RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 07a0055p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RONDRELL SANFORD (05-6489); TYSHAWN HILL

(05-6500),

Defendants-Appellants.

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Nos. 05-6489/6500

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

No. 05-00037—R. Allan Edgar, District Judge.

Argued: September 22, 2006

Decided and Filed: February 6, 2007 

Before: MERRITT, SUTTON, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Mike A. Little, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellants. Perry H. Piper, ASSISTANT

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mike A.

Little, Chattanooga, Tennessee, W. Charles Lea, GARLAND, SAMUEL & LOEB, Atlanta, Georgia,

for Appellants. Perry H. Piper, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Chattanooga,

Tennessee, for Appellee. 

GRIFFIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUTTON, J., joined. MERRITT,

J. (p. 6), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

_________________

OPINION _________________

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Defendants Tyshawn Hill and Rondrell Sanford appeal an order

of the district court denying their motion to suppress evidence discovered after a traffic stop for

following another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-

124. Specifically, defendants claim that the initial stop was not supported by probable cause or

reasonable suspicion and the ensuing detention, search, and arrest were consequently tainted and

unconstitutional. 

1
Nos. 05-6489/6500 United States v. Sanford, et al. Page 2

For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I.

On February 25, 2005, at approximately 4:30 p.m., McMinn County, Tennessee, Sheriff’s

Department Deputy Kenneth Pruitt was on a routine patrol driving north on Interstate 75. As Pruitt

drove, he noticed a Buick Regal, driven by defendant Hill, traveling at about 65 miles-per-hour. The

speed limit was 70 miles-per-hour. Pruitt continued to follow the Buick for two to three miles. At

some point, the Buick came upon a tractor-trailer truck “going considerably slower” than the body

of traffic. Hill began to change lanes to pass the truck but was unable to do so because of another

vehicle driving in the left lane. As a result, Hill came in close proximity – approximately ten feet

– to the truck in front of him. According to Pruitt, Hill “slammed on the brakes and backed off.”

After observing this incident, Pruitt activated his signal lights and stopped the Buick. 

Pruitt approached the driver’s side door and requested that Hill provide him with a driver’s

license, automobile registration, and proof of insurance. Hill provided Pruitt with a New York

“learner’s permit,” the automobile registration, and an insurance document. At the time, Pruitt

mistakenly believed that Hill had given him a driver’s license. Simultaneously, Pruitt noticed

approximately fifteen air fresheners hanging on the turn-signal lever on the steering column. He

testified later that, based on prior experience, he was aware that air fresheners are often used to

disguise the odor of narcotics. 

Pruitt then asked the passenger, defendant Sanford, for identification, which he was unable

to provide. After concluding that Sanford’s inability to do so was suspicious, Pruitt requested that

Hill exit the vehicle so he could question the two separately. Pruitt then asked questions of each

defendant out of the earshot of the other. Hill and Pruitt discussed the reason for the traffic stop, and

Hill explained that the vehicle in the fast lane had “cut him off.” When Pruitt inquired about their

travel plans, Hill explained that he had been driving back from Atlanta after watching an Atlanta

Hawks NBA basketball game. He further stated that he did not know the passenger’s name, but only

knew him by his nickname, “T.” 

Pruitt then interviewed Sanford briefly. Sanford stated that he did not know the driver’s

name, but only knew him by his nickname, “T-Money.” Contrary to Hill’s explanation, Sanford

stated that he did not have a nickname. Sanford recounted that they had been in Atlanta to find

“women,” and it had been “a couple of years” since he had last seen a basketball game. 

After these inconsistent conversations, Pruitt returned to his patrol car to call another officer,

Officer Johnson. Johnson, along with his narcotics-detection dog, arrived within minutes.

Thereafter, Hill consented to a search of the vehicle, adding that “I have nothing to hide.” Pruitt

patted down Hill and found several cell phones and a pager, along with a roll of $20 bills. Pruitt

then requested that Sanford exit the vehicle and patted him down. Upon feeling a bulge in a trouser

pocket, Pruitt asked Sanford if the bulge was marijuana. Sanford responded affirmatively. Pruitt

requested that both defendants stand at the front of the police vehicle while Johnson began a search

of the Buick. When Johnson reached the door to the back seat of the Buick, Hill ran across the

interstate. 

The continued search of the vehicle revealed approximately eight kilograms of powder

cocaine. Shortly after this discovery, police apprehended Hill. 

Defendants Hill and Sanford were each named in a two-count indictment charging a

conspiracy to distribute cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and a substantive

count of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. In May 2005, defendants filed, and the district court denied, a motion to
Nos. 05-6489/6500 United States v. Sanford, et al. Page 3

1

The definition of probable cause stems from the Supreme Court’s explanation in Carroll v. United States, 267

U.S. 132, 162 (1925), which stated that officers had justification for the contested search and seizure when, “the facts

and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in

themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the

suppress evidence arising from the traffic stop. Defendants were convicted following a trial by jury,

and, in September 2005, they timely appealed. 

II. 

The review of the denial or the grant of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of fact and

law. United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 756 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus, we review the district

court’s findings of fact for clear error and the district court’s conclusions of law de novo. United

States v. Dillard, 438 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2006). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when,

although there may be evidence to support it, the reviewing court, utilizing the entire evidence, “is

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.

Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 1999). The evidence must be viewed “in the light

most likely to support the district court’s decision.” Dillard, 438 F.3d at 680 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Finally, “‘[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence’

the district court’s conclusions ‘cannot be clearly erroneous.’” United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d

380, 384 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).

There is a degree of confusion in this circuit over the legal standard governing traffic stops.

United States v. Valdez, 147 F. App’x. 591, 594, 2005 WL 2374227 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 2005)

(unpublished). In a relatively recent decision, this circuit held that the reasonable suspicion standard

governs the legality of traffic stops when the suspected violation is a criminal offense rather than

a civil infraction. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 770 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the

reasonable suspicion standard governs a stop for driving under the influence). There, this court

purported to provide guidance to the district courts in this circuit by summarizing the state of this

circuit’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on vehicle stops, stating:

Police may make an investigative stop of a vehicle when they have reasonable

suspicion of an ongoing crime, whether it be a felony or misdemeanor, including

drunk driving in jurisdictions where that is a criminal offense. Police may also make

a stop when they have reasonable suspicion of a completed felony, though not of a

mere completed misdemeanor.

Next, police may make a stop when they have probable cause to believe a civil traffic

violation has occurred, even if the defendant raises a claim that the stop was

pretextual. Whether they may also stop a vehicle based on mere reasonable

suspicion of a traffic violation is the subject of another conflict in our case law.

Compare [Weaver v.] Shadoan, 340 F.3d [398] at 407-08 (upholding stop where

police had “reasonable suspicion” of a violation of vehicle registration and window

tinting regulations) with [United States v.] Freeman, 209 F.3d [464] at 466

(invalidating stop where police lacked “probable cause” to stop vehicle for failure

to stay in lane); and [United States v.] Ferguson, 8 F.3d [385] at 391 (stating in

dictum that probable cause is required for a stop premised on traffic violation).

Gaddis, 364 F.3d at 771 n.6 (internal citations omitted). 

The suspected violation in the present case is a misdemeanor traffic offense in violation of

TENN.CODE ANN. § 55-8-124 and, therefore, by application of Gaddis, the stop should be analyzed

under the standard of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.1

 However, because we
Nos. 05-6489/6500 United States v. Sanford, et al. Page 4

automobile which they stopped and searched.” 

conclude that Pruitt had probable cause to stop Hill for a traffic violation, it is unnecessary for us

to resolve this issue between the reasonable suspicion and probable cause standards at this time.

The statute at the center of the present controversy provides:

(a) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than

is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the

traffic upon and the condition of the highway.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-124. 

Further, we have previously noted that, “[t]hough the statute does not define ‘reasonable and

prudent,’ the Tennessee drivers’ manual provides that vehicles should maintain at least one car

length for every ten miles per hour.” Valdez, 147 F. App’x at 594 (holding that police officer’s

observation of car following within twenty feet of car in front of it for fifteen seconds, in violation

of the instant statute, gave rise to probable cause justifying vehicle stop). 

The crux of this case is a question of law – whether Pruitt had probable cause or reasonable

suspicion to believe that TENN.CODE ANN. § 55-8-124 was violated when defendants’ vehicle was

momentarily following another vehicle within a distance of ten feet while traveling 65 miles-perhour and a third vehicle was passing in the passing lane. Pruitt’s ulterior motivations, if any, are

irrelevant. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[C]onstitutional reasonableness of

traffic stops [does not] depend[ ] on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved . . . .

Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”) This

court reviews questions of law de novo. 

The district court found credible the testimony of Pruitt. On appeal, defendants contend that

the district court ignored the presence of the third vehicle in the passing lane, which, according to

them, rendered Hill’s actions reasonable. We conclude that, contrary to these assertions, the district

court did not “ignore” the presence of the third vehicle, but recounted it in its analysis:

[B]oth Hill and Sanford argue that coming within ten feet of the rig does not

constitute a traffic violation in these circumstances. Specifically, Hill only came so

close to the rig because Hill was trying to pass the rig but was prevented by a van in

the left lane. Officer Pruitt witnessed these circumstances but decided that they did

not warrant coming within ten feet of the rig while traveling at 65 mph. The Court

agrees. 

In Valdez, this court examined the instant statute and concluded that following another

vehicle within twenty to thirty feet of a car for fifteen seconds gave rise to sufficient probable cause

to justify a traffic stop. Valdez, 147 F. App’x. at 595. As an unpublished decision, Valdez is not

precedentially binding under the doctrine of stare decisis, but is considered by us for its persuasive

value only. See Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 295 n.3 (6th Cir.

1993); Eyerman v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, 967 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1992). Defendants attempt to

distinguish Valdez based on the fact that there, the car followed too closely for fifteen seconds, while

in the present case, the situation was for only a moment. Also, defendants cite United States v.

Freeman, 209 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2000), and its controversial conclusion that “one isolated

incident of a large motor home partially weaving into the emergency lane for a few feet and an
Nos. 05-6489/6500 United States v. Sanford, et al. Page 5

2

The relevant inquiry is whether the police officer possessed probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe

that a traffic violation occurred, not whether a traffic violation in fact occurred.

instant in time [does not] constitute[ ]” a traffic violation.2 Id. We are not persuaded by defendants’

arguments. 

The distance between the vehicles here, approximately ten feet, is significantly less than the

distance in Valdez of twenty to thirty feet. Although momentary, the danger is substantial when both

vehicles are traveling at interstate speeds. This holding is consistent with the Tennessee courts’

interpretation of the statute. In Helms v. Weaver, 770 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), the court

stated:

In cases where the violation of T.C.A., § 55-8-124 was an issue, the reasonableness

of the distance maintained by the operator of the following vehicle has been

measured in terms of the operator’s ability to make an emergency stop without

striking the forward vehicle where the vehicles had been proceeding in the same

direction. 

Id. at 553. Cf. United States v. Garrido, 467 F.3d 971, 978 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that officers had

probable cause to believe that Garrido violated similar Kentucky traffic law, KY. REV. STAT. § 189.340(8)(b), when a heavy commercial vehicle approached a vehicle within “two to three cars

lengths,” or approximately thirty feet, when the statute mandated 250 feet). 

We hold that Pruitt had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred and

therefore was justified in making the initial stop of Hill’s vehicle. Pruitt had probable cause to

believe that defendant Hill was following the truck “more closely than is reasonable and prudent”

when he came to within ten feet of the slow and steadily moving truck and had to “slam on his

brakes” to avoid a rear-end collision. 

III.

Finally, defendants claim that Pruitt was not a credible witness. The district court

specifically credited the testimony of Pruitt over defendants’ allegations, stating that it found “no

reason not to believe the officer as to what happened here.” “Where there are two permissible views

of the evidence” the conclusions of the district court “cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 470

U.S. at 574. Accordingly, we decline to hold that the district court clearly erred in deeming Pruitt

credible. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 
Nos. 05-6489/6500 United States v. Sanford, et al. Page 6

_________________

DISSENT _________________

MERRITT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The question in this case is whether Tennessee’s

statute on following too closely creates a rule for motorists or a broad standard giving police

officers a wide discretion to interpret it as they see fit. I do not believe that Officer Pruitt had

probable cause or any reasonable ground to believe that a traffic offense had occurred under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 55-8-124(a) (1998), which forbids a motorist from following too closely. Rather, the

Officer stopped this car with New York plates occupied by two black males a few minutes after the

car had braked to avoid an accident. Officer Pruitt stopped the car because he had a hunch, in my

judgment, that the two men might have some drugs. 

The language of the Weaver case — the Tennessee case quoted by the majority — seems on

point. In the instant case, Hill, the driver, complied with the statute which the case interprets to

require simply that drivers “make an emergency stop without striking the forward vehicle where the

vehicles had been proceeding in the same direction,” Ham v. Weaver, 770 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1989). Under this case, the Tennessee statute means that there is no violation if the

following car can brake and avoid “striking the forward vehicle.”

Although the Rule of the road found in this statute is not quite so narrow as rules regarding

the speed limit or red lights, it is clear, as interpreted by Tennessee courts, that it was not breached

here. There was no basis in Tennessee law for the officer to go beyond the rule and exercise his own

discretion even though Hill was able to brake and “avoid striking the forward vehicle where the

vehicles had been proceeding in the same direction.” A broad, discretionary “reasonable suspicion”

or “probable cause” standard does not fit such rules. “Reasonable suspicion” of what? What is it

that the officer “suspects?” There is no motive or intention or undisclosed fact to “suspect” or

believe to be “probable.” The Fourth Amendment should apply the same libertarian principle here

that would apply if the officer had stopped a driver for speeding who was going 68 in a 70 mile an

hour zone. This ability to avoid an accident by braking is what Tennessee law requires. A crime

does not occur every time a car speeds up to pass and then has to brake quickly in order to avoid an

accident when cut off by another car coming up fast in the passing lane; nor does a crime occur

when a motorist must brake quickly because the car in front brakes or slows quickly. A great many

drivers in America face this same problem everyday. See also State v. McCramey, 2003 Tenn. Crim.

App. Lexis 722 (Aug. 22, 2003). In that case the Tennessee Court of Appeals suppressed the drug

fruits of the same kind of claimed violation by the police of the same statute. The drug dealer’s car

had to brake and stop quickly in order to avoid striking the slow moving car in front of it. The Court

held that the “drug dealer’s actions in applying his brakes to avoid a collision did not give the police

officer probable cause or reasonable suspicion to lawfully make the traffic stop.” Id. at 6.