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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

MARISA HOSKINS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED July 16, 2015

v No. 320150 Jackson Circuit Court PATRICK MARTIN MILLER and CHRISTINE MILLER, LC No. 13-000587-NI

Defendants-Appellees,

and

HOME OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: F ORT H OOD , P.J., and S AAD and R IORDAN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendant, Home Owners Insuranc e Company, appeals by leave the trial court order denying its motion for summary di sposition. The Michigan Supre me Court remanded for consideration as leave granted. Hoskins v Miller , 497 Mich 887; 854 NW2d 898 (2014). We reverse and remand for entry of a n order of summary disposition in favor of defendant insurer.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the adult daughter o f Richard and Kathleen Hoskins . Relevant for this case, while she was residing with her parents, they jointly purchased a 2003 Ford Focus. To help pay for the vehicle, Richard and Ka thleen obtained a partial loan. At that time, Richa rd was the titled owner of the Focus. Richard and Kathleen obtained insurance fo r the Focus through defendant insurer, and they were each listed as a named insured. Plainti ff was not named as an insured, but was identified as the principal operator.

Subsequently, plaintiff moved out of her parents’ home. She al so reimbursed her father for the loan, and Richard transferred title of the car to plain tiff on April 18, 2011. The automobile insurance policy was renewed, and Richard and Kathle en remained the named insureds. Plaintiff did not obtai n an insurance policy of her own to cover the vehicle.-2- In January 2012, plaintiff was dr iving the Focus when she was i nvolved in an automobile accident. The other driver failed to yield at a stop sign and turned directly in front of plaintiff’s vehicle, causing a collision. T hus, plaintiff initiated this i nstant action alleging, inter alia , that defendant insurer unreasonably fa iled to pay personal injury pr otection (PIP) benefits. Defendant sought summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(1 0), arguing that it was not obligated to pay PIP benefits under the policy. It contended t hat neither Richard nor Kathleen had an insurable interest in the vehicle at the time the policy was renewed. It also posited that plaintiff was not a named ins ured on the policy, and, thus, it was not a priority insurer.

The trial court ultimately concluded there were several genuine issues of material fact. Accordingly, it denied defenda nt’s motion for summary dispositi on. Defendant now appeals.

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden v Rozwood , 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). As our Supreme Court has explained:

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. In evaluating a moti on for summary disposition brou ght under this subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depo sitions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), i n the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffere d evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the movi ng party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [ Id . at 120.]

The proper interpretation of a contract is a question of law t hat we review de novo. Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc , 468 Mich 459, 468; 663 NW2d 447 (2003). “The proper interpretation of a statute is a legal question that this Court also reviews de novo.” McCormick v Carrier , 487 Mich 180, 188; 795 NW2d 517 (2010).

B. INSURANCE COVERAGE

The trial court erred in finding that there were disputed issu es of fact in this case. The issues raised on appeal are legal disputes. Whether one has an “insurable interest” is a question of law, Morrison v Secura Ins , 286 Mich App 569, 572; 781 NW2d 151 (2009), as is the interpretation and construction of insurance contracts, Corwin v DaimlerChrysler Ins Co , 296 Mich App 242, 253; 819 NW2d 68 (2012). Thus, resolution of the se issues is appro priate in this appeal.

The parties first dispute whether plaintiff’s parents, Richard and Kathleen, had an “insurable interest” in the vehicle at the time of the accident . “An insurable interest need not be in the nature of ownership, but rather can be any kind of benef it from the thing so insured or any kind of loss that would be suffered by its damage or destructio n.” Morrison , 286 Mich App at 572-573. However, even assuming, arguendo , that an insurable interest was present, plaintiff’s claim still fails under the plai n language of t he policy.-3- “Insurance policies are contracts and, in the absence of an ap plicable statute, are ‘subject to the same contract constructio n principles that apply to any other species of contract.’ ” Titan Ins Co v Hyten , 491 Mich 547, 553; 817 NW2d 562 (2012), quoting Rory v Continental Ins Co
, 473 Mich 457, 461; 703 NW2d 23 (2005) . This Court “enforce[s] contracts according to their terms, as a corollary of the par ties’ liberty of contracting.” Holland v Trinity Health Care Corp
, 287 Mich App 524, 526; 791 NW2d 724 (2010). A contract’s terms are given “their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id . at 527. However, no-fault insurance policies must be constru ed in a manner that complies with the no-fault act. Corwin , 296 Mich App at 257.

“Under the no-fault automobile insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq ., insurance companies are required to provide first-party insurance benefit s, referred to as personal protection insurance (PIP) bene fits, for certain expenses and l osses. MCL 500.3107; MCL 500.3108.” Johnson v Recca , 492 Mich 169, 173; 821 NW2d 520 (2012). Pursuant to MCL 500.3114(1):

Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (5),[ 1 ] a personal protection insurance policy described in [ MCL 500.]3101(1) applies to acci dental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises fr om a motor vehicle accident. [Footnote added.]

Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3114 (1). “As this Court has held, the ‘person named in the policy’ under MCL 500.3114(1) is synonymous with the ‘named insured,’ and persons designated merely as drivers under a poli cy . . . are neither named insureds nor persons named in the policy.” Stone v Auto-Owners Ins Co , 307 Mich App 169, 175; 858 NW2d 765 (2014). Plaintiff is not listed on the policy as a na med insured. She is named only as a principal operator. Nor is pl aintiff a “relative . . . domic iled in the same household.” It is undisputed that plaintiff was no longer residing with her paren ts at the time of the accident. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to PIP benefits from defen dant insurer pursuant to MCL 500.3114(1).

Nor does MCL 500.3114(4) provide for coverage. Although plain tiff was an occupant of the vehicle, the statutory language does not provide for covera ge under the circumstances of this case. MCL 500.3114(4) provides:

(4) Except as provided in subsections (1) to (3), a person suff ering accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident while an oc cupant of a motor

1 This refers to MCL 500.3114(2), (3), and (5), respectively. N one of these provisions are at issue here. MCL 500.3114(2) applies to operators and passenger s of vehicles “operated in the business of transporting passe ngers . . . [,]”; MCL 500.3114(3) applies to employees and relatives of employees suffering injury “while an occupant of a motor vehicle owned or registered by the employer . . . [,]”; and MCL 500.3114(5) appl ies to accidents involving motorcycles.-4- vehicle shall claim personal prot ection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of priority:

(a) The insurer of the owner or r egistrant of the vehicle occup ied.

(b) The insurer of the operat or of the vehicle occupied.

At the time of the accident, plaintiff was the owner, registra nt, and operator of the vehicle. Yet, she did not have an insurance policy under which she was a named insured. That determination also “depends on the language of the relevant ins urance policy.” Dobbelaere v Auto-Owners Ins Co , 275 Mich App 527, 533; 740 NW2d 503 (2007).

The language in the policy indicates that individuals covered are the “named insured shown in the Declarations” and “relatives” of a named insured. A “relative” is defined in the policy as “a person who resides with you and who is related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption.” Because plaintiff did not reside with Richard and K athleen, she is not a “relative” as defined in the policy. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot recover P IP benefits from defendant insurer through the no-fault statute or by virtue of the policy. Thus, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition. 2

Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that the appropriate remedy i s to reform the policy to substitute plaintiff as a named insured. A court in equity gen erally has the power to reform a contract to conform it to the agreement made. Casey v Auto Owners Ins Co , 273 Mich App 388, 398; 729 NW2d 277 (2006). “To obtain reformation, a plaintiff must prove a mutual mistake of fact, or mistake on one side and fraud on the other, by clear a nd convincing evidence. A unilateral mistake is not sufficient to warrant reformation. A mistake in law—a mistake by one side or the other regarding the legal effect of an agreement—is not a basis for reformation.” Id. Plaintiff makes no argument tha t she has satisfied any of these requirements. Further, regardless of whether Richard and Kathleen had an “insurable interest” in the vehicle, there is no indication that the insurance policy violated public policy and contravene d the Legislative intent of the nofault act. See Corwin , 296 Mich App at 247, 257.

Plaintiff alternatively contends that she was an “innocent thi rd party” and, thus, the insurance policy cannot be resci nded. However, plaintiff faile d to raise this argument in the trial court. Moreover, she fails to identify the material misreprese ntation that occurred, nor address the fact that “an insurer has no duty to investigate or verify the representations of a potential insured.” Titan Ins Co , 491 Mich at 570. Nor do we ag ree with plaintiff that Titan stands for the proposition that an insurer cannot avoid liability if an innoce nt third party would be harmed. See

2 Although plaintiff briefly refe rs to underinsured and uninsure d benefits, she presents no cognizable claim for such benefits on appeal. “An appellant ma y not merely announce [her] position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for [her] claims, nor may [s]he give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” Houghton ex rel Johnson v Keller , 256 Mich App 336, 339; 662 NW2d 854 (2003). Nor does plainti ff present any argument, nor highli ght any evidence, regarding per mission.-5- id. at 571. (“[A]n insurer is not precluded from availing itself of traditional legal and equitable remedies to avoid liability under an insurance policy on the gr ound of fraud in the application for insurance, even when the fraud was easily ascertainable and the claimant is a third party.”).

Plaintiff also argues that defe ndant is equitably estopped fro m denying her coverage or, alternatively, that defendant w aived any objection to denying h er coverage. Again, plaintiff failed to raise these precise arguments below. Moreover, “[e]s toppel arises where a party, by representations, admissions or s ilence, intentionally or neglig ently induces another party to believe facts, and the other part y justifiably relies and acts on this belief, and will be prejudiced if the first party is permitted to deny the existence of the fa cts.” Casey v Auto Owners Ins Co
, 273 Mich App 388, 399; 729 NW2d 277 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Yet, “[i]t is well established under Mi chigan law that equitable est oppel is not a cause of action unto itself; it is available only as a defense.” Id. Further, plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant’s acts or representations induced the plaintiff to be lieve that the policy was in effect at the time of the accident; (2) the plaintiff justifiably relied on this belief; and (3) the plaintiff was prejudiced as a result of her belief that the policy was still in effect. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co , 458 Mich 288, 296-297; 582 NW2d 776 (1998).

The defendant’s acts or representations that induce the plaint iff to believe the policy was in effect must have been made “in tentionally or with culpable n egligence.” Mate v Wolverine Mutual Ins Co , 233 Mich App 14, 22; 592 NW2d 379 (1998). No evidence was in troduced that defendant made representations to plaintiff intentionally or wi th culpable negligence that induced her to believe she was covered by the policy. Though defendant continued to accept premiums from Richard and Kathleen after plaintiff moved out, the policy terms provide that a relative was covered by the policy only if the relative resided in the same household. There is no evidence that defendant knew plaintiff m oved out, nor of any intent to m islead Kathleen or Richard. Accordingly, defendant is not e stopped from denying plaintiff c overage.
Similarly, with respect to waiver, defendant insurer never mad e an “intentional relinquishment of a known right” with respect to covering plain tiff under the policy. Sweebe v Sweebe , 474 Mich 151, 156; 712 NW2d 708 (2006). There is no evidence that defendant knew plaintiff moved out, nor that no other relative resided with Ka thleen or Richard. Thus, plaintiff’s arguments are meritless.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the issues presented are questions of law, the trial c ourt erred in finding that there were genuine issues of material fact. Moreover, because plaintiff is not covered under the no-fault act or the terms of the insurance policy, summary disp osition in favor of defendant is appropriate. We reverse and r emand. We do not retain jurisdic tion.

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood /s/ Henry William Saad /s/ Michael J. Riordan