FILED JULY 29, 2009 GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of GARY E. BUSH, a protected person, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 136617

BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, M.D., M. ASHARAF MANSOUR, M.D., VASCULAR ASSOCIATES, P.C., and SPECTRUM HEALTH BUTTERWORTH CAMPUS, Defendants,

and JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., and WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR SURGEONS, Defendants-Appellants.

___________________ _________________ GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of GARY E. BUSH, a protected person, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., No. 136653 Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Opinion Chief Justice: Marilyn Kelly Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway2 Defendant-Appellant,

and JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR SURGEONS, GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, M.D., M. ASHRAF MANSOUR, M.D., VASCULAR ASSOCIATES, P.C., and SPECTRUM HEALTH BUTTERWORTH CAMPUS,

Defendants.

___________________ _________________ GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of GARY EDWARD BUSH, a protected person, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR SURGEONS, GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, M.D., M. ASHRAF MA NSOUR, M.D., and VASCULAR ASSOCIATES, P.C., Defendants, No. 136983

and

SPECTRUM HEALTH BUTTERWORTH CAMPUS, Defendant-Appellant.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH3 HATHAWAY, J. At issue before this Court is the pr oper interpretation of MCL 600.5856(c), as amended by 2004 PA 87, effective April 22, 2004. We have been asked to consider whether a defect in a timely mail ed notice of intent (NOI), provided to a medical malpractice defendant pursuant to MCL 600.2912b, pr ecludes the tolling of the statute of limitations on a plainti ff’s medical malpractice claim. We also consider whether, and under what circumstan ces, a plaintiff may take advantage of the 154-day statutory wa iting period provided und er MCL 600.2912b(8).

We conclude that the 2004 ame ndments of MCL 600.5856 have significantly clarified the proper role of an NOI provided pursuant to MCL 600.2912b. While the former statute, MCL 600.5856(d), has been interpreted to preclude tolling when defects are found in an NOI, the current statute, § 5856(c), makes clear that the question whether tolling applies is determined by the timeliness of the NOI. Thus, if an NOI is timely, the statute of limitations is tolled despite defects contained therein. Mo reover, in light of this significant clarification of § 5856, we hold that the purpose of the NOI stat ute is better served by allowing for defects in NOIs to be a ddressed in light of MCL 600.2301, which allows for amendment and disregard of “a ny error or defect” where the substantial rights of the parties are not affected and the cure is in the furtherance of justice. We hold that the mandates of § 2301 are met when a party makes a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements of § 291 2b. Finally, we hold that a plaintiff may take advantage of th e 154-day waiting period provided in4 § 2912b(8) where a defendant fails to make a good-faith attempt to reply to the plaintiff’s NOI in compliance with the statutory content requirements. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proc eedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The underlying facts and procedural hist ory of this case were well set forth by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals summarized: On August 7, 2003, Gary E. Bu sh (Bush), who was 33 at the time, had surgery to repair an aor tic aneurysm at Spectrum Health’s Butterworth Campus. Shabahang and Heiser, who are surgeons employed by WM Cardiova scular, performed the surgery. Plaintiff, Bush’s guardian, claims that when Shabahang cut open Bush’s chest, he lacerated the aneurysm, which made it necessary for Heiser to cannulate Bush’s femoral artery and femoral vein so that Bush could be placed on a heart-bypass mach ine before the surgery could proceed. Defendants George T. Sugiyama, M.D., and M. Ashraf Mansour, M.D., who are vascular su rgeons with defendant Vascular Associates, P.C., repaired Bush’s femoral artery and femoral vein, respectively. According to plai ntiff, the injuries Bush suffered during the surgery and during his recovery rendered him unable to lead an independent life. On August 5, 2005, which was just days before the expiration of the applicable period of limitati ons, plaintiff served a notice of intent to file a medical-malpract ice complaint agai nst Shabahang, Heiser, Sugiyama, Mansour, WM Cardiovascular, Vascular Associates, and Spectrum Health. Sugiyama, Mansour, Vascular Associates, and Shabah ang responded to pl aintiff’s notice as required by MCL 600.2912b(7). On January 27, 2006, which was 175 days after plaintiff served no tice on defendants, plaintiff filed his complaint against all defendants. Shortly thereafter, Sugiyama , Mansour, and Vascular Associates moved for summary di sposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). They argued that dismissal was appropriate on two5 grounds: (1) plaintiff failed to file a notice that complied with the requirements of MCL 600.2912b, a nd (2) plaintiff failed to wait the required 182 days before filing his complaint. Shab ahang, Heiser, and WM Cardiovascular joined th e motion. Spectrum Health later filed its own motion for summary disposition based solely on the alleged deficiency of the notice. In response to these motions, plaintiff argued that the notice met the minimum statutory requirements. Plaintiff responded to the allegations that the complaint was prematurely filed by arguing that the responses to the notice were deficient. Because defendants’ responses to the notice were defici ent, plaintiff contended that he could properly file his complaint after 154 days from the date of service of the notice. Hence, plai ntiff concluded, his complaint was not prematurely filed. The trial court determined th at the notice was insufficient with regard to Sugiyama, Mansour, and Vascular Associates. On the basis of that conclusion, the tria l court granted summary disposition in favor of Sugiyama, Mansou r, and Vascular Associates. The trial court also granted summary dispositi on in favor of Spectrum Health, but only to the extent that its alleged liability was based on the actions of Sugiyama and Mansour. The trial court also granted summary disposition in fa vor of Spectrum Health with regard to the claims of negligence on the part of Spectrum Health’s physician assistants because plaintiff failed to file a conforming affidavit of merit. However, “[a]s to the othe r doctors and defendants . . . the Court’s of the opinion that the [notic e] is clearly sufficient, so those motions are denied.” The trial cour t also determined that plaintiff’s complaint was not prematurely filed. [1] Defendants appealed the trial court’ s orders. The Court of Appeals consolidated defendants’ applications for leave to appeal. On May 1, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued a p ublished opinion affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding to the trial court for further proceedings. 2 The Court of Appeals

1 Bush v Shabahang , 278 Mich App 703, 706-70 8; 753 NW2d 271 (2008).

2 Id . at 726-727.6 held that, when read as a whole, the NOI was suffici ent to comply with the requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4), except w ith regard to the claims of direct liability for training and su pervision against West Mich igan Cardiovascular. The

Court also concluded that certain claims for vicarious liability against Spectrum Health were inadequately pled. 3 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of summary disposition on the deficiently pl ed direct liability

claims and remanded to the trial cour t for an order gran ting the motion for summary disposition and dismissing the clai ms without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling th at plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed, holding that plaintiff could avail himsel f of the shortened 154-day waiting period

because the defendants’ res ponse to the NOI was defici ent. Defendant Spectrum

Health’s motion for reconsidera tion of the opinion was denied. Defendants filed three separate applica tions for leave to appeal in this

Court. This Court consolidated the a ppeals and granted oral argument on the application. 4 After oral argument on the applic ation, this Court granted leave to appeal. 5

3 The Court of Appeals held that the claims for vicariou s liability for the physicians’ assistant and the nursing staff were inadequately pl ed, but the claims against Heiser and Shabah ang were sufficient.

4 Bush v Shabahang , 482 Mich 1014 (2008).

5 Bush v Shabahang , 482 Mich 1105 (2008).7 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The issues presented are issues of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. 6 This Court

also reviews de novo a trial court’s de cision regarding a motion for summary disposition. 7

III. ANALYSIS A. MCL 600.5856(c) and Tolling

The first issue this Court is asked to address is whether the defects identified in plaintiff’s NOI act to bar tolling of the st atute of limitations under MCL 600.5856(c) as amended by 2004 PA 87, effective April 22, 2004. Our analysis necessarily begins with a review of the langua ge of § 5856 before and

after the 2004 amendments. The relevant language of § 5856(d), the predecessor to § 5856(c), 8 provided that tolling is operative if the “notice is given in compliance with section 2912b .” (Emphasis added.) The relevant language of § 5856(c) currently provides that tolling is operative “[a]t the time notice is given in compliance wi th the applicable notice period under section 2912b . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The question arises

6 In re Investigation of March 1999 Riots in East Lansing (People v Pastor) , 463 Mich 378, 383; 617 NW2d 310 (2000).

7 Herald Co v Bay City , 463 Mich 111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).

8 The former § 5856(d) was renumbered by the amendment and now appears as § 5856(c).8 whether the amendment mandates complianc e with the entirety of § 2912b, such that a defective NOI does not get the be nefit of tolling, or whether the new language focuses on compliance with only th e applicable notice period in § 2912b,

such that a defective NOI tolls the statute of limitations as long as it is compliant with the notice period. This question was seemingly answered in Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp ( Roberts I ) 9 and Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr , 10 both of which held that a defect in an NOI precludes tolling of the statute of limitations during the 182-day waiting period. Roberts I opined that MCL 600.5856(d) and MCL 600.2912b were inextricably tied. The Court held that “t he statute of limitati ons cannot be tolled under MCL 600.5856(d) unless notice is given in compliance with all the provisions of MCL 600.2912b.” 11

However, this holding was foundationa lly premised on the pre-amendment language. The Court explained: Section 5856(d) clearly provides that notice must be compliant with § 2912b, not just § 2912b(2) as plaintiff contrarily contends. Had the Legislature in tended only the delivery provisions of § 2912b to be applicable, we presume that the Legislature would have expressly limited compliance only to § 2912b(2). However, the Legislature did not do so. Rathe r, it referred to all of § 2912b.

9 Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp , 466 Mich 57, 642 NW2d 663 (2002).

10 Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr , 481 Mich 558, 561; 751 NW2d 44 (2008).

11 Roberts I , supra at 59.9 Since the statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court is required to enforce § 5856(d) as wr itten. As a result, the tolling of the statute of limitations is availa ble to a plaintiff only if all the requirements included in § 2912b are met. [12] Significantly, Roberts I interpreted the former MCL 600.5856(d), as the

amendment was not enacted until after Roberts I was decided. Boodt , while decided in 2008, made no re ference to the 2004 amendm ent. Rather, it relied on

the Roberts I interpretation of the former § 58 56(d), presumably because the complaint in Boodt was filed prior to the 2 004 amendment. Neither Roberts I nor Boodt addressed the question at issue here, namely, whether the current language of § 5856(c) mandates that defects in an NO I act as a bar to tolli ng of the statute of

limitations. Since Roberts I and Boodt relied on language of a statute that is no longer in existence, exam ining the correct interpreta tion of § 5856(c) and its interrelationship with § 2912b is an issue of first impression. The question this Court addresses is one of statutory construction. Assuming that the Legislature has acted within its constitutional authority, the purpose of statutory construction is to disc ern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. 13 In determining the in tent of the Legislature, this Court must first look to the langua ge of the statute. 14 The Court must, first and foremost, interpret

12 Id . at 64.

13 Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward , 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).

14 Id

.10 the language of a statute in a manner that is consistent with the intent of the Legislature. 15 “‘As far as possible, effect shou ld be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute. The statutory la nguage must be read an d understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something diffe rent was intended.’” 16 Moreover, when considering th e correct interpretation, the statute must be read as

a whole. 17 Individual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the context of the entire legislative scheme. 18 While defining particular words in statutes, we must consider both the plai n meaning of the critic al word or phrase and its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. 19 A statute must be read in conjunction with other relevant statutes to ensure that the legislative intent is correctly ascertained. 20 The statute must be interp reted in a manner that ensures that it works in harmony with the entire statutory scheme. 21 Moreover, courts must pay particular attention to stat utory amendments, because a change in statutory language is presumed to reflect either a legislative ch ange in the meaning

15 Id.

16 Herman v Berrien Co , 481 Mich 352, 366; 750 NW2d 570, 579 (2008), quoting Sun Valley , supra at 237.

17 Sun Valley , supra at 237.

18 Herman , supra at 366.

19 Id. , quoting Bailey v United States , 516 US 137, 145; 116 S Ct 501; 133 L Ed 2d 472 (1995).

20 Wayne Co v Au ditor General , 250 Mich 227, 233; 229 NW 911 (1930).

21 Id . at 234.11 of the statute itself or a desire to clarif y the correct interpreta tion of the original

statute. 22 Finally, an analysis of a statute’s le gislative history is an important tool in ascertaining legislative intent. 23

To determine the intent of MCL 600. 5856(c), we first look at its plain language. The pre-amendment version of § 5856 stated: The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled: (a) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are serv ed on the defendant. (b) At the time jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired. (c) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint in good faith are plac ed in the hands of an officer for immediate service, but in this case the statute is not tolled longer than 90 days after the copy of the summons and complaint is received by the officer. (d) If, during the applicable no tice period under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not longer than a number of days equa l to the number of days in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given in compliance with section 2912b . [Emphasis added.] MCL 600.5856, as amended by the Legislature in 2004, states: The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled in any of the following circumstances: (a) At the time the co mplaint is filed, if a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant within th e time set forth in the supreme court rules.

22 See Lawrence Baking Co v Unem ployment Compensation Comm , 308 Mich 198, 205; 13 NW2d 260 (1944).

23 See In re MCI Telecom Complaint , 460 Mich 396, 415 ; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).12 (b) At the time jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired. (c) At the time notice is given in compliance with the applicable notice period under section 2912b , if during that period a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose; but in this case, the statute is tolled not longer than the number of days equal to the number of days remaining in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given. [Emphasis added.] In comparing the pre- and post-amendm ent language, it is clear that the focus of the operative language has been clarified. Roberts I opined that the focus of § 5856(d) was on compliance with § 2912b in its entirety. In contrast, the focus of the new § 5856(c) is un questionably limited to comp liance with the “applicable notice period.”

As Roberts I pointed out, if the Legislature had intended to limit the applicability of § 2912b, it would have expr essly limited compliance in the statute. The 2004 amendment of § 5 856 does precisely that. It limits compliance to the notice period under § 2912b. Thus, pursuant to the clear language of § 2912b and the new § 5856(c), if a plain tiff complies with the applic able notice period before commencing a medical malpractice action, the statute of limitations is tolled. Defendants ask us to disregard the chan ge to the language of § 5856 and assume that the change was merely inadve rtent. They urge us to interpret the

amended statute in the same manner that Roberts I and Boodtinterpreted the preamended statute. We canno t do so. This Court canno t assume that language13 chosen by the Legislature is inadvertent. 24 To the contrary , this Court must assume that an express legislative change denotes either a change in the meaning

of the statute itself or a clarification of the original legislative intent of the

statute. 25 We cannot assume that the change means nothing at all. The language of the new § 5856(c), “compliance with the applicable notice period under section 2912b,” clearly and unequivocally sets fo rth that a plaintiff’s NOI must comply only with the applicable notice period. In sum, neither the Roberts I nor the Boodt analysis applies in the matter

before us because both analyses were based on a former version of § 5856 that is no longer in existence. The Legislature, in exercising its authority, has changed the language of the statute and we must ab ide by that action. Thus, we hold that, pursuant to the clear language of § 2912b an d § 5856(c), if a plaintiff files a timely NOI before commencing a medical malpracti ce action, the statute of limitations is tolled despite the presence of defects in the NOI.

24 Lawrence Baking , supra at 205.

25 Id . See also Ettinger v City of Lansing , 215 Mich App 451; 546 NW2d 652 (1996), wherein Justice Markman, th en sitting at the Court of Appeals and joined by th en-Judge Corrigan, opined: We note that plaintiffs correc tly state the general proposition that changes in statutory language presumably reflect a change in meaning. Wortelboer v Benzie Co , 212 Mich App 208, 217; 537 NW2d 603 (1995). However, change s in statutory language may reflect an attempt to cl arify the meaning of a provision rather than change it. Id. ; see also Evans v Hebert , 203 Mich App 392, 403; 513 NW2d 164 (1994).14 B. Consequence of a Defective NOI In light of the fact that a defective NOI does not bar tolling of the statute of limitations under § 5856(c), we must now consider what a c ourt must do when presented with a defective NOI. 26 We must again begin our an alysis by examining the language of the statute itself. MCL 600.2912b states in relevant part: (1) Except as otherwise provide d in this section, a person shall not commence an action allegi ng medical malpractice against a health professional or health fac ility unless the person has given the health professional or health facil ity written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced. (2) The notice of intent to file a claim required under subsection (1) shall be mailed to the last known professional business address or residential address of the health professional or health facility who is the subject of the claim. Proof of the mailing constitutes prima facie evidence of co mpliance with this section. If no last known professional busine ss or residential address can reasonably be ascertained , notice may be mailed to the health facility where the care that is the ba sis for the claim was rendered. * * * (4) The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following:

26 The Boodt Court opined that because no tolling was affo rded in the presence of a defect pursuant to § 5856(d), the plainti ff’s action was not commenced under § 2912b(1). Boodt , supra at 562-563. Our analysis today explains that the Legislature has made it clear that a defective NOI does not preclude tolling of the statute of limitati ons for cases bought under § 5856(c). As a result, whether a medical malpractice action is commenced for purposes of § 5856(a) does not depend on the presence or absence of defects within the NOI.15 (a) The factual basis for the claim. (b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant. (c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility. (d) The alleged action that shou ld have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged st andard of practice or care. (e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice. (f) The names of all health pr ofessionals and health facilities the claimant is notifying under this section in relation to the claim. * * * (7) Within 154 days after receip t of notice under this section, the health professional or health facility against whom the claim is made shall furnish to the claima nt or his or her authorized representative a written response that contains a statement of each of the following: (a) The factual basis for th e defense to the claim. (b) The standard of practice or care that the health professional or health facility claims to be applicable to the action and that the health professional or health facility co mplied with that standard. (c) The manner in which it is claimed by the health professional or health facility th at there was compliance with the applicable standard of practice or care. (d) The manner in wh ich the health professional or health facility contends that the alle ged negligence of the health professional or health facility wa s not the proximate cause of the claimant’s alleged inju ry or alleged damage. (8) If the claimant does not receive the written response required under subsection (7) with in the required 154-day time period, the claimant may commen ce an action alleging medical malpractice upon the expiration of the 154-day period.16 The plain language of § 2912b(1) ma ndates that a plaintiff shall not commence an action for medical malpra ctice without filing a timely NOI. Notably, however, the statute is silent regarding the consequences of filing a

defective NOI. The statute makes no re ference whatsoever to a mandatory dismissal penalty in the event of a defect. Thus, our inquiry begins with whether a mandatory dismissal with prejudice u nder § 2912b was the intent of the Legislature. In the absence of an expr ess directive within the statute itself, the legislative history of § 2912b, the stat ute’s purpose, its placement within the broader statutory scheme, and a review of other relevant statutes are instructive guides. A review of the legislative history reveals that the Legislature did not

intend for a defect in an NO I to be grounds for dismissa l with prejudice based on § 2912b. The clearest indication for this conclusion was the Legislature’s complete rejection of a mandatory dism issal clause. The statute creating NOIs was originally introduced as Senate Bill 270 on January 28, 1993. 27 NOIs were codified in what was then proposed § 2912f. Section 2912d, a proposed companion to § 2912f, contained a mandato ry dismissal penalty for failure to comply with § 2912 f. The bill as intr oduced provided:

27 This bill was introduced in th e Senate by Senators DeGrow, Van Regenmorter, Gast, Cisky, Welborn, Wartner, Emmons, Schwarz, Ehlers, Geake, Arthurhultz, DiNello, Koivisto, Bouchard , Dunaskiss, Pridnia, and McManus.17 Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in an action alleging medical malpractice, the court shall dismiss a claim not included in the notice requi red under section 2912f . [Emphasis added.] Significantly, this penalty provision di d not have sufficient votes to pass. Mandatory dismissal was not the will of the Legislature. This Court has previously recognized that legislative history may be us ed to determine legislative intent. This Court previous ly held that “[w]here the Legislature has considered certain language and rejected it in favor of other language, the resulting statutory language should not be held to aut horize what the Legislature explicitly rejected.” 28 We can draw no conclusion from the omission of the dismissal

28 In re MCI Telecom Complaint , supra at 415. Similarly, Univ Med Affiliates, PC v Wa yne Co Executive , 142 Mich App 135, 140; 369 NW2d 277 (1985), held that the legislative history of a statute may be considered and, where it can be shown that certain language was affirmatively rejected, the court should not give the statute a construction that the Legislature plainly refused to give. As the Court explained in In re MCI Telecom Complaint : [W]e find the meaning of § 31 2a, standing alone, to be unambiguous on its face. The stat utory language clearly requires that, should interLAT A prohibitions be removed, Ameritech must provide intraLATA toll dialing par ity. There is, however, nothing on the face of this statute, or w ithin the language enacted by the Legislature, that would hold the reverse to be true. Indeed, where the Legislature specifically consid ered language authorizing such a linkage, and rejected it, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in holding that the statute inextricably lin ked intraLATA and interLATA toll dialing parity. [ Id

. at 415-416.] See also Nation v WDE Electric Co , 454 Mich 489, 492-493, 495; 563 NW2d 233 (1997); Miller v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co , 410 Mich 538, 566; 302 NW2d 537 (1981); and People v Adamowski , 340 Mich 422, 429; 65 NW2d 753 (1954).18 penalty in § 2912b other than it was not the intent of the Legislature to incorporate a mandatory dismissal penalty into § 2912b. The stated purpose of § 2912b was to provide a mechan ism for “promoting

settlement without the need for formal litigation, redu cing the cost of medical malpractice litigation, and providing compensation for meritorious medical malpractice claims that would otherwise be precluded from recovery because of litigation costs . . . .” 29 To hold that § 2912b in a nd of itself mandates dismissal with prejudice would complicate, prolong, and significantly increase the expense of litigation. Dismissal with prejudice wo uld be inconsistent with these stated

purposes. Further, in determining legislative intent, we must lo ok to § 2912b’s context within the broader medical malpra ctice statutory scheme. To do so, we

examine the statute as a whole. Our revi ew of the medical malpractice legislation indicates that it was designed as a balanced scheme, imposing equivalent requirements on both plaintiffs and defendan ts. Both are required to participate in the NOI process and file comparable documents. 30 Both are required to file comparable affidavits to acco mpany complaints and answers. 31 Both are required

29 Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 270, August 11, 1993; House Legislative Analysis, HB 4403-4406, March 22, 1993.

30 See MCL 600.2912b.

31 See MCL 600.2912d and MCL 600.2912e.19 to meet the same expert witness qualifications. 32 In light of these comparable and balanced requirements, the penalties shou ld likewise be comparable. It is significant that the only penalty provision included in § 2912b is very minor: a shortening of the defendant’s waiting period by 28 days. 33 In light of the minor penalty for a defendant, it would be inconsis tent with the balanc ed approach in the legislative scheme to assume that the Legislature intend ed to impose on plaintiffs the harshest penalty possible: dismissal with prejudice. 34 In determining legislativ e intent, we should also consider other relevant statutory provisions. To that end, we consider the Revised Judicature Act (RJA) to see if other appropriate remedies exis t that are consistent with the intended purpose of § 2912b. We have long recognized that the RJA does provide a

mechanism to cure certain defects within pleadings in MCL 600.2301. We note that the language of § 2301 goes beyond the limited concept of amendment of

32 MCL 600.2169.

33 MCL 600.2912b(8).

34 Given the Legislature’s clear rejec tion of dismissal as a penalty in § 2912b, and its amendment of § 5856(d ), we question whether the Legislature ever intended § 5856(d) to preclude tollin g of the statute of limitations in the presence of defects in an NOI. The tim ing of the amendment, the language chosen, and the legislative history support the conclusion that the change was intended to be a clarification of the original intent of the statut e rather than it being representative of a change from the orig inal intent. Accord ingly, we question whether Roberts I and Boodt were correctly decided, as they failed to consider the entire legislative scheme and the legisla tive history involved. However, because the NOI and filing in this case occurred afte r 2004, this issue is not before us and we will refrain from deciding this issue in the present case.20 “pleadings” and allows for curing of cert ain defects in any “process, pleading or proceeding.”

MCL 600.2301 states: The court in which any action or proceeding is pending, has power to amend any process, plea ding or proceeding in such action or proceeding, either in form or substance, for th e furtherance of justice, on such terms as are ju st, at any time before judgment rendered therein. The court at every stage of the action or proceeding shall disregard any erro r or defect in the proceedings which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Service of an NOI is clearly part of a medical malpractice “process” or “proceeding” in Michigan. 35 Section 2912b mandates that “an action alleging medical malpractice” in Michigan “shall not commence . . . unless the person has given the health profes sional or health facility written notice . . . .” 36 Since an NOI must be given before a medical malpractic e claim can be filed, the service of an NOI is a part of a medical malpractice “p roceeding.” As a re sult, § 2301 applies to the NOI “process.” 37 As Justice Cavanagh opined in his dissent in Boodt , this

35 See Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (After Remand) , 470 Mich 679, 691; 684 NW2d 711 (2004) ( Roberts II ) (“[W]e acknowledge that the notice of intent is provided at the earliest stage of a medical malpractice proceeding .” [Emphasis supplied.]); Boodt , supra at 561.

36 MCL 600.2912b(1).

37 We note that the majority in Boodt engaged in some limited discussion of § 2301 in a footnote. Boodt , supra at 567 n 4. However, as we previously indicated, the Boodt majority did not reach this issu e in light of its holding that, because the NOI was deficient, no action wa s pending, and § 23 01 only applies to21 Court has for several decades applied MC L 600.2301 or its predecessor (which contained nearly identical language) to allow amendment of documents that, although not aptly characterized as pl eadings, might well fall under the broad category of a “process” or “proceeding.” 38 Accordingly, we hold that § 2301 may be employed to cure defects in an NOI. We recognize that § 2301 allows fo r amendment of errors or defects,

whether the defect is in form or in subs tance, but only when the amendment would be “for the furtherance of justice.” Additionally, § 2301 ma ndates that courts disregard errors or defects when those errors or defects do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Thus, the applicability of § 2301 rests on a twopronged test: first, whether a substantial ri ght of a party is implicated and, second,

whether a cure is in the furt herance of justice. If both of these prongs are satisfied,

pending actions. Again, as this analysis is based on the former § 5856(d), it is no longer applicable.

38 Boodt , supra at 567-572 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). See also Tudryck v Mutch , 320 Mich 99, 107; 30 NW2d 518 (1 948) (applying the predecessor statute of MCL 600.2301 to allow amendm ent to a settlement agreement); Fildew v Stockard , 256 Mich 494, 498-499; 239 NW2d 868 (1932) (applying the predecessor statute of MCL 600.2301 to allow amendment of an affidavit for a writ of garnishment that was required to be filed before commencement of that action); Hopkins & Son v Green , 93 Mich 394, 395-396; 53 NW 537 (1892) (applying the predecessor statute of MC L 600.2301 to allow amendment of a bond); Bole v Sands & Ma xwell Lumber Co , 77 Mich 239, 241-242; 43 NW 873 (1889) (holding that a summons could be amended pursuant to the “process, pleading or proceeding” language of the predecessor statute of MCL 600.2301).22 a cure will be allowed “on such terms as are just.” 39 Given that NOIs are served at such an early stage in the proceedings, so-called “defects ” are to be expected. The statute contemplates that medical records may not have been turned over before

the NOI is mailed to the defendant. 40 Defendants who receive these notices are sophisticated health professionals with ex tensive medical background and training. Indeed, these same defendants are allowed to act as their own reviewing experts. A defendant who has enough medical expertis e to opine in his or her own defense certainly has the ability to understand the nature of clai ms being asserted against him or her even in the presence of defect s in the NOI. Accordingly, we conclude that no substantial right of a health care provider is implicated. Further, we hold that the second prong of the test, which requ ires that the cure be in the furtherance of justice, is satisfied when a party make s a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements of § 2912b. Thus, only when a plaintiff has not made a good-faith attempt to comp ly with § 2912b(4) should a trial court consider dismissal of an action without prejudice.

We must now turn to the instant NOI to determine the natu re of the defect and whether § 2301 may be in voked. The NOI is 13 page s long. Plaintiff made a good-faith attempt to addre ss each of the subsections enumerated in § 2912b(4). The Court of Appeals held, and we agree, th at the vast majority of plaintiff’s NOI

39 MCL 600.2301.

40 MCL 600.2912b(5) provides for th e exchange of medical records.23 was in compliance with § 2912b(4). 41 The Court of Appeals held that the NOI was defective with respect to the claims made against defend ant West Michigan Cardiovascular for direct liability for tr aining and supervision, and also with respect to the claims for di rect liability asserted agains t Spectrum Health for its nurses and physician assistants. In analyz ing these defects, the Court of Appeals

stated: Plaintiff’s notice does not adequa tely address the standard of care applicable to WM Cardiovasc ular under a direct theory of liability for failure to properly tr ain or hire. The notice merely provides that WM Cardiovascular should have hired competent staff members and properly trained them . But the notice identifies no relevant standard for determining competency or properly training staff persons. Nor can the standard be gleaned from the other sections of the notice: plain tiff failed to state how WM Cardiovascular’s hiring and training practices violated that standard, failed to state which hiring practi ces or training methods it should have employed, and failed to st ate how those improper practices proximately caused Bush’s injuries. For this reason, to the extent that plaintiff’s claims rest on thes e theories, the trial court should have granted summary disposition in favor of WM Cardiovascular. * * * Although plaintiff’s notice alle ges errors on the part of Spectrum Health’s nursing staff an d physician assistants, the notice does not purport to state a separate standard of care for the nurses and physician assistants. This pr oblem is compounded by the fact that the notice does not delineate the specific actions taken by the nursing staff or physician assistan ts that purportedly breached the standard of care. Rather, plainti ff’s notice generally asserts that the staff should have performed monitoring, charting, assessing, and

41 The court found no defects with regard to the claims against the individually named doctors, the vicarious liability claims agai nst West Michigan Cardiovascular Surgeons, and the vica rious liability claims against Spectrum Health for Heiser and Shabahang.24 reporting and engaged in advocacy for the patient and otherwise challenged the actions of physician s. Finally, the notice does not state the manner in which the identified breaches proximately caused Bush’s injuries. Thus, even when the notice is read as a whole, it does not adequately address the st andard of care applicable to Spectrum Health’s staff other than Heiser and Shabahang. For that reason, we agree with Spectrum Health that the trial court erred when it concluded that plain tiff’s notice met the minimum requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4)(b) with regard to Spectrum Health’s nursing staff and physician assistants. Likewise, to the extent that plaintiff purported to give notice that Spectrum Health could be held directly liable for Bu sh’s injuries on the basis of the theories that it negligently hired or failed to train its staff, for the same reasons we explained with re gard to WM Cardiovascular, we conclude that the notice did not meet the requirements of MCL 600.2912b. [42] We agree with the Court of Appeal s that these omissions do constitute defects in the NOI. However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals regarding the appropriate remedy. We are not persuaded that the defe cts described by the Court of Appeals warrant dismissal of a claim. These types of defects fall squarely within the ambit of § 2301 and should be disregarded or cured by amendment. It would not be in the furtherance of justice to dismiss a claim wh ere the plaintiff has made a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirement of § 2912b. A dismissal would only be warranted if the party fails to make a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements. 43 Accordingly, we hold that the alleged defects can be cured pursuant to § 2301 because the substantial rights of the

42 Bush , 278 Mich App at 711, 71 6-717 (citations omitted).

43 See defendant’s response to plaintiff’s NOI, infra at 27, which provides an example of a failure to demonstrate a good-faith at tempt to comp ly with the content requirements.25 parties are not affected, and “disregard” or “amendment” of the defect is in the furtherance of justice when a party has ma de a good-faith attemp t to comply with the content provisions of § 2912b. 44 C. MCL 600.2912b(7) and Defe ctive Responses to an NOI Next, given that the Court of Appeal s held that defendant Shabahang’s response to plaintiff’s NOI was defective because it did not meet the requirements of MCL 600.2912b(7), the qu estion arises whether plaintiff was required to wait the full 182-day period before filing his me dical malpractice action, or whether he could avail himself of the shortened 154-day period. Our analysis again begins by examining the text of MCL 600.2912b(7). 45 The statute is clear that a defendant must provide the plaintiff w ith a written response within 154 days of receipt of the NOI. This provision is manda tory. The re sponse must include a statement of the factual basis for the defense, the standard of care that the health professional claims applies, the manner in which it is claimed that the health professional complied with the standard of care, and the manner in which the health professional contends that the alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. If the plainti ff does not receive the written response

44 Section 2301 provides that any amendment shall be made “on such terms as are just.” We note that in light of this provision, justice would be served by having any amendment relate back to the time that the original NOI was mailed in accord with the trea tment afforded to pleading s when amended under MCR 2.118(D).

45 See part III(B) of this opi nion for the full text.26 required under MCL 600.2912b(7) within th e 154-day waiting period, the plaintiff may file suit after the 154- day waiting period has expired. 46 According to the Court of Appeals, Shabahang’s response was defective and did not comply with the statute. Desp ite this response, Shabahang argues that plaintiff was still required to wait the full 182-day waiting period before filing suit because plaintiff received a response to the NOI. Plai ntiff, on the other hand, argues that because the notic e did not meet the requireme nts of § 2912b(7), it was proper to commence his suit upon the expira tion of the 154-day period, as allowed under MCL 600.2912b(8). Shabahang counte rs that plaintiff c ould not unilaterally determine that the respon se was inadequate, conten ding that a judge must adjudicate the issue before plaintiff may file the complaint early. Once again we turn to the standards set forth in § 2301 for guidance. Section 2301 similarly allows for “amendm ent” or “disregard” of defects in responses to NOIs, as long as the cure is in the furtherance of justice and does not affect the substantial rights of the partie s. Significantly, defendants must make a good-faith attempt to comply with the cont ent requirements of the statute to avail themselves of § 2301.

46 MCL 600.2912b(8) provides: “If the claimant does not receive the written response required un der subsection (7) within the required 154-day time period, the claimant may commence an ac tion alleging medical malpractice upon the expiration of th e 154-day period.” We note that our holding to day does not conflict with Omelenchuk v City of Warren , 461 Mich 567, 575; 609 NW2d 177 ( 2000) (holding that the statute of limitations remains tolled for th e full 182 days even if the plaintiff takes advantage of the shortened waiting period).27 Shabahang’s one-page response to the NOI was utterly lacking in a goodfaith attempt to comply. The entire subs tantive portion of Shabahang’s response

stated:

1. Factual Basis for Defense to Claim The medical records in volved in this cas e, together with deposition testimony, will form the primary defense to this case. Briefly, Dr. Shabahang contends th at he properly evaluated, assessed and treated Gary Bush. The acti ons of Dr. Shabahang were well within the standard of care. 2. Standard of Care and Compliance The standard of care required Dr. Shabahang to do things demonstrated in the medical records, which may be further augmented by deposition testimony. At all times, he acted within the standards of care in his care and treatment of Gary Bush. 3. Manner of Compliance See § 2 above. The manner in which Dr. Shabahang complied with the applicable standa rd of care is outlined in the medical records, and will be furt her augmented by sworn deposition testimony. 4. Proximate Cause It is the position of Dr. Shabah ang that his actions did not within a reasonable degree of me dical probability contribute in any way to the complications alleged by Gary Bush. Additionally, it is the position of Dr. Shab ahang that the current medical condition of Gary Bush was not in any way caused or contributed by the activities of Dr. Shabahang. Shabahang was required to make a general statement of the factors contained in § 2912b(7). He failed to do so. Shabahang’s response is nothing more than a blanket denial of any wrong doing. Indeed, Shabahang himself does

not defend his efforts or the content of the re sponse in his arguments to this Court.28 Rather, defendant takes the pos ition that the content of th e response is irrelevant. We disagree. The purpose of the NOI wa iting period is to provide a cost-saving

method to resolve meritorious claims. If a defendant does not wish to use that process, the plaintiff is entitled to accelerate the fili ng of the complaint. A defendant can either advise the pl aintiff of the decision to waive 47 or the defendant may do nothing at all, e ither of which triggers th e shortened waiting period. However, we cannot allow a defendant to so flagrantly disregard the process and fail to make a good-faith attempt to comp ly, yet still take adva ntage of the full waiting period. As Shabahang did not make a good-faith attemp t to comply with § 2912b(7), he cannot avail himself of either § 2301 or the full 182 -day waiting period. This result is fully consistent with th e statutory NOI scheme. It makes little sense to continue a settlement period when one party has indicated that he or she

has no interest in settlemen t. When a defendant has made little or no attempt to comply with the statute, we will not afford the same bene fits as if he or she had made an attempt to comply. Finally, defendant asserts that pl aintiff does not have the right to unilaterally make a determination on the vali dity of a response. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a plaintiff who unila terally makes such a decision does so at his or her own peril. If a court ultimatel y determines that the response is not

47 See MCL 600.2912b(9).29 defective, plaintiff’s complaint may be deemed untimely. However, given the limited time period involved, it would be virtually impossible for a Court to adjudicate this issue on a timely basis. By the time the parties could schedule a hearing and brief the issue, the shortened time period afforded by § 2912b would be lost. Therefore, we agree with the Co urt of Appeals that a plaintiff may choose to make his own determination regarding th e sufficiency of a response, but he does so at the risk of having a court later de termine that the defe ndant’s response was indeed adequate. We conclude that § 2912b(7) allows a pl aintiff to file a complaint early if the defendant’s res ponse to the NOI is defective.

IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that pursuant to MCL 600. 5856(c), as amended by 2004 PA 87, effective April 22, 2004, when an NOI is timely, the statute of limitations is tolled despite defects contained therein. Moreover, in light of the legislative clarification of § 5856(c), we hold that the purpose of the NOI statute is better served by allowing for defects in NOIs to be addr essed in light of § 2301, which permits “amendment” or “disregard” of “any erro r or defect” where the substantial rights of the parties are not affected, as long as the cure is in the furtherance of justice and on terms that are just. A cure is in the furtherance of justice when a party makes a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements of § 2912b. Finally, we hold that a plaintiff may take advantage of the 154-day waiting period30 provided in § 2912b(8) wher e a defendant fails to make a good-faith attempt to reply to the plaintiff’s NOI in compliance with the stat utory content requirements. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proc eedings consistent with this opinion.

Diane M. Hathaway Marilyn Kelly Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. WeaverS T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of GARY E. BUSH, a protected person, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 136617

BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, M.D., M. ASHARAF MANSOUR, M.D., VASCULAR ASSOCIATES, P.C., and SPECTRUM HEALTH BUTTERWORTH CAMPUS, Defendants,

and JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., and WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR SURGEONS, Defendants-Appellants.

___________________ _________________ GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of GARY E. BUSH, a protected person, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., Defendant-Appellant,

and No. 1366532 JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR SURGEONS, GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, M.D., M. ASHRAF MANSOUR, M.D., VASCULAR ASSOCIATES, P.C., and SPECTRUM HEALTH BUTTERWORTH CAMPUS,

Defendants.

___________________ _________________ GARY L. BUSH, SR., as Guardian of GARY EDWARD BUSH, a protected person, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v BEHROOZ-BRUCE SHABAHANG, M.D., JOHN CHARLES HEISER, M.D., WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOVASCULAR SURGEONS, GEORGE T. SUGIYAMA, M.D., M. ASHRAF MA NSOUR, M.D., and VASCULAR ASSOCIATES, P.C., Defendants, No. 136983

and

SPECTRUM HEALTH BUTTERWORTH CAMPUS, Defendant-Appellant.

MARKMAN, J. ( dissenting ). Because I disagree with the majority ’s interpretation of the notice-tolling provision in MCL 600.5856, as well as with its interpretation of MCL 600.2912b3 regarding a defendant’s permissible response to a plaintiff’s notice of intent to sue, I respectfully dissent.

I. FACTS AND HISTORY Plaintiff underwent surgery on August 7, 2003, for an ao rtic aneurysm and a heart valve replacement. Plaintiff a lleges that during th e surgery defendant Behrooz-Bruce Shabahang, M.D., “cut in to the aortic aneurysm causing a

laceration” and defendant John Charles Heiser, M.D., “improperly clamped [a] vessel causing vascular damage.” Defenda nts George T. Sugiyama, M.D., and M. Ashraf Mansour, M.D., “were called in to re pair the vein and artery.” Plaintiff alleges that the injuries cau sed by the surgery have caus ed him to become “unable to live without supervision and assistance.” On August 5, 2005, two days befo re the two-year period of limitations expired, plaintiff served defendants , including Spectrum He alth Butterworth Campus (the facility where the su rgery took place), West Michigan Cardiovascular Surgeons (the entity to which Shabahang and Heiser belonged), and Vascular Associates, P.C. (the entity to which Sugiyama and Mansour belonged), with notices of in tent to file suit. Shabah ang responded to plaintiff’s notice, as did Sugiyama, Mansour, and Va scular Associates, but Heiser, Spectrum Health, and West Michigan Cardiovascul ar did not. On Ja nuary 27, 2006, 175 days after serving notice, plaintiff file d his complaint against all defendants. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Sugiyama, Mansour, and Vascular Associates becaus e plaintiff’s notice did not include a4 standard of care for Sugiyama and Mansour. 1 For that same reason, the trial court granted partial summary dis position in favor of Spectru m Health for its alleged liability based on Sugiyama’s a nd Mansour’s alleged malpractice. 2 The trial court, however, did not grant summary disposition in favor of Shabah ang, who argued that the complaint was filed prematurely. The Court of Appeals initially denied leave but, after remand by this Court, 477 Mich 934, 935 (2006), issued an opini on affirming in most respects the trial court’s decision regarding the suff iciency of plaintiff’s notice. Bush v Shabahang , 278 Mich App 703; 753 NW2d 271 (2008). The Court of Appeals, however, held

that the notice was defective for the dire ct liability claims against defendants Spectrum Health and West Mi chigan Cardiovascular Surgeons, which were based on their alleged failure to properly hire and train staff. With respect to those claims, the Court remanded for dismissal without prejudice, concluding that the

statute of limitations had been tolled by the defective no tice and that the “applicable limitations peri ods remain tolled until entry of the grants of summary disposition.” Id. at 727. With respect to the tim ing of plaintiff’s complaint, the court held that plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed, altho ugh Judge Fitzgerald would have held that plaintiff was requi red to wait 182 days after giving notice

1 Plaintiff did not appeal this decision and thus it is not before the Court.

2 The court also granted summary disp osition in favor of Spectrum Health on the negligence claims ba sed on Spectrum Health’s p hysician assistants because plaintiff failed to file a conforming a ffidavit of merit with those claims.5 before commencing the suit. Id. at 727-729 (Fitzgerald, P. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

This Court consolidated these case s and initially heard oral argument on defendants’ applications for leave to appe al regarding: (1) wh ether the Court of Appeals remand for dismi ssal without prejudice wa s inconsistent with Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr , 481 Mich 558; 751 NW2d 44 (2008 ); and (2) whether plaintiff’s complaint was filed prematurely. 482 Mi ch 1014 (2008). During oral arguments, a question arose regarding the 2004 am endment of the tolling statute, MCL 600.5856. Accordingly, we granted leave to hear full oral argument as follows: (1) whether the plaintiff’s defe ctive notice of intent as to defendants West Michigan Cardi ovascular Surgeons and Spectrum Health tolled the period of limitati ons pursuant to MCL 600.5856(c), as amended by 2004 PA 87, effe ctive April 22, 2004; and (2) whether defendant Shabah ang’s defective response to the plaintiff’s notice of intent, MCL 600.2912b(7), was presumed valid such that the plaintiff was required to wa it the full 182-day period before filing his medical malpractice action. [482 Mich 1105 (2008).] II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews questions regard ing summary dispos ition “de novo to determine if the moving party is entitle d to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden v Rozwood , 461 Mich 109, 118; 59 7 NW2d 817 (1999). We also review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Miller v Mercy Mem Hosp , 466 Mich 196, 201; 644 NW2d 730 (2002).6 III. TOLLING STATUTE A. Analysis A claim for medical malpractice must be brought within two years from the time the alleged malpractice takes place. 3 Solowy v Oakwood Hosp Corp , 454 Mich 214, 219; 561 NW2d 843 (1997 ). A claimant, however, can toll this limitations period by complying with MCL 600.5856. 4 Specifically, § 5856(c) allows tolling during the interlude to commencing a medical malpractice action required by § 2912b if the statute of limitati ons would otherwise expire during that period. 5 Absent tolling, however, an ac tion commenced afte r two years is “barred.” MCL 600.5838a(2). Accordingly, for plain tiff’s claims to survive summary disposition, the statute of limita tions must have been tolled, because plaintiff filed his complaint more than tw o years and five months from the date of the alleged malpractice.

3 The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims provides that a person “shall not bring or ma intain an action to recove r damages for injuries to persons or property unless . . . the action is commenced within [2 years].” MCL 600.5805(1), (6).

4 Tolling extends the time during wh ich a claim can be brought by temporarily suspending th e statute of limitations.

5 MCL 600.2912b(1) states: Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health fac ility unless the person has given the health professional or health facil ity written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.7 MCL 600.5856(c) provides:

The statutes of limitations or re pose are tolled in any of the following circumstances: *** (c) At the time notice is given in compliance with the applicable notice period under secti on 2912b, if during that period a claim would be barred by the statut e of limitations or repose; but in this case, the statute is tolled no t longer than the number of days equal to the number of days rema ining in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given. [6] Previously this provision read: The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled: *** (d) If, during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not longer th an a number of days equal to the number of days in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given in compliance with section 291 2b. [MCL 600.5856(d).] [7]

In Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp , 466 Mich 57, 64-66; 642 NW2d 663 (2002) ( Roberts I ), this Court held that in order to toll pursuant to the pre-amendment provision, plaintiff’s notice must comply with MC L 600.2912b(4). 8 The instant

6 Generally, this is known as the notice-tolling provision.

7 2004 PA 87 amended MCL 600.5856. The amendment deleted previous subsection (c).

8 Subsection (4) states: The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following:8 question is whether under the post-amend ment provision, the notice must also comply with § 2912b(4). The majority holds thatunder the amended noticetolling provision a defective notice, i.e., one that does not satisfy § 2912b(4), will

nonetheless toll the statute of limitations. I do not agree and believe instead that the notice-tolling provision still requires a not ice that is compliant with § 2912b(4) in order to effectively toll. The Court’s obligation in interpreting a statute is to “give effect to the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute.” Pohutski v City of

Allen Park , 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 21 9 (2002). “[L]anguage does not stand alone, and thus it cannot be read in a vacuum. Instead, ‘it exists and must be

read in context with the entire act . . . .’” G C Timmis & Co v Guardian Alarm Co , 468 Mich 416, 421; 662 NW 2d 710 (2003). “Statutes that address the same

(a) The factual basis for the claim. (b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant. (c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility. (d) The alleged action that shou ld have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged st andard of practice or care. (e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice. (f) The names of all health pr ofessionals and health facilities the claimant is notifying under this section in relation to the claim.9 subject or share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together as a whole” to fully reveal the Legislature’s intent. People v Harper , 479 Mich 599, 621; 739 NW2d 523 (2007); see also Turnbull v Prentiss Lumber Co , 55 Mich 387, 394; 21 NW 375 (1884). The notice-tolli ng provision and the notice statute, § 2912b, are in pari materia because the notice-tolling provision was enacted with § 2912b, see 1993 PA 78, and directly references § 2912b. Accordingly, the notice-tolling provision must be interpreted in light of the overall statutory scheme within which it was placed. The notice-tolling provision tolls “[a]t the time notice is given in compliance with the app licable notice period under section 2912b.” The applicable notice period und er § 2912b is 182 days fro m the filing of the notice during which a complaint may not be filed, MCL 600.2912b(1); Omelenchuk v City of Warren , 461 Mich 567, 573; 609 NW2d 177 (2000), and only begins once “the person has given the health professi onal or health facility written notice under this section.” MCL 600.2912b(1). No tice is only considered “written notice under this section” if it complies with § 2912b(4), which states that “notice . . .

under this section shall contain a statemen t” regarding substantive aspects of the alleged malpractice. See Boodt , 481 Mich at 562-563 (“[A] plaintiff cannot

commence an action before he or she files a notice of intent that contains all the information required unde r § 2912b(4).”). For the notice to be given in compliance with the “applicable notice period,” that period necessarily must exist. Because giving notice as re quired by § 2912b( 4) constitutes the only manner by10 which the applicable notice period is brou ght into existence, it seems logical to conclude that the Legislature intended th e notice-tolling provision to be triggered only by the plaintiff filing such notice. Furthermore, allowing the notice-tollin g provision to be triggered by a defective notice makes little sense considering that the provisio n only applies “if during [the applicable notice period] a cl aim would be barred by the statute of limitations.” MCL 600.5856(c). One cannot fairly say that a claim would be barred “during” the notice period when the notice period has not begun due to the plaintiff’s failure to file a sufficient notic e. Further, the tolling period is equal to the “number of days remaining in the app licable notice period after the date notice is given.” MCL 600.5856(c). Because a defective notice does not create an applicable notice period under § 2912b(1), the number of days remaining in that period cannot be determined. Thus, if a defective notice is allowed to toll, the notice-tolling provisi on would provide no guidance for determining the tolling period. The only manner by which th e notice-tolling provision can be given meaningful effect is to interpret it as re quiring the notice specifically contemplated in § 2912b(4), which creat es the applicable notice period to which the tolling provision repeatedly refers. Accordingly, contrary to the majority, I believe that a

defective notice cannot toll the statut e of limitations under § 5856(c). Here, plaintiff’s notice was defective because it did not contain any statement regarding the standard of care fo r claims alleging direct liability against West Michigan Cardiovascular and Spectrum Health. Plaintiff’s failure to include11 any statement regarding the standard of care for Sugiyama’s and Mansour’s alleged malpractice also makes the notice defective for vicarious liability claims against Spectrum Health based upon their malpractice. Because plaintiff’s notice was defective in this regard, the statut e of limitations for those claims was not tolled by § 5856(c). Moreov er, because the statute of limitations was not tolled, and because plaintiff’s comp laint was filed more than two years after the alleged malpractice, these claims are time-barred and should be dismissed with prejudice. B. Response to the Majority The majority’s interpretation is at od ds with its own asse rtion that “[t]he statute must be interpreted in a manner th at ensures that it wo rks in harmony with the entire statutory scheme.” Ante at 10. By focusing only on the amended language in the notice-tolling provision’s fi rst clause, the major ity disregards the implications of the remaining portion of the provision. Ante at 12-14. Such an analysis is incomplete in light of the direct correlation that th e remaining portion of the provision has with § 2912b and its notice period. Although the legislative amendment may only have alte red parts of § 5856(c), the whole scheme

nonetheless must be considered in order to determine the Legislature’s intent. The numerous references to the notice period in § 5856(c) necessari ly mean that the period established by § 2912b(1) must have come into being in the first place for those references to be given any effect, and this can only ta ke place when notice that complies with § 29 12b(4) has been supplied. The majority, however, interprets the notice-tolling provision in a manner that be ars no logical relationship12 with the statute that requires that notice be given in the first place. Thus, rather than adopting an interpretation that “wor ks in harmony with the entire statutory scheme,” the majority instead adopts an interpretation that raises an insoluble tension between the tolling provision and the notice stat ute that will only be resolved by years of litigation, which perhaps is the whol e point of the majority’s

exercise. This tension arises most clearly in the form of MCL 600.2301, which the majority employs to sustain its conclusi on that a defective notice can toll the statute of limitations, because a court can thereby “disregard any error or defect”

in the notice. MC L 600.2301 provides: The court in which any action or proceeding is pending , has power to amend any process, plea ding or proceeding in such action or proceeding, either in form or substance, for th e furtherance of justice, on such terms as are ju st, at any time before judgment rendered therein. The court at every stage of the action or proceeding shall disregard any erro r or defect in the proceedings which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. [Emphasis added.] Without reference to any language from th e tolling or notice statutes, the majority ascertains that a “good-faith a ttempt to comply with the content requirements of §

2912b” allows tollin g under § 5856(c), ante at 22, because any defect “should be disregarded or cured by amendment.” Ante at 24. As this Court explained in Boodt , 481 Mich at 563 n 4, “§ 2301 only applies to pending actions.” As disc ussed above, § 2912b(1) provides that a person “shall not commence an action a lleging medical malpractice against a13 health professional or h ealth facility unless the pe rson has given the health professional or health fac ility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.” Section 2912b(4) states that the “notice given to a health professiona l or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following . . . .” Therefore, “a plaintiff cannot

commence an action before he or she files a notice of intent that contains all the information required under § 2912b(4).” Boodt , 481 Mich at 562 -563. An action is not “pending” if it cannot be “commenc ed,” and § 2912b(1) clearly prohibits a plaintiff from commencing an action before giving sufficient notice. I would not allow a plaintiff who is out of complia nce with § 2912b, and thus not in compliance with th e medical malpractice reforms en acted by our Legislature, to take advantage of the amendment provision. Accordingly, § 23 01 is inapplicable, and a plaintiff cannot retroactively “amend” the notice of intent, and the courts cannot “disregard any error or de fect” in the notice of intent. Although I disagree in almost all resp ects with the majo rity’s analysis regarding the amended notice-tolling provisi on, I note in particular the following difficulties with this analysis: (1) The majority states that it “canno t assume that langu age chosen by the Legislature is inadvertent” or that a “change means nothing at all.” Ante at 12-13. Why exactly is “interpret[ing] the amended statute in the same manner [as] . . . the pre-amended statute” something that this Court “cannot do”? Ante at 12. The beginning point for interpreting a stat ute must always be its language. Wickens v14 Oakwood Healthcare Sys , 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 68 6 (2001). Even after an amendment, the statute must continue to control, because it co nstitutes the law of this state. In light of the majority’s position that any amendment must exact some change in meaning, what ch oice does the Legislature ha ve if it wishes to make minor amendments to clarify a certain portion of a statute consistent with the Court’s interpretation? The majority’s position is especially dubious when the Legislature, as it did here, makes minor chan ges to one part of a statute at the same time that it makes major changes to another part. 9 While in many and perhaps most instances it undoubtedly is the legislative intent, in enacting an amendment, to change existing law, there are, as undoubtedly, other instances, particularly if uncertainty exists as to the meani ng of a statute, when amendments are adopted for the purpose of ma king plain what the legislative intent had been all along from th e time of the statute’s original enactment. [ Detroit Edison Co v Janosz , 350 Mich 606, 614; 87 NW2d 126 (1957).]

9 The major change made to MCL 600.5856 was the amendment to the provision that begins tolling when a complaint is filed. That provision now states that “[t]he statutes of lim itation or repose are tolled . . . [a]t the time the complaint is filed, if a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant within the time set forth in the supreme court rules.” MCL 600.5856(a). Previously, the statute of limitations was to lled “[a]t the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant.” The amendment also completely deleted previous subsection (c), which allowed tolling when the complaint was filed and “placed in the hands of an officer for immediate service.” This reflects the Legislature’s focus on returning comp laint tolling to the way it previously operated, which Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc , 468 Mich 594; 664 NW2d 705 (2003), found inconsis tent with the pre-amendment version of § 5856(a).15 Indeed, it seems most reasonable that th e Legislature’s minimal changes to the notice-tolling provision were intended only to clarify th e precise moment at which

the statute of limitations would be tolled. The pre-amendment version, by stating that the “statutes of limitations or repose are tolled . . . [i]f, during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a cl aim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose,” MCL 600.5856(d), cl early described the circumstances by

which the statute of limitati ons could be tolled, but wa s less clear regarding at what point in time the tolling actually began. C onversely, the other tolling provisions did not suffer fro m this same infirmity by sta ting that the “statutes of limitations or repose are tolled . . . [a]t the time” a specific action occurred. See pre-amendment MCL 600.5856(a) throu gh (c). With this amendment, the Legislature changed the noti ce-tolling provision so that it too now states that the tolling starts “[a]t the time” the specified acti on occurs. In light of the identity to the other tolling provisions created by th e amendment, I believe the amendment is best interpreted as effecting the same mean ing that the identical language carries. Adding the phrase “[a]t th e time” clearly denotes that the tolling begins upon the occurrence of the specified act. Interpreting the amendm ent as such clarification does not render it “inadvertent,” ante at 12. Instead, this recognizes that the Legislature sought to enhance the clarity of the notice-tolling pr ovision to the level of the other provisions and did so through a minor alteration. (2) The majority creates a new sta ndard for determining whether a notice complies with § 2912b (4) by stating: “A defendant who has enough medical16 expertise to opine in his own defense certainly has th e ability to understand the nature of the claims being asserted agai nst him or her even in the presence of

defects in the NOI.” Ante at 22. This new subjective standard based on the defendant’s “medical expertise” is not onl y divorced from the statute, but it is also

inconsistent with the curre nt standard set forth in Roberts v Mecost a Co Gen Hosp (After Remand) , 470 Mich 679, 701; 684 NW2d 71 1 (2004) ( Roberts II ): “[T]he claimant is required to . . . provide details that are responsive to the information sought by the statut e and that are as particularized as is consistent with the early notice stage of the proceedings.” (Empha sis in original.) Th e majority thereby clumsily disposes of a standard that required a plaintiff to comply with all the statutory requirements in favor of one that requires the plainti ff to follow the law only to the extent th at the court believes a defendant’s “medical expertise” can fill the gaps of the plaintiff’s noncomp liance, all without explaining even perfunctorily why the new standard is consistent with the law actually enacted by the Legislature, as opposed to the statute the majority wishes had been adopted. (3) The majority’s ame ndment process allows a plaintiff to commence his action 182 days after giving defective notice despite the fact that § 2912b(1) disallows a plaintiff from commencing su it unless he has gi ven “written notice under this section.” In other words, the majority has rewritten § 2912b(1) to enable a plaintiff to commen ce his suit 182 days after giving defective notice if it manifests the plaintiff’s “good-faith a ttempt to comply w ith § 2912b(4).” Ante at 22. Cf. Roberts I , 466 Mich at 66 (holding that a “plaintiff must fulfill the17 preconditions of § 2912b(4) in order to ma intain a medical malpractice action”). By this revision, the major ity rejects the Legislature’s intention that notice “shall contain [specific] statement[ s]” and substitutes its own goa l of allowing plaintiffs to commence their actions despite obvious omissions that comple tely frustrate the purpose of the legislative notice procedure. 10 The majority never explains how the tolling statute amendment compels this rewriting of the notice statute , most likely because no valid explanation exists. The majority cannot cite anything in the

amendment that altered the clear language in § 2912b( 1), nor can it cite anything that indicates the Legislature intende d that such language be ignored. (4) The majority questions in dictum “whether Roberts I and Boodt were correctly decided” based on its inte rpretation of the amended notice-tolling provision, ante at 19 n 34, even after acknowle dging that those cases “relied on language of a statute that is no longer in existence,” ante at 9. The majority’s disagreement with Boodt seems to be based largely on its misunderstanding of that

decision. Boodt held that a plaintiff’s complain t does not toll the statute of

10 The majority provides no guidance regarding how lower courts should evaluate “good faith,” beyo nd the dubious guidance afford ed by its conclusion in this case that plaintiff’s notice meets th is threshold even th ough the majority agrees that plaintiff wholly omitted th e statements require d by § 2912b(4)(b)-(e) for direct liability claims against Sp ectrum Health and West Michigan Cardiovascular and those required by § 2912b(4)(b), (c ), and (e) for vicarious liability claims agains t Spectrum Health. Ante at 22-24, citing 278 Mich App at 711, 716-717. The only real guidance that can be gleaned from this conclusion is that the Legislature’s words are no longer much relevant to understanding the law of this state.18 limitations pursuant to § 5856(a) after def ective notice has been given, because § 2912b(1) disallows a plaintiff from comme ncing an action unless the plaintiff has given “written notice under this section.” Boodt , 481 Mich at 564 . The majority, however, interprets Boodt as holding that “no tolling was afforded in the presence of a defect pursuant” to the notice-tolling pr ovision, and thus “t he plaintiff’s action was not commenced under § 2912b(1).” Ante at 14 n 26. Thus, notice-tolling was

never an issue in Boodt , yet the majority in explicably finds that its interpretation of the notice-tolling provision throws Boodt into question. As for Roberts I , the majority never explains any possible errors in that decision other than to say that it “opined,” rather than “held,” that “the focus of § 5856(d) was on compliance with § 2912b in its entirety.” Ante at 12. The majority thus attempts to diminish the validity of Roberts I by characterizing this decision as simply an expression of one possible opinion among many, rather than actually analyzing the law in any coherent manner to demonstrate why Roberts I may be incorrect. 11 Although the majority makes clear that it disagr ees with the resu lts reached in Roberts I and

Boodt , it does not deign to explain why th e law does not support those results.

11 The Court’s decision in Roberts I that the pre-amendment notice-tolling provision required notice compliant with § 2912b to toll wa s supported by all seven justices, including three currently in the majority who now question it. See Roberts I , 466 Mich at 67; Roberts I , 466 Mich at 72 (Kelly, J., dissenting) ( “[T]o begin the tolling of the MCL 600.5856(d) st atute of limitations, a plaintiff must fully comply with the requi rements of MCL 600.2912b.”).19 (5) By finding that § 2912b “is sile nt regarding the consequences of filing a defective NOI [and] makes no reference whatsoever to a ma ndatory dismissal penalty in the event of a defe ct,” the majority raises an irrelevant issue concerning “whether a mandatory dismissal with prej udice under § 2912b was the intent of the Legislature.” Ante at 16. However, this Court ha s never held that a defective notice alone requires “mandatory dismissa l with prejudice.” By phrasing its inquiry as it does, the majority obviou sly misapprehends the procedure by which plaintiff’s claims were dismissed. First, the majority over looks the interplay between the statute of limitations and the notice-tolling provision. The Le gislature clearly created a two-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions, and then clearly stated that an action cannot be commenced after that period has expired. It also clearly created a tolling provision that allows the limitations period to be suspended if a claimant gives notice pursuant to § 2912b. If no tice is not given, then tolling is not triggered. If tolling is not triggered and th e statute of limitations expires, the latter operates in the same manner that it does in every other action: it bars claims from being commenced after its expiration. Second, even if a defective notice doe s not toll the statut e of limitations,

this Court has never held that the defect requires “mandatory dismissal with20 prejudice .” Ante at 16 (emphasis added). 12 In fact, current caselaw supports the exact opposite proposition, namely that a plaintiff filing a defective notice can avoid dismissal with prejudice by simply correcting the notice so that it complies with § 2912b(4) before the statute of limitations has expired. In Mayberry v Gen Orthopedics, PC , 474 Mich 1, 3; 704 NW2d 69 (2005), this Court held that “a second notice of intent to sue, sent with fewer than 182 days remaining in the limitations period, can initiate tolling under § 5856(d) as long as the first notice of

intent to sue did not initiate such to lling.” Thus, under these circumstances, nothing would bar a claimant from filing a second notice to take advantage of the notice-tolling provision. Here, rather than not tolling because there were more than 182 days remaining in the limitations period, plainti ff’s notice, filed within the last 182 days of the limitations period, did not toll because it was defective . Although plaintiff only had two days in which to correct the de fects, had he done so within that time,

the statute of limitations would have be en tolled and he could have timely

commenced his action afte r the 182-day waiting peri od. Thus, any time a defective notice is filed, the plaintiff al ways has the opportunity to revise the

12 This Court has held that “dismissal is an appropriate remedy for noncompliance with the notice provisions.” Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp , 471 Mich 745, 753; 691 NW2d 424 (2 005). Whether the dismissal is with prejudice depends on whether the plaintiff can “still co mply with the applicable statute of limitations.” Id.21 notice to comply with § 2912b(4), at leas t until the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the defect alone does not mandate dismissal with prejudice. (6) Without regard to the fact that a provision for “mandatory dismissal with prejudice” is unnecessary in § 2912b due to the dismissal necessitated by the statute of limitations, the majority proc eeds with its misguided, and fruitless, search for direction from the Legislat ure that a defective notice requires “mandatory dismissal with prejudice.” Un surprisingly, the majority finds no such mandate, but rather concludes that the Legislature rejected a “mandatory dismissal” based on its interpretation of a provision of the initial notice legislation that the Legislature never adopted. Ante at 16-17. Although “actions of the Legislature in considering various alternatives in language in statutory provisions before se ttling on the language actually enacted” may constitute a legitimate fo rm of legislative history, In re Certified Question , 468 Mich 109, 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003), the majority’s use of it here exemplifies well the shortcom ings inherent in such approach. To reasonably discern legislative intent from rejected la nguage, the rejected provision should be considered as a whole, rather than partially as the majority does by only looking at the first sentence of the provisi on. The full provision stated: Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in an action alleging medical malpractice, the court shall dismiss a claim not included in the notice required unde r section 2912f. This subsection does not apply to a claim that results from previously unknown information gathered during discovery.22 As an initial matter, this seems entirely unr elated to the statute of limitations under which dismissal is granted. The Legislat ure’s rejection of an unrelated provision can hardly be used to alte r the clear meaning of a stat ute. It seems far more reasonable to conclude that the Legislatur e rejected this provision in favor of § 2912b(3), which provides for similar tr eatment of the same subject matter:

undiscovered claims. 13 Rather than considering this to be the Legislature’s rationale for rejecting the initial provision, the majority concl udes that it “can

draw no conclusion from the omission . . . ot her than it was not the intent of the Legislature to incorporate a mandatory dismissal penalty into § 2912b.” Ante at 17-18. Most other observers of this same legislative history would without much difficulty be able to draw an “other conc lusion,” and would almost certainly be far closer to reality than th e majority. How can the majority draw an informed conclusion concerning legisla tive history from a provision never enacted without even considering a provision that has been enacted and actua lly substituted for the never-enacted provision? (7) The majority concl udes that “to hold that § 2912b in and of itself mandates dismissal with prejudice . . . would be inconsistent with” § 2912b’s “stated purpose of . . . promoting settlement.” Ante at 18. However, the majority

13 Subsection (3) provides a shortened notice period for a claim not in the initial notice only if the plaintiff “did no t identify, and could not reasonably have identified a health professional or health facility to which no tice must be sent” before filing the complaint ag ainst the other parties.23 does not explain how allowi ng a defective notice to substitute for the notice required by § 2912b(4) in any way “promot[es] settlement.” Ante at 18. The likelihood of settlement almost certainly in creases with the amount of information that the parties have regarding the subjec t of settlement. How can the majority’s interpretation conceivably encourage se ttlement when it compels defendants to proceed on the basis of in complete information?

IV. WAITING PERIOD The second major issue concerns how lo ng a plaintiff must wait after giving notice before filing his complaint. Th e relevant statutory provisions state: (1) Except as otherwise provide d in this section, a person shall not commence an action allegi ng medical malpractice against a health professional or health fac ility unless the person has given the health professional or health facil ity written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced. *** (7) Within 154 days after receip t of notice under this section, the health professional or health facility against whom the claim is made shall furnish to the claima nt or his or her authorized representative a written response that contains a statement of each of the following: (a) The factual basis for th e defense to the claim. (b) The standard of practice or care that the health professional or health facility claims to be applicable to the action and that the health professional or health facility co mplied with that standard. (c) The manner in which it is claimed by the health professional or health facility th at there was compliance with the applicable standard of practice or care.24 (d) The manner in wh ich the health professional or health facility contends that the alle ged negligence of the health professional or health facility wa s not the proximate cause of the claimant’s alleged inju ry or alleged damage. (8) If the claimant does not receive the written response required under subsection (7) with in the required 154-day time period, the claimant may commen ce an action alleging medical malpractice upon the expiration of the 154-day period. [MCL 600.2912b.] After receiving plaintiff’s notice, Shabah ang responded, but his response did not satisfy the requirements of § 2912b(7). 14 Plaintiff then commenced his action 175 days after giving notice. I agree with the majority that a plaintiff can make a tentative determination regarding the sufficiency of a defendant’s response pursuant to § 2912b(7), and I also agree w ith the Court of Appeals that plaintiff

did not need to cha llenge the sufficiency of Shabahang’s respon se before filing his complaint pursuant to the shortened waiti ng period established by § 2912b(8). A plaintiff can file his suit after 154 da ys if he “does not receive the written response required under subsection (7)” with in 154 days after giving notice. MCL 600.2912b(8). Importantly, th e response a plaintiff must receive is that “required under subsection (7),” which clearly states that the defendant “shall furnish” a response “that contains” specific statements . Thus, similar to the requirements for a plaintiff’s notice, § 2912b(7) places the burden on the defe ndant to provide a written response that includes th e requisite statements. See Roberts II , 470 Mich

14 Shabahang’s response clearly did not satisfy the substantive requirements of § 2912b(7), because it was completely unr esponsive to those requirements. See ante at 27.25 at 686; Roberts I , 466 Mich at 66. If the defendant does not provide those specific statements, then the response cannot be sa id to be the one re quired by § 2912b(7). Plaintiff, therefore, may file his compla int after 154 days, because he did not receive the proper response. However, to require a plaintiff to wait for a judicial determination regarding the sufficiency of defendant ’s response would effectiv ely nullify the requirements of § 2912b(7). That is, a defendant coul d give a response that failed to comply with § 2912b(7) and suffer no consequences, because the only possible statutory consequence, plaintiff’s early filing, would be unavailable until the court determined that the defendant’s response was defective, and by that time, the 28 days between the 154-day pe riod and the 182-day period would almost certainly have elapsed. Accordingly, plaintiff he re properly filed his complaint against Shabahang based on his own determination that he never received the response required by § 2912b(7). 15 Rather than adopting this straightfo rward understanding of § 2912b(8), the majority feels the need to additionally read into the la w an entirely concocted and gratuitous “good faith” sta ndard in determining whethe r the defendant’s response is sufficient. That is, rather than assessing the defend ant’s response, and comparing it to the requirements of the st atute, a plaintiff must now consider

15 A plaintiff makes such determination at his own peril. If a court later determines that the response was not defective, then th e plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal because he did not wait the full 182 days.26 whether defendant’s response constituted a “good-faith atte mpt to comply with the content requirements of the statute.” Ante at 26. In the place of a clear rule of law, the majority interposes an obscure and vague standard by which a plaintiff, who probably desires nothing more than to know what is statut orily required of each party, must now assess the mindset of the defendant. The majority, of course, supplies no guidance for how to satisfy its new sta ndard, which poses a particular conundrum for plaintiffs, because , if a court determin es that a response

was made in “good faith,” the majority hol ds that the trial court should allow defendant to amend his response. Ante at 26. This means that if the plaintiff

relied on his own assessment that the response was defective, and filed before the 182-day period had expired, defendant’s amendment c ould retrospectively make the complaint untimely. Doubtlessly, how ever, the majority will “correct” this problem in some later decision by a new word formula that is equally disregardful of the language of the statute. By cont rast, I would simply hold that a plaintiff may avail himself of the 154-day filing optio n if the defendant’s response does not comply with the re quirements of § 2912b(7), with out regard to whether the defendant has or has not made a “good faith” effort to comply w ith that provision.

V. CONCLUSION In summary, my concerns with the ma jority opinion are: (1) it ignores the great bulk of the language of the noti ce-tolling provision in interpreting that provision; (2) it ignores the larger statutory scheme w ithin which the notice-tolling provision is located; (3) it creates a new “rule” whereby legi slative amendments27 must be interpreted to alter the meani ng of the amended statute even if the statute’s clear language suggests otherwise; (4) it creates a new standard for determining a notice’s sufficiency that bears no relationship to the actual requirements set forth by the Legislature in § 2912b(4), in the pr ocess also giving

no consideration to the standard set forth in Roberts II ; (5) it gratuitously questions the validity of Roberts I and Boodt even though they interpreted a different version of the notice-tolling provision that has no bearing on the instan t case; (6) it has interpreted an amendment of one statut e to completely a lter the meaning of another statute; (7) it allows proposed le gislation that was ne ver enacted to trump the meaning of legislation that was actua lly enacted; and (8) it reads words into a

statute that are not there by concocting a “good faith” re quirement in § 2912b(7). I dissent and would hold that tolling can only be effected pursuant to § 5856(c) by a plaintiff’s notice of intent that complies with th e requirements of § 2912b(4). Accordingly, dismissal should be with prejudice with regard to West Michigan Cardiovascular and Spectrum He alth, because plaintiff’s notice did not

toll the statute of limitations for those cl aims and his complaint was filed after the limitations period had expired. Furthe r, I would hold that a plaintiff may commence an action 154 days after giving notice if the defendan t’s response does not comply with the requirements of § 2 912b(7), rather than introducing a new28 “good faith” requirement in assessing such response. B ecause Shabahang’s response did not comply with the require ments of § 2912b(7), plaintiff properly commenced his action 175 days after giving notice.

Stephen J. Markman Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr.