COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Willis 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

JOHN C. LUMPKIN 

v. Record No. 1660-94-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

SUZANNE MARIE KAZMARSKI LUMPKIN JULY 25, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

N. Wescott Jacob, Judge Designate 

 John C. Lumpkin, pro se. 

 Henry M. Schwan for appellee. 

 John C. Lumpkin (husband) appeals from a decree of the 

Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (trial court) that granted 

Suzanne Marie Kazmarski Lumpkin (wife) a divorce on the grounds 

of adultery and desertion and made support and equitable 

distribution awards. Husband contends that in making the various 

awards, the trial court erroneously failed to impute income to 

wife; wrongfully ordered him to pay an excessive amount of 

spousal and child support; mistakenly accepted the testimony of 

the less credible appraisal witness; and erroneously failed to 

credit him for monies he gave wife to be applied to her attorney 

fees. 

 In a counter appeal, wife asserts that the trial court erred 

when it failed to impute income to husband due by reason of 

husband having paid an excessive amount of salary to a secretary 

____________________ 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not 
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designated for publication. 

with whom wife alleges husband was having an affair, and by 

failing to deviate from the child support guidelines in order to 

account for the counseling needs of one of their two children. 

Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

 As the parties are knowledgeable of the extensive record in 

this case, we state only those facts essential to an 

understanding of this opinion. The divorce decree was entered on 

August 5, 1994. It found that husband had committed adultery 

with the secretary who wife contends was paid an excessive amount 

of salary as an employee in a business owned by husband. In 

1986, when wife became pregnant with the second child born of the 

marriage, wife stopped working at her registered nurse 

profession. She testified that her continued unemployment was 

due to the need to take care of the children. Husband claims 

that her refusal to work at her profession was caused by her 

attorney's advice not to seek work until after the case was 

completed. In this appeal, husband does not contest the grounds 

upon which the divorce was granted. 

I. Failure to Impute Income 

 Husband argues that wife could earn in excess of $18,000 

annually, yet she refuses to seek employment. In addition, he 

asserts that wife will be able to earn income from the property 

she receives from her equitable distribution share. Wife 
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contends that the two children are at a tender age, and that one 

child presently requires special attention due to an emotional 

illness. Further, she asserts, the amount of income, if any, 

from property she may receive is not yet computable. The trial 

court reviewed the evidence and declined to impute any income to 

wife "at this time." Thus, that door remains open for future 

change upon a showing that consideration should be given. Upon 

our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court's 

decision was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 

See Code § 8.01-680; Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 504, 229 

S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976). 

 Wife contends that the secretary with whom husband was 

having an affair was overpaid in relation to other secretaries 

employed in husband's business. Husband presented evidence that 

the trial court found tended to show that the secretary had 

earned her salary. Upon review of the record, we cannot say that 

judgment of the trial court was plainly wrong or without evidence 

to support it. Id. 

II. Rebuttal Evidence 

 Husband advised the trial court that a witness would testify 

that wife had been told by her attorney to not seek work until 

the case had been completed, and proffered the witness to 

corroborate that statement. The trial court did not decline to 

consider the proffered evidence but responded, "Good. We won't 

hear it. That's fine. That settles that one." It is clear that 
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the trial court was aware of the alleged statement and concluded 

that upon the whole record, wife was justified in not seeking 

employment "at that time." Upon this record we find no 

reversible error in the decision. 

III. Inclusion of Spousal Support 

 Husband concedes that Code § 20-108.2(C) permits spousal 

support to be considered as income to the recipient in 

calculating the child support obligations of the parties only if 

the spousal support is paid pursuant to a preexisting order or 

written agreement. Neither of these conditions are shown to be 

relevant to this case. Accordingly, the trial court did not err 

in refusing to consider the amount of spousal support awarded to 

wife when it determined the appropriate child support award. 

IV. Spousal and Child Support 

 Husband further contends that the support awards were 

excessive based upon the trial court's finding that his average 

annual income was $72,000. Wife argues that the awards were 

within the guidelines and reasonable based upon husband's actual 

income. She bases that claim upon evidence that shows husband's 

annual income has been on the rise for the past five years, and 

that his latest annual income was $93,000. 

 Premised upon an income of $6,000 per month, the trial court 

ordered husband to pay spousal support of $18,000 annually, or 

$1,500 per month. Based upon $6,000 gross monthly income, the 

guidelines disclose that an award of support for two children 
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should be $1,186. There is evidence in the record concerning one 

child's health that justified the trial court's actual child 

support award of $1,255 per month plus health insurance coverage. 

 A trial court is vested with broad discretion in fixing the 

amount of support, and its decision will not be disturbed unless 

it is clear that some injustice has been done. Lapidus v. 

Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 580, 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984). We find 

no abuse of trial court discretion in making the support awards. 

 V. Credit for Attorney Fees 

 Husband testified that he gave wife $4,500 to be applied to 

his attorney fees obligation. Wife testified that husband had 

agreed the children were to attend private school and that 

without warning husband stopped paying tuition. She further 

testified, and husband agreed, that he knew wife used the $4,500 

to make the tuition payments. We cannot say that the trial court 

was plainly wrong when it denied husband credit of $4,500 toward 

his attorney fees obligation. 

 Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.