FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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 Case No. 5D2022-3029

LT Case No. UNKNOWN

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KIM BRADDOCK,

Appellant,

v.

CITY OF PORT ORANGE PENSION 

FUND’S BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

Appellee.

_____________________________

Administrative appeal from the City of Port Orange Pension 

Fund’s Board of Trustees.

Lt. Warren Carman, Chairman.

Susanne D. McCabe and Allison J. McCabe, of McCabe Law 

Firm, Port Orange, for Appellant.

Kenneth R. Harrison, Sr., Robert A. Sugarman, Madison Levine, 

and Pedro Herrera, of Sugarman, Susskind, Braswell, & Herrera 

P.A., Coral Gables, for Appellee.

October 2, 2024

MAKAR, J.

Forfeiture of a retiree’s pension benefits, which is a harsh 

exaction of a property right, is a drastic and extremely limited 
2

remedy under longstanding Florida law, which mandates that 

forfeiture statutes be strictly construed in favor of pension owners. 

Because the forfeiture of pension benefits in this case is based on 

an erroneous and overly expansive interpretation of a so-called 

“catch-all” provision in Florida’s narrowly drawn forfeiture 

statute, reversal is required.

I.

Officer Steven Michael Braddock worked for the City of Port 

Orange, Florida, for almost 24 years. He retired in 2018 and began 

receiving his pension benefits. His ex-wife, Kim Braddock, began 

receiving her share (25%) of these benefits as well pursuant to a 

final court order in the couple’s dissolution proceeding. They had 

been married for almost twenty years when they divorced in 2015.

A few years after his retirement, Braddock pled nolo 

contendere to one count of exploitation of an elderly person, his 

mother, and one count of uttering forged documents. Two of the 

documents, a power of attorney and a warranty deed, were 

notarized by the City’s records clerk prior to Braddock’s 

retirement. The City’s records clerk played no role in the crime, 

nor did his ex-wife Kim, who is termed an “innocent spouse” 

because she was not involved in the crimes and had divorced 

Braddock years earlier.1 Braddock, who had no prior criminal 

record, was placed on probation for five years and ordered to pay 

restitution to his mother’s estate, which was done.

2

The City learned of Braddock’s nolo plea and initiated 

forfeiture proceedings to deprive him, and by extension his ex-wife, 

Kim, of pension benefits; it also sought return of pension benefits 

already paid. The sole legal basis for forfeiture was that Braddock 

used the free notary services of the City’s records clerk. The City’s 

1 Braddock’s then-current wife, Mary Louise Braddock, was 

part of the scheme to defraud and was charged and pled nolo 

contendere as well.

2 As part of a civil settlement with his brother, Braddock 

waived any interest in his mother’s estate, which in turn waived 

the payment of restitution.
3

legal position was that Braddock’s use of the notarization service 

fell within the broadly worded but narrowly drawn “catch-all” 

category of Florida’s forfeiture statute, which is limited to an 

employee’s misuse of “power, rights, privileges, duties, or position” 

that constitutes a breach of the public trust. This appeal, by Kim 

Braddock, challenges the City’s order of forfeiture.

II.

The legal authority for a forfeiture action is grounded in the 

state constitution, which provides: “Any public officer or employee 

who is convicted of a felony involving a breach of public trust shall 

be subject to forfeiture of rights and privileges under a public 

retirement system or pension plan in such manner as may be 

provided by law.” Art. II, § 8(d), Fla. Const. (emphases added). As 

highlighted, only felonies that involve a “breach of public trust” are 

actionable and the legislature is empowered to provide “by law”

the manner in which forfeitures occur. Section 112.3173 of the 

Florida Statutes implements this constitutional provision. It 

allows for forfeiture upon proof of one of seven “specified offenses” 

that are narrowly limited to felonies involving serious offenses 

against a public entity or involving an abuse of authority 

amounting to a misuse of public office. See § 112.3173(2)(e), Fla. 

Stat. (2024).

The exceptionally narrow scope of these “specified offenses” 

stands in stark contrast to the hundreds of criminal offenses that 

exist in Florida. None of these hundreds of crimes—from murder 

to petit theft—provide the basis for forfeiture absent the 

statutorily required proof that the crime is a “specified offense.” It 

is not enough to have committed a crime for forfeiture to occur; the 

crime must be a felony and involve a misuse of authority 

constituting a breach of the public trust.

A review of the statute confirms this point. The first five of the 

seven “specified offenses” are:

1. The committing, aiding, or abetting of an 

embezzlement of public funds;
4

2. The committing, aiding, or abetting of any theft 

by a public officer or employee from his or her 

employer;

3. Bribery in connection with the employment of a 

public officer or employee;

4. Any felony specified in chapter 838 [Bribery; 

Misuse of Public Office], except ss. 838.15 and 

838.16 [both dealing with commercial bribery];

5. The committing of an impeachable offense[.]

Id. § 112.3173(2)(e)1.–5. (emphases added). Each of the 

highlighted offenses involve actions that (a) deprived a public 

employer of funds or property, (b) constituted bribery connected to 

public employment, or (c) are impeachable offenses. None apply 

here. Braddock was not convicted of embezzlement of public funds, 

of theft from the City, or of a bribery offense; and his position as a 

police officer is not subject to impeachment. See Art. III, § 17, Fla. 

Const. For these reasons, the first five categories do not apply to 

him.

A seventh category was added in 2008 and includes the 

felonies of lewd or lascivious conduct against a victim under 16 

years old and sexual battery of a victim under 18 years old. In 

either case, the offenses must be done “through the use or 

attempted use of power, rights, privileges, duties, or position of his 

or her public office or employment position.” § 112.3173(2)(e)7., 

Fla. Stat. This category is also inapplicable to Braddock. Like the 

first five specified offenses, however, this category requires a nexus 

showing that the sex offense committed arose from a breach of 

public trust, i.e., that the public employee used the “power, rights, 

privileges, duties, or position” of his employment for the sex crime’s 

commission.

The sixth and remaining specified offense in the statute, and 

the one the City relies on in the forfeiture proceeding against 

Braddock, is dubbed a “catch-all” and states:

6. The committing of any felony by a public officer 

or employee who, willfully and with intent to 

defraud the public or the public agency for which 

the public officer or employee acts or in which he 
5

or she is employed of the right to receive the 

faithful performance of his or her duty as a 

public officer or employee, realizes or obtains, or 

attempts to realize or obtain, a profit, gain, or 

advantage for himself or herself or for some 

other person through the use or attempted use 

of the power, rights, privileges, duties, or 

position of his or her public office or employment 

position[.]

Id. § 112.3173(2)(e)6. (emphases added). This definitional 

sentence, consisting of 105 words, has a lot to unpack to 

understand its limited scope.

Before doing so, it is important to emphasize that courts must 

strictly construe a forfeiture statute, such as this one, in “favor of 

the party against whom the penalty is sought to be imposed.” 

Cabrera v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 478 So. 2d 454, 455–56 (Fla. 3d DCA 

1985). The reasons are many. As our supreme court has held, 

forfeitures are deemed “harsh exactions” that “are not favored 

either in law or equity.” Dep’t of Law Enf. v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 

957, 961 (Fla. 1991) (“[T]his Court has long followed a policy that 

it must strictly construe forfeiture statutes.”); Cabrera, 478 So. 2d 

at 455 (“Forfeiture is considered an extraordinarily harsh 

penalty.”); Williams v. Christian, 335 So. 2d 358, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1976) (“No citation of authority is required to support the rule that 

forfeitures are not favored in law. They are considered harsh 

exactions, odious, and to be avoided when possible.”). The 

requirements of due process apply because retirees have property 

rights in their pensions that are constitutionally protected. See

Town of Oakland v. Mercer, 851 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 5th DCA 

2003) (“Due process mandates that the provisions of the forfeiture 

act be strictly interpreted in favor of the persons being deprived of 

their property.”). Finally, “in uncertain cases, strict construction 

means that the courts will construe ambiguous statutes, or even 

clear forfeiture provisions resting on uncertain authority, against 

any loss and in favor of an owner’s retention of property.” Chuck v.

City of Homestead Police Dep’t, 888 So. 2d 736, 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2004); Christian, 335 So. 2d at 361 (“Statutes imposing forfeiture 

will be strictly construed in a manner such as to avoid the 
6

forfeiture and will be liberally construed so as to avoid and relieve 

from forfeiture.”).

Turning back to the “catch-all” provision that has five 

elements.

3 It applies to conduct that

(1) constitutes a felony, (2) is committed by a public 

employee, (3) is done willfully and with intent to 

defraud the public or the public employer of its right 

to the employee’s faithful performance, (4) is done to 

obtain a profit, gain, or advantage for the employee or 

some other person, and (5) is done through the use or 

attempted use of the power, rights, privileges, duties, 

or position of the employee’s employment. 

Houston v. City of Tampa Firefighters & Police Officers’ Pension

Fund Bd. of Trs., 297 So. 3d 664, 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (quoting 

another source). The City was required to establish each of the 

statutory elements to prove a sufficient “nexus” between 

Braddock’s offenses and his position as a City police officer. See id.; 

see also Rivera v. Bd. of Trs. of City of Tampa’s Gen. Emp. Ret.

Fund, 189 So. 3d 207, 210–11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). “The nexus 

determination focuses upon the conduct of the public employee.” 

Houston, 297 So. 3d at 666. Any interpretative doubt must be 

construed in favor of Braddock.

Elements (1), (2), and (4) are satisfied as to Braddock. He

committed a felony4 from which he obtained a profit, gain, or 

advantage, in this case the attempt to take advantage of his mom. 

Braddock also stipulated to element (3), though it is unclear how 

3 Houston v. City of Tampa Firefighters & Police Officers’

Pension Fund Bd. of Trs., 303 So. 3d 233, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) 

(“Subsection (6) in the definition of ‘specified offense’ is sometimes 

referred to as the definition’s catch-all provision because it does 

not identify a specific crime but rather reaches ‘any felony’ bearing 

certain characteristics.”).

4 The forfeiture statute provides that pleading nolo contendere 

constitutes a conviction for a felony. § 112.3173(2)(a), Fla. Stat. 

(2024).
7

his conduct willfully defrauded the public or his employer of the 

“faithful performance of his . . . duty” in his role as a police officer. 

No allegation is made that Braddock had a duty as a police officer 

that he violated; he was only charged with using the City’s free 

notary service. Nonetheless, the stipulation controls.

What’s left is the last element: whether use of the free notary 

service was a willful attempt to defraud the City of the faithful 

performance of his police officer position that was done “through 

the use or attempted use of the power, rights, privileges, duties, or 

position” of the employee’s employment. The dispositive legal 

question is whether the use of the City’s free notary service—

something any City employee could have done—is the type of 

misuse of “power, rights, privileges, duties, or position” that 

constitutes a breach of the public trust? It is not, for a number of

reasons.

First, the City erroneously interpreted the language of the 

“catch-all” provision in concluding that a sufficient nexus existed 

between Braddock’s crimes and his position as a City police officer. 

See Houston, 297 So. 3d at 668 (finding the review of a forfeiture 

order includes whether the Board “has erroneously interpreted a 

provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular 

action” (quoting § 120.68(7)(d), Fla. Stat. (2024))). It is not enough 

for Braddock to have committed a felony when he was a public 

employee, “nor is it enough that the crime bears some relationship 

to his public duties.” Houston, 297 So. 3d at 668 (quoting another 

source). Braddock committed a crime when he was a police officer, 

but is there a legally sufficient nexus between the crime and his 

exercise of official power, rights, privileges, duties, or position?

The City failed to meet its burden to prove that a sufficient 

nexus existed between Braddock’s position as a City police officer 

and his offenses. See Houston, 297 So. 3d at 670 (“It is the Board’s 

burden to establish the nexus between Mr. Houston’s position as 

an employee of the City of Tampa Police Department and his 

commission of the offense to which he pleaded guilty.”). According 

to the City, the nexus was that Braddock “was introduced to [the 

City’s records clerk] through his position as a police officer, 

approached her and utilized her notary services while she was on 

duty at [the police] station using a notary commission and seal 
8

paid for by the City.” That’s it – Braddock used the City’s notary 

services that any City employee could have utilized. To be clear, 

the notary merely provided authorized notary services. No finding 

was made that she was privy to Braddock’s plan to defraud or that 

she was pressured or influenced in any way to provide 

notarization. As a City clerk, she merely notarized the paperwork 

that Braddock provided her as she would for any other City 

employee whether they were police officers or not; members of the 

public could also obtain notarization from her during normal City 

business hours. In short, Braddock did not exercise any official 

power, rights, privileges, duties, or position of his employment in 

using free notarization services, such that no nexus existed.

Second, that subsection 112.3173(2)(e)6. has been dubbed a 

“catch-all” doesn’t mean it catches all. To the contrary, it applies 

to only those felonies that meet its narrow terms; it is not an openended invitation to revoke pensions for conduct other than 

breaches of the public trust through misuse of an employee’s

official power, rights, privileges, duties, or position. The limited 

reach of the specified offenses for forfeiture is reflected in the fact 

that murder, sexual assault, battery, and hundreds of other 

serious crimes are not a per se basis for forfeiture. That’s because 

the constitution requires that forfeiture must arise from a “felony 

involving a breach of public trust.” A city employee who murders 

his mother cannot have his pension forfeited on that basis; it’s a 

hideous act, and the public should be enraged, but, absent conduct 

that he used his official position in a way that breached the public 

trust, no basis for forfeiture exists. Here, the City’s overbroad 

interpretation of the “catch-all” provision is contrary to the 

forfeiture statute’s narrow, and strictly construed, scope.

Third, courts make clear that the “catch-all” provision

requires a clear and close connection between the misuse of the 

employee’s position or the employer’s resources and the specified 

offense before concluding that a sufficiently egregious breach of 

public trust occurred. For example, in Cuenca v. State Board of

Administration, 259 So. 3d 253, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), a clear 

nexus existed where a public schoolteacher/coach used his position 

of authority to sexually abuse students; he could not have 

committed the crimes without access to students. Likewise, in 

Jenne v. Florida Department of Management Services, Division of
9

Retirement, 36 So. 3d 738, 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), a sheriff’s use 

of his official position and powers to award contracts to and extract 

payments from persons doing business with the sheriff’s office 

violated the catch-all provision; again, a direct nexus existed. In 

Newmans v. Division of Retirement, 701 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 1997), a sheriff provided “information or ‘tip-offs’ to drug 

traffickers regarding confidential investigations, aircraft flyovers, 

and other law enforcement efforts”; doing so was “inseparably 

intertwined with his position as Sheriff.” The police officer in 

Simcox v. City of Hollywood Police Officers’ Retirement System, 988 

So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), used his position and 

expertise gained as an officer to effectuate a drug smuggling 

operation and to protect drug deliverymen. In DeSoto v. Hialeah

Police Pension Fund Board of Trustees, 870 So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2003), a police sergeant coordinated and participated in 

robberies using his official position, inside information, and city 

resources (mace/handcuffs), thereby establishing the “statutory 

requirement of a nexus between the crimes charged against the 

public officer and his or her duties and/or position.” Even more 

examples exist, but the point is that a clear nexus must be proven; 

it is simply not “enough that the crime bears some relationship” to 

public duties. Houston, 297 So. 3d at 668.

A case illustrating the lack of a sufficient nexus is instructive. 

In Houston, the city claimed that a police officer “used his position 

as a Tampa police officer and detective to cultivate his relationship 

with Rita Girven,” an alleged confidential informant whom the 

officer paid to get information used in a fraudulent scheme. 297 So. 

3d at 670. In rejecting that a nexus had been shown, the Second 

District noted the absence of any evidence to show that the police 

officer did anything wrong under Tampa’s police department 

guidelines. Id. Nor was there any nexus established between the 

police officer’s position and his use of funds fraudulently obtained

from third parties. Id. The police officer did not use police 

department resources, such as its personal identification 

information system, to assist in the fraudulent scheme and no 

evidence showed that “department funds were used improperly by 

Mr. Houston to pay Ms. Girven for information.” Id. Nor was there 

any evidence that the officer “used the expertise he gained as a law 

enforcement officer to facilitate the scheme.” Id. at 670–71. As 

such, the record failed “to provide a link between Mr. Houston’s
10

conduct, as an employee of the Tampa Police Department, and the 

crime for which he was convicted.” Id. at 670.

As in Houston, here the record fails to show the requisite 

nexus between Braddock’s conduct as a police officer and the 

attempt to defraud his mother. Braddock never used his position 

as a police officer as a part of the scheme. He violated no police 

department guidelines. He did not take or use any City funds or 

tangible property. He did not coerce any City employee or 

otherwise use his position or expertise gained as a police officer. 

His position as a police officer was simply not a factor, having no 

connection to the charges against him. 

The City relies on the First District’s decision in Bollone v.

Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, 100 

So. 3d 1276, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), which is distinguishable. In 

that case, a community college instructor was found guilty of 

possessing child pornography on the college-issued computer in his 

private office; his pension was subsequently forfeited on that basis. 

Id. Unlike the situation in Bollone, however, Braddock was not 

issued a work computer on which he committed felonies. If 

Braddock used a City-issued computer to directly commit a crime 

thereon, such as possession of child pornography, Bollone would be 

persuasive authority to support forfeiture; no such nexus is shown 

here. In addition, the instructor in Bollone was on notice of the 

college’s policies regarding computer usage. He nonetheless acted 

in violation of those policies. Here, Braddock did not violate any 

policies on use of the free notarization services—because none 

existed. Bollone simply doesn’t apply.

Finally, it is unclear what limiting principle applies if the 

catch-all provision is expanded to include the use of free notary 

services available to all City employees. What if a City employee, 

planning to murder his mother, puts poison in a bottle and fills it 

from a workplace water fountain provided by the City. Has a 

sufficient nexus been met? What if an employee used electricity 

from a City office to charge his personal cellphone that he later 

used to illegally surveil a neighbor or make scam calls to defraud 

others? Same question. In these situations, the statutory line to be 

drawn must be clear and strictly construed to avoid a forfeiture,

and liberally construed in the employee’s favor. See Chuck, 888 So. 
11

2d at 744; see also Christian, 335 So. 2d at 361. In an unclear or 

close case of statutory analysis, such as this one, the interpretive 

edge goes to the employee, Braddock.

III.

In conclusion, the de minimis act of using the City’s free 

notarization service in this case is too attenuated under the “catchall” provision to be a misuse of a “power, rights, privilege, duties,

or position” of employment that breached the public trust. And no 

legally sufficient nexus exists between the free notarization service 

and a misuse of a power, right, privilege, or duty in Braddock’s 

position as a police officer. Because the “catch-all” provision must 

be strictly construed in a way that avoids forfeiture, reversal is 

required. The City’s final order of forfeiture is vacated with 

directions that Kim Braddock’s court-ordered right to receive her 

share of the pension shall be fully restored, including without 

limitation the payment of any pension benefits withheld and the 

nullification of any requirement that pension benefits already paid

shall be returned.

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.

MACIVER, J., concurs.

SOUD, J., dissents with opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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12

Case No. 5D2022-3029

LT Case No. UNKNOWN

SOUD, J.

I respectfully dissent.

The People of the State of Florida, in their sovereign and 

righteous might, have declared that public officials who abuse the 

public trust shall forfeit certain compensation due them. See Art. 

II, § 8(d), Fla. Const. As a result, I would affirm—even in this case 

where equitable considerations favoring the innocent former 

spouse of the public official entice otherwise. Such considerations 

simply do not release me from the requirements of applicable 

Florida Statutes, duly enacted to fulfill this important state 

constitutional mandate.

I.

Appellant Kim Braddock and police Sergeant Steven Michael 

Braddock divorced in 2015. In their marital settlement agreement, 

Kim Braddock received 25% of Steven Braddock’s pension, which 

he earned during his career with the City of Port Orange Police 

Department.

Years later, in 2021, Steven Braddock pleaded no contest to 

two felony charges: (i) exploitation of an elderly person or disabled 

adult and (ii) uttering a forgery. The charges stemmed from 

Braddock forging a durable power of attorney and a warranty deed

and having each illegally notarized. The warranty deed was 

purportedly signed by Steven Braddock’s parents granting certain 

real property to him. The power of attorney was purportedly signed 

by his mother, granting him and his then-wife (not Kim Braddock) 

the power to act on his mother’s behalf.

Importantly, these documents were “fraudulently” and 

“illegally” notarized by the Port Orange Police Department’s 

records clerk, who was on duty at the time she notarized them. 

While Steven Braddock signed the power of attorney and warranty 

deed in the police records clerk’s presence, neither his parent(s) 

nor the witnesses to either document were present before the 

notary. Thus, the documents were unlawfully notarized. See §
13

117.107(9), Fla. Stat. (2016). Steven Braddock filed the warranty 

deed with the local clerk of court and presented the power of 

attorney to a financial institution.

As a result, the Board of Trustees of the City of Port Orange

Police Pension Fund ultimately forfeited Steven Braddock’s 

pension pursuant to section 112.3173(3), Florida Statutes (2022), 

concluding that he “used his position as a POPD police officer to 

engage [the police department records clerk] to improperly and 

illegally notarize” the documents. The Board further determined

that Kim Braddock did not have a right to receive partial benefit 

payments because she did not have an independent vested 

property right to her 25% share of the pension. This appeal by Kim 

Braddock followed. Notably, Steven Braddock did not appeal the 

Board’s decision.

II.

The majority reverses the forfeiture of the pension benefits at 

issue because it concludes that Steven Braddock’s crimes do not 

constitute a qualifying specified offense under Florida law. I 

disagree with my respected colleagues.

The Florida Constitution provides:

A public office is a public trust. The people shall 

have the right to secure and sustain that trust 

against abuse. To assure this right:

. . . .

Any public officer or employee who is convicted of a 

felony involving a breach of public trust shall be 

subject to forfeiture of rights and privileges under 

a public retirement system or pension plan in such 

manner as may be provided by law.

Art. II, § 8(d), Fla. Const. The Florida Legislature implemented

this protection by enacting section 112.3173, Florida Statutes:

Any public officer or employee who is convicted of a

specified offense committed prior to retirement . . . 
14

shall forfeit all rights and benefits under any public 

retirement system of which he or she is a member, 

except for the return of his or her accumulated 

contributions as of the date of termination.

§ 112.3173(3), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

Section 112.3173(2)(e) identifies these “specified offense[s],”

including embezzlement of public funds, theft from one’s employer, 

bribery, a felony specified in chapter 838 (bribery; misuse of public 

office), an impeachable offense, and identified sexual offenses 

against persons under sixteen or eighteen years old. See § 

112.3173(2)(e)1.–5. & 7., Fla. Stat. Pertinent here, section 

112.3173(2)(e)6., the section’s “catch-all” provision, see Simcox v. 

City of Hollywood Police Officers’ Ret. Sys., 988 So. 2d 731, 733

(Fla. 4th DCA 2008), further defines a specified offense as:

The committing of any felony by a public officer or 

employee who, willfully and with intent to defraud 

the public or the public agency for which the public 

officer or employee acts or in which he or she is 

employed of the right to receive the faithful 

performance of his or her duty as a public officer or 

employee, realizes or obtains, or attempts to realize 

or obtain, a profit, gain, or advantage for himself or 

herself or for some other person through the use or 

attempted use of the power, rights, privileges, 

duties, or position of his or her public office or 

employment position;

§ 112.3173(2)(e)6., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). It is this provision 

that the Board determined compelled forfeiture of Steven 

Braddock’s pension.

A.

Initially, I note that in resolving this case, the majority places 

considerable emphasis on the notion “that courts must strictly 

construe a forfeiture statute, such as this one, in favor of the party 

against whom the penalty is sought to be imposed.” Yet, such a 

notion is unnecessary here because the majority’s decision does not 

turn on our interpretation of the language of the statute. Rather, 
15

the majority arrives at its decision by applying the statute to the 

record facts before us in deciding whether Steven Braddock’s 

convictions qualify as “specified offense[s].”

Further, while the concept of “strictly construing” forfeiture 

statutes does exist in certain Florida precedent cited by the 

majority1 (to the extent they reach the issues here), it is worthy of 

reconsideration. “A text should not be construed strictly, and it 

should not be construed leniently; it should be construed 

reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.” Antonin Scalia, A 

Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 23 (2018 ed.) 

(emphasis added); see also State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. James, 374 

So. 3d 934, 939 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (Soud, J., specially concurring)

(same). In the context of “strict construction” being applied to 

statutes in derogation of common law, the concept has been rightly 

described as a “relic.” See Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 351 

So. 3d 136, 139 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (Sasso, J., concurring 

specially) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 318 (2012)).

This presumption—like other judicially created presumptions 

superimposed upon Florida courts’ state constitutional 

responsibility to reasonably interpret Florida Statutes by the 

employment of known and dependable canons of construction—is

problematic.

How “narrow” is the narrow construction that 

certain types of statutes are to be accorded . . . ?

There [is] no answer to [this question], which is why 

. . . artificial rules increase the unpredictability, if 

not the arbitrariness, of judicial decisions. . . . 

But whether these dice-loading rules are good or 

bad, there is also the question of where [Florida] 

courts get the authority to impose them. Can we 

really just decree that we will interpret the laws 

1 See Dep’t of Law Enf. v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 

1991); Town of Oakland v. Mercer, 851 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2003).
16

that [the Florida Legislature] passes to mean less 

or more than what they fairly say? I doubt it.

Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law at 

28–29.

Indeed.

B.

Turning to Steven Braddock’s convictions, it is his conduct 

that defines whether his crimes are “specified offenses” under 

subsection (2)(e)6., not the elements of the crimes to which he 

pleaded. See Bollone v. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs., Div. of Ret., 100 So. 

3d 1276, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citing Jenne v. State, Dep’t of 

Mgmt. Servs., Div. of Ret., 36 So. 3d 738, 741–43 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2010)). “Thus, ‘any felony could qualify as a specified offense, so 

long as the remaining conditions in the statute have been met.’” 

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jenne, 36 So. 3d at 742).

Exploitation of an elderly person or disabled adult and 

uttering a forgery, to which Steven Braddock pleaded no contest, 

are not—in and of themselves—specified offenses. Therefore, “the 

statutory conditions of the ‘catch-all’ category . . . must be 

examined and applied to the conduct of the official or the employee 

in making this determination.” Id. (citing Jenne, 36 So. 3d at 742).

For Steven Braddock’s crime(s) to constitute a specified 

offense under section 112.3173(2)(e)6., the plain language of the 

statute requires the criminal acts be: (1) a felony; (2) committed by 

him while he was a public employee; (3) done willfully and with 

intent to defraud the public or his public employer of the right to 

receive the faithful performance of his duty; (4) for the purpose of

obtaining a profit, gain or advantage for himself or some other 

person; and (5) carried out through the use or attempted use of the 

power, rights, privileges, duties, or position of his employment. See 

id. at 1280–81. I agree with the majority’s determination that the 

only element in dispute is the fifth and final element—whether

Steven Braddock carried out his conduct through the use of “the 

power, rights, privileges, duties, or position of his employment.”

The first four elements are satisfied.
17

There is sufficient evidence in the record before us to support 

the Board’s conclusion that Steven Braddock misused his position

at the Port Orange Police Department as a means to accomplish 

his criminal intention.

The majority repeatedly characterizes the individual who 

fraudulently notarized the deed and power of attorney as “the 

City’s records clerk.” This description, while not inaccurate, stops 

short of the fact that determines my opinion in this case. The 

notary was not just any city employee—she was hired by the Port 

Orange Police Department as the police records clerk in the very 

department in which Steven Braddock was a sergeant. To achieve 

his ends, Steven Braddock utilized the notary license of the police 

department’s records clerk—whom he knew only through his 

employment—relying upon his friendship with her and her 

subordinate position within the police department to have the 

forged deed and power of attorney “fraudulently” and “illegally” 

notarized.

Could members of the public (who could utilize the notary 

services for a nominal fee) avail themselves of these same notary 

services for the fraudulent and illegal notarization of documents? 

Conversely, could Steven Braddock go to any other Florida notary 

not within his police department and have the forged warranty 

deed and power of attorney unlawfully notarized without the 

principals and witnesses to the documents present before the 

notary? There is every reason in this record to answer both

questions in the negative.

But for his utilization of his police department records clerk’s 

notary license, Steven Braddock would not have been able to have 

the forged warranty deed and power of attorney fraudulently and 

illegally notarized. Without these documents, Steven Braddock 

could not have carried out his criminal actions. By using the police 

department records clerk’s services in this manner and to this end, 

Steven Braddock misused his position as a police sergeant in the 

Port Orange Police Department and, thereby, defrauded the 

agency and the public of the right to the faithful performance of 

his duty. As a result, as all elements necessary to qualify Steven 

Braddock’s crimes as “specified offense[s]” exist under section 
18

112.3173(3), Florida Statutes, the law requires forfeiture of his 

pension.

C.

Kim Braddock further argues that, even if Steven Braddock’s 

pension was rightfully forfeited, she should continue to receive her 

25% share because she has a separate and independent vested 

property interest in her share of the pension. Here, too, her 

argument must fail.

Under Florida law, Steven Braddock himself did not possess 

an independent vested property interest in his pension. All rights 

to his pension that he earned during his tenure with the Port 

Orange Police Department were subject to the forfeiture 

requirements of Article II, section 8(d) of the Florida Constitution 

and section 112.3173, Florida Statutes. See Busbee v. State, Div. of 

Ret., 685 So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also Hames v. 

City of Miami, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“[A]n

employee has no vested property interest in the pension; it is 

always subject to the statutory forfeiture limitations.”), aff’d sub 

nom. Hames v. City of Miami, FL, 281 F. App’x 853 (11th Cir. 

2008).

As a result, the same must hold true for Kim Braddock. 

Simply stated, while Steven Braddock’s pension was undeniably a 

marital asset rightly subject to equitable distribution, see § 

61.075(6)(a)1.d., Fla. Stat. (2015),2 any rights Kim Braddock 

obtained to a marital portion of his pension upon the dissolution of 

their marriage could be no greater than those rights Steven 

Braddock himself possessed. As such, Kim Braddock’s interest to 

the 25% share of the pension was derivative of his rights and, 

likewise, subject to the forfeiture requirements of Florida law.

2 See also Bd. of Pension Trs. of City Gen. Emps. Pension Plan 

v. Vizcaino, 635 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
19

III.

Accordingly, I would affirm the Board’s final order of 

forfeiture.