*

The Honorable Curtis L. Collier, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation. 

1

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0425P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 03a0425p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

IWAN MANDYCZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 02-1846

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint.

No. 00-40148—Paul V. Gadola, District Judge.

Submitted: September 25, 2003

Decided and Filed: December 4, 2003 

Before: COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; COLLIER,

District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Andrew J. Haliw III, Tracy S. Thomas, Joseph

A. Siciliano, HALIW, SICILIANO & MYCHALOWYCH,

2 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846

Farmington Hills, Michigan, Richard P. Zipser, Southfield,

Michigan, for Appellant. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Michelle

Heyer, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, D.C., for

Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellee, the

United States, moves to dismiss the interlocutory appeal of

Defendant-Appellant, Iwan Mandycz, for lack of jurisdiction.

Because the district court’s denial of Mandycz’s motion for

summary judgment was not a “final order” of the district

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss Mandycz’s

interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

In the underlying complaint, the Government seeks

Mandycz’s denaturalization based on his alleged service at

two Nazi-run labor camps during World War II. In the

district court, Mandycz moved for summary judgment on two

grounds. First, he claimed that laches bars the

denaturalization action because the Government unreasonably

delayed filing its complaint and that the delay prejudiced

Mandycz because his mental capacity diminished in the

intervening period. Second, he claimed that the

denaturalization action should be dismissed because he is

mentally incompetent. Mandycz contends that he suffers

from Alzheimer’s disease and cannot effectively participate

in his own defense. 

Initially, the district court ordered a competency hearing

and requested briefing from both parties on the applicability

of mental competency standards to denaturalization

proceedings. However, after considering the parties’ briefs,

the court ruled that incompetency to stand trial is not a

defense to a denaturalization action. The court, therefore,
No. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 3

cancelled the competency hearing. The district judge also

held that laches is unavailable as a defense against the

Government in a denaturalization proceeding. Accordingly,

the district court denied Mandycz’s motion for summary

judgment. The district court later denied Mandycz’s request

to certify the competency and laches issues in an interlocutory

appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The

instant uncertified interlocutory appeal followed. Although

trial was scheduled to begin on July 16, 2002, the district

court granted Mandycz’s motion for a stay of the trial’s

commencement pending our disposition of the instant appeal.

The Government now moves to dismiss the interlocutory

appeal on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to

consider it because the district court’s denial of Mandycz’s

motion for summary judgment was not a final order.

Mandycz opposes the Government’s motion to dismiss,

contending that the competency and laches issues are

immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order

doctrine set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,

337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).

This Court’s jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions” of

the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, the collateral

order doctrine establishes that a “small class” of interlocutory

appeals are immediately appealable, since they amount to

“final decisions” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. That small class of appealable

collateral orders “includes only decisions that are conclusive,

that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and

that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final

judgment in the underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers

County Com’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (citing Cohen, 337

U.S. at 546). “If the order at issue fails to satisfy any one of

these requirements, it is not appealable under the collateralorder exception.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.

Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988).

4 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846

Even if the district court’s ruling on the mental competency

and laches issues was conclusive and separate from the merits

of the action, Mandycz cannot satisfy the third prong of the

collateral order analysis, which requires that the order be

“effectively unreviewable” on appeal from a final judgment

of the district court. Rights that are effectively unreviewable

on appeal are those that “cannot be effectively vindicated

after the trial has occurred.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.

511, 525 (1985) (“A major characteristic of the denial or

granting of a claim appealable under Cohen’s ‘collateral

order’ doctrine is that ‘unless it can be reviewed before [the

proceedings terminate], it can never be reviewed at all.’”)

(quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1952) (opinion of

Jackson, J.)). Orders implicating claims of immunity – or

claims tantamount to immunity – are the most common

examples of collateral orders because immunity is “an

entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of

litigation.” Id. at 526 (district court’s denial of a claim of

absolute immunity is an order appealable before final

judgment). Pursuant to similar reasoning, the Supreme Court

has also held immediately appealable orders denying a motion

to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds, Abney

v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), and orders denying a

motion to dismiss an indictment based on immunity rooted in

the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States

Constitution, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979). 

Other effectively unreviewable orders are those that result

in a loss of liberty that cannot be corrected on appeal. For

instance, the Supreme Court has held that an order denying a

motion to reduce bail is reviewable as a collateral order

because if the appeal was not allowed, no remedy exists down

the line for the resulting loss of liberty. Stack v. Boyle, 342

U.S. 1 (1951). In addition, it is well-established that orders

of commitment for psychiatric examination are immediately

appealable. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286

(6th Cir. 1996). In Davis, the Sixth Circuit explained:
No. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 5

1

Denaturalization proceedings are technically considered suits in

equity, not criminal actions. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490,

516 (1981). However, because at present, mental incompetency is only

recognized as a defense to trial in criminal proceedings, our analysis is

necessarily based on the corpus of law encompassing mental

incompetency in the context of criminal cases. In civil cases, the

competency of a defendant is not irrelevant, of course. Incompetent and

infant civil defendants are entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad

litem. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). However, a civil defendant’s mental

incompetence does not trigger an abatement of trial as it does in the

criminal context. The district court has never made a finding concerning

Mandycz’s competence, but it has appointed him a guardian ad litem. In

his interlocutory appeal, however, Mandycz claims that the mental

[L]oss of liberty occasioned by the commitment for

examination, and the forced intrusion of a court-ordered

psychiatric examination, are completely unreviewable by

the time of final judgment. Appellate review after final

judgment would be available only if the defendant is

found guilty, and even then, no effective relief could be

provided for her loss of liberty during the period of

commitment. 

93 F.3d at 1289 (citing United States v. Weissberger, 951

F.2d 392, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The competency and

laches issues decided by the district court in Mandycz’s case

fail the Cohen analysis and do not fall into the small class of

orders that courts have found immediately appealable. First,

both issues are fully reviewable on appeal after a decision on

the merits. Second, neither the competency nor the laches

issue is tantamount to immunity nor entails an uncorrectable

loss of liberty along the lines of psychiatric commitment or

the denial of bail.

Although Mandycz argues that his incompetency claim – if

accepted by the court as equivalent to that of a criminal

defendant’s incompetency claim – is tantamount to immunity,

a finding that a criminal defendant is incompetent merely

postpones the proceedings until such time that the defendant

is competent to stand trial.1 Unlike the protection afforded by

6 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846

incompetency standards and protections applicable in criminal cases

should also apply to denaturalization proceedings. 

absolute immunity or the Double Jeopardy Clause, the

incompetency of a criminal defendant does not implicate an

absolute right not to be tried. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525.

Accordingly, courts that have addressed this issue have

consistently ruled that competency determinations – unlike

commitment orders – are not appealable as collateral orders

because they are fully reviewable following the final

judgment of the district court. See United States v. Mattison,

904 F.2d 709, 1990 WL 75252, at *1 (6th Cir. June 6, 1990);

see also United States v. Caraza, 483 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir.

1988); United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 (2d

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036 (1987); United States

v. Bendicks, 439 F.2d 1120, 1121 (5th Cir. 1971) (per

curiam). We therefore find that the district court’s ruling

concerning a defendant’s competency in denaturalization

proceedings is not appealable as a collateral order. 

Although the Sixth Circuit has not considered the laches

defense in the context of Cohen, it routinely reviews laches

claims after decisions on the merits, indicating that these

decisions are effectively reviewable on appeal. See, e.g.,

Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc.,

270 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2001); City of Wyandotte v. Consol.

Rail Corp., 262 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2001). Other courts have

explicitly refused to consider laches claims on an

interlocutory basis. See, e.g., Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway,

286 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002). In addition, it is wellsettled in this circuit that an order denying a motion to

dismiss on statute of limitations grounds is not immediately

appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. United

States v. Pi, 174 F.3d 745, 750-51 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing

United States v. Davis, 873 F.2d 900, 908-09 (6th Cir.), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 923 (1989)); see also United States v. Weiss,

7 F.3d 1088, 1089-91 (2d Cir. 1993). This Court explained

that “[u]nlike the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
No. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 7

Clause,” a statute of limitations defense “does not . . .

encompass a ‘right not to be tried’ which must be upheld

prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all.” Davis, 873 F.2d at

909 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 861

(1978)). Because laches is an equitable defense similar to a

statute of limitations, we find the same reasoning applicable.

Therefore, we hold that an order denying a motion to dismiss

or a motion for summary judgment on laches grounds is not

immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order

doctrine. 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks jurisdiction to

consider Mandycz’s interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the

appeal is DISMISSED.