### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 27, 200 4, a t K noxv ill e
STEV EN DOU GLA S TU TT v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Marshall County No. 13123 Charles Lee , Judge

No. M2003- 01168-CCA -R3-C O - F iled Septem ber 14, 2004

The de fendant, Steven Doug las Tutt, a ppeals the Marsha ll County Circuit Court’ s order that retire d his mot ionfo r e xpun g e me nt. We d ism iss theapp e a l.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al D ism iss e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined. Steven Doug las Tutt, Appellant, Pro Se

. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; and J ennife r L

. Ble dsoe, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

OnF e br ua ry 28 , 2 00 3, Ste ve n D ou g la s T utt pe tit ion e d th e Ma

rs ha ll Coun ty

Cir c uit Court in writing for

entry of an or der, pur suant to Code section 40-32- 101, direc ting the expungeme nt of all public rec ords re lated to three counts of ag g ravated sexual battery that had bee n dis mis se d a s p art

of a ple a a g re e me nt wi th the state , in e xch a ng e fo r the pe tit ion e r’ s g uil ty ple a to a sin g le c ha

rg e of a g g ra vate d se xua l batte ry
. Th e re c or d b e fo reus c on ta ins the jud g me nts fo r tho se counts, which we re e ntere d in J uly 1997, and it appea

rs undisputed that Counts 2, 3, and 4 of Ma rs ha ll Co un ty Ca se No . 131 23 we re , inde e d, dis mis se d in con ne c tio n with the pe tit ion e r’ s g uil ty plea to Count 1 and sentenc ing to f ifteen y ear s’ incar cer ation.

Fr om the rec ord, it also appea rs that appr ox imately one mont h afte r the e x pung ement petition was filed, the tria l judge enter ed, on Marc h 24, 2003, the following “Or der Plac ing Motion On The Retire d Docke t”:

This matter wa s hear d on the 19th day of Marc h, 2003 upon
a pro s e mot ionon be ha lf of the [pe tit ion er] for

e xpun g e me nt. I t is-2- here by Orde red that this m atter sha ll b e plac ed upon the r etired do c ke t su bject

to r e c a ll w he n [th e pe tit ion e r] c a n a pp e ar i n c ou rt

to prese nt his mot ion.

I t is furth er Or d er ed that the c lerk of the Court shall send a
c op y of th is ord e r t o th e de fe nd a nt at th e a dd re ss l ist e d u po n s a id motion. Responding to the su a s

po nte retire ment of his pe tition, the petitioner f iled a motion on April 1, 2003, asking the trial court to rescind its order and g rant the r equeste d relief . I n that motion, the petitioner arg ued that the c ourt had no d i s cr eti on to deny his request to expunge the public rec ords of the dismissed cha rg es. I n addition, the petit ioner filed a sepa rate motion seeking to s e t a he ari ng date on his orig ina l pe tit ionfo r e xpun g e me nt. Evidently , no action wa s taken on the petitioner’s pleading s filed in A pril. Then, on Ma y 14 , 200 3, the pe tit ion e r fi le d a ple a din g e nti tle d “ No tic e of Ap pe a l,” in w hic h h e a sse rt e d h is rig ht to take a direct appeal from “the final judgme nt entere d in this action on the 19th day of Mar ch, 2003.” Ag ainst this procedura l backg round, the matter is now befor e this court for dispositi on.
B e fo re us , t he pe tit ion e r a pp e ars pro s e , a ndhe a

rg ue s th a t th e re tir e me nt o f h is petition to ex pung e public re cords wa s a de facto de nia l of the pe tit ion , f ro m w hic h h e is e nti tle d to relief as a matter of law . The pe ti t i o n er as ks this court to rever se the judg ment of the trial c ourt placing the petition on the re tired docke t and to rema nd the matter w ith inst ructions to expunge the rele vant public re cords. The state arg ues that the trial court’s order placing the expunge ment petition on the re tired docke t is not a final appe alable judg ment and that a w rit of c e rti or ar i is n ot a

pp ro pria te i n a s m u c h a s t h e tr i a l c o u r td i d n o ta c ti l l e g a l l y.

We ag ree with the state th at the orde r re leg ating the expunge ment petition to the retire d docket is not a fina l or appe alable judg ment. Tenne ssee Appe llate Proce dure Rul e 3(b)
enumer ates those situations in which a de fendant in a criminal ac tion may appea l as of rig ht. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). A def

endant may

appea l as of rig ht from a judg ment of conviction upon a plea of not g uilty , in certain circ umstances in which there ha s been a plea of g uiltyor nolo contende re, “ from
an order denying or revoking probation, and from a f inal judgme nt in a criminal conte mpt, habeas corpus, e x tradition, or post-conviction proc eeding .” Id .; se e als o Sta te ex re l. Un de rwo od v . B ro wn , 193 Tenn. 113, 244 S.W.2d 168 (1951) (re jecting defe ndant’s a

rg ument that entry

of an or der pla cing his c a se on re tir e d doc ke t ope rate d as d ism iss a l; r uli ng that w he n c a se is p la c e d o n r e tir e d d oc ke t, c ou rt “ in no way

say s th a t c a se is d ism iss e d o r w ill no t be fu rthe r p ro se c ute d” ); Ma so n v. Sta te , 169 Tenn. 52, 82 S.W.2d 862 (1935) (bec ause order that retire d a murder pr osecution ag ainst defe ndant did not adjudicate any thing and beca use no disposition was made of the cause , d ef en d an t d i d not have any thing f

rom which to appe al).

Mo re ov e r, e ve n if

theru le s auth orize d u s to tr e a t the re tir e me nt of his pe tit iona s a de facto denial of the petiti o n , ap p el l ate review a s a matter of rig ht is, nonetheless, inappropriate.-3-

F ir st o f a ll, we no te that th e pe tit ion e r’ s n oti c e of app e a l w a s u nti me ly , h a vin g be e n f ile d w e ll bey ond the 30-day time w indow of Appe llate Proce dure Rule 4( a), and there being no showing that the i ntere sts of j ustice would be served by waiving a ti mely filing. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) . On
a more fundame ntal level, in S t a t e v. Adler , 92 S.W .3d 397 (Tenn. 2002) , the Supreme Court specific ally

held, “B eca

use of the plain and unambig uous lang uag e of [Appellate Procedur e] Rules 3(b) and 3(c) , we c onclude that ne ither the State nor a criminal defendant has the authority to appea l as of right an unfavor able r uling c oncerning an expungeme nt order unde r Rule 3.” Id . at 401. The inquiry

does not end, howe ver. The final question is whether to permit the appe al to proce ed as a

petition for a writ of c e rti or ar i , as the Supreme Court did in Adler when it hea

rd the
s t ate’ s appea l that the trial court e rrone ously g rante d an orde r of e x pung ement. Se e id . at 401-03 (disag ree ing w ith the s tate and holding that de fendant convicted of lesser- included off

ense is entitled to have r ecor d expunged of any g reater off

ense f or which jury

returne d not guilty

verdic t).

The c ommon law writ of c e rti or ar i has been codified in Te nnessee Code Annotated
se c tio n 2 7- 8- 10 1 ( 20 00 ). Th a t se c tio n p ro vid e s:

T h e wr it of c e rti or

ar i may be g rante d whene ver authorized by law, and als o ina ll c a s e s w h e r e a n in f e r io r trib u n a l, b o ar d , o r

o f f ic er exercising judicial functions has exceede d the j urisdiction confe rre d, or is acting illega lly , when, in the judg ment of the c ourt, there is no oth e r plain, sp e e dy , o r a de qu a te re me dy . T his se c tio n d oe s n ot a pp ly to actions g overne d by

the Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 8-101 (2000) . “Ge nera lly , the writ of c e rti or ar i is limit ed in application and do e s n ot n orma ll y li e to in quir e int o th e c or re c tne ss o f a

jud g me nt i ssu e d b y

a c ou rt wi th jurisdiction.” Adler , 92 S.W .3d at 401. Even so, “an appe llate court is withi n its province” to g rant the writ whe n the trial court’s action is without leg al authority

. Id

.

Un fo rtun a te ly

fo r the pe tit ion e r in this c a se , th e a c tio n ta ke n b y the tria l c ou rt

wa s to place his ex pung ement petition on the retired docket. The petiti on, thus, has been ne ither g rante d nor denie d. We are not awa re that a trial court acts illega lly or without leg al authority when it place s a matter on the re tired d o ck et

. According ly and in contra st with the situation i n Adler , we do not believe that the petitioner’s c omplaint should proceed a s a petition for a writ of c e rti or

ar i

. That said, we do not believe that the petit ioner is without rec ourse. Rule 11 of the Rules of the Suprem e Court of the State of Tenne ssee pr ovides for the Supreme Court’s “Supervision of the Judicial Sy stem

. ” Section I I I (c) of Rule 11 prohibits case s being held under advisement in ex cess of

60 day s, “abse nt the most compelling of r easons,” and per mits t he filing of

“ A M oti on To Re nd e r De c isi on ” wi th the pr e sid ing jud g e a nd /or c ir c uit jus tic e “ se tti ng ou t th e fa c ts said to c onstitut e a failure to c omply with this rule.” Sup. Ct. R. 11, § I I I (c)

. Afte r t h e p et i t i o ner obtains a ruling on his expungeme nt petition, then any revie w soug ht by

the state or the petitioner can pr ocee d as envisioned in Adler . I n the meantime, be cause the lower court’s or der did not-4-

adjudicate anything and beca use no disposition was made of the c ause, the petitioner has nothing fr om w hic h to app e a l, andwe , a c c or din g ly , d ism iss thi s a pp e a l.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE