alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya

Civil Action No. 11–cv–02712–REB–KMT

LEROY DAMASIO FRESQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v. 

SHERIFF TED MINKS, 

MICHAEL FISH, Detention Service Manager,

JOHN DOE (CAPTAIN), March 5, 2010,

LT. MARTINALLI,

LT. G. GITTIN,

LT. J. LUCAS,

ADMINISTRATIVE SGT. RENFRO,

SGT. TROY BETKA,

SGT. SCOTT HAPP,

SGT. STEVEN WYGANT,

OFFICER KATHRINE FEROE,

DEPUTY SHERIFF CRUMBAKER,

DEPUTY SHERIFF RYAN VIERS,

DEPUTY SHERIFF DUSTIN DYELING,

DEPUTY SHERIFF ANTHONY KOTRIS,

DEPUTY SHERIFF DONALD SPRINGFIELD,

DEPUTY SHERIFF HOLLEY,

DEPUTY SHERIFF JAMES GELEUDE,

DEPUTY SHERIFF JASON RICHARDSON,

DEPUTY SHERIFF REID PERRY,

DEPUTY SHERIFF WILLIAM BOHM,

DEPUTY SHERIFF ERIK BOUGHAM,

DEPUTY SHERIFF HERBERT LONGSHORE,

DEPUTY SHERIFF #1958 (Name Unknown),

COUNSELOR MIKE COLLINS,

COUNSELOR SUPERVISOR DEBRA ELUDO,

CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT,

CLAUDIA VAN BUREN/HSA,

RAYMOND HERR, Responsible Physician,

TRACY HAINES, LPN, and

Case 1:11-cv-02712-REB-KMT Document 70 Filed 05/18/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2
2

KATHERINE BECERRA, RN,

Defendants.

MINUTE ORDER

ORDER ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHLEEN M. TAFOYA

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s “Motion.” (Doc. No. 56, filed May 14, 2012.)

Plaintiff’s Motion seeks a court order directing Defendants or Defendants’ counsel to provide the

address of several “unserved” defendants—namely, Defendants Van Buren, Becerra, Herr, and

Correctional Healthcare Management—so that the United States Marshals Service may properly

serve these defendants. Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. No. 56) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. 

Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED to the extent that Plaintiff seeks addresses for Defendants Herr

and Correctional Healthcare Management. The docket indicates that these defendants were

served on May 2, 2012 (see Doc. Nos. 49-1 & 49-3) and counsel has since entered an appearance

on their behalf (Doc. No. 64, filed May 14, 2012). Therefore, the court will not require

Defendants to provide addresses for these defendants. 

Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED in part to the extent it seeks addresses for Defendants Van

Buren and Becerra. No later than May 25, 2012, Defendants shall file a Status Report either (1)

advising the court of forwarding addresses for Defendants Van Buren and Becerra, or (2)

advising the court that Defendants and Defendants’ counsel do not have access to, or record of,

such addresses. If the Status Report indeed includes forwarding addresses for Defendants Van

Buren and Becerra, it shall be filed under Restricted Access – Level 2. 

Dated: May 18, 2012

Case 1:11-cv-02712-REB-KMT Document 70 Filed 05/18/12 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
#### Charles Norman ADAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 45662.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

July 28, 1972.

Ray Montgomery, Houston, for appellant.

Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., James C. Brough and Jack Bodiford, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ONION, Presiding Judge.

The conviction was for robbery by assault with the punishment being assessed at 10 years.

On August 27, 1971, the appellant Adams, who had been jointly indicted with Jody Lee Wharton, was granted a severance. On the same date, he entered a plea of guilty before the court after waiving trial by jury. He was duly admonished of the consequences of his plea before the plea was accepted by the court.

The evidence was stipulated in accordance with Article 1.15, Vernon’s Ann.C.C. P. Included in the written stipulations, which were introduced into evidence, was a written sworn “judicial confession.”

*862On the same date, after the entry of judgment, the appellant waived the time in which to file a motion for new trial or in arrest of judgment and was sentenced. No notice of appeal was given.

Subsequently, he was permitted to give belated notice of appeal on October 8, 1971. See Article 44.08(e), Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P.

Appellant’s appointed counsel, who also represented him at the trial, filed a brief in which he determined that the appeal was wholly frivolous. Aware of his duties under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and the procedure recommended in Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), he urges one ground of error that might arguably support the appeal. He contends the trial court, at the hearing to determine if belated notice of appeal should be permitted, “ . . . should have allowed the Defendant to testify as to his reason or reasons for wanting a Motion for New Trial and his reasons for demanding that he be returned to the State of California.

The record reflects that a copy of the brief was served upon the appellant, and that, subsequently, the record on appeal was made available to the appellant without time limitation for the purpose of filing a pro se brief. The appellant refused and stated he wanted to be furnished a copy of the record in lieu of examining the appellate record in the sheriff’s office.

No pro se brief has been filed.

It appears there was compliance with the procedure required by *Anders*and *Gainous. Cf.*Garcia v. State, 436 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Price v. State, 449 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Perry v. State, 447 S.W.2d 910 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). See, also, Wilson v. State, 445 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.Cr.App.1969, concurring opinion); Houston v. State, 446 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App.1969, concurring opinion); Pitts v. State, 442 S.W.2d 389 (Tex.Cr.App.1969, concurring opinion); DeGay v. State, 455 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).

The judgment is affirmed.

ROBERTS, J., not participating.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOISES FORTIN MIRALDA,

Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 14-73115

Agency No. A072-543-229

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 26, 2016**

Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Moises Fortin Miralda, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen

removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We 

review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen and review de novo 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 3 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 14-73115 

claims of due process violations in removal proceedings. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 

400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir.2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the 

petition for review. 

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Fortin Miralda’s second

motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where it was filed over 17 years 

after the agency’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to 

establish materially changed circumstances in Honduras to qualify for the 

regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 

Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (the BIA may deny 

a motion to reopen for failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying 

relief sought).

We reject Fortin Miralda’s contention that the BIA violated due process by 

failing to consider evidence. See Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990-91 (finding the 

Board adequately considered petitioner’s evidence and sufficiently announced its 

decision); Larita-Martinez v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2000) (“an 

applicant attempting to establish that the Board violated his right to due process by 

failing to consider relevant evidence must overcome the presumption that it did 

review the evidence”).

We lack jurisdiction to consider Fortin Miralda’s argument that the filing 

deadline for his motion to reopen should have been equitably tolled because he 
 3 14-73115 

failed to raise it to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th 

Cir. 2004).

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its 

sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings. See Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609-

10 (9th Cir. 2014); cf. Bonilla v. Lynch, No. 12-73853, 2016 WL 3741866 (9th Cir. 

July 12, 2016).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
#### GORNTON v. COLLINS GARAGE.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January Term 1954.

Certiorari denied without opinion.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

# **CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Natrol, Inc.(the “Company”) for the period ended June 30, 2004, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), theundersigned, in the capacity and on the date listed below, hereby certifies,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

 

(1)           The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

This Certification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, and Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K promulgated under theSecurities Act of 1933, as amended, and shall not be deemed part of the Reportor “filed” for any purpose whatsoever, nor shall it be deemed incorporated byreference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934.

 

 
| Date: August 16, 2004 |                                                        |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
|                       |   /s/ Elliott Balbert                             |   |
|                       |   Elliott Balbert                                 |
|                       |   President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman |
|                       |   (Principal Executive Officer)                   |

 

----
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02677-RPM

FRED KAFER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

______________________________________________________________________________

THIS MATTER coming before the Court on the parties’ Stipulation for Dismissal and

the

Court having been fully advised in the premises,

HEREBY ORDERS that this case is dismissed with prejudice.

DONE AND SIGNED this 6th day of December, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

s/Richard P. Matsch

_________________________________

Richard P. Matsch, Senior District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-02677-RPM Document 21 Filed 12/06/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
#### PIO POVOA, PROSECUTOR, v. MANUEL VIERA CONSTRUCTION CO. AND AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY, RESPONDENTS.

Submitted January 20, 1948

Decided February 25, 1948.

Before Justices Donges, Colie and Eastwood.

For the prosecutor, *Harry D. Young (William H. Campbell, Jr.,*of counsel).

For the respondents, *David Roskein (John A. Laird,*of counsel).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Colie, J.

This is a workmen’s compensation case in which the deputy commissioner dismissed the petition for failure to establish the relationship of master and servant. On appeal the Essex County Court of Common Pleas found that there had been an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and “ordered, that this cause be remanded to' the New Jersey Department of Labor, Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, for the purpose of having fixed, the temporary and permanent disability to which the petitioner may be found entitled.

“The Workmen’s Compensation Bureau will accordingly fix and determine a proper period of temporary and permanent disability in accordance with the testimony to be taken and return its findings to this court for the entry here of final judgment which shall include petitioner’s costs and counsel fees.”

*651Patently there is no final judgment but a mere remand. Following the case of *Paluk*v. *United Color and Pigment Co.,*134 *N. J. L.*601, the writ is dismissed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Wayne Gay, Appellant.

County Court, Wayne County,

January 11,1957.

*William L. Clay*for appellant.

*Roger E. Davis, District Attorney,*for respondent.

*649James D. Hurley, J.

This is an appeal from a conviction of the defendant before a Justice of the Peace in the town of Ontario, Wayne County, New York, on a charge of passing a stop sign at the intersection of Route 350 and Ridge Road in Ontario Center, New York.

It appeared upon the trial that at the time of the alleged offense, the stop sign was located 175 feet north of the intersection, but that the same had been moved between the date of the alleged offense and the time of the trial to a point 90 feet north of the intersection.

The appellant contends that the People failed to prove that the stop sign was erected in accordance with the requirements of section 95-d of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the Rules of the State Traffic Commission, in that it was not located at or near the intersection, or that the sign was properly placed under the direction of the State Traffic Commission. Appellant also contends that under all the facts as developed upon the trial, the conviction should be reversed.

Without attempting to establish the correct distance at which a stop sign should be placed from the intersecting road or highway, since obviously the State Traffic Commission should have a reasonable amount of discretion in considering the physical facts in determining the proper position of the sign, it is the opinion of the court that the People have failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the stop sign was a proper sign and properly placed and that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.

The conviction should therefore be reversed.

Submit order accordingly.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2



                          [PETERSON & CO. LETTERHEAD]



                         INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the reference of our firm under the caption "Experts" and to the
incorporation by reference in Form 10-KSB, Annual Report Under Section 13 or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the fiscal year ended November
30, 1997, of CardioDynamics International Corporation of our report dated
February 25, 1997 (except for Note 14, as to which the date is March 6, 1997)
on the financial statements of CardioDynamics International Corporation for the
fiscal year ended November 30, 1996.

                                        /s/ Peterson & Co.
                                        PETERSON & CO.

San Diego, California
March 12, 1998
Exhibit 2.23
 FIFTH AMENDMENT TO SECOND LIEN CREDIT AGREEMENT
 Amendment Borrower Parent Lender Lenders MSSF Administrative Agent
 WITNESSETH
 Collateral Agent Existing
Credit Agreement Credit Agreement
   
 Certain Definitions.
 Amendment
 Borrower
 Credit Agreement
 Existing Credit Agreement
 Fifth Amendment Effective Date Article III
 Defined Terms Generally




---



##### 



Amendments to Section 1.1
  Eligible Sponsor Assignee Section
11.21
 Fifth Amendment
 Fifth Amendment Effective Date
 Purchase Acceptance Notice Section 11.21
 Purchase Notice Section 11.21
  Affiliate control controlled by common control with
  Consolidated Total Debt  clause (a)
 2




---



##### 



Section 11.11 clause (b) clause (a) clause
(c) clause (g) clause (f) plus clause (m) Section 7.2.2, clause (m) minus
  Consolidated EBITDA plus provided clause (b)(viii)(B), clause (b)(viii) minus
  Eligible Assignee
 3




---



##### 



Excess Cash Flow
   clause (b) Section
3.1.1 Section 3.1.1 clauses (iv) (vi) (vii)
 Amendments to Article XI.
  4




---



##### 



Section 11.21
  clauses (a) (g) Section 11.1
  Assignment to Eligible Sponsor Assignee. Section 11.11
 Purchase Notice
  5




---



##### 



Purchase Acceptance Notice
   clause h Section 11.11
 
 Conditions to Effectiveness Fifth Amendment Effective Date
 Counterparts
 Certificate of Authorized Officer
 First Lien Credit Agreement
 6




---



##### 



Obligor Acknowledgment and Consent
 Legal Matters
 Payment of Expenses.
 
  Representations and Warranties, No Event of Default
 Due Authorization, Non-Contravention, etc
 7




---



##### 



Government Approval, Regulation, etc
 Validity, etc
 
 Continued Effectiveness of Credit Agreement
 
 Counterparts
 Cross-References
 Governing Law
 Loan Document Pursuant to Credit Agreement
 8




---



##### 



No Waiver
 Successors and Assigns
 WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL
 REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 9




---



##### 



MITEL NETWORKS CORPORATIONBy:
    
    /s/ Gregory J. HiscockName:
    
    Gregory J. HiscockTitle:
    
    General Counsel and Corporate SecretaryMITEL US HOLDINGS, INC.By:
    
    /s/ Gregory J. HiscockName:
    
    Gregory J. HiscockTitle:
    
    Secretary




---



##### 



MORGAN STANLEY SENIOR
FUNDING, INC., as Administrative
Agent and as a LenderBy:
    /s/ Stephen B. KingName:
    Stephen B. KingTitle:
    Vice President




---



##### 



Ziff Brother Asset Management LP[NAME OF LENDER]By:
    
    /s/ David GrayName:
    
    David GrayTitle:
    
    Vice President, Morton Holdings Inc,
its General Partner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02632-CMA-MEH

BARBARA CHURCH, individually, and

BARBARA CHURCH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of William Church,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DANA KEPNER COMPANY, INC.,

Defendant.

MINUTE ORDER

Entered by Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge, on November 6, 2012.

The Motion to Quash Dana Kepner Company, Inc.’s Subpoena Duces Tecum and for

Protective Order filed by Waterous Company [filed November 5, 2012; docket #50] is denied as

moot. The subpoena challenged in the present motion was quashed by this Court on November 1,

2012. If the non-party, Waterous Company, still sees a need to seek a protective order in this matter,

it may renew its motion on or before November 13, 2012.

Case 1:11-cv-02632-CMA-MEH Document 53 Filed 11/06/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 32.01

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Sbarro, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the period ended July 1, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Peter Beaudrault, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that to my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: August 14, 2007



|                                                                                                                        
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Peter Beaudrault                                                                                                    
|Peter Beaudrault Chairman of the Board of Directors, President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)

NOTE: A signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
```

[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 197 (Thursday, October 9, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 59603]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-24022]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

(A-351-840)

Certain Orange Juice from Brazil; Notice of Extension of Time 
Limits for Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

EFFECTIVE DATE: October 9, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth Eastwood, AD/CVD Operations, 
Office 2, Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, 14\th\ Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, 
Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-3874.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On April 25, 2008, the Department of Commerce (the Department) 
published a notice of initiation of administrative review of the 
antidumping duty order on certain orange juice fromBrazil. See 
Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative 
Reviews and Request for Revocation in Part, 73 FR 22337 (April 25, 
2008). The period of review is March 1, 2007, through February 29, 
2008, and the preliminary results are currently due no later than 
December 1, 2008. The review covers two producers/exporters of the 
subject merchandise to the United States.

Extension of Time Limit for Preliminary Results

    Pursuant to section 751(a)(3)(A) of Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 
(the Act), the Department shall make a preliminary determination in an 
administrative review of an antidumping order within 245 days after the 
last day of the anniversary month of the date of publication of the 
order. Section 751(a)(3)(A) of the Act further provides, however, that 
the Department may extend the 245-day period to 365 days if it 
determines it is not practicable to complete the review within the 
foregoing time period. We determine that it is not practicable to 
complete this administrative review within the time limits mandated by 
section 751(a)(3)(A) of the Act because of certain technical issues 
contained in supplemental questionnaire responses. Analysis of these 
issues requires additional time. Therefore, we have fully extended the 
deadline for completing the preliminary results until March 31, 2009. 
The deadline for the final results of the review continues to be 120 
days after the publication of the preliminary results.
    This extension notice is published in accordance with sections 
751(a)(3)(A) and 777(i) of the Act.

    Dated: October 3, 2008.
Stephen J. Claeys,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. E8-24022 Filed 10-8-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-S
```