alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 6726** 

TERRY MICHAEL WILMORE , Petitioner

– Appellant ,

v. MICHAEL MCCALL, Warden , Respondent

– Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Distr ict of South Carolina , at Columbia

. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:11

- cv - 00408

- JFA )

Submitted : August 17, 2011 Decided: August 24, 2011

Before KING, WYNN, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

T erry Michael Wilmore, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Terry Michael Wilmore seeks to appeal the district
court’s order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate ju dge and dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition as
successive. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judg ment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civ il case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court’s order was entered on the docket

on April 1 3 , 2011 . The notice of appeal can be deemed filed , at the earliest, on May 24, 2011

. *

* For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the co urt. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988). Because Wilmore fa iled to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are3 adequately presented in the materials before the court an d argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-30555

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CARLOS B. MOORE,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:09-CR-279-11

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Carlos B. Moore appeals the 292-month prison sentence imposed following

his guilty plea conviction of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute

50 grams or more of crack cocaine. He argues that his sentence should be

vacated and that his case should be remanded for resentencing under the Fair

Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), 21 U.S.C. § 801, which was enacted during the

pendency of his appeal. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 22, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 10-30555 Document: 00512152839 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/22/2013
No. 10-30555

Criminal sentences are reviewed for reasonableness, using an abuse of

discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46-51 (2007). This court

reviews de novo the interpretation of a sentencing statute. United States v.

Salazar, 542 F.3d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 2008).

Moore’s claim is without merit. The FSA does not apply retroactively to

defendants, like Moore, who were sentenced before its enactment. See Dorsey

v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2328-36 (2012); United States v. Doggins, 633

F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2011). Additionally, insofar as Moore contends the FSA

must apply immediately to correct a claimed equal-protection violation caused

by the statute under which he was sentenced, our court has never recognized

such a violation stemming from the sentencing disparity of the prior law. See,

e.g., United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 574, 579 & n.21 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting

cocaine-base sentencing disparity not unconstitutional). 

AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 10-30555 Document: 00512152839 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/22/2013
Exhibit 32.1



TAYLOR CAPITAL GROUP, INC.



Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of Taylor Capital Group, Inc. (the Company) hereby certify that:



(i) the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2005 (the Report) fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                      |  |                        
|--------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Dated: August 3, 2005 |  | /s/ JEFFREY W. TAYLOR  
|                      |  | Jeffrey W. Taylor      
|                      |  | Chief Executive Officer
|                      | 
|Dated: August 3, 2005 |  | /s/ DANIEL C. STEVENS  
|                      |  | Daniel C. Stevens      
|                      |  | Chief Financial Officer



This certification
accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
another document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Taylor Capital Group, Inc. and will
be retained by Taylor Capital Group, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its Staff upon request.
-1-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02307-WYD-KMT

JULIO ALVAREZ-CORTEZ;

LORENZA MORALES-ALVAREZ, individually and as next friend of H G-T, a minor and

V G-T, a minor; and

EMMANUEL RUIZ,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LOU VALLARIO, Garfield County Sheriff, in his individual capacity;

DOES 1-3, Garfield County deputy sheriffs, in their individual capacities;

ALVARO AGON, a Carbondale police officer, in his individual capacity;

STEVE TURZA, an ICE agent, in his individual capacity; and

CHRIS CARTER, an ICE agent, in his individual capacity,

Defendants.

MINUTE ORDER 

ORDER ENTERED BY CHIEF JUDGE WILEY Y. DANIEL

Upon review of the Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice as to

Defendant Alvaro Agon filed on November 18, 2011 [ECF No. 21], Defendant Agon’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 21, 2011 [ECF No. 12] and his Motion to

Stay, filed October 21, 2011 [ECF No. 13] are DENIED AS MOOT. 

Dated: November 18, 2011.

Case 1:11-cv-02307-WYD-KMT Document 22 Filed 11/18/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
#### Mary P. ACCURSIO, Joined by her Husband, Lucio James Accursio, Appellants, v. TOWN OF FLORIDA CITY, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division B.

Feb. 4, 1955.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         114,000
<SECURITIES>                                     5,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,850,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                    94,000
<INVENTORY>                                  4,644,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               307,000
<PP&E>                                         837,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,886,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,886,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     14,000
<COMMON>                                        39,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,947,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 7,886,000
<SALES>                                      7,054,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,054,000
<CGS>                                        6,290,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,290,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,134,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              87,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,275,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,275,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,275,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .59
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .59
        

</TABLE>
Case 1:11-cv-02492-PAB-KMT Document 4 Filed 10/06/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 3
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| Skip to Content*Release Date: December 7, 2006*Release dates |  Coded tables |  Historical dataCurrent release |  Screen reader |  PDF (450 KB)**F.226 Taxes Payable by Businesses** |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### NEMARICH v. STAR CHECKER CAB CO. et al.

No. 14698.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Nov. 27, 1933.

Richard A. Dowling, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Hugh M. Wilkinson, A. Miles Coe, Fred W. Oser, and Harry Nowalsky, all of New Orleans, for appellees.

HIGGINS, Judge.

Plaintiff brought an action ex delicto to recover damages for alleged personal injuries and claimed the right to be relieved of paying the costs of court, or furnishing bond to secure the payment thereof,, under the provisions of Act No. 156 of 1912, generally referred to as the forma pauperis statute.

The defendant filed a rule to test the plaintiff’s right to the benefit of the provisions of the act. After hearing evidence on this issue, oñ May 12, 1933, the trial judge entered the following order: “Rule absolute and plaintiff directed to pay the costs within ten days, and, in default of that, the suit will be dismissed, and that he be required to give security for costs.”

The plaintiff having failed to comply with the order of the court, another rule was taken on June 2, 1933, to show cause why the suit should not be dismissed and, after a hearing thereon, the case was dismissed on June 8, 1933. The plaintiff has appealed.

On the original hearing_ the plaintiff testified that he was employed as a -seaman by the United Fruit Company at a salary of $50 per month and board and lodging; that his ship had arrived in port on May 11, 1933, the day before the rule was tried, and that he *863expected to go to sea on another vessel on May 13, 1933; that while he was on the list of regularly employed seamen of the company, sometimes he had to wait in order to be sent on another vessel; that he was single and had no dependents; and that he had no real or personal property, nor ány cash. The costs of court would have amounted to about $23.

In interpreting the provisions of Act No. 156 of 1912, the court, in the case of State ex rel. Gentry v. Stephens, Judge, 2 La. App. 460, in denying relator’s request for a writ of mandamus to compel the district judge to permit the plaintiff to file the suit in forma pauperis, said: “The true intent of the act, we think, is that the District Judge shall make inquiry into the applicant’s ability to pay costs or give security for their payment and after he has made such inquiry his discretion in permitting or refusing the application cannot he disturbed in the absence of a showing that he had abused his discretion.”

In the instant case the two rules were passed upon by different district judges, and both reached the same conclusion. Under the circumstances we do not feel that we should interfere, as the judge who saw and interrogated the plaintiff was of the opinion that he was able to pay the costs of court.

. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 17-1200

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Rodney D. Brown, also known as Rod

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: August 30, 2017

 Filed: September 1, 2017

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Federal inmate Rodney Brown appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro

1

se motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Upon careful

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

1

the Eastern District of Arkansas. 
de novo review, see United States v. Long, 757 F.3d 762, 763 (8th Cir. 2014)

(standard of review), we conclude that dismissal was proper because Brown was

sentenced based on a binding plea agreement that included a base offense level and

drug quantity, but did not include a criminal history level or Guidelines range, and

thus was not expressly based on a Guidelines range that was subsequently lowered

by the Sentencing Commission, see Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685,

2695-700 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Long, 757 F.3d at 764.

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

-2-
FILED

October 14, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

METRIC PARTNERS GROWTH )

SUITE INVESTORS, L.P., )

)

Plaintiff/Appellee, )

) Appeal No.

VS. ) 01-A-01-9712-CH-00723

)

NASHVILLE LODGING COMPANY; ) Davidson Chancery

2300 ELM HILL PIKE, INC., ) No. 96-1405-III

)

Defendants/Appellants, )

)

and )

)

ORLANDO RESIDENCE, LTD.; and )

LA SALLE NATIONAL BANK as )

trustee under that certain pooling and )

servicing agreement dated )

July 11, 1995, for the holders of the )

WHP Commercial Mortgage Pass )

Through Certificates, Series 1995C1, )

and ROBERT M. HOLLAND, JR., )

Trustee, )

)

Defendants/Appellees. )

ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR

The appellants have filed a petition to rehear which we have considered

and found to be without merit. It is, therefore, ordered that the petition be overruled.

__________________________________

HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE

MIDDLE SECTION

__________________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

__________________________________

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Senior District Judge Richard P. Matsch

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02429-RPM-GJR

RICHARD LAROY DAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNIVERSAL WELL SERVICES, INC.,

d/b/a Eastern Reservoir Services,

Defendant.

____________________________________________________________________________________

Amended ORDER OF REFERENCE TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

____________________________________________________________________________________

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) and (b), United States

Magistrate Judge Gudrun J. Rice is designated to conduct proceedings in this civil action as follows:

( X ) Convene a scheduling conference under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and enter a scheduling

order meeting the requirements of D.C.COLO.LCivR 16.2.

( X ) Conduct such status conferences and issue such orders necessary for compliance with the

scheduling order, including amendments or modifications of the scheduling order upon a

showing of good cause.

( X ) Convene such settlement conferences and direct related procedures as may facilitate

resolution of this case.

( X ) Hear and determine pretrial matters, including discovery and other non-dispositive

motions.

( ) Conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and submit proposed findings of fact

and recommendations for rulings on dispositive motions.

( ) Conduct a pretrial conference and enter a pretrial order.

It is ORDERED, that this civil action is referred to the named magistrate judge to proceed

according to the designations marked (X) above.

Dated: September 16th, 2011

BY THE COURT:

s/Richard P. Matsch

_________________________________

Richard P. Matsch, Senior District Judge
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Homeland Security

###### U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

# AGENCY:

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security. 

# ACTION:

Notice of accreditation and approval of Intertek USA, Inc., as a commercial gauger and laboratory. 

# SUMMARY:

                        Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to 19 CFR 151.12 and 19 CFR 151.13, Intertek USA, Inc., 801 West Orchard St., Suite 5, Bellingham, WA 98225, has been approved to gauge and accredited to test petroleum and petroleum products, organic chemicals and vegetable oils for customs purposes, in accordance with the provisions of 19 CFR 151.12 and 19 CFR 151.13. Anyone wishing to employ this entity to conduct laboratory analyses and gauger services should request and receive written assurances from the entity that it is accredited or approved by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to conduct the specific test or gauger service requested. Alternatively, inquiries regarding the specific test or gauger service this entity is accredited or approved to perform may be directed to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection by calling (202) 344-1060. The inquiry may also be sent to                         *cbp.labhq@dhs.gov.*                         Please reference the Web site listed below for a complete listing of CBP approved gaugers and accredited laboratories.                     

*http://cbp.gov/​xp/​cgov/​import/​operations_​support/​labs_​scientific_​svcs/​commercial_​gaugers/​*

# DATES:

The accreditation and approval of Intertek USA, Inc., as commercial gauger and laboratory became effective on March 14, 2007. The next triennial inspection date will be scheduled for March 2010. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Randall Breaux, Laboratories and Scientific Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Suite 1500N, Washington, DC 20229, 202-344-1060. 

Dated: October 2, 2008. 

Ira S. Reese, 

Executive Director,  Laboratories and Scientific  Services.

 [FR Doc. E8-24041 Filed 10-8-08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9111-14-P
Case 1:11-po-01133-DW Document 52 Filed 10/09/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
Case 1:11-po-01133-DW Document 52 Filed 10/09/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-7041

HARRY BROCKWELL,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. T.S. Ellis, III, Senior District Judge. (1:19-cv-00740-TSE-JFA)

Submitted: October 15, 2019 Decided: October 18, 2019

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and THACKER and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Harry Brockwell, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Harry Brockwell appeals the district court’s order construing his “Motion for a Void 

Judgment AB Initio” as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition and dismissing it as successive 

and unauthorized. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. Brockwell v. Virginia, No. 1:19-cv-00740-TSE-JFA (E.D. Va. June 26, 2019). We 

deny as unnecessary a certificate of appealability. See Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 

(2009); United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2015). We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Honorable R. Brooke Jackson

Civil Action No. 11-CV-02675-RBJ

CORNELUIS WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ESCALLATE LLC, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, 

Defendants.

ORDER TO SET SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. The parties are ordered to set an initial 

scheduling conference in this Court (with Judge Jackson) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and 

D.C.COLO.LCivR 16.1 no later than 45 days after all responsive pleadings are filed. Each 

party’s lead trial counsel shall attend the conference. The conference shall be held in Courtroom 

A-702, Alfred A. Arraj U.S. Courthouse, 901 19th Street, Denver, Colorado. The parties are 

directed to jointly contact Mary DeRosa by telephone at (303) 844-4694 or by email at 

Jackson_Chambers@cod.uscourts.gov to obtain a scheduling conference date. 

A meeting for the purposes of attempting to agree on a scheduling order and satisfying 

the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) should be held no later than 21 days before the 

proposed scheduling order is tendered. The proposed scheduling order, which should be 

prepared as described in Appendix F to the local rules, should be tendered no later than five days 

before the scheduling conference. The proposed scheduling order should set forth the parties’

agreement or their respective positions on the matters set forth in Appendix F. A copy of 

instructions for the preparation of a scheduling order and a form scheduling order can be 

downloaded from the Court’s website (http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Forms.aspx).

DATED this 18th day of October, 2011.

BY THE COURT: 

___________________________________

R. Brooke Jackson

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02675-RBJ Document 2 Filed 10/18/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1