IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-1495

Filed August 16, 2017

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

REUBEN ANTHONY STIGLER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M. 

Lekar, Judge.

Reuben Stigler appeals from his convictions for attempted murder, willful 

injury, going armed with intent, domestic abuse assault with intent to cause 

serious injury, domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, and false 

imprisonment. AFFIRMED. 

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
2

DANILSON, Chief Judge.

Reuben Stigler appeals from his convictions after a bench trial for 

attempted murder, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.11 (2015); willful injury, 

in violation of section 708.4; going armed with intent, in violation of section 708.8; 

domestic abuse assault with intent to cause serious injury, in violation of section 

708.2A(2)(c); domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, in violation of section 

708.2A(2)(b); and false imprisonment, in violation of section 710.7. Stigler 

asserts the district court erred in finding Stigler possessed the requisite specific 

intent during the commission of the crimes and overruling Stigler’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal. Stigler also contends the district court erred in allowing the 

admission of hearsay statements. Because we find the district court did not err in 

either respect, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

On the evening of March 23, 2015, Officer Greg Kemp responded to the 

home where Stigler and his significant other, Angelina O’Connell, were living. 

Sherry Johnson—O’Connell’s friend who was staying at the residence—called 

911 to report she believed Stigler was trying to kill O’Connell. When Officer 

Kemp entered the house, he located Stigler and O’Connell in a bedroom. 

O’Connell’s clothing was very bloody, and she appeared to have stab wounds. 

At the hospital, it was confirmed O’Connell had fifteen stab wounds to her face, 

torso, chest, side, and legs. Stigler cooperated with Officer Kemp and admitted 

he had stabbed O’Connell. As stated by the district court, during an interview 

with investigators at the police department following the assault:
3

Stigler gave a highly detailed description of the events and history 

leading up to this incident, as well as a detailed description of how 

he had stabbed, cut, and hit Ms. O’Connell. Stigler asserted the 

incident came about because he believed Ms. O’Connell was not 

telling him the truth. In the recording of the interview, Mr. Stigler

repeatedly states he intended to kill her if she did not tell him the 

truth.

The bench trial commenced on April 13, 2016. Stigler raised the 

diminished responsibility defense.1 Stigler called two expert witnesses—Dr. 

Arthur H. Konar and Dr. Thomas Gratzer—in support of his argument he did not 

possess the mental capacity to form specific intent at the time of the crimes.

In its July 8, 2016 order, the district court determined the State established 

the elements of all the crimes charged, including specific intent, and found Stigler 

guilty on all counts. Stigler appeals.

II. Analysis.

A. Diminished Responsibility. Stigler first contends the district court erred 

in overruling the motion for judgment of acquittal because there is insufficient 

evidence to establish Stigler had the requisite specific intent.

2

We review claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for 

corrections of errors at law. State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa 2005).

 

1

“The diminished responsibility defense is a common law doctrine that permits proof of 

a defendant’s mental condition on the issue of the defendant’s capacity to form a specific 

intent in those instances in which the State must prove a defendant’s specific intent as 

an element of the crime charged.” State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 2000).

2 We note Stigler asserts on appeal that “the State failed to disprove [Stigler’s] assertion 

that he lacked specific intent due to his compromised mental state.” However,

[a] defense of diminished responsibility does not “requir[e] the State to 

disprove the defense as an additional element of its case. . . . [E]vidence 

raising a theory of defense like diminished responsibility is simply to be 

considered by the jury in determining whether the State met its burden to 

prove the element involved.”

State v. Rinehart, 283 N.W.2d 319, 320 (Iowa 1979) (alteration in original) (citation 

omitted).
4

On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court is required to 

approach the evidence from a standpoint most favorable to the 

government, and to assume the truth of the evidence offered by the 

prosecution. If on this basis there is substantial evidence justifying 

an interference of guilt, the motion for acquittal must be denied.

State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 192 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v. Ellis, 578 

N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa 1998)). “‘Evidence is substantial if it would convince a 

rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 

Substantial evidence must do more than raise suspicion or speculation.” 

Williams, 695 N.W.2d at 27 (citations omitted).

At trial, Stigler testified he was subjected to childhood abuse and believed 

he exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Stigler also stated that 

prior to his arrest he consumed about one gram of methamphetamine per day. 

Stigler testified he had not slept for six or seven days prior to March 23, 2015. 

Stigler asserts the evidence shows he did not have the mental capacity to 

form specific intent due to his mental health, substance abuse, and lack of sleep. 

In support of this argument, Stigler relies on the expert testimony presented at 

trial and his own testimony regarding his heavy methamphetamine use3and lack 

of sleep in the days prior to his assault on O’Connell. Although the experts 

opined Stigler’s mental health issues, substance abuse, and lack of sleep could 

have affected his capacity to form specific intent, their testimony did not

 

3 Stigler and O’Connell both also testified Stigler believed officers were present in the 

home before officers were actually there, and Stigler contends this fact shows he was 

not of sound mind at the time of the assault.
5

unequivocally establish Stigler could not form specific intent under the particular

circumstances.

4

 

The district court carefully analyzed the facts regarding specific intent as 

evidenced by its July 8, 2016 order. The court held:

The court finds Mr. Stigler did have specific intent and 

specific purpose in committing the actions at issue in this case, 

even when considering the defense of diminished responsibility. 

The court finds Mr. Stigler was aware of his actions at the time he 

committed them. His description of the events remained consistent 

from his initial admission in the back of the patrol car, to his 

interview with [investigators], and finally, to his visit with his father 

at the jail four days after the incident. His description of events, 

including his recollection of the injuries inflicted and the weapons 

used, are consistent with the evidence found at the scene, the 

injuries Ms. O’Connell sustained, . . . and the credible portions of 

Ms. O’Connell’s testimony. Further, Mr. Stigler informed police he 

was not under the influence of any illegal drugs at the time he 

committed the acts involved in this case, and the videos with police 

following the incident do not suggest he was hallucinating or under 

the influence.

The defense argued Mr. Stigler believed the cops were in 

the house well before the time the officers actually arrived at the 

residence, meaning he must have been in some sort of 

hallucinogenic state. However, according to his testimony, Mr. 

Stigler heard Ms. O’Connell yell for Ms. Johnson to call the police, 

and Mr. Stigler knew Ms. Johnson was in the house when this 

incident occurred. As a result, when Ms. O’Connell acknowledged 

officers were in the house, it is reasonable he could have believed 

the scenario to be true. . . .

 

4 Based on his diagnosis that Stigler had amphetamine abuse and dependence, posttraumatic stress disorder, and depressive disorder, Dr. Konar opined Stigler could have 

been hallucinating during the commission of the crimes. However, Stigler denied ever 

having hallucinations or delusions. Dr. Konar also agreed people who abuse 

methamphetamine are not necessarily removed of their ability to engage in purposeful 

and intentional behavior. 

Dr. Gratzer did not meet with or evaluate Stigler personally, but provided analysis 

based on a hypothetical given to him using the facts of the case. Dr. Gratzer believed it 

was possible Stigler was in a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the assault resulting 

from his substance abuse and lack of sleep. However, Dr. Gratzer testified people with 

psychosis are still capable of forming specific intent. Both experts relied upon the 

amount of drug use and number of days without sleep as stated by Stigler without 

independent verification.
6

Finally, Mr. Stigler attacked Ms. O’Connell in at least three 

separate incidents, with pauses in between, resulting in [fifteen] 

lacerations. This, combined with his repeated statements that he 

would kill her if she kept lying, which were admitted by Mr. Stigler 

and confirmed by both Ms. O’Connell and Ms. Johnson, suggest he 

was aware of his actions. He intended for those actions to cause 

the death of Ms. O’Connell.

The court properly considered the diminished responsibility defense and 

determined the State met its burden to prove the element of specific intent. On 

our review of the record, we agree with the conclusions reached by the district 

court that there is substantial evidence establishing Stigler’s specific intent to 

commit the crimes considering the evidence most favorable to the State. We find 

the court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.

B. Hearsay Evidence. Stigler next contends the district court erred in 

allowing hearsay statements by O’Connell over defense counsel’s objection. 

Specifically, the State played a recording of an interview with O’Connell taken at 

the hospital on March 23, 2015, in which O’Connell stated Stigler had stabbed 

her, kicked her, and hit her with a hammer. At trial, O’Connell stated she did not 

recall the hospital interview. The State was permitted to admit the evidence as a 

recorded recollection. 

We review hearsay claims for correction of errors at law. State v. 

Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2009). “This standard of review extends to 

determining whether statements come within an exception to the general 

prohibition on hearsay evidence . . . .” Id.

Stigler argues proper foundation was not laid for admission of the hearsay 

statements because O’Connell testified listening to the recording did not refresh 

her recollection and she had no memory of the interview. Iowa Rule of Evidence 
7

5.803(5) defines a recorded recollection as: “A record that (A) is on a matter the 

witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and 

accurately; (B) Was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh 

in the witness’s memory; and (C) Accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge.” If 

admitted, the recorded recollection may be read or, as in this instance, played for 

the jury but not received as an exhibit. Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(5).

Stigler does not question the accuracy of the recording but rather the 

accuracy of O’Connell’s statements during the interview due to the fact she had 

suffered a trauma just prior to making the statements. This is not the standard 

for the recorded-recollection exception. See State v. Thompson, 397 N.W.2d 

679, 683 (Iowa 1986) (“The rule seeks to assure that there has been an accurate 

recordation of a past recollection, reasonably contemporaneous with the event, 

to use as a substitute for the nonexistent present recollection of the event.”).

At trial, O’Connell testified:

Q. Now, Ms. O’Connell, I know we talked about this once 

before, but having reviewed the audio recording of the interview at 

the hospital on the night of this incident, you still don’t remember 

that interview occurring? A. No, I don’t.

Q. You do recognize your voice? A. Yes, I do.

Q. And you don’t have any reason to dispute the accuracy of 

the recording? A. No.

The recording was properly admitted as a recorded recollection. See id.

at 682-83 (noting “a witness must be shown to have an incomplete recollection in 

order to invoke rule [5.]803(5)”). O’Connell once knew of the hospital interview 

as she was a participant, and she testified she no longer remembers the 

interview. Also, the interview occurred at the hospital directly following the 

incident and was therefore made when the events were fresh in O’Connell’s 
8

memory. O’Connell testified it was her voice on the recording and she had no 

reason to dispute the accuracy of the recording. Even if the recording was not 

properly admitted under the recorded-recollection exception, its admission would 

constitute harmless error as the evidence is cumulative to other evidence 

presented at trial.5 See Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a) (“A party may claim error in a 

ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of 

the party . . . .”); State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 19 (Iowa 2006) (“[E]rroneously 

admitted hearsay evidence will not be considered prejudicial if substantially the 

same evidence is properly in the record.”).

III. Conclusion.

Because we find the record contains substantial evidence of Stigler’s 

specific intent, we conclude the district court did not err in denying the motion for 

judgment of acquittal. We further conclude the hearsay evidence was properly 

admitted and did not result in prejudice. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.

 

5 Specifically, the recording of Stigler’s interview with investigators on March 23, 2015, 

was admitted into evidence in which Stigler recounts the injuries he inflicted on 

O’Connell in great detail.