NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 22a0213n.06

Case Nos. 21-5730/5731

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARCUS PAGE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

O P I N I O N

Before: GIBBONS, McKEAGUE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Marcus Page appeals his consecutive sentences 

for distributing drugs and violating conditions of supervised release. For the reasons explained 

below, we affirm the district court. 

I

Marcus Page was arrested in 2019 for selling drugs in violation of federal law. When he 

was arrested, Page was serving a term of supervised release for a 2009 federal conviction for 

distribution of cocaine base and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Five months prior to the

arrest, Page had violated the conditions of his supervised release and had been sentenced to time 

served for those violations. 

In December 2020, Page pled guilty in an amended plea agreement to possession with 

intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He initially entered a 
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plea agreement in June 2020 that included a binding agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) for a sentence of 156 months that would run concurrently to the sentence 

for the supervised release offense. The Guidelines ranges were 151–188 months for the drug 

violation and 24–30 months for the supervised release violation. The Guidelines advised that the

sentences run consecutively. 

Before Page could be re-arraigned, his case was reassigned to a district judge who does not 

accept binding plea agreements under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Page and the government amended the 

agreement to include those terms as recommendations under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). 

At sentencing, the court accepted the recommendation that Page receive a 156-month 

sentence for his drug offense, stating that it had considered “the [§] 3553 factors, the nature and 

circumstances of the offense, [and] the history and characteristics” of Page. R. 65, P. 217–18. But 

the court rejected the recommendation that Page’s sentence for violating supervised release run 

concurrently, noting that the Guidelines recommend consecutive sentences for such violations and 

that the offenses cause different harms. Page was sentenced to 30 months for the supervised 

release violation, to run consecutively to his 156-month drug sentence. He did not object. Page 

appeals, challenging his sentence on procedural and substantive reasonableness grounds. 

II

Page claims that the court procedurally erred by ordering his sentence for violating 

supervised release to run consecutively to, rather than concurrently with, his sentence for drug 

distribution. He argues that the court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors was insufficient and 

that it relied too much on a single factor. 

Page did not object to any procedural defect at sentencing, so we review his claim of 

procedural unreasonableness for plain error. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385–86 (6th 
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Cir. 2008) (en banc). To meet that standard, Page must show “(1) error (2) that was obvious or 

clear, (3) that affected [Page’s] substantial rights and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. King, 914 F.3d 1021, 1024 (6th 

Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2010)). This standard is 

“demanding.” Id. A district court has discretion to impose a consecutive sentence so long as it 

has (1) consulted the applicable Guidelines or policy statements, (2) considered the sentencing 

factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and (3) made “generally clear the rationale” for its decision. 

Id. at 1025 (quoting United States v. Hall, 632 F.3d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2011)). Here, the court did 

not plainly err when sentencing Page. 

The court consulted the applicable Guidelines, noting that “[t]he guidelines suggest that a 

violation of supervised release not run concurrent” even though “the [drug] crime was the basis of 

the violation.” R. 65, P. 220. That statement correctly summarizes the Guidelines 

recommendation that 

Any term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of probation or supervised 

release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment 

that the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being 

served resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation of probation or

supervised release.

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). 

The court also adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors. At the sentencing hearing, 

Page’s attorney emphasized the relatively small amount of drugs involved and short period of 

criminal conduct; Page’s immediate acceptance of responsibility for his actions; his distant 

criminal history and difficult background of early childhood addiction; his strong employment 

history; and his family and community support. After being presented with this information, the 

court stated that it “looked at the 3553 factors, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the 
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history and characteristics of the defendant,” and accepted the 156-month sentence 

recommendation for the drug offense. R. 65, P. 217–18. Page argues that the district court ignored 

those same factors a short time later when it sentenced Page for violating supervised release. This 

is an inaccurate representation of the court’s decision. In fact, the court again considered the nature 

and circumstances of the offense, noting that Page had been “placed on supervised release to 

demonstrate that he had the desire and the ability to conform his conduct in accordance with the 

law [and] [h]e was making progress toward returning to his position as a law-abiding and 

productive member of society” until he “violat[ed] the orders of this Court.” R. 65, P. 220. It was 

unnecessary for the court to repeat the other § 3553(a) factors that it had already considered.

Courts are not required to engage in a “ritual incantation” of the factors, United States v. Smith, 

505 F.3d 463, 467–68 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), or to repeat them in a way that “would be 

repetitious and unwarranted,” United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 2009). 

Finally, the court made generally clear its rationale, explaining that Page “committed 

violations separate from the [drug] crime” and that “the harm was to the dignity and the authority 

of this Court.” R. 65, P. 220. When imposing a within-Guidelines sentence, the court need not 

explicitly restate and reject every argument made by the defendant. Id. at 340–41; United States 

v. Sweeney, 891 F.3d 232, 239 (6th Cir. 2018). And the court does not have to give a fuller 

explanation “just because the government elects not to oppose” the requested downward variance. 

Berry, 565 F.3d at 341. The court’s explanation here, although brief, was reasonable and did not 

constitute plain error. 
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III

Page also argues that his consecutive sentence is substantively unreasonable, making 

largely the same arguments already addressed. He additionally claims that his sentence is higher 

than similarly situated defendants, reinforcing its unreasonableness. 

We review the substantive reasonableness of Page’s sentence “under a deferential abuse of 

discretion standard.” See United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United 

States v. Lalonde, 509 F.3d 750, 769 (6th Cir. 2007)). A substantively reasonable sentence is 

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of sentencing in light of 

the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th 824, 834 (6th Cir. 2022). However, if 

“the district court selects a sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails

to consider relevant sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent 

factor[,]” then that sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Small, 988 F.3d 241, 259 (6th Cir.

2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 191 (2021) (quoting United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 

(6th Cir. 2008)).

To begin, Page’s sentence is within the Guidelines range, so it is presumed reasonable. See

United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 509 (6th Cir. 2008). The decision to order the sentence to 

run consecutively also comports with the Guidelines. See § 7B1.3(f). 

Moreover, the sentence is not arbitrary because the court gave a reasoned explanation. The 

court acknowledged Page’s request “that the punishment for this violation be run concurrent” and 

that “the government has no objection” to a concurrent sentence. R. 65, P. 220–21. The court then 

exercised its discretion to order that the sentences run consecutively rather than concurrently 

because the supervised release “violations [are] separate from the [underlying] crime” and “the 

harms to society are different.” Id. at P. 220. Page makes much of the fact that the district court 
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relied on the § 3553(a) factors to impose a low-end Guidelines sentence on the drug crime, but a 

high-end Guidelines sentence on the supervised release violation. But the fact that a violation 

causing a different harm resulted in a different balancing of the § 3553(a) factors does not render 

a sentence unreasonable. See United States v. Chambers, No. 21-1331, 2022 WL 612805, at *4 

(6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2022). The district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that “the severity 

of the breach [of trust], in light of the leniency in trust the court had extended him” justified the 

sentence here. United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 204 (6th Cir. 2011); see also United States 

v. Morton, 843 F. App’x 699, 706 (6th Cir. 2021). Page violated his conditions of supervised 

release imposed for committing a drug crime by committing another drug crime, and he did so 

after being granted a lenient time-served sentence for violating conditions of supervised release 

five months earlier. 

Page argues that the court relied on impermissible factors when determining his sentence. 

Although harm to “the dignity and the authority of [the] Court” is not explicitly listed in § 3553(a),

it goes to “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to promote respect for the law,” among other 

factors. § 3553(a)(2)(A). The court did not give this factor impermissible weight because the 

Guidelines expressly instruct that “at revocation the court should sanction primarily the 

defendant’s breach of trust.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Part A(3)(b) (emphasis added). We have explained 

that “[a] district court may place great weight on one factor if such weight is warranted under the 

facts of the case.” United States v. Adkins, 729 F.3d 559, 571 (6th Cir. 2013). And the court had 

already sufficiently considered the other relevant § 3553(a) factors in its discussion of Page’s 

sentence for the drug crime which was the basis for his supervised release violation. 

Finally, Page argues that his sentence is unreasonable because he contends it is higher than 

those of similarly situated defendants. Even if that is true, there is no requirement that the court 
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consider sentencing statistics before issuing a sentence. United States v. Hymes, 19 F. 4th 928, 

935–936 (6th Cir. 2021). Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to decide 

that Page has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines 

sentence. 

IV

For these reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.