J-S28044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MONDALE ALONZO THOMAS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1061 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 11, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0000358-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: September 12, 2023

Appellant Mondale Alonzo Thomas appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on August 11, 2022, in the Allegheny County Court of 

Common Pleas. We affirm.

The relevant facts1 and procedural history are as follows: On January 3, 

2022, police detectives stopped a Chevy Malibu with dark tinted windows 

traveling at speeds of 40 to 50 MPH in a posted 25 MPH zone. N.T. at 6. The 

vehicle was being driven by the Appellant and there were two other occupants. 

N.T. at 7. Based on the traffic violation, the detectives initiated a traffic stop 

and immediately observed the rear passenger-side passenger bend his upper 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The parties stipulated to the facts contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause 

and to the testimony presented at the hearing on Appellant’s suppression 

motion for the purpose of trial testimony in the non-jury trial. 
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torso and reach toward the rear floorboard, return to an upright position, and 

then reach toward the right side of his person. N.T. at 8. Fearing that the

passenger was attempting to conceal or retrieve a weapon, detectives quickly 

removed him from the vehicle and performed a Terry2 pat down, which 

uncovered no weapon. N.T. at 8-9.

During the initial interaction with the vehicle occupants for the traffic 

violation, in addition to noticing the back passenger’s movements, the 

detectives observed the driver, Appellant, acting nervously, and the detectives

smelled the strong odor of fresh marijuana. Upon discovering that the front 

passenger, Ryan Stanton, was the owner of the vehicle, the detectives spoke 

with the front passenger and sought consent to search the vehicle. N.T. at 10. 

Prior to obtaining consent from the vehicle’s owner, Detectives asked 

Appellant to exit the driver’s seat. As Appellant complied, detectives observed 

him clench his elbows towards his waistline in a hunch-like fashion and noticed 

a large bulge in his sweatshirt. N.T. at 10, 12. Based on this unusual body 

language, the detectives believed Appellant was attempting to conceal an item 

in his waistband. N.T. at 10-11. 

When Detective Stegena asked Appellant if he had any weapons, 

Appellant said, “No.” N.T. at 13. The detectives described Appellant’s physical 

posture as “threatening” because Appellant kept his arms tucked in and in a 

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2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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hunched over position, and Detective Maloney ordered Appellant to “put your 

arms down.” N.T. at 13. When Appellant did so, Detective Maloney at that 

moment observed the barrel of a firearm visible from Appellant’s front pocket 

of his hooded sweatshirt. Appellant was patted down, and the loaded firearm

was seized. Detective Stegena knew Appellant from a prior incident involving 

firearms and reasonably suspected that Appellant did not have a permit to 

carry. Written consent was obtained from the vehicle owner to search the 

entire vehicle which revealed a small bag of marijuana. The vehicle owner and 

the other two occupants were released from the scene without incident while 

Appellant was transported to police headquarters. A search of Appellant’s 

person at headquarters revealed a small bag of marijuana. N.T. at 14.

Appellant was charged with a firearms violation. Thereafter, Appellant 

filed a suppression motion, claiming he was subjected to an unreasonable 

search and seizure as the detectives did not have reasonable suspicion to stop 

and frisk him. On July 13, 2022, the lower court held a suppression hearing 

at which two of the detectives who were at the scene testified. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the lower court denied Appellant’s suppression 

motion and immediately proceeded to a non-jury trial. At the conclusion of 

that proceeding, Appellant was convicted of the firearms violation and was 

sentenced on August 11, 2022, to serve a prison term of 18 to 48 months. 

This appeal followed.
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The trial court filed an opinion and determined that reasonable suspicion 

existed for the pat-down of Appellant’s person because the detectives 

observed (1) the rear passenger engaged in movements that led officers to 

believe the rear passenger may have been obtaining or concealing a firearm,

(2) the Appellant clenched his elbows against his torso and leaned forward 

which led officers to believe he was trying to conceal a weapon, and (3) the 

smell of marijuana.

3 Additionally, Detective Stegena knew Appellant from a 

prior incident involving firearms, and the firearm was discovered before the 

pat-down was conducted right after Appellant exited the vehicle. Tr. Ct. Op. 

at 6-7.

On appeal, Appellant’s sole claim is that the trial court erred in denying 

Appellant’s suppression motion when the detectives ordered him to stand fully 

upright, thereby exposing the firearm. We review a trial court's denial of a 

suppression motion under the following standard:

[o]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may 

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3 This Court recognizes based on the evidence contained in the record that the 

nature of the marijuana was fresh marijuana and not burnt marijuana, as the 

trial court had stated in its opinion. Tr. Ct. Op. at 7. However, the marijuana 

odor observed by the officers is irrelevant in this case. 
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reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where 

. . . the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns 

on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal 

conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it 

is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are 

subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 146 A.3d 1271, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citation omitted).

Specifically, Appellant concedes that it was permissible to stop the 

vehicle being driven by him because it was traveling over the speed limit, but 

claims that the officers needed something more in order to detain him beyond 

that point—and that neither the smell of fresh marijuana, nor the rear 

passenger’s body movements, nor Appellant’s “weird” posture was enough to 

order Appellant out of the car for a pat-down. Appellant’s Br. at 12, 13-14.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from being 

subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Lyles, 

626 Pa. 343, 350, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (2014). Search and seizure jurisprudence 

defines three levels of interaction between citizens and police officers and 

requires different levels of justification based upon the nature of the 

interaction.

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for 

information) which need not be supported by any level of 

suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. 

The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a 

reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period 
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of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest 

or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Way, 238 A.3d 515, 518-19 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted)). 

This case involves an investigative detention because the detectives 

initiated a forcible stop of the vehicle Appellant was driving. It is well 

established that a forcible stop of a motor vehicle by the police constitutes a 

second-level seizure, or “investigative detention,” which must be supported 

by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Commonwealth v. 

Clinton, 905 A.2d 1026, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2006). “The question of whether 

reasonable suspicion existed at the time of an investigatory detention must 

be answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to determine 

whether there was a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 

individual stopped of criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 273 

A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted). Police have the 

authority to stop a motor vehicle for further investigation of a Vehicle Code 

violation that is occurring or has just occurred. Clinton, 905 A.2d at 1030. 

The stop here was supported by reasonable suspicion because the detectives 

observed the vehicle Appellant was driving traveling between 40 and 50 MPH

in a 25 MPH speed zone, a violation of the Vehicle Code.
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Police may request that both drivers and passengers exit a lawfully 

stopped vehicle as a matter of right. If a motor vehicle has been lawfully 

detained for a traffic violation, police officers may order the occupants to get 

out without violating the Fourth Amendment’s prescription of unreasonable 

searches and seizures. This rationale extends to all vehicle occupants even 

absent reasonable suspicion that additional criminal activity is afoot.

Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 564 (Pa. Super. 2007). Thus, when

the detectives first asked the rear passenger and then Appellant to step out 

of the car, those requests were constitutional as a matter of right. The 

detectives need not have relied on the marijuana odor nor the suspicious 

demeanor or movements of any vehicle occupant to make that request. 

During an investigatory stop in which an officer has ordered a driver to 

step out of the vehicle, the officer can pat down the driver or passenger only 

when the officer believes, based on specific and articulable facts, that the 

individual is armed and dangerous. Such pat downs, which are permissible 

“without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable 

cause, must always be strictly limited to that which is necessary for the 

discovery of weapons that might present a danger” to the detectives or others. 

Commonwealth v. Parker, 957 A.2d 311, 314-315 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here, 

the detectives first removed the rear passenger and conducted a constitutional 

pat-down for weapons after that passenger’s upper body movements, 
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consistent with obtaining or concealing a weapon, gave rise to reasonable 

suspicion.

For Appellant, however, the issue is not if the detectives had specific 

and articulable facts that gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Appellant was 

armed and dangerous4 because, while an officer may only conduct a pat-down 

of a person stopped if the officer possesses reasonable suspicion that the 

person may be armed and dangerous, here, the pat-down of Appellant and 

retrieval of the weapon did not occur until after the detectives plainly observed 

the firearm in Appellant’s hoodie pocket. Thus, the pat-down need not have 

been based on a set of articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion 

because the detectives had more than reasonable suspicion that Appellant was 

armed—they were certain Appellant was armed because Detective Maloney

saw the weapon in plain view after making the request that Appellant put his 

arms down. 

The request by Detective Maloney that Appellant put his arms at his side 

was justified for officer safety. During any level of interaction between officers 

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4

If this were the appropriate inquiry, we would find that there are specific and 

articulable facts that gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Appellant was 

armed and dangerous. At the inception of the traffic stop, the detectives 

observed Appellant acting extremely nervous and was hunched forward in a 

“weird manner, not typical [of] what you would see in a normal, routine traffic 

stop.” N.T. at 11-12. His demeanor was threatening as if he was about to 

strike one of the detectives, he appeared to be concealing a weapon in a “TRex” position, and had his elbows clenched into his stomach where the 

detectives could see a large bulge. N.T. at 12. 
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and citizens, officers may make reasonable requests of the suspect to stand 

up straight, place arms at side, or take hands out of pockets. This Court has 

stated: 

An officer is justified in insisting that a citizen not conceal his 

hands during an encounter with police; an officer may make this 

reasonable request to ensure his or her own protection in case 

that individual is armed. This Court has stated that if during a 

mere encounter, an individual on his own accord, puts his hands 

in his pocket, thereby creating a potential danger to the safety of 

a police officer, the officer may justifiably reach for his side arm 

and order the individual to stop and take his hand out of his 

pocket. Such reaction by a police officer does not elevate the mere 

encounter into an investigative detention because the officer's 

reaction was necessitated by the individual's conduct. Coleman, 

19 A.3d at 1117 (quoting Commonwealth v. Carter, 2001 PA 

Super 201, 779 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa. Super. 2001) (noting that the 

fact that the officer asked the appellant to take his hands out of 

his pockets did not turn the encounter into a seizure)). See also 

Commonwealth v. Blair, 2004 PA Super 394, 860 A.2d 567, 573 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (finding that interaction remained a mere 

encounter when an officer approached a parked car and asked its 

occupants to show their hands).

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 179 A.3d 77, 82-83 (Pa. Super. 2018).

During the investigative detention at issue here, the detective was 

justified in asking Appellant to put his arms down because Appellant’s own 

conduct and posture necessitated the detective’s request. While Appellant was 

standing outside the vehicle after having been lawfully ordered out of it, 

Appellant remained hunched over with his elbows clenched into his waistline 

area. Detective Stegena described Appellant’s arms as being in a “T Rex” 
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position consistent with appellant concealing something.5 As a result of these 

observations, Appellant was asked to put his arms down. When he did, the 

firearm was immediately seen by the officers in his front pocket. Only then

was he patted down, and the already-discovered firearm retrieved. 

The detectives properly seized the firearm from Appellant’s person 

without a warrant because it was in plain view. 

The plain view doctrine allows the admission of evidence seized 

without a warrant when: (1) an officer views the object from a 

lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that 

the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right 

of access to the object. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 2008 PA 

Super 124, 950 A.2d 1041, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) 

(citation omitted) (emphasis added). “Where police officers 

observe incriminating-looking contraband in plain view in a vehicle 

from a lawful vantage-point, the lack of advance notice and 

opportunity to obtain a warrant provides the officers with a lawful 

right of access to seize the object in question.” Commonwealth 

v. Brown, 2011 PA Super 67, 23 A.3d 544, 557 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(en banc).

Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 471 (Pa. Super. 2022). 

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5 Appellant notes in his brief that he behaved this way on a January day when 

the weather was cold, perhaps suggesting that the officers should have 

interpreted his posture as huddled into his person in a manner consistent with 

attempting to stay warm. Appellant’s Br. at 8. However, “[t]his Court has held 

that ‘even in a case where one could say that the conduct of a person is equally 

consistent with innocent activity, the suppression court would not be 

foreclosed from concluding that reasonable suspicion nevertheless existed. ... 

Even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant 

further investigation.’” Thomas, 179 A.3d at 84.
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The detectives viewed the object from a lawful vantage point because 

they were standing in public outside a vehicle after a lawful stop, and the 

officers were justified in asking Appellant to put his arms down based on his 

own conduct, thus exposing the firearm. The change in Appellant’s body 

position resulted in the object being visible from a lawful vantage point giving 

the detectives lawful access to the object from where they were standing. The 

incriminating nature of the object was immediately apparent because 

Detective Stegena had experience with Appellant from a prior incident 

involving a firearm and knew that Appellant did not have a permit to carry to 

carry one. Therefore, the firearm was properly admitted into evidence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/12/2023
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