FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT AUGUST 10, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [D O N OT P UBL ISH] IN TH E U NITE D S TAT ES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E E LE V EN TH C IR C U IT

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1563 2 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 98-00427 -CR- MHS -1-1 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee ve rs us JANNIC E FRANK, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (A ug us t 10, 200 5) Be fo re CA RN E S, BA RKE T T and M A RC U S, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Janni ce F rank a

ppe al s he r se nte nc e of

24 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t f

or2

violatin g the condit ions o f her supervised rele ase. On a ppeal, F rank contends th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

and v iol at ed

he r due pr oc es s r igh ts whe n it im pose d a24- m onth se nte nc e in e xc es s of the r an ge e sta

bli she d inse ct ion7B 1. 4 of the sentencing g uidelin es because the court did not cons ider the Chapter 7 policy statem ents prior to im

posin g sentence. Frank notes that althou gh the Chapter 7 guid elines are not bindin g, the district court m ust at least consider the Chapter 7 gu id el in es pri orto im

po si ng sen te nc e aft er re vo cat io n o f supe rv is edrel eas e. Sp ec if ic al ly , F rank m ai nta ins that c ourt f ai le d to c onsi de r the gr ad e of the v i o l at i o nal l eg edi nth e r ev o ca t i o np et i t i o n , a s we l l as U.S .S .G. § 7 B1 .4 ’s s en t en ci n g ra n g e f

o r v i o l at i n g s up erv i s edre l ea s e, wh i ch , a cc o rd i n g t o Fr an k ’s cal cu la ti on s, was 8 t o 1 4 m on th s. Additionally , on appeal, Frank asserts the district court im posed an unreasonable sentence after revoking Frank’ s supervised release because the c ourt fa ile d to c onsi de r the Ch ap te r 7 po lic y state m en ts, and “ he r cr im ina l hi sto ry [ did ] not establis h her as being particularly deserving of harsh treatm ent.” I. Fr ank ’s claim that the districtcourterre d and violated F rank ’s du e pr oc es s r igh ts b y im po sin g a s en te nc e ab ove t he p re su m pt ive guideline r ange, without allegedly considerin g the C hapter7 policy statem ents Or dinarily , w e re view “ the district court’ s decision to exceed the C hapter 7 se nte nc ing r an ge f

or an a buse of dis cr et ion . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. H of

ie rk a, 83 F . 3d3

357, 361 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) . H ow ev er , w he n ade fe ndant f ai ls t o st at e cl earl y

the gr ound s f or an ob j ec tio n, he r obj ec tio n is w ai ve d onappe al and r ev ie w ed f or pla in er ro r. U nit ed

S ta te s v. Z inn , 321 F . 3d 1 084, 108 7 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ; se e al so U nit ed S ta te s v. H ay es , 40 F . 3d 3 62, 364 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) ( not ing that whe n du e pr oc es s is sue s are not

r ai se d be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt, thi s C ourt r ev ie w s du e pr oc es s c la im s f

or pla in e rr or ). A lso , w he n ade fe ndant r ai se s an arg um en t f or the fi rs t t im e on a

ppe al , w e re vie wonl y

f or pla in e rr or . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. Aguillard, 217 F. 3d 13 19, 1320 (11t h Cir. 2000 ). Plain er ror exists when: (1) an er ro r ex ist s th at , ( 2) is pla in, ( 3) se ri ousl y a ff ec ts a de fe ndant’ s su

bst an tia l r igh ts, and (4) “ seriouslyaff

ect[s] the fairness, integrity , or publ ic reputation of judicial pr oc eed in gs .” Uni te d S ta te s v . Acev ed o, 2 85 F.3d10 10 , 10 12 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ). He re, we reviewFrank’s c laim that the district court erred by failing to consi der the Ch ap te r 7 po lic y

state m en ts b ef

or e se nte nc ing he r unde r the pla in e rr or standard be ca use she f ai le d to r ai se thi s is sue a t the r ev oc at ionhe ar ing . S ee Z inn , 32 1 F .3dat 1 08 7. Upo n fi nd in g t ha t t he de fen da ntvi ol at eda co nd it io n o f supe rv is edrel eas e, a court, a fter c onsid ering factors set f orth in § 35 53(a)(1), (a) (2)(B )-( D) , ( a)(4) -(7), m ay revoke a ter

m of supervised release. 18 U. S. C. § 358 3(e). T he § 3553 (a) fa ct or s in cl ude , in re le vant p ar t: “ (1 ) the na tur e an d c ir cum stanc es of the of fe nse4

and the histo ry

and charac teristics of the defendant; (2) the need f or the sentence im po se d . . . (C) t o p ro te ctth e p ub li c fro m fur th er cr im es of t he de fen da nt ; . . . (4 ) the kin ds o f se nte nc e an d th e se nte nc ing r an ge e sta bli she d f or . . . ( B) in the ca se of avio la tio n of

pr obatio n or

sup er vis ed r el ea se , the appl ic ab le gui de lin es or pol ic y state m en ts i ssu ed

by the S en te nc ing Co m

m iss ion. . . ; and ( 5) any

pe rt ine nt po li cy st at em en t i ss ue d b y

th e Sen te nc in g C omm is si on . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3 55 3( a). T he se nte nc ing c ourt “ sha ll state in ope n c our t the r ea sons f

or it s im posi tio n of

the part ic ular se nte nc e, and, if the se nte nc e . . . is not

of the kin d, or

is out sid e the range, described in subs ection (a)( 4), the specif ic rea son for im

posit ion of a sentence differ ent from

that described.” 18 U. S. C. § 355 3(c)( 2). Ch ap te r 7 of

the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s, whic h go ve rn s vi olatio ns o f supe rv ise d r el ea se , c ont ai ns p oli cy state m en ts. O ne of

the pol ic y

state m en ts, U . S. S. G . § 7B 1. 4, pr ovi de s r ec om m en de d r an ge s of

im pr iso nm en t a

ppl ic ab le upo n revocation. P olicy

statem ents are m erely

advisory and thus, non-bi ndin g. United St at es v. Co ok, 291 F . 3d 1 297, 130 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) . “ Se ct ion355 3 r equir es a co urt on ly

to consider

[ the m ] in de te rm ini ng a

de fe ndant’ s se nte nc e” upo n r e v o c a t i o n . I d . a t1 3 0 2 ( e mp h a s i s i no r i g i n a l ) . I ti s e n o u g h i f “th e r e i s s o me indication the district court was aware of and consi dered [the guidelines.] ” Agu il la rd , 21 7 F .3dat 1 32 0.5

Inthi s c as e, ar ev ie wof

the tr an sc ri pt f

ro m the r ev oc at ionhe ar ing f

ai ls t o reveal that there wa s, at a m inim um , som e indication th at the district court wa s aw ar e of and c onsi de re d th e se nte nc ing gui de lin es . A lth oughF rank a dvi se d th e dis tr ic t c ourt tha t the c ourt c oul d se nte nc e he r to ( a) 24 m onths’ im pr iso nm en t, with no supervisedrelea se to follow, or (b) a shorter term , w ith further supervisio n, there is noth ing in the rec ord to sup port the conclusi on that th e court im plicitlyconsidered and rej ected the Chapter 7gui delines. A s such, the district co ur t erredby fail in g t o c on si de r th e ap pl ic ab le Ch ap te r 7 s en te nc in g ra ng e. Co ok , 29 1 F .3d12 97 , 13 02 . N ev er the le ss, a ssum ing w ith out de ci din g th at

F rank’ s a

ppl ic ab le gui de lin e range w as 8- 14 m onths’ im pr iso nm en t, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t c om m it pla in er ro r in i m posi ng F rank’ s se nte nc e w ith out c onsi de ri ng the Ch ap te r 7 r an ge because her substantial rights we re not seriously aff ected. In im

posin g a sentence for violating su pervised release, a district court is not bo und b y the policy statem ents of Chapter 7 and is not “ restricted to the guideline range applicable at the ti m e of

the ini tia l se nte nc ing he ar ing . ” S ee Co ok, 291 F . 3d at 13 00. H er e, the co urt’ s de ci sio n to se nte nc e Fr an k to 24 m onths’ im pr iso nm en t f

ar e xc ee de d th e pr es um pti ve Ch ap te r 7 se nte nc ing r an ge of 8 t o 14 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t, so i t i s unl ike ly that the c ourt w oul d have appl ie d th e Ch ap te r 7 se nte nc ing r an ge ha d itFr ank wa s convicted of interstate t ra n s p o rt ation of stolen prope rty , in violation of 18 1 U.S.C. § 2314, an offe nse punishable by imprisonment of not more than 10 year s. 18 U.S.C. § 2314. An of fe ns e is c la ssi fi e d a s a Clas s C fe lony if the maximumte rm

of imp ri so nme nt a

uth or ize d is le ss tha n 2 5 ye ars but 10 or mor e y e ars . 1 8 § 35 59 (a )( 3) . T he c ourt may imp os e a te rm of imp ri so nme nt, not to ex cee d 2 y ear s if the offe nse that resulted in the supe rvised re lease was a Class C felony . 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) . Be cause Fr ank’s rights were not substantially aff ecte d by the cour t’s failure to consider the 2 Cha pte r 7 se nte nc ing

ra ng e , F ra nk ’s du e pr oc e ss c la ims are wi tho ut m e ri t.

6 expli ci tly c onsi de re d it , e spe ci al ly

giv enthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ionthat F rank w as “ hope le ss. ” A ddi tio na lly , F rank w as se nte nc ed w ith in the statut or

y m ax im um se nte nc e of

24 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t f

or the r ev oc at ionof

sup er vis ed r el ea se im posed for the viol ation of 18 U.S .C. § 2314 . See 18 U. S. C. § 358 3(e)( 3). 1 T he re fo re , be ca

use ( a) it is unl ike ly

that the dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d have appl ie d th e Chapter 7 sentencing range, and (b) Frank was sentenced w ithin the statutory m ax im um se nte nc e, w e hol d th at

F rank’ s r igh ts w er e not

sub stanti al ly

a ff ec te d by the court’ s failure to consider the Chapter 7 sentencing range. 2

II. F ra nk ’s c lai m t ha t he r se nt en ce is un re ason ab le W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in te rp re ta tio n of the se nte nc ing pr ovi sio ns d e novo and the im

posi tio n of

ase nte nc e fo llo w ing r ev oc at ionof sup er vis ed r el ea se for abuse of discretion. United States v. Quinones, 136 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998 ); se e al so Unit ed

S ta te s v. T hom

pson , 976 F . 2d 1 380, 138 1 ( 11th Ci r. 1992 )( he ld tha t a

se nte nc e of

tw en ty -f our m onths f oll ow ing the r ev oc at ionof supervised release w as not an abuse of discretion).7

A s en t en ci n g co u rt , i ni m p o s i n g a s en t en ce up o nre v o ca t i o no f ad ef en d an t ’s supe rv ise d r el ea se , m

ust c onsi de r the f

ac tor s e num er at ed

in 18 U . S. C. § 35 53, inc lud ing the na tur e an d c ir cum stanc es of the of fe nse , the c hara ct er ist ic s and his tor y of th e de fe ndant, and the ne ed to de te r futur e cr im ina l c ondu ct and t o protect the publi c. T he Sentencing Com m issio n expressly

“ adopted [the] approach that . . . a t r ev oc at ionthe c ourt sh oul d sanc tio n pr im ar ily the de fe ndant’ s br ea chof tr ust , w hil e takin g ina cc ount , to a lim ite d de gr ee , the se ri ousn es s of the unde rl y ing vio la tio n and the c ri m ina l hi sto ry of the vio la tor . ” U . S. S. G . Ch . 7, P t. A, in tro . comm en t. (3 )(b ). In the instant case, F rank wa s sentenced to the statut ory m axim um sentence of 24 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t f

or the r ev oc at ionof

sup er vis ed r el ea se im

pose d f or the vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 23 14. T he dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc ed F rank t o th e m axim um sentence because F rank had a previous forgery conviction , had three fr au d c onvi ct ion s, and w as c ur re ntl y on s ta te pr obatio n f

or the ft and f or ge ry and the ft by takin g. A cc or din gly , the c ourt de te rm ine d th at F rank’ s c ri m ina l be havio r an d si m ilar co ur se of

c ondu ct w ar rante d th e m ax im

um se nte nc e. F rank d oe s no t dis put e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ind ing s r eg ar din g he r cr im ina l hi sto ry . N or doe s sh e contest the dis trict court’ s finding that she violated th e condition s of her supervised release by

(1) violating state law betw een April 1, 2002, and De cem ber8

31, 200 2, by

m ak ing una

uth or iz ed c re dit pur ch as es on c om

pany a cc ount s w ith out the prior knowledge or approval of her em ploy er; (2) failing to m ake ordere d re sti tut ionpaym en ts; ( 3) f ai lin g to r ep ort t o th e pr obatio n of fi ce r as dir ec te d; and (4 ) as soc ia tin g w ithac onvi ct ed f el on w ith out

the pe rm iss ionof

the pr obatio n officer . While each of F rank’ s underly ing vi olation s m ay not have been severe ind ivi dua lly , it

is ev ide nt tha t sh e co nti nuou sly ign or ed the e xpl ic it co ndi tio ns o f he r supe rv ise d r el ea se . T his pa tte rnof dis re gard

f or the sy ste m

de m onstrate s a br ea chof tr ust suf fi ci en t t o su

ppor t the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to se nte nc e Fr an k to the statut or

y m ax im um of 24 m onths. U . S. S. G . Ch . 7, P t. A , intro . c om m en t. (3 )(b ). Ac cordingly , w e hold that (1) the district court’ s apparent failure to consid er the presum

ptive sentencin g range under U. S. S. G. § 7B1.4 did notprej udice Fr an k’ s su

bst an tia l r igh ts a s th e se nte nc e im pose d f ar e xc ee de d th e pr es um

pti ve range und er

§ 7B 1. 4, ind ic at ing that c onsi de ratio n of the § 7B 1. 4 r an ge w oul d no t have inf lue nc ed the le ngth of

F rank’ s se nte nc e; and ( 2) F rank’ s se nte nc e w as not unr ea sona

ble , giv enhe r vio la tio n of state law , and o the r non- co m pli an ce w iththe co nd it io ns of h er re le as e. AFFIRMED.9