NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 11a0634n.06 Nos. 10-6489, 10-6541
UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.
MARCUS S . CHANDL ER and KENN ETH N. CI ERS,
Def

endants-A

ppellants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR T HE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF KE NTUCKY

BEF ORE: COL E, ROGERS, and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es.
GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e.
Def endants-a ppellants Marc us S. Chandler and Ke nneth N. Ciers e ach e ntere d conditional

g uilty pleas to conspirac y to distribute and possess with intent to distribute Oxy codone, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846, with Cha ndler also pleading g uilty to posse ssion of a firea rm in further ance of drug traff icking , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)( A). On appea l, both defe ndants challeng e the
denial of the ir motions to s uppress. Upon r eview, w e af firm.

I

. The undisputed fa cts of this matter we re summar ized by the district court a s follows: [This case ] commence d [ o n J an u ary 26, 2010,] when Serg eant Bill Birke nhauer
rec eived a telephone call

. . . from Br ian Ha m i l t o n reg arding drug activity being conduct ed b y his roommate, Marc us Chandler. Although Hamilton initially expressed a desire to rema in anony mous, he ultimately identified himself to Serg eant Birke nhauer

. Hamilton advised t hat Chandler was selling larg e quantities ofNos. 10-6489 / 10-6541

United States v. Chandler / Ciers

Ox y contin and that he made fre quent trips to Norther n Ohio for that purpos e. Serg eant Birke nhauer obtained Hamilton’s name, addre ss and telephone number and assig ned the matter

to Ag ent B rett B enton for f urther inve stiga tion. Ag ent Be nton met with Hamilton later on J anuary 2 6 , 2 0 1 0. At that time and throug h later contac ts with Hamilton, Be nton lear ned additional details reg arding the drug opera tion being conducte d by Def endant Chandler. I n rele vant part, Hamilton advised ag ents of the NKDSF that Chandler made trips to Norther n Ohi o at least
ever y other wee k, that Chandler would pay for Oxy contin and obtain a new shipment
on eac h trip, that the supplier was from Detroit, Michig an, that Chandler would meet with his source of supply at Ex it 122 or at the Wendy ’s restaur ant just off Ex it 125, that the supplier drove a dark colore d sedan, and that Chandler never drove himself but would employ differ ent drivers. Hamilton claimed to have the details of Chandler’ s opera tions beca use he had previously acte d as his driver. Hami l t o n provided further details, including that Chandler would obtain a full tank of g as and supply the d

r iv e r —usually an addict—with an 80 mg tablet of Oxy contin in exchang e for driving him to Norther n Ohio. Acc o rd i n g to Hamilton, the person with whom Chandler would meet to obtain additional drug s in exchang e for pay ment was not the main supplier.
Hamilton also provided the ag ents with information reg arding his living arr ang ement with Chandler. Acc ording to Hamilton, he beg an living with Chandler afte r C handler ’s fathe r was either arr ested or investiga ted by the L exington Dr u g Enforc ement Ag ency for selling larg e quantities of Oxy contin. At that time, the DEA
was also investiga ting Chandler. And acc ording to Hamilton, Chandler maintained
a safe for the storag e o f Ox y contin at his house that he share d with Hamilton. Fur ther, after the initial call, ag ents wer e able to confirm many of relevant details. For example, they wer e able to confirm that Chandler’ s fathe r had been investiga ted and ar rested in L exington for distributing O x y contin.
On Februa

ry 4, 2010, Hamilton notified Ag ent B enton that C handler was planning to make another trip to Norther n Ohio to purcha se 100 to 200 Oxy contin tablets and
was looking for a driver. Ag ents of the NKDSF then conducte d surveillance of Chandler’ s residenc e and observe d a black For d F–150 truck arr ive at that location. (Ag ents later identified [Daniel W.] Profitt a s the driver of the For d truck.) Ag ents followed the truck a

nd observe d two stops, including one at a gas station, befor e it returne d to Chandler’ s residenc e. Although Hamilton was n o t at h ome at the t ime of this activity , he was in contac t with Chandler (and NKDSF ag ents) by telephone.

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United States v. Chandler / Ciers

Hamilton was advised by Chandler throug hout the d a y th a t Cha ndler planned to make his usual trip to Norther

n Ohio to o b t ain Oxy contin and that the t ransa ction would take place at the Wendy ’s restaur ant parking lot near Ex it 125. Howeve r, Chandler advised Hamilton tha t he was having difficulty finding a driver and that it might be
nece ssary for Hamilton to drive. L ater that afte rnoon, howeve r, Chandler advised Hamilton that Profitt had ag ree d to drive him to Norther n Ohio. (A cc o rdi ng to Hamilton, Profitt had previously purcha sed Oxy contin from Chandler .)

Ba sed on the information rec eived from Hamilton, Serg eant Birke nhauer contac ted t h e Oh io Hig hway Patrol and spoke with Serg eant Schultz to advise him o f t h e ong oing investiga tion and the events wh i ch wer e expected to transpire at the Wendy ’s restaur ant in Norther n Ohio. Serg eant Birke nhauer reque sted that the Ohio Hig hway Patrol assist with surveillance at the restaur ant and Serg eant Schultz ag ree d to place a n unmarke d unit in the restaura nt’s parking lot.
Chandler and Profitt left the Chandl er/Ha milton residenc e in Profitt’s black For d truck in the ear ly evening on Fe bruar y 4, 2010, and wer e followed by members of the NKDSF as they proce eded to the Wendy ’s restaur ant parking lot just off Ex it 125 in Norther n Ohio. The truck rema ined in constant surveillance during the trip and made
no other stops during the three hour drive. Shortly afte r Chandler and Profitt arr ived and enter ed the restaur ant, a black Oldsmobile Alero sedan drove into the parking lot and parke d next to the black truck belong ing to Profitt. Profitt stay ed inside, but Chandler exit ed the restaur ant, walked to the black Oldsm o b ile, opened the passeng er- side door and enter ed the vehicle. L ess than five minutes later, Chandler exit ed the sedan and returne d to the restaur ant. During this time, no one other than Chandler exit ed the sedan. After Chandler returne d to the restaur ant, the sedan left the par king lot and w as followed by an unmar ked Ohio Hig hway

Patrol vehicle.
Wit hin fiftee n minutes, Chandler and Profitt returne d to Profitt’s truck and heade d south on I nterstate 75 toward Kentucky

. Birk en h au er testified that, based on his training and experience as well as surveillance and information that had been obtained throug hout the investiga tion, he believed tha t a drug transac tion had bee n completed in th e restaur ant parking lot. Fur ther, he believed that the information initially supplied by Hamilton had been corr oborate d by the actions of Chandler and Profitt. As a result, Birke nhauer communicated this info rm ation to the Ohio Hig hway Patrol and re quested a ssistance in stopping the black Oldsmobile.
* * *

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United States v. Chandler / Ciers

Although Chandler and Profitt wer e not stopped initiall y , they rema ined under surveillance b y the NKDSF ag ents. Once Chander and Profitt wer e in Kentucky , ag ents reque sted that a mar ked cr uiser (ope rate d by Kenton County Offic er D arr ell Caldwell) assist with the traff ic stop of Profitt’s vehicle. At the time of this stop, NKDSF ag ents wer e awa re that the black Oldsmobile had been stopped and that a larg e amount of curr ency had been rec overe d from that vehicle. T h e g overnme nt conce des that no traff

ic violations were observe d conce rning Profitt’s vehicle. I nstead, the stop wa s made ba sed solely on the re quest of NKD SF ag ents.
No display of forc e was made during the traff ic stop of Profitt’s vehicle. During the stop, Birke nhauer asked Profitt to ex p l ai n t h e purpose of t he trip and was told that he had driven Chandler to Ohio to “look at a truck.” Profitt and Chandler wer e then asked to ex i t the vehicle and wer e patted-dow n for wea pons but none wer e discovere d. Shortly afte r the stop, a drug dog was broug ht to the scene
. (Two ag ents involved in the surveillance had trained canine s.) As an agent place d his arm on Chandler’ s arm to g uide him to an office r’s patrol car , the ag ent felt an unusual bulge
on Chandler’ s arm, gi ving him rea son to investiga te further

. This investiga tion resulted in the di scover

y of 140 Oxy contin tablets taped to Chandler’ s b i ce p ar ea. Chandler and Pr o fi t t we re then place d under arr est. Approxim ately 15 minutes elapse d from the stop until the arr est of the two De fenda nts in Kentucky

. Following their arr est, Chandler and Profitt wer e transporte d to the L ak esi de Park/Crestview Hills police station and questi o n ed by NKDSF ag ents. Both Chandler and Profitt made admissions reg arding their conduct. Additionally , Chandler provided the ag ents with wr it ten consent to sear ch his residenc e. Following this sear ch, ag ents discovere d additional presc ription pil l s , d rug para pherna lia,
curr ency , and a stolen ha

ndg un.
* * *
After leaving the Wendy ’s restaur ant parking lot, the Oldsmob ile Alero was followed by Trooper Stacey Arnold of the Ohio Hig hway Patrol. Trooper Arnold has 16 y ear s experience as a law enfor ceme nt office r with the past 12 y ear s spent on enfor ceme nt of criminal laws and 10 y ear s as a canine handler

. Trooper Arnold was provided with details of the investiga tion by Serg eant Schultz as it was rel ay ed to him by the Ken t u ck y ag ents. Arnold testified that she followed the Oldsmobile for approximately 60 miles afte r it left the Wendy ’s lot. Ar o u n d m i l epost 187, the vehicle c rossed the r ight e dg e line of the highw ay “more than once ” and f

luctuated its spee d from the speed limit to slightly over the speed limit

. She then stopped the vehicle f o r the unm arke d lanes viol ation under O.R.C. § 4511.33. The traffic stop
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United States v. Chandler / Ciers

occur red at 9:17 p.m. I n addition to Trooper Arnold, Serg eant Schultz participa ted in the stop. The vehicle was drive n by Def endant Ke nneth Ciers. Trooper Arnold testified that, as she approa ched Ciers’ vehicle, the driver was observe d making “fur

tive movements” around the cente r console a r e a
. U p o n r equest, Ciers produce d his drivers license and reg istration. These documents confirme d that Ciers resided in the Detroit, Michig an are a. Troope r Ar nold advised Ciers that he had been stopped for crossing over the lane line, and fluctuating speed, and asked if he was too tired to drive or if he had been drinking

. Ciers responde d in the neg ative to both questions. I n addition to his license and reg istration, Ciers produce d a “stac k of paperwor

k,” ex plaining that he had previously had som e is sues wit h h i s driving privileg es. Howeve r, he indicated that the paper work would confirm that the issues had been resolved. Acc ording to T ro o p er Arnold, Ciers was “fumbling ” with the paper work and appea

red to be “ver

y nervous.” I n addition, his h an d s ap p eared to [be] shaking

. When asked about the trip to Ohio, Ciers responde d that he had arg ued with a family member in Michig an and was driving to “g et some air.” Ar nold testified that she found this re sponse “suspicious.” Trooper Arnold asked Ciers to exit the vehicle while S erg eant Schu l t z ra n a check of the paper

work Ciers had provided. Although Ciers indicated that he did not have any wea pons on his person, Trooper Arnold observe d that Ciers “blade d” his body two times, which she descr ibed as an attempt to conce al something on his rig ht side. Concer ned about the possibili ty of a wea pon, Arnold instructed Ciers to take his hands o ut of his pockets and then proce eded to conduct a pat-down. During the
course of the pat-down, Arnold observe d a larg e bundle of money i n C i er s ’ rig ht jacke t pocket. Due to the belief that Ciers might also have a wea pon in his pocket, the Def endant wa s handcuf

fed. Although no wea

pon was found, Trooper Arnold rea d Ciers his Miranda rig hts, advised him he was under investiga tive detention, and place d him in the rea r seat of Schultz ’s vehicle to permit her trained drug dog to sear ch the vehicle. Although the dog aler ted to the prese nce o f d rug s, no drug s wer e found. Acc ording to Trooper Arnold, the lack of drug s was not particula rly unusual beca

use the dog will aler

t even if drug s were prese nt rec ently beca use an odor will rema in in some instances. The Ohio office rs then notified the NKDSF that they had rec overe d $9,900 in curr ency
. Ciers was detained for ap p rox imately 24 minutes from the time Trooper Arnold activate d her lights until Ciers was taken to the near by police station. There , police confiscated the curr ency but did not immediately char g e Ciers with any felony offe nses. The total incident time was listed on Trooper Arnold’s repor t as being one hour, twenty

minutes.
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United States v. Chandler / Ciers

United States v. Chandler , Criminal Ac tion No. 2: 10–23–D CR, 2010 WL 2870723, at *2-5 (E.D. Ky . J uly 20, 2010) (f

ootnotes omitt ed). Following their indic t m en t on various fede ral drug crimes, both Chandler and Ciers filed
motions to su p p re s s evidenc e stemming from the Fe bruar y 4, 2010, traff

ic stops. These motions

wer e ref err ed to a mag istrate judge who, afte r conducting a hear ing and rec eiving testimony , denied
both m o t i o n s
. Soon there afte r, the district court adopted the mag istrate’s repor t and

rec ommendation, overr

uling de fenda

nts’ objections. Chandler and Ciers then ente red c onditional

g uilty pleas, rese rving the rig ht to appea l the denial of their suppression motions. Following

sentenc ing, both de fenda

nts filed timely

appea ls.

I I

. “The g rant or denial of a motion to suppress is a mix ed question of fac t and law. On appea l,

we revie w the district court’s finding s of fac t fo r cl ea r error and its conclusions of law de novo.”
United States v. Ellis , 497 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). A fa ct u al fi n d i n g is
clea rly err oneous when, althoug h there may be evidenc e to support it, we are “lef t with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). I n revie wing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the evidenc e in the light most
favor able to the g overnme nt. United States v. Coffee , 434 F.3d 887, 892 ( 6th Cir. 2006).

I I I

. We beg in our analy sis wi t h the claims of Chandler, who challeng es the denial of his suppression motion on two g rounds: first, Chandler arg ues that the traff ic stop of Profitt’s ve hicle

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was not supported by rea sonable suspicion, and second, he arg ues that the leng th of the traff ic stop
exceede d the bounds of a constitutionally -per missibl e Terry stop. We disag ree with both asser tions.
The Four th A mendment’s protec tions a g ainst unrea sonable sear ches and seizures “‘e x tend

to brief investiga

tory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arr est.’” United States v. Luqman , 522 F.3d 613, 616 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002))

. Nonethele ss, if a law enfor ceme nt office r has rea sonable suspicion that criminal activity

1
is a foot, the office r may

conduct a

brief tr aff

ic stop for investig ative purpose s to c onfirm or dispel his suspicions. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). Rea sonable suspicion require s more than a mere hunch, but is satisfied by a likelihood of criminal activity less than probable cause , and falls considera bly short of satisfy ing a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standard. I f an office r possesses a particula rized and objective basis for suspecting the particu l ar person of criminal activity based on specific and articula ble fa cts, he may

conduct a Terry stop. Dorsey v. Barber , 517 F.3d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 2008) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Rea sonable suspicion for an investiga tive stop must be [assessed] under the totality of the
circ umstances, considering all of the information available to law enfor ceme nt officia ls at the time” of the stop. Humphrey v. Mabry , 482 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2007) (interna l quotation marks and
citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion can be g leane d from the investiga ting office r’s own direc t
observa tions, dispatch information, an d d i rec tions from other office rs. Dorsey , 517 F.3d at 395.

Moreove r, “[t] he totality of the circ umstances analy sis permits police office rs to draw on their own

I t is undisput ed that a seiz ure under the Four th Amendment occurre d in this case and tha t 1 Chandler, as a passeng er in Prof itt’s ve hicle, may contest the lawfulne ss of the stop. See B rendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007).
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experience and specialized training to make infe renc es fr om and deductions about t he cumulative
information available to them that might well el ude an untrained person.” Ellis , 497 F.3d at 613 (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “individual fac tors, taken as a whole, [m ay ]

g ive rise to rea sonable suspicion, even if eac h individual fac tor is entirely consistent with innocent
behavior when examined separ ately .” United States v. Perez , 4 4 0 F. 3d 363, 371 (6th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted).

I n the present case , we a g ree with the district court that the initial stop of Profitt’s vehicle
fell well within the acc eptable para meters of a lawful Terry stop based upon a rea sonable suspicion
of criminal activity

. I ndeed, the office rs rec eived detailed information from Hamilt on, a known
informant who had direc t knowledg e of Chandler’ s drug -re lated activities. Ha milton was able to predic t w hen Chandler would lea ve his reside nce, the manner of trave l, the location of the alleg ed

narc otics transac tion, and the g ener al appea ranc e of the supplier’s vehicle. All of these predic tions

wer e there afte r confirme d by law-e nforc ement surveillance

. I n addition, the observe d behavior of
Chandler in quickl y en t er i n g and exit ing the black sedan, and the discovery of a larg e amount of

curr ency in Ciers’s pocke t, provided fur ther support for

the brief stop of Profitt’s vehicle. 2

I n contesting the exis tence of rea sonable suspicion, Chandler asser ts that Hamilton was not

a reliable informant. Once ag ain, we disag ree
. Tips from identified citizens, such as Hamilton, have

a high deg ree of reliability , in part beca use such witnesses risk adver se conseque nces for providing

Chandler emphasizes that the office rs did not direc tly observe any criminal activity

. “While 2 true, this [arg ument] misses the point beca use if any criminal activity had been observe d, our inquiry would be whe ther proba

ble ca use existed.” Perez , 440 F.3d a t 372 n.1.

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faulty information. United States v. Caruthers , 458 F.3d 4 5 9 , 465 (6th Cir. 2006). Moreove r,
Hamilton had direc t knowledg e of C handler ’s drug -re lated activities beca use he was Chandler’ s

roommate and had assisted Chandler in a previous drug transac tion. See Alabama v. W hite , 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990) (noting that an informant’s “basis of knowledg e” is “hig hly rele vant” to assessing
informant re liability ). Finally , a larg e portion of the information provided by Hamilton a ccur ately predic ted Chandler’ s future behavior

. See United States. v. Cohen , 481 F.3d 896, 899 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n anony

mous tip that acc urate ly predic ts a subj ect’ s future be havior in deta il can be c redited
with a special familiarity with [t he subj ect’ s] aff airs and thus bear s su fficient indicia of reliability

to provide rea sonable suspicion.”) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). Acc ording ly , the
information provided by Hamilton was sufficie ntly reliable t o s u pport a finding of rea sonable suspicion, supply ing a

basis upon which to per form a la wful Terry

stop.
I n his second claim of error, Chandler asserts that even if the s to p o f P ro fi t t’s vehicle was supported by rea sonable suspicion, the duration of the stop was unrea sonable and there fore exceede d
the bounds of Terry . This arg ument is without m erit.
A Terry stop must not only be justified at its inception, but also “must be rea sonably rela ted
in scope to the circ umstances which j u s t i fi ed the interfe renc e in the first place .” United States v.
B l a i r , 524 F.3d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 2008). Acc ording ly , the detention must last no longe r than i s

nece ssary to car

ry out the purpose of the stop. United States v. Garcia , 496 F.3d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 2007). “To assess wh et h er a detention was too long to be justified as an investiga tive stop, [we]
‘examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investiga tion that was likely to confirm

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or dispel their suspicions quickly .’” Perez , 440 F.3d a t 372 (quoting United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)).

I n this case , there is no evidenc e in the rec ord indicating that the office rs wer e any thing but diligent in conducting the investiga tive detention. Following their initial questioning, Chandler and
Profi t t were remove d from their vehicle and sear ched for wea pons. There afte r, office rs beg an to

escor t Chandler and Profitt to the marke d patrol car s wher e they wer e to be temporar ily detained for
the duration of the on-site investiga tion. I t was at this time that office rs felt an unusual bulge on
Chandler’ s biceps, which led to the discovery of the narc otics at issue. We find this sequenc e of

events to demonstrate a reasonable and di lige nt investiga tion. See Houston v. C lark Cnty. Sheriff Deputy Joh n Do es 1 -5 , 174 F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding an investiga tive stop to be

rea sonable when it “included sever al steps, all of them rea sonably nece ssary to ensure the office rs’
safe ty or to confirm or dispel their suspicions”). Moreove r, while we d o not adopt “rig id time
limit ation[s] ” for permissible Terry stops, Perez , 440 F.3d at 372, it is rele vant to note that the stop
in this case lasted no longe r than 15 minutes befor e the narc otics wer e discovere d. Cf. Sharpe , 470
U.S. a t 688 (“We reje ct the contention that a 20-minute stop is unrea sonable when the police have

acte d diligently and a suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay about which he complains.”).
Acc ording ly , for the rea sons stated above, we aff irm the district court’s denial of Chandler’ s
motion to s uppress.
I V.

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United States v. Chandler / Ciers

We now move to the claims of Ciers, who also challenge s the denial of his suppression
motion. To beg in, we note that Ciers does not dispute the lawfulne ss of the initial stop of his
vehicle. I ndeed, Ciers conce des that law-e nforc ement officia ls possessed probable cause to believe
that a traff

ic violation occur

red and rea sonable suspicion to believe that Ciers was rec ently involved
in a narc otics transac tion. See Terry , 392 U.S. at 30–31; Gaddis v. Redford Twp. , 364 F.3d 763, 771
n.6 (6th Cir. 2004). Additionally , Ciers does not challeng e the constitutionalit y of the pat-down

sear ch that led to the discovery of the curr ency
. See Benne tt v. City of Eastpointe , 410 F.3d 810, 822 (6th Cir. 2005). Rather, Ciers asser ts tha t w hen Trooper Arnold observe d the curr ency in his open jacke t pocket, she was not constitutionally permitted to seize it. This claim, howeve r, fails for two

rea sons: first, Ciers forf

eited any claim reg arding the seizure of the curr ency by neg lecting to raise
the issue befor e the district court, see Poplar Creek Dev

. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C

. , 636
F.3d 235, 242 n.5 (6th Cir. 2011) , and sec ond, Ciers’s claim fails on its mer its be cause the seizure falls within the plain-view e x ception to the wa rra nt require ment.
“Unde r the plain view doctrine, ‘if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating char acte r is immediately appar ent, and if the office rs have a lawful rig ht
of ac cess to the objec t, they may seize it without a wa

rra nt.’” United States v. Herndon , 501 F.3d 683, 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Minnesota v. Dicke rson , 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993))

. I n this case , Ciers admits that Trooper Arnold was in a lawful position from which to view the curr ency and had
“a lawful rig ht of acc ess.” Howeve r, Ciers asser ts that the incriminating nature of the curr ency was

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not “immediately appar ent,” there by preve nting the application of the plain-view doctrine. We disag ree
. I n deter mining whether the incriminating nature of evidenc e is “immediately appar ent,” we assess three factors, “none of which is nece ssary but eac h of which is instructiv e[

. ] ” Garcia , 496
F.3d a t 510. These f

actor s are : (1) a nexus betwee n the seized object and the [su s p ec t ed criminal activity ]; (2) whether the intrinsic nature or appea ranc e of the seized object g ives probable cause to believe that it is associate d with c riminal activity ; and (3) w hether the executing office rs can at the time of discovery of the object on the fac ts then available to them deter mine probable cause of the objec t’s incriminating nature

. Id. (interna l quotation marks, citation, and empha sis omit ted).

I n the case at bar, there was a strong nexus betwee n the purpose of the investiga tory stop and
the curr ency
. I ndeed, law-e nforc ement officia ls had rea sonable suspicion to believe that Ciers had

rec ently participa ted in an illegal n arc otics transac tion. Moreove r, while the mere possession of

curr ency is innocent beha v i o r, t h e large amount of curr ency possessed by Ciers was unusual. 3 Finally , no additional i n v es t igation was neede d to establish the likely connec tion betwee n the

curr ency and the suspected narc otics transac tion. There fore , the incrim inating nature of the 4

curr ency was “immediately ap p ar en t

. ” See United States. v. Gree n, 599 F.3d 360, 376 (4th Cir.

The diameter of the bundle of curr ency was four to four- and-a-half inches thick, there by 3 indicating a likelihood of a la rg e amount of mone y
. Ciers contends that the incriminating nature of the curr ency was not immediately appar ent 4 to Trooper Arnold. Howeve r, this asser tion is not supported by the rec ord. More importantly , Trooper Arnold’s subjective belief s play no role in our probable-c ause analy sis. W hren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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2010) (holding the incriminating nature of a larg e sum of money to be “immediately appar ent” when
defe ndant was suspe cted of drug -re lated activities); United States v. Bustos-Torres , 396 F.3d 935,
945 (8th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ) (h o l d i n g a larg e sum of curr ency to likely be “evide nce of the drug trade ”);
United States v. Hernande z-Rivas , 348 F.3d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding seizure of $10,000
cash under plain-view doctrine when “the deputy had rea son to believe that the money was proce eds
of the drug traff

icking ”); United States v. Riascos-Suarez , 73 F.3d 616, 625 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that “bundles of cash strewn about the inside of the vehic le” we re pr operly seized under the plainview doctrine) (over

ruled on other g rounds by Muscare llo v. United States , 524 U.S. 125 (1998))

. 5
There fore , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s denia l of Ciers’s motion to suppress.

V.
We affir m.

Be cause we find that the seizure of the curr ency falls within the plain-view exception to the 5
war rant require ment, we need not addre ss whether the seizure would also be permissible under the “plain-f eel” doctrine. See Garcia , 496 F.3d at 505 (“[A]n office r may seize an object whose contour or mass makes its identity as contra b an d i m m ediately appar ent.”) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted).
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