15-3010

Izmirligil v. Whelan

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.  CITATION TO A SUMMARY

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE

OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.  WHEN CITING A

SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE

FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ).  A

PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED

BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in

the City of New York, on the 2nd day of September, two thousand sixteen.

PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

DENNY CHIN,

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

Circuit Judges.

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DR. ARIF S. IZMIRLIGIL,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v. 15‐3010‐cv

THOMAS F. WHELAN, Individually and in his

Official Capacity as Justice of the State of New York,

Supreme Court of Suffolk County,

Defendant‐Appellee.

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FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: Arif S. Izmirligil, pro se, Miller Place, New

York.
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FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLEE: Mark H. Shawhan, Assistant Solicitor General

of Counsel (Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor

General, on the brief), for Barbara D.

Underwood, Solicitor General and Eric T.

Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of

New York, New York, New York.

   

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

New York (Feuerstein, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff‐appellant Arif Izmirligil appeals the judgment of the district court

entered August 28, 2015, dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint in favor of

defendant‐appellee Thomas F. Whelan, presiding justice of the New York State

Supreme Court, Suffolk County.  By an amended opinion and order dated August 25,

2015 and accompanying denial in part of Izmirligilʹs motion for reconsideration of an

earlier order, the district court granted Whelanʹs motion to dismiss Izmirligilʹs

complaint on the grounds that his claims were barred by sovereign and judicial

immunity.  We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural

history of the case, and the issues on appeal.   

We review a district courtʹs dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

de novo, Rivers v. McLeod, 252 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2001), and the denial of a motion for

reconsideration for abuse of discretion, Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P.,

684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012).  We may affirm on any basis for which there is a sufficient
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record, Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1993), and may consider issues related

to subject matter jurisdiction at any time, even those raised for the first time on appeal,

Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 250 (2d Cir. 2008); see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(h)(3).  

Upon review, rather than affirm for the reasons stated by the district

court, we affirm on the basis that Izmirligilʹs claims are barred by the Rooker‐Feldman

doctrine.  ʺUnder the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction

over cases that essentially amount to appeals of state court judgments.ʺ  Vossbrinck v.

Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).  The Rooker‐Feldman

doctrine has four requirements: ʺ(1) the federal‐court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the

plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites

review and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state judgment was rendered before

the district court proceedings commenced.ʺ  Id. (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted).   

Those requirements have been met here.  Izmirligil lost in state court and

the order ʺof which [he] ʹcomplainsʹ . . . and which he seeks to have remediedʺ was

rendered before he filed his complaint below.  Id. at 427.  Because Izmirligil is

essentially seeking review of the state court proceedings, the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine

bars his claims.  Id.; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293

(2005) (observing that the ʺparadigmʺ Rooker‐Feldman case involves a plaintiff

ʺrepair[ing] to federal court to undoʺ a state judgment).  For the same reason, we
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conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Izmirligilʹs

request for reconsideration of the dismissal order.   

We have considered Izmirligilʹs remaining arguments and conclude they

are without merit.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

     FOR THE COURT:

     Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk