alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MARTIN v. HUFF TRUCK LINE, Inc., et al.

No. 2914.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Nov. 21, 1947

For former opinion, see 32 So.2d 49.

*622C. A. Blanchard, of Donaldsonville, for appellant.

Percy & Wirtz, of Baton Rouge, for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

Notice of the judgment rendered in this case was received by counsel for plaintiffs, appellants, on October 4, 1947. The application for re-hearing was not filed until October 20, 1947. It is contended, by motion filed on behalf of the defendants, appellees, that the application comes too late and that it should be denied.

Counsel for appellants states that the time for filing the application expired on October 19, 1947, and he contends that as that day was a Sunday, a legal holiday, the delay was extended to the following day and consequently the application was filed within the time required by law. In support-of his contention he refers to Act No. 16 of 1910 which is now incorporated in Art. 920.5 of the Code of Practice and which reads in part as follows: “Judgments rendered in the courts of appeal of the state shall become final and executory on the fifteenth calendar day after the rendition, * * * unless the last day shall fall on a legal holiday, when the delay shall be extended to the first day thereafter not a legal holiday; provided that in the interval parties in interest shall have the right to apply for rehearing; * *

The fifteenth calendar day following October 4, 1947, was October 19, 1947 and that was the day on which the judgment in this case would have become executory had it not been a legal holiday. The legal holiday extended the day on which the judgment could have been executed until the following day, that is October 20, 1947. According to a further specific provision of the law execution of the judgment could have longer been delayed had the appellants, “in the interval” between October 4, 1947, the day on which notice was received, and the fifteenth calendar day thereafter, the day on which it became executory, which was, as we have seen, October 19, 1947, filed an application for rehearing. That interval was the fourteen day period between October 5, 1947 and October 18, 1947, both inclusive. See Murray v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., La.App., 184 So. 413 and O. K. Realty Co., Inc., v. John A. Juliani, Inc., 157 La. 277, 102 So. 399. The application was not filed within that interval. In fact it was not filed until two days after the interval had expired. Obviously it was filed too late and cannot be considered.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Criminal Case No. 11-mj-01164-BNB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

1. RICHARD CARL HEERINGA,

Defendant.

ORDER

THIS MATTER coming before the Court upon motion of the Government to dismiss the

Criminal Complaint, vacate the Arrest Warrant, and unseal the above-entitled case, and the Court

having considered the same,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Criminal Complaint in the above-captioned case is

dismissed, the Arrest Warrant is vacated, and the case – including the Government’s Motion to

Seal, the Order to Seal, the Criminal Complaint, the Arrest Warrant, and any other order issued

with regard to the Government’s Complaint or Motion to Seal – is unsealed.

DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 1st day of November, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

s/Craig B. Shaffer 

Craig B. Shaffer

United States Magistrate Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02613-DME-MEH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

$782,893.49 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY,

Defendant.

ENTRY OF DEFAULT

THIS MATTER is before the Clerk's Office on Plaintiff's Motion for Clerk’s Entry of

 Default. Upon examination of our records, we find that: 

 (a) Service to all known interested parties was made via first class U.S. Mail, and Certified

 Mail Return Receipt Requested, as evidenced by the Plaintiff’s Certificate of Service filed with the

 Court on October 18, 2011 (Doc. 6); and 

 (b) Notice of Civil Forfeiture was posted on an official government internet site

 (www.forfeiture.gov) for at least 30 consecutive days, beginning on October 23, 2011, as required

 by Rule G(4)(a)(iv)(C) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset

 Forfeiture Actions, as evidenced by the Notice of Publication filed with the Court on November 30,

 2011 (Doc. 7); and 

 (c) To date, no claim, answer, or other responsive pleading has been filed as to this

defendant property. 

Case No. 1:11-cv-02613-DME-MEH Document 9 filed 01/05/12 USDC Colorado pg 1 of 2
 Therefore, DEFAULT of the defendant property is herewith entered. 

DATED: January 5, 2012.

GREGORY C. LANGHAM, CLERK

By: s/ Gail Shaw

Gail Shaw, Deputy Clerk

Case No. 1:11-cv-02613-DME-MEH Document 9 filed 01/05/12 USDC Colorado pg 2 of 2
Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, August 09, 2017

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A17A1826. DENOISYO GIOVANNI STEVENSON v. THE STATE.

The appellant in this case failed to comply with the notice of docketing mailed by this 

Court and with Court of Appeals Rules 22 (a) and 23 (a), regarding the filing of an enumeration 

of errors and brief within twenty days after the appeal was docketed. See also Court of Appeals 

Rule 13.

On July 03, 2017, this Court ordered the appellant to file an enumeration of errors and a 

brief no later than July 13, 2017. As of the date of this order, the appellant's enumeration of 

errors and brief still have not been filed. Accordingly, this appeal is deemed abandoned and is 

hereby ordered DISMISSED. Court of Appeals Rules 7, 23 (a).

Because procedural deficiencies have deprived the appellant of the right of appellate 

review, the appellant is hereby informed of the following in accordance with Rowland v. State, 

264 Ga. 872 (452 SE2d 756) (1995):

This Court has dismissed your appeal because an enumeration of errors and a 

brief have not been filed on your behalf as required. If this failure occurred while 

you were represented by legal counsel and was due to your appellate counsel's 

failure to perform the duties of appellate counsel, and if you still wish to appeal, 

you may file a motion in the trial court for permission to pursue an out-of-time 

appeal. If the trial court grants your motion for an out-of-time appeal, you will 

have 30 days from the filing date of the order granting your motion to file in the 

trial court a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. If the 

trial court denies your motion for an out-of-time appeal, you will have 30 days 

from the filing date of the order denying your motion to file in the trial court a 

notice of appeal from that order.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, August 09, 2017.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the appellant as well as to 

the appellant's attorney of record, if any. The appellant's attorney is also directed to send a copy 

of this order to the appellant.
226 La. 649

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lloyd L. PERKINS.

No. 41973.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 13, 1954.

Lloyd L. Perkins, in pro. per.

Fred S. Le Blanc, Atty. Gen., M. E. Cul-ligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Stuart S. Kay, Dist. Atty., De Ridder, for appellee.

HAMITER, Justice.

The state has moved to dismiss this appeal. It was taken by the defendant, Lloyd L. Perkins, from a conviction of the crime (as a first offender) of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and from the imposed sentence to pay a fine of $300 or serve 90 days in jail.

LSA-R.S. 14:98 denounces such offense and makes provision for the imposition of a penalty, for a first offender, it being a fine of not less than $125 nor more than $400 or imprisonment in the parish jail for not less than 30 days nor more than eight months.

The motion to dismiss is meritorious and must be sustained. According to Article 7 Section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 this court has appellate jurisdiction of criminal cases, on questions of law alone, “whenever the penalty of death, or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed; or where a fine *exceeding*Three Hundred Dollars or imprisonment *exceeding*six months has been actually imposed.” Neither the penalty which might have been imposed on this defendant nor that which he actually received comes within the quoted constitutional provisions. (Italics ours.).

The appeal is dismissed.
Presidential Documents

60095 

Federal Register 

Vol. 73, No. 198 

Friday, October 10, 2008 

Title 3— 

The President 

Executive Order 13475 of October 7, 2008 

Further Amendments To Executive Orders 12139 And 12949 

In Light of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 

Amendments Act of 2008 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the 

laws of the United States of America, including sections 104 and 303 of 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), 

as amended by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–261), it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. Section 1–103 of Executive Order 12139 of May 23, 1979, as 

amended, is further amended by: 

(a) striking ‘‘(7)’’ each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘(6)’’; 

(b) adding after subsection (h) ‘‘(i) Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation.’’; and 

(c) by adding after the sentence that begins ‘‘None of the above officials 

. . .’’, a new sentence to read ‘‘The requirement of the preceding sentence 

that the named official must be appointed by the President with the advice 

and consent of the Senate does not apply to the Deputy Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation.’’ 

Sec. 2. Section 3 of Executive Order 12949 of February 9, 1995, as amended, 

is further amended by: 

(a) striking ‘‘(7)’’ each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘(6)’’; 

(b) striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of subsection (g); 

(c) striking the period at the end of subsection (h) and inserting in lieu 

thereof ‘‘; and’’; 

(d) adding after subsection (h) ‘‘(i) Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation.’’; and 

(e) by adding after the sentence that begins ‘‘None of the above officials 

. . .’’, a new sentence to read ‘‘The requirement of the preceding sentence 

that the named official must be appointed by the President with the advice 

and consent of the Senate does not apply to the Deputy Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation.’’ 


yshivers on PROD1PC62 with MISCELLANEOUS
60096 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 198 / Friday, October 10, 2008 / Presidential Documents 

Sec. 3. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or 

benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any 

party against the United States, its agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, 

its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

October 7, 2008. 

[FR Doc. E8–24342 

Filed 10–9–08; 8:45 am] 

Billing code 3195–W9–P 


yshivers on PROD1PC62 with MISCELLANEOUSGWBOLD.EPS</GPH>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1997
<CASH>                                           3,731
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,986
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   3,986
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         7,500
<OTHER-SE>                                      60,450
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     3,986
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                63,964
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (63,964)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (63,964)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
No. 07

- 20

- 0020 2

- CV

In re Caleb Logan Hart, Relator §

§

§

§ Or iginal Proce eding

September 29, 2020

Opinion Per Curiam

JUDGMENT

Pursuant to the opinion of the Co urt dated September 29, 2020 , it is ordered,

adjudged, and decreed that Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is conditionally

granted to the extent that the Honorable Steven R. Emmert rule on Relator’s pending

motions. Writ will issue only if Judge Emmert fails to act in accor dance with this Court's

opinion.

o O o
##### 



EXHIBIT 32 CAPSTEAD MORTGAGE CORPORATION
CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 We, Andrew F. Jacobs, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Phillip A.
Reinsch, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Capstead Mortgage
Corporation (the Company), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 that:  1.
    
    The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended
June 30, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company. Date: August 6, 2004
    
    By:
    
    /s/ ANDREW F. JACOBS
Andrew F. Jacobs
President and Chief Executive Officer
 Date: August 6, 2004
    
    By:
    
    /s/ PHILLIP A. REINSCH
Phillip A. Reinsch
Senior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Willie Mae PRIEST, Appellant, v. Mary Priest LOGAN as Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of William J. Priest, Deceased, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.

Jan. 7, 1955.

*884Scruggs & Carmichael, ’Gainesville, Fowler, White, Gillen, Yancey & Humkey, Cody Fowler, Tampa, and W. N. Avera, Gaines-ville, for appellant.

Goldstein & Goldstein, Jacksonville, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The summary declaratory judgment, from which this appeal was taken, which expressly provides that: “The Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this cause in order to entertain such further proceedings herein as may be proper”, is hereby affirmed. We deem it appropriate to observe that we construe this retention of jurisdiction proviso to mean that the learned Circuit Judge sitting as Chancellor will consider any and all equitable claims which appellant may appropriately present to him.

Affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J.j and TERRELL, THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02357-WYD-MEH

CS CAPITAL CORP. d/b/a THE INVOICE BANKERS CORP.,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOCAL SENIOR SERVICES,

RANDY KALANI FAHILGA, and

ILD CORP. f/k/a ILD Telecommunications, Inc.,

Defendants.

MINUTE ORDER

ORDER ENTERED BY CHIEF JUDGE WILEY Y. DANIEL

Plaintiff CS Capital Corp.’s Motion for Default Judgement, filed May 10, 2012

[ECF No. 44] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff must first request a entry of

default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 

Dated: May 10, 2012.

Case 1:11-cv-02357-WYD-MEH Document 45 Filed 05/11/12 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1621 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1621

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to treat certain farming 
  business machinery and equipment as 5-year property for purposes of 
                             depreciation.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 14, 2007

   Mr. Conrad (for himself, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Roberts, Mrs. 
 Lincoln, Mr. Bunning, and Mr. Salazar) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to treat certain farming 
  business machinery and equipment as 5-year property for purposes of 
                             depreciation.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTAIN FARMING BUSINESS MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT TREATED AS 
              5-YEAR PROPERTY.

    (a) In General.--Section 168(e)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 (defining 5-year property) is amended by striking ``and'' at 
the end of clause (v), by striking the period at the end of clause 
(vi)(III) and inserting ``, and'', and by inserting after clause (vi) 
the following new clause:
                            ``(vii) any machinery or equipment (other 
                        than any grain bin, cotton ginning asset, 
                        fence, or other land improvement) which is used 
                        in a farming business (as defined in section 
                        263A(e)(4)) and placed in service before 
                        January 1, 2010.''.
    (b) Alternative System.--The table contained in section 
168(g)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to special 
rule for certain property assigned to classes) is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to subparagraph (B)(iii) the following:

  ``(B)(vii)..............................................         10''.
 

    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to property placed in service after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
                                 <all>
```
-1-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Criminal Case No. 11-cr-00395-WYD

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

1. HUBERT B. AGUIRRE, SR.,

Defendant.

MINUTE ORDER

ORDER ENTERED BY CHIEF JUDGE WILEY Y. DANIEL

A Notice of Disposition was filed in the above matter on October 7, 2011. A

Change of Plea hearing is set for Tuesday, November 29, 2011, at 3:00 p.m. 

Counsel for the parties shall deliver all change of plea documents

separately to Judge Daniel’s chambers AND to the Probation Department not later

than 72 HOURS before the hearing date. If the documents are not timely submitted,

the hearing will be VACATED. There will be no exceptions to this policy, and

sanctions may be imposed for failure to comply.

Dated: October 12, 2011.

 

Case 1:11-cr-00395-WYD Document 10 Filed 10/12/11 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Heritage Organization, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending November 30, 2004 (the
"Report"), I, Vickie Walker, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1) The Report fully complies with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the Company's financial position and results of operations.





/s/ Vickie Walker
-----------------
Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer



June 15, 2005
#### Frank BOLTON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June Term 1953.

Dismissed without opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

684 

CAF 10-02092 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, GORSKI, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF MINDY L. HOWARD, 

PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STEVE W. HOWARD, RESPONDENT, 

AND SHIRLEY MCLOUGHLIN, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 

LINDA M. CAMPBELL, SYRACUSE, FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT. 

AMDURSKY, PELKY, FENNELL & WALLEN, P.C., OSWEGO (COURTNEY S. RADICK OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 

STEPHANIE N. DAVIS, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, OSWEGO, FOR APRIL H. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Oswego County (Kimberly

M. Seager, J.), entered September 17, 2010 in a proceeding pursuant to

Family Court Act article 6. The order dismissed the petition for

modification of custody. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the petition is

reinstated and the matter is remitted to Family Court, Oswego County,

for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: 

Petitioner mother appeals from an order dismissing her pro se petition

to modify an order of custody entered upon consent. That prior order,

inter alia, awarded the mother and respondent grandmother joint legal

custody of the child and awarded the grandmother primary physical

custody of the child. We agree with the mother that Family Court

erred in dismissing her petition without first receiving a report from

the Referee and providing the mother an opportunity to object to it

(see CPLR 4320 [b]; 22 NYCRR 202.44 [a]; see also Matter of Wilder v

Wilder, 55 AD3d 1341). The record establishes that the Referee was

authorized only to hear the matter and issue a report inasmuch as

there is no evidence that the parties consented to referral to the

Referee for a final determination on the petition (see Wilder, 55 AD3d

1341). We further agree with the mother that the Referee’s failure to

advise her of the right to counsel pursuant to Family Court Act § 262

(a) (v) constitutes reversible error (see Matter of Arlene R. v

Wynette G., 37 AD3d 1044). “The deprivation of a party’s right to

counsel guaranteed by [that] statute ‘requires reversal, without

regard to the merits of the unrepresented party’s position’ ” (Matter

of Collier v Norman, 69 AD3d 936, 937). We therefore reverse the

order, reinstate the mother’s petition and remit the matter to Family 
-2- 684 

CAF 10-02092 

Court for further proceedings on the petition.

Entered: June 10, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court