1 19

- 1717

- c v Yu v. Knighted, LLC

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT



## SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the not ation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York , on the 30 th day of June, two thousand twenty

.

PRESENT: J OSÉ A. C ABRANES
, R

AYMOND J. L OHIER
, J R

. S USAN L. C ARNEY
, Circuit Judges

.

S IJI Y U
,
Plaintiff

- Appell ant , 19

- 1717

- cv

v.

K

NIGHTED
, LLC, AN I NTELLIGRATED C OMPANY
,
Defendant

- Appellee

.

FOR PLAINTIFF

- APPELLANT : Siji Yu, pro se , Hopewell Junction, NY

.

FOR DEFENDANT

- APPEL L EE : Shira Franco, Sharon Cohen, Davis & Gilbert LLP, New York, NY

.

Appeal from judgment s of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York ( Kenneth M

. Karas

, J udge ).2 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment s of t he District Court be and hereby are
AFFIRMED

.
Appellant Siji Yu, pro se
, sued Knighted, LLC (“Knighted”) , his former employer, for

violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 1 Yu, who worked for Knighted as a senior database administrator, alleged that he faced discrimination based on his Asian ethnicity, Chinese national origin, and age (59 years) when he was not paid for mandatory overtime, did not receive an annual raise or a promotion, and was terminated in retaliation for challenging the alleged

discrimination. Yu’s FLSA claim was based on Knighted’s failure to pay him for mandatory

overtime.

On February 16, 2017, t he D istrict C ourt granted in part Knighted’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)

, dismissing Yu’s Title VII and ADEA discrimination and retaliation

claims on the basi s that they were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel

. It denied Knighted’s motion to dismiss with regard to Yu’s FLSA claim. On May 13, 2019, t he D istrict C ourt granted Knighted’s motion for summary judgment on Yu’s FLSA claim, ruling that Yu was exempt from overtime protections as a highly compensated employee. Yu appeals, challenging both orders

. Yu also challenges the D istrict C ourt’s denial s of his successive motions for reco nsideration o f the collateral estoppel issue, which the court denied on January 9, 2018 and February 14, 2018

. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo

. See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc. , 834 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2016). We also review de novo a district court’s collateral estoppel ruling. See Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections , 422 F.3d 77, 93 (2d Cir. 2005 )

. We review the denial of a

motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. See Simon v. City of New York , 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013)

. Finally, we review a grant of summary judgment de novo , “resolv[ing] all ambiguities and draw[ing ] all inferences against the moving party.” Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t , 706 F.3d 120, 126

– 27 (2d Cir. 2013).

1 Yu also raised claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and New York State Human Rights Law, which the D istrict C ourt dismissed. The District Court liberally construed Yu’s complaint as raising a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and dismissed that claim as well. Yu has now abandoned these claims because he does not challenge the Di strict C ourt’s dismissal in his appellate brief. Se e LoSacco v. City of Middletown , 71 F.3d 88, 92

– 93 (2d Cir. 1995).3 I. Discrimination and Retaliation Claims

Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a federal court must apply New York preclusion law to New York state court judgments. See Hoblock , 422 F.3d at 92

– 93. New York law provides that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, will apply i f “(1) the issue in question was actually and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, and (2) the party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first proceeding.” Id. at 94 (internal quot ation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel applies to discrimination claims previously litigated in a proceeding under N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 78. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp. , 456 U.S. 461, 484 (1982).

In February 2015, Yu filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“ NYSDHR ”) against Knighted , alleging that it discriminated against him on the basis of national origin, race/color, and age, and retaliated against him for making complaints abou t that

discrimination. The NYSDHR ruled against Yu, finding there was no probable cause to support the discrimination complained of. Under Article 78, Yu appealed that ruling to a New York state court , which upheld th e ruling after reviewing the record and determ ining that Yu had a full opportunity to present his discrimination and retaliation claims to the NYSDHR

, and that the agency’s determination was not arbitrary and capricious. The District Court correctly ruled that Yu’s Title VII

and ADEA claims were colla terally estopped pursuant to Supreme Court’s decision in Kremer

. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s February 16, 2017 judgment. S ee also Mejia v. N.YC. Health & Hosps. Corp. , 622 F. Ap p’ x 70 (2d Cir. 2015 ) ; Yan Yam Koo v. Dep ’ t of B ldgs. of City of N.Y.

, 218 F. App ’ x 97 (2d Cir. 2007)

.
As to Yu’s motions for reconsideration, the standard for granting such motions is “strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling

decisions or data t hat the court overlooked

— matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). A motion to reconsider “should not be granted where the movi ng party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Id. The D istrict C ourt’s denial of Yu’s motion for reconsideration was not an abuse of discretion because Yu merely sought to relitigate the collateral estoppel issue and did not rely on evid ence or controlling case law that the court had overlooked.

II. FLSA Claim

“Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non

- movant, ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

e ntitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Doninger v. Niehoff , 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Determining if a FLSA exemption applies is mixed question of law and fact: “[t]he question of how the employees spent their w orking time is a question of fact. The question of whether their particular activities excluded them from the overtime benefits of the FLSA4 is a question of law.” Pippins v. KPMG, LLP, 759 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Section 207(a)(1) of [the] FLSA requires that, ‘for a workweek longer than forty hours,’ an employee who works ‘in excess of’ forty hours shall be compensated for that excess work ‘at a rate

not less than one and one

- half times the regular rate at which h e is employed.’” Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc. , 711 F.3d 106, 113

– 14 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). This general rule does not apply, however, to several types of employees, including individuals who are employed “in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity

. ” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)

. These include certain “[h] ighly compensated employees ” as defined in FLSA regulations

. 29 C.F.R. § 541.601.

For substantially the reasons stated in its May 13, 2019 Opinion and Order, we affirm the District Court’s holding that Yu was an exempt employee under 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(a). The

D istrict C ourt properly held tha t there was no genuine dispute that Yu : (1) received an annual salary of at least $100,000 ; (2) “customarily and regularly” performed at least one of the exempt duties of an administrative or professional employee; and (3) exclusively performed non

- manual office work

. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.601

.

On ap peal, Yu argues that he was promised overtime pay that he has not received. Even assuming the truth of Yu’s allegation, it does not affect our FLSA ruling. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(a) )

.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all the arguments raised by Yu on appeal and find them to be without

merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the District Court’s February 16, 2017 judgment granting Knighted’s motion to dismiss Yu’s discrimination claims; the District Court’s May 13, 2019 judgment granting Knighted’s motion for summary judgment; and the District Court’s orders of January 9, 2018 and February 14, 2018 denying Yu’s successive motions for reconsideration of the collateral estoppel issue.

FOR THE COURT:
C atherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk