NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DERRICK W. MACON,

Petitioner

v.

OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2017-1026

______________________ 

Petition for review of a decision of the Board of Directors of the Office of Compliance in No. 15-CP-48 (CV, AG, 

FL, RP).

______________________ 

Decided: June 12, 2017

______________________ 

DERRICK W. MACON, Upper Marlboro, MD, pro se.

JOHN UELMEN, Office of the General Counsel, Office of

Compliance, Washington, DC, for respondent. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 
2 MACON v. OOC

Derrick Macon is an employee of the United States 

Capitol Police (“Department”), which garnished his wages 

in response to a Maryland state-court judgment against 

Mr. Macon based on two credit-card debts. Mr. Macon 

challenged this garnishment with the Office of Compliance (“Office”) under the procedures established by the 

Congressional Accountability Act. The Office construed 

Mr. Macon’s complaint as alleging discrimination and 

violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), while 

recognizing that the complaint rested on the assertion 

that the writ of garnishment issued by the Maryland 

court listed only one of the two debts. The Office then 

dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on 

which relief could be granted, among other reasons. We 

agree that Mr. Macon’s allegations fail to support a discrimination or FLSA claim. Therefore, we affirm. 

I 

Mr. Macon has been employed by the Department 

since 1985. On August 4, 2011, he was sued in Maryland 

state court by NRL Federal Credit Union to collect on two 

credit-card debts—one for $8,518.31, the other for

$20,756.70. The state court entered a default judgment 

against Mr. Macon, awarding the credit union the two 

debt amounts claimed, plus pre- and post-judgment 

interest on both debts and court costs. 

On April 23, 2013, the credit union requested that the 

state court issue a writ of garnishment for $38,407.13, the 

total amount owed at the time under the default judgment.1 The writ issued on May 13, 2013. The writ on its 

 

1 In this court, Mr. Macon does not dispute that the 

$38,407.13 sum correctly represented the debt and interest owed under the judgment, see Pet’r’s Br. 4, although, 

as explained later, he does dispute whether a writ of 

garnishment ever issued for the $20,765.70 debt.
MACON v. OOC 3

face gives $8,518.31 as the amount of the underlying 

judgment, but the writ also states, “See Attachments.” 

According to the Department, one such attachment was 

the default judgment for both debts. Mr. Macon does not 

dispute that contention. 

On July 24, 2013, Mr. Macon received notice from the 

Department that the writ had issued and his wages would 

be garnished until the $38,407.13 was paid in full. Pet’r’s 

Br. Ex. 2. The garnishment began on August 7 or 8, 2013

(the difference is immaterial here). Pet’r’s Br. Ex. 3. Mr. 

Macon subsequently sought relief from the state court 

multiple times, but he was unsuccessful. On March 16, 

2015, the Department notified Mr. Macon that it would 

withhold an additional $4,246.69 for accrued postjudgment interest. Pet’r’s Br. Ex. 1. 

On July 17, 2015, Mr. Macon began the process of 

seeking relief with the Office of Compliance under the 

Congressional Accountability Act. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301–

1438. He filed a request for counseling on that day. 

According to the Hearing Officer at the Office, the complaint asserted disparate treatment and age discrimination, retaliation, and a violation of the FLSA, which are 

within the coverage of the Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1313. On 

August 21, 2015, Mr. Macon requested mediation under 2 

U.S.C. § 1403. Pet’r’s Br. Ex. 5.

On December 28, 2015—after mediation ended, and 

after the state court was notified that both debts had been 

satisfied—Mr. Macon filed a complaint against the Department under 2 U.S.C. § 1405. In his complaint, he

claimed that the Department illegally withheld more 

money than was authorized by the writ of garnishment. 

The Department moved to dismiss the complaint on three 

grounds: (1) that the request for counseling was untimely, because it was not filed within 180 days after Mr. 

Macon had notice of his cause of action; (2) that the claims 

were barred by “res judicata” (seemingly covering claim 
4 MACON v. OOC

and issue preclusion); and (3) that Mr. Macon had not 

identified a material adverse action, as necessary for his 

discrimination and retaliation claims, and had not stated 

a claim for relief under the FLSA.

The Hearing Officer agreed with all three of the Department’s arguments, determining that Mr. Macon’s 

request for counseling was untimely filed, his complaint 

failed to state a discrimination or FLSA claim, and his 

challenges to the writ of garnishment were barred by 

collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). Mr. Macon appealed to the Office’s Board of Directors under 2 U.S.C.

§ 1406. The Board affirmed the Hearing Officer’s findings 

and legal conclusions.

Mr. Macon appeals. We have jurisdiction to review 

the Board’s decision under 2 U.S.C. § 1407(a)(1)(A). 

II

The Board agreed with the Hearing Officer that Mr. 

Macon’s complaint failed to state a claim on which relief 

could be granted. Resp’t’s App. 1; see Office of Compliance, Procedural Rules of the Office of Compliance

§ 5.03(a) (Nov. 2016), available at http://www.compliance.

gov/sites/default/files/Procedural%20Rules_508.pdf (“A

Hearing Officer may, after notice and an opportunity to

respond, dismiss any claim that the Hearing Officer finds 

to be frivolous or that fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, including, but not limited to, claims 

that were not advanced in counseling or mediation.”). As 

relevant here, we may set aside the Board decision only 

“if it is determined that the decision was—(1) arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not consistent with law; (2) not made consistent with required 

procedures; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 

2 U.S.C. § 1407(d). We see no such error.
MACON v. OOC 5

A 

According to 2 U.S.C. § 1311(a), “[a]ll personnel actions affecting [employees covered by the Congressional 

Accountability Act] shall be made free from any discrimination based on (1) race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin, within the meaning of [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2]” or “(2) 

age, within the meaning of [29 U.S.C. § 633a].” The 

Board determined that Mr. Macon failed to state a discrimination claim. We agree.

On its face, the complaint filed under 2 U.S.C. § 1405

does not allege that the Department’s actions were based 

on race or age discrimination. It alleges only that the 

Department acted outside its authority when it garnished 

Mr. Macon’s wages above the amount listed on the face of 

the writ of garnishment. See Record Before the Agency at 

776–86. Although the complaint alleges that the Department’s actions violated various District of Columbia 

employment laws, the Congressional Accountability Act 

does not extend to such violations. See 2 U.S.C. 

§ 1407(a)(1); id. §§ 1311–1317. 

In any event, if there is an implicit allegation of discrimination in the complaint, it was properly dismissed. 

The adverse action about which Mr. Macon complains is 

the garnishment of $20,765.70 (plus interest) for the 

second debt. Pet’r’s Br. 4. He argues that the state court 

did not issue a writ of garnishment for that debt, but only

for the $8,518.31 debt (plus interest). Id. But Mr. Macon 

failed to allege any facts that provided a plausible basis 

for inferring that the Department acted for any reason 

other than to fulfill its legal duty regarding garnishment.

“The garnishment provision of the Hatch Act Reform 

Amendments of 1993, 5 U.S.C. § 5520a(b), subjects the 

pay of federal agency employees to legal process ‘in the 

same manner and to the same extent as if the agency 

were a private person.’” First Va. Bank v. Randolph, 110 

F.3d 75, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 5520a(b)). 
6 MACON v. OOC

The requirements of § 5520a extend to employees of the 

legislative branch. See 5 U.S.C. § 5520a(a)(1)(D). Accordingly, the Department had to withhold money from Mr. 

Macon’s wages if a private person would have had to do 

so.

Maryland law is relevant here. “When an attachment 

is levied against the wages of a judgment debtor, it shall 

constitute a lien on all attachable wages that are payable 

at the time the attachment is served or which become 

payable until the judgment, interest, and costs, as specified in the attachment are satisfied.” Md. Code Ann. 

Com. Law § 15-602(a). Further, “[w]hile the attachment 

remains a lien, the employer/garnishee shall withhold all 

attachable wages payable to the judgment debtor and 

remit the amount withheld to the judgment creditor or his 

legal representative within 15 days after the close of the 

last pay period in each month.” Id. § 15-603(a).

Mr. Macon does not dispute the applicability of those 

provisions to part of the amount garnished. He argues, 

however, that the Department was not required or even 

authorized to withhold wages for the $20,756.70 debt (and 

interest) because a writ of garnishment was never issued 

for that debt. But we see no reversible error in the 

Board’s affirmance of the Hearing Officer’s contrary 

determination. We note that the Hearing Officer relied on 

the certified record from the state-court proceeding, 

particularly the default judgment and related docket 

entries, attached to the Department’s motion to dismiss, 

and Mr. Macon does not challenge that reliance here. The 

certified record amply supports the Hearing Officer’s 

determination. 

Although a May 7, 2012 docket entry notes a judgment for $8,518.31, another entry from the same day 

states that judgment is entered “in the sum of $8,518.31 

with interest at 10.9% per annum from April 12, 2010 

until judgment and thereafter at the judgment rate of 
MACON v. OOC 7

interest, plus $20,756.70 together with interest at 9.9% 

per annum from March 18, 2010 until judgment and 

thereafter at the judgment rate of interest.” Record 

Before the Agency at 101–02. Further, the order granting 

the credit union’s summary-judgment request contains a 

judgment for both amounts. Id. at 178. Mr. Macon does 

not dispute that the default judgment was issued for the 

two-debt amount, not the one-debt amount. Pet’r’s Br. 4. 

Additionally, although the writ of garnishment lists a 

judgment amount of $8,518.31, it also includes a notation 

to “See Attachments.” Record Before the Agency at 159. 

The Department contended to the Hearing Officer that 

the judgment reflecting the correct amount owed was 

attached to the writ, and Mr. Macon does not dispute the 

Hearing Officer’s acceptance of that contention. 

Regardless, we have been presented no basis for disturbing the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that standard 

principles of issue preclusion barred Mr. Macon from 

disputing the writ’s validity as to both debts (and related 

interest). See Kroeger v. U.S. Postal Serv., 865 F.2d 235, 

239 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (issue preclusion doctrine generally 

bars a party from raising an issue previously litigated 

where “(i) the issue previously adjudicated is identical 

with that now presented, (ii) that issue was actually 

litigated in the prior case, (iii) the previous determination 

of that issue was necessary to the end-decision then made, 

and (iv) the party precluded was fully represented in the 

prior action”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. 

Macon challenged the contents of the issued writ while 

before the Maryland court, arguing that the writ did not 

list the correct amount. Record Before the Agency at 146–

56. The Maryland court rejected Mr. Macon’s arguments. 

Id. at 145. And Mr. Macon does not dispute that he was 

fully represented. He has identified no ground for allowing him to relitigate the amount of the writ-covered debt 

in this proceeding.
8 MACON v. OOC

In sum, there is simply no basis in Mr. Macon’s complaint to suggest that the garnishment here reflected any 

discrimination, as opposed to clear garnishment duties of 

the Department. 

B 

The Congressional Accountability Act extends to covered employees the protections of the FLSA codified at 29 

U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1), 206(d), 207, 212(c). See 2 U.S.C. 

§ 1313(a)(1). The Board determined that Mr. Macon did 

not plead enough to state a FLSA claim. We see no 

reversible error in that determination.

The only potentially applicable FLSA provision is 29 

U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), which provides, with exceptions not 

relevant here, that “no employer shall employ any of his 

employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours 

unless such employee receives compensation for his 

employment in excess of the hours above specified at a 

rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate 

at which he is employed.” Id. But Mr. Macon’s complaint 

can only reasonably be read as basing the FLSA claim on 

the argument that the Department withheld more than 

was allowed under the writ of garnishment. For the 

reasons previously stated, that argument is barred by

issue preclusion. Mr. Macon provides no other reason 

that the Department’s actions violated the FLSA. Accordingly, the Board properly dismissed Mr. Macon’s FLSA 

claim. 

III

Because we determine that the Board properly dismissed Mr. Macon’s complaint for failure to state a claim 

on which relief may be granted, we need not consider the 

other grounds for dismissal. We affirm the decision of the 

Board.

No costs.
MACON v. OOC 9

AFFIRMED