1

 “[#73]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a

specific paper by the court’s electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this

convention throughout this order.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Case No. 11-cv-02695-REB-KMT

THERESA L. DOWLING,

Plaintiff,

v.

IBEW LOCAL #111,

Defendant.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Blackburn, J. 

The matter before me is Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief From Judgment [#73],1

filed August 14, 2012. Because the motion was filed more than 28 days after the entry

of Final Judgment [#57], filed June 1329, 2012, see FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b), I consider it

a request for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

In addition, because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, I have construed her pleadings

more liberally and held them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167

L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007); Hall v.

Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). Thus construed, I deny the

Case 1:11-cv-02695-REB-KMT Document 75 Filed 09/26/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 3
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 To the extent plaintiff also seeks my recusal from this case, I deny her request. Assuming

arguendo that I have jurisdiction to determine the matter at all, now that appeal has been taken to the

circuit court, plaintiff has failed to submit any facts that would cause "a reasonable person, knowing all the

facts, [to] harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of

Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Other than my rulings in this case, plaintiff

points to nothing even remotely suggesting that I have a “pervasive bias” against pro se plaintiffs in

general or an “extrajudicial bias” against this pro se plaintiff in particular. See Liteky v. United States,

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motion.

Rule 60(b) relief requires a showing of exceptional circumstances warranting

relief from judgment. Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.

1991). A litigant shows exceptional circumstances by satisfying one or more of the

grounds for relief enumerated in Rule 60(b). Id. at 1243-44. Here, the only possibly

applicable grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) are provided by subparagraph (3), which

allows the court to relieve a party from judgment on the basis of fraud,

misrepresentation, or misconduct of an opposing party, or alternatively subparagraph

(6), which contemplates relief from judgment based on “any other reason that justifies

relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3) & (6). 

I perceive nothing in plaintiff’s motion to suggest that such extraordinary relief is

warranted in this case under either rubric. Although plaintiff makes conclusory

allegations regarding the allegedly unethical and fraudulent conduct of various attorneys

representing parties in other cases in which she is a plaintiff, she neither substantiates

these assertions nor shows how they infected this proceeding. Moreover, regardless

whether plaintiff has a viable claim vel non, her own inability or unwillingness to conform

to the reasonable rules of procedure is the cause of her inability to have these claims

vetted substantively. Her dilemma, in short, is one of her own making, and provides no

basis warranting relief from judgment.2

 

Case 1:11-cv-02695-REB-KMT Document 75 Filed 09/26/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 3
510 U.S. 540, 550, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1155, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994).

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THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED it is ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief

From Judgment [#73], filed August 14, 2012, is DENIED.

Dated September 26, 2012, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

Case 1:11-cv-02695-REB-KMT Document 75 Filed 09/26/12 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 3