17-3858 

Vivares-Mazo v. Barr 

BIA 

A088 077 226

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 

States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 11th day of December, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

Chief Judge,

PETER W. HALL, 

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

JUAN ESTEBAN VIVARES-MAZO, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 17-3858 

 NAC 

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: David J. Woll, Simpson Thacher & 

Bartlett LLP, New York, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

Attorney General; John S. Hogan, 

Assistant Director; Robbin K. 

Blaya, Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC. 
2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

Petitioner Juan Esteban Vivares-Mazo, a native and 

citizen of Colombia, seeks review of a November 16, 2017, 

decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Juan 

Esteban Vivares-Mazo, No. A 088 077 226 (BIA Nov. 16, 2017). 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 

and procedural history in this case. 

 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen “for 

abuse of discretion.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d 

Cir. 2006). When the BIA considers evidence of country 

conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the 

BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence 

standard. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d 

Cir. 2008). 

 An alien seeking to reopen may file a motion to reopen 

no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). 

However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen 

does not apply if the motion is filed in order to apply for 
3

asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the 

country of nationality or the country to which removal has 

been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not 

available and would not have been discovered or presented at 

the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 

see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). “In determining 

whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates 

a material change in country conditions that would justify 

reopening, [the agency] compare[s] the evidence of country 

conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at 

the time of the merits hearing below.” In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. 

& N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007). We find no abuse of 

discretion. 

 First, contrary to Vivares-Mazo’s argument, remand is 

not required for the BIA to more fully explain its decision 

that there was not a material change in country conditions. 

The agency is not required to “expressly parse or refute on 

the record each individual argument or piece of evidence 

offered.” Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The BIA recognized the basis of VivaresMazo’s claim of changed country conditions, and, under the 

circumstances, it was not required to explain in detail why 
4

specific items of evidence did not establish changed 

conditions. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 

F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e presume that an IJ 

has taken into account all of the evidence before him, unless 

the record compellingly suggests otherwise.”). 

 The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

Vivares-Mazo’s evidence was insufficient to establish 

materially changed country conditions since his 2013 hearing. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. 

Dec. at 253. Although there was some evidence of an increase 

in killings by paramilitary groups following the signing of 

the peace agreement, as compared to the period immediately 

preceding the peace agreement, there was evidence of 

substantial violence at the time of the hearing before the 

IJ. See Certified Administrative Record at 264-66. 

Moreover, the evidence Vivares-Mazo submitted with his motion 

to reopen failed to remedy the underlying deficiency in his 

original claim, i.e., he did not corroborate his allegation 

that he was a campaign leader who suffered past persecution. 

See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2005). 

Because Vivares-Mazo did not establish that he was involved 

in political activities, he cannot show that increased 
5

targeting of political or community leaders or activists is 

material to him. Cf. Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 

143, 146–49 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that BIA may rely on 

underlying adverse credibility determination in denying 

motion to reopen). Because Vivares-Mazo did not show a 

material change in conditions or resolve the underlying 

deficiencies in his claims, the BIA did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that he had not demonstrated a material 

change in country conditions and denying his motion to reopen. 

See Ali, 448 F.3d at 517; Qin Wen Zheng, 500 F.3d at 146–49. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk