Filed 3/6/13 In re Ryan R. CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

In re RYAN R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B242620
(Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

v.
BRITTANY T.,
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. CK93461)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Marilyn Kading Martinez, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Jamie A. Moran, under ap pointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and David Nakhjavani, Deputy County Coun sel for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Brittany T. (mother) appeals from the j uvenile court’s orders terminating jurisdiction over her son Ryan (born November 2009) and placing him in the custody of his father, Jonathan R. (father), 1 pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 361.2. 2
We affirm.
CONTENTIONS Mother contends that the juvenile court failed to comp ly with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA).)
Mother further contends that the juvenile court erred when it terminated jurisdiction and granted sole legal and physical custody to father.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND 1. Section 300 petition and detention The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
received a referral of domestic violence on April 17, 2012, involv ing mother and her husband, Martin G. (Martin). An investigatin g police officer observed mother’s face was
swollen and there were scratches on her arm. Mother told the inves tigating officer that Martin had become upset and started hitting her. Ryan witnessed the incident, so the officers requested a follow-up home visit to assess Ryan’s safety. On April 23, 2012, a DCFS children’s social worker a rrived at the home and spoke
with mother. Mother stated that she and Martin had been married for only two months.
Mother confirmed the incident of domestic violence. She stated that she would be seeking an annulment of the marriage, that Martin was in carcerated, and that she had obtained an emergency restraining order agains t him. Mother also indicated that she planned to relocate.
Mother identified father as Ryan’s biological father, but stated that father was not in contact with Ryan a nd that mother was unaware of his whereabouts.

1 Father is not a party to this appeal.

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.3 On May 2, 2012, DCFS received anothe r referral regarding Ryan. The referral alleged that since Martin’s incarceration, mother had invited several men and women to live with her and Ryan and that the men and women were up all night, doing drugs. They slept during the day, and it was un clear who was supervising Ryan.
A DCFS social worker went to the home on the day of the referral. A woman answered the door, and informed the social worker that sh e did not live in the home but she was doing mother a favor and babysittin g Ryan while mother was out. Ryan appeared well groomed and healthy. The soci al worker returned to the home on May 4, 2012, and spoke with mother. Mother, who was on probation fo r petty theft, denied that people were coming in and out of the home. She told the social worker that she had submitted to a drug test on May 2, 2012, and that she was serv ing 90 days of house arrest. When asked about father, mother stated th at she had not been in contact with him
for some time. She told the social worker that father did not know how to care for Ryan
and described an incident where father retu rned Ryan to her with wet pants because father did not have any diapers for him. Ry an was again observed to be healthy and free
of marks or bruises. The home appeared suitable for a child. On May 7, 2012, mother’s drug test ca me back positive for methamphetamine. Mother’s probation officer noted that this wa s a violation of mother’s probation, and she would have to spend the remainder of her sentence in jail, leav ing Ryan without a
caretaker.
When the social worker a ttempted to take Ryan into custody, mother did not
answer the door. The social wo rker was able to reach mother by telephone. Mother said she was visiting her probation officer in Sant a Ana. However, mother’s probation officer tracked mother’s location, using her ankle br acelet, to her home. The probation officer reported that mother would be taken into custody that day. When speaking with the social worker, mother initially denied drug use and stated that she did not know why her drug test cam e back positive for methamphetamine. She later admitted methamphetamine us e, but denied an addiction. Ryan was taken into protective custody an d placed with maternal aunt, Megan T.4 On May 11, 2012, DCFS file d a section 300 pe tition on behalf of Ryan based on mother’s drug use and the incide nt of domestic violence with Martin. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found a prima facie case for detaining Ryan pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). Because mother was incarcerated and could not attend the hearing, the juvenile court continued th e case, deferring any findings on ICWA and paternity. 2. Jurisdiction/disposition DCFS filed a jurisdiction/di sposition report on June 8, 2012. Mother had been released from custody and returned home on June 6, 2012. On that date, DCFS
conducted a face to fa ce interview with mother. DC FS noted that on May 8, 2012, mother had stated that her family may have Cherokee heritage but she was unable to identify any specific nation or band. DCFS followed up on this info rmation in its June 6, 20 12 interview with mother. Mother was asked to provide information a bout her possible Cherokee heritage. Mother stated that her paternal grandfather may ha ve had this heritage. However, she did not know from which band this heritage may have come, nor if he was registered or enrolled with any of the tribes. Her grandfather wa s born at an unknown location in Missouri and passed away on May 24, 2011. Mother stated that neither her father’s mother, nor her mother, had any known Native American heritage . Mother’s father was also deceased, so no one on mother’s paternal side could be reached for further questioning on the issue. Father was interviewed on June 4, 2012, and denied any Native American heritage. Regarding the allegations, father did not know much about Martin. Mother had stopped all contact with father after she ma rried Martin in Febr uary 2012. On one occasion, father and his girlfriend encountered mother and Martin on the street while father was caring for Ryan. Mo ther became upset and Martin started becoming violent, shouting his gang affiliation, post uring and threatening father w ith physical harm. Father
concluded that Martin was a violent individua l. Father heard from third parties that mother and Martin argued fre quently, but did not have any further information.5 Father had never seen mother use drugs but he knew she smoked methamphetamine. He acknowledged that he smoked marijuana and had a valid medical marijuana card.
Mother confirmed that father did not dr ink or use any illicit c ontrolled substances
and that father had a valid medi cal marijuana card. Mother a ssured the social worker that
she had never seen father under the influe nce of marijuana during visits with Ryan. DCFS reported that father was proactive in the case and appeared to be aware of the family’s needs. Father committed himself to strengthe ning his bond with Ryan and allowed his medical marijuana card to expire in an effort to make himself better able to care for Ryan. Father had a minimal criminal history which consisted of a single arrest when he was 16 years old. Father was gain fully employed and seemed capable of caring for Ryan. DCFS recommended that the juvenile court grant it discretion to release Ryan to father upon completion of a home assessment report. Mother and father were both present for the June 8, 2012 ad judication hearing. Father was found to be Ryan’s presumed father. Mother en tered a no contest plea to the allegations. The juvenile court sustained th e allegations regarding domestic violence and substance abuse against mother pursua nt to section 300, subdivision (b). The juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply to the case. Regarding disposition, the court set the ma tter for a contested hearing on June 22,
2012. At the June 22, 2012 dis position hearing, mother’s coun sel informed the court that mother did not want Ryan placed with fath er because she considered father to be immature. Father asked that Ryan be releas ed to his custody. Ryan’s counsel joined father’s request, but asked that the court retain jurisdiction. The juvenile court declared Ryan to be a dependent of the court, finding by clear and convincing evidence that his safety c ould not be ensured without removal from mother’s custody. The court then ordered Ry an to be placed in father’s custody, and, pursuant to section 361.2, term inated jurisdiction. The cour t found no need for continued supervision.6 The juvenile court explained its decision. The court found no risk factors for the
child in his father’s custod y. The court stated that father was nonoffending and had participated in regular visits since the case came before the court. The visitation went very well; Ryan knew who his father was and enjoyed being with him. The court “[had] to make a decision as to whether or not his aunt or his father is a more appropriate caretaker. A parent has a fundamental right to parent his child over and above anyone else other than the other parent, of course.” DCFS was opposed to Ryan being placed with father because father lived on a property with two dwellings and the individua ls in the back home declined to have
criminal checks. The court ob served “this is akin to many people living in an apartment building . . . and I find that it is not reasonable to believe that people that live in a back house or a close dwelling have to be approved by the depart ment before a child can be placed with a parent such as [father].” The court explained to mother that it had not terminated her parental rights. “You can file for a modification with our Superior Court in Los Angeles in the Family Law Division. You will simply have to persuade the court that you have made substantial progress addressing the issues which you need to address.” On June 22, 2012, mother filed her notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION I. The juvenile court did not err in finding ICWA inapplicable The ICWA is federal legislation designed to protect Indian people and their culture from extinction. (25 U.S.C. § 1902; In re Crystal K. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 655, 661.) ICWA applies to all proceedi ngs involving Indian childr en that may result in an involuntary foster care placement; guardians hip or conservatorship placement; custody placement under Family Code section 3041; declaration freeing the child from the custody and control of one or both parents; termination of parental rights; or adoptive placement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.480.)7 An “Indian child” is defined as any unma rried person under th e age of 18 who is (1) a member of an Indian trib e; or (2) eligible for membersh ip in an Indian tribe and the biological child of a member of an Indian tr ibe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224, subd. (c).) If the court, social worker, or probati on officer knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved in a dependency proceeding, the social worker or probation officer is required to make furt her inquiry regarding the possibl e Indian status of the child as soon as practicable. The social worker or probation officer must interview the parents and extended family members to gather the information require d, then contact the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying the tribes of which the child may be a member or eligible for membership. (§ 224.3, subd. (c).) Mother argues that DCFS failed to make contact with the BIA or any of the
Cherokee tribes in the United St ates as it was required to do in response to mother’s information regarding Ryan’s Indian ancestry. Mother ar gues that both DCFS and the juvenile court had an affirmative duty to inqu ire as to whether Ryan might be an “Indian child” within the meaning of the statutory scheme. Mother argues that once the inquiry
resulted in notice that there was an Indian child involved, DCFS was required to obtain all of Ryan’s family history, including the name of the tribes in whic h Ryan is enrolled or eligible for enrollment. (§ 224.2, subd. (a)(5).) Here, the trial court reviewed both pa rents’ ICWA forms and found “there’s no
reason to know that the Indian Child Welfar e Act applies.” This finding is reviewed
under the substantial ev idence standard. ( In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430; In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 178-1 79.) Thus, we must uphold the court’s orders and findings if any substantial evidence, cont radicted or uncontradicted, supports them, and we must indulge all legiti mate inferences in favor of affirmance. ( In
re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212.) A juve nile court’s ICWA finding is also subject to harmless error analysis. ( In re Alexis H. (2005) 132 Cal. App.4th 11, 16.) In this case, there was in sufficient evidence for the court to have any reason to believe that Ryan was an In dian child. The California Rules of Court provide the8 circumstances under which a court has “reason to know” that the child is an Indian child.
Those circumstances include: “(A) The child or a person having an interest in the child, including an Indian tribe, an Indian organization, an officer of the court, a public or private agency, or a memb er of the child’s extended family, informs or otherwise provides information suggesting that the child is an Indian child to the court . . . ;
“(B) The residence or domicile of th e child, the child’s parents, or an Indian custodian is or was in a predominantly Indian community; or
“(C) The child or the ch ild’s family has received services or benefits from a tribe or services that are available to Indians from tribes or the federal government . . . .”
(Cal. Rules Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)

None of these circumstances were present here. Mother inform ed DCFS that her family may have Cherokee ancestry through her paternal grandfather, who was deceased.
Mother did not know what tribe or band her grandfather may have belonged to, where her grandfather was born, or whether he was ever a registered member of any tribe or band. Her own father was also deceased, and ther e was no other way of obtaining any such information. Mother’s spec ulation that the child’s grea t-grandfather may have had Cherokee heritage does not suggest that Ryan co uld be described as an Indian child under the applicable law. As set forth above, an Indian child must either be a member of an Indian tribe or eligible for me mbership and the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. (§ 224, subd. (c).) Courts have recognized that the requireme nts of ICWA are not triggered when the possibility that a child has Indi an ancestry is based on vague information. For example,
in In re O.K. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 152, ICWA notic e was sent to the BIA based on the mother’s statement that she “‘may be of Native American [h]eritage.’” ( Id. at p. 154.)
The notice was returned because it contai ned “‘[i]nsufficient identifying tribal information.’” ( Ibid. ) At the section 366. 26 hearing, the paternal grandmother further9 informed the court, “‘the young man may have Indian in him. I don’t know my family history that much, but where were [ sic ] from it is that secti on so I don’t know about checking that.’” ( Id. at p. 155.) Under these circumstan ces, the trial court’s finding that
there was no reason to believe the child was Indian was affirmed on appeal. Similarly, in In re Z.N. (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 282, mo ther had stated her belief that one of her grandmothers was Cherokee a nd another part Apache . The tribes were unidentified. Mother reported that she was not registered and did not believe her mother established any tribal affiliation. In affirmi ng the trial court’s determination that tribal notice was not necessary, the court stated:“Whatever the status of the grandmothers, they were greatgrandmothers of the twins, and this information did not suggest that the twins were members or eligible for me mbership as children of a member. We agree . . . that this did not trigger a duty to notify tribes. Thus there was no error.”
( In re Z.N., supra , at p. 298.)

The facts of Z.N. are analogous to the matter before us. Mother believed that the child’s great-grandparent was part Cherokee, but had no specific tribal information. As
in Z.N. , this did not trigger a duty to notify any tribes. (See also In re J.D. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 118, 125 [paterna l grandmother’s belief that she had Native American ancestry was “too vague, attenuated and specu lative to give the court any reason to believe the children might be Indian children”]. ) We find that the juvenile court’s finding is supported by the record , and no error occurred. Even if error had occurred, any such error would be harmless under the
circumstances of this case. The California Constitution provides that a judgment may not be set aside unless it has resulted in a miscarriag e of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Thus, reversal is permitted only if it is re asonably probable that the result would have
been more favorable to the appellant but for the error. ( In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59-60.) ICWA error is reviewed under this test. ( In re Alexis H., supra , 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 16.)10 In this case, Ryan was placed with his father and jurisdicti on was terminated. Ryan was not placed in foster care and neither parent’s pare ntal rights were terminated. Neither mother nor any Indian tribe has su ffered any prejudice fro m any alleged error. II. The juvenile court did not err in placing Ryan with father and terminating jurisdiction Mother next argues that the juvenile c ourt erred when it terminated jurisdiction and gave sole legal and ph ysical custody to father. 3 However, mother acknowledges that the juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a depe ndency case. (§ 361.2, subd. (b); In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179; In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 265, fn. 4.) Thus, we review the trial court’s decision to terminate jurisdiction and issue a custody order for abuse of discretion. ( In re Nada R
., supra , at p. 1179.) Under this standard, we
will not disturb the order unless the court “‘ “‘exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or paten tly absurd determination [citations].’”’ [Citations.]” ( Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300.)
Mother has failed to show an abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion. Mother argues that the court’s primary consideration must always be the best interests of the child. ( In re Nicholas H., supra , 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 268.) She argues that father was not a stable, positive force in Ry an’s life prior to the dependenc y proceeding. In addition, mother claims, father failed to show that he knew how to take care of Ryan. Mother points to the incident when fath er returned Ryan to her with wet pants because father did not have any diapers. Mother insists that with Martin out of her life, a significant safety hazard has been removed from her home, and that Ryan was otherwise healthy and free
from abuse.

3 DCFS has not responded to th is portion of mother’s appe al. DCFS has declined to take a position on this issue because DCFS oppo sed an order placing Ryan in his father’s custody at trial. DCFS asserts that father is the appropriate party to respond to mother’s arguments on this point.11 Mother’s arguments are not persuasive . Father was a nonoffending parent, and there was no evidence presented to the juvenile court suggesting that Ryan was at risk in father’s care. The sole objection of DCFS i nvolved the refusal of neighbors living near
father to submit to criminal checks. As the juvenile court noted, a parent ha s a fundamental right to parent his child. ( Johnson v. Department of Social Services (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 878, 885.) As set
forth in In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 697: “[A] nonoffending parent has a constitutionally protected interest in assuming physical custody, as well as a statutory right to do so, in the absence of clear and conv incing evidence that the parent’s choices will be ‘detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.’ [Citations.]”

Section 361.2 expressly addr esses the juvenile court’s obligation to place the child with a previously noncustodial parent under the circumstances present here. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) If a previously noncustodial pare nt desires custody of the child, the statute mandates that the juvenile court “ shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent woul d be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” ( Ibid ., italics added.) The statute thus expresses a clear direction to the court to place the child with a noncustodial parent under circumstances such as those present in this case. If the juvenile court had not placed Ryan with father, the court’s order would be a violation of father’s constitutional and statutory rights. Upon selecting this custody arrangement, the court had clear authority to terminate jurisdiction. (§ 36 1.2, subd. (b)(1); In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1244 [where child is placed with nonoffending noncustodi al parent and there is no need for ongoing supervision, court may terminate juri sdiction and grant the parent sole legal and physical custody].)
Mother was not entitled to reunificati on services. Section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1), provides that once a ch ild is placed with a previo usly noncustodial, nonoffending12 parent, “[t]he court shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the ch ild.” Because Ryan was in the care of father, an order of reunifi cation services for mother was unnecessary. As the juvenile court explaine d, mother has the option of petitioning the family court for a change in the custody order. Mother has failed to establish that the juve nile court abused its discretion. On the contrary, the juvenile court’s actions appear to be entirely appropriate under applicable
law.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

.

_______ _______________ ______, J. CHAVEZ

We concur:

_____________ _______________, P. J. BOREN

___________________ _________, J.* FERNS

________________ __________________ __________________ _________________ * Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chie f Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.