IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02708-WYD-KLM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY D. BERRYMAN;

THE TEMPLE OF THE UNVEILED GOD;

THE OFFICE OF THE OVERSEER OF DEDICATION TO ENLIGHTENMENT; and

HER SUCCESSORS, A CORPORATION SOLE,

Defendants.

ORDER AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s “Motion for Summary Judgment

Against Nancy D. Berryman and for Default Judgment Against the Temple of the

Unveiled God and the Office of the Overseer of Dedication to Enlightenment, and Her

Successors, a Corporation Sole, and for Sanctions Pursuant to FRCP 37", which was

filed on October 15, 2012 (the “Motion”). (ECF No. 52). The Motion was referred to

Magistrate Judge Mix for a Recommendation by Order of Reference. Magistrate Judge

Mix issued a Recommendation on April 12, 2013, which is incorporated herein by

reference. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), D.C.COLO.LCivR. 72.1. 

Magistrate Judge Mix recommends therein that Plaintiff’s Motion be granted in part and

denied in part. (Recommendation at 2). 

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II. BACKGROUND

On October 18, 2011, Plaintiff United States of America brought this civil action

against the Defendants to reduce federal income tax assessments to judgment and to

foreclose federal tax liens on real property and water rights. Plaintiff asserts proper

jurisdiction by this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340, and 1345 and to 26

U.S.C. §§ 7402 and 7403. Plaintiff states that venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1391 and 1396 on the basis that the real property at issue is located within this

District. The real property that is the subject of this action (“Subject Property”) is

referred to as Parcel A and Parcel B. Parcel A is vacant land located in Larimer County,

Colorado, and Parcel B is commonly referred to as 3295 Tunnel Road, Estes Park, CO

80517. 

In the pending motion, Plaintiff requests: (1) that default judgment be entered

against Defendants Temple of the Unveiled God (“Temple”) and Defendant Office of the

Overseer of Dedication to Enlightenment (“Overseer”), finding that they have no interest

in the Subject Property, and that Defendant Berryman is the true beneficial owner of the

property; (2) that summary judgment be entered against Defendant Berryman, finding

that she is indebted to the United States for federal income tax liabilities for the tax

years at issue and that the United States has valid and subsisting federal tax liens

which attach to all property and rights to property of Defendant Berryman, including her

interest in the Subject Property; (3) that the United States’ tax liens encumbering the

Subject Property be foreclosed and the Court enter an Order of Foreclosure and Decree

of Sale setting forth the terms and conditions of the sale; and (4) that, should Defendant

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Berryman attempt to oppose these claims by introducing previously undisclosed

evidence or testimony, the Court order sanctions against Defendant Berryman

prohibiting her from introducing such evidence or testimony. (Recommendation at 2-3). 

I note that in a prior Order dated August 8, 2012 (ECF No. 43), I affirmed

Magistrate Judge Mix’s ruling that Defendant Berryman may only represent herself in

this proceeding, and may not represent Defendants Temple and Overseer. I further

ordered that both Defendants Temple and Overseer are separate entities that require

an attorney to represent their interests in this action. “While Defendant Berryman may

be the corporation sole representative, the interests of a corporation and its principal

frequently overlap but are not identical in all respects. Thus, requiring separate counsel

for a corporation works as an independent safeguard of its interests.” (ECF No. 43,

Order at 4-5) (internal citations omitted). 

Neither Defendant Temple nor Overseer has appeared or filed a responsive

pleading in this matter, despite having been served with process. Defendant Overseer

was served on November 12, 2011, and its answer was due on December 5, 2011. 

Defendant Temple was served on November 27, 2011, and its answer was due on

December 19, 2011. The Clerk of Court entered default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(a) against Defendant Overseer on January 10, 2012, and against Defendant Temple

on September 20, 2012. To date, no answer or other response has been filed by

counsel on behalf of Defendant Temple or Overseer. (Recommendation at 3-4).

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III. RECOMMENDATION

Magistrate Judge Mix advised the parties that they had fourteen (14) days to

serve and file written, specific objections to the Recommendation. (Recommendation at

44). Neither Defendant Temple nor Defendant Overseer filed an objection to the portion

of the Recommendation granting the Motion for Default Judgment. However, both

Defendant Berryman and Plaintiff filed timely objections to the portion of the

Recommendation granting in part and denying in part the Motion for Summary

Judgment, which necessitates a de novo determination as to those specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made since the nature of the matter

is dispositive. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendants Temple and

Overseer Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55

As stated earlier, after a thorough analysis, Magistrate Judge Mix recommends

that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment against Defendants Temple and Overseer

be granted. (Recommendation at 20). Despite Magistrate Judge Mix’s advisement that

written objections were due within fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of the

Recommendation, no objections were filed to this portion of the Recommendation by

Plaintiff, Defendant Temple or Defendant Overseer. No objections having been filed, I

am vested with discretion to review the Recommendation under any standard [I] deem[]

appropriate. Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (stating that "[i]t does not appear that Congress

intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions,

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1

 Note, this standard of review is something less than a "clearly erroneous or

contrary to law" standard of review, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which in turn is less than a de

novo review, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

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under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings"). 

Nonetheless, though not required to do so, I review the Recommendation to "satisfy

[my]self that there is no clear error on the face of the record."1

 See Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b) Advisory Committee Notes.

Having reviewed this portion of the Recommendation, I am satisfied that there is

no clear error on the face of the record. I find that Magistrate Judge Mix’s

Recommendation is detailed, well reasoned and sound. I agree with Magistrate Judge

Mix that the Plaintiff has sufficiently asserted that Defendants Temple and Overseer are

nominees of Defendant Berryman. Thus, I find that Plaintiff’s request for a default

judgment against Defendants Temple and Overseer should be granted as they have no

interest in the Subject Property.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Berryman

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment in its favor, asking the Court (1) to reduce

to judgment federal tax assessments against Defendant Berryman for tax years 1997

and 1999-2006, and (2) to foreclose those tax liens against the Subject Property.

Magistrate Judge Mix correctly noted that because the United States is the Plaintiff in

this suit, it has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that foreclosure is appropriate. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff must establish that (1) it has a valid federal tax lien, and (2) that

the taxpayer has an interest in the property that the lien seeks to foreclose. Plaintiff

contends that it has a valid federal tax lien because it has conclusively established tax

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liabilities with presumptively valid tax assessments. Plaintiff next argues that it is

entitled to foreclose its tax liens against the Subject Property at issue in this suit

because Defendant Berryman is the true beneficial owner of the Subject Property. 

(Recommendation at 27). 

In her Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Mix made the following findings of

fact relevant to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. Based on Plaintiff’s

exhibits and Defendant Berryman’s testimony at her deposition, Defendant Berryman

received income for each of the tax years at issue that she failed to report to the Internal

Revenue Service (“IRS”). (Recommendation at 23). Magistrate Judge Mix found that

“Defendant Berryman received over $300,000 in capital gains from the sale or

exchange of assets, over $140,000 in distributions from her IRA retirement accounts,

and other income from sources such as Social Security, dividends, and interest income,

all of which she failed to report to the IRS.” (Recommendation at 24). In subsequent

years, “Defendant Berryman again received interest, dividends, and IRA distributions,

amounting to nearly $120,000 unreported income in 1999, over $98,000 unreported

income in 2000, and over $33,000 unreported income in 2001.” (Recommendation at

24). In 2006, Defendant Berryman received $4,875 in income from Teachers Insurance

and Annuity Association – College Retirement Equities Fund (“TIAA-CREF”), in addition

to over $50,000 in other income. TIAA-CREF, however, withheld $975 in federal taxes

from this $4,875, and Defendant Berryman subsequently filed a Form 1040 with the

IRS, claiming that this $975 in withheld taxes was her only income and demanding a

refund of $975 from the IRS. (Recommendation at 24). Magistrate Judge Mix found

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that Defendant Berryman received notices of her alleged tax liability and demands for

payment. (Recommendation at 24). 

As to the Subject Property, Magistrate Judge Mix found that Defendant Berryman

purchased the Subject Property with her own funds. On October 3, 2002, Defendant

Berryman incorporated Defendant Temple in the State of Utah. Defendant Berryman is

the sole director, officer, rector, overseer, and/or member of Defendant Temple. On

July 10, 2009, Defendant Berryman incorporated Defendant Overseer in the State of

Nevada. Defendant Berryman is also the sole director, officer, rector, overseer, and/or

member of Defendant Overseer. (Recommendation at 24-25). 

On April 29, 2003, Defendant Berryman transferred the Subject Property to

Defendant Temple via two quitclaim deeds that were recorded in the Larimer County

Recorder’s Office on May 7, 2003. Plaintiff alleges, and Defendants fail to contest, that

Defendant Temple paid no consideration for this transfer. On July 8, 2009, Defendant

Berryman, as sole director of Defendant Temple, purportedly transferred the Subject

Property from Defendant Temple to Defendant Overseer via a “Grant, Bargain, and

Sale Deed.” Magistrate Judge Mix noted that this occurred two days prior to Defendant

Overseer’s incorporation on July 10, 2009. The Grant, Bargain, and Sale Deed was

recorded in the Larimer County Recorder’s Office on July 9, 2009. The Grant, Bargain,

and Sale Deed lists ten dollars as the consideration, but there is no evidence that

Defendant Overseer paid this consideration for the purported transfer. 

(Recommendation at 25-26). 

Magistrate Judge Mix further found that Defendant Berryman has not denied that

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Defendant Overseer paid no consideration for this transfer. Rather, she denies

Plaintiff’s request that she admit that Defendant Overseer paid no consideration for this

transfer solely on the basis that she does not recognize the entity “Temple” as defined

by the United States. Defendant Berryman also refused during her deposition to

answer almost all questions relating to Defendants Temple and Overseer, including

questions regarding whether Defendant Temple paid any consideration for this

transfer. (Recommendation at 26). 

Magistrate Judge Mix also noted that notwithstanding these purported transfers,

Defendant Berryman admits that she has full use, enjoyment, and control over the

Subject Property, without any interference from Defendant Temple or Overseer. It is

uncontested that Defendant Berryman resides at the Subject Property without paying

rent, directly pays for certain expenses for the Subject Property, such as the

homeowner’s insurance for the Subject Property. Defendant Berryman also admits to

paying the other expenses for the Subject Property by giving money to Defendant

Overseer and as sole officer of Defendant Overseer, paying the expenses using this

money. (Recommendation at 26-27).

1. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may

grant summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and the . . . moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250

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(1986); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220

F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000). “When applying this standard, the court must ‘view

the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to

the party opposing summary judgment.’” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of

Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). All doubts must be

resolved in favor of the existence of triable issues of fact. Boren v. Southwestern Bell

Tel. Co., 933 F.2d 891, 892 (10th Cir. 1991).

“[The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any

material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322-23. 

The moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’ because the nonmoving

party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with

respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Id. at 323.

2. Valid Tax Lien

Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6321, a tax lien arises when (1) the taxpayer is found to

be liable to pay any tax; (2) a demand has been made for such payment; and (3) the

taxpayer has refused to pay. Here, Magistrate Judge Mix concluded that Defendant

Berryman received demands for the tax liability in question. She further found that it is

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undisputed that Defendant Berryman has not paid the requested tax liability. 

(Recommendation at 28). 

Magistrate Judge Mix next addressed the issue of Defendant Berryman’s liability. 

She found that Plaintiff submitted the Forms 4340 for all of the relevant tax years. 

(Recommendation at 28). Magistrate Judge Mix correctly noted that “[b]ecause these

assessments are given a presumption of correctness, the burden now shifts to

Defendants to submit admissible evidence to rebut that presumption.” 

(Recommendation at 28-29). However, instead of disputing the arguments or setting

forth additional facts, Defendant Berryman merely asserted standard tax protestor

arguments that the Court has previously rejected and that the IRS has deemed

“frivolous.” (Recommendation at 29). In a detailed and well-supported legal analysis,

Magistrate Judge Mix rejected each tax protestor argument posited by Defendant

Berryman. (Recommendation at 29-33). Accordingly, based on Defendant Berryman’s

failure to offer any evidence refuting the accuracy of the tax assessments, Magistrate

Judge Mix concluded that Defendant Berryman is liable to Plaintiff for unpaid taxes in

the years 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. 

(Recommendation at 33).

3. True Beneficial Owner

Magistrate Judge Mix next found that pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, the

IRS may satisfy a tax deficiency by imposing a lien on any “property” or “rights to

property” belonging to the taxpayer. (Recommendation at 34). Accordingly, since

Default judgment has been granted against Defendants Temple and Overseer,

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holding that neither has a valid interest in the Subject Property, Magistrate Judge Mix

concluded that Defendant Overseer holds the Subject Property as a nominee

corporation of Defendant Berryman rather than as a valid corporation sole, making

Defendant Berryman the true beneficial owner. “Therefore, the Subject Property

transferred to Defendant Overseer remains subject to the collection of Defendant

Berryman’s tax liability.” (Recommendation at 34). Thus, Magistrate Judge Mix found

that the United States has the authority to encumber the Subject Property with a valid

tax lien. (Recommendation at 34-35). 

4. Amount of Tax Liability

Finally, Magistrate Judge Mix addressed the disputed issue of the amount of

money Defendant Berryman owes the IRS. Magistrate Judge Mix explained that while

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Berryman’s outstanding tax liability was $601,437.27

as of October 15, 2012, she is unable to conclude that Plaintiff has presented sufficient

factual allegations as to the precise amount of Defendant Berryman’s tax liability. 

(Recommendation at 35). “Defendant Berryman has refused to provide documents or

testimony from which her income may be determined, yet argues that the tax liability

assessed against her is incorrect.” (Recommendation at 35). 

While a defendant’s failure to testify regarding the tax liabilities at issue typically

allows the court to draw the negative inference that the testimony would have supported

the plaintiff’s position, Magistrate Judge Mix was unable to assure herself that the

outstanding balance claimed in Plaintiff's Motion is clear on the face of the Forms 4340. 

Magistrate Judge Mix went on to detail her close analysis of the Forms 4340 presented

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by Plaintiff, and noted the nearly nine thousand dollar discrepancy between the

“Assessed Total” figure from the year 1997 and the “Balance” figure of the

corresponding Form 4340. After her careful review, Magistrate Judge Mix was unable

to determine from the IRS’s declaration, the INTSTD calculations, or the face of the

Form 4340 the reason for this discrepancy. (Recommendation at 38). “Similarly, the

‘Balance’ figure from the Form 4340 for the year 2000 indicates an Assessed Total of

$9,617.12. However, the ‘Assessed Total’ entered into the INTSTD computer program

for that year was -9,059.28, a figure the Court has been unable to explain from the face

of the year 2000 assessment.” (Recommendation at 38). 

Without knowing that these figures were accurately and directly drawn from the

presumptively valid assessment figures found in the Forms 4340, Magistrate Judge Mix

was hesitant “to presume that the INTSTD Calculations of Liability are alone sufficient to

determine the proper amount of liability. The Court declines to speculate as to the

legitimacy of such a high figure without confidence that the liability is correct on the face

of valid tax assessments.” (Recommendation at 38-39). Thus, Magistrate Judge Mix

“will permit Plaintiff to submit another dispositive motion for determination of the total

amount of liability in light of these concerns for accuracy on the face of a valid

assessment.” (Recommendation at 39).

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Mix recommends that Plaintiff’s request for

summary judgment finding valid and accurate tax liability be granted in part, for tax year

1999 in the amount of $77,765.47, for tax year 2001 in the amount of $7,264.97, for tax

year 2002 in the amount of $19,123.86, for tax year 2003 in the amount of $14,304.81,

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for tax year 2004 in the amount of $15,611.59, for tax year 2005 in the amount of

$14,086.97, and for tax year 2006 in the amount of $13,561.77. She also recommends

that Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment with respect to the tax years 1997 and

2000 be denied without prejudice. However, Magistrate Judge Mix will permit Plaintiff to

submit another dispositive motion for determination of the total amount of liability for

1997 and 2000 in light of these concerns for accuracy on the face of a valid

assessment. (Recommendation at 39-40). 

IV. OBJECTIONS

On April 23, 2013, Defendant Berryman filed timely objections to Magistrate

Judge Mix’s Recommendation. As a preliminary matter, I point out that it was difficult to

determine the nature of Defendant Berryman’s specific objections to Magistrate Judge

Mix’s Recommendation. The party filing objections must specifically identify those

findings or recommendations to which the objections are being made. The District

Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. Further, at least

one court has stated that arguments not provided to the attention of the magistrate

judge will not be considered in connection with review of nondispositive motions. 

Claytor v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 665, 667 (D. Kan. 2003). “The

court reiterates that this is not a de novo review permitting a ‘second shot’ based on

new arguments.” Id. (citing City of Wichita v. Aero Holdings, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 300, 302

(D. Kan. 2000)). 

Here, Defendant Berryman’s objections consist of numerous conclusory (often

unintelligible) statements without any supporting argument or evidence. Defendant

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Berryman spends considerable time reiterating her assertions that she is not a “United

States person” under the federal tax laws, the IRS is a debt collection agency, and the 

tax powers of the federal government are confined to the District of Columbia. 

Defendant Berryman goes on to assert that the IRS has no valid contract enforceable

against her. As Magistrate Judge Mix noted, these typical tax protestor arguments have

been rejected as meritless and frivolous by many courts including the Tenth Circuit. 

See Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990). “[C]ourts . . . are

not required to expend judicial resources endlessly entertaining repetitive arguments.” 

Id. Accordingly, I summarily overrule all of Defendant Berryman’s objections as they

entirely relate to tax protestor arguments that have already been rejected by a multitude

of courts. 

On April 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed a timely objection to Magistrate Judge Mix’s

“failure to recommend judgement for the tax years 1997 and 2000, and the failure to

recommend an order of foreclosure, as there are no material facts in dispute.” (Pl’s.

Objection at 2). Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Mix erred when she determined

that the United States cannot be granted summary judgment for the tax years 1997 and

2000 because the “Balance” line on the Form 4340s for the tax years 1997 and 2000

did not match the amounts in the “Assessed Total” line on the INTSTD. Plaintiff

contends that the assessment is correct when it submits Form 4340s.

The Plaintiff goes on to explain that “the INTSTD calculations do not contradict

the information of the Form 4340s. Rather, they provide an updated balance due that

includes any activity on Defendant Berryman’s account after the date that the Form

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4340 was generated.” (Pl’s. Objection at 4). Plaintiff further states that a “Form 4340

only reflects payments, and assessed taxes, penalties, and interest as of the date it was

generated. It does not include accrued but unassessed penalties or interest. An

INTSTD, tracks accrued tax, interest and penalties and provides up-to-date calculations

for balances owed. The amounts on the INTSTD submitted with the United States’

Motion for Summary Judgement are current though October 1, 2012.” (Objection at 4). 

After carefully reviewing Plaintiff’s evidence with respect to the amount of

Berryman’s tax liability, I cannot conclude that Magistrate Judge Mix erred in finding that

there are contradictions and inconsistencies with the calculations for tax years 1997 and

2000. As Magistrate Judge Mix correctly noted, “in ruling on motions for summary

judgment, all inferences are generally drawn in favor of the non-movant.” 

(Recommendation at 22). “Therefore, where there is any doubt that Plaintiff has clearly

met its summary judgment burden, the Court hesitates to draw an adverse inference

against one who refuses to provide information at the summary judgment stage.” 

(Recommendation at 22). Thus, given that there is a genuine issue of material fact as

to the amount Defendant Berryman owes the IRS for tax years 1997 and 2000, I find

Magistrate Judge Mix’s Recommendation that summary judgment be denied without

prejudice to be proper and just. I agree that Plaintiff failed to present a clear, accurate

calculation as to the precise amount of Defendant Berryman’s tax liability for tax years

1997 and 2000. I further affirm Magistrate Judge Mix’s Recommendation permitting

Plaintiff to “submit another dispositive motion for determination of the total amount of

liability for 1997 and 2000 in light of these concerns for accuracy on the face of a valid

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assessment.” (Recommendation at 40). 

 V. CONCLUSION

After carefully reviewing Magistrate Judge Mix’s Recommendation and the

parties’ objections, I agree with Magistrate Judge Mix that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment should be granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated

in both the Recommendation and this Order. Magistrate Judge Mix’s Recommendation

is thorough, well reasoned and is adopted. Accordingly, the objections are overruled. 

For the reasons stated above, it is

ORDERED that the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Mix

(ECF No. 66) is AFFIRMED AND ADOPTED. The Objections (ECF Nos. 67 and 68)

are OVERRULED. In accordance therewith, it is

FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff’s request for default judgment against Defendants

Temple and Overseer (ECF No. 52) is GRANTED. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment (ECF No.

52) is GRANTED regarding Defendant Berryman’s tax liability for the tax years 1999,

2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, in the amount of $142,595.58, plus other

statutory additions from October 1, 2012, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c)(1) and

26 U.S.C. § 6621, until judgment is paid in full. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 52) is GRANTED with

respect to Defendant Berryman’s liability for tax years 1997 and 2000 but DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE with respect to the validity of the requested amount of tax

liability for the tax years 1997 and 2000. It is

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FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion (ECF No. 52) is DENIED with respect to

Plaintiff’s request for Rule 37 sanctions. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that within 21 days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall

file either: (1) a motion for summary judgment regarding the amount of Defendant

Berryman’s liability for the years 1997 and 2000, or (2) a motion to set Final Pretrial

Conference regarding Defendant Berryman’s tax liabilities for the years 1997 and 2000.

Dated: September 27, 2013

BY THE COURT:

s/ Wiley Y. Daniel 

Wiley Y. Daniel

Senior United States District Judge

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