II 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1700 

To support the establishment of an international regime for the assured 

supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means and to authorize voluntary 

contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency to support 

the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 26, 2007 

Mr. CHAMBLISS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To support the establishment of an international regime for 

the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means 

and to authorize voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonprolifera6 tion Act of 2007’’. 

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1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

2 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents. 

TITLE I—INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY 

OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR PEACEFUL MEANS 

Sec. 101. Findings. 

Sec. 102. Sense of Congress. 

Sec. 103. Statements of policy. 

Sec. 104. Report. 

TITLE II—INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK 

Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations. 

3 TITLE I—INTERNATIONAL RE4 GIME FOR THE ASSURED SUP5 PLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR 

6 PEACEFUL MEANS 

7 SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 

8 Congress makes the following findings: 

9 (1) Since the United States Baruch Plan of 

10 1946, the United States has believed that an in11 crease in the number of countries that possess nu12 clear weapons and the means to create such weapons 

13 makes the world less secure and stable by increasing 

14 the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A 

15 world in which nuclear weapons are used again is 

16 less secure for all concerned, and could well trigger 

17 a global arms race, as more countries will be tempt18 ed to arm themselves with nuclear weapons to premstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

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1 vent attacks by countries that possess nuclear weap2 ons. 

3 (2) It is therefore in the general security inter4 est of all countries, and in the vital national security 

5 interest of the United States, that the number of 

6 countries that possess a nuclear weapons capability 

7 necessarily be kept to a minimum and ultimately re8 duced. 

9 (3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reproc10 essing facilities produce nuclear material that can ei11 ther be used for peaceful purposes in electricity-gen12 erating reactors, or can be used to produce uranium 

13 and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, these 

14 facilities are inherently a proliferation risk, allowing 

15 their possessor to be just months away from the pro16 duction of a nuclear explosive device. 

17 (4) It is also therefore in the general security 

18 interest of all countries that the number of countries 

19 that operate uranium enrichment and spent-fuel re20 processing facilities also be kept to a minimum, con21 sistent with the global demand for nuclear power re22 actor fuel. 

23 (5) The financing and construction of addi24 tional uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocess25 ing facilities in additional countries around the world 

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1 is indefensible on economic grounds alone, given cur2 rent and future supplies of uranium and existing 

3 providers of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel re4 processing services to the world market. 

5 (6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment 

6 and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities by additional 

7 countries, therefore, is often based upon consider8 ations other than economic calculations. The posses9 sion of such facilities is often elevated to a matter 

10 of national pride—a demonstration to the world that 

11 the country that possesses this technology has ar12 rived at a level of technological development com13 parable to that of the United States and other coun14 tries with advanced civil nuclear power programs. 

15 (7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium en16 richment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be 

17 perceived as a demonstration of the developing 

18 world’s independence from technological domination 

19 by the more developed states. Article IV of the Trea20 ty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 

21 done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 

22 1968 (21 UST 483; commonly referred to as the 

23 ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’), 

24 recognizes that State Parties have an ‘‘inalienable 

25 right . . . to develop research, production and use of 

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1 nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without dis2 crimination’’. However, this is a qualified right con3 ditioned by a State Party acting in conformity with 

4 the NPT’s obligation for such countries not to ac5 quire, possess, or develop nuclear weapons or nu6 clear explosive devices. 

7 (8) It has been long recognized that the pro8 liferation of national uranium enrichment and spent9 fuel reprocessing facilities would increase the likeli10 hood of the emergence of new nuclear weapon states. 

11 Concerned governments, nongovernmental organiza12 tions, and individual experts have for decades recog13 nized the need to address this problem through mul14 tilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply of 

15 nuclear fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of 

16 nuclear energy, an international fuel bank to provide 

17 fuel if the fuel supply to a country is disrupted, and 

18 even multilateral participation in international ura19 nium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facili20 ties, as a means of reducing incentives of countries 

21 to develop and construct such facilities themselves. 

22 (9) Until recently, such efforts have produced 

23 little more than reports. However, the revelations of 

24 a nuclear black-market in uranium enrichment tech25 nology and equipment, combined with the attempt 

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1 by North Korea and Iran to possess such technology 

2 and equipment to provide the basis for nuclear 

3 weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with 

4 a new urgency. 

5 (10) Iran has used the specter of a potentially 

6 unreliable international supply of nuclear reactor 

7 fuel as a pretext for developing its own uranium en8 richment and spent-fuel reprocessing capability, 

9 which would enable Iran to also produce weapons10 grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. 

11 (11) Several initiatives have been proposed over 

12 the last year to address these concerns. The United 

13 States has proposed the Global Nuclear Energy 

14 Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a consortium 

15 of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities pro16 viding nuclear fuel services—fresh fuel and recovery 

17 of used fuel—to other countries that agree to em18 ploy nuclear energy only for power generation pur19 poses, without possessing national uranium enrich20 ment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities. 

21 (12) The United States also joined France, the 

22 Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, 

23 and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, in proposing 

24 a ‘‘Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reli25 able Access to Nuclear Fuel’’ that would facilitate or 

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1 create new arrangements between suppliers and re2 cipients to provide fuel to countries with good non3 proliferation credentials in case of market failure. 

4 (13) Any assurance of the supply of nuclear 

5 fuel should meet the condition outlined by President 

6 George W. Bush on February 11, 2004: ‘‘The 

7 world’s leading nuclear exporters should ensure that 

8 states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel 

9 for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce 

10 enrichment and reprocessing.’’. 

11 (14) The Russian Federation has proposed that 

12 one of its uranium enrichment facilities be placed 

13 under international management and oversight, as 

14 part of a ‘‘Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure’’ 

15 proposal to create international nuclear fuel cycle 

16 centers. 

17 (15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi18 tiered system to assure the supply of nuclear reactor 

19 fuel at current market prices, under appropriate 

20 safeguards and conditions, could reassure countries 

21 that are dependent upon or will construct nuclear 

22 power reactors that they will have an assured supply 

23 of nuclear fuel at current market prices, so long as 

24 such countries forgo national uranium enrichment 

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1 and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities and are com2 mitted to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 

3 SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

4 It is the sense of Congress that— 

5 (1) the ‘‘Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism 

6 for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel’’, proposed by 

7 the United States, France, the Russian Federation, 

8 Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands 

9 on May 31, 2006, is welcomed and should be ex10 panded upon at the earliest possible opportunity; 

11 (2) the proposal by the Government of the Rus12 sian Federation to bring one of its uranium enrich13 ment facilities under international management and 

14 oversight is also a welcome development and should 

15 be encouraged by the United States; 

16 (3) the offer by the Nuclear Threat Institute 

17 (NTI) of $50,000,000 in funds to support the cre18 ation of an international nuclear fuel bank by the 

19 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is also 

20 welcomed, and the United States and other member 

21 states of the IAEA should pledge collectively at least 

22 an additional $100,000,000 in matching funds to 

23 fulfill the NTI proposal; and 

24 (4) the governments, organizations, and experts 

25 currently engaged in developing the initiatives demstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

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1 scribed in paragraphs (1) through (3) and other ini2 tiatives should seek to identify additional incentives 

3 to be included in an international regime for the as4 sured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at 

5 current market prices, including participation in 

6 non-weapons-relevant technology development and 

7 fuel leasing to further persuade countries that par8 ticipation in such a multilateral arrangement far 

9 outweighs the temptation and expense of developing 

10 national uranium enrichment and plutonium reproc11 essing facilities. 

12 SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY. 

13 (a) GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the pol14 icy of the United States to support the establishment of 

15 an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear 

16 fuel for peaceful means under multilateral authority, such 

17 as the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

18 (b) ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is fur19 ther the policy of the United States to— 

20 (1) oppose the development of a capability to 

21 produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon 

22 state, within or outside of the NPT; 

23 (2) encourage states party to the NPT to inter24 pret the right to ‘‘develop research, production and 

25 use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,’’ as demstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

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1 scribed in Article IV of the NPT, as being a quali2 fied right that is conditioned by the overall purpose 

3 of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weap4 ons and nuclear weapons capability, including by re5 fraining from all nuclear cooperation with any state 

6 party that has not demonstrated that it is in full 

7 compliance with its NPT obligations, as determined 

8 by the International Atomic Energy Agency; and 

9 (3) strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

10 guidelines concerning consultation by members re11 garding violations of supplier and recipient under12 standings by instituting the practice of a timely and 

13 coordinated response by Nuclear Suppliers Group 

14 members to all such violations, including termination 

15 of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that 

16 discourage individual Nuclear Suppliers Group mem17 bers from continuing cooperation with such recipient 

18 until such time as a consensus regarding a coordi19 nated response has been achieved. 

20 SEC. 104. REPORT. 

21 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact22 ment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Com23 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 

24 and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

25 a report on the activities of the United States to support 

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1 the establishment of an international regime for the as2 sured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at current 

3 market prices under multilateral authority, such as the 

4 International Atomic Energy Agency. The report shall in5 clude an assessment of the feasibility of establishing an 

6 international fuel services center within the United States. 

7 TITLE II—INTERNATIONAL 

8 NUCLEAR FUEL BANK 

9 SEC. 201. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTER10 NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. 

11 (a) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS AUTHORIZED.— 

12 The President is authorized to make voluntary contribu13 tions on a grant basis to the International Atomic Energy 

14 Agency (in this section referred to as the ‘‘IAEA’’) for 

15 the purpose of supporting the establishment of an inter16 national nuclear fuel bank to maintain a reserve of low17 enriched uranium for reactor fuel to provide to eligible 

18 countries in the case of a disruption in the supply of reac19 tor fuel by normal market mechanisms. 

20 (b) REQUIREMENTS.—Voluntary contributions under 

21 subsection (a) may be provided only if the President cer22 tifies to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 

23 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela24 tions of the Senate that— 

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1 (1) the IAEA has received pledges in a total 

2 amount of not less than $100,000,000 and is in re3 ceipt of not less than $75,000,000 of such pledges 

4 for the purpose of supporting the establishment of 

5 the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in 

6 subsection (a); 

7 (2) the international nuclear fuel bank referred 

8 to in subsection (a) will be established within the 

9 territory of a non-nuclear weapon state, and will be 

10 under the oversight of the IAEA, only if— 

11 (A) the non-nuclear weapon state, among 

12 other things— 

13 (i) has a full scope safeguards agree14 ment with the IAEA and an additional 

15 protocol for safeguards in force; 

16 (ii) has never been determined by the 

17 IAEA Board of Governors to be in non18 compliance with its IAEA full scope safe19 guards agreement and its additional pro20 tocol for safeguards; and 

21 (iii) has effective enforceable export 

22 controls regarding nuclear and dual-use 

23 nuclear technology and other sensitive ma24 terials comparable to those maintained by 

25 the United States; and 

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1 (B) the Secretary of State has never deter2 mined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Ex3 port Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 

4 App. 2405(j)), section 620A of the Foreign As5 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 

6 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 

7 2780), or any other provision of law, that the 

8 government of the non-nuclear weapon state 

9 has repeatedly provided support for acts of 

10 international terrorism; 

11 (3) the international nuclear fuel bank referred 

12 to in subsection (a) will provide nuclear reactor fuel 

13 to a country only if, at the time of the request for 

14 nuclear reactor fuel— 

15 (A) the country is in full compliance with 

16 its IAEA safeguards agreement and has an ad17 ditional protocol for safeguards in force; 

18 (B) in the case of a country that at any 

19 time prior to the request for nuclear reactor 

20 fuel has been determined to be in noncompli21 ance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, the 

22 IAEA Board of Governors determines that the 

23 country has taken all necessary actions to sat24 isfy any concerns of the IAEA Director General 

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1 regarding the activities that led to the prior de2 termination of noncompliance; 

3 (C) the country agrees to use the nuclear 

4 reactor fuel in accordance with its IAEA safe5 guards agreement; 

6 (D) the country has effective and enforce7 able export controls regarding nuclear and dual8 use nuclear technology and other sensitive ma9 terials comparable to those maintained by the 

10 United States; 

11 (E) the country does not possess uranium 

12 enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities 

13 of any scale; and 

14 (F) the government of the country is not 

15 a state sponsor of terrorism for purposes of sec16 tion 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 

17 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), section 620A of 

18 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 

19 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control 

20 Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of 

21 law; 

22 (4) the international nuclear fuel bank referred 

23 to in subsection (a) will not contain uranium enrich24 ment or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities; and 

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1 (5) the nuclear reactor fuel referred to in para2 graph (3) will be provided to a country referred to 

3 in such paragraph only at current market prices. 

4 (c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require5 ment of subparagraph (F) of subsection (b)(3) if the 

6 President— 

7 (1) determines that it is important to the na8 tional security interests of the United States to do 

9 so; and 

10 (2) transmits to the Committee on Foreign Af11 fairs of the House of Representatives and the Com12 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 

13 that contains the basis of the determination under 

14 paragraph (1). 

15 (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec16 tion shall be construed to authorize voluntary contribu17 tions under subsection (a) to support subsidization of the 

18 price of nuclear reactor fuel whose supply would be as19 sured by the United States, the IAEA, or any other state 

20 or international entity covered by this section. 

21 SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro23 priated to the President $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2008 

24 to carry out section 201. 

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1 (b) AVAILABILITY OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Amounts 

2 appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropria3 tions under subsection (a) are authorized to remain avail4 able until September 30, 2010. 

Æ 

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