Filed 8/23/22 In re T.G. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re T.G., et al., Persons Coming 

Under Juvenile Court Law.

_______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

H.O.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B312300

 (Los Angeles County Super.

Ct. No. 21CCJP00822A, B)

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION

BY THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on August 12, 

2022, is modified as follows: 

On the caption page, second paragraph, sentence in the 

first paragraph, after Daniel G. Rooney, insert “and Janette 

Freeman Cochran”.

There is no change in judgment.

RUBIN, P. J. BAKER, J. MOOR, J.
Filed 8/12/22 In re T.G. CA2/5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re T.G., et al., Persons Coming 

Under Juvenile Court Law.

_______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

H.O.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B312300

 (Los Angeles County Super.

Ct. No. 21CCJP00822A, B)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Julie Fox Blackshaw, Judge. Dismissed.

Nicole Williams; Daniel G. Rooney, under appointment by 

the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel and Sally J. Son, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
2

H.O. (mother) appeals from the order adjudicating her two 

children, T.G. (born 2011, older son) and L.W. (born 2021, baby), 

dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivision (b), although neither child was removed from her 

custody and jurisdiction was subsequently terminated as to both 

children. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The children have different fathers. Before baby was born, 

mother and older son’s father shared physical and legal custody 

of older son. In August 2019, mother, while under the influence 

of an unknown substance, tried to put older son in the car and 

drive off with him. The maternal grandmother intervened to 

protect the child, leading to a physical altercation. Police were 

called. Eventually the juvenile court issued a three-year 

protective order, protecting both older son and maternal 

grandmother from mother. The record does not indicate a change 

in the custody order, but in the immediate aftermath, older son 

lived exclusively with his father. The protective order appears to 

have terminated in November 2019. 

Mother and baby’s father had a turbulent relationship, 

which included drug use and domestic violence. In September 

2020, mother learned that she was 22 weeks pregnant with baby

and made the decision to stop using amphetamines. She moved 

back home with her mother, and requested that her doctor drug 

test her to prove that she was clean. She repeatedly tested 

negative and observers (specifically, the maternal grandmother 

and the father of older son) both saw a positive change in mother. 

In fact, older son’s father was comfortable with older son visiting 

mother in maternal grandmother’s home. Older son, as well, said 

that he felt safe in mother’s home. 
3

When baby was born, in January 2021, mother tested 

negative for drugs. However, the baby’s meconium was positive 

for amphetamines, caused by mother’s use during the pregnancy.

While it was the baby’s meconium test that brought the 

family to the attention of the Department of Children and Family 

Services (Department), the Department was also concerned about 

prior referrals, including the 2019 incident that had prompted a 

protective order. However, mother’s condition had improved to 

the point where neither maternal grandmother nor older son’s 

father believed older son needed to be protected from mother. 

On February 22, 2021, the Department filed a petition to 

declare both children dependent. Neither child was detained 

from mother.1 On March 19, 2021, the Department filed an 

amended petition. 

The jurisdiction/disposition hearing was held on May 11, 

2021. By that time, mother had continued to drug test, and all 

tests were negative. Older son’s father was very happy with 

mother’s progress, and the fact that she had reengaged in the 

care of older son. 

The court sustained some, but not all, allegations of the 

petition. Specifically, it found the children dependent, under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), for the 

following three reasons: (1) mother’s history of substance abuse

and that she was “still somewhat in denial of her substance abuse 

1 Baby was detained from his father, with whom he was not 

living. Throughout the dependency proceedings, baby’s father 

had no more than monitored visitation. He is not a party to this 

appeal. Older son’s father was non-offending. He was 

represented at the adjudication/disposition hearing, but the 

petition contained no allegations against him. He is also not a 

party to this appeal.
4

problem” despite maintaining sobriety; (2) mother’s history of 

domestic violence with baby’s father, about which mother 

continued to be in denial; and (3) baby’s father’s lengthy and 

ongoing history of substance abuse. 

As to disposition, the Department requested immediate 

termination of jurisdiction over older son, with joint physical 

custody, but sole legal custody with older son’s father. According 

to the Department’s counsel, the request for sole legal custody 

was based on the previous protective order. Counsel for mother, 

older son, and older son’s father all argued for joint legal and 

physical custody. The court agreed, and terminated jurisdiction

over older son, with a family court order for joint physical and 

legal custody, nearly identical to the previous joint legal and 

physical custody order. 

The disposition order for baby removed him from his father

and placed him in mother’s home (where he was already living), 

with family maintenance services. 

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.

Six months after disposition, while mother’s appeal was 

pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over baby and 

released baby to mother.

2

On appeal, the Department argued mother’s appeal as to 

baby should be dismissed as both non-justiciable and moot.

Jurisdiction over baby had been assumed on the conduct of both 

mother and baby’s father; and it had now been terminated with 

baby released to mother. As to justiciability, DCFS reasoned that 

even if this court were to conclude that the dependency court 

2 Specifically, there was a juvenile custody order granting 

baby’s parents joint legal custody, but mother sole physical 

custody. Baby’s father was granted monitored visitation only.
5

erred in assuming jurisdiction based on mother’s conduct,

jurisdiction had nonetheless been appropriate based on baby’s 

father’s conduct. (See, e.g., In re H.R. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 

1277, 1285-1286 [dependency court has jurisdiction when the 

conduct of either parent brings the child within the definition of a 

dependent].) As to mootness, the Department argued no relief 

could be granted mother as sole physical custody of baby had 

been returned to her. Mother argued in her Reply Brief that the 

appeal remained justiciable. We sought additional briefing as to 

whether the appeal should be dismissed as moot as to both 

children because jurisdiction had been terminated as to them 

both. Mother asks that we exercise our discretion to rule on the 

merits. The Department continues to argue that the case should 

be dismissed as to baby, but does not pursue the argument as to 

older son.

DISCUSSION

While an appeal is pending, and without fault of the 

respondent, if an event occurs which renders it impossible for this 

court, if it decides the case in favor of appellant, to grant any 

effectual relief, the appeal becomes moot. (In re Jessica K. (2000) 

79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316.) As both children have been returned 

to mother’s custody and jurisdiction has been terminated, there is 

no relief we could order.3

Mother suggests that we should consider this appeal 

regardless of its mootness, because the jurisdictional findings 

may be used against her in future proceedings. (In re Drake M.

(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763 [courts may exercise 

discretion to reach the merits of a moot appeal if the challenged 

3 Mother does not challenge the joint custody order with 

respect to older son; in fact, she sought that order.
6

order could potentially impact future proceedings].) “We are 

unconvinced, however, that any ruling we could issue here would 

have any practical effect on future dependency proceedings.” (In 

re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Mother admitted the 

facts of her prior drug abuse; indeed, her opening brief relies on 

the fact that she was “open and honest” about her drug use, 

including early in her pregnancy. That fact would certainly be 

available in any future proceeding. Mother has failed to show 

how the court’s findings, as opposed to the undisputed facts, 

would have any adverse effect on her in future proceedings.

Similarly, mother suggests that “finding a parent abused 

her child could lead to inclusion in” the Child Abuse Central 

Index (CACI). Mother did not argue that the findings in this case

could result in her inclusion in CACI. “Substantiated findings of 

general neglect are expressly excluded from those which must be 

reported for potential inclusion in CACI; only findings of ‘child 

abuse or severe neglect’ are subject to the CACI reporting 

obligation. (Pen. Code, § 11169, subds. (a) & (c).)” (In re Emily L.

(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) There were no allegations of child 

abuse in this case, nor does mother argue that the findings here 

met the statutory requirements for severe neglect. (See Pen. 

Code, § 11165.2, subd. (a) [defining severe neglect to include 

failure to protect the child from severe malnutrition, or willfully 

causing the child to be placed in a situation such that his health 

is endangered].) It is therefore unnecessary for us to address 

whether a parent’s possible inclusion in the CACI index is 

sufficient to overcome mootness, an issue which is presently 

pending before the California Supreme Court. (In re D.P.

(Feb. 10, 2021, B30113), 2021 WL 486159 [nonpub. opn.], review 

granted May 26, 2021, S267429.)
7

We dismiss the appeal as moot. We express no opinion on 

the correctness of the jurisdictional findings.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot.

RUBIN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, J.

MOOR, J.