[Cite as State v. Madrid, 2018-Ohio-1873.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-17-1299 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201401143 

v. 

Michael Ray Madrid DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: May 11, 2018 

* * * * * 

 Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Peter Galyardt, 

 Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

JENSEN, J. 

I. Introduction 

{¶ 1} This is an accelerated appeal of the judgment of the Lucas County Court of 

Common Pleas, denying appellant’s, Michael Madrid, “Motion to Vacate Void JudicialSanction Sentence.” 
2.

A. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} The facts of this case are straightforward. On November 29, 2006, appellant 

entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford in case No. CR0200601180 to one 

count of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and one count of 

involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A) and (C), felonies of the first 

degree. The trial court accepted appellant’s plea, found him guilty of the aforementioned 

charges, and sentenced him to seven years in prison on each offense, to be served 

concurrently. While sentencing appellant, the trial court informed him that he would be 

subject to five years mandatory postrelease control. However, the court’s sentencing 

entry merely states: “Defendant given * * * postrelease control notice under R.C. 

2929.19(B)(3) and R.C. 2967.28.” The entry omits any reference to a mandatory fiveyear term of postrelease control. 

{¶ 3} On January 29, 2014, appellant was indicted on one count of possession of 

heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(6)(d), a felony of the second degree, one 

count of trafficking in heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(6)(e), a felony 

of the second degree, one count of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) 

and (C)(4)(c), a felony of the third degree, one count of trafficking in cocaine in violation 

of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(4)(d), a felony of the third degree, one count of 

aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a), a felony of 

the fifth degree, one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(a), a felony of the fourth degree, and one count of having 

 
3.

weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a felony of the third 

degree. Appellant was serving his five-year term of postrelease control at the time of his 

indictment. 

{¶ 4} Following pretrial discovery and plea negotiations, appellant appeared 

before the trial court on March 13, 2014, and entered a plea of no contest to the lesser 

included offense of trafficking in heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(6)(e), 

a felony of the third degree, trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and 

(C)(4)(d), a felony of the third degree, and aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of 

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(a), a felony of the fourth degree. Pursuant to the parties’ 

plea agreement, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. The trial court 

accepted appellant’s no contest plea, found him guilty of the aforementioned charges, and 

continued the matter for sentencing. 

{¶ 5} At a sentencing hearing held on April 17, 2014, the court ordered appellant 

to serve 30 months in prison for the charges of trafficking in heroin and trafficking in 

cocaine, to be served concurrently. Additionally, the court imposed a 14-month prison 

sentence as to the charge for aggravated trafficking in drugs, and ordered that the 14-

month sentence be served consecutive to the 30-month sentence, for a total prison 

sentence of 44 months. Additionally, the court found that appellant committed the 

foregoing offenses while released on postrelease control in case No. CR0200601180. 

Consequently, the court found appellant in violation of the terms of his postrelease 

control, and ordered appellant to serve an additional 1,361 days in prison, to be served 

consecutive to his 44-month prison term. 
4.

{¶ 6} Over three years later, on October 20, 2017, appellant filed a “Motion to 

Vacate Void Judicial-Sanction Sentence.” In the motion, appellant argued that the trial 

court’s 1,361-day postrelease control prison sentence should be vacated under the 

authority of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 

2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, because the trial court failed to set forth appellant’s 

mandatory five-year term of postrelease control in its sentencing entry in case No. 

CR0200601180. As a result of this failure, and because appellant had already completed 

his 44-month sentence in this case, appellant asserted that he was entitled to an 

immediate release from prison. 

{¶ 7} On November 9, 2017, the trial court released its decision denying 

appellant’s motion to vacate. In its decision, the court stated the following, in pertinent 

part: 

10. Until the decision in Grimes, it was never designated what had to 

be incorporated into the sentencing entry because the notification was the 

primary concern. Now, the Ohio Supreme Court is applying the Grimes

requirements to old cases that relied on prior decisions. Because the Ohio 

Supreme Court changed the law, it should have been prospective and not 

retroactively applied like they did in State v. Schroeder, 2017-Ohio-7858. 

This application of Grimes could adversely affect thousands of cases in 

Ohio. 

11. It is interesting that R.C. 2967.28(B) has been totally ignored by 

the Grimes majority. This section specifically states that the failure to 
5.

comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) does not negate or limit the mandatory 

period of post-release control. See also R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). 

12. It is also interesting to note that the issue could have been raised 

on direct appeal, and pursuant to State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 

N.E.2d 104, it may have been res judicata by not raising this issue on direct 

appeal. 

For the above stated reasons, the court in Case No. CR0200601180 

properly notified the defendant of the post-release conditions and properly 

put the notification in the sentencing entry based upon the law at that time. 

This court has chosen not to apply Grimes retroactively and only hold the 

trial judge to the law at that time. In addition, pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B), 

the legislature indicated that a violation of R.C. 2929.19(B)(3) does not 

negate the mandatory period of post-release control. The legislature created 

post-release control and should control how it is imposed. For these 

reasons the motion to vacate or void the post-release control portion of 

Case No. CR0200601180 that was imposed in this case is DENIED. 

(Emphasis sic.). 

B. Assignment of Error 

{¶ 8} Following the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate, appellant filed a 

timely notice of appeal, asserting the following assignment of error: 

{¶ 9} The trial court erred when it denied Michael Madrid’s motion to 

vacate his judicial-sanction sentence. 
6.

II. Analysis 

{¶ 10} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argued that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to vacate the 1,361-day sentence attributable to his postrelease 

control violation. 

{¶ 11} We review the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to vacate de novo. 

State v. Brown, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-038, 2017-Ohio-7963, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 12} In Grimes, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court examined the manner in which 

trial courts must inform criminal defendant’s concerning postrelease control. Ultimately, 

the court held that to validly impose postrelease control, a trial court must include the 

following information in its sentencing entry: 

(1) whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, (2) 

the duration of the postrelease-control period, and (3) a statement to the 

effect that the Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) will administer the 

postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and that any violation by the 

offender of the conditions of postrelease control will subject the offender to 

the consequences set forth in that statute. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 

2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, at ¶ 1. 

{¶ 13} Here, the trial court’s sentencing entry in case No. CR0200601180 did not 

include the foregoing information. Thus, appellant contends that his postrelease control 

sanction should be vacated. In response, the state advances several arguments as to why 

 
7.

appellant’s postrelease control sanction should not be vacated. Among these arguments, 

the state asserts that the statutes in effect at the time of appellant’s sentencing did not 

require the judgment entry to reiterate the trial court’s verbal postrelease control 

notification. Indeed, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) merely requires a trial court to “[n]otify the 

offender that the offender will be supervised under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code 

after the offender leaves prison” when imposing a sentence for which the offender will be 

subject to postrelease control. Moreover, that section also provides: 

If a court imposes a sentence including a prison term of a type 

described in division (B)(2)(c) of this section on or after July 11, 2006, the 

failure of a court to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(c) of this 

section that the offender will be supervised under section 2967.28 of the 

Revised Code after the offender leaves prison or to include in the judgment 

of conviction entered on the journal a statement to that effect does not 

negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory period of supervision that is 

required for the offender under division (B) of section 2967.28 of the 

Revised Code. 

{¶ 14} Here, the trial court’s verbal notification, paired with its reference to the 

relevant sentencing statutes in its sentencing entry, complied with the postrelease control 

requirements in effect at the time of sentencing. Appellant does not dispute this fact. 

The state insists that Grimes should not be applied retroactively to appellant’s postrelease 

control sentence, which was imposed long before Grimes was released. We agree. 
8.

{¶ 15} In Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-6592, 819 N.E.2d 687, the 

Ohio Supreme Court instructed that “[a] new judicial ruling may be applied only to cases 

that are pending on the announcement date.” Id. at ¶ 6, citing State v. Evans, 32 Ohio 

St.2d 185, 186, 291 N.E.2d 466 (1972). In the criminal context, the court explained that 

a new judicial ruling “may not be applied retroactively to a conviction that has become 

final, i.e., where the accused has exhausted all of his appellate remedies.” Id. 

{¶ 16} In the present case, appellant had exhausted all of his appellate remedies 

several years prior to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Grimes. Consequently, his 

conviction had already become final, and therefore not subject to the application of 

Grimes. State v. Schroeder, 151 Ohio St.3d 345, 2017-Ohio-7858, 88 N.E.3d 957, does 

not command a different result. According to the trial court, the Ohio Supreme Court 

retroactively applied Grimes when it issued its decision in Schroeder. However, 

Schroeder was pending before the Ohio Supreme Court when Grimes was released. 

Thus, Grimes was prospectively applied in Schroeder. Such is not the case here given the 

fact that apellant’s motion to vacate had not yet been filed on the date Grimes was 

announced and was therefore not pending on the announcement date. 

{¶ 17} Because appellant’s sentencing entry complied with the preexisting body of 

case law concerning the imposition of postrelease control, we find that the trial court 

properly denied appellant’s motion to vacate his postrelease control sanction. 

Accordingly, appellant’s assignment of error is not well-taken. 

 
9.

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 18} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant 

to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

James D. Jensen, J. 

_______________________________ 

Christine E. Mayle, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.