NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

CASEY SCHNEIDER, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

JENNIFER PEREA, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0586 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015DO202300163

The Honorable Megan A. McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Casey Schneider, Lake Havasu City

Petitioner/Appellee

Law Offices of Heather C. Wellborn, PC, Lake Havasu City

By Heather C. Wellborn, Anita Dale, Russell Woemmel

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 5-14-2024
SCHNEIDER v. PEREA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Jennifer Perea (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s 

parenting time order. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Casey Schneider (“Father”) married in 2018 and 

have two daughters in common, born in 2018 and 2021. Mother has minor 

children from a previous marriage who are not parties to this appeal but 

were involved in some of the domestic violence allegations. Father has a 

teenage daughter from a previous relationship. Domestic violence has been 

an issue throughout Mother and Father’s relationship, with each parent 

alleging domestic violence by the other. 

¶3 In March 2016, Mother called the police saying Father—her 

boyfriend at the time—accused her of stealing his wallet, yelled profanities 

at her, and punched a large hole in the laundry room wall, waking her 

children who were sleeping in the next room. In March 2021, Father alleged 

that Mother hit him over the head with a coffee mug, splitting his head 

open. Mother explained that this was done in self-defense, after Father 

became violent. Father testified that he regularly had to fix their home 

because Mother punched holes in the drywall and pushed him into a 

mirror. 

¶4 In February 2023, as Mother prepared to leave town with the 

children for a gymnastics competition, Father prevented Mother from 

leaving by blocking the driveway, and reported her to the police. Father 

alleged Mother had bipolar disorder and was suicidal and, based on those 

allegations, Mother was involuntarily taken to a behavioral health center. 

Mother was released less than 24 hours later and, at the time of her 

discharge, the center reported she was a low risk for suicide and of being a 

danger to others. A police officer who responded to the scene later testified 

that despite Father’s report of domestic violence, they “didn’t find any 
SCHNEIDER v. PEREA

Decision of the Court

3

evidence that an assault had occurred . . . and found that [Mother] wasn’t a 

harm to herself or others.” 

¶5 A few days after that incident, Mother filed an order of 

protection against Father which the court dismissed at a contested hearing 

upon Father’s request. Around that time, Father petitioned for legal 

separation and also petitioned for an emergency temporary order and 

temporary orders on legal decision-making and parenting time. The 

superior court denied Father’s request for an emergency temporary order.

¶6 In March 2023, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)

reported that the children had “been exposed to multiple domestic violence 

incidents recently, and on an ongoing basis.” DCS also reported that Father 

“exhibit[ed] domestic violence behaviors such as controlling Mother, 

isolating her from family, being verbally aggressive, stalking Mother, [and] 

isolating [their oldest daughter] from school.”

¶7 After another contested hearing, the superior court issued an 

order of protection for Mother and her other children only, as well as 

temporary orders granting Mother sole legal decision-making and 

parenting time until the temporary orders hearing on March 22, 2023. Later 

that month, Mother asked the court to change the case from legal separation 

to dissolution.

¶8 At the March 2023 temporary orders hearing, a DCS 

investigator testified that DCS did not file for dependency because Mother 

did “her best given the circumstances to protect herself and the children” 

and persistently filed orders of protection. The investigator also testified 

she had “concerns about [Father’s] mental health and his mental stability.” 

The court permitted Father to have supervised visitation with the children 

for four hours a week. Father did not schedule any supervised visits.

¶9 The dissolution trial took place in May 2023. Father and 

Mother testified, and called several witnesses to testify about their 

parenting abilities, character, and interactions with each other and their 

children. At the end of the trial, the superior court noted: “this is going to 

be a difficult set of Orders based on how much each of you wants to be in 

your children’s life, and . . . how difficult it is going to be . . . to move 

forward without conflict.” The court also acknowledged the progress 

Mother and Father had made since prior proceedings: “this time apart has 

led to each of you appearing in court in a much more clear manner and a 

much more in control of yourself manner.” The court noted it would need 

to “give it the time it deserves” to make sure the decree “adequately 
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Decision of the Court

4

embraces what is going on in this family, protects these children, and is 

rooted in what is in these children’s best interests.” 

¶10 In its July 2023 dissolution decree, the court found that both 

parents had committed acts of domestic violence towards each other. The 

court granted Mother sole legal decision-making authority and ordered 

equal parenting time. Specifically, the court ordered that the “[p]arents 

shall exchange the children every Monday, Wednesday and Friday at 6pm 

at the [] [p]olice [d]epartment, or another mutually agreed upon location.” 

The court also ordered: “If the children attend school or a care provider, the 

exchange shall be completed by the parent picking up from the school or 

care provider to avoid contact between parents”; “[n]o communication may 

be done at exchanges”; and “[e]ach party may send a designee to the 

exchange with notice to the other parent.”

¶11 Mother moved to alter or amend the dissolution decree under 

Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“ARFLP”) 83(1)(A), arguing that 

the superior court did not properly consider or weigh all the evidence—

such as the DCS case records, Mother’s testimony, a police officer’s and 

DCS investigator’s testimonies—when it granted Father equal, 

unsupervised parenting time. The superior court denied Mother’s motion, 

finding, “no cause for amendment as the Court did consider all evidence 

and does not find error in the final orders.” 

¶12 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶13 Mother argues the superior court erred by (1) failing to 

consider all the evidence in ordering equal parenting time and (2) ordering 

the parents to exchange the children three times each week. 

¶14 Father did not file an answering brief. While failure to file an 

answering brief usually constitutes a confession of reversible error on

debatable issues, we decline to treat it as such here because the children’s 

best interests are at issue. See In re Marriage of Dieszi, 201 Ariz. 524, 525, ¶ 2 

(App. 2002).
SCHNEIDER v. PEREA

Decision of the Court

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I. The record shows the superior court considered all the admitted 

evidence in rendering its parenting time decision.

¶15 Mother argues the superior court erroneously awarded 

Father unsupervised, equal parenting time because it did not review the 

admitted evidence, such as the DCS case records, Mother’s testimony, 

Father’s violent history, mental health issues, and narcissistic behavior, and 

testimonies of the police officer and DCS case investigator. 

¶16 The superior court has the discretion to determine parenting 

time based on the evidence before it. Gonzalez-Gunter v. Gunter, 249 Ariz. 

489, 492, ¶ 11 (App. 2020). We presume the court considered all the 

admitted evidence before issuing its decision. See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 

Ariz. 51, 55–56, ¶ 18 (App. 2004). And “[w]e defer to the superior court’s 

discretionary findings and exercise of judgment regarding . . . the weighing 

of evidence.” Gutierrez v. Fox, 242 Ariz. 259, 272, ¶ 49 (App. 2017).

¶17 Within a parenting time determination, the court must 

consider all factors relevant to the children’s well-being including, but not 

limited to, “whether there has been domestic violence.” A.R.S. § 25-

403(A)(8). Here, the court considered “[w]hether there ha[d] been domestic 

violence . . . pursuant to [Section] 25-403.03” and found that both Mother 

and Father committed acts of domestic violence. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(8). 

Once the court determined that both Mother and Father committed acts of 

domestic violence, each “parent ha[d] the burden of proving to the court’s 

satisfaction that parenting time will not endanger the child[ren] or 

significantly impair the child[ren]’s emotional development.” See A.R.S. 

§ 25-403.03(F). “If the parent meets this burden to the court’s satisfaction, 

the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best protect the child 

and the other parent from further harm.” Id. 

¶18 Here, the superior court imposed two of the Section 25-

403.03(F) conditions. The court required Mother and Father to exchange 

the children in a protected setting—either at the specified police 

department or other mutually agreed upon location. See A.R.S. § 25-

403.03(F)(1). It also ordered that “the exchange shall be completed by the 

parent picking up from the school or care provider to avoid contact between 

parents[,]” and that “[n]o communication may be done at exchanges . . . .” 

See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F)(9) (The court may “[i]mpose any other condition 

that the court determines is necessary to protect the child, the other parent 

and any other family or household member.”).
SCHNEIDER v. PEREA

Decision of the Court

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¶19 At the conclusion of trial, the court acknowledged: “this is 

going to be a difficult set of Orders based on how much each of you wants 

to be in your children’s life, and . . . how difficult it is going to be . . . to 

move forward without conflict.” Also, “[a]fter significant deliberation,” the 

court issued its factual findings and rendered its parenting time decision. 

The court’s decree stated it “considered the evidence, including the 

demeanor of the witnesses, reviewed the exhibits as well as the case history, 

and considered the parties’ arguments.”

¶20 The record shows the court considered the admitted evidence 

to analyze the Section 25-403(A) best interests factors. After Mother moved 

to amend the dissolution decree—raising concern that the court did not 

properly consider or weigh all the evidence—the court responded that it 

“did consider all evidence” and found no error. To the extent Mother 

believed the decree lacked findings as to certain parts of admitted evidence, 

she could have requested specific findings of fact before filing her appeal. 

See ARFLP 82(a)(1); Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 134 (App. 1990) (“A 

litigant must object to inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law at 

the trial court level so that the court will have an opportunity to correct 

them.”). She did not do so. And Mother does not provide a basis on which 

we can conclude that the court did not consider the evidence presented. 

Thus, we see no error.

II. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the 

parents to exchange the children three times per week.

¶21 Mother also argues that because of her “volatile relationship” 

with Father, the superior court erred in ordering the parents to exchange 

the children every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, because the number 

of exchanges is not in the children’s or parties’ best interests. Mother states 

she “does not believe the Court even took the issues of domestic violence 

into consideration when determining a parenting time schedule.” 

¶22 We will affirm the superior court’s parenting time orders 

absent an abuse of discretion. Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 11 (App. 

2013). An abuse of discretion exists when the record is “devoid of 

competent evidence to support the decision.” Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 

52, ¶ 19 (App. 2009). We accept the superior court’s findings of fact unless 

they are clearly erroneous. Birnstihl v. Birnstihl, 243 Ariz. 588, 590–91, ¶ 8 

(App. 2018). The court “has discretion to determine parenting time based 

on all the evidence before it.” See Gonzalez-Gunter, 249 Ariz. at 492, ¶ 11.

“Consistent with the child[ren]’s best interests,” the statute directs the 

superior court to adopt a parenting plan that “maximizes [each parent’s] 
SCHNEIDER v. PEREA

Decision of the Court

7

respective parenting time.” A.R.S. § 25-403.02(B). In determining that plan, 

“[t]he court shall consider all factors that are relevant to the child[ren]’s 

physical and emotional well-being.” A.R.S. § 25-403(A). 

¶23 The record shows the court considered the protective order in 

its parenting time determination because it ordered the parents not to 

communicate at exchanges and that their “physical presence at exchanges 

shall not be a violation of the protective order.” And, as discussed above, 

the court considered the Section 25-403 best interests factors and imposed 

Section 25-403.03(F) conditions to protect the children and parents from 

harm. Thus, while ordering the parents to exchange the children three 

times per week may seem excessive, we cannot say the court abused its 

discretion in so ordering. 

¶24 Mother requests attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal pursuant 

to Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21, and Sections 12-342 and 

25-324(A). We deny her request. 

CONCLUSION

¶25 We affirm.