alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CHATTANOOGA GLASS CO. v. BATON ROUGE “76” BOTTLING CO. et al.

No. 3407.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Aug. 10, 1951.

Fred G. Benton, E. D. Moseley, Walker P. Macmurdo, Baton Rouge, for appellant.

Harrison G. Bagwell, Baton Rouge, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We will concern ourselves only with the alternative ground for a rehearing set forth in appellant’s application as all other contentions are fully covered in the original judgment. Alternatively, appellants contend that this Court erred in failing to hold that Tyree was liable for two-fifths of the debt sued on as a result of his purchase of an undivided two-fifths interest in the business from the Mitchells prior to the institution of this suit on April 1, 1947 and rely on the case of Hughes v. Waldo, 14 La.Ann. 348. This case is not applicable as there- was no Bulk Sales Statute at that *819time and the case under consideration must be decided in the light of the Bulk Sales Law as set forth in Act No. 270 of 1926, LSA-RS 9:2961 et seq., and the established jurisprudence on the point of law.

Under the provisions of the cited act, a purchaser of an interest in partnership assets is not to be held personally responsible as a joint or solidary obligor, but is liable to all of the creditors as a receiver for the fair value of all the property transferred to him. See Manchester Silver Co. v. Clara Jewelry Co., 19 La.App. 367, 138 So. 467; Bath Co., Ltd. v. Booth-McClelland Chevrolet Co., La.App., 142 So. 353; General Tire & Rubber Company v. Bullock, 14 La.App. 522, 130 So. 136.

Rehearing denied.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02765-PAB-BNB

DALIP BASANTI,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY METCALF, M.D.,

JASON ROZESKI, M.D.,

PLATTE VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, and

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

MINUTE ORDER

______________________________________________________________________________

Minute Order Entered by Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Withdraw her

Motion to Compel Salud Pharmacy Records and Vacate the Discovery Hearing on June 21,

2013 at 2:00 p.m. [docket no. 187, filed June 21, 2013] (the “Motion”).

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED and the hearing set for June 21, 2013 is

VACATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Salud Pharmacy

Records [171] is DENIED AS WITHDRAWN.

DATED: June 21, 2013

Case 1:11-cv-02765-PAB-BNB Document 189 Filed 06/21/13 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 199 (Tuesday, October 14, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 60679]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-24321]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-201-822]


Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils From Mexico: Extension 
of Time Limit for Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

EFFECTIVE DATE: October 14, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Maryanne Burke, or Robert James, AD/
CVD Operations, Office 7, Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
5604, or (202) 482-0649, respectively.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 6, 2008, the Department of 
Commerce (the Department) published the preliminary results of the 
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on stainless steel 
sheet and strip in coils from Mexico for the period July 1, 2006, 
through June 30, 2007. See Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils 
From Mexico; Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Review, 73 FR 45708 (August 6, 2008). The current deadline for the 
final results of this review is December 4, 2008.

Extension of Time Limits for Final Results

    Section 751(a)(3)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the 
Act), requires the Department to issue the final results of an 
administrative review within 120 days after the date on which the 
preliminary results were published. However, if it is not practicable 
to complete the review within this time period, section 751(a)(3)(A) of 
the Act allows the Department to extend the time limit for the final 
results up to 180 days from the date of publication of the preliminary 
results.
    The Department finds that it is not practicable to complete this 
review within the original time frame because additional analysis that 
must be performed with respect to respondent ThyssenKrupp Mexinox S.A. 
de C.V. and Mexinox USA, Inc.'s cost of production and certain 
adjustments made to U.S. price. Consequently, and in accordance with 
section 751(a)(3)(A) of the Act and 19 CFR 351.213(h)(2), the 
Department is extending the time limit for completion of the final 
results of this administrative review until no later than February 2, 
2009, which is 180 days from the date of publication of the preliminary 
results. This notice is published in accordance with section 
751(a)(3)(A) of the Act.

    Dated: October 7, 2008.
Stephen J. Claeys,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. E8-24321 Filed 10-10-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-S
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          33,530
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           1,028
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                   400
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    225,486
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          17,788
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            17,632
<LOANS>                                        643,227
<ALLOWANCE>                                      7,049
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 978,893
<DEPOSITS>                                     824,385
<SHORT-TERM>                                    40,064
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             48,350
<LONG-TERM>                                      6,885
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,428
<OTHER-SE>                                      56,781
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 978,893
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 49,646
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               14,547
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 1,130
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                65,323
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              30,186
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              34,076
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           31,247
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    1,641
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 (8)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 25,036
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,678
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       7,082
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     7,082
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.47
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.47
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.76
<LOANS-NON>                                      3,465
<LOANS-PAST>                                       373
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 6,099
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    1,079
<RECOVERIES>                                       388
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                7,049
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             5,357
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                          1,692




</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.78
                                                                   -------------

                              ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT

This Assignment Agreement (this "Agreement") is made and entered into as of
October 29, 2001 (the "Effective Date") by and between Agen Biomedical Limited,
an Australian company, having its principal place of business at 11 Durbell
Street, Acacia Ridge, Queensland 4110, Australia ("Agen"), and Synbiotics
Corporation, a California corporation, having its principal place of business at
11011 Via Frontera, San Diego, CA 92127, United States of America
("Synbiotics").

                                    RECITALS

Whereas, RM Diagnostics SAS entered into a Distribution Agreement dated July 9,
1997 with Rhone Merieux SAS for distribution of certain Witness products in
Japan (the "Distribution Agreement"),

Whereas, Synbiotics acquired all of the outstanding shares of RM Diagnostics
effective July 9, 1997,

Whereas, Agen and Synbiotics have entered into a License, Distribution and OEM
Agreement dated October 29, 2001,

Now, Therefore, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein and
for other good and valuable consideration the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, the Parties hereby agree as follows:

                                    AGREEMENT

Synbiotics hereby assigns all of it's rights and interests in the Distribution
Agreement to Agen.

In Witness Whereof, the Parties have caused this Agreement to be executed by
duly authorized representatives of the Parties as of the Effective Date.


Agen Biomedical Ltd.                       Synbiotics Corporation


By: /s/ Russell Richards                   By: /s/ Paul A. Rosinack
---------------------------------------    -------------------------------------
        Signature                                  Signature

Name: Russell Richards                     Name: Paul A. Rosinack


Title: General Manager                     Title: President and CEO
#### Roth et al. *v.*National Bank of Port Clinton. Roth et al. *v.*Holzhauer et al. Roth et al. *v.*Brokate.

(No. 25845

Decided March 4, 1936.)

*Messrs. Boggs & Chase*and *Mr. L. C. Rupp,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Messrs. Graves & Duff*and *Mr. George C. Bryce,*for defendants in error.

It is ordered and adjudged that said petition in error be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause.

*Petition in error dismissed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Stephenson, Williams, Jones, Matthias, Day and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-04-240-CV

IN RE MARK STALLONS	RELATOR

	------------

	ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	The court has considered relator's petition for writ of mandamus and motion for emergency stay, and the response of the real party in interest.  The court is of the opinion that relief should be denied.  Accordingly, relator's petition for writ of mandamus and motion for emergency stay are denied.

	Relator shall pay all costs of this original proceeding, for which let execution issue.

								PER CURIAM

PANEL B:	HOLMAN, LIVINGSTON, and WALKER, JJ.

DELIVERED: August 5, 2004
#### ALFRED SMITH, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. FOUR STAR DELIVERY SERVICE, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Submitted May 6, 1917

Decided January 8, 1948.

Before Justices Bodine, Heher and Wachenfeld.

For the appellant, *August*W. *Heckman (Leo N. Knoblauch,*of counsel).

For the respondent, *John R. Kelly.*

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Heher, J.

By an agreement in writing made, on July 12th, 1946, plaintiff “leased” a motor truck to defendant for an indefinite period commencing on the ensuing July 16th, terminable on two days’ written notice by either party to the other, and in consideration thereof, defendant agreed to pay “the sum of $50 per day of use for the lease of each individual piece of equipment, less the salary of a driver and a helper per unit for a ten hour work day.” At defendant’s instance, the vehicle was held for its exclusive use from July 16th to July 29th, 1946, when defendant canceled the agreement in the exercise of the reserved power of termination; and there was judgment for plaintiff for *the*stipulated rental for that period. Defendant appeals.

The essential question is the meaning of the agreement. Defendant was disappointed in its expectation that it would have need for the truck in its business; and the insistence *430is that the true sense of the terms employed to express the common intention is that “compensation for the lease of the truck”.was payable only “when it was used.” The words “of use” are pointed to as indicative of that intention. We do not entertain this view.

The agreement is in terms a “lease” of the vehicle until cancellation. And there is provision for the lessee’s “exclusive use” of the truck “in the conduct of its business as a distributor of alcoholic beverages” in this state. Again, it is provided that “during the period of this lease,” the vehicle “shall be solely and exclusively under the direction and control of the lessee, and is to be used solely in connection with its business;” and then comes the provision for the rental “per day of use for the use of each individual piece of equipment.” Viewing this rental stipulation in relation to the context, the words “of use” have the sense and significance of the right to use and enjoy the subject property for the term of the lease. The contrary interpretation would run counter to the obvious reason and spirit of the agreement; for exclusive dominion of the vehicle was reserved to defendant, and, by the same token, dominion was surrendered by plaintiff. That the term “lease” was intended to have its usual meaning is rendered clear by the more specific provisions of the agreement. Indeed, this was defendant’s conception of its undertaking; for the notice of cancellation would have been unnecessary if the agreement were open to the construction now offered. An absolute right of possession was vested in defendant; and it is of no consequence that the right was not exercised.

In this view, the rulings on evidence assigned for error axe ' without merit.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 95-40812

Summary Calendar

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAUL MONTES,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(C-92-CR-172-1)

_________________________________________________________________

September 25, 1996

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Raul Montes, #61361-079, appeals the dismissal of his motion

to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. §

2255. Montes’ contention that it was improper to refer to the §

2255 motion to the magistrate judge for findings of fact and a

recommendation is without merit. His assertion that the district

court’s summary denial of his motion violated the notice
- 2 -

requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 56 is also without merit, because

Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provide

the applicable procedure for summarily dismissing his § 2255

motion. 

Montes’ assertion that he received ineffective assistance of

trial counsel prior to his guilty plea and during sentencing is

without merit. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375

(1986). And, the district court did not err by failing to conduct

an evidentiary hearing, because Montes’ motion and the record show

conclusively that he is not entitled to relief. See United States

v. Drummond, 910 F.2d 284, 285 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 1104 (1991). 

Accordingly, Montes’ motion for appointment of counsel is

DENIED, and the judgment is

AFFIRMED.
II 

Calendar No. 300 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1781 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

118 Minner Avenue in Bakersfield, California, as the ‘‘Buck Owens 

Post Office’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 12, 2007 

Mrs. BOXER (for herself and Mrs. FEINSTEIN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

AUGUST 1, 2007 

Reported by Mr. LIEBERMAN, without amendment 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 118 Minner Avenue in Bakersfield, California, 

as the ‘‘Buck Owens Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. BUCK OWENS POST OFFICE. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 118 Minner Avenue in BakersVerDate Aug 31 2005 05:28 Aug 02, 2007 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1781.RS S1781

bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

•S 1781 RS

1 field, California, shall be known and designated as the 

2 ‘‘Buck Owens Post Office’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

6 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Buck Owens Post 

7 Office’’. 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS

bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
Calendar No. 300 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1781 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States PostOffice’’. kersfield, California, as the ‘‘Buck Owens Post al Service located at 118 Minner Avenue in BaAUGUST 1, 2007 

Reported without amendment 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 20-0546

JOSEPH H. SCHMAUS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CX RANCH, LLP,

Defendant and Appellee.

F

DEC U 8 2020

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of Supreme Court

State of Montana

ORDER

Appellee CX Ranch, LLP moves for dismissal of this appeal because a final

judgment has not yet been entered. Appellant Joseph H. Schmaus responds in opposition,

arguing he has appealed front a final judgment.

CX Ranch notes that the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure provide a "final

judgment . . . includ[es] any necessary determination of the amount of the costs and

attorney fees awarded or sanction imposed." M. R. App. P. 4(1). CX Ranch explains that

while the Broadwater County District Court issued an Order on Motion to Dismiss granting

its motion on November 12, 2020, the court also granted its motion for its litigation and

attorney fees, which determination has not yet been made because the appeal deprived the

court from jurisdiction. Schmaus argues in response that the District Court deemed the

motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and rendered a final, appealable

judgment, not an interlocutory order.

Upon review, we conclude that this appeal is prematurely before this Court. There

is not a final judgment, pursuant to M. R. App. P. 4(1)(a) and 6(1), and the District Court

needs an opportunity to issue an order assessing costs and attorney fees. We routinely

dismiss appeals to permit this determination to be made. Schmaus retains a right to appeal

upon entry of a final judgment. Therefore,

12/08/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0546
IT IS ORDERED that CX Ranch's Motion to Dismiss Appcal is GRANTED and

this appeal is DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court is directed to close this case as of the date of this

Order and to issue rernittitur.

The Clerk also is directed to provide a copy of this Order to the Honorable Judge

Mike Menahan, First Judicial District Court; to Valerie J. Hornsveld, Clerk of District

Court, Broadwater County, under Cause No. ADV-2020-31; to counsel of record, and to

Joseph H. Schrnaus personally.

DATED this day of December, 2020.

Chief Justice

e 

6Q=.1 1 2JA-LL/776124/144

Justices
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofLancer Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30,2005, as filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission on thedate hereof (the “Report”), I, Mark L. Freitas, Chief Financial Officer of theCompany, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)                                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(2)                                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

 
| November 14, 2005 | /s/ MARK L. FREITAS     |   |
|------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
|                   | Mark L. Freitas,        |
|                   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
#### Samuel Richard MONCADO, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Oct. 13, 1937.

Verne Lacy, of St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

Harry C. Blanton, U. S. Atty., and Henry G. 'Morris, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of St. Louis, Mo.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed on motion of appellee, without costs to either party in this court.