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JOHNHALE, Plaintiff,

v. THE UNITED STATES, No. 15-903C (Filed: September 2, 2015) NOT FORPUBLICATION ) ) ) 

# FILED SEP - 22015 U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS ) Pro Se Complaint; Sua Sponte ) Dismissal for Want ofJurisdiction; ) Transfer; 28 U.S.C. § 1631 ) ) ) Defendant. )

### ~~**~~~ ~~~~-)**  John Hale, Owensboro, KY, pro se. ORDER CAMPBELL-SMITH, ChiefJudge Before the court is the complaint ofproseplaintiffJohn Hale filed August 19, 2015. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs complaint states in full: I, John Hale, am filing a lawsuit against the Federal Government and the [National Security Agency (NSA)] over targeted, invasive surveillance and abrasive harassment/terrorism that has been directed at me over the past 5 years and most severely from the time ofDecember 2014 to the present date ofAugust2015. Supporting documents and evidence included. I am seeking compensation for damages over mental and physical torment and torture, stolen time, financial resources, relationships, and intellectual property. Id. at 1. The "[s]upporting documents and evidence" to whichplaintiffrefers consists of nineteenpages ofdocuments printed from the internet, including an article titled "Covert Operations ofthe U.S. National Security Agency"; a WorldCat.org 1 screenshot ofthe

"WorldCat is the world's largest network oflibrary content and services." What is WorldCat? http://www.worldcat.org/whatis/ (last visited September 1, 2015).bookPsychiatry and the CIA: Victims ofMind Control; a list ofthe purported effects of "psycho-electronic weapons"; and a chart purporting to depict "Mind Control Information Feedback Paths." Id., Attachs. 1-4. I. Legal Standards "Subject-matterjurisdiction may be challenged at any time bythe parties or bythe court sua sponte." Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see also Metabolite Labs, Inc. v. Lab. Corp. ofAm. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Subject matterjurisdiction is an inquiry that this court must raise sua sponte, even where, as here, neither party has raised this issue."). "In deciding whether there is subject-matterjurisdiction, "the allegations stated in the complaint are taken as true and jurisdiction is decided on the face ofthe pleadings."' Folden, 379 F.3d at 1354 (quoting Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are often held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see Vaizburd v. United States, 384 F.3d 1278, 1285 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that pleadings drafted bypro se parties "should

... not be held to the same standard as [pleadings drafted by] parties represented by counsel"). However, pro se plaintiffs must still meetjurisdictional requirements. Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499 (2004), affd, 98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Kelley v. Dep't ofLabor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[A] court may not similarly take a liberal view of[a] jurisdictional requirement and set a different rule for pro se litigants only."). Ifthe court determines that it does not have subject matterjurisdiction, it must dismiss the claim. Rules ofthe United States Court ofFederal Claims (RCFC) 12(h)(3). The Tucker Actprovides for this court'sjurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act ofCongress or any regulation ofan executive department, or upon any express or implied contractwiththe United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l) (2012) (emphasis added). A plaintiffmust "identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act itself' for the courtto exercisejurisdiction over a claim. Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The substantive source oflaw allegedly violated must '"fairlybe interpreted as mandating compensationby the Federal Government."' United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)).



### 2II. Discussion For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs complaint mustbe dismissed for lack of subject matterjurisdictionpursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3), and the court finds that a transfer ofplaintiffs case to another federal court is not appropriate.
A. The Court Does NotHave Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs Claims Plaintiffs demand for "compensation for damages over mental and physical torment and torture, stolen time, financial resources, relationships, and intellectual property" falls outside this court'sjurisdiction. Plaintiffs demand for compensation is based on allegations of"invasive surveillance and abrasive harassment/terrorism" on the part ofthe NSA. To the extentplaintiffs claims sound in tort, see Zhengxing v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 732, 739 (2006), affd, 204 F. App'x 885 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the Tucker Act plainly excludes tort claims from the court'sjurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993). To the extentplaintiffs claims are based on an allegation that the United States, acting through the NSA, has engaged in criminal activity, "[t]he United States Court ofFederal Claims has 'nojurisdictionto adjudicate any claims whatsoever underthe federal criminal code."' Zhengxing, 71 Fed. Cl. at 739 (quoting Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Moreover, plaintiffhas not identified "aprovision ofthe Constitution, a statute, an Executive order, or a regulation that mandates a payment ofmoney to the plaintiff," see Raney v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 666, 667 (2007), which is necessary for this court to exercisejurisdiction overplaintiffs claims, see Todd, 386 F.3d at 1094. Forthe foregoing reasons, plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3) for lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction.
B. Transfer ofthe Case to Another Court Is NotAppropriate The court now considers whether "it is in the interest of justice"to transfer plaintiffs complaint to another court ofthe United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See Tex. Peanut Farmers v. United States, 409 F.3d 1370, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating thatthe Court ofFederal Claims should considerwhether transfer is appropriate once the court has determined that it lacksjurisdiction). Section 1631 states in pertinentpart: Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 ofthis title

... andthatcourtfinds thatthere is a want of jurisdiction,the court shall, ifit is inthe interestof justice,transfer such action

...to any other such court in which the action

. . . could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed

....

328 U.S.C. § 1631; see 28 U.S.C. § 610 (defining courts as "courts ofappeals and district courts ofthe United States, the United States District Court for the District ofthe Canal Zone, the District Court ofGuam, the District Court ofthe Virgin Islands, the United States Court ofFederal Claims, and the Court ofInternational Trade"). "The phrase 'ifit is in the interest of justice' relates to claims which are nonfrivolous and as such shouldbe decided on the merits." Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see id. (stating that "[f]rivolous claims include 'spurious and specious arguments"' (quoting Devices for Med., Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). "A decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion ofthe transferor court, and the court may decline to transfer the case '[i]fsuch transfer would nevertheless be futile given the weakness ofplaintiffs case on the merits."' Spencer v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 349, 359 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Faulkner v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 54, 56 (1999)). Becausethe court can discern no identifiable nonfrivolous cause ofaction that wouldpotentially have merit in another court, transfer ofplaintiffs complaint is not in the interest of justice.
C. Plaintiffs Application to Proceed InFormaPauperis In addition to his complaint, plaintifffiled an Applicationto Proceed InForma Pauperis (IFP). ECF No. 2. Plaintiffs IFP application states that "the amount of [his] salary or wages permonth" is "40k." Id. at 1. The court understands that plaintiffhas an annual salary of$40,000, which approximately equates to a monthly salary of$3,333. Although instructed to do so in the application, plaintiffdoes not identify his employer. Id. In response to the question, "Do you own any cash, or so you have money in checking, savings, or any other accounts," plaintiffstates that he has $273. Id. at 2. Plaintiffalso states that he owns a "2006 Chevy Malibu," but fails, as instructed, to "state its approximate value." Id. Plaintiffdoes not identify any dependents. Id. Based onthe foregoing, the court concludes that plaintiffhas sufficientresources to satisfythe court's filing fee. See Walls v. United States, No. 05-533C, 2005 WL 6114552, at *2 (Fed. Cl. July 28, 2005) (concluding same given plaintiffs monthly salary of$3700); cf. Moore v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 411, 414-15 (2010) (granting the plaintiffs IFP application giventhat she hadthree dependents and an annual salary of $16,800, whichplacedher "belowthe 2009 poverty guidelines for a four-person family [($22,050)]"); Annual Update onthe HHS Poverty Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 3236, 3237 (Jan. 22, 2015) (identifying an annual income of$11,770 as the 2015 poverty guideline for family ofone living in the 48 contiguous states). "[A]lthough [a] litigant need notbe absolutely destitute, granting IFP status calls for showing thatpaying for the costs ofthe suit would make it difficult to afford the 'basic necessities oflife."' See Murphy v. United States, No. 14-536C, 2014 WL 3510222, at* 1 n.1 (Fed. Cl. July 16, 2014) (quoting Williams v. Court Servs. & Offender Supervision Agency for D.C., 878
4F.Supp.2d 263, 266 (D.D.C. 2012)), recons. denied, No. 14-536C, 2014 WL 3841874 (2014). Accordingly, plaintiffs IFP application is DENIED. Nevertheless, because the court lacksjurisdiction, see supraPart II.A, the fee need not be paid for the purpose offiling the instant complaint. Plaintiffis advisedthat, based on his current financial status, any future filings will be subjectto the court's $400 filing fee. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims. The Clerk of Court is directed to DISMISS plaintiffs complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Clerk ofCourt will enterjudgmentfor defendant. No costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.



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# ~0~J~~~1vi PA RICIA E. CAMPBELL!SMITH ChiefJudge