United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-2704

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Katherine L. Woitaszewski

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska

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Submitted: January 10, 2023

Filed: May 4, 2023

[Unpublished]

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Before GRASZ, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Katherine Woitaszewski entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon 

in possession of a firearm and possessing a stolen firearm. On appeal, Woitaszewski 
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argues the district court1 erred by denying her motion to suppress incriminating 

statements and evidence because law enforcement should have provided warnings

under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We affirm.

I. Background

Based on information from a confidential informant, United States Deputy 

Marshal Daniel Potter believed Woitaszewski, a former inmate with outstanding 

arrest warrants, was planning to assist a prison break. Deputy Potter sought 

assistance from the Omaha Police Department. He told the Omaha Police 

Department that Woitaszewski and the confidential informant would be in a black 

Ford F-350 near the airport in Omaha, Nebraska. Two City of Omaha police officers

pulled over a truck that matched the description. Deputy Potter later identified 

Woitaszewski, at which point she was removed from the truck and placed in 

handcuffs. While Woitaszewski was exiting the truck, Deputy Potter asked whether 

she had a weapon. It is unclear what, if anything, Woitaszewski said in response.

Woitaszewski was eventually placed in the back of a patrol car. In total, 

approximately eighteen minutes elapsed between the truck stop and when 

Woitaszewski was placed in handcuffs. Sometime after Woitaszewski was placed 

in the patrol car, she asked to speak with Deputy Potter. When Deputy Potter walked 

up to Woitaszewski, she told him there was a gun in a backpack in the truck. An 

officer searched the backpack and found a gun, ammunition, and drugs. Notably, 

Woitaszewski received no Miranda warnings before she was asked if she had a 

weapon or before she said there was a gun in the backpack. 

Following her arrest, Woitaszewski was indicted for being a felon in 

possession of a firearm and possessing a stolen firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

1

The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Nebraska, adopting the report and recommendation of the 

Honorable Susan M. Bazis, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of 

Nebraska.
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(j), and 924(a)(2). Woitaszewski later filed a motion to suppress incriminating 

statements and evidence obtained during the traffic stop. After an evidentiary 

hearing, the magistrate judge recommended the district court deny the motion. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b). The district court overruled 

Woitaszewski’s objection, adopted the recommendation, and denied the motion to 

suppress.

Woitaszewski later pled guilty but preserved the right to appeal the district 

court’s denial of her motion to suppress. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). After the

district court sentenced Woitaszewski to 54 months of imprisonment, Woitaszewski

timely appealed.

II. Analysis

Woitaszewski raises a single issue on appeal: whether the district court erred 

by denying her motion to suppress because law enforcement should have provided 

her Miranda warnings before she volunteered incriminating information. Under 

Miranda, “a law enforcement officer, prior to conducting custodial interrogation, 

must advise the suspect of his [or her] right to be free from compulsory selfincrimination and to the assistance of counsel.” United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 

F.3d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 2003). A district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based 

on Miranda is subject to a mixed standard of review: we review legal conclusions 

de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Sanchez, 676 F.3d 627, 

630 (8th Cir. 2012).

Woitaszewski argues she was subject to custodial interrogation under 

Miranda when Deputy Potter asked if she had a weapon while Woitaszewski was 

exiting the truck. It is unclear whether Woitaszewski responded to the question, but 

a number of events followed: Woitaszewski was placed in handcuffs, a female 

officer was called to conduct a pat-down search, the female officer arrived and 

completed the pat-down search, Woitaszewski said goodbye to her dog, and law 

enforcement placed her in the back of a patrol car. Woitaszewski later asked one of 
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the police officers, multiple times, if she could speak with Deputy Potter. When 

Deputy Potter finally approached Woitaszewski, he told her that he would talk to her 

later. Woitaszewski nonetheless volunteered to him that there was a gun in a 

backpack in the truck.

We need not decide whether Woitaszewski was subjected to custodial 

interrogation when she was asked if she had a weapon. Even assuming Deputy 

Potter subjected Woitaszewski to custodial interrogation under Miranda, any

questioning by Deputy Potter unambiguously ended before Woitaszewski reinitiated the conversation and volunteered incriminating information. “An unwarned 

statement is admissible if it is made voluntarily after police questioning has ended.” 

United States v. Bailey, 831 F.3d 1035, 1038 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. 

Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 612–13 (8th Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Harris, 64 

F.4th 999, 1002 (8th Cir. 2023). Accordingly, the district court did not err by 

denying the motion to suppress. See Bailey, 831 F.3d at 1038; Briones, 390 F.3d at 

612–13.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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