J-S86045-16

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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.N.S., 

S.N.S., AND T.I.W.S.

APPEAL OF: L.R.W., NATURAL 

MOTHER

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1260 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Dated July 19, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2016-8 IVT, 2016-9 IVT, 2016-10 IVT

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 21, 2016

Appellant, L.R.W. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered in the 

Cambria County Court of Common Pleas, which involuntarily terminated her 

parental rights to minor children, A.N.S., S.N.S., and T.I.W.S. (“Children”). 

We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

1. On January 6, 2016, [CYS] filed a Petition to 

Involuntarily Terminate the Parental Rights of [C.S. 

(“Father”)], then age 51, and [Mother], then age 34, 

biological parents of [Children]. 

* * *

4. Hearings were conducted on May 13, 2016, and 

June 17, 2016. Both parents were present at the 

hearings[.]
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5. [A.N.S.] and [S.N.S.] had been adjudicated 

dependent in July 2006 and placed in the care of CYS. 

However, they were returned to [Mother] in August of 

2008 and services [were] terminated to the family. 

6. CYS returned in August of 2013 due to reports 

between May 2013 and July 2013 that [Mother] did not 

have the ability to supervise [Children] and [F]ather was 

incarcerated. The two youngest children, [S.N.S.] and 

[T.I.W.S.], then ages [7] and 2, were on the street alone, 

and during the past year [A.N.S.] and [S.N.S.] were 

absent or late for school.[1]

7. After the initial adjudication hearing on August 

21, 2013, the Juvenile Court provided a list of actions for 

[Mother] to take, including successfully completing 

parenting classes, supervision of [Children], financial 

responsibility classes, and making sure that the two [older] 

children attended school on a regular basis. ... 

8. Permanency Review Hearings were held on 

December 30, 2013 and January 29, 2014. The Juvenile 

Court found [Mother] to be only minimally compliant with 

the Permanency Plan and [F]ather had no compliance with 

the plan. [T.I.W.S.] was removed and placed with a 

paternal aunt, along with his sister [A.N.S.], who was 

uncooperative and defiant. [S.N.S.] remained with 

[M]other. [Father] remained incarcerated. 

9. At the Permanency Review Hearing held on June 

2, 2014, the Juvenile Court again found [Mother] 

minimally compliant and [Father] had no compliance. 

Father was still incarcerated and determined not to be a 

placement option.

10. At a Permanency Review Hearing held on August 

13, 2014, [A.N.S.] and [T.I.W.S.] were removed from the 

home of the aunt and [S.N.S.] was removed from 

[Mother]. The Juvenile Court also made a finding that 

____________________________________________

1 CYS’ involvement with the family was also based on reports of household 

issues and financial instability. 
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neither parent would be a placement option. The Juvenile 

Court seemed frustrated that despite years of providing 

various services, [Mother] had not been able to alleviate 

the circumstances which led to CYS involvement for the 

past nine years.

11. Subsequent Permanency Review Hearings were 

held on June 10, 2015; November 25, 2015; and April 20, 

2016, with consistent findings of minimal or no compliance 

by [Mother] and absolutely no compliance by [Father] who 

had been in and out of jail.

12. Dennis Kashurba, a licensed psychologist, 

evaluated [Mother] on two occasions resulting in reports 

dated July 21, 2006, and March 6, 2008. ... 

* * *

14. [Mother] failed to show for a January 8, 2014 

evaluation. 

(Trial Court Order, filed July 19, 2016, at 1-5) (unpaginated). On January 6, 

2016, CYS filed a petition for involuntary termination of Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights to Children. Following two hearings on the petition, 

the court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to Children on 

July 19, 2016. On August 10, 2016, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal 

and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). 

Mother raises the following issue for our review:

WHETHER THE COURT EITHER ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

OR COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED 

THE PETITION FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF 

PARENTAL RIGHTS, THEREBY TERMINATING THE 

PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [MOTHER] TO [CHILDREN?]

(Mother’s Brief at 2). 
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Mother argues she did not demonstrate a settled purpose of 

relinquishing her parental rights to Children. Mother asserts she did not 

refuse or fail to perform parental duties. Mother contends the evidence 

showed her interest in Children and her active steps to bring them back into 

her custody. Mother claims she has long-term stable housing and has 

obtained available public assistance. Mother avers her testimony established 

her home was clean, organized, and suitable for Children. Mother maintains 

she also established her utilities were on and she was making acceptable 

payments to the service providers. Mother asserts she completed parenting 

classes and attended all scheduled visits with Children. Mother submits CYS 

relied on old records and outdated information. Mother claims she is being 

punished for her back condition, which temporarily hindered her ability to 

parent Children. Mother contends no evidence demonstrated the continued 

existence of the conditions which led to the removal of Children from her 

custody. Mother argues the trial court found, contrary to the record, that no 

bond existed between Mother and T.I.W.S. Mother avers CYS presented no 

evidence that Mother’s bonds with Children were unhealthy, or that Children 

had positive bonds with their foster parents. Mother concedes Children have 

done well in foster care but insists Children would benefit equally, if not 

more, by returning home to Mother. Mother concludes the court abused its 

discretion when it terminated her parental rights to Children. We disagree. 

The standard and scope of review applicable in termination of parental 
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rights cases are as follows:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has 

granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision 

the same deference that it would give to a jury verdict. 

We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence.

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of 

fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses 

and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by [the] 

finder of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking 

termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

the existence of grounds for doing so.

The standard of clear and convincing evidence means 

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing 

as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. 

We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis 

exists for the result reached. If the trial court’s findings 

are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the 

court’s decision, even though the record could support an 

opposite result.

In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 

CYS sought the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights on 

the following grounds:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after a petition 
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filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a 

period of at least six months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care 

of the parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency for a period of at 

least six months, the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue 

to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy 

those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy 

the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child within a reasonable 

period of time and termination of the parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care 

of the parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency, 12 months or more 

have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist and termination of parental rights would 
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best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b). “Parental rights may be 

involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is 

satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In 

re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2010). 

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination 

will best serve the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516 

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability 

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child.” Id.

at 520. “In this context, the court must take into account whether a bond 

exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an 

existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Z.P., supra at 1121. 

“[T]he mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not 

necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition.” In re T.S.M., 620 
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Pa. 602, 629, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “[I]t is an immutable psychological 

truth that even the most abused of children will often harbor some positive 

emotion towards the abusive parent.” Id. See also In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753 (Pa.Super. 2008) (affirming trial court’s decision to terminate mother’s 

parental rights, where trial court found placing child with mother would have 

negative impact on child and would not be in child’s best interest; no 

evidence suggested mother had bond with child comparable to child’s strong 

bond with foster parent, or that terminating mother’s parental rights would 

sever existing beneficial relationship or cause irreparable harm to child). 

“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines 

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide 

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements 

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be 

considered unfit and may properly have...her rights terminated.” In re 

B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). 

There is no simple or easy definition of parental 

duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation 

to the needs of a child. A child needs love, 

protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. 

Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation 

is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a 

financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 

the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child.
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Because a child needs more than a benefactor, 

parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to 

take and maintain a place of importance in the 

child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of...her ability, even in difficult circumstances. 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical 

and emotional needs.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 

718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of...her 

child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill...her parental duties, to the 

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of...her potential in a 

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856. 

Instantly, the trial court reasoned as follows:

After review of the CYS records of the Independent Family 

Services [(“IFS”)] monthly reports, participation in 

monthly case review with [IFS] and in consultation with 

the CYS caseworker, [Dr.] Kashurba concluded that:

The total information available at the present time 

suggests quite convincingly that [Mother’s] ability to 

independently implement parenting strategies that 

have been provided to her over the past several 

years’ time has not improved to a degree that would 

suggest that she can appropriately independently 
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parent any of her children on an ongoing basis. ... 

Monthly consultation during the course of [Mother’s] 

[IFS] treatment indicate[s] that she continues to 

“parent from the couch” and that she is able to 

explain what techniques she should employ with 

[Children] but continues to not be able to implement 

these on an independent basis. ... The escalating 

behavioral challenges of the older children also 

speaks for itself in that inadequate supervision and 

discipline on [Mother’s] part places these children at 

risk of harm due to their risky behaviors.

* * *

A caseworker for [IFS], which began providing services to 

[Mother], summarizes her experience with [Mother] as 

follows:

In summary, while it appeared as though [Mother] 

was initially interested in participating in the IFS 

Home Management Program, she became 

uninterested in participating. [Mother’s] general lack 

of concern for her home and [C]hildren and her lack 

of interest to improve her cleaning skills, financial 

skills and eliminate safety issues within the home 

made the home unsafe for [Children]. IFS Home 

Management Services were terminated when 

[Children] were removed from the home on August 

13, 2014.... 

[B]everly A. Ragan, a CASA volunteer for 12 years, ...in her 

June 2, 2015 report to the Juvenile Court dealing with 

[Children] and two of their siblings not involved in the

present case, stated as follows:

This sibling group was removed in 2006 returned 

home only to come back into the system in 2013. 

These children need stability in their lives. They 

have been on an emotional roller coaster, which has 

manifested itself with many disruptive behaviors.

* * *

The [c]ourt next considers the bond, if any, which each of 
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the parents have with [Children]. ... As regards [Mother], 

there is a bond between her and each of her two older 

children, [A.N.S.] and [S.N.S.] None exists with [T.I.W.S.]

[I]n summary, [Mother and Father] have demonstrated an 

inability to perform their parental duties and they lack the 

motivation of performing these duties within a reasonable 

period of time.

[I]n terminating the parental rights of [Mother and 

Father], the [c]ourt finds that such termination is in the 

best interests of [Children] and that termination will best 

meet the developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and welfare of [Children].

* * *

Each of the children deserves to have a better life. 

[S.N.S.] no longer exhibits significant behavioral issues or 

excessive school absences. [S.N.S.] is often on the Honor 

Roll at school, and she is active in multiple enrichment 

activities. [A.N.S.] no longer exhibits behavioral issues or 

excessive school absences. [A.N.S.] is now involved in a 

prestigious higher achiever program through her school 

and she is active in multiple enrichment activities. 

[T.I.W.S.] has flourished in his kinship foster home. He no 

longer exhibits significant behavioral issues and has 

developed a strong bond with his kinship foster family. 

In summary, all of these children are doing well in foster 

care. 

[Ms.] Ragan testified at the May 13, 2016 hearing 

concerning [Mother] and [Children] as follows:

And I know this and I know [Mother’s] background 

and I know that she has got some unresolved issues 

of herself and that’s from years of working with her 

and understanding her background. But her children 

are being destroyed by her inability in not seeking 

help sooner for herself. 

(Trial Court Order at 5-9) (unpaginated). We accept the court’s analysis. 
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CYS has been involved with Mother repeatedly over the last decade. 

The IFS worker testified that Mother was unable to stabilize financially or 

maintain the household, despite the assistance she received from IFS in the 

year after Children were adjudicated dependent. Mother exhausted every 

county social agency for financial assistance but still failed to meet monthly 

living expenses. Mother expressed an interest in working part-time due to a 

disability but failed to secure employment. Rooms in the house were 

extremely dirty and occasionally impassable. Mother submitted photographs 

purporting to show the suitability of the home for Children, but those 

photographs were taken well after the termination petition was filed and 

were not considered by the court. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Children 

often appeared unkempt in dirty clothing and laundry would pile up in the 

house. A CYS caseworker testified that Children were out of control at times 

during visits, but Mother was unresponsive. The court-appointed special 

advocate described the visits as chaotic. The caseworker also testified that 

Mother made no effort to initiate services after IFS was unsuccessful and 

Children were removed from her home. Dr. Kashurba opined that Mother 

has failed to improve her ability to implement parenting strategies to a point 

where she can appropriately parent Children on an ongoing basis. Dr. 

Kashurba stated that Mother’s inadequate supervision and discipline of 

Children places them at risk of harm. Thus, CYS presented clear and 

convincing evidence to warrant termination of Mother’s parental rights to 
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Children under Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). See In re Adoption 

of K.J., supra. 

With respect to Section 2511(b), the CYS caseworker testified that 

Children have bonds with Mother but stated A.N.S. and S.N.S. are old 

enough to recognize the stability of their current living arrangement and 

want to remain in foster care.2 The caseworker further testified that 

Children have strong bonds with their foster parents. The caseworker 

provided extensive testimony on the improvement of Children’s behavior and 

lives since they were placed in a stable and structured foster care 

environment. The caseworker opined that Mother is unable to provide 

stability to any of Children in a manner that would allow them to flourish as 

they have in foster care. The caseworker concluded termination of Mother’s 

parental rights was in Children’s best interest. The trial court’s Section 

2511(b) analysis makes clear it considered the caseworker’s testimony and 

whether severing Mother’s bond with Children would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship. See In re Z.P., supra. No “magic 

words” were required. See In re K.Z.S., supra. The record supports the 

court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Children’s 

____________________________________________

2 The caseworker responded “yes” to the question, “Have you noticed a bond 

between [Mother] and the children?” (N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/13/16, at 

21). During the ensuing questioning, however, the caseworker referred 

specifically to A.N.S. and S.N.S. It is unclear whether the caseworker 

intended to convey that Mother has a bond with T.I.W.S. as well. 
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best interests.3 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b); In re C.P., supra. 

Accordingly, we affirm.4 

Order affirmed. 

____________________________________________

3 The court in part relied on exhibits absent from the certified record, but the 

information quoted from those exhibits mirrors the testimony of the 

caseworkers and psychologist at the termination hearings. 

4 On October 28, 2016, Mother filed a motion to consolidate this appeal with 

the appeal she filed at 1219 WDA 2016. Mother’s stated basis for that 

appeal is the trial court’s finding of aggravated circumstances with respect to 

the dependency adjudication of one of Mother’s other children, K.S. The 

appeal at 1219 WDA 2016 is from a different order and involves a distinct 

issue, which Mother has not briefed. See Pa.R.A.P. 513 (stating this Court 

may exercise its discretion to consolidate multiple appeals where more than 

one appeal is from same order, or where same question is involved in two or 

more appeals in different cases). Therefore, we deny Mother’s motion to 

consolidate. Mother may take whatever action she deems necessary in the 

appeal at 1219 WDA 2016 in the wake of this Court’s disposition of the 

current appeal. 

Separately, Father filed a brief as a “participant” in this appeal, arguing that 

the court improperly terminated his parental rights to Children. On 

November 7, 2016, CYS and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) filed motions to 

“quash” Father’s brief in whole or in part. Father at no time filed a notice of 

appeal from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights. Father 

may not simply “piggyback” on Mother’s notice of appeal. Consequently, 

this Court has no jurisdiction over his claims. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (stating 

notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of order form 

which appeal is taken); Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613 

(Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 692, 882 A.2d 477 (2005) (stating 

jurisdiction is vested in Superior Court upon filing of timely notice of appeal). 

Therefore, we grant CYS’ and the GAL’s open motions and suppress Father’s 

brief in full. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/21/2016