alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-51222 Summary Calendar

MICHAELA RAE HOLLEY, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus STATE OF TEXAS, Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. W-98-CV-311

- - - - - - - - - - September 3, 1999 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Michaela Rae Holley, under indictment for murder, appeals the district court’s denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because Holley has not been retried and convicted, the correct basis for her habeas petition is 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Holley argues that a retrial on this indictment is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because her first trial ended in a mistrial when a juror informed the state trial judge that he recognized both her and the witness then on the stand for theNo. 98-51222 -2- state. The state trial court cited manifest necessity as the reason for dismissing the juror and ordering a mistrial, both over Holley’s objections. Once a trial court has declared a mistrial on manifest necessity grounds, we, as the reviewing court, are to give great deference to the trial court’s decision. Cherry v. Director, State Bd. of Corrections , 635 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1981). When a sua sponte mistrial is declared for juror bias, the decision should be upheld unless the trial judge has acted irrationally or irresponsibly. Arizona v. Washington , 434 U.S. 497, 514 (1977). The district court rejected Holley’s double jeopardy claim because it found that “there is nothing to indicate that the trial judge ... acted either irrationally or irresponsibly.” The district court’s finding is supported by the record and Holley has not presented any evidence that meets the standard of review.
See Baker v. Metcalfe , 633 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gonzalez , 76 F.3d 1339, 1342 (5th Cir. 1996). Holley also argues that the state trial court misapplied Texas state law when it determined that a mistrial was necessary because the trial could not continue with eleven jurors, as requested by Holley. The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals held that the state trial court correctly applied the Texas law in force at the time it declared the mistrial. Federal habeas courts are not super state supreme courts. Cronnon v. Alabama , 587 F.2d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 1979). Once a state has interpreted its own law, the federal habeas court will accept that interpretation. Seaton v. Procunier , 750 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1985).No. 98-51222 -3- The district court’s use of § 2254 instead of § 2241 to decide the merits of Holley’s habeas petition was harmless error because a review of the record applying the standards of § 2241 produces the same results. Accordingly, the dismissal of Holley’s habeas corpus petition is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Gregory S. Lang, hereby certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in my capacity as an officer of PMC-Sierra, Inc. (PMC), that, to my knowledge, this Quarterly Report of PMC on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 28, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of PMC.



|                     |  |     |  |                        
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | -----------------------
|Date: August 4, 2009 |  | By: |  | /s/    Gregory S. Lang 
|                     |  |     |  | Gregory S. Lang        
|                     |  |     |  | President and          
|                     |  |     |  | Chief Executive Officer
#### Shirley P. TOUART, Appellant, v. J. T. BIVINS and J. W. Weaver, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division A.

July 6, 1954.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
[No. 34630.

Department One.

November 28, 1958.]

#### Louis F. Masterjohn *et al., Respondents,*v. Otto H. Oldberg *et al, Appellants.*
      *1*

*Joseph D. Holmes*and *Joseph D. Holmes, Jr.,*for appellants.

*Karl Burgess (William C. Hallin,*of counsel), for respondents.

Reported in 332 P. (2d) 249.

Finley, J.

This is an appeal from a verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff in an action brought for personal injuries.

The plaintiff, Irma Masterjohn, sustained a whiplash injury when the car in which she was riding was struck in the rear by a car owned and operated by the defendant, Otto H. Olberg. The defendants stipulated as to liability. The sole issues tried to the jury concerned damages. After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $15,700, the defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was so excessive as to show passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. This motion was denied, and'the defendant has appealed.

The appellant makes two assignments of error: 1. The court erred “in not granting the defendant’s motion for a new trial because the verdict was so excessive as to show passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.” 2. The court erred “in not granting the defendant’s motion for new trial because the verdict was so excessive that substantial‘justice was not done the defendants.”

The damages awarded by the jury were reasonably within the range of the evidence and are supported by the record. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. It is so ordered.

Hill, C. J., Mallery, Ott, and Hunter, JJ., concur.

January 2, 1959. Petition for rehearing denied.
#### PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS v. SIGFRIED.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June Term 1953.

Dismissed without opinion.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

RAIN ILLARRAMENDI, §

No. 08

- 14

- 00057

- CV

Appellant, §

Appeal from the

v. §

243rd Judicial District Court

§

ECHOSTAR, ECHOSPHERE, L.L.C.,

ECHOSTAR TECHNOLOGIES L.L.C.,

ECHOSTAR SATELLITE L.L.C.

N/K/A DISH NETWORK L.L.C., AND

DISH NETWORK SERVICES L.L.C. §

§ of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2010

- 2007)

§

Appellees.

§

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the agreed motion to dismiss appeal and

concludes the motion should be granted and the appeal should be dismissed, in accordance with

the opinion of this Court. We therefore dismiss the appeal. Costs of the appeal are taxed against

the party incurring them. We further order that this deci sion be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 22ND DAY OF OCTOBER, 2014.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, J., and Barajas, C.J. (Senior Judge)

Barajas, C.J. (Seni or Judge, sitting by assignment)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 20-0546 JOSEPH H.SCHMAUS,

Plaintiffand Appellant,
v. CX RANCH,LLP,

Defendant and Appellee. F 

### DEC U 8 2020
Bowen Greenwood Clerk of Supreme Court State of Montana ORDER

Appellee CX Ranch, LLP moves for dismissal of this appeal because a final judgment has not yet been entered. Appellant Joseph H.Schmaus responds in opposition, arguing he has appealed front a finaljudgment. CX Ranch notes that the Montana Rules ofAppellate Procedure provide a "final judgment . . . includ[es] any necessary determination of the amount of the costs and attorney fees awarded or sanction imposed." M.R.App.P.4(1). CX Ranch explains that while the Broadwater County District Court issued an Order on Motion to Dismiss granting its motion on November 12, 2020, the court also granted its motion for its litigation and attorney fees,which determination has not yet been made because the appeal deprived the court from jurisdiction. Schmaus argues in response that the District Court deemed the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and rendered a final, appealable judgment,not an interlocutory order. Upon review,we conclude that this appeal is prematurely before this Court. There is not a final judgment,pursuant to M.R.App.P. 4(1)(a)and 6(1), and the District Court needs an opportunity to issue an order assessing costs and attorney fees. We routinely dismiss appeals to permit this determination to be made. Schmaus retains a right to appeal upon entry ofa finaljudgment. Therefore, 12/08/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0546

### IT IS ORDERED that CX Ranch's Motion to Dismiss Appcal is GRANTED and

this appeal is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk ofthe Supreme Court is directed to close this case as ofthe date ofthis Order and to issue rernittitur. The Clerk also is directed to provide a copy ofthis Order to the Honorable Judge Mike Menahan, First Judicial District Court; to Valerie J. Hornsveld, Clerk of District Court,Broadwater County,under Cause No.ADV-2020-31; to counsel ofrecord, and to Joseph H. Schrnaus personally. DATED this day ofDecember,2020.
ChiefJustice

e

6Q=.1 1 2JA
-LL/776124/144

Justices
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with Amendment No. 2 to the Annual Report of Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A for the fiscal year ending May 29, 2004 (the "Report"), I, Robert LaPenta, ^ certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section  1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge that:

(1)     The Report  fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/  Robert LaPenta
Robert LaPenta
Vice President - Chief Accounting Officer [Principal Financial Officer]October 25, 2004
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Defense

###### Office of the Secretary

          - [Transmittal Nos. 08-102]

# AGENCY:

Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated 21 July 1996.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601-3740.

The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittals 08-102 with attached transmittal, and policy justification.

Dated: October 7, 2008

Patricia L. Toppings,

OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

      ( print page 61080)          ( print page 61081)          ( print page 61082)    

BILLING CODE 5001-06-M

[FR Doc. E8-24407 Filed 10-14-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5001-06-C
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7560

MCDONALD WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

D. A. HEDGEPETH; DETECTIVE SKINNER; R. BLACKWELL,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

VANCE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior

District Judge. (CA-96-783-5-CT-BR)

Submitted: March 17, 1998 Decided: March 31, 1998

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

McDonald Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Keith David Burns, FAISON &

FLETCHER, Durham, North Carolina; Gary S. Parsons, David Scott

Wisz, BAILEY & DIXON, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
3

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court order granting summary

judgment to Appellee Blackwell and denying his motion for appointment of counsel. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction

because neither order is appealable. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292

(1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan

Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In this case, claims remain pending in

the district court against other defendants. Because the district

court has not certified its order granting summary judgment as

final under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and because neither of the orders

fall within the collateral order doctrine, we lack jurisdiction to

consider the appeal either from the award of summary judgment to

Blackwell or the denial of the motion for appointment of counsel.

See Baird v. Palmer, 114 F.3d 39, 43 (4th Cir. 1997); Miller v.

Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 964 (4th Cir. 1987).

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. We deny Appellees'

motions for dismissal and Appellant's motions to stay and amend the

appeal, to examine the record, and for appointment of counsel as

moot. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, J. Russell Porter, Chief Executive Officer of Gastar Exploration, Ltd. (the Company), hereby certify that the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31,
2010 (the Report), filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, fully complies with the requirements of
that section.

I further certify that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: March 10, 2011



/s/    J. RUSSELL PORTERJ. Russell PorterChief Executive Officer
#### Vandy WARREN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 17810.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Sept. 11, 1963.

Decided Sept. 19, 1963.

Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 31, 1963.

Mr. Richard F. Generelly, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Charles V. *615Shannon and John T. Ketcham, Washington, D. C. (all appointed by this court) were on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Anthony A. Lapham, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Edgerton, Senior Circuit Judge, and Wilbur K. Miller and Bas-tían, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, indicted for the crime of rape, D.C.Code (1961) § 22-2801, was convicted of the lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit rape and was duly sentenced.

Court-appointed counsel has diligently and ably briefed and argued the case, but examination of the record and authorities discloses no error affecting substantial rights.

Affirmed.
##### 



Exhibit 10.1
 SYBASE, INC.
AMENDED AND RESTATED 2003 STOCK PLAN
 FORM OF NOTICE OF GRANT  AND  RESTRICTED STOCK  AGREEMENT
 Shares Plan Notice and Agreement
 Participant:Home Address:Purchase Price Per Share:
    
    $0Number of Shares of Restricted
 Stock
Granted:Grant Date:Period of Restriction and Release of
Shares from Companys Return Right
(see Sections 2 and 3 of attached
Agreement)
    
    During the Period of Restriction,
the Shares shall be subject to
the Companys Return Right, which
shall lapse as follows: [INSERT
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS HERE]
  AGREED AND ACCEPTED:Signature:Print Name:




---



##### 



SYBASE, INC.
AMENDED AND RESTATED 2003 STOCK PLAN
 RESTRICTED STOCK AGREEMENT
 Grant of Restricted Stock Notice of
Grant
 Period of Restriction Release
Date Unreleased Shares
 Companys Return Right Return Right
 Restriction on Transfer Securities Act
 Retention of Shares Exhibit A.
 Stockholder Rights
 Legends




---



##### 



U.S. Tax Consequences Code
  Taxation at Vesting
  General




---



##### 



11. Clawback Policy




---



##### 



EXHIBIT A
 ASSIGNMENT SEPARATE FROM CERTIFICATE
 
 
 
 Signature:Print Name:
 INSTRUCTIONS:
 Please DO NOT fill in any blanks other than the signature lines .
 The purpose of this assignment is to enable the Company to exercise its Return Right as set forth
in the Notice and Agreement, without requiring additional signatures on the part of the
Participant.
[No. 34765.

Department Two.

January 2, 1959.]

#### Claudia Frizzell, *Appellant,*v. Gary A. Frizzell, *Respondent.**1*

*Chavelle & Millard*and *Hubert M. Jones,*for *appellant.*

*Helsell, Paul, Fetterman, Todd & Hokanson*and *Richard W. Bartke,*for respondent.

1

 Reported in 333 P. (2d) 657.

Weaver, J.

Plaintiff wife, who commenced an action for separate maintenance, appeals from a decree of divorce granted her husband upon his cross-complaint. The record on appeal does not contain a statement of facts.

The sole question is whether the court’s finding of fact

•“Plaintiff has been guilty of cruel treatment of the defendant and inflicted upon him personal indignities rendering life burdensome. Plaintiff has refused to treat defendant as a husband, refused to associate with defendant’s friends and continually embarrassed defendant in front of his friends by her conduct and remarks, refused to cook meals for defendant, persisted in spending long periods of time with her family away from the apartment of the parties, and nagged and harassed defendant while they were together, all to the extent that it is no longer possible for the defendant to live with plaintiff as his wife. The parties have lived separate and apart since on or about June 7, 1957.”

is sufficient to sustain the decree of divorce.

The decree must be affirmed upon the authority of *Sabot v. Sabot,*97 Wash. 395, 166 Pac. 624 (1917), wherein the findings of fact were less specific than in the instant case. See, also, *Bloom v. Bloom,*57 Wash. 23, 106 Pac. 197 (1910); *Burg v. Burg,*173 Wash. 273, 22 P. (2d) 664 (1933).

The judgment is affirmed.

. Hill, C. J., Donworth, Rosellini, and Foster, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 201 (Thursday, October 16, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 61420]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-24621]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION


Ocean Transportation Intermediary License Applicants

    Notice is hereby given that the following applicants have filed 
with the Federal Maritime Commission an application for license as a 
Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier and Ocean Freight Forwarder--Ocean 
Transportation Intermediary pursuant to section 19 of the Shipping Act 
of 1984 as amended (46 U.S.C. Chapter 409 and 46 CFR part 515).
    Persons knowing of any reason why the following applicants should 
not receive a license are requested to contact the Office of 
Transportation Intermediaries, Federal Maritime Commission, Washington, 
DC 20573.

Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier Ocean Transportation Intermediary 
Applicant:
    American NAV International Inc., dba Amerussia Shipping Company, 51 
Chestnut Street, Rutherford, NJ 07070, Officers: William J. Spanton, 
Vice President (Qualifying Individual), Richard Shannon, President.

    Dated: October 10, 2008.
Karen V. Gregory,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-24621 Filed 10-15-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6730-01-P
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000766561
<NAME> HICKORY TECH CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                           5,145
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   15,861
<ALLOWANCES>                                       549
<INVENTORY>                                      2,322
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                24,541
<PP&E>                                         128,638
<DEPRECIATION>                                  67,844
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 155,533
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,382
<BONDS>                                         74,382
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,366
<OTHER-SE>                                      60,299
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   155,533
<SALES>                                         21,150
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                69,093
<CGS>                                           16,840
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   50,489
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,361
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 17,697
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,211
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,486
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,486
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .77
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .77
        

</TABLE>