### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Se pte m be r 14, 200 4 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CU RTIS TA TE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 01-02543 Jam es C. Beasley, Jr ., Judge

No. W2003-00217-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled April 22, 2005

The appellant, Curtis Tate, was c onvicted by a jury in the Shelby

CountyCriminal Court of second deg ree murder. F ollowing a hearing, the trial cou rt s entenced the a ppellant to twenty

y ear s incar cer ation in the Tenne ssee De partment of Correc tion. On appea l, the appellant contends that (1) “[p] lain err or exists in the rec ord in that the two material and cr ucial witnesse s we re n o t called at trial”; (2) the trial court’s instructions to the jury wer e incomplete and misleading ; ( 3) the trial court
err ed by inst ru ct i n g t he jury

on flig ht; (4) the evide nce w as insufficie nt to sustain the appellant’s conviction; and (5) the sentenc e imposed by the trial court w as excessive. Upon re view of the rec ord
a ndthe pa

rt ie s’ br ie fs , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the op i n i o n o f the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., joined.

Jame s O. Ma

rt y (o n app e a l) a nd Ste ve n M. Te mpl e (at tr ia l) , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Curtis Tate.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Ra c he l E . Wil lis , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Linda Kirklen a nd P au l Hage rman, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

The instan t ca s e arises from the shooting death of the victim, Stephen Ward. At approximately

11:00 p.m. on November 8, 2000, the victim’s brother, Micha el Ward, wa s awakened by the victim as he a

rrived home from wor

k. The victim ran into the house , scre aming that Artavius Thompson had attempted to for ce his ve hicle off the roa d. Seconds later , Thompson arrive d at the Wards’ house and parke d his “light-c olored” Toy ota in the drivew ay . The victim and Micha el ra nB ecause t he vi ct i m and hi s b rother shar e t he same l ast nam e, we have el ect ed t o ref er t o Stephen W ard as “ t he 1

v ic tim ” a n d M ic h a e l W a rd a s “M ic h a e l.”
-2- to the front door a nd looked out. Michae l observed f our individuals, including Thompson, in the 1 vehicle. The other individuals we re later identified as Ter rell McGa

ug hy , Shaquita Clemons, and the appellant. As the victim r an outside to c onfront Thompson, Mic hael returne d to his room to put on his shoes. Michael he ard the victim and Thompson arg uing. T here afte r, a f ight e nsued.
When Michael finished putting on his shoes, he ra n outside. McGaug hy g ot out of the passeng er side of the vehicle and confr onted Michae l. After the men “ha d a fe w words,” McGaug hy ran to the driver’s s ide of the ve hicle and dr ove the c ar onto the stre et. He the n g ot out of the ca r and approa ched Michael, who was standing in the s tree t. McGaug hy attempted to strike Michae l, and the tw o me n b e g a n f

ig hti ng

. Whe n the vic tim ob se rv e d M ic ha e l a ndMc Gaug hy fi g hti ng , h e ra n to assist Michael. The victim chase d McGaug hy around the front of Thompson’s vehicle, a nd Michae l
ra n to w ar d s th e r e ar o f th e v e h ic le

. Wh e n M c G a u g h y r e a c h e d th e p a s s e n g e r d o o r , h e opene d the door and “ d[o] ve into the ca r.” A s the victim attempted to g rab Mc Gaug hy , the appe llant, who was sitti ng in the backse at, s aid, “Hey , man, y ou g ot my friend f ***ed up.” T he appe llant was re fer ring to Thompson, who, as a re sult of the fi gh t , wa s l y i n g in the street. The appellant then shot the vic tim

.
Ac c or din g to Mic ha e l, he a ndthe vic tim we rekn oc ke d to the g ro un d b y the sh otg un bla st. As Michae l stood up, he s aw t h e victim g rab his che st and fall to his knees. Micha el g rabbe d the victim and drag g ed him towards the house

. When they rea ched the driveway , the victim pushed Michae l a way and fell to the g round. Michae l r an into the house a nd retrie ved his .380 ca liber pistol from underneath his bed. When he returne d, Thompson was g etting into his vehicle and driving
awa y . Michae l fired thre e shot s at the vehic le and then r an to the victim and held him as he died. After the victim died, Michae l ran be hind the house and thre w his pistol over the fenc e.
At tr ia l, M ic ha e l’ s g ir lf

ri e nd , L a c y Jac ks on , te sti fi e d that on the nig ht o f the ins ta nt o ff e ns e she wa s spending the nig ht with Michael. She hea rd the victim outside arg uing w ith T h o mpson. Acc or d in g to Ja c k s o n , th e v ic ti m a s k e d T h o mp s o n , “ [W] h y y o u try to ru n me o f f th e roa d.” Thompson denied that he attempted to force the vi ctim from the roa d. There afte r, Jackson looked out the front door. Thompson’s vehicle was parked in the driveway , and the victim and Thompson
wer e fig hting in the y ard. Jackson went upstairs to wake the victim’s mother, Caroly n Ward. When J ackson c ame ba ck downstairs, Thompson’s ve hicle wa s parke d in the street. Micha el was standing in the street, a nd the victim and Thompson wer e fighting

. Suddenly , J ackson heard a g unshot and
saw a “fla sh” from the backse at of Thompson’s ve hicle. Micha el and the vic tim fell to the gr ound. They then stood and ran towards the house befor e ag ain falling to the g round. Michae l shoute d that the vic tim

ha d b e e n s ho t. A s Jac ks on te le ph on e d 9 11 , s he he ardthr e e mor e g un sh ots

. The victim’s mother , Ms. Ca roly n Ward, testified at trial that on the night of th e i n s tant offe nse she wa s awakened by J ackson w ho was upset be cause “some g uy s had come to the house.” Ms. War d f

oll ow e d Jac ks on do wn sta ir s. Mi c ha e l pu t on a pa ir of sh orts a ndwe nt o uts ide . M s.-3-

W a r d l o o k e d o u tt h e f

r o n t d o o r a n d o b s e r v e d T h o m p s o n ’ s v e h i c l e p ark e d i n t h e d r i v e w a y. N e ar b y, Thompson and the victim we re fig hting. Ms. War d shouted at the victim a nd Michae l to come inside the house. There afte r, she made sever al unsucce ssful attempts to te lephone 911. After one s uch attemp t, M s

. Wa

r d h e ar d a

g u n s h o t a n d r a n to th e f

r o n t d o o r

. Sh e o b s e r v e d M ic h a e l “ somewhat
c arry ing ” the vic tim

to the ho us e , s ho ut ing , “ [Yo u] di dn ’t ha ve to s ho ot h im. ” Ms. War d w e nt t o the back bedroom and telephoned 911. She then heard several more g unshots. W hen she r eturne d to the front door, the victim, who had bee n shot, was ly ing in Micha el’s arms. He died a t the scene

. At trial, Randy

Booke r testified that on Nove mber 9, 200 0 , McGaug hey and thre e other i n d i v i d u al s ca m e t o h i s ap ar t m en tan d as k ed h i mt o h i d e as aw ed -o ff s h o t gu n u n t i l t h e n ex tm o rn i n g. B oo ke r a g re e d a ndpla c e d th e sh otg un un de r h is m a ttr e ss. Ho mic ide of fi c e rs su bs e qu e ntl y

c a me to his apartment a nd retrie ved the we apon.
Offic ers discove red Micha el’s .380 ca liber pistol near the fenc e behind t h e W ards’ house. The pistol had two live rounds in the ca rtridg e. Serg eant T.J. Hel ldorfer of the Memphis Police Depa rtment testified at trial that during his investig ati on he intervie wed Thompson. Thompson dir e c te d o f

f i c e r s t o B o o k e r ’ s ap ar t m e n tw h e r e t h e m u r d e r w e ap o n w a s l o c a t e d

. T h o m p s o n a lso provided direc tions to the Autumn Woods Apartments w here the appellant’ s fathe r l i v ed

. W h en o f f i c e r s arr i v e d a tt h e ap ar t m e n t , t h e ap p e l l a n ta n s w e r e d t h e d o o r a n d w a s t ak e n i n t o c u s t o d y.

Ba sed upon the for eg oing e vidence , the jury convicted the appellant

o f s e c o n d d e g r e e mu r der. Following a sente ncing hearing, the trial court sentenc ed the a ppellant to twenty

y ear s incarc eration. The a ppellant now bring s this appea l, arg uing that (1) “[p] lain err or ex ists in the record in that the two materia l and cr

ucial witnesses w ere not called at trial”; (2) the trial court’ s instruction s to the jury wer e incomplete a nd misleading ; (3) the tria l court er red by instructing the jury o n fl i g ht; (4) the evidenc e wa s insufficient to sustain the appellant’ s conviction; and (5) the sentenc e imposed by the trial court was excessive.

II. Ana lys is

A. Fa ilure to Call Wi tnesses

As his f irst issue, the appellant a sserts that “tria l counsel had a vailable at trial two material witnesses, Shaquita Clemmons and Artavius Thompson, both of whom we re pr esent in the c ar w hen the sh oo tin g oc c ur

re d. F urthe r, the app e lla nt as se rt s tha t nei the r we re c a lle d a t tria l.” Ho we ve r, thi s issue was not ra ised in the appe lla n t ’s m o t i o n fo r new trial. Acc ording ly , the issue is waived on appea l. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e ); State v. Ray , 880 S.W .2d 700, 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.
Ne ve rthe le ss, the app e lla nt c on te nd s tha t this co urt sh ou ld a dd re ss h is c la im u nd e r the pla in
e rr or do c tr ine . T e nn e sse e Rul e of Cr imi nal Pro c e du re 52 (b ) p ro vid e s th a t th is c ou rt ma y a dd re ss “[a]n error w hich has a ffe cted the substantial rights of a n acc used

. . . at any time, even thoug h not raised in the motion for a new tria l . . . w here nece ssary to do substantial just ice.” See also Te nn.T he appel l ant ’ s en t i r e a r gu ment i s as fol l ows: “ B as ed upon proof at t r i al and t he Sent enc i ng H ear i ng , coun s el 2

w o u ld a rg u e the issu e o f sufficie n c y o f t h e e v id e n c e un d e r th e P la in E rr o r D o c trine in a ssig n m e n t # 1 .”
-4- R. Evid. 103(d). We ma y only consider a n issue as plain er ror whe n all five of the following fac tors
are me t:
(a ) the re c or d mu st c le arl y e sta bli sh wh a t oc c ur

re d in the tr ia l c ou rt ; (b) a clea r and une quivocal rule of law must have been br eac hed; (c ) a substantial rig ht of t he ac cused must have been a dverse ly aff ecte d; (d) the a ccuse d did not waive the issue f or tac tic al re as o n s; and (e) consideration of the err or is “nec essary to do substantial just ice.”

Sta te v. Ad kis so n, 89 9 S. W.2 d 62 6, 64 1- 42 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ) (f oo tno te s o mit te d) ; se e a lso Sta te v. Smith, 24 S.W. 3d27 4, 28 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) (a do pti ng the Ad kis so n tes t for de te rm ini ng pla in
err or). Furthermore , the “‘“ plain err or” must be of such a g reat ma g nitude that it probably chang ed the outcome of

the trial.’” Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642 (quoting United States v. Ker ley , 838 F.2d 932, 937 (7 Cir. 1988)). B ased upon the record before us, we cannot conclude t hat the appe llant

th satisfied the test for

revie w as plain e rror

.
I n the instant case , the appellant reta ined substitut e counsel for the purposes of

appea l after learning that trial counsel had be en suspende d from the pr actice of l aw

. T h e ap pellant ra ised the iss ue re g ard ing the wi tne sse s’ te sti mon y fo r the fi rs t time on dir e c t app e a l. B e c a us e the iss ue wo uld be be tte r a dd re sse d in a

po st- c on vic tio n p ro cee din g wh e re the app e lla nt w ill ha ve the op po rtun ity to a rg ue the me ri ts o f h is c la im at a n e vid e nti ary he ari ng, wede c lin e to r e vie w this iss ue a s p la in
err o r

. Se e St a te v

. B o b b y Jo e Se a y , N o

. 0 1 C0 1

- 9 3 0 2

- CR

- 0 0 0 5 9 , 1 9 9 3 WL 5 0 3 7 0 2 , a t * 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, De c. 9, 1993).
B. Jury I nstructions

As his s e c o n d a n d th ir d is s u e s , th e ap p e ll a n t c h a ll e n g e s th e c o rr e c tn e s s o f th e tria l court’s jury instructions. Specifically , the appe llant contends that the trial court’s “ instructions were incomplete, misleading and conf using to the jury .” Additionally , the appe llant claims that the trial
c ou rt e rr e d in g ivi ng the jury

a n in str uc tio n on fli g ht. Ho we ve r, the app e lla nt a g a in f a ile d to ra ise the se iss ue s in his mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l. A c c or din g ly , th e se iss ue s a re lik e wi se waive d o n a

pp e a l. See Te nn. R. App. P. 3(e); Ray , 880 S.W .2d at 705.
C. Sufficiency

of the Evidenc e
The a ppellant next conte nds that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to sustain his conviction of second de g ree murder. When an appellant challeng es t he sufficiency of the c onvicting e vidence , 2 the sta nd ardfo r r e vie w b y a n ap pe llate c ou rt is “w he the r, a ft e r vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t favor able to the prosec ution, any rational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt.” J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2789-5-

(1979); Te nn. R. App. P. 13(e)

. The S tate is entitled to the s trong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e and all re asonable or leg itimate inf ere nces which may be draw n there from. State v. Cabba g e, 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions conce rning the cr edibilityof witnesses a nd the weig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, a s well as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the evidenc e, ar e re solved by the trier of

fac t. I d. This court will not rewe i gh or re evaluate the evide nce. State v. G rac e, 493 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973) . Be cause a jury conviction re moves the pre sumption of innocence with which a de fenda nt i s initiallycloake d at trial and r eplac es it on appea l with one of g uilt, a
c on vic te d d e fe nd a nt h a s th e bu rd e n o f d e mon str a tin g to thi s c ou rt that th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt. State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).
Second deg ree murder is de fined a s “[a] knowing killing of a nother.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-210(a )(1) (1997). “A person acts knowing ly with r espec t to a result of the pe rson’s conduc t when the per son is awar e that the c onduct is rea sonably certain to cause the result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302( b) (1997)

. Viewe d in the light most favor able to the State, the e vidence at trial re veale d that on the nig ht of the instant offe ns e, t he appe llant rode to the victim’s house with Thompson, McGa ug hy , and Clemons. When the y arrived at the victim’s house , the victim c ame outside to confront Thompson, asking Thompson w hy he attempted to f orce his ve hicle off the road. Thomps o n d en i ed t he alleg ation, and the two men be g an fig hting. Therea fter, Mic hael we nt outside and was c onfronted by McGaug hy . When the victim observed the a ltercation between Mic hael a nd McGaug hy , he we nt to assist Michael, leaving Thompson ly ing on the street. The victim and Michae l chase d McGaug hey around Thompson’s vehicle. When the victim attempted to preve nt McGaug hy from ente ring the vehicle, the appellant shot the victim with a sawe d-off shotgun. We c onclude that the evidenc e wa s sufficie nt to convict the appe llant of second de g ree murder.

D. Sentence
When an appe llant challeng es the leng th, rang e, or ma nner of service of a se ntence , it is t he duty of this court to conduc t a de novo revie w with a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations made by the trial court a

re corr ect. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d) ( 2003). Howe ver, this pre sumption of cor rec tness is “conditioned upon the a ffirma tive showing in th e rec ord that the trial c ourt considere d the sentenc ing principles and all rele vant fac ts a nd circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). I f the rec ord demonstrates that the trial court failed to consider the
se nte nc ing pr inc ipl e s a ndthe re le va nt f a c ts a ndc ir c ums ta nc e s, re vie w o f the se nte nc e wi ll b e pu re ly de novo. I d.

I n conducting our review, thi s court must consider ( 1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived a t trial and at the se ntencing hearing; ( 2) th e p re s en tence report; (3) the princ iples of sentenc ing a nd the arg uments of counse l r elative to the sentenc ing a lternatives; (4) the nature and cha rac teristics of the of fe ns e s; ( 5) a ny mit ig a tin g or e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s; (6 ) an y state me nts ma de by the app e lla nt on h is own beha lf; and (7) the appe llant’s potential for rehabilitation or t reatment. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102, - 103, -210 (2003) ; se e also Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 168. The burden is on the a ppellant-6-

to show that the sentenc e is improper. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401, Sentenc ing Commission Com me nts

.
T h e a p p el l an twa s s en t en ce d as a R an ge I st an d ar d o ff en d er , fo r wh i ch t h e a p p l i ca b l e r an ge for a Class A felony

is fifteen to twe nty -five y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( a)( 1) (2003)

. The pre sumptive sentence for a Class A felony

is the m idpoint within the applica ble ra ng e if ther e are no enhanc ement or mitigating fac tors. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). I f the trial c ourt finds that such fa ctors do exis t , t h e co u rt must start at the presumptive sente nce, e nhance the sentenc e within the ra ng e as appropria te for the enhanceme nt fac tors, and then reduc e the se ntence within the rang e as a

ppropriate for the mitig ating fac t ors. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(e)

. There is no mathematical f o rm ula for valuating f

actor s to calcula te the appr opriate se ntence . See State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “Rather , the weig ht to be aff orded an existi ng fac tor is left to the t ri al court’s discretion so long as the trial c ourt complies with the purposes a nd principles of the 1989 Sentencing Act and its findings are adequately supported by

the
rec ord.” I d. at 475-76.

I n s e nte nc ing the app e lla nt, the tr ia l c ou rt app lie d th e fo llo wi ng e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s: (7 ) T he pe rs on a l in

jury inf lic te d u po n .

. . the vic tim wa s p art ic ula

rl y g re a t;
(10) The defe ndant possessed or employ ed a firea rm, ex p losive device or other deadly

wea pon during the commission of the offe nse; (11) The defe ndant had no hesitation about committing a c rime whe n the risk to human life wa s high; a nd
(17) The crime w as commi tted under circumstanc es under which the po te nti a l f

or bo dil y inj ury to a vic tim wa s g re a t.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (2003). The trial court a ffor ded no we ight to enha nceme nt fac tors (7) and (11) , finding that these fa ctors wer e inhere nt in the offe nse of sec ond deg ree murder. T he trial
court a f f o r d e d s o me w e ig h t to e n h a n c e me n t f a c to r ( 1 7 ) , f

in d in g , “ [U ]n d e r th e c ir c u ms ta n c es and close qua rters inside an automobile occupie d by either three or four people, wit h two people standing immediately

adjac ent, the firing of a shotg un, the potential for bodily injury to a victim other than the intended victim is g re at .” F inally , the trial court affor ded g reat weig ht to enhance ment fac tor (10), f inding that “ [t ]here’s just no justification . . . for possessing or ca rrying around a

sawe d-off shotgun.”

Th e re a ft e r, the tr ia l c ou rt app lie d th e fo llo wi ng mit ig a tin g fa c tor s: (2) The defe ndant ac ted under strong provocation;-7- (6) The defe ndant, bec ause of y outh or ol d age , lacke d substantial judgme nt in committ ing the offe nse; and
(11) The def

en d ant, although g uiltyof the c rime, committed the of fe ns e un de r s uc h u nusu al cir c ums ta nc e s th a t it is u nli ke ly

that a
su sta ine d in te nt t o v iol a te the la w m oti va te d th e c ri min a l c on du c t.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113 (2003) . Ba sed upon these f indings, the tria l co u rt s entenc ed the appellant to the pr esumptive minimum sentenc e of twe nty y ear s incarc eration, stating, “I don’t find that the mitigating fac tors are sufficie nt to outweigh the enhanc ing f actor s to reduce [t he sente nce] into the lower e nd rang e. And I don’t find that the enha nceme nt fac tors ou t we i gh t h e mi tigating fac tors sufficie nt to increa se it into the upper ra ng e.”
On appe al, the appe llant contends that t h e t ri al court should have aff orded the mitigating fac tors g reater we ight and reduc ed his se ntence to fifteen y ear s, the minimum within the rang e. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(a )(1) . Howeve r, as pr eviousl y s t at ed , t h e weight to be a ffor ded a fac tor is left to the t ri al co u rt ’s di scre tion as long a s the trial court complied with the sentenc ing principles and its findings are adequately supported by

the re cord. See Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d at 475- 76 . We fi ndno e rr or

in the tr ia l c ou rt ’s app lic a tio n o f m iti g a tin g fa c tor s.
Whil e the app e lla nt d oe s n ot ch a lle ng e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s app lic a tio n o f e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s, up on de no vo re vie w w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt mis app lie d c e rt a in e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s. Mo re ov e r, pr ior

to o ur re vie w o n app e a l, the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt re le a se d it s d e c isi on in B lake ly v. Was hin g ton , 5 42 U. S. _ _, 12 4 S. Ct. 25 31 (2 00 4) . T his c ou rt ha s r e c og nize d th a t B lake ly “ca lls int o question the continuing validity of our c urre nt sentencin g scheme .” State v. Jul ius E. Smit h, No. E2003-01059- CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1606998, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knox ville, Ju ly 1 9 , 2 0 0 4); see al s o St a te v

. M ic h a e l W a y n e Po e , N o

. E 2 0 0 3

- 0 0 4 1 7

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 4 WL 16 07 00 2, a t *9 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. a t Kn oxvil le , July 19 , 20 04 ). I n B lake ly , 5 42 U. S. at __ , 1 24 S. Ct. at 2537 (citations omitt ed), the Supreme Court held that

the “statutory

maxi mum” for Apprendi [v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 1 2 0 S

. C t

. 2 3 4 8 (2 0 0 0 )] p u rp o s es i s t h e m ax i m u ms e n t en ce a j u d ge may impose so le ly on th e ba sis of t he fac ts re

fle c te d in the jur

y v e r d ic t o r a d

m it te d by th e defendant . I n other wor ds, the rele vant “statut o ry m axim um” is not the max imum sentence a judge may impose after

finding additional fac ts, but the m ax imum he may imp o se without

a ny a dd iti on a l f

ind ing s. Whe n a

jud g e inf

lic ts punishment that the jury ’s verdic t a lone does not a llow, the jury has not found all the fa cts “whic h the l aw makes e ssential to the p u n i s h m e n t , ” a n d t h e j u d g e e x c e e d s h i s p r o p e r a u t h o r i t y. First, we will a ddress the trial court’s application of enhanc ement fac tors (7) an d (17). Ag ain, we note that enhanc ement factor (7) relates t o g reat bodily injury . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35--8-

114 (7). Enhance ment fac tor (17) provides that a sentence may be enhance d when “[t ]he crime wa s committed under c ircumstance s under which the pot ential for bodily injury to a victim was g reat.” I d. a t ( 17 ). Pr e vio us ly , th is c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t bo th o f the se e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s a re inh e re nt i n the offe nse of second deg ree murder. State v. J ames J ohnson, No. W 2003-02009-CCA-R3-CD, 20 04 WL 23 78 25 6, a t *13 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. a t Jac ks on , O c t. 2 0, 20 04 ); Sta te v. Mic ha e l Sc ott Br og an, No. E2001- 00712-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1723702, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J uly 25, 2002).

Moreove r, we note that the trial c ourt applied e nhance ment fac tor (17) based upon i ts finding that “th e potential for

bodily injury to a victim other than the intende d victim [ was] gr eat.” Ho we ve r, e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor (1 7) ma y no t be app lie d to e nh a nc e a se nte nc e wh e re a de fe nd a nt i s co n victed of c ommitt ing a n offe nse ag ainst a spec ific, name d victim. St ate v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 69 8, 70 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 2)

. “Th ere is no thi ng in the statut ory la ng ua g e of

the e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor to indicate that it applies to potential victims or that it applies simplybeca use the off

ense w as committed in the presenc e of othe r individuals.” I d. I n the instant case , the appe llant was convic ted of the sec ond deg ree murder of a spec ific, name d victim. Ac co rd i n gl y , we c onclude that the trial court improper ly

applied enha nceme nt fac tors (7) a nd (17).

Enhanc ement fa ctor (11) , the def endant ha d no hesitation about com m i tting a c rime whe n the risk to human l ife was high, may be applied w hen ther e is a risk to the life of someone other

than the victim. State v. Bing ham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Prior to Blake ly , the application of e nhance ment fac tor (11) w ould have been appropriate in the instant c ase. H oweve r, beca use the fa cts underlying the application of enhanc ement fac tor (11) wer e not r efle cted in the jury verdic t or admitted by

the appe llant, Blake ly

prec ludes its application. State v. Ambrec o Shaw, No. W2003-02822-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL2191044, at *9 (T en n

. Crim. App. at J ackson, Sept. 28, 2004). Ne verthe less, in light of the f act that the trial court sente nced the appellant to the pr esumptive min imu m se nte nc e , th e e rr or wa s h arm le ss.

Re g ard ing e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor (1 0) , w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d n o e rr or in apply ing this fa ctor a nd aff ording the fa ctor g reat weig ht. As this court ha s previously noted, “[t] he
us e of a fi re arm is ne ith e r a n e le me nt of se c on d de g re e mur de r n or inh e re nt i n th e of

fe ns e .” Sta te v. Hampton, 24 S.W.3d 823, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Moreove r, the a ppell an t admitted at sentenc ing that he used a shotgun to kill the victim. Specifica lly , the appellant stated that whe n the victim reac hed into the ca r window a nd attempted to strike the a ppellant, the ape llant “pulled [the shotgun] up, looked over

there and shot.” Ac cording ly , the trial court’s application of e nhance ment fac tor (10) did not violate the dic tates of B lakely

. Although w e have determined that the trial court misapplied enhanc ement fa ctors (7) , (11), and (17) , this does not necessa rily lead to a r eduction in the appe llant’s sentenc e. See State v. Winfield, 23 S .W.3d 279, 284 (Tenn. 200 0 ). I n light of the g reat weig ht affor ded enha nceme nt fa c tor (1 0) by the tr ia l c ou rt , w e c on clu de th at the tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d n o e rr or

by re fu sin g to reduc e the a

ppellant’s sente nce to f

ifteen y ear s, the min i m u m in the rang e. This issue is without
me ri t.-9- III. Conclusi on

F ind ing no re ve rs ibl e e rr or , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE