## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 09

- 3131 J OHN G ACEK, Plai nt i f f

-Appe l l ant, v. A MERI CAN A IRLI NES, I NC ., D efend a nt-A pp ellee

.

A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our t fo r the N o rthernDi stricto f Illino is, Eas tern Div isi on. No . 08 C3968

— Suzan ne B. C onl on, Judge
.
A RG UE D J UNE 9, 2010

— D ECI DE D J UL Y 15, 2010

Befo re P OSNER, W OO D , an d H A MI L T ON, Circ uit Ju dg es . P OSNER, Cir cu i tJudg e . A fo rm erb ag ga ge hand l erf or Am erica n Ai r l i ne s fi l ed th i s di ve r si tys ui t ag ains t th e air lin e fo r re ta l i a t or y d isc h ar ge in v iola tio n of th e Illino is W o r k er s’ Com pen sa ti o n Act, 8 20 I LCS 30 5/4( h)

. The dist ric t co urt gr anted sum m ar y j ud gm ent forthe ai rl i ne, preci pit ati ng thi s a pp eal, wh ich invo l ves the a pp l i cabil ity of M cD o nn ell D o ug la s C o rp. v. G reen , 41 1 U.S

. 79 2, 80 2- 03 ( 1973 ) , to a sui t ba sed o n sta te law b u t li ti gat ed i n federa l co urt.2 N o. 09

- 3131 The pl aint i ffs pr aine d the middl e fi ng ero f h is l eft ha nd a two r ko n De c e mbe r 2 2 , 2 0 0 5 , wh i l e l i ft i nga b a g, a nd a doctoratthe air port ’ s m edi calcl i ni c to l d him to wear a spl i nto n the fi ng era nd do o nl y light w o r kunt i l he re cove re d. Laterano therdocto r at the c l i ni c told hi m not to lift an yt hi ng with hi s l eft hand. H e ca l l ed i n si ck on Decem ber29 and an ai rl i ne “a tte nd ance m anage r” phoned hi m to fi n d out what w as w ro ng. H e di dn ’ t a nsw ero r retu rn th e call, thou gh she h ad l eft a m e s s a g e. H er sup ervi sorbe ga n harb or i ng suspi ci ons ofthe pla i nti ffbec ause i t w as the hol i day sea son ( w hen w or ker s are tem pted not to w or k) , and so the ai rl i ne hi red a detec ti ve age ncy t o c h e c ku p o n h i m. He c a l l e d i n s i c k t h e f o l l o wi n gt wo days as w ell, and on the se cond day was vi deotaped by a det ec ti ve . The v i d eotap e sh o wed the pl aint i ffr unning er r an ds o ve r a three-ho urpe r i o d, l i ftinga nd c ar r y i ng g r o ce r y ba g s wi th bo th ha nds , an d no t wearing the spl i nt. Later

—but be f or e le ar ni ng ab out the s urve i l l ance

— the pl ai nti ffto l d the ai rl in e th at he ha d been absent on D ec em b er 29 th ro u gh 31 be c au se of th e flu . L at e r st ill he said h e h ad n’t h ad the flu bu t had stayed offw ork b ec au se h is fin ge r w as bo th e rin g h im

— a cl ai m i n t en si o n with h i s ha vingb ee n obs er ve d l i ftinga nd c ar r y i ng groceries w ith both han d s and not w e a r in g his splint. S o he wa s fi r e d. H e d id n’t fi le a w orkers’ com p en sation claim til l years lat er . B u t w h en h e h ad f i rs t re p or te d th e inj u ry a c laim fi l e had be en o pened by the ai rl i ne’ s a dm i ni str at oro f w or ker s’ cl ai m s; and a di schar ge m oti vated b y such an inju ry rep or t i s a ret alia to ry d isc h ar ge u n d er Il lin oisN o. 09

- 3131 3

w or ke rs ’ c om p en sa tio n law

. Hi n t h o r n v . R o l a n d ’s o f B l o o mington, Inc. , 519 N
. E
. 2d 909, 913 (I ll

. 1988). I t s eem s unl ike l y that a n ai rl i ne would fi re a bagg age ha ndl ermer ely b ec au se he s pr aine d a fi ng er a nd might see k work er s’ co m pensati on, since w or se i nj uri es to bagg age handle rs are com m on. See Sahi ka Vatan Kork m az e ta l

. , “ Ba g g a g e Handli ng i n a n Ai r pl a ne Ca r g o Ho l d: A n Ergo nom i c Inter venti on S tudy, ” 3 6 Int’l J. In d u s. E rgonom ics 30 1 ( 2006) ; GeoffDel l, “The Causes and Pre

venti on o fBagga ge H and lerBack I nj uri es: A S urve y o f A i rl i ne S afetyPro fess i ona ls,” Saf e ty S ci e nc eM oni t or, http: // ssm on. chb. kth. se/vol 1/v1i 3ar t3. pd f ( vi si ted J une 21, 20 10 )
. Butpl au sibl e o r no t, no r ea sonable j ur y c o ul d fi nd th a tth e a i r l i n e h a d fi r e d th e p l a i nt i ffb e c a u s e i t s c l a i ms adm i ni str ato r had opened a fi l e o n the i nj ury ra ther th anb ec au se i t be l i eved tha t he ha d l i ed ab o utha ving th e fl u an d had disobe yed the d octor’s ord ers to w ear a spl i nt o n the i nj ured fi nger a n d n ot l i ft a nythi ng with tha th a nd

. W e s houl d consi der whether thi s co nc lu si on m i ght b e a l t e r e d b y w h e th e r th e fr a me wo r kf o r d e c i d i n ga n e mplo yer ’ s m oti on f orsum m ar y j ud gm ent i n a r eta l i ato ry disc h ar ge case go ver ned by I l l i noi s l aw i s s up pli ed by federa l l aw , wh i ch i s t o sayby M cD o nn ell D ougl as , o r by sta te l aw . The questi on has ar i sen r epeate dlyi n thi s ci rcui t, see M cCoy v. M ayt ag Corp. , 495 F.3d 515 , 521-22 (7th C ir. 20 07 ); Ca rter v
. Te nna ntCo. , 383 F.3d 673 , 677-78 (7th C ir. 2004 ); Bor cky v . M ayt ag Corp. , 248 F.3d 691, 696 n. 5 ( 7th Cir. 20 01 ); B o urbo n v. Km a rt C o rp . , 223 F.3d 469 , 473-77 (7th C ir. 2000 ) ( concurr in g o pini on) , but w e hav e ducked i t be

-4 N o. 09

- 3131

cause the l aw yer s i gnor ed i t o r the a nsw erwould not have ch an g ed th e o ut co m e. I t i s ti m e we an swe r ed th e que st i o n. I t i s har d on the dist ri ct j ud ges f orthe cour t o f a pp eal s t o al l o w a c o nfl i cti n the r ul es tha t g o ve r n s um m ar y j udg m en t to persi st. I t re quir es them to choos e between th e rul es ( whe n the y wo ul d y i e l d o pp o s i ngr e s ul t s ) wi tho utg ui dan c e, or, as a m at t e r o fp r u d en c e, to ap p ly b ot h ru les in eve rycas e an d h ope the o utcom e wil l be the s am e under both. S o l et us choo se. I n Cl e mons v. M e c ha n i c al D e vi c e s Co
. , 70 4 N
. E.2 d 403, 40 7- 08 (I l l

. 1 99 8) , the S upr eme Co ur t o fI l l i no i s r ej ec te d the M cDonne l l D ougl as fram ew ork for case s of r etaliatory d ischa rge for m aking a w orkers’ com p e ns ation claim

. Cf. Jordan v. Clay’s Res t H om e, Inc. , 48 3 S

. E.2 d 2 03 , 207 ( Va. 19 97 )
. I t di d so b ec au se i t was unwi l l i ngt o “ ex pan d th e tort of retaliatory disch arge by red uc ing p lai nt iff’ s burd en o fpro vi ng the el em ents ofthe tor t, ” o ne o f whi chi s th atthe wor k er s’ c o m pen sa ti o n c l ai m (orpo te nti alcl ai m ) was the cause ofthe pla i nti ff’ s be i ng fi re d. 704 N
. E.2 d at 4 08. I n M cEwen v. D e l t a Ai r l i ne s , Inc . , 9 1 9 F. 2d 58 (7th C ir. 1990 ) , ano therdi ver si ty case , we had hel d year s e arlier th at if th e ru le in Il lin o i s w a s , a s t h e p lain tiff a rg u ed in that case , thata pla i nti ffi n a r eta l i ato ry - discharg e ca se c ou l d d efe at su m m ar y jud gm en t h ow ev er w ea k h is pr i ma f a c i e c a s e , ne v e r the l e s s t he M cDonne l l D ougl as r ul e woul d g o ve r n. The em pl o y eri n M cE w en pre sente d evi den ce o fa l awfulr ea so n f o r the di sc ha r g e, a nd the pla i ntiff di d not r ebut i t. That defeat ed hercas e under M cDonne l l D ougl as . But i t would hav e d one so und erN o. 09

- 3131 5 I l l i no i s pr o ce dur all aw a s wel l, s i nc e th e ev i den ce , unc o ntr a di c t e d a s we s a i d, p r e c l ud e d a n i nfe r e nc e o fr e t al i ati on. W e know from the Cle m ons deci si on, deci ded after M cE w en , tha t th e I l l i no i s r ul e i s not a s w as ar g ue d t o us i n M cE w en . M or e i m port ant, the passage w e quot ed f r o m Cle m ons m ake s cl earthatt h e r ule adopted i n that c as e (r ej ecting M cDonne l l D ougl as ) i s g r o un de d in s ubsta nti ve ra therthan proce du ra l pri nci ple s

— in a de sire as w e s ai d to ass i m i l ate retal i ato rydi schar ge to othe r tort s. A nd so i n the post- Cle m ons case of M cCoy v. M a ytag Corp
. , sup ra , 4 9 5 F
. 3 d a t 5 2 2 , we t r e a t e d the a ppl i cabi l i tyo f M cD onn e l l D ougl as to di ver si ty case s g overne d b y the I l l i no i s l aw o fr et al i at ory d i scha r g e as o pen . ( “W e l eave the deci si on r ega rdi ng ‘ “w hat the p r i ma faciecas e o fr eta l i ation is i n the Se venth Ci rcui t” ’ f or anothe r day. ” Id .) S n e adv . M e t r op ol i t an P r op e r ty In s . & Cas u al ty Co
. , 23 7 F. 3d 1080 (9 th Ci r. 20 01) , i s s i m i l arto M cCoy
. A l though th e co ur t di sc us se d a t l en g ththe a ppl i cabi l i ty o fthe M cDo nn ell D ougl as te st to a ca se gov er ned by Ore gon l aw, i t was f o r the pur po se o fs ho wi ng th at, s i nc e th e ap p li cation of M c Don n e l l Do u g l as y i e l d e d th e s a me re sul t that a pp l yi ng Ore gon’ s t estw ou l d have done, ther e co uld b e no obj ecti on t o applying the federa l rul e. S ee id

. at10 90-94
. U nansw er ed w as the quest i on w he th er, i f a state ad op ts a p roced ura l rule that differs f rom th e fede r alpr o ce dur alr ul e, a nd do es s o f o r r ea so ns o fs ubs ta nt i ve po l i cy( i n the pr es en t ca se , t o b r i ng about unif or m i ty i n prov ing t or t ca ses ) , the federa l cour ts ar e r equi re d to apply the s tat e r ule i n a case gov -6 N o. 09

- 3131

er ned by s tat e s ubstantive l aw i fapply i ng the st ate r u l e r a th e r th a n th e fe d e r a lo n e m i g h ta l t e r th e o u t c o me o fthe l i ti g at i o n. Suppose M cDonne l l D ougl as w er e a p p l i c ab le t o t h is case ; the n a wo r k e r wh o h a d fi l e d a wo r k e r s ’ c o mpe ns ation claim , a n d w ho h ad prov ed that his w ork w as oth erwi se sa tisf ac to r y a nd tha t he ( an d no wor k erwho didn’tfi l e s uch a cl ai m ) was fi re d, w oul d be e nti tl ed to s ummar y j ud gm e ntu nl e s s the e mpl o y e r a dv a nc e d a re aso n f orhavi ng fir ed hi m thatthe w or kerco uld not sh ow w as m er ely a p re te x t. Borcky v

. M ayt ag Corp. , sup ra , 2 4 8 F .3d at69 7 n . 6; Bour b on v. Km ar tCorp. , sup ra , 22 3 F
. 3d at473. T he pl aint i ffwoul d thus ha ve wonwi th o ut ev erdi r ect l y c o nfr o nt i ngthe que st i o n whe th erhi s fi l i ng a w or ke rs ’ co m p en sa tio n cla im w as th e c au s e o fh is bei ng fi re d, eve n though such a showing w oul d be nece ssar y in any othe r tor t ca se. The c o nc ur r i ngo pi ni o n i n B o urbo n v . Km a rt C o rp ., sup ra , 223 F. 3d at 475- 77 , p oi nted out that som e ca ses o fr eta l i ato ry d isc h ar ge h av e re q u ire d p ro of of c a u sa tio n w h ile pu rpor ti n g to apply the M cDonne l l D ougl as fra m ew or k. Se e a l so St one v. City of Indi anap ol i s Pub l i c U t i l i t i e s D i vi s i on , 281 F.3 d 6 40, 64 2- 44 ( 7th Ci r. 20 02)
. W e ca n put that co m pl i ca ti o n t o o ne s i de, thou g h i t he l ps ex pl ain why the c hoi ce o fst andards wil l r ar el y a ffect the o utcom e o f a ca se . W e k no w tha t I l l i nois re qui r es pr o o fo fc au sa ti o n, a n d th a tc a n ma k e a d i ffe r e n c e . F o r s u p p o s e tha t i n a c a s e g o v e r ne d b y M cDonne l l D ougl as th e e m p loy er fails t o o ffe r a n y r e a s o n f o r ha v i n gfi r e d th e p l a i n t i ff

. An i nfer en ce woul d ar i se th at th e r ea so n was th e un l awfulN o. 09

- 3131 7

on e a l l e g e d b y the p l a i nt i ff

. Y e ti n s o me c a s e s the r eas on m ight be u nk no wn to the e m pl o y er( th e ac tu alfi r i ng ha ving bee n d one by a sub ord in a te w ho m ay ha ve left the c om pany or be un w i l l i ng to cooper ate i n i ts i nvest i gation) orthe e m pl o y ermightb e unwi l l i ngt o r ev ea l the re alr ea so n bec ause i t would di scl ose an i l l ega l o r u n e th i c a l o r o th e r wi s e e mb a r r a s s i ngp r a c t i c e ( n e p o t i s m, f orexam ple , o r bl ackm ai l ) tho ug h o n e un re l ate d to th e d isc rim in at ion alle ge d in th e s u i t
. Wa l l a c ev . S MC P neum atics, Inc. , 1 03 F
. 3d 13 94, 1 39 9 ( 7th Ci r . 1 997). T hen th e plaintiffw ou ld w in un d er M cDonne l l D ougl as w i thout m or e, but und ert h e Illi noi s r ule he woul d have to prove that t he al l ege d discr i m i nati on was the cause ofhi s be i ng fi re d. So the choi ce b etween the federa l M cDonne l l D ougl as approa ch and the s tat e Cle m ons a pproa ch m ay m ake a differ ence in a t l eas t s om e ca ses gov er ned by I l l i noi s l aw , and it i s a di ffer ence that w il l favor plaintiff s if M cDonne l l D ougl as is ap p lied in prefer ence to Cle m ons . U nd erthe E ri e doctr i ne, federa l cour ts i n d iversi ty ca se s ( an d a ny o th erc as es i n whi chs ta te l aw s uppl i es the r ul e o fde c i s i o n) a pp l y s t a t e “ s ub s t a nt i v e ” l a w b utfe der al “p ro c ed u ra l” law . E .g., G asper ini v. C ent erforH um anities , 518 U .S. 41 5, 4 2 7 (1 99 6); M aye rv. Gary Par t ne rs & Co. , 2 9 F .3d 33 0 (7 th C ir. 19 94 ); E s f e l d v . C o s t a C r o c i e r e, S
. P. A. , 28 9 F .3d 13 00 , 130 6 (1 1t h C ir. 20 02 ). A su b st an tiv e la w is o ne mo t i v a t e d b y a de s i r e t o i nfl ue nc e c o nd uc to ut s i de the l i ti gat i on pro cess , such a s a d esi re to deteracc i dents, w hile a p roced ura l law i s one m otiv a t e d by a de sire to re du ce the co st ori ncre ase the accuracy ofthe l i ti gati o n p r o c e s s , r e g a r d l e s s o fth e s u b s t a n t i v e b a s i s o fthe8 N o. 09

- 3131 p a r tic u lar litiga tio n . Thom as v. Guar ds m ark, LL C, 4 8 7F. 3d 531, 537 (7th C ir. 2007); Bar r on v. Fo rd M ot orCo. , 96 5 F
. 2d 19 5, 19 9 (7 th C ir. 19 92 ); Sim s v . Gr e atAm
. Li f eIns . Co. , 46 9 F .3d 87 0, 88 2-8 3 (1 0t h C ir. 20 06 )
. If an os te n sib ly proce du ra l r ule o fst ate l aw i s co nfined to a par ti cu lar su b st an tiv e a re a o f l a w , t h is s u gg es ts th at it p ro b ab ly w as m otivated by su bsta nt ive con cern s an d therefore shoul d be a pp l i ed by the federal c ourti n a c ase go ver n ed by st at e la w . B o urbo n v . Km a rt C o rp . , sup ra , 22 3 F
. 3d at 47 5 ( c on c u rrin g op in ion ); Herrem a ns v . Ca rrera D esign s, Inc. , 1 5 7 F.3d 1118, 1123 (7th C ir. 1998); S. A. He al y Co. v. M il w auk eeM et ropolit an Sewerage D is t. , 60 F. 3d 305, 31 0 ( 7th Ci r. 19 95) , and case s ci ted there ; C R STVan Expe di t e d, Inc. v. Wern er E nte rpr is es, Inc. , 47 9 F
. 3d 1099 , 11 11 ( 9th C ir. 2007); Tr i e r wei l e r v . Croxt on & Tr e nch Holdi ng Corp
. , 90 F.3d 15 23, 1539-41 (10th Cir. 1996). M cDonne l l D ouglas , unl i k e th e r ul e th atpl ac es the burden ofpro vi ng an affi rm ati ve defe nse o n the defendant, i s no t a ge n er al rule ofpro cedure, appli ed re

gar dle ss ofthe nature o f t h e case. I ni ti al l y i t was l i m i ted to case s o fem plo ym ent disc rim i nati on ( w hi ch i ncl ud es r e t a l i a t o r y di s c ha r g e , s i nc e e mpl o y men tdi s c r i mi na t i on j ust m eans basi ng an em plo ym ent deci si on o n an unlawfulgr ound), tho ugh i t has since been adapted f or u se in o th er ty p es of d isc rim in at ion ca se as w ell. E lkhatib v. Dun ki n Don u t s , Inc. , 49 3 F
. 3d 827, 82 9- 30 ( 7th Ci r. 20 07) (r a c ialdiscrim ination aga inst a franch isee); Kor m oczy v . S e c r e t a ry o

f HUD , 53 F. 3d 821, 82 3- 24 ( 7th Ci r. 19 95) (h ou sin g d isc rim in at ion ba se d on f a m ily st at u s); Li nds ay v. Ya tes , 4 9 8 F
. 3 d 4 3 4 , 4 3 8

- 3 9 ( 6 th C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) ( r a c i a l d i s c r i mination in h o u sing); Li nds ey v . SL T Los Ange l e s , LL C, 44 7N o. 09

- 3131 9 F. 3d 1138 , 11 44- 45 ( 9th C ir. 20 06) ( re fusal, o n ra ci al grou nd s, to ent er i nt o a cont ract); C hristia n v . Wa l-M a rt Store s, Inc. , 25 2 F
. 3d 862 , 8 67-73 ( 6th Ci r. 20 01) ( ra ci al d i s c rim in at ion in t re at m en t o f a c u st om er ); M e r ca doGarc i a v. Ponc eFe de r al Bank, 9 79 F
. 2d 89 0, 8 93 ( 1s t C ir. 1992 ) ( ra c ial l y m oti vate d denialo fcr edi t)
. I t’ s desi gned to m ake it e a s ie r f or plaintiff s to w ithsta nd sum m ary j ud gm en t in dis cri m i nati on ca ses , i n the bel i efthat“a disc ri m i natio n sui t ( unli ke, f ori nstance , an a cti on f or n eg lige n c e o r b re ac h of co n t r ac t), p u ts th e p lain tiff in th e di ffi cul t po si ti o n o fha vingt o pr o ve the s ta te o fmin d of the p erson m aking th e em p loym en t d ecision. Fu r th erm o r e, unl i k e so m e o th er to r ts , i n whi ch state ofmin d can be i nfe rr ed fro m the doi ng o fthe f orbi d den act, th e e m p loy er ’s s ta te of m in d ca n n otbe infe rre d so lely fro m th e fa c t o f th e a d v e r s e em p loy m en t a c tio n . . . . T o ma k e ma t t e r s s o me wh a te a s i e r f o r p l a i n t i ff s i n e mp loy m en t d isc rim in at ion su its , th e Su p re m e C ou rt, in M cD o nn ell D o ug la s C o rp. v. G reen , devel o pe d a p r e s umpti on that s up ple m ented

—but di d not r epl ace

— th e t ra d iti onalfra m ew or k. ” Wr ight v. So ut hl and Corp
. , 18 7 F
. 3d 1287, 12 89- 90 ( 11th Cir

. 19 99) ( ci tat i ons and fo otno te om i tte d); se e a l so U n i t e d S ta tes P o stal Servi ce B d. o f G o verno rs v. A ik ens, 46 0 U .S. 71 1, 71 6 (1 98 3); S to n e v . City o f In d i a n a p o l i s Pu b l i cUt i l i t i e s Di v i s i on , sup ra , 28 1 F
. 3d at 64 3; C o llier v . BuddCo. , 66 F. 3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1995); K li ne v. Tenne ss eeVa ll ey Autho ri ty, 12 8 F
. 3d 337, 34 8 ( 6th C ir. 1997). Illino is, h ow ev er , d oe sn ’t w an t t o giv e p lain tiffs in re talia to rydi schar ge case s g ove rned byst ate l aw that leg u p ; it do es n ’t w an t to m od ify th e con ve n tio n al p r i n c i-10 N o. 09

- 3131 ple s o f t o r t l a w. Th a t i s a s ub s t a nt i v e j ud g men t, o ne that a s t a t e i s fr e e t o ma k e i n a r e a s g o v e r n e d b y s t at e l a w, w hetherwe thinki twi s e o r u nwi s e . I n mos tc a s es ofem plo ym ent disc rim i nati on the st ate and federa l st an dar ds fors um m ar y j udg m en t wi l l b e m at er i al l y the sa m e an d the fede r alj udg es ’ g r ea te r f ami l i ar i tywi ththe M cDonne l l D ougl as doc tr i ne wi l l pr o vi de a co m pel l i ng re aso n to applyi t. But w hen a re tal i ato ryd isc harg e case go ver ned by I ll i noi s l aw i s l i ti gat ed i n a federa l co ur t, the fede r alc o ur t m us t appl y the st an dar d o fthe state law t o a mot i o n f o r s um m ar y j udg m en t, a nd no t th e fed er al s ta n d ar d , bec au se th e s ta n d ar d s a r e m at er ially differ ent a nd the differ ence i s r oo ted in a substa nti ve pol i cy ofthe sta te. We a r e c o n fi r me d i n th i s c o n c l u s i o n b y th e S u p r e me Cou r t’ s ve r y r ecent dec i si o n i n Gros s v. FBL Fi nan ci al Service s, Inc. , 12 9 S

. Ct. 2 34 3 ( 2009 )
. The questi on was w he th er th e ru le of Pri ceWat e rhous ev. Hopki ns , 490 U
. S. 22 8 (1 98 9), sh iftin g t h e b u rd en of p ro vin g c a u s a t ion in Tit l e VI Icas es f ro m pl ain tiffto defendant, sho uld al so gov er n case s under the Age Di scr i m i nati on i n Em plo ym en t Act. The S upr eme Co ur t i n G ross s a i d n o , thus tr ea tin g t h e b u rd en -s h iftin g ru le n otas a su b st an tiv ely ne ut ral rule of p roced ure bu t as a rule l im ited t o a pa rtic u lar st at u te , in t h a t c as e T itle V II. M cDonne l l D ougl as ha s a broad er dom ain of a p p li cab il ity, at l east as un d erst oo d b y th e low er fed er al cou rt s, b u t still a d o m ain defi ne d by a sub st an ti ve cat eg o r y, namel y di sc r i m i na ti o n. So the pla i nti ffi n this case co uld nothave pre vai l ed m er ely b y pr o vingtha t th e r ea sons g i ve n b y the a i r l i neN o. 09

- 3131 11 f o r fi r i nghi m wer e unwor th y o fb el i ef; a nd i n a ny e ve nt he pre sente d no cr edibl e e vi dence thattheywere. A FFI RMED .

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