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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

June 30, 2016 

v No. 326381 

Wayne Circuit Court 

KEVIN NEHRU THOMAS, LC No. 14-005972-FC; 

 14-007043-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: METER, P.J., and SHAPIRO and O’BRIEN, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted1

 his guilty plea convictions of six counts of 

first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b. Defendant’s minimum sentence guideline 

range was 135 to 225 months; however, the trial court departed upward and sentenced defendant 

to 40 to 60 years’ imprisonment for each conviction. On appeal, defendant asserts that he is 

entitled to resentencing because the trial court failed to articulate substantial and compelling 

reasons for its departure. In light of our decision in People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1; ___ 

NW2d ___ (2015), we remand for Crosby2

 proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 In People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 364-365; 870 NW2d 502 (2015) our Supreme 

Court struck down the requirement “that a sentencing court that departs from the applicable 

guidelines range must articulate a substantial and compelling reason for that departure.” Instead, 

“[a] sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an appellate 

court for reasonableness.” Id. at 392. Consequently, we need not review defendant’s argument

that the trial court lacked substantial and compelling reasons to justify its upward departure. See 

id; Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 42 n 16. 

 

1 People v Thomas, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 27, 2015 (Docket 

No. 326381). 

2 United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005). 
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Lockridge did not provide a test to determine what constitutes a reasonable sentence. 

However, in Steanhouse, we concluded that the reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence was to 

be determined by the proportionality principles set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 

461 NW2d 1 (1990). Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 46-48. In Steanhouse, we remanded for 

Crosby proceedings because the sentencing court “was unaware of, and not expressly bound by, 

a reasonableness standard rooted in the Milbourn principle of proportionality at the time of 

sentencing.” Id. at 48. In this case, the trial court sentenced defendant before the decisions in 

Lockridge and Steanhouse were decided. As such, the court in this case, like the court in 

Steanhouse, was also unaware of and unbound by the reasonableness test articulated in 

Steanhouse. We therefore conclude that defendant is entitled to a Crosby remand to determine 

whether the trial court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the new 

sentencing regime. See id. The specific procedures to be followed on remand were summarized 

in Lockridge as follows: 

[O]n a Crosby remand, a trial court should first allow a defendant an opportunity 

to inform the court that he or she will not seek resentencing. If notification is not 

received in a timely manner, the court (1) should obtain the views of counsel in 

some form, (2) may but is not required to hold a hearing on the matter, and (3) 

need not have the defendant present when it decides whether to resentence the 

defendant, but (4) must have the defendant present . . . if it decides to resentence 

the defendant. Further, in determining whether the court would have imposed a 

materially different sentence but for the unconstitutional constraint, the court 

should consider only the circumstances existing at the time of the original 

sentence. [Lockridge, 498 Mich at 398 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).]3

 

 

3

 Defendant argues that this case should be assigned to a different trial court judge. However, 

this issue is moot because the original sentencing judge is now retired. Thus, defendant’s 

proceedings on remand will necessarily be before a different judge. See People v Coones, 216 

Mich App 721, 730; 550 NW2d 600 (1996). 

 Defendant also briefly notes that the trial court failed to rule on his objections to the 

scoring of offense variable (OV) 10 (exploitation of a vulnerable victim), MCL 777.40, and OV 

13 (continuing pattern of criminal behavior), MCL 777.43; however, he does not present any 

argument on appeal as to whether the scoring for these OVs was in fact improper. “An appellant 

may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the 

basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment [of an issue] with little or no citation 

of supporting authority.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). 

As such we decline to review these issues. 
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 Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain 

jurisdiction. 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien