F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT Au g. 20, 20 08 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1356 2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 03-00562 -CV -JOF -1 MELVIN C. JONES,

Pet it io ne r-Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us VICTOR WAL KER, Res po nd en t-Ap pe ll ee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (A ug us t 20, 200 8) Befo re EDMONDSON, Ch ie f Ju dg e, an d TJ OFLAT, AN DERSON, BIRC H, D U BIN A , BL A CK , CA RN E S, BA RKE T T , H U L L , MA RC U S, W IL SO N and PR Y O R, Ci rc uit

Jud ge s. BL ACK , C ircuit Judg e:2

InAugus t 19 96, P et iti one r- Appe llant M el vinJon es w as c onvi ct ed in G eo rg iastate c ourt of

f el ony m ur de r an d c ru el ty

to a ch ild , in co nne ct ionw iththe death of his infant daug hter. On F ebruary 28, 2003, Jones filed a petition for a w ri t of ha be as c or pus unde r 28 U . S. C. § 22 54, c ont en din g he w as f or ce d to rep res en t h im se lf a t t ria l i n v io la ti on of h is Six th Am en dm en t ri gh t t o c ou ns el . Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt d en i edth e p et i t i o n , b u ta p an el o f t h i s Co u rt re v er s ed . We gr an te d e n banc r ev ie wto de te rm ine w he the r Jone s va lid ly w ai ve d hi s r igh t t o co un se l. R e v i e w i n g J o n e s ’ c l a i m de novo , w e co nc lud e Jone s vo lun tari ly w ai ve d hi s ri ght to co unse l. Mo re ove r, be ca use he f ai le d to m ee t hi s burd enof pr ovi ng the waiv er was un kn owi ng , we con cl ud e Jo ne s i s n ot en ti tl edto habe as rel ie f. T he re fo re , w e af

fi rm the j udgm en t of

the dis tr ic t c ourt. I. On July 25, 1995, Melvin Jon es’ three-m onth -old daugh ter, Jennifer Andrew s, died w hile in her father’ s care . An autopsy revea led her death w as ca use d by asub dur al he m at om a, r es ult ing f ro m blunt f or ce tr aum a to h er

he ad and face .3

Se ve ra l m onths l at er , Jon es w as ind ic te d f or f el ony m ur de r an d c ru el ty

to a ch ild , and e xpe ri en ce d publi c de fe nde r Cl au dia S aari w as appoi nte d to r ep re se nt hi m . Trial was s etforMarc h 2 5, 1 99 6. A. Jon es Reje ct

s As si gn ed Co un se l f

or th e Fir st Time From the beginni ng, Jones too k issu e w ith Saari’ s m anagem ent of his case, and on February

8, 1996, he m oved for new c ouns el. In a written order, the trial co urt de nie d th e m oti on w ith out he ar ing , e xpl ai nin g: A lth oughD ef

en dant i s e nti tle d to c ouns el , he is not e nti tle d to counsel of his own choosing . The C ourt has already inform ed De fendant of this fact w hen he previousl y requested private counsel be appoi nte d. Ms . Cl au dia S aari of the D eK al b C ounty

P ubl ic D ef en dant’ s O ff

ic e is w el l- qua lif

ie d to r ep re se nt the D ef

en dant, and the Co urt i s satis fi ed

w ithhe r re pr es en ta tio n. O ne m onth late r, S aari r eque ste d ahe ar ing to ad dr es s th e que sti on o f represe ntation ; on March 14, 1996, a hearing was convened. When Saar i expla ine d th at

Jon es w as e xpr es sin g di ssatis fa ct ionw ithhe r re pr es en ta tio n, the court turned to Jo nes and stated sim ply : “ [I] t’ s y our call. She’ s either y our lawy er ory ou do n’t h av e o ne .” N ot s at isf ie d w iththe c ourt’ s r es pons e, Jon es arg ue d: Jone s: Y our

H onor , it se em s to m e that un de r the Co nst itu tio n it guarantees m e the right to have a sufficiency of counsel al l thr oughthe pr oc ee din gs. I ’ m not w ai vin g th is r igh t t o4 have c ouns el a ssi st m e. I j ust do n ot w an t he r be ca

use sh e’s in effe ct iv e as si st an ce. I am not pr oc ee din g f

or m y se lf . I do w ishto have co unse l a ssi st m e thr ough out — Court: You’ re going to hav e either her or repr esent y ourself. So y ou can m ak e up you r m in d wh ic h o ne y ou want to do . Sh e is a f ine law y er . S he got

aguy out of ade ath pe na lty ca se r ec en tly

up h er e. A nd I a m

not goi ng t o le t y ou dic ta te to m e w ho y our

law y er is. Y ou’ re e nti tle d to a lawy er, I have f

urnished y ou a lawy er, and I furnished y ou a f ine law y er , and tha t’ s it . De spite the court’ s adm oniti on, Jones contin ued to debate Saari’ s m erits as co un se l. T he c ourt w as not

sw ay ed : Co urt: . . . I ’ m

not goi ng t o arg ue anym or e w ithy ou. S he is y our lawy er, or y ou do n’ t have a lawy er. It’ s that sim ple. Jone s: W el l, I ’ d j ust li ke the r ec or d to r ef

le ct that I ’ m not refusing m

y —I’ m not waiving m

y right to have coun sel as sis t m e— Co urt: A ll ri ght . L et the r ec or d r ef

le ct

— Jone s: —and I a m

not — Co urt: —tha t I a m

goi ng t o r el ie ve Ms . S aari , if that’ s w ha t y ou wan t t o d o.5

The e xchange between the court and Jon es continuedin this v ein, w ith the court ins ist ing it

w oul d no t a

ppoi nt anothe r law y er , and J one s in sis tin g he w as not w ai vin g hi s r igh t t o c ouns el : Co u rt : [Y ]o uca n fi g u re o u twh at y o uwa n tt o d o . If y o ud o n ’t want her to represent y ou, y ou’r e not goin g to have a lawy er. Jone s: W el l, I ’ m

not w ai vin g m

y r igh t t o have c ouns el a ssi st m e, and I ’ m

not pr oc ee din g pro se . I do n ot w ishto pr oc ee d pro se . Co ur t: Sh e’s y ou r la wy er, o r y ou ’re no t g oi ng to ha ve a la wy er.

It’ s that sim

ple. Jone s: Y our

H onor , unl es s y ou f

or ce m e to p ro ce ed

w ith ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e, y ou know , I do n ot— y ou know w ha t I ’ m say ing , I do n ot w ishto pr oc ee d w ithhe r— Co urt: A ll ri ght . Jone s: —A nd I do n ot w ishto pr oc ee d pro se . Court: W ell, y ou’ll be pro se . If y ou do n’ t want her y ou’r e

goin g to be pro se . A short tim e therea fter, Jones’ m other arr ived in court. In Jones’ presence, the j udge spo ke to he r at

le ngth, e xpl ai nin g th e sit ua tio n and a ski ng h er

to ta lk t o h ers o n ab o u tac ce p t i n g Sa ar i ’s re p re s en t at i o n . Th e ju d g e e m p h as i ze dSa ar i ’s qua lif ic at ion s, statin g:6

I’ ve appoi nte d hi m

alaw y er . S he is a fi ne law y er . S he ’ s r ec en tly tr ie d ade ath pe na lty

c as e up h er e an d go t the guy out of the de ath pe na lty . F or

som e re as on h e doe sn’ t w an t he r to r ep re se nt h im . A nd I don’ t have any

c hoi ce , I ’ m

r equir ed to furn ishhim

alaw y er . I ’ ve furnished him

a fine lawy er, and apparently he doesn’t w ant her. So he ’ s e ith er

goi ng t o have he r as his law y er or he ’ ll have to re pr es en t him se lf . I ’ ve tr ie d to e xpl ai n th at to him um pte enti m es , and I c annot get through to him . So he decided this m orning th at he’ d rather re pr es en t hi m se lf

, I ga the r, than havin g [ sic ] Ms . S aari to re pr es en t h i m. So I thought m ay

be y ou m ight cou ld talk to h im or som ething. If I we re c harged with a c rim e m y self, I don’ t know of any bodyI’ d prefer to ha ve rep res en t m e m or e th an Ms . Saari . T he c ourt ur ge d Jo ne s’ m oth er to spe ak w ithhe r son ab out

his de ci sio n; how ev er , Jon es w oul d have non e of it . A ft er r en ew ing his barr ag e of

c om pla int s ag ai nst S aari , Jon es e nga ge d inthe f oll ow ing e xc hange w iththe c ourt: Jone s: I’ m

not w ai vin g m

y r igh t t o have c ouns el a ssi st m e, but I do n ot w an t i ne ff

ec tiv e as sis tanc e, and I did w an t the reco rdto refl ectth at . Co urt: Y ou d on’ t w an t M s. S aari ? Jus t t el l m e that. Jone s: I’ m

not w ai vin g—I ’ m

not w ai vin g m

y r igh t t o have counsel—cou nsel assist m e. Co urt: W el l, y ou’ re e ith er goi ng t o have he r or

y ou’ re not

goi ng to h av e he r, and y ou’ re goi ng t o m ak e that de ci sio n.7

In ste ad of m ak ing his de ci sio n, Jon es c ont inu ed pr ovi din g un re spon siv e state m en ts cr iti ca l of his law y er . Whe n th e j udge ha d he ar d e noug h, he tur ne d to S aari , statin g: W el l, I’m ti red . I’ ve be en wres tl in g wi th hi m I do n’t k no w ho w lo ng . I ’m g o i n g t o s e n d

— i f h e d o n ’t w a n tyo u , yo uj u s td o n ’t r e p r e s e n th i m, th at ’s all th ere i s t o i t. A nd w iththat, S aari w as dis ch ar ge d. Trial was re sc he du le d fo r May 25 , 19 96 . B . J ones’ Ch angeof H

ea rt O n M ay 13, 199 6, Jon es ha d ac hange of he ar t, and wro te to the c ourt a ski ng to h av e Sa ar i r ea

ppoi nte d to his c as e. I n hi s le tte r, Jon es e xpl ai ne d: I’m writ in g t o l ety ou kn ow t ha t I h av e ta lk edwit h M s. Sa ari an d we have com e to an agree m ent. Y our Honor I am not tot ally

equipt [sic] to de fen d my se lf, b ei ng un fam il li ar [s ic ] wit h t he rul es of e vi de nc e. I’ m not say ing th at I a gree w ith every choice she has m ade in m y case, but I do ho pe she will avoid any futher [sic] conflict. Beca use I’ m left no c hoi ce I do [ sic ] w ishto pr oc ee d w ithMs . S aari ins te ad of proceeding alone. Y our Honor with all do [sic] respect I do hop e that y ou wil l al lo w Ms . Saari to pro ceed to tri al wit h m e. T he c ourt gr an te d th e re que st, S aari w as r ea ppoi nte d, and the tr ia l w as a ga in res ch edul ed , th is ti m e fo r Aug us t 1 9, 1 99 6. Fr om May unt il A ugus t the c as e pr oc ee de d w ith out inc ide nt. T he n, in earl y Aug us t, J on es ag ai n b eg an co m pl ai ni ng ab ou t t he qu al it y of S aari ’s rep res en ta ti on .8

On Au gu st8, 1 99 6, a s eco ndhe ari ng was c on ve ne d b efo re t he di st ric t co ur t. At that he ar ing , Jon es c ha lle nge d S aari ’ s de ci sio n no t t o c al l a s w itn es se s hi s nin e- y ear- old

c ousi n and a

m ed ic al e xpe rt

w hose c au se of

de ath de te rm inatio n di ffer edon ly sli gh tl y

fro m th e te st im on y

of t he Gov ern m en t’s ex pe rt wi tn es s. S a a r i , i n tu rn , o b

je c t e dt o J o n e s ’ a t t e mp t s t o d i c t a t e tr i a l s t r a t e g y: Mr. Jones had requested th at I do cer tain thin gs, in particular f ile a m otion to supp ress his statem ent [to the police] . . . . I inform ed him at that t im e that I w oul d no t do anythi ng o r supp re ss anythi ng i f I fe lt that i t w as goi ng t o he lp h is c as e, and l ike w ise I w oul d no t do an yth in g, ev en if h e req ue st edit , th atI fel t m ig ht hu rt h is cas e. I expla ine d to him

that I w ill c er

ta inl y a lw ay s li ste n to his opi nio ns, but when it com es down to what sort of m otion s [sic] file, when it com es d o w n t o th e tr i a l o f

th i s c a s e , th a ti s w h e r e my e du c a t i o n , my expe ri en ce c om e int o pl ay , and those are the kin d of de ci sio ns tha t I ’ ll b e mak i n g . Hi s d e c i s i o n s ar e i f h e wa n t s t o p l e a dg u i l t y o r n o tg u i l t y, if he w an ts a

j ur y tr ia l, if he w an ts t o te sti fy . T hose are a ll of his r igh ts to m ak e that de ci sio n [ sic ] , but anythi ng e lse I w oul d m ak e the de ci sio n onw he the r or

not to fi le am oti on t o su

ppr es s e vid en ce that I thinkm ight h elp his case. A ft er e xpl or ing Jon es ’ c om

pla int s and d et er

m ini ng S aari w as handl ing the ca se r es pons ibl y , the j udge onc e ag ai n of fe re d Jo ne s tw o op tio ns: [Y ] ou’ re goi ng t o do one of tw o th ing s. Y ou’ re e ith er goi ng t o have he r to rep res en t you o r y ou ’re go in g t o re pr es en t your se lf. No w, y ou’r e going to have to figure out what y ou’r e going to do, and y ou’r e go in g t o h av e to de ci de itto da y .9

Jone s c ont inu ed

to ar gue his law y er

w as inc om

pe te nt and h ad

ac onf lic t of interest that prevented her fr om repre senting him

properly . The e xchanges between the tr ia l j udge and J one s m ir ro re d th ose a t the Marc h 14 he ar ing , and r ev ea l the court’ s m ount ing frustration with Jon es’ obstin ance: Jone s: Y our

H onor , w oul d y ou p ro ce ed in a m ur de r tr ia l w ith out ana tto rn ey

that i s a ct ing in y our

be st i nte re st? Co urt: W el l, that’ s up to y ou. Y ou’ ve got the c hoi ce . Y ou’ ve got th e choice. Jone s: Why

are y ou— Co urt: I don’ t have to ar gue w iththi s m an . Jone s: I’ m

not arg uin g. Co urt: I don’ t have to ar gue w iththi s m an . Jone s: Y our

H onor , I ’ m

not arg uin g. Co urt: D o y ou w an t he r to r ep re se nt y ou o r not ? I’ m sic k and ti redof h eari ng y ou go ov er an d o ve r an d o ve r th is stuf f. The re’s n o way thi s l ad y

can tel l you s he cange t you o ff. She’ ll do th e best she can to get y ou off. Jo ne s: . . . I hav e n ot , y ou kn ow, re qu ire d t ha t s he ge t m e o ff.

I’ m j ust r equir ing that sh e do wha t’ s inm y be st i nte re st. Co urt: W el l, she ’ s tr y ing to do wha t’ s iny our be st i nte re st. Jone s: H owc anshe kno ww ha t’ s inm y be st i nte re st?10

Court: Beca

use she’ s a seasoned attorney and she kno ws what the lawis ab out

and h owit

sho uld be handl ed

in y our defense. * * * * [C] omm on sense say s y ou’r e going to have her or y ou’r e g o i n g t o re p re s en ty o u rs el f. No w, t h at ’s th e l as tt i m e I ’m say ing that. Jones: So, in other w ords, I’ m being—I’ m

being forced to trial w i t h o u tan a t t o rn e y? Court: That’ s up to y ou. Y ou’r e the one forcing y ourself. Jone s: W el l, I ’ m

not f or ci ng m y se lf . A nd I w an t the r ec or d to refle ct that I have not wa ived m y right to have an attorney to a ssi st m e, an e ff

ec tiv e attor

ne y w ho w ill — Co urt: . . . . D o y ou n ot w an t this w om anto re pr es en t y ou? J o n e s : I wa n tan a t t o rn e y. Co urt: D o y ou w an t this w om anto re pr es en t y ou? Jone s: I w an t an e ff ec tiv e— Co urt: D o y ou w an t this w om anto re pr es en t y ou? J o n e s : I wa n tan e f

f e c t i v e a t t o rn e y. Co urt: D o y ou w an t this w om anto re pr es en t y ou? Jones: No, sir. Co ur t: All rig ht . [To Sa ari ] You are re li ev edof t he cas e.11 . . . . [ T o Jo ne s] Y ou’ re m ak ing ahor ri ble m ist ak e. B ut that’ s y our

bus ine ss. C. J ones Proc ee ds to T

ria l A lon e Alm ost imm ediately

after his lawy er w as discharged, Jones requested an oth er c ont inu an ce , w hic h th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d. I n aw ri tte n m oti on f ile d Augus t 15, 199 6, Jon es r en ew ed

his r eque st f

or ac ont inu an ce , a ski ng f

or m or e tim e to subp oe naw itn es se s and “ re subm it m oti ons w hic h w er e ab an done d by [ his ] pr ev iou s c ouns el . ” I n hi s m oti on, Jon es arg ue d th at be ca use he la ck ed

“ the ski lls of a licensed attorney ,” he should be given “ additio nal tim e to prepare his defense.” Inthe w ee ks l ea din g up to tr ia l, Jon es f ile d se ve ra l m or e m oti ons re que sti ng, am ong o ther things , the disclosure of the cr im inal records of all proposed G ove rn m en t w itn es se s, abar on the a dm iss ionof “ oth er a ct s” e vid en ce , and a Ja ck son- D en no he ar ing on the a dm iss ibi lity of his Jul y 25, 199 5 c onf

es sio n. A t Jo ne s’ r eque st, the c ourt c ondu ct ed apr e- tr ia l m oti on h eari ng o n th e adm iss ibi lity

of the G ove rn m en t’ s “ sim ilar tr an sa ct ione vid en ce ” an d th e adm iss ibi lity

of Jon es ’ c onf

es sio n to pol ic e. T he c ha lle nge d e vid en ce w as a ll deem ed adm issib le. (A fter tr ial, Jones asserted he lost these challenges because, as a pro se li tig an t, he la ck ed the “ ski ll an d kn ow le dge ” ne ce ssary to pr ev ai l onhis12

cl ai m s th at

the e vid en ce w as obt ai ne d invio la tio n of his F ourth and F if

th Am en dm en t ri gh ts .) T ri al c om m en ce d Augus t 20 , 199 6, w ithJon es r ep re se nti ng h im se lf . O n th e m orning o f trial, Jones renewe d his m otion for a continu ance: Jones: Basically , I would like to say that it was, y ou kn ow, it wa s not my idea to proceed w ithou t counsel. But since I am be ing f or ce d to pr oc ee d w ith out c ouns el , I a m

r eque sti ng a co nt in ua nc e, You r Hon or , so I can pre pa re fo r th e cas e.

. . . I ain’ t been given no tim e to prepare . * * * * Co ur t: I wil l d en y

th e m ot io n fo r a co nt in ua nc e. Ch am be rs ve rsu s State , 213 G eo rg iaAppe al s 41 4, say s th at a de fe ndant w ill not

be pe rm itt ed

to use the dis ch ar ge of co unse l and e m

plo ym en t or

appoi ntm en t of

anothe r as a di la to ry tac ti c in po stpo ni ng or a vo id in g t ria l o f th e is su e. T his c as e w as se t ba ck

in May , w as it

not , Mr . Mc D an ie l? Pr ose cu tor : Y es , it

w as . C o u rt : H e f

i r e dM s . S a a r i i n M a r c h , a s I r e c a l l . Th e n i n M a y, right before trial, he re- hired her. A nd then righ t before th e tr ia l— so I ha d t o c on ti nu e it at t ha t t im e fo r Ms . Saari . T he n w e spe ci fi ca lly

se t i t f or tod ay and h e’ s f

ir ed Ms . Sa ar i a ga in. S o w e w ill pr oc ee d.

Jone s part ic ipate d a ct ive ly in the thr ee -d ay

tr ia l, e xam ini ng and c ro ssex am ini ng w itn es se s, r ai sin g ob j ec tio ns, and m ovi ng f

or a“ dir ec te d ve rd ic t” a t theUnder Geor g ia law, a

criminal def

endant may

file a motion for a

new tria l before 1 pursuinga dire ct appe al. SeeO.C.G.A. § 5-6- 36; O.C.G.A. 5-6-38( a). After moving f or a ne w trial on September 6, 1996, J ones’ a

ppellate c ounsel took no 2 further action on Jones’ appea l. When J ones brought the still -pendingmotion to t he trial c ourt’s attention, the cour

t appointed new a

ppellate c ounsel and sche duled the F ebrua ry 9, 2000 ev i d en t i ary

h eari n g. 13 cl ose of the G ove rn m en t’ s e vid en ce . O n Augus t 22 , 199 6, a ft er le ss than on e hour of de li be rat io n, t he jury returne d ave rd ic t co nv ic ti ng Jo ne s o f al l co un ts ch arg ed . Jo ne s was lat er s en te nc edto li fe i m pr is on m en t. D . M oti on f or a Ne w T

ria l Fo ll owi ng tri al , cou ns el was app oi nt edto ass is t J on es on ap pe al . On Septem ber 6, 1996 , Jones’ law y er m oved for a newtrial, raising several challenges to J one s’ c onvi ct ion , inc lud ing c la im s th at Jon es w as de nie d hi s r igh t t o c ouns el in vio la tio n of

the S ixth A m en dm en t and the G eo rg iaCo nst itu tio n. O n F eb ru ar y 9, 1 2000 , a lm ost

thr ee y ears late r, the dis tr ic t c ourt c onve ne d ahe ar ing on the m oti on. 2 A t the he ar ing , Jon es ’ appe llate c ouns el m ad e the f oll ow ing arg um en t: To establish the waiver , the Judge m ust inv estigate as long and as tho ro ughl y

[ sic ] the c ir cum stanc es of the c as e be fo re him

de m an ds. * * * * T he w ai ve r m

ust be m ad e w ithan a

ppr eh en sio n of

the na tur e of

the ch ar ge s, statut or

y of fe nse s w ith in the m , the r an ge of a llo w ab le puni shm en ts the re unde r, pos sib le de fe nse s to the c harg es and ci rc um stanc es in m iti ga tio n th er eo f an d a ll oth er f ac ts e sse nti al to a broad und erstanding of the m atter.14

Co unse l arg ue d th at

be ca use the tr ia l c ourt ha d f

ai le d to appr ise Jon es of

the se fact s, t he waiv er was in va li d. In response to couns el’ s argum ent, the tria l court asked the prosecutor to “ get Ms . S aari to co m e ove r” to the c ourtr oom to te ll him

“ howm any

ti m es she [ ha d] t o l d[ J o n e s ] w h a th i s p u n i s h me n tc o u l db e . ” Wh e n S a a r i arr i v e di n th e c o u rt r o o m a shor t t im e la te r, the tr ia l j udge be gan by que sti oni ng h er

r eg ar din g he r m em or

y of Jone s’ c as e: Court: Do y ou happ en to rem em ber a gentlem an nam ed Mr. Me lvi n Jo ne s? Sa ar i: I re m em

be r the nam e, and I r em em be r a little bit

about the case. I m ay

not rem em

ber all of the details since it w as y ears a go. Court: For som e re ason y ou all went back and forth severa l

tim es . Saar i: I do rem em

ber that, Judg e. * * * * Co urt: A ll I w an te d to kno wis did he und er stand wha t hi s pe na l t y w a s i f h e w a s c on vi c t e d[ ?] Sa ar i: Y es , he c er

ta inl y did . Court: That’ s all I w anted to ask. D id y ou go over that m ore

t h a n o n c e w i t h h i m?15

Sa ar i: Sure . T his w as am ur de r ca se . A nd I e xpl ai ne d, a s I do with all of m

y m urder clients, what the possible penalties ar e an d th at

it w as ali fe se nte nc e. H e ce rt ai nly understoo d that this wa s a serious, ser ious charge. Af ter the trial j udge finish ed question ing Saari, Jones’ counsel asked Saari ab out vari ous pr oc ed

ur al de ta ils of

the c as e. S aari r es pond ed that sh e did

not

“ re m em be r spe ci fi cs about

[ Jone s’ ] c as e an d th e ev ide nc e in the c as e. ” Whe n th e top ic tur ne d to the sub

j ec t of Jon es ’ w ai ve r of

c ouns el , the f

oll ow ing e xc hange oc curr ed : Co unse l: T he iss ue he re thi s m or nin g w as w as the re akno w ing and intellig ent waiver

on the record of his law y er. Sa ar i: Y ou know

—and I c an ’ t— I don’ t r em em be r spe ci fi ca lly the w or ds tha t he sa id. I do knowthat w e w en t ba ck and fo rth onthi s. H e ve ry

c le ar ly kne ww ha t hi s op tio ns w er e. T he y

w er e de sc ri be d by

the Co urt. N ot o nly

the Co urt, but

I did . A nd I e ve n e xpl ai ne d it

to him that y ou unde rs tand y ou cannot —y ou d on’ t have the r igh t t o pi ck and c hoos e w ho y our lawy er is, I know how to do m y j ob, I’ ve got an ind ep en de nt e xpe rt

r ev ie won h is c as e. A nd h e un de rs to odex act ly wha t was go in g t o h ap pe n. Co unse l: T his und er standi ng tha t he ha d, w er e any of the se unde rs tandi ngs pla ce d onthe r ec or d? Saar i: You’ ll have to refer to the record. I do not rem em ber w ha t w as pla ce d onthe r ec or d and wha t w as not on the re co rd .16 I knowthat w e did

have a c oupl e of

he ar ing s I tho ught before the Judge and before the Court. H e had an oppo rt uni ty to ta lk a bout w hy he didn’ t w an t m e as his lawy er. A nd the Jud ge w as ta lki ng t o hi m about w ha t w oul d ha ppe n if he did not w an t m e as his law y er . I do rem em be r be in g i n c ou rt. I d on ’t kn ow h ow m an y ti m es . I rem em be r th e Ma rch he ari ng . Af ter eliciting from

Saari a list of the advantages she could have provi ded Jone s ha d sh e re pr es en te d hi m a t tri al or se rv ed a s hi s st an dby

c ouns el , Jon es ’ law y er c ont inu ed : Co unse l: [D ] id y ou r eque st tha t the w ai ve r, if any , of Mr . Jon es ’ ri ght to co unse l be pla ce d onthe r ec or d? Sa ar i: I don’ t r ec al l. Co unse l: D o y ou r ec al l i f the thi ngs y ou t es tif ie d to be fo re about Mr . Jon es kno w ing the m ax im um pun ish m en ts, iss ue s in m itigatio n, possibl e defe nses, if that inform ation was placed on the record at the tim e? Sa ar i: W e’ d have to re fe r to the r ec or d be ca use I do n ot re m em be r ex ac tly

w ha t transpi re d a t those he ar ing s in de ta il. Jone s’ c ouns el did

not a sk S aari , and s he did

not vol unt ee r, any

inf orm at ion re gard ing w he the r she ha d sp oke n w ithJon es about the dange rs of

r ep re se nti ng17

him se lf a t tri al or w he the r, f

ro m he r co nve rs at ion s w ithhim , she ha d r ea son to be lie ve he und er sto od those dange rs a t the ti m e he w ai ve d hi s r igh t t o c ouns el . A s Jo ne s’ law y er

f ini she d qu es tio nin g S aari , the tr ia l j udge c om m en te d:

. . . I te ll y ou I got

so e xa spe rate d I did

e ve ry thi ng b ut g et

down on m y hands an d kn ee s and p le ad w ithhim to le t M s. S aari handl e his case. Jone s’ c ouns el a gr ee d w iththe c ourt’ s c hara ct er iz at ionof the a tm osph er e at

the A ugus t 8, 199 6 he ar ing : Co unse l: Judg e, on the Augus t date goi ng thr oughthe tr an sc ri pt i t

is obv ious th at every one invo lved in th at case wa s exasperated. E verything wa s tense. Y ou can te ll— usua lly it ’ s ac old

tr an sc ri pt, and y ou c an ’ t t el l wha t’s g oi ng on . Bu t y ou c ante ll by

r ea din g th e tr an sc ri pt tha t the te nsi ons we re high and that the tem pers we re f

laring, that there wa s acrim ony

betwee n the lawy er and the client, betwe en the c lie nt and the Co urt. Court: Ther e cer

tainly wa s because he ce rtainly j ust abou t wore every bodyout aroundhere. Co unse l: A nd o ur

arg um en t this m or

nin g is that un fo rt

unate ly the sid e af fe ct [ sic ] of w ha t w as goi ng o n th at

m or nin g [ w as ] that the pr ope r w ai ve r w as not pla ce d onthe r ec or d. Co urt: W el l, w e’ ll j ust have to le t the appe llate Co urts d ec ide that.18

Af ter Sa ari testified, Jones was ca lled to the standby his own counsel. Jones de sc ri be d hi s r el at ion shi p w ithS aari a s atr oubl ed one , and c at al ogue d hi s com plaints regarding h er handling of his case. When Jones’ lawy er questioned whether Jones had ask ed for a new lawy er in order to delay his trial, Jones an sw er ed : “

N o, sir . I ne ve r as ke d f

or anothe r attor

ne y by nam e. I onl y

a ske d th at

I ha d be en[ sic ] giv enan a tto rn ey dif fe re nt f ro m he r. I didn’ t w an t M s. S aari to represe nt m e. ” D uring his testim ony , Jones w as not asked and di d not v olun teer any inf orm at ionr eg ar din g w he the r Sa ar i ha d sp oke n w ithhim be fo re tr ia l a

bout the dange rs of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n, w he the r any one e lse ha d di sc uss ed the sub j ec t w ith him , or w he the r he und er sto od the dange rs of se lf -r ep re se ntatio n a t the ti m e he waiv edhi s ri gh t t o c ou ns el . O n c ro ss- ex am inatio n, the G ove rn m en t pr es se d Jo ne s r eg ar din g hi s unde rs tandi ng o f the lawnot onl y be fo re , but

dur ing tr ia l: G ov’ t: Mr . Jon es , y ou unde rs too d th e ch oic e tho ugh, if y ou di dn ’ th a ve M s. S a a r i , y ouh a d t o r e pr e se nt y our se l f ? D idn ’ t y ou unde rs tand tha t? Jo ne s: [No res po ns e.] G ov’ t: Is that a

y es ? Jone s: Y es .

* * * *19

G ov’ t: [Y ] ou f

el t c om fo rt ab le that y ou c oul d handl e thi s c as e y our se lf , didn’ t y ou? Jone s: N o. G ov’ t: Y ou d id an op en ing , didn’ t y ou? Jones: It w as required to be done. G ov’ t: Y ou c ro ss- ex am ine d w itn es se s, didn’ t y ou? Jones: It w as required to be done. G ov’ t: Y ou m ad e obj ec tio ns, c or re ct ? Jone s: It

w as r equir ed . * * * * G o v ’t : A n dyo umo v e df o r ami s t r i a l w h e n s o me e v i d e n c e c a me in tha t y ou thoug ht s houl dn’ t have c om e in, didn’ t y ou? Jone s: Y es . G ov’ t: Y ou w er e handl ing thi ngs, w er en ’ t y ou? Jone s: T he be st tha t I c oul d. G ov’ t: A nd y ou n ev er sa id, Jud ge , sto p, I w an t M s. S aari ba ck , did y ou? Jo ne s: No. Bec au se I wasn ’t go in g t o a ccep t M s. Sa ari ba ck . I

didn’ t w an t M s. S aari ba ck . G ov’ t: I unde rs tand. B ut y ou kne ww ha t y our opt ion s w er e, Ms . Sa ar i or y our se lf , r igh t?J ones ra ised sever al other c halleng es to his conviction as we ll, including cla ims that the 3 court e rre d when it (1) r efuse d to appoint substitute counse l; (2) fa iled to instruct the jury on the lesser of fense s of fe lony

or misdemeanor

involuntary

manslaug hter; and ( 3) allowe d the int ro du c tio n o f u

nti me ly -d isc los e d s imi lar t ra ns a c tio n e vid e nc e . G e or g ia Sup re me Court

Ca se No. SOOA1387, Appe llant’s Br ief at 8. 20 Jone s: Y es . Jo ne s al so ad m it te d t o re ad in g “ la w bo ok s” pri orto tri al . Inan or de r da te d F eb ru ar y 25, 200 0, the tr ia l j udge de nie d Jo ne s’ m oti on f or a ne wtr ia l, f

ind ing Jon es ha d “ ac know le dge d an on goi ng d ia log ue w ithhis ap poi nte d c ouns el about

r ep re se nti ng h im se lf

” an d ha d “ ac know le dge d th at he fu lly und er sto od tha t i f he r ej ec te d a ppoi nte d c ouns el , he w oul d have to re pr es en t him self. ” Ge orgia v. Jones , Ca se N o. 95C R4 769- 6, O rd er D eny ing Mo tio n f

or N ewT ri al , a t 3 (G a. S upe ri or Ct . F eb . 25, 200 0) . T he c ourt c onc lud ed Jon es ’ attem pt to di scharge counsel was a dilatory tactic which consti tuted “ the functional equiv al en t of

akno w ing and v oluntary w ai ve r of

a ppoi nte d c ouns el ” unde r G eo rg ia la w. Id . a t 3 (quot ing B ry ant

v . Sta te , 268 G a. 616 , 617 , 491 S . E . 2d 3 20, 322 (1 99 7) ). E . D ire ct A ppe al On direc t appeal, Jones continued to assert his Sixth Am endm ent rights had b e e n v i o l a t e db y h i s f

o r c e ds e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a ttr i a l . T h e G e o r g i aS up r e me 3 Co urt di sa gr ee d and a ff

irm ed Jon es ’ c onvi ct ion , e xpl ai nin g:21

T he tr ia l c ourt w as auth or iz ed to fi nd tha t Jo ne s se t f

orth n o j ust if

ia ble ba sis f or dis sa tis fa ct ionw iththe pub lic de fe nde r an d, the re fo re , that he “ wa s attem

pting to use the discharge and [appoin tm ent] of other counsel as a dilatory

tactic, which w as ‘ the functional equi valent of a kn owi ng an d v ol un ta ry

waiv er o f ap po in te d c ou ns el .’ ” . . . Furthe rm or e, the pub lic de fe nde r te sti fi ed that sh e m ad e Jone s f

ull y aw ar e of the na tur e of

the c harg e, the pos sib le se nte nc es , and the dange rs of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n. A cc or din g to Jon es ’ ow n te sti m ony , he co m ple te ly und er sto od tha t, if

he r ej ec te d a

ppoi nte d c ouns el , he w oul d have to represent him self. T he trial court endeavored to convince Jones to acce pt the pub lic defender, inform ing hi m and his m other ab ou t h is rig ht to co un se l an d t he qu al ifi cat io ns of t he pu bl ic de fen de r. U nde r al l the c ir cum stanc es , w e co nc lud e that Jo ne s kn ow ing ly and int el lig en tly

w ai ve d hi s r igh t t o c ouns el a ft er he w as m ad e aw ar e of the dange rs of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n. Jo nes v . Sta te , 272 G a. 884 , 886 , 536 S . E . 2d 5 11, 513 ( 2000 ) (i nte rn al c itatio ns om it te d) . F . State and

F ed eral H abe as Proc ee din gs Af ter his conviction becam e final on direct appeal, Jones filed a state habeas pe tit ionr ea sse rt ing his or igi na l S ixth A m en dm en t c la im and a ddi ng t o it

ac la im that his appellate coun sel had been ineffec tive. T he petition wa s denied in October 2001 , and the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt de nie d Jo ne s’ r eque st f or pe rm iss ionto ap pe al . H av ing e xhaust ed

his state pos tc onvi ct ionr em ed ie s, on F eb ru ar y 28, 200 3, Jones filed a petition for a wr it of habeas corpus in the United States D istrict Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia . I n hi s pe tit ion , Jon es arg ue d hi s S ixth22

Am endm ent rights had b een violated when he w as force d to represent him self at tr ia l and whe n hi s a

ppe llate law y er

f ai le d to a de quate ly

r es earc h hi s c as e dur ing his dir ec t a ppe al . F ind ing no c le ar

e rr or of lawor f ac t i n th e G eo rg iastate c ourts’ re sol uti on o f Jone s’ c la im s, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e habe as pe tit ionon June 8, 20 04 . O n a

ppe al , aunanim ous pane l of thi s C ourt r ev er se d and g rante d th e pe tit ion , c onc lud ing Jon es ’ S ixth A m en dm en t r igh ts h ad be envio la te d be ca

use he ha d “ not ‘ cl earl y and une qui voc al ly ’ a sse rt [e d] his de sir e to w ai ve c ouns el and pr oc ee d pro se .” Jones v. W alker , 4 9 6 F. 3 d

1 2 1 6 , 1 2 3 1 (1 1 t h Ci r. 2 0 0 7 ). We gr an te d e n banc r ev ie wto de te rm ine w he the r Jone s va lid ly w ai ve d hi s r igh t t o co un se l an d, i f no t, wh et he r he is en ti tl edto habe as rel ie f un de r 28 U.S.C. § 2 25 4. II. U nde r the S ixth A m en dm en t, c ri m ina l de fe ndants are e nti tle d to the as si st an ce o f co un se l dur in g a ll cri ti cal st ag es of t he cri m in al jus ti ce p ro ces s. Iowa v. T ov ar , 541 U . S. 77, 80- 81, 124 S . Ct . 137 9, 138 3 ( 2004 ). A rg uably , the m ost com plex of these stages is trial, where a dvocates questi on witnesses, introduce ev ide nc e, arg ue to the j ur y , and m ak e m

yri ad str at eg ic de ci sio ns. A s ar es ult of the te ch nic al ski ll tr ia l de m an ds, “ [i ] t i s un de nia ble that i n m ost

c ri m ina l pr ose cu tio nsCourt s h ave us e d v ari ou s v e rb a l f or mul atio ns to e xpre ss t

he sta nd ard fo r t he va lid 4 waiver of a c onstitut ional rig ht. Cases have require d courts to deter mine whether

the waive r wa s “intellige nt and compete nt,” se eJ oh ns on v . Ze rb st , 304 U.S. 458, 468-69, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1025 (1938), “ knowing , voluntary , and intellige nt,” Tovar , 541 U.S. at 88, 124 S. Ct . at 1387, “knowingand intentional,” Brewer v. W illiams , 430 U.S. 387, 434, 97 S. C t. 1232, 1258 (1977) (White, J ., dissenting) , and “know ing a nd voluntary ,” see Godinez v. M oran , 509 U.S. 389, 400, 113 S. Ct . 2680, 2687 (1993). We use the terms “knowing ” and “ voluntary” with the understandingthat, in the context of waiver, “ knowing ” is sy nony mous with “intelligent” and “voluntary” is sy

nony mous with “competent” and “intentional.” 23 defendants could b etter def end with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.” F

are tta v . Ca lif

orni a , 422 U. S. 806, 834, 95 S. C t. 2525, 2540 (197 5). Ne vertheless, it is the defe ndant, and not hi s lawy er or the S tate, who bear s th e p ers on al co ns eque nc es of c on vi ct io n. Id . a t 83 4, 95 S . Ct . a t 25 41. “ [T ] he defendant, there fore, . . . m ust be free personally

to decide whether in his p articular case c ouns el is to his adv antage.” Id . Adefendant m ay

wa ive his right to counsel an d r ep re se nt h im se lf

so l ong as his c hoi ce to do s o is m ad e vol unt ar ily and knowingl y , with “ a full aw areness of both the nature of the right being abando ned

4 and the consequ ences of the decision to abandon it.” P att er son v. I lli noi s , 487 U. S. 285, 292 , 108 S . Ct . 238 9, 239 5 ( 1988 ) (quot ing M oran v . B urbi ne , 475 U . S. 412 , 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135 , 1141 (1986)). Inthi s c as e, the tr ia l c ourt de te rm ine d th at Jon es ’ r ep eate d r ej ec tio n of his ap po in te d c ou ns el co ns ti tu te d a“ fu nc ti on al waiv er” o f hi s ri gh t t o c ou ns el . Co nse que ntl y , the c ourt di sc harg ed c ouns el , w hic h r equir ed

Jon es to re pr es en t24

him self during his m

urder trial. Jones contend s that by doing so the trial court vi ol at edhi s Si xt h Am en dm en t ri gh t t o c ou ns el . T his c as e co m es to us a s ape tit ionf or aw ri t of ha be as c or pus unde r 28 U . S. C. § 22 54, and a s su ch , is gove rn ed by the A nti te rr or ism

and E ff ec tiv e D eath Pe na lty A ct of 199 6 ( A E D PA ). U nde r A E D PA , af ed er al c ourt m

ust de ny r el ie f to a person in custod y

pursuant to a state c ourt convictio n unless the state court decision adjudicating th e petitioner’ s claim wa s (1) “ contrary

to, or involved an unr ea sona

ble appl ic at ionof

, c le ar ly e sta bli she d F ed er al law , a s de te rm ine d by the Suprem e Court of the U nited States,” or (2 ) w as “ba se d onan un re as ona ble determ ination of the fac ts in lig ht of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id

. § 2 25 4( d) (1 )-(2 ). J o n e s c a n n o tme e tth e r e qu i r e me n to f § 2 2 5 4 ( d ) ( 1 ) b e c au s e th e S up r e me Co urt ha s ne ve r co nf

ro nte d aS ixth A m en dm en t c ha lle nge inv olv ing ade fe ndant who reject s h is ap po in te d c ou ns el wit ho ut go odcau se . Cf. United States v. G arey , — F . 3d — , Ca se N o. 05- 1463 1 ( 11th C ir . Augus t 20 , 200 8) ( enbanc ) (“ T he Su pr em e Co urt ha s ne ve r co nf ro nte d ac as e in whic h an un co ope rativ e de fe ndant ha s re fu se d t o a ccep t ap po in te d c ou ns el or e ng ag e in a co ll oq uy with th e co ur t.”) . Howev er, as th e o rig in al pa ne l d eci si on in th is cas e d is cu ss edth or ou gh ly, see Jones , 496 F. 3d at 122 6-28, Jones has dem onstrated the Georgia S uprem e CourtFe dera l habea s courts g ener ally defe r to the fa ctual finding s of state c ourts, presuming 5 the fa cts to be cor

rec t unless they

are rebutted by

clea r and c onvincingevidenc e. Id. § 2254(e) (1). How ever , when a state cour

t’s adjudication of a

habea s claim “re sult[ s] i n a decision that [i] s based on a n unrea sonable de termination of the f acts in lig ht of the evide nce prese nted in the State cour t proce eding ,” Id. § 2 25 4( d) (2 ), thi s Co ur t is no t bo un d to de fe r t o unrea sonably -found f

acts or to the le g al conc lusions that flow from them. See Taylor v . Maddox , 36 6 F .3 d 9 92 , 1 00 8 ( 9th

Cir . 2 00 4) (“ Whe n w e de te rm ine that st ate -c ourt fa c t- fi nd ingis unre a so na

ble , . . . we have an o bli g atio n to se t th os e fi nd ing s a sid e . . . . ” ); see also Pane tti v. Quarterman , — U.S. —, 127 S. C t. 2842, 2858 (2007) (de clining to a pply AEDPA def

ere nce when state court made unrea sonable de termination of law unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) ). Al tho ugh th e Ge or g ia

Sup re me Court

fo un d Jon e s’ a

pp ointe d tr ia l c ouns e l, C la ud ia Sa ari , “testified that she made Jones fully awa re of the nature of the c harg e, the possible sente nces, a nd the dangers of self-repre

sentation ,” Jones , 272 Ga. at 886, 536 S.E.2d at 513 (emphasis adde d), the re cord de monstrates Saar i never testified about whe ther she w arne d J ones of the da ng ers of se lf -r e pr e se ntatio n. B e c a

us e the Ge or g ia

Sup re me Court

unre a so na

bly de te rm ine d th e fa c ts rele vant to J ones’ Six th Amendment claim, we do not owe the state court’s f indings de fer ence under A EDPA. We theref ore a pply the pre -AEDPA de novo standard of revie w to J ones’ ha

beas claims. See J

ohnson v. Alabama , 2 5 6 F. 3 d 1 1 5 6 , 1 1 6 9 (1 1 thC i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( n o t i n g de novo standard of re view g overns pr e-A EDPA claims). 25 unr ea sona

bly de te rm ine d th e fa ct s of

his c as e. U nde r A E D PA , w e w oul d or din ar ily de fer t o b ot h t he st at e co ur t’s l eg al an d fa ctua l d et erm in at io ns . Se e, e . g. , Parker v . Se c’ y for D ep ’t of Co rr. , 331 F. 3d 76 4, 776 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussin g defere nce unde r § 22 54( d) (1 )) ; G ore v . Se c’ y for D ep ’t of Co rr. , 492 F . 3d 1 273, 129 4 ( 11th Ci r. 200 7) ( dis cu ssi ng d ef er en ce und er

§ 22 54( d) (2 )) . N ev er

the le ss, be ca

use thi s is a rare c as e in whic h th e pe tit ion er ha s m et the r equir em en t of

§ 22 54( d) (2 ) by showing th e state courts m ade an unreasonable fac tual determ ination , w e re view J o n e s ’ c l a i m de novo , w ith out de fe re nc e to t

he G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n. 5 A. U nited Sta tes v. Garey26

Inour r ec en t e n banc de ci sio n in Garey , w e co nf ro nte d asim ilar Si xth A m en dm en t c ha lle nge br ough t by af ed er al de fe ndant who a sse rt ed his r igh t t o co un se l h adbe en vi ol at edby the di st ric t co ur t’s d is m is sa l o f hi s ap po in te d c ou ns el . A lth ough Gareyc am e to u s ondir ec t a ppe al , r athe r than a s ape tit ionf or aw ri t of habe as c or

pus, the sim ilari tie s be tw ee n th e de fe ndant’ s be havio r in Gareyand Jone s’ be havio r ar e str iki ng, and i nvi te c om pari son. T he f ac ts i n Gareyw er e the se . A ft er be ing c harg ed

w ithnum er ous fe lon y of fen se s, d efen da nt Edd ie Garey was ap po in te d aco m pe te nt de fen se att orne y . Id . at 5. O n th e ev e of

tr ia l, how ev er , G ar ey

a ske d f or ne wc ouns el , a lle gin g hi s ap po in te d c ou ns el su ffer edfro m a co nf li ctof i nt eres t. Id

. at 5-6. Ther e w as no real c o n f l i c t ; th e r e f

o r e , th e tr i a l j u d g e d e n i e dG a r e y’ s r e qu e s tan do f f e r e dh i m th e s a me ch oic e giv ento Jone s: pr oc ee d w ithappoi nte d c ouns el or pr oc ee d pro se . Id. at

6. Garey rej ected counsel, but ref

used to affirm atively

invok e his right to selfrep res en ta ti on . Id

. a t 7- 9. R ep eate dly , the tr ia l c ourt e xpl ai ne d G ar ey ’ s op tio ns, dis cu sse d th e pe na lti es G ar ey w oul d f ac e uponc onvi ct ion , and e la bor at ed on the be ne fit s o f co un se l an d t he “pi tfa ll s” of s el f-re pr es en ta ti on . Id . G ar ey c ont inu ed

to re j ec t hi s c ourt- ap poi nte d a tto rn ey and, in his w or ds, “ inv oluntari ly w ai ve ” his rig ht to co un se l. Id

.27

The district court interpre ted Gar ey ’ s uncoop erative behavior as a volu ntary w ai ve r of c ouns el and d isc harg ed

G ar ey ’ s a

ppoi nte d a tto rn ey , but

r equir ed him to rem ai n a s s ta ndby cou ns el . Id . at 9. At tr ial, G arey

repre sented him self, and was co nv ic te d o f 27 fel on y

off en se s. Id. at

13- 14 . O n a ppe al to thi s C ourt, G ar ey arg ue d th e dis tr ic t c ourt vi olate d hi s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh ts b y

f or ci ng h im

to re pr es en t hi m se lf

a t tri al w he n he ha d no t m ad e ana ff

irm at ive r eque st t o do so— a pr er equis ite to va lid w ai ve r unde r the nco ntr oll ing Ci rc uit

pr ec ed en t. I n ade ci sio n ov er ru lin g Marshall v. D ugger , 925 F. 2d 3 74, 377 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) , w e re co gni ze d f or the f ir st t im e that i t i s po ssi ble fo r a va lid

w ai ve r of

c ouns el to oc cur not

onl y w he n ac oope rativ e de fe ndant affir m atively invok es his right to self-r epresentation, but also when an unc oope rativ e de fe ndant k now ing ly r ej ec ts the onl y

c ouns el to w hic h he is co ns ti tu ti on al ly ent it le d. Garey , a t 21 . W e did not e sta bli sh a de fa ult r ule re qui ri ng d istri ct

c ourts t o in te rp re t e ac h in stanc e of unc oope rativ e be havio r as a w a i v e r b y c o n du c to f

th e r i g h tt o c o u n s e l ; h o w e v e r , w e r e c o g n i z e di n s o me ins tanc es ade fe ndant’ s c ondu ct w ill r ev ea l a

vol unt ar y de ci sio n to c hoos e the pa th of sel f-re pr es en ta ti on ov er t he co nt in ue d a ss is ta nc e o f co un se l. Id . at 2 3. Inthe c ont ex t of

the f ac ts the n be fo re us, w e he ld the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d no t ab use d it s di sc re tio n by

int er pr et ing G ar ey ’ s un co ope rativ e be havio r as e vid en ce of28

a v ol un ta ry

ch oi ce t o wai ve hi s ri gh t t o c ou ns el . Id . at 30. T he trial court had inform ed Garey

in no un certa in term s that the onlyattorney to which he w as en ti tl edwas h is ap po in te d c ou ns el . Id. at 7. In no less uncertain term s, G arey ind ic at ed he did not w an t hi s a

ppoi nte d c ouns el ’ s a ssi stanc e, que sti one d hi s counsel’s a llegiance, and dis agreed w ith the m anner in which his counsel was rep res en ti ng hi m . Id

. a t 28 . G ar ey

ha d r ej ec te d hi s a tto rn ey outri ght a t l ea st f our tim es , and s ev er al ti m es m or e ha d e xpr es se d an “ inv oluntary ” int en tio n to r ep re se nt hi m se lf. Id

. a t 30 . I n li ght

of tho se f ac ts, w e ag re ed

G ar ey ’ s c ondu ct

e vin ce d a vol unt ar y c hoi ce to pr oc ee d pro se . Id . O ur inquir y did not e nd the re , how ev er . W e em pha siz ed ac ourt m ay

not dis ch ar ge c ouns el w ith out vio la tin g th e de fe ndant’ s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh ts unle ss the de fe ndant n ot o nly

r ej ec ts the onl y

c ouns el to w hic h he is co nst itu tio na lly entitled, but also un derstands the choices available to him and the potenti al dangers of pr oc ee din g pro se . Id

. a t 21 . I n G ar ey ’ s c as e, w e co nc lud ed tho se r equir em en ts ha d be enm et . T he j udge w ho p re sid ed ove r G ar ey ’ s tr ia l pr ovi de d am ple w ar nin gs of the dange rs of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n, inf

orm ing the de fe ndant tha t the re w er e m any advanta ge s to be ing r ep re se nte d by an a tto rn ey

tr ai ne d inthe lawand f

am ili ar w ith th e ru le s o f ev id en ce an d o th er ru le s ap pl ic ab le to hi s ca se . Id . at 31. T he trial co urt w ar ne d of “pit fa lls ” as soc ia te d w ithint er ro ga tin g, im

pe ac hin g, and c ro ss-29

ex am ini ng w itn es se s and d isc uss ed w ithG ar ey

the c al cu lus inv olv ed

in de ci din g whe th er t o t es ti fy

at t ria l. Id

. I n a ddi tio n, the c ourt e xpl ai ne d so m e of the ch al le ng es Garey wou ldface in m ak in g h is op en in g s ta te m en t. Id . I n li ght of tho se fa ct s, w e co nc lud ed

G ar ey w ai ve d hi s r igh t t o c ouns el kno w ing ly and tha t hi s S ixth Am en dm en t ri gh ts were n ot vi ol at edby his sel f-re pr es en ta ti on at t ria l. Id . a t 32 . W it h t ha t b ack gr ou ndin m in d, we turn n ow t o t he fact s o f th e p res en t ca se . 1. V olun tary W

aiver Like G arey , Jones contends hi s Sixth Am endm ent rights were violated when the tr ia l c ourt di sm iss ed

his appoi nte d c ouns el and r eq uir ed him to re pr es en t hi m se lf a t t ria l. Itis un di sp ut edJo ne s n ev er d ire ct ly ask edto rep res en t h im se lf. Q uit e the opp osi te , he r ep eate dly inv oke d hi s r igh t t o c ouns el and i nsi ste d he w an te d an a tto rn ey

( j ust not the one appoi nte d to r ep re se nt h im). Jon es did not affir m atively wa ive his right to counsel; th eref ore, the question becom es whether Jone s, li ke G ar ey , vol unt ar ily w ai ve d hi s r igh t t o c ouns el not by his w or ds, but

by hi s co nd uc t. Throughout the course of his crim inal proceedings, Jones was inform ed re pe at ed ly

by the tr ia l c ourt and b y

his law y er

that he w as not

e nti tle d to c ouns el of hi s ch oi ce, see Th om as v . W ain wr igh t , 767 F. 2d 73 8, 742 (11th Cir. 1985), and thatJ ones does not cha lleng e the district cour t’s conclusion that there was no g ood cause for 6 dis mis sin ghis a

pp ointe d c ouns e l. 30 Saar i wa s the onlylaw y er who would be appo inted to represent him . A t the March 6 1 4 , 1 9 9 6 wa i v erh ea ri n g , t h e c o u rt ex p l ai n ed : “ [S aa ri ] is y o u r l aw yer, o r yo ud o n ’t have a lawy er. It’ s that sim ple.” And again, at the Augus t 8, 1996 hearing (which tookplace af

ter Jones had already

fired and re-hired Sa ari once bef ore), the trial co urt r ei te rate d: “ [Y ] ou’ re goi ng t o do one of tw o th ing s. Y ou’ re e ith er goi ng t o ha ve he r rep res en t you o r y ou ’re go in g t o re pr es en t your se lf.” Jone s a dm its he und er sto od h is c hoi ce w as to ac ce pt S aari ’ s r ep re se ntatio n or pr oc ee d w ith out

c ouns el , and g ive n th at

c hoi ce , he r ej ec te d S aari ’ s a ssi stanc e on tw o se parate oc ca sio ns, onc e in M ar ch199 6 and a ga in i n Augus t 19 96. A t the Marc h 14 , 199 6 he ar ing , Jon es r ef use d to c hoos e be tw ee n S aari ’ s r ep re se ntatio n an d se lf -r ep re se ntatio n, a ll the w hil e re pe at ed ly c ri tic iz ing S aari ’ s m an ag em en t of hi s ca se . In re sp on se , th e tr ia l co ur t d is m is se d c ou ns el . Whe n Jo ne s late r ha d se co nd thoug hts about the w isd om

of pr oc ee din g pro se , the trial court re appoin ted Saar i. H owever , it w as not lon g before Jones once again tookissue with her re presentation. A t the August 8, 1996 h earing, Jones expli ci tly r ej ec te d S aari ’ s a ssi stanc e: Co urt: D o y ou w an t this w om anto re pr es en t y ou?31

Jone s: I w an t an e ff ec tiv e— Co urt: D o y ou w an t this w om anto re pr es en t y ou? J o n e s : I wa n tan e f

f e c t i v e a t t o rn e y. Co urt: D o y ou w an t this w om anto re pr es en t y ou? Jones: No, sir. W ith respect to their conduct before the trial court, the m ain differe nce be tw ee n Jo ne s and G ar ey is that Jo ne s’ c ondu ct

w as e ve n le ss c oope rativ e an d m or e dil at or

y . Jon es ’ unc oope rativ e be havio r spanne d af ive -m onth pe ri od and re sul te d inhis tr ia l be ing de lay ed on thr ee se parate oc ca sio ns— al l “ ag gr av at ing factors” not present in Garey ’ s case. In virtually all other respects, their conduct was ne arl y

id en ti cal . Jo ne s u nd ers to odhe was e nt it le d t o o nl y on e at to rn ey : Cl au di a Saa ri. N ev er the le ss, Jon es r ej ec te d S aari ’ s a ssi stanc e, que sti one d he r “ ef fe ct ive ne ss, ” an d m ad e it known inope n c ourt tha t he dis ag re ed w iththe w ay

she w as handl ing his de fe nse . Whe n pr es se d by the tr ia l c ourt, Jon es une qui voc al ly state d he did

not want Saari to r epresent him . In light of tho se fac ts, the trial c ourt did n ot err when it co nc lud ed

that by r ej ec tin g a

ppoi nte d c ouns el , Jon es “ vol unt ar ily c hose to pr oc ee d pro se a s sure ly

a s if he ha d m ad e ana ff

irm at ive r eque st t o do so, ” an d therefore “ volu ntarily

wa ived his righ t to couns el by his condu ct.” Garey , a t 30 .32

2. K now ing W aiv er T ha t l eave s th e que sti on whe the r, be ca use ne ith er

the tr ia l c ourt no r his ap poi nte d c ouns el w ar

ne d hi m on the r ec or d of

the dange rs of

pr oc ee din g pro se , Jone s’ w ai ve r w as unknow ing . I t i s onthi s pr ong of our ana ly sis that Jo ne s’ s c as e b e g i n s t o d i v e r g e f

r o m Garey . In Garey , the tr ia l c ourt pr ovi de d th e de fe ndant w ithe xte nsi ve w ar nin gs re gard ing the dange rs of

pr oc ee din g pro se , descr ibing the potential pi tfalls of selfre pr es en ta tio n, “ inc lud ing the que sti oni ng o f w itn es se s, the de ci sio ns o n w ho t o pu t up a s w itn es se s, the de ci sio ns o n w he the r to t es tif y or not , de ci sio ns r eg ar din g im peachm ent, c ross-exam ination .” Garey , at 6. T he j udge explain ed the trial w oul d be c om

ple x, and p ro vid ed

G ar ey w ithe xam

ple s of the sor ts o f dif fi cu lt Fi fth Am endm ent issues th at m ight arise for him as a pro se li ti ga nt . Id

. at 1 1- 12 . Repeatedly , the tr ial court urged Garey to accept r epresentation from his appoi nted co un se l, wh om

th e co ur t h adret ai ne d a s s ta ndby cou ns el . T he tr ia l j udge did

not pr ovi de sim ilar w ar

nin gs i n Jo ne s’ c as e. A lth ough the j udge praised the virtues o f Jones’ appoint ed counsel and asked Jo nes’ m other to persuade her son to accept Saari’ s representation, the c ourt did n ot provid e Jones w ithany e xpl an at ionof

the r igh ts h e w as sur

re nde ri ng b y

w ai vin g c ouns el . T he tr ia l j udge did

not a dvi se Jon es of

the pr oc ed

ur al and e vid en tiary

r ule s he w oul d be33

re qui re d to f

oll owor inf orm him he w oul d have to m ak e co m pli cate d strate gic de ci sio ns at tri al . Whe n Jo ne s a ske d qu es tio ns r eg ar din g hi s r igh t t o c ouns el , the j udge ins isted appoi nted couns el Saari w as “ a fine lawy er” and indi cated he “ wa s sic k and t ir ed

of he ar ing [ Jone s] go o ve r an d ov er ” his c om pla int s a bout he r. T he j udge r ep eate dly

a sse rt ed he “ didn’ t have to ar gue ” w ithJon es . T he onl y com m ents approxim ating warnings wer e (1) the c ourt’ s statem ent to Jon es that Sa ar i w as “ a se as one d atto rn ey ” w ho “ know s w ha t the lawis ab out and h owit shou ld be handled in y our defense” and (2) the observation , m ade af ter Sa ari w as di sc ha rg ed , “ You ’re m ak in g aho rri bl e m is ta ke . Butth at ’s y ou r bu si ne ss .” O n di re ct appe al , the G ove rn m en t be ar s th e bur de n of pr ovi ng a

w ai ve r is bo th vo lu nt ary an d k no win g. Garey , a t 27 . I n su chc as es , the G ove rn m en t m ust do m or e than r es t onasil en t r ec or d: it m ust poi nt t o e vid en ce de m onstratin g th e defendant was w arned by the court or knew f

rom another reliable source ( e. g. , his lawy er, the prosecutor, past experience , specia lized training, or som e other independ ent source of inform ation) of the dangers that lay ahead. H ere, the trial co urt di d no t w ar

n Jo ne s of

the dange rs of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n and, c ontrary to the Geo rg iaSupr em e Co ur t’s o pi ni on , see no te 5, supra , the re is no r ec or d su ppor t f or the pr opos iti on tha t Jo ne s’ law y er te sti fi ed she c ouns el ed

him on the dange rs of34

re pr es en tin g hi m se lf

. I f co nf ro nte d w iththi s r ec or d ondir ec t a ppe al , w e w oul d be unable to say

the Governm ent had establish ed Jones’ wa iver w as knowinglym ade. Bu t t hi s i s n ot a di rect ap pe al : i t i s a p et it io n fo r a wri t o f habe as co rp us . B . H abe as C orpu s

“ Whe n th e pr oc es s of

dir ec t r ev ie w. . . c om es to ane nd, apr es um pti on o f fin al it y an d l eg al it y

att ach es to [a] con vi ct io n a ndsen te nc e.” B recht v. A brah am son , 507 U . S. 619 , 633 , 113 S . Ct . 171 0, 171 9 ( 1993 ) (quot ing Barefoot v. E ste lle , 463 U . S. 880 , 887 , 103 S . Ct . 338 3, 339 1- 92 ( 1983 )) . F or that r ea son, courts often “ appl[y ] differ ent standards on habeas than would be applied on direct review .” Id

. at 634, 113 S. C t. at 1720 . One such diffe rence is a shift in the burden of pr oof r el at ing to Si xthA m en dm en t w ai ve r of c ouns el c la im s. O n di re ct appe al , the G ove rn m en t be ar s th e bur de n of pr ovi ng a

de fe ndant ha s wai ve d h is rig ht to co un se l k no win gl y an d v ol un ta ril y . Garey , a t 27 ; United Sta tes v . Ca sh , 47 F . 3d 1 083, 108 8 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) . B ut whe n ade fe ndant “ se ek s re le as e by

the e xtr ao rd inary

r em edy of ha be as c or pus, the bur de n of

pr oof r es ts uponhim to es ta bli sh tha t he did

not c om pe te ntl y and i nte lli ge ntl y

w ai ve his constitu tional right to assistance of Counsel,” Jo hnso n v . Z erbst , 304 U . S. 458 , 468- 69, 58 S . Ct . 101 9, 102 5 ( 1938 ); see also Ferguson v. Culliver , 527 F . 3d 1 144, 1147 ( 11th C ir . 200 8) ; Vines v. United States , 28 F. 3d 11 23, 1135 (11t h Cir. 1994 );35

Li ndse y v. Sm ith , 820 F . 2d 1 137, 114 9 ( 11th C ir . 198 7) . Aw ri t of ha be as c or pus m ay be iss ue d on ly

if the pe tit ion er

“ co nvi nc es the c ourt by

apr ep onde ranc e of ev id en ce” t ha t h e d idno t v al id ly w ai ve hi s ri gh t t o c ou ns el . Jo hnso n , 304 U. S. at 469, 58 S . Ct . a t 10 25. C onse que ntl y , it is Jone s w ho b ears the bur de n of pr ovi ng his w ai ve r w as unknowin gly m ad e. To m eet his burden, Jones was r equired to poi nt to evid ence in the rec ord fr om w hic h atr ie r of

f ac t c oul d r ea sona

bly c onc lud e Jone s di d no t un de rs tand the dange rs of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n a t the ti m e he w ai ve d hi s r igh t t o c ouns el . A lth ough thi s C ourt’ s pr ec ed en ts p ut J one s onnot ic e of the im portanc e of

de ve lop ing a co m ple te r ec or d f

or his ha be as appe al , and a lth oughJon es w as giv ena m ple oppo rt uni ty to de ve lop his r ec or d instate c ourt, he f ai le d a s am atte r of

lawto pr ove he did

not und er stand the dange rs of se lf -r ep re se ntatio n a t the ti m e he waiv edhi s ri gh t t o c ou ns el . Jones argues the trial court wa s oblig ed to war n himof the dangers of selfreprese ntation , and because it did n ot do so , his Sixth Am endm ent rights were violated. O ur prece dents establis h, howe ver, that failure to provide on-the-record warn in gs do es no t al way s l eadto rev ers al . Se e, e . g. , St ro zi er v. News ome , 926 F . 2d 1100 , 1105 (11th Cir. 1991) ( Stroz ier II ); U nit ed Sta tes v . F

ant , 890 F . 2d 4 08, 409 (1 1thCi r. 198 9) ; Fitzpatrick , 8 0 0 F . 2 da t1 0 6 5 . T h o u g h th i s C o u rth a s h e l dt i me36

an d a ga in tha t tri al c ourts s houl d e nsur e de fe ndants do n ot w ai ve c ouns el unl es s th ey un de rs ta ndth e p ro te ct io ns th ey are s urren de rin g, se e, e . g. , Garey , a t 25 ; Ca sh , 47 F . 3d at 10 88, it

doe s no t f

oll owauto m at ic al ly

that Jo ne s’ c onst itu tio na l r igh ts we re violated by

the court’ s failure to w arn him in this p articular c ase. T he w ar nin gs g ive n ( or

not giv en ) to a

c ri m ina l de fe ndant are r el ev an t t o whether the defendant knowingl y wa ived his righ t to couns el; however, the failure to provid e on-the-rec ord war ning s is not conclusive proo f that a def endant’ s waiver of c ouns el w as unknow ing ly m ad e. W e re qui re tr ia l c ourts t o w ar n de fe ndants of the dange rs of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n no t be ca

use the w ar

nin gs are an e nd i n the m se lve s, but

be ca use the y are am eans t o th e en d of e nsur ing de fe ndants do n ot w ai ve f undam en ta l c onst itu tio na l r igh ts w ith out an a de quate und er standi ng o f the co ns eque nc es of t he ir c ho ic es . Cf . St ro zi er v. News ome , 871 F . 2d 9 95, 998 ( 11th Cir. 1989 ) ( Str ozi er

I ) (w arnings are “ a m eans to the end [of] ensuring a volu ntary an d in te lli ge nt w ai ve r” ). D es pit e our str ong adm oni tio n th at

tr ia l c ourts p ro vid e on- the -r ec or d w ar

nin gs t o a ll de fe ndants w ho w ishto w ai ve the ir r igh t t o c ouns el , the “ ultim ate test” of whether a def endant’ s choice is knowing is not the adequacy of the trial court’ s war

ning but “ the defendant’ s understand ing.” Fitzpatrick , 800 F. 2d at 10 65; see also Sta no v. D ugger , 921 F. 2d 11 25, 1145 (11t h Cir. 1991 ) (e n banc).37

So lon g a s ade fe ndant k

now s th e ri sks a sso ci at ed w ithse lf -r ep re se ntatio n, it i s i rr e l e v a n tf

o r c o n s t i tu t i o n a l p u r

p o s e s w h e t h e r

h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o me s f r o m a colloqu y with the trial c ourt, a c onversation with his counsel, or his own research or experience. T he core inquiry is whether the def

endant und erstood the choices be fo re him

and the pot en tia l dange rs of pr oc ee din g pro se . I f so, his w ai ve r is va lid . At the tim e Jones waived his right to coun sel, the pra ctice of this Circuit w as we ll-established: when review ing th e convictions of state defe ndants who had wa ived couns el w ithou t prior on-the-recor d war ning s, this Court would scrutinize the record to determ ine whether it supp orted a finding that each petition er had kn owi ng ly w ai ve d h is rig ht to co un se l. Se e, e . g. , Fitzpatrick , 800 F . 2d 1 057; Stroz ier II

, 926 F. 2d 11 00. T hat practice has not chang ed. In review ing habeas pe tit ion er s’ state c ourt r ec or ds, w e ex am ine avari ety of f ac ts, inc lud ing the de fe ndant’ s ba ck gr ound , e xpe ri en ce and c ondu ct ; hi s kn ow le dge of the na tur e of the c harg es , the pos sib le de fe nse s, and the pos sib le pe na lti es ; and whe the r the de fen da nt was t ry in g t o m an ip ul at e th e ev en ts of t he tri al . Stroz ier II , 926 F. 2d at 1105 ( ci tin g Fitzpatrick , 800 F. 2d at 106 5-67); se e als o Stroz ie r I , 87 1 F .2dat 9 98 . Jone s w as giv enaf

ull opp ortun ity

to de ve lop the r ec or d. N ev er the le ss, he squand ered his best oppo rtunity to adduce evidence on whether his wa iver w asAt the Fe bruar y 9, 2000 evidentiar

y hear ing on Jones’ motion for a ne w trial, the 7 Gover nment bore the burden of provingJ ones’ wa iver wa s knowingand voluntary . Neve rtheless, it was incumbe nt on J ones to deve lop the rec ord with an e y e not only to his direct appea l, but also to his federa l habea s petition. AEDPA require s habea s petitioners to develop the fac tual basis of their f

eder al claims in state cour t proce eding s, and any

petitioner who fa ils to do so is not entitl ed to a late r hea ringin fede ral c ourt. See28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) .

38 unkn ow ing . T hr ee y ears a ft er Jon es w as c onvi ct ed , he f ile d an am en de d m oti on f or a ne wtr ia l, c ont en din g am ong oth er thi ngs, that he ha d no t va lid ly w ai ve d hi s r igh t to couns el. The trial court convened an evidentiary hearing on the m otion , at w hic h Jo ne s w as r ep re se nte d. 7 At that hear ing, counsel argued Jon es’ wa iver w as not valid b ecause the tria l j udge had failed to apprise Jon es of “ the nature of the char ges, statutory offenses w ith in the m , the r an ge of a llo w ab le pun ish m en ts the re unde r, pos sib le de fe nse s to the c harg es and c ir cum stanc es in m iti ga tio n th er eo f an d a ll oth er f ac ts e sse nti al to a broad und erstanding of the m atter. ” H owever , Jones’ attorney studio usly

avoided asking q uestion s or eliciting testim ony on a critical f

actual issue: whether Jones kn ew fro m

Saar i o r an y

ot he r so ur ce o f th e d an ge rs of s el f-re pr es en ta ti on . D ur ing the e vid en tiary

he ar ing , the state tr ia l c ourt e lic ite d te sti m ony f ro m Sa ar i r eg ar din g Jo ne s’ und er standi ng o f the se ri ousn es s of his of fe nse and the ap pli ca ble pe na lti es . Jon es ’ c ouns el did not f oll owup o n th is l ine of

que sti oni ng by asking Saari whether she had ever discussed with Jones the dang ers of selfre pr es en ta tio n, or

by pr obi ng whe the r Sa ar i be lie ve d f ro m he r co nve rs at ion s w ith39

Jones th at he possessed an adequate und erstanding of the dang ers of selfreprese ntation . More troubling s till, w hen Jones to ok the stand , he never testified he had been unawar e of the dangers he w ouldfac e as a pro se li tig an t. I n r es pons e to the G ove rn m en t’ s qu es tio ns, Jon es a dm itt ed he und er sto od h is c hoi ce w as to be represe nted by

Saari or to repre sent him self. H e explained that he had not asked the c ourt t o r ea

ppoi nt S aari dur ing the tr ia l “ [b ] ec au se I w as n’ t go ing to ac ce pt M s. Sa ar i ba ck . I didn’ t w an t M s. S aari ba ck . ” I n sh ort, de spi te havin g ha d am ple oppo rt uni ty to de ve lop his r ec or d, Jon es r em ai ne d si le nt o n th e que sti on o f w ha t he kn ew (o r di d n ot kn ow) at t he ti m e h e wai ve d h is rig ht to co un se l. K now ing w ha t i s no t i n th e re co rd , w e tur n to w ha t i s. A t the ti m e of his ind ic tm ent, Jon es w as tw en ty -o ne y ears old . H is e duc at ion al ba ck gr ound is unclear, thoug h it is apparent from his filing s and his st atem ents in op en court that he w as li te rate and art ic ulate . H is f ili ngs an d or al state m en ts w er e co he re nt and sugg est he possess ed at least aver age intelligence. H e did not su ffer from m ental il ln es s. W ithr es pe ct

to Jone s’ c ont ac t w ithlaw y er s and h is unde rs tandi ng o f the case, the rec ord reveals he w as repre sented by Claudia Saari, an experienced attor ne y , f ro m the ti m e of

his ind ic tm en t i n th e fa ll of 199 5 to his f

ir st d ism iss al of co unse l i n M ar ch199 6. S aari r es um ed handl ing Jon es ’ c as e in M ay 199 6, a t Jo ne s’40

request, and rem ained his lawy er until August 19 96, w hen Jones again reje cted her represe ntation . Much of Jones’ conflict with Saari center ed around his trial de fe nse , inc lud ing the w itn es se s to be sub poe na ed and the e xpe rt

te sti m ony

to be el ic ite d. H is d if

fe re nc es of

opi nio n onthe se top ic s su gge st h e poss es se d a t l ea st a ru di m en ta ry

un de rs ta nd in g o f th e p os si bl e d efen se s t o h is cri m e. Jone s and h is m oth er

w er e inf orm ed in ope n c ourt of

the se ri ousn es s of

the m urder char ges against him and of the possi bilityhe could be sentenced to life im pr iso nm en t, and J one s’ law y er te sti fi ed she ha d di sc uss ed

w ithhim the pos sib le pe na lti es f

or his c ri m e an d Jo ne s un de rs too d th e se ri ousn es s of the c harg es a ga ins t h i m . B o t h Sa ar i an dth e t ri al co u rt i m p re s s edup o n J o n es th at , a s a r es u l to f S aa ri ’s le ga l t rai ni ng , sh e “ kn ew th e la w andho w itsh ou ldbe ha nd le d i n [h is ] de fen se .” T he r ec or d is m or e equiv oc al w ithr es pe ct to Jone s’ und er standi ng o f co urtr oom

r ule s and p ro ce dur es . Jon es w as not que sti one d a

bout his f am ili ar ity w iththe r ule s of e vid en ce or

w iththe lawgov er

nin g hi s c as e an d a lth oughhe testified that he had read “ law book s” prior to his trial, he a lso represented he w as

“ un fam il ia r wit h t he rul es of e vi de nc e.” Jone s w as , how ev er , aw ar e of the im portanc e of

the r ule s of e vid en ce and the im portance of having assist ance f rom an attorney

who understoodthem , a s ev ide nc ed

by his le tte r re que sti ng S aari ’ s r e- ap poi ntm en t i n M ay 199 6. F oll ow ing41

tr ia l, Jon es w ro te that hi s “ la ck [] [ of ] ski ll an d kn ow le dge ” ha d pr ev en te d hi m f ro m pr ev ai lin g onhis a tte m

pts to supp re ss e vid en ce the G ove rn m en t i ntr oduc ed a ga ins t him a t tri al . Jon es ’ pr ior

e xpe ri en ce w iththe c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m appe ar s to have been lim ited to on e char ge of battery , to which he pleaded guil ty and rece ived a se nte nc e of

pr obatio n. T his w as his f ir st tri al . W e re vie wJon es ’ pe rf

orm an ce dur ing tr ia l, not

be ca use w e w ishto determ ine whether his trial condu ct w as good o r bad, but because his perform ance at tr ia l pr ovi de s so m e ci rc um stanti al e vid en ce of w ha t he kne wa t the ti m e he wa ived his righ t to couns el. Jones participated actively in his trial defense. Before tr ia l, he sou ght

athi rd c ont inu an ce in or de r to s ubpo en a w itn es se s and “ re subm it m oti ons w hic h w er e ab an done d by [ his ] pr ev iou s c ouns el . ” H e al so f ile d m oti ons in lim ine and requested a Ja ck son- D en no he ar ing and a

he ar ing on the adm iss ibi lity

of “ sim ilar tr an sa ct ione vid en ce ” the G ove rn m en t pl anne d to intro duc e. D ur ing tr ia l, Jon es e xam ine d and c ro ss- ex am ine d w itn es se s, m ad e o b je ct i o n s , a n dm o v edfo r aju d g m en to f a cq u i t t al atth e c l o s e o f t h e G o v ern m en t ’s case. A t the hearing on his m otion for a new tr ial, Jones testified he had not asked the court to re-appoint couns el during trial because he “ didn ’ t want Ms. Sa ari ba ck ”— a state m en t tha t su gge sts e ve n inthe m ids t of c om pli cate d pr oc ee din gs, Jone s pr ef

er re d se lf -r ep re se ntatio n ov er

his onl y oth er opt ion .42

T he re are se ve ra l f

ac ts i n th e re co rd

w hic h su gge st J one s’ w ai ve r m ay not ha ve be en m ad e wit h aful l u nd ers ta nd in g o f th e d an ge rs of s el f-re pr es en ta ti on . Jones was only

twe nty -one y ears old at the tim e he w as charged and had m inim al pa stex pe rie nc e wit h t he cri m in al jus ti ce s y st em . He hadne ve r be fo re b een to tri al . H e w as not

a ssi gne d st an dby

c ouns el to as sis t hi m

a t tri al , and p er

ha ps m ost im portantly , neither the court nor any other person provid ed him with on-the-re cord warn in gs of t he da ng ers of s el f-re pr es en ta ti on . Ne vertheless, there are m any fac ts in the record w hich sug gest Jon es’ wa iver w as not unknow ing . Jon es w as not m en ta lly il l, und er sto od the na tur e of the ch ar ge s a ga ins t hi m , and w as aw ar e of the pos sib le pe na lti es he f ac ed upo n co nv ic ti on . Cf. Fitzpatrick , 800 F . 2d at 10 66- 67. H e ha d th e oppo rt uni ty to co nsul t w ithe xpe ri en ce d tr ia l c ouns el and w as not pr es sur ed

int o w ai vin g hi s r igh t to c ouns el . Jon es und er sto od c ourtr oom r ule s and p ro ce dur es w el l e noug h to part ic ipate a ct ive ly

in his de fe nse a t tri al by

m ovi ng t o su

ppr es s e vid en ce , m ak ing obj ec tio ns, m ovi ng f

or aj udgm en t of

a cquitta l, and e xam ini ng and c ro ss- ex am ini ng w itn es se s. H is unde rs tandi ng o f the se tr ia l pr oc ed ur es sug ge sts he kne whowto

“ co m pl[ y ] w ithnor

m al c ourt pr oc ed

ur e, and tha t he ge ne ra lly kne whowto handl e him self in court.” Id

. a t 10 67. Jon es ’ r ep eate d atte m pts to co nti nue his tr ia l by dis m iss ing , r e- hir ing , and r e- fi ri ng c ouns el are “ [e ] vid en ce of m an ipu la tio n or43

int en tio na l de lay ” w hic h “ im pl[ y ] agr eate r unde rs tandi ng o f the pr oc ee din gs and an understandin g of the risks and com plexities of a crim inal trial.” Id. A n df i n a l l y, Jone s’ te sti m ony

a t the e vid en tiary

he ar ing on h is m oti on f

or ane wtr ia l f

ai ls t o showhis de ci sio n to pr oc ee d pro se wa s anything but a calculated, volun tary ex erci se of h is in fo rm edfree wil l, cf . F are tta , 422 U . S. a t 83 5, 95 S . Ct . a t 25 41, rat he r th an th e res ul t o f a m is ta ke n o r un ifo rm edde ci si on . Jone s bo re the bur de n of

c om ing f or w ar d w ithsom e ev ide nc e— w he the r in the form of his own testim ony , the te stim ony of others or docum entary e v i d e n c e — f

r o m wh i c h atr i e r

o f f a c tc o u l dr e a s o n ab l y c o n c l u d e b y a preponderance of the evidence that he did not und erstand the right he was sur re nde ri ng and the a tte ndant d an ge rs of pr oc ee din g pro se , and he failed to m eet that burd en . A t hi s e vid en tiary he ar ing in state c ourt Jo ne s w as r ep re se nte d by counsel and to ok the standto testify . If at the tim e of his trial he had lacked an unde rs tandi ng o f the dange rs of se lf -r ep re se ntatio n, a ll he ha d to do w as te sti fy to that effe ct at the evidentiary hearing on his m otion for a new tr ial. I nstead, Jones rem ained silent on the question of w hat he understoo d at the tim e he w aived co unse l, and h is atto rn ey

a t the e vid en tiary

he ar ing did

not que sti on S aari about w he the r she e ve r w ar

ne d Jo ne s of

f the r ec or d of

the dange rs of

pr oc ee din g pro se .44

St an din g a lon e, the m er e ex ist en ce of som e ev ide nc e in the r ec or d c as tin g doub t onw he the r Jone s’ w ai ve r w as kno w ing is ins uf fi ci en t a s am atte r of

lawto pr ove the w ai ve r w as unknow ing . G ive n th e re co rd e vid en ce sup portin g th e inf er en ce that Jo ne s’ w ai ve r w as kno w ing and the de ar th o f ev ide nc e poi nti ng t o t h e o p p o s i t e c o n c l u s i o n , we c o n c l u d e J o n e s h a s n o tmeth i s b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g b y a pr ep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce t ha t h is waiv er o f co un se l was m ad e u nk no win gl y . As a re su lt , th e d is tri ctco ur t d idno t err by den y in g h is pe ti ti on forhabe as co rp us . AFFIRMED.This assumes of cour se that there is no constituti onal impediment—such as a conflict of 1 int e re st— to f or c ingc ontin

ue d r e pr e se ntatio n b y

the a pp ointe d c ouns e l. 45 BA RKE T T , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , D iss en tin g: Whe n ade fe ndant s uc h a s M el vinJon es obj ec ts t o a ppoi nte d c ouns el but re fu se s to w ai ve his r igh t t o c ouns el and at the sam e tim e re fu se s to r ep re se nt hi m se lf, t he tri al jud ge m us t n av ig at e b et ween co m pe ti ng co ns ti tu ti on al rig ht s. Insuc h ac as e, aj udge m ust a dvi se the de fe ndant tha t he is en tit le d to ef fe ct ive r ep re se ntatio n bu t no t t o th e co unse l of his c hoi ce , and the n to e xpl ai n th e ram if ic at ion s and d an ge rs both of w ai vin g th e ri ght

to co unse l and o f pr oc ee din g pro se. Af

ter the j udge has approp riately advised the defendant and determ ined that the de fe ndant unde rs tands the r am if ic at ion s of

the onl y a va ila ble c hoi ce s, the jud ge ha s t hr ee o pt io ns . Fi rs t, if the j udge de te rm ine s th at the de fe ndant i s in ca

pable of r ep re se nti ng him se lf , the j udge sho uld

or de r the de fe ndant t o pr oc ee d w ithappoi nte d c ouns el . 1 Se co nd, if

the j udge de te rm ine s th at the de fe ndant i s c ap ab le of r ep re se nti ng him se lf and the de fe ndant c ont inu es to ins ist that he doe s no t w ishto be represe nted by

appoint ed counsel, the j udge m ay perm it the defendant to proceed pr o se w iththe a ssi stanc e of standby c ouns el , a s inU nit ed

S ta te s v G ar ey , N o.In G are y , w e no te d th at th e re c or d r e fl e c te d th at th e tr ia l ju dg e pr ov ide d G are y wi th 2 e xten siv e wa

rn ing s a s to the da

ng e rs of se lf -r e pr e se ntatio n a

nd wa ive r o f c ouns e l. A ft e r b e ingso advised, Ga

rey made c lear

his prefe renc e for

self-r epre sentation over pr ocee ding w ith appointed counsel, a nd the trial cour

t discharg ed Ga

rey ’s appointed c ounsel, but require d that he re main as standby counsel. (Ma

j. Op. at 27–28.) Inan y ev en t , as th e m aj o ri ty

n o t edi nGa re y , th e p re fe rr edal t ern at i v e t o p erm i t t i n g a 3 defe ndant to proce ed entire ly alone is to reta in standby counsel. 46 05- 1463 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 8) . T he or et ic al ly , the j udge ’ s th ir d c hoi ce is to o rd er the 2 defendant to proceed entirely pro se. Although I believe the third choice is rarely constitu tionallyperm itted when the defendant unequi vocally states that he does not want to proceed pro se, I need 3 not address th at issue in thi s case, because the j udge presidin g over Jones’s tria l ne ith er a dvi se d Jo ne s of

the ha zard s of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n no r inquir ed int o th e know ing ne ss o f Jone s’ s su ppos ed de ci sio n to pr oc ee d a lon e. T he re w as no co llo quy on the r ec or d, a s th er e w as in G ar ey , to as sur e that Jo ne s pr oc ee de d w ith ey es ope n, aw ar e of

the c onse que nc es of

f or goi ng h is r igh t t o c ouns el a t tri al ; no r was he ev en pro vi de d s ta ndby cou ns el . On at le ast four occasions the Suprem e Court has indicated that on-there co rd w ar nin gs o f the dange rs of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n are r equir ed f or akno w ing wa iver of counsel. S ee I owa v. Tovar, 541 U.S . 77, 88–8 9 (2004) (“ As to w aiver of trial counsel, w e have said that before a defendant m ay

be allowed to procee d pr o se , he m

ust be w ar ne d sp ec if

ic al ly of the ha zard s ahe ad . ”) ; i d. ( “ W ar nin gs o f47

t h e p i t fa l l s o f p ro ce ed i n g t o tri al wi t h o u tco u n s el . . . mus tb e ‘r i g o ro u s [l y] ’ co nve y ed . ” (a lte ratio n inor igi na l) ( quot ing P atte rs on v . I lli noi s, 487 U . S. 285 , 298 (1 988) )) ; P atte rs on, 487 U . S. a t 29 8 ( “ [R ] ec ogni zi ng the e nor m ous im portanc e an d ro le that an a tto rn ey

play s a t a

c ri m ina l tri al , w e have im pose d th e m ost

r igo ro us re str ic tio ns o n th e inf

orm at ionthat m

ust be c onve y ed

to a de fe ndant, and the pr oc ed ur es that m

ust be obs er ve d, be fo re pe rm itt ing him to w ai ve his r igh t t o counsel at trial.”) ; id. at 299 (“ [W ] e re quire a m ore sear ching or form al inquiry before per

m itting an acc used to waive his right to cou nsel at trial than we require fo r a Si xthA m en dm en t w ai ve r dur ing pos tin dic tm en t qu es tio nin g. ”) ; F ar ettav. California, 422 U.S . 806, 835 (1975) (“ [H ] e shouldbe m ade aw are of the dangers an d di sa dvanta ge s of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n, so tha t the r ec or d w ill e sta bli sh tha t ‘ he kn o w s w h a th e i s d o i n g an dh i s c h o i c e i s ma d e w i t h e ye s o p e n . ’” ( qu o t i n g A d a ms v. U nit ed S ta te s e x r el . Mc Cann, 317 U . S. 269 , 279 ( 1942 )) ); V on M oltke v. G ill ie s, 332 U . S. 708 , 723 –24 (1 948) ( plura lity opi nio n) ( “ ‘ T he c onst itu tio na l r igh t of an acc used to be represented by counsel inv okes, of itself, the protection of a tr ia l c ourt, in w hic h th e ac cu se d—whose li fe or li be rty is at stake —i s w ith out co unse l. T his pr ote ct ing duty im pose s th e se ri ous an d w ei ghty r es pons ibi lity

upo n the trial j udge of determ ining whether there is an intelligent and com petent waiver by the a cc use d. ’ T o di sc harg e thi s du ty pr ope rl y in lig ht o f the str ong pr es um pti onSee also United States v. Thoma s, 357 F.3d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 2004) (“It is clear f rom the 4 Supreme Court’s de cision in Far etta . . . and this cour t’s decision in United States v. Welty , 674 F.2d 185, 188 ( 3d Cir. 1982), that the district court must undertake an a ffirma tive on-the-r ecor d colloquy to expl ain to the def

endant the possibility

of wa iver a

nd g ive the def

endant ‘ an awa rene ss of the dang ers a

nd disadvantag es inhere nt in defendingoneself.’ ”); United States v. Gewin, 471 F .3d 197, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“ To satisfy Fa retta, a trial court must eng ag e the defe ndant in a ‘shor

t discussion on the recor d’ about the da ng ers a nd disadvantag es of self-r epre sentation.”). 48 against waiver of

the constitu tional right to counsel, a j udge m ust inv estigate as lo ng an d a s t ho ro ug hl y

as t he cir cu m st an ces of t he cas e b efo re h im de m an d.” (footnote om itted) (citing John son v. Ze rbst, 304 U. S. 458, 465 (193 8))). Su chw ar nin gs o n th e re co rd

are r equir ed

to giv e fu ll m eanin g to the r igh t t o co un se l at tri al , andth ei r co m pl et e an d t ot al ab se nc e in th is cas e is , in m y vi ew, di sp os it iv e. Thu s, I b el ie ve Jo ne s i s en ti tl edto pro ceed wit h h is habe as pe ti ti on .

4 The m aj ority

agree s that Jon es would be entitled to relief on direct appeal be ca use , on this r ec or d, the gov er nm en t w oul d no t be able to sus ta in i ts b ur de n of proving that Jones kn owingly wa ived his righ t to couns el. It denies relief here, how ev er , on the gr ound s th at Jon es —and n ot the gov er nm en t— nowbe ar s th e bur de n of e sta bli shi ng a vio la tio n of

his c onst itu tio na l r igh t t o c ouns el . ( Ma j . O p. at 36. ) I f ai l t o se e a dis tin ct ionin the appl ic at ionof the bur de ns t o th e fa ct s of thi s case. A s the m aj ority

concedes, the governm ent could no t show on the record that Jone s kn ow ing ly

w ai ve d th e ri ght

to co unse l a s th e co urt ne ve r advis ed Jon es of the dange rs of

se lf -r ep re se ntatio n. O n th at

sam e re co rd , Jon es ha s c le ar ly m et his49

bur de n of sho w ing the ve ry

sam e thi ng: that he w as not w ar ne d of the dange rs of se lf -r ep re se ntatio n, that the re is no a de quate e vid en ce on the r ec or d th at he oth er w ise kne wand unde rs too d th ose dange rs , and thus, that he did not kno w ing ly w ai ve his r igh t t o c ouns el . I w oul d r ev er se the j udgm en t of the dis tr ic t c ourt and grant habeas relief

.