NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

In re: CREEKVIEW IP LLC,

Petitioner

______________________

2023-108

______________________

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States 

District Court for the District of Delaware in Nos. 1:22-cv00426-CFC and 1:22-cv-00427-CFC, Chief Judge Colm F. 

Connolly.

______________________

ON PETITION

______________________

Before DYK, BRYSON, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

O R D E R

Creekview IP LLC filed these suits in the United States 

District Court for the District of Delaware. On September 

12, 2022, the district court ordered Creekview’s managing 

member to attend a hearing to determine whether 

Creekview complied with the court’s standing orders concerning (1) disclosure of owners, members, and partners of 

nongovernmental entities that are parties before the court

and (2) disclosure of certain third-party funding arrangements in litigation before the court. Creekview petitions 

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2 IN RE: CREEKVIEW IP LLC

this court for a writ of mandamus that would direct the district court to cancel the hearing and end its “judicial inquisition.” Pet. at 5.

“As the writ [of mandamus] is one of the most potent 

weapons in the judicial arsenal, three conditions must be 

satisfied before it may issue”: the petitioner must show 

(1) there is “no other adequate means to attain the relief he 

desires,” (2) the “right to issuance of the writ is clear and 

indisputable,” and (3) “the writ is appropriate under the 

circumstances.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 

367, 380–81 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). That standard has not been met. 

Creekview argues that the district court clearly overstepped its authority when it entered the standing orders. 

But a direct challenge to those orders at this juncture is 

premature, as Creekview has not been found to violate 

those orders, and it will have alternative adequate means 

to raise such challenges if, and when, such violations are 

found to occur. 

Creekview further argues that it has an indisputable 

right to terminate the district court’s inquiry because both 

cases have been dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). On September 28, 2022, the parties in 

Creekview IP LLC v. Skullcandy Inc., No. 1:22-cv-00427 (D. 

Del.) filed a joint stipulation to dismiss. On October 6, 

2022, Creekview filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under 

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) in Creekview IP LLC v. Jabra Corp., No. 

1:22-cv-00426 (D. Del.). Creekview subsequently filed a 

motion to stay both cases pending the disposition of a petition for a writ of mandamus in In re Nimitz, No. 2023-103 

(Fed. Cir.), another case challenging the district court’s 

standing orders. The district court granted the motion, 

staying the litigation pending the termination of the Federal Circuit’s stay in the Nimitz case, and canceled the evidentiary hearing that had been ordered for December 6, 

2022. Meanwhile, this court denied the Nimitz petition, 

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IN RE: CREEKVIEW IP LLC 3

noting that a challenge to the standing orders was premature, and the district court has taken no further action in 

these cases since that time.

Here, as in Nimitz, the petition is premature. Given 

that the district court has taken no further action in these 

cases since its September 12 order, other than to grant 

Creekview’s motion for a stay, the court has not addressed 

Creekview’s argument that in light of the notice of voluntary dismissal and stipulation of dismissal the court may 

not conduct the proposed inquiry into the accuracy of 

Creekview’s corporate disclosure statements and compliance with the court’s standing order on third-party litigation funding. Creekview’s contention that the district court 

may not continue its inquiry following the dismissals and 

that mandamus should be granted on that ground is therefore premature.

Notably, there is no absolute prohibition on a district 

court’s addressing collateral issues following a dismissal. 

Rather, “[i]t is well established that a federal court may 

consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 

(1990). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b); Chambers v. NASCO, 

Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (a district court has authority to 

regulate practice before it). Creekview has not shown that 

the court has taken any action in this case that is so far 

outside its authority to warrant the extraordinary remedy

of a writ of mandamus. 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

The petition is denied. 

January 4, 2023 

 Date

 FOR THE COURT

/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

 Peter R. Marksteiner

 Clerk of Court

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