1 “[#27]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a specific

paper by the court’s electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this convention

throughout this order.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Case No. 11-cv-02298-REB-KMT

LINDA CASTRO,

Plaintiff,

v.

FIRST NATIONAL COLLECTION BUREAU, INC., a Nevada corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES

Blackburn, J.

The matter before me is plaintiff’s Motion For Attorneys [sic] Fees [#27]1

 filed 

January 24, 2012. I grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

Plaintiff filed this case alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices

Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., on September 1, 2011. On January 9, 2012,

plaintiff accepted an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. (See Plaintiff’s

Notice of Acceptance of Defendant’s Offer of Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 68 [#23], filed January 9, 2012.) Judgment was entered on behalf of plaintiff in the

amount of the offer, $1,001.00. (See Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.P. 68 [#24]

filed January 10, 2012.) Plaintiff now seeks $8,310.00 in attorney fees for 27.7 hours of

Case 1:11-cv-02298-REB-KMT Document 30 Filed 09/27/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 5
2

 Plaintiff’s request for an additional $1080.00 associated with filing his reply is untimely and in

violation of the Local Rules of this District, and thus will not be considered. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.C (“A

motion shall not be included in a response or reply to the original motion. A motion shall be made in a

separate paper.”); Varley v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 2012 WL 2107969 at *1 n.2 (D. Colo.

June 11, 2012) (citing Brimer v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 2012 WL 414386 at *7 (10th Cir.

Feb. 12, 2012)).

2

work on the case.2

The generally applicable “American Rule” provides that “the prevailing litigant is

ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser.” Alyeska

Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1616,

44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); see also Federal Trade Commission v. Kuykendall, 466 F.3d

1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, the FDCPA provides for an award of

reasonable attorney fees to a successful litigant. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Plaintiff

therefore is entitled to an award that is resonable. 

The starting point for any calculation of a reasonable attorney’s fee is the

“lodestar,” that is, the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable

hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76

L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1017-18 (10th Cir. 1996). In

determining the reasonable number of hours spent on the litigation, the applicant must

exercise the same “billing judgment” as would be proper in setting fees for a paying

client. Hensley, 103 S.Ct. at 1941; Malloy, 73 F.3d at 1018. “‘Hours that are not

properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to

statutory authority.’” Hensley, 103 S.Ct. at 1940 (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641

F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)) (emphases in Copeland). Counsel therefore

must make a good faith effort to exclude hours that are “excessive, redundant or

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3

 In addition, Judge Babcock found the assertions to the contrary contained in the affidavit

submitted by plaintiff in support of his motion for attorney fees – authored by the same affiant as pressed

here – unpersuasive. (Order at 4-5 [#16], filed March 16, 2012, White v. Calvary Portfolio Services,

LLC, Civil Case No. 11-cv-02217-LTB-KLM.) I concur with this analysis.

4

 I find counsel’s argument that entries of .1 hour for tasks such as electronically filing documents

with the court or sending an email to the court are justified because he cannot bill in a smaller increment

thoroughly unconvincing. It does not take a law degree or paralegal training to send an email. See Ursic

v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3rd Cir. 1983) (“A Michelangelo should not charge Sistine

Chapel rates for painting a farmer's barn.”). In any event, such routine and inconsequential clerical tasks

are more properly considered part of overhead, and thus not properly billable regardless who performs

them.

3

otherwise unnecessary.” Id. at 1939-40. 

In considering plaintiff’s application, I note first that her attorney’s requested

hourly rate of $300.00 is excessive and not in keeping with prevailing market rates in

the community for lawyers of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. As Judge

Babcock found in a recent order in a similar case, all the courts that have considered

plaintiff’s counsel’s attorney fees requests have found a reasonable hourly rate for his

services to be $250. (See Order at 3-4 [#16], filed March 16, 2012, White v. Calvary

Portfolio Services, LLC, Civil Case No. 11-cv-02217-LTB-KLM.)3

 I concur and use

this fee as the starting point of my lodestar analysis.

As for the amount of hours expended, I believe the fee application evidences a

clear lack of billing judgment. Plaintiff’s counsel has included at least 1.5 hours worth of

charges associated with secretarial and administrative tasks, which are not billable at an

attorney’s hourly rate.4

 See Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10,

109 S.Ct. 2463, 2471 n.10, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989). In addition, the entries for several

hours worth of attorney time allegedly devoted to drafting the complaint and reviewing

the answer – especially in light of counsel’s obvious and professed experience in these

types of cases – strikes this court as excessive and unnecessary. See Ursic v.

Case 1:11-cv-02298-REB-KMT Document 30 Filed 09/27/12 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 5
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Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3rd Cir. 1983).

Where an attorney has failed to exercise billing judgment, the court may do so for

him by striking problematic entries or by reducing the hours requested by a percentage

intended to substitute for the exercise of billing judgment. See Harper v. City of

Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 883

(2001), and cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1092 (2001); Walker v. United States Department

of Housing and Urban Development, 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996). In the exercise

of my broad discretion, I find the latter approach appropriate here. For the reasons

cited herein, I find that a reasonable amount of time expended on this case is 12 hours. 

See Fox v. Vice, – U.S. –, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2216, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) (“[T]rial courts

need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential

goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing

perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may

use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time.”); Malloy, 73 F.3d at 1018

(“[T]he district court need not identify and justify every hour allowed or disallowed, as

doing so would run counter to the Supreme Court's warning that a request for attorney's

fees should not result in a second major litigation.”) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

Multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended (12) by the reasonable

hourly rate ($250.00) results in a lodestar fee award of $3,000.00. 

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

Case 1:11-cv-02298-REB-KMT Document 30 Filed 09/27/12 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 5
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1. That plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys [sic] Fees [#27], filed January 24, 2012,

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

a. That the motion is GRANTED to the extent that plaintiff is entitled to

attorney fees of $3,000.00; and

b. That the motion is otherwise DENIED; and

2. That counsel for plaintiff is AWARDED $3,000.00 in attorney fees pursuant to

section 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Dated September 27, 2012, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

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