J-A26044-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

WOODHOUSE HUNTING CLUB, INC., A 

PENNSYLVANIA NON-PROFIT 

CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM HOYT, MARK HOYT, EDWARD 

HOYT, THEODORE R. HOYT, AND 

GEORGE S. HOYT, T/D/B/A THE FIRM OF 

HOYT BROTHERS AND THEIR UNKNOWN 

HEIRS, SUCCESSORS, AND ASSIGNS, 

DEFENDANTS

HOYT ROYALTY, LLC, TRUSTEES OF THE 

MARGARET E. HAIGHT TRUST; KAROL 

TAMOWSKI; THOMAS PEDDER 

BISPHAN; SYDNEY WYNNE 

WOODWARD; GERTRUDE WEBER; JOHN 

WEDEL; MATT WEDEL; JAY WEDEL; 

CAROLINE HOKE WEBER; HELEN HOYT 

WEBER; VIRGINIA FOOTE HAGGERTY; 

NATHAN CLARK SWEET; JOHN WEBER 

SWEET; AND ALL OTHER UNKNOWN 

HEIRS, SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS OF 

WILLIAM HOYT, MARK HOYT, EDWARD 

C. HOYT, THEODORE R. HOYT, AND 

GEORGE S. HOYT, INDIVIDUALLY, 

JOINTLY, AND/OR TRADING AS HOYT 

BROTHERS, COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFFS

 v.

WOODHOUSE HUNTING CLUB A/K/A 

WOODHOUSE HUNTING CLUB, INC. AND 

CAMP WOODHOUSE HUNTING CLUB; 

SWN PRODUCTION COMPANY, LLC; AND 

CABOT OIL & GAS CORPORATION, F/K/A 

No. 327 MDA 2017
J-A26044-17

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CABOT OIL & GAS CORPORATION OF 

DELAWARE AND CABOT OIL & GAS 

CORPORATION OF WEST VIRGINIA, AND 

WOODHOUSE HOLDING COMPANY, 

COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANTS

APPEAL OF: HOYT ROYALTY, LLC

Appeal from the Order Entered February 7, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County

Civil Division at No(s): 0302-CV-2008

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and RANSOM, J.

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 02, 2018

Appellant, Hoyt Royalty, LLC, appeals from the trial court’s order of 

February 1, 2017, granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, 

Woodhouse Hunting Club (“Woodhouse”). After careful review, we affirm.

We adopt the following statement of facts from three trial court opinions 

issued in this matter, which are in turn supported by the record. See Trial 

Court Opinion (TCO), 1/8/14, at 7-19; TCO, 2/7/17, at 1-5; TCO, 6/12/17, at

1-2. This is an action to quiet title, involving the subsurface oil and gas rights 

to a tract of land consisting of nine hundred thirty-seven acres located in

Morris Township, Tioga County, Pennsylvania, for which Warrant No. 1179 was 

issued in April 1792 (“the Property”).

In 1891, William Hoyt, Mark Hoyt, Edward C. Hoyt, Theodore R. Hoyt, 

and George S. Hoyt (“the Hoyts”) acquired title to the Property. In 1893, the 

Hoyts conveyed the Property to Union Tanning Company. The deed reserved 

ownership of the gas, oil, and mineral rights, and created a subsurface estate
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in favor of the Hoyts, their heirs, and assigns. The Hoyts did not notify the 

Tioga County commissioner of the severance or their ownership in the 

subsurface estate.

Between 1893 and 1902, the Property was assessed as unseated land.1 

On August 30, 1902, the Property was sold at tax sale due to the nonpayment 

of taxes on both the surface and subsurface estates. The sale was recorded 

in the Treasurer’s Sale Book of Unseated Lands by the Treasurer of Tioga 

County to Morris Manufacturing Company. On November 17, 1902, after the 

tax sale but prior to the recording of the tax sale deed, Union Tanning

Company executed a second deed to the surface rights of the Property in favor 

of Morris Manufacturing Company,2 and purportedly reserved mineral and oil 

rights in favor of the Hoyts and their heirs and assigns. The tax sale deed was 

not recorded until January 1903. 

____________________________________________

1

In short, “seated land” is land that has been 1) developed with residential 

structures, 2) had personal property upon it that could be levied upon for 

taxes, and 3) was producing regular profit through cultivation, lumbering, or 

mining; “unseated land” is “wild” and underdeveloped,” or any other land that 

does not fit the definition of “seated” land. See Herder Spring Hunting 

Club v. Keller, 143 A.3d 358, 363-64, 380 n.2 (Pa. 2016). Taxes are imposed 

on the land itself, in the name of the person to whom the original warrant was

issued. Id. at 364.

2 Although Morris Manufacturing Company was listed in the tax records as 

being the owner of the Property between 1901 and 1902, the deed itself was 

not executed until 1902, and not recorded until 1903.
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In 1932, the Property was again sold at tax sale. C.C. Slaght Lumber 

Company (“C.C. Slaght”), the record owner at the time, was allowed to 

redeem the Property in 1935, despite the expiration of the two-year 

redemption period. In May 1952, Woodhouse received title from C.C. Slaght. 

In 1953, Morris Township separately identified a mineral estate associated 

with Warrant 1179. In 1967, the Property was again sold at tax sale, but the 

rights eventually reverted to Woodhouse. Following several assignments

through which Woodhouse reserved the subsurface rights, Woodhouse is the 

current record owner of the Property.3

In 2011, Woodhouse commenced an action to quiet title against 

Appellant, Hoyt Royalty, a Colorado-based LLC formed to acquire, own, 

possess and manage all rights, title, and interests in the subsurface mineral 

rights originally owned by the Hoyt brothers. Appellant claimed to possess an 

83.9% interest in the subsurface rights to the Property. Litigation 

commenced, and Appellant joined additional defendants and filed a 

counterclaim.

In June 2013, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment against 

Woodhouse, arguing that the 1893 deed to Union Tanning Company severed 

the natural gas, oil, and mineral rights from the 629.178-acre parcel of 

disputed land. In response, Woodhouse argued that the tax sale of 1902 

____________________________________________

3 The trial court has meticulously and thoroughly documented the various 

sales, assignments, and locations the deeds are recorded, as well as the 

language of the deeds, dating back to 1792. We will not reproduce it in its 

entirety here.
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extinguished the chain of title upon which Appellant relied, essentially 

effectuating a “title wash.” In its response, Woodhouse proceeded solely on 

the “title wash” theory and abandoned several other claims to quiet title raised 

in the Complaint. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the claims 

abandoned by Woodhouse, but denied the remaining issues raised by 

Appellant.

In November 2014, Woodhouse filed a motion for summary judgment, 

and Appellant filed a countermotion. All parties agreed to stay the action 

pending the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Herder Spring 

Hunting Club v. Keller, 143 A.3d 358 (Pa. 2016), which implicated similar 

concerns. Following the Herder Spring decision, the parties filed 

supplemental briefs, and the court issued its decision. The trial court quieted 

title in favor of Woodhouse as to the entire Property and enjoined Appellant 

and its successors from asserting a contrary record title.

Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court issued a 

responsive opinion. 

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether summarily quieting title for those whose title to the oil 

and gas rests solely from earlier tax sales, rather than Appellant 

and its related parties, whose title flows directly from a duly 

recorded 1893 deed severance, is erroneous when, as the party 

with the burden of proof, the tax title claimants did not proffer the 

delivered treasurer’s deeds or other admissible evidence sufficient 

under the Statute of Frauds and prior case law to prove a legally 

superior title?
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2. Whether the trial court erred in ruling the 1932 unseated land 

tax sale divested Appellant’s 1893 recorded subsurface title when 

the summary judgment record contained undisputed evidence 

that a duly documented redemption occurred, rendering the sale 

a nullity?

3. Whether the trial court erred in ruling the 1902 and 1932 

unseated land tax sales divested Appellant’s 1893 recorded 

subsurface title when a strict construction of the tax statutes 

reveals the term “lands” means only the surface estate and when 

the summary judgment record reveals Morris Township identified 

no severed subsurface estate until 1953, thereby confirming only 

the severed surface estate was assessed and intended to be sold 

at the 1902 and 1932 tax sales or, alternatively, creating a 

genuine material, factual issue precluding summary judgment?

4. Whether summarily quieting title for those whose title to the oil 

and gas rests solely from earlier tax sales, rather than Appellant 

and its related party, whose title flows from a duly recorded 1893 

deed severance, is erroneous when the summary judgment record 

includes: (a) disputed evidence of “potential infirmities” and 

“other sale related defects” concerning the 1902 and 1932 tax 

sales, (b) a duly recorded admissible 1902 deed within the tax 

claimant’s chain of title which, being executed and recorded after 

the 1902 tax sale, does not mention it or any purportedly 

delivered treasurer’s deed but instead expressly acknowledges the 

recorded 1893 deed severance, and (c) an inadmissible 1909 deed 

which does not involve the property?

5. Whether Pennsylvania’s unseated land tax [statutes] under 

which the 1902 and 1932 tax sales were made and quiet title has 

been summarily entered violate federal and state due process as 

applied to Appellant and its related parties, as the known owners 

of recorded, nonproducing oil, gas, and other subsurface interests, 

who received no personal notice of such sales, including the 1902 

tax sale which took place on a Saturday, August 30, 1902, in 

contravention of the statutes’ requirement that all sales occur on 

the second Monday in June?

6. Whether the trial court erred in ruling Appellant is time-barred 

from defending its record title to the oil, gas, and other subsurface 

interests in a quiet title action the tax title claimants did not 
J-A26044-17

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commence until 2008 based on 1902 and 1932 tax sales for which 

no treasurer’s deeds exists?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-7 (suggested answers omitted).

An action to quiet title is designed to resolve a dispute over the title to 

real estate of which the plaintiff is in possession. See Moore v. Duran, 687 

A.2d 822, 827 (Pa. Super. 1996). The plaintiff bringing a quiet title action has 

the burden of proof and must recover on the strength of its own title. See 

Herder Spring, 143 A.3d at 372. With regard to motions for summary 

judgment, 

the standards which govern summary judgment are well settled. 

When a party seeks summary judgment, a court shall enter 

judgment whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact 

as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense that 

could be established by additional discovery. A motion for 

summary judgment is based on an evidentiary record that entitles 

the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law. In considering 

the merits of a motion for summary judgment, a court views the 

record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all 

doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must 

be resolved against the moving party. Finally, the court may grant 

summary judgment only when the right to such a judgment is 

clear and free from doubt. An appellate court may reverse the 

granting of a motion for summary judgment if there has been an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion . . . .

Swords v. Harleysville Ins. Companies, 883 A.2d 562, 566–67 (Pa. 2005) 

(citations omitted). To the extent this Court must resolve a question of law, 

we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the context of the entire 

record. Truax v. Roulhac, 126 A.3d 991, 996 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

As noted above, recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided 

Herder Spring, and as this decision disposes of Appellant’s issues, we will 
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discuss the Court’s holdings briefly. Herder Spring involved unseated land 

sold at tax sale where the assessment did not specify whether it involved 

surface or subsurface rights. Herder Spring, 143 A.3d at 360. The Court 

held unequivocally that where neither the owner nor the purchaser reported 

the transfer of the subsurface rights, the county would assess and tax the 

warrant in its entirety. Id. At a tax sale, the entirety of the property is 

conveyed, despite prior severance, if both estates have not been paid. Id. at 

360-365. “Courts interpreting Pennsylvania law have a long history of 

accepting the concept of a tax sale reuniting severed estates of unseated 

property and perfecting previously defective titles.” Id. at 368. 

Where the owner did not challenge the assessment and the tax sale 

within the initial two-year redemption period, a challenge to the propriety of 

the tax sale may not be heard, and if the land is not redeemed within that 

period, then both surface and subsurface rights are extinguished. Id. at 374-

75 (citing Act of 1815, § 4, as set forth at 72 P.S. § 6091). The Court held 

that there was no estoppel by deed where the language of the deed stated it 

was subject to “all exceptions and reservations as are contained within the 

chain of title,” and where title was extinguished by a prior tax sale. Herder 

Spring, 143 A.3d at 378. Finally, the Court held that notice by publication 

for tax sales of unseated lands was “reasonable given the difficulties of 

ascertaining ownership information relating to unseated owners,” the 

protection afforded by the two-year redemption period, and that such notice 
J-A26044-17

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did not deprive a property owner of due process. Id. With those principals 

in mind, we now turn to Appellants’ issues on appeal. 

First, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in quieting title in favor 

of Woodhouse, because the Woodhouse parties did not meet their burden of 

proving a superior tax title to the Property’s subsurface rights. See

Appellant’s Brief at 32. Appellant argues that because no delivered or 

recorded copies of the treasurer’s deeds for the 1902 and 1932 tax sales were 

submitted as part of the record, the trial court’s holding violates the Statute 

of Frauds and disregards Pennsylvania case law. Id. at 32-33.

It is well-settled that the plaintiff bringing a quiet title action has the 

burden of proof and must recover on the strength of its own title. See Herder 

Spring, 143 A.3d at 372. In tax sales, a tax title claimant does not acquire 

superior title until he first obtains a treasurer’s deed. See Gault’s Appeal, 

33 Pa. 94, 99 (Pa. 1859); see also City of Scranton v. O’Malley 

Manufacturing Co., 19 A.2d 269, 271 (Pa. 1941). When unseated land is 

sold, the treasurer must acknowledge the deed in open court. See Osmer v. 

Sheasley, 68 A. 965, 389-90 (Pa. 1908); see also Goodman v. Sanger, 91 

Pa. 71 (Pa. 1879). 

At the time of the 1902 tax sale, our Supreme Court noted that there 

was no legislation requiring the purchaser to record the deed or make an 

official record of his purchase, other than the acknowledgment of the deed by 

the treasurer in open court. Osmer, 68 A. at 390. Further, at the time, tax 

deeds were properly admitted into evidence where the prothonotary’s minutes 
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showed that the county treasurer had acknowledged the deeds in open court 

and the record of the treasurer’s deed showed that the plaintiff’s deed was 

amongst them. See Central Pennsylvania Lumber Co. v. Bristol, 95 A. 

383, 383-84 (Pa. 1915).

Further, in its examination of the relevant law, the trial court cited Bell 

v. Provance, 430 A.2d 391, 392-93 (Pa. Commw. 1981),4 where the 

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that, “[t]he existence of a 

Treasurer’s Deed establishes prima facie lawful title in the grantee by a 

rebuttable presumption of the regularity of the acts of public officials . . .” 

Even where the deed cannot be produced, where the record contains “reliable 

indicia” that a sale occurred comporting with the terms of the Act, this was 

sufficient evidence. Id. at 393.

The Statute of Frauds provides that “a purported transfer of an 

ownership interest in real property is not enforceable unless evidenced in 

writing and signed by the party granting the interest.” Zuk v. Zuk, 55 A.3d 

102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

However, “the Statute of Frauds relating to interests in land is a declaration 

of public policy and can be waived if it is not raised in the pleadings of a case.” 

Birdsboro Mun. Auth. v. Reading Co. & Wilmington & N. R.R., 758 A.2d 

____________________________________________

4 Although a decision of the Commonwealth Court is not binding upon this 

Court, it can be considered as persuasive authority.” Nw. Sav. Bank v. 

Knapp, 149 A.3d 95, 98 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
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222, 226 (Pa. Super. 2000). Appellant, due to its failure to raise the issue of 

the Statute of Frauds in its pleadings, has waived the issue. Id. at 226 (noting 

that the defense should be raised, at least, in any pretrial pleading); see also 

Pa.R.C.P. 1017 (pleadings allowed).5

Regardless, this issue is meritless. We find persuasive the 

Commonwealth Court’s decision in Bell, essentially stating that so long as the 

record contains reliable indicia that the sale occurred comporting with the 

terms of the Act, that evidence is sufficient to find a deed issues. See Bell, 

430 A.2d at 392-93. Although Appellant argues that no further evidence of 

the deed was introduced, citing in support Grakelow v. Nash, 98 Pa. Super. 

316 (1930),

6

the trial court noted that the following evidence regarding the 

1902-03 deed was introduced:

In the present case, Woodhouse Club has produced the minutes 

of the Tioga County Court recorded in the Prothonotary’s Office 

that show the acknowledgement in open court of the treasurer’s 

deed conveying the property to Morris Manufacturing Company. 

Woodhouse Club has further provided the records from the 

Treasurer’s Register Book under August 30, 1902, reflecting the 

tax sale of the property in Warrant 1179 to Morris Manufacturing 

Company. Furthermore, in Morris Manufacturing Company’s deed 

____________________________________________

5 While Appellant’s new matter avers that no admissible evidence exists 

regarding the 1902 treasurer’s deed, Appellant does not mention the statute 

of frauds, nor does it aver the statute as a defense. See Answer and New 

Matter, at ¶¶ 105-106. Instead, Appellant asserts that the claims are barred 

“by the parole evidence rule.” See Answer and New Matter, at ¶ 165.

6

In Grakelow, our Court noted that it was the title claimant’s evidentiary 

burden to put in evidence the deed and the record of the court showing that 

his acknowledgment of the deed was taken in open court. Grakelow, 98 Pa.

Super. at 324; but see Bell, 430 A.2d at 392-93. 
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to Spicer and Vandegrift in 1909, Morris Manufacturing references 

the tax sale of 1902 as the source of its title corroborating the 

records of the Toga Treasurer.

See TCO, 1/8/14, at 34-35. Thus, Appellee established prima facie evidence 

of the entry of the 1902 deed, and the court did not err in so finding, and in 

entering summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. See Osmer, 68 A. at 390; 

see Central Pennsylvania Lumber Co., 95 A.3d at 383-84; see also 

Swords, 883 A.2d at 566–67.

Second, Appellant claims that quiet title based on the 1932 tax sale is 

erroneous because a redemption occurred, rendering the sale a nullity. See

Appellant’s Brief at 42. Appellant argues that the redemption gave no new 

title to C.C. Slaght: rather, it wiped out the tax sale in its entirety. Id. at 46. 

Further, Appellant argues that the time period for redemption was five years 

rather than two years, as the land was sold to county commissioners. Id. at 

44. Essentially, Appellant contends that because C.C. Slaght held a title less 

than fee simple, redemption only served to “revive” the title as it was, i.e., 

with Appellant’s reservation. Id. at 43.

Initially, we note that Appellant’s challenge to the 1932 tax sale is of 

limited persuasiveness because as discussed supra, there was evidence of the 

delivery of the 1902 deed. Further, the trial court properly determined that 

the 1902 tax sale effectuated a title wash of the land and divested Appellant 

of its interests. See TCO, 1/8/14, at 24-35. Logically, even if a redemption

occurred, it could not restore an interest that did not exist. Nevertheless, 
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insofar as Appellant challenges the quality of Woodhouse’s title, we will 

address it herein.

At the time of the 1932 sale, the effect of a redemption was to set aside 

that tax sale and restore title as though the sale had not been made. Yocum 

v. Zahner, 29 A. 778, 779 (Pa. 1894). When the statutory time limit is 

exceeded and the landowner does not redeem the land, the title of the county 

following a tax sale is absolute and unqualified. See Lee v. Jeddo Coal Co., 

84 Pa. 74, 79 (1877). Contrary to Appellant’s argument, at the time of the 

tax sale, the redemption period had been amended to two years. See

Babcock Lumber Co. v. Faust, 39 A.2d 298, 302 (Pa. Super. 1944) (noting 

that the Act of May 9, 1889 acted to amend the redemption period for 

unseated lands to two years); see also Act of July 8, 1885, P.L. 268, 72 P.S. 

§ 6111 et seq., as amended by the Act of May 9, 1889, P.L. 141, § 1, 72 P.S. 

§ 6113. 

Based on this precedent, C.C. Slaght had until June 13, 1934 to redeem 

the property. They did not. Accordingly, absolute title vested in the county

and divested any subsurface interests that may have remained following the 

1902 tax sale, and summary judgment was properly entered.

7

 See Babcock 

Lumber Co., 39 A.2d at 302; Swords, 883 A.2d at 566–6.

____________________________________________

7 Although the record indicates that the property was permissively redeemed 

outside of the time period for redemption, the fact remains that absolute title 

vested in the county following the expiration of the time period for redemption. 

See, e.g., Goodman v. Sanger, 85 Pa. 37, 41 (Pa. 1877). 
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Third, Appellant argues that summary judgment was improper, as a 

strict construction of the unseated land tax statutes does not authorize a title 

wash of a recorded non-producing, severed subsurface estate. See

Appellant’s Brief at 46-47. Additionally, Appellant argues that the subsurface 

estate is not “lands” per the meaning of the statute because there was no 

evidence that a mineral estate was assessed until 1953. Id. at 46. Appellant 

argues that even though this issue was decided by Herder Spring, the 

Herder Spring Court erred by not utilizing a strict construction approach and 

instead relying upon prior case law. Id. at 46-47.

The reservation in the 1893 deed included all minerals and mineral 

rights, oil and gas “in, on or under any of said premises, with the right to 

mine, bore for, and remove the same.” See Deed, April 22, 1893, at 1. As 

we noted before, Herder Spring controls. Herder Spring, 143 A.3d at 360. 

In that case, where the assessment of the land does not specify whether it 

involved surface or subsurface rights, the tax sale conveys the property in its 

entirety. Id. The instant case also involves the sale of unseated land where 

the assessment did not specify whether it involved surface or subsurface 

rights. As in Herder Spring, the tax sale conveyed the property in its 

entirety. 

Nevertheless, Appellant employs a tortured argument to contend that 

the subsurface estate was a non-land, fugacious interest in oil and gas, not 

an interest in the “lands.” See Appellant’s Brief at 49-50. We reject this 

contention. The tax sale of unseated lands also validly extinguishes 
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subsurface oil and gas rights, as the owner has the duty to notify the taxing 

authority of their separate interest in oil and gas, regardless of the

development of that interest. See Cornwall Mt. Invs., L.P. v. Thomas E. 

Proctor Heirs Trust, 158 A.3d 148, 156-57 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

Accordingly, summary judgment was proper, as the tax sale conveyed 

the oil and gas rights in their entirety. See Swords, 883 A.2d at 566–67;

Herder Spring, 143 A.3d at 360; Cornwall Mt. Invs., L.P., 158 A.3d at 

156-57.

In its fourth and fifth issues, Appellant contends that summary 

judgment for a tax sale claimant is erroneous where there exists disputed 

evidence of notice infirmities and other sale-related defects and avers its due 

process rights were violated. See Appellant’s Brief at 53, 58. Appellant 

acknowledges that Herder Spring reiterated that collateral attacks on a tax 

sale may not be raised after the redemption period has passed. Id. at 53054, 

58. However, Appellant argues that in the instant case, there were no 

delivered treasurer’s deeds for the tax sales, and thus, the Hoyts and their 

heirs were not provided with actual notice. See Appellant’s Brief at 53-54, 

58.

Herder Spring noted that procedural defects could not be raised and 

the sale could not be collaterally attacked. Herder Spring, 143 A.3d at 374. 

Further, the Herder Spring Court found that the notice requirements under 

the Act of 1815 did not violate due process. Id. at 378. Regardless of 

Appellant’s arguments regarding the validity of the deeds and notice of the 
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tax sale, the trial court properly entered summary judgment based on this 

precedent. Id. at 374, 378; see also Swords, 883 A.2d at 566–67.

Sixth, Appellant claims that the court erred in finding Appellant was 

time-barred from defending its 1893 title based on jurisdictional defects to 

Appellee’s claims. See Appellant’s Brief at 66. However, as we have noted, 

this issue is again controlled by Herder Spring, which stated clearly that 

petitioners may not raise tax sale defects as a defense to a quiet title action 

outside of the redemption period. See Herder Spring, 143 A.3d at 374; 

Cornwall Mt. Invs., L.P., 158 A.3d at 160. Accordingly, the court did not 

err in granting summary judgment. Swords, 883 A.2d at 566–67.

Judgment affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date:2/2/18