UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4927

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RANDOLPH BARTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.

(6:05-cr-01180-HFF-2)

Submitted: August 27, 2007 Decided: September 5, 2007

Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Melissa J. Kimbrough, KIMBROUGH & LONGSHORE, Columbia, South

Carolina, for Appellant. Regan A. Pendleton, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Randolph Barton pled guilty pursuant to a written plea

agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute and to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2000). Barton was sentenced

by the district court to 125 months’ imprisonment. Finding no

error, we affirm.

On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there were no

meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the

district court erred in its application of the Sentencing

Guidelines. Barton was notified of his right to file a pro se

supplemental brief, but did not do so, and the Government elected

not to file a responsive brief.

When reviewing the district court’s application of the

Sentencing Guidelines, we review findings of fact for clear error

and questions of law de novo. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d

449, 456 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). Section

2D1.1(b)(6)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a

three-level increase if the offense involved the manufacture of

methamphetamine and created a significant risk of harm to the

environment. In determining whether a significant risk was

created, a court should consider: (1) the quantity of any chemical,

hazardous, or toxic substances, and the manner in which such
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substances were stored; (2) the manner in which the substances were

disposed, and the likelihood of release into the environment; (3)

the duration of the offense; and (4) the location of the

laboratory. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1, comment.

(n.20(A)); see United States v. Houchins, 364 F.3d 182, 187-90 (4th

Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1104 (2005).

Barton contends that the district court erred in its

application of § 2D1.1(b)(6)(B). He asserts that the Government’s

witness failed to identify a specific harm or environmental injury

stemming from the production of methamphetamine. Moreover, Barton

argues that the chemicals and compounds used to produce

methamphetamine are not individually unlawful to possess, use,

dispose of, and store.

However, as alleged in the indictment, the conspiracy to

manufacture methamphetamine spanned more than two years. Testimony

at the sentencing hearing established that numerous chemicals and

other materials were found at Barton’s residence. They were stored

in regular household garbage bags and placed in an open horse

trailer, which was described as having an “ether ammonia smell

emitting from it.” The trailer was located in a residential area,

and was emptied twice a year at a public landfill. Neither the

method of storage nor the manner of disposal was proper. Moreover,

a hazardous material team was required to clean up Barton’s
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property. Thus, under these circumstances, we conclude that the

district court properly applied the environmental risk enhancement.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for

appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

This court requires that counsel inform her client, in writing, of

his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then

counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid in the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED