IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–0156

Filed May 1, 2015

Amended July 1, 2015

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

KENNETH J. WEILAND, JR.,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

The grievance commission reports an attorney committed ethical 

misconduct and recommends a public reprimand. ATTORNEY 

REPRIMANDED.

Charles L. Harrington and Elizabeth E. Quinlan, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

Kenneth J. Weiland, Jr., Des Moines, pro se.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board) 

charged attorney Kenneth J. Weiland Jr. with violations of several of our 

ethical rules based on his actions in an appeal filed with this court. After 

a hearing, a division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court 

of Iowa found Weiland’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of

justice in violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(d), and 

recommended we impose a public reprimand. Upon our de novo review, 

we concur in the commission’s finding that Weiland’s conduct was 

prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of rule 32:8.4(d). 

Additionally, we conclude Weiland failed to make reasonable efforts to 

expedite litigation consistent with the interests of his client in violation of 

Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:3.2. Ultimately, we agree with the 

commission that a public reprimand is appropriate.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

Weiland was admitted to practice law in Iowa in 1994. He 

currently works in Des Moines, as a solo practitioner. His practice 

includes representing clients in a variety of matters, including family law. 

The Board’s complaint in this case stems from Weiland’s representation 

of Ryan Pierce in an appeal from a domestic relations case.

Weiland’s representation of Pierce began in 2012 when Weiland 

agreed to represent Pierce in a domestic relations case. The case 

proceeded to trial on December 17, 2012. The district court entered a 

decree in the matter on January 2, 2013. After reviewing the decree, 

Weiland concluded the district court failed to address an issue he 

believed it was required to address. Accordingly, Weiland informed

Pierce that there were sufficient grounds to appeal the case. Based on 
3

Weiland’s advice, Pierce elected to appeal the case. Weiland filed a notice 

of appeal on January 31.

After filing the notice of appeal, Weiland failed to file and serve a 

combined certificate or pay the filing fee as required by our rules of 

appellate procedure. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.702(1)(a) (establishing the 

filing fee for appeals and requiring the appellant to “pay the fee . . .

within seven days after filing the notice of appeal”); id. r. 6.804(1)

(requiring the appellant to complete and file a combined certificate

“within seven days after filing the notice of appeal,” and further requiring 

the appellant to “serve the combined certificate on all parties to the 

appeal and on each court reporter from whom a transcript was ordered”). 

On March 8, the clerk of the Iowa Supreme Court sent Weiland a notice 

of default informing him of the deficiency and assessing a $150 penalty 

against him. The notice further informed Weiland that if he failed to 

remedy the default within fifteen days, the clerk would dismiss the 

appeal for want of prosecution. See id. r. 6.1202(1)(a) (“If the appellant 

fails to cure the default, the clerk shall enter an order dismissing the 

appeal.”).

On the morning of March 25, Weiland called the court reporter 

that had reported the trial, Lisa McCarville, and requested a transcript of 

the Pierce trial. Later that morning, McCarville sent Weiland a follow-up 

email in which she stated that after their phone conversation, she 

reviewed her records and determined the transcript would cost $220.50. 

The email further stated that she would need a copy of the combined 

certificate. Additionally, the email stated, “I will get to work on the 

transcript as soon as I receive your deposit.” That same day, Weiland 

filed a combined certificate with the clerk in which he certified that “the 
4

Transcript ha[d] been ordered.” He did not serve McCarville with the 

combined certificate.

On June 4, the clerk sent both Weiland and McCarville a notice of 

failure to timely file transcript notifying them that McCarville had not 

filed the transcript by the deadline. See id. r. 6.803(3)(c) (establishing the 

deadline for filing transcript as forty days after service of the combined 

certificate). On June 5, McCarville filed a reporter’s application for an 

extension of time to file a transcript. In the application, she certified that 

she “ha[d] not received an order for transcript from . . . Weiland” because 

he had not served her with a copy of the combined certificate. See id. r.

6.803(1) (requiring the “appellant [to] use the combined certificate to 

order in writing from the court reporter a transcript”). The application 

also noted that she had not received a deposit for the transcript.

On June 17, this court filed an order requiring Weiland to “serve 

court reporter McCarville with the combined certificate and pay her 

required deposit” by June 27. The order further stated, “[F]ailure to pay 

[for] the transcript should be reported by the court reporter to this court, 

and will result in [the] appeal being dismissed for appellant’s failure to 

comply with the appellate rules.” On July 8, eleven days after the 

deadline, McCarville filed a reporter’s report of nonpayment in which she 

certified that as of July 3, Weiland had not sent her a combined 

certificate or paid the deposit. Accordingly, on July 18, this court filed 

an order dismissing the appeal for failure to comply with our appellate 

rules and instructing the clerk to forward a copy of the order to the 

Board for further action. See id. r. 6.1202(3) (“Following the dismissal of 

an appeal for failure to comply with an appellate deadline where the 

appellant was represented by an attorney, the clerk . . . shall forward 
5

certified copies of the docket, the notice of default which resulted in 

dismissal, and the order of dismissal to the . . . Board.”).

Based on these facts, the Board filed a complaint on August 11, 

2014. In its complaint, the Board alleged Weiland violated Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct 32:1.3 (requiring diligence), 32:3.2 (requiring 

reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), 32:3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting false 

statements to a tribunal), 32:3.4(c) (requiring compliance with the rules 

of a tribunal),1 and 32:8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice). Weiland filed his answer on September 10. In 

his answer, he admitted all the factual allegations in the Board’s 

complaint. However, he denied that his conduct violated any ethical 

rules. Additionally, Wieland asserted that he communicated to Pierce the 

need for Pierce to provide him with funds for the transcript on multiple 

occasions, but that Pierce had failed to do so. He also asserted that the 

reason he failed to dismiss the appeal was that he wanted to give Pierce 

“every opportunity to appeal his case.”

The commission conducted an evidentiary hearing in November. 

At the hearing, the following witnesses testified: Christine Mayberry, 

deputy clerk for the Iowa appellate courts; McCarville; and Weiland. 

Mayberry testified that between 1998 and 2014 Weiland has received 

forty notices of default for failing to comply with deadlines in various 

appeals. She testified that based on her fifteen years of experience as 

deputy clerk, this is an excessive number of notices of default. She 

1Prior to the hearing before the commission, the Board abandoned its claim that 

Weiland’s conduct violated rule 32:3.4(c). Accordingly, we do not consider whether 

Weiland’s conduct violated rule 32:3.4(c). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Keele, 795 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Iowa 2011) (declining to address rule violations abandoned 

by the Board on appeal).

 
6

further testified that when the clerk’s office is required to send default 

notices, it causes “a significant drain on [the office’s] workload.”2

McCarville testified that when a party files an appeal, the court 

reporter in the underlying matter typically receives a copy of the 

combined certificate. This combined certificate notifies the court reporter

that a party has filed an appeal for which a transcript is needed and 

provides the court reporter with details as to the dates of future 

deadlines. She testified that in Pierce’s case she did not receive a 

combined certificate. Instead, Weiland called her to request a transcript. 

She testified that after receiving the call from Weiland, she found the 

appeal online and discovered that Weiland had recently filed the

combined certificate. She then emailed Weiland and requested that he 

send her a copy of the combined certificate and informed him of the cost 

of the transcript.

McCarville gave conflicting testimony as to whether she considered 

the transcript ordered after speaking with Weiland on the phone on 

March 25. Initially, she testified that she requires the deposit to be paid 

prior to considering the transcript ordered. She testified that she 

typically requires a deposit in advance because doing so ensures that she 

receives payment for her services. However, she then testified that after 

her conversation with Weiland, she “considered [Weiland to have] ordered 

the transcript verbally.” She further testified that although she was 

waiting for both the combined certificate and her deposit, she probably 

2Weiland objected to the admission of this testimony and to related documentary 

evidence. He argued the commission could not use this evidence to find he committed 

an ethical violation. However, he acknowledged the commission could use this evidence 

“in regards to any disposition if there is a finding [he] acted in an unethical manner.” 

Thus, as did the commission, we consider this evidence only as it relates to our 

consideration of the appropriate sanction.

 
7

began doing some preliminary work on the transcript to ensure she did 

not miss any deadlines.

Weiland admitted that he failed to serve McCarville with the 

combined certificate. However, he maintained that he did not know our 

appellate rules required him to do so. Additionally, he testified that 

when he spoke with McCarville on the phone on March 25, he believed 

he had ordered the transcript. He testified that when he certified in the 

combined certificate that he had ordered the transcript, he knew he had 

not paid McCarville. However, he believed that ordering the transcript 

and paying for the transcript were distinct concepts. Accordingly, in 

certifying on the combined certificate that he had ordered the transcript, 

he “didn’t believe [he] was lying to the Court . . . or misrepresenting 

anything.”

Weiland did not dispute receiving the various notices of default in 

Pierce’s appeal. However, he testified that Pierce had been unable to 

supply him with the necessary funds for either the filing fee or the 

transcript. He further testified that he advanced Pierce $150 for the 

filing fee and that Pierce eventually reimbursed him $100 of that 

amount. However, Pierce never provided him funds for the transcript,

despite Weiland’s repeated requests that he do so. Weiland testified that 

he did not dismiss the appeal after the June 27 deadline because he 

believed Pierce still wanted to pursue it, and he hoped Pierce would 

“come up with [the] money.” Accordingly, Weiland “wasn’t trying to 

cause the Court problems.” Instead, he was trying to protect Pierce’s 

appeal rights by “gett[ing] as much time for him to [obtain the funds as 

possible].”

Weiland expressed remorse for failing to dismiss Pierce’s appeal 

once he realized Pierce would not be able to obtain funds for the 
8

transcript. He testified that when a client is unable to obtain funds for 

an appeal in the future, he will withdraw as counsel instead of repeatedly 

missing deadlines. He further noted that although he has a history of 

failing to meet appellate deadlines, he has recently improved his 

compliance with appellate deadlines. Specifically, he highlighted that 

many of the notices of default he has received in the past occurred 

“closer to the early 2000s.” However, he admitted he received notices of 

default in two other appeals in 2014 for failing to file the required 

combined certificates. Finally, Weiland acknowledged that the Board 

privately admonished him in 2003 for failing to dismiss an appeal after 

the client decided not to pursue it. However, he distinguished the 

instant case from this prior misconduct, noting that in this case his 

client wanted to pursue the appeal, but was unable to obtain the 

necessary funds to do so.

The commission issued its written findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, and recommended sanction on January 27, 2015. It concluded the 

Board failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate Weiland’s 

conduct violated rules 32:1.3 (requiring diligence), 32:3.2 (requiring 

reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), and 32:3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting 

false statements to a tribunal). Specifically, it concluded Weiland’s 

failure to dismiss the appeal was an attempt to protect the interests of 

his client. Additionally, it credited Weiland’s testimony that he had 

verbally ordered the transcript on March 25. Accordingly, the 

commission concluded that Weiland had not neglected Pierce’s case or 

knowingly made a false statement in the combined certificate. However, 

the commission concluded Weiland’s conduct violated rule 32:8.4(d) 

(prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 

Specifically, it reasoned that Weiland had a duty to dismiss the appeal by 
9

the July 27 deadline once he realized Pierce would not be able to obtain 

funds for the transcript, instead of relying on the clerk to dismiss the 

appeal. The commission credited Weiland for taking responsibility for his 

actions. It also credited Weiland for his commitment to require clients to 

pay him filing and transcript fees in advance to avoid similar problems in 

the future. Finally, the commission credited Weiland for maintaining a 

law practice that allows persons of modest means to obtain access to the 

courts at a modest rate. The commission recommended we publicly 

reprimand Weiland.

II. Standard of Review.

Our review of attorney disciplinary proceedings is de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conroy, 845 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 

2014). The Board must prove attorney misconduct by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence, a burden greater than a preponderance of 

the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 844 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Iowa

2014). We give the commission’s findings and recommendations 

respectful consideration, but we are not bound by them. Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Iowa 2014). 

“Upon proof of misconduct, we may impose a greater or lesser sanction 

than the sanction recommended by the commission.” Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Iowa 2010).

III. Review of Alleged Ethical Violations.

The Board alleged numerous violations of the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct based on Weiland’s conduct in the Pierce appeal. 

Weiland admitted each of the factual allegations in the Board’s 

complaint. “Factual matters admitted by an attorney in an answer are 

deemed established, regardless of the evidence in the record.” Iowa 
10

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 

2013). We turn now to address the individual rule violations alleged by 

the Board.

A. Rule 32:1.3: Reasonable Diligence and Promptness. This 

rule requires a lawyer to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness 

in representing a client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3. We have 

recognized that an attorney violates rule 32:1.3 when he or she neglects 

a client matter.3 See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 

796 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Iowa 2011). Generally, neglect involves “ ‘a 

consistent failure to perform those obligations that a lawyer has 

assumed, or a conscious disregard for the responsibilities a lawyer owes 

to a client.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 

N.W.2d 860, 867 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l 

Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Iowa 2004)). 

“[O]rdinary negligence does not constitute neglect.” Iowa Supreme Ct.

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Taylor, 814 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Iowa 2012). Thus, 

“[a] violation of this rule arises not from inadvertent acts or omissions or 

from missing a single deadline, but from consistently failing to perform 

functions required of an attorney or from repeatedly missing deadlines.” 

Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 64.

We have previously held that “even if a client no longer wants a

matter to be pursued, it is neglect for the attorney to allow the matter to 

languish, without terminating it.” Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 915. We have 

explained:

3“The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct no longer expressly refer to neglect. 

Nevertheless, we have continued to identify and sanction attorney neglect.” Conroy, 

845 N.W.2d at 63 (citation omitted). We do so under rule 32:1.3. See Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Iowa 2012). Thus, neglect 

cases under a prior version of our ethical rules provide “precedent for the interpretation 

and application of rule 32:1.3.” Id.

 
11

Regardless of the client’s interest in the case, the onus is on 

the attorney to comply with the deadlines provided in the 

appellate rules. Unless the court relieves an attorney of his 

or her responsibility to the client on appeal, as an officer of 

the court, the attorney is required to file the appropriate 

documents and briefs. Anything less may be considered 

neglect. . . . [S]imply because a client does not want to 

pursue the case does not relieve the attorney from taking 

steps necessary to end the matter.

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lesyshen, 712 N.W.2d 101, 

105 (Iowa 2006) (citations omitted).

However, when an attorney fails to comply with appellate deadlines 

or dismiss an appeal to protect a client’s interests, we will not find such 

conduct amounts to neglect. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Wright, 758 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Iowa 2008). For example, in Wright, 

after an attorney filed a notice of appeal, he contacted the court reporter 

in the underlying matter to order the transcript. Id. at 228. The court 

reporter informed the attorney that she would not prepare the transcript 

until she received payment. Id. The attorney contacted his client who 

reported that she did not have funds for the transcript, but that she 

would attempt to borrow them. Id. at 228–29. The attorney then filed a 

combined certificate in which he certified that he would pay for the 

transcript in accordance with our appellate rules. Id. at 229. However, 

he failed to serve the combined certificate on the court reporter. Id. As a 

result, the court reporter did not prepare the transcript by the deadline. 

Id. The attorney then also failed to file the required proof brief and 

designation of the contents of the appendix by the deadline. Id. 

Accordingly, the clerk sent the attorney a notice of default informing him 

that if he did not cure the various deficiencies within fifteen days, the 

appeal would be dismissed. Id. The attorney again contacted his client,

who was still unable to obtain funds for the transcript. Id. The attorney 
12

did not cure the default by the deadline, and the clerk dismissed the 

appeal. Id.

We concluded the attorney’s conduct did not amount to neglect. 

Id. at 230. We explained:

[I]t was [the client’s] failure to pay for the transcript, not [the 

attorney]’s actions, that prevented [the client] from 

proceeding with the appeal. Under the facts presented here, 

we find the Board failed to prove [the attorney] neglected [the 

client]’s interests. [This attorney] in fact protected [his 

client]’s interest by commencing and maintaining the appeal 

notwithstanding her failure to pay his fee as she had agreed, 

and by allowing her time . . . to raise the funds to pay for the 

transcript.

Id.

In this case, as in Wright, we do not find Weiland’s conduct 

amounted to neglect in violation of rule 32:1.3. The commission credited 

Weiland’s testimony that his failure to comply with various appellate

deadlines and timely dismiss the appeal was the result of his attempt to 

protect his client’s interests. Specifically, the commission found that 

Pierce wanted to pursue the appeal through June and that Weiland 

wanted to afford Pierce every opportunity to obtain funds for the 

transcript. We give deference to the commission’s credibility 

determination because the commission heard Weiland’s live testimony 

and observed his demeanor. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 659 (Iowa 2013). Thus, the record 

established that Weiland attempted to protect the interests of his client

by commencing and maintaining the appeal, advancing Pierce funds for 

the filing fee, and allowing Pierce time to raise funds for the transcript. 

Under the facts presented here, we find the Board failed to prove Weiland 

violated rule 32:1.3.
13

B. Rule 32:3.2: Expedite Litigation. This rule provides, “A 

lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with 

the interests of the client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:3.2. We require 

lawyers to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation because 

“[d]ilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” 

Id. cmt. [1]. In failure-to-expedite cases, “[t]he question is whether a 

competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action 

as having some substantial purpose other than delay.” Id. An attorney 

violates this rule when he or she fails to “file documents, pursue appeals, 

and meet deadlines.” Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 65. “The Board is only 

required to prove the attorney’s intent if the sole allegation is an attorney 

engaged in particular conduct for the purpose of frustrating the judicial 

process.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d 

466, 484 (Iowa 2014).

The commission concluded that Weiland did not violate rule 

32:3.2. We disagree. The record showed Weiland failed to timely file the 

combined certificate as required by our appellate rules, failed to serve the 

combined certificate on the court reporter as required by our appellate 

rules and as ordered by this court, and ultimately allowed the appeal to 

languish and be administratively dismissed. We have found violations of 

this rule in similar situations. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Kieffer-Garrison, 847 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2014) 

(finding the attorney’s “serial failures to comply with the requirements of 

this court’s procedural rules governing the timely presentation and 

progression of appeals constituted a violation of her obligation to 

demonstrate reasonable efforts to expedite numerous appeals consistent 

with her clients’ interests”); Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 65 (collecting cases 

and finding a rule 32:3.2 violation when the attorney failed to cure 
14

defaults in six appeals); Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 914 (finding a rule 32:3.2 

violation when the attorney failed to follow through with or dismiss 

appeals and disregarded default notices). Although Weiland failed to 

comply with our appellate procedures in an effort to protect Pierce’s

interests, the comments to the rule disclaim such motivation as a 

legitimate interest of a client. See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:3.2 cmt. [1]

(“Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in 

litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.”); accord 2 Geoffrey C. 

Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law of Lawyering § 31.03, at 31-4 to -5 (4th ed.

2015) (recognizing that a client’s interest in delay itself is not “entitled to 

weight in assessing the propriety of a lawyer’s tactics on behalf of the 

client”). Expediting an appeal by meeting deadlines, even when the client 

would benefit from delay, is consistent with the legitimate interest of the 

client and is therefore required by the rule. Here, Weiland elevated the 

client’s interests over his obligations to the court. Weiland violated rule 

32:3.2.4

C. Rule 32:8.4(d): Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration 

of Justice. This rule prohibits an attorney from engaging in “conduct 

that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:8.4(d). “There is no typical form of conduct that prejudices 

the administration of justice.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 580, 587 (Iowa 2011). Acts we have generally 

considered prejudicial to the administration of justice have “hampered 

the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems 

upon which the courts rely.” Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 230 (internal 

4As the Board did not contend Weiland engaged in conduct for the purpose of 

frustrating the judicial process, we need not address whether he acted with such intent. 

See Kieffer-Garrison, 847 N.W.2d at 493 n.2.

 
15

quotation marks omitted). “Examples of conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice include paying an adverse expert witness for 

information regarding an opponent’s case preparation, demanding a 

release in a civil action as a condition of dismissing criminal charges, 

and knowingly making false or reckless charges against a judicial 

officer.” Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 768. Most relevant here, “When an 

attorney’s failure to comply with appellate deadlines results in an 

administrative dismissal, his actions are prejudicial to the administration 

of justice.” Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 914; accord Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d 661, 668 (Iowa 2007) (finding 

an attorney acted in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice 

when he failed to prosecute or move to dismiss an appeal he believed to 

be without merit); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Daggett, 653 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 2002) (finding an attorney acted in a 

manner prejudicial to the administration of justice when he failed to 

comply with appellate deadlines). This is so even when such conduct 

does not amount to neglect. See Taylor, 814 N.W.2d at 267 (“[A]n 

attorney can be in violation of rule 32:8.4(d) when an appeal is 

administratively dismissed even though the attorney did not commit 

neglect in the handling of the appeal.”); Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 230–31 

(finding an attorney’s reliance on the clerk to dismiss an appeal when the 

client could not raise funds for the transcript was prejudicial to the 

administration of justice, despite the fact such conduct did not amount 

to neglect).

The commission concluded Weiland’s failure to dismiss the appeal 

by the June 27 deadline established by this court’s June 17 order 

violated rule 32:8.4(d). We agree. Although Weiland’s conduct did not 

amount to neglect, Weiland was not relieved “ ‘from taking steps to end 
16

the matter.’ ” Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 231 (quoting Lesyshen, 712 N.W.2d 

at 105). On June 17, this court ordered Weiland to “serve court reporter 

McCarville with the combined certificate and pay her required deposit” by 

June 27. The June 17 order further notified Weiland that “failure to pay 

[for] the transcript . . . [would] result in [the] appeal being dismissed.” 

Weiland knew by the June 27 deadline that Pierce would be unable to 

pay for the transcript, yet he took no action to dismiss the appeal. His 

inaction caused the clerk to prepare and file an order three weeks later 

accomplishing the dismissal. “ ‘Our case law makes it clear that an 

attorney cannot use a default notice to dismiss an appeal in lieu of the 

attorney’s obligation to comply with our appellate rules.’ ” Id. at 231 

(quoting Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d at 669). Weiland violated rule 32:8.4(d).

D. Rule 32:3.3(a)(1): Candor Toward the Tribunal. This rule

prohibits a lawyer from “knowingly . . . mak[ing] a false statement of fact 

or law to a tribunal.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:3.3(a)(1). Because the 

lawyer must knowingly make the false statement, the lawyer must have 

“actual knowledge of the fact in question.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 

32:1.0(f) (defining the term “knowingly”). A lawyer can make a false 

statement to the court either orally or in writing. See Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Iowa 2014). 

We found a violation of this rule when a lawyer falsely certified to the 

clerk of this court that she had filed an application for further review.

Kieffer-Garrison, 847 N.W.2d at 494. We have also found violations

when a lawyer filed falsely notarized documents with the 

court, when a lawyer forged a guilty plea for a defendant he 

was representing, and when a lawyer filed a document with 

the court misrepresenting the marital status of a decedent.

McGinness, 844 N.W.2d at 462.
17

The Board alleges Weiland violated this rule by falsely certifying in 

the combined certificate he filed with the clerk that “the Transcript ha[d]

been ordered.” In fact, he had not served McCarville with the combined 

certificate or made the necessary deposit at the time he filed the 

combined certificate. The commission concluded the Board failed to 

show that Weiland possessed the requisite knowledge to have violated 

this rule. Specifically, the commission credited the testimony of both 

Weiland and McCarville, each of whom testified that when Weiland 

contacted McCarville by phone on the morning of March 25, Weiland 

verbally ordered the transcript. Thus, the commission concluded that at 

the time Weiland certified in the combined certificate that he had ordered 

the transcript, he believed that he had done so.

We agree with the commission that the Board failed to present 

sufficient evidence to establish a violation of this rule. Here again, with 

respect to the testimony of both Weiland and McCarville, we defer to the 

commission’s credibility determinations because it heard their live 

testimony and observed their demeanor. See Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 659. 

At the hearing before the commission, McCarville gave conflicting 

testimony as to whether Weiland ordered the transcript during their

phone conversation. However, she ultimately conceded she “considered 

[Weiland to have] ordered the transcript verbally.” Weiland testified he

believed he had ordered the transcript at that time as well. Nothing in 

the email McCarville sent to Weiland is inconsistent with Weiland having 

placed a verbal order. Thus, the record showed that at the time Weiland 

certified in the combined certificate that he had ordered the transcript, 

he reasonably believed he had done so. We find the Board failed to 

establish that Weiland possessed the requisite knowledge to have 

violated rule 32:8.4(d).
18

IV. Consideration of Appropriate Sanction.

Having found the foregoing rule violations, we now consider the 

appropriate sanction. The commission found only a single violation of 

our rules and recommended we publicly reprimand Weiland. We give 

respectful consideration to the commission’s recommendation. Ricklefs, 

844 N.W.2d at 699. However, the issue of appropriate sanction is 

exclusively within this court’s authority. Id.

“There is no standard sanction for a particular type of misconduct, 

and though prior cases can be instructive, we ultimately determine an 

appropriate sanction based on the particular circumstances of each

case.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 774 N.W.2d 

301, 308 (Iowa 2009). As we have previously stated,

In considering an appropriate sanction, this court considers 

all the facts and circumstances, including the nature of the 

violations, the attorney’s fitness to practice law, deterrence, 

the protection of society, the need to uphold public 

confidence in the justice system, and the need to maintain 

the reputation of the bar.

McGinness, 844 N.W.2d at 463. “Where there are multiple violations of 

our disciplinary rules, enhanced sanctions may be imposed.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Alexander, 574 N.W.2d 322, 

327 (Iowa 1998). Further, we “consider mitigating and aggravating 

circumstances, including companion violations, repeated neglect, and 

the attorney’s disciplinary history.” Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 66.

In this case, Weiland failed to comply with appellate deadlines in a 

single matter and failed to dismiss his client’s appeal. Instead, Wieland

allowed the appeal to be administratively dismissed. Sanctions for 

conduct of this nature range from a public reprimand when the 

attorney’s misconduct is relatively isolated, to suspensions of several 

months when the conduct is egregious or accompanied by related 
19

misrepresentations, additional violations, or other aggravating

circumstances. See, e.g., Kieffer-Garrison, 847 N.W.2d at 492, 494, 496 

(finding an attorney’s failure to comply with appellate deadlines in nine 

criminal cases resulting in receipt of twenty default notices warranted a 

six-month suspension when the attorney also persistently 

misrepresented that she had filed an application for further review to her 

client and this court); Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 914, 920, 922–23 (finding 

an attorney’s failure to cure default notices in two appeals resulting in 

administrative dismissals warranted a thirty-day suspension when the 

attorney neglected two additional matters, committed trust-account 

violations, and had a history of failing to comply with court 

requirements); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Knopf, 793 

N.W.2d 525, 531–32 (Iowa 2011) (finding an attorney’s failure to cure a 

default notice in an appeal warranted a three-month suspension when 

the attorney also failed to file state income tax returns for two years in 

violation of ethical rules); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Hoglan, 781 N.W.2d 279, 282–83, 286–87 (Iowa 2010) (finding an 

attorney’s failure to prosecute four appeals resulting in their dismissal 

warranted a thirty-day suspension when each dismissal harmed the 

client and the attorney had previously been publicly reprimanded for 

similar misconduct); Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 231 (finding an attorney’s 

failure to dismiss an appeal after the client was unable to raise funds for 

a transcript warranted a public reprimand); Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d at 

669–70 (finding an attorney’s failure to dismiss an appeal warranted a 

public reprimand). Further, when such deficiencies result in harm to 

clients, increased sanctions are warranted. See, e.g., Dolezal, 796 

N.W.2d at 922 (considering harm to clients in crafting appropriate 
20

sanction); Hoglan, 781 N.W.2d at 286 (same); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Curtis, 749 N.W.2d 694, 704 (Iowa 2008) (same).

We draw guidance from the following attorney discipline cases 

involving similar misconduct. In Dolezal, we suspended an attorney’s 

license for thirty days. 796 N.W.2d at 923. There, the attorney failed to 

cure default notices in two appeals leading to their dismissal. Id. at 914. 

We concluded this conduct violated rules 32:1.3, 32:3.2, and 32:8.4(d). 

Id. at 914–15. In addition to rule violations related to the attorney’s 

failure to cure the default notices, we found the attorney neglected two 

other client matters, in one instance harming the client, and violated 

several of our rules governing an attorney’s management of the trust 

account. Id. at 920. In crafting the appropriate sanction, we emphasized 

that while the attorney’s behavior “inconvenienced the court system, in 

two out of three instances it [did] not harm[] his clients.” Id. at 922. We 

considered as aggravating factors that the Board had recently privately 

admonished the attorney for failing to respond to delinquency notices in 

another matter and that he had failed to comply with continuing legal 

education requirements in the past. Id. at 920.

In Hoglan, we suspended an attorney’s license for thirty days when 

he failed to prosecute four appeals resulting in their dismissal. 781 

N.W.2d at 282–83, 287. We concluded this conduct violated rules 

32:1.3, 32:1.16(a)(2) (requiring withdrawal from representation if a 

physical or mental condition materially impairs a lawyer’s ability to 

represent the client), 32:3.2, 32:8.4(a) (finding it misconduct to violate an 

ethical rule), and 32:8.4(d). Id. at 284. In crafting the proper sanction, 

we emphasized that the attorney neglected multiple client matters, each 

dismissal harmed the client, and the attorney had recently been publicly 

reprimanded for the dismissal of two other appeals due to neglect. Id. at 
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286–87. We considered the attorney’s severe back problems as a 

mitigating factor. Id. at 287.

In Wright, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who failed to 

comply with appellate deadlines in a single client matter and failed to 

dismiss his client’s appeal, instead allowing it to be administratively 

dismissed. 758 N.W.2d at 230–31. We found the attorney’s reliance on a 

default notice to dismiss the appeal after his client could not raise funds 

for the transcript was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Id. at 

231. However, we concluded this same conduct did not amount to 

neglect because the attorney was attempting to protect his client’s

interests by allowing her time to obtain funds for the transcript. Id. at 

230. In crafting the proper sanction, we considered as aggravating 

factors that the lawyer had over twenty-five years of experience in the 

field, had been publicly reprimanded on one prior occasion, and that he 

had been privately admonished on two prior occasions. Id. at 231.

Finally, in Tompkins, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who 

neglected two client matters. 733 N.W.2d at 669–70. In the first matter, 

the attorney neglected the client “by failing to communicate with [him]

and respond to his inquiries.” Id. at 669. In the second matter, the 

attorney allowed the client’s “appeal to be administratively dismissed, 

neglecting his client, and wasting judicial resources.” Id. In crafting the 

proper sanction, we emphasized that little harm ultimately befell either 

client because they were unlikely to succeed on their claims. Id. We 

considered as an aggravating factor that the attorney had been publicly 

reprimanded on two prior occasions. Id. at 670.

We believe this case is distinguishable from Dolezal and Hoglan. In 

those cases there were multiple instances of neglect, additional rule 

violations, and clients suffered harm. See Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 920
22

(finding multiple instances of neglect, trust account violations, and harm 

to a client); Hoglan, 781 N.W.2d at 286 (finding multiple instances of 

neglect and harm to clients). Here, Weiland’s misconduct stems from

one instance in which he failed to meet appellate deadlines resulting in 

the administrative dismissal of an appeal. While we did find this conduct

violated two of our rules of professional conduct, the Board has not 

alleged, and we have not concluded, that Weiland’s conduct resulted in 

any harm to the client. Thus, Wright and Tompkins are closer parallels.

See Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 230 (involving a single client matter and 

finding no harm to the client); Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d at 669 (finding no 

harm to clients). Further, as in Wright, Weiland’s conduct did not 

amount to neglect. See Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 230 (finding a failure to 

dismiss an appeal did not amount to neglect). Accordingly, we find these 

cases most instructive in crafting the proper sanction.

Finally, in crafting the proper punishment we consider aggravating 

and mitigating factors. Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 66. Here, several 

aggravating and mitigating factors warrant our consideration. We begin 

by addressing the aggravating factors. “[T]he prior disciplinary history of 

an attorney is [one] factor we must consider . . . .” Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 

at 589. “In so doing, we consider both prior admonitions and prior 

public discipline.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Baldwin, 

857 N.W.2d 195, 214 (Iowa 2014). “Prior misconduct is more suggestive 

of increased sanctions when it involves the same type of conduct as the 

conduct currently subject to discipline.” Id.

Weiland has been subject to discipline on four prior occasions. 

First, in 2003, the Board privately admonished Weiland for failing to 

respond to default notices in an appeal, ultimately resulting in its 

dismissal. This prior misconduct is an aggravating factor because it is 
23

similar to the misconduct in this case. See id. Also in 2003, we publicly 

reprimanded Weiland for failing to provide competent representation to a 

client in a probate matter. We do not consider this as an aggravating 

factor because of the age of this prior discipline and because it is 

dissimilar to the misconduct in this case. See Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 

920 (declining to consider prior discipline as aggravating factor when 

prior violations “occurred many years ago” and were not “similar to [the 

attorney]’s more recent ethical lapses”). In 2008, we publicly 

reprimanded Weiland for violating several of our ethical rules when he 

overstated mileage expenses for reimbursements from the State Public 

Defender for his representation of indigent defendants in court appointed 

matters. This prior misconduct is an aggravating factor because it 

occurred more recently. See id. Finally, in January 2014, we 

temporarily suspended Weiland’s license to practice law when he failed to 

respond to a Board inquiry in this matter. We reinstated his license 

several days later, after he responded to the inquiry. We do not consider 

this most recent temporary suspension as an aggravating factor because 

we believe the temporary suspension we imposed was sufficient 

discipline for failing to respond to the inquiry. See id. at 921 (concluding 

“temporary suspension was adequate discipline for failing to respond to 

the [B]oard’s inquiry”).

At the hearing, Wieland conceded that his notice-of-default track 

record could be considered as part of our determination of an 

appropriate sanction. We consider his track record to be an aggravating 

factor. We have previously recognized that using the clerk’s office as a 

private tickler system is unacceptable behavior for an attorney. See

Curtis, 749 N.W.2d at 699 (characterizing an attorney’s use of the clerk’s 

office as a private tickler system as “deplorable”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 
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Disciplinary Bd. v. Moonen, 706 N.W.2d 391, 400 (Iowa 2005)

(disapproving an attorney’s use of the clerk’s office as a private tickler 

system). Here, the record established that between 1998 and 2014,

Weiland received forty notices of default for failing to meet various 

deadlines in eighteen appeals. As confirmed by the deputy clerk, this is 

an excessive number of default notices. However, we lessen our 

consideration of this as an aggravating factor to an extent because the 

record also established that Weiland received a large majority of these 

notices of default much earlier in his career. In fact, Weiland received 

thirty-three of the forty notices of default between 1998 and 2007, and 

from 2008 to 2010 Weiland received no notices of default. However, 

since 2011 Weiland’s use of the clerk’s office as a private tickler system 

seems to have reemerged, as evidenced by his receipt of seven notices of 

default in five separate matters between 2011 and 2014. We are 

troubled by this recent trend. Consequently, we consider it as an 

aggravating factor.

We turn now to the mitigating factors. First, the record does not 

suggest that any clients suffered harm in this case. We consider this a 

mitigating factor. See Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 700 (considering lack of 

harm to clients a mitigating factor). Second, Weiland ultimately took 

responsibility for his actions before the commission, admitted that he 

should have dismissed the appeal once he realized Pierce would be

unable able to obtain funds for the transcript, and expressed remorse for 

his failure to do so. This is also a mitigating factor. Id. (considering

attorney’s taking responsibility for his actions as a mitigating factor). 

Third, Weiland testified that in the future he will require clients to 

advance the necessary costs for an appeal prior to proceeding. Further,

he testified that if a client is unable to advance these costs after appeal, 
25

he will withdraw as counsel and dismiss the appeal rather than miss 

deadlines and allow the appeal to be administratively dismissed. This is 

another mitigating factor. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Thomas, 794 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Iowa 2011) (considering an attorney’s 

implementation of new office procedures to ensure compliance with 

deadlines as a mitigating factor). Finally, we note that Weiland 

maintains a law practice that allows persons of modest means to obtain 

access to our court system at a modest rate. “Providing legal 

representation to an underserved part of the community is a significant 

mitigating factor.” Taylor, 814 N.W.2d at 268.

The commission recommended we publicly reprimand Weiland for 

his misconduct. Having considered the particular circumstances in this 

case, and after our de novo review of the record, we agree with the 

commission that a public reprimand is appropriate.

V. Conclusion.

We publicly reprimand Weiland. Costs are taxed to Weiland

pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.27.

ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.

All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who dissents.
26

#15–0156, Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland

WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).

Kenneth Weiland’s prior disciplinary record and his forty prior 

delinquency notices from the clerk of the supreme court require a thirtyday suspension.