Docket No. 93412–Agenda 13–November 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. LEONARD A. SHERMAN, Director of Professional Regulation, Appellee, v.

								YVONNE CRYNS, Appellant.

Opinion filed February 21, 2003.

	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the

court:

	At issue in this case is the narrow question of whether plaintiff,

the People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Leonard Sherman, Director of the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation

(Department), established a prima facie case that defendant, Yvonne Cryns, a lay midwife, violated provisions of the Nursing

and Advanced Practice Nursing Act (Act) (225 ILCS 65/20–75(a)

(West Supp. 2000)) when she participated in the August 19, 2000, birth

of Spencer Verzi. Plaintiff filed a petition for a preliminary

injunction against defendant, pursuant to section 20–75(a) of the

Act (225 ILCS 65/20–75(a) (West 2000)), arguing that injunctive

relief was warranted because defendant’s actions during the Verzi

birth constituted the practice of professional nursing and advanced

practice nursing without a license. During a hearing on plaintiff’s

petition, the circuit court of McHenry County granted defendant’s

motion for directed finding at the close of plaintiff’s case in chief.

The circuit court found that plaintiff had presented no evidence

showing that any acts engaged in by defendant at the Verzi home

constituted acts of nursing or advanced practice nursing. The

appellate court reversed, holding that plaintiff had presented prima facie evidence that during the birth of Spencer Verzi, defendant had practiced professional nursing and advanced practice nursing

without a license in violation of the Act. The appellate court

accordingly remanded this cause to the circuit court for further

proceedings. 327 Ill. App. 3d 753. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

	On January 18, 2000, Leonard Sherman, the Director of

Professional Regulation (Director), issued a rule to show cause against defendant, who is a lay midwife. The rule to show cause

alleged that, in practicing midwifery, defendant engaged in conduct

that constituted the practice of professional nursing and advanced

practice nursing, as defined within sections 5–10(l) and 15–5 of the

Act (225 ILCS 65/5–10(l), 15–5 (West Supp. 2000)). The rule to show

cause provided defendant with seven days in which to show why

an order to cease and desist the unlicenced practice of nursing and

midwifery should not be entered against her. Defendant responded

by filing a special and limited appearance objecting to the

Department’s jurisdiction over her as a nonnurse midwife.

Defendant also filed an affidavit in which she averred that she was

not licensed as a nurse or engaged in a licensed profession.

	On April 7, 2000, the Director issued a cease and desist order

against defendant, commanding her to immediately cease and desist

from engaging in conduct constituting the practice of nursing and

midwifery, until she complied with the licensing requirements for

a professional nurse and an advanced practice nurse contained

within the Act. Specifically, the cease and desist order stated that

defendant was not registered as a professional nurse pursuant to

section 10–5 of the Act (225 ILCS 65/10–5(a), (b), (c) (West

2000)); that defendant did not hold a current, national certificate

as a nurse midwife from the appropriate national certifying body

(225 ILCS 65/15–10(a)(3) (West 2000)); that defendant had not

complied with a post-basic advanced formal education program in

the area of midwifery (225 ILCS 65/15–10(a)(5) (West Supp. 2000));

that defendant does not have a collaborative agreement with a

physician as required of a certified nurse midwife under the Act

(225 ILCS 65/15–15 (West Supp. 2000)); and that defendant has been

practicing midwifery without the appropriate license and

certificate.1

	On October 3, 2000, plaintiff filed a verified complaint for

injunctive relief against defendant. Pursuant to section 20–75(a) of

the Act (225 ILCS 65/20–75(a) (West 2000)), the Director may,

in the name of the People of the State of Illinois and through the

Attorney General of Illinois, petition the circuit court for an order

enjoining any violation of the Act or for an order enforcing

compliance with the Act. The verified complaint alleged that the

Department is statutorily authorized to enforce minimum standards

of professional education and licensure for the practice of nursing

and advanced practice nursing. According to the complaint,

defendant, as a midwife, is improperly engaged in rendering

prenatal, childbirth and postpartum care without a nursing license.

The complaint further alleged that defendant violated provisions of

the Act when she assisted with the birth of Spencer Verzi, at the

Verzi home on August 19, 2000. According to the complaint,

“[w]hile defendant was physically assisting with the delivery, the

Verzi baby was born in a breech position. Defendant waited

approximately more than 15 minutes before calling paramedics.

Defendant made efforts to resuscitate the Verzi baby which were

unsuccessful.” The complaint further alleged that “[v]ideotape shot

at the scene shows the entire incident and shows defendant

physically assisting in the birth of baby Verzi, which amounted to

the continued practice of nursing or Midwifery” without the

requisite license. The complaint concluded by asserting that

“[d]efendant’s actions of continuing to practice nursing and

Midwifery without the proper qualifications, licensing and

supervision is creating an imminent danger of harm to the public.”

	On October 5, 2000, the circuit court entered a temporary

restraining order against defendant’s practice of nursing and

midwifery, pending a hearing on plaintiff’s complaint for

preliminary injunction. The circuit court conducted a hearing on

the preliminary injunction complaint on October 13, 2000. Plaintiff

called Louis Verzi, the father of Spencer Verzi, to testify with

respect to Spencer’s birth. Verzi stated that he and his wife,

Heather, hold “alternative ideas on health that are not shared with

most doctors in hospitals.” Accordingly, the Verzis decided that it

was best that they have their child at home without the presence of

a doctor or nurse. The Verzis desired to take a natural approach to childbirth, and decided on a “water birth,” wherein the mother gives

birth while being partially submerged in a birthing pool. Verzi

stated that the water-birth option was not available at any nearby

hospitals, and that he and his wife hired defendant to work with

them to accomplish a home water birth. According to Verzi,

defendant never claimed to be a nurse, and he and his wife did not

view defendant as a nurse. Rather, Verzi testified, the purpose of

defendant being in their home during Spencer’s birth was “to give

us advice and to help us through the birth of our child, to help us

in things that we didn’t know.” According to Verzi, defendant

discussed with him and his wife the fact that if complications were

to arise during the birth, medical assistance would not be

immediately available.

	According to Verzi, defendant had Heather fill out a “client

form,” in which Heather indicated that the Verzis believed in

“natural, health” and did not believe in prescriptions or over-the-

counter medications. The responses on this form also indicated that

the Verzis viewed Heather’s mother as their “doctor,” meaning

that they relied on her for advice with respect to their health.

According to Verzi, Heather had several prenatal visits with

defendant, during which defendant monitored the baby’s heartbeat

using both a specially designed stethoscope known as a

“fetoscope,” and also a device known as a “Doppler,” in which

reflected sound waves are used to estimate the speed and direction

of blood flow. Verzi stated that a few months before Spencer’s

birth, defendant had disclosed that a cease and desist order was

issued against her by the Department. This information, however,

did not deter the Verzis from continuing their relationship with

defendant, as defendant was someone that they “had come to trust”

and they “felt strongly” that defendant was the person to deliver

their child.

	Verzi testified that at mid-morning on August 19, 2000, his

wife’s water broke, and that defendant arrived at their home

between 1 and 1:30 p.m.. Several family members and friends had

gathered at the Verzi house to witness the birth. At approximately

3:45 p.m., Heather began to deliver the baby when his left foot

emerged from the birth canal. According to Verzi, during the

delivery defendant used the fetoscope “four or five times” to listen to the baby’s heartbeat, and also used the Doppler device. Verzi

recalled that at one point during the birthing process, Heather

asked defendant to physically pull the baby out, and that defendant

refused Heather’s request. Verzi stated that defendant instead told

Heather to push the baby out, and that Heather’s body would

know the right thing to do. However, Verzi testified that Heather

continued to have difficulty in delivering the baby and that “when

matters became urgent” defendant did attempt to physically extract

the baby. By 4:30 p.m., the baby was born. However, upon his

birth Spencer was not breathing. Verzi stated that although

defendant administered CPR to Spencer for approximately 10

minutes using an “Ambu bag,” which is a device used to push air

into a baby’s lungs after birth, the baby was not responsive. Verzi

testified that at that point defendant requested that 911 be called.

According to Verzi, defendant was still at their home, attempting

to resuscitate Spencer, when the ambulance and paramedics

arrived.

	Verzi further testified that the delivery of Spencer was

videotaped by two cameras which were present in the room: one

video camera was mounted on a tripod and was stationary, while

the other video camera was hand-held and operated by a friend of

the family. Verzi stated that, during the evening prior to his

testimony, a police officer delivered a videotape to his home. Upon

viewing the videotape, Verzi realized that the one tape contained

the video recordings from both cameras present during the birth.

He also testified that the tape ran for approximately 1 hour, 20

minutes. Verzi testified that although he did not know who

combined the two videotapes together, the videotape he viewed on

the evening prior to his testimony truly and accurately reflected the

events which transpired at his home on August 19, 2000. The

videotape was not played in court.

	Plaintiff thereafter moved to enter the videotape into evidence.

Defendant objected to the admission of the videotape on the

ground that plaintiff had failed to lay a proper foundation for the

tape recording. Defendant argued that plaintiff was required to call

the individuals who made the video recordings to testify. The

circuit court, over defendant’s objection, held that Verzi’s

testimony that the videotape truly and accurately reflected the events of Spencer’s birth provided a sufficient foundation for the

admission of the videotape. The court then admitted the tape into

evidence. However, the circuit court judge did not view the

videotape at any time during the proceedings.

	Plaintiff next called defendant to testify. Defendant invoked

her fifth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. V) privilege against self-

incrimination because of criminal charges pending against her as a

result of Spencer Verzi’s death, and refused to answer any

questions.

	At this juncture, plaintiff rested its case.

	After plaintiff rested its case, defendant moved for a directed

finding, arguing that plaintiff had presented no evidence showing

that any acts performed by defendant during the birth of Spencer

Verzi constituted acts of nursing or of advanced practice nursing.

The circuit court agreed, and granted defendant’s motion. The

circuit court stated that plaintiff produced no evidence that what

occurred during the Verzi birth violated any provisions of the Act.

The circuit court also dissolved the temporary restraining order

previously entered against defendant. However, the circuit court

stayed its order subject to an interlocutory appeal of its ruling.

	The appellate court vacated the circuit court’s order denying

plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and remanded the

cause to the circuit court. People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 321 Ill. App. 3d 990 (2001) (Cryns I). The appellate court determined that the circuit court abused its discretion in ruling on plaintiff’s request

for a preliminary injunction without viewing the videotape that it

had admitted into evidence.

	On August 7, 2001, the circuit court entered an order

reaffirming its decision to grant a directed finding in favor of

defendant. The circuit court held that after viewing the videotape

and reviewing the transcript of the hearing, it remained convinced

that “there is no evidence in the record *** from which this court

could conclude that the activities of [defendant] constituted the

practice of nursing or Midwifery.”

 	The appellate court reversed. 327 Ill. App. 3d 753 (Cryns II). The appellate court first rejected defendant’s contention that the

circuit court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the videotape recording of the events that transpired at the Verzi home

on August 19, 2000. The appellate court held that a videotape is

properly admitted if it is identified as an accurate and complete

portrayal of certain facts relevant to a particular issue and is

verified by a witness with personal knowledge who attests that it

is a correct representation of these facts. In the matter at bar, the

appellate court determined that Verzi was a competent witness

who had personal knowledge to identify the videotape as being a

correct representation of the birth of his child. The appellate court

also rejected defendant’s contention that although Verzi testified

that the videotape he viewed the night before the hearing

accurately depicted the events portrayed in the tape, there was no

verification at the hearing that the videotape admitted into evidence

was the same one that Verzi had viewed. The appellate court

observed that defendant failed to cite to any authority that a

videotape must be viewed at trial in order to establish a foundation

for its admission into evidence. In addition, the appellate court held

that defendant’s suggestion that the videotape entered into

evidence might not have been the same as that viewed by Verzi the

night before was completely unsubstantiated.

	The appellate court then turned to the question of whether the

circuit court erred in granting defendant’s motion for a directed

finding at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case in chief. The appellate

court determined that in the matter at bar plaintiff, through the

testimony of Louis Verzi and the events depicted in the videotape,

established a prima facie case that during Spencer’s birth defendant was practicing nursing or midwifery without a license.

	 The appellate court observed that under section 5–10(l) of the

Act, “[r]egistered professional nursing practice” includes “the

assessment of healthcare needs, nursing diagnosis, planning,

implementation, and nursing evaluation,” the “promotion,

maintenance, and restoration of health,” and “counseling, patient

education, health education, and patient advocacy.” 225 ILCS

65/5–10(l) (West 2000). The appellate court noted that Verzi had

testified that he and his wife, Heather, had hired and paid defendant

to advise and assist them in the delivery of their baby. In addition,

the court observed that prior to Spencer’s birth, defendant used

various medical instruments to listen to his heartbeat and ascertain his health status. Further, defendant actively assisted in delivering

the baby and in resuscitation efforts. In light of these facts, the

appellate court concluded that defendant was practicing nursing or

midwifery, as she was assessing the healthcare needs of the mother

and baby, making nursing evaluations, attempting to promote,

maintain and restore the baby’s health, and attempting corrective

measures to improve the baby’s health status. The appellate court

also concluded that the Act provides adequate notice of what

duties a person without a nursing license is unable to perform.

Accordingly, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in

finding that plaintiff presented no evidence from which the court

could conclude that defendant’s activities constituted the practice

of nursing or midwifery in violation of the Act.

	Defendant petitioned this court for leave to appeal pursuant to

our Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). We granted defendant’s

petition.

ANALYSIS

	The narrow issue presented in this appeal is whether plaintiff

adduced evidence during the October 13, 2000, hearing sufficient

to establish a prima facie case that defendant’s conduct on August 19, 2000, during the birth of Spencer Verzi constituted the practice

of nursing and advanced practice nursing without a license in

violation of the Act. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the

circuit court erred in directing a finding for defendant.

	At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case in chief, defendant,

pursuant to section 2–1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735

ILCS 5/2–1110 (West 2000)), moved for a finding in her favor.

Section 2–1110 provides that in all cases tried without a jury, a

defendant may, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, move for a

finding or judgment in his or her favor. In ruling on this motion, a

court must engage in a two-prong analysis. Kokinis v. Kotrich, 81 Ill. 2d 151, 155 (1980). First, the court must determine, as a matter

of law, whether the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by proffering at least “some evidence on every element essential to [the plaintiff’s underlying]

cause of action.” Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154. If the plaintiff has failed to meet this burden, the court should grant the motion and enter

judgment in the defendant’s favor. Kokinis, , 81 Ill. 2d at 155. Because a determination that a plaintiff has failed to present a

prima facie case is a question of law, the circuit court’s ruling is reviewed de novo on appeal. See Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154-55; Evans v. Gurnee Inns, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1102 (1994).

	If, however, the circuit court determines that the plaintiff has

presented a prima facie case, the court then moves to the second prong of the inquiry. In its role as the finder of fact, the court must

consider the totality of the evidence presented, including any

evidence which is favorable to the defendant. Contrary to the

Pedrick standard, which governs a motion for directed verdict during a jury trial (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494 (1967)), under section 2–1110 the court is not to view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154. Rather, the circuit court must weigh all the evidence,

determine the credibility of the witnesses, and draw reasonable

inferences therefrom. 735 ILCS 5/2–1110 (West 2000); Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154-55. This weighing process may result in the

negation of some of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. After

weighing the quality of all of the evidence, both that presented by

the plaintiff and that presented by the defendant, the court should

determine, applying the standard of proof required for the

underlying cause, whether sufficient evidence remains to establish

the plaintiff’s prima facie case. If the circuit court finds that sufficient evidence has been presented to establish the plaintiff’s

prima facie case, the court should deny the defendant’s motion and proceed with the trial. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 155. If, however, the court determines that the evidence warrants a finding in favor of

the defendant, it should grant the defendant’s motion and enter a

judgment dismissing the action. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 155. A reviewing court will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling on appeal

unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154.

	As stated, in the matter at bar, the circuit court determined

that plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case that defendant’s conduct during the Verzi birth violated provisions of the Act and,

therefore, denied plaintiff’s petition for a preliminary injunction by granting defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The circuit

court arrived at this conclusion by finding that plaintiff failed to

adduce any evidence that defendant was engaged in the practice of nursing without a license in violation of the Act. Because the

circuit court determined that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case as a matter of law, we consider the circuit court’s ruling under a de novo standard of review.

	The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain and

preserve the status quo, pending a decision on the merits of a

cause. Callis, Papa, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 195 Ill. 2d 356, 365 (2001). A preliminary injunction is not intended to determine controverted rights or

decide the merits of a case. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 162 Ill. 2d 117, 131 (1994). Under section 20–75 of the Act (225 ILCS

65/20–75 (West 2000)), the Director is authorized to petition the

circuit court for an injunction against any individual who is

practicing nursing without a license. Where, as here, the State or

a governmental agency is expressly authorized by statute to seek

injunctive relief, the traditional equitable elements necessary to

obtain an injunction need not be satisfied. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 Ill. 2d 105, 111-13 (1984); see People v. Van Tran Electric Corp., 152 Ill. App. 3d 175, 184 (1987); People ex rel. Hartigan v. Stianos, 131 Ill. App. 3d 575, 580 (1985). The State or the agency seeking the injunction need only show that the

statute was violated and that the statute relied upon specifically

allows injunctive relief. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 111-13 (1984); see Midland Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Elmhurst, 226 Ill. App. 3d 494, 504 (1993). This principle of law is animated by the rationale that

because statutes authorizing injunctive relief often do so on behalf

of a public official in his or her capacity as the enforcer of a

regulatory scheme, “the violation of such a statute implies an injury

to the general public [and] [s]uch injury necessitates the statutory

authorization for equitable relief and supplants the traditional

equitable pleading requirements.” Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 113. It is presumed that public harm occurs when a statute is violated. See Midland, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 504; Stianos, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 580 (“The principle underlying the willingness of the courts to issue

statutory injunctions to public bodies to restrain violations of a statute is that harm to the public at large can be presumed from the

statutory violation alone”). Once it has been established that a

statute has been violated, no discretion is vested in the circuit court

to refuse to grant the injunctive relief authorized by that statute.

See Midland, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 504.

	Accordingly, in order to establish a prima facie case for statutory injunctive relief, and to withstand a motion for a directed

finding, plaintiff at bar was required to present at least some

evidence in the circuit court that defendant’s conduct during the

Verzi birth violated the provisions of the Act. Defendant contends

that the circuit court correctly held that plaintiff failed to meet this

evidentiary burden. Defendant characterizes herself as a “traditional

(non-nurse) midwife” and contends that she is part of a class of

individuals that is not specifically identified in the Act. Defendant

argues that because there is no explicit prohibition against

traditional (nonnurse) midwifery in the Act, her conduct, therefore,

is not subject to regulation by the Department. Plaintiff responds

that the broad language chosen by the General Assembly to

describe the conduct governed by the Act, coupled with the

legislature’s stated purpose in passing the Act of protecting the

public health, safety and welfare, as well as the legislature’s explicit

command that the terms of the Act be liberally construed to

effectuate this stated purpose, evince that the General Assembly

intended that conduct, such as that engaged in by defendant during

the Verzi birth, be regulated under the Act.

	The question of whether the conduct of defendant on August

19, 2000, falls within the scope of the Act requires us to interpret

the statutory provisions found within that statute. Accordingly, the

issue before us is a matter of statutory construction, and our

review is de novo. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001). Our inquiry is guided by well-settled principles. 

	In construing the meaning of a statute, the primary objective

of this court is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the

legislature. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307 (2002); Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). All other rules of statutory construction

are subordinate to this cardinal principle. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232; Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1998). We ascertain the intent of the legislature by examining the

language of the statute, which is “the most reliable indicator of the

legislature’s objectives in enacting a particular law.” Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504; see also Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001). The language of the statute must be afforded its plain, ordinary and popularly understood

meaning (Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308; Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 381 (1995)), and we are to give the statutory language the fullest, rather than the narrowest,

possible meaning to which it is susceptible (Lake County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 119 Ill. 2d 419, 423 (1988)). This court will not depart from the plain language of a

statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that

conflict with the express legislative intent. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 446 (2002); Yang, 195 Ill. 2d at 103.

	All provisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as a whole. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504; Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 382. Therefore, words and phrases must be interpreted in

light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be

construed in isolation. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232; Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504. Each word, clause and sentence of the statute, if possible, must be given reasonable

meaning and not rendered superfluous. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232. Accordingly, in determining the intent of the General

Assembly, we may properly consider not only the language of the

statute, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils

sought to be remedied, and goals to be achieved. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308; People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). “Legislative intent can be ascertained from a

consideration of the entire Act, its nature, its object and the

consequences that would result from construing it one way or the

other.” Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96 (1990). In construing a statute, we presume that the General

Assembly, in its enactment of legislation, did not intend absurdity,

inconvenience or injustice. In re Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 309; Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40 (2001).

	It is well settled that the General Assembly has wide

regulatory power with respect to the health-care professions, and it is within the broad discretion of the legislature “ ‘to determine

not only what the public interest and welfare require, but to

determine the measures needed to secure such interest.’ ” Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 41, quoting Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 364 (1985). An example of the legislature’s exercise of these broad regulatory powers is its

enactment of the Nursing and Advanced Practice Nursing Act (225

ILCS 65/5–1 et seq. (West Supp. 2000)). In passing this Act, the General Assembly explicitly stated that because “[t]he practice of

professional and practical nursing in the State of Illinois is hereby

declared to affect the public health, safety, and welfare,” it is

“subject to regulation and control in the public interest.” 225 ILCS

65/5–5 (West 2000). In this Act, the legislature clearly expressed

its intent that it is “a matter of public interest and concern that the

practice of nursing, as defined in this Act, merit and receive the

confidence of the public and that only qualified persons be

authorized to so practice in the State of Illinois.” 225 ILCS 65/5–5

(West 2000). Therefore, the legislature mandated that “[f]or the

protection of life and the promotion of health *** any person

practicing or offering to practice professional *** nursing in Illinois

shall submit evidence that he or she is qualified to practice, and

shall be licensed as provided under this Act.” 225 ILCS 65/5–15

(West 2000). In order to effectuate the important regulatory and

remedial purposes of the Act, the legislature explicitly instructed

that the Act is to be “liberally construed to best carry out these

subjects and purposes.” 225 ILCS 65/5–5 (West 2000).

 	The Act authorizes the licensure of nurses in three categories: licensed practical nurses, registered professional nurses, and

advanced practice nurses. Only the latter two categories are at

issue in this appeal. A “registered professional nurse” is defined in

section 5–10(k) of the Act as “a person who is licensed as a

professional nurse under this Act and practices nursing as defined

in paragraph (l) of this Section.” 225 ILCS 65/5–10(k) (West

2000). Paragraph (l) of section 5–10 of the Act (225 ILCS

65/5–10(l) (West  Supp. 2000)) sets forth the conduct that constitutes a

“[r]egistered professional nursing practice” for purposes of the

Act:

			“ ‘Registered professional nursing practice’ includes all

nursing specialties and means the performance of any

nursing act based upon professional knowledge, judgment,

and skills acquired by means of completion of an approved

registered professional nursing education program. A

registered professional nurse provides nursing care

emphasizing the importance of the whole and the

interdependence of its parts through the nursing process to

individuals, groups, families, or communities, that includes

but is not limited to: (1) the assessment of healthcare

needs, nursing diagnosis, planning, implementation, and

nursing evaluation; (2) the promotion, maintenance, and

restoration of health; (3) counseling, patient education,

health education, and patient advocacy; (4) the

administration of medications and treatments as prescribed

by a physician licensed to practice medicine in all of its

branches, a licensed dentist, a licensed podiatrist, or a

licensed optometrist or as prescribed by a physician

assistant in accordance with written guidelines required

under the Physician Assistant Practice Act of 1987 or by

an advanced practice nurse in accordance with a written

collaborative agreement required under the Nursing and

Advanced Practice Nursing Act; (5) the coordination and

management of the nursing plan of care; (6) the delegation

to and supervision of individuals who assist the registered

professional nurse implementing the plan of care; and (7)

teaching and supervision of nursing students.”

	A nurse who specializes in the delivery of babies is referred to

as a “certified nurse midwife” in the Act and is characterized as an

“[a]dvanced practice nurse.” 225 ILCS 65/15–5 (West 2000). An

advanced practice nurse (APN) is a registered professional nurse,

as defined in section 5–10(k) of the Act (225 ILCS 65/5–10(k)

(West 2000)), who meets the additional licensing requirements set

forth in section 15–10 of the Act (225 ILCS 65/15–10 (West

2000)). Advanced practice nursing licenses are granted for four

categories of APNs, only one of which is relevant here: certified

nurse midwife. Pursuant to section 15–10 of the Act, a registered

nurse shall be qualified for licensure as a certified nurse midwife if that person has applied in writing to the Department; holds a

current license to practice as a registered nurse in this state; has

successfully completed requirements to practice as, and holds a

current, national certification as, a nurse midwife; has paid the

required fees; and has successfully completed a post-basic

advanced practice formal education program in nurse midwifery.

225 ILCS 65/15–10 (West 2000). In addition, pursuant to section

15–15 of the Act (225 ILCS 65/15–15 (West 2000)), a certified

nurse midwife must enter into a written collaborative agreement

with a physician who provides medical direction as authorized in

the collaborative agreement. A certified nurse midwife must meet

all of the above requirements in order to be qualified to treat

patients “by using medical, therapeutic, and corrective measures to

treat illness and improve health status.” 225 ILCS 65/15–5 (West

2000).

	As an initial matter, we address an evidentiary argument raised

by defendant with respect to the videotape of Spencer’s birth

admitted into evidence by the circuit court. In her brief to this

court, defendant reiterates her position that the circuit court erred

in allowing the videotape into evidence. Plaintiff is correct, and

defendant acknowledges, that defendant failed to raise this

argument in her petition for leave to appeal to this court (see 177

Ill. 2d R. 315(b)(3) (the petition shall state “the points relied upon

for reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court”)), and that a

party’s failure to raise an argument in the petition for leave to

appeal may be deemed a waiver of that argument. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. O’Malley, 163 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (1994). However, the rule of waiver is a limitation on the parties and not

on the court. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 518. We choose to address defendant’s contention.

	A videotape may be admitted as demonstrative evidence when

it is properly authenticated and is relevant to a particular issue in

the case. Cisarik v. Palos Community Hospital, 144 Ill. 2d 339, 341-42 (1991). First, a foundation must be laid, by someone having

personal knowledge of the filmed object, that the film is an

accurate portrayal of what it purports to show. Cisarik, 144 Ill. 2d at 342. “Verification may be furnished by the testimony of any

competent witness who has sufficient knowledge to testify that the videotape fully represents what it purports to portray.” Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. United Cement, Lime, Gypsum & Allied

Workers International Union, Division of Boilermakers, AFL-

CIO, Local No. 438, 145 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1027 (1986). Second, a videotape will be considered relevant only as long as its probative

value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice. Cisarik, 144 Ill. 2d at 342. The admission of a videotape into evidence is within the sound discretion of the circuit court and

will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Missouri Portland Cement Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d at 1027.

	In her submission to this court, defendant does not quarrel

with the above-discussed principles of law. She does assert,

however, that the circuit court erred in admitting the videotape into

evidence because although Louis Verzi stated that the videotape he

viewed in his home the evening before his court testimony was an

accurate portrayal of the events that occurred during his son’s

birth, this testimony was inadequate support for the admission of

the videotape that was actually admitted into evidence. We agree.

Whether the videotape viewed by Verzi at his home on the evening

prior to the October 13, 2000, hearing was the same tape produced

by plaintiff in court and admitted into evidence is unknown. During

the hearing, the videotape whichthat was admitted into evidence was not

played for the parties, the witnesses or the court. Plaintiff proffered

no testimony during the hearing that, based upon Verzi’s personal

knowledge, the videotape whichthat was actually admitted into evidence was a true and accurate depiction of what it purported to show.

The testimony proffered by Verzi with respect to the videotape he

viewed at his home during the previous evening was insufficient to

establish a proper evidentiary foundation for the videotape that was

actually admitted. Accordingly, we hold that because the

foundation for admission of the videotape was insufficient, the

circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the videotape into

evidence.

	Upon reviewing the record in this matter, absent the

videotape, we conclude that the conduct of defendant on August

19, 2000, during the birth of Spencer Verzi constituted prima facie evidence of “professional nursing” within the meaning of the Act.

Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in finding that plaintiff failed to present any evidence to establish a prima facie case that during the Verzi birth defendant engaged in conduct

which violated the Act. It is clear that the General Assembly passed

the Act as a comprehensive regulation of the practice of nursing,

and that the Act reflects serious policy concerns about the

detrimental effect to the public health and safety when unlicenced

individuals engage in the conduct described in, and regulated by,

the Act. To this end, the legislature explicitly provided in section

5–15 (225 ILCS 65/5–15 (West 2000)) that only those persons

qualified and licenced under the Act are authorized to engage in the

conduct defined as “professional nursing” in section 5–10(l) of the

Act. 225 ILCS 65/5–10(l) (West 2000). The legislature chose

broad language to define those individuals covered by the Act,

stating that “any person” who practices or offers to practice

professional nursing in this state must abide by the rules and

regulations set forth in this statute. 225 ILCS 65/5–15 (West

2000).

	The General Assembly, however, also deemed it appropriate

to enumerate certain limited and explicit exceptions to the

coverage of the Act. For example, the Act does not apply to

individuals who “furnish[ ] *** nursing assistance in an

emergency” (225 ILCS 65/5–15(c) (West 2000)) or to instances

where “[t]he incidental care of the sick [is performed] by members

of the family, domestic servants or housekeepers” (225 ILCS

65/5–15(e) (West 2000)). The Act also excludes from coverage

those individuals who care for the sick “where treatment is by

prayer or spiritual means” (225 ILCS 65/5–15(e) (West 2000)) and

exempts from its coverage persons “employed as nursing aides,

attendants, orderlies, and other auxiliary workers in private homes,

long term care facilities, nurseries, hospitals or other institutions”

(225 ILCS 65/5–15(f) (West 2000)). Under the principle of

expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the enumeration of exceptions in a statute is construed as an exclusion of all other

exceptions. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory

Construction §47.23 (6th ed. 2000). We have previously observed

that this rule of statutory construction “is based on logic and

common sense,” as “[i]t expresses the learning of common

experience that when people say one thing they do not mean something else.” Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 152 (1997). Applying this rule of construction to the

matter before us, we conclude that the General Assembly intended

to exempt from the coverage of the Act only those instances

specifically enumerated. We discern no contrary legislative intent

which would overcome this rule of construction and support

defendant’s contention that traditional midwives, as a class, were

intended by the General Assembly to be excluded from coverage

under the Act. See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d at 153- 54 (“the principle that the expression of one thing in a statute

excludes any other thing is only a rule of statutory construction,

not a rule of law *** [and] may be overcome by a strong indication

of legislative intent”). Indeed, the strong public policy

considerations of protecting the public health and safety which

underpin the Act lend additional support for our conclusion.

	 In addition to broadly defining the class of individuals subject

to regulation under the Act, the General Assembly also employed

broad language to define the conduct to which the Act applies.

Section 5–10(l) of the Act defines “professional nursing practice”

to include “the assessment of healthcare needs, nursing diagnosis,

planning, implementation, and nursing evaluation,” the “promotion,

maintenance, and restoration of health,” and “counseling, patient

education, health education, and patient advocacy.” 225 ILCS

65/5–10(l) (West 2000). The record establishes that plaintiff

proffered sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that defendant’s conduct with respect to the Verzi birth constituted the

practice of “professional nursing” and was therefore prohibited for

an individual without a nursing license.

	Louis Verzi testified that he and his wife hired defendant “to

give us advice and to help us through the birth of our child, to help

us in things that we didn’t know.” Verzi stated that Heather had

several prenatal visits with defendant, during which defendant

monitored the status of the baby’s health by using a fetoscope and

Doppler to listen for the baby’s heartbeat. On the date of Spencer’s

birth, August 19, 2000, defendant arrived at the Verzi home shortly

after Heather began her labor. After Heather delivered the baby’s

left foot, she experienced difficulty in delivering any more of the

baby. Verzi testified that during the labor process, defendant, on several occasions, used the fetoscope and Doppler to check the

baby’s heartbeat while the baby was still in Heather’s uterus. Once

Spencer was born, defendant attempted to resuscitate him with the

aid of an Ambu bag to push air into his lungs. Defendant attempted

resuscitation in this manner for approximately 10 minutes, stopping

every minute or so to listen to Spencer’s heartbeat with the

fetoscope.

	We conclude that the above described evidence is sufficient to

establish a prima facie case that defendant engaged in the practice of nursing without a license. We agree with the appellate court

below that throughout her interaction with the Verzis, defendant

was assessing the “healthcare needs” of both Heather and the baby,

and making “nursing evaluation[s]” in violation of section 5–10(l)

of the Act (225 ILCS 65/5–10(l) (West 2000)). We also agree with

the appellate court that defendant’s conduct was aimed at

“promot[ing], maint[aining], and restor[ing]” the health of the

mother and child, also in violation of section 5–10(l) of the Act

(225 ILCS 65/5–10(l) (West 2000)). Further, defendant provided

“counseling, patient education, [and] health education,” also in

violation of the Act. 225 ILCS 65/5–10(l) (West 2000). Finally, we

agree with the appellate court that defendant’s actions in

attempting to resuscitate the baby constituted “corrective

measures” to improve his health status and constituted additional

violations of the Act (225 ILCS 65/15–5 (West 2000)).

 	Defendant further contends that, if we determine that her conduct during the Verzi birth constituted “nursing practice”

within the meaning of the Act, she is nevertheless exempted from

the Act’s coverage because she engaged in the practice of nursing

only because she was faced with an emergency situation when she

could not hear the baby’s heartbeat. We disagree. Louis Verzi

testified that prior to Spencer’s birth, defendant provided the

Verzis with “advice” and “help” with respect to the birthing

process, and that during prenatal visits with Heather, defendant

checked the baby’s heartbeat with the aid of the fetoscope and

Doppler. Further, on the day Spencer was born, defendant used

both the fetoscope and Doppler on several occasions to listen to

Spencer’s heartbeat in utero. Thus, the record reveals that defendant performed several acts which constituted the practice of nursing, within the meaning of the Act, prior to any indication that

the baby was in distress. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s

contention that she is not subject to the provisions of the Act.

	In sum, we conclude that the circuit court erred in holding that

plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case that defendant engaged in conduct violative of the Act. As stated, in construing the

meaning of statutes, the primary objective of this court is to

ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 503-04. In exercising its broad powers in regulating matters of public health and safety, the

General Assembly employed broad language in the provisions of

the Act to effectuate the Act’s stated purpose of protecting life and

promoting health. See 225 ILCS 65/5–15 (West 2000). In addition,

the legislature explicitly instructed that the provisions of the Act

are to be liberally construed to effectuate these public policy goals.

225 ILCS 65/5–5 (West 2000). In interpreting statutory provisions,

we are to afford the statute’s plain language its fullest meaning to

effectuate the legislative intent (Lake County Board of Review, 119 Ill. 2d at 423), and we may not read into a statute exceptions,

limitations or conditions that conflict with the intent of the

legislature (Petersen, 198 Ill. 2d at 446).

	Our holding today effectuates the intent of the General

Assembly, as evidenced in the Act, to promote the public health,

safety and welfare by ensuring that those individuals who engage

in the conduct described in the Act are properly trained and

licensed. Indeed, a contrary result would thwart the intent of the

legislature in regulating conduct it has defined as the practice of

nursing. Were we to accept defendant’s argument that those

persons who label themselves as traditional nonnurse midwives are

not regulated by the Act, an absurd result would occur. An

individual would be able to bypass the licensing and training

requirements of the Act simply by referring to herself as a

“traditional nonnurse midwife,” even if that person provided

exactly the same type of nursing care as a certified nurse midwife.

This would mean that a person’s status under the Act would

depend merely upon how she labeled herself, and the conduct in

which that person engaged would become irrelevant. In construing

statutes, we presume that the General Assembly, in enacting the legislation, did not intend absurdity or injustice. Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 40. The stringent training and licensing requirements for a

certified nurse midwife demonstrate the legislature’s intent to

regulate this specific area of nursing practice. Defendant’s

interpretation of the Act would render a certified nurse midwife’s

license meaningless. Certainly, the General Assembly could not

have intended such an absurd result.

	Defendant also raises the contention on appeal that the

provisions of Act that prohibit the practice of nursing without a

license are unconstitutionally vague as applied to her, thereby

violating her right to due process. According to defendant, the Act

contains no language to indicate that it is intended to govern the

practice of traditional midwifery, as the Act fails to include a

definition of midwifery and does not expressly prohibit the practice

of midwifery by persons other than nurses. Thus, defendant

concludes, the Act does not provide adequate notice of the

conduct prohibited.

	The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject

to de novo review. Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 31; Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57 (2001). Statutes are presumed to be

constitutional, and the party challenging the validity of the statute

has the burden to clearly establish the constitutional invalidity.

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1999); Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998). A court must construe a statute so as to affirm its constitutionality,

if the statute is reasonably capable of such a construction. Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 32. Accordingly, “ ‘if [a] statute’s construction is

doubtful, a court will resolve the doubt in favor of the statute’s

validity.’ ” Miller, 196 Ill. 2d at 58, quoting People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1992). We conclude that defendant has failed

to satisfy her burden of clearly establishing that the provisions of

the Act are unconstitutionally vague as applied to her.

	 A statute violates the due process clauses of the United States

Constitution or the Illinois Constitution on the basis of vagueness

“ ‘only if its terms are so ill-defined that the ultimate decision as to

its meaning rests on the opinions and whims of the trier of fact

rather than any objective criteria or facts.’ ” Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 160, 168 (1997), quoting People v. Burpo, 164 Ill. 2d 261, 265-66 (1995). In order to succeed on a vagueness challenge to a statute that does not involve a first

amendment right, a party must establish that the statute is vague as

applied to the conduct for which the party is being prosecuted.

People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379, 385 (1989); see People v. Stults, 291 Ill. App. 3d 71, 83 (1997). A statute is not vague, and

therefore does not violate due process, if the duty imposed by the

statute is set forth in terms definite enough to serve as a guide to

those who must comply with it. Chastek v. Anderson, 83 Ill. 2d 502, 507 (1981). “[T]he party must show that the statute did not

provide clear notice that the party’s conduct was prohibited.”

Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 385; see also Stults, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 83. In other words, the provisions of a statute must be definite so that a

“ ‘person of ordinary intelligence [has] a reasonable opportunity to

know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.’ ” Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 385, quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99 (1972).

When the statute is examined in the light of the facts of the case

and the statute clearly applies to the party’s conduct, then a

challenge to the statue’s constitutionality based upon vagueness

will be unsuccessful. People v. Ryan, 117 Ill. 2d 28, 33-34 (1987).

	In the matter at bar, defendant asserts that the Act is

unconstitutionally vague, as it affords her no advance notice of the

type of acts which constitute “professional nursing.” We disagree.

The provisions of the Act that describe the practice of professional

nursing and advanced practice nursing are sufficiently explicit to

inform those subject to the Act of the conduct to which it applies.

The legislature has provided clear definitions of the conduct it

considers to be the practice of nursing, which includes: assessing

a health-care need and making a nursing evaluation; promoting,

maintaining and restoring health; counseling, patient education and

health education; and using medical, therapeutic and corrective

measures to treat illness and improve health status. 225 ILCS

65/5–10(l), 15–5 (West 2000). We hold that the provisions of the

statute are set forth in terms definite enough to afford an individual

of ordinary intelligence with clear notice as to what conduct is

prohibited absent a nursing license. We conclude that defendant has

not met her burden of rebutting the presumption of constitutionality and establishing that the provisions of the Act are

vague as applied to her. As stated, this court will construe a statute

as constitutional where it can do so reasonably. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994). 

	Defendant also asserts that our decision in People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379 (1989), is controlling in this case. We disagree. Our

decision in Jihan is factually distinguishable from the matter at bar. At issue in Jihan was a provision of the now-repealed Medical Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 4401 et seq.), which prohibited any person from the “practice *** [of]

midwifery” without a state license to do so (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985,

ch. 111, par. 4403). The defendant in Jihan was convicted of practicing midwifery without a license and sentenced to one year

of probation. The defendant appealed her conviction, asserting that

the statute under which she was convicted was unconstitutionally

vague as applied to her because the term “midwifery” was not

defined. We held that the term “midwifery,” as applied to the

defendant, was ambiguous because it was not clear whether the

term had “the broad meaning of assisting at childbirth” or “the more narrow meaning of actually delivering the child at birth.” (Emphasies in original.) Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 388. This court held that evidence had been presented that the defendant assisted at the

birth, but that there was no showing that the defendant delivered

the child. Accordingly, this court concluded that the Act was

unconstitutionally vague as it applied to the defendant in that it did

not provide sufficient notice that her conduct in that case was

prohibited. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 389.

	Unlike in Jihan, where the term “midwifery” was not defined in the statute, the Nursing and Advanced Practice Nursing Act

clearly and extensively defines “professional nursing” and

“advanced practice nursing.” The constitutional infirmity in Jihan stemmed from the fact that there was a broad range of activity that

could be encompassed by the term “midwifery,” and it was unclear

whether the legislature intended to proscribe the assistance at a

delivery or whether the proscription was limited to the actual

performance of the delivery. In contrast, viewing the terms

“professional nursing” and “advanced practice nursing” in the

context of the instant case, there are no ambiguities in those terms as they are defined by the Act, and as was found by the Jihan court in the term “midwifery.” In addition, we observe that the defendant

in Jihan was the subject of criminal proceedings, whereas in the matter at bar civil proceedings are at issue. As we stated in Jihan, “there is a greater tolerance for statutory ambiguity in civil

proceedings than in criminal proceedings ‘because the

consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.’ ” Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 387, quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371-72 (1982).

	We also reject defendant’s contention that the appellate court

violated the doctrine of the separation of powers (Ill. Const. 1970,

art. II, §1) when, in defendant’s words, the court “extended [the

Act’s] jurisdiction to include traditional (non-nurse) midwives.”

The Illinois Constitution provides that the legislative, executive and

judicial branches are separate, and that “[n]o branch shall exercise

powers properly belonging to another.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1.

In “ ‘both theory and practice, the purpose of the [separation of

powers] provision is to ensure that the whole power of two or

more branches of government shall not reside in the same hands.’ ”

Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 410 (1997), quoting People v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 465, 473 (1988). It is the function of the judicial branch of government to determine what

the law is and to apply statutes to cases. Stern, 179 Ill. 2d at 168. Where, as in the case of the appellate court below, a court merely

construes a statute and applies that statute to a specific set of facts,

there is no violation of the separation of powers doctrine. See

Stern, 179 Ill. 2d at 168. We therefore conclude that defendant’s separation of powers argument is without merit.

	In her submission to this court, defendant also urges us to

examine case decisions rendered outside of this jurisdiction for

assistance in making our ruling today. Defendant places particular

emphasis upon the decisions of the Supreme Court of Kansas in

State Board of Nursing v. Ruebke, 259 Kan. 599, 913 P.2d 142 (1996), and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 395 Mass. 670, 481 N.E.2d 1347 (1985). We have reviewed these opinions and conclude that

they are factually inapposite to the matter at bar.

	In Ruebke, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying a request by the Kansas State Board of Nursing for a preliminary

injunction against the defendant, a lay midwife, from engaging in

“healing arts” without a license. The Ruebke court determined that the definitional provisions of the regulatory statute at issue did not

cover midwifery. The court held that, in their ordinary usage, the

terms used to define “healing arts” within the statute “focus

exclusively on pathologies (i.e., diseases) and abnormal human conditions (i.e., ailments, deformities or injuries),” and determined that “[p]regnancy and childbirth are neither pathologies nor

abnormalities ***.” Ruebke, 259 Kan. at 615, 913 P.2d at 143. Unlike the narrow definition of “healing arts” contained within the

Kansas statute, our Act defines “professional nursing” and

“advanced practice nursing” in a broader manner. Based upon the

differences in the relevant statutes, we find the Ruebke case inapposite.

	In Leigh, a registered nurse had been suspended on the grounds that she had practiced midwifery without the authorization

of the Massachusetts Board of Registration of Nursing in violation

of a statute requiring her certification as a nurse midwife. The

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that, by being a

registered nurse and practicing as a midwife without board

authorization to practice as a nurse in the expanded role of nurse

midwife, Leigh violated the statute. Leigh, 395 Mass. at 677, 481 N.E.2d at 1347. In dicta,2 the court went on to clarify that Leigh’s position as a nurse practicing midwifery without certification constituted the statutory violation, and that it was not Leigh’s

practice of midwifery alone which violated the statute. The court,

construing Massachusetts statutes which proscribe the

unauthorized practice of medicine, concluded that simply assisting

in normal cases of childbirth did not violate these statutes. Leigh, 395 Mass. at 680-81, 481 N.E.2d at 1353. We find that the decision in Leigh is factually distinguishable from the matter at bar and, accordingly, is inapposite.

	In her written submission to this court, defendant also makes

a brief, one-paragraph argument that by construing the Act to

apply to her conduct during the Verzi birth, she is being denied her

“liberty and property interest in her employment as a traditional

midwife.” We reject defendant’s assertion. It is well settled that

“every citizen has the right to pursue a trade, occupation, business

or profession” and that “[t]his inalienable right constitutes both a

property and liberty interest entitled to the protection of the law as

guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Illinois and Federal

constitutions.” Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton, 105 Ill. 2d 389, 397 (1985). However, this constitutional right is not absolute; it is “limited by the right of

the State to regulate such freedom of action, through the proper

exercise of the police power, where the public health, safety or

welfare so requires.” Coldwell Banker, 105 Ill. 2d at 397. As stated, the regulation of nursing practice contained within the Act

is designed to protect the health and safety of the public.

Therefore, defendant’s claim that the application of the Act to her

conduct during the Verzi birth violates her liberty interest in her

employment as a lay midwife lacks merit.

	In sum, the General Assembly’s intent to ensure the health,

safety and welfare of the public by regulating the practice of

nursing would be frustrated if the statute did not apply to the

conduct of defendant at bar during the birth of Spencer Verzi. The

public policy concerns which underpin the Act weigh in favor of

regulating the conduct here as the delivery of a child affects both

the mother’s and child’s well-being. The state has a substantial

interest in promoting the general welfare, and whether a course

chosen by the legislature to achieve a desired result is either wise

or the best means available is not a proper subject of judicial

inquiry. Potts v. Illinois Department of Registration & Education, 128 Ill. 2d 322, 333 (1989). Although we understand plaintiff’s

concerns with respect to the continued existence of lay midwifery

in Illinois, we are constrained to apply the law as enacted by the

General Assembly. “ ‘Under the doctrine of the separation of

powers, courts may not legislate, rewrite or extend legislation. If the statute as enacted seems to operate in certain cases unjustly or

inappropriately, the appeal must be to the General Assembly, and

not to the court.’ ” Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 522, quoting People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 475-76 (1992).

	For the reasons stated above, we hold that plaintiff presented

a prima facie case that defendant engaged in conduct which violated the Act. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in granting

defendant’s motion for a directed finding at the close of plaintiff’s

case.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is

affirmed.

Affirmed.