Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

Order 

May 8, 2009 

137326 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137326 

 COA: 287160 

Wayne CC: 92-000334; 

92-000335 

MONTEZ A. STOVALL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 3, 2008 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s 

motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). 

KELLY, C.J. (dissenting) 

In 1991, defendant shot and killed two victims. With respect to each killing, he 

pleaded guilty of second-degree murder. Both pleas involved a sentence agreement 

under which defendant would be sentenced to parolable life imprisonment. 

At the plea hearing, his counsel stated, “I’ve advised [defendant] that the statute 

permits the Parole Board to consider him for [parole] at the end of ten years on this type 

of life sentence . . . .” Defendant later moved to withdraw his pleas, arguing that defense 

counsel had misled him concerning the likelihood that he could be paroled from his life 

sentences. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding 

that defendant’s pleas were freely, voluntarily, and understandingly made. This Court 

denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal.1

Defendant then filed two unsuccessful motions for relief from judgment. This is 

defendant’s third such motion. Although MCR 6.502(G)(1) states that a court must 

return without filing any successive motions for relief from judgment, MCR 6.502(G)(2) 

 

1 People v Stovall, 446 Mich 862 (1994). 
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

May 8, 2009 

p0505 

 

2

provides an exception to that rule when a retroactive change in the law has occurred. 

Defendant argues that, because the Michigan Parole Board has established a policy 

that “life in prison means life in prison,” the trial judge and defense counsel operated 

under a misunderstanding of the law when he was sentenced. Thus, defendant claims that 

he is entitled to resentencing because he did not understand the consequences of his 

guilty plea. Furthermore, defendant claims that changes in the parole board’s policy 

regarding life sentences that went into effect in 1992 and 1999 violate the Ex Post Facto 

Clause of the United States Constitution.2

Defendant relies on Foster Bey v Rubitschun,

3

 a federal case in which United 

States District Judge Battani held that the parole board policy changes in question 

violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when retroactively applied to prisoners. Judge Battani 

noted that (1) the board’s understanding of its ability to exercise its discretion in light of 

its changed policy, (2) its redefinition of the eligibility procedure for non-mandatory life 

sentences, and (3) the changes in the timing and intervals of the interview and review 

process have significantly disadvantaged prisoners with parolable life sentences. 

This issue has been addressed by the Court of Appeals.4

 But this Court has never 

spoken on whether the changes in the parole board’s policy constitute a violation of the 

Ex Post Facto Clause. The issue is jurisprudentially significant and a resolution of it by 

this Court is long overdue. Accordingly, the Court should grant defendant’s application 

for leave to appeal to consider the issue presented in Foster Bey and hear this case along 

with People v Washington, ___ Mich ___ (Docket No. 137518, order entered May 8, 

2009). 

 

2

 US Const, art I, § 10, cl 1. 

3 Foster Bey v Rubitschun, 2007 LEXIS 95748 (ED Mich, 2007). 

4 See People v Hill, 267 Mich App 345 (2005).