J-S17041-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BERNARD SALMOND 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2201 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0009618-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 5, 2024

Appellant, Bernard Salmond, appeals pro se from the post-conviction 

court’s August 11, 2023 order dismissing his second, untimely petition filed 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After 

careful review, we affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the facts of Appellant’s case, as follows:

On April 10, 2008, Kenneth Wiggins and Appellant’s brother, 

Quentin Salmond,

1 (“Quentin”), were betting on a game of dice. 

During the betting, there was an altercation over a bet which 

prompted Wiggins to take money from Quentin. 

1 As Quentin Salmond and [Appellant] share the same last 

name, Quentin Salmond will be referred to by his first name 

in order to prevent confusion. Quentin was also known as 

“Q[.”] 

Two days later, on April 12, 2008, at approximately 12:30 p.m., 

Wiggins went into the Skyline Restaurant, which he was known to 

frequent. As Wiggins entered the restaurant, a car driven by 

[Appellant], with Quentin and Jamil Banks as passengers, pulled 

up and parked on Woodlawn Road, near the intersection with 
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Chew Road. [Appellant] was driving a blue Lincoln Continental, 

with PA license plate GXW5380. Quentin, dressed in an Islamic 

khimar[1] and sunglasses to hide his identity, and Banks exited the 

vehicle and walked up the street towards the Skyline Restaurant. 

[Appellant] remained in the car, parked, with the engine running. 

Joan Hill witnessed [Appellant] park the car and also noticed 

Quentin, who appeared to Hill to be a male wearing female 

headwear. Believing that a robbery was about to happen, Hill 

called 911. 

Quentin remained outside the restaurant while Banks went inside 

and purchased a soda, presumably scouting for Wiggins. Banks 

then exited the restaurant and returned to where Quentin was 

standing outside. Shortly thereafter, Wiggins left the restaurant 

and began walking up the street when he was confronted by 

Quentin and Banks. During this confrontation, Quentin shot 

Wiggins once in the chest. After being shot, Wiggins attempted 

to flee the scene but collapsed on the far side of the street. 

Quentin and Banks ran back to the car in which [Appellant] was 

waiting, and the three fled the scene. Medical personnel arrived 

on scene and transported Wiggins to the hospital, where he was 

later pronounced dead. 

Police recovered two fired cartridge casings and a Mountain Dew 

soda bottle from the scene of the shooting. Police also recovered 

the surveillance cameras from the Skyline Restaurant, which had 

recorded the entire encounter. A .32 caliber bullet was recovered 

from Wiggins’ body. As the casings found at the scene were not 

.32 caliber, police determined that two guns had been fired 

outside of the restaurant, one .22 caliber semi-automatic and one 

.32 caliber revolver. 

[Appellant] had obtained the car that he used in the murder from 

Charles Hayward, who sold the vehicle to Appellant but never 

transferred the title. Because Appellant feared that police would 

trace the car to him through Hayward, [Appellant] instructed two 

associates, Shawn Pina and Tyree Fisher, to burn the vehicle. The 

vehicle was found on April 14, 2008, two days after the shooting, 

____________________________________________

1 “A khimar is a two-piece garment consisting of a long cape covering the 

entire body and a head covering that also can be pulled up to hide the mouth.” 

Commonwealth v. Salmond, No. 1975 EDA 2019, unpublished 

memorandum at 2 (Pa. Super. filed June 21, 2019). 
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when fire department personnel responded to a report of a vehicle 

fire near Chew Street and 10th Street in Philadelphia. 

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 11/14/23, at 4-5 (footnotes and citations to the 

record omitted).

Pertinent to the claims raised by Appellant herein, we also note that, in 

disposing of a recent appeal filed by Quentin, this Court mentioned that,

[o]n January 13, 2010, Robert Bluefort told police about three 

weeks after the murder, [Quentin] confessed to him that he shot 

Wiggins. According to [Quentin], he had to shoot or be shot. 

[Appellant] told Bluefort that the police had questioned Hayward 

because the car that was used in the murder was in his name. 

Bluefort and [Appellant] then discussed burning the vehicle. 

[Appellant] stayed with Bluefort for about a month after the 

murder.

Commonwealth v. Quentin Salmond, No. 3037 EDA 2022, unpublished 

memorandum at 2 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 24, 2023), appeal denied, 2024 WL 

684992 (Pa. Feb. 20, 2024).

The PCRA court also provided the following procedural history of 

Appellant’s case:

On March 21, 2014, following a jury trial before this [c]ourt, 

[Appellant] ... was convicted of one count each of murder of the 

third degree (18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c)) and conspiracy to commit 

murder (18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 2502). On June 20, 2014, the [c]ourt 

imposed an aggregate sentence of 18 to 36 years[’] incarceration 

in state prison. [Appellant] timely appealed, and the Superior 

Court affirmed [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence on November 

16, 2015. The Supreme Court denied allocatur on March 16, 

2016. [See Commonwealth v. Salmond, 134 A.3d 493 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, No. 

661 EAL 2015 (Pa. 2016).] 

On September 8, 2016, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition under 

the PCRA (“First Petition”). David Rudenstein, Esquire[,] was 

appointed to represent [Appellant] on July 12, 2017. Mr. 
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Rudenstein filed an amended PCRA petition on January 18, 2018. 

On November 20, 2018, the [c]ourt issued notice, pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its intent to dismiss [Appellant’s] petition

without a hearing (“907 Notice”) because [Appellant’s] petition 

failed to include certifications for his proffered witnesses in 

accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1). On June 21, 2019, the 

[c]ourt formally dismissed [Appellant’s] First Petition.

On July 8, 2019, Mr. Rudenstein filed a motion to withdraw as 

counsel, in which he detailed his efforts to contact witnesses 

proffered in [Appellant’s] First Petition and stated that there was 

no merit to [Appellant’s] claims for collateral relief. The next day, 

on July 9, 2019, [Appellant] filed a pro se notice of appeal to the 

Superior Court (docket number 2051 EDA 2019). On July 12, 

2019, the [c]ourt denied Mr. Rudenstein’s motion to withdraw as 

counsel, and Mr. Rudenstein filed a counseled notice of appeal to 

the Superior Court on behalf of [Appellant] (docket number 1975 

EDA 2019). That same day, the [c]ourt ordered [Appellant] to file 

a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) (“Statement of Errors”) by August 2, 2019. 

On August 23, 2019, Mr. Rudenstein filed a Statement of Errors in

which he stated his intent to file a brief with the Superior Court 

stating that there was no merit to [Appellant’s] claims for 

collateral relief pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 

213 (Pa. Super. 1988)[,] and Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).

On September 16, 2019, Mr. Rudenstein discontinued 

[Appellant’s] duplicative pro se appeal at docket number 2051 

EDA 2019. On October 15, 2019, [Appellant] filed another pro se

notice of appeal (docket number 3069 EDA 2019), along with a 

pro se Statement of Errors. The Superior Court dismissed the 

second pro se appeal as duplicative on January 10, 2020.

Unfortunately, Mr. Rudenstein passed away on April 15, 2020. 

This [c]ourt then appointed Gary S. Server, Esquire to represent 

[Appellant]. The Superior Court struck Mr. Rudenstein’s filings 

and established a new briefing schedule. Mr. Server then filed his 

own petition to withdraw and no-merit brief with the Superior 

Court. On November 16, 2020, the Superior Court affirmed this 

[c]ourt’s June 21, 2019 order dismissing the First Petition and

granted Mr. Server’s motion to withdraw as counsel. [See 

Commonwealth v. Salmond, 242 A.3d 416 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(unpublished memorandum).]
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On September 13, 2022, [Appellant] pro se filed a second PCRA 

petition (“Second Petition”), which is here at issue. The 

Commonwealth filed an answer to [Appellant’s] Second Petition 

on January 20, 2023, to which [Appellant] responded on March 

24, 2023. On April 6, 2023, the [c]ourt issued a notice pursuant 

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent to dismiss [Appellant’s] Second 

Petition without a hearing. [Appellant] then filed a detailed 

response to the [c]ourt’s 907 Notice (“907 Response”) raising 

additional claims on April 19, 2023. On July 7, 2023, the

Commonwealth filed a letter addressing [Appellant]’s response. 

On August 11, 2023, the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s Second 

Petition.

PCO at 1-3.

Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal, and he complied with 

the PCRA court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. The PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on 

November 14, 2023. Herein, Appellant states the following 11 claims for our 

review:

1. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it denied ... [Appellant’s] 

subsequent petition without stating the reasons for denial?

2. Did the [c]ourt err when it failed to recognize ... [Appellant’s] 

governmental interference claim?

3. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it failed to grant [Appellant] an 

evidentiary hearing and/or provide [Appellant] with effective 

assistance of counsel on his ineffective counsel claim?

4. Did the [c]ourt err when it substituted counsel untimely and by 

failing to respond to ... [Appellant’s] motion for new counsel?

5. Did the [c]ourt err when it failed to acknowledge and/or grant 

[Appellant’s] appeal, due to hybrid counsel, where ... [Appellant’s] 

counsel abandoned [Appellant] and violated the [a]ttorney-

[c]lient privilege?

6. Did the [c]ourt err when it denied ... [Appellant’s] First PCRA 

[P]etition without affording ... [Appellant] the opportunity to 

respond to the [c]ourt’s 907 Notice?
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7. Did the [c]ourt err in dismissing ... [Appellant’s] pro se appeals 

to the Superior Court?

8. Did the [c]ourt err in failing to grant [Appellant’s] Second 

Petition when [Appellant] presented newly-discovered evidence?

9. Did the [c]ourt err when it denied ... [Appellant’s] Brady[2] claim 

and governmental interference claim?

10. Did the [c]ourt err when it illegally sentenced [Appellant] and 

when it failed to address his illegal sentence claim in his PCRA 

petition?

11. Did the [PCRA c]ourt err when it failed to address [Appellant’s] 

jury misconduct claim in his PCRA petition?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

In assessing Appellant’s issues, we have reviewed the certified record, 

the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law. Additionally, we have 

examined the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Glenn B. Bronson of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We conclude that Judge 

Bronson’s comprehensive opinion accurately disposes of the issues presented 

by Appellant. However, we also agree with the Commonwealth that it is 

helpful to add the following three, supplemental arguments to Judge Bronson’s 

analysis:

First, as a part of his government interference claim, [Appellant]

suggests that the prison failed to deliver him mail from this Court 

concerning the disposition of his first PCRA appeal. Brief for 

[Appellant] at 15-16. However, the Department of Corrections 

documents he attaches to his brief show that the prison received 

mail from the Superior Court on December 12, 2020, three weeks 

after this Court affirmed the denial of his first PCRA petition. Id., 

at Exhibit B. That document says that the mail was “Delivered by 

Security” but was “Declined/Unable to Sign.” Id. This does not 

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2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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rise to government interference or a new fact to overcome the 

PCRA’s timeliness requirements. Nor does [Appellant] explain 

why it took him two years from that alleged government 

interference to raise the issue in his second PCRA petition. 

Accordingly, this claim does not warrant relief.[3]

Next, [Appellant’s] third through seventh issues all relate to 

alleged ineffectiveness of his first PCRA counsel. Brief for 

[Appellant] at 16-26. He raises all of these claims ostensibly 

through ... Bradley, 261 A.3d [at] 401..., which held that “a PCRA 

petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after 

obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if 

on appeal.” However, as this Court recognized in 

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130 (Pa. Super. 2023), 

Bradley created a prospective rule that does not overcome the 

PCRA’s timeliness requirements. “Nothing in Bradley creates a 

right to file a second PCRA petition outside the PCRA’s one-year 

time limit as a method of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel 

or permits recognition of such a right.” Stahl, 292 A.3d at 1136. 

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3 We note that in his reply brief, Appellant essentially contends that the mail 

was not delivered by the prison due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and not

through any fault of Appellant. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5. However, 

even if Appellant is correct that his mail was not delivered due to an error by 

the prison, he has failed to demonstrate that he acted with due diligence in 

discovering and raising this claim. Notably, the dates of the allegedly 

undelivered mail are July 14, 2020, November 19, 2020, and December 22, 

2020, yet Appellant did not raise this governmental interference claim until 

his Rule 907 response filed on April 19, 2023. He does not explain how, or 

exactly when, he discovered that this mail had not been delivered, or offer 

any discussion of why he could not have realized this fact earlier. 

Furthermore, Appellant does not specifically identify what he believes was in 

that undelivered mail, only cursorily claiming that his failure to receive it

impeded his ability “to appeal his first PCRA to a higher court” in order to

allege the ineffectiveness of his first PCRA counsel(s). However, Appellant 

would not have been permitted to raise, for the first time on appeal to our 

Supreme Court in 2020, the ineffectiveness of his first PCRA counsel. Indeed, 

prior to Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), which was

decided on October 20, 2021, any claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness had 

to be raised in the PCRA court and could not be raised for the first time on 

appeal. See id. at 391-97 (summarizing the then-current law regarding how 

a petitioner must raise PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness).
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Stahl is directly applicable here because [Appellant] is seeking to 

assert the ineffectiveness of his first PCRA counsel through an 

untimely second PCRA petition. Accordingly, the PCRA court 

properly dismissed as untimely all of [Appellant’s] various claims 

of ineffective assistance of his first PCRA counsel.[4]

Finally, [Appellant] argues that the PCRA court erred in failing to 

address his illegal sentence claim. Brief for [Appellant] at 31-34. 

In his appellate brief, he suggests that his sentence somehow 

violates Alleyne v. United States, [570 U.S. 99] (2013), 

because he was charged with murder and conspiracy generally but 

was ultimately convicted of third-degree murder and conspiracy 

to commit third-degree murder. This claim is clearly meritless as 

Alleyne only requires that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt 

any fact that would increase the imposed penalty. [Appellant]

does not point to any such facts that are at issue here. The jury

specifically found [Appellant] guilty of third-degree murder and 

therefore found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.3 [Appellant] also claims that his sentence is illegal because 

conspiracy to commit third-degree murder is not a cognizable 

offense. The PCRA court correctly determined that [Appellant]

failed to raise any exception to assert this untimely claim. [PCO] 

at 21. Moreover, this claim too is plainly meritless, as it is well 

settled that conspiracy to commit third-degree murder is a 

cognizable offense. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186, 

1187 (Pa. 2013).

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4 Appellant does not sufficiently explain how his ineffectiveness claims 

pertaining to his first PCRA counsel meet any timeliness exception. See 

Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (“It is well 

settled that allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome 

the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.”) (citations omitted). 

Indeed, Appellant states that he notified the PCRA court and this Court of the

alleged ineffectiveness of both Attorneys Rudenstein and Server during the 

litigation, and/or appeal from the denial, of his first PCRA petition. See 

Appellant’s Brief at 21. However, the proceedings involving his first PCRA 

petition occurred from September of 2016 to November of 2020, and 

Appellant does not explain why he waited until September of 2022 to file the 

instant petition raising these ineffectiveness claims. Accordingly, even if they 

met one of the exceptions in section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), he cannot prove that 

he raised these claims within one year of discovering them, as required by 

section 9545(b)(2).
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3 [Appellant] also suggests that he was found guilty of 

conspiracy “with multiple objectives.” Brief for [Appellant] 

at 33. It is unclear what he means by this, but his 

sentencing documents do not reflect any increased penalty 

based on the nature of the conspiracy.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 5-7. 

We conclude that Judge Bronson’s comprehensive opinion accurately 

disposes of the issues presented by Appellant, in conjunction with the 

additional, convincing arguments set forth by the Commonwealth.5 

Accordingly, we adopt Judge Bronson’s opinion as our own and affirm the 

order denying Appellant’s second, untimely PCRA petition for the reasons set

forth therein.

Order affirmed.

Date: 7/5/2024

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5 We also note that many of the claims that Appellant raises herein were also 

rejected by this Court in Quentin Salmond’s appeal from the denial of his PCRA 

petition. See Commonwealth v. Quentin Salmond, No. 3037 EDA 2022, 

unpublished memorandum at 1-7.