1

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-1463

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

William T. Felts, Jr., *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 7, 2002

Filed: November 29, 2002

___________

Before MCMILLIAN, LAY, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

William T. Felts entered a conditional plea of guilty to possessing more than

five kilograms of cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1). Felts was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment and five

years of supervised release. Prior to his plea, the district court1

 denied Felts’ Motions

to Suppress. Under his conditional plea, Felts maintained his right to appeal. We

affirm. 
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I.

On March 21, 2001, two Nebraska State Troopers were proceeding eastbound

on Interstate 80 near Kearney, Nebraska when they noticed a Ford Excursion drive

onto the right white shoulder line, cross the line, then drive on the right side shoulder

for a distance of four to six car lengths. The troopers followed the vehicle for six

miles and, during this time, observed several similar incidents including one final

incident where the vehicle crossed the center line into the passing lane, moved

completely across the lane, crossed the yellow left side shoulder line, and drove

outside the yellow line for approximately 100 feet before returning to its original lane.

At this time, the troopers signaled for the vehicle to stop. 

Trooper Gregory Goltz testified that Felts, the driver of the Ford Excursion,

had committed three traffic violations: driving on the shoulder, careless driving, and

driving left of center. He testified it was his intent during the traffic stop to issue

Felts a warning and determine whether he was impaired. Following his initial

conversation with Felts, Trooper Goltz brought Felts back to his patrol car while he

conducted computer checks of the vehicle and a criminal background check of the

driver. At this time, Trooper Andrew Duis led his drug detection dog on a

walkaround of the Ford. The dog “indicated” near the rear passenger side. Felts then

gave permission to search the vehicle. Upon conducting the search, Trooper Duis

found over 300 kilograms of cocaine concealed in U-Haul boxes in the rear of the

Ford. 

Felts alleges the stop of his vehicle was not justified under Nebraska law and

violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He further alleges

that the extended length of the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion. As

such, he urges that his grant of consent to search the vehicle is fruit of the poisonous

tree. 
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II.

Felts’ first argument on appeal is that the traffic stop itself was not justified

under Nebraska law. Magistrate Judge Thalken held that the troopers had sufficient

cause to the stop the vehicle based on Felts’ violation of Nebraska’s careless driving

statute. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,212 (“Any person who drives any motor vehicle

in this state carelessly or without due caution so as to endanger a person or property

shall be guilty of careless driving.”). Magistrate Judge Thalken found that the

troopers’ observations of the Ford crossing over lane lines and swerving in lanes over

the course of six miles provided an objective basis for the troopers’ reasonable belief

that Nebraska statutes had been violated, or that the driver might be impaired. Once

the troopers had such a reasonable belief, they could legally stop Felts to cite or warn

him, and to further investigate his capacity to safely operate his vehicle. See

Nebraska v. Frieze, 525 N.W.2d 646, 651 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994) (“It is well-settled in

Nebraska that an officer observing a traffic violation or driving behaviors which

reasonably indicate that the driver may be operating the vehicle while under the

influence may make an investigatory stop of the vehicle.”); Nebraska v. Bowley, 442

N.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Neb. 1989) (“[A] vehicle weaving in its own lane of traffic

provides an articulable basis or reasonable suspicion for stopping a vehicle for

investigation regarding the driver’s condition in operating the weaving vehicle.”)

(citing Nebraska v. Thomte, 413 N.W.2d 916 (Neb. 1987)). 

Felts concedes that a law enforcement officer who observes a traffic violation

has probable cause to stop the vehicle. He argues, however, that he did not commit

a traffic violation by crossing over lane lines because he did not present any threat to

other traffic. Felts argues that the Nebraska careless driving statute is intended to

penalize only the operation of a motor vehicle that endangers persons or property.

He asserts that the Government did not produce any evidence that his driving

endangered persons or property. 
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We disagree. This court has held that anytime a law enforcement officer

observes a traffic offense of any magnitude, he has probable cause to make a traffic

stop. United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“Any

traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.”). See

also United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)). Here, the troopers’ stop of Felts was

not based on only one observation. Rather, it was based on the totality of the

troopers’ observations, including multiple occurrences over a six-mile stretch of road.

These occurrences demonstrated to the troopers that Felts was driving “without due

caution so as to endanger person or property.” At the very least, these observations

gave the troopers cause to investigate whether the driver was operating the vehicle

in an impaired condition. Bowley, 442 N.W.2d at 218. Under Nebraska law, the

troopers had a legitimate reason to stop Felts’ vehicle and pursue further

investigation. 

III.

Felts’ second assertion on appeal regards the length of his detention following

the initial traffic stop. Trooper Goltz testified that he told his partner he would not

bring Felts back to the patrol car unless he became suspicious about the driver or the

vehicle. If he became suspicious about either, he would ask the driver to come with

him to the police vehicle. At that time, Trooper Duis was to deploy the police service

dog to walk around the vehicle. Felts argues this testimony demonstrates that at the

time Trooper Goltz brought him back to the police vehicle, Goltz had already

established reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on his initial interview

with Felts. Felts claims the information he gave Trooper Goltz in the initial interview

was consistent with information that would be given by innocent travelers. As such,

he urges that Goltz’s suspicion was no more than a “hunch” and, therefore, was not

based on reasonable articulable facts. Further, Felts argues that at the time he was

brought back to the police vehicle, the routine tasks of a traffic stop had been
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completed. He also asserts that any further detention violated his rights under the

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 

We disagree. After having made a valid traffic stop, an officer may detain a

driver while completing a number of routine but somewhat time-consuming tasks,

such as computerized checks of the driver’s license and criminal history. United

States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation

omitted). An officer may also take time to ask questions regarding the driver’s

destination and the purpose of the trip, and may also ask for permission to search the

vehicle and act on any information that is volunteered through this questioning.

$404,905.00, 182 F.3d at 647. 

The Government asserts that the detention of Felts in the patrol car while

Trooper Goltz conducted computer checks was a continuation of the lawful traffic

stop. We agree. Furthermore, it was during this time that Trooper Duis deployed the

drug detection dog around the Ford. Once the dog alerted to the odor of a controlled

substance, the troopers had probable cause to search the vehicle. This is true whether

or not Felts gave his consent. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the district court. 

AFFIRMED. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.