alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>         5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SEPTEMBER
30, 2000 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF WORLD SERVICES, INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>       1

<S>                                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                          9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                Dec-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                   Jan-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                     Sep-30-2000
<CASH>                                             1,452,404
<SECURITIES>                                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                                         46,930
<ALLOWANCES>                                               0
<INVENTORY>                                                0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   1,499,334
<PP&E>                                                     0
<DEPRECIATION>                                             0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     2,067,334
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                 47,459
<BONDS>                                                    0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                      0
<PREFERRED>                                                0
<COMMON>                                               2,715
<OTHER-SE>                                         2,017,160
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       2,067,334
<SALES>                                                    0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     219,457
<CGS>                                                      0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                              0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       9,609
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                           0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                         0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      209,848
<INCOME-TAX>                                               0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                        0
<DISCONTINUED>                                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                            0
<CHANGES>                                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                                         209,848
<EPS-BASIC>                                                .07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                              .07



</TABLE>
Exhibit 99(f)

Independent Accountants'Report

The Board of Directors

HSBC Finance Corporation:

We have examined management's assertion that the servicing of private label credit card receivables owned by Private Label Credit Card Master Note Trust I (the receivables) has been conducted by HSBC Finance Corporation, successor by merger to Household Finance Corporation, as Servicer, in compliance with the terms and conditions as set forth in Article III and Section 5.08 of the Transfer and Servicing Agreement dated June 12, 2001 (the Agreement), as supplemented by the Series 2001-1 Series Supplement, for the period January 1, 2004 through August 16, 2004. HSBC Finance Corporation's management is responsible for the assertion.  Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting that the servicing of receivableshas been conducted in compliance with the terms and conditions as set forth inArticle III and Section 5.08of the Agreement, as supplemented, and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion,management's assertion thatthe servicing of thereceivableshas been conducted by HSBC Finance Corporation,successor by merger to Household Finance Corporation,as Servicer,in compliance with the terms and conditions as set forth in Article III and Section 5.08 of the Transfer and Servicing Agreement dated June 12, 2001, as supplemented, for the period January 1, 2004 through August 16, 2004 is fairly stated, in all material respects.

This report is intended solely for the information and use of the addressee and is not intended to be and should not be used by anyone other than this specified party.



/s/ KPMG LLP

March 1, 2005







Management Assertion





For the period January 1, 2004 through August 16, 2004, the servicing of private label credit card receivables owned by Private Label Credit Card Master Note Trust I has been conducted by HSBC Finance Corporation, successor by merger to Household Finance Corporation, as Servicer, in compliance with the terms and conditions as set forth in Article III and Section 5.08 of the



|/s/ Steve Smith
Steve Smith
Servicing Officer
HSBC Finance CorporationMarch 1, 2005
Date | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 









|/s/ Joe Hoff
Joe Hoff
Chief Financial Officer-
HSBC Finance Corporation - Retail ServicesMarch 1, 2005
Date | /s/ Chuck Colip
Chuck Colip
Deputy Managing Director /
Chief Operating Officer -
HSBC Finance Corporation - Retail ServicesMarch 1, 2005
Date
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Cosi, Inc. (the
"Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge, that:

The Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 29, 2003, of the
Company, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-K
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.


By: /s/ Mark Stickney
    -------------------------
Mark Stickney
Chief Financial Officer
March 29, 2004
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

737 

KA 14-00966 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MICHAEL BUTLER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES ECKERT OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Francis

A. Affronti, J.), entered May 5, 2014. The order determined that

defendant is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender

Registration Act. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order determining that he

is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act

([SORA] Correction Law § 168 et seq.). We reject defendant’s

contention that Supreme Court erred in denying his request for a

downward departure from his presumptive risk level. While defendant

correctly contends that “[a]n offender’s response to treatment, if

exceptional, can be the basis for a downward departure” (Sex Offender

Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 17

[2006]), we conclude that “defendant failed to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that his response to treatment was

exceptional” (People v Torres, 124 AD3d 744, 746; see People v

Stewart, 123 AD3d 784, 785, lv denied 24 NY3d 916). We thus further

conclude that “defendant failed to meet his burden of ‘prov[ing] the 

existence of the alleged mitigating factor[] . . . by a preponderance

of the evidence’ ” (People v Colon, 124 AD3d 1340, 1340, lv denied 25

NY3d 902, quoting People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d 841, 861).

In any event, it is well established that “[a] sex offender’s

successful showing by a preponderance of the evidence of facts in

support of an appropriate mitigating factor does not automatically

result in the relief requested, but merely opens the door to the SORA

court’s exercise of its sound discretion upon further examination of

all relevant circumstances” (People v Worrell, 113 AD3d 742, 743

[internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Smith, 122 AD3d 1325,
-2- 737 

KA 14-00966 

1326). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant established that his

response to treatment was exceptional, we nevertheless conclude that

the court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s

request for a downward departure (see Smith, 122 AD3d at 1326).

Entered: June 12, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### Ex parte Jessie James CARROLL.

No. 45036.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 11, 1972.

Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order in a habeas corpus proceeding remanding appellant to custody for extradition to the State of Alabama.

The only evidence introduced was the executive warrant of the Governor of Texas. It recites that the appellant “ . . . stands charged by indictment and warrant before the proper authorities, with the crime of possession of pistol after conviction of a crime of violence . . . .” The petitioner objected to its introduction on the ground it did not allege a crime under the Texas statutes. The Alabama statutes were not introduced into evidence. Art. 489c, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., provides:

> “Section 1. No person who has been convicted of a felony involving an act of *924violence may possess away from the premises upon which he lives a prohibited weapon, or a firearm having a barrel of less than 12 inches in length. ‘Prohibited weapon’ means any weapon specified by Article 483, Penal Code of Texas, 1925, as amended.”

We hold this is sufficient. The executive warrant being regular on its face made a prima facie case for extradition. Ex parte Starks, 464 S.W.2d 837 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).

The judgment remanding appellant to custody is affirmed.

No motion for rehearing will be entertained without leave of this Court first being obtained.
#### Buckley, Appellant, *v.*Brown Hoisting Machinery Co.

*Negligence*— Steel *plates*— Fall—Accident—Judgment *for defendant n. o. v.*

Where three workmen pulled too hard upon a rope attached to a steel plate, whereby another plate was jostled from its place and fell upon a fourth workman, the resulting injuries could not be attributed to the negligence of the employer, but were the consequence of a pure accident, and in an action against the employer for personal injuries so sustained, judgment for defendant n. o. v. was properly entered.

Argued Jan. 7, 1915.

Appeal, No. 222, Jan. T., 1914, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. No. 4, Philadelphia Co., Dec. T., 1910, No. 2823, entered n. o. v. in case of Frank Buckley v. Brown Hoisting Machinery Company.

Before Potter, Elkin, Stewart, Mosohzisker and Frazer, JJ.

Affirmed.

*64January 18, 1915:

Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before Carr, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict for plaintiff. The court subsequently entered judgment for defendant n. o. v. Plaintiff appealed.

*Error assigned*was in entering judgment for defendant n. o. v.

*Frederick H. Warner,*for appellant.

*Alfred D. Wil'er,*for appellee.

Per Curiam,

The evidence in this case clearly shows that the injury for which plaintiff sought to recover damages, was the result of an accident, pure and simple. The combined strength of three men, pulling upon a rope, was more effective than they anticipated, and a piece of steel plate was swung with too much force against another plate, which was thereby driven from its base, causing the injury. The force which they applied, was miscalculated by the men doing the work. For this their employer, the defendant company, was in no wise responsible. The court below was fully justified in entering judgment for the defendant, non obstante veredicto, and the judgment is affirmed.
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-2136

___________ Henrietta S. Westbrook, * * * Plaintiff - Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of * Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Defendant - Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: December 18, 1998 Filed: February 2, 1999

___________ Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
Henrie ttaS. Westbrook applied for Social Security Supplemental Securit y Income benefits, cl aiming she is disabled by bronchitis, heart disease, an arthritic hip, and chronic pain. After a hearing, the adm inistrative law judge denied her application, finding that Westbrook, who was 48 years old at the time, has severe impairments that would prob ably prevent her from performing her prior jobs, but has the residua l functional capacity to perform a wide range of at least sedentary jobs. Westbrook then filed t his action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. Th eThe HONORABLE CATHERINE D. PERRY, United Stat es District Judge for 1 the Eastern District of Missouri. -2- dist rict court in a thorough opinion concluded the ALJ’s determination is supporte d

1 by substa ntial evidence in the administrative record and granted summary judgmen t in favor of the Commissioner.
Westb rook

appeals, arguing the ALJ failed to consider her hip problem i n combination with her other impairments , failed to properly evaluate her non-exertional pain limitations, made an unfounded assessment of her credibility, posed inadequat e hypothetical questions to the vocational expert regarding her residual functiona l capacity, and made improper judgments on medic al issues. After careful review of the administrative record, we affirm for the reasons stated by th e district court. See 8 Cir. th Rule 47B . A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
| Skip to Content*Release Date: December 11, 2008*Release dates |  Coded tables |  Historical dataCurrent release |  Screen reader |  PDF (450 KB)**L.4 Credit Market Debt, All Sectors, by Instrument** |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
<TABLE> <S> <C>


       

<S>                                  <C>
<ARTICLE>                                       5
<MULTIPLIER>                                1,000
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                     JUN-30-1996
<PERIOD-START>                        JUL-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-TYPE>                               6-MOS
<CASH>                                      2,182
<SECURITIES>                                  612
<RECEIVABLES>                               3,721 <F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                    0
<INVENTORY>                                 8,743
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           16,506
<PP&E>                                     28,791
<DEPRECIATION>                             14,506
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             31,110
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       4,419
<BONDS>                                     4,071
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           0
<PREFERRED>                                     0
<COMMON>                                       41
<OTHER-SE>                                 21,564
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               31,110
<SALES>                                    15,613
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           15,613
<CGS>                                      10,856
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              14,948
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            220
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               886
<INCOME-TAX>                                  282
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           604
<DISCONTINUED>                                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 0
<CHANGES>                                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                  604
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                0.16
<EPS-DILUTED>                                0.16

<FN>
<F1>note: receivables shown net of allowance of 290
</FN>
        



</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report onForm 10-QSB of World Heart Corporation (the “Corporation”) for the quarterended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission onthe date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Jal S. Jassawalla, Presidentand Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, hereby certifies, pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; as amended and

 

(2) The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Corporation as of March 31, 2006.

 
| Dated:  May 11, 2006 | /s/ * Jal S. Jassawalla |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|
|                      |                    | Jal S. Jassawalla, President and Chief |
|                      |                    | Executive Officer |
|                      |                    | (Principal Executive Officer) |

 

----

*******                **Asigned original of this written statement required by section 906 has beenprovided to the Corporation and will be retained by the Corporation andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1273 

KA 09-00951 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, FAHEY, LINDLEY, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CORNELLIUS L. NESMITH, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (KIMBERLY F. DUGUAY OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County

(Joseph D. Valentino, J.), rendered April 30, 2009. The judgment

convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession

of a weapon in the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a

guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree

(Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), defendant contends that the police conducted

an illegal inventory search of the vehicle and thus that Supreme Court

erred in refusing to suppress the weapon found during that search. We

reject defendant’s contention. “Following a lawful arrest of the

driver of an automobile that must then be impounded, the police may

conduct an inventory search of the vehicle” pursuant to established

police policy (People v Johnson, 1 NY3d 252, 255). Here, the People

met their burden of establishing that the police followed the

procedure set forth in the applicable order of the Rochester Police

Department in conducting the inventory search (see People v Wilburn,

50 AD3d 1617, 1618, lv denied 11 NY3d 742; People v Cooper, 48 AD3d

1055, 1056, lv denied 10 NY3d 861). Also contrary to defendant’s

contention, the officers followed the standard procedure in the

applicable order in impounding the vehicle upon determining that there

was no one available who could legally drive it. We reject

defendant’s contention that the applicable order required the officers

to locate the registered owner of the vehicle. Contrary to

defendant’s further contention, the record establishes that the police

prepared a “meaningful inventory list” (Johnson, 1 NY3d at 256; see

Wilburn, 50 AD3d at 1618). We have considered defendant’s remaining 
-2- 1273 

KA 09-00951 

contention and conclude that it is without merit.

Entered: January 2, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### Mack SHOTTS d/b/a Mack Shotts Truck Stop, Appellant, v. George J. PARDI, Appellee.

No. 686.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.

Oct. 7, 1971.

*178Clayton R. Baird, Edinburg, for appellant.

Sid L. Hardin, Edinburg, for appellee.

OPINION

NYE, Chief Justice.

This is a suit to recover the proceeds of a check from the maker. The check was payable to George Schnell. Schnell endorsed the check to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the maker stopped payment. The maker-defendant answered and excepted to plaintiff’s petition contending that the payee George Schnell was primary liable to the plaintiff and was therefore a necessary party. The trial court entered a “PRE-TRIAL ORDER” in which he sustained defendant’s exception and gave leave to the plaintiff to amend his petition. No other order or judgment affecting the issues before the trial court or of the parties was entered by the trial court.

The plaintiff then filed his motion denominated “Rehearing”. The trial court entered its order overruling “Motion of Plaintiff for Rehearing.” It is from this order that plaintiff has attempted his appeal. The plaintiff has tendered a transcript in this Court which has been marked “received” by the Clerk. It is clear to us that the trial court has not entered a final judgment.

An appeal may be prosecuted only from a final judgment and to be final a judgment or order must dispose of all issues and all parties to the case. North East Independent School District v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Sup.1966). The pretrial order did not dispose of the cause of action and therefore it was not appealable.

It has also been brought to our attention from the transcript, that the plaintiff sought and received an extension of time from the trial court in which to file his record in this Court. Extensions of time for perfecting appeals to the Court of Civil Appeals may not be granted by the trial court. Such extensions must be in compliance with Rule 386, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The tender here of the record long after the time prescribed under Rule 386, prevents this Court from obtaining jurisdiction, even had the attempted appeal been from a final order dismissing the suit.

The attempted appeal is dismissed.

SHARPE, J., not participating.