alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02698-AP

SANDY JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

 

Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security, by his attorney, the undersigned

Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Colorado, has moved this Court, pursuant to

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to enter a judgment with an order of reversal with remand

of the cause to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. Under sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has the power “to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the

record, a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the Commissioner, with or

without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).

Upon remand, the Appeals Council shall remand the matter to an administrative law

judge (ALJ) for a new hearing and a new decision. The Appeals Council shall direct the ALJ to

reevaluate whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal Listing 12.05, in accordance with

agency regulations and policy, with consideration to the claimant’s lowest IQ scores on the

WAIS intelligence test. The Appeals Council shall also direct the ALJ to, if necessary, further

evaluate the claimant’s residual functional capacity and obtain supplemental vocational expert

testimony. 

Case 1:11-cv-02698-JLK Document 12 Filed 06/06/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
-2-

Pursuant to the power of this Court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the Commissioner’s decision with remand in Social Security actions under sentence

four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and in light of the Commissioner’s request for remand of this action

for further administrative proceedings, this Court hereby

REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) with

a REMAND of the cause to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings as set out

above. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated at Denver, Colorado this 6th day of June, 2012.

s/John L. Kane _____

Judge John L. Kane

United States District Court Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02698-JLK Document 12 Filed 06/06/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1335

ROSS A. FIORANI, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

and

NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT; AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK; MERRIFIELD, 

VIRGINIA; BARCLAYS BANK; TD BANK; WEST PUBLISHING; ALLSTATE 

INSURANCE COMPANY; VIRGINIA TAX DEPARTMENT; FAIRFAX COUNTY 

TAX AUTHORITY; CAPITAL ONE, (401K/Roth),

Plaintiffs,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, et al; COMMISSIONERS OF THE 

TREASURY; DMV; MVDB; VITA’S AGENTS; MR. CANARY; MS. BROWN; 

MS. WOOD-HENRY; MS. ESTES; SAMUEL A. NIXON, JR., et al,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Senior

District Judge. (3:14-cv-00216-JRS)

Submitted: October 21, 2014 Decided: October 23, 2014

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

Ross A. Fiorani, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Ross A. Fiorani, Jr., appeals the district court’s 

order dismissing his civil complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e) (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no 

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated 

by the district court. Fiorani v. Commonwealth of Va., No. 

3:14-cv-00216-JRS (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2014). We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
812 A.2d 1104

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DAVID COOPER, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.

December 12, 2002.

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court, it is Ordered that the motion for leave to appeal is granted, and it is further Ordered that those provisions in the trial court orders requiring defendant to produce for the State trial counsel’s entire file are summarily reversed, without prejudice to the State making a subsequent motion to the trial court for discovery of the file, which request shall be narrowly tailored to include only relevant and non-privileged information. Jurisdiction is not retained.
#### Alexander NESBITT v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June Term 1953.

Dismissed without opinion.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Small Business Administration

          - [Disaster Declaration #11458 and #11459]

# AGENCY:

U.S. Small Business Administration.

# ACTION:

Amendment 1.

# SUMMARY:

This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for the State of Mississippi (FEMA-1794-DR), dated 09/26/2008.

*Incident:*                         Hurricane Gustav.                    

*Incident Period:*                         08/28/2008 through 09/08/2008.                    

*Effective Date:*                         10/03/2008.                    

*Physical Loan Application Deadline Date:*                         11/25/2008.                    

*EIDL Loan Application Deadline Date:*                         06/26/2009.                    

# ADDRESSES:

Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

A. Escobar, Office of Disaster Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The notice of the Presidential disaster declaration for the State of Mississippi, dated 09/26/2008 is hereby amended to include the following areas as adversely affected by the disaster:

*Primary Counties (Physical Damage and Economic Injury Loans):*

Adams, Wilkinson.

*Contiguous Counties/Parishes (Economic Injury Loans Only):*

Mississippi: Amite, Franklin, Jefferson.

Louisiana: Concordia, East Feliciana, Tensas, West Feliciana.

All other information in the original declaration remains unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 59002 and 59008)

James E. Rivera,

Acting Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.

[FR Doc. E8-24105 Filed 10-9-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
NO. 07-05-0367-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL C APRIL 10, 2006

______________________________ MARK STEVEN GREEN, APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A PPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE 2 42ND DIST RICT COURT OF HALE COU NTY; NO. A 13859-0010; HONORABLE EDSELF, JUDG E

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS an d HANCOCK, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPIN ION Pursuant to a plea agreement, appe llant MarkSt even Green w as convic

ted of unauthor ized absen ce from a community correctio ns facility

and sentenced to one year confinement, suspended in favor of two years community sup ervisi on, and a $1,000 fine. O n July 21, 2005, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s comm unity superv ision ,1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). 2 and appellant pled true to the viola tions alleg ed. Follow ing a heari ng on the State’ s motion, the trial cour

t revoked a ppellant’s community super vision and assessed the original term of confinement. In pres enting thisappeal, counsel has filed an Anders 1 brief in support of a motio n to w ithdr

aw. We grant cou nsel’ s moti on and a ffirm. In support of his moti on to withdr aw, counsel certifies hehas dilig ently rev iewed the record, and in his opi nion, the recor d reflectsno revers ible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. A nders v. C alifornia, 386 U .S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed.2d 493 (1967); Monroe v. State, 671 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex.App. –San Antonio 1984, no pet.). Thus, he concludesthe appeal is fri volou s. In comp lian ce with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Cr.A pp. 1978), counsel has candidly discussed why, under the controlling authorities, there is no error in the trial court's judg ment. Counsel has also show n thathe sent a copy of the brief to appel lant and informed appel lantthat, in counsel's view , the appeal is without merit. In addition, counsel has demonstr ated that he notified appellant of his right toreview th e record and fil e a pro se response if he des ired to do so. Appellant did not file a res pons e. N eith er d id t he State favor us w ith a br ief. We have made an independ ent revie w of the entire r

ecord to determi ne whether there are any arguable grounds w hich might s upport an appeal. See Penson v. O hio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988 ); Bledsoe v . St ate, 178 S.W.3d 8243

(Tex.Cr.A pp. 2005). We have found no su ch grounds an d agree w ith counsel th at the appeal is frivolous. Acco rdin gly, counsel's moti on to withdr aw is her

eby granted an d the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Don H. Reavis Justice Do not publish .
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the CardioDynamics International
Corporation (the Company) Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended November 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Michael K. Perry, Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |                        
|----------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: February 27, 2004 |  | /s/    MICHAEL K.
PERRY
|                        |  | Michael K. Perry       
|                        |  | Chief Executive Officer
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 198 (Friday, October 10, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 60235]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-24131]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Forest Service


Notice of New Fee Site; Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act 
(Title VIII, Pub. L. 108-447)

AGENCY: Chattahoochee-Oconee National Forests, USDA Forest Service.

ACTION: Notice of New Fee Site.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Chattahoochee-Oconee National Forests is planning to 
charge a $5 per site per night fee for overnight camping at Hickey Gap 
Campground. The fees listed are only proposed and will be determined 
upon further analysis and public comment. This campground has five 
campsites and has been available for camping use prior to this date. 
Campgrounds on the Chattahoochee-Oconee National Forests have shown 
that people appreciate and enjoy the availability of outdoor camping 
facilities. Funds from the campground will be used for the continued 
operation and maintenance of Hickey Gap Campground.

DATES: Hickey Gap Campground will start charging fees in March, 2009.

ADDRESSES: Forest Supervisor, Chattahoochee-Oconee National Forests, 
1755 Cleveland Highway, Gainesville, GA 30501.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karen McKenzie, Public Affairs 
Officer, 770-297-3061.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Recreation Lands Enhancement Act 
(Title VII, Pub. L. 108-447) directed the Secretary of Agriculture to 
publish a six month advance notice in the Federal Register whenever new 
recreation fee areas are established. This new fee will be reviewed by 
a Recreation Resource Advisory Committee prior to a final decision and 
implementation.
    The Chattahoochee-Oconee National Forests currently has thirty-five 
other campgrounds. These campgrounds have a total of 675 campsites; 23 
campgrounds are operated by concessionaires. A business analysis of 
Hickey Gap Campground has shown that people desire having this sort of 
recreation experience on the Chattahoochee-Oconee National Forests. A 
market analysis indicates that the $5 per site per night fee is both 
reasonable and acceptable for this sort of unique recreation 
experience.

    Dated: October 6, 2008.
Paul L. Bradley,
Acting Forest Supervisor, Chattahoochee-Oconee National Forests.
 [FR Doc. E8-24131 Filed 10-9-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-11-M
#### UNION INDEMNITY CO. v. F. D. HARVEY & CO.

No. 4457.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

Jan. 3, 1934.

For former opinion, see 148 So. 501.

Boyd K. Watson, of Marion, for appellant.

H. W. Ayres, of Jonesboro, for appellee.

DREW, Judge.

This case is before us on rehearing. After a careful reconsideration of the ease, we are convinced that the former judgment of this court is correct, and it is therefore reinstated and made the opinion of the court.

In the former opinion of this court, the court said, on page 502 of 148 So.: “Plaintiff has not filed brief in this court. Its brief in the district court is in the record, and from this we believe we are able to appreciate its theory of the case, but feel certain our labors would have been much less had plaintiff fully briefed its side of the case in this court.”

In fairness to the attorney for plaintiff, we wish to state that his brief was filed in due time and was misplaced. With that knowledge in mind after rendition of the former opinion, we felt it was necessary to grant a rehearing in order to correct the former misstatement in regard to brief of plaintiff’s attorney, and also to recheck the figures upon which the judgment was based.

We find no error in the former judgment, and same is reinstated and the judgment is affirmed.
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Magistrate Judge David L. West

Criminal No. 11-PO-01133-DLW

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

1. CAMERON JORDAN McARTHUR,

Defendant.

 

MINUTE ORDER RESCHEDULING MOTIONS HEARING

 

ORDER ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID L. WEST

This case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge David L. West on October 11, 2011. Currently

there is a motions hearing scheduled for November 23, 2011 at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom C201 in

Denver, Colorado. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions hearing scheduled for November 23, 2011

at 9:30 a.m. is VACATED and RESCHEDULED before Magistrate Judge David L. West on

November 4, 2011 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 601, 901 19th Street, Denver, Colorado.

DATED: October 14, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

s/David L. West 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 1:11-po-01133-DW Document 20 Filed 10/14/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02680-RBJ-KLM

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MERCK & CO., INC., and

MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________________________________________

MINUTE ORDER

_____________________________________________________________________

ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply

[Docket No. 21; Filed on February 13, 2012] (the “Motion”). On February 3, 2012,

Defendants filed a Motion to Submit Supplemental Authority [#17] in connection with

Plaintiff’s pending Motion to Proceed Anonymously [#2]. Defendants did not submit any

new evidence or additional legal argument in their motion; they simply submitted a copy of

one additional state-law opinion from New Jersey. See Ex. A [#17-1]. The Court granted

the Motion to Submit Supplemental Authority on February 9, 2012. See Minute Order

[#19]. 

As Plaintiff himself cites, “Generally, the nonmoving party should be given an

opportunity to respond to new material raised for the first time in the movant’s reply.”

Motion [#21] at 2 (quoting Green v. New Mexico, 420 F.3d 1189, 1196-97 (10th Cir. 2005)).

However, “material” includes new evidence and new legal arguments. See id. (citing

Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1139 n.13 (10th Cir, 2003)). Because

Defendants have only submitted supplemental authority without providing new evidence

or raising new legal arguments,

 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED. 

Dated: February 15, 2012

Case 1:11-cv-02680-RBJ-KLM Document 23 Filed 02/15/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
| Skip to Content*Release Date: June 8, 2006*Release dates |  Coded tables |  Historical dataCurrent release |  Screen reader |  PDF (450 KB)**F.4 Credit Market Borrowing, All Sectors, by Instrument** |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 7041

HARRY BROCKWELL , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria

. T.S. Ellis , III, Senior District Judge. ( 1:19

- cv - 00740

- TSE

- JFA )

Submitted : October 15, 2019 Decided: October 18, 2019

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and THACKER and RUSHING , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. Harry Brockwell , Appellant Pro Se

. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Harry Brockwell appeal s the district court’s order construing his “Motion for a Void Judgment AB Initio” as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition and dismissing it as successive and unauthorized. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error . Accordingly,

we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. Brockwell v. Virginia , No. 1:19

- cv - 00740

- TSE

- JFA (E.D. Va. June 26, 2019). We deny a s unnecessary a certificate of appealability. See Harbison v. Bell , 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009); United S tates v. McRae , 793 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2015). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7297

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ANTHONY CHERRY, a/k/a Pops,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:07-cr-00040-RLV-DSC-1)

Submitted: December 13, 2012 Decided: December 18, 2012

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Anthony Cherry, Appellant Pro Se. Steven R. Kaufman, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Michael Anthony Cherry appeals a district court order 

denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c) (2006). The district court found Cherry was not 

eligible for a reduction under the recent amendments to the 

Sentencing Guidelines because his sentence was based, not on a 

quantity of crack cocaine, but on his career offender status. 

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Cherry’s motion for a sentence reduction. United 

States v. Goines, 357 F.3d 469, 478 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating 

standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court’s order. We deny Cherry’s motion for appointment of 

counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 40937

STATE OF IDAHO ,

Plaintiff-Respondent ,

v.

JOSEPH NELSON CORTEZ ,

Defendant-Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 522

Filed: May 23, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN U NPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Boise County. Hon. Patrick H. Owen , District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years , for felony driving under the influence

, affirmed

.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley , Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________
Before LANSING, Judge; GRATTON, Judge; and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Joseph Nelson Cortez pled guilty to felony driving under the influence . Idaho Code

§ § 18

- 8004, 18

- 8005(9) . The district court sentenced Cortez to a unified term of ten years, with

a minimum period of confinement of two years

. Cortez appeals asserting that the district court

abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence

. Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of r eview and the

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 114, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

- 15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 44 7, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.

1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing2 the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Cortez ’s judgmen t of conviction and sentence are affirmed.