1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 120,334

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

LINUS BAKER,

Appellant,

v.

CALVIN HAYDEN, et al., and KATHERINE STOCKS, in Her Capacity

as Official Custodian of Records for the Tenth Judicial District,

Appellees.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Johnson District Court; ROBERT W. FAIRCHILD, judge. Opinion filed March 20, 

2020. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Linus Baker, appellant pro se. 

Kirk T. Ridgway and Brett T. Runyon, of Ferree, Bunn, Rundberg & Ridgway, Chtd., of Overland 

Park, for appellees.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., HILL and BUSER, JJ.

ATCHESON, J.: In this civil action, Plaintiff Linus Baker appeals the summary 

judgment the Johnson County District Court entered against him on claims that law 

enforcement officers with the Johnson County Sheriff's Department violated his 

constitutional rights and committed common-law torts against him and that a 

representative of the sheriff's department later failed to comply with the Kansas Open 

Records Act in responding to a request for documents concerning the circumstances 

giving rise to those claims. We find Baker has failed to present colorable evidence 

supporting actionable constitutional or tort injuries and affirm that part of the district 
2

court's decision. We find the district court impermissibly granted summary judgment on 

Baker's open records requests and remand for further proceedings on them.

After outlining the standards for granting and reviewing summary judgment, we 

take up Baker's claims based on the alleged constitutional and common-law torts and then 

consider the open records dispute. 

Summary Judgment Standards

The standards governing summary judgment guide how we consider competing 

versions of the relevant facts. The defendants, as the parties seeking summary judgment,

had the obligation to show the district court, based on appropriate evidentiary materials, 

there were no disputed issues of material fact and judgment could, therefore, be entered 

in their favor as a matter of law. Trear v. Chamberlain, 308 Kan. 932, 935, 425 P.3d 297 

(2018); Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver, 289 Kan. 891, 900, 220 P.3d 

333 (2009). In essence, they argued there was nothing for a jury or a district court judge 

sitting as fact-finder to decide that would make any difference. In opposing summary 

judgment, Baker had to cite record evidence calling into question a material factual 

representation defendants made in support of their motion. See Trear, 308 Kan. at 935-

36; Shamberg, 289 Kan. at 900. When a party has identified disputed material facts, the 

motion should be denied in favor of a trial to permit a judge or jury to resolve those

disputes after hearing witnesses testify in court and reviewing any relevant documentary 

evidence.

In addressing a request for summary judgment, the district court must view the 

evidence most favorably to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit 

of every reasonable inference that might be drawn from the evidentiary record. Trear, 

308 Kan. at 935; Shamberg, 289 Kan. at 900. An appellate court applies the same 

standards in reviewing the entry of a summary judgment. Because a summary judgment 

presents a question of law—it entails the application of legal principles to uncontroverted 
3

facts—an appellate court owes no deference to the district court's decision to grant the 

motion, and review is unlimited. See Adams v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 289 

Kan. 577, 584, 214 P.3d 1173 (2009).

Baker's Constitutional and Common-law Claims

A. Factual Circumstances

Baker's constitutional and common-law tort claims stem from efforts of Johnson 

County Sheriff's officers to serve a petition for protection from abuse and a related 

temporary order. On September 1, 2015, Ryan McCormick, then Baker's son-in-law, filed 

a petition for protection from abuse in Wyandotte County District Court against his wife

(and Baker's daughter) Maggie and immediately obtained a temporary order from that 

district court. The order generally identifies Maggie and gives her residential address as 

Baker's home in Stilwell. The order requires Maggie to stay away from Ryan and to 

refrain from contacting or communicating with him. In addition, the order grants Ryan 

"[t]emporary legal custody and residency" of S.F.M., his and Maggie's 10-month-old son, 

at least in advance of a hearing set in Wyandotte County District Court about two weeks 

later. The order neither indicates S.F.M.'s presumed whereabouts nor expressly directs 

Maggie to relinquish physical custody of the child. And the order contains no identifying 

information about S.F.M. apart from his name.

The day after obtaining the temporary order, Ryan contacted the Johnson County 

Sheriff's Department for assistance in serving the petition and order on Maggie and for a 

"stand-by" presence so he could return some personal property to her. Ryan and his 

mother initially met with Deputy Travis Turner shortly after 6 p.m. Turner was uncertain 

about the scope of his duties and authority in serving the order, particularly with respect 

to S.F.M. After speaking with two colleagues, Turner drove to Baker's home, followed by 

Ryan and his mother. Lieutenant Thomas Reddin and Sergeant Christopher Mills also 

arrived at the residence.
4

The three officers, all in uniform, walked up the driveway, where Baker met them. 

Turner explained they had an order to take custody of S.F.M. and deliver him to his 

father. Baker told the officers to leave. There was some more verbal back-and-forth. 

Baker again directed the officers to get off his property—a direction they informed him 

they would decline, prompting him to suggest they needed a search warrant. As Baker 

walked up the driveway toward the house, Mills saw C.B., Baker's three-year-old 

granddaughter. Mills crouched down and asked C.B. if she were S.F.M. The child 

seemed to nod reticently. Mills then picked up C.B. and began walking down the 

driveway toward Ryan's car. Baker turned around. As he approached Mills, Turner 

shouted, "Hey" as an admonition to stop. At the same time, Reddin moved between 

Baker and Mills. Reddin held up his hand and momentarily placed his hand on Baker's 

arm. Baker hesitated briefly and then marched down the driveway shouting for the 

officers to leave and telling them that C.B. was not S.F.M. C.B. appeared to be crying. 

Baker continued to demand the officers return C.B. and leave his property. When 

Ryan saw C.B., he informed Mills that the child was not S.F.M. Mills immediately 

returned to the mouth of the driveway, where he met Baker and relinquished a visibly 

upset C.B. Mills had physical custody of C.B. for between 30 and 45 seconds. Baker 

again told the officers to leave and got into another verbal back-and-forth with Mills 

about who was out of line. Baker picked up C.B. and walked into the house through the 

open garage. 

Mills called a sheriff's lieutenant who handled civil process to determine what they 

should do next. The lieutenant advised them to try calling Maggie and if they got no 

response to leave the premises. The officers then spoke with Ryan and attempted to call 

Maggie with no success. Ryan, his mother, and the officers then left. In all, the officers 

were at Baker's house for about 10 minutes. The verbal jousting between Baker and the 

three officers was conducted with stern and sometimes raised voices all the way around, 

punctuated with some literal finger pointing. 
5

The next day, Johnson County Sheriff's Deputy Brian Deer, Deputy Carl Alvano, 

and Deputy Blake Randel went to Baker's home to serve the temporary order on Maggie. 

They went up the driveway. As one officer knocked on the door and rang the bell, a 

second officer looked into the garage and through several windows into the residence. 

The last officer stood in the driveway and briefly approached the open garage. He and the 

first officer then walked to the side of the garage where they could look into the 

backyard. No one answered the door or otherwise communicated with the officers. 

As the officers were leaving, a car pulled into the driveway. The officers 

approached, and the driver identified himself as Baker's son. He told the officers he did 

not know if Maggie was living there. A passenger in the car stated that Baker had 

instructed them not to talk to the officers. Baker's son then backed his car out and drove 

away. The officers immediately left the area. They had been at Baker's house less than 10 

minutes.

B. Legal Analysis

Baker sued Turner, Mills, and Reddin for their conduct at his residence on 

September 2 and Deer, Alvano, and Randel for their conduct on September 3. Baker's 

petition tends to meander to no good effect—it contains 275 paragraphs covering 52 

pages and is anything but a "short and plain statement" of the claims and requested relief 

as contemplated in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-208(a)(1). The parties undertook what appears 

to be extensive discovery. And the summary judgment papers are lengthy. The district 

court ultimately granted summary judgment to all six officers on all of Baker's claims 

against them.

The district court wound up addressing the issues in four memorandum decisions 

serially filed between March and November 2018, as the parties presented competing 
6

motions for reconsideration. The district court modified its analysis of some of the points 

over the course of those rulings.

Baker's appellate brief shares certain compositional attributes with his petition. 

The brief is long on rhetoric about the dangers of government overreach and an incipient 

police state but considerably shorter on focused arguments tied to precise claims and 

supporting legal authority. We break out each claim Baker asserted in the district court 

and continues to press on appeal and explain why we affirm summary judgment on that 

claim.

• Baker claimed a violation of his right to be free of unreasonable government 

searches and seizures as protected in the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. He contends the conduct of the officers appearing the evening of September 

2 and the officers coming back the next day interfered with a constitutionally protected 

privacy interest in the residence. 

The Fourth Amendment protects an expectation of privacy in one's home and its 

curtilage. See Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 

(2018). Although the Fourth Amendment applies most robustly to dwellings, even there 

the constitutional shield is not absolute and yields to reasonable government intrusions. 

See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013) ("At 

the Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 

there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.'") (quoting Silverman v. United 

States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 [1961]); Kyllo v. United States, 

533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (Fourth Amendment protects 

"an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept as reasonable" and is 

particularly exacting with respect to "the interior of homes"). Government agents, 

including law enforcement officers, may enter residential property in the same way a 

private citizen could (typically by going up a driveway or front walk) to knock on the 

front door and speak to whoever answers—all without transgressing the Fourth 
7

Amendment. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469-70, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 179 L. Ed. 2d 

865 (2011); State v. Campbell, 297 Kan. 273, Syl. ¶ 5, 300 P.3d 72 (2013).

In addition, the officers here had a limited license or privilege to enter Baker's 

property to serve Maggie with the petition for protection from abuse and to execute the 

temporary order from the Wyandotte County District Court. As provided in K.S.A. 2019 

Supp. 60-3104(d), the petition required "personal service" on Maggie, meaning it had to 

be presented directly to her and could not simply be left with another adult with whom 

she resided. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-303(d)(1)(A); see In re J.A., 30 Kan. App. 2d 416, 

Syl. ¶ 4, 42 P.3d 215 (2002). The order provided Baker's address as the place Maggie 

could be found. Although the order was legally effective when the Wyandotte County 

District Court signed and filed it and law enforcement officers could then enforce the 

order's terms by, for example, removing Maggie from the family residence, Maggie 

would not have been subject to specific sanctions, such as contempt or criminal 

prosecution, for violating the order unless she had received actual notice of its terms. See 

K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5924(a)(1) (criminalizing knowing violation of protection from 

abuse order); Ensch v. Ensch, 157 Kan. 107, 115-16, 138 P.2d 491 (1943) (party may not 

be held in contempt of order that fails to define with particularity what is to be done or 

what is forbidden); 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Domestic Abuse and Violence § 55. The officers, 

therefore, had a legitimate reason to deliver the petition and order to her personally.

Instructive here, the Kansas Supreme Court has recognized and relied on the 

principles governing privilege attaching to the service of civil process outlined in the 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 208 (1965). State v. Reno, 260 Kan. 117, 127-28, 918 

P.2d 1235 (1996). The Kansas appellate courts often turn to the Restatement (Second) of 

Torts as a sound source of legal doctrine. See Williams v. C-U-Out Bail Bonds, 310 Kan. 

775, 789-91, 450 P.3d 330, 340-42 (2019) (citing and noting past reliance on 

Restatement); McElhaney v. Thomas, 307 Kan. 45, 55, 405 P.3d 1214 (2017) 

("adopt[ing] . . . as our own" Restatement principles outlining requisite mental state for 

intentional torts). 
8

The privilege defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 208 permits a person to 

enter the land of another to execute valid or facially legitimate civil process on an 

occupant of the land but prohibits a forcible entry of a dwelling to do so. In the 

commentary to that section, the Restatement authors point out that the manner of 

execution must be reasonable—so coming on the property in the dark of night or with a 

swarm of agents would not be privileged. And a person making a privileged entry may be 

liable for his or her independently tortious conduct once there. Restatement (Second) of 

Torts § 208, comment b (citing Restatement [Second] of Torts § 214); comment c. 

The Kansas appellate courts have not discussed a cognate privilege recognized in 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 210 pertaining to the service of a court order. The 

privilege is roughly comparable to the one for service of process but permits the forcible 

entry of buildings if reasonably necessary to effect the court order.

To resolve this case, we need not and do not attempt to sketch the outer limits of 

the common-law privilege in Kansas attaching to the service of civil process or the 

execution of civil orders. Nor do we consider whether the privileges might have different

contours for commissioned law enforcement officers acting under the color of state law, 

on the one hand, and for private process servers, on the other. 

Taking the evidence in the best light for Baker, the Johnson County Sheriff's 

officers acted within the boundaries of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 208 on both 

September 2 and September 3. In each instance, the officers had valid civil process and a 

court order directed at Maggie, and they had good reason to believe she resided at Baker's 

home. They entered the property to serve the petition and to execute the order and 

accomplished their entry during what would be considered appropriate hours without 

some overt display of weaponry or martial force. In neither instance did the officers 

attempt to enter Baker's house, forcibly or otherwise. And they did not come on the 

property by scaling a privacy fence or forcing their way through a locked gate. 
9

Baker's oral directives on September 2 that the officers leave the property did not 

undo the privilege recognized in Reno and outlined in Restatement (Second) of Torts 

§ 208. The officers were permitted to attempt service of the petition and order on Maggie 

at least by going to the front door and trying to summon her. On neither day did the 

officers linger excessively on Baker's property. Camping out on private property, 

especially in the face of a directive to leave, presumably would lose any common-law 

privilege after a "reasonable" time. 

When the officers confronted Baker, they stated their purpose as executing an 

order to deliver S.F.M. to his father. They did not mention serving Maggie with any legal 

papers. Mills, then, picked up C.B. and briefly removed her to the end of the driveway, 

presumably effecting a Fourth Amendment seizure of her. Those circumstances, 

however, do not negate the officers' privilege to enter and remain on the property to serve 

process and execute the order. As we discuss, the officers did not violate Baker's Fourth 

Amendment rights.

To the extent the officers' conduct in entering and remaining on Baker's property 

was privileged consistent with Reno and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 208, it was 

likewise reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and did not amount to a breach of 

Baker's privacy rights encompassed within the Fourth Amendment. The courts have 

recognized that government agents typically do not violate the Fourth Amendment if they 

intrude on or seize private property in a reasonable manner to effect service of civil 

process or the execution of civil orders. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 71, 113 

S. Ct. 538, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992) (If officers were repossessing or attaching property 

"pursuant to a court order . . . a showing of unreasonableness [under the Fourth 

Amendment] would be a laborious task indeed."); Widgren v. Maple Grove Tp., 429 F.3d 

575, 580 (6th Cir. 2005) (no Fourth Amendment violation when municipal zoning 

inspector posted civil infraction notice on front door of house bypassing metal gate and 

no trespassing signs at mouth of driveway); United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 421 
10

(8th Cir. 2001) (no Fourth Amendment violation when officer entered backyard of 

residence in effort to serve civil process on person believed to be living there). 

In this case, Baker has brought a civil claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages 

resulting from the conduct of the sheriff's officers, as government agents acting under the 

color of state law, that allegedly violated his constitutional rights. In assessing a 

constitutional injury based on a Fourth Amendment violation, the courts look at the 

objective reasonableness of the government agents' conduct and not the subjective intent 

behind their actions. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-54, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L. 

Ed. 2d 537 (2004); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 184 n.5 (4th Cir. 

1996). That is, would the hypothetical reasonable law enforcement officer have done 

what the officers did? If so, there would be no constitutional injury, since the Fourth 

Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and concomitant invasions of 

privacy. The objective reasonableness inquiry to the exclusion of subjective motivation 

aims to secure consistency across cases, so officers may not escape liability for 

unreasonable actions undertaken with subjective good faith or honesty of purpose. 

Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153-54 (law enforcement officer's state of mind irrelevant to 

constitutional propriety of Fourth Amendment seizure; contrary rule would recognize or 

reject constitutional violations arising from indistinguishable external factual 

circumstances based solely on subjective intent).

So even if officers were motivated exclusively by an intent to take custody of 

S.F.M., their conduct with respect to Baker and his Fourth Amendment rights in entering 

and remaining on the property was consistent with a reasonable effort to serve process 

and the temporary order on Maggie. That objective reasonableness undercuts Baker's 

claim the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by exercising some impermissible 

dominion over his property, even though they left without any further effort to find and 

serve Maggie after mistakenly picking up C.B.
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The officers did not invade Baker's constitutionally protected privacy rights on 

September 2, since they remained on the driveway, an unrestricted area to which the 

public generally had access and likely would use to reach the front door to deliver 

packages, solicit charitable contributions, or borrow a cup of sugar. Similarly, the officers 

did not impermissibly deprive Baker of the use of his residence, especially given the 

brevity of their limited physical intrusion. 

The officers who appeared at Baker's residence the next day to serve the petition 

and order on Maggie did not exceed the reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment. They 

came to the front door, rang the bell or knocked, and briefly looked in a front window 

and the backyard when no one responded, despite the presence of motor vehicles in the 

driveway. But they did not attempt to enter the house, the garage, or the backyard. The 

officers remained only briefly, including the time they spent talking to Baker's son after 

he drove up. 

Even if we were mistaken in finding no Fourth Amendment violations and the 

officers actually made a constitutionally impermissible search or seizure of Baker's 

property, they would, nonetheless, be entitled to qualified immunity on the claim. The 

district court granted summary judgment to them on that basis. Qualified immunity is a 

judicially recognized doctrine affording government agents a limited protection against 

claims for damages resulting from alleged violations of the United States Constitution or 

other federal law. The immunity applies in § 1983 actions unless the government agents 

have violated "a federal statutory or constitutional right" and the wrongfulness of their 

conduct was "'clearly established at the time'" they acted. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 

583 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. 

Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 182 L. Ed. 2d 985 [2012]). As a matter of 

public policy, judicial recognition of qualified immunity ostensibly encourages 

government officials and employees to act vigorously in performing their duties free from 

a fear they will be heavily burdened by insubstantial or harassing civil suits challenging 
12

those actions as violations of federal law. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 

102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). 

In the factual circumstances here, we, of course, have concluded the officers did 

not violate the Fourth Amendment at all, since they entered and remained briefly on 

Baker's property to serve a protection from abuse petition and to execute a related court 

order. A fortiori, we are not prepared to say the officers acted in a way that clearly 

violated Baker's established Fourth Amendment rights with respect to the property. But if 

we have erred in the first conclusion, the second holds in the absence of clearly 

established contrary case authority. We have been apprised of none. Moreover, court 

papers, particularly orders, issued in protection from abuse actions have a public welfare 

overlay that sets them apart from process and even judgments in more distinctly private 

disputes arising from breached contracts or negligently inflicted injuries. See K.S.A. 60-

3101(b) (Kansas Protection from Abuse Act "shall be liberally constructed to promote the 

protection of victims of domestic violence . . . and to facilitate access to judicial 

protection for the victims"). Accordingly, the officers did not violate some clearly 

established constitutional protection in the manner they attempted to effect service of the 

protection from abuse petition and execution of the temporary order.[1]

[1]In his petition, Baker brought claims under § 1983 alleging constitutionally 

deficient training and policies and practices of the Johnson County Sheriff's Department. 

Those claims lie against a municipal or local governmental entity legally responsible for 

the training and policies and practices. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). In Kansas, county 

sheriffs are locally elected officials, and their budgets are approved by county 

commissions. But some of their duties have been viewed as integral to statewide law 

enforcement. As a result, the courts have been less than monolithic in whether a sheriff's 

department functions as part of the county government and, thus, a municipality or as an 

arm of the State for purposes of Monell claims. See Arnold v. City of Olathe, 413 F. 

Supp. 3d 1087, 1109 (D. Kan. 2019) (recognizing division of authority and finding 

county sheriff to be agent of State entitled to immunity under Eleventh Amendment to the 

United States Constitution); contra Estate of Holmes v. Somers, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 

1257-61 (D. Kan. 2019) (recognizing authority and finding county sheriff to be agent of 

county, a municipality under Monell, and therefore, without Eleventh Amendment 

immunity). The uncertainty is not simply academic and affects the available defenses. 
13

Either way, however, qualified immunity granted to individual officers for § 1983 claims 

against them is not a pass-through defense that derivatively shields their employers from 

Monell claims. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 63 L. 

Ed. 2d 673 (1980); Barna v. Board of School Directors of Panther Valley School District, 

877 F.3d 136, 145 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2017). 

As we read the record, Baker voluntarily withdrew his Monell claims. We rely 

principally on a terse reference in the district court's order entered March 18, 2018, to 

Baker dismissing the Johnson County commissioners as defendants. The district court 

otherwise referred to Monell claims in its May 23 order that reversed the dismissal of 

some of Baker's other § 1983 claims. The district court concluded Baker could "proceed 

on his civil rights (Monell) claim," a reference we take to be a generic characterization of 

the alleged constitutional wrongs. The district court then reversed itself in an August 24 

decision and held the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. That decision 

discussed the constitutional claims generally and did not distinguish between those 

brought against the individual officers and the Monell claims. The ruling, therefore, 

presumably granted summary judgment to the defendants on all of the remaining claims. 

In its final order filed November 15, the district court simply denied Baker's request for 

reconsideration of the August 24 order. 

If the Monell claims were not dismissed either voluntarily or by court order, we do 

not have a final appealable judgment in front of us. See Wilkinson v. Shoney's, Inc., 265 

Kan. 141, Syl. ¶ 4, 958 P.2d 1157 (1998); Ball v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc., No. 

111,144, 2015 WL 4366440, at *13 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). None of the 

parties suggests that to be true. Baker has presented no arguments on appeal regarding the 

Monell claims. We, therefore, do not consider them. We may fairly construe the district 

court's orders collectively as denying relief to Baker on all of his claims. We do so and 

presume the appeal to be proper. 

 

• Baker claims the sheriff's deputies seized him on September 2 in violation of his 

Fourth Amendment rights. He identifies what he considers two unconstitutional seizures. 

First, Mills' decision to pick up C.B. and walk down the driveway with her effectively 

"froze" Baker, so that he could not go into his house or otherwise move away from the 

immediate area. And second, Reddin effected a seizure by placing his hand on Baker's 

upper arm as Mills carried C.B. toward the street. We find neither alone to be a Fourth 

Amendment violation. Nor are they if considered in tandem.
14

Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, 

some conduct of government agents may be so brief or unobtrusive that it cannot be 

considered unreasonable in a constitutional sense. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989) (not every push or shove amounts to an 

unconstitutional use of force effecting a seizure); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 

111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed 2d 331 (1977) (asking driver stopped for traffic violation to 

step out of vehicle is itself an "additional intrusion [that] can only be described as de 

minimis" for Fourth Amendment purposes). In those situations, the intrusion is treated as 

so minor that it causes no Fourth Amendment violation. The person intruded upon, thus, 

suffers no constitutional injury. 

We need not and do not endeavor to define the metes and bounds of actionable 

Fourth Amendment violations in addressing Baker's claims. But we comfortably 

conclude that the evidence taken in its best light for those claims fails to show an 

unconstitutional seizure of Baker. Mills had physical custody of C.B. for between 30 and 

45 seconds. Assuming Baker actually were detained as a result, the duration of the 

detention was remarkably brief. The place of detention was his own driveway in the early 

evening. And the manner entailed no particular, let alone painful, physical restraints. 

Baker's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. 

Reddin did not apply any demonstrable physical force to Baker. Rather, he 

touched Baker's upper arm in what looks to be a nonverbal signal indicating to Baker that 

he should not follow Mills. As the video shows, Baker essentially disregarded Reddin 

and did walk down the driveway after Mills without being physically restrained. Again, 

under those circumstances, Baker cannot establish that he was unreasonably seized in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. On this claim, we have not considered qualified 

immunity as an alternative ground for granting summary judgment, since the absence of a 

constitutional violation seems clear. 
15

Whether the officers violated C.B.'s Fourth Amendment rights on September 2 

when she was seized and carried down the driveway is an entirely different question and 

one that is not before us. The officers' treatment of C.B. was markedly more intrusive 

than their physical contact with Baker. And, as we have mentioned, the temporary order 

is elliptical about effecting the custody arrangements it directs for S.F.M., calling into 

question the officers' decision to make a physical seizure at all. The parties have informed 

us that C.B. has filed her own § 1983 action in federal district court alleging she was 

unconstitutionally seized. See C.F.B. v. Hayden, No. 16-2645-CM, 2019 WL 1299679 

(D. Kan. 2019) (unpublished opinion) (granting in part and denying in part defendants' 

motion for summary judgment). We express no opinion about that claim except to say 

that a violation of C.B.'s Fourth Amendment rights would not automatically violate 

Baker's rights.

• Baker claims Mills' actions in taking physical custody of C.B. interfered with a 

constitutionally protected associational right he had with her as her grandfather. The 

United States Supreme Court has suggested grandparents and grandchildren have a 

familial relationship commanding constitutional recognition. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 

539 U.S. 126, 131, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2003); see also United States v. 

White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1139-40 (10th Cir. 2015) (recognizing associational right of some 

constitutional dimension between grandparent and grandchild); Johnson v. City of 

Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 501 (6th Cir. 2002) (recognizing associational right between 

grandparent and grandchild). For purposes of this claim, we presume Baker and C.B. 

have interlocking constitutionally protected associational rights as grandparent and 

grandchild, presumably grounded in the First Amendment to the United States 

Constitution or in a substantive due process right in the Fourteenth Amendment.

But not every intrusion on that right creates a constitutional injury. See White, 782 

F.3d at 1140. The evidence taken most favorably to Baker does not depict an actionable 

interference in his constitutionally protected associational right with C.B. The officers 

physically separated Baker from C.B. for a little more than 30 seconds. And although the 
16

child was upset and Baker angered, their relationship suffered no actionable 

constitutional rift or impairment given the brevity of the separation. Without belaboring 

our analysis, the officers would be entitled to qualified immunity on this claim even if we 

are mistaken in finding no constitutional injury. No authority we are aware of would have 

supported the idea that in 2015 taking custody of a child for less than a minute to 

determine if he or she were the subject of a court order would have violated the 

constitutionally protected associational rights of the child's grandparents. 

• Baker has alleged that on September 2 the officers committed a common-law 

civil assault against him. A civil assault entails the threat of bodily harm coupled with the 

apparent ability to carry out the threat resulting in the victim's immediate apprehension of 

harm. Baska v. Scherzer, 283 Kan. 750, 756, 156 P.3d 617 (2007); Estate of Randolph v. 

City of Wichita, No. 118,842, 2020 WL 288978, Syl. ¶ 9 (Kan. App. 2020). The 

actionable injury is the victim's apprehension and, thus, his or her mental disturbance 

resulting from the threat. 2020 WL 288978, Syl. ¶ 9; see 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and 

Battery § 88; Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts § 10 (5th ed. 1984).

On appeal, Baker does not identify what conduct of the officers purportedly 

amounted to a threat of physical harm to him. We are neither obligated nor really 

supposed to pick through the record to find facts that might support a claim, even on 

behalf of a party resisting a motion for summary judgment. By failing to cite specific 

facts, a party effectively outsources his or her job as an advocate to marshal favorable 

evidence to us as a reviewing court. We should not do so. That failure alone is sufficient 

to affirm the district court's decision to grant the defendants' summary judgment motion 

on the assault claim. See Hill v. State, 310 Kan. 490, Syl. ¶ 7, 448 P.3d 457 (2019). 

But we have reviewed the parties' submissions to the district court, including the 

video recordings the officers made of their actions leading up to and upon entering 

Baker's property. Although the officers carry handguns, none of them—as shown in the 

videos—displays or otherwise threatens the use of the firearms or nonlethal weapons, 
17

such as a Taser or baton. Likewise, they do not by word or conduct seem to convey a 

threat of bodily harm to Baker. In short, we can find no readily apparent factual basis 

either directly or inferentially supporting a civil assault.

• Baker has alleged the officers on September 2 committed a civil battery against 

him. Civil battery entails an unprivileged intentional touching with the purpose of 

bringing about a harmful or offensive contact. Baska, 283 Kan. at 756; Estate of 

Randolph, 2020 WL 288978, Syl. ¶ 10. The compensable harm derives from the nature 

and extent of the contact. 2020 WL 288978, Syl. ¶ 10; Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts 

§ 9 (5th ed. 1984). The wrongdoer may be held accountable if he or she has the intent to 

cause a physical injury or an otherwise offensive physical contact. McElhaney, 307 Kan. 

at 55-56. On appeal, Baker has failed to identify the conduct he contends supports a civil 

battery. As with the assault claim, the omission is itself fatal to the point on appeal.

Again, however, our review of the videos shows nothing that could be construed 

as a civil battery. The only physical contact between Baker and any of the officers 

occurred when Reddin momentarily touched Baker's upper arm. We have already 

described the circumstance—a reasonable juror could not find it was either harmful or 

offensive. The district court properly granted summary judgment on the battery claim.

• Baker has alleged he was falsely arrested or imprisoned on September 2 as the 

officers were on his property. False arrest and false imprisonment are synonymous terms 

for an intentional tort entailing one person's physical restraint of another person's 

movement or liberty without legal justification. See Brown v. State, 261 Kan. 6, 9, 927 

P.2d 938 (1996). As we understand the claim, Baker relies on the same idea underlying 

the alleged Fourth Amendment violation: He was frozen or seized—he couldn't 

reasonably consider leaving the driveway—while Mills physically had custody of C.B. 

But the imposition on Baker lasted only during the time Mills had C.B. and, thus, was 

remarkably brief. Moreover, as we have mentioned, the officers did not impose any direct 

physical restraints on Baker or limit his movements other than to indicate he should not 
18

follow Mills. And Baker essentially did so anyway. The facts, taken favorably to Baker, 

would not permit a jury to find in his favor on this claim.

• Baker has alleged the sheriff's deputies trespassed on his property on both 

September 2 and September 3. Under Kansas law, the intentional tort of trespass entails a 

person's entry onto "the premises of another without any right, lawful authority, or an 

express or implied invitation or license." Armstrong v. Bromley Quarry & Asphalt, Inc., 

305 Kan. 16, 22, 378 P.3d 1090 (2016). Concomitantly, a person who remains on 

another's premises after an invitation or license has been revoked becomes a trespasser. 

See Riddle Quarries, Inc. v. Thompson, 177 Kan. 307, 311, 279 P.2d 266 (1955); 

GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012) (Under the 

common law, one who remains on land against the owner's wishes becomes a 

trespasser.). We have, for the most part, already addressed this issue in analyzing Baker's 

Fourth Amendment claim based on the officers' presence on his property. We do not 

repeat that analysis here.

The officers had a privilege to attempt service of the protection from abuse 

petition and the temporary order on Maggie at the address listed for her in those papers—

Baker's residence. As we have said, the privilege was a limited one, allowing the officers 

to go to the front door, to ring the door bell or to knock, and to briefly assess from that 

general vantage point whether anyone was inside. In doing so, they did not have a 

privilege to enter the home or to force their way through a locked gate or otherwise 

damage the premises. Conversely, Baker's oral directive that they leave did not override 

the limited privilege that derives from the officers' authority to serve the court papers 

rather than from any express grant of permission from Baker. The privilege shielded the 

attempts at service on both September 2 and September 3. Again, taking the evidence 

favorably to Baker, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the 

defendants.
19

Because Baker has not shown any actionable injury on the common-law claims he 

has asserted, we need not determine whether the defendants enjoyed some form of 

immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq. Those 

statutory immunities cut off liability for what would otherwise be colorable tort claims 

and function as affirmative defenses. See Estate of Randolph, 2020 WL 288978, Syl. ¶ 3. 

When, as here, a plaintiff has failed to produce evidence of a legally cognizable harm, 

KTCA immunity would be no more than an alternative (and superfluous) basis for 

granting judgment to the defendant. We, therefore, do not consider KTCA immunity. 

Baker's Open Records Act Claims

A. Factual Circumstances

Between September 11 and September 22, 2015, Baker sent a series of document 

requests under KORA to the Johnson County Sheriff's Department related to the officers 

entering his property earlier that month to serve the protection from abuse petition and to 

execute the temporary order. Those requests were made about 15 months before Baker 

filed this action. Baker communicated with the designated custodian of the departmental 

records about the requests. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 45-217(d) ("custodian" of records 

defined under KORA); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 45-217(e) ("official custodian" of record 

defined under KORA). Baker then redefined at least one of the requests. The department 

agreed to and did produce some documents, including various reports and the officers' 

bodycam videos from September 2 and September 3. The department declined to produce 

certain records, citing KORA exemptions. Baker sought relief under KORA in this case. 

See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 45-222 (party may bring civil action in district court to enforce 

disclosure provisions of KORA and to challenge government agency's claimed 

exemption).[2]

[2]In his petition, Baker made a separate KORA claim for judicial records—digital 

audio recordings of district court proceedings—and named an employee of the Tenth 

Judicial District as the defendant. The district court denied Baker relief on that claim and 
20

certified its ruling as a final judgment under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-254(b), since it 

presented a novel issue under KORA. Baker appealed, and another panel of this court 

reversed but found the legal controversy moot as to the particular records. Baker v. 

Hayden, 55 Kan. App. 2d 473, 486, 419 P.3d 31, rev. granted 308 Kan. 1593 (2018). Our 

review has nothing to do with the legal controversy over the judicial records.

We discern three remaining points of contention with Baker's KORA requests to 

the department. First, the department declined to produce any Professional Standards

Unit investigations of the officers for their conduct in entering or remaining on Baker's 

property on September 2 or September 3 and cited KORA exemptions in K.S.A. 2019 

Supp. 45-221(a)(4) for personnel and other records and in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 45-

221(a)(11) for records of agencies involved in administrative adjudications or civil 

litigation related to "detecting or investigating violations of civil law or administrative 

rules and regulations" if doing so would "interfere with" future proceedings or reveal 

confidential sources or undercover operatives. The department did not acknowledge 

whether it actually had any responsive documents.

Second, the department declined to produce records regarding whether Baker 

violated any law or obstructed the service of civil process during the September 2 

encounter with the officers at his residence. The department cited the exemption in 

K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 45-221(a)(10) for criminal investigation records. Again, the 

department's response did not acknowledge whether there were any such documents and 

couched the declination in terms of "an open criminal investigation."

Third, Baker says the department was two to three weeks late in making responses 

to some of his requests.

The district court found that the department's assertion of KORA exemptions to 

keep the requested records secret was appropriate and denied Baker relief on those issues. 

The district court found that although the department was late in making some responses, 

Baker was not entitled to relief on that issue, since the department either produced 
21

documents or interposed valid statutory grounds for declining to do so. Baker has 

appealed.

In reviewing the district court's rulings and the record on appeal, we find nothing 

indicating the department submitted any documents it claimed to be exempt from 

disclosure under KORA to the district court for in camera review. There are no such 

documents in the appellate record. 

B. Legal Analysis

In his petition, Baker named Sheriff Frank Denning in his official capacity as the 

defendant in the KORA claims and later substituted Calvin Hayden, when he became 

sheriff. The sheriff's department appears to be a "public agency" within the meaning of 

KORA and presumably would be the entity liable for any violation. See K.S.A. 2019 

Supp. 45-217(f)(1) (defining "public agency"); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 45-222 (civil 

remedies); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 45-223(a) (public agency liable for civil penalty in action 

brought by attorney general, county attorney, or district attorney). We suppose an 

official-capacity suit against a county sheriff comports with KORA, especially in the 

absence of an objection. Any error presumably would be a correctable misjoinder 

problem. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-215(c)(3); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-221.

As framed in the appellate record, the KORA issues present questions of law for 

our review. Baker's requests for documents and the department's responses are in writing, 

so we may review them just as well as the district court. And those communications then 

must be evaluated against the requirements outlined in KORA, a matter of statutory 

interpretation. We, therefore, owe no particular deference to the district court's legal 

conclusions. See Cheney v. Poore, 301 Kan. 120, 125, 339 P.3d 1220 (2014) 

(interpretation of statute question of law subject to unlimited appellate review); 

Thoroughbred Assocs. v. Kansas City Royalty Co., 297 Kan. 1193, 1207, 308 P.3d 1238 

(2013) (appellate court exercises unlimited review over "interpretation and legal effect of 
22

written instruments"); Telegram Publishing Co. v. Kansas Dept. of Transportation, 275 

Kan. 779, 784, 69 P.3d 578 (2003) (applying those rules to appellate review of KORA 

claim).

The Legislature intended KORA as a spotlight on the State and on local 

governments by generally making their records available for public inspection, thereby 

cultivating confidence in their operations. K.S.A. 45-216(a); see Telegram Publishing, 

275 Kan. 779, Syl. ¶ 2. And the Legislature has directed that KORA be "liberally 

construed and applied" to achieve that public policy objective. K.S.A. 45-216(a); see 

Cypress Media, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 268 Kan. 407, 416, 997 P.2d 681 (2000). 

Consistent with that mandate, the appellate courts should narrowly construe the statutory 

exemptions permitting government agencies to keep documents secret. Telegram 

Publishing, 275 Kan. at 785. 

We cannot perform an appropriate review in this case because the documents the 

department seeks to withhold have never been submitted to the district court for 

consideration. We fail to see how the district court could have determined the propriety 

of the claimed exemptions without inspecting the documents, if they exist. See K.S.A. 

2019 Supp. 45-222(b) (district court may require production of "records in controversy" 

for in camera inspection); Laut v. City of Arnold, 417 S.W.3d 315, 326 (Mo. App. 2013) 

(trial court reversed for entering summary judgment keeping internal affairs reports 

confidential under similar provisions of Missouri open records statute without having 

reviewed the documents). The sheriff's department has taken the position that it 

interposed a legally sufficient exemption without confirming or denying the existence of 

any responsive records. See Abdur-Rashid v. New York City Police Department, 31 

N.Y.3d 217, 225-26, 100 N.E.3d 799, 76 N.Y.S.3d 460 (2018) (court majority recognizes 

limited right under New York open records statute for agency to decline to acknowledge 

existence of certain documents when acknowledgment would itself potentially 

compromise ongoing criminal investigation). If there are no responsive records and the 

department is mistaken on this point, the district court may have to address additional 
23

KORA considerations. Without the disputed records or a clear understanding no such 

records exist, we are unable to carry out a meaningful oversight function on appeal.

Given the substantial public policies advanced in KORA, we would be remiss in simply 

affirming the district court when the appellate record doesn't necessarily support its legal 

conclusions. 

This is not a situation in which the findings or conclusions are deficient on their 

face because some material fact or governing legal rule has not been addressed. 

Ordinarily, the appellant must bear the burden of that sort of omission on appeal absent a 

request to the district court for further findings and conclusions. Fischer v. State, 296 

Kan. 808, Syl. ¶ 9, 295 P.3d 560 (2013). Here, we are left without confidence the district 

court fashioned appropriate findings and conclusions based on the available evidence. 

Moreover, the department was obligated to furnish that evidence, since it sought 

summary judgment, had exclusive control of the disputed documents, and claimed an 

exemption from disclosure. Telegram Publishing, 275 Kan. at 785 (government agency 

bears burden of proving applicability of KORA exemption).

We, therefore, reverse the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of 

Sheriff Hayden on Baker's KORA requests for the disclosure of both the Professional 

Standards Investigation documents and the documents related to any investigation of 

Baker for his interaction with the officers who came to his residence on September 2. On 

remand, the district court should reopen the proceedings, as it sees fit, to permit the 

department to submit for an in camera review those documents it has declined to make 

available to Baker. The department, then, must furnish the records to the district court 

under seal or inform the district court under seal that it never had documents responsive 

to either or both of the requests. The device (the order and response) should be tailored in

a way that doesn't compromise the department's legal claim that it need not even 

acknowledge the existence of any responsive documents.
24

In light of the department's response, the district court ultimately needs to make 

new findings and conclusions consistent with this opinion. Since we are remanding a 

summary judgment, the district court has broad latitude in how it gets from the 

production order to the new findings and conclusion. The district court should determine 

what, if any, access Baker may have to the department's response and impose appropriate 

limitations on his use or disclosure of that information. The district court may, of course,

request additional evidence, invite only further briefing or argument, or dispense with 

more input from the parties before rendering a ruling. 

Finally, we are unpersuaded by Baker's abbreviated argument on appeal that the 

district court erred in denying him relief on his claim the department violated the 

good-faith requirements of KORA when it took 17 days to respond to some of his 

requests for documents. We affirm that portion of the district court's decision. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.