alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### ANDERSON v. BURWELL MOTOR CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division B.

July 9, 1954.

*823Richard B. Austin, Jacksonville, for appellant.

John M. McNatt and Marion R. Shepard, Jacksonville, for Burwell Motor Co. and Boyd & Jenerette, Jacksonville, for Emmco Ins. Co., appellees.

THOMAS, Justice.

The appellant filed a complaint in the ■circuit court containing an allegation that •the appellees did “exercise dominion and control” over a certain automobile while it ■was in the appellant’s possession and did -cause it to be removed from the place where appellant had put it. It was stated that the ■value of the motorcar was $2,500.

The circuit judge dismissed the cause for want of jurisdiction inasmuch as the Civil •Court of Record in the county has “exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases at law' * * * where the matter in controversy does not exceed * * * three thousand ($3000) dollars * * *.” Chapter 8521, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1921, as amended, Chapter 27169, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1951.

. The appellant challenges this action because he claims that the averments of his complaint would have justified the recovery of punitive damages of more than $500 so that the sum of punitive and compensatory damages would have made the amount in controversy sufficient to vest jurisdiction of the cause in the circuit court.

We do not find in the pleading the aver-ments to sustain this position. It is charged that dominion over the property was intentionally, unlawfully and deliberately exercised and that as a result of the “acts of the said defendants in willfully, wantonly and maliciously converting the said automobile” the appellant was inconvenienced, humiliat‘ed and embarrassed. But the adverbs the pleader selected did not so strengthen the statement of a loss for which compensatory damages might be recovered as to warrant recovery for punitive damages as well. . There could be no recovery for punitive damages in the absence of allegations of “general facts and circumstances of fraud, - malice, gross negligence, or oppression * * ** ”*Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214, 222. -No charges of this character were made.

The circuit judge was correct in his holding that under the indefinite allegations of the complaint the compensatory damages could not be enhanced 'by punitive damages to such extent that the “amount claimed and put in controversy in good faith” was sufficient to give the circuit court jurisdiction. Richter Jewelry Co., Inc., v. Harrison, 147 Fla. 732, 3 So.2d 387, 388.

The judgment is affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., and HOBSON and DREW, JJ., concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Lewis T. Babcock, Judge

Criminal Case No. 11-cr-00391-LTB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL CANTER,

Defendant.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

______________________________________________________________________________

As further set forth on the record at the hearing held on May 17, 2012, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress [Doc # 14] is DENIED.

Dated: May 17 , 2012, in Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

 s/Lewis T. Babcock 

LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE

Case 1:11-cr-00391-LTB Document 31 Filed 05/17/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
[No. 34785.

Department One.

November 28, 1958.]

#### Lawrence F. Pullar *et al., Appellants,*v. Charles V. Wilder, Sr. *et al., Respondents.**1*

*Kindall & Voris,*for appellants.

*Livesey, Kingsbury & Livesey,*for respondents.

1

 Reported in 332 P. (2d) 249.

Per Curiam.

The plaintiffs entered into a written contract with the defendants, giving to the latter the right to remove gravel from a certain area of plaintiffs’ property. The- plaintiffs brought this action to reform the contract. They contend that, through a mutual mistake, the written contract gave to the defendants the right to remove gravel from a larger portion of plaintiffs’ land than had been intended by either of the parties involved. Plaintiffs argue further that, prior to the time this contract was entered into, Lawrence F. Pullar had agreed with the defendants’ agent that the defendants should have the right to remove gravel from an area south of a certain fence on the plaintiffs’ land. The trial court held that the parties had never agreed that the particular fence would act as the north boundary; that there was no mutual mistake of fact, and that the only definite agreement ever reached was the final written contract.

The plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed with prejudice. They have appealed.

Each of appellants’ assignments of error relates to findings of fact. These findings are supported by the record. We will not disturb them. *Kuyath v. Anderson Constr. Co.*(1958), 52 Wn. (2d) 174, 324 P. (2d) 264. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. It is so ordered.
#### DUCKETT v. PIETRO.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June Term 1953.

Dismissed without opinion.-
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND> 
                               This schedule contains summary financial
                               information extracted from the financial
                               statements of Obie Media Corporation which are
                               included in its quarterly report, Form 10-QSB,
                               for the quarter ended February, 28 1998 and is
                               qualified in its entirety by reference to such
                               financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               NOV-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                    FEB-28-1998
<CASH>                                    0
<SECURITIES>                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                     2,657,847
<ALLOWANCES>                        193,119
<INVENTORY>                               0<F1>
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  4,651,403
<PP&E>                           13,038,135
<DEPRECIATION>                    3,622,277
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                   14,314,537
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             4,843,814
<BONDS>                           6,282,118
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0
<PREFERRED>                               0
<COMMON>                          6,173,967
<OTHER-SE>                       (2,851,456)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>     14,314,537
<SALES>                                   0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  4,169,847
<CGS>                                     0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     2,848,448
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                     18,240
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0<F1>
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                  166,178
<INCOME-PRETAX>                     267,414
<INCOME-TAX>                        101,617
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                 165,797
<DISCONTINUED>                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<CHANGES>                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                        165,797
<EPS-PRIMARY>                           .04<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                           .04<F2>
<FN>
 <F1>                            Information not included in Financial
                                 Statements.

 <F2>                            The  Company is not  filing  restated
                                 Financial   Data   Schedules  as  the
                                 amounts  reflected  for  primary  and
                                 diluted  earnings  per  share  do not
                                 change  as a result  of SFAS No.  128
                                 for the applicable periods.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Ex parte Frank S. GAFFORD.

No. 44676.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 2, 1971.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., James C. Brough, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, and Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order entered in 183rd District Court of Harris County, Texas on the third day of March, 1971, remanding appellant to custody for extradition to the State of New Jersey.

The executive warrant of the Honorable Preston Smith, Governor of Texas, *119reciting in substance that appellant stands charged by indictment with the crime of “uttering forged money order (three counts) contrary to N.J.S. 2A:109-1 in the State of New Jersey,” was introduced.

The introduction of the executive warrant, regular on its face, made a prima facie case authorizing extradition. Ex parte Young, Tex.Cr.App., 455 S.W.2d 837.

It was stipulated between the State and the appellant herein and appellant’s counsel that the appellant was one and the same person who is named in the governor’s warrant; that the charge alleged to be against him alleges a criminal violation of the laws of the demanding State of New Jersey; and that he, the appellant, was present in the State of New Jersey at the time that the crime is alleged to have been committed.

There being no contention or showing in this Court that extradition should not be granted, the order remanding appellant to custody for extradition is affirmed. No motion for rehearing will be entertained or filed by the clerk of this Court except by leave of this Court after good cause has been shown.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation,Plaintiff-counter-defendantcross-defendant - Appellee,
v. RICHARD PIRA, Defendant, ANDREW PIRA, Defendant-cross-defendant, And ALEXANDER YIN,Defendant-counter-claimantcross-claimant - Appellant. No. 13-15991 D.C. No. 4:11-cv-03511-CW
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Claudia Wilken, Senior District Judge, Presiding 

# FILED
JUN 25 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.Argued and Submitted June 12, 2015 San Francisco, California Before: SCHROEDER, IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. Defendant Alexander Yin appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Plaintiff Allstate In surance Company. Yin also appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claim that Allstate breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by unreasonably refusing to indemnify Richard and Andrew Pira and pay Yin benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. The district court did not err in concluding that Richard Pira was not an “insured person” under Erlinda Ipac’s insurance policy for the Peabody street property because Richard Pira did not live in the same “household” as Ipac. Under California law, “the term ‘household’ is unambiguous.” Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exch. , 227 Cal. App. 3d 584, 591, 594 (1991). It is undisputed that Richard Pira and Ipac did not live “under one roof or within a common curtilage” at the time that Andrew Pira shot Yin, and therefore Richard Pi ra did not live in Ipac’s “household,” as defined by California law. 1 See id.

1 To the extent Yin suggests Allstate s hould have included Richard Pira as a named insured on the policy, there is no such claim before us. 2Even if the district court erred when it dismissed Yin’s claim that Allstate breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, any error would be harmless because Yin “cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him . . . to relief.” Stratton v. Buck , 697 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Richard Pira was not cove red by Ipac’s policy because he was not a member of her household, and Yin does not challenge the district court’s determination that Andrew Pira was not covered by the policy because his actions were intentional. Therefore, because Yin had no right to payment from Allstate, “there can be no action for breach of th e implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc. , 11 Cal. 4th 1, 36 (1995). Any error by the district court was thus harmless. AFFIRMED.

3
EXHIBIT 4.20

 



 

COCA-COLA PLAZA

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

 

February 7, 2013

 

	
 
    	
ADDRESS REPLY TO
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
P.O. DRAWER 1734
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
ATLANTA, GA 30301
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
404-ó7ó-2121
    	
 
    


 

Cia. de Bebidas Ipiranga

Av. D. Pedro I, 2270 - Ipiranga

Ribeirão Preto, SP

CEP.: 14055-630

Brasil

 

ATTN.: Mr. André Biagi

 

We use this instrument to record and formalize that the Bottling Agreement entered into on October 4, 2007 between The Coca-Cola Company (hereinafter the “Company”) and CIA. DE BEBIDAS IPIRANGA (hereinafter the “Bottler)  has been extended for five (05) years beginning October 3, 2012, therefore expiring October 3, 2017.  Through the Bottling Agreement, the Company authorizes the Bottler to prepare, package, sell and distribute the COCA-COLA beverage, as well as supplementary authorizations regarding the COCA-COLA beverage, and any additional authorizations and other agreements entered into by the Company and the Bottler for the preparation, packaging, distribution and sale of other Beverages under the Brands (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Bottling Agreements”) in a given territory in Brazil.

 

The terms used herein have the same meaning as assigned in the Bottling Agreements, unless otherwise expressly stated herein.

 

Except for the deadline, extended in accordance with this instrument, the mentioned Bottling Agreements, as well as all other provisions, covenants, agreements, commitments and clarifications remain in full force and effect until they are definitely terminated on October 3, 2017, without any right to tacit renewal.

 

Therefore, please kindly express your agreement with the terms of this instrument, by signing the 3 (three) attached copies.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AURA ALICIA MORALES CASTRO,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney

General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-72221

Agency No. A070-812-325

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 24, 2011** 

Before: PREGERSON, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

Aura Alicia Morales Castro, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order summarily affirming an

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her applications for asylum and

withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review

FILED

JUN 03 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-72221

for substantial evidence findings of fact, Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182,

1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006), and de novo claims of due process violations in

immigration proceedings, Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th

Cir. 2008). We deny the petition for review.

Morales Castro contends she will be harmed based on her membership in a

particular social group consisting of Guatemalan women who have witnessed

serious crimes. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that she failed to

demonstrate that she was or would be persecuted on the basis of a protected

ground. See Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004) (fears

stemming from isolated criminal acts of violence do not provide a basis for relief). 

Morales Castro’s assertion that the IJ violated her due process rights by failing to

address the gender aspect of her claim is belied by the record. See Colmenar v.

INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to establish a due

process violation). Accordingly, Morales Castro’s asylum and withholding of

removal claims fail. See Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.9.4

[LOGO OF IMPERIAL BANK]



Date: July 13, 2000

Mr. Mike Grajeda
Vice President and CFO
ClearCommerce Corporation
11500 Metric Blvd., Suite 300
Austin, Texas 78758

Re:  LOAN EXTENSION
     Borrower Name: ClearCommerce Corporation
     Loan Number/Note Number: 721000065/006

Dear Borrower:

Imperial Bank has approved an extension of the above-referenced credit facility
to September 18, 2000 from its current maturity as evidenced by that certain
note/agreement dated July 20, 1999 as may be or have been modified from time to
time.

Except as modified and extended hereby, the existing loan documentation as
amended concerning your obligation remains in full force and effect.

Very truly yours,

/s/ David McLaughlin

David McLaughlin
Assistant Vice President

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Acknowledged and accepted on ________________.


By: __________________________              By: __________________________


By: __________________________              By: __________________________

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Case 1:11-cv-02378-REB Document 19-1 Filed 04/30/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 7
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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 97-1778WM

_____________

Rex W. Carlson, individually and as *

Next Friend for; Karen Virginia Carlson; *

Erin Elizabeth Carlson; Dale Eugene *

Carlson; David Paul Carlson; Wendy *

Laura Carlson; Melissa Carlson Green, *

*

Plaintiffs-Appellants, *

*

v. *

*

Midway R-I School District; Janice *

Larson, Individually, and in her capacity *

as Superintendent of Midway R-I School *

District; Laurie Thomas, Individually, * Appeal from the United States

and In Her Capacity as a Member of * District Court for the Western

the School Board; Richard Farr, * District of Missouri.

Individually, and in his capacity as a *

Member of the School Board; Terry * [UNPUBLISHED]

Carter, Individually, and in his capacity *

as a Member of the School Board; *

*

Defendants-Appellees, *

*

Bill Potts, Individually, and as a *

Member of the School Board; *

*

Defendant, *

*

Roy M. Beaman, Individually, and in *

his capacity as a Member of the School *

Board; Ronnie D. Jones, Sr., *
-2-

individually, and in his capacity as a *

member of the School Board; Patricia *

Shade, Individually, and as an Employee *

of Midway R-I School District; *

*

Defendants-Appellees, *

*

Robert Weltsch, Individually, and as an *

Employee of Midway R-I School *

District; *

Defendant, *

*

Elvin S. Douglas, Jr.; *

*

Defendant-Appellee, *

*

Judy Long, Individually, and as an *

employee of Midway R-I School *

District, *

*

Defendant-Appellee. *

_____________

 Submitted: December 8, 1997

Filed: December 16, 1997

_____________

Before FAGG, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

Rex W. Carlson, individually and as next friend for his children, appeals from

the adverse decisions of the judge and the jury in this civil rights lawsuit. We reject

Carlson's contention that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on

the children's claim for educational malpractice based on their right to an education
-3-

under the Missouri constitution. We likewise reject Carlson's contention that the

district court misinstructed the jury on Carlson's claim for violations of the First

Amendment and retaliation. For the most part, Carlson failed to preserve his record for

an appeal on the jury instructions that were given or refused by the district court, and

having reviewed the challenged instructions under the appropriate standards of review,

we conclude the challenged instructions do not require reversal. Having considered

Carlson's remaining contentions under well-established standards, we find no error that

would require reversal. Because an opinion would have no precedential value, we

affirm the district court without further discussion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
FIRST AMENDMENT TO
AMENDED AND RESTATED
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

First
Amendment, dated as of December 14, 2006 (the Amendment), to the Amended and
Restated Employment Agreement, dated as of July 27, 2006 (the Agreement),
among TierOne Corporation and James A. Laphen (the Executive).

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS,
 pursuant  to Section 26 of the  Agreement,  the  parties to the  Agreement  desire to
modify the Agreement;

NOW
THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the mutual agreements herein set forth and
such other consideration the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties
hereby agree as follows:

1.       Section
9(b)(ix). Section 9(b)(ix) of the Agreement is hereby deleted in           its
entirety.

2.       Effectiveness.
This Amendment shall be deemed effective as of the date           first above written, as
if executed on such date. Except as expressly set forth           herein, this Amendment
shall not by implication or otherwise alter, modify,           amend or in any way affect
any of the terms, conditions, obligations, covenants           or agreements contained in
the Agreement, all of which are ratified and affirmed           in all respects and shall
continue in full force and effect and shall be           otherwise unaffected.

3.       Governing
Law. This Amendment shall be governed by and construed in           accordance with
the laws the State of Nebraska, except to the extent that           federal law controls.

4.       Counterparts.
This Amendment may be executed in two or more counterparts,           each of which shall
for all purposes be deemed an original, and all of which           together shall
constitute but one and the same instrument.

---

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be executed as of the
day and year first above written.

|                            | TIERONE CORPORATION              
|--------------------------- | ---------------------------------
|Attest:                    
|/s/ Judith A. Klinkman      | By:/s/ Gilbert G. Lundstrom      
|Name:  Judith A. Klinkman   | Name:  James A. Laphen           
|Title:  Assistant Secretary | Title:  Chairman of the Board and
|                            | Chief Executive Officer          
|Attest:                    
|/s/ Judith A. Klinkman      | /s/ James A. Laphen              
|Name:  Judith A. Klinkman   | Name:  James A. Laphen, Executive
|Title:  Assistant Secretary