J-A20014-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ROBERT O'CONNOR 

Appellant

v.

JANICE O'CONNOR

Appellee

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1666 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 12, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2014-0011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2017

Appellant, Robert O’Connor (“Husband”), appeals from the divorce 

decree entered in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, specifically 

challenging the order granting the petition of Appellee, Janice O’Connor 

(“Wife”), to enforce a property settlement agreement. We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

The parties were married on July 1, 1978. The parties’ primary marital 

residence was in Boalsburg, Pennsylvania. Husband, however, has not 

resided full-time at the marital residence since 2001. Since approximately 

2009, Husband has lived at the parties’ condominium in Arlington, Virginia. 

Husband works at the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), a federal agency 

in Washington, D.C. 

On December 22, 2013, Husband informed Wife he wanted a divorce. 
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The following day, December 23, 2013, Husband provided Wife with a 

document labeled “Divorce Ideas/Proposal,” which generally set forth 

Husband’s suggestions and questions about alimony and dividing the parties’ 

assets. Husband retained counsel and filed a divorce complaint on January 

2, 2014. Wife subsequently retained counsel. 

On April 15, 2014, the parties met without counsel and discussed a 

property settlement agreement (“PSA”) Wife had drafted herself. The PSA 

stated Wife would, as alimony, receive sixty-six percent (66%) of Husband’s 

income and sixty percent (60%) of Husband’s consulting income. The PSA 

provided the parties would later specify whether Wife would receive a 

percentage of Husband’s gross or net income. The PSA specified Wife would 

receive sixty-six percent (66%) of Husband’s retirement income and 

required Husband to work until age 74. During the April 15th meeting, the 

parties executed the PSA. Husband did not consult with counsel before 

signing the agreement. Later on April 15, 2014, Husband sent Wife an email asking her to reduce the percentage of income Husband owed Wife as

alimony under the PSA. 

On June 13, 2014, Wife filed a Petition to Enforce Property Settlement 

Agreement. Husband filed an answer on July 29, 2014. Husband asserted 

no new matter with affirmative defenses in response to Wife’s petition. The 

court conducted hearings on Wife’s petition on July 29, 2014, and on August 

13, 2014, during which Husband and Wife testified. 
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On July 29, 2014, Wife testified she drafted the PSA based on 

Husband’s “Divorce Ideas/Proposals” document. Wife stated the parties

discussed economic settlement conditions from December 23, 2013, until 

April 15, 2014. Wife said when she met with Husband on April 15, 2014, 

she told him she had given to her counsel an envelope containing 

information disparaging to Husband. Wife noted if Husband caused anything

to happen to her, she intended counsel to give the envelope to the police, 

Husband’s girlfriend, and Husband’s employer. Wife also stated she believed 

she was entitled to sixty-six percent (66%) of Husband’s gross salary. 

On August 13, 2014, Husband testified when he drafted the “Divorce 

Ideas/Proposals” document, he believed Pennsylvania had no alimony 

requirement and Wife would receive fifty percent (50%) of his retirement 

funds and income. Husband said he did not threaten Wife and there was no 

history of domestic violence incidents between the parties. 

Husband explained Wife told him on April 15, 2014, she intended to 

use information she had found on a computer at the marital residence to 

blackmail Husband. Husband said Wife told him she had provided several 

blackmail documents to her attorney. Husband testified Wife claimed she 

had obtained an e-mail Husband wrote ridiculing a United States Senator, a

leader of critics of the NSF. Husband added Wife said she found e-mails 

demonstrating Husband used his NSF e-mail address to participate in a 

NCAA men’s basketball pool and send personal correspondence to his 
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girlfriend. Husband stated Wife also claimed she had obtained gay club 

entrance passes and a parking pass to a nude beach from the 1990’s. 

Husband testified Wife gave him 24 hours to review and sign the PSA. 

Husband added Wife told him not to discuss the PSA with counsel or the

April 15th meeting. Husband explained he signed the PSA for several 

reasons: he feared Wife would make good on her threats to blackmail him if 

he did not sign the PSA; he hoped the language in the PSA was so vague the 

agreement would be unenforceable; and he believed the PSA terms were so

unfair as to render the PSA unenforceable. 

Husband testified he contacted his attorney about the PSA after he had 

signed the agreement. Husband stated his attorney later contacted Wife’s 

attorney to rescind his signature on the PSA. Husband said he believed Wife 

was entitled to sixty-six percent (66%) of his net income under the PSA. 

Husband explained if Wife received sixty-six percent (66%) of his gross 

income, Husband would receive only $347 per month in income. Both 

parties testified they were aware on April 15, 2014, that the appraisal for the 

marital residence had not yet been completed. 

On October 22, 2014, the trial court granted Wife’s Petition to Enforce 

Property Settlement Agreement. Husband filed a motion for reconsideration 

and a petition to stay enforcement of the PSA pending appeal on November 

20, 2014. On March 24, 2015, the court denied Husband’s reconsideration 

motion and granted Husband’s petition to stay enforcement of the PSA. On 
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October 16, 2015, Wife filed an answer and new matter to the divorce 

complaint.1 The court entered a divorce decree on September 12, 2016. On 

October 5, 2016, Husband filed a timely notice of appeal and a voluntary 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Husband raises three issues for our review:

WAS THE APRIL 15, 2014 TWO-PAGE DOCUMENT WITH 

SOME OF ITS TERMS HANDWRITTEN SO VAGUE THAT NO 

MEETING OF THE MINDS OCCURRED BETWEEN 

[HUSBAND] AND [WIFE], AND THUS NO ENFORCEABLE 

CONTRACT EXISTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES?

WAS A FULL AND FAIR DISCLOSURE OF THE PARTIES’ 

FINANCIAL POSITIONS EVER MADE, AS IS REQUIRED FOR

ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA?

DID [HUSBAND] SIGN THE TWO-PAGE DOCUMENT UNDER 

DURESS, RENDING THE EXECUTED DOCUMENT 

UNENFORCEABLE?

(Husband’s Brief at 4). 

Our review of a marital settlement agreement implicates the following 

principles:

A settlement agreement between spouses is governed by 

the law of contracts unless the agreement provides 

otherwise.

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1 We observe the trial court entered an order on November 9, 2015, allowing 

Husband to appeal from the October 22, 2014 order enforcing the PSA. On 

December 8, 2015, Husband filed a notice of appeal from the October 22, 

2014. On February 5, 2016, this Court sua sponte quashed Husband’s

December 8, 2015 appeal as interlocutory, because the trial court had not 

yet entered a divorce decree and the November 9, 2015 order failed to 

comply with Pa.R.A.P. 341(c). 
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* * *

Because contract interpretation is a question of law, 

this Court is not bound by the trial court’s 

interpretation. Our standard of review over 

questions of law is de novo and to the extent 

necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as the 

appellate court may review the entire record in 

making its decision. However, we are bound by the 

trial court’s credibility determinations. 

* * *

When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, 

the trial court is the sole determiner of facts and 

absent an abuse of discretion, we will not usurp the 

trial court’s fact-finding function. On appeal from an 

order interpreting a marital settlement agreement, 

we must decide whether the trial court committed an 

error of law or abused its discretion. 

[Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1257-58 

(Pa.Super. 2005)].

Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa.Super. 2007) (some 

internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

[U]nder the law of contracts, the court must ascertain the 

intent of the parties when interpreting a contractual 

agreement. The standard of enforceability of a contractual 

agreement is also clear: absent fraud, misrepresentation, 

or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of their 

agreements. As such, a trial court may interpret a 

property settlement agreement as it would a contract, but 

it has neither the power nor the authority to modify or 

vary the decree unless there is conclusive proof of fraud or 

mistake. Moreover, the long-standing law of this 

Commonwealth is that property settlement agreements are 

presumed to be valid and binding upon the parties. 

When construing agreements involving clear and 

unambiguous terms, a trial court need only examine the 

writing itself to give effect to the parties’ understanding. A 
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court may not modify the plain meaning of the words 

under the guise of interpretation. In addition, this Court 

must consider such contracts without reference to matters 

outside of the document, and we must ascertain the 

parties’ intentions when entering into the contract from the 

entire instrument. Also, the parties are bound without 

regard to whether the terms were read and fully 

understood and irrespective of whether the agreements 

embodied reasonable or good bargains.

Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

Generally, a contract is enforceable if its terms are “certain and 

explicit, not vague or indefinite.” Potter v. Leitenberger Mach. Co., 70 

A.2d 390, 392 (Pa.Super. 1950). The language of a contract “should be 

interpreted in the light of the subject matter, the apparent object or purpose 

of the parties and the conditions existing when it was executed.” Hart v. 

Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 333 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 695, 

897 A.2d 458 (2006). “When the words of a contract are clear and 

unambiguous, the meaning of the contract is ascertained from the contents 

alone.” Chen v. Chen, 586 Pa. 297, 307, 893 A.2d 87, 93 (2006). “If left 

undefined, the words of a contract are to be given their ordinary meaning.” 

Kripp v. Kripp, 578 Pa. 82, 90, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (2004). “In the 

absence of an ambiguity, the plain meaning of the agreement will be 

enforced.” Murphy v. Duquesne University Of The Holy Ghost, 565 Pa. 

571, 591, 777 A.2d 418, 430 (2001). “The meaning of an unambiguous 

written instrument presents a question of law for resolution by the court.” 
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Id. 

“Before a court will interpret a provision in...a contract in such a way 

as to lead to an absurdity or make the...contract ineffective to accomplish its 

purpose, it will endeavor to find an interpretation which will effectuate the 

reasonable result intended.” Pocono Manor Ass’n v. Allen, 337 Pa. 442, 

446-47, 12 A.2d 32, 35 (1940). An agreement is valid “if the parties 

intended to form a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving 

an appropriate remedy.” Jeannette Paper Co. v. Longview Fibre Co., 

548 A.2d 319, 324 (Pa.Super. 1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 577, 559 A.2d 

38 (1989). Furthermore, if the “vagueness as to some terms was not so 

overwhelming that it voided the basic understanding which was found to 

exist between the parties” the contract is valid. Id. at 325.

A postnuptial agreement requires a “full and fair disclosure of the 

parties’ financial positions.” Stoner v. Stoner, 572 Pa. 665, 671, 819 A.2d 

529, 532 (2003). The disclosure need not be precise, as long as it is “full 

and fair.” Simeone v. Simeone, 525 Pa. 392, 403, 581 A.2d 162, 167 

(1990). Full and fair economic disclosure can be waived and such waiver is 

enforceable absent a showing of “fraud, misrepresentation, or duress.” 

Lugg v. Lugg, 64 A.3d 1109, 1113 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

“Economic duress renders a contract voidable.” Nat’l Auto Brokers 

Corp. v. Aleeda Dev. Corp., 364 A.2d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 1976). “[T]he 

elements in the applicability of the doctrine of economic duress or business 
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compulsion are that (1) there exists such pressure of circumstances which 

compels the injured party to involuntarily or against his will execute an 

agreement which results in economic loss, and (2) the injured party does not 

have an immediate legal remedy.” Id. at 474. (citations omitted). “[T]here 

can be no duress where the contracting party is free to come and go and to 

consult with counsel before assuming...contractual obligations,” even if the 

contracting party was surprised by negotiations and pressured into accepting 

contractual obligations. Degenhardt v. Dillon Co., 543 Pa. 146, 155 n.4,

669 A.2d 946, 951 n.4 (1996). See also Simeone, supra, at 404, 581 

A.2d at 167 (holding no duress existed when plaintiff was able to consult 

with legal counsel); Adams v. Adams, 848 A.2d 991, 994 (Pa.Super. 2004) 

(holding divorce settlement agreement was valid, because no duress existed 

when wife had opportunity to consult with counsel even though wife 

experienced stress and anxiety during divorce process). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1030 provides as follows:

Rule 1030. New Matter

(a) Except as provided by subdivision (b), all affirmative 

defenses including but not limited to the defenses of 

accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, consent, 

discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of 

consideration, fair comment, fraud, illegality, immunity 

from suit, impossibility of performance, justification, 

laches, license, payment, privilege, release, res judicata, 

statute of frauds, statute of limitations, truth and waiver

shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading under the 

heading “New Matter”. A party may set forth as new 

matter any other material facts which are not merely 

denials of the averments of the preceding pleading.
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(b) The affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk, 

comparative negligence and contributory negligence need 

not be pleaded.

Pa.R.C.P. 1030. Rule 1032 reads in part:

Rule 1032. Waiver of Defenses. Exceptions. 

Suggestion of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or 

Failure to Join Indispensable Party

(a) A party waives all defenses and objections which are 

not presented either by preliminary objection, answer or 

reply, except a defense which is not required to be pleaded 

under Rule 1030(b), the defense of failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to 

join an indispensable party, the objection of failure to state 

a legal defense to a claim and any other nonwaivable 

defense or objection.

Pa.R.C.P. 1032(a). Importantly, the list of affirmative defenses contained in 

Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a) is not exclusive. Falcione v. Cornell School District, 

557 A.2d 425, 428 (Pa.Super. 1989). “An affirmative defense is 

distinguished from a denial of facts which make up a plaintiff’s cause of 

action in that a[n affirmative] defense will require the averment of facts 

extrinsic to the plaintiff’s claim for relief.” Id. at 428-29. “Failure to plead 

an affirmative defense in compliance with [Pa.R.C.P.] 1030 results in waiver 

of the defense.” Werner v. Werner, 573 A.2d 1119, 1121 (Pa.Super. 

1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 668, 593 A.2d 843 (1991); Pa.R.C.P. 

1032(a). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Pamela A. 
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Ruest, we conclude Husband’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinions

comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the questions presented. 

(See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed October 17, 2016, at 1 unpaginated; Trial 

Court Opinion, filed October 22, 2014, at 2-5) (finding: (1) parties 

negotiated settlement of their marital estate from December 2013, when 

Husband informed Wife he wanted to divorce, until April 2014; parties 

intended PSA to settle their marital estate amicably; PSA specifies allocation 

of real estate, alimony, retirement money, joint financial accounts, vehicles, 

jewelry, family antiques, and inherited possessions; under circumstances, 

parties’ intent was clear; (2) Husband waived full economic disclosure,

because he knew when he entered into PSA that appraisal of marital

residence was not complete; court will not question reasonableness of 

Husband’s negotiation of agreement; (3) Wife’s purported actions do not 

amount to economic duress; Husband testified Wife offered him 24 hours to 

consult with counsel before signing agreement; Wife’s alleged conduct also 

does not constitute traditional duress, because Husband alleged no threat of 

physical harm; further, purported threats Wife made to Husband were not 

impending; rather, Wife provided Husband 24 hours to discuss PSA with his 

attorney; further, Husband signed PSA on same day; therefore, Husband 

was not under “duress” to sign agreement). The record supports the trial 

court’s rationale. 

With respect to Husband’s specific complaints about the PSA, Husband 
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failed to raise any affirmative defenses to Wife’s petition to enforce the PSA, 

such as ambiguity, lack of full and fair disclosure, and duress. These claims 

are affirmative defenses, which required Husband to aver facts extrinsic to 

Wife’s petition in order to prevent enforcement of the PSA. See Falcione, 

supra. Husband averred in his answer to Wife’s petition that the PSA was

ambiguous but did not explain what terms of the PSA were vague. See id. 

Because Husband failed to raise his affirmative defenses in response to 

Wife’s petition to enforce the PSA, the defenses are waived. See Werner, 

supra. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinions. 

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2017
Circulated 11/02/2017 02:31 PM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CENTRE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL ACTION- LAW 

ROBERT O'CONNOR, 

Plaintiff 

v. No. 2014-0011 

JANICE O'CONNOR, 

Defendant 

Attorney for Plaintiff: 

Attorney for Defendant: 

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Laura Robbins, Esq?" 

Rosadele Kauffman, Esq. 

Opinion in Response to Matters Complained of on Appeal 

Ruest, J. 

Robert O'Connor ("Plaintiff') filed a Notice of Appeal contemporaneously with a 

Statement of Matters Complained of Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

1925(a) on October 5, 2016. Plaintiff appeals from this Court's Opinion and Order entered on 

October 22, 2014, granting a Petition to Enforce Property Settlement Agreement. The Court 

believes the matters Plaintiff complains of on appeal have been adequately addressed in this 

Court's Opinion and Order entered on October 22, 2014. The Court relies on that opinion and 

order and respectfully submits that no further opinion is necessary at this time. 

Date: Oe..-1-12foe.r 17 ,10/ to 

00 ORD CIS 

BY THE COURT: 

f 

Wo-v 

Pamela A. Ruest, Judge 
Circulated 11/02/2017 02:31 PM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CENTRE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL ACTION 

ROBERT O'CONNOR, 

Plaintiff No. 2014-0011 

v. 

JANICE O'CONNOR, 

Defendant 

Attorney for Plaintiff: Laura Robbins, Esq. - 

Attorney for Defendant: Rosadele Kauffman, Esq. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Ruest, J. 

Presently before the Court is a Petition to Enforce Property Settlement Agreement filed 

by Defendant Janice O'Connor on June 13, 2014. The Court held hearings on this matter on 

July 29, 2014 and August 13, 2014. The parties thereafter timely filed briefs on September 12, 

2014. Upon consideration of the record, the briefs, and the arguments of counsel, the Court is 

now ready to render its decision. 

Background 

Plaintiff Robert O'Connor ("Husband") and Defendant Janice O'Connor ("Wife") were 

married on July 1, 1978. On December 22, 2013, Husband told Wife he wanted a divorce. On 

the following day, he presented her with a document titled "Divorce Ideas/Proposal." On April 

15, 2014, the parties signed an agreement prepared by Wife and interlineated by the parties. 

On April 23, 2014, Husband's attorney sent Wife's attorney a letter indicating that she had 

reviewed the signed agreement and that the letter was to be considered a written revocation of 

Husband's signature as he had signed it under duress and did not agree to its terms. 

O RD MS 
Wife filed a Petition to Enforce Property Settlement Agreement on June 13, 2014. 

Husband filed an Answer on July 29, 2014. Hearings were held on this matter on July 29, 2014 

and August 13, 2014. 

Discussion 

Wife seeks to enforce the Agreement the parties signed on April 15, 2014. Husband 

alleges that it is unenforceable because he signed it under duress, it is too vague to be 

enforceable, and there was no full and fair disclosure of the marital estate. The Court will 

address each of Husband's arguments in turn. 

I. Duress 

Husband first argues that the Court should not enforce the Agreement, which both 

parties agree should be treated as a contract, because he signed it under duress According to 

Husband's testimony, Wife presented him with an Agreement and threatened she had 

downloaded his hard disc and was using information found on the hard disc to blackmail him. 

He testified that she told him she would give him 24 hours to sign or she would send a copy of a 

2009 email from Husband criticizing a U.S. Senator to the Senator; inform his employer, the 

National Science Foundation, that he had used his work email to place an illegal bet on an 

NCAA pool; and send his girlfriend and her adult children copies of passes to a gay club he had 

attended in the 1990s. Husband stated that Wife told him he had 24 hours to sign before she 

acted on her threats, and he could think about it on his drive from State College, Pennsylvania 

to Arlington, Virginia. Husband signed the Agreement before he left State College on April 15. 

He stated that he did so because he thought her threats regarding his reputation to his employer 

and girlfriend were credible and the Agreement was too vague and unfair to be enforceable. 

"[A]losent fraud, misrepresentation or duress, spouses should be held to the terms of 

their agreements." Lugg v. Lugg, 2013 PA Super 67, 64 A.3d 1109, 1112. Accordingly, 

contracts made under duress-either traditional duress or economic duress-may be avoided 

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under certain circumstances Husband cites to case law regarding the economic duress 

doctrine, while Wife cites to case law involving traditional duress. The Court will therefore 

consider both defenses to enforcing the Agreement. 

"[The elements in the applicability of the doctrine of economic duress or business 

compulsion are that (1) there exists such pressure of circumstances which compels the injured 

party to involuntarily or against his will execute an agreement which results in economic loss, 

and (2) the injured party does not have an Immediate legal remedy." Nat'l Auto Brokers Corp. 

v. Aleeda Dev. Corp 243 Pa. Super. 101, 364 A.2d 470, 474 (1976) (citations omitted). 

Traditional duress is "[t]hat degree of restraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened 

and impending, which is sufficient in severity or apprehension to overcome the mind of a person 

of ordinary firmness." Lugg v. Lugg, 64 A.3d at 1113 (citing Adams v. Adams, 414 Pa.Super. 

634, 607 A.2d 1116, 1119 (1992)). "Moreover, in the absence of threats of actual harm there 

can be no duress where the contracting party is free to consult with counsel." Id. In the instant 

matter, Wife's actions as presented by Husband do not amount to economic duress or duress 

because by Husband's own testimony Wife offered him 24 hours to consult with counsel before 

signing the Agreement. Husband cannot satisfy the second element of economic duress 

because Wife provided him an opportunity to seek legal remedies. Similarly, because Husband 

does not allege that Wife threatened him with physical harm, the elements of traditional duress 

are not met because Wife specifically offered him 24 hours to discuss the Agreement with his 

attorney. In fact, less than 24 hours after signing the Agreement, Husband emailed Wife to 

further discuss it. Husband emailed Wife that same day at 11:58 p.m. asking if alimony could 

be reduced if she got remarried or cohabitated and if she would consider reducing her share of 

the consulting income from 60% to 50% or even 25%. There was therefore no duress. 

II. Vagueness 

Husband argues the Court should not enforce the Agreement because the Agreement is 

too vague for a court to ascertain the parties' intent to a reasonable degree of certainty. in 

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support of his argument, Husband reviews the facts of one employment law case from 1922 

where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to enforce an employment contract "for life" 

between an employer and an employee. See Edgcomb v. Clough, 275 Pa. 90, 118 A.2d 610 

(1922). The Court finds it telling that Husband did not cite to any case in Pennsylvania where a 

court refused to enforce a post -nuptial agreement because it was too vague. 

The Court's goal in interpreting a post -nuptial agreement is to "ascertain and give effect 

to the parties' intent." Laudig v. Laudig, 425 Pa. Super. 228, 233, 624 A.2d 651, 653 (1993). 

To do so, the court "may take into consideration the surrounding circumstances, the situation of 

the parties, the objects they apparently have in view, and the nature of the subject -matter of the 

agreement." Id. (internal citations omitted). "The court will adopt an interpretation that is most 

reasonable and probable bearing in mind the objects which the parties intended to accomplish 

through the agreement." Id. In this case, the parties negotiated from December 2013, when 

Husband informed Wife of his intention to seek a divorce, until April 2014 regarding settling their 

marital estate. In December 2013, Husband drafted a document titled "Divorce Ideas/Proposal" 

specifying that "[t]he more we can agree on things, the happier we will be and the less we will 

pay to lawyers." It is clear that the parties' intent in signing the April 15, 2014 agreement was to 

settle their marital estate amicably. The agreement specifies allocations of real estate, alimony, 

retirement money, joint financial accounts, vehicles, jewelry, family antiques, and inherited 

possessions. The Court cannot find based on these circumstances that the intent of the parties 

was vague. 

III. Full and Fair Disclosure 

Husband argues that the Court should not enforce the Agreement because Wife did not 

make a full and fair disclosure of the marital estate to Husband and the Agreement does not 

provide Husband with reasonable provisions. In 2003, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

explained that "the postnuptial agreement should be evaluated as any other contract. All that is 

required is full and fair disclosure of the parties' financial positions; inquiry into the 

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reasonableness of the bargain or the parties' understanding is improper." Stoner v. Stoner, 

572 Pa. 665, 819 A.2d 529, 532 (2003). "null economic disclosure is waiveable in a postnuptial agreement." Lugg v. Lugg, 64 A.3d at 1113. In this case, Husband alleges that Wife 

did not provide him with a full and fair disclosure of the value of the Boalsburg, Pennsylvania, 

property because the appraisal was not complete at the time the parties' executed the 

Agreement on April 15, 2014. The Court finds that Husband waived full economic disclosure 

because he knew at the time he entered the Agreement that the appraisal was not complete. 

The Court will not inquire into the reasonableness of the bargain on behalf of Husband pursuant 

to Stoner v. Stoner, 572 Pa. 665, 819 A.2d 529, 532 (2003). 

Accordingly, the following Order is entered: 

ORDER 

AND NOW, this 22nd day of October, 2014, the Petition to Enforce Property Settlement 

Agreement filed by Defendant Janice O'Connor on June 13, 2014 is GRANTED. 

BY E COURT: 

g)ILL I -7(L11 O ' (JA -9-1k 

Pamela A, Ruest, Judge 

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