[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4269.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -4269
T HE S TATE EX REL
. B ONNLANDER , A PPELLANT , v . H AMON ET AL ., A PPELLEES
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4269.] Workers’ compensation—Whether a claim ant has voluntarily retired or has abandoned the workforce is a question of fact for the Industrial Commission to determine—A court must uphold a factual determination by the commission so long as it is supported by some evidence in the record, regardless of whether evidence suppor ting a contrary conclusion also exists, even if the contrary evidence is greater in quality or quantity—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. (No. 2019-1386—Submitted August 4, 2020—Decided September 2, 20 20.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals fo r Franklin County, No. 18AP-501,
2019-Ohio-3861.

________________S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Appellee Industrial Commission deni ed the request of appellant, Timothy Bonnlander, for permanent-total-disability (“PTD”) comp ensation, because the commission found that Bonnlander had voluntarily ab andoned the
workforce. Bonnlander asked th e Tenth District Court of Appeal s for a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its decision and gra nt his request.
The Tenth District de nied the writ because it found that the co mmission’s decision was supported by evidence in the record. Bonnlander appealed. We affirm the Tenth District’s judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND {¶ 2} Bonnlander sustained severe injur ies in a work-related vehicle
accident in 1992. His workers’ co mpensation claim was allowed for physical and psychological conditions. Bonnlander worked as a laborer and c onstruction worker from 1994 through 2000. He worked for the United States Postal Service from 2000 through 2009, first as a mail carrier and then as a custod ian. He has not
worked since 2009. {¶ 3} In February 2014, Bonnlander applied for PTD compensation. The commission denied that request i n September 2014, finding that he could perform sedentary work for up to four hours a day. In its order, the c ommission noted that Bonnlander’s failure to pursue vocational rehabilitation had re flected negatively on his application. In October 2014, Bonnlander sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District vacating the commission’s order. See State ex rel. Bonnlander v.
Hamon , 10th Dist. Franklin N o. 14AP-855, 2015-Ohio-4038, ¶ 30. {¶ 4} In the meantime, he also requested vocational-rehabilitation se rvices. The commission granted that request in February 2015. The voca tionalrehabilitation case manager (“VRCM ”) gathered information, but some of what she sought was unavailable: Bonnlander’s treating psychologist did not respond to multiple requests about Bonnlande r’s return-to-work outlook or his psychologicalJanuary Term, 2020

3 restrictions, and the managed-ca re organization handling Bonnla nder’s case denied the VRCM’s requests for additiona l neurological, psychological, and physical
evaluations. {¶ 5} The VRCM therefore considered a May 2014 psychological report b y an independent medical examiner, Dr. Debjani Sinha, who opined that Bonnlander could work part-time , up to four hours a day, with accommodatio ns, and a January 2015 application for wage-loss compensation in which Bonnlander ’s treating physician stated that he had the physical ability to perform se dentary work, up to eight hours a day, with standi ng and walking for up to one hour

. {¶ 6} The VRCM also “heavily” considered Bonnlander’s own statement that he suffered from memory issues that he believed would impe de his ability to
return to work. She u ltimately concluded:

Without the benefit of reconditioning, or a NeuroPsychological evaluation, and in just relying on [Bonnlander’s] presentation, pain levels, and a pplicable physical and psycholo gical restrictions, this VRCM has no confidence he would be able to actively participate in vocational rehab or [be] employable in a competitive labor market. It is therefore the VRCM [sic] opini on, that without increased psychological, physical, and cognitive functional abilities, he is not feasible for vocational rehabil itation or
return to work.

Bonnlander’s rehabilitation file was closed in March 2015 “due to medical instability.” {¶ 7} In September 2015, the Tenth District denied Bonnlander’s 2014 request for a writ of mandamus. Bonnlander , 2015-Ohio-4038, at ¶ 8. Bonnlander appealed, and in May 2017, this court unanimously affirmed the Tenth District’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 judgment, holding that “[i]t wa s within the commission’s discre tion to rely on Dr. Sinha’s report as evidence to support the conclusion that Bonnl ander was capable of up to four hours of sedentary work a day.” State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon , 150 Ohio St.3d 567, 2017-Ohio-4003, 84 N.E.3d 1004, ¶ 20-21. {¶ 8} On October 12, 2017, Bonnlander submitted a new application for PTD compensation. A staff hear ing officer (“SHO”) found that B onnlander’s psychological and orthopedic c onditions both independently rend ered him incapable of working and issued a “tentative order” awarding Bo nnlander compensation effective September 20, 2017. The SHO based this conclusion on medical opinions rendered in l ate 2017. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation objected to the tentative order, and a different SHO vacated it , finding that the order was inappropriate because there was a legal dispute over the is sue of PTD. {¶ 9} In May 2018, a third SHO denied Bonnlander’s request for PTD compensation, based on a finding that Bonnlander had voluntaril y abandoned the workforce. The SHO found that (1) this court had upheld the co mmission’s 2014 order denying PTD on the grounds that Bonnlander could work par t-time, (2) Bonnlander had last worked in late 2008 or early 2009, (3) Bonnlander is receiving federal disability bene fits arising from his employme nt at the post office as well as social-security-disability benefits and Bonnlander h ad testified that he did not believe that he could receive federal disability benefi ts if he was working, (4) Bonnlander had not looked for work for several years, at le ast since September 11, 2014 (the date of the hearing on his 2014 PTD-compensation application), (5) the VRCM “was without an accu rate assessment of [Bonnlander ’s] cognitive function,” and (6) Bonnlander’s “pu rsuit of vocational rehabili tation over roughly a three week period” was not sufficient to establish “a meaning ful effort in pursuing all reasonable avenues of accomp lishing a return to sustained r emunerative employment albeit on a part-time basis.” The commission reject ed Bonnlander’s request for reconsidera tion of the SHO’s decision.January Term, 2020

5 {¶ 10} In June 2018, Bonnlander filed the instant action in the Tenth District, seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order and grant his application for PTD compensation. The magistrate found that the
commission’s determination that B onnlander made an insufficient effort at
rehabilitation was a n abuse of discreti on and recommended that the court grant the writ. 2019-Ohio-3861, ¶ 48-50. {¶ 11} However, the Tenth District sustained the commission’s objectio ns to the magistrate’s recommenda tion and denied the writ. Id . at ¶ 13, 25-26. The court of appeals explained tha t “the SHO’s finding on relator’s effort at vocational rehabilitation was only one consideration among many used to su pport the SHO’s decision to deny PTD compensation,” id . at ¶ 17, and that other evidence in the record supported the decision that Bonnlander had voluntarily a bandoned the workforce, id. at ¶ 21. Specifically, the court of appeals pointed to (1) Bonnlander’s testimony that he believed working could resul t in the loss of his federal disability benefits, id ., and (2) his failure to work or to seek work after the commission found him capable of sustained remunerative employme nt in September 2014, id . at ¶ 22. {¶ 12} The court of appeals acknowledged that Bonnlander had pursued vocational rehabilitation in 2015, but it pointed out that the commission’s September 2014 determination that he could work part-time was n ot conditioned on his undergoing vocational re habilitation, so the vocational- rehabilitation
determination was irrelevant. Id . at ¶ 23. In any event, the Tenth District explained
that because Bonnlander’s testimo ny and inaction constitutes so me evidence that he voluntarily abandoned the workforce, the existence of contra ry evidence is
immaterial and the commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Bonnlander PTD compensation. Id . at ¶ 24.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 II. ANALYSIS
A. Mandamus Standard {¶ 13} Mandamus relief is appropriate onl y if the relator establishes “a clear legal right to the relief reque sted, a clear legal duty on the part of the commission * * * to provide the relief, and th e lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of the law.” State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. , 143 Ohio St.3d 56, 2015-Ohio1191, 34 N.E.3d 104, ¶ 12. In matters before it, the commissio n is the exclusive evaluator of the weight and c redibility of the evidence. State ex rel. LTV Steel Co.
v. Indus. Comm. , 88 Ohio St.3d 284, 287, 725 N.E.2d 639 (2000). Therefore, “[ t]o be entitled to an extraordinary remedy in mandamus, the relator must demonstrate that the [commission] abused its discretion by entering an orde r not supported by any evidence in the record.” State ex rel. WFAL Constr. v. Buehrer , 144 Ohio St.3d 21, 2015-Ohio-2305, 40 N.E.3d 1079, ¶ 12. The relator must mak e that showing by clear and convincing evidence. Id

. B. The Commission’s Decision Was Supported by Some Evidence {¶ 14} “ ‘Permanent total disability’ means the inability to perform sustained remunerative employme nt due to the allowed conditions in the claim.” Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). PTD compensation is not availab le to an injured worker who has voluntarily abandoned the workforce for reasons unrelated to his allowed conditions. R.C. 4123.58(D )(3); Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-3 4(D)(1)(d); see also State ex rel. Black v. Indus. Comm. , 137 Ohio St.3d 75, 2013-Ohio-4550, 997 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 14. {¶ 15} “Whether a claimant has voluntar ily retired or has abandoned th e workforce is a question of fact for the commission to determine .” Id. at ¶ 18. And a court must uphold a factual de termination by the commission s o long as it is supported by some evidence in the record, regardless of whether evidence supporting a contrary conclusion also exists, even if the contr ary evidence is greaterJanuary Term, 2020

7 in quality or quantity. State ex rel. Vonderheide v. Multi-Color Corp. , 156 Ohio St.3d 403, 2019-Ohio-1270, 128 N.E.3d 188, ¶ 14. {¶ 16} In his first proposition of law , Bonnlander argues that the commission abused its discretion by considering his failure to participate in
vocational rehabilitation. This ar gument is based on two premi ses. First,
Bonnlander asserts that after the commission’ s September 2014 d etermination that he could work four hours a day, hi s allowed medical conditions deteriorated to the point that he became permanently and totally disabled, as evide nced by the March
2015 determination that he was not a feasible candidate for voc ational rehabilitation and by medical opinions from November 2015 and late 2017. Seco nd, he asserts that the commission is not required to consider a claimant’s fa ilure to participate in vocational rehabilitation when a finding of permanent and total disability is based solely on medical factors. In support of this assertion, Bonnl ander cites State ex rel. R & L Carriers Shared Servs., L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm. , 151 Ohio St.3d 568, 2017-Ohio-5833, 91 N.E.3d 711, State ex rel. Heinen’s, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-635, 2019-Ohio-4690, and State ex rel. Tradesman
Internatl. v. Indus. Comm. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-122, 2014-Ohio-1064, aff’d sub nom. State ex rel. Tradesmen Internatl. v. Indus. Comm. , 143 Ohio St.3d 336, 2015-Ohio-2342, 37 N.E.3d 1203. {¶ 17} We reject Bonnlander’s first proposition of law. His reliance on medical evidence from 2015 and 2017 overlooks the fact that the evidence the commission relied on in making its finding of voluntary abandon ment dated from 2014 at the latest. And an injur ed worker who voluntarily aban dons the workforce
for reasons unrelated to the allowed conditions prior to becoming permanently and totally disabled is not ent itled to PTD compensation. State ex rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm. , 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 138 (1994), paragraph two of the syllabus.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 {¶ 18} Moreover, the cases Bonnlander relies on are inapplicable. The y permit the commission to award PTD compe nsation based solely on medic al factors without considering the claimant’s failure to participate in vo cational rehabilitation, but they do not require the commission to ignore a failure to participate in vocational rehabilitation when making a finding of voluntary ab andonment. R & L
Carriers at ¶ 18 (“Although the commission may consider a claimant’s nonparticipation in reeducation or retraining in its analysis o f an injured worker’s nonmedical disability factors, * * * when permanent total disab ility is based solely on the claimant’s medical impairment, the commission is not required to consider nonmedical disability factors * * *” [emphasis added]); Tradesman Internatl. , 2014-Ohio-1064, at ¶ 18 (“Where * * * medical factors alone pre clude sustained remunerative employment, * * * a c onsideration of the nonmedica l factors, including whether [the] claimant had or should have pursued voc ational rehabilitation, [is] unnecessary ” [emphasis added]); Heinen’s at ¶ 12 (same). {¶ 19} In his second proposition of law, Bonnlander argues that becaus e he sought vocational rehabilitation but was found to be a nonfeasi ble candidate, the commission abused its discretion by finding that he voluntarily abandoned his employment. He further assert s that the commission’s decision is not supported by any evidence in the record. {¶ 20} We reject Bonnlander’s second proposition of law and conclude, as did the Tenth District, that so me evidence in the record suppor ts the commission’s finding that Bonnlander voluntar ily abandoned the workforce. See 2019-Ohio3861 at ¶ 21-22. {¶ 21} Specifically, the third SHO in this case found that Bonnlander testified that he was receiving federal disability benefits ari sing from his former employment with the post office a nd that he believed he could n ot receive those benefits if he was working. I n addition, the third SHO found t hat Bonnlander failed to work or seek work after the commission found him capable of sustainedJanuary Term, 2020

9 remunerative employment in Sept ember 2014; in fact, he has not worked since 2009 and has not sought work since at least September 11, 2014. “[T ]he commission may consider a claimant’s inaction after leaving a job as evide nce that the claimant voluntarily decided to no longer be actively employed.” State ex rel. McKee v. Union Metal Corp. , 150 Ohio St.3d 223, 2017-Ohio-5541, 80 N.E.3d 491, ¶ 10. {¶ 22} It is true that Bonnlander soug ht vocational rehabilitation. B ut while the commission’s 2014 order denying PTD compensation noted that his failure to have pursued vocational rehabilitation “to improve his prospect s for returning to the workforce” was a negative factor with respect to his PTD-co mpensation application, the commission’s dete rmination that Bonnlander cou ld work four hours a day was not conditioned on hi s completion of vocational rehabilitation. {¶ 23} Moreover, although Bonnlande r’s pursuit of vocational rehabilitation and the VRCM’s finding that he was not a feasibl e candidate for rehabilitation services may cons titute evidence supporting a co nclusion that Bonnlander did not voluntarily abandon the workforce, the commi ssion is entitled to determine the appropriate weight and credibility of that evi dence. LTV Steel , 88 Ohio St.3d at 287, 725 N.E.2d 639. And the third SHO found tha t the VRCM “was
without an accurate assessment of [Bonnlander’s] cognitive func tion.” {¶ 24} In any event, the mere existence of conflicting evidence does n ot render the commission’s determina tion of a factual question an abuse of discretion.
Vonderheide , 156 Ohio St.3d 403, 2019-Ohio-1270, 128 N.E.3d 188, at ¶ 14. Because the commission’s decision that Bonnlander voluntarily a bandoned the workforce was supported by some evidence in the record, the Ten th District correctly denied the writ.
III. CONCLUSION {¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, we af firm the Tenth District’s judgm ent. Judgment affirmed.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.

_________________ Mark B. Weisser, f or appellant. Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Eric J. Tarbox, Assistant Atto rney General, for appellee In dustrial Commission of Ohio.

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