UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DHEADRY LOYD POWELL, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 20-3085 and No. 20-3142

(D.C. No. 2:05-CR-20067-JWL-1)

(D. Kan.)

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before LUCERO, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

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Dheadry Powell, proceeding pro se,1 appeals his 40-year sentence. For the 

reasons explained below, we affirm. 

Background

In 2005, Powell pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and 

possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 

10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 1 We liberally construe Powell’s pro se filings. But we will not act as his 

advocate by, for example, formulating possible arguments or combing the record for 

support. See Garrett v. Selby, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

January 15, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court
2

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846 and one count of money laundering in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). At Powell’s initial sentencing, the district court determined

the drug quantity attributable to Powell and applied various enhancements. 

Ultimately, the district court calculated a total offense level of 48. But because the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) cap offense levels at 

43, the district court lowered Powell’s total offense level to 43 for purposes of 

sentencing. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.2 (“An offense level of more than 43 is 

to be treated as an offense level of 43.”). This total offense level combined with

Powell’s criminal history resulted in an advisory Guidelines sentence of life 

imprisonment. Accordingly, the district court sentenced Powell to life imprisonment 

for the conspiracy-to-distribute count and 20 years for the money-laundering count, 

both sentences to run concurrently.

In July 2017, Powell filed a motion for a reduced sentence. Specifically, he 

argued he was eligible for a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) because certain

amendments to the Guidelines lowered his base offense level. In response, the district 

court recalculated the drug quantity attributable to Powell and determined that he had 

a lower base offense level under the amended Guidelines. But, after applying the 

same enhancements from the original sentence, Powell’s total offense level remained 

above 43. Because Powell’s sentencing range remained unchanged, the district court 

concluded that Powell was ineligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) and denied 

his motion. 
3

Powell appealed. See United States v. Powell, 739 Fed. App’x 511 (10th Cir. 

2018) (unpublished), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1462 (2019). He argued that the district 

court improperly calculated his total offense level by grouping his two convictions. 

Id. at 512. We acknowledged that each conviction had a different total offense level. 

Id. (noting total offense level for Powell’s drug conviction was 42 and total offense 

level for his money-laundering conviction was 44). But we explained that the district 

court properly grouped the two convictions and correctly calculated the total offense 

level. Id. However, although we approved this method of calculating Powell’s 

offense level, we determined that the district court should have dismissed Powell’s 

motion seeking a reduced sentence for lack of jurisdiction. Id. Accordingly, we 

vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack 

of jurisdiction. Id. at 512–13. 

Following that appeal, in April 2019, Powell filed another motion in the 

district court, this one seeking to be resentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act of 

2010 and the First Step Act of 2018. Powell argued that he was eligible for 

resentencing under these acts because they retroactively increased the threshold 

quantity of drugs necessary to convict a defendant under § 841(b)(1)(A)—Powell’s 

statute of conviction for his drug conviction—and retroactively changed the statutory 

penalties for such convictions. Powell also repeated his argument that the district 

court improperly grouped his two convictions together when calculating his sentence

under the Guidelines.
4

The district court agreed that Powell was eligible for resentencing under these 

acts, and it noted that Powell’s “advisory [G]uidelines range remain[ed] life 

imprisonment.” R. vol. 1, 347. But it concluded that Powell’s attributable drug 

quantity corresponded to a new statutory maximum of 40 years imprisonment. See 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (providing statutory maximum sentence). The district court 

also rejected Powell’s argument about improper grouping, stating that “the Tenth 

Circuit has held that the sentencing judge in this case correctly calculated [Powell]’s 

sentence and that the [presentence investigation report] correctly calculated [his]

advisory [G]uidelines range.” App. vol. 1, 348. Accordingly, the district court 

resentenced Powell to the new statutory maximum of 40 years. Powell then filed 

Appeal No. 20-3085. 

But in April 2020, before briefing in Appeal No. 20-3085, Powell filed another

motion in the district court, this one seeking a reduced sentence. This motion again 

reiterated the same argument this court addressed and rejected in Powell’s prior

appeal—that the district court improperly calculated his total offense level by 

grouping the offenses. See Powell, 739 F. App’x at 512. Citing the law-of-the-case 

doctrine and noting our previous decision, the district court declined to reconsider 

Powell’s arguments and denied his motion. Powell then filed another appeal, Appeal 

No. 20-3142. 
5

Accordingly, Appeal No. 20-3085 and Appeal No. 20-3142 are now pending. 

Because both appeals concern the same sentence, we address both here.

2

Analysis

I. Appeal No. 20-3085: Powell’s Motion Seeking To Be Resentenced Under 

the First Step Act and Fair Sentencing Act 

In appealing the district court’s order on his April 2019 motion seeking to be 

resentenced, Powell argues that “[t]he district court abused it[]s discretion[] when [it] 

. . . used a statute . . . as a substitute for sentencing, instead of the [Guidelines].” 

Case No. 20-3085, Aplt. Br. 3. Liberally construed, we interpret this as an argument 

that the district court erred by failing to calculate his Guidelines range upon 

resentencing. Cf. United States v. Brown, 974 F.3d 1137, 1144 (10th Cir. 2020)

(stating that district court “must calculate the defendant’s Guideline range” when 

revising sentence under First Step Act). But contrary to Powell’s assertion, the 

district court did consider the Guidelines when determining Powell’s sentence: It 

specifically stated that although Powell’s “advisory [G]uidelines range remains life 

imprisonment,” it was resentencing Powell to 40 years in accordance with the First 

Step Act and the 40-year statutory maximum newly applicable under that act. R. vol. 

1, 347 (emphasis added). Thus, we do not agree that the district court failed to 

2 Powell’s notice of appeal in Appeal No. 20-3142 indicated his intent to also 

appeal the denial of two additional motions: a motion to recuse the district-court 

judge and a motion to appoint counsel. Notwithstanding Powell’s notice, his opening 

briefs in both appeals address only his sentencing motions. Accordingly, we limit our 

consideration to those issues. See Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 911 (10th Cir. 2012)

(applying to pro se litigant rule that “[a]rguments not clearly made in a party’s 

opening brief are deemed waived”).
6

consider the guidelines.

And to the extent that Powell challenges the district court’s omission of any 

explanation regarding its recalculation of the Guidelines range, we would find any 

such error harmless. See United States v. Montgomery, 439 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th 

Cir. 2006) (“Harmless error is that which ‘did not affect the district court’s selection 

of the sentence imposed.’” (quoting United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 

1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005))). When resentencing under the First Step Act, the court

applies the version of the Guidelines in place at the time of the original sentencing.

See Brown, 974 F.3d at 1144. Under those Guidelines, there would be no change in 

Powell’s base offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2) (2006) (setting base offense 

level for convictions under § 841(b)(1)(A)–(C) at 38). And Powell does not suggest 

that there could or would be any change in the enhancements leading to his ultimate 

offense level of 43 and further concedes his criminal-history category of IV.

Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that the Guideline range remained 

life imprisonment, and any error in failing to explain that calculation is harmless.

3

Because Powell makes no other challenge to the district court’s order on 

3 When determining that Powell was eligible for resentencing, the district court 

resolved a dispute as to “whether a defendant’s eligibility for a reduction [under the 

Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act] is determined by a defendant’s statute[ ]of[ 

]conviction or whether it is determined by a defendant’s actual conduct.” R. vol. 1, 

345. The court concluded that eligibility is determined by the statute of conviction. In 

doing so, it explained that even though the Tenth Circuit has not explicitly addressed 

this issue, “[e]very Circuit Court of Appeals that has addressed this issue . . . has 

adopted [the] statute-of-conviction theory.” Id. Because Powell does not challenge 

the district court’s reasoning on this issue, we express no opinion as to whether the 

district court properly adopted the statute-of-conviction theory. 
7

Powell’s April 2019 motion seeking to be resentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act 

and First Step Act, we affirm that order. 

II. Appeal No. 20-3142: Powell’s Motion Seeking a Reduced Sentence

Next, Powell argues—as he did in his April 2020 motion seeking a reduced 

sentence—that the district court miscalculated his total offense level. But, as the 

district court observed, Powell’s position restates the same miscalculation arguments 

that we rejected in Powell’s earlier appeal. See Powell, 739 F. App’x at 512. And the 

district court declined to reconsider these same arguments according to the law-ofthe-case doctrine. Nevertheless, Powell contends that the district court should have 

applied an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine and reached the merits of his 

arguments. See United States v. Trent, 884 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 2018) (discussing 

exceptions). Specifically, he argues that the allegedly errant offense calculation 

“worked a manifest injustice” and that “controlling authority has subsequently made 

a contrary decision of the [applicable] [l]aw.” Case No. 20-3142, Aplt. Br. 3; see also 

Trent, 884 F.3d at 995. 

Yet Powell offers no support for his conclusory assertion of manifest injustice. 

For example, he doesn’t explain why it was unjust for the district court to reduce his 

life sentence to the mandatory maximum, nor does he explain how he could be 

entitled to a different sentence. Further, Powell fails to cite any authority—

subsequent, controlling, or otherwise—that undermines our prior conclusion that the 

district court correctly calculated Powell’s offense level. We therefore determine that 
8

neither of Powell’s purported exceptions apply and that the district court properly 

applied the law-of-the-case doctrine to deny Powell’s motion for resentencing.

Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s orders granting in part and denying in part 

Powell’s April 2019 motion seeking to be resentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act 

and First Step Act and denying Powell’s April 2020 motion seeking a reduced 

sentence. We also dismiss as moot his pending motions to add exhibits to his opening 

brief and to expedite his appeals.

Entered for the Court

Nancy L. Moritz

Circuit Judge