United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 18-1202 

DENNIS MAURICIO MIRANDA-BOJORQUEZ, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR,*

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 

Respondent. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF 

 THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 

Before 

Torruella, Lipez, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

Rachel L. Rado and The Law Office of Rachel L. Rado, LLC on 

brief for petitioner. 

Jennifer P. Levings, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. 

Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, and 

Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, on brief for respondent. 

August 27, 2019 

 

* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General William P. 

Barr is substituted for former Attorney General Jefferson B. 

Sessions III as respondent. 
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Dennis Mauricio 

Miranda-Bojorquez ("Miranda") fled his native El Salvador and 

entered the United States unlawfully. He sought asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

Torture ("CAT"), claiming that he was abused and threatened as a 

child by family and purported gang members in El Salvador. The 

Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied Miranda's application for refugee 

status, and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed. 

Because the agency's decision is supported by substantial 

evidence, we deny Miranda's petition for judicial review. 

I. 

A. 

On November 22, 2014, at age seventeen, Miranda 

unlawfully entered the United States near Hidalgo, Texas, after 

which he was detained by border patrol and classified as an 

unaccompanied juvenile. Miranda was later released to the custody 

of his parents, who lived in Chelsea, Massachusetts. On February 6, 

2015, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") charged Miranda 

with removability, pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), as an alien present in 

the United States who has not been admitted or paroled. In May 

of that year, he filed a timely application for asylum. 
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While in Chelsea, Miranda attended school and held jobs 

at restaurants. It was also in Chelsea, however, where he had two 

run-ins with the police. The first encounter took place on June 26, 

2016. Miranda was riding in a car with three other individuals 

when the police stopped them after receiving a tip that individuals 

matching their description had been acting suspiciously in the 

area. During this stop, Miranda was subjected to a protective 

search and thereafter arrested for possession of a dangerous 

weapon, a large knife, in violation of a local ordinance. 

Miranda's next encounter with the police resulted from 

a group altercation that occurred on September 23, 2016. Miranda 

was stabbed in the abdomen during this incident, after which he 

was transported to Massachusetts General Hospital for treatment. 

While Miranda was hospitalized, a Chelsea Police Department 

Officer, Anthony D'Alba, interviewed him. Miranda was under the 

effects of anesthesia and oxycodone at the time of this interview. 

Officer D'Alba filed a police report that detailed his interview 

with Miranda. The report stated that a woman had instigated the 

altercation. It explained that after Miranda and his friend 

ignored the woman's taunts, she summoned around a dozen of her 

friends, all alleged members of the 18th Street Gang. Upon 

arriving, the alleged gang members got into a scuffle with Miranda 

and his friend that eventually resulted in the latter two being 
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stabbed. The police report further reflects that during the 

interview Miranda stated that he was previously a member of MS-13 

but was no longer involved with the gang.1 Miranda also told 

Officer D'Alba that he still associated with and had friends who 

were members of MS-13. 

On October 14, 2016, Homeland Security Investigations 

("HSI")2 designated Miranda as a verified and active member of MS13. As a result, on November 17, 2016, DHS seized Miranda at his 

home and transferred him back to immigration custody.

B. 

In a series of hearings beginning on July 14, 2017, an 

IJ considered Miranda's application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the CAT. 

Miranda testified that, as a child in El Salvador, he 

suffered a pattern of physical and psychological abuse at the hands 

of family members -- specifically, his uncle Mauricio and aunt 

Virginia -- with whom he lived after his parents left El Salvador 

 

1 MS-13 and the 18th Street Gang are rival gangs. The Government 

claims Miranda was arrested for "assault/attempted murder" as a 

result of the altercation. But the sections of the record the 

Government cites do not support this assertion. 

2 "HSI is a critical investigative arm of the Department of 

Homeland Security . . . ." Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, https://www.ice.gov/hsi (last 

visited Aug. 19, 2019). 
-5- 

for the United States. Specifically, Miranda testified that 

Mauricio beat him and forced him to do agricultural work and that 

Virginia singled him out, beat him, and abused him repeatedly, all 

because of his race.3

During the proceedings, the IJ also examined police 

reports -- including Officer D'Alba's -- and other government 

documents, such as those prepared by DHS, identifying Miranda as 

a gang member. After finding these documents admissible, the IJ 

allowed Miranda a "full opportunity" to rebut their reliability. 

Miranda then went on to testify that he had never told anyone that 

he used to be a gang member; that he had never associated with 

anyone belonging to a gang; and that he had "never been associated 

with any gang." 

On August 25, 2017, the IJ issued a twenty-seven page 

opinion denying Miranda's application for refugee status and 

ordering his removal to El Salvador. The opinion lists all the 

documentary evidence that the IJ examined, including a memorandum 

of Miranda's "verified gang affiliation" based on the HSI database 

 

3 Virginia perpetrated these beatings with belts, broomsticks, 

and electric cords, and they were consistently accompanied by 

racial slurs referring to Miranda's dark complexion. Miranda was 

also deprived of food and medical care and forced to do 

agricultural work. His testimony further revealed that, out of 

all the children under Virginia's care, only those with dark skin 

received this treatment.
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and other government sources, as well as the reports detailing his 

encounters with the Chelsea Police Department. 

The IJ deemed credible Miranda's testimony about the 

abuse he experienced in El Salvador and found that Miranda faced 

past persecution on account of his race. Nonetheless, the IJ 

concluded that Miranda did not establish a well-founded fear of 

future persecution. The IJ made this determination in light of 

Miranda's testimony that his aunt Virginia is now deceased and the 

absence of evidence elsewhere in the record indicating that other 

actors would subject Miranda to similar mistreatment animated by 

racial animus.

The IJ also rejected Miranda's claim for asylum based on 

his belonging to a particular social group of "male minor children 

who are dependent and who cannot leave their families." According 

to the IJ, Miranda did not establish his membership in such a 

social group because he is no longer a minor and the record shows 

that he was in fact able to leave his family twice while living in 

El Salvador.4

 

4 The IJ also rejected Miranda's claim that he was a member of a 

protected social group made up of "family members of individuals 

who have been executed by gang members" because they resisted gang 

membership. Miranda, however, does not seek our review of the 

agency's denial of asylum based on this proposed category.
-7- 

Next, the IJ determined that Miranda was ineligible for 

humanitarian asylum. Critical to this determination was the IJ's 

adverse credibility finding with regards to Miranda's testimony 

about his gang affiliations in El Salvador and the United States. 

The IJ explained that "the record is dotted with inconsistent 

statements" about Miranda's connections to gangs in view of his 

testimony denying any involvement and the documentary evidence 

from multiple government sources revealing the contrary. This 

left the IJ "unable to discern the extent of [Miranda's] gang 

connections." Thus, despite finding that Miranda suffered past 

persecution, the IJ declined to exercise his discretion to grant 

humanitarian asylum because of the evidence showing that Miranda 

"associated with gang members and gang affiliates." Finally, the 

IJ found that Miranda's claim for withholding of removal failed 

because he could not meet the lower burden for asylum and that he 

did not show the requisite level of government involvement to 

access protection under the CAT.5 Miranda thereafter appealed to 

the BIA, which dismissed his appeal and affirmed the IJ on 

February 5, 2018. 

Miranda now seeks our review of the BIA's decision. He 

claims that the BIA erred in upholding the IJ's factual findings 

 

5 Miranda does not challenge the agency's denial of withholding 

of removal or relief under the CAT. 
-8- 

about his fear of future race-based persecution and his belonging 

to a protected social group. Miranda also challenges the agency's 

denial of humanitarian asylum. Specifically, he argues that it 

was an abuse of discretion for the IJ to deny him humanitarian 

asylum because of his purported gang affiliation. Lastly, Miranda 

contends that the agency violated his due process rights by relying 

on gang incident reports that he was unable to refute.

II. 

Where, as here, the BIA embraces the IJ's decision but 

adds its own gloss, we review both decisions as a unit. Urgilez 

Méndez v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 566, 569 (1st Cir. 2018); see also 

Aguilar-De Guillen v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2018). 

"Judicial review of the denial of asylum is deferential." 

Urgilez, 910 F.3d at 569 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 2152(b)(4)(B)). 

"[D]enial of asylum must be affirmed unless the administrative 

record unequivocally indicates error." Id. at 570 (citation 

omitted). 

We will leave the agency's factual findings -- such as 

credibility determinations and whether persecution occurred 

because of a protected ground -- undisturbed so long as they are 

supported by substantial evidence. See Ordonez-Quino v. Holder, 

760 F.3d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 2014); Jabri v. Holder, 675 F.3d 20, 24 

(1st Cir. 2012). "Only where the record compels a contrary outcome 
-9- 

will we reject the IJ's findings." Aguilar-De Guillen, 902 F.3d 

at 32-33 (citing Thapaliya v. Holder, 750 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 

2014)). 

A. 

To obtain asylum, an applicant must establish that he 

qualifies as a refugee under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA. 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1158. A refugee is someone who is "unable or 

unwilling" to return to his country of origin "because of 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion." Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). If a 

petitioner proves past persecution, "a presumption of future 

persecution follows." Santos-Guaman v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 12, 17 

(1st Cir. 2018). The Government, however, may rebut this 

presumption by showing either a fundamental change in 

circumstances that eliminates the fear of persecution or the 

reasonable expectation that the applicant can avoid future 

persecution by relocating within the country. Id. (citing 8 

C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B)). 

We first direct our attention to the argument that it 

was an error for the BIA to affirm the IJ's factual findings that 

Miranda does not belong to a particular social group and that he 

will not face race-based persecution if repatriated to El Salvador. 
-10- 

We conclude that it was not, as substantial evidence supports both 

determinations. 

As noted before, Miranda claimed membership in a 

"particular social group" made up of "male minor children dependent 

on and who cannot leave their families." But the IJ found that 

Miranda did not belong to such a group because he is no longer a 

minor and is neither dependent on his family nor unable to leave 

it. Nothing in the record contradicts the IJ's findings. It is 

unquestionable that Miranda is now twenty-one years old, a fact 

that means he is no longer in his purported social group of "minor 

children." Moreover, the record presents evidence that Miranda 

was able to leave his abusive family members, even as a minor in 

El Salvador. Miranda, for instance, escaped from the abuse he 

suffered at the hands of his aunt Virginia by choosing to go live 

with another aunt. Thus, there is substantial evidence in the 

record that supports the IJ's finding, affirmed by the BIA, that 

Miranda was not a member of the social group he invoked to seek 

asylum. 

The IJ did find that Miranda established past 

persecution on the basis of his race, thus entitling him to a 

presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The 

agency determined, however, that the Government successfully 

rebutted this presumption by demonstrating that the circumstances 
-11- 

leading to Miranda's past persecution in El Salvador have 

fundamentally changed because of the death of his aunt Virginia. 

See Uruci v. Holder, 558 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2009) ("The 

presumption can be rebutted, however, if 'a report demonstrates 

fundamental changes in the specific circumstances that form the 

basis of a petitioner's presumptive fear of future persecution.'" 

(quoting Chreng v. Gonzáles, 471 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2006))). 

And Miranda does not allege a fear of race-based persecution by 

any other parties. Here again, we spot nothing in the record to 

justify overturning the IJ's finding. 

Under the applicable deferential standard of review, we 

conclude there is substantial evidence to support the IJ's findings 

-- accepted by the BIA -- that Miranda is no longer a member of 

his proposed social group composed of minors and that circumstances 

in El Salvador have sufficiently changed so as to render his fears 

of future persecution unfounded. 

B. 

We now shift our focus to the agency's denial of 

humanitarian asylum, which Miranda contends was also erroneous. 

Even if the Government rebuts the presumption of future 

persecution -- like it did here -- the immigration courts retain 

the discretion to award asylum for humanitarian reasons to an 

applicant who has suffered past persecution. See Martínez-Pérez 
-12- 

v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 33, 42 (1st Cir. 2018); see also OrdonezQuino, 760 F.3d at 94. "To qualify for humanitarian asylum based 

on the severity of past persecution, an applicant must prove that 

he experienced extraordinary suffering in the past. In other 

words, an [applicant] must show past persecution so severe that 

repatriation would be inhumane." Ordonez-Quino, 760 F.3d at 94 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(citation omitted); see also Precetaj v. Holder, 649 F.3d 72, 77 

(1st Cir. 2011) ("[T]he paradigm case is one in which so much abuse 

has been directed against the victim that the suffering is 

projected into the future and that a return of the applicant to 

the place where the harm was inflicted would magnify the prior 

suffering."). This is a "last-resort form of relief that is 

difficult to obtain and rarely granted." Precetaj, 649 F.3d at 

78. Here, the IJ denied humanitarian asylum after concluding that 

the hardship Miranda might face if returned to El Salvador was 

overcome by evidence of his involvement with gangs and gang 

members. 

Miranda asks that we overrule the denial of humanitarian 

asylum because the agency's decision was informed by "erroneous, 

unauthenticated, prejudicial, and impermissible speculative 

evidence." He takes particular issue with the police and other 

government reports considered by the IJ that indicated his 
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association with MS-13 and its affiliates. Among other things, 

Miranda insists that the police reports contain hearsay, present 

inconsistencies "that at least cast suspicion on their 

reliability," and that such inconsistencies should have led the IJ 

"to wonder if the [police officers] had ulterior motives when 

preparing them." According to Miranda, his own testimony -- that 

he was under the effects of anesthesia in a hospital bed when he 

told the police about his past affiliation with MS-13 -- "casts 

suspicion on the narratives in the police report." Miranda also 

uses the alleged unreliability of these reports to challenge the 

IJ's refusal to deem credible his testimony denying gang 

involvement. 

Nothing in the record compels us to find that the police 

and other government reports were so obviously unreliable as to 

render the agency's reliance on them an abuse of the agency's wide 

discretion. See Conde Cuatzo v. Lynch, 796 F.3d 153, 156 (1st 

Cir. 2015) ("Immigration judges have broad discretion over the 

conduct of immigration court proceedings."). Here, not only did 

the IJ find the reports reliable and that their use would not be 

fundamentally unfair, but he also gave Miranda an opportunity to 

rebut their reliability. This is exactly what our precedents 

required the IJ to do. See, e.g., Arias-Minaya v. Holder, 779 

F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2015) (upholding admissibility of police 
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report after the agency determined its reliability and fairness 

and offered petitioner "an opportunity to challenge its veracity 

and refute its contents"). 

As we recently reiterated in Cabas v. Barr, since the 

rules of evidence do not apply in immigration proceedings, the 

evidentiary standards deployed by immigration judges "are 

generally more lax." 928 F.3d 177, 184 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing 

Castilho de Oliveira v. Holder, 564 F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 2009)). 

This means, for instance, that -- when considering discretionary 

decisions like whether to grant humanitarian asylum -- immigration 

judges can review police reports containing hearsay, "even if an 

arrest did not result in a charge or conviction, because the report 

casts probative light on [the applicant's] character." Mele v. 

Lynch, 798 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2015). Similarly, authentication 

in the immigration context "requires nothing more than proof that 

a document or thing is what it purports to be," and it is undisputed 

that such a requirement was fulfilled here. Cabas, 928 F.3d at 

184 (citing Yongo v. INS, 355 F.3d 27, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2004)). A 

presumption of regularity also attaches to the reports that Miranda 

contests, and he was unable to rebut that presumption with clear 

evidence. See Tota v. Gonzáles, 457 F.3d 161, 168 (1st Cir. 2006) 

("[I]n the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts 

presume that [government agencies] have properly discharged their 
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official duties." (alterations in original) (quoting United States 

v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996))). 

The IJ's decision not to grant humanitarian asylum was 

in any event further informed by evidence other than the government 

reports. In the almost three full pages that his twenty-seven 

page opinion dedicated to this claim, the IJ notes that he also 

accounted for the testimony of a school counselor and Miranda's 

sister as "negative factors" suggesting his involvement with gangs 

and thereby weighing against the grant of humanitarian asylum.6 

Conversely, the IJ considered a myriad of "humanitarian factors" 

that favored the grant of asylum to Miranda. These included 

Miranda's history of "suicidal ideations, depression, as well as 

symptoms" of PTSD; the "thoughts of hopelessness" that he expressed 

to a social worker; the medical complications that he experienced 

as a result of the abuse and neglect he suffered in El Salvador; 

and his ties to immediate family living in the United States. 

This comprehensive weighing of factors lead the IJ to acknowledge 

that "[t]he removal of an individual who suffers from ongoing 

mental and physical health is a challenging one" and that Miranda's 

"removal to El Salvador will place a hardship on him and his 

 

6 The IJ further noted that Miranda did not attempt to rebut his 

sister's negative testimony by calling her as a witness, even 

though she was available to testify. 
-16- 

health." After considering all available evidence, the agency 

nonetheless remained "unpersuaded that [Miranda] will refrain from 

gang affiliations that pose a danger to the community at large" 

and declined to grant him humanitarian asylum. 

The abuse that Miranda experienced in El Salvador was 

undoubtedly deplorable. But we conclude that substantial evidence 

supports both the agency's finding of adverse credibility with 

regards to Miranda's gang-affiliation testimony and the decision 

to withhold humanitarian asylum.7 Cf. Cantarero v. Holder, 734 

F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that "Congress did not mean to 

grant asylum to those whose association with a criminal syndicate 

has caused them to run into danger"). 

III. 

Finding that substantial evidence supports the findings 

of the immigration court, we deny Miranda's petition for judicial 

review. 

Denied. 

 

7 Miranda also argues that the agency's consideration of the 

government reports affiliating him with gangs violated his right 

to due process under the Fifth Amendment. In the immigration 

context, "[t]o make out a due process violation, a claimant must 

show that a procedural error led to fundamental unfairness as well 

as actual prejudice." Conde Cuatzo, 796 F.3d at 156. Having 

discerned no procedural error, we need not entertain this argument 

any further.