alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Natrol, Inc. (the “Company”)for the period ended June 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, in the capacityand on the date listed below, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, that:

(1)                                  thereport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), asapplicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)                                  Theinformation contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

ThisCertification shall not be deemed part of the report or “filed” for any purposewhatsoever, nor shall it be deemed incorporated by reference into any filingunder the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
| Date: August 14, 2006 |                                             |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
|                  | /s/ Dennis R. Jolicoeur                          |   |
|                  | Dennis R. Jolicoeur                              |
|                  | Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Executive |
|                  | Vice President (Principal Financial Officer)     |

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<PAGE>








<ARTICLE>                       5
<MULTIPLIER>                    1,000
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           3,256
<SECURITIES>                                     1,379
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,131<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      8,809
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                18,950
<PP&E>                                          29,989
<DEPRECIATION>                                  15,973
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  33,294
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,456
<BONDS>                                          3,211
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            41
<OTHER-SE>                                      24,897
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    33,294
<SALES>                                         16,926
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                16,926
<CGS>                                           11,114
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   15,188
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 199
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,639
<INCOME-TAX>                                       587
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,052
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,052
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.27

<FN>
<F1>note: receivables shown net of allowance of 345
</FN>





</TABLE>
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10** 
**- 1783** 

EUNICE ARHIN, a/k/a Eunice Akua Ahrin , Petitioner ,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General , Respondent

.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted : April 11, 2011 Decided: April 20, 2011

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Petition d enied in part ; dismiss ed in part by un published per curiam opinion

.

Jay S. Marks, MARKS, CALDERON, DERWIN & RA CINE, PLC, Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, Liza S. Murcia, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublish ed opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Eunice Arhin, a native and citizen of Ghana, petitions
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board) denying her motion to reconsider. We review t he denial

of m oti on s to reconsider for abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(a) (2010); Narine v. Holder , 559 F.3d 246, 249 (4th
Cir. 2009); Jean v. Gonzales , 435 F.3d 475, 481 (4th Cir. 2006).
To succeed on a motion to reconsider, the movant must specify an

error of fa ct or law in the Board’s prior decision. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2010)

. We have reviewed the administrative record and Arhin’s

contentions and conclude that the Board did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to reconsider. Accordingly, w e deny the petition for review in part for the reasons stated by

the Board. See In re: Arhin (B.I.A. June 17 , 2010). To the
extent that Arhin challenges the Board’s orders of July 15,

2008 , and February 11, 2009, we note that she failed to file
timely pe tition s for revie w of those orders. We therefore
dismiss the petition for review in part with respect to those
claims. Finally, we dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the3 materials before th e court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

PETITION DENIED IN PART ; DISMISSED IN PART
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

WALTER BRANUM and KAREN )

BRANUM, )

Appellants, )

 )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-3706

)

PAT FRANK, as Clerk of the )

Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, )

Florida, ) 

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed February 8, 2019. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Hillsborough County; Emmett L. Battles, 

Judge.

Arthur Barksdale, IV and Philip D. 

Storey, of Alvarez, Winthrop, Thompson 

& Storey, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants.

David M. Caldevilla of de la Parte & 

Gilbert, P.A., Tampa; Dale K. Bohner, 

General Counsel, Tampa; and Shelby K. 

Russ, Staff Attorney, Tampa, for Appellee 

Pat Frank, as Clerk of the Circuit Court

for Hillsborough County. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
- 2 -

MORRIS and BLACK, JJ., and CASE, JAMES R., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE, 

Concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Honorable R. Brooke Jackson

Civil Action No. 11-CV-02699-RBJ-BNB

PAULA PALMER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN GOOD SAMARITAN SOCIETY,

Defendant.

ORDER TO SET SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. The parties are ordered to set an initial 

scheduling conference in this Court (with Judge Jackson) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and 

D.C.COLO.LCivR 16.1 no later than 45 days after all responsive pleadings are filed. Each 

party’s lead trial counsel shall attend the conference. The conference shall be held in Courtroom 

A-702, Alfred A. Arraj U.S. Courthouse, 901 19th Street, Denver, Colorado. The parties are 

directed to jointly contact Mary DeRosa by telephone at (303) 844-4694 or by email at 

Jackson_Chambers@cod.uscourts.gov to obtain a scheduling conference date. 

A meeting for the purposes of attempting to agree on a scheduling order and satisfying 

the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) should be held no later than 21 days before the 

proposed scheduling order is tendered. The proposed scheduling order, which should be 

prepared as described in Appendix F to the local rules, should be tendered no later than five days 

before the scheduling conference. The proposed scheduling order should set forth the parties’

agreement or their respective positions on the matters set forth in Appendix F. A copy of 

instructions for the preparation of a scheduling order and a form scheduling order can be 

downloaded from the Court’s website (http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Forms.aspx).

DATED this 18th day of October, 2011.

BY THE COURT: 

___________________________________

R. Brooke Jackson

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02699-RBJ Document 4 Filed 10/18/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

BETHLEHEM AUTHORITY

v.

THE ZONING HEARING BOARD OF PENN

FOREST TOWNSHIP

PETITION OF: PENN FORREST TOWNSHIP :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 150 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court

ATLANTIC WIND, LLC

v.

ZONING HEARING BOARD OF PENN

FOREST TOWNSHIP

PETITION OF: PENN FORREST TOWNSHIP :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 151 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court

ATLANTIC WIND, LLC

v.

PENN FOREST TOWNSHIP ZONING

HEARING BOARD

PETITION OF: PENN FORREST TOWNSHIP :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 152 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court[ 150 MAL 2022, 151 MAL 2022, 152 MAL 2022 and 153 MAL 2022 ]

- 2

BETHLEHEM AUTHORITY

v.

PENN FOREST TOWNSHIP ZONING

HEARING BOARD

PETITION OF: PENN FORREST TOWNSHIP :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 153 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 27th day of September, 2022

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
Case 1:11-cv-02554-RM-MEH Document 5 Filed 10/24/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 4
Case 1:11-cv-02554-RM-MEH Document 5 Filed 10/24/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 4
Case 1:11-cv-02554-RM-MEH Document 5 Filed 10/24/11 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 4
Case 1:11-cv-02554-RM-MEH Document 5 Filed 10/24/11 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

an Illinois corporation,

 Plaintiff-counter-defendantcross-defendant - Appellee,

 v.

RICHARD PIRA,

 Defendant,

ANDREW PIRA,

 Defendant-cross-defendant,

 And

ALEXANDER YIN,

 Defendant-counter-claimantcross-claimant - Appellant.

No. 13-15991

D.C. No. 4:11-cv-03511-CW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Claudia Wilken, Senior District Judge, Presiding

FILED

JUN 25 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Argued and Submitted June 12, 2015

San Francisco, California

Before: SCHROEDER, IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Defendant Alexander Yin appeals the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Company. Yin also appeals the

district court’s dismissal of his claim that Allstate breached the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing by unreasonably refusing to indemnify Richard and

Andrew Pira and pay Yin benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we affirm.

The district court did not err in concluding that Richard Pira was not an

“insured person” under Erlinda Ipac’s insurance policy for the Peabody street

property because Richard Pira did not live in the same “household” as Ipac. Under

California law, “the term ‘household’ is unambiguous.” Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exch.,

227 Cal. App. 3d 584, 591, 594 (1991). It is undisputed that Richard Pira and Ipac

did not live “under one roof or within a common curtilage” at the time that Andrew

Pira shot Yin, and therefore Richard Pira did not live in Ipac’s “household,” as

defined by California law.1 See id.

1

To the extent Yin suggests Allstate should have included Richard Pira as a

named insured on the policy, there is no such claim before us.

2
Even if the district court erred when it dismissed Yin’s claim that Allstate

breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, any error would be

harmless because Yin “cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him . . . to

relief.” Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 61. Richard Pira was not covered by Ipac’s policy because he was not a

member of her household, and Yin does not challenge the district court’s

determination that Andrew Pira was not covered by the policy because his actions

were intentional. Therefore, because Yin had no right to payment from Allstate,

“there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.” Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 1, 36 (1995). Any error by

the district court was thus harmless. 

AFFIRMED.

3
| Skip to Content*Release Date: June 8, 2006*Release dates |  Coded tables |  Historical dataCurrent release |  Screen reader |  PDF (450 KB)**F.208 Open Market Paper** |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 198 / Friday, October 10, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 60191 

[FR Doc. E8–24177 Filed 10–7–08; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 3510–22–C 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

50 CFR Part 660 

[Docket No. 0809301285-81289-01] 

RIN 0648–AX31 

Fisheries Off West Coast States; 

Coastal Pelagic Species Fisheries; 

Reporting Requirements and 

Conservation Measures 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Final rule; notice of 

effectiveness of information collection. 

SUMMARY: NMFS is announcing that the 

information collection and reporting 

requirement was approved by the Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB). 

DATES: The information collection 

requirements in 50 CFR 660.520 are 

effective November 10, 2008. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Joshua Lindsay, Southwest Region, 

NMFS, (562) 980–4034. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 

30, 2007, NMFS published a final rule 

(72 FR 29891) implementing new 

reporting requirements and 

conservation measures under the 

Coastal Pelagic Species (CPS) Fishery 

Management Plan (FMP). This final rule 

contained information collection 

requirements that at the time of 

publication had not yet been approved 

by OMB. This included the requirement 

to report any interactions that may 

occur between a CPS vessel and/or 

fishing gear and sea otters. The final 

rule stated that NMFS would publish a 

subsequent Federal Register notice 

announcing the effectiveness of those 

requirements. Therefore NMFS 

announces that OMB approved the 

collection of information requirements 

contained in the May 30, 2007, final 

rule under Control Number 0648-0566 

with an expiration date of August 31, 

2010. 

Authority: 16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. 

Dated: October 7, 2008. 

Samuel D. Rauch III, 

Deputy Assistant Administrator For 

Regulatory Programs, National Marine 

Fisheries Service. 

[FR Doc. E8–24201 Filed 10–9–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–22–S 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULESER10OC08.038</GPH>
178 La. 109

#### Succession of MARKHAM.

No. 32411.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 30, 1933.

Lee, Gilmer & Lee, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Herndon & Herndon, of Shreveport, for appellee.

O’NIELL, Chief Justice.

The appellee has moved-to dismiss the sus-pensive appeal in this case on the ground that the appeal bond was filed after the expiration of ten days from the date on which the judgment was signed. In fact, there are two such appeals, and the motion is to dismiss both of them.

It is true that the appeal bond was filed after the expiration of ten days from the date on which the judgment was signed; but the judgment was signed before the expiration of the time allowed by law for the filing of a motion for a new trial, or for a rehearing ; and a motion for a rehearing was filed within the time allowed, though after the judgment was signed. The appeal bond was filed within ten days from the date on which the motion for a rehearing was overruled.

When a judgment has been signed before the expiration of the time allowed by law for the filing of a motion for a new trial, or for a rehearing, and a motion for a new trial or for a rehearing is filed within the time allowed therefor, and thereafter is overruled, the ten.days in which a suspen-sive appeal may be taken are counted, not from the date of the signing of the judgment, but from the date of the overruling of the motion for a new trial, or for a rehearing, as the case may be. State ex rel. Wellman v. Bell, Judge, 142 La. 662, 77 So. 493; Herold v. Jefferson, 172 La. 315, 134 So. 104.

The motion to dismiss is overruled.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02357-WYD-MEH

CS CAPITAL CORP. d/b/a THE INVOICE BANKERS CORP.,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOCAL SENIOR SERVICES and

RANDY KALANI FAHILGA,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for More Definite

Statement, filed September 7, 2011 [ECF No. 7]. A response in opposition to the

motion was filed on September 21, 2011, and a reply was filed on October 5, 2011. 

In their motion and reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s complaint is so

vague and ambiguous that Defendants cannot reasonably anticipate the claims being

made against them. Defendants assert that the complaint does not specify particular

legal claims or necessary facts upon which claims might be based. In its response,

Plaintiff states that as currently plead this case is a commercial collection action for

breach of contract.

In relevant part, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) states that a “party may

move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is

allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a

response. The motion . . . must point out the defects complained of and the details

Case 1:11-cv-02357-WYD-MEH Document 18 Filed 10/13/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
-2-

desired.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “[A] motion for more definite statement is generally

discouraged unless the pleading is so unintelligible that defendants do not understand

the allegation and are unable to respond.” Runyan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 566

F.Supp. 600, 608 (D. Colo. 1983). In a broad spectrum of contract cases, a plaintiff 

“should not be required to plead details about the terms of the contract . . .; as long as

the defendant has reasonable notice of the plaintiff’s contract based claim, [a] motion for

a more definite statement will be denied.” 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1377 (3d ed. 1998).

After carefully considering the motion, response, and reply, I find that the Motion

for More Definite Statement should be denied. 

Based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that the Motion for More Definite Statement filed September 7, 2011

[ECF No. 7], is DENIED.

Dated: October 13, 2011

BY THE COURT:

s/ Wiley Y. Daniel 

Wiley Y. Daniel

Chief United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02357-WYD-MEH Document 18 Filed 10/13/11 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 99.02

                Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

                             As Adopted Pursuant to

                  Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of iGate Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael Zugay,
Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. (S) 1350, as adopted pursuant to (S) 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ Michael Zugay
______________________________
Michael Zugay
Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer



November 12, 2002

     This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
     Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by
     the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes
     of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02765-WJM-BNB

DALIP BASANTI,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY METCALF, M.D.,

JASON ROZESKI, M.D.,

PLATTE VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, and

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

______________________________________________________________________________

This matter arises on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order [Doc. # 101, filed

2/5/2013]. Following a hearing yesterday, I made rulings on the record which are incorporated

here.

The parties have agreed to pay a reasonable rate for travel time incurred by Dr. Huffman

in appearing in Colorado for his deposition. No relief is requested from me in connection with

that agreement. 

I am not aware of any authority allowing me to require a party to compensate a local

expert for travel time to appear at a lawyer’s office for deposition, and I will not require such

payment. 

The parties have encountered a problem concerning whether an expert should be paid for

time reserved for a deposition or only for the time actually expended in conducting the

deposition. To resolve the dispute, I will require that any party intending to examine another

Case 1:11-cv-02765-PAB-NYW Document 115 Filed 02/20/13 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
2

party’s expert provide in advance of the deposition an estimate of the amount of time of

examination. The party examining must pay the expert for the greater of the time reserved or the

time of examination.

In addition, at the parties’ request the case schedule is modified to the following extent:

Discovery Cut-Off: May 20, 2013.

(All discovery must be completed by the discovery cut-off. All

written discovery must be served so that responses are due on or

before the discovery cut-off.)

Dispositive Motions Deadline: June 20, 2013.

 Expert Disclosures:

(a) The defendants shall designate all experts and

rebuttal experts and provide opposing counsel with

all information specified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)

on or before March 1, 2013.

(b) The plaintiff shall designate all rebuttal experts and

provide opposing counsel with all information

specified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) on or before

March 28, 2013. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated February 21, 2013.

BY THE COURT:

 s/ Boyd N. Boland 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02765-PAB-NYW Document 115 Filed 02/20/13 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2