UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4197

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT MOORE SAMPSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger, 

District Judge. (3:09-cr-00085-MR-3)

Submitted: March 29, 2011 Decided: April 22, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

S. Frederick Winiker, III, WINIKER LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Robert Moore Sampson pled guilty to conspiracy to 

distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). He was 

sentenced to sixty-five months’ imprisonment. Counsel has filed

a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal 

but questioning whether the sentence is reasonable. Sampson has 

filed a pro se supplemental brief, emphasizing the mitigating 

factors supporting a lesser sentence. Finding no error, we 

affirm.

This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness, 

applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. 

Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). This review requires 

appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In 

determining the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we

consider whether the district court properly calculated the 

defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by 

the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. 

Id. “Regardless of whether the district court imposes an above, 

below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the 
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record an individualized assessment based on the particular 

facts of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 

325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). If 

the sentence is procedurally sound, this court next assesses the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “taking into account 

the ‘totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any 

variance from the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Pauley, 

511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51). 

With these standards in mind, we have reviewed 

Sampson’s sentence and conclude that the district court properly 

calculated Sampson’s sentencing range under the advisory 

Guidelines as 87-108 months. The district court also allowed 

counsel to argue that the § 3553(a) factors warranted a sentence

of time served and afforded Sampson an opportunity to allocute.

See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 581 (4th Cir. 2010). 

The district court articulately explained before imposing 

sentence that other factors, particularly the need to deter 

others, outweighed Sampson’s favorable offender characteristics. 

See Carter, 564 F.3d at 330. Finally, Sampson offers no 

persuasive argument that the district court abused its 

discretion in sentencing him to a below-Guidelines sentence of 

sixty-five months. See Pauley, 511 F.3d at 474 (affirming 

sentence where downward variance was “reasonable and premised on 
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the factors set forth in § 3553(a)”). Accordingly, we discern 

neither procedural nor substantive sentencing error.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Sampson, in writing, of the right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Sampson requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Sampson. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED