15-1048 

Gumaneh v. Lynch 

BIA 

Christensen, IJ 

A094 230 713 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

26th 4 day of July, two thousand sixteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 MUHAMED GUMANEH, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 15-1048 

17 NAC 

18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Massucci, New York, N.Y. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

26 Assistant Attorney General; Shelley 

27 R. Goad, Assistant Director; Monica 

28 Antoun, Trial Attorney, Office of 

29 Immigration Litigation, United 

30 States Department of Justice, 

31 Washington, D.C. 
2 

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Muhamed Gumaneh, a native and citizen of the 

6 Gambia, seeks review of a March 17, 2015, decision of the BIA, 

7 affirming a February 26, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge 

8 (“IJ”) denying Gumaneh’s application for asylum, withholding 

9 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

10 (“CAT”). In re Muhamed Gumaneh, No. A094 230 713 (B.I.A. Mar. 

11 17, 2015), aff’g No. A094 230 713 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 

12 26, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

13 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the 

15 IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 

16 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review 

17 are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin 

18 v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 

19 For asylum applications like Gumaneh’s, governed by the 

20 REAL ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 

21 circumstances,” base an adverse credibility determination on 

22 an asylum applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” 

23 the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his 
3 

1 statements, “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart 

2 of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu 

3 Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 

4 credibility determination unless, from the totality of the 

5 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could 

6 make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d 

7 at 167. As discussed below, substantial evidence supports the 

8 credibility determination. 

9 The agency reasonably relied on the inconsistencies among 

10 Gumaneh’s application, testimony, and supporting evidence 

11 about the date of his mother’s death. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d 

12 at 167. Gumaneh testified that his mother died in the late 

13 ‘90s; his corrected application provided the same. But his 

14 sister’s birth certificate, dated 2001, was signed by his 

15 mother. When asked how his mother could have signed the birth 

16 certificate, if she had died years earlier, Gumaneh stated that 

17 the birth certificate was “wrong” and that he did not review 

18 it because it was mailed directly to his lawyer. The agency 

19 was not required to credit this explanation. See Majidi v. 

20 Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005). 

21 The adverse credibility determination was further 

22 supported by the inconsistencies surrounding how Gumaneh 

23 learned of his father’s family’s threats. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 
4 

1 F.3d at 163-64. Gumaneh testified that he never had contact 

2 with his father’s family, after helping his sister escape female 

3 genital mutilation (“FGM”), and that he only learned of the 

4 threats through friends. But Gumaneh stated in his application 

5 that his father’s family had threatened him directly. When 

6 asked how his family could have directly threatened him, if they 

7 had not been in contact, Gumaneh explained: “I’m not 

8 communicating with them. But, they’ll call me. . . .” 

9 Although Gumaneh argues that his explanation was “plausible,” 

10 “[a] petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation 

11 for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 

12 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled 

13 to credit his testimony.” Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 

14 The adverse credibility determination was also properly 

15 based on the inconsistencies in the record concerning when 

16 Gumaneh lived in Senegal. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. 

17 Gumaneh initially testified that he moved to Senegal in 2000 

18 and stayed for “two to three years,” but later testified that 

19 he was living in Senegal in 2005 when he learned his sister was 

20 threatened with FGM. Gumaneh also stated in his application 

21 that he was living in Senegal when he first learned his sister 

22 had been threatened with FGM. When asked to explain, Gumaneh 

23 stated that he returned to Gambia and then went back to Senegal 
5 

1 and that he had omitted this information from his initial 

2 testimony because his lawyer didn’t ask if he went back or not. 

3 The agency was not required to credit that explanation, Majidi, 

4 430 F.3d at 80, and did not err in relying on these 

5 inconsistencies. 

6 The agency also reasonably relied on Gumaneh’s failure to 

7 corroborate. Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 

8 2007). Gumaneh contends that his testimony was credible and 

9 did not need to be rehabilitated. As discussed above, however, 

10 the agency had ample grounds for questioning his credibility. 

11 While Gumaneh does not explicitly challenge the agency’s 

12 justifications for according his corroborating evidence 

13 minimal weight, the agency did not err in its treatment of this 

14 evidence. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 

15 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the weight given corroborating 

16 evidence lies largely with discretion of agency); see also Y.C. 

17 v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to 

18 agency’s decision to accord little weight to a relative’s 

19 letter).

20 In light of the foregoing inconsistencies and Gumaneh’s 

21 lack of corroboration, the totality of the circumstances 

22 supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See

23 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. 
6 

1 The agency therefore did not err in denying asylum, withholding 

2 of removal, and CAT relief because all claims shared the same 

3 factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d 

4 Cir. 2006). 

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

6 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

7 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

8 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

9 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

10 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

11 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

12 34.1(b). 

13 FOR THE COURT: 

14 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk