UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4856

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ALEXANDER ROLAND FRAZIER, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Sol Blatt, Jr., Senior District 

Judge. (2:09-cr-00906-SB-1)

Submitted: April 7, 2011 Decided: April 22, 2011

Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Alexander Roland Frazier, Jr., pleaded guilty to 

possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted 

of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one 

year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). The 

district court sentenced Frazier to eighty-four months of 

imprisonment, and he now appeals. His counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

questioning whether the district court complied with Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 and whether the sentence was reasonable. Frazier 

has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm. 

Counsel first questions whether the district court 

complied with the requirements of Rule 11. Prior to accepting a 

guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with the defendant, 

must inform the defendant of, and determine that he understands, 

the nature of the charges to which the plea is offered, any 

mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he 

faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing by pleading 

guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The court also must determine 

whether there is a factual basis for the plea. Id.; United 

States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). The 

purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure that the plea of 
3

guilty is entered into knowingly and voluntarily. See United 

States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002). 

Because Frazier did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is 

reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 

517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Frazier] 

must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and 

that the error affected his substantial rights.” United 

States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if 

Frazier satisfies these requirements, “correction of the error 

remains within our discretion, which we should not exercise 

. . . unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our review of 

the record reveals substantial compliance with Rule 11. We 

therefore conclude that Frazier pleaded guilty knowingly and 

voluntarily.

Counsel next questions whether the sentence is 

reasonable. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying 

an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 

330, 335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 290 (2009). In so 

doing, we first examine the sentence for “significant procedural 

error,” including “failing to calculate (or improperly 
4

calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 

mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) 

[(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 

sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We then “‘consider the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.’” United 

States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). If the sentence is within the Guidelines 

range, we apply a presumption of reasonableness. United 

States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see Rita v. 

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-59 (2007) (permitting 

presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence). 

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 

that the sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. 

The district court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines 

range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, responded to Frazier’s

arguments at sentencing, and thoroughly explained its chosen 

sentence. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th

Cir. 2009) (district court must conduct individualized 

assessment based on the particular facts of each case, whether 

sentence is above, below, or within the Guidelines range). 

Moreover, Frazier cannot overcome the presumption of 

reasonableness we accord his within-Guidelines sentence. 
5

In his pro se supplemental brief, Frazier argues that 

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a 

Guidelines enhancement despite Frazier’s request that counsel so 

object. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s performance was 

deficient,” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984). With respect to the first prong, “the defendant must 

show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In addition, 

“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 

deferential.” Id. at 689. Under the second prong of the test 

in the context of a conviction following a guilty plea, a 

defendant can show prejudice only by demonstrating “a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

We will address a claim of ineffective assistance on 

direct appeal only if the lawyer’s ineffectiveness conclusively 

appears on the record. United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 

233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). Upon review, we conclude that 

ineffective assistance does not conclusively appear on the face 

of the record, and therefore we decline to address this claim on 

direct appeal.
6

We have examined the entire record in accordance with 

the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues 

for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. This court requires that counsel inform Frazier, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Frazier requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Frazier. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED