UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA RO B ERT MCQ UE EN , : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 05-2068 (RMU)

: v. : Re Docume nt No.: 50

: WOODSTREAM CORP ORATI ON, : : Def endant. : M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION G R A N TI N G TH E D E F E NDANT ’ S M OT I ON T O D I S M I S S F OR L A C K O F S U BJECT M AT T E R J URI S DI CT I ON

I. IN TR OD UC TIO N This matter come s befor e the c ourt on the def endant’ s motion t o dismiss the plaintiff’s fr a ud ule nt m isr e pr e se ntatio n c la im f or la c k o f s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n. Th e de fe nd ant a sse rt s that th e pla int if

f c ann ot r e c ov e r s uf

fi c ie nt d ama g e s to satis fy the amou nt- in- c ontr ov e rs y require ment to maintain this di versity action. The court c oncludes that the pla intiff’s compensatory

damag es ar e limited to what he spec ifically g ave up in r eliance on the def endant’ s alleg ed misrepr esentations, termed his “out-of- pocket” damag es. The pla intiff has made no specific alleg ations with respec t to such damag es, instead f ocusingon damag es he c annot re cover under D istrict of Columbia law. The plaintiff ha s also asser ted a r ight to punitive damag es. Be cause the plaintiff ca

nnot rec over a

sufficie nt combination of compensatory and punitive damag es to satisfy

the amount-in-c ontroversy require ment, the cour

t gr ants the def

endant’ s mot ion to d ism iss
.2 II. F ACTUAL & P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND As the fa cts g iving r ise to the plaintiff’s c laims have be en set for th in prior opinions, the court will not restate them in exhausti ve deta il here. See Mem. Op. (Ma r. 10, 2008); Mem. Op. (Aug . 10, 2007). The pla intiff holds patents to technolog y used in insect and mouse traps. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. In 1992, the def endant r equeste d samples of the pla intiff’s patente d te c hn olo g y

so that it c ou ld d e te rm ine wh e the r i t w ish e d to purs ue a joi nt b us ine ss v e ntu

re wi th the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 8. The pla intiff sent the re quested samples to the de fenda nt, but neg otiations betwee n the plaintiff and the defe ndant soon broke down. Id. ¶¶ 8- 10. The only subsequent contac t betwee n the par

ties consisted of the de fenda nt repe atedly

informingthe plaintiff that no decision had be en made with respec t to the prospect of a joint business venture a nd that it was still assessingthe technology for possible licensingand/or futur e deve lopment with the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 1 0. In 2 00 3, a ft e r d isc ov e ri ngthat on e of the de fe nd ant’ s p ro du c ts “ inc or po ra te d a ll o r m os t of the tec hnology” that the plaintiff ha d disclosed to the def endant, the pla intiff commence d the instant suit. Id. ¶ 11. The c ourt has re solved sever al motions, including a motion to dismis s the plaintiff’s brea ch of c ontrac t claim, which the c ourt g rante d. See Mem. Op. (Ma r. 10, 2008); Mem. Op. (Aug . 10, 2007). The only cause of ac tion now remainingis the plaintiff’s fr audulent misrepre sentation claim. See Mem. Op. (Aug . 10, 2007). The de fenda nt moves to dismi ss that claim for la ck of subjec t matter jurisdiction, alleg ing that the plaintiff cannot meet the amount-incontrove rsy

require ment. See ge nerally Def .’s Mot. The cour

t turns now to the applicable leg al sta nd ard s and

the pa rt ie s’ argume nts .3 III . A NA LY SIS A. Legal Standard f

or a Mot ion to Dism iss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1) Fe dera l courts ar e cour

ts of limit ed jurisdiction and the law presumes that “a c ause lies outside this li mited jurisdiction.” Kokkone n v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1 99 4) ; St. Paul Mercury

Indem . Co. v. Red Cab Co. , 3 03 U. S. 2 83 , 2 88 -8 9 ( 19 38 ); se e als o Gen. Motors Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency , 3 63 F .3 d 4 42 , 4 48 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 4) (n oti ngthat “ [a]s a court of limited jurisdiction, we beg in, and end, with an e x amination of our jurisdiction”)
. Be cause “subjec t-matter jurisdiction is an ‘Ar t[ icle] I I Ias we ll as a statutory require ment[,] no action of the parties c an conf er subjec t-matter jurisdiction upon a f eder al court.’” Ak

ins e y e v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 3 3 9 F. 3 d

9 7 0 , 9 7 1 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g In s. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie de s Bauxite de G uinea , 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). O n a motion to dismi ss for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) , the plaintiff bea rs the burden of establishing by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the c ourt has subjec t matter jurisdiction. Luj an v . D e

fe nd e rs o f W ild lif e , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). B e c a us e su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n f oc us e s o n th e c ourt ’s po we r t o h e ar t he c la im, h o we v er , th e c o urtmu s tgi v e t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s fa ctu al al l ega t i o n s cl o s er s cr u t i n y wh en re s o l v i n g a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be require d for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Macharia v. U

nited States , 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 ( D.C. Cir. 2003); Grand Lodge of Frate rn al O rd

e r o f P oli c e v . A sh c ro

ft , 1 85 F . Su

pp . 2 d 9 , 1 3 ( D. D. C. 2 00 1) . T hu s, the c ourt is not limi ted to the alleg ations contained in the c omplaint. Hohri v. United States , 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacate d on other grounds , 482 U.S. 64 (1987). When nec essar y , the cour

t may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts evidence d in the rec ord, or the4

complaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts plus the court’s re solution of disput ed fa cts. He rb e rt v . Na t’ l A c ad

. o f Sc is. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 ( D.C. Cir. 1992). B. Legal Stan dard f

or Diver sity Jurisdi ction A f e de ra l di str ic t c ourt

ha s su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r a su it whe n th e amou

nt i n controve rsy

exceeds $75,000 a

nd the par ties are diverse in c itiz enship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); De Be rry v . F irs t G ov ’t Mo rtg age &In v esto rs C

or p ., 170 F.3d 1105, 1106 n.1 ( D.C. Cir. 1999);
se e als o Ste v e ns on v . S

e v e rs , 158 F.3d 1332, 1334 ( D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (identify

ing the $75,000 amount-in-contr oversy require ment for f

eder al diversity

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) ). The a

mount in controversy

is established at the c ommenceme nt of the ac tion. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a). Subsequent e vents reduc ing the amount in controver sy will not divest t he court of its jurisdiction. St. Paul , 3 03 U. S. at 28 9- 90 . I f i t be c ome s a pp are nt d ur ingthe c ours e of litigation that from the outset the maxim um conce ivable amount in controve rsy was less than the jurisdictional minimum , the cour t must di smiss t he ca se for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. W

ats on v . B lan k

ins hip , 2 0 F .3 d 3 83 , 3 87 -8 8 ( 10 th C ir . 1 99 4) ; Jones v . Knox Ex plo ra tio n Co rp ., 2 F.3d 181, 182- 83 (6th Cir. 1993). Where the plaintiff has a lleg ed a sum
cer tain that exceeds the r equisite amount in controver sy , that amount controls if made in good faith. St. Paul , 303 U.S. at 289-90. Additionally , to justi fy dismiss al, it must appear to a leg al
cer tainty that the claim is for le ss than the jurisdictional amount. Id . at 28 8- 89 ; Ha rti gh v . La tin , 4 8 5 F. 2 d 1 0 6 8 , 1 0 7 1 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 7 3 ) ( ci t i n g Gomez v . W ilson , 477 F.2d 411, 420 ( D.C. Cir. 1973)). Puniti ve dama g es ar e prope rly considere d as par

t of the amount in controve rsy . Hartigh , 4 8 5 F. 2 d at1 0 7 2 (c i t i n g Bell v. Pre ferred Life Assurance Soc ’y , 3 2 0 U
. S
. 2 3 8 , 2 4 0 ( 1 9 4 3 ) )
. InAs the C ircuit ha s explained , “ in a div ersity case , th e su

bstantiv e tort law of the D istrict of 1 Colum

bia co ntrols .
. . . [The court’s] duty , th en, is to achiev e the sam e outcom e [it] b eliev e[s] wou ld resu lt if the D istrict of Colum bia C ourt o f Appeals consid ered this ca se.” Nov ak v
. Cap ital Mgm t. & D ev. Cor p. , 4 52 F. 3d90 2, 90 7 ( D. C. Ci r . 2 00 6) (c i t a t i on s an d quo t a t i on m a rks om it te d)
. 5 consideringpunitive damag es to satisfy the jurisdictional minimum in a diversity case , the cour

t must conduct a two-pa

rt inquiry
. Be ll , 3 20 U. S. at 24 0; Cadek v . Great Lakes Dragaway, I nc. , 58 F.3d 1209, 1211- 12 (7th Cir. 1995). Fir st, the court must determine whether the plaintiff ca

n rec over punitive damag es as a matter of g overningsubstantive law. Be ll , 320 U.S. at 240. I f so, the cour t has subject matter

jurisdiction unless it i s clea r beyond a leg al ce rtainty that the plaintiff would under no c ircumstance s be entitled to rec over the jurisdictional amount. Cadek, 58 F.3d at 12 12 . In th is s e c on d s te p, the pla int if f m us t pr e se nt s ome fa c tua l e vid e nc e of e nti tle me nt t o punitive damag es. Lar

k in v . B ro wn , 4 1 F. 3 d

3 8 7 , 3 8 8 -8 9 (8 thC i r. 1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g Esler v. Nor throp Cor

p . , 8 6 F. R
. D. 2 0 , 2 8 (W
. D. M o . 1 9 7 9 ) ( re co gn i z i n g th at“w h en th e p l ai n t i ff 's
a lle g atio n o f t

he amou nt i n c ontr ov e rs y

is c ha lle ng e d .
. . e xiste nc e of the re qu ir e d amou

nt m us t b e s u p p o rt edb y

co mp et en tp ro o f” ) ( ci t i n g Hulsenbusch v . Davidson Rubber Co. , 344 F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 1965))).

C. The Court G rants the De fend ant’s Motion to Dism iss f or Lack of Sub jec t Mat terJurisdi ction 1. The “Ou t-of-P ocket” D am ages Me asure G overns the P laintif f’s Claim for Com pensatory Dam ages In support of its motion, t he def endant a sserts that the “out- of-poc ket” damag es mea sure g overns the pla intiff’s fra udulent misrepre sentation claim under District of Columbia law. 1 Def .’s Mot. at 6-9. Usingthis calculation method, the de fenda nt argues that the plaintiff c annot6

rec over more than fiftee n dollars in compensatory damag es, re prese nting the c ost of producing twelve tra ps and shipping the m to the defe ndant. See id. at 9. The plaintiff disagree s. SeePl.’s Opp’n at 9. He contends that a ll of the ca ses the defe ndant cites in re fer ence to the “out-of- pocket” measure are inapposite bec ause the y involved claims of fr audulent induce ment to contrac t for re al prope rty . Id. at 10. In this case, the pla intiff
ma int a ins , th e a

pp ro pr iate me tho d o f c a lc ulatin gdama g e s is un c le ar u nd e r D istri c t of

Col umb ia law, and the ref

ore the plaintiff urg es the c ourt to adopt the mea sure of damag es set for

th in the Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts. Id. at 9- 12 . B a se d o n th e a pp ro a c h d e sc ri be d in

the Re state me nt, the plaintiff cla ims he is entitled to the “benef it of the barg ain.” Id. The District of Columbia Court of Appe als has “e x plicitly rec og nized [ the ‘out-of

pocket’ damag es mea sure] as the norm” in fraudule nt misreprese ntation case s. Dresser v
. Sunderland Apartments Tenants Ass’n , 4 65 A. 2d 83 5, 84 0 n .1 8 ( D. C. 1 98 3) ; see also Horning v. Ferguson , 52 A.2d 116, 119 (D.C. 1947) ( reve rsingthe trial cour t’s awa rd of “ loss of the barg ain” damag es and holdingthat the plaintiff wa s entitled to recove r only for the “ direc t conseque nces of

the fa lse repr esentations”). The “ out-of-poc ket” mea sure is subject to exception only “in ra re c ases whe re ne cessa

ry to effe ct justice.” Dresser , 465 A.2d at 840 n.18. The exception is so rare, in f

act, that the c ourt is awar e of only two case s – eac h of which pr edate d the pronounce ment by

the District of Columbia Court of Appea ls in Dresser – in which the Court of Appea ls has deviated f

rom the “out-of

-pocke t” measur e with re spect to a f raudule ntThe D
. C
. C ir cu it , a pp ly in gD is tr ic t o f C ol um bi a law , h as a ls o de v ia te d fr om th e “o ut - of

- po ck et ” 2 m easure in on e instance. See Espai ll at v. Berl it z Sch ool s of Langua ges of Am. , 3 83 F.2 d 2 20, 22 3 (D
. C
. C ir
. 1 96 7) ( re fu si ngto a pp ly th e out- of

- po ck et o r th e be ne fi t- of

- th e- barg ai n m ea sure be caus e ne ithe r w ou ld

p ro v id e an

“ ap t g au g e of

r ec ov er y ”)
. I n Dra villas v. Ve

ga , th e de fe nd ant, aland lo rd , w as a cc us ed o f m is re pr es enti ngw he th er h is 3 pr op erty

c ou ld b e us ed a s a be auty

s al on . 2 94 A
. 2d

3 63 , 3 64 ( D
. C
. 1 97 2)
. W he n th e pl ai nt if f, the ten ant, was unab le to operate a salo n o n the pro perty , th e trial c ourt award ed d am ag es for her loss o f rev enue. Id. at 3 65. The District of C olum bia C ourt o f Appeals conclu ded that the trial court had not e rred b ecause “the ev idence was sufficient to pe rm it a re asona ble es tim ate” o f dam ag es p ursuant to the “b enefit- of- the- barg ain” m easure. Id. B y end orsingthe “bene fit- of- thebarg ain” m easure with respect to the plain tiff’s fraudu lent m isrepresentation c laim , th e Dra villas court departed , w ithout explan ation, from the standard

m easure of d am ag es ap plicable to su ch claim s. Se e D ress er

v . S un de rlan d A

pa rt m en ts T en an ts A ss ’n , 465 A.2d 835 , 840 n.18 (D.C. 1983 ). Dra villas , th erefore, pro v ides n o su pport for ap ply ingthe “bene fit- of- the- barg ain” m easure in this case. Spar gnap ani v . W

right li k ew is e fa il s to b ol st er

th e pl ai nt if

f’ s ar g um ent that the c ourts ho ul d 4 apply

the “bene fit- of- the- barg ain” m easure of d am ag es. Se e ge ne ra ll y11 0 A .2d

82 (D .C . 1 954). I n Spar gnap ani , th e D is tr ic t o f C ol um bi a C ourto f App ea ls d ev ia te d fr om th e “o ut - of

- po ck et ” m easure for the purpose of expedien cy . Id. at 8 5. The de fendant w as ac cused of m isrepresenting the q uality of a ho m e he atingsy stem . Id. R ather th an c alculate the “d ifference betw een the p rice paid for the ho use itself and its d epreciated

m ark et v alue re sultingfrom the discov ered defect”

– the “o ut- of- pock et” m easure – the court elected to tak e the “direct and sim ple ap proach ” by “award[ing ] dam ag es o n the bas is of the ac tual co st of replacingthe defectiv e bo iler.” Id. Beca use there is no indication that apply ingthe “bene fit- of- the- barg ain” m easure in this case wou ld be m ore e xped ient than ap ply ingthe “out- of- pock et” m easure, Spar gnap aniw ei g hs in fav or o f app ly ingthe “out- of- pock et” m easure here. 7 mis re pr e se ntatio n c la im. See D ravillas v. Vega , 294 A.2d 363 (D.C. 1972); Spargnapani v. 2 3 W right , 110 A.2d 82 (D.C. 1954). 4 The plaintiff of

fer s no support for his proposition that the “out-of- pocket” rule a pplies only to a nar row c lass of fr audulent misrepr esentation cases. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 10. Instead, he notes the abse nce of

authority expressly reje ctingthe “be nefit-of

-the-ba rg ain” mea sure. Id. at 9. Whil e the pla int if

f i s c or re c t th at th e Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Court of Ap pe a ls h a s n ot c ate g or ic a lly prec luded application of the “be nefit-of -the-ba rg ain” mea sure in fr audulent misrepr esentation8

case s, it has specified that courts should deviate f rom the “out-of

-pocke t” measur e only

when
nece ssary to effe ct justice. See Dresser , 465 A.2d at 840 n.18. Acc ording ly , the cour

t turns to the question of whether deviatingfrom the “ out-ofpocket” measure is nece ssary to effe ct justice in this case. A s the defe ndant points out, other
c a us e s o f a c tio n ma

y have pe rm itt e d th e pla int if f t o r e c ov e r d ama g e s b e y on d h is “ out- of -p oc ke t” losses. SeeDef

.’s Mot. at 11. Yet, with the e x ception of his bre ach of contra ct claim, which the court dismissed as time-bar red, the plaintiff has not asse rted a ny other c auses of

action. See generally Am . Co mpl .; M e m. O p. (Aug . 1 0, 20 07 ). Th e c ourt do e s n ot c on sid e r i t “ ne c e ssa ry to eff ect justice” to permit the plaintiff to rec over unde r a me asure of dama g es cor respondingto a
cause of ac tion that the plaintiff failed to a ssert. Cf. United States v. Gen. M otors Corp. , 323 U. S. 3 73 , 3 79 -8 0 ( 19 45 ) ( ho ldi ngthat vi c tim s o f g ov e rnme nt t akin g s a re e nti tle d to
c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s, but no t c on se qu e nti a l da ma g e s) ; Gre e nwi c h I

ns . Co . v . I

CE C on tra c tor s, Inc. , 5 41 F . Su

pp . 2 d 3 27 , 3 34 (D .D .C. 20 08 ) ( statin gthat pu nit ive dama g e s a

re unre c ov e ra

ble in
a b r e a c ho f c o n tr a c tc l a i m , e v e ni f

th e b r e a c hi s w i l l f

u l , w an t o no r

m a l i c i o u s )
. C o n s e qu e n t l y, there is no justi fication for deviatingfrom the “ out-of-poc ket” mea sure of damag es in this case. 2. The Plaintiff

Has Adequ ately State d a Claim for P uni tive Dam ages In deter mining the jurisdictional amount in controve rsy , the cour t must consider the plaintiff’s cla im for punitive damag es in addition to his claim for compensatory damag es. See Kah al v . J

.W . W ils on &As so cs. , Inc. , 673 F.2d 547, 548 ( D.C. Cir. 1982). The de fenda nt
c onte nd s th at th e pla int if

f f a ile d to a lle g e that th e de fe nd ant a c te d w itha state of min d th at w ou ld support a re cover

y of punitive damag es. SeeDef .’s Mot. at 11. In response , the plaintiff sug g ests that evidenc e of the defe ndant’s true intention will entit le him to puniti ve dama g es. SeeOn the p arties’ joint m otion, the court stay ed d iscov ery pen dingresolution o f the instant m otion. 5 See Mi nute O rd er ( July 1 7, 2 00 9)
. 9 Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. The pla intiff anticipates obta ining suc h evidenc e through depositions of the d e f e n d an t ’ s f o r m e r an d c ur r e n te mp l o ye e s , b u th e h a s n o tb e e na b l e t o o b t a i ns u c hd i s c o v e r y. 5 See id. at 14. Under District of Columbia law, re cover y of punitive damag es is permissible so long a s “it is shown by

clea r and c onvincingevidenc e that the tort c ommitt ed by the def endant wa s ag g ravated by

eg reg ious conduct and a

state of mind that justifies punitive damag es.” Chatman v. Lawlor , 831 A.2d 395, 400 (D.C. 2003). The plaintiff alleg es that the de fenda nt
m i s re p re s en t edi t s i n t en t i o nt o o b t ai ns amp l es o f t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s t ec h n o l o gy

fo r p o s s i b l e l i ce n s i n g, and that the de fenda

nt’s true intention was to conve rt the tec hnology for its own use a

nd benef it. SeeAm. Compl. ¶ 14. Given this alleg ation, and g iven that discover y – which the plaintiff maintains will y ield evidenc e of the defe ndant’s true intention – is noty et complete, the court
c ann ot c on c lud e that th e pla int if f w ill be un a

ble to r e c ov e r p un iti ve dama g e s. 3. The P lai nt iff F ail s t o Sa ti sfy t he Am ount -i n- Co nt r ov e r syRe quir e m e nt The de fenda

nt nextargues, base d on its estimation of the plaintiff’s compensatory dama g e s, that an a

wa rd of punit ive dama g e s su ff

ic ie nt t o s atis fy

the amou nt- in- c ontr ov e rs y require ment would violate the def endant’ s due proc ess rig hts. SeeDef .’s Mot. at 12-13. The plaintiff re sponds that there is no “simple mathe matical for mula” for deter mining whe ther a

n awa rd of punitive dama g es violates due pr ocess, a nd he conte nds that a re cover y of punitive damag es ca

n, by itself, satisfy

the amount-in-c ontroversy require ment. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 13-14.There has been lim ited treatm ent o f this issue in oth er circu its. The Seco nd Circuit, for exam ple, 6 affirm ed a

trial co urt’s h oldingthat the p laintiff’s pu nitiv e dam ag es alo ne s ufficed to m eet the am ount- in- controv ersy

requ irem ent. See Cola vito v. N .Y. O rgan D onor

N etwo rk, Inc. , 4 38 F.3 d 214, 22 1 (2 d C ir. 2 006). B y contrast, th e S ev enth Circuit has held that a plaintiff d id no t m eet t he j ur i s di c t i on a l th r e s ho l d b e c aus e th e ra t i o o f co mpe ns a t or y to pu ni t i ve d a mages wou l d h a ve had to be m ore th an 1 80 to 1 to satisfy the am ount- in- controv ersy requ irem ent. Se e D el

V ec ch io v. Con seco, Inc. , 2 30 F
. 3d 9 74 , 9 78
- 80 ( 7th C ir
. 2 00 0)
.

10 Th e pla int if

f i s c or re c t th at th e Sup re me Court ha s b e e n “ re luc tant t o id e nti fy c on c re te constitutional li mits on t he ratio between ha rm . . . to the plaintiff and the punitive damag es awa rd.” Sta teFa rm Mu t. A uto . I ns . Co . v . Ca mp be ll , 538 U.S. 408, 424-25 (2003). Neve rtheless, the Court ha s observe d that “fe w awa rds exceedinga sing le-dig it ratio betwee n punitive and compensatory damag es . . . will satisfy

due proc ess.” Id. at 42 5. Th e D. C. C ir c uit ha s n ot r ule d o n whe the r p un iti ve dama g e s a lon e may satis fy the amou nt- in- c ontr ov e rs y require ment or whe ther such a n awa rd would violate due proce ss. But c ourts in this circuit have 6 adher ed to the Supreme Court’s observation reg ardingthe per missibl e ratio between compensatory

and punitive damag es. Se e Hu nte r v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 384 F. Supp. 2d 257, 26 1 ( D. D. C. 2 00 5) (h old ingthat th e pla int if f c ou ld n ot m e e t th e amou nt- in- c ontr ov e rs y re qu ir e me nt b a se d o n a

13 to 1 ratio of

punit ive to c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s) ; Thomas v. Nat’l Legal Prof’l Assoc. , 594 F. Supp. 2d 31, 34 (D.D .C. 2009) (holdingthat the plaintiff could mee t the amount-in-c ontroversy require ment based on a

6.5 to 1 ratio of punitive to compensatory dama g e s) . M ind fu l of

thi s a dmo nit ion , th e c ourt tur ns to whe the r t

he pla int if

f’ s a lle g atio ns , if tr ue , w ou ld s up po rt

a re c ov e ry su ff ic ie nt t o s atis fy

the amou nt- in- c ontr ov e rs y

re qu ir e me nt. Th e c ourt la c ks su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n if it i s “ highly

imp ro ba ble that th e amou

nt i n controve rsy

could exceed the jurisdictional threshold, and whe n the plaintiff submits no evidence to the contra

ry .” Hunter , 3 8 4 F. S u

p p . 2 d at2 6 0 (c i t i n g Ro se nb oro v . Ki m , 9 94 F .2 d 1 3, 18 (D .C.11

Cir. 1993)). In this case, the only specific claim for da

mag es the plaintiff ha s made is “the loss of the profits [the defe ndant] has ga ined throug h its conversion of [the plaintiff’s] technolog y ,” see Am. Compl. ¶ 14, damag es which a re not re cover able unde r the “ out-of-poc ket” mea sure, see Dresser , 465 A.2d at 840 n.18 (e x plaining that the “out-of- pocket” measure permits rec overy only for “ the diffe renc e betwe en the a mount paid and the mar

ket value of

the thing a cquire d” (qu o t i n g Kra

ft v . Lo we , 77 A.2d 554, 558 (D.C. 1950)) ). The pla intiff has not indicated that he has suffe red a

ny loss based on the “ out-of-poc ket” mea sure of damag es. See ge ne ra lly

Am
. Compl.; Pl.’s Opp’n. Nor ha s the plaintiff re futed the de fenda nt’s asser tion that the plaintiff’s “out-of- pocket” damag es ar e limited to fifteen dollar s, repr esentingthe cost of pr oducingand shipping twe lve traps. See ge nerally Pl. ’s Op p’ n; se e als o Def .’s Mot at 9. As sumin g , th e re fo re , th at th e pla int if f’ s c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s w ou ld b e lim ite d to fiftee n dollars, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damag es nec essar

y for the pla intiff to satisfy the amount in controve rsy would be at lea st 5000 to 1. And while the plaintiff has a lleg ed that the def endant a cted willfully , Am. Compl. ¶ 14, his allegations fall far shor t of sug g estingthat he would conce ivably

be entitled to such a

high r atio of punitive to compensator y damag es. To the contra ry , the plaintiff has a lleg ed a pur ely economic injury , he has not a lleg ed that the de fenda nt showed a rec kless disreg ard f

or the he alth or saf

ety of others a

nd he has not a lleg ed that the defe ndant’s beha

vior took place on more than one occa sion. Com pa reBM W

of N . A m. v . G or e , 51 7 U .S. 55 9, 57 6- 77 (1 99 6) (c on c lud ingthat no ne of the a g g ra vatin gfa c tor s f

or re pr e he ns ibi lity we re pr e se nt b e c a

us e the pla int if

f a lle g e d a

pure ly e c on omi c inj ur

y , th e de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t di d
no t sh owa

re c kle ss d isr e g ard

fo r t he he a lthor

sa fe ty of oth e rs and

the de fe nd ant d id n ot p e rs ist in its conduct after

it was judg ed unlawf

ul) with Am. Compl. ¶ 14 (alleg ing that the defe ndant12

wi l l fu l l y m ad e afr au d

u l en tm i s re p re s en t at i o nwi thth e i n t en tt o co n v ertth e p l ai n t i ff ’s t ec h n o l o gy to i ts o wn us e and be ne fi t) . In s um, g ive n th at th e pla int if f h a s f a ile d to a sse rt

a pla us ibl e c la im for at least $75,000 in compensator y and punitive damag es, the c ourt conc ludes that the plaintiff cannot satisfy

the amount-in-c ontroversy require ment of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There fore , the cour t dismiss es the plaintiff’ s suit for lack of subject matter jur isdiction.

IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the c ourt g rants the de fenda nt’s motion to di smiss for lack of
su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n. An Or de r c on sis te nt w iththi s Me mor and um O pin ion

is s e pa ra te ly and conte mporane ously

issued this 9th day

of De cembe r, 2009.

RI CARDO M. URBI NA Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge