NO. 4-01-0748

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

In re: the Commitment of

WILLIAM J. STEVENS,

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

	Petitioner-Appellee,

	v.

WILLIAM J. STEVENS,

	Respondent-Appellant.	)

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)

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)

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)	Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Adams County

No. 00MR1

Honorable

Mark A. Schuering,

Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

		JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

		In July 2001, a jury found respondent, William J.

Stevens, to be a sexually violent person under the Sexually

Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 through 99

(West 2000)).  Following an August 2001 dispositional hearing,

the trial court ordered him committed to the Department of Human

Services (DHS) for institutional care in a secure setting.

		Respondent appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court

abused its discretion by denying his motion for a Frye eviden tiary hearing (see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)) on the admissibility of evidence regarding actuarial

instruments used by the State's experts in assessing respondent's

risk of reoffending; and (2) the jury's finding was against the

manifest weight of the evidence.  We disagree and affirm.

	I. BACKGROUND

		In January 2000, the State initiated proceedings under

the Act to commit respondent to DHS indefinitely.  At that time,

respondent was an inmate at the Western Illinois Correctional Center and was scheduled for entry into mandatory supervised

release on January 12, 2000, following the completion of his

sentence on 1996 convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse

(720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West 1996)) and aggravated battery (720

ILCS 5/12-4 (West 1996)).

		In February 2001, respondent filed a motion for a Frye evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence

regarding actuarial risk-assessment instruments used by the

State's experts in assessing respondent's risk of reoffending. 

Alternatively, respondent's motion sought to bar such evidence. 

Later that month, the State filed a response to respondent's

motion.  In March 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on

respondent's motion, and after considering counsels' arguments,

the court denied the motion in all respects.

		At respondent's July 2001 trial, Jacqueline Buck, a

clinical psychologist and special evaluator for the Department of

Corrections (DOC), testified that she had reviewed respondent's

DOC master file, which contained all of the court records related

to respondent, including the sentencing order, the presentence

investigation reports, psychiatric and psychological evaluations,

DOC records, and his criminal history.

		Buck's review of respondent's master file showed that

when respondent was five or six years old, his mother reported to

the police that he had been sexually abused by a 16-year-old boy. 

He had also been abused by his sister when he was an infant. 

When respondent was five years old, he was found maneuvering in a sexual way on top of a four-year-old girl.  Both children were

clothed.  When he was seven years old, respondent was found on

top of a little girl, rubbing his exposed penis against her. 

Around that same time, respondent entered foster care and was

subsequently placed in several different homes due to his having

difficulty with other children.  	

		When respondent was 12 years old, it was reported that

he had sexually molested two 5-year-old boys in a foster home. 

Buck acknowledged that she received this information in a tele

phone conversation with the Adams County State's Attorney, not

from any documents in respondent's master file.  However, she

stated she had no reason to disbelieve the report, and respondent

was removed from the foster home where the incident allegedly

occurred.  

		When respondent was 13 years old, he took a 15-year-old

girl who had some "intellectual deficits" into a stairwell and

"performed sexual acts."  Buck found it clear from the police

report that the girl did not understand what respondent was doing

to her. 

		When respondent was 14 years old, he took a 13-year-old

girl (who respondent had referred to as his "girlfriend") into

the bathroom at his foster home and "made her disrobe."  He also

undressed, and fondled the girl's breasts and attempted vaginal

and anal intercourse.  He then demanded that she perform oral sex

on him, and he ejaculated on the bathroom wall.  The girl was

crying during the oral sex.  As a result of this incident, respondent was adjudicated delinquent for aggravated criminal

sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16 (West 1998)).  Respondent was

committed to DOC juvenile division.  

		Respondent was also charged with aggravated criminal

sexual abuse of a 12-year-old boy who was mentally and physically

disabled and a member of respondent's foster household.  The

report indicated that respondent fondled the boy's penis in a

bedroom while another boy stood guard outside the door.  The

charge was dropped when respondent pleaded guilty to some other

pending charges.  

		Respondent's master file also contained an April 1992

juvenile DOC disciplinary report, which stated that respondent

had pressured another boy for a sexual favor and had threatened

to split the boy's head open.

		Buck interviewed respondent in October 1999.  Based on

the interview and her review of respondent's master file and

other information, Buck diagnosed respondent with paraphilia not

otherwise specified (paraphilia NOS), sexually attracted to

nonconsenting persons (nonexclusive type).  Her diagnosis was

based on the evidence that beginning at age 12, respondent

established a pattern of victimizing "younger people or people

mentally retarded or disabled in some way."    

		She also diagnosed respondent with "polysubstance

dependencies without physiological dependency and in a controlled

environment," based on the evidence of respondent's long history

of substance abuse.  She further explained that substance abuse was a factor in determining respondent's probability of re-

offending with additional acts of sexual violence because sub

stance abuse contributes to a loss of ability to control sexual

urges.  Respondent had not participated in any substance-abuse

treatment.  

		Buck also diagnosed respondent with antisocial person

ality disorder.  Seven criteria exist for that diagnosis, and the

presence of any three warrants the diagnosis.  Respondent satis

fied all seven criteria.  Buck described antisocial personality

disorder as "a pervasive disregard for and violation of the

rights of others."  The diagnosis is relevant to respondent's

probability of reoffending because a person with this disorder

lacks empathy or concern for other people.  Buck described

respondent as good at charming people to get what he wants, and

respondent described himself as being "devoid of feelings."  Buck

further explained that "by being cut off from his feelings he is

able to inflict a lot of harm on other people and not feel any

remorse or shame or sorrow for that."  

		Buck used "several" actuarial risk-assessment instru

ments to assess respondent's probability of reoffending, and she

concluded that his risk was "extremely high."  (The record shows

that Buck administered the following instruments:  (1) the

Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised; and (2) the

Violence Risk Assessment Guide.)  She subsequently administered

the "Sex Offender Risk Assessment Guide," on which respondent

scored in the 99th percentile.  This score placed respondent in the category of offenders with a 100% probability of reoffending

within 7 or 10 years.  Buck also administered a personality

inventory (the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised) in evaluating

respondent.

		Respondent's master file showed that he refused sex-

offender treatment on three different occasions while at DOC. 

Respondent told Buck that he did not need treatment.  He said

that all he needed to do was "grow up" and he had done that. 

Buck acknowledged that documents in the master file indicated

that respondent successfully completed a sex-offender education

program and sex-offender treatment at the Illinois Youth Center

in Joliet.  However, in her interview with respondent, he did not

admit that he had participated in treatment and would not tell

Buck anything he had learned in any sex-offender program. 

		Buck opined that should respondent be released to the

community, it was substantially probable that he would reoffend

with additional acts of sexual violence due to his untreated

diagnoses of paraphilia NOS, sexually attracted to nonconsenting

persons (nonexclusive type), polysubstance dependency, and

antisocial personality disorder.

		Robin Weaver testified that on November 21, 2000, she

was employed as a DHS security therapy aide.  On that date, she

and another staff member were transporting respondent, who was in

restraints, to the Adams County courthouse.  While walking

respondent to the van, he became agitated and resisted getting

into the van.  Once he was inside the van, he laid down on his back and began kicking the interior of the van.  After about 10

minutes, respondent calmed down and Weaver and her colleague

entered the front compartment of the van.  However, before they

drove off, Weaver's colleague left the van to take a telephone

call.  At that point, respondent said to Weaver, in a low tone,

"'You think you are better than me, don't you.  You are all high

and mighty looking down on me. ***  Well, bitch.  You are not any

better than me.'"  Weaver told him to be quiet.  Respondent then

said, "'You think you are tough, don't you? *** Well, that tin

badge don't make you tough, bitch.  You are not tough.  You are

just full of cellulite.'"  Respondent's last remarks to Weaver

were, "'I will throw you down and stick my pipe in you.  We will

see how tough you are then.  We will see then how tough you are

when I do this'"; and "'Well, hell, you can't even control me

with these handcuffs on.  How are you going to do it when they

are off?'"  Weaver stated that she was terrified by respondent

when he said these things.

		Phil Reidda, a clinical psychologist, testified that he

had been appointed by the Adams County circuit court to evaluate

respondent.  He reviewed respondent's DOC master file, adminis

tered psychological tests, and conducted a clinical interview,

which lasted approximately 3 1/2 hours.  

		Reidda administered the following tests to respondent: 

(1) the Gamma General Mental Ability Test, which is a cursory

evaluation of intelligence; (2) the Millon Multiaxial Personality

Inventory Assessment, which generates a personality profile; and (3) the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.  Respon

dent's score on the Gamma Test was "a little high average."  The

results of the Millon Assessment indicated that respondent had

antisocial personality disorder, and the results of the Minnesota

Multiphasic Personality Inventory underscored the conclusions of

the Millon Assessment.  The personality tests indicated that

respondent was defiant, had conflict with authority, and had

problems with his self-image.  Reidda also noted that an August

1998 mental health evaluation performed by Dr. Alton Angus at the

Lincoln Correctional Center indicated that respondent had an

antisocial personality disorder.

		Reidda stated that respondent's sexually aggressive

behavior began when he was only five or six years old and that

the reports "escalated" as time passed and became "stronger" as

respondent matured.  Reidda opined that the early onset of

respondent's sexual acting out was significant because it is "one

of the high risk indicators."  In addition to the incidents

testified to by Buck, Reidda noted that in 1996, respondent began

having sexual relations with K.H., a 13-year-old girl, for which

he was sentenced to DOC.

		In addition to respondent's history as a sex offender,

Reidda also considered that respondent had been a victim of

sexual abuse during his childhood.  

		Reidda's review of respondent's criminal history

unrelated to sexual assault showed that respondent had only once

successfully completed a term of probation or parole.  This was significant to Reidda because it indicated how difficult it was

for respondent to "manage at the community level."  In addition,

respondent told Reidda that he was a gang member.  This was

relevant to Reidda's evaluation because it showed that respondent

identified with a group of people who hold "procriminal values"

and are associated with violence.  

		Reidda also noted that respondent was consistently

recommended for sex-offender treatment, and as an adult, he did

not take advantage of any treatment opportunities.  Reidda

further noted that the sex-offender education program in which

respondent participated while he was in DOC juvenile division did

not have a significant impact on respondent.  He did not partici

pate in follow-up programs and reoffended after participating in

that program.  

		The master file also showed that when respondent was 13

years old, his family participated in family counseling.  The

counselor's notes showed that respondent's sister stated that

respondent had been "patting her on the butt and making sexual

advances," and she was afraid of him.  The counselor also noted

that progress toward treatment goals was minimal because of the

severity of the problems and respondent's "lack of real motiva

tion."  Reidda found this report significant because it showed

(1) respondent's inability to respect boundaries; (2) his prob

lems were "chronic"; and (3) he had never been in a situation

where he was held to treatment.  A report dated four months later

indicated that respondent remained resistant to dealing with anything other than superficial issues and would not address

family and sexual issues.  The counselor thought the prognosis

was very poor.  Reidda opined that respondent remained at this

stage.  

		Reidda also cited an April 1991 evaluation by Dr.

Robert Thorud, when respondent was in DOC juvenile division. 

Thorud opined that when placed in stressful situations, respon

dent would "act out sexually."

		Reidda further testified that the documents relating to

respondent's mental health strongly supported his view of respon

dent's risk of reoffending because the documents consistently

discuss the degree of respondent's pathology, lack of motivation,

and the need for clinical intervention.  

		In addition, respondent's record showed that he had

over 30 disciplinary infractions while at DOC.  Most of respon

dent's disciplinary reports had to do with either rule violations

or challenges to authority.  This indicated to Reidda that

respondent had trouble with authority and difficulty managing his

behavior, even in a controlled setting.  Reidda found the inci

dent with Weaver to be particularly significant because respon

dent's comments to Weaver support the conclusion that respondent

cannot control himself.

		After respondent was released from parole in 1995, he

committed criminal offenses, including possession of drug para

phernalia, criminal trespass, fighting, possession of liquor by a

minor, battery and aggravated battery, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse.  According to Reidda, respondent's record was

significant because it showed that his incarceration made no

significant impact on him and he still had no control over his

aggressive impulses.   

		Reidda diagnosed respondent with (1) paraphilia NOS,

with a subdiagnosis of polysubstance dependency in a controlled

environment; and (2) antisocial personality disorder, severe,

with narcissistic traits.  Reidda described antisocial personal

ity disorder as follows:  

		"[i]n layman's terms it *** is someone who

has a disregard for the other people or their

property, someone who has trouble adhering to

rules, and while they understand the letter

of the law, they cannot seem to concern them

selves about it.  Generally, *** when we see

antisocial personality characters, generally

people think--people who are not trained--to

see them as somebody without a conscience."  

Reidda characterized respondent's disorder as "severe" because of

its chronicity and intensity, and respondent's refusal to partic

ipate in any kind of treatment.  

		Reidda used two actuarial risk-assessment instruments

in evaluating respondent: the Static-99 and the Minnesota Screen

ing Tool-Revised.  The results of the Static-99 placed respondent

in the category of very high risk of committing future acts of

sexual violence.  The Minnesota Screening Tool-Revised also placed respondent in a very-high-risk category.  The results of

the two actuarial instruments were consistent with Reidda's

clinical opinion.  According to Reidda, this consistency under

scored the validity of his assessment.  Reidda opined that a

substantial probability exists that respondent would commit

future acts of sexual violence.  Reidda further stated that his

opinion regarding respondent's likelihood of reoffending would be

the same even if he excluded from consideration the unverified

report regarding the two five-year-old boys.

		Terry Brelje, a licensed clinical psychologist, testi

fied on respondent's behalf that he conducted a two-hour inter

view with respondent and reviewed approximately 170 pages of

background material.  He concluded that respondent did not meet

the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person under

the Act.  At the time of his interview, Brelje did not believe

that respondent was experiencing any mental disorder.  He ruled

out antisocial personality disorder because that disorder re

quires that the person had a conduct disorder before 15 years of

age.  Brelje had reviewed a psychiatric evaluation of respondent

that was conducted when he was 15 years old, and the diagnosis

did not include a conduct disorder.  An antisocial personality

disorder diagnosis also requires that the personality disorder be

continuing into adulthood.  Brelje did not believe sufficient

evidence existed that respondent exhibited repetitive and contin

uing behavior consistent with a diagnosis of antisocial personal

ity disorder.  

		Brelje further concluded that respondent did not meet

the diagnosis for paraphilia.  He saw no evidence of "inappropri

ate sexual arousal" or arousal to nonconsenting partners, and

stated that "you can't use sexual behavior as a child or an

adolescent to justify a diagnosis of paraphilia."  The only

"nonconsenting" behavior in respondent's adulthood was with K.H.,

a 13-year-old girl, who was nonconsenting only in that she was

below the legal age of consent.  Brelje acknowledged that respon

dent had a history of depression and substance abuse.  

		Brelje also acknowledged that he uses actuarial risk-

assessment instruments, but he stated that it was not appropriate

to use incidents which occurred before a person reached the age

of 18 in applying those instruments.  Brelje opined that the

results of such tests are not valid when based on information

from juvenile years because the tests were not designed to make

assessments based on juvenile conduct.  Brelje concluded that

respondent did not have a substantial probability of reoffending

sexually.  

		Carmella Stevens testified that in 1995, after dating

respondent for three or four months, she and respondent married. 

Shortly after they married, Stevens became pregnant.  At the time

of respondent's trial, they were still married but had been

separated since a few weeks after their nuptials.  Respondent was

loving toward their child, was never abusive toward her, and

never forced her to have sex.  

		K.H. testified that she dated respondent when she was 13 years old.  She later learned that before they started dating,

respondent had been having sexual intercourse with her mother. 

K.H. and respondent had sexual intercourse, but respondent never

tried to force her to have intercourse.  She had had sexual

intercourse with one person before respondent.  Respondent never

struck her or physically abused her and she chose to have sex

with him.  K.H. further testified that she fell in love with

respondent when she was 13 and loved him even more now.  She

would do anything to help him. 

		Based on the evidence presented, the jury found that

respondent was a sexually violent person.  The trial court later

ordered him committed to DHS for institutional care in a secure

setting.  This appeal followed.

	II. ANALYSIS

	A. The Trial Court's Denial of Respondent's 

Motion for a Frye Hearing

		Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by

denying his motion for a Frye evidentiary hearing to determine whether to admit evidence regarding actuarial instruments used by

Buck and Reidda in assessing respondent's risk of reoffending. 

We disagree.

1. Applicability of the Frye Standard to Actuarial 

Risk-Assessment Instruments

a. Scientific Principle, Method, or Test

		In In re Detention of Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d 350, 364, 800 N.E.2d 137, 149 (2003), this court recently held that actuar

ial risk-assessment instruments of the sort used in this     case--namely, the Minnesota Screening Tool-Revised, the Static-

99, and the Violence Risk Assessment Guide--do not purport to

involve a scientific principle, method, or test to which Frye applies.  In so holding, we stated, in pertinent part, as fol

lows:  

		"Actuarial risk-assessment instruments, like

those used in this case, were developed by

observing those sex offenders who reoffend to

determine which 'risk factors' they have in

common.  See In re Detention of Isbell, 333 Ill. App. 3d 906, 911, 916, 777 N.E.2d 994,

997-98, 1002 (2002) (by observing what a

large number of reoffenders have had in com

mon, one can compile a list of risk factors). 

One can then calculate the relative frequency

with which sex offenders with those risk

factors have reoffended and thus assess the

probability that other sex offenders with the

same risk factors will reoffend.  Isbell, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 916, 777 N.E.2d at 1002.  The

actuarial instruments merely help the profes

sional draw inferences from historical data

or the collective experience of other profes

sionals who have assessed sex offenders for

risks of reoffending.  In this regard, the

instruments are akin to actuarial tables for life expectancy admitted as evidence to a

jury for the determination of the gross

amount awarded for future pain and suffering

or used by an economic expert to determine

the present cash value of a pension.  Such

instruments simply do not constitute a

special scientific principle, method, or test

to which Frye applies."  Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 364-65, 800 N.E.2d at 149. 

We adhere to our holding in Erbe and thus reject respondent's contention that Frye applies in this case.  

			b. Novelty

		Even assuming that the sort of actuarial instruments

used by Buck and Reidda involve a scientific principle, method,

or test, those instruments do not involve the kind of "new" or

"novel" scientific principle, method, or technique to which Frye applies.  Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 365, 800 N.E.2d at 150.  As we stated in Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 366, 800 N.E.2d at 150, "Our society uses actuarial methods to predict human behavior all

the time (for example, in liability insurance and economics).  In

addition, actuarial instruments similar to the ones used in this

case have long been used in predicting recidivism by released

prisoners."

	2. General Acceptance of Actuarial Risk-Assessment Instruments

		Even assuming that the Frye standard applies, we agree with the trial court that the use of actuarial risk-assessment instruments is generally accepted by professionals who assess sex

offenders for risk of reoffending.

		In Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 369, 800 N.E.2d at 153, this court held that "the use of actuarial risk-assessment

instruments is sufficiently established to have gained general

acceptance by professionals who assess sex offenders for risks of

reoffending."  In so holding, we thoroughly examined every

reported decision in the United States that addressed the

admissibility of evidence regarding actuarial risk-assessment

instruments in a sexually-violent-persons proceeding and found

the decisions allowing evidence regarding such instruments to be

more persuasive (see for example In re Commitment of R.S., 339 N.J. Super. 507, 540-41, 773 A.2d 72, 92 (2001), aff'd 173 N.J. 134, 801 A.2d 219 (2002) (in which the New Jersey appellate court

held that the use of actuarial instruments was generally accepted

by professionals who assess sex offenders for risks of

reoffending); In re Detention of Strauss, 106 Wash. App. 1, 8, 20 P.3d 1022, 1025 (2001) (in which the Washington appellate court

held that actuarial instruments were generally accepted within

the relevant scientific community)).  Erbe, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 369-70, 800 N.E.2d at 152.  We adhere to our holding in Erbe and thus conclude that the trial court did not err by denying

respondent's motion for a Frye hearing.

		3. Harmless Error

		Even accepting respondent's contention that the trial

court erred by failing to conduct a Frye hearing, we conclude that any error was harmless because the evidence presented at

respondent's trial established that the actuarial risk-assessment

instruments at issue are generally accepted by professionals who

assess sex offenders for risks of reoffending.  In particular,

Reidda testified that such actuarial instruments are generally

accepted and are the "best tools" that professionals have to

assess sex offenders' risks of reoffending.  Indeed, Brelje

acknowledged that a "large percentage" of professionals who

evaluate sex offenders, including Brelje himself, use actuarial

instruments in assessing the risks of reoffending.  He also

acknowledged that (1) actuarial instruments "add to the overall

batch of stuff that [professionals] look at" in assessing the

risks of reoffending; and (2) risk-assessment predictions that

are based on actuarial instruments are "slightly more" accurate

than predictions that are based solely on a clinician's

professional judgment.  Brelje further acknowledged that the

actuarial instruments utilized by Buck and Reidda were

appropriate to administer to respondent based on his adult

behavior.  

		As a final matter, we note that traditional methods,

such as cross-examination and rebuttal witnesses, offered

respondent the opportunity to challenge Buck's and Reidda's

opinions in the proper forum--that is, during trial in front of

the jury.  As the Supreme Court stated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma- ceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 484, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993), "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the

burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of

attacking shaky but admissible evidence."  See also Halleck v. Coastal Building Maintenance Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 887, 897, 647 N.E.2d 618, 627 (1995) (on cross-examination, counsel may probe

the weaknesses in the bases of an expert's opinion as well as the

general soundness of his opinion).  

		The record shows that respondent conducted a vigorous

cross-examination of Buck and Reidda.  In addition, Brelje

testified regarding the predictive value of actuarial risk-

assessment instruments, how professionals may misuse actuarial

instruments, and when it is appropriate to use such instruments

to assess the risks of reoffending. 		

	B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

		Last, respondent argues that the jury's finding that he

was a sexually violent person was contrary to the manifest weight

of the evidence.  Specifically, he contends that the evidence was

insufficient because (1) the State failed to prove that he lacked

the ability to control his sexually dangerous behavior; (2) the

evidence did not support Buck's and Reidda's diagnoses of

paraphilia; and (3) the evidence did not establish a connection

between his mental disorder and his probability of reoffending. 

We disagree.

		Section 5(f) of the Act defines a sexually violent

person as an individual who has "been convicted of a sexually

violent offense, *** and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially

probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence." 

725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2000).  The State must prove the

allegations of its petition beyond a reasonable doubt.  725 ILCS

207/35(d)(1) (West 2000).  On review, we ask only whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

any rational trier of fact could find the elements proved beyond

a reasonable doubt.  In re Detention of Tittlebach, 324 Ill. App. 3d 6, 11, 754 N.E.2d 484, 488 (2001).  

	1. Proof of Respondent's Difficulty Controlling His Behavior

		Respondent contends that (1) Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002), requires a

separate lack-of-control determination couched in terms of

"serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior"; and

(2) the State failed to prove this element.  We disagree.

		In Crane, the United States Supreme Court interpreted Kansas's Secuxually Violent Predator Act (Kan. Stat. Ann. §59-29a01

et seq. (1994)), the same act it held constitutional in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).  The Crane cCourt reversed the Kansas Supreme Court's holding that pursuant to Hendricks, the State must prove that the respondent had a total or complete lack of control over his

dangerous behavior.  Specifically, the Court held that the Kansas

Supreme Court's decision was based on an overly restrictive

interpretation of Hendricks.  Crane, 534 U.S. at 411-12___, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 861-62, 122 S. Ct. at 870.  Although evidence of a complete lack of control is not required, a commitment would not

be constitutional if no volitional impairment showing were made. 

Crane, 534 U.S. at 412___, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 862, 122 S. Ct. at 870.   		We first note that the Act contains a volitional

component in (1) its definition of "mental disorder" as "a

congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or

volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts

of sexual violence" (725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 2000)); and (2) its

required finding that it is "substantially probable" that the

respondent will engage in proscribed sexual conduct in the

future.  People v. Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d 305, 319, 798 N.E.2d 735, 743 (2003).  In In re Detention of Varner, 207 Ill. 2d 425, 432, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___  (2003), our supreme court held that Crane "did not hold that the [c]onstitution requires a specific determination by the fact

finder in every case that a person lacks volitional control ***." 

The court further concluded that the Act "contain[s] definitions

that supply the constitutionally required elements for civil

commitment," and "[a] fact finder properly instructed with

definitions of these and other pertinent statutory terms need not

receive additional separate instruction on lack of control." 

Varner, 207 Ill. 2d at 432-33, ___ N.E.2d at ___.

		Respondent asserts that the State's evidence of his

lack of volitional control consisted of Buck's and Reidda's

diagnosies of paraphilia, coupled with their assessments of his

risk of reoffending based on the actuarial instruments.  However,

the record shows that Buck and Reidda testified that respondent's inability to control his dangerous conduct resulted from (1) his

antisocial personality disorder; (2) his substance abuse; and (3)

his failure to get treatment for his paraphilia and other mental

disorders.  Respondent's inability to control his dangerous

behavior was further evinced by Weaver's testimony regarding

respondent's conduct toward her.  We conclude that this evidence

sufficiently supports the jury's finding that respondent lacked

volitional control over his dangerous conduct beyond a reasonable

doubt.  

	2. Sufficiency of the Evidence To Support 

a Diagnosis of Paraphilia

		Respondent next contends that the evidence does not

support Buck's and Reidda's diagnosies of paraphilia because (1)

paraphilia requires that the person be at least 16 years old; and

(2) respondent committed only one offense after the age of 16. 

We disagree.  

		In this case, the evidence showed that at the age of

19, respondent was involved in a five-month sexual relationship

with K.H., a 13-year-old girl.  The fact that respondent was

convicted of only one crime related to that conduct does not bar

Buck from considering, for the purpose of psychological

diagnosis, that respondent had repeatedly engaged in sexual acts

with K.H., a girl too young to provide meaningful consent.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Respondent's 

Engaging in Future Acts of Sexual Violence

		Last, respondent contends that the evidence did not

show that because of his mental disorder a substantial probability existed that he would engage in future acts of sexual

violence.  We disagree. 

		Contrary to respondent's assertion that "there was no

testimony in which the experts linked their conclusion that

[respondent] was substantially probable to commit future acts of

sexual violence with a mental disorder," the record shows that

the State's witnesses did just that.  Both Buck and Reidda

testified that respondent's mental disorders, including his

paraphilia, antisocial personality disorder, and substance

dependency, caused him to be more likely to reoffend.  We

conclude that their testimony sufficiently supports the jury's

finding that respondent's mental disorders make it substantially

probable that he would engage in future acts of sexual violence.

					III. CONCLUSION

		For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's

judgment.

		Affirmed.

		TURNER and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.