Filed 5/5/16 P. v. Stratis CA2/5

On remand

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER STRATIS et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B229255

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. KA083187)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, 

Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instruction.

Leslie Conrad, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Christopher Stratis.

Jeralyn Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Victor Manuel Maurtua, III.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorney General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

In 2013, this court considered the appeals of defendants and appellants 

Christopher Stratis and Victor Manuel Maurtua III. Each challenged the judgment 

corresponding to their convictions for first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).1 

Defendant’s were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) 

because the jury found the murder was perpetrated during the commission of a burglary 

(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)).

Stratis and Maurtua both contended there was insufficient evidence to support the 

burglary-murder special circumstance finding and both maintained their LWOP sentences 

constituted cruel and/or unusual punishment under the state and federal Constitutions. 

Stratis also argued the trial court improperly imposed a parole revocation fine.

We reversed Stratis’s sentence of LWOP and remanded the matter for 

resentencing with adherence to the guidelines set forth in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 

U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct. 2455]. 2 We additionally ordered the trial court to recalculate 

Stratis’s presentence credit award and modified the judgment against Maurtua to omit a

parole revocation fine. In all other respects, the judgments were affirmed.

The California Supreme Court initially granted the petitions for review filed by the 

Attorney General and Stratis. Thereafter, the Supreme Court transferred review to this 

court for reconsideration in light of People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)—a 

case explaining the requirement that a defendant who is an aider and abettor to a murder 

must have conducted himself as a major participant with reckless indifference to human 

life in order to justify a finding that the he committed the murder under a special 

circumstance, e.g., during a burglary. The Supreme Court order directed as follows: “In 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The year after we filed our opinion, the California Supreme Court held Miller

applies to California’s sentencing scheme such that it “requires a trial court, in exercising 

its sentencing discretion, to consider the ‘distinctive attributes of youth’ and how those 

attributes ‘diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on 

juvenile offenders’ before imposing life without parole on a juvenile offender. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Guiterrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1360-1361.)
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the event the Court of Appeal determines defendant David Stratis’s burglary-murder 

special circumstance is supported by substantial evidence, the matter should be remanded 

to the trial court for resentencing of Stratis in light of the guidelines set forth in People v. 

Guiterrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354.” 

We hold Stratis’s conduct qualified him for special circumstance punishment and 

therefore, as directed by the Supreme Court, we remand the matter to the trial court for 

resentencing.

THE EVIDENCE3

A. A Home Invasion Robbery is Planned and Executed

Christopher Santana told Christine Alegre (Victor Maurtua’s cousin) that he 

wanted to invade the Hong home when the occupants were present and that he had

been watching the home for a while. He explained his ex-girlfriend lived in the home

but expressed concern that her brother was “kind of buff.” Santana suggested

committing the robbery while his ex-girlfriend and her brother were home—he

indicated he could tie up the brother and place him in a closet with his ex-girlfriend.

On March 19, 2008, Alegre and her friend Magali Fernandez were picked up at 

Alegre’s home by Santana and Maurtua. Santana was driving a van. They

proceeded to Ontario to pick up Christopher Stratis. On the trip home the three men

spoke about committing a home invasion robbery.

Santana stopped the van near the home of Stratis’s foster mother in Duarte.

Stratis wanted to break into the safe in the home. The three men got out of the van and

put on latex gloves. One of them was carrying a backpack. They abandoned their plan

when they noticed people were home. Stratis said, “We’re going to have to come

back.”

 

3

This section is lifted verbatim from our opinion in People v. Christopher Stratis et 

al, B229255.
4

Santana drove the van past the Hong home. A car was exiting the driveway. 

Santana commented: “[O]h, this is the house. . . . [L]ook how big this house is.” 

Santana said, “Okay, we’re going to do this right now because the gate is open.”

The three men exited the van. Santana took a backpack containing a Glock .40-

caliber semiautomatic handgun and covered his face with a bandana. Stratis

covered his head with the hood of his black sweatshirt. All three men put on latex

gloves.

The three men entered the garage of the Hong home. Santana continued inside

the house while Stratis and Maurtua stayed in the garage. Shots were fired in the

home— Santana had shot Hong three times while she was speaking to a 911 operator.

One of her wounds was “rapidly” fatal. The men fled the scene.

Alegre had driven the van away but returned to pick up the men when she

received a phone call from Santana. Stratis was quiet and remained calm for the

remainder of the day. Santana got into the driver’s seat of the van and drove it past the

Hong home. They observed an ambulance and police cars. Alegre asked, “Did you

hurt somebody?” Santana replied, “What do you think?”

The group stopped by Santana’s home. The three men exited the van and

returned a few minutes later. Alegre asked Santana, “Who did you shoot?” Santana

responded, “Some bitch.” The group proceeded to Maurtua’s residence where they sat

in the backyard for a brief time.

With the assistance of a police dog, officers followed defendants’ trail to a road 

nearby the Hong home. They recovered two pairs of surgical booties, discarded

clothing including a black hooded sweatshirt, and a backpack containing a loaded Glock

.40- caliber semiautomatic handgun and a crescent wrench.
5

B. The Police Interviews of Stratis and Maurtua

Maurtua and Stratis were interviewed by police detectives. Their interviews

were played for their respective juries only. A summary of the relevant portions of the 

interviews follows.

1. Stratis

Stratis referred to Santana by his moniker “Vicious” and said Santana was

“crazy” given the “way he looks and the way he acts towards people.” Stratis was

contacted by Santana the night before the home invasion robbery and agreed to do a

“house lick,” i.e., a home invasion robbery.

They initially stopped near a house in Duarte. The men exited the car with

gloves on but abandoned the idea of going into the house because a female was

observed in the window and there was a daycare next to the home.

When they reached the Hong home, Maurtua provided Stratis with gloves. 

Santana had a backpack. Stratis had the hood to his sweater over his head. The

three men jumped over a wall and entered the Hong garage through a side door.

Stratis heard gunshots and fled. His two companions caught up to him and the three

men jogged to a dead end street. The men discarded many items during their flight—

Santana threw his backpack, Maurtua dropped the gloves and Stratis took off his black

“hoodie” sweater. Santana called one of the girls in the van. The van arrived, the

men entered it, and Santana drove it away.

2. Maurtua

Maurtua knew Santana was associated with an El Monte criminal street gang and 

had the moniker “Vicious.” Prior to committing the crime at the Hong residence,

Santana spoke to Maurtua about Santana’s participation in home invasion robberies.

Santana described the crimes as “[J]ust freakin’ simple.” Santana said he had been to a

party at the Hong home and that it was a “big house.” He explained the girl who lived
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there had a brother who was “kind of buff” but that, if the girl and the brother happened

to be home, he would “just kill them.”

When the men exited the van at the Hong home, Maurtua saw Santana holding a 

backpack. Maurtua confirmed all three men put on latex gloves and that Santana had a 

bandana over his face. After the men jumped a fence, Santana unzipped the backpack 

and removed a gun. Maurtua was shocked. As Santana was entering the home with

the gun in his hand, Maurtua observed Hong walk by and look in their direction.

Maurtua heard Hong calling 911 and then heard the gunshots. Santana exited the

home, unzipped the backpack and placed the gun inside of it. He tossed the backpack

away as they fled the scene. After the men reached the van, Santana said he shot 

Hong because she saw him.

DISCUSSION

A. The Banks Case and Its Guidelines

An aider and abettor to first degree murder, i.e., not the actual killer, is subject to a 

penalty of LWOP if the jury finds true one of several special circumstances. In this 

case, the applicable special circumstance is murder during the commission of a 

burglary. Certain rules determine the constitutionality of such punishment if the aider 

and abettor did not have the intent to kill. Under these circumstances, an LWOP 

sentence for an aider and abettor is constitutionally permissible only if that person was 

a “major participant” in the crime who acted with “reckless indifference to human 

life.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 797-798.)

Banks applied these rules to assess whether there was sufficient evidence an aider 

and abettor to a murder (Lovie Matthews) was properly sentenced to LWOP. (Banks, 

supra, 61 Cal.3d at pp. 804-812.) The evidence demonstrated Matthews participated in 

the burglary of a marijuana dispensary with three confederates, one of whom was Leon 

Banks. Matthews was the driver of the car. He dropped his cohorts off near the 
7

dispensary and waited approximately three blocks away for about 45 minutes. During 

the burglary, Banks shot and killed one of the security guards of the dispensary. Just a 

few moments after the shooting, Banks called Matthews and Matthews responded by 

driving toward the dispensary. Matthews was eventually flagged down by two of the 

burglars (not Banks) who entered the vehicle. The three men drove off. The police 

arrived and captured Banks on foot near the dispensary. (Id. at pp. 795-796, 804-805.)

Banks held the evidence that Matthews was a major participant in the offense was 

“insufficient to find the special circumstance true and Matthews eligible for [LWOP] 

under state law.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 805.) It rejected the notion that he was 

a major participant in the offense for the following reasons: “No evidence was 

introduced establishing Matthews’s role, if any, in planning the robbery. No evidence 

was introduced establishing Matthews’s role, if any, in procuring weapons. . . . [N]o 

evidence was introduced that Matthews [or the two men he picked up after the shooting] 

had themselves previously committed murder, attempted murder, or any other violent 

crime. . . . During the robbery and murder, Matthews was absent from the scene, sitting

in a car and waiting. There was no evidence he saw or heard the shooting, that he could 

have seen or heard the shooting, or that he had any immediate role in instigating it or 

could have prevented it.” (Id. at p. 805, fn. omitted.) Banks summed up Matthews’s

role as “no more that a getaway driver.” (Ibid.)

Banks then turned to the issue of whether Matthews’s mental state demonstrated a 

reckless indifference to human life and applied the following rule: “Reckless 

indifference to human life ‘requires the defendant be “subjectively aware that his or her 

participation in the felony involved grave risk of death.”’ [Citations.]” (Banks, supra, 

61 Cal.4th at p. 807.) Banks held, although there was evidence Matthews knew he was 

participating in an armed robbery, “nothing at trial supported the conclusion beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Matthews knew his own actions would involve a grave risk of 

death.” (Id. at p. 807.) As a result, the mens rea component necessary to uphold the 
8

special circumstance and concomitant LWOP sentence was, like actus reus, also 

lacking.

B. The Application of Banks

Unlike Matthews, Stratis’s participation was far greater than that of a mere 

getaway driver. Stratis was involved in substantial planning and participation. He was 

contacted by Santana the night before the crimes were committed. This contact was not from 

any ordinary person—Santana was known by his moniker “Vicious” and Stratis considered him 

to be “crazy.” Stratis must have reached an agreement with Santana as the following day Stratis 

was picked up in a van containing Santana and Maurtua and the three men discussed the 

intended home invasion target. They initially selected the home of Stratis’s foster mother 

because Stratis knew there was a safe inside and wanted to break into it. Santana and the 

two men donned latex gloves and exited the van but, because people were seen in the 

home, it was Stratis who instructed, “We’re going to have to come back.”

When they reached the Hong home, the men operated together and attempted to

avoid identification—Maurtua put on a white bandana, Stratis pulled the hood up on his

sweatshirt, and all three men wore latex gloves. Stratis and Maurtua jumped a fence

with Santana and the three men entered Hong’s garage together. Stratis was present at 

the scene, operated to avoid detection, and provided security/protection for the shooter. 

After gunshots rang out, Stratis fled with the gunman and left Hong to die.

In sum, Stratis’s involvement in the crimes greatly exceed that of Matthews. 

Stratis participated in planning the home invasion robbery, knowingly teamed up with 

a man with the moniker of “Vicious,” took a leadership role by directing the group 

away from the first target, and was present at the scene of the shooting. We turn now 

to mens rea.

Some of the same facts illustrative of Stratis’s participation in the crimes, also 

indicate Stratis knew his actions involved a grave risk of harm to others. Most 

importantly, Stratis elected to commit the home invasion robbery with a man known as 
9

“Vicious” (Santana) and described by Stratis himself as “crazy.” This seeminglyconsidered sadistic mad man was, certainly to no surprise of anyone, armed with a gun. 

Indeed, there was evidence that the gun was visible in Santana’s hand when he entered 

the home. 

There are other non-overlapping circumstances indicative of the requisite mens 

rea. There was no evidence anyone made any attempt to ensure the home was empty. 

To the contrary, the evidence suggested someone was in the home—the gate was open 

when the men arrived at the scene and, thereafter, Hong looked through a window, in 

the direction of Stratis and Maurtua, just before she was gunned down by Santana. 

We have no difficulty distinguishing the mental state of Stratis from that of 

Matthews and concluding that a rational trier of fact could have found Stratis acted 

with reckless indifference to human life. 
10

DISPOSITION

The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing of Christopher Stratis 

pursuant to guidelines set forth in People v. Guiterrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354. In all 

other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT

KUMAR, J.

We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

KRIEGLER, J.

 



Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.