* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** The Honorable John L. Kane, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by desi gnation. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 2 2004 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

DAVID PRINCE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 03-7122 (D.C. No. CV-01-695-S) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges, and KANE , ** Senior District Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral-2-

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. David Prince appeals from an order of the district court affirming the Commissioner’s decision denying his application forsupplemental security income (SSI) benefits. Mr. Prince filed for these benefits on November 26, 1996. He alleged disability due to severe left arm pain a nd low back pain. He also alleged disability in part due to a mental impairme nt. The agency denied his application initially and on reconsideration. On May 13, 1998, Mr. Prince received a de novo hear ing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). On August 21, the ALJ issued a decision finding Mr. Prince not disabled. Mr. Prince appealed the d ecision and, on July 15, 1999, the Appeals Council remanded the claim to the ALJ f or additional proceedings. The ALJ held a second hearing on October 7, 1999. The ALJ issued his decision on March 17, 2000 finding Mr. Prince not disabled and denying his application for SSI benefits. The ALJ denied Mr. Prince’s appl ication for benefits concluding that he was not disabled because (1) his mental impairment was not severe within the meaning of the SSI regulations atstep two of the analysis, and (2) although he had a severe physical impairment, at step five of the analysis he retained the capacity for work that exists in signi ficant numbers in the national
economy. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)-3-

(explaining five-step process for evaluating claims for disability benefits). The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s dec ision the Commissioner’s final decision. We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Winfrey v. Chater , 92 F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996). On appeal, Mr. Prince contends that the ALJ erred in the following ways: (1) by failing to properly evaluate the evidence provided by the vocational expert (VE); (2) by failing to consider the limitations set forth in the record in making the residual functional capacity ( RFC) determination; and (3) by failing to properly consider the medical evi dence as to claimant’s psychological condition. We affirm.
I. Mr. Prince contends that the ALJ failed to properlyevaluate the evidence provided by the VE; however, the bulk of his argume nt seems to be that the medical evidence does not support a finding that he can perform a full range of light or sedentary work. The ALJ’s RFC assumes that Mr. Prince cannot perform the full range of light or sedentary work so Mr. Pr ince’s argument on that point is without merit. The ALJ determined that Mr. Prince had the following RFC: lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequentl y with the right hand and 5 pounds occasionally with the left hand; stand or walk up-4-

to 1 continuous hour, but no more than 4 hours in an 8-hour work day; sit up to 1 continuous hour, but no more than 4 hours in an 8 hour work day; no overhead reaching or lifting withthe left upper extremity; occasional handling with no prolonged gr ipping with the left hand; no fine manipulations with the left hand . Otherwise he may work on an 8-hour basis with normal breaks. Aplt. App. at 22. Because the ALJ’s RFC determinat ion included additional exertional or non-exertional limitations that would impact Mr. Prince’s ability to perform a full range of light work, the ALJ appropr iately asked the VE whether there were jobs at the light or sedentary level that could be performed with Mr. Prince’s limitations. Id. at 20-21, 68-69. The VE identified examples of light, unskilled jobs and sedentary, unskilled jobs that Mr. Prince could perform that were present in significant numbers in the state of Oklahoma and the national
economy. Id. at 69. Based on the VE’s testimony concerning Mr. Prince’s limitations, the ALJ found that, although he was no t capable of performing the full range of light work, he was capable of perform ing a significant range of light work. Id. at 20-21. The ALJ did not err in his consideratio n of the VE’s testimony.
II. Mr. Prince argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination fails to properly consider the limitations set forth in the record. In support of this argument, Mr. Prince claims that the ALJ failed to give prope r weight to the opinions of his treating physicians. Mr. Prince’s argument is some what illogical because the ALJ-5-

did give controlling weight to the opinion of his t reating physician, Dr. Luann Woods. See id. at 18 (“the opinion of Dr. Woods, the claimant’s t reating physician, is entitled to controlling weight”). Dr . Woods made the following assessments of Mr. Prince’s functional abilities ina medical source statement that was submitted with her treatment records: frequentl y lift/carry 20 pounds; occasionally lift/carry 25 pounds; stand and/or wal k with usual breaks for 8 hours, continuously for 1 hour; sit with usual breaks for 8 hours, continuously for 1 hour; left arm limited to push/pull 5-10 minutes an hour; limited in his ability to reach and handle. Id. at 303-04. The ALJ’s RFC is consistent with Dr. W oods’s assessment; and, in some areas, includes more limit ations than Dr. Woods’s
assessment. Id. at 19 (“The undersigned has reviewed [] Dr. Woods’ assessment, considered it credible and in fact has given the cl aimant more restrictions in his residual functional capacity.”). Mr. Prince appear s to argue that the ALJ gave Dr. Woods’s opinion too much weight, while giving i nsufficient weight to her treatment records. The ALJ found that Dr. Woods’s assessment was consistent with her treatment records. Id. at 18. The ALJ did not err by giving Dr. Woods’s opinion controlling weight and by relying on her as sessment of Mr. Prince’s functional abilities. Mr. Prince argues also that the ALJ did not properl y evaluate the opinion of Dr. Jack Howard. Mr. Prince characterizes Dr. Howard as a treating physician-6-

and he argues that the ALJ did not give good reason s for rejecting Dr. Howard’s opinion. First, Dr. Howard is not a treating physi cian because he only examined Mr. Prince once and he does not provide the only me dical evidence for the relevant time period. Doyal v. Barnhart , 331 F.3d 758, 763 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Absent an indication that an examining physician presented the only medical evidence submitted pertaining to the relevant time period, the opinion of an examining physician who only saw the claimant once is not entitled to the sort of deferential treatment accorded to a treating physic ian’s opinion”) (quotation omitted). Second, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Howar d’s opinion. Dr. Howard concluded that Mr. Prince “has some nerve damage to the hand and some limited range of motion of the hand. He has overall weakne ss of the left arm. He has throbbing pain. He does have pretty good full rang e of motion of the shoulder, but he is unable to lift any significant weight ove r his head.” Aplt. App. at 256. The ALJ summarized Dr. Howard’s findings, see id. at 17; and, consistent with those findings, included the following limitations in Mr. Prince’s RFC: “no overhead reaching or lifting with the left upper extremity; occasional handling with no prolonged gripping with the left hand; no f ine manipulations with the left hand,” id. at 22. The ALJ did not err in his treatment of Dr . Howard’s opinion. Finally, Mr. Prince argues that the ALJ erred in ev aluating the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Raymund King. Again , the ALJ’s RFC appears to-7-

be consistent with Dr. King’s evaluation. Dr. King did not offer any specific functional limitations, but he did state that Mr. P rince has some problems with coordination of the left hand. Id. at 265. The ALJ’s RFC limitations of “occasional handling with no prolonged gripping” an d “no fine manipulations with the left hand” are consistent with Dr. King’s evaluation. Id. at 22. The ALJ did not err in his consideration of Dr. King’s opin ion.
III. Mr. Prince argues that the ALJ failed to properly c onsider the evidence concerning his psychological limitations. Specific ally, Mr. Prince contends that the ALJ erred in his consideration of the opinions of Dr. Woods and Dr. Green. As discussed earlier, the ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Woods was claimant’s treating physician. A treating source opinion is t o be given controlling weight only if it is “well-supported by medically acceptab le clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] record . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2); see also Watkins v. Barnhart , 350 F.3d 1297, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 2003) (outlining framework for ALJ’s controlling weight determination). Although the AL J gave controlling weight to Dr. Woods’s assessment of Mr. Prince’s physical lim itations, he did not give controlling weight to her assessment of his mental limitations. Dr. Woods filled out a medical source statement related to Mr. Princ e’s alleged mental impairment.-8-

In that medical source statement for almost every c ategory she checked the box for “no evidence of limitation in this category” or“not significantly limited.” Aplt. App. at 302. Yet, she determined that Mr. Pr ince would be moderately limited in his ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length rest periods. Id. The ALJ noted that Dr. Woods had found no evidence of limitations in many work functions or that Mr. Prince would not be significantly limited. The ALJ noted also that Mr. Prince had not sought psychiatric or other ment al health assistance for his alleged mental impairment. Dr. Woods’s assessment was also inconsistent with the assessment of the consulting physician, Dr. Gre en. The ALJ determined that Dr. Woods’s assessment was entitled to minimal weig ht because she had never treated Mr. Prince for a mental impairment and beca use she did not have a speciality in that area. Because the ALJ considere d the appropriate factors and explained the reasons for the weight he was giving Dr. Woods’s opinion, no legal error occurred. See Watkins , 350 F.3d at 1300-01. In addition, Mr. Prince appears to argue that the A LJ did not give proper weight to Dr. Green’s opinion. Dr. Green performeda consultative examination of Mr. Prince. Dr. Green reported that Mr. Prince displayed adequate attention and concentration, and was persistent and able to w ork, seemingly at an adequate-9-

pace. Aplt. App. at 462. He found that Mr. Prince would only have slight limitations in a work environment, with the excepti on of a moderate limitation remembering and carrying out complex and/or detailed job instructions. Id. at 464-65. Based on Dr. Green’s assessment, the ALJ d etermined that Mr. Prince’s mental impairment was non-severe, in other words, M r. Prince’s alleged mental impairment does not significantly limit his ability to do basic work activities. Id. at 16. Mr. Prince seems to argue that the ALJ reje cted Dr. Green’s opinion, but provides no explanation as to how the ALJ’s determi nation is inconsistent with Dr. Green’s opinion. Because the ALJ’s determinati on is consistent with Dr. Green’s opinion, there is no error. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court

Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge