### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A SS IG N E D O N BR IE FS S E PT E MB E R 2 , 200 8
TENNES SEE RE ALTY DEVEL OPMENT, I NC. v. S TAT E OF TENNES SEE ( DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPO RTATI ON) a nd AMERI CAN

TELEP HON E A ND TELE GRA PH (A T&T )

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Henry County No. 20624 Ron E. Harmon, Chancellor

No. W2008-00722-C OA-R3-C V - Filed Dec ember 29, 2008

I n this ap p e a l, w e ar e a s k e d to d e te r mi n e w h e th e r

th e c h an c e r

y c o u rt e r r e d in f a il in g to a ll ow Ap pe lla nt t o p ro c e e d w ithdis c ov e ry a ft e r t he S tat e of

Te nn e sse e fi le d it s Mo tio n to Di smi ss, in dismiss ing A

ppellant’s Complaint and Amende d Complaint base d solely on argument, without any proof by testimony

or docume ntation , and in di smissi ng Appellant’s Complaint and Amende d Complaint i n reg ards to B ellSouth which did not file a m otion to dis miss or present e vidence or do c ume ntatio n p ri or

to t he c ourt ’s dis mis sa l. O n a pp e a l, Ap pe lla

nt c on te nd s that it

wa s e nti tle d to proce ed with discover

y befor e the c ourt ruled on the State’s motions. L ikewise, Appe llant argues that the State should have be en re quired to prove owner ship of an eas em en t ri gh t of way over Appellant’s property . Finally , Appellant conte nds that beca use B ellSouth filed only

a Notice of Appea ranc e, Appe llant’s claim ag ainst Be llSout h should not have bee n dismiss ed. We aff irm the trial court’ s dismis sal.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the C hancery Court Affir med

A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J.,W.S., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined.

W. Brown Ha wley, II , Paris, TN, for Appellant T. Leigh Jones, Senior Counsel, Offic e of the Att orney Gener al, J ackson, TN, for Appe llee State of Tenne ssee
Lo uis F. A lle n, Am y Fe rg us on Du de k, Me mph is, TN , f or Ap pe lle e Be llSo uthTe le c ommun ic a tio ns , Inc., inc orre ctly sued as Ame rica n Telephone and Te legra ph (AT&T)

OP IN IONA ccor di ng t o B el l Sou t h’s appel l at e br i ef , A pp el l ant ’ s C om pl ai nt and A m ended C om pl ai nt i ncorr ect l y s ued 1 A m er i can Tel epho ne & T el egra ph ( A T & T ) , w hi ch i s a ctu all y nam ed B el l Sou t h T el ecom m un i cat i on s , I nc. (“ B e llS o u th ” ).
-2- I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
Acc ording to the brief of Americ an Te lephone a

nd Teleg raph ( here inafte r “BellSouth” or “Appe llee”) , on November 14, 2006, a ser

vice outag e wa s repor

ted at the pos t office in Springville, 1 Tenne ssee. A B ellSouth technician, who wa s dispatched to investigate t he outage , deter mined that service was lost when B ellSouth’s telephone ca ble, which wa s located in the State of Tenne ssee’ s rig ht of way , “wa s augured into by someone dig g ing post holes f or a f ence .” That fenc e, ac cording to Be llSout h, was be ing c onstructed by Tenne ssee Rea lty

Deve lopment, I nc. ( “A p p ell ant” or “Te nnessee Realty ”), w hose primar y owner is J ames Hobbs ( “Mr. Hobbs” ).

I n Dec ember

2006, Be llSout h contac ted W illiam Hazlerig , the Director of Maintenanc e for the Tenne ssee Depa

rtment of Transpor

tation ( “State”) , to a dvise him of the see ming e ncroa chment on the State’s rig ht of way by Tenne ssee Realty

. The State commence d an investig ation, and ver ified that Tenne ssee Rea lty ’s fenc e had been built on the State’s rig ht of way . By a letter dated De cembe r 15, 2006, Mr. Hazlerignotified M r. Hobbs that Tenne ssee Rea lty ’s fe nce w as located within the State’s r ig h t o f

w a y an d mu s t b e r e mo v e d

w it h in te nd ay s o r

th e St a te w o u ld

r e mo v e th e f

ence , pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 54-5-136. This letter c ited a spec ific map a nd parc el
numbe r as we ll as hig hw ay pla ns and de e ds tha t su pp or te d th e State ’s ow ne rs hip of the e a se me nt. The State’s brief states that, on Fe bruar y 26, 2007, Mr. Hazlerig rec eived a letter from T en n essee Realty ’s counse l c laiming that the State had abandone d its rig hts of way ease ment and noting that other tra cts had e rec ted fe nces on the rig ht of way . Acc ordingto its Memorandum in Support of Mo tio n to Di smi ss, the State , bet wee n F e br ua ry and June 20 07 , id e nti fi e d th os e oth e r t ra c ts w ith
encr oachme nts, and notified t he respective owners of the required removal pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 54-5-136. Ag ain, by a letter d ated June 21, 2007, the State notified Tenne s s e e Re a lt

y o f it s e n c r o a c h me n t a

n d f u rth e r s tate d th a t, a f te r r e v ie w in g T e n n e s s e e Re a lt y ’s leg al position, it found that Tenne ssee Rea lty was not absolved fro m m o v i n g t he fe nce. Afinal
no tic e wa s se nt t o T e nn e sse e Re a lty on Au g us t 8, 20 07 , a llo wi ng fi ve a dd iti on a l da y s f ro m th e date of re ceipt bef

ore the State would remove Tenne ssee Rea lty ’s fenc e at Tenne ssee Rea lty ’s expense.

Tenne ssee Rea lty

did not remove it s fenc e fr om the State’s alleg ed rig ht of way , but instead filed a Complaint in the Henry County Chance ry

Court on Aug ust 27, 2007. The ac tion sought “a Dec laratory

J udg ment as to the rig hts a nd interests of the[] parties [i n the subject proper ty ] .

. . [and]
a Pe rm ane nt I

nju nc tio n r e str ic tin g [the State ’s and B e llSo uth ’s ] futur e ri g hts to i nte rf e re wi th [Te nn e sse e Re a lty ’s ] futur e us e of the land , a

nd fo r a jud g me nt a

wa rd ing[ Ten nes see Re a lty ’s ] dama g e s, re nts and a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. ” Te nn e sse e Re a lty ’s Com pla int e sse nti a lly

a lle g e d thre e iss ue s: (1) the State ha d abandone d its right of way ease ment; ( 2) B ellSouth was not entitled to use the rig ht of wa y ; and (3) th e State se le c tiv e ly

e xer c ise d it s r ig ht t o r e mov e e nc ro a c hme nts by fo rc ingon ly Tenne ssee Rea lty

and no other s to remove the c laimed enc roac hment.-3-

On Octobe r 12, 2007, the State filed a Motion to Dism iss, pursuant to Tennesse e Ru l e of Civil Procedur e 12.02, cla iming that, under the doctrine of sover eig n immunit y , Tenne ssee Rea lty ’s action wa s barr ed, and, f

urther, that Tennesse e Rea lty had fa iled to state a cla im upon which relief could be g ra n t ed. S ubsequently , Tenne ssee Rea lty filed an A mended Complaint on November 6, 20 07 , a lle g inginv e rs e c on de mna tio n f or wh ic h c omp e ns a tio n mu st b e pa id, a s an a dd iti on a l c a us e of ac tion, under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 29-16-123. The State then f iled an Amende d Motion to Dism iss and Objection to Amende d Complaint on November 29, 2007. The State moved the cour t to strike or deny

Tenne ssee Realty ’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 15.01 bec ause the Amended Complaint was f iled without the leave of

the Court or the wr itt e n c on se nt o f t

he a dv e rs e pa

rt y . A lte rn a tively , th e State ’s Am e nd e d M oti on to D ism iss , ag ain, ar g ued for

dismiss al base d on the cour t’s lack of jurisdiction a

nd Tenne ssee Rea lty ’s fa ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief could be g rante d.

On Dec ember

31, 2007, Tenne ssee Rea lty fi l ed a Motion to compel the State “ to make
arr ang ements for

the discover

y deposition of cer

tain of its employ ees, a long w ith other persons of interest to [Tennessee Realty ], or, in the alternative, t o schedule a dis cover y confe renc e.” T ennesse e Realty claimed that c ourt intervention wa s nece ssary beca use the State re fused to schedule discove ry depositions absent a court order requiring such. The S tate responded to Tenne ssee Rea lty ’s Motion by statin g that Tenne sse e Re a lty wa s usin g dis c ov e ry a s a mea ns of “ c ir c umv e nt[i ng ] the thr e sh old jurisdictional issues.”

After a hea ring on Fe bruar

y 4, 2008, the Henr

y County Chance ry

Court entere d an Or der Gra nting Motion to Dismiss and Amended Motion to Dismis s. The cour t stated:

After hear ing a

rguments of counse l (which i ncluded [Tennesse e Re a lty ’s ] co un se l’ s in sis te nc e that th e State of Te nn e sse e sh ou ld prove ow nership of the subject ea sement as a condition prec edent with o r to it s M o ti o n ) , th e Co u rt f in d s th a t D e f

e n d an t’ s ( St a te of Tenne ssee) Motion to Dism iss and Amended Motion to Dismiss are well taken a

nd should be g rante d. Th e C o urt finds that [Tennessee Re a lty ’s] Mo ti on to C omp e l and [its] i ns ist e nc e that th e State mus t put on proof as to owne rship are there fore not well taken a nd there fore denied.

I T I S TH ERE F OR E ORD ERE D that the De fe nd ant’ s ( State of Te nn e sse e ) M oti on

to D ism iss and

Am e nd e d M oti on

to D ism iss
are g ra nte d an d that this ca se is the re fo re dis mis se d in its e nti re ty to all parties. This appea l followed.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTEDA ppe l l a n t d o e s n o t a s k t h i s Co u r t t o c o n s i d e r whe t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t l a c k e d s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n or 2

w het her A ppel l ant ’ s Com pl ai nt f ai l ed t o r ai s e a cl ai m upon w hi ch r el i ef c oul d be gr ant ed, s uch t hat t he gr ant i ng of t he S ta te ’s M o tio n to D ism iss w a s a p p ro p ria te . T h u s, w e w ill n o t ad d re ss th o se issu e s o n a p p e a l.
-4- Appellant has timely filed i ts notice of appea l and presents the foll owing issues for re view as stated in its brief: 2

1. Was [ Tenne ssee Rea lty ] entit led to proce ed with reque sted discovery (depositions) af ter the fi lin g of the [Sta te ’s ] Mot ion

to D ism iss ? 2. Was the Court corre ct in dismiss ing the orig inal Complaint as amended ba sed solely on the argument of counse l f

or the [S tate] w ithout any proof e ither by testimony

or docume ntation? 3. Was the Court

c or re c t in di sm is si ng the or ig ina l Co mpl a int a s ame nd e d in

re g ard to “B el l S o u t h , ” w h o fi l edn o M o t i o nt o Di s m i s s an d wh o p re s en t edn o e v i d e n ce t h ro u gh te sti mony or do c ume ntatio n p ri or

to t he Court ’s dis mis sa l of

the Com pla int ?

F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on

of the c ha nc e ry c ourt

.
III
. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW
As g ro un ds fo r i ts M oti on to Di smi ss and Am e nd e d M oti on

to D ism iss , th e State g e ne ra lly
c ite d Te nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 12 .0 2. Ho we ve r, ba se d o n th e langua g e of bo th d oc ume nts , it appear s that the State moved for dismiss al base d on Rule 12.02(1), a rguing that the chanc ery

court did n o t h av e subject matter jur isdiction to adjudicate the c laim, and 12.02(6), c laiming that Tenne s s e e Re a lt

y h a d f a il e d to s tate a c la im u

p o n w h ic h r e li e f c o u ld b e g r an te d

. I n its Order Gra nting Motion to Dismiss, t he cha ncer y court fa iled to spe cify upon which g round the motion was g ra nte d; h ow e ve r, our s tand ard of re vie w i s th e same re g ard ingbo th gro un ds

. Our Supreme Court, in Nor thl an d I ns . Co. v . S

tate , 33 S.W .3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000) , set forth the a

ppropriate standard f

or re viewinga motion to di s m i s s fo r l ack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court stated:

A motion to dismiss for lack of subje ct matter jurisdiction fa lls under Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 12.02(1)

. The c oncept of subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s lawful authority to adjudicate a controve rsy

broug ht befor e it. See M

eighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co. , 9 24 S.W. 2d

63 2, 63 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. S l oan , 1 8 0 T e n n

. 2 2 0 , 2 3 0 , 1 7 3 S. W. 2 d 4 3 6 , 4 4 0 ( 1 9 4 3 )

. Subject matter jurisdiction involves the nature of t he cause of action and the relief soug ht, see Landers v . Jones , 872 S

. W.2d 674, 675 (Tenn. 1994), an d

c ano n ly b e c o n f e r r e d o na c o u rt b y c o n s ti tuti o n a l or leg islative act. See Kane v. Kane , 547 S.W .2d 559, 560 (Tenn. 1977) ; Com pu te r S ho pp e, I nc . v . S tate , 780 S.W .2d 729, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App.-5- 1989). Since a

deter mination of whether

subject matter jur isdiction exis ts, is a question of law, our standard of revie w i s de novo, without a pre sumption of corre ctness. See Ne lson v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 8 S.W .3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999)

. No rthl and Ins. C

o. , 33 S.W .3d at 729.

L ike wi se , th e de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in ru lin g on a mot ion to d ism iss for f ailure to state a

claim upon which r elief c ould be g rante d is a question of law. Do ev . Ca tho lic Bis hop fo r Dioc ese

of Memphis , No. W2007-01575-COA-R9-CV, 2008 WL4253628, at *3 (Te nn. C t

. Ap p

. S ep t

. 1 6 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Farris v. Todd , No. E1999-01574- COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL528408,
a t *2 (T e nn . Ct . App . M ay 3, 20 00 ))

. Thus , this Court mus t r e vie w the tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g on a Rul e 12.02(6) motion to dismi ss de novo with no p re s u m p t i on of cor rec tness. Id. (c i t i n g Stein v. Davidson H

o t el Co. , 9 45 S.W. 2d

71 4, 71 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ). “ ‘[W]e mus t c on str ue the [pla int if

f’ s] complaint liberally

in favor of

the plaintiff, taking all of the alleg ations of fac t the rein as true[,]’” Id. (q u o t i n g Randolph v. Dominion Bank of Middle Tenn. , 826 S.W .2d 477, 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)) , as “[a] moti on to dismiss for failure to state a cla im for which r elief c an be grante d ‘tests only the leg al suffic iency

of the c omplaint[ .]’” Id. (q u o t i n g Ste in , 945 S.W .2d at 716 (Te nn. 1997)).

IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. D isc ov e ry On appe al, Appellant a sserts that the cha ncer y court erre d when it fa iled to allow Tenne ssee Realty to proce ed with re quest ed discove ry afte r the State filed its Motion to Dismi ss. Appellant
c la ims that th e a

pp e lla te br ie fs su

bmi tte d b y bo th the State and B e llSo uth

un c ov e re d r e le va

nt f a c ts of wh ic h App e lla

nt w a s una

wa re . App e lla

nt a rgue s “ [i]t wa s the se fa c ts and se ve ra l mo re e qu a lly as per tinent which [Appellant] s oug ht to identify and expand throug h the discover y proce ss denied by the Trial Court.” H oweve r, in Hende rson v. Bates , N o

. W2 0 0 5

- 0 1 5 0 6

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 6 WL 360844 (Tenn. Ct. App. Fe b. 17, 2006), this Court considered this issue. In Hende rson , a n inmate plaintiff appe aled the tr ial court’s dismissal of hi s ca s e, cla iming that the tria l court er red by dismiss ing pla intiff’s civil rig ht action bef ore he could conduc t discovery or re spond to the d ef en d ant’s mot ion to dism iss. I n aff irming the trial court, we stated, “[o]bvi ously , when consideringa motion to dism iss for fa ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d, we a

re limit ed to the examination of the complaint alone .” Id. at * 2 (c i t i n g W olcot t s F i n

. S er v. , Inc. v

. McRe ynolds , 807 S.W .2d 708 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)) . Thus, we he ld that the trial court did not e rr in suspending disc overy

and fa iling to allow plaintiff to re spond to the motion t o dismiss , as neither would have be nefitted plaintiff. Id. at *4.

I n th e ins tant c a se , w e , li ke wi se , fin d that fur the r dis c ov e ry wo uld have be e n o f n o b e ne fi t to Appellant, as Rule 12.02 motions to d i s m i s s t es t only the suffic iency

of the c omplaint. Rose v. Coo ke v ill eRe g’ l Me d. Ctr

. , N o. M2 00 7- 02 36 8- CO A- R3- CV
, 20 08 WL20 78 05 6, a t *4 (T e nn . Ct

.-6-

Ap p

. M ay 1 4 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Pe nd le ton v . M ill s, 73 S.W. 3d 11 5, 12 0 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 01 )) . T hu s, we f ind that the trial court did not er r in failingto allow Appellant t o proce ed with re quested discovery afte r the State filed its Motion to Dismi ss.

B. Dism issal Wi thou t Proof

Next, Tennessee Realty

asser ts that the chancer

y court e rre d in dismi ssing its Complaint and Amended Complaint based sole ly on the ar g ument by

the State’s Counsel, without any proof e ither by testimony

or docume ntation. More specifica lly , Appellant cla ims that the St ate should have been require d to prove its owner ship of the ease ment rig ht of way and also that Tenne ssee Realty ’s fe nce had enc roac hed upon such.

I n ru lin g on a Te nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 12 .0 2 mot ion , the tr ia l c ourt c on sid e rs on ly the suffic iency of the complaint, rathe r than the streng th of the plaintiff’s e vidence

. Ros e , 2 0 0 8 WL 2 0 7 8 0 5 6 , at * 4 (c i t i n g Pe nd le ton v . M

ill s, 7 3 S.W .3d 115, 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)) . More specific ally , a Rule 12.02(6) motion for failure to state a c laim upon which re l i ef can be g rante d claims that eve n if all of the “ rele vant and mate rial fa ctual alleg ations in the complaint” ar e take n as true, the fac ts none theless fail to r aise a cause of ac tion. Id. (c i t i n g Marce aux v. Thompson, 212 S.W. 3d 26 3, 26 7 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 6) ). Th e tr ia l cou rt mus t “c on str

ue the c omp la int lib e ra lly in favor of the plaintiff, taking a ll alleg ations of fa ct as true , and deny the motion unless it appears that th e p la in ti f

f c an p r o v e n o s e t o f f

a c ts in s u p p o rt o f h e r c la im th a t w o u ld e n ti tl e h e r to r elief.” Id. (c i t i n g Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 94 5 S. W.2 d 7 14 , 7 16 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ; see W inchester v . Litt le, 996 S.W .2d 818, 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)) . L ikewise, this Court must presume the fac tual alleg ations contained w ithin the plaintiff’s complaint are true, an d “re view the tria l court’s leg al conc lusions reg ar d i n g t h e adequa cy

of the c omplaint without a presumption of corr ectne ss.” Id. (citing Marce aux, 21 2 S. W.3 d at 26 7; see LeagueCent. Credit Union v. Mottern, 660 S.W .2 d 787, 789 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983))

.

To de te rm ine the a

pp ro pr iate sta

nd ard of re vie w c on c e rnin g a

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Procedur e 12.02(1) motion to di smiss for lack of subject matter jur isdiction, we must first determine wh i ch m ethod the def

endant is employing to c halleng e such jurisdiction. “Tw o methods are
a va ila ble to c ha lle ng e a

c ourt ’s su

bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n. Th e fi rs t, a nd mos t c omm on , is a

‘f a c ia l’ challeng e. The second i s a ‘factua l’ cha lleng e.” Staats v. McKinnon , 206 S.W .3d 532, 542 (Tenn. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Tho ma s v . M ay fie ld , No. M2000-02533-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 904080, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2004); 2 J ames W. Moore e t al., Moore’ s Federal Prac tice § 12.30[4] (3d ed. 2005) ).

Under a fa cial cha lleng e, the c omplaint, its elf, is attac ked. Id. “ I t a sse rt s th a t th e c omp la int , considere d from top to bottom, fails to allege fac ts t h at show that the cour t has power

to hear the
case .” Sta ats , 2 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d at 5 4 2 (c i t i n g Crawf

ord v. U.S. Dep’ t of J

ustice , 123 F. Supp. 2d 1012,Th e S ta a ts C our t not ed t hat “ Tenn. R. Ci v. P. 12 i s s ubs t ant i al l y i dent i ca l t o Fe d. R. Ci v. P. 12, m aki ng 3 f eder al court pre cedent s per s uas i ve aut ho r i t y i n con s t r ui ng our r ul e. ” S ta a ts , 206 S. W

. 3d at 543 n. 13 ( ci t i ng B yr d v. H a ll , 8 4 7 S .W .2 d 2 0 8 , 2 1 1 n .2 (T e n n . 1 9 9 3 ); B ayberr y Ass ocs
. v. Jones , 7 8 3 S .W .2 d 5 5 3 , 5 5 7 (T e n n . 1 9 9 0 ); P a c ifi c E. Cor p. v
. G ul f Li f e H ol di ng Co. , 90 2 S.W

. 2 d 94 6 , 95 2 n.7 (T en n

. C t

. A p p

. 19 9 5 ))

. -7- 1013-14 (S.D. Miss. 2000)). “In decidinga fa cial cha llenge, the cour t considers the impug ned 3 plea d i n g and nothing else.” Id. (c i t i n g Laird v. Ramirez , 884 F. Supp. 1265, 1272 (N.D . I owa 19 95 ); Ensign-Bickford Co. v

. ICI Explosives USA, Inc

. , 817 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (D. Conn. 1993))

. Un de r a fa c ia l c ha lle ng e , “ [i]f a

c omp la int

. . . c omp e te ntl y a lle g e s any fa c ts wh ic h, if tr ue , w ou ld establish g rounds for subje ct matter jurisdiction, the c ourt must uncritically acc ept those fac ts, end its inqui ry , and deny

the dismissal mot ion.” Id. at 5 4 2 -4 3 (c i t i n g Great Lakes Educ . Consultant s v. Fed. Eme rgency

Mgmt. Agenc

y , 582 F. Supp. 193, 194 (W.D. Mich. 1984)).

I n a fa ctual challeng e, the defe ndant contends that the cour t lacks subject matter

jurisdiction even thoug h the p laintiff’s complaint “a lleg es fa cts tending to show jurisdiction.” Id. a t5 4 3

. “ It controve rts the complaint’s fa ctual a l l egations re g ardingjurisdiction, Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. W atkins , 11 F.3d 1573, 1583-84 (F ed. Cir. 1993) , and puts at issue the suff iciency of the e vidence to prove fa cts that would bring the case within the c ourt’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Ensign-Bickford Co. , 817 F. Supp. at 1023).

We c onstrue the State’s Motion to Dismiss and Amended Motion to Dismiss a s fa cial challeng es to the cha

ncer y court’s subjec t matter j u ri s d i ct i o n. Thus, in consideringthe State’s Motions, under both Rules 12.02(1) and 12.02( 6), the trial c ourt was only require d to consider Appellant’s Complaint and Amende d Complaint t o deter mine whether

the court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Appe llant’s claim, and then to de termine wh et h er Appellant’s Complaint sufficie ntly

alleg ed a claim for relief

. Henc e, we find no err or in the trial court’s ruling on the State’s motions wit hout “proof e ither by testimony

or docume ntation.” C. Di smissa l of

Be llSo uth

I n its brief, Tenne ssee Rea lty lists as a n issue for this Court’s revie w, whethe r the c hance ry court e rre d in dismi ssing its Com plaint and Amende d Complaint wit h reg ard to B ellSouth, as Be llSout h did not file a motion to dism iss, a n d i t p rese nted no evidenc e, throug h testimony or documentation, to the cour t. Howeve r, Tenne ssee Rea lty has failed to pre sent a suff icient ar g ument
conce rning this issue. Tenne ssee Rule of Civil P roce dure 27( a) pr ovides that an a ppellant’s brie f:

s h a l l c o n t a i n

. . . [ a ] n a r g u m e n t , w h i c hm ay b e p r e c e d e d b y a summary of ar g ument, setting f

orth the conte ntion o f the a ppellant with respec t to the issues presente d, and the r easons ther efor, including the rea sons why the contentions re quire a ppellate r eli ef,-8- with citations to t h e authorities and a ppropriate ref

ere nces to the
rec ord . . . re lied on[.]

“The failure of a pa

rty to cite to any

authority or to construc t an ar g ument reg ardinghis positi on on appea l constitutes waiver

of that issue.” Bog

gs Kurl and e r Ste e le , LLC v . Ho riz on Co mm c ’n s , No. M2006-00018-COA- R3-CV, 2008 WL 490628, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App

. Fe b

. 2 1 , 2008) (c iting Newcomb v. Kohler Co. , 222 S.W .3d 368, 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); se e als o Rec tor v. Halliburton , No. M1999-02802-COA- R3 -C V, 2 0 0 3 W L535924, at *9 (Te nn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2003) (per
c ur iam) ; Rh e a Coun ty

v . To wn o f G ra y sv ill e , No. E2001-02313-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 1723681, at *7 (Te nn. Ct. App. J uly 25, 2002)).

On a p p e a l, T e n n e s s e e Re a lt

y ’ s o n ly a tt e mp t a t an ar g u me n t o n th is is s u e comes in the “Statement of the Case” a nd “Statement of Fa cts” sections of i ts brief which s tate that “[ n]o formal Answer was filed by

either the [S tate] or [BellSouth] , and [ Be llSout h] only had its attorney ’s Notice of Appe ara

nce f iled[; ] “the respe ctive positions of t he par ties throug h their plea dings w ere prese nted to the Court without any proof, testim o n y o r documentation[ ;] ” and “ [o] ther than introduc tion, counsel for

[BellSouth] did not participate in the pr ocee ding, a nd, like the [S tate], produced no evidenc e of a

ny nature .” The s e s t at em ents do not provide the “ argument” and “ citation to the authorities” r equire d by

Tenne ssee Rul e o f Appe llate Proce dure 27( a). Thus, w e find, unde r Tenne ssee Rule of A

ppellate Proc edure 27(a) , that Appellant has w aived its rig ht to have the issue of B ellSouth’s dism issal considere d by this Court.

V. C ONCL US I ON

F or the a fo re me nti on e d r e a so ns , w e a ff ir m the de c isi on

of the c ha nc e ry c ourt . Co sts of

thi s appea l are taxed to Appellant, Tennesse e Rea lty Deve lopment, L L C, and its surety , for whic h
e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

AL ANE. HI GH ERS , P. J. , W .S.