UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WALTER G. FINCH, Esquire,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, JOHNS HOPKINS

No. 96-2016

UNIVERSITY; JOHNS HOPKINS

UNIVERSITY, a Maryland

Corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Benson E. Legg, District Judge.

(CA-95-2751-L)

Submitted: December 19, 1996

Decided: January 3, 1997

Before ERVIN and MOTZ,* Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,

Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Walter G. Finch, THE LAW OFFICES OF WALTER G. FINCH,

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*Judge Motz did not participate in consideration of this case. The

opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
ESQUIRE, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Estelle A. Fishbein,

Frederick G. Savage, Eileen S. Goldgeier, THE JOHNS HOPKINS

UNIVERSITY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Walter Finch appeals the district court's order granting summary

judgment in favor of Johns Hopkins University and the Board of

Trustees [hereinafter Johns Hopkins or Hopkins] in this action for an

alleged violation of Finch's civil rights and pendent state law claims.

We affirm the order of the district court.

Walter Finch attended Johns Hopkins University School of Engineering as a graduate student in 1940. Finch submitted a draft of his

dissertation to Professor A.G. Christie, his doctoral advisor. In 1946,

Christie and other academic reviewers unanimously rejected the thesis

as unsuitable for a doctorate degree. Finch then sought the opinions

of other experts in the field who determined that his thesis presented

new information and made a valuable contribution to its field, thereby

rising to doctoral status.

After Finch revised his paper, Christie submitted it to a new member of the Johns Hopkins Mechanical Engineering staff who was an

authority on the plastic flow of metals. Again, it was determined that

Finch's dissertation did not meet the standards for a doctorate degree.

With the advice of Christie, Finch accepted a Master's Degree of

Engineering from Hopkins in 1950.

In 1993 Finch requested and received a copy of his student file. In

his file, Finch found a letter dated May 13, 1950, from Christie to the

School of Engineering stating that Finch's paper met the requirements

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for a master's degree. In the letter, Christie described Finch's research

topic as a "new and unexplained phenomena." Finch filed a 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (1994)* action against Johns Hopkins University and its Board

of Trustees, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and breach of contract.

Hopkins filed a motion for summary judgment, which Finch

opposed. The district court granted summary judgment for Hopkins,

finding that Finch's claims were barred by the statute of limitations,

or in the alternative, failed to state a claim upon which relief could

be granted. Finch appealed.

A three year limitation period applies to Finch's§ 1983 and breach

of contract claims. Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc.§ 5-101 (1995);

see Grattan v. Burnett, 710 F.2d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468

U.S. 42 (1984). For a § 1983 action, the time of accrual is when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury. Cox v. Stanton,

529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975). In a breach of contract action, the

limitations period generally accrues from the date of the alleged

breach. Tolbard v. Bechtel Corp., 632 F. Supp. 12, 13 (D. Md. 1986).

A review of the record reveals that in 1950 Finch knew of all the

relevant facts necessary to file the instant action for violations of his

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and breach of contract. In

1946 Hopkins rejected his thesis as unsuitable for doctorate degree.

Believing that his dissertation was worthy of a doctoral degree, Finch

sought and obtained the opinion of independent experts that his

research represented a new contribution to his field. In 1948, despite

the alleged merits of his work, Hopkins again rejected his dissertation

as not meeting doctoral standards. Finch accepted a master's degree

rather than a doctorate degree for his work in 1950. At this point, a

reasonable plaintiff would have believed himself harmed and would

have been aware of a breach.

Finch attempts to circumvent the accrual of limitations in 1950 by

couching his claims in terms of fraud. Finch contends that Christie

perpetrated a fraud upon him by wrongfully representing to him that

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*Finch filed his claims pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) which the

district court treated as arising under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 (1994).

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his work did not merit a doctorate degree. Thus, he contends that his

claims did not accrue until October 1993, when he discovered the

fraud by reading Christie's letter in his student file. Where fraud prevents a party from discovering the injury, the cause of action accrues

when the party discovered, or by exercising due diligence should have

discovered the fraud. O'Hara v. Kovens, 503 A.2d 1313, 1317 (Md.

1986); see Cox, 529 F.2d at 50. Finch's assertion, however, is

unavailing. There is no evidence that Hopkins prevented Finch from

examining his student record in 1950. A reasonable plaintiff would

have examined his student file and discovered the letter at the time

of injury. Thus, even if Christie's letter evidences a fraud, the letter

should have been discovered in 1950, so the fraud exception does not

apply. We therefore affirm the district court's order granting summary

judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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