RENDERED: JANUARY 28, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0789-MR

MARK CRANMER APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-CI-00891

JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY CABINET APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: LAMBERT, MAZE, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, L., JUDGE: Mark Cranmer, pro se, appeals from an order of the 

Franklin Circuit Court dismissing his petition for a reconsideration of his parole 

eligibility. Appellant argues that the Kentucky Parole Board violated statutory law 

and the Kentucky Constitution when it denied his parole application. We find no 

error and affirm.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant is currently an inmate at the Northpoint Training Center in 

Burgin, Kentucky. He is currently serving a ten-year sentence for various offenses. 

On September 1, 2020, Appellant went before the Kentucky Parole Board. The 

Board denied his application for parole and indicated he could seek parole again in 

twenty-four months. The Board indicated that it denied his parole for the 

following reasons: (1) seriousness of the crime; (2) prior felony convictions; (3) 

drugs or alcohol involvement; (4) assaultive behavior; (5) history of violating 

conditions of probation or parole; and (6) prior misdemeanor convictions.

Appellant then filed for reconsideration of his parole. He claimed that 

the Board made an error by indicating he had a history of “assaultive behavior.” 

He argued that he was a nonviolent offender and had never been convicted of a 

violent offense. Appellant’s reconsideration was denied. A Board member stated 

the following in denying the reconsideration: “Mr. Cranmer contends the board 

erred in citing ‘History of Assaultive Behavior’ on his Parole Denied Order, thus 

requests reconsideration due to ‘procedural error.’ Mr. Cranmer was convicted of 

Sexual Abuse in 2001 which qualifies as assaultive behavior. No reconsideration. 

Decision Stands.”1

 

1 We note that Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree sexual abuse in 2003, not 2001.
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Appellant then sought judicial review of this decision. Appellant 

argued that the Board violated Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 439.331 and KRS 

439.335. He also argued that by ignoring these two statutes, the Board violated the 

Kentucky Constitution. The trial court found no error, dismissed his petition, and 

this appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

“The parole-release decision . . . depends on an amalgam of elements, 

some of which are factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by 

the Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and sensitive 

task of evaluating the advisability of parole release.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 

2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1979).

Belcher v. Kentucky Parole Board, 917 S.W.2d 584 (Ky.

App. 1996), determined that all that was required in 

the parole review process when parole is denied is that 

the prisoner have the opportunity to be heard and that he 

be advised in general terms of the reason for the decision 

of the Board. The judicial standard of review of 

decisions of the Parole Board is limited to an 

examination of compliance with the terms of KRS 

439.250 to 439.560.

Stewart v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 789, 791 (Ky. 2005).

With the above standard of review in mind, we will now proceed to 

Appellant’s argument on appeal. Like he did at the trial court, Appellant argues 
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that the Board did not follow KRS 439.331 and KRS 439.335; therefore, he should 

get a new parole hearing. KRS 439.331 states:

The department shall:

(1) Administer a validated risk and needs assessment to 

assess the criminal risk factors of all inmates who are 

eligible for parole, or a reassessment of a previously 

administered risk and needs assessment, before the 

case is considered by the board;

(2) Provide the results of the most recent risk and needs 

assessment to the board before an inmate appears 

before the board; and

(3) Incorporate information from an inmate’s criminal 

risk and needs assessment into the development of his 

or her case plan.

KRS 439.335 states in relevant part that “[i]n considering the granting of parole 

and the terms of parole, the parole board shall use the results from an inmate’s 

validated risk and needs assessment and any other scientific means for personality 

analysis that may hereafter be developed.”

The trial court held that KRS 439.331 related to the Kentucky 

Department of Corrections and not the Board. We agree. The statute specifically 

relates to “the department.” In any event, there is no allegation that the Board did 

not have a validated risk assessment on Appellant. 

As for KRS 439.335, Appellant argues that the Board relied solely on 

a 2003 misdemeanor for denying his parole; therefore, the Board violated KRS 
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439.335 by not utilizing the risk assessment when determining parole eligibility. 

Appellant also argues that he has never been convicted of a violent offense as 

defined in KRS 439.3401; therefore, the claim that he has “assaultive behavior” 

was in error. We find no error here.

KRS 439.3401 lists a number of violent offenses that limit parole 

eligibility under certain circumstances. Appellant is correct that second-degree 

sexual abuse is not among that list; however, the Board’s stating that Appellant has 

a history of assaultive behavior does not mean the Board was indicating he was a 

violent offender under KRS 439.3401. At the time of his conviction, seconddegree sexual abuse was defined as:

(1) A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the second 

degree when:

(a) He subjects another person to sexual contact who is 

incapable of consent because he is mentally retarded;

(b) He subjects another person who is less than fourteen 

(14) years old to sexual contact;

(c) Being an employee, contractor, vendor, or volunteer 

of the Department of Corrections, or a detention 

facility as defined in KRS 520.010, or of an entity 

under contract with either the department or a 

detention facility for the custody, supervision, 

evaluation, or treatment of offenders, he subjects an 

offender who is incarcerated, supervised, evaluated, or 

treated by the Department of Corrections, the 

detention facility, or the contracting entity, to sexual 

contact. In any prosecution under this paragraph, the 

defendant may prove in exculpation that, at the time 
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he engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, he 

and the offender were married to each other; or

(d) Being twenty-one (21) years old or more, he subjects 

another person to sexual contact who is less than 

eighteen (18) years old and for whom he provides a 

foster family home as defined in KRS 600.020.

(2) Sexual abuse in the second degree is a Class A

misdemeanor.

KRS 510.120. It is unclear from the record before us which subsection Appellant 

was convicted under; however, any subsection could be deemed as “assaultive 

behavior” by the parole board. 

In addition, the Board did not violate KRS 439.335 by relying solely 

on the sexual abuse conviction when denying Appellant’s parole. The Board listed 

six factors it considered when denying his parole. Clearly the Board considered 

the risk assessment. The only reason the reconsideration of parole order focused 

on the “assaultive behavior” factor was because that was the only factor Appellant 

sought to be reconsidered. It is clear that the Board examined the risk assessment 

in this case.

Furthermore, we note that KRS 439.330(1) states that the Board shall 

“(a) [s]tudy the case histories of persons eligible for parole, and deliberate on that 

record [and] (b) [c]onduct reviews and hearings on the desirability of granting 

parole[.]” The Board does not simply rely on the risk assessment in making its 

determination, but may consider other relevant evidence.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in this 

case. The Board followed the applicable statutory requirements and we find no 

error. There was no violation of KRS 439.331, KRS 439.335, or the Kentucky 

Constitution.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Mark Cranmer, pro se

Burgin, Kentucky

NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.