Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Iwan Ries & Co. v. City of Chicago, 2018 IL App (1st) 170875

Appellate Court 

Caption

IWAN RIES & CO., an Illinois Corporation; CIGAR ASSOCIATION 

OF AMERICA, INC., a New York Corporation; ILLINOIS 

ASSOCIATION OF WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTORS, an Illinois 

Corporation; ILLINOIS RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION, 

an Illinois Corporation; INTERNATIONAL PREMIUM CIGAR 

AND PIPE RETAILERS ASSOCIATION, a New York Corporation; 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TOBACCO OUTLETS, INC., a 

Minnesota Corporation; and ARANGOLD CORPORATION, d/b/a 

Arango Cigar Co., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. 

THE CITY OF CHICAGO and ERIN KEANE, in Her Capacity as the 

Comptroller of the Department of Finance Within the City of Chicago, 

Illinois, Defendants-Appellants.

District & No. First District, Fourth Division 

Docket No. 1-17-0875

Filed December 20, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-L-50356; the 

Hon. Ann Collins-Dole, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Edward N. Siskel, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth 

Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Assistant 

Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellants.
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Stanley R. Kaminski, Amy E. McCracken, and Elinor H. Murárová, of 

Duane Morris LLP, of Chicago, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice McBride and Justice Burke concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 The instant appeal arises from the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment in 

favor of plaintiffs, Iwan Ries & Co.; Cigar Association of America, Inc.; Illinois Association 

of Wholesale Distributors; Illinois Retail Merchants Association; International Premium Cigar 

and Pipe Retailers Association; National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc.; and Arangold 

Corporation d/b/a Arango Cigar Co., which operated to strike down the City of Chicago Other 

Tobacco Products Tax Ordinance (ordinance) (Chicago Municipal Code § 3-49 (added Mar. 

16, 2016)). The circuit court found that the City of Chicago’s home rule authority to enact the 

ordinance was preempted by section 8-11-6a(2) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 

5/8-11-6a(2) (West 2016)). Defendants, the City of Chicago and Erin Keane in her capacity as 

the Comptroller of the Department of Finance (collectively the City), appeal, and for the 

reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 The center of the dispute in this matter is the ordinance enacted by the Chicago City 

Council on March 16, 2016, which created flat taxes on units of non-cigarette tobacco products 

including smoking tobacco, smokeless tobacco, pipe tobacco, little cigars, and large cigars 

sold and used within Chicago. Chicago Municipal Code § 3-49-30 (added Mar. 16, 2016). 

¶ 4 Plaintiffs filed a verified complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on May 

26, 2016, requesting the circuit court declare the ordinance unconstitutional pursuant to article 

VII, section 6(g), of the Illinois Constitution and to permanently enjoin its enforcement. Ill. 

Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(g). Plaintiffs maintained that the City’s home rule power to tax 

non-cigarette tobacco products was preempted by section 8-11-6a(2) of the Municipal Code 

(65 ILCS 5/8-11-6a(2) (West 2016)), which provides that “a home rule municipality that has 

not imposed a tax based on the number of units of cigarettes or tobacco products before July 1, 

1993, shall not impose such a tax after that date.” Plaintiffs alleged that the City could not 

impose this new tax on non-cigarette products because it had previously taxed only cigarettes 

(not non-cigarette products) before July 1, 1993. 

¶ 5 Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a three-count amended complaint for declaratory and 

injunctive relief: count I sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unauthorized 

because it was preempted by section 8-11-6a(2) of the Municipal Code; count II sought a 

permanent injunction; and count III sought a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction 

as to other regulatory provisions not at issue in this appeal that imposed price floors for 
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non-cigarette tobacco products, prohibited the use of coupons, and imposed minimum 

packaging requirements for certain tobacco products. 

¶ 6 Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on counts I and II 

of the amended complaint, addressing the sole issue of whether section 8-11-6a(2) of the 

Municipal Code preempts the City’s home rule authority to impose the ordinance. The parties 

were in agreement that the City had in place, as of July 1, 1993, a tax on cigarettes. Plaintiffs 

maintained that the plain language of section 8-11-6a(2) of the Municipal Code only allowed a 

home rule authority to enact a tax on “tobacco products” if such a tax was in existence prior to 

July 1, 1993. Because the City had not enacted a tax on the other tobacco products as listed in 

the ordinance, they could not do so now. In response, the City maintained that it was not 

preempted from enacting the ordinance because it was merely required to have a tax in place 

before July 1, 1993, on either cigarettes or “tobacco products.”

¶ 7 After the matter was fully briefed and argued, the circuit court ruled that section 8-11-6a(2) 

of the Municipal Code preempted the City’s authority to enact the ordinance and thus granted 

plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied the City’s motion. Thereafter, the 

circuit court entered an order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 

2016). This appeal followed. 

¶ 8 ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 This appeal requires us to determine whether or not section 8-11-6a(2) of the Municipal 

Code (65 ILCS 5/8-11-6a(2) (West 2016)) preempts the City’s home rule authority to enact the 

ordinance that taxes tobacco products other than cigarettes. See Chicago Municipal Code 

§ 3-49-020 (added Mar. 16, 2016) (specifically excluding from its definition of “[o]ther 

[t]obacco [p]roducts” cigarettes, electronic cigarettes, and liquid nicotine products). 

¶ 10 The City contends that the ordinance is a valid exercise of its home rule authority. The City 

maintains that because it had imposed a tax on cigarettes prior to July 1, 1993, it falls within the 

exception of section 8-11-6a(2) of the Municipal Code, which it contends must be read to 

provide for a tax on either cigarettes or non-cigarette tobacco products prior to July 1, 1993. 65 

ILCS 5/8-11-6a(2) (West 2016). The City reasons that because it taxed cigarettes, a tax within 

the category of cigarettes or non-cigarette tobacco products, prior to July 1, 1993, the 

ordinance is valid. The City concedes that no tax on “tobacco products” other than cigarettes 

had been implemented prior to July 1, 1993. 

¶ 11 In response, plaintiffs contend that section 8-11-6a(2) unambiguously provides that the 

City, a home rule municipality, cannot impose a tax on tobacco products unless the 

municipality imposed such a tax prior to July 1, 1993. According to plaintiffs, the use of the 

phrase “such a tax” in section 8-11-6a(2) refers to a tax on either “cigarettes or tobacco 

products.” Id. Plaintiffs reason that, because “such a tax” is a singular modifier, it can only be 

referring to a separate tax on cigarettes or a separate tax on other tobacco products. Plaintiffs 

maintain that because the City did not impose a tax on tobacco products prior to July 1, 1993, 

the City is precluded from enacting the ordinance. 

¶ 12 We first set forth our standard of review. This matter comes before us after the disposition 

of cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the 

pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, viewed in a light most favorable to the 

nonmovant, fail to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists, thereby entitling the 

moving party to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016); Fox v. 
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Seiden, 2016 IL App (1st) 141984, ¶ 12. When, as here, parties file cross-motions for summary 

judgment, they agree that no genuine issues of material fact exist and they invite the court to 

decide the case as a matter of law based on the record. Casey’s Marketing Co. v. Hamer, 2016 

IL App (1st) 143485, ¶ 11. We review a circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment 

de novo. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 

132350, ¶ 8. As the principal issue we are asked to resolve necessarily involves matters of 

statutory construction, we also observe our review in that regard is de novo. Stasko v. City of 

Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 120265, ¶ 31. De novo consideration means we perform the same 

analysis that a trial judge would perform. Midwest Gaming & Entertainment, LLC v. County of 

Cook, 2015 IL App (1st) 142786, ¶ 46. 

¶ 13 To determine whether or not the City’s home rule authority to enact the ordinance is 

preempted by section 8-11-6a(2), we must necessarily begin by discussing our constitution and 

the power it grants to home rule units. The relationship between our state and local 

governments was aptly recounted by our supreme court in City of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc., 

2011 IL 111127: 

“Under the 1870 Illinois Constitution, the balance of power between our state and

local governments was heavily weighted toward the state. The 1970 Illinois 

Constitution drastically altered that balance, giving local governments more autonomy. 

Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill. 2d 281, 286-87 (2001); City of 

Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 107 (1981) (quoting 4 Record of Proceedings, 

Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 3024). Municipalities now enjoy ‘the broadest 

powers possible’ (Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1992)) under 

the Constitution.” Id. ¶ 18. 

The court went on to explain that section 6(a) of article VII, “gives municipalities any powers 

pertaining to their governments and affairs, including the power to tax, but not the power over 

matters such as divorce, real property, trusts, and contracts (7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth 

Illinois Constitutional Convention 1621).” Id. ¶ 19. Thus, “[t]he framers’ intent was clear: ‘the 

powers of home-rule units relate to their own problems,’ not problems more competently 

solved by the state.” Id. (quoting 7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional 

Convention 1621). The court also observed that, “[t]he framers *** understood that further 

interpretation of section 6(a)’s intentionally imprecise language would fall to the judicial 

branch.” Id. (citing 4 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 3052). 

¶ 14 Under the Illinois Constitution, except as limited by article VII, section 6, of the 

constitution, a home rule unit such as the City “may exercise any power and perform any 

function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to 

regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; 

and to incur debt.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a). “Section 6(a) was written with the intention 

to give home rule units the broadest powers possible.” Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive 

Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 30. Furthermore, the constitution expressly provides 

that the “[p]owers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally.” Ill. Const. 

1970, art. VII, § 6(m). 

¶ 15 The General Assembly, however, “may *** preempt the exercise of a municipality’s home 

rule powers by expressly limiting that authority.” Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31. Under article 

VII, section 6(h), “[t]he General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive 

exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit other than a taxing power.” 
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Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(h). With respect to the power to tax, “[t]he General Assembly by 

a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each house may deny or 

limit the power to tax and any other power or function of a home rule unit not exercised or 

performed by the State.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(g). 

¶ 16 “If the legislature intends to limit or deny the exercise of home rule powers, the statute 

must contain an express statement to that effect.” Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31. If the legislature 

does not do so, article VII, section 6(i), provides that “[h]ome rule units may exercise and 

perform concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that 

the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically 

declare the State’s exercise to be exclusive.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(i). Thus, the Illinois 

Constitution provides home rule units with the same powers as the sovereign, except when 

those powers are limited by the General Assembly. City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 

513 (1998) (citing Triple A Services, Inc. v. Rice, 131 Ill. 2d 217, 230 (1989)). Our supreme 

court has “consistently recognized that the home rule provisions of the Illinois Constitution are 

intended to ‘eliminate or at least reduce to a bare minimum the circumstances under which 

local home rule powers are preempted by judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative 

intention.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 34 (quoting Scadron 

v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 186 (1992)); see also Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City 

of Naperville, 198 Ill. 2d 281, 288 (2001); Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 516. 

¶ 17 In this instance, the parties agree that the legislature granted the City, a home rule unit, the 

authority to tax cigarettes pursuant to section 8-11-6(a) of the Municipal Code, which provides 

as follows: 

“Except as provided in Sections 8-11-1, 8-11-5, 8-11-6, 8-11-6b, 8-11-6c, and 

11-74.3-6 on and after September 1, 1990, no home rule municipality has the authority 

to impose, pursuant to its home rule authority, a retailer’s occupation tax, service 

occupation tax, use tax, sales tax or other tax on the use, sale or purchase of tangible 

personal property based on the gross receipts from such sales or the selling or purchase 

price of said tangible personal property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Section 

does not preempt any home rule imposed tax such as the following: *** (2) a tax based 

on the number of units of cigarettes or tobacco products (provided, however, that a 

home rule municipality that has not imposed a tax based on the number of units of 

cigarettes or tobacco products before July 1, 1993, shall not impose such a tax after 

that date); ***. *** This Section is a limitation, pursuant to subsection (g) of Section 6 

of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution, on the power of home rule units to tax.” 

(Emphases added.) 65 ILCS 5/8-11-6a (West 2016). 

What is at issue, however, is whether section 8-11-6a(2) of the Municipal Code preempts the 

City’s authority to tax “tobacco products” as provided in the ordinance where the City had not 

imposed a tax specifically on “tobacco products” prior to July 1, 1993. The answer to this 

question requires us to interpret this particular section of the Municipal Code, which we do 

de novo. Stasko, 2013 IL App (1st) 120265, ¶ 31. 

¶ 18 The fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the 

drafter’s intent. Hubble v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan 

District, 238 Ill. 2d 262, 268 (2010). The statutory language, given its plain and ordinary 

meaning, is the best indication of that intent. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 48. “A reasonable 

construction must be given to each word, clause, and sentence of a statute, and no term should 
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be rendered superfluous.” 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2015 

IL 118372, ¶ 21. When determining a statute’s meaning, the statute should be read as a whole, 

with all relevant parts considered. Gardner v. Mullins, 234 Ill. 2d 503, 511 (2009). A court may 

not depart from the plain statutory language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or 

conditions not expressed by the legislature. In re Estate of Ellis, 236 Ill. 2d 45, 51 (2009). 

“Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to 

other aids of construction.” Bettis v. Marsaglia, 2014 IL 117050, ¶ 13. 

¶ 19 “An examination of the validity of home rule authority requires the court to determine 

whether the questioned home rule ordinance is related to its government and affairs and 

whether the state legislature has preempted the exercise of the home rule power.” Page v. City 

of Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 3d 450, 460 (1998). In this case, there is no question as to whether the 

ordinance is related to the City’s government and affairs, rather the primary issue is whether 

section 8-11-6a(2) of the Municipal Code preempts the City’s home rule authority to tax other 

tobacco products. 

¶ 20 We begin by reviewing the history of the relevant provision of the Municipal Code as we 

find it to be both helpful and instructive. See Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello, 18 Ill. 2d 

306, 312 (1960) (when a statute has been amended, courts are to construe the language of the 

amendment together with the original act). 

¶ 21 Section 8-11-6a was originally enacted in 1988 and expressly limited a home rule 

municipality from imposing certain taxes on the use, sale, or purchase of tangible personal 

property. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 24, ¶ 8-11-6a (stating this section “is a limitation, 

pursuant to subsection (g) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution, on the power 

of home rule units to tax”). The legislature, however, allowed for certain exceptions to this rule 

and set forth seven categories where a home rule unit could impose a tax. See id. Section 

8-11-6a, as originally enacted, provided in pertinent part as follows: 

“Except as provided in Section 8-11-1, 8-11-5 and 8-11-6, on and after September 1, 

1990, no home rule municipality has the authority to impose, pursuant to its home rule 

authority, a retailer’s occupation tax, service occupation tax, use tax, sales tax or other 

tax on the use, sale or purchase of tangible personal property based on the gross 

receipts from such sales or the selling or purchase price of said tangible personal 

property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Section does not preempt any home rule 

imposed tax such as the following: (1) a tax on alcoholic beverages, whether based on 

gross receipts, volume sold or any other measurement; (2) a tax based on the number of 

units of cigarettes or tobacco products; (3) a tax, however measured, based on the use 

of a hotel or motel room or similar facility; (4) a tax, however measured, on the sale or 

transfer of real property; (5) a tax, however measured, on lease receipts; (6) a tax on 

food prepared for immediate consumption and on alcoholic beverages ***; or (7) other 

taxes not based on the selling or purchase price or gross receipts from the use, sale or 

purchase of tangible personal property. *** This Section is a limitation, pursuant to 

subsection (g) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution, on the power of 

home rule units to tax.” (Emphases added.) Id. 

¶ 22 Relevant to the issue in this case section 8-11-6a originally provided: “this Section does not

preempt any home rule imposed tax such as the following *** (2) a tax based on the number of 

units of cigarettes or tobacco products.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, beginning on September 

1, 1990, a home rule municipality, such as the City, was allowed to impose a tax based on the 
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selling or purchase price or gross receipts from the sale of cigarettes or tobacco products. See

id. 

¶ 23 The City maintains that “or” was employed in the first iteration of the statute in the 

inclusive sense and thus the statute allowed a home rule unit the power to tax either cigarettes, 

or non-cigarette tobacco products, or both. We agree with the City’s interpretation. Viewing 

the statute as a whole, which we must (Sinkus v. BTE Consulting, 2017 IL App (1st) 152135, 

¶ 14), it is evident that the legislature intended to create broad descriptions for the categories in 

section 8-11-6a. For example, when describing places of accommodations, the legislature 

employed the phrase “hotel or motel room or similar facility.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 24, 

¶ 8-11-6a(3). The legislature also used the word “or” to put together different transactions 

involving real property. Id. ¶ 8-11-6a(4). Likewise, “cigarettes or tobacco products” is a wide 

category that describes goods that contain nicotine. A tenant of statutory construction is that “a 

word or phrase that is repeated in a statute is presumed to have the same meaning throughout.” 

Borg v. Village of Schiller Park Police Pension Board, 111 Ill. App. 3d 653, 657 (1982). Thus, 

the legislature’s original inclusive use of the word “or” in section 8-11-6a created broad 

categories where home rule units could impose taxes on the property stated in the seven 

exceptions. 

¶ 24 In addition, our case law supports the conclusion that the word “or” can be used in an 

inclusive sense. See Campbell v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 15 Ill. 2d 308, 311 

(1958). Whether “or” is used in the inclusive sense is determined by the context in which it is 

used. See Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 466 

(1976); see also Sinkus, 2017 IL App (1st) 152135, ¶ 14 (“In interpreting a statute, we must 

view the statute as a whole, making sure not to read any of its language in isolation.”). In this 

case, the circuit court concluded the “or” was used in the exclusive or disjunctive sense, relying 

on the case of People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326 (1992). We initially observe that Frieberg

involved the interpretation of a criminal statute, but regardless, it did set forth the general 

proposition that, “As used in its ordinary sense, the word ‘or’ marks an alternative indicating 

the various members of the sentence which it connects are to be taken separately.” Id. at 349 

(citing People v. Vraniak, 5 Ill. 2d 384 (1955); Campbell, 15 Ill. 2d 308). While we do not 

disagree with this proposition, it is also true that “or” can mean “and” when considered in 

context to effectuate the legislature’s intent.

¶ 25 To this end, we find the cases cited by the City to be instructive, as in those cases the 

reviewing courts examined the context in which the word “or” was employed to interpret the 

legislature’s intent. See Apex Oil Co. v. Henkhaus, 118 Ill. App. 3d 273 (1983); Thoman v. 

Village of Northbrook, 148 Ill. App. 3d 356 (1986). In Apex Oil Co., the plaintiff, a sublessee 

of a tract of land that was leased to the Tri-City Port District of Madison County, Illinois (Port 

District), from the United States of America, brought an action for declaratory judgment and 

injunctive relief against certain officials of Madison County regarding the assessment and 

collection of property taxes. Apex Oil Co., 118 Ill. App. 3d at 274-75. While the plaintiff 

subleased the land and had erected six storage tanks thereon, two other storage tanks present on 

the property were owned by the Port District. Id. at 275. In 1979, the value of the plaintiff’s 

leasehold was assessed to include the value of the leasehold estate as well as the improvements 

thereon, including the two storage tanks owned by the Port District. Id. at 275-76. The plaintiff 

disagreed with the assessment calculation and maintained that the taxes were not authorized on 

both the value of the leasehold and the improvements owned by others. Id. at 276. In 
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considering this claim, the reviewing court construed the language of the section 19.19 of the 

Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, ¶ 500.19), which read in pertinent part:

“ ‘All property of every kind belonging to the Chicago Regional Port District or any 

other port district created by the legislature of this State, provided that a tax may be 

levied upon a lessee of such a District by reason of the value of a leasehold estate 

separate and apart from the fee, or upon such improvements as are constructed and 

owned by others than the Port District.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Apex Oil Co., 118 Ill. 

App. 3d at 275 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, ¶ 500.19). 

In determining whether the plaintiff should have been taxed on the value of its leasehold and 

the improvements constructed thereon, the reviewing court determined 

“the disjunction ‘or’ in section 19.19 is of no significance as it appears to us unlikely 

that the legislature intended to require local assessing authorities to choose between 

valuing the leasehold without consideration of the value of improvements erected by 

others or the improvements erected by others without consideration of the current 

market rental value of the lease.” Id. at 278. 

Accordingly, the court concluded that the proper interpretation of section 19.19 was that “a tax 

may be levied upon the value of the leasehold which includes improvements erected thereon 

by the lessor, or upon the leasehold and improvements erected thereon by others, so that 

regardless of ownership of the improvements, they will not be exempt from taxation.” 

(Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 279. In reaching this conclusion, the Apex Oil Co. court recognized 

that “the disjunctive ‘or’ and conjunctive ‘and’ are not always employed in statutory drafting 

to express the true legislative purpose, and when it seems apparent that a literal reading would 

produce a result not intended, the literal meaning may be altered to express the true legislative 

purpose.” Id. 

¶ 26 Similarly, in Thoman this court construed certain language in the Road Construction 

Injuries Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 121, ¶ 314.1) to determine whether the defendants in a 

negligence case, consisting of a governmental agency and its employee, were exempted from 

liability. Thoman, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 357. There, the plaintiff suffered injuries when her 

automobile collided with defendant Daniel McGee’s vehicle. Id. McGee was an employee of 

defendant Village of Northbrook and was engaged in road repairs while operating a vehicle 

owned by the Village of Northbrook at the time of the collision. Id. The plaintiff’s lawsuit 

alleged two counts: (1) negligence and (2) violations of the Road Construction Injuries Act. Id.

The defendants then moved to dismiss count II arguing that the language of the Road 

Construction Injuries Act exempted them from liability. Id. The trial court granted the motion, 

and the plaintiff appealed. Id. 

¶ 27 On appeal, the reviewing court considered the following language of the Road 

Construction Injuries Act: “ ‘The provisions of this Act shall not apply to employees or 

officials of the State of Illinois or any other public agency engaged in the construction or the 

maintenance of highways and bridges.’ ” Id. (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 121, ¶ 314.8). 

The plaintiff maintained that this section did not exempt local governments (such as the 

Village of Northbrook) and their employees from the duties and liabilities imposed by the 

statute and urged that “since the word ‘or’ is used in the phrase ‘of the State of Illinois or any 

other public agency,’ this phrase must be read in the disjunctive.” Id. at 357-58. The plaintiff 

argued that based on this construction, the exemption was not intended to apply to any 
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governmental body but was only intended to apply to certain employees or officials of those 

governmental bodies. Id. at 358.

¶ 28 The reviewing court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument. In reaching the 

conclusion that the statute exempted government agencies as well as their employees and 

officials from the provisions of the Road Construction Injury Act, the court explained:

“We are also mindful of the rule that the disjunction ‘or’ and conjunction ‘and’ are 

not always employed in statutory drafting to express the true legislative purpose, and 

when it seems apparent that a literal reading would produce a result not intended, the 

literal meaning may be altered to express the true legislative purpose. [Citation.] We 

believe the use of the disjunction ‘or’ in section 8 is of no significance as it appears to 

us unlikely that the legislature intended to carve out an exemption for governmental 

employees and officials and not the agencies they represent.” Id. at 359.

¶ 29 Following the guidance of Apex and Thoman, when viewing the original section 8-11-6a in 

its entirety (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 24, ¶ 8-11-6a), it is apparent that the legislature intended to 

carve out broad categories that home rule units would be allowed to tax and that the use of the 

word “or” in “cigarettes or tobacco products” was originally employed by the legislature in an 

inclusive sense so as to cover the gamut of nicotine based products. 

¶ 30 In 1993, the general assembly amended section 8-11-6a(2) to impose a limitation on “a tax 

based on the number of units of cigarettes or tobacco products.” Besides this limitation, the 

language of the statute remained the same: 

“Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Section does not preempt any home rule imposed 

tax such as the following: *** (2) a tax based on the number of units of cigarettes or 

tobacco products (provided, however, that a home rule municipality that has not 

imposed a tax based on the number of units of cigarettes or tobacco products before 

July 1, 1993, shall not impose such a tax after that date)[.]” (Emphasis added.) 65 

ILCS 5/8-11- 6a(2) (West 2016). 

When adding this parenthetical clause to section 8-11-6a(2), the legislature mirrored the 

language that appeared in the original statute, “cigarettes or tobacco products.” As previously 

determined, it was the legislature’s intent to carve out a broad category. “Where a meaning is 

attributed to a word and it again appears in the same statute, it should be given consistent 

meaning unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed.” Chapman v. County of Will, 

55 Ill. 2d 524, 529-30 (1973); Borg, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 657. Construing these terms 

consistently within the statute and in light of its original meaning, it follows that either a tax 

based on the number of units of cigarettes or tobacco products or both must have been in effect 

prior to July 1, 1993, in order for a home rule unit’s power to tax “cigarettes or tobacco 

products” not to be preempted.

¶ 31 In addition, the legislature’s repeated use of the words “a tax” in section 8-11-6a(2) 

supports our interpretation. The description of what a home rule unit is allowed to tax (the 

number of units of cigarettes or tobacco products) is introduced with an indefinite article, “a 

tax.” The word “a” is an indefinite article and is used in English to “refer to a person or thing 

that is not identified or specified.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.

merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indefinite%20article (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) [https://

perma.cc/AX98-2F4R]. Thus, according to the basic principles of grammar, when an 

indefinite article prefaces a noun, that noun refers to something general rather than something 

specific. Accordingly, based on common grammar principles and our prior conclusion that the 
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legislature intended to allow a home rule unit to tax a broad category of nicotine products, the 

words “a tax” as employed in the context of section 8-11-6a(2) refers not to a specific tax, but 

to a tax generally on either cigarettes or tobacco products or both. See Warner v. King, 267 Ill. 

82, 87 (1915) (the grammatical construction of a statute is one mode of interpretation and 

“[s]tatutes *** are to be read and understood primarily according to their grammatical sense, 

unless it is apparent from a perusal of the context of the whole statute that the Legislature did 

not express its intention”); see also People v. Cherry Valley Public Library District, 356 Ill. 

App. 3d 893, 896-97 (2005) (interpreting a statute based on the grammar of the statute itself); 

Lyons Township ex rel. Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park, 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, 

¶ 26 (employing the “commonly understood principles of grammar and usage” to interpret a 

statute). Reading section 8-11-6a(2) in its entirety, it follows that the legislature intended for a 

home rule municipality to be able to tax cigarettes or tobacco products so long as the home rule 

municipality had “a tax” in place on either “cigarettes or tobacco products” prior to July 1, 

1993. (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/8-11-6a (West 2016). 

¶ 32 We conclude that because the City had enacted a tax on cigarettes prior to July 1, 1993, it 

fulfilled the condition of the statute that “a tax” exist on either the number of units of cigarettes 

or tobacco products. Thus, the City is not preempted from now enacting a tax on other tobacco 

products. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court granting plaintiffs’ motion 

for partial summary judgment and denying the City’s motion for summary judgment. 

¶ 33 CONCLUSION 

¶ 34 The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed. 

¶ 35 Reversed.