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******************************************************
IN RE JAMES O., JR., ET AL.*

(SC 19579)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Robinson, Js.**

Argued May 5—officially released August 12, 2016***

David J. Reich, for the appellant (respondent

mother).

Frank H. LaMonaca, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, Gregory T. D’Auria, solicitor general, Benjamin

Zivyon, assistant attorney general, and Romiesha

Briscoe, certified legal intern, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The sole issue in this certified appeal

is whetherthe trial court made an improper comparison

between the respondent mother, Marjorie H., and Paula

M., the therapeutic foster mother of the respondent’s

minor children, James O., Jr., and Jolene O., during

the adjudicative phase of its judgment terminating the

respondent’s parental rights.1 The respondent2 appeals

from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the

trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights

as to James and Jolene, and to appoint the petitioner,

the Commissioner of Children and Families, as their

statutory parent. In re James O., 160 Conn. App. 506,

508, 127 A.3d 375 (2015). The respondent claims that

the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court’s

judgment terminating her parental rights pursuant to

General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)3

because the trial court engaged in an improper comparison between the parenting abilities of the respondent

and those of Paula M. to support the court’s conclusion

that the respondent had failed to reach a sufficient level

of personal rehabilitation. We disagree and affirm the

judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts, which the trial court found by

clear and convincing evidence, and procedural history

are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. During the

spring of 2011, staff at James’ school became concerned

with the fact that James, then seven years old, was

making suicidal and homicidal statements and was

physically harming himself. The school staff attempted

to work with the respondent to secure a psychological

evaluation and appropriate treatment for James.

Around the same time, James’ therapist reported that

James disclosed to her that he ‘‘had a secret, that he

[heard] voices, and that he hurts himself at home.’’

The therapist also recommended that James receive a

psychological evaluation, but the respondent refused

to allow an evaluation unless the school paid for both

children to be evaluated. The therapist did not believe

that the respondent grasped the seriousness of

James’ condition.

School staff also referred James for Intensive InHome Child and Adolescent Services (in-home services). The respondent refused to allow the services in

her home. The respondent removed the children from

the school, intending to homeschool them, claiming

that James had psychotic episodes only at school and

would behave normally at home. During 2011, the children’s school made a referral for both children to the

Department of Children and Families (department).

On June 9, 2011, the petitioner filed neglect petitions

and sought and received an order of temporary custody

as to both children based on the children’s exposure

to substance abuse and domestic violence, evidence of
James’ serious mental health issues, the failure of both

parents; see footnote 2 of this opinion; to follow through

with recommended services for both children, and the

withdrawal ofthe children from school and the resulting

lack of visibility in the community. The petitioner

included as an additional ground educational neglect

arising from the children having missed thirty days of

school.

At the time of their removal from the respondent’s

custody, both children displayed highly disturbing

behaviors. After removal, outside the presence of his

parents, James disclosed to Danbury Hospital staff that

he was hearing voices and that his head was telling him

to do things. James threatened to harm another child

in his first foster home, stating that he would kill and

eat the child. Jolene, then six years old, displayed sexualized behavior including frequent public masturbation,

talk about sex, and attempts to engage other children,

including her brother, in inappropriate sexual acts.

Based on Jolene’s conduct, her first foster mother questioned whether Jolene had a history of sexual abuse.

Despite Jolene’s behavior, the respondent and the

department reached an agreement whereby the order

of temporary custody would remain in effect for James,

who was to be hospitalized at Yale-New Haven Hospital

for psychiatric treatment, while the order would dissolve for Jolene on June 23, 2011, upon the condition

that the respondent would take Jolene to therapy. On

June 24, 2011, during her therapy in-take interview,

Jolene disclosed to the therapist that her father had

physically abused her and inappropriately touched her.

The department invoked a ninety-six hour hold and

removed Jolene from the respondent’s custody for the

second time.

While at Yale-New Haven Hospital, James continued

to make suicidal statements and homicidal statements

about killing and eating other children. The respondent

attributed his conductto a cartoon he watched on television. The hospital staff also reported bizarre interactions between James and Jolene. They observed that

the parents did not set appropriate limits on the children’s behavior.

The department placed James and Jolene in a Safe

Home placement, which would provide more stability,

allow the children to receive mental health services

directly at the facility, and allow the department to

more directly assess their needs. While the children

were at the Safe Home, the department determined that

the children would need a family that would understand

and be able to handle their ongoing behavioral issues.

James was still having suicidal ideation, had a tendency

to fixate, and had a fragile emotional state. In addition

to sexual behavior, Jolene was reluctant to bathe, was

very hyperactive and aggressive, cursed and made

threats to others. She also exhibited excessive animal
behaviors, at times walking on all fours and making

animal noises, and had a skewed sense of reality. Safe

Home staff described her ‘‘as one of the most traumatized children they have seen.’’

The department determined that the children needed

to be placed in a therapeutic foster home with a caregiver who could understand and manage their behaviors

and provide more intensive therapeutic support. In

October, 2011, the department placed the children with

Paula M., a licensed therapeutic foster care provider.

The trial court described Paula M. as ‘‘part of a team

thatincludes [the department],the children’s therapists,

and Wheeler Clinic . . . .’’ Paula M. met with the children’s therapists weekly, attended special education

planning and placement meetings, informed the children’s therapists of issues that arose with the children,

and helped to implement at home what the children

learned in therapy, such as specific coping skills when

they became anxious. Paula M. also worked with the

in-home service providers in the home twice weekly,

once with James and a second time without the children

present to train her to work with James.

Beginning in October, 2011, Jolene was referred for

treatment to the Child Abuse Treatment Services Program at Klingberg Family Centers. That program uses

trauma focused cognitive behavioral therapy to assist

children who have experienced physical or sexual

abuse or have witnessed domestic violence. At the time

of the referral, the therapists were not able to begin

trauma focused cognitive behavioral therapy with

Jolene because the respondent refused to give her

consent.

In February, 2012, both children separately made disclosures of sexual abuse to Paula M. Using the coping

skills he learned in therapy, James wrote a narrative that

included numerous explicit descriptions of a variety

of sexual contact involving James, Jolene, and their

parents. While attending church with Paula M., Jolene

asked for paper and a pencil and then drew figures of

what looked like a child and an adult, including one

that suggested sexual activity between the two figures.

Paula M., in her capacity as a mandatory reporter, provided a copy of Jolene’s drawings to the department.

Jolene subsequently disclosed to her therapist that the

drawings depicted her abuse.

On June 19, 2012, after the trial court had already

taken evidence in the contested neglect petitions over

several days, the respondent and the children’s father

entered nolo contendere pleas to neglect. The court

adjudicated the children neglected and committed them

to the custody of the petitioner.

Because of Jolene’s commitment to the petitioner’s

custody, she was able to begin trauma focused cognitive

behavioral therapy. The goal of her therapy was treat-
ment of the symptoms of trauma and abuse, rather

than investigation of alleged sexual abuse. Jolene was

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

By June, 2013, Jolene exhibited a successful reduction

in trauma symptoms, developed coping and relaxation

skills, and, as a result, was successfully discharged from

the trauma focused cognitive behavioral therapy

program.

James also exhibited a marked improvement to his

therapists. At the time of his initial commitment, James

presented with suicidal ideation, hypervigilance, high

anxiety, frequent tantrums, a great deal of fear, difficulty sleeping, and paranoia. He was diagnosed with

PTSD and autism. By the time his most recent therapist

was assigned to him in June, 2013, he was no longer

presenting with suicidal ideations and his anxiety had

decreased significantly. James continued to exhibit

issues with boundaries and social skills, which caused

behavioral issues for him at school. James’ therapist

noted that he required the lessons and skills he was

taught in therapy to be mirrored in the parenting he

received at home, with a caregiver who is firm, but also

very calm, warm, and supportive of him.

At the time that the respondent entered her nolo

contendere pleas to neglect, the respondent agreed to

specific steps to facilitate reunification with James and

Jolene, including attending individual therapy for the

purpose of gaining insight into domestic violence and its

impact on the children, improving her communication

skills, learning how to problem solve without escalating

to violence, and understanding appropriate boundaries

with respect to sexual abuse and the needs of children

who have disclosed sexual abuse.

The respondent declined to see a department recommended therapist and instead selected one who disagreed with most of the treatment goals outlined in the

court-ordered specific steps. Rather than work with the

respondent to address the steps provided by the court,

the psychologist focused, instead, on discrediting the

children’s reports of sexual abuse. The trial court found

that while the respondent attended individual therapy,

she failed to advance any of the goals of such therapy

as agreed to in her specific steps.

During the children’s commitment, the department

provided the respondent with supervised visitation with

the children and parent education support, as well as

assistance with transportation to visitations. The

respondent worked with two parent educators along

with visitation supervisors. Both parent educators

attempted to provide feedback to the respondent on

her interactions with the children, but the respondent

reacted negatively to any perceived criticism, at times

yelling at the educators or the department social

worker. The parent educators observed that the respondent continued to have difficulty setting appropriate
limits for the children or setting consequences if the

children failed to comply with limits.

As part of her specific steps, the respondent was also

required to improve her communication skills in order

to allow her to effectively communicate and work with

the children’s therapy providers. The respondent was

permitted, and encouraged, to communicate with the

children’s therapists and school social workers and psychologists. The respondent declined to do so.

The respondent was also required to take steps to

acknowledge her role in the removal of her children.

The respondent focused, instead, on denying the allegations of sexual abuse. She also failed to acknowledge

the disturbing behaviorthat initially led to her children’s

removal or the impact of substance abuse and domestic

violence on the children. While she acknowledged that

the children’s father had a substance abuse issue and

could be violent, she minimized the impact that his

behavior had on the children and did not acknowledge

her own propensity for violence. According to the

respondent, the father’s substance abuse and violence

would not impact the children in the future because

she was then divorced from the father and he did not

have visitation rights under the dissolution agreement.

The trial court found, however, that the respondent and

the father entered into a visitation agreement in order

for it to appear to the department that the respondent

was protecting the children when, in reality, the respondent and the father still had a relationship and he was

often present in her home.

OnApril 24, 2013,the petitioner, pursuant to § 17a-112

(j) (3) (B), filed a petition to terminate the respondent’s

parental rights as to both children on the ground that

she had failed to achieve the degree of personalrehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a

reasonable time, considering the age and particular

needs of the children, she could assume a responsible

position in their lives.

On November 13, 2014, the trial court terminated the

respondent’s parental rights as to both children. The

court found that the department had made reasonable

efforts to reunify the respondent with both children, but

that she failed to acknowledge the children’s disturbing

behavior and her role in causing their removal. The

court further found that the respondent had failed to

achieve a reasonable level of rehabilitation. The court

finally found that it was in the best interest of the

children for the court to terminate the respondent’s

parental rights.

On March 3, 2015, the respondent appealed the trial

court’s termination of her parental rights to the Appellate Court, claiming that the court had made an

improper comparison between the respondent and

Paula M. in the adjudicative portion of its memorandum
of decision.4 Thereafter, the Appellate Court affirmed

the judgment of the trial court. In re James O., supra,

160 Conn. App. 507, 528. The Appellate Court ‘‘construe[d] the language relied on by the respondent, not

as making a direct comparison between the respondent

and Paula M., so much as clarifying that the children

needed and continued to need an environment that is

calm, in which their needs are understood, and in which

their caregiver can manage their anxiety in an appropriate manner.’’ Id., 520. This appeal followed.

The respondent claims that the Appellate Court

improperly held that the trial court did not engage in

an improper comparison between the parenting abilities

of the respondent and Paula M. in the adjudicative portion of its memorandum of decision terminating the

respondent’s parental rights. In the respondent’s view,

certain language in the trial court’s memorandum of

decision evidences its improper reasoning. The respondent contends that any comparison at all between a

parent and a foster parent is a violation of Practice

Book § 35a-7 (b),5

should be presumed to influence the

trial court’s determination in the adjudicatory phase,

and requires reversal.6

The petitioner agrees that if the trial court based its

determination that the respondent had failed to reach

an adequate level of rehabilitation on a finding that

Paula M. was a better parent or was a preferable parent

to the respondent, that would be a due process violation

and grounds for reversal. The petitioner contends that,

when read within the context of the entire memorandum of decision, the challenged language does not constitute a comparison between the respondent and Paula

M. Rather, the court was discussing the specific needs

of the children as a predicate to considering the respondent’s ability to meet those needs. Within this context,

the examination of Paula M.’s role in the children’s

therapy and the environment of the foster home are

merely evidence of what is actually required to meet

the children’s specific needs, which is a necessary consideration during the adjudicative phase of a termination of parental rights determination when the ground

fortermination is a failure to rehabilitate. The petitioner

further emphasizes that the respondent failed to reach

even a minimally sufficient ability to assume a role as an

appropriate caregiver and refused to even acknowledge

the children’s particular needs. Therefore, according

to the petitioner, the court did not make an improper

comparison that would require reversal. We agree with

the petitioner.

We first set forth the applicable standard of review

and general principles. ‘‘The interpretation of a trial

court’s judgment presents a question of law over which

our review is plenary. . . . As a general rule, judgments

are to be construed in the same fashion as other written

instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the inten-
tion of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly

implied as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The

judgment should admit of a consistent construction as

a whole. . . . If there is ambiguity in a court’s memorandum of decision, we look to the articulations that the

court provides.’’7(Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Olson v. Mohammadu, 310 Conn. 665,

682, 81 A.3d 215 (2013).

‘‘In orderto terminate a parent’s parentalrights under

§ 17a-112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear

and convincing evidence, that: (1) the department has

made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; General

Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (1); (2) termination is in the best

interest of the child; General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (2);

and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for

termination delineated in § 17a-112 (j) (3).’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) In re Melody L., 290 Conn.

131, 148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009), overruled in part on

other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 746–47,

754, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). When the petitioner seeks to

terminate a parent’s parental rights on the ground that

the parent has failed to rehabilitate, ‘‘[t]he trial court is

required, pursuant to § 17a-112, to analyze the [parent’s]

rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the

particular child, and further . . . such rehabilitation

must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.’’(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 585, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015).

Therefore, the trial court must first determine the needs

of the particular child before determining whether a

parent has achieved a sufficient rehabilitative status to

meet those needs. See, e.g., In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.

App. 167, 175, 743A.2d 165 (1999)(respondent’s rehabilitative status viewed in light of child’s medical and

psychiatric conditions).

Turning to the ability of a trial court to consider

evidence of the abilities of a foster parent when adjudicating a petition to terminate parental rights, we have

recognized that such determinations ‘‘are particularly

vulnerable to the risk that judges or social workers will

be tempted, consciously or unconsciously, to compare

unfavorably the material advantages of the child’s natural parents with those of prospective adoptive parents

and therefore to reach a result based on such comparisons rather than on the statutory criteria.’’8

In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 672–73, 420

A.2d 875 (1979). ‘‘ ‘It is . . . essential, in considering a

petition to terminate parental rights, to sever completely the issues of whether termination is statutorily

warranted and whether a proposed adoption is desirable. Although petitions for termination are presumably

seldom brought unless prospective adoptive parents

are available, there still must be a two-step process to

determine, first, the threshold question of whether

cause for termination . . . has been proved.’ [Id., 673];
see also Matter of Corey L v. Martin L, 45 N.Y.2d 383,

391, 380 N.E.2d 266, 408 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1978). Accordingly, we have held that ‘[o]nly if a ground for termination exists may the suitability and circumstances of

adoptive parents, in an appropriate proceeding, be considered.’ In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181

Conn. 638, 645, 436 A.2d 290 (1980).’’ In re Baby Girl

B., 224 Conn. 263, 275, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).

We do not permit foster or preadoptive parents to

intervene in termination proceedings because to do so

would ‘‘permit them to shape the case in such a way

as to introduce an impermissible ingredient into the

termination proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 278. We have never held, however, that

a foster parent may not testify during the adjudicative

phase of a termination proceeding or that a trial court

may not consider evidence that arises within the context of a foster placement that is relevant to one of the

statutory grounds raised for termination of parental

rights. See In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10718),

188 Conn. 259, 266–67, 449 A.2d 165 (1982) (Shea, J.,

dissenting) (‘‘Unquestionably the foster parents . . .

would have been permitted to testify, as the foster

mother did, during the adjudicative phase of the termination proceedings. The majority opinion does not question that her testimony was highly relevant to the

grounds alleged for termination of parental rights.’’);

see also In re Anthony H., 104 Conn. App. 744, 752,

936 A.2d 638 (2007) (trial court noted, and Appellate

Court did not question, that child needed ‘‘a substantial

amount of structure, which his prior therapeutic foster

homes were able to provide’’ within context of specific

needs of child), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d

1100 (2008);In re Vincent D., 65 Conn. App. 658, 665–66,

783 A.2d 534 (2001) (foster parent may not intervene

in adjudicative phase of proceeding, but may be called

as witness for petitioner on issues that may be considered during dispositional phase); In re Shyliesh H.,

supra, 56 Conn. App. 171–72 (child’s interactions with

foster mother, in contrast to interactions with others,

were evidence of psychiatric condition relevant to specific needs of child in adjudicative phase).

We must determine, therefore, whetherthe trial court

properly considered evidence of the children’s foster

placement as relevant to an aspect of an adjudicatory

ground for termination, or rather, as the respondent

contends, it improperly reasoned that termination was

warranted because Paula M. was a better or preferable

parent than the respondent. Looking to the trial court’s

memorandum of decision, the court made the following

findings that are relevant to this determination.

Atthe outset ofits analysis on the respondent’s failure

to rehabilitate, the trial court quoted law stating that

rehabilitation must be assessed with reference to the

needs of the particular children at issue. Thereafter,
the court emphasized that ‘‘[p]ivotal to this court’s findings and the starting point for its analysis is the . . .

determination of the age and needs of James . . . and

Jolene.’’ The court went on to describe the children’s

history of disturbing behavior, the respondent’s continuing failure to acknowledge that behavior, and her role

in causing it, opining that such failure was an ‘‘enormous impediment to reunification.’’9

The trial court next noted that ‘‘[t]he most credible,

persuasive and reliable evidence of the children’s needs

is the testimony of the children’s therapists, as manifested by the therapeutic approach they utilized and

the importance of the caregivers’ role in helping the

children address and heal from the trauma they have

endured.’’ The court went on to describe the goals of

the children’s therapy and the roles of various therapy

providers, including Paula M., in documenting any disclosures made by the children.

The next paragraph of the memorandum of decision

is the subject of this appeal. In its entirety, it reads:

‘‘More important than the disclosures, however, is the

clear and convincing evidence that the children have

made extraordinary progress while living with Paula

M., in an environment that is calm and understanding

of the children’s needs. As both therapists have made

clear, the children have needed a caregiver who is calm,

patient, able to set appropriate limits, willing to participate intensively in the children’s therapy, and able to

help the children with coping skills to manage their

anxiety. The children have also needed someone who

would believe their statements about the source of their

trauma. [The children’s therapist] credibly testified that

the [trauma focused cognitive behavioral therapy]

modelrequires that a child be understood and treated in

the context of theirliving environment. As the children’s

progress, relationship and work with Paula M. makes

clear, the process of healing and recovery must also

occur in a home environment which the children have

come to learn is safe and caring. Given Paula M.’s training and participation in therapy sessions, it is clear that

this process cannot be limited to the one hour per week

session that a child has, even with a trusting therapist.

In contrast, [the respondent] is volatile and prone to

violence, unable to set appropriate limits, unwilling to

talk with the children’s therapists and, therefore, unable

to help them use coping skills to manage their anxiety

and ultimately, unwilling to believe the children’s statements regarding the trauma. In short, [the respondent]

has none of the qualities [that] the children have

required to stabilize and to continue to heal from the

traumas they experienced while in their parents’ care.’’

In the very next paragraph, the trial court reiterates

that ‘‘the most credible and reliable evidence of the age

and needs of the children, around which the [respondent’s] rehabilitation is evaluated and assessed, neces-
sarily comes from the work done by the children’s

therapeutic team, which includes the work of [Paula

M.], the reliable and credible evidence regarding the

children’s severely disturbed behaviors and the degree

to which the children’s behaviors have greatly stabilized. The evidence that the children have, in fact, made

such dramatic improvement in their functioning, under

the conditions which their therapists and caregivers

have been able to dictate and nurture, is itself confirmation of the expertise, skill and knowledge of these professionals.’’ Thereafter, the trial court concluded the

adjudicatory phase, finding ‘‘that the petitioner has met

its burden, by clear and convincing evidence, [that] the

[respondent has] failed to rehabilitate, given the age

and needs of both children.’’

After considering the challenged portion of the memorandum of decision within the context of the trial

court’s overall analysis, we conclude that the court’s

adjudicative findings are appropriately centered on the

specific needs of James and Jolene, a necessary consideration when determining whether a respondent has

failed to rehabilitate. The beginning of the court’s analysis makes it abundantly clear that the court is focused

on James’ and Jolene’s particular needs, as seriously

traumatized children, and is assessing the respondent’s

state of rehabilitation with reference to those needs.

Additionally, the court twice indicates its belief that

the best evidence of those needs is an examination of

the children’s course of therapy and its positive results,

including the roles of their therapists and caregivers.

In essence, the court recognized that, whoever the children’s caregiver is, he or she necessarily must play

an important role in helping the children continue to

address and heal from their trauma.

It is within this overall framework that the trial court

made the findings that the respondent alleges are an

improper comparison of the respondent and Paula M.

Here, while the court does specifically discuss Paula

M., it does so in light of what the children’s therapists

have testified are the specific needs of the children.

The court notes generally that, ‘‘[a]s both therapists

have made clear, the children have needed a caregiver

who is calm, patient, able to set appropriate limits,

willing to participate intensively in the children’s therapy, and able to help the children with coping skills to

manage their anxiety. The children have also needed

someone who would believe their statements about the

source of their trauma.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court

is basing the level of care needed not on what Paula M.

is providing to the children, but on what the children’s

therapists have testified the children need from a caregiver. Although the court then discusses the progress

made by the children while they were living with Paula

M., we interpret that discussion as merely evidence

that supports the recommendations of the children’s

therapists as to the children’s particular needs. In short,
the improvements seen from Paula M.’s implementation

of the therapeutic recommendations proved the need

for and efficacy of the recommended approach. Importantly, the court never opined that only Paula M. could

meet the children’s needs or that Paula M. ought to

be the person to meet their needs. The court merely

explained that, when the children were in an environment that did meet their particular needs, they were

able to make extraordinary progress.

Appropriately, the trial court then began its assessment of the respondent’s ability to meet the particular

needs of the children. The respondent advocates that

the sentence beginning ‘‘[i]n contrast’’ evidences an

improper comparison of the abilities of the respondent

and those of Paula M. Reading that sentence in context,

however, we disagree. Rather, the language following

‘‘[i]n contrast’’ directly parallels the language the court

previously had used to describe generally the qualities

of a caregiver who would meet the children’s particular

needs. In establishing the children’s particular needs,

the court found that ‘‘the children have needed a caregiver who is calm, patient, able to set appropriate limits,

willing to participate intensively in the children’s therapy, and able to help the children with coping skills to

manage their anxiety . . . [and] also . . . someone

who would believe their statements about the source

of their trauma.’’ Then in evaluating the respondent,

the court found that, ‘‘[i]n contrast, [the respondent] is

volatile and prone to violence, unable to set appropriate

limits, unwilling to talk with the children’s therapists

and, therefore, unable to help them use coping skills

to manage their anxiety and ultimately, unwilling to

believe the children’s statements regarding the trauma.’’

It is clear that the contrast drawn by the court is

between the qualities of a caregiver who meets the

particular needs of the children, as described by the

children’s therapists, and those of the respondent.

Most importantly, after comparing the needs of the

children with the abilities of the respondent, the trial

court found that the respondent ‘‘has none of the qualities the children have required to stabilize and to continue to heal from the traumas they experienced while

in their parents’ care.’’ (Emphasis added.) Quite simply,

the court found that the respondent did not have the

minimum ability to meet her children’s particular needs

and refused to even acknowledge what those needs

were. While we are sensitive to the risks of a court

comparing the abilities of a natural parent who can

meet the basic needs of her children with the abilities

of a foster parent who is more capable of meeting those

needs and then making an adjudicatory determination

based on who can better meet the needs of the particular

children, those risks do not materialize when a court

has found that a respondent has failed to achieve any

level of rehabilitation and has none of the qualities

necessary to meet the needs of the particular children.10
Therefore, because the trial court found that the

respondent had none of the qualities necessary to meet

her children’s needs, we conclude that the court did

not improperly compare the abilities of the respondent

and Paula M. in making its finding during the adjudicatory phase that the respondent failed to achieve a reasonable degree of rehabilitation.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion PALMER, EVELEIGH and ESPINOSA,

Js., concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of

this court consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Palmer, Zarella,

Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson. Although Chief Justice Rogers

was not present when the case was argued before the court, she has read

the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument

prior to participating in this decision.

*** August 12, 2016, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 We granted the respondent’s petition for certification to appeal limited

to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the

trial court’s comparison between the [respondent’s] ability to parent and

[Paula M.’s] abilities to parent did not improperly factor into the court’s

determination that the [respondent] had failed to rehabilitate?’’ In re James

O., 319 Conn. 956, 125 A.3d 533 (2015). Because the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court did not make such a comparison, the issue before

this court, more accurately rephrased, is whether the trial court made an

improper comparison between the respondent and Paula M. during the

adjudicatory phase of its decision. See State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173,

184, 989 A.2d 1048 (2010) (court may reframe certified question to more

accurately reflect issue).

2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s father,

James O., Sr. The respondent father has not appealed from that judgment.

We refer to the mother as the respondent in this opinion.

3 General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part:

‘‘The Superior Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a716 and 45a-717, may grant a petition [terminating parental rights] if it finds

by clear and convincing evidence that . . . (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has

been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been

neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . (ii) . . . and the parent

of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return

of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to

achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief

that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child,

such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child

. . . .’’

Section 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) was amended in 2015. See Public Acts 2015,

No. 15-159, § 1. For purposes of clarity, we refer to the 2013 revision of the

statute, which was in effect at the time of the relevant proceedings.

4 The respondent also raised two additional grounds for reversal: (1) that

the trial court improperly concluded that the petitioner proved by clear and

convincing evidence that the department had made reasonable efforts to

reunify the respondent and the children; and (2) that the trial court abused

its discretion in admitting into evidence two statements made by the children.

The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with respect

to the first additional ground and declined to review the second ground as

it was inadequately briefed. See In re James O., supra, 160 Conn. App. 525,

526. The respondent did not seek certification of these issues to this court.

5 Practice Book § 35a-7 (b) provides: ‘‘In the discretion of the judicial

authority, evidence on adjudication and disposition may be heard in a nonbifurcated hearing, provided disposition may not be considered until the adjudicatory phase has concluded.’’
6 The respondent also claims that the comparison of the parenting skills

of the respondent and Paula M. violated her due process rights and was

plain error, both requiring reversal. Because both claims rely on a determination that the trial court improperly compared the respondent and Paula M.,

and we conclude that no such comparison was made, we do not reach these

additional claims.

7 We note that in the present case, the respondent did not seek an articulation of the trial court’s memorandum of decision. In the absence of an

articulation, ‘‘[w]e read an ambiguous trial court record so as to support,

rather than contradict, its judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Jason R., 306 Conn. 438, 453, 51 A.3d 334 (2012). The concurring

justices acknowledge that certain of the trial court’s findings are susceptible

to varying interpretations, yet construe them as undermining the judgment,

contrary to this tenet.

8 We note that, while not all foster parents are proposed adoptive parents,

the consideration of the relative merits of a foster parent or an adoptive

parent raises similar issues. See In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10718),

188 Conn. 259, 261–62, 449 A.2d 165 (1982) (foster parents do not have

standing to intervene in proceeding on termination of parental rights of

natural parents).

9

In finding that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify

the respondent and the children, the trial court also emphasized that ‘‘both

parents have seriously discounted and/or not acknowledged the extent to

which domestic violence and substance abuse have been a significant source

of trauma to their children. Having focused exclusively on the allegations

of sexual abuse, the parents have failed to acknowledge the degree to which

their children presented with profoundly disturbing behaviors, which has

not been credibly disputed. Despite opportunities to talk to her children’s

therapists, [the respondent] has refused to do so and thus has actively chosen

to ignore her children’s problems and how their needs can be addressed.’’

10 In light of this circumstance, we disagree with the reasoning of the

concurrence that the trial court engaged in an impropriety, albeit a harmless

one. In short, because the respondent, considered in isolation, had completely failed to reach the level of rehabilitation necessary to reunite her

with her children, there simply was no practical reason for the court to

engage in a comparison between her and Paula M., as the respondent was

not going to regain custody regardless of their relative merits as parents.

Stated otherwise, because the respondent herself clearly had failed to rehabilitate, the court did not, in violation of our jurisprudence, ‘‘compare unfavorably the material advantages of the [children’s] natural parents with

those of prospective adoptive parents and therefore . . . reach a result

based on such comparisons rather than on the statutory criteria.’’ (Emphasis added.) In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), supra, 177 Conn. 672–73.