## IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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. 14-0459

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### H O U S T O N 

### B E L T 

### & T E R M IN A L 

### R A IL W A Y 

### C O


### . , B N S F R A IL W A Y 

### C O


### . , A N D 

### U N IO N 

### P A C IF IC 

### R A IL R O A D 

### C O


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P E T IT IO N E R S 

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v . 

### C IT Y O F 

### H O U S T O N 

### , T E X A S A N D 

### D A N IE L 

### K R U E G E R 

### , IN H IS 

### O F F IC IA L 

### C A P A C IT Y A S 

### D IR E C T O R O F 

### P U B L IC 

### W O R K S A N D 

### E N G IN E E R IN G 

### , R E S P O N D E N T S

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O N P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W F R O M T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E F O U R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

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Argued October 13, 2015

J U S T I C E B R O W N delivere d the opinion of the Court.
J U S T I C E L E H R M A N N filed a c oncurr ing opinion.
Gover nmental immunit y protec ts political subdivisions of the state, such as cities and their office rs, from liability

. Reata Const. Corp. v. City ofDallas , 197 S.W .3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006). An important justification for this immunit y is prag matic: it shields “the public fr o m t he costs and
conseque nces of improvident actions of their g overnme nts.” Tooke v. City of Mex ia , 197 S.W .3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). Yet the prag matic rationale supporting this immunit y also helps to delineate its limit s—“extending immunit y to officia ls using state resour ces in violation of the law would notbe an eff

icient way of ensuring those resour ces are spent as intended.” City of El Paso v. Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). Thus, this Court has long rec og nized that g overnme ntal immunit y does not ba

r claims alleg ing that a g overnme nt of fice r acte d ultra v ires , or without leg al authority , in car ry ing out his duties. Id. at 371–72. This case conce rns the brea dth of this ultra vires doctrine. Specifica lly , it p re sents the 1 question of whether a suit complaining “of a g overnme nt office r’s exercise of [l imited] discretion” by alleg ing “that the office r acte d without leg al authority ” is a viable ultra vires claim. See Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d at 372. We conclude that it is. Although go v er n mental i mmunity justifiably provides broad protec tion to the g ov ernment and its ag ents, it does not protec t eve ry act by a g overnme nt office r that require s some exercise of judgme nt—a g overnme nt office r with some discretion to interpre t and apply a law may nonetheless act “without leg al authority ,” and thus ultra vires , if he exceeds the bounds of

his gr anted a

uthority or if his ac ts conflict with the law itself. To the extent that the court of appea ls he ld dif fer ently , we reve rse that part of its judg ment and rema nd this c ase to the trial court f

or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.
I
I n 2011, the City of Houston enac ted a draina g e-f ee ordinanc e, wh i ch was proposed as a “pay -as- y ou-g o” sy stem to improve the city ’s draina g e. See H O U S T O N , T E X ., C O D E O F O R D I N A N C E S

W e h a v e o f

t e n r e f e r r e d t o t h e u l t r a v i r e s d o c t r i n e a s a n e x c e p t i o n t o g o v e r n m e n t a l a n d s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y , 1
a n d w e c o n t i n u e t o d o s o t o d a y . H o w e v e r , s o m e c l a r i f i c a t i o n i s w a r r a n t e d

. O u r u s a g e s h o u l d n o t b e r e a d t o i m p l y t h a t g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y a p p l i e s a n d t h a t u l t r a v i r e s i s t h e n a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n ; r a t h e r , w h e n a g o v e r n m e n t a l o f f i c e r i s s u e d f

o r a l l e g e d l y u l t r a v i r e s a c t s , g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y d o e s n o t a p p l y f r o m t h e o u t s e t

. T h u s , o u r u l t r a v i r e s c a s e s d o n o t r u n a f

o u l o f o u r l o n g - s t a n d i n g r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t “ i t i s t h e L e g i s l a t u r e ’ s s o l e p r o v i n c e t o w a i v e o r a b r o g a t e s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y . ” S e e T e x
. N a t

. R e s
. C o n s e r v a t i o n C o m m ’ n v
. I T

- D a v y , 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d 8 4 9 , 8 5 3 ( T e x . 2 0 0 2 ) ( q u o t i n g F e d

. S i g n v
. T

e x
. S

. U n i v
. , 9 5 1 S

. W

. 2 d 4 0 1 , 4 0 9 ( T e x . 1 9 9 7 ) ) ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d )

.
2ch. 47, art. XI V (2011). Under the ordinanc e, draina g e char g es are imposed on proper ties within the 2 city to “re cover the city ’s cost in furnishing dra i n ag e for any benef itted proper

ty and the cost of funding future draina g e sy stem improvements,” and any monies collecte d are to be used exclusively for “expenses associate d with the cost of service to provide draina g e ser v ices within the service

are a.” Id. §§ 47-802, 47-821. Such char g es are calc ulated based on a specifie d rate per “squar e [foot] of impervious surfa ce on e ach be nefitted prope rty .” Id. § 47-822(c ).
T h e ordinanc e g ives the city ’s Direc tor of Public Works and Eng ineer ing—in this ca s e, Daniel Krue g er—a

uthority to administer its provisions, subject to the terms of the ordinanc e itself. Id. §§ 47-805, 47-824 (the direc tor “shall be responsible for the administration of this article including, but not limit ed to, enac ting any proce dures o r p o l i cies nece ssary for the administration of the draina g e sy stem and the draina g e char g es . . . s u b j ect to the provisions of this article ” and “shall establish and implement a sy stem of verific ation and corr ection of draina g e char g es for eac h
proper ty subject to the draina g e char g es.”)

. Howeve r, the ordinanc e also provides g uidance as to the
scope and limit s of Krue g er’ s authority

. As is espec ially rele vant here , it provides definitions for both “bene fitted proper

ty ” and “ impervious surfa ce” : Bene fitted property means a lot or trac t to which draina g e service is made available under this article and which discharg es into a street, cre ek, river, slough, bay ou, culver t, conduit, inlet, or other channe l that forms part of the city draina g e utilit y sy stem.

A f t e r t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s i s s u e d i t s d e c i s i o n i n t h i s c a s e , t h e H o u s t o n c i t y c o u n c i l a m e n d e d t h e o r d i n a n c e . T h e 2
c i t y a r g u e s t h a t w e s h o u l d c o n s i d e r t h e a m e n d e d o r d i n a n c e i n c o n s t r u i n g K r u e g e r ’ s a u t h o r i t y a s i t r e l a t e s t o d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h p r o p e r t i e s a r e “ b e n e f i t t e d ” a n d w h i c h s u r f

a c e s a r e “ i m p e r v i o u s . ” H o w e v e r , t h e a m e n d m e n t s i n q u e s t i o n c h a n g e r a t h e r t h a n c l a r i f

y K r u e g e r ’ s a u t h o r i t y . T h e c i t y c i t e s n o a u t h o r i t y t e n d i n g t o s h o w w h y w e s h o u l d c o n s i d e r t h e a m e n d m e n t s . T h u s , w e c o n s t r u e t h e o r d i n a n c e a s i t r e a d w h e n K r u e g e r p r o p o s e d t h e d r a i n a g e c h a r g e s a t i s s u e a n d d o n o t c o n s u l t t h e r e c e n t a m e n d m e n t s t o c l a r i f y t h e o r d i n a n c e ’ s o r i g i n a l l a n g u a g e . S e e T i j e r i n a v
. C i t

y o f T y l e r , 8 4 6 S

. W

. 2 d 8 2 5 , 8 2 7

– 2 8 ( T e x . 1 9 9 2 ) ( c o u r t s c a n c o n s i d e r l a t e r - a d o p t e d a m e n d m e n t s i f t h e y c l a r i f y b u t d o n o t c h a n g e t h e l a w )

. 3. . .

Impe rvious surface means any are a that has been compac ted or cover ed such that it does not rea dily absorb water or does not allow water to perc olate throug h to undisturbed underly ing soil strata. Surfac e materia ls considere d impervious shall include, but not be li mited to, bricks, pavers, concre te, asphalt, compac ted oi l-dirt, compac ted or decompose d s h al e, o y ster shell, g rave l, or g ranite, and other simil ar materia ls. Surfac e fea tures utiliz ing such materia ls and considere d impervious shall include, but not be limit ed to, decks, foundations

. . . , building roofs, parking and drivewa y are as, sidewalks, compac ted or rolled are as, paved rec rea t ion are as, swimming pool s, an d other feature s or surface s that are built or l aid on the s urfa ce of the land and have the eff ect of incre asing , conce ntrating , or otherwise altering water runoff so that flows are not rea dily absorbe d. Id. § 47-802

. As to “impervious surfa ce,” the ordinanc e additionally provides that the “ar ea of impervious surfa ce on eac h benef itted proper

ty shall be deter

mined on the basis of digital map data associate d with tax plats and assessment rolls or ot her similar re liable data as shall be determined by the direc tor.” Id. § 47-822(d)

. Shor tl y a f te r th e o r d in a

n c e w a s e n acte d, petitioners Houston Be lt & Terminal Railway , BN SF Railway , and Un i o n P ac i fic Railway (collec tively , the “ra ilroads”) rec eived notices of proposed char g es for

their properties i n Houston. The charg es, proposed by Krue g er, w ere about $3 million annually based on Krue g er’ s deter mination that all of the railroa ds’ proper ties within Houston wer e “b en ef i tted” and that the surfa ces of near ly all of those proper ties wer e also “impervious.” As t o “impervious surfa ce,” Krue g er made his deter mination based upon aer ial imag es—looking to see if the proper

ties appea

red g ree n or brown—rather than digital map data. Gene ra l l y , u n der this method, if the proper

ty appea red brown, Krue g er deter

mined it was impervious; if it appea red g ree n, he deter mined it was pervious. Using this brown-or- g ree n method, Krue g er de termined that a bout
93 milli on square fee t of the railroa ds’ proper ties wer e impervious. On the other hand, the railroa ds’

4have pointed out that Houston’s digital map data shows that only 72,364 square fee t of the railroa ds’

proper ties wer e impervious. I t fo l l o ws that the use of digital map data would have y ielded signific antly

lower c harg es on the ra ilroads’ prope rties.
Pursuant to the o rd i n an ce, afte r rec eiving the notice of proposed char g es, the railroa ds submitt ed reque sts for verific ation and corr ection of Kr u ege r’s proposed char g es, contending
Krue g er had improperly proposed char g es on proper ties that wer e not benef

itted and on surfa ces that

wer e not impervious. After a hear ing panel upheld Krue g er’ s decision, the railroa ds filed suit ag ainst the city and Krue g er in his officia l capa city , alleg ing ultra vires claims ag ainst Krue g er and seeking 3
prospec tive injunctive relief

. The city filed a plea to the jurisdiction as to the railroa ds’ ultra vires 4
claims based on g overnme ntal immunit y . Wit hout holdin g an evidentiary hear ing, the trial court

s ustained the city ’s plea. The railroa ds moved for clar ification of the court’s order and sough t an opportunity

to amend. The trial court de nied their motion. The railroa ds filed an interlocutory appea l. The court of appea ls examined the two ultra vires questio n s : wh et h er Krue g er acte d outside his authority by (1) deter mining that cer

tain proper

ties

wer e benefitted and thus subject t o draina g e charg es and (2) de termining that the railroads should
pay roug hly $3 milli on based on their benef itted proper

ties’ impervious surfa ce are a. Houston Belt
& Terminal Ry. v. City of Houst o n , 424 S.W .3d 663, 667–68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2014). The court of appea ls aff irmed in p ar t an d reve rsed in part, concluding that the railroa ds

T h i s o p i n i o n r e f

e r s t o “ t h e c i t y ” w h e n r e f e r r i n g t o a r g u m e n t s m a d e b y t h e c i t y o n K r u e g e r ’ s b e h a l f

. 3
S e e H e i n r i c h , 2 8 4 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 7 3 , 3 7 6 ( “ E v e n i f [ a n u l t r a v i r e s ] c l a i m m a y b e b r o u g h t , t h e r e m e d y m a y 4 i m p l i c a t e i m m u n i t y . . . . [ G e n e r a l l y ] , “ a c l a i m a n t w h o s u c c e s s f u l l y p r o v e s a n u l t r a v i r e s c l a i m i s e n t i t l e d t o p r o s p e c t i v e i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f

, a s m e a s u r e d f

r o m t h e d a t e o f i n

j u n c t i o n . ” )

. 5pleade d a viable ultra vires claim challenging Krue g er’ s deter mination that their proper ties wer e benef itted, but that they had not pleade d a viable ultra vires claim contesting Krue g er’ s deter mination that the railroa ds’ proper ties wer e impervious. Id. at 673. As to its second holding, the
court rea soned that beca

use “the enac ting body intended to g rant [Krueg er] the ability to exercise his discretion,” the railroa ds’ alleg ations re gar ding imperviousness did not fall within the ultra vires exception and wer e barr ed. Id. at 672. The par t i es cross-a ppeale d, and we g rante d revie w to deter mine whether

Krue g er’ s actions wer e ultra vires under Heinrich and its prog eny . 5
II Gene rally , “immunity from sui t implicates courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rusk Stat e Hosp. v. Black , 392 S.W .3d 88, 91 (Tex. 2012). Thus, i t “i s p ro perly asser ted in a plea to the jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’ t of Parks & W ildlif e v. Mi r a n d

a , 1 33 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). As subject-matter jurisdiction is a q u es t i o n of law, we revie w a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdictio n d e n ovo. Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys. , 458 S.W .3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015). “When a plea to the jurisdiction challeng es the pleading s,” as here , “we deter mine if the pleade r has alleg ed fac ts that aff

irmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause .” Heinrich , 284
S.W .3d at 378 (interna l quotation marks omitted). I n doing so, w e construe the pleading s liberally in the pleade rs’ favor and look to their intent. Id. On l y i f t he pleading s aff irmatively neg ate ju ri sdiction should the plea to the jurisdiction be g rante d without aff ording the plaintiffs an opportunity

to replea d. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227.

T h e r a i l r o a d s a d d i t i o n a l l y a r g u e t h a t t h e c i t y i s n o t i m m u n e h e r e b e c a u s e i t s o p e r a t i o n o f t h e d r a i n a g e u t i l i t y 5 i s a p r o p r i e t a r y f

u n c t i o n . S e e T

o o k e , 1 9 7 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 4 3

. H o w e v e r , g i v e n o u r r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e u l t r a v i r e s i s s u e s , w e n e e d n o t a d d r e s s t h i s a r g u m e n t

. 6III

The city contends that g overnme ntal immunit y bars the railroa ds’ claims beca use Krueg er
acte d pursuant to the authority g rante d to him under the ordinanc e, and so the trial court proper ly
g rante d the city ’s plea to the jurisdiction. The railroa ds arg ue their claims alleg e that Krue g er’ s “bene fitted proper

ty ” and “impervious surfa ce” deter minations wer e made “without leg al authority ” under the ordin an ce and there fore are not barr ed by g overnme ntal immunit y . Whil e the parties disa gre e o n t he authority g rante d to Krue g er under the ordinanc e, the resolution of their dispute hinge s upon the meaning of our ultra vires jurisprudenc e. As alre ady

noted, while g overnme ntal immunit y provides broad protec tion to the state a nd its office rs, it does not bar a suit ag ainst a g overnme nt office r for acting outside his authority

— i.e. ,

an ultra vires suit. See Tex. Parks & W ildlif e Dep’ t v. Sawy er T

r u s t , 354 S.W .3d 384, 393 (Tex. 2011). “T o fa l l within this ultra vires exception,” howeve r, “a suit must not complain of a
g overnme nt office r’s exercise of discretion, but rathe r must alleg e, and ul t i m at ely prove, that the office r acte d without leg al authority or failed to perf orm a purely minist eria l act.” Heinrich , 284
S.W .3d at 372; see also Fed. Sign , 951 S.W .2d at 404 (“[A]n action to deter mine or protec t a private party ’s rig hts ag ainst a state officia l w ho has acte d without leg al or statutory authority is not a suit
ag ainst the State that sovere ign immunity bars.” ). The parties dispute the meaning of “exerc ise of discretion” and “without leg al authority ” as used in Heinrich

. The city contends that under Heinrich , Krue g er’ s deter minations cannot be ultra
vires if he had some discretion to make them under the ordinanc e. To the city , “exerc ise of discretion” means any decision made in which the office r has the authority to use his persona l

7judgme nt, and “a mistake in exercising his judgme nt is not an ultra vires act.” Thus, beca use the ordinanc e g rante d Krue g er authorit y to make “bene fitted proper ty ” and “impervious surfa ce” deter minations, his deter

minations are discretionar y and, as a matter of l aw, cannot be the s ubject of an ultra v ires suit. Of course , the railroa ds urg e a diffe rent unde rstanding of Heinrich

. The ty pe

o f d is c r e ti o n that immunit y protec ts, they arg ue, is absolute discretion—discre tion wher e n o s p e c if ic , substantive, or objective standards g overn the e xe r c is e o f ju d g me nt. There fore , reg ardle ss of whether
Krue g er had some authority or di scre tion, h i s d et er minations are still ultra vires beca use he acte d bey ond his g rante d discretion in making them. Ultimately , we conclude that our case law, along with the purposes underly ing g overnme ntal immunit y and the ultra vires exception, favor s the railroa ds’ interpre tation.
Be cause Heinrich is the major point of contention betwee n the parties, we s t ar t there

. I n Heinrich , a police office r’s widow—Heinr ich—broug ht an action ag ainst El Paso’s Fire men & Policemen’s Pension Fund Boa rd office rs, among other defe ndants, alleg ing that the office rs acte d outside their statutory authority by retroa ctively reduc ing her pension benef its. 284 S.W .3d at 369. The rele vant statute provided the office rs authority to “mak e from time to time” cer tain modifications, including “modify [i ng ] or chang [ ing] prospec tively or retroa ctively in any manner whatsoeve r any of the benef its provided by this Act, except t h at any retroa ctive chang e or modification shall only incre ase pensions or benef its.” Id. at 378. I mportantly , there fore , the office rs being sued had a

uthority —and at lea st some discretion—to modify benef its.
Howeve r, under that statute, “while benef its [could] be incre ased if cer tain proc e d

u r es [were] followed, the Boa

rd [had] no discretion to retroa ctively lower pensions.” Id. at 379. And so, beca use
8she had all ege d a re t roactive reduc tion in her pension, Heinric h arg ued that her suit pleade d ultra

vires acts an d was not barr ed by immunit y . We ag ree d. Recog nizi ng our jurisprudenc e clea rly established that suits see king to r equire g overnme nt of fice rs to c omply with the law are not barr ed by g overnme ntal immunit y beca use noncomplianc e with the law is an ultra vires act, we clarified that exception. See id. at 371–72 (citing IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d at 855–56; W .D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen , 308 S.W .2d 838, 841 (Tex. 1958); and State v. Epperson , 42 S.W .2d 228, 231 (Tex. 1931)). We held that to fall within the ultra vires exception, “a suit must not complain o f a go vernme nt office r’s exercise of discretion, but rathe r must alleg e, an d u l t i mately prove, that the office r acte d without leg al authority

or fa iled to perfor

m a pure ly

minist eria l act.” Id. at 372.
Be cause Heinric h h ad “a lleg e[d] that petitioners vi olated [ the l aw] when they reduc ed her b en efits,” we found that her claims ag ainst the pension board members wer e not barr ed. Id. at 371–78. To be sure, Heinric h’s claim was ag ainst the office rs for acting pursuant to, y et outside the limit s of, a statutory g rant of authority

. I n other words, Heinric h alleg ed that the office rs, making the ty pe of de termination which they had authority to make, made t hat determination in a way the law d i d n o t allow. Thus, Heinrich cannot rea sonably be rea d to limit ultra vires claims to those challeng ing minist eria l acts, nor can it be rea d to shield ever y act underta ken by an office r who has some limit ed author ity

. See id.
I nd ee d , i n t h e s even y ear s since Heinrich , we have spoken a number of times on the intersec tion of the ultra vires exception and g overnme ntal immunit y . I n doing so, we have confirme d that Heinrich did not expand g overnme ntal immunit y ’s rea ch or diminis h the ultra vires exception by providing an absolute shield to limit ed as well as absolute discretion. See, e.g. , Sw. Bell Tel., L.P.

9v. Emme tt , 459 S.W .3d 578, 588–89 (Tex. 2015) ; Klumb , 458 S.W .3d at 9–11; Sawyer Trust , 354

S.W .3d at 393–94. I n Sawyer Trust , for example, we wer e asked whethe r a n avig ability deter mination by an office r of the Parks and Wil dlife Depa rtment—a depar

tment with “author ity to make deter

minations on behalf of the State as to navig ability of streams and to e x erc ise the State’s rig hts over navig able streambe ds”—could be challeng ed via an ultra vires suit. 354 S.W .3d at 394. Noting the “untena

ble position” in which a landowner would find himself if the office r’s navig ability finding could not be challeng ed by an ultra vires suit, we held that it could. See i d

. S i m i l ar l y , in 6
Emme tt , we asked “whether [ an officer ’s] anticipatory ref usal to comply with the s tatute qualifies

as a minist eria l act

or was undertaken without legal authori ty ,” thus reinfor cing that Heinrich did
not fore close ultra vires suits alleg ing acts that wer e n o t minist eria l y et wer e done without leg al authority

. See 459 S.W .3d at 588 (empha sis added)

. Emme tt , howeve r, did not require us to addre ss the “without leg al authority ” question—beca use the au thority g rante d in Emme tt was a “pure ly minist eria l d u t y , ” we found the plaintiff’s alleg ations that the office r violated that duty wer e sufficie nt to plead an ultra vires claim. Id. at 589. Of our rec ent case s, Klumb is most helpful to our inquiry here

. See 4 5 8 S

. W

. 3 d at 9–11. There , we evalua ted a pension board’ s interpre tation and application of Article 6243h of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. Id. The issue was “whe ther the pension board acte d without leg al authority by expanding Ar

ticle 6243h’s definition of ‘employ ee’ without the City ’s appr oval and in conf lict

W e r e c o g n i z e t h a t S a w y e r T r u s t n o t e d t h a t “ t h e q u e s t i o n o f n a v i g a b i l i t y i s , a t b o t t o m , a j u d i c i a l o n e . ” 6 I d

. a t 3 9 4

. W h i l e t h i s r u l e w a s a f a c t o r i n o u r a n a l y s i s i n S a w y e r T r u s t , t h a t c a s e i s a l s o p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d a s a l l o w i n g a n u l t r a v i r e s c l a i m t o c h a l l e n g e a d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e a u t h o r i t y o f a s t a t e o f f i c e r b e c a u s e t h a t o f

f i c e r a l l e g e d l y m a d e t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i t h o u t s t a t u t o r y o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y . S e e i d

. a t 3 9 3

– 9 4

. 1 0with the pl ain l ang uag e of the s tatute.” Id. at 9. We ultimately found that t he pension board’ s acts

wer e not “without leg al authority ” so as to be ultra vires

. Id. at 10–11.
Our holding i n Klumb , howeve r, was not that g overnme nt office rs char g ed with ad m i n i s t ra tion can perf

orm their duties “in conflict with the plain lang uag e of [t heir enabling]
statute” whene ver they might please with no threa t of judicial revie w. See id. at 9. Rather, we only conclude d that no ultra vires claim had been pleade d afte r noting that “[t] he brea dth of the pension board’ s authority under Article 6243h [was] inesca pable” and afte r rec og nizi ng the express authorization for the pension board to “construe the statute, add lang uag e it deems nece ssary for the administration of t h e p en s i o n fund, and deter mine all elig ibilit y questions and all other leg al and fac tual matters perta ining to the fund’s administration.” Id. at 10. Moreove r, the statute barr ed judicial revie w “abse nt a manifest conflict with express statutory terms.” Id. As there was no manifes t co n fl ict, we noted that “any further consideration of the matter would impermissibly

encr oach on the unrevie wable, discretionar y authority aff orded to the boa

rd under Article 6243h.” Id. at 11. And, as is espec ially rele vant here , we wer e sure to emphasize that o u r h o l d ing did not diminis h the ultra vires exception: “[a]lt houg h the pension board ha[d] unq u estionably broad discretionar

y authority under [t he statute], we caution[ed] that the board [cou l d ] n o t violate the
statute.” Id. Even under the board’ s “un q u es t i o nably broad discretionar y authority ,” we acknow ledg ed “the possibili ty that, in appropria te circ umstances, a particula r interpr etation of the statute could be ultra vires. ” Id.

1 1* * *

These case s aff

irm that while the protec tions of g overnme ntal immunit y rema in robust, they

are not absolute. As we said in Heinrich , g overnme ntal immunit y protec ts ex erc ises of di scre tion, but when an office r acts bey ond his g rante d discretion—in other words, when he acts without leg al authority —his acts ar e not protec ted. Thus, “discr etion,” as w e have used the ter m in this context,
cannot mean limited discretion that is otherwise constrained b y t h e principles of law. See, e.g. , B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 565 (10th ed. 2014) (def ining “judicial discretion” as “[t] he exercise of judgme nt

. . . g uided by the rules and principl es o f law”)

. Rather, our ultra vires case law uses the
term in its broad sense. See, e.g. , id. (def ining “discre tion” as “the power of fre e decision-making ”).
Acc ording ly , the principle arising out of Heinrich and its prog eny is t hat g overnme ntal immunit y bars suit s complaining of an e x erc ise of absolute discretion but not suits complaining of either an office r’s failure to perf

orm a minist eria l act or an office r’s exercise of judgme nt or limited discretion without ref

ere nce to or in conflict with the constraints of the law authorizing the officia l to act. Only when such absolute discretion—fr ee decision-making without any constraints—is g rante d are ultra
vires suits absolutely barr ed. And, as a g ener al rule, “a public office r has no discretion or authority to misi nterpre t the law.” Cf. In re Smith , 333 S.W .3d 582, 585 (Tex. 2011) (orig . proce eding ).
To be sure, absolute protection would g o ag ainst the rationale for gove rnmental im munity in the first place

. Gover

nmental immunit y is premised in part on preve nting su i t s t h at attempt to control state action by imposing liability upon the state. See IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d at 8 5 5

– 5 6

. But

“ ultra vires suits do not attempt to exert control over the state—they attempt to rea ssert the control of the state.” Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d at 372. Thus, prohibiting ultra v ires suits whe n an office r acts

1 2outside the bounds of his g rante d authority would run counter to the purposes behind immuni t y .

Allowing such suits, on th e o t h er h and, encour ag es enfor ceme nt of exis ting policy

. See id. And, while g overnme ntal immunit y serve s the prag matic purpose of protec ting public resour ces, we have

rec og nized that ex tending immunit y to office rs who violate the law doe s not further tha t goa l. See id. Acc ording ly , g overnme ntal immunit y only extends to those g overnme nt office rs who are acting consistently

with the law, which inc ludes those who ac t within their gr anted discr etion. See id. 7
Be cause the ultra vires standard we clar ify today hems closely to the purpo ses underlying
g overnme ntal immunit y and the ultra vires exception g ener ally , it does not cre ate a new vehicle for suits ag ainst the s tate to masquera de as ultra vires claims—indeed, our opinion mere ly re inforce s the narr ow ultra vires principles we have repe atedly an n ounced and endorse d. See Heinrich , 284
S.W .3d at 372; Fed. Sign , 951 S.W .2d at 404; Dodgen , 308 S.W .2d at 842. Although only exercises of absolute discretion are absolutely protec ted, whether a suit at t ac k ing an exercise of limit ed discretion will be barr ed is depende nt upon the g rant of authority at issue in any particula r case . And

so many leg islative g rants of authority , althoug h not absolute, will be broad enoug h to ba r most, if not all, alleg edly ultra vires claims. See, e .g. , Klumb , 458 S.W .3d at 11.
IV
I n light of this clar ification, we look to the ordinance’s lang uag e to deter mine whether the railroa ds have proper ly alleg ed that Krue g er acte d ultra vires

. As noted above, the court of appea ls hel d t h at the railroa ds proper ly alleg ed an ultra vires claim as to Krue g er’ s “bene fitted proper ty ”

T h i s s t a n d a r d i s n o t t o b e c o n f u s e d w i t h t h a t f

o r o f f i c i a l i m m u n i t y . W h i l e g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y o n l y p r o t e c t s 7
a n o f f i c e r i n h i s o

f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y u p u n t i l h e a c t s “ w i t h o u t l e g a l a u t h o r i t y , ” o f f i c i a l i m m u n i t y m a y m o r e b r o a d l y p r o t e c t h i m w h e n s u e d i n h i s p e r s o n a l c a p a c i t y . S e e , e
. g
. , C i t

y o f L a n c a s t e r v
. C h a m b e r s , 8 8 3 S

. W

. 2 d 6 5 0 , 6 5 3

– 5 5 ( T e x . 1 9 9 4 )

. 1 3deter

mination but not as to his “i m p ervious surfa ce” deter mination. Construing the pleading s liberally in the railroa ds’ fa vor, we hold that they have a lleg ed viable ultra vires claims as t o both of Krue g er’ s determinations. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm in par t and re verse in part.
A
We apply rules of statutory construction to construe municipal ordinanc es. Bd. of Adjustment

v. W ende , 92 S.W .3d 424, 430 (Tex. 2002). Our primary objective in construing the ordinanc e is to

asce rtain and g ive eff

ect to the enac ting body ’s intent. See TGS-NOPEC Geophy sical Co. v. Combs , 340 S.W .3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). To discern that intent, we start with the plain and o rd i n ary meaning of the ordinanc e’s words, using any definitions provided by the enac ting body

. See Tex.
Mu t

. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger , 381 S.W .3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012). We rea d the ordinanc e as a whole,
p re s u ming the enac ting body purposef ully included eac h word, In re M.N. , 262 S.W .3d 799, 80 2 (Tex. 2008), and construing the ordinance to avoid rendering any word or provision meaning less. Kalli nen v. C ity of Houston , 462 S.W .3d 25, 28 (Tex. 2015) (per curia m). When clea r, the text is deter min ative of the enac ting body ’s intent unless the plain meaning produce s an absurd result. Ruttiger , 381 S.W .3d at 452.
B The railroa ds pleade d that a number of their proper ties do not make use of the city ’s draina g e
sy stem but instead discharg e direc tly into natura l bay ous not owned or controlled in whole or in part by the city

. They there fore arg ue that Krue g er acte d ultra vires i n i d en t i fy ing such proper ties as benef itted. The court of appea ls ag ree d. Rely ing on its holding in a companion case , City of Houston
v. L ittle Nell Apartments , it held t h at “if, as t he R ailroads have pleaded, their proper ties do not fit

1 4within the definiti on of ‘b en ef i t t ed proper

ty ’ because they do not make use of t he C ity ’s drainag e
sy stem,” then Krue g er does not have authority an d d i s cretion to impose draina g e char g es on the railroa ds’ proper

ties

. Houston Belt , 424 S.W .3d at 669 (citing City of Houston v. Litt le Nell Apartments , L.P. , 424 S.W .3d 640 (Tex. App

. —Houston [14t h Dist.] 2014)). Construing the pleading s in favor of

the ra ilroads, the court of appea ls the n found that the ra ilroads had plea ded a viable ultra vires claim. See id. We ag ree . The ordinanc e char ges Krue g er with “administration of [t he ordinanc e] including, but not limit ed to, enac ting any proce dures or policies nece ssary for the administratio n of the draina g e
sy ste m an d the draina g e char g es . . . in acc ordanc e with and subject to the provisions of [t he ordinanc e].” See C O D E O F O R D I N A N C E S § 47-805. The city arg ues t hat “administ ration” impl ies a broad gra n t o f authority and discretion, citing dictionary definitions of “administration” and “ministerial.” I t arg ues that beca use Krue g er has authority to administer, he nece ssarily has authority
to interpre t “bene fitted proper ty ,” and so his deter

mination—even if wrong —cannot be ultra vires.
Howeve r, under our jurisprudenc e, only absolute g rants of a

uthority and discretion will totally bar judicial revie w. I f Krue g er’ s authority is less than absolute, then he acts ultra vires if he acts outside of his limit ed authority

. Her e, as is g ener ally the case , the limit s of Krue g er’ s authority are found in the authority -g ranting law itself—the or dinance

. The ordinanc e was enac ted “to enhanc e, improve and rene w the City ’s draina g e sy stems and
streets.” See id. at pmbl. Such improvement is to be funded by “esta blish[ ing] a schedule of draina g e char g es ag ainst all rea l proper ty in the city subject to such char g es under [t he ordinanc e]” and then “provid[in g] d raina g e for all rea l proper ty in the city on pay

ment of draina g e char g es unless the

1 5proper

ty is ex em p t from such pay ment as provided here in.” Id. § 47-801. The draina g e char g es, imposed “[t] o rec over the city ’s cost of service t o p ro v i de draina g e to benef itted proper

ties,” are calc ulated by multipl y ing an applicable rate “by the are a in square fee t of impervious surfa ce on eac h benef itted proper

ty .” Id. §§ 47-822(a ), (c)

. And “dra inag e char g e” is define d as “the char g e imposed b y t he city here in, including penalties, to rec over the city ’s cost in furnishing draina ge fo r an y benef itted proper

ty an d t h e cost of funding future draina g e sy stem improvements.” Id. § 47-802.
Acc ording ly

—and the city does not now arg ue otherwise—a property mu st meet the definition of “bene fitted proper

ty ” bef ore c harg es may

be asse ssed on it. See Little Nell , 424 S.W .3d at 650–53 (“[T]he expressed purpose of t he drainag e charg e is t o re co v er the cost of service associated with providing draina g e to ‘be nefitted prope rties.’” ).
“B enef itted proper

ty ” is define d as “a lot or trac t to which draina g e service is made available under this article and which discharg es into a str eet, cre ek, river, slough, bay ou, culver t, conduit, inlet, or o t h er ch an n el that forms part of the city draina g e utilit y sy stem.” C O D E O F O R D I N A N C E S § 47-802. Fr om this definition, two things are plainly require d for a proper ty to qualify as benef

itted: (1) dr ainag e ser

vice must be made a

vailable a nd (2) it must discharg e into the city draina g e utility
sy ste m . See id. Even so, the city claims that all proper ties within Houston, unless exempt, are benef itted under the ordinanc e. But this arg ument is contra dicted by the ordinanc e’s plain lang uag e. To supplement the definition of “bene fitted proper ty ,” which require s that draina g e discha rg e into the dra inag e sy stem, the ordinanc e def ines “dra inag e sy stem” as “ draina g e owne d or controlled in whole or in part by the city and dedica ted to the service of benef itted proper

ty .” Id

. “Dr ainag e,” on the other hand, is broadly define d to include various water way s, “whe ther natura l or artificia l,” and

1 6is broad enoug h to include bay ous. Id. I ndeed, the definition of “benefitted pr operty ” includes the

term “bay ou.” Id. But, for a proper ty to be benef

itted, the draina g e to which it discharg es must also be part of the draina g e sy stem—it must be “owne d or controlled in whole or in part by the city and dedica ted to the service of benef itted proper

ty .” Id. There fore , to rea d “dra inag e sy stem” broadly to i n cl u d e all draina g e in Houston, as the city does, rende rs meaning less the broad definition of “dra inag e”—if

all draina g e is also part of the drainag e sy stem, why is drainag e sepa rate ly define d and used throug hout the ordinanc e? As the plain lang uag e of the definitions of “dra inag e” and “dra inag e sy stem”—which are differ ent—conf irms, “dra inag e sy stem” cannot mean the same thing as “d ra i n age . ” S

ee TGS-NOPEC , 340 S.W .3d at 439 (“We .

. . consider statutes as a whole rather than their isolated provisions.”). I t follows that even though a proper ty that discharg es into a bay ou
may also be benef

itted (bec ause a bay ou may be par t o f the draina g e sy stem), the fac t that it discharg es into a bay ou is not by itself sufficie nt to make a ny g iven prope rty

benef itted ( beca

use a bay ou is not nece

ssarily part of the draina g e sy stem). Reading “bene fitted proper ty ” to mean “all proper

ties within Houston” also rende rs a larg e part of that definition meaning less. I ndeed, under the city ’s constru c ti o n , the definition of “bene fitted
proper ty ” is mostly unnece ssary : to construe “bene fitted proper ty ” as the city does—to mean all
proper ties within Houston—would rende r “and which discharg es into a street, cre ek, river, slough, bay ou, culver

t, conduit, inlet, or other channe l that fo rm s p ar t of the city draina g e utilit y sy stem” meaning less. See C O D E O F O R D I N A N C E S § 47-802. On this point, there fore , we ag ree with the court of appe als in Litt le Nell that “the ordinanc e consistently qualifies that draina g e char g es are only to be imposed wher e draina g e is provided to ‘bene fitted proper ties’” and that the enac ting body would

1 7not have particula rly define d “bene fitted proper ty ” and consistently used it throug hout the ordinanc e if its true intent was that all rea l proper ty wit h i n Hous ton was to be presumptively benef itted and assessed c harg es. See 424 S.W .3d at 652; see also Kallinen , 462 S.W .3d at 28. The Litt le Nell court of appea ls also found that the ordinanc e “does not contain any lang uag e indicating —even if the direc tor has the authority to make [benefitted proper ty ] deter minations—that he persona lly decide s which proper ties are ‘bene fitted.’” 424 S.W .3d at 654. W e agr ee. Unlike Klumb , wh er e t h e brea dth of the pension board’ s authority and discretion was “inesc apable ,”
Krue g er’ s authority here is expli citly limit ed. See Klumb , 458 S.W .3d at 10. The provision g ranting 8
Krue g er a uthority provides that he must administer the or dinance “in ac corda nce w ith a

nd subject
to [i ts] provisions.” C O D E O F O R D I N A N C E S § 47-805. Th e ordinance ex pressly define s “bene fitted
proper ty ,” and no lang uag e in the ordinanc e g rants Krue g er discretion to interpre t “bene fitted
proper ty ”—or any other definition—in a way that is contra ry to the definition itself. Cf. Klumb , 458
S.W .3d at 10. Acc ording ly , we conclude that while Krue g er may have some authority with respe ct
to deter mining wh ic h p r o p erties are benef itted, he does not have authority to make that deter mination in a way that conflicts with othe r provisions of the ordinanc e, including its de finition a nd usag e of “bene fitted proper

ty .” The railroa ds’ pleading s alleg e that their proper ties are not “bene fitted” beca use they do not

m ak e use of the city ’s draina g e sy stem but rathe r discharg e into natura l bay ous not owne d o r

F o r e x a m p l e , t h e s t a t u t e i n K l u m b e x p r e s s l y g r a n t e d t h e p e n s i o n b o a r d a u t h o r i t y t o , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , “ a d o p t 8

. . . w r i t t e n r u l e s a n d g u i d e l i n e s ; . . . i n t e r p r e t a n d c o n s t r u e [ t h e a c t ; ]

. . . c o r r e c t a n y d e f e c t , s u p p l y a n y o m i s s i o n , a n d r e c o n c i l e a n y i n c o n s i s t e n c y t h a t a p p e a r s i n [ t h e a c t ] i n a m a n n e r a n d t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e p e n s i o n b o a r d c o n s i d e r s e x p e d i e n t t o a d m i n i s t e r [ t h e a c t ] f o r t h e g r e a t e s t b e n e f

i t o f a l l m e m b e r s ; [ a n d ] d e t e r m i n e a l l q u e s t i o n s , w h e t h e r l e g a l o r f a c t u a l , r e l a t i n g t o e l i g i b i l i t y f o r m e m b e r s h i p , s e r v i c e , o r b e n e f i t s o r r e l a t i n g t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e p e n s i o n f u n d

. ” T E X
. R E V
. C IV
. S T A T
. a r t

. 6 2 4 3 h , § 2 ( x ) ; K l u m b , 4 5 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4

– 5

. 1 8controlled by the city

. And they alleg e that Krue g er thus acte d ultra vires in classify ing the railroa ds’
proper ties as benef

itted without ref

ere nce to the definition of “bene fitted proper ty ” provided by the ordinanc e. Under the ordinanc e, natura l bay ous are not, as a matter of law, within the definition of “dra inag e sy stem,” and the city did not bring forth any jurisdictional evidenc e to rebut the railroa ds’ alleg ations. There fore , construing the p leading s liberally in the railroa ds’ favor , we find that the pleading s aff

irmatively alleg e an ultra vires claim. See Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d at 378. Acc ording ly ,

we a ffirm the c ourt of appe als on this issue.
C The ra i l ro ad s next contend they have proper ly pleade d that Krue g er acte d ultra vires in deter mining the “impervious surfa ce” of their proper ly identified benef itted proper

ties. The court of
appea ls, citing Krue g er’ s authority to dete rm i n e, adjust, revie w, and corr ect the amount of impervious surfa ce on any g iven proper ty , deter mined that the ordinanc e “g rants [Krueg er] authority with reg ard to th e d et er m ination of ‘the are a of impervious surfa ce on eac h benef itted proper

ty .’”
Houston Belt , 424 S.W .3d at 671. Then, finding that “[t] he plain lang uag e of the definition of ‘im p er v i ous surfa ce’

. . . does not prec lude all ‘room for judgme nt’ or ‘room for discretion’ in deter mining what additional ‘similar’ surfa ce materia ls and ‘other’ surfa ce fea tures would meet the definition,” the court of appea ls c oncluded that “the enac ting body intended to g rant [Krueg er] the ability to exercise his discretion” in making “impervious surf ac e” deter

minations. Id. at 672. There fore , the court of appea ls held t h at “because the Railroads only have alleg ed fac ts demonstrating acts within Krue g er’ s leg al authority and discretion under the ordinanc e, their claim seeks to control state action, and thus it is barr ed by sovere ign immunit y .” Id. at 673. We disag ree .
1 9The questio n is not, as the court of appea ls fra med it, whether Krue g er was g rante d “the

ability to exercise his discretion.” Rather, the question we must as k is whether the enac ting body intended to g rant Krue g er absolute discretion as to “impervious surfa ce” deter minations or, if it did

n o t , wh et h er the railroa ds alleg ed that Krue g er acte d bey ond the limit s of the discretion he was
actua lly g rante d. Ag ain, this question require s us to deter mine how m uch authority and dis cre tion the ordinanc e g rante d Krue g er. As discussed above, t h e ordinanc e provides that draina g e char g es are to be calc ulated by multipl y ing a

n applicable rate “by

the ar ea in squa

re fee t of impervious surfa ce on eac h benef itted
proper ty .” C O D E O F O R D I N A N C E S § 47-822(c ). “Impervious surfa ce” is define d as “any are a that has been compac ted o r co v er ed such that it does not rea dily absorb water or does not allow water to
perc olate throug h to undisturbed underly ing soil strata.” Id. § 47-802. Krue g er is g rante d authority

as to impervious surfa ce deter minations throug hout the ordinanc e. See, e.g. , id. §§ 47-805 (authority
to adjust impervious surfa c e c a lc u la ti o n s d o w nwar d); 47-822(d) (authority to deter mine ty pes of data
to use in deter

mining impervious surfa ce) ; 47-823 (authority to “on a reg ular basis revie w available data to verify the amount of impervious surfa ce” ); 47-824(a ) (authority to “esta blish and implement

a sy stem of verific ation and corr ection of drain age ch ar ges”). Most pertinent to our analy sis is section 47-822(d) , which provides that “[t] he are a of impervious surfa ce on eac h benef itted proper

ty shall be dete rmined on the ba sis of digital map data associated with tax plats and assessment rolls

or other simila r r el i a b l e data as shall be determine d by [Krueger] .” Id. § 47-822(d) (empha sis added)

.

2 0As the court o f appea ls proper ly noted, these sections—espe cially the “as shall be deter mined by [Krueg er]” lang uag e—make clea r that Krue g er had authority to deter mine “impervious surfa ce,” and specific ally to decide what constitutes “other simil ar reliable data” and when he shall utiliz e such data in deter

mining “impervious surfa ce.” Houston Belt , 424 S.W .3d at 672. And indeed, the court of appea ls proper ly found that the ordinanc e did not prec lude all “room for judgme nt” or “room for discretion.” Id. But while Krue g er clea rly had authority , and while he clea rly had to use some judgme nt in deter

mining “impervious surfa ce,” the court of appea ls stopped short of asking whether his authority

might nonethe less have some limit s. I f the c ourt of appe als was c orre ct to stop there, the ordinance must be read to g ive Krueg er unbridled discretion to deter mine the t y

pes o f d at a he relies upon in deter

mining “impervious s u rf ac e. ” But that rea ding is hard to square with the ordinanc e, which lay s out the specific ty pes of data Krue g er may use in his deter mination: “dig ital
map data” or “other simil ar reliable data.” See C O D E O F O R D I N A N C E S § 47-822(d)

. I f Krue g er may unilatera lly deter

mine the ty

pe of data he will rely upon, then section 47-822(d) ’s “dig ital map data” and “other si milar reliable data” are without meaning

. See id. T h er efor e, li ke the city ’s reading of “bene fitted proper

ty ,” i t s re ading of “impervious surfa ce” “violates [t he] duty of statutory interpre tation to ‘g ive eff

ect to all the words of [an ordinanc e] and not trea t any [such] lang uag e as surplusag e if possible.’” Kalli nen , 4 6 2 S. W.3d at 28 (quoting Chevron Corp. v. Redmon , 745 S.W .2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1987)).
I ndeed, the more natura l r eading of section 47-822(d) —and the rea ding that g ives eff ect to

eac h word—is that it imposes specific restra ints upon the ty pe of data that can be used in deter mining “impervious surfa ce.” Her e, it is undisputed that Krue g er did not use digital map data.

2 1Thus, we must deter mine how “similar reliable dat a” re s t rains Krue g er’ s choice of data. Not surprising ly , the ordinanc e does not define “similar reliable data.” The common meaning of “similar reliable data” is data that is “alike in substance” and “fit to be relied upon.” See M E R R I A M -W E B S T E R D I C T I O N A R Y & T H E S A U R U S 669, 769 (2014). Under this common meaning of “similar reliable data,” there fore , Krue g er’ s authority to deter mine what data to use was limit ed—he must have chosen data “alike in substanc e” to dig ital map data that wa s also “fit to be re lied upon.”
I n th e ir p le a d in g s b e f

o re the trial court, the railroa ds arg ued that Krue g er’ s aer ial photogr aphy
approa ch—which they now char acte rize as, “if it is g ree n, it must be pervious”—is neces s ar ily unreliable : under it, any

thing g ree n, even artificia l turf, will be found to be pervious; any thing brown,

even sandy are as with no veg etation, will be found to be impervious. Thus, the railroa ds contende d that Krue g er’ s chosen method failed to produce results consistent with the ordinanc e’s definition of “impervious surfa ce.” Their proper ties, they arg ued, contained signific antly less impervious surfa ce than Krue g er had deter

mined—indeed, they wer e “desig ned, en gi n ee red, and built so that [t hey ]

rea dily absorb[] water and a llow[ ] water to per colate to the undisturbe d underly ing soil strata .” The city counter ed that Krue g er acte d within his discretion in choosing to use aer ial data,

even if it ultimately resulted in impro p e r ly classify ing pervious surfa ces as impervious. Thus, the city
arg ues that even if Krue g er had deter mined brown g rass was impervious, his de termination would be protec ted by g over

n me n ta l immunity

. Howeve r, the city assumes an incorre ct view of the standard for alleg ing an ultra vires claim under Heinrich. Under the proper standard, the railroa ds need only
to al leg e that Krue g er acte d outside his discretion by using an unreliable or dissimi lar method to

c la s s if y th e ir proper

ties as impervious. Her e, we need not conclusively decide that aer ial ph o to g r a p h y
2 2is dissimi lar to digital map data or otherwise unreliable

. I n light of the railroa ds’ alleg ations that use

of digital map data would in fac t y ield a signific antly lower are a of impervious surfa ce on their
proper ties than Krue g er’ s aer ial-photog raphy method, and that Krue g er’ s chosen method led to a n improper classifica tion of are as not meeting the “impervious surfa ce” definition as impervious, our standard of revie w leads us to infer un re l i ab i l i t y and dissimi larity in this case . See Heinrich , 284
S.W .3d at 378; Miranda , 133 S.W .3d 226–27. Acc ord i n gl y , construing the pl eading s liberally in favor of the railroa ds, we find that the railroa ds’ pleading s are sufficie nt to confe r the trial court with jurisdiction over their claim that Krue g er acte d ultra vires in deter mining the impervious surfa ce of their prope rties. * * * The railroa ds’ pleading s aff irmatively alleg e that Krue g er acte d “without leg al authority ” in both his “bene fitted proper ty ” and “impervious surfa ce” deter minations, and thus they have alleg ed viable ultra vires claims as to eac h. See Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d at 372, 378. Acc ording ly , we reve rse the court of appea ls’ judgme nt in part and rema nd this case to the trial court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

_______________________________ J eff rey V. B rown J ustice
OPI NI ON DEL I VERED: April 1, 2016

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