The Honor able Na ncy G. Edmunds, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District * of Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0023n.06 F iled: Janu ary 8, 2007 No. 06-3158 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT OXY USA INC., Cross Claim P laintif

f-App ellant,
v. BORDEN, INC., Cross Claim Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE E AST ERN D ISTRIC T OF KENTUCK

Y

Before: DA UG HTREY, GIBBONS, Circuit Jud ges; and EDMUNDS, Distr ict Judge * JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge
. This c ase arises out of a dispute betwe en OXY USA, I nc. ( “ O X Y ” ) , th e s u c cessor -in-intere st to Ci ties Service Company (“Cities”), a

nd Bor den, Inc. (“B orden” ) over the interpre tation of a c ontrac t under whic h Bor den ac quired a n ink manufac turing bus in e s s f

r o m C it ie s . T h e d is p u te h in g e s o nth e in te r p r e tati o no f

ana s s u mp ti o no f

o b li g ations pr ov isi on in the 19 74 Ag re e me nt f

or Pur c ha se a

nd Sa le (“ APA ” ) e xec ute d b y the pa rt ie s. Th e so le issue before t h i s court is whether the trial c ourt err ed in deter mining that def

endant B orden is not liable to indemnify OXY for costs incurre d by OXY in a federa lly -mandated clea nup of the Skinner L andfill in West C hester, O hio. F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.23 I
. OX Y i s a De lawa re corp orat ion w ithits pr inc ipa l pl a c e of bu sin e ss i n T e xas. B or de n is a New Jersey corpor ation with its principal place of business in Ohio. Cit ies, OXY’ s prede cessor -ininterest, oper ated a

n ink man u fa ct u ring fac ility in Woodl awn, Ohio ( “the L evey Division”), and prior to J anuar

y 31, 1974, the L evey

Division dispos ed o f wa s te containinghazardous substance s at th e S k i n n er L andfill in West C hester, O hio. At no time did either Cities or OXY eve r own or operate the Skinner L andfill. Bor den neve r disposed of any waste f rom the Woodlawn fac ility at the Skinner L andfill. After considera

ble neg otiations and draf

ts, Cit ies and Borde n enter ed int o the final APA on J anuar y 31, 1974, and the transac tion c losed the same day
. Both be fore and af ter the c losing, thre e
surf a c e imp oundment s w e re loc a te d o n th e L e ve y fa c ili ty pr op e rt y , a nd B or de n o pe ra

te d th e se impoundments after the closing . The ne g otiations for the sale of the fa cility

took place f

rom No ve mbe r 1 97 3 thr ou g h la te Janu ary 19 74
. Th e pa rt ie s’ ne g oti a tio ns re su lte d in v ari ou s d ra ft sa le contra cts, which ultimately evolved into the fina l APA. Citi es and B orden e ntere d into the final dra ft of the APA on January 31, 1974. Two provisions of the APA are of particula r importance to this case , Section 7 (“Tr ansfe r of Asse ts”) and Se c tio n 1 1 ( “ the As su mpt ion ” ). Se c tio n 7 , in re le va nt p art , s ta te s: (a) Gene ral Tr ansfe r: On the Closing D ate, subject to the terms and c onditions set fo rt h in thi s A g re e me nt, Citi e s w ill se ll, c on ve y , a ssi g n, tr ans fe r and deli ve r t o Bor den, all the a ssets and prope rties of e very kind, char acte r and description, whethe r tang ible or intang ible, and whe ther real or persona l, wher ever located, of

the L evey Division (except cash, a ccounts re ceiva ble, claims ag ainst third parties a nd insurance c la ims , a nd inv e nto ri e s o f f

ini sh e d p ro du c ts, li th og ra ph ic plate s and

litho g ra ph ic ch e mi c a ls , in

e xis te n c e an d

o w n e d b y Ci ti e s o nth e Cl o s in g D a te , L e tt e r s Patent licensed unde r Para g raph 4( d) her eof, c ontrac ts not acce ptable to B or d e n a s id e nti fied in E xhibi t 11 , a

nd e xce pt a s o the rw ise sp e c if ic a lly state d h e re in) , f

re e and c le ar o f a ll4

lia bil iti e s and ob lig a tio ns , exce pt onl y tho se lia bil iti e s and ob lig a tio ns wh ic h ar e to be assumed by

Bor den as pr ovided her ein . . . . Th e fi na l ve rs ion

of Se c tio n 1 1, the c e ntr a l pr ov isi on of thi s d isp ute , p ro vid e s in

re le va nt p art : 11
. As su mpt ion : Exc e pt if and a s o the rw ise pr ov ide d in

thi s A g re e me nt, su

bje c t to and as of th e c o n s u mm a ti o no f th e Cl o s in g , B o r d e nh e r e b y a s s u me s a ll the obligations of Cit ies, arising out of eve nts occurr ing after the Closing Date re lating to the business or asse ts of the L evey Division transfer

red he reunde r, except to the extent that any

such oblig ation arises f rom a bre ac h b y C ities of a wa rra nty or cove n an t
. Citi es will continue to be re sponsible for all oblig ations arising out of e ve nts oc c ur

ri ngpr ior to a nd on the Cl osingDate re la tin g to t he bu sin e ss o r a sse ts of the L evey

Division. Ci ties makes no re prese ntations as t o the condition of the assets transf

err ed beingin compliance with any fede ral, state, or local law s provided, howeve r, that Cities repre sents and wa rra nts that Cit ies has rece ived no notice of any violation or claim of v i o l at i o n of any such law a

nd the manag ement of Cities including the L evey

Division manag ement has no actual knowle dg e ther eof. Cities shall have no obligations or liabiliti es arising out of failure of such asse t s t o h ave been in c ompliance pr ior to the Closing, with a ny fede ral, state or

local law e x cept to the extent that any such obl igation arises from a breac h by Citi es of the f

oreg oing w ar r an t y. “Eve nt” as used in Sec tion 11 is not define d in the APA. No provisi on of the APA dire ctly addre sses wh e the r B or de n w ou ld a ssume the e nv ir on me nta l obli g a tio ns re la te d to the L e ve y Di vis ion a sse ts. The Comprehe nsive Environmental Response, Compensation, an d L iability Act (“CERCL A”) was e nacte d i n 1 9 8 0
. 4 2 U.S .C. §§ 9601-75. I n 1983, pursuant to CERCL A, the United States Environmental P rotec tion Ag ency (“EPA” ) added the S kinner L andfill to the National Priorities L ist after it i dentified re lease s, actua l and threatened, of hazardous substance s from the L andfill. See 4 8 Fe d . Reg . 40658 (Sept. 8, 1983). I t is undisput ed that all costs re lated to the Skinner L andfill clea

nup relate to incidents that transpire d prior to CERCL A’s ena ctment and be fore Citi es (a s OXY’s pr edec essor-in- interest) c onvey ed the Woodlawn fa cility to Borde n. On Marc h 28, 1997, Dow asse rt ed a claim ag ainst OXY a nd more than 80 othe r par ties
se e kin g re c ov e ry

of res po ns e co sts un de r s e c tio n 1 07 of CER CL A. Do w b a se d it s c la ims a g a ins t5

OXY on al l ega t i o n s that, prior to the 1974 closing , the L evey fac ility arr ang ed for

the disposal of waste c ontaining ha zardous substances at th e S kinner L andfill and OX Y was the ref ore oblig ated
un de r C ERC L A, 42 U.S. C. § 96 07 (a), to s ha re in t he c os t of

c le an- up a t th e Ski nn e r L and fi ll. Almost all of the CERCL A claims we re r esolved throug h a conse nt decr ee en t er ed i n t o with the United States on April 3, 2001, pursuant to which O XY a n d o t hers a g ree d to pay cer tain past and future c osts at the site. See U nited States v. Elsa Skinner- Morgan , Civ. Action No. C-1-00-424. On J anuar

y 5, 2001, OXY a

nd Bor den filed a

J oint Moti on for a Case Mana g ement Or der to permit OXY to f

ile a cross-c laim a g ainst Bor den seeking damag es OXY had incurre d to date and any future da mag es OXY might incur

related to th e S k i nner L andfill. The United States D istrict Court fo r t he Sou the rn

Di str ic t of

Oh io g ra nte d th e mot ion

and on June 20 , 200 1, OX Y fil e d a c ro ssc la im a g a ins t B or de n c iti ngthe L e ve y CER CL A o bl igation . O XY so ug ht d a ma g e s in c ur re d in clea ning the Skinner L andfill and in reimbursing the EPA and other Potential Responsibl e Parties (“PRPs”) for c osts incurred at the L andfill. On M ay 3, 2002, Bor den moved for summary judgme nt on OXY’ s cross-c laim, and the district court subsequently denied the motion. I n denying the motion, the district court noted: The Court finds as a

matter of l aw t h at the contra ctual languag e is ambig uous conce rning wh e the r B or de n a ssume d li a bil ity fo r c os ts i nc ur

re d in c on ne c tio n wi th the Ski nn e r L and fi ll cle an u p for mate rials deposited ther e prior to the Closing Date. B oth parties have posited pla us ibl e and

va ry ing int e rp re ta tio ns of the Ag re e me nt, and the y have c ite d s e ve ra l c a se s in supp ort of the ir

re sp e c tiv e int e rp re ta tio ns . I t is no t a pp are nt f ro m th e fa c e of

the c on tr a c t, howeve r, which of t he reasonable interpre tations the parties intende d when the A g ree ment wa s d ra ft e d. No r do the c ite d c a se s re so lve the a mbi g uit y sin c e tho se c a se s d o n ot e sta bli sh wh a t th e se pa

rt ie s in te nd e d w he n th e y dr a ft e d the pa rt ic ula r Ag re e me nt at

iss ue he re . T hu s, it is necessar

y to look bey ond the four c orner s of the wr itten Ag ree ment to asce rtain the pa rt ie s’ int e nti on

a s to the a ssumpt ion

of lia bil ity fo r t he c le anu p c os ts. Th e c a se the n p ro c e e de d to a no nju ry tr ia l. O n D e c e mbe r 2 9, 20 05 , th e dis tr ic t c ourt iss ue d it s6

opinion and found in f

avor of Bor den on all claims. The district cour t concluded that OXY “f

ailed to su sta in i ts b ur de n o f d e mon str a tin g that th e APAin q ue sti on manif e sts a ‘c le ar a nd un mis taka

ble intent’ to require Bor den to assume liability for the e nvironmental hazard a t Skinner L andfill.” The district court we nt on to state that “the most re asonable interpre tation” of the APA lang uag e, in light of all the e videnc e at trial, was that the pa rties contemplate d that the closing date of the contra ct
wo uld se rv e a s th e “ de marc a tio n li ne ” fo r d e te rm ini ngfutur e lia bil ity “ wi th C iti e s to re ta in responsibility

for a ll liabili ties arising from ac tivity that took place on or befor e the tra

nsfer date, a nd Bor den assuming responsibility for a ll liabili ties arising from ac tivity occur ring there afte r.” II. The district cour

t’s construction of the contra ct is a question of law subject to de novo revie w by this court. Cam

pb e ll v . Pot ash Co rp ., 238 F.3d 792, 797 ( 6th Cir. 2001). The existence of ambi g uity in a contra ct is also a de novo question for this court. M e r id ia n Leasing, Inc. v. A ssociated Aviation Underwriters, Inc
. , 4 0 9 F
. 3 d 3 4 2 , 3 4 6 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 5 )
. T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s
re so lut ion of any a mbi g uit

y ba se d on extr ins ic e vid e nc e may be ov e rt ur ne d o nly if c le arl y e rr on e ou s. Id. Pur su ant t o F e de ra l Ru le of Civ il Pr oc e dure 52 (a ), fi nd ing s o f f a c t by the dis tr ic t c ourt

sh ou ld not be re verse d unless clea rly err oneous. F ed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)
. A finding of fac t is c lear ly err oneous wh e n, a lth ou g h th e re is e vid e nc e to su pp or t it, “ the re vie wi ng c ourt on the e nti re e vid e nc e is l e ft wi th the def inite and firm convic tion that a mistake has bee n committed.” Anderson v. City of Besseme r City , N. C. , 4 7 0 U. S
. 5 6 4 , 5 7 3 (1 9 8 5 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. U.S. G ypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1 94 8) ); accord G ross v. Comm’r , 272 F.3d 333, 3 4 3 (6 t h Cir. 2001). When the finding s rest on
cre dibilit y

deter minations, Ru l e 5 2 demands e ven g reater de fer ence . Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575; Ha mi lto n v . Ca re ll , 243 F.3d 992, 997- 98 (6th Cir. 2001).7 I I I
. The parties ag ree that the APA provides that their rig hts and obligations thereunder are to be construed under New York law. New York law provides that it is the court’s function to “disce rn the intent of the pa

rties to the extent their intent is evidenced by their written agre em ent.” Int’l Klaft er Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co. , 8 69 F .2 d 9 6, 99 (2 d Ci r. 19 89) (cita tio n o mitte d) . I f t he pa rt ie s’ intent is unclear f

rom the writing, however, the court may consider e x trinsic evidenc e of intent. Sla tt
v . S lat t , 64 N.Y.2d 966, 967 (1985). A court ca nnot find a duty

to indemnify

“abse nt manifestation of a ‘ clea r and unmistakable intent’ to indemnify .” Commander Oil Corp. v. Advanc e Food Se rv. Eq uip ., 991 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1993) (interna l c itation omitted). Moreove r, as noted by the district
c ourt , c ourt s appl y in g Ne w Y or k la w a bid e by the “ wi de ly

a c c e pte d p ri nc ipl e ” that “ ind e mni ty ag ree ments which purpor

t to indemnify

the indemnitee f

or its own fault are to be strictly construed.” (JA a t 10 4. ); see Olin Corp. v. Yeargin, Inc. , 1 4 6 F. 3 d 3 9 8 , 4 0 7 -0 8 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc
. , 7 7 2 F
. S u p p . 1 2 4 , 1 3 1 ( W
. D
. N
. Y
. 1 9 9 1 ) )
. A p r e - C E R C LA indemnity

ag ree ment inhere ntly

cannot e x pressly

waive ( or cove r) CERCL A liability that did not exis t at i ts dr a f

ti n g , b u t u

n d e r N e w Y o r k la w s u f f ic ie n tl y b r o a d c o n tr a c tu a l l an g u a g e c antransfe r unknown future CERCL A obligations. Olin Corp. v. Consol. Aluminum Corp. , 5 F.3d 10, 15- 16 (2d Cir. 1993). Section 11 of the APA states in c lear l an gu age that “B orden he reby assumes all of the ob lig a tio ns of

Citi e s, ari sin g ou t of ev e nts oc c ur ri nga ft e r t

he Clo sin gDate re la tin g to t he bu sin e ss
or a sse ts o f t

he L e ve y Di vis ion tr ans fe rr e d h e re un de r, ” wh ile “ Citi e s will c on tin ue to b e re sp on sib le fo r a ll o bli g a tio ns arising out of eve nts occurring prior to and on the Closing Date relating to the business or assets of the L evey Division.” OXY’s oblig ation under CERCL A to share in the clea nup8

of the Skinner L andfill direc tly ar o s e fr o m a pre- closing event: Cities’ disposal of waste at the landfill. As such, OXY must reta in liabilit y under the plain lang uag e of the contra ct. An alter native
rea ding of

the APA require s a strained eff ort to a rrive at an outcome not appa rent fr om the fac e of the contra ct. Se e W

.W .W

. As so cs. , In c . v . G ian c on tie ri , 77 N.Y.2d 157, 163 (1990) (“B y ignor ing the plain lang uag e of the contra ct, plaintiff ef fec tively rewri t es the bar g ain that was struc k. An
an al y s i s that beg ins with consideration of e x trinsic evidenc e of w hat the par ties meant, instead of loo kin g fi rs t to wh a t the y sa id an d r e a c hin g e xtri ns ic e vid e nc e on ly wh e n r e qu ir e d to do so be c a us e of some identified a

mbiguity , unnece ssarily

denig rate s the contra ct and unse ttles the law.”)
. OX Y’ s relianc e on Purolator , 772 F.Supp. at 131, is misplaced. Rathe r than bolstering OXY’ s case , Purolator

highlig hts the di stinction betwee n the contract at issue in this case and the one at issue in Purolator
. Purolator conce rned only the breadth of t he contract, i.e., whether the pre

CERCL A contra ct was sufficiently broad to cover CERCL A liability
. Id. a t 13 0- 31 (f ind ingthat a “settlement a g ree ment which shows that the parties intended to r esolve a ll their disputes involvi ng any ty pe of c laim includes CERCL A liability , even if the agr eeme nt is framed in g ener al terms and does not specif

ically ref er to CERCL A or to enviro n m en t al l iability ”). The Purolator court conclude d that contra ct lang uag e stating that one party “assumes and ag ree s to satisfy all liabiliti es and oblig ations” of the othe r p ar t y was suff iciently broad to e ncompass CERCL A liability
. Id. at 131-32. Unlike the contrac t in this case , howeve r, t here was no tempora l disti nction in the Purolator contra ct: the contra ct said nothing of one pa rty reta ining liability

arising out of ev ents prior to the
c los ing
. He re the pa

rt ie s’ us e of the c los ing date a s a “ de marc a tio n lin e ” to assi gn li abi li ty distinguishes the APA fr om the contra ct at issue in Purolator
. OXY also argues that “[t] he disposal of waste in the ordinary course of bu s i n es s b y theI t is unclear w hy OXY r elies on this particular dictionary

definition, as it was not 1 rele ased until fiftee n y ear s after the par ties draf ted the APA. Bor den asse rts that “OXYconspicuously failed to de vote so much as a sentenc e to the 2 me anin g of

the ph ra se ‘a

ri sin g ou t of

’” a s u se d in

Se c tio n 1 1 o f t

he APA . B or de n g oe s o n to no te how New York c ourts interpre t “ar ising out of.” Id. Howeve r, the phra se “a rising out of

” as used in Section 11 is stil l depende nt on whether Citi es’ disposal of ha zardous waste w as an “eve nt” within the meaningof the c ontrac t, and as such “ arising out of” ha s no independe nt rele vance to determining liability
. 9 Woodlawn plant was not an ‘e vent’” within the meaning of the APA, a nd there fore did not trigg er any leg al obliga

tion. OXY emphasizes the us ag e of “eve nt” from the 1989 edition of Black’ s Law Di c tio na ry

and its definition including the “conse quence of any thing” and a “ noteworthy

happening
or occ urre nce.” OXY then splice s the definition in order to a rrive at its conclusion that “an e vent 1 is: ‘the conseque nce of

any thing,’ the ‘outcome of an a ction as finally deter mined,’ that in which a

n action ‘terminate s’ or a ‘notewor thy happening .’” (F inal Br
. of Appellant at 30 (citing Black’ s Law Di c tio na ry , 49 8 (5 th ed. 1989).) O XY g oes on to note that “[a]t least one New York c ourt has embra ced a s imilar definition of “event,” and then cites a New York case from 1851. See Fitch v. Bates , 1 1 B arb our 4 71 , 4 73 (N .Y . 1 85 1) . OX Y the n co nc lud e s tha t, in line wi th t he se de fi nit ion s, the “ dis po sa l of

wa ste by the Woo dla

wn pla nt, an a c tio n w hic h w a s o f n o c on se qu e nc e , w a s c le arl y not an ‘e vent’ unde r the plain mea ning of the word.” Citi es’ disposal of w aste, howe ver, doe s fit within the pla in meaning of “e vent.” The 1968 2 edition of Blac k ’s Law D ic tio na ry , the m ost rec ent editi on at t he ti me t he APA wa s draf ted but not cited by either party , define s “eve nt” as “[t] he conseque nce of any thing, the issue, the conclusion, end” an d “ [a ]n y th in g th a t h a

p p e n s o r c o me s to p a s s a s d is ti n g u is h e d f r o m a th in g th a t e x ists.” Blac k ’s Law D ic tio na ry

654 (4th ed. 1968). T he disposal of ha zardous waste f its withi n this broad definition. Simi larly , the cur rent e dition of W

ebster’s dictionary

at the time of the c ontrac t drafting10

(also not cited by either party ) defined “e vent” a s “somethingthat happens: oc curr ence .” W ebster’s Third Int’l Dictionary 78 8 (3 d ed. 19 67 ). Ag a in, larg e -s c a le dis po sa l of ha zar do us wa ste fi ts comforta bly within this definition. OXY a lso contends that the di strict court’s interpretation of “event” contradicts the me aning the par ties attache d to “eve nt” in a separ ate provision of the APA. This argument is misl eading . The APA provision cited by

OXY, Sec tion 2(n), is titl ed “A bsence of Adver se Events” and is a g uara ntee that nothing ne g ative has ha ppened to the property in the period be tween the draf ting date and the closing . The illu s t ra t i o n s o f “e vents” provide d in this section, including “f ire, a ccide nt, or other
casua lty
. . . or any

act of Good [sic] or the public e nemy ,” apply only to ad v e rseevents a s defined,
no t “ e ve nts ” with ou t this mo dif ie r. Th e same pr ov isi on g oe s o n to dis c us s “ g e ne ra l e c on omi c events” an d “eve nts which aff ect industry

in ge nera l,” but these other usag es of “ event” are not
a dd re sse d ( or

a c kn ow le dg e d) by

OX Y. On ly

a ne utr a l us a g e or

de fi nit ion

of “ e ve nt, ” no t a contextual usag e like that found in Section 2(n), w ould be useful in dete rmining the parties’ intent with reg ard to the usa g e of “ event” in Section 11 of t he APA. As such, any relianc e on the mea

ning of “e vent” a s used in Section 2(n) is misplaced. OX Y a sse rt s th a t “ the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr on e ou sly

e qu a te d th e te rm ‘e ve nt’ wi th ‘ a c tiv ity ’ i n concluding that pre- Closing disposal of waste was an ‘eve nt.’” OX Y ra ises this arg ument based on the district court’s holding that “the pa rties contemplate d that the C losing Date would ser ve as the demar cation line for

deter mining future liability , with Cities to r etain responsibility for all liabiliti es ari sin g fr om activity th a t t o o k p la c e o no r

b e f o r e th e tr an s f

e r d a te , an d

B o r d e na ssuming
re sp on sib ili ty

fo r a ll l ia

bil iti e s ari sin g fr om a c ti v it y occur ri ngthe re a ft e r. ” (JA a t 10 5 ( e mph a sis
a dd e d) .) Th is st ate me nt d oe s n ot, ho we ve r, ne c e ssa ri ly imp ly tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

“ us e d ‘ e ve nt’OX Y a lso a sse rt s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s int e rp re ta tio n o f “ e ve nt” fata lly c on fl ic ts w ith 3 the war ranty clause in Section 11. Cit ies’ limited warr anty that it had no knowledg e that it was in violation of state or fe dera l law does not, howe ver, c ircumvent the pla in lang uag e of othe r sections of the c ontrac t provision. See B uffalo Color Corp. v. AlliedSignal, Inc. , 139 F. Supp. 2d 40 9, 42 4- 25 (W. D. N. Y. 20 01 ) ( fi nd ingthat on e c omp any ’s purc ha se of ano the r c omp any

“ a s is ” d o e s n o tr e s u l ti nana s s u mp t i o no f C E R C L A l i a

b i l i t y: “ If t h e p art i e s i n t e n d e d

s u c h ani n d e m n i t y, the y c ou ld h a ve dr a ft e d a

pp ro pr ia te sp e c if

ic langua g e to r e fl e c t th is i nte nt, or —q uit e simply —they could have draf

ted all-e ncompassing broad la ng uag e . . . .” ( citation omitted)). Moreove r, the wa

rra nty cover s only

the “a ssets transfe rre d.” B y its plain langua g e, then, the war ranty does not cove r dumping or any subsequent re lease
. 11 and ‘a ctivity ’ interc hang eably ,” as O XY alleg es. Instead, this wording mere ly ref lects the district court’s c onclusion as to th e meaningof the provision and the court’s f inding that OX Y re mains liable for pr e-c losing dumping ; the district court need not quote the languag e of the contra ct in ever y passag e. 3 There is ample evidence in the re cord to support the district c ourt’s conc lusion that OXY reta ined liability . Sever al Bo rden employ ees, inc luding its then-vice president Jon Caseyand inhouse counsel Paul J osenhans, testified extensively as to Bor den’s non- assumption of liabilit y at the Skinner L andfill. Moreove r, the e vidence prese nted by OXY is not convincing . OXY notes va rious state me nts by

Citi e s’ emp loy e e s, bu t no ne pr ov ide s any re so lut e e vid e nc e that w ou ld s up po rt a finding of clea

r err or. Some e vidence emphasized by OXY is not rele vant, like the testimony of Dr. He llw ig (w ho le d Ci tie s’ ne g oti a tin g te a m) that Cit ie s w ante d to sel l the L e ve y Di vis ion be c a us e it “wanted to ge t out of t he busi ness.” Other OXY evidence f ocuses on the dr afting history of the APA , b u t th is u lt im a te ly d e mo n s tr a te s li tt le mo r e th an th e O X Y r e p r e s e n tati v e s ’ per sonal interpre tations of the neg otiations. OXY al s o re lies on various conte mporane ous notes and
me mor and a

fo r t he pr op os iti on

that “ Citi es wa

nte d n o o bli g a tio ns ‘h ang ingov e r. ’” Th e se no te s, howeve r, do nothing to affe ct interp re t at i o n of the APA. OX Y does little more than c ite various12

persona l notes of OXY officia ls a nd then liberally interpre t the se notes in its favor . Even if OX Y’s evidenc e per

mitt ed a fi n ding c ontrary to that of the district court, this would not be the ba sis of a finding of cle ar e rror . Anderson , N.C

. , 470 U.S. at 573- 74 (“Where there are two permissible views of the e vid e nc e , the fa c tf

ind e r’ s c ho ic e be tw e e n th e m c ann ot b e c le arl y e rr on e ou s. ” ); se e als o F

uji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay I nt’l, Inc. , 461 F.3d 675, 687 ( 6th Cir. 2006).

I V. OXY al s o ar g ues that the “ unequivoca l lang uag e of the APA demonstrates that Borde n purcha sed the on-g oing busine ss of the L evey Division.” OXY a sserts that the district cour t erre d
as a matter of law when it conclude d that Citi es did not transfe r the L evey Division to Borden a s an ong oing busine ss. The district court f ound that “B orden did not purcha se ‘the on-g oing busine ss of th e L e v e y D iv is io n , ’ b u t r a th e r p u r c h a s e d o n ly s e le c te d a s s e ts o f th a t e n ti ty
. ” T h e la n g u a g e in the APA is cons i s t en t wi t h this int erpr etation. Section 1(b) of the APA states that B orden pur chase s only “those c erta in assets of the L evey Division more particula

rly s et fo rth in Parag raph 7.” That
se c tio n th e n d e ta ils va

ri ou s L e ve y

a sse ts not i n cl u d ed in t he sale : “Expressly excluded from the assets to be c onvey ed her eunder are all L evey

Division accounts re ceiva ble outstanding as of the Closing Date , all cash, c laims a g ainst third parties and insurance claims, and inventories of finished pr od uc ts c on sis tin g of

fi nis he d inks and

re la te d p ro du c ts, litho g ra ph ic plate s and

litho g ra ph ic
c he mic a ls i n e xiste nc e and a llo c a ble to t he L e ve y Di vis ion a s of the Clo sin g Date
. . . . ” F ur the r, it is clear that the district court we ighe d the extrinsic ev i d en ce an d arr ived at the c onclusion that Bor den purc hased only

cer tain assets. Even if B orden ha d purcha sed the L evey Division as an ong oing busine ss, this would not inh e re ntl y be de te rm inativ e of

e nv ir on me nta l li a

bil ity
. As dis c us se d a

bo ve , Se c tio n 7 of

the APA13

provides that Cities transfe rre d assets of the L evey Division to Bor den “free and clear of all liabiliti es and oblig ations, except tho s e l i ab i l ities and obligations which are to be assumed by Bor den as pr ov ide d h e re in. ” Secti on 11 fu rt he r s ta te s th a t “ Citi e s w ill c on tin ue to b e re sp on sib le fo r a ll ob lig a tio ns ari sin g ou t of e ve nts oc c ur ri ng pr ior to and on the Clo sin g Date re la tin g to t he bu sin e ss
or asse ts of the L evey

Division.” Even if Bor den had purcha sed the ong oing busine ss of the L evey Di vis ion , th is w ou ld n ot o ve rc ome the pa rt ie s’ ne g oti a te d a g re e me nt. V. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the district cour t.