 

Hamon, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-855, 2015-Ohio-4038, ¶ 30. 

{¶ 4} In the meantime, he also requested vocational-rehabilitation services. 

The commission granted that request in February 2015. The vocationalrehabilitation case manager (“VRCM”) gathered information, but some of what she 

sought was unavailable: Bonnlander’s treating psychologist did not respond to 

multiple requests about Bonnlander’s return-to-work outlook or his psychological 
January Term, 2020 

3

restrictions, and the managed-care organization handling Bonnlander’s case denied 

the VRCM’s requests for additional neurological, psychological, and physical 

evaluations. 

{¶ 5} The VRCM therefore considered a May 2014 psychological report by 

an independent medical examiner, Dr. Debjani Sinha, who opined that Bonnlander 

could work part-time, up to four hours a day, with accommodations, and a January 

2015 application for wage-loss compensation in which Bonnlander’s treating 

physician stated that he had the physical ability to perform sedentary work, up to 

eight hours a day, with standing and walking for up to one hour. 

{¶ 6} The VRCM also “heavily” considered Bonnlander’s own statement 

that he suffered from memory issues that he believed would impede his ability to 

return to work. She ultimately concluded: 

Without the benefit of reconditioning, or a NeuroPsychological evaluation, and in just relying on [Bonnlander’s]

presentation, pain levels, and applicable physical and psychological 

restrictions, this VRCM has no confidence he would be able to 

actively participate in vocational rehab or [be] employable in a 

competitive labor market. It is therefore the VRCM [sic] opinion, 

that without increased psychological, physical, and cognitive 

functional abilities, he is not feasible for vocational rehabilitation or 

return to work. 

Bonnlander’s rehabilitation file was closed in March 2015 “due to medical 

instability.” 

{¶ 7} In September 2015, the Tenth District denied Bonnlander’s 2014 

request for a writ of mandamus. Bonnlander, 2015-Ohio-4038, at ¶ 8. Bonnlander 

appealed, and in May 2017, this court unanimously affirmed the Tenth District’s 
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judgment, holding that “[i]t was within the commission’s discretion to rely on Dr. 

Sinha’s report as evidence to support the conclusion that Bonnlander was capable 

of up to four hours of sedentary work a day.” State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon, 

150 Ohio St.3d 567, 2017-Ohio-4003, 84 N.E.3d 1004, ¶ 20-21. 

{¶ 8} On October 12, 2017, Bonnlander submitted a new application for

PTD compensation. A staff hearing officer (“SHO”) found that Bonnlander’s 

psychological and orthopedic conditions both independently rendered him 

incapable of working and issued a “tentative order” awarding Bonnlander 

compensation effective September 20, 2017. The SHO based this conclusion on 

medical opinions rendered in late 2017. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 

objected to the tentative order, and a different SHO vacated it, finding that the order 

was inappropriate because there was a legal dispute over the issue of PTD. 

{¶ 9} In May 2018, a third SHO denied Bonnlander’s request for PTD 

compensation, based on a finding that Bonnlander had voluntarily abandoned the 

workforce. The SHO found that (1) this court had upheld the commission’s 2014 

order denying PTD on the grounds that Bonnlander could work part-time, 

(2) Bonnlander had last worked in late 2008 or early 2009, (3) Bonnlander is 

receiving federal disability benefits arising from his employment at the post office 

as well as social-security-disability benefits and Bonnlander had testified that he 

did not believe that he could receive federal disability benefits if he was working, 

(4) Bonnlander had not looked for work for several years, at least since September 

11, 2014 (the date of the hearing on his 2014 PTD-compensation application), 

(5) the VRCM “was without an accurate assessment of [Bonnlander’s] cognitive 

function,” and (6) Bonnlander’s “pursuit of vocational rehabilitation over roughly 

a three week period” was not sufficient to establish “a meaningful effort in pursuing 

all reasonable avenues of accomplishing a return to sustained remunerative 

employment albeit on a part-time basis.” The commission rejected Bonnlander’s 

request for reconsideration of the SHO’s decision. 
January Term, 2020 

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{¶ 10} In June 2018, Bonnlander filed the instant action in the Tenth 

District, seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order 

and grant his application for PTD compensation. The magistrate found that the 

commission’s determination that Bonnlander made an insufficient effort at 

rehabilitation was an abuse of discretion and recommended that the court grant the 

writ. 2019-Ohio-3861, ¶ 48-50. 

{¶ 11} However, the Tenth District sustained the commission’s objections 

to the magistrate’s recommendation and denied the writ. Id. at ¶ 13, 25-26. The 

court of appeals explained that “the SHO’s finding on relator’s effort at vocational 

rehabilitation was only one consideration among many used to support the SHO’s 

decision to deny PTD compensation,” id. at ¶ 17, and that other evidence in the 

record supported the decision that Bonnlander had voluntarily abandoned the 

workforce, id. at ¶ 21. Specifically, the court of appeals pointed to 

(1) Bonnlander’s testimony that he believed working could result in the loss of his 

federal disability benefits, id., and (2) his failure to work or to seek work after the 

commission found him capable of sustained remunerative employment in 

September 2014, id. at ¶ 22. 

{¶ 12} The court of appeals acknowledged that Bonnlander had pursued 

vocational rehabilitation in 2015, but it pointed out that the commission’s 

September 2014 determination that he could work part-time was not conditioned 

on his undergoing vocational rehabilitation, so the vocational-rehabilitation 

determination was irrelevant. Id. at ¶ 23. In any event, the Tenth District explained 

that because Bonnlander’s testimony and inaction constitutes some evidence that 

he voluntarily abandoned the workforce, the existence of contrary evidence is 

immaterial and the commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

Bonnlander PTD compensation. Id. at ¶ 24. 

 
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II. ANALYSIS 

A. Mandamus Standard 

{¶ 13} Mandamus relief is appropriate only if the relator establishes “a clear 

legal right to the relief requested, a clear legal duty on the part of the commission 

* * * to provide the relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 

of the law.” State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 143 Ohio St.3d 56, 2015-Ohio1191, 34 N.E.3d 104, ¶ 12. In matters before it, the commission is the exclusive 

evaluator of the weight and credibility of the evidence. State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. 

v. Indus. Comm., 88 Ohio St.3d 284, 287, 725 N.E.2d 639 (2000). Therefore, “[t]o 

be entitled to an extraordinary remedy in mandamus, the relator must demonstrate 

that the [commission] abused its discretion by entering an order not supported by 

any evidence in the record.” State ex rel. WFAL Constr. v. Buehrer, 144 Ohio St.3d 

21, 2015-Ohio-2305, 40 N.E.3d 1079, ¶ 12. The relator must make that showing 

by clear and convincing evidence. Id. 

B. The Commission’s Decision Was Supported by Some Evidence 

{¶ 14} “ ‘Permanent total disability’ means the inability to perform 

sustained remunerative employment due to the allowed conditions in the claim.” 

Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). PTD compensation is not available to an injured 

worker who has voluntarily abandoned the workforce for reasons unrelated to his 

allowed conditions. R.C. 4123.58(D)(3); Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d); see 

also State ex rel. Black v. Indus. Comm., 137 Ohio St.3d 75, 2013-Ohio-4550, 997 

N.E.2d 536, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 15} “Whether a claimant has voluntarily retired or has abandoned the 

workforce is a question of fact for the commission to determine.” Id. at ¶ 18. And 

a court must uphold a factual determination by the commission so long as it is 

supported by some evidence in the record, regardless of whether evidence 

supporting a contrary conclusion also exists, even if the contrary evidence is greater 
January Term, 2020 

7

in quality or quantity. State ex rel. Vonderheide v. Multi-Color Corp., 156 Ohio 

St.3d 403, 2019-Ohio-1270, 128 N.E.3d 188, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 16} In his first proposition of law, Bonnlander argues that the 

commission abused its discretion by considering his failure to participate in 

vocational rehabilitation. This argument is based on two premises. First, 

Bonnlander asserts that after the commission’s September 2014 determination that 

he could work four hours a day, his allowed medical conditions deteriorated to the 

point that he became permanently and totally disabled, as evidenced by the March 

2015 determination that he was not a feasible candidate for vocational rehabilitation 

and by medical opinions from November 2015 and late 2017. Second, he asserts 

that the commission is not required to consider a claimant’s failure to participate in 

vocational rehabilitation when a finding of permanent and total disability is based 

solely on medical factors. In support of this assertion, Bonnlander cites State ex 

rel. R & L Carriers Shared Servs., L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm., 151 Ohio St.3d 568, 

2017-Ohio-5833, 91 N.E.3d 711, State ex rel. Heinen’s, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 10th 

Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-635, 2019-Ohio-4690, and State ex rel. Tradesman 

Internatl. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-122, 2014-Ohio-1064, 

aff’d sub nom. State ex rel. Tradesmen Internatl. v. Indus. Comm., 143 Ohio St.3d 

336, 2015-Ohio-2342, 37 N.E.3d 1203. 

{¶ 17} We reject Bonnlander’s first proposition of law. His reliance on 

medical evidence from 2015 and 2017 overlooks the fact that the evidence the 

commission relied on in making its finding of voluntary abandonment dated from 

2014 at the latest. And an injured worker who voluntarily abandons the workforce 

for reasons unrelated to the allowed conditions prior to becoming permanently and 

totally disabled is not entitled to PTD compensation. State ex rel. Baker Material 

Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 138 (1994), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. 
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{¶ 18} Moreover, the cases Bonnlander relies on are inapplicable. They 

permit the commission to award PTD compensation based solely on medical factors 

without considering the claimant’s failure to participate in vocational rehabilitation, 

but they do not require the commission to ignore a failure to participate in 

vocational rehabilitation when making a finding of voluntary abandonment. R & L 

Carriers at ¶ 18 (“Although the commission may consider a claimant’s 

nonparticipation in reeducation or retraining in its analysis of an injured worker’s 

nonmedical disability factors, * * * when permanent total disability is based solely 

on the claimant’s medical impairment, the commission is not required to consider 

nonmedical disability factors * * *” [emphasis added]); Tradesman Internatl., 

2014-Ohio-1064, at ¶ 18 (“Where * * * medical factors alone preclude sustained 

remunerative employment, * * * a consideration of the nonmedical factors, 

including whether [the] claimant had or should have pursued vocational 

rehabilitation, [is] unnecessary” [emphasis added]); Heinen’s at ¶ 12 (same). 

{¶ 19} In his second proposition of law, Bonnlander argues that because he 

sought vocational rehabilitation but was found to be a nonfeasible candidate, the 

commission abused its discretion by finding that he voluntarily abandoned his 

employment. He further asserts that the commission’s decision is not supported by 

any evidence in the record. 

{¶ 20} We reject Bonnlander’s second proposition of law and conclude, as 

did the Tenth District, that some evidence in the record supports the commission’s 

finding that Bonnlander voluntarily abandoned the workforce. See 2019-Ohio3861 at ¶ 21-22. 

{¶ 21} Specifically, the third SHO in this case found that Bonnlander 

testified that he was receiving federal disability benefits arising from his former 

employment with the post office and that he believed he could not receive those 

benefits if he was working. In addition, the third SHO found that Bonnlander failed 

to work or seek work after the commission found him capable of sustained 
January Term, 2020 

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remunerative employment in September 2014; in fact, he has not worked since 2009 

and has not sought work since at least September 11, 2014. “[T]he commission 

may consider a claimant’s inaction after leaving a job as evidence that the claimant 

voluntarily decided to no longer be actively employed.” State ex rel. McKee v. 

Union Metal Corp., 150 Ohio St.3d 223, 2017-Ohio-5541, 80 N.E.3d 491, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 22} It is true that Bonnlander sought vocational rehabilitation. But while 

the commission’s 2014 order denying PTD compensation noted that his failure to 

have pursued vocational rehabilitation “to improve his prospects for returning to 

the workforce” was a negative factor with respect to his PTD-compensation 

application, the commission’s determination that Bonnlander could work four 

hours a day was not conditioned on his completion of vocational rehabilitation. 

{¶ 23} Moreover, although Bonnlander’s pursuit of vocational 

rehabilitation and the VRCM’s finding that he was not a feasible candidate for 

rehabilitation services may constitute evidence supporting a conclusion that 

Bonnlander did not voluntarily abandon the workforce, the commission is entitled 

to determine the appropriate weight and credibility of that evidence. LTV Steel, 88 

Ohio St.3d at 287, 725 N.E.2d 639. And the third SHO found that the VRCM “was 

without an accurate assessment of [Bonnlander’s] cognitive function.” 

{¶ 24} In any event, the mere existence of conflicting evidence does not 

render the commission’s determination of a factual question an abuse of discretion. 

Vonderheide, 156 Ohio St.3d 403, 2019-Ohio-1270, 128 N.E.3d 188, at ¶ 14. 

Because the commission’s decision that Bonnlander voluntarily abandoned the 

workforce was supported by some evidence in the record, the Tenth District 

correctly denied the writ. 

III. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Tenth District’s judgment. 

Judgment affirmed. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 

and STEWART, JJ., concur. 

_________________ 

Mark B. Weisser, for appellant. 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Eric J. Tarbox, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 

_________________