___________ No. 95-4048

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Winston Thomas, formerly known * as Michael S. Diaz, * * Appellant. *

__________ Submitted: April 8, 1996 Filed: May 10, 1996

__________ Before MAGILL, HENLEY, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Winston Thomas appeals the district court's determination tha t evidence seized from a passenger in his car could be used against him at trial. Because Thomas voluntarily consented to the search, we affirm.

I.
On Decemb er 10, 1993, driver Thomas, passenger Galinda Edwards, and a backseat passenger were traveling on Interstate 80 in Nebraska in a rental car driven by Thomas when officer James B rady of the Nebraska State Patrol pulled them over for speeding. After inspecting Thomas's license and car rental agreement, Brady issued Thomas a speeding citation.

### -2- During the stop, officer Brady noticed that there was a 2700- mil e difference between the car's checkout mileage and the present mileage on the odometer. Because Thomas was only 400 miles from Denver, where h e rented the car, Brady became suspicious that Thomas was transporting drugs
. Brady req uested that Thomas accompany him back to the police car. Onc e there, Brady asked Th omas if he could search the car. He provided Thomas witha consent-to-search form. At this point, Officer Brady cautione d Thomas th at he need not consent to the search. Thomas nevertheles s reviewed and signed the consent form.
After s earching the car, officer Brady performed a pat down of th e two passengers. Neither possessed any weapons, but a search of Edward s revealed that she was carrying brown paper bags containing cocaine. A t this point, all three passengers were placed under arrest and the car was impounded.
Thomas was charged with possession with intent to distribute mor e than fifty grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Prior to t rial, Thomas moved to suppress any evidence seized from hi s vehicle and from the person of Edwards on the grounds that officer Brady lacked an articulable and reasonable suspicion t o justify the detention of Thomas following the identification procedure, vitiating the consent t o search. The magis trate judge recommended suppression of any evidence seized fromthe vehicle or from Thomas's person. However, the magistrate judge concluded that Thomas lacked standing to challenge the search of Edwards, and t hus he recommended that the cocaine seized from Edwards should b e admitted at trial.
The dis trict court adopted the recommendation. Thomas the n conditionally pled guilty to the indictment, res erving the right to appeal the partial denial of his suppression motion. He was sentenced to 32 4 months imprisonment. Thomas appeals.

### -3- II.

We assume without deciding that Thomas would have standing t o challenge the evidence seized from Edwards as fruits of his illega l detention. However, the evidence may still be admissible if Thoma s voluntarily consented to the search.
The district court determined that Thomas's consent to search wa s involuntary. Because this conclusion was based solely on the fact that th e consent followed an i llegal detention, and because the district court did not take into account subsequent events that demonstrate that the consent was freely given, we conclude that the district court's finding is clearly erroneous. See United States v. White , 42 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review).
Th e present case is controlled by this Court's opinion in Unite d States v. Ramos , 42 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct . 2015 (1 995). In Ramos , following an illegal detention, the defendan t consent ed to a search of his car. Before consenting, Ramos wa s specifically made aware of his right to refuse t o consent. Based on these facts, the panel concluded that the voluntary consent rendered the evidenc e seized admissible. Id. at 1164.
The Ramos court noted that the fact of an illegal detention is only the start, and not th e end, of the Fourth Amendment analysis. Even given the illeg al detention, a court must still decide if the consent wa s nevertheless "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint. " Id. (qu oting Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)). Th e court went on to conc lude that the consent given was "sufficiently an act of free will":
The officer told [the defendant], both orally and in writing, that he did not have to sign the consent form. Such a warning is not required by law, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218 (1973), and so the fact that the

### -4- officer gave it indicates rather strongly to us tha t he was not att empting to exploit an illegal situation. The arrest an d con sent were close in time, and there were no intervenin g circumstances, but the officer's conduct was in goo d faith, and the violation of Terrywas not flagrant. What happened here, really, went beyond voluntary consent. It was an affirmative waiver of [the defendant's] Fourth Amendment right to prevent a search of his vehicle.
Id. In the present case, Thomas was spec ifically made aware of his right to refuse consent. As in Ramos , this "indicates rather strongly to us tha t [the officer] was not attempting to exploit an illegal situation." Id
. Further, the officer in this case had some suspicion that criminal activit y was afoot, and the violation of Terry was not flagrant. Based on these tw o factors, we hold that "signing the consent form was sufficiently an act of free wil l [by Thomas] to purge the taint of the preceding illega l detention." Id. Therefore, the consent was voluntary and the evidenc e discovered during the search was admissible.

III. Thomas voluntarily consented to the search, rendering admissible the evidence seized from the person of Edwards. Accordingly, we affirm th e decision of the district court on alternate grounds.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.