1

06- 3699- cr U nite d S tates v. R eyes UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m 2 008 (S ub mi tt ed: J anu ary 14 , 20 09 Dec id ed: Fe bruar y 19 , 20 09) Do cket No . 06 -3 699 -c r U NI T ED S TATES O F A M ERI CA , Appellee ,
-v .- J UA N REYES , De fe ndant -A ppella nt . B ef or e: LEVAL , C AB R ANES , and L I V I NGS T ON , Circuit Jud ges. Def end ant J uanReyes app eals a s ent enc e of 15 y ear s ’ im pr

is on men t, ent er ed af

te r he p lead ed guilt y t o o ne c ou nt

of as s aul t r es ul ti ng i n s er

io us bo dily i nj ur

y inaidof a r acke te er

ing act ivi ty in vio lat io n o f 1 8 U. S.C. § 19 59(a)(3) . At s ent enc ing, the D is tr

ict Cou r t n ot ed that

th e app lic abl e Guid eli nes r ang e was 92 t o 1 15 m on th s ’ im pr is on men t, whi ch i nclud ed a s ix- lev el en han cem ent bas ed
onth e vi ct

im ’s in ju r ies . H owe ver , the D is tr

ict Cou r t d et er mi nedth at, pu r s uan t t o U .S. S.G . § 5 K2 .2, the extent of the victim’s injuries warranted an upw ard adjustment fr om the recommended range , and sentenced defenda nt principally to a term of 15 years’ impris onment (180 months) . We hold that the Distr ict Court did not enga ge in impe rmis sible “double c ounting” of the victim’s injuries because the six-level enha ncement to the recommende d Guidelines range di d not consider the victim’s injuries t o th e s ame ext ent

permi tt ed u nd er

U.S .S. G. § 5K

2.2
. Gl ennA. O bedin , Cen tr al I s lip , N Y, fo r D ef en dant -A ppella nt . Rich ar d P . D on ogh ue, As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney (U ni te dU .S .S .G . § 5 K 2 .2 sta te s, in re le v a n t p a rt: * If s i gni f i cant phys i cal i njury res ul t ed , t he co urt m ay i ncrease t he sent ence ab o ve t he aut ho ri zed gui d el i ne ra n g e . T h e e x te n t o f t h e inc re a se o rd ina rily sh o u ld d e p e n d o n the e x te n t o f t h e inj u ry, the d e g re e to w h ic h it m ay p rove p erm anent , and t he ext ent t o whi ch t he i njury was i nt end ed or kno wi ngl y ri sked. W hen t he vi ct i m su f

f er s a maj or, per manen t di s abi l i t y an d when s uch i nj ur y was i nt ent i onal l y i nf l i ct ed, a s ubs t ant i al d e p a rtu re m a y b e a p p ro p ria te . If the inj u ry is le ss se rio u s o r if t h e d e fen d a n t (tho u g h c rim ina lly n e g lige n t) d id no t kn o w ing ly cr e a te the risk o f ha rm , a le ss su b sta n tial d e p a rtu re w o u ld b e ind ic a te d
. U
. S. S. G
. § 2A2. 2( b) ( 3) ( C ) ac t ual l y m andat es a s even - l evel enh anc em ent f or t he i nf l i ct i on o f per m ane nt or ** l i fe-t hre aten i ng bo d i l y inj u ry. H ow ev er, as d efe nd an t w as als o su bjec t t o a fou r-l ev el enh an ce m en t for u se o f a d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n p u r su a n t to U .S .S .G . § 2 A 2 .2 (b )(2 ), a n d U .S .S .G . § 2 A 2 .2 (b ) c a p s a t te n le v e ls th e p e r m iss ib le cum ul at i ve e nha ncem ent s pur s uant t o U
. S. S. G
. § 2A2. 2( b) ( 2) an d U
. S. S. G
. § 2A2. 2( b) ( 3) , def endant r ecei ved an ef

f ect i ve s i x - l e v e l e n h a n c e me n t a s a r e s u l t o f t h e i n j u r y h e i n f

l i c t e d o n h i s v i c t i m. 2 States Attorney Benton J. Campbell, a nd Assis tant Unit ed S tat es At to r ney Emily Berger, on the brief ), Unit ed St ate s At to r ney ’s Of

fi ce f or th e Eas te r n D is tr

ict of New Yor k, B r oo kly

n, NY for Appellee
. P ER C URI AM : We c onsider in this opinion whethe r an upward adjustment in sentencing pursuant to Section 5K 2.2 of th e Unit ed S tat es Sen te nci ng G ui del in es (the “ Guid eli nes ” or

“U. S.S .G .”) , whi ch ap pl

ies * whe r e the v

ict imhas s uf fe r ed “ s ignif

ican t p hys ical

in ju ry,” con s ti tu te s im permi s s ib le “ do ub le co un ti ng” of a s ent enc ing f

act or whe r e the r eco mm end ed s ent enc ing r ang e un der th e Gu id eli nes alr eady

in clu des

a s ix- lev el en han cem ent

fo r “[ p] er man ent

or [l ]i fe -[ t] hr eat eni ng [

b] odily [i ]n ju ry.” Def end ant J uanReyes app eals fr oma J uly 26 , 20 06 j udgm ent of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e Eas te r n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Le on ar d D . Wex ler , Judge

), convicting hi m, after a guilty pl ea, o f o ne c ou nt

of as s aul t r es ul ti ng i n s er

io us bo dily i nj ur

y inaidof a r acke te er

ing act ivi ty , in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1959(a)(3). At a sentenc ing hea ring held on July 26, 200 6, the District Court det er mi nedth at the r eco mm end ed G ui del in es r ang e was 92 t o 1 15 m on th s ’ im pr is on men t, bas ed i n par t o n a s ix- lev el en han cem ent pu r s uan t t o U .S. S.G . § 2 A2. 2( b) (3 )( C) f or “[ p] er man ent

or [l ]i fe

- [t ]h r eat eni ng [

b] odily [i ]n ju ry.” Up oncon s id er ati onof th e de vas tat

ing ex te nt of th e vi ct im ’s ** injuries—including testimony from the victim’s wife that he was missing the left s ide of his brain and3

that she had been told he would “ne ver wake up aga in”—and de fendant’s own admission that he par ti cip ate d i n a b r ut al ga ng a tt ack i n whichth e vi ct imwas bl udgeo ned“wi th , am ong other things , a bas ebal l b at, ” the D is tr

ict Cou r t s tat ed, “I ’mgoi ng t o upwar dly de par t b as ed upo n [ U.S .S. G. §] 5 K2 .2, th e s er io us nes s of

th e in ju ry, o r

th e in fl ict ed i nj ur y, whichis th e mo s t s er

io us on e of

all , o th er th an death. Some times it’s worse than death to the people who have to live with him.” The District Court th en s ent enc ed d ef

end ant pr in cip ally t o a t er m o f 1 5 yea r s ’ im pr is on men t ( 180 mo nths). Altho ugh def ens e co un s el h ad ea rlie r

ur gedth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t t o i mp os e a s ent enc e withi n the r eco mm end ed Guidelines range a nd to consider mitigating factors weighing a gainst an upwa rd adjustment, he did not ob ject to th e en han ceds ent enc e. The sole iss ue on appe al is whether defenda nt’s s entence was unreasonable be cause, a ccording
to def end ant , the D is tr

ict Cou r t i mp er mi s s ib ly “ do ub le co un te d” the s ever it y of th e vi ct im ’s in ju r ies whe n i t m ade a n upwar d ad ju s tm ent pu r s uan t t o U .S. S.G . § 5 K2 .2. “I mp er mi s s ib le ‘ do ub le co un ti ng’ is th e judi ci al augmenta tion of a defendant’s sentence in c ontravention of the applica ble statute or Sen te nci ng G ui del

in e.” Uni te d St ate s v . T o rr es-Ec hav arr ia , 12 9 F .3d692 , 69 9 (

2dCir . 19 97) ; see also United St ate s v . M o rr is , 35 0 F .3d32, 37 (

2dCir . 20 03) (“ [A] s lo ng a s th e co ur t d oes no t augm ent a s ent enc e in
con tr aven ti onof

th e app lic abl e s tatut e or

Sen te nci ng G ui del

in e, n o f orbi dd en d ou bl e co un ti ng o ccu r s .” (i nt ernal qu ot ati onmar ks omit te d) ); cf
. United Sta tes v. M

aloney , 40 6 F .3d149 , 15 3 (

2dCir . 20 05) (“ [D ]o ub le co un ti ng i s permi s s ib le i n cal cul ati ng aGuid eli nes s ent enc e wh er e . . . eac h o f the m ul tipl e Guidelines sections applica ble to a single a ct serves a distinct purpose or r epresents a discrete harm.”); United Sta tes v. Castellanos, 355 F.3d 56, 60 (2d C ir. 2003) (“[A] distr ict court may ba se two aspects of a Guid eli nes calc ul ati onona s ingle act whe r e they

s er ve dif fe r ent pu rpo s es .”)
. Fo llo wing United Sta tes v. B ook er , 543 U.S. 2 20 (2005), a district court has br oad la titude to “im po s e either

a Gu id eli nes s ent enc e or

a no n- Guid eli nes s ent enc e.” United Sta tes v. Sanchez , 51 7 F .3d 651 , 66 0 ( 2dCir . 20 08) . O ur

r ol e is limit ed t o ex ami ni ng as ent enc e f or r eas on abl ene s s , whichis aki n to r evi ew u nd er

an ab us e- of

-dis cr et io n s tan dar d. Se e i

d. ; see also Gall v. Uni

ted States, 12 8 S. Ct. 586 , 59 14

(2007) (holding that “courts of appeals must r eviewall sentence s—whether inside, just out side, or

s ignif ican tl y ou ts id e the G ui del

in es r ang e—u nd er

a def er ent ial abu s e- of -dis cr et io n s tan dar d”) ; cf

. Sims v. Blot , 534 F.3d 117, 13 2 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A di str ict court has abused its dis cretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the lawor on a clea rly erroneous ass essment of the evide nce, or rendered a dec is io n that

cann ot be l ocat ed w

ithi n the r ang e of

permi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” (cit ati on s andin te r nal quotation marks omitted)) . Eve n post- Boo ker , we r evi ew a dis tr

ict cou r t’ s “in te rpr et ati onof

th e . . . Guid elin es de novo , . . . an d . . . f in di ngs of fa ct un der th e cle arly err on eou s s tan dar d. ” United Sta tes v. Me jia , 46 1 F .3d158 , 16 2 (

2dCir . 20 06) (c it ati on s omitte d) . Al th ough the d ecis io n t o ad ju s t a s ent enc e pu r s uan t t o U .S. S.G . § 5 K2 .2 i s di s cr et io nar y, se e i d. (“[T]he court ma

y in cr eas e the s ent enc e . . . .” (e mp ha sis a dd ed

)), the in te rpl a y o f th e t

wo po rti on s of t he Guid elin es p re sen te d i n th is c a se i s a qu es ti onof

law, whi ch w e r evi ew de novo . H owe ver , “[ w]h er e, as her e, a d ef

end ant has faile d t o o bj ect to an alle ged sentencing

impropriety on the record in the distr ict court, we revie w for plain error,
r equ ir ing the d ef

end ant to es tab lis h ( 1) er r or , (

2) th at i s pl ain , an d ( 3) th at a ff ect s s ub s tan ti al r

igh ts .” United Sta tes v. F

uller , 42 6 F .3d556 , 56 3 (

2dCir . 20 05) (i nt ernal

qu ot ati onmar ks omit te d) . “A n err or is ‘p lai n’ if it is ‘cl ear ’ o r

‘o bv io us ’ at th e t im e of app ell ate con s id er ati on .” Uni te d St ate s v . T ho mas , 27 4 F .3d 655, 667 (2d C ir. 2001) ( en banc ). I n thi s cas e, d ef

end ant has no t p oi nt ed t o any pas s age o f e ither th e Gu id eli nes or a s tatut e that
r ef lect s a leg is lat ive in te nt to pr eclu de the ap pl

icat io n o f b oth the U .S. S.G . § 2 A2. 2( b) (3 )( C) enh ance men t an d a U .S. S.G . § 5 K2 .2 a dj us tm ent ina s ingle s ent enc e. Se e M o rr is , 35 0 F .3dat 3 7 (“Defendant has offered nothing in the . . . Guidelines or r eleva nt st atutes reflecting an intent to preclude the double counting the District Court employed, a nd has therefore not s hown any im permi s s ib le d ou bl e co un ti ng. ”) . Al th ough b oth U .S. S.G . § 2 A2. 2( b) (3 )( C) ( “[

p] er man ent

or [l ]i fe

- [t]hreatening [i]njury”) and U.S .S.G. § 5K2. 2 (“significant physica l injury”) address injuries that are
un com mo nly s ever e, they

ar e no t i den ti cal. T he v ery wo r di ng o f U .S. S.G . § 2 A2. 2( b) (3 )( C)— th at a n enhanc ement of seven leve ls is pr ovided for “[p]ermanent or [l ]i fe -[ t] hr eat eni ng [

i] nj ur y” (emp has is5

add ed) —s ignif

ies th at i t i s mea nt

to app ly ei th er

whe r e the v

ict imnev er fully r eco ver s , or

where the in ju ry thr eat ens th e vi ct

im ’s lif e. Anin ju ry canbe p er man ent , an d thu s qu ali fy fo r th e in cr eas e, ev en i f it is les s s ever e thanth e in ju ry s uf fe r ed b y the v

ict iminthis cas e. Cf.U.S.S.G. 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(J) (indicating tha t injuries involving “substantial impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ,
or men tal fa cul ty . . . or an o bv io us di s figur eme nt ” m ay qu ali fy as perman ent

or lif e- th r eat eni ng b odily injuries). Conversely, an i njury can be life-threatening temporarily a nd yet hav e no long term effects fo llo wing the v

ict im ’s r eco ver

y. T he ad ju s tm ent

pr ov id ed b y U. S.S .G . § 5 K2 .2 w as emp lo yed , inthis case, on a ccount of an injury that w as both permanent and exce pt io nally s er io us —i n o th er

wor ds , an in ju ry co ns id er ably gr aver

th an wh at i s nec es s ary t o qual if y f or an i ncr eas e un der

U.S .S. G. § 2A2 .2( b) (3 )( C). Cf. U

nit ed Stat es v. P hil ipo si an , 267 F.3d 214, 21 9 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming an upwa rd adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 5K2. 2, where the victim’s injuries were already taken into a ccount by the

s ent enc ing en han cem ent

un der U.S .S. G. § 2A2 .2(

b) (3 )( C), bu t wher e the D is tr ict Cou r t f ou ndth at those injuries were “above a nd beyond the typi cal c ase contempla ted by the six-level a djustment and
warr ant ed f

ur th er up war d d epar tu r e”) . I nd eed , U. S.S .G . § 5 K2 .2 e xp r es s ly s tat es ,“Wh en the v ict im
s uf fe r s a ma jor, permanen t disab ility andwhe n s uchin ju ry was in te nt io nally i nf lic te d, a s ub s tan ti al dep ar tu r e may be app r op r iat e” (emp has is add ed)
. I n any eve nt , d ef

end ant ’s do ub le- cou nt

ing argum ent

mi s s es th e po in t. Af

te r Boo ker , assuming th e s ent enc e is no t b as ed o n a mis un der s tan di ng o f the G ui del in es , we w ill vacat e a s ent enc e only i f i t i s
un r eas on abl e. I n thi s cas e, the D is tr ict Cou r t c orr ect

ly u nd er s to odth e Gu

id eli nes , an d the s ent enc e is
no t u nr eas on abl e.6

We ther ef or e co nclud e that

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t didno t e ngage i n i mp er mi s s ib le “ do ub lecounting” w hen it considered the vic tim’s permanent and life-threatening injuries in depa rting upward from the recommende d Guidelines range pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5 K2.2. Upon a review of the record before us, we find no basis to conclude that the upwa rd adjustment was legal e rror or an abuse of di s cr et io n, mu ch l es s pl ainer r or . Fo r th e f or ego ing r eas on s , we AF F IRM the judgment of the Distr ict Court.