Docket No . 108109.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT

OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF I LLI NOI S, Appe llee, v. IS AAC A LC OZ ER , A

pp el l an t.
Opinion filed March 24, 2011.

CHIEF JUSTICE KILBRIDE

de li v er ed th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, wit h op inion. Justice s Fr ee man , T ho mas , Ga r man , Ka r meie r , Bu r ke , an d T he is
co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

At iss ue in

t his appe al

i s th e c ons ti tutiona l i ty of se cti on 2 2–1 05 of t he Code of Ci

vi l Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/ 22–105 ( West 2006) ), pr o viding fo r imp o sit io n o f fees and costs u pon s um mary dis mi ssal of a postconvi ction petition sum ma ril y di sm is sed as f riv olous
orpa ten tl y wi th out m eri t pu rs ua n t to s ec ti on

12 2– 2.1 of th e P ost

Con vi cti on Hear i ng A ct (Act) (725 IL CS 5/1 22–2.1 (We st 2006 )). Peti tion er, I sa ac Alco ze r , co nt en ds t ha t se ct io n 2 2– 10 5 v io lat es his ri ghts to due proce ss a

nd e qual protecti on. Up on summ aril y dismi ssin g Alcozer’s pro se pet i ti on f or po st co nvict io n r elief, the

ci rcu i t cou rt of Cook Co unty i

mposed f ees and costs. Alcozer

ap pe ale d o nly

the or der im

posing f ees and costs. The appella

te court aff

irm ed, but modi fi

ed the cost s an

d f ee s. No.-2- 1–07–2 092 (un

pub l i shed order

und er Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 23). W e allowe d Alco zer ’s pe t itio n for leave to appeal . Ill . S. Ct . R . 3 15 (e ff. Fe b . 26 , 20 10 ). W

e af f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e a pp el l ate cou rt.

I. BACKG

ROUND A lc o zer was convi

cted of fi rst degree murder f

oll owing a ben ch trial and sent ence d t o 2 5 year s o f im pr isonment on t he murder ch arge, wi th an addi tional 25 y ea rs f orpersonally

dis chargi ng the f irearm that caused the vi cti m ’s de ath . The a

ppe l l atecou

r t affirm ed Alcozer’s
co nv i cti on and senten

ce on di rect ap peal

. People v. Alcozer , No

. 1–04–0806 (20 05)(un

publ i sh ed or der und er Suprem e Court Ru

l e 23). On April 19, 2007, Al

cozer fi le d a pro se po st co nvictio n pet itio n. In hi s pro se postco nvi

ction petition, Alcozer presented two arguments: (1) that he was i ll egally arrested an d h is pr etr

i al moti on to quash arres t sh

ou ld have been

granted; and (2) that he recei ved ineffect iveas s i sta

n ce of trial cou n se l b ec au se cou n se l f ai l ed to con ti n ue ch al l en gi n g th e l eg al i ty of h i s a rre st. On June 21 , 20 07 , t he t r ial c o ur t su mmar ily dism issed Al coz er’s pro sepo st co nvictio n pet itio n, finding that Alc ozer fai le d t o r aise t he cla ims on direct appeal

and that res judicata prevented con si de rati on of Alcozer’s po stco nvi

ction clai ms. The trial

court ’s orderconcl

uded that “the is su es ra ised a nd pr ese nt ed by [ Alcoz er ] a re frivolo us a nd pa t en t ly wi thout m eri t.” In addi ti on to dismissing Alcoz er ’s pe t itio n, t he trial court ordered t hat

Al coze r p ay a t ot al of $ 359 in cos t s and fees, pursuant to sect ion 22–105 of the Code (735 I LCS 5/22– 105 (West 2006)). The order im posin g fees and costs found:

“ [Al coz er’s pe t it io n fo rpo st co nvic t io n r elie f] wa s e nt ire ly fri volousin t ha t : 1

. it l ac ksan arg ua bl e b as i s i n l aw ori n f ac t; and 2. t he claims, d efense s, a nd o t her legal co nt ent ions t he r ein
are not warr anted by

exi stin g la w or by a n

onfri volous argumen t fo r th e e xte

ns i on, modif

i ca ti on, or reve

rs al of
exi sti ng l aw or the estab l i sh men t of new l aw.” On appe al , A l coz er c

ha l l en ge d the a ss es sm

en t of costs and fees,
as well as t heir co nst itu t ionalit y. The appe l l ate court aff irm ed the trial
cou rt ’s im

positi on of costs and f

ees , b ut a dj us ted

th e tota l du e to $105. No. 1–07–2092 (unpublis hed order under Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 23.)-3- II. AN AL YSIS In this appeal , Alcozer argues that section 22–105 o f the Code violates the d

ue pro cess and equal

prot ection cl

auses of the U

ni ted Stat es and Il

li nois constitutions. He contends that se cti on 22 –1 05 is unconsti tut iona l as appl ie d t o him and other prisone

rs who fi le in itial pet itio ns fo rpo st co nvic t io n r elie f be ca us e it i s a p ecun i ary punishment that “acts as a f

in anci al in terpo si tion between

an i ndi gent pe ti t ione

r and hi s righ

t t o t he courts.” In the alternati ve, Al cozer subm

its that t his cou rt nee d n ot co n si der h i s c on sti t utiona l arg um en t i f se cti on 22–105 is co ns t rued a s n ot requi ri ng th e i m posi tion of a m onetary pen al ty every ti me an in digent prisoner’s pro se postco nvi ct i on petition i s sum ma ril y di sm is sed. T he St at e a r gu es t ha t se ct io n 2 2– 10 5 is co nst it ut io na l be ca us e it is rati onal l y des i gne d to serve a l

egi tim ate gov ern

me n t pu rp ose , “ to dis courage prison

ers f rom fi li ng f riv olous pl eadi

ngsan d r ec o up so me of th e sy ste m i c c ost s gene ra t ed by t he fili ng of su ch plea dings. ” T he Sta te contends thatAl

cozer f orf ei ted hi s a l tern ati ve arg um en t by not sp ec ifica lly

r ais ing t he iss ue in his pe t it io n fo rle ave to ap pe al or be f ore the appella

te court . See People v. McCar ty , 223 Ill . 2d 109, 122 (2 006 ) ( t he failure t o r aise an iss ue in a p et itio n for leave t o appeal re su l ts in the forfe iture of that

issue); People v. Robinson , 223 I ll. 2d 165, 174-75 (2006) (d ismi ssing app eal whe re t he o nly clai m the defend ant arg

ue d i n h i s b ri ef wa s n ot ra i se d i n h i s p eti ti on f or l ea v e to appe al or bef ore the a ppel l ate court). Al cozer responds to t he Stat e’ s f or feit ur e a r gu men t t ha t his pe ti ti on for leave to ap

pe al pr ope rl y ra i se d th e iss ue b y argui n g th at: “[I] n Pe o p l e v

. B ro wn , N o . 1 06 24 3 ( pe t it io n fo r le av e to appeal al l owed, M arch

29, 2 008) , this C ourt wil l de ci de whether ‘frivo lou s’ means t he sa

me i n s ec ti on 2 2–1 05(

b) (1) of t he Code of Civil Pro ced ur e and se cti on 12 2– 2.1 of th e P ost

Conv i cti on He ari

ng A ct.” Al cozer states that his peti

tion f or leave to appeal as ke d t his cou

rt to ho ld hi s case i

n ab eyanc e fo r r es o lut io n o f B ro wn , a s it may be dispo sitive of t he is sues rai sed i n A lc ozer’s case. Ul

tim atel y , thi s court declin ed to consider the c ons t ru ct ion o f sect ion 2 2–1 05 in B ro wn because the f

ees and costs were v

aca ted an d, thus , c onstru cti

on of
se cti on 22–105 was no longe

r an i ssue. See Pe o

p l e v

. B ro wn , 23 6 I ll.-4- 2d 175 , 182 (2 010). We rej ec t the

State ’s arg um en t tha t Al coz er h asf or f ei te d t his
ar gument by

fai li ng to raisei

t in his petiti on f or le av e to appea

l . The re i s n o que sti on th at a de term i na ti on of w het her “frivolo us” means t he
sa me i n s ec ti on 22– 105 (b) (1 ) o f the Co de a nd se ct ion 1 22– 2. 1 o f the Pos t-Con vi cti on Hearing Act w as raised in Al coz er’s pe ti

ti on f orleave to ap pe al. Add it io na lly, e ve n “[ w] he n a n iss ue is no t sp ec ifica lly
me ntioned in a par t y’s pet itio n f or lea ve t o ap pe al, bu t it is ‘ine xt r ica bly

in tert win ed’ wi th ot her m atter s properly

bef ore t he co u

rt, reviewi s ap

propriate.”People v. Becker , 239 Ill . 2d 215, 239 (2010) (q uo t ing People

v. M cKo wn , 236 I ll. 2 d 2 78 , 31 0 ( 20 10 ) )

. Fu r t he r , it is cl ear that the constitutional is sues rai sed

by A l coz er d

ep en d up on con stru cti on o f se ct io n 2 2– 10 5. I t is w ell s et t led t ha t co ur t s s ho uld
av o id co nst itu t ional qu est ions when a case ma y b e decided on other grounds. Beahringer v. Page , 204 Il l . 2d 363 , 370 (2 003). In terpreta ti on of s ection 22– 105 is i

nextri cab l y i ntert wi n ed wi th t he co ns t it ut io na l iss ue s p r es en t ed in t his ap pe al a nd , ac co r di ng ly, reviewi s ap

propriate. Pe o

p l e v

. M cKo wn , 23 6 I ll. 2d 278 , 310 (2 010). Moreov er, Alcozer’s arg umen t req uires i n

ter pr eta ti on of th e statu te dir ec t ly r ela t ed t o his c o nst it ut io na l c hal len ge , an d w e fin d t ha t t his is sue has n

ot been forfe i ted. See McCarty , 223 Ill . 2d at 123 (an
ar gument on t he int er pretati on of a s tatute

di rectl y rel ate d to a
constituti onal chal l enge i s n ot forf ei ted).

A . Sta tutory In terpreta ti on We now c onsi der Al

cozer’s argum

ent that section 22–105 does not require a m

onetary pen

al ty be impos ed e ver y time an indigent pr iso ne r ’s po st co nvic t io n p et it io n is sum ma ril y di sm is sed. Thi s i ssue requires us t o co nst rue se ct io n 2 2– 10 5 t o as ce r t ain t he mea nin g of “f ri vol ous.”Issu es of statutory co nst ru ct ion invo lvequestions of la w and aresu bj ec t to de novo revi ew. People v. Howard , 228 Ill . 2d 428, 432 (2008 ). Th e f

un da men tal ru l e of sta tutor y con str uc ti on i s to as ce r t ain an d g iv e e ffe ct to the legi slature’ s i nten t. People v. Blair , 215 Ill . 2d 427, 442 (20 05). The best indi cat ion of the legislature’s intent i s the

l anguag e of

the statute, given

i ts plai n a nd ord i na ry mean i ng. Blair , 215 Ill . 2d at 442-43. Al cozer argues that section 22–105 uses a dif f ere nt s tan da rd f or-5- det er mini ng whether a pet itio n i s “ f ri vol ous ” than the sta nd ard f or sum mary di sm i ss al as“ f ri vol ousor** * p at en t ly

without meri

t” under
s ec ti on 122–2.1 of the Post-Co nvi ction Heari

ng Act. According t o Al cozer, se cti

on 2 2–1 05 s

pe cif i cal l y om i ts a ny men ti on of t he “p at en t ly withoutmeri

t” sta nd ard of se cti on 1 22– 2.1 , an d that s ec ti on 22–105 is o nly

applic abl e when a pris oner fi

le s a “f riv olous” pl eadi

ng. The State coun

ters that a p et it io n fo rpo st co nvic t io n r elie f su mmar ily dis mi ssed as “ f ri v ol ous or * ** pa ten tl y wi th out m eri t” u n der the P ost

Con vi cti on Hea ring Ac t is also “f

ri vol ous ” a s def

i ne d by se cti on 22–105(b) of the Code. Sec ti on 122 –2. 1 of the Pos t-Con vi cti on H ea ri ng A ct p rovi de s f

or t he sum mary dism i ssa l of p ostconv

i cti on petiti

ons “ [i ]f the c ourt determi nesthe pe ti ti on i s f ri vol ousoris p at en t ly

without meri

t.” 725 ILCS 5/122

–2.1 (W est 200 6). In

19 97 , t he leg isla t ur e p as se d P ub lic Act 90 –5 05 (P ub. Act 90 –5 05 , e ff. Aug. 19, 19 97 )

. I nc lud ed in t his l eg i sl ati on wer e pr ovi sions on t he fili ng o f frivolo us law suit s by prisoners. Pu

bli c A ct 9 0–5 05 a

dde d s ec ti on 2 2–1 05 to th e C odeof Civil Pr o ce du r e. Se e 7 35 I LC S 5 /2 2– 10 5 ( We st 20 06 )

. At t he t ime Al cozer f i l ed hi s p eti ti on f or postcon

vi cti on r el i ef , se cti on 2 2–1 05 of the Code provided: “Fri volous lawsui

ts fil ed by prisoners. (a) If a p riso ner co nfined in an Il l i noi s D ep artm

en t of Co rr ect ions facility fi

les a p leading, mot ion, or ot her fil ing whi ch pu rp ortsto b e a

l eg al docum en t i n a c as e s eeki

n g p ost

con vi cti on re lief u nder Arti cl e 122 of the Code of Cri mi nal Procedu re of 19 63 , pu rs ua n t to Sec t ion 1 16– 3 o f the Code of Crim in al Proc ed ure of 196 3, i n a ha be ascorp usac ti on under Ar t icle X of thi s Code , in a cla im un de rt he Co ur t o f Cla ims A ct, o rin a no t he rac t io n a ga inst t he St at e, t he I llin oi s Dep ar t ment of

Corr ec ti ons , or

t he Prison

er R ev i ew Boa rd, or agains t an y of thei r off i cers or em ploye es a nd th e Court ma kes
a spe cific fi

nding t hat t he ple ading, mot ion, or ot her fil ing whi ch purport s to be a legal

documen t file d by t he pr iso ne ris fri volous, the pris oner is

respo nsi bl e f or th e f ul l pa y men t of fi li ng fees an

d actual cour t co sts. On fi li ng the acti on or pro ceedi ng the court shall a s s ess and, when fund s exist , c ollect as a par t ial payment o f any-6- courtcos ts re qui

red by l aw , a f i rs t ti me p ay men t of 50%of t he average m

onthly bal ance of t he pr isone r’s t ru st fund a cco unt f ort he pa st 6mont hs. T her eaft er 50% of a ll depo sits into t he prisoner ’s in

div idua l a cco unt unde r S ect ions 3 –4– 3 and 3 –12 –5 of t he Unified Co de o f Cor re ct ions a dminister ed by t he I lli nois D epa rt ment o f Cor re ct ions s hall bewit hhe ld un t il t he ac tua l cou rt costs a re c ol l ec ted

i n f ul l . The D ep artm

en t of Co rr ect ions shall for war d anymo ne ys wi thh el d to the c ourt of jurisd ictio n. If

a prisone r i s rel eas ed b ef

ore the f ull costs a re coll ected, t he De pa r t men t o f Co rr ec t io ns sh all forw ar d t he
amou nt of costs collected through the d a t e o f relea se. The courtof j urisd i cti on i s r es pon si bl e f orsend ing t he De par t ment of Corrections a copy of

the order mandat in g the a moun t of courtfe es to be pai

d. Not hi ng i n thi s Section prohi

bi ts an app licant from

fi li ng an ac ti o n or pr oc eed ing if the a pplicant is un able to pay the court cost s. (b) In thi s Section, ‘f

riv olous’ m eans that a pl

eadi ng, moti on, or oth

er f i l i n g w h i ch pu rp orts t o be a lega l do cument fi le d by a pris oner

in his or her lawsu it meet s any o r a ll of the followi ng cri teria: (1 ) i t l acksan argu ab l e b as i s e i

th er i n l aw or i n f ac t; ( 2) it i s bei

ng presen ted for any

im proper purpo se, such as to harass or to cause un necessary de l ay or need less incr eas e in the co st of litiga t ion; (3 ) the cl ai m s, d ef en se s, a nd othe r leg al con ten ti on s t he r ein are not warranted by ex is ting la w o rby a nonf riv olous ar gument for t he ext ensio n, mo dificat ion, or reversal of exi stin g la w or t he establ

is hm ent of new l

aw; (4) t he allega t ions and other f ac tua l con ten ti ons do n ot have evi den

tia ry supp ort or, if

spe ci f i cal l y so i den tif i ed are not like ly t o ha ve ev ide nt iar y su pp o r t aft er a r ea so na ble oppor tun i ty f or f urth er i nv es ti ga ti on or di sc ove ry ; or (5) the deni

al s of f actual co nt ent ions are not warranted
on t he ev ide nc e, o rif sp ec if i cal l y so i de nti f i ed , are n ot rea son ab l y base d on a l ac k of i nf orm ati on or beli ef.” 7351 Public Act 95– 424 , §5 , effect ive Janu ar y 1, 2 008 , a mende d sub section (a) by in ser tin g “ or a s econd o r s ub sequ ent p etit ion f or rel ief fromjudgment
unde r Se cti on 2–14 01 o f th

e Cod e. ”
-7- ILCS 5/22– 105 (W

est 200 6). 1 Sec ti on 22 –1 05 (b ) s pe cifica lly pro vide s fo r t he d efinit io n o f a “f rivolous” l awsui

t. Secti on 122

–1.2 of t he Po st -Co nvictio n Hea ring Act does not pro vi

de a def in ition of “f riv olous or *** pat ently

without
meri t.” Ho weve r, in People

v. Boclair, 20 2 I ll. 2 d 8 9 ( 20 02 ) , t his
cour t exam

in ed the m eani ng of “ fri volous or *** patently

without meri t” in section 122–2.1 and looked to dictionary defi ni tions:

“‘Fr ivo lo us ’ ha s be en d efine d a s ‘o f l ittle we i gh t or im port ance: ha

vi ng n o bas i s i n l aw or f act.’ W eb ster’ s Th

i rd NewInternational

Dic tionary 913 (1993); Black’s La w Dicti onary

677 (7th ed. 1999); accord Ander s v. C a lifornia , 386 U.S. 7 38, 744, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 498, 87 S. Ct. 1396 , 1400 (1967) (leg al

poi nts ‘a rguab l e on

the i r m eri ts’ are not f ri vol ous). ‘[P ] atently ’ m

eans ‘ CLEARL

Y, OBVIOUSLY, PLA INLY .’ We

bster’s Thi rd New Intern ati onal Dicti onary 1654 (1993 ); B l ack’ s La

w Di cti onary 1147 ( 7th e d. 1999 ). ‘[ M] eri t’ me ans ‘ le gal

signifi cance, standi

ng, or im portanc e.’ Webster’s T hi

rd New In

terna tion al Dicti onary

1414 ( 1993) ; Black’s Law D ic t iona

ry 1003 (7th ed. 1999).” Boclair, 202 Ill . 2d at 101. In Blair , this court reli

ed o nthe defi

ni tion of “ fri

volous or *** pa te n tly wit hou t merit ” se t for t h in Boclair in concl udin g that “ ‘fr ivo lo us o r** * p at en t ly withoutmerit ’ may be defined as ha ving
no basis i n l aw or factand obv

iousl y w ithoutle gal

signifi cance.” Blair , 215 Ill . 2d at 445. More re cent ly, in People

v. Hodges , 234 Ill . 2d 1, 11 ( 20 09 ) , t his
cou rt noted tha t “ [n]ei the r ‘ f ri vol ous ’ n or‘p ate n tl y wi th out m eri t’ is d efine d in the [Post -Convi

ction Heari

ng] Act.” Hodges l ooke d to Boclair, wh ere th

i s court ci ted Anders in

defi ni ng “ fri volous.” Hodges recogniz ed that “[u]nder Anders , ‘le ga l po int s a r gu ab le o n t he ir meri ts’ are ‘not fri

volous.’ ” Hodges , 234 Ill . 2d at 11. Hodges further expl ai ned that Illin ois l awha s u se d t his definitio n in ot her co nt ext s and-8- sp ec ifica lly

ci ted to section 22–105(b ) “def in in g fri volous ple adi

ng as one whi ch

‘l acks an argua bl e b asis ei ther i n l aw or inf ac t’ ” an d to Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 137 (Ill . S. Ct. R. 13 7 (ef f . Feb . 1, 1994 )) pr ovid ingfor sanctions ai

me d at deterr in

g fri volous sui ts or pleadi

ngs “ ‘without any b asis i

n law.’ ” Based on our case l

aw def in in g “f riv olous or *** pat ently

without
meri t” a s “ ha vi ng no b as i s i n l aw orfact and obv iousl y w ithout legal si gni f i can ce,” we de ter m i n e th at t he def in ition of “f riv olous or *** pa t en t ly wi thou t meri t” u nd er s ec ti on 122–2 .1 of

the Pos t-Con vi cti on Hea ring Act is i

ncl uded in the stat uto ry def in ition of a “ fri

volous” la w su it in se ct io n 2 2– 10 5( b)

. T hu s, a p o st co nvic t io n p et it io n su mmar ily

dis mi ssed as f riv olous or pa t ently

without meri

t under
se cti on 122 –2. 1 o f the Po st -Co nvi c ti on He ari n g A ct is s ub j ec t to im positi on of f

ees and c osts under section 22–105(b) of the Code. Al cozer argu e s t ha t his p o st co nvic t io n p et it io n w as su mmar ily dism iss e d ba sed on the procedu ral def ects of f orfe i ture and res judicata an

d that p roce dur

al de f ec ts c an not b e d eemed

f ri vol ousor paten tl y wit hou t merit . We re

ject t his arg ument . I n Blair , thi s court sp ec ifica lly

ruled that postconvi ction petitions di sm is sed on pri

nci ple s of forfe iture o r r es judicata ar e, nece ssar ily , bo t h frivolo us a nd paten tly wi thout m eri t. Blair , 215 Il

l . 2d at 44 5. Blair expl

ai ned: “[T ]he le gis la

ture intended that the phras e ‘f riv olous or *** pa ten tl y without merit’ encompasses res judicata and forfe iture. De t er minat io ns o f res judicata and f orfe i ture are inhe r en t ly legal de t er minatio ns whi

ch m ay bar re lief under t he A ct. Thus, an otherwi se m eritorious cl ai

m h as no bas is

in la w if res judicata orfor feitu re bar t he claim. The legal co mpo nent is therefore consi stent with ‘f riv olous’ def

in ed a s ‘ of lit t le weight or impor t ance : having no basis in law or fac t.’ ( E mph as is added.) Webs ter’s Thi rd New International Dicti onary

913 (1 993); Bl

ack’ s L aw

Di cti on ar y 67 7 ( 7th ed. 1999) ; accord Anders

v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 , 498, 87S. Ct. 1396 , 1400 ( 1967)( legal poi n ts ‘arguab le on their meri

ts’ are not fri

volous). I t is al so co nsist ent w i

th a c l ear, obvi

ous, or pl

ai n l ack of ‘m eri t,’ meaning wi

th out ‘ legal

si gni f i can ce, stand i ng, or i m portanc e.’ ( E mph as is added.) Webs ter’s Thi rd New International-9- Dicti onary

1414 (199 3) . B l ack’ s L aw Di cti on ar y 10 03 (7 th ed. 1999)

. Thus, where res judicataand f orfei ture preclude a defend ant fr o m o bt ain ing r elie f, su ch a c laim is ne ce ss ar ily ‘fri volous’ or ‘pa t ent ly witho ut merit .’ ” (E mpha si s in origi na l .) Blair , 215 Ill . 2d at 445. Thus, up on

de ter m i n i n g th at a pos tcon vi cti on petition di

sm is sed
as “friv o lo us o r * ** pa t ent ly wit ho ut mer it ” me et s t he d efinit io n o f a “f rivolous” lawsu it u nder sec t ion 2 2 –105 of the C ode, we n

ow turn to Alcozer’s co nstitutional argumen ts.

B. Whe ther Section 22–105 Is Consti tut iona l Al cozer contends that section 22–105 v i ol ate s h i s r i gh ts to b oth due pro cess and equal

prot ection un

der the law

by pla ci ng a f in anci al
con si de rati on between hi m and hi s statutory

ri ght to fi

le an i ni tial postco nv i cti on pe ti ti on an d b y tar ge ti n g h i m as a “ pri son er” to th e excl us i on of noni ncarcerated petiti oners. The Stat e coun ters that
se cti on 22–105 is

constitutional

because the Genera l Ass emb ly
r at io na lly de si gn ed i t to s er v e a l eg i ti mate gov er n men t pu rp ose : to dis courage prison

ers f rom fi li ng f riv olous pl eadi

ngsan d r ec o up so me of the costsgen

erated by the f i l i ng of f ri vol ous pl eadi ngs
. We review the constitutional ity of a statute de n ovo
. Peo ple v. Malchow , 193 Ill . 2d

413 , 41 8 (2 000 ). “Le gi sl

ati ve en ac tmen ts enj oy a st ro ng pr esu mpt ion o f co nst itu t ionalit y, and the bu rde n r es ts u pon t he challenge r t o d emons t ra t e t he inv al idi ty of a parti cul ar statute.” Kunkel v. Walton , 179 Ill . 2d 519, 529 (1997). A revi ewi ng court has t he du t y to co nstrue a statut e to uphold its validi ty whe never r ea so na bly

possi bl e. Peop le v. Huddleston , 212 Ill . 2d 107, 129 (2 00 4) . We n

ow c on si der Al coz er ’s

du e p roc es s a

rgum en t.

1. Due Pr ocess Al cozer con ten dstha t se cti on 22–105 of the Code vi

olates his due pro cess r igh t s be ca us e it un fair ly sub j ects h i m to pecun

i ary punishment f

oratte m pti ng to exerc i se

a s tate -gran

ted pos tcon vi cti on remedy , in violation of

hi s due process ri ght of m eani ngf ul ac ce ss to t he co ur t s. T he St at e a dmit s t ha t t he r e is a fun dam ental constitutional right of access to the cour ts, but that t hi s right does not encompass-10- the right to li

tigate without expense and f ees. The part ies do not dispute t hat “[i]t is n ow est ablished be yond dou bt t hat pr isone rs ha ve a c ons t itu t ional r ight of a cce ss t o t he courts.” Bounds v. Sm ith , 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). Alcozer argues that section 22–105 vi

olates due pro cess becauseit int er fere s wit h a prisoner’s fun

damental right of access to t he court s. We reject Al

cozer’s basic premi

se tha t se cti on 22–105 in

terferes wi th h i s r i gh t to meaningful acc ess t o t he co ur t s. T he langu age of t he st atu te be l i esthi

s a rgu men t. The l eg i sl atu re m ad e c l ea r i n s ec ti on 22 –1 05 ( a) t ha t “[ n] o t hing in t his Section prohi bi ts an appl i ca nt f rom fil ingan acti on or pro ceedi ng if t he ap plicant is unable t o p ay the courtcosts” (735 ILCS 5/2 2–1 05( a) (Wes t 200 6) ). In People v. Conick , 232 Il l . 2d 132 , 141 (2 008), th is co ur t re co gnized t hat t he General Ass emb ly

enacted s ection 22– 105 “ to curb the la

rge num ber of frivolo us c ollat er al plead ings filed by priso ner s which a dve r se ly aff ect th e e f f i ci en t a dmini st ra t ion o f just ice, and t o c omp ensa t e t he
co ur t s for t he t ime and exp ense incur re d in pr oc essing a nd dispo sing of them .” Fr om a p lain r ea ding o f s ection 22 –10 5, we d et er mine that t he sta tute doe s n ot i m pi n ge up on a p ri son er ’s f un da men tal ri gh t to access to t he co ur t s be ca us e fe es ar e a ss es se d o nly aft er a le ga l do cu men t is fou nd t o be fr ivo lo us . A t mo st , t he s t at ut e o nly aff ects a prisoner ’s right to fi le fri volous l egal documen ts without be i

ng res pon si bl e f or t he costs, b

ut does n ot prohi bi t pri sone rs f rom e xerci si ng th ei r r i ght to pe ti ti on f or p ost con

v i cti on re l i ef . We th er ef orere j ec t Al coz er’s
ar gument that section 22–105 vi olates due process and i

t bur dens a prisoner’s fun

damental right of access to t he court s. Al cozer also ar gues that section 22–105 violates due pro cess when applie d to fi

rst-t im e pro se peti

tion ers f or postcon

vi cti on re lief. As thi s court h

as re cogn ized, t he purp ose

of se cti on 22–1 05 i s to com pen sa te court s f

or some of the ex

pense i ncu rre d in adjud icat ing fri volouspet itio ns f

or pos tcon

vi cti on r el i ef , wh ether i ni ti al or successi ve. People v. Conick

, 232 Il l . 2d 132 , 141 (2 008). In Conick , this court stated:

“ For t he pu rp os es o f sect ion 2 2–1 05, t he st at us o f the pe ti ti on as ei ther ori gi na l or s ucc ess i

ve i s n ot si gni f i can t. [Ci tation .] The t r ial c o ur t mu st st ill e xa mine ev er y r eque st f or-11- pos tcon vi cti on reli ef wh ether it be a

n in itial pe ti ti on su b j ect to reviewunder the ‘gist’ standa rd [ci tation] or a pro ff

ered
suc ces sive pe ti

ti on s ub j ec t to t he mor e exa ct ing cau se a nd prejudi ce standard [ci

tation].” Conick

, 232 Ill . 2d at 141-42. Sec ti on 22–105 does not

imping e u po n a ny p r iso ne r ’s r igh t t o file
a po st co nvic t ion petition, wh ether the prisone

r is a pro se firs t

- t ime petitioner or a successi

ve peti tioner. Accordi

ngl y, we rej ect Alcozer’s
ar gument that section 22–105 vi olates due process asappl i ed to f i rs tt ime pro se pe t it io ner s fo r p o st co nvict io n r elief. We als o r eje ct Alco ze r ’s ar gu men t t ha t se ct io n 2 2– 10 5 v io la tes due pro cess because

it lacks a mens re a co mpo nent an d i ts a ppl i ca ti on is not l i m i ted to pe ti ti ons f i l ed by prison ers wh o kn owt he ir c laims are fri volous. Al

cozer fai ls to expl ai n how the l

ack of a men s rea co mpo nent i

n terf er es wi th h i s r i gh t of ac ce ss to th e c our

ts o rho w t his
argu men t i s i n an y wa y re l ate d to h

i s d ue pr oce ss argu men t. Under t he pl ai n l an gua geof the sta tute, se cti on 2 2–1 05 d

oesnot restricta pr isone r’s meaningful acc ess t o t he court s. Accordin gly , we concl ude there is

no due process vi

olation b ased o n res

tri cti on of courtacc ess. We now consider whether section 22–105 violates equal pr ot ect ion.

2. Eq ual Prote cti on Al cozer argues that section 22–105 v iolates equal

prote cti on on it s fac e be ca us e it t re at s p ris o ner s w ho fi l e f ri volous pl

eadi ngs diffe r en t ly

from noni ncarcerate d perso ns who fi le f rivolous pleadin

gs. The Stat e conten ds th at sec t ion 2 2–1 05 is r at ionally relat ed t o t he stat e’s inter est in maint ain ing t he efficiency of o ur legal syst em and that t her e is a r eas ona ble basis fo r d istingu ishing be twe en pri sone rs and o t her s s ee king similar re lief. Consti tu tional challenge s t o s t at ut es u nder due pr oc ess a nd equal pro tect ion require the sam e essential

anal ysi s
. People v. Kimbrough , 163 Ill . 2d 231, 242 ( 1994) (“ Alt ho ug h e xp r es se d in slig ht ly diffe r en t lan gu ag e, t he st an da r ds us ed t o de t er mi n e th e con sti tuti on al i ty of a stat u te under the due process and equal prote cti on claus es a re i den tic al .”). It is the na

ture o f the ri

ght aff ected that dicta testhe l evel of scruti ny weem pl oy in determi ni ng whether-12- th e statu te meets c onsti

tution al requi rem en ts. Napleton v. Village of Hins da le , 22 9 I l l . 2d

29 6, 3 07 (2 00 8) . If

th e ch al l en ge d s tatu te im pli cates a fun

dam ental righ t o r disc rim in ates based on a s

uspect cl assifi cation of race

or national

or igin, t he co ur t subjec t s t he sta tute to “ str i ct s cr uti n y ” a n al y sis a n d w i l l up h ol d th

e statu t e o nly if it is
na rr o wly tail ored t o serve a c o mp el

l i ng S tate i

ntere st. People v. Shephard , 15 2 I ll. 2d 489 , 500 (1 992); People v. Cornelius , 213 I ll. 2d 178 , 20 4 (2 004 ); Napleton , 22 9 I ll. 2d at 307 . Under an equal pr o t ec t io na na

l y sis, s uspe ct c l as si

f i ca ti ons are base d on

rac e or na tion al origi n. Peop le v. Bot ru ff , 212 Il l . 2d 166 , 176-7 7 (200 4). If th e statu te d oes n ot af f ec t a fun dam ental con sti tutiona l righ t or involve a suspect classifi cation, the rational

bas is test applies, re quir ing the statute be ar a ra

t io na l r elat ionship t o t he pu rp os e t he l egi slature intend ed t o a chieve by enacti ng i t. Shephard , 152 Ill . 2d at 500. Addit ionally, “[a ] t hird t ier o f co nst itu t ional sc ru t iny li es between deferen tial rati on al b asis review and stri ct scrutiny , and i s known as i n ter med i ate scrutin y,” an d has b een appl

ie dto re view class ifi

cat ions based on gender, ill

egi tim acy , and those cl as sif

ications that cause “c er t ain content-neutral, i

nci dental bur den s to spee ch .” Napleton , 229 I ll. 2d at 308 . “T o w ithst and i nterm ediat e sc ru t iny, the legislat ive
enac t ment must

b e s ub sta n ti al l y re l ate d to an i

mportant governm

ental in terest. ” Napleton , 229 Ill . 2d at 308. Pri sone rs ar e n o t a s us pe ct cla ss
. Whe r e, as he r e, t he leg is l ation does not d iscri

mi nate against a suspect class , the rat ional basi s test a p pli es. Cornelius , 21 3 Il

l . 2d at 2 03- 04. A

sta tutory cl as si f i ca ti on mee t s t he r at io na l ba sis r eq uir eme nt if it t he leg isla t io n is “ r at io na lly related to a l egi tim ate Stat e goal.” Shephard , 152 Ill . 2d at 500 . I f any setof f acts can reasonably be concei ved to justi fy

the chal le nged legislat ion, the c ourt mu st uph old i ts cons tituti onal i ty. Bot ru ff , 212 I ll. 2d at 17 7. W

h eth er a rati on al b as i s ex i sts

f or a cl as si f i ca ti on is a que sti on of law reviewed de novo
. In re A.A. , 181 Ill . 2d 32, 38 (1998 ). Al cozer re lies on Rinaldi v. Yeager , 384 U .S. 3 05 (19 66 ) , in
ar guing that section 22– 10 5 fa i l s un der a r ati onal ba si s rev i ew. In Rinaldi , the Supreme C ourt struck down a Ne w Je rse y law req uiring in carcerated i

n di v i du als to re i

m b ur se th e c ost s of

th ei r tra n scri pts upon den i al of a ppel l ate rel i ef

. The Sup reme C ourt expl ai ned that-13- “[t]h ereis no defen

si ble i nterest served by f

ocusin g on th[e] dis tinction [between i

ncarcerated and n

onin carcerated appell

ants] as a cla ss if yi ng f ea t ur e in a re imbursement st at ut e, since it bear s no r ela t io nsh ip whate ve

r to th e p urp ose

of t he repay

men t provi sion.” Rinaldi , 384 U. S. at 309 . T he Court observed that the New Jersey la w did no t simi la

rly bur den “ a m

an wh o has recei

ved a sus

pended sentence or been pl

aced on probation, regar dless o f ho w h igh his subs equ ent earni

ngs m ay be,” nor did the la

wrequire “

repaym ent at all fro m an unsu cce ssful ap pellant who has b een sentence d only

to pay a fi ne.” Rinaldi , 38 4 U.S. a t 308. Furthe

r, Rinaldi recogniz ed that
once a state

establ is hes av enues of appel la te review , those “aven

ues must be kept f ree of un rea son ed di sti nc ti ons tha t ca n on l y i mpe de openand equal access t o t he court s.” Rinaldi , 384 U .S. at 310. In ot her wo rd s, a ny

financ i al b ur den ti ed to th e a v en ue s of appe l l ate reviewmus

t be applie d

with a n “ even han d.” Rinaldi , 384 U.S. at 311. The Supreme Court has con si stently and repeatedl

y recogni zed that when states pro vi

de for appel

la te or coll ateral revi ewof cri mi nal convicti ons, t hey may not discr imi nat e o n t he b as is

of poverty. See Griffin v. Illinois , 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiri ng a f ree tran scri pt, or ot her mea ns o f affo rd ing e ff

ectiv e app ellate re view, for indigent de f en da n ts se ek i ng to appe al ); Burns v

. Ohio , 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (clerk must docket in

dige nt petitioner’ s m

ot ion f or leave to appeal de sp i te in abi li ty to pay f

il in g fee ) ; Smith v. Benn ett , 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (o nce a st at e gr ant s a postco nvi ction right, in

abi li ty to pay fil ingf ee ca n n ot li m i t i t s exe rcise) ; L a n e v

. B ro wn , 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (i n ab i l i ty to pay for transcri

pt cannot hi

nder appeal

from deni al of peti tion f or wri t of error coram n obis ); Douglas v. California , 372 U.S. 353 (1 963 ) ( finding unco nst itu t ional linebe twe en rich an d poor wh ereme rits of i ndi gent defe ndan t’s fi rst direct appeal

are deci ded withoutbenefit o f cou nsel); Long v. District Court , 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (indi

gent defe ndan t must be al

lowed f ree transcript

to appeal deni al o f habeas relief); Gardne r v. Califor

nia , 393 U.S. 367 (1969) (indige nt de f

en da nt m us t be al l owe d f ree tran scri pt of habeas hear ing to faci li tate fil in g new habeas peti

tion i n h i ghe r court). Al cozer argu es

th at, l i ke th e statut e s t ru ck d ow n in Rinaldi , se cti on 22– 105 sho ul d be struck down beca use there i s no rational
rea son to burden prisoners exc lus iv el y w hen noni ncarcerated ind ividua ls mi

ght als o file

for postco nvi

ction rel ie f, ev e n when t he-14- purpo se i s to de ter f

ri vol ousappe als. W

e f i nd A l coz er’ s r el

i an ceon Rinaldi and the l

ong li ne of Un ited Stat e s Supreme

Court cases mi spl aced be ca us e s ec t io n 2 2– 10 5 i s e nt ir ely dis ti ng ui sh ab l e f rom those statutes f

ound u nc onsti tution al

. Rinaldi found that the New Jer se y sta tute v i ol ate d e qua

l prote cti on b ec au se

i ts c l as si f i ca ti on of those subj ec t to i t wa s u nsu pp o r t ed by r ea so n, in t ha t it fina nc ially burdened man y pri sone rs “w ho se ap pe als , t ho ug h u nsu cc es sfu l, were notfr ivolo us, and lea ves u nt ou ched many whos e ap pea ls may ha v e been fri volous i ndeed.” Rinaldi , 384 U.S. at 309-10. In con tra st to t he sta tute in Rinaldi , se ct ion 2 2–1 05 w as e na cted by the General Ass emb ly “to stem the tide

of f ri vol ous f i l i ngs by pri sone rs who have been convicted and, in

most insta nces , ha ve had thei r ‘cases’ subj ected to addi tional form s of appel

la te review .” Conick

, 232 Ill . 2d at 143. We de t er mine t ha t se ct io n 22–10 5 w it hst an ds t he r at io na l ba sis test be cause the i

mposi tion of f ees and c osts foll

owing a fri volous finding of a pri soner’s docum ent is rational ly rel ate d to t he legisl atu re’s goal

of stem mi ng the tide of f riv olous fi li ngsby prisoners. See Bot ru ff , 212 Ill . 2d at 177. Wh en the ch al l en ge d leg i sl ati on can be uphel

d on any set of facts, t he cour t must up h ol d i

ts constituti

onal i ty. Bot ru ff , 212 Ill . 2d at 177. Here, se cti

on 2 2–1 05 on

l y appl i esto prison

ers who fi

le fri volous p lea din gs, a pe rmissible dist inctio n re late d t o t he pu rp os e o f the cl as si f i ca ti on to achie ve p erm

i ssi bl e en ds. Rinaldi , 384 U.S. at 309. Ac co r di ng ly, we hol d that section 22–1 05 does not violate equal prot ection of the l

aw.

III. CONCLUSION We hold t

hat a postco nvi

ction petition sum

ma ril y di sm is sed pur sua nt to se cti

on 122–2.1 of the Post-Co nvi ction Heari

ng Act (725 ILCS 5/122–2.1 (West 2006)) as fri volous or patently

withoutmer it is su bj ec t to i m pos i ti on of fee s and co st s und er sec t ion 2 2–1 05 o f the Code of Ci

vi l Procedure (735 ILCS 5/22–1 05 (West 2006)) , as a f ri vol ous la w sui t f i l ed by a p ri son er. W e f urth er h ol d that s ec ti on-15- 22–105 of the Code of Ci vi l Procedure (735 ILCS 5 /22–105 ( West 2006) ) does not viol ate either duepro cess or equ al pr ot ect ion. We th er ef oreaf f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e a pp el l ate cou rt.
Appel la te court judgm

ent aff irm ed.