IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02664-BNB

DARIAN L. HUNTER,

Applicant,

v.

J. WANDS, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution (F.C.I.), Florence,

Respondent.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Applicant’s motion for a preliminary injunction

(Doc. #2) filed on October 13, 2011. Applicant is a prisoner in the custody of the United

States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at the Federal Correctional Institution in Florence,

Colorado. Applicant initiated this action by filing an application for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the computation of his sentence and

the amount of time he will be placed in a halfway house upon his release. In the motion

for a preliminary injunction, Applicant apparently seeks an order directing Respondent

to advance the date on which he is scheduled to be released from prison to a halfway

house.

The Court must construe the motion liberally because Applicant is not

represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall

v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not be an

advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated

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below, the motion will be denied.

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show a substantial likelihood of

prevailing on the merits, that he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues,

that the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may

cause the opposing party, and that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the

public interest. See Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). A

preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and “the primary goal of a preliminary

injunction is to preserve the pre-trial status quo.” RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d

1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). Therefore, “courts should be especially cautious when

granting an injunction that requires the nonmoving party to take affirmative action - a

mandatory preliminary injunction - before a trial on the merits occurs.” Id. Because

Applicant is seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction that seeks to alter the status

quo, he must make a heightened showing of the four factors listed above. See id. at

1209.

The Court finds that Applicant has not made a sufficient showing that he is

entitled to issuance of a preliminary injunction in the instant action. The Applicant fails

to make the necessary showing with respect to any of the four factors because the

substance of the claim he is asserting regarding halfway house time is not clear. 

Instead, Applicant alleges only that he is being denied due process because his home

confinement eligibility date is January 7, 2012, and Respondent has not acted in

accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1). This vague and conclusory allegation does not

demonstrate that Applicant’s rights have been violated in any way with respect to his

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pending transfer to a halfway house. Therefore, the motion for a preliminary injunction

will be denied. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. #2) filed on October

13, 2011, is denied.

DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 17th day of November , 2011.

BY THE COURT:

 s/Lewis T. Babcock 

LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge

United States District Court

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